Media and Conflict in the Social Media Era in China [1 ed.] 9789811576348, 9789811576355

Table of contents :
Preface
Acknowledgments
Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
Chapter 1: Introduction: Media and Conflict Studies in the Social Media Age
1.1 Mediatization of Conflict
1.2 Actor-Network Theory (ANT)
1.3 Proposing a New Analytical Model
1.4 Significance and Research Questions
1.5 Research Methods
1.6 The Chapters
References
Chapter 2: China’s Social Media Platforms: Weibo
2.1 China’s Social Media Ecology
2.2 Weibo’s Origin and Transformation
2.3 Weibo’s Technical Features and Usability
2.4 Weibo’s User and Comment Culture
2.5 Weibo’s Censorship Practices
2.6 Weibo’s Political and Social Impacts
2.7 News, Mainstream Media and Weibo
2.8 Conclusion
References
Chapter 3: Sino-Indian Border Crisis in 2017
3.1 A Brief Historic Overview of Sino-Indian Border Crisis
3.2 Analysis of Global Times Posts
3.3 Analysis of Web Users’ Comments and Replies
3.4 Analysis of Macro-Structural Factors
3.5 Conclusion
References
Chapter 4: Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute in 2017–2018
4.1 A Brief Historic Overview of Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute
4.2 Analysis of Global Times Posts
4.3 Analysis of Web Users’ Comments and Replies
4.4 Analysis of Macro-Structural Factors
4.5 Conclusion
References
Chapter 5: South China Sea Dispute in 2018
5.1 A Brief Historic Overview of SCS Disputes
5.2 Analysis of Global Times Posts
5.3 Analysis of Web Users’ Comments and Replies
5.4 Analysis of Macro-Structural Factors
5.5 Conclusion
References
Chapter 6: North Korea Nuclear Crisis in 2018
6.1 A Brief Historic Overview of North Korea Nuclear Crisis
6.2 Analysis of Global Times Posts
6.3 Analysis of Web Users’ Comments and Replies
6.4 Analysis of Macro-Structural Factors
6.5 Conclusion
References
Chapter 7: Conclusion
7.1 Theoretical Contributions: Refining the New Model
7.2 Empirical Contributions: Four Major Conclusions
7.3 Limitations and Direction for Future Research
References
Index

Citation preview

Media and Conflict in the Social Media Era in China Shixin Ivy Zhang

Media and Conflict in the Social Media Era in China

Shixin Ivy Zhang

Media and Conflict in the Social Media Era in China

Shixin Ivy Zhang School of International Communications University of Nottingham Ningbo China Ningbo, China

ISBN 978-981-15-7634-8    ISBN 978-981-15-7635-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7635-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-­01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Preface

This research monograph explores the changing relationship between media and conflict in the social media age through the lens of China. Inspired by the concepts of mediatisation of conflict and actor-network theory, this book centres on four main actors in the wars and conflicts: social media platform, the mainstream news organizations, online users and social media content. These four human and non-human actors associate, interact and negotiate with each other in the social media network surrounding specific issues. Specifically, this book examines and analyses the professional media’s news coverage and users’ comments on social media platform Weibo in China, and discuss how the professional media and other actors interact with each other and use social media for their own ends. The central argument is that social media is playing an enabling role in contemporary wars and conflicts with limitations and constraints. Both professional media outlets and web users employ the functionalities of social media platforms to set, counter-set or expand the public agenda. Social media platform embodies a web of technological and human complexities with different actors, factors, interests, and power relations. These four actors and the macro social-political context are influential in the mediatisation of conflict in the social media era. Ningbo, China

Shixin Ivy Zhang

v

Acknowledgments

Thanks go to student interns at University of Nottingham Ningbo China who helped with data collection and preliminary coding for this book project. They are: Chen Chen, Cheng Cheng, Gui Haoyang, Jiarui Guo, Meishu Ai, Kexin Yu and Te Rong. I also express appreciation for funding and support from Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Nottingham Ningbo China. Some content in Chaps. 1, 2 and 3 was published in Zhang, S. I. (2019) Mediatization of Conflict in the Social Media Era – A Case Study of SinoIndian Border Crisis in 2017, Journalism. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 1464884919870329.

vii

Contents

1 Introduction: Media and Conflict Studies in the Social Media Age  1 2 China’s Social Media Platforms: Weibo 21 3 Sino-Indian Border Crisis in 2017 41 4 Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute in 2017–2018 63 5 South China Sea Dispute in 2018 89 6 North Korea Nuclear Crisis in 2018113 7 Conclusion137 Index155

ix

List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Fig. 3.1 Fig. 4.1 Fig. 5.1 Fig. 6.1 Fig. 7.1

Media and conflict actor-network in the social media era. (Source: the author) The trend of forwards (shares), comments and likes of GT’s Weibo posts during the Sino-Indian border crisis in 2017. (Data source: Sina Weibo) The trend of forwards (shares), comments and likes of GT’s Weibo posts during the Diaoyu/Senkaky Isands in 2017–8 (N=60). (Data source: Sina Weibo) The trend of forwards (shares), comments and likes of GT’s Weibo posts during the South China Sea dispute in 2018. (Data source: Sina Weibo) The trend of forwards (shares), comments and likes of GT’s Weibo posts during the North Korea nuclear crisis in 2018. (Data source: Sina Weibo) Contextualized social media and conflict actor–networks. (Source: the author)

8 50 75 99 122 139

xi

List of Tables

Table 1.1 Table 2.1 Table 3.1 Table 3.2 Table 3.3 Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 5.1 Table 5.2 Table 5.3 Table 6.1 Table 6.2

Summary of data collection 15 Major social media platforms in China 2019 24 Distribution of frames in GT posts on Weibo pertaining to the Sino-Indian border crisis in 2017 (N = 71)49 Five GT posts that have the largest number of shares, comments and likes 51 Online users’ usage of languages and emoji on Weibo 56 Distribution of frames in GT posts on Weibo pertaining to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute in 2017 and 2018 (N=60)74 Four GT posts that have the largest number of shares, comments and likes pertaining to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in 2017–8 76 Online users’ usage of languages and emoji on Weibo pertaining to Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in 2017–8 80 Distribution of frames in GT posts on Weibo pertaining to the SCS disputes in 2018. (N=98)98 Four GT posts that have the largest number of shares, comments and likes pertaining to the South China Sea in 2018 100 Online users’ usage of languages and emoji on Weibo pertaining to South China Sea in 2018 103 Distribution of frames in GT posts on Weibo pertaining to the North Korea nuclear crisis in 2018 (N=51)121 Three GT posts that have the largest number of shares, comments and likes pertaining to the North Korea nuclear crisis in 2018 122 xiii

xiv 

List of Tables

Table 6.3 Table 7.1 Table 7.2 Table 7.3

Online users’ usage of languages and emoji on Weibo pertaining to North Korea nuclear crisis in 2018 Web users’ response to professional media’s coverage of conflicts/crisis on social media in China Weibo’s censorship in different conflicts Different levels of impact of external actors/factors on the media-­conflict actor-network

126 146 149 150

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Media and Conflict Studies in the Social Media Age

The Asia-Pacific faces a security dilemma due to crises in this region that have escalated and intensified such as Sino-Indian border crisis, South China Sea disputes, North Korea nuclear crisis and the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands disputes (Sun, 2015). Today the media have become integral to the planning and conduct of war and conflicts (Horten, 2011). This research monograph explores the changing relationship between media and conflict in the social media age through the lens of China. Inspired by the concepts of Arrested War in mediatisation of conflict and actor-­ network theory, this book centres on four main actors in the wars and conflicts: social media platform, the mainstream news organizations, online users and social media content. These four human and non-human actors associate, interact and negotiate with each other in the social media network surrounding specific issues. This book examines and analyses the professional media’s news coverage and users’ comments on social media platform Weibo in China, and discuss how the professional media and other actors interact with each other and use social media for their own ends. The central argument is that social media is playing an enabling role in contemporary wars and conflicts with limitations and constraints. Both professional media outlets and web users employ the functionalities of social media platforms to set, counter-set or expand the public agenda. Social media platform embodies a web of technological and human complexities with different actors, factors, interests, and power relations. These four actors and the macro © The Author(s) 2020 S. I. Zhang, Media and Conflict in the Social Media Era in China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7635-5_1

1

2 

S. I. ZHANG

social-political context are influential in the mediatisation of conflict in the social media era. This introductory chapter is organized as follows: it starts with reviewing academic literatures and debates surrounding mediatization of conflict and social media to situate the current research in the context. It then proposes and theorizes a new analytical framework on the basis of Arrested War propositions and the actor-network theory (ANT) to study the media and conflict in the social media era. What follows are the significance of the research and research questions. After giving a methodological note on the use of mixed research methods, it ends with an outline of chapters in the book.

1.1   Mediatization of Conflict Mediatization is about changes. It studies the roles of contemporary media and denotes the process of transformations driven by the communication technologies. Lundby (2014: 3) pointed out: “Mediatization” has become a much-used concept to characterize changes in practices, cultures, and institutions in media-saturated societies, thus denoting transformations of these societies themselves. Admittedly, mediatization is an awkward term, but one that has gained terrain in academic discourse through the second decade of the third millennium. It is a matter of communication – how changes occur when communication patterns are transformed due to new communication tools and technologies, or in short: the “media”.

The concept of mediatization has been debated for long. Some scholars argued that mediatization describes a historical, ongoing and dynamic metaprocess, related to but distinct from globalization, that features the increased central role and influence of media in social life (e.g. Lundby, 2014; Hjarvard, 2013). Others pointed out that the metaprocess view is so broad that ‘the concept of “medatization” itself may not be suitable to contain the heterogeneity of the transformations in question’ (Couldry, 2008). Mediatization is ‘bordering on hyperbole and marked by enormous theoretical heterogeneity’ (Adolf, 2011: 167). To move forward the debate on mediatizaiton, Waisbord (2013) called scholars to move beyond the media dominance paradigm to assess drivers and consequences, to understand better the factors that bind, steer, and shape mediatization.

1  INTRODUCTION: MEDIA AND CONFLICT STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL MEDIA… 

3

The process of mediatization should be understood as a multidimensional concept that takes place on different levels of analysis (Strömbäck, 2008, 2011; Falasca, 2014). There are different approaches to study the various facets, dimensions and dynamics of mediatization. For instance, mediatization can be analysed on micro (individual actors), meso (organizations and institutions), or macro (culture and society) levels. But most importantly, research on contemporary mediatization must be able to handle change and networked communication with digital media (Lundby, 2014: 21–22). Though mediatizaiton is a vague and contested term, there have been growing researches and literatures that adopt the concept of mediatization of conflicts/wars in recent years. In his book Mediatized Conflict, Simon Cottle (2006: 8–9) used the phrase ‘mediatized conflict’ to ‘emphasize the complex ways in which media are often implicated within conflicts while disseminating ideas and images about them’. He argued that the media are capable of enacting and performing conflicts as well as reporting and representing them. The media-conflict relationship goes beyond the ‘reflection’ and ‘representation’ but focuses on ‘media doing’ or ‘media performativity’. McQuail (2006), in a review article, pointed out that the historical conditions for war have changed. War is not primarily a struggle between armed and willing nation-states, but a series of conflicts in relation to global economic and strategic interests, between the haves and have-nots, or resources such as oil, minerals or other forms of property. Such new situation ‘does require a much higher degree of control of the information environment and, indirectly via this, the consent of relatively passive publics.’ (ibid) In the new mediatized environment, the media performance is often inadequate: media reportage of war is typically thin on explanation, extremely selective, oversimplified, biased for or against one or other party, emphasizing spectacle and action, and so on (McQuail, 2006). Meanwhile, Morse (2017) argued that the study of mediatized war needs to extend beyond questions of control over information transmission and the military-media-audience power dynamics, and to include the moral orientation and ethical solicitation for spectators to reflect upon their responsibility to the suffering of distant others during wartime. Other scholars studied media-conflict relationship from different perspectives. Maltby (2012) examined British army’s media management strategies and argued that the military are increasingly ‘mediatized’. The military has integrated media in their operations and interacted with different actors based on the media and media logic. The military’s attempts

4 

S. I. ZHANG

to harness the power of media influence may be transforming the media-­ polity-­military relationship. Horten (2011) compared the American and German coverage of the Vietnam and Iraq wars, and argued that the mediatization of war has significantly accelerated over the past fifty years and has established the media as the “fourth branch” of military operations beyond the army, air force, and navy. Meanwhile he emphasized the national particularities during the mediatization process as he wrote, ‘the developments are neither uniform nor unidirectional, depending on the cultural and historical circumstances’ (Horten, 2011). Kaempf (2013) argued that the rise of new media technology has led to a heteropolar global media environment in which the media-war relationship has been altered. Non-state actors and individuals contest the state-policed narratives and coverage of war whereas traditional media platforms converge with digital new media platforms. In a word, ‘digital new media has introduced a wide range of voices into the mediatisation of war’ (Kaempf, 2013). The most relevant work to this study is Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2015)’s ‘Arrested war: the third phase of mediatization’. In this article, the two scholars took ‘mediatization’ as the process by which warfare is increasingly embedded in and penetrated by media. The process of mediatization is uneven as different actors employ different media for their own ends. They divided the process into three phases: Broadcast War, Diffused War and Arrested War. While the first phase Broadcast War features the stability and certainty with discrete and mono-directional media (the Big Media) that elites use in their planning, waging and representing war, the second phase Diffused War refers to the Web 2.0 and new digital media ecology with connected, multi-directional media and chaotic dynamics. In the third phase, Arrested War is ‘characterized by the appropriation and control of previously chaotic dynamics by mainstream media and, at a slower pace, government and military policy-makers’ (Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2015). In other words, as Siapera, Hunt, and Lynn (2015) explained, Arrested War points to the ways in which the mainstream media remediate social media contents, ‘arresting’ or capturing certain events or issues or images and more or less ignoring the remaining. Mainstream media emerge as sources of order and intelligibility in the current chaotic and fluid media system. Following Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2015)’s notion of Diffused War, Siapera et  al. (2015) examined Twitter and the case of Palestine. With respect to a transition from diffused to Arrested War, they found synergies between mainstream media, Internet platforms and user contents, but on

1  INTRODUCTION: MEDIA AND CONFLICT STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL MEDIA… 

5

Twitter, there was no dominance of a single-user category. They argued that Diffused War does not necessarily lead to a collapse of communication hierarchies, but may create new or modify existing ones. There are various actors on the media platform and the media platform itself is an actor. Previous researches have demonstrated the increasing and transforming role of digital media in contemporary wars and conflicts. However mediatized conflicts as a research field is still at an early stage, awaiting theoretical and conceptual development (Mortensen, Eskjaer, & Hjarvard, 2015). Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2015) also admit that the concepts and theory that are used to explain relations and interdependencies in the period of Arrested War remain uncertain. Hence, a conceptual and analytical model that delineate different actors (levels of analysis) as well as their relations is needed to unpack the complexities of mediatization of conflict. The model shall be feasible to be implemented and operationalized in the empirical research.

1.2   Actor-Network Theory (ANT) While studying the mediatized conflict, Mortensen et  al. (2015) called scholars to look towards field theory, systems theory, actor-network theory, and institutional theory to grasp how institutional logics of media play out during conflicts as well as how they are applied in diverse conflict arenas. ANT is fit for researching the mediatized conflict in the social media era. ANT is a pragmatic sociotechnical process in which actors—both human and nonhuman—seek to build and maintain networks (Law, 1999; Heeks & Stanforth, 2015). These actors shall be understood within a network wherein their identity is defined through their interaction with other actors (Cressman, 2009). It can be used as both a theory and a method. Association, translation and generalized symmetry are central elements to the process. First, association. Latour (2005) called us to ‘follow the actors themselves’ and to identify the ties, attachments or associations among actors. The social should be thought of as “a trail of associations between heterogeneous elements.” As Primo and Zago (2015) notes, ANT seeks to assess the dynamics of heterogeneous associations while they occur. An actor-network is what is made to act by a large star-shaped web of mediators flowing in and out of it. It is made to exist by its many ties: attachments

6 

S. I. ZHANG

are first, actors are second. When we speak of actor we should always add the large network of attachments making it act. (Latour, 2005)

The second important notion in ANT is translation (or transformation). Translation ‘involves creating convergences and homologies by relating things that were previously different’ (Callon, 1980: 211). In Law (1999)’s words, actors are network effects. In a network, elements retain their spatial integrity by virtue of their position in a set of links or relations. Translation is the process or the work of making two things that are not the same, equivalent. But this term translation tells us nothing at all about how it is that links are made. …Or, to put it differently, there was no assumption that an assemblage of relations would occupy a homogeneous, conformable and singularly tellable space. (Law, 1999)

Translation emphasizes a more interpretive approach that looks at how ideas and modes of behaviour are sociotechnical nature (Cressman, 2009). Spyridou et al. (2013) also noted, ANT claims that the relations among actors are simultaneously material (between things) and semiotic (between concepts). Together these form a single network. Network actors, as well as the relations that bind them, are translated. The third principle in ANT is generalized symmetry between the human and the nonhuman actors (actants). In labs, research centres and field tests, texts, technologies and humans all play equally important roles in the construction of actor-networks. This particular aspect of ANT is called generalized symmetry (Callon, 1986; Cressman, 2009). Similarly, Law (1992) states, agents, texts, devices, architectures are all generated in, form part of, and are essential to, the networks of the social. All should be analyzed in the same terms. ANT offers a set of conceptual tools for analyzing the socio-technical actors and their implications (Anderson & Kreiss, 2013). It can be applied in the journalism studies. Journalism takes place in increasingly networked settings (networked journalism) involving a wide range of actors and actants. Such an ‘ambient’ and ‘liquid’ conception of journalism requires a toolkit that takes the field as a dynamic set of practices and expectations (Deuze & Witsche, 2018). In response, Turner (2005) argued that ANT offers a powerful tool for analyzing shifts in journalism under new technological conditions. From a traditional point of view, new media simply offer new channels for the distribution of information. However, from the

1  INTRODUCTION: MEDIA AND CONFLICT STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL MEDIA… 

7

point of view of ANT, new media and their human partners collaborate in the creation of new socio-technical formations. Digital media do not just offer professionals a new voice but the ability to build new linkages of institutions, individuals and machines (Turner, 2005). In journalism studies, ANT has been applied in the study of newsroom innovations, foreign correspondents, and data journalism. For instance, combining diffusion of innovations theory and ANT, Micó, Masip, and Domingo (2013) studied innovation processes in journalism and found that journalists’ evaluation of the relative advantage of convergence depends on their position in the network. Spyridou et al. (2013) employed ANT to investigate how different actors negotiate and shape the way in which digital technologies become embedded in the newsroom. While previous literatures mainly used ANT in studying technological innovations, Anderson and Maeyer (2015) pushed back against this dominant perspective and call for a theoretical approach to address historical change, power, and symbolic practices. Archetti (2014) applied ANT in the study of foreign correspondents’ practices and the role of locations. She found that local practices (identities, newsgathering routines and story outputs) are relationally constructed through the interactions of social actors, technologies and material infrastructures. In the context of Big Data, Hammond (2017) argued that human subjectivity tends to be downgraded. However ‘datafication’ is not driving changes in the profession, rather, the impact of Big Data is shaped by the broader contemporary post-humanist political context. Morlandstø and Mathisen (2017) adopted ANT to investigate commentary journalism online and to explore the interaction amongst editorial staff, new technologies, professional norms and the participation of audiences. They found that digital technology becomes a powerful actor in the network of public media and contributes to the empowerment of audiences. The limitations of ANT-based studies lie in its being ‘descriptive rather than foundational in explanatory terms’ (Law, 2007: 2); ‘being apolitical’ through flattening social structures into networks of associations between actors (Plesner, 2009; Domingo, 2015); ‘relative neglect of time’ (Couldry, 2008); neglect of social context and power structures (Williams & Edge, 1996); and time-consuming process of data recollection and analysis (Micó et al., 2013). In response, Heeks and Stanforth (2015) called on researchers to combine ANT with other theoretical bases in order to generate greater explanatory power. Hence, the author proposes a new analytical model to study the media-conflict relations in the social media era

8 

S. I. ZHANG

on the basis of combining ANT with Arrested War concept, as well as a pilot study of 2017 Sino-Indian border crisis on Weibo. More details about the pilot study can be found in Research Methods section below and Chap. 3.

1.3   Proposing a New Analytical Model Contemporary wars and conflicts are mediated via social media platforms. Combining ANT with the Arrested War phase of mediatization of conflict, the author proposes a new analytical model named Media and Conflict Actor-Network in the Social Media Era (Fig. 1.1) to study the linkages and interactions of four main actors—(a) social media platform (non-human actant); (b) social media content or texts-based discourses (non-human actant); (c) the news organization (human actor); and (d) the web users (human actor). The significance of studying these four actors as well as their linkages and interactions are discussed and theorized below. Figure 1.1 delineates the dynamics and interactions of four actors within the news network. First, the social media platform. ANT foregrounds the importance of technology. For ANT, ‘the social’ is technical as ‘the technical’ is social (Couldry, 2008). In journalism, technological artifacts are traditionally not considered as an actor and they have been Social Media (the Platform)

Network effect: more users and posts add values to the social media platform

Mainstream News Organizations (the Institution)

‘Extended the public and circulated content’

‘Strengthens the articulation of an issue-specific public’ Text Videos Images Photos Hyperlinks Emoji ...

Set public agenda, influence public opinion Counter-set, expand public agenda

Network effect: more users and comments add values tothe social media platform

Web Users (the Public) Peer-to-peer interaction

Fig. 1.1  Media and conflict actor-network in the social media era. (Source: the author)

1  INTRODUCTION: MEDIA AND CONFLICT STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL MEDIA… 

9

treated as intermediaries or carriers only. But looking through the lens of ANT, technology can act as actors and mediators, transforming the news process (Primo & Zago, 2015). Today the digital and social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and Weibo are everywhere. Digitalization is changing journalistic practices, cultures and institutions. The new ‘news ecosystem’, ‘news landscape’, ‘ambient’ and ‘networked’ journalism have emerged because of practices predominantly related to social media (Steensen & Ahva, 2015). This study will take Weibo, the social media platform in China, as non-human actor and trace its origin, development, features and user cultures. Second, in the middle of the diagram are social media content including texts, videos, images, hyperlinks, emoji, etc. The assemblage of these elements is a nonhuman actor in the network. As Law (1992) claims, agents, texts, devices, architectures are all generated in, form part of, and are essential to, the networks of the social. Using the network approach, analysis of the actors’ discourses will reveal the actions, interactions, negotiations and power relations among various actors. Third, the mainstream news organizations. In journalism, actors come in three flavors: sources, journalists and audience members. All are human. Though the members of any one group might at times be members of the others, they are treated as analytically distinct (Turner, 2005). Through the ANT lens, news organizations and professional journalists need to act as hubs rather than destinations, engage in conversations and increase their reliability (Spyridou et al., 2013). As stated above, mainstream news organizations have appropriated social media and remediated social media content during the Arrested War phase. Thus the mainstream news organization as an institution will be treated as a distinct human actor and its posted messages on the social media platform will be examined. Fourth, web users (the public). A news piece, after being published, can (re)circulate by being commented on and distributed by readers in social network sites (Primo & Zago, 2015). In the news network, an important and diverse set of actants is the web users—‘the people formerly known as the audience’ (Rosen, 2006; Domingo, Masip, & Meijer, 2015). Digital technology creates new public spheres where the audience can interact, intervene and participate. Audiences are empowered to impact on the editorial agenda through likes and shares (Morlandstø & Mathisen, 2017). As spatial metaphors such as networks, fields, or spheres indicate, the lines between professional and citizen, and between one organization and

10 

S. I. ZHANG

another have blurred (Reese, 2016). In this study, online users’ comments on the news articles as well as peer-to-peer conversations will be examined. As Fig.  1.1 demonstrates, all these four actors are closely associated, linked and interactive. Social media content (texts, videos, hyperlinks, emoji) are part of the platform’s comment culture. Social media platform, with its technical features, functionalities and user cultures, have afforded news outlets and web users (individuals) an extraordinary networking power. It has extended the professional news media’s reach and facilitated public participation in debate on conflicts and crisis. For news outlet, the platform provides a virtual public venue thus ‘extended the public and circulated content’ (Poell, Kloet, & Zeng, 2014). For web users, the platform’s comment culture ‘strengthens the articulation of an issue-specific public’ (Poell et al., 2014). In a reversed direction, both news organizations and web users post news, views, comments and interact with each other on the social media platform, consequently lead to network effect. Network effect refers to ‘the more users who can communicate with one another on a network, the more valuable the network is’ (Hayes, 2005). The value of social networking sites greatly increase with the number of users. Law (1999) claims, ‘Yes, actors are network effects. They take the attributes of the entities which they include. They are, of course, precarious.’ As for the inter-relation of media outlets and online users, the mainstream media have appropriated social media to cover the conflict/crisis, set the public agenda and influence public opinion. News outlets have incorporated social media in its news production. They post news updates and views regularly and lead public debate with their ideological stances. On the other side, online users have created new frames, counter-set and expanded the public agenda. Professional media outlets initiate and set the tone of the debate. Meanwhile, the web users use variety of languages and emoji/emoticons to freely express their views, opinions, attitudes and emotions. In comparison to the mainstream media, the themes and scope of the peer-to-peer dialogues are much wider, personalized, opinionated and diversified. In the new social media-enabled public sphere, the heterogeneous publics interact and participate in the debate. They also impact on the editorial agenda through likes and shares (Morlandstø & Mathisen, 2017). Moreover, the network approach shall integrate the social context and macro-structural factors into the analysis (Micó et al., 2013). For instance, nationalism is an important macro factor in studying contemporary wars,

1  INTRODUCTION: MEDIA AND CONFLICT STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL MEDIA… 

11

crisis and conflicts. As Montiel et al. (2014) argued, during international conflicts, domestic media can churn out news accounts that are not only morally ascendant but also entitle their homeland to clash with the other country (Montiel et al., 2014). In China’s particular social and cultural context, nationalism is one of the key enduring driving forces which have shaped Chinese foreign policy as China increasingly integrates itself into the globalized and interdependent world, the so-called ‘positive nationalism’ (Chen, 2005). The Internet brings profound changes to the power relations between state and popular players. It creates a space for ordinary Chinese to take active roles in shaping Chinese nationalism by circulating their own nationalist narratives, interpretation and voices (Ma, 2018). This project will provide empirical evidence to demonstrate that both professional news media and the online publics in China produce, disseminate and mobilize popular nationalism via social media platforms. This new model has limitations. Since this study focuses on news network, Fig. 1.1 only delineates four main actors and their linkages. It is a simplified version of a complex web for analysis purposes. As a flexible and elastic model, other influential actors such as the government, the military, business institutions, think tanks, computers, mobile phones as well as other intertwined networks can be added to this diagram. For example, the social media platform itself can be an actor-network involving social media company, software, hardware, programmers, engineers, etc. The news organization is also a network per se that connects journalists, editors, managers, sources, audience, government, etc. And web users form their own network. As Primo and Zago (2015) explained: ‘ANT makes no distinction between the individual and the whole. A network is defined by its actors as well as an actor is defined by its network. “Hence the term, actor-network—an actor is also, always, a network” (Law, 1992: 384). What follows is that each actant, human or non-human, is a network within other networks.’

1.4   Significance and Research Questions This book project is significant because it shall be the first to give systematic analysis on the media and conflict relationship in the social media age from China’s perspectives. Using the network approach to trace the technological and human actors will unveil associations, translations and symmetries of different actors in the digital public sphere.

12 

S. I. ZHANG

As stated above, there have been growing researches and literatures that adopt the concept of mediatization of conflicts/wars in recent years. However research on mediatized conflicts is still at an early stage, awaiting theoretical and conceptual development (Mortensen et  al., 2015). This research will make theoretical contributions by proposing, theorizing, applying and refining the new analytical model ‘Media and conflict actor-­ network in the social media era’. In addition, most researches in media and conflict are confined to the western democracies. Studies of mediatised conflict in the digital age shall be de-Westernized. McQuail (2006) claimed that ‘Western “communication science” does not offer any clear framework for collecting and interpreting observations and information about contemporary war situations’ and ‘largely neglected were the colonial wars of post-Second World War and the many bitter conflicts that did not directly impinge on western interests or responsibilities’. His statement still stands today. The existing researches on media and conflict are mostly confined to the western democracies. With the US’ global pre-­ eminence ebbing away, concerns have increasingly centred on China’s ability to move from economic power to political leverage in global geopolitics (Brevini & Murdock, 2013). It is important to study mediatized conflicts in non-Western countries. This research will provide empirical evidence on the basis of case studies in China. Four research questions are raised: RQ1. How do the professional media outlets cover the conflict/crisis on social media in China? RQ2. How do the web users respond to the professional media’s coverage on social media? RQ3: How do different actors in the news network negotiate and interact with each other? RQ4: What are the macro-structural factors in the conflict and how do they impact the actor-network performance?

1.5   Research Methods This book employs comparative case study and content study. The newly proposed analytical model (Fig. 1.1) will be applied in four cases including the Sino-Indian border crisis, the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands dispute, the South China Sea dispute and the North Korea nuclear crisis in 2017/2018. Both quantitative content analysis and qualitative textual analysis will be

1  INTRODUCTION: MEDIA AND CONFLICT STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL MEDIA… 

13

conducted on the basis of Global Times’ (GT) news posts and users’ comments on Weibo, China’s leading microblogging site. As a commercialized nationalist tabloid affiliated to China’s flagship Party paper People’s Daily, Global Times (GT) has a circulation of over two million copies and its Weibo account has more than 23 million followers by October 2019. Its Weibo account is an ideal venue to trace how a state-owned mainstream media outlet cover the conflict/crisis and interact with web users in China. The study undergoes two stages. First, a pilot study on the Sino-Indian border crisis in 2017 was conducted in the summer of 2018. This case was selected for pilot study because on the one hand, it renders up-to-date empirical data about the crisis/conflict for social media analysis; and on the other hand, the short time period of this particular crisis makes the pilot project manageable. It was a recent case appropriate to try out the new analytical model. This 2017 border crisis refers to the Sino-Indian standoff in the Doklam region of the Himalayas where the borders of China, India and Bhutan converge. It started in mid-June when China attempted to build a road in an area it believed to be under its sovereign control, provoking Indian authorities to block the construction by crossing the Sino-Indian border with troops and bulldozers (Zhang, 2017). On 28 August, India withdrew all its personnel and equipment back to its side of the Sino-Indian border after a 10-week intrusion into China’s Donglang area (China Daily, 29 August 2017). Quantitative content analysis and qualitative textual analysis are conducted to examine the patterns of GT postings and users’ comments on Weibo. The unit of analysis is each post/comment. The sampling time period was set for two months from 26 June to 28 August 2017. Four undergraduate student interns formed two teams. In each team, two students collected data for 15  days separately, and then the two students swapped their work and moderated each other’s work. Guidelines were provided to all interns beforehand. They accessed Weibo and collected posts and users’ comments from GT ’s Weibo account using the key words 中印 (China-India). Students collected data and conducted preliminary coding based on the following categories: For posts: date/time, topic, content, news/views, news source, theme, format (texts/video/photo/hyperlink), number of forwards (shares), number of comments, number of likes For comments: date/time, post topic, users’ comments/replies, use of languages, use of emoji/emoticons

14 

S. I. ZHANG

As a result, a total of 71 GT posts and 1409 users’ comments were collected. Then five posts with the highest number of likes and shares as well as their corresponding users’ comments were selected for textual analysis with an aim of identifying key themes, frames, and use of languages/emojis. Frame analysis was conducted to identity frames in the professional media’s posts and web users’ comments using inductive approach. Framing refers to the way news reports emphasize some aspects of an issue and make them salient to promote certain interpretations or public perceptions of events (Entman, 1993, 2004). As a dynamic process, framing involves frame-building and frame-setting (de Vreese, 2005). Inductive approach in frame analysis means frames emerge from the material during the course of analysis. It refrains from analyzing news stories with a prior defined news frames in mind (de Vreese, 2005). This research uses inductive approach to identity and generate news and public frames. Findings of the pilot study are presented and discussed in Chap. 3. In the second stage, the same approaches are adopted in the other three cases from October to December 2019. A new set of four undergraduate students formed two teams. In each team, two students collected data on Weibo for the specified sampling time period and then the two students swap their code book and moderate each other’s work. Team A collected posts and comments on Diaoyu islands disputes using key words ‘Diaoyu Island’ (钓鱼岛) for the time period from 1 January to 31 December 2017, and from 1 January to 31 December 2018. Team B collected posts and comments on South China Sea disputes using the key words ‘South China Sea’ (南海), and those on North Korea nuclear crisis using key words ‘Korea Nuclear’ (朝鲜核) for the time period from 1 Jan to 31 Dec 2018. Guidelines, templates and examples were provided to students beforehand. Coding categories and analytical methods (frame analysis) are the same as stated in the pilot study. Findings are presented and discussed in details in Chaps. 4, 5 and 6 individually. Data collection is summarized in Table 1.1 below:

1.6   The Chapters This book consists of seven chapters. Chapter 1 reviews academic literatures and debates surrounding mediatization of conflict and social media to situate the current research in context. Even though many scholarly researches on media and conflict are existent, mediatized conflicts as a research field still requires theoretical and conceptual development. In

1  INTRODUCTION: MEDIA AND CONFLICT STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL MEDIA… 

15

Table 1.1  Summary of data collection Stage

Cases

Sampling time period

Stage I

The Sino-Indian border crisis in 2017 Diaoyu islands dispute South China Sea dispute North Korea nuclear crisis

26 Jun. to 28 Aug. 2017 1 Jan 2017 to 31 Dec 2018 1 Jan to 31 Dec 2018 1 Jan to 31 Dec 2018

Stage II

Number of GT posts collected

Number of comments collected

71

1409

60

965

98

970

51

597

Data source: Sina Weibo

addition, in the globalisation and digitalization era, more researches shall be conducted to de-center the Western accounts and to shed light on the social media and conflict relationship. Based on the literature review, the author proposes and theorizes a new analytical framework on the basis of Arrested War propositions and the actor-network theory. It also gives a methodological note on the use of mixed research methods including case study, content and textual analysis. Chapter 2 focuses upon China’s social media platforms—Weibo. This chapter discusses China’s social media ecology drawing on the review of academic literatures. It examines Weibo’s origin, transformation, technical features and usability, users and comment culture, and self-censorship practices. It argues that all these features of Weibo are essential in the way different actors mediate, interact, associate and negotiate with each other on the platform. Chapter 3 studies Sino-Indian border crisis in 2017. This chapter reveals that the traditional division of news/views and in-house/external news sources are not so important on the social media platform. The professional media’s use of foreign policy and conflict frames as well as the use of multimedia format are most important at time of crisis to attract the attention of and engage with the web users. Online users generated new frames such as criticizing China’s domestic policy and societal issues. The scope of the peer-to-peer dialogues are much wider, personalized, opinionated and diversified. GT mainly plays the role of initiating, informing, enforcing and reviving the online debate. Online users use different forms

16 

S. I. ZHANG

of languages and emoji/emoticons to express their opinions, attitudes, emotions and sentiments towards the Sino-Indian border crisis and beyond. Chapter 4 focuses on Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands dispute in 2017 and 2018. It finds that security/military and policy are two strong frames in the media agenda. GT ’s engagement with users in this case is unstable with frequent ups and downs. Posts about Japan’s actions and comments that are unfavourable to China tend to draw online users’ shares and comments, whereas the posts that include anti-Japan or pro-China stance are likely to attract ‘likes’ from users. The majority of users support and conform to official discourse whereas Chinese nationalists view Japan with distrust, disdain and hatred. The four contextual factors—history, foreign policy, security (military) and nationalism—intertwine with each other, influence and determine the social media content as well as the actions and interactions of different actors within the social media network. Chapter 5 discusses South China Sea disputes in 2018. The case analysis reveals that GT has used the security/military, diplomacy and analysis as strong frames, which coincides with the militarization, multilateralism and complexity of the SCS.  The online domestic public opinion is that many users have demonstrated national pride and support of China’s assertive postures in the SCS. Meanwhile there are moderate criticisms of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and China’s military propaganda. Six contextual factors including history, legality, security/military, diplomacy/policy, economics and nationalism are all important that influence the online public opinion. Of these six factors, security (military), diplomacy (foreign policy) and nationalism seem to be more important than the other three in this case. In addition, it finds that China’s diplomacy (foreign policy) on the China-US power struggle in the SCS is the most sensitive topic that has been highly controlled and strictly censored on Weibo. Chapter 6 addresses the complex and tricky North Korea nuclear crisis. The case analysis reveals that Chinese media outlets attached greatest importance to the role of US and the US-North Korea relations. While the GT ’s media discourses are official and rigid citing political elites or giving commentaries, online users’ discourses are short, personal, straightforward, critical, sarcastic and abusive. Users have used sarcasm and parody to frame the image of Trump as a ‘three-year-baby’ and a ‘jerk’ who cannot be trusted, and the US as a trouble maker and hegemon that does not seek world peace at all. Netizens have shown some sympathy towards North Korea and South Korea but they gloat over the situation of Japan on the nuclear issue. As for contextual factors, security/military,

1  INTRODUCTION: MEDIA AND CONFLICT STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL MEDIA… 

17

diplomacy and economy weigh more than history and nationalism. China seems to have played down the historical relations with North Korea and try to avoid being hijacked by the domestic public opinion on its foreign policy. Chapter 7 is conclusion. This chapter summarizes the empirical findings from previous chapters and answer the questions of how the professional media outlets frame the conflict/crisis on social media and how different actors in relation to crisis negotiate, act and interact via social media in China. It further discusses and refines the new theoretical and analytical model to study social media and conflict using the actor-network approach on the basis of four case studies in China. Finally it gives concluding remarks, illustrates the limitations and points out directions of future research.

References Adolf, M. (2011). Clarifying mediatization: Sorting through a current debate Empedocles. European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication, 3, 153–175. Anderson, C. W., & Kreis, D. (2013). Black Boxes as Capacities for and Constraints on Action: Electoral Politics, Journalism, and Devices of Representation. Qualitative Sociology, 36, 365–382. Anderson, C. W., & Maeyer, J. D. (2015). Objects of journalism and the news. Journalism, 16(1), 3–9. Archetti, C. (2014). Journalism and the city. Journalism Studies, 15(5), 586–595. Brevini, B., & Murdock, G. (2013). Follow the money: Wikileaks and the political economy of disclosure. In B. Brevini, A. Hintz, & P. McCurdy (Eds.), Beyond WikiLeaks: Implications for the future of communications, journalism and society (pp. 35–55). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Callon, M. (1980). Struggles and negotiations to define what is problematic and what is not: The socio-logics of translation. In K. Knorr, R. Krohn, & R. Whitley (Eds.), The social process of scientific investigation (pp.  197–219). Dordrecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel Publishing Co. Callon, M. (1986). Some elements of a sociology of translation: Domestication of the scallops and the fishermen of St Brieuc Bay. In J. Law (Ed.), Power, action and belief: A new sociology of knowledge? (pp. 196–223). London: Routledge. Chen, Z. (2005). Nationalism, internationalism and Chinese foreign policy. Journal of Contemporary China, 14(42), 35–53. Cottle, S. (2006). Mediatized conflict. Maidenhead, UK: Open University Press. Couldry, N. (2008). Actor network theory and media: Do they connect and on what terms? In A.  Hepp et  al. (Eds.), Connectivity, networks and flows: Conceptualizing contemporary communications (pp.  93–108). Mahwah, NJ: Hampton Press.

