Diversity in International Communism: A Documentary Record, 1961–1963 9780231880954

Table of contents :
PREFACE
CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
INTRODUCTION. ISSUES AND METHODS
CHAPTER I. THE XXII CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION (CPSU)
CHAPTER II. THE ALBANIAN CRISIS
CHAPTER III. THE CHINESE POSITION
CHAPTER IV. THE EAST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES
CHAPTER V. COMMUNIST PARTIES IN ASIAN “SOCIALIST” STATES
CHAPTER VI. THE COMMUNIST PARTIES IN THE WEST
CHAPTER VII. COMMUNIST PARTIES OF ASIA, THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, AND LATIN AMERICA
CHAPTER VIII. THE YUGOSLAV RESPONSE
CHAPTER IX. THE RESTATEMENT OF THE SOVIET POSITION
CHAPTER X. FROM CALM TO CRISIS (April, 1962–April, 1963)
APPENDIX

Citation preview

DIVERSITY in INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

DIVERSITY in INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM A Documentary Record, EDITED WITH

BY

1961-1963

Alexander Dallin

Jonathan Harris

AND

Grey Hodnett

FOR THE Research Institute on Communist Affairs Columbia University

Columbia University Press

NEW YORK & LONDON

1963

The transliteration system used in this book is based on the Library of Congress system, with some modifications

C o p y r i g h t © 1963 C o l u m b i a University Press L i b r a r y of C o n g r e s s Catalog Card N u m b e r : 6 2 - 2 1 5 1 5 M a n u f a c t u r e d in the United States of A m e r i c a

PREFACE

This volume is concerned with the issues that have troubled and divided the international Communist movement since the X X I I Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, held in October, 1961. It may be considered a sequel to two earlier publications—one, dealing with Khrushchev's attack on Stalin at the X X CPSU Congress and its repercussions in other Communist parties; the other, with the dramatic events in Poland and Hungary in 1956. 1 The purpose of these volumes is to provide the reader with the most important available documentation on m a j o r trends within the international Communist movement. When this collection was first conceived, in the months following the X X I I Congress, there was still considerable doubt and disagreement about the reality and depth of differences among Communist parties and states. Even then it was apparent that behind the open Soviet-Albanian rift lay, on the one hand, the crucial balance of Sino-Soviet relations and, on the other, Khrushchev's continuing search for a definition of post-Stalin communism. More broadly, one could speculate whether communism, as a world movement, had not come to the most important crossroad of its history. As the documents in this collection illustrate, the remarkably frank discussion of a wide range of topics gained in scope and content f r o m the simultaneity of queries, pressures, and arguments generated in many 1 The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism: A Selection of Documents, edited by the Russian Institute, C o l u m b i a University ( N e w Y o r k : C o l u m b i a University Press, 1956): and National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe: A Selection of Documents on Events in Poland and Hungary, February-November, 1956, edited by P a u l Zinner ( N e w Y o r k : C o l u m b i a University Press, 1 9 5 6 ) .

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quarters. Nor has the Sino-Soviet contest been by any means the only focus of debate. Without ever coming to a full stop, the overt debate of contentious issues diminished markedly in April, 1962, as a result of what we now know to have been an effort of various Communist parties to mute, if not to resolve, the disagreements, as a matter of self-interest or political survival. That effort failed, and by the fall a combination of events ushered in a new phase of the conflict, which rapidly "escalated" into a severe crisis. The unprecedented bluntness and publicity of the debate, which now centered on Sino-Soviet relations, incidentally validated the earlier interpretations arrived at by more "intuitive" techniques. An understanding of international communism requires the close study of those remarkable periods—such as mid-1956, the winter of 1961-62, and the winter of 1962-63—when the deeply ingrained discipline and secretiveness among Communists proved incapable of preventing the exposure of internal debate and dissension to the scrutiny of outsiders. While of course the public pronouncements and exchanges of Communist elites do not normally reflect the full spectrum of resentments and disagreements, the documents are here reproduced on the explicit assumption that they are of genuine and substantive significance in the disputes. Yet it is remarkable how at all times—even after the shock engendered by Khrushchev's revelations about Stalin, the public excommunication of Albania, or the conflicting strategies pursued in the Cuban and Sino-Indian crises—some inhibitions remain, some efforts are made to "paper over" the issues, and some lip service is paid to the fetishes of "unity" and historical inevitability. So much the more important is it, then, to be "tuned in" on the debates which are, more often than not, carried on in a variety of indirect ways. Indeed, for many readers it may be a surprise to discover that most of the issues ventilated by the Communist parties since October, 1962, existed earlier, although they were debated in other terms. This is one reason for the attention devoted in this volume

Preface

vii

to the year "before C u b a " — a year which provided the evidence essential for an understanding of the differences among Communists and of the "esoteric" terms in which they were frequently expressed. The sheer quantity and the verbosity of Communist publications on these issues have necessitated a strict selection of materials and the use of excerpts. Many items of interest that were not related to the major issues and others which were substantially repetitive had to be omitted for reasons of space. Since the voluminous proceedings of the X X I I C P S U Congress are available in other English-language publications, the selections included here have been kept to the essential minimum. Similarly, both Russian and Chinese Communist collections of some key documents for the period from December, 1962, to March, 1963, are available in English translation. Hence it has once again been possible—and necessary—to reproduce only the most significant statements for these months. A s these lines are being written, new documentary evidence accumulates on the positions taken within "third" parties on the latest issues dividing the Communist world. Most of it must, regrettably, be omitted from this book. N o uniform organization of the evidence can be entirely satisfactory for the reconstruction of an international process in which numerous elites simultaneously respond to the same problems and in turn influence each other's views. It has seemed most useful to combine a chronological framework with a treatment by geographic areas. The source material divides into three somewhat distinct groups. Chapters I through IX offer detailed evidence from all parties for the period from October, 1961, to April, 1962. Chapter X, covering the following year, is rather in the nature of an extensive summary, largely limited to Soviet and Chinese documents. Finally, the documents reproduced in the Appendix are of somewhat earlier vintage. These are the French and Italian Communist Party publications concerning their delegations' activities at the Moscow Conference of Eighty-one Communist Parties in November-December, 1960. Because of the

viii

Preface

new and important light they shed on the background of the dispute and on the nature of discourse among leading Communists "behind closed doors," the essential parts of these documents deserve reproduction here. The problems of assembling, analyzing, translating, and verifying the texts proved to be considerably greater than any of the editors or sponsors of this volume had foreseen. Wherever possible, the translations have been based on texts in the original language. If these were not available, official government translations or translations by the Communist party issuing the document were used. Unfortunately, as one consequence of this procedure, the same concept or term is at times rendered in two or more different ways. (Thus, "cult of the personality," "cult of the individual," and "personality cult" of course all refer to the current circumlocution for the abuses of Stalinism. Likewise, different parties speak of a "plenum," a "plenary session," or a "plenary meeting" of their Central Committees.) It need hardly be said that a variety of terms, such as "Liquidators," "Economism," "adventurists," "class nature," or "repression," have a specific, value-laden meaning in Communist parlance, evoking unmistakable judgments and precedents. Among the several phrases which have recently come into use and often appear in the documents in abbreviated form, a few deserve identification: the Bucharest Conference is the meeting of representatives of Communist parties held on June 21-26, 1960, in conjunction with the III Congress of the Rumanian Workers Party. The Moscow Declaration is the document signed by the twelve "ruling" Communist parties (but not the Yugoslavs) as a result of their first major post-Stalin conference in November, 1957. The Moscow Statement is the document adopted by the representatives of eighty-one Communist parties who met in Moscow for several weeks in November-December, I960. 2 The "anti-Party group" is the current 2 The 1957 Moscow Declaration is available in English in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, IX, No. 47 (January 1, 1958), 3-7; and in The New York Times, November 22, 1957, p. 6. The 1960 Moscow Statement is available in English in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XII, Nos. 48-49 (December 28, 1960, and January 4, 1961);

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ix

Soviet label for the amalgam of leaders who in June, 1957, joined to form what more properly should be called the "antiKhrushchev group" (Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich in particular)—momentarily controlling seven out of eleven votes in the CPSU Presidium but promptly finding themselves outplayed and purged by Khrushchev. In some instances, available official translations have been revised (on the basis of the original documents) for the sake of greater precision and intelligibility. Even so, occasional infelicities of style, awkwardness of expression, and obscurity of Communist jargon remain. In view of the political significance of purposeful deletions, omissions, and distortions in the republication of these materials by other Communist parties, an effort has been made to indicate at least the major variant versions. The advice and assistance of many individuals have been essential for the completion of the work which this volume required. Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski, Director of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs, Columbia University, worked with the editors in planning the original contents of the volume and was co-author of the introductory essay, which is designed to help the reader as he threads his way through the unfamiliar fabric of Communist debate. Professor Henry L. Roberts, then Director of the Russian Institute and of the Program on East Central Europe, Columbia University, generously advised on fundamental matters of selection and organization, accuracy and authenticity of materials, and was instrumental in working out publication arrangements. Mr. Jonathan Harris, Associate in Government in Columbia College, had the interminable burdens of coordinating the proNeir Times. No. 50 ( 1 9 6 0 ) . Supplement: World Marxist Review, December, 1960, pp. 4 - 2 5 ; and The New York Times, December 7, 1960. pp. ¡4-17. Both are also translated in The Sino-Soviel Dispute, edited by G. F. Hudson. Richard Lowenthal, and Roderick MacFarquhar ( N e w York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), and The New Communist Manifesto and Related Documents, edited by Dan N. Jacobs ( N e w York: Harper & Brothers, 1962).

X

Preface

duction of the manuscript, securing documents, arranging for translations, and supervising the selection of excerpts used in Chapters I - I X . Dr. Grey Hodnett, Instructor in Government in Columbia College, had the responsibility for the painstaking review of the entire manuscript, including the checking of terminology, accuracy of translations, and editorial comment, as well as the production of Chapter X. Thomas Bernstein, Seweryn Bialer, Marshall Shatz, and Jane Perlberg Shapiro made valuable contributions by surveying, selecting, and editing materials for individual chapters. It is a pleasure to acknowledge the assistance in making, editing, or verifying translations of Professor Stavro Skendi, Paul Horwitz, Jane Harris, Allen Krause, Edith Rogovin, Richard Sorich, Rudolf Tokes, Pio Uliassi, Barbara Wolfe, as well as the conscientious and competent research of James E. Connor, Upyong Kim, Julie Martin, and Thomas W. Robinson. C. M. Alphonso, Inna Buld, Frances Kohn, Seena Krizman, Edith Rogovin, Mary Tokes, and Barbara Zimmerman struggled valiantly with various parts of the typescript. Special recognition is due to Christine Dodson and Anne Miller for secretarial, editorial, and proofreading assistance of high quality. Henry H. Wiggins, William Bernhardt, and the Editorial Department of Columbia University Press were most understanding and helpful in seeing this volume to difficult completion. Miss Louise E. Luke, Editor at the Russian Institute, Columbia University, repeatedly shared with the editors her unerring competence on matters of sense, style, and format. Dr. William E. Griffith, of the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, was good enough to offer, at an early stage, his very knowledgeable comments and suggestions on the coverage of the volume, and later, to supply verifications of some translations. Leo Gruliow, editor of The Current Digest oj the Soviet Press, on behalf of the publishers, the Joint Committee of Slavic Studies, kindly authorized the use of some translations that appeared in the Digest. The unselfish and often painstaking assistance of the above

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was instrumental for the success of an undertaking which proved to be far more instructive than satisfying, and far more timeconsuming than editors, sponsors, or publishers had assumed. Perhaps no academic institution is as yet adequately staffed and organized so as to procure, translate, and analyze with facility the overt and official pronouncements of the nearly one hundred Communist parties around the globe. 3 Above all else, an appreciation of the inherent interest and importance of the subject-matter—substantive and methodological—and the relative unavailability of a large part of the documentation, spurred the editors and the staff to see this project through to completion. ALEXANDER

May,

DALLIN

1963

' It may be mildly comforting to note that even the Soviet Union seems to be experiencing similar difficulties in collecting and following the widely scattered evidence. As the introduction to a global survey of C o m munist parties puts it, "The authors, in preparing this book, encountered certain difficulties related either to the lack of data or to the lack of certainty about the nature of this new type of publication. One must take into account the fact that the latest comparable Marxist publications appeared more than thirty years ago." (Akademiia nauk S S S R , I M E M O ,

Rahochee dvizhenie v kapitalisticheskikh stranakh, 1959-1961 gg. [Moscow, 1961], p. 7 . )

CONTENTS

LIST O F ABBREVIATIONS INTRODUCTION:

ISSUES

XXIV AND

METHODS,

by

Zbigniew

Brzezinski and Alexander Dallin

xxv

I. T H E XXII CONGRESS OF T H E C O M M U N I S T PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION ( C P S U )

1. Nikita Khrushchev. Report of the Central Committee to the XXII Congress of the CPSU, October 17, 1961 2. Nikita Khrushchev. Report on the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the XXII Congress of the CPSU, October 18, 1961 3. Chou En-lai. Speech at the XXII CPSU Congress, October 19, 1961 4. Anastas Mikoyan. Speech at the XXII CPSU Congress, October 20, 1961 5. Mikhail Suslov. Speech at the XXII CPSU Congress, October 21, 1961 6. Petr Pospelov. Speech at the XXII CPSU Congress, October 26, 1961 7. Otto Kuusinen. Speech at the XXII CPSU Congress, October 26, 1961 8. Nikita Khrushchev. Concluding Remarks at the XXII CPSU Congress, October 27, 1961 II.

THE ALBANIAN

CRISIS

9. Declaration of the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor, October 20, 1961 10. Enver Hoxha. Speech Marking the Anniversary

1

4

33 45 55 63 66 70 71 85

85

Contents of the APL and the Forty-fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution, November 7, 1961 88 11. Fedor Konstantinov. "The Schismatic Anti-Marxist Activities of the Albanian Leaders." Kommunist, No. 17, November, 1961 132 12. Note Verbale Presented on November 25, 1961, Concerning the Recall of the Soviet Ambassador from Albania 145 13. Note Verbale Presented on November 25, 1961, Concerning the Departure of the Albanian Ambassador in the USSR 146 14. Note Verbale Presented on December 3, 1961, Concerning the Recall of the USSR Embassy Staff and Commercial Representation in Tirana and the Demand for the Departure of the Staff of the Albanian Embassy and the Albanian Commercial Counselor in the USSR 148 15. Note of the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Presented to the Embassy of the Soviet Union in Tirana, December 4, 1961 150 16. Note of the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Presented to the Embassy of the Soviet Union in Tirana, December 9, 1961 152 17. "The Fighting Banner of Communists of the Entire World." Editorial, Pravda, December 6, 1961 156 18. "A Year of Historic Proofs." Editorial, Zeri i Popullit, December 6, 1961 159 19. "Deeper and Deeper in the Mire of Anti-Marxism." Editorial, Zeri i Popullit, January 9, 1962 167 20. Exclusion from Warsaw Treaty Organization Protested, February 8, 1962 181 21. "Khrushchev Has Been Devoting His Time to Aggravating the Divergencies with Our Party and State Instead of Solving Them." Editorial, Zeri i Popullit, March 25, 1962 182

Contents III. THE CHINESE POSITION

22. Message of Greetings from the Chinese People's Republic to the Soviet Union on the Anniversary of the October Revolution, November 6, 1961 23. Message of Greetings from the Communist Party of China to the Albanian Party of Labor on the Twentieth Anniversary of the Founding of the Albanian Party of Labor, November 7, 1961 24. "Wu Yu-chang's Speech at Peking Rally." Peking Review, November 10, 1961 25. H o Tsung. "Glorious Albanian Party of Labor." Peking Review, November 17, 1961 26. "Fraternal Albania's Seventeenth Anniversary." Peking Review, December 1, 1961 27. "Holding Aloft the Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary Banner of the Moscow Statement." Editorial, Jen-min jih-pao, December 1, 1961 28. Liao Cheng-chih. Speech at the Gaza Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, December 9, 1961 29. Liao Cheng-chih. Speech at the World Peace Council, Stockholm, December 16, 1961 30. Liu Ning-I. Speech at the World Peace Council, Stockholm, December 18, 1961 31. " A Year-End Balance Sheet of the Kennedy Administration's Policies of Aggression." Editorial, Ta-kung Pao, December 30, 1961 32. Kuo Chi-chou. "Hail the Great Victories of the National Liberation Movement." Hung-ch'i, January 1, 1962 33. "New Year's Greetings." Editorial, Jen-min jihpao, January 1, 1962 34. Chou En-lai. Speech to the Albanian Trade Delegation, January 13, 1962 35. " A Great Day of Friendship." Editorial, Jen-min jih-pao, February 14, 1962

xv 209

200

202 204 208 210

212

222 224 229

234

237 243 248 249

Contents

XVI

36. "Fraternal Friendship of Great Peoples—On the Twelfth Anniversary of the Signing of the SovietChinese Treaty." Pravda, February 14, 1962 37. Hsiao Shu and Ch'un-ping. "On Bernsteinian Revisionism." Hung-ch'i, February 10, 1962 38. Wu Chiang. "Our Age and Edvard Kardelj's 'Dialectics.'" Hung-ch'i, March 1, 1962 39. NCNA Press Communiqué on the National People's Congress, April 16, 1962 40. Li Fu, Li Ssu-wen, and Wang Fu-ju. "On Kautskyism." Hung-ch'i,

April 25, 1 9 6 2

41. Pien Chung-yin. "The Revolutionary Tradition of Political Parties of the Proletariat." Hung-ch'i, May 16, 1962

253 258 269 272 277

289

IV. THE EAST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES

297

Czechoslovak Communist Party (CCP) 42. Antonin Novotny. Report to the Central Committee of the CCP, November 15, 1961 43. Vladimir Koucky. Speech at the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CCP, November 15, 1961 44. Viliam Siroky. Speech at the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CCP, November 15-17, 1961 Polish United Workers Party (PUWP) 45. Wladyslaw Gomulka. Report to the Central Committee of the PUWP, November 22, 1961 46. Tadeusz Daniszewski. Speech at the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the PUWP, November 22, 1961 47. "The Direction of Renewal and the March Toward Communism." Editorial, Nowe Drogi, December, 1961 48. Mieczyslaw Rakowski. "Content and Forms of Unity." Nowe Drogi, January, 1962

298 298

313

315 317 318

333

342 345

Contents

xvii

Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) 49. Walter Ulbricht. Report to the Central Committee of the SED, November 23-26, 1961 Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) 50. Todor Zhivkov. Report to the Central Committee of the BCP, November 28, 1961 Rumanian Workers Party ( R W P ) 51. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej. Report to the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers Party, November 30-December 5, 1961 Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (HSWP) 52. Janos Kadar. "Lenin's Ideas Will Triumph." Pravda, December 26, 1961

350

V. C O M M U N I S T

PARTIES

IN ASIAN " S O C I A L I S T "

STATES

Korean Workers Party (KWP) 53. Kim 11-sung. Report to the Central Committee of the KWP, November 27, 1961 54. Kim Il-sung and Choi Yong Kun. Message of Greetings to Enver Hoxha, Haxhi Lleshi, and Mehmet Shchu, November 27, 1961 Vietnamese Workers Party (VWP) 55. Ho Chi Minh, Truong Chinh, and Pham Van Dong. Message of Greetings to Enver Hoxha, Haxhi Lleshi, and Mehmet Shehu, November 28, 1961 56. "Albania—A Firm Advance Post of the Socialist Camp." Hoc Tap, November, 1961 57. Communiqué of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Workers Party Concerning the XXII CPSU Congress, December 4, 1961 Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) 58. Luysantserengiin Tsend. Report to the Party Aktiv of Ulan Bator, November 28, 1961 59. Yumzhagiin Tsedenbal. Report to the Central Committee of the MPRP, February 2, 1962

350 355 355 370

370 377 377 387

387 388

394 395

396 397

399 402 402 405

Contents

xviii VI. THE COMMUNIST

PARTIES IN THE WEST

Italian Communist Party (PCI) 60. Palmiro Togliatti. Report to the Central Committee of the PCI, November 10, 1961 61. The Debate in the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the PCI on the XXII CPSU Congress, November 11, 1961 62. Italian Communist Party Communiqué on the XXII CPSU Congress, November 27, 1961 63. "The XXII CPSU Congress on the Elimination of the Consequences of the Personality Cult." Editorial, Pravda, November 21, 1961 64. Luigi Longo. Statement at the Central Committee Debate, December 21-22, 1961 65. Palmiro Togliatti. Speech in Florence, January 21, 1962 French Communist Party (PCF) 66. Maurice Thorez. Speech at the Salle de la Mutualité, November 7, 1961 67. Waldeck Rochet. Report to the Central Committee of the PCF, November 26, 1961 68. Maurice Thorez. Statement to the Central Committee of the PCF, November 27, 1961 69. Saverio Tutino. "Statement of Thorez at the Central Committee of the PCF on the Problems Raised by the XXII Congress." L'Unità, December 1, 1961 70. Palmiro Togliatti. Statement. L'Unità, December 2,1961 71. Jacques Duclos. "Problems of Unity in the International Communist and Workers Movement." L'Humanité, December 9, 1961 World Federation of Trade Unions ( WFTU) 72. Agostino Novella. Proposed Amendments to the Draft Program of the WFTU Submitted at the Fifth Congress of the WFTU in Moscow, December, 1961

408

408 408

421 451

468 474 475 476 476 478 487

495 496

498 501

503

Contents

xix

Other Parties Belgian Communist Party (PCB) 73. Jean Blume. Article in Le Drapeau Rouge, December 7, 1961 74. Jean Terfve. "On Divergences of Outlook among Communist Parties." Le Drapeau Rouge, January 5-17, 1962 75. Statement by the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Belgium, February 22, 1962 Austrian Communist Party (KPO) 76. Franz Muhri. Report to the Central Committee of the KPO, December 28-29, 1961 77. Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Austria, February 8-9, 1962 Swiss Communist Party Scandinavian Communist Parties 78. Preben Henriksen. Report to the Central Committee of the Danish Communist Party, December 20, 1961 Creek and Cypriot Communist Parties Israeli Communist Party Communist Party of the United States Communist Party of Great Britain Communist Party of Canada

504 505

VII. C O M M U N I S T

P A R T I E S O F ASIA, T H E NEAR AND

506

508 519 526 527 529 530 531

532 535 535 536 536 537

MID-

D L E EAST, AND L A T I N A M E R I C A

Communist Party of India ( C P I ) 79. Ajoy Ghosh. "Comments on the XXII CPSU Congress." New Age, December 10, 1961 80. Editorial Commemorating the Anniversary of Stalin's Birth. Swadhinata, December 21, 1961 Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) 81. Dipa Aidit. Statement on the XXII CPSU Congress, November 23, 1961 82. Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the PKI on the Work of the PKI Dele-

539

539 540 547 549 550

Contents

XX

gation to the X X I I CPSU Congress, December 15, 1961 83. "J. V. Stalin—Ivory with Flaws, but Ivory." Editorial, Harian Rakjat, December 21, 1961 84. Dipa Aidit. Interview in Djakarta. Harian Rakjat, March 6, 1962 Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 85. "Struggle Against Two Foes for the Consolidation of the International Communist Movement." Editorial, Akahata, December 29, 1961 86. "Answering the Opposition's Charges." Editorial, Akahata, January 29, 1962 Malayan Communist Party 87. Telegram of Greetings from the Central Committee of the Malayan Communist Party to the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor, November 8, 1961 Thai Communist Party 88. Telegram of Greetings from the Central Committee of the Thai Communist Party to the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor, November 8, 1961 Burmese Communist Party 89. Telegram of Greetings from the Central C o m mittee of the Communist Party of Burma to the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor, November 8, 1961 Ceylonese Communist Party Australian Communist Party Near Eastern and North African Communist Parties Latin American Communist Parties 90. Resolution of the Central Committee of the Paraguayan Communist Party, December 28, 1961 VIII. T H E

YUGOSLAV R E S P O N S E

91. Josip Broz Tito. Speech at Skoplje, November 13, 1961

558 563 565 567

568 571 573

573 574

574 575

575 576 576 577 579 582 584

584

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xxi

92. Srecko Frajndlih. "The Root Is the Same— Stalinism." Zagreb Vjesnik, November 27, 1961 93. Zvonimir Kristl. "The Disturbed Balance." Zagreb Vjesnik, December 24, 1961 94. Zvonimir Kristl. "Struggle for Primacy." Zagreb Vjesnik, January 20, 1962 95. Punisa Perovic. "Discussion on 'Polycentrism.'" Review of International A ffairs, April 20, 1962 IX. T H E RESTATF.MF.NT O F T H E SOVIET POSITION

96. Yuri Andropov. "The X X I I CPSU Congress and the Development of the World Socialist System." Pravda, December 2, 1961 97. Aleksei Rumiantsev. " O u r Common Ideological Weapon." World Marxist Review, January, 1962 98. Nikolai Inozemtsev. "Peaceful Coexistence Is the M a j o r Question of Our Time." Pravda, January 17, 1962 99. Petr Pospelov. "V. I. Lenin and the Prague Conference." Pravda, January 18, 1962 100. Nikita Khrushchev. "The Present Stage of Communist Construction and the Party's Task in Improving the Management of Agriculture." Report at the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CPSU, March 5, 1962 101. Anastas Mikoyan. Speech in Erevan, March 14, 1962 102. Yuri Arbatov. "Leninism and the Revolutionary Force of Socialist Example." World Marxist Review, April, 1962 X.

F R O M C A L M TO CRISIS ( A P R I L , 1 9 6 2

APRIL, 1 9 6 3 )

Cuba The Sino-Indian Conflict The Party Congresses 103. Statement of the Delegation of the Communist

587 590 595 598 605

605

616

627 631

633 638

639 650

656 659 660

xxii

Contents

Party of China at the XII Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, December 8, 1962 Tito and Hoxha Explication and Escalation 104. Nikita Khrushchev. Report to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, December 12, 1962 105. "Workers of All Countries, Unite to Oppose Our Common Enemy!" Editorial, Jen-min jih-pao, December 15, 1962 106. "The Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us." Editorial, Jen-min jih-pao, December 31, 1962 107. "Strengthen the Unity of the Communist Movement for the Triumph of Peace and Socialism." Editorial, Pravda, January 7, 1963 108. Nikita Khrushchev. Speech at the VI Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, January 16, 1963 109. "Let Us Unite on the Basis of the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement." Editorial, Jen-min jih-pao, January 27, 1963 110. "For Marxist-Leninist Unity of the Communist Movement, for Solidarity of the Countries of Socialism." Editorial, Pravda, February 10, 1963 111. "Whence the Differences?" Editorial, Jen-min jih-pao, February 27, 1963 112. "More on the Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us." Hung-ch'i, March 4, 1963 113. "A Comment on the Statement of the Communist Party of the USA." Editorial, Jen-min jih-pao, March 8, 1963 114. Letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, February 21, 1963 115. Letter from the Central Committee of the Com-

664 667 669 670

695

706

729

746

762

768 782 794

808

814

Contents munist Party of China to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, March 9, 1963 APPENDIX

116. Maurice Thorez. Speech at the Conference of Eighty-one Communist and Workers Parties, Moscow, November, 1960 117. Luigi Longo. First Speech on Behalf of the Italian Communist Party Delegation to the Conference of Eighty-one Communist and Workers Parties, Moscow, November, 1960 118. Maurice Thorez. Declaration at the Conference of Eighty-one Communist and Workers Parties, Moscow, November, 1960 119. Luigi Longo. Second Speech on Behalf of the Italian Communist Party Delegation to the Conference of Eighty-one Communist and Workers Parties, Moscow, November, 1960 120. Letter from the PCI Delegation to N. S. Khrushchev and to the CPSU Delegation to the Conference of Eighty-one Communist and Workers Parties, November, 1960

xxiii

820 829

830

845

861

863

864

LIST OF AKEL APL APR BCP CC CCC CCP CCTU CGIL CGT CMEA CPC CPGB CPI CPR CPSU CPUSA DPRK DPRV EDA FGCI GDR HSWP ICFTU JCP KKE KPD KPO KWP MPR MPRP NCNA NKVD PCB PCF PCI PKI PUWP RCP(B) RWP SF.D SPD UDB VWP WFTU

ABBREVIATIONS

Reform Party of the Working People (Cyprus) Albanian Party of Labor Albanian People's Republic Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee Central Control Commission Czechoslovak Communist Party Confederation of Christian Trade Unions Italian General Confederation of Labor General Confederation of Labor (France) Council for Mutual Economic Assistance Communist Party of China Communist Party of Great Britain Communist Party of India Chinese People's Republic Communist Party of the Soviet Union Communist Party of the USA Democratic People's Republic of Korea Democratic People's Republic of Vietnam United Democratic Left (Greece) Italian Communist Youth Federation German Democratic Republic Hungarian Socialist Workers Party International Confederation of Free Trade Unions Japanese Communist Party Greek Communist Party Communist Party of Germany Austrian Communist Party Korean Workers Party Mongolian People's Republic Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party New China News Agency People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (USSR) Belgian Communist Party French Communist Party Italian Communist Party Indonesian Communist Party Polish United Workers Party Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) Rumanian Workers Party Socialist Unity Party (German Democratic Republic) Social Democratic Party of Germany Administration of State Security (Yugoslavia) Vietnamese Workers Party World Federation of Trade Unions

INTRODUCTION

ISSUES AND METHODS

The Communist movement, once considered to be rigidly monolithic, has in recent years developed into an unstable international system beset by a number of serious divergences and internal crises. In retrospect, one essential condition for this transformation was the postwar ( 1 9 4 5 - 4 9 ) expansion of Communist rule from the single Soviet state to a "world socialist system" of twelve or more states, each run by its own Communist elite. A parallel growth in numbers and influence of Communist parties took place in certain areas outside the bloc. 1 This very success of communism combined with the simultaneous growth of various centrifugal and national pressures within the bloc to set the stage for the diffusion of authority which began after the death of Stalin in March, 1953. A decade later, each of the four states —Yugoslavia, Albania, China, and Cuba—in which Communists had come to power substantially by their own, rather than Moscow's, efforts had asserted its independence from Soviet policy dictation. By 1956 there was no longer any central institution (such as the Comintern had been in the 1920's and 1930's) to coordinate the Communist parties and their followers throughout the world; the mere tradition of Soviet hegemony and rigid discipline proved to be inadequate when the emerging Soviet leader, Khrushchev, embarked on his search for a new formula of governance and 1 By 1963 there were over 9 0 C o m m u n i s t parties in the world, with a c l a i m e d membership of some 4 2 million, of w h o m o v e r 36 million were in the fourteen "ruling" C o m m u n i s t parties. T h e s e are the parties of the Soviet U n i o n . China, Poland. East G e r m a n y ( G D R ) , C z e c h o s l o v a k i a , H u n g a r y , Rumania. Bulgaria. Albania, N o r t h K o r e a , N o r t h V i e t n a m ( D P R V ) , Mongolia, Yugoslavia, and Cuba.

xxvi

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for a new basis of authority, including a new relationship with Communists abroad. The events in the autumn of 1956 in Poland and Hungary dramatically displayed the critical quandaries which Moscow faced. Coincident with the emergence of Communist China as a major power, seeking greater authority within the bloc and in international Communist conclaves, the movement as a whole found itself involved, after 1956-57, in a variety of disputes— over substance and form, ideology and organization, strategy and tactics, autonomy and control. Some of the issues had been endemic in international communism from the very beginning; others reflected novel problems in a changing world. But whereas disputes had previously been settled by purge or Soviet fiat, the element of explicit subordination was now lacking or was being questioned, and no regular machinery was provided for the resolution of differences. Increasingly aware of the dangers and difficulties, the Communist leaders made several efforts to limit the scope of the disputes and to dampen their injurious implications for Communist "unity," an old fetish of the movement and —in their own terms—a prerequisite for victory. It was still possible, in November, 1957, to arrive at a common declaration by the twelve "ruling" Communist parties. Considerably more time and effort were required, and greater bitterness, invective, and "fundamental differences" were stirred up, before the Conference of Eighty-one Communist and Workers Parties, meeting in Moscow in November-December, 1960, could hammer out an acceptable statement reestablishing at least formal unity. This "unity" did not last long. A new crisis emerged at the XXII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in October, 1961, when Khrushchev launched a public attack on the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor, renewed and intensified the process of "de-Stalinization," and struck out at the "dogmatists"—explicitly identified with the domestic "antiparty group" which he had ousted in June, 1957, and implicitly identified with the Chinese Communist leadership. The events of the XXII Party Congress opened a new phase

Introduction

xxvii

in the evolution of international communism. The reaction of the Communist parties throughout the world to the developments in Moscow and to the related issues in dispute showed that the era of unquestioned Soviet predominance in the movement had passed. The very range of responses to the Soviet stand at the Congress—from silence to assent, from perfunctory compliance to explicit challenge, from militant "sectarianism" to gradualist "revisionism"—suggested the scope of the great debate which was to ensue in international communism, and which forms the subject of this book. The spread of communism involves the application of a single ideology to different cultures and national settings. From this perspective the years since 1958 have been marked by the unique coincidence of rival power bases (such as Moscow, Peking, Belgrade, and Tirana) with rival orientations in Communist ideology and political strategy. What has been taking place is not a clear-cut division into two rival Communist camps, but a trend toward diversity and multiplicity of positions and policies—in brief, toward the crystallization of varieties of Communist experience. 2 After the XXII Congress the arguments among Communist parties continued to be waged—at first with increasing candor and publicity, at all times with residual inhibitions—within a common framework of doctrinal assumptions and "esoteric" terminology. While at times these were—and are—mystifying or annoying to non-Communist readers, experience has shown 2 For developments up to the XXII Congress of the CPSU, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc—Unity and Conflict, revised edition (New York: Praeger, 1961); Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962); Unity and Contradiction, edited by Kurt London (New York: Praeger, 1962); the documentary collections. The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956); National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe, edited by Paul Zinner (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956); The Sino-Soviet Dispute, edited by G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, and Roderick MacFarquhar (New York: Praeger, 1961); and Alexander Dallin, "International Movements," in Russian Foreign Policy, edited by Ivo Lederer (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).

xxviii

Introduction

that the formulas and symbols employed in such a multilateral debate have been used by Communists with a high measure of consistency and can thus provide the outside observer with valuable clues for an understanding of Communist discourse. Indeed, the amazing eruption of the dispute in the winter of 1962-63 saw the protagonists name names and spell out their differences in an unprecedented fashion. Unwittingly, this "escalation" confirmed the meanings previously placed on esoteric clues and conventions. Yet even then all the parties continued to operate under some restraints. To the surprise of many, the shell of international communism proved to be elastic enough to accommodate at once variants of Marxism-Leninism as diverse as the Soviet and Albanian, Chinese and Italian, Polish and Cuban, American and Japanese. In early 1962 and again in 1963, efforts were made by some parties to patch things up short of an open break in the world movement, to mute differences, and to suppress proof of crises in Communist ranks. The evidence suggested, however, that— regardless of organizational forms and lingering loyalties—international communism as a single, coordinated world movement was beyond repair. 3 ISSUES The overt and acknowledged issues in the public exchanges among Communist parties do not, of course, exhaust the differences in attitude or the causes behind them. In the SinoSoviet dialogue, for instance, no public mention has been made of personal animosities among the leaders, of Chinese demands for military assistance and nuclear weapons, or of Peking's demand for Soviet support to gain control of "Saiwan. Some issues were dredged up into the light of publicity only at a late stage in the debates. Chinese resentment of the Soviet dissent over the Indian border conflict in September, 1959; reference to territorial grievances stemming from the acquisition of the Russian Far East a century ago; Chinese identification with "colonial" revolutions, in contrast to an allegedly condescending attitude * See also Richard Lowenthal, "The Rise and Decline of International Communism," Problems of Communism, March-April, 1963; Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Threat and Opportunity in the Communist Schism," Foreign

Introduction

xxix

on the part of Western Communists—all these first appeared in print as late as 1963. Official documents and communications among Communist parties d o not permit conclusive inferences regarding motives and causes, different stages of social and economic development, national traditions, and styles of political leadership. In the heat of argument, one party may seriously misrepresent the position of a rival party. The evidence does prove, however, that in these exchanges and debates there is a core of real issues which divide the Communist world—problems which are not contrived but genuine, not insignificant but profound. T h e materials reproduced below indicate that leading Communists have acknowledged as much. As a matter of convenience some major issues which have troubled the international Communist movement can be divided into organizational problems, matters of international concern, and questions of domestic policy. Any such classification must be somewhat arbitrary; some of the issues necessarily overlap. Still, the following listing, while not claiming to cover all controversial subjects, may be of assistance in approaching a documentary record of debate among Communists using the concepts and terms of Marxism-Leninism. 1. ORGANIZATIONAL INTERNATIONAL

PROBLEMS OF

THE

MOVEMENT

The Role of the USSR and the CPSU. T h e role of the CPSU as the "leading" party of the movement (and of the USSR as the "center" of the bloc) was virtually unchallenged in the Stalin era. Since 1956, some parties—among them, the Polish and the Italian—have argued for a more genuine equality and autonomy of all parties, a position which has found formal recognition in international Communist documents since 1957. In 1960 the CPSU indicated that it did not wish to be designated as the leading party, nor saddled with responsibility for the other parties' behavior. While references have varied since then, it has Affairs, April, 1963: Alexander Dallin. "Long Divisions and Fine Fractions," Problems of Communism, March-April, 1962; and William E. Griffith, Albania and the Sino-Soviel Rijt (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of T e c h n o l o g y Press, 1 9 6 3 ) .

