Capitalism and Freedom in African Political Philosophy 3030443590, 9783030443597

Table of contents :
Preface
Acknowledgments
Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
1 General Introduction
1.1 Capitalism and Freedom in Africa
1.2 African Political Philosophy
1.3 Content Introduction
References
2 Theoretical Conceptualization of Capitalism and Freedom
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Capitalism and the Marxist-Conflict Perspective
2.3 Capitalism and the Weberian-Rational Perspective
2.4 Capitalism and the Liberal Perspective
2.5 African Conceptualization
2.6 Conclusion
References
3 Capitalism and Freedom in African Communitarianism
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Communitarianism
3.3 Monarchism and Democratic Governance
3.4 Mercantile Capitalism
3.5 Private Property
3.6 Conceptualizing Freedom
3.7 Conclusion
References
4 Capitalism and Freedom in the Colonial Period
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Colonialism
4.3 Development of Colonial Capitalism
4.4 The African Proletarian Revolution
4.5 Conclusion
References
5 Capitalism and Freedom in One-Party Politics
5.1 Introduction
5.2 One-Party Political System
5.3 One-Party System and Freedom
5.4 One-Party System: Capitalism, Wealth, and Power
5.5 Conclusion
References
6 Capitalist Multiparty Democracy Reforms
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Concept of Democracy and Freedom
6.3 Multiparty Democracy and the Capitalist Agenda
6.4 Multiparty Reforms in Malawian
6.5 Conclusion
References
7 Capitalist Economic Reforms in Africa
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Keynesian Reform and the African Condition
7.3 Capitalist Economic Reform
7.4 Capitalist Economic Transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa
7.5 Conclusion
References
8 Economic Freedom Conflict
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Economic Dependence or Independence?
8.3 Private Property Conflict: Land Alienation
8.4 Government Control Versus Market Freedom: Devaluation and Price Control
8.5 Conclusion
References
9 Sovereignty and Political Freedom Conflict Between African Communitarianism and Capitalism
9.1 Introduction
9.2 Conceptualizing Sovereignty
9.3 African Head of State as Sovereign: ICC and Al Bashiri’s Case
9.3.1 The ICC and Darfur Warrants of Arrest
9.3.2 Content of al Bashir’s Warrant of Arrest
9.3.3 Warrant of Arrest, Binding on the Signatories of the ICC
9.4 Afro-Communitarian Pro-Hobbesian Sovereignty Response
9.4.1 Pan-African Influence
9.4.2 Local Decisions by African Presidents
9.5 Afro-Capitalist Rousseau’s Sovereignty Response
9.6 Conclusion
References
10 Moral Freedom Conflict
10.1 Introduction
10.2 Homophobia and Moral Freedom
10.3 Abortion Controversy
10.4 Conclusion
References
11 Primitive Accumulation Crisis in the Modern African Capitalism
11.1 Introduction
11.2 The Concept of Primitive Accumulation
11.3 Politicians, Bureaucrats, Civil Servants, and Primitive Accumulation
11.4 Local Population and Primitive Accumulation
11.5 Primitive Accumulation as a Consequence of Free-Market Failure
11.6 Conclusion
References
12 Neo-African Renaissance as a Response to Neo-Capitalism
12.1 Introduction
12.2 Semantics of Renaissance
12.3 Conceptualizing African Renaissance
12.4 Mutharika’s Response Through Renaissance
12.5 Conclusion
References
13 Afro-Chinese Alternative to Capitalism and Freedom Conflict
13.1 Introduction
13.2 Neoliberalism or Socialism or Communist?
13.3 Economic Freedom and the Expansion of China
13.4 Cultural Freedom and Chinese Expansion
13.5 Conclusion
References
14 Embedding Capitalism and Freedom in a Comprehensive Theory of Ubuntu
14.1 Introduction
14.2 Capitalism and Freedom in the Ubuntu Radical Communitarianism
14.3 Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Ubuntu
14.4 Capitalism and Freedom in a Comprehensive Theory of Ubuntu
14.5 Conclusion
References
15 Conclusion
Appendix: Conceptualizing Phronesis in African Analytic Philosophy
Introduction
The Concept of Phronesis
Phronesis in African Thought Through Language Analysis
Who Is a Phronimos in the African Context?
Conclusion
References
Index

Citation preview

Capitalism and Freedom in African Political Philosophy Grivas Muchineripi Kayange

Capitalism and Freedom in African Political Philosophy

Grivas Muchineripi Kayange

Capitalism and Freedom in African Political Philosophy

Grivas Muchineripi Kayange Philosophy Department University of Malawi, Chancellor College Zomba, Malawi

ISBN 978-3-030-44359-7 ISBN 978-3-030-44360-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44360-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover credit: Mode Images/Alamy Stock Photo This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

This book is a consequence of a long debate on capitalism, freedom, and truth that I had with colleagues, friends and students at the Chancellor College, University of Malawi, and during my formation as a philosopher at the Gregorian University in Rome, London School of Economics (as a visiting scholar), and University of Edinburgh (as a visiting postgraduate student). My main concern in various debates was on the status of African political systems in the general context of capitalism and freedom. I have also given lectures to the youth in various parts of Malawi with the help of some academics and religious leaders. I often selected components of this book and entered into a debate with different individuals. In my long engagement with capitalism, freedom, and issues around the ‘truth,’ I realized that there were two groups of individuals; one consisted of adults (over 30 years) who experienced both the autocratic and one-party democratic era in various African nations and another of the young generation born in the neoliberal era (this coincides with the oneparty democratic era). The younger generation failed to understand the possibility of a government that was too powerful, to the point of controlling the life of its citizens. In fact, in one of my philosophy classes, one of the students smiled and asked me a question, ‘Why did you live under the one-party autocratic rule for over thirty years without fighting for your precious liberty?’ My response was that in the autocratic government people lived under ‘collective fear’ that made them remain oppressed and get used to the harsh conditions. I further noted that, when oppression v

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PREFACE

reaches its pick, people are ready to sacrifice everything for their freedom. This fear disappeared in most of the African nations and people revolted against the one-party system. My experience in Malawi is that people reacted for change after 30 years of harsh rule. When freedom came, the older generation lived for some time in a shock, failing to believe that the one-party dictatorship was over. Nevertheless, in my debates, I noted that now, there is nostalgia for a glorified past in the one-party system mainly because of the many challenges such as corruption that have accompanied the modern development of capitalism and freedom in multiparty Africa. In my experience as a student in Uganda, Italy, and the UK, in debates on poverty, communitarianism, capitalism, war, and freedom in Africa, I failed to identify with radical communitarianism, which I saw as dogmatic and oppressive. Similarly, I was unable to identify with individualism, which was for me very attractive but at the same time unrealistic. This made me live in an intense conflict and a prolonged identity crisis. In my confusion relative to the two extremes, I read the ideas of great thinkers and teachers of a good life from both communitarianism and individualism. I was fascinated by the ideas of thinkers such as Hayek, Nozick, Friedman and von Mises, who made me realize that most of the ideas they were proposing constitute what made me live a life of capitalism and freedom conflict in my country, village, in the seminary (where I failed to live a radical communitarian life of total obedience as demanded by the superiors in one of the religious congregations) and during my university formation. I have often felt that most of the freedom-morality-problems are a fruit of the ideas imposed by some great teachers and academics in African philosophy (such as Tempels, 1959, Mbiti, 1969 and Menkiti 1984), who in my view wrongly reduced African identity to radical communitarianism. I was often frustrated to hear individuals in an African community say, ‘for us Africans the right thing to do is x.’ In the early days as a student, I kept wondering why excellent academics never adequately questioned radical communitarianism, which they kept promoting in forums of the most learned in society. In spite of my quasi-hostile attitude towards radical communitarianism in African philosophy, I recognized it as one of the many attractive perspectives of thought that promotes unity and solidarity in this continent. I also realized that individualism is equally a perspective current in

PREFACE

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the African thought. This discovery of perspectives within African philosophy was liberating for me, as I realized that choosing radical communitarianism, individualism, or a combination of elements from both, is a question of personal interest from a particular perspective. I have since then started a reflection on these attractive philosophical extremes within African thought to understand how they affect issues relative to capitalism, freedom, and truth, which are fundamental in the study of human nature and well-being. Zomba, Malawi

Grivas Muchineripi Kayange

Acknowledgments

I want to thank the following individuals for their support in developing this manuscript: Firstly, thanks to my wife Memory Thindo Kayange, and family members, including my daughter Bethel Rudo Kayange, Loveness White, Nick Kayange, Victor Mungomo, Stain Mateya, Steve Lupale, Mtisunge Thindo, and Brian Thindo. Special thanks to Mum and late Dad and the Kayange extended family for their continuous support. Secondly, I want to thank late Don Remiggio for his support when I was a student of Politics for Development at Giovanni Ventitressimo in Rome. He had a great passion for developing Africa with Africans. I continuously thank the Gregorian Pontifical University for my education from Bachelor’s degree up to a Ph.D. in Philosophy. At this university, I am indebted to Professor Louis Caruana who has always provoked in me a critical reflection towards different experiences in life. Thirdly, I want to acknowledge the Comboni Missionaries of the Heart of Jesus for developing my interest in African Philosophy. Their motto was to Save Africa with Africans, and they followed an integrated approach to improve living standards as well as the spiritual wellbeing of the continent. I couldn’t escape from falling in love with African philosophy because of their teachings, which carried a lot of passion and commitment for the good of Africa. I still remember the hours I spent in their libraries reading and writing notes on African traditional life and thought since 1993 (in Malawi, Uganda and Italy).

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Thanks to all colleagues and students in the Philosophy Department at the Chancellor College, University of Malawi, for challenging me on how to do African philosophy. I would like to acknowledge, in a particular way Lawrence Mpekansambo, a great socio-political philosopher at Chancellor College who undoubtedly has challenged my thinking on different occasions. I want to acknowledge the Demetz family for the long debates I had with them on the African experience. Special thanks should go to Reinhard Demetz, Gitti Demetz, and Agnese, with whom I had long hours of debates on the African condition. I treasure everything in my philosophical endeavor. Thanks to all who contributed towards the success of this work.

Contents

1

General Introduction 1.1 Capitalism and Freedom in Africa 1.2 African Political Philosophy 1.3 Content Introduction References

1 1 10 12 16

2

Theoretical Conceptualization of Capitalism and Freedom 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Capitalism and the Marxist-Conflict Perspective 2.3 Capitalism and the Weberian-Rational Perspective 2.4 Capitalism and the Liberal Perspective 2.5 African Conceptualization 2.6 Conclusion References

19 19 21 24 26 37 41 42

Capitalism and Freedom in African Communitarianism 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Communitarianism 3.3 Monarchism and Democratic Governance 3.4 Mercantile Capitalism 3.5 Private Property 3.6 Conceptualizing Freedom

45 45 46 50 56 60 64

3

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CONTENTS

3.7 Conclusion References

70 70

4

Capitalism and Freedom in the Colonial Period 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Colonialism 4.3 Development of Colonial Capitalism 4.4 The African Proletarian Revolution 4.5 Conclusion References

73 73 74 84 90 93 93

5

Capitalism and Freedom in One-Party Politics 5.1 Introduction 5.2 One-Party Political System 5.3 One-Party System and Freedom 5.4 One-Party System: Capitalism, Wealth, and Power 5.5 Conclusion References

95 95 96 101 106 107 108

6

Capitalist Multiparty Democracy Reforms 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Concept of Democracy and Freedom 6.3 Multiparty Democracy and the Capitalist Agenda 6.4 Multiparty Reforms in Malawian 6.5 Conclusion References

111 111 112 116 119 125 126

7

Capitalist Economic Reforms in Africa 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Keynesian Reform and the African Condition 7.3 Capitalist Economic Reform 7.4 Capitalist Economic Transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa 7.5 Conclusion References

129 129 130 135 140 145 146

Economic Freedom Conflict 8.1 Introduction

147 147

8

CONTENTS

8.2 8.3 8.4

Economic Dependence or Independence? Private Property Conflict: Land Alienation Government Control Versus Market Freedom: Devaluation and Price Control 8.5 Conclusion References 9

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148 150 153 159 160

Sovereignty and Political Freedom Conflict Between African Communitarianism and Capitalism 9.1 Introduction 9.2 Conceptualizing Sovereignty 9.3 African Head of State as Sovereign: ICC and Al Bashiri’s Case 9.4 Afro-Communitarian Pro-Hobbesian Sovereignty Response 9.5 Afro-Capitalist Rousseau’s Sovereignty Response 9.6 Conclusion References

169 177 180 181

10

Moral Freedom Conflict 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Homophobia and Moral Freedom 10.3 Abortion Controversy 10.4 Conclusion References

183 183 186 193 197 198

11

Primitive Accumulation Crisis in the Modern African Capitalism 11.1 Introduction 11.2 The Concept of Primitive Accumulation 11.3 Politicians, Bureaucrats, Civil Servants, and Primitive Accumulation 11.4 Local Population and Primitive Accumulation 11.5 Primitive Accumulation as a Consequence of Free-Market Failure 11.6 Conclusion References

161 161 162 166

199 199 200 203 205 207 209 210

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12

Neo-African Renaissance as a Response to Neo-Capitalism 12.1 Introduction 12.2 Semantics of Renaissance 12.3 Conceptualizing African Renaissance 12.4 Mutharika’s Response Through Renaissance 12.5 Conclusion References

213 213 214 217 221 234 234

Afro-Chinese Alternative to Capitalism and Freedom Conflict 13.1 Introduction 13.2 Neoliberalism or Socialism or Communist? 13.3 Economic Freedom and the Expansion of China 13.4 Cultural Freedom and Chinese Expansion 13.5 Conclusion References

237 237 239 241 245 247 248

13

14

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Embedding Capitalism and Freedom in a Comprehensive Theory of Ubuntu 14.1 Introduction 14.2 Capitalism and Freedom in the Ubuntu Radical Communitarianism 14.3 Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Ubuntu 14.4 Capitalism and Freedom in a Comprehensive Theory of Ubuntu 14.5 Conclusion References

261 264 265

Conclusion

267

249 249 250 257

Appendix: Conceptualizing Phronesis in African Analytic Philosophy

271

References

289

Index

301

List of Figures

Fig. 3.1 Fig. 4.1 Fig. 4.2 Fig. 4.3

Consensus structure of consultations Division of Africa as a property of the colonials in 1880 (This map is from Shanguhyia and Falola [2018, vi]) Division of Africa as a property (by 1914) (The map is from Shanguhyia and Falola [2018, vii]) Structure of power relations in the colonial government

55 79 80 82

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List of Tables

Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table

3.1 3.2 5.1 8.1 13.1 14.1 A.1 A.2 A.3

Private property proverbs Meanings of freedom in the traditional setting The African states up to 1989 Currencies weights Chinese investments in the sub-Saharan region Summary of reconceptualized ubuntu Ordinary language use of the concept of wisdom Figurative expressions and the concept of wisdom Figurative expression on advice as a component of phronesis

62 69 97 154 242 264 276 281 286

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CHAPTER 1

General Introduction

The free man will ask neither what his country can do for him nor what he can do for his country. He will ask rather “What can I and my compatriots do through government” to help us discharge our individual responsibilities, to achieve our several goals and purposes, and above all, to protect our freedom? And he will accompany this question with another: How can we keep the government we create from becoming a Frankenstein that will destroy the very freedom we establish it to protect? Freedom is a rare and delicate plant. (Friedman 2002, 2) For you, brethren, have been called to liberty; only do not use liberty as an opportunity for the flesh, but through love serve one another. (Galatians 5:13)1

1.1

Capitalism and Freedom in Africa

What is the status of capitalism and freedom in the African political thought? The situation of an African individual in the current socioeconomic, ethical, and political realms in sub-Saharan Africa raises more questions than answers, as to the value of neo-independence in terms of wealth creation (of the citizens), individual freedom, and responsibility. 1 This is a Bible verse which is retrieved from, https://biblehub.com/galatians/5-13. htm.

© The Author(s) 2020 G. M. Kayange, Capitalism and Freedom in African Political Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44360-3_1

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Tracing the sequence of events in the sub-Saharan countries in both one-party political systems and the current proliferation of multiparty political systems (also known as African second independence), the ideas of capitalism and freedom have become more complex and sometimes obscure than thought by Africans and the donor community. A common expectation that the current multiparty democracies meant a total transfer of wealth to individuals and the fulfillment of their liberty is slowly transforming into an impossible ideal. As Africa stands today, one wonders how far the African governments are protecting liberties and helping individuals to discharge their responsibilities (such as moral and economic responsibilities). In this book, I will be discussing capitalism and freedom relative to the African experience, mainly focusing on (i) individual liberty, (ii) political freedom, (iii) economic freedom, and (iv) capitalism as a system. i. The study of capitalism and freedom in African thought may primarily take the route of interrogating individual liberty, which is central in this context. It may be noted that the coming of free-market capitalism around the 1980s and 1990s has led to the creation of modern individual freedom-based governments in countries such as Zambia, South Africa, and Malawi. There is an increase in debates on individual rights and freedoms, such as right to life against the legal framework of the death penalty, individual liberty to engage in lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender practices, and political freedom, which are clearly signaling an advanced stage of capitalism and freedom in modern African societies. This advancement of capitalism is further confirmed by the increase of non-governmental organizations at both local and international levels, which are fighting for individual and minority rights. In most cases, the organizations and individuals are free to demand accountability from their political leaders and charge them for any irresponsible deeds without any fear. In some cases, they are free to declare null a parliamentary or presidential election, when they feel that their right to choose a person they want is violated. Similarly, in the academic context, there is a strong interest in studying an African contribution or status relative to themes regarding individual rights and freedoms. Some of the areas that have received much attention include the concept of democracy and its values, justice, minority freedoms/rights (such as gay rights), and

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freedoms (see Wamala 2004; Teffo 2004; Metz 2019). A common tendency has been the interrogation of different themes relative to freedom by contrasting Western thought and the African experience.2 A good example is an article by Tambulasi and Kayuni (2005, 147–161), ‘Can African Feet Divorce Western Shoes? The Case of Ubuntu and Democratic Good Governance in Malawi,’ which interprets aspects of good governance, based on African communitarian values. I am aware of the proliferation of reflections on African freedom before and after the colonial rule (such as Nyerere [1966] 2000; Williams 1944; Du Bois 1897; Nkrumah 1965), but what is particular today is a shift toward the individual and his/her freedom in relation to the community. Can we say that an African individual is completely free at last? In spite of the various improvements and proclamation of individual rights and freedoms, the African political experience and in some respects the behavior of the masses lead to more questions on the status of individual freedom in the continent. As time goes, it seems very hard to differentiate the current dictatorial tendencies of some African leaders and communities from the one-party systems, which preceded them. Apparently, there is nostalgia for the autocratic leadership pertaining to some issues of communal identity. Similarly, in some circumstances, the communities still violate the freedom of individuals who are against the central beliefs of a particular group, which sometimes leads to mob justice. A recent example is where capitalist violence on resources and employment has led to xenophobic tendencies against African individuals of other countries who are performing better than the owners of a particular nation. This phenomenon occurred in South Africa in 2019 and individuals from other nations such as Nigeria and Zimbabwe reacted against these anti-freedom behaviors. This was a repetition of the xenophobic experience of 2008 which Jason Hickel (2014, 103) recorded in the following words, Violent riots erupted in the township of Alexandra, just northeast of Johannesburg, on May 11, 2008. Local residents attacked foreign immigrants from African countries like Mozambique, Somalia, and Zimbabwe, known collectively as makwerekwere—a derogatory term 2 This may be viewed as a form of comparative philosophy.

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for foreigners and onomatopoeia for someone who speaks unintelligibly, a “babbler.” Two people were killed in this first bout of violence, and more than forty injured.

These xenophobic sentiments are not only in South Africa, but are also common in other countries such as Malawi, Angola, and Zimbabwe. This experience begs the question, ‘Has Africa developed a Frankenstein with the introduction of multiparty governments?’ Is multiparty democracy a justification of the violation of the freedom of an individual who created or embraced this system? On another note, one may dismiss these questions and argue that the various problems noted above are a sign of the lack of understanding and proper implementation of democratic values, and may further indicate that the African traditional communitarian experience is responsible for this. Whatever view one may hold, problems relative to freedoms are indicative of the urgency of discussing this matter. ii. The second element that compliments a study on individual liberty is interrogating capitalism focusing on the element of political freedom. Considering the African situation, there is no doubt that there is an improvement in terms of political freedom. Individuals are now allowed to develop their own political parties, register them, and compete with other parties. There is also an improvement with regard to the participation of women in politics, as more female politicians are taking various top responsibilities in the African governments. A list of such leaders include female presidents such as Slyvie Kinigi, Acting President of Burundi (February–October 1993), Ivy Matsepe-Casaburri, Acting President of South Africa (September 2005), Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, President of Liberia (January 2006–January 2018), Rose Francine Rogombe, Interim President of Gabon (June 2009–October 2009), Agnes Monique Ohsan Bellepeau, Acting President of Mauritius (March–July 2012 and May–June 2015), Joyce Hilda Banda, President of Malawi (April 2012–May 2014), Catherine Samba, Acting President of Central African Republic (January 2014–March 2016), Ameenah GuribFakim, President of Mauritius (June 2015–March 2018), and SahleWork Zewde, President of Ethiopia (October 2018–present).3 3 See also http://afjn.org/list-of-female-african-presidents/.

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Similarly, the number of women involved in parliament is steadily increasing in various parts of the continent. Although some African traditional societies registered the existence of female leaders (see O’Barr 1975, 23), the presence of these presidents in the multiparty democracy shows openness and freedom in the political context. There is also a slight improvement in political freedom in terms of the apparent reduction of political persecution in some of the African nations. This is partly due to the accommodation of political pluralism, mutual acceptance and liberty of individuals to belong to a party of their choice. While pluralism is acknowledged, there are some situations where violent confrontations occur, mainly when different groups struggle to gain control of political power during and after elections. In this game of power, society evils such as favoritism, bribery, nepotism, and tribalism seem to be strongly coming back in various political parties. There are also pockets of violence and threats toward individuals and political parties that are against the ruling governments. In some cases, revealing how one has voted becomes fatal, mainly when some groups which expected to win an election fail to do so. For instance, Elekwa and Okechukwu (2011, 833) studies this phenomenon in Zimbabwe and Nigeria and noted that, Generally, the history of electoral politics in Africa has not been encouraging. It has always been a source of unrestrained resentments, irrational action, and political instability. The violence which has erupted from the towns of Nairobi and Harare to the rural areas has exposed tribal sentiments that have long festered in Kenya and Zimbabwe. Just as these societies were beginning to enjoy the image of true democracy in their midst, thousands of their countrymen and women were killed and displaced from their villages as gang of militia conducted “Operation How Did you vote?”

A disturbing trend is where some politicians attempt to remain in power by lobbing for change of constitution through the parliament. This justifies them as being democratic; for instance, they claim to be following the ‘will of the people.’ Although it is still too early to pose this question, one may ask, ‘what is this will of the people?’ Is it a personal desire to remain in power? Is it will of one’s tribe or political party to remain in power? Is it the

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will of the majority? Nevertheless, a common trend has been an attempt to change the constitution from two terms of office to three or more (e.g., the case of Bakili Muluzi of Malawi in 2004, Chiluba of Zambia in 2004, and Pierre Nkurunziza of Burundi in 2015). While this is allowed as long as the citizens agree to such modifications in ‘the spirit of democracy,’ some have been suspicious of these changes as driven by the self-interest for power. Of course, this is not only an African problem, but it also occurs in other parts of the world. What is puzzling is whether we have to keep changing the constitution based on the understanding that a particular leader is highly performing in a country. Does this imply that in a nation this is the only highly gifted individual? Another aspect affecting political freedom is the dependence of African nations on the legal systems, most of which are easily manipulated by politicians and bureaucrats. The worst scenario is where members of parliament create laws that are in their favor. Similarly, the other worrying situation is where bureaucrats interpret laws to get some benefits from politicians. Citizens are left reflecting whether to trust the legal system or to abandon it as an enemy of freedom. Of course, a negative view of the legal system relative to political freedom cannot be generalized. I want to acknowledge that there are cases where the legal system has shown total independence in its decisions. In fact, cases have been made in various nations against the ruling political powers. A good example is a Kenyan and Malawian experience, where the presidential elections were nullified by the courts. There is also good evidence showing presidents who were prosecuted for corruption in countries such as Zambia and Malawi. Political freedom is also questioned in the relation between the African nations and the donor community, which on various occasions accompany their aid with conditionalities. One of the important issues that question further Africa’s political freedom is in the context of loans from banks such as IMF and World Bank and some governments, whereby getting access allows the Western and Eastern nations to make demands on how to run the affairs in African governments. While African nations willingly ask for such loans and accept the conditionalities, the question still remains, ‘Is there political freedom in African governments?’ Is political freedom not just an ideal that regulates the actions of politicians?

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Before criticizing the conditionalities in terms of freedom, the other issue is to understand whether the conditionalities are regarded as positive and helpful for the development of individual Africans. iii. The third element in interrogating capitalism and freedom in African thought is the question of economic freedom. A reflection on the status of economic freedom and the creation of wealth may be considered looking at various efforts and transformation processes made in different African governments. One of the positive but difficult processes has been the transfer of economic power to the private sector through privatization. This has been driven by the interest to trickle down wealth to the individual citizens. This followed the emergence of many private businesses. There is continuous market freedom in various areas such as the control of the economy using the forces of demand and supply without human intervention. An individual who has lived in the autocratic one-party systems in various nations, such as Malawi, Zaire (Republic of Congo), Comoros, Guinea, and Ghana, may easily appreciate these changes. In fact, this is a transformation from government control of the economy to individual control, which made most of the leaders extremely rich while the masses remained poor. The paradox with economic freedom has been the fact that the poor African masses became more vulnerable to the point of lacking even the basic needs. In fact, many Africans are living in conditions of abject poverty regardless of the many efforts to make them economically independent and effective. A question of despair that is often posed is, ‘What is wrong with this continent, which is very rich in terms of resources but has high levels of poverty?’ This has created sentiments that some of the governments are not adequately helping or guiding the individuals. I still think that one may wonder how a government that has lost its economic power to the individuals can manage to help its citizens. Another dilemma is that the total abandonment of economic control practices to natural forces to determine the course of things has led to market chaos4 in African society. The overemphasized economic freedom led to market chaos, such that trade and other related activities have become difficult to control in most of the African nations, even 4 This reminds me of the idea that nature turns into chaos when there is lacking a human subject to impose order.

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in those circumstances where individual rights may be in danger. A question that may require a serious reflection is, ‘Is free-market system what Africa requires?’ A more internal and serious problem that cripples the creation of wealth is the rise of malpractices such as corruption in most of the African political systems. For instance, many politicians have been charged with corruption, and some have been called to answer related allegations. One wonders the independence and functionality of some African legal systems, where issues of corruption regarding top political subjects go on for years without any significant conclusion. Khali (2005, 383–393) studied some of the issues related to corruption in the political context, with reference to Bongo’s Gabon, Biya’s Cameroon, Chiluba’s Zambia, Muluzi’s Malawi, Moi’s Kenya, and Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, where cases of embezzlement of public funds were common. The current development of events begs another question, ‘Is corruption in Africa a consequence of the rise of capitalism and freedom or this has just exposed malpractices in the traditional system?’ iv. A fourth aspect is the investigation of capitalism and freedom relative to African political thought where it is viewed as a system, which is opposed to socialism/communitarianism. This is considered as cultural, economic, or political system, which takes individual freedom as a fundamental element. Acknowledging this system in an African society where the common philosophical conception is that it is based on the communitarian system (Menkiti 1984) becomes problematic but at the same time a justification of this study. This creates a conflict between the individualistic tendencies of capitalism and communitarianism within the African political system. An immediate question that may be raised is, ‘Is ‘capitalism and freedom’ possible in the African context characterized by communitarianism?’ This begs a further and seemingly unorthodox question, ‘Is African society communitarian?’ If the answer is no, then the possible option is that it follows a capitalist system. If the answer is yes, then there is the possibility that capitalism is embedded in the African communitarian system. This book will take a safer position given that it investigates the different African political systems and traces elements of capitalism and freedom. Based on the above discussion, this project traces elements of capitalism in African philosophical and political systems, focusing

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on aspects such as democratic governance, economic freedom, and individual freedom, departing from the traditional African society, colonial period, one-party political system, to the current multiparty democratic systems. It shows how both African and Western cultures have contributed to shaping the current socio-economic and political climate in the sub-Saharan region. This project is, therefore, one of the few works in African political philosophy that questions the various political developments relative to issues surrounding property accumulation under the capitalist economy and the evolution of individual freedom. This work will benefit the intellectual community by provoking debate, providing knowledge, and clarifying the role of capitalism and freedom in the events unfolding in the African society. It will argue that there are a series of conflicts that have their roots in the adoption of either some capitalist ideals and policies or communitarianism in the African continent. For example, the battle is between the communitarian orientation of thought (socialism) and the individualist orientation (capitalism). In the political context, the African governments, which were guided by absolute ‘public power relations’ and responsibilities, have been replaced by minimalist governments that have limited powers. In the moral context, there are many questions raised on the ethical foundations and practices in African communitarianism; for example, the denial of abortion and same-sex marriages are seen by neo-capitalists as a threat to individual freedom. In the economic context, the mutual economic dependence in a nation is in crisis, mainly in most of the townships. The weakening of the economic power of governments has left most of them helpless and destitute; hence, they have precipitated into a life of Foreign Debt and Economic Dependence (Ayayi and Khan 2000). The work is expected to provide direction to the African nations in addressing various problems that are a consequence of misunderstandings rooted in capitalism and freedom. It will offer a useful philosophical framework for the African communities/nations to reflect on culture and the status amidst the continuous economic, political, and moral challenges that are supposedly inspired by the Western models of capitalism and freedom.

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1.2

African Political Philosophy

This book departed from the claim that it wanted to deal with capitalism and freedom in African political philosophy; however, another question that requires clarification is, ‘what is African political philosophy?’ In my view, philosophy is the logical activity that develops arguments in response to pertinent questions about being. ‘African political philosophy’ contextualizes this logical activity by indicating that its focus is ‘Africa’ and ‘politics.’ As is well-known, the word ‘Africa’ mainly refers to ‘land of the black people,’ while ‘politics’ refers to a life lived relative to the organization of a polis (city-state or nation). In this regard, African political philosophy reflects on a diversity of experiences and theories that respond to fundamental questions regarding the good or bad functioning of the polis. This may reflect on themes such as good governance, state, justice, will of the people, economy, and independence. A philosopher engaged in this reflection desires to align politics with human well-being. Other philosophers such as David Miller in Political Philosophy (2003, 2) indicate that ‘We can define political philosophy as an investigation into the nature, causes, and effects of good and bad government, and our picture not only encapsulates this quest but expresses in striking visual form three ideas that stand at the very heart of the subject.’ This definition draws from Ambrogio Lorenzetti’s picture in the Palazzo Pubblico of Siena, which is suggestive of understanding political philosophy based on a reflection on the good and bad government in a particular context. Based on this framework, it may be indicated that as a logical activity, philosophy in the African context further focuses on ‘the nature, causes, and effects of good and bad government.’ Martin (2012) considered African political thought by defining its content in the following passage, In essence, African political thought refers to the original ideas, values, and blueprints for a better Africa that inform African political systems and institutions from the ancient period (Kush, sixth century BCE) to the present. African political thought also refers to political theories and ideologies developed by various African scholars and statesmen, as enunciated in their speeches, autobiographies, writings, and policy statements, the main focus here being on the ideas rather than on the individuals.

This definition suggests the semantics of African political philosophy by focusing more on the content of this discipline (it is more on what African

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thought denotes). The context has different elements such as ideas, values, ideologies, and theories. The uncomfortable and weaker part of the definition (essence) of African thought is where the author qualifies these ideas as belonging to various African scholars and statesmen. I am of the view that African political philosophy can be done even by non-African scholars and statesmen. Of course in the last part of the quotation, the author attempts to avoid this critique by indicating that focus is on the ideas and not on the individuals. I think that it is much safer to underline the element of ‘rational activity’ or ‘logical activity’ where this content is investigated or created by thinkers, relative to the African political system. When did African political philosophy start? If this question is answered in terms of rational activity, it is difficult, given that it coincides with the creation of African individuals. Based on where archaeology and history can lead us, we can talk about the ancient history of African Philosophy. For Martin (2012, 1), ‘In essence, African political thought refers to the original ideas, values, and blueprints for a better Africa that inform African political systems and institutions from the ancient period (Kush, sixth century BCE) to the present.’ This may be extended further to the philosophies developed in different ancient kingdoms up to the recent activities. Modern African political philosophy may be founded on both black philosophies across the continent some of which led to the development of Pan-Africanism and African reflections in the pre-colonial and post-colonial era. In this regard, philosophies of various thinkers such as Du Bois (1897), Washington (1901), Fanon (1964), Nkrumah (1965),5 Kaunda (1966), and Nyerere (1966) and the recent philosophers such as Menkiti (1984) and Metz (2007, 2019). Metz (2015, 1–9) in his article ‘African Political Philosophy’ notes the following thinkers in the 1990s: Claude Ake, Segun Gbadegesin, Kwasi Wiredu, Kwame Gyekye, Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba, Bénézet Bujo, Henry Odera Oruka, and Mogobe Ramose (Metz 2015, 4). In the period between 2000 and 2019, African political philosophy has expanded its scope and considers a variety of topics. For instance, going through one of the general works (Wiredu 2004) that attempt to offer a holistic conceptualization of African philosophy, one comes across themes such as democracy in the African traditional setting

5 Thomas Nelson and sons: London.

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(Wamala 2004; Teffo 2004), Western and African communitarianism (Masolo 2004), human rights in the African context (Deng 2004, 499– 501), and African jurisprudence Marungi (2004, 519). Further contemporary studies are also attempting to present a historical trajectory of African political philosophy looking at its development in various epochs. In fact, such a development may be seen in Martin in African Political Thought (2012) as mentioned above, who traces African political philosophy in the indigenous African context, independence period characterized by nationalism, socialism, populism, Marxism, and Pan-Africanism and lastly focuses on contemporary themes relative to development, democracy, and African state. Briefly, there is a substantial development of the history of African political philosophy, which cannot be exhausted in this volume as per the scope of this study which is limited to capitalism and freedom. My interest in African political philosophy in this book is in the socio-economic and political philosophy. Specifically, I attempt to trace the role of capitalism as a system that drives the African political landscape. I will be identifying capitalism, its various modes of existence, its implications to the lives of the citizens, etc. While the economic element is fundamental in this political philosophy, the notion of freedom on which capitalism is founded is regarded as central in this book. Briefly, this book reflects on the political philosophy of property, freedom and responsibility, building on both people’s experience and different writings on the subject matter.

1.3

Content Introduction

The arrangement of the content of this work is as follows: After the general introduction, Chapter 2 develops theoretical issues around capitalism and freedom. It argues that there are three fundamental Western perspectives that are influencing African views, namely the Marxist-Conflict Perspective, the Weberian-Rational Perspective, and the Capitalist-Liberal Perspective. Concerning the Marxian-Conflict Perspective, capitalism and freedom are studied based on a conflict between the owners of means of production, such as the Western nations that own capital and the exploited African countries. In some circumstances, the concentration is on the owners of capital and the exploited laborers who work for a wage. The Weberian-Rational Perspective builds in the context of Christianity

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and focuses more on the use of reason in the pursuit of surplus value. Weberian capitalism is very organized and does not take the negative connotation that is evident in the Marxian context. The Capitalist-Liberal Perspective builds on classical liberalism and neoliberalism as structural systems on which capitalism and freedom develop. The idea of freedom/individual freedom is central in production and market exchange. These perspectives are used interchangeably in African thought. Chapter 3 investigates capitalism and freedom in African traditional political philosophy. It discusses on radical communitarianism, a version of socialism, which is claimed by academics as representative of the African sociopolitical and economic system, and a common system of governance known as the monarchism. The chapter explores capitalism and freedom by concentrating on indicators, such as ‘democratic governance,’ ‘trade relations,’ ‘private property,’ and the conceptualization of freedom in the African communities. The presence of elements of capitalism in these communities before the coming of colonialism raises some doubts about radical communitarianism as a genuine representation of the African experience. Chapter 4 investigates the idea of capitalism and freedom in the colonial Africa. After building the semantics of colonialism, it argues that (i) it is the extension of Western nationalism (a version of Western communalism); (ii) it is a distorted version of capitalism, which is termed colonial capitalism. The chapter further argues that (iii) colonialism is a tool for the development of wealth for both the occupying and occupied nations, and (iv) the oppressive nature of the ruling community motivated a revolution for freedom, which led African nations to independence. Chapter 5 builds on elements of freedom and accumulation of wealth in Africa during the early post-independence era. These elements were promoted in the one-party system, which at first seemed to highly promote the freedom of the indigenous citizens. By overstretching the importance of community life guided by one leader, the president, most of these governments became dictatorial, hence defeating the whole purpose of democracy. This led to a lot of suffering in most of the African societies, where every citizen was expected to behave based on the desires of the one-party political leader. Although most of these nations claimed to be based on a capitalistic system, it is argued that they did not live the expected values, which accompany capitalism and freedom. This became

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one of the reasons why they were easily removed from power when neocapitalism came to Africa, beginning from the 1980s. Chapter 6 argues that the neoliberal reforms called for the reemergence of the multiparty democracy system, claiming that it represents its agenda of promoting true freedom. The importance of this system is that it presents checks and balances in the political realm, against the dictatorial tendencies of some of the leaders. This system brings back the aspect of political freedom and safeguards various individual-human rights. The multiparty democratic method is, therefore, selected as a crucial hub of the ongoing neoliberal reforms meant at controlling political power and socialist tendencies (majority power) and promoting individual freedom. Chapter 7 discusses the capitalist economic reforms that took place in sub-Saharan Africa. They may be defined as a movement from government-controlled economics to a liberalized economy. The former is represented by the Keynesian philosophy, which was adopted by most of the sub-Saharan nations immediately after independence. The latter is founded on free-market philosophy, which is centered on individual property and freedom. This transformation is motivated by the assumption that contrary to a government-controlled economy, free market guarantees both economic success and political freedom. The chapter further discusses the concrete transformation of the African continent through the introduction of principles suggested by the Washington Consensus. Chapter 8 discusses the economic conflict that follows the reforms that took shape in the African continent. It is argued that the insistence on the idea of freedom and independence in the neo-capitalist setting did not lead to the desired result. This, however, increased the situation of poverty and dependence in the African continent. It is this conflict that will lead to a continuous situation of dependence on the capitalists, which ended up in increasing the debt situation. The chapter concentrates on concrete situations of economic conflict by considering the situation under Mugabe in Zimbabwe. This conflict is mainly around the use of land between the capitalists and the peasants, and the socialist decisions that characterized the government of Mugabe. The chapter also considers the conflict in Malawi, mainly focusing on devaluation and market price control. In both cases, these conflicts led to a series of sanctions given to these African nations forcing them to change.

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Chapter 9 studies some selected conflicts between African communitarian principles and neo-capitalist principles as applied by African governments and Western governments, respectively. One of the conflicts that show differences in principles is between the International Criminal Court (ICC) and some African nations such as Malawi, Kenya, and South Africa. For example, with reference to the eradication of the former President of Sudan, Al Bashir for trial on homicide, some African nations defied the international call for his arrest, arguing that this was a violation of the independence and national sovereignty. The African Union as a custodian of African identity joined the conflict and denied the eradication of Al Bashir as a seating African president. Chapter 10 discusses various problems that are attributed to the conflict between communitarianism and individualism in the context of morality. The first conflict regards issues around lesbians, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT), whereby the communitarian philosophy tends to be intolerant as opposed to the free-market system. The second conflict concerns the question of abortion. Similarly, the communitarian system tends to criminalize abortion on the grounds that the duty of the community is to protect life. Chapter 11 investigates various problems that are linked with the development of modern capitalism, such as corruption, fraud, and bribery. It uses Marx’s idea that the initial development of capitalism is characterized by primitive accumulation, which is done through the displacement of people’s capital and labor using immoral practices such as stealing, bribery, and fraud. I argue that the modern interpretation of Marx’s idea where primitive accumulation is seen as a process inherent in the modern development of capitalism best suits the African condition. This is followed by a presentation of modern African experience on this matter with respect to politicians, bureaucrats, and civil servants. Lastly, the chapter explores primitive accumulation among the indigenous populations, non-governmental organizations, and other religious bodies. It is argued that primitive accumulation in its different forms is one of the main causes of suppression of individual freedom and potential of the masses toward the accumulation of wealth. Chapter 12 investigates the neo-African renaissance as a response to neo-capitalism, which has dominated the political system in modern-day Africa. It is argued by different heads of states such as Mutharika, Mandela, and Mbeki that the economic, moral, and freedom crises that have characterized most of the African nations may be adequately addressed

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through the project of rebirth. This is a call for a revolution in Africa that takes into consideration the glorious past of Africa and transforms the mind-set of the African individuals, toward a new and prosperous continent. This presents a shared dream by different individuals that have hope for a better life in Africa. Chapter 13 interrogates the Chinese model of capitalism and freedom. While like any other capitalist system it may lead to exploitation of the poor countries or poor masses, it has helped the economy of China in terms of exposure and getting access to businesses throughout the world. This model has been accommodated in the African context in various nations through the strategy of mutual relations that are encouraged by the Chinese capitalists. This capitalism differs from the classical version promoted by the IMF and World Bank given that it minimizes conditionalities and argues for the promotion of the independence of the African states. Regardless of this aspect, the possibility of exploitation of the African nations remains an open issue. Chapter 14 argues that a possible way of effectively responding to capitalism and freedom challenges in the sub-Saharan region is through reconceptualizing and adopting a comprehensive version of ubuntu theory. This new theory takes into account the African ordinary life experience and incorporates various aspects in the traditional setting such as the importance of recognizing an individual (and self-regarding virtues), the community (and other-regarding virtues), and practical reason. It is argued that through this theory, a potentially adequate conception of capitalism and freedom may be elaborated in the African context. Chapter 15 is a general conclusion, which also maps the way forward in terms of research on capitalism and freedom in the African context. The work has an appendix, which develops further the African notion of practical reason, which is in line with aspects of Chapter 14. It is hoped that proper use of the traditional conception of the practical reason may assist in solving most of the problems relative to capitalism and freedom in African society.

References Ayayi, A., & Khan, M. (2000). External Debt and Capital Flight in Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, DC: International Monetary Funds. Deng, F. (2004). Human Rights in the African Context. In W. Kwasi (Ed.), A Companion to African Philosophy (pp. 499–508). Malden: Blackwell.

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Du Bois, W. E. (1897). The Conservation of Races. Washington, DC: Baptist Print. Elekwa, N., & Okechukwu, E. (2011). Post-election Violence in Africa: A Comparative Case of Kenya and Zimbabwe. The Indian Journal of Political Science, 72, 833–844. Fanon, F. (1964). Towards the African Revolution. New York: Groove Press. Friedman, M. (2002). Capitalism and Freedom. London and Chicago: Chicago University Press. Hickel, J. (2014). Cultural Anthropology. The American Anthropological Association, 29, 103–127. Kaunda, K. D. (1966). A Humanist in Africa. London: Longmans. Khalil, T. (2005). African Leaders and Corruption. Review of African Political Economy, 32, 383–393. Martin, G. (2012). African Political Thought. Cham and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Marungi, J. (2004). The Question an African Jurisprudence: Some Hermeneutic Reflections. In K. Wiredu (Ed.), A Companion to African Philosophy (pp. 519–526). Malden: Blackwell. Masolo, D. (2004). Western and African Communitarianism: A Comparison. In W. Kwasi (Ed.), A Companion to African Philosophy (pp. 483–498). Malden: Blackwell. Menkiti, I. (1984). Person and Community in African Traditional Thought. In W. Richard (Ed.), In African Philosophy: An Introduction (pp. 171–181). Lanham: University Press of America. Metz, T. (2007). Toward an African Moral Theory. The Journal of Political Philosophy, 15(3), 321–341. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2007. 00280.x. Metz, T. (2015). African Political Philosophy. In H. LaFollette (Ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics (pp. 1–9). Hoboken:Wiley. Metz, T. (2019, forthcoming). Relational Economics: An African Approach to Distributive Justice. Ethical perspectives, 25(4), 1–34. Miller, D. (2003). Political Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. Nkrumah, K. (1965). Neocolonialism. London: Thomas Nelson and Sons. Nyerere, J. ([1966] 2000). Leaders Must Not Be Masters. In E. C. Eze (Ed.), African Philosophy: An Anthology (pp. 77–78). Malden: Blackwell. O’Barr, J. (1975). Making the Invisible Visible: African Women in Politics and Policy. African Studies Review, 18, 19–27. Tambulasi, R., & Kayuni, H. (2005). Can African Feet Divorce Western Shoes? The Case of ‘Ubuntu’ and Democratic Good Governance in Malawi. Nordic Journal of African Studies, 14, 147–161.

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Teffo, J. (2004). Democracy, Kinship, and Consensus: A South African Perspective. In K. Wiredu (Ed.), A Companion to African Philosophy (pp. 443–449). Malden: Blackwell. Wamala, E. (2004). Government by Consensus: An Analysis of a Traditional Form of Democracy. In K. Wiredu (Ed.), A Companion to African Philosophy (pp. 435–442). Malden: Blackwell. Washington, B. (1901). Up from Slavery. Auckland: The Floating Press. William, E. (1944). Capitalism and Slavery. Chapel Hill: The University of North Caroline Press. Wiredu, K. (2004). A Companion to African Philosophy. Malden: Blackwell.

CHAPTER 2

Theoretical Conceptualization of Capitalism and Freedom

2.1

Introduction

What are the theoretical issues behind the conceptualization of capitalism and freedom in African philosophy? Attempting to respond to this question begs the clarification of whether it is appropriate to talk about the African theory of capitalism. I will not labor on this issue, given that the rest of the book represents an attempt to make sense of capitalism in an African setting departing from the traditional African community to the current political systems. The common dogmatic position further hinders the immediate discourse on theoretical aspects of capitalism in African philosophy. The dogmatism constitutes the belief that African thought is a version of socialism (communitarianism) and contrary to capitalism. Hallen (2004) commenting on the philosophy of Segun, underscores that African philosophy mainly identifies with socialism rather than capitalism. This is indicated in the following expression, ‘Finally if there must be a choice between capitalism and socialism, the latter in its democratic forms appears to be more compatible with the humanitarian values definitive of Africa’s ‘‘communitarian’’ societies’ (Hallen 2004, 115). When a committed capitalist analyzes this expression, it is full of a contradiction given that it entails the existence of democratic socialism, which is assumed as a version of capitalism. Nevertheless, dogmatism is present in many African philosophers and leaders such as Mutharika (2010), Nyerere

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([1966] 2000), and Senghor (1964), who considered capitalism and its assumed individual freedom as foreign and at times very destructive. While it is difficult to agree on the African theory of capitalism at this stage, literature shows that contrary to Hallen’s claim, this phenomenon is present in this context. Thinkers have speculated and suggested different views on the emergence of capitalism in the African context. Some have indicated that there was capitalism in traditional African society even before the coming of the Western capitalists (Jarven 2014, 431–454). Some thinkers have focused more on the colonial system, arguing that it is responsible for bringing capitalism, understood as a system that was designed to exploit the African resources (Chitonge 2017). Some African governments, when they acquired independence, have equally argued that their system is capitalist. For example, the first President of the Republic of Malawi explained that his nation was following capitalist principles (Short 1974; Kayange 2012, 16–30). This interest toward capitalism is questionable given that after independence, most of the African leaders became autocratic. Literature shows that there are generally three theoretical perspectives used in the various discussions on capitalism in the African context, namely, the Marxian interpretation, Weberian interpretation, and liberal interpretation. Firstly in Sect. 2.2, the presence of capitalism in Africa is discussed based on the Marxian theory. Secondly, Sect. 2.3 will focus on the Weberian Approach, although it is used rarely in the African debates on capitalism. Thirdly, discourse on capitalism and freedom is mainly done using the liberal theoretical framework, as will be shown in Sect. 2.4. For instance, this link between capitalism and liberalism is reflected in Freeman (2011, 19) who noted that ‘The enforcement of a scheme of private economic rights and liberties within a system of free competitive markets designed to achieve conditions of economic efficiency in both the allocation and the distribution of income and wealth is, as I understand it, the most fundamental feature of capitalism. It is also the primary feature of classical liberalism that distinguishes it from what I call the “high liberal tradition.”’ Section 2.5 considers some of the developments on capitalism in an African context relative to the studied frameworks.

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2.2 Capitalism and the Marxist-Conflict Perspective The African academic discourse on the presence of capitalism mainly evolved around the Marxian theory (Jarven 2014, 431ff; Cooper 2014). Marx is a forerunner of the idea that clarified the socio-economic system that was guiding some advanced Western nations. The main interest was toward industrial capitalism, which led to the economic development of Britain. The economic affair constituted the accumulation of wealth following the rapid industrialization and agricultural development using the capitalist mode of production (capitalism). Marx summarizes capitalism in Das Capital in the following passage, It produces its products as commodities. The fact that it produces commodities does not in itself distinguish it from other modes of production; but that the dominant and determining character of its product is the commodity certainly does so. This means, first of all, that … labour generally appears as wage-labour… [and] the relationship of capital to wage-labour determines the whole character of the mode of production.

In this passage, profit-making is rooted in the production of commodities. Marx primarily defines a product as anything, whose qualities satisfy human needs (Marx 1890, 127). For example, the qualities of a table such as hardness and flat surface meet my need to put a laptop and write, hence commodity. It is because of these qualities that a product creates value and demand, therefore, attract profit-making. I exchange a table with an equivalent amount in the form of money. In this process of maximization of profits, the central component is the link between capital (anything that leads to surplus value) and wage labor. For Marx, human labor is responsible for the creation of value in a particular commodity, he writes, ‘A use-value, or useful article, therefore, has value only because abstract human labor is objectified [vergegenstiindlicht] or materialized in it’ (Marx 1890, 129). Marx utilized his ideas on production to offer an analysis of a society based on capitalism. In this regard, the community is viewed based on the capitalist relations that evolved between the class of owners of capital known as the bourgeoisie and the class of providers of labor, the proletariats, who transform objects by giving them a use-value. Numerically, the bourgeoisie class has very few members, while the proletariats form a

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large part of the society. In providing value to objects, they help the class of the bourgeoisie to accumulate capital. This labor-based relation constitutes a situation of conflict, whereby the proletariats are an exploited party (they are forced to sell their labor for less than its value).1 They live in abject poverty and oppression while the class of the bourgeoisie enjoys a good life, as they consume and invest what the proletariats produce through their labor. For instance, noting the harsh conditions lived by factory proletariat in Britain, Marx wrote, The slavery in which the bourgeoisie holds the proletariat chained is nowhere more conspicuous than in the factory system. Here ends all freedom in law and in fact. The operative must be in the mill at half past five in the morning; if he comes a couple of minutes too late, he is fined; if he comes ten minutes too late, he is not let in until breakfast is over, and a quarter of the day’s wages is withheld. He must eat, drink and sleep at command… (Marx 1890, 550)

According to the proletariats, the class revolution resolves the injustices in society. The masses must struggle and eliminate the mechanisms put in place by their oppressors, hence develop a just society that equally benefits everyone in the context of the creation of surplus value. On the other hand, aware of the possible reaction from the proletariats, the bourgeoisie attempt to develop a just society through the development of labor laws that are accepted by both parties. Laws are there to clarify value (wage) in the exchange of labor with an equivalent amount, more especially monetary value. The bourgeoisie created different capitalist acts/laws that affected the proletariats. For example, the labor laws of 1802 and the Factory Act of 1833 in Britain tried to respond to the injustices in the exchange of labor for a wage. For example, one of the most significant issues that required attention was that of the working hours. In this regard, The new Factory Act of 8 June 1847 enacted that on I July 1847 there should be a preliminary reduction of the working day for ‘young persons’ (from 13 to 18) and all females to 11 hours, but that on I May 1848 1 The proletariats are named differently in Marxian theory depending on their type of work. For instance, the factory proletariats work in the industries, while the Agricultural proletariats or rural proletariats work in the fields. Marx also mentions of the urban proletariats living on paid wages in the urban cities.

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there should be a definite limitation of the working day to 10 hours. For the rest, the Act was only an emendatory supplement to the Acts of l833 and 1844. (Marx 1890, 550)

Briefly, for Marx, capitalism is a system of labor relations characterized by a series of laws calling for justice against the exploitation of laborers as they relate with the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, for Marx (1890, 391), lawmarkers did not want to interfere in the freedom of labor between the two interested parties. Some of the laws were ‘laws of convenience,’ and this is suggestive of the question, ‘How many convenience laws are entertained in various institutions?’ Does the existence of laws implying the presence of justice in a system? Do laws entail freedom? The other fundamental idea that characterizes capitalism in the Marxian framework is the existence of market relations where commodities are exchanged, leading to the accumulation of surplus value. Apart from this exchange, Marx indicated that the movement into wage labor also slowly created the idea of consuming what was produced at a price, hence developing the concept of the home market. Commenting on this commencement of the home market, Marx writes, ‘In fact, the events that transformed the small peasants into wage-laborers, and their means of subsistence and labor into material [sachliche] elements of capital, created, at the same time, a home market for capital’ (Marx 1890, 10). The laborer, instead of producing their food as was the case in the new communities, they were busy trying to earn a wage; hence, they had to buy what to consume. The situation was sometimes paradoxical in the sense that in some circumstances, the laborers had to buy the same products, which they produced for the bourgeoisie. The system often exploited the peasants, given that they were buying what to consume at a higher price as compared with their wages. Marx was very negative toward the capitalist system, and he called it evil.2 This was mainly because of the various modes of exploitation of the masses. An interesting theory of this exploitation is presented in his conceptualization of ‘primitive accumulation,’ which is the initial moment where a capitalist unjustly and violently gets capital from the initial owners. For instance, this is done through different means such as stealing, bribery, and alienation of property through war. It is in this element of 2 Karl Marx, Capital Volume One—Preface to the First German Edition: Marx talks of Capitalism’s ‘modern evils’.

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depriving them of their needs that the capitalists make them dependent to work for them for a wage or as slaves.3 In summary, the Marxian framework of capitalism mainly hinges on the production of commodities, accumulation of surplus value, wage labor relations, labor laws, market relations, and freedom-based conflict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariats. The African discourse on capitalism often hinges on these various elements. Interpreting capitalism using Marx often leads to underlining the conflicts that are a consequence of this system. I am aware of the fact that Marx is highly criticized because of introducing communism as an alternative to the capitalist system. I will limit my presentation in this section on some of the basic ideas on capitalism as shown above.

2.3 Capitalism and the Weberian-Rational Perspective Max Weber develops further the concept of capitalism in his fundamental work known as, The Protestant Work Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Summarizing the idea of capitalism, he indicated that ‘But capitalism is identical with the pursuit of profit, and forever renewed profit, by means of continuous, rational, capitalistic enterprise.’ There are three fundamental ideas in this definition, namely, ‘pursuit for profit,’ ‘rational,’ and ‘capitalistic enterprise.’ The concept of ‘pursuit for profit’ is indicative of the fact that interest to produce a profit (surplus value) is what motivates or drives capitalism. He argues that, although this pursuit for profit is a fundamental component defining capitalism, it should be different from the general desire/impulse for a benefit, which is driven by greed. Commenting on this impulse for money or profit guided by greed he writes, The impulse to acquisition, pursuit of gain, of money, of the greatest possible amount of money, has in itself nothing to do with capitalism. This impulse exists and has existed among waiters, physicians, coachmen, artists, prostitutes, dishonest officials, soldiers, nobles, crusaders, gamblers, and beggars. (Weber [1930] 2005)

3 I will discuss this concept of primitive accumulation further in Chapter 11, where I consider similar evils in the modern African capitalism.

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The passage shows that the pursuit of the gain of money does not define capitalism; in fact, Weber indicated that this leads to a ‘naïve idea of capitalism.’ The exclusion of greed for surplus value, such as money, is further motivated by Weber’s adherence to rationalism. The second fundamental element in Weber’s conception of capitalism is the idea of ‘rationality.’ The means of attaining the capitalist goal, which is the pursuit for profit, is guided by reason and not impulse. ‘Reason’ is mainly crucial in terms of bringing order in the business of accumulating profit in a particular context. It is there to indicate the best means and guide individuals in the process of pursuing profit. This rational activity or enterprise toward the accumulation of surplus value qualifies the definition of ‘capitalism.’ The term ‘capitalistic’ draws from the Marxian definition of capital indicated earlier, where it refers to a value that is utilized to produce surplus value. In this regard, Weber argues that this ‘rational capitalistic enterprise’ is an economic activity. In this activity, there is a systematic or rational production of surplus value following the opportunities exchange (Weber 1930] 2005, xxxii). Weber reflects this surplus value in the following passage: This means that the action is adapted to a systematic utilization of goods or personal services as means of acquisition in such a way that, at the close of a business period, the balance of the enterprise in money assets (or, in the case of a continuous enterprise, the periodically estimated money value of assets) exceeds the capital, i.e. the estimated value of the material means of production used for acquisition in exchange. (Weber [1930] 2005, xxxii)

Key to the idea of surplus value in this passage is the mention that after completing a business, ‘the balance of the enterprise in money assets…exceeds the capital.’ As indicated earlier, the unique aspect of capitalist activity is that reason plays a distinctive feature. Weber perfectly summarizes this in the following words, ‘But in modern times the Occident has developed, in addition to this, a very different form of capitalism which has appeared nowhere else: the rational capitalistic organization of (formally) free labor’ (Weber [1930] 2005, xxxv). The real use of reason toward the accumulation of surplus value is associated with the protestant way of life/an ethic, more specifically Calvinism (Weber [1930] 2005, 1–12). This ethic has as its target the accumulation of surplus value, as is captured by the following passage, ‘In fact,

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the summum bonum of this ethic, the earning of more and more money, combined with the strict avoidance of all spontaneous enjoyment of life, is above all completely devoid of any eudemonistic, not to say hedonistic, admixture’ (Weber [1930] 2005, 18). The ‘spirit’ of capitalism will create the attitude and practice of using capital to produce surplus value and proceed to transform it by investing and harvesting further value. The spirit of capitalism is mainly possible through discipline, such that surplus value becomes an occasion for producing more. Weber’s theory of capitalism ends by underlining that the capitalist spirit is cultivated properly through the protestant ethic, more especially the Calvinist way of life. It primarily requires an understanding that an individual must do well and live a better experience on this earth. Doing things properly is a sign of a positive response to one’s salvation. The wealth which is accumulated by an individual is indicative of salvation; hence, individuals are to strive for this good life. A proper disposition is to do every work as if one was doing it for God. In this regard, the pursuit of surplus value is a calling from God (Weber [1930] 2005, 39–50). This spirit of hard work and the understanding that good life starts here on earth differentiates a Calvinist from a Catholic. The conception is that for a Catholic, good life is going to be achieved in heaven; hence, willingly living a miserable life on earth for the sake of a pleasant experience with God is highly recommended. It is an occasion for one to purify his/her life in preparation for a good life in heaven. The spirit of poverty is not in line with the spirit of capitalism in the Calvinist context, which requires self-engagement toward the attainment of surplus value, which is equally an indication of salvation (Weber [1930] 2005, 102–125). Where there is abject poverty entails that the protestant ethic is not adequately reflected in the lives of the citizens.

2.4

Capitalism and the Liberal Perspective

I start this section with the assumption that modern African sociopolitical and economic systems are substantially driven by the liberal perspective of capitalism. This begs the first semantic question, ‘What does it mean to view capitalism and freedom using the liberal perspective?’ A quick response to this question is that this means using ‘individual liberty’ as a key for conceptualizing private property, the process of capital accumulation (creation of wealth) and liberty. Before I delve into an elaboration of this perspective, I want to briefly comment on the concept of ‘individual

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liberty.’ This idea correlates two notions in metaphysics, namely, ‘individual,’ which is a particular (a ‘this’) and ‘liberty’ or ‘freedom,’ which is a universal (what is said of a particular or what is predicated of a particular). Individual, relative to human beings, refers to a ‘this human subject,’ who is unique and independent of the other human subjects. Liberty, as a universal, refers to a state of being and acting independently of other subjects or external influence. This definition shows that liberty and the individual are inseparable; in fact, one entails the other. This linkage is further seen in German philosophy where the term ‘autonomy’ is used to capture the idea of liberty. For instance, Kantian philosophy uses the term ‘autonomy’ to refer to what depends on oneself. A broader conception of liberty may come from its negative definition, where it is conceived as the absence of constraints. This goes beyond the individual who acts without constraints (individual freedom) and includes the absence of constraints relative to a community (community freedom). Different philosophers such as Aristotle, Augustine of Hippo, Thomas Aquinas, Kierkegaard, Sartre, and Ayer have interrogated freedom from various angles (such as theology, ethics, and metaphysics); however, the interest in this section is the classical and neoliberal conceptualization, which is an attempt to build the human society on individual liberty. How is ‘individual liberty’ used as a foundation of capitalism? This may be answered using two related philosophical traditions, namely, classical liberalism and neoliberalism. Classical liberalism coincides with the development of empiricism by philosophers such as John Locke (1632– 1704) (also known as the father of liberalism), John Stuart Mill (1806– 1873), and Adam Smith (1723–1790).4 Elements in this view of capitalism will be discussed in section (i) below. The neoliberalism is a version that attempted to revive classical liberalism and is represented by modern thinkers such as von Mises, Hayek, Friedman, and Nozick. Selected ideas of this neoliberal view of capitalism, which in some respects is a form of neo-empiricism, will be presented in section (ii). (i) In political philosophy, classical liberalism may be viewed as a political ideology, which defines the relation (such as socio-economic and political relations) between the state and its citizens based on liberty. The general tendency is to depart from an idealization of a period before the development of an organized society, state, or government (also know in 4 Other important figures connected with liberalism include Immanuel Kant, Francis Bacon, and David Hume.