18 

S. I. ZHANG

Cressman, D. (2009). A brief overview of actor-network theory: Punctualization, heterogeneous engineering & translation. Available at faculty.georgetown.edu/ irvinem/theory/Cressman-ABriefOverviewofANT.pdf de Vreese, C. H. (2005). News framing: Theory and typology. Information Design Journal + Document Design, 13(1), 51–61. Deuze, M., & Witschge, T. (2018). Beyond journalism: Theorizing the transformation of journalism. Journalism, (19(2), 165–181. Domingo, D. (2015). Research that empowers responsibility: Reconciling human agency with materiality. Journalism, 16(1), 69–73. Domingo, D., Masip, P., & Meijer, I. C. (2015). Tracing digital news networks. Digital Journalism, 3(1), 53–67. Entman, R.  M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. Journal of Communication, 43, 51–58. Entman, R. M. (2004). Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Falasca, K. (2014). Political news journalism: Mediatization across three news reporting contexts. European Journal of Communication, 29(5), 583–597. Hammond, P. (2017). From computer-assisted to data-driven: Journalism and big data. Journalism, 18(4), 408–424. Hayes, F. (2005, August 29). Network Effect. Computerworld. Available at https://www.computerworld.com/article/2556971/network-effect.html Heeks, R., & Stanforth, C. (2015). Technological change in developing countries: Opening the black box of process using actor–network theory. Development Studies Research, 2(1), 33–50. Hjarvard, S. (2013). The mediatization of culture and society. London: Routledge. Horten, G. (2011). The mediatization of war: A comparison of the American and German media coverage of the Vietnam and Iraq wars. American Journalism, 28(4), 29–53. Hoskins, A., & O’Loughlin, B. (2015). Arrested war: The third phase of mediatization. Information, Communication & Society, 18(11), 1320–1338. Kaempf, S. (2013). The mediatisation of war in a transforming global media landscape. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 67(5), 586–604. Latour, B. (2005). Reassembling the social: An introduction to actor-network theory. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Law, J. (1992). Notes on the theory of the actor-network: Ordering, strategy, and heterogeneity. Systems Practice, 5(4), 379–393. Law, J. (1999). After ANT: Complexity, naming and topology. In J.  Law & J.  Hassard (Eds.), Actor network theory and after (pp.  1–14). Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

1  INTRODUCTION: MEDIA AND CONFLICT STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL MEDIA… 

19

Law, J. (2007). Actor network theory and material semiotics. Version of 25 April 2007, available at http://www.eterogeneities.net/publications/Law2007 ANTandMaterialSemiotics.pdf Lundby, K. (2014). Mediatization of communication. In K. Lundby & De Gruyter (Eds.), Mediatization of Communication. ProQuest Ebook Central. Retrieved October 2, 2018, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unnc-ebooks/ detail.action?docID=1778479 Ma, Y. (2018). Online Chinese nationalism: A competing discourse? A discourse analysis of Chinese media texts relating to the Beijing Olympic torch relay in Paris. The Journal of International Communication, 24(2), 305–325. Maltby, S. (2012). The mediatization of the military. Media, War & Conflict, 5(3), 255–268. McQuail, D. (2006). On the mediatization of war. The International Communication Gazette, 68(2), 107–118. Micó, J.  L., Masip, P., & Domingo, D. (2013). To wish impossible things: Convergence as a process of diffusion of innovations in an actor-network. International Communication Gazette, 75, 118. Montiel, C. J., et al. (2014). Nationalism in local media during international conflict: Text mining domestic news reports of the China–Philippines maritime dispute. Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 33(5), 445–464. Morlandstø, L., & Mathisen, B.  R. (2017). Participation and control. Digital Journalism, 5(6), 791–808. Morse, T. (2017). Mediatized war and the moralizing function of news about  ­disruptive events. Journalism, 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 1464884917693861. Mortensen, M., Eskjær, M. F., & Hjarvard, S. (2015). Conclusion. The mediatization of conflicts: prospects and challenges. In M.  F. Eskjær, S.  Hjarvard, & M.  Mortensen (Eds.), The dynamics of mediatized conflict (pp.  205–211). New York: Peter Lang. Plesner, U. (2009). An actor-network perspective on changing work practices. Journalism, 10(5), 604–626. Poell, T., Kloet, J., & Zeng, G. (2014). Will the real Weibo please stand up? Chinese online contention and actor-network theory. Chinese Journal of Communication, 7(1), 1–18. Primo, A., & Zago, G. (2015). Who and what do journalism? Digital Journalism, 3(1), 38–52. Reese, S.  D. (2016). The new geography of journalism research. Digital Journalism, 4(7), 816–826. Rosen, J. (2006). The people formerly known as “the audience”. Retrieved December 12, 2018, https://blog.p2pfoundation.net/jay-rosenthe-people-formerlyknown-as-the-audience/2006/07/18

20 

S. I. ZHANG

Siapera, E., Hunt, G., & Lynn, T. (2015). #GazaUnderAttack: Twitter, Palestine and diffused war. Information, Communication & Society, 18(11), 1297–1319. Spyridou, L. P., et al. (2013). Journalism in a state of flux: Journalists as agents of technology innovation and emerging news practices. International Communication Gazette, 75, 76–98. Steensen, S., & Ahva, L. (2015). Theories of journalism in a digital age. Digital Journalism, 3(1), 1–18. Strömbäck, J. (2008). Four phases of mediatization. International Journal of Press/Politics, 13(3), 228–246. Strömbäck, J. (2011). Mediatization and perceptions of the media’s political influence. Journalism Studies, 12(4), 423–439. Sun, Z. (2015). Building a security community in Asia-Pacific region: Can China contribute? American Foreign Policy Interests, 37, 279–287. Turner, F. (2005). Actor-networking the news. Social Epistemology, 19(4), 321–324. Waisbord, S. (2013). A metatheory of mediatization and globalization? Journal of Multicultural Discourses, 8(3), 182–189. Williams, R., & Edge, D. (1996). The social shaping of technology. Research Policy, 25(6), 865–899. Zhang, F. (2017). Assessing China’s response to the South China Sea arbitration ruling. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 71(4), 440–459.

CHAPTER 2

China’s Social Media Platforms: Weibo

Social media platforms have become a significant participant in China’s politics, culture and society. As Rauchfleisch and Schäfer (2015) noted, China has established its own microcosm of social media. Launched in 2009, Weibo (Sina Weibo) is a leading and largest microblogging site in China. Weibo’s MAUs (monthly active users) and DAUs (daily active users) reached 465 million and 203 million respectively by the end of March 2019. About 93% of users accessed Weibo through mobile devices (CMMO.com, 2019). Drawing on the review of academic literature, this chapter firstly discusses China’s social media ecology. It then examines Weibo’s origin and transformation, technical features and usability, user and comment culture, self-censorship practices, as well as Weibo’s political and social impact. It ends with discussions on news, mainstream media and Weibo, which provides context for the case studies in the following chapters. The main argument is that all the technical features and political/social implications of Weibo are essential in the way different actors/nodes and forces mediate, interact, associate and negotiate with each other on the platform.

2.1   China’s Social Media Ecology The Internet and social media have become pervasive and transformative forces in contemporary China (deLisle, Goldstein, & Yang, 2016). The adoption of mobile technologies and social media has reached an © The Author(s) 2020 S. I. Zhang, Media and Conflict in the Social Media Era in China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7635-5_2

21

22 

S. I. ZHANG

unprecedented level since 2000 (Jian & Liu, 2018). China has the largest number of Internet and social media users in the world. The recent report from China Internet Network Information Center (CINIC, 2019) showed that, as of June 2019, the number of Internet users in China had reached 854 million with a penetration rate of 61.2%. The number of mobile Internet users reached 847 million, meaning more than 99% Internet users used mobile phones to access Internet. According to Digital 2019 report, more than 1 billion people in China now use social media, although this figure is somewhat inflated by duplicate accounts (Kemp, 2019). Social media are online communication channels characterized by participation and shifting power from institutions to individuals. In the age of social media, as Castells (2007) noted, the mass-self communication on the basis of interactive and horizontal communication networks is converging with mass media-based vertical communication networks. Social media can be defined as ‘a group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of User Generated Content’ (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010). The social media ecosystem is dynamic and competitive in nature, which is fundamentally different from that of mass media. While the mass media systems have remained largely stable over 400  years for print or 70 years for broadcast, the social media have seen an endless emergence of new platforms such as blogs, microblogging, questions and answers, instant messengers, online social networks, and short video stream (Zhu et al., 2019) China has a unique social media landscape and its social media platforms are transforming. China’s social media system is in a state of contradictions. The biggest contradiction, as Hong (2017) pointed out, is that the Internet and social media in China have witnessed the most explosive growth in the world, yet they have been fettered and controlled by the authorities most strictly. According to a report from Kantar China (2018), China’s social media started with the first online forum Shuguang (10qf. com) in 1994 and rose to prominence with the explosive growth of Sina Weibo users in 2012. As older forms of social media fade out of view, new online media platforms begin to take the stage. Today the top trending Chinese social platforms in China are WeChat, Weibo, QQ (messenger), Red (Xiaohongshu), Zhihu, and TikTok (Chinainternetwatch.com). WeChat and Weibo are the most popular social media platforms in China. Weibo is an open and public social network platform whereas WeChat focuses on private or semi-private social networks (Zhang & Guo, 2019).

2  CHINA’S SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS: WEIBO 

23

These two platforms also rank high in terms of active users in the world behind Facebook, YouTube, Instagram (for social networking sites) as well as WhatsApp and Messenger (for social networking apps) (Kallas, 2019). To give a glimpse at China’s social media market, Table 2.1 below shows the information of major social media platforms in China. Three observations can be made on the basis of Table 2.1. First, China’s social media landscape is diverse and dynamic featured with a wide range of social media forms. Driven by the advancement of mobile technologies, mobile phone based applications are prevalent. Sina and Tencent remain the dominant players. Meanwhile new players such as Red, Zhihu and TikTok established after 2010 are emerging and growing with momentum. New forms such as Q&A and short video streaming apps are gaining popularity. Multimedia entertainment is trendy. ‘Companion-style content becomes the major product serving the “boredom economy”. Video-based socializing satisfies the need of masses to kill time when feeling bored or lonely’ (Kantar China, 2018). Second, all the social media platforms are owned by private commercial companies based in Beijing and/or Shanghai. As Fuchs (2016) claimed, the Chinese Internet stands in the context of capitalism in China. Given that China is embedded into and shaped by global capitalism, China’s social media are actually capitalist social media. Third, Chinese social media companies target at domestic market. Meanwhile some companies are developing global strategies, successfully or unsuccessfully. Weibo was the first Chinese social media platform to get listed on Nasdaq in New York in 2014. WeChat and TikTok have entered and expanded their presence in overseas markets. WeChat hit most international markets around 2012 but the app hasn’t caught on outside of China (Custer, 2016). In contrast, TikTok has more than one billion downloads in 150 markets worldwide and 75 languages. TikTok’s strategy of dual versions– one for China’s Internet censored market and another for the rest of the world—could be a new model for other digital content companies aiming for global reach (Fannin, 2019). State censorship is nothing new in China. In fact, ‘censorship is the norm, rather than the exception’ (Hockx, 2005). In the digital age, Chinese party-state has adapted and developed new means of limiting and controlling speech in cyberspace, including mechanisms of participation, monitoring, regulating, censoring, and sanctioning (deLisle et al., 2016). The purpose is to maintain a culture of fear where everybody is his own self-censor (Tsui, 2003; Jiang, 2016b). For instance, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube are blocked. ‘Wall jumping’ techniques are required to

Social networking app (super-app) Microblogging site

Instant messenger Social lifestyle & e-commerce app Q&A app (Quora in China) Short video streaming app

WeChat

QQ Red (Xiaohongshu) Zhihu 2016

2011

1999 2013

2009

2010

Year of establishment

Tencent Xinying Information Technology Shanghai Co., Ltd Beijing Zhizhe Tianxia Science Technology Co., Ltd. ByteDance

Sina Corporation

Tencent Holdings Co.

Ownership

Source: The author manually searched, collected and compiled data from the Web in November 2019

TikTok (Dou Yin)

Weibo

Categories

Social media platforms

Table 2.1  Major social media platforms in China 2019

>500 million

>220 million

700 million >200 million

465 million

1040 million

Monthly active users

https://www.wechat. com https://www.weibo. com http://im.qq.com/ https://www. xiaohongshu.com/ https://www.zhihu. com/ https://www.douyin. com/

URL

24  S. I. ZHANG

2  CHINA’S SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS: WEIBO 

25

access these sites. The government introduced the Real Name Registration (RNR) policy in 2011, cracked down Big V (prominent verified microblog users) and passed ‘anti-rumour’ regulations to silence online public dissent in 2013 (Bolsover, 2017; Jiang, 2016b; Zhang & Guo, 2019). Chinese online platforms are legally liable for rumours and other controversial content on their websites, hence social media providers actively self-censor in order to avoid potential penalties such as license revocation or shutdown (Jiang, M. 2014a; MacKinnon, 2009; Zeng, Burgess, & Bruns, 2019). Different social media platforms afford different levels of censorship. Weibo and WeChat are good examples. While Weibo’s openness and accessibility allow the government to track information flow easily, thus making its information environment more constrained, WeChat’s relative privateness allows users to bypass government censorship easier (Zhang & Guo, 2019). In terms of the nature of content to be censored, what counts as sensitive content is in blanket terms and the interpretation varies from region to region and from time to time. It makes government controls the more effective as users resort to self-censorship (Nip & Fu, 2016). Generally speaking, the government allows the online users to vent their anger, grievance and criticism as long as they do not challenge or oppose the Party’s legitimacy. King, Pan, and Roberts (2013) argue that the government allows criticism but silences collective expression. Their largescale systematic analysis of social media posts demonstrates that posts with negative, even vitriolic, criticism of the state, its leaders, and its policies are not more likely to be censored. Instead, ‘the censorship program is aimed at curtailing collective action by silencing comments that represent, reinforce, or spur social mobilization, regardless of content’ (King et al. 2013). Similarly, Lagerkvist and Sundqvist (2013)’s research on Weibo’s posts (tweets) about political scandals reveals that a majority of the tweets contain criticism against certain activities of the Party, but do not challenge its hold on power. Such ‘loyal dissent’ is the distinguishing feature of China’s online political discourse. In addition, social issues or security incidents are on the fringe of censorship, as they do not constitute a direct threat to the legitimacy of the ruling party and to the overall social stability (Su, 2019). As a result of and in response to the state control and censorship on Internet and social media, on the one hand, Chinese netizens use the Internet simply as an outlet to express their opinions rather than to engage in debates with others (Bolsover, 2017). Opinions among Chinese citizens mirror official statements (Nip & Fu, 2016). On the other hand,

26 

S. I. ZHANG

Chinese netizens adapt and react to it in creative ways, for instance, using encoded posts to further express their opinions. This highlights the creativity and responsiveness of an active online audience (Rauchfleisch & Schäfer, 2015). In all, within the limit of freedom and political boundary set by the State, as the metaphor ‘giant cage’ indicates (Nip & Fu, 2016), social media have great political, economic and social impacts on contemporary society in China. Weibo is an ideal venue to trace, research and analyze the complex relationship between media and politics, between media and society, and between media and conflict. Recent years have witnessed abundant researches on social media in China using Weibo as a research object for case study.

2.2   Weibo’s Origin and Transformation Weibo emerged in August 2009 as the microblogging service of Sina.com in the aftermath of the riots in Xinjiang involving Han Chinese and ethnic Uighurs in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang. At that time, Twitter was blocked permanently and some domestic microblog services such as Fanfou were also shut down in China. Since then, Weibo has played an essential part in the public life of the Chinese people, reflecting China’s socio-political transition in the post-Olympics decade (Guo & Jiang, 2015; Han, 2018). Meanwhile Weibo’s popularity suffered several severe blows such as the introduction of the RNR policy in 2011 and migration of users to WeChat (Jiang, 2016b). Han (2018) divided Weibo’s transformation into three stages: collective witness, ideological contention, and networks of expertise. She argued that ‘the three stages reflect a major transformation of social media and digital culture in China, from the civic-minded public engagement and activism to the celebration of individual online fame and monetization of content creation’ (Han, 2018). On July 22, 2012, the official Weibo account of the People’s Daily (@renminribao) posted its first Weibo (tweet) when Beijing was struck by a thunderstorm and the flooding killed 77 people. This event marked that official media started stepping in the realm of social media. ‘Since then, the presence of official media on Weibo has become a norm. They quickly adapted to the platform’s user culture and the language, and began to act as a major source of authority on the platform’ (Han, 2018). These official media not only incorporated Weibo in news production but took lead in public debate with their ideological

2  CHINA’S SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS: WEIBO 

27

stances. Han (2018) pointed out, Global Times and its chief editor Hu Xijin (@huxijin) represented the ‘Chinese characteristics’ side whereas the newspapers in the Southern Media Group represented the ‘liberal values’ camp. Since 2012, Weibo’s influence started to decline with the rise and competition of WeChat as well as the tightened state control in the digital media space. However, the operation team of Weibo maintained that the ‘decline’ only meant ‘going back to a normal status.’ They created a different set of discourse focusing on ‘transformation’ and a ‘new opportunity’. On April 17, 2014, Weibo was listed at Nasdaq, which marked Weibo’s step into the global market (Han, 2018).

2.3   Weibo’s Technical Features and Usability In terms of technical features and usability, Weibo provides services that combine the microblogging functions of Twitter with many of the social networking functions of Facebook. It adopted features tailored especially for Chinese users (Bolsover, 2017; Jiang, 2016b). Weibo provides real-­ time information and it is characterized by three components: it enables users to post 140-character messages, address others with ‘@’ symbols, and use hashtags to topically mark Weibos, repost messages and answer them. A distinct feature of Weibo is that users are allowed to include URLs in their messages and to attach images, music, and video files to their posts. Comments to a post are displayed right below the post itself (Poell, Kloet, & Zeng, 2014). Due to the nature of Chinese language, Weibo’s 140-character-limit allows for much longer texts, where characters signify entire words (Poell et al., 2014; Rauchfleisch & Schäfer, 2015). In recent years, online content in video format becomes prevalent. Weibo has developed new features such as short videos and interest-based information feeds. Users are now allowed to upload and download, share, link to and access audio, video and other content (Weibo annual report, 2017). Meanwhile, Weibo faces copyright and technical issues. There are unauthorized posting of copyrighted content on Weibo. Weibo has experienced service disruptions, outages and other performance problems due to infrastructure changes, human or software errors, hardware failure, capacity constraints, computer viruses and security attacks. ‘Any disruption or failure in our infrastructure could hinder our ability to handle existing or increased traffic on our platform or cause us to lose content stored on our platform’ (Weibo annual report, 2017).

28 

S. I. ZHANG

Weibo and WeChat are rivals in the social media market and they have different affordances. Weibo is more open and anonymous where social interactions are publicly accessible and tend to occur among strangers, whereas people often disclose their real identities on WeChat and use it for maintaining existing relationships (Zhang & Guo, 2019). Weibo users could receive a variety of up-to-date information via functions such as ‘hot topics’ covering domestic and foreign news, entertainment and industry information. Thus Weibo can better fulfill individuals’ information and hedonic gratifications, while individuals prefer to use WeChat for achieving gratifications of social and affection (Gan, 2018).

2.4   Weibo’s User and Comment Culture In terms of Weibo’s user and comment culture, ‘long Weibo’, data monitoring and commenting practices as well as hyperlinks are special features. A long Weibo means the users attaching a picture/image that contain an article or an essay to their Weibo via a browser add-on or an external website to work around the limitation of 140 characters. Through the long Weibo, the users have creatively exploited the Weibo’s technological architecture to circumvent the limitations set by Weibo (Poell et al., 2014). In addition, Weibo’s real-time character also allows its users to monitor countless data streams that run across multiple online platforms but converged on Weibo. Visual trickery, symbolic manipulation, parody, humor, and intense interaction have become key practices on Weibo. Weibo’s comment culture increases ‘the sense of shared joy’ and ‘strengthens the articulation of an issue-specific public’ (Poell et al., 2014). Hyperlinking refers to the practice of linking to an external website (Fu & Lee, 2016). Weibo users’ practice of hyperlinking has broadened discussion to other online platforms and mainstream media, thus ‘extended the public and circulated content across the media landscape’ (Poell et al., 2014). Weibo places much emphasis on user commentary. It added a number of features such as message threading and the ability to comment directly on other users’ posts (Sullivan, 2014). In comparison to Facebook, Bolsover (2017) found that both sites offer similar affordances to users to interact with news stories: users can like, comment on or forward/share the news story. Both sites provide a threaded commenting system. But for Weibo, the box to input comment is much larger and the submit comment button far more prominent. Weibo also allows users to filter comments to see popular comments, comments by verified users and comments by

2  CHINA’S SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS: WEIBO 

29

individuals that users follow. Weibo encourages user interaction with posts by listing the number of users who have liked, commented or reposted a particular post or comment. ‘This structural choice would likely increase the snowball effect of already popular comments.’ (Bolsover, 2017) More importantly, ‘comments on Weibo are more divisive and less constructive than those on Facebook, indicating a style of communication much closer to a liberal, individualistic rather than a rationally, discursive model (Bolsover, 2017). Weibo also adopts a ‘celebrity’ approach (Jiang, 2016b). It invites famous Chinese entertainers, sports personalities, business people, writers, reporters, scholars and other elites to open Weibo. Sina verifies these accounts with an orange ‘V’, a symbol that resembles status, power and social recognition. Each of Sina’s top 10 celebrities has over 50 million followers. Business, government and nonprofit entities can have their accounts verified with a blue ‘V’. ‘While such verifications are voluntary and business-driven, RNR is mandated by the state’ (Jiang, 2016b).

2.5   Weibo’s Censorship Practices Weibo’s usability, low cost, instantaneity and sociability are appealing to its users, but its interactive affordances and deep integration into China’s public life are regulatory nightmares for authorities (Jiang, 2016b). In response, the government tightened up censorship toward Weibo and censorship practices on social media became institutional with the implementation of RNR policy. In late 2011, the Real Name Registration (RNR) policy was introduced in China following the principle of ‘front stage voluntary, backstage real name’. This policy targeted over microblog service providers (MSPs) in Beijing, Sina Weibo in particular. It means that microbloggers can use pseudo-user names but they need to register their real identities backstage with the MSP, linked to their national ID cards, mobile phone numbers or other identifications. Unregistered users can view microblogs but cannot post or pass along any. One year later, RNR was passed as law by the National People’s Congress in December 2012 (Jiang, 2016b). The RNR policy shows that the state encourages users to manage their ‘micro-self’ via self-monitor, self-censor and self-control. As a result, ‘while the overall effect of RNR on personal expression on Sina Weibo was not highly significant, politically sensitive posts are notably more restricted’ (Jiang, 2016b). After all, Weibo comes under the same system of technical control and human scrutiny as other Internet Service

30 

S. I. ZHANG

Providers. Although online platforms such as Weibo pulled audience away from the party media and facilitated the relative freedom of speech, the absolute dominance of party mouthpieces has never been fundamentally challenged (Su, 2019). In fact, the Internet companies in China are held responsible for the content and behavior of the users on their sites, and the News Office of the State Council disseminated regularly lists of keywords for filtering among the Internet companies (Poell et  al., 2014). Hence, on the one hand, the Sina Corporation, a leading technology company in private business sector in China, has cultivated cooperative relationship with the state. It ‘must conform to the communications regulations set by the state, and the state constantly pressures Sina to ensure its censorship compliance’ (Guo & Jiang, 2015). To track and block content, Weibo employs thousands of censors and uses sophisticated software to monitor ‘sensitive words’ (Sullivan, 2014). Specifically, according to Poell et al. (2014), Sina Weibo employs about 1000 full-time editors to monitor and censor users. In addition, there was a rumor control team in Weibo, composed of 10 staff, maintaining a 24 hour watch on Weibo with an aim of deleting false news and information. The Weibo comments function was open to the public but comments on Weibo are heavily censored (Guo & Jiang, 2015). Bolsover (2017) also noted that political speech is likely to be censored on Weibo. However despite a greater degree of political control and uncertainty on Weibo, the expression of political opinions online is generally unproblematic and some posters believe they risk little apart from having their comment removed (Bolsover, 2017). On the other hand, Rauchfleisch and Schäfer (2015) pointed out, Sina’s censorship is mitigated by the company’s commercial interests, and it therefore aims to remain as open as possible. Weibo content is neither entirely apolitical nor it is fully government-­controlled or censored in all instances. As Guo and Jiang (2015) argued, both transparency and tight political control coexist on Weibo, which forms the paradox of Weibo. Weibo is both free, open and highly monitored.

2.6   Weibo’s Political and Social Impacts Weibo’s political impacts are mainly manifested in three aspects: e-­governance, public opinion formation, and democracy. E-governance refers to ‘the application of information and communication technologies (ICTs) for delivering government services and exchanging information

2  CHINA’S SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS: WEIBO 

31

between the government and citizens’ (Zhang & Guo, 2019). In China, the goals of service-oriented E-governance are to improve the efficiency and transparency of government and to fight corruption (Zhang, 2002). Central, provincial and local government departments opened official accounts on Weibo and WeChat. The Chinese government has extended its e-governance to Weibo and WeChat and considers social media-based E-governance to be a key indicator for evaluating government’s online performance (Zhang & Guo, 2019). By the end of 2014, the number of verified government agency accounts on Weibo (both Sina and Tencent) reached 2.77 million. There were 17, 217 WeChat governmental accounts and 400 governance apps (Beijing Legal Evening News, 28 September 2015). In recent years, People’s Daily regularly released Governance Index Weibo Impact Report about governmental accounts on Weibo in terms of their communication, services, interactivity and recognition. According to the latest report in 2019, @China Police Online, @Central Youth League and @China fire are the top three in the ranking list. Sichuan and Jiangsu provinces ranked top two in the provincial governance list (People.cn, 12 August 2019). Zhang and Guo (2019)’s study revealed that the central government’s use of social media has been effective, but the lack of resources for maintaining social media accounts might contribute to local government’s ineffectiveness in making a positive impact on their citizens’ attitudes. Social media platforms are digital space for public opinion formation. Zhang and Guo (2019) called on scholars to consider social media not as one homogeneous information source, but rather a field of discourse in which different voices compete to shape public opinion. On the one hand, as President Xi Jinping put it, the Internet, especially social media, has become ‘the main battlefield for public opinion struggle’ (Zhang & Guo, 2019). The government has incorporated online opinions into public management in order to regain their political legitimacy (Noesselt, 2013). The government increased its efforts to comb Chinese social media, using data mining, or ‘opinion mining’, as a tool to assess the attitudes and opinions of Chinese citizens (Rauchfleisch & Schäfer, 2015). Meanwhile, the Xi administration proactively distributes positive content about the state, hoping to re-shape the online conversation. Hence the official voices have taken control on Weibo (Zhang & Guo, 2019). On the other hand, Rauchfleisch and Schäfer (2015) presented a typology of various public spheres including thematic, short-term, encoded, local, non-domestic political, and mobile public spheres. They argued that these public spheres

32 

S. I. ZHANG

exist on Weibo in which open and critical debates can occur under specific circumstances. In similar veins, Jiang, Y. (2014b) and Su (2019) argued that Weibo provides a platform for participation in public affairs and offers a channel for the Chinese public to express their opinions but the state still sets its political boundary, resulting in ‘partial reversed agenda effects’. A growing body of celebrities and public intellectuals (Big Vs) also play an important role in disseminating alternative information and shaping public opinion in China (Creemers, 2017; Jiang, 2016a; Zhang & Guo, 2019). However the role of social media in facilitating rational debates is uncertain. Bolsover (2017) argued that Chinese netizens were less likely to talk with others, attempt to understand others’ opinions or attempt to work towards consensus or resolution. Therefore, Chinese netizens use the Internet simply as an outlet to express their opinions rather than to engage in debates with others. Rauchfleisch and Schäfer (2015) also noted, some scholars are skeptical about Weibo’s potential to trigger truly open debates. Use of Weibo is dominated by entertainment (Sullivan, 2014). Information generated by ordinary social media users has long been officially labelled as irrational and trivial. Rationality is always overpowered by the public’s negative emotions, thus making Weibo an ‘emotive public opinion field’ (Zeng et al., 2019). Turning to democracy, China’s online information environment features with a mixture of authoritarianism and grassroots democracy (Jiang, 2016a). The political implications of the Internet and social media in China are limited by the fragmentation of cyberspace, users’ lack of interest in politics, infotainment, misinformation, interest-based ghettos, digital divides, and censorship (Huang & Sun, 2016). Though there is no strong evidence to show that the Internet and social media are leading toward Western style democracy in China, Jiang, Y. (2014b) argued that social media have a comparatively much freer space when mainstream media are controlled by the state. In addition, Lei (2011) argued, Chinese netizens as critical citizenry are more politically opinionated. They are more likely to support the norms of democracy and critical about the party-state and the political conditions in China. However, ‘whether social media such as Weibo is serving as a tool for democracy in China still require further observation.’ (Jiang, Y. 2014b). As for the social impact, social media in China demonstrates strong participatory, connective, and self-reflexive characteristics (Wu & Montgomery, 2019). They are considered as a ‘catalyst for social and political transformation’ (Rauchfleisch & Schäfer, 2015). Social media in

2  CHINA’S SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS: WEIBO 

33

China poses new opportunities for civil society, but at the same time it is an object where the fusion of state and corporate power and its contradictions are manifested (Fuchs, 2016). There have been many researches that study how the usage of social media (Weibo) influences societal issues such as anti-nuclear protests (Huang & Sun, 2016), social movements (such as Wenzhou high-speed train collision) (Liu, 2015), 2015 Tianjin blasts (Zeng et al., 2019; Su, 2019; Wu & Montgomery, 2019) and environmental mobilization (Deng & Peng, 2018). Scholars find that social media use ‘blurs the boundary between online individualized expression and offline protests, and thus enables offline protests’ (Huang & Sun, 2016); fosters a broad-based coalition among individual citizens by tweeting, retweeting and commenting (Liu, 2015); enables ordinary users to engage in citizen journalism and grassroots rumour-debunking practices (Zeng et al., 2019); and constitutes a public testimony that can challenge official discourses of crisis in China (Wu & Montgomery, 2019). Individual trust, group norms and information networks of the social capital played an important role in the social media mobilization (Deng & Peng, 2018). Of all these researches, scholars have paid much attention to the news and mainstream media that play an important role in the social media mediated society.

2.7   News, Mainstream Media and Weibo We are witnessing a shift from mass media logic to social media logic (Welbers & Opgenhaffen, 2019). Traditional news organizations and journalists have adopted social media in their work routine. With Facebook distancing itself from news and focusing on ‘meaningful interactions between people’, debate about the role of social elements in professional news has new, reinvigorated relevance (Welbers & Opgenhaffen, 2019). In addition to being effective tools for breaking and updating news, social media facilitates the dissemination of digital fragments of news and information from official and unofficial sources, which creates new kinds of interactions around the news and leads to the ‘ambient journalism’ (Hermida, 2013). For journalists, social media has broadened the pool of potential sources and placed both elite and non-elite sources on the same platforms. Meanwhile members of the public are participating in the news from below the line comments to different forms of citizen journalism (Thorsen & Jackson, 2018). However it shall be noted that while social media has become part of a journalist’s daily newsgathering routine,

34 

S. I. ZHANG

journalists are cautious in using social networks to source and verify information. Traditional and elite sources such as PR agencies and corporate spokespeople still hold sway (Hermida, 2012; Thorsen & Jackson, 2018). Journalists employed the interactive features of social media mostly for gauging community interest and promoting individual news stories and media organizations (Bossio & Bebawi, 2016; Jian & Liu, 2018). Thorsen and Jackson (2018) also found that social media content in news stories was highly format-dependant, not genre-dependant. Moreover, Welbers and Opgenhaffen (2019) pointed out that an important element of sharing news on social media is the expression of a private state—a person’s opinion, emotion or view—through the use of subjective and positive language. Social media editors at news outlets catered to this format in order to increase users’ engagement and enhance the virality of their news items. In China, Weibo has served as a new channel for interpersonal communication and source of news for Chinese Internet users at home and abroad (Han & Wang, 2015). Weibo is important as both an information provider and a distribution platform, as well as for robot accounts in news forwarding (Bolsover, 2013). A large number of news sources co-exist on social media with traditional news organisations expanding their influence online and ordinary citizens sharing facts and opinions that may be alternative or critical of the mainstream discourse (Zhang & Guo, 2019). Backed up by the government’s policy to promote media convergence and ‘Internet Plus’, mainstream news media are influential on social media platforms. A telephone survey on credibility ratings showed that people place more trust in traditional news media than in online sources by a significant margin (Shen & Zhang, 2014). On Weibo, the number of news media accounts rose exponentially (Nip & Fu, 2016). According to Zhang & Guo (2019), Weibo had 33,000 verified mainstream media accounts, which collectively published 1.7 million posts by November 2017. Journalists described their Weibo accounts as ‘online petition offices’, which suggests citizens still look to the news media to voice their concerns on their behalf. Reposters may prefer to follow mainstream news suppliers and Weibo users chose to repost content published by news organizations as a strategy as news media content is considered officially acceptable for dissemination (Nip & Fu, 2016). Beijing has encouraged professional news media and government departments to use social media to promote the official agenda, but Zhang & Guo (2019)’s study found that news consumption from mainstream media sources on social media did not significantly influence the public’s government satisfaction.

2  CHINA’S SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS: WEIBO 

35

Journalist adoption of social media was a growing phenomenon worldwide (Jian & Liu, 2018). Journalists in China may use microblogs to search for news tips and locate the interview source. Their use of social media were strategic and varied such as following Weibo accounts of opinion leaders or newsworthy personalities, using social media to reach elite and grassroots sources, debunking rumors (Jian & Liu, 2018). Moreover, journalistic use of microblogs was influenced by a news organization’s culture and policies with less politically rigid news organizations being more likely to adopt microblogging (Jian & Liu, 2018). Jian and Liu (2018)’s review of journalist social media practice in China concluded that researches in both Chinese and Western contexts demonstrate ambivalence toward the reliability and quality of social media contents in news sourcing and verification. Chinese journalists are forging an ambivalent relationship with online public, which employs social media to set agenda, frame issues, and challenge the journalistic authority. Journalists’ use of social media as public expression versus private voice reflects and exacerbates the tensions in Chinese journalistic doxa. In view of scant researches in this regard, the two authors called for further researches into journalist social media adoption and use (Jian & Liu, 2018). Online users are also influential in news diffusion with the culture of participation and interactivity on Weibo. Han and Wang (2015) noted, although social and personal life are the dominant content on microblogging, some motivated individuals express their ideas or positions on particular public issues or current affairs, or report news censored by mainstream media, which leads to an interactive conversation among users and their followers. Bolsover (2013) also found that in comparison with Twitter, retweeting and commentary on news stories is more prevalent on Weibo, with news stories traveling further from their source. In news events such as Diaoyu islands controversy, many Weibo users became sources that the state media quoted in the news. Weibo not only changed the diffusion patterns on social networks but also contributed to self-­ mobilization, mobilization of others, and social coordination (Su, 2019). In addition, Bolsover and Howard (2018)’s study demonstrates that emotion and rationality can co-exist in Chinese Internet users. Weibo users were capable to rationally curate evidence in order to verify official news. Negative emotions can have positive impacts when they compel the media and authorities to act more transparently and accountably. In terms of User Generated Content, satire is often observed on the Chinese Internet but it could only be described as ‘enigmatic criticism’ at best, cynical but

36 

S. I. ZHANG

not critical in the sense of challenging the hold on power by the Chinese Communist Party (Nip & Fu, 2016).

2.8   Conclusion Weibo is ‘more than a media, a brand, or a corporation. It is a piece of the Chinese institutional transition’ (Bomsel, 2014). In this chapter, I started with mapping China’s social media ecology with a focus on the contradiction of fast growth of social media industry and political constraints, and discussed Weibo’s technical features, usability, comment culture, censorship practice and its political and social impacts. All these features, affordance and functions of Weibo are essential in the way different actors/ nodes mediate, interact, associate and negotiate with each other on the platform. As Poell et al. (2014) argued: Weibo is not one thing, but rather constitutes a techno-cultural assemblage which becomes entangled with a wide variety of other actors in the course of contentious episodes. Consequently, each analysis of the “meaning of Weibo” always has to start with a specific event or issue.

Next, the mainstream news media Global Times’ Weibo posts and the web users’ online comments/replies will be analyzed and discussed surrounding the cases of Sino-Indian border crisis, Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands dispute, South China Sea dispute and North Korea nuclear crisis.

References Bolsover, G. (2013). News in China’s new information environment: Dissemination patterns, opinion leaders and news commentary on Weibo. Paper to be presented at CIRC11: The Eleventh Chinese Internet Research Conference, Oxford, UK, June 15. Bolsover, G. (2017). Harmonious communitarianism or a rational public sphere: A content analysis of the differences between comments on news stories on Weibo and Facebook. Asian Journal of Communication, 27(2), 115–133. Bolsover, G., & Howard, P. (2018). Chinese computational propaganda: Automation, algorithms and the manipulation of information about Chinese politics on Twitter and Weibo. Information, Communication & Society. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2018.1476576. Bomsel, O. (2014). Is China a Weibo democracy? International Relations and Diplomacy, 2, 1–17.

2  CHINA’S SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS: WEIBO 

37

Bossio, D., & Bebawi, S. (2016). Mapping the emergence of social media in everyday journalistic practices. Media International Australia, 161(1), 147–158. Castells, M. (2007). Communication, power and counter-power in the network society. International Journal of Communication, 1, 238–266. Chinainternetwatch.com (N.A.). Chinese social media trends, statistics, and insights. https://www.chinainternetwatch.com/tag/social-media/ CINIC. (2019, August 30). CNNIC fabu di 44 ci zhongguo hulianwang fazhan zhuangkuang tongji baogao [CNNIC released 44th China Internet Development Status Report]. http://www.cac.gov. cn/2019-08/30/c_1124939590.htm CMMO.com. (2019, May 24). Weibo fabu 2019nian Q1 caibao ri huoyue yonghong yijing dada 2.03yi [Weibo released 2019 Q1 report Daily Active Users reached 203 million]. http://dy.163.com/v2/article/detail/ EFUI1ET4051191D6.html Creemers, R. (2017). Cyber China: Upgrading propaganda, public opinion work and social management for the twenty-first century. Journal of Contemporary China, 26(103), 85–100. Custer, C. (2016, May 26). 3 reasons WeChat failed internationally (and most other Chinese apps do too). Retrieved on November 4, 2019, https://www.techinasia. com/3-reasons-wechat-failed-internationally-chinese-apps deLisle, J., Goldstein, A., & Yang, G. (2016). Introduction. In J. deLisle, A.  Goldstein, & G.  Yang (Eds.), The Internet, social media, and a changing China (pp. 1–27). Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Deng, X., & Peng, S. (2018). Trust, norms and networks in social media environmental mobilization: A social capital analysis of Under the Dome in China. Asian Journal of Communication, 28(5), 526–540. Fannin, R. (2019, September 13). The strategy behind TikTok’s global rise. Retrieved on November 4, 2019, https://hbr.org/2019/09/ the-strategy-behind-tiktoks-global-rise Fu, J. S., & Lee, A. Y. L. (2016). Chinese journalists’ discursive weibo practices in an extended journalistic sphere. Journalism Studies, 17(1), 80–99. Fuchs, C. (2016). Baidu, Weibo and Renren: The global political economy of social media in China. Asian Journal of Communication, 26(1), 14–41. Gan, C. (2018). A comparative analysis of Sina Weibo and WeChat in China. Information Development, 34(2), 139–147. Guo, B., & Jiang, Y. (2015). Analyzing the coexistence of emerging transparency and tight political control on Weibo. The Journal of International Communication, 21(1), 78–108. Han, E. L. (2018). Weibo and the making of Chinese networked publics: Witness, debates and expertise. Communication and the Public, 3(2), 97–112. Han, G., & Wang, W. (2015). Mapping user relationships for health information diffusion on microblogging in China: A social network analysis of Sina Weibo. Asian Journal of Communication, 25(1), 65 –83.

