Divided Kashmir: Old Problems, New Opportunities for India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiri People 9781685857967

Describes the antecedents and evolution of the Kashmir conflict and presents a solution--based on geography, demography,

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Divided Kashmir: Old Problems, New Opportunities for India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiri People
 9781685857967

Table of contents :
Contents
List of Illustrations
Preface
A Chronology of the Kashmir Crisis
1 Introduction
2 The Evolution of Jammu and Kashmir State
3 Location and Orientation
4 Population and Economy
5 Kashmir and the People's Movement
6 Partition of British India and Kashmir
7 Accession of the Princely States
8 Kashmir and the United Nations
9 The 1965 War and the Tashkent Declaration
10 The 1971 War and the Simla Accord
11 From the Simla Accord to 1990
12 Intifada and the Struggle for Freedom: 1990 and Beyond
13 Potential Solutions
14 The Indus Waters Treaty and Divided Kashmir
Appendixes
Bibliography
Index
About the Book and Author

Citation preview

DIVIDED KASHMIR

DIVIDED KASHMIR Old Problems, New Opportunities for India, Pakistan, ¿ m d £ / z e Kashmiri People

Mushtaqur Rahman

LYN N E RIENNER PUBLISHERS

B O U L D E R L O N D O N

Published in the United States of America in 1996 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 1996 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Rahman, Mushtaqur. Divided Kashmir : old problems, new opportunities for India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiri people / by Mushtaqur Rahman. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-55587-589-3 (he : alk. paper) 1. Jammu and Kashmir (India)—Politics and government. 2. India— Foreign relations—Pakistan. 3. Pakistan—Foreign relations— India. I. Title. DS485.K27R33 1995 954'.6—dc20 95-18416 CIP British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America

@

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992.

Contents

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

List of Illustrations Preface A Chronology of the Kashmir Crisis

vii ix xiii

Introduction The Evolution of Jammu and Kashmir State Location and Orientation Population and Economy Kashmir and the People's Movement Partition of British India and Kashmir Accession of the Princely States Kashmir and the United Nations The 1965 War and the Tashkent Declaration The 1971 War and the Simla Accord From the Simla Accord to 1990 Intifada and the Struggle for Freedom: 1990 and Beyond Potential Solutions The Indus Waters Treaty and Divided Kashmir

1 9 21 29 37 47 65 85 105 119 137 147 161 169

Appendixes Treaty of Amritsar Rulers of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Report of Establishment of Azad Kashmir Government White Paper on Partition Accession Letter of the Maharaja of Kashmir and Lord Mountbatten's Reply The Simla Accord Agreement Between the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front and Hizbul Mujahideen The Indus Waters Treaty Bibliography Index About the Book and Author

182 185 186 188 192 194 196 197 209 215 219

v

Illustrations

Figures 2.1 7.1 9.1

Receipt for the Sale of Kashmir Instrument of Accession Addition by President Ayub Khan of Pakistan in Tashkent Declaration

14 79 115

Northern Area, Azad Kashmir, Aksai Chin, and Jammu and Kashmir Administrative Districts: Jammu and Kashmir Princely States of British India, 1947 The Indo-Pakistani War of 1947-1948 The Indo : Pakistani War of 1971 Siachen Glacier

5 30 50 86 130 134

Maps 1.1 4.1 6.1 8.1 10.1 10.2

Tables 3.1 4.1 4.2 4.3 6.1 10.1 11.1 11.2 12.1

Catchment Areas of the Punjab Rivers Distribution of Population Based on Religion Population of Jammu and Kashmir Distribution of Linguistic Groups Percentage of Sikhs and Muslims in Divisions and Districts of the Former Punjab Defense Expenditures for India and Pakistan State Assembly Elections Lok Sabha Elections in Kashmir Damage to People and Property in Kashmir

vii

27 31 33 34 55 121 144 144 157

Preface

I belong to the generation that saw Mahatma Gandhi, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah, Pandit Nehru, Liaquat Ali Khan, Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, Sardar Patel, and other prominent leaders of the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League criss-cross colonial India campaigning for freedom. I am also one of those who witnessed the day when India and Pakistan gained independence as two sovereign nations. Though freedom was accompanied by death and disaster, as well as the movement of more than 13 million people across the newly established borders, it would be hard for the present generation to imagine the feelings people experienced at independence. Whether at home or abroad, the people rejoiced with renewed vigor and hope for a better and more peaceful subcontinent, though some in India saw Pakistan as a country born in betrayal, while those in Pakistan saw freedom as a deliverance from perpetual Hindu domination. In his first policy pronouncement, Mohammad Ali Jinnah of Pakistan outlined his future policy for good and amicable relations with neighboring India. Gandhi reciprocated by offering to live in Pakistan for the rest of his life to promote peace and prosperity, but conflict over the state of Jammu and Kashmir dashed every hope. Instead of cooperation, there was increasing rancor, and instead of trust, there was heightened antagonism. Both countries were fighting or threatening to fight to the finish, stockpiling arms, and building or buying long range missiles with which to destroy each other. The political relationship continues to be based in conflict, largely because the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir state is still unresolved. The dispute has perpetuated the historical disagreements between India and Pakistan in microcosm, with ramifications that often seem to defy rational solution.1 Perhaps Ghandi and Jinnah could have resolved the dispute in the beginning, but Gandhi succumbed to an assassin's bullet on 30 January 1948, and Jinnah died about eight months later, leaving Nehru alone to defy the United Nations, precluding any reasonable resolution of the dispute. I argue that three people share historic responsibility for the ongoing ix

X

Preface

Kashmir conflict and the problems it is causing for India, Pakistan, and the people of Kashmir: (1) Jawaharlal Nehru, the prime minister of India, (2) Maharaja Hari Singh, the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir state, and (3) Lord Louis Mountbatten, the last British viceroy and the first governor general of independent India. If the Maharaja had been able to adequately represent the views of his people before 15 August 1947, when the British had the authority to implement a plan, the dispute and its consequent repercussions might never have arisen. If Nehru had been more foresightful and implemented the United Nations resolutions or accepted UN mediation, the Kashmir dispute might have been resolved long ago. Perhaps it was Nehru's Kashmir ancestry or his love for the state that blocked reasonable resolution of the dispute. He was once described by U. S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson as beset by politicians who prevented him from establishing consistent and stable policies. He talked about the welfare of masses but was a "monumental snob." 2 He was very close to the Mountbattens; some suggest that he used his friendship with Lord and Lady Mountbatten to benefit India at Pakistan's expense. 3 Toward the end of his life, Nehru modified his position on Kashmir and dispatched Sheikh Abdullah to Pakistan to negotiate a settlement. Sheikh Abdullah had only one meeting with the president of Pakistan, on 26 May 1964. Nehru died suddenly the next day, on 27 May 1964, leaving Sheikh Abdullah no option but to return to Delhi. He flew back to Delhi with Pakistan's foreign minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Sheikh Abdullah advised Bhutto to respect the plebiscite demand for possession of the entire state, expecting that Jammu and Kashmir would be partitioned below the Chenab River. He believed Pethlinot would be a realistic final position. 4 Later, Mirza Afzal Beg concurred with the partition proposition, but events in India and Pakistan changed so rapidly that a partition proposal along religious lines could not be advanced publicly. It is difficult to quantify the harsh effects of the continuing Kashmir dispute. Not only are the people of Kashmir suffering; this dispute is keeping destructive bitterness, mistrust, and hostilities alive between India and Pakistan. The conflict over Kashmir also prevents both India and Pakistan from meeting their domestic social needs and improving the quality of life for their people. Divided Kashmir: Old Problems, New Opportunities for India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiri People is presented in three sections to allow for a comprehensive understanding of the state and to propose a possible resolution of the Kashmir dispute. The first section deals with the evolution of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, its geography, demography, and economy as it existed in 1941. This section also traces the origin and development of the Kashmir dispute. The second section discusses the United Nations and its role in the dispute. The third section reviews various proposals to resolve

Preface

xi

the dispute and offers a proposal based on the historic 1960 Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan. Research for this book was done at Iowa State University, the University of Heidelberg's South Asia Institute, and the University of Karachi. Materials were acquired through the interlibrary loan network at Iowa State University. To keep the discussion objective, Pakistani, U.S., European, and Indian sources were used. I am thankful to Kuldip Nayar, former Indian ambassador to the United Kingdom and a prominent social activist, for permitting me to quote extensively from his book, The Distant Neighbours, and to Charles Ziegler of the World Bank for providing a copy of the signed Indus Waters Treaty. During my sabbatical leave in 1992-1993, many people in Pakistan, Bahrain, England, and Germany enthusiastically supported the project and provided tremendous help and hospitality. Special thanks are due to Syed Irtefaq Ali, vice-chancellor, Karachi University, for permission to use his university's library and facilities, and to Mumtaz Ahmad, professor of political science at Hampton University, for his review of part of the manuscript and continued encouragement. In spite of his busy schedule, he never tired of my questions. The assistance of others in India and Pakistan is also gratefully acknowledged. The research facilities at the University of Heidelberg's South Asia Institute and the assistance provided by the staff of the Department of Geography and its director, U. Schweinfurth, was invaluable. I am indebted to the department and to Alexander von-Humboldt Stiftung for their support during the term of my study at the South Asia Institute. I am also indebted to Karl Gwiasda, associate professor of English at Iowa State University, for reading and correcting the manuscript. Colleagues in the Department of Anthropology at Iowa State University, especially the department secretary, Linda Haglund, and Darci Thelaner, a graduate student in anthropology, provided every possible assistance in completing the book. I am also thankful to Bob Fisher of the University of Western Sydney, Hawkesbury, a specialist in Indian studies, for his suggestions. At Lynne Rienner Publishers, I benefited from Martha Peacock's proficiency as an editor. She gave of her time and energy unsparingly to make this book attractive and thorough. Finally, most important has been the cooperation and moral and intellectual support of my wife, Guljan Rahman. However, I alone am responsible for the interpretation of events, the proposal, and all of the details in the book. Mushtaqur

Rahman

xii

Preface

Notes 1. See New York Times, 21 November 1993 for a statement by Benazir Bhutto, prime minister of Pakistan, on the continuing deadlock over Kashmir. 2. Lilienthal, Journals of David Lilienthal, 1966, p. 61. 3. M. J. Akbar, Nehru's biographer and a close confidant of Nehru's grandson, Rajiv Gandhi, asserts that Nehru and Lady Mountbatten had a physical relationship. Crossette, India: Facing the Twenty-First Century, 1993, p. 128. 4. Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan, 1993, p. 78.

A Chronology of the Kashmir Crisis

? to A.D. 741

Pre-Muslim Period.

A.D. 711

Beginnings of Islam. Hamim, a Syrian, was the first Muslim to arrive in Kashmir. Rinchan, military commander from Ladakh, embraces Islam.

1320 to 1560

Sultanate of Kashmir (Kashmir as independent state).

1586 to 1752

Kashmir as "ornament of Moghul empire."

1752 to 1819

Kashmir ruled by Afghans.

1819 to 1846

Kashmir annexed and ruled by Sikhs.

1846

British sell Kashmir, Gilgit, and Ladakh to Gulab Singh, a Dogra Chieftain.

1885

Indian National Congress formed.

1906

Muslim League formed.

1925

Hari Singh succeeds his uncle Pratab Singh as ruler of Jammu and Kashmir.

13 July 1931

Mass agitation against Hari Singh by Kashmiri Muslims led by Sheikh Abdullah.

1935

Poonch joins Kashmir as legal settlement.

23 March 1940

Muslim League adopts Pakistan Resolution.

3 June 1947

Plan to transfer power from British Indian Empire to two independent states—Pakistan and India. The princely states to join one of the two new dominions.

14 August 1947

Mohammad Ali Jinnah sworn in as first governor general of Pakistan. xiii

xiv

Chronology

15 August 1947

Jawaharlal Nehru sworn in as prime minister and Lord Louis Mountbatten as governor general of India. People of Gilgit, Hunza, Nagar, and Baltistan revolt and accede to Pakistan.

22 October 1947

Tribesmen from Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan help fellow Muslims liberate Jammu and Kashmir from Hari Singh's rule. Nehru calls them invaders.

24 October 1947

Revolutionary government of Azad Kashmir formed at Pullundri with Sardar Ibrahim Khan as president.

25 October 1947

V. P. Menon dispatched to Srinagar by Mountbatten to ask the Maharaja to accede to India. The Maharaja and his family abandon capital and take refuge in Jammu.

26 October 1947

The Maharaja, in despair and under duress, signs the Instrument of Accession.

27 October 1947

Mountbatten accepts the accession. India promises to consult the people once law and order is restored. Indian army intervenes in Kashmir.

1 January 1948

India files complaint against Pakistan in the United Nations.

1948

India withholds Pakistan's share of postpartition development funds. Sardar Patel warns that "until Kashmir issue is settled, the financial pact between India and Pakistan cannot be implemented," and says that Kashmir belongs to India. Gandhi goes on "fast unto death" to pressure India to release Pakistan's share of money.

11 September 1948

M. A. Jinnah dies; Khawaja Nazimuddin becomes governor general.

1 January 1949

India and Pakistan accept UN cease-fire line that divides Jammu and Kashmir. Approximately one-third of the state becomes Azad Kashmir (in Pakistan) and twothirds becomes the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. Nehru reaffirms the pledge for Kashmiri self-determination through an internationally supervised plebiscite. Patel indicts United Nations for mishandling Kashmir issue. Says "We accepted the U.N. Commission's ceasefire proposals but the other party did not."

Chronology

XV

16 October 1951

Liaquat Ali Khan, first prime minister of Pakistan, assassinated. Khawaja Nazimuddin takes over as prime minister.

1954

Pakistan signs mutual defense agreement with the United States. Indians argue "that the circumstances in Kashmir have changed so completely that the original offer for a plebiscite is no longer valid. India accepts the Kashmir constituent assembly's vote of accession equivalent to a plebiscite." Pakistan protests in the United Nations that India is trying to usurp Kashmir.

1956

Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir adopts constitution that specifies the "state of Jammu and Kashmir is and shall be an integral part of the Indian Union."

February, May 1957

United Nations Security Council discusses Kashmir.

25 May 1964

Sheikh Abdullah released from jail and dispatched to Pakistan by Nehru to open negotiations.

27 May 1964

Nehru dies. Lai Bahadur Shastri succeeds as prime minister. Moi-Mubarak holy relic stolen from Hazrat Bal Shrine. Massive unrest and demonstrations in Jammu and Kashmir.

23 April 1965

India and Pakistan fight a major battle in the Rann of Kutch leading to the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965.

8 May 1965

Sheikh Abdullah and Miraz Afzal Beg arrested and interned in south India.

14 June 1965

Indian prime minister Shastri alleges that 3,000 to 4,000 Pakistani infiltrators are in Kashmir and warns that India will respond if the "aggression" continues.

6 September 1965

Second Indo-Pakistan war begins. India attacks several points in West Pakistan, including the city of Lahore.

23 September 1965

India and Pakistan accept a cease-fire following a resolution passed by the Security Council of the United Nations.

10 January 1966

President Ayub Khan of Pakistan and Prime Minister Shastri of India sign the Tashkent Declaration "affirming their obligation not to use force and [to] settle their disputes through peaceful means."

xvi

Chronology

Leadership of the Soviet Union instrumental in the signing of the Tashkent Declaration. 10 January 1966

Shastri dies in Tashkent.

7 January 1971

Sheikh Abdullah and his son-in-law barred from Kashmir, to keep them away from elections scheduled in March 1971.

12 January 1971

Plebiscite Front declared an illegal organization.

9 August 1971

Indo-Soviet Treaty signed.

16 November 1971

Indian troops move into East Pakistan and begin advance toward Dacca.

3 December 1971

Pakistan attacks India to divert its attention from East Pakistan. Third Indo-Pakistan war begins.

16 December 1971

Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora of India accepts surrender in Dacca by Lieutenant General Niazi of Pakistan.

June 1972

Sheikh Abdullah, Mirza Afzal Beg, and other leaders allowed to return to Kashmir.

2 July 1972

Simla Accord signed by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Indira Gandhi. The accord confirmed a new line of control in Kashmir and attempted to provide the basis for a "durable peace" between India and Pakistan.

2 July 1974

Sheikh Abdullah signs Kashmir Accord with Indira Gandhi. Kashmir agrees to continue as a constituent part of India in return for maintaining the terms of Article 370.

1 March 1975

Pakistan lodges a protest in the United Nations that the Kashmir Accord violates the Simla Accord.

April 1975

Sheikh Abdullah drifts from Kashmir Accord and talks about merger of his state with Azad Kashmir.

August 1981

National Conference leadership passes from Sheikh Abdullah to his son Farooq Abdullah.

September 1982

Sheikh Abdullah dies.

1972 to 1982

Periodic shooting across the cease-fire line but relatively little agitation in either Azad Kashmir or the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.

May 1984

Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah dismissed

and

Chronology

xvii

replaced by pro-Congress government headed by Ghulam Mohammad Shah, Farooq's brother-in-law and chief rival. The opposition parties—save for Congress allied AIADMK—condemn the "undemocratic removal" of Abdullah and his replacement by G. M. Shah. Abdullah later forms a National Conference Congress coalition state government. 1985 to 1989

Uprising by Kashmiri Muslims in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.

1989

Boycott of elections by Muslim population.

January 1990

Government of Pakistan raises Kashmir issue with foreign dignitaries visiting Pakistan.

1990

Governor Jagmohan replaces the incumbent governor. Farooq Abdullah resigns. President's rule imposed, and a crackdown on militants leaves 35 dead and 400 wounded. Mirwaiz Farooq assassinated. His death eliminates one of Kashmir's most deeply revered and respected leaders. Militant protests continue.

1991

Protests and police crackdowns continue. In Azad Kashmir, marchers attempt to reach the border to support protests on the Indian side. The government of Pakistan tries to maintain control by detaining leaders of the march.

1992

Protests continue in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. The government of Pakistan considers the Kashmir issue as "a factor in its security environment."

1993

Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front and Hizbul Mujahideen sign an accord to unite their forces for the liberation of Kashmir. Protests continue and human rights violations intensify.

October 1994

Backed by the Organization of Islamic Countries, Pakistan attempts to raise Kashmir issue at the United Nations. India strongly opposes the move.

This chronology is based principally on the following sources: G. M. D. Sufi, Kashmir: A History of Kashmir. New Delhi: Light and Life Publishers,

xviii

Chronology

1974; Durga Das (Ed.), Sardar Patel's Correspondence, 1945-50. Vol. I. Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1989; Richard F. Nyrop (Ed.), Pakistan: A Country Study 5th ed. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1984; Shahid Javed Burki, Historical Dictionary of Pakistan. Metuchen, NY: Scarecrow Press, Inc. 1991; Muhammad Yusuf Buch and Q. U. Shahab "Jammu and Kashmir" in Hamid Jalal, et al. (eds.) Pakistan Past and Present. London: Stacey International, 1977, pp. 176-179; Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. and Stanley A. Kochanck; India: Government and Politics in a Developing Nation, 4th ed. NY: Harcourt Brace and Jovanovich Publishers, 1986.

1 Introduction

Few international problems have been so entangled in prejudice and suspicion as that of Kashmir. Antagonism and distrust have blocked any move toward a resolution. Historically, the suspicion and prejudice are a legacy of British rule and its lopsided and hasty partition of the subcontinent, which left issues related to the assets, army, and accession of princely states undecided. These and other unresolved issues created a host of complex territorial problems. The most critical were disagreements over three princely states: Junagadh, Hyderabad, and Jammu and Kashmir. Although India's de facto occupation of the Junagadh and Hyderabad states has been broadly accepted, the state of Jammu and Kashmir is still a territory disputed among India, Pakistan, and the people of Kashmir. Problems with accession arose because the British seemed to be trying to do three things at one time: to rule, to hand over power, and to divide and quit in a hurry. Early division did not give the states adequate opportunity to make reasonable decisions or allow enough time to the succeeding dominions for effective control of their countries. An immediate consequence of this urgency was the outbreak of uncontrolled communal riots. Tens of thousands of people were killed and millions forced to move in despair and with no known destination. Hindus fled the Muslim-majority regions now defined as Pakistan and Muslims rushed from areas of now independent India, to become Sharnarthis or Mohajirs (refugees) in their own countries. India and Pakistan both faced the overwhelming task of accommodating their people in makeshift shelters or houses abandoned by the departing masses. The principles on which partition was based were ambiguous, particularly with respect to the princely states. British India had 562 princely states tied to the empire with different treaties and agreements. The treaties were to lapse on 15 August 1947, but before they did, each state was to join either India or Pakistan, in keeping with its geography and the will of its people, which usually translated into Muslim or Hindu heritage. Lord Listowel, India's secretary of state, was emphatic in his statement that the states must 1

2

Divided Kashmir

join one of the two succeeding dominions. 1 He said that neither the British nor any other government would recognize them as independent states, even if that were their choice. During his visit to Kashmir in June 1947, Mountbatten urged the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir and his prime minister to ascertain the will of their people and join one of the two dominions before 14 August 1947. He assured the leaders that India would not be offended if Kashmir decided to join Pakistan. A few days after independence, Lord Ismay also urged the Maharaja on behalf of Louis Mountbatten, governor general of India, to ascertain the wishes of his people and join either India or Pakistan.

Accession of the Princely States For most of the princely states, the issue was not whether they should accede to India or Pakistan, but rather under what terms they should do so. The state of Jodhpur presented an odd case. Both the ruling family and the majority of the people were Hindus, but the state wanted to join Muslim Pakistan. The ruler was snubbed as his desire of accession clashed with the agreed principles of the partition. For Junagadh, Hyderabad, and Jammu and Kashmir, the situation was more complicated. In each of these states the ruling family belonged to one religious community and the great majority or the population to the other. In Junagadh and Hyderabad, Muslim princes ruled over the Hindu majority. When Hyderabad wavered and Junagadh joined Pakistan, both states were forcibly occupied by India. Jammu and Kashmir was the largest of all the princely states and bordered Pakistan, India, China, and Afghanistan. There were about 4 million inhabitants in the territory at the time of partition in 1947, nearly half of whom lived in the Kashmir Valley. Approximately 45 percent of the people lived in Jammu District, which ran along the foothill slopes of the Himalayas to the edge of the Punjab. The remaining 5 percent of the people were scattered throughout the mountainous regions of the state, including Gilgit and Baltistan. Since 1846, the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir state had been a Dogra Hindu, while his people were predominantly Muslim. Since the early 1930s, the Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir had been agitating against the Maharaja, tired of his insensitivity and heavy taxation. The Muslims of Poonch region revolted against him in June 1947, and the Maharaja retaliated with brutal force against them. The revolt spread to other parts of Jammu and Kashmir. The situation deteriorated during August and September of 1947, as the Muslims openly revolted and were joined by their fellow tribesmen from the Northwest Frontier Province. By 22 October 1947, the tribesmen captured several towns, massacred large numbers of civilians, and advanced within four miles of the capital, Srinagar. At that point the over-

Introduction

3

throw of the Maharaja seemed imminent. In desperation, the Maharaja and his family fled from Srinagar and sought military assistance from India. India insisted that the Maharaja sign the instrument of accession to India before any assistance would be given. Implicit in the demand was a provision that the Maharaja sign the accession agreement subject to obtaining the consent of his people, as Mountbatten had urged. The Maharaja signed the accession agreement without going to his people, and India rushed in its forces. In fact, the forces of the Indian state of Patiala were already in Kashmir fighting for the Maharaja prior to the signing of the accession agreement. India's intervention contradicted the government's professed position of nonviolence and good faith ethics. India did everything possible to get Junagadh, and later Hyderabad, to join India, arguing that the majority of the people were Hindus and their rulers were not. Logically, then, India should have supported the Muslim majority of Jammu and Kashmir and let them join Pakistan.

