Doubtful Certainties: Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism 3868381716, 9783868381719

Table of contents :
CONTENTS
Doubtful Certainties Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism
Taking Language Games Seriously
Is there Certainty in our Form of Life?
Certainty and Forms of Life
‘Hinge Propositions’ and Radical Skepticism
Animal Logic and Transcendental Arguments: On Certainty’s two Levels of Justification
Über Gewißheit: a Textbook for Psychologists?
Wittgenstein, Pretence and Uncertainty
Was Wittgenstein a Relativist?
Language Meets and Measures Reality
Beyond Relativism: Wittgenstein’s Method of Grammatical Enquiry in Philosophical Investigations §§198-202
Russian Matters for Wittgenstein
Common Sense and Language: Wittgenstein and Gramsci
Demystifying Mysticism: Brouwer and Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein and the Future of the Mathematical Sciences
Abbreviations

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Jesús Padilla Gálvez | Margit Gaffal (Eds.) Doubtful Certainties Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism

APORIA Apori/a HRSG. VON / EDITED BY Jesús Padilla Gálvez (University of Castilla-La Mancha) ADVISORY BOARD Pavo Barišić (University of Split) Michel Le Du (University of Strasbourg) Miguel García-Baró (University of Comillas) Margit Gaffal (University of Castilla-La Mancha) Guillermo Hurtado (National Autonomous University of Mexico) Antonio Marques (New University of Lisbon) Lorenzo Peña (Spanish National Research Council) Nicanor Ursua Lezaun (University of the Basque Country) Nuno Venturinha (New University of Lisbon) Pablo Quintanilla (Pontifical Catholic University of Peru) Aporia is a new series devoted to studies in the field of philosophy. Aporia (Aπορία) means philosophical puzzle and the aim of the series is to present contributions by authors who systematically investigate current problems. Aporia (Aπορία) puts special emphasis on the publication of concise arguments on the topics studied. The publication has to contribute to the explanation of current philosophical problem, using a systematic or a historic approach. Contributions should concern relevant philosophical topics and should reflect the ongoing progress of scientific development.

Volume 7

Jesús Padilla Gálvez | Margit Gaffal (Eds.)

Doubtful Certainties Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de.

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CONTENTS

Jesús PADILLA GÁLVEZ & Margit GAFFAL Doubtful Certainties. Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism

7

André MAURY Taking Language Games Seriously

13

Jesús PADILLA GÁLVEZ Is there Certainty in our Form of Life?

25

Inês SALGUEIRO Certainty and Forms of Life

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Nicola CLAUDIO SALVATORE ‘Hinge Propositions’ and Radical Skepticism

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Modesto M. GÓMEZ ALONSO Animal Logic and Transcendental Arguments: On Certainty’s two Levels of Justification

63

Michel LE DU Über Gewißheit: a Textbook for Psychologists?

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Livia ANDREIA JURESCHI Wittgenstein, Pretence and Uncertainty

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Margit GAFFAL Was Wittgenstein a Relativist?

109

Jakub MÁCHA Language Meets and Measures Reality

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Sebastian GRÈVE Beyond Relativism: Wittgenstein’s Method of Grammatical Enquiry in Philosophical Investigations §§198-202

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Niamh O’MAHONY Russian Matters for Wittgenstein

149

Norberto ABREU E SILVA NETO Common Sense and Language: Wittgenstein and Gramsci

181

Nuno VENTURINHA Demystifying Mysticism: Brouwer and Wittgenstein

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Arthur GIBSON Wittgenstein and the Future of the Mathematical Sciences

213

Abbreviations

225

Doubtful Certainties Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism Jesús PADILLA GÁLVEZ & Margit GAFFAL How are certainties expressed in words? To what extent can we doubt certainties? Which language games convey some form of certainty? In order to answer these questions we have to recall the method Wittgenstein used in his investigations. As described in ‘The Big Typescript’, he viewed philosophy as a collection of statements that are not proved: “Philosophy is constantly collecting a stock of propositions without worrying about their truth or falsity; only in the cases of logic and mathematics does it have to do solely with “true” propositions.”1

This passage raises again several questions: What did Wittgenstein understand by “stock of propositions”? When we look at language games and forms of life as inseparable phenomena, do forms of life then provide any certainty? On the other hand, do we automatically relapse into relativism once we doubt certainties? Which formal structures underlie certainty and doubt? Language games are complex entities embedded in coherent activities. If we want to explain the meaning of language signs, (Zeichen) we have to refer to these entities. Wittgenstein illustrates this process by referring to children’s language acquisition and their use of basic language games. In ‘Philosophical Investigations’, he says: “We can also think of the whole process of using words in (2) as one of those games by means of which children learn their native language. I will call these games “language-games” and will sometimes speak of a primitive language as a language-game.”2

In another passage, he reminds us that language game and reality are not coupled in a rigid manner. Language game is rather a transitory 1

Wittgenstein, BT, 505, 357e “Wir können uns auch denken, dass der ganze Vorgang des Gebrauchs der Worte in (2) eines jener Spiele ist, mittels welcher Kinder ihre Muttersprache erlernen. Ich will diese Spiele “Sprachspiele” nennen und von einer primitiven Sprache manchmal als einem Sprachspiel reden.” Wittgenstein, PU, §7.

2

Doubtful Certainties. Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism, (Eds. Jesús PADILLA GÁLVEZ, Margit GAFFAL), Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt a. M., 2012, 7-12.

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phenomenon, which comes into being and disappears again in the course of time. He describes this peculiarity in the following quote: “But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say assertion, question, and command?—There are countless kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call “symbols”, “words”, “sentences”. And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten. (…) Here the term “language-game” is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.”3

During his final years, Wittgenstein dealt with G.E. Moore’s writings, especially with ‘Defence of Common Sense’ and ‘Proof of an External World’ in which Moore stated he knew with certainty that a number of statements were true. These include statements such as, for instance, “Here is a hand”, or else “The earth had already existed long before my birth”. A significant feature of such statements is their contingency and that they are considered “…propositions which are not self-contradictory and of which the contradictory is not selfcontradictory.”4 Against this background, Wittgenstein analyzed certainty and provided an overview of the different ways in which it may be expressed. These include statements such as “It is my unshakeable conviction that etc.”5, or “Here I have arrived at a foundation of all my beliefs.”6, “I can’t help believing...”7 Wittgenstein seemed to be particularly interested in sentences of the kind “We know that…”, or “We cannot doubt that…”. He 3

“Wie viel Arten der Sätze gibt es aber? Etwa Behauptung, Frage und Befehl? Es gibt unzählige solcher Arten: unzählige verschiedene Arten der Verwendung alles dessen, was wir “Zeichen”, “Worte”, “Sätze” nennen. Und diese Mannigfaltigkeit ist nichts Festes, ein für allemal Gegebenes; sondern neue Typen der Sprache, neue Sprachspiele, wie wir sagen können entstehen und andre veralten und werden vergessen. (…) Das Wort “Sprachspiel” soll hier hervorheben, dass das Sprechen der Sprache ein Teil ist einer Tätigkeit, oder einer Lebensform.” Wittgenstein, PU, §23. 4 S.G.E. Moore, Philosophical Papers. George Allen y Unwin Ltd., London, 1959, pp. 229ff. 5 Wittgenstein, ÜG, §103. 6 Wittgenstein, ÜG, §246. 7 Wittgenstein, ÜG, §277.

Doubtful Certainties. Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism

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even spoke out against particular statements says this: “The propositions which one comes back to again and again as if bewitched – these I should like to expunge from philosophical language.”8 The questions posed at the beginning involve a skeptical approach towards certainty. Its aim is to reveal the lack of agreement that exists among experts referring the uncertainty of both, language games and forms of life. A skeptic’s strategy is to demonstrate a recurrence ad infinitum in the arguments used in this context. A skeptic would negate any specific or definite relation between language and form of life and would intend to that all arguments and questions result in a vicious circle.9 One of the most common errors committed by representatives of academic philosophy is to set too much importance on recording Wittgenstein’s proposals in index registers. The usual philosophical method is to summarize the essential arguments used in debate, unify the criteria used and rationally explain the doubts. A traditional academic approach entails a compilation of Wittgenstein’s text repertoire in order to arrange it in a formal structure. The aim of this method is to bring the arguments to light that are used in philosophical debate. Yet this method produces more obscurity than insights. Actually, the answers proposed to Wittgenstein’s questions based on such method appear rather mechanical. They are often just an unrefined imitation of the style and thoroughness by which Wittgenstein addressed relevant issues. Many answers given by academic philosophers do not meet the standards set by Wittgenstein’s sophistic linguistic expressions. In fact, many scientific discussions consist of fallacies. There are mainly three reasons for these fallacies. Firstly, sporadically wrong translations of Wittgenstein’s manuscripts result in an incorrect lecture. A second reason may be incomprehension of Wittgensteinian manuscripts in German language. Thirdly, in order to make a name some philosophers use Wittgenstein’s writings as a false pretence to initiate polemic discussions. The aim is to find entrance into the various citation indexes. Such strategies are not new. Even Sextus Empiricus criticized them as one of the disadvantages of academic science.

8

Wittgenstein, ÜG, §31. Sexti Empirici, Opera. Recensuit Hermannus Mutschmann (Vol. I). Teubner, Leipzig, 1912, p. 164.

9

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Doubtful Certainties. Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism

Referring the problem of certainty, we are interested whether doubtless language games exist at all. Can we call our language in question? Again, a skeptic would translate these questions into an epistemic problem. Let us see whether cognitive skepticism causes Wittgenstein’s proposals to sway. According to his view, all knowledge is mediate. We call this position the “mediate hypothesis”. It is explicitly mentioned in a recently published manuscript, in which Wittgenstein says this: ‘Alle Erkenntnis ist mittelbar’.10 Until the end of his life, he had held on to this “mediate hypothesis”. Many philosophers who read Wittgenstein are puzzled or irritated because they search for “Tatsachen” in Wittgenstein’s works. However, Wittgenstein seems to be mainly interested in language games as a key element in our language. He poses the following rhetorical question in ‘On Certainty’: “Ja, ist es nicht selbstverständlich, dass die Möglichkeit eines Sprachspiels durch gewisse Tatsachen bedingt ist?”11 “Indeed, doesn’t it seem obvious that the possibility of a language-game is conditioned by certain facts?”12

In the following passage Wittgenstein answers that matter of facts (Tatsachen) are not a direct condition of language games. In fact, he actually negates a possible connection between facts and language games. He says this: “Es schiene dann, als müsste das Sprachspiel die Tatsachen, die es ermöglichen, ‚zeigen’. (Aber so ist es nicht.)”13 “In that case it would seem as if the language-game must ‘show’ the facts that make it possible. (But that’s not how it is.)”14

This translation is erroneous because it uses the indicative instead of the subjunctive mood. Consequently, the reader may erroneously conclude that language games reveal those matter of facts upon which they based. Wittgenstein denies this twice categorically, implicitly by using the past subjunctive to express an improbable condition and explicitly by 10

L. Wittgenstein, Alle Erkenntnis ist mittelbar..., Dókos. Revista filosófica, 5-6, 2010, pp. 87-94. See p. 87. 11 Wittgenstein, ÜG, §617. 12 L. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, ed. G. H. von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford, Blackwell, §617. 13 Wittgenstein, ÜG, §618. 14 L. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, ed. G. H. von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford, Blackwell, §618.

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emphasizing that in the last statement in brackets. Additionally he emphasizes his point of view by referring to the problem of induction. The aim of the Conference was to examine how language games, certainty and relativism are intertwined. The lectures belong to four sections. In the first section on language games André Maury deals with Wittgenstein’s thoughts on the problem of proof and the inspiration he received from Moore’s writings. Maury describes language game as a sequence of moves following a tacit presupposition. This represents an integrity that in turn produces a feeling of certainty in the speaker of a language game. In the second section on the interrelation of certainty and form of life, Jesús Padilla Gálvez asks whether we can find any certainty in our form of life. He analyzes the role of belief sentences and propositional attitudes within the frame of form of life and discusses the structure and relevance of hinge-propositions. Inês Salgueiro examines the notion of common sense considering Moore’s proposals and analyzes Wittgenstein and the Cartesian doubt as well as the consequences that follow for the problem of certainty. Nicola Claudio Salvatore deals with the Cartesian skeptical paradox and compares hinges with rules of grammar. The author concludes that hinge prepositions are a means to dissipate Cartesian skepticism due to conceptual error. Modesto M. Gómez Alonso examines the deflationary and the naturalistic interpretation and illustrates Wittgenstein’s arguments referring making reference to three kinds of belief. Michael Le Du asks whether the book ‘Über Gewißheit’ should function as a textbook for psychologists as it offers relevant insights. Livia Andreia Jureschi takes up the notion of pretence as a key-concept in philosophical psychology. An examination of the practices used in this context reveals the relevance of pretence for the problem of certainty. The authors of the third section deal with the problem of relativism. Margit Gaffal asks whether we can find any hints in Wittgenstein’s writings that suggest that he was a relativist. A study of the interrelation between relativism and form of life is the starting point for a critical analysis of cultural relativism. This analysis reveals the misconceptions associated with this position. Jacub Mácha grounds his analysis of relativism on Protagoras’ notorious quote that man is the measure of all things. The author analyses the distinction between internal and external relations and examines these aspects in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Sebastian Gréve deals with the method of grammatical inquiry in the

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Philosophical Investigations. He analyses rules, practice and forms of life with reference to relativism. The fourth group of authors dedicates their papers to miscellaneous topics. Niamh O’Mahony investigates Russian Matters in Wittgenstein writings. Norberto Abreu E Silva Neto deals with the supposed relation between Wittgenstein and Gramsci and illustrates that the discussion about this relation is far-fetched. However, it discloses interesting debates on topics such as common sense, politics, philosophy and the relation between individual and society. Nuno Venturinha investigates the relation between Brouwer and Wittgenstein and the topic of mysticism. He looks into the influence that intuitionism has on Wittgenstein’s writings of the first period. Arthur Gibson analyzes Wittgenstein and the Future of the Mathematical Sciences. The present volume is a collection of papers presented at the International Wittgenstein Conference under the topic “Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism,” which was held at the University of Castilla-La Mancha in Toledo (Spain) in May 2012. I would like to thank all the colleagues who accepted the invitation to participate in the Conference and contributed to the book. Financial support was provided by the Spanish Government (MICINN), (FFI2011-12575-E). On this occasion, we benefited not only from the University of Castilla-La Mancha and the Faculty of Law and Social Sciences in Toledo. UCLM & UPC

Taking Language Games Seriously André MAURY A paper on proofs is not out of place in a discussion of Wittgenstein. He was after all inspired by Moore’s ‘Proof of an External World’. In that proof Moore moves from a premiss to a conclusion, from p to q. He holds that his proof is a “perfectly rigorous one”. It is rigorous, he says, because the premiss is known and the conclusion is different from the premiss and, moreover, centrally: the conclusion follows from the premiss. In fact he gives two proofs which differ in character. I come to this towards the end of this paper. I Let us look at what is involved in moving from one proposition to another. Let us call such movements “language games”. Here you indeed make a move, as in ordinary games. The games I am going to describe are, indeed, proofs – though they occur in ordinary circumstances. It is not uncommon to move, in thought, from one fact to another. It is quite as common describing a fact, as setting up a proposition. Let us see what such moves involve, starting from Russell’s Principles of Mathematics and Principia Mathematica, by Whitehead and Russell. These texts were important for Wittgenstein. You can see the influence even in his very late writings, not only in Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. RFM is a work on epistemology. The very notion of proof is in itself an epistemological notion. So, what does Russell say? I shall be quite brief. In moving from p to q in a logical way we set up a “material implication”, Russell says in the Principles. It is material because propositions proper are involved. The move is logical because it involves a rule. In moving in the preferred way from p to q, we use the rule “if p, then q”. However, this rule is not mentioned. An inference, which often occurs within an epistemic setting, a proof, that is, which proceeds from a single proposition is of special interest here.

Doubtful Certainties. Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism, (Eds. Jesús PADILLA GÁLVEZ, Margit GAFFAL), Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt a. M., 2012, 13-24.

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So a language-game which shows a proof-pattern, like Moore’s, is a two-propositions’ affair. Here the proposition we start out from is allimportant. After all we get the second proposition for free, given that the move is right. There are two principles in PM which are worth mentioning now. It is said that a proof is an instance of a general rule. Rules are not premises, it is said, since, “they assert any instance of themselves, not something other”.1 If our proof is “p, so q” the rule is “if p, then q” or in a more general form “Gen. (if p, then q)”, meaning that inferences of this type are accepted. This rule is not a premiss. The proof is not of the form: Generally (if p, then q) and p, so q. This view is certainly in Wittgenstein, too. The second principle is this. In moving from p to q we do not mention the rule. However, we still “mean” it, the PM holds. According to the Principles we do indeed state a “formal implication”, without actually mentioning it. This is put in PM, more guardedly as “we mean it”.2 So there is a third proposition, the rule, which is hidden. It is obvious that this was not accepted by Wittgenstein. The proof does not need any third proposition3 to back it up. The rightness of the move lies in “the sequence of propositions itself”. It can be shown that the rule used cannot be made part of the proof. However, this is not central now. What is useful is this: No rule is mentioned. Part of this point is expressed in RFM as: The proof proves, nothing behind it.4 Let us take this as our lead in considering some language games. My point is this: The fact that a language game is based on something – which is maintained in On Certainty – does not mean that the basis – the logico-semantic framework, certainty, trust, forms of life, facts – occurs as premises, in the proof. The Voraussetzungen of the proof are not premises, not even hidden ones. There is thus a self-sufficiency in proofs, an integrity. That integrity explains in part the felt “certainty” in the language game. 1

Russell, PM, p. 96. Russell, PM, p. 9. 3 Wittgenstein, RFM, §19. 4 Cf. Wittgenstein, RFM, II, 47. 2

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In calling my presentation “Taking language games seriously” I mean that this self-sufficiency should not be lost sight of in general philosophy. Let us discuss three or four language games, starting with moves from fact to fact. Then we consider some moves from fact to mental fact, and, finally, moves from fact to philosophical fact, if I may say so. Moore’s proof is the obvious case. In these language games we start from a single proposition. No other premiss is used, nor needed. Not long ago there were countries in Europe where the following exchange of words was natural. The daughter comes home and says she bought some apples. Mummy is surprised and says, so there were apples to be bought. Another example. Watson says he saw Jones in the street. Sherlock Holmes: Jones is in London. Watson looks surprised and asks How do you know? Sherlock Holmes: You said it. Watson: Did I? Here the language games begin with a proposition. The conclusion spells out a truth-condition of it. No wonder the conclusion follows. You cannot buy apples if there are none. You cannot see a man if he is not there. These proofs, using “proof” in the way Moore does, are wholly “übersichtlich”. In order to assess the rightness of the move you need not add anything, look behind it. Note that you need not add the Voraussetzung that no-one is lying here. In drawing a conclusion you have already made up your mind on this point. You take the premiss as certain. Nor is any rule a hidden premiss. Any relevant rule is shown. In PM it is held that inference as such is justified by the rule “What follows from a true proposition is true”, the first primitive proposition of PM. It need not be added, nor do we need to add the more specific rule “A proposition implies its own truth-conditions”. These rules are certainly “hinge propositions”. However, they are not premises in particular proofs. That this is so is certainly an important thing to point out if you set out to describe a language game. Nothing this is an application of the principle mentioned earlier: General rules only assert their instances, no other thing.

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Of course, not all proofs are this obvious. Sometimes premises are indeed hidden. You say you write to John and I conclude that you write to John Smith. If that is so there is the extra premiss that John is John Smith. However, that is not a general rule, quite to the contrary. In setting up a proof you do not start by stating the rules you are going to use, so to speak. You cannot do that. Why? Because, we have no rule before we have a conclusion. A proposition used as a premiss admits different conclusions. So we have to wait for the conclusion until it is drawn. Moreover, the conclusion does not go beyond the premiss, in the cases mentioned here. So if you, for some reason want to draw a particular conclusion you better see to it that the premiss used admits that conclusion. A proof is an epistemic setting. This means that we also put some epistemic demands on the conclusion. Certain inferences admitted by logic are not in fact used. P implies not not p. However, that is not worth stating, so it is not stated. What follows from any proposition need not be proved. Mummy and Sherlock Holmes state conclusions which in their respective settings are not trivial. They record important facts, again in the setting. Once again, this is a thing which a description of the language game cannot neglect. II Let us consider some cases where we move from fact to mental fact, from the outer to the inner. A man asks for water in the desert, so he is thirsty. A man with a bottle of water in his hand asks for water. Now we do not draw that conclusion. This shows that we draw on the situation. Let us next ask, more daringly, whether a move from the fact that a man is groaning to his being in pain could ever be a proof. Thinking people have always known that there is a problem here. Berkeley said that we do not see the man, that is, we do not see what is important about him. The evidence provided by outer fact is not enough. There is pretence. Wittgenstein spent much time on this. Suppose the man is pretending to be in pain. If the pretence is good we see no difference to the evidence provided in the more normal case. How do we then make out the difference?

Taking Language Games Seriously

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The criterion here is the pain itself, obviously, its being there or not. The trouble is that the criterion is not available. However, it seems that we can draw the right conclusion in the normal case, if we can ascertain that he is not pretending. So we can go from the outer to the inner if we add the premiss that he is not pretending? Indeed, we can. However, that only means that we have already drawn the conclusion. We draw it once, before we draw it. So the premiss of nonpretence is not an extra. The non-pretence is not a Voraussetzung added to the move. It is the very move itself. In drawing the conclusion, for whatever reason, we have already made up our mind – no pretence. The case is similar in the move: He says he is in pain, so he is in pain. We do not make it if we think he is lying. However, there is no extra premiss “not-lying” added when we draw the conclusion. It is not an extra. In laying down that he is not lying we have already drawn the conclusion. The pain itself is the criterion all along, both for non-pretence and notlying. But, how is the criterion given, then? The evidence, what we see or hear is not enough. The obvious explanation is that we draw on the situation, as in the case of the thirsty man. We add the pain. In fact we do not go from: He is groaning to He is in pain. We expand the premiss to: He is groaning from pain. So he is in pain. Simple logic. The conclusion follows. It is just a way of spelling out a truth-condition of the premiss. Whatever uncertainty there is, it is not in the move itself. The move is no more uncertain that the move from buying apples to there being apples for sale. In this respect the logic is the same. In Philosophical Investigations, though not later, Wittgenstein stresses the role of the situation. We may say that someone is expecting an explosion, though he perhaps just has a vacant look, because the situation is one in which an explosion is to be expected.5 In Philosophical Investigations the case is presented as follows: “I see a picture which represents a smiling face. What do I do if I take the smile now as a kind one, now as malicious? Don’t I often imagine it with a … context which is one either of kindness or malice? Thus I might 5

Wittgenstein, PI, §581.

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Doubtful Certainties. Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism supply the picture with the fancy that the smiler was smiling down on a child at play or again on the suffering of an enemy … If no special circumstances reverse my interpretation I shall conceive a particular smile as kind …”6

In §536 he talks of a re-interpretation of a facial expression, changing the “aspect of the face itself”. As you saw I favour this line, with a stress on the context. Here the inner thing, the kindness, is extracted from the context. The result of the extraction is that we add the kindness to what we see, I would think, perhaps somewhat rashly. Once more we expand the premiss to She smiles out of kindness, so she is kind. Easy. Of course, there is a price paid here. Indeed, the move looks like a trick. We expand the premiss and then draw the conclusion – with a straight face. Yet things have to be done in this way, we have to draw on something else. What you see or hear, the evidence that is, is never enough. In order to get a proof, or the proof-pattern at least, you have to decide what the evidence is evidence for. That there is a wilful, not to say rash, addition is obvious. We set up a connection and then we see it there. Drawing the conclusion once before we draw it, so to speak, does also away with doubt. The absence of doubt is not an extra premiss, then. Formally, going from fact to mental fact is nothing special, relying on some non-standard logic. “My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the opinion that he has a soul.”7

What this remark could mean is that in, say, greeting him, I do not use an extra premiss of the kind mentioned. The trick, as I called it, is used also in some practical proceedings. In tying the line to the hook, you do it by first making loop, and then you put the end of the line through the loop, and pull the knot tight. There is

6 7

Wittgenstein, PI, §539. Wittgenstein, PI II, p. 178.

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nothing wrong with that, no cheating. Similarly we make the loop: She is smiling from kindness. Then we pull the knot tight: She is kind. Noting that a loop is used, does not solve any epistemological problems in this field. We just pack the problems into the single premiss, and in asserting it these problems are passed by. That this is so, should certainly be included in a description of the language game. The method of setting up a connection and then seeing it there is used when we say we know or see something, which are indeed very common moves. From Kp we conclude that p. In fact we have already come to that conclusion in setting up Kp. Likewise in concluding that p, moving now from p was seen. Using a rule from PM, Wittgenstein notes in Philosophical Grammar that ““p . q = p” means “q follows from p”8. That p follows from Kp can then be expressed by “Kp . p = Kp”. Kp says it all. In drawing the conclusion you just confirm something already. Let us look once more at the place of doubt in moves from the outer to the inner: “A doctor asks: “How is he feeling?” The nurse says: “He is groaning”. A report on his behaviour. But need to be any question for them whether the groaning is really genuine, is really the expression of anything? Might they not, for example, draw the conclusion “If he groans, we must give him some more analgesic” – without suppressing a middle term? Isn’t the point the service to which thet put the description of behaviour? “But then they make a tacit presupposition.” Then what we do in our language-game always rests on a tacit presupposition. … Doesn’t a presupposition imply a doubt? And doubt may be entirely lacking. Doubting has an end.”9

Let us note at what stage the doubt creeps is. Here again, doubt has no place in the proof, in the move to q. In asserting p, doubts have been done away with. The “tacit presupposition” is not then in the move itself. So the language-game as understood here is an end-game. So it is not so that in my heart I know that I am jumping to a conclusion. In our examples this far, the conclusion spells out a truth-condition. This is so also in this case: The fisherman notes that the knife is good. We can safely conclude that it is sharp. Here the premiss is not explicit, but the sharpness is part of the premiss, somehow. In his Varieties of Goodness von Wright shows that the 8 9

Wittgenstein, PG, p. 243. Wittgenstein, PI II, p. 179f.

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premiss can contain different things, depending on the language game – a fine book. In his book Explanation and Understanding von Wright discusses the relation between action and intention and finds it logical, though problematically so. Here is a case: A man presses a button, intentionally or unintentionally. The matter cannot be decided by looking closely, however closely you look. So you quite drastically put the intention there by taking in the overall situation. The premiss is expanded to: He did it intentionally. You draw the conclusion once before you draw it: There was an intention. The inner follows. Wittgenstein’s case of the arm going up, raised or just rising?10 can be treated in a similar way. von Wright used to say that he was not influenced by Wittgenstein. This should be taken with a grain of salt, to use one of von Wright’s favourite expressions. Going back to one more example from Wittgenstein, we can see the loop also in his account of seeing an aspect. How can you see a square, drawn on paper, as a window? You put it into the context of windows – it is like a window – them you see it as a window. A clear case of aided vision. There is also in PI a discussion of seeing fear in someone’s face. Of course, the fear is not in the face. It is in the heart. So if you see it in the face, you must have put it there. The move to: He is afraid, is, then, easy. In RFM, actually the last page (another important last page in Wittgenstein) Wittgenstein notes the practice of first setting up a connection and then seeing it there: “The proof registers the procedure according to the rule .… A proof (shows) the existence of an internal relation. (The) internal relation is the operation producing one structure from another, seen as equivalent to the picture of the transition itself – so that now the transition is eo ipso a transition according to those rules.”11

So, in going from p to q we set up a connection, which then strikes us as an application of “if p, then q”. This is a direct criticism of the thesis of PM discussed above that the rule “meant” is a hidden proposition.

10 11

Wittgenstein, PI, §621. Wittgenstein, RFM, VII-72, p. 434.

Taking Language Games Seriously

21

The practice of setting up a connection and then finding it occurs elsewhere too, not just in explicit proofs, as we have seen. In a moving passage on the very last page of Philosophical Investigations, part I, where Wittgenstein discusses how a person means N.N. in making a drawing of him, we read: “For one would naturally like to say: when he meant him, he aimed at him. But how is anyone doing that, when he calls someone else’s face to mind? I mean, how does he call HIM to mind? How does he call him?”12

The blunt answer is: You add him, in the way you add the pain, the kindness, the intention or the sharpness. Fortified by these examples of moves in language games, let us next look at the purported language game introduced by Moore, his proof, socalled, of an external world. Is it a proof? III The proofs, if I may say so, considered this far, are simple, that is their pattern is simple. P is asserted and then q is asserted. Such descriptions of language games are complete, given our admittedly limited approach. “Watson saw him, so he is around” is, then, a complete description. It is complete for the simple reason that the assessment of the move needs no extra premiss. The confidence invested in the premiss p, goes over intact to the conclusion q. Our confidence in propositions like: She bought apples, He saw Jones, She is smiling, The knife is good, He is groaning from pain, is normally quite high. We see no special obstacles in asserting these propositions. If there is confidence enough in p, we proceed to q, which, in our examples, follows. In Moore’s proof the premiss is: Here is one hand and here is another. The conclusion is: Two human hands exist. That follows to be sure. There is nothing wrong with it. It is no worse off than any other proof. The proposition we proceed from, the premiss, is not supposed to be proved within the game. So what is the problem? One problem here is that 12

Wittgenstein, PI, §691.

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this is not supposed to be Moore’s proof. He adds in the text: “and if, by doing this I have proved ipso facto the existence of external things, you will all see that I can also do it now in numbers of other ways.” The crux here is the “ipso facto”. Moore goes from his having two hands to the existence of two human hands. No problem. Then, and only then, he goes from that proposition to asserting that there are external things or objects. There are two moves. When he says that the proof is “perfectly rigorous” he uses the first move as the case in point. Rightly so. The second, important, move is not discussed! In the first paper on On Certainty von Wright says that “Let it be granted that the proposition that I have two hands entails the proposition that there are material objects”.13 So he is on Moore’s lines, the issue is just a matter of the “ipso facto”. Von Wright sees a weakness in Moore’s proof: the premiss is not really known. In this he is expanding on Wittgenstein’s view that if we accept the premiss as known, “we grant you all the rest”14. Let us, for a change, take another line. After all any proof shows some weakness in the premiss. Moore is well aware of the weakness in his premiss. His retort – on the last page of the paper – is that people who do not accept his proof for that reason demand an “extra proof” – this time of the premiss. He points out that this is to demand too much. He is right in principle. Such a general demand leads to a regress. If anything is wrong in principle with Moore’s second proof it must be, then, rather in the move from hands to external things or material objects. If it follows then the conclusion is part of the premiss, somehow. It is certainly not set up as an extra premiss in Moore’s argument. However, it is obvious that there being material objects is not a fact which is used in setting up the premiss. So that is not the ground for holding that it follows. Moore’s argument does not, then, spell out a specific truth-condition of the premiss. Moore’s argument describes rather a condition for Moore’s statement that there are two hands, being a proposition. So the argument is like the proof that not not p follows from p. These implications are, then, formal in 13 14

von Wright, 1982, p. 171. Wittgenstein, OC, §1.

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that they are provided by language itself. They are not “material” in Russell’s sense. So they do not qualify as moves in a language game, as understood here. It may very well be that this is the fate of hinge propositions in general. An account of the language game does not need them. This is not meant as a criticism of the very conception. What is shown is just the hinge propositions have another place, outside proofs. There is a tension on this point in On Certainty. On one hand description of the language game is recommended. On the other hand most of the things said in the book goes well beyond that. Indeed, it goes well beyond the task of description set earlier in Philosophical Investigations. In Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology there is a remark to the effect that description is not enough after all: “Uncertainty: whether a man really has this feeling, or is merely putting up an appearance of it. … - But what does this uncertainty consist in? Am I really always in some uncertainty whether someone is really angry, sad, glad etc.? No. Any more than whether I have a notebook in front of me and a pen in my hand, or whether this book will fall if I let go of it. … The following, however, is true: I cannot give criteria which put the presence of the sensation beyond doubt; that is to say: there are no such criteria. – But what sort of fact is that? …I might say: it is a peculiarity of our language game. But even if that is true, it passes over a main point: In certain cases I am in some uncertainty … and no expression on his part can remove this uncertainty.”15

In Last Writings, II (last page) he even says that knowing another’s mind is a “logical impossibility”. This goes against the position in PI. Perhaps it is not wrong to say that Wittgenstein in the end becomes quite traditional. Our language games can be put to the test of philosophy. This is not the position taken in PI. There the “main point” is not passed over in noting the actual language game. References Moore, G. E., 1959: “Proof of an External World”, Philosophical Papers, Georg Allen & Unwin, London.

15

Wittgenstein, RPP, §137.

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Russell, B., 1937: The Principles of Mathematics, 2nd ed., Georg Allen & Unwin, London. Whitehead, A. M., Russell, B., 1927: Principia Mathematica, 2nd edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. von Wright, G. H., 1963: The Varieties of Goodness, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London. von Wright, G. H., 1971: Explanation and Understanding, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. von Wright, G. H., 1982: “Wittgenstein on Certainty”, Wittgenstein, Basil Blackwell, Oxford. Wittgenstein, L., 1963: Philosophical Investigations, G.E.M. Anscombe, R. Rhees. (eds.), Basil Blackwell, Oxford. Wittgenstein, L., 1956: Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees, G.E.M. Anscombe (eds.), Basil Blackwell, Oxford. Wittgenstgein, L., 1969: On Certainty, G.E.M. Anscombe, G.H. von Wright (eds.), Basil Blackwell, Oxford. Wittgenstein, L., 1974: Philosophical Grammar, R. Rhees (ed.), Basil Blackwell, Oxford. Wittgenstein, L., 1980: Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, G.E.M. Anscombe, G.H. von Wright (eds.), Basil Blackwell, Oxford. Wittgenstein, L., 1992: Last Writings, Inner and Outer, G.H. von Wright, H. Nyman (eds.), Basil Blackwell, Oxford. University of Helsinki

Is there Certainty in our Form of Life? Jesús PADILLA GÁLVEZ Introduction In his work entitled On Certainty L. Wittgenstein indicates a connection between certainty and form of life. He sees a relation among certainty and form of life. But what prompted him to believe that? Let us first focus on a definition of both concepts and then see how they might be interconnected. In general, certainty is a state free from risk, hazards or interference.1 On closer reflection we must concede that certainty is only relatively free of doubt. A form of life is the totality of statements and practices exercised through a person’s actions and utterances. An interlocutor has acquired a range of language games which underpins his form of life. Language games include a variety of speech acts such as, asking questions, expressing doubts, giving orders, or verbalizing beliefs. Together they form the frame within which a form of life is situated. Language games belong to a form of life in that they shape the patterns along which people align their lives. Wittgenstein says: “‘We are quite sure of it’ does not mean just that every single person is certain of it, but that we belong to a community which is bound together by science and education.”2

But can one actually build up certainty on a form of life? To answer this we shall take up the notion that language games and forms of life are interconnected. Does that mean that particular language games are related to particular forms of life? Is there any recognizable dividing line that 1

Several expressions belong to this lexical field, such as the general term of security (innere Sicherheit, Sorglosigkeit, Gewissheit), certainty (Sicherheit, Bestimmtheit, Gewissheit, Überzeugung), safety (free from danger: Sicherheit, Gefahrlosigkeit), sureness (Sicherheit, feste Überzeugung, Zuverlässigkeit) or certitude (innere Gewissheit, Überzeugung). Wittgenstein used several German expressions in this context, such as “Sicherheit”, then he mentioned “Gewißheit” which he later replaced by “Zweifelsfreiheit”. Additionally he used “Gewisses” which means “what is known” or “what someone is positive about”. 2 “Wir sind dessen ganz sicher, heißt nicht nur, daß jeder Einzelne dessen gewiß ist, sondern, daß wir zu einer Gemeinschaft gehören, die durch die Wissenschaft und Erziehung verbunden ist.” Wittgenstein, ÜG, §298. Doubtful Certainties. Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism, (Eds. Jesús PADILLA GÁLVEZ, Margit GAFFAL), Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt a. M., 2012, 25-40.

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distinguishes one form of life from another? Is certainty linked to particular words and actions that function as patterns of conduct? Are forms of life thereby passed on over time? Which epistemic value would we gain from this? Do our certainties literally hinge3 of special key elements? In the following quote, Wittgenstein indicates a link between certainty and form of life when he says: “Now I would like to regard this certainty, not as something akin to hastiness or superficiality, but as a form of life. (That is very badly expressed and probably badly thought as well.)”4

The meaning of a term is determined by its semantic components. The purport of “certainty” arises from all semantic features of the constituents of its lexical field. First he names the antonyms “prematurity (hastiness) or superficiality” (Vorschnellheit oder Oberfächlichkeit), both of which are opposed to certainty. Then he establishes a link between certainty and form of life and finally puts certainty on a level with form of life. However, he immediately questions this statement and seems doubtful about this reference. Some paragraphs before he mentioned a kind of “reassured or comfortable certainty” that he had in mind when thinking of certainty. What does Wittgenstein tell us about the so-called “comfortable certainty”? He established a link between certainty and statements of the form “I know that ...”. I shall explore to which extent a form of life can be expressed by statements of the syntactic structure “I know that ...”? How certainty is expressed in a language game of the form “I know that ...” linked to a form of life? I will only selectively respond to the reception of Wittgenstein’s work but rather place the term “form of life” in a new context.

3

Wittgenstein refers to the hinge propositions as the axis (Wittgenstein, ÜG, §152), riverbed (Wittgenstein, ÜG, §97) and scaffolding (Wittgenstein, ÜG, §211) of our thoughts. 4 “Ich möchte nun diese Sicherheit nicht als etwas der Vorschnellheit oder Oberflächlichkeit Verwandtes ansehen, sondern als (eine) Lebensform. (Das ist sehr schlecht ausgedrückt und wohl auch schlecht gedacht.)” Wittgenstein, ÜG, §358. The original entry in a pocket notebook reads as: “Ich möchte nun diese Sicherheit nicht als etwas der Vorschnellheit ‹‹oder Oberflächlichkeit›› verwandtes ansehen, sondern als ‹ ( ›eine‹ ) › Lebensform. (Das ist sehr schlecht ausgedrückt & vielleicht ‹‹wohl auch›› schlecht ‹‹wohl auch›› gedacht.)”. Wittgenstein, BEE, 2000, Item 175, Tachennotizbuch, p. 55v.

Is there certainty in our form of life?

1.

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“I am here inclined to fight windmills”5

The reason for the discussion on certainty is perhaps due to a speaker’s difficulty to put thoughts into words. The linguistic possibilities fall sometimes short when expressing a set of facts (Sachverhalt). What is the reason for this tension between a content a speaker wants to convey and the available means of expression? If a sentence is introduced by “I know that ...”, it reveals primarily the speaker’s own knowledge. Wittgenstein considered the underlying logic of such propositional attitudes irrelevant.6 Quite the opposite applies to empirical propositions or logic sentences. Empirical propositions must not be understood as hypothesis and can therefore not be replaced by other sentences should the proposition turn out wrong.7 Let us now examine how the demonstrative pronoun of “this certainty” relates to an earlier quote in which Wittgenstein wrote about a “comfortable or assured certainty”. He described it as if it were in contrast to what he called a “struggling certainty”. Wittgenstein revolved around the problem by reflecting over the opposite aspect when he mentioned a still doubtful certainty. He pointed to an extenuated form of certainty lacking reassurance or confirmation. Wittgenstein wrote this: “One might say: “I know’ expresses comfortable certainty, not the certainty that is still struggling.”8

But why would this statement create a feeling of certainty? What is the source of such certitude? At a first glance this appears as some form of dogmatism or would indicate a weakened form of fundamentalism. However, Wittgenstein does not fall into this trap but rather intends to detect its meaning by exploring the various connotations that are associated with the statement. A speaker expressing a propositional attitude of the kind “I know that something is so-and-so” seems convinced that he is 5

“Ich bin hier geneigt, gegen Windmühlen zu kämpfen” Wittgenstein, ÜG, §400. “Ich will sagen: Sätze von der Form der Erfahrungssätze und nicht nur Sätze der Logik gehören zum Fundament alles Operierens mit Gedanken (mit der Sprache). – Diese Feststellung ist nicht von der Form »Ich weiß, ...«. »Ich weiß, ...« sagt aus, was ich weiß, und das ist nicht von logischem Interesse.” Wittgenstein, ÜG, §401. 7 “In dieser Bemerkung ist schon der Ausdruck »Sätze von der Form der Erfahrungssätze« ganz schlecht; es handelt sich um Aussagen über Gegenstände. Und sie dienen nicht als Fundamente wie Hypothesen, die, wenn sie sich als falsch erweisen, durch andere ersetzt werden.” Wittgenstein, ÜG, §402. 8 “Man könnte sagen: “‘Ich weiß’ drückt die beruhigte Sicherheit aus, nicht die noch kämpfende.” Wittgenstein, ÜG, §357. 6

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saying the truth. He has linked his statement to truth. However, this relation must be called into question. In fact, Wittgenstein detected two fallacies in that assumption both of which he intended to overcome. The first error lies in the speaker’s conviction that his knowledge be true. Second, the supposedly true proposition is just an unshaken fundament of a language game.9 Yet this language game appears inappropriate as a relation between assumption and truth requires verification in order to be accepted as true. This is a crucial point of the investigation. There are speakers who claim that what they know were true. But to speak of truth one has to provide evidence. Otherwise truth would be based on mere assumption. A language game of such kind does not require any cognitive process. The third error lies in the ambiguity associated with the statement “I know that...” Wittgenstein had repeatedly pointed to the different connotations of propositional attitudes in natural language and philosophical terminology. In everyday language sentences are, for instance, used in the following example. A speaker may confirm a statement of the form “I know that this is a foot” by pointing to his foot saying, “You see, I told you so”. Should this turn out wrong it would still not unsettle the speaker’s knowledge base. The error could, for example, be due to an involuntary deception in the sense that, where the speaker sees a foot there may be prosthesis instead. Whereas statements of the form “I know that ...” is part of everyday knowledge it represents a position in philosophy. Philosophers do not judge statements according to their empirical provability but use other criteria of verification. Wittgenstein pointed to the consequences of wrongly adopted knowledge within philosophy. It seems as if a propositional attitude of the form “I know that ...” is the royal road to transfer the listener into the speaker’s holistic world. However, Wittgenstein accused Moore of ignoring the claim that natural language and philosophic terminology shall not be intermingled. The difference in meaning of a propositional attitude in natural language as opposed to that in philosophy shall be exemplified by the following statement: “I assume that the earth has existed for many years.” One might 9

“Vom Menschen, in Moores Sinne, zu sagen, er wisse etwas; was er sage, sei also unbedingt die Wahrheit, scheint mir falsch. – Es ist die Wahrheit nur insofern, als es eine unwankende Grundlage seiner Sprachspiele ist.” Wittgenstein, ÜG, §403. (My italics).

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29

consider this statement true due to the empirical nature of its content. It is true because we view ancient remains as a proof of the long existence of the earth. Still it is wrong to take empirical evidence as a basis for philosophical explanation. This causes misunderstandings and leads to wrong results. 2.

“I know p…”

To the question of what the purport of the statement “I know p” is Wittgenstein suggest these two possibilities: “I say “I know p” either to assure people that I, too, know the truth p, or simply as an emphasis of ├ p. One says too, “I don’t believe it, I know it”. And one might also put it like this (for example): “That is a tree. And that’s not just surmise.” [...] But what about this: “If I were to tell someone that that was a tree, that wouldn’t be just surmise.””10

Asked for the content of a propositional attitude “I know p” the speaker may simply insist on his claim that “p” be true. However, Wittgenstein shows that the introduction of truth is not justified in this context. No assertion is sufficient to recognize the truth of a judgment. To express an assertion is to presuppose a thought as true. As such, the statement “Caesar died” implies the idea of ”Caesar’s death” and not “the truth of Caesar’s death”. The second sentence introduces a predicate not in accordance with the first sentence. In fact, recourse to the concept of truth does not add any new cognitive value. To introduce truth does not elucidate the connection between the relational and the propositional term. Therefore truth is redundant and must be rejected. The speaker of a statement “I know p” could still argue that his knowledge is some sort of reinforcement of ├ p, pointing to the symbol of the affirmation “├”. The symbol is complex, however, as it consists of a horizontal and a vertical line, both of which have different meanings. It 10

Cf. “Ich sage »Ich weiß p«, entweder um zu versichern, daß auch mir die Wahrheit p bekannt sei, oder einfach als eine Verstärkung von├ p. Man sagt auch »Ich glaube es nicht, ich weiß es«. Und das könnte man auch so ausdrücken (z. B.): »Das ist ein Baum. Und das ist keine bloße Vermutung.« [...] Aber wie ist es damit: »Wenn ich jemand mitteilte, daß das ein Baum ist, so wäre es keine bloße Vermutung.« Ist nicht dies, was Moore sagen wollte?” Wittgenstein, ÜG, §422.

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expresses two different notions, the mere content and the speaker’s attitude towards this content. In order to illustrate what was said we shall consider another example of the form: “I know that a “box tree (Boxes sempervirens) is a tree.”11 What does the speaker exactly know when saying this? As the word is a compound of “box” and “tree” the speaker starts from the assumption that the plant is a type of tree. Let us further suppose the speaker had never seen a “box tree”, or if he had, could not clearly identify it. The speaker has learned to distinguish between a shrub and a tree. If he then applies what he has learned he would not be misled by the name tree but rather identify the plant by its shape and recognize it as shrub. This example shows how the knowledge of speaker and listener may differ, even though they relate to the same object. Let us examine this example in more detail. Our speaker has expressed a statement that he considers a certainty in the form of a belief set system. But why is this certainty justified? Philosophers have provided different explanations on this issue. N. Garver argues that certainty is based on a form of life. A characteristic element of this form of life is that it is species-specific following a division of objects into genera and species. Likewise a form of life makes reference to the general term “tree” and thereby takes its natural history into account. The speaker would therefore most likely assume to be confronted with a tree and then assign it to the subgenus “box tree”.12 In this context the assumption of a plurality of forms of life would be arbitrary, redundant and even misleading, as Garver thinks. Everybody could clearly identify the box tree as a special type of tree. As such, two speakers with the same knowledge of natural history would easily agree on the issue due to their same from of life. As both share the same form of life they would be like-minded and even coincide in their actions.13 Another is the position of R. Haller, who argues for a pluralistic interpretation of form of life. This position is reflected in a particular reading of the Philosophical Investigations.14 In his view a multitude of forms of life corresponds to a plurality of “facts of Life” (Tatsachen des

11

Cf. Wittgenstein, ÜG, §352. Garver, 1984, 34. 13 Garver, 1984, 48. 14 Haller, 1984, 55ff. 12

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Lebens).15 According to his view Wittgenstein used the notion of forms of life in an “anthropological-sociological sense,”16 in which “facts of life” are linked to human actions. But what kind of certainty does someone obtain when acting according to the facts of life? Except for a few occasional references Wittgenstein does not give an answer. One of these occasional references is the notion of what he calls “the given language.” Contrary to Garver’s position I will plead for a pluralistic view and argue that language is a distinctive criterion of different forms of life. Anthropological-sociological action is the result of the variety of forms of life rather than its precondition. Different language games provide the basis for different forms of life. The choice of grammar allows to perceive what Wittgenstein calls “the given” from a particular perspective. We tend to build our certainty upon on the grammar that we use in this context. Consequently certainty and grammar are closely linked. The degree of certainty underlying the statement “I know that a box tree (Buxus sempervirens) is a tree” depends neither on a type of species nor on facts of life (Tatsachen des Lebens). It is rather the speaker’s language that is relevant in this context. In the process of language acquisition we not only learn the literal meaning of words but also the figurative connotations that are associated with it. Accordingly, in order to understand that “box tree” does not necessarily refer to a tree, the speaker must have understood the underlying grammar. In this process neither knowledge of natural history nor a classification of species are of any help but rather lead us on a wrong track. On the other hand, one may be baffled if a speaker cannot identify a “box tree” as a tree. How can one reasonably explain that a “box tree” is not a tree? How can the doubt be removed? A biologist would point to the distinctive features according to which a box tree is a shrub rather than a tree. In this context we shall take up Wittgenstein’s quote in which he says this: One might say: “‘I know’ expresses comfortable certainty, not the certainty that is still struggling.”17

A biologist would express the statement with reassured certainty, “I know that this is a box tree and therefore it is a shrub.” The calm certainty is part of the language game by which the statement is expressed. Only 15

Wittgenstein, PU II, p. 529. Haller, 1984, 50. 17 Cf. “Man könnte sagen: “‘Ich weiß’ drückt die beruhigte Sicherheit aus, nicht die noch käpfende.” Wittgenstein, ÜG, §357. 16

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those who have learned this language game can therefore claim to have a form of life. 3.