38 

S. I. ZHANG

Hermida, A. (2012). Tweets and truth. Journalism Practice, 6(5–6), 659–668. Hermida, A. (2013). #Journalism. Digital Journalism, 1(3), 295–313. Hockx, M. (2005). Virtual Chinese literature: A comparative case study of online poetry communities. China Quarterly, 183, 670–691. Hong, J. (2017). Social media in China: An unprecedented force for an unprecedented social change? Telematics and Informatics, 34, 691–693. Huang, R., & Sun, X. (2016). Dynamic preference revelation and expression of personal frames: How Weibo is used in an anti-nuclear protest in China. Chinese Journal of Communication, 9(4), 385–402. Jian, G., & Liu, T. (2018). Journalist social media practice in China: A review and synthesis. Journalism, 19(9–10), 1452–1470. Jiang, M. (2014a). The business and politics of search engines: A comparative study of Baidu and Google’s search results of Internet events in China. New Media & Society, 16, 212–233. Jiang, Y. (2014b). ‘Reversed agenda-setting effects’ in China Case studies of Weibo trending topics and the effects on state-owned media in China. Journal of International Communication, 20(2), 168–183. Jiang, M. (2016a). The co-evolution of the Internet, (un) civil society & authoritarianism in China. In J. deLisle, A. Goldstein, & G. Yang (Eds.), The Internet, social media, and a changing China (pp.  28–48). Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Jiang, M. (2016b). Managing the micro-self: The governmentality of real name registration policy in Chinese microblogosphere. Information, Communication & Society, 19(2), 203–220. Kallas, P. (2019). Top 15 most popular social networking sites and apps (2019). Retrieved on November 2, 2019, https://www.dreamgrow.com/ top-15-most-popular-social-networking-sites/ Kantar China. (2018, September 5). China social media landscape 2018. Retrieved September 2, 2019, https://www.chinainternetwatch.com/26502/ social-media-2018/ Kaplan, A. M., & Haenlein, M. (2010). Users of the world, unite! The challenges and opportunities of social media. Business Horizons, 53(1), 59–68. Kemp, S. (2019, January 31). Digital 2019: Global digital overview. Retrieved on November 2, 2019, https://datareportal.com/reports/ digital-2019-global-digital-overview King, G., Pan, J., & Roberts, M. (2013). How censorship in China allows government criticism but silences collective expression. American Political Science Review, 107(2), 26–343. Lagerkvist, J., & Sundqvist, G. (2013). Loyal dissent in the Chinese blogosphere: SinaWeibo discourse on the Chinese communist party. Studies in Media and Communication, 1(1), 140–149.

2  CHINA’S SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS: WEIBO 

39

Lei, Y. (2011). The political consequences of the rise of the Internet: Political beliefs and practices of Chinese netizens. Political Communication, 28, 291–322. Liu, Y. (2015). Tweeting, re-tweeting, and commenting: Microblogging and social movements in China. Asian Journal of Communication, 25(6), 567–583. MacKinnon, R. (2009, First Monday 14). China’s censorship 2.0: How companies censor bloggers. Retrieved from https://firstmonday.org/article/view/ 2378/2089 Nip, J.  Y. M., & Fu, K. (2016). Networked framing between source posts and their reposts: An analysis of public opinion on China’s microblogs. Information, Communication & Society, 19(8), 1127–1149. Noesselt, N. (2013). Microblogs and the adaptation of the Chinese party-state’s governance strategy. Governance, 27(3), 449–468. Poell, T., Kloet, J., & Zeng, G. (2014). Will the real Weibo please stand up? Chinese online contention and actor-network theory. Chinese Journal of Communication, 7(1), 1–18. Rauchfleisch, A., & Schäfer, M. S. (2015). Multiple public spheres of Weibo: A typology of forms and potentials of online public spheres in China. Information, Communication & Society, 18(2), 139–155. Shen, F., & Zhang, H. (2014). Predicting media credibility in China: The influence of Weibo use. Asian Journal for Public Opinion Research, 1(4). Su, Y. (2019). Exploring the effect of Weibo opinion leaders on the dynamics of public opinion in China: A revisit of the two-step flow of communication. Global Media and China, XX, 1–21. Sullivan, J. (2014). China’s Weibo: Is faster different? New Media & Society, 16(1), 24–37. Thorsen, E., & Jackson, D. (2018). Seven characteristics defining online news formats. Digital Journalism. https://doi.org/10.1080/2167081 1.2018.1468722. Tsui, L. (2003). The panopticon as the antithesis of a space of freedom: Control and regulation of the Internet in China. China Information, 17(2), 65–82. Welbers, K., & Opgenhaffen, M. (2019). Presenting news on social media. Digital Journalism, 7(1), 45–62. Wu, X., & Montgomery, M. (2019). Witnessing in crisis contexts in the social media age: The case of the 2015 Tianjin blasts on Weibo. Media, Culture & Society. https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443719855300. Zeng, J., Burgess, J., & Bruns, A. (2019). Is citizen journalism better than professional journalism for factchecking rumours in China? How Weibo users verified information following the 2015 Tianjin blasts. Global Media and China, 4(1), 13–35. Zhang, J. (2002). Will the government ‘serve the people’?: The development of Chinese e-government. New Media & Society, 4(2), 163–184.

40 

S. I. ZHANG

Zhang, Y., & Guo, L. (2019). ‘A battlefield for public opinion struggle’: How does news consumption from different sources on social media influence government satisfaction in China? Information, Communication & Society. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2019.1662073. Zhu, J. H., et al. (2019). Applying user analytics to uses and effects of social media in China. Asian Journal of Communication, 29(3), 291–306.

CHAPTER 3

Sino-Indian Border Crisis in 2017

Territorial disputes, as one of the elements of national sovereignty, are more war-prone than other conflicts (Muratbekova, 2018). While studying the media and conflict relations, territorial disputes deserve more empirical research. As Vasquez and Henehan (2001) noted, territorial disputes are a fundamental underlying cause of interstate wars in the modern global system. Territorial disputes do not make war inevitable, rather disputes bring about war when they are handled in certain ways. In a word, territorial conflict led to military aggression (Vasquez, 2009; Muratbekova, 2018). The Sino-Indian border issue was important to defend territorial integrity and sovereignty at a time of constructing nationalism of both China and India (Muratbekova, 2018). The border issue also plays an important role in the bilateral relations between China and India, the two emerging powers, which have both regional and global significance. This chapter takes the Sino-Indian border crisis in 2017 as a case study. It firstly provides background information and gives a brief historic account of the Sino-Indian border disputes. Transformation of Sino-­ Indian relations will also be explored and addressed. It then presents and analyses results from the content and textual analysis on the basis of Global Times’ posts as well as web users’ comments and replies on Weibo. News sources, main themes, dominant frames, web users’ peer-to-peer interactions, usage of languages and emoji are discussed. Lastly, it gives an analysis of macro-structural factors surrounding the case. This chapter demonstrates the synergies between mainstream media, social media © The Author(s) 2020 S. I. Zhang, Media and Conflict in the Social Media Era in China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7635-5_3

41

42 

S. I. ZHANG

platforms and user contents, and reveals the shifting associations and power relations between the three intertwining actors.

3.1   A Brief Historic Overview of Sino-Indian Border Crisis The 2017 Sino-Indian border crisis (also called Sino-Indian border conflict, dispute, standoff or confrontation) refers to the military standoff in the Doklam region from June to August 2017. It ‘involved Indian military efforts to block Chinese strategic road construction in an area of disputed ownership between China and Bhutan’ (O’Donnell, 2018). The Doklam episode occurred at a time when both countries are modernizing their military forces and developing logistical networks along the Sino-Indian border (O’Donnell, 2018). For many people, the Sino-India stand-off in 2017 is reminiscent of the Sino-India war of 1962. However, there are significant differences between the two situations. Mohanty (2017) observed, in 1962, India and China faced a direct border conflict; in 2017, India is facing the Chinese wrath for defending the Bhutanese territory. But then, Bhutan is merely a pawn on the politico-strategic-military chessboard of the Himalayan region; India and China are the principal rivals battling it out for regional hegemony. Today a full-scale war is unlikely to happen as both India and China are nuclear-armed states. China has a much bigger military establishment, but Indian defense forces are in a perpetual state of readiness to take on any military challenge at short notice (Mohanty, 2017). In an attempt to situate the 2017 border crisis in the context, a brief historic overview of the Sino-Indian border dispute and the role of the border dispute in the Sino-Indian relations are provided below. The Sino-Indian border dispute originated in the time of British and Russian expansion when Tibet was divided into a buffer zone in the early twentieth century (Liu, 2011; Muratbekova, 2018). Maxwell (2011) noted, the British Empire in India launched an aggressive annexation of what it recognized to be legally Chinese territory. The government of independent India inherited that border dispute and intensified it, completing the annexation and ignoring China’s protests. However, the entire China–India boundary has never been formally delimited by any mutually accepted treaty. There has existed a boundary Line of Actual Control between the two countries (Liu, 2011). Traditionally,

3  SINO-INDIAN BORDER CRISIS IN 2017 

43

the boundary was divided into three sectors—the western, eastern, and middle sectors. The western sector involved the dispute over the Askai Chin area, which India claims as part of Ladakh and China claims as part of Xinjiang. The middle sector involved the area at the junction of the TibetKashmir-Punjab borders and the Nepal-Tibet-Uttar Pradesh borders. The eastern sector involves a dispute over the area between the pre-1914 Outer Line and the McMahon Line (Liu, 2011; Muratbekova, 2018). The eastern sector is accessible from the Indian side and inaccessible from the Chinese side, whereas the western sector is only reachable from the Chinese side (Muratbekova, 2018). Generally speaking, Aksai Chin in the western sector and the McMahon Line in the eastern sector have been central to the settlement of the border dispute (Liu, 2011). Located in the extreme northeast of Kashmir, Aksai Chin (‘white stone’ plateau) is uninhabited land, a 38,000 square kilometers desolate area that is strategically important for China, with a motorway connecting Tibet to Xinjiang (Chaudhuri, 2009; Muratbekova, 2018). The McMahon Line is some 700 miles long (Chaudhuri, 2009). Proposed by Sir Henry McMahon during the Simla Convention in 1914, the Line is important for India not only due to its large Indian population and water resources but for the defense of the entire north-east (Muratbekova, 2018). Today the Line of Actual Control observed by both sides conforms to the McMahon Line. The disputed area between the pre-1914 Outer Line and the McMahon Line covers a total area of 90,000 square kilometres. China claims this area is composed of Tibet’s three districts Monyul, Loyul and lower Zayul, whereas India claims this area is its Arunachal Pradesh, formerly the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) of Assam State (Liu, 2011). In essence, the China–India border dispute has been the dispute on the ‘zone’ rather than the ‘line’ in the eastern and western sectors because in the old days, wide desolate tracts in the remote high mountains between the two countries were physically inaccessible. Thus ‘such a China–India boundary has never existed, though each side has made its own territorial claims’ (Liu, 2011). India established formal diplomatic relations with PRC in 1950. The 1950s is often called the “Chini-Hindi bhai bhai” period in terms of China-India relations, meaning “China-India are brothers”, reflecting the depth of the cultural and historical ties (Muratbekova, 2018). However, India and China’s different approaches to Tibet and disagreements over border demarcations limited China-India relations. To foster closer relations, Nehru and the Chinese premier Chou Enlai introduced the ‘Five

44 

S. I. ZHANG

Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ or Panchsheel in 1954. India officially accepted Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. In April 1955, Nehru and Chou Enlai jointly denounced colonialism at the first Afro-Asian conference or the Bandung conference in Indonesia (Chaudhuri, 2009). The trigger point that changed the attitudes of both countries was in 1959 when the Dalai Lama fled to India and accepted asylum there following a revolt in Lhasa. Tensions around the border dispute increased. As a result, territorial claims and misunderstandings led to the war (Chaudhuri, 2009; Muratbekova, 2018). To be exact, scholars such as Sidhu and Yuan (2001) and Liu (2011) argued that the border issue as well as Nehru’s policy of no-dispute and no-negotiation and his forward policy led to the border war in 1962. The forward policy involved establishing outposts occupied by Indian troops closest to the Indian claimed border so as to establish an Indian presence and deter further Chinese ‘incursions’ (Westcott, 2019). The Sino-Indian border war of 1962 broke out on October 20 and ended on November 22  in NEFA and Ladakh. Sino-Indian relations at this time were characterized by mutual antagonism, rivalry, distrust, and hostility (Muratbekova, 2018). The jury is still out as to who initiated the 32-day war (Topgyal, 2011). According to Basu (2000), border clashes became more frequent since the early 1962, and New Delhi was under immense domestic pressure to undertake tough military measures against the Chinese. Nehru announced on 12 October that he had instructed the Indian army to ‘throw the Chinese across the McMahon Line.’ Before this order could be carried out, however, the Chinese launched a massive attack all along the border on 20 October. However, Maxwell (2011) claimed that the Indian army made their first offensive move on October 10, inflicting significant casualties on the Chinese. On October 19, the Indian army assaulted a Chinese position in the Walong area, near the Burma end of the McMahon Line; and next day the Chinese launched a counter-offensive in self-defence. On November 22, Beijing declared the unilateral ceasefire; and a month later withdrew its forces. Topgyal (2011) also noted, China initiated operations in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh on October 20. It inflicted an embarrassing defeat on Indian forces, invading deep into Indian-controlled territory and then unilaterally withdrawing to its previous positions. While the Chinese referred to the war as teaching India a lesson, the Indians have never properly recovered from the shock and humiliation of that defeat (Topgyal, 2011). The war left a deep scar on bilateral relations (Sidhu & Yuan, 2001). It put Sino–Indian relations, including border negotiations, in deep-freeze

3  SINO-INDIAN BORDER CRISIS IN 2017 

45

without any diplomatic relations until 1976 (Topgyal, 2011). After the war, India’s political and military perceptions changed and all political issues were oriented toward China. China’s 1964 nuclear test further increased Sinophobia in India. China and India withdrew diplomatic missions and suspended all relations (Muratbekova, 2018). Since then, India and China clashed several times in the 1970s and 1980s, with the 1986–1987 standoff at Sumdorong Chu in the eastern sector being the most serious of them. Nonetheless, Beijing and New Delhi have sought to resolve the border issue through negotiations and confidence building measures since the late 1970s. In 1976, the two countries exchanged ambassadors and re-established diplomatic missions (Sidhu & Yuan, 2001). Regarding the border issue, Muratbekova (2018) and Liu (2011) divided the post war period into three stages. In the first stage in the 1980s, border discussions resumed in 1981 and eight rounds of talks were held before the historic visit of Rajiv Gandhi to Beijing in 1988. The second stage covered the 1990s including the short break during India’s nuclear tests of 1998. China–India interactions in this stage focused on the political and security fields (Liu, 2011). In 1993 and 1996, China and India signed two important agreements to maintain peace and reduce tensions along the Line of Actual Control (Sidhu & Yuan, 2001). The third stage started in the 2000s with establishing a strategic partnership between India and China. In 2008, the two countries concluded a ‘Shared Vision for the 21st century’, which forms the basis for bilateral cooperation on global issues. ‘If they focused on stabilizing their relations and securing their border areas in the 1990s, they have now shifted their attention to the settlement of their border dispute by developing their political and economic relations while taking concrete and substantive measures to resolve the border dispute’ (Liu, 2011). In 2013, the agreement signed on border defense cooperation was one more step toward a border settlement (Muratbekova, 2018). According to Muratbekova (2018), there are two different positions on settling the border issue between China and India today. China’s position was the ‘one package deal’ proposed by Deng Xiaoping, meaning China would accept the McMahon Line in return for India’s acceptance of the status quo in Aksai Chin. India refused to accept the package deal, insisting that the border should be examined through ‘sector wise examination’, investigating each sector separately. The border dispute has shadowed the ebb and flow of Sino-Indian relations (Liu, 2011). The ‘Ghosts of 1962’, referring to the 1962 war, still haunts the psychology of the strategic and political elite of India, and casts

46 

S. I. ZHANG

a long shadow over Indian perceptions of China today (Topgyal, 2011). In terms of China-India relations, distinct schools of thought exist: Pro-­ Indian scholars regard India as a victim of Chinese betrayal and expansions, whereas pro-Chinese scholars argue that China’s actions were completely justified (Muratbekova, 2018). There are many researches on the border dispute but most of the literature either simply provides historical accounts or seeks to establish the legitimacy of their side’s claims or blaming the other side for the breakdown of relations (Westcott, 2019). In recent years, scholars have re-examined the protracting border dispute and China-India relations from different perspectives. For instance, Chaudhuri (2009) used a cultural approach to revisit the border war of 1962, and argued that cultural beliefs, rooted in India’s past experience with colonial rule, guided the strategic decision-making process in the time of national security crisis. Maxwell (2011) used a historical approach to recapitulate the Sino-Indian border dispute, and concluded that the dispute and armed confrontation are the consequence of Indian expansionism and intransigence. India is to blame because ‘India created the dispute, made its resolution by diplomacy impossible, attempted to impose a settlement by force, and met defeat’. Liu (2011) argued that the trade relationship drive the overall bilateral relations in a positive manner with China becoming India’s largest trading partner in 2008. Muratbekova (2018) argued that the geopolitical change, the end of the Cold War and economic reforms drive the shifting perceptions on China-India relations. Topgyal (2011) highlighted the importance of Tibet issue in the border dispute and Sino-India relations, and argued that Tibet has now become a victim of the new realism pervading India’s policy of engaging and emulating China in the post-Cold War era. Moreover, Westcott (2019) used poliheuristic choice theory to examine the choices of Mao Zedong and Jawaharlal Nehru, and explained why these two leaders chose status quo policies before embracing either compromise or escalation policies in face of domestic pressure. Today China and India are collaborating with each other in multiple sectors but they are unable to resolve their border disputes. Tensions on the border are a routine matter (Qaddos, 2018). The 2017 Doklam border crisis goes beyond the territorial scope. ‘The crisis between Beijing and New Delhi quickly escalated to include mutual force buildups near that area and an exchange of explicit war threats’ (O’Donnell, 2018). The standoff coincided with an ongoing deterioration in bilateral relations and accelerated preexisting security dilemma dynamics. Indian strategists

3  SINO-INDIAN BORDER CRISIS IN 2017 

47

believe China seeks to militarily dominate disputed border areas whereas Chinese analysts attribute India’s military posturing to a desire for great power status, rather than defensive responses to perceived Chinese aggression (O’Donnell, 2018). In the end, factors such as geopolitical situation, trade relations, economic ties, power imbalance and international image led to de-escalation of conflict (Qaddos, 2018). Qaddos (2018) concluded, what drives the de-escalation of conflict was Chinese preference to not let the issue harm its policy of promoting regional and global connectivity with respect to the Belt & Road Initiative. Hence, China’s geo-­ economic interests prevailed over the geo-political. The 2017 Doklam conflict is a test for both China and India to manage the security dilemmas to improve bilateral relationship. Against this backdrop, the 2017 border crisis is taken as a case study to discuss the roles and interactions of different actors in the news network during the conflict process. Next, results from the content and textual analysis on the basis of GT  posts as well as web users’ comments and replies on Weibo will be presented and discussed.

3.2   Analysis of Global Times Posts In this section, results from the content and textual analysis will be presented and discussed on the basis of GT postings and users’ comments on Weibo pertaining to the Sino-Indian border crisis in 2017. The unit of analysis is each post/comment. The sampling time period was set for two months from 26 June to 28 August 2017. As a result, a total of 71 GT posts and 1409 users’ comments were collected. The trend/patterns of GT ’s online news coverage and the users’ reactions will be addressed firstly. Then five posts with the highest number of likes and shares as well as their corresponding users’ comments were selected for textual analysis with an aim of identifying key themes, frames, and use of languages/emojis. GT disseminated a total of 71 posts on its Weibo account @ Huanqiushibao during the sampling time period, of which 53 are coded as news and 18 are views. It suggests that GT ’s posts are dominantly news items rather than views on Weibo. As for the format of posts, the majority of posts contain texts, hyperlinks, photos, and/or videos. Three posts are texts only. It reveals that GT, as a newspaper-based media outlet, has fully employed Weibo’s multi-media technological features to disseminate news and views on the social media platform.

48 

S. I. ZHANG

In terms of news sources, more than half of the posts, 54% (38 out of 71), are taken from either GT ’s print edition or GT ’s website. However, while examining the sources within the texts, only six news posts clearly show elements of in-house reporting. It reflects the common way of how Chinese newspapers do international news. Editors usually start with selecting and taking information from external sources and then journalists do follow-up interviews with Chinese experts and scholars to solicit their comments or views on the news events. In other cases, journalists may make phone calls or go online to check and verify related information. One post dated on July 7 was titled ‘This is the corridor, which makes India live in the hypochondria that their throat is locked by China’. It indicates ‘…staff correspondent(s) recently went to this area with strategic importance (Siliguri corridor) that bears the ‘geographical curse’, and made investigations…’. This is the only investigative news report in which GT journalists conducted on-the-spot investigations on their own. Five main news sources were identified: (1) Chinese media such as People’s Daily, People’s Daily overseas net –haiwainet.cn, China Central Television Station (CCTV), Xinhua net and China Radio International Online, Ministry of Defense website; (2) foreign and global media such as The Times of India, Indian Express, The Financial Express of India, The Wire (thewire.in) of India, Dunya Pakistan online, Himshikhar Television of Nepal, The Australians, Reuters, CNN, and New York Times. (3) Chinese political elites such as spokespersons from Ministry of Defense, spokespersons and officials from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, military experts, research fellows, etc; (4) foreign political elites such as officials and diplomats from India, Trump administration, Bhutan, Japan, Russia, etc.; and (5) Hu Xijin, the editor-in-chief of GT. General terms such as Indian media, Indian government, Russian media and Chinese netizens were used. Five main themes are generated from the GT posts. First, China condemned Indian troop’s illegal intrusion and demanded India to withdraw its troops. For instance, on 26 June, the post was titled ‘Ministry of Defense: Indian troop’s cross-bordering blocked China’s road construction and jeopardized peace on frontier’. On 25 July, the post was titled ‘Wang Yi (China’s Foreign Minister): Indian troops shall withdraw honestly’. Second, India’s changing attitude from confrontation to appeasement. For instance, the post dated on 6 July indicated, ‘India claims China’s road construction on the border posed severe security risks. China: what about India’s deployment of troops and building fortresses?’. About

3  SINO-INDIAN BORDER CRISIS IN 2017 

49

one month later, the 28 July post indicated, ‘Want to cool down the situation? Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterates “developing partnership” with China’. Third, third-party countries’ involvement and attitudes towards the dispute. For instance, on 9 August, the post indicated, ‘Slapped in the face! Bhutan claims Doklam is not their territory. Surprised why India entered China’s territory’. Fourth, military confrontation, military power, deployment and maneuver. For instance, on 11 August, the post was ‘Indian media: India gets upper hand than China in terms of air strikes. (Chinese) experts: hitting airports is China’s strength’. Lastly, fake news and media hypes. For example, the 18 July post accused the Pakistan Dunya news network’s coverage of China’s rockets killing 158 Indian soldiers of fake news. The 26 August post wrote: ‘Indian guests are running trains on their mouths: the Liberate Army uses ‘China Kungfu’ to attack Indian army’. Based on the themes, five main frames are identified: China’s foreign policy, India’s foreign policy, military confrontation, third-party involvement, and fake news. Some posts contain more than one frame, for instance, it may illustrate both India’s attitude/policy and China’s response and policy. In these cases, both frames are noted down. Table 3.1 below shows the spread of frames. Table 3.1 reveals that China’s foreign policy is the most dominant frame (38%). Third-party involvement (23%) and military confrontation (21%) are strong frames. Turning to the popularity of GT ’s posts, Fig.  3.1 below shows the trend/pattern of forwards (shares), comments and likes. The horizontal axis indicates the serial number of posts and the vertical axis indicates the number of shares/comments/likes on Weibo. The peak time occurred on 4 and 5 August with posts No. 34 and No. 35 (See Table 3.2 for details), a few days after China’s military parade in Inner Mongolia on July 31, Table 3.1 Distribution of frames in GT posts on Weibo pertaining to the Sino-Indian border crisis in 2017 (N = 71)

Frames China’s foreign policy India’s foreign policy Third-party countries’ involvement Military confrontation ‘Fake news’ Data source: Sina Weibo

Number

Percentage

27 11 16

38% 15% 23%

15 7

21% 10%

50 

S. I. ZHANG

Fowards, Comments and Likes 35000

25000

30000

20000

25000

15000

20000

10000

15000 10000

5000 0

5000 1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61 64 67 70 Forwards

Comments

0

Likes

Fig. 3.1  The trend of forwards (shares), comments and likes of GT’s Weibo posts during the Sino-Indian border crisis in 2017. (Data source: Sina Weibo)

2017. The parade was seen to ‘show off its might’ (Lockie, 2017) and ‘reaffirm the CPC (Communist Party of China)’s absolute control over the army’ (Gao, 2017). It was ‘the first time that China commemorated Army Day, which falls on Aug. 1, with a military parade since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949’ (Xinhua, 2017). In the aftermath of the parade, Chinese government reiterated its stance and kept demanding the Indian government to withdraw its troops. At other times, there are small rises and falls but the pattern is generally stable. Based on the level of popularity, five posts were then selected for further textual analysis (see Table 3.2 below). It can be seen that the top two posts, the editorial about Modi administration on 4 August and the CNN video report on confrontation on 5 August, were the most popular posts that engaged deeply with the web users. Both have achieved the highest number of shares, comments and likes. The other three posts topped in either shares, or comments or likes respectively. However, the degree of these three posts’ popularity or users’ engagement has dropped greatly in comparison to the top two posts. Furthermore, except for post No. 34 that is editorial (views), the other four posts are news pieces but they mostly sourced from CNN and Indian

3  SINO-INDIAN BORDER CRISIS IN 2017 

51

Table 3.2 Five GT posts that have the largest number of shares, comments and likes Serial No.

Date/ Time

34

4 Aug, 15:44

35

57

20

41

Topic

Editorial: Modi administration shall not be a sinner to start Sino-Indian war 5 Aug, CNN discloses confrontation videos 10:30 on Sino-Indian border: Indian artillery-carriages run on roads of the front line 19 Suspected videos on Sino-Indian Aug, soldiers’ confrontation at Bangong 20:30 Tso, throwing rocks at each other 23 July, Finally Indian authoritative expert 19:00 speaks the truth: we are in the wrong, we have to withdraw troops! 9 Aug, Two big institutions of Nepal strongly 16:50 support China: ‘Doklam belongs to China. India shall withdraw troops unconditionally’

Forwards (shares)

Comments Likes

6281

20,073

33,084

5102

20,834

23,170

1033

2592

1434

857

3381

5204

476

1892

7284

Data source: Sina Weibo

media outlets. All the five posts used the multimedia format namely texts with hyperlinks, videos, and photos. They all used either frames of supporting China’s foreign policy (Post No. 34, 20 and 41) or military confrontational (conflict) frames (Post No. 35 and 57). Put in nutshell, the traditional division of views/news as well as internal/external news sources do not matter much on the social media platform. With the dividing line between views and news being blurred, both views and news items as well as in-house reporting and edited news reports can attract audience’s interests. What really matters are the use of particular frames that are either supportive of China’s foreign policy or conflict frames, as well as the use of multimedia format, videos and photos in particular, at time of crisis.

52 

S. I. ZHANG

3.3   Analysis of Web Users’ Comments and Replies Corresponding to the above-mentioned five most popular posts of GT, a total of 42 pieces of comments and replies were selected for textual analysis. Themes, frames, peer-to-peer interactions, the use of languages and emoji will be discussed below. Five main themes can be generated from web users’ comments and replies. First, Web users criticize Chinese government as well as China’s domestic and foreign policies. Netizens often expand the discussions and relate the current Sino-Indian border crisis to other border disputes, history and domestic issues. For instance, one user commented: ‘Diaoyu island, Spratly island, Sino-India border ok the only thing left is for Mongolia to take Inner Mongolia back…’. This quote suggests that Chinese government was weak and incompetent, getting itself into border disputes with almost all its neighboring countries. Another user made more direct and harsh comments: ‘…this country has no dignity or integrity…It’s totally no different from Qing Dynasty, seeking peace with payment. Pity the 1.4 billion housing slaves who have to pay for mortgages, traffic fines, forced insurance, higher oil prices compared to overseas…’. These comments show the users’ discontents towards the government as well as its domestic and foreign policies. Second, pro- or anti-war debate. On the one hand, some web users claimed that China shall fight against India. For instance, they commented: ‘(We) shall use actions to tell India what to do, rather than having a spat fight!’; ‘Motherland needs a war to comfort the world’s unsettled heart’. On the other hand, some voiced their opinions against the war for different reasons: ‘Hope it can be solved peacefully. Don’t want to fight a war. But if other countries come to invade us, we will show them a lesson!! China will win!’; ‘Give money if they want money. Give land if they want land. Or give them beauties. Don’t fire canons. The rich and the powerful all went to USA! What can the poor do.’ and ‘Those who said we should fight a war, shut the fuck up. You can’t think straight. You just talk shit. How many years the war will make the economy step back? They want you to fight a war. Don’t you understand the third-party benefits from the tussle?...’ These comments show that the heated debate is on among online users about fighting or not fighting a war with India. Third, provide suggestions on China’s strategies/tactics. For instance, one user commented: ‘(I) heard Doklam will become the firing range for

3  SINO-INDIAN BORDER CRISIS IN 2017 

53

China’s artillery and rocket army! But before the strike, (we) shall evaluate the reliability and precision of navigation function of Beidou (Northern Dipper) satellite system. In case of power-off or network breakdown, the commander shall have other means to continue with the fight.’ Another user commented: ‘…the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) shall take this opportunity to apply to the central government to increase investment on the infrastructure construction in Tibet and relevant regions. As soon as the money is allocated, roads built and airports set, the situation will be in our favor.’ Fourth, comment and evaluate India and other countries. Regarding India, comments include: ‘India has the ambition to seek hegemony. It does not have the wisdom and capability to seek hegemony. India thinks it can dominate the region because its population surpasses that of China’; ‘Play cheap in face of defeat. That’s certainly India’. Regarding Nepal’s support of China, comments include: ‘Well-done Nepal. It speaks the truth’; ‘Nepal used to be close to India when the Maoist Party was in power. Later the Indian National Congress came to power…getting even closer to India’; and ‘Nepal’s economy, 70% 80% comes from Brother Three (India)’. Fifth, joke about and make fun of the news content. In response to the GT ’s post titled ‘Suspected videos on Sino-Indian soldiers’ confrontation at Bangong Tso, throwing rocks at each other’, web users joked: ‘(They) can have a snowball fight in two months’; ‘I care more about whether we win out in the rock-throwing. We can’t lose’; ‘Who did the kick? Fantastic!’ Based on these themes, the following frames can be identified: comments on Chinese government, domestic and foreign policy; pro/anti-war debate; comments on India and third-party countries; comments on China’s military strategies/tactics; and joke/humor. In comparison to the themes and frames of GT ’s posts, despite some similarities and overlapping, web users’ comments have demonstrated more diverse, different and critical voices. The scope of themes and frames are much wider than that of the GT posts. In addition to users’ comments on the GT ’s posts, peer-to-peer conversations dominate the commentary area on Weibo. Netizens either indicate agreement with certain comments, reinforce and expand the ideas, or they disagree with the comments, criticize and abuse the users. Two examples are given below.

54 

S. I. ZHANG

Example 3.1 GT’s Post: Finally Indian authoritative expert speaks the truth: we are in the wrong, we have to withdraw troops! Users’ comment: Indian public intellectual. User’s reply 1: Chinese public intellectuals must have had the climax. User’s reply 2: You are slandering this Indian expert. He is not public intellectual—what he said is true. He did not attack or smear his own country either. On the contrary, he is saving India. In this example, the peer-to-peer dialogues/interactions showed different attitudes towards the Indian expert. When one user called the Indian expert ‘Indian public intellectual’, one respondent used sexual language to allude it to Chinese public intellectuals. The term ‘public intellectual’ in Chinese has negative connotations. It suggests that the well-educated Chinese who are active on the web and who enjoyed high social status slander and smear history. ‘They use some groundless historical facts as evidence and draw a conclusion: China will lose’ (JingshiVyan, 2017). In view of this, another respondent disagreed with the labelling and defended the Indian expert. Example 3.2 GT’s Post: Suspected videos on Sino-Indian soldiers’ confrontation at Bangong Tso, throwing rocks at each other. Users’ comment: I feel that India acts like a great power, though being elusive and speaking few words. It acts strong and does what it is supposed to do. Looking back on China, it has been invaded by others for about two months. Chinese citizens either abused India or abused each other. Media made presumptions. Some departments gave warnings or they were busy looking through the historical documents and 1962. It sucks! User’s reply 1: In the video, the way your father, the Indian soldier, rolled down the rocks was amusing! In this example, one web user praised India as a great power while criticizing China, Chinese government, Chinese netizens and Chinese media. The respondent who disagreed with him humiliated and abused this user referring to footages in the post.

3  SINO-INDIAN BORDER CRISIS IN 2017 

55

In sum, textual analysis of 42 entries of comments and replies reveals that GT’s posts have set the users’ agenda with its ideological stance and caused heated debate among web users on Weibo. GT does not moderate or directly involves in the debate. The online debates including comments and replies are a hybrid of information/opinion, rational/irrational, abusing/amusing, agreement/disagreement voices. While the online users’ comments are somewhat in alignment with the general themes and frames of GT posts such as China and India’s policy, third-party involvement and military confrontation, online users generated new themes and frames such as criticizing China’s domestic policy, foreign policy and societal issues, abusing, joking and making fun of India and other countries, making fun of the video footages in the news, peer-to-peer interactions, and so on. The themes and scope of the peer-to-peer conversations are much wider, personalized, opinionated and diversified than that of the mainstream media. The mainstream media such as GT mainly plays the role of initiating, informing, enforcing and reviving the online debate. Online users share their opinions, emotions and participate in the debate, rationally or irrationally. Regarding the usage of languages and emoji, in comparison to the official and formal use of languages by GT, web users have employed the functionalities of Weibo such as anonymity (using pseudo names or nicknames in accordance with the ‘front stage voluntary, backstage real name’ policy. See Chap. 2 for Real Name Registration (RNR) policy) and emoji to express themselves, make comments, and/or have a spat fight with other users. Table  3.3 below shows categories of some languages and emoji used by Chinese netizens. Table 3.3 shows that the online users use a great variety of languages and emoji to express their opinions, attitudes and emotions towards the border crisis and beyond. Since GT is a nationalist tabloid, it is not a surprise that many users use Weibo to stir up the nationalist sentiment, or to vent their anger using offensive languages, or to abuse others to achieve self-satisfaction. Some users make rational and insightful comments while others participate in the debate for fun or revealing certain sentiments.

3.4   Analysis of Macro-Structural Factors As Micó, Masip, and Domingo (2013) noted, the network approach shall integrate the social context and macro-structural factors into the analysis to generate explanatory power. This case demonstrates that the social

56 

S. I. ZHANG

Table 3.3  Online users’ usage of languages and emoji on Weibo Use of languages

Examples

Affirmative

Unconditionally support our motherland, Chinese Communist Party and People’s Liberation Army of China Whatever the result is, China will win in the end. Do remember! Abusive In order to prevent some retards from making damned noises, I make an announcement. Last time (China) protested for one year before fighting India Many trolls are bogus foreign devils who hold green cards of Western countries such as the imperialist USA. Racist Brother Three, hope you cherish that China is still throwing stones at you Can’t you just play with snakes, A San? Sarcasm I think we can form a keyboard army. Let the keyboard heroes who commented on the national issues go to the frontline… Come on, sooner or later we can shout them back home Strongly protest against Indian holy oil What do you know, this is India’s tactic—making the Liberation Army laugh to death and then inherit our land Metaphor Actually it is only the urban management officers (UMOs) who can and dare to fight the war in China. Americans are even afraid of China’s UMOs. UMOs are China’s most elite troops who can fight a real fight. One sentence: government is coward Parody Nepal: Big Brother, I’m running out of money Well-said. Will build you a rail way next year. Use of emoji Examples Which country in the world is not eyeing China with hostility? Smile Nothing wrong. You are not qualified to be the imaginary enemy of the USA. Laugh-Cry India sent people to talk about withdrawal of troops. It wants China to Allow me to be sad stop road construction at Doklam. However China does not talk with it … They are scared by road construction?!!! Nobody else can do that Spread out hands Seems the Indian experts have brains compared to Indian army Doge If we are not worried about the Belt & Road Initiatives being screwed up, Angry India would have already surrendered (continued)

3  SINO-INDIAN BORDER CRISIS IN 2017 

57

Table 3.3 (continued) Use of languages Shit

Examples (You) just fight with words. Don’t tell me something like you are going to the frontline in war. Those soldiers that are raised by high taxes eat

Data source: Sina Weibo

context and macro factors such as history, foreign policy, military strategies and tactics, and nationalism are significant indeed to explain and analyze the behavior, interactions and associations of actors in the social media network. After all, media-conflict relationship is multi-dimensional, historical and political in nature. Historically, since China and India established diplomatic relations in 1950, nearly 70 years passed but the border dispute remain unsolved and tensions even increased in 2017. The 2017 Doklam crisis was a reminiscent of the 1962 border war. Both professional news outlet and web users referred to the 1962 war in their social media content. For instance, the topic of GT’s post on 10 August was ‘Indian Sanskrit textbook wrongly claimed: India beat China in the 1962 war ’. This post clearly pointed out the historical fact of China’s victory in the 1962 border war with a contemptuous attitude towards the mistake made in the Indian textbook. One web user commented on 11 August: ‘in 1962, China made full preparations before fighting the war, gaining support from international public opinion and making pre-war mobilization within the country. Do you think you can fight a war anytime you want? Considering the geography of Tibet, what if the logistics can’t follow up? If we fight, we must make it a win.’ This web user used the 1960 war to highlight the importance of preparations, logistics, international public opinion, domestic mobilization and most of all the location of Tibet in the current conflict scenario. These posts and users’ comments cannot be explained or interpreted without the historical context. Foreign policy is a significant macro-structural factor. Since China is an authoritarian party/state and news outlets are state-owned, it is fair to say that the state foreign policy sets the mainstream media’s news agenda, and the mainstream media in turn sets the public (web users)’s agenda. In this case, O’Donnell (2018) indicates, the Doklam standoff is actually

58 

S. I. ZHANG

perception-fueled military competition. China’s perception of Indian military force development along the border as intentions for great power status, Xi’s assertive policy to resolve the border issue rather than shelving the difference, China and India’s deteriorating bilateral relations, and China’s policy of promoting BRI for its geo-economic interests set the tone of GT and the online debate. In addition, while the GT’s posts conform to and support the foreign policy, Weido provides a freer space for web users to comment and even criticize China’s foreign policy. Military strategies and tactics are another significant macro-structural factor. According to O’Donnell (2018)’s assessment, China has superior mobilization logistics but India will enjoy conventional military advantage over China once its conventional force modernization is complete. In addition, Beijing and New Delhi hold different views on nuclear deterrence. ‘New Delhi assesses that Beijing will only view India’s nuclear deterrent as credible once India can deploy missiles, such as the Agni-V, that can reach Beijing and Shanghai. Chinese strategists assert that such Indian targeting goals are unnecessary for stable bilateral deterrence, despite China’s larger, superior nuclear arsenal’ (O’Donnell, 2018). In view of the secrecy that usually shrouds military information, both GT and online users make assumptions or speculations on military matters. For instance, on 29 July, GT cited a report on valuewalk.com of the US and claimed ‘China obviously has advantages in almost all military fields’. The author traced the original article but can’t find this statement. This quote seems to contradict O’Donnell (2018)’s assessment of the two countries’ military advantages. On 6 August, one web user commented: ‘for instance the nuclear warheads, (China) publicly announced that the number is 250. Anyone will be a 250 (a 250 means a fool in Chinese) if he believes it .’ This quote suggests this web user does not believe that China possesses 250 nuclear warheads. He demonstrated his disbelief and mistrust of the military information with a dog face showing his disbelief and sarcastic attitude. Nationalism is an important macro factor in studying territory disputes and military conflicts. As Muratbekova (2018) pointed out, the Sino-­ Indian border issue is important to defend territorial integrity and sovereignty at a time of constructing nationalism of both China and India. As a popular nationalist tabloid, GT constructs and disseminates nationalist discourses on Weibo that can be summarized as ‘Doklam belongs to China, India must withdraw its troops’, ‘China is in the right and India is

3  SINO-INDIAN BORDER CRISIS IN 2017 

59

in the wrong’, ‘China will win and India will lose’, coupled with warnings and threats. The ‘China vs. India’ or ‘us vs. them’ dichotomy is evident. Ma (2018) noted, the feelings of hatred is one of the most defining features in the online nationalist discourses, and such feelings were discursively nurtured, maintained and reinforced by drawing a clear boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’. In this regard, both GT and online users have used Weibo to disseminate nationalist discourses and stir up the nationalist sentiment.