The Kashmir Dispute In many ways India's efforts to occupy Jammu and Kashmir are a product of the political history of the Indian subcontinent and British handling of the partition of 1947. Indian history is replete with examples of fears, jealousies, and rivalries between the "two nations" (Hindus and Muslims, and today, India and Pakistan) that dominate the subcontinent. After independence, instead of learning to tolerate each other and acting to build bridges through collaboration to overcome poverty, hunger, and disease, the two nations continued to follow their old ways. Because the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir state is at the core of continuing conflict between India and Pakistan, it is essential to objectively analyze and understand the key issues. It is likely that the Kashmir dispute will continue to sour relations between India and Pakistan, though its nature is fairly simple. The expressed rules of paritition suggested that the state of Jammu and Kashmir, with a predominantly Muslim population under a Hindu Maharaja, would have joined Pakistan. More than 75 percent of the population of the state was Muslim, the state was contiguous to Pakistan, and the Maharaja's rule was not popular. The option of independence for the state was not viable; the Maharaja was cornered into acceding to India after he had already abandoned his capital. Following this accession, Indian armies supported the Maharaja, and Pakistanis challenged the accession by every means possible. Had the British made different decisions, or had Mountbatten, their last viceroy, been more evenhanded, the Kashmir problem might never have arisen.

4

Divided Kashmir

Mountbatten was involved in airlifting Indian troops to Kashmir. " T h e mantle of governor-general fell from him and he assumed the garb of the Supreme Commander," says Philip Ziegler, his biographer. 2 Mersevey, commander in chief of Pakistan, had come to Delhi for talks and was surprised to find Mountbatten directing military operations in Kashmir. "Mountbatten was becoming more and more anathema to the Muslim cause, and it certainly seemed as if he could see nothing except through Hindu eyes." The dispute became more serious after India and Pakistan openly clashed in Kashmir and India brought the issue before the United Nations. The United Nations and

Kashmir

On 1 January 1948, India lodged a complaint in the United Nations demanding that Pakistan stop its aggression, withdraw its troops, and deny access through Pakistan to tribal "invaders" fighting against Kashmir. The Security Council responded quickly. On 6 January, it asked India and Pakistan to "refrain from any step which may aggravate the situation and be incompatible with the United Nations Charter." On 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, the Security Council passed resolutions to enforce a cease-fire and required the contestants to withdraw their forces from Jammu and Kashmir and to hold a plebiscite. Since 1949, the United Nations and Pakistan have been consistent in their demand for the plebiscite, but the plebiscite has not yet been held, nor is it likely to be held in the foreseeable future. When a plebiscite was not acceptable to India, Sir Owen Dixon, a UN mediator, proposed partitioning the state of Jammu and Kashmir on a regional or communal basis as an alternative. Sir Owen's partition plan was based on the "two nation" theory, which had been the basis for dividing the subcontinent into India and Pakistan. Following the two nation principle, General A. G. L. McNaughton of Canada, president of the Security Council, also proposed that parts of the Jhelum Valley that were predominantly Muslim be given to Pakistan. None of these proposals were accepted by India, and the deadlock precipitated two bloody wars, in 1965 and 1971. As of 1995, a line of actual control divides the old Jammu and Kashmir state into four political units: (1) Ladakh and Jammu and Kashmir Valley, composing about 45 percent of the state, controlled by India (also called Indian held or occupied Kashmir); (2) Azad Kashmir, indirectly ruled by Pakistan; (3) the Northern Area, which together with Azad Kashmir composes about 35 percent of the territory, ruled by Pakistan; and (4) Aksai Chin, composing about 2 0 percent of Kashmir, controlled by China (see Map 1.1). Ladakh is drifting toward Tibet, Jammu wants to merge with India, and the Kashmir Valley is struggling to join Pakistan. Azad Kashmir is happy with its own government

6

Divided Kashmir

(established on 24 October 1947). The Northern Area acceded to Pakistan in September 1947. The Chinese annexed Aksai Chin in 1962 to formalize their long-standing claim to the territory. Uprisings in Indian Jammu and Kashmir Dissatisfied with India and dismayed by the United Nations, the people of Kashmir have been campaigning fiercely since 1988 to break with India and to either join Pakistan or become independent. The alienation with India is total and strong. Indian efforts to control uprisings by force—including killings, torture, and denial of human rights—further aggravate the situation. The defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan, the recently gained independence of six Central Asian Muslim republics, and the rise of ethnonational movements in Europe, Africa, and South Asia provide a cultural context encouraging Kashmiris to continue their struggle against the massive Indian army. A recent decision of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to begin operation Hathyar Uthau Kashmir Bacahao ("Pick up arms and save Kashmir") against Kashmiri Muslims may aggravate the already volatile situation. To quote John Mallott, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State: The Kashmir dispute is a major source of Indo-Pakistan conflict. Although the 1972 Simla Agreement provided for India and Pakistan to solve the dispute bilaterally, little has happened. A military standoff continues along the line of control in Kashmir. Indian and Pakistani forces have fought two wars here, and cross-border firings still take place. India and Pakistan should work to achieve near-term steps such as demilitarization of the Siachen Glacier, support the efforts of UNMOGIP to monitor the line of control and adopt confidence building measures. . . . In Jammu and Kashmir, militants have launched an insurgency and are resorting to terrorist attacks. Indian security forces commit human rights abuses . . . India should safeguard human rights fully, grant genuine access to Kashmir for international human rights groups, and pursue a meaningful political dialogue with the Kashmiris. . . . South Asia must embark on a revolutionary reformation of its policies and d i s p u t e s . . . . [It is] a seat of political turmoil, insurgency, and war, and of national, ethnic and religious tensions. It is also a possible nuclear flashpoint. 3

Possible Solutions to the Kashmir Dispute There are a number of alternatives for dealing with the dispute in Kashmir. Indians would prefer to maintain the status quo, but that is not acceptable to the people of Kashmir or to Pakistan. A second option is to secure Kashmir's accession to Pakistan, which is the resolution Pakistan seeks to achieve through a UN-supervised plebiscite. Another option is for India and Pakistan to grant independence to disputed areas under their control and let Jammu

Introduction

7

and Kashmir emerge as a neutral country. This was the choice of Sheikh Abdullah and the majority of Kashmiris from the early 1950s to the beginning of the crisis in 1989. Another alternative is a "Trieste" type solution, in which Kashmir would be divided along communal lines. The Hindu majority areas of Jammu and the Buddhist-dominated region of Ladakh would join India. The Northern Area would remain with Pakistan, and the Kashmir Valley with Azad Kashmir would join Pakistan. Free access would be given to people living on both sides of Kashmir. Still another option is to place Kashmir under the joint control of India and Pakistan. Another more plausible alternative is to divide Jammu and Kashmir state following the terms of the Indus Waters Treaty, which divided the rivers between India and Pakistan. The dispute over the waters arose with the partition. When the boundary commission split the irrigation system, the canals were given to Pakistan, and the headwaters feeding them were awarded to India. Because there was no joint control, the two countries argued endlessly over their respective rights. In 1951, Pakistan was on the brink of bringing the dispute before the UN Security Council. The World Bank stepped in, and the result was the famous Indus Waters Treaty signed by the prime minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, and the president of Pakistan, Mohammad Ayub Khan, on 19 September 1960 in Karachi. The treaty was supported by the leading Western nations and was funded by the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Germany, and New Zealand. The treaty divided the Indus River system and allocated three western rivers (Indus, Chenab, and Jhelum) to Pakistan and three eastern rivers (Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas) to India. The Indus Waters Treaty was one of the boldest steps ever taken by two belligerent nations. It addressed grievances that threatened peace in South Asia and had soured relations from the very beginning. The conflict over Jammu and Kashmir state is another such crisis. This study proposes splitting the state of Jammu and Kashmir following the principle of the internationally planned and financed Indus Waters Treaty. The Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab Rivers and their basins should join Pakistan, and the Sutlej, Ravi, and Beas Rivers and their basins, as well as the remaining parts of Kashmir, should join India. The division of a major river system was accepted by India, Pakistan, and the rest of the world in 1960, and the same principle could resolve the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir.

Notes 1. Burke, Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies, 1974, p. 16. 2. Ziegler, Mountbatten, 1985, p. 447. 3. Statement of John Mallott, interim director and deputy assistant secretary of state, Bureau of South Asian Affairs, U. S. Department of State, 28 April 1993.

2 The Evolution of Jammu and Kashmir State

According to one theory, Kashmir owes its name to a Semitic tribe, the Kash, who founded the cities of Kash, Kashan, and Kashgar in Central Asia. Another theory claims that the old name of Kashmir was Satisaras, meaning a land from which water (kra) was brought by winds (samira). Still another theory is that the name Kashmir is a compound Prakrit word in which kas means channel and mar, mountain. 1 R. M. Parmu suggests that the name Kashmir originated from Kashap-Mar.2 Kashmir had been ruled by 21 dynasties of Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, and Zoroastrians through the fourteenth century.3 In the ninth century the region was a center of Hindu culture. Rajatarangini, written by the poet and historian Kalhana in about 1200 A.D., gives an account of Kashmir's history from 1182 B.C. Kalhana writes that the Nagas, a tribal people who practiced agriculture, originally inhabited Kashmir. The Nagas worshipped serpent deities, a practice that continued in the valley until the end of the sixteenth century. Abul Fazl, who visited Kashmir with Emperor Akbar, reported seeing carved images of snakes that people worshipped in seven hundred places in the valley. The present names of Nilnag, Verinag, Anantnag, and Semag include reference to the symbol of snakes. Pandit Jonaraja continued Kalhana's work, reporting the history of the valley through the year 1486 A.D. Srivara and Prajyabhatta recorded the history through the conquest of Kashmir by Emperor Akbar in 1586.4 The early histories were written in Sanskrit; later writers such as Haidar Malik, Mohammad Azim, and Naryan Kul wrote in Persian. Later reports are found in the works of Birbal Kacheri and Diwan Kirpa Ram. British and European historians wrote significant accounts of the more recent history of Kashmir. The history of Kashmir before 1947 can be divided into four phases: (1) Hindu and Buddhist rule, (2) Muslim rule, (3) Sikh conquest, and (4) Dogra rule.

9

10

Divided Kashmir

Hindu and Buddhist Rule In the earliest phase, local kings ruled. At times they extended their domains into the Indian heartland and Central Asia, and at times they were conquered by emperors from India. The Hindu religion, with its caste system, rituals, priests, and gods, was practiced widely in the valley. Buddhism replaced Hinduism during the rule of Mauryan emperor Ashoka (274-237 B.C.), whose empire extended from Hindukush in the west to Bengal in the east. Ashoka constructed many monasteries and sacred cupolas in which to house holy relics. The monasteries in Kashmir became great centers of learning and attracted a large number of local and foreign scholars. Subsequently, monks, missionaries, and merchants spread Buddhism from Kashmir to China, Central Asia, and Tibet. Early Buddhism was based on four noble truths and the eightfold path of the Buddha that emphasized self-restraint, nonviolence, and moderation. Kanishka strengthened Buddhism by making it a state religion in the first century A.D. Kanishka held a Buddhist council in Kashmir to help him spread Buddhism to other areas.5 Under Kanishka's successors, Buddhism's role diminished in Kashmir. In the early sixth century, the Huns conquered Kashmir. In 530 A.D., Kashmir regained its independence and joined the empire of Ujjain, based in India. When Ujjain's reign declined, Kashmir's rulers revived Buddhism. A continued Buddhist link with Kashmir is illustrated by the visit of Chinese pilgrim, Ou-kong, in the middle of the eighth century.

Muslim Rule Islam entered Kashmir peacefully in 711 A.D., after Sindh was conquered by Arab Muslims. Raja Dahir, the ruler of Sindh, was defeated by the Arabs, and his son took refuge in Kashmir. He was accompanied by Hamim, a Syrian Muslim said to be the first Muslim to set foot on the soil of Kashmir.6 Hamim began preaching Islam and soon won converts. The local ruler gave Muslims an area in Srinagar still known as Malchamar. Local rulers employed many Turkish Muslims in their army, strengthening Muslim influence in Kashmir. Muslim conquest in 1339 brought an end to the Hindu phase in Kashmir. Prior to that date, Kashmir had been threatened by a Tartar chief; the commander in chief of Kashmir sought help from Shah Mir of Swat and Rainchau Shah of Tibet. Rainchau Shah helped the commander in chief but later killed him. He then occupied the throne and married Kuta Rani, the commander's daughter. He converted to Islam later and became known as Sadruddin. 7 Upon Sadruddin's death, a Hindu chief attempted to recapture Kashmir, but Shah Mir defeated him. Shah Mir, the first sultan of Kashmir, was

Evolution of Jammu and Kashmir State

11

known as Shamsuddin. Humane, just, and generous, Shah Mir made many improvements in Kashmir. He introduced a new Kashmiri calendar to replace the Hindu calendar. The new calendar began from Rainchau's conversion to Islam, which was fixed at A.H. 720 (1320 A.D.). Shah Mir died in 1342 and was buried at Andarkot. 8 During the rule of Shah Mir and his descendants, a number of Muslim missionaries came to Kashmir, including Mir Sayyid Ali Hamadani of Persia (Iran), who consolidated the dominance of Islam in Kashmir.9 Mir Hamadani first came to Kashmir in 1372 and stayed for four months. He visited again in 1379 and stayed for two and a half years. He came for the third and last time in 1383 with 700 followers to further consolidate Islam in Kashmir. Sikander inherited the throne in 1394 and was the first sultan to enforce Muslim law (sharia). He banned the use of alcohol and prohibited gambling, dancing by women, and prostitution. He also abolished sati (self-immolation of widows). He was a great builder; he founded the town of Sikandarpur (Nowhatta in Srinagar) and built a magnificent palace and a grand jamia masjid (central mosque) there. He laid the foundation stone of Idgah and constructed the khanqah-i-mualla (monastery) on the right bank of the Jhelum, the site where Sayyid Ali Hamadani had preached the faith. Sikander was followed by Zainul Abedin (1420-1470), popularly known as Budshah. Budshah was wise, tolerant, and a great patron of arts and letters. He abolished all laws that discriminated against Hindus, recalled the Brahmans, and publicly proclaimed toleration of all religions. His rule was peaceful, based on social justice and communal harmony. Budshah died on 12 May 1470 and was buried on the right bank of the Jhelum, not far from Zainakadal Bridge. Budshah did not leave a government strong enough to resist invasions, and as a result, his son Haider Shah was defeated by the Chak tribes. In 1561, the first Muslim dynasty of Kashmir ended. On 28 June 1586 Emperor Akbar dispatched a large army that conquered Kashmir in July 1589. Soon after, Akbar visited Kashmir and built a road that required the labor of about five thousand workers. Akbar was so enchanted by Kashmir that he visited the valley two more times, in 1592 and 1597. When Akbar died in 1605, Jahangir succeeded him on the throne. He visited Kashmir several times and once said that he would rather lose his whole kingdom than lose Kashmir. The Moghul passion for gardens climaxed during Jahangir's rule. He built Shalimar Garden in Srinagar, a living testimony to his aesthetic sense. During his reign, there were 777 gardens on the edge of Lake Dal. His queen, Nur Jahan, built Pathar Mosque on the left bank of the Jhelum. Jahangir died in 1628 and was succeeded by his son, Shah Jahan. Shah Jahan conquered Ladakh, Baltistan, and Kishtwar and annexed them to his empire in 1634. Later he and his son Dara Shikoh constructed a number of gardens and mosques in Srinagar. Shah Jahan was followed by Aurangzeb. Moghul rule in Kashmir was replaced by Afghans in 1753. From 1753

12

Divided. Kashmir

until 1819, when Afghan rule ended, 28 governors ruled Kashmir. The hallmark of most Afghan governors was unmitigated oppression of the people of Kashmir.

Sikh Conquest When Afghan rule became unbearable, the people of Kashmir sought outside help to remove the Afghans. The Kashmiri Pandit community led by Birbal Dhar encouraged the Sikhs to invade Kashmir, and Birbal Dhar offered to bear the expenses of the invasion. Ranjit Singh invaded Kashmir with an army of 30,000 Sikh soldiers and captured the valley on 15 June 1819. After five centuries of Muslim rule, during which nine-tenths of the population embraced Islam, Kashmir was again in the hands of nonMuslims. To celebrate his conquest, Ranjit Singh illuminated his capital, Lahore, for three days and named his newborn son Kashmira Singh. 10 The capital city, Kashmir, was renamed Srinagar. The rule of Ranjit Singh was acclaimed as dharma raj (the rule of religion). The Sikhs ruled Kashmir for 27 years (1819-1846). Their rule proved worse than that of their predecessors. The Sikhs treated Kashmiri Muslims like animals and nonentities. If a Sikh murdered a Hindu, the punishment was a fine of 20 rupees; four rupees were given to the deceased's family; the rest went to the state. If a Sikh murdered a Muslim, two rupees were given to the deceased's family. 11 The Sikhs closed the Jamia Mosque of Srinagar, and Muslims were forbidden to give the call for prayers (Azan). Pathar masjid, constructed by Empress Noor Jahan, was used for grain storage. In 1818, during the Sikh attack on the city of Jammu, Ranjit Singh was impressed by Dogra chieftain Gulab Singh and his brothers. Ranjit Singh gave Jammu to Gulab Singh in 1822 and made him a raja. Gulab Singh's brother Dhyan Singh was made the raja of Poonch, and his brother, Suchet Singh, was made the raja of Ramnagar. During the next 15 years, the three brothers subdued the neighboring principalities; they conquered Ladakh in 1834 and Baltistan in 1840.

Gulab Singh and the British Ranjit Singh's death in 1841 led to anarchy and intrigue within his dominion. The Sikh army was turbulent, corrupt, and undisciplined. There was no leader among the Sikhs able to unite the forces. Gulab Singh took advantage of the situation. He asked the British for support; the British invaded Afghanistan in 1841 with Gulab Singh's help, gaining access to Kabul through Sikh territory in Punjab. In an earlier campaign against Afghanistan, the British gained access through Sindh province. British manipulation and

Evolution of Jammu and Kashmir State

13

consequent disorder further destabilized Punjab. In January 1846, in an attempt to maintain control, Rani Jindan of Lahore appointed Gulab Singh as prime minister. 1 2 Rani Jindan was aware of Gulab Singh's relations with the British and thought he would help. Instead, Gulab Singh betrayed the Sikhs and conspired with the British, believing that the British would be the future rulers of India. The British conquest of the Sikhs marked the beginning of Hindu Dogra rule in Kashmir. 1 3

Dogra Rule 14 On 10 February 1846, the British defeated the Sikhs in the battle of Subraon. The British captured Lahore and other parts of Punjab that had been under Sikh control. Then the British, eager to crush any future resistance by the Sikhs, negotiated with Gulab Singh. As a result, two treaties were concluded. The first was signed in Lahore on 9 March 1846 and promised the British an indemnity of one crore (10 million) rupees for the state of Kashmir and the hill country between the Beas and Indus Rivers, including the province of Hazara. The Sikhs could not pay the indemnity money, and Gulab Singh paid the British for possession of Jammu, Kashmir, Ladakh, and Baltistan. The British retained possession o f the trans-Beas portions of Kulu and Mandi, including Nurpur and the fort at Kangra, and reduced the indemnity money by 2.5 million rupees; Gulab Singh bought the state of Kashmir for 7.5 million rupees. On 15 March 1846 the second treaty was signed in Amritsar giving "all mountainous country and its dependencies, situated east of the Indus and west of Ravi river, including Chamba, but excluding Lahul" to Gulab Singh. The British gave Gulab Singh a receipt for the purchase of Kashmir (see Figure 2 . 1 ) 1 5 After signing the treaty, Gulab Singh stood in gratitude, and with folded hands, said that he had become a zarkharid ghulam ("gold bought slave") of the British. 1 6 However, Gulab Singh did not take possession of Kashmir without a fight. Sheikh Islamuddin, governor of Kashmir, fought the Dogra troops sent to take control with the assistance of Bambas from the Jhelum Valley. The British dispatched Brigadier Wheeler and his troops from Jullundar, accompanied by 17,000 men from the Sikh army. Sheikh Islamuddin relented and allowed Gulab Singh to enter Srinagar at 8 : 0 0 A.M. on 9 November 1846.

Demarcating the Boundaries Soon after selling Kashmir, the British commissioned a team to determine the borders of the state, in particular, the border with Tibet. In 1 8 4 6 - 1 8 4 7 the team explored the border from the edge of Lahul to the mountains north of Lake Panggong.