More on Certainty

Let us now come back to the essential aspect of certainty by analyzing the relation between language game and form of life. The following quotes sum up Wittgenstein’s position on this issue: “Die primitive Form des Sprachspiels ist nicht die S Unsicherheit «Sicherheit», nicht die Unsicherheit. Denn die Unsicherheit könnte nie «nicht» zur Tat führen. Ich will sagen: es ist charakteristisch für unsere Sprache, daß sie auf dem Grund fester Lebensformen, regelmäßigen Hand‹e›lungs, «regelmäßiger Handlungen,» emporwächst. // daß sie auf dem Grund fester Lebensformen, regelmäßigen Handlungsformen, regelmäßigen Handlungsformen «Formen des Handelns» «// regelmäßigen Tun’s», emporwächst. // Ihre Funktion ist vor allem durch die Handlung, deren Begleiterin sie ist, bestimmt. Wir haben eben einen Begriff davon, was für «welcherlei» Lebensformen primitiv «sind», & welche erst aus solchen entsprossen «entsprungen» sind.”18

Yet, Wittgenstein’s explanations on the basic form of language game are anything but clear. He fluctuates between certainty and insecurity until he ultimately opts for certainty. A response to this question19, requires a definition of certainty. But Wittgenstein rejected definitions because of their “fluctuating nature”.20 Their ambiguity becomes apparent once an object is determined by two different language games that do not coincide. This creates a situation in which an expression has two different definitions that cannot be reconciled. We shall take the example of the use of the word “Hund” in German and “dog” in English and its meaning in different language games. One would think that the word “dog” is always an animal with specific characteristics namely that of a “dog”. If I claim to know the definition of a dog, then I know all the language games associated with this term. But this 18

Wittgenstein, BEE, 2000, Item 119, Vol. XV, p. 147f. Wittgenstein, BEE, 2000, Item 121, Vol. XVII, p. 56r. 20 Wittgenstein, BEE, 2000, Item 121, Vol. XVII, p. 56v. 19

Is there certainty in our form of life?

33

is not how it is. I could, for instance, reveal the name of my dog by saying: “Woody is my dog.” But when I express a figurative meaning by saying the German proverb “Da liegt der Hund begraben” then the literal English translation of this proverb “Here is where the dog is buried” does not convey the original German meaning. The actual sense in English is “There is the rub,” (or “That’s the crux of the matter”) to indicate that a certain problem is hidden behind a matter. On the other hand, I could also say “Hier liegt aus meiner Sicht der Hund begraben”, which means that “This is the Achilles heel of the matter, in my view”. However, nobody would normally associate a person with a dog as this would violate the definition of a dog. The same occurs with the statement “Ein toter Hund beißt nicht” (also: “A dead dog does not bite”), which means something like “Dead men tell no tales.” These examples show that Wittgenstein was right when he underlined that definitions do not always fully cover the semantic scope of a term. A definition does not apply to all language games. As definitions remain vague to a certain extent they must be rejected as a primitive form of language game. Still a basic language game is supposed to be simple. Wittgenstein considers the cause-and-effect relation as the most basic from of a language game and calls it “Urform”.21 Its aim is not to remove doubt but rather to detect the cause of a matter. If we compare the above mentioned games in German and then read its English translation, we wonder how this correspondence occurs. A particular notion may be expressed by different languages that are embedded in different cultures. How come that neither the language nor the culture prevent us from accessing the same content? This is only possible if we know the underlying cause of what is intended to be expressed by the language games. If we know the underlying “fact” we will understand the language game which results in a feeling of certainty when dealing with two different languages. 4.

Forms of Life

The occasional comments that Wittgenstein makes about “forms of life”, “form of life” and “Form des Lebens” are quite different as they are used in distinct contexts.22 At the beginning of the Philosophical Investigations,

21 22

Wittgenstein, BEE, 2000, Item 119, Band XV, p. 75r. See: Padilla Gálvez, 2011, 37ff.

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he started from a direct correlation between language and form of life.23 In another stance he specified this correlation and denoted statements as “language games”. He exemplified various language games and pointed to their connection with a corresponding form of life. Language games are particular forms of speaking a language. A multiplicity of language games corresponds to a variety of forms of life. In a next step, he links speaking up to an activity.24 The dual relation between language and form of life becomes a three-fold constellation of language game, activity and form of life. Certain ways of expression are associated with actions that make up a form of life. The role of language is misleading in that the entire process is very dynamic and the indefinite article creates the impression as if there were only “one”. Several philosophers have supported the view that “form of life” is an abstract concept, which is a misconception in my view. The next step is to use a language game in a real life context. Wittgenstein does not seem to be restricted to the correlation between language and culture, but rather intends to show how existence can be analyzed. He situated the language game within the frame of interpersonal relationship. Surprisingly he opted for accordance among interlocutors because he could equally have chosen discrepancy. How can one ever find two people who have kinship in their language games, actions and form of life? In people’s language or actions one would expect discrepancy, inconsistency or misunderstanding rather than compliance or agreement. As all knowledge is mediate (mittelbar) and communication of knowledge in transferred in sentences,25 one can only judge as right or wrong, what people say. Hence, people can only agree in language. However, Wittgenstein went one step further and underlined that such agreement is be situated within a form of life.26 23

“It is easy to imagine a language consisting only of orders and reports in battle. – Or a language consisting only of questions and expressions for answering Yes and No – and countless other things. – And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life.” Wittgenstein, PU, §19. 24 Wittgenstein, PU, 23. See: Wittgenstein, 2000, BEE, Item 142, p. 18f.; Wittgenstein, BEE, 2000, Item 220, p. 16; Wittgenstein, BEE, 2000, Item 227a, p. 21f.; Wittgenstein, BEE, 2000, Item 227b, p. 23; Wittgenstein, BEE, 2000, Item 239, p. 16. 25 Wittgenstein, PU, 2001, p. 85. 26 ““So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?” – What is true or false is what human beings say; and it is in their language that human beings agree. This is agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life.” Wittgenstein, PU, §241.

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5.

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On Doors and Hinges

In the Anglo-Saxon world, the section on the so-called “hinge propositions” has provoked animated discussion among philosophers.27 The issue is mainly debated within the field of skepticism. I do not want to reopen this debate here in its entirety but just want to approach the problem from a new perspective that has found little attention until now. Basically, the “hinge propositions” contain information about how the concept of form of life can be determined. However, the mutual interdependence of language games, form of life and behavior does not elucidate why two different languages portend to two forms of life despite their translatability. Obviously there are cultural differences that are not measurable in time. If we reject a monistic approach the unity of form of life and the distortion disappear. We shall concentrate on the role of utterances and actions within a specific form of life. Leaving aside the question of singularity versus a plurality of forms of life, we are interested in the question of how specific statements and actions are treated within a form of life. An in this context, Wittgenstein’s proposal of “hinge-propositions” seems interesting. He put it like this: “d.h., die Fragen, die wir Stellen & unsre Zweifel beruhen auf der Sicherheit «Gewißheit // Zweifelsfreiheit // » mit der wir derjenigen Annahmen, die gleichsam die Angeln sind, in denen jene sich drehen. // beruhen darauf, daß gewisse Sätze vom Zweifel ausgenommen sind, gleichsam die Angeln, in welchen jene sich bewegen. //”28

The quote shows that the notion of the hinge-propositions is closely related to the problem of certainty and doubt. Wittgenstein considered certain sentences to act as if they were hinges in our language. As these hinge-propositions are normally undoubted they function as fixed points upon which other sentences hinge as if they were doors attached to them. Wittgenstein says this:

27

See for instance: Cook, 1985, 85; Malcolm, 1988, 277ff; Dorbolo, 1988, 256ff; Orr, 1989, 134ff; Winch, 1998, 189ff; Rhees, 2003, 157f. 28 Wittgenstein, BEE, 2000, Item 175, Taschennotizbuch, 48r.

36

Doubtful Certainties. Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism “[...] the questions that we raise and our doubts depend upon the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.”29

The assumption of “hinges” is relevant because our philosopher expressed a conjecture which he considered impossible to prove. However, if such hinge-propositions exist then they play an important role for the ascertainment of certainty. He put it like this: “That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted.”30

And Wittgenstein said: “But it isn’t that the situation is like this: We just can’t investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.”31

These remarks point to three interesting aspects. First, he hypothesized that language games provoking a feeling of certainty in the speaker function as “hinges” on which other sentences depend. Secondly, Wittgenstein conceded that these propositions cannot be assumed without doubt. This is relevant because they function as anchors for other statements. Thirdly, these propositions would have to be beyond any doubt. Therefore assumptions must be examined and checked for their steadfastness (Standhaftigkeit). Consequently hinge-propositions within a form of life must be called into question. To what extent does a belief system play a central role in a system of convictions that underpins a form of life? Wittgenstein argued that we often make the mistake of treating ordinary empirical statements as hinge propositions. This is exemplified in the debate between Wittgenstein and Moore by reference to an example of the following sentence: “I have two hands.” Wittgenstein argued that under normal conditions this sentence is viewed as hinge-proposition and its contents is considered doubtlessly certain. But it is just undoubted because the speakers accept it without contradiction and not because there is proof. 29

“d.h., die Fragen, die wir stellen, und unsre Zweifel beruhen darauf, daß gewisse Sätze vom Zweifel ausgenommen sind, gleichsam die Angeln, in welchen jene sich bewegen.” Wittgenstein, ÜG, §341. 30 “D. h. es gehört zur Logik unsrer wissenschaftlichen Untersuchungen, daß Gewisses30 in der Tat nicht angezweifelt wird.” Wittgenstein, ÜG, §342. 31 “Es ist aber damit nicht so, daß wir eben nicht alles untersuchen können und uns daher notgedrungen mit der Annahme zufriedenstellen müssen. Wenn ich will, daß die Türe sich drehe, müssen die Angeln feststehen.” Wittgenstein, ÜG, §343.

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In other words, everybody uncritically accepts this statement after my pointing to my hands. The empirical experience is as certain as any other statement which I would prove by giving evidence. Yet, this evidence appears deceptive because it is impossible to give evidence for a hinge proposition. It is impossible to provide evidence for a sentence in which the speaker has unwavering belief. Wittgenstein goes even further by saying that such empirical statements can actually never be proved. Consequently they cannot function as hinge propositions. If we take Wittgenstein at his word then it seems useless to refute his skeptical hypothesis.32 Once again the Viennese philosopher gives us a valuable insight according to which usual sentences play a central role in our system of convictions. But in spite of its obvious doubtlessness they cannot be logically proved. Conclusions Let’s imagine a different form of life in which colours have a different significance than in our own. How would we perceive and interpret these colours? Would we assume that their meaning corresponds to the one that we are accustomed to? In one of his pocket notebooks, Wittgenstein wrote the following note: “Ein Lebensmuster dient als «ist die» Basis für eine «einer» Wortverwendung. Das Muster ändert sich. Das Sprachspiel kommt ins Wanken. Das Lebensmuster ist ja nicht genaue Regelmässigkeit.”33

This quote shows the direct relationship between form of life and linguistic usage. Form of life and language games are inseparably linked, because a form of life is passed on by language games. If we represented our form of life in patterns, we could make out ritualized forms of language use. A speaker acquires a form of life by learning language games and adding new language games which fit into this pattern. A change of a pattern of life involves a modification of language games. A comparison of different forms of life reveals other new combinations of patterns and language use. Close examination of a speaker’s language games reveals his form of life. It allows us to explore the patterns that underpin his form of life. In this context the hinge propositions have an 32 33

Wittgenstein, ÜG, §20. Wittgenstein, BEE, 2000, Item 167, Taschennotizbuch, p. 16r.

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essential role as they are a source of certitude for the speaker. According to Wittgenstein these propositions cannot be proved but still belong to the speaker’s repertoire of key sentences that equip him with certainty. New situations require from the speaker an adaptation of his language games. He is asked to respond to the new circumstances by modifying his language games respectively. But the hinge propositions are not exempt from this process. Only if a speaker manages to adapt and modify his hinge propositions according to the new context they may exert their function as new source of certainty. References Works by Ludwig Wittgenstein34 - The Bergen Electronic Edition.Oxford, Oxford U.P., 2000. - The Big Typescript (TS 213), German-English Scholars’ Edition, ed. C. Grant Luckhardt, M.A.E. Aue, Oxford, Blackwell, 2005. MS ... - Manuscript …, according to the register of G.H. v. Wright. - Philosophische Bemerkungen (1964), Ed. Rush Rhees, WA, PB Vol. 2. - Philosophische Grammatik (1969), Ed. Rush Rhees, WA, PG Vol. 4. - Philosophische Untersuchungen (1953), Ed. G.E.M. PIAnscombe, G.H. v. Wright, R. Rhees, en: WA, Vol. 1, 1953 pp. 225-618. - Philosophische PIUntersuchungen / Philosophical Investigation (1958), Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, P. 2009 M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, Wiley Blackwell, Oxford, 2009. - Philosophische Untersuchungen (2001). (Kritisch-genetische PU Edition J. Schulte), Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. RPP-I - Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (1980). Volume I. (Ed. G. E. M. Anscombe, G. H. von Wright. Trad. G. E. M. Anscombe). Blackwell, Oxford. RPP- - Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (1980). Volume II. (Ed. G. H. von Wright, Heikki Nyman. Trad. C. G. Luckhardt, II M. A. E. Aue). Blackwell, Oxford. BEE BT

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The following abbreviations are used to refer to Wittgenstein’s published works.

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ÜG W WA

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- Über Gewißheit. (1994). Werkausgabe, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. - Werkausgabe (8 Vols.), Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M., 1984. - Wiener Ausgabe. (WA, 1 - WA, 5). (Ed. V. M. Nedo). Springer Verlag, Wien – New York, 1993-1996.

Baker, G.P., P.M.S. Hacker, 1985: An Analytical Commentary on the ‘Philosophical Investigations’. Vol. II. Wittgenstein, Rules, Grammar and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell. Cook, J., 1985: The Metaphysics of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, Philososphical Investigations, 8 (2), 81-119. Dorbolo, J., 1988: What Turns on Hinges? Philosophical Investigations, 11 (2), 156-161. Gaffal, M., 2011: Forms of Life as Social Techniques, in: J. Padilla Gálvez, M. Gaffal (eds.), Forms of Life and Language Games, Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt a. M., 57-74. Garver, N., 1984: Die Lebensform in Wittgensteins Philosophischen Untersuchungen, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 21, 33-54. Haller, R., 1984, “Lebensform oder Lebensformen” – Eine Bemerkung zu N. Garvers ‘Die Lebensform in Wittgensteins Philosophischen Untersuchungen’, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 21, 55-64. Lütterfelds, W. and A. Roser (eds.), 1999: Der Konflikt der Lebensformen in Wittgensteins Philosophie der Sprache, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. Malcolm, N., 1988: Wittgenstein’s Scepticism’ in On Certainty. Inquiry, 31 (3), 277-293. Marques, A. and N. Venturinha (eds.), 2010: Wittgenstein on Forms of Life and the Nature of Experience. Peter Lang, Frankfurt a.M. Moore, S.G.E., 1939: Proof of an External World, in: Proceedings of the British Academy, 25, 273-300. Reprinted in: Moore, 1959, 147-170. Moore, S.G.E., 1925: A Defence of Common Sense, in Contemporary British Philosophy, 2nd Series; J. H. Muirhead (ed.), Allen and Unwin, London, 193-223. Reprinted in: Moore, 1959, 106-133. Moore, S.G.E., 1959: Philosophical Papers. George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. Orr, D.J., 1989: Did Wittgenstein Have a Theory of Hinge Propositions? Philosophical Investigations, 12 (2), 134-153. Padilla Gálvez, J., 2010: Form of Life as Arithmetical Experiment, in: Marques, Venturinha, 2010, 113-124.

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Padilla Gálvez, J., 2011: Language as Forms of Life, in: J. Padilla Gálvez & M. Gaffal (eds.), Forms of Life and Language Games, Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt a. M., 37-56. Phillips, D. Z., 2005: The Case of the Missing Propositions, in: D. MoyalSharrock, W. H. Brenner (eds.), Readings of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 16-29. Rhees, R., 2003: Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. There – Like Our Life. Blackwell, Oxford. Winch, P., 1998: Judgement: Propositions and Practices. Philosophical Investigations, 21 (3), 189-202. University of Castilla-La Mancha

Certainty and Forms of Life Inês SALGUEIRO 1. Common Sense Human beings are the holders of a general form of access to the world, which ensures the legitimacy of their point of view without the need for any substantiation. This form of access is called common sense. Common sense is the barrier that protects the consistency of our lives and, accordingly, does not have the duty to formulate or solve philosophical problems. Its task is situated rather at the antipodes of the problematic of philosophy. Therefore this mode of access is never put in check. In other words, there are certainties, though not clear, which act as pillars underlying our whole life. These foundations are not known, i.e. common sense does not know what they are and how they are. In any case common sense works through our acts, or holds a practical functionality. This feature does not admit weakness. In our daily life we act not only with certainty, but also with safety. We know, for example, that our life is part of a pre-existing world in which we operate. We integrate ourselves into this world and we start acting in compliance with it. But this is not a decision on our part as if there was the option to not act accordingly. We (apparently) have no choice; we are not given the possibility to choose at birth if we want or do not want to subordinate ourselves to the coherence of common sense. It seems that we cannot reverse this setting. In consequence, the knowledge of common sense cannot admit the possibility of splitting. Its knowledge is never the result of mere belief and does not suspect there is the possibility of being liable to delusion or deception. Obviously knowledge can make mistakes and admit that it often misses, but these mistakes are mistakes of detail, i.e. they are mistakes within the framework of common sense and are not mistakes that bring this structure into question. If common sense allowed itself to admit the possibility of finding itself deeply wrong, this would imply its collapse because it would instil doubt. This cannot happen because what is proper to common sense is certainty or, to put it another

Doubtful Certainties. Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism, (Eds. Jesús PADILLA GÁLVEZ, Margit GAFFAL), Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt a. M., 2012, 41-52.

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way, to make no distinction between holding a thing to be true and its being true.1 The knowledge of common sense does not even see the difference between both positions and does not see them because it does not have that possibility in its horizon of meaning. It would be a contradiction. The holding to be true becomes true and common sense knows how things are. This is not arguable and it means that common sense depends on life; it is found in it and it is life that directs us with its enigmatic logic. 2.

Moore and ‘A Defence of Common Sense’

In ‘A Defence of Common Sense’, Moore seeks to pursue a defence of common sense. His task is to be able to claim, with legitimacy, a series of statements that he “knows with certainty to be true.” Moore starts with common sense to support common sense. This task is not easy since what is proper to common sense is precisely its lack of clarity to itself. It is this being short of information that allows common sense to be common sense. Common sense in its own definition excludes the possibility of finding grounds to accurately justify itself. But to understand Moore better it is appropriate to note what he stated: “(1) I begin, then, with my list of truisms, every one of which (in my own opinion) I know, with certainty, to be true. The propositions to be included in this list are the following: There exists at present a living human body, which is my body. This body was born at a certain time in the past, and has existed continuously ever since, though not without undergoing changes; it was, for instance, much smaller when it was born, and for some times afterwards, than it is now. Ever since it was born, it has been either in contact with or not far from the surface of the earth; and, at every moment since it was born, there have also existed many other things, having shape and size in three dimensions (in the same familiar sense in which it has), from which it has been at various distances (in the familiar sense in which it is now at a distance both from that mantelpiece and from that bookcase, and at a greater distance from the bookcase than it is from the mantelpiece); also there have (very often, at all events) existed some other things of this kind with which it was in contact (in the familiar sense in which it is now in contact with the pen I am holding in my right hand and with some of the clothes I am wearing). Among the things which have, in this sense, 1

I would like to thank Nuno Venturinha for discussions about the importance of this expression in Wittgenstein’s philosophy.

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formed part of its environment (i.e., have been either in contact with it, or at some distance from it, however great) there have, at every moment since its birth, been large numbers of other living bodies, each of which has, like it, (a) at some time been born, (b) continued to exist from some time after birth, (c) been, at every moment of its life after birth, either in contact with or not far from the surface of the earth; and many of these bodies have already died and ceased to exist. But the earth had existed also for many years before my body was born; and for many of these years, also, large numbers of human bodies had, at every moment, been alive upon it; and many of these bodies had died and ceased to exist before it was born.”2

What Moore expresses in this excerpt is not anything new. There are a number of certainties that common sense dominates. Further, common sense is a sense common to all of us, that is, we all understand what Moore says and give him our consent: we believe this is so. As Wittgenstein expresses it: “The truths which Moore says he knows, are such as, roughly speaking, all of us know, if he knows them”3. We all know the propositions of common sense. The difficulty is not to know what these theses are but to enlighten them. In common sense, as stated in the previous point, the cognitive determinations are not explicit. But what Moore carries out is not an attempt at disclosure, that is, to show the “depth” of common sense. No. What Moore tells us is: i. ii. iii.

Common sense is so; We live by common sense; He knows it is so.

It is a fact that Moore knows that it is so. But that fact does not confer any advocacy of common sense. Wittgenstein tells us that: “It needs to be shewn that no mistake was possible giving the assurance ‘I know’ doesn’t suffice. For it is after all only an assurance that I can’t be making a mistake, and it needs to be objectively established that I am not making a mistake about that.”4 And he adds: “And so, when writers enumerate all the things they know, that proves nothing whatever. So the possibility of knowledge about physical objects

2

Moore, 1993, pp 107-108. Wittgenstein, 1974, OC, §100. 4 Wittgenstein, 1974, OC, § 15. 3

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Doubtful Certainties. Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism cannot be proved by the protestations of those who believe that they have such knowledge.”5

Wittgenstein’s proposition shows precisely the failure of Moore’s statements. Moore is not only unable to defend common sense, but he also does not find the most important feature, namely, it is by being so that there is insufficiency regarding knowledge. Therefore, if we question how this knowledge is acquired, the answer remains at the same level: “I also hold that there is no good reason to suppose that every physical fact is causally dependent upon some mental fact.” 6

Moore knows. And how does he know? Knowing. He knows because he says he knows. But: “What is the proof that I Know something? Most certainly not my saying I know it.”7 Moore must prove that he knows, but Moore does not prove this; he legitimizes his position by stating that there is no good reason for it to be otherwise, and obviously because it is so. Wittgenstein’s analysis does not remove Moore’s reason about the fact that Moore cannot find a good reason to establish a practical doubt about common sense. What Wittgenstein tells us is that Moore does not explain anything, but just assumes: “But how can we show someone that we know truths, not only about sense-data but also about things? For after all it can’t be enough for someone to assure us that he knows this. Well, what must our starting point be if we are to shew this?”8 “The statement ‘I know that here is a hand’ may then be continued: ‘for it’s my hand that I’m looking at’. Then a reasonable man will not doubt that I know. – Nor will the idealist; rather he will say that he was not dealing with the practical doubt which is being dismissed, but there is a further doubt behind that one. – That this is an illusion has to be shewn in a different way.”9

What Wittgenstein argues is: if in fact we cannot establish a practical doubt about common sense, it is also true that belief, however strong it might be, even if it is taken as knowledge, is not knowledge. And one cannot defend the knowledge of common sense just by saying, quite simply, that it is evident. This means that the certainties of common sense 5

Wittgenstein, 1974, OC, §488. Moore, 1993, p. 126. 7 Wittgenstein, 1974, OC, §487. 8 Wittgenstein, 1974, OC, §426. 9 Wittgenstein, 1974, OC, §19. 6

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are founded on beliefs that assume these same assurances. And “The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing.”10 Moore does not distinguish the knowledge of common sense from philosophical knowledge because as Wittgenstein tells us: “‘I Know it’ I say to someone else; and there is a justification. But there is none for my belief.”11 Wittgenstein does not accept Moore’s evidence because it has no objective value. But Moore’s article caught the attention of Wittgenstein. Why? The claims that Moore makes intend ultimately to show that one cannot live outside common sense.12 Wittgenstein maintains this position, but the justification must be made in another way. Not by assumption. The assumption of the statements of common sense includes a belief that is not clear, i.e. a belief which is taken as knowledge, but actually is not. This assumption is “tied” to the praxis of everyday life. We affirm that there is an acceptance of common sense knowledge because no one knows why it is accepted. We take our knowledge to be true and we take it because this knowledge is not put under review except for in practical functionality. It is because the knowledge of common sense works in life that we take it for granted. But this holding to be true is not elucidated to itself, i.e. common sense does not suspect that its knowledge only has itself as if it is true. This is beyond its comprehension. And this occurs because its evidence is only practical, works for our day to day survival and allows us to guide our lives. All knowledge of common sense belongs to a sphere of intimacy that guides us and enables us to live with certainties. As Wittgenstein says: “My life shews that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on. I tell a friend e.g. ‘Take that chair over there’, ‘shut the door’, etc. etc.”13 “Even the most trustworthy of men assures me that he knows things are thus and so, this by itself cannot satisfy me that he does know. Only that he believes he knows. That is why Moore’s assurance that he knows … does not interest us. The propositions, however, which Moore retails as examples of such known truths are indeed interesting. Not because anyone knows their truths, or believes he knows them, but because they all have a similar role in the system of our empirical judgments.”14 10

Wittgenstein, 1974, OC, §166. Wittgenstein, 1974, OC, §175. 12 Moore does not clarify this position. His criteria are not philosophical but empirical. 13 Wittgenstein, 1974, OC, §7. 14 Wittgenstein, 1974, OC, §137. 11

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Wittgenstein turns his attention to the statements that Moore selected as knowing to be true. What is at issue is not how Moore argues about these statements - this does not interest him. What is relevant is that these statements are, precisely, fundamental statements, or, in other words, statements that endanger our whole system of beliefs. If it is known that we just take these statements to be true, and if we try to determine what we do know, the task turns out to be unbearable: “It is as if ‘I Know’ did not tolerate a metaphysical emphasis.”15

Thus, Wittgenstein says that the attempt of knowledge leads to a “bewitchment” of the concept, because “The propositions which one comes back to again and again as if bewitched - these I should like to expunge from philosophical language.”16 He adds: “One is often bewitched by a word. For example, by the word ‘know’.”17 How can we get out of here? An exit through common sense is not possible because it was perceived that we were just assuming. In other words, we cannot return to it as if nothing had happened since it was understood that its certainties require support. Wittgenstein tells us that the possibility for clarification should occur at the root of the problem. However, “It is so difficult to find the beginning. Or, better: it is difficult to begin at the beginning. And not try to go further back.”18. But we cannot start at the beginning, precisely because knowledge is constituted within life: “The child learns by believing the adult. Doubt comes after belief.”19 As a consequence, the problem of knowledge can only be formed in language games. Philosophy wishes to change nature. Wanting to “know” instead of “I believe” is to alter the natural state of life: “One cannot make experiments if there are not some things that one does not doubt. But that does not mean that one takes certain presuppositions on trust. When, I write a letter and post it, I take it for granted that it will arrive - I expect this. If I make an experiment I do not doubt the existence of the apparatus before my eyes. I have plenty of doubts, but not that. If I do a calculation I believe, without any doubts, that the figures on the paper aren’t switching of their own accord, and I also trust my memory 15

Wittgenstein, 1974, OC, §482. Wittgenstein, 1974, OC, §31. 17 Wittgenstein, 1974, OC, §435. 18 Wittgenstein, 1974, OC, §471. 19 Wittgenstein, 1974, OC, §160. 16

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the whole time, and trust it without any reservation. The certainty here is the same as that of my never having been on the moon.”20

Wittgenstein draws attention to the fact that it is impossible to make our lives depend on the necessity of having to know everything with absolute certainty: “If I say ‘we assume’ that the earth has existed for many years past’ (or something similar), then of course it sounds strange that we should assume such a thing. But the entire system of our language-games it belongs to the foundations. The assumption, one might say, forms the basis of action, and therefore, naturally, of thought.”21

3.

Wittgenstein and the Cartesian Doubt

The attempt at clarification cannot be done, as Descartes claims, from doubt. Nor can Descartes justify experience through a fundament which is presented as absolutely clear and distinct. Wittgenstein tells us that: “Perhaps someone says ‘There must be some basic principle on which we accord credence’, but what can such a principle accomplish? Is it more than a natural law of ‘taking for true’?”22 What Wittgenstein points out is that in the search for a fundamental principle lies the assumption that we keep track of what is at stake. The Cartesian doubt requires removing whatever is not presented as crystal clear and distinct. Therefore it is necessary to assume criteria to decide on the course, i.e. it is previously known what we want to achieve. It is through this knowledge that we remove what is susceptible to doubt: “If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty.”23

The method through which Descartes strives for certainty cannot be followed without many certainties remaining intact: “Admittedly, if you are obeying the order ‘Bring me a book’, you may have to check whether the thing you see over there really is a book, but then you do at least know what people mean by ‘book’; and if you don’t you can look it up, -but then you must know what some other word means. And the fact that a word means such-and-such, is used in such20

Wittgenstein, 1974, OC, §337. Wittgenstein, 1974, OC, §411. 22 Wittgenstein, 1974, OC, §172. 23 Wittgenstein, 1974, OC, §115. 21

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Doubtful Certainties. Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism and-such a way, is in turn an empirical fact, like the fact that what you see over there is a book. Therefore, in order for you to be able to carry out an order there must be some empirical fact about which you are not in doubt. Doubt itself rests only on what is beyond doubt. But since a language-game is something that consists in the recurrent procedures of the game in time, it seems impossible to say in any individual case that such-and-such must be beyond doubt if there is to be a language-game - though it is right enough to say that as a rule some empirical judgment or other must be beyond doubt.”24

We cannot doubt everything because doubt moves within certainty. Knowledge is not justified by a given base that it is the first and irrefutable datum. First, in such datum one would have to recognize a prior sense as if we were able to decide the rules of the game. Descartes does not nullify this assumption in any case. It is precisely because doubt must assume a form of assumption in itself that the act of doubting is presented as absolutely certain: “‘Here I have arrived at a foundation of all my beliefs.’ ‘This position I will hold!’ But isn’t that, precisely, only because I am completely convinced of it? – What is ‘being completely convinced’ like?”25

Second, this information is “inside” experience, or rather, it is a part of it: “When we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions. (Light dawns gradually over the whole.)”26 “It is not single axioms that strikes me as obvious, it is a system in which consequences and premises give one another mutual support”27

The experience occurs in its entirety. It is in this whole that each part has its value. It is the whole that gives meaning to the parts and not the reverse. It is a system: “Our knowledge forms an enormous system. And only within this system has a particular bit the value we give it.”28It is this system that shapes our knowledge. We cannot reveal all propositions that 24

Wittgenstein, 1974, OC, §519. Wittgenstein, 1974, OC, §246. 26 Wittgenstein, 1974, OC, §141. 27 Wittgenstein, 1974, OC, §142. 28 Wittgenstein, 1974, OC, §410. 25

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constitute it. But this system works as a hinge around which the propositions move: “I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.”29 “That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were hinges on which those turn.”30 “I want to say: propositions of the form of empirical propositions, and not only propositions of logic, form the foundation of all operating with thoughts (with language). - This observation is not of the form ‘I Know…’. ‘I know…’ states what I know, and that is not of logical interest.”31

4.

The Fundamental Problem

It is not an issue for Wittgenstein to know how our experience is constituted, if an object is grasped correctly, if we know the limitations of our point of view, and so on. What matters to Wittgenstein is: What is the meaning of our experience? What matters is to notice that what constitutes our knowledge is its being attached to our lives, forming a total set of possibilities. Therefore, pure speculation is derived from a fabulous consideration since the position of each thing possesses a meaning for our existence: “I make assertions about reality, assertions which have different degrees of assurance. How does the degree of assurance come out? What consequences has it? We may be dealing, for example, with the certainty of memory, or again of perception. I may be sure of something, but still know what test might convince me of error. I am e.g. quite sure of the date of a battle, but if I should find a different date in a recognized work of history, I should alter my opinion, and this would not mean I lost all faith in judging.”32

29

Wittgenstein, 1974, OC, §152. Wittgenstein, 1974, OC, §341. 31 Wittgenstein, 1974, OC, §401. 32 Wittgenstein, 1974, OC, §66. 30

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In life we live. We cannot stop living. Thus, pure philosophical speculation is not possible because it is not our form of life: “But imagine people who were never quite certain of these things, but said that they were very probably so, and that it did not pay to doubt them. Such a person, then, would say in my situation: ‘It is extremely unlikely that I have ever been on the moon’, etc., etc. How would the life of these people differ from ours? For there are people who say that it is merely extremely probable that water over a fire will boil and not freeze, and that therefore strictly speaking what we consider impossible is only improbable. What difference does this make in their lives? Isn’t it just that they talk rather more about certain things than the rest of us?”33

We can start to understand the world differently, have the perception of its habits, meditate on knowledge, discover its faults and have a sense of finitude. But all these differences occur on a basis that allows them to do so. This base did not change. Nobody has metamorphosed: “So is the hypothesis possible, that all things around us don’t exist? Would that not be like the hypothesis of our having miscalculated in all our calculations?”34

All the possibilities of error, even though they appear to infect our way of being as a whole, do not affect us: “Now I would like to regard this certainty, not as something akin to hastiness or superficiality, but as a form of life. (That is very badly expressed and probably badly thought as well.)”35 “My life consists in my being content to accept many things.”36

The problem is anthropological; it can never be merely epistemological. And in an attempt to clarify the meaning, the problematic issues are recognized as being meaningless since this does not make sense in our grammar, the only one capable of conferring sense within its language games: “Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; - but the end is not certain propositions striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is

33

Wittgenstein, 1974, OC, §338. Wittgenstein, 1974, OC, §55. 35 Wittgenstein, 1974, OC, §358. 36 Wittgenstein, 1974, OC, §344. 34

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not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game.” 37 “Do I want to say, then, that certainty resides in the nature of the language-games?”38 “You must bear in mind that the language-game is so to say something unpredictable. I mean: it is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable). It is there – like our life.”39

In short, philosophical speculation occurs in life. As a result, any reflection takes place from our concrete existence. And when we try to clarify life, this clarification can only be done through language. Although language is a means to an end; it is the only way that seems to give us certainty. Wittgenstein reports to us that the ideal would be to find the beginning40. This task, however, appears to be similar to finding the way out of the labyrinth of Minos. For this reason, the solution must be the acceptance of our form of life41. Take, for example, a straight line in mathematics. Where to begin? There are no straight lines available to our capacity of human understanding; only line segments. Mathematicians do not know where the beginning of the line lies, but this has never prevented anyone from drawing a straight line. In its practical application, this “failure” is not responsible for the collapse of buildings. We have a recognition that we are not before totality.42 But it happens as expected, such as life does. Whether our life or our language, or the line, are similar with regard to the beginning, we do not know where it is located. Despite this omission, they work.43 References Moore, G. E., 1993: A Defense of Common Sense. In: Selected Writings. Routledge, London, pp. 106-133.

37

Wittgenstein, 1974, OC, §204. Wittgenstein, 1974, OC, §457. 39 Wittgenstein, 1974, OC, §559. 40 About this concept see note 18. 41 See note 35. 42 I am grateful to Arthur Gibson for his helpful comments in Toledo about Philosophy of Mathematics. 43 Many thanks to Nuno Venturinha for his great help with this paper. 38

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Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1974: On Certainty, (OC), ed. by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, tr. by Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe. Blackwell, Oxford. Lisbon

‘Hinge Propositions’ and Radical Skepticism Nicola CLAUDIO SALVATORE Introduction In this paper, I present and discuss an anti-skeptical strategy influenced by Wittgenstein’s remarks on ‘hinge propositions’. I argue that this account represents a viable solution—or, perhaps better, dissolution—of Cartesianstyle skeptical arguments. To defend this claim, I will first present Cartesian skepticism and his implications; then, I will briefly sketch G.E. Moore anti-skeptical strategy and Wittgenstein’s main criticisms against Moore’s use of the expression ‘to know’ and ‘to doubt. I will finally present Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘hinges’ and its anti-skeptical consequences. 1.

The Cartesian Skeptical Paradox

The feature of Cartesian-style arguments is that we cannot know some empirical propositions (such as “I have a body”, or “There are external objects”), as we may be dreaming, hallucinating, deceived by a demon, or be “brains-in-the-vat” (BIVs—i.e., disembodied brains floating in a vat connected to supercomputers). Therefore, as we are unable to refute these skeptical hypotheses, we are also unable to know propositions that we would otherwise accept as being true if we could rule-out these scenarios. Let’s take a skeptical hypothesis, SH, such as the BIV hypothesis mentioned above, and M, an empirical proposition like “I have a body” that would entail the falsity of a skeptical hypothesis. We can then state the structure of Cartesian skeptical arguments as follows: (S1) I do not know not-SH. (S2) If I do not know not-SH, then I do not know M. (SC) I do not know M.

Doubtful Certainties. Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism, (Eds. Jesús PADILLA GÁLVEZ, Margit GAFFAL), Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt a. M., 2012, 53-61.

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Considering that we can repeat this argument for each and every of our empirical knowledge claims, the radical skeptical consequence that we can draw from this and similar arguments is that our knowledge is impossible. A way of dealing with “Cartesian style” skepticism is to deny the premise S1) of the skeptical argument, thus affirming contra the skeptic that we can know the falsity of the relevant skeptical hypothesis. For instance, in his “A Defence of Common Sense”1 and “Proof of the External World”2, G. E. Moore famously argued that we can have knowledge of the “commonsense view of the world”, that is of propositions such as “I have a body”, “There are external objects” or “The earth existed long before my birth” and that this knowledge would offer a direct response against skeptical worries. Wittgenstein wrote the 676 anti-skeptical remarks published posthumously as On Certainty3 under the influence of both DCS and PEW, and of the conversations he had about these papers with his pupil and friend Norman Malcolm. As I’ve briefly mentioned, Moore’s affirmation that he knows for certain the “obvious truisms” of commonsense is pivotal in his anti-skeptical strategy; his knowledge-claims would allow him to refute the skeptic. But, argues Wittgenstein, to say that we simply “know” Moore-style propositions would be somewhat misleading. First, because in order to say “I know” one should be able, at least in principle, to produce evidence and/or to offer compelling grounds for his beliefs. This is to say, the “language game” of knowledge involves and presupposes the ability to give reasons, justifications and evidence. Now this seems highly problematic in the case of Moore-style propositions. This is because, argues Wittgenstein,4 Moore’s grounds aren’t stronger than what they are supposed to justify. Just imagine, for instance, than one attempted to legitimate one’s claim to know that p by using the evidence that one has for p (for example, what one sees, what one has been told about p and so on). Now, if the evidence we adduce to support p is less secure than p itself, then this same evidence would be unable to support p.

1

Moore, 1925, henceforth DCS. Moore, 1939, henceforth PEW. 3 Wittgenstein, 1969, henceforth OC. 4 Wittgenstein, 1969, OC, 245. 2

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But if it would be somewhat odd to claim that we simply ‘know’ Moore-style propositions, still, argues Wittgenstein, they cannot be object of doubt. If someone is holding seriously a denial of a Moore style proposition, for instance by saying that she has no body, we would not investigate the truth-value of her affirmations, but her ability to understand the language she is using or her sanity; for a similar false belief would more likely be the result of a sensorial or mental disturbance.5 Also, for Wittgenstein doubts must be based on grounds: that is, they are internal to a precise practice and must be in a way or another justified. If they don’t, they are constitutively empty. Wittgenstein gives the example6 of a pupil that constantly interrupts a lesson questioning about the existence of things, or of the meaning of words. His doubts will lack any sense, and at most it will lead to a sort of epistemic paralysis; he will just be unable to learn the skill/subject we are trying to teach him.7 More generally, for Wittgenstein any proper epistemic inquiry presupposes that we take something for granted; if we start doubting everything, there will be no knowledge at all. As he remarks at one point: “If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either […] If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty.”8

Not knowable or doubtable, Wittgenstein calls Moore-style propositions “hinges”9; just apparently empirical contingent claims which on closer inspection perform a different, more basic role in our epistemic practices. 2.

Hinges as Rules of Grammar

Throughout OC, Wittgenstein compares Moore-style propositions to norms of representations or ‘rules of grammar’.10 Very generally, in the second

5

Wittgenstein, 1969, OC, 526. Wittgenstein, 1969, OC, 310. 7 Wittgenstein, 1969, OC, 315. 8 Wittgenstein, 1969, OC, 114-115. 9 Wittgenstein, 1969, OC, 341-343. 10 Wittgenstein, 1969, OC, 36, 53,95, 167. 6

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phase of his thought Wittgenstein calls ‘‘rules of grammar’’ the conditions, the method, necessary for comparing a proposition with reality.11 To understand this point, just consider the following propositions: i)

What is red must be colored

ii)

Nothing can be red and green all over

iii)

All bachelors are unmarried

iv)

A proposition is either true or false

v)

12×12=144

Despite their differences, all these share common features that I will consider in turn. First, they are all normative, for they delimit what makes sense to say, for instance licensing and prohibiting inferences. Just consider i): if p is called red, is correctly characterized as ‘colored’; to say that it is red and to deny that it is colored would be a misuse of language, that is a move excluded from a language-game. Similarly ii), even if it looks as a description of the physics of color, is a rule that we use to exclude the description of an object as being red and green all over. iii): apparently an empirical description, is not meant to make a true statement of fact about bachelors but rather to explain the meaning of the word “bachelor”. iv) looks like a description, a generalization about propositions as ‘All lions are carnivorous ‘ is a generalization about lions. But things are somewhat different, for we use iv) to define what may be correctly called ‘a proposition’ in logical reasoning; also, it does not exclude a third possibility but rather exclude as meaningless the phrase ‘a proposition which is neither true nor false’. Finally12, we call v) a true arithmetical proposition, and more generally we also speak of ‘true’ or ‘false’ equations (2+2= 4 true, 2+2= 5 false). But this is somewhat misleading and can lead us considering arithmetical propositions as descriptions of state of affairs that do or do not obtain. On the contrary, for Wittgenstein mathematical necessary truths are not descriptive but normative; for instance, v) licenses and prohibits 11

Wittgenstein, 1974, PG, 88. In the following, I will just sketch some uncontroversial aspects of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics, in order to cast more light on his conception of ‘‘rules of grammar’’. A punctual reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s views on the matter and of the debate they originated would fall beyond the scope of this essay.

12

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inferences, in the sense that it licenses transformations of empirical statements and at the same time excludes other inferences as invalid. Following v)13 we can legitimate transform the statement ‘There were 12 books each on 12 shelves in the bookshop’ into ‘There were 144 books into the bookshop’; also, v) excludes as illegitimate ‘There were 12 books each on 12 shelves, so there were 1212 books in the bookshop’ (an inference which is also excluded by the true inequation 12×12≠1212). A second feature of the ‘rules of grammar’ is that they cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed by reality; rather, they are ways to make sense of reality. For instance, no one ever discovered that i), nor we came to know that i) by, say, checking the color of any object that we call ‘red’; in a similar fashion, ii) cannot possibly be disconfirmed by the existence of something which is red and green all over. Likewise, we would not verify iii) by investigating the marital status of people identified as bachelors, and no ‘married bachelor’ would possibly disconfirm iii). Similarly, even if we do perfectly speak of half truths, or rough or approximate truths or of something being partly true or partly false, this does not affect in any way iv), for the objects of such assertions are not cut to the pattern required for logical inference and thus cannot confirm or disconfirm iv).14 Finally, even if we can imagine a different arithmetic in which v) can turn out to be wrong and v*) 12×12=1212 is correct, this would not disconfirm v), for this v*) would simply not belong to the practice we call arithmetic. A third and important feature of Wittgenstein’s ‘rules of grammar’ is that they are not propositions, namely they cannot be either true or false; for their ‘negation’ is, more than false, senseless. Just consider the following putative statements: i*)

p is red and is not colored

ii*)

p is red and green all over

iii*) Some bachelors are married iv*) a proposition is neither true nor false v*)

13 14

12×12=1212

This is a, slightly modified, example used by Hacker and Baker, 1985, 269. Hacker and Baker, 1985, 265.

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Statements from i*) to v*) are nothing but nonsensical, even if intelligible, combinations of signs. Thus, the difference between ‘‘rules of grammar’’ and their negations is not similar to the difference between true and false statements, but between a rule of expression and a use of words/symbols which that rule excludes as nonsensical. 3.

Hinges, Knowledge and Understanding

To sum up, ‘rules of grammar’ have three features which make them different from empirical knowledge claims. First, they are not descriptive but normative; second, they cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed by reality but rather are ways to make sense of reality; finally, they are not propositions as their negation is not false but senseless. An important consequence of the distinction between empirical propositions and ‘rules of grammar’ is that to claim that we ‘know’ a rule would not only be improper but altogether misguided. As Wittgenstein writes with regard to mathematical propositions15 once we ‘know’ that, for instance, v) 12×12=144, we do not know anything about reality (I.e. whether a state of affairs does or does not obtain); rather, we are acquainted with a technique which can enable us to make sense of reality. More generally, to ‘know’ a ‘rule of grammar’ consists in understanding its meaning and the correct application for its use; accordingly, to hold a denial of a rule would not display factual ignorance but rather lack of understanding, for it would mean that we have not understood or completely understood the rule at issue. With this account of ‘rules of grammar’ in mind, we can go back to Wittgenstein’s treatment of ‘hinges’ and their epistemic role. In a number of entries of OC, Wittgenstein considers Moore-style propositions as “the scaffolding of our thoughts”,16 “foundation-walls”,17 the “substratum of all our enquiring and asserting”.18 These ‘hinges’ are the basic rules which enable us to make sense of reality, thus drawing a line between sense and nonsense rather than between truth and falsity. 15

Wittgenstein, 1978, RFM, 356; Hacker and Baker, 1985, 290. Wittgenstein, 1969, OC, 211. 17 Wittgenstein, 1969, OC, 248. 18 Wittgenstein, 1969, OC, 162. 16

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As with the denials of the grammatical rules we encountered before, to deny or doubt Moore-style propositions would not show factual ignorance but a systematic misunderstanding of the role they play in our system of beliefs. For to take for granted ‘rules of grammar’ like “There are external objects’ is a constitutive part of our practices of ‘arguing’ and ‘judging’: “All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system. And this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of departure for all our arguments: no, it belongs to the essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which arguments have their 19 life”.

Accordingly, Moore-style propositions would define what rationality is; to be rational epistemic agents would be, among other things, to think of ourselves as embodied beings, interacting with external objects and so on. This is why, as we have already seen, Wittgenstein considers Radical skepticism more similar to a mental disturbance20 than to a, maybe wrong but still sensible, philosophical position. This account will have two promising anti-skeptical implications. Recall the feature of Cartesian-style arguments: (S1) I do not know not-SH. (S2) If I do not know not-SH, then I do not know M. (SC) I do not know M, where not-SH can be an ‘hinge’ such as “I have a body’ or ‘There are external objects’. This argument seems so compelling as long as we take ‘hinges’ as propositional beliefs, which can be either confirmed by evidence or legitimately doubted once we run skeptical arguments. But as we have seen, even if they resemble empirical contingent knowledge claims ‘hinges’ are rules of grammar; accordingly, Cartesian-style skepticism would be based on a conceptual error, namely on treating nonpropositional rules as propositional beliefs. A second and more important consequence of this account is that it will not affect Closure. Recall our formulation of the Closure principle:

19 20

Wittgenstein, 1969, OC, 105, my italics. Wittgenstein, 1969, OC, 526.

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If S knows that p, and S competently deduces from p that q, thereby coming to believe that q on this basis while retaining her knowledge that p, then S knows that q. As has been pointed out by Duncan Pritchard,21 the crucial aspect of this principle to notice is that it involves an agent forming a belief on the basis of the relevant competent deduction; the idea behind Closure is in fact that an agent can came to acquire new knowledge via the competent deduction where this means that the belief in question is based on that deduction. Accordingly, if we cannot rule out a skeptical scenario such as the BIV one, we would be unable to know Moore-style propositions such as ‘I have a body’ or “There are external object’ and thus, given Closure, we would be unable to know anything at all. But “hinges” are not the expressions of a propositional attitude such as a belief in; rather, they are the expression of non-propositional rules. Thus, the very fact that we, strictly speaking, do not know the denials of skeptical scenarios would be then compatible with Closure; for hinges are not beliefs, so they are not in the market for propositional knowledge. Concluding Remarks In this paper, I have argued that Wittgenstein’s “hinge propositions” strategy, correctly understood and developed, can help us to dissolve Cartesian skepticism as the result of a conceptual error. References Baker, G., Hacker P.M.S, 1985: Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar And Necessity, Oxford, Blackwell. Moore, G.E., 1925: ‘A defence of Commonsense’, Contemporary British Philosophers (2nd series) (ed.) J.H. Muirhead, London, Allen and Unwin. Moore, G.E., 1939: ‘Proof of an External world’, Proceedings of the British academy, 25, 273-300. Moyal-Sharrock, D., 2004: Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, London, Palgrave Macmillan. 21

Pritchard, forthcoming b, 14.