3.5   Conclusion This chapter starts with giving a brief historic overview of the Sino-Indian border dispute. It then applies the new analytical model—media and conflict actor-network in the social media era—in the case of 2017 Doklam military standoff. It analyses social media content and macro-structural factors surrounding the case. Four conclusions can be made. First, news outlets such as GT have incorporated Weibo in its news production. They post news updates and views regularly and lead public debate with their ideological stances. This case reveals that the traditional division of news/views and in-house/external news sources are not so important on the social media platform. The professional media’s use of foreign policy and conflict frames as well as the use of multimedia format are most important at time of crisis to attract the attention of and engage with the web users. Second, the online users, while keeping in line with the GT’s frames to a large extent, generated new frames such as criticizing China’s domestic policy and societal issues, involving in the war debate, abusing, joking and making fun of India and other countries, and so on. The scope of the peer-­ to-­peer dialogues are much wider, personalized, opinionated and diversified. The mainstream media such as GT mainly plays the role of initiating, informing, enforcing and reviving the online debate. Online users use different forms of languages and emoji to express their opinions, attitudes, emotions and sentiments towards the border crisis and beyond. Third, social media platform, with its technical features and user cultures, has afforded news outlets and web users (individuals) an extraordinary networking power. In terms of censorship, Chinese publics seem to enjoy much more leeway in addressing the border issues than that of domestic issues on social media platforms. Nobody complained that their posts were censored or deleted. The wide use of abusive, provocative,

60 

S. I. ZHANG

racist languages as well as criticisms about the Chinese government and policies suggest that Weibo presents an open and free platform when it comes to the border crisis. However, on the downside, the constraining force of the social media platform is embodied in the online echo-chamber effect and chilling effect. Web users re-enforce their ideas and views about the on-going crisis by the means of sharing, commenting and interacting with other users on the platform, whereas those who make different voices encounter abuses and bullying, thus may be unwilling to participate in the debate any more. Fourth, the macro-structural factors including history, foreign policy, the military, and nationalism are significant within the social mediaenabled actor-network. It shall also be noted that even though China and India are the major players in the Sino-Indian border dispute and conflict, other countries such as Bhutan, Nepal, Pakistan, the US and Russia have geo-­political and geo-strategic interests in the border conflict as well. Next, I will turn the gaze from the south-western border to the eastern border and examine the controversial Diaoyu islands dispute.

References Basu, P. P. (2000). The press as participant: Sino-Indian border dispute (1959–63). Jadavpur Journal of International Relations, 5(1), 104–116. Chaudhuri, R. (2009). Why culture matters: Revisiting the Sino-Indian Border War of 1962. Journal of Strategic Studies, 32(6), 841–869. Gao, C. (2017). China’s Military Parade Reaffirms Communist Party’s Absolute Control Over Army, Aug 1. Accessed on December 20, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/chinasmilitary-parade-reaffirms-communist-partysabsolute-control-over-army/ JingshiVyan, (2017). China public intellectual is walking into dead end! (中国公 知，正在步 入穷途末路!). Accessed on December 16, 2018, https://www. sohu.com/a/212472405_688977 Liu, X. (2011). Look beyond the Sino–Indian border dispute. China Report, 47(2), 147–158. Lockie, A. (2017). China held a massive military parade showing off its might — and it could surpass the US by 2030. Accessed on December 20, 2018, https:// www.businessinsider.com/china-military-paradesuperior-to-us-by-20302017-7 Ma, Y. (2018). Online Chinese nationalism: A competing discourse? A discourse analysis of Chinese media texts relating to the Beijing Olympic torch relay in Paris. The Journal of International Communication, 24(2), 305–325.

3  SINO-INDIAN BORDER CRISIS IN 2017 

61

Maxwell, N. (2011). Why the Sino–Indian border dispute is still unresolved after 50 years: A recapitulation. China Report, 47(2), 71–82. Micó, J.  L., Masip, P., & Domingo, D. (2013). To wish impossible things: Convergence as a process of diffusion of innovations in an actor-network. International Communication Gazette, 75, 118. Mohanty, N. R. (2017, July 11). A Sino-Indian War in 2017 will not be a repeat of 1962. Retrieved on November 15, 2019, https://www.nationalheraldindia. com/international/a-sino-indian-war-in-2017-will-not-be-a-repeat-of-1962 Muratbekova, A. (2018). The Sino-Indian border issue as a factor for the development of bilateral relations. Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, 3(1), 3–12. O’Donnell, F. (2018). Stabilizing Sino-Indian security relations—Managing strategic rivalry after Doklam, The Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy. 2018 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_335_ODonnell_Sino_Indian_Security_Brief.pdf Qaddos, M. (2018). Sino-Indian border conflict and implications for bilateral relations. Policy Perspectives, 15(2), 57–69. Sidhu, W.  P. S., & Yuan, J. (2001). Resolving the Sino-Indian border dispute: Building confidence through cooperative monitoring. Asian Survey, 41(2), 351–376. Topgyal, T. (2011). Charting the Tibet issue in the Sino–Indian border dispute. China Report, 47(2), 115–131. Vasquez, J.  A. (2009). The war puzzle revisited. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Vasquez, J. A., & Henehan, M. T. (2001). Territorial disputes and the probability of war, 1816–1992. Journal of Peace Research, 38(2), 123–138. Westcott, S. P. (2019). Mao, Nehru and the Sino-Indian border dispute: A poliheuristic analysis. India Quarterly, 75(2), 155–171. Xinhua, (2017). New features give China’s first Army Day parade a more combat feel, 30 July. Accessed on December 16, 2018, http://english.china.com/ news/china/54/20170730/1034269.html

CHAPTER 4

Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute in 2017–2018

Territorial conflicts posed dangers to international peace and states with territorial claims are more likely to initiate militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) that may escalate to war and develop rivalries (Mattes, 2018). Along China’s 9000 miles of coastline, the East and South China Seas are the sites of China’s most contentious territorial disputes and the most important targets of the nation’s Peaceful Development campaign (Dixon, 2014). The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute in the East China Sea is seen as one of the ‘on-going international disputes with the greatest potential for escalation’ (Mattes, 2018), ‘one of the most salient territorial conflicts in the world’ (Wang, 2017), and ‘the single most pressing foreign policy challenge for Beijing and Tokyo’ (Manicom & O’Neil, 2009). Since the 1970s, the ownership of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands has been a source of contention between China and Japan due to the economic interests, energy supply, national identity issues, historical grievances, power politics and political distrust (Liao, 2008; Wang, 2017). As Kim (2018) noted, tensions in the East China Sea have emerged as important elements that could test Sino-Japanese relations with greater regional security implications. Especially considering the on-going regional power shift and escalating nationalist passions on both sides, which put pressure on policymakers to be tougher when dealing with the Diaoyu/Senkaku controversy, the tug-of-war between China and Japan is likely to escalate with greater challenges to find any sustainable and peaceful resolution (Kim, 2018).

© The Author(s) 2020 S. I. Zhang, Media and Conflict in the Social Media Era in China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7635-5_4

63

64 

S. I. ZHANG

With regards to the role of Chinese media in Sino-Japanese conflicts, the orthodox view was that the Chinese media have shaped public opinion by promoting hostile sentiment toward Japan, thereby preventing China and Japan from achieving an effective national reconciliation (Guan, 2018). However most research in this regard has been event-based and crisis-driven (Guan, 2018). In contrast, Guan (2018)’s analysis of People’s Daily’s coverage of the Sino-Japanese relations between 2001 and 2015 showed that the People’s Daily attempted to de-radicalize the antagonistic sentiments towards Japan and stabilize Sino-Japanese relations. Moreover, with Chinese media ecology having shifted from a top-down information delivery to a networked communication space, it is important to examine the responses, reactions and re-interpretations of the official frames used by other media participants (Guan, 2018). On Chinese social media platforms, prior research demonstrated that discussion of prominent issues can get heated without a gatekeeper who would filter or edit content for public consumption (Wu, 2015). Wu (2015) analyzed uncivil online comments and emotional responses on Diaoyu Island sovereignty in Tianya Club, the popular online discussion board, and found that fear and disgust were not typical emotional responses to incivility among the members of the forum. On the contrary, ‘support’ was the most identified emotional response. She concluded that cultural context, characteristics of an issue, and characteristics of a particular topic are important factors that affect ‘incivility’ and ‘emotional response’ in online comments (Wu, 2015). Against this backdrop, this chapter focuses upon the actions and interactions of state media GT and users on Weibo regarding the Diaoyu/ Senkaku Islands dispute. The sampling time period was set for two years in 2017 and 2018, a comparatively quiet and peaceful time period. The chapter is organized as follows: it firstly provides a backgrounder highlighting a few landmark historical events/crisis as well as the general development and transitions of Sino-Japanese relations. It then presents and analyses results from the content and textual analysis on the basis of Global Times’ posts as well as web users’ comments and replies on Weibo. Lastly, it discusses the importance and impacts of the contextual factors of history, foreign policy (Sino-Japan bilateral relations), security (military) and nationalism, and gives a conclusion.

4  DIAOYU/SENKAKU ISLANDS DISPUTE IN 2017–2018 

65

4.1   A Brief Historic Overview of Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute China has disputed Japan’s sovereignty of Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in the East China Sea for five decades. The island chain, comprised of eight small, uninhabited, barren islands, is located about 120 nautical miles west of Fujian Province in China, 90 nautical miles northwest of islands in the Japanese Ryukyu island chain, and on the edge of the continental shelf about 100  miles northeast of Taiwan (Wiegand, 2009; Zhao, 2008). Japan considers these islets as part of the Ryukyus whereas China claims them as part of the Taiwan province and therefore part of China (Zhao, 2008). In the current debates, two competing views have emerged: the pro-China group emphasizes the use of historical evidence whereas the pro-Japan group focuses on the ‘discover’ theory in international law, arguing that the Japanese ‘rediscovered’ these islands in 1884, as terra nullius (un-administered territory or no-man’s land). In reality, the Diaoyu Islands have become ‘hostage’ to Japan and China since the 1970s (Suganuma, 2007: 157). From the legal (international law) perspective, Japan and China’s positions are totally different. Japan’s position was that the Japanese government took procedures to administer these islands in January 1895, three months before the Treaty of Shimonoski signed at the close of the first Chinese-Japanese War, and the islands have been under Japan’s sovereign rule since then. China’s position was based on the 1943 Cairo Declaration, which prescribed that “all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.” The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are among those territories. Japan’s occupation of the islands is in violation of the Cairo Declaration and the 1945 Potsdam Declaration (Togo, 2014). Simply speaking, the issue is about eight rocky islets ‘which belonged to China historically but are currently controlled by the Japanese government administratively.’ (Liao, 2008). Historically, documentary evidence from China’s Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1911) dynasties indicates China’s possession of the islands prior to the First Sino–Japanese War (1894–1895). At the end of this war, Japan incorporated the islands under the Okinawa Prefecture. In 1953, the United States assumed administrative control as a result of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty after World War II and then returned them to Japan on 15 May 1972, as accorded by the Okinawa Reversion

66 

S. I. ZHANG

Treaty signed by the US and Japan in 1971 (Wang, 2017). However, Wiegand (2009) indicates that Japan first legally acquired the disputed islands from China as surrounding islands of Formosa (Taiwan) as part of the Treaty of Shimonoseki after the Sino-Japanese War of 1895. Japan has had effective control over the islands, monitored by the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency (MSA) since 1972 (Wiegand, 2009). The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands attracted attention after the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) of the United Nations conducted a survey in 1968, which indicated the possible existence of petroleum resources in the East China Sea (Sato, 2019). China made its formal claim for the islands and surrounding waters on December 30, 1971. In the official claim, the Foreign Ministry office claimed usurped ownership and encroachment of China’s sovereign territory, which had been part of China’s territory since the fifteenth century. The Japanese reacted to China’s claim by stating that ‘the Senkaku islands have been consistently a part of Japan’s territory of Nansei Shoto’. Japan maintains occupation of the islands, claiming there is no territorial dispute, while China claims the islands as part of its national sovereignty (Wiegand, 2009). In the 1970s, China made it clear that they did not want to touch on the issue (Akio, 2017: 31). In negotiating the terms of diplomatic normalization in 1972 with Takeiri Yoshikatsu, the then leader of the Komei Party, Premier Zhou Enlai said: ‘There is no need to touch on the question of the Senkaku Islands. I don’t think Mr. Takeiri, you were interested in the issue. I wasn’t, either, but because of oil, some historians started to raise the issue, and in Japan Mr. Inoue Kiyoshi is keen. There is no need to pay much attention to this issue.’ (Akio, 2017: 31–32) After Japan and China signed the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship on August 12, 1978, Deng Xiaoping publicly stated that the Diaoyu Islands issue should be left to posterity (Suganuma, 2007: 159). Deng held that ‘China and Japan are faced with different circumstances, and it is fully understandable that the two may have different views towards certain issues’, such as that of the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands. Deng suggested that the issue be left for the next-generation, who ‘will be wiser than us [to solve the problem]’ (Liao, 2008). Hence, following the principle of ‘shelving’ (ge zhi) their territorial dispute for later generations, China and Japan were unable to reach a consensus regarding the sovereignty of the Diaoyu/ Senkaku Islands (Liao, 2008). In the 1970s and 1980s, Japan was introduced to the Chinese as a model of modernization (Akio, 2017: 60) Many Chinese scholars referred

4  DIAOYU/SENKAKU ISLANDS DISPUTE IN 2017–2018 

67

to the 1970s and early 1980s as a ‘honeymoon’ period in the bilateral relationship between Japan and China. Since the mid-1980s, anti-Japan protests have erupted in a regular manner, causing uncertainties and sometimes even crises in the bilateral relationship (Zhang, 2007: 17). Zhang (2007: 17) claimed, while Chinese nationalist indignation at Japan is long-standing and deep-rooted, it should be noted that for the first decade after the normalization of ties, historical feuds did not constitute a major problem for either side. Historically, Japan supported China’s shift from Maoist autarchy to an open-door policy whereby the mainland China developed and integrated into the global economy. Japan sought to prevent the international ostracism of China after the 1989 June 4th Tiananmen event when Emperor Akihito visited Beijing in 1992 (Er, 2017: 5). However, the 1990s represented a watershed in the development of popular anti-Japanese sentiments in China when nongovernmental groups and activists began to play an influential role in shaping the agenda of bilateral disputes and conducting anti-Japanese actions (Zhang, 2007: 18). In this time period, the highest point for feelings of closeness was the Emperor’s 1992 China visit, while the lowest point was in 1996 when the Chinese military conducted missile tests off the coast of Taiwan to intimidate the Taiwanese at the time of their presidential election (Akio, 2017: 38). In 1992, Beijing promulgated the Law of the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, in which it listed all the islands in the East China Sea and the South China Sea over which it claimed sovereignty, including the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. In 1993, China revised its military strategy, emphasizing the extension of its defense sphere to the near seas and the space above it (Akio, 2017: 38). In response, Japan pursued the ‘no-dispute’ policy and insisted that the issue of sovereignty should not even be discussed with China. Japan’s ulterior motive may have been a careful approach of ‘strategic non-action’, so as to control the islands without provoking China. In time, effective control will become internationally recognized and legally consolidated (Hagstrom 2005: 169–170, cited in Yee, 2011). A crisis took place in July 1996 when a right-wing Japanese group went to the islands to renovate a lighthouse they constructed in 1978 and demanded the Japanese government recognize the lighthouse (Zhao, 2008). The Chinese government made a protest to the Japanese government about these activities and allowed the establishment of China Federation for Defending the Diaoyu Islands in mainland China. Similar entities were also established in Taiwan and Hong Kong. Hong Kong and Taiwan activists succeeded in landing Uotsurijima

68 

S. I. ZHANG

Island in October 1996, after the drowning of David Chan Yuk-cheung. ‘The PRC government attitude toward the Senkaku Islands was rather moderate and restrained in 1996’ (Sato, 2019). Pragmatic leaders in Beijing feared the dispute would fan popular anti-Japanese sentiment that in turn would force the government to take proactive action seriously damaging relations with Japan. Thus the dispute was not reported at all in the Chinese media until tensions subsided (Zhao, 2008). In sum, new trends emerged in Sino-Japanese relations in the 1990s. ‘While there was a boost in economic exchange due to China’s acceleration of reform and opening, sharp frictions emerged in the areas of history and security,’ Akio (2017: 44) noted. ‘But we should not overlook the fact that the benefits of cooperation were substantial, and the countries generally upheld conciliatory policies towards each other.’ In the twenty-first century, the bilateral relationship became increasingly bumpy and a popular phrase ‘hot economics, cool politics’ came to describe the Sino-Japanese relations. At the turn of the new century, there seemed ‘a “resource war” over the contested vast oil and gas reserves in the East China Sea’ (Hsiung, 2007: 1). During the tenure of Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro (April 2001 to September 2006), a series of events and confrontations occurred including visits by Japanese Prime Minister to the ceremonial Yasukuni Shrine and oil drilling rights over the disputed territory in the East China Sea. Among these disputes, the territorial boundary in the East China Sea was a fundamental issue (Suganuma, 2007: 155). Rose (2010) also observed that the 2001–2006 period saw a marked shift in Japan’s China diplomacy towards an assertive stance due to Koizumi’s particular stance on China as well as heightened concerns about China’s military modernization, rapid economic growth, environmental impact, and energy requirements. The Japanese government considers itself the owner of one islet in the group, Chiwei, while the others are privately held (Suganuma, 2007: 160). In October 2002, the Japanese government registered, and flaunted, its ‘renal’ (from private owners) of three of the five disputed islands. This move sparked protests from China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Eventually the ‘anti-Japanese movement’ erupted inside China during the Asian Football Cup in 2004. By the end of 2005, the Diaoyu Islands had turned into a heated issue of contention between Tokyo and Beijing. The suicide of a 46-year-old Japanese envoy at the consulate-general in Shanghai was symbolic of the complications of the territorial issue (Suganuma, 2007: 160). Zhang (2007: 15) claimed: ‘2005 will be remembered as a most

4  DIAOYU/SENKAKU ISLANDS DISPUTE IN 2017–2018 

69

disturbing year.’ In April 2005, violent anti-Japanese mass demonstrations took place in many Chinese cities, signifying the rise of a new wave of anti-­ Japanese nationalism. The scale, intensity and violence of this outburst took the world by surprise. Unlike popular protests in the 1980s and 1990s, anti-Japanese sentiment has become increasingly aggressive rather than reactive (Zhang, 2007: 22). Meanwhile, China also advanced steadily towards the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. In March 2004, seven activists sent by the China Federation for Defending the Diaoyu Islands landed on Uotsurijima, the largest island, and were arrested and deported by the Japanese authorities. In 2006, the China Marine Surveillance of the State Oceanic Administration established the Regular Patrol System to Protect Interests in the East China Sea (Akio, 2017: 56). Abe became the Prime Minister in September 2005 and he visited China 13 days later. However, the core issue – territorial conflict – will not be settled unless the Yasukuni Shrine issues are resolved first (Suganuma, 2007: 166). After the deep-freeze in Sino-Japanese relations between 2001 and 2006, Abe avoided the Shrine during his first tenure as Prime Minister. In 2008, the two countries agreed to cooperate in joint development in East China Sea (Er, 2017: 245). Another two events that happened in the first decade of the twenty-first century include Koizumi’s quest for Japan to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2004, and the doctoring of Japanese history textbooks in 2005. In all, China has opposed a Japanese permanent seat on the UN Security Council and protested the Japanese history textbook that is perceived as whitewashing Japanese WWII atrocities in China, and the Japanese Prime Minister’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. ‘In addition to the territorial disputes, the relations between the two countries have been troubled by political and military competitions,’ Zhao (2008) noted: ‘both China and Japan are net oil importers…These two countries’ quest for energy security has enflamed these tensions.’ Since 2010, two incidents have brought the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue to the forefront of public consciousness, causing the most serious deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations (Denemark & Chubb, 2016). Akio (2017: 25) noted: ‘Clashes over the SenKaka (Diaoyu) Islands in 2010 and 2012 have heightened tension to a level that have caused some people in both countries to raise the possibility of war.’ On 7 September, 2010, a Chinese trawler collided with the Japanese Coast Guard’s patrol boats near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The Chinese captain Zhan Qixiong was detained and later released without charge. This incident ‘provoked Chinese public

70 

S. I. ZHANG

protests and led to large-scale, anti-Japanese demonstrations in many Chinese cities’. (Guan, 2018) ‘The event was not resolved until China suspended diplomatic and civilian exchanges with Japan and threatened to stop rare earth exports’ (Yee, 2011). Yee (2011) argued that Japan’s position of ‘no-dispute’ and exercise of ‘quiet power’ was evident throughout the incident, as Japan stated that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were an integral part of Japanese territories, and that the Chinese captain was being detained for breach of Japanese law. Japan’s nationalization of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in 2012 led Sino-Japanese relations reach a historic freezing point (Ye, 2019). In March of  2012, the Chinese coast guard started its first patrol of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands (Guan, 2018). On 16 April 2012, Tokyo’s Governor Shintaro Ishihara made a government proposal to ‘purchase’ the Diaoyu Islands in a speech in the United States. On 10 September 2012, the Japanese Prime Minister, Yoshihiko Noda, announced that the Japanese government would nationalize the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands by purchasing them from a private owner (Guan, 2018; Wu et  al., 2016). This announcement provoked large-scale anti-Japanese protests and demonstrations in many cities across China. An overall boycott of Japanese goods also occurred (Guan, 2018; Wu et al., 2016). In view of this incident, China’s narrative was that Japan broke the 1972 and 1978 ‘shelving agreement’ by nationalizing the islands. Japan denied the existence of such an agreement and argued that it was the Chinese who broke the supposed agreement by including the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in their territorial waters law in 1992, leading to the December 2008 declaration of ‘accumulating evidence to prove actual control.’ (Togo, 2014) Both countries see each other as a threat. However, Moore (2014) argues that it was the domestic political environment in Japan that led to the nationalization of the islands. ‘The move was not a decision taken in Tokyo to poke China in the eye, so to speak. Rather, it was the result of a contest between moderate and rightist elements in the Japanese government and society more broadly speaking.’ (Moore, 2014). Akio (2017: 56) went further and noted that with or without this incident, ‘sooner or later there would be a clash between the two countries over the Senkaku Islands…However there seemed to be a tendency that discussions in China exaggerated the intentions of Japan.’ In 2012, Xi Jinping and Abe Shinzo became the top political leaders in China and Japan. Both are strong leaders who ‘happened to be markedly more nationalistic than their immediate predecessors.’ (Akio, 2017: 45)

4  DIAOYU/SENKAKU ISLANDS DISPUTE IN 2017–2018 

71

Both have adopted assertive policy over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. In December 2012, tensions between the two countries nearly broke into an armed conflict. In November 2013, the Chinese government established an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), which includes the territorial airspace above the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, elevating its territorial claims in the East China Sea to a higher level (Cotillon, 2017). In December 2015 and January 2016, China entered the disputed waters twice, showing that it stands by its claim on the maritime territory surrounding the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (Cotillon, 2017). In Japan, Abe declared after the parliamentary election in December 2012: ‘the islands are the inherent territory of Japan…We own and effectively control them. There is no room for negotiations about them.’ Abe continued the ‘no-dispute’ policy and expanded Japanese security policy (Castro, 2017: 215). In July 2014, the Abe Cabinet announced a defense policy reform based on the reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution that would allow the Self Defense Force to exercise the right of collective self-defense (Castro, 2017: 228). After all, Abe’s ‘life mission’ is constitutional revision, especially the jettisoning of Article 9 of the peace constitution which forbids Japan from resorting to war to settle international disputes (Er, 2017: 248). In 2015, the US and Japan upgraded their security alliance by publishing a new version of the ‘US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines’, expanding the scope of the US–Japan alliance from Japan’s main island to the global context so as to restrict China’s growing regional influence (Ye, 2019). During the Xi Jinping  – Abe era (2012  – present), what’s unprecedented is that ‘the evolving economic and geostrategic power parity, caused by China’s rise and Japan’s new defence policy, have raised the stake of the issue along with the chances for overt confrontation between the two states’ (Kim, 2018). Guan (2018)’s analysis of People’s Daily news coverage on Sino-Japanese relations finds that the historical themes were dramatically played down during this time period. Meanwhile contemporary conflict was more reported surrounding two main topics of the territorial dispute in the East China Sea and the adjustment of Japanese security policies. According to Pew Research Center’s 2016 survey, majorities in China and Japan view each other as violent and with disdain. In fact, ‘80 per cent of Japanese and 59 per cent Chinese fear military clash around the East China Sea.’ (Kim, 2018).

72 

S. I. ZHANG

4.2   Analysis of Global Times Posts In this section, results from the content and textual analysis surrounding the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute are presented, analyzed and discussed. The sampling time period was set for two years from 1 January 2017 to 31 December 2018. As a result, a total of 60 GT posts (35 for 2017 and 25 for 2018) and 965 users’ comments (595 for 2017 and 370 for 2018) were collected. The trend/patterns of GT’s online news coverage and the users’ reactions were addressed first. Then five posts with the highest number of shares, comments and likes as well as their corresponding users’ comments were selected for textual analysis with an aim of identifying key themes, frames, and use of languages/emojis. With regards to the news/views division, of the 60 GT posts, 52 posts are coded as news whereas eight are views. Though the majority of the posts are news reports, it shall be noted that the dividing line between news and views is blurring, which makes the coding difficult. The facts and views (commentary) are often mixed up in the post. For instance, on 11 January 2018, the topic of the post is ‘Q&As of News Agency of Defense Ministry on Japan’s hype-up of Chinese navy’s entry into contiguous zone of Diaoyu Islands’. In answering to a journalist’s question, the post is mainly about the Defense Ministry’s statement on the legality of China Navy’s entry into the waters and China’s opposition to Japan’s hype-up, thus this post is coded as views. Another example is a post dated on 2 January 2018. Though being coded as news, it actually reported the views of a Japanese entertainer who claimed during a TV debate that if the Diaoyu Islands was ‘invaded’, Japan shall raise the white flag and surrender. Regarding the news sources, 80% (48 out of 60) posts are sourced from GT’s print edition and/or GT’s website. Combining the news sources and the in-text attributions, six main sources are identified: (1) Chinese media such as Reference News, People’s Daily, People’s Daily overseas net –haiwainet.cn, China Central Television Station (CCTV), Xinhua International, and Taiwan media. (2) Chinese government institutions such as Ministry of Defense and its website, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, spokespersons from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China Coast Guard’s official Weibo account @China Coast Guard. (3) Japanese and global media such as NHK of Japan, Kyodo News Service of Japan, Asahi Shimbun of Japan, Yomiuri Shinbun of Japan, The Mainichi of Japan, Jiji News Agency of Japan, TV Asahi of Japan, DHC TV of Japan, Yonhap News Agency of South Korea, Financial Times of UK, CNN of the USA, Euro News Italy,

4  DIAOYU/SENKAKU ISLANDS DISPUTE IN 2017–2018 

73

and Pilipino media. (4) Japanese government institutions, politicians and elites such as Japanese government, Japanese Foreign Ministry, Japan Coast Guard, Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Japanese Prime Minister Abe, Japanese former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida, Japanese senators, Japanese foreign affairs director, former Lieutenant General of Japan Air Self-Defense Force, Ishigaki Mayor Yoshitaka Nakayama Japanese historians, specialists in Sino-Japanese relations, journalist and entertainer. (5) US senior officials including Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and Secretary of State (6) Hu Xijin, the editor-in-chief of GT. It finds that Chinese/Japanese media as well as Chinese/Japanese government institutions are dominant sources. In comparison to Chinese official sources that are limited to spokespersons from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense and China Coast Guard, Japanese sources are more diverse ranging from government officials, politicians, militaries to academics and social elites. Five main themes are generated from the GT posts. First, security issues including China’s coast guard patrol, China-Japan confrontation, Japan/ US military buildup and US-Japan alliance. China’s routine patrol in the Diaoyu/Senkaku waters is the biggest event covered by the GT in 2017–8. For example, the posts read: ‘First Time! Japan claims China submarine enter contiguous waters of Diaoyu Islands’ on 18 January 2018. ‘Japan establishes “Marine Corps” to defend Diaoyu Islands; China Ministry of Foreign Affairs: It won’t change the facts’ on 28 March 2018. Second, China and Japan’s policy and diplomacy towards the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. In addition to the conventional foreign policy-oriented posts on the basis of statements made by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this category includes Japan’s name changing of the island and the MUJI event. For instance, on 21 September 2017, the topic of the post was ‘Play a little trick again: Japanese government plans to change the name of Diaoyu Islands of China’. On 31 January 2018, the post was ‘MUJI revises the map that misses out Diaoyu Islands as requested by China; Japanese government protests’. Third, Japan’s education issue including textbook. For instance, on 30 January 2017, the post was ‘Japan makes an issue of Diaoyu Islands again; Intends to strengthen “territorial education” at schools’. On 25 January 2018, ‘Japan’s little trick becomes official; “The National Museum of Territory and Sovereignty” opens today’. Fourth, historical evidence. On 21 March 2017, the post was ‘An Italian Chinese donated Italian version of China ancient map; It indicates the historical

74 

S. I. ZHANG

ownership of Diaoyu Islands’. Fifth, others including the Yasukuni Shrine issue, Taiwan and Japanese entertainer’s comments. Based on the above-mentioned themes, five frames are identified: Security/Military, Policy/Diplomacy, Education, History and Others. Table 4.1 below shows the spread of frames. Table 4.1 reveals that security/military is the most dominant frame (52%) and policy/diplomacy is a strong frame. This result aligns with Guan (2018)’ finding that the historical themes were dramatically played down and contemporary conflict was more reported. In this case, security issues are widely reported as evidenced by the fact that more than half of the GT posts contain security frame. As for the popularity of GT’s posts, Fig. 4.1 below shows the trend/ pattern of forwards (shares), comments and likes. Figure 4.1 shows that the trend/pattern of shares, comments and likes of GT posts is very unstable with frequent ups and downs. The sharp rising number of shares and comments is not necessarily consistent with the number of likes, meaning online users who share and comment a particular post may not like the post. In other words, the significance of a post evidenced by the number of shares and comments is not in proportion to or equivalent to the popularity of the post evidenced by the number of likes. Table 4.2 below gives more details. As indicated in Table 4.2, four posts that have the deepest engagement with online users are selected for further textual analysis. No. 8 and No. 36 are the top two posts that have the largest number of forwards/comments, as well as the largest number of forwards/likes respectively. In addition, No. 45 post has the second largest number of comments whereas No. 11 has the second largest number of likes. Of these four posts, three are news pieces and one is views, sourcing from GT, DHC TV of Japan, and Euro News Italy. They contain four frames namely education (No. 8), Table 4.1 Distribution of frames in GT posts on Weibo pertaining to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute in 2017 and 2018 (N=60)

Frames

Number

Security/military Policy/diplomacy Education History Others Data source: Sina Weibo

31 14 7 5 3

Percentage 52% 23% 12% 8% 5%

4  DIAOYU/SENKAKU ISLANDS DISPUTE IN 2017–2018 

75

Forwards, Comments and Likes 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55 57 59

Forwards

comments

Likes

Fig. 4.1  The trend of forwards (shares), comments and likes of GT’s Weibo posts during the Diaoyu/Senkaky Isands in 2017–8 (N=60). (Data source: Sina Weibo)

others (No. 36), security/military (No. 45) and history (No. 11) respectively. The formats are either text and links (No. 8, 11) or video (No. 36, 45). What is noticeable is that posts about Japan’s actions, behaviors and comments that are unfavorable to China such as the kindergarten and submarine events tend to draw online users’ shares and comments, whereas the posts that include anti-Japan or pro-China stance are likely to attract ‘likes’ from users such as the Japanese entertainer’s comments and the historical evidence from Italy.

4.3   Analysis of Web Users’ Comments and Replies Corresponding to the four selected GT posts, a total of 78 entries of comments and replies were selected for textual analysis. Themes, frames, peer-­ to-­peer interactions, the use of languages and emoji are discussed below. Since the four posts are event-based, covering the subjects ranging from kindergarten, entertainer, and submarine to maps, online users have shown strong inclination to comment on the particular events. Sometimes the comments go beyond the particular events and touch upon wider issues. Six main themes are generated from the comments. First, territorial

76 

S. I. ZHANG

Table 4.2 Four GT posts that have the largest number of shares, comments and likes pertaining to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in 2017–8 Serial No.

Date

Topic

8

28 Feb 2017 11:42 2 January 2018 14:50 23 January 2018 18:30 21 March 2017 15:30

Japan right-wing kindergarten sports meet pledges ‘Defend Diaoyu Islands’

2393

2371

793

Japanese entertainer: if Diaoyu Islands are ‘invaded’, Japan shall raise white flag and surrender! Japan Air Self-Defense Force ex-Lieutenant General: Diaoyu Islands nuclear submarine event brings shame to China in the world An Italian Chinese donated Italian version of China ancient map; It indicates the historical ownership of Diaoyu Islands

1060

1757

2779

308

2094

684

214

425

2528

36

45

11

Forwards Comments Likes (shares)

Data source: Sina Weibo

claims. Web users repeatedly claim Diaoyu Islands belong to China, and China shall re-claim the sovereignty of Diaoyu Islands as well as other areas. For instance, on 21 March 2017, a web user commented: ‘Diaoyu Islands are China’s CNCNCN’. He used three CNs (China) to emphasize China’s ownership of Diaoyu Islands. Other entries in this regard include ‘boys, go claim the Kurile Islands’ and ‘at that time, outer Mongolia, Sakhalin etc. were also China’s.’ Second, commenting on Japan and its education. In response to the PG’s post on the kindergarten event, web users commented: ‘poor kids, born in a shameless country’. ‘Having been to the Memorial Hall of Victims in Nanjing Massacre, hatred comes from my heart, irrelevant to education and textbooks’. ‘Collect information about these right-wing Nazi children. Create archives for them, just in case. You understand.’ Third, commenting on the Japanese entertainer, the TV program, the right wingers and Japanese society per se. In response to the comments made by the comedian, a member of Woman Rush Hours, on TV, online comments include ‘what he said is right. But this guy may be cursed to death in Japan’. ‘Japanese young people do not care about this [Diaoyu Islands]…’ and ‘Don’t they say Japanese are polite [?] how come I don’t feel anything about it in the video[.] (they) keep

4  DIAOYU/SENKAKU ISLANDS DISPUTE IN 2017–2018 

77

interrupting at their will[.] give no chance for others to express opinions fully[.]’. Fourth, commenting on the military power of China and Japan with a focus on submarine. ‘Japan owns the ‘dragon’ submarine ranking the 2nd in the world. It doesn’t take ours seriously. Stop having fantasy’. ‘Touching nuclear submarine is attacking nuclear facilities. Does Japan want to have a nuclear war with us?’. ‘Actually our submarine is rather weak. Nonetheless, does Japan want us to increase military expenses?’. Fifth, history. For instance, ‘Japan must face the history. Diaoyu Islands is China’s since ancient times’. Lastly, verbal abuse and personal attacks. In accordance with these themes, six main frames can be identified from comments: territory, education, society, security/military, history and incivility. In comparison to the frames of GT’s posts (security/military, policy/diplomacy, education, history and others), there is high degree of match between the media agenda and public agenda. After all, the frame of ‘territory’ on the side of online users falls into the scope of ‘policy/diplomacy’ frame on the side of GT. Nonetheless, two new frames have emerged from the online users’ comments: society and incivility. With regard to the peer-to-peer interactions, web users agree/disagree, support/abuse each other. Or they may provide additional information and/or give further comments. Two examples are given below. Example 4.1 GT ’s post: Japan’s right-wing kindergarten sports meet pledges ‘Defend Diaoyu Islands’. User’s comment: Japan, following small etiquette but neglecting grand righteousness. User’s reply 1: The pretentious small etiquette is also called small etiquette? In Wenchuan earthquake, Japanese dogs cursed [at us], which was very unpleasant to hear. However many Chinese told me, Japanese are kind, polite and friendly. User’s reply 2: The so-called kindness and friendliness, to be blunt, is actually hiding a dagger in a smile. User’s reply 3: [I] agree with you very much. Nowadays many people say how good Japan is, how clean their streets are, and so on. They’ll just need to kneel down and lick it. In this example, in response to the GT’s kindergarten post, a web user commented on Japan, which attracted 1399 likes. This peer-to-peer

78 

S. I. ZHANG

interaction showed that the three respondents agreed with and supported the comment that Japan being polite but unrighteous. They expanded the argument, voiced their strong emotions and opinions against Japan and the Chinese who favor Japan. The third respondent even used bad language to show his hatred and disgust. Example 4.2 GT ’s post: An Italian Chinese donated Italian version of China’s ancient map; It indicates the historical ownership of Diaoyu Islands. User’s comment: At that time, outer Mongolia, Sakhalin etc. were also China’s. User’s reply 1: Please remember, Japan is the defeated country of the WWII. User’s reply 2: Then what? Who are you deceiving with your own lies? In the past, North Korea and South Korea were Japan’s in the map. Europe belonged to China’s Yuan Dynasty. Do you have the face (shame) to ask it back? GT indeed likes to brainwash people. Moreover, there are often a few Chaoyang spies on Weibo. User’s reply 3: You can say whatever you want. In this example, in response to GT’s map post, a web user commented on the territory, attracting 186 likes. While the official discourse is that China owns Diaoyu Islands evidenced by historical archives, the netizen suggested the territorial claim shall extend to other areas such as outer Mongolia and Sakhalin. The first respondent went off the subject a bit and reminded people of the fact that Japan lost in the WWII. The second respondent disagreed with the comment, accusing the netizen of deceiving himself and blaming GT for brain-washing. In addition, he pointed out that there are online ‘spies’ who post comments on Weibo to mislead public opinion. The third respondent just showed a cynical and disdainful attitude. Regarding the usage of languages and emoji, web users have used different forms of rhetoric, discourse and emoji to express themselves, make comments, and have a spat fight with other users, or simply hurl verbal abuse or personal attacks to others. Applying the categories in Chap. 3, Table  4.3 below gives examples of some languages and emoji used by Chinese netizens in the case of Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.

4  DIAOYU/SENKAKU ISLANDS DISPUTE IN 2017–2018 

79

Table 4.3 shows that the online users use various languages, punctuations, emoji to express, highlight and strengthen their opinions, attitudes and emotions. In addition to many offensive, abusive and irrational comments, it shall be noted that there are some rational and insightful comments and debate. However, the majority tend to toe the government’s line, insisting on China’s ownership of Diaoyu Islands and the justice of China’s routine patrol in the Diaoyu waters. Chinese nationalists, while criticizing the right wingers in Japan, view Japan with distrust, disdain and even hatred. They also violently abuse other Chinese web users who hold different views. Moreover, there are the ‘five cent army’ or online ‘spies’ who are Internet commentators paid by the Chinese authorities to manipulate public opinion. A few Weibo users are very active who often leave comments and copy/paste their comments under the posts right after the post is released. Some users are accused of being the ‘US cent army’. A web user commented on 21 March 2017: ‘US cent, come to copy the comment and receive your pay’. Here the ‘US cent’ is a slang referring to those who ‘always praise the foreign system, mechanism and culture’ and ‘the anti-China forces overseas’ (https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E7%B E%8E%E5%88%86%E5%85%9A/4617032).

