Aristotle: On Coming-to-Be and Passing-Away 9004320091, 9789004320093

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ARISTOTLE ON COMING-TO-BEAND PASSING AWAY

PHILOSOPHIA ANTIQUA A SERIES OF MONOGRAPHS ON ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY EDITED BY

W. j. VERDENIUS AND

J. H.

W ASZINK

VOLUME I

ARISTOTLE ON COMING-TO-BE AND PASSINO-AWAY

E.

LEIDEN

J. BRILL 1946

ARISTOTLE ON COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY SOME COMMENTS BY

W.

J. VERDENIUS,D.

LITT.

AND

J. H. WASZINK,D.

E.

LEIDEN

J. BRILL 1946

LITT.

PREFACE The following dissertation asks for a short preliminary explanation. It will b.e observed that most of our remarks contain a criticism of the commentary by Professor H. H. Joachim (Oxford, 1922). This fact might cause some misunderstanding, which we should like to clear up beforehand. Firstly, if only incidentally we mention other works, ( e.g. the French translation by Mr. /. Tricot, Paris, 1934), it is not because we have not consulted them, but because their interpretations are either overridden by Joachim's .explanations or correspond to them. This does not hold good for Pacius' and Zabarella' s editions, which were not accessible to us. Secondly, when passing Jo~ chim' s interpretations and corrections in silence, we do not always agree with them; we have confined ourselves to such points as appeared to us most in ne.ed of elucidation. Finally, it has never been our intention to belittle the merits of Joachim's commentary by our criticism. On the contrary, irt the course of our studies we have got the highest respect for his work and we should consider it an honour, if our comments were looked upon as a supple- . ment to his commentary. We wish to thank Professor C. W. Vollgraft for some valuable suggestions and Dr L. /. Guittart for correcting the wording of our dissertation.

W. /. V. /. H. W.

ARISTOTLE ON COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY The Atomists hold that all things are composed of 'tO'U'tOl; indivisible bodies: Q'l)'t(laeneoi; Q'U'ta6tacpEQ£L'V i~ oov dai xat 02021.xat 'ta;eL 'tomoov {314a, 23-24). Joachim writes ail'ta aeneo; ail'ta with EJL and remarks: 'The compounds differ 'one as compared with another', not 'as compared with themselves'.' However, it will be difficult to quote parallels for ail'ta neoi; all'ta in the sense of 'one as compared with another'. On the other hand, the traditional reading can certainly have this meaning. The present treatise contains two more examples of ai>'ta = ciU.11ia,viz. 323b, 28-29: oi,x i;Cafl)ai yae EaV'ta 'tij; qruaeoo;oaa JL1l'tE'V«'V't£a JL1l"C i; ivav't£CJ>'V icn:£v(where Joachim rightly has not accepted 0Lyycivov"Ca the reading of EL, aii11ia), and 327a, 2: JLTJ JL1J'teai>'tvJL'll't'aA.ACJ>'V. Cf. De incessu anim. 707a, 7, Pol. 1305b, 13, and Liddell-Scott, s.v. iavTov, Ill. 0

0

'Those who make the ultimate kinds of things more with than one' cannot identify 'alteration' (dll.0Cooa1.i;} coming-to-be, because they conceive of coming-to-be as a mechanical combination of elements. ~1.0 ).eyeL 'toih:ov "CO'V 't'Qonov xat 'Eµ.:nel>ox).'iji;, O't1...qruai; oi,3ev6; µ£;1.; 't£ 6uilla;C; "CEJ.I.LYE'V'tCl>'V" icn:1.v•.• aAA.a J1.0'VO'V {314b,6-8). Joachim translates: 'That is why Empedokles too uses language to this effect', and he explains Philosophia Antiqua I

2

ARISTOTLE

the word 'too' by 'as well as Anaxagoras', referring to 314a, 13-15. But the mere word Ka£ can hardly refer to. what has been stated so long before, and besides the reference is not to the point. In 314a, 13-15 Aristotle points out an inconsistency in the system of Anaxagoras, who, though being a pluralist, declared comingto-be and passing-away to be identical with 'alteration'. On the other hand, the statement of Empedocles is in harmony with the logical foundation of his system, and it is quoted by Aristotle as a historical proof of his systematic interpretation. Hence we should translate: 'That is why Empedocles in fact expresses himself in these terms' {thus rightly Sylvester Maurus: 'ideoque Empedocles cecinit'). Aristotle has more examples of Ka£ introducing a quotation, cf. 314b, 17-21: -rci ycie nci&q••• 61.acpoeaL cp11aneoKOL:Eancpci> 'A1Ka£ou "0D..m 'fL elnijv", K-r1., Poet. 1453b, 27-29: lai:1. µAvycie o-u-rmy£vea0a1.fll'V nea;1.v, ci>anseol naM1.ot ino£0'U'Vel66-ra, KOLy1.yvco-ra;, 61.tyCl>Q£iv 61.a)..eye-raL ffQO' 'fO'V9ufJ,6v•"'O'U'VCIQ611 ffCIQCJ cp£1.Cl>'V dnciyxeo··, De caelo 268a, 10-11 : 'H.a0cin£Q yciQ cpaa1.'H.at ot Il-u0ay6oe1.01., -ro nav Kot -re\ ncina -rot; -rea.atv me1.ai:a1..It is important to realize the special

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ON COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY

force of Ka£ in such cases. In the passage quoted from the Poetics, for example, it has led editors astray, in so far as it is commonly held that Aristotle did not class Euripides among the 'ancient' poets. The improbability of this view has been pointed out by Mr. J. D. Denniston in Class. Rev. 43 (1929), 60. Instead of 'Euripides as well as the ancients' he proposes the translation 'Euripides as well as other ancients' and, accordingly, in his Greek Particles (Oxford, 1934), 296, he declares: 'Ka£ sometimes refers, not to the content of the main clause, but to other, unspecified, examples'. Yet we cannot accept this view either. It is highly improbable that Aristotle, in using the word Ka£, should have other instances in mind. We should rather refer to the use of Ka£ in the following examples (partly borrowed from Uenniston, The Greek Particles): Iliad 12, 8-9: 0eoov 6" aEK1J't'I. 't'E't"UK't'O ci0ava't'OOV • 't'OKai. O'U'tl. :n:oA.iwxe6vov iµ.:n:e6ov;jev. Od. 20, 156: dlla ,uiA. tiei. vsov't'at, bcei. Kai. :n:ciai.vioQ't'1J.Aristoph. Thesm. 580: 't'1JQ'fi't'e µiJ Kai. :n:eoa:n:s11 i,µtv. Nub. 611-12: :n:eoo't'a µev 0

't'O'Uµ11vo; el; 6116'oiJK u.a't''t'OVii 6Qaxµ11v,/ ooa't'eKai. Uyei.v ci:n:ana;, K't'A,.Plato Lach. 194a: KaQ-ree11aooµev, iva Kai µiJ 11µ.oov aii't'1)11civ6ee£aKa't'ayeA.a11. Phdr. 258e: 6 611oA.Cyou:n:ciaai.al :n:eei.'t'o aooµa 116ovai.exo1.1a1.· 6u\ Phd. 73d : 't'O'U't'O Kai. 61.xa£00;civ6ea:n:06006e1.; KEXA.1JV't'at. 6s SO't'LVcivaµv11a1.,·ooa:n:eeye Kal l':1.µµ.£av't'l£ l6Cl>'Y 108d: ciµa µev eyootaooc; :n:oUaKL£Ks(i1)'t'O£dveµV11a81J. oi,6" liv otcS; 't'e et11v,aµa 6s, et Kai T1:n:1.0't'aµ11v, 6 (3£oc; iµcS,, l':1.µµ£a,'t'ci} JJ.'l)KEI. 't'O'UA.O"fO'l!O'\JK JI.OL6oxet ci>aav't'oo;Kai 't'O'U£U001.1c; i;aexetv. 11Od: Kai. a-u 't'a exe1.v dva 't'OV a-u't'ov Aoyov 't''tl'V 't'E MLO't'1J't'aKai. 't'TJV

o

co

oe11

4

ARISTOTLE

6uxcpcive1.av xai 'ta xewµa"ta xaU.£ro· oov xai "ta ev9ci6e 11.8£61.aetvai. "tav"ta 'ta ciyanwµeva µ6e1.a. In all these cases Ka£ seems to emphasize the connection between

the contents of a subordinate clause with those of the main sentence. So it conveys the idea of something natural or factual, which may be translated by 'indeed', 'really', 'in fact', 'actually'. Accordingly, the terms 61.0 Ka£ and ci>anee xa£ introducing the above quotations from Aristotle do not serve to give one example taken from many others, but to stress the factual accordance of an example with a general truth. Hence, in 314b, 20, for example, we should translate: 'as indeed Empedocles says'. We must treat this point at some length, because it has often been an obstacle to the right understanding of the text. For instance, in Plato Crat. 436e: 8auµcit0tµ· av et xai 'ta ov6µa"ta auµcprovet ai>'ta av"tot;, the term et xa£ means 'if really', and Denniston (op. cit., 327) is wrong in taking this passage as one of the instances of irregular order, for xa£ does not go closely with auµcp6>Vet(Denniston, 323), but it serves to bring out the conditional purport of the sentence. In Soph. Phil. 191-2: oi>6ev 'tO'U't6>V 9a"UµaO"tov iµo£·I 9eta ycie, etnee xdyw 'tt cpeovoo,the last words are usually explained as 'I as well as others', but the meaning is obviously 'if actually', 'if at least'. The same interpretation holds good for Ant. 719 and 0. R. 1110. In the laws 792d Plato says: "to µiaov, 6 vw6ia neoaetnov ci>; LM6>V O'VOf.1.CJOa" 'ijv 6116ta9eal.'VXat 0e0'0 Xa'ta 'tt'VUµaV't££a; cpftµ11vei>O"t6xro;nciv1:e; neoaayoerioµev. ..>..ov'ta i)µci>v(op. cit., 372), seem to be superfluous, for the idea is not 'we as well as God', but: 'kindness is a characteristic of God ; accordingly, each of us who wants to be godlike should in fact (in German: 'muss denn auch') pursue this disposition'. Some passages taken from Aristotle's Politics may serve as further illustrations. In 1278a, 21-25 the text runs: E'V 6e 'tat, 0Atyaex£at£ 0ij,:a µE'VO'UKev6exnm. 'YCXQ JLUKQci>'V al µe0e~Sl£ s{vm. 1COA£'t1)'V ( 01'0 'tlf.11)f.L..>..oi. 1:ci>v'tSX'Vt'tci>v. ad Loe.) declares: 'xa£ intensifies oL no>..>..0£, 'quite the majority',' but we prefer to translate 'for in fact'. There are more examples of yae xa£, in spite of Denniston's opinion that it 'can hardly be regarded as a combination, since xa£ adheres to what follows' (op. cit.,307). Cf. Hdt. II, 99: n6At'V K'ttOat 'tU1J't1)'V 1)'tt£ 'V'U'V Meµcpt; xa).is-rat (ea'tt yae xat iJ Meµcpt£ ev "tt a-rewt -cij; Al"f'IJn'to'U)('for Memphis actually lies'). The general fault underlying Denniston's treatment of the 'responsive' use of xa£ lies in his inclination to regard it as a particle of addition referring to what follows, instead of admitting its function to stress the connection between two sentences. So he often assumes a transposition of xa£ where there is no occasion for it, e.g. in Thuc. I, 91, 3: 11611yae xai. -qxov ai>,:t oL ;vµneea(3si;, he translates: 'his fellow ambassadors also had arrived', but the correct translation is: 'his fellow ambassadors had indeed arrived already'. In Pol. 1301b, 29 seqq. Aristotle points out that two

6

ARISTOTLE

different conceptions of equality determine men's political feelings: 6Laq>BQO'V'tat, Ka9cinee Wx&IJ neo-rseO'V,

ot pAv o-rt, Mv Ka-rci -rt taoL llatv, o>..co; taoL vop.£t011aLv stvat, ot 6' o-rt, iav Kai:ci 'CL civtaot, ncivrcov d.v£acov &uoy{vO'V'taLffOAL't8i:at, ~LO'UGL'V Ea'U't01J;·6to Kai. p.ci)..Lv tn; ,:ou,:oyae ,:ot xat µ.6vov/ i,:' icnt i..OLnovdya06v ('yes, and in fact this is the only remaining good'). Denniston (op. cit., 307-8) quotes more examples, though not all of them convincing. From what we have said before it will be clear that we cannot accept his explanation: 'The particle here denotes that the words following it add something, and something important, to the content of the demonstrative. Or, to look at it in another way, xa£ binds the demonstrative more closely to the following words'. Here, just as in our preceding examples, we should say: xa£ denotes that the sentence in which it appears is obviously and naturally connected with the main clause. The other instances of xa£ taken by Newman to mean 'for example' (1287a, 7, 1300b, 29, 1303b, 20, 1307b, 6, 1331a, 31} are all to be explained in the above manner.