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Pritchard, D.H., forthcoming a: Entitlement and the Groundlessness of our believing, Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, (eds.) D. Dodd & E. Zardini. Oxford, Oxford UP. Pritchard, D.H., forthcoming b: Wittgenstein and the Groundlessness of our believing, Synthese. Williamson, T., 2001: Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Wittgenstein, L., 1958: Philosophical Investigations (PI), ed. G.E.M Anscombe and R. Rhees. Oxford, Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L., 1969: On Certainty (OC), ed. G.E.M Anscombe and G.H. von Wright. Oxford, Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L., 1974: Philosophical Grammar (PG), ed. R. Rhees. Oxford, Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L., 1978: Remarks on the foundation of mathematics (RFM), G.E.M Anscombe, R. Rhees and G.H. von Wright. Oxford, Blackwell.

University of Edinburgh

Animal Logic and Transcendental Arguments: On Certainty’s two Levels of Justification Modesto M. GÓMEZ ALONSO Introduction The aims of this paper are: (i) to reject deflationary and naturalistic readings of On Certainty; (ii) to show how, according to Wittgenstein, perceptual basic beliefs are grounded in epistemic competences which are not reason-involving; (iii) to distinguish two levels of knowledge, the animal and the reflective, in order to explain why Wittgenstein makes use of transcendental arguments. 1.

Deflationary and Naturalistic Interpretations of On Certainty

Certain conundra mark the heart of our incomprehension in a particularly vivid way, they are the most painful symptoms of our affliction. Skepticism is one of these problems, or, borrowing from Davidson, it is “our grudging tribute”1 to the apparent impossibility of coming to terms with three irreducible (and at first sight, independent) varieties of knowledge: the subjective, the intersubjective, and the objective. Among interpreters of On Certainty there is consensus regarding two points: Wittgenstein’s last collection of notes is not a skeptical handbook; his author is fighting to articulate an epistemological position capable to put an end to skeptical qualms in the realm of philosophy, a position whose significance is overwhelming. Unfortunately, beyond these general remarks disagreement is the rule. It is enough a cursory examination of literature to verify that almost every significant contribution to debates in analytic epistemology written in the last four decades has been disinterred from this enigmatic work in progress, and hence that interpreters attribute incompatible views to Wittgenstein. Two of these readings, the deflationary and the naturalistic interpretations, have come to be the focus of controversy. 1

Davidson, 2001, 206.

Doubtful Certainties. Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism, (Eds. Jesús PADILLA GÁLVEZ, Margit GAFFAL), Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt a. M., 2012, 63-74.

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According to the deflationary reading, forcefully advocated by Michael Williams,2 Wittgenstein’s view of skepticism is close to Carnap’s: skepticism is not idle, but nonsensical; it is absurd to raise the question if our basic beliefs, namely, those which cannot be either refuted or verified, and which Danièle Moyal-Sharrock dubbed hinge beliefs,3 are in agreement with the world; skeptics and epistemologists are guilty of the category mistake of conflating rules and propositions, ascribing a cognitive and factual content exclusive of the latter to the former. According to this type of outlook, Wittgenstein’s stance could be labeled as “internalism”: the rules of the language-game (which include stand fast beliefs like “The earth exists”, “My name is M.G.”, “I have two hands”…) do not answer to anything external to it; Wittgenstein reduced the notion of “truth” to epistemic concepts, its nature to its criteria; there is no relevant difference between the social and linguistic idealism of Philosophical Investigations and the position defended in Wittgenstein’s last remarks. The gist of this interpretation is to show how, because indubitable propositions as “There are external objects”, “I have a body” or “The world didn’t come into being five seconds ago replete with apparent traces of a much more extended past” are in fact grammatical rules, normative assertions or basic principles of inference with the external (and misleading) appearance of factual reports (they belong to logic, not to science), both skeptics and Cartesian epistemologists make senseless claims. They deal with them as with propositions, looking for proofs or evidences, when, because they constitute the props of our worldview, they are beyond demonstration, doubt and truth-values. In other words, principles of inference are indemonstrable without begging the question, which doesn’t mean that they are doubtable: we only can question that which, in other cognitive position, we also could prove, that is, empirical statements. Logical rules are neither correct nor incorrect: they make possible to talk about right and wrong (from an epistemological point of view). In contrast to this interpretation, Peter Strawson underlined the association of Wittgenstein’s “social naturalism”4 with Hume the naturalist, namely, with the mood displayed by Hume when he didn’t take skepticism seriously. According to this perspective, hinge beliefs, which, alluded to by the figures of scaffolding, framework, background and substratum, are different in nature from the rest of our propositions, make 2

Williams, 2004, 76-96. Moyal-Sharrock, 2007, 8. 4 Strawson, 2008, 19. 3

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up the original, natural, and inescapable commitments which we neither choose nor could give up, the rules which we take for granted in all our reasonings and which we simply cannot help believing, the principles which are either part of our natural endowment [this is the case of those drives to believe which are “subject to no alteration or only to an imperceptible one”5] or convictions socially acquired and solidified. As a result, there is no such a thing as the reasons for which we hold these beliefs, and thereby skeptical arguments and traditional proofs against skepticism are equally idle. In short: skepticism can’t be refuted, but, insofar as skeptical arguments are powerless against the force of nature, it can be disavowed; skeptical doubts are humanly irrelevant and hence they are “phoney doubts”, namely, not doubts at all; because reason is subordinate to nature, either our animal dispositions to believe don’t require justification, or our unshakeable convictions are justified because unshakeable. 2.

Neither Internalism nor Naturalism: Wittgenstein’s Diagnosis of Skepticism

It is safe to state that one of the main targets Wittgenstein is aiming at in On Certainty is the metaphysical version of the correspondence theory of truth, that is, what could be dubbed falsification thesis. According to this position, reality has an essence in itself, an essence which is wholly independent of our way of thinking, cognitive procedures and interests, and which could conflict with them. Consequently, even if our beliefs satisfy the standards of rational acceptability they could be false: appearances could be massively false; it might be a radical discrepancy between what things are and how they seem to be. It is obvious that skepticism depends on this conception of truth. It is also obvious which the consequences of the failure of a priori arguments to derive knowledge of the external world from self-knowledge were: (i) to equate the falsification thesis with skepticism; (ii) a shift of focus in anti-skeptical strategies, procedures which presently are not trying to refute skepticism directly, but to abandon the picture of truth which makes sense of it. The thing in itself is not unknowable, but inconceivable. The crux of the matter is that the limits of language are not limitations, that the negation of metaphysical realism excludes only something contradictory. As omnipotence is not limited by God’s inability to make something to be and not to be at the same time, 5

Wittgenstein, 2004, §99.

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cognitive power is not limited by the inability to reach a point of view from nowhere. Up to this point, nothing is wrong with deflationary readings of On Certainty. The problem is that they think that the denial of the falsification thesis entails the denial of truth, namely, the denial of existence in itself, as opposed to existence in relation to language. But this conclusion is only correct if we add a second premise: the autonomy of language. This thesis raises the problem of self-reference (if the external world is the work of our language; society, institutions and language itself are also the work of language), a question which threatens to end in a reduction to absurdity. Furthermore, it seems incapable to deal successfully with skepticism, since it shares the most fundamental of its principles: the severance between meaning and truth; the possibility of keeping our beliefs (and our rational capacities) unscathed in spite of their illusory character. Replacing reality with an autonomous language, linguistic idealists transform the inconceivable into something ontologically possible, trafficking with the falsification thesis that they attempted to overcome. This is I think a devastating refutation of internalism, on at least one natural understanding of it; so I am glad that Wittgenstein did not hold such a view. Internalism would make sense if we were forced to face a dilemma between transcending language and accepting that language is wholly autonomous. But On Certainty’s goal is to show not only that this dilemma is avoidable, that meaning and truth, coming in tandem, are logically co-dependent concepts, but that, since the first horn of the dichotomy is grounded in the second horn, idealism shares skepticism’s nonsensical character. Wittgenstein makes it explicit that language and reality are co-dependent, stating that the possibility of a language-game “is conditioned by certain facts”,6 demonstrating that external world skepticism implies skepticism regarding the internal,7 and showing that, since if I could be dreaming of my hands I could be dreaming that my words have a meaning or that I’m thinking, the dream hypothesis is senseless8 (we are automatically committed to affirm that we’re not dreaming whenever we consider this question), and thereby that hinge propositions are akin to Cartesian thoughts, thoughts that we cannot

6

Wittgenstein, 2004, §617. Wittgenstein, 2004, §369. 8 Wittgenstein, 2004, §676. 7

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attempt to doubt without immediately discovering the doubt to be unintelligible. It is true that Wittgenstein also wrote that in the case of hinge beliefs “the idea of ‘agreement with reality’ does not have any clear application”;9 but this passage gives no substance to deflationary interpretations: what it means is that it makes no sense to question the adequacy of beliefs which provide the measure of all things, or to seek a more ultimate standard or justification, namely, that the condition that makes agreement possible it cannot be the result of agreement. In short: hinge beliefs are not grounded in evidences, but it doesn’t mean that they are conventional norms. Wittgenstein defended a common sense version of the correspondence theory of truth. According to H.O. Mounce: “In his last work he reclaimed, in a purified (and we could add: coherent) form, the realism he advanced in the first.”10 When Strawson underlines the animal dimension of our basic commitments and the fact that, according to Wittgenstein, “language did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination”,11 he is following the right track. This notwithstanding, I think that attributing unqualified naturalism to Wittgenstein’s On Certainty is, at the very least, misguided. On one side, it leaves unexplained his deployment of transcendental arguments which attempt to demonstrate that skepticism is nonsensical. According to Strawson’s view of naturalism, skepticism is irrefutable12 and idle, something at odds with the attitude of a philosopher who, appealing to substantive reasons, presupposes that it is disquieting and refutable. On the other side, naturalism is grounded in conceptual confusions which Wittgenstein explicitly condemns: between subjective certainty and objective knowledge,13 between internal conviction and justification, between causes and grounds of believing,14 and between that which belongs to logic (although it were a logic good enough only for primitive means of communication) and that which does not. Strawson’s mistakes are rooted in two general assumptions: (i) that innate dispositions to believe are non-epistemic in character, namely, that 9

Wittgenstein, 2004, §215. Mounce, 2007, 121. 11 Wittgenstein, 2004, §475. 12 Strawson, 2008, 16-18. 13 Wittgenstein, 2004, §569. 14 Wittgenstein, 2004, §474. 10

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justification is equivalent to reason-involving justification; and (ii) that the verb “to know” is unambiguous. And these are the very presuppositions which, in my opinion, Wittgenstein was trying to undermine. It is obvious that hinge beliefs are primitive reactions, noninferential “takings” which are “just like directly taking hold of something”15. But in order to constitute knowledge they must be rooted in a competence, they have to be performances whose success (truth) could be credited to the ability exercised by the epistemic agent. Otherwise, compulsions would fall short of knowledge, they would be incapable of distinguishing mechanisms of belief inducement and epistemic justification. The role played by our “natural endowment” is not only to explain why we believe as we do, but why our basic beliefs are correct. Which doesn’t imply an over-intellectualization of justification; quite the contrary: it means its externalization. In order to know we don’t need to be able to defend our hinge beliefs in the arena of reflection. It is enough the exercise of subpersonal competences to get our hinge beliefs justified. Nothing more than (and nothing short of) a justification by default is required to be justified. In short: from the appealing to human nature it doesn’t follow divesting our basic perceptual beliefs of their epistemic character. On the other side, transcendental arguments are required because truth-conditions of ordinary claims of knowledge are different from conditions which make true reflective knowledge. One doesn’t need to know that he knows in order to be true that he knows, but one has to be able to defend his beliefs rationally to close the gap between what we know and what we think we know. When Wittgenstein wrote that “a doubt is not necessary even when it is possible”,16 he didn’t mean that we must be satisfied with the fact that certain things in deed are not doubted. His point was rather negative: to remind us that we don’t have to face skeptical scenarios in order to know. Knowledge takes care of itself, but it doesn’t imply that reasons are idle. The crux of the matter is the distinction between animal and reflective knowledge, between two independent levels of justification. Otherwise, neither Wittgenstein’s use of transcendental arguments (which discloses a deep interest in global scenarios) nor his interpretation of skepticism both as a misfire resulting from burdening animal knowledge with “a metaphysical emphasis”,17 and as an ultimately 15

Wittgenstein, 2004, §510. Wittgenstein, 2004, §392. 17 Wittgenstein, 2004, §482. 16

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nonsensical attitude, would make sense. Two are the main problems of the skeptic: misidentification of targets (insofar as animal knowledge doesn’t require reasons to be justified, he cannot appeal to alternative possibilities for casting doubts upon common sense’s basic beliefs), and senselessness (skepticism is self-refuting, since casting doubts upon the external world it undermines meaning, and so it undermines the very conditions of its possibility). But one thing is for skepticism to be unable of questioning apt beliefs (animal knowledge), and quite another to be unable of questioning rational security. The true fatherland of coherent skepticism (insofar as it can be coherent) is reflective knowledge. 3.

Aptness and Safety: Three Kinds of Beliefs

One popular version of skepticism, that proposed by Robert Fogelin in Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification, points out that it is easy to raise radical skeptical doubts by checkable but unchecked defeators, namely, that it is enough imagining some uneliminated but eliminable possibility (doppelgangers such as fake barns, painted mules or automatons) in order to defeat whatever cognitive claim we could think of. According to this position, levels of scrutiny are heightened “by reflection alone”,18 and hence abstract possibilities have to be eliminated in order to gain the right to know. The point is that truth-conditions of cognitive claims are context-independent, that possibilities, not facts, pollute our statements. Agent centered and reason centered, this view defends that knowledge requires the impossible task of overcoming every conceivable defeator. Nevertheless, cognitive claims are context-dependent, only facts, not possibilities, pollute an epistemic scenario. Consider “fake-barns” country. The agent who, ignoring that some of the barns he sees are replica, takes his perception at face value, is justified in believing that the thing to which he is pointing it is a barn. We refuse ascribing knowledge to him, but the reason is not that his performance is discreditable, but that, given the unfortunate context, his belief could be false too easily. That which context takes away, context gives back: if the scenario were fortunate (there is no “fake-barn”), and insofar as under those circumstances the epistemic agent could not be wrong when justified, we would promote his belief to knowledge. This case makes clear three things: (i) that in order to be true 18

Fogelin, 1994, 99.

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that the agent knows he is not required to know that he knows, that is, that his ignorance of the fortunate circumstances which surround him is compatible with true knowledge; (ii) that skeptical possibilities are noninfectious, namely, that from the fact that under some hypothetical circumstances my belief could be false it doesn’t follow that it could be false now, when those circumstances are not met (the possibility of those circumstances shows that my knowledge is fragile, not that I don’t know); and (iii) that, since the agent’s belief is not based on a reason (he just reacts to what he is perceiving) and, in spite of it, it is justified (it is enough the normal exercise of his perceptual mechanisms to give account of why his belief is correct: nothing else is required), hinge beliefs are default commitments “that come with normal human nature”.19 Given the precedent reflections, it is not a surprise that, in relation to their criteria of justification and to the measure of their vulnerability to conflicting evidence, Wittgenstein had distinguished three kinds of beliefs: (i) empirical beliefs which, based on reasons, can be demonstrated or refuted; (ii) contingent hinges, that is, those fundamental beliefs which, under concrete circumstances, change their role and come under scrutiny (fragile knowledge); and (iii) immutable hinges, beliefs which, coming with “the stamp of incontestability”,20 are not doubtable appealing to doppelgangers. The latter are safe beliefs. They can be doubted only appealing to global scenarios, hypotheses which, beyond evidences, question neither their aptness nor their safety, but their reflective security. Global scenarios introduce the falsification thesis. They give sense to the deployment of reasons that are not a form of evidence. 4.

Facing Global Scenarios

In On Certainty there are many remarks where Wittgenstein states the conceptual connection between doubts regarding the external world and doubts concerning meaning and rules of enquiry,21 thus linking meaning and correspondence with reality. There are as many remarks where he says that (i) our fundamental beliefs are beyond justification; (ii) it is preposterous to try to draw a bridge from reality to language; and (iii) 19

Sosa, 2011, 146. Wittgenstein, 2004, §655. 21 Wittgenstein, 2004, §383, §671, §676. 20

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skepticism is nonsensical. Is it possible to conciliate these (apparently) contradictory tendencies, one (allegedly) leading to internalism, another to epistemology? The answer is affirmative. It’s enough to remember that (i) there are reasons which are not a form of evidence; (ii) there is a sense of “justification” according to which “to ground our beliefs” is not to trying to garner new and better support for nuclear propositions, but to subtract grounds for doubt, that is to say, where “justification” means “to defend our beliefs against our philosophical opinions”; (iii) skepticism can be labeled as “nonsensical” only after working oneself into a position from which global hypotheses no longer make sense, namely, once we reflect, facing skepticism at face value, on the very conditions that could make this position possible. What I’m attempting to say is that Wittgenstein’s anti-skeptical strategy rests on two correlated facts: (i) the ultimate and unquestionable nature of meaning; and (ii) the discovery (which reflection on skepticism makes possible) that meaning and truth are mutually and internally dependent primitive concepts and, in consequence, that they stand or fall together. Meaning warrants truth, as it were, automatically (without requiring a second and metaphysical warrant). Truth is indispensable for meaning. When skepticism becomes extreme (and thus coherent), it also becomes self-refuting. Due to the fact that, questioning the deliverances of reason, skepticism also brings to question its very intelligibility, the extension of skepticism implies its annihilation. In other words: in order to demonstrate that nothing can be known, the skeptic has to rely on the capacity of reason for raising insurmountable scenarios which, providing conclusive reasons to doubt in any occasion, question that our minds are reliable instruments for the detection of truth; nevertheless, these very scenarios question the reliability of reason for raising them, they cast doubts over themselves. This is why Wittgenstein’s procedure entitles us to conclude that the only order of reality is the order that our grammar gives us access to, and thus, that meta-level doubts are as senseless as objectlevel doubts. Obviously, this strategy is analogous to the one deployed by Moore in “Proof of an External World”, and, as the latter, it could be accused of begging the question. Nonetheless, it is enough to remember that skepticism must be rational in order to be effective and that it undermines the very conditions that make it intelligible, to appeasing this last qualm.

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In agreement with internalism, Wittgenstein defends that there is not an “absolute truth”, if for “absolute” we understand an “intelligible foundation of thought” and an “independent order of possibilities that could be inconsistent with grammar”. Nonetheless, far from distinguishing between absolute and relative truth there is for Wittgenstein only truth of one kind, unqualified truth or truth simpliciter. In agreement with epistemology, Wittgenstein resists the drive to reduce the notion of “truth” to epistemic concepts (verification, warranted assertion, agreement…). Nonetheless, he doesn’t severe truth from meaning, falling into the traps of full-fledge metaphysics. Wittgenstein justifies our basic beliefs showing that they are groundless. He backs them demonstrating both that they are the last word and that they couldn’t be the last word without being intrinsically veridical. In this respect, for Wittgenstein the very question “Why should one trust the laws of thought?” makes little sense. In short, Wittgenstein’s strategy could be described as a paradigmatic sample of “rational therapy”. It is therapy, because problems are not solved, but dissolved. But it is also rational, because it involves reflection and it avoids the lure of an external court of appeal, such as “ordinary language”, “common sense” or “natural and unshakeable compulsions”. It is apposite to mention that, unlike those deflationary approaches to philosophy characteristic of the last century which are incapable to making sense of the dangerous attraction of philosophical questions, Wittgenstein takes a point of view internal to philosophy, that is to say, that his proposal is a therapy from philosophers, for philosophers and with philosophers which, avoiding to face philosophy as an spectacle for a critical and detached spectator, takes epistemic questions seriously enough and so captures the intimacy between the thinker and his topics. Wittgenstein, like Descartes, extended skepticism in order to refute it. He granted its widest scope to this position only for deflating its meaning. If this is not a real breakthrough in epistemology, I don’t know what could count as one. Neither know I if this procedure is effective against the possibility of a self-refuting reason (of paradoxes internal to reason), but at least it is compelling against the more familiar varieties of skepticism and epistemology, those which attempt to question and to rescue thought from the outside. In any case, the aforementioned possibility forces us to go back to Descartes, to his project of breaking the sceptical balance using particular deliverances of reason, contents which couldn’t be assented to without the wholesale rejection of skeptical possibilities.

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I repeat myself: Wittgenstein’s refutation of global skepticism (a hidden reality in possible conflict with reality is unimaginable and inconceivable) could be considered as a watershed in epistemology. But he didn’t stand alone when pursuing the falsification thesis to the end. I would like to finish this paper quoting a passage where Descartes, sharing intuitions with Wittgenstein, forcefully rejects the metaphysical conception of truth: “What is it to us that someone may make out that the perception whose truth we are so firmly convinced of may appear false to God or an angel, so that it is, absolutely speaking, false? Why should this alleged ‘absolute falsity’ bother us, since we neither believe in it nor have even the smallest suspicion of it? For the supposition which we are making here is of a conviction so firm that it is quite incapable of being destroyed; and such a conviction is clearly the same as the most perfect certainty.”22

References Davidson, D., 2001: Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Descartes, R., 2008: Meditations on First Philosophy. In: John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch (eds.), The Philosophical Writings of Descartes II. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Fogelin, R., 1994: Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Mounce, H.O., 2007: Wittgenstein and Classical Realism. In: Danièle Moyal-Sharrock and William H. Brenner (eds.), Readings of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. Palgrave, Basigstoke, 103-121. Moyal-Sharrock, D., 2007: Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. Palgrave, Basingstoke. Sosa, E., 2011: Knowing Full Well. Princeton University Press, Princeton. Strawson, P.F., 2008: Scepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties. Routledge, London. Williams, M., 2004: Wittgenstein’s Refutation of Idealism. In: Denis McManus (ed.), Wittgenstein and Scepticism. Routledge, London, 76-96. 22

Descartes, 2008, 103.

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Wittgenstein, L., 2004: On Certainty. Blackwell Publishing, Oxford. Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca

Über Gewißheit: a Textbook for Psychologists? Michel LE DU 1 Approximately twenty years ago I was appointed to an institution where school teachers were trained for their job. This was my first professional assignment and I was supposed to teach them philosophy of education and child psychology. Once a student came up with a report she wanted to complete, entitled “The acquisition of certainties in kindergarten”. She told me that she had been reading a book entitled On Certainty, by an author named Wittgenstein and, as a result, thought that such a reading should be mandatory, both for teaching practitioners and child psychologists. I remember remaining speechless for a while. I knew very little about Wittgenstein at that time and eventually advised her to direct her efforts towards a more conventional goal. I didn’t think long and hard before changing my mind. Indeed, I soon discovered that reading On Certainty brings us to see reactions, lines of conduct, behaviors frequently studied by psychologists through different spectacles or, perhaps, without spectacles. As the sense of anthropological reality which radiates from these very last pages by Wittgenstein is deeper and more subtle than the one even the most benevolent reader would detect in standard educational psychology textbooks, they would be, for sure, a profitable reading for educators. It’s striking to see that although the anti-mentalist remainders punctuating On Certainty have frequently been underlined, little has been said of the consequences psychologists should draw from them. In this regard, On Certainty and the Philosophical Investigations (whose contribution to the disentanglement of conceptual confusions infesting the description of mental life has been largely discussed) have had very different posterities. In his last writing, Wittgenstein addresses, more than he has ever done before, a range of human stances and actions he calls instinctive. He suggests that a much greater part of our developed thoughts than we are inclined to think is rooted in instinctive behaviors and reactions. But one must not overlook the fact that, for this very reason, Doubtful Certainties. Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism, (Eds. Jesús PADILLA GÁLVEZ, Margit GAFFAL), Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt a. M., 2012, 75-89.

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these behaviors and reactions should not in turn be seen as products of thought or reasoning: this is precisely the point he tries to capture by using adjectives such as instinctive or primitive when describing them. The aim of the present paper is to see to what extent the exploration of the stances and behaviors denoted by these predicates is of interest to psychologists. As we will see, through such an exploration, psychology is not confronted with unexpected empirical material, but with a demand to reorient its conceptual scheme in a less mentalist way. 2 In Wittgenstein’s writings, the predicate instinctive doesn’t cover a homogenous range of conducts, but labels many different ways of acting and reacting which might well have nothing in common but the fact that they don’t originate in thought. The problem is that it is almost impossible to describe such actions and reactions without implementing the pattern of psychological terms i.e. without describing them as if they were inspired by thoughts, believes, motives etc.1 No other pattern can be offered as an alternative and the familiar psychological vocabulary remains a prism one cannot get rid of, through which one tries to catch a glimpse of a large set of primitive reactions.2 Accordingly, it is not a matter of substituting new

1

One must not overlook the fact that an “adult” perspective on children’s performances, although misleading from an objective point of view (because it treats them as less primitive than they are), might sometimes be fruitful regarding educational goals. Jerome Bruner notices for instance that, at the outset, an infant cannot participate in what he calls a “Gricean cycle”, i. e. cannot use consciously conventions in order to express his intentions (for instance in his games with his mother). But “the mother acts as if he did” (See: Bruner, 1983, p. 41). The fact that, in such cases, the adults have too generous a representation of the child’s capacities stimulates the learning-process and can eventually encourage the infant’s conscious uptake of conventions. 2 The present use of the prism metaphor should be distinguished from the one familiar in connection with the so-called unconscious thoughts or volitions. When one speaks of unconscious thoughts, one is on the verge of a grammatical confusion. The reason for such confusion lies in the fact that it’s tempting to see the unconscious thoughts as doubles of conscious ones, minus consciousness. However, one must understand how an intention, for instance, can be unconscious, in order to achieve a systematic mastery of the concept of having an intention (See: Alasdair MacIntyre, The Unconscious, London, Routledge, 1958 and Jacques Bouveresse, Philosophie, mythologie, pseudoscience, Combas, L’éclat, 1991). The point I want to draw attention to is that, in the

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terms for the usual psychological ones, but of seeing that, in a large range of contexts, these terms should not be taken at face value but as stopgaps, used in order to grasp more primitive aspects of human agency than those they usually denote. In other words, terms such as belief, thought etc. have a standard range of uses in which they function as expressions (Äusserungen), when employed in the first person, present tense, and as vehicles for information (Mitteilung) when employed in other persons and / or other tenses3 ; but in a context where one aims at “seeing man as an animal”4, the very notion of expression, as used within the framework of the previous distinction, often loses its point. Beliefs are mentioned, in the context of expressive sentences, as justifications or explanations given by speakers for their having done (or said) something.5 But one would never think of justifying one’s deed (or one’s refraining from doing something) by saying “Because material objects do not evaporate” or “Because the external world exists”. “Material objects do not evaporate”6 and “The external world exists” are typical examples of what Wittgenstein labels hinge propositions.7 Outside a group of scholars studying On Certainty, no one would feel inclined to put forward such propositions. Accordingly, when preceded by the name hinge, the word proposition is clearly employed in order to denote something more primitive than its usual denotation i. e., is employed to present context, the concepts of thought, belief etc. as such, are the prism through which we see more primitive and “animal” features of human life. 3 Cf.: Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 2, §63, Oxford, Blackwell, 1980. One must not overlook the fact that this asymmetry between the first person, present tense (expression, avowal) and the other persons (information, description) is the very criterion for psychological verbs. Accordingly, to be irritable or to be manicdepressive are not psychological verbs in Wittgenstein’s sense (one see from noting one’s reactions that one is irritable and, subsequently, I am irritable is not an example of avowal but the result of one observing one’s own reactions). 4 Cf.: On Certainty, Blackwell, Oxford, 1969, §359, §475. 5 However, one must notice that the verb to believe is often used in the first person, past tense, when the agent doesn’t believe anymore that P at the moment he mentions P to explain, for instance, his past decision. I made my decision because I believed that P could, accordingly, be paraphrased by I made my decision because I believed that P [and was wrong in believing that P]. Most probably, if the agent still believed that P, he would justify himself simply by saying because P. Nevertheless, one can express a belief by mentioning only the content of the belief (= P), without expressing openly the fact that one believes. 6 Cf.: OC, §134. 7 Cf.: OC, §152, §341.

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denote proto-propositions no one would set in an expressive sentence in order to justify oneself. Such propositions, in all probability, will never cross the agent’s mind either. They are not established through reasoning or with the help of observation, but integrated by the child in the course of his learning many other propositions (in the ordinary sense of the word).8 Moreover, hinge propositions are not part of one’s world picture as the result of one playing Sprachspiele: in fact, they underpin our exertion of judgment and language-games. Mistaking hinge propositions for ordinary ones would lead us to a mentalist dead end. First, from an epistemic point of view, if we didn’t assume the existence of such pivotal propositions channeling the development of knowledge, we would have to ground our understanding of the world on intuitively self-evident truths; now, attributing to ourselves the grasp of such truths would imply the ascription of a special power to the mind, and we don’t have at hand any external manifestation of such a power.9 In fact, as underlined by Georg-Henrik von Wright, certainty, in Wittgenstein’s sense, doesn’t result of the intellection of some judgment’s content, but is required by the very exertion of judgment10: accordingly, we cannot cast doubt on all the elements of our knowledge at the same time because doubt has to revolve around pivots which remain undoubted.11 Secondly, from a psychological point of view, explaining primitive attitudes by saying that they originate in full-blooded propositions boils down to patently over-intellectualizing many of our daily instinctive attitudes and lines of conduct.12 Such a stance is a perfect illustration of the 8

Cf.: OC, §144. See also Avrum Stroll, Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 154. Stroll expresses that point by saying that “… we absorb the foundations that make language possible”. Stroll’s thesis is that Wittgenstein’s conception regarding the foundations of knowledge in On Certainty is less and less propositional. Accordingly, the very notion of hinge propositions is less and less propositional as he proceeds. Notions such as acting, being trained in communal practices, instinct become gradually preponderant. 9 In connection with this see again Stroll, op. cit., p. 146, 154. 10 Cf.: Georg-Henrik von Wright, «Wittgenstein on Certainty» in Wittgenstein, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1982, p. 165-181. 11 Cf.: OC, §115. 12 A kindred excessive intellectualization can be detected in Chomsky’s theory of language acquisition. In his book Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1965, p. 36), he goes as far as comparing the learning of language to the learning of a theory. If he is right, for the learner, understanding new sentences is like making up hypotheses (see also Noam Chomsky, Language and Mind, New-York,

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excessively mentalist representation of the mind I was alluding to at the end of section one. It is worth noticing that, just like the term proposition, the word belief, in the context of the present discussion, is also used to denote a more primitive feature of human mindedness than it usually does. The assumption that an agent has beliefs he would never express, even if charged to explain his own behavior, draws our attention to an important distinction. We build up our convictions through the practice of languagegames13 and this is why the connection between having such and such beliefs, on the one hand, and the capacity to put forward these beliefs as reasons for our actions, on the other hand, is internal. This point can be made in more general terms: the relation between the agent’s capacity to form reasons and his capacity to express them is a logical one (accordingly, it’s impossible to attribute reasons to a creature unable to express them).14 The fact that, contrary to its standard use, the word belief is also employed to denote an agent’s relation to hinge-propositions, which would be made explicit only under very unusual circumstances, shows that the term can be used to mention attitudes enshrined in the foundations of language-games (such as questioning and expressing doubts) and, for that very reason, vastly different from what we call propositional attitudes. Such beliefs, as one can see from the previous remarks, cannot be understood as reasons to act in such and such way, although they obviously play a major role in our undertaking actions. The fact that, when making explicit the cogs of our action, we do not mention these beliefs as possible reasons is the main ground for calling them instinctive.15 Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968). In fact, most of our use and understanding of words in everyday practice of language is largely instinctive. Wittgenstein’s remark (OC, § 475) stating that language doesn’t emerge from reasoning could easily be opposed to some of Chomsky’s major claims. Noticing that our ordinary linguistic practice is much more instinctive than suggested by most sophisticated theories of language should incline us to see language learning itself as a much more instinctive development than imagined by Chomsky. 13 Cf.: OC, §3. 14 In this connection, see Anthony Kenny, The Metaphysics of Mind, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 36. 15 Stroll (op. cit., p. 146) notices that “… hinge propositions are not ordinary propositions at all. Such concepts as being true or false, known or unknown, justified or unjustified do not apply to them”. My point here is not only that hinge propositions do not lend themselves to justification, but that they are almost never mentioned as justifications.

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3 Assuming, on the one hand, that instinctive beliefs which are different from propositional attitudes do exist and, on the other hand, that our web of beliefs revolves around such proto-beliefs, brings the following question: are there beliefs deserving to be called instinctive too, although they do not play the pivotal role mentioned in the previous section? As we are going to see, the answer to this question is clearly “yes” and, in fact, such beliefs are the main theme of one of Norman Malcolm’s finest papers.16 His main point seems to be that the concept of thought is made of different threads and subsequently, not built around a single core. He states this central thesis in various ways along his paper, but mainly establishes his distinction in terms of two levels of thought.17 The higher of these two levels is not conceivable without the holder of these thoughts (or beliefs) having the concept of thought (or belief). Obviously, with this idea of second level thoughts, Norman Malcolm is very close to the traditional idea of propositional attitudes: these higher thoughts involve the subject’s relation to propositions. His next point consists in underlining that such a relation cannot be the very heart of the concept of thought, because this concept is, in fact, made of different knots (the relation to propositions being only one of them). Accordingly, it’s a mentalist conceptual mistake to persist on reducing thought to the grasp of propositions, and this is, among other things, what Malcolm suggests when he introduces the idea of more primitive first-level thoughts. Here, the meanings of belief and thought become more difficult to circumscribe but it is still possible to clarify them with the help of examples. If the illusion that a film hero is going to cross the screen (like does the character played by Jeff Daniels in Woody Allen’s celebrated Purple Rose of Cairo) startles me, I will perhaps explain my reaction the next moment by saying “I thought that he [= the character] was going to enter in the theater”. I would be ludicrous if I described myself in such a situation 16

Cf.: Norman Malcolm, “Thoughtless Brutes” in Thought and Knowledge, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1977, p. 40-57. 17 Unfortunately, some of Malcolm’s examples do not fit well his own distinction between levels of thought. A driver having a conversation with his passenger and searching his keys in the glove compartment at the same time has second level thoughts (those occurring during the chat with the passenger) and a first level thought (regarding the fact that his keys are in the glove compartment), Malcolm explains. However, I think that such a situation would be best described in terms of a division of attention, rather than as a competition between levels of thought.

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by saying “I had in mind the proposition that the hero was entering the theater, and my reaction originates in my believing this proposition”: the use of words thought and belief, in such a context, is perfectly sound, but cannot be analyzed in terms of a relation to a proposition. Comparing the spectator’s behavior in the previous example to attitudes towards one’s pain (or fear) would be more judicious: a pain reaction, for instance, is not grounded in judgment (even if it’s a verbal reaction); one doesn’t believe that the character is going to jump out of the screen on the basis of a judgment either: indeed, the spectator’s reaction and his belief are almost one and the same thing. Moreover, although in most situations belief denotes a disposition, in the previous example it refers to an ephemeral episode: the momentary reaction of a thinking creature to what appears as an unexpected event. In the standard pattern of intentional explanation, beliefs (together with intentions, desires etc.) are mentioned in order to render intelligible actions which are (1) initiated by the agent i.e. not simply responses to a heavy environmental stimulus (2) accomplished in prospect of a remote aim (the aim being the justification of the agent undertaking a meaningful action, like, for instance, when someone stand for candidate in primaries in order to run later for presidency). Here, on the contrary, the spectator (1) reacts to a stimulus (although he misunderstands it) and (2) pursues an immediate goal (running away from what he believes to be an intrusion). However, his action remains understandable: had the so-called intrusion really happened, the spectator’s standing up from his seat would have looked consistent. Of course, the fact that such a meaningful relation exists justifies the use of the words belief and thought a fortiori in cases where the threat is real: if I jump behind a wall because I think rightly that someone is about to shoot me at point-blank, my reaction is fully justified, although I certainly had no time to form in foro interno the thought that a shooter is going to kill me. A justification is not a description of the process leading to an action, and it’s in the justification after the event that thoughts are mentioned. An intelligent behavior which doesn’t originate in thoughts formed in the agent’s mind may nevertheless lend itself to justification, and beliefs of the ephemeral kind illustrated in this section can be evoked as reasons in the process of giving justifications. As we are going to see now, not all the so-called first level beliefs can play such a role.

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4 After reading the previous section, one might think that first level beliefs can only transitory. That would be however completely foreign to Malcolm’s thought. Indeed most of them are dispositional, and the reason to describe them as first level beliefs is that they are actualized through one’s actions and decisions, without being present to the agent’s mind. A comparison with board games rules will be useful here. An experienced chess player doesn’t have the constitutive rules of the game in mind any more, although it’s visible from the way he acts that he knows them: they have become a second nature and are, accordingly, too obvious to be mentioned.18 Many of first level beliefs are in such a situation: they are also too obvious to be mentioned and, moreover, most of them, unlike the rules of a game, have not been acquired through an explicit process. These second nature beliefs do not hold the kind of pivotal role previously described, but they share with the hinge propositions the fact that they exceed the range of reasons one normally gives for one’s actions. No one would think, for instance, of explaining one’s behavior at a cash desk by saying that one believes in the possibility of exchanging money for items. However, the agent certainly believes in such a possibility, otherwise he would not even have entered a supermarket. Accordingly, this belief may be described as pivotal towards a set of practices (buying, selling, haggling etc.), i.e. in a less radical sense than the proto-propositions mentioned earlier, which are pivotal in the sense of being the hinges around which our world picture revolves. There is another way to grasp the cognitive role of these first level beliefs. This way consists in interpreting the difference between levels of belief as a difference between believing that p and believing that p is true. It’s impossible to believe that p is true without having the concept of belief, and it’s impossible to have the concept of belief without having also the concepts of truth and falseness. In other words, if all our beliefs were full-blooded propositional attitudes, there would be no difference between believing that p is true and believing that p. However, even creatures like us, who master the concept of belief, are also holders of numerous beliefs to which we do not think of applying the concept of belief -and among these are the pivotal beliefs in the weak and in the strong senses mentioned previously. Regarding these last beliefs, the difference between us and 18

See John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, London, Penguin Books, 1996, chap. 6.

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creatures not possessing at all the concept of belief is only a matter of degree: ascriptions of such beliefs to speakers are problematic, because it’s very likely that we cannot tap their claims and avowals in order to back up the attribution. Accordingly, it becomes difficult to circumscribe what exactly is believed. And this uncertainty is maximized when one is confronted with ascriptions of beliefs to animals.19 5 Wittgenstein’s remarks in On Certainty extend the battle undertaken by Gilbert Ryle against the “intellectualist legend”.20 It’s useful to bear in mind several aspects of Wittgenstein’s criticism of mentalist illusions in the Philosophical Investigations21, in order to see how this criticism can be continued in the light of remarks found in On Certainty. One of the most important cogs in Wittgenstein’s anti-intellectualist line of thought is his analysis of the concept of understanding, especially in connection with the notion of rule-following. His idea is that assuming a rule always requires a mental act of interpretation is both a grammatical mistake and the source of mentalist mythology. It’s a grammatical mistake concerning the very concept of interpretation, because an interpretation always takes place in a symbolic system and, accordingly, cannot ultimately explain the connection between such a system and reality. It’s the source of a mythology because, by making up such a hypothesis, one fancies an inner act which, in fact, doesn’t exist, and attributes to the agent, who allegedly accomplishes it, the mythical power to decide on what the rule tells him. The conclusion is not only the wrongness of the assumption that an act of interpretation occurs every time we follow a rule, but also that if, indeed, 19

This conclusion is at odds with the one defended by Donald Davidson in his paper “Rational Animals”. His argument seems to be that (1) One cannot have thoughts without having beliefs (2) One cannot have beliefs without having the concept of belief (3) One cannot have the concept of belief without language. Accordingly, Davidson’s conclusion is that there is no point in ascribing thought to a creature devoid of language. I agree with (1) and (3) but disagree with (2). In fact, if by belief one means what has been called second level beliefs in the last two sections, the argument is almost circular. Now, if by belief one means something larger (2) becomes false. 20 Cf.: Gilbert Ryle, Concept of Mind (1949), Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1984. 21 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (1953), Blackwell, Oxford, 2000.

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such an act occurred, it would be, as such, deprived of all power to make the rule effective, i.e. to fill the gap between one thinking that one follows a rule and one following a rule. The interesting point in this mythology of understanding is that the alleged act of understanding is in weightless conditions regarding social setting: it is not rooted in practices, habits in any way because the agent, by obeying not to the rule but to his interpretation of it, ultimately authors what he is told by the rule. One will easily recognize, in the previous paragraph, the core of Wittgenstein’s criticism towards the idea of a private language. As we will see soon, the myth of a private language is not the only fallacious conception involving mysterious acts and processes allegedly located in the mind. But one must also underline that “the futility of considering human nature as a set of autonomous dispositions”22 has been more and more recognized during the last decades, both by philosophers and psychologists. And if, indeed, there is no such thing as a human nature defined as a set of autonomous dispositions, there is no reason to identify the mind to such a set either. The fact that this so-called “autonomy” of the mind can be conceived in different ways doesn’t change anything to the verdict: nativist conceptions appealing to innate structures, as well as more ethereal doctrines resorting to the kind of purely psychological processes castigated by Wittgenstein are both on the hot seat.23 The hypothesis of a private language, subsequently, is only one among a range of speculations ascribing to the human mind a purely phantasmagorical autonomy. Misplaced references to thought-processes are also recurrent among contemporary cognitive scientists and philosophers of the mind. The fact that they are implemented in hardware and do not belong, accordingly, to the kind of ethereal ongoing processes Wittgenstein was trying to eradicate from the image of thought, doesn’t make such mythology any better: a 22

Cf.: Child’s Talk, p. 24. See, for instance, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 2, §7. In this passage, Wittgenstein’s target is the belief in autonomous thought-processes. His reaction towards them consists in saying that (1) such processes should not be mistaken for neurological processes whose existence he doesn’t question (2) if fullblooded internal thought-processes existed, one should be able to grasp them through introspection and even, perhaps, to slow them down: we clearly don’t have any evidence backing up such an allegation (3) one can rightly speak of thought-processes, only in order to refer to processes (like inferring or reasoning) which can be accomplished with the help of language, i. e. which could be completed publicly and cannot, accordingly be considered as pure and autonomous processes of thought. 23

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mythology with a technical alibi remains a mythology. In his book Acts of Meaning, Bruner notices that: …very early on … emphasis began shifting from “meaning” to “information”, from the construction of meaning to the processing of information. These are profoundly different matters.24

The problem is that with such concepts as information and information processing, we do not have, in reality, an explicans for what everyone calls meaning. And that is why Bruner’s remark seems quite relevant to me: these are profoundly different things. Mentalist theories could do the job only if the kind of internal representations they take to be processed in the course of the mind’s activity were able to interpret themselves. But this is impossible: no symbol is capable of interpreting itself. 25 Subsequently, contextual theory of meaning is to be substituted for the so-called “computational” or “mechanical” theories of meaning. Reference to the context is needed in order to build a more substantial notion of meaning. Indeed, there is no getting away from such reference when the issue is the learning of language either. To put it in other words: understanding requires a form of life and learning language too. Bruner tap some of Wittgenstein’s remarks and writes: …the child can explore without serious consequences for himself, can do so in a limited arena for combinatorial activity that also allows him to dissociate means and ends in the sense that there are various ways of getting to goals. Like the word games made famous by Ludwig Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations, each of the games that are played by children and their parents is a self-contained “form of life” as well. The games are, in a word, an idealized and closed circumscribed format.26

Bruner is thinking about games such as peekaboo, Ride-a-CockHorse etc. He calls them “idealized” because they are self-contained and autonomous: “Even the goal is constituted by the game itself” (ibid.). His conclusion is that the idealization “makes the format ‘language-like’.” In the paper I mentioned in the last paragraph, Bruce Goldberg notices that the very same words, “I don’t want to play Doctor No”, have two different 24

Cf.: Jerome Bruner, Acts of Meaning, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1990, p. 4. 25 In connection with this issue, see Bruce Goldberg «Mechanism & Meaning» in Investigating Psychology, John Hyman (ed.), London, Routledge, 1991, p. 48-66. 26 Cf.: Child’s Talk, p. 46.

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meanings according to their being uttered by an actor casted for a role or by a member of the censorship board. It is very difficult to explain such a difference within the frame a purely mentalist semantic theory. One has to take into account the fact that the two tokens occur in the course of different practices and this embedding in different games accounts for differences of meanings. The games played by the child and his caretakers provide us with small-scale models for such meaning acquisition processes. And this is quite in keeping with On Certainty’s final insistence on acting, training, communal practices etc. 6 However, such an insistence cannot be fully understood without a more detailed analysis of the very notion of instinct. In his paper, “The Relation of Language to Instinctive Behavior”, Norman Malcolm distinguishes primitive instinctive behaviors from derived instinctive behaviors.27 (1) Reactions to one’s pain, as well as causal behaviors (like one shooting in the stone which made one stumble) are both primitive reactions. (2) Obeying orders (an infant can do it although he might be unable to use the same words), (3) using words spontaneously are derivative instinctive actions. The feature common to these different kinds of actions is their being rooted in an absence of doubt: there is no place for doubt where instinct is at work. However, actions of the kinds (2) and (3) require learning. I think another distinction should be added to the one between primitive and derived actions. Some instinctive actions are simply reactive (like the so-called causal ones) others illustrate a general pattern and are goal oriented. As noted by Kurt Koffka, a child who has been burned by a flame doesn’t simply learn to withdraw his hand: he learns a general attitude, avoiding flames. 28 As a result, a new configuration is established. Such new lines of conduct are goal oriented, although the goal may be purely negative (it may simply consist in avoiding something). The two distinctions (primitive / derived, with / without a general pattern) are not identical. When one looks at the moon instead of looking at the finger and, accordingly, turns one’s head in the appropriate direction, one illustrates a 27

Norman Malcolm, «The Relation of Language to Instinctive Behavior» in Investigating Psychology, p. 27-47. 28 Cf.: Kurt Koffka, The Growth of Mind (1924), New Brunswick, Transaction Inc., 1960, p. 302.

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general pattern (= following someone’s finger’s movement with one’s eyes), although Malcolm would have probably termed such a behavior primitive. Moreover, some reactions deserve to be called natural and others do not because, although one can label them instinctive, they involve concepts that the agent possess only as a member of a definite culture. Not all cultures have the concept of a portrait, for instance, and if the jealous husband, in a fit of temper, destroys the picture of his infidel wife, his reaction may well be described as expressive or instinctive, but it is nevertheless a cultural reaction (although it has features in common with the so-called causal reactions). Such a reaction is clearly derived, in Malcolm’s sense (it involves the mastery and, accordingly, a prior learning of the concept of a portrait). It is also goal oriented (towards satisfaction or relief) and fits a general pattern (= destroying symbolically). Now, it’s important to see that mistaking actions illustrating a general pattern for actions whose source is a general idea is a major motive of intellectualist confusion.29 It would be absurd to describe the toddler who has learned to avoid the flame as inspired by a general idea of things to be avoided. However, the situation regarding the word idea is not very different from the one we have been confronted with when analyzing the use of words such as proposition and belief. The toddler doesn’t have, strictly speaking, the general idea of things he should stay at distance from, but his behavior can be seen in a general perspective (a “protect oneself

29

Such a mistake is much similar to the confusion between following a rule and acting in accord with a rule. A behavior may be organized, structured etc. and, for that reason, in accord with some rule, without the agent applying such a rule. Similarly, from the fact that a behavior fits a general pattern, one cannot deduce that it has its source in a general idea. Regarding this issue, even reputable thinkers have relapses. In Child’s Talk (p. 29) Bruner goes as far as saying that “Infants during their first year appear to have rules for dealing with space, time, and even causation”. He adds (p. 30) that “The infant’s perceptual world, far from being a blooming, buzzing confusion, is rather orderly and organized by what seem like highly abstract rules”(my emphasis). The pre-linguistic child’s world is certainly organized, but the abstract rules, for sure, are in the mind of the psychologist who describes it. One must also (ibid.) distinguish the primitive reaction of surprise resulting from the fact that something unusual occurs in the infant’s environment from a more sophisticated (and adult) notion of surprise, internally connected with such other concepts as expectation, hope, symbolic anticipation etc.