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Hobbes as the state of nature). This is a situation where all individuals were completely free (natural freedom) to own property and live as they desired, without any special rules to guide their activities, and they had to depend on their conscience. Political philosophy provides the theory of social contract, as a description of how rational individuals organized their freedoms and rights under a common framework (government or state). Capitalism is, therefore, a classical liberal theory that describes the relations that take shape in this framework. Below, I will briefly discuss insights from some selected philosophers such as John Stuart Mill and Adam Smith. In his elaboration on the relation between the individual and the state, Mill defends ‘individual liberty’ against any possible harm from ‘state intervention.’ He further establishes a condition whereby the society can intervene on individual liberty. Mill firstly clarifies his ideas by appealing to ancient Greek philosophy where, ‘By liberty, was meant protection against the tyranny of the political rulers’ (Mill 1998, 3). In this regard, liberty is a limitation of the power of the ruler exercised on a particular people. He approaches the Greek concept of liberty from the angle of the government; however, the other possibility is to view it from the perspective of citizens. In this regard, liberty is the will of an individual to freely participate in the political life of society. In the relation of liberty between an individual and the government, Mill targets leaders who were very powerful in ancient times, and whose term of office was often prolonged. In most cases, they were manipulating the masses using the power which they consolidated over the years. Citizens were tired with long years of manipulation and saw the need for limiting the power of their rulers, and this consequently led to the introduction of elective and temporary rulers. The people acquired authority to put leaders in power and dismiss them when they attempted to violate their freedom. For a ruler to remain in power, then it was essential to express the will of the people. This correlation of freedom with the will of the people led to a popular conception of liberty, which in my view, does not necessarily defend the individual. In fact, the ‘will of the people’ is often a vague concept, which is manipulated by some politicians to suit their interests. Taking the liberal position, Mill is rightly skeptical toward the traditional conception of liberty because of correlating it with the will of the people. The worry is that in some circumstances, the masses have

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decisions that infringe freedom of some individuals, more especially subjects that do not follow what the community wants. In this circumstance, adverse actions toward these individuals are justified, but in actual sense, the masses are harming innocent individuals, who freely gave the community the mandate to govern their liberties. Commenting on this problem, Mill (1998, 7) wrote, Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it practices a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself. Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough; there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own.

This citation is essential for liberalism, as it underlines that society can become an enemy of liberty in its pretense to defend the same. The protection of freedom requires strict monitoring of the community so that the individual is respected and not harmed.5 Protection as a requirement justifies and explains why most of the capitalists are hostile toward the collective power such that in some circumstances, the individual is given more authority, which can make him/her violate collective opinion and communal freedom. Of course, the individual may have this power when supported by other external forces. The negative mentality toward the society as oppressive of individual’s freedom and the suspicion toward the will of the people created several issues in liberal thought. One of the most problematic areas is the objective determination of what is good or bad action and the question of moral responsibility. The society which plays a fundamental role in determining rules of conduct is questioned, and it is left without power to 5 Note that, critiquing the society relative to liberty is also present in the ancient times, mainly in the ideas of Plato and Aristotle who were skeptical toward the decisions of the masses without rationality.

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reasonably determine what is objective and what is not (or what is right or wrong). Rules governing the society are therefore not necessarily accurate, but they express the taste and judgment of the majority. In other words, the majority of consent does not necessarily imply that a particular action or judgment is logically valid. In fact, Mill noted that moral standards express, The likings and dislikings of society, or some powerful portion of it, are thus the main thing which has practically determined the rules laid down for general observance, under the penalties of law or opinion. (Mill 1998, 10)

The fact that society determines these rules and penalties, they may sometimes be erroneous and lead toward the oppression of the individual in society. It is for this reason that any government must not exercise absolute control on individuals to adhere to collective decisions. There is a chance that such rules may one day be discovered as false and against individual freedom. Nevertheless, my opinion is that for the sake of progress we still need to use reason and come up with rules that are closer to the truth regarding human well-being. This may help us to operate based on them now, but still being open to further improvements in the future for the good of all human subjects. Although classical liberalism is suspicious toward the society/collectivity, it allows for the intervention of the society or individual in the context of self-protection. Mill indicates this exception in the following passage: That principle is that the sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.

Self-protection partly explains the type of security adopted in the liberal theory, whereby the rights of an individual become so special. The government has the responsibility of making sure that the individual is

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also not harming others. Individual freedom only ends where the interested subject has started interfering in the affairs of the other. Paradoxically, the society may unjustly intervene in the life of a person and give an excuse that the end of such an intervention is self-protection. The relation between the individual and government may be considered further in the ideas of Adam Smith in his free-market economy or laissez-faire economics (let them do or let them alone economics), which underlines the importance of individual and market freedom, independent of government interference. Smith wanted to make nations and individuals free and happy, as is seen in his work known as Wealth of Nations (Smith 1776).6 How will individuals be ‘left to do’ in economics? Firstly, individuals are expected to freely take a fundamental role in the creation of wealth through a spontaneous system which allows for the division of labor into various specializations (pluralism). This is important in terms of the creation of a wealth of the nations for various reasons: One of the advantages is that this division of labor makes it easy for people to produce various products and supply them in the market. Apparently, this element of variety makes this system better than mere industrial work, which brings different people together and concentrates on one item. Pluralism in the division of labor may quickly enhance the wealth of individuals, which trickles down to the whole society. This specialization also contributes to boosting the technology of a particular nation and leads to the production of surplus wealth and exchange of various commodities. It is this aspect of exchange that will give value to money. Secondly, apart from the division of labor, Smith acknowledges the central role of developing markets, which creates opportunities for individuals. In fact, the presence of markets acts as a motivation for them to produce more, hence increase the income and wealth of the nations. Commenting on markets, Smith writes, By opening a more extensive market for whatever part of the produce of their labor may exceed the home consumption, it encourages them to improve its productive powers, and to augment its annual produce to the utmost, and thereby to increase the real revenue and wealth of the society. These great and important services foreign trade is continually occupied in

6 These ideas are also present in thinkers such as Thomas Malthus and David Ricardo.

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performing, to all the different countries between which it is carried on. (Smith 1776, 582)

Thirdly, while the creation of markets is essential, Smith introduces the idea that liberty is the foundation of the economy such that the market is capable of adjusting or regulating itself. In this regard, it does not necessarily require the government or any other power to regulate it. This thinking is grounded in the doctrine of the invisible hand, which is also very common in the works of Smith, such as The Theory of Moral Sentiments . For example, this doctrine appears in his History of Astronomy, where he discusses the invisible hand of Jupiter. A clear articulation of the invisible forces of nature is in his works Wealth of Nations (Smith 1776, 456) and the Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith 1759, 184–185). The invisible hand doctrine is implicitly presented in some of his explications on the division of labor as discussed above, as may be confirmed by the following passage, This division of labor, from which so many advantages are derived, is officially not an effect of any human wisdom, which foresees and intends that general opulence to which it gives occasion. It is the necessary, though very slow and gradual consequence of a certain propensity in human nature which has in view no such extensive utility; the propensity of track, barter and exchange one thing for the other.

The passage puts emphasis on some unseen forces in nature that are responsible for the division of labor, which is a necessity. There is a spontaneous order that occurs in the universe without man’s intervention. Human philosophy/reason and knowledge are not part of the natural mechanisms, which give rise to this division. It seems that the tendency here is to underline that this aspect is there without discussing the origin as this requires a metaphysical explanation. In this economy, the element of what is beyond natural experience is a problem that does not concern human experience. What is very clear is trusting nature to take its course. Similarly, there is too much trust in human nature to direct the exchange of products. The ordinary and average rate of wages and profits are naturally regulated. The market price of commodities is not controlled by the government or any special body, but by the proportion between the number of things in a particular market and the demand of those who want

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to exchange its value with money (Demand and Supply). The role of the government is reduced to creating an environment that facilitates the exercise of freedoms and the creation of wealth, such as the provision of justice, security, good public conditions that encourage trade, and education. I have some reservations on this overemphasis of liberty and spontaneity of the market, given that the role of reason in ordering human activities is ignored. While I understand that classical liberalists are influenced by empiricism which is opposed to rationalism and that it makes sense to trust nature, the question still stands, ‘Can nature be trusted as the best organizer of human activities without reason?’ Does nature respect human liberty, which is promulgated in classical liberalism? In fact, some of the arguments that lead to the violation of human freedom are based on conceptualizing ‘what is natural as right’ and ‘what is created by human reason as wrong.’ Nevertheless, classical liberalism still has a point in supporting human liberty against various forms of oppression. (ii) Ideas of classical liberalism resurfaced in the twentieth century through what is commonly known as neoliberalism or free-market philosophy.7 Neoliberalism appears in thinkers such as Von Mises (1927), Hayek (1944), Friedman ([1976] 2002), and Nozick (1974), who following classical liberalism, underline the ideas of individual freedom, market freedom, and minimum government intervention. Automatically, this is a new wave of individualism, which developed against new forms of socialisms such as nationalism (Nazism, Fascism, and Stalinism). According to von Mises, liberalism is a system that takes shape in a capitalist society, aimed at promoting human welfare. Mises writes, Liberalism has always had in view the good of the whole, not that of any special group. It was this that the English utilitarians meant to expressalthough, it is true, not very aptly-in their famous formula, ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’. (Von Mises 1927, 7)

The citation begs various questions, such as, ‘What is human good?’ ‘How can this good be promoted?’ Human good is the potential of an individual to exercise liberty basically in the context of ownership of property and other relations in the society. Von Mises summarizes the program of liberalism in the following words, 7 In some cases, this is called neo-capitalism.

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The program of liberalism, therefore, if condensed into a single word, would have to read: property, that is, private ownership of the means of production (for in regard to commodities ready for consumption, private ownership is a matter of course and is not disputed even by the socialists and communists). All the other demands of liberalism result from this fundamental demand. (von Mises 1927, 19)

The program suggests founding various relations in the society on the idea of property, specifically on individual property. The mention of individual property is in line with the capitalist system, which promotes singularity at the expense of the collective conception of society. The individual is free to own property and enter into property exchange with other individuals in the market. In Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974, 26–53), Nozick discusses the centrality of property, freedom, and individualism in neoliberalism. For Nozick, the notions of individual dignity and individual freedoms/liberties are fundamental in his political thought. In this setting, the individual is naturally born with (a) dignity and (b) non-alienable individual freedoms/rights (see Harvey 2008, 5). The underlying assumption behind human dignity is that each individual is intrinsically a value in the self regardless of the external forces. In the Judeo-Christian context, this value of individuals has its source in God. The conception is that God calls human beings to be free. The neoliberals have a different view, in fact, We liberals do not assert that God or Nature meant all people to be free, because we are not instructed in the designs of God or Nature, and we avoid one principle, drawing God and Nature into a dispute over mundane questions. What we maintain is only that a system based on freedom for all workers warrants the greatest productive of human labor and is therefore in the interest of inhabitants of the earth. (Von Mises 1927, 22)

In this respect, the foundation of freedom is instrumental because it matters for economic growth. As humans, we, therefore, need to be free so that we can produce without any interference. Building on the conception of human dignity noted earlier, neoliberals tried to build a freedom-based deontological version of ethics whereby a human being must be treated as an end in himself/herself and not as a means to an end. In the Ground of Metaphysics of Morals (1785, 38/492),

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Kant captured this idea in the expression that, ‘So act that you use humanity, whether in your person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.’ Humanity in any person is, therefore, an end in itself such that none is allowed to sacrifice individuals for any purpose without their consent. This principle defends human subjects against any exploitation by other subjects, including the community. It suggests some constraints in our actions so that others do not harm the individual. An individual must therefore not be treated as an object but as possessing intrinsic value. Dignity in this context is consequently emanating from the inherent value that human beings are inviolable (see Nozick 1974, 30–31). Individual dignity correctly links with the non-alienable individual freedoms. Commenting on this link, Nozick (1974, 33) indicated that; This moral idea, namely, that there are differently individuals with separate lives and so on one may be sacrificed for others, underlies the existence of moral side constraints, but also, I believe leads to a libertarian side constraint that prohibits aggression against another.

The passage underlines the idea that individuals are free and there are no grounds that justify any interference as was earlier discussed in Mill. However, this does not mean that individuals can do whatever they want; in fact, they need to be held responsible for their actions. They are owners of their actions. Thinking in these lines, Hayek (1944, 63) underlines the importance of recognizing the individual as the ultimate judge of his works. It is according to this capacity that a human subject is capable of governing his/her actions. The ethical problems that an individual faces in his actions are, therefore, not a significant concern of the society given that responsibility must go to the individual who is a moral agent. It is when actions are affecting others (community) that the problems involved will require special attention. This idea while being present in different neoliberal thinkers (such as Hayek 1944; Nozick 1974) is echoed in this citation from Friedman’s work Capitalism and Freedom: Indeed, a major aim of the liberal is to leave the ethical problem for the individual to wrestle with. The “really” important ethical problems are those that face an individual in a free society—what he should do with his freedom. There are thus two sets of values that a liberal will emphasize— the values that are relevant to relations among people, which is the context

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in which he assigns first priority to freedom; and the values that are relevant to the individual in the exercise of his freedom, which is the realm of individual ethics and philosophy. (Friedman 2002, 12)

Looking at the various interests of an individual, some of which are selfish in nature, one wonders whether an individual must be fully trusted in matters of morality. In other words, ‘Is an individual mature enough to always make a good decision on what is right or wrong?’ This component of making an individual a judge of what is right and wrong is one of the main concerns relative to the neoliberal system. In fact, this is suggestive of moral relativism, whereby the determination of good and bad actions depends on the acting subject (moral subjectivism). The other central idea of neoliberalism as was the case with classical liberalism is ‘market freedom,’ which was echoed by Harvey (2008, 3) in the following words, In so far as neoliberalism values market exchange as ‘an ethic in itself, capable of acting as a guide to all human action, and substituting for all previously held ethical beliefs’, it emphasizes the significance of contractual relations in the marketplace.

The forerunners of neoliberalism believed that free-market economy (capitalism) was fundamental in enhancing the right conduct/freedom in the polis. It was pivotal in avoiding the oppression of individuals by totalitarian governments. As noted earlier, in a free-market context, there is spontaneous order in all the activities that take shape such that persecution from a government is impossible. For instance, contracts between sellers and buyers build on free principles to the point that there is no external intervention from anyone. It is believed by these thinkers that a market is a place of exchange of commodities which provides the whole exercise of human freedom. Individual values are guaranteed in the market place, although each individual is held responsible for his actions. An individual is free to sell and buy, suggest prices, bargain, etc., and the market naturally keeps adjusting itself (Hayek 1944, 38ff). The freedom to sell and buy shows how the market spontaneously orders itself and this mechanism reflects the idea of freedom. Unfortunately, in this market ethic, an individual is a property that primarily owns the self and then he/she can extend this ownership to things in the world which he/she justly acquires. To obtain

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what belongs to the other, there is a need for a contract between the two and just transfer. The aspect of ‘just’ transfer ensures that an object must not be stolen and sold to another person. This is a theory of justice as an entitlement (Nozick 1974, 150–153), which is an alternative to the Rawlsian distributive justice, which is more oriented toward the social agreement and equality (Rawls 1971, 185). Apart from the importance of freedom in the economic context, the neoliberals wanted to emphasize it as a foundation so that they can stop the atrocities that the world has experienced due to the anti-liberals in different parts of the world. Africa has also experienced a lot of brutality due to the existence of the slave trade which was caused by some European enemies of liberty (among others—such as the Arabs). Malawi experienced the brutality of the slave trade in the nineteenth century as European and Arab Slave traders shipped slaves through Zanzibar. These were forced to work in different fields of production and enriched the Western and the Arab World. Neoliberalism was, therefore, trying to develop a new world order free from all the forms of oppression of human beings. In other words, they wanted to reinforce peace in different parts of the world hence obtain political freedom. Washington Consensus articulated neoliberal ideas into a theory that was imposed on different countries through conditionalities of borrowing money from IMF and World Bank in the early 1990s.8 John Williamson suggested the term ‘Washington Consensus,’ in 1990 to summarize various reforms carried out by different departments and organizations in the USA. Of course, most of these and similar reforms had already been functioning in different countries, such as the UK. In the earlier developments, neoliberals implemented the beliefs of various economists in Latin America, which had problems of economic growth and a series of inflation issues affecting these nations.

2.5

African Conceptualization

Are there theories of capitalism in African thought? It is difficult to claim a unique and independent philosophical development of this concept. Nevertheless, in African liberal thought, all the above theories are used

8 This will be discussed in details later in this work.

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when discussing capitalism in different contexts.9 Although liberalism, Marxian, and Weber’s theory are equally used, Marxism has profoundly influenced the academic conceptualization of capitalism. Understandably, Marx’s approach is the foundation of the Weberian conceptualization, and it forms a good basis of African socialist critique of capitalism. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the Marxian theory of capitalism is currently evident in various works targeting African thought such as Jarven (2014) and Chitonge (2017). For instance, Jarven uses Marxian theory in the emergence of capitalism in the African context beyond 1850. Jarven writes, If by capitalism we mean the production of goods for exchange by capitalists who combine their own capital and land with labor bought from free workers without land, then the accumulative historical evidence tells us that only to a limited extent had capitalism emerged before 1850, and it was most certainly not the dominant system of production in Africa. (Jarven 2014, 431)

This position clearly alludes to the semantics of capitalism as referring to the idea of production, which is central in the Marxian conceptualization. This idea of creation reflects the Marxian notions of ownership of land as capital and wage labor. Developing ideas around these concepts, Jarven (2014, 431) argues for the presence of capitalism in pre-colonial Africa before the 1850s. This argument will be refined further in this work in the next chapter; however, the Marxian theoretical framework influences the outcome of this theory. Jarven points out the importance of production finalized at trade relationships. This is seen in the emergence of production not only for food but also for consumption. There is also the production of other things such as metal and minerals. Similarly, there is an evolution of markets, for selling products, which is partly the initial phase in the development of capitalism in the African context. Further evidence of capitalism that is pointed out by Jarven is the development of the sub-Saharan and Indian Ocean slave trade. Of course, this also includes the trans-Atlantic slave trade, which signals a strong 9 Note that this work will attempt to show elements of capitalism and freedom in the traditional thought.

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presence of primitive accumulation of capital in the African continent. I am aware that there is a lot of literature on how the trans-Atlantic slave trade as a component of capitalism affected Africa and the black population; I will therefore not analyze further this system is this work. Worthy noting is the fact that the abolition of this slavery in 1807 reveals the appearance of terms indicative of alternative ways of building a capitalist system such as ‘legitimate commerce.’ Commenting on this aspect, Jarven (2014, 431) writes, The term “legitimate commerce” denotes the exchange of goods other than slaves, and is usually used to denote the period of commerce following the abolition of the slave trade in 1807 (Law 1995). The slave trade is, of course, crucial to understanding the relationship between external trade and the emergence of capitalism in this period.

From this passage, I assume that the exchange of goods in the African continent is indicative of the fact that slavery was illegitimate capitalist commerce. Unfortunately, this presence of capitalist elements did not necessarily translate into the growth of a strong form of capitalism in Africa. Other thinkers, such as Chitonge (2017), argued that two approaches define capitalism relative to the African context. These two ways include capitalism that focuses on the means of production as the defining characteristic of this idea, and the ‘deductive approach, asserting that capitalist relations have long been established on the continent, and therefore African societies have been capitalist for a long time’ (Chitonge 2017, 3). The first view falls under the Marxian view, which I have noted earlier, while, in my opinion; the second approach does not define capitalism. It only affirms that capitalism was present in the African context, as is also supported by different thinkers such as Amin (1972, 105–119) and Wallerstein (1980, 21–31). The Marxian approach and the Liberal approach to conceptualizing capitalism and freedom are dominant even in Chitonge (2017), in spite of his claim regarding the Marxian and the deductive method. For instance, commenting on the collective meaning which reflects theoretical preferences of individuals, he notes, Some scholars think of a capitalist society as one where profit drive overrides any other motives in the way people relate to each other. Others see the taking root of capitalist relations and structures of production as

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the definitive feature of a capitalist society. Yet for many ordinary people, a capitalist society is understood as simply one that is characterised by exploitation of one section of society by another. Often, a capitalist society is defined by the existence of free-market enterprise, and freedom to sell and buy goods and services. (Chitonge 2017, 3)

The citation firstly suggests the conventional conceptualization of capitalism in the African context where it is associated with profit-making, which is in the area of production. The relations of individuals are generally framed in terms of profit maximization rather than on social responsibility toward one another. For instance, people in this society focus more on business, and they have less time for mutual support or solidarity. In philosophy, this conceptualization of capitalism appears in the writings of Friedman (2002), mainly in his denial of corporate social responsibility and the affirmation that the sole goal of a business in the maximization of profits by the shareholders. Smith and Sender (1986) discussed capitalism in Africa, mainly focusing on the aspect of increase or decrease in poverty. These authors argue that the condition of poverty is unsatisfactory, given that the masses are still experiencing the negative consequences of the growth of capitalism. Commenting on this situation, Smith and Sender (1986, 1) wrote, Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced profound social and economic changes during the course of the twentieth century. These changes have involved brutality, disruption and suffering for millions of Africans and, as is well known, many millions of Africans continue to starve, remain illiterate and are subject to violence and cruel forms of exploitation. The quality of life of the mass of the population in the 1980s must be regarded as appallingly unsatisfactory by any criteria.

The assumption is that the problems of Africa such as the increase of poverty in the 1980s are a consequence of capitalism. I think that to attribute poverty to capitalism as the leading cause is highly problematic, given that many other factors are equally responsible. Some of these factors include civil wars that are arguably not based on capitalism, but tribal hatred and other factors. Of course, some battles follow the desire of specific individuals to accumulate wealth, mainly through the control of precious minerals market, such as gold, diamond, and fuel. In the analysis of the consequences of capitalism, Sender and Smith use both the Marxian interpretation and its further development by Lenin.

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For instance, they noted that ‘The analysis of African social and economic change in this book is informed by a further general characteristic of Marxist methodology, concerning the relative analytical significance of internal as opposed to external forces.’ They acknowledged the Marxian conception of capitalism as rooted in the transfer of ownership of the means of production between two individuals. As for Lenin, he attempted to go beyond this abstract conception of changes in the relation between the new owners of means of production and the wage laborers in some historical societies. He argued that capitalism was present even in communities where the wage laborers do not wholly abandon the means of production. The point is that capitalism does not necessarily imply the complete abandonment of the means of production. Using this framework, Sender and Smith consider various themes, such as the trade-based relation between the Western capitalist nations and Africa, the contribution of post-colonial governments in promoting capitalism and issues concerning economic stagnation in various countries. Sub-Saharan nations that are considered in this Marxist interpretation include: ‘Ethiopia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.’

2.6

Conclusion

The chapter has considered the main theoretical frameworks in conceptualizing capitalism and freedom in the African context. It has indicated the Marxian-Conflict perspective, which viewed capitalism as a relation of production between the bourgeoisie and the proletariats. However, what has been unique in this context is that the analysis of society has portrayed this relation as problematic. This was due to the exploitation of the proletariat masses by the owners of capital. This relation involves the Western population and Africans. The other element has been the Weberian perspective, which has underlined the aspect of rationality and protestant ethic in the capitalist economy. This theoretical framework is often ignored by the intellectuals in the African setting; however, it is profoundly influencing the lives of many African individuals. This is the case because of the spread of the protestant doctrines in different African nations. One of the critical aspects of this approach is that it gives the understanding that capitalism is something positive that improves the life of the children of God. It has thirdly considered the liberal approach, which has currently dominated the debates on capitalism and freedom in

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various African nations and beyond. Lastly, the chapter has focused on some literature on capitalism in Africa.

References Amin, S. (1972). Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa: Historical Origin. Journal of Peace Research, 9, 105–119. Chitonge, H. (2017). Capitalism in Africa: Mutating Capitalist Relations and Reformations. Review of African Political Economy, 45, 1–10. Cooper, F. (2014). Africa in the World: Capitalism, Empire and Nation-State. Cambridge, MA and London, UK: Harvard University Press. Freeman, S. (2011). Capitalism in the Classical and High Liberal Traditions. Social Philosophy and Policy, 28, 19–55. Friedman, M. (2002). Capitalism and Freedom. London and Chicago: Chicago University Press. Hallen, B. (2004). Contemporary Anglophone African, Philosophy: A Survey. In W. Kwasi (Ed.), Companion to African Philosophy (pp. 99–148). Malden: Blackwell. Harvey, D. (2008). A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hayek, V. (1944). The Road to Serfdom. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Jarven, M. (2014). Emergence of Capitalism. In L. Neal & J. Williamson (Eds.), The Rise of Capitalism from Ancient Origins to 1848 (pp. 431–454). New York: Cambridge University Press. Kant, I. ([1785] 1997). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kayange, G. M. (2012). Modern African Nationalistic-Ideological Philosophy: Its Controversial Development in Malawi (1958–2012). African Philosophy, 6, 16–30. Marx, K. (1890). Das Capital. Berlin: Dietz Verlag. Mill, J. S. (1998). On Liberty. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University. Von Mises, L. ([1927] 2002). Liberalism. California: Cobden Press. Mutharika, B. (2010). African Dream from Poverty to Prosperity. Limbe: The Guardian Publications. Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy State and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell. Nyerere, J. ([1966] 2000). Leaders Must Not Be Masters. In E. C. Eze (Ed.), African Philosophy: An Anthology (pp. 77–78). Malden: Blackwell. Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Harvard: Harvard University Press. Senghor, L. (1964). Negritude et Humanisme. Paris: Éditions du Seuil. Short, P. (1974). Banda, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, 1974. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

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Smith, A. (1759). The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Smith, A. (1776). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. New York: ElecBook Classics. Smith, S., & Sender, J. (1986). The Development of Capitalism in Africa. London and New York: Methuen. Wallerstein, I. (1980). Africa in a Capitalist World. A Journal of Opinion, 10, 21–31. Weber, M. ([1930] 2005). The Protestant Work Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. London and New York: Routledge.

CHAPTER 3

Capitalism and Freedom in African Communitarianism

3.1

Introduction

Can there be any reasonable discourse of capitalism and freedom in the African traditional political philosophy? The development of African philosophy since the late 1950s has much discouraged a rational reflection on capitalism in the continent. The main obstacle has been the dogmatic understanding that African political thought is a form of radical communitarianism, a version of socialism, which is contrary to individualism as supported in capitalism. The greatest counterpart of capitalism after the Second World War was communism, which is another version of radical communitarianism that gives priority to the community rather than an individual. These two systems have been at war (Cold War) represented by the communist bloc (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] and allies) and the capitalist bloc (mainly represented by Western Europe, United States of America [USA], and their partners). The other obstacle was that the African continent had a plurality of monarchical systems (such as the Ganda, Zulu, Ashanti, Lunda, and Maravi kingdoms), hence disqualifying it as a form of capitalism. The first assumption is that a monarchical system does not give priority to individualism or individual freedom, which is a defining element of capitalism. The second assumption is that on some occasions, the monarchs were despotic and practiced a form of oligarchy, which was transformed into an autocratic rule (dictatorship). For instance, Chaka Zulu was a great king, but © The Author(s) 2020 G. M. Kayange, Capitalism and Freedom in African Political Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44360-3_3

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because of practicing some despotism, various groups of people decided to leave his kingdom in search of freedom. Similarly, in the Maravi kingdom, some of the Chewa leaders in Malawi, Zambia, and Mozambique were oppressing their subjects because of their dictatorial tendencies. The discussion suggests two systems in African traditional political thought, before colonialism, which, to a certain extent, continue to exist in the various communities. The first is a sociopolitical and economic system known as African socialism (communitarian philosophy), and the second is a system of governance known as the monarchism. ‘Capitalism and Freedom’ in Africa are investigated relative to these philosophical systems. In terms of methodology, a study of these systems is mainly influenced by the writings of philosophers and historical data, which are often the interpretations of individuals who are, in most cases, influenced by certain biases (more especially philosophers who narrate African socialism). I will approach the study of capitalism and freedom by searching for particular indicators in African political thought. These indicators will include ‘democratic governance,’ ‘mercantile capitalism,’ ‘private property,’ and the general conceptualization of the idea of ‘freedom.’ The arrangement of sections will start with a presentation and clarification of the communitarian philosophy and monarchism in Sect. 3.2. The general description of these terms will help in understanding the supposed African experience of ‘capitalism and freedom.’ In Sect. 3.3, I will investigate democracy and freedom. In Sect. 3.4, I focus on mercantile capitalism, which confirms the presence of market freedom. In Sect. 3.5, I focus on the conceptualization of freedom as an indicator of capitalist elements.

3.2

Communitarianism

African traditional political thought is often argued as founded on the community, hence communitarian (Menkiti 1984; Mutharika 2010a). Masolo (2004, 488) acknowledges the unique aspect of African communitarian philosophy in that; it draws from ‘African traditional socialpolitical order.’ While seeking assistance from a particular culture is almost the case in most of the communitarian political philosophies such as Indian communal philosophy, what is notable in African thought is that it became an orthodox conceptualization of the way of life representing the past, present, and future generations in this continent. Commenting about the past and present Africa, Masolo argued that, ‘In Africa, the theoretical beginnings of communitarianism, as noted earlier on, are due to the emancipatory politics of independence from European colonialism.

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But as an ethic of everyday life, it precedes recent African political and intellectual movements’ (Masolo 2004, 493). The passage presupposes that communitarian political philosophy is what defines the African polis. The strength of this theory is that, apart from African political philosophy, it draws support from different disciplines such as ethnology, theology, metaphysics, and ethics. Before discussing further versions of this philosophy in the African context, I would like to clarify the semantics of terms correlated with the word ‘communitarian.’ The familiar words that appear in the literature include communalism, communism, communitarianism, and socialism. In African political philosophy, these concepts are often used interchangeably. For instance, in the work of Masolo (2004, 483–498), the terms communalism, communitarianism, and communitarian are used within the same context of meaning. What is the content of the term ‘communalism’? Semantics shows that ‘communalism’ is said in many ways. One of the meanings is that it refers to an exaggerated social organization that underlines the uniqueness of different communities, mainly based on certain beliefs. For instance, these beliefs could be religious or any other philosophical theories about specific communities. The members, who share the same beliefs, are mainly united and defend their created identity against the intruders (those that belong to other groups). It follows that communalism may also reflect the idea of tribalism, where a particular group may claim to be superior to another group.1 The semantics of this concept, as discussed above, may be traced not only in Africa but also in other parts of the world. For example, in Asian communities, Chandra (1990, 38) indicated the spread of communalism in the following text, For example, in India, though communal ideology was preached in a minor fashion, primarily through history writing from the 1830s, and it started emerging as a more structured ideology in the 1870s and 1880s, except for very short spurts of violence in one place or another, say in 1893 in Poona and Calcutta, communal violence became a force in India only in the 1920s. But it was precisely because of the spread of communal ideology in the previous four decades that this happened.

1 A tribe is normally comprised of people that are united by belonging to the same ethnic group.

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Chandra argues further than communalism in India in modern times; for instance, Hindu communalism takes the form of fascism (an extreme version of nationalism promoting a particular ideology). In Africa, the collective meaning is that communalism refers to a philosophy that gives priority to the community. For example, Táíwò (2016) in ‘Against African Communalism,’ argues that there are three main theses of communalism propagated by defenders of this theory. Firstly, the ontological thesis, defines ‘being human’ as ‘being with others.’ He argues that ‘One cannot think of human beings in the world without thinking of them in communion\community with one another’ (Táíwò 2016, 82). Kayange (2018a; d, 121), uses the term ‘communitarianism’ instead of communalism and argues for the ontological thesis in the words of philosophers such as Mbiti (1969), Menkiti (1984), and Tutu (1999). The ontological thesis is that, the essence of an African is in being with others. In ontology, the notion of essence implies the definition of a particular thing, in this case of an African. Kayange (2018d, 121) further clarifies the essence of an African as suggested in different philosophers, such as Tempels (1959), Mbiti (1969), Kagame (1976), and Tutu (1999). For example, Tutu indicates, ‘We say, “a person is a person through other people.” It is not “I think therefore I am.” It says instead: “I am human because I belong.”’ While this is indicative of the essence of a person, it equally appeals to the metaphysics of self-consciousness or self-awareness, which is possible through others.2 Similarly, the famous Mbitian dictum ‘I am because we are, we are therefore I am’ (Mbiti 1969, 108–109) points to the essence of an African, and it is the basis of communalism. This understanding of essence is fundamental given that it is a foundation that explains the ethics and politics of the African society. Táíwò (2016, 82) suggests a methodological thesis and indicates that ‘no matter how humans are in the world, we are best placed to make sense of their being-in-the-world and their activities attached thereto if we view them through the prism of community.’ The assumption from this idea is that human beings can be studied reasonably through the community perspective. Although there may be some truth in the assertion above, claiming that the community is the best key to make sense of ‘being-inthe-world and activities’ is rather questionable. I think that it is unfair

2 This will be discussed further in Chapter 13 of this work.

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to reduce consciousness of our ‘being-in-the-world’ to the community, leaving aside an individual, who is the center of self-consciousness. Nevertheless, the word communitarianism refers to a philosophical approach that gives priority to the community and uses it as a lens for conceptualizing human nature. The last meaning of communalism refers to a value-based thesis. Táíwò (2016, 82–83) talks about axiological thesis as well as communalist virtue ethics. Similarly, communitarianism has an argument that expounds a version of virtue ethics. This ethics gives preference to other-regarding virtues by arguing that an action is right if it leads toward the well-being of the community; otherwise, it is bad. For example, some argue that ubuntu is a version of radical communitarian virtue ethics (see Chapter 14 of this book). In African political philosophy, communalism and communitarianism are a socio-economic and political system known as socialism or communism. These two concepts ‘socialism’ and ‘communism’ may, in some respect, have a negative connotation in the capitalist world because of their connection with the communist system in the USSR and other African nations such as Angola and Mozambique. This link of African countries with communism seems to divert from the traditional philosophy. It links it with the communist manifesto of Marx and Engels (1948), which is characterized by a political structure that abolishes private property based on the interest of promoting the common interest of all the members of the society (the state owns everything). Socialism, on the other hand, advocates that all members of the community own everything in society. The slight difference with communism is that socialism does not represent the idea that the state owns everything. The purpose of socialism has been considered by different politicians, such as Nyerere ([1966] 2000) and Mutharika (1995, 2010b), as representative of the traditional African society. In African politics, socialism is a combination of communism and the traditional African communitarianism, as also noted in Masolo (2004). For instance, in the Ujaama socialist theory, Nyerere draws from the notion of public ownership in communism and the traditional African society, where the community owns everything, and people worked together toward the achievement of the common good. The linkage between communism and traditional African communitarianism is also evident in Mutharika (2010b). He argued that the traditional African communitarian system embraced a version of socialism, given that there are different versions. However, he noted that the central elements

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of socialism as a version of communitarian philosophy may be traced in the traditional society as he writes, ‘Although people were not all necessarily considered ‘equal,’ it was understood that all rewards would be shared according to each person’s basic needs, regardless of whether they resulted from collective or individual labor’ Mutharika (2010b, 252). This interpretation of African socialism reflects the Marxian communist idea of equality and public ownership. The discussion above seems to direct toward the understanding that African communitarian philosophy is a form of socialism. With the debate on capitalism, it appears that we can’t hold a reasonable discourse on capitalism and freedom in this conceptualization of African political philosophy. Socialism is entirely parallel to capitalism unless we admit and embrace the concept of democratic socialism. Our investigation is, therefore, going to be a review of traditional African society to trace elements that justify the existence of a form of socialism that accommodates some capitalist features. It is a search for an interpretation of the traditional African community that lives the paradox between communitarians and individualism.

3.3

Monarchism and Democratic Governance

Is there capitalism in African traditional political systems? In the above section, communitarianism is a socio-economic and political system that that is thought to represent the African traditional political philosophy; however, various works indicate that the common method of governance was monarchism (Wamala 2004; Teffo 2004; Kayange 2018b). The concept of ‘monarchism’ comes from the Greek word monarchia (rule of one man). As a political system, it is led by a monarch who is the head of state. In Plato’s Republic, he notes that ‘The first, I said, is that which we have been describing, and which may be said to have two names, monarchy and aristocracy, accordingly as rule is exercised by one distinguished man or by many.’3 Monarchism is similar to aristocracy because it is the rule by a distinguished leader such as a king or a philosopher-king. In Aristotle, monarchism comes in the discussion of different systems; according to the constitution, the right ones are three, kingship, aristocracy, and polity and the deviations are tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. Kingship is, in this case, a correct version of monarchism.

3 Plato, Republic, http://www.idph.net, 18 de maio de 2002, p. 304.

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Tyranny is monarchism in its worst state, whereby the monarch becomes oppressive to the people. Kingship is either by birth or through an elevation in a particular country. This experience of Ancient Greece is the same in the traditional African system, where different kings led their people as leaders. Both methods of monarchism, namely kingship and tyranny, are present in various narrations of the African kingdoms. What is fundamental for this work is that different academics are arguing that we can trace a particular form of monarchism that puts together kingship and democracy, and not kingship and tyranny as suggested by Aristotle. It is this combination between kingship and democracy that allows for a discourse of capitalism and freedom in the African context. Different political philosophers in African philosophy have attempted to accommodate elements of capitalism and freedom in the traditional African monarchism, by arguing for the presence of democracy (see Ake 1990a; b; Wamala 2004; Bradley 2011; Teffo 2004; Kayange 2018b). The general propensity has been the acceptance of a co-existence of elements of democracy, communalism, and leadership by the kings. For instance, Mutharika (1995; 2010a) named this co-existence ‘participatory democracy.’ Mutharika (2010a, 178) noted that, Evidence suggests that in general Africans have common conceptual and analytical framework for participatory democracy, based on their traditions and cultures. Traditional democracy dates back to time immemorial, having survived the colonial and neo-colonial onslaught to the present day. Based on independent research by anthropologists, archeologists, explorers, ethnographers, historians, traditional oral accounts and folklore, a consensus has emerged that Africa is not only the ‘cradle of humankind’ but is also the cradle of democracy, having evolved elaborate systems where people participated in development.

In this passage, Mutharika is using the idea of participatory democracy to incorporate the concept of majority rule that involves the community members led by a monarch. Attention is on the participation of all members of the community in the affairs that concern their well-being as community members (see also Mutharika 2010a, 178–179). This acceptance of democracy, communalism, and kingship is paradoxical. The paradox is that the notions of capitalism and freedom are often associated with the liberal tradition with its promotion of individual liberty as opposed to communalism and monarchism, which is an enemy of individual freedom.

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Socialism and monarchism will value more the idea of participation of all members of the community under one ruler. An individual who does not do according to the ruler is dangerous. In the traditional African context, he/she is either a witch or wizard, hence easily eliminated. What requires clarification in the African context is whether the element of freedom accompanied this assumed participation, or it is a way of fulfilling one’s obligations as is required by the community through its leader/s. In the history of political philosophy, the concept of ‘democratic socialism’ was a solution to the paradox between democracy and communalism. Socialism, as a representative of communalism (most probably led by a monarch in traditional Africa), tries to integrate with liberalism. Hayek (1944, 25), in his work Road to Serfdom, argued that although socialism started as an authoritarian system (Aristotle’s tyranny relative to monarchism) against the liberal French Revolution, it transformed after 1848 by embracing elements of liberalism. One explanation is that it is because of the attractiveness of freedom in society as opposed to authoritarianism. Democratic socialism gives a balance between extreme socialism, such as communism and radical individualism that promotes total individual liberty. On the one hand, it thus attempts responding to the belief that human beings are naturally called to be free.4 On the other hand, it tries to return to the call to socialism, constituting the belief that human beings by essence are social and moral agents. The combination of African communalism, monarchism, and democracy is indicative of the presence of capitalism in this political philosophy. Before building further this claim with examples from various African traditional experiences, it is vital to trade with caution with this combination of socialism and capitalism, given that, at times, these systems are entirely parallel and irreconcilable. De Tocqueville was uncomfortable with the concept of democratic socialism on the view that democracy and socialism are incompatible as is cited in Hayek (1944, 25), Democracy extends the sphere of individual freedom [he said in 1848], socialism restricts it. Democracy attaches all possible value to each man; socialism makes each man a mere agent, a mere number. Democracy and

4 In fact, in the enlightenment period, the supposed father of liberalism, John Locke in his Two Treatises of Government (1823), articulated elements supporting the centrality of liberty in human life (Locke John. [1823]. Two Treatise of Government. London: Rod Hay).

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socialism have nothing in common but one word: equality. But notice the difference: while democracy seeks equality in liberty, socialism seeks equality in restraint and servitude.

In spite of these genuine concerns, I would like to note that there are no legitimate reasons why individuals cannot accommodate a moderate system that incorporates elements from capitalism and socialism. Gyekye (1992) and Kayange (2018b) have argued that traditional African society practiced a form of a moderate version of communitarianism that attempted to embrace the importance of the community and individual in some respects. It is this system that may incorporate the notion of democratic socialism in the African context. Leaving aside issues of what type of system best accommodates polity or democracy,5 or what form of democracy is present in African society, I will concentrate on elements that show the presence of democracy as alluded to earlier in this work. The first qualification of democracy and freedom in the African traditional monarchical system is that an African individual freely participates in political decision making through a complex system of consensus (Kayange 2018b; Wamala 2004, 433–442; Teffo 2004, 443–449).6 For instance, Wamala studying traditional monarchism in Uganda responds to the question, ‘Is it possible to talk of democracy in a traditional African society that was monarchical, in a social-political set-up that had neither an elected parliament nor a people’s representatives?’ He responds positively to this question by appealing to the demographic aspect of the Ganda people of Uganda as a favorable condition for a monarchical system that is democratic. The main idea is that democracy develops favorably in the context where there is a small group, and people have a chance of entering into dialogue. In this context, leaders easily facilitate consensus, which is a democratic value. Wamala argues that the structure of the Ganda clan made it possible for consensus to flourish, as an element showing the presence of democracy. In this structure, there was a plurality of patrilineal totemic clans that were headed by a leader known as omutaka. He 5 Note that polity is the best form of governance where the interest of individuals and the whole community is taken care of. On the contrary, democracy is regarded by Aristotle as worst form of government as noted earlier. 6 Note that concern here is not the theory of participatory democracy as was the case in Mutharika above.

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further noted that the omutaka presided over other smaller clan leaders (Bataka) in a hierarchy. The Bataka that was more influential overpowered other leaders and gained the title of Ssabataka (Kabaka). The drawback of this position is that the more he sought more powers, the more the other Batakas under him developed avoidance relation. To maintain control, the Ssabataka was forced to combine some kingship with democracy. This was the best way of avoiding possible tensions that could have followed the dictatorial style of governance (this is adopting democracy for convenience). It is this structure that led to the flourishing of democracy in a version of monarchism within the traditional African setting. This led Wamala to claim the existence of monarchical democracy. The understanding is that this system does not give absolute power to the monarch since it allows for consensus in decision making. The tyranny which is opposite to freedom does not arise in this context. The king and other leaders are representatives of the will of the people. A similar combination accommodating elements from democracy, communitarianism, and kingship is in Kayange (2018b), relative to the Maravi people who cover the modern areas of Malawi, Zambia, and Mozambique. He argued for aspects of democracy similar to Wamala, with the difference that this is a matrilineal totemic system. Central to this idea is that the Maravi practiced as the version of monarchism ruled by female leaders under the guidance of Mangadzi. Democratic elements come in when she decided to enter into dialogue with other heads of clans led by men, such as the Phiri and Mwale clans. This led to the division of responsibilities, whereby women became spiritual leaders, and men were given positions as leaders in other affairs of the kingdom. This dialogue led to the election of one supreme leader known as the Kalonga. What was also unique in this kingdom was the sharing of responsibilities between various clan leaders, depending on what a particular leader was good at. Similarly, notable for this system was the element of the federation, where different leaders, while being independent, were joining the Maravi kingdom under the overall leader, the Kalonga. Another fascinating component in the traditional setting is the structure of consultation among the Maravi, before decision making. In this structure, there was a chain of consultations starting with the King (Head of Nation Kalonga) who consulted the Eni Mzinda (owners of the territory) for guidance. If the issue is of communal interest, the Eni Mzinda consulted the court attendants or guardians (ankhoswe) or the ward or territory chieftains (Aphungu or Mbili). These were expected to consult

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the lineage or village chiefs. Village chiefs were consulting the ordinary people (family elders) in their respective villages (Phiri 1975, 75). This structure of communication may be presented graphically as shown in Fig. 3.1. The above networking introduces in monarchism the element of individual participation, which is fundamental in a democracy (see also Nthara 1973, 4–10; Phiri 1975, 75ff). Teffo (2004), in the study of the Zulu of South Africa, acknowledges the combination of communitarianism, democracy, and monarchism in the traditional political philosophy. He noted that African democracy is not adversarial, as is the case with Western democracy. According to Teffo, the driving value in all relationships is solidarity, which cannot lead to disputes. In this case, while being democratic, people are mindful that they must promote solidarity in the community. Apart from this component of solidarity guiding democratic governance in the traditional setting, Teffo introduces the centrality of participation as equals in the traditional African communities. He puts this idea in the following expression, ‘Second, and even more importantly, kingship, as a special manifestation of democracy in African society, embraces complete equal participation by the community.’ Although this idea calls for participation of all, some exceptions are noted, such as the case of age as a segregation factor. Lastly, Teffo links the concept of consensus as at the core of decision making in the traditional setting. Individuals come together and consult each other before reaching a decision that affects the whole community. Although Teffo seems to support the presence of democracy in the traditional African context, the problem is that the development of his ideas shows full support of radical communalism, which is contrary to

Eni Mzinda

•King

•Owners of the territory Kalonga

•Attendents or Gurdians or Territory chieftains Ankhoswe or Aphungu

Fig. 3.1 Consensus structure of consultations

Nyakwawa •Village Chiefs

•Family/mainly elders

Banja

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the democratic spirit. In my view, the concept of solidarity proposed earlier does not adequately represent democracy, given that it fits more in the context of socialism. Even the component of consensus in decision making does not necessarily imply the acceptance of individual liberty. Consensus may punish the minority by denying their right to freedom. The idea of majority support in a decision does not imply that the rights of an individual are respected. The majority may be a catalyst toward the exclusion of the minority in a particular context. For example, communal consensus may lead to a negative perception of the people who are involved in Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) practices. Although consensus is important, I am aware that Mouffe noted that disagreement and how to handle them be considered as an important aspect that is indicative of the presence of democracy. Teffo and Wamala would have provided evidence on handling dissension and allowing people to be different as indicative of democracy in the African context. Unfortunately, allowing people to be different encourages pluralism, which is often not welcomed in most communitarian settings. I believe that the question of allowing dissensions cannot be fully dealt with within this section, but any evidence of this experience in the African traditional society can provide further evidence of the existence of democracy, freedom, and openness. Nevertheless, Kayange (2018b) shows that the art of handling dissensions was present in different parts of the Maravi kingdom.

3.4

Mercantile Capitalism

Was there a market structure that confirms the presence of capitalism in the traditional African context? I want to make a case for capitalism in the traditional African system by appealing to the presence of mercantile capitalism. Although scholars have different views, some agree that this form of capitalism was present in the traditional setting, and others deny such existence. Before entering into details on the reality of this capitalism, I would like to recall the work of Lawson titled, ‘The role of capitalism in South African History,’7 who argues for the presence of both industrial capitalism and mercantile capitalism in the modern postAfrican-traditional context. Industrial capitalism mainly refers to a system 7 https://disa.ukzn.ac.za/sites/default/files/pdf_files/LiFeb56.1729.455X.000.016. Feb1956.4.pdf.

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of production that focused on the relationship between owners of capital who owned means of production and the workers/laborers. This system was discussed earlier as part of the critique of Marx in Chapter 2. However, in this context, focus is on mercantile capitalism, which is commonly present in different nations. At the center of this capitalism is the idea of a spontaneous market exchange of finished goods and other raw materials. There is no continent spared from the natural or organized evolution of markets. Nevertheless, I will appeal to the presence of trade in the traditional setting as indicative of elements of capitalism and the incumbent relations. Firstly, a pro-mercantile capitalist position is present in the general civilizations that took place in various kingdoms in Africa. For instance, the earlier version of mercantile capitalism occurred within the African context, where different villagers exchanged their products. Africans were primarily hunters, but there is evidence that they traded in products such as precious metals in the Northern part of the continent. In the Southern region, they also purchased valuable products within the continent, and this later extended to other nations through contacts with the Arab traders. Western Europe traded with North Africa in ancient times. For instance, the Greeks, as well as the Romans, have had a long history of exchange of trade with the North African countries such as Egypt and Tunisia. The Western capitalists entered the scene for the second time later with the discovery of Africa by the Portuguese and others. Akrong (2019) acknowledges the presence of trade in the pre-colonial times in the African continent in the work, ‘Trade, Routes Trade, and Commerce in Pre-colonial Africa.’ The following passage indicates some mercantile capitalism, Though trade, as Ellis and MacGaffey (1996) realized, “may go unrecorded for a great variety of reasons … informal economic activities, by nature, is difficult to detect and measure” (p. 19), yet there is ample evidence indicating iron, salt, kola, copper, animals like sheep, goats, cattle, and camels, spices, skin, and grain were products significantly traded in at both the inter-village level and in the big local–international markets. The coastal trade was responsible for the export of the raw minerals—gold, ivory, copper, and iron. (Akrong 2019, 69)

Fundamental for this work is that this trade was present at intervillage level, but sometimes it was extended to other kingdoms or nations

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depending on the needs. Although Africa in the southern part was not well known to the Western world, it would be an injustice to think that international trade only affected those nations in the Northern part of Africa, such as Egypt. South African region has been in contact with people of other countries, including the Arabs, even before the assumed discovery by the Europeans. Apart from support coming from writings of various thinkers on the existence of the idea of trade in the traditional African societies, another pertinent aspect that may support this argument is the existence of certain practices that accommodated the purpose of exchange. One of such practices where the transaction occurred between individuals or families is the practice of dowry. Individuals were symbolically paying certain goods such as cows in exchange for a wife. This exchange already shows the possibility of other forms of trade in the traditional setting. Dowry has changed in many parts of Africa, from paying through goods to the equivalent value in terms of money. Another form of exchange in the traditional context which is indicative of the possibility of mercantile capitalism was in the context of services. For example, in Malawi, there was a system known as the Thangata,8 whereby the traditional members were supporting each other in exchange for equivalent support. For instance, members of a particular community may work in a field of one individual who, in exchange, helped them in times of need. The help that one received was sometimes equivalent to the investment, but in some circumstances, it was different. For example, you can support me on my farm, but I can give back by helping you during a calamity, such as a drought. There are some cases where the owner of a particular field was exchanging labor with some food or drinks (mostly beer) as a sign of appreciation for the work done. While exchange may support the existence of the market in the traditional context, what will be difficult to qualify is the idea of profit. In fact, by investing in work or any other value, one may question where surplus value is? Surplus value is a bit difficult to qualify, but the idea of exchange of products for a particular amount, which is fundamental in capitalism, is fully present in the traditional African setting. Secondly, Lawson denies the presence of mercantile capitalism in the traditional African setting based on the understanding that people

8 The word Thangata is a Chichewa language word which means help.

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were living on subsistence farming, they lacked money as a medium of exchange and had no private property (such as private land). Commenting on the aspect Lawson and Kaluwa (1996, 5) wrote, It is easy to see that capitalist relation would not have been possible in the tribal societies of southern Africa. Their economy was based on subsistence farming, not on the production of commodities for a market. Moreover, they lacked a convenient medium of exchange to act as money, and the absence of private property in land acted against the accumulation of too much wealth in one hand. Capitalism was therefore not an indigenous growth in South Africa, as it was in Europe; it was introduced from outside.

While the argument regarding the lack of production of commodities for the market is widely shared, I think that one of the reasons could be a lack of an apparent market demand where individuals could sell such items; this equally contributed to the lack of interest in producing more goods. The other two aspects such as lack of a convenient medium of exchange are debatable given that Africans were able to exchange commodities without the need for money. The commodity-based model of transaction extended even during the time of Arabs and Portuguese merchants. Individuals were exchanging salt with cloth, ivory with guns, etc. I don’t see why capitalism couldn’t be considered as indigenous in South Africa as compared to Europe. The way capitalism developed in Europe regardless of the conditions, is the same way it would have flourished in the African context. The denial of capitalism in the context of Lawson seems to echo the radical communitarian thinking of Nyerere in his theory of Ujaama. I underline that individuals can’t discuss private land with this conception of African traditional context; hence, the position by Lawson above is justifiable. In spite of this, I beg to differ on the issue of ownership of private land that this was not necessarily the case, given that Africans were few, and the land was available for everyone. There was no urgent need for private land ownership, given that they already owned plenty of land. Individuals were allowed by the chief or other leaders to use the land they wanted for the good of their families. All that was required was informing the chief. The individual had still a chance of cultivating the land and producing a surplus for exchange with others in times of need. For example, individuals invested the surplus value for manual labor in the context of farming.

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In spite of this denial of the presence of mercantile capitalism in the traditional context, I believe that it is more justifiable to accept its existence than not. What is probably questionable in the African context is the aspect of industrial capitalism, which, in my view, did not develop in most of the areas as was the case in Europe. At a lower scale, the individual had small industries that were producing weapons and other utensils, mainly in the Iron Age period.9 Nevertheless, different thinkers acknowledge that industrial capitalism may be reasonably discussed in Africa, departing from the coming of colonialism.

3.5

Private Property

Is it appropriate to address the private property in the traditional African society? An investigation of capitalism in the classical African philosophy must take into account the aspect of private property, which is central in a capitalist system. As is the case with communitarianism in Sect. 3.2 above, a study of this nature is often discouraged by dogmatic philosophy presented by the radical communitarians, who claim that property was public, such that there was no one poor. Nyerere ([1966] 2000, 77) noted that, Our Africa was … poor … before it was invaded and ruled by foreigners. There were no rich people in Africa. There was the property of all the people, and those who used it did not do so because it was their property. They used it because they needed it, and it was their responsibility to use it carefully and hand it over in good condition for use by future generations.

This citation gives the impression of a traditional African context, which had responsible individuals in terms of handling the property. The demonstration of this responsibility is manifested in the proper use of land, conserving it for future use for the generations to come. It was the case that the leaders were expected to represent the people in the ownership of land. This power of leaders over land is still experienced up to this day, in various African nations. Thinking of land in terms of capital, the leaders, more especially chiefs, are the owners of capital. Chiefs sell traditional land to those that want it, and in some circumstances, give to 9 The Iron Age refers to the period when human beings moved from the use of stone instruments to iron.

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those that are close to them (their blood relatives or those that are loyal to them). Although the myth of public property triumphs in African political philosophy, history is indicative of a system where there were inequalities in ownership of particular precious property. For instance, there are various indicators of wealth centered on chiefs and their collaborators, while ordinary people lacked valuable goods. This reality is captured by Phiri (1975, 73), who, with reference to the Maravi kingdom, noted that ‘cattle, red cloth, and ivory were entirely restricted to him and to minor officials who were subordinate to him.’ In satisfying more their interests for wealth and honor, chiefs wanted to expand their territories, and this led to internal conflicts and wars along with their neighbors. Internal conflicts may be exemplified by ‘Mpinganjila’s dynasty south of Manthimba, which challenged the authority of Kalonga after the reign of Khute’ (Phiri 1975, 78). Another vital conflict in this confederation in the mid-eighteenth century was between Chadza Mkwenda dynasty in the Nsinja Bunada territory, which rebelled against the Kalonga. The conflict ended up with a military campaign against the Kalonga. What is interesting in this work is that chiefs and other warlords made their people fight for wealth but unequally distributed what they plundered during these wars. The Ngoni from the Nguni group from South Africa also engaged in battles to increase their economic power, but what counts is how they distributed wealth. Similarly, the issue of the internal slave trade in African kingdoms is indicative of disparities in the community. While it is difficult to adequately trace the aspect of individual ownership of property or private property in history, I would like to argue for this component through the study of language. I follow a simple method in the analytic philosophy framework, where language is one of the fundamental candidates of thought. Philosophy is about the clarification of language. Similarly, most of the philosophical problems are a consequence of the misuse of language (Wittgenstein 1952). I will show this philosophy by appealing to the use of figurative expressions, which is an excellent candidate for traditional thought that is passed on from generation to the next. My understanding is that meaning is a consequence of how people are using language in a particular context. The approach is held by philosophers who follow the ordinary language approach, also considered as the use-theoretical conception of the meaning.

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Some proverbs which show the element of private ownership of property in the traditional African context are discussed in Kayange (2018d, 134) (see Table 3.1). In these figurative expressions, there are various fundamental principles contained in capitalism that are brought forward and lived by African individuals. The first symbolic expression above is usually used to affirm the principle of extension of the property done by an individual. It is phrased in the expression using a similar structure of the principle of identity, where a thing is identical with itself. In this figurative expression, the use of meaning shows that no other individual can interfere with what is Table 3.1 Private property proverbs S/N

Chichewa proverb

English translation

Meaning

1

Chamwini ndi chamwini

Individual ownership is good than counting on what is not yours

2

Chinthu chikatayika chimalira mwini

That which is owned by an individual is that which is owned by an individual When a thing is lost, it cries for the owner

3

Kanthu ndi kako, kamwini nkamwini

4

Kanthu n’kako, waona adakhuta thope

5

Fodya wako ndiye ali Pamphuno

A thing is what you have, ‘that’ which is with others is just a ‘that’ What you have is yours, and whoever saw it got satisfied with mud Your snuff is what you have on your nose

6

Khasu liposa mako ndi tate

A hoe is more than your mother and father

7

Kudya kwamzako sungamwere madzi

When you eat at a friend’s/neighbor’s home, you cannot accompany the food with water

Transfer of ownership when an item is lost is not justifiable before making an effort to take it back to the rightful owner Don’t count on what is not yours

What you have is yours, and no one can interfere Count on what you have not on what belongs to others Individual hard work is better than dependence on the community Dependence on other people’s property does not make an individual free

Note that this table was adopted from Meaning and Truth in African Philosophy: Doing Philosophy with Language (Kayange 2018d, 134)

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owned by another individual. It calls for the idea of individual freedom in terms of ownership of property. The figurative expression also calls for the protection of individual property, inviting others to respect what does not belong to them. The second figurative expression calls for the centrality of just the transfer of ownership from the owner to the next. It indicates that even when an individual has lost his private property, it remains under his name unless there is a just process that allows for a transfer to another. The figurative expression is not indicating the aspect of theft, but it only emphasizes that there is no right for him/her to own it. When one finds this property, the expectation is to take it back to the rightful owner in the community. In the traditional context, individuals could quickly return their property after losing it. I believe that this act of taking back what belongs to others is a component of capitalism in its health status, where individuals compete, but each one owns property in a just manner. The third figurative expression above discourages the spirit of envy toward what is owned by other individuals. It does this by differentiating a thing (reality) and what appears like reality. Trusting that what your friend has is yours too, as is the case in socialism, is here considered as an illusion. Individuals are discouraged from counting on a dream. One may wonder why the radical communitarians insist on collective ownership when it is evident in this traditional setting that counting on what is not yours is living in a world of verisimilitude, which resembles the truth or what is real. The figurative expressions 4 and 5 continue to emphasize that individuals must trust what they have as real rather than what belongs to their neighbors. The sixth figurative expression suggests a critical component in capitalism, whereby individuals are encouraged to work hard and produce their property. It is against the spirit of dependence on one’s family or extended family, which is the ordinary way of dealing with everyday business. Similarly, the last expression discourages dependence, which is unfavorable. One does not feel comfortable, depending on other individuals. This fact is shown further in the mentioning of the fact that when you eat at your friend’s house, it is difficult for you to drink water. It shows that one cannot be satisfied with the practice of dependence even in those circumstances where he/she is on the receiving end.

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3.6

Conceptualizing Freedom

Can freedom required in capitalism be accommodated in the traditional African context? In the radical communitarian context, Freedom is defined in relation to the community. For instance, Ramose (2011, 1) indicates that, Freedom is coeval with human existence. Freedom was a lived human experience long before wise words were spoken about it or erudite treatises written on it. Freedom was known wherever human beings lived. Freedom is not, in the first place, a hollow abstract concept subsisting in the metaphysical world of Platonic ideas. If it were such a concept then it would be separated from the human being, waiting to be seized and grasped by whoever cared to travel the metaphysical world of Plato’s ideas. For us, freedom is rooted in the ontology of an embodied human being. It is the concrete lived reality of the human being, in a complex web of relationships, to stay alive in the unfolding ad incessantly changing conditions of life.