XXX

Introduction

been proper to refer to the CPSU as the "first" party or the "vanguard" of the international movement. The Relevance of Soviet Experience. Paradoxically, in 1960-62, some of the militant parties which had insisted that there must be a center of the bloc or a Communist world headquarters came to deny that the resolutions of the "anti-Stalinist" congresses of the CPSU (the XX in 1956 and the XXII in 1961) were relevant, much less binding, outside the USSR. Conversely, the Soviet leadership—and some of the moderate parties which on other occasions had tended to dispute Soviet predominance —now insisted on the universal relevance of the Soviet party's congresses and of the new CPSU Program, and with some reservations, on the relevance of the Soviet experience in "building socialism." By contrast, the parties opposed to this view acknowledged the binding nature of only those documents which the representatives of all the Communist parties had themselves worked out and signed. Polycentrism. Coined by the Italian Communist leader Togliatti in 1956, soon after the dissolution of the Cominform, this term suggested a multiplicity of Communist centers and the absence of a common, binding line. Such decentralization met with opposition, for instance, from the French Communist party and others who favored the creation of a common international secretariat for the movement. According to Walter Ulbricht, the proposition that there should be "a general line" for international communism prevailed at the 1960 Moscow conference. Majority Rule vs. Unanimity. If there was no "leading" party, agreements had to be sought in "conciliar" fashion. But no consensus existed on the principle by which decisions were to be reached. The Chinese and some other parties, stressing the sovereignty of each national Communist organization, insisted on unanimity as essential for all international Communist pronouncements. In this they were echoing the earlier argument, e.g., of the Poles, who in 1957 had felt the need to protect themselves against Soviet pressure. On the other hand, the CPSU, appealing to the Leninist spirit of "democratic centralism," in 1960-61 made a major but unsuccessful effort to secure agree-

Introduction

xxxi

ment to consider decisions adopted by a majority of Communist parties (which were presumably aligned with the CPSU) binding for the entire movement. Membership in the International Communist Movement. Soviet statements argued, in 1962, that the Albanian leadership by its open attacks on Khrushchev had cut itself away from the Communist bloc. Among others, the Czechoslovak and Bulgarian leaders agreed. On the other hand, the Chinese and some others continued to speak of the socialist camp as comprising twelve states (that is, including Albania). According to the head of the Indonesian party, membership in the bloc depended on "objective" conditions, regardless of Soviet views and wishes. Such a formulation, however, reopened the door to Yugoslavia, which, Moscow acknowledged, was also "building socialism" (something Peking vehemently denied), and by implication made impossible the expulsion of any "deviant" Communist party or state. There was thus no agreement on the criteria of legitimacy for a Communist movement, nor on who was to be their judge. In January, 1963, Khrushchev reversed himself. Watering down the previous requirements for orthodoxy, he recognized the existence of fourteen Communist states—including, in other words, China, Albania, Cuba, and Yugoslavia— and in effect sanctioned the toleration of significant variations within the bloc. Forms of Interparty Behavior. The 1957 Moscow Declaration and the 1960 Moscow Statement provided generally accepted principles for interparty relations. The 1960 Statement sought to regulate such dealings by providing for periodic multilateral consultations and, if need be, bilateral exchanges where disagreements arose between two Communist parties. A number of parties considered the open Soviet attack on Albania, in October, 1961, a violation of the accepted forms of behavior, whatever the merits of the Soviet charges. The subsequent argument—further stimulated by efforts to silence the public debate and by the charges that the Chinese had not consulted their Communist allies before the Sino-Indian conflict—involved (1) the propriety of publicity in interparty

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Introduction

differences and ( 2 ) the search for a possible mechanism to resolve them. Chinese demands for a new conference of all Communist parties were evaded or brushed aside by Moscow. While the Chinese delegation had apparently insisted, in December, 1960, that such conferences be called at least once every two years, there was evidently no way in which Peking could compel the CPSU to convene one. Fractionalism. The traditional Bolshevik hostility to "fractional" activity within the movement was invoked by the Soviet, French, Italian, and other parties in arguing against Chinese efforts to constitute an organized minority within the international movement. For their part, the Chinese argued that Bolshevik history—and the formation of the Bolshevik party itself —provided precedents for "fractionalism" in support of essential principles. In dispute was also the right of other parties to spread ideas and writings rejected by a given party or by the majority of parties. In the contest for the control of third parties, "fractionalism" became increasingly the Communist majority's charge of subversion leveled against the rival movement. Extension to Stale Relations. It had been customary among Communists to divorce party conflicts from state relations. When Stalin and Tito clashed in 1948, party relations were suspended, but no full diplomatic break occurred. The Chinese, however, took strong exception to the Soviet stand on the Sino-Indian border dispute in September, 1959. The following summer SinoSoviet "ideological" tensions entailed withdrawal of Soviet technicians, and the cessation of certain forms of Soviet assistance and exports to China; in 1962, it led to the closing of most Soviet consulates in the CPR. The USSR broke off diplomatic relations with Albania soon after the party rift came into the open in 1961—but not all other East European members of the bloc followed suit. While the positions assumed by any one Communist party on a number of issues have not always been ideologically or politically consistent, the Sino-Soviet dialogue has encouraged a crystallization of views

COMMUNIST PERSPECTIVE AND STRATEGY.

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Introduction

which has permitted assessing both domestic and foreign policy problems with a single yardstick—be it what its Communist opponents would label "modern revisionism," or what the other wing would call "dogmatic" and "sectarian." The linkage, in Khrushchev's pronouncements, of Stalinism with Hoxha, and, in other statements, of Molotov with the Chinese and Albanian leaderships, suggests such a broad approach. In turn, the Chinese use of Tito and Togliatti as verbal "proxies" for Khrushchev has been due to their sharing the "revisionist" label, as do some domestic opponents of the CPC leadership. Revisionism or Dogmatism—Which Is the Greater Danger? From October, 1956, to the aftermath of the XXII CPSU Congress, five years later, both deviations were held to be dangerous, but revisionism was consistently identified as the greater danger of the moment. According to the Chinese, as yet Tito was the only revisionist in power; from 1961 on, the APL leadership openly applied the same terms to Khrushchev. Meanwhile the moderate parties sought to link some of the "dogmatists" with charges of both "Trotskyism" and Stalinism. The polarization of positions after the Cuban crisis led to a reassessment of the relative danger of the two trends. The World Marxist Review redefined dogmatism to include "pseudorevolutionary adventurism." By December, 1962, some Communist leaders, including Thorez, had come to identify dogmatism as the principal menace to the labor movement "at present." Moscow officially equivocated, but Boris Ponomarev (April 22, 1963) affirmed that "under present conditions, 'leftist' opportunism was no less a danger than revisionism." By contrast, the Indonesian Communist leadership asserted once again that "modern revisionism" remained "the main danger of the international Communist movement" (February 10, 1963). 2.

PROBLEMS

OF

WORLD

AFFAIRS

"Nature of Our Epoch." The point of departure in the determination of Communist strategy is the definition of the present stage. The current Soviet view stresses the growth in power of the Communist world and hence argues that "the world socialist

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Introduction

system is becoming the decisive factor" of change in our time. This view has been challenged by those Communists who believe that the bloc already "has become" the decisive force, as well as those who see in the Soviet formula an overestimation of revolutionary opportunities. War and Peace. The complex of problems relating to war and peace has been identified by a variety of Communist leaders as the "issue of issues," the "most burning" and the "crucial" problem of our time. It involves disagreements about the nature of modern imperialism, the destructive power of nuclear weapons, the strength of the imperialist camp and, above all, of the United States. Related are the divergent Communist appraisals of the prospects of negotiating with the West, the utility of "contacts abroad," personal diplomacy, and summit meetings. One major change in the Soviet position was the recognition, in 1956, that war is not inevitable (though it remains possible at all times). Peking, on the other hand, has continued to stress the image of imperialism as a "paper tiger." Only in late 1962 were some of the ambiguities in this area spelled out by the two parties. Peaceful Coexistence—Strategy or Tactic? According to the CPSU, "peaceful coexistence" is a feasible and promising longrange strategy. Those Communists who reject it may be willing to accept it for tactical, temporary reasons of propaganda or convenience. The degree of commitment to it is of course inversely related to the level of risk-taking which a given party is prepared to sustain in pursuing its objectives on the world stage. Priority of Objectives: "Disarmament and Peace" or the "Anticolonial Liberation Struggle." While there is general agreement that both goals should be promoted (although perhaps for different reasons), there has been dispute as to which comes first. For instance, at the World Peace Council meeting in Stockholm, in December, 1961, the Soviet and Chinese delegations clashed sharply, with the Chinese arguing that the "national liberation" struggle had priority. On other occasions they have maintained that the peoples struggling for "liberation" needed to arm, not to disarm. In turn, Khrushchev, Gomulka, and

Introduction

XXXV

others have labeled the alleged need to choose between peaceful coexistence and revolutionary objectives a false dilemma. Relations with the "National Bourgeoisie." The concept of a "national democracy," developed by Soviet ideologues in 1960-61, envisages a prolonged period of collaboration between the Communists and the so-called national bourgeoisie in the common anticolonial struggle and in the first stages of internal change in the newly independent states. The more militant point of view tends to question the "progressive" nature of nationalism and stresses rather the need for immediate revolutionary action, often by peasant armies led by a Communist party. Economic Aid to Underdeveloped Nations. According to one view, aid to nonsocialist developing states is fully justifiable in Marxist-Leninist terms. The opposite view sees such aid as imposing economic sacrifices within the bloc, strengthening the national bourgeoisie, and generally impeding the revolutionary process. T h e less developed bloc members have made clear their claim to priority in receiving aid from the more advanced ones. 3.

P R O B L E M S IN D O M E S T I C

POLICY

The "Personality Cult" and the Role of Stalin. While the Soviet leaders described it in largely negative terms, Stalin's record continued to be defended by some of the other Communist parties. In turn, some parties which accept the CPSU's position regard the Soviet explanation of the causes of Stalinism as superficial or "subjectivist." For instance, Gomulka has pointed to the brutal collectivization of the 1930's; the West European parties have emphasized Russian backwardness; others have stressed the rise of fascism among the roots of Stalinism. The parties have also disagreed about the relevance to the non-Soviet parties of combating the "personality cult." The North Korean Communist leader, Kim Il-sung, for example, indicated that de-Stalinization is purely a Soviet affair. Stages in Building Socialism and Communism. According to the CPSU, history moves in well-defined, "objective" stages, none of which can be skipped; a "material and technical base" is a prerequisite to attaining communism even where it is pos-

xxxvi

Introduction

sible to organize an underdeveloped economy along communistic lines. This view underlies Soviet criticism of the Chinese communes and the "great leap forward." Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Class Struggle. The CPSU sees the Soviet Union as having advanced beyond the point where either of these classic concepts of Marxism-Leninism is deemed applicable. Some parties see in this claim a watering-down of established doctrine, with the consequent dangers of weakening revolutionary vigilance and consciousness and of lapsing into revisionism. Importance of Soviet Economic Development. Khrushchev has stated that the development of the Soviet economy is a major contribution to international Communist victory. Invoking "proletarian internationalism," some Communist parties from the less developed countries, including Albania and China, have advocated an "averaging out" of economic standards and growth in order to ensure the simultaneous entry of all Communist states into the higher stage of full communism. Moscow, on the other hand, has stressed the primordial role of economic competition as a form of revolutionary struggle in the absence of war. Peking, among others, was able to attack current Soviet policy as "economism"—in Leninist terms, the heresy of giving priority to economic affairs rather than to political organization and action. Affluent Communism. Khrushchev has come to be identified with the desirability, at least in theory, of allocating more resources for consumer goods and services. According to Khrushchev, material incentives rewarding individual productivity are compatible with communist morality, and he has rejected the ascetic notion of an "egalitarianism of poverty," which has been identified with Chinese Communist practice. Some parties have dissented from his outlook as a concession to "bourgeois morality," while others have been concerned about the implications for the balance between "guns" and "butter." Freedom and Controls. In a number of parties, especially in Western Europe, demands for "intraparty democracy" have been voiced with increasing insistence. Communist student organiza-

Introduction

xxxvii

tions in France, Belgium, and Italy have demanded "unity without unanimity," "real" rather than "fictitious" or "coercive" democracy, and on occasion the toleration of minorities within the movement. At times, this has placed these parties, or their "liberal" wings, in opposition not only to the "dogmatists" but also to the CPSU, as for instance over control in the arts and letters, in early 1963. More broadly, some parties have opposed public international "discussions" of critical issues, while others have advocated tolerance of diversity within the world movement, within one party, or within one country. Peaceful Transition to Socialism. The possibility of Communism's "nonviolent" accession to power, as formulated by Khrushchev in 1956, does suggest a revision of Leninism. Initially applied only to certain advanced "capitalist" countries, the proposition was subsequently extended to include some of the new nations. It was strongly attacked by the Chinese and others as signifying opportunism and the abandonment of the class struggle, but it was defended by most European Communist parties. It should be noted that the recognition of possibly peaceful means to power does not necessarily mean abandonment of violence. Another aspect of the debate involved the theory of "structural reform," formulated in the Italian party and sharply assailed by Peking and other "dogmatist" quarters. While to its advocates it provided a formula for the gradual transition of the state machinery into Communist hands, to its opponents it looked like a substitute for proletarian revolution, based on illusory and "anti-Marxist" assumptions that state institutions could be "above classes." METHODS The assumptions concerning the validity of the specialized textual analysis here described as a means of gaining insights into Communist reasoning and argument have been reinforced by a number of case studies in which inferences drawn from published sources have subsequently been confirmed by independent evidence. In fact, relations among Communist parties

xxxviii

Introduction

and states (and within the Soviet elite) have provided the most impressive specimens of such "esoteric communications." 4 It is self-evident that such "decoding," when applied to the international Communist movement, is not by any means a foolproof science. It invites certain distinct dangers, especially in overanalyzing or misinterpreting fortuitous developments resulting from causes not apparent to the outsider, and in establishing artificial patterns of manipulation and personnel shifts which may have no relationship to genuine power struggles. Therefore, it is essential to apply the technique with a sense of historical perspective and an awareness of other factors making for unity or conflict, which the direct dialogue does not reflect. The exchanges can, however, provide valuable clues to some of the basic issues which are the subject of inter-Communist discussions, and the careful reader can discern significant variations in emphasis and priorities. The task, naturally, becomes easier with the sharpening of the discussion, especially if corroborated by evidence of personal or organizational clashes. Moreover, in examining various responses to an official "line," it should be borne in mind that verbal assent need not necessarily indicate agreement; it may reflect traditional discipline, a conscious or unconscious suppression of disagreement, a sacrifice of public divergence for the sake of an image of "unity" or for the pretense of unquestioned loyalty. But verbal dissent may usually be taken as a proper indicator of genuine divergences. Communist leaders themselves acknowledge that they read documents with an eye to such tell-tale indicators of loyalty, nonconformity, unity, and disagreement. Especially in the post' The term came into use thanks to Myron Rush's Rise of Khrushchev (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1958), which made extensive use of this technique of analysis. For stimulating discussions of the methodological problems, see Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, pp. 24-35, who employs it expertly to demonstrate Sino-Soviet differences since 1956; and Robert Conquest, Power and Policy in the USSR (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961), chaps. I—III. Other examples of this method are: Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu (New York: Macmillan, I960), especially his analysis of Chinese "esoteric" signals; Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, especially on Soviet-Albanian relations in 1960-61 and bloc responses to them; and Griffith, Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift.

Introduction

xxxix

Stalin era, differences in the public utterances of Communist leaders and organs cannot be taken to be the result of diabolically clever stage management and central manipulation. Hence it may be useful to point out some examples of the use of symbols and phrases that an analyst of Communist documents may wish to watch out for. When Khrushchev, at a CPSU congress, attacks the Albanian leadership, the "antiparty group" (a characteristic label for what should be called the "anti-Khrushchev group"), and the "personality cult" (a circumlocution for Stalinism), all delegations of foreign Communist parties are expected to express their solidarity with the Soviet position by making similarly unambiguous statements about the objects of the Soviet attack. Any omission is suspicious; silence regarding the Albanian crisis— the issue with most obvious international overtones, greatest drama, and most overt aspects of a "loyalty test" for other Communist parties—may be taken to indicate divergence from the Moscow line. Subsequently the Central Committee of each party is expected to pass an appropriate resolution assessing the performance of its own party's delegation and the issues discussed at the congress. Failure to adopt such a resolution or an inordinate delay in adopting it is probably indicative of internal difficulties in reaching a consensus in the party leadership. Approval of some features (endorsement of the new CPSU Program) but silence on others (Khrushchev's stand on Albania) implies dissent from the Soviet stand. For example, the Indonesian party explicitly endorsed the silence of its leader at the Moscow meeting on the subject of Albania. Before long, the context of arguments changes. In a new setting—Cuba, the Indian border, Yugoslavia—new loyalty tests are easily evolved, and the whole process resumes. Similarly, the dispatch of greetings from one party to another on ritual occasions (such as the New Year, May Day, the anniversary of a party's founding or accession to power) must be watched for careful formulations. The very dispatch of a message may be a clue: when the CPSU fails to convey its greetings

xl

Introduction

to the Albanians on November 7 or New Year's day, a message to Tirana from another party amounts to "breaking ranks." If messages are sent, their precise formulations may be taken as indicating varying degrees of commitment or disengagement; the greetings sent by the Malayan, Thai, and Burmese parties to the Albanians (see pp. 5 7 3 - 7 5 ) are examples of this. The telegrams may be scanned for additional clues: Do they contain personal greetings for leaders mentioned by name, or are they addressed impersonally to the Central Committee, or merely to the "fraternal" people? These are important gradations. Silence or omissions are important. Thus, while some parties in 1961 hailed the new CPSU Program as relevant beyond the borders of the USSR, or as a "guide" for their own future policies, one could question the degree of enthusiasm behind the editorial comment by the North Korean Nodong Sinmun, which referred to the program merely as "inspiring." This impression of reticence is reinforced by the subsequent North Korean effort to depict the CPSU decisions regarding Stalin and Molotov as an internal Soviet matter, not of direct concern to the other parties. Selectivity in reporting is, of course, an almost automatic signal for closer scrutiny. Thus, deletions in Pravda's republication of Gomulka's and Togliatti's speeches, or the use of halfsentences and the omission of certain paragraphs in the Soviet reporting of the Indonesian and North Korean comments on the Soviet congress may be assumed to be not "accidental." 5 Indirection, the essence of the esoteric argument, is often used to avoid identifying precisely the target of a given comment. In many cases the pattern of circumlocution is quite distinct and 6 Allowance must be made, however, for some variation in styles and spirits of different parties. While the Italian Communist daily reprinted French Communist criticism of the Italian party, the French organ failed to publish the Italian replies. While Soviet publication of foreign Communist comments has often been deliberately selective, the Chinese Communists have generally limited themselves to the alternatives of correct publication or total silence. When, in March, 1963, Peking initiated the systematic publication of the views of 44 Communist parties hostile to the Chinese "line," it challenged Moscow to dare publish Communist statements hostile to the CPSU. (See Document No. 112 below.) But the CPSU chose not to comply.

Introduction

xli

easily pierced. "Some comrades" may be translated as "the Soviet leadership" when the Chinese or Albanian Communists use the term, or as "the Chinese Communist leadership" when Moscow uses the term. "Sectarian," "dogmatist," and "adventurist" are used to identify the more radical and militant wing of the movement; "revisionist" or "opportunist" for their opponents. Gradations of disapproval may extend through such terms as "reformism" and "petty bourgeois" to charges of "objectively" aiding the imperialist camp. A related technique has been the use of "proxies." While various parties have criticized both the Soviet and the Chinese leaders or policies, Moscow and Peking did not publicly trade charges and accusations identifying the other side. Instead, the Soviet press, until December, 1962, extensively republished Italian, Bulgarian, Iraqi, Polish, and other Communist press attacks which directly identified the Chinese. Tito, Thorez, and others publicly recognized, at different times, that at least sometimes when the Albanians said Tito they meant Khrushchev. In turn, Gian-Carlo Pajetta broke the spell by declaring, at the Italian party's congress in December, 1962, that when he and his comrades meant China, they would no longer feel compelled to say "Albania" instead. A month later, the British Communists declared that "everyone knows that the phrase 'modern revisionist' means the Communist parties who disagree with our Chinese comrades. Such irresponsible charges simply cannot be taken seriously." In general, republication of other Communist materials seems to be a convenient way of intimating views or communicating facts. In reprinting, in the Warsaw Polityka, long excerpts from an Italian publication containing the texts of Luigi Longo's violent attack on the Chinese at the November, 1960, Moscow conference, the Polish Communists were able to present data and judgments they might not dare attribute to themselves. Similarly, when the Japanese Communists, promptly after the end of the X X I I Congress, announced the publication of Volume IV of Mao's writings in translation, they invited speculation that they were trying to make available important and symbolic

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documents expressing the "militant" line, without explicitly challenging or questioning Soviet authority. Some of the major attacks on the "adventurist" wing of the movement came from Moscow, in June, 1960, in the form of reviews of a new edition of Lenin's Left-Wing Communism—An Infantile Disorder. These devices of indirection—symbols, circumlocutions, proxy targets—at times provide evidence of an intensification of debate, as the symbols and their application carry increasingly negative implications. For example, the subtle, occasional, and indirect references by Soviet and pro-Soviet spokesmen to "Trotsky" in contexts suggesting parallels with the Peking line in 1961-62 seemed to invite corresponding counterattacks in the form of Chinese references to Bukharin, Kautsky, or even Eduard Bernstein. The particular code used often corresponds to the level of the debate. Thus the surprisingly numerous gradations of conflict may be exemplified by the following stages: ( 1 ) two or more organs separately promoting divergent lines, without taking explicit cognizance of the differences; ( 2 ) the use of references to "classics" of Marxism-Leninism and other noncontemporary proxies, such as discussions of Lenin's Left-Wing Communism, to Kautsky, Bernstein, and the Second International; ( 3 ) indirect allusions which indicate dissent but camouflage the target, down to the references to "some comrades" and to "modern revisionists"; (4) references to individual proxies, such as the use of Tito and Hoxha by Peking and Moscow in referring to each other; ( 5 ) explicit disagreement attributed to others, such as Pravda's publication of quotations from Togliatti, Thorez, and Novotny about the Chinese Communists in December, 1962; (6) full identification of target and issues, such as Hoxha's speech of November, 1961, and the exchange of letters between the Soviet and Chinese parties' Central Committees in February, 1963. Adherence to certain variants in terminology often indicates substantive differences as well. Thus, reference to the X X CPSU Congress has become a "shorthand" way of suggesting the essence of the Khrushchev policy and the binding nature of

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xliii

Soviet decisions for other parties. Gomulka's statements are scrutinized to see whether he refers to the Soviet Union and the CPSU as "first" in seniority (and in power) or as the "vanguard" of, but not as "guiding" or "leading," the Communist world. "National roads to communism" are permissible but "national communism" is not: the former implies diversity in unity, the latter disunity. Other such variations in the apparent minutiae of phrase or stereotype can be revealing. It is significant whether "peaceful coexistence" or "struggle against imperialism" comes first in a listing of Communist objectives. Whether the Albanian leaders are still called "comrades" or not (and reciprocate in kind) is a clue to a given individual's or party's position in the dispute. While Moscow may equivocate as to whether Albania or Yugoslavia is a bona fide "socialist" state, the Indonesian Communists find Albania to be socialist by definition (or by objective criteria) and draw inferences critical of the Moscow line. The Dutch Communist leader is even more roundabout: by labeling Cuba the "thirteenth" socialist state he implies that in his view Albania is still one of the other twelve. On the other hand, similar terminology does not always indicate identical views. There are taboos and ritual phrases which no Communist party is likely to tamper with. All parties will ordinarily support "unity," endorse "Leninist principles," condemn "fractionalism," and depict themselves as stalwart champions of "class struggle" and "revolution," advocates of "peace" and "progress," and foes of "imperialism." 6 In all probability the significance of a number of clues and terms will elude the outside observer. No doubt there are important documents in the dispute which we do not possess; some of the documents we do have refer to them. Much of the negoti9

While all the parties have made themselves champions of "unity," the meaning given to the term has varied. In the Chinese view, it has implied the right of veto by a minority party in international communism. In the Polish view, unity presupposes no international organization or coordination. The Soviet ideal is one in which all parties would voluntarily do as Moscow does. In all three cases—as in most others—it sanctions a far greater measure of diversity than was true in Stalin's days.

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ating, lobbying, and controversy is entirely verbal and receives no publicity. It would be erroneous, then, to conclude that documentary collections can shed light on all interparty polemics and tensions. Furthermore, an analyst may succumb to the temptation of reading divergences into purely verbal or fortuitous differences in two texts—differences sometimes arising simply from problems of translation from one language to another. T h e degree of consistency and rigidity in the use of symbols and stereotypes in rhetoric may vary somewhat from country to country and f r o m one period of time to another (the specific content of such terms as "humanism" and "patriotism" has indeed been known to change in Communist usage). A n d yet, while one may be wrong in this or that particular instance, some of the current Communist discussions, including the publication by Communists of hitherto restricted materials pertaining to earlier differences, provide substantial confirmation that analyses which have been made in the past by attentive nonCommunist observers were by and large correct. The deciphering of communications among Communist parties is not an insurmountable task. Alexander Dallin Zbigniew Brzezinski

CHAPTER

I

THE XXII CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION (CPSU)

According to the Rules of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union ( C P S U ) , the Party Congress is the "supreme organ" of the Party. CPSU congresses have not, however, ordinarily shaped or debated policies. Under Stalin as well as under his successors, they have provided formal occasions for ratifying and publicizing decisions of the leadership. The post-Stalin years have seen three CPSU congresses: the XX (1956), which marked the break with Stalinism; the (Extraordinary) XXI (1959); and the XXII, which met from October 17 to October 31, 1961. Following the dissolution of the Communist International (1943) and the Communist Information Bureau (1956), no formal mechanism has existed for establishing a binding common "line" for the international Communist movement. Since 1957, international gatherings on the occasion of party congresses or anniversaries have provided opportunities for meetings and conferences of the various parties' representatives. Thus the Moscow meeting of the twelve "ruling" parties in November, 1957, produced a common "Declaration," and the Moscow Conference of Representatives of Eightyone Communist and Workers Parties in November-December, 1960, hammered out a "Statement." Both these documents were important in the subsequent debates within the movement. Each of the contending parties, notably the CPSU, the Albanian Party of Labor ( A P L ) , and the Communist Party of China ( C P C ) , was to claim that it—unlike its opponents—adhered to the spirit and letter of these documents. The XXII CPSU Congress was to provide another opportunity for Communist representatives to gather. Along with some 4,800 delegates of the CPSU who attended the Congress, representatives of eighty "fraternal Communist and workers parties" (and guests from the ruling, non-Communist parties of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali) were present. No representatives from the Yugoslav and Albanian parties were invited.

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T h e following table indicates the order in which N. S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, listed the attending delegations of foreign Communist parties at the XX, XXI, and XXII CPSU congresses. XX (7956) [CPSU] China Poland Czechoslovakia France Italy East Germany Hungary Rumania Bulgaria 10 Albania North Korea North Vietnam Indonesia Mongolia India Finland Spain Great Britain West Germany 20 Austria Argentina Syria and Lebanon Sweden Mexico Denmark Norway Trieste Netherlands Belgium 30 Canada Iceland Switzerland Luxembourg Israel Uruguay (Brazil) (Japan) 1

XXI (7959) [CPSU] China Poland Czechoslovakia East G e r m a n y Rumania Bulgaria Hungary Albania North Vietnam North Korea Mongolia Italy France Indonesia India Finland Great Britain West G e r m a n y Spain United States Austria Japan Argentina Uruguay Chile Venezuela Mexico Ecuador Australia Syria Canada Colombia Bolivia New Zealand Morocco Tunisia Sweden

XXII (1961)

[CPSU] China Poland Czechoslovakia East Germany Rumania Bulgaria Hungary North Vietnam North Korea Mongolia France Italy Cuba Indonesia India Japan Finland Great Britain West Germany Spain Portugal United States Greece Belgium Cyprus Austria Argentina Brazil Venezuela Uruguay Chile Colombia Canada Ecuador Bolivia Mexico Peru

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(1956) (Venezuela) (Chile) (Bolivia) (Cuba) (Costa R i c a ) (Colombia) (Australia) (Morocco) (Tunisia) [47 to 55 not named]

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(1959) Norway Denmark Netherlands Ceylon Belgium Switzerland Iceland Israel (Iraq) (Algeria) (Greece) (Turkey) (Iran) (Luxembourg) (Portugal) (Burma) ( 1 ) (Brazil) (Guatemala) (Honduras) (Dominican Rep.) (Jordan) (Costa Rica) (Lebanon) (Malaya) (Panama) (Paraguay) (Peru) (Salvador) (Sudan) ( 2 ) (Ireland)

3 XXII

(1961) Australia New Zealand Algeria Iraq Syria Lebanon Jordan Morocco Tunisia Iran Sweden Norway Denmark Netherlands Switzerland Luxembourg Ceylon Israel (Burma) (1) (Haiti) (Honduras) (Guadeloupe) (Guatemala) (Dominican Rep.) (Iceland) (Costa Rica) (Malaya) (Martinique) (Nicaragua) (Pakistan) (Panama) (Paraguay) (Réunion) (Salvador) (San Marino) (Northern Ireland) (Sudan) (Thailand) (Turkey) ( 2 ) (Ireland) (Republic of South Africa)

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(Parentheses indicate representation by a single individual or message of greetings only.) There is evidence that the rank order corresponded to the relative standing of the parties in Soviet eyes, except where alphabetic order of listing suggests a rough equality of status. The parties listed between (1) and (2) in each column are in Russian alphabetic order.

1. NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV,

F I R S T SECRETARY O F THE

CENTRAL

C O M M I T T E E OF THE C P S U . R E P O R T OF THE C E N T R A L C O M M I T T E E TO THE X X I I

17, 1961. Pravda

CONGRESS OF THE C P S U ,

OCTOBER

( M o s c o w ) , October 18, 1961. 1

On October 17, 1961, N. S. Khrushchev presented the first substantive report to the Congress. Traditionally the Central Committee report has reviewed domestic and international developments since the last regular congress—in this case, the XX (1956). According to the agenda, announced well in advance, Khrushchev was likewise to present the draft of the new Party Program, which had been published and widely discussed during the preceding months as a blueprint for the "construction of communism." Secretary Frol Kozlov was to report on the proposed new Rules of the CPSU. None but a handful of the Soviet and foreign delegates had any advance knowledge of the forthcoming attack on the leadership of the Albanian Party and the launching of a vigorous new campaign against the "personality cult" and the "antiparty" group—issues which were to occupy the major attention of speakers and audience during the Congress. . . COMRADES! The competition of the two world social systems, the socialist and the capitalist, has been the chief content of the period since the X X Party Congress. It has become the pivot, the foundation, of world development at the present historical stage. T w o lines, two historical trends, have manifested themselves more and more clearly in social development. One is 'Translation from Current Soviet Policies IV, edited by Charlotte Saikowski and Leo Gruliow (New York: Columbia University Press. 1962), pp. 42-77. This volume contains reliable, though somewhat incomplete, English translations of the proceedings of the XXII Congress. For the full text in Russian, see the stenographic report, XXII S"ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1962, 3 vols.). Pravda is the daily organ of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

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the line of social progress, peace, and constructive activity. The other is the line of reaction, oppression, and war. If we visualize the whole globe as the tremendous arena of this competition, we see that socialism has, step by step, won one position after another from the old world. Above all, socialism has pressed capitalism hard in the decisive sphere of activity, the sphere of material production. The share of the socialist system in world production has risen, and its rates of development have considerably exceeded the rates of the most highly developed capitalist countries. Everybody sees that the socialist countries are capable of developing colossal productive forces and creating a genuine abundance of material and spiritual benefits on earth. While unswervingly pursuing a policy of peace, we have not forgotten about the threat of war on the part of the imperialists. Everything has been done to assure our country's superiority in defense. The achievements of socialist production and Soviet science and technology have enabled us to carry out a real revolution in the military sphere. Our country and the whole socialist camp now possess power that is quite sufficient for reliable defense of the great gains of socialism against attempts by the imperialist aggressors. (Applause.) The increased defense might of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and the peace-loving forces throughout the world have not allowed the imperialists to divert the competition of the two systems from peaceful rails to the path of armed conflict, the path of war. The Soviet Union, firmly pursuing a Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence, has exposed and resolutely checked the imperialists' provocations. The fact that it has been possible to prevent war and that Soviet people and the peoples of other countries have been able to enjoy the benefits of peaceful life must be regarded as the chief result of the work of the Party, of its Central Committee, in increasing the might of the Soviet state and in carrying out a Leninist foreign policy, a result of the activity of the fraternal parties of the lands of socialism and the activizing of the peaceloving forces of all countries. (Prolonged applause.)

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As we know, the imperialists have more than once in recent years tried to ignite the fire of a new war, to test the stability of the socialist system. In the past five years the United States and its closest allies have repeatedly resorted to gross force, have taken to arms. But each time the Soviet Union and all the socialist countries have stopped the aggressor in time. The actions of the socialist countries in defense of peoples fighting for freedom and independence have been of particular, fundamental importance. The realization that the Soviet Union and all the socialist countries are a reliable bulwark in the peoples' struggle for freedom and independence, for progress and peace, has sunk still deeper into the minds of the masses. (Applause.) In the course of the peaceful competition of the two systems capitalism has suffered a profound moral defeat in the eyes of all peoples. The common people are daily convinced that capitalism is incapable of solving a single one of the urgent problems confronting mankind. It becomes more and more obvious that only on the paths to socialism can a solution to these problems be found. Faith in the capitalist system and the capitalist path of development is dwindling. Monopoly capital, losing its influence, resorts more and more to intimidating and suppressing the masses of the people, to methods of open dictatorship in carrying out its domestic policy, and to aggressive acts against other countries. But the masses of the people offer increasing resistance to reaction's acts. . . . Events have shown that our party's course, worked out at the XX Congress, was correct and true: The Congress noted that the chief feature of our epoch is the emergence of socialism beyond the framework of a single country and its conversion into a world system. A new and important advance has occurred since the Congress: The world socialist system is becoming the decisive factor in the development of society. The Party drew the conclusion that the collapse of colonialism is inevitable. Under the powerful blows of the national liberation movement the colonial system has in effect caved in. The Party propounded the important thesis that wars among

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states are not inevitable in the present epoch, that they can be prevented. The events of the past years have confirmed this conclusion also. They have shown that the mighty forces standing guard over peace possess great means in our times for preventing the imperialists from unleashing a world war. T h e superiority of the forces of peace and socialism over the forces of imperialism and war has become even more sharply delineated. T o put it briefly, comrades, for us these have been a fine six years on the global scale! (Stormy applause.) Further Growth of the Might of the Socialist System. Its Conversion into the Decisive Factor of World Development; Strengthening of the International Brotherhood of Socialist Countries. In the period under review an important stage of the historical development of the world socialist system has been completed. With the appearance of a large group of sovereign socialist states in the world arena, life presented the problem of organizing mutual relations and cooperation among them on fundamentally new principles. By the joint efforts of the fraternal parties, new forms of interstate relations were found and are being perfected—relations of economic, political, and cultural cooperation on the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and comradely mutual aid. The process of undeviating fraternal rapprochement among the socialist countries and of their political and economic consolidation is one of the decisive factors in the firmness and indestructibility of the entire world system of socialism. We joined ranks voluntarily to advance together toward a common goal. No one imposed this union upon us. It is as necessary to us all as air. Since 1959, the state plans of economic development have been coordinated. It has become the practice to hold periodic consultations and exchanges of views among the heads of parties and governments on major economic and political problems. The collective agencies of the socialist states—the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance—have grown stronger.

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There is every justification for speaking of the existence in the world arena of a durable socialist commonwealth of free peoples. The profound qualitative changes that have taken place in the socialist countries and in the relations among them are vivid evidence of the increased maturity of the world system of socialism. It has now entered a new stage of its development. The chief thing now is, by steadily developing the economy of each and all of the socialist countries, to achieve a preponderance of the world socialist system over the capitalist in absolute volume of production. This will be a great historical victory of socialism. The achievements of our country, the first to enter on the path of full-scale construction of communism, facilitate and accelerate the advance of the other countries of the world socialist system toward communism. . . A combination of efforts to develop the national economy of each socialist country with common efforts to strengthen and expand economic cooperation and mutual aid—such is the high road to a further upswing in the world socialist economy. Comrades! V. I. Lenin's declaration that socialism exerts its chief influence on world development by its economic achievements is more valid today than ever. The increasing influence exerted in every way upon the peoples of the nonsocialist countries by the construction of socialism and communism is a revolutionizing factor that accelerates the development of all mankind along the path of progress. . . Like a mighty tree that has put down deep roots and does not fear any storms, the new socialist world is frightened by no vicissitudes or upheavals. The counter-revolutionary insurrection in Hungary, organized by domestic reaction with the support of imperialist forces, and the intrigues of enemies in Poland and the German Democratic Republic showed that class struggle may at times grow more intense and take sharp forms in the period of construction of socialism. The remnants of domestic reaction, with the support of imperialism, may continue to try to sever one country or another from the socialist system and seek to restore the old bourgeois ways. The re-

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actionary forces speculate on the difficulties that are inevitable in such a new undertaking as the revolutionary transformation of society and send their agents into socialist countries. . . . The imperialists' intrigues must never be forgotten. Our tremendous successes in building a new life should not lead to complacency, to relaxation of vigilance. Of course, the greater the successes of socialism and the higher the living standard in each socialist country, the more the people rally around the Communist and workers parties. This is one aspect of the matter, and a very gratifying aspect. But one must bear in mind another aspect also. As the solidarity of the peoples in all socialist countries grows, the imperialists' hopes for the restoration of capitalist ways and for the degeneration of the socialist countries fade. World reaction therefore becomes more and more oriented toward striking a blow at the socialist states from outside in order to achieve through war the rule of capitalism throughout the world, or at least to check the development of the countries of socialism. . . The imperialists could, of course, set out on dangerous adventures, but they have no chance of success. They are prepared to try other ways. To weaken the socialist camp, the imperialists seek to set the peoples of the fraternal countries to quarreling or try to introduce discord into the relations among them, to stir up the remnants of national friction and artificially inflame nationalist sentiments. A great historical responsibility rests upon the MarxistLeninist parties, upon the peoples of the socialist countries— to strengthen tirelessly the international brotherhood among the socialist countries, friendship among peoples. As long as the imperialist aggressors exist, we must be on guard, keep our powder dry, and improve the defense of the socialist countries, their armed forces, and the state security agencies. If, in the face of common sense, the imperialists dare attack the socialist countries and plunge mankind into the abyss of a world war of annihilation, this mad act of theirs would be their last, it would be the end of the whole system of capitalism. (Applause.) . . .