14

Divided Kashmir

Figure 2.1

Receipt for the Sale of Kashmir

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"The Hon'ble the East India Company having received from His Highness the Maharaja Gulab Singh the sum of Rs. 7,500,000, seventy five lakhs, in payment of the amount guaranteed by the III Article of the Treaty between the Hon'ble Company and His Highness dated Amritsar the 16th March 1846, this single acknowledgement of the receipt of the whole amount is granted by the Board of Administrators for the affairs of the Punjab at the request of Dewan Jowalla Sahai, in addition to the receipts already given to His Highness agents by the receiving officers, for the instalments received by them from time to time between the date of the Treaty and the 14th of March 1850, the day on which the last instalment was paid into the Lahore Treasury. [Singed] H.M. Lawrence, John Lawrence, C.G. Mansel"

Evolution

of Jammu and Kashmir

State

15

British interest in Ladakh increased after Russian advances in the khanates (independent principalities) of Khiva, Kokand, and Bokhara in the 1880s. After the Russians absorbed the khanates, it seemed they would advance to Afghanistan and also intrude into Chinese Turkistan. Chinese rule over Muslim Central Asia was collapsing, and the situation was critical. The main communication line between China and Central Asia was disrupted. In 1861 the region was split into two administrative districts, Kashgiria and Dzungaria. In 1867 the British appointed a political agent in Leh to monitor and manage trade. The office of political agent continued until 1947 when the British left the subcontinent. In 1878 China recaptured Khasgar and declared it a province of Sinkiang in 1884. A boundary (the McDonald line) between British and Chinese areas was proposed on 14 March 1889, but China did not accept it. The British offered the following treaty, which China neither accepted nor rejected: 17 Commencing at the Little Pamir, from the peak at which the Anglo-Russian Boundary commission of 1895 ended their work, it runs southeast crossing the Karachikar stream at Mintaka Aghazi; then proceeding in the same direction it joins at the Karchenai pass, the crest of the main ridge of the Mustagh range. It follows this to the south, passing by the Khunjerab pass. At this point the boundary leaves the crest and follows a spur running east approximately parallel to the road from the Shimshal to the Hunza post at Darwaza. The line turning south through the Darwaza post crosses the road from the Shimshal pass at that point, and then ascends the nearest high spur, and regains the main crest which the boundary will again follow, passing through Mustagh, Gasherbrum, and Saltoro passes of the Karakorum.18

The China-British India boundary was thus in limbo when Pakistan was established in 1947. In 1965, a boundary between China and Pakistan was drawn. The boundary is 325 miles (520 kilometers) long, running southeast from the eastern end of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to Karakorum Pass. Another boundary will be negotiated when the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan is finally resolved. The demarcation of the China-Pakistan boundary drew protests from India. India alleged that Pakistan had given about 2,000 square miles (6,180 square kilometers) to China. This claim has been disputed by Pakistan. Lamb (1964) 19 maintains that the boundary is reasonably close to the de facto boundary observed by British authorities. The northern boundary with Dardistan (the northwestern states) was vague. The British sold the area east of the Indus, not including the small states in the northwest, Chitral, Hunza, Nagar, Gilgit, Punial, Ishkuman, and Yasin. Ranjit Singh had tenuous hold on Gilgit, and the British gave Gilgit to Gulab Singh after they sold Kashmir. In 1852 a tribal revolt in Gilgit shat-

16

Divided Kashmir

tered this tenuous hold, and Gulab Singh withdrew to Bunji, east of the Indus. Ranbir Singh then captured Gilgit and included it in Kashmir state. In 1870 Ranbir Singh 20 entered a treaty with Hunza. Following this treaty, Ranbir Singh thought that Hunza was within his domain, though Hunza already had a treaty with eastern Turkistan. The rulers of Hunza never recognized their inclusion in Jammu and Kashmir state. The Chinese considered Hunza a minor tributary state and part of the Manchu Empire. Chitral was also hostile to the Dogras and competed over Yasin and other Dardistan states. In 1878, the Mehtar (ruler) of Chitral accepted Dogra suzerainty and paid horses, five hawks, and five hounds every third year as a tribute to the Dogras. In 1877 the British appointed a political agent in Gilgit, as the situation was unsettled and the area strategically important. In 1892, a number of small states within Gilgit agency revolted. As a result of these revolts, Chitral was detached from Gilgit agency and Jammu and Kashmir state in 1895. Chitral was established as a princely state, and a new political agent was appointed in Malakand to look after the states of Chitral, Dir, and Swat. The Maharaja was informed of the change and advised to negotiate a new treaty with Chitral. By 1881 the Russians advanced close to Turkmenistan and the Pamir region. They had established contacts with Chitral, Hunza, and probably with Jammu and Kashmir state. To offset the influence of Russian and Chinese intrusion into the northern frontiers, the agency in Gilgit was reestablished in 1889. The agency was considered necessary because the Maharaja was weak, notoriously inefficient, and incapable of resisting Russian or Chinese influence or intrusion in the northern frontiers. In the 1930s Muslims in Sinkiang became restive; the Muslims challenged Chinese authority, and the disorder threatened to spread to Gilgit, also a predominantly Muslim area. To avert the possibility, in 1935 the British leased Gilgit and its dependencies for 60 years. The leased area included (1) Puniyal Jagir, (2) the state of Hunza and Nagar, (3) the governorship of Yasin, Koh, and Ghazinat, (4) Chilas District, (5) the governorship of Ishkoman, and (6) the western portion of Gaghdumbash Pamir.21 (Karan Singh, heir apparent of Jammu and Kashmir state, says that his father was forced into leasing the area.) The lease was signed on 26 March 1935 and ratified by the governor general on 3 April 1935. In August 1947, two weeks before partition, Mountbatten terminated the lease. The territory could have been transferred to one of the two successor states after ascertaining the wishes of the people. On 1 August 1947 when Gandhi saw the people of the state of Jammu and Kashmir celebrating the return of Gilgit, he remarked that it was a great mistake; the opportunity should have been taken to proclaim autonomy for Gilgit within Kashmir. He saw the seeds of future trouble in the unqualified inclusion of Gilgit in Kashmir.22

Evolution of Jammu and Kashmir State

17

Pratab Singh died in 1925 and was succeeded by his nephew Hari Singh, who ruled the state until 1948. Hari Singh's reign was as repressive as the reigns of his predecessors. In 1935, a decade before the British were due to leave India, he added Poonch to his territory in a legal settlement. Sikhs had previously awarded Poonch to Gulab Singh's brother, Dhyan Singh, and the area was a state in Punjab province. The Muslims in Poonch (about 380,000) never accepted their merger with Jammu and Kashmir state. The modern state of Jammu and Kashmir thus evolved from the Dogra heartland in Jammu, as the home of different ethnic groups and diverse cultures. Ladakh was conquered and made a part of the state in 1834. Baltistan was conquered and annexed by the Dogras in 1840. The Valley of Kashmir joined the state in 1846 when the British sold it. Attempts to capture Gilgit were made from Baltistan in 1850-1890, but control was not established there. In 1935 Gilgit was leased to the British for 60 years, and in 1947 the British terminated the lease. Poonch joined the state in 1936 as the result of a judicial settlement. 23 Aksai Chin was annexed by the Chinese in 1962 (see Map 1.1). Kashmir Valley was inhabited predominantly by Muslims and had a small community of Sikhs and Kashmiri Pandits; Jammu had a Dogra Hindu majority with a significant Muslim component; the western strip from Muzaffarabad to Mirpur had a majority of Punjabi Muslims; Gilgit, Skardu, and Kargil were also inhabited by Muslims; Ladakh had a majority of Lamaistic Buddhists. After the cease-fire of 1 January 1949, Jammu and Kashmir state was divided into four political units: (1) Ladakh and Jammu and Kashmir Valley (Indian-occupied Kashmir or occupied Kashmir from a Pakistani viewpoint), (2) Azad Kashmir (Pakistan-occupied Kashmir from an Indian viewpoint), (3) the Northern Area, administered by Pakistan, and (4) Aksai Chin, controlled by China. Scholars at Jawaharlal Nehru University have written about the geography and ethnic background of the Indian part of Kashmir. I will discuss Azad Kashmir and the Northern Area briefly here.

Azad Kashmir Azad Kashmir comprised just 650 square miles (1,680 square kilometers) when its revolutionary government was established at Pullundri in Jammu District on 24 October 1947. 2 4 Sardar Ibrahim Khan, who had an advanced British law degree, was the first head of Azad Kashmir. In a press statement, the provisional government expressed the utmost friendliness and goodwill toward the neighboring dominions of India and Pakistan and expressed a belief in their birthright of independence. 25 The provisional government defined itself as a war council whose sole purpose was to liberate Jammu and Kashmir state from the Dogra dynasty. It functioned on an ad

18

Divided Kashmir

hoc basis until the 1949 cease-fire between India and Pakistan went into effect. During 1949, various resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and Commission for India and Pakistan defined Azad Kashmir's government as a local authority. After the cease-fire the local authority of Azad Kashmir had jurisdiction over an area of about 5,100 square miles, with a population of slightly more than two million. 26 Azad Kashmir is mostly rugged terrain, with narrow, relatively steep valleys. 27 One exception is a small section of Mirpur District that is an extension of the Punjab plains. It consists of Kundal Shahi, Muzaffarabad, and Uri tehsils (subdistricts) in Muzaffarabad District; and Bagh, Sudhanti, and part of Haveli tehsils in Mirpur District. Azad Kashmir depends on Pakistan for military and financial support. In 1987/88, Pakistan provided more than 2.1 billion rupees to Azad Kashmir's 2.5 billion rupee budget. In 1989/90 Pakistan provided 1.94 billion rupees to Azad Kashmir's 2.76 billion rupee budget. Azad Kashmir also received a small amount of foreign aid (from US AID and the World Bank) for development projects.

Northern Area The Northern Area administered by Pakistan (Gilgit, Baltistan, and Diamont Districts) has an area of 27,800 square miles (82,010 square kilometers). The Karakorum Mountains surround the Northern Area, with 28 peaks of more than 20,000 feet (6,100 meters). Within these mountains are a number of important passes: Chaleli, Mintka, Kilik, Shamshal, Shandour, Karambar, Thougre, Burril, and Durhit. The Northern Area has a population of about 650,000 people, who live in 645 villages and towns perched along narrow valleys. Some people live at 11,000 feet (3,350 meters) and climb in the summer to 14,000 feet (4,265 meters) with their sheep and goats. During the winter, they live in the valleys and heat their homes by burning wood. In 1984, recorded in Gilgit, maximum and minimum temperatures fluctuated between -60°C and 45°C. During the summer, farmers cultivate rice, wheat, and potatoes in small terraced fields tucked upon the mountain slopes. They also cultivate apples, almonds, walnuts, apricots, strawberries, peaches, and grapes. Since Karakorum Highway was completed and inaugurated in 1978, hotels have been built and tourist traffic has increased, as has trade between Pakistan and China. The airport at Gilgit has been modernized so that jets and C-130s can use it. The Agha Khan Rural Academy is running a number of projects for agricultural and social development in Gilgit. In addition, a team with members from 10 German universities is cooperating with Peshawar University to study archaeology, geology, geography, economics, agriculture, and social conditions in the Northern Area.

Evolution of Jammu and Kashmir State

19

In September 1947, the people of the Northern Area, under the leadership of Major W. Brown and Captain Mohammad Babar Khan, revolted against Dogra rule and arrested Brigadier Ghansera Singh, governor of Gilgit Province. Troops from the Northern Area annihilated Dogra forces in Baltistan and Zulji La Pass up to Leh, liberating 2 7 , 0 0 0 square miles ( 6 9 , 9 3 0 square kilometers) of the Northern Area. In September, Mohammad Babar Khan formed a provisional government with the people. They acceded to Pakistan on 1 November 1947. Shah Rais Khan, an elder who belonged to the former princely family, was appointed president of the provisional government. T h e inscription on the grave of Captain Babar Khan in Gilgit tells the story of the revolt and accession to Pakistan. Hunza and Nagar were already independent and joined the Northern Area. The Mir of Hunza had previously asked the United States government for permission to accede his state to the United States. The U.S. government said that was impossible and advised him to join Pakistan. 2 8 India, however, does not recognize the Northern Area as part of Pakistan, arguing that it was part of Jammu and Kashmir state and that the Maharaja's accession made it part of India. The Indian ambassador did not attend the meeting convened by President Zia-ul Haq in 1980 in Gilgit, nor did the delegates from India attending an international conference in Islamabad participate in an excursion to Gilgit. The Maharaja's claim to the Northern Area was emphatically denied by the British resident in Kashmir in 1941. The British resident wrote a letter on 16 July 1941 to Gopalswamy Ayyenger, prime minister of the state, denying the Maharaja's claim to the territory. The letter categorically stated (1) that Hunza and Nagar, though under the suzerainty of the state, were not part of it but were separate states; and (2) that Chilas, Koh Ghizar, Ishkoman, and Yasin were tribal areas. Regarding the trans-Indus Gilgit region, the letter stated that the British government never concurred in changing any limits of the Kashmir territory laid down in Article I of the treaty of 1846. 2 9 From this evidence, the Northern Area was never part of Jammu and Kashmir state. However, on 8 March 1993 the High Court of Azad Kashmir ruled that the Northern Area is a part of Kashmir and asked the Azad Kashmir government to immediately take control of its administration. In late March 1993, the matter was before the Supreme Court for adjudication.

Notes 1. 2. 3. 4.

Sufi, Kashir, 1974, p. 12. Parmu, A History of Muslim Rule, 1969, p. 36. Sibtain, "The Genesis of Kashmir Dispute," 1992, p. 117. Sufi, Kashir, 1974, p. 1

20

Divided Kashmir

5. Ray, Early History and Culture of Kashmir, 1970, p. 6. 6. Hussain, A., The Wounded Paradise, 1991, p. 32. 7. Lawrence, The Valley of Kashmir, 1885. 8. Hussain, A., The Wounded Paradise, 1991, p. 34. 9. Hamadani, Introduction to Kashmir: Now or Never, 1992, pp. 24-30. 10. Hussain, A., The Wounded Paradise, 1991, p. 76. 11. Younghusband, Kashmir, 1911, p. 161. 12. Sufi, Kashir, 1974, p. 763. 13. Bazaz, The History of Struggle, 1954, pp. 120-122. 14. The term Dogra is used for the people who inhabit the hilly country between the Chenab and Sutlej Rivers, irrespective of the fact that they are Hindus, Muslims, Brahmans, Rajputs, Rathis, or Ghirths. According to one account, the term derived from two Sanskrit words, do and girath, meaning two lakes (Siroensar and Mansar) in the hills a little to the east of Jammu. Jammu is the cultural heart of Dogra country. 15. C. Gray, a retired railway officer interested in Sikh history, found the receipt for the sale of Kashmir in the record office in Lahore. The receipt was written on a small piece of ordinary paper and was in a bundle with other miscellaneous documents that were destined to be destroyed as waste papers. How the documents came to be where they were is not known. The receipt is now preserved in the record office in Lahore. (See Sufi and Civil and Military Gazette, Lahore, 12 April 1939). 16. See Appendix 1 for the Treaty of Amritsar, 15 March 1946. 17. Lamb, The China-India Boundary, 1964. 18. Prescott, quoted in Lamb, 1964, pp. 101-102. 19. Lamb, "The Sino-Pakistan Boundary," 1964, pp. 292-312. 20. For a list of rulers of Jammu and Kashmir State, see Appendix 1. 21. Awan, "Northern Areas: Constitutional Status," 1985. 22. Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, 1958, p. 355. 23. Poonch (area 1,627 square miles; 4,214 square kilometers) was originally one of the Muslim hill states. It was annexed by Sikhs, who killed the raja and exhibited his head and that of his nephew in an open cage. Sikhs gave this state to Dhyan Singh. Since there was no male heir to take over the state, it reverted to the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir in 1935. In 1931 Poonch had a population of 387,384; over 80 percent of the population was Muslim. 24. Civil and Military Gazette, Lahore, 8 October 1947. 25. Pakistan Times Overseas Weekly, 6 November 1983. See Appendix 3 for a full text of the press statement by the revolutionary government of Azad Kashmir. 26. The figures include thousands of Azad Kashmiris who live in Europe or the Middle East but retain their residential status in Kashmir. 27. Rose, "The Politics of Azad Kashmir," 1992, pp. 235-253. 28. Pakistan Times Overseas Weekly, 25 December 1983. 29. Awan, "Northern Area: Constitutional Status," 1985.

3 Location and Orientation

Jammu and Kashmir is a landlocked state, located close to the heart of Asia. It is in the shape of a trapezoid, with its two longer sides bordering Pakistan. The border with Pakistan is 563 miles (900 kilometers) long. The Ugur region of Sinkiang (China) borders the north; in the east the state borders the plateau of Tibet. In the northwest the Wakhan panhandle of Afghanistan separates the state from Tajikistan. India is to the south (see Map 1.1, p. 5). From north to south the state is about 240 miles (384 kilometers) long (32°17'N to 36°58'N latitude), and from east to west it is about 350 miles (560 kilometers) wide (73°26'E to 80°36'E longitude). The state covers an area of about 84,471 square miles (218,780 square kilometers) and is about the same size as the state of Minnesota, the combined nations of North and South Korea, or the area of the Benelux countries combined with Denmark, Austria, and Albania. 1 The state is larger than 68 countries of the world and more populous than 90 countries. Jammu and Kashmir state has striking physical and cultural heterogeneity. It is so varied that interpretation of its geology and physical geography, especially its river system, is difficult. The mountains in Jammu and Kashmir are among the earth's youngest. According to some geologists, they were raised with considerable speed and attained their present height during the last million years. 2 The Indus River rises to the north of the Himalayas and flows around to the northwest (see Map 1.1). The Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River rises near the Indus and flows around the Himalayas to the southeast to join the Bay of Bengal. The Indus and its longest tributary, the Sutlej, rise within 80 miles of each other, flow around the Himalayas, and meet near Mithankot in Pakistan. In its course to join the Indus, the Sutlej collects the drainage of the shorter streams rising in or cutting through the Himalayas, including the drainage of Kashmir Valley near Srinagar and Lake Wular. The Beas River joins the Sutlej directly; the Jhelum and the Ravi join the Chenab, which in turn joins the Sutlej to form the Panjnad.

21

22

Divided Kashmir

Physiography Generally, the state is mountainous, with intermontane valleys, plateaus, passes, and peaks. Rivers generally cut the state from the northwest to the southeast. Physiographically the state looks like a double staircase, first ascending to the Himalayas in three steps and then descending into Tibet in two steps.3 The first step is the Punjab or Siwalik Hills, where Bhadrawah and Kishtwar are located. The Siwalik Hills generally parallel one another and range between 1,000 and 3,000 feet (305 to 915 meters) in elevation; in the extreme north, they reach heights of 18,000 feet (6,210 meters). Portions of Jammu are included in these hills. They are known locally as Poonch, Riasi, and Hazara. Jammu City is located in these hills on a spur that overlooks the Tavi and Ujh Rivers. Small irrigation canals have been built from the Ujh and Tavi Rivers to irrigate the Jammu Plain. Between the hills are small river valleys and forests. 4 The next step is situated between the outer hills and the high mountains, in an area known as the Middle Mountains. The Middle Mountains begin about 10 miles (16 kilometers) north of Basoli and north of Ramnagar, Riasi, Rajouri, Kishtwar, Doda, and Ramban. From these towns the middle mountains turn northwest toward Muzaffarabad and are divided by the Bhadarwah, Kishtwar, and Padar River Valleys. The average elevation of these hills is 14,000-15,000 feet (4,267-4,573 meters). The famous passes of Pir Panjal (11,400 feet; 3,475 meters), Banihal (9,290 feet; 2,831 meters), and Baramula (5,191 feet; 1,582 meters) are in the Middle Mountains. The Middle Mountains are bounded on the north by two high mountain ranges; one comes from southeast and ends at Kishtwar, and the other is the Pir Panjal Range, which overlooks the Kashmir Valley and divides it from Jammu. Three mountain ranges surround the Kashmir Valley: Pir Panjal Range, Jhelum Valley Range, and the Northeastern Range. The Pir Panjal Range forms the highest line of the mountain barrier that divides the valley from Jammu. It runs for about 31 miles (50 kilometers) from east to west, then turns northwest and continues for about 50 miles (80 kilometers), attaining a height of 15,524 feet (4,731 meters) atTatakuti Peak. The range then gradually descends toward the Jhelum Valley. All the important routes that connect Kashmir with the plains of northern India cut across this range. A ridge from the Himalayan Mountains known as the Jhelum Valley Range separates the Kashmir Valley from the Jhelum Valley at Bandipur, across Lake Wular. The ridge is 2,000 to 3,000 feet (610 to 414 meters) above Tragbal. On the other side of the ridge is the Kishanganga River, which rises about 40 miles (65 kilometers) east of Kunzalwan, in the mountains behind the Dras Valley. The Jhelum Valley Range consists of two small mountain chains that

Location and

Orientation

23

branch off from the Pir Panjal and Kajnag Ranges. Starting southward from the Baramula Gorge, they continue along the Jhelum River for about 80 miles (128 kilometers) to the confluence of the Jhelum and Kishinganga Rivers at Domel. This route does not pass through very high ground, and it is free from snow throughout the year. The Northeastern Range separates the valley from Ladakh, Baltistan, and Dardistan. Zoji La and Burzil are two important passes in this range. Through these and other passes, the Kashmir Valley maintained links with the outside world. Ponies, elephants, and bullocks were used to cross these mountain passes before there were roads and vehicular traffic. Running from northeast to southwest is the third step in the Himalayan Mountains. In this portion of the range, one pass leads west to Astor and Baltistan, and another leads east to Leh. Toward the northwest, beyond Baltistan, is Gilgit. Further north of Gilgit, near the Pamirs, are Hunza and Nagar. Beyond the greater Himalayan Range is the Ladakh Range, also called the Inner Himalayas. This range stretches to Tibet, and because of its lower elevation, has a number of gaps. In Tibet one gap is situated about 25 miles (40 kilometers) southwest of Mansarowar, and another is located about 65 miles (104 kilometers) north of Chamo Lhari. The Tibetan Range is about 12,000 feet (3,658 meters) high and forms the watershed between the Indus Valley and the Tibet Plateau. From Tibet, the Indus runs in an east-west direction through Jammu and Kashmir state and then swings south on its way to Pakistan. The Shyok joins the Indus near Kiris in Skardu. On the other side of the Himalayan Mountains, the staircase of mountains descends again into Tibet in two steps. First is the famous Karakorum Range known in Baltistan as "the backbone of Asia." The Karakorum is a continuation of the Tibetan Mountains. This range includes the peaks of Gasherbrum (28,100 feet; 8,565 meters), Masherbrum (25,600 feet; 7,802 meters), and K2 (Mount Godwin Austin, 28,265 feet; 8,615 meters). The Karakorum Range is deeply dissected by rivers that have gorges as deep as 5,000 feet (1,520 meters). The second step is the Tibetan Plateau itself, which rises to a height of 12,000 feet (3,657 meters) and extends into the territory of Tibet beyond Kashmir state.

Rivers and Lakes According to the Harza Engineering Company, the total area of the Indus Basin is 364,700 square miles (944,573 square kilometers), larger than the area of Pakistan. 5 About 160,400 square miles (415,436 square kilometers) of the basin are in the highlands of Tibet, Kashmir, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The rest make up the Indus Plains, one of the most homogenous physiographic regions on earth. 6 The depth of the alluvial deposits over

24

Divided Kashmir

most of the Indus Basin is unknown, but there is reason to believe that it averages a mile or more. The Indus River begins from a spring, called Mouth of the Lion, about 30 miles (48 kilometers) from Lake Mansarowar in Tibet. After gathering water from glacier-fed streams and rivers, the Indus turns northwest in a structural trough between the Karakorum and Himalayan Mountains. The river is known by different names along its route. Between the Karakorum Mountains and the Himalayas, people call it the Eastern River. Outside of Karakorum, the river is known as Abasin (the father of rivers). In ancient times, the river was known as Sindhu, which later became Indu (the name that India came from). 7 The Indus cuts through Jammu-Kashmir state in a northwest direction, following the Himalayas. 8 Near Leh in Ladakh, the Indus crosses the 12,000-foot (3,657 meter) contour. Southwest of K2, the Shyok River join the Indus, and the Shigar River joins it at Skardu. Here the Indus is 1,400 miles (2,240 meters) from its mouth and 7,500 feet (2,286 meters) high. Twenty-five miles (40 kilometers) below Skardu the Indus enters its gorge and falls 6,000 feet (1,828 meters) in 300 miles (480 kilometers). In making this descent, the Indus reaches its northernmost point (35° 51', the same latitude as K2) at an elevation of 4,500 feet (1,368 meters). After the Gilgit and Astor Rivers join the Indus near Bunji, the Indus turns west and continues past Chilas. It describes another "S" around the Kohistan Range in the Lesser Himalayas and then turns south through the Siwaliks, where it passes the dam site at Tarbela. At Tarbela, the Indus has descended to 1,300 feet (400 meters), but it is still 1,100 miles (1,760 kilometers) from its mouth. The Indus is past the Himalayas, and it crosses the outlier of the Hindu Kush, Safed Koh. It reaches the Suleiman and Salt Ranges and breaches these between Attock and Kalabagh. At Attock the Kabul River joins the Indus from the east. Three miles (5 kilometers) below Kalabagh is the Jinnah Barrage. From the Jinnah Barrage to the Arabian Sea is 950 miles (1,520 kilometers), and the average gradient of the Indus is less than nine inches per mile. From Mithaiikot, where the combined streams of the Punjab join the Indus, the average gradient is less than six inches per mile. The beautiful Kashmir Valley is embedded in the mountains south of the Indus River. The valley is situated between Nanga Parbat at an elevation of 26,000 feet (7,924 meters) in the northeast and Pir Panjal Range in the southwest, with an elevation ranging between 5,000 and 6,000 feet (1,524 to 1,828 meters) and peaks as high as 15,000 feet (4,572 meters). The valley and its surrounding mountains form an oval shaped landscape 84 miles (135 kilometers) long and 25 miles (40 kilometers) wide with an area of about 1,800 square miles (4,500 square kilometers). 9 The valley was historically important as a staging area for Himalayan trade routes, leading either to Tibet or across the Karakorum Range to Sinkiang. The valley is an important and centrally located region of remarkable

Location and Orientation

25

beauty. Francois Bernier, who visited the valley in 1659 during the reign of Jahangir, was so enchanted that he called Kashmir a "terrestrial paradise in the east." 10 Bernier quoted the emperor as saying that he would rather be deprived of every other province in his kingdom than lose Kashmir. Akbar also called Kashmir Bagh-e-Khas ("the Chosen Garden"). Centuries earlier, the traveling saint, Syed Ali Hamadani (1314-1364), called the valley the Bagh-i-Sulaiman ("Garden of Solomon"). W. Wakefield said that Kashmir is a theme worthy of a poet. 11 Allama Iqbal, the poet and philosopher of Pakistan, originally from Kashmir, identified Kashmir as paradise on earth and wrote a beautiful couplet in Persian. That couplet inspired Sufi (1975) to dedicate his monumental work on Kashmir to Iqbal. 12 Nowhere else in Asia can a comparable natural paradise be found. Nehru also loved Kashmir, an attachment that played a part in his handling of the Kashmir dispute. 13 In a letter written to Edwina Mountbatten on 27 June 1948, Nehru said: Kashmir affects me in a particular way; it is a kind of mild intoxication, like music sometimes or the company of a beloved person. For years and years I could not visit Kashmir because of [the threat of] prison, etc., and the desire to come here again became a passion and an obsession. It is not just the beauty of the scene, though I love beauty and beautiful things, but even more is the very air of Kashmir which has something mysterious and compelling about it. 1 4