4.4   Analysis of Macro-Structural Factors History, foreign policy (bilateral relations), security (military) and nationalism are four major macro-structural factors that influence and determine the online news coverage of mainstream media and online peer-to-peer interactions and debates. History is a fundamental element in the formation of official discourse and public opinion. There are strong references to history throughout the disputed territorial claims of Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands which goes back to centuries (Cotillon, 2017; McCarthy & Song, 2015). Since 1969, China used two historical reasons – the Islands had been part of Taiwan, and the Islands have belonged to China since ancient times – to denounce Japan. However, these two historical issues to claim the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are not legally effective (Sato, 2019). Chinese state media makes clear references to history and the majority of posts on Sina Weibo carry a strong adversarial sentiment towards Japan’s actions (Cotillon, 2017). This case analysis shows that both state media and online users adopt ‘history’ and ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ frames. The anti-Japanese sentiment is indeed fervent online despite some rational voices. It is interesting to find that

80 

S. I. ZHANG

Table 4.3  Online users’ usage of languages and emoji on Weibo pertaining to Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in 2017–8 Use of languages

Examples

Affirmative

Diaoyu Islands are China’s As for sovereignty, (we) must not give one inch away He (the Japanese comedian) was sure to be cursed (in Japan). But he can make that speech and such speech can be broadcast in the program, which is something that China can’t compare to… Traitor Don’t know how much nuclear transgenosis fodder Japan and US feed you, and raise you up idiot Diaoyu Islands are China’s territory since ancient times. Little ghost (Japanese) is indeed shameless Diaoyu Islands and Ryukyu islands were actually taken away by little Japan Routine patrol. Some island country, please do not make a fuss. Believe you will get used to it. In the later stage, not only fleet, our planes will also fly over for routine training Comparing the strength of China and Japan, he (Japan) can only build a museum China travel agency shall organize tour groups to do sightseeing on Diaoyu Islands Lee Teng-hui is a running dog of Japan Big rooster (China) eats up Japan, the little worm The following day, we dispatched 100 planes a time. Japan: we don’t have so many planes… Japan: Father! China bullied me! USA: what are you doing? China: Come over to discuss a business deal? USA: Okay Dokey

Abusive

Racist

Sarcasm

Metaphor Parody

Use of emoji Smile

We are all civilized people. Do not mention fighting and killing easily If there are Chinese on the Diaoyu Islands, there won’t be any conflict People’s army and China Coast Guard start to play Weibo very skillfully

Laugh-Cry They verbally occupy the island Our fleet make patrol You said you Allow me admire them to be sad If the war breaks out, I’m afraid Japan may build many ‘Yasukuni Shrine’ Spread out hands Are we going to get ready to boycott Japanese goods again? The shorter the news, the bigger the event Doge (continued)

4  DIAOYU/SENKAKU ISLANDS DISPUTE IN 2017–2018 

81

Table 4.3 (continued) Use of languages

Examples Trump and Abe act in collusion

Angry People, don’t get too excited. Diaoyu Islands are actually islands in dispute. Can’t say it belongs to China. It belongs to whoever is strong Digging nose Data source: Sina Weibo

though the state media (GT) played down the historical theme with only 5 ‘history’ posts (8%) during the sampling period, the post about an Italian Chinese donating a Chinese ancient map gained huge popularity with 2528 likes. In addition, online non-official discourse is often confirmative and supportive of the official narratives, for instance, online users often claim: ‘Diaoyu Islands is China’s territory since ancient times’. Foreign policy is another contextual factor. As Cotillon (2017) noted, China has become increasingly assertive in its foreign policy, especially regarding maritime territorial sovereignty in the East and South China Seas. Amako (2012) also noted that a hardline stance has surfaced within Chinese foreign policy decision-making, symbolized by the emphasis on defending so-called ‘core interests’ including the territorial sovereignty. After Xi Jinping came into power in 2012, ‘China Dream’ has become a major issue, meaning ‘achieving a rich and powerful country, the revitalization of the nation, and the people’s happiness’ (Guan, 2018). While some scholars viewed the China Dream positively as PRC’s goal in domestic and foreign policy, other scholars viewed it negatively as containing ‘strong anti-Japanese or anti-Western implications aimed at safeguarding the regime’s legitimacy at home (Guan, 2018). This case reveals that the GT covers lots of statements made by China Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition to demonstrating strong anti-Japanese and anti-Western sentiments, web users reveal their assertive and aggressive stance towards Japan, and suggests the possibility of war. For instance, one user commented: ‘To tell the truth, if you don’t make the Japanese nation admit they are being defeated, they will always cause trouble to you. Why don’t they submit to China? Because they believe they have not been defeated by China alone. So [we] must find a chance to beat it alone till it doubts the life. In return China can enjoy peace and prosperity for 200 years.’ Hence the frames and

82 

S. I. ZHANG

tones of both GT’s posts and online users’ comments/discussions can attribute partly to China’s foreign policy and the deteriorating Sino-­ Japanese relations, the so-called ‘cold politics’ between the two countries. Security (military) is the most significant issue in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute since the dispute is ‘often identified as the site of a possible Sino-Japanese military confrontation’ (Manicom & O’Neil, 2009). Since 2000s, China’s strategies have changed from ‘assertive diplomacy’ to ‘security policy’ (Rose, 2010). The geostrategic rivalry between China and Japan have reinforced the security dilemma and the two countries have maintained ‘negative peace’ (Kim, 2018). In terms of military power, Lee (2016) claims that China’s military expenditure reached US$145.8 billion in 2015, ranking second after the United States. Despite China’s ‘peaceful rise’ rhetoric, China’s Asian neighbors and the West are wary of China’s military build-up. For Japan, Kim (2018) noted that Japan’s China policy has incorporated a balancing strategy through expanding its own military power, and the relative power was in Japan’s favour because of the US-Japan security alliance. Such national security concerns (e.g. defense, energy, environment) as well as military build-up and rivalry between China and Japan have led the state media such as GT to use ‘security (military)’ as dominant frame in their post. Meanwhile ‘security (military) is also a main frame in online users’ comments, discussions and debates. The GT’s post about China’s nuclear submarine event attracted more than 2000 comments. Netizens fervently discussed and compared the two country’s military power and armament. For instance, one user commented on 23 January 2018: ‘The Dragon sub is a first class ordinary AIP sub. Ordinary sub is incomparable to nuclear sub. Where does the 2nd place come from?’. This comment entry attracted 483 likes. In recent years, there has been renewed nationalism in both China and Japan, driven by the shifting balance of power (Kim, 2018). Such ‘clash of nationalisms’ constraints the Sino-Japanese relations (Yee, 2011). As Akio (2017: 62) noted, ‘nationalistic sentiments are now a worst significant factor in Japan-China relations.’ In China, keeping in line with China Dream, the slogan of Xi’s administration, ‘the Japan Threat Theory was gaining currency in Chinese society, adding fuel to the rising flame of assertive nationalism’ (Akio, 2017: 62). There are two main views about domestic nationalism in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute. On the one hand, the state-centric view treats the Chinese government as the main proponent of nationalism. It argued that Chinese government used the dispute to stir up nationalism and patriotism to enhance its legitimacy and to gain

4  DIAOYU/SENKAKU ISLANDS DISPUTE IN 2017–2018 

83

concessions from Japan (Wang, 2017; Wiegand, 2011). On the other hand, the ‘society-driven’ view argues that the anti-Japanese popular nationalism was driven by the growth of grassroots nationalist groups (Zhang, 2007: 16). ‘The Chinese government has actually taken great efforts to control expressions of anti-Japanese sentiment to prevent them from disrupting the government’s overall foreign policy agenda’ (Zhang, 2007: 25). Since the Internet was introduced into China in the mid-­1990s, ‘nowhere is this hyper-hostility of Japan more visible than in Chinese cyberspace’ (Zhang, 2007: 20). The special feature of anti-Japanese nationalism is that it ‘has been directed by its advocates not only at Japan but also at their fellow Chinese who advise moderate and conciliatory approaches towards Japan’ (Zhang, 2007: 20). Moreover, historical narratives form an integral part in the top-down and bottom-up construction of Chinese nationalism (Cotillon, 2017). In this context, this case analysis finds strong anti-Japanese sentiment in both GT’s posts and users’ comments. The state media presents and promotes official discourse through framing news events and statements in an assertive and disdainful manner. The posts mainly contain national pride narratives and frame Japan in the image of being ‘bad’, ‘robber’ and ‘evil’. For instance, the topic of some posts includes the wordings of ‘play little trick again…’, ‘here comes the new provocation…’, ‘The bad guy is the first to sling accusations’…’, ‘Japan is instilling robbery thoughts …’ In response to the GT’s posts, the users demonstrate a range of attitudes and a mixture of militaristic and moderate stances. Denemark and Chubb (2016) pointed out, the public have little information upon which to form their views besides the media content they consume. The media are most strongly able to convey their issue agenda to their audiences for these kinds of ‘unobtrusive issues’. This case reveals that the media set the ‘issue’ agenda for the online public, but the users’ attitudes and views may be polarized and/or plural. Having said this, in this case, the majority of users tend to conform to the official and media discourse and hold a pro-China attitude. After all, the Diaoyu/ Senkaku Islands is about the sovereignty issue. Nobody wants to be labeled as a traitor and get verbally abused on Weibo.

4.5   Conclusion This chapter focuses on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute, the most contentious territory dispute for China and the most important site for Chinese popular nationalism. Four conclusions are made.

84 

S. I. ZHANG

First, this case analysis reveals that the majority of GT posts are event-­ based news reports and the news and views are converging. Chinese/ Japanese media as well as Chinese/Japanese government institutions are dominant sources. In comparison to limited Chinese official sources, Japanese sources are more diverse ranging from government officials, politicians, militaries to academics and social elites. GT has used the security/military as the most dominant frame and policy/diplomacy as a strong frame. In other words, security/military and policy are the two main issues in the media agenda. It supports Guan (2018)’ finding that the historical themes were dramatically played down and contemporary conflict was more reported. Second, the trend/pattern of GT’s engagement with users is unstable with frequent and sharp ups and downs. The significance of a post evidenced by the number of shares and comments is not necessarily in proportion to the popularity of the post evidenced by the number of likes. In this case, posts about Japan’s actions, behaviors and comments that are unfavorable to China tend to draw online users’ shares and comments, whereas the posts that include anti-Japan or pro-China stance are likely to attract ‘likes’ from users. In addition, the media set the public agenda. Apart from the high degree of consistency between the media and public agenda (security, policy, education and history), two additional frames emerged from users’ reactions  – society and incivility. The majority of users support and conform to official discourse and few criticize China’s domestic or foreign policy. Third, social media platforms enabled online users to use various languages and emoji to express their opinions and emotions. Chinese nationalists view Japan with distrust, disdain and hatred. Users agree/disagree, support/abuse each other. Despite offensive, abusive and irrational comments, there are some rational and insightful comments and debate. In addition to the censorship by Weibo, users employ slangs to refer to different political forces online and make fun of them such as the ‘five cent army’, ‘US cent army’, and ‘water army’. This forms part of the social media platform culture. Fourth, the four contextual factors including history, foreign policy, security (military) and nationalism intertwine with each other, influence and determine the social media content as well as the actions and interactions of different actors within the social media network. Amid the tensions over the sovereignty issue of Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, both China and Japan advanced their national interests in South

4  DIAOYU/SENKAKU ISLANDS DISPUTE IN 2017–2018 

85

China Sea. Moreover, ‘the South China Sea could affect the situation in the East China Sea’ (Yoshimatsu, 2017) and ‘the disputes in the South China Sea and East China Sea are inextricably linked’ (Storey, 2013). I will then discuss the case of South China Sea dispute next.

References Akio, T. (2017). Forty-four years of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations since normalization. In L.  P. Er (Ed.), China-Japan relations in the 21st century  – Antagonism despite interdependency (pp.  25–66). Singapore, Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan/Springer Nature. Amako, S. (2012). China, the Emerging Superpower and Drifting Sino-Japanese Relations. Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, 1(1), 73–95. Castro, R.  C. D. (2017). Sino-Japanese rivalry in Maritime Southeast Asia. In L. P. Er (Ed.), China-Japan relations in the 21st century – Antagonism despite interdependency (pp.  205–236). Singapore, Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan/ Springer Nature. Cotillon, H. (2017). Territorial disputes and nationalism: A comparative case study of China and Vietnam. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 36(1), 51–88. Denemark, D., & Chubb, A. (2016). Citizen attitudes towards China’s maritime territorial disputes: Traditional media and Internet usage as distinctive conduits of political views in China. Information, Communication & Society, 19(1), 59–79. Dixon, J. (2014). From “Pearls” to “Arrows”: Rethinking the “String of Pearls” theory of China’s naval ambitions. Comparative Strategy, 33(4), 389–400. Er, L. P. (2017). China-Japan paradox: Antagonism despite interdependency. In L. P. Er (Ed.), China-Japan relations in the 21st century – Antagonism despite interdependency (pp.  1–24). Singapore, Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan/ Springer Nature. Guan, T. (2018). Framing the boundary of Sino-Japanese conflicts in China’s communication sphere: A content analysis of the news coverage of Japan and Sino-Japanese controversies by the People’s Daily between 2001 and 2015. Journal of Chinese Political Science/Association of Chinese Political Studies, 23, 603–618. Hagstrom, L. (2005). Japan’s China policy: A relational power analysis. New York: Routledge. Hsiung, J.  C. (2007). Introduction: Theory and the long-running tussle. In J. C. Hsiung (Ed.), China and Japan at odds – Deciphering the perpetual conflict. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

86 

S. I. ZHANG

Kim, J. (2018). The clash of power and nationalism: The Sino-Japan territorial dispute. Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 5(1), 31–56. Lee, P. S. N. (2016). The rise of China and its contest for discursive power. Global Media and China, 1(1–2), 102–120. Liao, J. X. (2008). Sino-Japanese energy security and regional stability: The case of the East China Sea gas exploration. East Asia, 25, 57–78. Manicom, J., & O’Neil, A. (2009). Sino-Japanese strategic relations: Will rivalry lead to confrontation? Australian Journal of International Affairs, 63(2), 213–232. Mattes, M. (2018). “Chipping Away at the Issues”: Piecemeal dispute resolution and territorial conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 62(1), 94–118. McCarthy, G., & Song, X. (2015). Australian governments’ policy conundrum: Ambivalence on China and certainty on Japan. Social Identities, 21(6), 590–605. Moore, J. G. (2014). “In Your Face”: Domestic politics, nationalism, and “Face” in the Sino-Japanese Islands dispute. Asian Perspective, 38, 219–240. Rose, C. (2010). ‘Managing China’: Risk and risk management in Japan’s China policy. Japan Forum, 22(1–2), 149–168. Sato, K. (2019). The Senkaku Islands Dispute: Four Reasons of the Chinese Offensive - A Japanese View. Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, 8(1), 50–82. Storey, I. (2013). Japan’s maritime security interests in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea dispute. Political Science, 65(2), 135–156. Suganuma, U. (2007). The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: A hotbed for a hot war? In J. C. Hsiung (Ed.), China and Japan at odds – Deciphering the perpetual conflict (pp. 155–172). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Togo, K. (2014). Japan-China-US relations and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute: Perspectives from international relations theory. Asian Perspective, 38, 241–261. Wang, G. (2017). Discursive construction of territorial disputes: Foreign newspaper reporting on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute. Social Semiotics, 27(5), 567–585. Wiegand, K. E. (2009). China’s strategy in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute: Issue linkage and coercive diplomacy. Asian Security, 5(2), 170–193. Wiegand, K. E. (2011). Enduring Territorial Disputes: Strategies of Bargaining, Coercive Diplomacy, and Settlement. Athens: University of Georgia Press. Wu, X., et al. (2016). Impact of political dispute on international trade based on an international trade Inoperability Input-Output Model: A case study of the 2012 Diaoyu Islands dispute. The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, 25(1), 47–70.

4  DIAOYU/SENKAKU ISLANDS DISPUTE IN 2017–2018 

87

Wu, Y. (2015). Incivility on Diaoyu Island sovereignty in Tianya Club. The Journal of International Communication, 21(1), 109–131. Ye, X. (2019). Rediscovering the transition in China’s national interest: A neoclassical realist. Approach, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 48, 1–30. Yee, A. (2011). Maritime territorial disputes in East Asia: A comparative analysis of the South China Sea and the East China Sea. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 40(2), 165–193. Yoshimatsu, H. (2017). China, Japan and the South China Sea dispute: Pursuing strategic goals through economic and institutional means. Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 4(3), 294–315. Zhang, J. (2007). The influence of Chinese nationalism on Sino-Japanese relations. In M. Heazle & N. Knight (Eds.), China-Japan relations in the twenty-­ first century: Creating a future past? (pp. 15–32). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Zhao, S. (2008). China’s global search for energy security: Cooperation and competition in Asia-Pacific. Journal of Contemporary China, 17(55), 207–227.

CHAPTER 5

South China Sea Dispute in 2018

The South China Sea (SCS), as the world’s second busiest international sea lane, is a ‘strategic maritime link and a vital gateway for shipping’ (Singh, 2012). More than $5 trillion worth of trade passes through the SCS each year. It is also a vital transit route for military vessels between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe (Hayton, 2017). The SCS is often regarded as ‘a major source of tension and instability’ in East Asia (Thao & Amer, 2009). The disputes are about the most complex territorial and maritime issues that dominate the regional security agenda in the twenty-­ first century (Mishra, 2017; Sison III, 2018). It also raises questions about the nature of international law, the link between law’s validity and efficacy in particular (Sison III, 2018). The SCS disputes are particularly critical because of the strategic importance of the SCS to China, the United States, and other states (Hayton, 2017). The disputes involve more than 20 countries and regions. China is at the heart of the disputes claiming more than 80% of the SCS with its ‘Nine-Dash Line’. Other major claimants include the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei. Third-party countries such as the US and Japan also involve in the disputes as part of their global strategies (Guo, Mays & Wang, 2019). The SCS disputes are unique for three reasons: the importance of the sea lanes; the sheer number of parties involved; and the dispute has turned into a power struggle between China and the US with Southeast Asia caught in the middle (Ravindran, 2012). Specifically, the disputes consist of two layers: First, territorial or sovereignty disputes over land features © The Author(s) 2020 S. I. Zhang, Media and Conflict in the Social Media Era in China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7635-5_5

89

90 

S. I. ZHANG

(rocks and reefs) governed by international law. Second, maritime disputes over delimitation of maritime zones governed by the 1982 UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea), the so-called Constitution for the Oceans, and whether states can restrict the operation of military vessels in national waters (Hayton, 2017; Sison III, 2018). There are two main archipelagos under dispute – the Paracel Islands (Xisha in Chinese) and the Spratly archipelago (Nansha in Chinese) (Storey, 2013). The SCS is becoming more central to Chinese national security. President Xi Jinping stated that China must become a ‘maritime great power’ to achieve ‘the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ (Wood, 2019). China’s preferred approach to resolve the disputes is through bilateral relations and consultation with the ‘countries directly concerned’, namely, the coastal states of the SCS, to legitimize the Nine-Dash Line (Sison III, 2018). However, as Wood (2019) noted, both the Chinese island building campaign and the uncertainties for states concerning China’s Nine-Dash Line lead to greater tensions in the region, and make the SCS one of the riskier points of potential conflict in the world today. Similarly, Li (2015) argued, there are three major factors that hinder China’s development of security relations with the region: China’s military build-up, its failure to improve its security relations with regional states, and its role in the SCS disputes. The SCS issue is indeed the ‘greatest potential threat’ to China’s ties with regional countries (Li, 2015). In today’s information age, while the international conflict revolves around military and economic disputes, international politics also hinges on how each country presents the dispute in the news and whose ‘story’ wins the support of foreign publics (Guo et al., 2019). There are actually two ‘courts’ in the SCS dispute: the international tribunal and the court of public opinion (Guo et al., 2019). As for domestic public opinion, China’s PLA (People’s Liberation Army) has developed public opinion warfare operations since the late 1990s with the profusion of military media commentators. The basic aim of ‘public opinion warfare’ is to generate domestic popular support for China’s position and opposition to China’s enemies (Raine & Mière, 2013). This chapter focuses on online domestic public opinion. It examines how Chinese mainstream media present the dispute on Weibo and what kind of ‘story’ attracts the public’s attention and engages users in discussions, thus impacts the public opinion and sentiments in cyber space. The chapter is organized as follows: it starts with giving a brief overview of the SCS disputes, then presents and discusses findings from the content

5  SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE IN 2018 

91

and textual analysis on the basis of GT ’s posts as well as web users’ comments on Weibo. Lastly, it analyzes key contextual factors ranging from history, legality, military, foreign policy, economy to nationalism. It ends with a conclusion.

5.1   A Brief Historic Overview of SCS Disputes China claims sovereignty over the Paracel archipelago and the Spratly archipelago as well as the Pratas Islands (Dongsha in Chinese) (Thao & Amer, 2009). Though such claims are based on historical evidence, the history of the SCS disputes is itself in dispute (Singh, 2012). The search for a clear historical narrative has been hindered by government secrecy, poor access to archives, and language barriers (Hayton, 2017). In this section, major historical events surrounding the SCS disputes are laid out chronologically to situate the content analysis and discussions in context. The SCS disputes began to take shape in the 1900s and there was no state-to-state dispute over any of the islands before the twentieth century (Hayton, 2017). The first dispute arose in early 1909 between Qing China and Japan over Pratas Island, following the discovery of a Japanese merchant engaged in mining guano there. As a result, China bought out the merchant and Japan recognized China’s claim in late 1909. ‘The episode also led China to stake a claim to at least some of the Paracel Islands in June 1909. The dispute expanded in the 1920s and 1930s, with France, various Chinese authorities, and Japan pursuing competing claims initially in the Paracels and later the Spratly Islands’ (Hayton, 2017). In the 1930s and 1940s, most parts of SCS islands were occupied by France and Japan during the World War II. France annexed several features in the Spratly Islands in 1933, provoking widespread anger in China. In July 1938, Paris declared ownership of the Paracels and created a delegation under the governor of Cochinchina (Hayton, 2017; Raine & Mière, 2013). Japan occupied Pratas Island in 1937, and then occupied Woody, Spratly and Lincoln islands in early 1938. In 1939, Japan landed on Hainan Island and later claimed sovereignty over all of the Paracel and Spratly Islands (Raine & Mière, 2013). The end of the WWII saw a temporary demilitarization of much of the SCS. Japan renounced all its titles and claims to the Spratly and Paracel Islands under the San Francisco Treaty in 1951, while France was ousted from the Spratlys and drawn back from the Paracels. The SCS islands were thus essentially unoccupied (Raine & Mière, 2013).

92 

S. I. ZHANG

In 1948, China’s Kuomintang government published a map entitled Map Showing the Location of the Various Islands in the South Sea that showed a broken U-shaped line covering almost the entire SCS. The map is regarded as ‘the cartographic progenitor’ of China’s Nine-Dash Line claim in the SCS (Sison III, 2018). China claimed all of the islands within those lines. A 1992 Chinese law restated its claims in the region (Singh, 2012). But China’s SCS policy is ambiguous and the ambiguity stems mainly from the interpretation of the Nine-Dash Line on the map. China has claimed it ‘has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, and China enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters’. For outside observers, it has never been clear what Beijing means by ‘adjacent waters’ and ‘relevant waters’ (Li, 2015). In the 1970s several clashes took place between the claimant nations over the islands in the SCS (Singh, 2012). In January 1974, China occupied the whole of the Paracels when the PLA dislodged South Vietnamese troops from the western part of the archipelago. This is the Paracels incident or Battle of the Paracels (Hayton, 2017; Storey, 2013). According to Ravindran (2012), China and Vietnam have a long history of conflict and cooperation. The two sides fought a war in 1979 and had two skirmishes over the SCS disputes, one in 1974 and the other in 1988. In 1988, Chinese naval forces clashed with Vietnamese forces at South Johnson Reef, defeating the Vietnamese naval forces in a one-sided skirmish and occupying four islands (Wood, 2019). In the 1990s, tensions rose in the SCS especially between China and Vietnam and China and the Philippines over the Spratly Islands (Storey, 2013). In 1995 and 1999, China clashed with the Philippines over the Mischief Reef in the Spratlys. In 1998, Beijing fought a war with the unified Vietnam over the Spratlys (Li, 2015). Meanwhile, China strengthened its sovereignty claims through the passage of domestic legislations. Chinese government promulgated the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Law in 1992, and then the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Law in 1998. ‘In both pieces of legislation, the concept of ocean rights and interests has been adopted’ (Cheng & Paladini, 2014). In particular, the 1998 Law noted that its stipulations do not affect China’s historic rights in the SCS. ‘This was the first time that Beijing had officially referenced the issue of historic rights, even though it was intended as a “saving clause” and not in itself a claim to a specific set of historic rights’ (Zhang, 2017). After the 1998 Law was promulgated, maritime security patrols by ships of

5  SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE IN 2018 

93

the Chinese Fisheries Administration began around the year  2000. The patrols were soon conducted also by the armed vessels of the State Oceanographic Administration. They were further strengthened and standardized in 2005 in the SCS and elsewhere (Cheng & Paladini, 2014). In the early 2000s, tensions eased considerably due to China’s ‘Charm Offensive’ in Southeast Asia and China promoted an appeasement policy (Storey, 2013). As Kim and Kim (2018) noted, despite efforts to enlarge its dominance of maritime territory in the SCS, China did not militarily confront Southeast Asian countries during the late 1990s to mid-2000s. Rather China agreed, along with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member countries, to nonviolent principles and the right of navigation in the SCS. In 2002, China and the ASEAN member countries engaged in official negotiations and agreed to the Code of Conduct (CoC) for the first time. However, the CoC was non-binding in nature (Mishra, 2017). In 2003, China signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with the ASEAN and agreed on a Code of Conduct aimed at reducing the risk of conflict over territorial disputes in the SCS (Lee, 2016). Two incidents in 2009 led to the escalation of tensions in the SCS. The first was the Impeccable incident in March 2009 when ‘the United States ocean surveillance vessel USNS Impeccable was harassed by Chinese vessels in an area south of Hainan’ (Bateman, 2011). While the US argued that operations of the Impeccable were a legitimate freedom of navigation in a country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), China viewed the operations as marine scientific research requiring Chinese consent. ‘The incident became a catalyst for United States direct intervention in the affairs of the South China Sea’ (Bateman, 2011). The second incident started in early 2008 when the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UNCLCS) set a deadline 13 May 2009 for submitting claims for extended continental shelves beyond 200 nautical miles. In May 2009, China made a submission to the UN after Vietnam and Malaysia submitted their claims. Beijing dubbed the SCS as a ‘core national interest’ and in the non-negotiable territorial claims category (Singh, 2012). China also presented its U-shape or Nine-Dash Line map encompassing about 80% of the SCS to denounce Malaysia’s and Vietnam’s claims to their respective continental shelf (Castro, 2013). In response, the former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton rejected China’s claims at the 17th ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting in July 2010 at Hanoi. She declared that ‘the United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons and respect for

94 

S. I. ZHANG

international law in the South China Sea’ (Singh, 2012). This was widely understood as an attempt to ‘internationalise’ the dispute and a direct challenge to China (Yee, 2011). By 2010, China had developed a formidable navy with its booming economy. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has shifted from pre-empting possible US intervention in a Taiwan Straits crisis to denying the US Navy access to the East China Sea (ECS) and the South China Sea, the so-called ‘First Island Chain’ (Castro, 2013). Since 2010, China has been perceived by the Western world as adopting an increasingly assertive posture in safeguarding its maritime interests and China’s assertiveness has exacerbated the Sino-ASEAN relations. In response, some ASEAN member countries chose to strengthen their security ties with the USA as a ‘hedging strategy’, which in turn facilitated the Obama administration’s ‘return to Asia’. (Cheng & Paladini, 2014). In 2011, the United States announced a ‘rebalance to Asia’ and part of the rebalancing strategy was to deal with China’s rise and assertive actions in the SCS and ECS. The Obama administration also engaged in ‘multilateralism 2.0’ through joining the EAS (East Asia Summit) in 2011 (Burgess, 2016; He, 2019). Since President Benigno Auino III came into office in 2010, Sino-Philippine relations turned sour and the Philippines started referring to the SCS as the ‘West Philippine Sea’. From 2011 to 2016, the Aquino Administration pursued a balancing policy on China as it promoted closer security cooperation with the US (Castro, 2017; Ravindran, 2012). In April 2012, the Filipino Navy entered the vicinity of the Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Dao in Chinese), and armed soldiers boarded Chinese fishing boats to terminate their operations. China responded by sending in its Marine Surveillance vessels, resulting in a standoff. The Philippines withdrew its warship, and replaced it with a coast guard vessel, while China dispatched its Fisheries Law Enforcement vessels (Cheng & Paladini, 2014; Ravindran, 2012). This 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident (or standoff) triggered the Philippines to bring the arbitration case against China (Sison III, 2018). Also in 2012, Vietnam passed a law asserting its jurisdiction over the disputed islands in the SCS, while China established Sansha City on Woody Island (Yongxing Island in Chinese) in the Paracels and asserted its own jurisdiction over the disputed islands. The tensions between Vietnam and China thus soared (Ravindran, 2012). In January 2013, the Philippines filed an arbitration case to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea against China under the

5  SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE IN 2018 

95

UNCLOS. However China refused to take part in this UN arbitration process (Cheng & Paladini, 2014; Zhang, 2017). On 12 July 2016, the tribunal rendered its award, which accepted almost all of the Philippines’ submissions. The most significant ruling of the Award is the invalidation of China’s Nine-Dash Line as being incompatible with UNCLOS (Sison III, 2018). While many international observers described the final ruling as an overwhelming victory for the Philippines and a heavy defeat for China, Zhang (2017) argued that the arbitration award has created paradoxical effects on Chinese policy and Asian maritime politics. The arbitration ruling has led to a hardening of China’s SCS claims, and it makes difficult for the Philippines government to negotiate and make concessions to China on the basis of the award. Tai and Huang (2018) also noted, foreign policy implementation is largely dependent on the president in power. Rodrigo Duterte became the 16th President of Philippine in 2016. Differing from his predecessor Aquino, Duterte intends to change Manila’s confrontational policy and sees no need to press Beijing to abide by the July ruling (Castro, 2017; Shah, 2017). Duterte’s foreign policy aimed at appeasing China and he agreed to bilateral negotiations to resolve the SCS dispute. However Chinese analysts and decision-makers viewed Duterte’s pronouncements as mere posturing to please Beijing rather than a realistic plan (Castro, 2017). In 2017, the White Paper published by the State Council declared a ‘reactive assertiveness’ in the maritime domain, meaning China upholds freedom of navigation in the SCS, but it would make a ‘necessary response’ to violation of its territorial integrity (Shah, 2017). China’s military budget for 2017 also increases by 7%, to 1.044 trillion yuan (US$151.43 billion) (Shah, 2017). To challenge China’s claim in the sea, the US has been conducting Freedom of Navigation Operations in the SCS since 2004. Under the banner of ‘America goes first’, the Trump administration (2017- president) is likely to make the Obama administration’s Freedom of Navigation Operations more robust and provocative, in addition to further strengthening US military presence in the region. The SCS has become a geostrategic battleground for US and China (Zhang, 2017). Meanwhile, Sino-ASEAN relationship has progressed. In August 2018, China demonstrates its willingness to agree on a Code of Conduct (CoC) negotiation in ASEAN–China ministerial meeting in Singapore, which ‘marks a milestone in the prospect of peaceful settlement of the South China Sea’ (Rosyidin, 2019).

96 

S. I. ZHANG

The brief historic overview demonstrates that the SCS disputes are complex involving history, legality and security issues as well as a number of actors including multiple claimants and third-party countries such as the US. Tensions in the SCS have eased and risen over time with clashes and conflicts. As Raine and Mière (2013) argued, tensions surrounding the SCS are not only based on claimant interpretations of history and demands of sovereignty, or contested access to hydrocarbons and fisheries; they also involve concerns of grand strategy. Thus the SCS becomes a ‘natural focal point for attention’ (Raine & Mière, 2013). The internal debates about the SCS are evolving within China. Three camps – pragmatists, hardliners and moderates — are vying for influence over SCS policy within China’s policymaking apparatus (Zhang, 2017). The pragmatists value China’s physical presence more highly than its international image or reputation. They thus celebrate Beijing’s construction since 2014 of seven new islands. The hardliners think China should further expand its territorial and military reach in the SCS. The moderates believe that China will face the danger of strategic overstretch if it does not adjust its policy (Zhang, 2017).

5.2   Analysis of Global Times Posts In this section, results from the content and textual analysis surrounding the SCS disputes are presented, analyzed and discussed. The sampling time period was set for one year from 1 January 2018 to 31 December 2018. As a result, a total of 98 GT posts and 970 users’ comments were collected. The trend/patterns of GT ’s online news coverage and the users’ reactions are addressed below. With regards to the news/views division, of the 98 GT posts, 86 posts are coded as news whereas 12 are views. Though the majority of the posts are news, it shall be noted that many news pieces are statements, comments and responses made by government officials, spokespersons and scholars. For instance, spokespersons from China Ministry of Foreign Affairs give statements and responses to journalists’ questions at regular press conferences. Views are mainly editorials of GT and personal comments made by Editor-in-Chief Hu Xijin. Regarding the news sources, 83% (81 out of 98) posts are sourced from GT ’s print edition and/or GT ’s website. Combining the news sources and the in-text attributions, six main sources are identified: (1) Chinese media such as People’s Daily, China Daily, CCTV (CCTV news and CCTV

5  SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE IN 2018 

97

military channel), Xinhua, PLA Daily, and Taiwan media. Social video channels such as Mongo TV, V diu (微丢), an online news and comments aggregator established in 2012 by Shanghai Observer, and Passion News (燃新闻). GT also forms its own video team and posts video clips. (2) Chinese government institutions and military such as Ministry of Defense and its website, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, diplomats and spokespersons, China Navy and its spokespersons, website, China MSA (Maritime Safety Administration) and its website, Sansha MSA, Fujian MSA, Chinapeace. org.cn by Politics and Law Commission of the CCCPC (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China). (3) Global and foreign media such as CNN, New York Times, Reuters, AFP, BBC, South China Morning Post, Philippine Star, Philippine Daily Inquirer, ABS-CBN TV of Philippine, Rappler website of Philippine, Vietnam Express, VnExpress of Vietnam, National Herold of India, Kyodo News of Japan. General terms including Vietnamese media, Indian media, US media are used. (4) Foreign government officials and politicians such as US Ministry of Defense, US Air Force, US Navy, White House spokesperson, Philippine President Duterte and his spokesperson, Philippine congressman, Philippine military spokesperson, Japanese officials, and so on. (5) Chinese military experts, scholars, GT commentators and Hu Xijin, the editor-in-­ chief of GT. It finds that more and more online media outlets, social media video channels in particular, have been used. Chinese government institutions, officials and military experts seem to be dominant news sources. Five main themes are generated from the GT posts. First, military activities in the SCS ranging from navy actions, military exercises, patrols, parade, confrontations to official statements surrounding the military activities. For instance, on 20 January 2018, the post was ‘Wu Qian, press spokesperson of Ministry of Defense, made speech on US Navy’s entry into adjacent waters of China’s Huangyan Island (Scarborough Shoal)’. On 11 April, the post was ‘Forbid to enter! China Navy starts to conduct a 3-day military training in Sanya waters today’. Second, foreign policy, international politics and official statements on bilateral/international relations made by diplomats and government officials. For instance, on 8 March, the post was titled ‘Minister of Foreign Affairs: some external forces always want to stir in SCS’. On 16 November, the post was ‘Duerte warned the US: Don’t conduct military exercise to provoke China!’. Third, editorials, commentary and analysis of the situation/status-quo in SCS. For instance, on 13 April, the post was titled ‘Editorial: A strong navy will make the rise of China more stable and more balanced’. On 17

98 

S. I. ZHANG

October, it forwarded a post of Hu Xijin, the chief editor of GT. ‘@Hu Xijin US Minister of Defense visited Vietnam twice within a year. He obviously went there for China.’ Fourth, culture, science and society including media propaganda. For instance, on 4 May, the post was about celebrating the successful launch of APSTAR-6C Communications Satellite. On 22 August, the post was about the flag raising ceremony in SCS and GT posted a publicity video released by China Navy entitled ‘homestead overhead’ on 15 September. On 15 May, the post was ‘Chinese tourists wearing ‘SCS Nine-Dash Line’ clothes were stopped when entering Vietnam’. Fifth, others including oil explorations, construction of artificial islands and in commemoration of Wang Wei, Chinese pilot who died in the Sino-US mid-air collision in 2001. Based on the above-mentioned themes, five frames are identified: security/military; diplomacy/international relations; editorials, commentary and analysis; and culture, science & society; and Others. Table  5.1 below shows the spread of frames. Table 5.1 reveals that security/military is the dominant frame (48%). Diplomacy and commentaries/analysis of the situations in SCS are both strong frames (17%). It suggests, on the one hand, the wide coverage of military power and military activities reflects the tensions and power struggle in the SCS.  On the other hand, China has paid more attentions to influence and shape domestic public opinions by showing official stance and giving commentaries/analysis on the SCS issues. In other words, China is building up both hard power and soft (cultural) power in the SCS. As for the popularity of GT ’s posts, Fig. 5.1 below shows the trend/ pattern of forwards (shares), comments and likes. In terms of the number of shares, comments and likes, the peak time occurred on 12 April 2018 Table 5.1  Distribution of frames in GT posts on Weibo pertaining to the SCS disputes in 2018. (N=98)

Frames Security/military Diplomacy/international relations Editorials, commentary and analysis Culture, science & society Others Data source: Sina Weibo

Number

Percentage

47 17

48% 17%

17

17%

13 4

13% 4%

5  SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE IN 2018 

99

Forwards, Comments and Likes 9000 8000 7000 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0

1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61 64 67 70 73 76 79 82 85 88 91 94 97

Forwards

Comments

Likes

Fig. 5.1  The trend of forwards (shares), comments and likes of GT’s Weibo posts during the South China Sea dispute in 2018. (Data source: Sina Weibo)

with the post about military training in Sanya and live-fire drill in Taiwan Straits. Figure 5.1 shows that the trend/pattern of shares, comments and likes of GT posts is generally stable with occasional sharp rises. The sharp rises of likes are the most striking. The number of comments and shares also fluctuate with a few peak times. Generally speaking, the fluctuation of comments and shares is much more moderate than that of likes. The trend of these three indicators is more or less consistent. Table 5.2 below gives more details. In Table  5.2, four posts that have the deepest engagement with the online users are selected for further textual analysis. The No. 27 post about the end of military training in Sanya and the start of live-fire drills in Taiwan Strait has attracted the largest of number of shares, comments and likes. This post demonstrates the highest level of popularity and deepest degree of engagement with online users. Post No. 30, the video of China military parade in SCS, achieves the second largest number of shares. Post No. 66 about the PLA giving warnings in English to the US military gains the second largest number of both comments and likes. In addition, Post No. 23 in commemoration of the Chinese pilot killed in 2001 is also very popular among online users with the third largest number of likes. All these four posts are news pieces. Three of them contain the military frame. The formats include texts, photos, videos and web links. It finds that hard

100 

S. I. ZHANG

Table 5.2 Four GT posts that have the largest number of shares, comments and likes pertaining to the South China Sea in 2018 Serial No.

Date

Topic

27

12 April 2018 16:46 12 April 2018 21:17 11 August 2018 12:10 1 April 2018 9:51

Military training ends ahead of time in Sanya Sea waters. Live-fire drill sets on the 18th in Taiwan Straits #Military parade on South China Sea# here comes the complete video version! [Mighty] Listen, this is the warning in English given by the PLA to the US military!

1944

2799

8253

1467

454

3019

572

2131

5038

Today, post a Weibo for this name [candle] (Note: this post is in commemoration of Wang Wei, the Chinese pilot killed in China-US air collision in 2001)

1155

455

4333

30

66

23

Forwards (shares)

Comments Likes

Data source: Sina Weibo

news with military frames undoubtedly has drawn users’ widest attentions and responses on the SCS issues. Posts with videos (e.g. No. 30 and No.66) are more likely to be shared, commented and shared. Despite the multimedia formats, content still seems to be the most important as post No.27 (texts and web links) tops the list.