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from flame” perspective), and this is simply what the word idea is supposed to mean here.30 Another mentalist confusion to be avoided is the one between goal oriented behaviors and behavior involving the concept of a goal. Infants already have goal directed attitudes (they adjust their behavior until the goal reached) even at a time when they do not have the concept of goal.31 The toddler’s behavior towards flames in the previous example is a good example of such a goal directed attitude. Obviously, we, as observers, cannot dispense ourselves with the concept of goal when try to account for such attitudes, but it would be fallacious to deduce from this that prelinguistic infants have such a concept in mind. Nevertheless, goal orientedness is a major and primitive feature of human action. And, as Bruner underlines “The infant’s principal ‘tool’ for achieving his ends is another familiar human being”.32 It’s easy to understand that the “other human being” is the caretaker or the mother. What is suggested here is the communal practice dimension of child’s development. One major task of psychology is the description of instinctive attitudes, especially if they rank among ways of thought’s prototypes.33 Goal directed behaviors, lines of conduct illustrating general patterns, are such prototypes. They are the ground in which full-blooded intentionality, structured language use, as well as considered actions are rooted. They still need to be described when the bedrock is reached and the justifications exhausted.34 They are, so to speak, the pace of certainty. 30

Another way to put things consists in saying that a pre-linguistic child, as well as a chimp, for instance, has categories (one token of flame is sorted out, accordingly, in the category of things to be avoided), but doesn’t have the instruments required to interpret such a category. Interpretation would require the exertion of linguistic devices, as well as a degree of conscious mastery of language we do not always show, even as adult speakers. It’s worth noticing that the distinction between having a category and mastering the interpretation of a category parallels Malcolm’s distinction between first and second level thoughts. 31 Cf.: Joseph Perner, Understanding the Representational Mind, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1991, chap. 9. Not only children have goal directed behaviors. The adult who tears apart his wife’s portrait has a goal directed behavior. However, this doesn’t mean that he tears the picture apart with a goal (satisfaction, relief) in mind. 32 Cf.: Child’s Talk, p. 26. 33 Cf.: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel, Oxford, Blackwell, 1967, §§540-541. 34 Cf.: Philosophical Investigations, §217. There would be no point in asking for justifications when confronted with an agent avoiding flames: this simply how people generally act after a previous painful experience.

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References Bouveresse, Jacques, 1991: Philosophie, mythologie, pseudo-science. Wittgenstein lecteur de Freud, Combas, L’éclat. Bruner, Jerome, 1983: Child’s Talk, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Bruner, Jerome, 1990: Acts of Meaning, Cambridge, Harvard University Press. Chomsky, Noam, 1965: Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge, MIT Press. Chomsky, Noam, 1968: Language and Mind, New-York, Harcourt, Brace & World. Goldberg, Bruce, 1991: “Mechanism & Meaning”, in: Investigating Psychology, John Hyman (ed.), London, Routledge. Kenny, Anthony, 1992: The Metaphysics of Mind, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Koffka, Kurt, 1960: The Growth of Mind (1924), New Brunswick, Transaction Inc. MacIntyre, Alasdair, 1958: The Unconscious, London, Routledge. Malcolm, Norman, 1977: “Thoughtless Brutes” in: Thought and Knowledge, Ithaca, Cornell University Press. Malcolm, Norman, 1991: “The Relation of Language to Instinctive Behavior”, in: Investigating Psychology, John Hyman (ed.), London, Routledge, pp. 27-47. Perner, Joseph, 1991: Understanding the Representational Mind, Cambridge, MIT Press. Ryle, Gilbert, 1984: Concept of Mind (1949), Chicago, Chicago University Press. Searle, John R., 1996: The Construction of Social Reality, London, Penguin Books. Stroll, Avrum, 1994: Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1967: Zettel, Oxford, Blackwell. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1969: On Certainty, Oxford, Blackwell. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1980: Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 2. Oxford, Blackwell. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 2000: Philosophical Investigations (1953), Oxford, Blackwell. Wright, Georg-Henrik von, 1982: “Wittgenstein on Certainty”, in Wittgenstein, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press. Université de Strasbourg

Wittgenstein, Pretence and Uncertainty Livia ANDREIA JURESCHI Pretence is a key-concept in philosophical psychology. It has been traditionally employed as a paradigmatic example of uncertainty with regards to other minds, revealing as such a misguided commitment to the picture of the inner. Could Wittgenstein’s analysis of the concept of pretence help us account for the uncertainty with regards to other minds in a clearer, better-grounded way than could be explained through the picture of the inner? In order to answer this question positively, I focus on elucidating Wittgenstein’s view on the concept of pretence as embedded in human practices. This shift in our orientation of thought enables us to show that the appeal to the picture of the inner lacks the explanatory properties for which it is often employed. I argue that following Wittgenstein’s suggestion to look at the concept “in action” contributes to a different and better understanding of the uncertainty with regards to other minds. By exploring Wittgenstein’s remarks on the concept of pretence, this kind of uncertainty can be accounted for by the complexity of the language-games in which pretence plays a role. This complexity is, in turn, connected to varied and complicated patterns of human behavior. In Wittgenstein’s later writings on philosophical psychology, the concept of pretence is dealt with extensively. Exploring his remarks on the uses of the concept is helpful in shedding some light on the phenomenon of pretending, not by means of speculating about what goes on in people’s minds, but by pointing out the roles it plays in our language-games. The possibility of pretence seems to provide grounds to claim that we can never know what others really think or feel. What is at stake here is not only a problematic exclusive disjunction between “really feeling” as opposed to “appearing to feel” – we do not always interpret other people’s behavior against this distinction – but also the picture philosophers are prompted to attach to this distinction – really feeling something is understood as there being something (e.g. the feeling) in one’s mind. Therefore, another important aspect of investigating Wittgenstein’s remarks on the features of pretence is identifying its relation to more general insights on mind and language. Doubtful Certainties. Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism, (Eds. Jesús PADILLA GÁLVEZ, Margit GAFFAL), Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt a. M., 2012, 91-108.

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If we follow Wittgenstein in looking at the practices that underlie our uses of concepts, we can see the constructive aspect of his remarks: what is usually associated with the “inner hidden mind” in fact lye open to view and should not necessarily be explained through inner entities and processes. At the same time, this method can help us elude the confusions which stem from associating pretence with the “inner hidden mind”. However, it is important to notice that this wittgensteinean approach does not commit us to a dogmatic view that “forbids” the sort of explanations where an invisible entity is postulated to explain visible phenomena. The fact that in the existent tradition in philosophical psychology such methods have failed and we are, in fact, dealing with pseudo-explanations modeled after scientific explanations does not imply that we should not, in principle, try to explain them like this. Wittgenstein’s remarkable contribution is that he shows us we do not need to give such explanations in order to have an accurate picture of our psychological concepts. A methodological observation is that the case analyses will mostly be focused on the concept of pain. The motivation for this option is twofold. The first reason is that “pain” is a concept intensely discussed by Wittgenstein himself, thus making multiple textual evidence available for an adequate interpretation. The second aspect is that the grammar of the concepts for sensations is simpler, in the sense that the language game in which we usually use, for instance, “pain” does not require other linguistic competences, as opposed to more complex language games such as the one for pretence. Beside the methodological motivation, one can identify strategic and illustrative reasons for using the concept of pain to show that there is an internal relation between the meaning of psychological concepts and their (natural) expression. In the context of explaining Wittgenstein’s strategy to show that a public language game as a measure for meaning is necessary, Michel ter Hark1 identifies two of these reasons: the first is that “pain”, as opposed to “thinking”, “expecting”, “desire”, has a natural expression: a face contorted by pain, a cry for help etc.; the second is that, unlike emotions with specific physiognomies (anger or joy), pain is more direct, in the sense that it is usually an acute state of consciousness. These observations however seem to imply that it is only in extreme cases that we do not doubt a person’s genuine expression of pain (e.g. when she is 1

ter Hark, 1990, p. 78.

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thrown in flames and screams in agony) and that Wittgenstein took the “easy way” by dealing with such cases. On the contrary, as will be shown, Wittgenstein discusses a variety of cases, most of which are not as straightforward as this. And it is precisely because our judging behavior as genuine expression or pretence has nothing to do with the “nature” of what is expressed, but rather with what “surrounds” it. “The ‘atmosphere’ of a word is a picture of its use. We look at a word in a certain environment, spoken with a certain intonation, as an expression of feeling.”2

1.

The Problem and its Roots

The issue arises from a misunderstanding regarding the implications of the fact that people are sometimes uncertain of what another is feeling or thinking. Philosophers are inclined to explain this uncertainty through the picture of the inner. More precisely, the uncertainty about what other people feel or think is explained by postulating some inner entities or processes that correspond to the behavior we associate with different feelings or beliefs. A key feature of the inner is taken to be the fact that it is essentially private, i.e. directly accessible only to its owner, who can in turn choose whether to show it to others through language and behavior or not, or even to show something different. This picture of the inner (mind) in contrast with the outer (behavior) is therefore taken to account for the possibility of pretence. This picture then opens the way to the following challenge: if one can pretend then there is pretence; and if there is pretence then what is there to stop us from always doubting that people’s utterances and expressions are genuine? “But what does this mean: “All behaviour theoretically could be dissimulation.””3 “It must surely mean: the concept of dissimulation allows for it.”4

That this picture of the concept of pretence, as it springs from the relation in which it stands with the picture of the inner, is false stands in need of clarification. Not only does Wittgenstein help us see the inherent misunderstandings and confusions, but he also offers an alternative account 2

Wittgenstein, LWPP, II, 39. Wittgenstein, LWPP, I, 257. 4 Wittgenstein, LWPP, I, 258. 3

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of the implications of pretence and its applications. This account is illustrated in two complementary ways: the analysis of the grammar of the concept and the description of the practices with which its use is interwoven. 2.

Criticism of the Existing Picture by Means of Grammatical Elucidations

In this section I shall focus on Wittgenstein’s grammatical approach to the uses of our concepts to show that the attempt to explain the uncertainty with regard to other minds through the picture of the inner is misguided. In order to do this, I will address a few features of the picture of the concept of pretence, aiming to show how Wittgenstein’s grammatical elucidations undermine the challenge. The possibility of pretence seems to provide grounds for the claim that the inner is hidden. The fact that people sometimes hide their thoughts is taken to entail that thoughts are hidden entities. “One can say “He is hiding his feelings”. But that means that it is not a priori they are always hidden. Or: There are two statements contradicting one another: one is that feelings are essentially hidden; the other, that someone is hiding his feelings from me. If I can never know what he is 5 feeling, then neither can he pretend.”

The claim that the inner (thoughts, emotions, etc.) is essentially hidden can only be supported by instances of people hiding their thoughts and emotions. But the assumption behind the fact that this is sometimes the case is that sometimes it is not. Differently put, it is a grammatical feature of the concept of pretence that it can, at least sometimes, be exposed. We would not even be able to sensibly talk about pretence if there were no such thing as genuine expression, in the same way we would not have the concept of lying if people were never sincere. This is a possible line of reasoning that would support Wittgenstein’s claim that there is a contradiction between the statements “Feelings are essentially hidden” and “Someone is hiding his feelings from me”. For if someone can hide his feelings, this implies he can also show them, so it does not rest in the nature of feelings that they are hidden. Consequently, the possibility of pretence does not ground the idea that we can never know what another is feeling, but rather points to the contrary. Pretence is only possible if there 5

Wittgenstein, LWPP, II, 35.

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are instances of both knowing and not knowing what others are thinking or feeling. The challenge might be considered to rest on an illicit inference that we can never know what others are thinking or feeling from the fact that people sometimes pretend. A typically wittgensteinian remark on the way our concepts work is welcomed here to make a point against this line of thought: it makes no sense to say that people sometimes pretend unless it makes sense to say that sometimes they don’t. Genuine expression and sincerity are required as a background against which we are able to judge some expressions and avowals as being feigned or insincere. Another aspect of the confusion inherent to this challenge is the idea that we can never know what goes on in another’s inner world. In order to show that this conclusion is false, I will draw upon Wittgenstein’s point that there are external criteria for pretence. Knowledge as well as doubting stand it need of grounds. If we are to talk about doubting another’s sincerity or genuineness of expression, we must also allow for the possibility of knowing when another is pretending. And, as Wittgenstein puts it: “Whether I know something depends on whether the evidence backs me up or contradicts me.”6

In the case of pretence, the evidence we are dealing with bear two important characteristics: outward and imponderable. The challenge we are addressing involves the two contrasting claims: that there are no external criteria for pretence and there is no clear and sufficient proof that would help us determine that some behavior is feigned. Being in pain and pretending to be in pain are taken to have the same outer manifestations and the difference between the two is that in the first case pain-behavior is accompanied by pain while in the other it is not. “In the inner there is either pain or pretence. On the outside there are signs (behaviour), which don’t mean either one with complete certainty.” But that’s not the way it is. In an extremely complicated way the outer signs sometimes mean unambiguously, sometimes without certainty: pain, pretence and several other things.”7

6 7

Wittgenstein, OC, 504. Wittgenstein, LWPP, II, 59.

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The feature of the traditional picture of pretence captured by Wittgenstein in the statement between quotation marks in the above passage suggests that both pain and pretence are different inner states (experiences) that manifest in behavior in the same way. However, if pretence and pain functioned on the same level, it would be possible to “experience” both in a similar manner. But this is not the case. We cannot show someone what it is like to pretend in the same way we could show her what it is like to feel pain; i.e. by producing the experience. Moreover, if the difference between pretence and pain is that they involve different inner states and not different manifestations, this picture could not account for a vast variety of situations: our reaction to someone’s screaming in pain, the spontaneous, impossible to withhold smile upon being reunited with a loved one, our reaction to a friend “pouring her soul out”, being caught in a lie by someone “reading” it on one’s face.8 If the only evidence we can talk about in the case of pretence lied within the mind of the person who pretends, detecting dissimulation would be inconceivable. But the possibility of detection is a central factor to consider in accounting for both instances of successful and unsuccessful dissimulation. In addition, the very idea of private proof is fundamentally flawed from a grammatical point of view. In order for the concept of proof to even make sense, it demands inter-subjective verifiability and controllability. Therefore, the only way to identify pretence and distinguish it from genuine expression is through outward evidence. “There is an unmistakable expression of joy and its opposite.”9 “Even though we often simply don’t know what to say, all the same we do sometimes have to lean towards one opinion, and sometimes be quite certain.”10

The fact that sometimes we are uncertain whether to interpret some behavior as pretence or not has nothing to do with the fact that the proof that would help us decide is only accessible to the person whose behavior we are interpreting. As previously shown, the idea private proof lacks sense. Rather, it can be explained through a specific feature of the evidence that comes into play in the language game of pretence, i.e. imponderable evidence. 8

Wittgenstein, LWPP, II, 33. Wittgenstein, LWPP, II, 32. 10 Wittgenstein, RPP, II, 718. 9

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“‘Imponderable evidence’ includes subtleties of tone, of glance, of gesture.”11

The fact that the evidence is imponderable does not imply that we cannot speak of knowledge of other minds. The fact that our ability to detect pretence sometimes rests on imponderable evidence is not a shortcoming of the language game of pretence, but part of it. The justification for the claim that imponderable evidence is part of our language game with pretence is connected with the characteristics of our psychological concepts as embedded in our practices. Wittgenstein writes: “Sufficient evidence passes over into insufficient without a borderline. A natural foundation for the way this concept is formed is the complex nature and the variety of human contingencies. Then given much less variety, a sharply bounded conceptual structure would have to seem natural. But why does it seem so difficult to imagine the simplified case? Is it as if one were trying to imagine a facial expression not susceptible of gradual and subtle alterations; but which had, say, just five positions; when it changed it would snap straight from one to another. Would this fixed smile really be a smile? And why not?--I might not be able to react as I do to a smile. Maybe it would not make me smile myself.”12

Wittgenstein points out a correspondence between human behavior and the blurry boundaries of our concepts that might be put as following. Where there is complexity and variety in behavior, concepts are elastic (fluid) which makes evidence sometimes imponderable. Where there is simplicity and uniformity of behavior, concepts are clearly determined (fixed limits) which demands clear and sufficient evidence. But in the case of pretence, the simple case is difficult to imagine. The simple case here is an artificial idealization – an attempt to capture the nature of a concept, which is specific to traditional philosophy. Even if we can imagine very simple forms of behavior (instinctive behavior), it would not be meaningful for our purposes. We could say, for example, that jellyfish behave, but this mere fact would not grant sense to a discussion about pretence in jellyfish. Hence, the complexity and variety of human behavior is natural, which accounts for the imponderability of evidence. 11 12

Wittgenstein, LWPP, I, 936. Wittgenstein, [a, b: Z 439; c: cf. Z 527.]; Wittgenstein, RPP, II, 614.

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It is important to note that this correspondence accounts for the fact that “imponderable evidence” is part of the language game as opposed to it being a shortcoming. However, this does not mean that the imponderability of evidence is a universal condition without which the language game would collapse; for there could be cases where the evidence would be clear enough to convince anybody that someone is pretending. Wittgenstein’s insistence on the idea that the evidence for pretence cannot always be and, more importantly, need not be specified in terms of generally agreed upon principles has even further reach. Specifically, it challenges the traditional picture which assumes that certainty, wrongly understood as an essential characteristic of knowledge, can only be acquired through irrefutable evidence. How, then, can we account for the fact that outer signs sometimes mean unambiguously pain or pretence? “Certainty enters the game but not via proof or incontrovertible evidence. No criteria constitute proof, but there are criteria which can convince.”13 For example, evidence for my certainty that someone is pretending to be in pain can only be the look which he gives to another. But the fact that I cannot prove to someone else that she was pretending does not undermine my conviction; for I can say “If you had seen it you would have said the same thing”.14 Therefore, even though we cannot always ponder the evidence, we can capture what convinced us. Moreover, imponderability of evidence is a result of the subtleties of human behavior and therefore functions in daily life as unproblematic clues to understanding others.15 If the concept of pretence does not get its meaning from the picture of the inner and the resort to the possibility of pretence as an explanation for the uncertainty regarding other minds fails, what, then, does justice to both the uncertainty and a picture of the concept of pretence that accounts for its uses? Here is where I suggest Wittgenstein’s constructive approach comes in. 3.

A New Account of Pretence by Means of Investigating Practices

In this section I will focus on showing how Wittgenstein’s constant reference to the practices that underlie our uses of psychological concepts can both set out a more accurate picture of the concept of pretence and 13

Johnston, 1993, p. 180. Wittgenstein, LWPP, I, 923. 15 ter Hark, 1990, p.145. 14

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account for the uncertainty with regards to other minds, without internalizing the confusions inherent to the picture of the inner. I will pursue two of the claims which I consider relevant to the issue at hand: (i) the language game of pretence is complex, specific and presupposes other games and conceptual abilities, as well as particular circumstances (ii) the uncertainty with regards to other minds (when conditions for such uncertainty are met) is part of our language games with psychological concepts and is to be accounted for through the indefiniteness of human life and behavior From the outset, it is important to note that Wittgenstein’s recurrent interest in the practices that underlie our uses of concepts is not a philosophical artifice. He is not exchanging an inner postulated entity with an outer one. Instead of attempting to explain a phenomenon by trying to capture the diversity of the concept’s uses under one and the same umbrella, he describes its various uses by looking at the complexity of human life and behavior. Moreover, the emphasis on “concepts in action” is not just an instructive instrument that can help us get a clearer grasp of our concepts. The reason it gives us a more adequate picture is that the very meaning of the concepts is embedded in practices. “The concept ‘dissimulation’ serves practical aims.”16 “Therefore not all behaviour can be dissimulation under all circumstances. (Occasion, motive, etc., are part of ‘dissimulation’.)”17

If we stop treating pretence as some abstract concept and consider all the factors coming into play when pretence is “part of our lives”, it immediately strikes us how specific and context-dependant the language game really is. Philosophers defending other minds skepticism have therefore exaggerated the scope of pretence and hence distorted the meaning of the concept. If we see the language game as specific and investigate the circumstances in which it is usually played, some important features of the concept of pretence come to light. There are characteristics that we can consistently associate with some uses of the concept (for example, that it presupposes motive, that it can be discovered etc.). In order for these 16 17

Wittgenstein, LWPP, I, 261. Wittgenstein, LWPP, I, 262.

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features to become clear, it is instructive to look at how children learn to play the language-game. This is a strategy Wittgenstein often appeals to, mainly because the language games in which children learn to use a concept are simpler, which allows for a clearer grasp of the uses. However, in the case of pretence, this strategy leads to some difficulties that I shall attempt to set straight. One of the main reasons why these difficulties occur is the fact that there are no simple (i.e. instinctive) forms of pretence. Before we begin the investigation of the language game in which children learn to pretend, it is important to ground the idea that pretence only occurs within a complex language game. “Instinct comes first, reasoning second. Not until there is a language-game are there reasons.”18 “The steps that lie between instinctive cunning and cunning that is carefully thought out. An idiot could behave slyly, for that’s what we’d call it, but we wouldn’t think him capable of planning anything.”19 “[…] A dog can’t pretend to be in pain, because his life is too simple for that. It doesn’t have the joints necessary for such movements.”20 “A dog cannot be a hypocrite; but neither is it sincere.”21 “If pretending were not a complicated pattern, it would be imaginable that a new-born child pretends.22

All these remarks hint to the same idea: we cannot sensibly speak of the possibility of pretence before there is a complicated pattern of behavior. This is one way to account for the fact that we are reluctant to suspect newborns or animals as being capable of pretence. It is not because of their sincerity or their innocence that we do not think them capable of pretending, it is the constitutive rules of the concept of pretence that do not allow for the possibility. A variety of behavioral abilities have to be manifested in order for a child to be able to pretend. “A child has to learn all sorts of things before he can pretend.”23 “What does a child have to learn before he can pretend?

18

Wittgenstein, RPP, II, 689. Wittgenstein, RPP, II, 650. 20 Wittgenstein, LWPP, I, 862. 21 Wittgenstein, LWPP, I, 870. 22 Wittgenstein, LWPP, II, 55. 23 Wittgenstein, LWPP, I, 868. 19

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Well, for example, the use of words like: “He thinks I’m feeling pain, but I’m not.””24

So the ability to mimic pain (i.e. learning the game “acting as if in pain”) is not sufficient to account for the possibility of pretence. The child must also realize that “acting as if in pain” can be used to mislead. “A child discovers that when he is in pain for instance, he will get treated kindly if he screams; then he screams, so as to get treated that way. This is not pretence. Merely one root of pretence.”25 As Wittgenstein’s investigation is set out so far, it would seem that he suggests that the intention to deceive is a central factor to consider before talking about the very possibility of pretence. Paul Johnston has the following comment to this remark: “What is lacking at this stage is the concept of deception and the intention to deceive.”26 Even though Johnston’s observation is not about child psychology but is meant to illustrate that at this stage the child’s behavior does not belong to the pattern we call pretence, there is a certain misinterpretation we need to prevent. Clearly the intention to deceive is not the essential feature of the concept of pretence. For Wittgenstein would surely recognize there are many other uses of the concept and some of them do not share this feature. There are various cases in which we say that people pretend: actors pretend when they play their roles, children pretend that a broomstick is a horse, some people pretend to do their jobs etc. Some features of the concept overlap in some uses, while other features are completely different: pretence is a family resemblance concept. This apparent inconsistency is the most important difficulty I will address. Wittgenstein systematically warns us against the tendency “to look for something in common to all the entities commonly subsumed under the same general term”.27 If we take him to hold that the intention to deceive is an essential feature of the concept of pretence, the following objection arises: is Wittgenstein not simply substituting the mental entity with this feature that is common to all uses? There are a few ways one could reply to this objection. 24

Wittgenstein, LWPP, I, 866. Wittgenstein, LWPP, I, 867. 26 Johnston, 1993, p. 174. 27 Wittgenstein, BB, 1958, p. 17. 25

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First of all, it is important to note that the intention to deceive is not merely a different kind of explanation of pretence from the explanation through the mental entity. The identification of this feature is a result of the description of the practices usually intertwined with the uses of the concept. Hence this approach not only eludes the objections to the inner picture, but has firmer grounds. Second, one could argue that even though the intention to deceive is not a constitutive feature of the concept of pretence, it is a constitutive feature of one of the concept’s uses. But it would be difficult to pinpoint what this use is. For example, say we take the intention to deceive to be characteristic to the use of pretence as the attempt to make someone believe I am in pain when in fact I am not or to pretending to be someone else. Even so, we can imagine cases where I pretend to be in pain or to be someone else just for the fun of it, not necessarily to deceive. Eventually, if we tried to specify the use of pretence for which the intention to deceive is constitutive, we would be stuck at saying that the intention to deceive is constitutive of the use of pretence where the pretender’s purpose is to deceive. Third, I suggest that it is misleading to understand the intention to deceive as a psychological condition for pretence. Wittgenstein’s insistence on it being specific to pretence has a different point: that one cannot pretend by accident. So the remark about this feature of pretence is grammatical, meant to circumscribe pretence as an intentional ability, as opposed to other psychological concepts determining experiences, reactions etc. However, the question that Wittgenstein often revisits still stands: what is lacking from a child’s imitation of pain-behavior for it to be pretence? Wittgenstein’s attempts to answer this question are not a search for essences, but examples which play different roles. The manner in which this question is formulated seems to imply that whatever answer we might give, that will constitute the essential characteristic of the concept or, differently put, what makes some behavior pretence. This expectation is responsible for the apparent tension in Wittgenstein’s thought. I shall therefore propose a different approach to this question, which not only eludes the difficulties previously mentioned, but is also closer to Wittgenstein’s orientation of thought. I suggest the key to this perspective is to be found in the following remark:

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“He has to learn a complicated pattern of behaviour before he can pretend or be sincere.”28

The reason why a child who has just learnt to imitate pain-behavior cannot yet pretend is not that she does not have the intention to deceive. Rather, it is because she is not yet acquainted with the complexity of behavior and the range of appropriate reactions to it; she has not yet acquired the abilities and the varied patterns of behavior against which pretence appears. The ability to imitate points to the child’s being capable of pretending and constitutes as such only the beginning of the language game: “The capacity to pretend therefore resides in the ability to imitate, or in the ability to have this intention.”29

This is why imitating behavior is merely “one root of pretence”. But in order for the child to pretend, she must be able to continue the language game.30 Continuing the language-game in this context might consist, for instance, in her imitating pain-behavior in the appropriate surroundings (e.g. after feigning having hit herself during a fall). The change in perspective I am proposing as a better alternative to the question of what a child needs to learn before it can pretend can be put like this: instead of looking for a something that the child needs to learn, we should be looking for a how to. That is, what the child is lacking is mastery of a technique. The fact that we cannot point to a precise criterion that determines when the child learns to pretend is also a marker for the idea that pretence is an ability that can only be exercised within a complex behavioral pattern. Wittgenstein asks: “[…] But how can a language-game suddenly become clear to a child? God only knows. – One day it starts doing something. An analogue might be the child learning a board game which he sees played daily.”31

Another aspect of the complexity of the language game of pretence is that it presupposes other language games and conceptual abilities. More precisely, it rests on the language game of genuine expression.

28

Wittgenstein, LWPP, I, 869. Wittgenstein, LWPP, II, 56. 30 Wittgenstein, LWPP, I, 183. 31 Wittgenstein, LWPP, I, 183. 29

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Doubtful Certainties. Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism “Therefore I want to say that there is an original genuine expression of pain; that the expression of pain therefore is not equally connected to the pain and to the pretence. That is: the utterance of pain is not equally connected with the pain and the pretence.”32

That we can, and in fact often do, know what another is feeling is not, however, only true with regards to spontaneous expressions of sensations. This is just a clearer way to show it due the fact that pain has a natural expression which is, arguably, more spontaneous than other psychological states (e.g. love, sadness, etc.). In getting to know what another is feeling we do not try to “look” inside the other’s mind, neither do we interpret the other’s behavior univocally (that is to say, taking behavior or avowals as indications of another’s psychological state is not analogous to a computer’s making an inference in accordance with its programming). We are not facing self-contained bodily movements, but human beings. That is why we appreciate the complexity of human’s behavior against the “patterns in the weave of life”33 and consequently consider a variety of factors: connecting previous experience, close observation, engaging in conversation, etc. Of course we can imagine a person such skillful in dissimulation that she could make all factors consistent in her deceiving purpose, but this does not invalidate, but rather rests upon, the detectability of pretence. “Even the case where there is uncertainty (genuine and not mere philosophical uncertainty) requires that there be in the background instances of certainty on both sides, positive and negative.”34 Another important aspect of Wittgenstein’s analysis to understanding the relevant features of pretence as embedded in practice is his appeal to the idea of confession. “If someone ‘pretends friendship and then finally shows his true feelings, or confesses’, we normally don’t think of doubting this confession in turn, and also saying that we cannot know what’s really going on inside him. Rather, certainty now seems to be achieved.”35

This passage might be taken to commit Wittgenstein to the idea that people’s reaction to confessions as opposed to other statements about feelings are different based on the very nature of confessions. That is to 32

Wittgenstein, LWPP, II, 55. Wittgenstein, LWPP, I, 862. 34 Canfield, 2004, p. 155. 35 Wittgenstein, LWPP, II, 86. 33

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say, we have a disposition to commit to the genuineness of a person’s confession that she had previously pretended or lied and not treat the confession as a further lie. This approach to the idea of confessions seems to hint at a psychological disposition to believe a confession. In other words, there is a natural inclination to accept a confession as genuine, based on a “psychological need” to believe people’s expression of feelings.36 But surely there is such a thing as a false confession. While it may be true that we are disposed to believe (i.e. take as genuine) a confession about somebody having pretended friendship, this might not have as much to do with a natural psychological inclination, as with the conceptual requirements of the shared practices that are part of the language games with our psychological vocabulary. In order to make this point, it is perhaps useful to make two distinctions explicit, which are meant to circumscribe some grammatical features of the concept of confession. First, confessing, as opposed to saying, is not merely a report about one’s own feelings and is therefore not open to doubt in the same way saying something is. That is to say, “confessing” grammatically implies telling the truth. The possibility of a false confession can be accounted for through the second distinction, between confessing and pretending to confess. The difference between confessing and saying or between confessing and pretending to confess is given by the fact that they are different patterns in the stream of life – they have different surroundings. “For surely it is one thing quietly to confess one’s fear--and quite another to give expression to it unabashedly. The words can be the same, but the tone and the gestures different.”37

But there is no set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a surrounding to uniquely determine a concept. And this just goes to show that our reaction to confessions has nothing to do with some intrinsic trustworthiness of confessions, nor does it depend on some general psychological disposition. “Even if we vary the concept of pretence, its inwardness must still be kept, i.e. the possibility of a confession. But we don’t always have to believe a confession, and a false confession is not necessarily deception.”38 36

Zamuner, 2004, pp. 187-188. Wittgenstein, LWPP, I, 33. 38 Wittgenstein, RPP, II, 692. 37

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Doubtful Certainties. Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism “There is indeed the case where someone later reveals his inmost heart to me by a confession: but that this is so cannot offer me any explanation of outer and inner, for I have to give credence to the confession. For confession is of course something exterior.”39

Therefore, the apparent inconsistency in Wittgenstein’s thought hinted at through the initial interpretation of the role confessions play in the game of pretence is merely a reminder of his central point: the signs for the genuineness of confessions, as well as the signs for pretence, are outward. “But you can’t recongize [[sic]] pain with certainty just from externals.”-The only way of recognizing it is by externals, and the uncertainty is constitutional. It is not a shortcoming. It resides in our concept that this uncertainty exists, in our instrument. Whether this concept is practical or impractical is really not the question.”40

The picture of the concept of pretence as embedded in practice opens up the way for the understanding of uncertainty not as an epistemological shortcoming, but as a feature of our language games with psychological concepts in which we talk about other minds. The reason why uncertainty is sometimes part of the language games is because the only way to talk about other minds is through reference to outward evidence. And since outer evidence is tightly connected with the complexity of human behavior, which in turn is made up of shared but irregular “patterns in the weave of life”, it is a fact of life that, where there is uncertainty, it is part of the language-games. “The ‘uncertainty’ relates not to the particular case, but to the method, to the rules of evidence.”41 “Concepts with fixed limits would demand a uniformity of behaviour. But what happens is that where I am certain, someone else is uncertain. And that is a fact of nature.”42

The fact that the uncertainty is a trait of these language games does not imply that people are always in doubt about what others feel. The possibility of doubt does not change the meaning of concepts such as “pain” and thus does not entail the generalized doubt. The possibility of disagreement and uncertainty is a characteristic of our language-games 39

Wittgenstein, RPP, II, 703. Wittgenstein, RPP, II, 657. 41 Wittgenstein, RPP, II, 682. 42 Wittgenstein, RPP, II, 683. 40

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with psychological concepts, due to the complexity and diversity of our reactions in certain circumstances. It is therefore not an external aspect of the language-game that undermines it and, by doing so, supports the picture of the inner. “If a concept refers to a certain pattern of life then it has to contain a degree of indefiniteness.”43

The distinction between genuine expression and pretence is important only if it plays a role in the language game. The concept of pretence is not an irregularity, but it is itself a pattern which we can recognize as such only against the background of genuine expression. Wittgenstein’s strategy of linking the rules of the language game of pretence to our factual way of living accounts for the uncertainty through the complexity and irregularity of our behavior. And the important point here is that this uncertainty also implies certainty. Wittgenstein’s new picture, far from being a theoretical construction that explains a phenomenon, can nevertheless account for the features of the concept of pretence and its implications, which the picture of the inner failed to explain. This picture is therefore constructive, inasmuch as it amounts to producing non-theoretical insights about the patterns of the concept of pretence by means of investigating its grammar and the human practices with which its use is intertwined. One might still ask what is so substantive and constructive about Wittgenstein’s analysis of the concept of pretence. For after all, he did not meet the traditional philosopher’s expectation to tell us what pretence is, but merely pointed out what it is not, based on constantly attacking the picture of the inner that has been misleadingly attached to it. Does that not just go to show that he is simply pursuing a therapeutic purpose? My suggestion here is that the reason why we cannot give a definitive answer to settle the issue of pretence following Wittgenstein’s line of thought is not connected with the philosopher’s views on the task of philosophical inquiry. Rather, it stands in the very nature of Wittgenstein’s positive instruction of looking at concepts “in action” that a complete picture cannot be laid out. But the picture does not have to be complete in order to be illuminating. The question of whether Wittgenstein gives us any answers at all is, of course, a matter of what our expectations are. But a more pertinent question is, after all, how much more than he gives us do 43

Wittgenstein, LWPP, I, 206.

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we actually need? As long as we can elucidate the distinctive features of our psychological concepts and offer alternative insights into puzzles that philosophers have tried but failed to explain through the picture of the inner, the positive aspects Wittgenstein’s philosophy show themselves, as a contribution to understanding. References Canfield, John V., 2004: Pretence and the Inner, in: Moyal-Sharrock, Danièle (ed.), The Third Wittgenstein: The Post-Investigations Works, Ashgate, Aldershot, 145-158. Johnston, Paul, 1993: Wittgenstein Rethinking the Inner, Routledge, London & New York. Ter Hark, Michel, 1990: Beyond the Inner and the Outer: Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht. Ter Hark, Michel, 1990: Wittgenstein’s Metaphysics of the Inner and the Outer, in: Daimon: Revista de filosofía, Nr. 2, 139-150. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1982: Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, (eds.) G. H. von Wright & H. Nyman, (tr.) C. G. Luckhardt & M. A. E. Aue, Blackwell, Oxford. [=LWPP] Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1969: On Certainty, (eds.) G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. von Wright, (tr.) D. Paul & G. E. M. Anscombe, Blackwell, Oxford. [=OC] Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1980: Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, (eds.) G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. von Wright, (tr.) G. E. M. Anscombe, Blackwell, Oxford. [=RPP] Zamuner, Edoardo, 2004: Treating the Sceptic with Genuine Expression of Feeling, in: (eds.) A. Roser & R. Raatzsch, Jahrbuch der Deutschen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft, Peter Lang Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 187-188. University of Bucharest

Was Wittgenstein a Relativist? Margit GAFFAL Introduction It has sometimes been argued that Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy is marked by relativism. According to this view people view general concepts in relative terms due to different considerations and perceptions. More specifically, there is a tendency among some philosophers to assign the Wittgensteinian concept of form of life to the idea of culture. The argument goes like this: as language games and forms of life develop within a particular culture and cultures are different they are no absolute phenomena but rather relative depending on the frame within which they developed.1 I would like to take up this thought and examine whether we can find any relativistic position in Wittgenstein’s writings. The question is whether the existence of a multitude of forms of life points to any sort of relativism. Many philosophers have speculated over the significant concept of “form of life”. There has been an ongoing debate over the question whether the concept is to be understood in the singular or in the plural.2 The discussion here revolves around the question of whether there is only one prevailing form of life to which others can be subsumed. Or else, is there a variety of coexisting forms of life of equal value? If we consider forms of life as part of the broad concept of culture there must be a rule according to which these forms are arranged. If there were no ruling principle we would drift into relativism. This relativism would easily deteriorate in conflict among different forms of life. It was argued that a multitude of forms of life without any regulating mechanism holds a dangerous potential of conflict. Order could only be restored by enforcing a radical solution.3 But this argument is based on wrong 1

Cf.: “So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?” – What is true or false is what human beings say; and it is in their language that human beings agree. This is agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life.” Wittgenstein, PU, §241. 2 Garver, 1984, 33ff; Garver, 1999, 37ff; Haller, 1979, 521ff; Lütterfelds, Roser, 1999; Marques, Venturinha, 2010; Padilla Gálvez, 2010, 72ff; Padilla Gálvez, Gaffal, 2011. 3 Lütterfelds, Roser, 1999, 25f. Doubtful Certainties. Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism, (Eds. Jesús PADILLA GÁLVEZ, Margit GAFFAL), Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt a. M., 2012, 109-120.

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presumptions. It is incorrectly assumed that each plural phenomenon is derived from its singular version. And it is a misconception that a multitude of forms of life would overrule singular forms, the same as a generic concept super ordinate, denotes and classifies its deduced components. The conclusion to these misconceptions is then: one “culture” comprises a multitude of forms of life. These many forms of life have a tendency to compete which inevitably results in conflict. Such disorder must be overcome by introducing a hierarchical order. The relativistic approach starts from the assumption that cultural and religious identities are the primary source of conflict. I would now like to go into more detail and analyze how forms of life relate to relativism in general in Wittgenstein’s writings. 1.

Relativism and Forms of Life

Relativism as a philosophical position implies that there is neither an absolute truth nor a universal standard according to which a culture could be measured. Truth is always subjective and relative in the sense that it depends on the set of conditions under which it is expressed. According to Wittgenstein forms of life develop out of what he calls the “facts of life” or “Tatsachen des Lebens”.4 The most concise formulation in which Wittgenstein puts facts of life5 on a level with forms of life can be found in his book entitled “Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology” and it reads like this: “Statt des Unzerlegbaren, Spezifischen, Undefinierbaren: die Tatsache, dass wir so und so handeln, z.B. gewisse Handlungen strafen, den Tatbestand so und so feststellen, Befehle geben, Berichte erstatten, Farben beschreiben, uns für die Gefühle der Anderen interessieren. Das Hinzunehmende, Gegebene – könnte man sagen – seien Tatsachen des Lebens / seien Lebensformen /”6

The reason why we act in specific ways is because we have the ability of adapting to the conditions that surround us. The conditions in which a speaker unfolds his life are called “the given” or “facts of life”. Our actions are based on these facts and a totality of all these facts makes up a form of life. In the secondary literature “facts of life” have been 4

Wittgenstein, PU II, p. 529. Other expressions that Wittgenstein uses for forms of life are “Lebensmuster” or “Muster im Lebensteppich”. Wittgenstein, PU II, i, p. 489. 6 Wittgenstein, BPP, Vol. I, §630. 5

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interpreted in different ways. Some authors use a socio-anthropological perspective and consider them as a result of cultural development.7 According to the quote mentioned above our actions depend on the given and the conditions under which we live.8 These facts differ among people, which is the reason why they develop different forms of life. But how do we interact? Can we ever reach the necessary agreement as the basis for our collective action? How can a consensus of opinion be achieved? Or do we judge as true what is in accordance with our own conditions? Wittgenstein does not explicitly answer these questions but makes only sporadic remarks. The few statements in which he used the notions of “Lebensform”, “Lebensformen” und “Form des Lebens” are quite different referring the context in which they occur.9 Still one can make out the different connotations associated with the notions. At the beginning of the Philosophical Investigation Wittgenstein established a direct connection between language and form of life.10 He said: “It is easy to imagine a language consisting only of orders and reports in battle. Or a language consisting only of questions and expressions for answering Yes and No and countless other things. —– And to imagine a 11 language means to imagine a form of life.”

Subsequently he compared grammaticality to rules of a game and specified language as a “language game” according to which we play with language.12 Wittgenstein gives a long list of possible language games and illustrating that words and sentences can be used in numerous different ways. Finally he concluded that producing and using language games is an activity that belongs to a form of life.13 The mutual connection of language 7

Haller, 1984, 50. Wittgenstein, PU II, p. XI. 9 For a detailed discussion of the notions and their respective contexts see: Padilla Gálvez, Gaffal, 2011, 9ff. 10 Wittgenstein, PU, §19. Cf.: Baker, Hacker, 1985b, 65ff. 11 Wittgenstein, PU, §19. 12 He says: “D.h. die Sprache funktioniert als Sprache nur ducrh die regeln, nach denen wir uns in ihrem Gebrauch richten. (Wie das Spiel nur durch Regeln als Spiel funktioniert.)” Wittgenstein, TS, 213, p. 151. 13 “Wieviele Arten der Sätze gibt es aber? Etwa Behauptung, Frage und Befehl? – Es gibt unzählige solcher Arten: unzählige verschiedene Arten der Verwendung alles dessen, was wir »Zeichen«, »Worte«, »Sätze«, nennen. Und diese Mannigfaltigkeit ist nichts Festes, ein für allemal Gegebenes; sondern neue Typen der Sprache, neue 8

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and form of life has now become a constellation of three elements such as language game – activity – and form of life.14 At first sight this description creates the impression as if there is a static relation between action and form of life. It has often been held that form of life is an abstract singular concept. Yet there are rather many different ways in which language can be used and the relation between action and form of life is dynamic. I will plead for a plurality of forms of life. Language may be considered as both, a distinctive element differentiating one form of life from another and at the same time it is a conjoining tool which keeps us connected. The fact that we follow Sprachspiele, wie wir sagen können, entstehen und andre veralten und werden vergessen. (Ein ungefähres Bild davon können uns die Wandlungen der Mathematik geben.) Das Wort »Sprachspiel« soll hier hervorheben, daß das Sprechen der Sprache ein Teil ist einer Tätigkeit, oder einer Lebensform. Führe dir die Mannigfaltigkeit der Sprachspiele an diesen Beispielen, und anderen, vor Augen: - Befehlen, und nach Befehlen handeln – - Beschreiben eines Gegenstands nach dem Ansehen, oder nach Messungen – - Herstellen eines Gegenstands nach einer Beschreibung (Zeichnung) – - Berichten eines Hergangs – - Über den Hergang Vermutungen anstellen – - Eine Hypothese aufstellen und prüfen – - Darstellen der Ergebnisse eines Experiments durch Tabellen und Diagramme – - Eine Geschichte erfinden; und lesen – - Theater spielen – - Reigen singen – - Rätsel raten – - Einen Witz machen; erzählen – - Ein angewandtes Rechenexempel lösen – - Aus einer Sprache in die andere übersetzen – - Bitten, Danken, Fluchen, Grüssen, Beten. - Es ist interessant, die Mannigfaltigkeit der Werkzeuge der Sprache und ihrer Verwendungsweisen, die Mannigfaltigkeit der Wort- und Satzarten, mit dem zu vergleichen, was Logiker über den Bau der Sprache gesagt haben. (Und auch der Verfasser der Logisch-Philosophischen Abhandlung.).” Wittgenstein, PU, §23. 14 In another work I have discussed the function of language games in the context of Alfred Wechsler’s work and have identified them as cultural tools by which we act upon the world. They may be considered as “social techniques” that a speaker uses to interact with the outer world in such a manner that he would avoid conflict. Taking into account that there are implicit rules of what is considered social competence one could also describe language games as techniques of appropriate conduct or decent social behavior. See: Gaffal, 2011, 57ff.

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grammatical rules when we produce language games, allows us to understand each other. It enables us to approach the given from a particular perspective and to produce utterances that express our form of life. We gain certainty by applying grammaticality in our language use. In fact we coincide in the use of appropriate grammar rules. This is the first counterargument against a relativistic position. Authors such as Charles Taylor have argued that Wittgenstein becomes understandable if one adopts a non-relativist position and accepts the Verstehen-thesis as premises.15 Philip Pettit has pointed to the doubtful reasoning.16 Another author, Norman Malcom sees the origin of form of life in a custom derived from a regular behavior among a group of people. It is the collective who determines what is to be considered as form of life. To him observing a rule means to practice a habit. He says literally, “following a rule as a practice, a custom, an institution.” And he comes to the conclusion that “It is a form of life, […] it can have its roots only in a setting where there is a people”.17 In this context, Gordon Baker put emphasis on the notion of practice,18 which suggests that certain commonness in the use of language unifies the interlocutors. After having described the interrelation between language games, human conduct and forms of life I shall now exemplify the concept of cultural relativism and examine whether Wittgenstein’s texts allow for a relativistic reading. 2.

Cultural Relativism

Cultural relativism views human civilization as relative rather than absolute in the sense that ideas and conceptions are only true with respect to the social context within which they develop. Social competence is acquired by following all those rules that are considered appropriate in a society. Such relativist approach is described by N. Malcolm in the following quotation: “...following a rule […] is a practice, a custom, an institution. It is a form of life; […] it can have its roots only in a setting where there is a people”.19 Cultural relativists view diversity from a neutral 15

Taylor, 1981, 191ff. Pettit, 1981, 230ff. 17 Malcolm, 1989, 23. 18 Baker, 2004, 103. 19 Malcolm, 1989, 23. 16

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perspective and believe that all cultures are of equal value. What is considered accepted or unaccepted is determined only by the individual or by society. If we apply this view to form of life one may characterize form of life as the sum of cultural peculiarities that has developed within a community. What is implied here is actually a justification of cultural practices, strategies in the conduct of people and the socio-political order, the organization of society, gender relations, etc? An action is customary if there is a consensus about this habit within a cultural community. A tradition is considered valuable with respect to a culture and a form of life is widespread within a culture. The cultural relativist delimits the domain of a custom to the cultural background in which it originated. Different forms of life represent substantially different cultural areas. This presumption supports the view of cultures as fundamentally different and therefore as being incompatible. Relativism points to the distinctive features that differentiate one culture from another. “I said that so far as facts and propositions are concerned there is only relative value and relative good, right, etc.”20

The first difficulty associated with this position is that the relativist does not accept universal standards according to which a culture could be compared. But there is a more severe problem. If the relativist adopted that position he would have to apply the same to his own view and this would turn our relative as well. Therefore every statement that the relativist makes about another culture is in itself again relative. Consequently all that a cultural relativist can do is to make an empirical statement. According to this view, Wittgenstein should have collected empirical data about different cultures and put them in relation to the aim that this culture would have wanted to reach. 3.

Language and Forms of Life

In the discussion on relativism language normally plays a minor role. The aim is more to highlight the distinctive features rather than the unifying elements. However, Wittgenstein repeatedly pointed to the crucial role of language in the development of form of life. We learn a language game through observation and instruction and do not normally doubt what we are taught. In his book On Certainty he says, for instance, that when a child 20

Wittgenstein, PO, 40.

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learns to act in this-or-that way he or she does not acquire knowledge but learns language games. Therefore the child would not have any doubts about their content. It is the sum of all these language games that would later turn into knowledge. He puts it like this: “472. Wenn das Kind die Sprache lernt, lernt es zugleich, was zu untersuchen und was nicht zu untersuchen ist.” “538. Das Kind, möchte ich sagen, lernt so und so reagieren; und wenn es das nun tut, so weiss es damit noch nichts. Das Wissen beginnt erst auf einer späteren Stufe.” “283. Denn wie kann das Kind an dem gleich zweifeln, was man ihm beibringt? Das könnte nur bedeuten, dass es gewissen Sprachspiele nicht erlernen könnte.”21

On another stance he exemplified that to give somebody instructions can only be understood by the one who has learned the language game. In other words, a speaker’s language game is only of relative importance to the listener. A message may be received but not understood. The decoding of a message depends on the dispositions that the listener has available. If he has not learned that language game the speech act is doomed to fail. Wittgenstein described this process in the following quote: “Ich beschreibe eben das Sprachspiel “Bring etwas Rotes”, dem, der es schon selbst spielen kann. Den Andern könnt’ ich’s nur lehren. (Relativität).”22

This shows thate we do not communicate absolute truths and see whether we coincide. According to how we have learned the language we learn the game first and it turns into knowledge later. We do not start a language game by examining whether each other’s statements correspond to any objective outside truth. We can only coincide in the language use by which we interact. We apply a similar language game, approach

21

Wittgenstein, OC, p.76. Wittgenstein, BEE, 2000, Item 136, Vol. Q, p.130. Compare this passage: “Wie wäre es den wenn mein ehrliches Geständnis unzuverlässiger wäre als das Urteil des Andern? Oder auch: Was ist das für eine Tatsache: dass es nicht so ist? Wenn sich auf mein Geständnis meines Motivs nicht die Konsequenzen aufbauen liessen, die man im Allgemeinen drauf bauen kann, dann gäbe es das ganze Sprachspiel nicht. Ein Relativitätsproblem.” Wittgenstein, BEE, 2000, Item 136, Vol. Q, p.133a.