In this passage, Ramose criticizes Plato’s idealism, which recognizes the existence of an abstract world of ideas as real. The concept such as freedom is real as opposed to its instantiation in individuals in the world of experience. In this regard, Ramose underlines that freedom is defined by human relations, where my freedom is dependent on other human subjects. Similarly, Metz (2015) confirms the idea of freedom with reference to ubuntu moral theory, a version of communitarian philosophy. He attempts to dispel the claims that ubuntu fails to adequately account for individual freedom, with its too much focus on the community. I suggest responding to the issue of freedom in Africa based on the question, ‘What are the ordinary people doing when they are using the word ‘freedom?’ Similar to Sect. 3.4 above, this study builds the philosophy of liberty through the study of language use. I will limit my development on Chichewa language in the Maravi monarchical system in part of Malawi Zambia and Mozambique. The first candidate for ordinary language meaning is the dictionary. The concept ‘freedom’ is translated in Chichewa by the word ufulu or mtendere. The idea may refer to living without obstacles or constraints,

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just as is the case in English. The Chichewa monolingual dictionary (Centre for Language Studies 2000) defines Ufulu as, ‘mwayi wokhala momasuka, mokondwa ndi mopanda mantha,’ (Fortune of living without constraints, happy and without fear). It is not clear why the monolingual dictionary defined ufulu as ‘fortune’ instead of a ‘right’ or a ‘condition’ of living without constraints, of being happy and without fear. ‘Living without constraints’ is the only element that reflects the idea of freedom. Being happy is just an indicator of the presence of freedom. Similarly, living without fear may in some circumstances be an indicator of freedom. Unfortunately, the monolingual dictionary skipped the term mtendere, which is a commonly used word in Malawi to mean freedom. This is an equivocal term, which is used interchangeably with ufulu to mean either peace or freedom. Nevertheless, ufulu is, in some circumstances, preferred when discussing independence rather than mtendere. Although a monolingual dictionary is one of the sources indicating meaning in a particular context, it cannot fully serve the purpose of this section. I, therefore, suggest following a different development of the indigenous understanding of freedom by building on common language use of expressions, mainly figurative phrases such as proverbs and metaphors. Building on a collection of 2009 proverbs and metaphors by Chakanza (2000), I will discuss some basic expressions that refer to freedom in people’s daily use of language. The first understanding of the concept of freedom focuses on individual liberty. One of such proverbs is ‘Gule ndi wa aliyense kulakwa ndi kuthyola mwendo’ (A dance is for everyone, but the wrong thing is to break one’s leg). The literal meaning of this expression is that in a dance, every member is free to participate. In the process of dancing, all individuals are expected to be responsible for their own lives. When one injures himself during the process, then it is a personal problem (personal responsibility). The symbolic meaning is that all members of the community are free to participate in various activities. They can freely express their actions or what they believe in the community. A problem comes when their actions are harmful toward themselves and when they become a burden to society. Individual freedom is in the expression, Kanthu kalikonse n’chifuniro, buluzi adakana bweya (Everything is personal will/desire, a lizard refused a fur). The literal meaning of this figurative expression refers to a situation where a lizard had freedom whether to have fur or not. A lizard decided to live with a fur. The symbolic meaning of this expression is that human

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beings are free to determine and live the way they want. The first possible interpretation may be negative in the sense that freedom is for everyone and that there are no limits. An individual can even decide to do bad things (in case a fur is what was required for a lizard). The second possible interpretation is that it is not good just to do things because others are doing them. It is against conformism in the community, which is an enemy of freedom. A proverb that is similar to the above is ‘Makonda makonda buluzi adakonda khonde’ (Appetites vary, a lizard liked the veranda). It means that people are free to choose what they want; no one can force them otherwise. The fact that people decided to be inside the house does not compel a lizard to make a similar choice. There is a pluralistic understanding of what people do or like. It is commonly used to advise the community to leave individuals free in the decisions they make. The link between desire and will with freedom is suggestive of an understanding that to be free is natural. Freedom, in this case, follows from desire. This conception of freedom is reflected further in the figurative expression, ‘Nsalu ndi ku khosi,’ (A piece of cloth is the throat).10 This figurative expression is complicated, as it requires further explanation in understanding its literal meaning. The literal interpretation is that one’s desire (throat or taste) determines the attraction toward a particular piece of cloth. The figurative meaning from this proverb is that any individual is free based on his desire to prefer a thing x rather than y. It means that no external force has the mandate to go against individual choice. According to Chakanza (2000, 256), this figurative expression focuses on freedom understood as a natural endowment in individuals such that no authority can go against it. Individual liberty is further in the figurative expression, ‘Cholira njovu idalira minyanga,’ (The elephant cried to get tusks, and now he has them). The literal meaning of this expression is that elephants have tusks because they desired them. In the figurative meaning, elephants represent human beings, and their behavior is symbolically that of human beings. Chakanza (2000, 68) indicates that this figurative expression refers to the idea that ‘every person is free to choose what he/she wants to be in life

10 Chakanza (2000, 256) replaces throat with heart. This is due to the fact that throat and heart are in some respects utilized interchangeably to symbolize the center of desire/will.

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and must accept the consequences of that choice.’ The figurative meaning is suggestive of the importance of individual freedom at the same time underlines the fact that this must go together with responsibility. The elephant in the expression is therefore expected to bear the consequences of what he/she has tried to achieve. Malawian traditional society encourages that freedom must be allowed even in those cases when one is insisting on something harmful to his own life. One of the figurative expressions designed to respond to this issue is ‘Mwana akalilira nyanga ya mtsatsi musemere im’fotere yekha’ (When a child cries for a horn made of ‘castor oil wood’ make it for him, let it wither in his own hands). The literal meaning of this figurative expression points to the idea that there are many good trees for making an instrument. A castor oil wood is not among these good trees, given that it quickly withers. The figurative meaning refers to the idea that an individual who insists on having certain freedoms/rights or property must be left to have them. The idea is that such a person will learn through experience that the freedom/choice he/she is making is bad. The community has, therefore, no power to continue insisting that an individual must behave in a certain way.11 Existence of oppression in African traditional culture is in the following figurative sentence, ‘Anditseka mau ndingayambe kulankhula,’ (They closed my mouth fearing I could speak). The literal meaning of this metaphorical sentence is that a person who knows the truth about a particular situation is made to keep quiet for fear that the perpetrators may be exposed. The figurative meaning of this expression refers to the violation of freedom of speech in society. Freedom is violated in different ways, for instance, through bribery. In modern Chichewa, some people use the expression ‘kupanitsidwa banzi,’ (to be put bread in a mouth). The situation is where a poor individual distorts the truth in exchange for food. In other cases, the poor distorts the truth out of fear. A similar figurative expression is ‘Musandiyangire nkhata pakamwa/Musandiike dzungu pakamwa’ (Do not make a ring pad and place it on my mouth/don’t put a pumpkin in my mouth). The literal meaning of this proverb is that a ring pad placed on the mouth becomes an obstacle and one can’t speak. The individual is, therefore, 11 This proverb is similar to mwana akalirira fupa mpatse/mpatse fupa mwana atothole (When a child cries for a bone give it to her/him/Give a bone to a child she/he keeps quiet). Freedom to a child who is insisting to do something is a must.

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objecting to this by calling for personal liberty. The act of putting a pumpkin on/in one’s mouth is similarly violating individual freedom of speech. The figurative meaning of this expression is that freedom of expression must be respected in the society as no one is allowed to be an obstacle. A person who oppresses an individual not to speak is the same as putting a ring pad or a pumpkin in the mouth. The second community-focus concept that captures the notion of freedom is ‘Achoke alizagundu, tiyanike inswa ziume/zachoka ndundu tiyanike inswa’ (Let the ant-eater go away so that we may sun-dry the flying ants/the big soldier ants have gone, let us put out the flying ants to dry). This figurative expression literarily denotes the idea that the big ants eat the winged ants and it makes it difficult for human beings to collect and eat them. The scenario indicates the idea that these ants are not present, and by implication, human beings can now receive them outside the anthill. The big soldier ants have an advantage that they live in the vicinity of the flying ants, and they can catch them before they fly. The figurative meaning from this expression is that the big soldier represents those that are in authority. This authority may be a consequence of having wealth or political power. The people are therefore indicating displeasure over any jurisdiction that makes them fail to obtain their basic needs (food) and other commodities. Freedom may thus be the absence of dominant forces that take what belongs to the public. Another proverb is ‘Anyang’wa a insa, aona ukonde waguluka’ (The duikers are parading around proudly, they have seen that the net is loosened). The literal meaning of this expression is that duikers freely move when there is no net, which is an obstacle. The figurative meaning is that duikers represent people and net stands for authoritative leadership. People do not behave, as they want when strong authority is present in a particular community. When authority is weak, people will start acting loosely. The figurative expression shows that loose behavior is a sign of weak leadership. When there is no control, it is a sign of weakness and vice versa. It also follows that individual freedom is possible only when there is no autocracy in the society. The Chichewa language speakers recognize the importance of not interfering in other people’s freedom by forcing them to behave in a certain way. One of such proverbs is ‘Fupa lokakamiza silichedwa kuswa mphika’ (A bone that is forced in a pot does not take long before breaking a pot). The figurative expression literarily refers to a situation where

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Table 3.2 Meanings of freedom in the traditional setting Meanings of freedom S/N

Abstracted meanings

1 2 3

Everything is will; therefore freedom is will. Freedom comes from will/desire; therefore it is natural. Given that freedom comes from desire, it is universally valid to all human subjects, and it is unalienable. Individuals are free to act as they want, on condition that they take responsibility for their actions. Freedom of expression is a right such that no one can compel others not to exercise it. Just as there are different preferences, human beings are free to choose and live a life they want. Authority is useful as long as it allows individuals to obtain their daily needs through their hard work. The authority that builds a community without compliance structures is against the very nature of freedom.

4 5 6 7 8

a big bone is forced to enter a small clay pot. In this situation, it is evident that the pot in question will break. This figurative expression sounds more like a warning to those that have authority in the community. It is not suitable for them to force ideas or ways of doing things in the community. For example, if a young man does not want to marry a particular individual, the expression is indicating to the elders that it is not good to force him to marry another person. The understanding is that the practice of forcing others cannot go on for a long time as the individual in question may have a breakdown as problems increase in his forced status. It seems that the traditional African society had a lot of tolerance toward others even in those cases where they disagreed.12 I conclude from above that among other important elements, some central ideas of freedom in the traditional African context are given in Table 3.2. From the above discussion, the traditional African society reflects both individual liberty and communal liberty, depending on the circumstances.

12 The figurative expression discussed in this section is similar to kachinyiza anang’amba thumba (The forcing made a bag to burst).

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3.7

Conclusion

The chapter has explored the possibility of capitalism and freedom elements in the African traditional political philosophy. It is argued that two systems represent this philosophy, namely the communitarian philosophy, which is a version of socialism and monarchism. While socialism is a socioeconomic and political system that gives priority to the community, some elements reveal the existence of both individualism and communitarianism in the traditional setting. Nevertheless, given that the commonly accepted version of African communitarianism underlines radical socialism, it has been argued that it is difficult to discuss capitalism and freedom isolated from other factors. This is due to the idea that capitalism is based on individualist elements. One of the possible ways of discussing capitalism is to re-conceptualize communitarianism into a moderate version that incorporates both individual and community (see Kayange 2018c). The chapter investigated capitalism and freedom in African monarchism, in which a governance system is based on the one-man rule. In spite of claiming that this monarchism is in a communitarian system, there are elements of democracy in the traditional setting. This has led to the understanding that the system in question is a combination of democracy, communitarianism, and monarchism. Lastly, the chapter has introduced interesting results focusing on the indicators of capitalism, mainly by the notions of private property and freedom. History, as well as a study of language, has revealed that the traditional African society had instances of private property. This is contrary to the general myth that in the traditional setting there was/is no private property. It seems that this myth is an African version of the desired ideal state. The chapter also revealed through the study of language that individual liberty, just as communal liberty, is vital in the traditional African setting. All this shows that elements of capitalism and freedom were/are present in traditional African society.

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CHAPTER 4

Capitalism and Freedom in the Colonial Period

4.1

Introduction

The colonial period, which officially commences with the division of Africa by Western countries in the nineteenth century, is a decisive moment that defines the new capitalist orientation of this continent. It will be wrong to wholly attribute the development of capitalism and freedom to the Western world in this period. I contend that there is the development of an original form of capitalism, which I call ‘colonial capitalism.’ By this, I refer to a hybrid conception that amalgamates the experience of capitalist enterprise in the African tradition system (as in Chapter 3) and the Western system (as in Chapter 2). Colonialism is a meeting of cultures relative to the aspect of the generation of means of production (capital) and the pursuit of profit (surplus value). Capitalism and colonization are correlated, and the latter is generally an old phenomenon that has characterized most of the civilizations in Africa and beyond. For instance, the famous African cultures such as Mwenemutapa, Asanti kingdom, Ngoni kingdom, and Zulu kingdom had colonies; some were occupied by force while others based on an agreement. This phenomenon is also present in both the ancient Greek and Roman empires, which migrated to other parts of the world and made colonies. In spite of this extensive presence of colonialism in different

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parts of the world, this chapter wants to explore the unique aspects of capitalism and freedom that evolved in the colonial period in Africa, specifically in the sub-Saharan region. The chapter will firstly clarify the concept of ‘colonialism’ in Sect. 4.2. The study will help in defining this concept, which has undoubtedly evolved in terms of its meaning. It will further serve as a way of demonstrating the theoretical basis that correlates this concept with the notions of capitalism and freedom. This section will be followed by a discussion of capitalism and freedom in colonial Africa, mainly focusing on the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries in Sect. 4.3. This period shapes most of the developments in the context of capitalism and freedom in most of the African nations. Section 4.4 will discuss the proletariat revolution guided by the initial owners of the occupied lands as they attempted to defend their rights. The revolt led to the beginning of different versions of nationalism, which will lead to the development of one-party politics, as will be discussed in Chapter 6.

4.2

Colonialism

In political philosophy, the concept of ‘colonization’ is generally a process of moving from one place to occupy another. This movement is often associated with the dilemma between freedom and domination relative to the ownership of resources, such as land. Freedom for the colonizer makes it possible to exercise the right to move and own or occupy free (assumed free land). It is part of the process of the extension of individual property to other things that one can call his/hers. Domination is, on the other hand, associated with the supposed owner who views the occupying force as an exploiting and oppressing power that has overpowered or defeated him/her. It is in this element of a dominating entity that the concept of colonization is often used interchangeably with ‘imperialism.’ In a similar conception, Ogbechie (2018, 430) argues that ‘Colonialism defines the imposition of European rule on Africa starting from the late nineteenth century onwards. It is a subset of ongoing imperialism that asserts Western (white) power and control over African bodies and resources.’ Of course, this definition assumes that imperialism is more general than colonialism; hence, the concepts are interchangeable. In analytic philosophy, one way of providing a better understanding of this concept may be through the analysis of its semantics. The term colonialism derives from the word ‘colony,’ which refers to various terms such

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as gathering, cultivating, settlement, outpost, and protectorate. The use of the words colonialism and colonial leads to multiple meanings. One of the ways of grasping ordinary language use is to check the dictionary entry of this concept and its related synonyms. I will clarify the semantics of colonialism and then discuss further the theoretical implications of the various meanings. The intention is that of unfolding the system that represents this concept. The semantics of the word colonialism or colonization shows that they come from the word ‘colony,’ which comes from the Latin word colonus, which means farmer in English. Similarly, it comes from the Latin verb colere, which means to ‘cultivate.’ The link with cultivating was that different individuals were moving into a particular land and occupy it for agrarian purposes. The idea of occupying suggests a further understanding of this word as taking hold of something and making it yours. The element of cultivating is also suggestive of ‘creating something’ and then owning it. In the Malawian context among the Chewa language speakers, the cultivation of this type is ‘kuswa mphanje’ (clearing a free land so that you can use it). This practice brings-in different variables such as ‘farmer’ (as in colunus ), open farm, and the component of entitlement (occupying an open area). These elements are in the context of agriculture/land, and they will characterize the issues that will be fundamental in the colonization of Africa. Apart from the association of colonialism with agriculture or land, its definition suggests the idea of domination. The purpose of domination is already implicit in the concept of getting a supposedly free property and making it your own. Instead of farmers occupying land, the idea of hegemony directs to the nations that hold an already occupied territory in a different country. Delavignette expresses this idea in the following passage, In most cases, colonization takes the form of a political expansion, with the centre of the expansion turning into a metropolis; it becomes a matter of State, and there is a tendency to found an empire based on the principle of linking to the metropolis countries often separated from it even further ethically and sociologically than they are by physical distance…. From this point of view, it becomes clear that there is no colonization without a metropolis or mother-country. (Delavignette 1964, 8)

While the earlier occupation of land was to transform it for the benefit of those that claimed ownership, the definition of colonization suggests

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a broader idea of cultivation. The political expansion yields not only land for the sake of cultivation and other forms of profit-making activities but transform other fundamental aspects such as the power structure, technology, and the infrastructure, hence developing a metropolis. The association with the word ‘colonialism’ with either immigration on agricultural grounds or political power extension makes Táíwò (2010, 27) suggest the two conceptions. Firstly, ‘colonization 1,’ refers to immigration to a particular land for the sake of cultivation and ‘colonization 2’ for political expansion. The second meaning indicated above dominated the conception of colonization, mainly because of its linkage with imperialism. The British, as an imperial power, colonized most of the African nations in the subSaharan region. The colonization comes from the link between the status of Britain which was considered as an empire under the royal family (British Empire). Imperialism was mainly associated with political and economic domination; hence it was regarded as a version or a stage of capitalism. The Marxists and the Leninists viewed imperialism as colonialism, which for them was a form of capitalism. The link with imperialism is in the fact that the colonizers were in command of all the affairs of the occupied nation. The idea of command is related to imperialism, whose Latin root is imperium, which means command. In philosophy, various thinkers in both continental and Anglo-Saxon contexts have studied the concept of ‘colonialism.’ For instance, for Hegel, using his dialectic logic1 argues that colonialism is a necessary movement aimed at transferring civilization to the less developed nations. These nations cannot depend on their management to experience freedom given that their minds have not yet developed, as is the case in Western Europe. Colonization leads to the process of modernization of various developing nations. Commenting on the aspect of colonialism in his work Philosophy of Right, Hegel (§ 246) summarized his idea in the following words, ‘This inner dialectic of civil society thus drives it – or at any rate drives a specific civil society – to push beyond its own limits and seek markets, and so it’s necessary means of subsistence, in other lands

1 Dialectic logic builds on the relation between a thing such as number 1 and its negation ~1. There is movement from 1 to its negation with an aim of canceling the differences and achieve unity. This unity is a situation where 1 and its negation ~1 are recognized as the same entity.

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which are either deficient in the goods it has over-produced, or else generally backward in industry.’ This citation suggests the dialectical relation between a developed nation and its opposite. While a developed country has a surplus and its movement toward other nations is justified because it requires markets where there is demand and other further means of its subsistence. It is important to note that where this developed nation is going, there is a demand for certain goods and, more importantly, industrialization. The countries that are backward in manufacturing, in this case, the African nations, are, therefore, a fertile area for colonization. Colonialism has, therefore, some positive aspects that benefit the developing countries. Colonialism is definable as a dialectic movement where the industrialized nation A, projects itself to non-industrialized nation not-A.2 The Hegelian movement aimed at the industrialization of the colonized may be interpreted in the development of a form of colonialism in Africa and other parts of the world as directly linked with the spread of civilization. This movement is made possible because of the awareness, which is a consequence of the Western realization or discovery of poor and not yet industrialized nations. This discovery mainly occurred in the philosophy of the fourteenth century, whereby different Western countries improved their technology and explored other parts of the world. These voyages of discovery are colonization journeys that affected Africa and other parts of the world, including America. Although these journeys were driven by different motives such as the desire to spread Christianity or Islamic religion, contact with the African nations immediately created a relation of dominance and dependence. For example, David Livingstone and other missionaries had the interest of discovering foreign lands for the sake of evangelization; however, they facilitated colonialism. In some circumstances, missionaries did not intend to bring their co-nationals to dominate the new countries, which they discovered, but looking at the lack of security in some of their missions, they ended up inviting the colonial powers to provide protection. This process facilitated the increase of colonization of Africa. The discovery of Africa culminated in the partition of Africa among the influential and industrialized nations such as Britain and France. This division is also known as the ‘scramble for Africa,’ that mainly happened in the period between 1800 and 1900. The division of the African nations

2 Often industrialized nation is rich, while non-industrialized nation is regarded as poor.

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marks the climax of the colonization of Africa. An extraordinary meeting that decided the fate of Africa is the Berlin Conference. Commenting on this partition Shanguhyia and Falola (2018, 86) noted that, Now known as the Berlin Conference, it was held from 15 November 1884 to 26 February 1885, with Germany as the host. It was agreed that all the European countries were free to participate in the takeover of Africa, that the navigation of the Congo and Niger Rivers was free to all, and that for any country to declare a protectorate over any part of Africa ‘effective occupation’ of the area was required. When a protectorate was declared by one European country, it must notify the others that it had acquired ‘spheres of influence’. The country involved must also give evidence that it would protect certain rights and ensure freedom of trade. The Berlin decisions laid down the rules for partitioning Africa.

While I will not go in detail on the partition of Africa, it is essential to note that the fate of Africans, whether to be transformed into French, British, Portuguese, German, etc., was decided during this event. Below is a map that gives a picture of the fate of Africa with the new civilizations, in 1870 and the 1914 map of colonization after the partition of Africa from 1884 to 1885. Those African nations that will be under France, such as Benin and Zaire, will transform their culture in line with the French culture. Similarly, those Britain, such as Kenya, Malawi, and Zimbabwe, will demonstrate elements of the British culture. The partition of Africa which is a typical representation of capitalism and the question of freedom is clearly presented in different maps. The colonials are on one hand indicating through a map that this is how we have shared the African content conceived as property. On the other hand, most of the locals were resisting and calling for their freedom. For instance, the map of 1870 (see MacKenzie 1983) shows that different powers colonized only a few African countries; some were still not demarcated by the Western nations. In this period, the known forces included Britain, Ottoman (German), France, Spain, Portuguese, Boer Republics (Dutch), and Zanzibar Sultanate. It is important to note the resistance of the areas such as Algeria, Sokoto, Borno, Mandinka, Igbo, Asante, Ndebele, and Transvaal. In another map of 1880, the division of African and resistance for the sake of freedom was visualized as follows (Fig. 4.1). A complete picture of 1914 was as follows (Fig. 4.2).

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Fig. 4.1 Division of Africa as a property of the colonials in 1880 (This map is from Shanguhyia and Falola [2018, vi])

During the Second World War, the colonies for German (such as German Southwest Africa and German East Africa) were taken away because of its involvement and defeat. There are different reactions to the philosophy of colonialism in various African countries. I will discuss most of the issues below in the context of

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Fig. 4.2 Division of Africa as a property (by 1914) (The map is from Shanguhyia and Falola [2018, vii])

colonial capitalism; however, in this context, I would like to acknowledge that in various nations, colonial governments partly assisted in industrializing and developing African countries as Hegel alluded. In this line of thought, the Portuguese claimed that they helped in terms of African development in their colonies, for instance, they noted that,

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We alone, before anyone else, brought to Africa the notion of human rights and racial equality. We alone practiced the principle of multi-racialism, which all now consider to be the most perfect and daring expression of human brotherhood and sociological progress. … Our African provinces are more developed, more progressive in every respect than any recently independent territory in Africa south of the Sahara, without exception.3 (Davidson 1974, 11)

Apart from this self-glorification, some of the areas that are often appreciated by the colonials from different nations include the fact that they introduced education, hospitals, industries/technology, religion, security, and other aspects that help in the improvement of human life. For instance, in the context of security, some of the colonial governments greatly assisted in stopping the slave trade. For example, a case of Malawi where the missionaries invited the British to eliminate slavery and this led to the full declaration of this nation as a British protectorate in 1891. British soldiers entered Malawi and chased the Arab slave traders. This war led to the victory of the British who ultimately defeated the slave traders around 1895. In the same area of security, the establishment of the colonial government intervened in many African nations to stop the tribal wars that were very common. The borders were set to control the movement of tribes from one area to the other, which in some circumstances contributed toward tribal wars. Unfortunately, on the other side, the division of nations separated people of the same family/extended family along the borders. For example, people of the same family were split into two different countries, some were part of a British colony (Malawi), and others were part of a Portuguese colony (Mozambique). The division of nations is responsible for the compromised participation of Africans in the sharing of political power, which was mainly in the hands of the colonials. The division of political power and the creation of boundaries in the African context had no significant involvement of the black Africans. Similarly, there was a lack of political participation in the development of a governance system that led the Africans in the colonial period. In most circumstances, the sub-Saharan political landscape had a version of democratic governance modeled on the colonizing politics in their homeland. 3 Franco Nogueira, former Portuguese Foreign Minister.

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Generally, the overall power was with the colonizing nation, which had to run most of the government affairs. The African chiefs enjoyed some control in their territories, but they had to collaborate with the demands forwarded by the colonizers. For example, the structure of governance often had the governor (a colonial capitalist) on top, and then there were different individuals at a lower level including the African chiefs. Below is an example of the political power structure adopted in Malawi (Fig. 4.3). On top of the hierarchy is the British government that is represented by the liberal British Colonial Office. This had its first office in the period between 1768 and 1821 under the Secretary of State for the Southern Department and Committee of the Privy Council (board of trade and plantations), and it was abolished in 1782 after American colonies were lost. The Home Office took over, and in 1801 the War office. In 1854 it was divided into two offices, and the colonial office was given to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. After the independence of India in 1947, the dominion office and the India office combined to develop the commonwealth. The second member in the hierarchy above was the governor departing from Sir Harry Johnston in 1891. The governor was expected to inform the British Colonial Office by reporting the affairs of the government in British Colonial Office (Member of the British Cabinet UK)

Governor (Elected by the British Government)

African Chiefs (Selected and Imposed by the British)

African Traditional Chiefs

Boma Administrators/Commissioners

Fig. 4.3 Structure of power relations in the colonial government

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Malawi. The governor created a system of division of power by developing small administrative areas known as British Overseas Military Administration or BOMA (now used interchangeably with the term ‘District’). The commissioners elected in these areas were reporting to the governor on matters concerning their districts. The last but crucially important members in the hierarchy were the traditional chiefs and their councilors. These expected to retain their power in the villages but at the same time, collaborate with the British administrators in matters that interested both parties. Chiefs were divided into two groups those that were leaders through birth (and other traditionally recognized arrangements) and those that were elected by the British. The structure above shows that there was a problematic decentralization and shift of power from most of the chiefs to the colonial administrative posts. For example, a BOMA was built in 1897 at Mvela and also at Domwe following the defeat of Chiwere and Gomani (the Maseko Ngoni). For Lilongwe, a government post was established as early as 1898, an administrative system by 1903. The government chose its collaborators in various areas as it wanted, and in some circumstances, it left out some of the paramount chiefs. The policies followed a negative understanding of who the chiefs were, probably because a liberalist with a classical orientation hardly understood African communalism and role played by some of these chiefs. It seems that Johnston saw most of these chiefs as oligarchic, ready to use their people (communities) to take from them for their satisfaction. The citation of Phiri (1975, 203) captures well this aspect, ‘Harry Johnston’s policy toward African authorities rested on the negative view that chiefs and their councilors had exploited their people in the past, through their arbitrary powers and ill-defined system of tribute collection.’ Because of this understanding, writers such as Johnston and Alfred Sharpe removed most of the traditional leaders. Some tribes resisted the structure that was imposed by the British through war. Some of these resistances were motivated by the desire of some chiefs to retain power. Remaining in power was necessary for them because it was a source of socio-economic influence. It was an important source of capital. Being under the British meant stopping any involvement in the slave trade and other illegal relations with other tribes. It meant above all following classical individualist principles and abandoning some communitarian principles, and this created a conflict. The passage below shows the resistance of some chiefs,

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Unlike the Yao who fought several battles against the British before they surrendered in 1895, the Chewa did not offer much resistance militarily. They fought only 3 battles against colonial forces, at Nkhotakota, Kasungu and Chilenje. Colonial troops occupied Khotakota as a result of a local quarrel between Jumbe and his Yao Lieutenant, Chiwaula. The latter had grown more powerful and wealthier than Jumbe over the years. (Phiri 1975, 192)

It is interesting to note in this citation that African chiefs were busy fighting each other, and this contributed to their downfall as the imperials gained more and more socio-economic and political power. The imperial strategy of using a war in bringing freedom also included raiding some chiefs after accusing them of their involvement with the slave traders. This was sometimes a setup on African leaders who were resisting the whites to dominate them. They were therefore eliminated even in those cases where they were not involved in the slave trade (see Phiri 1975, 194). Religious and cultural capture was in various areas whereby the African way of life was commonly regarded as unfavorable, hence requiring elimination. For instance, when the missionaries arrived in Africa, they found a system of beliefs and practices, which were, according to them, pagan. The Africans needed salvation from these traditional ways of worship. Some of the critical slogans that were promoted by the missionaries included ‘Saving Africa with Africans.’ Some selected Africans joined Western religion, which came together with the colonials and their civilization. These individuals became strategic in convincing fellow Africans to abandon their traditional practices. Of course, some of the practices were against human rights such as the right to life; however, the new religion often called for complete elimination of the traditional belief to cultivate a new environment and way of life. Religion and politics managed to transform the African condition, given that many individuals who became influential in running the affairs of the government were products of this colonization.

4.3

Development of Colonial Capitalism

I contend that the emergence of a high level of capitalism on African soil is as a consequence of the establishment of what I will term ‘colonial capitalism.’ This concept refers to the capitalist philosophy in the colonial

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system, focusing on the appropriation of means of production primarily through the ownership of African land (land-tenure). The discussion above has shown that the establishment of colonialism in Africa automatically led to the adjustment and redistribution of land ownership. In Chapter 3, it was indicated that some African thinkers such as Nyerere ([1966] 2000) argued that in traditional African society, the land was a commodity that was owned by the whole community. However, the redistribution of land created various owners (private property) in the African setting. It is on these boundaries in terms of land ownership (private property) that enhanced different capitalist elements such as wagelabor relations, colonial capitalist market system, class relations, and the accumulation of surplus value. The land ownership element of capitalism in the colonial systems fundamentally hinges on a practice of alienation of land from the African locals to the colonials. The occupying colonials, by default, accumulated and controlled big pieces of land. While the colonial government justified this alienation of land as a means of developing the Africans through various activities such as infrastructure, agricultural, and economic development, most of this land was given to the fellow capitalists for individual use. This practice was experienced not only in the sub-Saharan region but also in other African nations. For instance, Shanguhyia and Falola (2018, 52) advance the idea that, The alienation of Africans’ land and seizure of their livestock, for which colonial administrations and the settlers offered an economic justification, led to ecological, economic, and social disruption of African systems. French colonization of Algeria after 1830 led to a series of government legislations that resulted in alienation of land from Algerians that was in turn handed over to French colons. More land that formerly belonged to the beylik and which was inhabited by Arabs and Berbers was forcibly inherited by the French conquest state.

The author further notes a similar development by the Dutch colonizers in South Africa, which led to the alienation of land that belonged to the Khoikhoi, the Xhosa pastoralists, and other local people around and beyond the Cape (Shanguhyia and Falola 2018, 54). It is also equally the experience in Kenya, where the colonials alienated the Maasai and Kalenjin people from their fertile land, and various white settlers occupied the area (White highland). In Malawi, Zambia, and Mozambique, the

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multiple tribes such as the Lomwe, Chewa, and Bemba were equally alienated from their land, giving way to the capitalists to undertake various activities. The whole situation meant loss of land on the part of the locals, while the capitalists gained more and more capital required for the attainment of surplus value. The alienation of land generally depended on many colonials who were interested in using land for various capitalist activities in the area. For instance, a commonly discussed case is that of Zimbabwe and South Africa, where the population of the colonizers was massive. Alienation of land in such circumstances was profoundly felt by the African communities, as was the case of the Khoikhoi, Xhosa, Zulu, and Shona. The alienation of land explains why a situation of a continuous struggle between the new owners of capital and the locals continued up to the independence era. This independence era is marked by a reversal of alienation from the white capitalists to the local individuals during the regime of Robert Mugabe (he was president from 1980 to 2018). Although the government played a fundamental role in alienating land from the local individuals, the missionaries also contributed highly to this process. The story of land alienation shows that the missionaries were among the first to colonize and promote the spirit of capitalism. Of course, although the capitalist element of owning land interested some Protestant missionaries such as the Calvinists, land tenure also attracted most of the Catholics. For example, commenting on land tenure in Mozambique, Duffy (1968, 110–112) captures the Catholic missionaries involvement in the following words, ‘In violation of their vow of poverty, Dominicans in Zambezia held great tracts of land, which they administered like any prazero, collecting head taxes and dealing in slaves… To the detriment of their one-time evangelical zeal, some Jesuits also participated in agricultural and mining ventures along the river.’ The process of land alienation cannot be complete without the African chiefs who were selling land. In this context, the presence of the colonials became a fertile environment for alienating land from fellow local individuals. It is important to note that land alienation was either done by force (occupation) or through an exchange of value in terms of money or other goods, such as cloth and guns (as was indicated above in Chapter 3). Colonialism reinforced a culture of land-tenure as a business that involved various parties. A typical example, which is in different African countries, is where local individuals at the time bought land from those that controlled it, such as the government, chiefs, and other individuals. For

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instance, to this effect, Shanguhyia and Falola (2018, 52) indicated that ‘In Port Elizabeth, both Asians and Africans did not wait to be relocated into officially designated zones, but on their own accord moved to areas on the city’s outskirts that were out of government control. A few Africans purchased plots of land on which they erected their own dwellings.’ Briefly, buying good land depended on one’s financial status, and this strategically allowed individuals to improve their condition toward the creation of surplus value. There are various reasons why capitalists thought that the alienation of land was necessary. For example, in the economic context, this was an excellent opportunity to cease the wealth of the nations, more especially the minerals and farming land. The capitalists wanted to accumulate wealth and sent most of the benefits to their home countries in Europe. In nations such as the Congo area, there was a lot of gold and diamonds, which attracted the settlement of the colonizers. Similarly, South Africa was fundamental for the colonizers because of the high presence of gold among other reasons. This made the Dutch as well as the British to establish themselves in this nation and benefit from its riches. In countries such as Zambia, the colonizers wanted to extract copper, which was transferred to their homeland as well as used in their respective colonies. The relation between the colonizers also played a significant role in acquiring land. The new owners of land introduced various crops such as maize, tobacco, cotton, and tea. Capitalists created farms in multiple African nations. Some of the capitalists introduced companies in different countries, such as the British South African Company. Most of these companies did not only do farming but also involved in mining and ivory trade. Some capitalists worked as individuals and accumulated more wealth; at the same time, they influenced the socio-economic and political landscape. For example, some of these elites include Livingstone in Malawi, who controlled tea farming with his big plantations in the Southern region. Systematic colonial capitalism starts after the alienation of land from the locals, given that this created a boundary between owners of capital (land) and the required labor force (laborers) to work for them. At this point, the element of alienation of land discussed above led to the creation of classes in various African nations. In Marxian conception of capitalism, the first class was the bourgeoisie, which in this case had the white landowners of capital coming from the occupying power and the local owners, who were mainly chiefs and some few individuals, such as recognized hunters, warriors, and some renowned traditional doctors. The second

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class was that of the African proletariats, which was further into different categories. Some of these categories included the tenants who were providing labor on the land of the bourgeoisie in exchange for a wage. These proletariats participated in production in the process of obtaining surplus value. There were also the local proletariats who practiced domestic farming on a small scale to provide food for their families and surplus value in the local market. The above classes meant the beginning of a fully-fledged capitalist system in the African nations. There are a variety of models indicating how the labor-based capitalist relations started manifesting in various places. The African proletariats provided labor in exchange for their basic needs, such as food and clothes, but also in some circumstances, forced labor was applied. Indicating on forced labor in South Africa, Shanguhyia (54) wrote, ‘These pioneers built their initial colonial fortunes on fertile lands, livestock, and labor, frequently forcibly acquired from local African communities in the Cape and beyond.’ The passage suggests that the capitalist labor relations that took shape in the African context are classifiable into wage-labor based on free agreement and secondly forced labor with or without pay, which is a form of slavery. Wage labor in colonial capitalism developed in different ways and one such is through the tenants’ system in the agricultural sector. This is where the owner of capital was employing various individuals to work in the plantains, and they usually were staying on the farm in some huts together with their families. These workers were mainly male; however, there is evidence that women were also providing the same labor force in various nations such as Kenya and Mozambique (Byfield 2018, 155). Unfortunately, most of the tenants regardless of their gender status worked in very harsh conditions for long hours and were often miserably paid. The other form of capitalist wage labor was in mines such as the gold mines in South Africa and the copper mines in Zambia. While there were hard conditions for the workers also based on the nature of mining work, other nations participated in providing labor force. For instance, Malawi was partly considered by the colonials as a labor force, where many people were taken to work in the mines in South and Zambia. This type of wage labor was often welcome in the Malawian villages, given that the individuals who come back after working abroad were men of prestige. They had some lucrative goods such as radio and bicycles that were scarce in the villages.

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The other form of wage labor that will develop with the structure of colonial capitalism is commonly known as white-color wage labor. This mainly involved people who passed through colonial capitalist education, and they were helping colonials in running their various businesses. Of course, some were doing domestic duties, but my interest is on those that were either doing office duties in various capitalist enterprises, including the colonial government. Interest in this section is that they offered labor in exchange for a wage, generally in the form of the equivalent monetary value. In terms of forced labor, it equally developed in different ways, and one of the examples is that Thangata system, which was mainly used by some colonial capitalists in Malawi. The term thangata is a Chichewa word, which means ‘help.’ It was not initially a capitalist term, but a socialist concept for social capital, where villagers were reciprocally helping each other. Helping a neighbor was, therefore, a form of investment because of expecting the same treatment when need arise (quid pro quo principle). In the colonial capitalist system, it became a system of exploitation, where Africans were forced to help the bourgeoisie without or with little pay, hence becoming a form of slavery. The application of the labor force required by the bourgeoisie in the alienated land led to the production of various goods that were sold in the internal as well as external markets for the acquisition of surplus value. Regarding the goods, some of the cash crops were tea, cocoa, coffee, tobacco, and cotton. The capitalists supplied in the colony as well as in other capitalist nations, mainly in their home of origin. The number of markets increased in various African countries that facilitated the exchange of commodities. This also encouraged the local people to be involved in selling some of the little products, which they had. While my interest is not on the type of markets and what transpired in them, a vital element for capitalism that became evident in the African context is that of market competition. At a higher level, the bourgeoisie competed to produce more and quality products at the international market. This was necessary given that most of the crops in the colonies in Africa were present in other parts of the continent more especially in America. The locals had to compete at a lower level based on the number of their goods, which were few. The prices of such crops were also typically low, based on the quality of life and wealth in a particular area.

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Africans developed their small markets to exercise the capitalist requirement of a situation and conditions that allow for the exchange of commodities. These will keep rising in numbers up to this day, there are many local markets in most of the African villages and towns. Although according to liberal conception, the market relations create their laws depending on the market forces of demand and supply, colonial capitalists wanted to intervene with various laws to make sure that there was order and possibly justice in the process of production and exchange of commodities. While it is difficult to discuss the process of developing these laws, it suffices to mention some of the developments. The most important ones that were intended to reflect the capitalist spirit include the land tenure laws and labor laws.

4.4

The African Proletarian Revolution

The African proletariat experienced various forms of exploitation from colonial capitalism, and gradually got organized and staged a revolution that led to the transformation of colonial capitalism. The main problem was that the bourgeoisie exploited and maltreated the proletariat in various ways. As indicated above, one of their concerns was that they were losing land while the bourgeoisie kept accumulating it. The loss of land was accompanied by restriction in movement, given that they were no longer allowed to visit some of the areas. This was, according to the proletariats, an infringement of their freedom in their land. Another aspect that disturbed them is also mentioned earlier under forced labor. They disliked the perspective of being treated like slaves in their land. They were forced to participate in the First World War and the Second World War, which was part of exploitation on the part of the colonials. Briefly, they felt that the new system was oppressive, and they wanted to replace it with a different one where their rights were protected, and where there is equality in the sharing of the resources. In the context of Marxian interpretation of capitalism, the proletarian revolution was expected to lead to a classless society, where exploitation will disappear; similarly in colonial Africa, the general expectation was to revert into a form of perfect socialism. This is a situation whereby Africans will rule in the political structure as one family and that the resources will be shared equally among equals. This philosophy spreads through various forms of movements, one of which was the Pan-African movement.

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Below I will briefly discuss Pan-Africanism, which is fundamental in conceptualizing the African revolt toward colonial capitalism. The beginning of Pan-Africanism or Pan-Negroes in the general black people’s study relates to American philosophers such as Du Bois, who organized African intellectuals to come together and discuss issues that concern their continent. The development followed the various problems that were faced by black slaves in America. After their freedom in the late nineteenth century, blacks needed to affirm themselves and build their proper image in the capitalist society.4 It is for this reason that Du Bois announced the importance of making the Pan-African/Pan-Negro movement, which was expected to address the problems of Negroes in America and across the continents. Fighting colonial capitalism required clarifying some of the myths for subjecting the black proletariats under the white bourgeoisie. History shows that physical differences, which are often superficial, characterized blacks as inferior while whites as superior. However, there is no rational or objective ground in using color or physical appearances as criteria for the categorization of substantial differences. For Du Bois, there are deeper differences among individuals that may not be simplistically explained by colors, ‘But while race differences have followed mainly physical race lines yet no mere physical distinctions would really define or explain the deeper differences – the cohesiveness and continuity of these groups’ (Du Bois 1897, 9). The more profound differences are spiritual and mental differences, where people share the same culture and destiny. The proletariats recognized that they shared not merely physical differences but the status of being subjected under spiritual as well as material poverty by the capitalist bourgeoisie. African leaders who led their nations toward independence were protagonists in the promotion Pan-African revolution in Africa. Some of the most critical thinkers include Julius Nyerere (Ujaama), Senghor (Negritude), and Kaunda (Humanism). At the center of their ideas is the possibility of building a union of Africans toward the liberation and promotion of African individuals. At first, this idea was quite general, as individuals

4 A good narration of the blacks experience during this period is presented by Booker Washington, a contemporary of Du Bois, in his master piece….

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focused on all proletariats of African origin who needed liberation regardless of their specific geographical position. Later this changed, and PanAfricanism was localized into African nationalism. This made the idea of a black nation to become fundamental. While Pan-Africanism mainly promoted the transformation of mind-set hence motivating the proletariats to fight for liberation, different movements did the practical work toward the elimination of colonial capitalism. For example, in Malawi, Pan-Africanism led to the Chilembwe uprising against the colonials and their capitalist system as early as 1915. Chilembwe had a robust connection with Du Bois’ philosophy as well as Booker Washington’s philosophy because of his education in America. He also followed the ideas of Joseph Booth, who was also fascinated by PanAfrican ideas. Briefly, the various revolutions for independence in sub-Saharan Africa are part of the revolution against colonial capitalism. This applies to movements such as the Mau Mau in Kenya, and the different African parties such as the Kenyan African National Union (KANU), Tanzanian National Union (TANU), and Malawi Congress Party (MCP), which were all substantially a coming together of proletariats revolting against the defective colonial capitalism. It is very difficult to argue that these parties were fighting to bring pure capitalism in the name of genuine democracy in their nations. In the next chapter, I will show, most of these nations after getting independence, revealed the authentic character that they were promoting socialist ideals. They promoted the one-party system, which re-introduced a defective form of capitalism. Other thinkers such as Ogbechie (2018) discuss colonialism concerning the problem of African identity. Africans wanted to affirm their subjectivity/identity against the colonials. Colonization of Africa also raised for the first time a global consciousness of African identity as being distinctive from, despite being subjugated to, Western imperialism. The effort to define African subjectivity within the confines of colonial rule ultimately led to various forms of anti-colonial and nationalist struggles, which were central to the emergence of new African identities and efforts to define a modern African art in the global context. (Ogbechie 2018, 431)

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I would like to maintain that such problems are a consequence of capitalist struggle mainly as the bourgeoisie attempted to maintain their superiority in the process of accumulating surplus value.

4.5

Conclusion

The chapter has discussed the evolution of capitalism and freedom during the period of colonialism. In most of the countries in the sub-Saharan region, colonialism is a version of capitalism. This confirms the argument of communists, more especially Lenin, who was noted earlier as indicating that this is a stage in the development of capitalism. Colonialism encouraged capitalism and freedom through the modernization of Africa based on the European model. This was partly an advantage in improving the socio-economic and political situation of the African continent. For instance, there was a notable transformation in terms of infrastructure, mainly in terms of buildings as well as road construction. The transport system greatly improved with the introduction of the railway, water (ships) as well as road transportation. Freedom was encouraged in some respects as the governments sometimes intervened in defense of the weak. Capitalism promoted certain fundamental rights that were violated by the fellow Africans but also by the slave traders. In spite of the above developments, capitalism practiced by the colonials violated individual freedom at the expense of promoting communal or national freedom. Individuals became slaves of very few bourgeoisie that had means of production, mainly the white population. This introduced a form of racism, which excluded the African masses, by making them remain in a situation of poverty. The economic development of most of the African individuals was hampered by the introduction of boundaries and the eradication of individual freedom. The boundaries made by the colonials scattered the African tribes and enhanced a situation of division.

References Byfield, J. A. (2018). African Women in Colonial Economies. In M. S. Falola (Ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of African Colonial and Postcolonial History (pp. 145–170). New York: Palgrave. Davidson, B. (1974). Portuguese Colonialism in Africa the End of an Era. Paris: The Unesco Press.

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Delavignette, R. (1964). Christianity and Colonialism. New York: Hawthorn Books. Du Bois, W. E. (1897). The Conservation of Races. Washington, DC: Baptist Print. Duffy, J. (1968). Portuguese Africa. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. MacKenzie, J. (1983). The Partition of Africa, 1880–1900, and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century. New York: Methuen. Nyerere, J. ([1966] 2000). Leaders Must Not Be Masters. In E. C. Eze (Ed.), African Philosophy: An Anthology (pp. 77–78). Malden: Blackwell. Ogbechie, S. O. (2018). Art, African Identities, and Colonialism. In M. S. Shanguhyia & T. Falola (Eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Colonial and Postcolonial History (pp. 429–450). New York: Palgrave. Phiri, D. (1975). Malawians to Remember: Charles Chidongo Chinula. Blantyre: Christian Literature Association in Malawi. Shanguhyia, S., & Falola, T. (2018). The Palgrave Handbook of African Colonial. New York: Palgrave. Taiwo, O. (2010). How Colonialism Preempted Modernity in Africa. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

CHAPTER 5

Capitalism and Freedom in One-Party Politics

5.1

Introduction

Von Mises (1927) warned the world about different forms of aggressive nationalism, such as Leninism, Fascism, and Nazism by indicating that they were dangerous enemies of freedom. In Africa, different forms of nationalism that fought for independence during the colonial period1 adopted the one-party political system. Parallel to their interest in bringing peace and wealth to the African population that was oppressed earlier by the colonials, they became a hub for the violation of human freedom and the accumulation of wealth by political leaders at the expense of the poor masses. In spite of this, it was difficult to challenge these systems because they were grounded on pre-independence ideologies such as black-consciousness and Pan-Africanism. Under the demise of national unity, one-party systems became populated in various nations, such as Malawi, Mozambique, Angola, Kenya, Zambia, and Uganda. Although there were various versions, they were mainly reduced into capitalism-oriented and communism-oriented systems. This division was influenced by the Cold War after the Second World War, which divided the world into Capitalist and Communist blocks. While they drew insights from different external political systems, African one-party systems were united in that they also got insights from 1 The different forms of nationalisms were discussed in Chapter 3 of this work.

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the African traditional system, which was noted earlier as based on a form of socialism or communitarianism. In Sect. 5.2 below, I present the one-party versions that developed in Africa. In Sect. 5.3, the chapter will consider the one-party system as an enemy of freedom, focusing on different cases of systematic suppression of freedom. Finally, in Sect. 5.4, the chapter will focus on the accumulation of wealth by African leaders and other few individuals in the one-party system.

5.2

One-Party Political System

There are mixed feelings on the nature of the political system that was guiding the one-party political regimes that characterized most of the sub-Saharan nations in the post-independence era. The first position is that this is an autocratic political system, a form of dictatorship that has oppressed the freedom of the African individuals. The feeling was that the dictators needed the people to support them in the fight against the colonial government, but after independence, they started pushing their personal agenda, such as the desire to remain in power and accumulate wealth (Cowen and Kanyika 2002, 128ff).2 The second conception is that it is a form of democratic socialism that attempted to defend the African traditional culture and national sovereignty of the African nations (Mutharika 1995, 98–99). The unfortunate side is that national sovereignty was overstretched; hence it became machinery against people’s long-awaited freedom. In fact, these nations are conceptualized as autocratic, totalitarian, or dictatorial, rightly because of the understanding that the suppression of the people’s freedom and wealth outweighed the idea of independence. A further conceptualization that may shed light on the notion of the one-party system is seen in Bratton and van de Walle (1997, 77ff) in their classification of regimes in Africa. The two scholars note that there are 5 modal variants of regimes, including the plebiscitary one-party system, the military oligarchy, the competitive one-party system, the settler

2 Note that in their discussion of multiparty elections in Kenya, Cowen, and Kanyika pointed out conception of one-party system under Kenyatta and later Moi as autocratic or dictatorship.

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Table 5.1 The African states up to 1989a Plebiscitary one-party nations

Military oligarchies

Competitive one-party nations

Settler oligarchies

Multiparty nations

Angola, Benin, Cape Verde, Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Mozambique, Niger, Somalia, Swaziland and Zaire

Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Ghana, Guinea, Lesotho, Liberia, Mauriania, Nigeria, Nigeria, Sudan and Uganda

Cameroon, Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Madagascar, Mali, Malawi, Rwanda, Sao Tome, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Tanzania Togo and Zambia

Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa

Botswana, Gambia, Mauritius, Senegal and Zimbabwe

a Note that the table has been slightly modified

oligarchy, and the multiparty system.3 The plebiscitary one-party system is where citizens are allowed to participate in politics, but it has limited competition. This system is viewed as undemocratic because it prohibits the existence of other political parties separate from the ruling regime. The military oligarchy fits in the explanation of oligarchy in the African traditional context, the only difference being that in this case, the leaders are military officials working together with the elite. The competitive one-party system allows citizens to participate, and at the same time, it encourages competition. Interestingly, even the president is ready to leave power to another individual, although he generally puts those close to him in power. Bratton and van de Walle (1997, 79) classify the African nations as per Table 5.1. The above classification is mainly based on the variables of participation of citizens in political affairs and competition in elections pertaining to political offices, such as parliament and the presidency. However, in 3 The other two regimes—the settler oligarchy and the multiparty regimes—are already discussed in Chapters 3 and 8, respectively.

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terms of governance style, the above-discussed regimes fall under autocratic rule, with the exception of the multiparty regime. As one-party autocratic states in Africa, they mainly constituted leaders who were either democratically elected during the elections that marked a passage from colonialism to African rule or rose into power through force, generally with the help of the military. Considering the case of Malawi for example, which is here placed under the competitive one-party system, Kamuzu Banda was democratically elected in the 1960s general elections. He defeated the Mbadwa party and the CLP, both of them under the British colonial government. However, he took the country from multiparty to a dictatorship form of government by banning all the other parties by 1963. Later, in 1971, he declared himself the life President of Malawi. This arrogation of power to himself makes me question whether this form of politics suits better a plebiscitary one-party system or competitive one-party system as suggested by Bratton and van de Walle (1997, 79). Similarly, Kenya, which is rightly classified under a plebiscitary one-party system, had Jomo Kenyatta who was democratically elected after defeating the colonial government. He also became a dictator by turning Kenya into a one-party state. The transformation was done through the amendment of the constitution in order to frustrate the opposition parties (Ake 2000, 41).4 Looking at the trend of changes from democratic elections in a multiparty context to a one-party system raises the question of whether the early African leaders who supported nationalism were true democrats. It is obvious that nationalism and multiparty democracy are incompatible as also argued by von Mises (1927) and others (Hayek 1944; Harvey 2008). It seems to be further indication that in Africa, it is not the multiparty democracy that matters, but the individual and his political orientation. In some circumstances what matters is the tribe where one comes from. African nationalism as lived by political leaders in a one-party state may, therefore, be considered as a non-democratic system that manipulates democracy in order to achieve its radical communitarian agenda. Apart from adopting the one-party system after democratic elections, there are a number of dictators who adopted this system after taking power by force. A case in point is that of Idi Amin in Uganda and Jerry Rawlings in Ghana. Most of these leaders removed their fellow African 4 Sekou Toure, who ruled Guinea between 1958 and 1984, did a similar declaration of one-party system.

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leaders from power and developed a totalitarian system. These coups were common in Africa. For example, there was a coup in the then Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo). During a power crisis in the 1960s, the first prime minister of Congo (Patrick Emery Lumumba) and the Head of State (Joseph-Kasa Vubu) were removed from power in 1965 by Joseph-Desire Mobutu SeseSeko, who became a dictator and ruled the DRC for 32 years. The same trend happened in 1997 when LaurentDesire Kabila overthrew Mobutu SeseSeko and became the third president of the DRC. Although the above discussion shows that most African nations adopted the one-party system, there are different reasons why they opted for this system. For instance, a good number of systems, such as Julius Nyerere’s and Kenneth Kaunda’s competitive one-party system were designed to promote a form of African nationalism (a version of democratic socialism). Nyerere promoted the Ujaama socialist system, while Kaunda advocated for a form of humanism. These systems were a response to colonial capitalism. In fact, the expectation was to rule Africa as one big village with different small leaders under the President, who was the supreme leader. Here, the idea of the one-party system was thought to best represent the African identity and unity, rather than the multiparty form of governance, which entailed the division of the community. It was also easier to defend national sovereignty when working together as one nation. The promotion of African identity through the introduction of traditional socialism was often compromised by the lack of individual freedom in different areas. Second, some plebiscitary one-party systems wanted to promote a form of capitalism that respected the conditions of the African people. For instance, Kamuzu Banda of Malawi defended one-party democracy as the best system that fits the condition of the Malawian people.5 Democracy lies in ‘the right of the people to choose what they want.’ His thinking is therefore that communalism under one leader (king/president) can be needed by the people; it can be for the people and ruled by the people. The community freely gives power to only one supreme leader to rule them. What that leader thinks is accepted as what is right; the people accept that he knows what is best for them. Paradoxically, Kamuzu Banda’s reasoning seems to suggest that democracy can accommodate both 5 Note that I have argued that Malawi best fits under plebiscitary one-party system rather than competitive one-party system.

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multiparty and one-party systems of governance. The idea here is that the citizens of a particular country can choose the one-party system as their form of government. In virtue of this potential of the community to choose its form of democracy, the party can be justified, even in those circumstances where it goes against the minority parties. His thinking was that if there are other parties trying to come in, they will be going against the will of the people. The existence of any party in a nation must, therefore, be decided by the will of the people. Kamuzu Banda put this thinking into practice when he claimed that the people of Malawi democratically desired to have the Malawi Congress Party (MCP).6 He was by virtue of these ideas deflecting from his endorsement of the multiparty system of democracy, which led Malawi to independence. Supporting this idea Short (1974) wrote in his book, Banda, that: Until February 1961, Banda had maintained publicly strict adherence to the Westminster ideal of democracy, emphasizing the right of his political opponents to ‘freedom of speech and freedom of association’, and declaring more than once that he would ‘welcome’ the formation of rival political groups.

It can be argued that this assertion was meant at promoting Kamuzu Banda’s nationalistic ideological thought, who wanted to transform Malawi into one traditional African kingdom. Another possible and common interpretation is that he defended social democracy due to his fear that other parties would one day take away the power that he started enjoying in the country.7 Most of the leaders endorsing the one-party system as a form of democracy will generally resist any interpretation that accommodates the development of different parties by rationalizing the idea of democracy. For example, in Kenya, President Moi’s idea of democracy was that it should constitute one party. Similarly, Kenneth Kaunda attempted to conceptualize the modern multiparty ideas of democracy as against African 6 This way of thinking started in 1961 and became completely established in the mind of some politicians from 1962 onward. 7 Fear of the image that he portrayed to others was one grave weakness in the personality of H. K. Banda, This was reflected in his way of presenting himself and further in his attitude. One factor that reveals further his fear of his image was the tendency to hide his age, leading to a big confusion in the history of Malawi.

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independence and sovereignty. This was seen as a threat to African Unity. Kamuzu Banda also rationalized the new demands of various parties as an attempt by the capitalists and their followers to bring division to the African communities. This resistance comes from the understanding that being a one-party system in an African context is already being democratic, given that unity is an important element in the African culture. The other reason was the interest of some African leaders who wanted to develop a system that incorporates elements of communism mainly from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR)—the MarxianLeninist communism and occasionally from China. Siad Barre of Somalia developed one such system in the period between 1969 and 1991. Another form of democratic socialism under the one-party system was developed in Mozambique in 1975. This was the time when it got its independence from the Portuguese through the FRELIMO party. Similar to the Somali situation above, Mozambique adopted elements from both the African traditional communitarian context and the communist state ideology from the USSR. The one-state party did not last long, given that it ended in 1990 with the coming of multiparty democracy. A similar development took place in Angola, which became independent in 1975 and also adopted communism, building elements from African culture and USSR. The thinking behind the communist orientation of the one-party system was very close to the African traditional communitarianism that was used by thinkers such as Nyerere and Kaunda. For example, the difference with Kaunda is that he developed his humanism in a capitalist framework which allowed for individual ownership of property but at the same time encouraging social support systems, while a truly communist-based system calls for common ownership and distribution of property based on the individual needs. Nevertheless, both Nyerere and Kaunda wanted to make sure that Africans are free by choosing to live a communal life. Below I will attempt to respond to the question of whether one-party systems adopted in various nations managed to defend or bring freedom to the African people.

5.3

One-Party System and Freedom

In its various forms, the one-party system had in common the aspect of violation of freedom of either the individual or the masses. Surprisingly, most of the citizens partly accepted this system as part of their life.

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This analogy is similar to the realization that Plato alludes to in his allegory of the cave, where individuals thought that they were seeing reality, yet all they were experiencing were only shadows (Plato Republic). However, after experiencing oppression for a long time, some individuals started questioning the validity of the one-party system in African countries. Below is a presentation of some indicators and experiences of Africans in the one-party regime. The fundamental aspect that helps in testing a political system in the context of capitalism and freedom is through the status of political freedom. Following Dahl’s aspects of competition and participation as indicators of democracy, hence freedom, one-party systems in Africa qualify as enemies of individual freedom (Dahl 1971). The first experience of lack of freedom constituted the suppression of other political parties that freely participated in the earlier election. This is an important characteristic of one-party politics, given that it is defined by the absence of other parties, which is a violation of freedom to participate in political matters. For instance, it was noted earlier that in terms of participation, the plebiscitary one-party system did not encourage genuine political participation, which was a violation of freedom (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 79). The common experience of depriving individuals of this right to participate in political matters may be seen mainly in the suppression of political parties. Below I will discuss some sampled cases (C1, C2, and C3) which show the violation of freedom that was common in the African nations. The first case, C1, concerns Swaziland. The country was earlier classified under a plebiscitary one-party system, although at the beginning it practiced a multiparty system. For example, in 1967 there were parties such as Imbokodvo National Movement (INM) which was favored by the King and the Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC). In a multiparty competition of 1972, NNLC won some seats in the parliament, but the ruling party called for the abolition of opposition parties. Some of the main reasons for this suppression of the parties are reflected in the following proclamation of King Sobhuza II, [t]hat the constitution has failed to provide the machinery for good government and for the maintenance of peace and order; that the constitution is indeed the cause of growing unrest, insecurity, dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in our country and an impediment to free and progressive development in all spheres of life; that the constitution has permitted the introduction into Swaziland of highly undesirable political practices alien

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to, and incompatible with, the Swazi way of life; these practices were seen by the king as designed to disrupt and destroy Swazi’s peaceful, constructive and essentially democratic methods of political activity. Sobhuza considered that this engendered hostility, bitterness and unrest. (See Maroleng 2003, 2)

This speech intentionally attacks the constitution as responsible for the various problems that were faced in Swaziland. This deliberate move is done to avoid the direct attack toward the multiparty system that is not needed in this nation. The following action was done through an amendment of the constitution on 12 April 1973, where all the other parties were proscribed. This has led to parties such as the People’s United Democratic Movement (PUDEMO) and the NNLC fail to operate legally, with the exception of the Sive Siyingaba (SS), which works as a sort of a cultural group that is pro-King. After the violation of the liberal principles by Sobhuza II, the current Sobhuza (up to 2018) did not change much, given that absolute monarch was still preferred. The second case study involves Malawi, which is labeled as C2, where the suppression of freedom through the elimination of opposition parties was experienced under the one-party system of Kamuzu Banda. As noted earlier, in the 1961 general elections, different parties were freely allowed to participate. When Kamuzu and his MCP won the elections, he immediately started oppressing all those parties and individuals that wanted to participate in politics as opposition parties. In fact, the British and other nationalists were warned that if they supported the opposition parties such as the Mbadwa party and the CLP, he was going to deport them. Some individuals attempted to oppose this one-party system, and either they were forced to leave the country or they were killed (e.g., during the cabinet crisis in 1964). Finally, I focus on Kenya or C3. In Kenya, the violation of political freedom through the suppression of political parties took place in 1966 by Jomo Kenyatta. The period between 1961 and 1966 was under the multiparty system. It was only when some members of parliament decided to leave the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) and develop their own Kenya People’s Union (KPU) that the plebiscitary one-party system entered into play. The various members of the KPU were detained and left in prison for some years. This suppression of other parties was accompanied by several lives that were lost, such as the killing of Pio Gama Pinto in 1965. Other assassinations included that of Tom Mboya,

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the economic planning minister in 1969, and many other individuals that attempted to go against the ruling political party. Blocking political participation has many other consequences in the context of the violation of human life. For example, in different nations, there was the continuous disappearance of individuals that were against the ruling one-party system. In Malawi, for example, many individuals were put in prison without trial for criticizing the president, his political party, or some practices that violated freedom. Similar victims were registered in various nations such as in Uganda under Idi Amini’s dictatorship, Zaire under Mobutu SeseSeko, and Kenya under Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel Arap Moi. Another common factor in the dictatorial regimes is the presence of very harsh prison conditions that were meant to punish those that were thought to be against the ruling party. Many critics found themselves in these prisons and were not tried in a meaningful court of law. They were often subjected to torture and many of them died in prison. In fact, when the UN visited most of the dictatorial nations, it discovered that the prisons were violating human rights. For example, Malawi had several prisons such as Mikuyu prison in Zomba and Dzaleka (meaning I will stop) prison in Dowa, where inmates lived in inhuman and degrading conditions. The one-party systems snatched away individual freedom in terms of free participation in politics by forcing all the members to belong to the ruling party. Any newly born baby was immediately considered as a member of the ruling party. Countries like Zambia, Malawi, and Kenya were known for forcing people to buy membership cards. A worse scenario is where some religions that did not agree with the dictators were banned from worshiping in the one-party system. A case in point is that of the Jehova’s witness which refused to buy the Party membership cards of the ruling party, MCP during Kamuzu Banda’s one-party system. The members were persecuted; some went to exile while others were massacred in big numbers. For example, there is a case of the Karonga Massacre where many were burnt alive and killed. The other area where individual freedom was suppressed is where oneparty political systems were associated with a particular ethnic group. This led to the advantage of one ethnic group over another and in some instances the life of the other ethnic group that was in danger. In

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Malawi, for example, the President identified himself with the Chewa ethnic group. He thus imposed his mother tongue to become a national language. In Kenya, a similar instance happened when the Kikuyu tribe was favored because of belonging to the tribe of the ruling one-party system (Cowen and Kanyinga 2002, 130–139). It may thus be indicated that tribalism is one of the components that rob the people of their freedom for equal participation in politics. Apart from political freedom, which is linked to the loss of other freedoms such as freedom of worship and freedom of expression, different one-party states encouraged a particular dressing. People were often told what was allowed to be worn and what was not. In Malawi, miniskirts and bell-bottoms were banned such that any individual found wearing them was beaten and often imprisoned for going against the orders of the President. Similarly, there were some regulatory institutions of the state, mainly the Censorship Board, which was designed to make sure that people were abiding by what the one-party system wanted them to get access to, and what was forbidden. It was very risky for an individual to become rich in the one-party system. This was interpreted as a way of trying to compete with the President who was expected to be above every citizen. This became a control measure that stopped individuals from getting rich, mainly in those nations where the one-party system was practiced in a capitalism-based context. A rich person was expected to give more gifts to the President and the ruling party occasionally, to show that he/she was a good member of the party. The main philosophy was that what every rich individual had was accumulated because of the goodness of the dictator, who created a conducive environment for the accumulation of wealth. In summary, the one-party system was characterized by an increase in freedom-based wars that were as a response to the ruling party politics. These wars were either influenced by individuals with political ambition, who then gathered some people, to fight against the oppressive system and bring back individual freedom. In some cases, these wars were based on ethnic groups that were marginalized and wanted to regain their freedom. In yet other cases, freedom-based wars were between those that wanted capitalism against those that wanted communism; this was a reflection of the Cold War. This last scenario mainly happened in countries such as Mozambique and Angola.