5.3   Analysis of Web Users’ Comments and Replies Corresponding to the four selected GT posts, a total of 43 entries of comments and replies were selected for textual analysis. Themes, frames, peer-­ to-­peer interactions, the use of languages and emoji/emoticons will be discussed below. Five main themes are generated from the comments. First, Taiwan Straits (Taiwan liberation and unification). In response to post No. 27 about the military drills in Taiwan Strait and post no.30 about military parade, online users commented: ‘heard you are going to anti-attack mainland [it’s not easy]’. This comment attracted 2016 likes. ‘(We) should make the Straits restless from time to time. Normalize it.’ Second, pro/

5  SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE IN 2018 

101

anti-war debate on the SCS. In response to the post no.66 about warning given to the US military, web users commented: ‘I’m scared by the stealthy Eagle. Shall we fill a few more islands to steady your nerves, you are all okay with it.’ ‘Hit it off. We shall learn from Russia on this.’ This post draws 1423 likes. Third, praise China’s strength and demonstrate national pride. Comments are: ‘Long live the motherland’. ‘That’s why I can stay at home eating BBQ, go to see movies.’ Fourth, commemorate the Chinese pilot and express sentiments. Comments are: ‘My fleet number is 16. The deck is clear. You can land. Please return. [Sadness]’. ‘17 years passed. China is not a country that was chopped up by others and dared not to fight back. Today we are the largest developing country in the world. 81192 is not simply a series of numbers. It is a kind of spirit. It will carry on forever. Whoever offends China, though far away, will be condemned!!!’. Fifth, verbal abuse and personal attacks. Comments are: ‘A group of US cents (author’s note: US cents refer to pro-US or US-loving intellectuals) will have climax again.’ In accordance with these themes, four main frames can be identified from comments: Taiwan issue, pro/anti-war debate, national pride, and incivility. In comparison to the frames of GT ’s posts (security/military, diplomacy, Editorials, commentary and analysis, Culture, science & society, and others), there is a degree of match between the media agenda and public agenda  – security/military vs. Taiwan issue and pro/anti-war debate; media propaganda (culture, science & society) vs. national pride – though the debate, sentiments and incivility are new. With regards to the peer-to-peer interactions, web users agree/disagree, support/attack each other. Or they may provide additional information and/or give further comments. Two examples are given below. Example 5.1 GT ’s post: #Military parade on South China Sea# here comes the complete video version! [Mighty]. User’s comment: Wait till 18 April to come to Taiwan. User’s reply 1: Liberate Taiwan on any days (in the near future). User’s reply 2: Really hope that the center (government) is prepared. Build the army now, liberate Taiwan in 2021. User’s reply 3: Taiwan experts said they are going to anti-attack mainland. I am scared to death. Can’t eat or sleep for a few days.

102 

S. I. ZHANG

In this example, in response to the GT ’s post of video on the military parade, a web user raised the Taiwan issue. This peer-to-peer interaction showed that the three respondents agreed with and supported the comment on Taiwan liberation. They voiced their opinions about building up strong army and liberating Taiwan, which is in line with China’s state policy of unification of Taiwan. Example 5.2 GT ’s post: Listen, this is the warning in English given by the PLA to the US military! User’s comment: (We) shall warn them three times the most. If they don’t go away, hit it. (Give warnings) six times. Too generous. User’s reply 1: Are you literate, have you heard about 12 nautical miles? Hit your ass. User’s reply 2: You fight when they haven’t entered the 12 nautical miles? Are you in such a hurry to be 艹 (fucked up) by the US? User’s reply 3: Why don’t you go to fight. It’s easy to stand and talk without feeling the ache in the waist. In this example, in response to the GT ’s post of warning the US military plane, a web user commented that China army shall hit the plane after giving warning three times. Respondents disagreed with him and highlighted the 12 nautical miles principles. They even mocked the commentator and challenged him to fight rather than just talking in the cyber space. Regarding the usage of languages and emoji, Table  5.3 below gives examples of some languages and emoji used by Chinese netizens in the case of SCS. Table 5.3 shows that the online users use various languages and emoji to express, highlight and strengthen their opinions, attitudes and emotions towards the SCS disputes. In addition to what have been found in previous chapters, this case finds that many online users have national pride and support China’s assertive postures in the SCS. Due to the nature of SCS disputes, users commented, criticized and mocked other claimants and third-party countries such as Vietnam, Philippines, US, and Japan. Some also criticized Ministry of Foreign Affairs and China’s military

5  SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE IN 2018 

103

Table 5.3  Online users’ usage of languages and emoji on Weibo pertaining to South China Sea in 2018 Use of languages Examples Affirmative

Abusive

Racist

Sarcasm

Metaphor

Parody

More than 60 years ago, with a war, we gained decades of peaceful time and international status. Today, do not expect to rise with peace. Abandon illusions. Get ready to fight! The task of building a strong people’s navy is never so pressing like today Mighty is the President! Mighty is our big Changsha fleet! Liberate Taiwan in 2021, present it as a gift to the Party’s 100th anniversary Damn, I just can’t think through. We deploy missiles and army on our own soil. How are you fucking excited across the ocean. Is it still the fucking China threat theory?! The West has a nasty dog, it’s named US imperial Brain-damaged ones are not in small numbers Vietnamese monkeys are really gross! What qualifications do the white skinned pigs have to say we deploy defense on our own territory Working at Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as long as you know how to strongly condemn, it is ok You are not think tank but retard! Every year when it is time for general election, the US ships would come over. How easy it is to gain votes with anti-China Kangaroo, can’t you stay away and don’t give us more trouble. Mind it is pretty dangerous! China needs to fill a few more islands to steady nerves In the near future, SCS will be China’s inner sea Japan is a sheep raised by the US, always waiting to be pulled out US = troublemaker Chairman Mao said; all anti-revolutionaries are paper tigers China reiterate: (we) target no particular countries and regions India: in my country you can’t say anything good about China!!!!

Use of emoji/ emoticons Smile

Laugh-Cry

(I) have a presentiment, Taiwan is soon! US cents, public intellectuals: the world belongs to our country of Beacon She (Cai Yingwen, Taiwan) made sacrifice to the unification Find when Philippine is getting close to China, the way it talks is different (continued)

104 

S. I. ZHANG

Table 5.3 (continued) Use of languages Examples Allow me to be sad

Spread out hands

Doge

Angry Nose picking

Thank CNN for telling me, the island in our country is already so damn good. Otherwise I don’t even know it! Those who commented that China is weak are enough. How can the reef turn into an island if (we are) weak? Recently I watched Tom Cruise’ Top Gun, look at their military propaganda…When will our leaders get the point and attract large number of young people (I) find that many people can’t tell the difference between Indonesia and India. It must be tiring to read through the article To tell the truth, Americans speak for the US, I have no problem with it. What I find odd is that some Chinese speak for the US government. Really don’t understand it China can do whatever it wants on its own island I can also give warnings under Trump’s Twitter account, and warn it seven times. Please click ‘like’ for me! This is Philippine’s best fleet at present, the cost is a bit big A big country only does shameless things! Must warn foreign countries: China will open fire for any military entry into China’s sea waters Both economy and military need to be strong. Thousands of protests are less than one vibration of firefighters’ wings! If you take it as fleet, it must be something wrong with your eyesight

Data source: Sina Weibo

propaganda. Peer-to-peer abuse and personal attacks are still prevalent. The US cents and public intellectuals are often named.

5.4   Analysis of Macro-Structural Factors In this case, history, legality, security/military, diplomacy (foreign policy), economics and nationalism are six major macro-structural factors that influence and determine the online news coverage of mainstream media and online peer-to-peer interactions and debates. China’s claims in the SCS are based on historical evidence, and the territorial/sovereignty disputes are legal issues involving the international law. History and legality are essential in the SCS dispute, the Nine-Dash Line in particular. Some news posts and users’ comments refer to the history and legality of the SCS that is mainly used to justify China’s official

5  SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE IN 2018 

105

stance and the military build-up. For instance, on 2 June, in the GT post titled “Shangrila Summit”  – China Delegation refutes speech by US Defense Minister’, it reported that Mattis, the former US Defense Minister, condemns China’s militarialization of SCS. He Lei, the leader of China Delegation, claimed ‘South China Sea islands, reefs and the adjacent waters are China’s land, which has historical bases and is recognized by the international law. It is undisputable. China upholds that out of respect for history and on the basis of international law, resolve the dispute with parties in concern through peaceful means.’ In response, users commented: ‘The Singapore Shangrila Summit just provides a place for spat fight. Rabbit (China) has never paid much attention to it. The levels of attendees are not high. What Rabbit does now is to do more and speak less, be more active in military defense and economy…’. ‘According to the definition of international law, SCS is public sea. The key is whether the validity of Nine-Dash Line (the former 12-dash line) can be recognized by other countries. At present, it is not optimistic. But we are afraid of nothing if we have actual control over SCS.’ Security (military) or militarialization of SCS is the most important factor in this case. Maritime security involves the coordination of civil and military, as well as national and regional, components (Raine & Mière, 2013). Since 2009, it is widely acknowledged that China has become more assertive in the SCS disputes partly due to the growth of China’s military power (Li, 2015). In similar veins, Kim (2018) also argued that the SCS disputes have gained greater attention in recent years due to Beijing’s controversial land reclamation and militarization in contested waters. The militarization mainly covers Taiwan Straits, military training exercises, the build-up of the PLAN capabilities, military and marine law enforcement patrols, and China’s clash with the US on ‘freedom of navigation’ and ‘open sky’ in SCS. As Cheng and Paladini (2014) noted, ‘the situation in the Taiwan Straits has been accorded top priority in China’s military planning all the time.’ That is why there are plenty of news posts and users’ comments on Taiwan Straits. In addition, PLAN has conducted regular security patrols in the SCS from 2005 onwards, which reflects China’s ‘increasing capability and the heightening concern of the Chinese leadership to strengthen China’s territorial claims in the area through a military presence’ (Cheng & Paladini, 2014). China’s increasing political and military power complicates US predominance in the region (Castro, 2013). In response to US’ pressure and surveillance activities, China takes more direct military and paramilitary action alongside diplomatic protests

106 

S. I. ZHANG

(Raine & Mière, 2013). Generally speaking, China’s public opinion aligns with and supports the nation’s positions, actions and reactions in the SCS including Taiwan Straits, military build-up and competition with the US in the SCS. As Li (2015) indicated, PLA leaders regarded the SCS as part of China’s maritime territory. The PLA’s position has had a direct impact on the views of the general public in China. In 2012, a survey conducted by GT showed nearly 80% respondents indicated support for China’s use of military means to counter ‘foreign provocations and encroachments’ (Li, 2015). Today, GT continues to publish hardline posts on Weibo as evidenced by its dominant military frames. But users’ comments are diverse as shown by their assertive attitude on Taiwan issue and the pro/ anti-war debate. For instance, GT has a series of news posts on its #2019 GT Annual Meeting#. One of the topic is rising tensions in SCS and Taiwan Straits (8 December 2018). Zhu Feng, a Chinese scholar from Nanjing University, claimed, though the SCS arbitration is a piece of waste paper, the situation in the SCS today remains serious and complex. As for the militarization of SCS, Zhu pointed out, ‘the US militarization is even worse than China. We are aware, during Obama’s two terms, US fleets navigated freely in the SCS four times. But in less than two years since Trump came into power, the navigation happened nine times. In addition, some other countries also participated. The ‘free navigation’ in SCS is multilateral.’ In response, voices of three camps including pragmatists, hardliners and moderates indicated by Zhang (2017) are present on Weibo. Take a few comments as examples: ‘how come the territory waters passed on from (our) ancestors have turned into public sea when the US comes over?’ (moderates). ‘Most parts of SCS is public sea. What China claims is that the islands are our own. In a sense, as long as we (we) occupy the island, the sea naturally falls into our control.’ (pragmatists). ‘China-US hot war will break out in the SCS!’ (hardliners). Diplomacy/policy also impacts the online public opinion on the SCS issue. Zhang (2017) noted, while China is trying to strengthen strategic control over its positions in the SCS, China does not wish to escalate regional tensions and the military approach does not dominate its policy. Diplomacy still takes centre stage. But China has not achieved foreign policy objectives in the region since the discourses on a ‘harmonious world’ and ‘peaceful rise’ have not been convincing. China’s assertive foreign policy behavior and expanded military capabilities lead to a perceived security dilemma (Cheng & Stephanie Paladini). President Xi Jinping pointed out, China ‘will not give up even one inch in the South China Sea’

5  SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE IN 2018 

107

and the disputed area belongs to China’s territory ‘since ancient time’ (Rosyidin, 2019). His statements set out the base line for China’s diplomacy, assertive policy and the general public opinion toward its territorial claims in the SCS. SCS is regarded as vital for the realization of China’s sustained development, the great revival of the Chinese nation, and the China Dream (Li, 2015). China’s ‘muscle flexing’ in the SCS also signifies a shift in the “lie-low” policy to the “Three Self-Confidences” policy (Lee, 2016). In 2012, Xi Jinping put forward a fourth ‘cultural self-confidence’ in addition to confidence in the path, theory, and system of Chinese socialism. In fact, as Rosyidin (2019) argued, China has employed both coercive and cooperative diplomacy. Correspondingly the concept of ‘Chinese threat’ produced by Western scholars co-exists with the ‘China’s peaceful rise’ narrative promoted by Chinese scholars (Rosyidin, 2019). Public opinion in China holds that the government is too weak in handling territorial disputes with neighboring countries, thus talking tough and acting assertively becomes politically correct in the Chinese decision-making milieu (Li, 2015). This case study finds that online users have shown different attitudes towards China’s diplomacy in the SCS. They supported, mocked or criticized China’s diplomacy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in particular. For instance, users comments include: ‘Actually China’s diplomacy is rather strong and tough’; ‘seriously support the silver tongues at Ministry of Foreign Affairs. You must curse the American imperialists and their dogs to death’. And, ‘The talk sounds rather weak. A few days ago, Ministry of Foreign Affairs said well, China will never be a hegemony, will not build military bases all over the world. Will the US dare to day the same things? Just talk back like this will be all. Make a pile of empty talks [black line][black line].’ It suggests that the majority of users support China’s diplomacy. The few criticisms are rather moderate with a focus on the weak and empty talk of Chinese diplomats. The most significant finding is that no hard criticisms can be found towards diplomacy and foreign policy. Moreover, users comments to five posts regarding diplomacy/foreign policy are completely blocked on Weibo. Below is the list of posts whose comments are censored off. It reveals that nearly all the comments that have been censored involve Sino-US military competition or clash in the SCS. Hence, diplomacy/foreign policy on the China-US power struggle in SCS are the most sensitive topics that have been strictly controlled on Weibo.

108 

S. I. ZHANG

1. No. 14 PLAN will conduct actual combat exercise in SCS [mic] (23 March 2018) 2. No. 62 Wang Yi: US is the biggest force behind the regional militarization; Condemnation of China is calling black white (4 August 2018) 3. No. 79 Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded to illegal entry of US fleet into adjacent reefs and waters of Nansha (the Spratly) Islands (2 October 2018) 4. No. 81. Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Urge US to stop stirring and producing tensions (5 October 2018) 5. No. 88 Great power overseas, please cease interfering SCS affairs! Give thumb-up to Great Monk (1 November 2018) In addition to military, economic is another leverage that China uses in dealing with the SCS disputes. As Raine and Mière (2013) noted, China’s economic rise and growth in trade with the region mean China can also utilise its extensive economic influence in its diplomacy, the so-called economic or energy diplomacy. Indeed, China’s economic growth leads to an ambitious ocean development strategy in the context of securing resources, protecting national interests and pursuing scientific and technological achievements (Cheng & Paladini, 2014). The 12th Five-Year Plan increased emphasis on the marine economy and the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) started publishing annual reports on China’s Ocean Development (Laurenceson, 2017). Meanwhile, experts hold a view that China prefers a ‘divide and conquer’ tactic over allowing its opponents to group together. Thus, China supports economic cooperation while preventing the emergence of a unified bloc (Shah, 2017). But such a stance discounts the importance of multilateralism and confidence-building measures between parties (Shah, 2017). Rising tensions in the SCS have made China’s use of its economic leverage over Southeast Asian countries come into focus. China’s strategy of ‘using economic means for political purposes’ is facing challenges (Li, 2015; Ravindran, 2012). In this context, the case analysis shows there are a few news posts and users’ comments that address China’s economic influence in the SCS. For instance, an editorial post dated on 13 April 2018 claimed that the military parade held on the SCS waters tells Chinese people ‘our increased military expenses these years are not spent in vain. Part of China’s economic power is rapidly translating into the navy power.’ Users’ comments focus on both military and economic influence. One user commented: ‘the US (deals with China)

5  SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE IN 2018 

109

on all fronts now, economic first, then military. China shall be on high alert. Adopt a dual economy/military approach. Both must be strong.’ In sum, a few posts/comments address economics and they mainly tackle the intertwining of economic and military spheres of influence. The SCS dispute is also about domestic political will to manage rising popular nationalism (Raine & Mière, 2013). In China, there is a growing tide of chauvinistic nationalism. The vision of the ‘Chinese Dream’ relies on increasing nationalism and militarization. President Xi is appealing to Chinese nationalism in forging ahead in the SCS. But strong nationalism may lead to unintended escalation in the SCS as well as the ECS against Japan. It may also make compromise and backtracking by its leaders politically difficult, if not dangerous (Beeson, 2016; Burgess, 2016; Guo et al., 2019). In the ‘public opinion warfare’, Party newspapers reflect and cultivate nationalist opinion. Microblogs also provide a platform for local nationalists to voice provocative and aggressive opinions. The danger is that nationalist opinion may undermine a government’s ability to control its foreign policy actively (Raine & Mière, 2013). To manage the nationalist sentiments and opinions on Weibo and minimize the policy risks, as discussed above, Weibo completely blocked users’ comments to some diplomacy (foreign policy) posts on the SCS. Thus, online censorship is an effective management strategy for the state in collaboration with the platform company to promote and encourage ‘safe’ nationalism while keeping the ‘dangerous’ nationalist sentiments and voices in check. In this case, the China-US relations and strategic competition/clash are deemed to be ‘dangerous’. National pride, support of foreign policy, military might and territorial claims, as well as moderate criticism seem to be safe and encouraged. Provocative, aggressive, racist languages, and peer-to-peer personal attacks are allowed. Both rational and irrational sentiments co-exist on Weibo.

5.5   Conclusion This chapter focuses on the SCS disputes that are indeed significant due to the geo-strategic positions. The disputes are also complex involving multiple countries and covering various issues. This case analysis reveals that the majority of GT posts are news pieces, though many of which are statements made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Online media outlets, social media video channels in particular, have been used. Chinese government institutions, officials and military

110 

S. I. ZHANG

experts seem to be dominant news sources. Social media videos start to be prevalent in production and dissemination of news, and official voices are undoubtedly dominant. GT has used the security/military as the dominant frame, and diplomacy/analysis as strong frames. This coincides with the militarization, multilateralism and complexity of the SCS. As for GT ’s engagement with users, hard news that contains military frames has drawn users’ attentions and responses. For instance, the post about military training in Sanya and live-fire drills in Taiwan Strait has attracted the largest of number of shares, comments and likes, which demonstrates the highest level of popularity and engagement. In addition, the media agenda and public agenda more or less matches despite the expanded public agenda including debate, sentiments and incivility for netizens. The online domestic public opinion is that many users have demonstrated national pride and support of China’s assertive postures in the SCS.  Meanwhile there are moderate criticisms of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and China’s military propaganda. Six contextual factors including history, legality, security/military, diplomacy/policy, economics and nationalism are all important that influence the online public opinion. Of these six factors, security (military), diplomacy (foreign policy) and nationalism seem to be more important than the other three. In particular, the SCS has become a geostrategic battleground for US and China (Zhang, 2017). Correspondingly, China’s diplomacy (foreign policy) on the China-US power struggle in the SCS is the most sensitive topic that has been highly controlled and strictly censored on Weibo. Users’ comments to five posts are totally blocked out. In this book project, this is the first time that hard evidence has been collected about Weibo censorship on the territory disputes or crisis. It shows that social media censorship is China’s media management strategy to control the online nationalist sentiments and to ensure that China’s diplomacy (foreign policy) are not hijacked by the online public opinion.

References Bateman, S. (2011). Regime building in the South China Sea – Current situation and outlook. Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs, 3(1), 25–33. Beeson, M. (2016). Can ASEAN Cope with China? Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 35(1), 5–28.

5  SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE IN 2018 

111

Burgess, S.  F. (2016). Rising bipolarity in the South China Sea: The American rebalance to Asia and China’s expansion. Contemporary Security Policy, 37(1), 111–143. Castro, R. C. D. (2013). China and Japan in maritime Southeast Asia: Extending their geo-strategic rivalry by competing for friends. Philippine Political Science Journal, 34(2), 150–169. Castro, R.  C. D. (2017). The Duterte Administration’s appeasement policy on China and the crisis in the Philippine–US alliance. Philippine Political Science Journal, 38(3), 159–181. Cheng, J. Y. S., & Paladini, S. (2014). China’s ocean development strategy and its handling of the territorial conflicts in the South China Sea. Philippine Political Science Journal, 35(2), 185–202. Guo, L., Mays, K., & Wang, J. (2019). Whose story wins on Twitter? Visualizing the South China Sea dispute. Journalism Studies, 20(4), 563–584. Hayton, B. (2017). When good lawyers write bad history: Unreliable evidence and the South China Sea territorial dispute. Ocean Development & International Law, 48(1), 17–34. He, K. (2019). Contested multilateralism 2.0 and regional order transition: Causes and implications. The Pacific Review, 32(2), 210–220. Kim, A., & Kim, J. (2018). China’s aggressive ‘periphery diplomacy’ and South Korean perspectives. The Pacific Review, 31(2), 267–277. Kim, J. (2018). The clash of power and nationalism: The Sino-Japan territorial dispute. Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 5(1), 31–56. Laurenceson, J. (2017). Economics and freedom of navigation in East Asia. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 71(5), 461–473. Lee, P. S. N. (2016). The rise of China and its contest for discursive power. Global Media and China, 1(1–2), 102–120. Li, M. (2015). The People’s Liberation Army and China’s smart power quandary in Southeast Asia. Journal of Strategic Studies, 38(3), 359–382. Mishra, R. (2017). Code of conduct in the South China Sea: More discord than accord. Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India, 13(2), 62–75. Raine, S., & Mière, C. L. (2013). Chapter Two: Beijing’s multifaceted approaches. Adelphi Series, 53(436–437), 55–104. Ravindran, M. S. (2012). China’s potential for economic coercion in the South China Sea disputes: A comparative study of the Philippines and Vietnam. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 31(3), 105–132. Rosyidin, M. (2019). The Dao of foreign policy: Understanding China’s dual strategy in the South China Sea. Contemporary Security Policy, 40(2), 214–238. Shah, D. P. (2017). China’s maritime security strategy: An assessment of the white paper on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation. Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India, 13(1), 1–13.

112 

S. I. ZHANG

Singh, A. (2012). South China Sea disputes: Regional issue, global concerns. Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India, 8(1), 116–135. Sison, M. P. T., III. (2018). Universalizing the law of the sea in the South China Sea dispute. Ocean Development & International Law, 49(2), 157–175. Storey, I. (2013). Japan’s maritime security interests in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea dispute. Political Science, 65(2), 135–156. Tai, W., & Huang, Y. (2018). Political and economic relationships between China and the Philippines under the OBOR initiative. The Chinese Economy, 51(4), 356–369. Thao, N. H., & Amer, R. (2009). A new legal arrangement for the South China Sea? Ocean Development & International Law, 40(4), 333–349. Wood, J. R. (2019). China’s maritime strategy and national security in the South China Sea. Intelligence and National Security. https://doi.org/10.108 0/02684527.2019.1620548. Yee, A. (2011). Maritime territorial disputes in East Asia: A comparative analysis of the South China Sea and the East China Sea. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 40(2), 165–193. Zhang, F. (2017). Assessing China’s response to the South China Sea arbitration ruling. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 71(4), 440–459.

CHAPTER 6

North Korea Nuclear Crisis in 2018

The North Korea nuclear crisis is one of the most protracted security issues in the world (Yoon, 2019). Since its first nuclear test in 2006, North Korea (DPRK) has carried out six nuclear tests. North Korea has become a de facto nuclear weapon state or a nuclear power (Gittings, 2007; Kim, 2020). Its intentions to develop ballistic missiles and nuclear arms can be summarized as regime survival and defense, deterrence of the USA, a bargaining chip, a cost effective equalizer in its competition with South Korea (ROK), and an opportunity to earn hard currency through sales of these technologies, and boost the regime’s domestic legitimacy (Hess, 2018). China is regarded as the most crucial factor in dealing with North Korea’s nuclear issue (Chang & Lee, 2018) and many look to China for leverage to change North Korea’s behaviour (Zhang & Denton, 2019). After all, China has had an alliance relationship with North Korea since 1961. China played a dual diplomatic role as the host of the Six-Party Talks while serving as its longtime aid donor (Cai, 2010). Even President Trump claimed, ‘China has great influence over North Korea. And China will either decide to help us on North Korea or they won’t’ (Khoo, 2019). However, Zhang and Denton (2019) found that China’s leverage on North Korea is nuanced. They argued that North Korea has been wary of China’s influence and pressure from China may render North Korea more resistant to China’s influence. China’s policy towards North Korea has shifted from regarding it as a buffer zone and strategic asset to a burden and strategic liability (Chung & Choi, 2013; Kim, 2016). As Wu (2006) © The Author(s) 2020 S. I. Zhang, Media and Conflict in the Social Media Era in China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7635-5_6

113

114 

S. I. ZHANG

argued, China’s ‘close as lips-and-teeth’ relationship with North Korea has become obsolete. North Korea’s traditional role as a buffer zone against the United States is today much less salient for China. Although North Korea is still considered a traditional friend, it has at times proved to be an unstable neighbor and an embarrassing partner. Lee (2014) also pointed out, ‘the North’s nuclear test brought about heated debates inside China about whether North Korea was more a liability than a buffer.’ Mastro (2018) went further and claimed that North Korea is not China’s top policy priority. Chinese relations with North Korea have deteriorated over the last two decades. Today China is no longer wedded to North Korea’s survival, nor is it dominated by fears of Korean instability and a resulting refugee crisis (Mastro, 2018). For many, the year 2018 was remembered as a historic year on the Korean Peninsula (Choi, 2018). Following the 2017 nuclear crisis in which North Korea implemented a total of 19 missile tests resulting in United Nations Security Council (UNSC)’s No. 2375 sanction resolution, ‘the first days of the year 2018 began with the debate on whose nuclear button is comparatively larger between Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump’ (Gafarli, 2018). However, a dramatic turnaround began to unfold in Pyongchang Winter Olympics in February 2018. Kim Jong-un started to mend relations with the U.S. and his East Asian neighbors except for Japan. He made a surprise visit to Beijing for talks with Xi Jinping on 25 March, his first foreign trip ever since he took power in 2012. He then had five summits within three months: two with China on 7 May and 19 June; two with South Korea on 27 April and 26 May; one with the U.S. in Singapore on 12 June. The de-escalation process culminated with the historic Trump–Kim summit in Singapore, which spurred Trump to declare that North Korea is ‘no longer a nuclear threat’ (Choi, 2018; Meyskens, 2019). In response, Chinese media praised Kim Jong-un’s efforts to bring tangible results in the economic and political situation (Meyskens, 2019). Three themes have emerged within Chinese discourse on North Korea: China as a responsible nation; the DPRK as a hindrance to Beijing’s regional and international influence; and a China-led denuclearization of the DPRK under a Chinese-led East Asian order (Meyskens, 2019). Dalton et al. (2016) argued, media plays an important role in ‘constructing’ North Korea in public sphere. Media (news) discourse influences policy-makers and public opinion. In China, public opinion towards North Korea may have changed in correspondence with the changing

6  NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR CRISIS IN 2018 

115

media discourses. For instance, a public opinion poll conducted by Global Times revealed that about two-thirds of the Chinese public supported Beijing to take stronger actions including sanctions to resolve the North Korea nuclear problem (Taylor, 2009). A recent poll by Global Times suggested public support for Beijing to distance itself from Pyongyang (Mastro, 2018). So the questions are: how do the Chinese mainstream media cover North Korea nuclear crisis online now? What is the latest public opinion towards North Korea and relevant countries? This chapter proceeds as follows: it firstly gives a brief historic overview of North Korea nuclear crisis, followed by findings from content and textual analysis on the basis of Global Times’ posts and web users’ comments on Weibo. It then analyzes contextual factors and ends with a conclusion.

6.1   A Brief Historic Overview of North Korea Nuclear Crisis Since the partition of North and South governments in 1948, military hostilities – the US-North Korea hostility and inter-Korean rivalry – began and were exacerbated by the Korean War from 1950 to 1953 (Choi, 2018). In the mid-1950s, North Korea launched an atomic energy program, signing a nuclear cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union and sending scientists to Moscow for training. The Soviets supplied a research reactor and helped North Korea build a nuclear research center at Yongbyon in the 1960s (Kux, 1998; Meyskens, 2019). Anderson (2017) pointed out, the North initiated its nuclear program in the late 1960s, pursued weaponisation in the early 1980s, and progressed till its first nuclear test in 2006. The North Korean nuclear program consists of three primary components: a plutonium program, a highly enriched uranium program and a ballistic missile program (Anderson, 2017). North Korea expanded its nuclear program considerably during the 1980s and joined the Non-­ Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985. But North Korea did not conclude a bilateral safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) until 1992 (O’Neil, 2004). In 1993, North Korea threatened to withdraw from the NPT and later disaffiliated from the NPT in 2003 (Kwon, 2019). The first North Korea nuclear crisis broke out in 1993-1994. Between May 1993 and June 1994, North Korea successfully tested a midrange

116 

S. I. ZHANG

missile and expelled IAEA inspectors, ‘signaling their intentions to divert fuel from their power program to create nuclear weapons’ (Ramirez, 2018). Clinton increased troops in South Korea and suggested economic sanctions. In response, Kim Il Sung threatened to ‘turn Seoul into a sea of flames.’ (Ramirez, 2018). Under the pressure of the US military and possible UN sanctions, Pyongyang signed the 1994 Agreed Framework, which stipulated that North Korea would shut down its reactor program and reprocessing plant in exchange for international assistance with constructing light water nuclear reactors and supplies of oil (Meyskens, 2019). In August 1998, North Korea fired a TaepoDong I ballistic missile over northern Japan in the direction of Hawaii, which ‘sparked an international crisis’ (Taylor, 2009). While North Korea announced a few days later that it was satellite, it revealed North Korea’s significant progress in the development of long-range missiles (Lee, 2005). Japan retaliated by halting food and other aid to North Korea, dispatching Maritime Self Defense Force vessels and P3-C patrol aircraft for reconnaissance and intelligence collection. Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi stated that ‘the missile launching concerns not only the security of Japan but also the whole of Asia’ (Lee, 2005). The second nuclear crisis broke out between North Korea and the U.S. in 2002. In January, Present Bush labeled North Korea as part of an ‘axis of evil’ during his first State of the Union address, which portended a break from the Clinton policy of engagement (Ayson & Taylor, 2004; Cotton, 2003). In October, North Korea acknowledged that it had a secret uranium-enrichment nuclear weapons program (Yoon & Lee, 2005). Washington regarded this revelation as a ‘serious breach’ of the Agreed Framework and suspended all further fuel oil deliveries to North Korea. The Agreed Framework collapsed in December and Pyongyang ejected all IAEA inspectors from North Korea later that month. In January 2003, North Korea declared its withdrawal from the NPT (O’Neil, 2004). Without Agreed Framework and NPT obligations, North Korea ‘now faces no external obstacles to accelerating its nuclear weapons programme’ (O’Neil, 2004). Following North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT, the Six-Party Talks – the diplomatic process comprising the US, North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan and Russia  – was established to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem in 2003 (Taylor, 2009). However, this process has enjoyed a mixed record, enjoying some limited successes but stalling for lengthy periods (Taylor, 2009). China’s chairmanship of the Six-Party

6  NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR CRISIS IN 2018 

117

Talks showed that the Chinese government shifted from the ‘discreet behind-the-scenes approach’ to a new approach of ‘proactive crisis management’. China’s changing stance reflects its concern about increasing regional insecurity (Lee, 2014). In 2006, North Korea launched ballistic missiles and conducted its first nuclear test. The second Korea nuclear crisis ‘reached a climax’ (Cai, 2010). According to New York Times, North Korea became ‘the eighth country in history, and arguably the most unstable and most dangerous, to proclaim that it has joined the club of nuclear weapons states’ (Gusterson, 2008). Meanwhile, Michishita (2006) pointed out, the nuclear test has shown North Korea’s vulnerability in which it has not acquired credible nuclear capabilities, but its intention to possess nuclear weapons has become undeniable. In response, Japan augmented its programs to develop a next-generation missile defense system with the US and China supported UN sanctions against North Korea for the first time (Lee, 2007; Meyskens, 2019). After crossing an important ‘red line’ in October 2006, North Korea agreed to dismantle its nuclear installations and make a full disclosure of its past and present programmes at the Six-­ Party Talks in early 2007 (Litwak, 2008). North Korea conducted its second nuclear test in May 2009. Meyskens (2019) claims, North Korea carried out a failed satellite launch, which foreign observers considered to be a cover for an intercontinental-ballistic-­ missile (ICBM) test. The UNSC reacted with even stronger sanctions. Prior to the test, North Korea officially withdrew from the Six-Party Talks in April, which led many people conclude that ‘the Six Party Talks which aimed to solve the crisis are a total failure’ (Cai, 2010). The second nuclear test suggested that Pyongyang had no intention of relinquishing its nuclear programme and its Songun (military-first) policy introduced by Kim Jong II in 1994 has been justified (Habib, 2011). Since 2009, China has shifted its North Korea strategy. It has forged new economic ties with North Korea, especially with the adoption of territorial policies, with an aim of improving security-cum-stability or enhancing geopolitical security through geo-economics means (Lee, 2014). In 2012, North Korea claimed it is a nuclear weapons state under its new leader Kim Jong-un and revised its constitution claiming itself to be a nuclear power (Choi, 2018). In the following years, despite the tightening of UN sanctions and the threat of armed intervention by the US (Beczkowska, 2019), North Korea conducted its third nuclear test in 2013, fourth and fifth nuclear test in 2016, and sixth nuclear test in 2017.

118 

S. I. ZHANG

Hess (2018) argued, the military provocations, ballistic missile and nuclear tests in particular, are conducted to improve North Korean capabilities. Meanwhile, it showed that coercion and compellence have a limited influence on North Korean behaviour. Indeed, as Nilsson-Wright (2019) pointed out, the emergence of a nuclear-capable North Korea, led by a young and seemingly overconfident new leader – Kim Jong-un – threatens to disrupt the delicate strategic balance in the region. In 2017 alone, North Korea fired 23 missiles and conducted its sixth nuclear test (hydrogen bomb) test. North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme has long been a cause of great concern for the international community, but it was not until 2017 that the full-scale of the danger became apparent. The nuclear test in September yielded 50–250 kilotons, ten to sixteen times bigger than the nuclear bomb dropped on Hiroshima (Düben, 2017). In response, South Korea and the United States carried out joint military exercises, and the UNSC adopted four resolutions further tightening sanctions (Gafarli, 2018; Kim, 2020). The exchange of hostile rhetoric between North Korea and the US continued: Trump called Kim Jong-un a rocket man, North Korean Foreign Minister denounced Trump as a dotard. Trump threatened with ‘total destruction’ and ‘fire and fury’. Tension escalated to the extent that a military clash looked imminent (Kim, 2020). However, Beczkowska (2019) concluded, the biggest threat to North Korea is self-destruction. Trump’s ‘fire and rage’ rhetoric has only strengthened Kim Jong-un’s position within the state. The threat from the U.S. justified the spending on nuclear program. Meanwhile, Trump has called on China to play a more proactive role in reining in Kim Jong-un’s nuclear ambition (Kim, 2020). For China, Beijing hopes that North Korean will abandon nuclear weapons and embrace Chinese-style ‘reform and opening up, and normalize diplomatic relations’ in the long run. In the short-term, China has sought to end US-North Korea brinkmanship and implement its ‘double-suspension’ policy of North Korea ending nuclear tests and the United States halting military exercises (Meyskens, 2019). Since early 2017, China has enforced UN sanctions against North Korea’s nuclear weapon programs faithfully (Kim, 2020). In 2018, China developed more positive relations with North Korea after Kim Jong-un swapped nuclear tests for improved relations with the United States, South Korea, and China (Meyskens, 2019). Against this historic backdrop, China’s online news discourse and public opinion will be discussed in the next section drawing on the analysis of Global Times’ posts and comments on Weibo in 2018.