ON COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY

9

After his quotation from Empedocles referred to above ovvolxeto; o 16yo; ai>-roov Aristotle continues: o-r1.µ.ev

TDinto0ea£1. O'U'tCt> cpcivai., 6ijM>V, xat O'tl. A.E"f01JOI. 'tO'Y

'tO'U'tO'V • avayxatO'V 6eKat 'tO'U'tOI.;'tfl'V allo(Ct>OI.V 'tl cpa'Val.1CaQa'tfl'V 'VE'VEOt'V, d6-uva'tO'VJLEV'tOI. £lova&.fLEV xa'ta -ra i>n' tu£vCt>v )..ey6µ.gva(314b, 8-12). The last

'tQ61CO'V

sentence is translated by Joachim as follows: 'Nevertheless, they too (i.e. the pluralists as well as ordinary people) must recognize 'alteration' as a fact distinct from coming-to-be, though it is impossible for them to do so consistently with what they say'. The word 'nevertheless' is very inappropriate in this connection, for it is impossible to imagine a contradiction between the fact that the actual words of the pluralists (viz. that there is only a mingling of elements) are in accordance with their fundamental assumption (viz. that the ultimate kinds of things are more than one), and the necessity to recognize alteration as a fact distinct from coming-to-be. The error of Joachim consists in regarding the whole passage as a recapitulation of the pluralist position. He does not seem to have clearly realized that etva1. "tl. naea fl)'V yeveal.'V the phrase fl)'V d)..)..o£Ct>ai.v (b, 11) means something totally different from 61.acpeee1.v TIJ'YaU.0£Ct>a1.v -rij;· yeveaeCt>;(b, 5). Aristotle had first considered the character which the pluralists must attribute to 'alteration': it cannot be identical with coming-to-be, for they conceive of coming-to-be as a mechanical combination of elements. He now proceeds to a second point, viz. the question whether the pluralists may admit the existenceof 'alteration' as an independent fact. In other words, from the question -rC ia-rtv he

10

ARISTOTLE

proceeds to the question o-ra.eanv. This is also ~parent from the following sentences: 'alteration' is a fact established by common experience, but made impossible by mechanical pluralism (b, 13-17). Accordingly,we may paraphrase the argument as follows : Pluralists must maintain that 'alteration' is distinct from coming-to-be. µaµve(a µve£ax1;JLEQTI ii, the association being facilitated by the fact that we can say: civ J.L'UQ((Iµve(axt; fLEQ1) 61.ne11Jdvan), and then by attraction caused the plural of the verb. Cf. Hdt. Ill, 60: ,:oµftxo; 'tO'U oevyµa,:o; bc-ra a-ra610(elaLV, Thuc. IV, 102: ,:oxooe£ov,:ou,:o, onee ne61:eeov "Evvro 0601 ixa>..oiiv,:o,Varro De ling. lat. 6, 28: novus annus Kalendae lanuariae appellatae (sc. sunt), K. Brugmann, lndogerm. Forsch. 43, Beiheft {1925), 158-9. But perhaps it is simpler to assume a contamination of two constructions, viz. 6:v ,:oaci>µaet, µve£a µve£Lt)QTlµe'VOVn, and civ ,:o;; acoµa,:o; JL'UQLcoev'tEA.EXEL~ QE'tOVxat 61.ne11fdvov,dU..a 61.t1Q1Jfdvov xa0' O'tl.O'U'V 01)· µetov) • ou6ev ClQaEO'tat )..otn6v, K't).,.(b, 19-25). Joachim thinks 'that the sentence oux ooO'te• • • miµetov (b, 2325) was originally a marginal note, intended (like 6ta1.QE't6v(added by EL after 6'Uvaµe1.]in b, 21) to explain -roµ.Avyae ••• iJnae;e,. This suspicion is confirmed by

ON COMING-TO-BE

AND PASSING-AWAY

13

the fact that pt reads 6tne11Jdvov8wciµ.etxa0' in b, 24-25. When the marginal note got displaced and inserted in the text, 6-uvaµ.etbecame unintelligible. Accordingly it was dropped, pt alone retaining it'. Against this reconstruction it might be objected that the perfect 6tne11Jdvov is the natural continuation of the preceding xav yevot-ro and that the two sentences in themselves may quite possibly be connected. So perhaps we might be inclined to dismiss the idea of an interpolation, but if we consider the whole context of the passage, we can hardly accept the text as it stands. We have already observed that the passage is introduced by Aristotle as the statement of a problem ). He concludes his account (b, 19: fll'Vcbr:oe£av>..ex-rwv with the words: o µ.ev ow dvayxatetv 6oxoov MSyo; elvaL µ.eye011a't'oµ.a ol;-r6; EO"t'L'V (b, 34-317 a, 1). The qualification 6oxvshould not be overlooked: the MSyo; which has been quoted is really a paralogism. Aristotle proceeds to point out this fallacy, at the same time expounding his own solution of the problem (317a, 1-17). The Atomists try to fortify their position by pursuing the opposite view ad absurdum. If a body is divisible in all directions, the complete division might also be carried out in practice {316b, 23: et yae 6wa-r6v, xav yevot't'o).But in that case the body would pass-away into what is incorporeal and nothing would remain {b, 25-27). As the absurdity of this result is obvious, we must assume a limit, beyond which the division cannot proceed (b, 27-34). However, according to Aristotle, the argument is conclusive only if the term 'divisible in all directions' means 'divisible every-

14

ARISTOTLE

where simultaneously'.But in fact a body is 'divisible everywhere' only successively,i.e. the division may be prosecuted at any point, but it cannot be realized at all points simultaneously (317a, 2-17). We may now return to the parenthesis a6x cocne••. ariµetov (316b, 23-25) suspected by Joachim. It is evident that this sentence gives an interpretation of the preceding words xav ytvoi-ro which runs counter to their original meaning. The Atomists assume the realization of a complete division for a moment, in order to expose its absurdity; the parenthesis, on the other hand, tries to show in which sense the possibility of a complete division should be conceived.The Atomists, in their criticism, are anxious to retain the 'simultaneous' sense of the term 'divisible in all directions'; in the parenthesis, on the contrary, aµa :n:avi:nis replaced by xaa· bi:io'Ova11µetov.Joachim translates the parenthesis as follows: 'with the result. not that the body would simultaneously be actually both(indivisible and divided), but that it would be simultaneously divided at any and every point'. It will be observed that in this translation the word 'simultaneously' occurs first in a logical, and then in a temporal, sense. The Greek text has ciµa only once and in the first sense; so it seems improbable that in the second part of the sentence we should mentally supply the word in its second and temporal sense. Hence it is equally improbable that xae· oi:iovv ariµerov should be equivalent to :n:avi:11.It should rather be compared with Aristotle's assertion that a body is completely divisible 'anywhere' (317a, 5 and 8: o:n:novv),i.e. at given points successively.

ON COMING-TO-BE

AND PASSING-AWAY

15

Now the following explanation suggests itself: a zealous but not very intelligent Aristotelean heard the voice of the Master in the word yevo1:toand felt called upon to fix its true meaning. If a complete division is said to be 'possible', this should not be supposed to mean (ovx wcne) that a body might actually be divided in all directions in the same sense in which it is now actually undivided, but complete divisibility can only be conceived in this sense that a body may be divided at any point (Ka6' o-ra.o-uv.eCov;

6s f.1.1.ci£ O'UK sla(v ( Eq>S;ij£Y«Q O'UK sla(v), oocn:'O'U 11:Cl'VTQ" sl yae xa,:a µiaov 6icnesi:6v, xat xa,:' exoµivrJv cn:typ:iJvfcn:at 6taien6v· o-6ycie icn:tv ex6f18'VO'V 01)f.l,8tO'V fi cn:typ:iJ cn:tyµij~ ,:oii-ro 6' icn:t 6La(esai; fi 01)f.t8Co'U auv0sai; (317a, 9-12). After fcn:ai 6t~iesi:6v Joachim,

adopting a conjecture of Mr T. W. Allen, inserts oox icn:i 6s, because the last sentence cannot be supposed to provide an argument for the sentence beginning with st ycie. However, a conclusive argument may be obtained in a simpler manner, viz. by taking st ycie ••• fcn:at 6iatesi:6v as a parenthesis. The words o-6 ycie icn:w ix6f18'VOV 01)f.t8tov01)f.t8£oo,xd.. are an explanation and an elaboration of iq>s;ij; yae o'6x sla£v: there are not more points than one 'anywhere' within a given magnitude, for points are not 'consecutive' in this sense that they are 'immediately-next' to each other. It follows that division is not 'immediately-next' to division: Philosophia Antiqua I

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ARISTOTLE

hence the magnitude is not simultaneously divisible in all directions. Let us consider the meaning of the parenthesis. It might be supposed, thus we may complete the argument, that a total division, if carried out by means of bisection, would escape the objection just stated. For it seems that a bisection has nothing to do with 'points in consecutiveness', as it does not proceed directly from one point to the next. Against this view Aristotle argues that a bisection, if carried through completely (after 61.meei:ov in a, 10 nciv,:n should be mentally supplied from a, 9), will indirectly produce the same result and so will be open to the same objection. For as the process of bisection is thought to proceed, the more will the divisions approach each other, till a bisection will be made at a point 'immediately-next' to the previous division. Cf. 316a, 19-20, where Aristotle in a similar manner points out that a complete division through bisection has the same effect as any other absolute division.

It is false to assume that the origin of growth should lie in a matter which is actually incorporeal and devoid of magnitude. For a matter which has an independent existence, really 'separate' from body and magnitude, may be supposed either to exist alone by itself, or to be contained in an actual body. Both ways are µevyae ouao ii o'66ivo impossible (320a, 27-34): xwei.CJTII

xo6e;et ,:6nov (ij otov a,:1.yµ:ij,:1.;), ii xevov e'V ii xa>..e:rcci>v EVTJOO'V'tO' 'tOO'Vigyrov KQl.'ta;

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ARISTOTLE

yevea0ai. 01tO'Ufia£ou;, 1267b, 12-13: ii 'tCO'V {06,:1),:a

t1J't1)1:EO'V (

ii

ffOV'tID'V

't6e

O'tt.yµ.a; 0e-reov oi>6e yeaµ.µ.a; 't7l'V'fO'Uawµ.a-ro; iJ)..11v 61.a 'fa; ai>'fa; al-r(a;• EXEL'VO 6e O'U 'tU'U'ta WX«'ta TI -u)..11, ijv oi>6s:rto-r·live,, :rta0oi,; ot6v 'f8 etvat oi,6' ave,, J.LOQqrii;. Joachim says: 'The theories of the Atomists and of Plato in the Timaeus are examples (more or

less imperfect) of the type which Aristotle here condemns'. This view is not correct, for neither the Atomists nor Plato took the starting point of their cosmologies in the geometrical point. So did only the Pythagoreans and the Platonists referred to above: it was their fundamental error to treat the v011-ritii)..11of the mathematical entities as an ala01)'f'I ii)..11,making them the elements of the real objects. According to Joachim, the meaning of 6ui -ra; ai>-ra; at'tCa; 'is not very clear. The reference appears to be to the whole preceding argument (320a, 29-b, 12) which proves that the matter, out of which a body (with magnitude) comes-to-be, cannot be something actually incorporeal (and sizeless)'. Perhaps we may succeed in giving a somewhat more accurate account of this reference, particularly of the plural at-rCa;. We have already seen that points and lines do not occupy a real place and so cannot form the elements of perceptible things. But there is a second reason why they cannot have this function. According to Aristotle, geometrical units have no real matter but they are only

ON COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY

23

the limits of matter (320b, 16). Further from the Physics we know that the limits of a body coincide with the place it occupies (211b, 11-12: iv -iaiJ'tq, yae ,:aioxa-ro ,:o'[; neeiexov-ro; KCIL 'tO'fi neeLEXOµe'VO'U, 212a, 5-6: avayx11 "COV -r6nov EtvoL••• 'COneea, ,:o,0 n2e1exov-ro,}. A body is contained in its place as in a vessel (212a, 28-29: 60KEL en£n266v 1:L £lvaL KOLotov ayyetov O -r6:co; Kai. neetexov). Of such a vessel Aristotle had spoken in the

preceding lines (320b, 8-12): a body cannot be the matter out of which another body comes-to-be, if the latter is supposed to be contained in it separately as in a vessel. Consequently, if the geometrical units constitute the 'vessel' in which a body is contained, they cannot form the matter out of which things come-to-be.