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5.4 One-Party System: Capitalism, Wealth, and Power Political leaders in the one-party systems in Africa are commonly well known because of the power in both the economic and political realm. This was generally done through the centralization of power. What is worrisome is that in most of the one-party states in post-colonial Africa, it was the president and those that were close to him that were benefiting from this centralization of power. These individuals included people who belong to the president’s ethnic group, and sometimes this extended to those that shared with him the same religious faith. For example, Ake (2000, 34–35) indicates the element of sharing power with those close to the leader and argued that this was the case in, Liberia under Samuel Doe, Nigeria under General Ibrahim Babangida, Cameroon under Paul Biya, Kenya under Jomo Kenyatta, and even more under Arap Moi, Somalia under Said Barré, Togo under Eyadéma, Ethiopia under Mengistu, Rwanda under General Habyarimana, Bénin under Kérékou, Mali under Moussa Traoré, Burkina Faso under Blaise Compaoré, Uganda under Idi Amin, Sudan under Niemeri, Niger under President Diori and Zaire under Mobutu. The list can be much longer.

In these and many other African countries not mentioned by Ake above, wealth was centered on the Presidents in the one-party system. They were among the richest individuals in the world. In fact, most of them lived a luxurious life and heavily invested in their country as well as outside Africa. Often, the source of their funds was either through the selling of rich minerals and other important products as well as through collecting from the poor masses. One of the ways of collecting wealth was by forcing people to give the President gifts, in order to thank him for the service that he was performing. These gifts were in the form of money as well as other goods, including livestock. A general excuse for the wealth of the Presidents was that what they owned also belonged to the population since they were a symbol of unity. In fact, it was often believed that everything belongs to the President including the citizens. Apart from the President, the people indicated earlier as being close to him would suddenly become very rich. An interesting fact that was common is that of giving good jobs to people that belong to one’s ethnic

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group. For example, Idi Amin of Uganda gave strategic positions to members of his ethnic group, which boosted their economic status. Of course, this is because he trusted them for protection. Similarly, Moi of Kenya concentrated power in his Kalenjin ethnic group. Claude Ake (2000, 37– 45) gave various examples of this manipulation of power for several reasons, hence the centralization of economic power in a few individuals. A similar trend to centralizing power on the President and members of his ethnic group is also reported in the one-party system in Malawi. For example, John Tembo was made head of various companies, hence increasing his economic advantage over other individuals. The President and his government-owned different businesses, and this gave an economic advantage to the president. The centralization of economic power on the government, specifically on the President and his close political allies and tribesmen, made the sub-Saharan masses suffer from poverty. The gap between the political leaders and the masses was so massive, to the point that it has created a precedent were to become rich is equivalent to joining politics. However, this is dangerous in some countries in cases where one does not belong to the ethnic group of the ruling party’s leader. All this hinders economic growth on the African continent. For example, Claude Ake (2000, 46) noted that, The average annual growth rate of per capita income for Sub-Saharan Africa between 1973 and 1980 was a mere 0.1 per cent; between 1980 and 1989 it was -2.2 per cent. On some social indicators Africans are worse off at the end of 1980s than they were in the 1960s.

This apparently shows that the one-party system in Africa has contributed to increasing levels of poverty among the masses. The unfortunate part of the whole story is that no one is able to question the leaders on financial matters; hence they are not held accountable to any individual. All this is a form of violation of individual freedom in its diverse dimensions such as economic and political contexts.

5.5

Conclusion

The one-party system has been shown to have created a national system that incorporated elements from capitalism, communism, and the African communitarian system. The system was taken to an extreme and created

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a situation of radical communitarianism, which then transformed into a form of oligarchy. In the context of freedom, it was the president and some close followers that took lead in suppressing political, economic, individual, and other forms of freedom. Similarly, in the context of accumulation of wealth, the same few individuals became very rich while most of the citizens were living in abject poverty. People were kept in bondage by brainwashing them that the one-party system was good because it was one way of protecting them from the interference of the colonials. They were further convinced that this was a form of communitarianism that was there to protect their culture and individual interests. The suffering became one of the reasons for individuals to start desiring change. It was, however, very difficult to succeed in most of the nations because the ideologies that were promoted by the leaders instilled fear in the citizens. In some nations, some have tried to revolt against the one-party system and ended up losing their life. In other cases, the way forward was to remove the president through a coup. This was mainly done by military officials. Unfortunately, when the military started leading the people, they also became tyrants and restored the totalitarian system. Looking at these various obstacles, it became clear that the only way forward was a return to the multiparty system which was banned in most of the countries. This was at least expected to give back power to the citizens so that they could not only choose a party they wanted but also remove a ruling party that was underperforming. This will also help in reducing the power of the government, hence give room for individuals to participate significantly in the economy as well as the political life of the African nations.

References Ake, C. (2000). The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa. Dakar: CODESRIA. Bratton, M., & van de Walle, N. (1997). Democratic Experience in Africa. New York: Cambridge University Press. Cowen, M., & Kanyika, K. (2002). The 1997 Elections in Kenya. In M. Cowen & L. Laakso (Eds.), Multiparty Elections in Africa (pp. 172–186). Oxford: Palgrave. Dahl, R. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven, CT: Yale University. Harvey, D. (2008). A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hayek, V. (1944). The Road to Serfdom. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

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Maroleng, C. (2003). Swaziland: The King’s Constitution (African Security Analysis Programme, Security Report, 1–5). Mutharika, B. (1995). One Africa One Destiny: Towards Democracy, Good Governance and Development. Harare: SAPES. Short, P. (1974). Banda, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, 1974. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Von Mises, L. ([1927] 2002). Liberalism. California: Cobden Press.

CHAPTER 6

Capitalist Multiparty Democracy Reforms

6.1

Introduction

African nations in the one-party political systems, discussed in Chapter 5, profoundly affected the liberal capitalist agenda by introducing different socialist measures parallel to their principles. These measures were heavily an infringement on individual and economic freedom, which are fundamental for the smooth development of the liberal capitalist spirit. For economic and other liberties, neoliberals wanted a chance to transform the political system, so that it guarantees the proper development of capitalism. The paradox in African nations was that most of the leaders argued that they were following a democratic system, and they belonged to the capitalist block, while in actual sense, they were in a dictatorial system. For the liberals, the proliferation of a one-party system that claimed to be democracy was dangerous, and only a democratic revolution was key to true political freedom. Below I will present the capitalist multiparty democracy reform in Africa as a remedy toward the one-party systems and their suppression of individual freedom. Section 6.2 will firstly clarify the concept of democracy and its link with freedom in the philosophical context. This will act as a background for a further discussion on capitalist multiparty democracy reform in Sect. 6.3, with a particular focus on Africa. In Sect. 6.4, the focus is on the liberal concept of minimum government and how it reflects the multiparty structure. Section 6.5 discusses the place of civil © The Author(s) 2020 G. M. Kayange, Capitalism and Freedom in African Political Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44360-3_6

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society in multiparty political reform. This is important because it is one of the aspects that assure political freedom in a pluralistic setting.

6.2

Concept of Democracy and Freedom

In the modern ‘ordinary language usage’ of the term democracy, meaning comes from the famous quotation of the American president of the midnineteenth century, Abraham Lincoln, in his address after the 1863 battle of Gettysburg near the declared cessation of the American Civil War. He identified democracy as a ‘government of the people, by the people, and for the people.’ This phrase has permeated in ordinary people’s understanding of democracy. In political philosophy, the concept ‘democracy’ comes from Greek word demos , which means people in English and adding cracy it takes the connotation of the rule of the people. A systematic explication of the meaning of this concept appears in the ancient Greek philosophy in the writings of Plato. According to Plato in his work The Republic, this system is grounded in a theory of freedom and comes when the poor people who are a majority come into power. The passage ‘Freedom, I replied; which, as they tell you in a democracy, is the glory of the State–and that therefore in a democracy alone will the freeman of nature deign to dwell’ (Plato 422) expresses the driving principle of democracy. This principle is summarized in the analysis of the IDPH version of The Republic in the following words, ‘The great natural good of life, says the democrat, is freedom’ (Plato 95). While commenting on the coming into power of the poor he writes, ‘And then democracy comes into being after the poor have conquered their opponents, slaughtering some and banishing some, while to the remainder they give an equal share of freedom and power, and this is the form of government in which the magistrates are commonly elected by lot’ (Plato 415). This gives the masses the chance to share what is in the government. In Plato’s philosophy, democracy is inherently flawed, given that it creates a condition where every individual does according to his/her interests. The manner of life in such a State is that of democrats; there is freedom and plainness of speech, and every man does what is right in his own eyes and has his own way of life. Hence arise the most various developments of character; the State is like a piece of embroidery of which the colours

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and figures are the manners of men, and there are many who, like women and children, prefer this variety to real beauty and excellence. The State is not one but many, like a bazaar at which you can buy anything. The great charm is, that you may do as you like; you may govern if you like, let it alone if you like; go to war and make peace if you feel disposed, and all quite irrespective of anybody else. (Plato 94)1

This passage presents the heart of Plato’s critique, but at the same time, links democracy with the element of freedom, which is fundamental for a capitalist. Unfortunately, the idea of freedom is misinforming, given that ‘every man does what is right.’ This brings the problem of pluralism, where individuals adopt a form of perspectivism. There is no objective truth given that everyone has his way of determining what is right. Values are equally compromised, given that everyone will decide what is right. This political system brings forward a society where there is chaos even in the context of morality. Based on the idea of freedom, the individuals also say whatever they want (freedom of speech). Although Plato’s conception is a misconception of freedom, it suggests an understanding of democracy with equal treatment of individuals, and they are free to do what they want. I conclude his concern with democracy with the expression that, ‘Such is a democracy; –a pleasing, lawless, various sort of government, distributing equality to equals and unequals alike’ (Plato 94). When a state overstretches freedom, democracy precipitates into tyranny, and some individuals take advantage (Plato 402). Aristotle does not diverge much from Plato, given that he recognizes democracy as a deviant political system from the polity. The concept of polity refers to the situation whereby ‘the masses conduct political life for the common advantage’ (Aristotle 1279a36–37). Instead of targeting a distinct advantage for all, ‘democracy aims at the advantage of the disadvantaged’ (Aristotle 1279b9–10). In ancient Greece, the poor people were a majority, such that there coming together to form a government qualified it as fighting for the equality that was deficit among the disadvantaged. This implies that democracy is not a sound system, which must benefit the whole community. The conception of Aristotle and its further consideration of liberty as the heart of the deviant system, democracy, apparently convinced Hobbes in his work The Elements of Law (27.3). He argued that ‘Aristotle saith 1 connois https://www.slideshare.net/alippg27/the-republic-by-plato-32626356.

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well (lib. 6, cap 2 of his Politics ), The ground or intention of a democracy, is liberty’. In this work (Chapter 10 of the elements, 2.11), he gives the definition of democracy, ‘And if the major part of their whole number be supposed to involve the wills of all the particulars, then are they said to be a democracy, that is to say, a government wherein the whole number, or so many of them as please, being assembled together, are the sovereign, and every particular man a subject.’ Democracy is, therefore, a government that constitutes the rule of the people. Hobbes does not sustain this in his further writings. In the De Cive, 10.8, he is not happy with Aristotle’s conceptualization of democracy by underlining the concept of liberty (see also Leviathan, 21.8). In De Cive (273), he does not agree to the contention that there is ‘more liberty in a democracy than in monarchy’ as it is often assumed. Understandably, this is influenced by his position on the importance of the monarchical system and its supremacy in representing the will of the people. In spite of this component, in Chapter 7 (on dominion) he defines it as ‘the one when the power is in a council where every citizen hath a right to vote; and it is called a democracy.’ This calls for the participation of the majority, and by implication freedom in governing a particular nation. Similarly, in Leviathan (Chapter 19, Of Commonwealth), he defines it as an assembly that comes together and governs, a form of popular commonwealth. In modern times, popular notions of democracy have generally regarded it as a prima facie good, and they are at par with Aristotle’s polity. Robert Dahl (1971) considered democracy focusing on political equality. In this setting, every individual has the freedom to contribute to the governance of the state. According to Dahl, there are indicators of democracy, which among others, include freedom of expression and information, freedom of association, right to stand as a candidate, universal suffrage, and free and fair elections, are indispensable (see Kayange 2018). Dahl’s conception follows in the tradition of Karl Popper (1945), who noted the power of the citizens to elect a government or dismantle it. The dismantling mainly follows when the government is totalitarian. An open society is capable of changing leadership when governance is poor. While Popper acknowledged majoritarian democracy, he noted that,

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Democracy cannot be fully characterized as the rule of majority, although the institution of general elections is most important. […] In a democracy, the power of the rulers must be limited; and the criterion of a democracy is this: In a democracy, the rulers – that is to say, the government – can be dismissed by the ruled without bloodshed. Thus, if the men in power do not safeguard those institutions, which secure to the minority the possibility of working for a peaceful change, then their rule is a tyranny. (Popper 2010, 176)2

It seems that Karl Popper wants to underline the importance of general elections in providing checks and balances to the governments. The caution by Karl Popper is also present in Hayek, in his Law Legislation and Liberty (1939). In this work, Hayek argued that he is not a democrat if democracy is the unrestricted rule of the majority. In Hayek, this new form of democracy is required to underline economic freedom, which was indicated earlier as a condition for the achievement of political freedom. Schumpeter (1947) was another philosopher who considered democracy as a system where individuals acquire power, through competition of the elites in the society. Democracy demands that various groups meet and compete so that the one who has many votes governs. Przeworski (2000) focuses on aspects of representational politics, with various features such as the election of the chief executive, the election of the legislature, and competitions among different parties during elections, and clear electoral rules and procedures that allow for the transfer of power in some circumstances. The different factors that are presented above are necessary, if not sufficient, elements for democracy. The above conceptions of democracy have been attractive to leaders of different national struggles because of the importance they place upon the liberal aspects of governance, in a worldwide atmosphere of approval to shift from autocracy to pluralistic structuring of political power. Different studies have focused on this geopolitical shift from authoritarian oligarchies to democratic systems occurring in the second half of the twentieth century. Given that neoliberals were not happy with the unrestricted democracy of the majority, they preferred respecting the minority/individual. It is for

2 Popper, K. R. (1945). The Open Society and Its Enemies. Volume I: The Spell of Plato. London: Routledge.

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this reason that the multiparty system of democracy was a sound system that controlled the interests of one dictatorial party.3

6.3 Multiparty Democracy and the Capitalist Agenda By 1980s, authoritarian rulers in Africa’s patrimonial regimes typically faced a crisis of political legitimacy. This crisis was manifest in a loss of faith among African citizens that state elites were capable of solving basic problems of socio-economic and political development. Leaders had damaged their own claim to rule by engaging in nepotism and corruption, which led to popular perceptions that those with access to political office were living high on the hog while ordinary people suffered. (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 98–99)

The above citation perfectly captures the common experience of the African nations, where different ruling political parties lost credibility because of various reasons, such as the suppression of the people’s freedom. This motivated the capitalist multiparty democracy reform in the 1980s. This refers to a wave of democratic changes in political systems, whereby the various one-party governments were removed through elections. The election gave room to all parties that satisfy specific demands participate in elections. One of the most widely discussed works of this kind is by Huntington (1993: 22–49), who argued that a ‘third democratic wave’ had affected different nations in the late twentieth century. He saw this transition from authoritarian rule to democratic rule as driven by a range of factors including notable increases of economic growth in the private sector, escalating urbanization, and promotion of individual rights and freedoms. Similarly, Doorenspleet (2000) has argued that a shift from authoritarian regimes continues this trend in what she calls a ‘fourth wave’ of democracy, starting in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall. African nations have experienced debates on democracy and independence since the 1960s. Although it remains hotly disputed among African 3 Philosophers such as Chantal Mouffe and Irish young have all questioned the traditional conception of democracy. Note that even Aristotle was not comfortable with this traditional conception given that it ignored the importance of reasoning. It is as if whatever the society wanted was considered as fine.

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political theorists, observers, and activists, transformation as characterized by Huntington’s third wave and Doorenspleet’s fourth wave has been traced by some commentators as emerging in the 1980s and 1990s. During this period, different countries in the sub-Saharan region (such as Malawi and Zambia) appeared to embrace or to re-embrace multiparty democracy. For example, Malawi, in 1963–1964, adopted the multiparty system, only to abandon it in the late 1960s. In the 1990s, multiparty systems came back with the coming of the third wave of democracy (Kayange 2012) in Malawi; a similar situation was in Tanzania under the leadership of Nyerere ([1966] 2004). Some theorists have perceived the democratic euphoria in African countries that adopted multiparty electoral politics due to their apparent victory over dictatorial and military regimes that had characterized many new nations, such as Tanzania with Julius Nyerere, Malawi with Kamuzu Banda, Zimbabwe with Robert Mugabe and Milton Obote in Zaire. Although the general African democratic wave came with a liberal (Western) understanding of democracy with a particular emphasis on freedom (individual freedom, individual dignity, and market freedom) and consensus, the autocratic elements remained in most of the leaders. It is for this reason that Levitsky and Way (2001) argued that the element of competition is rising to power was adopted in most of the African countries, but authoritarianism still dominated or lay latent in most of the regimes (see also, Levitsky 2002). They suggest instead that the democratic wave in Africa led to ‘competitive authoritarianism.’ They proposed this as the view of political systems that mix democratic elements (such as free elections where the sense of competition flourishes) with autocratic elements. While there is some truth that various leaders in the multiparty democracy became autocratic, the early days of multiparty reform experienced notable changes in the government system. In the old philosophy of democracy focused on the centralization of power on a government (and its single party) chosen by the people, the new system opted for a decentralization of power. Competition coming from the other parties controlled the President and his/her party. The coming of neoliberal democracy started with the desire of Africans in various nations to be free from different atrocities that were committed by the one-party system. The road toward this freedom relates to numerous Africans who were meeting to force the governments to change various oppressive strategies

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and actions. There were different movements for multiparty democracy, designed to meet secretly and bring neoliberal democracy. The element of forcing African leaders to adopt a multiparty system is best exemplified in the experience of Benin. There was a military government led by Mathieu Kerekou. Unhappy with the Marxism-Leninism that was promoted in the country and the related lack of various basic needs, students, teachers, and other individuals took to the streets, asking for an intervention. The president was forced by the continuing demonstrations against his rule, such that various changes were effectuated hoping to remain in power. Some of the efforts include the abandonment of Marxism-Leninism by his party, People’s Revolutionary Party of Benin (PRPB). This transformation was accompanied by the re-introduction of the multiparty system in 1989. Commenting on Benin’s transition to freedom-based politics, Bratton and van de Walle (1997, 1) noted that, ‘Most important, the president created a commission to prepare a “national reconciliation conference” to which political and trade union organizations, religious associations, and Beninois living abroad would be invited to discuss the country’s future.’ The democratic spirit is seen in the transformation but also the attitude of the president, who requested the people to forgive him for adopting a Frankenstein government, which oppressed the very people who created it. The transformation into a multiparty philosophy may be exemplified in Swaziland; the people criticized the government of oppressing the masses that were poor. People wanted to force the government to change, as was the case of the People’s United Democratic Movement (PUDEMO) in the 1980s and early 1990s. Neocosmos (2002, 31) commenting on the struggle of Swaziland toward freedom through the multiparty system, noted that members of the urban classes were dissatisfied with the government and played a fundamental role in the process of change. The pressure mounted by the oppressed individuals forced the government to amend its constitution and give way for a multiparty-based system. This acceptance of multiparty democracy and the amendment of the constitution in 1991 were preceded by a series of consultations. In the context of Swaziland, Vusela committee was established to lead in the transition toward a freedom-based politics. This was done through collecting views of the people, analyzing them, and preparing them for multiparty politics. Similarly, the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) had a landslide victory in 1998, given that it was thought to adequately respond to the needs of the people and solve their various problems. This was

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an answer to the masses that we’re reacting to the oppression of the government, which had policies that excluded them in wealth creation. There was bribery in the political system, which tended to favor foreigners (Neocosmos 2002, 32). Apart from various freedoms that lacked in Lesotho, market freedom was comprised, given that the Asians and other colonials were advantaged by favors at the expense of the locals. There are mixed experiences of the development of multiparty democracy in the African context; for example, Ghana required this freedom-based system to eradicate military rule in various epochs. Ghana has experienced military rule departing from 1966, when Nkrumah was overthrown. His government was viewed as oppressive, although his philosophy was very influential and fundamental toward the liberation of various African nations. In his consciencism, Nkrumah valued a revolution that was balanced and influenced by intellectual revolution (Nkrumah [1966] 2000, 81–93). Nevertheless, the military leader that overthrew him justified this action based on the need to bring true freedom. The military leaders gave back the country to the civilians, but after a few years of democracy, another military coup followed in 1972. In the early 1980s after a few years of civilian rule, another military coup followed. The military seemed to have converted to multiparty democracy in the early 1990s, given that they facilitated the freedom-based transformation. A National Commission for Democracy (NCD) collected views from the citizens on the type of multiparty democracy that was required (see Aubyinn 2002, 75–103).

6.4

Multiparty Reforms in Malawian

Multiparty philosophy targeting among others participation, competition, decentralization, and sharing of power came back to Malawi in the 1980s and it coincides with the coming of the free-market system. Individuals were tired of the dictatorial tendencies of the one-party system, which held them in bondage for a long period of time. The end of the Berlin war, financial difficulties, and involvement of the civil society in calling for change were some of the aspects that encouraged this transformation. For instance, a letter by Catholics Bishops in March 1992 voiced out different atrocities that were taking place in the country and asking the president to act and transform the position of the government. Following this letter, many Malawians started coming out openly and requesting the government to change. After some resistance, the government decided

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to give up and allowed Malawians to express their desire for neoliberal democracy through a referendum. According to the social (nationalist) democrats, this aspect of calling for a referendum is a sign of practicing real democracy by allowing the majority to choose the best for everyone. In the referendum, most Malawians voted for neoliberal democracy (67%) to be adopted as a political system for the Malawi government, and only a few wanted the old system to continue (33%). The unfortunate part is that most of the citizens were not very clear about what the future would be like with the new system they embraced. Phiri and Ross (1998, 8) indicated this unclear future in the following lines, The limitations of the transition were also reflected in the lack of any defined policy agenda among the pro-democracy parties, which emerged. Both in the 1993 National Referendum and in the General Elections of 1994, there was no doubt that Malawians voted for change, However, it was far from clear what this change would involve other than the replacement of Band and his loyalists with a group of disaffected ex-MCP politicians.

One of the commonly shared changes in African nations is that the tenure of office for the President became five years, but renewable through elections at least once. The short period of five years made the presidents check their performance making sure that there are no actions that could lead to loss of power. The system also led to the sharing of power in the parliament as members belonged to different political parties. The opposition had a lot of power similarly in the parliament and on some occasions, managed to interfere in some of the decisions. This was contrary to the earlier system whereby Malawi had only one party in the parliament, and any opposition was not allowed. While the earlier one-party system underlined nationalism and destroyed ethnic rivalries, the multiparty democracy revived ethnic/tribal politics. Africans in various nations started voting based on their home of origin. Preference is on leaders who are coming from one’s tribe rather than focusing on the political and development agenda. This tribal (some say regional) politics impedes undertaking any nationalist program. For instance, Malawi currently considers patriotism as one of its pillars. In a neoliberal structure marked with tribal/regional politics, the virtue of

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patriotism can hardly be a reality. It is necessary to eliminate tribal politics (voting based on a tribe) first; then patriotism will make sense. A fundamental element of change in the multiparty system was the reduction of the power of the executive, and strengthening of the legislative and judiciary. It is necessary to underline the changing power of the judiciary given that in the earlier government, this was utterly manipulated and controlled by the executive. During the one-party government, the judiciary was sometimes a vehicle of mishandling laws hence violating the freedom of many individuals. In other words, the African leaders in the one-party system often operated above the rule of law. It was, therefore, the desire of neoliberals to clarify and interfere with the role of the rule of law. It is due to this necessity that the question of the legitimacy of the constitution became an essential issue in various African nations more especially in the context of the rule of law. Reforms were required to make sure that the constitution is in line with the free-market principles in different aspects. More freedom was needed to be given to an individual and his protection more especially his property. Firstly, the legislative, which is a body that is given authority to deliberate and make laws for the country, was strongly influenced to develop laws that support the neoliberal understanding of rights. This explains why African multiparty nations have in common the various changes and attempts to change laws to satisfy the demands of the neoliberals. While the members of parliament have often been questioned by the people not to support some laws that go against their cultural beliefs (such as abortion laws), the president in various epochs has been pressurized by the Western neoliberal donors to adopt these controversial laws. The neoliberal reforms will focus on the parliament because of powers invested in this house to amend the constitution of Malawi section 195 to 197. The only tricky part of the whole reliance on the Parliament was that most of the parliamentarians were still affected by their cultural beliefs. While the constitution requires majority rule through a referendum in the amendment (Malawi Constitution 195, a), some of the desires of the majority are not in line with neoliberal principles. For instance, modifying the principles around sodomy through the recommendation by the public would be problematic as the majority would vote against such practices due to traditional and religious influences given that Malawi is considered as religious. Of course, there are some cases where this referendum cannot work, and amendment can be done; in fact, it does not affect the

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substance of the constitution (see Malawi Constitution 196). Summarizing this power of the legislative, the Malawi Constitution (197) reads, Subject to section 196, Parliament may amend those Chapters and sections of this Constitution not listed in the Schedule only if the Bill proposing the amendment is supported by at least two-thirds of the total number of members of the National Assembly entitled to vote.

In all this process, the legislative was expected to respect the desires of the people of Malawi. Secondly, the judiciary gained more power in neoliberal democracy and became independent from any form of manipulation from the presidential powers. Neoliberal thought utilized the constitution and made of these powers depend on it.4 This added the value of the judiciary in Malawi. The new structure of this system weakened the presidential powers, legislative powers, and the judicial powers. For example, the president in this new system was challenged in some of the decisions using the judiciary, often through the injunctions. The actions of the judiciary are here not dependent anymore on the president as it was the case before the introduction of the neoliberal system. Authority of the judiciary is guided by the constitution of Malawi (9), The judiciary shall have the responsibility of interpreting, protecting and enforcing this Constitution and all laws in accordance with this Constitution in an independent and impartial manner with regard only to legally relevant facts and the prescriptions of law.

A good incident that shows the growing power and independence of the judiciary is the presidential election of 2014, which was controversial and contested by the presidential candidate (out-going president) Joyce Banda, among others. What reveals the independence of the judiciary is that she wanted to nullify the elections and come up with a new election within 90 days. According to her, she was not going to stand during these elections so that there will be fair play.5 Nevertheless, the chairman

4 The centrality of the constitution explains why it was amended to introduce elements that express the views of the neoliberals. 5 She was afraid that if she is going to win this may cause difficulties in the country as the others parties will also refute to acknowledge the results as genuine.

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of Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC), Maxon Mbendera, decided to proceed with the counting of the elections. Joyce Banda took an injunction, which was easily vacated. Independence of the judiciary was seen when the case was taken to Justice Nyirenda to decide on this matter. Demonstrating that this was an independent body, he gave a dilemma consisting of a go-ahead to uphold the counting and recount but at the same time, release the results within eight days as mandated by the law. To the disappointment of President Joyce Banda that the judiciary did not listen to her, MEC had no choice looking at the brevity of time it had to follow the law and decided to release the results as they were. Justice Nyirenda acted in this way in respect of the Malawian electoral statutes. Similarly, respecting the Constitution of Malawi, the 2019 Presidential elections were annulled by the high court because of inconsistencies. The third aspect following from above is that the executive, which was indicated as the most powerful entity in democratic socialism, lost its absolute influence on both the judiciary and the legislative. This explains why it has been difficult for the executive to influence this country in various matters that require a final decision, especially in the context of morality. In this new system, the president is called to order now and then by these two independent powers of the government. The old nationalistic ideological style of giving more control to the president who was like a king seems to be gone for good. Of course, in some circumstances, the power of the majority has still some power in Malawian politics. For instance, during the case that tried to impeach President Mutharika, the people stopped some intentions of the legislators in the parliament to remove him from power. Although he had the minority in the parliament by then, he still managed to get his way through with the help of the people. Apart from reducing powers of the classical tripartite political system, legislative, presidential and judiciary, neoliberal democracy introduced civil society.6 This had a unique role in reducing government power as expressed by the tripartite political system and it was further a weapon utilized to represent civilian’s voices. For instance, civil society through different organizations had power and funding to fight against 6 The concept was used in the modern world by Hegel to refer to the civilian society which was fundament in transformation in the capitalist-based relations in the society. This idea was later taken by the philosophy of Alexis Tocqueville.

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some of the laws of Malawi that were against some of the neoliberal rights/freedoms. Their system has therefore been that of pushing not only the legislative body to transform the laws of the country, but the president is also pressurized to transform various rules so that the minority rights are respected. In its history, Malawi claimed to have followed a one-party democracy system in which the civil servants did not play a fundamental role in critical decision-making. In this system, absolute power was given to President Kamuzu Banda who declared himself the life president of the Republic of Malawi. It is due to the lack of freedom on the part of the civil society that the changes supported by neoliberals were more meaningful to the public in the country. Neoliberals needed a courageous civil society that could stand against various abuses of power reflected in the earlier system in Malawi. In 1992, the Catholic Bishops took advantage of this favorable time for the civil servants and decided to write a letter that voiced the grievances of the civil society. Neoliberals saw their dream fulfilled as they were driving toward a form of democracy where the voices of the poor were carried by organizations or different groups of civil servants. This voice gave pressure to President Kamuzu Banda, who gave in and decided to hold a referendum whether to continue with his system of one party or embrace this new form of democracy. One of the commonly known civil society representatives in the early 1990s was the Public Affairs Committee (PAC), the interfaith religious groups including the Episcopal Conference of Malawi (Catholic Church), the Malawi Council of Churches (mainly Protestant denominations), and the Muslim Association of Malawi (MAM) formed this group. These organizations took advantage of the fact that they were in close link with the people. When the new form of democracy was finally embraced, the new president, who thought his party had the power to make decisions through the majority in the parliament, was challenged by civil society on various occasions. The civil society became more powerful as it started forming coalitions. This gave hope to both donors and civil society as they thought they could quickly fulfill their neoliberal agenda.

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But with a friendlier environment, expectations of CSO7 networks have also increased. Donors and government now see networks as key to fulfilling their agendas. The current external reputation of some CSO networks is stronger than the reputation amongst members. Is the honeymoon ending? To answer this, we need to understand more about the actual performance and impact of these networks over the past few years. (Ricky James and Chiku Malunga 2006 wrote in Civil Society Coalition)

While in the early days of democracy the neoliberals gave the impression of heavily relying on political pluralism as an important weapon of checks and balances in politics, their interest in the late 1990s shifted more to the coalition of civil society. This explains why Malawi Economic Network Justice (MENJ) was developed in 2000 to coordinate in the development of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. Neoliberal democracy is problematic in the sense that civil society is sometimes forced to effectuate the neoliberal ideas and agendas. The biggest problem lies in the economic realm as most of these civil servants have no apparent means of generating funds. This leads to a situation of donor dependence. If there is any conflict between the neoliberals and the government, the civil servants can hardly take the position of the people they claim to stand for, as they have to please those that are making these organizations survive.

6.5

Conclusion

The introduction of multiparty democracy in most of the African countries shows that it led to the transformation of various nations in terms of political power and participation. The euphoria of a perfect polity with this form of governance was, however, short-lived, given that some political parties became dominant and kept winning all the elections. This showed that there was not much difference with the earlier one-party

7 The term Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) refer to organization that including nongovernmental organizations, community groups, faith-based organizations, trade unions, informal groups (those without constitutions and boards). The term also encompasses individual activists, including online activists, artists, and writers and human rights defenders, who normally act in the public sphere to advance or defend a viewpoint that others (A Report on CSO Engagement with the Development Effectiveness Agenda in Malawi [2013, 2]: http://www.ccic.ca/_files/en/what_we_do/2014_02_20_Malawi_Case_Study. pdf).

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political system. The direction indicated by Plato the democracies transform into tyranny when they have reached the excess of freedom, became a reality. The manipulation to remain in power by modifying the constitution became common, given that the multiparty system was easily manipulated in various nations. Chapters 8, 9, and 10 will indicate the multiple conflicts that followed the weakening political power of the African governments.

References Aubyinn, A. K. (2002). Behind Transparent Ballot Box: The Significance of the 1990s Elections in Ghana. In M. Cowen & L. Laakso (Eds.), Multiparty Elections in Africa (pp. 75–103). Oxford: Palgrave Macmillan. Bratton, M., & van de Walle, N. (1997). Democratic Experience in Africa. New York: Cambridge University Press. Dahl, R. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven, CT: Yale University. Doorenspleet, R. (2000). Democratic Transitions: Exploring the Structural Sources of the Fourth Wave. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Huntington, S. (1993). The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs, 72(3), 22– 49. Kayange, G. M. (2012). Modern African Nationalistic-Ideological Philosophy: Its Controversial Development in Malawi (1958–2012). African Philosophy, 6, 16–30. Kayange, G. M. (2018). Rediscovering Individual-Based Values in Ubuntu Virtue Ethics: Transforming Corporate Entities in Post-colonial Africa. In R. O. K´o.lá (Ed.), An African Path to a Global Future (pp. 107–129). Washington, DC: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. Levitsky, S. (2002). The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism. Harvard: Harvard University Press. Levitsky, S., & Way, L. (2001). Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Neocosmos, M. (2002). The Politics of National Elections in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland: Towards a Comparative Analysis. In M. Cowen & L. Laako (Eds.), Multi-Party Elections in Africa (pp. 27–59). New York: Palgrave. Nkrumah, K. ([1966] 2000). Consciencism. In E. C. Eze (Ed.), African Philosophy: An Anthology. Malden: Blackwell. Nyerere, J. ([1966] 2000). Leaders Must Not Be Masters. In E. C. Eze (Ed.), African Philosophy: An Anthology (pp. 77–78). Malden: Blackwell. Phiri, M. K., & Ross, K. R. (1998). Democratization in Malawi: A Stocktaking. Blantyre: Claim.

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Popper, K. R. ([1945] 2010). The Open Society and Its Enemies. London: Routledge & Sons. Przeworski, A. (2000). Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Wellbeing in the World, 1950–1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schumpeter, J. (1947). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper & Brothers.

CHAPTER 7

Capitalist Economic Reforms in Africa

7.1

Introduction

Many sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, undertook fundamental reforms to liberalize their economies, including in particular their international trade and foreign exchange rate regimes, in the 1980s and early 1990s. Before liberalization, the foreign exchange regimes of many of these countries were characterized by administrative controls over foreign exchange allocation and current account transactions, extensive rationing of foreign exchange because of persistently weak external accounts, sizeable black market premiums, sometimes reaching 1,000–4,000 percent …, and, importantly, stagnant or declining per capita real income. (Maehle et al. 2013, 5)

The citation above summarizes the gist of capitalist economic reform from ‘government-controlled economy’ to ‘liberalized economy.’ The chapter discusses Africa’s place in the general neoliberal philosophy of economics, which was connected with Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Regan in the USA, and international organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank. This was a new form of the philosophy of capitalism that was founded on the notion of freedom, mainly, individual freedom and market freedom. The basic assumption was that by promoting individual and economic freedom, this will consequently lead to political freedom. The chapter argues that this revolution significantly came to Africa in the © The Author(s) 2020 G. M. Kayange, Capitalism and Freedom in African Political Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44360-3_7

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1980s and transformed the communitarian thinking, which was politicized and claimed to represent the African identity. This communitarian thinking was rooted in the Keynesian economic principles promoted by various African presidents. The neoliberal transformation of Africa was mainly achieved through the introduction of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) and multiparty democracy, which substituted the one-party system. This capitalist revolution wanted to trickle-down wealth from governments to individuals and to promote individual freedom. Below, in Sect. 7.2, I will discuss the old sub-Saharan economic system, which applied a version of the Keynesian philosophy of economy. In Sect. 7.3, the chapter presents the capitalist economic reform that is founded on neoliberal principles. In Sect. 7.4, the chapter will indicate some African experiences of transformation toward a philosophy of economics founded on liberalization.

7.2 Keynesian Reform and the African Condition Philosophy of economics may be considered as a continuum of various systems that come and go. The two dominant philosophies of economics that influence policy development in various nations in Africa are Liberal and Keynesian philosophies. Liberal or neo-capitalist economic reforms are preceded by the Keynesian reform in various African governing political systems. What motivated this reform was the interest to deal with the economic crises that affected various nations. The governments saw it right to control their economy in order to avoid the further economic downfall of their nations. The belief was that economic crises were a consequence of the classical liberal economic principles that encouraged too much market freedom. For instance, there was a Great Depression of 1930–1932 and nations attempted to recover through the development of interventionist principles. It is these principles that were later attributed to the Keynesian philosophy in various nations in Europe, Africa and beyond. In fact, although this philosophy takes the name of the Philosopher Bernard Keynes, it precedes his fundamental works known as, the General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, which was published in 1936. For instance, the intervention of the government in economic matters may be seen in Britain in 1933, whereby the liberal gold measure standard was abandoned. The gold standard measure was a component

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of classical market freedom where value was dictated by market exchange rather than the government. Keynesian philosophy as summarized by Keynes (1936) was more evident in different nations after the Second World War mainly starting from the 1950s. He developed a system that was parallel to the classical capitalist philosophy of economics. In his conceptualization, this philosophy was represented by different thinkers such as Ricardo, J. S. Mill, Marshall, Edgeworth, Adam Smith, and Pigou. Commenting on this philosophy Keynes wrote, ‘The “classical economists” was a name invented by Marx to cover Ricardo and James Mill and their predecessors, that is to say for the founders of the theory which culminated in the Ricardian economics’ (Keynes 1936, 3).1 For example, Ricardo is well-known because of his promotion of free trade and also more specialized industrialization. The specialized industries encouraged the centrality of privatization but at the same time market competition. The element of protectionism was not entertained by the thinkers that encouraged this freedom-based philosophy. Keynes (1936, 22) summarizes the classical theory as dependent on three fundamental assumptions that are interdependent, namely: (i) that the real wage is equal to the marginal disutility of the existing employment; (ii) that there is no such thing as involuntary unemployment in the strict sense; (iii) that supply creates its own demand in the sense that the aggregate demand price is equal to the aggregate supply price for all levels of output and employment. In the first assumption above, the discourse hinges on the correlation between wage and utility (both marginal utility and marginal disutility). He bases this discussion on two postulates: Firstly, the postulate that, The wage is equal to the marginal product of labor. (Keynes 1936, 5)

In the relation of equality in this postulate, the concept ‘wage’ refers to the compensation that is given to a laborer in exchange for the work that has been provided. If this value is in a form of money, then the economists call it nominal wage. It is often expected that the value of this work will be equal to the rendered work. Generally, the determination of value is based on an agreement between the employer and the employee. 1 These philosophers are often regarded as leaders of classical liberal philosophy economics.

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On the other hand, the concept of ‘marginal product of labor’ refers to the output following from hiring one additional subject, while the other factors remain constant. Commenting on the meaning of this postulate, he noted that, ‘That is to say, the wage of an employed person is equal to the value which would be lost if employment were to be reduced by one unit (after deducting any other costs which this reduction of output would avoid); subject, however, to the qualification that the equality may be disturbed, in accordance with certain principles, if competition and markets are imperfect’ (Keynes 1936, 5). While Keynes acknowledges that the postulate calls for the element of demand, desire to purchase goods and services (Keynes 1936, 6), there is an important component that is fundamental for the purposes of this work in the last expression where he gives a condition for the relation between wage and marginal product labor. Equality is guaranteed by good principles that encourage competition and market freedom. This is apparently indicating that any disturbance or interventions that are harmful to this relationship may lead to grave consequences. It seems that this is alluding to the importance of promoting freedom-based principles that will ascertain the liberal labor relations that are naturally controlled by and on the market. Unfortunately, in a Keynesian system, these principles are created and controlled by the government. In the second postulate, it is stated that, The utility of the wage when a given volume of labor is employed is equal to the marginal disutility of that amount of employment. (Keynes 1936, 5)

In this postulate, ‘utility’ generally refers to the element of happiness or pleasure connected with the consumption of a good or service, or from work. The concept of ‘marginal utility’ refers to the change that occurs in our utility, based on one additional unit of consumption. Keynes noted that this postulate calls for the notion of ‘real wage,’ which refers to the amount of goods and services that an employee purchases with his/her wage (the nominal wage). His explanation of the above postulate is as follows, That is to say, the real wage of an employed person is that which is just sufficient (in the estimation of the employed persons themselves) to induce the volume of labour actually employed to be forthcoming; subject to the

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qualification that the equality for each individual unit of labour may be disturbed by combination between employable units analogous to the imperfections of competition which qualify the first postulate. (Keynes 1936, 6–7)

The second assumption forwards the belief that full employment is possible where the liberal principles of thought are followed. The way Keynes has framed the assumption; it brings the problem of employment in the relation between voluntary employment and involuntary unemployment. The classical liberal concept of ‘involuntary unemployment’ questions the situation where individuals that are able and are willing to work at a particularly common or accepted wage rate are unable to get a job. This situation of involuntary unemployment is refuted in the context of classical liberalism, in favor of ‘voluntary unemployment,’ whereby individuals deliberately decide not to work because of the low wage scale, but also lack a satisfactory job according to one’s interests. The classical theory is presupposing that failure to work in a particular context is a consequence of an individuals’ free choice. The third assumption encourages the understanding that aggregate supply and aggregate demand are determined by market relations, and there is no need for government intervention. The aggregate demand, which is the general demand (spending) of everything that forms the economy of a nation, is controlled by market relation behaviors. For instance, when all the prices go down, the behavior of individuals will tend toward spending more (interest rate falls). When the prices go up and there is inflation, then people will not be able to spend more (interest rate goes up). The other element showing how the market adjusts itself is the saving effect. This occurs when the prices go down and individuals immediately decide to save rather than spend. Similarly, market behavior shows that when interest rates go down people convert their money to other forms such as from dollars to pounds (Foreign Exchange Effect). The aggregate supply, which is the production of everything in a particular country, is equally controlled by ‘market relation behaviors.’ For instance, when prices increase it is expected that the behavior of producers will tend to work more and produce more products. The market will similarly control itself when the prices decrease, as the producers will produce less. Classical theory questions whether it will be necessary to allow the

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government to control market forces when they have their own internal mechanisms. According to Keynesian philosophy, the lack of intervention on the part of government indicated above may lead to instability and lack of economic growth. What is required then, is government control (Keynes 1936). The philosophy of government control over market forces in Keynes’ General Theory is summarized in John Hicks (1969) into three aspects: firstly, ‘the effect of investment on income and employmentthe Multiplier theory,’ secondly ‘the effect of interest on investment-the Marginal Efficiency of Capital,’ and thirdly ‘the effect of money supply, or of monetary policy, upon the rate of interest-Liquidity Preference.’ The common idea of government intervention may be indicated contrary to the classical capitalist second assumption of full employment for all. Keynes argues that the belief that everyone can be employed is an illusion. For him, involuntary unemployment is a consequence of insufficiency in terms of effective demand, which can be corrected through government intervention. This may be done through an intervention that increases the aggregate demand. In summary, the aggregate demand, which is calculated by the total spending by households, government, and businesses as noted above, is a fundamental driving element of an economy. The government has to encourage spending if this is not the case in a particular context. In Africa, most of the nations became independent in the 1960s and this period was characterized by Keynesian principles. In the 1950s and 1960s, there was a notable interest in this philosophy in various nations and organizations such as IMF and World Bank. African history coincides with the triumph of this thought, for instance, Ghana became independent in 1957 and various nations in the early and mid-1960s. For instance, the element of government control in the economy may be seen in Zambia in the 1960s through the process of nationalization. Similarly, in Malawi, there was nationalization by Kamuzu Banda’s, which led to the control of the economy by the government in various areas. Nationalization and elements of the Keynesian economy will influence other countries such as Congo under Mobuto’s regime, Tanzania under Nyerere, and Senegal under Senghor.

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Capitalist Economic Reform

Capitalist philosophy for economic reform and development is mainly associated with the ideas of the Washington Consensus, whose cardinal members have been IMF, World Bank, and US Treasury. The early development of this philosophy was based on three fundamental ideas, namely, the development of market economy, the promotion of market discipline and openness to the world (Williamson 1990). There were more ideas and further elaboration of these three ideas, hence making this theory broader. For instance, Narcís Serra and Joseph E. Stiglitz (2008) focused on the ideas of privatization, liberalization, and macro-stability (price stability). These thinkers have summarized the common conception of this philosophy in the following words, ‘More generally, the Washington Consensus has come to be associated with “market fundamentalism,” the view that markets solve most, if not all, economic problems by themselves views from which Williamson has carefully distanced himself.’ This definition perfectly summarizes the neoliberal capitalist philosophy and its emphasis that markets must be left to operate in absolute freedom without any state interference. The theory that represents the Washington Consensus comes from the ideas of Williamson (1990) who coined this term in 1989. This theory had 10 points, which were given by him for discussion toward the improvement of the economic situation of countries in Latin America.2 The main intention was to agree on the policy direction aimed at improving the economic standards. It was meant at reaching an agreement between the politicians (such as Washington Congress politicians) and the technocrats (such as members of the IMF and World Bank). Economic policy reform points included, fiscal discipline, reordering public expenditure priorities, tax reform, liberalizing interest rates, competitive exchange rates, trade liberalization, liberalization of inward foreign direct investments, privatization, deregulation, and property rights. The language that is suggested in these principles prima facie reflects the liberal capitalists’ demand to promote market freedom together with individual freedom as alluded to in Chapter 2. Most of these principles were designed to respond to the various problems that were faced by different nations.

2 A conference titled ‘Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?’ was set to discuss this new theory. The famous paper that was presented by Williamson was ‘What Washington Means by Policy Reform’ (Williamson 2008).

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Fiscal discipline as a point of reform was suggested as a capitalist corrective measure to deal with a specific problem that was noticed in Latin America. The main issue was that the nations were overspending as compared with their income. According to Williamson (1990, 2008), this affected the economic transactions between members of a nation and the members of other countries (balance of payment crisis). There was also an increase in the prices of goods, which made the lives of the masses difficult. In order to correct these consequences, nations were required to control their spending relative to their income. The common language that will be emphasized in this regard is a call to the nation to ‘cut expenditure.’ This cutting of expenditure as a corrective measure was partly related to reordering the priorities in spending. According to Williamson, ‘This suggested switching towards pro-growth and pro-poor expenditures, from things like non-merit subsidies to basic health care, education, and infrastructure.’ However, in various nations, this became very controversial because of the common people’s mind-set, whereby they conceived the government as responsible in all the areas of their well-being. It will be indicated below how this will create the subsidy conflict between some African nations such as Malawi and the capitalist world. Tax reform targets the correction of the economy of the nations by operating on the broad tax base and moderate marginal tax rates. The idea was to target most of the potential tax base, which includes all that may be taxed without exceptions. This was further meant to transform most of the nations which had a narrow tax base that concentrated only on goods, leaving aside other taxable elements, such as services. These reforms wanted to control the tendency of exemptions in the context of tax, but at the same time increase the revenues from this context. While the above reforms are not explicitly linked with the idea of freedom, the rest of the principles are clearly linked with the neoliberal ideas. Liberalizing interest rates was a mechanism of promoting market freedom by easing off control of these rates by the government or the central banks. This suggests some freedom in determining the interest to be added to the principal sum. This has to be a free relation between the borrower and the lender in a particular free-market environment. The competitive exchange rates principle is directed at introducing freedom in the determination of the value of the currency of nation A in relation with nation B. A good example of this exchange that reflects the spirit of the neoliberal capitalists is the free-floating exchange rate, which allows the currency of a particular nation to be determined by the forex market.

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Mainly, the capitalists in large banks determine this free market, and nations are by default expected to follow the suggested currency value (see Williamson 2008, 17). The capitalist liberal conception of freedom is further introduced by calling for the reduction of restrictions that hinders the free exchange of goods in the market (trade liberalization). This reduces the government’s power in charging tariffs on goods that are coming from other countries (e.g., the reduction of duty and surcharges), and also on rules that affect particular goods. Similarly, there is an introduction of freedom in the investments made by an individual in one country to another foreign nation (FDI). For instance, I have a shoe company in Malawi and I want to establish a business in Zambia; it is expected that there will be a reduction in the interventions by the governments in this trade. Liberal capitalists underlined the centrality of individual freedom and participation in business through the introduction of privatization. This was meant at shifting ownership of business and property from the governments to the local individuals. The nations were generally very rich and dominated in business while the rest of the population could not compete adequately in the controlled market. It was therefore important for liberalization to introduce some order in society by empowering the individuals. This was also meant at minimizing the government economic power hence to create a better condition for political freedom. Similarly, deregulation was meant at increasing freedom in the industry by reducing the involvement of the governments. This includes deregulating the practices in the industry with the aim of increasing competition among the industries. The principles of liberal philosophy stated above were very close to the desires expressed by Margaret Thatcher in 1979 as British Prime minister and the President of the US, Regan in 1980. Both were motivated by economic difficulties in their governments and wanted to find a way of addressing them. For instance, in the UK, Thatcher wanted to regulate social unions’ power, which was becoming excessive. This is already an interest to move away from strong communitarian thinking expressed through the associations. She also wanted to deal with the economic crisis that affected growth in the UK. Summarizing on Thatcher as a promoter of neoliberal economic reform, Harvey (2008, 22–23) noted that,

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Under the influence of Keith Joseph, a very active and committed publicist and polemicist with strong connections to the neoliberal Institute of Economic Affairs, she accepted that Keynesianism had to be abandoned and that monetarist ‘supply-side’ solutions were essential to cure the stagflation that had characterized the British economy during the 1970s. She recognized that this meant nothing short of a revolution in fiscal and social policies, and immediately signaled a fierce determination to have done with the institutions and political ways of the social democratic state that had been consolidated in Britain after 1945.

The economic activities of Britain in the 1970s were controlled by the Keynesian economic principles, and Thatcher blamed these as responsible for the poor economic situation of this nation. In this period, Britain was considered the sick man of Europe because of its declining and pathetic economic conditions. The control of the economy by the labor unions paralyzed freedom that was required in the market, hence hindered economic growth. Elements from the free-market philosophy were introduced by Thatcher to improve the economic status of Britain. Robin Harris (2013) who had firsthand experience with her indicate some of the free-market elements in the following passage, ‘We denationalized, we cut taxes, we cut regulation, we did bring down inflation through controlling the money supply. We did all the things which were “impossible,” and as a result, Britain did reverse its economic decline’ (Harris 2013, 6). This is similar to the principles of the Washington Consensus discussed earlier. For instance, denationalization shares the same significance and goal with privatization. They both imply the movement of economic and other powers from the government to the people. Cutting taxes go together with an increase of tax base. This encourages competition rather than making people pay heavy taxes. The element of cutting regulation is captured in the Washington Consensus as a version of deregulation, which minimizes government control. The reforms carried out by Thatcher seemed to confirm that the free-market adjustments were fundamental in improving the economic status of a particular nation. In fact, evidence shows that before her interventions in the period between 1973 and 1979 the economic growth of Britain was very minimal, actually below 1%. On the contrary, since 1979 when she applied free-market principles up to the late 1980s, the economy of Britain grew slightly above 2%.

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Harris (2013) considers Thatcher as sharing ideological stand with Ronald Reagan, who were both promoters of neoliberal economic reform. He noted that ‘They both were real conservatives, both committed cold Warriors who hated communism and socialism’ (Harris 2013, 7). This hatred toward communism and socialism justifies their commitment to free-market ideas, which are strongly founded on individualism. Reagan introduced a version of free-market reform which is commonly known as the Reaganomics. This is centered on various economic reforms that were meant at empowering the citizens toward the generation of wealth, and the removal of strong government regulation in the economic realm. For instance, Reagan called for the deregulation of domestic markets in order to empower market freedom. Tax cuts were employed in order to allow the private sector to reasonably engage in the creation of wealth without the burden of paying too much tax for supporting society. Similarly, the government was expected to cut spending on social issues. This echoes the idea of Hayek which indicated that individuals must not question what the government can do for them, but they should indicate what they can do for the government. A free-market government cannot waste its resources on supporting the community as is the case in the communist-socialist realm. The reforms were expected to increase spending on security, which reflects better the free-market conception that a government must provide security so that individuals can exercise their market activities and rights without any interference from other forces. In his reforms, Reagan wanted to make sure that the government’s power is restructured so that there is a shift toward the individuals. This is reflected in the following passage, which is attributed to Reagan (Magazzino 2010, 2). Only a first step toward reordering the relationship between citizen and government. […] I know that accepting responsibility, especially for cutbacks, is not easy. But this package should be looked at by state and local government as a great step toward not only getting America moving again, but toward restructuring the power system which has led to economic stagnation and urban deterioration.

This passage strongly reflects the heart of classical liberalism and neoliberalism in the context of how to conceptualize the government in relation to the citizen. The power system of the government that is accused of leading to economic problems in the American system is

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founded on the Keynesian economic principles. While this has led to ‘economic stagnation and urban deterioration,’ the free-market principles were expected to bring wealth in this context. The free-market philosophy is generally linked with the notion of the structural adjustment programs, which were created by the International Monetary Fund. The fundamental idea is that the countries that want to get money from the IMF are requested to make certain free-market reforms. Most of the reforms are discussed earlier in the presentation of the neoliberal principles above. For noting, some of these include reduction in government spending as a control measure on the budgets, devaluation, doing business on the basic services such as education and hospital, removal of subsidies, removal of government controls on prices, encourage Foreign Direct Investments, intervene on corruption, trade liberalization, austerity measures against social spending, improve governance and export of agricultural commodities.

7.4 Capitalist Economic Transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa The best context for discussing the African neo-capitalist reforms is through the consideration of the structural adjustment programs (SAPs), which were noted above as a carrier of the capitalist economic theory. By ‘Structural Adjustment Programs’ I refer to reform programs that marked a shift from government-controlled economy to private/individual sector dominance in various sub-Saharan countries such as Uganda, Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia. The SAPs may be considered as policy recommendations created to support developing nations to improve their economy. For example, Boussard (1992, Chapter 3) commenting on the SAPs relative to smallholder farmers noted the fundamental recommendations in the following passage, The essential recommendation was adjusting rates of exchange to increase the internal price of imports, so making them less attractive as well as making exports more profitable. For the same reason, a recommendation was made to remove taxes on exports (such as taxes on cocoa, groundnuts and coffee, which are common in many African countries). Rather than impose import duties, it recommended at least the removal of all import subsidies, such as those that were applied to a number of “strategic commodities”, which often included fertilizers and, in some cases, staple foods. Such fiscal

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policies were especially recommended whenever a rare-of-exchange policy was not possible, as in the case of most of West Africa where currency is tied with the French franc.

What is important for this work is that SAPs may be considered as neoliberal interventions that are apparently driven by the desire to help in terms of policy direction. In fact, considering the above citation, prima facie, they seem to be very helpful for the poor masses. For example, the removal of import duties on subsidies seems to allow for basic needs to enter a particular nation. However, another possible interpretation is that this wanted to encourage free-market aspect, whereby big capitalists could easily sell their products and make a profit without too many restrictions. The question, therefore, that requires further probing is, ‘what was the reason for SAPs?’ One of the commonly discussed reasons for introducing SAPs in Africa was to help developing nations reform and get funds to repay their debts. For instance, Horst Tomann (1988, 203–207)3 in ‘The debt crisis and the structural adjustment programmes in developing countries’ analyzes the World Bank Report which was promoting these programs. Tomann shows that these programs were intended at improving the debt situation of these developing countries. As it is indicated in the following comment on the World Bank report, ‘As the year before, it expresses considerable optimism about the solution of the Third World’s debt problems through growth and an expansion in exports and reiterates the view that the debtor countries could again achieve the high growth rates of the fifties and sixties by adopting rigorous structural adjustment measures’ (Tomann 1988, 203). Similarly, Boussard (1992) views these reforms as partly influenced by the desire to generate and produce more so that developing nations can repay their debt. In this regard, SAPs are therefore a tool used by capitalists to get what belongs to them, and possibly accumulate further capital in the process. Boussard (1992, Chapter) comments on this aspect in the following words, The idea was to generate the savings necessary to repay debt, and to prepare for future production increases. In this respect, structural adjustment programmes resembled growth programmes, except that emphasis was put

3 Tomann, H. (1988). The Debt Crisis and Structural Adjustment in Developing Countries. Intereconomics, 23(5), 203–207.

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on liberalism, market and free enterprise, whereas during the preceding period direct state intervention in production was deemed, if not a prerequisite to growth policy, at least a necessary evil.

Apart from the interest to repay debts, why did the SAPs succeed to dominate in most of the African nations? From 1979 to the early 1980s, most of the African nations were undergoing economic difficulties and this created a good ground for a search for a solution. For instance, commenting on the situation of Ghana, Nils Maehle et al. (2013, 13) indicated that, The economy was in a poor shape in 1982–83. Real per capita income had declined by 27 percent since 1970 (Figures 1, 2); fiscal revenue had declined to only 4–6 percent of GDP (Figure 12); and with foreign aid close to zero, imports through official recorded channels had been compressed from 24 percent of GDP in 1970 to only 3 percent of GDP in 1982. The foreign exchange reserves had been almost depleted, and large external payments arrears had been incurred.

Ghana had other problems such as high inflation. This experience of a series of economic failures is also present in countries such as Mozambique, Malawi, and Zambia; it seems that the African experience of underperformance in the economic sector was the same. There were also other factors that contributed to the poor economic performance in the subSaharan region such as wars and drought. For example, in Mozambique in the early 1980s the economy was affected by the war involving the Freedom Liberation Movement (Frelimo, influenced by communist principles) and Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Renamo, influenced by capitalist principles). Other notable wars that contribute toward the weak economy in Africa include countries such as Sudan, Uganda, and Somalia. Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis (2000, 1) indicated that ‘Over the last 40 years nearly 20 African countries (or about 40 percent of Africa south of the Sahara (SSA)) have experienced at least one period of civil war.’ For Cote d’Ivoire, economic crisis followed the fall of prices of coffee and cocoa in the 1980s, which are the main income-generating crops. This signaled the importance of helping this nation through the SAPs, an agreement that was reached with the IMF in 1989 and 1991. This facilitated a provision of loans from the IMF and the World Bank departing from 1989. The government was expected to cut its expenditure, increase

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the tax base, and many other liberal economic adjustments. The currency was devalued, for instance in 1994, and other reforms such as market deregulation, privatization, and reduction of the civil servants took shape. In most of the African nations, the best area where these reforms may be adequately considered is the agricultural industry. This is following the understanding that most of these nations such as Malawi, Zimbabwe, and Tanzania were substantially founded on the Agricultural economy. For instance in Malawi, 80% of Malawi’s population lives in the villages and survives on Agriculture. This suggests that the highest employer and labor force is Agriculture. This is confirmed by the Malawi Economic Growth (2004, 1). The Malawi economy remains agro-based with the agriculture sector accounting for over 38.6% of GDP, employing about 84.5% of the labor force and accounting for 82.5% of foreign exchange earnings. In Tanzania, while there are around 48 million people, Agriculture contributes about 27% of its GDP, with most of the population employed in this sector. In Zambia, Agriculture contributes around 19% of its GDP and employees almost 75% of the population. In most African nations, agriculture is characterized by a dual structure consisting of commercial estates that grows cash crops and a large smallholder sub-sector that is mainly engaged in mixed subsistence farming. Crops such as maize, sorghum, and cassava are mainly grown for food, while tobacco and tea are for commercial use. For instance, in Malawi, maize is regarded as the staple food, accounts for 80% of cultivated land in the smallholder sub-sector. The main agricultural export crop is tobacco, followed by tea, sugar, and coffee. SAPs introduced liberalization in this sector against the government controls that were characteristic in the agricultural sector in different nations. For instance, from the late 1920s to 1980, the common tendency was developing different control measures meant at boosting the economy. For example, government controls were carried out by the Native Tobacco Board, as early as 1926, which determined the requirements for the growing of tobacco by the natives. Tobacco Industry Marketing Board controls and regulates the market of tobacco in Zimbabwe. Of course, these boards are coming back in order to regulate the use of tobacco for health purposes such as the Tobacco Board of Kenya 2007. A similar strategic board of government control over crops grown by farmers was through the Maize Control Board in 1949. This board determined the principles required to be followed in buying and selling of

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maize in this country. In the same period, the Cotton Control Board was established to indicate terms for growing and selling cotton in Malawi. A good part of colonial governance proved to be guided by various principles that affected the Agricultural marketing industry. Apart from the boards that regulate the tobacco market in some instances, the nations have developed corporations guided by the governments. One such development is the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC), which was developed in Malawi in 1971. This was a state enterprise, which was given the power to lead the nation in developing Agricultural marketing strategies and to provide facilities that were required. Another important enterprise, which assisted in marketing and development, was Malawi Development Corporation (MDC). Market control intensified mainly in the 1970s such that different officers were given the mandate to make sure that the right prices were followed by traders even in the local markets. Although neoliberalism wanted to eliminate the controlled economy, the neoliberals were also worried about state-owned enterprises, which dominated the economy of nations. Funding these enterprises led to various financial problems. The state was, in fact, using a lot of money in supporting ADMARC, which was undergoing financial difficulties mainly in 1979–1981. The other aspect was the desire to boost individual participation in the economy of Malawi. Whatever the reason was, the neoliberals realized that there was a chance of introducing their philosophical agenda in Malawi due to the difficulties that were present in this nation. Coincidently, Malawi was undergoing an economic crisis in 1979–1980 due to a number of factors. For example, the war between the ruling party Frelimo and Renamo in Mozambique intensified, such that it was difficult for Malawi to use the Mozambican coasts in import and exports (Malawi being a lack locked country, see Ng’ong’ola 1996, 3). Life became tough for poor people as different commodities became scarce and prices increased. In the early 1980s, Malawi was advised to abandon elements of democratic socialism and encouraged to embrace free-market philosophy by implementing SPAs in different sectors.4 Did the SAPs manage to improve the African economic condition? There is a debate on whether they were successful or not. The IMF and the World Bank have on some occasions indicated that these programs

4 See Appendix II for some reforms in Malawi.

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have been successful. For example, this may be seen in the World Bank reports of 1994 and 2000 where the reforms were claimed to work in those countries that followed the directives. On the contrary, Easterly (2000)5 argues that the results were not substantial in terms of poverty reduction in most of the nations where the reforms were implemented. The neoliberal economic reform is further questioned because of its contribution to the worldwide crisis in 2007/2008. While there may be different sentiments toward SAPs ranging from the best way of helping developing countries, a necessary evil, to the worst capitalist strategy of interfering with the sovereignty of developing nations, there are many objective questions that may be asked requiring objective answers (both in favor and against the SAPs). I will not give further details on capitalist economic transformation in sub-Saharan Africa, given that there are many studies that have analyzed this aspect. What I want to underline is that almost all sub-Saharan countries in the African continent were subjected to liberal economic forms. Writing in 1989, Cleary (1989, 41) indicated that some thirty African nations in the sub-Saharan region were already implementing the SAPs as conditions for borrowing money from the IMF. This number increased in the 1990s given that many nations started implementing these reforms. There are slight differences on the emphasis on these liberal reforms and the results were equally different.