22

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phenomena from a particular perspective which indicates a form of life. He says: “Alles was ich in der Sprache tun kann ist etwas sagen: das eine sagen. (Das eine sagen im Raume dessen was ich hätte sagen können.) Man könnte das auch so ausdrücken: Die Sprache “arbeitet” “wirkt” relativ & nicht absolut. Wenn ein Satz nicht eine mögliche Bildung unter andern wäre, so hätte er keine Funktion. D.h.: wenn ein Satz nicht das Resultat “Ergebnis” einer Entscheidung wäre, hätte er nichts zu sagen.”23

Application of grammaticality and particular word combination are ways that represent a form of life. The listener comprehends a language game if he coincides in the grammar that we use: “So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?” – What is true or false is what human beings say; and it is in their language that human beings agree. This is agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life.” 24

All experience is mediate and facts can only be communicated through language. The same as form is related to content in the field of design the mode of expression determines the content of a statement in communication. A speaker’s language game has an impact on the content that is expressed. Language is the only vehicle by which we can access reality. A language game gives form to content. If two people coincide it is because of their similar language games. As such content is only relative to the language that somebody uses to convey it. We learn ways of conduct by way of language games. Behavior is acquired through imitation and description. Language game is an orientation guide which shows us how we are supposed to behave and act. A cultural relativist presumes that two people with different cultural backgrounds could never really comprehend the other’s language game. As both have learned different language games within their respective cultures they would not understand each other. But what both have in common is their grammaticality to express the content in which a matter is placed. This grammaticality reflects the coordinates of a person’s mental map. One could even detect a liar by the way in which such person uses a language game. Wittgenstein considered the content of a proposition relative to the 23 24

Wittgenstein, BEE, 2000, Item 110, p.1. Wittgenstein, PU, §241.

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language game that a speaker applies. But where we happen to coincide is the grammar as the base frame of an expression. As such, people with two different forms of life have a common basis or denominator which is grammar. Conclusion What are the consequences of all this for the co-existence of a multitude of forms of life? The cultural relativist argues that the difference in language games among representatives of different cultures impedes mutual understanding. A relativist uses this argument as a justification to maintain a particular language game reflecting traditional cultural habits. How can two people of different cultures ever reach an agreement? Wittgenstein reminds us that we use certain techniques by which we follow patterns of behavior that he calls form of life (Lebensform, Lebensteppich). Although people differ in their language games they may still carry out similar actions which result in similar forms of life. Their behavior may be targeted at the same aim despite of different language games. As such, nobody would doubt the joining power that the Olympic Games have on the understanding among nations. People of different backgrounds may coincide in their cultural techniques when sharing an interest in a matter or practicing the same hobby. How could international politics ever produce positive result if politicians were not successful in their combined actions to solve problems despite of different language games? The economic crisis that the Western world is momentarily facing can only be mastered by a combined effort of political representatives. The media transmits pictures of summits with debating politicians and the viewer tacitly hopes that hopes that joint strategies and combined action prevail over politicians’ different language games and cultural backgrounds. If cultural relativists opened his repertoire of language games to members of other speech communities on an exchange basis they would probably discover more commonalities than expected. As Wittgenstein underlined that we coincide in our language games he was certainly not a relativist. Different cultures may coexist peacefully as long as their respective members make an attempt to understand the others’ language games and forms of life.

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References Works by Ludwig Wittgenstein25 - The Bergen Electronic Edition. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000. - Das Blaue Buch . Schriften 5. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. BLB - Bemerkungen über die Philosophie der Psychologie, Vol. I, BPPI Schriften 7. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. - The Big Typescript (TS 213), German-English Scholars’ BT Edition, Ed. C. Grant Luckhardt, M. A. E. Aue, Blackwell, 2005. - Manuscript …, according to the register of G.H. v. Wright. MS ... - Philosophische Bemerkungen (1964), Ed. Rush Rhees, WA, PB Vol. 2. - Philosophische Grammatik (1969), Ed. Rush Rhees, WA, PG Vol. 4. PI, 1958 - Philosophische Untersuchungen / Philosophical Investigation (1958), Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, Second Edition, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1958. PI, 2009 - Philosophische Untersuchungen / Philosophical Investigation (1958), Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, Wiley Blackwell, Oxford, 2009. - Philosophische Untersuchungen (2001). (KritischPU genetische Edition editada por J. Schulte), Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. - Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (1980). Volume I. RPP-I (Ed. G. E. M. Anscombe, G. H. von Wright. Trad. G. E. M. Anscombe). Blackwell, Oxford. RPP-II - Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (1980). Volume II. (Ed. G. H. von Wright, Heikki Nyman. Trad. C. G. Luckhardt, M. A. E. Aue). Blackwell, Oxford. - Über Gewißheit. (1994). Werkausgabe, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt ÜG a. M. - Werkausgabe (8 Vols.), Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M., 1984. W - Wiener Ausgabe. (WA, 1 - WA, 5). (Ed. V. M. Nedo). WA Springer Verlag, Wien – New York, 1993-1996. BEE

25

The following abbreviations are used to refer to Wittgenstein’s published works.

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- Zettel. Schriften 5. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M.

Baker, G.P., 2004: Wittgenstein’s Method: Neglected Aspects. Edited and introduced by Katherine Morris. Oxford: Blackwell. Baker, G.P. and P.M.S. Hacker, 1985a: An Analytical Commentary on the ‘Philosophical Investigations’. Vol. II. Wittgenstein, Rules, Grammar and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell. Baker, G.P. and P.M.S. Hacker, 1985b: Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning. Part II: Exegesis §§1-184. Oxford: Blackwell. Gaffal, M., 2011: Forms of Life as Social Techniques, in: J. Padilla Gálvez, M. Gaffal (eds.), Forms of Life and Language Games, Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt a. M., 57-74. Garver, N., 1984: Die Lebensform in Wittgensteins Philosophischen Untersuchungen, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 21, 33-54. Garver, N., 1999: Die Unbestimmheit der Lebensform, in: Lütterfelds, Roser 1999, 37-52. Haller, R. 1979: Die gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 33, 521-533. Haller, R., 1984, “Lebensform oder Lebensformen” – Eine Bemerkung zu N. Garvers ‘Die Lebensform in Wittgensteins Philosophischen Untersuchungen’, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 21, 55-64. Haller, R. 1999: Variationen und Bruchlinien einer Lebensform, in: Lütterfelds, Roser 1999, 53-71. Lütterfelds, Wilhelm / Andreas Roser (ed.), 1999: Der Konflikt der Lebensformen in Wittgensteins Philosophie der Sprache, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. Malcolm, N., 1989: Wittgenstein on Language and Rules, Philosophy, 64 (247), 5-28. Marques, A. and N. Venturinha (eds.), 2010: Wittgenstein on Forms of Life and the Nature of Experience. Peter Lang, Frankfurt a.M. Padilla Gálvez, J., 2010: Form of Life as Arithmetical Experiment, in: A. Marques, N. Venturinha (eds.) Wittgenstein on Forms of Life and the Nature of Experience. Peter Lang, Frankfurt a.M., 113-124.

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Padilla Gálvez, J., 2011: Language as Forms of Life, in: Forms of Life and Language Games, (Eds. J. Padilla Gálvez, M. Gaffal), Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt a. M., 37-56. Pettit, Ph., 1981: Reply: Evaluative ‘Realism’ and Interpretation, in: Holtzman, Leich, 1991, 211-245. Taylor, Ch., 1981: Understanding and Explanation in Geisteswissenschaften, in: Holtzman, Leich, 1991, 191-210.

the

Universidad Pontificia de Comillas

Language Meets and Measures Reality Jakub MÁCHA Language meets reality by measuring it. My aim in this paper is to shed some light on Wittgenstein’s metaphors of language’s meeting and measuring reality. My additional aim will be to delimit to what extent or in what sense these functions of language are transcendental. 1.

The Standard Meter

Many commentators have focused on the question whether one can reasonably say that the Standard meter is or is not one meter long. My focus will be directed rather on the problem of how a material object becomes a part of language or a part of a language-game in particular. A language-game is for Wittgenstein not only a part of a language (taken as an abstraction) but the whole activity related to a language: “I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the ‘language-game’.”1 In what follows I will argue that the Standard meter is a part of such an activity and, thus, of a language-game. The expression “the Standard meter” shows a peculiar de re/de dicto ambiguity. “The Standard meter” may refer to the object that is or had been stored in Paris. It may refer, however, to its role in our language game.2 This role determines many things: (1) It determines where and how its bearer is deposited (in Paris, in vacuum etc.). (2) It picks out a particular property of its bearer (here it is the length). (3) It determines its own application to reality, or, in Wittgenstein’s terminology, it contains its own method of projections. In particular, one has to pick out a corresponding property of the object measured and perform a comparison. The Standard meter belongs to two realms. It is a real object that has been arbitrary chosen for its role. So it belongs to reality. It also belongs, however, due to this double role, to language as well. Comparing the 1

Wittgenstein, PI, §7. By the expressions “the meter rod”, “the Standard meter”, “the rod that is the Standard meter” or “the rod that is just the Standard meter” I will refer de re to the rod in question. I will indicate a de dicto reference explicitly by the expression “the role of Standard meter”.

2

Doubtful Certainties. Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism, (Eds. Jesús PADILLA GÁLVEZ, Margit GAFFAL), Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt a. M., 2012, 121-128.

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Standard meter with another object can be taken either as comparing two real objects or as comparing a linguistic object with a real object. It is a comparison within reality and a comparison between language and reality. To put is simply, language meets reality because there is an entity that belongs to both realms, their intersection is not empty. This entity is the Standard meter which belongs to both realms, due to its role to language and due to its being a material object to reality. This meeting of language and reality is further specified as measuring. Hence language meets reality by measuring it. 2.

Language Measures Reality

The idea of measuring has attracted philosophers’ attention from early times. In his famous fragment Protagoras wrote that “Man is the measure of all things: of things which are, that they are, and of things which are not, that they are not”3. This statement has been taken as a credo of (radical) relativism. But due to its fragmentary preservation, it is open to various readings. It is disputable whether the subject “man” means an individual man or whether there is admissible a collective interpretation “all men” or even “human nature”. The Greek χρήµατα does not mean things as material objects, but rather the things one is dealing with.4 Finally, the conjunction ως allows an existential interpretation “that”, but also the adverbial interpretations “how” or “in what manner”. Taking this into account, the fragment may be interpreted as follows: Measures of things are not absolute; they are relative to human dealing with them.5 This interpretation, I will argue, is pretty much in accord with Wittgenstein’s employment of the concept of measure. Wittgenstein knew this fragment from Plato’s dialogue Theaetetus where it is extensively discussed— although Plato’s interpretation is significantly different from the one I have sketched. Wittgenstein’s interest in measuring may, however, initially originate in another author. In the context of the discussion of solipsism, Wittgenstein wrote in his Notebooks that “I have to judge the world, to measure things.”6 This inspiration originates in his early reading of Otto

3

DK80b1. The contemporary meaning of χρήµατα is “money”. 5 My translation of Greek is based on Versenyi, 1962. 6 Wittgenstein, NB, p. 82, 2.9.1916. 4

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Weininger’s book Über die letzten Dinge.7 Weininger advanced the idea that man lays down measures of things in their epistemological and ethical aspects. The absolute measure is, for Weininger and for the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, logic. Such measures, Weininger argues, are given by or originate in the biological nature of man. 3.

Internal Relations

In this section, I want to connect the problem discussed above to a more general and in Wittgenstein’s writings more important problem of distinguishing between internal and external relations. In WWK Wittgenstein says that the relation of being longer than between two sticks is external, whereas the relation of being greater than between their lengths is internal.8 In his Remarks on Colour Wittgenstein renders the same distinction: “A language-game: Report whether a certain body is lighter or darker than another.—But now there’s a related one: State the relationship between the lightness of certain shades of colour. (Compare with this: Determining the relationship between the lengths of two sticks—and the relationship between two numbers.)—The form of the propositions in both languagegames is the same: “X is lighter than Y”. But in the first it is an external relation and the proposition is temporal, in the second it is an internal relation and the proposition is timeless.”9

A relation between two numbers or between two color shades is also an internal one, a relation between two spatial objects is an external one. This distinction might get lost in the surface grammar. Wittgenstein, however, offers a criterion of how to find out what sort of relation is expressed. Temporal propositions express external relations, whereas timeless propositions express internal relations. Let us slightly modify the example from Wittgenstein’s conversations with Waismann:10 Rod A is as long as the standard meter. This is an external relation. The length of rod A is the same as the length of the standard meter; this is an internal relation which can be expressed as 1=1. Hence all objects that are one meter long have a property that is internally related to the length of the standard meter by the relation of 7

See Janik, 2001. Wittgenstein, WWK, 1979, 54. 9 Wittgenstein, ROC, 1977, §1. 10 Wittgenstein, WWK, 1979, 54. 8

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identity. By the same token, all objects that are longer than one meter have a property that is internally related to the length of the standard meter by the relation of being longer than.11 This resembles the Tractrarian picture theory of meaning—a view that a picture “is laid against reality like a measure”.12 The way how a picture depicts reality—the pictorial relationship—has to belong to the very picture.13 This relationship marks what the picture and reality (i.e. what the picture depicts) have in common. It is their common form.14 Hence, a pictorial relation persists between the formal properties of a picture and the formal properties of reality. Such a relation is, of course, an internal relation of identity. Wittgenstein says, thus, that there is an internal relation (of depicting) between language and the world.15 Wittgenstein obviously employs the metaphor of language’s measuring reality both in the Tractatus and in his late philosophy. I want to stress that although it is still the same metaphor, its interpretations, and its particular uses are different in the respective stages of Wittgenstein’s thinking. In the Tractuatus, there is no mention of the arbitrariness of a measure, whereas this feature of a measure is going to be highlighted in the context of the Philosophical Investigations. 4.

Storing of Other Prototypes, Logic and Mathematics in Archives

The Standard meter is, of course, only an example here. The color sepia can be defined in the same way. What is important at this point is that its role—i.e. its place in grammar—must be defined or known in advance. By defining the unit of length “meter” it must be clear what length is. Or it must be clear what color is if one wants to define the color “sepia”. Hence, prototypes as the Standard meter or the Standard sepia determine an application of categorial (that is grammatical) terms like length or color.16 We could store in the archives in Paris not only the rod but also a description of its role. To put it differently, we could store the rod (as a part of language) and a rule of its application. Turing and later Kripke raised the objection that in order to apply that rule one needs another rule 11

As I argue in more detail in my essay (Mácha, forthcoming). Wittgenstein, TLP, 2.1512. 13 Wittgenstein, TLP, 2.1513. 14 Wittgenstein, TLP, 2.17. 15 Wittgenstein, TLP, 4.014. 16 See Wittgenstein, PI, §29. 12

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and there is, thus, an infinite regress (of instantiation of rules).17 Wittgenstein’s answer is that there must be stored enough information that the majority of us will be able to follow the rule in the same way. Wittgenstein extended this idea of storing a rod in archives with the insight that we could store not only material objects but also calculations and proofs there. Such mathematical entities are for Wittgenstein measures of reality.18 My interpretative question is at this point how a mathematical proof or calculation could be a measure of reality. This is, again, a metaphor. Its obvious sense is that mathematics is arbitrary in the same sense as a choice of the Standard meter. Axioms of mathematics and its notation are arbitrary. We may choose other axioms depending on what we want to achieve, i.e. by the end of a particular mathematical subdiscipline. According to the Tractatus, logic (and mathematics) shows the (logical) structure of the world. Wittgenstein rejects this Russellian (or even Aristotelian) view in his late philosophy.19 One may, then, ask how logic and mathematics could measure the world. Wittgenstein says that a logical conclusion is a transformation of an expression20 that could be used for converting two measures. Since mathematical calculations allow also the possibility for converting measures, this is a further common feature of mathematics and logic—besides their normativity. As argued before, a measure is defined by a prototype or sample whose property is internally related to the respective property of other objects measured. An internal relation is expressed or rather constituted by a mathematical proof (which has to proceed by rules that have been laid down previously).21 Mathematics can, thus, extend these internal relations to properties that are not carried on or tied to a material object, to a prototype. What, also, does Wittgenstein intend by the idea of putting something in archives? Rules and prototypes that have been deposited in archives have an extraordinary status. Wittgenstein says reluctantly that propositions stored in archives can be characterized by a formula “by definition”.22 But they might have been empirical propositions before they 17

Wittgenstein, LFM, 105. Wittgenstein, RFM I, 162 & III, 27. 19 Wittgenstein, RFM I, 8. 20 Wittgenstein, RFM I, 9. 21 Cf. Wittgenstein, RFM, 363: “What is proved by a mathematical proof is set up as an internal relation and withdrawn from doubt.” 22 Wittgenstein, LFM, 111-112. 18

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were put into archives. Consider an empirical proposition describing an experiment. If it were stored in archives, this experiment would become a paradigmatic case for other experiments. Hence, depositing a proposition into archives changes its empirical status to the status of a rule. Such rules are necessary, but this necessity is relative to the archive where this rule is stored. They are contingent in the sense that they are in the archives only accidentally (and they may lose their status in the future). Moreover, there might be more archives, each serving as a pool of rules for different language-games. To put it differently: A rule is always a rule of the language-game in which it is a norm of necessity. In a different languagegame, the same sentence may be an empirical proposition.23 5.

What is Transcendental

Here is Kant’s definition of the term transcendental: “I apply the term transcendental to all knowledge which is not so much occupied with objects as with the mode of our cognition of these objects, so far as this mode of cognition is possible a priori.”24 Transcendental knowledge is such that it determines an application of a priori concepts to experience (Erfahrung). I think that Wittgenstein did not make a strict difference between transcendental and a priori knowledge in the sense as Kant did. I want to stress at the outset that a priori knowledge is nothing mysterious which resides in or refers to some third realm. Knowledge a priori is simply such that cannot be vindicated by experience. Having these specifications in mind, I want to argue that propositions expressing internal relations are a priori and the rules of their projection are transcendental. As to the former point, let us consider again the very first paragraph of Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Colour.25 The proposition that “Stick A is longer than stick B” is expressing an external relation between two sticks, whereas “2>1” is expressing an internal relation between two numbers (or the lengths of the sticks). The former proposition is the empirical one and, thus, a posteriori; the latter cannot be justified by pointing out at these sticks. Therefore, this mathematical statement is knowledge a priori. Finally, I wish to scrutinize the roots of a priori knowledge in Wittgenstein’s late philosophy. There have been two points so far at which 23

For another treatment of the idea of archives see Diamond, 2001, Section 6. Kant, CPR, B25. 25 Wittgenstein, ROC, I, §1. 24

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Wittgenstein’s account of measuring requires a closer look. First, in order to be able to apply the Standard meter, one must already know what is meant by length. Second, people must mostly agree in their following the rules of projection. These points are not independent. If people did not know what length is, they would not be able to apply the rules of projection determined by the role of Standard meter. They would not be able to pick out the corresponding properties of the sample and of the object measured. Thus, I will focus on categorial concepts such as length, color or number. They are, on the one hand, presupposed by the definition of the unit of measurement and, on the other hand, they are defined by this very activity.26 To avoid a vicious circle, categorial concepts have to be founded elsewhere. To put it differently: We have to explain how people master the concept of length (or color). Wittgenstein says that “what we call ‘measuring’ is partly determined by certain constancy in results of measurement.” And furthermore: “That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life.”27 This passage clearly moves Wittgenstein away from any form of radical conventionalism. The fact that we are interested primarily in length and color28 (as opposed to, for example, wave length or electric charge) is rooted in our form of life. In this sense Wittgenstein’s account of measurement is in accord with my reading of Protagoras’ Man-measure fragment above and with Weininger’s idea that basic measures originate in the biological constitution of man. But this is not the whole story. At the end of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein states the utmost transcendental condition of language: “Our interest certainly includes the correspondence between concepts and very general facts of nature. (Such facts as mostly do not strike us because of their generality.)”.29 Our concepts are conditioned30 by 26

Wittgenstein makes this point in the case of the concept of number: “you cannot explain number by means of correlation […] you can explain it by means of possible correlation, and this precisely presupposes number.” (Wittgenstein, WWK, 1979, 1645) As to the length, when we measure an object by a ruler, we recognize their corresponding properties fall under the common concept of length. 27 Wittgenstein, PI, §§241-2. 28 Cf. Wittgenstein, Z, §345: “For the language-game with colours is characterized by what we can do and what we cannot do.” 29 Wittgenstein, PI II, 230. 30 These concepts are conditioned by those facts in the sense of being caused. If those facts were different, so would our concepts be.

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general facts of nature or reality. That is to understand that the structure of our categorial concepts is what it is because of these general facts. This is again nothing mysterious, for we people as physical creatures are a part of nature and a subject of the same physical laws. To conclude, Wittgenstein’s account of grammar and necessity is based on the metaphor of language’s measuring reality exemplified by the Standard meter. Grammar is arbitrary insofar as we could choose a different (unit of) measure of reality. The present choice is a matter of convention and may change sometimes in the future. Once certain grammatical rules have been chosen, they are necessary in our practice. In order to apply them to reality, we have to follow the rules of their projection. Constancy in following such rules is grounded in our form of life. Their projection depends, further, on our ability to focus on general properties, along which we perform a measurement. They are rooted, too, in our form of life conditioned by general facts of nature. In this sense they are transcendental.31 References Diamond, C., 2001: How Long Is the Standard Meter in Paris? In: T. McCarthy and S. C. Stidd (eds.), Wittgenstein in America. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 104-139. Diels, H. and W. Kranz, 1952: Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, (DK). Berlin, Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, (1903). Janik, A., 2001: From Logic to Animality or How Wittgenstein Used Otto Weininger, Nómadas. Revista Crítica de Ciencias Sociales y Jurídicas, 4 (2001.2), 1-14. Mácha, J., forthcoming: The Standard Meter and Wittgenstein’s Method of Analysis. Versenyi, L., 1962: Protagoras’ Man-Measure Fragment, The American Journal of Philology, 83, 2, 178-184.

Masaryk University Brno

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This paper was improved by discussions following presentations at the IIT Bombay, in March, 2012 and the University of Castilla-La Mancha, Toledo, in May 2012. Supported by project GACR P401/11/P174.

Beyond Relativism: Wittgenstein’s Method of Grammatical Enquiry in Philosophical Investigations §§198-2021 Sebastian GRÈVE In the following I want to suggest a reading of Philosophical Investigations §§198-202 according to which Wittgenstein’s discussion proceeds entirely on a grammatical level, and does so, moreover, in a way which particularly distinguishes it significantly from any traditional kind of philosophical relativism. This claim I want to make both clear and plausible, mainly by drawing on a widely neglected passage from the Blue Book and through close reading of the relevant remarks in the Investigations. The basic misunderstanding I want to address is most clearly exemplified by the so-called community view reading, put forward, for example, by Rush Rhees, Norman Malcolm, Saul Kripke, Crispin Wright, Eike v. Savigny and John McDowell, according to which, as Malcolm put it, ‘the presence of a community of people who act in accordance with rules [is] a necessary condition for there being any rule-following at all’.2 However, my proposed reading equally shows some of their opponents to have missed a crucial aspect of what goes on in PI §§198-202, most 1

I am very grateful for the several helpful discussions I had with Marie McGinn and Severin Schroeder on the issues that I discuss here. I also want to thank Alois Pichler for his encouraging advice throughout the writing process as well as Sarah Anna Szeltner and Konstancja Duff for their comments on an early draft. I am indebted to Jesús Padilla Gálvez for inviting me to give a presentation on this topic at a conference which he organised at the University of Castilla-La Mancha, Toledo (Spain). Thanks also to the numerous other participants for their comments and criticisms during the discussion and afterwards at the dining table. 2 Malcolm, 1989, 6. See Kusch, 2006 for a recent defence of Kripke’s community view. It might be objected that it was wrong to classify McDowell alongside these readings as he explicitly rejects the community view. However, it can easily be seen that he doesn’t succeed in doing so, but rather returns to an understanding of a communal practice supposedly underlying the normativity of meaning, as he puts it. He writes, for instance, ‘Wittgenstein’s point is that we have to situate our conception of meaning and understanding within a framework of communal practices’ McDowell, 1984, 342. Doubtful Certainties. Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism, (Eds. Jesús PADILLA GÁLVEZ, Margit GAFFAL), Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt a. M., 2012, 129-148.

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prominently Peter Hacker and the early Gordon Baker in their co-authored Volume II of An Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations.3 Following the later Gordon Baker in his emphasis on Wittgenstein’s non-dogmatic method, my proposed alternative reading, rather provocatively put, is this: ‘rule-following’ is—really—not a practice! One might wonder whether this isn’t inconsistent with what Wittgenstein actually says in PI §202, viz., ‘“following a rule” is a practice.’ But, as it will turn out, it is not. 1.

Rules – Practice – Forms of Life – Relativisms?

The later Gordon Baker wrote: “…we should presumably take [Wittgenstein] to avoid asking such questions as … ‘What is following a rule?’; and equally avoid giving answers that formulate the essences of these things. Is it reasonable for us to interpret him as asserting … ‘Following a rule must be a social practice (custom)’ (§199)?”4

And, indeed, taking Wittgenstein to ask such questions and to give such answers is just the kind of analytic misunderstanding of his method that he discusses in PI §§89-92; “[f]or it sees the essence of things not as something that already lies open to view”.5 He writes: “90. … Our inquiry is therefore a grammatical one. … 91. But now it may come to look as if there were something like a final analysis of our linguistic expressions, … as if there were something hidden in them that had to be brought to light. … 92. … ‘The essence is hidden from us’: this is the form our problem now assumes. We ask: “What is language?”, “What is a proposition?” And the answer to these questions is to be given once for all, and independently of any future experience.”6

3

Cf. Canfield, 1996 for an illuminating analysis and partial synthesis of the dispute between Malcolm and Baker & Hacker. 4 Baker, 2002, 103. 5 Wittgenstein, PI, §92. See also McGinn, 1997, 17-19 for a discussion of what, by reference to Wittgenstein, PI §§38 and 89, she has come to call the picture of logic as something sublime. 6 Wittgenstein, PI, §91ff.

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This misunderstanding of his method figures importantly in what I take to be the crucial mistake of the readings I want to discuss here. More specifically, I will argue that their mistake lies in the role they ascribe to the paradox in PI §201, on the one hand, and their resulting reading of the word ‘practice’ in PI §202 on the other, namely, as constituting a substantial thesis about what it is to go by a rule.7 Any particular relativistic rendering of Wittgenstein that my reading is supposed to reject, as it shows them to result from a certain misunderstanding of ‘practice’ in §202, can remain broadly unspecified. Instead, the one potential route to relativism, which shall interest me here only, becomes sufficiently clear by quoting the following bit from Malcolm: ‘following a rule […] is a practice, a custom, an institution. It is a form of life, […] it can have its roots only in a setting where there is a people’8. He goes on: ‘Undoubtedly this conception provokes great philosophical resistance but this should not prevent us from seeing that it truly is Wittgenstein’s conception.’ (ibid.) But I think it should, for, amongst other reasons, it seems that exactly such a reading would pave the way for all sorts of bogus relativisms.9 2.

The ‘Last Interpretation’

The paradox expressed in PI §201, namely, that ‘no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be brought into accord with the rule’10, is widely thought of as a reductio ad absurdum of the hypothesis that all rule-following essentially consists in an act of interpretation. Baker & Hacker write: ‘What the paradox shows is that not all understanding of rules can consist in interpreting.’11 In a similar vein, Hans-Johann Glock writes: ‘Wittgenstein invokes a regress argument

7

For example, I will also count the following grammatical theses as substantial theses of this kind: ‘What are “grammatical truths” are that following a rule is a practice, that there is no such thing as following a rule without there being public criteria for so doing, that all languages must in principle be capable of being understood by others who possess the appropriate abilities.’ Hacker, 2010, 108. 8 Malcolm, 1989, 23. 9 Obviously the connection of my discussion with questions about relativism in Wittgenstein is fairly loose. However, I do think that my discussion of §§198-202, particularly its methodological aspects, can potentially be helpful to someone whose tempted to think of Wittgenstein as a relativist of some sort. 10 Wittgenstein, PI, §201. 11 Baker & Hacker, 1985, 125.

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which goes back to Kant.’12 As in the case of the community view readings, it is partly because of the role they ascribe to the paradox in §201, or so I shall argue, that Baker & Hacker comment on the role of ‘practice’ in §202 as follows: ‘A rule is connected with its applications by means of a practice – a normative regularity of behaviour’13, and: ‘What the previous argument has committed W[ittgenstein] to is that following a rule … must be the instantiation of a regularity’ (ibid.).14 But, as will become clear in the course of my argument, this is, firstly, to ignore that Wittgenstein is engaged in a grammatical enquiry, and hence not in the least interested in advancing philosophical theses, be they positive (stating a “grammatical truth” about ‘practice’ in PI §202) or negative (stating the inconsistence of the interpretation hypothesis in PI §201); secondly, it is to completely misconstrue the nature of the philosophical problem at issue. In the Blue Book Wittgenstein discusses the (confused) idea of a last interpretation. After having introduced the paradoxical regress of interpretations in the form of adding arrow after arrow in order to specify the intended direction of an original arrow, he writes: “What one wishes to say is: ‘Every sign is capable of interpretation; but the meaning mustn’t be capable of interpretation. It is the last interpretation.’”15

From the discussion of this idea it can be seen why a simple reductio cannot do the job, that is, why it cannot solve the problem Wittgenstein is concerned with; namely, because the philosophical problem at issue really is one stemming from a misunderstanding of our language. That’s why the paradox of PI §201, pace Baker & Hacker, does not automatically, as it were, drive one to accept the conclusion that ‘not all understanding of rules can consist in interpreting’16. For, as illustrated by the idea of a last interpretation, someone holding the interpretation hypothesis to be true can be tempted to think that one can put a stop to the regress without retracting the interpretation hypothesis. Instead of withdrawing from the hypothesis, one can be tempted to think that the (“apparent”) paradox merely shows 12

Glock, 1996, 326. Cf. also McDowell, 2002, 102: ‘the regress shows there must be cases of following rules that are not cases of acting on interpretations.’ 13 Baker & Hacker, 1985, 131. 14 Cf. McDowell, 1984, 339: ‘we have to realize that obeying a rule is a practice if we are to find it intelligible that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation.’ 15 Wittgenstein, Bl.B, 34. 16 Baker & Hacker, 1985, 125.

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that there must be something like a ‘last interpretation’, that is, one which somehow cannot be interpreted itself. Hence, by considering the idea of a last interpretation as it is expressed in the Blue Book, we come to see that the alleged reductio argument of PI §201 might leave the philosophical problem entirely unsolved because it would leave the underlying confusion entirely untouched.—That’s why a different strategy is called for. In PI §182, Wittgenstein writes: “The criteria which we accept for ‘fitting’, ‘being able to’, ‘understanding’, [and, one may add, ‘interpreting’] are much more complicated than might appear at first sight. That is, the game with these words, their use in the linguistic intercourse that is carried on by their means, is more involved [(verwickelter)] – the role of these words in our language is other than we are tempted to think. (This role is what we need to understand in order to resolve philosophical paradoxes. And that’s why definitions usually aren’t enough to resolve them ….)”17

This is a pretty straightforward recipe, saying that what we need to understand is the use we make of certain words that are likely to mislead us. Thus the underlying problem gets clearly diagnosed as one that has to do with a misunderstanding of language, in particular with a misunderstanding of the words we use in philosophical thinking about matters like rule-following and understanding. Moreover, as Wittgenstein adds, a mere look in the dictionary, a definition or general “grammatical truth”, will not suffice to resolve our problems—hence, the need of a more complex method of clarification. This method is indeed instantiated by the vast majority of remarks contained in the Philosophical Investigations. One essential ingredient of this method is to compare particular uses of words (both real and imaginary ones) by means of detailed description and variation.18 This is what Wittgenstein has called grammatical enquiry (‘…clearing

17

Wittgenstein, PI, §182. Note that in total there are only six remarks in Philosophical Investigations containing the root word ‘paradox’, and §201 is the only other occurrence within the range of §§96-303. Also note his use of ‘that’s why’ (‘darum’) here. The respective references of this expression are similarly loose in Wittgenstein, PI, §§201-202. 18 Cf. Wittgenstein, PI, §122, §130.

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misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings concerning the use of words…’19), and this, I argue, is also what goes on in PI §§198-202.20 In the Blue Book, Wittgenstein also clearly states the grammatical nature of the problem he is concerned with. He is not so much concerned with the truth or falsehood of a philosophical claim, but rather with its sense, the use (and misuse) of words that it involves.21 The interpretation hypothesis relies above all on a deep misunderstanding of our language, of how our concepts function, in general, and how we ordinarily use those words involved, like ‘interpreting’, ‘last interpretation’, ‘meaning’ and ‘understanding’, in particular. As to the bogus idea of a last interpretation, Wittgenstein writes: “You have therefore further to tell me what you take to be the distinguishing mark between a sign and the meaning. If you do so, e.g., by saying that the meaning is the arrow which you imagine as opposed to any which you may draw or produce in any other way, you thereby say that you will call no further arrow an interpretation of the one which you have imagined.”22

The important implication is that all one would be doing by fixing ‘the last interpretation’ as referring to one’s imagined arrow is, not to explain anything, but merely to explicate the way one is going to use the words, inter alia, ‘interpretation’ and ‘meaning’ on future occasions. Now, such a definition is, in one sense, completely arbitrary and useless. Yet, in another it might not be picked just randomly. For example, one might have chosen the imagined picture to serve as ‘the last interpretation’ due to certain mentalistic tendencies in one’s philosophical outlook. This, as we know, is not altogether unlikely. But, just as Wittgenstein pointed out in PI §182 above, a look in the dictionary, a counter-definition, as it were, wouldn’t be of much help. The problem does not consist in a disagreement about possible general characterisations of ‘interpretation’. Rather the problem has to do with the particular use of the words ‘interpretation’, ‘last interpretation’, ‘meaning’ etc. which is made in connection with the ‘(last) interpretation’-hypothesis. And, more specifically, one important ingredient of the problem is just that this use of 19

Wittgenstein, PI, §90. See below. 21 As he writes in an early remark from February 1929: ‘This method is essentially the transition from the question of truth to the question of sense.’ (MS 105, 46) 22 Wittgenstein, Bl.B, 34. 20

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words, on the face of it, doesn’t appear to be problematic at all—the familiar character of these words is likely to prevent one from noticing the peculiarity of this particular instance. As Wittgenstein puts it: ‘The problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of language … are as deeply rooted in us as the forms of our language’.23 Therefore, pace Baker & Hacker, Malcolm, McDowell, Kripke and all the others, it is a misunderstanding to suppose Wittgenstein would simply invoke a regress argument in PI §201,24 a misunderstanding which, in turn, stems from a failure to appreciate the real nature of the problem Wittgenstein is actually working on, and a misunderstanding which, as will become clearer in the following section, is likely to lead to a misrepresentation of the philosophical method that he employs in order to solve such problems. 3.

‘Following a Rule’ is not a Practice

Let us have a closer look at PI §§201-202 then, in order to see how Wittgenstein can be read in a way in which it becomes clear how he exclusively sticks to descriptions of words and word-use. For the purpose of orientation, here is a full quote of the two remarks (first in the German original, then in the English translation): “201. Unser Paradox war dies: eine Regel könnte keine Handlungsweise bestimmen, da jede Handlungsweise mit der Regel in Übereinstimmung zu bringen sei. Die Antwort war: Ist jede mit der Regel in Übereinstimmung zu bringen, dann auch zum Widerspruch. Daher gäbe es hier weder Übereinstimmung noch Widerspruch. Daß da ein Mißverständnis ist, zeigt sich schon darin, daß wir in diesem Gedankengang Deutung hinter Deutung setzen; als beruhige uns eine jede wenigstens für einen Augenblick, bis wir an eine Deutung denken, die wieder hinter dieser liegt. Dadurch zeigen wir nämlich, daß es eine Auffassung einer Regel gibt, die nicht eine Deutung ist; sondern sich, von 23

Wittgenstein, PI, §111. Of course, presenting the paradoxical regress of interpretations in §201 is part of Wittgenstein’s method. However, it is only a way of alerting us to the presence of a misunderstanding, that is, it marks the beginning of a particular grammatical enquiry rather than the conclusive end of a traditional argument. Cf. also: ‘Wittgenstein wants to point to the crucial first step: that of thinking that our next application of the rule amounts to an interpretation.’ (Goldfarb 2012, [79], my emphasis) 24

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It is remarkable first of all, though at the same time fairly obvious, that at the end of §201 Wittgenstein distinctively makes a point about the word ‘interpretation’ when saying that, ‘one should speak of interpretation only when one expression of a rule is substituted for another.’26 Now it might be less obvious that the diagnosed misunderstanding in the second paragraph of the same remark is equally one concerning the word ‘interpretation’, rather than a thoughtless unawareness of an otherwise apodeictic reductio argument. Wittgenstein’s diagnosis is that 25 26

Wittgenstein, PI, §§201-202. Wittgenstein, PI, §201.

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there is something wrong, or at least quite unusual, about the way the word ‘interpretation’ is being used in the paradoxical interpretation hypothesis.27 We do not usually ‘place one interpretation behind another’. One interpretation is not usually a call for further interpretation, as it were. But this is what placing one interpretation behind another is supposed to mean here, viz., interpreting wherever interpretation is possible, or, rather, whenever one thinks of a possible interpretation lying behind the preceding one. Of course, one can easily imagine a game like this, and philosophers may even be said to frequently engage in such a game with quite some pleasure. However, exceptions prove the rule. Next consider the anaphoric reference (‘thereby’) in the following sentence. Instead of referring to the paradox as such, I suggest reading it like this: “For what we thereby show [, i.e., ‘by the mere fact that in this chain of reasoning we place one interpretation behind another, as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another lying behind it’,] is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation,[28] but which, from case to case of application, is exhibited in what we call “following the rule” and “going against it”.”29

It is crucial not to be misled by the form of the first sentence; that is, we should not take it as a concluding thesis about what there is. This is simply to apply one of the basic insights of Wittgensteinian philosophy. Yet it makes all the difference! This is merely to note that we use the expressions ‘following the rule’ and ‘interpreting the rule’ differently, in a way in which we might use them when we describe someone, who is acting in accordance with a rule, by saying ‘she is not following the rule but only interpreting it’.30 Just as Warren Goldfarb writes in his Rule-

27

Cf. Goldfarb, 2012, [79]: ‘The misunderstanding that engenders the paradox, Wittgenstein goes on to say, is the odd use that is being made of the notion of the interpretation of the rule.’ 28 Note that for some reason the italics of ‘interpretation’ have been omitted in the latest English translation. Further note that the resulting emphasis can seem to stress ‘interpretation’ in a way as to suggest that it is not the right word. The second half of the sentence strengthens this reading by forcing the focus on our language use even more, saying that what is important is what we call ‘following the rule’ or ‘going against it’ on particular occasions. 29 Wittgenstein, PI, §201. 30 See Wittgenstein, PI, §202: ‘to follow a rule’ vs. ‘to think one is following a rule’.

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Following Revisited,31 ‘Wittgenstein … wants to issue reminders about what work the notion of interpretation actually does in ordinary cases.’32 For, as in this case, suppose it was otherwise, as held by the interpretation hypothesis: how could it even make sense to say such a thing? Moreover, when discussing the idea of a last interpretation we saw that a dogmatic counter-thesis (‘not all understanding of rules can consist in interpreting’;33 ‘following a rule is a practice’;34 ‘following a rule is “essentially social”’35), that is, ‘“following a rule” is a practice’,36 when understood as making a substantial claim about the grammar (the possibility) of ‘following a rule’ by reference to a supposedly underlying necessity of either regularity or community, would entirely miss the point; such an understanding relies on a misconstrual of the problem Wittgenstein is concerned with. Analogously, imagine we were to give some supposedly convincing examples of very immediate cases of rule-following. Think of cases in which a person just acts, for example, when playing blitz chess. That wouldn’t do either! Someone inclined to think that rule-following must be interpretation might just reply that still there would be an interpretation process going on, only very fast, as it were, at the speed of neurons.37— This only shows once more that the kind of misunderstanding that is at issue here calls for a more complex method of clarification. Or, as Goldfarb puts it: ‘The subtlety here lies in trying to depict what it is to put the metaphysical demand on the conception of rules into this notion of interpretation.’38 Wittgenstein proceeds: ‘That’s why there is an inclination to say: every action according to a rule is an interpretation.’39 Along the same 31

Goldfarb, forthcoming in 2012. Goldfarb, 2012, [80]. 33 Baker & Hacker, 1985, 125. 34 Hacker, 2010, 108. 35 Malcolm, 1989, 23. 36 Wittgenstein, PI, §202. 37 Cf. Goldfarb, 2012, [80]: ‘The [problematic] philosophical move is then to the idea that every time one acts in accordance with the rule, one is, implicitly or unconsciously interpreting it.’ 38 Goldfarb, 2012, [80]. ‘To convince someone of the truth, it is not enough to state it, but rather one must find the path from error to truth.’ (Wittgenstein, PO 119; Wittgenstein, MS 110, 58; Wittgenstein, TS 211, 313) 39 Wittgenstein, PI, §201. 32

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lines as Baker & Hacker, I understand this as an immediate diagnosis of what could possibly cause the confusion.40 It is because of our intellectualising talk when philosophising and the seemingly ever present possibility of misinterpretation on the side of the rule-follower that we tend to think of it in terms of interpretation. If the rule isn’t misinterpreted, we falsely conclude, it must be interpreted correctly.—Just like Wittgenstein writes in PI §93, it is as though we are ‘unable simply to look and see how propositions work. For the forms of the expressions we use in talking about propositions and thought stand in [our] way.’41 Note that this diagnosis is also clearly concerned with the use (and misuse) of words, just like the following last sentence of §201: ‘But one should speak of interpretation only when one expression of a rule is substituted for another.’42 This finally leads over to §202: ‘That’s why “following a rule” is a practice. And to think one is following a rule is not to follow a rule.’43 As a natural continuation of the foregoing this is, in one sense,44 merely to say that what we call ‘following a rule’ can be something that we just do, as opposed to what we’d rather call ‘attempting to follow a rule’, ‘thinking one is following a rule’, or ‘interpreting a rule’.45 However there is no problem with reading this remark also as pointing to the various aspects of our word-use involving community and/or regularity, as Wittgenstein indeed does in many places.46 But there is no reason to suppose Wittgenstein would promote a thesis either to the effect that ‘the presence of a community of people who act in accordance with rules [is] a necessary condition for there being any rule-following at all’47 or that ‘[a] rule is connected with its applications by means of a practice – a normative regularity of behaviour’.48 Therefore, and in this 40

Cf. Baker & Hacker, 1985, 126. Wittgenstein, PI, §93. 42 Wittgenstein, PI, §201. 43 Wittgenstein, PI, §202. 44 See below for another sense. 45 See also Wittgenstein, PI, §197, where Wittgenstein writes that, the connection between the sense of the words ‘Let’s play a game of chess’ and all the rules of the game is effected, inter alia, ‘in the everyday practice of playing’ (Wittgenstein, PI, §197), not ‘by’ (the) practice in abstracto. 46 e.g. Wittgenstein, PI, §207. 47 Malcolm, 1989, 6. 48 Baker & Hacker, 1985, 131. 41

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sense, ‘rule-following’ is not a practice. It is wrong to suppose it must be a practice, be it by an appeal to community or regularity, as though in some mysterious sense ‘practice’ could explanatorily mediate between a rule and its application. In fact, it seems clear that Wittgenstein would have been the first one to show a substantial thesis like this to be quite empty and useless for his purposes.49 On the community view readings, as well as on Baker & Hacker’s, it appears as though Wittgenstein would reject one hypothesis about what following a rule ultimately consists in (viz. interpretation) and provide another one instead (viz. practice). But this, as I have tried to argue, is a somewhat careless misunderstanding of Wittgenstein’s discussion.50 To summarise, there are at least six reasons why such a reading is problematic, and which rather seem to speak in favour of my suggested reading. First, it would make Wittgenstein appear to have been either insincere or simply wrong about his own method in philosophy, or at any rate bad at applying it, when emphasising that he wasn’t even interested in theorising (generalising) or advancing thesis, as he repeatedly and in salient places did. I am particularly thinking of what he said in the course of his lectures on mathematics in 1939: ‘I won’t say anything which anyone can dispute. Or if anyone does dispute it, I will let that point drop and pass on to say something else.’51 Following these lines my suggested reading can also be understood as trying to show PI §§198-202 to be just another instance in the series of examples by which Wittgenstein sets out to teach his method

49

And, indeed, he did so in several places; see below. Cf. Goldfarb 2012, [83]: ‘the role of practices is easy to misstate, and is often misstated. … The subtle thing is to appreciate how Wittgenstein wants to get rid of this [hypothetical unconditioned grounding of rule-following] without putting anything in its place. It is not that correctness or determination by the rule is constituted by our practices.’ See also ibid., [87]. 51 Wittgenstein, LFM, 22. See also in a letter to Rhees in 1945: ‘in doing philosophy you have got to be ready constantly to change the direction in which you are moving. … You must be able to give up those central notions which have seemed to be what you must keep if you are to think at all’ (Rhees, 1984, 208); further Wittgenstein, AWL 97, Wittgenstein, PI, §128; and Wittgenstein, LFM, 55-6 on what Wittgenstein remarkably takes to be ‘a severe criticism’ of him. On theorising, see, for example: ‘And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. All explanation must disappear, and description alone must take its place.’ Wittgenstein, PI, §109. For ‘the craving for generality’ cf. Wittgenstein, Bl.B 17-20. 50

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in the Philosophical Investigations.52 Secondly, and more particularly, such an understanding seems to ignore Wittgenstein’s more concrete methodological remark about how to resolve philosophical paradoxes in PI §182.53 Thirdly, in the Blue Book, as can be seen from his discussion of the bogus idea of ‘the last interpretation’, Wittgenstein already dealt with the interpretation hypothesis in a way that is much more in agreement with his methodological remarks in the Philosophical Investigations, taking it to be a confusion of the kind ‘that arise[s] when language is, as it were, idling’;54 and there is no reason to suppose he would have abandoned these very thoughts. Fourthly, if we acknowledge the problem of the interpretation hypothesis as one specifically motivated by a misunderstanding of the role of certain words involved in our thinking about rule-following which needs to be cleared away,55 we come to see that there was no need, as well as no use, for a counter-thesis in the first place, be it in the form of a general “grammatical truth” or whatnot. Fifthly, there are passages in the Nachlass in which Wittgenstein explicitly rejects ‘“following a rule” is a practice’ as an attempt to explain where explanation is out of the question.56 Thus, it seems more accurate to understand it along the same lines as, for example, ‘the meaning of a word is its use in the language’57: as a methodological remark, a recommendation of a different way of looking at the phenomenon we are interested in, or feel puzzled by.58 Sixthly, there is another good reason to doubt that Wittgenstein could ever have wanted to give a substantial answer to such questions like ‘What is rule-following?’ or ‘How is rule-following possible?’. This has to do with a central feature of his rule-following discussion that, surprisingly, hasn’t been appreciated much in the literature so far, namely, that the theme of rule-following in many of its aspects serves as an analogy for Wittgenstein.59 In PI §81, for instance, he writes the following: 52

Wittgenstein, PI, §133. Cf. also: Wittgenstein, PI, §199; see below. 54 Wittgenstein, PI, §132. 55 see Wittgenstein, PI, §90. 56 Cf. Wittgenstein, PI, §217. Wittgenstein, MS 165, 87; Wittgenstein, WVC 155; see below. 57 Wittgenstein, PI, §43. 58 Cf. Wittgenstein, MS 121, 78r. 59 Cf. however Oskari Kuusela’s section on Rules as objects of comparison in Kuusela, 2008, 140-5. 53

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Doubtful Certainties. Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism “…in philosophy we often compare the use of words with games, calculi with fixed rules, but cannot say that someone who is using language must be playing such a game. … All this, however, can appear in the right light only when one has attained greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning something, and thinking. For it will then also become clear what may mislead us (and did mislead me) into thinking that if anyone utters a sentence and means or understands it, he is thereby operating a calculus according to definite rules.”60

And in the Blue Book we read: “Why then do we in philosophizing constantly compare our use of words with one following exact rules? The answer is that the puzzles which we try to remove always spring from just this attitude towards language.”61

If we see that Wittgenstein uses ‘following a rule’ primarily as an analogy, i.e. as an object of comparison, and, furthermore, that he thinks of it as a possibly misleading analogy,62 it gets even more questionable whether he had any immediate interest in explaining what rule-following is, i.e. what is necessary in order for something to count as a case of following a rule, or that his discussion was in any sense directed at such a goal.63 Thus, to repeat, the problem at issue in PI §201 is not one in the form of a question that deserved to be answered, but rather one in the form of a confusion stemming from a misunderstanding of language. This confusion needs to be dissolved by clarifying the role of the words involved.64 Therefore, just as Goldfarb correctly observes, ‘we ought to ask: when 60

Wittgenstein, PI, §81. Wittgenstein, Bl.B, 25-6. 62 See also Wittgenstein, Bl.B 25-6; Wittgenstein, AWL 3, 30, 32; Wittgenstein, MS 140, 33; Wittgenstein, MS 302, 14. More generally, see Wittgenstein, PI §131: ‘For we can avoid unfairness or vacuity in our assertions only by presenting the model as what it is, as an object of comparison a as a sort of yardstick; not as a preconception to which reality must correspond’. 63 Cf. Schroeder, 2006, 156: ‘It has been suggested … that Wittgenstein’s later conception of philosophy … aims at a synoptic representation of grammar to give us a better understanding of the workings of our language (Wittgenstein, PI §122). But for Wittgenstein such an understanding of language is not an end in itself. After all, a philosopher is not a linguist. He investigates and describes only those aspects of language that give rise to philosophical problems (Wittgenstein, PI §109); and the clarity he aims at simply means that the philosophical problems disappear (Wittgenstein, PI §133).’ 64 Wittgenstein, PI, §182. 61

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does one invoke the notion of interpretation ordinarily?’65 But, once more, what we have to look for is not a definition. General facts of grammar or “grammatical truths”, like ‘“following a rule” is a practice’,66 will, in the cases Wittgenstein is interested in, not be of much help either. Instead, what we need to find are perspicuous representations (‘übersichtliche Darstellung’67) of the use of a word on particular occasions, which let us grasp the distinct aspects of its use the ignorance of which produced our puzzlement.68 One way of constructing perspicuous representations is to look at particular uses of words from different perspectives, so as to highlight the subtle aspects and differences that we are otherwise prone to neglect. It is partly as a recommendation of such a perspective, I think, that Wittgenstein writes in PI §202 ‘“following a rule” is a practice’. He urges us to look at particular cases of rule-following as embedded in certain practices,69 as opposed to looking at it as something that occurs in a moment, or at a stroke, as it were.70 These practices are usually both communally institutionalised (community view) and involve a distinctive degree of regularity (Baker & Hacker). Yet this is nothing more than a methodological recommendation and nothing like a philosophical thesis. 4.