If the matter out of which a thing comes-to-be is conceived as being contained in an actual body, whilst retaining a separate being of its own, e.g. if the matter of the air which comes-to-be out of water is supposed to be contained in the water as in a vessel, the following 'UA.a;elvm, difficulty arises: ane£Q01';yaQ oiJ6ev KCl>A.'UEI. (320b, 10-11). Joachim, ci>o-rexat y£yveo0ai ev-re>..exeUJ following the interpretation of Zabarella, explains: 'Since there would be nothing to limit the quantity of the matter 'contained in' the Water, there would be nothing to limit the volume of the resulting Air. But in fact a given volume of Water generates only a determinate volume of Air'. Against this interpretation two objections may be raised: (1) Why does Aristotle use the plural i,)..a;, if the difficulty should only lie in the quantity of a certain matter? (2) Why should he suppose the capacity of the vessel to be unlimited?

24

ARISTOTLE

The term linaneo; here does not mean 'quantitatively infinite' but 'infinitely various' (cf. 325b, 27: cins(eo'-' ax11µ.aai, 332b, 14: lins1.eoi ivav't1.6fll'tB;). Aristotle in this passage opposes the mechanical conception of the relation between matter and form. If the form of a thing out of which another thing comes-to-beis imagined as a vessel containing the matter of the new thing, it might contain another matter as well ; it might even be successively filled with infinitely different matters. These matters being taken out of the form, an infinite number of different things would come-to-be, all of them owing their actual nature to the fact that at one time they were contained in the same form, which is clearly absurd. So Aristotle points out that it is only by definition (b, 14: 16y(&))that the potential matter for the new thing is isolable from the thing out of which it comes-to-be. This means that the specific character of the new thing does not arise because its matter leaves the form of the formerthing, but depends on the fact that the matter of the former thing has been 're-formed' in such a way that a new matter comes into being. Only this principle can answer the question why this particular thing necessarily comesto~be out of that particular thing, whereas, according to the theory here rejected, from a determinate form some other thing might have arisen just as well. We have seen that the matter out of which a thing comes-to-be cannot consist of points or lines, but is always an actual body provided with certain qualities and a definite form (320b, 14-21). The text continues:

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25

met 8" 4cnt xat oi,ala; ii>..11 acoµ.a-ri.xii. acoµ.a-ro; 6" 4)8,. 't01.0'U6£ ( a&>µ.ayaQ XOl.'VO'V 006EV), 1) O'U'n)XOLµ.eye00'U; xat :cci0o'U; iatl, -rcil µiv MSyq, xooel.Cffll,-r6:cq, 6" oo XCllQLCJTq, et Jl.11xal 'ta :cci&rJ XCllQLa'tCJ. q>aveeov6' ix -rci>v61.11:coQ1Jµ.evoov o-ri. oi,x la-ri.v i) aiJ;11a1.;µ.e-raf3o1it ix OO'VCJµ.£1. µ.eys00'U.ivte>..exe(q6e µ.116ev lxov-ro; µ.sye0o;

(b, 22-27). The first words of this passage are translated by Joachim as follows: 'Nevertheless, since there is also a matter out of which corporeal substance itself comes-to-be'. The word 'also' sounds rather strange in this connection, because in the preceding lines this corporeal matter is the subject under consideration. It should be remembered that in a subordinate clause xa£ is often pleonastic, e.g. Plato Lys. 211a: ci:ceexat

4µ.ol Uyei.;, el:ce xal Meve;evq,, Phd. 16e : d.vayxatov, coa:ceexat -ra'D-raia-ri.v, O'U'tx11vstvai., Arist. Rhet. 1374a, 17-18: 6µ.oloo; 6e xat Pol. :ceet 't&>'V(i).,).,cov lxei., coanee xat :ceel 'tOtrtCO'V, 1309b, 12-14: xa0ci:cee xat a.i>-rot; oux i>1C1Jee-ro'Da1.v xat neo; 'tO XOl.'VO'V el86-re; xal q>LAo'Dv-re; ai>-rau;, O'U'f(l) oo0ev XCOA'UEI. ixei.v ivlO'U;,De caelo, 281a, 9-10: xai. -ru µ.6e1.a6wa-ra.1.-ra iv-r6;, sinee xat TrJV i,:ceeoviv.

omco,

Cf. Bonitz, Index 357b, 24-27. An interesting example is De gen. et corr. 326a, 19-20 (discussed below, pp. 51-52) : COa'teKOL fa'V :CUoXUii:cEQ ,v6xe-ra1.,'tO'U'f'D'tl. xat aUo :coi.-qaetij :ce£ae-ra1..It might be supposed that xa£ belongs to coa-rein the sense of 'so that in fact' (see supra, pp. 3-4), but we prefer to connect xat Mv, which is equivalent to l1i:vxa£, and to regard xa£ as pleonastic. Cf. Pol. 1322b, J-2: ki. 6s xch mai.v

bt,rst; ij ,&,1.AOl ij 'C0;6-rai.ij 'VO'U'CLK6v, xat mi. 'CO'U'tv ev£o'C8Ka8Ccnawc11. clexaC.For Kai Mv = Mv xaC, cf. also Pol. 1298b,23, 1309b,9. These examples support our belief that in 320b, 22 KaCshould not be

translated. A second difficulty in Joachim's translation is the word 'nevertheless'. We may grasp the meaning of this word from his commentary: Aristotle points out that the three '6~a1. (viz. oa>p.a-rtK'fl; oooCa;, µ.syi00'U;, nci90'U;), 'though not really separable, are separable by definition(isolable by scientific analysis) both from the actual body and from one another'. So he certainly does, but it is not the main point of his argument and he touches it only in passing (-r~ µ.hr>..6y(&) Xa>e1.crrfa). It is difficult to see how this concessive turn could be connected with the adversative 'nevertheless' without disturbing the context. On the other hand, the argument is clear, if only 6eis taken as a particle of transition and not in a strongly adversative sense. Aristotle had started his discussion from the question whether growth proceeds from a potential, or an actual, magnitude. The argument soon widened to the problem which characteristics are to be attributed to the matter out of which things come-to-be.The answer has been that matter is inseparable from the actual body in which it exists (320a,27-b, 17). However, the answer only applies to unqualified coming-to-be (b, 17-18: yCyve,:a1.µ.hr ovvcmMi>;i-reeov 4; s-rieov), whereas the original problem relates to a special case: the increase of magnitude. The passage quoted above subsumes this case under the result already established. It elaborates a former remark, viz. that the matter of

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27

an actual body can never exist without qualities and without form (b, 17). Now we may paraphrase the argument in the following way: 'Since (1) there exists a matter of corporeal substance and (2) this substance belongs to an actual body, (there also exists a matter of magnitude and quality, for an actual body is characterized by these factors, and) this matter is (even) identical with that of corporeal substance, for otherwise magnitude and quality would be separable in place from the body to which they adhere. (For a quality this is clearly impossible and so the same applies to magnitude). Hence growth cannot proceed from anything which, though potentially a magnitude, actually possesses no magnitude'. Our interpretation will have made it clear that the 'preceding development', from which, according to Aristotle, this conclusion follows, not only includes 320a, 27-b, 12 (as is maintained by Joachim), but also b, 12-25. One of the principles of growth is: any and every part of the growing magnitude is made bigger (e.g. if flesh grows, every particle of the flesh gets bigger) (321a, 19-20). In this connection it should be remembered that terms like 'flesh' and 'bone' are ambiguous, because sometimes they mean the matter, and at other times the form of these tissues (321b, 19-22). 'A tissue ( e.g. flesh), considered in abstraction from the living body to which it belongs, is simply a r.ux9n - a mere chemical compound. Its matter is the four 'simple bodies' (or rather the four 'elementary qualities') and its form is adequately expressed in their 'combining-

•

28

ARISTOTLE

formula', (MSyo,Tfi, µ.C;sm,)'Ooachim,p. 130,following Alex. Aphrod. neei. xeciaeoo, xai. ai>;11aeoo,235, 17 seqq. Bruns). Hence, when saying that any and every part of the growing thing must increase, it is important to realize the exact meaning of this assertion: -ro ovv

6i:tO'Ovµ.eeo, ai>;civea0at xai. neoat6vro, i:tvo, xa,:ci µAv ,:oet36, roi:tv iv3ex6µ.evov,xa,:ci 3i fll'Vv>-11voi>x iai:tv· 3et ycie vofaaat :rceoa£o1. i>ye6v, :rceoae>..0ov 6i µ.e,:a(ja>..>..ot xat yevo1.,:olrie6v (321b, 35-322a, 3). Against

this reading, though generally accepted, the objection may be raised that the connection of evav,:£ov with xa>..et,:mis unsatisfactory. Food is not 'called' contrary to flesh, but it is really so. The reading evavd01J (EJ) makes far better sense, the contrast with µe,:af3allov,:o£ 6e El; ,:o aii,:o et6o, now being brought out more clearly. Accepting this reading we should put a comma

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31

after ,:eoq,1'and take a xwt,:cn ,:eoqn\as a parenthesis. Ka£ has explanatory force ('et quidem'), just as in 321b, µieo; a'6;civea8a1.xal :n:eoa1.mo; 22-23: ,:oow6,:1.oO'V Cf. De caelo ,:1.vo;xa,:a pAv ,:oet36; fanv n6ex61,LBVov. 268b, 8-10: 1:03s :n:civo-l;,:ai),:a µ.6euz,,:D..£1.ov clvayxatov Pol. 1300b, stva1. xal xa9ci:n:se,:olJvofJ.a0'1)µ.a£ve1. :n:civTQ, 22-23 : :n:sel -r&v t3£cov O'U'Vall.ayfJ,ci,:cov xa, tx6ncov piye9o;, Met. 1037b, 25-26: 6 yae 6e1.aµ.o;MSyo; ,:£; fa,:1.v et; xal ooa£a;, Anal. post. 95a, 8: ivexci ,:ov y£vna1. xal ii cp'UOBI. ii ,:ixvn, Hdt. I, 102: lxcov 3vo ,:a&ra 19vea Kal clµ.q,6-reeatax11eci,Plato Phd. 58d: ciUci :n:aeijaciv,:1.ve;xal :n:oU.0£ye. In 322a, 19 Joachim writes: aae;3s ii 6a,:O'O'V ii xeie ( ii PeaxCwv) xal ,:ovrcov ,:a6u.oa.ofJ.Beti, because ,:oo-

,:cov cannot refer to acie; and 601:ovv,being 6µoa.oµ.sefi

themselves. However, the addition ii PeaxCwvis superfluous, if we remember that the word xe£e here does not mean 'a hand', but has the collectivemeaning of 'every specimen of the genus hand'. A general term used in a collective sense may be followed by a plural word, cf. Od. 9, 114-5: 8sµa.a,:ris1.3s exaa,:o; / :n:a£3cov (where polygamy is out of the question), '1a3"cll.cSxcov Xen. Inst. Cyr. VIII, 3, 49: smea ,:au;,:a ma1.vovpivov; Thuc. III, iJ:n:6,:tvo; clv,:a:n:a1.vO'Ona; ,:oo,:ov; :n:eo&uJ.1,CO;, 22, 4 : P0116erv3s oo3ei; &6>..µ.an Tfi; en-r&v qro>..axt1;, Arist. Pol. 1338a, 7-8: -ravnrv pB'V"tOl fll'V1160'VTl'V OOU'CI. fll'Vavritv ,:1.6iaa1.v,dW xaa· sa11,:au;ixaa,:o; xal fll'V 1'11.vTfav ai,,:Gw, Anal. pr. 69b, 1-4: cpiena1. 3s 11ha,:aaa.;61.x&; xal 61.a &uo CJX11JJ.ci1:cov, 61.x&;pAv h1. ii Ka06>..ovii n pses1.:n:ciaaha,:aa1.;, ix &uo 3s oX'IJJJ.U"CWV

32

ARISTOTLE

on clv1:LKSLJJBVC1L q>tfeovraLTfi neo1:aasL,Anal.post. 92a, 12-13 : clsi. yae 01'.11ii µieo;

11 :rre6'taaL.

i; hv 6 auUoyLaJJ,6. Menan. Mon. 304-5 : xaxov q>V-rovnsq>Vxn l:v Pt,clvayxatov KBM'Y.