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Khrushchev next discussed the growing "contradictions in the capitalist camp," the "militarization" of the American economy, and the rivalry between the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, and Japan. The positions of imperialism in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, where the colonialists only quite recently oppressed hundreds of millions of people, are becoming more and more shaky. The revolutionary struggle of the peoples of those continents is rising stormily. In the past six years twenty-eight states have won political independence. The 1960's will go down in history as the years of the complete disintegration of the colonial system of imperialism. (Applause.) It must not be forgotten, however, that although the colonial system has collapsed, its remnants have not been liquidated. Many millions of people in Asia and Africa are still suffering colonial slavery and waging a struggle for their liberation. For seven years the blood of Algerian patriots has been flowing in the fight for freedom. The French monopolies do not want an end to the war in Algeria, although this "dirty war" against a peaceful people is costing thousands of lives and lays a heavy burden on the shoulders of the French and Algerian peoples. Portugal, a small state with an area no more than two-thirds of our Vologda Province, holds in bondage colonies with an area nearly twenty-five times its own size. The Dutch colonists stubbornly refuse to return to the Indonesian people their ageold land of West Irian. The United States is retaining its hold on the Chinese island of Taiwan, which it has seized, and the Japanese island of Okinawa. Against the will of the Cuban people it is making free with the Guantanamo military base on Cuban soil. . . . Throughout all these years, the Soviet Union, unswervingly fulfilling its internationalist duty, has been helping peoples who are fighting against imperialism and colonialism. Some people do not like this stand. Too bad. Such are our convictions. . . . The countries that have liberated themselves from the colonial yoke have achieved definite successes in national and cultural

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regeneration. But the economic development of the majority of the liberated countries of Asia and Africa is still proceeding slowly. The material position of the masses of the people remains difficult, while the wealth of their countries flows in streams of gold into the coffers of foreign banks and corporations. The U.S. monopolies are making two or three dollars' profit on every dollar they spend in the underdeveloped countries. Not long ago, the U.S. monopolists announced that they wish to "allocate" $500,000,000 for aid to Latin American countries. What is $500,000,000 among twenty countries over a period of five years? These are miserly alms that the rich man throws to those whom he has been robbing to tatters for many years and whom he continues to rob. The peoples who have been plundered have the right to demand from the colonialists not aid but the return of what was stolen. . . . T h e colonial powers are imposing unequal treaties on the liberated countries, are locating military bases on their territories, and are trying to involve them in military blocs, which is one of the new forms of enslavement. Almost half of the states that have arisen as a result of the disintegration of the colonial system are shackled by burdensome, unequal treaties. In the center of the system of refurbished but no less disgraceful colonialism stands the United States of America. In the role of its closest allies, and at the same time its rivals, are British colonialism and West German imperialism, the latter unceremoniously squeezing the British and French monopolies out of Africa and the Middle East. The countries that have freed themselves f r o m colonial oppression have entered a new period of their development. The struggle for political independence united all the national forces that suffered under the colonialists and were moved by common interests. But now that there appear on the agenda of the day the tasks of ripping out the roots of imperialism and carrying out agrarian and other urgent social reforms, the differences in class interests are beginning to show more and more distinctly. Broad strata of the working people, and also that considerable part of the national bourgeoisie interested in the accomplish-

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ment of the basic tasks of the anti-imperialist, antifeudal revolution, want to move further along the path of strengthening independence and social and economic transformations. Within the ruling circles of these countries, however, there are also forces that are afraid of further collaboration with the democratic, progressive strata of the nation. They would like to appropriate the fruits of the people's struggle and retard the further development of the national revolution. Such forces follow a line of compromise with imperialism outside the country and feudalism within, and resort to dictatorial methods. . . To take the path of anticommunism means to split the forces of the nation and weaken them in the face of the imperialists, the colonialists. And, on the contrary, the firmer the unity of the democratic national forces, the more thoroughly will urgent social and economic transformations be effected and the stronger the young state. Why did the Cuban people, for instance, rally so solidly around their government? Because the Cuban peasants obtained land and extensive material support from the government. Because, now that industry has been nationalized, the Cuban workers are working for themselves and not for the American monopolies. Because the small and medium producers in Cuba have been given protection against the arbitrariness of the monopolies. The entire Cuban people have acquired broad democratic rights and freedoms, the road has been opened for them to better living conditions, happiness, and prosperity. . . Khrushchev proceeded to discuss the growth of Communist parties abroad. The decisions of the XX Congress, backed by the fraternal parties, multiplied the great creative forces of the Communist movement and helped restore the Leninist spirit and style in the life of the fraternal parties and the mutual relations among them. The conferences of representatives of Communist and workers parties held in recent years were important milestones

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in the development of the world Communist movement. International conferences of Communists are one of the forms evolved by the fraternal parties that ensure their militant cooperation. T o Marxist-Leninists it is indisputable that the vital interests of the international Communist movement demand consistent and undeviating unity of action, and the Communist and workers parties observe it faithfully. Only the leaders of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, who plainly suffer from national narrow-mindedness, have turned from the straight MarxistLeninist road onto a winding path that has landed them in the bog of revisionism. The Yugoslav leaders responded to the 1957 Declaration of the fraternal parties, which resounded throughout the world as a charter of Communist unity and solidarity, with a revisionist, anti-Leninist program that all the Marxist-Leninist parties criticized decisively and justly. Revisionist ideas pervade not only the theory but also the practice of the leadership of the Yugoslav League of Communists. The line they have adopted—that of development in isolation, apart from the world socialist community—is harmful and dangerous. It plays into the hands of imperialist reaction, foments nationalist tendencies, and may in the long run lead to the loss of socialist gains in the country, which has broken away from the friendly and united family of builders of a new world. Our party has criticized and will continue to criticize the Yugoslav leaders' revisionist conceptions. As internationalists, we cannot but feel concern for the destiny of the fraternal peoples of Yugoslavia, who fought selflessly against fascism and after victory chose the path of socialist construction. T h e historic conference of November, 1960, once again convincingly confirmed the will and resolve of the Communist parties to uphold the purity of Marxism-Leninism, strengthen the unity of their ranks, and continue the determined struggle on two fronts: against revisionism, as the main danger, and against dogmatism and sectarianism. The important propositions on the necessity for each party to observe joint decisions adopted collectively and likewise not to permit any actions that could

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undermine the unity of the Communist ranks are of tremendous importance for further strengthening the solidarity of the working-class parties. . . . Socialism is the result of the creative activity of the broadest masses marching under the banner of Marxism-Leninism. Communists are opposed to the forcible, artificial implanting of this or that sociopolitical system in other countries. We are convinced that in the end the socialist system will triumph everywhere, but this in no way means that we shall seek to achieve this victory by interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. Attempts are made to blame us Communists for any action by the masses against their oppressors. When the working people of any capitalist or colonial country rise in struggle, the imperialists begin to cry that it is the "handiwork of the Communists" or the "hand of Moscow." Of course we are glad to have the imperialists ascribe to Communists all the good actions of the peoples. By so doing, the imperialists are involuntarily helping the masses to gain a better understanding of Communist ideas. These ideas are spreading widely throughout the world. But of course this is not happening because the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries are imposing them on the peoples. Ideas cannot be carried on bayonets, as people used to say, or on rockets, as it would now be more accurate to say. Of course, warring classes have always sought to rely on the support of kindred forces from outside. For a long time the bourgeois class had an advantage in this respect. The world bourgeoisie, acting in concert, stamped out centers of revolution everywhere and by every means, including armed intervention. Obviously, even at that time the international proletariat was not indifferent to the struggle of its class brothers, but more often than not it could express its solidarity with them only in the form of moral support. Now the situation has changed. The people of this or that country who rise in struggle will not find themselves engaged in single combat with world imperialism. On their side are powerful international forces, possessing every-

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thing necessary to give effective moral and material support. (A pplause.) The imperialists, alarmed by the scale of the revolutionary struggle, are not ceasing their attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of peoples and states. This is why they have reserved, in military pacts and agreements, the "right" to armed intervention in the event of so-called internal unrest, that is, to suppress revolutions, to put down actions by the masses of the people against reactionary regimes. The imperialists charge at every crossroads that the Communists export revolution. T h e imperialist gentlemen need this slander to camouflage in at least some way their claim to the right to export counter-revolution. It is a strange logic these gentlemen have. Apparently they are still under the spell of the times when they were able to strangle the people's efforts to liberate themselves. But those times have gone forever. The Communists are against the export of revolution, and this is well known in the West. But we do not recognize anybody's right to export counter-revolution, to perform the functions of an international gendarme. This too should be well known. The attempts of the imperialists to interfere in the affairs of peoples rising in revolution would constitute nothing less than acts of aggression—a threat to world peace. We must state outright that in the event of imperialist export of counter-revolution the Communists will call on the peoples of all countries to rally, to mobilize their forces, and, relying on the might of the world socialist system, firmly to repel the enemies of freedom, the enemies of peace. In short, as ye sow, so shall ye reap! (Prolonged applause.) Peaceful Coexistence ¡s the General Course of Soviet Foreign Policy. The Peoples Are the Decisive Force in the Struggle for Peace. Comrades! In the period under review important changes have occurred in the alignment of forces in the world arena. T h e world socialist system has become a reliable shield protecting not only the peoples of countries friendly to us but all mankind against the military adventures of imperialism. And the fact

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that the preponderance of strength is on the side of the socialist commonwealth of peoples is extremely fortunate for all mankind. At the same time, the forces of peace have continued to grow all over the world. A few years ago only two opposing camps, the socialist and the imperialist, were active in international relations. Today the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America that have freed or are freeing themselves from foreign oppression have also begun to play an active role in international affairs. These countries are often called neutralist, though they can be considered neutral only in the sense that they do not belong to any of the existing military-political alliances. But the majority of these countries are by no means neutral when it comes to the fundamental question of the day—the question of war and peace. As a rule they take their stand for peace and against war. The countries that have won their freedom from colonialism are becoming a serious factor in the world, a factor in the struggle against colonialism and imperialism; the basic issues of world politics can no longer be settled without regard for their interests. In the capitalist countries themselves the masses are taking a more and more vigorous stand against war. The working class and all the working people are waging a struggle against the arms race and against the disastrous policy of the warmongers. Thus the aggressive policy of the imperialist powers is today being countered by augmented forces. The struggle of the countries of socialism and all peace-loving forces against the preparations for new aggression and war constitutes the main substance of world politics today. In the past few years the forces of war and aggression have time and again placed world peace in jeopardy. In 1956, simultaneously with the counter-revolutionary rising in Hungary, the imperialists staged an attack on Egypt. In the latter half of 1957 the imperialists prepared to invade Syria; this held the threat of a military conflagration. In the summer of 1958, in connection with the revolution in Iraq, they launched an intervention in Lebanon and Jordan and at the same time created

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tension in the region of Taiwan, an island that belongs to the Chinese People's Republic. In April and May of 1960, the American imperialists sent their military aircraft into the air space of the USSR and wrecked the Paris summit conference. In the spring of 1961 they mounted an armed incursion into Cuba by gangs of hirelings, and they sought to bring Laos under their sway, to involve it in the aggressive S E A T O military bloc. But these sallies of the imperialists all foundered. It would be the greatest of mistakes, however, to imagine that the failures of their aggressive plans have brought the imperialists to their senses. The facts argue the reverse. They have not ceased their efforts to aggravate the international situation still further and bring the world to the brink of war. In recent months the imperialists have deliberately undertaken to create a dangerous situation in Central Europe by threatening to take up arms in response to our proposal to do away with the vestiges of the Second World War, to conclude a German peace treaty, and to normalize the situation in West Berlin. In circumstances of an exacerbated international situation, we were forced to take steps necessary to render our country secure against encroachments by aggressors and to save mankind from the danger of a new world war. . . Some people in the West are now claiming that the measures taken by the Soviet government to strengthen our homeland's defenses represent a renunciation of the policy of peaceful coexistence. This, of course, is plain nonsense. The policy of peaceful coexistence derives from the very nature of our system. . . . The principles of peaceful coexistence worked out by V. I. Lenin and developed in our party's documents remain unalterably the general course of Soviet foreign policy. The entire foreign policy of the Soviet government attests convincingly the fidelity of the Party and of all the Soviet people to this peaceful Leninist course. (Applause.) But the threat of war is hard to avert unilaterally, just as a campfire is hard to put out if one person is pouring water on the fire and another kerosene. The Western powers, which

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should be no less interested than we are in avoiding a thermonuclear catastrophe, are obliged in their turn to show a readiness to seek ways of settling outstanding issues on a mutually acceptable basis. . . . Peace and peaceful coexistence are not quite the same thing. Peaceful coexistence is not simply the absence of war, not an unstable truce between wars. It is the coexistence of two opposing social systems, founded on mutual renunciation of w a r as a means of settling disputes between states. The experience of history teaches that you are not going to appease an aggressor with concessions. Concessions to the imperialists on vitally important matters represent not a policy of peaceful coexistence but capitulation to the forces of aggression. That we will never accede to. (Applause.) T h e imperialists must at long last realize that they are no longer arbiters of mankind's fate, and that whether they like it or not socialism will continue to exist, develop, and grow stronger. (Stormy applause.) But for the moment it does not look as though the imperialist gentry have assimilated this truth. One may expect from them adventurous actions that would spell disaster for hundreds of millions of human beings. Aggressors must not be humored, therefore, but bridled. {Prolonged applause.) . . . After reviewing the Soviet stand in favor of "general and complete disarmament," Khrushchev defended the resumption of Soviet tests of nuclear weapons and reiterated his insistence on signing a German peace treaty, "improving the machinery" of the U N , eliminating all remnants of colonial oppression, establishing atom-free zones in Europe and Asia, and signing a nonaggression pact between the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and N A T O .

A s we see it, a way to improve the international situation is to be found in the further development of businesslike relations with all countries. O u r relations with the socialist countries have been, are, and will continue to be relations of unbreakable fraternal friendship and cooperation. (Applause.) We shall continue developing and improving mutually advantageous economic and cultural ties with them on the basis of agreed long-range plans. This coopera-

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tion will enable us all to march ahead at an even faster pace on the road of socialism and communism. ( S t o r m y applause.) We intend to go on helping the peoples of the newly independent states to get on their feet, gain strength, and play a worthy part in international affairs. The peoples of these countries are making a valuable contribution to the great cause of peace and progress. Traveling this road, they will always find reliable, loyal friends in the Soviet Union and in all the socialist countries. (Prolonged applause.) We attach great importance to relations with the principal countries of the capitalist world, above all the United States of America. In recent years U.S. foreign policy has invariably been aimed at exacerbating the international situation. This occasions regret in all peace-loving peoples. As for the Soviet Union, it has always believed that the only way to prevent a global war of annihilation is to normalize relations among states regardless of their social systems. This being so, we must engage in a mutual search for ways of accomplishing this. No one asks the ruling circles of the United States to love socialism, just as they cannot ask us to love capitalism. The main thing is for them to renounce the settlement of disputed issues by war and to base international relations on the principles of peaceful economic competition. If realism wins out in U.S. policy, one of the serious obstacles to normalization of the entire international situation will have been removed. Not only the peoples of our countries but other peoples as well, and the cause of peace the world over, stand to gain from this kind of approach. (Applause.) We also intend to broaden and reinforce normal businesslike economic and cultural ties with Britain, France, Italy, West Germany, and other countries of Western Europe. Noticeable progress has been made in this matter in recent years, and now the matter rests entirely with our partners. . . . Contacts with the leaders of other countries have come to be one of the important elements of Soviet foreign policy. As we know, V. I. Lenin, who was directly engaged in guiding the foreign policy of the Soviet state, for all his busy schedule used

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to meet with figures from the United States, Britain, France, Finland, Afghanistan, and other countries, conducted negotiations with them, and intended to participate in person in the Genoa Conference of 1922. The Central Committee has made a point of steadfastly observing this tradition established by Lenin. Carrying on active work in foreign policy, the members of the Party's Central Committee's Presidium have often visited the countries in the socialist commonwealth and have made sixty-five trips to twenty-seven nonsocialist states. I, too, have had occasion to do quite a bit of traveling the wide world over. It can't be helped—my position requires it, it is called for in the interest of our cause. (Prolonged applause.) . . Comrades! Events show our party's foreign policy line, framed at the XX Congress, to have been correct. Keeping to this line, we have scored major victories. And although our strength has now grown substantially, we shall pursue the Leninist course just as unswervingly and consistently, seeking to make the idea of peaceful coexistence prevail. Present conditions have opened up the prospect of achieving peaceful coexistence over the entire period within which the social and political problems now dividing the world must be resolved. Matters are reaching a point where even before the total victory of socialism on earth, while capitalism holds on in part of the world, there will be a real chance of eliminating war from the life of society. (Applause.) V. I. Lenin taught us to remain firm, unyielding, and uncompromising where fundamental positions of principle are at stake. Under the most trying circumstances, when the only socialist state was withstanding the assaults of the whole capitalist world, when the enemy was attacking us at the front, in the rear, and on the flanks, Vladimir Ilyich used firm and resolute language with the imperialists, at the same time pursuing a flexible line and constantly retaining the initiative. What are the tasks for Soviet foreign policy that grow out of the present international situation? We must continue: unswervingly and consistently implementing the principle of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems,

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as the general course of the Soviet Union's foreign policy (applause); strengthening the unity of the socialist countries on the basis of fraternal cooperation and mutual assistance, and doing our part to reinforce the might of the world socialist system (applause); developing contacts and cooperating with all fighters for peace throughout the world; joining with all who want peace in a stand against those who want war (applause); strengthening proletarian solidarity with the working class and working people of the whole world, giving all possible moral and material support to peoples who are struggling for their liberation from imperialist and colonial oppression and for the consolidation of their independence (applause); developing international business ties, economic cooperation, and trade on the broadest possible scale with all countries desirous of maintaining such relations with the Soviet Union (applause); carrying on a vigorous and flexible foreign policy, striving to secure settlement of urgent world problems through negotiations, exposing intrigues and maneuvers of the warmongers, and establishing businesslike cooperation with all states on the basis of reciprocity. (Applause.) Experience has proved that the principle of the peaceful coexistence of states with different socialist systems, a principle put forward by the great Lenin, represents the way to preserve peace and prevent a global war of annihilation. We have been doing and we shall do everything in our power to achieve the triumph of peaceful coexistence and peaceful economic cooperation all over the world. (Stormy, prolonged applause.) Khrushchev reviewed in detail the economic growth of the USSR and discussed various means of assuring further expansion in the future.

The transition to communist principles is practicable, but not before the material and technical base has been created, not

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before the people have reached a high level of political consciousness and the principles of socialism have completely evolved and revealed their progressive potentialities to the fullest degree. There is no other path to communist social relations than through the development and perfection of socialist relations. . . . After discussing the duties of Soviet citizens in the "building of communism," Khrushchev turned to party affairs. The restoration and further development of the Leninist norms of party life and principles of leadership is a highly important aspect of the activities of our party during the period covered by the report. The XX Congress, by condemning the cult of the individual, which is alien to the spirit of MarxismLeninism, opened a broad vista for the expansion and strengthening of the Party's ties with the people and the increasing of its combat readiness. On the eve of the XX Congress the question was this: Either the Party would openly and in a Leninist manner condemn the errors and distortions committed during the period of the cult of J. V. Stalin and reject those methods of party and state leadership that had become an impediment to progress, or the forces that had chained themselves to the old and were resisting everything new and creative would gain the upper hand in the Party. This is exactly how serious the problem was. Was it necessary to make such sharp and frank criticism of the major errors and the serious consequences of the cult of the individual? Yes, it was necessary. After the inveterate enemy and adventurer Beria had been unmasked, a careful analysis and profound study of a number of documents was made, as a result of which there were fully revealed to the Central Committee instances of the grossest violations of socialist legality, abuses of power, instances of arbitrary action and repression against many honest people, including outstanding figures in the Party and the Soviet state. The Central Committee, profoundly aware of its responsibility to the Party and the people, could not enter

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upon a course of concealing or glossing over the errors and distortions that had taken place in the past. Following Lenin's behests, the Central Committee decided to tell the truth about the abuses of power during the period of the cult of the individual. This was the inner moral requirement and obligation of the Party and its leadership. It was a correct decision. It was of enormous importance for the fate of the Party and for the building of communism. (Prolonged applause.) Vladimir Ilyich Lenin called upon the Party not to conceal mistakes but to criticize and correct them openly. " T h e attitude of a political party toward its errors," he wrote, "is one of the most important and truest criteria of the seriousness of the party and of its actual performance of its duties to its class and to the masses of working people. To admit a mistake openly, to ascertain its causes, to analyze the situation that gave rise to it, and to discuss attentively the means for correcting it—this is the sign of a serious party, this is the fulfillment of its obligations, this is the rearing and training of the class, and later of the masses." (Sochineniia, X X X I , 39.) (Applause.) What would have happened to the Party and the country had the cult of the individual not been condemned, had its harmful consequences not been overcome, and had the Leninist principles of party and state activity not been restored? This would have threatened to cut the Party off from the masses and the people, to cause serious violation of Soviet democracy and revolutionary legality, to slow down the country's economic development and to reduce the rate of communist construction, and, consequently, to detract from the well-being of the working people. In the field of international relations it would have led to a weaker position for the Soviet Union in the world arena and to a worsening of relations with other countries, which would have been fraught with serious consequences. This is why the criticism of the cult of the individual and the overcoming of its consequences was of great political and practical importance. (Applause.) Marxism-Leninism has always sternly condemned any evidence of the cult of the individual and has considered it alien

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to the spirit of the proletarian revolutionary movement, alien to the spirit of communism. Marx, Engels, and Lenin saw the people as the true creator of history; they emphasized the leading and organizational role of the party of the working class. Marxism-Leninism does not deny the importance of leaders and chiefs of the working class, but it is decisively against the exaltation and certainly against the deification of any person. The exaltation of one individual inevitably pushes the Party and the people into the background and reduces their role and importance. The Soviet people, through labors and heroic struggle under the leadership of their party, have achieved great successes in socialist construction. They gained an outstanding victory in the Great Patriotic War against fascism. But, as you remember, all the successes and victories gained by the Party and the people were ascribed during the period of the cuh of the individual to one man. Of course J. V. Stalin did make great contributions to the Party and the Communist movement, and we give him his due. However, it was incorrect to associate all the victories of the Party and the people with the name of one man. This was a gross distortion of the true state of affairs. (Applause.) The X X Congress restored justice, eliminated distortions, and emphasized the great role of the people and the role of the Party as the vanguard of the working class and all the people and as the leading and guiding force in the struggle for communism. The Congress instructed the Central Committee to implement consistently measures that would ensure that the cult of the individual was completely overcome, that would eliminate its consequences in all fields of party, state, and ideological work, and that would bring about strict observance of the norms of party life and the principle of collective leadership elaborated by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. (Prolonged applause.) In its principled and decisive criticism of the cult of the individual our party was guided by the teachings of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin and by his testament. It is known that while Lenin valued Stalin, he also perceived his shortcomings, even vices. In December, 1922—i.e., soon after Stalin's election as General Secretary

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of the Central Committee—Vladimir Ilyich, concerned for the fate of the Party and the Soviet state, wrote in a letter to the next Party congress: "Having become General Secretary, Comrade Stalin has acquired immense power, and I am not sure he will always know how to use this power with sufficient caution. . . . Stalin is too rude, and this failing, which is quite tolerable in our midst and in relations among us Communists, becomes intolerable in one holding the office of General Secretary. Therefore, I propose that the comrades think of a way of removing Stalin from this post and appointing to it a man who above all would differ from Comrade Stalin in one quality alone, namely, that he be more tolerant, more loyal, more courteous, and more considerate to comrades, less capricious, etc." As you see, Vladimir Ilyich understood very well that Stalin's negative qualities could do great harm to the Party and the country. Unfortunately, Lenin's warning and advice were not heeded in time, and as a result the Party and the country had to live through a good many difficulties that were due to the cult of the individual. At the XX Congress the Party severely criticized the cult of the individual. In carrying out the decisions of the Congress, it overcame the distortions and errors and drew up measures that would preclude the possibility of such phenomena in the future. This was a bold decision, and was new evidence of the political maturity of our party and its Central Committee. (Stormy, prolonged applause.) Of course, the Party was aware that the disclosure of the errors, distortions, and abuses of power might arouse a certain feeling of bitterness and even dissatisfaction in party ranks and among the people, that it might entail certain costs and minuses and create temporary difficulties for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties. But the Party boldly met the difficulties head on, and it honestly and frankly told the people the whole truth, with profound faith that the line it had taken would be correctly understood by the people. The Party was not mistaken. Our progress along the road to communism became faster. Now we can straighten our backs

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more freely, breathe easier, and see more clearly. The whole internal life of the country is developing rapidly. Our industry, agriculture, science, and culture have conquered great new frontiers. As we know, millions of Soviet people are taking a more and more active part in the management of state and public affairs. Soviet Communists can say with pride: We have not sullied the honor and dignity of the Leninist party; its authority has grown immeasurably and the international Communist movement has climbed to a new and higher stage. Our party is now united and monolithic as never before! (Stormy, prolonged applause.) The Leninist course expressed by the X X Congress was at first carried out against the fierce resistance of antiparty elements, zealous partisans of the methods and practices prevailing under the cult of the individual, revisionists, and dogmatists. The fractionalist antiparty group consisting of Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Voroshilov, Bulganin, Pervukhin, Saburov, and Shepilov, who joined them, came out against the Party's Leninist course. At first, the strong resistance to the Party's line on condemning the cult of the individual, fostering intra-party democracy, condemning and rectifying all abuses of power, and exposing the individuals guilty of repression was rejected by Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, and Voroshilov. Their stand in this matter was no accident. They bear personal responsibility for many mass repressions against Party, soviet, economic, military, and YCL cadres and for other similar manifestations that were apparent during the period of the cult of the individual. At first this group was only an insignificant minority in the Presidium of the Central Committee. But when the Party launched the struggle to restore Leninist norms of party and state life, when it set about such urgent tasks as developing the virgin lands, reorganizing the management of industry and construction, enlarging the rights of the Union republics, improving the well-being of Soviet people, and restoring revolutionary legality, the fractional group activized its antiparty

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subversive work and began to recruit supporters in the Central Committee Presidium. It added Bulganin, Pervukhin, and Saburov, and Shepilov joined them. Realizing that they had succeeded in throwing together an arithmetical majority in the Presidium, the participants in the antiparty group went into open attack seeking to change the policy in the Party and the country—the policy set forth by the XX Party Congress. Having reached agreement at their secret gatherings, the fractionalists demanded an extraordinary meeting of the Presidium. They counted on carrying out their antiparty designs, on seizing the leadership of the Party and the country. T h e antiparty group wanted to confront the members of the Central Committee and the whole Party with a fait accompli. But the fractionalists miscalculated. Members of the Central Committee who were then in Moscow, learning of the fractional actions of the antiparty group within the Presidium, demanded the immediate calling of a Central Committee plenary session. The Central Committee plenary session, held in June, 1957, resolutely exposed the antiparty group and routed it ideologically. The June plenary session demonstrated the political maturity, monolithic unity, and close cohesion of the Central Committee on the basis of the Leninist line of the X X Congress. (Stormy applause.) Ideologically routed in the course of the plenary session and faced with unanimous condemnation by the Central Committee session, the participants in the antiparty group came forth with the confession that they had conspired, and with an admission of the harmfulness of their antiparty activity. Comrade Voroshilov came forth at the plenary session with an admission of his mistakes, saying that "the fractionalists misled" him and that he fully recognized his errors and firmly condemned them, together with the whole subversive work of the antiparty group. As you know, the resolution of the Central Committee plenary session on the antiparty group was adopted unanimously; the participants in the antiparty group also voted for it, except Molotov, who abstained from voting. Later, at a primary party organization's discussion of the results of the plenary session,

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Molotov too declared that he considered the plenary session's decision correct and accepted it. The struggle against the antiparty group was a struggle of principle, a sharp political struggle, a struggle between the new and the old. The issue was whether our party would continue to carry out the Leninist policy set forth by the X X Congress, or whether the methods of the period of the cult of the individual, methods condemned by the whole Party, would be revived. . . . The decisions of the June plenary session of the Central Committee were unanimously approved by our whole party, by the entire Soviet people. Somewhat later, in October, 1957, a plenary session of the party Central Committee firmly rebuffed attempts by the former Minister of Defense, Zhukov, to take an adventurist path and to pursue a policy of separating the armed forces from the Party, of opposing the Soviet Army to the party leadership. By casting aside the bankrupt fractionalists and scheming careerists, the Party rallied its ranks closer, strengthened its ties with the people, and mobilized all forces for the successful implementation of its general line. (Prolonged applause. ) The policy of the X X Congress encountered ardent approval from the international Communist movement, from the fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties. This was reflected in the decisions of congresses and other materials of the fraternal parties and in the documents of the conferences of representatives of Communist and workers parties in 1957 and 1960. Thus the Statement issued by the Moscow Conference of 1960 pointed out that "the historic decisions of the X X Congress of the CPSU . . initiated a new stage in the international Communist movement and contributed to its further development on the basis of Marxism-Leninism." At the same time it should be noted that, as it later turned out, our party's policy of overcoming the harmful effects of the cult of the individual did not meet with due understanding from the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor; indeed, they began to conduct a struggle against this policy.

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Everyone knows that until recently the relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of Albania, and between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Albanian Party of Labor were friendly and good. The peoples of our country gave Albania comprehensive, disinterested help in developing its economy, in socialist construction. We sincerely wanted and want to see Albania a flourishing socialist republic and its people happy and enjoying all the benefits of the new life. For many years the Albanian leaders signified their complete unity of views with the Central Committee of our party and the Soviet government on all questions of the international Communist movement. They repeatedly declared their support of the XX Congress policy. Enver Hoxha, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor, stated this in his speeches at the XX and XXI congresses of our party. At the Third Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor, held soon after the XX Congress, the criticism of the cult of the individual, as well as measures to overcome its harmful consequences, was fully and completely approved. We Soviet people believed the Albanian leaders and considered that mutual understanding and unity of views existed between our party and the Albanian Party of Labor. The facts show, however, that recently the Albanian leaders, despite their former declarations and the decisions of their own party congress, sharply changed political course without any excuse and took the path of acute deterioration of relations with our party, with the Soviet Union. They began to depart from the commonly agreed line of the whole world Communist movement on the major questions of our times, something which became particularly manifest from the middle of last year. Now the Albanian leaders do not conceal the fact that they do not like the course, taken by our party, of firmly overcoming the harmful consequences of the Stalin cult, of sharply condemning the abuse of power, of restoring Leninist norms of party and state life. Evidently the Albanian leaders in their hearts disagreed with the conclusions of the 1957 and 1960 conferences of fraternal

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parties, which, as everyone knows, approved the decisions of the XX Congress and our party's policy of overcoming the harmful consequences of the cult of the individual. This stand of the Albanian leaders is explained by the fact that they themselves, to our regret and distress, are repeating the methods that occurred in our country in the period of the cult of the individual. We are following events in Albania with a feeling of anxiety for the destinies of the heroic Albanian people. We are pained to see that rank-and-file Albanian Communists and the whole Albanian people, who are vitally interested in friendship and cooperation with all the socialist countries, are obliged to pay for the mistaken line of the Albanian leaders. We are deeply troubled by this situation and have persistently sought and are seeking ways of overcoming the differences that have arisen. The course drawn up by the X X Congress of our party is a Leninist course, and we cannot concede on this fundamental question to either the Albanian leaders or anyone else. To depart from the X X Congress line would mean not heeding the wise instructions of Lenin, who discerned the danger of the appearance of the Stalin cult even when it was in embryo. It would mean disregarding the costly lessons of history, forgetting the price that our party paid for not having heeded in time the instructions of its great leader. Now the Albanian leaders, opposing the X X Congress policy, are trying to pull our party back to ways that they like but that will never be repeated in our country. Our party will continue firmly and unswervingly to carry out the line of its X X Congress, a line that has withstood the test of time. No one will succeed in diverting us from the Leninist path! (Stormy, prolonged applause.) If the Albanian leaders hold dear the interests of their people and the cause of building socialism in Albania, if they really want friendship with the CPSU, with all the fraternal parties, they should renounce their mistaken views and return to the path of unity and close cooperation in the fraternal family of the socialist commonwealth, the path of unity with the whole international Communist movement.

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As for our party, it will continue, in keeping with its internationalist duty, to do everything it can so that Albania may march shoulder to shoulder with all the socialist countries. . . . After a lengthy discussion of organizational work within the C P S U and the Young Communist League and the importance of educational work in strengthening the Party's ties with the masses, Khrushchev turned to problems of ideology.

Life is immeasurably richer than any formulas. Theoretical propositions must be adjusted and modified in the light of changes in the life of society. Our party has furnished wonderful examples of this truly Marxist-Leninist approach to revolutionary theory. The period of the Party's life under review has been marked by creative solutions to many large questions of communist construction and to urgent problems in the international liberation movement. These include highly important theoretical conclusions concerning the dictatorship of the proletariat in present-day conditions, the laws of the transition of socialism into communism, the ways for creating the material and technical base of communism, the formation of communist social relations and the rearing of the new man, the variety of forms of transition from capitalism to socialism, the more or less simultaneous entry of the socialist countries into communism, the possibility of preventing a world war in our time, the nature of the modern epoch, etc. T h e great theoretical work of the Party is most fully embodied in its new Program, which represents the philosophical, economic, and political foundation for building communism in our country. The working out of the Program not only attests to historic victories in the fields of economic and cultural development but also indicates the great and many-sided theoretical work of the Party. The development of revolutionary theory has become the business of the entire Party. (Applause.) . . Creative Marxism-Leninism is intransigent toward stagnation of thought and toward submission to formulas that n o longer

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correspond to the actual state of affairs or to the objective situation. Nothing is so contrary to the essence and creative spirit of revolutionary theory as an attempt to cling to propositions that life has proved to be untenable. In our economic literature, for example, and not only economic literature, one thesis that persisted for a long time was that under socialism public demand backed by purchasing power supposedly must always keep ahead of production; it was even alleged that this represented some kind of special superiority of socialism over capitalism and was one of the moving forces of our society. This clearly erroneous assertion, which contradicts Marxist-Leninist teaching on the relation between production and consumption, arose on the basis of an uncritical, dogmatic acceptance of J. V. Stalin's mistaken thesis that in the USSR "the growth of mass demand (purchasing power) exceeds the growth of production at all times." . . Khrushchev listed the major tasks in the field of "party construction." They included: ( 1 ) directing the Soviet people in the creation of the material and technical basis for communism; ( 2 ) concentrating on the fulfillment of the seven-year plan; ( 3 ) observing "Leninist norms" of party life and increasing the participation of all party members in "formulating and implementing" policy; ( 4 ) expanding the activity of local organs of government and mass organizations; and ( 5 ) raising the level of "ideological work."

( 6 ) The Party considers the building of communism in the USSR to be the fulfillment of its international duty to the working people of all countries. It will continue to fight tirelessly for the strengthening of the world socialist system and for the unity of all the international Communist and workers parties, and jointly with them will wage a resolute struggle for the purity of Marxism-Leninism and against various manifestations of opportunism and present-day revisionism, the chief danger, and against dogmatism and sectarianism. The following day Khrushchev delivered a report to the XXII CPSU Congress on the new party Program. The bulk of his speech dealt with the "construction of communism" within the Soviet Union. In reviewing the "historic victories of socialism," Khrushchev also touched on the experience of the "socialist camp."

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2 . NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV. REPORT ON THE PROGRAM OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION TO THE

XXII

CONGRESS OF

Pravda,

THE

CPSU,

OCTOBER

18,

1961.

October 19, 1961. 2 The following excerpts illustrate his views on the development of the revolutionary movement throughout the world and the "international significance" of the new CPSU Program. THE GLORIOUS Marxist-Leninist parties of the fraternal countries have made a vital contribution to the collective experience of socialist revolution and socialist construction. Along with the vast experience of the USSR, the international working-class movement can today draw upon the experience of others in developing a new form of dictatorship of the proletariat— people's democracy; upon their experience of peaceful transition from the democratic stage of the revolution to the socialist stage; the experience in making use of parliaments and multiparty systems in the furtherance of socialist construction; the experience of building a socialist society in industrially developed countries; the experience of the bypassing of the capitalist stage of development by economically underdeveloped countries in their transition to socialism; the experience of socialist transformation of the countryside without nationalization of the land, taking into account the lingering tradition of deep peasant attachment to private ownership. . . . After giving an extensive survey of the new Program's blueprint for the construction of a communist society in the Soviet Union, Khrushchev turned to the significance of the Program for the rest of mankind. By the power of example, communism in the making will attract to the banner of Marxism-Leninism additional hundreds of millions of people of labor throughout the world. The example is above all an example of rapid development of productive forces, of a great rise in the people's living standard and cultural level, of the creation of the conditions for a peaceful ' Translation from Current Soviet Policies IV, pp. 83-116.

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and happy life f o r people. T h e whole course of social development confirms Lenin's prediction that the countries where socialism triumphs would exert their chief influence on the development of world revolution through economic construction. Peaceful e c o n o m i c competition is the chief arena of the contest between the socialist and capitalist systems. T h e o u t c o m e of this competition will be decided in tremendous measure by the competition between the Soviet Union and the United States of A m e r i c a . . . . T h e building of communism in o u r country is an integral part of the building of communist society in the whole socialist c o m m o n w e a l t h . T h e successful development of the world system of socialism opens up a prospect of a m o r e or less simultaneous transition of the socialist countries to c o m m u n i s m within a single historical epoch. T h e law of uneven economic and political development, leading to the deepening of contradictions and the intensification of the competitive struggle a m o n g states, is characteristic of the world system of capitalism. T h e world system of socialism develops by diametrically opposite laws. It is characterized by the steady and planned economic growth of each country, faster development of those states that lagged economically under capitalism, and the evening up of the general level of development of all the countries. Within the f r a m e w o r k of the world system of socialism, countries that o n c e lagged behind because of specific features of their historical development have already c o m e far toward the level of the a d v a n c e d socialist countries in a brief period, with the comprehensive assistance and support of the latter. H o w e v e r , the productive f o r c e s in these countries are not yet developed to the same degree. It is these objective factors that account f o r the circumstance that there cannot be any one definite " h o u r " for all the socialist countries to enter the higher phase of the n e w society. It is natural that the full-scale building of communist society will begin in those countries as the necessary conditions for it arise. T h i s is in accordance with the interests of the entire socialist system, since it will accelerate the process of the c o m mon advance of the peoples toward c o m m u n i s m and will create

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more favorable conditions for increasing aid and support by the countries of victorious communism to other socialist states. To Marxist-Leninists it is indisputable that the fundamental interests of the socialist states imperatively require the utmost strengthening of their commonwealth. Any policy of building socialism in isolation, separately from the world development of a socialist society, runs counter to the objective laws of development of a socialist society. Such a policy is harmful, since it could weaken the forces of socialism in the face of the united front of imperialist reaction; it nourishes nationalist tendencies; and in the long run it could lead to the loss of socialist gains. Nationalism, in whatever guise it wraps itself, represents the most dangerous political and ideological weapon employed by international reaction against the unity of the socialist countries. " T h e Communists consider it their prime duty to educate the working people in a spirit of internationalism, socialist patriotism, and intolerance of any manifestations of nationalism and chauvinism," our draft Party Program emphasizes. "Nationalism damages the common interests of the socialist commonwealth, and above all it harms the people of the country in which it appears, since estrangement from the socialist c a m p retards the country's development, deprives it of the possibility of making use of the advantages of the world socialist system, and encourages attempts by imperialist powers to utilize the nationalist tendencies for their own purposes." Soviet people have the most friendly feelings for their brothers in the socialist countries of Europe and Asia. They rejoice at their successes and take pride in their victories. They have helped and will help them to build the new life. In fair weather and foul, the peoples of the socialist countries act according to the principle "All for one and one for all." Whoever raises a hand against the socialist gains of the peoples of our c o m m o n wealth will receive a crushing rebuff from the billion builders of socialism and communism. (Prolonged applause.) A s for Yugoslavia, as already stated in the Central Committee report, we have fought and will fight against the revisionist positions of the leadership of the League of Communists of

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Yugoslavia; at the same time, we have stood and we stand for the utmost development and strengthening of relations with Yugoslavia along state lines. On questions of the struggle for peace, our position and that of Yugoslavia coincide in many ways. The Soviet Union stands for the rapprochement and consolidation of all forces fighting against the imperialist warmongers, for peace and friendship among peoples. . . . The world is going through an epoch of revolutions. Socialist revolutions, anti-imperialist national liberation revolutions, people's democratic revolutions, broad peasant movements, the struggle of the masses to overthrow fascist and other tyrannical regimes, the general democratic movements against national oppression—all these merge into a single world revolutionary process undermining and destroying capitalism. The draft Program illumines the paths of the peaceful and the nonpeaceful development of revolution. In this question, as in all others, our party stands fully on the principles collectively formulated by the international Communist movement in the 1957 Declaration and the 1960 Statement. In the present epoch more favorable international conditions have arisen for the development of the world revolutionary movement. This is due above all to the strengthening of the forces and the growth of the influence of the socialist system. The example of socialism is exerting a powerful influence on the minds of people, making them active fighters for the establishment of the new system. Peoples rising in revolution have the opportunity to rely on the support of the socialist countries in the struggle against the attempts of world reaction to export counter-revolution. They can obtain comprehensive help from the socialist countries in building a new society. In the present epoch internal conditions for the transition of new countries to socialism have also become more favorable. Among these conditions are: the general weakening of capitalism and the deepening of its contradictions; the growth in the size, organization, and unification of the working class and the intensification of its influence in society; the growth in the numbers of the allies of the working class objectively interested

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in the struggle against imperialism, in liquidating the monopolies' omnipotence; the rise and strengthening of Communist parties in almost all countries of the world. But one should not forget about the difficulties in the way of the revolutionary forces. In the postwar period the monopoly bourgeoisie has created a new reactionary "holy alliance"— military blocs aimed not only against the socialist countries but against the revolutionary workers and national liberation movement. It has monstrously inflated the apparatus of violence and suppression. At the same time it is resorting to new and subtle methods of splitting the working class and corrupting the trade union movement, making active use for this purpose of the reactionary leaders of Social Democracy and reactionary trade union officials. It has launched a rabid campaign of anticommunism, uniting all the enemies of the working people under this black flag. By no means should the possibility be excluded that the monopoly bourgeoisie would resort to the most extreme, the bloodiest means of preserving its domination. In these circumstances Lenin's words sound more pertinent than ever: the working class must "master all—without the slightest exception—forms or aspects of public activity . . ." and it must be prepared "for the swiftest and most unexpected replacement of one form by another." T h e tasks of people's democratic, national liberation, and socialist revolutions are drawing closer together and becoming more intertwined in the present epoch. The logic of social development has caused all these revolutions to be directed primarily against one chief enemy—imperialism, the monopoly bourgeoisie. The question is often asked: H o w will the world liberation movement proceed? Obviously, the prerequisites for a transition to socialism have fully matured in the highly developed capitalist countries. The seething, underdeveloped states of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, upon carrying the anti-imperialist national liberation revolution to the end, will be able to make the transition to socialism. In the present epoch, almost any country, regardless

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of the level of its development, can embark on the path that leads to socialism. The world revolutionary process is developing more and more widely, embracing all the continents. At one time imperialism, unable to destroy the world's first socialist state by military means, tried to fence it off from the rest of the world by a "cordon sanitaire." But the revolutionary energy of peoples of Europe and Asia extended the borders of socialism from the Elbe to the South China Sea. The imperialists did everything to confine the ideas of the revolution within these bounds. But neither mountains nor oceans serve as barriers to the ideas of freedom. Vivid evidence of this is the triumphant revolution in Cuba. (Stormy applause.) Cuba lies far from the Soviet Union. But our peoples are close. Our hearts are with you, heroes of Cuba, who are defending your independence and freedom from American imperialism and who have inscribed socialist goals on your battle standards! (Stormy applause.) Our people have extended and will extend help to the fraternal Cuban people in their sacred struggle for their just cause. (Prolonged applause.) As the socialist system grows stronger and as its advantages over capitalism are more and more fully revealed and the socialist and democratic forces throughout the world increase, more and more countries at various levels of development will embark on the path of revolution and will join the system of socialism as streams add their waters to a huge and mighty river. The working class, in its revolutionary struggle, will continue to come up against various opportunist trends hindering the rallying of its forces and attainment of its goals. As long as capitalism exists, these trends will appear over and over under various guises. This is why the draft Program emphasizes the need to fight the ideology of Social Democracy and revisionism as well as dogmatism and sectarianism. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union will continue to do everything to fulfill with honor its internationalist duty to the international working class and the working people of the whole

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world, will continue to direct its efforts toward strengthening the unity and solidarity of the ranks of the great army of Communists of all lands. (Prolonged applause.) Comrades! Our successes in communist construction will be of extraordinary significance to the destinies of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, those huge and long-suffering continents, who are now rising to their full stature to become makers of their own history and are seeking ways for rapid development of their economy and culture. The national liberation movement has entered the final stage of liquidation of colonial regimes. T h e peoples who have freed themselves are setting themselves the task of consolidating their political independence, launching an offensive against economic backwardness and eliminating it, and wiping out all forms of dependence on imperialism. The achievement of political independence by the former colonies has had a favorable influence on their economic development. The rates of growth of production have increased. Whereas the average annual rate of growth of production in these countries was 1 percent before the Second World War, it has risen to 4 percent in recent years. A state sector has been established in many countries and national industry has begun to develop. But these are only the first steps. T h e heritage of colonialism is still quite strong. The major economic tasks still await resolution. Meanwhile, the upper crust of the bourgeoisie and the feudal landlords, who have linked their destinies with foreign capital, are seeking to fasten the underdeveloped countries in the system of world capitalism. The path onto which the imperialists and their henchmen are pushing these countries cannot in the least ensure solution of the problems because of which the peoples rose in struggle against the colonialists. What is the way out? If history provides a clear answer to the question, the way out must be sought along a noncapitalist path of development. Let whoever wants to know what fruits it yields look at the flourishing republics of Soviet Central Asia and

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other parts of our country that since the October Revolution have bypassed the agonizing path of capitalist development. (Applause.) Entering the noncapitalist path of development cannot be achieved by drifting onto it. Only active struggle on the part of the working class and the masses of working people, and the unification of all democratic and patriotic forces in a broad national front can lead the peoples onto this path. By deep study of the objective course of development, Marxist theoretical thought has discovered the form in which all the sound forces of a nation can be most successfully unified. This form is the national democratic state. Such a state, reflecting the interests not of any one class but of broad strata of the people, is called upon to carry through the tasks of the anti-imperialist, national liberation revolution. It is the good fortune of peoples who have won national independence that they are emerging on the road of independent development in a situation in which the forces of imperialism and its ability to influence the course of developments are steadily declining, while the forces and influence of socialism are growing more and more. In these circumstances it will be immeasurably easier for them to solve the tasks of economic and social development. The Soviet Union, like the other socialist countries, has no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of the young free states, of imposing socialism upon anyone. Socialism has not been, is not being, and will not be exported. But there must also not be any imposition of colonialism, there must not be export of counter-revolution. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union regards alliance with peoples who have thrown off the colonial yoke as one of the cornerstones of its international policy. Our party considers it our internationalist duty to help peoples who are taking the path of winning and consolidating national independence, all peoples fighting for the complete destruction of the colonial system. (Applause.) Comrades! Fulfillment of our vast plans will be of decisive

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help in accomplishing communism's historic mission of abolishing war and establishing everlasting peace on earth. Historical experience has confirmed that war is as inseparable from imperialism as the struggle against imperialist wars, the policy of strengthening peace, is inherent in socialism. Events inscribed in history's annals not in ink but in the blood of millions cannot be eradicated from human memory. Beginning in 1898, when the United States of America unleashed the first war of the imperialist epoch, imperialism has loosed upon the peoples one "local war" after another, and twice it has plunged mankind into world holocausts of unparalleled bloodshed; moreover, the ruins of cities and villages were still smoldering and the wounds in the hearts of millions of people who lost relatives in the flames of the Second World War had not yet healed when the U.S. imperialists were already "asking" for a third world war. In the imperialist camp, and above all in the United States of America, groups are operating that behave like gamblers. They give no thought to the calamity that the new war they are preparing would cause to mankind. The use of thermonuclear and rocket weapons would turn all the continents of the globe into a zone of mass annihilation of people and destruction of material values. In the conditions of a thermonuclear world war the factor of distance would lose its former significance. And the Western hemisphere would become an area in which a holocaust of destruction would rage. In our times war cannot and must not serve as the means of settling international disputes. It may be asked: Is there not a contradiction between the recognition on the one hand of the existence of a danger of war, and on the other hand our striving to eliminate war from the life of society? No, comrades, there is no contradiction here. Khrushchev here repeated his contention that the balance of power favored the "peace-loving" forces, composed of the Soviet Union, the other members of the "socialist camp," newly independent nations of Asia and Africa, Latin American nations, and the masses in "capitalist" countries.