The Jhelum, a major tributary of the Indus that originates in Kashmir and adds to its beauty, has a 13,000-square-mile (3,670 square kilometers) catchment area. The source of the Jhelum River is Varnag Spring, or more precisely, nearby Vithavutur Spring, at 12,000 feet (3,657 meters), not far from Zoji La Pass. The Jhelum River is also known as the Bihat, Vihat, and Bihatab in different places along its route. The modern Kashmiri name of the river is Vyath. The name Jhelum originated during the Muslim period. 15 According to Emperor Jahangir, the spring from which the river rises is a basin of octagonal form, about 60 feet (18 meters) long and 60 feet (18 meters) wide. The water is so clear "that a poppy seed thrown in it will be visible till it reaches the bottom." 1 6 Jahangir encased the spring with stone and planted a garden around it. The Poonch River joins the Jhelum after flowing through the towns of Poonch, Kotli, and Chaumuk. Other small streams join, the Jhelum near Anantnag (former Islamabad). The river is navigable from about 15 miles (24 kilometers) north of Anantnag as far as Baramula. At Baramula it broadens to about 100 yards (90 meters), with an average depth of 10 feet (3 meters), and from Baramula descends through a deep gorge to Kohala. At the lower end of Srinagar, Dudhaganga Stream joins the Jhelum, and at Shadipur (near Srinagar) the Sind River joins it. Then at Muzzaffarabad, the Kishinganga River joins the Jhelum via its eastern bank. Below Kishinganga Junction, the Jhelum forms the boundary between

26

Divided Kashmir

Kashmir state and the districts of Hazara and Rawalpindi in Pakistan. Finally the Jhelum joins the Chenab at Trimmu, 10 miles (16 kilometers) south of Maghiana, after flowing about 450 miles (720 kilometers), 200 miles (320 kilometers) of which are in Pakistan. In Kashmir, the Jhelum has three tributaries on the eastern bank and six tributaries on the western bank. The eastern bank tributaries are (1) the Liddar, (2) the Sind, and (3) the Pohru. The western tributaries are (1) the Vishav, (2) the Rembiara, (3) the Ramshi, (4) the Dudaganga, (5) the Sukang, and (6) the Firozpur. The Dudaganga joins the Jhelum near Srinagar and then continues to the northwest to flow into Lake Wular.17 Much of Kashmir's internal commerce depends on the Jhelum. Recognizing the importance of the Jhelum to Kashmir, Sinha said that if Egypt is the gift of the Nile, Kashmir is the gift of the Jhelum River.18 Before the construction of modern roads between Srinagar and Khanabal and between Srinagar and Baramula, the Jhelum was the great highway for passengers and goods up and down the valley. Wular, Manabal, Anchar, and Dal Lakes, whose broad meanders have cut swampy lowlands, are in the Jhelum flood plain near Srinagar. These swampy lowlands protected Srinagar from tribal invasion in October 1947.19 Lake Dal, with its houseboats, is the most beautiful. Major palaces of former Dogra rulers (Lakshmi Kutir, Gulab Bhavan, and Chashmashahi House) are located around Lake Dal. Lake Dal has two small islands that each measure about 4 miles (6.4 kilometers) by 2 miles (3 kilometers). Lake Wular is in the extreme northwest (60 square miles; 153 square kilometers). The Chenab, another tributary of the Indus, has its source on the southern flank of the Himalayas, about 150 miles (240 kilometers) south of Leh. The river flows parallel to the Indus northwest, then turns southwest and passes through the extreme southern corner of Jammu and Kashmir state to Pakistan. Below Akhnur the river splits into smaller channels. Further west of Akhnur, along the Bhimber area, is a strip of comparatively dry plain that is crossed by the Minawar Tavi River. The Minawar Tavi rises in the Ratan Range behind Rajauri, and after crossing various ridges of the Siwalik Hills, joins the Chenab River. The Beas rises not far from the headwaters of the Chenab but takes a different course, west, and then south. The first European to see the source of the Beas was Moorcroft, who erected a cairn to commemorate the occasion. The Ravi does not penetrate the Himalayas. The catchment area is limited to the southwestern slopes of the Pir Panjal Range, and it is closely circumscribed by Chandra-Chenab. It is the most seasonal of the Punjab rivers. Compared to the Beas, the Ravi has a long course, traveling 425 miles (680 kilometers) from Madhopur to its junction with the Chenab above Multan. Over this course it falls one foot per mile. For a short distance the Ravi marks the India-Pakistan boundary between Jammu and Punjab in the Gurdaspur District. The Ravi joins the Chenab and Jhelum Rivers about 40 miles below their confluence.

27

Location and Orientation

The Beas rises near Rohtang Pass at the southeastern end of the Pir Panjal Range. Its headwaters are closely hemmed in by those of the Sutlej to the south and east of the Ravi and Chandra to the west and north. The Chandra narrowly cuts off the Beas from all but the Pir Parbati Massif of the Himalayas. The two streams pass within six miles of each other (9.5 kilometers); a diversion dam and tunnel were therefore proposed prior to the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960. Now India has given up this scheme in favor of a 24-mile (38 kilometers) link involving two tunnels between the Beas at Pandoh, at the end of the gorge through the Lesser Himalayas, and the Sutlej. 20 The Beas used to flow all the way to the Chenab above Panjnad but was captured late in the eighteenth century by the Sutlej near Harike. Thus, the Beas is the shortest of the Punjab rivers, only 247 miles (395 kilometers) long. In general, the course of the Sutlej is less complicated than that of the Indus. It acts as a transverse Himalayan stream, exploiting the ancient fault line in its gorge below Shipki La. This course brings it to the Inner Siwaliks at Bhakra 1,200 feet (365 meters) above sea level. The rim station on the Sutlej is at Rupar, where it cuts through the last of the foothills and emerges onto the plains. From Rupar to Mithankot is a distance of about 550 miles, over which the Sutlej falls only 500 feet (152 meters), with an average gradient of one foot per mile. Table 3.1 shows the catchment areas of the Punjab rivers based on the studies done for the Indus Waters Treaty.

Table 3.1

Catchment Areas of the Punjab Rivers

River

Gauging Station

Indus Jhelum Chenab Sutlej Beas Ravi

Attack Mangia Marala Rupar Mandi Plain Madhopur

Catchment Area (Sq. Miles) (Sq. Km.) 102,220 12,900 11,400 18,550 6,500 3,100

264,750 33,410 28,386 48,045 16,938 8,028

Average Annual Runoff,1922-1961 (mill, acre-ft) 93 23 26 14 13 7

Notes 1. There is some disagreement over the area of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The state government says the area is 84,471 square miles (218,780 square kilometers), a figure that is used by most Indian and Pakistani writers. However, the 1891 census of India found 60,000 square miles (155,400 square kilometers) as the area, a number that was repeated in 1901. The 1911 census found the area of the state to be 84,432 square miles (218,678 square kilometers), and the 1921 census found

28

Divided Kashmir

84,259 square miles (218,230 square kilometers). The 1961 census said that all earlier estimates were incorrect. (See Lamb, The Kashmir Problem, 1966.) 2. Michel, The Indus Rivers, 1967, p. 23. 3. Pithawalla, An Introduction to Kashmir, 1963. 4. Drew, The Jammu and Kashmir Territories, 1971, p. 26. 5. Harza International, A Program for Water and Power, 1963. 6. Michel, The Indus Rivers, 1967, p. 29. 7. Fairley, The Lion River, 1975, p. xvi. 8. Of the 103,800 square mile catchment basin of the Indus, 62,700 square miles of the catchment basin are in Kashmir. (See Kureishy, "Hydrological Control of Kashmir," 1953, pp. 78-93 . 9. Spate, India and Pakistan, 1957, p. 373. 10. Younghusband, Kashmir, 1911, p. 158. 11. Wakefield, History of Kashmir, 1976. 12. Sufi, Kashir, 1974. 13. Nehru, The Discovery of India, 1960, p. 571. 14. Nehru's letter to Edwina Mountbatten, 27 June 1948, quoted in Ziegler, Mountbatten, p. 445. 15. Sufi, Kashir, 1974, p. 537. 16. Fairley, The Lion River, 1975, p. 180. 17. Lake Wular is the largest in Kashmir. It is situated toward the north end of the valley, about 21 miles (34 kilometers) northwest of Srinagar. Lake Wular is at 5,100 feet (1,555 meters) above sea level and has an area of about 12 square miles. In years of floods it exceeds 103 square miles (267 square kilometers). The average depth is 812 feet (247 meters). The circumference is nearly 30 miles (46 kilometers). The name is supposed to be a corruption of Wilola, a Sanskrit word for turbulence or a lake with high waves. The ancient name of the lake was Wahapadma. (See Sufi, p. 159.) 18. Sinha, pp. 16-17, quoted by Sufi, Kashir, 1974, p. 538. 19. Khan, Akbar, Raiders in Kashmir, 1970, p. 39. 20. Michel, The Indus Rivers, 1967, p. 33.

4 Population and Economy

Jammu and Kashmir is a state of varied religions, classes, sects, and ethnic and linguistic groups. Ladakh is inhabited by Lamaistic Buddhists. Jammu is inhabited predominantly by Hindus and includes a significant Muslim population. Gilgit, Skardu, Baltistan, Kargil, and the western strip from Muzaffarabad to Mirpur are inhabited mainly by Muslims. Muslims also predominate in the valley, which also includes a small community of Sikhs and Kashmiri Pandits. An understanding of the population, its ethnicity, and its economic infrastructure is necessary to understand the present conflict in Kashmir.

Population With a population of about 4 million people in 1941, Jammu and Kashmir was the fourth most populous princely state. Dogra rule was harsh, discriminating, and oppressive for Muslims. The administration was dominated by Kashmiri Pandits and Dogras, who were notoriously corrupt and avaricious. Muslims were systematically excluded from civil service and the armed forces, even though about two-thirds of the population was Muslim. In 1931, the population of the state was 3.6 million, and it increased by more than 10 percent in 1941. In 1941, Jammu and Kashmir state consisted of three provinces that were divided into 13 districts. The provinces were: (1) Jammu, (2) Kashmir,1 and (3) Frontier.2 A fourteenth district, Gilgit agency, was leased to the British government of India in 1935. Map 4.1 represents the administrative districts of the state in 1968. About four-fifths of the state is too mountainous or too arid to permit dense settlement. Kashmir Valley, located between Pir Panjal and Nanga Parbat, was the oekumene (habitable area) of Jammu and Kashmir state. Of the state's 4 million people, 1.72 million lived in Kashmir Province (mainly in the Jhelum and Srinagar Valleys), and 1.98 million lived in the north29

Map 4.1 Administrative Districts: Jammu and Kashmir

31

Population and Economy

western uplands of Jammu Province. The remaining 311,000 lived in isolated marginal areas, such as the upper Indus or Ladakh Valleys, or Gilgit. Table 4.1 shows the distribution of the population based on religion in 1941.

Table 4.1 Distribution of Population Based on Religion, 1941 Province/ District

Area (sq.miles)

Non-Muslims

Muslims

Total

1. Jammu Province 12,378 Jammu District 1,147 Katuha District 1,023 Udhampur District 5,070 Riasi District 1,789 Mirpur District 1,627 Chenani Jagir® 95 Poonch Jagir® 1,627 2. Kashmir Province 8,539 Baramula District 3,317 Anantnag District 2,814 Muzaffarabad District 2,408 65,554 3. Frontier District Ladakh District 47,762 Astore District 1,632 Gilgit(Leased Area) 1,480 Gilgit Agency 14,680

765,757 260,573 132,458 165,890 82,364 5,557 9,591 39,106 113,227 21,492 72,922 18,813 41,385 40,939 143 199 99

1,215,676 170,789 45,241 128,327 175,539 310,880 2,205 382,722 1,615,478 590,936 778,684 245,858 270,093 154,492 16,979 22,296 76,427

1,981,433 431,362 177,672 294,217 257,903 386,655 11,796 421,828 1,728,705 612,428 851,606 264,671 311,478 195,431 17,026 22,495 76,526

Total for Jammu and Kashmir

920,369

3,101,247

4,021,618

84,471

Note: a. A jagir is a tax-exempt semi-independent fiefdom or feudal estate.

In 1981, Jammu Province had nearly 45 percent of the population of the state. Two-thirds were Dogra Hindus, with Muslims constituting the majority of the remaining one-third of the population. Dogra Hindus of Jammu are ethnically different from Kashmiri Hindus of the valley. The Maharaja and Maharani of the state came from a Dogra family. Supported by the state, Dogra Hindus were dominant in the military, bureaucracy, economic structure, and politics. In the Kashmir Valley, Muslims comprised 95 percent of the population; Hindus and Kashmiri Pandits, 5 percent. Politically and economically, Kashmiri Pandits were most important. Known also as Batta in Kashmir, Pandits held positions of power as ministers and advisers. Pandits who were not in government earned their livelihood performing religious rites, serving as priests, or teaching the sacred texts. They were paid a fee, and further donations were frequently given. In addition, temple Pandits received the revenue of the villages. Separate taxes were levied for village temples and the Maharaja's temples during Dogra rule to support temple Pandits.

32

Divided Kashmir

Though Kashmiri Pandits are basically Hindus, they are a distinct subculture, with a different diet and mode of dress than Indian Hindus. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister of India, belonged to this community, and it affected his handling of the accession of the state to India and his later responses to developments in Jammu and Kashmir. The influence of the Pandits is so great that some mountain peaks in the Himalayan Range surrounding the valley bear the names of their gods. The demographics in Kashmir have changed greatly since India occupied the state in 1947. After the Indian occupation, thousands of Muslims and Hindus left their homelands to take refuge in either Pakistan or India. After partition of the subcontinent, many Hindus migrated from the Punjab to Jammu. Jammu already had a large Hindu population opposed to the Muslims; the new migrants also opposed the Muslim presence in Jammu. In 1947-1948, supported by a Dpgra viceroy of Jammu, they demonstrated against the Muslims in Jammu. The demonstrations developed into a vengeful anti-Muslim mob. The London Times reported that 237,000 Muslims were systematically exterminated by Dogra forces headed by the Maharaja. 3 People moved to Azad Kashmir or Pakistan. Those who migrated to Azad Kashmir were mostly Punjabis; they dominate the population, leading some to suggest that Azad Kashmir be renamed "Azad Punjab." In Pakistan, Kashmiris are widely scattered and engaged in the professions, business, civil service, and other service sectors of the economy. As of 1995, 2.5 million inhabitants live in Azad Kashmir and the Northern Area (including Gilgit, Hunza, and Baltistan). In addition, about 1.5 million Kashmiris live in Pakistan, 300,000 live in Britain, and about 100,000 live in other parts of the world. Another major change in the demographics of the state is the result of uprisings or intifada in Jammu and Kashmir since 1989. According to Kaul and Teng, more than 26,000 people have left their homes in the valley for Jammu, Chandigarh, and Delhi; 4 only about 500 Hindu households remain in the valley. The people in the valley allege that the migrations were engineered by state forces, whereas the government of India blames the uprisings. A report in Economist Weekly seems to confirm that some Hindus do not want to leave the valley.5 According to Altaf Hussain, more than 20,000 Pandits still live peacefully in the valley.6 In support of his position, he quotes a group of human rights activists who visited Kashmir in April 1990 under the leadership of V. M. Tarkunde. The impression of the group was: Hindus have received full cooperation from the local Muslims. The Muslims shared their rations and other items of day to day requirements with them. There is total communal harmony in Kashmir. Those people who came out either over reacted to the situation or because of certain other reasons which could be winter, curfew, or closure of offices and educational institutions. Not a single case of looting or arson of non-Muslim property had taken place.

33

Population and Economy

Since the partition in 1947, other waves of migration have come from India; policymakers and the government of India have encouraged people from other parts of India to settle in Jammu and Kashmir, apparently to reduce the Muslim majority. This has been done despite Article 370 of the constitution that prohibits outside migrations and occupation of Kashmiri land and property by non-Kashmiris. Even Kashmiris who left the valley or Jammu after 1947 have a right to their land and property if they choose to return to Kashmir. In 1981, the state had a population of 5.9 million people. Table 4.2 presents the population and religious breakdown of the state of Jammu and Kashmir in 1981. Table 4.2

Population of Jammu and Kashmir, 1981 7

Region

Kashmir Valley Jammu Ladakh Total State

Population (% of state population) 3,134,904 (52.36%) 2,718,113 (45.39%) 134,372 (2.24%) 5,987,389

% Muslim

% Hindus

% Others

94.96

4.59

0.05

29.60

66.25

4.15

46.04

2.66

64.19

32.24

51.30 (Buddhist) 3.57

Source: Adapted from Varsheny, "Three Compromised Nationalisms," 1992, pp. 192-234.

Languages Languages also differ widely from one area to another in Kashmir. Jammu and Kashmir state is a forced political entity; there are such varied and distinct differences that no common culture holds the people together. 8 It is a pluralistic state with at least six different peoples living in different parts of the state, having distinct languages, cultures, customs, manners, and historyThe Imperial Gazetteer of India published in 1908 noted that about 34 percent of the people speak Kashmiri, 15 percent speak Dogri, and 30 percent speak Punjabi. 9 The 1921 census reported that 181,000 people speak Bhotia (Ladakhi and Balti), 1,256,886 people speak Kashmiri, and 425,850 speak Dogri. The valley is inhabited by people who speak Kashmiri. Most of the people of Jammu speak Dogri, and some speak Punjabi. Ladakh's language is a Tibetan dialect. Poonchis have absorbed influences both from their northern and southern neighbors and represent a different linguistic and cultural entity.

34

Divided Kashmir

The Tibetan language group is represented primarily in Ladakh. People in Astor and Gilgit speak Shina or Burushaski languages. Kashmiri is widely spoken f r o m Karnsh to Bhadrawah, and a few people use it in Poonch, Uri, and Riasi. Dogri is the primary language in Udhampur, Katuha, Jammu, and Chenani Jagir districts. Table 4.3 presents the distribution of language groups in Jammu and Kashmir state as of 1941.

Table 4.3 Distribution of Linguistic Groups, 1941 District Jammu Katuha Udhampur Riasi Mirpur Chenani Jagir Poonch Jagir Baramula Anantnag Muzaffarabad Ladakh Astor Gilgit (Leased Area) Gilgit Agency

Kashmiri

Dogri

Punjabi

Hindustani

61,000 131,000 3,135,000 972,000 3,000 655,000 444,000 8,900,000 9,400,000 907,000 60,000 78,000 76,000 2,000

6,494,000 8,616,000 3,388,000 3,183,000 848,000 7,282,000 19,000 3,000 23,000 2,000 11,000 7,000

1,813,000 185,000 39,000 568,000 5,784,000 70,000 518,000 195,000 112,000 1,817,000 12,000 133,000 105,000 11,000

635,000 376,000 65,000 517,000 540,000 655,000 2,285,000 65,000 37,000 134,000 1,000 3,000 49,000 51,000





Economy Low income, poverty, and misery are endemic in Jammu and Kashmir state. India's massive economic assistance of more than 70,000 crores has not alleviated the economic condition. 1 0 The economy is predominantly agricultural, with more than 80 percent of the people engaged in agricultural pursuits. Most of the other industries, such as forestry, fruit processing, and sericulture, are closely tied to agriculture. Srinagar, Jammu, and Muzaffarabad have comparatively better economic structures, because people also work in cottage industries as weavers or craftsmen. Highly skewed taxation and land tenure systems are one reason the majority of the people remain abjectly poor. Historically, all land in the state belonged to the Maharaja. He distributed the land according to clan, caste, or allegiance to the state. Members of the royal family and their relatives were first to receive good land. People who belonged to the Dogra caste and the same religion as the ruler were second. People who were loyal or useful to the state were third. Land was divided into jagirs. Landowners were

Population and Economy

35

known as jagirdars, and they were the administrators, keepers of law and order, and dispensers of justice in their jagirs. The jagirdars operated their estates through chakars, who were entitled to one-half of the produce from their chaks of several villages. The cultivators were required to produce for the jagirdars or their chakars as well as render domestic and menial services. The taxation system of the Dogra rulers was exploitative and ruthless. Taxes included (1) a half-share of kharif and rabi crops, (2) a tax on walnut trees, (3) a tax from shawl weavers, (4) an advance tax on the original assessment under the public auction system, (5) a tax on jungle produce, and (6) a tax on grass. In addition there were 12 other taxes levied since 1883: (1) a 2 percent general tax known as Do Khawari, (2) a Sala Jalus tax11 (3) a tax for law enforcement, (4) a tax for land revenue collectors, (5) a tax for the Maharaja's temples, (6) a tax for public servants, (7) a tax for establishment, (8) a tax for land granted to chakars, (9) a tax on apricot trees, (10) a tax for temples, (11) a tax for gifts, and (12) a tax for marriages in the royal household. 12 Restrictions were placed on the manufacture of shawls. Wool was taxed when it entered Kashmir. The manufacturer was taxed for every worker he employed according to the value of the fabric at each stage. Finally, there was an 85 percent ad valorem tax. Butchers, bakers, carpenters, boatmen, and prostitutes were taxed. Coolies, who were engaged to carry loads for tourists, had to pay half of their earnings to the state. 13 According to the 1951 census, the state had an area of 59,300,000 acres (23,994,710 hectares). Of this area, 4,800,000 acres (1,942,560 hectares) were arable, but only 230,000 acres were cultivated. Agriculture was confined to about 50 percent of the arable Jammu Piedmont and the valley.14 About one-third of the cultivated land was located in the valley. Rice, corn, and saffron were the main crops; wheat and oil seeds were next in importance. Jammu Province was known for wheat cultivation and also produced corn, millet, and rice. Ladakh grew millet and fruit at elevations ranging from 12,000 to 15,000 feet (3,657 to 4,572 meters), but, because of its dry climate and short warm summers, agricultural development was not widespread. In the valley, tropical fruits such as apricots, apples, oranges, peaches, grapes, and mulberries were grown. The cultivation of mulberries provided a base for sericulture and silk, one of the major exports from Kashmir. In the high plains and rugged country, sheep and goats were raised. In the 1950s the state had about 10,000 square miles (25,900 square kilometers) of forest in the sub-Himalayan foothill zone. The principal forest trees were pine, fir, spruce, walnut, and ash. The state does not produce enough food and relies on imports from India through Banihal Pass. Before partition, most domestic supplies were obtained overland through Rawalpindi and Sialkot or imported through Karachi.

36

Divided Kashmir

Notes 1. The Jagir of Poonch, administered by its raja under the sovereignty of the Maharaja of Kashmir, was included in Jammu Province. 2. The Frontier District included Ladakh and Baltistan. Prior to August 1947, Ladakh and Baltistan owed a limited loyalty to the Maharaja of Kashmir, but they were administered by a political agent of the government of India. (See Lord Birdwood, Two Nations and Kashmir, 1856, p. 209.) 3. London Times, 10 November 1948. 4. Kaul and Teng, "Human Rights Violations of Kashmiri Hindus," 1992, p. 176. 5. Economist Weekly, London, 1-7 May 1993. 6. Hussain, A., The Wounded Paradise, 1991. 7. More recent data not available. 8. Madhok, Kashmir Divided, 1949, pp. 16-17. 9. Imperial Gazetteer of India, Delhi, 1908. 10. One crore equals 10 million rupees. 11. Sala was a tax for Sanskrit schools. Jala was a tax for British visitors to the state. 12. Punjabi, "Kashmir: The Bruised Identity," 1992, pp. 134-152. See also Peter Lyon (pp. 133-136). 13. Sufi, Kashir, 1974, p. 799. 14. Mukerjee, "Kashmir: A Study of Political Geography," 1956, p. 15.