6  NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR CRISIS IN 2018 

119

6.2   Analysis of Global Times Posts Results from the content and textual analysis surrounding North Korea nuclear crisis are presented, analyzed and discussed. The sampling time period was set for one year from 1 January 2018 to 31 December 2018. As a result, a total of 51 GT posts and 607 users’ comments were collected. The trend/patterns of GT ’s online news coverage and the users’ reactions are addressed below. With regards to the news/views division, of the 51 GT posts, 40 posts are coded as news whereas 11 are views. The majority of the posts are news pieces. The views-based posts are either editorials (8) or remarks (3) given by Hu Xijin, the chief editor of GT. Nearly all the news posts are edited drawing on secondary sources. Six main sources are identified: (1) Chinese media such as People’s Daily mobile app, CCTV, Xinhua International, China News Service web (中新网), V diu (微丢 – Video news produced by Shanghai Observer). (2) Chinese government institutions such as Ministry of Foreign Affairs web, spokespersons of Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (3) Global and foreign media such as AP, AFP, Fox News, CNBC of US, RT (former Russia Today), Sputnik News of Russia, Asahi Shimbun of Japan, KCNA (Korean Central News Agency) of North Korea, Arirang News of South Korea, Yonhap News of South Korea, and The Dong-a Ilbo of South Korea. (4) Foreign government officials and politicians such as Trump and his Twitter, Xi Jinping, Kim Jong-un, Abe, Putin, former US Defense Minister Mattis, former US ambassador to UN Nikki Haley, Defense Minister from Japan, Deputy Foreign Minister from North Korea as well as officials from Cheongwadae (The Blue House) in Seoul. (5) Hu Xijin and unidentified sources. It finds that GT posts do not use diverse sources from Chinese media but concentrate on the few big state news outlets. Chinese scholars and experts’ voices are out of the picture. In addition to sourcing from global media and national media from the six related countries (as those in Six-Party Talks), GT uses Trump’s Twitter as its source. Sources cannot be identified in a few news posts. Seven themes are generated from the GT posts. First, North Korea’s actions and progress on its nuclear programme. It covers North Korea’s announcement to suspend all nuclear and ICBM tests, and close down nuclear test site in April, acceptance of nuclear weapon inspections, inviting international media to visit the abandoned nuclear test site, explosion and dismantling of nuclear testing facility at Punggye-ri in May, and the death of nuclear missile expert in North Korea in September. Second, US

120 

S. I. ZHANG

reactions and attitudes including Trump’s statements. This includes: US will not accept a nuclear North Korea in January, Trump is willing to meet with Kim Jong-un on denuclearization of Korean Peninsula in March, Trump praises North Korea’s suspension of nuclear test as progress in April, Trump’s letter to Kim Jong-un to cancel the summit in Singapore in May, the Singapore Summit continues, and Trump announces to continue with sanctions if North Korea does not give up nuclear programme in June, Trump plans to meet with Putin in July, and Trump thanks North Korea for not showing nuclear missiles at its military parade in September. Third, China’s responses, stances and attitudes. Chinese diplomats (spokespersons of Ministry of Foreign Affairs) reiterated China’s stance: China supports denuclearization and seeking peace on Korean Peninsula; China supports North Korea’s economic progress; The nuclear issue shall be resolved through direct dialogues and consultation; and North Korea has made concessions, which shall be encouraged and supported by the international community. Fourth, North-South negotiations and South Korea’s responses and attitudes. In January, the North-South negotiations ended with both sides willing to ease the border tensions and to promote peace on Korean Peninsula; In April, the Blue House in Seoul welcomes North Korea’s suspension of nuclear and missile tests while the anti-Thaad group demanded Thaad to be dismantled; in September, Kim Jong-un and Moon Jae-in signed a declaration to prevent military confrontation and both sides may jointly apply for hosting the 2032 Summer Olympic Games. Fifth, Japan and Russia’s attitudes. For instance, on 21 April, the headline of the GT post is: ‘Japan is dissatisfied with North Korea’s suspension of nuclear test; it will continue to impose maximum pressures’. On 25 May, the post is ‘Putin expresses regret towards US-North Korea summit’. Sixth, GT ’s editorials and Hu Xijin’s commentary. GT ’s editorial line is that a new political order will form on Korean Peninsula if nuclear tests and military exercises have stopped. In response to North Korea’s suspension of nuclear tests, US and South Korea shall make major strategic adjustment. The North-South relation depends on US-North Korea relation. The key is the US. China shall encourage US and North Korea to resolve the nuclear issue through dialogues and support North Korea to protect its interests. Hu Xijin believes President of South Korea needs to sacrifice US-South Korea alliance to a certain extent in order to continue interactions with North Korea. It is difficult to denuclearize North Korea. US shall support and promote denuclearization of North Korea rather than having suspicions. Seventh, others. One post on 29

6  NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR CRISIS IN 2018 

121

October was breaking news: ‘According to Sputnik, Russia, Britain, China, US, and France oppose a nuclear ban treaty and have refused to sign it’. Based on the above-mentioned themes, five frames are identified: North Korea’s suspension of nuclear tests; US’ responses and US-North Korea Summit; China’s response and Xi-Kim summit; South Korea’s response and North-South summit; Japan and Russia’s stance and attitudes; GT editorials and Hu Xijin commentary; and Others. Table  6.1 below shows the spread of frames. Table 6.1 reveals that the ‘US’ response and US-North Korea Summit’ is the most dominant frame with 12 posts accounting for about 24% of the total posts, followed by frames of ‘North Korea’s suspension of nuclear tests’ and ‘GT editorials and commentary’ with 11 posts accounting for about 22%. These three frames can be regarded as equally strong with only one post difference. They are grouped into the ‘strong frames’ category. The second group of ‘medium frames’ include ‘China’s response and Xi-Kim summit’ and ‘South Korea’s response and North-South summit’ with 7 and 6 frames respectively. The third group are ‘weak frames’ consisting of ‘Japan and Russia’s responses’ (3 frames) and ‘others’ (1 frame). As for the popularity of GT ’s posts, Fig. 6.1 below shows the trend/ pattern of forwards (shares), comments and likes. The peak time occurred on 24 May 2018 with the post about Trump’s letter to Kim Jung-un. Figure 6.1 demonstrates moderate fluctuations of frequent rises and falls in terms of the number of forwards (shares), comments and likes. Three posts have drawn sharp spikes with variants on the order of shares, comments and likes. In other words, the degree of significance and Table 6.1  Distribution of frames in GT posts on Weibo pertaining to the North Korea nuclear crisis in 2018 (N=51) Frames North Korea’s suspension of nuclear tests US’ response and US-North Korea Summit South Korea’s response and North-South summit China’s response and Xi-Kim summit Japan and Russia’s response GT editorials and commentary Others

Data source: Sina Weibo

Number

Percentage

11 12 6

21.5% 23.5% 11.8%

7 3 11 1

13.7% 6% 21.5% 2%

122 

S. I. ZHANG

Forwards, Comments and Likes 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 Forwards

Comments

Likes

Fig. 6.1  The trend of forwards (shares), comments and likes of GT’s Weibo posts during the North Korea nuclear crisis in 2018. (Data source: Sina Weibo) Table 6.2 Three GT posts that have the largest number of shares, comments and likes pertaining to the North Korea nuclear crisis in 2018 Serial No.

Date

Topic

Forwards (shares)

Comments Likes

33

24 May 2018 22:29 12 June 2018 17:26 16 May 2018 10:44

Trump’s letter to Kim Jong-un

2044

1880

1406

Trump: South Korea and Japan shall 1984 pay for North Korea’s denuclearization

1243

1713

Breaking news: Deputy Foreign Minister of North Korea claims it is necessary to reconsider the North Korea-US Summit

1190

1864

40

28

501

Data source: Sina Weibo

popularity of these three posts is different. The three ‘hot’ posts are indicated and discussed below. Table 6.2 shows that the post on ‘Trump’s letter to Kim Jong-un’ has the highest degree of significance drawing the largest number of shares and comments. But it is not the most popular one among online users. The post on ‘Breaking news: Deputy Foreign Minister of North Korea claims it is necessary to reconsider the North Korea-US Summit’ has the

6  NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR CRISIS IN 2018 

123

highest degree of popularity with the largest number of likes but it has the lowest number of shares of the three posts. The third post on ‘Trump: South Korea and Japan shall pay for North Korea’s denuclearization’ enjoys the second largest number of shares, comments and likes. It proves that that the significance of a post indicated by the number shares and comments is not correlated with the degree of popularity indicated by the number of likes. In addition, as GT editorial writes on 23 April 2018: ‘As for the future trend of Peninsula, the key lies in the US’, the US plays a decisive role in the nuclear issue of North Korea. The three ‘hot’ posts are all about Trump’s statements and North Korea-US relations. The three posts contain texts and images only in the form of Trump’s letter in English, Trump’s photo and logo of GT ’s breaking news.

6.3   Analysis of Web Users’ Comments and Replies Corresponding to the three selected GT posts, a total of 57 entries of ­comments and replies were selected for textual analysis. Themes, frames, peer-to-peer interactions, the use of languages and emoji are discussed below. Five main themes are generated from the comments. First, criticism on Trump’s untrustworthiness, US hegemony and North Korea-US relations. In response to post No. 33 about Trump’s letter to Kim Jung-Un and post no. 28 about reconsideration of US-North Korea Summit, online users commented: ‘the textbook level Dear John letter of a jerk’. This post attracted 1045 ‘likes’. ‘Trump is untrustworthy’. ‘Trump cannot keep his promise.’ ‘US can withdraw at any time after it signed the agreement. Better to be careful.’ Second, comments on Kim Jung-un’s victory and North Korea’s nuclear weapon. Web users commented: ‘Xiao San (Little Three referring to Kim Jung-un) wins. (He) accomplished diplomacy overseas. After all, (he) can go to big fool (referring to China) to get money and food’. ‘In peace, who will they sell weapons to? In the past they can print some US dollars when they were short of money. It doesn’t work now. They have to live depending on selling weapons’. Third, comments on the triad of South Korea, Japan and US. In response to post No. 40 about Trump calling on South Korea and Japan to pay for North Korea’s denuclearization, users’ comments include: ‘I give this response a score of 100%’. This post draws 2030 likes. ‘Sitting in front of TV, Moon Jae-in gradually lost his smile’. Fourth, impact on China. In response to post No. 28, comments are: ‘Real estate speculators in Dandong (north

124 

S. I. ZHANG

China) are trembling…’. ‘People from Zhejiang are buying whole buildings in Dandong.’ Fifth, peer-to-peer attacks. Comments include: ‘If you go to Korea for a month, you wouldn’t have said this.’ ‘Why do you like to see things on the surface. Have you completed 9-year compulsory education. Your IQ is insufficient.’ In accordance with these themes, five main frames can be identified from comments: Trump, US and US-North Korea relations, Kim Jung-un and North Korea’s nuclear, triad of US, South Korea and Japan, impact on China and peer-to-peer attacks. In comparison to the frames of GT ’s posts (US’ response and US-North Korea Summit, North Korea’s suspension of nuclear tests, South Korea, Japan, China’s responses and GT editorials and commentary), there is a match between the media and public agenda, except for GT editorial commentary vs. peer-to peer interaction. However the framing, usage of languages and rhetoric in particular, are totally different. While the GT ’s media discourses are official citing political elites including state leadership, senior government officials, diplomats as well as other domestic and international media sources, online users’ discourses are short, personal, straightforward, critical, sarcastic and abusive. With regards to the peer-to-peer interactions, web users agree or disagree with each other. They may have dialogues and expand the conversation by voicing their opinions, providing additional information, pointing out others’ errors and giving further comments. Some users swear, abuse and conduct personal attacks towards others. Two examples are given below. Example 6.1 GT ’s post: Trump: South Korea and Japan shall pay for North Korea’s denuclearization. User’s comment: I give (Trump’s) response a score of 100%. User’s reply 1: Congratulations. Japan finally is not marginalized on the North Korean issue. User’s reply 2: Congratulate Abe. He used to complain about being marginalized on the North Korean nuclear issue. The US daddy finally and thoughtfully take him on board. User’s reply 3: (#first respondent): Japan: why (do you) think of me when it comes to payment? [Difficult to understand].

6  NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR CRISIS IN 2018 

125

In this example, in response to the news post, one user showed his/her full support to Trump in terms of requesting Japan and South Korea to pay for denuclearization of North Korea. The first three respondents agreed with the user and constructed a dialogue/conversation by congratulating Japan/Abe for not being marginalized on the nuclear issue any more. The tone of their remarks is sarcastic. Example 6.2 GT ’s post: Breaking news: Deputy Foreign Minister of North Korea claims it is necessary to reconsider the North Korea-US Summit. User’s comment: North Korea is truly and sincere, South Korea’s hands are tied, and US has ulterior motive. User’s reply 1: Three Americans have been released. North and South Korea have already met. South Korea and US conduct military exercise at the time of negotiating nuclear abandonment, is it bullying? Moreover, it clearly reveals the true intention for South Korea and US to topple Kim regime and reclaim North Korea. User’s reply 2: US damned never wants North Korea in peace. No peace in Peninsula benefits US in its maximum interests. User’s reply 3: (North Korea) does not plan to give up nuclear, not truly. It is arrogant of possessing nuclear. In this example, when the user summarized the intentions of three major players on the nuclear issue  – North Korea, South Korea and the US, respondents expanded the conversations by pointing out that the US and South Korea intend to topple Kim regime and reclaim North Korea. The US is not seeking peace. The third respondent disagreed with the first user and claimed that North Korea is not truly or sincere but arrogant of possessing nuclear power. Regarding the usage of languages and emoji, Table  6.3 below gives examples of languages and emoji used by Chinese netizens in the case of North Korea nuclear crisis. Table 6.3 shows that the online users use various languages and emoji with regards to the North Korea nuclear crisis to express their opinions and emotions. In comparison to previous chapters, this case finds that netizens use affirmative and abusive languages as well as sarcasm and

126 

S. I. ZHANG

Table 6.3  Online users’ usage of languages and emoji on Weibo pertaining to North Korea nuclear crisis in 2018 Use of languages

Examples

Affirmative

US does not want world peace indeed Wish no war in the world! Immigrate to the US imperial! Deeply worried about Moon Jae-in! [hush] What’s wrong with China? Are you short of food or clothing? Really don’t know why there are so many traitors like you Those US and Japan’s penetrating forces within China are simply traitors. They are not Chinese, not even human beings Nobody believes US except for public intellectuals [angry] Don’t believe this white-skinned pig! Japanese ghosts just don’t want to see the North and South Korean reconciliation [doge] It is hopeless. After all, sticky country (South Korea) is not a sovereign country (nose picking). The military power of sticky country is still in the hands of Yankees US cents will behave themselves if they taste the sweetness of bullets [nose picking] This year’s Nobel Prize shall award to North Korea [heart] This is embarrassing. (Trump) was competing with fat kid (Kim Jung-Un) to see whose (nuclear) button is bigger a few months ago [doge] The textbook level Dear John letter of a jerk US imperial: signed agreement is toilet paper Rental? UN is the sitting room of US One day, Trump announces to use nuclear missiles to destroy the earth! I am not surprised at all. He just wants the world in trouble because he is a three-year-old baby North Korea: We have possessed the nuclear technologies. I won’t go mad if nobody piss me off. We want to focus on economy now. I’ll fight with anyone who bothers me [Stupid husky] Reporter: Why attack Syria? Trump: We suspect it possesses mass destruction weapons Reporter: Why not attack North Korea? Trump: It really does US: If the Peninsula is at peace, where shall I post the army? Got to stir Japan: I am the only country that witnessed the power of nuclear missiles. I must participate in the inspections on the traces of nuclear missile tests

Abusive

Racist

Sarcasm

Metaphor

Parody

(continued)

6  NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR CRISIS IN 2018 

127

Table 6.3 (continued) Use of languages

Examples

Use of emoji (Trump) can’t keep his words but he is still affirmative Stupid Soviets withdrew troops from Korean Peninsula after WWII. But US stayed on and it won’t leave husky At the moment, North Korea’s nuclear missile can only hit China and South Korea. It can’t threaten US and Japan. Don’t understand why Chinese netizens are so happy The truce treaty was not signed by China and US Allow It looks those who did not cast a vote are nuclear countries me to be sad US cancelled the summit, letting the entire world see the spirit of giving up contract again Hahaha, daddy speaks and the son pays! Each fulfills his own duty! Abe: Laugh-Cry …! Trump is really calculating Who shall be awarded with Nobel Prize this year? US is determined to cause trouble in East Asia Doge Abe: I’m a dog what can I say? Japanese dwarfs expect the Korean Peninsula to be in trouble. They are Spread more active than Americans You made it seem like the US army based in Japan and South Korea have out hands no power to launch nuclear attacks [Spread out hands] Denuclearization on the Peninsula is a false proposition [nose picking] Sanctions + military force=negotiations Smile We call it little Japan not because it is weak [smile] but because it ever invaded China, and brutally killed millions of innocent people Forget about Olympic Games Wanna know how has China’s attitude changed? What are the changes? How does the editor access the external web? Why can’t the small Nose potatoes like us see anything? picking Data source: Sina Weibo

parody to mock and ridicule Trump/US, Kim Jung-Un/North Korea, South Korea and Japan. Sarcasm and parody in particular have been used to frame the image of Trump as a ‘three-year-baby’ and a ‘jerk’ who cannot be trusted and the US as a trouble maker and hegemon that does not seek world peace at all. The image of Kim Jung-Un is a ‘fat kid’ who has already possessed nuclear missiles technology and wants to focus on economy now. Netizens have shown some sympathy towards South Korea but gloat over the situation of Japan on the nuclear issue. Peer-to-peer abuse

128 

S. I. ZHANG

and personal attacks are still prevalent. Chinese liberal intellectuals are often called and labelled as ‘the US cents’  (pro-US intellectuals), ‘US cents dog’ and ‘traitors’. In addition to the widely used sarcasm and parody, netizens also use emoji’s to express their emotions and convey their point of views or attitudes. On Weibo, the most popular expressions in 2017 are place),

(2nd place),

(3rd place),

(4th place) and

(1st

(fifth place)

(IT home, 2017). The palm face originated in China is regarded as the Top One emoji on the Web, beloved by 760 million Chinese netizens (IT home, 2017). In this case, except for [heart] that is rarely used, the other four emoji along with , and are widely used. It finds that netizens often use the dog faces, both [Stupid husky] and [doge], as well as [laugh-cry] to mock and ridicule the ‘stupidity’ of Trump/US, Abe/Japan and fellow Chinese netizens. The palm face, shrug and smiley face are used to complement an argument or counter-argument, and/or providing rationale. It is interesting to see that netizens use the emoji of nose picking to challenge and show contempt towards those who asked about China’s changing attitudes on North Korea nuclear issue and the GT editors who can access VPN but the ordinary Chinese people cannot.

6.4   Analysis of Macro-Structural Factors In this case, macro-structural factors ranging from history, security/military, diplomacy (foreign policy, international relations), economy and nationalism influence and determine the online news coverage of mainstream media and online peer-to-peer interactions and debates. But the degrees of impact/influence of these factors in the 2018 nuclear crisis vary with security, international relations and economy being the most important factors whereas history and nationalism coming the second. The historical account of North Korea nuclear crisis is dual-faceted: the process of North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons including nuclear tests, launch of missiles and ICBM test on the one hand and the evolution of Sino-North Korea relations on the other hand. These two historical lines provide context and base for the GT ’s posts and users’ debate. For instance, in the post dated on 8  May, 2018 about Xi-Kim meeting in Dalian, China, GT cited Xinhua: Xi Jinping claimed that the traditional Sino-DPRK friendship is a treasure for both sides and Kim Jung-un said the mutual trust and feelings of older generations of party

6  NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR CRISIS IN 2018 

129

and state leaders of DPRK and China is the close bondage and solid base for traditional DRPK-China friendship. One user commented on 21 April 2018 about Sino-DPRK relation drawing on history: ‘The analogy is wrong. At that time, China and Soviet Union were enemies. Soviets nearly stroke China with nuclear weapons. But today China and North Korea’s relation is not like that. North Korea is not China and China is not Soviet Union in those years. In the future, North Korea cannot develop its economy without China’s support. (North Korea) at most will stand neutral on the military between China and the  US.  It won’t lean towards US’. Another user commented on 29 April: ‘In less than 6.5  years, (Kim Jung-Un) fired atomic missiles, hydrogen bomb, ICBM, submarine launched ICBM; got rid of his brother and uncle…’ These examples demonstrate that historical context is essential for the mainstream media and online users to report and discuss the current affairs. However, it does not weigh too much in this case in terms of amount of GT posts and users’ entries. Few GT posts and users’ comments contain the term of ‘Sino-­ PDRK (中朝), ‘China and North Korea’ and Six-Party Talks. Security/military is the most important factor in the North Korea nuclear crisis. As Lee (2016)  indicated, ‘North Korea poses a security threat by developing nuclear weapons’. There are two options to address this security concern: undertaking military actions and engaging the countries through dialogs and contacts. However, the option of military actions ‘seems inconceivable now and in the future’ (Lee, 2016). GT posts and users comments mainly address the security issue of denuclearization through the lens of war/military actions and dialog. For instance, GT ’s posts include ‘South Korean officials: Trump is willing to meet with Kim Jung-Un, discussing denuclearization of Peninsular’ on 9 March; ‘North Korea and US have different definitions of denuclearization. State summits may be postponed? China responses’ on 31 May. Users’ comments include ‘negotiations on denuclearization of Peninsular will not be very smooth. All the parties have not placed their interests on the negotiation table. Compared to the past, they are willing to talk.’ ‘Denuclearization on the Peninsula is a false proposition’. ‘The US military base in South Korea is one of the most important militaries in its first islands chain. US will never ever give it up. US will rather start another Korean War rather than seeing the North-South unification.’ ‘North Korea’s nuclear weapons are a big deterrence to the US. If a war really happens, North Korea will peel US skin off. If North Korea has no nuclear weapons, US can play it in any way it wants.’ These examples demonstrate that the mainstream

130 

S. I. ZHANG

media tend to toe the official line and promote denuclearization, dialog and peace whereas users are suspicious of denuclearization and the US’ role with its military deployment in South Korea. Both media outlets and netizens believe the US plays a predominant role in the security and denuclearization of Korean Peninsula. In relation to the security/military factor, diplomacy or international relation is another most important factor on the North Korea nuclear issue. The nuclear issue involves six countries and their relationship is complex. As Kim (2016) noted, ‘the Korean peninsula is a major flashpoint for the Sino-US strategic competition in East Asia. North Korea is China’s blood-shared ally whereas South Korea is a key ally of the US. While North Korea is a major adversary of the US and South Korea, China is a major trading partner of those two countries.’ In fact, North Korea nuclear issue is neither China nor US’s top policy priority (Choi 2018; Meyskens, 2019). China has common interests with the US in the stability and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (Kim, 2016). But China has given priority to the stability of the Kim regime over denuclearization (Kim, 2020). While Beijing regards North Korea as a sovereign state and the nuclear issue as a diplomatic nuisance, Washington views North Korea as a ‘rogue state,’ ‘axis of evil,’ an ‘outpost of tyranny,’ and a ‘criminal regime’. The basic idea of US diplomacy with North Korea is to exchange security guarantees for nuclear disarmament (Meyskens, 2019; Wu, 2006; Zhang & Wang, 2019). For inter-Korean relations, peace and unification are the key words (Choi, 2018). In this context, GT has used the North Korea’s suspension of nuclear tests, US’ response/US-DPRK Summit and GT editorials as dominant frames. This more or less supports Choi (2018)‘s argument that ‘the North Korea problem seems to be a strategic conflict between the U.S. and China.’ In particular, it finds that the comments have been blocked off and commentary function has been ceased to one particular GT post dated on 9 March. This post is titled ‘Ministry of Foreign Affairs expresses attitude: China gives full support’. Under this vague topic, GT reported that ‘China welcomes the positive message released by the US-DPRK direct dialogue. The nuclear issue is moving into the right direction. We give full support to finding solutions through dialogue and negotiations’. There is no way to find out users’ comments below this official diplomatic post. Assumptions can be made that some users made critical comments on the US-China competition and the intricate China-US-North Korea relation. Meanwhile, users managed to make comments and debate on international relations under other posts. The comments include ‘China’s response is like no response’, ‘No.

6  NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR CRISIS IN 2018 

131

There is a key point. “(China) believes during the denuclearization of Peninsula process, it is necessary to pay attention to and solve North Korea’s reasonable security concerns”’; ‘This is a world of weak nation having no diplomacy’; ‘On the one hand, (US) asks China to help solve the North Korean issue. On the other hand, (US) enhance support of Taiwan. Is US policy dumb?’; ‘On the one hand, (China) said North Korea is our brother. On the other hand, (China) does not allow it to develop nuclear weapons. What do you say about this?’ ‘Rogue state US, why do you say China has changed attitude? Rogue said anything without evidence now?’ ‘I feel the world will be in more peace without US.’ Economy is also a key factor in the nuclear issue. On the one hand, starting in 2013, Pyongyang has shifted its policy from Songun (military-­ first) to the Byungjin line of pursuing both economic development and nuclear weapons (Meyskens, 2019). According to Watson (2020), North Korea is now focused on ‘everything for the economy’. On the other hand, regional stability is essential for China’s economic growth and legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Kim, 2016). China implements an even-handed diplomacy  – respect for North Korea’s interests while ratcheting up economic sanctions (Kong, 2019). Since early 2017, China has blocked North Korea’s export of natural resources and other industrial products. As of fall 2018, China’s sanctions enforcement has remained robust with trade volume between China and North Korea dropping by about 58% (Kim, 2020). In response, the importance of economic factor is reflected in the media posts and users’ comments. For instance, on 23 April, GT ’s editorial claims: North Korea has shifted its work focus towards economic construction. This shall be its strategic commitment. GT calls on the international community, US, South Korea, Japan and the West in particular, to get rid of the image of demonized North Korea and push for North Korea’s ultimate denuclearization. On 12 June, GT posted one line  – Trump: sanctions will be cancelled after North Korea’s abandonment of nuclear weapons. Users’ comments in relation to economy are diverse with some in a mocking and joking tone. For instance, one user commented on 10 January: ‘China comes the second to South Korea that wants stability on Peninsula. If North Korea is unstable, the China-led Free Trade Zone in North-East Asia will never be constructed’. Another user posted on 21 April: ‘North Korea: We have possessed the nuclear technologies. I won’t go mad if nobody piss me off. We want to focus on economy now. I’ll fight with anyone who bothers me [Stupid husky]’. Popular nationalism is a factor in the case of North Korea nuclear crisis but it is not an important one. North Korea nuclear issue involves China’s

132 

S. I. ZHANG

national interests but it does not touch upon China’s core national interests –territory and sovereignty- and legitimacy of CCP. As Jang (2016) indicated, ‘authoritarian regimes tend to rely on nationalism in order to establish legitimacy’. In comparison to North Korea’s using nuclear programme as a rallying symbol of the country’s hyper-nationalist ideology (Habib, 2011) and Trump’s divisive and zero-sum ‘America First’ strategy, grounded in combative nationalism (Nilsson-Wright, 2019), China’s popular nationalism in this case features in mocking and teasing other countries and their state leaders (plus Taiwan and Tsai Ing-wen) while defending China, as well as attacking the liberal (pro-West) public intellectuals in cyber space. Two examples are given here. On 29 April, GT released a post (quote from Kim Jung-Un): ‘US chats with me and will know I will not be the one who will throw nuclear bombs to the US’ [Meow]. In response, users comments include ‘But it does not mean the US will not throw (nuclear bombs) at you [Eating melon] [Eating melon]’, ‘Cut oil, cut grain, (nuclear bombs) will be thrown towards the West!’, ‘Don’t know whether he throws (bombs) or not. But (North Korea) is closest to North-East (China). A nuclear leak, we’ll be fucked’, and ‘The one who said throwing at China, could you speak using your dog brain’. On 9 May, GT also used a quote in the topic of post: ‘Who will believe the US now?’ Users gave answers right below the post: ‘Tsai Ing-wen (Taiwan leader)’, ‘Abe’, ‘Public intellectuals’, ‘Nobody believes US except for public intellectuals [angry]’, ‘I believe the US. I believe what the US said are lies’, and ‘As US cent dog, (you) come out and bark hahaha good-for-­ nothing [giggles]’. These two examples demonstrates the nature of GT and the ideology of a nationalist tabloid in China. Many online users that follow GT ’s account tend to conform to its nationalist ideology and editorial lines by mocking and demonizing other countries, the US and Japan in particular, and at the same time labelling, attacking and humiliating the pro-Western liberal public intellectuals.

6.5   Conclusion This chapter has addressed the complex and tricky North Korea nuclear crisis from the perspective of social media-conflict relations with a focus on how the mainstream media outlets such as GT covers the North Korea nuclear issue on Weibo and how the online users comment, respond and interact with GT and other users. China is important in the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula as Kim (2020) claimed, ‘practically, China is the only agent available that might provide meaningful leverage against North

6  NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR CRISIS IN 2018 

133

Korea.’ Moreover, as the Sino-US hegemonic competition in East Asia intensifies, North Korea’s strategic value for China increases. The intensifying Sino-US competition allows Pyongyang to continue provocations, regardless of Beijing’s explicit opposition (Kim, 2016). The triangle of US-China-North Korea relations is crucial, which is manifested in the online media discourse and public opinion. In the first section of this chapter, I have raised two questions. The first one is ‘how do the Chinese mainstream media cover North Korea nuclear crisis online now?’. The content and textual analysis reveal that the majority of GT ’s posts are edited news pieces but the news sources are mainly official citing the big state media organizations in China and attributing to state leaders and government officials from related countries. In addition to traditional and conventional sources, GT has used Trump’s Twitter as its source. With regards to the news coverage on Weibo, GT has used ‘the US’ response and US-North Korea Summit’, ‘North Korea’s suspension of nuclear tests’ and ‘GT editorials and commentary’ as strong frames. It shows that Chinese media outlets attached greatest importance to the role of US and the US-North Korea relations. The Trump-Kim Summit in Singapore has caught attentions of global media. As Watson (2020) argued, there is ‘a paradigm shift’ emerging in US-North Korea and the Singapore meeting represents ‘a whole new relationship between the United States and North Korea’. Meanwhile, the three strong frames also suggest the significance of the US-China-North Korea triangle through the lens of media. The second question is ‘what is the latest public opinion towards North Korea and relevant countries?’. With regards to the GT ’s engagement with the users, the three ‘hot’ posts are about Trump’s statements and US-DPRK relations. The post on ‘Trump’s letter to Kim Jong-un’ has the highest degree of significance in terms of number of shares and comments. But the degree of significance is not necessarily co-related with the popularity of the posts. The post on ‘Breaking news: Deputy Foreign Minister of North Korea claims it is necessary to reconsider the N.  Korea-US Summit’ has the highest degree of popularity in terms of number of likes. As for the online users’ comments and discussions, it finds a match between the media and public agenda, except for GT editorial commentary vs. peer-to peer interaction. However the framing, usage of languages and rhetoric in particular, are totally different. While the GT ’s media discourses are official and rigid citing political elites or giving commentaries, online users’ discourses are short, personal, straightforward, critical, sarcastic and abusive. Sarcasm and parody in particular have

134 

S. I. ZHANG

been used to frame the image of Trump as a ‘three-year-baby’ and a ‘jerk’ who cannot be trusted and the US as a trouble maker and hegemon that does not seek world peace at all. The image of Kim Jung-un is a ‘fat kid’ who has already possessed nuclear missiles technology and wants to focus on economy now. Netizens have shown some sympathy towards North Korea and South Korea but they gloat over the situation of Japan on the nuclear issue, regarding Japan as a dog of the US. With regards to contextual factors that influence the media discourse and online public opinion, security (military), diplomacy (foreign policy, international relations) and economy seem to be more important than the other two (history and nationalism). It is understandable that the North Korea nuclear issue is in nature a security issue that may bring about military actions. Regional peace or conflicts/wars are determined by the foreign policy and international relations – US vs. North Korea, North Korea vs. South Korea, US vs. China, etc. As Cai (2010) pointed out, ‘from a long-term point of view, the North Korean nuclear issue is not a conflict between North Korea and the United States, but centers on China’s world strategy and the U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy.’ China’s stance and policy on North Korea nuclear issue is crucial especially in relation to Sino-US strategic competition. In addition to China’s three principles of ‘denuclearisation’, ‘peace and stability’, and ‘dialogue and negotiation’ in the 2000s (Kong, 2019), China seems to have played down the historical relations with North Korea and try to avoid being hijacked by the domestic public opinion on its foreign policy. That is why the history and nationalism are not the key contextual factors in this case. It also explains why the users’ comments to the post regarding attitude of Ministry of Foreign Affairs were censored and totally blocked out by Weibo.

References Anderson, N. D. (2017). Explaining North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions:Power and Position on the Korean Peninsula. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 71(6), 621–641, https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2017.1317328 Ayson, R., & Taylor, B. (2004). Attacking North Korea: Why war might be preferred. Comparative Strategy, 23(3), 263–279. Beczkowska, J. (2019). Korean Crisis and a War of Words, International Studies. International Studies. Interdisciplinary Political and Cultural Journal, 23(1), 103–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/1641-4233.23.07 Cai, J. (2010). The Korea nuclear crisis and the changing Sino-DPRK relationship. Asian Perspective, 34(1), 137–158.

6  NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR CRISIS IN 2018 

135

Chang, K., & Lee, C. (2018). North Korea and the East Asian Security order: Competing views on what South Korea ought to do. The Pacific Review, 31(2), 245–255. Choi, J. (2018). How to stop North Korea’s nuclear ambition: Failed diplomacy and future options. Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, 7(1), 1–15. Chung, J. H., & Choi, M. (2013). Uncertain allies or uncomfortable neighbors? Making sense of China–North Korea Relations, 1949–2010. The Pacific Review, 26(3), 243–264. Cotton, J. (2003). The second North Korean nuclear crisis. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 57(2), 261–279. Dalton, B., et  al. (2016). Framing and dominant metaphors in the coverage of North Korea in the Australian media. The Pacific Review, 29(4), 523–547. Düben, B. A. (2017). Atomic outcast. The RUSI Journal, 162(6), 6–14. Gafarli, O. (2018, January 9). North Korean peace plan from Russian and Chinese perspective. China Plus. http://chinaplus.cri.cn/opinion/opedblog/23/ 20180109/75762.html. Retrieved on 10 Mar 2020. Gittings, J. (2007). After trident: Proliferation or peace? International Relations, 21(4), 387–410. Gusterson, H. (2008). Paranoid, potbellied Stalinist gets nuclear weapons. The Nonproliferation Review, 15(1), 21–42. Habib, B. (2011). North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme and the maintenance of the Songun system. The Pacific Review, 24(1), 43–64. Hess, A. A. C. (2018). Why does North Korea engage in provocations? Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 5(1), 57–83. Jang, S. Y. (2016). The Evolution of US Extended Deterrence and South Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions. Journal of Strategic Studies, 39(4), 502–520. https://doi. org/10.1080/01402390.2016.1168012 Khoo, N. (2019). Retooling great power nonproliferation theory: Explaining China’s North Korea nuclear weapons policy. The Pacific Review. https://doi. org/10.1080/09512748.2019.1689287. Kim, I. (2020). Trump power: Maximum pressure and China’s sanctions enforcement against North Korea. The Pacific Review, 33(1), 96–124. Kim, M. (2016). Why provoke? The Sino-US competition in East Asia and North Korea’s strategic choice. Journal of Strategic Studies, 39(7), 979–998. Kong, T. Y. (2019). How China views North Korea’s readiness to reform and its influence on China’s North Korea policy in the post-Cold War era. The Pacific Review. https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2019.1651384. Kux, B. (1998). A near miss: The North Korean nuclear crisis. Security Studies, 8(1), 239–263. Kwon, I. (2019). Conceptual mappings in political cartoons: A comparative study of the case of nuclear crises in US-North Korean relations. Journal of Pragmatics, 143, 10–27. Lee, M. (2016). The EU, regional cooperation, and the North Korean nuclear crisis. Asia Europe Journal, 14, 401–415.

136 

S. I. ZHANG

Lee, S. (2014). China’s new territorial strategies towards North Korea: Security, development, and inter-scalar politics. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 55(2), 175–200. Lee, C. M. (2005). A View from Asia: The North Korean Missile Threat and  Missile  Defense in the Context of South Korea’s Changing National Security Debate. Comparative Strategy, 24(3), 253–275. https://doi. org/10.1080/01495930500197957 Lee, D. S. (2007). A nuclear North Korea and the stability of East Asia: a tsunami on the horizon?. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 61(4), 436–454. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357710701684906 Litwak, R. S. (2008). Living with ambiguity: Nuclear deals with Iran and North Korea. Survival, 50(1), 91–118. Mastro, O. K. (2018). Why China won’t rescue North Korea: What to expect if things fall apart. Foreign Affairs, 97(1), 58–66. Meyskens, C. (2019). Chinese views of the nuclear endgame in North Korea. The  Nonproliferation Review. https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2019. 1667050. Michishita, N. (2006). Coercing to reconcile: North Korea’s response to US ‘hegemony’. Journal of Strategic Studies, 29(6), 1015–1040. Nilsson-Wright, J. (2019). Nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula: Strategic adaptation, the Abe administration and extended deterrence in the face of uncertainty. Japan Forum, 31(1), 110–131. O’Neil, A. (2004). Confronting the reality of a nuclear North Korea: The challenge of shrinking policy options. Policy and Society, 23(2), 101–128. Ramirez, S. L. (2018). Mediation in the shadow of an audience: How third parties use secrecy and agenda-setting to broker settlements. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 30(1), 119–146. Taylor, B. (2009). Chapter Two: Sanctioning North Korea. The Adelphi Papers, 49(411), 25–58. https://doi.org/10.1080/02681307.2009.488035. Watson, I. (2020). South Korea’s changing middle power identities as response to North Korea. The Pacific Review, 33(1), 1–31. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 09512748.2018.1518923 Wu, X.  A. (2006). China and the US beyond the Korean Peninsula. The Nonproliferation Review, 13(2), 317–338. Yoon, E., & Lee, D. H. (2005). A view from Asia Vladmir Putin’s Korean opportunity: Russian interests in the North Korean nuclear crises. Comparative Strategy, 24(2), 185–201. Yoon, S. (2019). Why is there no securitisation theory in the Korean nuclear crisis? The Pacific Review, 32(3), 336–364. Zhang, H., & Wang, K. (2019). A nuclear-armed North Korea without ICBMs: The best achievable objective. The Nonproliferation Review, 26(1–2), 143–153. Zhang, W., & Denton, G. L. (2019). The North Korean nuclear dilemma: Does China have leverage? Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs. https://doi.org/10.1177/2347797019842437.

CHAPTER 7

Conclusion

Employing the actor-network approach, this book has researched media and conflict relations in the age of social media. In the Introduction chapter, I proposed a new analytical model—Media and Conflict Actor-­Network in the Social Media Era—to follow four human and non-human actors, and study their linkages and interactions—(a) social media platform; (b) texts-based discourses; (c) the news organization; and (d) the web users. Four research questions are raised: (1) How do the professional media outlets cover the conflict/crisis on social media in China? (2) How do the web users respond to the professional media’s coverage on social media? (3) How do different actors in the news network negotiate and interact with each other? and (4) What are the macro-structural factors in the conflict and how do they impact the actor-network performance? This chapter is divided into three main sections. It starts with refining the new analytical model by adding six contextual dimensions (or external actors). It then draws five major conclusions in answering research questions on the basis of case studies. Lastly it delineates limitations of this project and points out direction for future research.

© The Author(s) 2020 S. I. Zhang, Media and Conflict in the Social Media Era in China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7635-5_7

137

138 

S. I. ZHANG

7.1   Theoretical Contributions: Refining the New Model This research makes theoretical contributions by proposing, theorizing, applying and refining the new analytical model named Media and Conflict Actor-network in the Social Media Era. In the Introductory chapter, I already proposed and theorized four main actors—social media platforms, social media content, professional media outlets and web users—and their linkages/interactions. (See Fig. 1.1 in Chap. 1.) This new model has then been applied in the examination of four cases namely Sino-Indian border crisis, Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands dispute, South China Sea dispute and North Korea nuclear crisis. As a result, this model proves conceptually useful and valid in studying the roles of social media in contemporary conflicts and revealing the linkages and interactions of different actors within the media-conflict network. To refine the new model, six contextual dimensions (external actors) are added to the social media-conflict network on the basis of the above-mentioned four case studies. These six dimensions form an external actor-network vis-à-vis the internal actor-­ network. Both external and internal networks intertwine with each other whereas association, translation and generalized symmetry occur during the sociotechnical process. ANT-based studies have been criticized for neglecting the broader social context and structures of power and interests. However, the network approach can integrate the macro-structural factors into the analysis by tracing the links between the actors within an organization and external actors (Micó, Masip, & Domingo, 2013). In this study, as Fig. 7.1 indicates, six macro-structural actors or contextual dimensions including history, security (military), diplomacy (foreign policy), economics (trade), legality and nationalism have been identified and found influential in the medialization of conflict in the social media era. Meanwhile it shall be noted that these six external actors or dimensions have various degree of influence on the internal actor-network. The six external dimensions and their influences are discussed below. First, historical context is essential in the media-conflict relations. Discussion of the roles of media in wars, conflicts, disputes and crisis is often set in specific historical, social and geographical context. As Hoxha and Hanitzsch (2018) noted, conflicts are complicated and often have a long history loaded with meaning and interpretation. In the process of making a complex conflict simple and accessible to their audiences,

7 CONCLUSION 

139

History

Security/ Military

Social Media (the Platform)

Network effect: more users and posts add values to the social media platform

Mainstream News Organizations (the Institution)

‘Extended the public and circulated content’

‘Strengthens the articulation of an issue-specific public’ Text Videos Images Photos Hyperlinks Emoji ...