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Our unshakable confidence in this does not by any means signify even the slightest underestimation of the forces of imperialism. We know that imperialism is still strong. The possibility that the imperialists may unleash a new war cannot be excluded. The imperialist maniacs may throw themselves into adventures to stay the course of history. In this situation we have only one path: to strengthen our might, to create the most powerful weapons, to be prepared every minute to hurl back an attack by aggressors. (Applause.) We have declared more than once and we declare again that we are prepared fully to disband the army, to sink atomic bombs and rockets in the sea, but of course only on the condition of general and complete disarmament under strict international control. Until the imperialist powers accept that, we shall see to it that our armed forces possess the most modern means of defending the motherland—atomic and thermonuclear weapons and rockets of all ranges—so that all types of war matériel are maintained at the necessary level. Strengthening the defense of the USSR, the might of the Soviet Armed Forces, is the task of tasks of the Soviet people. (Stormy

applause.)

.

.

.

Khrushchev turned next to the response to the new draft Program of the CPSU and dwelt on some points of contention. There are proposals of another sort, which I would say are presented from the standpoint of a scholarly but uncreative approach to the processes going on in life. For example, in the opinion of certain comrades, the dictatorship of the proletariat must be preserved right up to the complete victory of communism. Such comrades take absolutely no account of the objective conditions that have developed in our country but base themselves solely on arbitrarily excerpted quotations, while losing sight of the essence of the teachings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin concerning the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the state form in the transitional period from capitalism to socialism, the first phase of communism. They do not consider that in our socialist society there are now only laboring classes, which are engaged in socialist production and are unified in

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their sociopolitical and ideological attitude. After the full and final victory of socialism in our country, there is no room for the dictatorship of one class. Indeed, over what class can we have a dictatorship? We have no such class. Further, these comrades believe that, inasmuch as the alliance of the working class and the peasantry has remained, the dictatorship of the proletariat must remain as well. But these comrades do not realize that the workers and peasants alliance needed the dictatorship of the proletariat for the fight against the exploiter classes, for the socialist transformation of the peasant economy and the reeducation of the peasants, and for the building of socialism. With the accomplishment of these tasks, the alliance of the working class and the peasantry is successfully developing and growing stronger without the dictatorship of the proletariat, in the conditions of a socialist state of the entire people. These comrades also use the argument that the organizationaleconomic and cultural-education functions inherent in the dictatorship of the proletariat are retained in the period of the transition to communism. But these functions will remain under communism as well. If one is to be consistent, the dictatorship of the working class too must be preserved, in the logic of these comrades, under communism. The fallacy of this reasoning is obvious to everyone. . Our party, being a party of scientific communism, advances and carries out the tasks of communist construction only as the necessary conditions develop and mature. I have already spoken at length about the Party's plans in the fields of production and the people's well-being. But some comrades propose going beyond the planned goals and in the very near future extending the principle of free satisfaction of the requirements of society's members to a wider range of material and cultural goods, thus virtually establishing equal pay for all, regardless of the skill and complexity of their work. Such proposals are profoundly erroneous. To embark on this path would mean to undermine the material incentive for raising labor productivity and to slow down the building of communism. (Applause.) . . .

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The draft of the Program of the CPSU has acquired the character of a document of truly world significance and has already exerted an enormous influence on the political climate of the world. It has attracted the closest attention of the broadest popular masses in the countries of the socialist camp, of public circles in the imperialist states, and of the people who have already won independence or are still groaning under the boot of the colonialists. It has penetrated to the remotest corners of the globe and has found its way to the pages of even the most reactionary bourgeois publications. We Soviet Communists naturally feel a deep satisfaction in the fact that the fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties and the many-millions-strong army of Communists of all countries have given a high appraisal to the draft Program. As internationalists we are happy when Communists of other lands declare that they draw from the Program of the CPSU inspiration for their practical activity and struggle and that our party's successes multiply their forces, the forces of freedom, peace, and socialism throughout the world. Permit me, on behalf of the delegates to the XXII Congress, on behalf of the members of our party and of the entire Soviet people, to express heartfelt gratitude to all the fraternal parties and to all the Communists of the world for their support of our plans and our goals. (Prolonged applause.) We assure you, our brothers in other lands, that our Leninist party, bearing high the banner of proletarian internationalism, will do everything in its power to bring mankind closer to a society of peace, happiness, and prosperity—a communist society. (Stormy applause.) All the people of advanced and democratic views note that the Program provides answers to the most acute problems and that it will play an outstanding role in the social movements and progressive transformations of our time. As for the bourgeoisie and its press, even they cannot help but admit that the Program and its fulfillment will exert an exceptional impact on the state of affairs throughout the world. . . . In addition to CPSU delegates, speakers from each foreign Communist party represented at the XXII Congress were given an op-

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portunity to comment on the two Khrushchev reports (Documents 1 and 2 ) . Experience at previous congresses indicated that foreign delegates were expected to support the CPSU's position. Thus, at the XXII Congress, each delegation was presumably expected to praise the new CPSU Program as a document of "international significance," and reiterate its support for: (1) the general line initiated at the XX CPSU Congress; (2) the attacks on the "cult of personality" and the "antiparty group"; and (3) Khrushchev's analysis of the international situation, including his conception of peaceful coexistence, his stress on general and complete disarmament, and his specific policy proposals. Probably most important, each foreign delegation was expected to uphold Khrushchev's unprecedented attack on the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor ( A P L ) . 3.

CHOU E N - L A I , VICE-CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL C O M M I T TEE OF THE C O M M U N I S T PARTY OF CHINA AND M E M B E R OF THE POLITBURO OF THE C P C

CENTRAL

COMMITTEE.

SPEECH AT THE X X I I C P S U CONGRESS, OCTOBER 1 9 ,

Pravda,

1961.

October 20, 1961. 3

Vice-Chairman Chou En-lai was the first foreign speaker to address the Congress. His speech failed to mention the XX Congress, the attack on Stalin, and the "antiparty group." His bitter attack on the Kennedy administration was in sharp contrast to Khrushchev's plea for "businesslike" relations with the United States. Most important, Chou En-lai openly questioned Khrushchev's attack on the leaders of the APL. DEAR COMRADES! The delegation of the Communist Party of China considers it a great honor to be present, by invitation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, at the X X I I Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. On behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and in the name of all members of the Communist Party of China and of the Chinese people as a whole, let me convey to this Congress, and through the Congress to the great Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the great Soviet people, the wannest fraternal congratulations and expressions of the highest respect. (Applause.) ' Translation from Current Soviet Policies IV, pp. 127-29.

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We wholeheartedly wish the XXII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union success in its work. Since the XXI Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet people, led by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union with Comrade Khrushchev at its head, have scored brilliant victories in the full-scale build(Applause.) ing of communism. We are delighted to see the national economy of the Soviet Union making steady advances. . . . Twice this year the Soviet Union has successfully launched into space manned spaceships, which triumphantly orbited the earth and returned to it. This new exploit in man's conquest of space is still more conclusive evidence that the Soviet Union is leaving the United States further and further behind in major fields of science and technology. It demonstrates strikingly that the socialist system is incomparably superior to the capitalist system. (Applause.) This Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union will adopt a new Party Program which sets forth for the Soviet people a grand plan for the building of communism under the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. . . . This brilliant prospect is a powerful inspiration to all the peoples in their struggles. The Chinese Communists and the Chinese people are certain that under the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet people will score great new victories in their efforts to make a reality of this magnificent plan for the building of communism. (Applause.) Together with the peoples of the other socialist countries, the Soviet people are exerting enormous efforts to uphold world peace, relax international tension, bring about general disarmament, maintain the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, and extend support to the national democratic movement in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. A short while ago the Soviet Union advanced proposals that a German peace treaty be concluded and the situation in West Berlin normalized on that basis. In the face of the serious situation that had re-

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suited from intensification of the arms race and military preparations, the breakdown of the conference on the cessation of nuclear testing, and the rejection of disarmament by the United States, the Soviet Union was forced to take very important steps, such as the resumption of test explosions of nuclear weapons. These proposals and these steps represent important moves to uphold world peace and protect the security of the socialist camp, and to put a stop to imperialist military adventures; they are fully consistent with the interests of the peoples of the whole world. The Chinese people fully support all of these important moves by the Soviet Union aimed at defending world peace. (Applause.) T h e way in which the present international situation is developing fully substantiates the scientific Marxist-Leninist analysis given in the 1960 Statement of representatives of Communist and workers parties. T h e forces of the socialist camp and its international influence are growing very rapidly. The strides in construction in all the countries of the socialist camp are reinforcing the positions of peace and socialism all over the world. The burgeoning national democratic movement in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, supported by the socialist camp, has already become a great force in the struggle against the new and the old colonialism and internal reaction. The class struggle in the capitalist world is becoming ever sharper, the capitalist system is continuing its decline and decay, and the imperialist camp, headed by the United States, is day by day nearer the point of breaking up. This means that the preponderance of the forces of socialism over the forces of imperialism, of the forces of peace over the forces of war, is today becoming more and more apparent in the world arena. The correlation of forces in the world has created a situation that is extremely favorable for the people's struggle for universal peace, national liberation, democracy, and socialism. (Applause.) T h e struggle of the peoples of the socialist countries for the cause of revolution and construction, the revolutionary struggle of the peoples of the capitalist countries, the liberation move-

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ment of oppressed nations, and the general democratic movement and struggle of the masses for peace all over the world are today flowing together into a common stream which is undermining and demolishing the imperialist system. The Cuban revolution is advancing with giant strides and successfully parrying the aggressive and interventionist intrigues of the United States. The Laotian people, despite U.S. interference, have won tremendous victories in the struggle to uphold their independence and neutrality. The peoples of the southern part of Vietnam and the southern part of Korea are engaged in a selfless struggle for the peaceful unification of their countries. The Algerian people are steadily gaining strength in the struggle for their independence. The peoples of the Congo, Angola, and Cameroon and other African peoples still being oppressed by the new and the old colonialism have engaged colonialism in fierce combat, seeking to smash its chains. In Japan and Brazil, everywhere the fiendish grip of American imperialism extends, the patriotic struggle of the peoples against that imperialism, their struggle to uphold national independence, is building up. In the principal capitalist countries the masses of workers and peasants are waging a struggle against oppression, a struggle to win and defend democratic rights and to improve their living conditions. The struggle of the masses to defend world peace is spreading to every corner of the globe. No matter how savagely the imperialists and reactionaries of various countries may behave, and no matter how tortuous the path of struggle may be, the oppressed nations and peoples, encountering support from the socialist camp, are certain to win out over imperialism; the forces of peace, with the socialist camp and the international working class as their nucleus, are certain to win out over the forces of war. Inevitable doom awaits the imperialists and all reactionaries. (Applause.) As the Statement of the Moscow Conference points out, however, as long as imperialism lasts, the soil for aggressive wars will remain. The worst enemy of peace is American imperialism. It is the bulwark of present-day colonialism and international reaction, the prime force of aggression and war. The whole world

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sees today that the Kennedy administration is even more insidious and adventurous. Seeking to make itself more attractive with an "olive branch," it spouts "peace," "progress," and "the prosperity of mankind," while under the cloak of "peace" it is actually making even more frenzied efforts in the arms race and in preparing for war. This administration has been the direct organizer of an attack on Cuba and has provoked civil war in Laos, and it is preventing the reaching of an agreement at the Geneva conference. It is this administration which, making use of the so-called Berlin crisis, is raising a frantic war clamor and threatening war, incessantly engineering military provocations in Berlin, Cuba, Laos, South Vietnam, and South Korea, and on territory belonging to our country—Taiwan. It is this administration which is appropriating the largest sums the United States has ever spent for military purposes in time of peace, which is making intensive preparations for local wars and nuclear war against the peoples of the whole world. The face of American imperialism as the common enemy of the peoples of the whole world has been completely exposed. All the actions of American imperialism indicate that we still face the danger of war and that the peoples of all lands must redouble their vigilance. The struggle against imperialist aggression and the defense of the world peace remain, as they have been, a task of extreme urgency for the peoples of all countries. If the socialist camp, the international working class, the national liberation movement, and all peace-loving peoples and states make common cause, form a united front to combat the policy of aggression and war being pursued by the imperialist circles headed by the United States, and wage an unflagging struggle, world peace is certain to be preserved. (Applause.) Our country steadfastly upholds solidarity with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and, together with them, is carrying on an unflagging struggle for world peace and the progress of mankind. We are actively supporting the liberation struggle of oppressed nations and oppressed peoples and resolutely opposing the policy of aggression and war being pursued by the imperialist circles headed by the U.S.A. We stand at all

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times for the peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems on the basis of the Five Principles and are exerting tremendous efforts to achieve it. In recent years China has concluded treaties of friendship or treaties of friendship and nonaggression with many countries of Asia and Africa, including Yemen, Burma, Nepal, Afghanistan, Guinea, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Ghana. The conclusion of these treaties not only strengthens and develops the friendly relations between China and these countries but also makes a useful contribution to the defense of world peace. The Chinese people, under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, and holding high three red banners—the banners of the general line, of the great leap, and of the people's commune—are struggling to turn China into a socialist country with modern industry, modern agriculture, and modern science and culture. We are aware that we are bound to encounter difficulties on the path of our advance. In the past three years our country's agriculture has suffered natural calamities. But no difficulties can daunt the solidly united and tempered Chinese people. We are positive that we shall be able with our own hands, by hard work, to surmount the difficulties and realize our great goal. (Applause.) The Moscow conferences of representatives of Communist and workers parties held in 1957 and 1960 were conferences of great historic importance for the international Communist movement. The 1957 Declaration and the 1960 Statement are the common program of action for the Communist and workers parties. The Declaration and the Statement point out that the solidarity of the socialist camp and of the international Communist movement is the guarantee of victory in the struggle of the peoples of all countries for universal peace, national liberation, democracy, and socialism. Upholding this great solidarity is an internationalist duty for us as Communists. (Applause.) The Declaration and Statement point out that the solidarity of the socialist camp and of the international Communist movement is the nucleus for even broader cohesion on a world-wide

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scale. This solidarity of ours is cemented by common ideals and a common cause. It has been reinforced and developed in the joint struggle against common enemies. It rests on the foundation of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. This solidarity of ours has stood up under testing, and there are no forces capable of undermining it. Our socialist camp of twelve fraternal countries, from the Korean People's Democratic Republic to the German Democratic Republic and from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to the People's Republic of Albania, constitutes a single whole. Our socialist countries and our Communist parties fraternally support and cooperate with one another on the basis of independence and complete equality. We must unite as closely as possible, must cherish our solidarity as the apple of our eye, and on no account permit any statements or actions detrimental to that solidarity. (Applause.) We hold that if, unfortunately, disputes and disagreements have arisen among the fraternal parties and fraternal countries, we should resolve them patiently, being guided by the spirit of proletarian internationalism and by the principles of equality and the achievement of unanimity through consultation. Open unilateral condemnation of a fraternal party does not make for unity, does not help settle issues. Openly exposing disputes between fraternal parties and fraternal countries for enemies to see cannot be regarded as a serious, Marxist-Leninist approach. Such an approach can only pain friends and gladden foes. The Communist Party of China sincerely hopes that the fraternal parties between which the disputes and disagreements exist will reunite on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and on the basis of mutual respect for independence and equality. I think that this is the position that we Communists should take on this question. At present the imperialist circles headed by the United States, using the struggle against communism as a façade, are engaged in aggressive and expansionist activities. American imperialism and the Yugoslav revisionist group are doing all they can to drive a wedge into the progressive forces of the world and to undermine their solidarity. Under the circumstances the solidar-

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ity and unity of the whole socialist camp and of the whole international Communist movement take on supreme importance. In solidarity there is strength. If there is solidarity any difficulty can be surmounted. In the face of the solidarity of the forces of world socialism, the solidarity of oppressed nations and peoples and of the peace-loving peoples and states of the whole world, the mad designs of the imperialists and their stooges are all sure to founder. (Applause.) Between the peoples of China and the Soviet Union there is a deep friendship of long standing. Both in revolution and in construction our people have received and are continuing to receive support and assistance from the Soviet people and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, for which we here once more tender sincere thanks. (Applause.) Both in the building of socialism and communism and in the struggle against imperialist aggression and for world peace, the peoples of our two countries and the peoples of the other socialist countries have always rendered each other assistance, cooperated with one another, waged a joint struggle, and advanced shoulder to shoulder. This great solidarity and friendship between the peoples of our two countries will live forever, even as the Yangtze and the Volga will flow eternally. (Applause.) Let me now read a message of greetings to the Congress from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, signed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. (Applause.) "To the XXII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. "Dear Comrades! The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in the name of all members of the Communist Party of China and the entire Chinese people sends to the XXII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union warm fraternal congratulations and conveys sincere feelings of respect to the great Communist Party of the Soviet Union and to the great Soviet people. "In the time since the XXI Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet people, under the leadership of

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the Central Committee of the CPSU headed by Comrade Khrushchev, have achieved brilliant successes in the extensive building of communism. "Industry and agriculture in the Soviet Union have undergone enormous development. The material and cultural level of the life of the Soviet people is steadily rising. The amazing flight of two Soviet manned spacecraft into the cosmos and their successful return to earth have made a brilliant contribution to the goal of the subjugation by man of the cosmos. The great achievements of the Soviet people in building communism demonstrate the incomparable superiority of the socialist over the capitalist system. "The new program which is to be adopted at this congress of your party sets forth the Soviet people's grand plan of building communism. We are sure that the Soviet people, under the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, will achicve ever greater victories in the struggle to build communism. (Warm applause.) "The Soviet people have made outstanding contributions to the preservation of world peace, the relaxation of international tensions, the fight for general disarmament, the realization of peaceful coexistence among countries with different social systems, the support for the liberation struggles of the various oppressed nations and peoples, and the strengthening of the might of the socialist camp. (Applause.) "All the achievements that have already been gained and will be gained by the Soviet people under the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union are a source of incalculable inspiration to the peoples of the whole world who are striving for world peace, national liberation, democracy, and socialism. (Applause.) "Close solidarity and friendship have always existed between the CPC and the CPSU and between the peoples of China and of the Soviet Union. This solidarity and friendship, which rest on the foundation of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, are of exceptional importance for the triumph of the common cause of the peoples of the whole world—the strug-

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gle against imperialism, for world peace, and for the progress of mankind. The solidarity and friendship between our two parties and our two peoples have stood up under testing and are eternal and inviolable. (Applause.) "With all our hearts we wish the X X I I Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union success in its work. We wish the Soviet people, led by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, great new strides in the struggle to build communism, uphold world peace, and further the progress of mankind. (A pplause.) "Hail to the great Soviet people! (Applause.) "Hail to the great and glorious Communist Party of the Soviet Union! (Applause.) "Hail to the eternal and inviolable solidarity and friendship of the peoples of China and the Soviet Union! (Applause.) "Hail to the great solidarity of the socialist camp! (Applause.) "Hail to the great solidarity of the peoples of the whole world! (Applause.) "Hail to Marxism-Leninism! (Applause.)—Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, October 14, 1961." (Stormy, prolonged applause. All rise.) According to a New China News Agency (NCNA) dispatch (October 21, 1961), Chou En-lai laid a wreath on Stalin's tomb with the inscription, "To the Great Marxist-Leninist, J. Stalin." (The inscriptions on such wreaths are not usually reported.) Chou En-lai left Moscow to return to China on October 23, while the XXII Congress was still in session. The unusual and presumably demonstrative nature of his return was underscored by the fact that he was met at the Peking airport by Mao Tse-tung and other leading members of the CPC. Most CPSU speakers at the Congress upheld the Soviet line without explicitly referring to Chou's dissent. Some seemed to make oblique reference to Chinese criticism of Soviet policy (e.g., "peaceful coexistence," personal diplomacy) in attacking the "antiparty group" and its "theoretician," Vyacheslav Molotov. Others hinted that the "antiparty group" might have been receiving support from abroad.

The XXII 4.

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ANASTAS

MIKOYAN,

CENTRAL

55

of the CPSU MEMBER

COMMITTEE

OF

C H A I R M A N OF THE U S S R

OF T H E

THE

CPSU

PRESIDIUM AND

COUNCIL OF M I N I S T E R S .

AT T H E X X I I C P S U C O N G R E S S , O C T O B E R 2 0 ,

OF

FIRST

THE VICE-

SPEECH

Pravda,

1961.

October 22, 1961.4 .

COMRADES! T h e

XX

Congress was

a turning

point

in the life of our party and of the entire world C o m m u n i s t m o v e m e n t . T h e political course o f that Congress a n d its theoretical instructions have already produced fine s h o o t s . T h i s has b e e n p r o v e d by the historical experience of the past few years. T h e ideological orientation of the X X C o n g r e s s was not s o m e thing t h a t manifested itself in the space of a day b e f o r e

the

C o n g r e s s or within the few days of its proceedings. It evolved o v e r a span of two years preceding the C o n g r e s s in the p r o c e s s o f c r i t i c a l reexamination of certain ideological principles,

re-

o r g a n i z a t i o n of the practical work of the P a r t y and the state, a n d the elimination o f the harmful c o n s e q u e n c e s o f the cult of the individual. D i s a g r e e m e n t s on basic questions of party policy a n d p r a c tice h a d arisen within the Central C o m m i t t e e in this period. M o l o t o v , K a g a n o v i c h , M a l e n k o v , and V o r o s h i l o v showed c o n s e r v a t i s m in their thinking and proved i n c a p a b l e o f c o r r e c t l y assessing the postwar international and d o m e s t i c situation, of c o m p r e h e n d i n g the new line of conduct that was required of M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t s . T h e y rejected everything n e w and o p p o s e d the theses that were later advanced by the C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e at the X X

Congress of the C P S U . T h e fractionalist

antiparty

g r o u p , o f which M o l o t o v b e c a m e the chief ideologist, was later j o i n e d by Bulganin, Pervukhin, Saburov, and Shepilov. T h e m e m b e r s of the group fiercely resisted the restoration of L e n i n i s t n o r m s of party life and socialist legality and o p p o s e d the elimination of the harmful c o n s e q u e n c e s o f the cult o f the individual, and they also opposed such urgent and vitally e s s e n 4

Translation from Current Soviet Policies IV, pp. 138—44.

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tial measures as the reorganization of planning, especially in agriculture, the development and utilization of virgin lands, etc. These differences with the conservative-dogmatic group were not differences on particular organizational or political points. No, they concerned the shaping of the Party's entire policy at the new stage of historical development, its general line. V. I. Lenin indicated in his day that the reorganization of the Workers and Peasants Inspection proposed in 1923 was not a simple organizational measure, but had a bearing on all our work, our policy, our tactics, our strategy. It was a question at the time of ensuring the victory of socialism in the USSR by maintaining working-class guidance of the peasantry. Under today's conditions it was all the more a question not simply of organizational measures but of evolving a policy that would ensure the successful building of communism in our country and make it possible to prevent a world war. How can the opposition of the conservative-dogmatic group be explained? Above all by the organic attachment of its members to the cult of the individual, which is alien to MarxismLeninism, by their failure to understand that the country was entering a new stage of its development—the period of the fullscale building of communism, that the world socialist system was turning into the dominant factor in the evolution of mankind while the imperialist camp had lost its determining role in international relations. Indeed, just before the X X Congress of the CPSU, Molotov, in a report at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, openly questioned whether a socialist society had been built in the USSR. His statement was: "Along with the Soviet Union, in which the foundations of socialist society have already been built, there are those people's democracies that have taken only the first, but extremely important, steps in the direction of socialism." According to Molotov, it appeared that, first, socialism had not yet been built in the USSR; second, the first steps toward socialism were being taken by only some of the people's democracies; and, third, there were people's democracies in which even these steps had not been taken.

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You yourselves appreciate that with premises like these there could be no thought of a plan for building communism. Influenced by criticism in the Central Committee, Molotov was forced to excuse himself in the pages of the journal Kommunisf, he tried to reduce the issue to one of erroneous formulation. But it was not an erroneous formulation that was involved. If only the foundations of socialism had been built, it was clearly impossible to pose the question of transition to the full-scale building of communism. If only some of the people's democracies had taken the first steps in the direction of socialism, it meant that the world socialist system had not formed and there could be no talk, therefore, of its growing influence on the course of social development. This was a fundamentally wrong, non-Leninist assessment of the lineup of class and political forces in the world of today. T h e result of his underestimating the forces of socialism and consequently overestimating the forces of imperialism was that Molotov made serious mistakes on questions of international development—on peaceful coexistence and the possibility of preventing a world war, and on the multiplicity of the forms of transition to socialism in various countries. In general, Molotov rejects the line of peaceful coexistence, reducing the concept to nothing more than a state of peace, or rather the absence of war at a given moment, and denying the possibility of preventing a world war. In its substance this view approximates that of the foreign adversaries of peaceful coexistence, who interpret it as a variant of the "cold war," as a state of "armed peace." This conception is at odds with the Leninist understanding of relations between the two systems and would have led to repudiating the broad development of economic relations between them and to the curtailment of contacts and cultural ties. Finally, it would to all intents and purposes have meant accepting the inevitability of war and abandoning the active quest for agreements aimed at reducing international tension and at disarmament. It is no accident, therefore, that he should reject

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the historic thesis of the XX Party Congress on the possibility of preventing world war in this age. He disputes the advisability of the personal meetings our party and government leaders have been holding with leaders of the capitalist states, considering them a pure infatuation ascribable to excessive faith in personal contacts and talks. In defiance of this point of view, the Party undertook to broaden contacts between Soviet and foreign state and public organizations and figures. And experience has shown how right the Party was in these moves: I need only refer to the enormous political response to the meetings and speeches abroad of N. S. Khrushchev and other figures and to the great good they have done and continue to do. (Applause.) Despite the differences, neither Molotov nor anyone else at the XX Congress advanced his own particular points of view. They did not contest the political line of the Central Committee and voted along with all the rest. The Central Committee thought that this would put an end to the differences that had existed prior to the Congress. We assumed that unity had been established on the basic points of policy. It turned out afterward, however, that this was far from the case. The stand that Molotov and others had taken at the Congress had been hypocritical. It is now clear that, knowing they would be isolated at the Congress if they came out openly against the new Congress theses advanced by the Central Committee, they chose different tactics for their struggle. These were tactics calculated to keep them from suffering a defeat at the Congress while enabling them at a later, more convenient time to try, using other means, to bring about a revision of the party line. As it turned out, the Congress had ended but the differences remained. But now they concerned the line of the X X Congress, its decisions. A sharp struggle against implementation of the decisions of the XX Congress went on in the Central Committee for over a year. It was a question of whether the Party would take the path the Congress had condemned, the path that had been

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followed in the days of the cult of the individual, or would take the Leninist road. At a time when Comrade Khrushchev and others were busy working creatively to carry the decisions of the Congress into effect, these people were busy with just one thing—creating obstructions, hampering the activity of the Central Committee, winning over supporters from among the members of the Central Committee's Presidium, and knocking together a group, doing it with utmost secrecy. When the Party decided to abolish the industrial ministries and set u p economic councils, and also to reorganize the machine and tractor stations, the fractionalists considered the moment had come for seizing power and changing the Party's policy by a c o u p at the top. They had held their peace at the Congress, but now, at their clandestine meetings, they began to hatch a plot against the Party. And then in June, 1957, the members of the group, having tallied the votes against the party leadership that they could muster from the members of the Central Committee's Presidium, went over to the direct attack. But they miscalculated. T h e plenary session of the Central Committee measured up to Leninist requirements and administered the antiparty oppositionist group a crushing ideological and organizational defeat. (Applause.) T h e group's members made appropriate statements at the plenary session, and afterwards, a year to a year and a half later, wrote letters to the Central Committee in which they acknowledged and condemned their mistakes. Molotov was the only one who did not vote for the resolution of the Central C o m mittee's plenary session or anywhere in any form repudiate his antiparty activity or his views, which had inflicted great harm on the Party. What he had said in the primary organization about agreeing with the decision of the plenary session had been insincere, prompted by tactical considerations. T o this day he clings bullheadedly to his conservative-dogmatic views. T h e Central Committee consistently bases its activity on Leninist norms of party life. This has shown itself in the fact that the fight against the conservative-dogmatic group was waged by the methods of intra-party democracy, without resort to

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repressive state measures, as had been the case under the cult of the individual. But the victory of the antiparty group would have led to reprisals against all the active supporters of the X X Congress, by methods that the Party can never forget. Had we not dealt a crushing ideological defeat to the conservative-dogmatic antiparty group, we should not have been able to carry out the decisions of the X X Congress and score the gigantic gains that have exalted our country and strengthened its might and authority on the world scene and that are ensuring success in the building of communism. (Stormy applause.) The Leninist spirit of innovation and dedication to principle have triumphed, the Leninist orientation has triumphed, the Leninist leadership of the Central Committee, headed by Comrade N. S. Khrushchev, has triumphed. The Party has arrived at its XXII Congress united, monolithic, and strong as never before. (Stormy, prolonged applause.) . . . The Soviet people are building a communist society in the fraternal family of the peoples of the socialist countries. The welding of all the forces of socialism, of all the Communist and workers parties, is the most important factor in our common advance. The Communist and workers parties have placed a high assessment on our party's vanguard role in the international Communist movement and on the importance of the XX Congress. Our party feels the moral support of the fraternal parties in all its work. (Applause.) Unfortunately, this does not apply to the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor. For many years the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor on any and all occasions vowed their friendship with our party and the Soviet people and professed to support the decisions of the XX Congress. But as recent events have shown, these vows and protestations of theirs were insincere. For more than a year now the Albanian leaders, having abruptly altered their political policy, have been waging a fight against the decisions of the X X Congress of the CPSU and attacking our party and its Leninist Central Committee, headed by N. S. Khrushchev, and other Communist parties. The actions of the Albanian leaders indicate

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that they are departing from internationalist positions and backsliding onto the path of nationalism. Where nationalism and alienation from the socialist camp lead to is shown by the experience of Yugoslavia's revisionism, which is being given effect in practice and has found expression in concentrated form in the anti-Leninist Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. It would be worth while for the Albanian leaders to give this some thought. The facts indicate that a deplorable situation has developed in the Albanian Party of Labor. Just how far Hoxha and Shehu have descended can be seen from the fact that they not only failed to publish the draft Program of the CPSU (this is, of course, their internal affair) but presented a distorted account of it in their press. What are we to make of this? Why, even The New York Times, as well as many other bourgeois organs, carried the draft Program in full. Even in Greece, Albania's neighbor, where bourgeois reactionaries are in power, progressive forces managed to have our Program published in a printing that was enormous for that country. But the Albanian people and the Albanian Communists are deprived of an opportunity to read this historic document. The Albanian leaders today see even the publication of the Program of the CPSU as a danger to them. The people have an expression for a situation of this kind: "How far can you go!" Developments are showing that those who persist in revisionism and dogmatism arrive, even though from different directions, at one and the same thing—estrangement from MarxismLeninism and from the socialist camp and the world Communist movement. The Albanian leaders' disagreement with our party's Leninist policy as laid down by the XX Congress is also to be explained by the fact that Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu have long been cultivating in their party practices and methods that are incompatible with Marxism-Leninism. How Mehmet Shehu, for example, interprets the norms of party life is plain from his statement at the recent Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor

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that anyone who disagreed with the leadership on a question would get (and I quote) "a spit in the face, a punch in the mouth, and, if need be, a bullet in the brain." Several prominent figures in the Albanian Party of Labor have only recently been expelled from the Party and subjected to repressive action: Liri Belishova, member of the Politburo, together with her husband, and Mago Como, member of the Central Committee and a government minister (both of them were also deprived of their deputies' credentials), and also Koco Tashko, veteran of the international Communist movement and the oldest member of the Albanian Party of Labor, who has been active since as far back as the Comintern days of the 1930's and who has never had a disagreement with the Party; until recently Enver Hoxha considered him his closest friend. Now he has been expelled from the Party. These people have been victimized merely because they did not wish to leave the tried and tested path of Albanian-Soviet friendship. Albanian seamen who had been studying in our country recently returned home. In talks among themselves they voiced perplexity over what could have caused the sudden deterioration of relations between Albania and the USSR. Many of them landed in prison for this. Albanian students who were studying in our country went home for their vacations, and afterwards many of them were not permitted by the Albanian authorities to continue their studies in the USSR. This naturally caused dissatisfaction among them, and again many of the malcontents were subject to repressive action. On the one hand, the Albanian leaders persecute those who want to maintain friendship between our parties and peoples, and on the other hand they hold a Soviet-Albanian friendship month to deceive their people. This was in September. It will be said that these are their internal affairs and must not be interfered in. But after all, the persecution and acts of repression are directed against Albanians who uphold the traditional friendship with the Soviet Union. And this is something

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that dircctly concerns us; we cannot remain indifferent in the matter, and are obliged to state our opinion. The Albanian leaders are now extolling the cult of Stalin and seeking to use his name as a cover-up for actions that are incompatible with Leninism. Can anyone really think that friendship between us is possible on the "basis'"—if 1 may be excused for using the term—on which the Albanian leaders are now operating? No, they have to understand clearly that only by renouncing this course and taking positions that are mandatory for Communist parties can they count on the friendship of the party of Lenin—the friendship of the Soviet people. This is the only way it can be! (Stormy, prolonged applause.) . . . Comrades, problems of foreign policy have occupied and will continue to occupy an important place in our party's activities. These problems cannot be separated from our domestic policy. What counts most for us is to ensure peaceful conditions for the building of a communist society. . . . 5.

MIKHAIL

SUSLOV, SECRETARY OF THE C E N T R A L

T E E O F THE C P S U . S P E E C H AT THE X X I I C P S U

COMMITCONGRESS,

OCTOBER 21, 1961. Pravda, October 23, 1961. 5 . . . IN THE CONDITIONS of warm approval of the draft Program by the working people of all countries, attention is drawn to the fact that in Albania the draft Program was published in abridged and distorted form. A distorted idea of the CPSU's position on a number of fundamental questions has thereby been created. This unfriendly act of the Albanian leaders is no accident. Inflating in every way the cult of the individual in their party and country and grossly violating Leninist norms of party life, they do not wish to reconcile themselves to the course being carried out by our party of overcoming the harmful consequences of the cult of the individual and restoring revolutionary legality. Today matters have reached a point in AI* Translation from Current

Soviet Policies IV, pp. 144—47.