5 Kashmir and the People's Movement

Maharaja Hari Singh inherited Jammu and Kashmir state from his uncle in 1925, a time when nationalism was gaining strength in British India. In December 1929, the Indian National Congress adopted a resolution in Lahore setting its goal as complete independence. A massive civil disobedience followed, electrifying the entire subcontinent. Jammu and Kashmir, too, felt repercussions. The people were excited by what was taking place in the rest of the country, but the Maharaja was averse to nationalism. In an effort to maintain the traditional feudal order, the Maharaja used force to eliminate or curb expressions of nationalism. The result was dissension, agitation, and turmoil in the state. To Gandhi and other Indian leaders it seemed impossible to separate the princely states such as Jammu and Kashmir or their people from the rest of India.1 Referring to the princely states, Gandhi said "there is complete anarchy, and the liberation of British India spells the liberation of states as well." 2 In Kashmir, Dogra rule was ruthless and authoritarian from the beginning. Muslims in Kashmir were condemned to a life of suffering and serfdom. During the Dogra rule (1846-1947), there was never a Muslim prime minister. There was only one Muslim battalion out of the 13 battalions in Kashmir, even though Muslims constituted 77 percent of the population. During the Maharaja's reign, no Muslim could carry a firearm or even a sharp instrument or knife. A license was required to sacrifice a chicken. The slaughter of cows was banned. According to Sayyid Mohammed Syeed, a Kashmiri and secretary general of the Islamic Society of North America, a family hosting a bridal party, unaware of the ban, slaughtered a cow. The host of the wedding party and the bridegroom were dragged by their feet and hung upside down for three days in Srinagar to set an example. 3 Until 1934 the slaughter of a cow was a capital crime. Later, the law was amended to provide 10 years' imprisonment for cow slaughter.4 A tax was imposed on the goats and sheep Muslims sacrificed during religious festivals. The kinsmen and relatives of the ruler were given unlimited lands, to which Muslim 37

38

Divided Kashmir

farmers had no rights. 5 All political activities were banned for Muslims. They could not form sabhas (societies or associations) without permission from the state. Muslims were denied education and excluded from civil service. Such discrimination produced a large number of illiterate Muslims who lived in ignorance and abject poverty. There was widespread discontent among the Muslim masses, leading to the struggle for democratization of Jammu and Kashmir state. The All India States People's Conference (AISPC) was established in 1927. The objective of this organization was to attain responsible government for the people in the Indian states through representative institutions under the aegis of their rulers. By 1939, the AISPC adopted a constitution that emphasized using peaceful and legitimate means to attain full responsible government by the people of the state as an integral part of a free and federal India. A number of other organizations were formed to achieve the objectives of the AISPC.

Hindu Organizations Kashmiri Pandits, who had contacts in Lahore, Delhi, and Lucknow, were influenced by the nationalist reform movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Kashmiri Hindus formed a Hindu revivalist party, led by Arya Samaj. In Jammu, a Dogra sabha, open only to Hindus, was established in 1903. In 1915, Yawak Sabha and other Dogra organizations were established. In the beginning, these organizations dealt with social issues. Some of them worked to improve the conditions of women, in particular dealing with the issue of remarriage of widows.

Muslim Organizations The Hindu associations inspired Muslims in Kashmir to establish their own organizations. In 1905, the Mirwaiz of Kashmir formed the Anjuman-iNusrat-ul-Islam to preach Islam and to improve education and social justice for Kashmiri Muslims. The Anjuman formed councils and committees for communication and established Islamia High School in Srinagar. In 1922 it sent a delegation to the state government to seek redress of Muslim grievances. Following the Anjuman, other Muslim groups emerged in Kashmir, including one in Jammu. Though these subsequent groups were strictly social, the state banned all Muslim organizations. In 1924, a labor crisis developed in the silk mill in Srinagar owned by the Maharaja. The silk mill employed more than 5,000 workers, who were paid 4.5 annas per day. 6 Most

Kashmir and the People's Movement

39

of the laborers were Muslim. They resented the exploitation, low wages, and inhumane conditions in the mill.7 In October 1924, a memorandum signed by prominent Muslims, outlining Muslim grievances and those of the silk mill workers, was presented to the governor general of India, Lord Reading.8 In addition to specifying grievances, the memorandum called for an increase in Muslim employment, improved education, land reforms, protection of Muslim religious establishments from encroachment, the abolition of forced labor, equitable distribution of resources, a state constitution, and a legislative assembly that would give Muslims proper representation. In the 1920s, as a result of rising consciousness and a desire for higher education, a number of Muslim students left the state to study in the Punjab and at Aligarh Muslim University. Aligarh was considered the best school for Muslim education. It was established by Sayyid Ahmad Khan in 1875 as the Anglo-Oriental College and had just been upgraded to a university. The Kashmiris who attended Aligarh returned home in the early 1930s as motivated, educated people. They participated in state politics, resulting in new opposition to the Maharaja's autocracy. There was virtually no opposition to the Maharaja, however, in the Hindu areas of Jammu and Ladakh. In 1931, events intensified opposition to the Maharaja. With the Maharaja's approval, a mosque in Jammu Province was demolished by Hindus. Also in Jammu, Muslims were prevented from offering their prayers; and at another mosque in Jammu, an Imam was not allowed to give his khutba (sermon). Then a few pages of the holy Quran were found discarded in a public latrine in Srinagar. Some villages (Jandala, Makial, Kotli, Nawal, Dana, and Cheerala) were destroyed, and their inhabitants burned alive in their houses.9 These atrocities intensified hatred of the Maharaja and led Muslims to launch an independence movement against him.

Independence Movement In the beginning, the Muslim independence movement was dominated by two men: Mirwaiz Mohammad Yusuf Shah and Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. Sheikh Abdullah returned from Aligarh Muslim University in 1930. He was the first Kashmiri Muslim to obtain a Master's degree in science (chemistry). The state hired him as a schoolmaster at a salary of 60 rupees per month.10 Mirwaiz Mohammad Yusuf had religious prestige, and Sheikh Abdullah had a charismatic personality and organizing ability; together they were a formidable team to lead the opposition to the Maharaja." Sheikh Abdullah organized a public meeting on 21 June 1931 as a protest. At this meeting he took a public oath, with the Quran in his hand, to

40

Divided

Kashmir

never betray the cause of Kashmiri Muslims. The atmosphere was supercharged with emotion. Abdul Qadeer, a young man from the Northwest Frontier Province who was an employee of a British Army officer, gave a fiery speech. He was arrested and put on trial for treason. Ghulam Nabi Gilkar and Sheikh Abdullah addressed a huge public meeting at Gaw Kadal on 12 July 1931 and exhorted the people to get ready for a resolute struggle against the Maharaja. Inspired by this speech, a large number of Muslims gathered at the gate of the central prison in Srinagar to witness Abdul Qadeer's trial on 13 July 1931. Police opened fire, killing 22 demonstrators and one policeman. Sheikh Abdullah, Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas, Ghulam Nabi Gilkar, Abdur Rahim, and other Muslim leaders were arrested. Martial law was imposed. Srinagar, Anantnag, Baramula, and Sopore were handed over to the Dogra army. At gunpoint, every passerby on the street was made to say, Maharaja ki-jai ("victory for the Maharaja"), and all residents of the cities were required to wear Dogra flags on their shoulders indicating loyalty to the Maharaja. 12 Agitation continued, with the support of Muslims from other provinces. Almost 3,000 men from Punjab were imprisoned. 13 The mass imprisonments and agitations against the Maharaja made 13 July 1931 a turning point in the history of Jammu and Kashmir. It is observed as "Martyr's Day" throughout Kashmir and marks the beginning of the independence struggle. The Maharaja spread rumors that Sheikh Abdullah's agitation was a conspiracy to allow the British to take over the state under the "doctrine of lapse," as there was no heir to the state. It was rumored that the British wanted to punish the Maharaja for a speech in London at the Round Table Conference in 1930. British designs were said to have been frustrated by the birth of the heir apparent (Karan Singh) in Cannes, France, on 9 March 1931.14 The Maharaja became more repressive as agitation against him broadened. Because of increased resistance by Muslims and increased repression by the Maharaja, the British appointed a committee, presided over by a senior British officer, to investigate the causes behind the agitation. Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz, Lok Nath Sharma, Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas, and Khawaja G. A. Ashai helped the commission. The commission recommended: 1. Restoration of Khanqah (shrine) Sokhta, Khanqah Bulbul Shah, Khanqah Dara Shikoh, Malshahi Bagh Mosque (Ganderbal), Khanqah Sufi Shah (Jammu), Bahu Mosque (Bahu), and Srinagar Idgah to Muslims 2. Grant of proprietary rights of land to occupancy tenants 3. Fair share in government jobs to all communities 4. Abrogation of unauthorized taxes 5. Abolition of marriage tax

Kashmir and the People's

Movement

41

Following the commission's recommendations, the Maharaja adopted a state constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and association and created a legislative assembly with limited powers. The legislative assembly included 42 nominated and 35 elected members. Of the elected members, 21 were Muslims, 10 were Hindus, and two were Sikhs. 15 The Muslim Conference Sheikh Abdullah, Mirwaiz Mohammad Yusuf Shah, and others formed an All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference in October 1932. Chaudhri Ghulam Abbas, Mirza Afzal Beg, and G. M. Sadiq were all activists who returned from Aligarh University after graduation. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad joined the group later. The inaugural session of the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference was held in the historic Pathar Masjid, Srinagar. Sheikh Abdullah was unanimously elected president, and Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas was elected secretary of the party. The party adopted a green and white flag, representing Muslims and minorities with a crescent and star, similar to the flag of Pakistan. By January 1933, differences arose between Sheikh Abdullah and Mirwaiz Mohammad Yusuf Shah. The Muslims were divided into two camps. Mirwaiz's followers were dubbed bakras (goats) by political opponents, and followers of Sheikh Abdullah were called shers (lions). Following a provocative speech by Mirwaiz, clashes took place between his followers and those of Sheikh Abdullah, resulting in injuries and arrests on both sides. Another serious clash took place on the day of Eid (6 April 1933). Secularization of the Movement In October 1933, Sheikh Abdullah married Akbar Jahan Begum, a divorcee. Her father, Englishman Harry Nedou, was a major shareholder in the Nedou hotel chain that owned the Nedou hotel in Srinagar. The marriage helped Sheikh Abdullah become the richest man in the state. The next session of the Muslim Conference was held at Mirpur in December 1933, and Sheikh Abdullah was again elected president of the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference. This time the Sheikh invited non-Muslims to join the party to restore democratic rights in the state, thus beginning the secular political movement in Kashmir. Early in 1938, Congress passed a resolution that considered the states an integral part of India and demanded the same political, social, and economic freedom in the states as in the rest of India. Thus an intimate connection was established between the Congress and the All India States People's Conference, which was under Gandhi's leadership. Gandhi warned the states that the congressional policy of noninterference might be

42

Divided Kashmir

abandoned and advised the rulers to cultivate friendly relations "with an organization which bids fair in the future, to replace the paramount power." In 1939, Nehru was elected president of the All India States People's Conference. 16 Nehru and Bazaz were Sheikh Abdullah's mentors in his quest for secularization. In July 1932 Sheikh Abdullah and Bazaz had met at Chashma Shahi Garden to thrash out various ideological issues. At this meeting they resolved that the freedom movement should be conducted on "secular, democratic, and progressive" lines. 17 As a result, Sheikh Abdullah began seeing the Muslim National Conference in the state as an extension of the Indian National Congress. In 1933, Sheikh Abdullah formally replaced the Muslim Conference with the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, and in 1938 he proclaimed: "We must end communalism by ceasing to think in terms of Muslims and non-Muslims when discussing our political problems . . . and we must open our doors to all such Hindus and Sikhs, who, like ourselves, believe in the freedom of their country from the shackles of an irresponsible rule." 18 Muslims in Kashmir reacted strongly against Sheikh Abdullah and secularization. In 1941, Abbas disassociated himself from the Sheikh and joined Mirwaiz to resurrect the Muslim Conference. For all practical purposes, Abbas and the Muslim Conference became allied with the Muslim League and Mohammad Ali Jinnah, representing the interests of Muslims in Kashmir. The National Conference represented only the Congress and Hindu interest. Yusuf Buch described the split in the state very clearly: Later in the 1940s, a turmoil grew between Hindus and Muslims. This produced a cleavage in Kashmir. Abbas held to the Muslim Conference, while Abdullah joined by some Hindus, founded National Conference. The first allied itself to the Muslim League—the party of M.A. Jinnah and Pakistan, and the latter accepted the leadership of the Indian National Congress—the party of Gandhi and Nehru. 1 9

Sheikh Abdullah became closer to Nehru, when they met in Peshawar in 1938. Nehru saw a reflection of himself in Sheikh Abdullah—Kashmiri origin, tall build, and handsome looks. They shared the goal of a secular independent India. Nehru toured Kashmir for 10 days in 1940 accompanied by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Sheikh Abdullah. These travels brought them closer and helped Sheikh Abdullah solidify his secular credentials. Nehru believed that Sheikh Abdullah transformed the Kashmiri communal movement into a national secular movement. In response to the changed political situation and continued political protests, the Maharaja liberalized his regime in 1939. The number of elected representatives was raised to 40, but the restricted franchise was maintained as in 1939. At first, the National Conference dominated the assembly,

Kashmir and the People's Movement

43

but in 1941 it had only 10 members in the assembly. The Muslim Conference secured a majority, clearly establishing Muslim predominance in Kashmir politics. The Maharaja appointed Mirza Afzal B e g as minister in his government in 1944 to represent the Muslims. In May of that year, Jinnah visited Kashmir at the invitation of Muslim Conference. Aware of the changed political scene, he did everything possible to consolidate the Muslim aspirations in the state. At parties he went to different tables to shake hands with guests. He met with students and liberally granted interviews to the press. He was taken in a procession from Pratab Park to Dalgate, where he addressed the Muslim Conference rally, and said, "as Muslims have one God, one Prophet, and one Book, the Muslims of Kashmir should also have a common objective, a single voice, and should unite under one organization for the freedom struggle." 2 0 To offset Jinnah's growing influence, the National Conference held a session in Sopore in 1945. Nehru, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, and Indira Gandhi all attended. In view of the impending partition and the weakening position o f Sheikh Abdullah, Congress was prepared to do anything to win support from Kashmir. After this session, Nehru, Azad, and Indira Gandhi traveled in a procession escorted by Sheikh Abdullah; there were massive hostile demonstrations by Kashmiris against Congress and against secularism. In March 1946, Mirza Afzal B e g resigned from the government, and on 15 May 1946, Sheikh Abdullah launched a "Quit Kashmir" movement similar to Gandhi's "Quit India" movement four years earlier. Sheikh Abdullah contended that the British sale of Kashmir to Gulab Singh was an invalid act and demanded that the Dogra dynasty leave Kashmir immediately. Sheikh Abdullah submitted a memorandum of his demand to the British cabinet mission that was visiting India. The "Quit Kashmir" movement led to widespread agitation that the state mistakenly interpreted as a breakdown of civil law and order. Martial law was imposed, and Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues, including Abbas of the Muslim Conference, were arrested. When Nehru announced that he would visit Kashmir to help Sheikh Abdullah, the Maharaja banned his entry into the state. Nehru decided to defy the ban and entered Kashmir from the Punjab via the Kohala Bridge. A company of state forces commanded by a Gurkha officer, Major Bhagwan Singh, stood with fixed bayonets halfway across the bridge. Nehru walked across and pushed the bayonets aside. Bhagwan Singh ordered his troops aside and asked Nehru to come across the bridge. At the customs post in Domel, he informed Nehru that he was under arrest. Nehru was taken to the state-owned "rest house" in Uri. His arrest created a big stir in Delhi where the cabinet mission was involved in crucial talks with leading politicians of India. Lord Wavell, the governor general, intervened and sent a plane to bring Nehru back from Srinagar on 2 2 June. Later in July the state govern-

44

Divided Kashmir

ment lifted the ban on his entry, and he met with Sheikh Abdullah in jail. 21 In January 1947 the Maharaja held elections for the legislative assembly. The Muslim Conference won a majority of the seats. On 19 July 1947, the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference passed a resolution that the state should join Pakistan. The text of the resolution was: The Convention of the All Jammu and Kashmir Conference expresses its jubilation and great satisfaction at the coming into being of Pakistan and offers its congratulations to the Quaid-i-Azam... . After carefully considering the position, the Conference has arrived at the conclusion that accession of the State to Pakistan is absolutely necessary in view of the geographic, economic, linguistic, cultural and religious conditions, because Muslims constitute eighty percent of the population, all major rivers of Pakistan have their source in the State, and inhabitants of the State are strongly connected with the people of Pakistan through religious, cultural and economic relations. It is therefore necessary that the State should accede to Pakistan. 22

Notes 1. Gandhi, The Indian States Problem, 1941, p. 18. 2. Gupta, S., Kashmir, 1966. 3. Hussain, M., "The Kashmir Issue," 1992, p. 345. For further details about the discrimination and atrocities of the Maharaja, see also Thorpe, Kashmir Misgovernment, 1973. 4. Brecher, The Struggle for Kashmir, 1949, p. 9. 5. Khan, M. Zafarullah, The Kashmir Dispute, 1958, pp. 5-7. 6. Four and a half annas were equivalent to 0.6 cents, assuming that four rupees were equal to one U.S. dollar at that time. 7. Ganju, Textile Industry in Kashmir, 1945. 8. The memorandum was signed by Saeeduddin Shawl, Hassan Shah Naqshbandi, Moulvi Ahmadullah, Mirwaiz Hamadani, Syed Hussain, Shah Jalali, Mufti Sharifuddin, and Hassan Shah Mahandi. 9. Sibtain, "The Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute," 1992, pp. 117-150. 10. Rabbani, Kashmir: Social and Cultural History, 1986, p. 60. 11. Sheikh Abdullah was born in 1905 in Sourah, about seven miles (11 kilometers) from Srinagar, to the family of a Kashmiri shawl dealer. His father died two weeks before his birth. He passed his high school examination in 1922 from a Srinagar high school, received a Bachelors in Science degree in 1924 from Islamia College, Lahore, and a Masters in Science in Chemistry from Aligarh Muslim University. At first, Sheikh Abdullah set up a Fateh Kewdal Reading Room that served as a meeting place for like-minded young men who discussed the problems of the day not risking suppression by the Maharaja's forces. Because of his opposition to the Maharaja, he was transferred to Muzaffarabad, but he refused the transfer. After four months of service he resigned and entered politics. He was a devout Muslim and impressed everybody with his intelligence, height, handsomeness, and the charm and manner he learned at Aligarh University. After hearing his speech,

Kashmir and the People's Movement

45

Maulana Zafar Ali Khan called him Sher-i-Kashmir (Lion of Kashmir), a name that stuck to him for the rest of his life. In a speech on 16 May 1946 he claimed that he was "ordained to liberate his native land from Dogra's slavery that the treaty of Amritsar brought on Kashmir." Throughout his political life, he remained imbued with a bitterly anti-Dogra and antimonarchial attitude and opposed the Maharaja at every stage, until the Maharaja was forced to leave the state in 1948. 12. Rabbani, Kashmir: Social and Cultural History, p. 60. 13. Buch and Shahab, "Jammu and Kashmir," 1977, p. 177. 14. Singh, Karan, Heir Apparent, 1982. 15. The franchise was restricted to village and district headmen, priests, managers of religious properties, holders of titles, those who paid 20 rupees either as land revenue or municipal tax or 60 rupees as rent, or those who owned a house worth 600 rupees or more. Medical practitioners, pensioned officers, and those who had passed middle school or its equivalent were also included in the franchise. Women in general were excluded, except for those with acquired educational qualifications. This included about 10 percent of the population. (See Bhushan, State Politics and Government, 1985, pp. 44, 365.) 16. Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, 1967, p. 225. 17. Hussain, A., The Wounded Paradise, 1991, p. 138. 18. Bamazi, A History of Kashmir, 1973, p. 722. 19. Buch, Y., "Friendly Call from Northern Neighbor," 1956, p. 39. 20. Khurshid, Memories ofJinnah, 1990, p. 9. 21. For Jawaharlal Nehru's detention and its impact on the future of Kashmir, see Singh, Karan, pp. 39-40. 22. Khan, Sardar Abdul Qayyum, The Kashmir Case, 1992, pp. 4 3 ^ 4 .