7.5

Conclusion

The capitalist reforms were implemented in different African nations with the help of various conditions accompanying them. It is difficult to tell that African nations reformed because of the value of these capitalist reforms. Apparently, most of these nations had no choice, given that their refusal to reform had grave consequences. The reaction of the capitalists through the IMF, World Bank, and the donor communities was very strong for the poor African nations. Generally, the donor nations had the tendency of withdrawing from the nation that refused to apply the aspects of reform that were requested by these capitalists. One of the scapegoats used was that the African nations are refusing to embrace democracy, hence they were withdrawing aid. Of course, some of the reasons for this withdrawal were genuine, but in some circumstances, the overemphasis 5 Easterly, W. (2000). The Effect of IMF and World Bank Programs on Poverty. Mimeographed. The World Bank, Washington, DC.

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on liberal economic principles was detrimental toward African development. Generally, African nations were left in a dilemma on whether to develop their own policies defying the demands of the neoliberals and face the harsh economic consequences caused by the withdrawal of donors or embrace the new ideas. The next chapter will focus on the conflict caused by this reform.

References Boussard, Jean-Marc. (1992). The impact of structural adjustments on smallholders. Economic and Social Development Paper. FAO: United Nations. Cleary, S. (1989). Structural Adjustment in Africa. Trocaire Development Review, 1989, 41–59. Elbadawi, I., & Sambanis, N. (2000). Why are there so many civil wars in Africa? Understanding and preventing violent conflict. Journal of African economies. 1–31. Harris, R. (2013). Not for Turning: The Life of Margaret Thatcher (No. 1237). The Heritage Foundation. Harvey, D. (2008). A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hicks, J. R. (1969). A Theory of Economic History. London: Oxford University Press. Keynes, J. M. ([1936] 2018). The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money. Cambridge, Cambridgeshire: Palgrave. Maehle, N., Teferra, H., & Khachatryan, A. (2013). Exchange Rate Liberalization in Selected Sub-Saharan African Countries Successes, Failures, and Lessons (IMF Working Paper WP/13/32). International Monetary Fund. Magazzino, C. (2010). The Economic Policy of Ronald Reagan. Rome: Roma Tre University, DIPES. Malawi Economic Growth. (2004). Report. Ministry of Economic Planning and Development. Lilongwe: Malawi Government. Ng’ong’ola, D. H. (1996). Analysis of Policy Reform and Structural Adjustment Programs in Malawi: With Emphasis on Agriculture and Trade. Bunda: USAID. Serra, N., & Stiglitz, J. E. (2008). The Washington Consensus Reconsidered. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tomann, H. (1988). The Debt Crisis and Structural Adjustment in Developing Countries. Intereconomics, 23, 203–207. Williamson, J. (1990). Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? Washington: Institute for International Economics. Williamson, J. (2008). A Short History of Washington Consensus. In N. Serra & J. E. Stiglitz (Eds.), The Washington Consensus Reconsidered (pp. 14–30). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

CHAPTER 8

Economic Freedom Conflict

8.1

Introduction

Is economic freedom feasible in African politics? The neoliberal economic reform discussed in the previous chapter is apparently a very attractive transformation, although it did not go smoothly without conflicts. In fact, it raised many questions on whether to fully embrace the suggested reforms or to continue Africanizing and controlling the economy independent of foreign influence. It may be questioned, ‘Are African countries free to adapt and build their economic policies based on a theory of their choice?’ ‘Can African nations say no to foreign economic conditionalities and pursue their independent economic agenda?’ ‘Can they liberate their nations from economic dependence syndrome?’ Whatever answers can be given, below I present practical economic controversies that affect African nations when they want to decide on policies and the related implementation strategies. There is no African nation that was spared from the capitalist reforms, which were accompanied by various crises such as devaluation. This has been true of countries such as Angola, Cote devoir, Nigeria, Zambia, and Zimbabwe which experienced a series of changes in the value of their currency because of devaluation. The instability of the value of currencies was indicative of the complications of market freedom. While different nations will raise concerns toward the neo-capitalist economic philosophy, there are two notable recent conflicts experienced in Malawi under President © The Author(s) 2020 G. M. Kayange, Capitalism and Freedom in African Political Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44360-3_8

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Mutharika and in Zimbabwe under President Mugabe. The former conflict regards the neo-capitalist economic principles, while the latter regards neo-capitalist means of production, mainly, the problem of land. Although there are different interesting economic conflicts that hinge on economic philosophy in various African nations such as Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Zaire, I will focus on a case study of Malawi. My choice is firstly based on the fact that Malawi through President Mutharika has clearly presented this conflict in various works. Another reason is that living in Malawi, I have experienced and witnessed the economic conflict between this nation and the Western capitalists. Apart from the experience of Malawi, I will also focus on Zimbabwe more especially because of the conflicts around the means of production. In both conflicts, the African nations are forced to transform through the introduction of various sanctions. The sanctions will worsen the economic conditions hence force for the adoption of the demands of the capitalists. In Sect. 8.2, I will discuss the conflict between economic dependence and independence. This dilemma has highly affected Africa’s involvement in economic affairs. In Sect. 8.3, I will focus on economic policy conflict. I will firstly consider the Zimbabwean conflict under Mugabe and the neocapitalist philosophy. Mugabe and Mutharika were known for being tough Pan-Africanists, and at the same time, they share the same fate in terms of receiving various sanctions and criticisms because of their methods. Both wanted to build a form of economics based on the Africanization of economic philosophy, but at the same time founded on the government’s control and intervention in the market.

8.2

Economic Dependence or Independence?

Can African nations control their economy as independent nations amidst economic dependence on foreign aid/debt? Can the assumed communitarian philosophy lead to economic independence? This first fundamental economic philosophy conflict is between economic dependence and independence. Conceptual analysis of the concept ‘dependence’ entails that the continued existence of a particular element is tied to another element. Dependence calls for the logic of conditionals or implication, which states a relation that if A then B (symbolized as A ⊃ B). This logic excludes the idea that B can economically do well when A has failed to

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do so. A nation that depends on another nation cannot do well without its antecedent. However, the expectation is that the bilateral relations between nations require the notion of ‘mutual economic dependence’ (inter-dependence). The logic that is expected between nations may be defined by a bi-conditional, that A if and only if B (A ≡ B). This suggests that the two nations equally benefit. On the other hand, the concept ‘economic independence’ implies that a nation lives an economic life without constraints, it is self-supporting. The idea of independence is interchangeable with the notion of economic freedom. This is whether an individual has the power to determine what type of relation he/she wants to enter and has a say in developing conditions for a particular relation. The question that we may now ask is, ‘what type of economic relation model is followed by the African and other so-called developing nations?’ Obviously, the way conditions are dictated by the Western markets, and banks (IMF and World Bank), and donors show that economic mutual dependence may hardly be the case. The type of relationship that is holding between Western capitalists and underdeveloped nations is theorized pretty well by the dependency theory, which states that resources move from the poor nations and are concentrated in the developing countries. In this unbalanced relation, the poor nations continue to be impoverished while the rich nations increase their wealth at the expense of the former. Determining this factor requires a further study on whether the conditionality and other strategies are benefitting more the Western capitalist nations or the underdeveloped countries. This work cannot determine this as it is out of its scope; however, the general sentiments in the dependency theory are that this is the case. In fact, it is contended in this theory that in some circumstances economic dependence may be created in order to benefit from the poor nations. Let us consider further the relation between economic dependence and independence in the African setting. African nations in the sub-Saharan region have gone through various economic conflicts since the 1980s. The main philosophical problem has been the dilemma between dependence on Western capitalists supporting the African nations and independence, whereas independent nations were free to make relevant decisions in the economic context. History shows that African nations were colonized by capitalists and their economy depended on them. The question still remains whether the independence of Africa also meant economic independence. Apparently, it seems that this is not the case, given that African nations still want the Western capitalist to support them in terms

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of their fragile economies. In most cases, a capitalist does not help without conditions in terms of what he/she will get back together with interest. The common condition is often to pay back what a nation has borrowed with an interest. Benefiting from the conflict between economic dependence and independence, the neo-capitalists have gone beyond asking for interest, but has set further conditions in terms of who can borrow and what must a nation do in order to be given a credit. It was discussed in the previous chapter, the neo-capitalists through the IMF, World Bank, and other capitalist organizations have seriously demanded reforms as a condition for this borrowing. Although these are freedom-based organizations, one wonders the definition of freedom. What is freedom for them? Or better what is economic freedom? Does borrowing + condition 1 (interest) + condition 2 (change your economic structure/policies) + condition 3 (change your habits/behavior) still entail freedom? Philosophers of economics may speculate on these questions; for instance, one possible answer is that African nations are still free because they decide to borrow knowing the various conditions attached to what they desire to get. A different response is that the nature of borrowing has various constraints most of which reflect a lack of freedom. In this case, economic freedom may be viewed as a mere utopia. The conflict between economic dependence and independence is seen further in the notion of African debt, which was partly discussed above. African nations have had difficulties in financing their annual budgets and they have sought help from the Western capitalists and other nations. Of course, almost all nations in the world have debts, but the condition of the African debt was worsened in the 1980s to the fact that most of the nations were failing to pay back. This attracted the development of debt relief programs aimed at helping nations that are struggling to pay back, more especially sub-Saharan nations. Here the point is that a nation that survives on debt and cannot manage to pay back up to seeking pardon and cancellation of debt is not free or independent.

8.3

Private Property Conflict: Land Alienation

Is land a property of the indigenous community or some capitalists? African communitarian philosophy has supported that the black community is the rightful owner of land, which was passed on from the ancestors. The leaders have the responsibility to equally share this land with the

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members of the community based on their needs. On the other hand, the development of events in African politics has led to the application of the principle of just acquisition, where individuals can enter into agreement and exchange land for money value, with the approval of the relevant authorities (chiefs and government). Those that had money during the colonial rule and the one-party system managed to accumulate more land for themselves until a clear difference between those that owned more land and those that had little or none. The problem is that those that owned more land were very few privileged individuals, while those that had little were the masses. Conflicts came when politicians attempted to redistribute land without respecting the private owners. A famous economic conflict on ownership of land occurred in Zimbabwe. It was part of the federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland as noted earlier, but it was unique because it had more colonials who were engaged in capitalist activities such as commercial farming. The setting of the capitalist conflict before considering it at a government level was between the white population engaged in commercial farming and the peasantry involved in subsistence farming. Whitlow (1985, 309) indicated that ‘a commercial farming system dominated by some 4600 European farmers and, a peasant farming system where an estimated 820,000 African families are involved in agriculture on a full-time basis.’ (see also Whitlow 1988, 419–433). What is paradoxical is that the commercial farmers who were generally white capitalists owned fertile land amounting to 14.4 million hectares (commercial land) while the peasants 16.3 million of land (communal land), which was often not fertile. This became one of the causes of dissatisfaction on the part of the black peasants, who felt that there was injustice in the division and use of land. This inequality was further worsened by the various benefits that were given to commercial farmers as opposed to the peasants. The conflict became apparent when Zimbabwe became independent under President Mugabe in 1980 who adopted African communitarian economic philosophy (a form of socialism). This made the government to side with the peasants against the capitalists who promoted the component of their freedom to own land and competition in a free economy. In the early solution of the conflict, the British Prime Minister, Thatcher, attempted to provide funds for buying and redistributing land to those that freely wanted to sell; however, this initiative ended with Tony Briar. The government of Zimbabwe decided to implement land reform. At first, the government made it compulsory that it wanted to buy some

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land from the white farmers, but later in 2000, it took the land by force and redistributed it to the peasants. This practice continued up to 2018 when it was discontinued. The above story of taking land from the capitalist owners was motivated by the interest of Mugabe to fulfill the communitarian aspect of solidarity and mutual support. Focus here is on the black community which is being supported based on the assumed traditional conception that land was owned and shared by everyone. Every individual has the right to receive land in this country. On the contrary for the capitalists, the taking away of land from the white settlers was a violation of property rights. This was a violation of the fundamental democratic right regarding private ownership of property. Apart from this, the government of Mugabe was accused of not respecting other democratic principles, such as free and fair elections. Western capitalist nations attempted forcing Zimbabwe to change through sanctions. The USA, the UK, and Australia will be among the first to pass sanctions in 2001 and 2002. Some of these include stopping any process of cancellation of debts and no loans to be given to Zimbabwe. Mugabe and other officials will be banned from traveling to Europe and related nations and this will be accompanied by financial sanctions. In this conflict, Mugabe will be recognized by the peasants as fulfilling the principles of communitarianism, making sure that the whole community benefit and not only a few capitalists. Given that African nations are often dependent on the Western capitalists, the economy of Zimbabwe will start crumbling. The Zimbabwean dollar will continuously lose its value, to the point that foreign currency (the US dollar) will be used as an alternative. The poverty levels will start rising as basic and other needs will become very expensive. Intellectuals will start moving away from Zimbabwe to the neighboring countries and beyond. Mugabe did not easily give up on the conditions and sanctions given but will continue to be defiant toward the Western demands. He repeatedly noted that Zimbabwe was not under the Western capitalist but it was an independent nation. The deteriorating conditions in Zimbabwe in the economic realm created a situation of mistrust in the government, such that this led to a special case of a coup de tat by some soldiers. Their interest was apparently the elimination of Mugabe’s socialism and replacing it with neo-capitalist theory. The extent to which the neo-capitalist influenced the soldiers in this coup is still a question of contention.

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8.4 Government Control Versus Market Freedom: Devaluation and Price Control Economic policy conflict may be traced in the notion of (a) devaluation and (b) control of market prices. (a) Are African nations free to devalue the currency as they wish? The commonly debated controversy between neoliberals and African nations was on the issue of devaluation of the currency. While the neoliberals pushed African nations to devalue the currency and adopt a freefloating exchange rate (flexible exchange rate) the later believed in a fixed exchange rate which was controlled by the government. Often the fixed exchange system leads to the parallel structures commonly known as the black markets, which attempt to follow their own exchange rate as required in the free market. This black market is created to make sure that free-market principles supported by the neoliberals are observed. Mutharika’s admiration of controlled economy in Malawi may be evidenced in his interest in the system of Hastings Kamuzu Banda (1964– 1994), the Malawi government opted for a fixed exchange and controlled Malawian currency. The main reason for this was to direct economic growth in the country, and further, the government wanted to protect poor Malawians from the effects of inflation. The system was also meant at ensuring investors that they will not suffer losses when the market changes. Hastings Kamuzu Banda had to follow this fixed way as he was influenced by Keynesian economic principles, which tried to ensure growth through such controls. In the early days mainly from 1965 to the early 1980s, the idea of floating the Malawian currency was greatly discouraged as this was thought to disturb the economic growth. The Kwacha currency was attached to the British pound and this helped the achievement of some stability. Whatever was happening to the British currency was also the case for Malawian currency. Later departing from 1973 the government wanted more control over the currency. This made the government hook the currency to both the British pound and the American dollar. In 1984 with the introduction of neoliberal principles in the country, Malawi was advised to hook its currency to the IMF system. This led Malawi to hook its currency to weighted seven basket currencies. Currencies in the basket and their weights were as follows (Table 8.1).

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Table 8.1 Currencies weights

Country

Currency

USA UK South Africa Germany France Japan The Netherlands

Dollar Pound sterling Rand Deutsche mark Franc Yen Guilder

Weight (%) 27 27 18 7 7 7 7

This was a slight introduction to the neoliberal world where the country had to lose slowly its control over the currency as other currencies started determining its value. Of course, as an African nationalist, Hastings Kamuzu Banda tried to control devaluation but he was criticized by the external market forces. A hard blow for Malawi’s control over its currency occurred with the official embracement of the neoliberal system in 1994. In this year, the neoliberal system was almost entirely gone although most of the members in the new system were still having some characteristics from the earlier government. This is the time when Malawi agreed to free float its currency hence adopting the flexibility model. In spite of this adoption of flexibility, President Muluzi, who took over from Hastings Kamuzu Banda, saw it necessary to slightly control the floatation of the Kwacha currency in the Market. What is very important for this work is the decision of the Democratic Socialism of Mutharika (2004–2012) to go back to a controlled economy, a model similar in some respects to that of Hastings Kamuzu Banda. It is due to this transformation that started slowly and reached its climax with a controversy between the Malawi government and the donor community (most of whom adopted the neoliberal economy/free-market economy). The argument of Mutharika was that there is no need to devalue the kwacha because the arguments by the IMF and other donors are not helpful or advantageous for Malawi. He focused more on criticizing the argument that devaluation will make Malawi more competitive in the international market. Tobacco, tea, and cotton, which are the main products that are exported by Malawi, have fixed prices and they cannot be affected by devaluation. Devaluation will make sense for Malawi only in a situation where Malawi will have a diversified economy exporting different things

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to the outside world. Mutharika argued that the economics done by IMF is not clear and it seems they don’t even understand what they are trying to do. It is believed that devaluation will lead to economic stability, but any tampering with the currency does not necessarily lead to economic stability. In his view, Mutharika argued that devaluation will highly affect Malawi and prices will instantly rise. Economists argued that the Kwacha is overvalued but they were not specific in what they meant. Mutharika argued further that devaluation is forced by the neoliberals on the poor countries, but in their home of origin, they don’t want to devalue. Although there were different consequences that followed Mutharika’s refusal to devalue Malawian currency and also follow other free-market principles that were put in place by the neoliberals, one of the main consequences was the scarcity of forex in Malawi. The president reacted in different ways to the shortage of forex. For instance, he closed some of the forex bureaus, which were accused of operating without respecting the terms of operation that were put in place by the government. Similarly, the black-market exchange increased its operations following the market forces. The result of lack of forex triggered by the refusal to devalue the Kwacha led to other problems such as the fuel crisis, lack of medicine in some public hospitals, the rise in living conditions, and scarcity of money in the private sector. Life of the citizens became so difficult, and consequently, a series of protests against the president started. The unfortunate part of the whole story is that most of the citizens in Malawi did not reflect on the problem in terms of systems that contributed to Mutharika’s policy orientation and the neoliberal thought. Credit was given to the neoliberals who argued that the Malawian policy orientation has made it fail to govern the nation. The question is, ‘Was this true?’ When Mutharika died, he was succeeded by Joyce Banda came back with the triumph of neoliberalism as she announced a total reverse of the decisions made by the African Nationalistic Democratic Socialism of Mutharika. As a common teacher who was not an expert in economics, she relied on a group of politicians who surrounded her. A good number of these politicians were apparently those that were against Mutharika’s policies. She, therefore, decided to put an end to the devaluation problem by following the decision of the neoliberals to devalue the currency by 50%.

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To correct these imbalances and comply with donor requirements for the reestablishment of aid flows, Joyce Banda made the politically difficult decision to devalue the kwacha by 50% in early May 2012 and then let it float at market-set rates. In the long run, the devaluation is intended to bring parity to the official and black-market currency exchange rates, and provide market incentives to spur greater domestic production and export of crops like tobacco and sugar. This devaluation and other faithful responses to the neoliberals made the donors come back to Malawi and continue their project of economic and other forms of liberalization. This helped solve the forex crisis and the related problems that the country was going through. For example, the fuel crisis was completely gone. Common citizens in Malawi generally looked at how things are happening on the ground and they slowly started supporting the new president. On the contrary, the sociopolitical and economic system was continuously weakened by the absolute embracement of neoliberal policies. In the whole history of Malawi, it may be indicated that devaluation increased immediately when neoliberal principles were applied and on the contrary decreased when the government applied Democratic Socialism. For example, very few instances of devaluation are recorded in the period between 1964 and 1979. The main devaluation occurred in 1967 whereby Malawian currency was devalued by 14% in line with the devaluation of the British pound. The period between 1980 and 1993 when Kamuzu Banda was forced by IMF to apply neoliberal principles, a series of devaluations were done. For example, in 1982 it was devalued by 15%. In 1983, it was devalued by 12%. In April 1985, it was devalued by 15% and in August by 10%. In February 1987, it was devalued by 20%. In January 1988, it was devalued by 15%. In March 1990, it was devalued by 7%. In March and July 1992, it was devalued by 15 and 22%, respectively. President Muluzi continued the history of devaluation by allowing the Kwacha float in the free-market economy. This made the currency to continuously lose its original value. He further produced a record devaluation in 1998 of 28% in August and then 23% (51% devaluation of the Kwacha). Mutharika after a lot of pressure from the IMF devalued the currency by 10% in August 2011. As indicated earlier, further devaluations will be done by Joyce Banda who favored neoliberalism and removed all the government control in fixing the value of Malawian currency. With the new president Peter Mutharika, there is not much that is done since 2014 as

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the Malawian currency is left to be valued by the free market without any government control. (b) Does Malawi need to liberalize tobacco prices or not? The main controversy between neoliberals and the democratic socialism of Mutharika has focused on the problem of controlling the prices of tobacco. From 1980 to 2008, Malawi has often witnessed tobacco cover over 70% of its exports. In the second year of Mutharika’s reign in 2011, Malawian tobacco was 50% of the exports and this had a lot of impact on the economic status of this country. In the earlier years such as 2008 and 2009, it was almost accounting for 70% of Malawi’s exports. The problem of fixing prices can be easily understood by departing from the whole liberalization process of the tobacco industry that was suggested by the neoliberals to the government of Malawi. The system of Hastings Kamuzu Banda reinforced the production of tobacco to boost the economy of Malawi. As part of the process, smallholder farmers were not allowed to grow burley cured tobacco due to the Special Crops Act of 1972. It is only licensed estate owners that were advantaged to grow this type of tobacco. When the neoliberal capitalists came in the 1980s, they used their financial advantage to force Malawi to change the Special Crops Act. This was done through a special credit program known as Agriculture Sector Adjustment Program (ASAP). This was supposed to be given to Malawi on the condition that it accepts the liberalization of tobacco growing so that this can benefit also the smallholder farmers. The neoliberals through the World Bank managed to change this situation as the government agreed to slowly change its position by giving quotas of production to smallholder farmers up to 1996 when the Act was completely abolished. After this liberalization of tobacco growing, the neoliberals started tempering also with tobacco markets and the determination of prices. They wanted neoliberal principles to be employed and respected throughout the country. It is this area of market and price liberalization that will create a clear controversy with the democratic socialism. The liberalization of the market and prices may be traced to the freedom-based market structure. In the past, burley tobacco was sold only to the Agriculture Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC), but with liberalization, farmers were allowed to directly sell their tobacco to the auction floors. The idea was to help them compete

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in the world market. On the contrary, they became more vulnerable to buyers in the context of prices. The free-market system led to the Mediate Buyer Program in 1993, which also stopped the monopoly of auction floors as buyers of tobacco. It was realized that this free-market system led to the deterioration of tobacco quality in Malawi and the government decided to stop it in 2000. This led the government back to slightly controlled markets of tobacco, whereby only auction floors and ADMARC were the only places where farmers can sell their tobacco; of course, the later is slowly disappearing due to the privatization process that is affecting state-owned businesses. Mutharika did not like how the market-determined prices as this practice did not benefit smallholder farmers. He, therefore, decided to intervene in fixing prices not only of tobacco but also other products such as tea and cotton. The accusation by free-market advocates was that Mutharika was going against market principles by intervening in market prices. For tobacco and cotton, his complaint was that there was no international market for these crops. Tobacco is grown and prepared by local farmers and then buyers act as middlemen who sell these products to the international companies at pre-fixed prices. The problem for him was that buyers were buying these crops at a very low price and they were selling them at a very high price. It is this injustice that led him to fix tobacco prices so that the ordinary farmers may as well benefit from selling their products. The history of this conflict may be traced from 2005 to 2006 when Mutharika indicated his dissatisfaction with the tendency of the tobacco buyers in fixing prices for Malawians. In 2005, smallholder farmers decided to boycott prices that were set by the neoliberals who did everything to their own advantage. Farmers failed to sustain this boycott as they feared that their tobacco was about to go bad. There was not much that could be done by the Tobacco Control Commission of Malawi, which was powerless in front of the free-market principles that were applied by buyers. The buyers agreed to slightly raise prices to make sure that they reached a compromise. In 2009 tobacco openning auction speech in Lilongwe, he fixed the prices to benefit the smallholder farmers by indicating that ‘The minimum price for burley tobacco this year will now be US$2.15 per kg and US$3.09 per kg for Flu cured and I want all tobacco farmers not to allow anything below this.’ He did this as a reaction toward the neoliberals who according to him in 2008 formed cartels that were determining tobacco

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prices that were disadvantageous to the poor farmers in the villages. Earlier in 2008, the prices were influenced by buyers ‘at a minimum of $1.85 and $2.70 for flue-cured tobacco.’ While Kamuzu Banda and Mutharika tried to control tobacco prices, the current Malawian government, which is oriented toward neoliberalism by default, has in 2016 completely given power to the free market to determine the prices of tobacco. In an opening speech of tobacco market sells the president gave the buyers authority to determine the prices and at the same time urged them to suggest fair prices to the people. Although the ruling party is the same Democratic Peoples’ Party, which had various conflicts due to fixing prices and other issues, there is a complete turn of attitude. While the neoliberals and foreign buyers are happy with this new arrangement, the poor smallholder farmers feel not protected as they are left to adhere to the decisions modeled based on free-market principles. Apparently, the poor have no way out as they have two choices only, either they agree and sell or they don’t and remain with their tobacco. Deciding not to sell due to the low prices implies completely losing as tobacco is a product that continuously loses value if not processed in due time. What is the best economic orientation for Malawi? The problem cannot be simply solved by giving credit to democratic socialism or neoliberalism is given that there are a number of factors affecting the Malawian economy. The dependence on tobacco has a lot to decide whatever the system is adopted by the government. The dependence on foreign aid, which is mostly controlled by neoliberals is likely decisive in Malawi’s economy. A good example may be seen in both Hastings Kamuzu Banda and Mutharika. The moment they decided to withdraw aid the economy of Malawi heavily suffered. One could think that the best option is to wholly embrace the neoliberal model, but the lack of government control for Malawians has proved to be fatal in the economic and moral contexts.

8.5

Conclusion

The chapter has discussed various economic conflicts that are a consequence of the reforms that were undertaken by the capitalist in the subSaharan region. The discussion shows that African nations are trapped in a circle of dependence on capitalist nations. One of the causes has been

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the fact that most of these nations are forced by the Western capitalist policies to remain under the neo-capitalist. One of the deadly traps that have affected these nations is the idea of debts. Most of these nations are trying their best to give back the money they borrowed from Europe. Unfortunately, it seems that the money that is collected by Africans is lost in trying to service the debts. Devaluation has been another condition that has often negatively affected nations in the sub-Saharan region. Other common conflicts have been experienced around the idea of the government fixing prices in the market. This has been highly discouraged and has led to a big conflict. Is economic freedom possible? From the above discussion it seems that in the African context as long as there is dependence on the capitalist world, economic freedom will never be the case. I am aware that this requires a lot of sacrifice. Although the above discussion suffices in indicating the economic conflicts in the African context, there are many other problematic issues that will not be discussed in this chapter. I would like to note that the economic liberalization of the African economy created a series of related conflicts regarding whether the government has to provide economic support to the masses toward the fulfillment of their needs. An area that may require close attention is the liberalization of hospitals, where individuals have to pay for the services they get. In very poor African nations, this is becoming a big problem that is leading to difficult questions toward the value of neo-capitalism. Are the poor nations ready to liberalize hospital services leaving those that cannot afford it? Are African governments ready to continue subsidizing health services in a context where its economic power is weakened? If it is indicated that those who can pay let them do so, and those that are poor, let the government pay. Is this going to be the right solution? In summary, the conflict between government economic support and individual responsibility begs a lot of questions, whose answers are difficult to provide.

References Whitlow, R. (1985). Conflicts in land use in Zimbabwe: Political economic and environmental perspectives. Land Use Policy, 2(4), 3009–3022. Whitlow, R. (1988). Soil erosion and conservation policy in Zimbabwe. Land Use Policy, 5(4), 419–433.

CHAPTER 9

Sovereignty and Political Freedom Conflict Between African Communitarianism and Capitalism

9.1

Introduction

Are African Heads of States or nations answerable to the international community or any other foreign powers on matters of common interest? This question raises the problem of political freedom and more specifically the issue of national sovereignty. In the African communitarian framework inspired by Pan-Africa principles, a nation is an independent community that has to decide what is best for its individuals (Mutharika 1995). Similarly, a Head of State is a sovereign who has the power to decide on matters that concern the citizens, and no one is allowed to interfere with him. An external intervention on a Head of State is tantamount to the violation of national freedom or independence. In the Western capitalist context, there are laws that defend individual rights and other freedoms; hence, it is such laws that are sovereign (Nozick 1974). Any individual, Head of State is answerable to the international law on any actions against human rights, regardless of being a sovereign in a particular context. The international community is designed to protect the common interests of the citizens (ICC: International Criminal Court).1

1 Also known as the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

© The Author(s) 2020 G. M. Kayange, Capitalism and Freedom in African Political Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44360-3_9

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In this chapter, I will focus on the conflict of sovereignty with reference to the ICC’s interventions on African seating heads of state. This intervention that has tested the African notion of sovereignty is seen in the cases of Al Bashir who was the President of Sudan2 and Uhuru Kenyatta the President of Kenya. I will focus mainly on Al Bashir’s case, which has attracted a conflict involving different parties such as the African Union, the ICC, some African nations, and non-governmental organizations. It will be argued that, while this is a freedom conflict, it is substantially rooted in the problem of the relation between principles and ideologies. For instance, the conflict is influenced by the choice of the theory of sovereignty, which may focus on the sovereign understood as the individual, the collective members of the state, or the constitution/laws as the sovereign. Secondly, it is influenced by the relation between African communitarian principles and Western capitalist principles. The chapter will build this conflict by firstly clarifying the concept of sovereignty, focusing on Hobbes’ version and Rousseau’s version in Sect. 9.2. Section 9.3, will present the sovereignty conflict mainly the warrant of arrest involving Al Bashir, ICC, African Union, and some African states. In Sect. 9.4, the chapter will present the position that defends the sovereignty of the African Head of State even in those circumstances where there is the assumption that human rights have been violated. In Sect. 9.5, the chapter discusses the position that denies absolute sovereignty on an individual Head of State and recognizes the international law and community as the sovereign.

9.2

Conceptualizing Sovereignty

African leaders on different occasions have affirmed that their nations are sovereign. This confirmation mainly comes when they are in conflict with the foreign nations (Mutharika 2010a; Museven 2017). What is meant by ‘being sovereign nations,’ requires a clarification of the significance of this concept in the context of political philosophy. In the history of philosophy, the concept of sovereignty is mainly used in two different senses. Firstly, it is used to refer to the absolute authority of the monarch or a leader of a particular nation, or an assembly representing the masses. In other cases, it is used to refer to the collective authority of the people

2 Recently, Al Bashir has been removed from power by his military.

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forming up a particular nation. The use by different African leaders may fall under these meanings, depending on the type of leader who is using this concept. For example, if in the government of Nyerere the word sovereignty is used, then it refers to the authority of all the citizens acting together. If it was used by a dictator such as Idi Amin, then it implies that he is referring to his absolute power. (1) Theoretical elaboration of the first conception of the word sovereignty above may be given using the framework of Hobbes. According to Hobbes, in the Leviathan, he discusses the sovereign power or the absolute power with reference to the commonwealth. The sovereign or absolute power is a person or an assembly representative of all and every one of forms of the multitude in the commonwealth (Hobbes [1651] 1998, 123). The word ‘commonwealth’ refers to different political systems, which according to him are mainly reducible to three; monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. The assumption is therefore that the sovereign power in a monarchy is the king, hence absolute monarchism. In aristocracy, the sovereign is an assembly of a group of people (a part) representing the masses. In the context of democracy, a sovereign is a group representing everyone that is endorsed by other political parties and the masses. Putting it in Hobbes’ words, he writes, For the representative must needs be one man, or more: and if more, then it is the assembly of all, or but of a part. When the representative is one man, then is the commonwealth a MONARCHY: when an assembly of all that will come together, then it is a DEMOCRACY, or popular commonwealth: when an assembly of a part only, then it is called an ARISTOCRACY. Other kind of commonwealth there can be none: for either one, or more, or all, must have the sovereign power (which I have shown to be indivisible) entire. (Hobbes [1651]1998, 123)

In any form of commonwealth, individuals are expected to willingly surrender their power to the sovereign. The question is why do individuals need to subject their will to the sovereign power? In Leviathan, Hobbes argues that individuals are in a ‘state of war’ given that each one tries to fulfill his self-preservation. The state of war is generally avoided because of the presence of rationality which helps individuals to discern the natural laws that are fundamental for the survival of everyone. Knowing these natural laws doesn’t guarantee that all individuals in the community will follow them. In order to avoid a chaotic environment, each individual

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must abandon the natural law to do whatever he/she wants. It is in this context that Hobbes calls for the sovereign power that will be a custodian of the laws of nature and at the same time will guide the masses in the civil society. The sovereign power is obeyed by everyone, regardless of the personal interests of the individuals. Hobbes argued that this abandonment of personal desires toward the sovereign is necessitated by the fact that this power was instituted by the multitude of men to represent their interests. This authority is therefore recognized by those that voted for the power (whether a person or an assembly) and those that did not vote or had a contrary opinion. This is clearly echoed in the following words, ‘[e]very one, as well he that voted for it, as he that voted against it, shall authorize all the actions and judgments, of that man, or assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against other men’ (Hobbes [1651]1998, 115). The sovereign has absolute power given by the people, and there is a long list of rights and duties, such as sovereign power cannot be forfeited, right not to be put to death, right to appoint office bearers, and prescribing the rules. What can be learned from Hobbes in the African political setting is that, any absolute power practiced by an elected president is in view of his/her being a supreme leader. For example, the situation of Swaziland with King Sobhuza as suggested in Chapter 6 shows that the Monarchical notion of the commonwealth is apparently at work. This qualifies Sobhuza as a sovereign monarch. This seems to be indicative of the understanding that absolute power, although it comes from the element of democracy where individuals (majority) gave consent to the leader, it does not entail political freedom. Similarly, in democratic Botswana, the elected president is expected to have absolute power, etc. (2) Theoretical elaboration of the second conception of the sovereign is provided by the framework of Rousseau. In this context, sovereignty refers to all the citizens that act collectively. Commenting on the people forming the general will, Rousseau noted that, ‘As regards the associates, they collectively take the name of people and are individually called citizens as being participants in sovereign authority, and subjects as Being bound by the laws of the state’ (Rousseau 1987, 56). In Rousseau, what apparently guides the sovereign, are the laws of a particular nation. This is because they reflect the common good of the citizens that represent the sovereign power. Commenting on this aspect

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he wrote, ‘The sovereign’s only strength being its legislative powers, it acts only by its laws; and laws being nothing but the authentic decisions of the general will, the sovereign is unable to act unless the people are assembled’ (Rousseau 1987, 122). This idea explains that acting based on the law is sovereign because the law is a reflection of the general will. All the citizens are represented in the development of the laws of the nation departing from the constitution to all the other laws that govern life in civil society. Individuals are bound to follow the laws, as is expressed in the following passage, In order therefore that the social pact should not be an empty formula, it contains an implicit obligation which alone can give force to the others, that if anyone refuses to obey the general will he will be compelled to do so by the whole body; which means nothing else than that he will be forced to be free; for such is the condition which, giving each citizen to his country, guarantees that he will not depend on any person. This condition is the device that ensures the operation of the political machine; it alone legitimizes civil obligations, which without it would be absurd and tyrannical, and subject to the most terrible abuses. (Rousseau 1987, 57)

It may be argued that some African nations in both a one-party system (mainly the competitive one-party system) and the multiparty system utilized Rousseau’s concept of sovereignty. This depends on the nature of government but also on the ideological influences that drive a particular nation. For example, the model of sovereignty suggested by Rousseau may apply in different African nations such as in Tanzania. This may be considered in both the competitive one-party system of President Nyerere and the current multiparty democracy of President Magufuli. In Nyerere’s one-party system, the general will of the people represented the whole community as guided by socialist principles. The socialist laws in Tanzania equally represented the general will of the people. Similarly, in the multiparty system of Magufuli, the will of the people is represented by members of parliament who make laws to represent the whole population. In the multiparty system, the common expression that summarizes the role of rule of law is, ‘No one is above the law.’ The paradox with the sovereignty of the laws in view of the general will is that there are some laws that are manipulated or wrongly framed by the

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representatives of the people. Laws of this nature, often become oppressive to the very individuals they were created to defend. For example, some laws such as the death penalty do represent the will of the people in various nations. However, this law has raised a big debate regarding the importance of the right to life. This has led to the elimination of this law in some nations. Some laws have also violated the rights of individuals; on the contrary, these may still be supported because they represent the sovereign will of the citizens. Other laws that are supported by the will of the people such as Sharia Law have often caused concern on whether they take into consideration the individuals belonging to other faiths, etc. In other words, most of these laws are subjective in nature; hence, they lack universality or objectivity. In short, it may be noted that the rule of the people reflected in the laws may be manipulated by lawmakers who may not necessarily represent the will of the people. The other difficult issue is that these laws require interpretation, and this raises a lot of concern in some of the governments that are led by the dictators. In such circumstances, the tendency is generally to interpret the laws for personal benefit. Similarly, creation of laws is obscured by personal interests.

9.3 African Head of State as Sovereign: ICC and Al Bashiri’s Case African Union (AU), International Criminal Court (ICC), and various African countries such as Djibouti, Chad, Malawi, and Kenya have recently been involved in a sovereignty and freedom conflict with respect to the application of ICC’s Warrants of Arrest of President Omar Hassan Ahmed Al Bashir of Sudan. The ICC wanted him to be tried in court against his sovereign status, to avoid perpetuating impunity behind sovereignty. The first warrant was offered on 4 March 2009 for crimes against humanity and war crimes, and the second in July 2010 for genocide (as indicated by the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber I). The crimes were committed against the people of Darfur in Sudan (see Schabas 2007, 47ff.). These crimes have led to devastating consequences since 2003. In fact, 2.7 million people are reported to have fled their homes since the conflict began in 2003 and 300,000 have lost their lives according to the United Nations (BBC News, 4 May 2012). The Sudanese government sees this figure of the dead as exaggerated, and it estimated the dead to be 12,000.

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The ICC and Darfur Warrants of Arrest

The ICC has had a great interest in dealing with the situation in Darfur (indicated above) following the intervention of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which reported about the situation in Darfur on 31 March 2005. In UNSC resolution 1593, countries and organizations were urged to cooperate with the ICC in dealing with this situation. Given that it was indicated earlier that the difficulties faced in Darfur started in 2003, it means that the UNSC waited for two years before this fundamental resolution (Schabas 2007, 49ff.). As is well-known, this decision followed the international outcry against the atrocities committed in Darfur. It is based on this that the ICC started issuing warrants of arrest to some Sudanese leaders involved in the Darfur situation. One of the first warrants of arrest was issued by the Pre-Trial Chamber 1 on 27 May 2007 against the Humanitarian Affairs Minister of Sudan, Ahmad Mohammad Harun, and Ali Mohammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (Ali Kushayb). They were both suspected of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Harun is allegedly accused of 42 counts due to his individual responsibility as indicated by articles 25(3)(b) and 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute, and Al Rahman has 50 counts based on articles 25(3)(a) and 25(3)(d) of the same Statute. Harun has twenty counts under crimes against humanity, while Rahman has 22 counts. The former has 22 counts of war crimes, while the latter has 28 counts. While the above subjects are still indicated to be at large by the ICC, there are some members who are under arrest by the ICC. The first is Bahr Idriss Abu Garda, the Chairman and General Coordinator of Military Operations of the United Resistance Front, whose first appearance was on 18 May 2009. The second is Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain, Commander-in-chief of Justice and Equality Movement Collective-Leadership, one of the components of the United Resistance Front, who first appeared in court on 17 June 2010. Thirdly, Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, former Chief of Staff of SLA-Unity, currently integrated into the Justice and Equality Movement. The fourth is Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein, who was the Minister of National Defence and former Minister of the Interior, and a former Sudanese President’s Special Representative in Darfur. His warrant was issued on 1 March 2012. The purpose of this work is not to discuss further these personalities and their warrants of arrests, but Al Bashir’s Warrants of Arrest which have drawn Malawi into the conundrum.

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The most controversial of the warrants of arrests were issued against Omar Hassan Ahmed Al Bashir, the President of the Republic of Sudan (Mendes 2010, 38–40, 86ff.). As briefly indicated earlier, the first was issued on 4 March 2009 and the second on 12 July 2010. The requests of cooperation to all State Parties to the Rome Statute were forwarded on 6 March 2009 and 21 July 2010, respectively. The requests claimed that Al Bashir committed crimes against humanity in Darfur, Sudan. Generally, a warrant of arrest does not have exceptions; it is issued equally to any person who has committed crimes against humanity with the aim of prosecuting the targeted subject. Its main objective according to the Preamble of the Rome Statute is to make sure that Al Bashir, if found guilty, must be punished as a perpetrator of crimes against humanity. The issuing of the warrants of arrest implies that the government of Sudan failed to try him in view of his being the Head of State. Below is a further consideration of the content of the two ICC’s Warrants of Arrest. 9.3.2

Content of al Bashir’s Warrant of Arrest

In the official Web site of the ICC, the warrant of arrest is expressed in the following text: ‘Mr. Al Bashir is allegedly criminally responsible for ten counts on the basis of his individual criminal responsibility under Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute as an indirect (co) perpetrator….’ These ten counts include: a. The five counts that refer to crimes against humanity. He is held responsible for murder, extermination, forcible transfer, torture, and rape. All these are part of Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute. b. The second set of accusations fall under the war crimes expressed in Article 8(2) of the same Statute. This implies that he intentionally directed his soldiers and other followers to attack the innocent people who were not concerned with the hostilities in his country. This further implies that he is accused of pillaging those citizens who according to him were against his rule. c. The third accusation regards genocide, which according to Article 6(a, b, and c) regards genocide killing of human subjects, genocide inflicting of serious bodily and mental harm and deliberately putting conditions on human beings that led to the physical destruction of the inflicted subjects.

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Warrant of Arrest, Binding on the Signatories of the ICC

Part 9, of the Rome Statute, ‘international co-operation and judicial assistance,’ calls for cooperation among the member states and other organizations. This implies that all signatories to the Rome Statute are expected to cooperate. The general obligation of cooperation to these states is indicated in Article 86 of the statute. Building on Article 87, ICC sent requests to State Parties to arrest and surrender President Al Bashir, following the above warrants. The first communiqué was on 6 March. The ICC’s registry sent this request after being mandated by the Pre-Trial Chamber. A second request was forwarded to the interested parties on 26 July 2009. Based on this warrant, all the countries, more especially those that are signatories to the Rome Statute, were expected to collaborate in compliance with the articles of ICC, such as articles 89 and 91. In principle, the demands of the ICC were quite clear to the States Parties, but the application of the warrants of arrest led to difficulties among some of the African countries due to other principles of the African Union and the rules of their countries to which they belong. Further difficulties came due to the fact that it is not an easy task to arrest a sitting Head of State due to the fear of conflicting with the government of Sudan. This feared conflict is seen in the decisions of countries like Kenya, Chad, Malawi, and others. Below are the responses of Malawi to the request of the ICC.

9.4 Afro-Communitarian Pro-Hobbesian Sovereignty Response Although the figures above are apparently enough to involve all the countries in arresting President Al Bashir, a number of presidents in the countries such as Malawi, Egypt, Chad, South Africa, and Kenya have decided to go against this warrant of arrest. The decision was mainly motivated by the conception of sovereignty relative to the seating head of state, who cannot be prosecuted by any individual as a sovereign. They have therefore allowed him to enter their territories and leave without any difficulty. This has generally been the decision of heads of state as a way of exercising their power as sovereign leaders in their respective nations. The thinking has mainly focused on the understanding that a country such as Chad has its own independence to decide who enters and goes out of

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its territory without interference from the external forces. This is often underlined by leaders that have embraced the pan-African communitarian thinking. Related to this, the AU pan-African position, which indicated that the African nations should not cooperate in 2009, highly contributed to the decisions by these nations? In some cases, the laws of the interested nations were interpreted by the seating African presidents in favor of not arresting Al Bashir. I will regard this position not to arrest Al Bashir as influenced by a form of Afro-communitarian Pro-Hobbesian notion of sovereignty. In brief, this is the recognition of absolute power in a person, the sitting African head of state, hence this calls for immunity. The Afro-communitarian position is flexible for the Africans as a community to deal with their own issues as influenced by the pan-African principles. Below I outline the basis of saying no to the arrest of Al Bashir as a seating President as influenced by the Afro-communitarian thinking. The first backing will come from the laws relative to the African Union and second will be with reference to the interpretation of the local laws that African nations have. 9.4.1

Pan-African Influence

The Pan-African influence refers to the declaration of the AU in 2009, which indicated that African nations have to stop collaborating with the ICC on the grounds that it was targeting Africans. This targeting of African nations is here considered as a form of neo-colonialism, which wants to subject Africans under capitalist influence. It is an infringement of the sovereignty of both the African leaders and the power of the masses. The strong recommendation in 2009 mainly came from countries such as Djibouti, Cameroon, and Senegal. Their main reference was the case of Al Bashir, although the developments of other arrests in Africa also contributed to this position. A similar call to boycott the ICC was also repeated in various meetings of the AU such as the Addis Ababa summit which took place in 2013. This was mainly in reference to the ICC case involving the Kenyan President, Uhuru Kenyatta, which according to the AU would have been best attended to in Kenya, which is a sovereign state. Although it was focusing on the status of Uhuru Kenyatta, it applied to all African states and presidents, including Al Bashir. One of the resolutions indicated that African heads of state shall not appear in any international court during their term

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of office. Similarly, through the UN Security Council, the ICC was asked to stop the proceedings based on Article 16 of the Rome Statutes. It must be noted that the position of the African Union is based on some important principles on which it is founded. The violation of such principles undermines its own reason for existence in the African context. These principles are in fact explicative of the negative response to the ICC in spite of the obligations following its being a signatory to the ICC Rome Statute. Below are some of the principles. Firstly, the core principle is the worldwide Unity and Solidarity of the Africans. The term ‘African’ is applied to all citizens of African origin regardless of their color. It may be argued that presidents who denied the implementation of the arrest warrant were acting in favor of the unity and solidarity toward Sudan as one of the countries in Africa. The ICC’s request is seen as challenging this solidarity. These nations are, therefore, caught in a dilemma whether to sacrifice its solidarity by betraying a fellow African leader or to ignore ICC’s demand. The second Pan-African principle is clearly deducible from the justification of no response based on the form of the Immunities and Privileges Act. This calls for the enactment of the Pan-African principle of the sovereignty of an African State. A sovereign state requires independence in dealing with most of the issues that arise within its territory. Consequently, this suggests that any African nation as a sovereign African state has the authority to decide what is right for the country based on its internal law. Although it was not explicitly said by the presidents, it may be argued that the ICC, as an international body, is generally founded on the Western world principles. This increases suspicion that the ICC is intervening too much in African affairs, violating the fact that African countries are sovereign states. The third principle is ridding the African continent of the remaining vestiges of colonization and apartheid. The African States vowed during the development of the Organisation of the African Union (the predecessor of the AU) that they will support each other so that all members may be liberated from colonial rule. The trial of a sitting African Head of State in this context would imply a new form of colonialism, whereby the African leaders are still being subjected to the Western-based organizations. A Pan-African adherer may further look with suspicion at the fact that important countries like USA and Israel decided to withdraw their being State Parties of the ICC’s Rome Statute. The question is, If ICC is

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important, why did the USA decide to withdraw? This withdrawal leads to questioning the universality of the ICC’s jurisdiction. The principles above were originally embraced by the Organisation of the African Union, which was founded on Pan-Africanism. The current African Union which replaced it maintained some of the principles, but there are still nostalgic tendencies to continue with most of the principles of the old organization. A Pan-Africanist shows sympathy toward the AU and is ready to follow its directives. Apparently, the African nations had no choice but to support the position of the African Union. 9.4.2

Local Decisions by African Presidents

African presidents, who followed the AU position, had other factors that supported their no to the arrest suggested by the ICC. While there are various interesting cases, I will discuss (1) the case of Malawi with Mutharika, who immediately after the 2009 influence by the AU he became its Chairperson in 2010. Apart from this fact, he proved to be a strong supporter of a version of Afro communitarianism, rooted in the notion of African renaissance, which supported the move from African bondage in various situations to freedom. In fact, the element of African sovereignty was according to him a key to positive thinking about Africa. (2) Apart from Mutharika, another interesting case is Kenya’s position in saying no to the arrest of Omar Al Bashir. Kenya is important because it also ended up with a similar problem of the arrest of its head of state and sovereignty in 2013. (3) I will further interpret the no response as also caused by a conflict of principles. (1) In Mutharika’s epoch on 14 October 2011, Malawi offered a categorical no to the ICC’s Warrants of Arrest by deciding to allow President Omar Al Bashir to attend the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) meeting which was held in Lilongwe from 14 to 15 October 2011. This decision was firm defiance of the ICC’s Statute. It was, further, a move against the UNSC which urged countries to collaborate in Resolution 1593 (2005). Was Malawi justified in its decision to go against the ICC’s Warrants of Arrest? The AU and Malawi felt that this position was justifiable while ICC felt that it was not. The arguments in favor of Malawi’s decision as forwarded by both the Republic of Malawi and AU can be summarized by the following argument: (a) ‘Al Bashir is a sitting Head of State.’

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(b) ‘Any subject satisfying (a) has immunities and privileges, including the freedom of arrest and persecution within the territories of Malawi.’ (c) Therefore, Malawi cannot arrest Al Bashir given (a) and (b). What is the justification of this thinking? Firstly, Malawi argued that the (i) International Law and (ii) the Immunities and Privileges Act of Malawi, support granting Al Bashir immunity, based on his privilege as a sitting Head of State. (i) The issue regarding the international law is presented by the PreTrial Chamber 1 (No.: ICC-02/05-01/09; 12 December 2011) as contained in the Rome Statute (98(1)) as follows: The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the co-operation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity.

The Statute suggests that it requires the involvement of Sudan to cooperate before Malawi applies the directives given by the ICC. The situation becomes difficult based on the grounds that Sudan is not a signatory to the ICC’s Rome Statute; therefore, the issue of cooperation is out of the question. This argument would have been very strong in favor of Malawi’s position because there is further evidence with reference to the pronouncement of the ICC regarding the arrest warrant case of Democratic Republic of Congo V. Belgium as quoted by the African Union: The ICJ3 stated that “it has been unable to deduce … that there exists under customary international law any form of exception to the rule according to immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs, where they are suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity.”

Contrary to this position of the ICC, AU, and Malawi as supported by the international law, the ICC clearly indicates that it does not give immunity to those who have committed crimes against humanity, whether they are Heads of States or not. The explanation of the ICC position is 3 This means International Court of Justice, which is also known as International Criminal Court.

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that the immunity referred to concerns only national jurisdiction and not International courts. (ii) The issue of Immunities and Privileges Act of Malawi justifies the position above, given that the president is supposed to respect the rule of law in his country if he is to continue existing. Both arguments were refuted by the ICC. The argument based on Malawi’s act is denied with the help of International Law Article 23 of the Vienna Convention of the law of treatise held on 23 May 1969. This denies the use of internal law as a justification for a country’s failure to perform a treaty. ICC further argued with examples that the international law does not give any immunity to a head of state who has committed crimes against humanity in view of his position (ICC, No. 02/05-01/09, 12 December 2011). The ICC went ahead in applying Article 87(7) and related articles as punishment to Malawi for willingly defying its indication and failing to keep its obligations (Articles 86, 87(7), 89, 109(2), and 109(3)). This move was justified further by the fact that Malawi did not want to apply Article 97 of the Rome Statute, which provided a chance for consulting with the ICC in case there was a problem in the application of its directives. It further indicated that Malawi did not respect the sole authority of the court with respect to Article 119(1) of the Statute. (2) The developments in Kenya may be traced in the refusal of President Kenyatta to abide by the arrest warrant of the ICC in 2010 when he entered the country to attend the signing of the New Constitution of Kenya. Al Bashir was a special guest during the ceremony and was given an important role to play. This did not please the member state parties of the ICC, given that Kenya was by then a member of this international court. In fact, the ICC wrote to the United Nations to act on the defiant behavior demonstrated by the Kenyan leader. Surprisingly, other nonmember states such as the USA, through President Obama, indicated that they were not happy with the action of Kenya. One of the arguments against the decision of Kenya to defy the ICC’s warrant of arrest was that being a party member of the ICC, it was legally bound to implement the arrest. A contrary argument is that Kenya was also bound to the African Union which strictly indicated that African nations should not corporate with the ICC as noted above. This nocorporation position, was also tried immediately after the New Constitution launch when Al Bashir was expected to visit Kenya the same year (2010) in October. The visit was to attend the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) meeting, which was scheduled for August

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2010. The ICC acted quickly given that on 25 October, Pre-Trial Chamber 1 of the ICC wrote the Kenyan government on the matters concerning the plan to arrest Al Bashir. This plan was a follow up to the warrant of arrest through ICJ-Kenya on 18 October 2018. The non-corporative spirit of the Kenyan leader, made the members of the IGD move the venue of the meeting to Addis Ababa. The battle in Kenya after its defiance to ICC has been between the government and the courts, which we’re trying to make the arrest of Al Bashir mandatory in Kenya. The high court issued an order to the Attorney General to get a warrant on his arrest. The most discussed articles interpreted in favor of obeying the ICC’s warrant is given by articles 2(5) and 2(6) of the New Constitution of 2010. In this debate, it is further backed by the International Crimes Act of 2008 (Act No. 16, section 4(1) and 131(1)(c)). The courts were mainly acting with the sovereignty concept that gets insights from Rousseau, which gives the law an upper hand rather than the person of the president as noted earlier. In fact, it is clearly seen in the invocation of Article 143(4) of the Kenyan New Constitution, which states that ‘[t]he immunity of the President under this Article shall not extend to a crime for which the President may be prosecuted under any treaty to which Kenya is party and which prohibits such immunity.’ This article apparently goes against the element of immunity, which by implication meant that President Al Bashir shouldn’t be defended based on personal sovereignty as was the case. (3) In both experiences, it is clear that African nations are faced with a complex conflict of principles. The principles of their nations say one thing, the pan-African says another thing, and the ICC say another thing. The conflict of principles mainly stands between the Pan-African thinking and that of the ICC. For example in the case of Malawi, the first clash of principles is clearly seen with respect to the Immunities and Privileges Act of the Republic of Malawi (Chilenga 2011, 26) which is contrary to the arrest of a Head of State on Malawian soil and the ICC’s obligations to comply with the court as indicated by articles, 86, 87, 88, 89. The articles became binding on Malawi since 1 December 2002 when it became part of the court under the leadership of President Bakili Muluzi. Failing to comply with the request, the court has the authority to open a disciplinary finding of non-cooperation and refer the country to the UN Security Council for further action as indicated by 87(7) and 91 of

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the Rome Statute. Malawi’s dilemma here is whether it must follow its national obligations as set by the Immunities and Privileges Act or to follow the ICC cooperation-obligation as a member state. A similar principle that forbids the cooperation of African countries to apply the demands of the ICC with respect to the arrest of Al Bashir was set by the AU. The main reason for this decision is due to Article 98 of the Rome Statute. In its 13th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government it indicated clearly that, ‘in view of the fact that the request by the African Union has never been acted upon (by UN Security Council), the AU member states shall not cooperate pursuant to the provisions of Article 98 of the Rome Statute of the ICC relating to immunities, for the arrest and surrender of President Omar Al Bashir of the Sudan.’ Aggravating the conflict is Malawi’s obligations to the principles set by the AU. In fact, the African Union demands its member states ‘to comply with the decisions and policies of the Union’ as indicated by Article 23(2) of the Constitutive Act. In this line of thought, it is expected of all the African countries who are members to comply. Malawi is obliged by the provisions of Rule 33 of the Assembly to comply. A further dilemma for Malawi here consists in whether it must fulfill its obligations to the ICC or the African Union. Regardless of the decisions above and their motivation, the question still remains: Is Malawi supposed to follow its principles, or ICC’s or AU’s demands? If the answer is in favor of Malawi, then ICC and AU must modify their principles with respect to the issue of immunities of the sitting Heads of States. If the answer is not in favor of Malawi, then Malawi must modify its laws with reference to immunities. The conflict of principles and deciding to act based on the sovereignty of a particular president has various consequences in the capitalist world. A big problem is seen in the context of African dependence on the capitalist and other nations. The denial to abide by the ICC and other international organizations comes with its price in terms of credibility and in some cases in affects donor relations. For instance, in the case of Mutharika, his defiance affected the donations that Malawi was receiving. Of course, there were also other reasons, but this was surely one of them. Malawi immediately experienced the interruption of funds from different international organizations. For instance, the Extended Credit Fund of the IMF was interrupted in 2011. The president was, however, not ready to give in to the demands of the Western donor countries.

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Mutharika was seen as a president who does not want to listen to others, more especially to the demands of the international community. This was supported by the fact that he failed to collaborate with the ICC and showed no interest to explain that there was a problem with whether Malawi must follow the IMF directives or not.

9.5

Afro-Capitalist Rousseau’s Sovereignty Response

In some African nations, some leaders influenced by courts, national pressure, and capitalists influence, have vowed to arrest Al Bashir. The common conception has been that the law is more sovereign than the individual person heading a particular nation. They, therefore, were bound by the law to establish strict measures against Al Bashir visiting their nations. This experience will strongly be present in different nations such as Zambia, which vowed to implement the warrant of arrest. In some countries because of the decision of the courts and pressure groups, such as the case of South Africa and Kenya, the leaders were pressurized to arrest him. Other nations such as Malawi, when leadership changed in 2012, vowed to arrest Al Bashir, who was planning to visit the country. This is indicative of the fact that the change of leaders and their ideological orientation was decisive in their decision toward the warrant of arrest. Below I will discuss the interesting incident of Malawi which was against ICC’s up to May 2012 and then became a pro-ICC warrant of arrest. In the epoch of President Joyce Banda, President Al Bashir was expected back to Malawi in July 2012 for the heads of state summit of the AU. Contrary to his predecessor’s decision, she decided to offer positive response to ICC’s warrant of arrest by indicating that Al Bashir will be arrested if he lands on the soil of Malawi. This decision was arrived at after Malawi’s failed attempts to convince the AU to allow only a representative of Sudan to attend the meeting and not the president. AU responded by giving Malawi an out-out situation. It was either supposed to accept his arrival in Malawi hence ignore ICC’s demands or the meeting was expected to be shifted to Ethiopia, which is the headquarters of the Union. Malawi’s argument was that the nation was afraid of the economic implications that the decision to accept him was going to cause. The country was already in serious economic difficulties which were inherited from the previous government of Mutharika.