Conversely, a plural word may be interpreted in a collective sense and followed by a singular, e. g. Poet. 1448b, 6-7: ,:O,S,:q, &Laq>tfeooaLv( sc. ol liv9enoL),:6>\I liUCl>'V t'V O"CLJI.LJl.11"'LK..a 6i, which words he takes to be equivalent to 6 6Loetaµ.o; -cov neo; ciU11>..acin-cea0at, and trans-

lates: 'But the disjunctive definition of 'touching' must include and distinguish (a) 'contact in general' as the relation between two things which, having position, are such that one is able to impart motion and the other to be moved, and {b) 'reciprocal contact' as the relation between two things, one able to impart motion and the other able to be moved in such a way that 'action and passion' are predicable of them'. It should, however, be borne in mind that in the precedinglinesAristotlealwayswrites cin-cea0atd)..111>..v 1eat KL'V1J'tci>v i,n· d).l,\1;#:v£o,:ecpaµev, ,:c) XlVO'UV cm,:ea8c11.

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fW'VO'V 1:0'0 KL'VO'Ul,f,8'VO'U, 1:0 3' Cffl'r6Jl,8'VO'V f£11cimBvna£6wv -co-u(where Gemoll and Marchant omit o-ca.with DF), O'tt xat 't'f'i :CUQO'IJO'll e~etvat and VII, 4, 7 : d:tEKQLVU"CO li'1.'1.ooexeiia0aa. ai:ea"tLcj(where Gemoll and Marchant write i;e£11 with DF). In Hell. II, 2, 2: et6oo; O'tL,oa av :CA.ELO'U£ O'UA.A.eyci>'V/ onotov ooxl vci)v l-r1. twaatv -rd.et; (where h1. is usually taken in the sense of o -rt, which gives rise to an awkward o-rt and tautology after onotov). The terms JWJ.1.'V1Ja8• ota9' o-r1.may quite possibly be put at the beginning of a sentence without influencing its construction, if ot6' o-rt and ta9' h1. are seen to be used in this way at the end of the sentence, cf. Soph. Ant. 276: nciee1.µ.1. 6' lixcav oox ixofia1.v,ot6' o-rt, Arist. Plut. 182-3 : µ.ovw-ra-ro; vaeet au navrc:av at-r1.o;,I xat -rcirvxaxcirv xat 'tcirvclya9cirv,8U fa9' O'tL. In 323b, 22 Joachim, though 'with great hesitation', ou-rco;4xov-rcov.In accepts the reading of L: -rou-rc:av his Preface he declares: 'An inferior manuscript, of far less value than EFH or J. I have followed it against EFHJ in three passages : but in all of them its reading appears to be a mere conjecture of the scribe and not an original variant'. One of these passages is of secondary importance (338a, 6); with the second (337b, 33) we shall deal below and try to defend the traditional reading (pp. 79-80). In tne above passage, too, we think that the other manuscripts have preserved the true reading: -rou-rcavov-rcovou-rco;(oinco; oinco; of Eis

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43

obviously a clerical error for ov,:covovrco;). Cf. II. 1, 564: et 6' oinco ,:oi),:' ia,:£v, iµot µDJ.et cpOwov etvat, 24, 373 : ou,:co~ ,:ci6e y' ia,:C,q,0.0.•wxo;, ci>;dyoeevet;, Thuc. I, 132, 4: brov9civov,:o 6i xal i; ,:oi,; ED..co,:a; neciaaetv ,:t av,:6v, xat "iv 6i ou,:co" Plato Phd. 71a: lai:tv oii,:co, 8cp'r),Arist. Eth. Nie. 1133b, 26: o-u,:co; 11dU.aYrJ "iv, Liddell-Scott, s. v. elµt, C I. There are more examples of etvat with an adverb in Aristotle, e. g. Anal. post. 86a, 38 : et yae 6µo£co;ei11,:oyvcbetµa Rhet. ad Alex. 1421a, 14: ,:oai,:tov -taD etvat ,:a JLE(Ja, KGMi>;etvat. The traditional theories of 'action' and 'passion' are conflicting, because they have in view different aspects ,:av,:a l.eyov,:a; of the process: xat xa,:a 16yov Mi,:oµ.11 dµcpo't'EQO'U; 6µo£co; an,:ea9at Tij; qroaeco;(324a, 14-15). Joachim declares: 'In spite of the overwhelming manuscript authority for oµo£co; [EFHJ1L], op.co; U2fllcr1is clearly required'. The last words are certainly exaggerated: it is true the text could have had op.co;, but there are no objections against oµ.o£co;,which Both parties alike are in only emphasizes clµq>o't'iQO'U;. contact with the essence of the problem, i.e. one party as much as the other. Cf. Dern. 18, 2: bµo£co;dµcpotv clxeociaaa9at, Pind. Pyth. 9, 78 : 6µo£co;nav-t6;, Hdt. I, 31 : cle01oq,6eot't'e dµcp6-teQOL oµo£co;iiiaav, VII, 100: ixciai:a; 6µo£co;, Xen. An. I, 3, 12: lxet 6i 6waµtv ••• ilv nciv-te; oµocco, oec:i>µ.ev. In 324a, 24 seqq. Aristotle tries to establish an analogy between the processes of 'action and passion' and of

*

44

ARISTOTLE

'imparting motion and being moved'. His main argument is: i:o JJ.8'V ow :n:eooi:ovKtvoilv o66ev Koo>..i,eil:v JJ.8'V xivqaei ciK£v1)i:ov elvai (en· l:v£oov6e Kai. ci.vayKatov ), ,:o 6• 8CJXU1:0'V ci.ei.KtVEt'V Kt'VO'UJI.E'VOV • E:71:l 6£ :n:ot~aeoo; ,:oµe'V:n:Qci>'tOV ci:n:a9~,-ro6" saxai:ov Kai.avro :n:ciaxov (324a, 30-34). Joachim makes the following remark on this passage: 'Since l:v JJ.8'V Ktvqaei {31) corresponds to e.ni.6e :n:01.~aeoo; {32),the passage would be simplified grammatically by E's omission of Ktvovv {30}'. We believe the various µiv's and 6e's of this sentence to be connected in a somewhat different manner: ,:o µe'V~\I ffQOO'l:OV Kt\lO'UV corresponds both to ,:o6"8CJXU1:0V and to e.ni.6e noi~aeoo;; µiv before Ktvqaei does not relate to this word but to oi>6evKoo>..i,ei and so it corresponds to e.:n:· 1:v£oov6e. Accordingly, l:v Kt'V~aei should be translated by 'during the movement', i.e. while the other things are moving. A transposition of µiv is not uncommon in Aristotle, cf. Pol. 1259b, 14-15: qruaei yae i:ov l3aa1.Ma61.aq,eeeiv JJ.8'V 6et, ,:ci) yEVet6' elvai ,:ovai,,:6v (instead of q>vaei µev), 1286b, 35-36: 6et yae ai,,:ov µev exetv laxi,v, elvai 6e i:oaavTl)vtaxw (where µiv really belongs to laxw), 1326b, 40-41: XQTI µevi:oi; no1£µ£oi;eivai 6'Uaeµ(fo>..ov, ai>i:ot;a·ri~o6ov (instead of i:oi; µevno>..eµ£oi;), 1336a, 18-19 : nciv,:a yae oaa 6wai:ov e0£tetv ri0i,; µEVe.0£tetv,EK:n:Qoayooyi'j; a·e.0£tetv ci.exoµivoov l3ei..i:tov (where µ.EVshould logically have followed 40£tew). Cf. Bonitz, Index 454a, 20: 'µiv interdum non ei additur vocabulo in quo vis oppositionis cernitur'. Agents are to be distinguished into two classes: i:o

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45

neci>,:ovnotoitv and ,:olaxa,:O\f notoOv. The 'first agent' does not have the same matter as its 'patient' and so it acts without being affected itself (e.g. the doctor and the art of healing); the 'last agent' in a certain sense has the same matter as its 'patient' and so, in acting, is itself in some way acted upon (e.g. the food) (324a, 29-b, 4). Aristotle continues: oaa µiv oov1,1:JJ l:v -ii1nsxst fll'Vp.oe~v, ,:a-0,:a p.ev dna0ii ,:ci>vnot'lj,:txci>v, oaa 3•1:v-ii1n,na&q-rtxci(b, 4-6). This passage is commented upon by Joachim as follows: 'Aristotle proceeds to introduce, without further explanation, a new division of not1J'CtKciinto (a) those whose forms are not in matter at all, and (b) those whose forms are in matter. . . The secondkind of not'l)-rtKciwould include not only 'the food', but also 'the doctor'.' This interpretation is refuted by the next sentence: fll'Vµiv ycie -ii111v>..iyop.svop.o{oo;eh; stnstv fll'Vavriav stvat -rci>vdntxstµivcav ono,:SQO'IJO'Ov (b, 6-7). From these last mentioned (b, 5) words it is apparent that the -ii>..11 does not mean matter in general, but a distinct matter, viz. that which two things have in common (rightly Sylvester Maurus: 'in materia eiusdem rationis cum materia passi'). This matter includes the food, but not the doctor. The concluding sentence of this passage: 3t6, xa9cinSQ SLQ'll'CCII., 'tCI fl.B'V 'Cci>'V :COl.1),:tK6'.,v dna&fi ,:a 3e na&q-rtKci(b, 9-10), shows that Aristotle always has the same division in mind. Why, then, in b, 4 does he say: p.iJ l:v -ii1n, and not: 1111l:v Tfi avrfi 'U111? Because as an example of this kind he first mentioned the doctor (a, 30), but later on the art of healing (a, 35). The latter not only does not have the same matter as