6 Partition of British India and Kashmir

On 20 February 1947, Prime Minister Clement Attlee announced that the British Empire in India would be liquidated and power would be transferred to responsible Indian hands by a date not later than June 1948. If an agreed constitution "by a fully representative assembly" was not worked out by then, the government "would have to consider to whom the power should be handed over on the due date, whether as a whole to some form of central government for British India, or in some areas to the existing provincial governments, or in such other way as may seem most reasonable and in the best interests of the Indian people." 1 Attlee sent Lord Louis Mountbatten to replace Lord Wavell as governor general of India and to manage the transfer of power to responsible Indian hands. The instrument of instructions issued to Mountbatten on his appointment asked him to find an agreed solution for a united India on the basis of the cabinet mission plan. Mountbatten reached Delhi on 22 March 1947 and was sworn in on 24 March. Soon after his arrival he was persuaded by events and the attitudes of party leaders of the improbability of an consensus solution and of a united India. He therefore fell back upon the prime minister's statement of 20 February and prepared a plan. Meanwhile the communal killings moved into Punjab and Northwest Frontier Province, affecting the Sikhs directly for the first time. During the first weeks of March, the government of Punjab (a coalition that excluded members of the Muslim League) resigned. Large scale attacks on the Sikh community occurred. 2 Why did the Sikhs want partition when it would inevitably divide their community into two, lies in the riots of the winter of 1946-47. . . . In the beginning of 1947 all Sikhs had come to the conclusion that, since they could not prevent Pakistan, the best they could do was to save as much of the province as they could from going into Muslim hands. 3

In consultation with his advisers, Mountbatten drew up an outline of a

47

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plan to transfer power, the "broad basis of which was the demission of authority to the provinces, or to such confederations of provinces as might decide to group themselves in the intervening period before the transfer of power." On 11 April Lord Ismay sent this outline to V. P. Menon for his amendments and to work out a rough timetable. Menon carried out this order but appended his own opinion that the plan was "a bad one and certainly would not work." 4 The finished plan was put before the governors' conference on 15 and 16 April and approved. On 2 May, Ismay and George Abell left for London carrying the plan with them for Whitehall's approval. Mountbatten was hoping to get the approval of the British government by 10 May, for he planned to call a meeting of party leaders on 17 May in order to learn their reactions. 5 The Mountbatten plan apparently called for handing over sovereignty to the individual provinces, allowing them to recombine at will. In the meantime, Mountbatten, accompanied by Sir Eric Mieville and Menon, went to Simla. Here for the first time Menon had an opportunity to discuss the plan with Mountbatten at length. He argued against the plan that was sent to London and proposed an alternative plan that he developed with the concurrence of Sardar Patel. Mountbatten was still contemplating the import of Menon's views when Nehru and Krishna Menon arrived to visit him on 8 May. Mountbatten asked Menon to describe his alternative plan to Nehru. On 9 May, Menon outlined his scheme to Nehru whereby power would be transferred on the basis of "dominion" status to two Indias, not to provinces or groups of provinces. On 10 May this plan was discussed in a meeting attended by Mountbatten, Nehru, Menon, and Mieville. The proceedings of this meeting are recorded in the viceregal minutes and are a part of the government of India records.6 On the same day Mountbatten received the plan from London that had been approved by the British government with certain amendments. In the evening after dinner Mountbatten took Nehru to his study and showed him the plan as approved by the British government. Nehru was furious after reading it and told Mountbatten that it would never be accepted by him, by Congress, or by India. On the morning of 11 May, Mountbatten told Menon of Nehru's reaction to the official plan. Menon lobbied for his own plan, saying that "the plan approved by His Majesty's Government would break up the country into several units, my plan would retain unity of India while allowing those areas to secede which did not choose to remain a part of it." A staff meeting was called at once to which Nehru was also invited. At this meeting, Nehru's objections to the official plan were formally written into the minutes. Then Mountbatten asked Nehru if Menon's plan would be acceptable to him. Nehru wanted to see the plan in writing before giving his approval. This created a problem because Nehru was leaving for Delhi that evening. Mountbatten was anxious to show him the finished plan and win his approval. Menon was therefore asked to put his plan down on paper for Nehru's review before his departure.7 "It was by now 2 P.M. Menon walked

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to his hotel, poured himself a stiff whisky (he had never before had a whisky before six in the evening) and settled down to work." By 6 P.M. he had written the last sentence, and the plan was immediately taken to the Viceregal Lodge by Mieville. There it was shown to Nehru, who gave his approval. Mountbatten flew to London on 18 May 1947 to present the plan to the British Cabinet. Both Ismay and Abell were opposed to Menon's plan, but Mountbatten put all his weight behind it and threatened to resign if it was not accepted by the British government. His threat worked, and Attlee and the whole cabinet gave their approval "without the alteration of a comma," in a meeting that lasted only five minutes. On 2 June, Mountbatten, back in Delhi, called a meeting of seven leaders—Nehru, Patel, Kirpalani, Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, Abdur Rab Nishtar, and Baldev Singh. They too approved the plan. Then Mountbatten went to Gandhi, who still opposed the partition, ostensibly to persuade him that the plan was the best in the circumstances. In reality it was merely an exercise in make-believe, because Gandhi had consented to the plan before it was taken to London. 8 On 3 June a white paper was issued that gave details of the partition (see Appendix 4). The most significant points of the plan were that the provincial assemblies of Bengal and the Punjab would each be asked to meet in two parts, one representing the Muslim majority districts and the other the rest of the province. The members of the two parts of each legislative assembly would, on behalf of the areas they represented, decide whether to join the existing constituent assembly or a new constituent assembly. As soon as this was decided the governor general would appoint a boundary commission "to demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of the Punjab on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. The princely states could stay independent or join either of the two dominions in keeping with their geography and mandate of the people."9 The princely states constituted about 33 percent of British India (see Map 6.1). The white paper added that power would be transferred first on the dominion status, but either government could withdraw from the commonwealth if it wished. In a surprise announcement, Mountbatten fixed 15 August 1947 as the date for terminating British rule—about 10 months ahead of the schedule set by Attlee in his first statement on the transfer of power. The first prominent Congress leader to publicly accept Mountbatten's plan for partition was Sardar Patel, followed by Nehru (who had already seen the plan), and Gandhi. 10 The All India Muslim League council met on 9 June and accepted the plan, authorizing Jinnah "to work on all details" as the proposed partition of Punjab and Bengal Provinces was not to the liking of the council. The representatives from the United Provinces, Bihar, and other Muslim-minority provinces that were to remain parts of India were worried about having to face the inevitable hostility of the Hindu majority that never appreciated the Muslim demand for a separate Muslim homeland.

Map 6.1 Princely States of British India, 1947

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The All India Congress committee met on 14 June to consider the partition plan. The "two Ps" of the Congress (Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel) moved the resolution and were on the defensive in the debate that followed. They maintained that in the existing circumstances, partition was the only possible solution. Gandhi also spoke about the partition. He did not debate the merit of the plan but warned "The Congress have signed on your behalf. You can disown the Congress, but you would do it only if you wish to start a big revolution. I do not think you want to do it."11 Abul Kalam Azad opposed the resolution, saying that "partition was a tragedy, and the only thing that could be said in its favor is that we had done our best to avoid the division, but we failed." 12 On 15 June the Congress committee accepted the partition resolution. Twenty-nine voted for it, and 15 were against. The members from Sindh vehemently opposed the resolution. They were given assurances and were told that if they suffered any disability or indignity in Pakistan, India would retaliate against 45 million Muslims in India. Formerly, the Congress leaders had passionately opposed partition and the demand for Pakistan, whatever the merits. Nehru was adamant, and as late as 15 April 1946 he said that, "Congress is not going to agree to Pakistan under any circumstances whatsoever, even if the British Government agrees to it. Nothing on earth, not even the United Nations Organization, is going to bring about the Pakistan which Jinnah wants to create." 13 Similarly, Gandhi said on 31 March 1947, "If the Congress wishes to accept partition, it will be over my dead body. So long as I am alive, I will never agree to the partition of India. Nor will I, if I can help it, allow Congress to accept the partition." 14 The question arises: Why did the Congress eventually agree to the partition demand of the Muslim League? There are two possible answers to this important question. The first is that acceptance of the proposed partition seemed to be the only sure way of getting the British out of India quickly. Louis Fischer remarks in his introduction to Abul Kalam Azad's book, India Wins Freedom,15 that "Mountbatten made it clear that given partition, Britain would certainly leave India. Nehru and other Congress leaders eagerly seized the offer, lest the British change their mind and withdraw the offer." Both Nehru, and later Krishna Menon, reaffirmed this fact. 16 Menon, then high commissioner of India in Britain, said in a Manchester meeting that India had paid the price of partition to get rid of the British Empire. 17 Another plausible explanation is that the leaders of Congress thought "it would teach the Muslim League a bitter lesson, as Pakistan would collapse in a short time." According to Krishna Menon, Mountbatten stressed that the partition was in the best interest of India and should not be delayed. He was sure that a truncated Pakistan, if conceded now, was bound to come back to India later.18 V. P. Menon was delighted at what Mountbatten said at the meeting and immediately conveyed it to Patel, with the following comment

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of his own, "I agreed with H.E.'s [Mountbatten's] observation, and our slogan should now be: divide in order to unite." Immediately after the announcement of the partition plan, Gandhi said, "We Muslims and Hindus are interdependent on one another. We cannot get along without each other. The Muslim League would ask to come back to Hindustan. They will ask Jawaharlal to come back and he will take them back." 19 In his All-India Radio broadcast of 3 June 1947, Nehru said that there was no joy in his heart and that he still hoped that in this way a united India shall be reached sooner than otherwise. 20 On independence day, Congress President Acharya Kirpalani lamented, "The freedom we have achieved cannot be complete without the unity of India." 21 Nehru repeated the same view in a public address after Pakistan was established. Speaking in November 1947 at Guru Nanak's birthday, he said that India and Pakistan could either unite or go to war against each other, but after the war they would have to merge as one country.22 Some years later, Nehru also told Joseph Korbel, "Pakistan should never have been created and would not have come into being if the British had not stood behind this foolish idea of Jinnah." The background of the partition is economic. . . . We Indians have always advocated political freedom and social progress. First we had to get rid of British domination and now we must try to achieve economic prosperity. But as nobody can possibly stand up against the independence of a nation and against the prosperity of the broad masses, the people had to find other arguments to procure their privileged position. So they used religion. In reality, it is not at all a dispute between religion. We give to all people full religious freedom. Besides, it is impossible to divide the country according to religion. Even now there are still some forty-two million Muslims in India. It is, then, a struggle between freedom and progress and a group of wealthy men. Jinnah abandoned us (the National Congress) thirty years ago and founded the League—not to defend Islam, as he asserts, but to defend privileged materialistic right. It has nothing to do with religion; he himself is not a religious man. But there was no other solution to the problem in our struggle for independence, so we agreed to the establishment of Pakistan. 23

On a later occasion, Nehru told Korbel that "we want to cooperate and work towards cooperation, and one day integration will inevitably come. It will be four, five, ten years, I do not know." 24 Mountbatten also wanted to keep India united, as he said on 11 January 1972, in an interview with Kuldip Nayar.25 He regretted partition, but he had no choice. When he had no choice, he advanced the partition date from June 1948 to 15 August 1947. Mountbatten's reasons for picking that date have remained a mystery and source of controversy. Mountbatten's biographer, Philip Ziegler, says that there is little evidence that Mountbatten discussed any precise date with anyone, but that Jinnah had a hunch that the transfer

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of power would be nearer to August 1947 than to June 1948. Mountbatten's papers show that he told Jinnah in May that partition could be as early as October. In September 1948, Mountbatten wrote in a report that he obtained agreement on the 15 August date when the Indian leaders met with him on 2 - 3 June, but at another time he said the date came as a sudden inspiration. It is possible that 15 August was fixed by Mountbatten because it was the date when Japan surrendered two years before to end World War II. The effects of this choice, however, were more damaging to Pakistan than to India. The more hastily Pakistan was established, the weaker it would be and the quicker would be its end and its return to India. At a later date, Patel admitted to holding such a view. Speaking in the constituent assembly, he said that one of his conditions for agreeing to the partition was that power should be transferred in "two months' time." 26 The more hurriedly Pakistan was set up, the more unstable it would be and the quicker would be its collapse. The Muslim League wanted to set the partition for June 1948. M. A. H. Ispahani, a close associate of Jinnah, wrote that Pakistani representatives, including Jinnah himself, pressed for partition in June 1948, as was originally announced by the British prime minister, but their efforts were to no avail. 27 After partition, Liaquat Ali Khan also commented on the Muslim League's unsuccessful efforts to have the partition delayed. He said that "We urged that it was impossible to establish a government, in a country so vast, and with so large a population, without any staff, nor office, nor even paper and pencil, within a short span of two months. We were told that there was no other alternative." 28 As part of the partition agreement, a boundary commission was set up on 11 July 1947 to delineate boundaries between India and Pakistan, based on the location of Hindu and Muslim majorities as of the 1941 census. After failing to get the United Nations to nominate the members of the boundary commission, Jinnah recommended that Cyril Radcliffe, vice chairman of the English bar council, be appointed as chairman of the boundary commission. After consulting Krishna Menon, Nehru agreed. The commission included two judges representing Congress (non-Muslim interest) and two judges representing the Muslim League (Muslim interest). Radcliffe arrived in New Delhi on 8 July 1947, stayed with Mountbatten for two days, and took less than five weeks to finalize the boundaries. 29 The principle of communal majorities appeared simple in theory, but the imprecise mandate given to the commission made the division difficult. It was not specified whether a "contiguous majority area" would be a province, a commissioner's division, a deputy commissioner's district, a district subdivision (tehsil), or a village. The mandate allowed the commission to consider "other factors" while demarcating the boundaries, but it did not specify what weight "other factors" would have in the equation. These

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"other factors" were, moreover, left undefined, which led to the conflicting demands by the contending parties. Finally, it was not known whether it was contiguity, communal majority, or other factors that would take precedence in demarcating the boundaries. 30 In the end, many of the difficulties experienced by Pakistan resulted from the consideration of "other factors."

Boundaries in Punjab Province In 1941 Punjab had a total population of 28.4 million people; 15.8 million (55.6 percent) were Muslim and 12.6 million (44.4 percent) were Hindus and Sikhs. Muslims were overwhelmingly dominant in the districts of Attock (90.3 percent), Jhelum (89.2 percent), and Rawalpindi (80 percent). Toward the southeast, the Muslim majority progressively declined. In Lahore, the Muslim population was 60.7 percent and in Gurdaspur 50.2 percent. The third dominant group was the Sikhs, who are neither Muslim nor Hindu. Their presence in sizable numbers complicated the partition process somewhat. The Sikhs resented that their home province was being divided between India and Pakistan. Logic demanded that the Sikhs support Pakistan as Jinnah advised. Jinnah even offered them an independent homeland in East Punjab, something that they are struggling to establish in 1995 as "Khalistan." What the Sikhs wanted at that time, however, was an impossibility, namely, an independent Sikh province that included Ambala, Jullundur, Lahore Division, Lyallpur (Faisalabad), and Montgomery (Sahiwal) Districts. 31 Later, the most prominent Sikh leader, Tara Singh, publicly admitted in Gujar Khan that he made a mistake in aligning with India, but that it was too late. 32 Working under an imprecise mandate and the conflicting interests of the contesting parties, the commission had to delineate new boundaries in Punjab in four weeks' time. The stipulation that areas could be allocated to either of the two countries based on "other factors" led Congress and the Muslim League to present varying demands before the commission.

The Sikh Proposals Thirty-two of the 33 Sikh members of the Punjab legislative assembly presented the commission with a signed memorandum. This memorandum reviewed the historical growth of Punjab, first as a Sikh state under Ranjit Singh and then as a British administrative unit. The Sikh legislators argued that the 1931 census was more accurate than any other and alleged that the 1941 census was grossly inaccurate because each community tried to exaggerate the number of its own group and to diminish that of its rivals through

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bogus entries and omissions, with a view to increasing its own representation in the provincial assembly and government. 33 The Sikh legislators claimed that 4.6 million of the Muslims recorded in the 1941 census were "not rooted in the soil, but were essentially of a floating character." Table 6.1 indicates the strength of the Muslim community in 1931 and 1941 on a district and divisional basis. 34 Realizing that a strictly communal division would go against their interest, the Sikh legislators urged "other factors":

Table 6.1 Percentage of Sikhs and Muslims in Divisions and Districts of the Former Punjab According to 1931 and 1941 Censuses Sikhs

Lahore Division Amritsar District Gurdaspur District Gujranwala District Lahore District Sheikhupura District Sialkot District Jullundur Division Ferozpur District Hoshiarpur District Jullundur District Kangra District Ludhiana District Ambala Division Ambala District Gurgaon District Hissar District Karnal District Rohtak District Simla District Multan Division Dera Ghazi Khan Jhang District Lyallpur District Montgomery District Multan District Muzzaffargarh District Rawalpindi Division Attock District Gujrat District Jhelum District Mianwali District Rawalpindi District Shahpur District

Muslims

1931

1941

1931

1941

18.86 35.80 18.38 9.73 17.72 17.15 9.69 24.45 33.55 16.78 26.45 0.30 46.52 5.63 20.94 0.07 6.13 1.99 0.07 2.07 8.10 0.15 1.28 18.36 14.82 3.36 0.90 4.76 3.34 6.42 4.07 1.03 6.50 4.88

19.98 36.14 19.18 10.87 18.29 18.85 11.70 24.32 33.68 15.92 26.44 0.57 41.69 5.12 18.44 0.07 6.03 2.00 0.15 2.67 8.15 0.17 1.49 18.81 13.91 4.15 0.83 4.98 2.97 6.35 3.92 1.36 8.16 4.81

58.01 46.96 50.80 70.82 59.18 64.01 62.23 33.41 44.56 31.79 44.46 5.05 35.03 27.72 31.07 32.74 28.01 30.46 17.11 15.79 76.23 88.80 83.16 66.62 69.77 80.23 86.79 85.88 91.07 85.29 89.10 86.77 82.76 82.72

58.18 46.58 50.23 70.39 60.69 63.62 62.10 34.53 45.08 32.48 45.17 5.09 36.92 28.07 31.64 33.49 28.33 30.58 17.22 18.20 75.43 88.90 82.58 62.82 69.07 79.96 86.52 85.53 90.54 85.30 89.51 86.17 80.00 83.67

Source: Adapted from Aloys Arthur Michel, The Indus River: A Study of the Effects of Partition, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967, p. 172.

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The Sikh community is concentrated in Jullundur and Lahore Divisions and Montgomery (Sahiwal) and Lyallpur (Faisalabad) districts of the Multan Division. These areas form one contiguous tract, and it is in this tract that Sikhs have played, and must continue to play, the most important role in the life of the province. . . . In this area the Sikhs have vital essential agricultural interests. In fact the agricultural economy of Jullundur and Lahore Divisions of the Punjab and colony areas depends very largely upon the labor that Sikhs have put in this area. . . . In Lahore Districts,the Sikhs pay Rs. 841,921 out of a total land revenue of Rs. 1,419,455; in Amritsar they pay Rs. 1,194,574 out of a total of Rs. 1,577,131. Sikh share in annual land revenue of Lahore Division is 46 percent. 35

Thus Sikhs were asking for a diagonal, northeast to southwest partition that would leave them in possession of most of the canal colonies to which their fathers and grandfathers had migrated at the invitation of British colonization officers after 1890. They wanted most of the Lower Chenab project, especially Lyallpur (Faisalabad) District, as well as most of the areas served by the Triple Canal project, including the Montgomery (Sahiwal) District. From the communal standpoint, however, their claim was untenable.

Congress's Demand Congress claimed the area east of the Chenab River, arguing that the districts east of Chenab (Sialkot, Gujranwala, Sheikhupura, Multan, Montgomery, Lahore, Amritsar, and Gurdaspur) would have a non-Muslim majority if they were joined with the rest of northern Punjab. Congress argued that Punjabi non-Muslims (Hindus and Sikhs) had a greater economic stake, as they had a virtual monopoly over banking, business, and insurance. Their share of ownership of industries was also twice that of the Muslims. Even in the capital city of Lahore, non-Muslims owned 178 factories out of a total of 186.36 Further, based on the memorandum of Sikh legislators, Congress argued that if these nine districts were allocated to Pakistan, the Hindus and Sikhs would lose the rich canal colonies that the British developed for the benefit of Muslims and non-Muslims alike. In addition, according to Congress's argument, the Sikhs would lose a number of holy places if the Muslim majority areas were given to Pakistan. Congress knew full well that its demand negated the partition principle, but it pressed them to take advantage of "other factors."

The League's Demand The Muslim League's claim was largely based on the communal criterion, but its demand had contradictions also. In addition to the Muslim majority districts, the league's claim included Amritsar and Jullundur Districts where

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Muslims were 46.6 and 45.2 percent of the population, respectively. The league argued that the Muslim population of these districts was more than that of either the Hindus or Sikhs considered separately. The demand would have been more consistent if only the contiguous Muslim majority parts of these districts were claimed for Pakistan.37 Another exception to the communal criterion was the demand of the Muslim League for the fertile parts of Hoshiarpur District, where Muslims were only 32.5 percent of the population. The league justified its claim by saying that the boundary of Hoshiarpur District followed the crest of the Siwalik Hills, which is a water divide. Hence, the functional efficiency of the irrigation networks warranted inclusion of the Rupar and Ferozpur headworks in Pakistan. The greatest weakness of the league's demand for Hoshiarpur District was that it went beyond its communal criterion.

Radcliffe's Partition and Award Members of the boundary commission seldom agreed with each other, making Cyril Radcliffe the sole arbiter of the boundaries between India and Pakistan. According to his demarcation, the partitioned boundary begins near the northeastern corner of Bahawalpur state and follows the Sutlej River east to a point 10 miles northeast of Ferozpur. This is an important sector, because of the Sulaimankee canal headwork is at the western end and the Ferozpur Canal headwork at the eastern end. At the western end, the boundary begins just south of the Sutlej River, with the Sulaimankee headwork in Pakistan; its canals were in Pakistan, and the population was predominantly Muslim. At the eastern end, the Ferozpur headwork was given to India, though the population of the district and the headwork was predominantly Muslim. Along the Sutlej River, the boundary was not marked in the middle of the river, as is done for the international boundaries, but marked along the northern bank of the river. Suspicions arose as to whether this action was meant to hurt Pakistan. The next section of the boundary was particularly controversial. It stretched between the Sutlej and Ravi Rivers and involved the districts of Lahore, Amritsar, and Gurdaspur. Lahore District had a Muslim majority in three tehsils and in the district as a whole. It was logical that the entire district would be included in Pakistan. Instead, the demarcated boundary meandered in an arbitrary manner, diagonally cutting across the Muslim tehsil of Qasur. The southeast half of Qasur tehsil was given to India. The reason behind this award was not clear, as the area involved presented no special strategic or economic grounds to override the communal criterion. Unlike Lahore, Amritsar had a non-Muslim majority (53.5 percent) in the district as a whole, but its northern tehsil, Ajnala, had a Muslim majority. Despite the Muslim majority, the boundary followed the Lahore-Amritsar

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District line north from the point where it was joined by the Lahore-Qasur tehsil line (and also by the boundary line across the Qasur tehsil). It then followed the Ravi River, thus giving the entire Amritsar District to India, including the Muslim tehsil of Ajnala. The third district, Gurdaspur, was the most critical from the communal and strategic standpoint. Muslims formed a bare majority in the district as a whole (50.80 percent in 1931 and 50.23 percent in 1941) but clear majorities in three out of four tehsils. The demarcated boundary followed the Ravi River and its tributary (the Ujh) to the Kashmir border, allocating two Muslim tehsils, Gurdaspur and Batala, and a small portion of Shakargarh tehsil north of the river to India. Gurdaspur is important in any discussion relating to Jammu and Kashmir and merits a detailed examination. The Gurdaspur

Controversy

Leaders of Congress drew Mountbatten's attention to Gurdaspur District soon after he came to India. As early as 18 April 1947, Rajendera Prasad, Congress member of the interim government, wrote to Mountbatten that "in the Punjab there is the district of Gurdaspur with a nominal majority of Musalmans of 51.14 percent." 38 At a meeting with Mountbatten on 11 May, Nehru raised the question of this district, and according to his biographer, M. J. Akbar, "virtually ensured that this critical land-link with Kashmir remained in India." 39 There is also an intriguing letter dated 8 August 1947 written by George Abbel, Mountbatten's private secretary, to J. Abbot, private secretary to the governor of Punjab, in response to a request for advance information on the possible boundary line, as the report of the boundary commission had already been finalized. The governor of Punjab wanted to make necessary arrangements to prevent bloodshed in his province. George Abbel's reply on 9 August reads: I enclose a map showing roughly the boundary which Sir Cyril Radcliffe proposes to demarcate in his award, and a note by Christopher Beaumont describing it. There will not be any great change from the boundary, but it will have to be accurately defined with reference to village and zila boundaries in the Lahore district. The award itself is expected within the next 48 hours, and I will let you know later about the probable time of announcement. Perhaps you will ring me up if H.E. the Governor has any views on this point.

On the map, the tehsils of Ferozpur and Zira were shown as part of Pakistan. Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, representing Pakistan during the partition, saw the map on 9 August, when he went to Ismay's office in Mountbatten's house. 40 There was immediate objection from the Indian side to the inclusion of Ferozpur and Zira tehsils in Pakistan. Nehru wrote a let-

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ter to Mountbatten on 9 August, enclosing a letter from an irrigation official reporting overhearing a lunchtime conversation between Radcliffe and members of his commission to the effect that the award of Ferozpur and Zira tehsils to Pakistan was compensation for the award of the three eastern tehsils of Gurdaspur to India. Nehru's letter is intriguing and is open to three possible interpretations: (1) to ensure that Ferozpur tehsil did not go to Pakistan; (2) to ensure that the award of three tehsils of Gurdaspur should remain within India; and (3) to provide reasons for both these decisions. On 9 August 1947 news of the award that three eastern tehsils of Gurdaspur were being given to India reached Liaquat Ali Khan. Until that time he believed that Gurdaspur would be part of Pakistan following the principle that all Muslim majority contiguous areas would go to Pakistan. He protested but was rebuked. On 11 August 1947, the prime minister of Jammu and Kashmir was replaced by Major General Janak Singh, a cousin of the Maharaja. He pleaded that the Maharaja was ready to hold a referendum to decide his accession to India or Pakistan, provided that the boundary commission gave him a land link between Kashmir and India through Gurdaspur. On 11 August 1947, the governor of Punjab received a coded telegram from the governor general's house in New Delhi asking him to "eliminate salient," which meant that Ferozpur and Zira tehsils had been transferred to India. In the final award that was ready on 12 August, Ferozpur and Zira tehsils were included in India. In an interview with the Daily Telegraph in February 1992, Radcliffe's secretary, Christopher Beaumont, confirmed that the boundary award was manipulated by Mountbatten at the behest of Nehru. 41 Rao Ayer (assistant secretary to the commission), the Maharaja of Bikaner, and V. P. Menon also played influential roles in revising the decisions of the commission. The boundary award was finalized and given to Mountbatten on 12 August. Mountbatten announced the boundaries on 17 August 1947, two days after independence and the termination of the British paramountcy. The authorities of neither dominion knew exactly where their boundaries were and could not make any arrangements for the administration of their border until 17 August. With a delayed announcement, millions of people found themselves on the wrong side of the border. Some members of the civil service of Pakistan recall that Muslim members of the civil service were actually sent into Gurdaspur prior to independence in anticipation of the whole district's being awarded to Pakistan. Gurdaspur was recognized as a Muslim majority district in the Indian Independence Act of July 1947.42 The civil servants and people of Gurdaspur actually hoisted the Pakistan flag on 15 August and proceeded to take over the administration. Then with the announcement of the boundaries on 17 August, the administrators were sent packing and scurrying for the new border, along with thousands of Muslims not only from Gurdaspur, but from Hoshiarpur, Jullundur, Kapurthala, and Amritsar as well.