Not in my Backyard!

I have argued, among other things, that by writing in PI §202 that ‘“following a rule” is a practice’ Wittgenstein does neither commit himself to the claim that ‘the presence of a community of people [was] a necessary condition for there being any rule-following at all’,71 nor should he be seen as committing himself to the claim that ‘following a rule … must be the 65

Goldfarb, 2012, [80]. Cf. Hacker, 2010, 108. (see also footnote 5 above) 67 Wittgenstein, PI, §122. 68 For a detailed account of Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘perspicuous representation’, see Baker 1991. 69 Cf. also with respect to the analogy of rules and rule-following: ‘Wir betrachten die Sprache unter dem Gesichtspunkt des Spieles nach festen Regeln. [(We look at language as seen from the perspective of a game with fixed rules.)]’ Wittgenstein, MS 140, 33. 70 Cf. Wittgenstein, PI §§ 151, 184, 197. Needless to say that this does not mean that what we call ‘rule-following’ wasn’t something that in an important sense can be quite instantaneous. 71 Malcolm, 1989, 6. 66

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instantiation of a regularity’.72 In this last section, I want to discuss some few possible objections to this. Peter Hacker recently provided a thorough study of Wittgenstein’s use of the word ‘Praxis’, and ‘practice’ respectively, throughout his Nachlass. He observes that unsurprisingly most of the practices Wittgenstein discusses are indeed social practices, like language, games, arithmetic. Furthermore, he is surely right in his judgement that Wittgenstein’s emphasis is often on the regularity of a rule-like behaviour rather than on its social character when speaking of practice.73 Yet he doesn’t make much out of his third observation, namely, that, as he writes, ‘[s]ometimes ‘Praxis’ is more or less equated with ‘Anwendung’ (‘Application’)74), sometimes with ‘Anwendungsart’ (‘way of applying’75) and sometimes with ‘Ausübung’ (exercise, performance, execution)’76.77 But this is exactly the way of using the word ‘practice’ which, I believe, should receive more attention. For one thing, it makes the most sympathetic sense of PI §§198-202, as I have tried to argue. But then, aren’t there enough passages in the Nachlass, as Hacker partly shows, that speak in favour of a different reading of PI §202? MS 165, written in 1941, serves as a good example that is also mainly used by Hacker in his article. Here we find Wittgenstein saying: ‘It’s not interpretation that bridges the gap between the sign and the signified. Only practice does this.’78 Notably, he goes on to ask whether it is communal agreement that constitutes the practice, and denies it. Does this mean that practice is to be understood as ‘regularity’, and it is this, after all, that Wittgenstein wants to set against the interpretation hypothesis?—No. If we read only a few pages further, we find Wittgenstein writing: ‘In reality, however, it’s not two things that fit together here.’79—So, in this passage he is not merely saying that ‘interpretation’ is not the right way to bridge the gap, but rather that there is no gap in the first place. It is wrong to suppose there was a gap and hence it is also wrong to suppose there was 72

Baker & Hacker, 1985, 131. See Hacker, 2010, 94-96. 74 Wittgenstein, MS 121, p. 42r. 75 Wittgenstein, MS 120, p. 78r. 76 Wittgenstein, MS 152, p. 59. Cf. also Wittgenstein, MS 174, 30v; Wittgenstein, Br.B, 94. 77 Hacker, 2010, 94. 78 Cf. Wittgenstein, MS 165, 82; Wittgenstein, MS 122, 50v-51r. 79 Wittgenstein, MS 165, 87. 73

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a need for ‘practice’ to fulfil any explanatory role here, be it constitutively social or regulative.80 But, one might want to object, doesn’t Wittgenstein at least in the special case of PI §§198-9 clearly state ‘that a person goes by a signpost only in so far as there is an established usage, a custom’,81 where he cannot but either refer to the requirement of a community or a regularity?—But he doesn’t. Instead of stating this, he introduces this sentence by saying ‘I have further indicated ….’.82 He is replying to a misunderstanding of what he said before. And what he said before is equally introduced by a condition. It is simply not a thesis, not a claim in any substantial sense of the word, but an example. He writes: ‘What sort of connection obtains here? – Well, this one, for example: I have been trained to react in a particular way to this sign, and now I do so react to it.’83 Finally, the following paragraph does not reinforce the alleged necessity of a community of rule-followers by asking: ‘Is what we call “following a rule” something that it would be possible for only one person, only once in a lifetime, to do?’84 But rather the real level of investigation is made unmistakably clear right in the following sentence: ‘And this is, of course[!], a gloss on the grammar[!] of the expression[!] “to follow a rule”.’85 In other words, all of these remarks are, of course, not intended to explain what the phenomenon of rule-following essentially consists in. Rather all of these remarks are intended to contribute exclusively to Wittgenstein’s complex method of grammatical enquiry ‘into the workings of our language’86 in general, and the way we use the words involved in thinking about rule-following, meaning, understanding etc. in particular.87 As expressed in the much cited PI §217, Wittgenstein is not interested in 80

Cf. Goldfarb, 2012, [81]: ‘The bottom line is that grasping a rule is grasping a rule. There is no further general story. It is exhibited in our shared standards of correctness in what we call obeying a rule or not. But there is nothing from which our practices flow.’ 81 Wittgenstein, PI, §198. 82 Wittgenstein, PI, §198. 83 Wittgenstein, PI, §198. Here it is also helpful to have a look at Peter Hacker’s lucid account of why Wittgenstein didn’t think of the aspect of learning and training as being essential to his point; see Hacker, 2010, 97-99. Cf. also Wittgenstein, MS 179, 2r; Wittgenstein, Bl.B, 14. 84 Wittgenstein, PI, §199. 85 Wittgenstein, PI, §199. 86 Wittgenstein, PI, §109. 87 Cf. Wittgenstein, PI, §200.

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answering the question, ‘“How am I able to follow a rule?”’88, but he wants us to recognise the idleness of our philosophical question: “Remember that we sometimes demand explanations for the sake not of their content, but of their form. Our requirement is an architectural one; 89 the explanation a kind of sham corbel that supports nothing.”

Analogously, presenting the supposed (grammatical) fact that a ‘rule is connected with its applications by means of a practice’90 as the one great insight into rule-following is just another symptom of the very philosophical confusion Wittgenstein was actually working on. And this, in fact, Wittgenstein had already worked out quite soon after his return to academic philosophy in 1929 it seems. In a conversation with Moritz Schlick and Friedrich Waismann in January 1931 he explained as to the confusions about rules and rule-following: “Here [one] imagine[s] two things connected by a rope. But this image is misleading. For how is the rope connected with the thing?”91

Finally, to conclude with regard to the question of relativism(s) in Wittgenstein, it should be clear enough from the foregoing that ‘rules – practice – forms of life – relativisms’ is not a possible way of rendering Wittgenstein’s philosophy as relativistic, at least not in any traditionally philosophical sense that I could think of. Indeed the door seems closed right from the beginning.92 Moreover, I suspect that, in an important respect, Wittgenstein’s method of grammatical enquiry, with its particular form of non-dogmaticity, makes for a philosophy beyond relativism. References Ayer, A. J. and Rhees, R., 1954: Can There Be a Private Language? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 28, 63-94. Baker, G. P., 1991: Philosophical Investigations §122: Neglected Aspects. In: Katherine Morris (ed.), Neglected Aspects, 2004, 22-51. 88

Wittgenstein, PI, §217. Wittgenstein, PI, §217. 90 Baker & Hacker, 1985, 131. 91 Wittgenstein, WVC, 155. I changed the translation of the German ‘Man’ from ‘people’ into the here more accurate ‘one’. 92 For a thoroughgoing, non-relativistic reassessment of the significance of ‘form of life’ see Majetschak, 2010; Rentsch, 2003, 345-54. 89

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Baker, G. P., 2002: Wittgenstein on Metaphysical/Everyday Use. In: Katherine Morris (ed.), Neglected Aspects, 2004, 92-107. Baker, G. P., Hacker, P. M. S., 1985: Wittgenstein. Rules, Grammar and Necessity. Volume II of An Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations (revised 2nd edition, 2009). Oxford, Blackwell. Canfield, J. V., 1996: The Community View, The Philosophical Review, 105 (4), 469-488. Glock, H.-J., 1996: A Wittgenstein Dictionary. Oxford, Blackwell. Goldfarb, W., 2012 (forthcoming): Rule-Following Revisited. In: Jonathan Ellis & Daniel Guevara (eds.), Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind, [73-90]. Hacker, P.M.S., 2010: Robinson Crusoe Sails Again: The Interpretative Relevance of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass. In: N. Venturinha (ed.), Wittgenstein After His Nachlass, 91-109. Kuusela, O., 2008: The Struggle against Dogmatism: Wittgenstein and the Concept of Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Majetschak, S., 2010: Forms and Patterns of Life: A Reassessment of a SoCalled Basic Concept in the Late Philosophy of Wittgenstein. In: A. Marques & N. Venturinha (eds.), Wittgenstein on Forms of Life and the Nature of Experience. Frankfurt a.M., Peter Lang, 75-96. Malcolm, N., 1989: Wittgenstein on Language and Rules, Philosophy, 64 (247), 5-28. McDowell, J, 1984: Wittgenstein on Following a Rule, Synthese, 58, 325363. McDowell, J., 2002: How Not to Read Philosophical Investigations: Brandom’s Wittgenstein. In: J. McDowell, The Engaged Intellect: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 96111. McGinn, M., 1997: Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations. London, Routledge. Kripke, S. A., 1982: Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press. Kusch, M., 2006: A Sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules: Defending Kripke’s Wittgenstein. Acumen, Chesham.

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Rentsch, T., 2003: Heidegger und Wittgenstein. Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta. Rhees, R., 1984: Postscript. In: Rush Rhees (ed.), Recollections of Wittgenstein. Rowman & Littlefield Pub Inc. Schroeder, S., 2006: Wittgenstein: The Way Out of the Fly-Bottle. Cambridge, Polity Press. von Savigny, E., 1994: Wittgensteins ‘Philosophische Untersuchungen’: Ein Kommentar für Leser. (2nd edition). Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann. Wittgenstein, L., 1969: The Blue and Brown Books. (2nd edition, by Rush Rhees) [BB (Blue Book), BrB (Brown Book)]. Oxford, Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L., 1976: Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics: Cambridge 1939, from the notes of R. G. Bosanquet, N. Malcolm, R. Rhees and Y. Smythies, ed. by C. Diamond, 1976. [LFM]. Sussex, The Harvester Press. Wittgenstein, L., 1979: Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle. Conversations recorded by Friedrich Waismann. (edited by Brian McGuinness; transl. by Joachim Schulte and Brian McGuinness) [WVC]. Oxford, Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L., 1979: Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge, 1932–1935, from the notes of A. Ambrose and M. Macdonald. ed. by Alice Ambrose, 1979. [AWL]. Oxford, Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L., 1993: Philosophical Occasions 1912–1951, ed. by J. C. Klagge & A. Nordmann. Wittgenstein, L., 2000: Wittgenstein’s Nachlass: The Bergen Electronic Edition, ed. by The Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen, 2000. [MS (manuscript), TS (typescript); numbers according to v. Wright’s catalogue]. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Wittgenstein, L., 2009: Philosophical Investigations. (revised 4th edition, transl. by G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker & J. Schulte) [PI]. Oxford, Wiley-Blackwell. Wright, C., 1980: Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics. London, Duckworth. Birkbeck College London

Russian Matters for Wittgenstein Niamh O’MAHONY Wittgenstein was Romantic about Russia; he affirmed: “Russland: Die Leidenschaft verspricht etwas. Unser Gerede dagegen ist kraftlos.” (“Russia: the passion there contains the promise of something, whereas all our gabble is impotent.”)1.

Some of the reaction to Wittgenstein when he visited Russia merits attention. The British correspondent of the Daily Worker Pat Sloan – whom Wittgenstein met there – wrote to Maurice Dobb in Cambridge during Wittgenstein’s visit in 1935. In this hitherto unpublished letter, he states: “He [Wittgenstein] is hardly a suitable person to come to live and work in the USSR. His mind is so narrowly confined (amounting almost to insanity)…”2

The matter of Wittgenstein’s visit to Russia/Soviet Union has provoked much speculation. His attraction towards the idea of going to live and work there lasted in its most active form between 1922 and 1937, its zenith being 1935, when Wittgenstein finally went on a three-week visit to Moscow and Leningrad. This paper attempts to probe the nature of Wittgenstein’s Russophilia, what happened to it, also how some poems by Pushkin could perhaps shed some light on the relationship between Francis Skinner and Wittgenstein. This delightfully playful photograph of J. M. Keynes and his wife Lydia Lopokova provides a spark for this discussion.3 [Figure 1] In 1925, Keynes published his volume, A Short View of Russia. And it was also the 1

Reportedly said by Wittgenstein to Waismann in 1931. See Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1989, p. 142. 2 In an unpublished letter from Pat Sloan to Maurice Dobb on 24.5.1935 following Sloan’s meetings with Wittgenstein in Moscow in September 1935. I am indebted to Jonathan Smith, Archivist of the Wren Library, Trinity College Cambridge for seeking out this letter for me from the Sraffa Archive. 3 Thanks to Lady Anne Keynes and Professor Simon Keynes Who kindly allowed me access to their private photograph albums and permission to use this one. Doubtful Certainties. Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism (Eds. Jesús PADILLA GÁLVEZ, Margit GAFFAL), Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt a. M., 2012, 149-180.

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year of his (surprising) marriage to Lydia Lopokova, the Russian ballet dancer who had arrived in London with the Ballets Russes in 1921. According to Monk, it is this briefest of volumes that may have had some influence on Wittgenstein’s desire to go to Russia.4 Despite the fact that Keynes spent only a few days in Russia, as part of his honeymoon, he deemed what he found there to be most oppressive. Nevertheless although Keynes criticized Marxism as an economic theory, he could apprehend that communism in Russia might have a point as a new spiritual force. In 1927, Wittgenstein wrote to Keynes, whom he had known since his earlier days in Cambridge, thanking him for the book and enthusing that he liked it.

[Figure 1] In 1935 Wittgenstein appealed to the well-connected Keynes, when the idea of going to the Soviet Union to live and work began to take on more urgency. Keynes procured meetings with the Russian Ambassador Ivan Maisky and Semyon Vinogradov, the Press Attaché and Wittgenstein succeeded in persuading them of his need for a visa for the Soviet Union. 4

Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius. London: Jonathan Cape, 1990, p. 348.

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The notion of going to Russia had been simmering for many years. On the 14th September 1922, while a primary schoolteacher in rural Austria, Wittgenstein wrote to his friend Paul Engelmann saying he was haunted by the possibility of Russia. ‘It still goes round in my head – an eventual flight to Russia.” 5 Did the Soviet Union, with its underpinning idea of the construction of a new classless society, appeal to him even more than the old Classical Russia of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky? Tolstoy and Dostoevsky From the sources available, rather than Pushkin as Russian muse, it is the great 19th century Russian novelists who appealed to Wittgenstein, in particular Tolstoy and Dostoevsky. Wittgenstein’s appreciation is well attested. Even in the severe winter of 1916, which was spent on a military train near Lwow, he engaged in lengthy discussions, often on Dostoevsky and in particular on The Brothers Karamazov, with a young doctor called Bieler.6 “To Wittgenstein, Russia meant Tolstoy, rather than Marx”.7 Wittgenstein’s sister Hermine reported that the soldiers who knew him during World War I referred to him as “der mit dem Evangelien” (‘the one with the bible’), because he always carried with him Tolstoy’s edition of the Gospels.8 His yearning for manual labour in his life, according to Pascal’s recollection of a remark by George Thomson: “would be entirely consonant with his admiration for the moral teachings of Tolstoy.” 9 Wittgenstein had began to learn Russian in 1933/34 when he sent his young student and amanuensis Francis Skinner to knock on the door of a young mother in Cambridge to ask for Russian lessons. Fania Pascal, originally Feiga Polinovskaya, of Ukrainian Jewish origin, left Russia after World War 1, studied philosophy in Berlin and had ended up living in Cambridge in 1930. 5

P. Engelmann, Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein With a Memoir, Oxford 1967, pp. 52-3. 6 Dr Max Bieler to Dr George Pitcher, as cited in B. McGuinness, Wittgenstein: A Life: Young Ludwig 1889-1921. London: Duckworth, 1988, p. 235. 7 F. von Hayek (Wittgenstein’s third cousin) in J. Moran, “Wittgenstein and Russia”, New Left Review, 1/73, May-June 1972, p. 89. 8 Hermine Wittgenstein in Rush Rhees, ed., Personal Recollections. Oxford: OUP, 1984, p. 4. 9 F. Pascal in Portraits of Wittgenstein, vol. 2, p. 248. George Thomson, at that time a Fellow of King’s College, came to know Wittgenstein when the latter returned to Cambridge in 1929, and became a close friend.

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[Figure 2] She married Roy Pascal, a Marxist lecturer. Later the two Pascals collaborated on “Hegel’s Philosophy of Right” for Labour Monthly in September 1943. Pascal taught Wittgenstein and Francis once a week for two hours for three terms throughout the academic year 1934/35. According to Fania Pascal, Wittgenstein “turned out to be a fairly docile as well as an outstanding pupil”.10 We know that Wittgenstein liked the sound of the Russian language. We hear others echoing this view: “Russian was a most beautiful language to listen to.” 11 Pushkin This brings us to one of the central points of this chapter, namely Pushkin’s poetry in the life of Wittgenstein and Skinner.

10

F. Pascal, Personal Recollections, p. 31. Wittgenstein in 1934 to Maisky, Russian Ambassador to Britain, according to Drury in Personal Recollections, p. 126 and also Theodore Redpath, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Student Memoir. London: Duckworth, 1990, p. 27. 11

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[Figure 3] In the Wittgenstein manuscript designated as Notebook 166, we find five poems by Aleksandr Pushkin, written out in Wittgenstein’s cursive hand; and liberally sprinkled with crossing-out and splodges, albeit articulating a beautiful writing style. Why are the poems there? Was Wittgenstein practising his Russian handwriting, memorizing the poems, or wrote for some other purpose? Since it appears, as proposed below, the date of their writing was that of some point in 1941, i.e. beyond any date on which he was considering emigration to Russia or was absorbed with interest in things Russian, it appears we should seek another more grounded explanation. We have it in the unexpected death of his thenpartner, with whom he had planned to emigrate to Russia: France Skinner, with whom he learnt Russian. It is appropriate this context to highlight the importance of the poet Wittgenstein chose to reproduce in Notebook 166 – note Skinner’s favourite, not Wittgenstein’s: Pushkin is the towering figure in what has come to be known as the Golden Age of Russian literature, which he virtually created. By common agreement, at least among his own compatriots, Pushkin was the greatest of Russia poets. In fact, nearly all Russian writers, not least Tolstoy, owed a debt of gratitude to Pushkin.

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Dostoevsky wrote: “Everything we have comes from Pushkin.” “One may say positively that if Pushkin had not existed, there would not have been the gifted writers who came after him.”12 He was an overwhelming influence and had greater impact on Russian than either Dante or Shakespeare had on their own languages. The reasons for this centre on Pushkin’s range and profundity; his poems are replete with classical precision yet fulsome with closeness to the ordinary human heart. Despite the importance of Pushkin in the Russian canon, Wittgenstein’s teacher was adamant that they never studied any Pushkin nor read any poetry. Wittgenstein had attempted some translation of, for example, a German folk-tale into Russian for her perusal; yet no poetry translation into Russian was attempted. Wittgenstein had only once quoted a Pushkin lyric to her and she thought it possible that he had picked it up from his friend Nicholas Bakhtin, “who adored reading Russian poetry out loud.”13 According to Terry Eagleton14, Nicholas Bakhtin, the brother of the more famous Mikhail, and a Professor of German at Birmingham University, published a collection of rather unremarkable essays and lectures of his own, on such topics as Tolstoy, Pushkin, Mayakovsky, realism in theatre and Russian Symbolism. (Nicholas Bakhtin died a year before Wittgenstein in 1950, still a member of the communist party.) Furthermore, it is possible that Wittgenstein knew some Pushkin poems vis-a-vis music lyrics. Some of these poems, which he wrote in Notebook 166 – in particular Пророк (‘The Prophet’) and Анчар (‘Anchar’) – had been set to music by Rimsky-Korsakov in the late 19th century, and were well-known in the salons of Central Europe.15 It is not impossible that Wittgenstein had been familiar with some of them from his youth in his ultra musical family home in Vienna. It is highly probable that Wittgenstein was familiar with Pushkin from earlier days in Central Europe. Reasons for this concern his experience and location in WWI. During World War I Wittgenstein spent 12

F. Dostoevskiy, 8 June 1880, at the unveiling of the Pushkin statue in Moscow. “Положительно можно сказать: не был бы Пушкина, не было бы и последовавших за ним талантов.” 13 Fania Pascal, in Rush Rhees’ Recollections, p. 35 14 A. Duncan-Jones (ed.), Nicholai Bakhtin: Lectures and Essays, Birmingham: University of Birmingham Press, 1963. See T. Eagleton “Wittgenstein’s Friends”, New Left Review 1982, 1/35, Sept/Oct, p. 75 15 N. Rimskiy-Korsakov, Анчарь и Пророк два ариосо для баса с сопровождениемь фортепиано соч.49. Edition M.P. Leipzig: Beläieff, 1907.

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the winter of 1915/16 working in a military workshop train at Sokal north of Lwow, which was then part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. For much of this winter he had a Russian –speaking companion. Konstantin was a Russian prisoner-of-war who was assigned from a local camp to act as a manservant for Wittgenstein. Brian McGuinness calls Konstantin a protégé of Wittgenstein; and it appears that they had a mutually rewarding relationship. Wittgenstein warmed to his “simple Russian characteristics” and in turn, Konstantin tended to Wittgenstein with great zeal.16 Pushkin holds such a place in the hearts of most Russians that it is not improbable to think that Konstantin might spout verses of Pushkin as he polished his master’s boots. But if admiration for Pushkin’s poetry is not generally associated with Wittgenstein, why then does he write these five Pushkin poems in the back of a Notebook (MS 166) in 1941, five years after he has given up the study of Russian and long after his grand plan to move to Russia was aborted? The clue lies in the circumstances and date of Francis’ death. Francis’ death Something significant happened in Wittgenstein’s life in October 1941. His close friend, amanuensis and companion of the 1930s, Francis Skinner, died suddenly of acute anterior poliomyelitis. (It has been reported that it was the 11th of October, though his death certificate has the 13 October 1941.) It was actually Francis, not Wittgenstein, who had been enthusiastic about Pushkin. Theodore Redpath in his memoir “Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Student Memoir”, recounts a visit paid to Wittgenstein and Francis in 1935.17 “In the summer of 1935 Wittgenstein and Francis Skinner invited me to have supper with them at 81 East Road. They talked about going to Russia together. They had both been learning Russian. They wanted to see what society was really like under the Communist system, and they planned to go there on a visit in September 1935.” “After we finished our meal the conversation ran on the Russian language and Russian literature. They had both been greatly enjoying their Russian 16

Brian McGuiness, Wittgenstein: A Life: Young Ludwig 1889-1921. London: Duckworth, 1988, p. 236. 17 Theodore Redpath, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Student Memoir. London: Duckworth, 1990, p. 27.

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Doubtful Certainties. Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism lessons and were keen on making substantial progress. Francis was by then working in the Cambridge Instrument Company but evidently spent a good deal of time on his Russian. Wittgenstein was intent on being able to read Tolstoy and Dostoevsky in the original, and Francis had recently being reading some poems of Pushkin. They were both enchanted with the sound of the Russian language.” “Francis had a book of Russian poems in the room, and I asked him to show me one or two in the Russian text. I also felt I wanted to show interest in hat Francis was intent on doing.”

It was also Francis, not Wittgenstein, who read a Pushkin poem to Theodore Redpath about the exiles in Siberia, entitled Во глубине сибирских руд... (“In the depths of a Siberian mine…”)18 Even so, an undercurrent of Francis’ concern in the form of ‘the exiles’ here complements what Klagge has called Wittgenstein’s exile from another time – the earlier 19th century.19 The poems Let us to take a closer look at the text of the five poems. They are written in Notebook 166 in this order: Пророк (‘The Prophet’), Анчар (‘Anchar’), Бесы (‘Demons’), Воспоминание (‘Remembrance’), Елегия (‘Elegy’). Certainly, they are all familiar poems in the Pushkin corpus, but they are hardly representative at all of his more typical beloved Romantic poetry. These poems constitute the very darkest side of Pushkin, where more negative themes of dark apprehension and cosmic gloom jostle together. The first poem, Пророк (‘The Prophet’) [Figure 4] is a poem of immense intensity and concentration. Power has been conferred upon the speaker in the poem – so as “to burn the hearts of men” (глаголом жги cepдца людей).

18 19

Ibid, pp. 28-29. Cf. James Klagge, Wittgenstein in Exile. Cambridge: MIT, 2011.

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[Figure 4] The second poem Анчар (‘Anchar’) [Figure 5], is perhaps the darkest of all the poems. This is a poem about a hideous poisonous tree (the exotic Upas tree) that infects others, spreads death, and in particular it kills the messenger sent by the king to collect the poison. Принес — и ослабел и лег Под сводом шалаша на лыки, И умер бедный раб у ног Непобедимого владыки. Brought [his gift], then fainting, lay on the bast floor of the tent The poor slave died at the feet of his invincible master.20

20

All translations from Russian are by the author of this chapter.

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[Figure 5] The next poem Бесы (‘Devils’ or ‘Demons’) appears to be about a man beset with troubles, a man who has lost his way. Визгом жалобным и воем
 Надрывая сердце мне... And their howls and mournful wailing tears my heart in twain.

Pushkin’s poem here shares a title with Dostoevsky’s later novel Бесы (‘The Possessed’). We know from many sources close to Wittgenstein – Parek, Engelmann, Drury, Pascal, Redpath – of Wittgenstein’s continued admiration for the writings of Dostoevsky, though Crime and Punishment and The Brothers Karamazov are usually mentioned by these sources, not The Possessed.21 Significantly, the motif of ‘devils’ (бесы) and possession has cropped up earlier with regard to Wittgenstein. In a letter to Engelmann, still grieving over the recent death of David Pinsent, he wrote, “Everyday I think of Pinsent. He took half my life with him. The devil will take the other half….22 I am in a state of mind 21

“Among a few other books he took with him The Brothers Karamazov. He liked this book very much” (in Max Bieler, Letter from Dr Max Bieler to Dr George Pitcher, 30 September 1961, in Flowers, vol. 2, p. 3). Pascal states that, “Crime and Punishment soon became his favourite reading in Russian.” in R. Rhees (ed.), Recollections, p. 34. 22 Alexander Waugh’s The House of Wittgenstein. London: Bloomsbury, 2008, p. 151.

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that is terrible to me.” Wittgenstein says that he needs to be working every day, “else all the devils in hell will break loose inside me”.23 In Воспоминание (‘Remembrance’) [Figure 6], the note of intensity and loss gives way to the theme of remorse:

[Figure 6] Когда для смертного умолкнет шумный день, И на немые стогны града Полупрозрачная наляжет ночи тень И сон, дневных трудов награда, В то время для меня влачатся в тишине Часы томительного бденья: В бездействии ночном живей горят во мне Змеи сердечной угрызенья; Мечты кипят; в уме, подавленном тоской, Теснится тяжких дум избыток; Воспоминание безмолвно предо мной Свой длинный развивает свиток; И с отвращением читая жизнь мою, Я трепещу и проклинаю, И горько жалуюсь, и горько слезы лью, Но строк печальных не смываю. When the noisy day is stilled for mortals and the translucent shadow of night and sleep, reward for daily toil, descend on the city’s mute avenues, 23

Ibid, p. 152.

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Doubtful Certainties. Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism then in the silence hours of wearisome wakefulness painfully drag on: in nocturnal inactivity, remorse, the heart’s snakebite, burns hard in me; dreams seethe; an overflow of heavy thoughts crowd my mind, which is crushed by anguish; remembrance me unrolls its long scroll silently before me: and, reading my life with revulsion, I tremble and curse, and bitterly complain, and bitterly shed tears, but do not wash away the sad lines.

In these poems Pushkin strikes notes of guilt and remorse, which may settles on a person making him feel that his life is contemptible and worthless. The last poem Элегия (‘Elegy’) [Figure 7] is just that – an elegy for somebody who has gone, especially for one’s past self.

[Figure 7] Мой путь уныл. Сулит мне труд и горе Грядущего волнуемое море… Я жить хочу, чтоб мыслить и страдать; My path is sad, the waving sea of the future promises only toil and sorrow… I want to live, in order to think and suffer

It is worth commenting that Wittgenstein’s handwriting in Russian is relatively able and fluent, albeit with a number of crossing-outs and erasures. The splodges on the middle pages 45 and 46 – in particular the

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poem Бесы (‘Devils’) – stain the page in a way that is not reminiscent of other notebook entries. Is it too maudlin to launch an enquiry to discover if these are tearstains? Remorse We know that Wittgenstein felt remorse about the way he had treated Francis on some occasions in their last years together at the end of the 1930s. Francis died suddenly. At his funeral in Letchworth, Hertfordshire, according to Francis’ sister, Priscilla Truscutt, Wittgenstein was inconsolable. She recalls that he behaved like “a frightened wild animal”24. On a number of occasions Wittgenstein wrote about his sense of guilt and remorse. A month after Francis’ death, Wittgenstein wrote on 28/12/1941: “think a lot about Francis, but always with remorse over my lovelessness; not with gratitude. His life and death seem only to accuse me, for I was in the last two years of his life very often loveless and, in my heart, unfaithful to him. If he had not been so boundlessly gentle and true, I would have become totally loveless towards him.”25 One might add that his feelings of remorse were warranted. There had been a build-up of worry on Skinner’s part about Wittgenstein, at least in the later 1930s where Wittgenstein’s episodic antipathy and neglect of Francis emerged over some years prior to Skinner’s death. Wittgenstein occasioned, in some form, Francis’ relinquishing his mathematical research, and then, by consequence, an academic career in mathematics. Having influenced the choice of a lowly technical job for Francis in a machine tool factory almost opposite their flat in East Road, Cambridge, Wittgenstein then took up with one of Francis’ young work-mates at the factory, namely Keith Kirk. “Occupied myself the whole day with thoughts of my relations with Kirk. If I wrote these thoughts down, one would see how low and dishonest – how indecent they were.”26 Just prior to this, Wittgenstein had written a diary entry in one of his manuscripts: “I wish he (Francis) were dead”, even though he rebuked himself in the same context for having had the thought.27 After Francis’ death, Wittgenstein chastised himself repeatedly for not having been as kind to him as he should. As late 24

Mrs Truscott in F. Pascal’s ‘Wittgenstein: A Personal Memoir’, in Personal Recollections, p. 40. 25 MS 125 28/12/1941. 26 MS 123 7/10/1940. 27 MS 120 4/1/1938.

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as 1948, Wittgenstein was still being plagued by fits of remorse. While living alone in the West of Ireland, he wrote: “think a great deal of the last time I was with Francis, of my odiousness towards him. I was at that time very unhappy but with a wicked heart. I cannot see how I will ever in my life be freed from this guilt.”28 Let us return with this autobiographical clothing to the Pushkin poems in Wittgenstein’s Notebook 166. It seems that Wittgenstein’s writing out of the poems at the time of Skinner’s death and funeral was to torture himself with these poetic multiple identities, which accordingly judged him as unworthy. We can speculate that Wittgenstein was in such an anguished emotional state that he scribbled down some Pushkin poems he knew were dear to Francis or that he felt that Pushkin could express the power of the emotions he was feeling. But how can we be sure of the date he wrote the poems? British Academy Lecture The poems are written at the back-end of Notebook 166 [Figure 8].

[Figure 8] At the beginning the first page of Notebook 166 has the heading in Wittgenstein’s hand: ‘Notes for the Philosophical Lecture’, followed immediately by the draft of a part of a lecture [Figure 9]. A piece of paper stuck over the front cover has comments in Rhees’s handwriting, which mention the lecture notes, but they do not identify, though Klagge has as

28

MS 137 11/7/1948.

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Wittgenstein’s projected British Academy Lecture.29 Rhees also stated on the piece of paper “Date unknown./ Oxford”. If this relates to the lecture date, the new evidence below indicates it is March 1941. There has been some uncertainty about the date of the poems at the other end of this Notebook, even perhaps by tapping an assumption that the poems were written in the mid-1930s when Wittgenstein and Skinner were interested in emigrating to Russia. There is no valid reason to suppose this to be so. Rather, the reason for the 1941 writing of the poems is the death of the man who loved Wittgenstein and Pushkin’s poetry. It is worth attending a little more closely to the nature of Notebook 166 in the light of this.

[Figure 9] 29

James Klagge made reference to this letter (based on his enquiry to Anthony Kenny), in which Wittgenstein cancels his undertaking to give the 1942 British Academy Philosophical Lecture and to prepare an advance-written publishable text. See Klagge’s contribution in Wittgenstein, L. (1993). Philosophical Occasions, 19121951 in J. C. Klagge & A. Nordmann, (eds.) Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co. Arthur Gibson (see his L. Wittgenstein Dictating Philosophy [forthcoming] obtained a copy of this BA letter, which is dated as written on 20.10.1941 – no more than a week after Skinner died. I also acknowledge the assistance from the British Academy’s staff, namely Kate Mole and James Rivington.

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It is a Cambridge Heffers’ bookshop stiff backed version, and notice that viewing the book from its end, the spine and parallel and more particularly the outer page edges are slanted somewhat diagonally – reflecting the way the book was repeatedly held open and bent back. This slant complements Notebook 166’s inside opening cover with the Heffer’s printed details, which corresponds to the book’s front cover actually being treated as the front of the book.30 This end of Notebook 166 is where the pages of the projected lecture were drafted.31 When we look at the pages at the other (back) end of Notebook 166, we see the Pushkin poems that Wittgenstein wrote. The poems are upside-down and at the back opposite end of Notebook 166, from the standpoint of the printed beginning and lecture draft. Wittgenstein wrote these poems down in the back of the Notebook – having turned the Notebook up side down, and starting on the last page. The above evidence of the Notebook having the characteristic slant that shows it to have been regularly opened at the front, and no such evidence at the back, indicates that the poems were written quickly and not much returned to – if at all. Although no date for the lecture is recorded in the manuscript, yet its title and content suggest that it was written for the projected British Academy lecture that was to be given in March 1942, which points to date of invitation some time in 1941 – as the letter by Wittgenstein on 20 October 1941 and British Academy custom to invite in the year before presuppose Wittgenstein never gave the lecture. Dated by Wittgenstein as written on the 20/10/1941, his hitherto unpublished letter to the British Academy reveals that Wittgenstein cancelled his forthcoming lecture: “I very much regret to inform you that I shall be unable to deliver the Philosophical Lecture.” To summarize: Francis Skinner died on 11th October 1941. Wittgenstein cancelled the lecture on 20th October 1941. The Pushkin poems are written in the same Notebook 166 as the lecture notes. Can we avoid the conclusion that Wittgenstein had been attempting to write the lecture when he received the news of Francis’ death? That is to say, he turned the Notebook over, and upside-down, in order to start anew – and end! – the manuscript Notebook so as to write down his reaction to the

30

Notebook 166 is in the Heffer Bookshop series entitled, on the inside of the hard cover its ‘Canvas SERIES’. 31 I.e. as explained by the archivists in the Wren Library.

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tragic news? And his response was to write down the poems of Pushkin who Francis admired so well. It is poignant (as well as perhaps relevant to Wittgenstein’s own possible knowledge) to recall that that Alexandr Pushkin also died at a premature age from a fatal blow in a duel when he was in his 30s, as did Francis Skinner who was only 29 when he died. Furthermore, the premature death of Skinner echoes the earlier close relationship of Wittgenstein and David Pinsent. Both Skinner and Pinsent were young mathematical Wranglers at Trinity, both had been encouraged by Wittgenstein to forego mathematical careers for more ordinary technical work concerning aircraft manufacture in differing times of impending war with Germany, both had died tragically young and unexpectedly (Pinsent in an airplane crash at the close of WW1). Pinsent himself had been preoccupied as a child, witnessing announcements of the death of “Mr David”, and mistaken telegrams of death, to the family, as one of his unpublished childhood plays reveals.32 The Failure of Escape The longed-for emigration to Russia for Francis and Wittgenstein was not to be. Perhaps it was of a part with a number of Wittgenstein’s other unrealistic visions of escape with Skinner and others? Wittgenstein had also approached his former student, and later psychiatrist, Maurice Drury, with the plan that he should train as a psychiatrist; or another project: that he and Skinner should train as doctors or medical workers. The inclusion of the polio-struck Skinner as co-emigrant to Russia to do manual work seems so doomed as to be surrealistic. Was Wittgenstein’s unconscious suppressing the real deal – wishing to leave Skinner behind, as in fact he did on the September 1935 visit – due to a recurrence of Francis’ polio; or that he could depend on Skinner’s illness to destroy the joint venture, so as to release Wittgenstein from his socialist realist plan and enable him to continue life in Cambridge with Skinner; or not with him. The 32

This play script entitled “The War”, is inserted in one of David Pinsent’s young childhood diaries. The bound diary is dated 1898, though the handwriting of the playscript seems slightly older than that of the diary. So the allusion to the War could be the first (1880-1881) or second Boer War (1899-1902). I acknowledge the kind permission and cooperation of the Honourable Mrs Ann Keynes and Professor Simon Keynes for access to these manuscripts, and for insights into her nephew – David Pinsent’s life.

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computations seem as various and intriguing as Wittgenstein’s states of mind. As late as June 1937, Wittgenstein wrote to Engelmann again saying he might go to Russia.33 “God knows what will become of me, perhaps I will go to Russia.” But to all intents and purposes, the dream of going to live in Russia seems to have died after Wittgenstein’s brief visit there in 1935. Why go to the Soviet Union? As we ponder the stakes in 1935, why did Wittgenstein, together with Francis, decide to try to live in Soviet Union? Was it the old hankering for Russia of 19th century novelists that attracted him or did the new society of the Soviet Union hold its own lure for him? Cambridge in the 1930’s was in state of ferment. Marxism was perhaps the most important intellectual force in university of Cambridge. Many of Wittgenstein’s friends were Marxists or members of the Communist Party – Dobb, Cornford, Bakhtin, Sraffa, George Thomson and he met them regularly in the summer of 1934 and 1935. For these people, the USSR was a pilgrimage site. Antony Blunt and Michael Straight, both Cambridge men and spies, both went to Russia in 1935. Despite all this seething communism in Cambridge, friends vouch for the fact that he was not really politically engaged with the left. “He did not quote things said by Lenin or Stalin, and it is inane to affix any political label to him.”34 John Moran, who sought to reclaim Wittgenstein for Marxism admitted that Wittgenstein knew nothing of Engels; that he thought that a philosopher should not be committed to any doctrine e.g. the Communist Party.35 Roy Pascal, Fania’s husband and a Marxist, said that Wittgenstein hated political discussions and newspapers and shared ‘a general malaise about Western society’ and hoped to find Russia more congenial.36 As for allegations that Wittgenstein was a Stalinist sympathiser, von Wright thought these “absurd and anachronistic”.

33

P. Engelmann, Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein with a Memoir. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 58-9 34 F. Pascal, Recollections, p. 44. 35 J. Moran, p. 94. 36 Ibid, p. 89.

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Rather than being a political animal, was Wittgenstein solely a high European intellectual with a psychologically complex family history who yearned for a Tolstoyan holiness and simplicity of life? Certainly many of those who knew him well thought so. His student Goodstein remarked that, “what attracted him was the Russia of Tolstoy, not of Marx.”37 His Russian teacher was sure “his feeling for Russia would have had at all times more to do with Tolstoy’s moral teachings, with Dostoevsky’s spiritual insights, than with any political or social matters.”38 Decline of the West We know from von Wright and others that Wittgenstein was deeply influenced by Oswald Spengler’s The Decline of the West [Der Untergang des Abenlandes], which in 1918 became a best-seller in post-World War I Europe.39 Wittgenstein made numerous references to it in 1930-1931. Drury notes that in 1930, “Wittgenstein advised me to read Spengler’s The Decline of the West. It was a book, he said, that might teach me something about the age we were now living in. It might be an antidote to my ‘incurable romanticism’ “.40 Klagge observes that Spengler clearly viewed Russia as the embryo of a new culture, and considered Dostoyevsky to be its prophet.41 Manual labour According to George Thompson, who saw Wittgenstein frequently during the years 1934/5 in Cambridge, the intention of the move to Russia was to take up manual work.42 Wittgenstein wanted to do something. Skinner was also excited by the idea of doing something worthwhile. Wittgenstein spoke to Rhees with approval that the new regime in Russia did provide work for the mass of the people. “The important thing is that people have work.”43 In 1934, he commented to Drury that, “Lenin’s writings about 37

Private communication quoted in J. Moran, New Left Review 1/73, May-June 1972, p. 89. 38 F. Pascal, Personal Recollections, p. 57. 39 See ‘Wittgenstein in Relation to his Times’ by Georg H. von Wright in Flowers, vol. 4, pp. 211-212. 40 M.O’C. Drury, Recollections, p. 128. 41 J. Klagge, Wittgenstein in Exile. Cambridge: MIT, 2011. 42 George Thompson, in Portraits of Wittgenstein, vol. 2, p. 220. 43 Rhees, Recollections, p. 226.

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philosophy are of course absurd, but at least he did want to get something done.”44 Rhees highlighted that Wittgenstein was strongly sympathetic with the emphasis that the Russian regime at that time placed on ‘manual labour’.45 Wittgenstein had always shown an interest in working with his hands, and detested many aspects of academic life. 46 According to Drury, “I wish I had some mechanical skill like that [of Spinoza – grinding lenses] by which I could earn a living”.47 He had already spent time as a gardener’s assistant in Hütteldorf and Klosterneuburg in Austria and would later work as a hospital porter in England during the war. Donald Mackay, who, as a boy, knew Wittgenstein in the 1930’s, because Wittgenstein lodged in rooms belonging to his father on East Road, was keen to relate that Wittgenstein would go to no end of trouble playing board games and making things with him. Mackay recalls that in the late 1930s a message reached him from Whewell’s Court, Trinity where Wittgenstein then lived. Wittgenstein needed some help since he had lost the key to his trunk and could not open it. The boy took two chairs and placed them apart, lifted the trunk on top and crawled underneath and looked up at the lock from the floor; he then asked Wittgenstein for a paperclip and tumbled the lock from below. He recalls that Wittgenstein was thrilled by this strategy and enthusiastically praised him. To this day, MacKay does not know whether Wittgenstein was merely testing the boy’s ingenuity or indeed had not figured out himself the best solution. What Mackay remembers most is Wittgenstein’s kindness and his evident delight in making and tackling things with his hands.48 Timing Wittgenstein was about to finish his Fellowship that year (1935) and Francis his post-graduate award. With nothing definite on the horizon, it would have been an apt time to go abroad together. All these reasons coalesced. It appears that Wittgenstein’s reasons for going were not even clear to himself. “I admit that there are partly bad and even childish reasons (for wanting to go to Russia) but it is true also that behind all there 44

M O’C. Drury, quoting Wittgenstein in Recollections, p. 141. Rhees, , Recollections, p. 228. 46 See F. Pascal, in Portraits of Wittgenstein, vol. 2, pp. 248 and 233. 47 M.O’C. Drury, Ibid, II, p.70. 48 Interview with Donald MacKay, Cambridge, 2007. 45

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are deep and even good reasons.”49 Whatever the particular reason, it was resolved to that they should go. Unfortunately, yet again, Francis’ health worked against him. He had already been turned down for service in both the International Brigade in Spain and in World War II because of his health. It was decided that Wittgenstein should go on a reconnaissance trip to the Soviet Union alone and report back. Although Wittgenstein was in Russia for a brief period, he and Francis corresponded. In Francis’ letter of September 17 1934 to Wittgenstein in Russia, his tone is rather desperate and pathetic. It appears that Francis senses in this following letter at some variable levels that he must give Wittgenstein as much rope as is needed to ensure their emotional future. Dear Ludwig, It was very lovely to get your letter today from Leningrad. I was very glad to know you were alright. I think of you a great deal. I wish I could be with you and see things with you. But I feel it is as though I was with you. I hope you are finding yourself able to learn about things in Moscow. I hope enormously that you will in some way be successful. I wonder how much your introductions have helped you…I feel very anxious that you should be able to get in contact with the life there. Do you think of prolonging your stay there? If there is any chance that you might learn more, it might be good. I wonder if you have found your plan of getting them to give you some sort of a job while you were there at all possible. Also if this has not been possible, I wonder how much you have been able to see people at their work or be with them. I wonder very much how you are feeling in Moscow. How does your Russian go? I hope your conversations with officials have also gone well. I need lots of practise in Russian… I’d like to say again that I hope you will stay longer in Moscow than the time you arranged for if you feel there is any chance that you might learn more. It would be valuable for both of us.50

From our perspective, it may seem that Wittgenstein’s intention to settle in the Soviet Union was naïve. Wittgenstein’s visit to the USSR was indeed during a terrible period. The mid-1930’s in Stalin’s Russia were traumatic times of immense upheavals, of purges, of industrialization following the brutal collectivization of the peasants. Political and material conditions were in these years never other than harsh in the extreme. It must be kept in mind that few outside of USSR had neither full knowledge of the gulag system, the horrors of forced collectivization, nor the purge 49 50

Letter to J. M. Keynes, 6 July 1934. Letter sent from Letchworth, Hertfordshire, to Moscow on 17th September 1935.

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trials of the 1930’s. Bertrand Russell had seen the potential tyranny of the Bolshevik regime, even in Lenin’s time. One wonders whether or not Wittgenstein had ever read Russell’s book on the subject –The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism. Also interest in the USSR by Britain was at its height in 1935, following the rise of fascism in Europe and influential publications such as Webbs’ Soviet Russia – a New Civilisation (1933), which was part of a wave of popularity amongst the intelligentsia in the West. Accordingly Wittgenstein was going to Russia for his own reasons but it chimed with the Zeitgeist of the Left in Britain. Meanwhile, Wittgenstein’s brother Paul, the pianist, was touring the Soviet Union in the mid 1930’s to perform a series of concerts. As always, he took up a stance at the opposite end of the spectrum from Ludwig; he detested everything about Russia and the Soviet Union.51 Birobidjan

[Figure 10] In his letter to Keynes of July 1935, Wittgenstein asks for introductions to people at two specific institutions: “I want to speak to officials at two institutions; one is the “Institute of the north” in Leningrad, the other the “Institute of national Minorities” in Moscow. These Institutes, as I am told, deal with people from who want 51

For a fuller treatment of Paul Wittgenstein, see Alexander Waugh’s The House of Wittgenstein.