46

ARISTOTLE

the patient, but it is wholly devoid of matter. Aristotle's thoughts are dominated so much by this example that involuntarily he disturbs the exactness of his systematic division. There are more examples of such an abrupt transition from a general theory to a particular case, e. g. Met. 996a, 32-33: i:ciw aocpunciwi:tv2' otov "Aeta• i:uc:n:o; :n:eosmJA«xttsvavrci;, Anal. post. 77 b, 17-18 : xal :n:ae•ex«Cffll'V intO'fflµ.11v i:a xai:a rltv ciyvotav rltv :n:ota'Vyscoµ.s,:etxciicntv ; In 324b, 14-18 Aristotle argues that the final cause Then he continues, rather abruptly: cannot be :n:ot1)i:tx6v. 116' -u>-.11 '6111:n:a&qi:txtSv.,:o fJ.8'Vovv:n:-ueexst e:v '61u i:o 9seµ.6v• sl 6e i:t st11 9seµ.ov xcoetcn6v, ,:oino au6sv civ naaxot. ,:o,0,:oµ.B'Vow taco; ci&uva,:ovstvat xcoetcn6v- st 6' icntv ivta i:ota-0,:a, i:n:' ixs£vcov civ st11 ,:oMy6µ.svov ci>-.1182; (b, 18-22). According to Joachim, this passage has no connection with the preceding lines, but it continues b, 4-13 discussed above. No doubt there is a certain connection between i:t 9seµ.ov xcoetcn6v and things oaa µ.11e:v'61u ixst rltv µ.oe~v (b, 4). But why should Aristotle introduce this passage by emphasizing the 'passive' character of matter qua matter? And why, after declaring the problem of interaction to be settled (b, 9-14), should he discuss the 'apathetic' character of pure form for the second time? Let us try to follow the natural order of Aristotle's words and to reconstruct his line of thought. He has first spoken about the efficient cause and discussed the question whether, in acting, it is itself acted upon (324a, 24-b, 14). This induces him to point out that the final cause is not :n:ot1)i:tx6v(b, 14-18). ( The

n

47

ON COMING-TO-BE AND PASSINO-AWAY

material cause is not not111:tx6veither, for on the contrary) matter qua matter is 'passive'. (The restriction 'qua matter' has the following meaning. Among the four primary qualities 'the Hot' is most 'active' (329b, 24-29 and Joachim's note). It might be supposed that the same applies to the matter which is the purest embodiment of this quality, viz. Fire (cf. 330b, 25, 331a, 5-6). However, it should be remembered that Fire is something else than a mere concentration of heat: ) it contains 'the Hot' embodied in matter. (For this reason it cannot be a true final cause: its corporeal nature causes it to be moved and to suffer action {336a,6-7).) If 'the Hot' could exist apart from matter, it would not suffer any action and 'what we are saying would be true of it', (i. e. it would be truly 1COL1J'tLK6v). After having quoted some Eleatic arguments against pluralism (325a, 2-13), Aristotle cannot refrain from making a sharp remark on the biassed point of view of the Eleatics, who by over-estimating the competence of reasoning were led to disregard the evidence of sense-perception (a, 13-16). Then he continues: ol Jl.8'V O'U'V O'U'tCt>; KUL 3ta ,:av,:a; 'Ca; at,:£a; affB(f)'q'VU'V'tO ffBQL Tfi; cn.110e£a;.i,:t 3e snl µh, ,:v16yCt>V 3oxet 'Cail-eaauµ.f3a£vetv,ml 3e 'tID'Vneayµ.ci,:(t)'Vµ.av(cJnaeanA-qaLO'V etvat omm; (a, 16-19). Joachim is probably wrong in regarding the words neei. fl\; £110e£a; as an ironic

,:o3o;atetv

quotation from Parmenides frag. 8, 50-51 : l:v

,:ti)

aoi

navm nLCJ"Cov A6yov -fl6sv6,.µ.a I ciµ.cpl;dA118e£11;. Cf. De caelo 298b, 12-14 : ol pAv nQ6-reeovq>tAoao(f)'qaavre;

ow

48

ARISTOTLE

:reset Tijc; d.1110Biac; xal :rceoc;on, vOv 1eyoµ.8'V'iJJ.1.8~ 16y011c; xat :rceoc;dll:q101Jc;6t11vsx01)aav,where not only the Eleatics, but also the Ionian philosophers and Plato are meant. Furthermore he presumes that after d1110sCac; 'one or more arguments against the Eleatic theory have dropped out', as it seems difficult to connect in 3s with the preceding sentence, which evidently has the character of a concluding remark. The improbability of such a large lacunabeing obvious, it might be suggested that 11:t 3s has crept into the text as a dittography of snt 3s which opens the second part of the sentence (L has s:rcs£). But Aristotle, perhaps in revising the manuscript of his lecture, is more likely to have added a supplementary note on his subject, the more so as he is obviously irritated at Eleatic rationalism. Just as in a, 13-16 he denounced the partiality of their. method, so he now argues that their ignoring the facts leads to consequences which even a lunatic would not dare to accept (a, 17-23). This is the method he usually follows in his criticisms: he first considers a theory from a logical and immanent point of view and then applies the facts of experience for testing the results. This induces us to believe that the text as it stands is sound. -~.

Aristotle, in discussing the differences between the theories of Leucippus and Plato says: sx &q ,:ovrcov (i.e. the 'indivisibles') at ysvsastc; xat al 3taxewstc; &t'Jo'tQ6:rtOl fJ.'VBUW,3tu 't8 ,:oij KBVOtl AsuxC:rtn41f&8'V xat 3UJTijc;ciq,fic; (,:a-u,:nyc\e3taLQnovlxamov ), IlM1:cov,

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49

6e ,ea,:a 1:1)\1Bcp1)'Vµ.6vov• "8'VO'Vyae ot"J,eetva£ q>t)O'l.\l

(325b, 29-33). Here Joachim remarks: 'The best remedy in this passage is, I think, the excision of 6uo -re6:rcot «iv etev. An alternative would be to read a colon after 6ta,ee£aet, (cf. J) and to insert ycie after µEV (cf. r)'. The second emendation can hardly be called an improvement on the present text: combination and association cannot be said to happen 'in two ways', as they are realized 'through the void and through contact', i.e. as both the void and contact are required to explain their occurrence. So it seems far more probable that the words 6vo -re6:rcotoriginally formed a marginal gloss pointing to the explanations (a) of Leucippus and (b) of Plato. There is, however, no reason to exclude «iv etev from the text; the potentialis is often used by Aristotle in definitions and concluding remarks 6tooe£a&ri:rce6neov, ( e.g. 323a, 3-6: et owsai:£v, ci>a:rcee 1:0 a:rt't8CJ0at'tO ,:a eaxa,:a EXEL\Iaµa, 1:U'U'taav a:rti:ot'tO d)..).11).Cl>VOCJa6tnQ1'JJ.LEVU µeye0'11,eal

EXEL,:a eaxai:a).

0eCJL\IEXO'V'tU aµa

In 325b, 34 seqq. Aristotle raises some objections against the assumption of 'indivisible solids' as supported by the Atomists. Successively he argues that it is paradoxical (a) to deny the 'indivisibles' all qualities except figure, (b) to attribute to each 'indivisible' one quality in addition to its figure, and (c) to assign more than one of these additional properties to the single 'indivisible'. The second objection is stated in the foJlowing words: d).).c\ µiJv a-ro:rcov,eal et µ1')0sv 'U:rtOQXEL d).)." ii µ6vov axiiµa, ,eal el iJnaexet, iv 3s Pbilosophla Antlqua 1

4

50

ARISTOTLE

JJ,6vov,otov -co pev GKA.1JQOV -co &e0seµ6v • oo&e YOQ liv µ£a ·n; st11ii ..s£ova lxs1.v nci&q. co'tBQCI>

a

(173, 16-20). Cf. the Latin translation: 'secundum quod infrigidatur'. In spite of these authorities we suggest a different interpretation. Both finse and -ra'l)'t1)have a local meaning, and a comma should be placed after nciaxn: 'For, being indivisible, it will possess these properties in the same point, so that, if it 'suffers

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ARISTOTLE

action', ( e.g. if it is chilled), it will· also, at the very point where it is chilled, 'act' or 'suffer action' in some other way'. This translation is favoured not only by the preceding i:v -r(il airrci}, but also by the next sentence. Aristotle argues that the properties of the 'indivisibles', unlike those of the composites, cannot be deduced mechanically from different degrees of 'density' and 'rareness': for such an explanation requires a void, and there is no void in 'indivisibles' (326a, 20-24). Obviously Aristotle, as is often the case in his criticisms, assumes the point of view of. his opponents for a moment, in order to show the difficulties arising from their tendency to reduce all qualities to quantitative factors. The conclusion is not unwarranted that he adopts this procedure also in the preceding sentence. So we should not relate 'fi:rcse and -ravTQto a 3vvaµ.i.. but should confine ourselves to the Atomistic sphere of thought and, accordingly, take both words in a 'quantitative', i. e. a local, sense. 'Since, according to Empedocles, the pores are always full of some other body, Aristotle has maintained that the porous body is solid throughout and as impenetrable as if it were non-porous. The whole body -- pores and all - is oµ.o£m; :rcliie2- (326b, 14), (Joachim, p. 170). Aristotle continues: sl 6sfllA1.Hairra-ro µ.sys9o; ci>cn:siJ.11 6ixsa8a1. a&µ.a µ.116n,yslotov 'tO f'L• HQOVµ.svotsaµ.a, &uva-rov 3. iart ynea9at. (2) It follows that there exists a void of equal size as that of the body which it contains (b, 20: wars ••• Knov). (3) Hence there exists a void of a real size (4) Consequently {b, 17-18: yd.otov ••• 6ffl'l1LKOVoirv). it is absurd to regard 'the void' as an imaginary magnitude, 'too minute to admit any body' (b, 16-17:

et

a, . . . µ.116iv).

Since a body potentially possesses the qualities to which it is susceptible, its susceptibility, though it may vary in degree in different parts of the body,

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ARISTOTLE

pervades it throughout (326b, 29-327a, l): -ro &i Tii µiv otscJ9cn ff«p.o481.o(es-cov 1' x1a't'o• oox IJ.vst11xa'VT[I xo&q-r1.K6v,611' oo&i avvsxi; oo&iv(327a, 6-9). Joachim is right in his opinion that the words l:v aexfl probably do not refer to 324b, 26 seqq.,where various forms of the supposition of 'partial susceptibility' are distinguished, but rather to the elaborate discussion of the sense in which every magnitude is divisible in all directions (316a, 14-317a, 17, see supra, pp. 10-18). For in the next sentence {327a, 7-14) Aristotle bases himself upon the results of this discussion in order to refute the supposition that a body is susceptible only in parts of itself (see Joachim's note). In that case the words -ro &eTii µiv otsa801.xaaxsi.v Tii &i µ.~ cannot depend on 61.oe£aov~o;l:v dexfl,for in the passage 316a, 14-317a, 17 there is no mention of the theory of 'partial susceptibility'. Accordingly, Joachim assumes a lacuna after p.~ and he supplies the text as follows: 'But the supposition that a body is 'susceptible in some parts, but insusceptible in others' (is only possible for those who hold an erroneous view concerning the divisibility of magnitude. For us) the following account results from the distinctions we established at the beginning'. However, the assumption of a lacuna seems to be superfluous, as it is much simpler to regard the words -ro3i TftµAvo'Csa801. xaaxsi.v Tft 6e p.~as a nominativus pendens Accordingly, a comma should be put after p.~. A close parallel is Phys. 222b, 11-12 : -ro 3e "'U,1.ovcpcivoi.ii&,. eo1a>Kivot, oo Uyoµ.sv,

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55

o-ri n6eem Uuv -raO v&v. Cf. Bonitz, Index 46b, 41 seqq.,

who quotes more places where the 'nominativus in principio enunciati ponitur quasi absoluti et tituli instar'. See also Newman on Pol. 1326a, 34. There are two points of minor importance in this sentence to which we wish to call attention. The term 3ioe£aawu;, which has no object, is used in the absolute sense of 'to make distinctions', as occasionally elsewhere ( e. g. 323a, 16-17 : 0'6 µ:qv cilla 3iaq,seei ye xai. 3et 3,oe£teiv). The word i:O'Oi:ohere refers to the following sentence, although this sentence is introduced by ycie. Cf. Rhet. 1410b, 9-10: dexiJ 3" l..a"te

auµf:Ja£ve1. -re6nov 'ti.va ~ iJy1.e£a;fll'V i,yCei.avy£yvea9ai. xat fll'V otxCav 4; otx£a" Tij; civ81JiS111;fll'V ixauaav • ii yae la'tei.x~ ia"ti. xat ii otxo60µ.tx11'to el3o; iS111v Tij; i,yi.e£a; xal Tij; ob(ta; (b, 11-14).