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bania where people who advocate preservation of friendship with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries are dismissed from their posts and subjected to repressions. Yet only two years ago, at the X X I CPSU Congress, Enver Hoxha, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor, expressed to our Communist Party, the Soviet people and the Soviet government, and to Comrade N. S. Khrushchev personally, "the deepest gratitude for all they have done and are doing for the good and happiness of the small Albanian nation." How far have the Albanian leaders now departed from this, in defaming our party and its leadership in every way! At the same time, in their press they still hypocritically continue to paint a picture of friendship, trading on the good feelings of the Albanian people for the Soviet Union and our party. Now the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor's Central Committee have sent a letter. This letter, comrades, is a mixture of hypocrisy and slanderous insinuations. Permit me to tell the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor: We are well aware where friendship is, and where hypocrisy. (Applause.) Do the leaders of Albania realize what harm they are doing above all to the cause of the building of socialism in their country by undermining the foundation of friendship with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and with the Soviet people and opposing themselves to the other fraternal parties on major questions of our times? Communist internationalists cannot but be alarmed by the position taken by the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor. . . . Comrades . . . The experience of the Soviet Union and of the other socialist countries and of the entire international revolutionary movement shows that the road to socialism is only through socialist revolution and dictatorship of the proletariat." The preachings of the reformists and revisionists regarding other roads to socialism of one sort or another are deception of the "Following the wording adopted in the 1960 Statement, the stenographic report of the proceedings of the XXII Congress ("signed to press" December 14, 1961) reads: ". . . dictatorship of the proletariat in one form or another."

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working people. Also anti-Marxist is the conception of the Yugoslav revisionists, who demand a withering away of the socialist state almost immediately after the victory of the proletarian revolution, which would disarm the proletariat in the face of its foreign and internal enemies and undermine its victory. However, the working class is the only class in history that is not trying to perpetuate its political supremacy. It uses its dictatorship only to accomplish the tasks of building socialism. The dictatorship of the proletariat is, consequently, a historically transient political institution linked with the accomplishment of definite historically conditioned tasks. After fulfilling its historical mission, it develops into a state of the entire people in which the working class, as the most advanced, organized force in Soviet society, continues to perform its leading role until classes disappear. The process of the withering away of the socialist state that is already under way cannot, however, be understood as a transformation of the state into nothing. Communist society is not an anarchically formless and unorganized mass of people—as the ideologists of imperialism frequently write of it—but a highly organized and harmonious commonwealth of people of ¡abor, distinguished for lofty communist awareness of their public duty and high discipline. . . . During the following week of the Congress considerable interest was aroused by further comments of leading party officials on "abuses of the era of the personality cult" and on views and actions attributed to Molotov and others in the "antiparty group." Thus Leonid llyichev, Pavel Satiukov, Aleksandr Shelepin, and Nikolai Shvernik discussed the use of the Kirov murder by Stalin, Molotov, and Kaganovich as a pretext for purges, their personal responsibility for the liquidation of army and party leaders in the 1930's, Malenkov's involvement in the so-called Armenian and Leningrad affairs, and Stalin's liquidation of Voznesensky in 1949. Some of the same speakers, as well as Aleksei Adzhubei, commented on the "fractional" activities of Molotov and hinted at unamed foreign Communists who sympathized with his views. T w o incidents invited special attention. According to llyichev, Molotov had sent an article reflecting "dogmatic" views o n politics, economics, and ideology to the party journal, Kommunist; the date

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of submission, April 18, 1960, w a s of significance b e c a u s e it coincided with the launching of the explicit Chinese C o m m u n i s t press c a m p a i g n against the Khrushchev line." Satiukov provided s o m e information o n the letter M o l o t o v had dispatched to the Central C o m m i t t e e in October, 1 9 6 1 — j u s t prior to the C o n g r e s s — i n which he attacked the C P S U Draft P r o g r a m as revisionist and pacifist, and reportedly denied that Lenin had ever subscribed to "peaceful c o existence."

6 . PETR POSPELOV, DIRECTOR OF THE C P S U CENTRAL C O M MITTEE INSTITUTE OF MARXISM-LENINISM. SPEECH AT THE X X I I C P S U CONGRESS, OCTOBER

26, 1961. Pravda, October

28, 1961.8

. . AND at this greatest turning point in history there have appeared miserable renegades, falsely calling themselves Marxists, who are trying to oppose our Program with antiLeninist, unworthy, and slanderous attacks. These are the Albanian leaders and the chief ideologist of the schismatic antiparty group, Molotov. The antiparty attacks by Molotov against our Program have already been discussed yesterday and today. I would like to dwell on this matter in somewhat more detail. It is known that at the X X Congress Molotov voted for all the decisions of the Congress. Later, however, he took the course of revising and denying these decisions, approved not only by our party but also by the highly authoritative conferences of the fraternal parties in 1957 and 1960. Molotov, showing himself to be an unprincipled doubledealer, began opposing not only condemnation of the Stalin cult —not only the Party's policy of eliminating the consequences of the cult of the individual and developing socialist democracy; * For details on the "Long Live Leninism" series, see G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, and Roderick MacFarquhar (eds.). The Sino-Soviet Dispute ( N e w York: Praeger. 1961), pp. 73-122; and Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961 (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1962), pp. 299-318. " Translation from Current Soviet Policies IV, pp. 182-84.

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Molo.ov opposed the major fundamental proposition of the X X Party Congress concerning the possibility of averting a new world war in the present epoch. New Molotov makes a declaration that is monstrous in its absurdity and hostility to the entire course of the Party. He lashes out at the following major thesis of the concluding part of the Program: "When the Soviet people enjoy the blessings of communism, new hundreds and millions of people on earth will say: 'We are for communism!' It is not through war with countries but by the example of a more perfect organization of society, by the flowering of productive forces, the creation of all the conditions for the happiness and well-being of man, that the ideas of communism are winning the minds and hearts of the masses." Molotov slanderously asserts that this proposition of the Program is in deep conflict with the revolutionary essence of Marxist-Leninist teaching. Actually, Molotov only demonstrates his own departure from Leninism, or else his ignorance, his failure to understand the fundamentals of Leninist revolutionary theory and the Leninist method. He especially dislikes the way the Program poses the question of the winning over of new hundreds upon hundreds of millions of people to the side of communism "not through war with other countries but by the example of a more perfect organization of society." It turns out, according to Molotov, that it is precisely through war that we must win over hundreds of millions of people to the side of communism! But this is precisely what our enemies want to impute to us; it is the same "big lie" about the Soviet Union's supposed intentions of promoting the spread of communism to other countries by means of war, rather than by example, that is heard in imperialist propaganda. In opposing the basic propositions of our Program, based on the major instructions of Vladimir llyich Lenin, Molotov is opposing Lenin and breaking with the great Leninist teaching. Permit me to remind you of Lenin's programmatic instructions, valid for many decades, concerning the question of peace-

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ful coexistence and concerning the fact that socialism has the force of example and will exert its chief influence on the development of the international revolution, on the minds and hearts of peoples of a country, through the successes of its economic construction. Even the first Soviet Decree on Peace contained a powerful appeal to the peoples to put an end to the imperialist war and laid the basis for the peace-loving foreign policy of the socialist state. But there is, after all, a limit to the patience and generosity of the Party. Surely our great party cannot tolerate in its ranks renegades and schismatics who impudently oppose the major propositions of Leninism, the Leninist course of our party, and the great new Program of our party, this now generally recognized Manifesto of the Communist Party of our epoch. Many delegates to the Congress were right in saying that Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich cannot be members of our great Leninist party. There is no doubt that the XXII Congress will unanimously approve the proposal of a number of delegations to exclude these schismatics and fractionalists from the Party's ranks. (Applause.) They should be held responsible both for their criminal actions during the period of the Stalin cult and for the attempt to counterpose their own antiparty, anti-Leninist line, dangerous and harmful to the cause of communism, to the Party's Leninist course. . . I would like to say a few words about the behavior of the Albanian leaders. On behalf of the Central Committee, Comrade Andropov and I attended the Fourth Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor as members of our delegation. The Congress made a painful impression both on us and on the delegations of the fraternal parties. The Congress became a rowdy, noisy, importunate demonstration of the cult of the individual, alien to Marxism-Leninism, a demonstration of incredible self-adulation of the Albanian Party of Labor, which supposedly never had made and never would make any mistakes. Yet all Marxist-Leninists should have known Lenin's words on this question: "What applies to individuals applies, with corre-

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sponding adjustments, to policy and parties. He is not wise who makes no mistakes. There are and can be no such people. He is wise who makes mistakes that are not very drastic and who knows how to rectify them easily and quickly." (Applause.) The Albanian leaders are slipping more and more toward the most thoroughgoing nationalism, grossly trampling upon the principles of proletarian internationalism and friendship of peoples, and departing more and more from Leninism. Our party has patiently done everything to facilitate the Albanian leaders' return to the path of party spirit and party friendship with the CPSU. For example, during the last congress of the Albanian Party of Labor we encountered a number of glaring instances of direct anti-Soviet attacks by prominent Albanian officials, instances of a humiliating, hostile attitude toward our specialists, geologists, and Soviet seamen. On behalf of the Central Committee, we handed the Albanian leaders the following protest and warning on February 20, 1961: "The Central Committee of our party considers that such instances not only impede the development and strengthening of Albanian-Soviet friendship but also run counter to the interests of the entire socialist camp." "If these abnormal phenomena are not stopped in good time, they may entail highly serious consequences," our statement said. Do you think this warning brought the Albanian leaders to their senses? No, after this they further intensified their behind-the-scenes anti-Leninist activity, hostile to the Soviet Union, at the same time hypocritically declaring their alleged friendship with the Soviet people and the CPSU. At the X X I I Congress this hypocritical, double-dealing position of the Albanian leaders was rightly condemned by our party and representatives of the fraternal parties who spoke from this rostrum. (Applause.) We hope that the Albanian Communists and the Albanian people will draw the appropriate conclusions from this fact and will in the end understand into what a dangerous antirevolutionary swamp they are being dragged by the misguided Albanian leaders. . . .

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7. O T T O KUUSINEN, SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE OCTOBER

CPSU. SPEECH AT 26, 1961. Pravda,

THE X X I I CPSU CONGRESS, 9 October 27, 1961.

. . . IN THE COURSE of my long life I have many times had the opportunity to participate in the Party's struggle against various kinds of opposition factions—Trotskyites, Zinovievites, Bukharinites, and others. Usually each of these factions began the struggle against the Party by proclaiming political differences. But it soon became clcar that the main thing for them was not political arguments but seizing power. They always placed their own personal ambition and striving for power above the cause of the working class, the cause of socialism and communism. This feature was also characteristic of the latest antiparty group. Of course, the members of this group also had political motives for their fractionalist activity. They opposed everything new and creative in the Party's policy, they were against eliminating the consequences of the cult of the individual, and so on. In general they rebelled against the Leninist line of the party leadership. But even at the very beginning it came to light that the chief aspiration of this group was to remove Comrade Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, continuer of the cause of Lenin, from the Presidium of the Central Committee and to take full leadership into their own hands.

The fractionalists of 1957, as distinguished from the previous antiparty groups, did not even have any written political platform. Molotov apparently noticed this "omission" only later. This is why he has recently engaged in writing notes that unscrupulously distort the Leninist line of the Party's Central Committee and basely slander the political position of Comrade Khrushchev. In essence, Molotov is trying to concoct a kind of sectarian platform for his further antiparty profiteering. He apparently has decided to stir up the waters in order to try later on to catch a fish in these muddy waters. Perhaps the bait will • Translation from Current Soviet Policies IV, pp. 179-80.

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be swallowed by some bony sprat (laughter), if not here in home reservoirs, then at least somewhere in foreign waters. (Stir in the hall. Laughter.) It seems to me—and I think that you too, comrade delegates, are of the same opinion—that our Leninist party has no need for such an incorrigible and malicious political profiteer in its ranks. (Applause.) • . . 8.

NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV. CONCLUDING R E M A R K S AT T H E CPSU

CONGRESS, OCTOBER

XXII

27, 1961. Pravda, October 29,

1961. 10 After extolling the "monolithic solidarity" of the world Communist movement—ostensibly demonstrated by the speeches of foreign Communists at the Congress—Khrushchev reiterated his views on foreign policy, "peaceful coexistence," and the shift in the balance of power in favor of the "socialist camp." P E O P L E attack us, accusing us of oversimplifying or softening the picture when in assessing the international situation we underline the need for peaceful coexistence in presentday circumstances. We are told that those who lay stress on peaceful coexistence somehow underestimate the nature of imperialism and even end up contradicting Lenin's assessment of imperialism. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin's classical definition of imperialism is well known. This definition of Lenin's discloses the reactionary and aggressive nature of imperialism as the final stage of capitalism. Imperialism is inseparably linked with wars, with the struggle for the division and redivision of the world, for enslaving people and bringing them under the rule of monopoly capital. It is capable of any adventurous undertaking. This appraisal of the nature of imperialism retains full validity today. Far from disavowing it, our party reaffirms it and is guided bv it in all its policy, in its working out of the strategy and tactics of revolutionary struggle. This is impressively shown in the draft of our party's new Program. At the same time the SOME

10

Translation from Current Soviet Policies IV, pp. 194-200.

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Party is obliged, if it hews to creative Marxism, to take into account the great changes that have occurred in the world since Lenin gave his analysis of imperialism. We are living through a period in which there are two world systems, a period in which the world socialist system is developing rapidly. The time is not far off when it will surpass the world capitalist system in the production of material wealth. As for science and culture, the countries in the world socialist system have already greatly surpassed the capitalist countries in a number of fields. At present the world socialist system is mightier than the imperialist countries militarily as well. This being the case, it cannot be maintained that nothing has happened, that nothing has changed in the world in the past few decades. Only people who are out of touch with life, who are blind to the great changes that have occurred in the balance of forces in the world arena, can maintain this. It is a fact that the essence of imperialism, its aggressive nature, has not changed. But the possibilities open to it today are no longer what they were in the period when it exercised undivided sway. The situation today is such that imperialism cannot dictate its will to all, or pursue its aggressive policy unimpeded. Under present circumstances the principle of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems assumes vital importance. The only people who fail to see this are the hopeless dogmatists who, having learned by rote general formulas on imperialism, stubbornly turn away from life. This continues to be the position of the diehard Molotov. He and his like fail to appreciate the changes in the world situation, the new developments in life. They have not kept up with the times and have long since become a drag, a needless burden. (Applause.) . . . Comrades! The Central Committee's report and also speeches by delegates to the Congress have referred to the erroneous position of the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor, who have taken the path of combating the line of our party's X X Con-

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gress and undermining the foundations of friendship with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The representatives of the fraternal parties have declared in their speeches that they share our alarm over the state of affairs in the Albanian Party of Labor and roundly condemn the dangerous actions of its leaders, which are prejudicing the fundamental interests of the Albanian people and the solidarity of the entire socialist commonwealth. The speeches by delegates and by representatives of the fraternal parties are convincing evidence that our party's Central Committee was absolutely correct in reporting to the Congress, openly and as a matter of principle, on the abnormal state of Soviet-Albanian relations. We were obliged to do this because our repeated attempts to normalize relations with the Albanian Party of Labor have unfortunately borne no fruit. I should like to emphasize that the Central Committee of our party has shown a maximum of patience and has done everything in its power to restore good relations between our parties. T h e members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU have tried time and again to get together with the Albanian leaders and discuss the issues that have arisen. Back in August, 1960, we twice proposed a meeting to the Albanian leaders but they avoided it. They were equally persistent in declining to have talks with us at the time of the Moscow Conference of fraternal parties in November, 1960. When, at the insistence of the Central Committee of the CPSU, such a meeting did take place, Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu disrupted it and moved on to actions that can only be described as provocative. The leaders of the Albanian Party of L a b o r made a deliberate show of walking out on the November conference, indicating their refusal to defer to the collective opinion of the fraternal parties. T o our subsequent suggestions that we meet, exchange views, and resolve our differences they again responded with a rude refusal, and they stepped up their campaign of attacks and slander against our party and its Central Committee. There are no expedients that the leaders of the Albanian

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Party of Labor shrink from using in their efforts to hide from their people the truth about what our party and people are doing. Albania is the only country in the socialist camp in which the draft Program of the CPSU was not published in full. The Albanian press carried only sections of the draft, deliberately creating a distorted impression of our party's activities. This fact speaks for itself. After all, even communism's adversaries were unable to pass over our Program in silence. We can understand why the Albanian leaders are concealing the CPSU Program from their party and people. They fear the truth like the plague. The Party Program is something sacred for us, our lodestone in the building of communism. H a d they published it in full the working people of Albania would have been able to tell truth from slander, would have seen that all our party's activities, all its plans accord with the vital interests of the peoples, including the interests of the Albanian people, who are friendly to us. (Prolonged applause.) O u r great party has more than once been subjected to bitter and filthy attacks from open and covert enemies of communism. But it must be said outright that we do not recall an instance in which anyone shifted with such dizzying speed from protestations and vows of eternal friendship to unbridled anti-Soviet slander as the Albanian leaders have done. Presumably they expect in this way to lay the groundwork for earning handouts from the imperialists. The imperialists are always willing to pay thirty pieces of silver to those who cause a split in the ranks of the Communists. But pieces of silver have never brought anyone anything but dishonor and shame. (Applause.) Clearly, the Central Committee of our party could not fail to tell the Congress the whole truth about the reprehensible stand taken by the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor. H a d we not done so, they would have gone on claiming that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was afraid to let the Party know of its differences with the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor. Our party and the

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Soviet people should know how the Albanian leaders have been acting. And let the Congress, which is empowered to speak for the whole Party, state its attitude on this matter, pronounce its authoritative opinion. It has been emphasized at our Congress that we are prepared to normalize relations with the Albanian Party of L a b o r on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles. H o w have the Albanian leaders responded to this? T h e y have lashed out at our party and its Central Committee with a blatant, mud-slinging statement. Comrade Chou En-lai, head of the delegation of the Communist Party of China, voiced concern in his speech over our having openly raised the issue of Albanian-Soviet relations at the Congress. As far as we can see, his statement primarily reflects alarm lest the present state of our relations with the Albanian Party of L a b o r affect the solidarity of the socialist camp. We share the anxiety of our Chinese friends and appreciate their concern for the strengthening of unity. If the Chinese comrades wish to apply their efforts to normalizing the Albanian Party of Labor's relations with the fraternal parties, it is doubtful whether there is anyone better able to facilitate accomplishment of this purpose than the Communist Party of China. This would really redound to the benefit of the Albanian Party of Labor and accord with the interests of the entire commonwealth of socialist countries. (Prolonged applause.) It is true, of course, that Communists should so f r a m e their interparty relations as not to provide the enemy with the slightest opening. But unfortunately the Albanian leaders have grossly flouted this requirement. F o r a long time now they have been openly attacking the line of the X X Congress, providing the bourgeois press with food for all sorts of speculation. It is they, the Albanian leaders, who have been shouting from the rooftops about having a position of their own, views of their own that differ from the views of our party and the other fraternal parties. This showed clearly at the Fourth Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor, and has been particularly clear of late.

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Why did the Albanian leaders launch a campaign against the decisions of our party's X X Congress? What treason d o they see in them? Above all, the resolute condemnation of the Stalin cult and its harmful consequences is not to the liking of the Albanian leaders. They are displeased that we should have resolutely denounced the arbitrary rule, the abuse of power from which many innocent people suffered, among them eminent representatives of the old guard who had been with Lenin in building the world's first proletarian state. T h e Albanian leaders cannot refer without vexation and rancor to the fact that we have put an end for good to the situation where one man at his own pleasure arbitrarily decided all-important questions relating to the life of our party and country. (Prolonged applause. ) Stalin is no longer among the living, but we have thought it necessary to denounce the disgraceful methods of leadership that flourished in the setting of the Stalin cult. Our party is doing everything possible to prevent phenomena of this sort from ever again recurring. One would have supposed that the Leninist line of the X X Party Congress, which was supported by the fraternal parties, would have met with support from the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor too, since the cult of the individual is incompatible with Marxism-Leninism. Actually, the Albanian leaders heaped encomiums on the Stalin cult and launched a violent campaign against the decisions of the X X Party Congress, in an effort to make the socialist countries swerve from this sound course. This, naturally, was no accident. All that was reprehensible in our country in the period of the cult of the individual is manifested in its worst form in the Albanian Party of Labor. It is now an open secret that the Albanian leaders remain in power by resorting to force and arbitrary rule. F o r a long time now there has existed in the Albanian Party of Labor an abnormal, evil situation in which any person ob-

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jectionable to the leadership is liable to meet with cruel persecution. Where today are the Albanian Communists who built the Party, who fought the Italian and German fascist invaders? Nearly all of them are victims of the bloody misdeeds of Mehmet Shehu and Enver Hoxha. T h e Central Committee of the CPSU has received more than one letter from Albanian Communists appealing to us to restrain the Albanian leaders from dealing savagely with the finest sons and daughters of the Albanian Party of L a b o r . The delegates to the Congress can form their own idea of the Albanian leaders' moral complexion by having a look at some of these letters. T h e Albanian leaders reproach us with meddling in the internal affairs of the Albanian Party of Labor. I should like to tell you what form this so-called meddling took. A few years ago the Central Committee of the CPSU interceded with the Albanian leaders over the fate of Liri Gega, a former member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor, who had been sentenced to death along with her husband. This woman had for a number of years been a member of leading bodies of the Albanian Party of L a b o r and had taken part in the Albanian people's struggle for liberation. In approaching the Albanian leaders at the time, we were guided by considerations of humanity, by anxiety to prevent the shooting of a woman, and a pregnant woman at that. We felt and still feel that as a fraternal party we had a right to state our opinion in the matter. After all, even in the blackest days of rampant reaction, the tsarist satraps, who tortured revolutionaries, scrupled to execute pregnant women. And here, in a socialist country, they had sentenced to death and they executed a woman who was about to become a mother; they had shown altogether unwarranted cruelty. (Stir in the hall. Shouts of "Shame! Shame!") People of integrity today incur punishment in Albania just for daring to come out for Soviet-Albanian friendship, which

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the Albanian leaders are fond of talking about in such highsounding and florid terms. Comrades Liri Belishova and Koco Tashko, prominent figures in the Albanian Party of Labor, were not only expelled from the Party's Central Committee but are now being called enemies of the Party and the people. And all this merely because Liri Belishova and Koco Tashko had the courage honestly and openly to voice their disagreement with the policy of the Albanian leaders and took a stand for Albanian solidarity with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. People who today advocate friendship with the Soviet Union, with the CPSU, are regarded by the Albanian leaders as enemies. How is all this to be squared with the vows and protestations of friendly feelings for the CPSU and the Soviet Union that have been heard from Shehu and Hoxha? It is obvious that all their spouting about friendship is nothing but hypocrisy and deception. This is the atmosphere that prevails in the Albanian Party of Labor, and this is why the Albanian leaders oppose the Leninist line of the XX Party Congress. After all, to put an end to the cult of the individual would in effect mean that Shehu, Hoxha, and others would have to give up their key positions in the Party and government. And this they do not want to do. But we are certain the time will come when the Albanian Communists and the Albanian people will have their say, and then the Albanian leaders will have to answer for the harm they have done their country, their people, and the cause of socialist construction in Albania. (Stormy, prolonged applause.) Comrades! Our party will continue to combat revisionists of all shades as it has in the past. Steadfastly conforming to the principles of the Declaration and the Statement of the conferences of Marxist-Leninist parties, we have exposed and shall continue unremittingly to expose the revisionism that has found expression in the Program of the Yugoslav League of Communists. We shall also constantly combat dogmatism and all other deviations from Marxism-Leninism. (Applause.) . . .

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Returning to his attack on the "antiparty group," Khrushchev charged it with having opposed the exposure of the "personality cult." Providing some details about the group's alleged activities and plans in 1957, he went on to link it with repressions carried out under Stalin. In this connection he supplied some information suggesting Stalin's and N K V D complicity in the assassination of Sergei Kirov in 1934, and Stalin's willingness to use documents forged by the Gestapo against leading Red Army commanders. Finally, Khrushchev proposed the erection of a monument in memory of innocent Communists victimized during the era of the "personality cult."

I would like to say a few words about the following question. In many speeches at the Congress, and not infrequently in our press as well, when mention is made of the activity of our party's Central Committee a certain special emphasis is placed on me personally, and my role in carrying out major party and government measures is underlined. I understand the kind feelings guiding these comrades. Allow me, however, to emphasize emphatically that everything that is said about me should be said about the Central Committee of our Leninist party and about the Presidium of the Central Committee. (Stormy, prolonged applause.) Not one m a j o r measure, not one responsible pronouncement has been carried out upon anyone's personal directive; they have all been the result of collective deliberation and collective decision. (Stormy applause.) And this concluding speech, too, has been considered and approved by the executive collective. (Prolonged applause.) O u r great strength, comrades, lies in collective leadership, in collegial decisions on all questions of principle. (Stormy applause.) . . . Here at the Congress much has been said, for instance, about the furious energy displayed by the antiparty fractionalists Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, and others against the Leninist Party Central Committee and against me personally. Speaking against the course set forth by the X X Congress, the schismatics concentrated their main fire against Khrushchev, who did not suit them. Why against Khrushchev? Well, because Khrushchev had been promoted by the will of the Party to the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee. The fractionalists badly

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miscalculated. The Party smashed them both ideologically and organizationally. (Stormy applause.) The Central Committee of our party has displayed an exceptionally high political maturity and a truly Leninist understanding of the situation. It is characteristic that literally not one member or candidate member of the Central Committee and not one member of the Inspection Commission supported the miserable handful of schismatics. (Prolonged applause.) While resolutely pronouncing themselves opposed to all the disgusting phenomena of the cult of the individual, MarxistLeninists have always recognized and will continue to recognize the authority of leaders. But it would be incorrect to single out this or that leader, to set him apart from the executive collective or to exalt him inordinately. This is contrary to the principles of Marxism-Leninism. It is known with what impatience Marx, Engels, and Lenin spoke out against those who eulogized their contributions. Yet it is difficult to overestimate the great role of the founders of scientific communism, Marx, Engels, and Lenin, and their contributions to the working class and to all mankind. (Prolonged applause.) Feelings of self-praise and any special emphasis on or excessive exaggeration of the role of individual leaders are utterly alien to true Marxist-Leninists. They find it simply insulting when someone tries obtrusively to set them apart, to isolate them from the executive nucleus of comrades. (Stormy applause.) We Communists highly value and support the authority of correct and mature leadership. We must safeguard the authority of the leaders who are recognized by the Party and the people. But each leader must also understand the other side of the matter—never to plume himself on his position, to remember that in holding this or that post he is merely fulfilling the will of the Party and the will of the people, who may have invested the greatest power in him but never lose control over him. (Applause.) The leader who forgets this pays heavily for his mistake. I would add that he will pay while he is alive; or even after his death the people will not forgive him, as we can see

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from the condemnation of the cult of Stalin. (Applause.) A person who forgets that he is obliged to fulfill the will of the Party and of the people cannot, properly speaking, be called a true leader; there must be no such "leaders" either in the Party or in the state apparatus. (Applause.) Of course, for many reasons great power is concentrated in the hands of the man who holds an executive post. A leader advanced by the Party and the people must not abuse his power. In the reports to the Congress you have heard about the measures that we have implemented and that we shall carry out in order that a revival of the ugly phenomena of the cult of the individual may never recur in the future. But there is one thing that no statutory provision can prescribe: The collective of leaders must thoroughly understand that a situation must not be permitted to arise whereby any authority, even the most deserving one, can cease to heed the opinions of those who have advanced him. (Applause.) It is wrong, comrades, it is simply impossible to permit the inception and development of instances when the merited prestige of an individual may assume forms in which he fancies that everything is permissible to him and that he no longer has need of the collective. In such a case this individual may stop listening to the voices of other comrades who have been advanced to leadership, just as he was, and may begin suppressing them. Our great teacher V. I. Lenin resolutely fought against this, and the Party paid too dear a price for not heeding his wise counsel in good time. So let us be worthy disciples of Lenin in this important matter. (Stormy, prolonged applause.) . . . On the following day, Frol Kozlov delivered his report o n changes in the Rules of the CPSU. H e proceeded to join in the condemnation of the "antiparty group," indicating that at the Congress "facts have been disclosed and set forth attesting that Molotov, Kaganovich, and Malenkov had a hand in the destruction of many altogether innocent people, including prominent party figures and statesmen, and that by their careerist policy and their departure from Marxism-Leninism they contributed to the establishment and flourishing of the cult of the individual.

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"The facts show that even now the organizers of the antiparty croup are still endeavoring to uphold their pernicious views. Molotov has been showing particular zeal in this respect. H e has even gone so far as to describe the new Program of the C P S U as antirevolutionary in spirit. It means nothing to Molotov that in the general discussion of the Program it met with universal approval from the Party and the people and f r o m the fraternal MarxistLeninist parties, or that all honorable people on earth are calling it the Communist Manifesto of our times. This declaration of Molotov's is in effect a challenge to our whole party and to the X X I I Congress of the CPSU, which has given its unanimous approval to the new Program. I share the opinion of the delegates who have spoken here that Molotov, Kaganovich, and Malenkov should be called to strict account before the Party and the people for all their antiparty, criminal acts." As for the APL, Kozlov continued, "the actions of the leaders of the APL, above all Mehmet Shehu and Enver Hoxha, plainly show what can happen when there are relapses into the cult of the individual, when Leninist principles of party leadership are violated and antidemocratic practices are implanted in a party and a country. . . . The pernicious policy of the Albanian leaders may result in divorcing Albania f r o m the socialist camp and isolating the A P L politically in the ranks of the international Communist movement. This kind of anti-Leninist course may at the same time seriously prejudice socialist construction in Albania, construction that has cost that country's heroic people such exertion and labor, and may impair the country's position in the international arena." The XXII CPSU Congress closed on October 31, 1961, after electing a new Central Committee and adopting a number of resolutions. The "Resolution on the Lenin Mausoleum" resolved to "recognize as unsuitable the continued retention in the mausoleum of the sarcophagus with J. V. Stalin's coffin, since the serious violations by Stalin of Lenin's behests, the abuses of power, the mass repressive actions against honest Soviet people, and other actions in the period of the cult of the individual make it impossible to leave the coffin with his body in the V. I. Lenin Mausoleum." The "Resolution on the Central Committee Report" repeated Khrushchev's formulations on foreign and domestic policy. In reference to the A P L the resolution stated: " T h e Congress flatly rejects as unfounded and slanderous the attacks on the CPSU and its Leninist Central Committee by the leaders of the A P L . The actions of the Albanian leaders are at variance with the Declaration and Statement of the 1957 and 1960 conferences of representatives of Communist and workers parties and can only be considered as being divisive,

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aimed at undermining the friendship and solidarity o f the socialist countries, and as playing into the hands o f imperialism. T h e Congress expresses the hope that the Albanian leaders, if they hold the interests of their people dear and really want friendship with the C P S U and with all the fraternal parties, will renounce their erroneous views and return to the path of unity and cooperation with all the socialist countries and with the international Communist m o v e m e n t . " N o mention was made of the C P C ' s support for the leaders o f the A P L . T h e resolution condemned the "antiparty group" but did not call for its expulsion f r o m the C P S U . Speeches o f foreign Communist party representatives at the X X I I C P S U Congress were closely scanned for significant indications o f political orientation regarding such key issues as de-Stalinization, the "antiparty group," the role o f the C P S U in the world Communist m o v e m e n t , a n d — m o s t dramatically—the Albanian crisis. While some speeches permitted doubts to linger concerning their authors' stand, the initial responses of the various parties to the Albanian issue may be summarized as follows. 1 1 ( a ) O f the 6 6 foreign parties whose representatives delivered speeches at the X X I I Congress, the following 2 2 failed to endorse the C P S U ' s condemnation o f the A P L leadership then and there ( a n asterisk indicates those parties which gave such official endorsement during the following y e a r ) : C o m m u n i s t parties of China North K o r e a North Vietnam Indonesia India* United Kingdom * Canada* Algeria* Japan Burma Malava

Dominican Rep. Guadeloupe Martinique* Australia* N e w Zealand Sweden* Norway* Denmark* Iceland* Belgium* Switzerland

T h e other 4 4 parties in varying degrees supported the C P S U line on the A P L . 11 F o r a more detailed breakdown, see William E. Griffith, Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press. 1963). For the text of speeches and messages by foreign delegations, see Privel.stviia XXII S"ezdu KPSS (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1961).

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( b ) Of the remaining Communist parties which conveyed messages of greetings to the Congress, four included condemnations of the A P L leadership ( L u x e m b o u r g , 1 2 San Marino, Nicaragua, and H a i t i ) . T h e failure of the others t o do so may have been due in m a n y instances to the fact that the messages were dispatched before the X X I I Congress opened and hence prior to the Khrushchev attack on the A P L . (This group consisted of the C o m m u n i s t parties of G u a t e m a l a * , Paraguay*, Republic of South A f r i c a * , N o r t h e r n Ireland, Ireland, Honduras, Pakistan, Thailand, Senegal, and two other Burmese groups: the Burmese Workers Party and the People's Comrades Party.) 12

The importance attached, at least by some parties, to the wording of such messages, and hence the importance of reading the "fine print," can be illustrated by a comparison of two versions of the message to the XXII CPSU Congress from the Luxembourg Communist Party. The official text, in the volume of speeches and greetings from foreign parties ("signed to press" on November 28, 1961, pp. 308-9), includes two passages which are not to be found in the equally official text presented at the Congress (and published in Pravda on October 29, 1961). The relevant addition, other than the insertion of a phrase hailing Khrushchev personally as a "courageous fighter for the cause of the working class," reads: "This forward movement of the Soviet people and its Communist Party cannot be hindered by treacherous attacks from the present leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor, directed against the unity of the socialist camp. Against these attacks stand the overwhelming majority of Communists in all countries, including the Communists of Luxembourg."

CHAPTER

II

THE ALBANIAN CRISIS

T h e Soviet-Albanian crisis, brought into the open at the X X I I Congress, had its roots in a variety of earlier tensions. 1 F o u r of these w a r r a n t restatement here: ( 1 ) the Albanian-Yugoslav conflict, reflecting national resentments on both sides, recalling earlier postwar plans f o r Yugoslavia's absorption of Albania, and involving the violently anti-Titoist orientation of Albania's C o m m u n i s t leadership; ( 2 ) the A P L ' s dissent f r o m the policy pursued by the C P S U since 1956 of de-Stalinization and rehabilitation of victims of Stalinism; ( 3 ) the polarization of views on war and peace and on related issues of general strategy at the Bucharest and Moscow conferences of 1960, and the concomitant charges of Sino-Albanian " f r a c t i o n a l i s m " within the world Communist movement; a n d ( 4 ) the increased publicizing of the Albanian-Soviet rift f r o m late 1960 on, as it spread to state relations (including trade and aid) and military cooperation. F u r t h e r evidence on these issues was to be revealed as the conflict unfolded in the wake of the XXII C P S U Congress.

9.

D E C L A R A T I O N OF THE C E N T R A L

C O M M I T T E E OF T H E

AL-

BANIAN PARTY OF LABOR, OCTOBER 2 0 , 1 9 6 1 . R a d i o Tirana, O c t o b e r 2 0 , 1961. AT THE X X I I Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet U n i o n , N . Khrushchev publicly attacked the A l b a n i a n Party of Labor. T h e anti-Marxist calumnies and attacks of N . Khrushchev are of use only to the enemies of c o m m u n i s m and of the A l b a n i a n People's R e p u b l i c — t o the various imperialists and to the Y u g o s l a v revisionists. N . Khrushchev, in revealing to the e n e m i e s the disagreements which have long existed b e t w e e n the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet U n i o n and the 1 For a comprehensive review of the evidence and an interpretation, see William E. Griffith, Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1963).

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Albanian Party of Labor, has brutally violated the Moscow Statement of 1960, which emphasizes that the disagreements arising between fraternal parties must be settled with patience, in the spirit of proletarian internationalism, and on the basis of the principles of equality and mutual consultation. In publicly attacking the Albanian Party of Labor, N. Khrushchev has in effect undertaken an open attack against the unity of the international Communist and workers movement, against the unity of the socialist camp. T h e responsibility for this anti-Marxist act and for all the conscquences which derive from it falls entirely upon N. Khrushchev. T h e Albanian Party of Labor, guided by the interests of the unity of the world Communist movement and of the socialist camp, has endeavored with great patience, from the moment our disagreements with the Soviet line first arose, to settle them in the correct Marxist-Leninist way, by the path designated in the Moscow Statement. N. Khrushchev, however, has chosen the anti-Marxist path of aggravating these disagreements, the path of attacks and slanders, of pressures and threats, the path of public denunciation of our disagreements. The Albanian Party of Labor warmly welcomed the declaration of Comrade Chou En-lai, head of the delegation of the Communist Party of China to the X X I I Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which stated that unilateral criticism and revelation to the enemy of disagreement between fraternal parties cannot be considered a serious and MarxistLeninist attitude. But even after this statement of principle on the part of the representative of the Chinese Communist Party, the most virulent attacks and calumnies continue from the rostrum of the X X I I Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union against the Albanian Party of Labor and the Albanian People's Republic. These attacks have come as much from certain members of the Soviet leadership as from certain leaders of the Communist and workers parties of other countries, who also thus assume a heavy historical responsibility as splitters of the unity of the international Communist and workers movement.

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In these conditions—in the face of the organized anti-Marxist attack by N. Khrushchev and his followers, in the face of these calumnies and inventions which have as their goal the discrediting of our party, in the face of the serious danger to the future destiny of the international Communist and workers movement and of the socialist camp—the Albanian Party of Labor cannot keep silent. By means of supporting facts and documents, it will make known to the entire Communist and workers movement, as well as to world public opinion, where the truth lies, on what side justice is to be found about the relations between the Albanian Party of Labor and the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; it will unmask the anti-Marxist and anti-Albanian activities of N. Khrushchev and his group. The unity of the socialist camp and of the international Communist and workers movement is seriously endangered by the anti-Marxist plots of N. Khrushchev and his followers. In this situation, in order to defend the highest interests of the people and the fatherland and their socialist victories, in order to defend the purity of Marxism-Leninism and the unity of the ranks of the Communist movement and the socialist camp, the Albanian Party of Labor has assumed and will continue to assume with a clean conscience all responsibility for all its actions, both before the international Communist and workers movement and before the Albanian people. The struggle which is imposed upon our party and our people will be long and difficult. But difficulties have never alarmed our party and our people. Our party and our people have been firmly tempered in the struggle against the numerous and continual slanders and attacks and plots of the various imperialists and of the Yugoslav revisionists. They will not waver nor will they be brought to their knees in the face of the slanderous attacks, blackmail, and pressures exerted by N. Khrushchev and his followers. The Party and the people, in a unity of steel, will as always mark out resolutely the path before them and will triumph in taking the correct path, the path of the triumph of Marxism-Leninism and of the cause of socialism and communism. We will gain the victory because we are not alone. With

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us, with the great cause of Marxism-Leninism, stand the Communists and the peoples of the Soviet Union, for whom we feel an indestructible affection and friendship which we will keep intact in our hearts through all storms and tempests; with us are the Communists and the peoples of China; with us are the Communists of the world and the peoples of the other socialist countries. The victorious flag of the Party, the invincible flag of Marxism-Leninism, will always fly proudly over new socialist Albania.

10. ENVER

HOXHA,

PARTY OF

FIRST

LABOR.

O F THE A P L

SECRETARY

SPEECH

OF

MARKING

THE

THE

AND THE F O R T Y - F O U R T H

THE O C T O B E R R E V O L U T I O N , N O V E M B E R

ALBANIAN

ANNIVERSARY

ANNIVERSARY 7,

1961.

Zeri

OF i

Popullit ( T i r a n a ) , November 8, 1961. 2 ALL OUR PEOPLE, young and old, are now joyfully celebrating two wonderful dates: the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the glorious Albanian Party of Labor and the forty-fourth anniversary of the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution. It is not by chance that we celebrate them together. The two outstanding events—the triumph of the Great October Revolution in Russia on November 7, 1917, and the founding of the Albanian Communist Party on November 8, 1941, are closely intertwined in the history of our people; they are two bonds in the historical destiny of our country. . . . In the past our people did not have capable leadership thoroughly determined to lead their fight and struggle success= This speech has appeared in several versions—e.g., as broadcast by Radio Tirana, as published in Albanian on N o v e m b e r 8. as distributed by the Albanian Embassy in Moscow in Russian on N o v e m b e r 22, as released in French by the Albanian Telegraph Agency, and as printed in English by Tirana University. The version reproduced here is a composite prepared after consulting all available texts. Zeri i Popullit is the daily organ of the Central Committee of the Albanian Party o f Labor.