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The response of President Joyce Banda above may be considered as based on utilitarian principles. The basic principle guiding her may be formulated as follows: Malawi’s action is good if it maximizes a pleasurable outcome and diminishes pain. Malawi’s pain here consists in the economic crisis which followed the death of Mutharika. Joyce Banda’s administration captures the pain of Malawi in the following words: The new administration inherited a very difficult economic situation, marked by a severe shortage of foreign exchange which led to shortages of critical imports including fuel, inputs for production and medicines. Delays in making payments abroad led to the loss of credit lines for several businesses, resulting in scaled-down operations and the laying off of workers. Malawi’s long-standing foreign exchange problems intensified in 2011 because of lower tobacco export earnings and the interruption of the ECF-supported program with the IMF which led several donors to cut their general budget support grants to Malawi. (IMF 2012, 3)

Following this situation, any good action or decision must lead to the improvement of Malawi’s economic situation. The interest is, therefore, not necessarily doing what was morally right in the conflict above, but acting in such a way that Malawi’s interest is met. In this context, the action or decision is meant to pleasing international donors. The fact is that, by pleasing the ICC, which is an international organization, Malawi has a wider chance of bringing back donors at a larger scale. AU was therefore left aside by Malawi, given that most of the donors are from the Western world. It may be argued that if most of the donors were coming from the AU, Malawi was ready to support AU’s directive not to cooperate with the Warrants of Arrest of Al Bashir. Utilitarianism is not only practiced by President Joyce Banda, but it was also primarily present in President Kamuzu Banda who underlined the fact that decision-making with respect to international relations must be based on what is right for Malawians. There are elements of sovereignty linked with the general will. This form of utilitarianism is different from Joyce Banda’s in the sense that Kamuzu underlined the aspect of pleasing Malawians (Short 1974, 175), while the latter underlines the aspect of what is pleasing to the donors. Her form of utilitarianism wants to avoid any possible conflict with donors, while the one of Kamuzu has a fair chance of not pleasing donors, that is, if the demands are not in line with what is best for Malawians. In this explanation, Kamuzu was a

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strong nationalist, not ready to compromise or sacrifice Malawi’s pleasurable ends for the good of the foreign powers. The first implication is that the utilitarian mentality led Malawi to start acquiring most of its interests, such as economic needs. The country started creating a better image worldwide, which meant the coming back of donors. IMF showed its readiness to support Malawi with the Extended Credit Fund, the USA showed interest to revisit the Millennium Goals Fund and give Malawi the funds it decided to withdraw earlier. As of now, utilitarian principles seem to be working for the Malawi government. In spite of the apparent positive economic implications, the danger is that Utilitarianism can make Malawi sacrifice most of its ethical principles at the cost of obtaining pleasurable results from the donors. For instance, Malawi risks accepting some Western practices such as homosexuality, lesbian practices as normal for the country. The only condition for accepting them is that the donors continued support to Malawi. Although supporting the interests of donors is pleasurable for Malawi, the president risks losing popularity from Malawians who are traditionally oriented. This category of traditionalists is not ready to sacrifice some of the traditions at any cost. The other possible problem is that Malawi will lose its national and, possibly, cultural identity given that most of its decisions are based on what the Western world says is acceptable. Finally, it may be argued that, although utilitarianism helped Malawi to start gaining popularity in the Western world, it started losing it in the AU due to its refusal to comply with the directives of the union. It is possible that Malawi became strong economically with the help of the Western nations, but very weak in the context of Pan-Africanism, nationalism, morality and cultural identity. The implications above indicate that: Firstly, for Malawi to be on a safer side, it needs to opt for a system that takes into consideration various elements from Pan-Africanism and utilitarianism. This implies that the current government is invited to take courage and be ready to sacrifice Utilitarianism in some circumstances and promote some nationalistic aspects, hence create a personality for Malawi. Secondly, the conflict above shows that Malawian politics is still conditioned by new forms of neo-colonialism that are ruling the country in the guise of the ‘Donor Community.’ The issue is that some of the donors such as the World Bank, IMF suggest some policies that Malawi has to fulfill if it wants to be helped. The country is put in a situation whereby there is no better

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alternative rather than accept those policies, hence allowing the foreigners to indirectly rule this country. Thirdly, it may be argued from the conflict that the postcolonial political leaders apparently have no clear political vision that is shared by a good number of the leading politicians. Unfortunately, for almost four decades after the British colonial rule, politics in Malawi is still an activity that is meant to answer problems related to the basic needs of the citizens. Although this is important, it makes it difficult for politicians to come up with new and constructive ideas. Fourthly, Malawian politics leaves a continuous identity crisis, whether the country has to keep and follow African Union-based identity or Global Unionsbased identity. In fact, for Mutharika, the former is better and for Joyce Banda, the latter seems to be a better option.

9.6

Conclusion

The question of sovereignty has been interpreted differently by parties such as African Presidents, the ICC, and the courts. The dominant interpretations are influenced either by the Hobbesian interpretation of the sovereign, where it may refer to an individual person, a small group of people or to the whole group of citizens, which select representatives. This has been followed by leaders and individuals that support the PanAfrican principles which are promoted by the AU. Apart from this position, the other dominant position has been that of Rousseau’s orientation. In this position, sovereignty is recognized as constituting the will of the people as expressed in the laws, mainly the constitution. It supports the collective conception of sovereignty as opposed to a single individual. Although the Hobbesian conception has been used to support the Afro-communitarian denial of ICC’s warrant of arrest of Al Bashir as a seating president, it has been argued that there are many factors that were in play. For instance, a decision not to follow the ICC’s warrant of arrest is further influenced by personal adherence to ideologies, such as Pan-Africanism, a conception of the Western interference with reference to neo-colonialism and power relations. Similarly, compliance to ICC is influenced by many factors, such as the allegiance to the donor community, personal interest to gain certain favors and recognition and faithfulness to the democratic principles that are promoted by respect toward the general will.

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The theme of freedom has run through the presentation in this chapter in various areas, for example, the freedom of a seating president to commit atrocities and remain unpunished because of being a sovereign person. This has also questioned the aspect of the immunity of a seating president amidst his violations of human rights. It addresses the question of whether general will restricted to an African government is enough in denying a higher sovereign power that involves more individuals such as the ICC. The chapter lives a very important question on whether ICC is international enough to claim itself as representing the general will. In spite of the problems noted above, it seems that it is impossible for the world to address most of the practices of impunity by sovereign leaders without any high court. The power given to the ICC by its international nature seems to be suggesting a notion of sovereignty where the more international the collective nature of an organization, the higher the level of sovereignty. The expectation is that in the context of human rights and related prosecution of the higher offices, the AU represents a lower level of sovereignty, which dissolves into the ICC. Similarly, national sovereignty disappears in front of higher sovereignty such as the ICC.

References Chilenga, M. (2011). Civil Procedure in Malawi. Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law. Hobbes, T. ([1651] 1998). Leviathan. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. International Monetary, Fund. (2012). Malawi: Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding. Washington: IMF. Mendes, E. (2010). Peace and Justice at the International Criminal Court: A Court of Last Resort. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. Mutharika, B. (1995). One Africa One Destiny: Towards Democracy, Good Governance and Development. Harare: SAPES. Mutharika, B. (2010a). African Dream from Poverty to Prosperity. Limbe: The Guardian Publications. Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, State and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell. Rousseau, J. (1987). Basic Political Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Donald A. Cress, Trans.). Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company. Schabas, W. (2007). An Introduction to the International Criminal Court. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Short, P. (1974). Banda. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd.

CHAPTER 10

Moral Freedom Conflict

10.1

Introduction

Should we base our morality on communitarian ethics or an individual endowed with reason has to decide what is right or wrong? In other words, who determines what is right? Is it the individual or the community? Modern African political philosophy is haunted by these questions. Those that are inclined toward radical communitarian ethics, will respond by arguing that, the community knows and decides what is right? On the contrary, those inclined toward classical liberalism believe in individual autonomy, dignity, capacity, and responsibility to make the right choices and live well as a moral agent. In the relation between African socialist orientation and free-market orientation, nations are torn apart between either embracing fully communitarian or individual ethics. By following communitarian ethics, which is claimed to represent the African communities, governments please both the traditional community and various religious groups who believe in shared values. On the other hand, they displease the capitalist who represents individual rights in determining what is right. In this context, the community members who want shared values are responsible for putting in politics power, while the liberal nations and organizations are responsible for funding the activities of the politicians through loans and donations.

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Apart from the above dilemma, the practical life of individuals reveals that there is a multiplicity of moral problems in the current African political setting. Of course, moral problems are a worldwide concern (see Küng 2004), where there are a series of ethical scandals in countries such as the USA, the UK, and France, but my interest is what is happening in subSaharan Africa. Some of these scandals include corruption, theft, bribery, the murder of individuals that are different, intolerance, and nepotism. The question that comes in this context is, are ethical scandals increasing because of the free-market system that is imposed on African individuals, or it is a component within the socialist system which is adopted by various leaders? An important observation is that in a socialist government (one-party system) it appears that very few individuals were accumulating wealth through corrupt means. These individuals were often politicians and warlords. In the current neoliberal capitalist setting, corruption has trickled down to most of the individuals due to the rise of their freedom. Is this a coincidence or it implies that neoliberal capitalism increases malpractices while socialism reduces malpractices in terms of numbers of individuals involved in such practices? This work cannot give an adequate answer to this question; however, it can indicate the moral conflict which is mainly influenced by orientation either toward neoliberal capitalist individualism or socialism (nationalism). In this chapter, I will focus on the following question and the related conflict: Is it ethical for an individual to engage in LGBT practices? Is abortion ethical? Is corruption immoral? These questions are apparently straight forward to dogmatic neoliberal capitalism, who may argue that it all depends on whether individual liberty is respected and equally the individual does not infringe on other people’s rights. A dogmatic communitarian will argue that, where the community well-being is compromised, these practices are unethical. The transformation of African nations through the neoliberal capitalist reforms has led to a conflict relative to how to respond to the above issues. A blame game between the two systems has often gone against the neoliberal capitalists as responsible for the increase in cases of LGBT, abortion, corruption, etc. These cases are generally regarded as immoral using the assumed traditional ethical standards that are put in place by different African governments. The argument is that during the one-party autocratic system, these cases were very few, but with the coming of neoliberal capitalism, they have increased in most of the African nations.

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For instance, the accusation game is seen in the issue of LGBT, whereby neoliberal capitalists are accused of bringing and encouraging unethical conduct, while the African nations are accused of infringing rights by considering it unethical. This has been the case in various nations such as Malawi and Uganda where the governments opted for the common sentiments that were ant-LGBT while the capitalists defended individual freedom to engage in these practices. Different laws in the oneparty African rule barred people from engaging in these practices based on the understanding that they are not part of the African culture. A similar accusation game has been around abortion, where most of the African cultures have argued for a defense of a pro-life philosophy (Mbiti 1975; Braugen 2000).1 On the contrary, the neoliberal capitalists and other Westerners have allowed individuals to abort in those cases that a woman expressed such an interest. There are other further arguments that are forwarded in support of abortion, such as, the unwanted pregnancy argument, this gives a right to a woman to abort in those circumstances where she did not want this status for other reasons such as rape. Another common problem that has led to the accusation game is the increase of corruption which is explained by the African nationalists as a consequence of neoliberal capitalists’ promotion of individualism and weakening of the government (see Mutharika 2010). Everyone is seen as responsible yet each individual does as he/she wishes. The weak governments created through the neoliberal agenda have failed to instill discipline in the citizens. On the other hand, it may be speculated that communalism encourages the plundering of government funds through corruption. This often happens when individuals attempt to get from the governments in order to support their extended families. They do this because they no longer feel part of the government, which is pluralistic in nature. Corruption is seen as a sign of moral decline caused by the adoption of neoliberal capitalist principles in the African context. This chapter will focus on conflicts that are related to the decline of moral standards due to the adoption of neoliberal individualism, while African citizens attempt to make a compromise with the communitarian thinking. In Sect. 9.2, I will discuss the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) conflict, which has led to tensions between some African nations and the donor community. In Sect. 9.3, I focus on the conflict 1 This is equally supported by various Western and Eastern religions that building on communitarian thinking, such as the Catholic Church and the Islamic Religion.

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around the legalization of abortion, mainly focusing on the case of Malawi due to my familiarity with the development of events.

10.2

Homophobia and Moral Freedom

Are individuals free to engage in lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) practices in an African setting? Looking at the homophobic experience in different countries such as Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, and Sudan, it seems obvious that the answer to this question is a No. Is homophobia a component of African communitarianism or the creation of foreign capitalists? This question is preceded by an understanding of whether lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) practices were present in the African traditional setting. If they were present then a further question is, ‘how were they viewed by the community members?’ Were there traces of homophobic attitude? The first common argument in the current African nations is that LGBT practices are non-African (Mokhobo 1989). African traditional communities are viewed as promoters of the institution of family, where the relationship between a man and a woman in the institution of marriage for communion and procreation was indispensable. There was a negative attitude toward an individual who willingly avoided marriage and sexual intimacy with the opposite sex within the cultural boundaries. The general feeling has been that LGBT practices are foreign and were mainly encouraged by the neoliberals. This has created homophobic reactions in various arguments on the basis that LGBT practices do not form part of the African traditional moral code. This is further on the basis of a reaction toward practices that are imported from other nations. This is extended to the conception that any common ceremonies based on these practices such as ‘gay marriages’ are unacceptable. The second argument is that LGBT was part of the African traditional communities. For instance, it was present in groups of people such as the Baganda, Azande, Khoikhoi, Zulu, Tswana, Ndebele, Langi, and

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Bunyoro.2 Busangokwakhe Dlamini (2006)3 argued for the presence of homosexuality in the African traditional setting, using evidence from literature and other sources. For instance, it is noted that Evans-Pritchard in 1970/1971 and later Murry and Roscoe confirmed the presence of homosexual practices among the Azande warriors, to the extent of paying the bride price. Other academics such as Marc Epprecht (2013, 53ff.) argues that there is evidence in the Great Zimbabwe ruins and Egypt that the practice of same-sex acts was present.4 After a long discussion of evidence showing these practices, Busangokwakhe Dlamini makes a summary of this position in these words, ‘In this brief forum I have engaged some critical literature to support my argument that patterns of homosexuality can be found in Africa, which in turn further lends support to the evidence of the existence of African homosexuality, and that the latter is compatible with African culture, cosmology, and spirituality. It is clear that the existence of homosexuality in African society is not to be disputed, and in my opinion, is not a colonial import.’ Some of the oldest known depictions or references to same-sex sexuality in the world come from Africa, including those from cave paintings of at least two thousand years old in Zimbabwe, and in Egyptian myths and written histories. If this second position is true, the question now is, where did homophobia come from? One of the common answers is that homophobia came with colonialism and Christianity. For instance, Leah Buckle commenting on the overturning of laws against homosexuality in Botswana, traced homophobia attitudes to colonizers and Christians in the following words, ‘Colonisation and the spread of fundamentalist Christian attitudes from the British meant that much of Africa lost its previous cultural attitude towards sexual orientation and gender identity and were forced to adopt “new” values from British colonizers in the 19th and 20th centuries. Homophobia was legally enforced by colonial administrators and

2 For instance, Kabaka Mwanga II king of the Baganda is known for having practiced homosexuality in his kingdom. 3 Busangokwakhe Dlamini (2006), Homosexuality in the African Context, Agenda: Empowering Women for Gender Equity, No. 67, African Feminisms, Volume 2, 3: Homosexuality (2006), pp. 128–136. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4066801, accessed 17 January 2020 07:18 UTC. 4 Marc Epprecht (2013), Sexuality and Social Justice in Africa: Rethinking Homophobia and Forging Resistance, London, Zed Books.

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Christian missionaries. In 1910, Christians made up about 9 percent of the population of sub-Saharan Africa; by 2010, the figure had leaped to 63 percent. Anti-LGBT laws were not only written into constitutions, but also into the minds of many African people, and after the passing of several generations, this has become dogma.’5 The understanding is that the colonizers and the Christians instilled African intolerance toward LGBT. Similarly, Busangokwakhe Dlamini (2006) attributes the homophobic attitude to the laws and ideas brought by the Westerners. A similar argument can be extended to other religions such as Islamic religion that in some areas they influence the understanding that sodomy is a crime. In fact in extremist countries such as Sudan and Iran, sodomy was penalized under Islamic penal code, such that in 2011 three individuals were killed for sodomy in Iran. Although arguments may be made against homophobia as imported in Africa, and that the African traditional society was generally tolerant, history confirms that there was transformation of this culture toward a general homophobic attitude. I want also to acknowledge that this led to a general acceptance of the dogma that African traditional culture is against LGBT practices. In other words, Africans embraced homophobia. In fact, most of the African nations have tended to argue that LGBT is immoral and against the African culture. For instance, in the Apartheid South Africa, Zimbabwe and Zambia LGBT practices were by law considered as illegal. Of course, I have earlier indicated that this problem is traceable during the colonial rule in Africa and beyond where such practices were illegal. Nevertheless, it must be underlined that Africa is living a conflict between neo-capitalists who promote individual freedoms/rights and the African nationalist politicians and other religious congregation who continue arguing that LGBT as illegal and evil, foreign to the African society. There is a situation such that those politicians that are toward African democratic socialism tend to criminalize LGBT and are supported by the homophobic tendencies of the masses in the traditional setting. Below, I will focus on some cases in the African political setting to demonstrate a serious conflict of orientation in matters that concern LGBT practices and homophobia. In this regard, there is a problem of freedom, whereby some 5 Leah Buchle (30 September 2019), African sexuality and the legacy of imported homophobia, https://www.stonewall.org.uk/about-us/news/african-sexuality-and-legacyimported-homophobia, accessed 16 January, 2020.

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are defending the rights of individuals involved in the LGBT practices, while others are defending the freedom of the community to exclude and embrace certain practices. The African experience of homophobia against LGBT with serious consequences on the freedom of those involved in these practices was experienced recently in Uganda. The Ugandan government took a harsh position against the freedom of LGBT individuals by introducing a draft bill intended at killing all those that are involved in such practices. The process became evident between 2009 and 2011 with the amendments made on a draft bill incriminating LGBT practices. The will of the people through the representation of the members of parliament signed the bill into law in December 2013. After a long debate, a death penalty was substituted with life imprisonment. This is a form of elimination of LGBT individuals from their communities. With this development, the fears of a government that denies individual liberty indicated by the classical liberalists such as Mill as well as neoliberals such as Nozick and Hayek became a reality. Similarly, the fears of Aristotle and Plato on the threat of the reasoning of the majority, which can avoid a healthy debate on issues, were seen in a quick decision by the community. Nevertheless, this harsh decision was supported not only by the members of parliament representing the people but also by most of the religious groups, who believed that LGBT practices were unethical and against the word of God. In February 2014, the bill became law, signed by Museveni the long-serving president of Uganda. Fortunately, this law was questioned by the Constitutional Court given that the procedural aspect was flawed; therefore, it was regarded as invalid.6 The development of events relative to this law may be read elsewhere, and it has been highly followed by different interested parties. The interest in this chapter is that these developments in Uganda created a conflict, which led to various reactions from the neoliberal community. In the period between December 2013 and July 2014, Uganda was requested to remove this apparently evil law against individual freedom. This was seen by the Ugandan government as interference toward the independence of this nation. In other words, the conception here is that these interventions qualified as a form of violation of national sovereignty. World Bank as one of the giants promoting the neoliberal agenda decided

6 The bill was passed without the required quorum.

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to withhold support through the loans. The donor nations such as the USA and the Scandinavian nations (Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden) decided to withdraw their aid to a nation that was violating individual liberty with reference to LGBT. In a conflict of this type, it is difficult for the African nations that depend on foreign aid to insist on their sovereignty, given that this has a lot of negative consequences on the poor majority. Uganda has therefore tended to compromise by attempting to revise the hostile attitude toward the citizens that are involved in LGBT. A similar development will occur in various African nations, such as Malawi, where different donor nations will intervene and compromise became an alternative. Below I will focus on this conflict in Malawi. Another experience of homophobia took shape in Malawi, where two citizens were arrested for conducting a traditional same-sex marriage. On 28 May 2011, Mr. Steven Monjeza and Mr. Tiwonge Chimbalanga were prosecuted and sentenced to 14 years imprisonment with hard labor for declaring themselves husband and wife following a traditional marriage ceremony (Chikhoswe). This punishment was in line with the Penal Code of Malawi Chapter 7:01, S153, which deals with unnatural offices which have the punishment of 14 years imprisonment, with or without corporal punishment. The punishment is therefore indicative of the fact that gay practices are unnatural in the Malawian context. Unfortunately, this law was set based on a problematic notion ‘unnatural.’ The question is, who decides what is natural and what is not? Marriage can, in the same way, be questioned whether it is natural or a convenient creation of human beings. If it is regarded as natural, then procreation is considered as a decisive element that qualifies marriage as natural. This naturalist argument is very weak due to lack of clarity on what is natural, such that it can hardly impress the neoliberals. There are also other laws that are applied against gays and lesbians, which are also often questioned by neoliberal capitalists as violating individual and minority freedoms. For example, the Penal Code of Malawi Chapter 7:01, S154 regards the punishment for those that attempt to commit unnatural offices and gives a punishment of 7 years imprisonment, with or without corporal punishment. The Penal Code of Malawi Chapter 7:01, S156 regards the punishment for indecent practice between males and gives a punishment of 5 years imprisonment, with or without corporal punishment. Similarly, S137A focuses on the indecent practice

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between females and gives the same punishment. For Nationalistic Democratic Socialism, these issues are problematic for the society, and they must be seriously dealt with. For neoliberal capitalists, this is a total breach of individual freedom as individuals are free to act and enter into associations with whom they want. Allegiance to Democratic Socialism made the Malawi government apply the anti-gay laws on Mr. Chimbalanga and Mr. Monjeza. These laws were the remnants of the colonial rule and Kamuzu Banda’s thought and a reflection of a majority of African traditionalists. Malawi entered a big conflict with the representatives of neoliberal thought such as the nongovernmental organizations. Amidst this controversy, the United Nations Chief Ban Ki-moon visited the country on a private visit to the president, allegedly to resolve this issue on the part of the neoliberals. However, Mutharika indicated that the main issue was that the practices of homosexuals were against traditional cultural beliefs, religious orientations, and Malawian laws. He accused donors as responsible for the gay problem. According to him, he pardoned those that were involved not because he was agreeing with them but because it is important to forgive those that error. It was generally noted that this act of pardon was influenced by the visit of the United Nations secretary, Ban Ki-moon. The release of the two LGBT members on mercy grounds after the intervention of the neoliberals indicated how the neoliberal capitalism was more powerful as compared with Democratic Socialism present in Malawi. The attempt of Mutharika to support his Democratic Socialism using Malawian laws did not help him to stop the neoliberals. The next move of neoliberals was blaming the laws of Malawi and requesting for a review. When the pro-neoliberal President Joyce Banda started her work, the High Court of Malawi decided to review the sodomy laws of this country. Clearly, this revision was to remove the socialist orientation and develop the laws in line with neoliberal thought. As is often the case, neoliberals influenced and utilized different organizations in the destruction of these anti-LGBT laws. A good number of converts to neoliberal orientation came from the Centre for Development of People (CEDEP), the University of Malawi (some individuals from the Faculty of Law and Public Administration and Political Science), Malawi Network of Religious Leaders Living with or affected by HIV, Malawi Law Society, and others. One may argue that all these organizations were just doing their routine work,

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but in the context of the conflict between socialism and neoliberals, they were used to benefit the agenda of capitalism. The controversy has now tended to deviate the discussion from whether LGBT individuals are law culprits or not, to the issue of legalizing same-sex marriage. It seems the neoliberals won the battle against criminalizing homosexuals as supported by Malawian law, but this new concern is facing a lot of challenges from the society, which is still strongly influenced by African Democratic Socialism. President Joyce Banda tried to influence the public but she met a lot of resistance and this greatly affected her popularity hence minimizing her chances of being re-elected as President of Malawi in 2014. Of course, this will not be the only element that will make her lose popularity but it is certainly one among the many choices that she made. Her attempt to reverse her position toward LGBT practices may be seen in her presentation in the USA to the UN, Anyone who has listened to the debate in Malawi realizes that Malawians are not ready to deal with that right now. I as a leader have no right to influence how people feel…. Where Malawi is and most African countries are, is maybe where America or the U.K. were about 100 years ago. The best thing the world can do is to allow each country to take its course, to allow each country to have that debate freely without the pressure of being pushed. We have seen countries where homosexuals have been killed. Why? Because, in my view, the country - the nation -wasn’t ready.7

This comes from her realization that she was ready to deal with homosexual issues with the help of the neoliberals but the people she was leading were not. Deciding in favor of the neoliberals in this context is not yet easy because of the religious and cultural resistance toward accepting homosexuality. Religious leaders and a good number of politicians have openly said no to this process of legalizing homosexuality. The current President Peter Mutharika has decided to remain silent and argued earlier that it is for the people to decide whether they want to go this way or not. Focus is not on whether these practices are right or wrong but how

7 Nyasa Times (29 September 2012), Malawi Not Ready to Legalise Homosexuality, https://www.nyasatimes.com/malawi-not-ready-to-legalise-homosexuality-sayspresident-banda/.

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people judge them. The leader of the opposition has taken a similar trend while at the same time condemning homosexuality as problematic. The experience of homophobia may also be evidenced in the history of African politics in nations that embraced the Sharia Law building on insights from the Islamic religion. One such country that I briefly mentioned above is Sudan. This experience mixed with the common African homophobic tendencies in the communities, it is difficult to defend those that engage in LGBT-related offenses. One of the offenses that were very clear in Sudan was the involvement of individuals in homosexuality, which is illegal. Individuals involved in such practices are firstly whipped if it is the first offense. However, when this is a second offense, the individuals were receiving the death penalty. Other African nations such as Kenya do not engage in the death penalty but the individual involved in these practices was given 10 years imprisonment with hard labor. In other African nations such as Mozambique, the position against LGBT is not spelled out exclusively in the laws, but it is interpreted by-laws that deter people from engaging in unnatural acts. The interpretation here is that LGBT practices are contrary to human nature.

10.3

Abortion Controversy

Are women free to terminate the pregnancy when they want to? While African philosophy promotes life at different stages, there are various exceptions with respect to when life can be terminated. Most of the areas include beliefs that are fundamental to the well-being of the community. When such beliefs are violated, then termination of life was regarded as a better option. For instance, when a witch or wizard is discovered in the community, then termination of life was allowed for the good of the members of the village. Similarly, when a child was born with certain characteristics that were outside the normal expectations of the community, termination of life was seen as a better option. Regardless of these exceptions, termination of life through the removal of pregnancy has always been controversial in this context. Nevertheless, the general tendency has been the consideration of abortion as illegal. About 10 African nations, abortion is completely illegal without exceptions, while the other nations make some few exceptions (such as abortion for health reasons). An African is therefore seen as a protector of life in the community. There has been a version of communitarianism that has promoted philosophy of life known as vitalogy. An African recognizes the essence of

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a human subject, and it is the duty of the community to promote and protect the right of the individuals. In this regard, the right to life is protected by the community. This centrality of the community in protecting rights is reflected in the following passage, In African vitalogy, the social subject is therefore an impersonal reality: the community. In this way, the human being in the singular or ‘‘a man,’’ is and always has been a member of a family, a group, a community, or a society. In this case, it is the community which is subject to rights and duties and not individuals as such. This is also why it is said that Man is a relational subject between himself and his peers, between himself and the world and between himself and God. The ‘‘himself’’ in question, is to be read as the community, as a collectivity, and/or as a people. (Nkemnkia 2006, 102)

Based on this conception of African thought, conflict will come when the communities see that some individuals are not protecting life (Nkemnkia 1999). I will not go through what is transpiring in various African nations, given that most of the events are similar. The focus of this work will be on a case study with reference to Malawi. Access to abortion conflict between neoliberals and the African socialist orientation of thought may be seen in 2009 when Women in Law in Southern Africa-Malawi (WILSA-Malawi) attempted to open a legal action against Mutharika’s government for denying abortion to women. The main argument revolves around the idea of unwanted pregnancies. Denying abortion to such a woman is seen by the neoliberal capitalists as going against her body rights. This is in contrast with the African traditional thought, which draws on an understanding that life in Africa is seen as a gift from the creator through the ancestors and denying a child to live through abortion is seen as sacrilege. The Malawi penal code supports this denial of abortion in those cases where a woman wants to abort. According to the Malawi Penal Code (MPC) which goes as early as the colonial period (1930), abortion can be illegal or legal depending on the circumstance in which it is done. The first context where it is illegal refers to those cases indicated in Sections 149–151 of the MPC. The first instance where the illegal element is indicated in Section 149 which reads, Any person who, with intent to procure a miscarriage of a woman, whether she is or she is not with a child, unlawfully administers to her or causes her

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to take any poison or other noxious thing, or uses any force of any kind, or uses any other means whatever, shall be guilt of a felony and shall be liable to imprisonment for fourteen years.

The quotation indicates that doctors and all those practitioners that are involved in helping women abort are performing an illegal practice. The penalty is one of the heaviest in Malawi because it is demanding 14 years of imprisonment. This is similar to other crimes that are regarded as grave in Malawi as they are under committing unnatural offensive acts that are not allowed in the nation (see MPC 153). This explains that abortion is considered as one of the acts that are against the natural way things should go; this is based on the assumption that nature wants children to be born and not aborted. Similar illegality of abortion is noted relative to pregnant mothers who are told not to abort (MPC 150). In this case, they are warned that if such practice is done, the responsible mother will be imprisoned for seven years. A person who provides the materials used for such abortion is also given three years of imprisonment. The second context where abortion is legal regards those cases where it is done to save the life of the mother. This abortion is done for health reasons as is indicated in MPC 243. A person is not criminally responsible for performing in good faith and with reasonable care and skill a surgical operation upon any person for his benefit or upon an unborn child for the preservation of mothers life, if the performance of the operation is reasonable, having regard to the patient’s state at the time, and to all the circumstances of the case. An interesting question is, ‘What is reasonable?’ Mutharika in his presidency (2004–2012) while accepting this legal aspect of abortion reinforced the idea that out of this reason it is illegal to terminate the life of an unborn child. This contributed to making him unpopular among the neoliberal donors as a president who interfered in people’s rights. The basic driving force for the neoliberal capitalists was their concern on the number of women who were dying of unsafe abortions in those countries where abortion is not allowed. According to the report of the World Health Organization (WHO), the worldwide number of unsafe abortions in 2008 was 21.6 million. Developing countries such as Malawi were highly affected by these unsafe abortions given that it had 98% of the abortions. For promoters of safe abortion what is worrying is the number of women who lost their lives during this practice. Out of 21.6 million women, 47,000 lost their lives during this process. The thinking is that if

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this was done at the hospital in these developing countries then the number is expected to drop. What is alarming for sub-Saharan Africa including Malawi is that most of the deaths affect women in these countries. Departing from 1964 when Malawi got its independence, there are various deaths of women that occurred in the country, and hence, this has tended to strengthen the argument of legalizing abortions in cases of unwanted pregnancies. For instance, the death rate of women in the maternity process was 675 out of every 100,000 pregnant women. Earlier the numbers were even higher as they were often beyond 900 deaths in every 100,000. In the period between 2012 and 2014, President Joyce Banda took over the project of neoliberals in Malawi and assured to bring safe motherhood in the country. One of the laws that she reviewed and tried to do away with is that of abortion. She wanted to encourage safe abortion, which was earlier not accepted by her predecessor. In 2013, she formulated a committee that was given authority to review Malawian laws that regard abortion. Abortion in the context of Banda Joyce further supported the Gender Equality Act of 2013 which strongly argued for the right to, ‘choose whether to have a child or not’ (See Gender Equality Act Resource 2013, 25). This right is included under the right to adequate sexual and reproductive health. It was thought that there was an abortion bill that was expected to be tabled at the parliament. President Joyce Banda’s promotion of the neoliberal idea of safe abortion in conditions where there is unwanted pregnancy led to an internal conflict. The dilemma was that she was a Christian belonging to the Church of Central Africa Presbyterian (CCAP), which was strongly against abortion. A further problem for her was that she was considered as a model of an African woman who valued life and was ready to protect it. Her interest in changing abortion laws was accompanied by a lot of resistance from those politicians that were more oriented toward African Democratic Socialist thinking and also different Christian and other churches. The different parties saw the neoliberal interest in changing abortion laws as against their respective doctrines. For example, in 2013 the CCAP Nkhoma Synod saw this bill as problematic and urged the government to use the existing medical rules that were already functioning in the country. Other Christian organizations demonized President Joyce Banda as representing an evil agenda that is meant at destroying God’s gift. Further resistance will come from different organizations such

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as the umunthu pressure group, which is strongly oriented toward African nationalism and traditional culture (Nyasa Times, April 26, 2013). Although there was resistance on the part of the traditionalists and religious movements, Joyce Banda continued to gain support and praise from the donor community and other neoliberal advocates of individual freedom. In her decision, she was often portrayed as a strong female president who made bold decisions in her country. The biggest worry for her was the May 2014 elections that were going to decide her fate. She was a leader who was already losing support from a majority of Malawians who were strongly against abortion and other practices that were accommodated by the president (such as same-sex marriages and related practices). In 2014, President Joyce Banda lost the elections, an obvious consequence of some of the decisions that go against African traditional culture. When she was booted out of her position, Peter Mutharika took her position. As a man who apparently values people’s decisions, his personal position on abortion is not clearly stated or emphasized. Currently, the pressure is yet to build up as neoliberals want his clear position on a number of issues, including same-sex marriages and the transformation of abortion laws in favor of the neoliberal agenda. He may most probably continue buying time to avoid making strong decisions that will go against African Democratic Socialism and African traditional culture. As his parliament is discussing modifying abortion laws in favor of safe abortion, a majority of traditional Malawians and Christian organizations are busy demonstrating against this modification. Currently, the debates on abortion have weaken in Malawi, because people are interested in the scramble for political power that has affected all the parties.

10.4

Conclusion

The chapter has discussed conflict of values in African political systems, mainly between the neoliberal capitalist ethics which underlined individualism and the African political system which is assumed as communitarian. The first problem has focused on LGBT, which according to the neoliberal capitalists is the expression of individual liberty. It is questionable whether this expression of individual liberty is objective enough to avoid interfering in the freedom of other individuals in the community. On the contrary, most of the African governments have argued that these practices are foreign to African culture. The argument by politicians that builds on African culture is questioned given that there have been instances of LGBT independent of foreign influence. Nevertheless, the

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fact that certain practices were there is the traditional context does not adequately judge LGBT as right or wrong. The second conflict has been whether it is morally acceptable to abort. In the neoliberal capitalist context, it was noted that individuals are free to abort insofar as they are not interfering with others. On the contrary, abortion is regarded as morally wrong in most of the African political philosophies.

References Braugen, V. (2000). Chewa Traditional Religion. Zomba: Kachere. Busangokwakhe, Dlamini. (2006). Homosexuality in the African context. Agenda, 20(67), 128–136. https://doi.org/10.1080/10130950.2006. 9674706. Gender Equality Act Resource. (2013). Signed by President Joyce Banda. Lilongwe: Malawi Government. Küng, H. (2004). An Ethical Framework for the Global Market Economy, In J. H. Dunnings (Ed.), An Ethical Framework for the Global Market Economy (pp. 146–158). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mbiti, J. (1975). Introduction to African Religion. Nairobi: Heinemann. Mokhobo, S. (1989, August/October). AIDS and the Mining Industry. Chamber of Mines Newsletter. Mutharika, B. (2010). African Dream from Poverty to Prosperity. Limbe: The Guardian Publications. Nkemnkia, N. M. (1999). African Vitalogy: A Step Forward in African Thinking. Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa. Nkemnkia, N. M. (2006). “Vitalogy”: The African Vision of the Human Person. In A.-T. Tymieniecka (Ed.), Analecta Husserliana (pp. 101–120). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer.

CHAPTER 11

Primitive Accumulation Crisis in the Modern African Capitalism

11.1

Introduction

A complete discussion of problems that are associated with the spread of capitalism in Africa cannot be achieved without the consideration of various evils such as corruption, exploitation, tribalism, and bribery that have characterized the development of modern capitalism in the continent. While I acknowledge that similar problems have characterized the development of capitalism across the continents, the modern story of African nations has attracted debate in various parts of the world, mainly because of the poor masses that are affected by such practices. The mechanisms behind practices such as corruption and bribery are continuously reshaping African capitalism, by enriching some individuals through unjust ways, but at the same time exploiting and impoverishing others, and making them dependent on a few masters. In most nations, political leaders, as well as the civil servants, are at the forefront in this unjust accumulation of wealth and investments toward the destruction of the poor masses. In fact, the history of modern Africa is populated with inconclusive cases of presidents involved in the unjust accumulation of wealth, which is invested in various nations. While most of these cases are inconclusive, hence no one can judge the presidents for corruption; there is evidence that corruption and lack of accountability are indicative of unjust forms of accumulation of wealth in the modern African societies and political structures. I have taken interest in this unjust accumulation in the modern African nations © The Author(s) 2020 G. M. Kayange, Capitalism and Freedom in African Political Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44360-3_11

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given that this has become a culture, which is driving most of the individuals, even those that are not directly engaged in politics. For theoretical purposes in discussing the problem of unjust accumulation, while not succumbing to communism or neoliberalism, I would like to use the Marxist notion of ‘Primitive Accumulation of Capital’ as a negative moment in the initial development of capitalism. I intend to use the interpretation whereby primitive accumulation is a continuous process in the development of capitalism and not only a moment at its initial stage. Below in Sect. 11.2, I will clarify the concept of primitive accumulation so that the reader may familiarize himself/herself with the use meaning of this concept in this discussion. In Sect. 11.3, the focus will be on politicians, bureaucrats, and the rest of the civil servants engaged in running government affairs. In Sect. 11.4, I will focus on the rest of the citizens that are not involved in the direct running of government affairs. My interest is the local people and the religious who are directly involved in the accumulation and investment of property. In the Conclusion Sect. 11.6, I will indicate some attempts to deal with evils associated with primitive accumulation of capital.

11.2

The Concept of Primitive Accumulation

Marx considers the concept of primitive accumulation of capital relative to the acquisition of initial capital and labor power as a starting point of the capitalist production toward surplus value. Primitive accumulation may be understood by first alluding to the ideas of ‘accumulation’ and ‘primitive.’ The process of accumulation was discussed earlier as concerning the investment of capital, which is expected to produce surplus value leading to accumulation. In primitive accumulation, the interest is not investing what an individual has, but it is a capitalist strategy of initial accumulation of capital through unethical means. This was primarily done through the separation of people from their means of production. For instance, separating them from the land they were using to get their daily needs. It is this that was creating demand for goods on the part of the people whose land was alienated, as also noted in Chapter 2 of this book. The mechanism of this primitive accumulation is that it was done through bribery, stealing, lying, war and other unethical means.

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Commenting on various moments of this accumulation of capital, Marx indicated that, [t]he discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black-skins signaled the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief moments of primitive accumulation. (Marx [1867] 1976, 703)

It is because of this deprivation of people of freedom and property that Marx viewed the capitalist system of private property as evil. In the chapter on colonialism and capitalism, I have noted various elements that fit properly in this context of primitive accumulation such as through the acquisition of land from the black community, reducing them to tenants; hence, their survival was granted by depending on the capitalists. In fact, this was underlined through the mention of systems such as Thangata system in Malawi. Another good example in pre-independence Africa was through the spread of slavery, such as the trans-Atlantic slave trade.1 While this suffices as to the meaning of primitive accumulation, I would like to focus more on some theoretical aspects of this practice. In terms of theory, Massimo De Angelis classifies the trends of interpreting primitive accumulation into two, namely historical and inherent interpretations. Historical is referred to Lenin, who focused on the transfer from a particular mode of life to another as caused by primitive accumulation strategy. For instance, Lenin viewed Russian state capitalism as a one-time movement where people were deprived of their property and this was invested, hence starting a version of accumulation of property, where everyone was assumed to be equal. This one-time moment deprived the bourgeoisie of their property at the cost of state capitalism. The other interpretation is where primitive accumulation is a continuous

1 I am aware of the importance of the trans-Atlantic slave trade as an important example of the primitive accumulation of capital, but my main focus in this chapter is modern Africa.

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process that is inherent in world systems. Summarizing these approaches, De Angelis noted that, Lenin’s and Luxemburg’s two classic interpretations have left a mark on subsequent approaches. It is perhaps useful to label Lenin’s interpretation as “historical primitive accumulation”, to indicate an age, historically and temporally defined, describing the pattern of separation between people and means of production. Luxemburg’s approach to primitive accumulation could be instead labelled as “inherent-continuous primitive accumulation”, to indicate the fact that the characteristic extra-economic process of separation between people and means of production is a continuous and inherent process of capitalist production. (Angelis 2001, 3–4)

Although the first interpretation may fit in the early development of capitalism in Africa (from traditional system to colonialism and from one-party system to neoliberal system), I would like to adopt the second conception. The reason for this adoption is the understanding that transformation is a continuous process. People become capitalists as they attempt to find solutions to everyday challenges in terms of property ownership and their freedom. Following the inherent interpretation noted above, the modern African challenges may be interrogated through the continuous experiences of primitive accumulation. African economic capitalist development has seen a series of violations of human life in terms of depriving individuals of their property, such as through slavery, through snatching land from the locals during communism, bribery to get African minerals, capitalist wars, and manipulation of monetary capital. After the independence of African nations from the European capitalists, which have been substantially discussed in the chapters above, most of the African elite turned into capitalists, and some of these engage (and some are continuing) in various forms of the primitive accumulation. Although there are different means that are used by these capitalists such as bribery, stealing, corruption, manipulation of monetary policies, and wars, I would like to focus on corrupt practices such as bribery.

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11.3 Politicians, Bureaucrats, Civil Servants, and Primitive Accumulation Primitive accumulation by politicians, bureaucrats, and civil servants has tended to be common in the second independence era (multiparty democracy era), which was noted earlier as characterized by the rise of neoliberalism. This has created some very rich politicians and bureaucrats who have turned into big capitalists in various poor African nations through primitive accumulation. Of course, this does not imply that all rich individuals in this sector are culprits in terms of this practice. Nevertheless, unethical means of becoming owners of capital have been very common in Africa, in the political setting. In fact, high-profile cases of alleged malpractices have involved this elite class in different countries, such as Zambia (the case of President Chiluba), Zimbabwe (the case of President Mugabe), and Malawi (the case of President Bakili Muluzi). The primitive accumulation in African settings through various malpractices may be considered through a discussion of corrupt practices (corruption). In this context, the understanding of corruption is that it is the exploitation of power or duty for personal accumulation of initial capital or surplus value. This is done through different practices such as fraud, bribery, nepotism, extortion, theft, and embezzlement of public resources. All these practices lead to the draining of public resources and the creation of a class of capitalists at the expense of the masses. The question that must be addressed is, What is the modern African experience in terms of primitive accumulation through corrupt practices?

The African experience in this regard is too vast such that it is very difficult to narrate the whole story. However, we can start with a selected group of our African leaders who have been involved in malpractices or were allegedly questioned for primitive accumulation of capital. For instance, in Zambia, President Chiluba who led the country in eliminating Kaunda’s one-party system was accused of various malpractices such as illegal payments made to his account, relatives and friends, bribery, and misuse of privatization process for personal gain. Jan Kees van Donge (2009, 76) comments on some of the malpractices in the following passage,

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First, that there had been illegal payments to him and his friends. Among other examples Mwanawasa mentioned in his speech to Parliament were a payment of US$1.1 million to his tailor and one of US$90,000 to his daughter, Helen Chiluba. During the following years, more and more such payments came to light. Tax officials testified that they found gifts from Chiluba to his second wife, Regina, of US$352,000 in the period 1995 2001. A shameful one went to the Chief Justice, Matthew Ngulube, who received US$168,000. Another striking remittance is that of US$70,000 to American fundamentalist churches.

The accusations toward president Chiluba led to various court cases and his conviction together with his accomplices in 2007. Of course, he did not accept this judgment and kept declaring that he was innocent in the charges that were made. President Chiluba does not stand alone in the accusations toward top politicians for malpractices; similar allegations were forwarded toward President Muluzi who led Malawi from Kamuzu’s one-party system to multiparty democracy. He was accused of various corrupt practices in terms of misuse of public funds, and more especially for using 1.7 billion Kwacha for personal use during the campaign for the presidency of his predecessor President Bingu wa Mutharika. The case was started by the Anti-Corruption Bureau in 2009, and it is still not concluded to this day. Apart from the alleged case by the Muluzi, Malawi has been known in terms of primitive accumulation of capital because of the Cashgate scandal. This consisted in the looting of public funds by civil servants and other public officials. A number of public servants were caught with very big sums of money as they were trying to transfer it to other places. A series of arrests involving civil servants, government top officials, business owners, and others followed the discovery of individuals involved in this grand scam (Strasser 2016, 306–308). Malawians dubbed the scandal “Cashgate” because low-level bureaucrats found with stockpiles of cash in their homes and vehicles were among the first arrests made when the scandal came to light in September 2013. In a country where the average government employee earns $100 per month, these cash hoards in amounts up to 100 million kwacha (c. $240,000) were, quite literally, a fortune.

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President Joyce Banda decided to fire her cabinet members as a gesture of correcting the moral degeneration that heavily affected her government. It was discovered that public servants manipulated the Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS) to unjustly maximize individual gains and most of the donors decided to withdraw funding until moral degeneration was addressed. Corruption as a means of primitive accumulation cannot be overemphasized in the multiparty governments, given that it was also common among the dictators in the one-party government systems. However, what is alarming in the current setting is that this mode of accumulation of capital is commonly used not only by those in top authority, but it is present at various levels. Further, there is more knowledge of the cases of corruption, which is possibly a consequence of an improvement in terms of freedom in various African nations.

11.4 Local Population and Primitive Accumulation Primitive accumulation is a common practice that may be evidenced in the local population, where most of the African individuals are in continuous competition for capital and surplus value. This is partly related to the primitive accumulation discussed in 11.3 above, but it is also associated with other bodies, such as religious bodies and non-governmental organizations. The primitive accumulation that is linked with the government services mainly lies in the context where individuals are involved in corrupt practices for services and for occasions that provide them with an advantage in getting government contracts. These benefits are mainly acquired through a process of bribery and manipulation of the procurement systems. This system has affected individuals even in private business, where bribery and other trickery ways are employed to get capital or increase surplus value. Issues of company theft, nepotism, and other forms of manipulation are common in private firms. It is all about taking advantage of a particular firm for the sake of capital acquisition. Similarly, in a non-governmental organization, there are various cases that relate to the primitive accumulation by individual members and at times by the organization in general. One of the ways of engaging in this accumulation is through bribery when giving contracts to individuals. This is where contracts may be inflated so that certain individuals can get a percentage of the allocated funds.

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The presence of cases of primitive accumulation of funds in different non-governmental organizations is worrying in the development of capitalism in Africa. This is due to the understanding that most of the African countries were accused of corruption by non-governmental organizations, which were seen as a watchdog against the primitive accumulation of capital through bribery, fraud, and other means. This is making individuals lose trust in non-governmental organizations, which are seen as mere machines for the accumulation of capital toward creating capitalists within the organizations. Apart from these problems, there is a common conception that international organizations have better working conditions; hence, they belong to a certain class of capitalists. Another controversial area where primitive accumulation is increasing is the religious context. Earlier, I indicated Max Weber’s interpretation of capitalism relative to Christianity. It is in this area that there are various forms of accumulation of capital and investments, which may fall under the category of primitive accumulation. In fact, there is a boom of business in the religious context, more especially in Christianity with the rise of Pentecostal churches and doctrines. While it is difficult to judge the validity of the increasing capitalist market relative to religious matters, the situation is that there are many objects that are being sold to individuals for healing and as tools for miraculous creation of wealth. These objects which are believed to have religious value include things such as water and oil. This has already created a gap in the churches between individuals who can manage to buy such products and receive God’s intervention, and those that cannot manage to buy such objects. In the name of religion, some capitalists have become semi-gods, such that meeting them requires paying a lot of money. While some theologians may argue differently on the currently growing accumulation of wealth by religious leaders (such as prophets and evangelists), there are various cases of fraudulent using the religious setting. Other individuals who have seen that this is good business are engaging in fraud activities by requesting money from the people using fake identities of religious leaders that are well known. What may be noted is that the neo-religious capitalists who are engaged in primitive accumulation remind us of the period of reformation, where the Catholic Church was involved in similar practices, hence motivating other individuals to develop alternative religious movements (such as Martin Luther and John Calvin). It is unfortunate that most of the Africans are vulnerable because of various problems such as the significant presence of deadly diseases

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such as Malaria and HIV AIDS. Similarly, the presence of high levels of poverty and illiteracy increases the vulnerability of individuals and hence increases the possibility of fraud in the religious sector. Apparently, the religious sector is heading toward another imminent reformation.

11.5 Primitive Accumulation as a Consequence of Free-Market Failure I would like to provide a theoretical interpretation of the increase in modes relative to inherent primitive accumulation as a consequence of free-market failure. In this regard, an inspirational and systematic approach to these failures is provided by free-market failures as in a book Global Capitalism at Bay, by John Dunnings (2001), who discussed three types of failures in a free-market system (global capitalism), namely, market failure, institutional failure, and moral failure (Dunning 2001, 38). Based on the understanding that when moral failure is present the other failures follow, it is argued that market and institutional failures are founded on moral failures (see also Küng 2004, 145–146). Hans Kung in his work An Ethical Framework for the Global Market Economy developed further Dunnings tripartite categorization of free-market failures.2 Firstly at the center of Dunnings-Kung theory is the market failure, which may be defined as the inefficiency in the allocation of resources in the market due to various problems that come from poor decisions by market players and the existence of poor free-market competition structures. Market players may cause this failure due to diverse reasons such as market monopoly and oligopoly whereby few firms or individuals dominate the market inflating prices to make super profits, imbalance of power in the market due to greedy of some players who hide information and negative externalities. Summarizing Dunning’s market failures in freemarket economy, Huns Küng (2004, 146) indicated that they range from ‘moral hazard, inappropriate macroeconomic politics, excessive speculation (property and stock market), and inappropriately valued currency, manipulated exchange rates, cross-border and intra-firm transfer prices, bad timing of short-term debts, presence of a strong black market, and the abuse of monopoly power.’ Market failure highly affects the poor who

2 Hans Kung and John Dunnings use the term Global capitalism to represent freemarket system.

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cannot adequately compete in the market. For instance, African nations which are among the poorest suffer when there is a market failure as the majority of the citizens are poor and are incapacitated in acquiring their basic and other needs. This may often happen when prices go higher as firms compete to maximize profits. Secondly, Dunnings-Kung theory of free-market failure indicates the existence of institutional failures which range from ‘inefficient functioning of the regulatory and supervisory systems, and inadequate legal and financial infrastructure, and shortcomings in the protection of ownership rights, lack of accountability and/or transparency, and inadequate standards in financial reporting’ (See Kung, 246; Dunnings 2001). Institutions may refer to formalized structures that govern the community such as the government or process/behavior patterns that are validated as a normal way of doing things in a particular setting. The free-market institutions that are the main focus of Dunnings-Kung theory include markets, intermediate associations (IAs), governments, and supranational entities. Markets are free institutions, which develop spontaneously as individuals want to exchange what they own or enter into corporations (Friedman 1962, Nozick 1974). Freedom of individuals and freedom of exchange are a fundamental characteristic of this institution. The government is a higher institution in the market place that provides security and minimum interventions. Intermediate institutions include civil society, nonprofit organizations, quasi-markets, and trade associations. These are important so that they make sure that free-market principles are observed by the governments and members of the society. Supranational entities are those that provide resources (such as banks), entities that set rules, advisory entities, etc. Thirdly, free-market failure may take the form of moral failure. Moral failure implies the choice of moral agents to engage in actions that are regarded as wrong. Such actions violate the freedoms and rights of others as individuals do them to maximize their personal interests and gains at the expense of others. Although theoretically there are differences in deciding whether an action is good or bad, there are some actions in the market that are universally accepted as bad. Dunnings-Kung’s theory of free-market failures recognizes moral failures such as ‘Crony- and Mafiacapitalism, bribery and corruption, lack of truthfulness, trust and social responsibility, and excessive greed of the investors or institutions’ (See Küng 2004, 146; Dunnings 2001).

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The types of failures in Dunnings-Kung theory reveal most of the problems leading to market and institutional failures, which have their root in the declining moral standards as individuals engage in primitive accumulation of capital. For instance, in market failure, the manipulation of exchange rates is indicative of the lack of honesty. Similarly, oligopoly has its basis in some vices such as greed and selfishness. It is clear that justice and concern for others are apparently ignored. This creates a situation of manipulation where others are used as means, not as ends. Institutional failures also show that most of the problems are rooted in morality. For example in the lack of accountability and transparency hide corrupt practices such as fraud, theft, and money laundering. Although some failures come because of improper use or absence of intellectual virtues, most of the failures are highly rooted in immoral acts in both the markets and institutions. It can be learned from this theory that the transformation of markets, institutions, and human actions (behavior) in the free-market society requires serious consideration of ethical virtues as well as intellectual virtues and how they can be utilized in transforming society. The question still remains, ‘Are individuals justified to engage in primitive accumulation because of these failures?’

11.6

Conclusion

How can the failure relative to primitive accumulation modes be eliminated in the African political system? There have been significant investments and efforts to eliminate corrupt practices relative to the primitive accumulation of capital in various countries3 ; however, the effect of the formal interventions is apparently insignificant (see also Marguette and Pfeiffer 2015; Mungiu-Pippidi 2015). For instance, in Malawi, the formal anti-corruption interventions have been carried out through various reforms, such as the institutional reforms and legal reforms. Further interventions were done through formal channels of knowledge transfer, such as education reform, which focused on training individuals. In spite of these various formal anti-corruption efforts, Malawi was ranked 122/180 (1 is the least corrupt) in the 2017 Corruption Perception Index (CPI). Similarly, in studies done in Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania (Baez-Camargo 2017), and Nigeria (Koni-Hoffmann and Navanit-Patel 2017), it is widely

3 See also World Bank (2010).

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perceived that the results obtained through these reforms are very modest and unsatisfactory. The dissatisfaction with formal anti-corruption approach has led to a shift toward the informal approach, which takes into consideration the ‘locally prevailing conditions and context-specific drivers of corruption – including hidden agendas, social habits and deeply engrained attitudes towards corruption’ (Baez-Camargo 2017, 4; see also Baez-Camargo and Passas 2017; Koni-Hoffmann and Navanit-Patel 2017). For instance, in Uganda, Rwanda, and Tanzania a study funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), through its East Africa Research Fund (EARF), utilized an informal intervention focusing on ‘Corruption, Social Norms, and Behaviors in East Africa.’ The research wanted to account for locally prevailing conditions that encourage corrupt practices through a study on social and behavioral drivers of corruption (Baez-Camargo 2017). Another study was done by Koni-Hoffmann, Leena, and Raj Navanit-Patel (2017) in Nigeria, which focused on the social norms approach and its impact on collective corruption. Currently, another informal approach to anti-corruption is underway in a project on ‘Corruption in the Criminal Justice Sector’, in Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.4 Apparently, this is a more promising approach of dealing with primitive accumulation in its different modes. I conclude by indicating that African nations must find locally made strategies to deal with primitive modes of accumulation, a failure which it will be very difficult to achieve the development of this continent.

References Angelis, M. D. (2001). Marx and Primitive Accumulation: The Continuous Character of Capital’s “Enclosures”. https://www.researchgate.net/ publication/268411539. Baez-Camargo, C. (2017). Corruption, Social Norms and Behaviors: A comparative assessment of Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. Basel Institute on Governance: Basel. Baez-Camargo, C., & Passas, N. (2017). Hidden Agendas, Social Norms and Why We Need to Re-think Anti-Corruption. Basel: Basel Institute on Governance. Dunning, J. (2001). Global Capitalism at Bay. New York: Routledge.

4 http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Institute-for-Human-Security/Research/Corruption.

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Koni-Hoffmann, L., & Navanit-Patel, R. (2017). Collective Action on Corruption in Nigeria: A Social Norms Approach to Connecting Society and Institutions. London: Chatham House. Küng, H. (2004). An Ethical Framework for the Global Market Economy. In J. H. Dunnings (Ed.), An Ethical Framework for the Global Market Economy (pp. 146–158). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Marquette, H., & Pfeiffer, C. (2015). Corruption and Collective Action. Birmingham: University of Birmingham. Marx, K. ([1867] 1976). Capital (Vol. 1). New York: Penguin Books. Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2015). A Quest for Good Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy State and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell. Strasser, P. (2016). An Anti-Corruption Bureau’s Inexorable Endeavor: A Study of Malawi’s Cashgate Scandal. Washington and Lee Law Review, 73, 303–337. van Donge, J. K. (2009). The plundering of Zambian resources by Frederick Chiluba and his friends: A case study of the interaction between national politics and the international drive towards good governance. African Affairs, 108(430), 69–90. World Bank. (2010). Africa Development Indicators 2010: Silent and Lethal: How Quiet Corruption Undermines Africa’s Development Efforts. Africa Development Indicators. The World Bank. http://elibrary.worldbank.org/ doi/abs/10.1596/978-0-8213-8202-8.

CHAPTER 12

Neo-African Renaissance as a Response to Neo-Capitalism

12.1

Introduction

Can Neo-Capitalism be adequately addressed in the African thought? A majority of African leaders in the sub-Saharan region and beyond argue that the proper response to deal with the current African condition is through the African philosophy of renaissance (Mandela 1994; Mbeki 1998; Mutharika 2010a). This rebirth is a transformation from the current chaotic situation to a better life through the recuperation of the African glorious past. The idea is to change the current situation with its various problems, such as poverty, corruption, conflict of freedoms, economic imbalances, and moral decadence. Renaissance is, therefore, a moment for changing the image of Africa, with reference to the current challenges and a negative past image, mainly from the colonial vestiges. It is a moment of responding to neoliberal capitalism, by elucidating that the African glorious past has a sociopolitical and economic system that can improve the African condition, without compromising the fundamental human values (Mutharika 2010a, b). It is going beyond the one-party politics that were common on the African continent, by showing that there is a better governance system that can be learned from the African glorious past. The renaissance that wants to respond to modern capitalism is preceded and inspired by the pre-independence African renaissance. This was pioneered by the black African freedom movements departing from © The Author(s) 2020 G. M. Kayange, Capitalism and Freedom in African Political Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44360-3_12

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the late 1880s. These movements were partly discussed in Chapter 3, as a response to the deprivation of freedom and economic progress of Africans by colonial capitalism. One of the earliest movements that called for black people’s renaissance throughout the world was Pan-Africanism, which called for black-consciousness and liberation as noted earlier. In the 1950s and 1960s, the renaissance was used as an effective tool toward the independence of African nations. Philosophers such as Senghor (1964a) of Senegal, Hastings Kamuzu Banda of Malawi, and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana called for this emancipation of the African people. They were tired of the system of oppression that was inflicted on the African individuals by the colonials. It is for this reason that Senghor adopted the idea of a renaissance in the African context with his notion of Negritude and Hastings Kamuzu Banda adopted the Kwacha philosophy (see Kayange 2012, 16–30). Similarly, Kwame Nkrumah suggested this movement from oppression to a better life through his philosophy of consciencism. Below, I will discuss the current renaissance as a response to the African conditions in three sections. In Sect. 12.2, I will clarify the concept of renaissance in general. This will be a background for better use of this concept. In 12.3, I will discuss the suggestions by African leaders on African renaissance and its centrality in responding to the current challenges. In Sect. 12.4, there will be a presentation of how Mutharika attempted to use his version of the renaissance in Malawi. This development will clarify how different responses are suggested by African presidents toward the transformation of Africa toward prosperity.

12.2

Semantics of Renaissance

The semantics of the concept ‘renaissance’ shows that it is a word that signifies rebirth or revival in something. It entails that there was something in the past, which was forgotten for various reasons, and now it is resurfacing. The idea of resurfacing or coming back to life is motivated by the recognition of its usefulness in a particular environment. The word renaissance also presupposes that there is the current or present situation which is a distortion of the glorious past or rather a violation of human freedom. It may, therefore, be indicated that renaissance is about the elimination of the undesirable present in view of building a future that reflects the glorious past. Apart from this literal meaning, the use-meaning of this concept refers to a period between the middle ages and the modern period. It is

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often indicated that this period is from the fourteenth century to the seventeenth century. This suggests that what happened in this period is what may be conceived as the meaning of the concept ‘renaissance.’ The idea of a renaissance in the period between the fourteenth century and the seventeenth century is mainly characterized by the rebirth of ancient culture and transformation or abandonment of the way of life of the middle ages. Culture is a word that represents a way of life including different aspects such as, philosophy, literature, art, religion, and science. One of the most important elements was the rediscovery of the philosophical works of the ancient philosophers such as Aristotle’s writings. It must be noted that the interest for reviving Aristotelian philosophy started earlier than the fourteenth century, mainly in clarifying theology. For example, Averroes (1126–1198), also known as Ibn Rushd, revived the study of Aristotle for the purpose of clarifying the Islamic philosophy. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) was a forerunner of renaissance who studied Aristotle and used his ideas to clarify the Christian doctrines. The difference with renaissance is that interest was not primarily the application of Aristotle in religion, but scholars wanted to understand better his writings, based on the new techniques of interpretation. The revival of the Aristotelian works by the renaissance thinkers followed different interpretation techniques. For instance, the works of Averroes were mainly used by some Italian schools of thought as a key to understanding Aristotle’s works. For example, Paul of Venice (d. 1429) came with a defense of the doctrines of Averroes (Renaissance Averroism) as a key to understanding the Aristotelian doctrines, such as his theory of being, the mind/intellect, and the status of the soul. Similarly, Agostino Nifo (1469–1538) embraced the renaissance averroism and contributed in the debate on the immortality of the soul. Other neo-Aristotelians did not focus on theology or metaphysics but revived the natural philosophy building on the Aristotelian works, such as the case of Pietro Pomponazzi (1462–1525) and Jacopo Zabarella (1533–1589). An important philosophy to be noted in this transformation period is the Hispanic philosophy (some famous members were Francisco de Victoria and Francesco Suarez), which was more apologetic toward the teachings of the Catholic Church. In spite of this apologetic stance, the school contributed significantly to the philosophy of law and metaphysics. Apart from the revival of the Aristotelian writings, the renaissance also attracted the revival of Platonism. This was contrary to the image provided by the scholastics, who gave more preference to Aristotle’s ideas.