From this point of view another passage in the present treatise may also be explained,viz. 324b, 14-15:

'to 6"ovhexa oono1.111:1.x6v (61.0ii i,yCei.aoi, 11:01.111:1.x6v, The metaphoricalsense in which et µ11xa,:a p.e,:acpoeciv).

health can produce health is based on the fact that the notion of health which is present in the mind of the doctor contributes to bringing about the real health of the patient.

In 330b, 1-2 Aristotle remarks that the four possible 'couplings' of the four elementaryqualities: l)xo1au0,.u awµ.aai.. After enumexa,:a Myov -rot; cmM>t;q>Cll'VOJl,B'VOt; rating the ways in which these four couples are attached to the 'simple' bodies, he continues: ci>a"C" e'616yco;

61.avsµ.ea8a1.1:a; 6i.acpoea; 1:ot; necoToi.;awµaai. xal -ro n1-ij0o; a-6'tci>velvai. xa,:a 16yov (b, 6-7). In both cases Joachim translates xa-ra Myov by 'in a manner consonant

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ARISTOTLE

with theory' and so he takes it as a synonymof ei>16ym; (for this sense, see Bonitz, Index 436a, 58-b, 4). Accordingly he has to put a comma after awµ.aatin b, 7. Against this view two objections may be raised: (1) It is improbable that Aristotle should have three times repeated his remark that the qualities are reasonably distributed among the primary bodies. (2) It seems far more natural that he should have made this remark after explaining the factual nature of this distribution. So we think that xa,:a Myov in both places has the meaning of 'proportionally', i.e. in such a manner that the number of couples corresponds with the number of primary bodies (cf. Bonitz, Index 437b, 18-24). If this is correct, the comma after awµ.aat disappears, for dMym; also qualifies the latter part of the sentence. After having seen firstly that the number of couples corresponds with the number of primary bodies (330b, 1-3), and secondly how the former are distributed among the latter (b, 3-5), we may conclude that the numericalcorrespondenceis also reasonableand obvious (b, 6-7). In 330b, 21 seqq. Aristotle argues that the four primary bodies are no pure embodimentsof the couples constituted by the elementary qualities. The pure types of these combinations (,:a unMi) resemble the primary bodies but are not identical with them: ,:a 6' un14 ,:ota-0,:a µiv 4a,:w, oi> µ.ev,:ot ,:ai,,:ci, olov ,:o,:ci) m,et oi> n'De, oµ.o£co;6e KaffL ,:c'i>vcilJ..cgy. OJJ.OLO'VfflJQOEL6~

Kv3s X'q'V'tl'Va stvat avrci>vii enl 'tq) UKQqJ fi fl.8(Jq», 3ij1ov. ext µiv ow-roi; 4xeot; oox ia,:at, o-rt ff'OeiO"tat fi 'Vii nav-ra, xal o a-6-ro; )..cSyo;'tq) cpavat EX m>eo; ii yij; etvat ffCl'V'ta • O'tl 3• oo3s µiaov - wame 3oxsi 'tlGt'V ci11e µiv xat el; :rrue µ.s-raPaUstv xal et; 'ii36>e,'ii3we 3s XaL el; clsea XaL Bl; yijv, 'ta 3• iaxa-ra O'UHe'tts(; • 3st µiv yciQ cnijvat xal P.11et; 4nsteov -raO-ro 4U..11>..a Uvat m·ri0eCa; icp' sxa-reea (332b, 5-13). Joachim remarks : 'We do not know to what thinkers Aristotle is referring'. Yet it may with some certainty be supposed that Anaximenes is meant. Cf. Fragm. d. Vorsokr.5 , 13A5: xat cieatovp.svovµiv :rrue y(vsa0at (sc. -rov cieea), ffl>X'VO'Up.e'VO'V 3e uvep.ov, e{,:a Vecpo~in 3e µ.cillov 'iJ36>Q, et-ra yijv, et-ra U0ou;, -ra 3s cilla ix -rO'U'tcav, AS: -ro xal O'UVLO"tU• nciv EO"tt'V6 cioqe,xal oo-ro; ffl>XVO'Up.e'VO; p.svo; iS36>Qxat yij y(ve-rat, cieato-uµ.svo;3e. xal 61.axecSp.svo; al0'1)Qxat :TC'UQ, el; 3e 't'l)'Vai,,:o{j(p'UGtV effa'Vt(l)V ci-qQ. The last words are specially interesting, because they confirm Aristotle's testimony that Water returns to Air. For the plural -rtvs;, see supra, p. 56. After clll11>..a(b, 12) Joachim assumes a lacuna, because 'the sense requires 3ij1ov or ix -r&rv3e&ij>..ov, which can hardly be borrowed in thought from b, 7'. We fail to see why this should not be possible. A similar case is found in De part. an. 642a, 13-17: art µiv ow 3-uo -recSnot'tij; atda; xat 3ei ).,gyona; wnciveiv p.cil.1.a,:aµiv cip.cpoiv,el 3s p.-q,3ij)..6vye ns1.eaa8a1. ffOI.SiV,xat art ffCl'V'tE;ol 'taO'tO JJ.1) ).,gyong; • dex11 yae 11 o'63sv ; ebcetv ff8Ql q,va86>; ).,gyouac.v

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61

cp,,01.;µ.aUov 'rij; -u111;,where W. Ogle (in a note to the Oxford-translation), followed by A. L. Peck (in the Loeb-edition), unnecessarily proposes to read: et &e µ:q,ns1.eaa8u£ ys no1.2tv-rou-ro,&ij10'V.Here the construction is even more halting, as &ij10\fis to be supplied to the first o-ri.from the following, and not from the preceding, lines. There are more examples of an ellipsis of &ij10'V,e. g. Anal. post. 83b, 12-13: ci)J..u 611 o-ri. oi,&"st; -ro livco linsi.eu iµuatxul oox stalv uvcul xua· EU1J'ta;dnu9st, OVOUL 'tci>'v'CO'U aci>µu-ro;KI.YtlOSCD'V. 'tO'U'tO&e 3-ijA.O'V nciw yCvs'tULh 't8 -rat; µi9ut; xul l:v -cut; deecomCut;, Plato, Rep. 471c : msl o-rt ys, st yE'Vot-ro,nciv-r·6.v si11 dya9a n61si., 493d: int µ.ev yciQ • • • 11At0p:q&s1.u uyof1.8V11 dvciyx11no1.2tv ave() -ra'O-ra.

The transformations of the elements cannot continue ad infinitum in a straight line, since (1) an element qua being transformed into another element is characterized by a quality the contrary of which belongs to the new element, (2) each new transformation is based upon a new contrariety, (3) the addition of a new element implies the attachment of a new contrariety to the preceding elements, (4) if the elements are infinitely many, an infinite number of contrarieties will belong to each single element (332b, 30-333a, 7). The most absurd result of this supposition will be that all elements become one, for all contrarieties which are characteristic of the elements 'above' a given element must belong to those 'below' this element, and viceversa (333a, 13-15}. In his commentary Joachim says about

62

ARISTOTLE

this: 'Aristotle's argument here appears to be unsound. He has proved that each new 'element' above Fire in the 'upward' line of transformation implies a new contrariety: and from this it follows that a contraryfrom each new contrariety must belong to all the 'elements' below Fire. Similarly, if we suppose the line of transformation to be reversed, each new 'element' belowFire in the 'downward' transformation implies a new contrariety, a contraryfrom which must belong to all the 'elements' above Fire. But it does not follow from this that the elements above and below Fire are identical, since they will not all have the same contraries(i. e. qualities). If e. g. Fire qua K changes into 'I' qua fl), all the 'elements' belowFire will possess the contrary K: whilst 'I', and all the 'elements' aboveit, will possess the contrary fl)'. This interpretation is correct, but it neglects one important point, viz. that Aristotle can never refrain from considering the point of view of his opponents in the light of his own theory. It should be remembered that, according to Aristotle, a thing which is to be transformed into another thing must possess not only the quality which determines this transformation, but in a degree also its contrary, the actual quality of the new thing. Hence every element potentially possesses the contraries of its own qualities {cf. 334b, 9-10 : o-rav

µev dnlci>, ii

0a'tEQO'V E'V'fEAEXEUJ, 8waµet yae 'f() E'VEQYEUJ 0eeµ.ov 0a'tEQO'Vim:at, b, 21-23: E1JGt'V. "f.1.~t; ,:e 3ui)..MX;~ -re f.1.LYB'V1:CO'V", rix11 3' mt 1:0'U1:0t;6voµ.ate-rat, all.' o-6 MSyo;. EG'CL yue f.1.tX9iivatci>;lnxev (333b, 11-16). Instead of the manuscript reading ,:omot; Joachim writes ,:ot; and he trans-

lates : 'And chance,not proportion,is the name given to these occurrences (viz. to f.1.~t;and 6uiUa;t; f.1.LYB'V· 1:CO'V)'. He presumes that Aristotle is here parodying Empedocles' words, of which he entirely altered the construction and the meaning. The fragment alluded to (frag. 8) runs:

3s 1:0Lq8CO • 'V at'l:LO'V ,:o ovra>; lxetv, KCIL 'iJ sKcimou qroai; avnJ, neet ,fi; o638'V ).iyet • o638'V 4ea neet qroaew;>.eyet(333b, 16-18). The proud pretention which Inspired Empedocles to intitle his work 'The Essential Nature of Things' at one sweep vanishes into air. Philosophia Antlqua I

5

66

ARISTOTLE

It is strange that Aristotle so entirely misapprehended the meaning of the term cpvai; in this fragment of Empedocles. From the context of our passage it is apparent that he took cpvaL;here to mean 'substantial nature', and in Met. 1014b, 35-1015a, 3 he quotes this very fragment as an illustration of cpvai; in the sense of 11,:c'i'>'V cpvaeiov-r(l)'V o'6a£u.It is even more strange that modern scholars (Burnet, Early GreekPhilosophy3, 205 .n. 4, Ross on Met. 1015a, 1) have followed this view. The contrast with 0civu1:o,shows that the meaning must be 'origin', 'birth'. The same idea appears in frags. 9 and 11 ; see also frag. 123: fhacb ,:e fl)0lfm'11'te. There is ·a second term in frag. 8 which, though rightly understood by Aristotle, has caused a misunderstanding, viz. 3u0..1u;i;. Diets translated this word by 'Austausch', and he is followed by Kranz, Burnet, and Robin (La penseegrecque,Paris, 1932, 123). Apparently the translation 'interchange' originated from the fact that cpvai; in the last line seems to refer both to p.{;t; and 3iaUCJii;. However, this is not true, for the first two lines show that there are two ·popular names, cpva~ and 8civu-ro;, which Empedocles wishes to replace by scientific terms. So 3ici)J..oii; means 'dissociation' and after cpvai; we have mentally to supply xul 0civu,:o;, or 0avu-ro; was mentioned in the next line now lost (perhaps frag. JO: 04vu-rov••• d1o£fllv, belongs here). From our passage as well as from 314b, 5-8 it is apparent that Aristotle regarded 3uiUu;~ as equivalent to &iaxeLaL;.Cf. also De Xen~Mel.Oorg.975b, 13, Plut. adv. Col.1112a, 1113b. Aia>J.u;i; has the same meaning in Hipp. De victu I, 10 ( Vorsokr. I, p. 185, 23).

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This point of view enables us to make an important correction in the interpretation of frag. 35, 14-15: al,t,a 8s &v11-c'iqruO'V"Co, 'ta nelv µ.a6ov cl0ava't' etvat., tCt>QU "CE 'ta nQt'V lfaQ11'ta8tall.a;a'V"CUxe)..ev601J;.