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fully. They found such leadership only in the creation of the Albanian Communist Party (today our A P L ) . (Stormy applause. All rise. Ovation.) . . . In the past our people did not have any strong and loyal support in the international arena, aid and support with which to meet successfully the aggression of the imperialists and to liquidate the great socioeconomic and cultural backwardness to which foreign occupation and the rule of reactionary and exploiting classes had doomed Albania. Our people received such support with the triumph of the Great October Socialist Revolution, with the birth of the first socialist state in the world, the glorious Soviet Union. (Stormy applause.) . . . With the aid of the glorious Soviet army, which smashed the war machine of Nazi Germany in World War II, it became possible to liberate our country from fascist slavery. The aid and unstinting internationalist support of the Soviet Union after the liberation of the country was the decisive external factor which enabled our country to stand as firm as granite against all the plots of the imperialists and their tools, to overcome all difficulties, and to go securely forward on the road to socialism. Here lie the roots of the deep, everlasting, unbroken friendship of our people with the glorious, fraternal peoples of the Soviet Union. (Stormy applause.) . . . Neither the maneuvers of imperialists, nor the intrigues of Tito's renegade band, nor the slanders, pressures, blackmail, and blockade of Nikita Khrushchev have been, are, or will be able to break off this friendship. (Applause.) The life-giving Albanian-Soviet friendship will live for ages! In celebrating the forty-fourth anniversary of the October Socialist Revolution, the revolution that shook the old world to its foundations and laid the foundation of a new world, the Party and our people send their very best wishes to the fraternal Soviet people and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for ever newer and greater victories, for the glory of the great Communist cause. (Stormy applause.) . . . In outlining the history of the APL, Hoxha stopped to deal with the crisis in 1948^9.

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At that time, our party had to carry on a bitter, life-or-death struggle against the brutal intervention, the hostile activity, and wild attacks of Tito's gang against our party and country, and against the subversive Trotskyite activity of Tito's tool, Koci Xoxe, and his accomplices, who had put the Party under the control of the security organs which he himself directed, which had flagrantly violated socialist legality and Leninist norms of party life and were preparing to annex Albania to the Yugoslav Federal Republic. Our party was able to triumph in this bitter struggle because it always remained faithful to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and did not depart from these principles in the face of the most rabid attacks, slanders, pressures, and blackmail of the treacherous Belgrade gang. Our party received saving aid in this struggle from the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) and from J. V. Stalin (applause), who in well-known letters on the situation in the Yugoslav Communist Party unmasked before the whole world the real face of this band of renegades. For the defense of the liberty and independence of our country, our party has not relied exclusively on the internal forces of the people but also on the joint strength of the entire great camp of socialism. At the same time, as a worthy member of the Warsaw Pact, the Albanian People's Republic has honored and will honor its international obligation of defending the common interests of the socialist camp in the Adriatic and Mediterranean area against any possible imperialist aggression. . . . Our party has always kept its Marxist-Leninist line as pure as crystal and has defended it in bitter combat with various enemies and deviationists, from Anastas Ljulua and Sadik Premtja, Ymer Dishnica and Sojfulla Maleshova, to Tito and Koci Xoxe, Tuk Jakova and Bedri Spahiu, Liri Gega and Liri Belishova, and others who attempted to turn the Party from the correct path. But our party always remained as steadfast as granite. In this struggle, it has maintained and every day strengthens more and more the ideological and organizational

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unity of its ranks, on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, as one of the most important factors of our victories, of the strength and invincibility of our party against any enemy. We shall maintain this unity with fanaticism and shall strengthen it still more. . . . The great historic victories which our people won in the struggle for liberation of the country and for the construction of socialism in a free, independent, and sovereign Albania are due to the internationalist aid and support which the Soviet Union, in the first place, the Chinese People's Republic, and other countries of the socialist camp gave and are giving to our country. T h e Party and the Albanian people will remain ever grateful for this generous help. This help is a wonderful expression of the eternal friendship which binds our people with the glorious peoples of the Soviet Union, with the great Chinese people, and with all the peoples of the other socialist countries. We shall always cherish this sacred friendship highly, since it is our common strength, a sound guarantee of our invincibility. . . . T h e A P L recognizes and understands the profound changes that have taken place in the world, the new conditions and phenomena that have appeared. But we reject any attempt of modern revisionists, who, hiding behind the slogan of "creatively interpreting Marxism under new conditions," spread their distorted, opportunistic views, try to present them as a further development of Marxism, and hasten to label as dogmatic, sectarian, or adventurist anyone who opposes their views. These are familiar tactics. There is nothing new or original here. All revisionists and opportunists from Bernstein to Tito have denied the basic principles of Marxism under the pretext of "changes in the situation" and "new phenomena." As V. I. Lenin pointed out, they have risen up against Marxism, always hiding behind the slogan of fighting against dogmatism and using the "appropriate little word: dogmatist." Correct, revolutionary, Marxist-Leninist conclusions must be drawn from the changes that have occurred in the world— conclusions that do not generate pacifist and reformist illusions,

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that do not weaken the struggle against imperialism but continually strengthen this just struggle. Conclusions must be drawn that do not put off the task of a revolutionary victory, but bring it ever closer, that do not divert the people from the struggle for national independence, but make them wage this struggle on an ever wider scale. Let us consider the problem of war and peace. Shall I say that the change in the balance of forces in favor of socialism has brought a change in the nature of imperialism, that imperialism is bound hand and foot, that it is not capable of doing anything, of launching wars and undertaking other aggressive actions? Such a conclusion is not only wrong but extremely harmful. Underestimating the forces of the enemy and overestimating our forces leads to relaxing our guard and encourages dangerous adventures, just as underestimating our forces and overestimating the forces of the enemy leads to unfounded concessions, mistakes, and an opportunistic stand. Proceeding from the actual relationship of forces in the world today, our party has always said and still says that in the question of war and peace two possibilities have to be considered and prepared for: the banning of war, and the launching of war by the imperialists. Our firm conviction that at the present time world war and other imperialistic aggressive wars can be banned rests not at all on the "good intentions" of the leaders of imperialism but on the colossal economic, political, and military force of the powerful socialist camp, on the unity and struggle of the international working class, on the resolute struggle of all peoples of the world against the imperialist warmongers, on the unity and cohesion of all peace-loving forces. (Stormy applause.) During all the years of its existence, the people's regime, the government of the Albanian People's Republic, has resolutely and consistently followed a line of foreign policy that fully corresponds to the interests of our people and country, to the interests of the defense of national freedom and independence, and to the interests of the whole socialist camp and to the cause of peace and progress of human society. The basis of

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the foreign policy of the APL has always been and is the continuous strengthening of the ties of friendship, fraternal collaboration, and mutual aid and support with the countries of the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union; the rendering of support to the anti-imperialist and anticolonial national liberation struggle of oppressed peoples and nations and the revolutionary struggle of workers in capitalist countries; efforts to ensure relations of peaceful coexistence between the Albanian People's Republic and capitalist countries, especially neighboring countries; efforts to maintain and strengthen peace in the whole world, especially in the Balkan and Adriatic area; unmasking the policy of war and aggression that is followed by imperialist powers, headed by the United States of America, and their partners and tools around our country, such as the Italian imperialists, the monarcho-fascist Greeks, and the Yugoslav revisionists. In foreign policy, our party and government have always gone arm in arm with the other socialist countries in an effort to maintain and consolidate peace in the world. They have always approved and strongly supported the general line of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and all the other socialist countries for solving the most important international problems. And this foreign policy of the Albanian People's Republic has always been approved by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, which have always considered it as a correct policy, favoring our common cause. But recently N. Khrushchev and his friends sharply changed their attitude toward us, first calling us "adventurers and warmongers" and then accusing us of "rapprochement" with imperialism. (Laughter.) Those who accuse us have no argument, no single fact, only slander and fiction, to prove that the foreign policy of the Albanian People's Republic has changed. Nothing has changed in our foreign policy. There has been no change in our stand on the problems of war and peace, on the relations with other states, particularly with neighboring states, on the struggle against imperialism, and on unmasking Yugoslav revisionists.

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The twenty-year life and the revolutionary struggle of the A P L refute all these slanders and base fictions which have deeply angered and enraged our people, who have fought and are fighting heroically against imperialism and its lackeys. Those who accuse and slander the APL and its leadership are not able to present a single fact to prove their case, whereas we can present many facts and documents to show clearly their deviation from the Marxist-Leninist position and their wavering in the battle against imperialism. We have never had any illusions about our enemies, we have not embraced and kissed them, we have not flattered them or rubbed elbows with them, we have never bowed before them. (Stormy applause. All rise. Ovation.) Our party and government have always maintained a resolute stand, based on Marxist-Leninist principles, in regard to the enemies of peace and socialism; they have harshly and constantly unmasked imperialists, whether they be American or English, French or Italian, and their policy of war and aggression; they have been implacable with regard to the class enemy. They have shown their solidarity and have supported, with all their strength and without wavering, the just cause of peoples who have risen up in a struggle against imperialism. They have always given support to the fraternal peoples of Algeria, Cuba, the Congo, Laos, etc., in their sacred struggle against imperialism, resolutely condemning all aggressive attempts of imperialism. For all this "good" that the Party has done to imperialism during these twenty years (laughter), imperialism and its tools have rewarded it with a savage and uninterrupted fight against the Albanian People's Republic, by plots and continuous provocations, by diversions, blackmail, and incessant slanders. We are accused of being afraid of imperialism (laughter), of being afraid to accept responsibility for solving important international problems. The question involved here is the signing of a peace treaty with Germany and settling the West Berlin question. The A P L and government of the Albanian People's Republic never have been and are not afraid of imperialism, they never have been and are not afraid of their responsibility as a socialist country and member of the Warsaw Pact, and

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they have carefully and honorably discharged their international duties. (Stormy applause.) The whole world knows the position of the APL and of the government of the Albanian People's Republic on the German question; it has been stated in many well-publicized documents. The APL and the government of the Albanian People's Republic have always supported and now support firmly the efforts of the USSR and the GDR for a peaceful solution of the German problem. The viewpoint of our party and government has been and is that the signing of a peace treaty with Germany and the solution of the West Berlin question on this basis are necessary, long overdue steps that are also in the interest of the Albanian People's Republic, the GDR, and other socialist countries, in the interest of peace and security in Europe. We have been and are for solving these problems as soon as possible, because any delay only benefits our enemies. The declaration of the Central Committee of the APL on the German question stated directly that "in any situation and at any dangerous moment we shall fight to the end alongside the Soviet Union and the other fraternal countries, regardless of any sacrifice, and on every occasion, as always, we shall show our solidarity to the end and shall honorably discharge our obligation." This has been, is, and will be the point of view of our party and government. (Stormy applause.) The question arises: Who is really afraid of the responsibility for solving the German question? Who has dragged it out? We, who have been and are for its solution as soon as possible, or our accusers, who have retreated in this question and have dragged out its resolution from year to year? Or let us take the problem of disarmament. It is public knowledge that our government has supported the proposal of the Soviet Union for complete and general disarmament, since as long as arms exist and the armaments race continues, as long as there is no complete and general disarmament, there will not be any kind of assurance of the preservation of peace. The Soviet government, together with our government, has proposed making the Balkan and Adriatic area a peace zone, without atomic arms or rocket bases. But the proposal of the Soviet

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Union and of the socialist countries for complete and general disarmament and for the creation of peace zones was rejected by the imperialist powers. In such a situation, our government has supported and fully supports the decision of the Soviet government for the resumption of nuclear weapons tests as a very important and necessary measure for the guarantee of security of the Soviet Union and of the entire socialist camp, to restrain the imperialist forces, headed by the United States and the Bonn revanchists, who have intensified to the maximum the unrestrained armaments race and the insane preparations for a new world war. We realize that the disarmament problem is a difficult one, that great efforts will be needed for its solution, and that a resolute struggle must be waged without wavering by the socialist countries and by all peace-loving forces to impose the solution on imperialism. But N. Khrushchev, instead of following any such correct road, seeks to disarm a socialist country surrounded by enemies on all sides, the Albanian People's Republic. By weakening the defensive powers of Albania, he harms not only the interests of our country but of the entire socialist camp. And all this is done at a time when the American Sixth Fleet cruises in the Mediterranean like a sea monster, when American rocket bases are established in Greece and Italy, when the N A T O forces are feverishly continuing the armaments race, when the imperialists and West German revanchists rattle their sabers and gravely endanger the peace of the world. No fault or responsibility for this falls on the Albanian government. But in any case, N. Khrushchev should not have reached the point of openly inciting the imperialists and the various reactionaries against a socialist country such as the Albanian People's Republic. In spite of all this, the defense of the boundaries of Albania is completely secured. (Stormy applause. All rise. Ovation.) In a situation where there exist in the world states with different social systems, the only correct principle for regulating relations among them is the principle of peaceful coexistence, the principle defined by Lenin and applied by Stalin. O u r party has always considered and considers that the policy of peaceful co-

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existence corresponds to the vital interests of all peoples, both of the socialist countries and the capitalist countries, corresponds to the aim of further strengthening the positions of socialism and peace in the whole world. Therefore this principle has been the basis of the relations of our state with the other, nonsocialist states. It is absurd to accuse our party and socialist state of being against peaceful coexistence. This slander is refuted in all the practical aspects of our state's foreign policy. We do not oppose the principle of peaceful coexistence, but d o not agree with some opportunistic views of N. Khrushchev and his followers, w h o consider peaceful coexistence the general line of the foreign policy of socialist countries, the main road to victory of socialism on a world scale; who for the sake of peaceful coexistence retreat from the struggle to unmask imperialism; who are ready to abandon the political, ideological struggle against the Yugoslav revisionists on the pretext that Yugoslavia supports the Soviet Union in some matters of foreign policy. Such a notion of peaceful coexistence is distorted and anti-Marxist, because it leads to a denial of the class struggle. Correct execution of the policy of peaceful coexistence, by pointing out and unmasking imperialism and its policy of war and aggression, should aid in carrying out the struggle of the working class in capitalist countries and the national liberation movement in colonial and dependent countries. For their part, the successes of the working class and national liberation revolutionary struggle, by narrowing and weakening the positions of imperialism, strengthen the cause of peace and peaceful coexistence. Communist parties in capitalist countries, along with the struggle to impose the policy of peaceful coexistence on the bourgeois governments of their countries, at the same time carry on a class struggle to overthrow the bourgeois regimes and for the transition to socialism according to the concrete conditions in each country. As far as the forms of transition to socialism are concerned, N. Khrushchev also badly complicated this question during the X X Congress and after it. He practically made the peaceful way

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the only way of taking over power by the working class, and this created the illusion that only by obtaining a majority in parliament can a working class and the Communist party take power into their own hands. These theses pleased only revisionists and various opportunists, who used them to justify their antiMarxist views. We Albanian Communists never have been nor are a priori against the peaceful way. But the teaching of Marxism-Leninism, historical experience, and present reality teach us that to ensure victory for the cause of socialism, the working class and its party must be prepared at the same time for both possibilities, for the peaceful way and the nonpeaceful way. This is the way we understand peaceful coexistence and its connection with the class struggle. This is the way we understand and apply the policy of peaceful coexistence to other, nonsocialist states, and, first of all, to our neighbors. It is strange that Nikita Khrushchev and his followers demand that we apply peaceful coexistence to our Greek neighbors. They accuse us of not going along with the proposal for disarmament of the Balkan countries; they accuse us of not making efforts toward a "Balkan understanding"; they join in the chorus of Tito and Karamanlis as though we were the "warmongers of the Balkans" at the very time when Greece continues to consider itself in a "state of war" with Albania, when it makes territorial claims against our country and plots to attack Albania, when monarcho-fascist Greece has become a fortress, armed to the teeth by American imperialists, against our socialist country. The accusations of our critics are baseless, since no one in his right mind would think that tiny Albania, surrounded by wolves which for seventeen years in a row have tried to swallow her whole, does not want peace and disarmament. Everybody knows, and experience has shown, how much monarcho-fascist Greece has disarmed, to what extent the hopes of those who believed in this have been fulfilled; but if we had failed to criticize Nikita Khrushchev (and we made this criticism in a comradely fashion) when he raised the hopes of Sophocles Venizelos for "the autonomy of southern Albania," it would have been treason on our part. N. Khrushchev did not like our

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just criticism. This is the least of evils. But he twisted our criticism into a counteraccusation, accusing us of slandering the Soviet Union, which liberated us and protects us. This, of course, is Machiavellian. However, the devil showed his horns again later. When the Americans, Greeks, and Turks were conducting large-scale military maneuvers along the Albanian and Bulgarian borders, N. Khrushchev said in a statement to [C. L.] Sulzberger, a New York Times reporter, on September 10, 1961: "You [Americans] have also established bases in Greece and from there are threatening our ally Bulgaria." Has not monarchofascist Greece also established missile bases against Albania? When did Nikita Khrushchev decide that Albania cannot be an ally of the Soviet Union? This is astounding. Are these trifling matters? Should the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Prime Minister of the USSR, even if he were engaged in mortal combat with socialist Albania, be allowed to say openly to Greek reactionary elements that Albania is not an ally of the Soviet Union and to send President Kennedy the news that "relations between the Soviet Union and Albania have deteriorated"? Therefore, according to some, we are the ones who look at things as "sectarian nationalists," while others, who speculate with the interests of our people, are Marxists. Tomorrow these same critics may make us responsible for the election defeat of the Greek Progressive Party, the EDA. {Laughter.) Can these so-called Marxists think that we ought to hand over the keys of our country to the Greek monarcho-fascists so that their line of "peaceful coexistence" may triumph and power may be taken over in Greece "in a peaceful and parliamentary way"? (Laughter.) No, they cannot expect that of us. Let the so-called Marxists not forget the internationalism of the great APL and the Albanian people in saving tens of thousands of heroes of the Greek people and of the Greek Communist Party who, we are sure, do not spit on the horse after they have crossed the river. (Stormy applause.) Our party and government have followed this foreign policy. These are our views on the problems of present world develop-

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ment. It is precisely for these positions, for these views that they criticize us, that N. Khrushchev attacked us at the X X I I Congress of the CPSU. In this way, he first unilaterally brought our differences out into the open, giving weapons to the enemy and taking upon himself a great historical responsibility as a dissenter from the unity of the international Communist movement and the socialist camp. Our A P L has never openly aired our differences, it has spoken of them only at party meetings. But now that N . Khrushchev has made them public, our party is obligated to make public its view. (Stormy applause.) In his speeches at the X X I I Congress of the CPSU, Nikita Khrushchev, accusing our party, said that Albanian-Soviet relations had deteriorated through the fault of the Albanian leadership. It is well known that our party's twenty years of revolutionary activity have been twenty years of colossal work to strengthen the friendship between the Albanian people and the Soviet peoples, to establish the closest fraternal ties between the People's Republic of Albania and the Soviet Union, twenty years of exemplary collaboration between our party and the glorious CPSU. The twenty years of our party's activity have been twenty years of sincere loyalty, of great fraternal love of our party for the great party of Lenin, which has been, is, and always will be for us the source of inspiration and experience, from which we have learned and will learn to work and fight for the good of our people, for the cause of socialism and communism. T h e twenty years of our party's activity have been years of generous and all-round aid of the Soviet Union to the Albanian people, internationalist fraternal aid which our party and government have used correctly for the economic development of our country, for the construction of socialism in Albania, for improving the living standard of the Albanian people. Under these conditions, it is absurd and incredible that anyone can believe it was the Albanian leaders who "without any reason" and "with dizzying speed" changed their attitude toward the Soviet Union and the CPSU. Equally incredible is the slander that the Albanian leaders have joined the imperialists and sold out for thirty pieces of silver. {Laughter.) Only novel and de-

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tectivc story fans could believe such "revelations," but not any serious man, because any honest man, however little he knows about the twenty-year history of our party, cannot fail to see that such a slander is not justified by any stand of our party, by any action of its leadership. Throughout all its revolutionary history, the A P L has always fought and is fighting resolutely against imperialism and its agents; it never has held, is not holding, and will not hold out its hand in the past, present, or future, to anyone for alms, least of all to the imperialists and their allies. ( S t o r m y applause. All rise. Ovation.) It has received and is receiving from its friends and brothers of the countries of the socialist camp not alms but only internationalist aid in credit, and it will continue in the future to accept only from those socialist countries that want to offer such aid to it. We beg for alms from no one. If, for one reason or another, N. Khrushchev and his followers do not wish to aid us, they wait in vain for us to go to the imperialists and their allies for "alms." Our people have friends and comrades in socialist countries that have not left us and will not leave us in the lurch. ( S t o r m y applause. All rise. Ovation.) But independently of this, we say to N. Khrushchev that the Albanian people and their party will live on grass if necessary, but never will they sell out for thirty pieces of silver because they would rather die on their feet with honor than to live on their knees in dishonor. ( S t o r m y applause. All

rise.

Ovation.)

Then why did Soviet-Albanian relations deteriorate? It is clear and well known to Khrushchev himself and to the international Communist movement. The reason is well known to Khrushchev, for indeed he himself is to blame. We will say only this: the starting point was the Bucharest meeting of June, 1960. Even before June, 1960, there were differences between our party and the Soviet leaders on some questions of an ideological and political nature; however, they had no negative influence on the relations between our two socialist states, between our two Marxist-Leninist parties. The A P L has always declared and declares again now that

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the experience of the CPSU and the experience of its congresses, including also the X X and XXII congresses, have been, are, and always will be a great help along our path of constructing a socialist and communist society. However, our party has not been and is not of the same opinion as the Soviet leaders on some particular basic theses of the X X Congress of the CPSU, just as it is not now of the same opinion on some particular theses of the X X I I Congress or on the new Program of the CPSU which the XXII Congress approved. Does not our party have this right? Is this not in keeping with the teaching of Marxism-Leninism and of proletarian internationalism? Can this be considered an anti-Soviet position, as they try to accuse us? The Soviet leaders call any party that is not of the same opinion on certain basic theses that were expounded at the XXII Congress anti-Marxist, dogmatic, sectarian, and against proletarian internationalism, etc. From the rostrum of the XXII Congress, E. Furtseva, a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, even went so far as to ask: "How can those who do not accept the resolutions of the X X Congress of our party call themselves Communists?" (Laughter.) (Although we say that we do not agree with particular theses of the X X Congress, the Soviet leaders are pleased to round off things and say that we do not agree with the whole X X Congress.) This means, according to some Soviet leaders, that the criterion of loyalty to Marxism-Leninism, to communism and proletarian internationalism is the position on the XX Congress of the CPSU. Can such logic be Marxist? If all the Communist and workers parties of the world were to apply the new criteria that Furtseva invented, then mere lack of agreement, let us say, with many of the revisionist theses of the Eighth Congress of the Italian Communist Party would plunge millions of Communists into sorrow and create difficulties for them, since they would not know to what address to send their party cards. {Laughter.) According to the Leninist principles that govern the relations between Marxist parties, however important the congress of a

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party, however great and authoritative the party of a country, the decisions of its congress are binding only on its members. In the international Communist movement, the Moscow Statement declares, all parties are equal and independent. They work out their own policy starting from the concrete conditions of their own countries, guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism. The attempt to make the decisions of the congress of one or another party the international norms binding for all parties is a brutal trampling on the principle of equality and independence of Marxist-Leninist parties; it is in open contradiction to proletarian internationalism. Therefore, it is not our party, but the Soviet leaders, headed by N. Khrushchev, that have slipped from the positions of Marxism-Leninism and of proletarian internationalism by attempting to impose their own policy on other parties, asking them to give up their own views and to obey and be subject to them. Whether or not our party takes a stand on Marxist-Leninist positions cannot be determined at all by its critical attitude toward individual theses expressed by the leaders of certain fraternal parties, nor by the subjective evaluation that N. Khrushchev and his followers may make of the Party's line and activity. The criterion of truth is life, experience; therefore, individuals and parties should be judged by facts, by their practical activity. The road that the APL has traveled, the line that it has followed since its founding, its twenty years of political activity are convincing facts that bear witness to its unbending loyalty to Marxism-Leninism, to the vital interests of the Albanian people, to the great cause of socialism and communism, and to the cause of world peace. {Applause.) Our APL expressed its own observations on some basic theses of the X X Congress and on certain stands of the Soviet leaders with which it did not agree in the correct party way, thus respecting all the principles jointly established which govern the relations among fraternal parties. We have already spoken about our observations on foreign policy and the problems of present world development. Let us now take up another important problem on which we have had and have a view

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different from that of the Soviet leaders. It is the question of the attitude toward J. V. Stalin and his work. According to the view of our party, N. Khrushchev first had to dethrone J. V. Stalin and his work so that he could expound his opportunist theses at the XX Congress of the CPSU and spread them later. He did this in his special report to the XX Congress, "On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences." Our party did not and does not agree with the criticism of Stalin as made at the X X Congress and later. (Applause.) Slandering our party at the XXII Congress of the CPSU and brutally meddling in our internal affairs, N. Khrushchev said that the Albanian leaders are against criticism of the cult of the person of Stalin because methods of the personality cult abound in our party, because terror and injustice reign in Albania. We shall not stop here to refute these slanders, but the fact that their author has sunk so low that, to mobilize public opinion against our party, he used such "arguments," borrowed from the most rabid enemies of socialism and communism, shows his dark purposes. It is clear that in linking the unsubstantiated attack against the APL with the "fight against the cult of Stalin and the antiparty group" at the XXII Congress, N. Khrushchev's purpose was to show the "analogy" between alleged "Albanian Stalinism" and the "period of Stalinist crimes" in the Soviet Union, thus creating the "atmosphere" he needed at the Congress and in world public opinion to make his slanderous accusations more credible. The A P L has always taken into account, and still does, the teaching of Marxism-Leninism on the role of the masses, of the classes, of the party and the leaders. It has always considered and still considers the appearance of the personality cult as a phenomenon foreign to Marxism-Leninism and harmful to a Communist and workers party. Our party has not hesitated, when the occasion arose, to criticize even in its first stage various manifestations of this type in its own ranks, as it did at its Third Congress. Likewise, our party, when the occasion arose, fought bravely and eradicated any trampling upon revolutionary legality, any abuse of power by anyone, as it did at its First Congress.

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Everybody knows the fate that befell the enemy of the Party and the people, Koci Xoxe, and his comrades, who before 1948, incited by the Yugoslav revisionists and abusing the trust given them by the Party and the people, broke the laws of the state to dig a grave for the cadres of the Party and the state. Neither the disease of the cult of personality nor the violation of socialist legality exists in our party. But at the same time, while guarding against the phenomenon of the personality cult, our party, in the proper Marxist-Leninist way, cherishes a love and respect for its leaders; while carefully respecting socialist legality, our party and the people's power are severe toward the enemies of our people's republic, toward all those who try to eradicate the historic victories of our people. (Stormy applause.) Therefore, the APL has been and is opposed to the criticism that was made of J. V. Stalin at the XX Congress, and that was repeated at the XXII Congress because of other reasons of principle. According to the view of our party, J. V. Stalin, in all his theoretical and practical activity, was and remains one of the brilliant leaders and personalities not only of the Soviet Union and the CPSU but also of the international Communist and workers movement, one of the most ardent defenders and greatest theoreticians of Marxism-Leninism. (Stormy applause. All rise. Ovation.) His great historical merit lies in the fact that for many years he was a faithful student ana resolute comradein-arms of V. I. Lenin in the struggle for the overthrowing of tsarism and the triumph of the Great October Socialist Revolution; and after Lenin's death he, as head of the CPSU, faithfully defended Leninism against the rabid attacks of Trotskyites, Bukharinists, Zinovievists, and other enemies and smashed them ideologically and politically. As the main leader of the Party, J. V. Stalin made a great contribution to the successful construction of socialism in the Soviet Union and to the successful campaigns of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union against fascism; he further developed Marxism-Leninism in a number of important matters concerning the Soviet socialist society and the construction of socialism and communism; he made an in-

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valuable contribution to the strengthening of the socialist camp and the international Communist movement and to unmasking the modern revisionism of Tito's treacherous revisionist group. In thus evaluating J. V. Stalin's activity, there can be no doubt that the mistakes he may have made in the last years of his life were limited and cannot serve as a criterion for giving a general evaluation of J . V. Stalin's personality and his activity. In a general evaluation of J . V. Stalin's activity his great merits lie in the foreground: the struggle to defend Leninism, the struggle to construct socialism in the Soviet Union, the struggle to form and strengthen the socialist camp, to strengthen the unity of the international Communist and workers movement, his policy of defending peace and peaceful coexistence. These make up his basic features as a leader and as a Communist. This has been and is the inflexible position of the APL in regard to an evaluation of the work of J . V. Stalin. (Applause.) N. Khrushchev's vicious position in criticizing J . V. Stalin consists in the following: ( a ) In a one-sided and tendentious way he greatly exaggerated Stalin's mistakes, even to the point of base slander. Stalin was pictured almost as an "enemy" of the Soviet Union and of communism; he was characterized as "brutal," "capricious," "despotic," "murderous," "bloodthirsty," and "criminal" toward party cadres and tried and true revolutionaries, and "short-sighted" toward imperialists and fascists (laughter), as a man who committed great "follies" in practice and in theoretical questions, who "had no idea" of what was going on in the Soviet Union, who showed "lack of respect for Lenin's memory," and many other accusations of this type. Scattered statements made at the X X Congress and afterwards to the effect that Stalin still is an outstanding Communist, etc., were completely formal and were made to lessen the bad impression and the righteous indignation that these accusations against Stalin aroused in Communists throughout the world. In fact, neither at the X X Congress nor up to this day have the leaders of the CPSU, even in their propaganda, made any positive evaluation of the theoretical legacy of J . V. Stalin to show his positive points and his con-

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tribution to the defense and further development of MarxismLeninism. The culmination of this inhuman position was reached at the X X I I Congress of the CPSU, where not only the accusations of the X X Congress were repeated, this time publicly, but also a specific resolution was passed to remove the embalmed body of J . V. Stalin from the mausoleum. Unable to refute Stalin with arguments of principle in the field of his activity and theoretical creation, Khrushchev, to fight Stalin, reduces the question to the realm of police agents and takes steps to get rid of Stalin's body. After all these actions, how hypocritical N. Khrushchev's words of January, 1957, sound: "When it was a question of the cause of the revolution, of defending the class interests of the proletariat in the revolutionary struggle against our class enemy, Stalin bravely and implacably defended the cause of MarxismLeninism. . . . In the main and fundamental thing, and the main and fundamental thing for Marxist-Leninists is the defense of the interests of the working class, of the cause of socialism, the struggle against the enemies of Marxism-Leninism . . . in these main and fundamental things, may God grant, as they say, that every Communist may know how to fight the way Stalin fought." (Laughter.) ( b ) The question of the struggle against the personality cult was given a one-sided treatment by N. Khrushchev at the X X Congress of the CPSU and in Soviet propaganda after the Congress, while the Leninist teachings on the relationships between masses, classes, parties, and leaders were forgotten. Particularly in his brilliant book Lejt-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder, the great Lenin spoke of the need to create in each party a group of more or less permanent leaders made up of men with more authority, with more influence, with more experience, who are called leaders. Without such permanent leaders, the struggle of the working class and its Communist party cannot be crowned with success. In contrast to this clear teaching of Lenin, the democracy of the masses was set against the role of the leaders under the pretext of fighting against the personality cult. It is a good idea for us to recall what V. I. Lenin wrote in this

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connection. "To go so far on this account as generally to set the dictatorship of the masses against the dictatorship of the leaders is a ridiculous absurdity and idiocy. It is particularly ridiculous when you see'new leaders who speak utter nonsense take the place of older leaders who have human views on simple things (under cover of the slogan, 'Down with the leaders!')." N. Khrushchev and his group used the so-called principled criticism of the Stalin personality cult—and this is becoming ever clearer with the passage of time—for their anti-Marxist purposes. It is none of our business how he uses it and for what purposes he acts on the domestic level (in the Soviet Union and CPSU); only the CPSU can judge this. Nevertheless, we cannot help pointing out that actually N. Khrushchev, by speaking of the "crimes" that were committed in the Stalin era, of the "murder of innocent people," of the "wiping out of thousands of cadres" by "false" trials, of the reign of "terror," which are depicted in the blackest colors, by making these things known to international public opinion, is doing a great disservice to the Soviet Union and is bringing joy only to the imperialists and all the enemies of communism. N. Khrushchev has accused the leaders of our party for the just criticisms they made in party meetings of certain impermissible actions against our party, alleging that the Albanian leaders "are slinging mud at the Soviet Union." What shall we say of this unrestrained zeal of his to blacken an entire glorious era, the era of the construction of socialism in the Soviet Union, to discredit the glory of the Soviet Union in the eyes of the whole world by presenting it as a country where terror and murder reigned, as the entire bourgeois press has said and is saying in its propaganda? Is it not precisely he himself that is discrediting the Soviet Union by his actions? Is he not gravely insulting the heroism of the Soviet peoples, who in the struggle with domestic and foreign enemies, in the struggle with countless difficulties and obstacles, under the leadership of their Communist party, which was directed by Stalin, laid the foundations of the socialist and communist society in the Soviet Union, when he proposed that a monument to the "victims" of the personality cult be erected in Moscow?

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Some call this action "bold self-criticism." Let us think deeper on how much good and evil this kind of "bold self-criticism" has brought to the Soviet Union and the Communist movement! By speaking of "injustice" and "victims of the period of the cult of personality" and by declaring the various trials "trumped up," regardless of the fact that mistakes may have been made during all this struggle, N. Khrushchev shows that he is consistent in his anti-Marxist conception of imperialism and its lackeys. In fact, he rendered a service to imperialism, since he represented it as not dangerous for countries that are constructing socialism, and lowered the guard of peoples struggling against the agents of imperialism, who have carried on and are carrying on savage activity against the socialist camp. N. Khrushchev also adopted his tactics of silence toward the plot organized by Yugoslav revisionists, monarcho-fascist Greeks, and the American Sixth Fleet, which was revealed here a few months ago. These tactics were also recommended to some other fraternal parties; he passed the word that the plot was trumped up, that the participants in the plot were "honest patriots and fighters" whom he later, in his closing speech at the X X I I Congress of the CPSU, took under his protection. And a little while before, N. Khrushchev publicly accused the Albanian leaders of links with imperialist agents. Therefore, according to his logic, it follows that whoever fights against imperialism, whoever fights against its agents, whoever fights to defend the freedom and independence of a socialist country, is an agent of imperialism. And, on the other hand, whoever rises up against the people's power and against the Party, whoever serves the enemies of socialism, is a "martyr," a "good patriot," and is taken under the protection of the leaders of the CPSU; to such a man they will erect monuments. N. Khrushchev used the question of the Stalin cult to dethrone Leninism, to lay the ground for the revision of MarxismLeninism, and to spread his opportunist views on the very important questions of present world development and the international Communist movement. This action and these tactics of his against Leninism are neither new nor original. In fact,

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Trotsky also used the same tactics in his fight against Leninism. "In his literary works Trotsky made another (yet another!) attempt," J. V. Stalin said, "to make conditions ready for the replacement of Leninism by Trotskyism. 'At all costs' Trotsky had to discredit the Party, its cadres who carried through the uprising, so that by discrediting the Party he might also discredit Leninism. Discrediting of Leninism was necessary to drag in Trotskyism as the 'only proletarian' ideology (this is no joke). All this was done, of course (oh, of course!), under the banner of Leninism, so that the dragging operation might be performed 'as painlessly as possible.'" N. Khrushchev has also used the question of Stalin to strike a blow against solid Marxist-Leninist elements in the leadership of Communist and workers parties of various countries, to intimidate, and, in case of resistance, even to liquidate anyone who dares oppose him, to silence other parties and various leaders who do not support his revisionist views and policy. In a word, the question of the personality cult has been used as a bugbear to put pressure on other parties and even to liquidate leaders that do not please N. Khrushchev. These schemes, which until yesterday he kept secret, hiding them under "principled" and "Marxist" phraseology, he made public at the XXII Congress of the CPSU. In his speech he said: "To put an end to the personality cult means essentially that Shehu, Hoxha, and others must give up their commanding posts in the Party and the state." And he added that "they do not want to do that." If we consider that in the same speech, he, as we said before, takes under his protection and calls patriots the antiparty elements and agents of imperialism, the participants in the plot organized by imperialism against the People's Republic of Albania, then N. Khrushchev's struggle against the personality cult in Albania, his great preoccupation, becomes clear! He is trying to liquidate the present leaders of our party and replace them with antiparty elements and any kind of plotter and agent of imperialism. The fact that he is not at all concerned with the correct and principled Marxist-Leninist struggle against the personality cult

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shows that Khrushchev, under the pretext of the struggle against the personality cult, is seeking to dethrone Leninism to open up the way to revisionism. If this were not so, in spite of his demagogic words, he could not have failed to point out that today in the Soviet Union the personality cult becomes more noticeable every day—moreover, often in the most open way, and exalting his own person. Thus, it is hard to find an issue of illustrated Soviet periodicals without photographs of Khrushchev; pages of the Soviet press are filled with quotations from his speeches; everywhere and on every question he alone speaks; an entire film is devoted to his life, and other films to his visits to various countries of the world; great praise is given him in various speeches and articles attributing to him personally the greatest successes of the Soviet peoples in the development of industry, science, and technology. Great, feverish efforts are being made to present Khrushchev not only as a "great military strategist" but also almost as the "architect" of the victory over fascism in World War II. (Laughter.) Where then are N. Khrushchev's principles in the struggle against the appearance of the personality cult, which he advertises so loudly in his unprincipled struggle against other fraternal parties and their leaders? This, comrades, is why our party has not been and is not in agreement with the Soviet leaders on the question of their criticism of Stalin. Further, the APL has not been and is not in agreement with the Soviet leaders on the question of the attitude toward contemporary revisionism, and particularly toward the treacherous clique of Yugoslav revisionists. N. Khrushchev and his group are using the question of Stalin and the personality cult to lay the ground for full rehabilitation of Tito's treacherous revisionist clique by presenting them as "victims" of Stalin's mistakes and by thus encouraging revisionist renegades, regardless of what they are and where they are, to begin their activity against Marxism-Leninism under the demagogic slogan of "anti-Stalinism," etc. It is known that Tito's revisionist clique was publicly de-

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nounced both in the famous letters of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik), signed by J. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov, and in a resolution of the Information Bureau of some Communist and workers parties of June, 1948, "On the Situation of the Yugoslav Communist Party," which was later endorsed by all the Communist and workers parties of the world. Later, in November, 1949, a second resolution of the Information Bureau appeared which showed that Tito's clique had finally degenerated into an agency of imperialism; that it had liquidated the victories of the revolution in Yugoslavia; that it had drawn Yugoslavia from the path of socialism and torn it out of the socialist camp, and had made it economically and politically dependent upon imperialism; that the Titoist gang was carrying on widespread espionage activity and plotting against various socialist countries; that in various ways it was supporting the imperialist policy of war and aggression, etc. The viewpoint of the A P L has been and is that the conclusions of Stalin and the Information Bureau on Tito's renegade revisionist clique were and remain correct. These conclusions have been and are being proved both by the Yugoslav activities of that time and by later and present-day events. The Yugoslav revisionists have become a center of diversion and plots in the service of imperialism against the countries of the socialist camp. Under their direction, Koci Xoxe's gang worked in Albania and tried to destroy the APL and to liquidate the people's regime. From Tito's Yugoslavia, hundreds and thousands of agents provocateurs, spies, and diversionists, whose mission was terror, sabotage, hatching of plots against socialism, penetrated secretly into socialist countries. Since 1948, Tito's revisionist clique has come ever more openly into the service of American imperialism, to which it is bound by millions and billions of dollars in the form of American economic and military aid to Yugoslavia; it is bound by participation in the Balkan Pact, which is only an appendix to the North Atlantic Treaty; it is bound by the policy of diversion and plots against socialist countries and against the