Set public agenda, influence public opinion Counter-set, expand public agenda

Legality

Network effect: more users and comments add values tothe social media platform

Diplomacy/ Foreign Policy

Web Users (the Public) Peer-to-peer interaction

Economics/ Trade

Nationalism

Fig. 7.1  Contextualized social media and conflict actor–networks. (Source: the author)

journalists actualize the factual evidence that speaks to the central narrative and that best ‘exemplifies’ what they think the essence of the story is about (Hoxha & Hanitzsch, 2018). The four case studies in this project demonstrate that history is an essential dimension in the complex social media-conflict networks. Both news organizations (journalists) and online users draw on the historical facts, past events, evidence and narratives to construct their online discourses and debate as well as to make arguments and counter-arguments on social media platforms. Second, security (military) dynamic is the most important contextual dimension and external actor in the media-conflict network. Geostrategic rivalry, military threat, and militarization of inter-state disputes/issues have enhanced the security dilemma. In international relations studies, for Realists, the security dilemma (meaning the security of one’s own state is likely to be enhanced at the expense of another state) is averted by their faith in the balance of power. The security of the most powerful states rests on not allowing any one of them tipping the balance by becoming too

140 

S. I. ZHANG

powerful (Hough, 2013: 3). With shifting balance of power (the imbalance of power), security dilemma and risks lead to military confrontations, conflicts and crisis. Media plays a critical role in the conflicts. ‘Depending on the narrative the journalists use, journalistic coverage can contribute to escalation and de-escalation of conflicts’ (Hoxha & Hanitzsch, 2018). In the age of social media, new data sources such as social media present opportunities to improve understanding of conflict processes (Zeitzoff, 2011). Zeitzoff (2011) also noted, the aggregated social media sources mirrored the mainstream reporting for large events (battles, air strikes, and artillery fire) whereas social media fleshed out the micro-interactions of the conflict in the details (i.e., individual rocket attacks, statements by ministers, low-level skirmishes, and psychological operations). This level of detail is particularly important when analyzing interactions in asymmetric conflict (Zeitzoff, 2011). This project also indicates that both the mainstream media and online users use security (military) as main frames (i.e. military expenses, military power, weaponry, confrontations, battles) in the news coverage, discussions, debates and interactions on the social media during the conflict process, which in turn may contribute directly or indirectly to the escalation or de-escalation of conflict. Third, diplomacy (foreign policy) is another important contextual dimension and external actor. Two main theories, the indexing theory and the CNN effect, are often used to study the foreign policy-media relationship. While the indexing theory argues that news content is indexed to foreign policy elites, the CNN effect highlights the influence of mass media on diplomacy and foreign policy making process (Zhang, 2016: 9–10). In other words, on the one hand, journalists and news outlet are willing to promote government and foreign policy frames. On the other hand, news media influence foreign policy by drawing public attention to certain issues and demonstrating how issues influence national interests (Manor & Crilley, 2018). This study presents empirical evidence and demonstrates that mainstream media outlets have used diplomacy (foreign policy) as main frames in times of conflicts and crises, and they indexed their news coverage to the political and foreign policy elites such as state leaders, diplomats, spokespersons and website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFAs). As Dimitrova and Strömbäck (2008) argued, the role of news media is even more important during times of war. News media do not only inform the public but also impact public opinion. The media relies too heavily on official government and military sources and frame events in ways that are consistent with the national political environment.

7 CONCLUSION 

141

Meanwhile, it shall be noted that external actors such as military and diplomacy can translate (convert) into internal actors in the media-conflict network. Translation is the process of establishing identities and the conditions of interaction, and of characterizing representations (A-Ritzer, 2004). As a core concept of ANT, translation ‘involves creating convergences and homologies by relating things that were previously different’ (Callon, 1980: 211). Network actants, as well as the relations that bind them, are translated as networks change (A-Ritzer, 2004). As Plesner (2009) put it, if non-humans are essential for holding actor-networks together, the same is the case for translations. Different actors and actor-­ networks manage to reach agreement and associate through translations. In the media and conflict actor-network, the development of social media has changed the environment in which foreign policy issues are framed and has enabled more actors to exert influence through framing (Manor & Crilley, 2018). MFAs and diplomats have migrated to social media sites in the past decade, a practice referred to as digital diplomacy. Through social media, MFAs can frame foreign policy events and communicate these frames directly to national and global audiences (Manor & Crilley, 2018). Thus in the social media-enabled media-conflict network, military and diplomacy are the main external actors that act as sources and reference points for mainstream media outlets. At the same time, military and diplomacy can translate into internal actor-network and become internal actors that directly communicate and associate with online users by the means of their official websites, social media accounts, and so on, thus practicing digital military/diplomacy. Fourth, though it may not be prevalent in all conflicts, legality is an actor and factor in some conflicts, wars and crises. Existing literature with regards to legal issues in media and conflict mostly focuses on drone strikes (e.g. Sheets, Rowling, & Jones, 2015; Maurer, 2016), human rights such as torture and freedom of speech (e.g. Blauwkamp, Rowling, & Pettit, 2018; Major, 2016; Vultee, 2009), terror (e.g. Roy & Ross, 2011) and protection of journalists in conflict zones (e.g. Høiby & Ottosen, 2019). This study shows that legality is more important in some conflicts such as the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands and South China Sea disputes than other conflicts such as Sino-Indian border crisis and North Korea nuclear crisis. The territory disputes often have legal underpinnings that involve the international law (See more in Chaps. 4 and 5). However legal aspects of international conflict are underreported and the mainstream media reflect the dominant security policy of their own governments. More critical

142 

S. I. ZHANG

reporting of international law in relation to ongoing conflicts has the potential to raise awareness of legal issues in general (Høiby & Ottosen, 2019). Fifth, economic (trade) is a dimension in in inter-state conflicts. The discussion of media-conflict relationship shall feature political economy of war and conflict. As Somerville (2017) noted, conflicts have a multiplicity of causes—political, social, economic, resource scarcity, demographics, regional and global factors. They vary in their causal weight in different conflicts. Livingston (2011) also pointed out that the US is now challenged by new economic and cultural powerhouses, and by the rise of networked non-state actors. The key variable for analysis of media effect is an information environment created by the totality of technologies in a given era, as adapted to particular economic, cultural and social needs, and in alignment with the social and political institutions present in that environment (Livingston, 2011). In this study, the new economic and cultural powerhouse, and the information environment in China is created by the totality of social media technologies (platforms) in alignment of China’s social and political institutions. This research demonstrates the significance of political-economy dimension to analyze the media-conflict relations in the social media era. Sixth, nationalism. There is a debate about nationalism and patriotism. While some scholars have treated the two terms strictly as separate concepts, others treat the two concepts about the same and use them interchangeably. Nationalism and patriotism are conceptually and normatively different. According to Sinkkonen (2013), ‘nationalism’ is defined as viewing one’s country superior to other countries and providing uncritical support of the home country’s actions whereas ‘patriotism’ is defined as a feeling of pride and emotional attachment to one’s country. The key difference between the concepts is that nationalism compares one nation’s qualities with those of other nations, whereas patriotism relates only to internal qualities (Sinkkonen, 2013). Nationalism is closely related to national identity, thus there are Chinese nationalism, American nationalism, Spanish nationalism, Palestinian nationalism, Indian nationalism, Kurdish nationalism, Ukrainian nationalism and so on. In China, patriotism and nationalism are empirically distinct and nationalism but not patriotism has an impact on Chinese foreign policy preferences (Gries et al., 2011). Gries et al. (2011)’s study has shown that inflamed nationalism can have very serious consequences during conflicts and crises. China’s young netizens are not mere ‘caffè latte’ nationalists. Individual differences in

7 CONCLUSION 

143

‘trait’ or enduring levels of nationalism affect both perceptions of US threat and preferred US policies. In times of wars, conflicts and crisis, news media serves as the mediator of information that feeds the rally effect (i.e. people in a nation will rally around the flag in the face of an external threat) and also acts as a distributor of ideology (Ismail et al., 2009). Media remained patriotic and nationalistic during wars and the patriotic sentiments of journalists make them inclined to support ‘their’ side during a war (Hussain, 2017), for instance, the American press often supports the strategic national interests of US foreign policy (Major, 2016). Pakistan journalists are wary of national security and they fear of being labeled unpatriotic, a traitor, and debunked culturally and socially (Hussain, 2017). This study has shown that nationalism in a given cultural context has acted as an external actor (or contextual actor) that influence the actions and interactions of internal actors in the social media-conflict network. The degree of nationalism (variations of nationalism) is related to the ownership and nature of the news organization such as Global Times, a commercialized nationalist tabloid in China, and the traits of online users, the followers of GT ’s Weibo account in this case. GT ’s news posts on Weibo reflects the ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ division and shows uncritical support of China’s foreign policy. GT rallies its online followers around the national flag, thus achieving the rally effect. Meanwhile Chinese netizens, the GT followers on Weibo in particular, participates and enhances popular nationalism in alignment with state nationalism. Moreover, nationalist netizens label, humiliate and launch personal attacks to their peers who may hold different views, show sympathy, or make arguments in favor of the ‘state enemy’ as public intellectuals, traitor, US cents, US cents party, etc. thus achieving the chilling effect. After all, nationalism is considered to be ‘an infantile disease’ and ‘the measles’ to humanity by Albert Einstein (Major, 2016). ‘The news media should provide sufficient and contextual information for citizens to deliberate and understand policies in their name regardless of the inconvenience this may impose on their national sensibilities’ (Major, 2016). Put in nutshell, this section has discussed and theorized six contextual dimensions or external actors—the history, security (military), diplomacy (foreign policy), legality, economic (trade) and nationalism. These six actors form the external actor-network that influences and intertwines with the internal actor-network. The contextual (external) actors can translate and transform into internal actor-network at certain times.

144 

S. I. ZHANG

With regards to the internal actor-network (see Chap. 1 for detailed discussions), Fig. 7.1 indicates that the four human and non-human actors (social media platform, social media content, news organizations and online users) are closely linked and interactive. Social media content (texts, videos, hyperlinks, emoji) are part of platform’s comment culture. Social media platform, with its technical features, functionalities and user cultures, have afforded news outlets and web users (individuals) an extraordinary networking power. It has extended the professional news media’s reach and facilitated public participation in debate on conflicts and crisis. For news outlet, the platform provides a virtual public venue thus ‘extended the public and circulated content’ (Poell, Kloet, & Zeng, 2014). For web users, the platform’s comment culture ‘strengthens the articulation of an issue-specific public’ (Poell et al., 2014). In a reversed direction, both news organizations and web users post news, views, comments and interact with each other on the social media platform, consequently lead to network effect. Network effect refers to ‘the more users who can communicate with one another on a network, the more valuable the network is’ (Hayes, 2005). The value of social networking sites greatly increase with the number of users (Zhang, 2019). As for the inter-relation of media outlets and online users, the mainstream media have appropriated social media to cover the conflict/crisis, set the public agenda and influence public opinion. News outlets have incorporated social media in its news production. They post news updates and views regularly and lead public debate with their ideological stances. On the other side, online users have created new frames, counter-set and expanded the public agenda. Professional media outlets initiate and set the tone of the debate. Meanwhile, the web users use variety of languages and emoji/emoticons to freely express their views, opinions, attitudes and emotions. In comparison to the mainstream media, the themes and scope of the peer-to-peer dialogues are much wider, personalized, opinionated and diversified. In the new social media-enabled public sphere, the heterogeneous publics interact and participate in the debate. They also impact on the editorial agenda through likes and shares (Morlandstø & Mathisen, 2017; Zhang, 2019). In all, the strength of this actor-network based model is that it identifies and follows both non-human and human actors and reveals their relations in the complex media-conflict network. It acts as an alternative model to analyze the complex media-conflict relations in the social media era. This model is elastic and flexible transcending the geographical, political, social

7 CONCLUSION 

145

and time/space restrictions. The limitations of this model lie in the limited number of actors and their seemingly simplified networked relations (Zhang, 2019).

7.2   Empirical Contributions: Four Major Conclusions Guided by the media and conflict actor-network model, five major conclusions are made in answering the research questions. First, with regards to news coverage of conflict/crisis by professional media outlets on social media in China, the four case studies show that professional news media such as GT have incorporated social media (Weibo) in its news production. They post news updates and views regularly, use hashtags and web languages to get close to the users, and lead public debate with their ideological slants/stances. News and views are converging. The traditional division of news/views and in-house/external news sources are not so important on the social media platform. Though the majority of GT posts are event-based news reports, they are edited news sourcing from the big state media organizations in China, international media, and attributing to state leaders and government officials from China and other countries. In addition to these traditional and conventional media and official/elitist sources, online and social media have been used as news sources and GT has its own video production team. This seems to conform to the international trend in news profession today. As Weaver and Willnat (2016) found, US journalists use social media predominantly as information-gathering tools. Social media make journalism more accountable to the public but these new forms of digital communication may not benefit journalistic professionalism (Weaver & Willnat, 2016). GT has used the security/military and diplomacy/foreign policy as dominant frames in the conflicts, disputes and crisis that involve China’s core national interests—territory and sovereignty. Saleem (2007) summarized the literature on framing and argued that  media frames represent specific ideology and determine the ‘tone’ of media coverage of an event or issue. They can play a vital role in stimulating opposition to or support for an event or issue. In this sense, GT, as a popular official newspaper in China, represents the ideology of state nationalism and engages in ‘conflict-­ priming’ with its news discourse. The primary purpose of conflict-priming

146 

S. I. ZHANG

is to ‘soften public objection against actions that would otherwise be deemed as hawkish’ (Dalton et  al., 2016). Embedded in the entangled twine of facts and hyperbole around a story, the danger of conflict-­priming reportage of the media is pushing too far and options for de-escalation of the media-fueled tensions will no longer be possible (Dalton et al., 2016). Second, as for the web users’ response to professional media’s coverage on social media, Table  7.1 demonstrates the trend or pattern of users’ response towards different conflicts/crisis. The trend/pattern seems stable with minor and moderate fluctuations towards conflicts of Sino-Indian border crisis and South China Sea disputes, whereas the trend/pattern looks unstable with frequent fluctuations towards conflicts of Diaoyu Islands disputes and North Korea nuclear crisis. It demonstrates that users are ‘issue-specific public’ whose responses are driven by the news events. It is noted that the degree of significance of a post evidenced by the number of shares and comments is not necessarily co-related with the post’s degree of popularity evidenced by the number of likes. This study reveals that hard news that contains military/conflict frames tends to draw users’ Table 7.1  Web users’ response to professional media’s coverage of conflicts/ crisis on social media in China Conflicts

Media frames with high level of engagement with users

New frames generated by users

Indian border Stable crisis

China’s foreign policy; military/conflict frames

Diaoyu islands dispute South China Sea disputes

Unstable

Education; security/ military; history

Stable

Military frames

North Korea nuclear crisis

Unstable

Trump’s statements; North Korea-US relations

Criticism of China’s domestic/foreign policy & societal issues; War debate; Peer-to-peer interactions (incivility) Society; Peer-to-peer interactions (incivility) Taiwan issue; war debate; national pride (sentiment); Peer-to-peer interactions (incivility) GT editorial commentary; Peer-to peer interaction (incivility)

Source: the author

Trend/pattern of users’ responses

7 CONCLUSION 

147

attentions and responses, thus having the high degree of significance. Both hard news and soft news that feature anti-foreign and pro-China stances tend to get ‘likes’ among users, thus having the high degree of popularity. Hence, when studying the professional news outlets’ engagement with online users, both the level of significance (shares and comments) and the level of popularity (likes) shall be taken into account. Moreover, online users, while conforming to the GT ’s frames to a large extent, generated new frames such as criticism of China’s domestic and foreign policy, discussion of society (social issues), war debates and peer-­ to-­peer interactions (incivility). It shall be noted that despite some moderate criticism of China’s policy, the majority of users support and conform to official media discourse. Online users use different forms of languages and emoji to express their opinions, attitudes, emotions and sentiments towards the conflicts. Rational and insightful comments sit side by side with offensive, abusive and irrational comments online. Since GT is a nationalist tabloid, it is not a surprise that many users use Weibo to stir up the nationalist sentiment, or to vent their anger using offensive languages, or to abuse others to achieve self-satisfaction. On the one hand, users have demonstrated national pride and support of China’s assertive postures in the conflicts and disputes. On the other hand, they view other countries with distrust, disdain and hatred. For instance, users use sarcasm and parody to frame the image of Trump as a ‘three-year-baby’ and a ‘jerk’; the US as a trouble maker and hegemon; Kim Jung-un as a ‘fat kid’ and Japan as a dog of the US. What is indeed noticeable is the prevalence of peer-to-­ peer cyber abuse and personal attacks. Many users abuse other Chinese web users who hold different views, naming and labelling the liberal public intellectuals as ‘the US cents’, ‘US cents party’, ‘US cents dog’ and ‘traitor’. A chilling effect may be formed, thus turning away some users. Third, with regards to the negotiations and interactions of actors in the media and conflict actor-network, four actors/actants have been traced and analyzed. In this study, Weibo as social media platform provides an online public space where different actors and forces mediate, interact, associate and negotiate with each other. Weibo’s technical features and usability as well as users’ comment culture have enabled both institutions and individual users to have real-time communication; upload and download video, use hyperlinks to share, link and access audio, video and other content; address others with ‘@’ symbols; message threading; and comment directly on other users’ posts. Users can like, comment on or forward/share the news story. They use a large variety of languages and

148 

S. I. ZHANG

emoji/emoticon to express themselves. As discussed in Chap. 3, visual trickery, symbolic manipulation, parody, humor, and intense interaction have become key practices on Weibo. Weibo’s comment culture increases ‘the sense of shared joy’ and ‘strengthens the articulation of an issue-­ specific public’ (Poell et al., 2014). In particular, in addition to its implementation of RNR policy, Weibo’s censorship practice highlights its regulating power in the online negotiated space in which different actors’ interests converge, diverge and clash. Weibo employs censors and uses software to track and block content. As Guo and Jiang (2015) notes, the Weibo comments function was open to the public but comments on Weibo are heavily censored. This study finds that the level of censorship is variant in different conflicts. Table 7.2 demonstrates different levels of censorship in different conflicts on Weibo. Users can post comments freely for Sino-Indian border crisis and Diaoyu Islands dispute, leading to low or moderate level of censorship. As for South China Sea disputes and North Korea nuclear crisis, users’ comments to certain posts were blocked off, i.e. users cannot make any comments under the news posts, leading to high or very high level of censorship. Furthering to Bolsover (2017)’s argument that political speech is likely to be censored on Weibo, this study reveals that users’ comments or debates regarding China’s diplomacy (foreign policy), China-US power struggle in SCS in particular, are highly controlled and strictly censored on Weibo. Online censorship is an effective management strategy for the state in collaboration with the platform company to promote and encourage ‘safe’ nationalism while keeping the ‘dangerous’ nationalist sentiments and voices in check. China’s foreign policy involving Sino-US relations and military competition/clash are deemed to be ‘dangerous’. National pride, support of China’s foreign policy, military might and territorial claims, as well as moderate criticism seem to be safe and encouraged. Social media censorship is China’s media management strategy to control the online nationalist sentiments and to ensure that China’s diplomacy (foreign policy) is not hijacked by the online public opinion. In response to the online censorship, online users fight back by calling the Internet censors and commentators as ‘five cent party’, ‘water army’ and ‘spies’. This forms part of the social media platform culture. Professional media outlets remediate social media contents, ‘arresting’ or capturing certain events or issues or images acting as sources of order and intelligibility in the chaotic and fluid media system, which is referred to as Arrested War (Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2015; Siapera, Hunt, &

7 CONCLUSION 

149

Table 7.2  Weibo’s censorship in different conflicts Conflicts

Level of censorship

Indicators (comments)

Notes/Examples

Sino-Indian Low border crisis Diaoyu Moderate Islands disputes

Open

South China Sea disputes

Very high

Block

North Korea nuclear crisis

High

Block

Criticisms about the Chinese government and policies were allowed. The majority of users tend to toe the government’s line, insisting on China’s ownership of Diaoyu Islands and the justice of China’s routine patrol in the Diaoyu waters; Criticisms were moderate with a focus on the weak and empty talk of Chinese diplomats. Users’ comments below five GT posts were totally blocked out; Comments that have been censored involve Sino-US military competition or clash in the SCS. Example posts:  PLAN will conduct actual combat exercise in SCS [mic] (23 March 2018)  Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded to illegal entry of US fleet into adjacent reefs and waters of Nansha (the Spratly) Islands (2 October 2018)  Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Urge US to stop stirring and producing tensions (5 October 2018) Users’ comments were blocked off below one GT post: Ministry of Foreign Affairs expresses attitude: China gives full support (9 March 2018)

Open

Source: the author

Lynn, 2015). This study shows that the professional news outlets such as GT has ‘arrested’ or captured conflicts, territorial disputes and crisis in the social media system. As a commercial nationalist tabloid, GT produced and disseminated social media content including news, views, images, videos, and hyperlinks, engaged with online users, set online pubic agenda, guided and manipulated public opinion on social media. GT published hardline (hawkish) posts on Weibo as evidenced by its dominant military frames. In response, online users, empowered with networking power, created new frames, counter-set and expanded the public agenda by

150 

S. I. ZHANG

posting comments and having peer-to-peer dialogues/interactions. Many online users that follow GT ’s account tend to conform to its nationalist ideology and editorial lines by mocking and demonizing other countries, the US and Japan in particular, and at the same time labelling, attacking and humiliating the pro-Western liberal public intellectuals. Meanwhile users demonstrate a range of attitudes and a mixture of militaristic and moderate stances. Some users even criticized GT, GT ’s social media editors, and Hu Xijin, the chief editor of GT, for their brain-washing efforts. The four main actors—Weibo, GT, users and social media content— form the negotiated space in the inner actor-network. They associate, intertwine and negotiate with each other. The power struggle is on with different actors fighting for their own interests. While GT and its daily posts as well as the large number of users and their comments contribute to the network effect for Weibo, echo-chamber and chilling effect are co-­ existent, which may turn away some existing users. Fourth, the macro-structural actors/factors in the conflict include history, security (military), diplomacy (foreign policy), legality, economics (trade) and nationalism. These six external actors impact the performance of inner actor-network at different levels. Table 7.3 demonstrates, external actors/factors impact on the media-conflict actor-network differently Table 7.3  Different levels of impact of external actors/factors on the media-­ conflict actor-network Conflicts

History

Sino-Indian border crisis Diaoyu Islands dispute South China Sea disputes North Korea nuclear crisis

Diplomacy (foreign policy)

Legality Economics (trade)

Nationalism

Moderate Moderate

High

Low

Low

High

Moderate High

Moderate

High

Low

High

Moderate High

Moderate

High

Low

High

Low

High

Low

High

Low

Source: the author

Security (military)

High

7 CONCLUSION 

151

subject to the nature of conflicts (e.g the territory disputes and nuclear crisis are security/military issues), the political and editorial line of media outlets (liberal, conservative or nationalist), and the state policy (e.g. the state and news organizations played down history in Diaoyu Islands dispute and Sino-North Korea relations). Meanwhile, external actors such as military (e.g. Ministry of Defense, China Coast Guard) and diplomacy (e.g. Ministry of Foreign Affairs) can translate and transform into internal actors and interact with users directly via their official Weibo accounts.

7.3   Limitations and Direction for Future Research There are limitations with this study. The newly proposed and refined theoretical framework based on the ANT and ‘Arrested War’ concepts is just one alternative model to study the media-conflict relations in the age of social media. Case studies are all based in China. Scholars shall apply the new media-conflict actor-network model in other cultural and societal contexts and conduct comparative analysis. War, conflict, crisis and social media can be studied from other theoretical lens. More actors and more complex actor-network relationship can be followed, analyzed and revealed. In addition, specific indicators shall be worked out to determine different degrees of external actors on the performance of inner actor-network.

References A-Ritzer. (2004). Actor network theory. Encyclopedia.qxd. Blauwkamp, J.  M., Rowling, C.  M., & Pettit, W. (2018). Are Americans really okay with torture? The effects of message framing on public opinion. Media, War & Conflict, 11(4), 446–475. Bolsover, G. (2017). Harmonious communitarianism or a rational public sphere: A content analysis of the differences between comments on news stories on Weibo and Facebook. Asian Journal of Communication, 27(2), 115–133. Callon, M. (1980). Struggles and Negotiations to Define what is Problematic and what is not: The Socio-logics of Translation. In K. Knorr, R. Krohn & R. Whitley (Eds.), The Social Process of Scientific Investigation (pp. 197–210). Dordecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co. Dalton, B., et  al. (2016). Framing and dominant metaphors in the coverage of North Korea in the Australian media. The Pacific Review, 29(4), 523–547.

152 

S. I. ZHANG

Dimitrova, D. V., & Strömbäck, J. (2008). Foreign policy and the framing of the 2003 Iraq War in elite Swedish and US newspapers. Media, War & Conflict, 1(2), 203–220. Gries, P. H. et al. (2011, March). Patriotism, Nationalism and China’s US Policy: Structures and Consequences of Chinese National Identity. The China Quarterly, 205, 1–17. Guo, B., & Jiang, Y. (2015). Analyzing the coexistence of emerging transparency and tight political control on Weibo. The Journal of International Communication, 21(1), 78–108. Hayes, F. (2005, August 29). Network Effect. Computerworld. Available at https://www.computerworld.com/article/2556971/network-effect.html Høiby, M., & Ottosen, R. (2019). Journalism under pressure in conflict zones: A study of journalists and editors in seven countries. Media, War & Conflict, 12(1), 69–86. Hoskins, A., & O’Loughlin, B. (2015). Arrested war: The third phase of mediatization. Information, Communication & Society, 18(11), 1320–1338. Hough, P. (2013). Understanding global security. Routledge. Hoxha, A., & Hanitzsch, T. (2018). How conflict news comes into being: Reconstructing ‘reality’ through telling stories. Media, War & Conflict, 11(1), 46–64. Hussain, S. (2017). Analyzing the war–media nexus in the conflict-ridden, semidemocratic milieu of Pakistan. Media, War & Conflict, 10(3), 273–292. Ismail, A. et al. (2009). ‘American’ in crisis: opinion discourses, the Iraq War and the politics of identity. Media, War & Conflict, 2(2), 149–170. Livingston, S. (2011). The CNN effect reconsidered (again): Problematizing ICT and global governance in the CNN effect research agenda. Media, War & Conflict, 4(1), 20–36. Major, M. (2016). The Dan Rather Maxim: Collective identity and news coverage of human rights and international law. Media, War & Conflict, 10(2), 127–140. Manor, I., & Crilley, R. (2018). Visually framing the Gaza War of 2014: The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Twitter. Media, War & Conflict, 11(4), 369–391. Maurer, K. (2016). Visual power: The scopic regime of military drone operations. Media, War & Conflict, 10(2), 141–151. Micó, J.  L., Masip, P., & Domingo, D. (2013). To wish impossible things: Convergence as a process of diffusion of innovations in an actor-network. International Communication Gazette, 75, 118. Morlandstø, L., & Mathisen, B.  R. (2017). Participation and control. Digital Journalism, 5(6), 791–808. Plesner, U. (2009). An actor-network perspective on changing work practices. Journalism, 10(5), 604–626.

7 CONCLUSION 

153

Poell, T., Kloet, J., & Zeng, G. (2014). Will the real Weibo please stand up? Chinese online contention and actor-network theory. Chinese Journal of Communication, 7(1), 1–18. Roy, S., & Ross, S. D. (2011). The circle of terror: Strategic localizations of global media terror meta-discourses in the US, India and Scotland. Media, War & Conflict, 4(3), 287–301. Saleem, N. (2007). U.S. media framing of foreign countries’ image: An analytical perspective. Canadian Journal of Media Studies, 2(1), 130–162. Sheets, P., Rowling, C. M., & Jones, T. M. (2015). The view from above (and below): A comparison of American, British, and Arab news coverage of US drones. Media, War & Conflict, 8(3), 289–311. Siapera, E., Hunt, G., & Lynn, T. (2015). #GazaUnderAttack: Twitter, Palestine and diffused war. Information, Communication & Society, 18(11), 1297–1319. Sinkkonen, E. (2013, December). Nationalism, Patriotism and Foreign Policy Attitudes among Chinese University Students. The China Quarterly, 216, 1045–1063. Somerville, K. (2017). Framing conflict—The Cold War and after: Reflections from an old hack. Media, War & Conflict, 10(1), 48–58. Vultee, F. (2009). The second casualty: Effects of interstate conflict and civil war on press freedom. Media, War & Conflict, 2(2), 111–127. Weaver, D.  H., & Willnat, L. (2016). Changes in U.S.  Journalism. Journalism Practice, 10(7), 844–855. Zeitzoff, T. (2011). Using social media to measure conflict dynamics: An application to the 2008–2009 Gaza Conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 55(6), 938–969. Zhang, S. (2016). Chinese war correspondents: Covering wars and conflicts in the 21st century. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Zhang, S. (2019). Mediatization of conflict in the social media era—A case study of Sino-Indian border crisis in 2017. Journalism. https://doi. org/10.1177/1464884919870329.

Index

A Abe, 69–71, 73, 119, 124, 125, 128, 132 Actor-Network Theory (ANT), v, 1, 2, 5–9, 11, 15, 138, 141, 151 AFP, 97, 119 Akai Chin, 43, 45 Ambient journalism, 33 Anti-Japan, 16, 67, 75, 84 Aquino III, Benigno, 94, 95 Arbitration, 94, 95, 106 Arrested War, 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 15, 148, 151 Army Day, 50 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 93 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 93–95 Auino III, Benigno, 94 Axis of evil, 116, 130 B Ballistic missile, 113, 115–118 BBC, 97

Beijing, 23, 26, 29, 31, 34, 44–46, 58, 63, 67, 68, 92, 93, 95, 96, 105, 114, 115, 118, 130, 133 Belt & Road Initiative, 47 Bhutan, 13, 42, 60 Broadcast War, 4 Brunei, 89 C Cairo Declaration, 65 The CCCPC (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China), 97 Censorship, 23, 25, 29–30, 32, 36, 59, 84, 109, 110, 148, 149 self-censorship, 15, 21, 25 Charm Offensive, 93 Cheongwadae (The Blue House), 119, 120 The chilling effect, 60, 143, 147, 150 China Central Television Station (CCTV), 72, 96, 119 China Daily, 13, 96 China Dream, 81, 82, 107

© The Author(s) 2020 S. I. Zhang, Media and Conflict in the Social Media Era in China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7635-5

155

156 

INDEX

China Federation for Defending the Diaoyu Islands, 69 China Marine Surveillance of the State Oceanic Administration, 69 China MSA (Maritime Safety Administration), 97 China Radio International, 48 China-US power struggle, 16, 107, 110, 148 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 36, 131, 132 Chinese Fisheries Administration, 93 Chou (Zhou) Enlai, 43, 44 Citizen journalism, 33 Clinton, Hillary, 93, 116 CNN, 72, 97, 140 The CNN effect, 140 Coast Guard, 69, 70, 72, 73, 94, 151 Code of Conduct (CoC), 93, 95 Comment culture, 10, 15, 21, 28–29, 36, 144, 147, 148 Conflict frames, 15, 59, 146 Conflict-priming, 145, 146 D Deng Xiaoping, 33, 45, 66 Denuclearization, 114, 120, 123–125, 129–131 Diaoyu (Senkaku) islands dispute, 1, 12, 14, 16, 35, 36, 52, 60, 63–85, 138, 141, 146, 148, 151 Diffused War, 4, 5 Digitalization, 9, 15 Diplomacy, 16, 17, 46, 68, 73, 74, 77, 82, 84, 98, 101, 104, 106–110, 123, 128, 130, 131, 134, 138, 140, 141, 143, 145, 148, 150, 151 Doklam, 13, 42, 46, 52, 57–59 Doklam conflict, 47 Duterte (Rodrigo), 95, 97

E East Asia, 89, 130, 133 East China Sea (ECS), 63, 65–69, 71, 85, 94, 109 Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), 66 E-governance, 30, 31 Emoji, 9, 10, 13, 14, 16, 41, 52, 55–57, 59, 72, 75, 78–81, 84, 100, 102–104, 123, 125–128, 144, 147, 148 Euro News, 72, 74 Exclusive economic zone (EEZ), 93 Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Law, 92 F Facebook, 9, 23, 27–29, 33 Fake news, 49 Financial Times, 72 Five cent (army), 79, 84 Foreign policy, 11, 15–17, 53, 55, 57–60, 63, 64, 73, 79, 81–84, 91, 95, 97, 104, 106, 107, 109, 110, 128, 134, 138, 140–143, 145, 147, 148, 150 Frame analysis, 14 France, 91, 121 Freedom of navigation, 93, 95, 105 Freedom of Navigation Operations, 95 Free Trade Zone, 131 G Global Times (GT ), 13–16, 27, 36, 41, 47, 52–55, 57–59, 64, 72–75, 77, 78, 81–84, 91, 96, 100–102, 105, 106, 109, 110, 115, 118–125, 128–133, 143, 145, 147, 149, 150

 INDEX 

157

H Hawaii, 116 Hong Kong, 67, 68 Hu Xijin, 27, 73, 96–98, 119–121, 150 Hyperlinking, 28

L Law of the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 67 Legality, 16, 72, 91, 96, 104, 110, 138, 141, 143, 144, 150 Long Weibo, 28

I The Impeccable incident, 93 Incivility, 64, 77, 84, 101, 110, 147 The indexing theory, 140 India, 13, 41–47, 52–55, 57–60, 97 Intercontinental-ballistic-missile (ICBM), 117, 119, 128, 129 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 115, 116 International law, 65, 89, 90, 94, 104, 105, 141, 142 International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea, 94

M Mainstream media, 4, 10, 13, 21, 28, 32–36, 41, 55, 57, 59, 79, 90, 104, 115, 128, 129, 132, 133, 140, 141, 144 Malaysia, 89, 93 Manila, 95 Mao Zedong, 46 The McMahon Line, 43–45 Media-conflict relationship, 3, 57, 142 Mediatisation, 4 mediatisation of conflict (mediatised conflict), v, 1, 2, 12 Metaphor, 9, 26 Microblog service providers (MSPs), 29 Militarization, 16, 105, 106, 108–110, 139 Military, 3, 4, 11, 16, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47, 53, 55, 57–60, 64, 67–69, 71, 73–75, 77, 79, 82, 84, 89–91, 95–102, 104–110, 115–118, 120, 125, 128–131, 134, 138–141, 143, 145, 146, 148, 150, 151 Ministry of Defense, 72, 73, 97, 151 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFAs), 16, 72, 73, 81, 96, 97, 102, 107–110, 119, 120, 130, 134, 140, 141, 151 Mischief Reef, 92 Mongolia, 52, 76, 78 Mongo TV, 97

J Japan, 16, 63–79, 81–84, 89, 91, 97, 102, 109, 114, 116, 117, 119–121, 123–125, 127, 128, 131, 132, 134, 147, 150 Japanese Maritime Safety Agency (MSA), 66 Journalistic professionalism, 145 K Kashmir, 43 Kim Il Sung, 116 Kim Jong-un, 114, 117–120, 122, 133 Korean Peninsula, 114, 120, 130, 132 Kyodo News Service, 72, 97

158 

INDEX

Moon Jae-in, 120, 123 MUJI, 73 Multilateralism 2.0, 94 N National interests, 84, 93, 108, 132, 140, 143, 145 Nationalism popular nationalism, 11, 83, 109, 131, 132, 143 state nationalism, 143, 145 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 43, 44, 46 Nepal, 53, 60 Networked journalism, 6, 9 Network effect, 6, 10, 144, 150 New Delhi, 44–46, 58 News Office of the State Council, 30 New York Times, 97, 117 NHK, 72 Nine-Dash Line, 90, 92, 95, 98, 104, 105 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 115, 116 North East Asia, 131 North Korea (DPRK), 1, 12, 14, 16, 17, 36, 78, 113–134, 138, 141, 148 North Korea nuclear crisis, 1, 12, 14, 16, 36, 113–134, 138, 141, 146, 148 North-South summit, 121 Nuclear nuclear crisis, 1, 12, 14, 16, 36, 113–134, 138, 151 nuclear test, 45, 113–115, 117–121, 124, 128, 130, 133 O Obama, Barack, 94, 95, 106 Open sky, 105

P Pakistan, 60, 143 Paracel (Xisha) Islands, 90, 91 Parody, 16, 28, 127, 128, 133, 147, 148 Patriotism, 82, 142 People’s Daily, 13, 31, 64, 71, 72, 96, 119 People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 53, 90, 92, 99, 102, 106 The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), 94, 105, 108 Pew Research Center, 71 Philippines, 89, 92, 94, 95, 102 PLA Daily, 97 Potsdam Declaration, 65 Pratas (Dongsha) Islands, 91 Present Bush, 116 Pro/anti-war debate, 52, 53, 100, 101, 106 Pro-China, 16, 65, 75, 83, 84, 147 Propaganda, 16, 98, 101, 104, 110 Public intellectual, 32, 54, 104, 132, 143, 147, 150 Public opinion, 10, 16, 17, 30–32, 57, 64, 78, 79, 90, 98, 106, 107, 110, 114, 115, 118, 133, 134, 140, 148, 149 public opinion warfare, 90, 109 Pyongchang Winter Olympics, 114 Pyongyang, 115–117, 131, 133 R Racist, 60, 109 The rally effect, 143 Real Name Registration (RNR) policy, 25, 26, 29, 55, 148 Red, 22, 23 Reuters, 97 Russia, 60, 101, 116, 120, 121 Ryukyu island, 65

 INDEX 

S San Francisco Treaty, 91 Sanya, 97, 99, 110 Sarcasm, 16, 125, 127, 128, 133, 147 Satire, 35 Scarborough Shoal incident, 94 Security, 1, 16, 25, 27, 45–47, 63, 64, 68, 69, 71, 73–75, 77, 79, 82, 84, 89, 90, 92, 94, 96, 98, 101, 104–106, 110, 113, 116, 117, 128–130, 134, 138–141, 143, 145, 150, 151 security dilemma, 1, 46, 47, 82, 106, 139, 140 Self-censorship, 15, 21, 25 Seoul, 116, 119, 120 Singapore, 95, 114, 120, 133 The Singapore Shangrila Summit, 105 Sino-ASEAN, 94, 95 Sino-DPRK, 128, 129 Sino-Indian border crisis, 1, 8, 12, 13, 15, 16, 36, 41–60, 138, 141, 146, 148 Sino-India war of 1962, 42 Sino-Japanese relation, 63, 64, 68–71, 73, 82 Sino-Japanese War, 65 Six-Party Talks, 113, 116–117, 119, 129 Songun (military-first), 117, 131 South China Morning Post, 97 South China Sea dispute, 99, 138, 141, 146, 148 Southeast Asia, 89, 93 Southern Media Group, 27 South Johnson Reef, 92 South Korea (ROK), 16, 72, 78, 113, 114, 116, 118–121, 123–125, 127, 129–131, 134 Soviet Union, 115, 129 Spratly island, 52, 91, 92, 108

159

Spratly (Nansha) archipelago, 90, 91 State censorship, 23 State Oceanic Administration (SOA), 69, 108 State Oceanographic administration, 93 State of the Union address, 116 Summer Olympic Games, 120 Symmetry(ies), 5, 6, 11, 138 T Taiwan, 65–68, 72, 74, 79, 89, 97, 100–102, 106, 130, 132 Taiwan Straits, 94, 99, 100, 105, 106, 110 Territorial disputes, 41, 63, 66, 69, 71, 93, 107 Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Law, 92 Thaad (anti-Thaad), 120 Tianya Club, 64 Tibet, 42–44, 46, 53, 57 TikTok, 22, 23 Translation(s), 5, 6, 11, 138, 141 Treaty of Shimonoski, 65 Trump, Donald, 16, 95, 106, 113, 114, 118–125, 127–129, 131–134, 147 Trump-Kim Summit, 114, 133 Tsai Ing-wen, 132 The 12th Five-Year Plan, 108 Twitter, 4, 5, 9, 23, 26, 27, 35, 119, 133 U The United Nations (UN), 66, 93, 95, 116–118 United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UNCLCS), 93

160 

INDEX

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 90, 95 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 114, 117, 118 The US, 12, 16, 52, 58, 60, 66, 71–73, 89, 93–97, 99, 101, 102, 104–110, 113, 116–121, 123–125, 127–134, 142, 143, 147, 150 US Air Force, 97 US cent (army), 79, 84 US-China, 130 US-DPRK, 130, 133 US Ministry of Defense, 97 US Navy, 94, 97 US-North Korea relations, 16, 115, 116, 118, 120, 124, 133 V Vietnam, 4, 89, 92–94, 98, 102 VPN, 128 W Washington, 116, 130 Water army, 84, 148 Weaponisation, 115

WeChat, 22, 23, 25–28, 31 Weibo, v, 1, 8, 9, 13–16, 21–36, 41, 47, 53, 55–60, 64, 72, 74, 75, 78–81, 83, 84, 90, 91, 98, 99, 103–104, 106, 107, 109, 110, 115, 118, 121, 122, 126–128, 132–134, 143, 145, 147–151 White House, 97 Woody (Yongxing) Island, 91, 94 World War II (WWII), 65, 69, 78, 91 X Xi Jinping, 31, 70, 71, 81, 90, 106, 107, 114, 119, 128 Xi-Kim summit, 121 Xinhua, 97, 128 Xinjiang, 26, 43 Y Yasukuni Shrine, 68, 69, 74 Yongbyon, 115 Yonhap News Agency, 72 Z Zhihu, 22, 23