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Both individuals with religious orientation and those with a humanist orientation studied the works of Plato and informed the new way of life that was created in the renaissance period. There were also studies that were done on the Hellenistic philosophy with an aim of understanding it further and getting insights for a new and better way of life. Similarly, there was a study of ancient Greek and Roman art which gave birth to new aesthetics. The outcome of renaissance has been enormous in different fields and led to a totally new way of life. Just to mention some of the fundamental transformations, there were significant discoveries that were achieved in this period. For instance, in science, Nicolaus Copernicus (1473–1543) made a notable revolution of people’s conception of the world, from a geocentric system to a heliocentric system. This revolution comes in as an element of a renaissance after studying the old Aristotelian and other conceptions of the universe and the motion of the planets. This marked a total transformation from what the people believed to something totally new. This made many individuals who had political power, such as the Catholic Church to feel uncomfortable with this discovery. Galileo Galilee became a victim of promoting the change that occurred in the renaissance period. Apart from shaking people’s beliefs pertaining to the world, the renaissance is noted for its influence in the division of the Christian Church. The revival of learning also affected studies on the Holy Bible. At first, it was in the hands of a few individuals, but with the renaissance, many individuals wanted to understand the bible as one of the literary works, while others for theological clarifications. This led to a schism and the rebirth of the Protestant Church with its own theology. One of the important revolutionaries of the renaissance was Erasmus, who studied the fathers of the church and gave his own interpretations, leading to problems with the common theology of the time (Scholastic theology). Similarly, Martin Luther will study the scriptures and underline his doctrine that the bible is the only authority (sola scrittura), challenging the authority of the Pope. After resistance from the Catholic Church, this led to the development of a new Christian Protestant Church. The above discussion shows that renaissance in Western thought is about change in the society by giving an alternative to the usual life. It is a challenge to what people are used to. It is a transformation on how to do things, but also how to view reality. Renaissance springs from a dislike of the ordinary way of doing things. The development of a new future

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is not done from nothing, but the past is regarded as an important starting point for a nation to change. It is this spirit of renaissance that will be attractive in the African context; in fact, it will be regarded as the required spirit for the transformation of Africa into a better world.

12.3

Conceptualizing African Renaissance

In Africa, the concept of African renaissance has been recurrent mainly in two periods. The first period is when Africans were moving from the colonial rule to the African rule. The colonial period represented the African Dark Age while independence meant a shift to a New Age (Diop ([1946] 1996); Senghor 1964b). This is the period when Pan-Africanists and nationalists argued that the moment for the African renaissance has now come. For example in Chapter 3, I have indicated the various works that fought capitalist ideas through the concept of the renaissance. For example, in 1946, Cheikh Anta Diop (see [1946] 1996), in the collection of essays, Towards the African Renaissance: Essays in Culture and Development, 1946–1960, signaled that the time for African renaissance was ready. This is also seen in 1948 in the essay, ‘When Can We Talk of an African Renaissance?’ where the same idea is underlined. Another important example is Senghor with his theory of Negritude which called for a change of mind-set and the transformation of Africa into a prosperous continent (see also Senghor 1964b; Mutharika 2010a, 21–23).1 In modern neo-capitalism Africa, a more pronounced development of African renaissance that responds to the challenges caused by neocapitalism was suggested by President Mandela of South Africa. In fact, Mandela was one of the first leaders to indicate the era of a new African renaissance, in a speech delivered during the African Union meeting in Tunis (1994), at the Renaissance Festival in Durban (1999), and in many other occasions. In Tunis, Mandela pointed out a moment of renaissance in the following words, Finally, at this summit meeting in Tunis, we shall remove from our agenda the consideration of the question of Apartheid South Africa. Where South Africa appears on the agenda again, let it be because we want to discuss what its contribution shall be to the making of the new African renaissance. 1 Note that this has been discussed earlier in Sect. 12.3 in response to the colonial system.

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Let it be because we want to discuss what materials it will supply for the rebuilding of the African city of Carthage. One epoch with its historic tasks has come to an end. Surely, another must commence with its own challenges. Africa cries out for a new birth, Carthage awaits the restoration of its glory. (Mandela 1994, n.d.)

Although the citation focuses on South Africa, it captures the centrality of change that is central in renaissance. Mandela wants a movement where people stop talking about apartheid South African to new Africa which is desired by different nations. This is an Africa where there is no longer nostalgia for talking about the sad stories that happened in apartheid, South Africa. It is a movement to a new Africa which is characterized by a talk about prosperity. Mandela evoked Carthage which was an old African advanced civilization as a sign of a prosperous Africa. A new Carthage is a dream that is shared by all the African leaders, and it will be a restoration of glory to the continent. At the Renaissance festival, Mandela calls for a renaissance as a form of regeneration of the African continent. It is a way of promoting liberation or freedom of Africa in a different setting to the pre-independence experience. He argued that for the South Africans, including people residing in the other parts of Africa, this renaissance is ‘a call to continue the fight for a better life for all’ (Mandela 1999). In this regard, a good life is possible when Africans are free from various obstacles, such as poverty that has affected most of the African nations. It is further noted by Mandela that renaissance is ‘a call to join hands against crime, corruption, and AIDS.’ This is suggesting that a new Africa is a place where individuals will take it as their responsibility to fight against the African problems. The inspirational definition of renaissance continues to include its goal as the creation of jobs, which are expected to improve the lives of many Africans who are jobless, more especially the young generation. Briefly, renaissance for Mandela is a complete change of the African condition from miserable and problematic situation to a better life for every African individual. The above ideas are clearly summarized in the voice of Mandela, who stated that, For South Africans it is a call to continue the fight for a better life for all. It is a call to join hands against crime, corruption and AIDS; a call to create jobs, to house those who are still homeless; to bring the sweet taste of clean water to more of our rural people beyond the three million

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who have gained access to it in the first years of our freedom; to bring communications and light to millions more. (Mandela 1999, 1)

The continuity of the ideas of renaissance as expressed by Mandela will be evident in his successor Thabo Mbeki. When he was South African Deputy President, he gave a speech in which he underlined the idea of a movement toward a better Africa. This according to him is a journey where Africans project into both the past and the future. The past is there to motivate individuals that change for a better life is possible. The idea of the past that Africa can count on in Mbeki (1998)2 was the glorious past. This is characterized by important discoveries and different works. Commenting on the element of works, Mbeki noted that, ‘I speak of African works of art in South Africa that are a thousand years old. I speak of the continuum in the fine arts that encompasses the varied artistic creations of the Nubians and the Egyptians, the Benin bronzes of Nigeria and the intricate sculptures of the Makonde of Tanzania and Mozambique. I speak of the centuries-old contributions to the evolution of religious thought made by the Christians of Ethiopia and the Muslims of Nigeria.’3 The important works of art are often left aside because the African past is not valued the way it should be. Apparently, Mbeki and Mandela are trying to restore the distorted image of Africa, hence re-establish a positive identity. Apart from these works, Mbeki recognizes the great kingdoms and cities in ancient times, which are a symbol of African greatness, such as Timbuktu, Nuba, Egyptian kingdom, and Mwenemutapa. In these kingdoms, there are many architectural monuments that must remind the Africans of their greatness. The future as Africa’s destination in the renaissance of Mbeki is the carrier of the African good life; it is a dream for prosperity made real in all African nations. For this good future to be possible, it is a must that Africans must rediscover their identity. The discovery of a beautiful and rich past noted above is already a step toward accepting the African past in a positive way. Mbeki notes further that this good future must be accompanied by the destruction of the negative mind-set from the colonial times, which has greatly affected African self-conception and progress. He calls this mind-set problem a dogma about the Africans,

2 http://archive.unu.edu/unupress/mbeki.html. 3 http://archive.unu.edu/unupress/mbeki.html.

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‘When I survey all this and much more besides, I find nothing to sustain the long-held dogma of African exceptionalism, according to which the color black becomes a symbol of fear, evil and death’ (Mbeki 1998).4 This dogma may be understood as a belief about Africans that provides a pessimistic understanding. It is in this case very difficult to appreciate any African individual or entrust him/her with an important responsibility. Mbeki beautifully summarizes the consequences of this pessimism on an African in the following words, I speak of this long-held dogma because it continues still to weigh down the African mind and spirit, like the ton of lead that the African slave carries on her own shoulders, producing in her and the rest a condition which, in itself, contests any assertion that she is capable of initiative, creativity, individuality, and entrepreneurship. Its weight dictates that she will never straighten her back and thus discover that she is as tall as the slave master who carries the whip. Neither will she have the opportunity to question why the master has legal title both to the commodity she transports on her back and the labour she must make available to ensure that the burden on her shoulders translates into dollars and yen. (Mbeki 1998)5

An African is invited to get rid of all this negativity and embrace a positive or optimistic view of the self. It is in this case that it is possible for Africans to concentrate on their own liberation from different forms of bondage in the continent. Similarly, when Thabo Mbeki became the President of South Africa declared that his government will be guided by ideas from African renaissance. Mbeki’s concept of rebirth may be summarized in the following words, ‘The Africa Renaissance is upon us. As we peer through the looking glass darkly, this may not be obvious. Africa reaffirms that she is continuing her rise from the ashes. Whatever the setbacks of the continent, nothing can stop us now! Whatever the difficulties, Africa shall be at peace and however improbable it may sound to the skeptics, Africa will prosper.’ While different African leaders have in a way promoted African rebirth, such as Kagame of Rwanda and Magufuli in Tanzania, this chapter will be limited to the renaissance proposed by Mutharika to the United Nations. The choice of his ideas is based on the understanding that he did not 4 http://archive.unu.edu/unupress/mbeki.html. 5 http://archive.unu.edu/unupress/mbeki.html.

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only develop renaissance ideas but also attempted to implement them with substantial success in Malawi, mainly in the period between 2004 and 2010. The other reason why this work is selected is because of the various debates that Mutharika had with the neo-capitalists (Mutharika 1995, 2010a).

12.4

Mutharika’s Response Through Renaissance

A strong African response (to both old capitalism and neo-capitalism), which is representative of most of the nations, was given through the theory of renaissance. One of the commonly shared versions of the renaissance was developed by African Union Chairman, Mutharika in 2010, who was also the President of the Republic of Malawi. In fact, the aspect of sharing with other leaders is echoed in the words, ‘In a way, the dream I speak of in this treatise is not mine alone but one that I share with my fellow African leaders and with all African people, a billion of them, speaking thousands of languages, in 53 countries…’ (Mutharika 2010a, xiv). One of the fundamental works that summarize his concept of renaissance is the African Dream: From Poverty to Prosperity (2010a), which is a movement from Afro-pessimism to Afro-optimism. Afro-pessimism is represented by ‘Old Africa’ which is known as a hopeless center for various human problems such as hunger, poverty, diseases, and corruption. Afrooptimism is represented by a new Africa which is marked by prosperity and becomes a true development partner of the Western capitalist world and the rest of the world. Below is (1) I will discuss the idea of Afropessimism, in (2) Afro-optimism, and in (3) Mutharika’s implementation of neo-renaissance. (1) Mutharika’s African renaissance departs with the presentation of a paradigm similar to the Dark Ages, which must be left behind in this transformation process toward a new and prosperous Africa. The main argument is that there is an old image of Africa, which is an obstacle in the context of development. This image is a consequence of the negative conceptualization of the old African reality. The concept of old Africa in Mutharika (2010a) refers to both the facts and image of this continent by both Africans and Western nations (and other parts of the globe). The common image was that Africa is a dark continent that is characterized by a multiplicity of problems such as diseases, lack of political freedom, poverty, and underdevelopment.

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The western image on Africa and Africans: There are mixed views on how the old Africa is viewed by the Western countries. There are different sides or perspectives of Africa that the citizens in most of capitalist Europe are made to know. The assumption of Mutharika was that they are often shown the negative part of this continent. In a lecture delivered at Boston University (Mutharika 2010b, 2), he confirmed this negative image in the following words, I am saying this because hitherto, the Africa you have been made to know is the Africa of incessant calamities, the Africa of endemic diseases such as HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the Africa where many children die before the age of five years, the Africa of conflicts, terrorism and piracy, and indeed the Africa of underdevelopment and extreme poverty. This is the Africa you all know. This Africa does exist.

While he acknowledges the existence of this problematic perspective, this image has often led to an Africa which is miserable and helpless. On the one hand, this rightly creates a situation of compassion for Africa and consequently calls for support in various ways. On the other hand, this creates a situation of dependence, where Africans remain in the ‘old Africa’ without any hope for change. The old Africa is characterized by the dependence of most of the African nations on the Western capitalists for their survival. Apart from asking the Western capitalists for support, the image of many was that Africans try to survive by entering into continuous debt (Martin 1991). As indicated in Chapter 8, the economic dependence of Africa created sympathy in various countries in the West and this led to the idea of cancellation of debts (Martin 1991; Hillyard 1998, 18–19). This is the Africa of debts and that of being forgiven based on the understanding that the nations cannot manage to pay back. The old Africa is known for the problem of slavery, where different individuals were taken to Europe by the capitalists. They were viewed as a labor source, created to enrich the capitalists. Africa is known as a land of slavery, where individuals are ready to sell their own neighbors in order to ascertain their own survival. While Africans are remembered for selling each other, the Western capitalists who initiated the whole business and reduced these slaves to a commodity to be owned, and to a means of production, are often forgotten. A sad side of old Africa is that it is known by different wars against individual freedom, which led to the destruction of human life. The famous

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wars included the tribal, political, and economic wars that characterized various African nations. These wars continued in a number of countries such as Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Mozambique, Angola, and Uganda. All this gave the impression that this is a war zone. The worst scenario came with the Rwandan genocide that occurred in different nations, such as Burundi and Rwanda. The assassination on 6 April 1994 of two Hutu presidents Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda and Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi in a plane to Kigali led to the claim that it was the Tutsi who were responsible. This tribal attribution to the Tutsi immediately led to a civil war, where many Tutsi top officials, Hutu moderate individuals, and many others were killed. According to van Harperen (2019, 113),6 Between 6 April and the end of June 1994, in just 100 days, approximately three quarters of the total Tutsi population of Rwanda was killed. Estimates of the number of victims vary between 507,000 (Human Rights Watch’s historian and ICTR expert witness Alison Des Forges) and 1.2 million (Rwandan government).

Similarly, the worst situation came from Sudan, which experienced mass killings under the dictatorial regime of Al Bashir, which was discussed earlier in Chapter 6. One cannot forget the Africa of wars toward the control of the market of diamonds and other precious minerals, as was the case of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Briefly, this is the side of an Africa that is characterized by the continuous violation of individual freedom. Apart from the realistic picture of Africa that isolates a negative story as above, there is also an unrealistic image in old Africa. This image was mainly created by the colonials, and it was embraced and owned by most of the Africans. It is also a consequence of the biases that spring from the above realities that actually happen in Africa. This is the mentality where Africans look at themselves and anything that is African as negative. On the contrary, they view everything that is Western in a positive way. Africans are brainwashed to think that they are inferior to the Western white capitalists. The inferiority complex has entered deeply in African people’s philosophy, such that what is done by the Western capitalists is often seen as 6 https://www.niod.nl/sites/niod.nl/files/Rwandan%20genocide.pdf retrieved on 20 April 2019.

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good. Similarly, to be developed is to live a life similar to the capitalists (Mutharika 2010a, 113–125). This covers different areas such as dressing, eating standards, and means of mobility. This has also affected the conception of various concepts such as art, work, beauty, and truth. For example, it is common among Africans to view a person (fellow African) with lighter skin as beautiful, while the one with dark skin as not. The measure of what is true or the truth is what comes from Western civilization. Briefly, the measure of what is good or right has become what is accepted by the Western capitalists. Another wrong image is seen in the conceptualization of education and religion. Education is measured by how an individual has acquired elements of Western civilization. For example, speaking and writing well Western languages such as English and French qualifies an individual as very educated as opposed to the one who can do the same with a local language such as Chichewa. In the old Africa, individuals preferred to do their education in the Western world. The thinking was that they will become like the Western capitalists, hence improve their identity. The truth is that it is these individuals who went to acquire Western education that became leaders in independent Africa. Their thinking is, therefore, that of trying to transform African nations to be like the Western world by using its models, such as economic models (Mutharika 2010a, 116– 134). Similarly, Western religions are easily accepted as bringing the truth to the Africans, while the traditional religions are regarded as backward and a threat toward human life and rights. In Mutharika’s thought, the main problem is that governments and systems change in Africa, but the old Africa and its image continue guiding the consciousness of the African individuals. For example, the transformation from one-party politics to multiparty politics did not manage to eliminate the negative thinking that characterizes old Africa. The neocolonialists invented new forms of dominating African individuals through a negative image. The concept ‘neo-colonialism’ refers to the new forms of dominance of Africa by the capitalist and other nations (Mutharika 1995, 42–59; 2010a, 195–202).7 In short, the image provided by the old Africa keeps hindering Africans from genuine change and development. Individuals have accepted their old Africa as their fate.

7 This concept was firstly suggested by Jean Paul Sartre to refer to the new forms of Western dominance after the nations have obtained their independence.

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Embracing old Africa as a way of life completely hinders an individual from engaging in critical and innovative thinking. Mutharika noted that this makes one think that what is currently suggested by the Western Capitalists is the only reality and that there are no alternative solutions to problems. For example, individuals accepted multiparty democracy as the only system in the African context, yet there are many other alternatives that are present in Africa and beyond. Similarly, they accepted the neoliberal economic system as the only one that fits the African condition, forgetting that there are different ways that may help individuals achieve a particular end (Mutharika 1995, 124–125; 2010a, 113–138). Finally, the biggest problem coming from the above is that there is a wrong African identity among the individuals given that they fail to appreciate their status. There is also a big problem for Africans to become creative and productive, independent of the Western and other influences. (2) The movement to new Africa in the context of Mutharika is mainly what is desired by the citizens. He often used the word ‘Dream’ and sometimes ‘Dreaming in color’ in order to conceptualize what is desired. Apart from what is desired, this new Africa is where there is a narration of the positive aspects that are often ignored in the common account of this continent. The idea is that, instead of just hearing miserable stories about Africa, such as war and famine, people start hearing about the past as well as the present successes in different nations. This is Africa where the potential in different areas such as economy, agriculture, and technology is put into proper use, leading the citizens to a life of prosperity (Mutharika 2010a, 9–29). In summary, new Africa is ‘Positive Africa’ which has overcome the ‘Negative Africa’ in old Africa. New Africa is characterized by (i) positive thinking, which is also viewed as the mind-set and attitude change, (ii) rebirth of African systems, and (iii) transformation of the African reality. (i) Positive thinking constitutes the provision of a perspective of Africa that has plenty of good things. It calls for a total transformation in the context of narrating the African story. For instance, Mutharika encouraged the Media houses to adopt positive thinking, where they start appreciating the many good elements happening in Africa. Reporting has to focus on making an effort to change the negative image of Africa. More time in Media houses must be that of narrating stories of success in different areas of life. Similarly, musicians who narrate the African story were encouraged to be carriers of the African success story rather than always singing about social problems. The national radio was advised to give a

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strong message to musicians to change their thinking. This affected those musicians that wanted to continue transmitting sad stories which they confront in their life. Mutharika put into practice this positive thinking in his various speeches and visits across the globe by narrating success stories. He organized a ceremony once a year whereby he was identifying different African Heroes and showcase their achievements using National Media institutions. Similarly, he promoted different African Heroes from other parts of Africa so that hearing all these stories, Africans would start changing their mind on their continent, hence building a positive way of thinking. Some of the Heroes he attempted to promote as a way of enhancing positive thinking included the different African presidents such as Senghor of Senegal, Nyerere of Tanzania, Kamuzu Banda of Malawi, and Kaunda of Zambia. Apart from these Heroes, the positive thinking was done through narrating the African remote past, by indicating its great political readers, kingdoms, and civilizations. He wanted Africans to think positively about the past by remembering stories of success such as Hannibal and the various great kingdoms. Commenting on this aspect, Mutharika (2010a, 10) noted that, ‘Historians and archeologists have unearthed comprehensive and indisputable proof that the ancient African kingdoms of Ghana, Songhai (Niger/Burkina Faso), Timbuktu (Mali) Nubia (Southern Egypt/Northern Sudan), Axum (Ethiopia), Democratic Republic of Congo and Munhumutapa (Zimbabwe/Mozambique).’ There are also various technological innovations in this remote past that have to enhance positive thinking in today’s Africa. The right mentality developed in this regard is that our forefathers did it, and we are also going to be successful. A further area regarded the African resources; this was to bring the positive thinking that Africa is not poor as was portrayed in the old Africa narration. Propaganda showing different aspects such as African beauty, water resources, and minerals was therefore encouraged. The main thinking was that Africa has all the resources required for building a better or a desired good life. There is no need to keep importing things from the outside world. For instance, he indicated that there is a lot of water and land that are not used in Africa. The mind-set is that they don’t have anything, and need support. With this mind-set, people die of hunger in front of all the resources that they have. Positive thinking is about telling Africans that you have all the resources that you need, and all that is needed is to use them to meet the various needs.

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Positive thinking is also promoted in discovering and creating a good image of who is African. This necessitates a clear understanding of true African identity (Mutharika 1995, 191–197; 2010a, 18–28). This will help to cancel the image created by the old Africa. It is this identity that will enlighten an African to understand that being African or being black does not imply that one is inferior. This is enhanced further by a rediscovery of the original African identity, even before the coming of the capitalists in Africa. (ii) The creation of a new Africa is centered on Mutharika’s desire for the rebirth of knowledge and the invention of new ways of thinking, in various areas, such as economics, politics, and science. While thinkers such as Aristotle and Plato were fundamental in the rebirth of knowledge in Europe, Mutharika suggested as fundamental philosophers such as Leopold Senghor and his Negritude philosophy (Senghor 1964a), Julius Nyerere and the Ujamaa thought, Kenneth Kaunda with his African Humanism and elements of Banda’s Kwacha philosophy. Apart from these thinkers, a rebirth of knowledge has to draw from African culture and the various systems. For example, rebirth in the context of a philosophical system, Mutharika suggested the rebirth of humanism as a new form of African philosophy. While Chapter 3 has already discussed humanism, I will exemplify how he called for its revival in building a democratic political system, a theory of social justice and a conception of freedom (Humanism explains also his new idea of democracy). For example, his idea of democracy that has to be revived from humanism is participatory democracy (as developed in Chapter 2). Commenting on this African democracy, he noted that, Another notable African philosophy of participatory democracy, similar to Ujamaa but developed independently, was Humanism. It was developed in Southern Africa by Kenneth David Kaunda, the first President of Zambia. In Zambia in Humanism (Kaunda, 1974), he defined Humanism as absolute devotion to human interests or the human race through the complete dedication to development objectives and priorities for the betterment of mankind. (Mutharika 2010a, 25–26)

Instead of adopting the Western conceptions of democracy such as the neoliberal democracy discussed in Chapter 8, the new Africa has to go back to the communitarian system of governance, which was indicated

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as based on a kingship system. Mutharika argues that democracy in this system will be defined by the demonstration of the will of the people through consensus. In this context, he is very close to Kamuzu Banda who argued that Malawi as a nation is a community that has its own democracy guided by the will of the people. He noted that if they want only a one-party system, this will be a form of democracy, given that this is what they want. Mutharika sees this rebirth of African democracy as fundamental toward the development of Africa. According to him, this will allow all the community members to equally benefit from the national development agenda. He gives an example of the contribution of a version of African democracy suggested by Nyerere, Mutharika writes, Nyerere asserted that development should come from the people themselves, especially those in rural communities, since they make up the bulk of the population. Growth had to start with the village unit or scheme, and then spread to the rest of the economy. Villages have to be modernised through the re-organisation and re-grouping of people into productive social units. They have to be provided modern amenities so they can increase productivity and growth through traditional means. It was believed that the use of time-tested traditional morals, norms, principles and obligations would create wide support among rural communities, ensuring their full participation and commitment to development. (Mutharika 2010a, 23)

The citation shows that the aspect of participation is made possible in this context by centering everything on the community, which owns the development and benefit through their free participation. Apart from the rebirth of African democracy in new Africa, Mutharika calls for the rebirth of the system of social justice. This system was present in the traditional African society, where equality was a norm, and also the recognition of the disadvantaged was fundamental. In terms of equality, his thinking is that the African community recognizes all its members as fundamental. It is the human value that is at the center of all the actions in a particular community. Equality is therefore seen inland distribution, whereby every individual is given according to his/her needs. On recognition of differences, is where some people may lack things while others have more. In this regard, Mutharika argues that the less advantaged must be supported by the community so that they can have what they need.

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While the above thinking of Mutharika seems to come from the African traditional context, the recognition of differences raises various questions. For instance, bearing in mind that in the African traditional context everything was owned together, this raised the question of why some people become less advantaged. In fact, everything is for everyone. One of the possible interpretations of this status is given in Chapter 3, whereby it is indicated that the African traditional society practiced communitarianism but at the same time a form of capitalism. It was shown that chiefs, elders, and other members owned more things as compared to the other members of the society (Mutharika 1995, 95–112; 2010a, 251–286). Another possible interpretation is that Mutharika is influenced by the concept of distributive justice by John Rawls. This may be summarized in the following citation, Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that: (i) they are to be of the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of society, consistent with the just savings principle (the difference principle). (ii) offices and positions must be open to everyone under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. (Rawls 1971, 302)

The first aspect of this principle known as the difference principle acknowledges social and economic inequalities only in those areas where the least developed or advantaged are supported. It, therefore, explains the element of recognizing differences for the benefit of the less advantaged. The second aspect encourages equality which is also underlined in Mutharika’s thinking. (iii) In the new Africa, Mutharika called for the transformation of the African negative reality, such as poverty, hunger, and diseases. His main focus was in the context of boosting the Agriculture economy. This was according to him a way of responding to the various challenges facing the African nations. His interest is reflected in the following words, I am here today to discuss with you not the African calamities and endemic poverty, but new African hopes and new opportunities. I want to discuss with you not widespread food shortages, hunger and malnutrition, but how Africa can produce enough food to feed its people and the rest of the world. (Mutharika 2010b, 1)

Based on the communitarian approach and his idea of social justice, Africa can produce by primarily empowering the local farmers so that they

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can make a significant contribution by producing more for consumption as well as a surplus for business. This will further help them to compete well in the free-market context, which is dominated by some individuals that have more capital and surplus value. It was for this reason that Mutharika introduced his fertilizer subsidy program in Malawi. The general African program that was suggested by Mutharika was the ‘African Food Basket.’ This was a food security program that wanted the farmers to produce more by helping them in ‘the purchase of tractors, agricultural implements, irrigation equipment, fertilizers and manures, improved seeds, cement for dam construction, water pumps, pipes and trucks for transportation’ (Mutharika 2010b). It was presented to the African presidents in the African Union, who agreed to end African hunger through this idea. The concept was shared also with the development partners as well as presented in various universities across the globe. Mutharika summarized African Food Basket in the following words: The African Food Basket initiative is therefore a new focused approach that highlights agriculture and food security as the springboard for growth. It calls for Africa and all cooperating partners to focus on improving agriculture and food security in the next five years through innovative interventions and increased financing. (Mutharika 2010b, 1–2)

Against the wish of various capitalists, this program was tried in Malawi, and it became a success story. It immediately moved Malawian farmers to produce more, and the surplus value was sold to other countries. (3) Did Mutharika’s renaissance lead Africa toward a period of modernity marked by the experience of enlightenment and freedom? In the discussion of renaissance with reference to Europe, it was noted that this system led to modernity, and in the early pre-independence period, African renaissance led to an independent Africa. Mutharika’s renaissance was expected to lead Africa into a new context characterized by prosperity. Given that his ideas were applied in Malawi, the idea of a new prosperous Africa will be discussed below by reflecting on Malawi. Beyond Malawi, it is difficult to trace whether these ideas transformed other African countries toward prosperity. According to Mutharika, the movement to a new Africa was successful in Malawi because of the various achievements that were realized.

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Firstly, success comes in departing from the development of homegrown policies rather than getting systems from the Western world (Mutharika 2010a, 516). This is seen in the development of the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS), which was an instrument for economic growth and poverty reduction. Secondly, the ideas of Mutharika were a success story because Malawians agreed to work and achieve prosperity as he instructed. Commenting on this aspect, he wrote, ‘Consensus also emerged that for Malawi to become an industrial nation capable of transforming agricultural primary commodities and other raw materials and minerals into new wealth for the people, the people had to work harder’ (Mutharika 2010a, 520). Thirdly, he indicated the choice of Malawi to refute ‘Macroeconomic stability’ as a policy and made its own based on the achievement of ‘macroeconomic growth within a stable political and economic environment.’ This confirms that in the new Africa, African individuals will formulate their own policies that best respond to the challenges in this context rather than depending on Western policies. In the period between 2004 and 2009, Mutharika’s African renaissance helped in improving the economy of Malawi; in fact, there was notable macroeconomic growth. He noted that this may be seen in the inflation rate in 2008 which was only 8.7%. Similarly, he indicated the dropping of the interest rates from 35% in 2003 to 13% in 2010 (Mutharika 2010a, 522). Commenting on the decrease of public debt, Mutharika writes, The total public debt as a percentage of the GDP decreased from 123.9% in 2004 to only 19.9% in 2008. Malawi also managed to reduce its domestic debt from 25% of the GDP in 2004 to 11.5% in 2008. During the same period, foreign debt as a percentage of GDP dropped from 112.6% in 2004 to only 16.5% in 2008.

The African Food Basket which was noted in the section above also continued yielding excellent results in Malawi. The country moved from a hungry nation to that with food security. The story of success is mainly seen in Malawi’s food crop, maize, which registered an increase in the surplus from 2005 when the Input Subsidy Programme was initiated. For instance, Mutharika noted that in the 2005 and 2006 period, the food surplus value was 500,000 metric tons. In the planting season in 2006 and 2007, the surplus value increased up to 1.1 million metric tons. The state newspaper, Tiyende Pamodzi, pointed out in August 2008

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that in 2005/2006 to 2006/2007, Malawi moved from 216 metric tons of maize to 3.2 million. Similarly, from 2008 up to 2010, Malawi has increasingly done extremely well in terms of maize production. Another indicator of transformation in Malawi was seen in the idea of creating a green belt, whereby irrigation was used. Different schemes were created to avoid the culture of only waiting for rainy water. This gave a chance to the farmers to engage in production throughout the year. Given that Malawi has various good lakes such as Lake Malawi and Lake Malombe, Mutharika took advantage and developed different schemes. There were different crops that were planted through irrigation such as wheat, rice, maize, and vegetables. Following the good performance of Malawi, Mutharika received a series of international awards confirm a success story of his African renaissance. In 2008, he received the International Award for Food Security by the Food and Agriculture Natural Resources and Policy Network (FANRPN). The Agricola Medal was offered to him by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in 2008. There are other awards that he received up to 2009 for the best performance in a number of areas, confirming that his philosophy could really produce practical results. Although there are many areas where Mutharika’s African renaissance confirms a success story, this new Africa did not last long because of various problems. Lastly, he managed to influence many Malawians to change their mind-set by becoming positive as they struggled toward prosperity. Unfortunately, most of the achievements started fading away in his second term of office from 2009, as the controversial aspects of his thought took center stage. The main problem would turn out to be a conflict between some of the elements in his ideological philosophy and multiparty democracy. The first controversial aspect consisted in the fact that Mutharika’s philosophy overlooked the current state of affairs in the democratic world, whereby globalization in writing and application of policies (in governance) plays a big role. It is a world where too much stress is placed on being African, Asian, or belonging to the European Union. He demonstrated the characteristic of not being able to welcome any foreign suggestions. Just like Kamuzu, he knew what was good for Malawians. This was further supported by the fact that he was successful in his goals. Therefore, his thinking was better than what the other nations were suggesting. But this mentality was suicidal because, in the current democracy,

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every citizen has an authentic voice concerning what is happening in other countries. The second controversial aspect is in the area of power. His ideological philosophy slowly gave more powers to the president to the point that he began to display some of the characteristics that were problematic in Kamuzu’s regime. The president acquired names like ‘Today’s Moses’ and ‘Ngwazi.’8 This consolidation of power occurred because the president had an absolute majority in parliament. Just as the king had more power in some African traditional society, the president was viewed likewise. This power shift invoked the conception that everything belongs to the king, and Malawi was gradually moving into a monarchist oligarchy. Under these ruling conditions, he could decide what he thought was important; he could appoint and change political and administrative positions without consultation. Consequently, the nation lacked accountability in financial and other matters. Because multiparty democracy is opposed to this state of affairs, the president began to receive criticism. Some thought that this aspect of the president going against popular opinion was admirable. But the proper way of viewing it is that multiparty democracy is fundamentally opposed to absolutism, a system of governance where absolute power resides with the king. Power should be with the people, not with the village headmen or small chiefs. The third problem of Mutharika’s ideological philosophy relates to his notion of freedom. Given that it was for a democratic nation, it was expected that individual freedom would be greatly respected. Unfortunately, it failed to meet some of the demands necessitated by democracy, as activists demonstrated. His philosophy was underlining the rediscovery of African systems tended to promoted freedom centered on the entire community. Individualistic freedom is supervened by communitarian freedom. The system tries to ensure that there is security in the entire community, but it misfires over individual freedoms, creating some of the problems that individuals face such as academic freedom, homosexual rights, freedom of expression, and media freedom.

8 Kamuzu Banda was the first leader of Malawi to receive this title.

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12.5

Conclusion

The chapter has discussed the idea of renaissance, which was used as a means for transforming Africa’s mindset toward the development of this continent. The main interest was to eliminate the negative conception of Africa, which is a consequence of colonialism, and replacing it with a positive view. This renaissance was fundamental for bringing back the African identity, which was highly compromised by the different doctrines promoted by the Western capitalists. After discussing different experiences of renaissance, the chapter concentrated on Bingu was Mutharika of Malawi, who tried to share his African renaissance with his political party, the DPP, other Malawians, and other African heads of state. In 2012 before completing his term of office, he died. Her predecessor, Joyce Banda took his place, but she did not continue with the concept of the renaissance. The question is, why did this seeming successful system begin to fall? There are several responses that may be given, such as, Mutharika did not share his vision with most of the politicians that were working under him. Immediately after his death, they felt relieved and followed their own systems. Other reasons are given above show that this system failed because it was in conflict with the neo-capitalist agenda. In fact, neo-capitalism (neoliberalism) came in Africa as a form of the renaissance from one-party democracy which was thought to be autocratic to a freedom-based government. The renaissance of Mutharika because of its similarity with the earlier nationalism in the one-party system, it was interpreted as a threat toward human life. This explains the various wars with Mutharika from 2011 up to his death in 2012. While African renaissance seems to be an interesting alternative to Western capitalism, it generally fails because of its communitarian or socialist bias. It is because of this aspect that it may generally be viewed as a version of democratic socialism. This makes it very difficult to address issues that concern individual freedom as was the case with communitarianism.

References Diop, C. A. ([1946] 1996). Towards the African Renaissance: Essays in Culture and Development, 1946–1960 (Egbuna P. Modum, Trans.). London: The Estate of Cheikh Anta Diop and Karnak House. Hillyard, M. (1998). Cancellation of Third World Debt. London, UK: House of Commons Library.

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Kayange, G. M. (2012). Modern African Nationalistic-Ideological Philosophy: Its Controversial Development in Malawi (1958–2012). African Philosophy, 6, 16–30. Mandela, N. (1994). Address by President Nelson Mandela at the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) meeting of Heads of State and Government, Tunis – Lybia. http://www.mandela.gov.za/mandela_speeches/1994/940613_oau. htm. Mandela, N. (1999). Address by President Nelson Mandela at the African Renaissance Festival, Durban. http://www.mandela.gov.za/mandela_speeches/ 1999/990327_renaissance.htm. Martin, M. (1991). The Crumbling Facade of African Debt Negotiations. New York: Palgrave. Mbeki, Thabo. (1998, April 9). The African Renaissance, South Africa and the World. Speech by Deputy President Thabo Mbeki at the United Nations University. http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/1998/mbek0409.htm. Mutharika, B. (1995). One Africa One Destiny: Towards Democracy, Good Governance and Development. Harare: SAPES. Mutharika, B. (2010a). African Dream from Poverty to Prosperity. Limbe: The Guardian Publications. Mutharika, B. (2010b, October 1). The African Food Basket: Innovations, Interventions, and Strategic Partnerships. Keynote Address (pp. 1–9). Boston University, MA. https://www.un.int/malawi/sites/www.un.int/files/Malawi/ Documents/keynote_address_at_boston_university_octover_1_2010.pdf. Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Harvard: Harvard University Press. Senghor, L. (1964a). Negritude et Humanisme. Paris: Éditions du Seuil. Senghor, L. (1964b). On African Socialism. London: Pall Mall Press. van Harperen, M. (2019). The Rwandan Genocide, 1994. https://www.niod.nl/ sites/niod.nl/files/Rwandan%20genocide.pdf.

CHAPTER 13

Afro-Chinese Alternative to Capitalism and Freedom Conflict

13.1

Introduction

Over 40 years have passed since China decided to embark on the economic transformation that attempted to reverse communism transforming it toward a specific case of socialism mixed with capitalism. Harvey noted this transformation by indicating that, ‘In 1978, Deng Xiaoping took the first momentous steps towards the liberalization of a communist-ruled economy in a country that accounted for a fifth of the world’s population.’ Xiaoping required a lot of sacrifice in a nation that experience for a long time with Mao. This transformation is a story of success, whereby the economy of China has increased due to its openness toward the external world. What is important is, ‘what type of market liberalization worked in China.’ This comes against the background that the same process did not produce the expected results in most of the African nations. Is the Chinese model an alternative system that may liberate Africa from its capitalist crisis? A Chinese Ambassador to Malawi in the launch of a Center of Excellence in Ethics and Governance on 9 September 2019 indicated that, while the Chinese value liberty, its model is that development comes first and then democracy will automatically follow. While there is a lot of philosophy in this model, China has asserted itself in Africa because of the interest to engage in economic activities that benefit its population but also develop the African continent. The question that is fundamental although it will not fully be answered in this work is, ‘What © The Author(s) 2020 G. M. Kayange, Capitalism and Freedom in African Political Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44360-3_13

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is the cost of developing through the assistance of a foreign nation?’ The two common answers include the positive conception in which China is seen as a savior in terms of African development and a negative conception in which it is portrayed as a new form of imperialism (colonialism). Whatever answer may be given toward this question, China has made strides in establishing relationships with various African nations, making itself an important alternative to the neo-capitalist systems from the Western world. Neo-capitalism with its emphasis on decentralization and individual freedom dismantled the political muscle of the African communitarian system but failed to ascertain liberation from the poverty of the masses. The government that acted as a community representative in spite of other difficulties, assured the poor masses that it was there to support them at least provide their basic needs, including security and health. Most African nations precipitated in a situation where the weakened governments were not looked after for support. The relation with the people has often been seen to intensify when elections are close. This is when politicians try to show that they love their population and in some nations, they start providing for handouts. This is often accompanied by many promises, most of which are not satisfied because of the conditions provided by neo-capitalist and also because of an increase in government poverty. It is apparently unorthodox to deny the contention that the elimination of the Berlin wall and the division of the great USSR gave the impression of the end of communism and the triumph of capitalism. Nevertheless, this system remained and was mixed with a dose of state capitalism. Chinese economic philosophy is apparently an alternative to the neoliberal capitalism of the giants such as IMF and World, which was discussed earlier. Commenting on this Ziso indicated that, ‘China is not just an alternative economic partner—a new source of aid and investment and an increasingly important market—but an economic partner with a distinctive developmental model from that advocated by traditional institutions such as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’ (Ziso 2018, 3). Although the main concern of Ziso was the Chinese experience in Ethiopia, most of the elements are similar to the developments in various parts of Africa. The chapter explores the capitalism and freedom contribution of China in the African context. It does this by primarily clarifying the liberalization reform that took place during Deng Xiaoping in Sect. 13.2. This will clarify the status of China and its role in the free-market reforms over the

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years. In Sect. 13.3, I will focus on how China contributed to capitalism through investments in various parts of Africa. While China looks innocent because of investing and giving loans without additional conditions, its presence and competition in the free-market context are significant toward its development and that of Africa. In Sect. 13.4, I will focus on the component of cultural freedom and exchange with African nations as a way of spreading a version of capitalist that is accepted in China. In Sect. 13.5, conclusion, I raise some issues regarding whether the African content has to regard this as an indispensable alternative. I will be of the view that African nations have to develop or sustain their own system toward development.

13.2

Neoliberalism or Socialism or Communist?

A discourse on Chinese influence in modern capitalism must be preceded by clarifying the relation between neoliberalism with its insistence on freedom and socialism with its focus on social relations. China has earlier lived a socialist system under Mao (1893–1976), which underlined the role of the government is controlling socio-economic and political system. The system that was adopted by Mao as the founder of the Chinese Republic was Marxism-Leninism. Similar to the development of events in Africa, he declared China a one-party nation around 1949. In his philosophy, he wanted to make his country free from the imperial powers and make it one of the strongest nations in the world. His death in 1976 left China in a weak state, in a situation of economic stagnation whose transformation required another visionary. The successor Hua Guofeng did not last long as he attempted to maintain communism, he was sidelined by members of the communist party ruling that nation. A movement that witnessed the incorporation of aspects of liberalism in this system came around 1978 when Deng Xiaoping decided to carry out a reform (Harvey 2008, 119). The clever move taken by Xiaoping in the reforms was to merge elements of the free market and the authoritarian components typical of socialism. This is a difficult affair given that the elements that these two systems are often presented as conflicting. One based on radical communitarianism and the other based on radical individualism as required by the neoliberals. The outcome of this reform is what is commonly known as state capitalism. Commenting on this outcome Harvey (2008, 120) wrote,

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The outcome in China has been the construction of a particular kind of market economy that increasingly incorporates neoliberal elements interdigitated with authoritarian centralized control. Elsewhere, as in Chile, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, the compatibility between authoritarianism and the capitalist market had already been clearly established?

This suggested that both the individual and the government were encouraged to participate in market activities. In spite of this government involvement, liberalizations of some of the areas of the Chinese economy were done. The economy was encouraged to focus mainly on the industry, agriculture, education, science, and defense (see Harvey 2008, 120). China managed to move away from a more strict and authoritarian government to a new setting that tolerates pockets of freedom. Countries that had a system similar to China such as North Korea continued with an authoritarian government. There are various signs of openness in the transformation of China, mainly changes in policies, by allowing the market to determine the prices of commodities but also increase the chances of competition in its economy. Another important factor that has contributed to the transformation of China has been the element of openness to foreign trade and nations. This practice will not only introduce China into the neoliberal system, but it also became an occasion for sharing its fundamental beliefs at the international level. What can be said with precision, is that China, by not taking the ‘shock therapy’ path of instant privatization later foisted on Russia and central Europe by the IMF, the World Bank, and the ‘Washington Consensus’ in the 1990s, managed to avert the economic disasters that beset those countries. By taking its own peculiar path towards ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ or, as some now prefer to call it, ‘privatization with Chinese characteristics’, it managed to construct a form of state-manipulated market economy that delivered spectacular economic growth (averaging close to 10 per cent a year) and rising standards of living for a significant proportion of the population for more than twenty years. (Harvey 2008, 122)

This citation helps to respond to the question asked above, whether China embraced neoliberal capitalism or socialism. This shows that the system is attempting to embrace elements from both sides of a purported dilemma between socialism and neoliberalism. The system that came with this reform is rightly given two names above, that is, either ‘socialism with

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Chinese characteristics’ or ‘privatization with Chinese characteristics’. All these show that this is a hybrid system that takes into consideration the changes but at the same time keeps what is essential in this country. Although there is notable transformation toward free-market system in China, the component of ‘state capitalism’ leads to a lot of questions from a neoliberal capitalist who attempts to fully embrace classical liberalism. Indicating that ‘state capitalism’ is apparently paradoxical on the grounds that you cannot encourage individual freedom and ownership of property, and at the same time underline state control in some of the areas. For the state to be in control in some aspects, it entails that some freedom will be compromised or rather sacrificed. In spite of these possible threats, Deng Xiaoping looked more at the benefits of such a system rather than stick to systems that are not effective.

13.3 Economic Freedom and the Expansion of China China practiced a form of capitalism which is often called ‘State Capitalism.’ A strict neo-capitalist will have difficulties in calling this ‘capitalism’ because it is a version of socialism, which is often regarded as dangerous toward individual freedom and market freedom. In state capitalism, a nation still plays a fundamental role in controlling the economy as well as some elements of freedom. Different from pure communism that was exercised in USSR, modern Chinese capitalism reformed and allowed its individuals to exercise their freedom to engage in business in the capitalist world and beyond. In fact, Harvey (2008) argues that China embarked on neoliberal reform by privatizing some of the state businesses, but at the same time the government maintained influence. This opened a door for many Chinese to come to Africa as independent individuals to engage in business. The extension of China in Africa cannot be overemphasized as the only unique experience of Chinese state capitalism. China Global Investment Tracker shows that from 2005 to 2019, China has engaged in different business investments through its state businesses and related institutes in various parts of the world, hence affirming the expansion of its state capitalism. Some of the areas of investment include energy, Agriculture, metals, and minerals where different Chinese sectors have shares in different parts of the world, such as Russia, the USA, Peru, and India. Table 13.1 showing the Chinese investments in the sub-Saharan region.

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Table 13.1 Chinese investments in the sub-Saharan region S/N

Year

1

2006

2

2007

3

2008

4

2009

5

2010

6

2011

Organization

Element

Nation

CNOOC Sinopec China Nonferrous Sinosteel Ex-IM Bank CNPC ICC Sinosteel Shenzhen China National Nuclear China Railway Engineering MCC, Sinohydro Wuhan Iron and Steel China Nonferrous Taiyuan CNPC First Auto Works Sinomach China Railway Construction Jinchuan, China Development Tangshan Jidong Cement Jingsu Qiyuan Bosai Minerals China Merchants China Railway Construction CNPC Evergreen Sinopec Shandong Iron CITIC, China Development Dreal Group Gold one

Energy Energy (oil) Metals (copper) Metals (steel) Metals Energy (oil) Finance Metals Energy (gas) Metals Metals (copper)

Nigeria Angola Zambia South Africa DRC Chad South Africa Zimbabwe Ghana Niger DRC

Metals (copper) Metals (steel) Metals (copper) Real estate Energy (oil) Transport (autos) Transport (autos) Metals (steel)

DRC Liberia Zambia Mauritius Chad South Africa Cameroon Sierra Leone

Metals

South Africa

Real estate Real estate Metals (aluminum) Transport (shipping) Real estate

South Africa Ethiopia Ghana Nigeria Nigeria

Energy (oil) Agriculture Energy Metals Metals

Chad Congo Cameroon Sierra Leone South Africa

Real estate Metals

Angola South Africa

(continued)

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Table 13.1 (continued) S/N

Year

7

2012

8

2013

9

2014

Organization

Element

Nation

Jinchuan Sinosteel Minmetals Anhui Foreign Economic CNPC CIC CNOOC China Copper Mines Wanbao Grain Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt China Merchants China Power Investment China Nonferrous Sinomach Beijing Jingmei Sinopec Hebei Iron and Steel Sinosteel China Merchants CNPC Anhui Foreign Economic Sinopec Yunnan Copper-led C Kingho Energy CNOOC Dreal Sinopec Shanghai Zendai Evergreen Anhui Foreign Economic China National Nuclear China Nonferrous China Energy Engineering Zhenfa New Energy Science Hongqiao Chinalco Jinhua Huajian

Metals Metals Metals (copper) Metals Energy Finance Energy (oil) Metals (copper) Agriculture Metals Logistics Energy Metal Metal Energy (coal) Energy (oil) Metals (copper) Metals (steel) Transport Energy (gas) Metals Energy (oil) Metals (copper) Metals (steel) Energy (oil) Real estate Energy (oil) Real estate Chemicals Metals Metals Metals (copper) Energy (oil) Energy

South Africa Zimbabwe DRC Zimbabwe Madagascar South Africa Uganda Zambia Mozambique DRC Togo Nigeria Zambia Uganda South Africa Nigeria South Africa Cameroon Djibouti Mozambique DRC Angola Uganda Sierra Leone Uganda Angola Sao Tomer South Africa Congo Mozambique Namibia Congo Liberia Zimbabwe

Metals (aluminum) Metals (steel) Real estate

Guinea Guinea Ethiopia

(continued)

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Table 13.1 (continued) S/N

10

Year

2015

2016

Organization

Element

Nation

Solargiga Sichuan Department A. China General Nuclear Hebei Zhongbo Platinum CITic Dreal Guangzhou Dongsong Shandong Iron CITIC CITIC Sichuan Hanlong Shenzhen Energy and C… China Communications Ashanxi Building Material Qingdao Hengshun China Lilongwe Grand Jiangsu Sunshine China Molybdenum Beijing Auto

Energy Agriculture Metals Metals Agriculture Real estate Chemicals Metals (steel) Real estate Real estate Metals Energy (gas)

Ghana Uganda Namibia South Africa Angola Guinea Uganda Sierra Leone Rwanda Kenya Tanzania Ghana

Transport Real estate Energy (coal) Real estate Textile Metals (copper) Transport

Sao Tome Namibia South Africa Malawi Ethiopia DRC South Africa

The table is built on a selection from a list by China Global Investment Tracker (2019). [China Global Investment Tracker, @Data compiled by, The American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation.]

In the period between 2017 and 2019, China will continue its presence through investments in various parts of the world. When one follows these various investments, it comes out clearly that Chinese state capitalism is at its best in the world. It may be speculated that the main aim is not necessarily to develop Africa but to engage in capitalist activities for profit maximization. Although the discussion above focus has been on trade (business) relations through investments that occurred mainly from 2005, the presence of China in business relations with Africa has a long history. For instance, Olivier (2008) argues that this presence may be traced in the sixteenth century when they engaged in trade with North Africa. This presence may also be seen in some independent African nations during the one-party era such as Zambia and Tanzania. In terms of ideology, the Chinese were trying to critique the growth of capitalism in Africa and beyond in favor of

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a version of socialism similar to one-party nationalism that developed in various countries. Adisu et al. (2010) acknowledge three epochs of this engagement with Africa. Firstly, during the rise of capitalist industrialization in the period between the 1800s and 1950s, the Chinese provided the labor force. Secondly, the Cold War period after the Second World War, where China entered trade agreements with African nations such as Libya, Zambia, Tanzania, Guinea, Sudan, and Morocco. This phase was attempted to strategically engage with African countries, most of which were endorsing the capitalist side. Thirdly, in the 1980s with the economic crisis in various African nations and the rise of neoliberal capitalism, the Chinese started to seriously engagement with the African content in terms of trade as shown above. This will be accompanied by attractive loans to African governments without asking for special conditions or interests. Another import factor in the context of business is the increasing number of African individuals that go to China to buy different materials which they sell or use (such as material for building infrastructure). This has been a common trend where local people prefer to buy material in China than in Africa given that the prices are fair, and there is a wide variety, hence individuals are free to choose what they want. There has been a general attempt by capitalists to discredit the quality of Chinese goods as compared to what comes from the Western capitalists’ nations. The main issue has been the capitalist propaganda argument that goods from the West are strong and of good quality while those from China don’t last. Whether this is true or not, is not my concern, but my interest is that Africans are continuously going to China for business. For instance, in Malawi, some universities procure their furniture and other materials needed in classrooms and offices from China. Different African delegations are busy going to China to procure material at a cheaper price as compared to the locally made things. Apart from Africans buying things from China and participate in business in their nations, there are also various Chinese individuals who have decided to stay and do business in African villages and townships.

13.4

Cultural Freedom and Chinese Expansion

Apart from business relations, Chinese influence has been characterized by the promotion of cultural freedom. In this regard, African nations are encouraged to promote their traditional culture through cultural

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exchange programs, often promoted by the Confucius Institute, which works under the Chinese Ministry of Education. In some of the poor nations, students are easily attracted to this institute hoping to get a scholarship to study in China, where it is assumed that the education provided is of good quality. It seems that the common style of Chinese relations is, ‘Keep your culture but learn mine too.’ While this seems to be simple, it is highly valued by various African individuals. What one discovers is that there are some fundamental common elements between the Chinese and African virtue philosophy of living together in a society. While different studies have compared Chinese socialism with African socialism, I would like to compare elements of this system through a study on some selected proverbs. My interest in language comes from my belief that the philosophy of a particular group of people may be considered through the study of language. Language is an important carrier of thought mainly in areas where individuals have depended on oral tradition in the remote past. For example, the proverb which states that 人心齐, 泰山移 rén x¯ın qí, tài sh¯ an yí (When people work with one mind, they can even remove Mount Taishan)1 calls for the component of working together in the community as an important value. It is apparently supporting communitarian philosophy as leading to great achievements, and by implication, it excludes individualism as a way toward great success. This is similar to the African proverb which states that Mutu umodzi siusenza denga (One head cannot carry a roof). Similarly, this underlines the importance of working together in a community toward great success in a particular area. This is also similar to the Chinese proverb indicating that ‘A single tree does not make a forest, a single string cannot make music,’ where the community makes things complete and not individualism. The implication of this proverb is that the essence of a forest, as well as music, depends on working together as a community. In Malawi, the proverb lende nkukakhana (See-Saw is pushing each other), defines the essence of See-Saw as the community support. Socialism is further supported by the Chinese proverb which states that ‘One bee cannot produce honey; one grain of rice cannot produce a meal,’ underscoring the magic of the community in making things

1 This comes from the Chinese expression 人心齐, 泰山移 rén x¯ın qí, tài sh¯an yí. See also https://www.hanbridgemandarin.com/article/daily-chinese-learningtips/chinese-proverbs.

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happen.2 This discredits the value of an individual in terms of bringing good outcomes independent of the community. It reminds of the Malawian proverb which states that Nzeru zayekha adaviyika nsima mmadzi (Counting solely on personal knowledge, he/she soaked nsima (food) in the water). The individual trusted his own knowledge without asking what was wrapped in a parcel. Briefly, the philosophy of socialism depicts an image of a society whose success is dependent on working together as a community. The striking similarities in terms of the value of the community and support from others between the Chinese and African thought apparently encourage the acceptance of Chinese influence in the African context. Nevertheless, the components of living together as a community still require accounting for the freedom of an individual independent of society, which can hardly be done by radical communitarian philosophy.

13.5

Conclusion

The spread of Chinese influence and contribution in the context of capitalism and freedom raises two important issues. The first issue is, ‘What can be learned from the Chinese model of capitalism and freedom?’ Apparently, the central ideas of a balance between individualistic elements of free market and socialism are fundamental in maintaining the socioeconomic and political order. This component has been very difficult for most of the African nations, given that these reforms were initiated by foreign organizations. The foreign organizations gave many conditions, most of which impoverished most of the African nations. For China, this reform may be claimed as starting with cultural exchange between the two parties. The second issue is more negative toward the system of capitalism and freedom introduced by China. The question which may be applicable to all foreign powers is, ‘Can China be trusted in some of its various loans and aid?’ Considering that African nations with which China is entering into relations are poor, it seems that this is a new form of imperialism. Nevertheless, what matters is that African nations freely decide to enter into a relationship with China or other rich nations so that they are supported to get their needs. African poverty is a trap toward exploitation by the capitalist world, given that they create a relation of dependence. The

2 See also, https://www.chinasage.info/proverbs/jointeffort.htm.

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question that requires our attention is, ‘What can African nations learn from the Chinese experience?’

References Adisu, K., Sum, O., & Sharkley, T. (2010). The Impact of Chinese Investment in Africa. International Journal of Business and Management, 5(9), 1–9. Harvey, D. (2008). A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford Press. Olivier, A. (2008). Social Status of Elite Women of the New Kingdom of Ancient Egypt: A Comparison of Artistic Features. Pretoria: UNISA. Ziso, E. (2018). A Post State-Centric Analysis of China-Africa Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

CHAPTER 14

Embedding Capitalism and Freedom in a Comprehensive Theory of Ubuntu

14.1

Introduction

Is a comprehensive theory of ubuntu in sub-Saharan Africa a better response to challenges relative to capitalism and freedom? Can it protect individual freedom? Can it allow an individual and others to fulfill their responsibilities in the community? The concept of ubuntu is translated in different languages such as umunthu in Chichewa and hunhu in Shona, and it is theorized as a socio-economic and political theory that represents the African experience. It is commonly presented as a version of radical communitarianism, hence a form of socialism. In spite of this commonly accepted categorization, the development in Chapter 3 has shown that this is a generalization and a misrepresentation of African thought and experience. This has been based on the idea that apart from communitarian elements, private property and individual freedom, which are individualist elements and relevant for capitalism are also accommodated in the traditional setting. This is suggestive of the idea that a more comprehensive theory of ubuntu that incorporates these elements may adequately respond to problems relative to capitalism and freedom, hence provide a better alternative to neoliberalism/neo-capitalism and radical communitarianism, which are extremes. My interest is to show that these systems may be embedded and interpreted in a general theory of ubuntu that reflects ordinary people’s experience.

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Before the presentation of a general theory of ubuntu, in Sect. 14.2, I will discuss the failure of the radical communitarian version of ubuntu to adequately accommodate elements of capitalism and freedom, such as individual freedom. This will show how this theory is flawed and in oftentimes becomes an enemy of individual freedom and individual creation of wealth, which it is supposed to promote. This inadequacy of ubuntu is attributed to biased theorization of this concept, which is mainly caused by ideological preferences by various African academics and politicians. In Sect. 14.3, I will argue for a comprehensive theory of ubuntu as a true reflection of the ordinary life of African communities in the sub-Saharan region. The section will reconceptualize this concept as founded on the reciprocal relationship between the individual and community-centered on the use of practical reason. I have developed a similar theory in the context of ethics in my article ‘Restoration of Ubuntu as an Autocentric Virtue-Phronesis Theory’ (Kayange 2020, 1–12). In Sect. 14.4, I provide a conclusion that takes into consideration the relation affecting ubuntu socialism, neoliberal capitalism and a reconceptualized theory of ubuntu.

14.2 Capitalism and Freedom in the Ubuntu Radical Communitarianism Can the radical communitarian version of ubuntu adequately respond to capitalism and freedom? Can it allow ‘I and my compatriots’ to fulfill our responsibilities toward the achievement of individual and communal goals? Can this system guarantee individual and communal freedom? The commonly known conceptualization of ubuntu in African philosophy is where it is regarded as a version of socialism. This theory was elaborated as a form of humanism aimed at affirming the African identity as founded on other-regarding values, such as unity, solidarity, and friendliness (Ramose 1999). This ideology is contrary to capitalism given that it is a form of radical communitarianism (socialism), which potentially elevates the freedom and wealth of the community at the expense of the individual. While it may be argued that ubuntu as a Pan-African theory has been a tool that has helped in promoting freedom in countries such as Zimbabwe in the 1980s and South Africa in the 1990s, it has currently raised more questions as to whether it has achieved its intended objectives. Academics tend to be divided between those that support a radical communitarian version of ubuntu as an important basis for African conceptualization in ethics, politics, and other areas (such as Metz 2012;

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Ramose 1999) and those that see it as a source of various forms of deprivation and oppression in the areas such as individual freedom, justice, and property accumulation. I will not take the route of developing various versions of ubuntu as a communitarian theory, which I believe are well documented in academic literature (see Ramose 1999; Metz 2007; van Niekerk 2007), but I will concentrate on some selected aspects that may be useful in this work. The first area is the legal framework, where I will ask a simple question, Can a legal framework based on ubuntu accommodate individual rights and freedoms?