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national liberation movement of peoples just freed or still being crushed under the heel of colonialism. Until 1 9 5 5 , all Communist and workers parties were unanim o u s in condemning the Yugoslav revisionist leaders and in waging a resolute struggle of ideological and political principles against them. However, precisely at this time, N . Khrushchev announced that a great injustice had been done to Yugoslavia and her leaders, that baseless accusations had been made against them " u n d e r the influence of the agent B e r i a , " that in the Y u g o slav question J . V . Stalin had also been mistaken. And he immediately took the initiative: he went to Belgrade, where he called T i t o a " d e a r c o m r a d e , " unilaterally threw the resolution o f the Information Bureau into the wastebasket, and in a loud voice announced that Yugoslavia was a socialist country and that the Yugoslav leaders, although they displayed certain waverings, were in general Marxist-Leninists. W h a t does experience show, what does life show? Experience and practical life, both before and after 1 9 5 5 , show that in evaluating the Yugoslav question Stalin and the Information B u r e a u were right because their evaluation rested on objective facts, on the teachings of Marxism-Leninism. On the other hand, experience and practical life show that with regard to Tito's revisionist clique N. Khrushchev and his followers are wrong because their actions rest on subjective views and contradict the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, contradict objective reality. L e t us look at the facts. W h a t were the results of the efforts to rehabilitate Tito's clique? T h e Yugoslav revisionist leaders have not given up their anti-Marxist views nor their hostile activities against the socialist c a m p and fraternal Communist and workers parties. T h e most significant result of N . Khrushchev's effort is the fact that after 1 9 5 5 it became possible for the gang o f Yugoslav renegades to operate more freely against the international Communist movement and the countries of the socialist c a m p under the guise of "persecuted c o m r a d e s , " by exploiting along this line the patronage of the first secretary of the Central C o m m i t t e e of the C P S U . Rehabilitation of Y u g o s l a v revisionists

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brought with it also the rehabilitation of all agents and their comrades in some fraternal parties where, under the guise of "correcting mistakes," a real campaign against solid cadres of the Party and an activation of all antiparty elements began. This happened in some parties of European socialist countries as well as in some parties of capitalist countries. In this connection, most typical are the events in Hungary, where activation of revisionist elements headed by Imre Nagy, who had the active aid and support of Yugoslav revisionists, led to the outbreak of counterrevolution which endangered the very existence of Hungary and the people's democratic state. Nevertheless, N. Khrushchev, with great trust in Tito and his companions, has persistently followed the policy of rapprochement, of flattering and fondling the Yugoslav revisionists. The events of Hungary revealed this position even more clearly. When the counter-revolution broke out in Hungary, it was clear to everyone that the Yugoslav revisionists were playing a foul part in the Hungarian events. This was seen in their influence in the counter-revolutionary discussions of the Petofi Circle; this became obvious during the counter-revolutionary uprising in the enthusiasm which the Yugoslavs then expressed; but it was seen still more clearly in the fact that the traitor Imre Nagy, after the counter-revolution was crushed, found asylum in the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest. Instead of ruthlessly unmasking the Belgrade renegades as direct inspirers of the counterrevolutionary putsch in Hungary, N. Khrushchev tried in every way to attenuate, to minimize, and finally to dismiss their responsibility altogether. L. I. Krylov, then Soviet Ambassador to Albania, informed the Central Committee of the A P L of a letter N. Khrushchev had sent to J. B. Tito on November 9, 1956. In this letter, Khrushchev wrote to Tito, among other things: "The Central Committee of the CPSU has examined your recent letter. We consider it possible to agree with your view that now particular importance is not to be given to the question of whether or not the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest acted correctly in giving asylum to Imre Nagy and his companions. We note with satisfaction that, since the Brioni talks,

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you agree fully with our position on Comrade Janos Kadar as an outstanding personality with revolutionary authority in Hungary, capable in these difficult times and conditions of heading the new revolutionary government. . . . You were fully satisfied with the fact that the Central Committee of the CPSU, since the summer of this year, in connection with the removal of Rakosi, has tried to have Comrade Kadar made First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers Party." Any comment on this letter is superfluous. This letter shows quite clearly that the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, trampling under foot every rule that governs the relations among fraternal parties, has gone so far as to interfere even in a question that is so important and has such a decidedly intra-party character as the choice of a particular person for the post of first secretary of a fraternal party. This also clearly shows that N. Khrushchev had long been in full agreement with J. B. Tito, that he deemed it logical to consult with Tito, with this enemy of socialism, with the very inspirer and organizer of the counter-revolution in Hungary, on everything, even on the "appointment" of the first secretary of another party. Hence it is clearly understandable and quite logical why N. Khrushchev tried to cover up the question of Yugoslav interference in the events in Hungary: he could not consult with Tito and unmask him at the same time. After Tito's notorious speech at Pula in November, 1956, the struggle of Communist and workers parties against Yugoslav revisionism was revived and the Yugoslav leaders were criticized for their stand. But Tito's treacherous group not only failed to make any self-criticism nor any positive step toward the Communist movement but in 1958 even judged it suitable to formulate and gather its revisionist ideas into a program for the Yugoslav Communist League, which was published as a counterweight to the Moscow Declaration of Communist and Workers Parties in November, 1957. It now seemed that there was no room for the slightest illusion, since Tito and his group openly wrote in the Program what he had hidden for years behind

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demagogic pseudo-Marxist and pseudo-socialist slogans. But what happened? At first, N. Khrushchev, who felt uncomfortable in the face of public opinion and the international Communist movement, although halfheartedly, took a position against the Yugoslav revisionists. However, this did not last long. With amazing adroitness and in contradiction to the most elementary logic, at the Fifth Congress of the S E D in July, 1958, he gave instructions not to speak about Yugoslav revisionists, saying that "in our struggle for our common cause we should not pay more attention to the Yugoslav revisionists than they deserve. They want their reputation to be enhanced, so that everybody will think they are the center of the world. . . We will not help by enkindling passions, by exacerbating relations. Even in the existing state of our relations with the Yugoslav Communist League it will be useful to preserve a spark of hope, to seek acceptable forms of contact on certain questions." He also emphasized this during his visit to Albania in May, 1959. At the same time, ever more frequently the phrase " C o m rade T i t o " began to be employed again, again began the propaganda that "Yugoslavia is a socialist state," that between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia "there is mutual understanding on many problems of foreign policy." It is appropriate for us to recall that in his time V . I. Lenin waged a relentless struggle not only against opportunism but also against those who preached "unity" with opportunists. T h e group of Yugoslav leaders, left in peace to their treacherous, antisocialist, plotting work, continued with greater intensity their efforts to split the Communist movement and to undermine the national liberation and anti-imperialist movement of the peoples who are fighting for freedom or who have just won their national independence. With each passing day the Yugoslav revisionists revealed themselves more and more as enemies of communism and the freedom of peoples. Precisely because this is the way Tito's gang is, the representatives of the eighty-one fraternal Communist and workers parties resolutely denounced the Yugoslav revisionist leaders in the 1960 Moscow Statement. A s is known, it was emphasized in this Statement that the Yugoslav

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leaders, after betraying Marxism-Leninism, tore their country from the socialist camp and made it dependent on the "aid" of American imperialists and other imperialists and thus endangered the revolutionary victories that were gained in the heroic struggle of the Yugoslav people; that the Yugoslav revisionists are undermining the socialist camp and the international Communist movement; that under the guise of a policy of nonalignment with either bloc they are carrying on an activity that harms the cause of unity of all peace-loving forces and states. Finally, the Statement stressed that a continuous struggle must be waged to unmask completely the group of Yugoslav leaders. Nevertheless, after November, 1960, the Soviet leaders on most occasions forgot these correct theses of the Statement. Rather, as if wishing to encourage Tito's revisionist clique, to "calm" its anger, the Soviet leaders found it expedient to make warm official statements for the benefit of the Yugoslav "comrades." Thus, only a few days after the Statement of the eighty-one fraternal parties was issued, A. Gromyko, a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU and foreign minister of the Soviet Union, declared in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, on December 23, 1960, that on certain basic questions the foreign policy of the Soviet Union was in a complete agreement with the foreign policy of Yugoslavia. Khrushchev himself, in an interview given to [C. L.] Sulzberger, a reporter of The New York Times, which was published in Pravda on September 10, 1961, said: "We, of course, consider Yugoslavia a socialist country." Is not such a statement in contradiction with the Statement of the eighty-one fraternal Communist and workers parties? Should one not conclude that the First Secretary of the CPSU in this statement intended to "calm" the anger of the Yugoslav revisionist leaders and to let them know publicly that what is written in the Moscow Statement or even in any other document of the CPSU is a formality, whereas his views are different? Why did all this happen? Why is such a favorable attitude so persistently held toward a band of renegades to MarxismLeninism, who have sunk over their heads in the swamp of revisionism and treachery; and, at the same time, why are Com-

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munist and workers parties that have always been faithful to the revolutionary doctrine of Marxism-Leninism and the cause of socialism being savagely attacked? The A P L could not, and cannot, agree with such an opportunistic stand toward Tito's dangerous revisionist band of agents of imperialism and enemies of socialism and communism, of the A P L and the Albanian people. In the struggle against contemporary revisionism, particularly against Tito's revisionist clique, our A P L has always kept and still keeps before it the invaluable teaching of the great Lenin, who especially emphasized that opportunism is a serious danger to the very existence of the socialist order. This important teaching of Lenin was very easily understood by our party, because it had learned at its own expense what Yugoslav revisionism means not only in theory but also in practice—since, in fact, Tito's clique never once, either before 1 9 4 8 or after 1955, gave up its plots against the People's Republic of Albania and the A P L but rather increased them. Therefore, the struggle of the A P L against Yugoslav revisionism was not only an important internationalist duty of our party, as a Marxist-Leninist party, but also a sacred duty in defense of our socialist country against the designs and plots of the Yugoslav revisionists. Some Soviet leaders did not like this stand of the A P L , which contradicted and blocked their plans of approaching and embracing the Titoist clique. They began to pass the word that the Albanians are "hotheaded," are "narrow-minded and fight against the Yugoslav leaders from positions of nationalism," that "the Albanians want to capture the banner of antirevisionism," and that "they overestimate Tito's clique," etc., etc. But our party did not waver from its principled position and continued consistently and uncompromisingly to struggle against the Yugoslav revisionists. This action of our party never pleased N. Khrushchev and is one of the reasons for his furious attitude toward the A P L and its leaders. The position of N. Khrushchev's group toward Yugoslav revisionism, in fact, is different not only from that of the A P L but also from that of the entire Communist and workers move-

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ment, from the position expressed in the Moscow declarations of 1957 and 1960, in which revisionism was described as the principal danger in the international Communist and workers movement and Yugoslav revisionism as undermining the socialist camp and the forces of peace. Therefore, it is clear that the Soviet leaders are trying to attenuate the struggle against opportunism and revisionism in the Communist and workers movement. Here is the source also of the attempts to distort by all sorts of manipulations the clear theses of the two Moscow declarations on revisionism as the main danger in the Communist and workers movement and to bring the struggle against dogmatism to the fore. It is daily becoming clearer to our party that by approving the need of the struggle against revisionism only in word but not carrying it out in deed, N. Khrushchev and his followers, under the pretext of struggling against dogmatism, are fighting against Marxism-Leninism, are attempting to reject the basic theses of the revolutionary doctrine of the proletariat, just as Tito attempted before and just as all kinds of opportunists and revisionists have attempted in the past. What have been the results of the spreading of the various opportunistic views, of the unprincipled struggle against J. V. Stalin, and of the policy of reconciliation with Tito's treacherous revisionist clique which have been persistently pursued by N . Khrushchev and his group? Although they shout to the high heavens about "the marvelous results" allegedly achieved by the "criticism of the J. V. Stalin personality cult" and "normalizing of relations with Yugoslavia," although they present the matter as though with the X X Congress a new era began in the further development and strengthening of the world Communist movement, the facts directly contradict this. These distorted views and actions have become a banner in the hands of opportunists and revisionists in many countries who launch a revisionist attack on Marxist-Leninist parties. This has happened in the Communist parties of the United States, Denmark, the Netherlands, Italy, France, England. Under the influence of the opportunist views presented by N. Khrushchev at the X X Congress, revisionism was revived and assumed major dimen-

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sions in many Communist and workers parties, seriously endangering the entire international Communist movement. Precisely under the slogan of fighting against "Stalinist despotism"—the term taken from the "secret" report, "On the Cult of the Individual and Its Consequences," which (strangely enough) fell into the hands of reactionary circles in the West and was reprinted by the tons—imperialist reaction and modern revisionism (especially the revisionist renegades in Belgrade, the enemies of socialism, of the Soviet Union, and of the peoples of all countries of the socialist camp) organized counter-revolutionary activities against the socialist order in Poland and the counter-revolutionary putsch in Hungary. Precisely under the protection of those opportunist theses, thanks to the attacks against Stalin and the conciliatory stand of N. Khrushchev toward the Yugoslav revisionists, Tito's renegade band was enlivened, was given a free hand to carry on its activity of undermining the socialist camp and the international Communist movement on a wide scale. It is perfectly clear to us that such a conclusion is unacceptable to N. Khrushchev and his followers. But it is logical for us to ask: Why precisely after the XX Congress did the renegades and revisionists immediately revive in the ranks of the Communist and workers parties of various countries, why did the Yugoslav revisionist clique lift their heads and jointly launch a frontal attack against Marxism-Leninism? Why did they not make the the theses of, say, the XIX or XVIII Congress of the CPSU their banner? This has only one explanation: some of the theses that were drawn up at the XX Congress had an opportunist character, which served as ideological food for the renegades and revisionists in their struggle against MarxismLeninism; the attitude toward Stalin and Tito's clique was antiMarxist, and was therefore used successfully by the enemies of Marxism and socialism for their purposes. These bitter consequences were also felt in Albania. In our country opportunist elements like Tuk Jakova and Bedri Spahiu, and many other elements expelled from the Party for antiparty activity, became active again and with the direct encouragement

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of the Yugoslav revisionists organized a plot at the Tirana city party conference in April, 1956. It is known that the main role in this plot was played by the traitor Panajot Plaku, oldtime Yugoslav espionage agent, to whom, after he fled from Albania to Yugoslavia, Khrushchev offered political asylum in the Soviet Union in 1957. The slogans of these traitors were the demagogic slogans, "liberalism and democratization of the dictatorship of the proletariat," "normalizing relations with Yugoslavia," "rehabilitation of Koci Xoxe and other elements formerly condemned." It is very significant that precisely at this time, in April-May, 1956, the Soviet leadership, through M. Suslov and P. Pospelov, tried to persuade our party to rehabilitate the traitor Koci Xoxe, that enemy of the Party and of the Albanian people, agent of Tito's clique, who had been shot for his hostile activity aimed at liquidating the Party and people's regime and transforming Albania into a republic of Tito's Yugoslavia. N. Khrushchev's anti-Marxist stand on the above-mentioned questions, therefore, has wrought great harm to our common cause of socialism and communism. However, the international Communist and workers movement can successfully withstand the revisionist attack. The ranks of the Communist and workers parties have been strengthened, and this is due to the strength and firmness of fraternal Communist and workers parties, to the vitality of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. And so it shall always be. MarxismLeninism is the banner of victory; therefore, its enemies, revisionists and opportunists, have failed and will always fail miserably. (Applause.) It is clear from what has been said that the nature of our differences has essentially been ideological and political, that our party did not agree with some of the opportunist views and actions of N. Khrushchev on some vital questions of present world development and of the international Communist and workers movement, views which are in contradiction with some of the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism and are a serious violation of the declarations of the Communist and workers

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parties of 1957 and 1960. But the existence of these distorted views among the Soviet leaders is only half of the evil. The greatest evil is that they are trying at any price to impose their opportunist views on all the Communist and workers parties, without shrinking from the most brutal pressure, blackmail, and attacks against fraternal parties and their leaders who do not agree with N. Khrushchev's revisionist theses, and who oppose them and resolutely defend Marxism-Leninism. Here is the greatest evil; here lies the reason why relations between our country and the Soviet leadership are strained. Seeing that his many efforts to bring the APL to its knees and to impose upon it his anti-Marxist views failed before the inflexible stand of our party, and wishing to justify to his party and the international workers movement his impermissible hostile activity against the APL and the Albanian People's Republic, N. Khrushchev stooped to savage public slanders like those which he and other Soviet leaders made at the XXII Congress of the CPSU. The fact that he chose the rostrum of the XXII Congress of the CPSU to "pass judgment" on our party, and the fact that he deceived the representatives of some fraternal parties into expressing themselves in unfriendly terms toward our party in their greetings to the Congress of the CPSU, throw light on his "putschist" methods, on his surprise tactics of unilaterally imposing his desires on the international Communist and workers parties, on his disregard for the basic principles which govern the relations among fraternal Communist and workers parties, collectively established and defined in the Moscow Statement. Only an international forum, an international meeting of the Communist and workers parties—and only after the arguments of the party in question have been carefully heard—can examine the actions of a Communist or workers party and determine whether or not it has taken the correct position. But N. Khrushchev was afraid to call a meeting of this kind, because he was convinced that he could not attain his aim of condemning our party. For this reason he did not invite our party to the X X I I Congress, because its words would have brought forth the truth about Albanian-Soviet relations, would have unmasked

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his anti-Marxist attempts and activities, would have completely refuted all his baseless slanders and accusations. The method which the First Secretary of the CPSU used to make a unilateral attack on our party is known to the international Communist and workers movement. He also used these tactics in Bucharest, where with false and one-sided accusations he endeavored to bring Marxist-Leninist parties to their knees, and tried by a hurried pronouncement, which was not well founded or studied, to compromise the representatives of the fraternal parties; but in spite of all his efforts he did not achieve his goal. On the contrary, N. Khrushchev was forced into convening the Moscow meeting of November, 1960, where correct debates took place, where it was clearly seen that his views did not meet with enthusiastic support among the participants; this is recorded in the very documents approved by the representatives of the eighty-one parties, but which N. Khrushchev coarsely violates in all his actions. Therefore, fearing to call an international conference, he fell back on his "putschist" methods for the purpose of attacking our party, using the XXII Congress to this end. In this way N. Khrushchev has effectively sabotaged every other future international meeting, because by attacking our party unilaterally and publicly he has put our party in an unequal position. At the X X I I Congress Khrushchev and his followers accused our party of allegedly "harming" unity by dividing the socialist camp and the international Communist movement by its actions. All sense of responsibility and seriousness must have been lost to make such a charge. Who has really undermined our unity? The APL or the leadership of the CPSU headed by N. Khrushchev? Our party, which has always supported the principle that our differences should be solved in a party fashion, on the basis of the principles of the Moscow declarations of 1957 and 1960, or the Soviet leadership which has trampled these principles under foot and embarked on the anti-Marxist road of pressures and blackmail, even to the point of openly calling for counter-revolution in socialist Albania? The A P L has never

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once publicly spoken of our differences; only in a party fashion and at party meetings has it openly and courageously criticized the mistaken views and actions of the Soviet leaders. However, N. Khrushchev was not only the first to speak publicly from the rostrum of the XXII Congress about the existence of our differences but he also poured out bile; in broad daylight he slandered our party and people's regime, presenting it as a "reign of terror where there are prisons and firing squads right and left," using the language of Rankovic who said that "barbed wire and the boots of the border guards rule in Albania." Our party stands for unity, for strengthening it further, but for a sound, steel-like unity, not an anemic and sickly unity. Precisely because it is for the steel-like unity of the international Communist and workers movement it dared courageously and in a party fashion to criticize the anti-Marxist manifestations and actions of N. Khrushchev which weaken this unity. ( A p -

plause.) We deeply regret that some leaders of the fraternal parties adhered to the mistaken views of N. Khrushchev. We do not want to seek the reasons that compelled them to take this position (we know quite well the difficult position they were in), but can their unilateral, a priori position be called correct when the majority of the representatives of the fraternal parties did not know of the development of relations between our party and the Soviet leaders? Is it right to take sides when the arguments of only one side have been heard, while the other side is denied the right to express its views? Or are new principles to be established in the Communist movement according to which the great are to be heard but not the small, the great are right while the small are always wrong? In our opinion such reasoning is not right at all and is not in agreement with the Leninist norms of relations between fraternal parties. Such a position does not aid the strengthening of the unity of the international Communist and workers movement, the strengthening of the socialist camp, but weakens it and in the future will cause great trouble. Despite this, N. Khrushchev was not supported at the X X I I

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Congress of the CPSU by all the representatives of the fraternal Communist and workers parties. Out of the eighty foreign delegations that took part in the work of the Congress and spoke or sent their greetings in writing, thirty-four representatives of fraternal parties did not join in N. Khrushchev's slanders and accusations against our party ( s t o r m y applause) and did not speak about the misunderstandings that exist between the A P L and the Soviet leaders. 3 Of course, some of them may even have had their own opinions on the work of the A P L , but during the X X I I Congress, which was the Congress of the C P S U , the congress of a particular party, they thought it out of place to discuss a matter that concerns the entire international Communist movement, thus maintaining a correct Marxist-Leninist position. We should also state that the mass of domestic delegates of the X X I I Congress did not express themselves on the Soviet-Albanian misunderstandings. They did not speak against our party, they did not support N. Khrushchev in his attacks and slanders against the A P L . Out of the eighty-eight [CPSU] delegates who took part in the discussions at the Congress, only fourteen spoke against our party. And all these were members of the Soviet leadership. Our A P L thanks both the representatives of the fraternal workers parties for their correct principled position of not supporting N. Khrushchev in his unilateral attacks on our party, and the delegates of Lenin's glorious Communist Party who, by adhering to Bolshevik traditions and Leninist principles of objective judgment in this matter, did not support N. Khrushchev in this anti-Marxist act. (Applause.) From the rostrum of the X X I I Congress, among the numerous slanderous accusations, the First Secretary of the CPSU spoke about the alleged lack of democracy in our party, of the alleged violation of Leninist norms in its internal life. This, of course, is open meddling in the internal affairs of our party; however, we can say to these "defenders" of democracy: Take a better look at your affairs, because there are many scandalous violations of the most elementary rules of democracy, not in the "See above, p. 83.—Ed.

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A P L but in your party. When Dimitri Polyansky attacked the antiparty group, and particularly Comrade Kliment Voroshilov, naturally he neglected to relate in detail all the preparations that he and his comrades had organized at the time of the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in the summer of 1957. Polyansky hid all these things from the Congress but told them to his "friend" Liri Belishova, who reported them to our party. Let us take another example. When the court in Tirana meted out well-deserved punishment to Teme Sejko and his companions, who were agents of American imperialism, of Yugoslavia and Greece, out of the entire press of the countries of the people's democracies of Europe only the newspaper Trud, the organ of the Bulgarian working class, reported this trial correctly. Immediately, that very day, in a most "democratic" fashion (laughter), it was announced that the president and two secretaries of the Central Council of the Bulgarian Labor Unions had been removed from their posts. This was because the revisionist Tito on that very day lodged a strong protest with the Bulgarian government in connection with the paper's report of the Tirana trial. After all, these people that talk about internal democracy and respect for the party norms, and we are speaking especially about Palmiro Togliatti—did he define his action at the XXII Congress as correct and democratic when he spoke and condemned our party? He did not know what had happened before and how relations between our party and the Soviet leaders had developed. At least our party had given the Italian Communist Party no materials. Its Central Committee had not previously passed any resolution denouncing our party and therefore authorizing its representatives to condemn our party. At least we knew of no such fact. What kind of democracy then are these leaders talking about, who are scandalized without cause over the fate of one person, but who, when the fate of a party, of 50,000 Communists, and of an entire people is involved, make statements that are insulting, totally irresponsible, and in flagrant contradiction to the elementary rules not only of party democracy but also of simple logic and human conscience? Palmiro Togliatti pronounced the Roman anathema

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against us, accusing us of disrupting the unity of the international Communist movement. On what grounds does Togliatti stand, who only a few years ago publicly attacked the Soviet socialist system and preached polycentrism and zones of influence in the international Communist movement? He does not and will not have anything against us; but with his own anti-Marxist theses he rendered a great service to the revisionist Tito. It is strange that no one came out against Togliatti's revisionist views. N. Khrushchev, who talks so much about democratic methods, patience, and internationalism, employs the most anti-Marxist methods against our country, methods which are thoroughly alien to relations between socialist countries. With the purpose of subduing the APL, of keeping it from having its own view, of imposing his own anti-Marxist view on it, he and his followers have not refrained from any measures, not only in the relations between our parties but also in the relations between our socialist states. Today, we do not want to go into details and dwell at length on this question since there are many facts and countless documents that illustrate this objectively, but we will mention that as a result of the use of anti-Marxist methods by the Soviet leaders to solve existing misunderstandings, as a result of one pressure after another in the economic, political, and military spheres, relations between our country and the Soviet Union have become quite strained. This development began in the second half of last year, i.e., after the Bucharest meeting. Since then, instead of agreeing to solve them patiently, N. Khrushchev has made public the ideological and political misunderstandings existing between our party and the Soviet leadership and has even extended them to state relations. Thus, in the economic field all credits that the Soviet Union had granted our country for the Third Five-Year Plan were cut, and this was done to sabotage the economic plan of our country; all the Soviet specialists who were working in Albania and whom our economy needs and whom we officially asked to stay were withdrawn unilaterally and without any reason; with an ultimatum that, starting this year, we repay old debts (although, according to existing documents, this should start after 1970), the

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Soviet side has broken off almost all trade on a clearing basis; scholarships were taken away from all Albanian civilian and military students in the Soviet Union, etc., etc. Economic pressures have been accompanied with pressures and restrictive measures in the military sphere. On the other hand, everybody knows well that the press of the People's Republic of Albania continually reports on the life and successes of the Soviet Union in the construction of communism and openly supports the proposals of the CPSU and the Soviet government in connection with various international questions. However, about a year and a half ago, the Soviet press declared a blockade of silence against Albania. Whereas it does not let the slightest occasion go by to write about any positive word that by chance has escaped from any English lord, the Soviet press has not written a line either about the APL or Albania, as though there did not exist on the face of the earth either the People's Republic of Albania or the Albanian people who are constructing socialism and are fighting for peace, finding themselves in the jaws of the wolf, surrounded on all sides by imperialists and their tools. The icy silence was broken only at the XXII Congress of the CPSU by N. Khrushchev, and it was broken solely and simply to slander and pour out bile on the APL and the Albanian People's Republic. Some leaders of the socialist countries of Europe have also followed Nikita Khrushchev in these anti-Marxist and hostile actions toward the Albanian people. Altogether they are doing their utmost to isolate Albania economically, politically, and militarily by creating a "cordon sanitaire" around her. N. Khrushchev forgets that in the century of the triumph of Leninism there can be no "cordon" to isolate a people and a party that are fighting resolutely for the triumph of socialism and communism: there can be no "cordon," however organized and strong, that can resist Marxist-Leninist truth. Any "cordon" will be smashed and its organizers fall in shame! (Stormy applause. All rise. Ovation.) The First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR

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was not satisfied with this. Seeing that all his pressures, blockades, and blackmail did not yield the results he desired, did not bring our party and people to their knees, he openly issued a call from the rostrum of the X X I I Congress to overthrow the leaders of the APL with a counter-revolutionary putsch, to liquidate the Party, which is something he refrains from doing even with regard to the governments of captalist countries, since he considers it meddling in their internal affairs. He said: " T o put an end to the personality cult means essentially for Shehu, Hoxha, and others to give up their command posts in the Party and state. But they do not want to do this. However, we are convinced that the time will come when the Albanian people will have their say (laughter), and then the Albanian leaders will have to answer for the harm they have done to their country, their people, and the cause of socialist construction in Albania." The Albanian people and the Albanian Communists have given the answer to N. Khrushchev in hundreds and thousands of telegrams and letters, some of which have been published in our press. (Stormy applause. All rise. Ovation.) Our party and people have heard continuously for seventeen years the call to overthrow our people's regime, to liquidate our party and its leaders. They have heard it and still hear it every year from the U.S. State Department, from American, British, and other imperialists, from Franco's Radio "Nationalist Spain," from Tito's treacherous revisionist gang, from the Greek monarcho-fascists, and others. They have even organized plots to achieve their aims. Now we have heard such a call from Nikita Khrushchev as well; he is in fact joining them in their hostile activities against the Albanian people and their APL. What have the imperialists and their tools relied on in their activity against our people's regime and party in our country? Their army has been the scum of our society, degenerate and antiparty elements, men who have sold themselves to foreign imperialist intelligence, whom our people think of only with a feeling of disgust, contempt, and deep revulsion. This will also be Nikita Khrushchev's army. (Laughter.) It cannot be otherwise. All our people, young and old, all decent and patriotic persons, whether

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in or outside the Party, are now united more strongly than ever around our glorious party and its correct Marxist-Leninist line which expresses the vital interests of our people and corresponds to the common interests of our great cause, socialism and communism. (Stormy applause. All rise. Ovation.) The hostile activities and brutal interference of Nikita Khrushchev will fail miserably before the steel-like unity of our party and people, before this indestructible force, just as all the hostile activities and all the plots of imperialists, of Yugoslav revisionists, of Greek monarcho-fascists, and of other enemies against the Albanian people, its APL, have failed in the past and will always fail. At the XXII Congress of the CPSU, N. Khrushchev accused our party and its leaders of being anti-Soviet, calling any critical comment about his anti-Marxist views and actions, made at party assemblies and according to Leninist rules, an attack on the Soviet Union and the Soviet peoples. This is a slander and a monstrous distortion. For twenty years our party and people have been educated in the spirit of boundless love and infinite loyalty to the glorious Soviet Union and the CPSU. They have shown this love and loyalty by deeds in the common struggle against fascism, in common views on the construction of the socialist and communist society, for peace and freedom of peoples, have shown them by their principled and inflexible struggle against our common enemies—imperialists and presentday revisionists—particularly after the X X Congress of the CPSU and the counter-revolution in Hungary, when the enemies of socialism launched a savage attack and slanders against the Soviet system and stabbed Soviet soldiers in the back. The entire heroic struggle and untiring efforts of our party and people for twenty years to forge and strengthen constantly the sacred Albanian-Soviet friendship cannot be liquidated so easily by some unfounded accusations and vile slanders. AlbanianSoviet friendship has deep roots; it shall exist for centuries, despite the desires and efforts of our critics. (Applause.) Who is really defending the Soviet Union and its prestige? Is it Nikita Khrushchev, who with his own unprincipled attacks

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and slanders against J. V. Stalin has discredited the glorious Soviet Union, presenting it as a country where savage terror reigned, like Hitler's Germany; or is it the APL, which has defended and is defending the Soviet Union from the savage attacks of imperialist and revisionist propaganda to which Nikita Khrushchev has given arms? Who is defending the Soviet Union and its prestige—Nikita Khrushchev, who by his anti-Marxist activities, attacks, pressures, and blockades against the People's Republic of Albania has given arms to the imperialists to stain the Soviet Union in the eyes of the world, or the APL, which has shown and is showing that his anti-Marxist actions have nothing in common with the internationalist principles and traditions of the glorious Soviet Union and Lenin's great party, that they are an unfortunate and passing illness in their healthy body? Our party listened patiently to what was said about it at the X X I I Congress. Now we are giving our views on this question. The APL, with a clear and untroubled conscience, calls on the CPSU, calls on the new Central Committee elected by the X X I I Congress to judge with Leninist fairness, with objectivity and coolness, not in a one-sided way, the situation created in the relations between the two parties and the two states. Our party has always been ready to resolve existing misunderstandings, for the sake of the unity of the Communist movement and the socialist camp, in the interest of our countries. But it has always been and is of the opinion that these questions must be settled justly and in the Marxist-Leninist way, under conditions of equality and not of pressures and dictation. (Stormy applause.) We have hope and confidence in the justice of the CPSU. Our party and people, regardless of the attacks, slanders, and hostile actions that have been directed against them, will keep intact in their hearts pure sentiments of friendship for the fraternal peoples of the Soviet Union. Our party has taught and teaches us to love the Soviet Union, the great motherland of Lenin and Stalin, both in good and in bad times. For us the glorious Soviet Union and Soviet peoples, the great Bolshevik

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party, have been, are, and remain the dearest friends of our hearts, our liberators from the fascist yoke, our loyal and resolute allies in the struggle for the construction of socialism in our country. We have been and will be bound for life with the Soviet Union, with the Soviet peoples, with the CPSU. (Stormy applause.) Our party and people have followed and are following with particular sympathy the glorious efforts and successes which the Soviet toilers, led by their glorious Communist Party, have won in all fields of communist construction, and consider them victories of the Albanian people in the common struggle for the triumph of the great cause of socialism and communism. We are firmly convinced that the objectives and tasks mapped out by the XXII Congress of the CPSU will be successfully realized, as always, for the good of the peoples of the Soviet Union, of the entire socialist camp, for the benefit of the sacred cause of socialism and communism, of peace and freedom of all the peoples of the world. Our party and people, as always, will fight for the cause of socialism and communism, united in the socialist camp, hand in hand with the fraternal peoples of the Soviet Union, with the fraternal Chinese people, with all the peoples in the countries of the socialist camp. . . . The following month saw an intensification of verbal attacks by the CPSU and other parties on the APL leadership. The Chinese Communist press, on the contrary, gave increasing and favorable coverage to Albanian developments, while the CPC leadership hailed Albanian anniversaries and welcomed visiting Albanian delegations to China. 1 1 . F E D O R KONSTANTINOV, E D I T O R - I N - C H I E F

OF

Kommunist.

" T H E SCHISMATIC A N T I - M A R X I S T A C T I V I T I E S O F THE A L -

Kommunist (Moscow), No. 17, November, 1961 ["signed to press" December 7, 1961]. 4 BANIAN L E A D E R S . "

. . THE INTERNATIONAL C O M M U N I S T movement approves and supports the decisions of the XX and XXII congresses of .

* Kommunist is the monthly theoretical organ of the Central Committee of the C P S U .

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the C P S U , their theoretical propositions and political conclusions, the c o n d e m n a t i o n of the Stalin personality c u l t and its conseq u e n c e s , as w e l l as the ideological and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l rout of the antiparty g r o u p of M o l o t o v , K a g a n o v i c h , M a l e n k o v , others.

T h r o u g h the speeches of their representatives

and

at the

X X I I C o n g r e s s of the C P S U the fraternal parties c o n d e m n e d strongly

and unreservedly

schismatic Labor.

activity

.

.

of

the anti-Leninist p o s i t i o n and

the leaders of

the A l b a n i a n

the

Party

of

.

T h e article cited the resolution adopted by the X X I I C P S U Congress on the Central Committee report, and went on to refer in some detail to the attacks on the A P L leadership made by foreign C o m munists at the Congress and thereafter. R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the fraternal parties of socialist and capitalist countries f r o m E u r o p e , A m e r i c a , A s i a , a n d A f r i c a o n e after another

condemned

the

schismatic

activity

of

the

Albanian

leaders. N o b o o k k e e p i n g technique used b y H o x h a and S h e h u to c o u n t up h o w m a n y times their names w e r e m e n t i o n e d at the X X I I C o n g r e s s will help them. Since the X X I I C o n g r e s s of the C P S U as well, the fraternal parties have been c o n d e m n i n g witho u t reservation, in the press and the resolutions of their C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e s , the A l b a n i a n leaders' trampling u p o n the principles of internationalism, their renunciation of M a r x i s m , a n d their s u b versive vicious p r o p a g a n d a and adventurism in p o l i c y . T h e issue is clear. T h e c o n d e m n a t i o n b y the

.

.

international

C o m m u n i s t m o v e m e n t of the A l b a n i a n leaders' schismatic and a n t i - M a r x i s t p o l i c y and p r o p a g a n d a is u n a n i m o u s . A l i e n to M a r x i s m - L e n i n i s m and the socialist system, the p e r sonality cult is the principal, y e t not the sole, c a u s e and m a n i festation of Albanian

the political

leaders. A n o t h e r

and

ideological

degradation

m a j o r cause is their

of

the

nationalism,

nationalistic n a r r o w - m i n d e d n e s s , their inability and incapacity to

approach

Leninist

present-day

internationalism,

problems of

the

from

the

viewpoint

interests

and

tasks

of

of the

socialist c a m p , and the international C o m m u n i s t m o v e m e n t as a whole.