The usual explanation is that those things which had before been unmixed, changed their ways and so were mixed. We are referred to frag. 115, 8: clevaUa; (iL6'toLo µ.e"tall.aaao'V'ta xe>..ev6oo;, but there the context is different. It is more obvious to connect 8Lall.a;av-cu xu.ri6oo; with nelv 4KQ11'taand to translate: 'things which had before been unmixed owing to the dissociation of their ways'. Cf. frag. 22, 6-7: ex0ea a·a n>..Etftov cln' clll.11>..Ct>'V 8Ltfxo1JaL µ.a>..LO'ta / YE'V'V'D -cexe11aeL'te. For this meaning of 8Lall.aaaCt>,cf. Hipp. De victu I, 6 (Vorsokr. I, p. 183, 26-27): neoa(teL yae -co 0'6µ.q>0eov

-ccil01Jµ.q>6Q4l, 'to 8s a0'6µ.q,oeovno>..eµ.et xal p.tixe-caL xat 8La)..)..aaaEL an' clll.-q),,Ct>'V. In 333b, 16 Joachim writes: iarL yae µ.Lx(fflvaLci>,

&uxev and he translates : ~for things can be 'mingled'

fortuitously'. However, in view of the context of the whole ·passage we think it necessary to write iO'tt and to supply 11~{;t; iiv e,oetvo, UyeL as subject from the preceding µ.£;1.;-cB8LaUa;" "CBµ.LyMCt>'V, aneeexetv6; qnJmv (b, 14-15): 'for µ.(s1.;in ·the sense in which Empedocles takes it amounts to fortuitous mingling'. Of course, we should supply only µ.£;t;, not µ.{;t; -cB8uil.l.cl;" u. Aristotle introduced his criticism as applying to yneaL, only (b, 4); with xal 'to'VBtxo; (b, 12) he extended his scope to the whole process of change, but now he returns to his main subject.

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ARISTOTLE

Against Empedocles' theory of µ.C;r.;Aristotle raises the objection that the particles of the elements forming a tissue cannot be conceived to be merely juxtaposed each to each. For in that case Fire and Water could not come-to-be out of any and every part of flesh: auµ.pa£vs1.Mmµ.11e; lrrauovv µ.ieau; aaexo; y£yvsa8a1. ffllQxal iS3me, WOffSQ ex X1JQO'U "f8'VOl."C 8:v W p.e'V"CO'U3L "CO'O µ.seau; acpatea, m,eaµ.i.; a·e; til.l.O'U"Ct.V6;, dU" 8\18• 3sxn6 ye e; 8XU"C8QO'U EXCl"CSQO'V yevsa9at.. "COO-CO µiv Mi -coil-covy£vs-ca1.-cov -ce6nov ex -cij; aaexo; e; o-cauoilv ciµ.cpm(334a, 31-35). Joachim inserts -c6 after -ce6nov and he takes -co ex "Cij; aaexo; e; cn:auow ciµ.cpmas epexegetic of -coil"Co.But this results in a tautology: 'That, viz. the fact that both Fire and Water may come-to-be out of any and every particle of flesh, takes place in that manner, viz. both coming-to-be out of any and every particle'. So we had better not insert -c6; -coil-rorefers both to Fire and Water and the singular is due to the influence of the preceding sxci-ceeov.The word y£vnar. means 'come-to-be' and i; o-cauo'Dvciµ.cpmis epexegetic of -coil-cov-cov -ce6nov (For a similar case of epexegesis, cf. De caelo 279b, 14-15 : ol 3"ivaUa; cn:s pAv oiS-cm;o-ce 3e cDJ.m;lxs1.v cp8ste6µ.evov,where cp8s1.Q6µ.evov explains «Um; lxanv). Accordingly, a comma should be put after aae"6;. 0

The tissues result from the various combinations of the elements, and the elements are constituted by the four couples of contraries: lcna1. Mm,.ux0m(l)'V 'CcU).." (practically= the tissues) ex -ccinlfvavdcov ii ('or rather', see supra, p. 19) 'CcinlO'I),Tfi, iJt11, xai ovnanaxou -rii, av'tfi, civciyx11xai -rci, ye:viast; civcoµ.ci1'.ov, slvat xai 'ta; µ.ev9ci't'tO'U;-ra; 3s f3ea-ro'U-ccov yivsatv ci1'.1'.ot, &ui:iea, • ooai:s auµ.f3a£vst3ta TIJV y£vsa9m q,9oeciv (336b, 20-24). Joachim puts a comma after auµ.f3a£vst,inserts -r6 after 3tci and takes noUcixt, l:v eMnovt q,9s(esa9at as the subject of auµ.f3aCvst. This far-fetched explanation is superfluous, if we supply a very obvious link in the argument. Aristotle wishes to point out the reason why certain things pass-away before their time. Since matter is inhomogeneous, some things come-to-be at irregular times. Their origin implies the destruction of other things, ( which, of course, will also be irregular). The correlation of coming-to-be and passing-away neo; ciU111'.aauyxoaatv. is denoted by the words 3tci TIJ'V They are regarded by Joachim as 'probably spurious', because '(a) m,yxoaat,· is a very inappropriate word, and (b) the phrase would then only anticipate obscurely what the following lines state clearly'. But an anticipation is not impossible, and the term auyxoa~ is not so strange, if it is borne in mind that, according

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75

to Aristotle, the degree of heat of a thing is constituted by a 'mingling' of the Hot and the Cold, so that its actual heat is equal to its potential coldness and complementary to its actual coldness {334b, 8-13). So the generation of heat implies a shifting in the mixture, actual coldness 'perishing' into potential coldness. In the tenth chapter of the second book Aristotle points out that the circular movement of the outermost sphere, viz. that of the fixed stars, causes the annual movement of the sun, which in its turn effects the continuous character of coming-to-be and passing-away. In 337a, 17-33 he adds the following supplementary note : iml a·clvayx11 stva£ ,a. 'tO Kl.'VO'Ovsl K£'VflGI.; lcna1., mansesie11,,:a1. :ce6't8QO'Viv f,,:iQoi;, xal sl 48£, &r1. 481 &st 'ft slva1., xal et O'U'Vsx,q;,iv ,,:oavro xal

clx£'Vfl'tO'V xal clyBVl)'tO'V xal clvallo£co,,:ov,xal sl :c1s£ou; al iv K'UKM&) KL'V'qG8L;, :c1s£ov; Jl.8'V, :Caaa; 6s :Ceo;stvat ovro; 'to9 'Ca'U'ta; clvayx11iJ:co fl.Ul'Vclexilv. avvsxoO; XQ6vou clvayx11 TiJv x£'Vfla1.vavvexii slva1., si:cse cl&uva,:ov xecSvovxcoel; Kl.'V'qCJBCO; slva1.. O'U'VBXO'O; aea ,:1.vo; cle1.8µ.o; xe6vo;, Tij; xvx>..c:,«ea, xa9ci:cse iv -rot; iv 4Qxfl· MSyot; 31.coe£ae.,.. avvaxia; &' 1\ x£'Vflat; :c6'tseov -r(l -co xtvouµ.evov avvsx~ stva1. ii -co iv µ.ev ycie,xd .•). So they are

ON COMING-TO-BE AND PASSINO-AWAY

79

to be completed and confirmed by a purely theoretical deduction which proves (1) that movement (and consequently, coming-to-be and passing-away) is continuous, and (2) why it is continuous. Here, just as elsewhere, Aristotle uses a twofold method in defending his views: he supports the results of empiricalinduction by a logical deduction, and conversely. Cf. Met. 1072a, 21-22: eO''tt 'tt dei. Ktvouµ.evov KL'V1)CJtV Cl1t'01JCJ'tOV, O'UflJ

6'

11xux)..q,• xat

'tO'U'tOO'U).,6yq, µ.6vov a)..)..' EQY4l6ij)..ov.

Finally, as to our last point it should be observed that there is a 'gigantic protasis' only in a logical, and not in a grammatical,sense. Originally Aristotle seems to have had this c"onstructionin mind: 'Since, if there is to be movement, there must be something which initiates it, there must always be something which initiates it, if there is to be movement always'. However, remembering that he had discussed this problem elsewhere in detail, he inserted the words ci>ansesiQ11-rat l.v hseoi,, on which he made the rest of the ne61:BQOV sentence depend. So there is an anacoluthon,o-rt {a, 18) depending not on dvayx11, but on siQ11'tat. Joachim's punctuation of the whole passage is not very satisfactory; the understanding of the argument is facilitated by putting a full-stop after every premiss. If it is necessary that the consequent should come-

to-be, the antecedent must also have come-to-be, but the converse holds good only under a special condition: if the antecedent has come-to-be, the consequent must also come-to-be, not, however, because of the antecedent, for there is no necessity emanating from it,

80

ARISTOTLE

but because the future being of the consequent is necessary in itself {337b,14 seqq.). This condition is not fulfilled, e. g., in the building of a house: it is not absolutely necessary for a house to come-to-be when foundations have been laid. The contrary supposition leads to an absurdity: 01:av yae yivf11:ai., et p:q det

civciyxfl y£vea9ai.,c:n,µ.P,.ae-raL ciet eivaL fv3ex6µ.evov JI.TIciet eivaL (337b,32-33). Joachim writes ,:6 beforesv3ex6µ.evovwith Philoponus

,:oi),:o

and the inferior manuscriptL (see supra, p. 42), 'because the argument gains in clearness and ·forceby its retention·. His translation runs: 'for (unless it is always necessary for a house to be coming-to-be) we should be faced with the consequence that, when foundations have been led, a thing, which need not always be, must always be'. However, the omission of ,:6 makes perfect sense; we only have to supply ,:oi),:o as the subject of c:n,µ.P,.anaL.Aristotle has some examples with the infinitive(e.g. of a personal use of c:n,µ.f:la£veLV Pol. 1319b, 17: onee c:n,vsf:ITI ,:ij; cnciaeC1>; at'l:LO'Vyevsa8aL) and this construction is rather common in Plato (e.g. Phd. 67c: xci8aQO'L;3e eivaL &ea oi, 1:0'01:0 ;'Uµ.(:la£veL;). Cf. Liddell-Scott, s.v. c:n,µ.pa£vC1>, Ill, 3b. In 337b, 25 seqq. Aristotle argues that coming-to-be can only be necessary, if it is based on cyclical movement, i.e. if it returns upon itself. A rectilinear movement proceeding ad infinitum does not contain a principle (ae:ri) from which coming-to-be might derive its necessity. A limited rectilinear sequence cannot afford such a principle either: for its members cannot

ON COMING-TO-BE AND PASSINO-AWAY

81

always come-to-be, and a thing which is not eternal cannot be necessary. So only cyclical movement remains. In 338a, 5 seqq. Aristotle goes through the same arguments in a reverse order. The second hypothesis has turned out to be impossible, because the limited character of that movement also imposes a limit (neea£) upon coming-to-be. Since coming-to-be must be eternal, an unlimited movement suggests itself. An unlimited movement is either rectilinear or cyclical. The first alternative is impossible, for an infinite rectilinear succession does not have an dQX'tl"dvayx11 3' elvat dQXt)VJ.1.'tl'tE 1tE1tEQaOµ.E'V1)£ O'U..et, civateet, De part. an. 697b, 15-17 : ,µiv Yae o,j,c {1yy -re-reanou, meea SXBl,; 6' o,j,c (1w oevt; oiJ'te d-ra-rat µ.s-rewett6µ.evo;xal -rci meeci o,; xgqatµ.aneo, m'ijatv cl)J.ci-retxm6,..The combination µ.-q-re ••• xa£ is also found: Pol. 1313b, 19-21: onw, Jl.'q't8cp,,)..aK'fl 'tQ8cp1J'taL KaLneo, ~ Ka0' 11Jl.8Qa'V O'V'tB; liaxo>..otmae.vintPou>..evsLV. Aristotle's licence in using oiJ-rs and µ.-q-reappears from the fact that he even writes µ.-q-re ••• clUci and ovre • • • 4)..)..ci ( d. Pol. 1308b, 11-12, 1339a, 18, De respir. 477b, 9-12, Ath. Resp. 16, 3, Met. 1046b, 33-36, De an. 410b, 18-21). For µ.-q-re ••• m£ connecting two grammatically dissimilar parts of the sentence two passages from Thucydides may be compared, viz. II, 29, 3: T-qQ"I;6s oiJ'te 'COavro ovoµ.a sx(l)'VPaallri, -re nearro, l:v ,ceci-ree. '06pa6)v q,nno (where Hude is wrong in writing oo3s and excising -re), VII, 30, 2: m1 clno,c-re£vouae.v avr&>vl:v Tft W~BL -rcn,; n18£arou;, oiJ'te mtenaJ1.8VOU; ;BO>Q(l)'V -rci l:v Tft yft, vetv, -rci'w-re l:v -rot; n>..o£oe.;, 6e1uam(l)'V l;w -ro;truµ.a-ro;-ra n>..ota.