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Many years later, while attending a Commonwealth prime minister's conference in London, Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, prime minister of Pakistan, was introduced to Radcliffe at a social function at 10 Downing Street. Radcliffe asked him which place he came from. The prime minister replied, "From the same unfortunate Muslim majority area in the angle of Beas and Sutlej Rivers over which you hesitated before assigning it to India without any valid reason." 43 Later, a Pakistani diplomat reminded Radcliffe of Abbel's letter and insinuated that he had been partisan. Instead of explaining his action, Radcliffe told the Pakistani diplomat that Pakistan got more than it should have. Earlier in 1956, Feroz Khan Noon raised the same question to Radcliffe at a New York meeting. Radcliffe replied that he thought the Ravi River would make a better boundary between India and Pakistan. 44 When questioned about the way he drew the boundaries between India and Pakistan, Radcliffe said that he had no choice: "There was no alternative; the time was so short that I could not do a better job. Given the same period I would do the same thing again. I had no time to go into the details. Even accurate district maps were not there and other materials were inadequate." Radcliffe said that he did an injustice to non-Muslims in Punjab. "Hindus were expecting Lahore to be included in India; but I had to give it to Pakistan because they had to have a big city in West Punjab." Radcliffe said that he never imagined that Kashmir, or for that matter Gurdaspur or Ferozpur, would create any problem subsequently. "However, if I had two to three years I must have improved what I did," Radcliffe once said.45 At no time did he explain why he gave the whole or parts of five Muslim tehsils to India. Radcliffe's decision crippled Pakistan and was inconsistent and confusing, to say the least, when judged on communal, economic, or strategic criteria. The boundary was obviously drawn to give India access to the road that passes through Gurdaspur and Batala to Jammu. Possession of Gurdaspur and the Madhopur barrage bridge did contribute to India's occupation of Jammu and even of Poonch, south of Pir Panjal. It was not until the completion of the Banihal Tunnel and the rebuilding of the Banihal Road that Kashmir Valley could be supplied by India on the ground. As Sheikh Abdullah pointed out, in 1947 Pakistan controlled the lowland route into the valley, the one along the Jhelum River from Muzaffarabad via Uri to Baramula. 46 When details of Radcliffe's boundaries were made public on 17 August, it caused huge migrations on both sides. At least half a million people were slaughtered in the violent regionalism attending the chaotic partition, and no fewer than 14 million moved across the newly established borders, leaving behind most of their belongings. The presence of such a large number of destitute refugees in both new dominions added to the depth and bitterness already existing between the two peoples. Pakistan's refugee problem was more severe than that of India. In the flow of refugees, Pakistan received

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some 1.7 million more people than it sent out. 47 This meant that one person in every four or five in Pakistan was homeless. Proportionately, this situation created a far greater problem for Pakistan than the lesser number posed for the much bigger India. Liaquat Ali and Nehru decided to stop any further exodus and encouraged the return of those who had already left. The Pakistan that had been achieved was something different from the Pakistan that had been sought. The partition of Punjab and Bengal, accompanied by the loss of Muslim majority tehsils in Punjab and the attendant communal frenzy, was hardly the ideal that the Muslim League had envisioned. It was a political compromise and, like most compromises, gained acceptance only because more satisfactory alternatives were deemed unachievable. Yet, from the perspective of the Muslim League it was a success insofar as it provided a deliverance from the domination of the non-Muslims and thereby presented new opportunities. Commenting on Radcliffe's boundaries, Jinnah said in a broadcast: The division of India is now finally and irrevocably affected. N o doubt we feel that in carving out the great independent Muslim state, we have suffered injustices. We have been squeezed in as much as it was possible, and the blow that we have received was the award of the boundary commission. It is an unjust, incomprehensible, and even perverse award, but we have agreed to abide by it. It may be our misfortune, but we must bear this one more blow with fortitude, courage and hope. 4 8

Jinnah and the Muslim League leaders left India and flew to Karachi on 7 August 1947 to begin building Pakistan from the chaos produced by the departing Hindus and the newly arriving Pakistanis. The constituent assembly met on 11 August to take charge of the new dominion and adopt a flag that would symbolize the aspirations of the new nation. Jinnah was elected as governor general and head of the constituent assembly. At that time, everything in Pakistan was at a standstill or in chaos. There was virtually no institutional infrastructure in the country: no industry, no resources, no money, no bank or agency for issuing currency, no arms, no material, not even postage stamps. At first, "Pakistan" was overprinted on the formerly British Indian postage stamps and currency. To meet day-to-day expenses, Pakistan borrowed two hundred million rupees from the Nizam of Hyderabad. Some of the new administrators squatted on the floor, placing their suitcases in front of them to serve as desks. Despite the immense difficulties, however, they were determined to save Pakistan. As part of its share, Pakistan was allocated 750 million rupees (75 crores) from the cash balance of undivided India. Two hundred million (20 crore) were transferred by India as an interim measure. Thè Kashmir conflict broke out in October 1947, and India withheld the 550 million rupees (55 crores) still due to Pakistan stating that the "money might be utilized for warlike operations against India." Gandhi denounced this act as immoral,

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and went on a "fast unto death." Before commencing the fast, Gandhi met Mountbatten and asked "for a frank opinion about India's refusal to pay," which Mountbatten did not hesitate to give, saying that he considered the step most unstatesmanlike and unwise. 49 Ultimately, India released the cash balance in January 1948. For independence day celebrations on 14 August 1947, the new Pakistani government could muster only four aircraft from all over the country for display at the Polo Ground, Karachi. The heaviest armor in 1951 totalled 13 tanks with less than 13 hours of engine life left in the best of them. "I shall never forget," recalls Vincent Sheean, "that when I visited the new establishment . . . there was only one typewriter in the whole Foreign Office." 50 The Foreign Office began in Mohatta Palace, Karachi, with a handful of officers collected in haste from heterogeneous sources. Later, 85 members for the new Foreign Service were recruited from different age groups on an ad hoc basis. Also, because of the shortage of experienced people in the country, those selected were of uneven quality. In contrast, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs simply continued to function as it already had for a year. All the premises of international diplomatic and trade missions for India were taken over as established by the British. Pakistan had to buy or build new embassies and offices everywhere and recruit new personnel to run them. Among other advantages, this substantial head start enabled India to exploit the already existing image of the country as one of the world's leading powers and that of Pakistan as a new and immature country in the international arena. Pakistan was unknown to the outside world, and its preoccupation with the problem of survival greatly impaired its capacity to project itself on an international scale. M. A. H. Ispahani bought a building to house the Pakistan embassy and presented his credentials in Washington on 8 October 1947. Shoaib Qureshi presented his credentials in Moscow on 31 December 1949, and General Raza in Peking on 12 December 1951. Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, one of the founding fathers of Pakistan and a close associate of Jinnah, once told me that cabinet ministers would meet Jinnah every evening to report on the day's developments and problems. After patiently hearing everybody, he would say the same thing every evening: "No surrender. It is a question of Muslim dignity and honor." Even faced with such a disheartening situation, Pakistan was a promised land to the Muslims. In Pakistan, the people saw the realization of their dreams, a deliverance from Hindu domination, and the return of the days when Muslims ruled India. Rich and poor, politicians and civil servants, men and women, young and old, farmers and shopkeepers rallied behind Jinnah, but just when things started shaping up, the overpowering dispute over Jammu and Kashmir state arose.

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Notes 1. Qureshi, The Struggle for Pakistan, 1965, p. 291. 2. The causes included the inconsistent behavior of the unionist Muslim premier, Khizr Hayat Khan, who arrested hundreds of League demonstrators. He eventually resigned. Sir Evan Jenkins, the governor, then assumed direct administration of the province on 5 March 1947. The ultimate result, it may be said, was the partition of Punjab. (For details, see Michel, The Indus Rivers, 1967, pp. 149-150.) 3. Singh, Kushwant, The Sikhs, 1953, pp. 151-152. 4. Qureshi, The Struggle for Pakistan, 1965, p. 295. 5. Michel, The Indus Rivers, 1967, p. 155. 6. Qureshi, The Struggle for Pakistan, 1965, p. 295. 7. Three reasons explain Mountbatten's heavy reliance on Menon during the crucial days of the partition: (1) Menon, though a Hindu, a close friend of Sardar Patel, and one of the key leaders of Congress, was a ranking member of the the governor general's staff, serving both Wavell and Mountbatten as constitutional advisor; (2) in this capacity, he had access to virtually all the documents and was a party to most of the negotiations; (3) he had gone further in working out a possible plan for partition than had anyone else. (See Michel, p. 153.) 8. Qureshi, The Struggle for Pakistan, 1965, p. 299. 9. The princely states were divided into three categories based on their size and treaty relations. Included in the first group were 140 states that had jurisdictional and legislative powers. The second group comprised another 140 states in which the British controlled the internal administration to some extent. In the third group were 300 small states that had limited governmental rights. (For details, see Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1990, p. 4.) 10. Azad, India Wins Freedom, I960, pp. 214-219. 11. Nayar, Distant Neighbours, 1972, p. 42. 12. Azad, India Wins Freedom, 1960, p. 238. 13. Lumbe, The Transfer of Power, 1947, p. 76 (quoted in Burke, Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies, 1974, p. 57). 14. Azad, Abul Kalam, India Wins Freedom, 1960, p. 218. 15. Ibid. 16. Burke, Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies, 1974, p. 57. 17. Statesman, 14 October 1947. 18. Das, Durga (ed.), Sardar Patel's Correspondence, 1972, pp. 114-115. 19. New York Herald Tribune, 5 June 1947 (quoted by Sherwani, "Kashmir's Accession to India Re-examined," 1990, pp. 23-70). 20. Akbar, Nehru: The Making of India, 1988, p. 413. 21. Quoted by Selig Harrison in Foreign Affairs, vol. 43, no. 2 (1965), p. 319. 22. Statesman, 29 November 1947. 23. Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 1954, p. 128. 24. Ibid., p. 128. 25. Nayar, Distant Neighbours, 1972, p. 3. 26. Panjabi, The Indomitable Sardar, 1964, p. 166. 27. Ispahani, Quaid-i-Azam as I Knew Him, 1966, p. 222. 28. Afzal, Speeches and Statements, 1966, p. 287. 29. Justice Din Muhammad and Justice Muhammad Munir represented the Muslims and Pakistan, and Justice Mehar Chand Mahajan and Justice Teja Singh represented the Congress and India. 30. Tayyeb, Pakistan: A Political Geography, 1966, p. 77.

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31. Hamid, Early Years of Pakistan, 1993, p. 28. 32. Mumtaz Ahmad, a professor of political science, Hampton University, Hampton, Virginia, and a native of Gujar Khan told me about a meeting Tara Singh had with the people of Gujar Khan in which he admitted his mistake. Singh originally lived in Gujar Khan, Punjab, Pakistan. 33. Singh, Harnam (ed.), The Sikh Memorandum, 1947, p. 2. 34. Adapted from Michel, 1967, p. 172. 35. To substantiate the economic argument, the Sikh legislators cited Malcolm Darling, The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt, pp. 41,122. (Quoted in Michel, The Indus Rivers, 1967, p. 174.) 36. Spate, "The Partition of the Punjab and Bengal," 1947, pp. 202-229. 37. Zafarullah Khan, representing the Muslim League before the boundary commission, demanded inclusion of Amritsar and Jullundur in Pakistan. The original Muslim League partition plan did not include the non-Muslim districts. Justice Din Mohammad and Justice Mohammad Munir, who were the Muslim members of the boundary commission, were taken aback by this demand. Din Mohammad was of the view that Khan added Amritsar and Jullundur on his own; Amritsar because of Qadian, as Khan was a Qadiani, and Jullundur because Mamdot, a prominent Muslim League leader of Punjab, had his landed property in that district. When asked, Khan denied the story and said that he was asked to do so by Punjab Muslim League leadership (personal communication with Mumtaz Ahmad, professor of political science, Hampton University, Hampton, Virginia). Ahmad once interviewed Khan in Karachi. 38. Mountbatten Papers, London: India Office Records, File No. 120 (cited in Sherwani, "Kashmir's Accession to India Re-examined," 1990, p. 31). 39. Akbar, Nehru, 1988, p. 11. At that time a small road passed through Gurdaspur to Jammu and then to Srinagar. Other land connections were through Pakistan. The road that linked the state with the outside world ran along the Jhelum Valley to Rawalpindi in Pakistan. The rail link connecting the state lay through Sialkot into Pakistan. 40. Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, 1967, p. 218. 41. See Simon Scott Plummer's interview with Christopher Beaumont, Daily Telegraph, 24 February 1992. See also Dawn, Karachi, 25 February 1993. 42. Second Schedule, "District Provisionally Included in New Province of West Punjab" (quoted in Michel, The Indus Rivers, 1967, p. 192). 43. Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, 1967, p. 219. 44. Noon, From Memory, 1966, p. 21. 45. Nayar, Distant Neighbours, 1972, p. 5, 45. 46. Abdullah, "Kashmir, India and Pakistan," 1965, p. 529. 47. Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, 1967, p. 264. 48. Jinnah, Speeches as Governor General, 1963, pp. 32-33. 49. Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, 1951. 50. Sheeab, Nehru, 1960, p. 91.

7 Accession of the Princely States

Before the partition of British India on 14 August 1947, 564 princely states joined either India or Pakistan, in keeping with their geographic compulsions. Only three states, (1) Junagadh, (2) Hyderabad, and (3) Jammu and Kashmir joined neither India nor Pakistan. In these states, the rulers belonged to a religion different from that of the majority of their people. In Junagadh and Hyderabad the rulers were Muslim but the majority of the people were non-Muslim; in Jammu and Kashmir the ruler was a Hindu and the overwhelming majority of his people were Muslim. Each one of these states faced a unique set of conditions before they acceded to or were occupied by India. Technically, Junagadh state is still a Pakistani territory that has been occupied by India, and Jammu and Kashmir's accession has not been accepted by the United Nations, by Pakistan, or by the people of state. The following section briefly discusses the accession to or occupation of these states by India.

Junagadh State Junagadh was a coastal princely state situated midway between Karachi and Bombay that acceded to Pakistan on 15 August 1947. It was one of the important conglomerate states on Kathiawar Peninsula, with an area of 3,337 square miles (8,642 square kilometers). In 1941, the population of Junagadh was 670,719 people; 80 percent were Hindu. The ruler was a Muslim, with an eccentric fondness for dogs. He loved dogs with such fervor that he spent a fortune on the marriage of two of his favorites and proclaimed an official holiday in their honor.1 The chief minister, Shah Nawaz Bhutto was a Sindhi Muslim; he took over as the diwan (chief minister) in May 1947. In the first week of August 1947, the British government of India asked the nawab (ruler) to declare his accession to either of the two dominions and 65

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to sign the instrument of accession accordingly. When no reply was received, the state department of India asked him again on 12 August. On behalf of the nawab, Bhutto replied that the matter was still under consideration. On 13 August a citizens' conference was called in Junagadh, and on 15 August the ruler acceded to Pakistan. The decision was a shock to India for various reasons: First, it violated the geographical compulsion of contiguity; second, it set a precedent in that a ruler of a different religion did not consult his people and acceded to a country of different religion; and third, the accession could be an example for the other two states that had not yet decided about their accession. Annoyed by the accession, India hastened to occupy Babariawad, Mangrol, and Manavadar, three tiny tributary states of Junagadh. Mangrol was ruled by a sheikh, and Babariawad by local landholders. To continue exerting pressure on the nawab, on 25 September India encouraged formation of a provisional government of Junagadh based in Bombay with Samaldas Gandhi as its president. Many in the government of India wanted to send in the army. Sardar Patel was particularly vociferous, and V. P. Menon threatened to resign and take up arms "to fight on behalf of the wronged states inside Junagadh against their oppressors." At a cabinet meeting on 29 September the clamor for some sort of military operation became almost overwhelming, but Governor General Mountbatten was dismayed at the prospect of any armed conflict between India and Pakistan. When Patel called for a show of strength over Junagadh, Mountbatten held to his view, pointing out that: If the "strong line" included entering Junagadh (i.e., Pakistan) territory, a senseless act of aggression, for which India would have to pay the price before the world, would have been committed. . . . All the high international prestige which India had achieved, all the Ambassadors and Embassies we had established abroad, and all the Corps Diplomatique which we were so assiduously collecting in Delhi, would become a liability instead of an asset, for we should have assuredly lost our international position if we were to prove otherwise to be nothing more than "out-andout" aggressors. 2

Mountbatten urged that the question be referred to the United Nations, but Patel and Nehru disagreed. 3 He also emphasized that though a war between India and Pakistan might be the end of Pakistan altogether, "it would also be the end of India for at least a generation to come." 4 The formation of a provisional government and the forced occupation of the tributary states of Mangrol, Manavadar, and Babariawad shook the nawab, who left for Pakistan with his family and dogs, leaving his chief minister behind. The chief minister surrendered the state, on the condition that a plebiscite be held to determine the wishes of the people. Nehru accepted the plebiscite condition and invited Pakistan to hold it under impartial auspices, as technically Junagadh was still a Pakistan territory. On 16

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October Liaquat Ali Khan indicated privately to Mountbatten that he accepted the plebiscite plan—later developments in Jammu and Kashmir, however, changed his mind. Finally, the state was occupied by India on 1 November 1947 through the regional commissioner for western Indian states. After occupying the state, India held a plebiscite on 20 February 1948 in which the overwhelming majority of the people voted to join India. Pakistan did not accept the plebiscite results and continues to regard Junagadh as its territory under Indian occupation.

Hyderabad State Hyderabad state also had a Hindu majority with a Muslim ruler (nizam) who wanted to remain independent. It was the richest and most populous of all the princely states (16,339,000 people); 88 percent of the people were Hindu. In July 1947, the nizam sent a delegation to Delhi to negotiate a dominion status within the British Commonwealth. Because the nizam supported the British during the World War II by contributing 200 million pounds sterling and two fighter squadrons, he thought he was entitled to special and better treatment by the British. Mountbatten did not support the nizam's point of view and turned the delegation down. Then, the nizam approached Jinnah to see if Pakistan would help Hyderabad against India. Jinnah's reply was simple and realistic: he would not endanger Pakistan by helping Hyderabad. A few months later, he told the same thing to Mountbatten: "The Hyderabad question is for the nizam and his government to decide." Earlier, negotiations had begun with India for an association, not accession. The nizam offered a treaty that yielded defense, foreign affairs, and communications to India through "Articles of Association" instead of an "Instrument of Accession." This was not acceptable to India; India asked for a plebiscite under British supervision. Among these controversies and the changing political climate, a standstill agreement was signed by the nizam on 29 November 1947. The standstill agreement emphasized that (1) India and Hyderabad would work in close association and amity for their mutual benefit; (2) until new agreements were made, all the agreements and administrative arrangements of common concern between the government of Hyderabad and the crown representative would continue as between the government of Hyderabad and the government of India; (3) there would be no obligation or right of the government of India to send troops to assist the nizam in the maintenance of law and order; and (4) there would be no paramountcy functions for the government of India. The partition documents published by the U.S. State Department reveal that the nizam also tried to establish direct relations with the British crown, presumably to maintain the state independent of India. By early September, India's attitude changed considerably, partly

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because of India's attrition and partly because of the activities of the razakars (voluntary force) in the state. India considered the razakars as a dagger in its belly and demanded that the razakar organization be banned. India further demanded a right to post troops in the state to maintain law and order. When the nizam resisted these moves, India sent its forces into Hyderabad and called it a "police action" on 11 September 1948, the day Jinnah died. It is said that Nehru heard about the police action when troops were already inside Hyderabad. When he tried to contact Patel, he was told that the home minister was sick and that a conversation with him was not possible. Some people, however, dispute the story.5 The police action, Operation Polo, lasted for five days. Later, Mountbatten said that Operation Polo was planned while he was in Burma from 8-16 March 1948 and that he did not know that it was to be executed. The quick end of the operation defused any possibility of the United Nations Security Council or any foreign country discussing the action. Nehru mentioned this in a letter to Patel from Paris on 27 October: "It was very fortunate that we could dispose of it [Hyderabad] rapidly. Otherwise reactions would have been much adverse as it is very difficult to explain everything; and the simple fact of a large country attacking a small one impressed people unfavorably." 6 Pakistan asked for a debate in the Security Council on 6 October, 21 November, and then again on 6 December 1948, but the members showed little interest as the nizam had withdrawn his complaint.