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to go to the ‘colonies’ the newly colonized parts at the periphery of the USSR. I want to get help and information and possibly help from people in these Institutes.”52

Rush Rhees observed that Wittgenstein wanted to go “to the newly colonised areas on the periphery of the USSR, where life would be primitive.”53 The most obvious candidate for this newly colonized territory at the particular time was Birobidjan, which matched Wittgenstein prerequisites. Birobidjan was a very topical subject at the time.54 In May 1934 the Soviet government had established the Jewish Autonomous Republic (JAR) – popularly known as Birobidjan, after the region’s capital. This was a sparsely populated region of the Soviet Far East about the size of Belgium, some five thousand miles from Moscow and containing large tracts of swamp and marshes. The Birobidjan project was marked with great fanfare in the Soviet Union and abroad and marked the culmination of an effort begun in the 1920s. Birobidjan was an experiment in social engineering – to transform the socio-economic profile of Soviet Jewry by turning them from landless urbanites engaged in trade and commerce into secular agricultural settlers and thus promote their integration into Soviet society. The Autonomous Republic of Birobidjan still exists today. Wittgenstein’s Diary55 Wittgenstein spent a very short time in the USSR. He departed London on the seventh of September and was back in Cambridge on the first of October. It was a brief but very busy visit. We know this from his small Heffer’s Cambridge University pocket diary, which contains numerous names of various people both Russian and non-Russian. Some of these he had specific appointments arranged; of the other projected meetings associated with names, we do not know whether or not he met all or some. The Englishman Pat Sloan was a key person for Wittgenstein in Moscow. He was thought to be a source of contacts for any one coming out 52

Letter to J. M. Keynes 6 July. 1935 in B. McGuinness, Wittgenstein in Cambridge. Oxford: Blackwell, 2008, p. 245. 53 Rhees, Postscript, Recollections, p. 228. 54 For data on Birobidjan, see Robert Weinberg’s Stalin’s Forgotten Zion. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998; H. F. Srebnik, Dreams of Nationhood. Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2010. 55 I am indebted to Brian McGuiness for kindly supplying me with names and dates from Wittgenstein’s diary of Sept 1935.

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to Russia from England. Sloan was a Cambridge undergraduate who had taught economics in UK before going to live in Moscow in 1931. He worked as Russian correspondent for the Daily Worker. As someone with much experience of Soviet Russia, as an ex-Cambridge man, and with many friends among the hard Left in Cambridge – such as Maurice Dobb, Piero Sraffa, Roy Pascal – he was well placed to assist Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein met him two or three times in Moscow; and it is obvious from the following letter from Sloan to Dobb on the 24 September 1935 that (putting it mildly) things had not gone too well. [Figure 11] (Wittgenstein had only arrived in Moscow on the 14th September, so with Sloan writing on 24th of that month, Sloan had quickly formed his judgement of Wittgenstein.)

[Figure 11] Here is the hitherto unpublished letter: Dear Maurice, I did my best for Wittgenstein, but he is hardly the person I should recommend to settle in the USSR! He wanted (a) to give up his speciality, and (b) retire from bourgeouis society. If he had wanted (b) only, with a

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speciality useful to socialist construction, the matter would have been easier, but not easy. As it was, he had NO qualifications for any job but a teacher of English based on his 6 years in an elementary school. And nobody seems to want to import such people any longer. In the end he got in touch with one or two Mathematicians, who have opened up the possibility of his coming here to teach TO TEACH HIS SPECIALITY. This is the most favourable possibility available, sand he should be advised to seize it. If not, then I advised him to do his medical training and then come here with a USEFUL speciality; OR, to complete his training. But, all in all, when a man says “I am 46, I cannot read the philosophy of the land I want to settle in, for I am too old,” he is hardly a suitable person to come and live and work in the USSR. His mind is so narrowly confined (amounting almost to insanity) that he, feeling this, wants to abandon his mind altogether. He deems it quite impossible to develop it along new channels AT HIS AGE (46!), and if he does come here the results will either be disastrous, through his persistent clinging to a counter-revolutionary ideology (I doubt if his mind will ever be disciplined, i.e. if he will ever be satisfactory as a Soviet citizen), or a possible miracle, through his complete re-making as a result of life and conditions here. But unfortunately, I feel he is so absolutely muddled in the social-political sphere that he will just get worse not better. What ghastly effects capitalism is having on the intellectuals. Every young intellectual coming here from England is. They either can’t talk without twitching and stammering, or they have other serious inner conflicts that they can see no way out of. Meeting such people makes one realize how healthy this society is, in spite of all its faults… … As to Sraffa’s Ricardo stuff --- why doesn’t he come over himself? If he has got any conception of how hard it is to get anything out of a Soviet organization, especially for someone else, he would realize that I can do nothing unless I know the PERSON with whom he has corresponded, and can then go and bully this PERSON. Without that I can do nothing, as nobody in the USSR is going to give me such material for “someone” in Cambridge. Best wishes, /Yours/Pat Sloan

The aftermath of the USSR visit Poor Wittgenstein. “The most favourable possibility” available to him in Russia was “to teach his speciality.” It is especially ironic that, whereas he

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had sought employment as a medical worker or as a laborer on a collective farm, the only job he was offered was work as a philosopher – as lecturer at the University of Moscow or as a professor at Kazan University. It seems that quite early on in his trip to Russia, disillusionment set in; he decided not to persist with the idea of starting a new life there in the near future. After less than a week in Moscow, he wrote a letter to G. E. Moore in Cambridge saying: “I shall come back to Cambridge in about two weeks. I intend to stop in Cambridge for the whole academic year and to lecture.”56 In citing this letter McGuinness suggests that Wittgenstein had a change of mind due to the fact that he had little immediate prospect of employment there and he could not take Francis (now ill) with him, still less leave him behind.57 Pace John Moran, Wittgenstein had intended to accept the offer of a post at Moscow University at some point, but that (according to Sraffa) the offer was withdrawn soon afterwards when all Germans became suspect in Russia.”58 Despite his rude awakening in the USSR, Wittgenstein cannot have entirely let go of his Russian fantasy. In 1937, he is still in correspondence with Yanovskaya in Moscow: he is still restless and attracted to the idea of Russia. “I sometimes consider whether I should leave here now already. For example: first to Vienna for a month, then to England for a month—or longer—then to Russia.”59 It has been noted by a number of sources that Wittgenstein returned to Russia in 1939 but one can find no proof of that.60 It would be highly unlikely on the outbreak of World War II that he would be able to enter Russia. He was very absorbed in the summer of 1939 crisscrossing Europe, and the Atlantic, in a bid to secure his sisters’ safety in Vienna. During World War II Wittgenstein was still favourably disposed towards the Soviet Union. In 1942 he called on George Thomson in 56

Postcard of 18 September 1935 from Moscow. In Wittgenstein in Cambridge: Letters and Documents 1911-1951, ed. B. McGuinness. Oxford: Blackwell, 2008, p. 249. 57 Ibid , p. 249. 58 According to J. Moran, p. 91. 59 See Wittgenstein’s diary entry of 4 April 1937 while in Norway. 60 According to J. Moran, Oleg Drobnitsky of the Institute of Philosophy in Moscow says that Tatiana Gornstein alleges that Wittgenstein made a return visit to Moscow in 1939. Also in Biryuk and Biryukova’s Людвиг Витгенштейн и Софья Александровна Яновская : «Кембриджскии гении » знакомится с советскими математиками 30-х годов.

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Birmingham while visiting the Bakhtins. It was, he recalled, a time when the Red Army was under heavy pressure on the Eastern front. Thomson notes that Wittgenstein, pacing up and down and deeply moved said, “The Russians may be defeated but they have set an example to the World which will never be forgotten”.61 However later, his view of the Red Army altered. In von Hayek’s memoir of Wittgenstein, he recounts that after World War II Wittgenstein had visited Soviet-occupied Vienna: “He then engaged me in the most lively conversation, beginning with his impressions of the Russians at Vienna, an experience which evidently had shaken him to his depths and destroyed certain long-cherished illusions”.62 Despite his tendency to idealise manual labour, Wittgenstein retained a sense of the value of the “good things” of life, according to Fania Pascal. In other words, she always imagined that “he was not a born ascetic.”63 If so, how would he have coped with living the USSR? It is interesting to surmise what would have happened to Wittgenstein if he had gone to live in Birobidjan – the fantasy of a Soviet promised land for Jews? The dropout rate for settlers was more than 50 percent during the first several years of settlement in Birobidjan, as they found horrendous conditions on arrival –mosquito–infested swamps, no potable water, inadequate supplies and tools. As for the Jewish settlers who did not flee, by 1939 the vast majority did not become farmers but stayed in the towns, which sprang up like slums along the railway in Birobidjan. Influential gentiles and foreigners publicly supported the Birobidjan project. The most prominent British non-Jewish champion was Lord Marley, a British Labour peer who visited Birobidjan in October 1933; and on his return he published a glowing account of the region.64 Marley notes that settlers need not be Jewish but “should be ready to work in a collective spirit for the good of the community.”65 He was rather optimistic about climatic conditions: “brilliant sunshine similar to conditions in Switzerland.”66 Anna Louise Strong, an American contact of Wittgenstein’s in Moscow was a strong supporter of the Birobidjan 61

G. Thompson, in Portraits of Wittgenstein, vol. 2, p. 220. F. von Hayek, “Remembering My Cousin Ludwig Wittgenstein”, in Portraits of Wittgenstein, vol. 1, p. 129. 63 F. Pascal, Recollections, p. 34. 64 Lord Marley, BiroBidjan as I Saw It. New York: ICOR, 1935. 65 In H.F. Srebnik, Dreams of Nationhood. Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2010, p. 32. 66 Ibid. 62

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Project. She visited Birobidjan in April 1935 and gave lectures in the West and published widely on the subject of Birobidjan. Of course, Birobidjan also did not escape Stalin’s purges and in the late 1930’s just after Wittgenstein’s visit, Yiddish schools were closed, and prominent Jewish officials were sent to gulags or executed. In 1935, the year that Wittgenstein went to the Soviet Union, a medical doctor touring the Soviet Far East visited Birobidjan and decried the “disgraceful unsanitary” conditions of Birobidjan.67 One wonders how Wittgenstein, with his chronic aversion to fleas, would have coped.68 His friend Drury recalls that on seeing primitive cottages in the West of Ireland in July 1935, he was moved to admit the following: “You know, there is only one thing I dread about going to live in Russia: bedbugs!”69

Subjects for Future Research This final section offers names and data that require further exploration and research. There are two parts to this section – the Russians and the nonRussians mentioned in Wittgenstein’s own personal Cambridge University Diary. To these data are added information given by Brian McGuinness, and a selection of provisional results of my own research. Russians mentioned in Wittgenstein’ Cambridge University (Heffers’) diary Moscow (those with appointments whom Wittgenstein intended to meet are underlined): Yanovskaya, Sof’ya (Neimark) (1896-1966)70: Became Bolshevik in 1918; mentioned in Babel’ story; in 1924 studied at Institute of Red 67

Ibid. Letter from Wittgenstein to P. Sraffa on 13.7.1935: “I meant to ask you what was the name of the preparation against bugs which you once mentioned to me. I think you said that you had the stuff with you in Russia. Also please let me know where one can get it…”. Quoted in Wittgenstein in Cambridge: Letters and Documents 1911-1951, ed. B. McGuinness, Oxford: Blackwell, 2008, p. 248. 69 R. Rhees, Recollections, p. 126. 70 Б.В.Бирюков, Л.Г.Бирюкова , Людвиг Витгенштейн иСофья Александровна Яновская «Кембриджскии гении » знакомится с советскими математиками 30-х годов1 http://iph.ras.ru/uplfile//logic/log11/Li_11_Biryukov_Biryukova. 68

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Professors founded in 1921; Professor of at MGU in 1931; co-editor of Marx’s Mathematical Manuscript; she taught history of mathematics from 1931 and mathematical logic from 1936; first occupant of Chair of Mathematical Logic at Moscow University in 1959; she wrote Primary Tasks of Marxist Mathematicians (1930); “She was one of the leading Communist Party ideologues among Moscow mathematicians”, according to S.S. Demidov; Wittgenstein presented her with Frege’s The Foundations of Arithmetic; she advised Wittgenstein to “read more Hegel”; she received the Order of Lenin in 1951; she said that Wittgenstein was very badly dressed even by Soviet standards of 1930s; Wittgenstein went to visit her in her communal flat; lived with mentally ill son; both husband and son committed suicide; Wittgenstein corresponded with her for number of years and also sent insulin for diabetes; she suggests in letter that Wittgenstein should come and teach mathematical logic in Russia Yushkevich, Adolf Pavlovich (1906-1993): historian of mathematics; born Odessa; lived in France until 1917; later directed a seminar on history of mathematics with Yanovskaya; and wrote History of Mathematics in the Middle Ages. Glivenko, V.I. (1896-1940): Mathematician, logic, probability theory, ed. Professor of Mathematics at Karl-Liebknecht Institute; with Vygodskiy and Aleksandrov of 15 years of Mathematics in the USSR (1932); О логике Броуэра (On the logic of Brouwer) (1928). Kolmogorov, A. N. (1903-1987): one of the most prominent mathematicians – wrote on intuitionist logic, especially between 1925 and 1932; research on algorithms; he taught mathematical logic at Moscow University. Vygodskiy, M. Ya. (1998-1965): old time Communist; took part in civil War; had worked at Y. M. Sverdlov Communist University and Institute of Red Professors; wrote on Euclid; 1935 gave seminar with Yanovskaya on history of mathematics at Mech-Mat; expelled from party in 1930s for “errors”. Zhegal’kin (Gegekine), Ivan Ivanovich (1896-1947): Zhegalkin polynomials; Professor of mathematics at MGU; he helped found the

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thriving mathematical logic group there, which became the Department of Mathematical Logic established by Sof’ya Yanovskaya in 1959. Ladygina-Kohts, Nadezhda Nikolaevna (1890-1963): psychologist; studied mental abilities of primates; Darwin Museum of Moscow; author of influential Ditia shimpanze i ditia cheloveka v ikh instinktakh, emotsiiakh, igrakh, privychkakh i vyrazitel’nykh dvizheniiakh. Infant Child and Chimpanzee (Moscow, 1935); received Order of Lenin. Var’yash, Aleksandr Ivanovich (1885-?): taught history and philosophy of mechanics and mathematics; interested in dialecticism. Those with posts in Leningrad: Tatiana Nikolayevna Gornshteyn (1904-1980): historian of science and philosophy; worked at Institute of Philosophy Communist Academy; her speciality was the history of physics; former professor of Dialectical Materialism, probably met Wittgenstein on the on advice of Yanovskaya; friend of Yanovskaya; invited Wittgenstein home; embarrassed about oneroom communal flat; she remembers that Wittgenstein loved St Basil’s in Moscow; she said he gave her a copy of the Yellow Book, for which see Ostashevsky (2008)71; Wittgenstein was invited by her to give a philosophy course at Leningrad University. According to Gornshteyn, Wittgenstein visited Yanovskaya again in 1939; if we follow the account of Biryuk and Biryukova, she was arrested the following year and spent many years in the gulag. Fisher, Anna M.: Leningrad Institute of Math and Mech; wrote on consistency of geometric axioms; contributor to mathematics in Большои советскои энциклопедии on the subject philosophy of mathematics of P. Gonsett (in The Big Soviet Encyclopedia, 1936). Borodina: Director of Technikum of Foreign Languages; Leningrad.

71

See “The Case of the Yellow Notebook” by Eugene Ostashevsky, in Common Knowledge, Vol. 14, Issue 3, Fall 2008, pp. 374-379.

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Non-Russians mentioned in Wittgenstein’s Cambridge University (Heffers’) diary Pat Sloan: British; went to Russia in 1931. Cambridge undergraduate; taught economics in UK first; lived seven years in USSR; correspondent of the Daily Worker and also managed English language broadcasts; wrote numerous books – Russia Without Illusions (1938), Russia-Friend or Foe (1939) Russia in Peace and War (1941), Russia Resists (1941), Russia’s Fight is our Fight (1942), Russia-the country With a Plan (1948). Anna Louise Strong: (1885-1970): Wittgenstein had contact with her in Moscow. She was then editor of the Moscow Daily News. Born in Nebraska, USA; moved to USSR in 1921 and again in 1930; enthusiastic supporter of Soviet regime; in 1920’s became well known as an authority on “soft news” (e.g. how to get an apartment) about the USSR; founded Moscow News, an English language newspaper, in 1930. Wrote “The Soviets Conquer Wheat (1930), I Change Worlds: the Remaking of an American (1935), This Soviet World (1936), The Soviet Constitution (1937) and dozens of other books; in 1936 she returned to USA; in 1958, aged 72 she moved on to live in and write about China; she also met Eleanor Roosevelt in Russia in 1935; visited Birobidjan in April 1935; gave lectures in USA On Birobidjan as I Saw It. (Feb. 6,1936) at Webster Hall, New York; published article in Asia 36, 1 (January 1936) pp. 41-42. Here she informed readers that, “Birobidjan was being settled by Jewish pioneers who “want to express themselves, in schools, courts, theatres, government, not only as soviet citizens but also as Jews.”72 Mr Spector: Wittgenstein had breakfast with the mysterious Mr Spector – he was an historian of Western Philosophy. This could this be Ivar Spektor, (18981989); born in Russia; originally Ivan Vladimirovich Spectorsky; who wrote The Golden Age of Russian Literature, includes much on Tolstoy, Dostoevsky and some on Pushkin; An Introduction to Russian History and Culture; The First Russian Revolution: its impact on Asia; The Soviet Union and the Muslim World; Russian prepositions and how to use them, 72

H.F.Srebnik, Dreams of Nationhood, Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2010, p. 36.

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with English parallels, Readings in Russian History and Culture. There is a rumour that he might have been a USA informer or spy for USA, or for Russia, or for both.) In 1933 he was an instructor in Oriental Subjects at The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington (Seattle); according to some was originally a part-time rabbi in Tacoma. (In passing: the plot of From Russia With Love uses a fictional Soviet Spektor decoding machine as a lure to trap Bond. Trinity College, Cambridge University

Common Sense and Language: Wittgenstein and Gramsci Norberto ABREU E SILVA NETO Introduction In the Preface to the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein acknowledges the criticism Piero Sraffa practised on his thoughts for many years and declares it was to that stimulus he owed the most fruitful ideas of that book.1 He also included Sraffa in the list of those who influenced him.2 The various memoirs written about Wittgenstein show clearly Sraffa exerted a lasting influence on Wittgenstein’s philosophy, specially in the abandon of his earlier views and the set out upon new ways.3 However, until now it is not clear the exact nature of Sraffa’s likely influence on Wittgenstein, and recently appeared some works showing an interest in getting a deeper understanding of this matter. In these works it is suggested that we could get insight on Sraffa’s influence on Wittgenstein if we examine their interactions taken in the light of Sraffa’s close relationship with Antonio Gramsci, the Italian Marxist theorist, who had a strong influence on him.4 Davis tried to explore these chains of influences assuming the possibility of delineating a set of philosophical ideas which he believes Gramsci, Sraffa, and Wittgenstein would have shared in some degree.5 In his article he identifies three Gramsci’s philosophical themes: the concepts of emergence and of catastrophic equilibrium and the idea of a concrete universal; these philosophical themes are used by him as a basis to interpret the thinking of both Sraffa and the later Wittgenstein, and in his essay he presents some “parallel philosophical positions” claiming that they would be shared by Gramsci and Wittgenstein.

1

Wittgenstein, 2009, Preface. Wittgenstein, 1980, p. 19. 3 Haller, 1988, Malcolm, 2001, pp. 14-15; Monk, 1990, von Wright, 1986. 4 Davis, 2002; Sen, 2003; Lo Piparo, 2010; Venturinha, 2011. 5 Davis 2002, pp. 384 ff. 2

Doubtful Certainties. Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism, (Eds. Jesús PADILLA GÁLVEZ, Margit GAFFAL), Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt a. M., 2012, 181-201.

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From another side, Amartya Sen examined the interactions SraffaWittgenstein and Sraffa-Gramsci aiming at to explain the transformation of the ‘early Wittgenstein’ into the ‘later Wittgenstein’ through the influence of Gramsci. He believes that the nature of the conversations between Sraffa and Wittgenstein could be puzzled out if we consider that the issues and ideas they discussed had been a part of the standard debates in the intelectual circle in Italy to which Sraffa and Gramsci belonged. And, for him, Gramsci’s famous Prison Notebooks can give considerable understanding of what he and his circle were interested in. Amartya Sen asserts that Wittgenstein emphasis on the role of conventions and rules, his notion of “language games”, and the relevance of the so called “anthroplogical way”, all seem to figure quite prominently in these notebooks, in which Gramsci also discussed the role of linguistic conventions with various illustrations.6 Based on these arguments Sen suggests that the research of the supposed chain of philosophical influence linking the ideas of Gramsci, Sraffa, and Wittgenstein must be directed towards the specific issue of language. The nature of Sraffa’s influence on Wittgenstein was also investigated by Venturinha. This researcher recognizes that “there are many aspects in Gramsci’s thought that are reminiscent of issues characteristic of the later Wittgenstein”.7 However, he states that, despite this proximity and having examined documents brought to light by Brian McGuinnes in a new edition of Wittgenstein’s correspondence, the exact influence of Sraffa on Wittgenstein’s ideas remains a mystery and a matter of speculation. In his article, he discusses the relation Sraffa-Wittgenstein through the analysis of an unpublished document that belongs to Sraffa’s papers at Trinity College Library, Cambridge, and that consists of a series of notes on a copy of Wittgenstein’s Blue Book, supplemented by a letter from Sraffa to G. H. von Wright dated of 1958. As a whole, what stands out from his analysis is that Sraffa comments were not accepted by Wittgenstein and the confirmation of the well known fact that Sraffa played a decisive role in Wittgenstein’s new approach through his “anthropological way” of considering philosophical matters. So the mystery remains.

6 7

Sen, 2003, p. 1245. Venturinha, 2011, p. 188.

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The perspective of Amartya Sen above mentioned was strenghtened and extended by Franco Lo Piparo8 in an article in which he brings out arguments derived from Gramsci’s biography and philosophy. He reports that when Gramsci was student at the university he was trained to become a linguist and that his interest in language remained until the prison years. In this sense, we can read in the Prison Notebooks9 that his plan of studies included a research in linguistics and that the last of these notebooks, Quaderno 29, written in 1935, is entirely devoted to the concept of grammar. After presente these arguments, in the second part of his essay, Lo Piparo undertakes a comparison between concepts of both: Gramsci and Wittgenstein, taking as main themes the “grammaticality of human behaviors”, the question of “rules and public praxes”. These articles aroused my interest in getting insight on this perplexing triadic relation, and I decided to begin my research on this subject taking as starting point one issue Lo Piparo brought up but did not develop in his essay: the relationship between language and the formation of common sense. An aspect he presents as related to the centrality of language in Gramsci’s ideas and a topic that is central in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. So, I examined firstly Gramsci’s perspective on the relationship between language and the formation of “common sense”. After I compared some of Gramsci’s ideas with Wittgentein’s philosophy, and, as a result of my work it appeared that they have different conceptions of the philosophical activity, that their perspectives for dealing with the common sense are antagonic, and that they have diverse positions regarding the relation between philosophy and politics. 1.

Gramsci’s Conception of Common Sense

In his Prison Notebooks, Gramsci deals with the principle of common sense in two ways: first, he sees it as a philosophy that he names “the philosophy of common sense” and second, he uses this concept as a technical instrument of his political activism. According to his perspective, common sense, religion and philosophy are intimately connected and as such should be analysed.10 8

Lo Piparo, 2010, pp. 285ff. Gramsci, 2011a. 10 Gramsci participates in a quite specific Italian philosophical tradition marked, among others, by the philosophy of Giambatista Vico (1668-1744) and whose 9

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Like religion, common sense would not be an intelectual order as philosophy is. In the same way as religion, common sense is a collective name, that means, it would not have only and one conception, identical in time and space: it would be the ‘folklore’ of the philosophy and, as such, its presentation would happen under countless forms. The concept of common sense is an historical and changeable product. “Religion and common sense cannot constitute an intelectual order because they cannot be reduced to unity and coherence, not even to the individual consciousness, not to mention the collective consciousness: they cannot be reduced ‘freely’ to unity and coherence since this could have happened in an ‘authoritarian way’, as in fact occurred, within certain limits, in the past.”11

Philosophy, on the contrary, is for Gramsci an intellectual order that would act as the criticism and the overcoming of religion and common sense. What Gramsci calls “philosophy of common sense”, he identifies with what he names “philosophy of non-philosophers” or “philosophy of the multitudes”. And this philosophy is defined by him as the world conception uncritically assimilated in the various social and cultural environments in which the moral individuality of ordinary man develops. Gramsci describes common sense as a desintegrated, incoherent, inconsistent conception in accordance with the social and cultural state of the multitudes of whom it would be the philosophy; and this fact, he stresses, would be its most characteristic and fundamental feature.12 In his Prison Notebooks we read: “Common sense is a chaotic assemblage of foolish conceptions and in it one can find whatever he wants.”13 Despite this negative view, Gramsci acknowledges a positive value to common sense, asserting first that this value would be in the fact that it relevance to contemporary humanities is acknowledged. Gramsci was a student of the philosophers Benedetto Croce and Giovane Gentile, whom played a fondamental role in his intellectual education and through their mediation Vico had an influence on Gramsci’s ideas. According to Garin (1976), apparently Gramsci did not examined Vico’s work directly, and the references he gives are of second hand, probably having as fountain the works of Croce. Neverthless, affirms Garin, it is possible to detect and examine the presence of some of the Vichian deeper thematic motives in Gramsci. Unfortunately to enlarge the study of the relation Gramsci and Vico goes beyond the scope of this work. 11 Gramsci, 2011a, p. 96. This and other passages of Gramsci’s works transcribed here were free translated by myself from Brazilian Portuguese into English. 12 Gramsci, 2011a, p. 114. 13 Gramsci, 2011a, p. 117.

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uses the principle of causality, and beyond this it would be in the much more restrict fact that, in a series of judgments, common sense would identify the exact cause, simple and at hand, and would not let itself to turn aside from its course by phantoms, pseudoscientific and metaphysical obscurities.14 He points out also that in “common sense” there would be a certain amount of experimentation and direct observation of reality, although empirical and limited. Gramsci asserts that there would be a close alliance between common sense and religion, being this one the provider of common sense main elements. He explains this relationship would not be a flat one because every religion, including Roman Catholic, is in fact a multiplicity of distinct and frequently contradictory religions, so that, all of the following groups: peasants, middle class and urban workers, intellectuals, and women, have their own way of being Catholics. The influence of religion upon common sense would not comprise only these rough and less elaborated forms of the mentioned catholicisms, but, he defends, would have also influenced and would be components of the actual common sense the preceding religions and the present day catholicism previous forms, the popular heretical movements, the scientific superstitions linked to past religions, etc.”15 In another part of his Prison Notebooks, Gramsci connects religion with the common sense belief in the “reality of an external world”. He asserts that this belief would have a religious origin. To give fundament to his assertive he defends that religions instruct that the world, the nature, and the universe were created by God before he created the man, and that, consequently, in the moment of hs creation man would have met yet a ready and complete world, catalogued and defined once for all. This belief, he says, “became a hard datum of ‘common sense’, living with the same resistance even though having the religious sentiment hiden and switched off.”16 Not in contradiction with the religious element, Gramsci says that in common sense would predominate the ‘realist’, materialist elements, which would be the immediate brute sensation; but these elements would be

14

Gramsci, 2011a, p. 402. Gramsci, 2011a, p. 115. 16 Gramsci, 2011a, p. 130. 15

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‘superstitious’, uncritical, and due to these non critical elements, common sense would be “still ptolemaic, anthropomorfic and anthropocentric.”17 Gramsci considers a prejudice to say that philosophy is the exclusive intelectual activity of “professional and systematic philosophers”. To him, all men would be “philosophers” of an “spontaneous philosophy” peculiar to everyone, because philosophy would be contained (1) in language itself, which he understands as a set of notions and determined concepts and not simply as a set of words grammatically lacking content, (2) in common sense and in good sense18, and (3) in popular religion; and, consequently, Gramsci adds that the spontaneous philosophy would be “in all system of beliefs, superstitions, opinions, ways of seeing and acting manifest in what is known as folklore.” 19 In his description of the relation between common sense and philosophy, Gramsci divides it into two nuclei: one healthy or sane common sense and the other a conformist one. In order to explain what he understands as the sane nucleus of common sense, he analyses one widespread ordinary language expression that says: “to take the things with philosophy”. He recognizes that despite the invitation to resignation and patience present in this expression, it also would act as an invitation to reflection – and this is the most important for him. This expression would act as an appeal to a person to become conscious of the rationality of the events and to use his rational powers in facing the situation he confronts, that means, not to yield to instinctive and violent reactions. According to Gramsci, these kind of expressions would have a precise meaning that would be to invite men “to overcome the bestial and elementar passions in a conception of the need that gives a conscious direction to the very action. This woud be the healthy common sense nucleus, that could be precisely

17

Gramsci, 2011a, p. 115. Descartes (1962) uses “common sense” to mean “good sense” (le bon sens), defined by him as “the rational ability to recognize what comes before the mind as a clear and distinct idea” and that let us to recognize rational first truths when we encounter them” (p. 41). According to Bayer (2008), Descartes’good sense, understood as epistemic conception of “sensus communis” is involved in Vico’s definition of common sense, specially his assertion that “common sense is judgment without reflection that is shared by an entire class, an entire people, an entire nation, or the entire human race” (Vico, 1987, p. 45). 19 Gramsci, 2011a, p. 93. 18

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called good sense, and that deserves to be developed and changed into somewhat unitary and coherent.”20 In Gramsci’s perspective there would happen a close interchange between “philosophy of common sense” and what he names “philosophy of the intellectuals”. For him, philosophy would be the universalization of a world conception (of an ideology) that surpass the immediate range of the economic and the juridic and extends itself across all institutions of civil society, charging it with ethical and political content. Philosophy would operate a criticism that would promote the overcoming of religion and common sense, and, in this way, it would coincide with “good sense”, which he defines as opposed to common sense.21 From one side, all philosophy would tend to become common sense of an environment, even though a restricted one. And from another side, considering the healthy nucleus of common sense, the “popular philosophy” would be criticised by the philosophy of the intellectuals in order to be worked out as a philosophy that would become a new common sense, a renewed common sense that would have the coherence and energy of the individual philosophies. So, the philosophical movements would aim at working out a thought superior to the prevailing common sense of a certain society and culture. Following his “philosophy of praxis”, Gramsci departs from a established “common sense” and through his action he aims to create a new or renewed “common sense”. Gramsci sees the history of philosophy as the history of philosopher’s philosophies, which he understands as the history of the attempts and the ideological iniciatives by which a determined class of people wants to change, to correct and to perfect the concepts of the existing world; and changing as a whole the practical activity. The philosophy of an historical time is described by Gramsci as a combination of the following elements: the world conceptions of the large masses, the conceptions of the more restrict group of managers and intellectuals, aspects of the inherited or remained traditions, and the 20

Gramsci, 2011a, p. 98. According to Bayer, the idea of common sense as a corrective of reason associated with Descartes’ good sense is related to the generally view of common sense as an epistemic power, a way of knowing what is protoscientific; a sense, she states, that is present in the German expression for common sense: “gesunder Menschenverstand” or as she translates to English: “sound healthy human understanding”. Bayer, 2008, p. 1131. 21 Gramsci, 2011a, p. 96.

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philosophy of the philosophers. The combination of all these elements would reach the highest point in a determined direction, and the culmination of it would become the norms of collective action. The result of this process would appear as the whole and concrete history. To Gramsci, the philosophy of an historical time would be nothing but the history of that very epoch. It would be nothing else than the amount of variation the rulling classes succeed in determining the previous reality: history and philosophy would be in this sense united. 2.

Gramsci and Wittgenstein

To my view the above notes on Gramsci’s conception of common sense allow us to see the differences Wittgenstein’s philosophy presents regarding Gramsci’s ideas, to begin by their conceptions of the philosophical activity. Gramsci postulates an identity between philosophy, politics and economy, and considered these three disciplines the necessary constitutive elements of a world conception. And, being identical they could necessarily be convertible one into another; they could be reciprocally translated into the very specific language of each constitutive element: one is implicit in the other and they all together form a unity. According to this perspective, philosophy would be reduced to a “world conception” or ideology, and the philosophical work would no more be conceived as an individual systematic working out of concepts. Above all philosophy would be taken as cultural fight aiming at changing the popular way of thinking and searching to spread out the revealed “historically true” philosophical innovations. So, considering philosophy from this point of view, “the question of language and of the tongues must be technically put in foreground.”22 From Wittgenstein’s point of view philosophy is an autonomous activity that could not be reduced to politics, economy, or any science. Philosophy cannot be a theory or a set of doctrines; it is a conceptual activity that through language criticism simply describes the philosophical problems aiming at propositional clarity in itself; and without explaining or deducing anything in terms of the natural or social sciences. In Blue Book, Wittgenstein says philosophers are always tempted to ask and answers questions in the way science does. This tendency, he adverts, “is the real 22

Gramsci, 2011a, p. 398.

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source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher in complete darkness. I want to say that we will never have as a task to reduce whatever be to any other thing, or explain whatever. Philosophy is in truth ‘purely descriptive’”23 Philosophical work is conceived by him as an individual working out of concepts, as we can read in Culture and Value: Working in philosophy – like work in architecture in many respects – is really more a working on oneself. On one’s own interpretation. On one’s way of seeing things. (And what one expects of them).24 The autonomy of philosophy is best demonstrated in the treatment Wittgenstein25 gives to the topic of the “common sense” that is contained in his book On Certainty, where he discusses the works of G. E. Moore: ‘Defense of Common Sense’26 and ‘Proof of an External World’.27 Moore states that there are a set of propositions, every one of which we know, with certainty, to be true, or, that there are many things we know despite the fact we do not know how we know them. These are the “common sense beliefs” and the “common sense propositions” that compose what he names “common sense view of the world”. This view is built in terms of our ordinary language and some common sense belief could not be said false by a philosopher, because the very medium in which he expresses himself would be disqualified and his talk would be equivocal or nonsense28. The ordinary meaning of a common sense proposition is clearly evident to all competent language users, and must be accepted as starting point for philosophical reflection. Moore considered evident the truth of common sense propositions, so that he never produced proofs or explicit arguments for defending his claim about their certainty. His did not question their truth and directed his philosophical work aiming at to provide their correct analysis or explanations.

23

Wittgenstein, 1992, p. 49. Wittgenstein, 1980, p. 16. 25 Wittgenstein, 1972. 26 Moore, 1959. 27 Moore, 1962. 28 Thomas Reid (1710-1796) thought the truths of common sense to be evident in ordinary language and claimed that there were no deductive proofs to give evidence to such truths, so that philosophers could not attempt to reason against them, because their language would fail to make good sense (Wolterstorff, 2004). For Reid, says Thora Bayer, “…common sense act as a corrective when we pursue reason to the point of holding incoherent views.” Bayer, 2008, p. 1140. 24

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Wittgenstein did not agree to its full extent with Moore’s ideas, but he was in accordance with the implicit aim of Moore’s endeavour, asserts von Wright.29 And we could consider the book On Certainty an exercise into the correct analysis of the common sense proposed by Moore. According to von Wright, Wittgenstein has given a more clear and more true expression to this aim. And as pointed out by Stroll, despite their differences, Moore and Wittgenstein shared a philosophical outlook; they both had “a conviction that there is such a thing as certainty and that an accurate description of the world must take account of it.”30 In On Certainty we find that common sense is constituted by the mass of propositions that belongs to previous knowing (vor wissen); that it is not something we personally posses; that it is linked to the notion of ‘culture’ and to the fact that we belong to a community which is bound together by science and education; and that the truth of its propositions is fused into the foundations of our language game. In the book On Certainty, Wittgenstein does not use the expression “common sense”. He holds that each of us has a grasp of the world that is not open to alteration or replacement, that means, our common sense view of the world is resistant to changes. He speaks of our “world view” or “picture of the world” or our “inherited brackground”.31 According to Stroll, the common sense view is thought by Moore as non-scientific and the task of describing it he assigns to philosophy. Wittgenstein carried out this task and advanced in new and fruitful ways the topics dealt with by Moore in his works in defense of the common sense. In this way, as a result of his work, Wittgenstein established the conceptual difference between belief and knowing. He revealed that knowledge and certainty are independent concepts that play related but diverse roles in human interaction. Knowledge and certainty belong to different categories: knowledge is an epistemic concept that belongs to the language game32 and certainty is non-epistemic and lies outside the language game. Knowledge is part of a conceptual system that includes related notions like: guessing, forming hypothesis, doubting, judging, believing, thinking, among others. Certainty stands outside the conceptual web of knowledge belongs. Our language 29

von Wright, 1986. Stroll, 1994, 160. 31 Wittgenstein, 1972, OC, 94. 32 Wittgenstein, 1972, OC 136, 137, 140, 141, 142, 105. 30

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games presuppose certainties, that means, these make the language game possible. Because one is certain that “the earth exists”, he can study history and develop activities as such: forming hypothesis, gathering evidence, asserting conclusions, judging, doubting, and knowing. Because “there exists at present a living body, which is my body” I can say I have experiences, perceptions, awareness, expectations, beliefs, thoughts, imaginations, dreams, and feelings. Activities like enquiring and asserting and others that form the web of related and intertwined notions to which knowledge belongs are learned from infancy and are supported by the human community that embeds them. They are done according to beliefs the child learns. “The child learns by believing the adult. Doubt comes after belief”.33 “I learned an enormous amount and accepted it on human authority, and then I found some things confirmed or disconfirmed by my own experience”.34 “The child learns to believe a host of things. i.e. it learns to act according to these beliefs. Bit by bit there forms a system of what is believed, and in that system some things stand unshakeably fast and some are more or less liable to shift. What stands fast does so, not because it is intrinsically obvious or convincing; it is rather held fast by what lies around it.”35

And what lies around that does some beliefs stand fast is the community that supports the background we inherit. It is the world picture we have that, “above all is the substratum of all my enquiring and asserting”36 Gramsci deals with “common sense” from a point of view scientistically oriented and Wittgenstein from a philosophical perspective. It is not very clear Gramsci’s conception of “common sense”. It is a concept or a world conception (Weltanschauung) or an ideology. It is a kind of theory. Religion is the provider of common sense main elements. The principle of causality, experimentation, and the direct observation of reality is involved in it. It has an organizational structure and is therefore a system: a chaotic assemblage of foolish conceptions. Its componentes include observacional data, prejudices, scientific superstitions, old saws, scientific information, religious elements, philosophical innovations, etc. It is an historical and changeable product. Belief modification is possible, so that various false beliefs may eventually be replaced by “true” ones. 33

Wittgenstein, 1972, OC, 160. Wittgenstein, 1972, OC, 161. 35 Wittgenstein, 1972, OC, 144. 36 Wittgenstein, 1972, OC, 162. 34

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Another aspect Wittgenstein and Gramsci deal with in a different way refers to the common sense belief in the “reality of an external world”. As above pointed out, for Gramsci this belief has a religious origin. In Wittgenstein’s philosophy this issue is placed in another structure. The belief in the reality of an external world is related to the belief in the existence of the earth and in the beliefs that are absorbed in the building of our worldview or inherited background: “The existence of the Earth is rather part of the whole picture which forms the starting-point of belief for me”.37 “I believe that I have forebears, and that every human being has them. I believe that there are various cities, and, quite generally, in the main facts of geography and history. I believe that the earth is a body on whose surface we move and that it no more suddenly disapperars or the like than any other solid body; this table, this house, this tree, etc. If I wanted to doubt the existence of the earth long before my birth, I should have to doubt all sorts of things that stands fast for me.38 And that something 39 stands fast for me is not grounded in my stupidity or credulity.”

All of us are reared in a community where we learn to recognize persons, to speak a language, and to participate of human interactions, practices and institutions. Wittgenstein defends that such an immersion in the community constituted an inherited background that becomes deeprooted and cannot be rejected or revised. “I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness... No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false”.40 The interrelation of these two components of our inherited background, the existence of the world as the starting point of belief for every human being and the existence of community with its linguistic practices and as the place where we get our picture of the world, would give an underlying support for our belief in the reality of external world. According to Stroll,41 these two components stands fast “in having somewhat different pressuppositional relationships to the language game”, and taken together these two features would make concrete Wittgenstein’s ‘solution’ to the problem of the existence of the external world. The 37

Wittgenstein, 1972, OC, 209. Wittgenstein, 1972, OC, 234. 39 Wittgenstein, 1972, OC, 235. 40 Wittgenstein, 1972, OC, 94. 41 Stroll, 1994, p. 181. 38

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solution, Stroll asserts, is on the fact that “no sensible question can be raised with respect to either of these two aspects” and that “their existence is pressupposed in any formulation of the problem.” 3.

Common Sense and Politics

Until now the above notes are related to the principle of common sense dealt by Gramsci as a philosophy of common sense or the philosophy of the multitudes. But as it was mentioned he uses also the principle of common sense as a technical instrument of political activism. In order to make clear this aspect I will present some of his reflections on grammar. In his Cuaderno 29: notes for an introduction to the study of grammar (1935/2011), Gramsci talks about two grammars: there would be one which is “immanent” or spontaneous to the very language. There would exist an inmense number of this immanent grammar; a number that would be impossible to calculate, and theoretically, he says, each person would have his own grammar. Beyond this immanent grammar there would exist the “normative grammars”, constituted of reciprocal controls, of reciprocal ‘censorship’, and that would act in the sense of determining a gramatical conformism. “We could sketch a framework of the ‘normative grammars’ that operates spontaneously in all determined society, in so far as this (society) tends to unification either as territory or as culture, that means in so far as exists in this society a social ruler class whose fonction is acknowledged and followed.”42

Gramsci considers that the written normative grammars are politicalinstitutional intervention on spoken language games. “The written ‘normative grammars’ tend to include a whole national territory and all ‘linguistic volume’ in order to create a unitary national linguistic conformism. The written normative grammar, therefore, always pressuposes a ‘choice’ and a cultural orientation, that is, it is an act of cultural-national politics. We can discuss about the best way of presenting the ‘choice’ and the ‘orientation’, so that they can be willingly accepted, that is we can discuss about the most suitable means to achieve the aim; there can be no doubt that there is a goal to achieve that requires suitable and appropriate means, that is, that it is a question of a political act.”43 42 43

Gramsci, 2011b, p. 143. Gramsci, 2011b, p. 144.

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Gramsci stimulate his reader to intervene actively in the process of formation, dissemination and development of a unitary national language. Since this process would be accomplished through a set of molecular processes, he recommends that it would be useful “to be aware of the process as a whole, to be able to intervene actively in with the maximal results.” He advises also one should not regard this intervention as decisive and not imagine that “its aims will be achieved in all their details”, that means, as a result of the intervention the person would obtain a unitary particular language, because a “unitary language” will be got if there is a necessity and the organized intervention acts in the sense of accelerating the evolution of an existing process. Gramsci asserts that it is not possible to predict and establish the exact details of the resulting language; but he affirms also that “in any case, if the intervention is ‘rational’, it will be organically linked to tradition, which is not of little importance to the economy of culture.”44 When Gramsci mentions a rational intervention organically linked to tradition, by this sentence we should understand as linguistic rational interventions the truths revealed by philosophy and in particular his philosophy of praxis that would be inserted and assimilated in the “common sense”. In his Notebook 11 (1932-1933): An introduction to the study of philosophy we can read: “It is possible to say correctly that one determined truth became common sense and by saying this to hint that it was transmitted from the circle of intelectual groups, but, in this case, what happens is nothing else than a certification of the historical character and an affirmation of the historical rationality; in this sense, since this argument be used with sobriety it has its value precisely because the common sense is crudely misoneistic and conservative, and to succeed in having a new truth inserted in it is a proof that such a truth has a great expansiveness strenght and evidence.”45

And Gramsci lists the centers for spreading linguistic innovations in the tradition and for leading to a national linguistic conformism in large national masses: the school, the newspapers, the art writers and popular writers, the theater and the spoken cinema, the radio, public meetings of all kinds, including the religious ones, the reports in “chats” among the

44 45

Gramsci, 2011b, p. 145. Gramsci, 2011b, p. 118.

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various layers of the population, more or less educated, and the local and regional dialects.46 4.

Gramsci and Wittgenstein: Politics and Philosophy

In the “Postscript” to the Recollections of Wittgenstein, Rush Rhees reports that in 1945 he said to Wittgenstein he had been thinking he ought to become a member of Revolutionary Communist (Trotskyist) Party. In reply Wittgenstein asked him why he thought he ought to, and he answered it was because he found himself “more and more in agreement with the chief points in analysis and criticism of present society and with their objectives”. To this argument Wittgenstein set against by saying that he could continue agreeing with that without becoming a member of the party. Rhees replyed him: ‘I’m inclined to tell myself hic Rhodus, hic salta.’ In the sequence, Rhees reports that “Wittgenstein stopped walking at once and grew more serious – as he did if you mentioned a problem that he’d thought about” and then sat down on a park bench and talked about this. His main point, continues Rhees, was that: “When you are a member of the party you have to be prepared to act and to speak as the party has decided. You will be trying to convince other people. In arguing and answering their questions you cannot turn back on the party line if you now see something shaky in it and say, ‘Well I can see that isn’t quite right; perhaps the matter (wathever it is) goes more like this ... If you are in the habit of trying one way, then turning back on your tracks like this and trying another, you will be no use as a party member... (and) what you say must be what the party has agreed to say.”47

And after arguing this way, Wittgenstein compared the militancy for a party with doing philosophy and made explicit the difference of demands: “In doing philosophy you have got to be ready constantly to change the direction in which you are moving. At some point you see that there must be something wrong with the whole way you have been tackling the difficulty. You have to be able to give up those central notions which have seemed to be what you must keep if you are to think at all. Go back and start from scratch. And if you are thinking as a philosopher you cannot treat the ideas of communism differently from others. Some people speak 46 47

Gramsci, 2011b, p. 145. Rhees, 1984.

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Doubtful Certainties. Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism of philosophy as a way of living. Working as a member of a communist party is also a way of living.” 48

Wittgenstein distinguishes clearly politics from philosophy whereas Gramsci conceives or postulates an identity of philosophy and politics, that for the Marxist theorist brings as consequence the possibility of a reciprocal translation of them into the specific language of each other. Philosophy is reduced by Gramsci to an ideology and is taken as cultural fight aiming at changing the history; or changing the popular thought, the common sense, and by this movement to reveal the truths of his phiosophy of praxis. And, from another side, if for Wittgenstein philosophy and political militancy are distinct ways of living, for Gramsci there is no such a difference. The task of philosophy, for Wittgenstein,49 is not the creation of an ideal language, but the clarification of the use of the existing language. For him, philosophy “will never have as a task to reduce whatever be to any other thing, or explain whatever. Philosophy is in truth ‘purely descriptive’.50 Philosophy is not a reformative undertaking but a descriptive one. Contrariwise Gramsci defends that the task of philosophy is social criticism and overcoming of religion and common sense. Gramsci wants to insert in the “common sense” new truths that would be originated in the circle of intelectual groups. He proposes political-institutional rational interventions on spoken language games. He admired Benedetto Croce for having the talent of putting into practice successfully these sort of interventions, as we can read in a transcription of a Gramsci’s letter that appeared in the essay of Lo Piparo. “I think that Croce’s greatest quality has always been the following: to get across his conception of the world in a non-pedantic way through a series of short writings in which his philosophy is immediately presented to the reader and is absorbed as common sense. In this way, the solutions of many questions are starting to circulate in an anonymous form, they get into newspapers, into every day’s life and there is a great quantity of followers of Croce who do not know they are such and who do not even know who Croce is.”51

48

Rhees, 1984, p. 208. Wittgenstein, 2009, 108. 50 Wittgenstein, 1992, p. 49. 51 Lo Piparo, 2010, p. 290. 49

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It seems to me Gramsci wanted through his writings to conquer a great quantity of followers that would reproduce his thoughts. This was not the case of Wittgenstein. In his “Sketch for a Foreword” to Philosophical Remarks, written in 1930, he declares he was “really writing for friends who are scattered throughout the corners of the globe”.52 An in the Preface to Philosophical Investigations he asserts: “I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But if possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own”.53 5.