ON COMINO-TO-BE AND PASSINO-AWAY

83

Movements depending upon a cyclical movement KL'VOUf&8\'0Y must be cyclicalthemselves: sl yc\e"to K'6KM&l

dsC'ft KL'VSt, cl'VciYK1J KUl 'fO'U't'CO'VKVKM&l stvcn fll'V K('V1JOLV - olov Tlj; 4'Vc.oq,oe4; oiiaq; 6 fi1to; KVKM&l &C (338b,

1-3). Joachim translates: 'Thus, from the being of the

'upper revolution' it follows that the sun revolves in this determinate manner'. Bonitz (Arist. Stud. IV, 399) already remarked that oiiaq; cannot be without a predicate, as this very predicate must contain the principle which determines the character of the subjacent movement,so that we should follow the reading 6 fi1a.o;6C. of F : Tlj; 4vm cpoQ4; oiiaq; K'6KM&l

INDEX LOCORUM AESCHYLUS Agam. 377-80 .

Page

36

ANAXIMENES VS 13A5 ... A8 ...

60 60

ARISTOPHANES Nub. 612 . Plut. 182-3 Ran. 73 .. Thesm. 580

3 42 8 3

ARISTOTLE Cat. 14a, 3-4 .... Anal. pr. 69b, 3 . . . Anal. post. 77b, 17-18 83b, 12-13. 86a,38 . 90b, 9-10 92a, 12 92b, 15 94b, 18 95a,8

Phys. 208b, 23 . 208b,26-27 209a, 11 .. 211b, 11-12 212a,5-6 . 212a,28-29 212b,24 212b,28-29 222b, 11

.

..

73 31

46

61 43 36 32 8 36 31 20

53 20 23 23 23 20 20 54

ARISTOTLE De caelo 268a, 10 268b,9 .. 279a, 13-14 279b, 14-15 281a, 10. . 298b, 12-14 305a,26 ..

Page

2 31 53 68 25 47 20

De gen. et corr. 314a, 23 . 314b,5-8 . 314b, 7 314b, 10-12 314b,20. . 316a, 19-20 316a,22 316b, 19-25 316b,34 . 317a, 2-17 . 317a, 9-12 . 317b, 34 seqq. 318a, 23 . 320b, 1 320b,8-12. 320b, 10-11 320b, 14-17 320b, 17 .. 320b, 22 ... 321b,22 .. 321b,22-28 322a, 1 . 322a, 19 . . . . . .

...

.

1 66 . 1-7 9-10 2 18 . 10-12 . 12-17 . 13 . 13-14 . 17-18 . . 79 . . 78 . 18-22 .. 23 . 23-24 . 19-23 .. 26 . 25-26 .. 31 . 28-30 . 30-31 . 31-32

. .. .

INDEX LOCORUM

ARISTOTLE

De gen. et corr. 322a,

Page

26-33 . . . . . . . . 33-35 .. 55 322b, 13-15 . 35-36 322b,25 323a, 1-2 . 20 323a, 3-6 . 49 323a, 12 .. 37 323a, 15-16 38 55 323a, 16-17 • 37-38 323a,22-25 . 38-39 323a,28-33 323b, 7 .. . 39-40 323b,22 .. . 42-43 323b,28 .. 1 .. 43 324a, 15. . .. 44 324a,30-34 324b,4-10. . 44-46 .. 57 324b, 14-15 . 11-12 324b, 16 •. . 46-47 324b, 18-22 . 47-48 325a, 16-23 . . 24 325b,Z1 .. . 48-49 325b,30-31 . 49-51 326a, 14-17 326a, 19-20 . . 25-26, 51-52 326b, 16-20 . 52-53 3Zla, 2 ... 1 327a,6-14. . 53-55 327a, 34-b, 6 . . 55-56 327b,24-26 .. 35 328a,22-23 . 56-57 328a,26-28 .. 35 . . 63 329a,30 .. ... 47 329b,24-29 330b, 1-7 . 57-58 .. 58-59 330b, 22-26

ARISTOTLE

85 Page

De gen. et corr. 330b, 25 47 331a, 5-6 . . . 47, 59 . . 63 331a, 12 seqq. 332a,4 . . . . . 64 332b, 10-13 . . 59-61 332b, 14. . . . .. 24 . 61-64 332b, 30-33a, 15 333b, 11-16 . 64-67 333b, 15. . 32 333b, 16-18 65 334a, 31-35 68 334b,8-13. 75 334b, 9-10 . 62 . 68-72 334b, 16-28 334b, 17 . . 19 . . 62 334b, 21-23 334b, 25-26 . . 32 334b, 28-30 . 72-73 336a,6-7 47 336a, 16-18 . . 78 . . 78 336a, 32-b, 18 . 336b, 2-3 . . 76 . 73-74 336b, 14-15 . . 336b, 15-17 . . . 78 336b, 20-24 . . . 74 336b, 25-34 . . 78 337a, 17-33 . 75-79 337b, 32-33 . 79-80 338a,9-11 ,80-82 83 338b,3 • . De anima 410b, 18-21. 82 424a,4 . . . . . . 73 De somno 457b, 24 • . . · 32 De respir.477b, 9-12. 82 Hist. an. 581a, 1 . • . 40 De part. an. 640b, 12 40

86 ARISTOTLE

INDEX LOCORUM Page

De part. an. 642a,13-17 60-61 697b, 15-17 . . . . . 82 De incess. an. 707a,7 . . 1 Physiogn. 805a, 1-4 ... 61 De mir. ausc. 846a,18 . . 73 De Xen. Mel. Gorg. 975b,13 66 Metaph. 986a, 17 21 996a,32-33 . . 46 1014b,35-15a,3 66 1032b,5-14 57 1036a,2-12 . . 20 1037b,26 . . . 31 1043a,9 . . 19 1046b,33-36 . 82 1053a,10-12. 77 1072a,21-22 . 79 1072b,9-14 77 1080b,32 . . . . 21 1083b,13 21 1085a,22 22 1091a,16 21 1092a,20 20 1092a,32 21 Eth. Nie. 11lOa, 10 32 1116b,18 . . 8 1133b,26 . . 43 Polit. 1255a,36 6 1259b,8 6 1259b,15 . . 44 1261b,6-9 . . 82 1263b,22-25 . . 71-72 1265a,10-15. 72 1266b,22 . 8 1267b,13 . 20 1271b,11 82 l272b,18 . 6

ARISTOTLE Polit. 1272b,19

1273a,28 1277a,17 1278a,24 1278a,36 1286a,14 1286b,35 1287a,7 1287b,31 1289b,22 • 1290b,5 1298b,23 1300b,23 1300b,29 1301b,39 1303b,20 1305b,13 1307b,6 1308b,11-12. • 1309b,9 . . 1309b,12 ..• 1313b,19-21. . 1313b,35 1314a,4 1314b,1 1319b,17 1322b,1 1326b,40. 1328a,3 1331a,31 1336a,19 1338a,8 1339a,18 1340b,24 Rhet. 1367a,8 . 1374a,18 ..

Page

82 7

6 5 6 32 44 8 32 36 56

26

31 8 6 8 1

8

82 26 25 82 82 19 82 80

. 25-26 44 2 8

44 31 82 19 2 25

87

INDEX LOCORUM

ARISTOTLE

Page

Rhet. 1386a, 19-20 .

1410b,9-10 • . • Rhet. ad Alex. 1421a,14 Poet. 1448b,7 . • . • • 1453b,28 . • • . 1461a,22 . .

56

. 55

43 • 32 • 2-3 • 56 Ath. Resp. 16, 3 • . . • • 82

DEMOSTHENES

9, I • • . . • •

18, 2 . • • • . • DIOGENES APOLL. frag. 2 ..• EMPEDOCLES frag. 8

66

EURIPIDES

lph. Taur. 351-3

55

591-2 ..•

82

HERODOTUS

Ill, 20 III, 60

VII, 100

56

67 67 67

123 .•••

11, 99 Ill, 14

55

66 66 . 66

115 ..

Ill'

43

.. 64-66

9 •• 10 •••• 11 • • • 22, 6-7 •. 35, 14-15

I, 31 I, 102

42

•

•

•

43 31 5 56 56 11 43

HIPPOCRATES De victu l, 6 . I, 10.

Page

67 66

HCJMER Iliad I, 564 • • 12,9

43

3

24,373 . . • . • • • Odyssey 9, 15 • 20, J56 . . . • .

43 31

3

JAMBLICHUS

Theol. Arithm. 62-63

LUCIAN

Dial. Mer. 2, 4

22

• . • . • 82

LYSIAS

13, 9 • • • • •

40

MENANDER

Mon. 304-5 •

32

PARMENIDES frag. 8, 50-1 .

47

PHILOPONUS

De gen. et corr. 109,27 29 173,16-20 . . . • • • 51

197,24-198,3 276,30 seqq. .

PINDAR

Pyth. 9, 78

.••

56-57

. . . . 70

..

43

Charm. 164d Crat. 421d •. 436e •• Gorg. 481d •. Lach. 194a •

41

PLATO

• • • • •

7 4 40

3

88

INDEX LOCORUM Page

PLATO

Laws 792d

892d .. Lys. 211a . Meno 71d. Phaedo 58d. 67c 71a 73d 76e 108d 108e

110d Phaedr. 258e Rep. 471c .. 493d ...

.

PLUTARCH

....

Adv. Colot. 1112a . 1113b

..

SOPHOCLES Ant. 2-3 276 .• 570 •... 576 ..... 719 .... Oed. R. 1110 1401-3 Phil. 192 ..

.

. 4-5 40 25 72 31 80 43 3 25 3 40 3 3 61 61

66 66 42 42 12 12 4 4 42 4

THUCYDIDES I, 6,2 . I, 91, 3 . I, 132, 4 . II, 29,3 . Ill, 22,4 . IV, 102 . V, 46,3. V, 61,2. VI, 18, 1 . VI, 79, 1 . VII, 30,2, VIII, 91, 3 . VARRO

De ling. lat. 6, 28 .

XENOPHON Anab. I, 3, 12 . VI, 1, 29 VI, 3, 11 . Hell. I, 7, 23 II, 2, 2 111,4, 27 VI, 5, 42 Inst. Cyr. I, 2, 5 . I, 6, 18 . II, 4, 15 • VII, 4, 7 VIII, 1,25. VIII, 3, 49.

Page

36 5 43 82 31

11

40 . 39-40 72 36 82 7

11

.

43 41 36

. .

41 40 41

.

41 41 41 40 31

11

11

GREEK INDEX Page

. . . . . 24 claLQo, cwrov. . . . . 1 &ijM>Y, ellipsis of . 60-61 . 66-67 6uW.ul" • . . . 55 6LOQ(tsLY. . . 42-43 stvuL + adv. .. . 72 .eai.6'l\ . 19-20 41• . . . .

. . 1-8, 25-26, 31, 71-72 m,:c\ 16yov . . 57-58 . . . . . . . . . 44 l&8'Y

KCI(.

pgacmi, p:q,:s-xu(

..

oJ&Ouo,

+

O'fL inf ••

. ..

ovrg.q(

oho,

Page

.

.

ff'UQ081.6'l\,

avvxeua" crup.(:lu(vsLY fl'V8'

•

cp,JOL' . .

. 72-73

. . . 82

. . 43 . . 40-42 82

55

58 74 80

56, 60

. • 65-66