Jammu and Kashmir The period immediately following partition was the most tense between India and Pakistan. Of the numerous disputes that impeded good neighborly relations between them, the two most serious related to the Indus Waters and Kashmir. The Indus Waters dispute was resolved through the good offices of the World Bank: Kashmir is the remaining issue that continues to bedevil relations between India and Pakistan. Maharaja Hari Singh, the ruler of Kashmir, and Jawaharlal Nehru, the prime minister of India, were the most significant players influencing the fate of Jammu and Kashmir. Before and after independence, Nehru manipulated inclusion of three Muslims tehsils in India and virtually forced the Maharaja to sign the instrument of accession in favor of India. Pressure on the Maharaja for accession to India is illustrated by the efforts and speeches of Nehru and other Indian leaders. They were concerned that Jammu and Kashmir would accede to Pakistan, because the state's population was predominantly Muslim and the Maharaja had an extremely bad relationship with Nehru. In order to mend fences, Achariya Kirpalani, the president of Indian Congress, visited the Kashmiri capital of Srinagar in the third week of May 1947. He was there for a week attempting to woo the ruler and went to the extent of publicly declaring that it was

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absurd to demand the ouster of the ruler. 7 When he failed to sway the Maharaja, Congress sought help from the rulers of the eastern Punjab states. In quick succession the maharajas of Patiala, Kapurthala, Faridkot, and some hill states visited Kashmir to try to persuade Maharaja Singh to follow their example and join India. 8 On 13 June, addressing a prayer meeting, Gandhi said that the princes should join a constituent assembly. He added that he did not mind which of the two assemblies they joined. 9 Earlier, on 10 June, the Hindustan Times, a newspaper sympathetic to Congress, published an article that urged the princes to join either of the two constituent assemblies. 10 On 14 June, V. P. Menon told Mountbatten about the anxiety of the Congress Party over Kashmir. He said that if Kashmir and Northwest Frontier Province should go to Pakistan, all hopes of the plan providing a resolution would be unrealistic. 11 Soon after the 3 June plan was published, Gandhi told Mountbatten that he was eager to go to Kashmir. Mountbatten replied that Nehru also wanted to go there, but the Maharaja wanted neither leader to visit. Hence, Mountbatten said, he could not let the Indian leaders go and proposed to go to Kashmir himself to discuss the state's accession. Before his departure, Mountbatten asked Nehru to submit a note to him presenting his position on Kashmir. Accordingly, Nehru sent a long memorandum with his letter of 17 June, making a case for Kashmir's accession to India. In addition, Nehru discredited Kashmir's prime minister, Ram Chandra Kak, by fabricating a story that Kak had told the Maharaja that Mountbatten wanted Kashmir to join Pakistan because of its geographical situation. Nehru suggested that Kak be removed as prime minister and that Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues be released from prison. Nehru concluded his note saying that the normal and obvious course for Kashmir would be to join India. Mountbatten travelled to Srinagar on 18 June and stayed until 23 June to persuade the Maharaja to make up his mind well before the partition on 15 August. The Maharaja's reaction was to avoid facing reality. Instead of taking advantage of Mountbatten's visit to discuss the situation meaningfully and try to arrive at a rational decision, the Maharaja sent Mountbatten on a prolonged fishing trip to Thricker. 12 When Mountbatten returned from the fishing trip, the Maharaja set a meeting for just before Mountbatten was due to leave and then got out of it on the plea that he had suddenly developed a severe attack of colic. Mountbatten returned to Delhi. In the note of his conversation with prime minister Kak on June 22, Mountbatten said: It was not for him to suggest which constituent assembly he should join, but clearly Kashmiris should work this out for themselves on the basis of the best advantage to the ruler and his people and in consideration of the factors of geography and the probable attitude of the Congress and the Muslim League in Kashmir. If Kashmir joined the Pakistan constituent assembly presumably Mr. Jinnah would protect them against pressure from the Congress. If they joined the Hindustan assembly it would be inevitable

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that they should be treated with consideration by Hindustan. But if they joined neither assembly they would be in a very difficult position. 1 3

On 24 June when Mountbatten told Nehru about the advice he gave to the Maharaja and his prime minister, he did not emphasize the importance of either ascertaining the wishes of the people or of joining one of the two dominions by independence day. He told Nehru that his advice to the Maharaja was: r 1. That Kashmir should not decide about joining any constitutional assembly until the Pakistan constitutional assembly had been set up and the situation before them was a bit clearer; 2. That meanwhile they should make no statement about independence or about their intentions; 3. That they should go ahead and enter into "standstill" and other agreements with both new states; 4. That eventually they should send representatives to one constituent assembly and join one of the two States, at least for defense, communication and external affairs, and 5. That so far as possible they should consult the will of the people and do what the majority thought was best for their state. 14

Addressing a prayer meeting on 8 July 1947, Gandhi appealed to Mountbatten to see that the states join one of the two dominions before 15 August. On 27 July Gandhi again appealed to the princes to make their choice and join one of the two dominions, with due regard to their "geographical location and compulsions of that position." 15 On 29 July Jinnah reiterated his earlier statement of 17 June that states could join either country or enter into any understanding or conclude a treaty, or even enter a standstill agreement to fill administrative voids. 16 Twice in the course of these vital days, Jinnah issued statements guaranteeing the states the power to choose either of the two dominions or to remain independent. In spite of such assurances, it seems that joining Pakistan was anathema to the Maharaja. As a Hindu, the Maharaja was opposed to joining a Muslim country. He was also afraid that if he did join Pakistan his loyal supporters, the Hindus and Sikhs, would leave the state. In spite of all these pressures, the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir delayed his decision. Later, the Maharaja explained that earlier events in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) discouraged him from consulting his people. He was referring to the referendum in NWFP before the transfer of power to determine whether NWFP wanted to join India or Pakistan. In that vote, the people overwhelmingly voted for Pakistan. The Maharaja's preference was for independence and, failing that, a merger with India. According to his son, Karan Singh, he was too much of a Hindu to join Pakistan. The problem became acute when the Maharaja had not made a decision by 15 August 1947. Technically the state became independent. Following

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the two nation principle, Pakistanis thought that the state would join Pakistan because of its geographic contiguity, economic interdependence, and dominant Muslim population. Later, the same arguments were presented by Pakistan's foreign minister, Muhammad Zafarullah Khan, to the United Nations Security Council on 16 January 1948: "Geography, economics and the wishes and the sentiments of an overwhelming majority of his (the Kashmir ruler's) people pointed in one direction—that is to say, accession to Pakistan—and indications have not been wanting that he was at one time inclined to proceed in that direction." 17 The domestic situation within the state also may have played a part in the Maharaja's delayed decision. In June 1947, a "no tax" campaign began in Poonch, a small jagir in southwest Jammu and Kashmir. Subsequently, on 14 and 15 August 1947, "Pakistan Day" was celebrated in Poonch and Srinagar. Coincidently, since 1931, 14 August was celebrated in Jammu and Kashmir as "Kashmir Day." After the tax revolt and Pakistan Day celebrations were ruthlessly suppressed, an uprising began throughout the state to depose the Maharaja. 18 On 15 August the Maharaja imposed martial law in Poonch and increased his Hindu and Sikh forces to control the situation. On 12 August 1947, the state of Jammu and Kashmir proposed a standstill agreement, 19 a device that ensured that current arrangements of trade, communication, and services continued and allowed time for the rulers to make up their minds and announce their decisions. Pakistan agreed to a standstill agreement, but India procrastinated, arguing that the state should send a representative to Delhi to discuss the matter. No official was dispatched to Delhi, nor was a standstill agreement signed with India. Before the transfer of power on 15 August, Jinnah asked Mian Iftikharuddin to visit Kashmir and assess the political situation. As a Muslim socialist, Iftikharuddin had good relationships with the Muslim League and the leaders of Congress, and perhaps also with Sheikh Abdullah. Sheikh Abdullah belonged to the secular socialist club and in Srinagar had witnessed the marriage of Fiaz Ahmad Faiz, a prominent socialist. Upon his return from Srinagar early in September, Iftikharuddin reported that a peaceful resolution in Kashmir was unlikely. By this time, the communal situation in Jammu had deteriorated. Bands of armed Hindus and Sikhs attacked Muslim villages, killing thousands of Muslims and setting off a mass exodus from the state. It is estimated that in the three months beginning in August 1947,200,000 Muslims were killed and 500,000 forced out of their villages. The displaced persons told horrifying tales after crossing the border to Pakistan, and these accounts inflamed public opinion against the Maharaja's state. The Indian government denied any such excesses by the Maharaja or his forces against the Muslims. 20 To make matters worse, the Maharaja ordered that all Muslims surrender their firearms and ammunition to the state. With the Muslims disarmed and unable to resist, the attacks of militant Hindus and Sikhs escalated and became more

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severe. This set the stage for Muslims to seek arms from the the tribal areas of Pakistan, which had a long history of arms manufacturing and smuggling. This arms connection brought the people of Poonch in contact with the tribal Pathans. By the beginning of September, armed bands of Muslims challenged the state forces in Poonch Jagir and Mirpur. The first shot was fired by Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan, then a young landlord of Poonch, and at the time of this writing the prime minister of the Azad Kashmir government. 21 In sympathy, a small group of volunteers from across the Jhelum joined the fighting; they were joined later by small groups of volunteers from Pakistan and by Pathan tribesmen from Northwest Frontier Province. 22 By September 1947, the Poonch revolt acquired a formal command structure. Mohammad Ibrahim Khan, an imprisoned member of the legislative assembly in Srinagar, escaped from jail and crossed over to Pakistan. He succeeded in establishing an operational base in Murree, a hill station in Pakistan, not far from Poonch. His base served as a conduit for arms, ammunition, and supplies to Poonch fighters opposing the Maharaja. As the resistance movement heightened, a number of Muslim soldiers deserted the state army and joined the guerrillas. The attitude of the Maharaja changed considerably during September 1947. While not happy to join India, he believed that he was unlikely to survive as a ruler if he joined Pakistan, though Pakistan offered his state a status similar to that of Sikkim, a state in the Himalayan Mountains between Nepal and Bhutan, which is semi-independent. 23 India was ablaze, his own people were in revolt, and everything was turned upside down. He began looking for a new prime minister, as Gandhi had advised him to do during his visit to Kashmir. He settled on the intriguing choice of Justice Mehar Chand Mahajan. Mahajan practiced law in Gurdaspur and was a member of the Radcliffe boundary commission. After independence he returned to the law as a judge in the East Punjab high court. The Maharaja offered him the job of prime minister of Jammu and Kashmir on 18 September 1947. Patel insisted that he accept the job, even temporarily "in the interest of India." Mahajan could well have been a nominee of Patel, who was Indian deputy prime minister in charge of the states department. Patel thanked the Maharaja for his appointment in a letter dated 2 October 1947 and held further talks with Mahajan in Amritsar.24 Mahajan's task was to arrange the accession of the state to India. Before reaching the state, Mahajan visited Delhi on 11 October 1947 and met with Patel, Nehru, Gandhi, and Mountbatten. Mountbatten said that as governor-general of India he would be very happy if Mahajan advised the Maharaja to accede to India. 25 Then Mountbatten sent Mahajan to see V. P. Menon, who also advised him to arrange the accession of the state to India. Mahajan took an eight-month leave of absence from the East Punjab high court and joined Kashmir state as its prime minister, in response to the wishes of Mountbatten, Patel, and V. P. Menon. Even before Mahajan joined

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the state, the Maharaja was negotiating with Sheikh Abdullah for his collaboration over the accession question, which was assuming greater importance because of approaching winter. (Every winter the government would temporarily relocate to the city of Jammu because Srinigar and most of the valley are cut off from the rest of the world, except Pakistan, by snow and ice. This relocation is known as the Darbar Move.) On 29 September 1947 Sheikh Abdullah was released from jail with members of his National Conference. 26 Ghulam Abbas and his Muslim Conference associates remained incarcerated. On 27 September, Nehru wrote to Patel that accession of the state was of extreme urgency and that the Maharaja needed the support of Sheikh Abdullah and his National Conference. Patel, Baldev Singh, and others got busy planning a forced intervention in Kashmir. The Sikh Maharaja of Patiala provided a battalion and a battery of mountain artillery from his forces. On 22 September the links of the state were strengthened by providing Srinagar airfield with wireless gear to help in winter aviation. By the middle of the month, arms and ammunitions were flown in significant quantities to the state army. Arrangements were made for the Indian troops at Madhopur in the Pathankot tehsil near the Jammu and Kashmir border for possible reinforcement of the state army. Improvement of the road from Jammu to Pathankot was also begun. Telegraph lines were expanded to Srinagar. The deputy prime minister of the state was in regular and close contact with Patel and Baldev Singh, the defense minister of India. 27 These arrangements were made long before 22 October, when Pathan tribesmen invaded the state. All this activity revealed that the Maharaja had a deal with India, as was exposed by the papers that the Maharaja's cousin and envoy, Thakore Hariman Singh, was carrying to Delhi. His plane landed at Lahore Airport because of engine trouble. The plane was attacked by a mob, and Thakore's suitcases were seized. A draft of a treaty between India and Kashmir was discovered in one of the suitcases. 28 The treaty promised Kashmir's accession and provided that India build a road from Pathankot to Jammu and station its troops in Gilgit. By virtue of the standstill agreement, Pakistan was supposed to supply oil, coal, salt, and other essential goods to Kashmir. However, due to the uncertain conditions in the early days, lack of administration, and the pressing shortage of goods, Pakistan could not continue supplying the goods to Kashmir. Kashmir protested and accused Pakistan of deliberately withholding the supply of goods as a pressure mechanism. It appeared that the standstill agreement was intended to buy time and, later, to antagonize Pakistan. On 18 October, the government of Kashmir issued a warning that "if the economic relations between Pakistan and the state were not improved, the state will be justified in asking for assistance elsewhere." Pakistan's foreign minister explained that uncertain conditions in Kashmir discouraged drivers of the trucks from taking supplies to

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Kashmir and that they refused to go beyond Rawalpindi. Since transport services on this route were private, he noted, there was not much that Pakistan could do. Liaquat Ali Khan also responded to Kashmir's challenge by telegram on the following day: We are astonished to hear your threat to ask for assistance from an outside power. The only object of this intervention by an outside power secured by you would be to complete the process of suppressing the Muslims to enable you to join the Indian dominion as a coup d'état against the declared and well known will of the Muslims and others who form 85% of the population of your state. We must earnestly draw your attention to the fact that if this policy is not changed and the preparations and the measures which you are now taking in implementing the policy are not stopped, the gravest consequences will follow for which you alone will be held responsible. 29

India alleged that Pakistan imposed a blockade, organized raids along the border, and allowed "raiders" to enter Kashmir. As a result, Kashmir sought supplies from India that India was happy to send to Srinagar via Jammu. Until the third week of October, resistance against the Maharaja had been internal. Sheikh Abdullah admitted this in his press conference in Delhi on 21 October 1947; "The happenings in certain states such as Patiala, Bharatpur, and elsewhere [in Hindu-dominated States] have naturally caused apprehensions in the minds of the Muslims in Kashmir, who form the majority of the population." They were afraid that the state's accession to India portended danger to them. He added that the present troubles in Poonch were because of the unwise policies adopted by the state. The people of Poonch who suffered under their local ruler, and then again under the Maharaja, started a people's movement for the redress of their grievances. The protest was not communal, and when Kashmir state sent in troops there was panic in Poonch. But most of the adult population of Poonch were former servicemen of the Indian Army who had close connections with the people in Jhelum and Rawalpindi. They evacuated their women and children, crossed the frontier, and returned with arms supplied to them by the willing people. In response to the resistance, the Kashmir state forces had to withdraw from certain areas. 30 Thus, until the third week of October the resistance to the Maharaja had been domestic. In the middle of September, one of the resistance commanders in Poonch, Khurshid Anwar, established contacts with various tribal leaders to be supplied with arms. By this time, the people of Pakistan began to take an active interest in the Poonch situation. Major General Akbar Khan recorded a meeting in the middle of September attended by Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, Finance Minister Ghulam Mohammad, Mian Iftikharuddin, Zaman Kiani, Khurshid Anwar, and Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan, a minister in the Punjab government. The meeting was called to consider three options:

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(1) to ignore the situation taking place so near to Pakistan, (2) to assist the Maharaja and suppress the rebellion, and (3) to assist the resistance against the Maharaja. The third option seemed most viable and was acted upon. Jinnah was not involved and was not informed of the meeting. Large scale tribal attacks began on or about 19 October 1947; neither Jinnah nor Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, secretary general of Pakistan, knew of the attacks.31 General headquarters of the Pakistan army learned of the attacks and sent a telegram to the commander in chief of India on 20 October, stating that 5,000 tribesmen had attacked and captured Muzaffarabad and Domel. However, it is not known precisely how many Pathan tribesmen were involved in the mission. Some Indian estimates range as high as 70,000. But Major General Akbar Khan says that there were about 2,000, and Stanley Wolpert says that there were about 5,000. 32 After the tribal attack, India asked its interservices chief to prepare a plan for sending forces into Kashmir. Three staff officers flew to Srinagar on the afternoon of 20 October and prepared a plan known as "Operation Gulmerg." On the morning of 22 October, the tribesmen captured Baramula, 35 miles from Srinagar, and opened the road to Srinagar. They eventually moved within four miles of Srinagar and knocked out its only power station. On 24 October 1947, the Poonch rebels formally declared their independence from the Maharaja and formed the government of Azad (Free) Kashmir, with Mohammad Ibrahim Khan as its president and Mirwaiz Mohammad Yusuf Shah as its minister for education. The Poonch rebels were called the Azad Kashmir army. In spite of all these pressures, the Maharaja was still indecisive. On 25 October, the London Times commented "Indications are that the Hindu Maharaja of Kashmir, Sir Hari Singh, has lately been much influenced by representations made by Gandhi who visited Kashmir three months ago, and by other Congress leaders not to accede to Pakistan." 33 On the same morning, the deputy prime minister of Jammu and Kashmir flew to Delhi to seek help for the Indian army. He was carrying with him an accession offer to India but did not show it to the Indian leaders. 34 The Indian defense committee presided over by Mountbatten met in an emergency session and agreed to assemble all the arms and aircraft they could find for possible immediate dispatch to Srinagar. V. P. Menon was sent to Srinagar to see if he could convince the Maharaja to sign an accession agreement. On 25 October Sheikh Abdullah flew to Delhi and stayed with Nehru at Tin Murti, his official residence. In the early hours of 26 October, Menon returned from Srinagar to report to Mountbatten, Nehru, and Patel that the "Maharaja had gone to pieces," and "could come to no decision." 35 His state's prime minister, M. C. Mahajan (later chief justice of India), was responsive, however, and returned with Menon to Delhi, where he met Nehru and Patel. Mahajan pleaded for help and offered to step down and accept Sheikh Abdullah as

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prime minister of Kashmir, in return for military assistance. Mahajan said that "The army must fly to Srinagar this evening or else I will go to Lahore and negotiate terms with Mr. Jinnah." Mahajan reported that Nehru became upset and angry at the mention of Jinnah's name and ordered him away, but Patel detained him, whispering "of course, Mahajan, you are not going to Pakistan." Then Sheikh Abdullah, who was listening from an adjoining bedroom in Nehru's Delhi house (Tin Murti) sent a message to second Mahajan's advice, which immediately changed Nehru's "attitude." 36 After a few hours, Mahajan was informed that India would intervene if the Maharaja signed the instrument of accession to India. Consequently, Menon and Mahajan flew back to Jammu, where Menon was able to "squeeze" the accession from the Maharaja as he boasted the same evening to the deputy high commissioner, Alexander Symon. V. P. Menon was back in his Delhi residence late on the evening of that same Sunday, 26 October, where Alexander Symon, Britain's deputy high commissioner, joined him for a drink a few minutes after his return. The jubilant Menon poured them each a stiff drink. As they sat down, an enormous smile spread across his face. He raised his glass to Symon. Then, he pulled a piece of paper from his jacket pocket and waved it gaily toward the Englishman. "Here it is." he said "We have Kashmir. The bastard signed the act of accession. And now that we've got it, we'll never let it go

Mountbatten forced Nehru to get the instrument of accession before sending troops, as he wanted things done legally. Mountbatten told Nehru that without legal accession he would not want British officers to serve in the Indian army.38 But once the accession was signed and the decision to intervene was taken, Mountbatten involved himself totally in the work of making it effective. According to Philip Ziegler, "the mantle of governor general fell from him (Mountbatten) and he assumed the garb of the supreme commander." 39 Pakistani sources claimed to have seen him at the airport, supervising the loading of men and weapons into the approximately one hundred aircraft assembled to ferry the troops to Kashmir. George Cunningham also wrote in his diary that Mountbatten was becoming more and more anathema to Muslims daily, and it seemed that he could see nothing except through Hindu eyes. 40 There is some confusion about the circumstances and date of the signing of the instrument of accession and when Indian intervention began. Karan Singh, son of the Maharaja and heir apparent of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, describes the situation on 27 October. It is worth quoting him: My father and members of the family were attending the Darbar in the beautiful hall of the city palace at the Jhelum with its richly decorated papier mache ceiling. Suddenly the lights went out—the invaders had captured and destroyed the only power house at that time, which was at

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Mahura on the main road from Domel to Srinagar along which the invasion was proceeding. In the pitch darkness, I sat quite alone in my room on the wheel chair. After a few minutes the eerie silence was broken by the sudden, blood-chilling howl of jackals. Weirdly the cacophony rose and fell, then rose again into a crescendo. Death and destruction were fast approaching Srinagar, our smug world had collapsed around us, the wheels of destiny had turned full circle. Suddenly there was a flurry of activity. The subsequent events are a jumble in my mind-servants frantically rushing around with petromax lamps, my father's precipitate return from the Darbar ashen-faced and grim, V. P. Menon's dramatic air dash to Srinagar to persuade him to move to Jammu, my father's reluctance but the final agreement in view of Menon's insistence, and then the long, nightmarish exodus from Srinagar late at night on the 27th.41

The Maharaja left for Jammu with his wife, near relatives, and some staff in the early hours of the morning on 28 October. The Maharaja drove his car with Victor Rosenthal at his side and two staff officers in the back seat. His wife followed with others in several cars. The heir apparent was in a heavy plaster cast for a broken leg, and his wheelchair was put in the back of one of the station wagons. The journey was interminable, with numerous stops en route. All through the night, the convoy drove, slowly, haltingly. The convoy crawled over Banihal Pass when the first light was beginning to break. The caravan stopped at a small settlement at Kud, 60 miles from Jammu, where Swami Sant Dev joined the group. The convoy reached Jammu Palace in the evening of 28 October. The Maharaja did not speak a word throughout the journey; and when he reached the palace, he uttered only one sentence, "We lost Kashmir." 42 Tired as he was, the Maharaja went to sleep, but before he did, he instructed his aide-de-camp that if Menon came back he was not to be disturbed, as it would mean that Indian help was forthcoming and he could sleep in peace. If, however, he failed to return, everything was obviously lost and the ADC should shoot him dead in his sleep. 43 If the dates Karan Singh speaks of are correct, then the chronicle of events that recounts that the instrument of accession was signed on 26 October, that Mountbatten accepted it on 27 October, and that India intervened on the same day, is a fabrication to legitimize the Indian action. It appears that Indian forces were already in Kashmir before 26 October, and the instrument of accession was signed by the Maharaja on 29 October; Mountbatten had signed it on 27 October. Alastair Lamb was the first to point out that the instrument of accession was postdated, as the Indian army was already in Kashmir. 44 Another important perspective offered by Lamb is that the decision to retain Jammu and Kashmir as part of India was made by the British colonial administration under Mountbatten, as the departing British felt that Jammu and Kashmir was an important buffer to the north of India against the communist Soviet Union. Since it was a political decision made by the colonial administration, there was no question of allowing the

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future of Kashmir to be decided through the popular will of the people. Lamb repeated the same perspective during his presentation at a seminar on Kashmir organized by Neville Maxwell at Oxford University on 23-24 June 1990.45 A number of people in Pakistan have also raised questions about the sequence of events relating to the accession of Kashmir. 46 The first Indian soldiers to arrive were a Sikh regiment flown into Srinagar from Gurgaon in the morning of 27 October. The orders for the airlift were issued at 1:00 P.M. on 26 October, before the accession was accepted by Mountbatten; the operation was supervised by General Dudley Russell. 47 The timing and the manner in which the troops were airlifted also indicate that Indian intervention began before the accession formalities were complete. The official description of the formal accession was a fabrication for international consumption. Most of the tribesmen were still in Baramula, not knowing that Indian reinforcements were flying to Srinagar every hour. Pakistan was stunned over the Maharaja's accession of Kashmir to India. At first, Pakistan wanted to commit all the troops it had, but the plan was abandoned. Late on 27 October, Jinnah asked General Douglas Gracey, acting commander in chief, to send Pakistani troops to Kashmir. The general refused, saying that he would need the approval of Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, who held supreme command over Indian and Pakistani forces. Gracey's refusal was a severe shock to Jinnah, whose health deteriorated from that point on. 48 On Auchinleck's recommendation, Jinnah invited Indian leaders and Mountbatten to Lahore for talks on Kashmir. Nehru did not come because of illness, and Patel refused to come, because "for him or for the prime minister to come crawling to Jinnah, when India was stronger would be a step which the Indian people would never forgive." Before leaving for Lahore, Mountbatten met Gandhi, who made it clear where his sympathies were. Jinnah argued in Lahore that the accession was not legal because it was brought about by violence. Ismay, who accompanied Mountbatten to Lahore, suggested that the fighting be stopped. Jinnah said he was in favor of that, provided both sides withdraw from Kashmir at once. When Mountbatten asked how the tribesmen were to be called off, Jinnah said he would guarantee their withdrawal within 24 hours. Mountbatten suggested a plebiscite under the supervision of the United Nations, with an advance contingent of observers and organizers to prepare the necessary atmosphere. Mountbatten gave a record of his talks with Jinnah to Nehru in the form of a report that stated "Jinnah was quite pessimistic that India was out to throttle and choke the dominion of Pakistan at its birth." Auchinleck also sent a similar assessment by cable to London: "I have no hesitation in affirming that the present Indian cabinet are implacably determined to do all in their power to prevent the establishment of the dominion of Pakistan on a firm basis." 49

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Figure 7.1 Instrument of Accession (Page 2 showing disputed dates) %

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