Different supporters of ubuntu such as Ramose seem to respond positively to this question. In fact, he is one of the main theorists of this concept who contended that ubuntu is the foundation of African Law (Ramose 2002). This presupposes that laws and rights are developed in such a way that they lead to the well-being of the community which is the summum bonum (greatest good). For instance, stealing will be regarded as an offense insofar as it is against the well being of the community. Homosexual acts will be regarded as good or bad depending on whether this communal well-being is assured through such practices. Prima facie, we can pose a question, ‘Is the community a good judge of what is right and wrong?’ What if the community is driven by some beliefs or superstitions? For instance, a situation where the community thinks that sex outside marriage leads to a calamity that affects the whole village. This implies that a girl and a boy caught in the act will be punished severely. Independent of arguments and questions that may be raised against the radical communitarian conception of ubuntu, it has greatly influenced different developments that attempt to build and apply a version of jurisprudence. In a similar context, the constitutional court of the Republic of South Africa has linked the concept of ubuntu with democratic values. The main argument was that the promotion of democratic values is possible in the African context using ubuntu as its foundation. This encouraged further the development of ubuntu jurisprudence as a form of indigenous approach that incorporates the assumed ‘African value system’ in the legal thinking. Keevy, I. (2009a) sees the link between ubuntu and law as problematic in some respects, hence a foundation that affects freedom of individuals and the minority, such as women. For instance, Keevy reflects on the

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link between ubuntu and core values of the constitution in the African setting as she writes, ‘The aim of this article is to juxtapose ubuntu’s shared beliefs and values with the core values of the South African Constitution, viz. equality and human dignity.’ The author argues that as a basis of African law, ubuntu ‘sustains the deep-seated patriarchal hierarchy and entrenched inequality in traditional African societies.’ For instance, this comes clearly in various sections more especially in the discussion on ubuntu as a form of restorative justice (communal justice). Keevy discusses restorative justice linking it to the element of communal consensus and normally accompanied by reconciliation. This reconciliation comes after justice is achieved and is aimed at ascertaining the continuity of unity and solidarity which are important for the community. The importance of people coming together to restore justice through consensus supports a version of communal justice that is attributed to ubuntu. Keevy indicates some problems with this form of justice given that people are not treated in the same way. On this point, she agrees with Nyirongo that a case done involving an influential person such as the chief is not treated in the same way as that concerning a poor person. In my view, these inequalities are dangerous toward the freedom of non-influential individuals in the community. In fact, those that are influential can freely oppress others, knowing that at their level, their actions will not constitute a high offense. A similar critique against ubuntu as an oppressive system comes from the feminists. Commenting on this element Keevy noted that, ‘African feminists and gender activists, however, oppose such utopian views and disclose that ubuntu represents an oppressive reality: it fosters deep-seated patriarchy that entrenches gender inequality and disregard for the dignity of African women.’ This critique is apparently a generalization given that there are some tribes in the African context which are matriarchal but they are claimed to be founded on ubuntu. An example in question is the Chewa tribe which extends in areas of Malawi, Zambia, and Mozambique. Society builds on the centrality of the power of women, who are assumed to be rulers and owners of society. Of course, I have some reservations on the role of the brothers of these powerful women, who are apparently still influential in the affairs concerning their sisters. In my view, it is the wrong theory of ubuntu that is grounded on radical communitarianism that may tend to affect the freedom of women as well as men. In this case, the problem is not that ubuntu per se is against women, but the communitarian system which is claimed by some ideologists of this concept may

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affect individual qua individual. This justifies the importance of separating ubuntu dogmatism from how the African communities function in the ordinary way of life. Although Keevy (2009a, 33) develops a critical approach to the system of ubuntu in terms of equality, the author seems to fully embrace the understanding that this is a version of socialism, as she writes, ‘Despite cultural differences, this ancient worldview is “fundamentally holistic” and engenders a spirit of community, mutual support, sharing, interconnectedness and respect for one another.’ It seems that Keevy’s critique is directed at the ideology created by academics and politicians, but this does not equally do justice to the African traditional way of life that provides the original meaning of this concept (as it will be shown below). Apart from criticizing the element of equality relative to the radical communitarian version of ubuntu, Keevy (2009b) argues against the link between this concept and religion. This is mainly the case when ubuntu is viewed as representing a worldview, strictly connected with African traditional religion. In this regard, Keevy noted that ‘ubuntu or ethnophilosophy represents a religious worldview as it is inseparable from African Religion and the African spirit world. It is argued that the advocating of ubuntu’s shared beliefs and values by South African courts and the State is to the detriment of other religious philosophies as it violates section 15(1) of the Constitution and constitutes unfair discrimination.’ Keevy has in mind ideas of thinkers such as Somé (1999, 89)1 who argued that the ancestors are fundamental in preserving welfare and rights and judging those that are culprits through different modes of punishment. Similarly, Ramose (2002, 94) noted that ‘The authority of [African] law is justified by appeal to the living dead.’ The link with the religious convictions regarding the living dead and religion, in general, gives another reason why ubuntu is denied as a genuine foundation of the constitution. This shows that a nation that builds its law on African religion is biased, given that it does not consider the multiplicity of religions that are present in the current African setting. In a way, this violates religious freedom, as it demands that the citizens have to follow the African religious model. In fact, there are other religions such as Christianity and Islamic religion, which are equally fundamental and have in most of the areas become integrated with the African

1 Somé, M. P. (1999). The Healing Wisdom of Africa. New York: Penguin Putnam.

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culture. While I agree with some of the concerns raised by Keevy, my question is, ‘Is it right to conceptualize ubuntu based on religion?’ If the answer is ‘yes,’ ‘Does this conceptualization truly represent the African traditional experience?’ in other words, ‘Was the theorization of the concept of ubuntu properly done?’ In spite of the critique of Keevy, some academics still believe that ubuntu is a good foundation of laws and justice, and these are fundamental for safeguarding individual and communal freedom. In fact, following the direction of Ramose, Moeketsi Letseka (2014) uses the radical communitarian version of this theory in discussing the notion of ‘justice and fairness’ in an African context. While juxtaposing this theory with John Rawls’ theory of justice, it is argued that ubuntu is more than a moral theory; it is also about other aspects such as justice. The author argues for ubuntu as communal justice, which is liberal and egalitarian (Letseka 2014, 544). Building on the understanding that Rawls’ theory of justice is rooted in the notion of agreement (Social Contract), Latseka tries to demonstrate an African traditional system where discussion and consensus are fundamental. From the foregoing analysis it can be reasonably argued that Ubuntu as fair African communal justice is only attainable if communality, interdependence, open public discussion, broad based consultation and the need for consensus on issues of moral disagreement, commitment to ‘social contract theory’ as a guiding principle for politics and governance, are revived as the core values of society. (Latseka 2014, 549)

The citation underscores the role of the community as fundamental in determining what justice and fairness entail, but in my view fails to account for individual justice and freedom. In fact, communal justice does not necessarily translate into the presence of individual justice. An individual may be unjustly maltreated on the grounds of communal consensus, which may at times go against individual rights and interests. In my view, what is lacking in this presentation of communal justice is a clear consideration of the centrality of an individual and practical reason in determining this assumed ‘justice as fairness’ founded on ubuntu. This was going to partly help the community avoid some biases that are influenced by various factors in this setting. Nevertheless, the author further embraces humanism as worth pursuing as a foundation of the theory of justice (Letseka 2014, 550). It is unfortunate that humanism is often obscured by

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communitarianism-bias mainly in the radical conception of ubuntu where ‘to be human’ is defined relative to ‘being with others.’ If a ‘human subject’ was defined independent of relations (individual qua individual), but who has ‘being with others’ as part of his/her nature, the conceptualization of justice and fairness could equally yield a theory of moderate communal justice. Another important link between the communitarian version of ubuntu and the element of rights was suggested by Metz who noted that ‘an act is right if and only if it develops one’s social nature without violating the rights of others’ (Metz 2007, 332). Niekerk argued that this right-based approach to actions developed by Metz does not entail a theory of rights. Note that Metz subscribes to ubuntu as a version of the African virtue theory. There are two important elements in this view of Metz, firstly an ethical element where a right action is linked to the development of community oriented-ness in one’s life. This seems to send a message that, whether an action goes against individual freedom it is right as long as it promotes social relations (social nature). The second element directly linking with freedom is that the right action is qualified further by not violating the rights of others. The principle of Metz above may be transformed in the context of freedom to the idea that, An act is right if it develops one’s social nature without violating the freedom2 of others.

This seems to be partly interesting for freedom of the ‘other,’ whether this is the community, the minority or an individual with whom I can relate to. What is not covered in the above expressions ‘I’ as an entity, who apart from having a social nature, I have an ontological nature of being unique, different from other beings. On the other hand, an individual does not only want to develop the social nature, but also individual qualities independent of the community. I would further love to develop my nature of being endowed with practical reason that is crucial for my actions as I develop my social nature as well as the self. While the efforts to discuss aspects of rights, laws, justice, etc. may be appreciated, there are various arguments that may be developed to show that the radical version of ubuntu is not a good candidate that can respond 2 I have replaced ‘rights’ with freedom.

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to capitalism and freedom. Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013) summarize the failure of ubuntu relative to modern capitalism and freedom in the following passage, The failure of socialism in its various guises was galling. On the economic front it led to the impoverishment of large swathes of the continent, leaving many citizens leading undignified and pained lives. Scant health services, low education standards, slim life opportunities, and all other ills associated with low economic stations became all too real for many an African… On the political front the search for the narrative of return led to suppression of political space, tyrannical dictatorships developed in pursuit of a one-party state that was supposed to be an embodiment of the people’s aspirations. (Matolino and Kwindingwi 2013, 198)

The citation suggests two fundamental aspects of capitalism and freedom, namely the element of economic and political components of freedom. Ubuntu version of radical communitarianism is condemned for creating poverty instead of wealth. Ubuntu was expected to significantly create conditions toward the fulfillment of basic needs and other services, but on the contrary, it has led to the impoverishment of African lives. It may be speculated that the economic failure is due to the lack of individual freedom (private sector freedom) in economic affairs, but also because of the greed of some leaders who viewed their countries as a base for primitive accumulation of capital and further investments. The second part of the citation directly focuses on the element of political freedom, whereby ubuntu and related ideologies are held accountable for the various forms of violation of human freedom. The communal element forced Africans to embrace a one-party (one-community) system, which frustrated all individual freedom in its various facets. The oppression is piloted by the thesis of return, which refers to the interest of African leaders in creating an African identity that adequately responds to the various critics from the colonialists. This criticism of creating an identity sort from the past glorious Africa was forwarded earlier by Binsbergen against Ramose’s conceptualization of ubuntu (Van Binsbergen 2001).3 Are these authors doing justice to the concept of ubuntu? Was it not devised as an instrument to lead African nations

3 See also Bewaji, J., & Ramose, M. (2003). Where There Is a Debate on Ubuntu with Van Binsbergen and Ramose (378–415).

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toward independence? Can ubuntu adequately be defended against these criticisms? In its current version of radical communitarianism, I think it cannot. I conclude by indicating the foundation of problems against ubuntu as noted above lies in the failure to accommodate the individual due to the overemphasis of the community. In fact, even self-realization is dependent on others (see Metz 2007; van Niekerk 2007, 364–368). The overemphasis on the community leads to the thesis that self-realization is acquired through relations with others. This is common in the ethical version of this concept, for example, Metz (2007, 331) comments on the maxim that, ‘An action is right just insofar as it positively relates to others and thereby realizes oneself; an act is wrong to the extent that it does not perfect one’s valuable nature as a social being.’ It is the proper relations with others that make one recognize the humanity in them and his/her own, hence achieve self-realization. This recognition is a good ground for the acknowledgement of freedoms and more especially the fundamental and shared human rights. Becoming fully human (matured person who respects the self and the other) is a process of self-realization through others. This view is indicated by Metz as the commonly held position in ubuntu and African philosophy in general. For example, it is represented by thinkers such as Ramose (1999) and Tutu (1999), as was earlier summarized in to be a person is to be in relation with others. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that philosophers such as Metz are aware of the fact that the overemphasis of the community may lead to various problems, such as acting as a platform for doing bad actions (such as murder) as long as this promotes good relationships with others (Metz 2007, 331– 334).

14.3

Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Ubuntu

Can ubuntu as a theory be saved toward a discussion of capitalism and freedom in the African thought? My response to this question is ‘yes it can.’ However, for this to happen, it is necessary to provide an adequate notion of ubuntu (A comprehensive theory of ubuntu) that reflects the ordinary life of the African communities. I will develop this through the use of the analytic philosophy, specifically the language-use approach (Ordinary Language Approach). The guiding question is, ‘how are Africans using the concept ‘ubuntu’ in the ordinary language?’ I

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respond to this question by looking at (a) academic use in various literatures, (b) ordinary language use through dictionary, and (c) characteristics that are associated with a person with ubuntu, such as wisdom. Firstly in the academic-usage, the study of Gade (2011) identified various meanings departing from a study of past writings (from and before 1950). In this study, Gade provided 32 meanings4 of the concept ubuntu, which may be characterized into three categories. The first meaning of ubuntu focuses on ‘humanity and related terms, such as humanness, human kindness, and true humanity.’ In this category, it is difficult to claim a specific referent of ubuntu, because it may denote ‘human race’ (collectively), human quality, state of being human, philanthropy, etc. (see also Gade 2011, 308). The second commonly present meaning focuses on virtue—mainly the state or disposition of being moral or the qualities of a good person. In this context, ubuntu has meanings such as virtue, good moral nature, kindness, and politeness. The third category concerns individuality. This is reflected in the meanings of ubuntu such as personality, personhood, and a person’s own human nature. I have conducted a similar study on meanings of ubuntu through its translation in Chichewa language umunthu, in different writings. For instance, studying the works that are on Google scholar books in the nineteenth century, there is nowhere this concept is used. The first appearance in Google books study is in 1976, where its meaning is ‘humanity’ (Shumba 1976).5 In a publication of 1990, van Gorcum indicates that the meaning of umunthu is ‘personhood’ and ‘basic human values’ (see page 14).6 Other terms for umunthu that appear in different writings up to 2000 include; ‘virtues that give meaning to human life’ (Ethiopian Register 1997),7 humanity, human nature,8 personhood (Elleni 1995), and humanness (Musopole 1994). Other meanings in the twenty-first 4 In his study on page 307, he says there are 31 meanings, but counting his list it shows that there are 32 (human nature appears twice) (see Gade 2011). 5 Shumba, T. (1976). Worklife. Dorrace Publishing. 6 Van Gorcum. (2009). Ultimate Reality and Meaning, Institute for Encyclopaedia of

Human Ideas on Ultimate Reality and Meaning. University of Michigan. 7 Ethiopian Register. (1997). Ethiopian Register. University of Wisconsin, Madison, Volume 4 (p. iv). 8 This is reflected in Moni magazine in the following statement, ‘Koma kuti anthufe tili ndi Umunthu wambiri oti sitingamvetse zimene mulungu amatichitira’ Moni Monthly Magazine, Issues 267–278. Popular Publications Office, 1987. Indiana University.

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century include a good heart, ‘to be humane, hospitable, dependable and sociable’ (Tambulasi and Kayuni 2012; Mfutso-Bengo 2016). All these various meanings suggest that the concept of ubuntu is complex and may lead to different theoretical perspectives. In fact, it is due to this complexity that many people question this concept and argue that it is vague, as is also indicated by Metz (2005) in the following passage; First, and most often, people complain that talk of Ubuntu in Nguni languages (and cognate terms such as botho in Sotho-Tswana and hunhuin Shona) is vague. Although the word literally means humanness, it does not admit of the precision required in order to render a publicly-justifiable rationale for making a particular decision.9

Secondly in the ordinary people’s use of the word ubuntu as is the case of its translation umunthu, may be abstracted from the dictionary, such as the Oxford-Chichewa-Dictionary. In this context, the word umunthu has the following five different meanings, (1) personhood; (2) personality; (3) humanity; (4) human character; and (5) human behavior. Thirdly, the characteristics of a person with umunthu show that this is an individual who is termed ‘a good person.’ When one interrogates what it means to be good, there are a series of attributes that explain this aspect. For instance, attributes such as supportive, empathy, solidarity, understanding, self-respect, and respect-for-humanity are used to classify this individual. The idea of defining ubuntu based on one’s character ‘good person’ leads to understanding that this is a virtuous person. It thus resonates well with the idea that ubuntu is a version of virtue ethics. Here we cannot rush to indicate that the virtues that are referred to are other-regarding virtues as is the case in the radical communitarian version. Kayange (2018) gave a clue on what attributes (virtues) are encouraged as qualifying an individual as good in the African traditional context through a study of a collection of 2009 figurative expressions. The study of Kayange 2018 revealed that the first attribute that was promoted in a good person was ‘patience’ toward the self as well as others. The other attributes that followed included, humility, responsibility (toward the self and others), perseverance, foresight, respect, discretion, honesty, prudence, cooperation, luck, pride, self-control, care,

9 Ubuntu as a moral theory and human rights in South Africa.

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and determination.10 For instance, people use a proverb such as Linda madzi apite ndiye uziti ndadala (Allow the floods to go then say that you are blessed) to promote the attribute of ‘prudence’ in a person in a particular context. My point is that figurative expressions are used to promote both community-oriented virtues/values and individual-oriented virtues/values as important attributes that make an individual good in a particular context. The promotion depends on people’s interpretation of what is good in a particular context. In some circumstances, they may promote independence at the cost of the community, for instance in the proverbs, Chuluke chuluke ndi wa njuchi umanena iyo yakuluma, translated as, ‘Being many is for bees, you identify the one that stung you’ and Andiyitana pakalowa njoka, pakalowa mbewa akumba okha, translated as, ‘They call me when a snake has entered a hole, but when it is a mouse, they dig it out themselves.’ The first proverb encourages individual responsibility against collective responsibility and the second independence against fake responsibility. When one probes further into ubuntu as referring to a good person in the African traditional context, it becomes clear that this happens through a process of becoming. This process entails the discovery and practice of virtues as a particular situation demands. To this effect, the African traditional society puts value in learning how to become good through personal experience and through education (such as through initiation), in which the traditional sages (wise individuals in terms of living well) become fundamental. These traditional sages are experts in living well given that they have experience and know-how to deliberate properly in different situations and take the right course of action. In most cases, these individuals have demonstrated with their lives as good individuals in the society, such that others can easily seek guidance and learn from them. Based on the above development, it is appropriate to ask again the question, ‘Is radical communitarian version of ubuntu a good representation of the African traditional experience?’ Certainly, this is a very weak theory that fails to appreciate the richness of the African traditional experience. I guess this speaks volumes why it is important to develop an alternative comprehensive system that may adequately inform the African experience departing from the political realm to other contexts. It is

10 Refer to Kayange 2018 for a further clarification on these virtues and vices.

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for this reason that Kayange (2020) in ‘Restoration of ubuntu as an auto-centric virtue-phronesis theory’ suggested a comprehensive theory of ubuntu that incorporates the self, community, and practical reason (wisdom) as pillars of African traditional thought. Briefly, this comprehensive theory views ubuntu as a virtue theory that targets human wellbeing (individual and community well-being) through the practice of selfregarding and other-regarding virtues. These are not only moral virtues but include both moral and intellectual virtues that help individuals live a good life. Similar to the Aristotelian Nichomachean ethics, the whole process is anchored on the intellectual virtue known as phronesis (practical reason),11 which supports individuals to continually reflect on experiences and attempt to provide a solution informed by well-being. Phronesis is also there to moderate the use of virtues in different situations depending on the determination by well-being. I believe that a genuine analysis of the African traditional society cannot be complete without the consideration of wisdom, which is fundamental in ordinary life. From the above discussion, we can deduce the following statements that are important in theorizing ubuntu. • Self-regarding virtues are meant at building the good character of an African citizen. • Other-regarding virtues are relational in nature and are meant at building African social relations. • Wisdom or practical reason is a driving component for isolating the bad from the right course of action. It may be concluded that a person with ubuntu is the one who is guided by practical reason or wisdom in the practice of self and otherregarding virtues toward well-being.

14.4 Capitalism and Freedom in a Comprehensive Theory of Ubuntu An application of a comprehensive theory of ubuntu inspired by a broad range of virtues in the African tradition context is the best way of accommodating systems such as capitalism and socialism, but at the same time 11 Appendix 1 explains further this component of practical reason.

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transforming them relative to individual and communal well-being. For example, in this theory, African nations will still embrace democratic principles and values as discussed earlier, but they will be controlled by the African experience of practical reason toward individual well-being. This implies that elements such as free and fair elections of leaders, division of power, and participation of citizens will be guided reason. In this regard what is required is a system that accommodates relevant individual and communal virtues but at the same time, it is driven by a practical reasonbased government. The idea of government will neither be absolute sovereign nor minimum watchman government of the neoliberal capitalism, but it will be directed by the African search for human well-being as summum bonum (greatest good) guided by practical reason. This government will accommodate free-market principles but reinterpret and intervene in those areas where this system goes against human well-being. In fact, the government will recognize private property, but at the same time enhance engagement in economic and other activities. In this regard, privatization will not be necessary and individuals will be empowered to compete in the accumulation of wealth at a broader scale. This would avoid the status of most of the African governments which are dependent on the mercy of the donors to get their needs. Briefly, the government will have the power to intervene in those circumstances where human well-being is threatened, even in the context of the economy as guided by practical reason.12 A crucial area in the government learning from the comprehensive theory of ubuntu is that of leadership, where leaders are expected to be guided by practical reason. The current African condition is where any individual can decide to become a leader even without demonstrating a lucid use of practical reason and broader knowledge of the national/international leadership. Practical reason does not entail that these leaders have to acquire only technical knowledge, but they should demonstrate the capacity of deliberating and finding appropriate solutions to the problems that are facing Africans in their daily life. For instance, the practical reason led sages will attempt to find a way of eliminating hunger in their nation using the resources that are available. A further expectation in a government led by insights from the comprehensive theory of ubuntu is that leaders will be expected to practice

12 See Appendix 1 for a reflection on practical wisdom.

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both self-regarding and other-regarding virtues as directed by practical reason. Proper use of reason among the leaders will help in giving direction toward a broader notion of the ‘other.’ This is a government that will graduate from a reduced conception of the ‘other’ conceived as one’s tribe or family to the ‘other’ conceived as a human being or humanity at a national level. This may be extended to other nations depending on the context of the application. In fact, my view is that the current situation of most of the African nations hinders well-being given that focus is more on one’s family, extended family or tribe. It is only in those circumstances where individuals have graduated from this level that a step is made toward human well-being. The practice of self and other-regarding virtues guided by reason is expected to lessen problems such as corruption and tribalism that continually hinder development in most of the African nations. Political parties will still compete for power to govern but victory will be guided by how best the agenda of a particular party helps achieve human well-being using practical reason. This will help in eliminating biases in selecting political leaders based on tribal lines, regionalism and other factors that do not help African nations achieve the greatest good for the communities. The use of practical reason has to expand to all the citizens who are often affected by interests that do not help the African nations toward well-being. In the context of freedoms, while acknowledging the universal rights and freedoms, the application of various forms of freedoms will be guided by practical reasons as interpreted in a particular context. Interpretation of other freedoms relative to human well-being will require that both the individual and the community deliberate and find the right course of action. What will be required more is an understanding of the freedoms, which will inform a better decision in society. In fact, one of the current challenges that have affected most African nations is the lack of a common understanding of certain freedoms as indicated earlier in this book. Another important area where the comprehensive theory of ubuntu may be useful for insights, is the context of the constitution, where African virtues may be used to inform the development of laws. A component of the practical reason may be used in the creation of interpretations that are informed by human well-being. The expectation is that laws will reflect and defend both individual and communal freedom. These laws will be achieved through a system of deliberation of individuals that are endowed with practical reason and have achieved the status of sages or

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phronimos . Laws will be made to reflect individual and communal wellbeing. Similarly, justice and fairness will be influenced by both fundamental rights such as the right to life and the proper use of practical reason by sages in deliberation.

14.5

Conclusion

The above discussion leads to the conclusion that the reconceptualized ubuntu is a more general theory that takes into consideration the way human subjects live and interpret reality, as opposed to neoliberal capitalism and socialism which tend toward dogmatism. The fundamental element is that the above reconceptualization gives room for different interpretations that are typical of life in society. Human beings may encourage any of the areas, such as community freedom, individual freedom, public property, and private property, depending on various interests and the situation that is required to be addressed. The relation affecting ubuntu socialism, neoliberal capitalism, and the reconceptualized ubuntu may be summarized in the following Table 14.1.

Table 14.1 Summary of reconceptualized ubuntu Ubuntu socialism

Reconceptualized ubuntu

Neoliberal capitalism

Community dogmatisma

Community-individual perspectivismb and wisdom Community-Individual perspectivism and wisdom Communal-individual freedom perspectivism and wisdom Communal and individual responsibility perspectivism and wisdom

Individual dogmatism

Public property dogmatism Community freedom dogmatism Communal responsibility dogmatism

Individual property dogmatism Individual freedom dogmatism Individual responsibility dogmatism

a Note that ‘dogmatism’ is used in this table to refer to an extreme position b Perspectivism indicates that it depends on people’s interest to either use communitarian or individual

interpretation

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References Bewaji, J., & Ramose, M. (2003). Van Binsbergen and Ramose Debate on Ubuntu. South African Journal of Philosophy, 22(4), 378–415. Elleni, T. (1995). African Thought and Education. Charlottesville: University of Virginia. Ethiopian, R. (1997). Ethiopian Register. Madison: University of Wisconsin. Gade, C. B. N. (2011). The Historical Development of the Written Discourses on Ubuntu. South African Journal of Philosophy, 30(3), 303–329. https:// doi.org/10.4314/sajpem.v30i3.69578. Gorcum, V. (2009). Ultimate Reality and Meaning. Toronto: Institute for Encyclopaedia of Human Ideas on Ultimate Reality and Meaning. Kayange, G. M. (2018). African Philosophical Foundation of a Pneumatological Controversy Inside the Church of Central Africa Presbyterian in Malawi. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions, 7 (1), 79–100. Kayange, G. M. (2020). Restoration of Ubuntu as an Autocentric VirtuePhronesis Theory. South African Journal of Philosophy, 39(1), 1–12. https:// doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2019.1665817. Keevy, I. (2009a). Ubuntu Versus the Core Values of the South African Constitution. Journal for Juridical Science, 34, 19–58. Keevy, I. (2009b). The Constitutional Court and Ubuntu’s Inseparable Trinity. Journal for Juridical Science, 34, 61–88. Letseka, M. (2014). Ubuntu and Justice as Fairness. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 5, 544–551. Matolino, B., & Kwindingwi, W. (2013). The End of Ubuntu. South African Journal of Philosophy, 32, 197–205. Metz, T. (2005). Ubuntu as a Moral Theory and Human Rights in South Africa. African Human Rights Law Journal, 532–559. Metz, T. (2007). Towards an African Moral Theory. The Journal of Political Philosophy, 15(3), 321–341. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2007. 00280.x. Metz, T. (2012). Ethics in Africa and in Aristotle: Some Points of Contrast. Phronimon, 13, 99–117. Mfutso-Bengo, J. (2016). Biethics as Moral Capital in Africa/Malawi. Saarbrucken: Lambert Academic Publishing. Musopole, A. (1994). Being Human in Africa: Toward an African Christian Anthropology. New York: Peter Lang. Ramose, B. M. (1999). African Philosophy Through Ubuntu. Harare: Mond Books. Ramose, M. B. (2002). The Philosophy of Ubuntu and Ubuntu as a Philosophy. In P. H. Coetzee & A. P. J. Roux (Eds.), African Philosophy Reader (pp. 270– 280). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Shumba, T. (1976). Worklife. Pittsburgh: Dorrace Publishing. Somé, M. (1999). The Healing Wisdom of Africa. New York: Penguin Putnam. Tambulasi, R., & Kayuni, H. (2012). Ubuntu and Corporate Social Responsibility: The Case of Selected Malawian Organizations. African Journal of Economic and Management Studies, 3, 64–76. Tutu, D. (1999). No Future Without Forgiveness. New York: Random House. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5842.1999.tb00012.x. Van Binsbergen, W. M. (2001). Ubuntu and the Globalisation of Southern African Thought and Society. Quest, 15(1–2), 53–89. van Niekerk, J. (2007). In Defence of an Autocentric Account of Ubuntu. South African Journal of Philosophy, 26(4), 364–368. https://doi.org/10.4314/ sajpem.v26i4.31494.

CHAPTER 15

Conclusion

Creation of wealth and living without constraints are the two driving forces of human life. Different systems have been created to clarify and protect these fundamental elements. Politics may be perceived as a rational activity attempting to put order and provide direction on well-being relative to these elements. The study has indicated that the two main political systems that are explanatory of these elements are capitalism and communitarianism (such as communism). The former was demonstrated as founded on private property and individual freedom. Creation of wealth is, therefore, discussed around the idea of ownership of private property. The book has considered capitalism as promoting the recognition and promotion of individual freedoms and rights. The government is not allowed to intervene, unless there are matters regarding the provision of a good environment that promotes individual liberty. This is an environment that allows individuals to exercise their liberty. The latter was based on communal creation of wealth, where every member of the community is expected to fulfill the good of the community. Everything is owned together in virtue of belonging to the same community. Similarly, freedom belongs to the whole community, such that the individual must be ready to sacrifice individual freedom for the achievement of communal freedom. The book has demonstrated that in the African political philosophy, the individualist and communitarian orientations have been present in different systems. Each system has been presented as a better option in © The Author(s) 2020 G. M. Kayange, Capitalism and Freedom in African Political Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44360-3_15

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creation of wealth and promotion of liberty. The chapter provided a historical review of different systems such as the African traditional system, colonialism, one-party system, and multiparty system. The mutual presence of individual and communitarian elements in these systems has often led to a conflict whether to prioritize one or the other. It has been shown in Chapter 3 that African political philosophers have tended to argue that the community was given preference, but within such a system, an individual was recognized and protected. Elements of capitalism are claimed to be present through the presence of democratic elements such as political participation and consensus. It was shown that another position is to argue that the presence of elements of capitalism is indicative that the African traditional society was not exclusively communitarian, but it followed moderate communitarianism. This is an appropriate system that gives priority to both individual and community. It was further confirmed by the presence of aspects such as ownership of private property, mercantile capitalism, and the hidden inequality in the ownership of property. This work has demonstrated that colonialism constitutes one of the most important systems that encouraged the spread of capitalism among African countries. Although it partly contributed toward development, it made Africans to be conceived as a property that can be shared among powerful nations or individuals. This was seen in the division of Africa among the capitalists. It was demonstrated that there were different forms of primitive accumulation of capital, such as alienation of land and organized paid labor. It was indicated that colonialism created a capitalist system, which exploited laborers and alienated land. Different types of trade were also common in this capitalist system. The primitive accumulation modes that were in this period led to the violation of both individual and communal freedom. In terms of creation of wealth, the colonialism created a gap between the rich owners of means of production and the poor masses. This necessitated the proletariat fight for their freedom and liberation. The organized battle for independence led to the liberation of most of the African nations and the development of a good environment for the creation of wealth and the supposed true liberty. It was shown that most of the nations started with true political freedom manifested in the presence of multiparty politics and power sharing. This dream of a free Africa did not last long given that most of the African nations canceled political freedom and developed one-party systems. The freedom that individuals fought for started disappearing and extreme socialist systems were instituted. Creation of wealth gave priority to the government,

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where this was represented by the presidents and other influential political leaders. Involvement in politics became a faster way of accumulation of wealth and surplus value in many African nations. It has been shown that African masses that were oppressed by the oneparty governments, which they created, started fighting for a second independence under multiparty system. This was also supported by the rise of neoliberal philosophy, which called for a return to classical liberalism, and its original version of capitalism. This was forced on different African countries through the help of organizations, such as the IMF and the World Bank, and nations such as the USA and Britain. Conditioned by financial and other problems, African nations embraced neo-capitalism, which weakened the government and its structures. In the area of promoting individual freedom, this weakening of African governments may partly be seen as a necessary evil. In the context of creation of wealth, it is difficult to tell whether the masses have benefited or not. It was demonstrated that African individuals are living a conflict whether to fully embrace capitalism and its inherent individualism or African traditional system, which also allows for communitarian elements. Some of the conflicts regard the question of abortion, where some traditional systems do not allow this practice, while some individuals and organizations think that this is an individual right. Other problems are related to whether an individual can freely engage in LGBT practices or not. It was shown that most of the communities have seen this practice as foreign, and this has apparently led to a number of conflicts and violation of individual freedom. Other conflicts involved the question of the sovereignty of African governments as sovereign states. It was shown that some African leaders and individuals ended up in a conflict with the capitalists because they refused to follow the decisions coming from other foreign nations. African Union has in different occasions motivated nations to defy demands from capitalists, such as the extradition of sitting African presidents for possible cases against humanity in the International Criminal Courts. The different conflicts have led to moral, institutional, and market failures, in different African nations. These have consequently encouraged the forms of primitive accumulation that have crippled the development of Africa. These failures have raised the question, ‘what can be done to liberate Africa from obstacles that hamper the creation of wealth and freedom?’ The book has presented three possible alternatives that can accommodate both individual and community orientations in capitalism and

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communitarianism, respectively. The first perspective is renaissance, which has called for a return to African traditional values and glorious past. This is an attempt to make an African individual believe in a good identity passed on from the traditional realm to the present. The second perspective was the Chinese model, where African nations may embrace some elements of capitalism while maintaining common aspects that define their identity as was done in China. Third perspective was building on values present in the African traditional society. This was done under the creation of a comprehensive theory of ubuntu that recognizes self and community, and the component of practical reason (wisdom), which is central in African thought. Although this work has provided a good context for reflection on capitalism and freedom in African political philosophy, and suggested a possible alternative to the western systems, it did not exhaust the debates in this context. For instance, one of the areas of research that is important is gender issues and capitalism. This was not addressed as a separate topic but future studies may wish to explore this aspect. Another area of study is forms of modern slavery and capitalism. There are many other areas that can be further explored; however, for the purposes of this work, the discussion above suffices. Freedom is the essence of human life; it is, therefore, a responsibility of every individual to make sure that it is not violated or used to obtain selfish interests. Honest creation of wealth is the essence of a proper response toward hunger and poverty in Africa.

Appendix: Conceptualizing Phronesis in African Analytic Philosophy

Introduction Africans can significantly respond to most of the challenges pertaining to capitalism and freedom through the rediscovery and use of practical reason, which in my view, played a fundamental role in the traditional societies. Nevertheless, the history of African philosophy has been characterized by a debate on rationality, understood as logical elaboration in different issues. The common debate has been between those that argued that the African people were part of the primitive societies; hence, they lacked logical thinking (Bruhl; Horton), and those that supported the existence of rationality (such as Wiredu, Masolo, and Oruka). Because of the centrality of the question of rationality, African philosophy may be viewed as an attempt to clarify and demonstrate the presence of rationality in this context. Most of the early African Philosophers have, therefore, attempted to show African identity in relation to the element of rationality. One of the directions in African analytic philosophy has been the claim that the concept of rationality may be considered looking at the proverbs. The understanding was that these figurative expressions are the carriers of African thought and wisdom. The idea was that they revealed that there was a great deal of thinking, but at the same time they provoked thinking when they were used in ordinary language discourse (Kayange 2018).

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 G. M. Kayange, Capitalism and Freedom in African Political Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44360-3

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What remained problematic for a while was whether the claimed rationality among Africans may be attributed to the community, or there were certain individuals who may claim authorship of particular ideas or theories. This clarification was seen as important, just because the common way of understanding philosophy was modeled on Western thought, where there were individual thinkers such as Plato and Aristotle, who claimed particular ideas. The common defense in the African context was that there is communal thought, which is transmitted from generation to the next. However, this conception led to the understanding that African thought is static, it is just passed on passively from one generation to the other. Unhappy with this type of conclusion, Oruka attempted to show individual philosophers through conducting a research that identified African sages or philosophers. Apart from this research, a common thinking is that of appealing to the African elders, who are often considered as custodians of wisdom. The common linking of rationality with logic in the early studies in African thought created a big gap in the context of ϕρ Òνησ ι˘ς translated as phronesis (practical wisdom). This gap is clearly seen in various developments in the context of African ethics. For example, ubuntu as a version of African ethics underlined a discourse on knowledge and practice of communitarian virtues toward the community’s well-being. The community is considered as the summum bonum (ultimate or greatest good), or eudemonia using Aristotelian language. This interest on ‘well-being’ led to the argument that it is a component of eudemonia ethics, similar to the Aristotelian virtue ethics. In this regard, Metz argued that though it is similar to Aristotelian ethics, eudemonia in Aristotle is achieved through the practice of both self- and other-regarding virtues, while ubuntu ethics is based on other-regarding virtues. The unfortunate part in ubuntu and other versions of African ethics, there is no adequate elaboration of the role of practical reason toward the achievement of well-being.1 This responds to the gap relative to the African conceptualization of phronesis by developing this concept and its role in people’s lives, using the ordinary language framework. As alluded to earlier, in this framework, philosophy is studied by focusing on language. The main contention is 1 I have written an unpublished article (in review), ‘Restoration of Ubuntu as an Autocentric Virtue Theory,’ which attempts to clarify African self- and other-regarding virtues and the element of phronesis toward the attainment of individual and communal wellbeing.

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that most of the philosophical problems are a consequence of misuse of language. Further understanding is that language is an important carrier of a particular people’s philosophy. I believe that the study of language may adequately assist in revealing central elements in African traditional philosophy. The issue is that Africa has depended on oral tradition for a long period, and it is very difficult to trace most of the individual thinkers. However, studying language, there are some expressions, mainly proverbs, and metaphors that have been transmitted from one generation to the next. A reflection of these expressions may assist in identifying some fundamental components of the African traditional thought. The study will analyze what people were meaning or doing when using these particular expressions, hence draw some philosophical conclusions pertaining to phronesis. This method is inspired by various thinkers in the ordinary language approach such as Gilbert Ryle (1953), J. L. Austin (1962), and Wittgenstein (1953). It is further inspired by different works in pragmatic semantics that focus on meaning relative to the relation involving the speaker, hearer, context, and intention (Grice 1957). Below, I will firstly clarify the meaning of phronesis, drawing insights from Aristotle’s ideas. This will provide a background of the concept of phronesis in the African context. Secondly, I will consider the concept of phronesis in the African context using techniques from the analytic framework. As alluded to earlier, my main focus will be on proverbs. Thirdly, I will clarify the philosophical implications of the conceptualization of phronesis in the African context. The Concept of Phronesis What is phronesis ? A quick response is that phronesis is an intellectual virtue known as practical wisdom or intellectual wisdom. In Aristotle’s words, in Nicomachean ethics, phronesis is ‘true practical condition, with logos, about the good and bad for man’ (1995, 1140b5–6). A better understanding of phronesis requires clarifying Aristotle’s division of virtues into intellectual virtues and moral virtues. Intellectual virtues are excellences of the rational soul and they are about the mind, while moral virtues deal with human conduct such as honesty. Intellectual or rational soul has virtues that include episteme (scientific knowledge), techne (technical knowledge), and phronesis (practical knowledge) (NE VI 1, 1139a5– 15). Firstly, phronesis may be viewed as a state of excellence (virtue) that constitutes grasping the truth about what is good or bad with reference

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to human actions (NE VI 5, 1140b5–7). Secondly, it grasps the right means for achieving the right end. Thirdly, it helps an individual recognize the good end of human life in different situations. A fundamental characteristic of phronesis that follows from these characteristics is that it calculates the link between the quality of human actions, human ultimate goal, and means toward it. In every situation, an individual is involved in a reflection (deliberation) of these characteristics, hence make a proper decision for his/her good and that of the community (Kayange 2020). The above discussion shows that phronesis is highly connected with both moral virtues given that they target the quality of human actions. According to Aristotle, while phronesis shows the right means, the good end is achievable because of the virtue of character (moral virtue). Commenting on the relation between virtue of character and phronesis, Aristotle noted that, {‘[W]e fulfill our function insofar as we have [phronêsis ] and virtue of character; for virtue makes the goal correct, and [phronêsis ] makes the things promoting the goal [correct]’ (NE VI 12, 1144a8– 10); and ‘[virtue] makes us achieve the end, whereas [phronêsis ] makes us achieve the things that promote the end’ (NE VI 13, 1145a6–7).} This affirms the idea that the end is therefore justified by living the moral virtues such as self-control and truthfulness. On the contrary, the means are justified by practical reason, which has undergone proper scrutiny of a particular situation and provided direction with regard to the proper tools required. The virtue of phronesis and the virtue of character (virtue of good character) are instantiated through an individual who becomes a moral expert known as a phronimos. Commenting on this moral expert, Aristotle writes, ‘The agent they would call [the phronimos 1] is the one who studies well each question about his own [good], and he is the one to whom they would entrust such questions’ (Nicomachean Ethics VI 7, 1141a26–28). This citation shows that this individual knows both the ultimate good and questions pertaining to how this may be achieved. This implies that this individual knows the right means and the right end. Because of this expertise, the citation shows that this individual may be viewed as a guide, who knows how to deliberate. Affirming the centrality of deliberation, Aristotle states that, ‘so that in general the phronimos would be the one able to deliberate (Ð βoυλευτικÒς)’ (Nicomachean Ethics 1995, 1140a25–31). This expert of deliberation is a guide in matters about living a good life that are entrusted to this expert.

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Phronesis in African Thought Through Language Analysis Similar to the Aristotelian division of the rational soul, in the Chewa language, people use words and utterances to refer to episteme, techne, and phronesis, depending on the speaker’s intention to communicate in particular context. I will, firstly, indicate in brief the use meaning of the word representing the rational soul and its threefold characteristic in the mentioned language, and then the figurative expressions. This will be followed by a detailed consideration of phronesis. (1) The concept that is used in ordinary language to represent the characteristics of the rational soul, is nzeru. In his consideration of the use of the word nzeru among the Chewa language speakers, Pass (2010) suggests 13 meanings in the ordinary people’s use, which confirm that this concept may be used to refer to different realities of the rational soul. These meanings include the use of nzeru to refer to, wisdom, intelligence, knowledge, thinking capacity, capability, cleverness, dexterity, common sense, cunning, genius, brilliance, wit, and techne. These different uses of this term suggest that it represents a set of intellectual virtues that are present among the Chichewa language speakers. In these intellectual virtues, it is clear that they adequately represent the Aristotelian episteme, techne as well as phronesis. Although dictionary usage of this word represented well the ordinary language use, a further consideration from the Chewa language speakers confirmed these virtues by indicating the following meanings regarding a person who has nzeru. The question that was randomly asked to help in confirming what the dictionary is indicating was, ‘what does the term nzeru refer to when you are using it in a discourse?’ The following were the answers. Table A.1 shows that the way people are using the word nzeru suggests a complex theory of the rational component of the soul in the African traditional context. The corresponding values that are presented above mainly fall under intellectual virtues in the Aristotelian division. The term nzeru suggests some fundamental intellectual virtues such as knowledge, cleverness, craft, shrewdness, capability, craft, intelligence, good character, integrity, being ethical, responsibility, understanding, deliberation, understanding, prudence, foresight, wisdom, thinking, techne, practical wisdom, moral expert, logical, extraordinary, and respect. This use of the term nzeru suggests that in the African traditional context, the following

Munthu odziwa zinthu (A person who knows things); Munthu oganiza mwakuya (A person who is a deep thinker) Munthu ochenjera (a clever person), Munthu odziwa zinthu (A person who knows things); Munthu ochangamuka (A shrewd person) Munthu waluso (A talented person); Munthu wakuthekera (A capable person); Munthu waphatso zapadera (A uniquely gifted person) Nzeru za mkalasi (Class intelligence); Munthu wanzeru osati zakusukulu koma odziwa kuthetsa mavuto ndi mikangano. (A wise person who might not necessarily have intellectual capabilities but they have wisdom for solving issues and disputes); Munthu waluso (A person who is skilled in some craft) Nzeru za kusukulu (intelligent at school); Osaphunzira za mkalasi koma ali ndi nzeru zina; Munthu wachikhalidwe cha chabwino, nthawi zina mawu okuti nzeru amayimira chikhalidwe (A person who act morally in situation, sometimes it is used interchangeably with the word); khalidwe (good moral character) Munthu wochita bwino business ndiwothandiza kumudzi (A person who does well business and supports the community); Munthu yemwe zimamuyendera (A person who is successful); Munthu wanzeru mkalasi (A person who is wise in class)

R1

R6

R5

R4

R3

R2

Ordinary language use

Ordinary language use of the concept of wisdom

R

Table A.1

Craft; Craft; Intelligence

Intelligence; Wisdom; Good Character

Intelligence; Wisdom; Craft

Craft; Capability; Craft/creative

Cleverness; Knowledge; Shrewdness

Knowledge; Wisdom

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Munthu okutha kuganiza moyenelera panthawinso (A person who knows how to think well and on time); Munthu wochita zinthu zakuya (Person who does extraordinary things) Munthu odziwa zinthu (A person who knows things); Munthu wa umunthu (Ethical person); Munthu wochenjera (A clever person) Munthu ochita bwino pa maphunziro (A person of high performance in education); Kuthekera kowunikira bwino zinthu ndi kupanga chiganizo choyenera (Ability to assess situations and arrive at productive solution to problems) Munthu womvetsetsa za chikhalidwe chanthu (An individual who has an adequate understanding of cultural beliefs, particular rituals, and rites (especially about marriage, funerals, and initiations)); Munthu woupeza mtima (An individual who is patient and follows up an issue before giving an input or judgment); Munthu wokonzera zakutsogolo (An individual who can plan ahead) Munthu odziwa zinthu (A person who knows things); Munthu ochenjera (A clever person); Munthu owonera zinthu patali (A person who foresees issues before the happen) Munthu wozindikira (Knowledgeable person); Munthu wochenjera (A clever person) R13: Munthu woganiza (A person who is a thinker); Munthuyu ali ndi wisdom koma umunthu alibe (A person with wisdom but without good moral character); Nzeru zakuchita zinthu koma akhonza (Knowledge for doing things)

R7

R13

R12

R11

R10

R9

R8

Ordinary language use

R

Wisdom; Knowledge; Craft

Knowledge; Cleverness

Knowledge; Cleverness; Foresight

Understanding; Prudence; Foresight

Intelligence; Deliberation/Reflection

Knowledge; Ethical; Cleverness

Logical; Extraordinary

(continued)

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R14: Kumva zinthu msanga (Understanding things quickly); Kuganiza Mwachangu (Thinking in a quick way); Kuchita mwaukadaulo (Doing things in a technical way) Munthu wanzeru zophunzira (Intelligent person); Munthu wanzeru koma zosapita kusukulu (Wise person); Munthu wochita zinthu modzitsata (Smart person) Munthu wopanga ziganizo zabwino (A person who thinks well); Munthu wokhulupilika (A responsible person); Munthu woopa chauta (A person who is God fearing) Munthu wochita bwino zamaphunziro (A successful person in education); Munthu wodziwa zochita pa moyo (A person who knows what to do in life); Munthu wopanga ziganizo zabwino (Good in decision making); Munthu wodziwa kulangiza kapena kuthandiza ena (Good in advising or helping others who are in problems) Wodziwa kuweruza milandu (Good judge); Wodziwa kusamala banja lake (One who knows to look after his family); Munthu waulemu (A person with good behaviour); munthu wokalamba (An old person) Munthu wanzeru (A person with wisdom); Munthu wanzeru ndi zinthu (A person with knowledge of things) Munthu wanzeru (A wise person); Munthu wanzeru zophunzira (An intelligent person; knowledgeable person) Munthu wanzeru zophunzira (A person who is intelligent); Nzeru zosapita kusukulu (Wisdom without formal education); Umunthu (Being human or morally correct person)

R14

R21

R20

R19

R18

R17

R16

R15

Ordinary language use

(continued)

R

Table A.1

Intelligence; Wisdom; Practical wisdom/integrity

Wisdom; Intelligence

Wisdom; Craft

Judgment; Practical wisdom; Respect; Wisdom

Intelligent; Practical wisdom; Deliberation; Moral expert

Wisdom; Responsibility; Prudent

Intelligence; Wisdom; Shrewd

Understanding; Thinking; techne/craft

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Munthu wodziwa zinthu zambiri (Someone who knows a lot of things); Munthu wochita bwino kusukulu (Someone who does well in education); Munthu wokonza mavuto mosavuta (Someone who can resolve difficult problems with ease) Kupanga ziganizo zabwino (Able to impartially make judgments); Kuthekera kokonza zolakwikwa (Ability to resolve dilemmas); Kudziwa zamtsogolo (Displaying an ability for foresight) Munthu wa umunthu (A person of integrity); Munthu ali ndikuthekera kokonza mavuto (A person who has problem solving skills); Munthu womva zinthu mwachangu (A person who understands things very fast) Munthu wochitabwino mkalasi (A person who does well at school); Munthu wa umunthu (A person with a good character); Munthu waluso (A skilled person)

R22

R stands for Respondent

R25

R24

R23

Ordinary language use

R

Knowledge; Practical wisdom; Craft

Integrity; Critical thinking; Understanding

Practical wisdom; Practical wisdom; Craft

Knowledge; Intelligent; Practical wisdom

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are some of the possible theoretical interpretations, (i) nzeru is knowing how to do something, which is practical knowledge in the sense of techne. (ii) nzeru as a rational process that leads to valid conclusions, which is part of critical thinking. (iii) nzeru is a body of knowledge. (iv) nzeru is creative thinking. (v) nzeru is practical wisdom. In the discussion above, the idea of phronesis is clearly captured in the use of nzeru relative to human conduct toward well-being. It is this person with phronesis who is seen as having umunthu or ubuntu (integrity), which is a set of virtues such as honesty, faithfulness, and respect. It is this person who thinks with umunthu, meaning that he/she seeks an individual or communal good. This is the individual who deliberates and provides proper judgments that are seen in everyday actions. The use also shows that the experience is fundamental in this person with practical wisdom pertaining to human conduct. Some identified a person with nzeru as the one who is old in society. This is to underline the importance of experience that the old people acquired in life. (2) Apart from the ordinary use of words demonstrated above, proverbs in the African context constitute elements of both Sophia in terms of episteme and techne, but also phronesis. The concept phronesis is mainly represented in various proverbs, which, when they are used in ordinary language, they represent or mean prudence (This is similar to Aquinas’ translation of Aristotle’s phronesis into prudentia, which is prudence in English). In a study where over 2009 figurative expressions were collected among the Chewa language speakers, it indicated the meaning of the ordinary people when they are using them in a particular context. I will restrict this section to proverbs that capture the element of practical reason focusing mainly on prudence. Below is the list of figurative expressions, which when used, ordinary language users want to refer to phronesis or prudence (Chakanza 2000, 459) (Table A.2). In the above figurative expressions, most of them have various meanings, and it is for this reason that the ordinary language approach to meaning becomes operation. It is therefore fundamental to indicate the relation involving the speaker, hearer, context, and intention. When these Chewa language speakers are using some proverbs, they are calling for practical wisdom for various purposes. Using the speech act theory, it may be indicated that they are performing speech acts such as verdictives, exercitives, commissives, behabitives, and expressive relative to practical wisdom.

Kagwa m’khutu satong’ola, atong’ola n’kam’maso Kuthawa simantha Kuyenda ‘nkupilingizika Kwa eni kulibe mkuwe, ukakuwa wadzikuwira nkhondo

Liwiro lilibe manyazi, chikakula patuka

Maimvaimva adathawitsa zolo paukwati Maimvaimva kupasulitsa banja koma kudekha Makhwala a utsi nkuthawa

Mantha ali n’kuseka, ukali uli ndi maliro Maso ndi maliwa Mawu a munthu mmodzi ndi chisa cha njuchi Mawu okoma n’kamba, mawu oipa n’ndulu Mawu salawa chakudya ndicho amalawa

3

7

8

11

15

14

12 13

10

9

Eyes are stone-traps The words of one person are like a honey comb Good words are food, bad words are poison Words are not tasted but food

Gluttony sent a fly to the grave The horn grew because of fearing the thick bush What falls in the ear cannot be resonated but what is seen by the eyes Running away is not fear Traveling is winding up oneself At other people’s home there is no shouting, if you shout, you have called for trouble There is no shame in running, when an obstacle is huge just give way Hearsay made the zolo mouse run away from marriage Hearsay breaks a marriage, what is needed is prudence The remedy against smoke is running away Fear has laughing, anger has death

Dyera linapititsa ntchentche kumanda Idakula nyanga poopa malunje

1 2

4 5 6

Translation

Figurative expressions and the concept of wisdom

Chichewa expression

Table A.2

(continued)

Discretion, Prudence, Self-control

Prudence, Generosity, Kindness

Prudence, Judgment, Patience Prudence, Advice

Prudence

Prudence or Temptation

Prudence, self-control

Prudence, Gossip, Hearsay

Prudence, limitation, humility

Prudence Prudence Prudence or cunning

Prudence or speech

Prudence Prudence or responsibility

Meaning

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The scared bush buck grew long winding horns A chief is like a swamp where bush fires are extinguished Stomach carries your own, while a shoulder carries for others The gluttonous son-in-law poured away the fat of winged white ants against a pole A lawsuit is in the mouth The one who came to stay with the owners, snatched their home Like the nose, eyes are very busy You cannot move twice in the thighs of an elephant ‘I love this place’ was left alone on the veranda A borrowed piece of cloth does not last long on the body Fish and okra are not cooked in the same pot Right thinking is wealth (or Wisdom is wealth) A mouth is like a court, if you fool with it you get arrested When a finger point at something, there is a garden The one who wears a dark cloth does not jump over the fire

Mbawala yamantha idapota nyanga

Mfumu ndi m’dambo mozimira moto

Mimba ndi mtengakako, phewa ndi mtengakaeni Mkamwini wankhuli adathira thendo la inswa pa nsanamira

Mulandu uli Mkamwa Mkhala nawo analanda malo

Monga mphuno maso atakataka Mphechepeche mwa njovu sapitamo kawiri “Ndapakonda” adam’siya m’khonde

Nguwo yobwereka siilimba m’thupi

Msomba ndi there’re saphika mphika umodzi Nzeru n’nchuma

Pakamwa ndi pa boma, ukasewera napo pakumangitsa Pali chala pali munda

Wovala nyanda salumpha moto

16

17

18

20 21

22 23

25

26

28

30

29

27

24

18

Translation

(continued)

Chichewa expression

Table A.2

Prudence

Prudence, Advice, Warning

Prudence, Discretion, Self-control

Prudence

Prudence, Fairness

Prudence, Self-reliance

Prudence, Maturity

Prudence, Discretion, Prudence Prudence

Prudence, Discretion Prudence, Discernment, Foresight.

Immaturity, Prudence.

Prudence, Leadership, Secrecy, Understanding, Patience Prudence, Foresight, Planning

Prudence, Cautiousness

Meaning

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For instance, when a speaker of this language utters Liwiro lilibe manyazi, chikakula patuka (There is no shame in running when an obstacle is huge just give way), in a situation where an individual wants to perform a particular action, it is used as a warning to exercise prudence. This warning is important because prudence will lead the interested individual to achieve a good end without falling into vice. Similarly, this is used as an advice to exercise prudence in a particular situation. The individual is being advised that it is not good to perform actions that you know are impossible. The figurative expression shows that a calculative intellect is a necessary prerequisite for individuals to act toward their own good, in situations where they are faced with bigger challenges. The other possible meanings suggested above are limitations and humility. In the former, one has to know and accept that in some circumstances, he/she is limited and cannot do everything. In the second meaning, the individual is being advised to exercise humility. Both of these meanings are connected to the virtue of humility, in the sense that the individual exercises the calculating intellect, hence become prudent. From this explanation, phronesis in the African context may refer to the understanding of a situation, deliberate and decide not to act in some situations that may divert an individual from achieving what is good. The other figurative expression whose meaning is the virtue of phronesis in the African context is Maimvaimva adathawitsa zolo paukwati (Hearsay breaks a marriage, what is needed is prudence). The figurative expression sets a context where there are different messages that are given to an individual meant at influencing his course of action. The example given refers to the context of marriage, where an individual decides based on what others say without using the calculative intellect in his decision. By uttering this figurative expression, the speaker has the intention of calling the interested individual to exercise the calculating part of the soul, deliberate properly so that error inactions may be avoided. Apart from this aspect, it may be given as a piece of advice that listening to everything that people say may interfere in one’s decision toward doing a certain action. Similarly, it may be a warning to a person who has decided to act based on what people say, without understanding well the situation at hand. This utterance may also be meant at reporting the consequences of making decisions without proper deliberation. The use of this utterance indicates how phronesis is valued in human actions in the context of living together happily as a family.

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When the figurative expression Mimba ndi mtengakako, phewa ndi mtengakaeni (Stomach carries your own, while a shoulder carries for others) is uttered, shows that prudence is also about making the right decision in using what one has. It discourages just keeping things or wealth without using them. Prudence is, therefore, using what you need. The utterance warns that if one does not apply prudence as a guide in using what is accumulated when she dies other people will use his belongings. It provokes a good question, ‘Why do you want to accumulate things which you will not use?’ Accumulation with a proper reflection is therefore seen as a sign of lacking phronesis. Apart from the discussed figurative utterance above, the rest of the expressions above provide different environments where phronesis is encouraged in the African context. A single figurative utterance may be used in a different situation where deliberation and a decision to act in a particular way take shape. Who Is a Phronimos in the African Context? In African traditional thought, both literal utterances and figurative utterances suggest the centrality of the idea of a phronimos, or a person who practices phronesis. There are different words such as Munthu wankulu (elder), Nankungwi (advisor), and Mlangizi (advisor) that are used for individual that are moral experts and guide others on living well. Different figurative utterances, when they are used, tend to support the centrality of this moral expert in the African context. For example, when one of the utterances that guide on this aspect is, Akulu akulu ndi mdambo mozimira moto (Elders are a swamp where bushfires get extinguished), a similar figurative utterance was shown in the list above, which instead of ‘elder’ used the chief. This proverb states that, Mfumu ndi m’dambo mozimira moto (Elders are a swamp where bushfires get extinguished). This suggests that a phronimos is either a person who is an elder or a chief. These are expected to be moral experts in the community, given that they have demonstrated a good character, but at the same time they have shown a high-level capacity in terms of deliberating one issue that concerns human well-being. A further assumption is that they know well what is good for human subjects in a particular society. One of the important aspects that make elders qualify as phronimos in the African context is because of the idea of the experience. In fact, while African traditional thought shows elements of rational soul in term of

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theoretical knowledge, there is a strong understanding of the centrality of experience. This explains why African thought underlines the element of observation and empirical knowledge before making any decision or committing oneself. There are various figurative utterances, such as Kuwona maso ankhono nkudekha (Seeing the eyes of a snail requires patience) and Ziliko nkulinga utatosako (To say ‘The mice are there’ presupposes that you have poked into their hole). These are some examples that show the centrality of evidence in the African traditional context. There is a need for quality evidence before concluding or pronouncing oneself in a particular context. Elders go beyond mere observation or knowledge of evidence, given that they have tested their experience for a long time. It has now become a habit for them to make good judgment, given that they are aided by history. It is for this reason that the quality of evidence and experience provided by elders is indispensable in society. For instance, the figurative expression is Chaona wankulu atakhala pansi, mwana sangaone atakula (What an old person sees seated, a child cannot see even when standing). Trust in the quality of life of the elders, the traditional society gives them the role of being advisors or moral experts who can guide the community. In fact, people get guidance from elders because of their experience in handling issues. The thinking is that most of the issues that are coming now, elders have met them in their lives. It is for this reason than the utterance, Mau a akulu akoma akagonera (Elders words become important with time), indicates that their advice must be followed; otherwise, one will remember them when already in big trouble. The value of advice from the phronimos may be considered further by viewing utterances which confirm both a moral expert and the centrality of advice and experience (Table A.3). When the above figurative utterances are uttered, they are meant at encouraging individuals to take seriously the issue of getting knowledge from those that know. Doing good actions requires consultation with the elders who are ready to guide the community based on their status as moral experts. When these utterances are uttered, they are guiding an individual to seek guidance before acting. In other contexts, when uttering them, language speakers are judging an individual who did not seriously take the guidance that was given. For example, in the utterance, Wafa atamva (Has died after listening), it shows that they are judging an individual that the current difficult situation, he/she is in, is a consequence of not taking advice.

Mr Do it died at the lake The one who never took advice was cooked together with vegetables A small one with a mother does not fall in the pit Something which is said first does not take long to happen ‘Mister dig for me’ went with all the medicine The one who does not ask ate wax Not asking caused the cock to be killed Getting one’s wisdom out of the bush squirrel’s bag The river ‘We were saying’ poured its water in the river ‘Here it is.’ When a finger point at something, there is a garden The one who did not ask took a road to the graveyard The one who does not listen to others is a fool The one who doesn’t take advice soaked food in the water He died after listening He that has pinched your ear is a neighbour

Chitani adakafera ku Nyanja Chosamva adachiphikira m’masamba

Wafa atamva Wakutsina nkhutu ndi mnasi

Samva za anzake nchitsiru Osamva adaviyika nsima m’madzi

Safunsa adalowera njira yakumanda

Pali chala pali munda

Mtsinje wa tinkanena udathira Msiizi

Kumbire adanka nao Safunsa adadya phula Kusafunsa kudaphetsa tambala Kutapa nzeru m’thumba la likongwe

Ili ndi make sikugwa mbuna Kanthu koyamba sikachedwa kuoneka

English translation

Figurative expression on advice as a component of phronesis

Figurative utterance

Table A.3

Selfishness Foolishness, Pride Guidance, Pride Listening

Advice, Listening Advice, Dissuasion

Advice, Listening Advice, Listening

Advice, Guidance

Prudence, Advice, Warning

Advice, Warnings

Advice, Advice, Advice, Advice,

Advice, Education Advice, Warning, Humility

Advice, Cost, Haste Advice, Warning, Self-centeredness

Meaning

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287

While the advice may be given by different individuals, the elders are the best candidates because of their good character in society. In fact, they are the custodians of the African traditional culture including its values that direct individuals toward a good life. These elders do not speak only out of their art and knowledge, but they accompany their knowledge with a demonstration of living virtues through their good character. Similarly, a chief is expected to demonstrate that he/she is a moral expert through living a good life of virtue. The phronimos is, therefore, a great teacher or educator of what is good life and how one may achieve a good life. It is for this reason that the African traditional context underlines the importance of learning from the elders. In fact, different occasions for this learning process are created, such as initiation. The education is not only to transfer what the moral experts know but also to help the young people and other members of the community to become moral experts. It is after this education that they will also teach others on how to live a good life. Conclusion The appendix has discussed the centrality of the concept phronesis in the African traditional thought. While this concept comes from the Aristotelian thought, it is shown through the study of language that it is present and highly valued in the African context. It is conceived as a virtue that helps in terms of calculating and deliberating what is good in human beings. After deliberating and grasping the situation, it is there to guide in terms of what are the right means and what is the proper goal to be achieved. It is indicated that in the African context, the person who practices phronesis, a moral expert, is qualified as such because of the demonstrated capacity to analyze and make good judgments and actions. He/she is further qualified by the demonstration of good character and experience. A phronimos is a person that gives guidance on whether to act based on the self-regarding virtues or other-regarding virtues, depending on the understanding of the issue at hand. This solves the issue of whether priority must be given to individual-oriented virtues or community-oriented virtues. In fact, the study leads to the support of both virtues depending on the situation.

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Index

A abortion, 194 African political philosophy, 10 African proletariat, 90 African renaissance, 217 African response, 221 Agriculture, 143 Anarchy, State and Utopia, 34 Aristotle, 113 B British Colonial Office, 82 C Capitalism and Freedom, 35 capitalism in African, 37 capitalist multiparty democracy, 116 Chinese influence, 239 Chinese model, 237 civil society, 123 classical liberalism, 27, 30 colonial capitalism, 84

Colonialism, 74 communalism, 47 communitarian/communitarianism, 46 conflict, 22

D Darfur, 167 democracy, 112, 227 demos , 112 dependence, 148 devaluation, 153

E economic independence, 148 episteme, 273 executive, 121

F Fiscal discipline, 136 freedom, 64

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 G. M. Kayange, Capitalism and Freedom in African Political Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44360-3

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302

INDEX

Friedman, M., 33

G global capitalism, 207

H Hayek, V., 33 History of Astronomy, 32

I individual liberty, 26

J judiciary, 121

K Keynesian philosophy, 134 Keynes, J.M., 131

L labor laws, 22 legislative, 121 Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT), 184, 186 Liberal, 130 Liberal approach, 39 liberalization, 137, 157 Liberalizing interest rates, 136

M market relations, 23 Marxian theory, 21 meaning of communalism, 49 mercantile capitalism, 56 Metz, T., 255 monarchism, 50

N neo-capitalist reforms, 140 neoliberalism, 33, 36 Nozick, R., 33, 34 nzeru, 275 O one-party system, 96, 101 P Pan-Africanism, 92 phronesis (ϕρ Òνησ ι˘ς ), 272, 274 phronimos , 264 Popper, Karl, 115 primitive accumulation, 200, 203, 205 private property, 60 R radical communitarian/radical communitarianism, 45, 250 Ramose, M., 251 renaissance, 213, 214 restorative justice, 252 S Smith, A., 32 social (nationalist) democrats, 120 sovereignty, 162 State Capitalism, 241 Structural Adjustment Programs, 130 summum bonum, 272 T Tax reform, 136 Thangata, 58 Theory of Moral Sentiments , 32 U ubuntu, 249, 250, 257

INDEX

V Von Mises, L., 33

W Wealth of Nations , 31 Weber, Max, 24, 25

303