The Relation: Individual and Society

In the above mentioned article, Amartya Sen54 explains that the relevance of the so called ‘anthropological way’ which Sraffa taught to Wittgenstein is in the fact that he defended the importance of the fundamental relation of the individual to the social group for the language analysis.55 Of course the social circunstances in which language is used is emphasized in Philosophical Investigations. However, the incorporation of this perspective by the late Wittgenstein does not mean he became an anthropologist. In Culture and Value, our philosopher is very clear about this point: If we look at things from an ethnological point of view, does this mean we are saying that philosophy is ethonology? No, it only means that we are taking up a position right outside so as to be able to see things more objectively.”56

The best way of interpreting how Wittgenstein dealt with the relation between individual and society I have found in the work of Bloor, who defends the idea of a sociological Wittgenstein. According to Bloor, the description of the process of ostensive learning and the use of paradigms or models demonstrates Wittgenstein was calling our attention to the relation between individual and society. The information transmitted in these processes is social information, and ostensive learning in the form of models aims at socialization into the local practices of self-reference.57 52

Wittgenstein, 1980, CV, p. 6. Wittgenstein, 2009, p. 4. 54 Sen, 2010. 55 Sen, 2003. 56 Wittgenstein, 1980, CV, p. 44. 57 Bloor, 1996, p. 369. 53

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A not intriguing question: Why did Wittgenstein never connected explicitly his insights on social dimensions of meaning to the data of political, legal, and economic history? This question is not intriguing because Wittgenstein left very clear he was a philosopher and not a political theoretician militant as Gramsci was. But a more interesting answer to this question is related to the polarization of philosophy and the natural sciences, that, after the Tractatus, became the key to the understanding of Wittgenstein’s method. In this sense, Bloor defends that Wittgenstein did not care about that connection and even personally abstained from such pronouncements because he wanted to avoid these sort of self-commentaries. Why this avoidance? Because acting this way he kept himself coherent with his antiscientific and anti-causal aims to philosophy. Beyond this, asserts Bloor, to Wittgenstein philosophical problems are nothing other than “entanglements in the misleading forms of self commentary that we are prone to give on our practices”,58 and, in this way, to expect these pronouncements of him is to misunderstanding his work. 6.

Last Remarks: Actuality and Imagination “In May 1946 Piero Sraffa decided he no longer wished to have conversations with Wittgenstein, saying that he could no longer give his time and attention to the matters Wittgenstein wished to discuss. This came as a great blow to Wittgenstein. He pleaded with Sraffa to continue their weekly conversations, even if it meant staying away from philosophical subjects. “I will talk about anything,” he told him. “Yes”, Sraffa replied, “but in your way.”59

The first remark we can make about this passage about the Wittgenstein-Sraffa conversations is that apparently these were mainly about “philosophical subjects” and not on politics or sociology etc. Second remark: When Wittgenstein says that he would talk about anything we can imagine Sraffa wished to discuss other subjects, for example, politics. And he, Wittgenstein, was accepting to discuss any other subject since they continued the relationship. Third: Sraffa’s reply shows a characteristic feature of Wittgenstein’s personality: the domineering manners caricatured in a poem of a student, 58 59

Bloor, 1996, p. 337. Monk, 1991, p. 487.

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quoted by Amartya Sen: “Who, on any issue, ever saw/ Ludwig refrain from laying down the law?/ In every company he shouts us down,/And stops our sentence stuttering his own”.60 My fourth remark is related to a suggestion Davis exposed at the end of his article on the triadic relation: Wittgenstein, Sraffa and Gramsci. Considering the fact that they three were originally intellectuals of continental background, and the fact that Sraffa and Wittgenstein became part of British intelectual history and engaged themselves with problems and issues of this tradition, and that Gramsci, by contrast, remained within the domaine of continental philosophy, Davis took this occurrence as suggestive of a Gramsci dominance. He asserts that his ideas “may have had a directness that enabled them to be communicated to the others with particular forcefulness”.61 Because these three intelectual devoted themselves to quite diferente realm of ideas: Gramsci to power, Sraffa to value, and Wittgenstein to meaning, he deduces that “the transmission of influence across them would need to have operated in terms of very fundamental principles”.62 So, following this chain of ideas, Davis infers that Gramsci was able to exercise an influence on Sraffa by transmitting the fundamental principles from continental sources needed to face the issues raised in Cambridge traditions. And he emphasizes that Gramsci’s ideas, to the extent they were expressed in the thinking of Sraffa and Wittgenstein, they did not appeared as such but “took on new forms removed from the way in which they were originally elaborated”.63 If we accept this chain of ideas Sraffa and Wittgenstein should be considered as spokesmen of Gramsci’s ideas. So, considering the differences Wittgenstein’s philosophy as regarding Gramsci’s perspectives I tried to delineate above and also the acknowledgment by Sraffa that whatever the subject of the conversation Wittgenstein would talk in his own way, would our philosopher accept to be a spokesman of Gramsci’s ideas? To my oppinion: not at all.

60

Sen, 2003, p. 1243. Davis, 2002, p. 397. 62 Davis, 2002, p. 397. 63 Davis, 2002, p. 398. 61

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References Bayer, T. I., 2008: Vico’s Principle of Sensus Communis and Forensic Eloquence, Chicago-Kent Law Review, 83:3, pp. 1131-1155. Bloor, D., 1996: The question of linguistic idealism revisited, in H. Sluga & D. G. Stern (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein (pp. 354-382). Cambridge University Press. Davis, J. B., 2002: Gramsci, Sraffa, Wittgenstein: philosophical linkages, European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 9:3, 384-401. Descartes, R., 1962: Discurso do Método, in R. Descartes, Obra Escolhida. Difusão Européia do Livro, São Paulo, pp. 39-103. Garin, E., 1976: Vico in Gramsci, Bollettino del Centro di Studi Vichiani, 6, pp. 187-189. Gramsci, A., 2011a: Cadernos do Cárcere, vol. 1: Introdução ao estudo da filosofia; A filosofia de Benedetto Croce (5a. Ed.). Civilização Brasileira, Rio de Janeiro. Gramsci, A. 2011b: Cadernos do Cárcere, vol 6: Literatura. Folclore. Gramática. Apêndices: índices e variantes (2a. Ed.). Civilização Brasileira, Rio de Janeiro. Haller, R., 1988: Questions on Wittgenstein. Routledge, London. Lo Piparo, F., 2010: Gramsci and Wittgenstein. An intriguing connection, in A. Capone (ed.): Perspectives on language use and pragmatics. Lincom Europa, München, pp. 285-320. Malcolm, N., 2001: Ludwig Wittgenstein – A memoir. (2nd ed.). Clarendon Press, Oxford. Monk, R., 1991: Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius. Penguin Books, New York. Moore, G. E., 1925: A defense of common sense, in: J. H. Muirhead (ed.), Contemporary British Philosophy (2nd series). pp. 193-223. Moore, G. E., 1962: Proof of an External World, Philosophical Papers. Collier Books, New York, pp. 144-148. Rhees, R., 1984: Postscript, in: R. Rhees (ed.), Recollections of Wittgenstein. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 172-209.

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Sen, A., 2003: Sraffa, Wittgenstein, and Gramsci, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLI, pp. 1240-1255. Stroll, A., 1994: Moore and Wittgenstein on certainty. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Venturinha, N., 2011: Wittgenstein’s Debt to Sraffa, in: J. Padilla Gálvez & M. Gaffal (Eds.), Forms of Life and Language Games. Ontos, Frankfurt am Main, pp. 187-195. Vico, G., 1987: Principios de una ciencia nueva en torno a la natureza común de las naciones. Fondo de Cultura Económica, México. Von Wright, G. H., 1986: Wittgenstein. Trans-Europ-Repress, Mauvezin. Wittgenstein, L., 1972: Über Gewissheit / On Certainty (OC), G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. von Wright (Eds.). Harper & Row, Publishers, New York. Wittgenstein, L. 1980: Vermischte Bemerkungen/Culture and Value (CV), G. H. von Wright (ed.). Basil Blackwell, Oxford. Wittgenstein, L., 1992: O Livro Azul (BB). (J. Mendes, transl.). Edições 70, Lisboa. Wittgenstein, L., 2009: Philosophische Untersuchungen / Philosophical Investigations (PI), Rev. 4th ed. by P. M. S. Hacker and J. Schulte. Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford. Wolterstorff, N., 2004: Reid on Common Sense, in: T. Cuneo & R. Van Woudenberg (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid. Cambridge University Press, pp. 77-100. São Paulo

Demystifying Mysticism: Brouwer and Wittgenstein Nuno VENTURINHA Most commentators agree that not only the interaction with the Vienna Circle after 1926 but also the impact of Brouwer’s Vienna lectures in 1928 was decisive for Wittgenstein’s return to philosophical activity at the beginning of 1929. It is actually at the invitation of Herbert Feigl and Friedrich Waismann that Wittgenstein attends the first lecture given by the Dutch mathematician, “Mathematics, Science, and Language”, held on 10 March. It remains a matter of speculation whether Wittgenstein really attended the second lecture, entitled “The Structure of the Continuum” and held on 14 March.1 The testimonies we have concentrate on Wittgenstein’s attendance at the first lecture.2 However, there has been some dispute about how exactly Brouwer influenced Wittgenstein. In the first edition of his Insight and Illusion, Peter Hacker argued that the intuitionist ideas put forward by Brouwer would have inspired an anti-realist view, which, in opposition to the realism of the Tractatus, could explain Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.3 Yet this is not maintained in the revised edition of the book where the (Dummettian) realist/anti-realist interpretation of Wittgenstein’s thought is dropped. What Hacker says here is that “[h]is excitement after the lecture may just as well have been a reaction to Brouwer’s misconceptions, for while Wittgenstein might have been sympathetic to some features of Brouwer’s constructivism [...] he would, even in 1928, have found much to quarrel with”.4 A similar reading has been propounded by Jaakko Hintikka in his influential 1988 paper “Die 1

See the confirmation by C. A. van Peursen in Hallett (1977, 762), based on Brouwer’s own account, which is nevertheless denied by Menger (1994, 138). See also Le Roy Finch, 1977, 260-261, and van Dalen, 2005, 566-567 and 871, together with Marion, 2008, 102-103, about a subsequent meeting between Brouwer and Wittgenstein “during which they had discussed Brouwer’s lecture [sic]” (van Dalen, 2005, 566, and Marion, 2008, 102). Both lectures are published in Brouwer, 1975, 417-428 and 429-440. 2 See Feigl, 1981, 64, as well as his report in Pitcher, 1964, 8, n. 8, and Menger, 1994, 129-139. 3 See Hacker, 1972, 98-104. 4 Hacker, 1986, 120. Doubtful Certainties. Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism (Eds. Jesús PADILLA GÁLVEZ, Margit GAFFAL), Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt a. M., 2012, 203-211.

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Wende der Philosophie: Wittgenstein’s New Logic of 1928”, where he calls attention to crucial differences between the later Wittgenstein and Brouwer regarding language use and mathematics.5 More recent approaches, however, favour another perspective. Mathieu Marion, for example, is convinced that “it was indeed the author of the Tractatus who listened to Brouwer in March 1928”, so that “there could not have been an influence where Wittgenstein already shared much of Brouwer’s conception”.6 This does not mean that Marion regards the Tractatus as a proto-intuitionist work. He stresses that “there are numerous remarks of a negative nature on Brouwer’s intuitionism in Wittgenstein’s Nachlass”, but in his opinion “the very points where the Tractatus and Brouwer diverge are precisely at the source of these negative remarks”.7 Marion then mentions the convergences between the antilogicist programs of the early Wittgenstein and Brouwer and tries to show that the differences between the later Wittgenstein and the intuitionist program will not result in a “strict finitism”, as Dummett believes, but in a peculiar finitist approach that is grammatical.8 The irreducibility of Wittgenstein’s philosophical project to any foundationalism (logicist, formalist or even intuitionist) was actually one of the main points of Christoffer Gefwert in Wittgenstein on Mathematics, Minds and Mental Machines, where Wittgenstein’s reception of Brouwer in 1928 is taken as being one of a “spiritual ally”.9 In fact, as Gefwert rightly claims, the influence of Schopenhauer and Spengler on both thinkers is evident, with Brouwer making use in his inaugural lecture of the notions of “will” (Wille) and “primordial phenomenon” (Urphänomen), which Wittgenstein did certainly recognize as familiar. Nevertheless, there is another text of Brouwer’s alluded to by Gefwert, “Life, Art, and Mysticism”, that may shed light on other similarities, possibly grasped by Wittgenstein at that time. In this paper, I shall then explore some parallels between “Life, Art, and Mysticism” and the Tractatus in regard to epistemology, ethics and 5

See Hintikka, 1996, 81-82. It is worth noting, however, that Hintikka constantly refers to 1928 as the terminus a quo of Wittgenstein’s return to philosophy (cf. ibid., 1, 6, 35, 69, 79-80, 86-89, 93, 95, 127, 132, 137, 154, 159, 166, 263-264 and 316, as well as Hintikka and Hintikka, 1986, 137). 6 Marion, 2003, 107. 7 Ibid. 8 See ibid., 108ff. This reading is anticipated in Marion, 1998, esp. 147-192 and 213236. 9 Cf. Gefwert, 1998, 174.

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language, evaluating Brouwer’s alleged influence on Wittgenstein in 1928 through the concept of mysticism. Brouwer’s essay “Life, Art, and Mysticism” is, first of all, an invitation to philosophy as discovery of the self or, more specifically, “turning-into-oneself”.10 He isolates the given as experience of consciousness and sees what belongs to the world as something that ultimately cannot make sense insofar as the individual withdraws from freedom. According to Brouwer, only a “free will” can strive in a “definite direction” in which time becomes a continuous present.11 This overcoming of the illusory situation we are originally in does not have a rational foundation. For Brouwer, the “intellect”, as creator of the various fictional mechanisms we apparently need, is the very root of “man’s downfall”.12 From this diagnosis to a criticism of science, taken as being in the service of “desire” – of our “system of desire” – is only a small further step.13 And thanks to the internal relation between “language” and the “intellect”, Brouwer insists on the incapacity of man to communicate directly, i.e. “instinctively”.14 This takes Brouwer to find transcendence in immanence. He states that “[t]he manifestations of the self within the restrictions and in the forms of this life are eruptions of truth” in such a way that there can be a real understanding of how we live.15 Still, it is not only this “immanent truth” 10

Cf. Brouwer, 2004, 7-8. Cf. ibid., 8. 12 Cf. ibid., 9. 13 Cf. ibid., 9-12. 14 Cf. ibid., 15. 15 Cf. ibid., 19. It is interesting to compare Brouwer’s allusion to “the forms of this life” with Wittgenstein’s use of “forms of life” (Lebensformen), and not only of “form of life” (Lebensform), in his later philosophy. But Wittgenstein also uses the expression Form des Lebens, for example in a remark dated 27 August 1937 which reads: “The fact that life is problematic means that your life does not fit life’s shape. So you must change your life, & once it fits the shape, what is problematic will disappear.” (Wittgenstein, 2000, MS 118, 17r-17v; 1998, 31e, emphasis mine) This idea already appears in the pre-Tractatus notebooks, namely in a remark that made its way into proposition 6.521(1) of the Tractatus. It runs thus: “The solution of the problem of life is to be seen in the disappearance of this problem.” (Wittgenstein, 2000, MS 103, 13r; 1979, 74e, 6 July 1916) It is equally worth comparing Brouwer’s views on time with what Wittgenstein says in the last entry for that day: “But is it possible for one so to live that life stops being problematic? That one is living in eternity and not in time?” (Wittgenstein, 2000, 13r-14r; 1979, 74e) 11

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that makes its appearance in our life; there is at the same time, in Brouwer’s view, the recognition of another sphere, that of the “transcendent truth”. He summarizes his point rather eloquently saying: “Immanent truth enlightens; transcendent truth makes man devout.”16 In a clear Schopenhauerian – and Eckartian – style,17 Brouwer affirms that “[t]ranscendent truth represents the Kingdom of God in this sad world, self-reflection, forever emanating and reabsorbing itself, the confluence of all fantasies, the panta rei of Heraclite”.18 But this is something that, due to the “outrage” it causes, we should keep silent about.19 This is hardly what one would expect from a mathematician even though many ideas in “Life, Art, and Mysticism” can be reconciled with Brouwer’s intuitionism. In effect, what it postulates is that any foundation of mathematics can only make use of finitist processes. Intuitionism does not deny infinity. It simply claims that human beings cannot go beyond their finitude. We do certainly have access to infinity. As a matter of fact, there is no way of conceiving its inexistence. But this is an originary presentation about which nothing can be said meaningfully. This confinement in immanence, which should not be taken as “solipsistic”, as for example Kripke defends,20 constitutes therefore a mathematical extension of Brouwer’s 1905 mystical thoughts. These ideas, already seen from an intuitionistic point of view, are truly reminiscent of many of Wittgenstein’s remarks in the Tractatus. This is a work where Wittgenstein also invites the reader to philosophize, but not in the academic sense, as if it were “a text-book”.21 From the start, Wittgenstein drives his reader from the facts to the essence of the world,22 and this means looking at things from my perspective, understanding that “[t]he world and life are one”,23 that “I am my world”, a 16

Brouwer, 2004, 19. Brouwer refers to Schopenhauer earlier in the text, citing Eckhart on various pages (6, 7 and 38-39). Stocker (2010, 26) emphasizes “the element of ascetic passive mysticism of Brouwer, which echoes Schopenhauer”. 18 Brouwer, 2004, 28. 19 Cf. ibid., 29ff. 20 Cf. Kripke, 1982, 80, n. 68. 21 Cf. Wittgenstein, 1933, 27. 22 He actually says, in a note penned on 2 August 1916, that “[his] work has extended from the foundations of logic to the essence of the world” (Wittgenstein, 2000, MS 103, 40r; 1979, 79e, translation slightly amended). 23 Wittgenstein, 1933, 5.621. 17

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“microcosm”.24 In doing so, our mundane activities loose their apparent significance and the concept of “value” undergoes a radical transformation. “If there is a value which is of value”, Wittgenstein remarks, “it must lie outside all happening and being-so” given that “all happening and being-so is accidental”.25 What counts is my “will”, which is interpreted as “the bearer of good and evil”,26 and when I decide to lead my own life doing away with the fulfilment of desire, it becomes clear that “[o]nly a man who lives not in time but in the present is happy”.27 This, for Wittgenstein, is the result of contemplating the world “as a limited whole”, which manifests itself in a “feeling”, a “mystical feeling”.28 The Tractatus is thus far from viewing science as the ultimate answer to our problems. The second entry for 25 May 1915 in the second of the surviving wartime notebooks, which would make its way in a different form into proposition 6.52 of the Tractatus, is particularly illustrative: “The urge towards the mystical comes of the non-satisfaction of our wishes by science. We know feel that even if all possible scientific questions are answered our problem is still not touched at all. Of course there is then no question any more; and just this is the answer.”29

Commenting on Wittgenstein’s “mysticism”, G. E. M. Anscombe points out that it cannot be confounded with “extraordinary and unusual experiences”, with “thoughts and visions peculiar to an extraordinary type of individual”.30 In her view, “Wittgenstein took the term over from Russell, who used it in a special way, with reference to an entirely ordinary feeling”31 – allegedly that of proposition 6.52 of the Tractatus.32 When writing these lines, Anscombe certainly had in mind “Mysticism and Logic”, published by Russell in July 1914. However, as Brian McGuinness observes, it is not likely that Wittgenstein had read Russell’s paper at the time since he came back to Austria, after living for some time in Norway, at the beginning of the summer of 1914, only returning to England after the 24

Cf. ibid., 5.63. Cf. ibid., 6.41. 26 Cf. Wittgenstein, 2000, MS 103, 28r; 1979, 76e. 27 Wittgenstein, 2000, MS 103, 18r; 1979, 74e. See n. 15 above. 28 Cf. Wittgenstein, 1933, 6.45. 29 Wittgenstein, 2000, MS 102, 107r-108r; 1979, 51e, translation modified. 30 Anscombe, 1971, 169-170. 31 Ibid., 170. 32 This simply states: “We feel that even if all possible scientific questions are answered, our problems of life are still not touched at all. Of course there is then no question any more, and just this is the answer.” (Translation modified) 25

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end of the war.33 Of course a copy could have been sent to him in the meantime, but there is no sign of this in Wittgenstein’s correspondence. In a letter to Russell from January 1915, in reply to one sent on 28 July 1914, Wittgenstein only acknowledges receipt of “The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics”, also published in that month.34 Be that as it may, Wittgenstein would never have accepted Russell’s rejection of mysticism, which is identified with metaphysics and consequently opposed to “scientific philosophy”, characterized in its turn by what Russell calls “ethical neutrality”.35 In Wittgenstein’s philosophy, both early and late, ethics is at the centre, with the Tractatus and his unpublished papers continuously stressing the existing gap between science and man’s real need: the reason why he exists.36 It is this understanding that we find in proposition 6.44 of the Tractatus, where Wittgenstein specifies that “[n]ot how the world is, is the mystical, but that it is”. He does not turn away from reflecting upon such a sphere for the sake of an objective discourse. Nonsense cannot be avoided, pace some “new Wittgensteinians”, when we approach the limits of experience, and mysticism is exactly the expression of that contact, of that stammering, producing what can be called an exponential communication. This mysterion can be found at length in the works of mystics like Meister Eckhart or Angelus Silesius, both of whom are abundantly quoted by Schopenhauer in his The World as Will and Representation from which Wittgenstein, in all probability, took over the term.37 This is not to say that Wittgenstein’s thought involves the “extraordinary and unusual experiences” or the “thoughts and visions peculiar to an extraordinary type of individual” that Anscombe talks about. Although she is probably right in saying that this is the meaning of the term “mysticism” in “natural

33

See McGuinness, 2002, 140. See Wittgenstein, 2008, 77. 35 Cf. Russell, 1986, 47ff. 36 Landini (2007, 94ff.) suggests that Russell’s influence in regard to Wittgenstein’s adoption of the term “mysticism” will have occurred through the paper “The Essence of Religion”, published in 1912. But the fact remains that, as Landini notes, Wittgenstein “detested” that work (ibid., 98). 37 See Schopenhauer, 1969a, 129, 249, 381, 386-387 and 404, and 1969b, 176, 610614, 633 and 639. See also the references to Asmus, pseudonym of Matthias Claudius, in 1969a, 394-395, 398 and 403. 34

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language”,38 it has nothing to do with its use in the tradition Wittgenstein belongs to – a stance that aims precisely at surpassing common sense. One can then conjecture that when Wittgenstein attended Brouwer’s lecture(s) or eventually met him in Vienna, he enjoyed noticing that a famous mathematician shared many of his influences and views. Moreover, contrary to the Tractarian injunction to silence, Wittgenstein will have realized that much could still be shown through philosophical discourse, in particular that from an immanent perspective no theoretical foundation is possible. This is what Wittgenstein will attempt to do when he starts writing in the first of a series of “volumes” on 2 February 1929, where Ernst Mach’s “phenomenology” or Immanenzphilosophie is approached in a brand new light. References Anscombe, G. E. M., 1971: An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, 3rd edition. Hutchinson, London. Brouwer, L. E. J., 1975: Collected Works, vol. 1, ed. A. Heyting. New Holland, Amsterdam. Brouwer, L. E. J., 2004: Life, Art, and Mysticism, trans. W. P. van Stigt. In: B. Stocker (ed.), Post-Analytic Tractatus. Ashgate, Aldershot, 545. Feigl, H., 1981: Inquiries and Provocations. Selected Writings 1929-1974, ed. R. S. Cohen. D. Reidel, Dordrecht. Gefwert, C., 1998: Wittgenstein on Mathematics, Minds and Mental Machines. Ashgate, Aldershot. Hacker, P. M. S., 1972: Insight and Illusion. Wittgenstein on Philosophy and the Metaphysics of Experience. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Hacker, P. M. S., 1986: Insight and Illusion. Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein, 2nd edition. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Hallett, G., 1977: A Companion to Wittgenstein’s “Philosophical Investigations”. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY.

38

Cf. Anscombe, 1971, 169.

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Hintikka, J., 1996: Wittgenstein: Half-Truths and One-and-a-Half-Truths. Selected Papers, vol. 1. Kluwer, Dordrecht. Hintikka, M. B., and Hintikka, J., 1986: Investigating Wittgenstein. Basil Blackwell, Oxford. Kripke, S. A., 1982: Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. An Elementary Exposition. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Landini, G., 2007: Wittgenstein’s Apprenticeship with Russell. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Le Roy Finch, H., 1977: Wittgenstein. The Later Philosophy. Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, NJ. Marion, M., 1998: Wittgenstein, Finitism and the Foundations of Mathematics. Clarendon Press, Oxford. Marion, M., 2003: Wittgenstein and Brouwer, Synthese, 137, 103-127. Marion, M., 2008: Brouwer on “hypotheses” and the middle Wittgenstein. In: M. van Atten, P. Boldini, M. Bourdeau and G. Heinzmann (eds.), One-Hundred Years of Intuitionism (1907-2007). Birkhäuser, Basel, 96-114. McGuinness, B., 2002: Approaches to Wittgenstein. Collected Papers. Routledge, London. Menger, K., 1994: Reminiscences of the Vienna Circle and the Mathematical Colloquium, ed. L. Golland, B. McGuinness and A. Sklar. Kluwer, Dordrecht. Pitcher, G., 1964: The Philosophy of Wittgenstein. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. Russell, B., 1986: The Philosophy of Logical Atomism and Other Essays 1914-19. The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. 8, ed. J. G. Slater. George Allen & Unwin, London. Schopenhauer, A., 1969a-b: The World as Will and Representation, 2 vols., trans. E. F. J. Payne. Dover Publications, New York. Stocker, B., 2010: Dialectic of Paradox in the Tractatus: Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard. In: A. Marques and N. Venturinha (eds.), Wittgenstein on Forms of Life and the Nature of Experience. Peter Lang, Bern, 21-37.

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van Dalen, D., 2005: Mystic, Geometer, and Intuitionist. The Life of L. E. J. Brouwer – Volume 2: Hope and Disillusion. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Wittgenstein, L., 1933: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C. K. Ogden, revised edition. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. Wittgenstein, L., 1979: Notebooks 1914-1916, ed. G. H. von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 2nd edition. Basil Blackwell, Oxford. Wittgenstein, L., 1998: Culture and Value. A Selection from the Posthumous Remains, ed. G. H. von Wright in collaboration with H. Nyman, rev. ed. A. Pichler, trans. P. Winch. Blackwell, Oxford. Wittgenstein, L., 2000: Wittgenstein’s Nachlass. The Bergen Electronic Edition, ed. Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Wittgenstein, L., 2008: Wittgenstein in Cambridge. Letters and Documents 1911-1951, ed. B. McGuinness. Blackwell, Oxford. New University of Lisbon

Wittgenstein and the Future of the Mathematical Sciences Arthur GIBSON Introduction Negative criticism of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics, and of his mathematics, has had major influence, sometimes at the hands of those who do not have sufficient mathematics, or have not read his manuscripts. Valuable as is the posthumously published edition of Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, it is not an accurate reproduction of the excluded extensive and complex fragmented families of manuscripts that do not appear in the book. Some of these exclusions derive from incorrect criticism given to the earlier editors by others that was confidential and has not been published. Of course Wittgenstein made mistakes in some of the material, as do mathematicians in the course of producing unpublished drafts of work in progress. The excluded notes on the manuscripts or parts thereof – The Big Typescript editions, the Philosophical Grammar otherwise – commendable editions – omit major attacks by unpublished hands writing on the manuscripts, which seem to be the prejudiced source influencing the original literary heirs. Distinguished philosophers of mathematics have written against this negative trend whilst, acknowledging that it was probably too late to reverse it; there is enough evidence to require a volte-face, though this chapter contain only hints of forthcoming publications to sustain this conclusion. An instance of this is his analysis of Euler. Littlewood was not uncertain about Wittgenstein’s rare talent in 1930: he assessed Wittgenstein’s ability to do research from 1929 onwards, and concluded that he was gifted enough to write a book that could prove more important than his Tractatus.1 We should note that Hardy rated Littlewood more highly than himself (as do now a sample-batch of Cambridge mathematicians). 1

See B. McGuinness Wittgenstein in Cambridge. Oxford: Blackwell, 2008: Document 133.

Doubtful Certainties. Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism (Eds. Jesús PADILLA GÁLVEZ, Margit GAFFAL), Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt a. M., 2012, 213-224.

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The Large C Series Notebooks Wittgenstein was intrigued by the interplay and contrasts between mathematics and natural language usage, for both their apparent states, and for crafting hitherto unknown identities, in analogy and games – with interplay between the two. One whole arena for evidence of this has not been extensively explored: it is the Large C series of Notebooks MSS: 145 to 152, (dated 1933-36), only available in the full form in Alois Pichler’s Bergen Wittgenstein Nachlass. It seems that the mathematical material, often at the bottom of the pages, has not much been related to the narrative prose on the same page. This is a project that someone might undertake. Suffice now to notice that until such research is done we will not have a large enough picture of the scale of Wittgenstein’s investigation into his grasp of family resemblances between mathematics and natural language uses related to games – and much else. Such a set of dimensions in the C series is a counterpart not only to Wittgenstein’s German writing of the same period; it has counterparts in the Blue and Brown Books and his other 1930s writings. One problem for research here is that certain family resemblances in mathematics are not self-evident, and one interpretation of a calculation is treated as if it were the actual and only identity of that calculation. Related to this is the problem of isolating, and making explicit, the criteria for the actual identity that is calculation. The use of ‘survey’ is rare in Wittgenstein in the 1930s. Superficially it looks as if he was using it straightforwardly; yet this was awaiting a creative tension, which he raises in the rare use in the large C Notebook MS 147(46v47r): One might also say survey the cases of trying and forgetting. …It sounds as though it had a deep and clear meaning but is like most of these general philosophical propositions meaningless except in special cases.

Blue and Brown Books In the Blue Book Wittgenstein states: 2 I am at liberty to choose between many uses, that is, between different kinds of analogy. One might say in such as case, that the term “personality” hasn’t got one legitimate heir only. (This kind of consideration is of importance in the philosophy of mathematics. Consider the use of the words “proof”, “formula”. And others. Consider the 2

MS 309: 104-05.

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question: “Why should what we do here be called ‘philosophy’? Why should it be regarded as the only legitimate heir of the different activities which had this name in former times?” In (75) I said of the usage of the word “game” that it is not ‘bounded at every point by rules’.

Quite so. Furthermore, we can build on this by noting, on the relation of ‘analogy’ and ‘game’ in MS 226:3 what use is there left for the expression “rule according to which he plays”? Doesn’t the analogy of language with a game throw any light here? For we can easily imagine people amusing themselves on a common by playing with a ball in such a way that they begin various existing games, not finishing some of them, in between whiles throwing the ball up at random.

This could be part of a model for the model of a professional mathematician doing research. And the Brown Book4 We introduce into our language-games the endless series of numerals. But how is this done? ... not the same as that between introducing a series of twenty numerals…and ten numerals….But what does the difference consist in? (… almost one of the spirit in which the games are played.) 5

This presciently embodies the embarrassment displayed in A. J. Ayer’s answer to Brian Magee about Ayer’s latest view on verification: ‘true in spirit’. Wittgenstein is moving beyond verification here when exploring numerals. The Philosophical Investigations Some time later Wittgenstein considers his earlier position of deeming such play as sublime: after observing in PI §89 that where no single ideal of exactness is envisaged, whilst we do not know what fully to make of this idea, he goes on in PI §89 to enquire: we find ourselves facing the problem of in what way is logic something sublime? By PI §98, having resisted this illusion, he considers: there is a sense, there must be perfect order. – So there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sense. Yet (PI 3

MS 226: 90-91(58-59) MS 310: 22-23 5 Cf also MS 310: 27-28, 49 4

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§100) we must not be dazzled or contaminated by the ideal. Rather, we must see the actual use of the word “game” clearly. A tension is struck with this engagement, in 1946 – the year after he crafts the PI draft: he observed that his ‘achievement’ is very much like that of a mathematician who invents a calculus.6 Earlier in the 1930s, Wittgenstein had stated that: “Our prose expressions in mathematics are highly metaphorical.” This remark is almost an axiom for his following point concerning the signal for, and of a bridge between mathematical analogy and prose in philosophy. Wittgenstein wrote in Band XV, pp.108-109: This book is a collection of wisecracks. But the point is: they are connected, they form a system. If the task were to draw the shape of an object true to nature, then a wisecrack is like drawing just one tangent to the real curve; but a thousand wisecracks (lying close to each other) can draw the curve.

M. O’C, Drury, suspicious of poetic whimsy, nevertheless quoted Von Wright, stating that “Between Wittgenstein and Pascal there is a trenchant parallelism which deserves closer study.”7 Such an alignment relies on or regresses to the use of analogy. An asymmetric consequence of such analogy could be certain relations between mathematics and prose in Wittgenstein’s mathematical philosophy and Pascal’s prose, of which the above quotation from Band XV articulates some such analogical use, according to which differences of degree in prose ascend to compose a geometry analogy. It is in this conjunction that a new fresh identity can be crafted. As with the above quotations above from the Brown Book and MS 226, on occasions new identity in Wittgenstein is achieved by the use of analogy to extend old games into a new one(s). Von Wright stated that: “Between Wittgenstein and Pascal there is a trenchant parallelism which deserves closer study.” Such an alignment relies on or regresses to analogy. An Asymmetric properties of such analogy could be the relations between mathematics and prose of both, or, say, Wittgenstein’s mathematical philosophy and Pascal’s prose, and 6

CV, p.50 Wittgenstein has one other use of “achievement” in his English Nachlass, that of MS 309: 73, in which he likens the achievement (his?) philosophical exploration to the figure of putting the (right) books together, even though after this they need to be moved to other shelves. 7 M.O’C Drury in “Some notes on conversations with Wittgenstein”, in (ed.) F. A. Flowers III, Portraits of Wittgenstein, vol. 3. Bristol: Thoemmes Press: 178

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various other combinations. Such a project is not directly pursued here, though its priorities will be presupposed. ‘Is Mathematics a Game?’ an Open Question? A large subset of α in PI involves presuppositions of games. This regresses a research project of Wittgenstein’s, which impinges on his question: “Is Mathematics a game?”8 Here Wittgenstein considers the mathematical assessment of uncomputed possibilities, and aligns this domain, at some levels, with the unproven Goldbach’s theorem, so as to spring on us the unverified state of mathematics’ logic (whatever it is). He is obviously pushing an agenda that is now at the centre of our contemporary mathematics. In this way he promotes similarity between games and proof in other areas of maths. Somewhere down this sequence of arguments he finds that games in life’s experience, in natural languages, and in pure mathematics utilise and depend upon imagination for their current identities. Here there is a problem in the field of: “What does it mean to understand a mathematical question?”9 This becomes more interesting when we notice Wittgenstein linking it to series of 7’s, perhaps in π in relation to the major enterprises in mathematics that are concerned in the enterprises that consist in discovering the range entitled, “short cut”.10 It is perhaps significant that Wittgenstein’s final instruction to Anscombe, about how to deal with his greatest piece of creative prose, is to propose editorial invasion of the manuscripts, characterised as a mathematical game. If to non-random mathematical calculations, binary chance is introduced, then disordering new identities are a consequence. Even, as with combinatorics, in which there are precisely determined sets of calculated possibilities and their explicitly formulated limits, unknown possibilities hover within and under the familiar combinations of calculated mathematical states. This is very much the case, if we were to assign a range of fixed possible values to a highly original philosophical text such as PI, so as to try and reach an assignment for a final text that Wittgenstein might have envisaged. Textual evidence surrounding his work on PI indicates that – among the multifaceted causal ingredients, which contributed to the emergence of the Philosophical Investigations – 8

MS 161, 15r (note the capital ‘M’ in the manuscript). MS 151 Grosses Notizbuch C7: 17. 10 MS 151 Grosses Notizbuch C7: 23 (note, this is Wittgenstein’s emphasis). 9

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there are conjunctions of distinct causes whose conjunctions constitute new identities. Evidently, Wittgenstein might have intended that his proposal of coin-tossing be implemented or conceived by him as an internal disposition of his own creativity, or how his work might be resolved into a later form Nn by random means. Certainly it might be taken as the last resort of a dying person who had given up on finding a solution. Yet this terminus hardly concurs with his obsessive care in making near-identical repeated drafts and concern with detail. One of the above-mentioned conjunctions that constitute new identities is that of the excess that is emergent from, in Wittgenstein’s aligning properties of mathematics with features of prose. The term ‘game’ is one such strategy. Typically, this excess from, say, ‘game of chess’, in Grosses Notizbuch C411, where he contrasts the expected ‘game’ of causing an explosion with the actual calculations of the “exact” use of circumstances and variabilities to produce causal conjunction, “which would set our head whirling”, is itself complex, unpredictably nonlinear, and which initiates original conceptual and literary features. The ways in which Wittgenstein networks such elementary examples, whilst being aware that below the surface they harness deep mathematical and empirical calculations, is party to the creative semantic contracts that Wittgenstein maps into his literary creativity. The presupposed and internalised, yet submerged, theoretical considerations should attract, theoretical constructions of their possible identities. So it is worthwhile presenting theoretical proposals that are based on a number of close readings of textual history that comprises a substantial core of PI’s genesis. Unexpected relations of Wittgenstein’s narrative map are the incomplete edges halting the emergence of the complete identity of the Philosophical Investigations. Maybe Wittgenstein’s death-bed strategy for Anscombe to toss a coin to further its future order to calculate an extended game –12 let’s designate it PI+ n. So let these considerations be θ, which are interpretations to degree δ of textual history about a set of manuscripts N, then they direct attention to aspects α internal that comprise the manuscript(s) of the extant Philosophical Investigations, and α comprises functions that in principle could yield derivations of additional creative 11

MS148. 34v. E.g., Ramsey number theory, infinite Ramsey theory, and to some degree, graph theory and combinatorics. 12

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properties φ internal to PI to infer PI+ n.13 Obviously PI+ n stands proxy as virtual identity projected for – namely what we presuppose Wittgenstein himself held as a projected (presumably opaque) final identity. On one interpretation, if Wittgenstein had lived longer, he would have composed PI+ n. On another, he posed for Anscombe and others, the coin-tossing proposal because internal to his conception of Philosophical Investigations, was to internalise PI itself as an open question game question with PI+ n in need of solution. Since we do not have a final text of PI, for which Wittgenstein claimed completion, it is possible that, in his senses of ‘mathematically’, creatively the final form of PI is itself an open question – partly as a result of extant the combinatorial possibilities of PI’s textual interior identities, which are themselves, to some degree or type, are viewed as open rather than closed. In this connection we should appreciate Wittgenstein’s remark:“[T]he theory of the game is not arbitrary although the game is”.14 Should this opposition be absent in a perfected mathematical game? Would the only condition that satisfied that be omniscience? So is the queried identity of mathematics itself, and the relations of its parts, an open question – now, forever? Certainly, such use can bring about misunderstanding. Wittgenstein considers this in MS 226:64, while he also draws attention to ways that “completely clarified” may seem “like an ultimate analysis”, which is exploded on contact with open questions, as he states: “For this question does not see the essence as something which already lies open before us, and which a process of ordering becomes transparent.” (MS 226:65)15 In following the development of Wittgenstein’s creativity using English, we find only very few uses of the form of ‘survey’, prior to PI, in the published Nachlass, and only four of that form in the Wittgenstein-Skinner archive. There is only one use in these latter occurrences that is pinned to mathematics, that of the last in the latter archive. (This engages with a parody on Russell’s theory of cardinal numbers.) 13

In this circumstance we are fortunate to be able to use the most recent edition of the PI. See: Philosophische Untersuchungen / Philosophical Investigation (1958), Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, Wiley Blackwell, Oxford, 2009. 14 Idem. 15 MS 226 = Englische Übersetzung von Rush Rhees des Anfangs der Vorkriegsfassung der Philosophischen Untersuchungen, mit Korrrekturen von Wittgensteins Hand. 1939. 72 p.

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Philosophical Investigations and metaphoric Surveyability There is in the 1930s no advanced and expanded vocabulary such as “lack surveyability” (of §PI 122). We have seen above that some nuances approaching this start to emerge earlier in his writings. As Hans Sluga observes, Wittgenstein never explains what he means by übersichtlich.16 Sluga concludes that Wittgenstein’s usage of übersichtlich in PI is metaphoric. In other words, although the notion signified by this latter term is a key function and is redolent of a cluster of concerns about the openness of a range of questions, Wittgenstein has not achieved closure on the matter of calculation of certainty. There is no short cut to the end of the matter. One problem for philosophers of mathematic is that terms such as ‘surveyable’ are not technical terms in advanced mathematics, and more especially not in advanced research. So how do we test the pedigree of this metaphoric coinage? Nevertheless there is little difficulty in seeing how one might transfer the rough notion and convey its coinage to professional research mathematics. Unfortunately it comes unstuck if one presses it as a requirement, since it is not clear that it corresponds to any one concept or proof-procedure in such mathematics. It is wise to attempt an experiment. Let us select a leading mathematician who is puzzled about this type of attempt to engage with mathematical and mathematical scientific ‘survey’. Ideally he would be simultaneously engaged with some applied research of a high level and yet utilizes advanced pure mathematics to it; let us also expect that this person is involved with an advanced area where there are problems of empirical proof, yet there is an extensive and complex fit between what small empirical base there is and very advanced fully developed mathematics. It is our good fortune that Professor Malcolm Perry, the string theorist, is to hand. He has more than the requisite pedigree17, and he kindly agrees to study over some hours the appropriate passage of Philosophical Investigations in the new edition edited by Hacker and Schulte (2009), sections 118 to 129. We have no problem, except surprise agreement that Wittgenstein’s final draft accords with this

16

H. Sluga, in ‘Our grammar lacks surveyability’, in Language and World: Essays on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein. Eds. V. Munz, K. Puhl, J. Wang. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2010, 189. 17 See G. W. Gibbons and M. J. Perry, in Proceedings of the Royal Society of London A358, 467-94.

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specialist’s research practice. One difficulty is recognised as mapping what happens in calculation §122: Our grammar is deficient in surveyability. A surveyable representation produces precisely that kind of understanding which consists in ‘seeing connections’.

We see connections. The psychological element is not mere mechanistic recognition but involves developing a recognition capacity that is not itself entirely internal to the model that is the mathematical calculation. Furthermore, a literal surveyability is impossible – of a geometry that has, in the case of Professor Perry’s way of recognising the mathematical universe, 10600 states.18 This also obtains for some of pure mathematical proof. Even with some realms of super-computing, and uses of the new Cambridge COSMOS-DiRAC numerical cosmology, where the proof of consequences of General Relativity continue to be expanded apace, and equations numerically resolved, the idea of having all uses of algorithms in calculations that are surveyable in a literal sense is impossible at present and, possibly in principle – even if advanced quantum computing were a scientific reality. To such exotic limitations and the actual experiences of research calculations and analysis in mathematics and science, Wittgenstein seems to have had a prescient sense of the modest limits of our capacity to survey alongside the tremendous advances that stretch the mind. It is remarkable that Wittgenstein is flexile enough to allow that: Of course, if mathematics were the natural science of infinite extensions of which we can never have exhaustive knowledge, then a question that was in principle undecidable would certainly be conceivable.”19

Research in pure mathematics and the higher levels of mathematical research in cosmology approaching new frontiers are exposing arenas that, if not engaging directly with the domain of this statement, can benefit from research on the Wittgenstein’s point here, including what it would be to be a physical counterpart that could be mapped by an infinite extension, which of course presses the question of how this pertains to Wittgenstein’s 18

I have also benefited from stimulating conversations and research discussion over a year, which continue, with Professor Malcolm Perry, which include both of us closely examining Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (secs. 122-129), and also matters arising from my attending and studying the examples in Malcolm’s researchsensitive Cambridge lectures ‘String Theory’ (Part III for Lent Term 2012). 19 MS 209: 92.

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conjecture that infinity is a quality not a number. It would be a peculiar game of halting. Live Metaphor Surveyability There is the remaining matter of how a metaphor can be integrated into numerical measurement. Going beyond Wittgenstein, yet consistent with Sluga’s view of the metaphoricity of surveyability, we would have to require of the metaphor that it is not dead (as with root of a tree/problem). Rather, it would need to be along the lines of analogical live metaphors. For example, consider ‘Stephen Hawking’ and a statue of him, which is the live metaphor. There would have to be equations that deleted one set of presuppositions that did not map from the former to the latter and vice versa. And correspondingly so: for uses of live metaphor where mathematics is extended so as to infer a new identity from an extant identity or sets of them. Is an ‘Original Game’ a Solution to an Open Question? Is the question “Is an Original Game an Open Question?” a contrary of Wittgenstein’s “I’m playing the game”?20 Presumably, yes; yet in what respect? If so, how can a new game be tested as to whether or not it complies with the idea of being that game’s rules? What if we use Wittgenstein to reply to the question: “That comes to asking in which case do we call something a language. I can only answer. Look at the family of language games and that will show you whatever can be shown about the matter.”21 This requires that there is some derivable link by analogy with a former set of game(s) to a new game; but if the game is a new identity, how is that possible? Exploration of the last point involves deriving from its ingredients an attempt at an additional fresh perspective on Wittgenstein’s relation to some presuppositions of his later philosophy. To the question: from where did Wittgenstein procure and compose PI? – There are many answers. One answer is pertinent to the current subject, which requires a sketch of two mathematical approaches. One is system-building, in a subject such as geometry. Another is problem-solving, which is the manifest activity that 20 21

MS 118 Band XIV: 19r. Cf. MS 148, C4:39v to 148:48v. MS 148: 36v

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grips such spheres as combinatorics and graph theory. Littlewood (and to a considerable degree Hardy) engaged with problem-solving, whereas Russell had earlier embraced a novel form of system-building. Certainly, in certain mathematical research, this two-fold opposition to artificially or partially attenuated; such specialists as Timothy Gowers recognises the probity of the division between system-building and problem-solving, even allowing for their overlaps, however.22 In the foregoing qualified perspective, Russell’s and Whitehead’s Principia belongs (somewhat narrowly) to a system-building culture, in which category Wittgenstein’s Tractatus can be placed – sharing some edges with a conceptual map of the Principia.23 (Certainly this ignores the differences between mathematics and logic, though we should recall how the Principia was conceived as an engagement with some mathematics.) The Cambridge problem-solving environment in mathematics of the 1930s, especially as rehearsed in Littlewood’s research, has some resemblance to Wittgenstein’s investigations subsequent to the Tractatus. It is usual to position Wittgenstein in his return to Cambridge as someone who is adrift without formal systems, having rejected the Principia. In this perspective he is then accorded a position in linguistic philosophy and games that leaves him a considerable distance away from the professional mathematics being done at Cambridge. Rather, let us introduce a competing perspective, using the above two-cultures (acknowledging its limitations) and place him firmly back in a centre of the then current mathematical debate – in a new generation of mathematicians. It is helpful, in going some way to estimate Wittgenstein’s distance from Russell, while travelling in the direction of mathematicians contemporary to him in the 1930s, to calibrate the contrast between the two, by quoting Russell’s paragraph-length ‘definition’ of pure mathematics in his The Principles of Mathematics (1903: 3): Pure mathematics is the class of all propositions of the form “p implies q,” where p and q are propositions containing one or two variables, the same in the two propositions, and neither p nor q contains any constants except logical constants. And logical constants are all notions definable in terms of he following: Implication, the relation of a term to a class of which it is a member, the notion of such that, the notion of relation, as such further as may be involved in the general notion of propositions of the above 22 23

Cf. T. Gowers “Two Cultures”, I am using the term ‘edges’ on an analogy with graph theory here.

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Now contrast this ‘definition’ with Timothy Gowers’ view encapsulated in his introduction the Princeton Companion to Mathematics (2008: ix): The Princeton Companion to Mathematics could be said to be about everything that Russell’s definition leaves out.

In some ways, Wittgenstein attempted to take a parallel position not only with respect to mathematics, but also philosophy. He was, in certain respects prescient in some ways in which he explored contemporary mathematical concerns in research in the 1930s and early 1940s. He had discovered problems, and attempted to solve them; he was more favourable to system-building, though he was still favourable to system-building in new mathematics but not in logic. Department of pure Mathematics Centre for Mathematical Sciences University of Cambridge

Abbreviations L. Wittgenstein BF

: Bemerkungen über die Farben

BGM

: Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik

BPP

: Bemerkungen über die Philosophie der Psychologie

BT

: The Big Typescript

BB

: The Blue and Brown Books

LCA

: Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief

LE

: Lectures on Ethics

LFM

: Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics

LO

: Letters to Ogden

LRKM : Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore NB

: Notebooks 1914 – 1916

NL

: Notes for Lectures on Private Experience and Sensedata

OC

: On Certainty

PB

: Philosophische Bemerkungen

PG

: Philosophische Grammatik / Philosophical Grammar

PI

: Philosophische Untersuchungen / Philosophical Investigations

PO

: Philosophical Occasions 1912 – 1951

PR

: Philosophical Remarks

PU

: Philosophische Untersuchungen / Philosophical Investigations

PT

: Prototractatus

RC

: Remarks on Color

RFM

: Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics

Doubtful Certainties. Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism (Eds. Jesús PADILLA GÁLVEZ, Margit GAFFAL), Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt a. M., 2012, 225-226.

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Doubtful Certainties. Language-Games, Forms of Life, Relativism

RPP

: Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology

RLF

: Some Remarks on Logical Form

TB

: Tagebücher 1914 – 1916

TLP

: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

ÜG

: Über Gewißheit

VB

: Vermischte Bemerkungen / Culture and Value

WL

: Wittgenstein’s Lectures

WWK

: Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis

Z

: Zettel