134

The Albanian

Crisis

Leninist proletarian internationalism unites and consolidates the socialist countries, the international working class, the Communist and workers parties into a powerful revolutionary force. In contrast to this, reactionary nationalism weakens the working class of different countries. Taken as a weapon by the imperialistic bourgeoisie, nationalism is its ideology and policy used for disuniting the working class and subjugating it to the imperialist bourgeoisie. By betraying the principles of proletarian internationalism the Albanian leaders are sliding toward the positions of bourgeois nationalism. This is what has led them to the hostile attitude toward the international Communist movement and to the schismatic activity against the countries of the socialist camp, including the great internationalist force, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and against the CPSU. At present the Albanian leaders are trying to shift the blame for the economic difficulties in Albania onto the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. This device is used by them to absolve themselves of the responsibility for poor management of their national economy and at the same time to try to destroy the Albanian people's love for the Soviet people, their liberator and friend, and to stir up morbid nationalistic feelings among the people. Such is the perfidious scheme of the Albanian leaders. They mislead the people and distort facts. For facts refute the Albanian leaders' assertions that the USSR and other socialist countries refused to help Albania. Actually, the Soviet Union, guided by the principles of fraternal cooperation and socialist internationalism, constantly rendered help of all kinds to Albania and spared no effort to enable Albania to accomplish the tasks of economic and cultural construction and raise the living standards of the Albanian people more rapidly. Within fifteen years Albania received many hundreds of millions of rubles in free aid and loans from the USSR and other socialist countries. More than once considerable loans to Albania were declared by the Soviet Union to be free grants and canceled, and a number of enterprises built with Soviet loans

The Albanian

Crisis

135

were transferred as gifts of the Soviet people to the Albanian people. Contrary to the declarations of the Albanian leaders, the Soviet Union complied with all deliveries of grain under the trade agreements for 1960 and 1961 scrupulously, punctually, in due time, and even in excess of the amounts specified. Such are the facts. But the Albanian leaders began to make exorbitant demands of the USSR and other socialist countries in violation of the reciprocity principle. These exorbitant demands reflected not internationalism, but narrow-minded nationalism. Hoxha and Shehu interpret the internationalist principle of fraternal cooperation and mutual aid in a rather peculiar way: as a unilateral duty of the other socialist countries to satisfy any of their economic demands. Consistent internationalism lies in the combination of the efforts to develop the national economy of each socialist country with the joint efforts to consolidate and expand economic cooperation and mutual assistance. ". . Such is the highroad of the further advance of the world socialist economy" (N. S. Khrushchev). Contrary to their noisy "left-wing" phrases, Hoxha, Shehu, and their followers manifest nationalistic narrow-mindedness and egotism also in their resenting the fact that the USSR and the other socialist countries help the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa. To hear them speak, this is not useful, but indeed harmful to the cause of social progress. Because of their narrow-minded nationalism the Albanian leaders cannot understand that the help to these countries is of great historical significance for their independent development; it is also helpful in expanding the anti-imperialist front. The Albanian leaders fail to understand the role of the neutral countries in the struggle for peace. To engraft his nationalistic feelings alien to socialism in the Albanian people and set them against the USSR, Hoxha resorts to monstrous slander: He claims that the Soviet Union demanded that Albania disarm itself unilaterally. Knowing too well that this is a malicious and provocative fabrication, Hoxha yet again and again brings into play his impudent allegation that

136

The Albanian

Crisis

the Soviet government supports the territorial claims of the Greek reactionary circles to South Albania, an allegation which has long been refuted. T h e bourgeois nationalism of the Albanian leaders is also manifested in their extolling inordinately their role in the destinies of the socialist camp, in the struggle against imperialism, in the "development" of Marxist theory and the criticism of revisionism. Nationalist arrogance and claims to exclusiveness have aways been the attributes of the representatives of bourgeois nationalism and not of Marxist-Leninists. Now what are the new propositions of creative MarxismLeninism that the "Marxists" Hoxha and Shehu are fighting against? Against the major propositions of the X X and X X I I congresses of the CPSU, the 1957 Declaration and the 1960 Statement. First of all, against the characterization of the contemporary epoch, given in those documents and the Program of the C P S U , as an epoch whose main content is the transition from capitalism to socialism and against the appraisal of the correlation of forces in the world arena. On those issues as well, Hoxha and his followers are standing still by accepting definitions and conclusions dating back to the period prior to 1917. But life has moved far ahead. A powerful world socialist system exists today. Its decisive influence on the course of world events is beyond doubt. The direction of historical development is now determined not by imperialism but by socialism. . The dogmatists Hoxha and Shehu refuse to understand that the imperialist tiger, a tiger though it still is, cannot go on the prowl with impunity as before, for he is greatly apprehensive of the socialist giant. Should imperialism dare to attack the socialist countries it would dig its own grave. Gone is the time when the question of war and peace depended on the will of the imperialists. The presence in the world of the mighty socialist camp and the movement of peoples fighting for peace prevents this. Hoxha distorts and falsifies the position of the X X Congress of the C P S U as well as the Declaration and Statement of the

The Albanian Crisis

137

Communist parties concerning the possibility of preventing wars. He ascribes to the CPSU the most preposterous idea that in the decisions of the X X Congress all hopes in the struggle for peace are associated, not with the might of the socialist camp and the peoples of the entire world, but with the "good intentions of the imperialist rulers." . . . Such are the facts. These facts Hoxha, Shehu, and their followers want to distort. What for? To misrepresent the position of the CPSU and to damage the cause of unity of the fraternal Communist parties, the unity based on their common MarxistLeninist views concerning all cardinal questions of today, including that of the possibility of preventing war in our epoch. The Marxist-Leninist position of our party and of the Soviet state on the issues of war and peace has won the respect and support of all peace-loving peoples, the support of the countries of the socialist camp and of the fraternal Communist parties; this position has nothing to do with crude inventions and slanderous allegations concocted by the Albanian leaders. To hear them speak, Hoxha and his retainers come out for the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, but in the same breath they manage to slander the CPSU, misrepresent the foreign policy of the Soviet state and our party as well as the policy of the socialist countries, and at the same time to distort the documents on this major issue of the international forums held by the fraternal parties. For Hoxha and his followers the Leninist principle of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems is not the general line of foreign policy, but merely a fine noncommittal catchword, a clever tactical ruse. This is what Hoxha said in his speech on November 7, 1961: "We do not object[!] to the principle of peaceful coexistence" . . . but [we] do not agree with those who "regard peaceful coexistence as the general line of the foreign policy of the socialist countries." No, the policy of peaceful coexistence is not a tactical device for the Soviet Union and the Communist parties of the other socialist states, as the ideologists and political chieftains of im-

138

The Albanian

Crisis

perialism are trying to make out. Profoundly substantiated by Lenin and creatively developed by our party, by Comrade N. S. Khrushchev, it is the general line of the foreign policy of the USSR and the other socialist countries. This policy corresponds to the fundamental interests of all peoples, including the Albanian people, as well as the fundamental vital interests of all mankind. This policy follows from the nature of the socialist system, from the letter and spirit of Marxism-Leninism. The CPSU has always regarded peaceful coexistence as a form of the class struggle. Peaceful coexistence does not mean the "freezing" of social progress, of the class struggle inside the capitalist countries and on the international arena between the exploited and the exploiters, between the forces of progress and those of reaction. Following the behests of Lenin, the Marxist-Leninists proceed from the fact that in the peaceful competition of the two systems—socialism and capitalism— socialism is bound to triumph owing to its advantages and because the new, advanced, ascending has always triumphed over the old, moribund, outdated. How can people like Hoxha, who consider themselves Marxists, come out, under the circumstances, against peaceful coexistence as the general line of the foreign policy of the socialist countries? Evidently Hoxha does not believe in the power and advantages of socialism; this is why he insists on his adventurist foreign policy; it is clear from his statements that he is in fact against the Soviet proposals on general and complete disarmament. In their official government-level statements the Albanian leaders support the Soviet proposals on the questions of disarmament. But in the articles and speeches in which they "theorize" they make thousands of reservations nullifying their agreement with the proposals of the USSR. . . . Another falsification of Hoxha should be pointed out— that concerning the forms of the transition of various countries to socialism, including the possibility of peaceful transition, a socialist revolution without a civil war, by means of combining parliamentary and nonparliamentary forms of the class struggle of the working people. Distorting the decisions of the X X Con-

The Albanian

Crisis

139

gress of the C P S U in which both peaceful and nonpeaceful forms are indicated, Hoxha falsely claims that the CPSU favors peaceful forms only. As is known, Marx and Engels admitted that the working class of nineteenth-century Britain and Holland could come to power without an armed insurrection. Nor did V . I. Lenin rule out this possibility under the conditions of the new epoch. With the formation of the world socialist system, when the correlation of forces in the world has been changing in favor of socialism, there are increasing possibilities in several countries for the peaceful transition of power to the working class, for the peaceful achievement of the dictatorship of the working class. . . . Whenever the leaders of the A P L refer to imperialism, war and peace, peaceful coexistence, the forms of the transition of different countries to socialism, their speeches are shot through with the idea that socialist revolutions are not the result of the inner development of the capitalist countries but something imposed from outside. Marxism-Leninism holds that revolutions are accomplished by the working class, the people of a given country, when all necessary objective and subjective conditions in it have matured. Marx and Lenin came out against "blessing" other peoples with revolutions imposed from outside. Lenin came out on this issue especially against the "Left-wing" Communists headed by Bukharin. Our party fought against the adventurism of the Trotskyites in the sphere of foreign policy. The enemies of MarxismLeninism try to ascribe to us the inimical theory and practice of the export of revolutions. But then they are the representatives of the bourgeoisie, enemies of Marxism, enemies of socialism. Now, who is going to benefit by the adventurist ways of E . Hoxha? Whom does he echo? Beset by inner difficulties and contradictions the Albanian leaders would like, it seems, to "accelerate" the course of historical development by means of external interference. This is evidently one of the sources of their adventurism, their vociferous petty-bourgeois revolutionism, their attempts to readjust

140

The Albanian

Crisis

and interpret Marxism-Leninism subjectively and in their own fashion, to make it suit the needs of their anti-Marxist political practices. While deviating from the revolutionary teaching of Marx, Engels, Lenin, the A P L leaders pretend to be fighters against revisionism. It should be said, however, that the "leftist" phrases sported by H o x h a and Shehu can deceive no one. The Communist movement has seen opportunists in different disguises, both "leftist" and rightist. History gives evidence that in the final analysis the "left-wingers" joined hands with the "right-wingers." This is how it was with the "Left C o m munists" in our country in 1918, this is how it was with the Trotskyites and Zinovievites, and this is how it was with the group of Ruth Fischer and Maslow in the Communist Party of Germany. All those who came out against Leninism, against the first country of socialism, against the USSR, against the Leninist Party, all who persevered in, and insisted on, their fallacious anti-Leninist line, would always roll down finally to the camp of the enemies of socialism, the camp of the enemies of Marxism-Leninism. Deeply aware of the fact that the two varieties of opportunism nourish each other, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its Leninist Central Committee have always conducted a relentless struggle against revisionism as well as against dogmatism and sectarianism. Our party was the first to have leveled a well-justified and comprehensive criticism at the Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. The new Program of the CPSU, named the Communist Manifesto of our epoch by the fraternal parties, is a powerful blow against revisionism as well as against dogmatism. No truly consistent struggle against revisionism is possible from the positions of dogmatism and sectarianism on which the Albanian leaders make their stand. Revisionism can be routed ideologically and defeated only from the positions of creative Marxism-Leninism. This is what the CPSU has been doing brilliantly, in a Leninist way, in close cooperation with other fraternal parties. The Albanian leaders' noisy abuse of the re-

The Albanian Crisis

141

visionists more often than not discredits the genuine and effective struggle against revisionism. T h e example of the Albanian leaders confirms the proposition set down in the Statement of the Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers Parties of 1960; that alongside the struggle against revisionism as the chief danger, a struggle should be waged against dogmatism as well which may become the chief danger in some parties. F o r the Albanian Party of Labor the dogmatism of its leaders has indeed become the chief danger. Hence, it is clear that a relentless uncompromising struggle on two fronts is necessary in the future as well: against revisionism and against dogmatism and sectarianism, for the Marxist-Leninist line, for proletarian internationalism, for the unity of the socialist camp and the world Communist movement on a principled Marxist-Leninist basis. In their continued attacks on the leadership of the APL, the spokesmen for the CPSU emphasized that the "entire" international Communist movement supported the CPSU position. From late October, 1961, through February, 1962, Pravda (along with other media) published excerpts from or the complete texts of numerous statements, editorials, and resolutions of foreign Communists to illustrate wide support for the CPSU. The following table lists only those foreign Communist statements which dealt with the APL. Date of Pravda Oct. 28, 1961 Oct. 31, 1961 Nov. 10, 1961 Nov. 11, 1961 Nov. 11, 1961

Party and Source Czechoslovak Communist Party. Editorial in Rude Pravo. Polish United Workers Party. Editorial in Try buna Ludu. Communist Party of France. Speech by Maurice Thorez, Secretary-General, Nov. 7, 1961. (See Document No. 66.)11 Rumanian Workers Party. Editorial in Scinteia, Nov. 10, 1961. Hungarian Socialist Workers Party. Editorial in Nepszabadsag.

' The Pravda reprint of this speech omits any mention of China.

142 Date of Pravda Nov. 12, 1961

The Albanian Party and

Crisis

Source

Communist Party of Great Britain. Article by John Gollan, General Secretary, in the Daily Worker. Nov. 13, 1961 Communist Party of USA. Article by Elizabeth G . Flynn, Chairman of National Committee, in Pravda. Nov. 13, 1961 Communist Party of the Netherlands. Article by Paul de Groot, Secretary-General, in Pravda. Nov. 14, 1961 Communist Party of Denmark. Editorial in Land og Folk. Nov. 14, 1961 Czechoslovak Communist Party. Editorial in Rude Pravo. Nov. 16, 1961 Communist Party of Italy. Speech by Palmiro Togliatti, Secretary-General, Nov. 10, 1961. (See Document No. 60.) Nov. 16, 1961 Communist Party of Great Britain. Resolution of Executive Committee, in the Daily Worker. Nov. 17, 1961 Communist Party of Belgium. Editorial in Le Drapeau Rouge, Nov. 14, 1961. Nov. 17, 1961 Polish United Workers Party. Editorial in Trybuna Ludu. Nov. 18, 1961 Communist Party of Canada. Article by Tim Buck, General Secretary, in Pravda. Nov. 19, 1961 Communist Party of Luxembourg. Resolution of Central Committee, in Zeitung Vum Letzeburger Vollek. Nov. 21, 1961 Hungarian Socialist Workers Party. Resolution of Central Committee, Nov. 17, 1961. Nov. 22, 1961 Czechoslovak Communist Party. Report of Antonin Novotnv, First Secretary. (See Document No. 42.) Nov. 23, 1961 Communist Party of Austria. Resolution of Central Committee. Nov. 24, 1961 Communist Party of Uruguay. Article by Rodney Arismendi, First Secretary, in El Popular. Nov. 24, 1961- Polish United Workers Party. Report of speech by Nov. 25, 1961 Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Secretary, at Central Committee Plenum. (See Document No. 45.) Nov. 26, 1961 Communist Party of France. Speech by Maurice Thorez, Nov. 19, 1961. N o v . 27, 1961- G e r m a n Socialist Unity Party. Report of speech by

The Albanian Date of Pravda Nov. 29, 1961 Nov. 28, 1961

Nov. 30, 1961

Dec. 2, 1961Dec. 8, 1961 Dec. 3, 1961 Dec. 4, 1961 Dec. 5, 1961 Dec. 7, 1961 Dec. 7, 1961 Dec. 10, 1961 Dec. 13, 1961 Dec. 14, 1961 Dec. 15, 1961 Dec. 17, 1961 Dec. 18, 1961

Dec. 20, 1961

143

Crisis Party and

Source

Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary, at Central Committee Plenum. (See Document No. 49.) Communist Party of France. Resolution of Central Committee on speech by Waldeck Rochet, Deputy Secretary-General. (See Document No. 67.) Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. Speech by Luysantserengiin Tsend, Second Secretary, at meeting of Ulan Bator party aktiv. (See Document No. 58.) Bulgarian Communist Party. Report of speech by Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary, at Central Committee Plenum. (See Document No. 50.) Communist Party of Sweden. Article by Hilding Hagberg, Chairman, in Ny Dag. Korean Workers Party. Speech by Kim Il-sung, Chairman, at Central Committee Plenum. (See Document No. 53.) Integrated Revolutionary Organizations of Cuba. Television speech by Bias Roca, Head of Cuban delegation to XXII CPSU Congress, Dec. 1, 1961. Rumanian Workers Party. Resolution of Central Committee. Communist Party of Greece. Resolution of Central Committee. Rumanian Workers Party. Speech by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, First Secretary. (See Document No. 51.) Progressive Party of the Working People of Cyprus. Resolution of Central Committee. Communist Party of Uruguay. Resolution of Central Committee. Czechoslovak Communist Party. Article in Rude Pravo. Communist Party of Martinique. Article by Camille Sylvestre, General Secretary. Communist Party of France. Report by Pravda correspondent in Paris on the discussion of the results of the XXII CPSU Congress by French Communists. Communist Party of Norway. Article by Emil L0vlien, Chairman, in Friheten.

144 Dale of Pravda Dec. 21, 1961 Dec. 21, 1961 Dec. 22, 1961 Dec. 24, 1961 Dec. 26, 1961 Dec. 27, 1961

Dec. 31, 1961 Jan. 3, 1962 Jan. 3, 1962 Jan. 5, 1962 Jan. 7, 1962 Jan. 8, 1962 Jan. 8, 1962 Jan. 10, 1962 Jan. 12, 1962

Jan. 13, 1962

Jan. 15, 1962 Jan. 22, 1962 Jan. 23, 1962

The Albanian Crisis Party and

Source

Peoples Vanguard Party of Costa Rica. Resolution of National Committee. Communist Party of Germany. Resolution of Central Committee. Communist Party of Iraq. Resolution of Central Committee. Communist Party of Australia. Declaration of Central Committee. Hungarian Socialist Workers Party. Article by Janos Kadar, First Secretary. Communist Party of Spain. Speech by Santiago Carrillo, Secretary-General, in Espana popular, Dec. 26, 1961. Communist Party of Denmark. Resolution of Central Committee, in Land og Folk. Guatemalan Party of Labor. Article by S. Juarez, Secretary, in Pravda. Communist Party of the Netherlands. Report of Paul de Groot, at Central Committee Plenum. Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. Speech by Yumzhagiin Tsedenbal, First Secretary. Communist Party of Brazil. Resolution of Central Committee. Communist Party of Mexico. Resolution of Central Committee. Communist Party of Colombia. Resolution of Central Committee. Communist Party of Algeria. Resolution of Central Committee. Communist Party of Paraguay. Declaration of Central Committee, in El Popular. (See Document N o . 90.) Communist Party of Argentina. Report of speech by Victorio Codovilla, President, at Central Committee Plenum. Communist Party of Tunisia. Declaration of Central Committee. Communist Party of Great Britain. Declaration of Executive Committee. Communist Party of Canada. Resolution of National Congress.

The Albanian Date of Pravda Jan. 28, 1962 Jan. 31, 1962 Feb. 3, 1962 Feb. 11, 1962 Feb. 21, 1962

145

Crisis Party and Source

Communist Party of Morocco. Resolution of Central Committee. Communist Party of Spain. Declaration of Central Committee. Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. Speech by Yumzhagiin Tsedenbal, at Central Committee Plenum. (See Document No. 59.) Czechoslovak Communist Party. Report given at Central Committee Plenum, February 6 - 7 . Statements condemning the APL leadership by the Communist parties of the following countries: Rumania, Spain, Mongolian People's Republic, Finland, Greece, Denmark, Austria, Lebanon, Mexico, Uruguay, Canada, Chile, Republic of South Africa.

12. Note Verbale PRESENTED ON NOVEMBER 25, 1961, BY THE DEPUTY

M I N I S T E R OF F O R E I G N A F F A I R S O F T H E

USSR,

N I K O L A I F I R I U B I N , TO T H E A C T I N G CHARGÉ D ' A F F A I R E S O F A L B A N I A IN THE U S S R , G A C M A Z I , C O N C E R N I N G T H E CALL O F THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR,

IOSIF SHIKIN,

RE-

FROM

ALBANIA. Zeri i Popullit, December 10, 1961. THE USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been authorized, by instructions of the Soviet government, to declare the following: T h e A l b a n i a n government, by following a course of f u r t h e r aggravation of its relations with the Soviet Union, especially since the X X I I CPSU Congress, has created an intolerable situation for normal activities of the Soviet A m b a s s a d o r in T i r a n a as well as for those of other Soviet diplomats. T h e Soviet A m b a s s a d o r has been put in a position where he c a n n o t c a r r y out normally the recommendations of his government. In fact, the USSR Embassy is in an isolated situation and the most elementary norms of international law are being violated in regard to it. F o r provocative reasons, the Albanian authorities are slanderously accusing the employees of the USSR E m b a s s y of allegedly hostile activities against Albania. In addition, in the

146

The Albanian

Crisis

past few days the Albanian government has taken a step unprecedented in reciprocal relations between two socialist countries, demanding, without any grounds, a reduction of the staff of the Soviet Embassy by nearly two-thirds. In view of the fact that the Albanian authorities have intentionally created conditions depriving the Soviet Ambassador to Albania of the opportunity to perform his diplomatic functions, the USSR government is compelled to take the decision to recall the USSR Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Comrade I. V. Shikin, from Albania. The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs asks that this decision of the USSR government be transmitted to the Albanian government without delay. 13. Note

Verbale

PRESENTED ON NOVEMBER 25, 1961, BY THE

D E P U T Y MINISTER OF FOREIGN A F F A I R S OF THE

USSR,

NIKOLAI FIRIUBIN, TO THE A C T I N G CHARGÉ D ' A F F A I R E S OF ALBANIA IN THE U S S R , GAC M A Z I , CONCERNING THE D E PARTURE OF THE ALBANIAN AMBASSADOR IN THE

USSR,

NESTI NASE. Zeri i Popullit, D e c e m b e r 10, 1961.

THE USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs has heard that the Embassy of the Albanian People's Republic in Moscow has lately been trying to distribute in an intensive manner all kinds of antiSoviet material, containing zealous fabrications against the CPSU and the Soviet Union. Among these are the texts of the hostile declaration of the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor dated October 20, the report by Hoxha on November 7, and other materials containing all manner of lies and base slanders against our party, the Soviet government, and the decisions of the XXII CPSU Congress. Thus the matter reached the point where the Embassy turned over these slanderous materials to the enemies of the socialist camp. One also cannot fail to draw attention to the fact that Albanian citizens in the USSR are widely exploited for acts hostile to the Soviet Union. By abusing the sincere aspiration of the Soviet

The Albanian

Crisis

147

Union to contribute to the training of highly qualified experts to work in the Albanian national economy, the Embassy mobilized the Albanian students for dissemination of anti-Soviet propaganda. Thus an "aspirant" of the Moscow Power Engineering Institute, Jakniu, the students of the Moscow State University, Mecaj and Prillo, of the Moscow Institute of Chemical Technology, Hajdar and Haxhimihali, of the Moscow Technical Institute of Light Industry, Gurakuqi and Gjipale, of the Moscow Institute of Chemical and Gas Industry, Reshati, and of the Leningrad Institute of Technology of Industrial Refrigeration, Pa?ma, have attempted to distribute anti-Soviet documents among Soviet and foreign students and have expressed themselves calumniously concerning questions of Soviet-Albanian relations. All these actions directed against the U S S R cause righteous indignation among the Soviet people inasmuch as they have but one aim—to aggravate and worsen still further the relations between our countries and our parties with a view to disrupting the unity and cohesion of the countries of the great socialist camp. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has repeatedly drawn the attention of the Albanian Embassy in Moscow to the fact that it is forbidden to distribute anti-Soviet materials in the Soviet Union and to mobilize for this work the Albanian citizens who are in the U S S R . However, the Albanian side has not taken any measures to end the distribution of these materials. Instead, the Albanian Embassy, as the facts cited testify, has recently been trying to promote the distribution of materials hostile to the CPSU and the Soviet Union, which is contrary to the normal functions of every diplomatic mission and especially of a country which claims to be a member of the socialist camp. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs protests vigorously to the Albanian Embassy in Moscow in this respect, and it no longer considers it possible for the Ambassador of Albania, Nesti Nase, to remain in the USSR. Simultaneously, the U S S R Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been authorized to demand immediate sus-

The Albanian

148

Crisis

pension of the distribution of anti-Soviet materials by the Albanian Embassy in the USSR and of the dissemination of propaganda hostile to the CPSU and the Soviet Union. 14.

Note Verbale DEPUTY

P R E S E N T E D ON D E C E M B E R 3 ,

MINISTER

OF F O R E I G N

AFFAIRS

1 9 6 1 , BY THE

OF

THE

USSR,

N I K O L A I F I R I U B I N , TO T H E A C T I N G C H A R G É D ' A F F A I R E S O F ALBANIA

IN

THE

USSR,

GAC

MAZI,

CONCERNING

THE

R E C A L L O F T H E U S S R E M B A S S Y S T A F F AND C O M M E R C I A L REPRESENTATION DEPARTURE AND

THE

USSR.

IN TIRANA AND T H E D E M A N D F O R

OF THE S T A F F

ALBANIAN

OF

THE ALBANIAN

COMMERCIAL

Zeri i Popullit, December

10,

COUNSELOR

THE

EMBASSY IN

THE

1961.

THE Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, on instruction by the government of the USSR, states : The Albanian government, by pursuing a course of further aggravation of Albanian-Soviet relations, particularly since the X X I I CPSU Congress, has unleashed in Albania a slanderous and hostile campaign against the USSR. It engages in measures deliberately aimed at hindering the normal activity of the Embassy and the commercial representation of the USSR in Albania. The Soviet diplomats in the Albanian People's Republic are isolated, and even deprived of the possibility of maintaining official contacts with Albanian institutions and organizations. For provocative purposes, the Albanian authorities slanderously accuse the employees of the Soviet representative institutions of allegedly promoting hostile activity against Albania. The most elementary norms of international law are violated with regard to the Soviet Embassy and other Soviet institutions in Albania. The USSR has repeatedly drawn the attention of the Albanian government to the inadmissible actions of the Albanian authorities toward the USSR Embassy in Tirana. The Albanian government, however, not only failed to take any measures, but it further complicated conditions for the personnel of Soviet institutions in Albania.

The

Albanian

Crisis

149

The groundless demand of the Albanian government concerning the reduction of the staff of the Soviet Embassy to almost one-third of its present personnel is an unprecedented step in relations between states, especially between socialist states. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR is authorized to reject emphatically the entirely impermissible demand of the Albanian government regarding the decrease in the staff of the Soviet Embassy in Tirana. As is known, international law does not recognize the right of a country to limit arbitrarily and unilaterally the size of foreign diplomatic missions accredited to that country. It is appropriate to recall, in this regard, that Albania, at several international conferences not long ago, was opposed to attempts to legalize the incorrect practice by which a state that accepts a diplomatic mission in its country fixes its numerical composition. Yet the Albanian government is presently resorting to the methods of capitalist countries, which are used to render difficult at any cost the diplomatic activity of the countries of the socialist camp. The Soviet side certainly cannot remain indifferent to the insufferable situation created by the Albanian authorities for the employees of the USSR Embassy and commercial representation in Tirana. The government of the Soviet Union, taking all this into consideration, and the shameless claim of the Albanian side that Soviet diplomats no longer have anything to do in Albania, has taken the decision to withdraw the entire personnel of the Soviet Embassy and the commercial representation from Albania. Three technical employees will remain to guard the buildings and other materials of the Embassy and the commercial representation of the USSR in Tirana. The Albanian side will be informed at a later date of which state the Soviet government will charge with representing the interests of the Soviet Union and its citizens in Albania. The Soviet side considers that, in view of the conditions in which the Albanian government deliberately further aggravates relations with the Soviet Union by exploiting its diplomatic mission in the

150

The Albanian

Crisis

USSR for anti-Soviet objectives, the future stay of the staff of the Albanian Embassy and the commercial counselor of Albania in Moscow is purposeless. In this connection the Soviet government demands that the entire personnel of the Embassy and the commercial counselor of Albania in Moscow leave the territory of the USSR. 1 5 . N O T E OF THE ALBANIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN

AFFAIRS

PRESENTED TO THE EMBASSY OF THE SOVIET U N I O N IN

TIRANA, DECEMBER 4, 1961. Zeri i Popullit,

D e c e m b e r 10,

1961.

THE Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, acting on instructions of its government and in connection with the verbal note delivered on November 25 to Deputy Chargé d'Affaires of the People's Republic of Albania by the Acting Minister Firiubin, has the honor to present the Embassy of the USSR in Tirana with the following, with the request that he transmit it to the Soviet government. . . . The allegations fabricated in order to justify the recall of Ambassador Shikin are completely groundless and tendentious. The Soviet Ambassador has never been hindered in his work. Oil the contrary, he lias always been given every opportunity to carry out his mission as Ambassador. The truth, and the only motive in this question, is the fact that the authors of this grave and extraordinary act have adopted an unfriendly policy toward the People's Republic of Albania and, in pursuit of this course, are resorting to ever more condemnable anti-Albanian and antiMarxist actions. It is to be noted that among other things the very history of the beginning, continuation, and end of the activity of Ambassador Shikin in the People's Republic of Albania makes one think that from the moment he was sent to Albania the Soviet government intended to recall him in a short time. He remained only five months in Albania, and one cannot refrain from mentioning the fact that for the first time in the history of diplomatic relations between two countries, and precisely at

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the very moment when the sphere of the normal activity of the Embassy was reduced considerably by the fault of the Soviet side, an embassy counselor with the rank of minister plenipotentiary was sent with Ambassador Shikin. This was an act which could be understood only within the context of the premeditated recall of the ambassador. Second, it is with the most profound astonishment and indignation that the government of the Albanian People's Republic received the notification of the government of the USSR that it considers it impossible to continue the stay of the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Albania in the USSR, Nesti Nase, under the completely fabricated and unworthy pretext that the Albanian Ambassador in Moscow has recently distributed materials hostile to the CPSU and the Soviet Union. The Albanian government rejects with greatest firmness this groundless accusation and the protest of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on this subject. The decision of the Soviet leadership concerning the departure of the Ambassador, Nesti Nase, is an integral part of its unfriendly policy toward a socialist state, a friend and brother of the Soviet people, as is the Albanian People's Republic. The Ambassador of the Albanian People's Republic to the Soviet Union, Comrade Nesti Nase, has always fulfilled his tasks conscientiously as a diplomat, as an Albanian, and as a Communist, rigorously respecting the laws and the rules which are in force in the Soviet Union. He has worked vigorously to further strengthen and temper the eternal friendship between our fraternal peoples and our socialist countries. It is appropriate to say that in the performance of his noble mission as a socialist diplomat, not only did he not have proper assistance, but he was obstructed by the Soviet authorities, who used every means, even the most impermissible, including concealed and overt surveillance. Indeed, it is known that for a number of years the Albanian Embassy in the Soviet Union has been under constant surveillance through a special device installed at the time of the construction of the building, and even today it is under obvious police control. Three militiamen are

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permanently stationed in front of the Embassy, and they screen all persons who enter, thus hindering the normal functioning and regular fulfillment of diplomatic tasks of the mission and violating the most elementary norms which ought to be observed with respect to a foreign legation, particularly of a country which is a friend and ally. The government of the Albanian People's Republic vehemently protests against this decision of the Soviet government which demands, without reason, the departure of the Ambassador of the Albanian People's Republic from the Soviet Union, a decision which is profoundly unjust and unjustifiable, and in open contradiction to the fundamental principles of international law and of relations between socialist countries, and which lays heavy responsibility on the Soviet government for all the consequences in the relations between the Albanian People's Republic and the Soviet Union. 1 6 . N O T E OF THE ALBANIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN A F F A I R S PRESENTED TO THE EMBASSY OF THE SOVIET U N I O N IN

TIRANA, DECEMBER 9, 1961. Zeri i Popullit,

D e c e m b e r 10,

1961.

WITH THE authorization of the government of the Albanian People's Republic, the Foreign Ministry of the Albanian People's Republic kindly requests the USSR Embassy in Tirana to transmit to the government of the USSR the following: Following the establishment of the APR, after the triumph of the national liberation war over the Nazi-fascist occupiers and domestic traitors and the triumph of the people's revolution, the cornerstone of its foreign policy has been the indestructible and everlasting friendship with the Soviet Union. This friendship was tempered during World War II and was further strengthened by the APL after the liberation. The roots of this friendship lie in the blood shed in common by the glorious Soviet liberation army and the valiant Albanian partisans in the war against the common enemy. This friendship is based on the eternal principles of Marxism-Leninism.

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The Albanian people, educated by their party, have always seen in the Soviet Union their liberator and dearest friend. The A P L and the Albanian government have considered it is a duty of the first order to preserve and to strengthen ever more this friendship, to nourish and strengthen in the hearts of the Albanian people this love and loyalty toward the great fatherland of Lenin and the CPSU. In the years after the liberation of Albania the relations between the Albanian People's Republic and the Soviet Union were, for a long period, extended and developed in all fields on the basis of Leninist principles of equality, mutual respect, close cooperation, and fraternal mutual assistance. The Albanian people will always be grateful to the fraternal Soviet people for the internationalist aid given our country during this period. It has been an important factor in building socialism in Albania. During these years, the Albanian People's Republic, a faithful member of the socialist camp and of the Warsaw Pact, has at all times and under all conditions strengthened its unity with the Soviet Union, has resolutely stood on the side of the Soviet Union against every attack and slander on the part of tne enemies of the fatherland of the Soviets, has firmly defended the peaceful policy of the Soviet Union, and has done its utmost to contribute to its triumph. The relations of close cooperation in the economic, political, cultural, and military fields and the fraternal friendship between our two countries have created truly internationalist and indestructible ties between our two peoples; and, as they have always proved by their consistent attitude and actions, the APL and the government of the Albanian People's Republic have been and remain resolute fighters in preserving and further strengthening the friendship and unity between the two countries and our two parties on a correct and inviolable Marxist-Leninist basis. Unfortunately, lately—and definitely since the second half of 1960—relations between the Albanian People's Republic and the Soviet Union have not been what they once were. They have been harmed and rendered acrimonious by N. Khrushchev and his group because, at the June, 1960, Bucharest meeting of a

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number of Communist and workers parties and later, the APL did not agree with the anti-Marxist views of N. Khrushchev, did not subordinate itself to Khrushchev's dictates on important ideological issues, and resolutely defended and defends MarxismLeninism. Unable to endure this principled attitude of the APL, Nikita Khrushchev and his group brutally violated the principles on which relations among socialist states are based, as well as the 1957 and 1960 Moscow declarations. Because of ideological differences with the APL, Khrushchev resorted to unilateral state measures—each of which has been more arbitrary and grave than the one preceding—against the Albanian People's Republic, with the aim of exerting pressure and forcing capitulation. During this period Nikita Khrushchev and his group consciously tried every means to make the Albanian people, the APL, and the Albanian government yield and to aggravate Soviet-Albanian relations at the state level as well, and, in so doing, have trampled on proletarian internationalism and every norm of international law and of relations among states. Suffice it to mention that Nikita Khrushchev, unilaterally and with the sole aim of preventing the building of socialism in Albania, canceled the credits granted by regular agreements to the Albanian People's Republic by the Soviet Union for the Third Five-Year Plan—1961 to 1965—arbitrarily violated and discarded the 1961 trade exchange agreement, unilaterally withdrew Soviet technicians, in effect liquidated the agreements on cultural cooperation, expelled—under false claims—a number of Albanian students and cadets from the Soviet Union, canceled the agreement on granting scholarships to Albanian students and cadets studying in the Soviet Union, violated the military agreements, and organized a strict economic, political, and military blockade against the Albanian People's Republic. Nikita Khrushchev, by publicly revealing at the XXII CPSU Congress the differences existing between the APL and the present Soviet leadership, and by distorting the truth and banally slandering a fraternal people and a Marxist-Leninist party—as

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are the Albanian people and the APL—has not only encouraged imperialism and its lackeys against Albania, but also dared to urge the Albanian people to counter-revolution. In so doing, he acted in the same way as the fierce enemies of the Albanian people, the APL, the socialist camp, and communism. The Albanian people answered this unprecedented provocation by consolidating their ranks around the APL and government and by steeling their determination to build socialism and strengthening their vigilance to defend the achievements of their socialist fatherland. O n November 25, 1961, the Soviet government, at the dictate of Nikita Khrushchev, withdrew its ambassador, I. Shikin, from Albania under the false pretext that he was "placed under conditions which prevented him from carrying out normally the orders of his government," and that this situation had become "intolerable," "especially since the XXII CPSU Congress." A pretext of this kind is absurd and is used only for malicious purposes. In fact, it is well known that the most favorable conditions were always, from the very beginning, created for the Embassy of the Soviet Union in Albania and all its personnel, from the ambassador to the simplest worker. . . . The Albanian note went on to reiterate arguments made in other documents, cited above, and concluded:

T h e unilateral decision of Nikita Khrushchev's group to close the Soviet Embassy and the commercial representation in Tirana, as well as the Albanian Embassy in Moscow, reflects not only his intention to sever all relations between the Soviet Union and the Albanian People's Republic, but brutally violates the principles on which relations among socialist countries are based as well as the glorious tradition of friendship always followed by the Soviet Union toward other socialist countries and toward all countries of the world. In fact, this decision is another manifestation of pressure on the Albanian People's Republic. It is an inseparable part of the anti-Albanian and antisocialist policy pursued with unprecedented ferocity by Nikita Khrushchev against the Albanian

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people and the Albanian People's Republic. This can please only the sworn enemies of the Albanian and Soviet peoples, of socialism, and of Marxism-Leninism—the imperialists and their lackeys, the Yugoslav revisionists. . . . The Albanian government deeply deplores that a time has come when the leadership of the Soviet Union—the first socialist state in the world—and the glorious CPSU—founded by V. I. Lenin—includes people like the Nikita Khrushchev group, which attacks the best friends of the Soviet Union and is doing its utmost to harm the immortal cause of the socialist camp and communism. . . . The government of the Albanian People's Republic, strongly protesting the Soviet government's unilateral decision to close the Embassy of the Soviet Union in Tirana and the Albanian Embassy in Moscow, states that the entire responsibility for this seriously hostile act falls on Nikita Khrushchev and his group. It expresses its complete confidence that sooner or later the Soviet people and the CPSU will condemn this criminal act and all of Nikita Khrushchev's hostile activity against a fraternal, friendly, and allied country like the Albanian People's Republic, which is building socialism and firmly fighting imperialism and modern revisionism by always holding high the banner of friendship and unity with the Soviet Union and the other fraternal countries, the banner of Marxism-Leninism. 17. " T H E FIGHTING BANNER OF COMMUNISTS OF THE ENTIRE

WORLD." Editorial commemorating the first anniversary of the 1960 Statement. Pravda, December 6, 1961. . . . THE STATEMENT of the Communist parties and the appeal to the peoples of the whole world, which they adopted, call on all people of good will to develop the struggle against the danger of a world war, not to wait until atomic and hydrogen bombs begin to fall; to maintain the greatest vigilance and untiringly unmask the plans of the imperialists. Indeed, in the year that has passed since publication of the Statement of the Conference of eighty-one parties, the forces of imperialism have more

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than once threatened world peace; even now they do not refrain from attempts to aggravate the international situation and bring mankind to the brink of war. Taking into consideration this danger from the imperialists, our party calls on the Soviet people and all peace-loving forces of the world to maintain high vigilance. "As long as the imperialist aggressors exist," said Comrade Khrushchev in the CPSU Central Committee report to the XXII Congress, "we must be on guard, keep our powder dry, perfect the defense of the socialist countries and their armed forces and state security organs. If, contrary to reason, the imperialists dare to march on the socialist countries and cast mankind into the abyss of a destructive world war, then this foolish step will be their last; this will be the end of the entire capitalist system." In the spirit of the conclusions of the Conference of Eighty-one Communist and Workers Parties, our party does not limit itself merely to exposing the enemies of peace, but combines the struggle to expose imperialist intrigues with active practical work to unite all forces for the defense of the cause of peace. The many-faceted activity of the Soviet Union directed toward general and complete disarmament, its active struggle for the liquidation of colonial oppression in all its forms, for the guarantee of effective aid to all countries which have recently gained their independence, for the liquidation of the remnants of World War II in the center of Europe, and for the reestablishment of the rights of the Chinese People's Republic in the United Nations are well known. In the interests of easing international tension, the Soviet government recently proposed the conclusion of an agreement banning thermonuclear weapons tests. The Statement of the Communist parties contains important directives on problems in the further ideological struggle against anticommunism, opportunism, and reformism in the workers movement. Of particular importance is the struggle on two fronts which it emphasized— against revisionism as the principal danger and also against dogmatism and sectarianism. Having condemned the Yugoslav variant of international op-

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portunism as a concentrated expression of the "theory" of modern revisionists, the Conference called for the future exposure of and a more active struggle against revisionism. At the same time the Statement correctly warns against the danger of dogmatism and sectarianism which, if a consistent struggle is not waged against them, can also become a main danger in one or another stage in the development of individual parties. Life has already more than once confirmed that both revisionism and right-wing opportunism, as well as dogmatism and sectarian leftism, are capable of inflicting considerable damage to the interests of the cause of the proletariat, the cause of socialism. Not infrequently these two superficially opposite phenomena in the revolutionary movement have joined and merged into one. There are instances, for example, where isolated elements in the workers movement, adrift from their main stream and having lost their Marxist-Leninist integrity, have slid into inveterate nationalism and revisionism. This has been precisely the fate of the present leaders of the A P L . . . . The Conference of Eighty-one Communist and Workers Parties pointed out that overcoming the harmful consequences of the personality cult is one of the most important and principal conditions for the successful solution of the tasks facing the Communist parties. The line of the Albanian leaders in renouncing these conditions which are obligatory for every MarxistLeninist party—a line which has become apparent over the past year—exposes them as apostates from the foundations of the world Communist movement. Facts show that the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor are drawing further and further away from the principles of the Declaration and the Statement unanimously adopted by the international Communist movement. They have declined the repeated proposals for a settlement of the differences that have arisen, through meetings and consultations. They have set out on the course of subversive activities, slandering the C P S U and other fraternal parties. The divisive activities of the Albanian leaders, undermining the unity of the socialist camp, the entire

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international Communist movement, have evoked decisive condemnation by the fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties. . . . In its entire practical and theoretical activity, the crown of which is the new Program of the CPSU adopted by the X X I I Congress, our glorious party and all Soviet Communists show that they have done and shall do everything to warrant the tide of the fighting vanguard of the great world Communist army. Our party, whose faith in Marxism-Leninism has been demonstrated by its entire heroic history, henceforth shall hold high the banner of Marxism-Leninism, a mighty revolutionary weapon in the struggle for the victory of communism. 18. "A Y E A R OF H I S T O R I C P R O O F S . " Editorial commemorating the first anniversay of the 1960 Statement. Zeri i Popullit, December 6, 1961. . . T H E YEAR which has elapsed since the publication of the Statement clearly proved the correctness of its important conclusion that revisionism remains the main danger for the international Communist movement. Revisionism has not been fully beaten. On the contrary, lately, as a result of the slackening of the struggle, revisionism has been revived in many Communist and workers parties, thus becoming an ever-increasing danger. This fact is shown by the example of some Communist and workers parties, especially the Italian Communist Party. . . . Under the guise of the struggle against Stalinism, dogmatism, or nationalism, the revisionists are trying to bury the revolutionary spirit of Marxism-Leninism, to reject its fundamental principles, and to undermine the unity of the socialist camp and the international Communist movement.

The conclusion of the Statement—that Yugoslav revisionism is the concentrated expression of contemporary international opportunism and that the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist League are traitors to Marxism-Leninism, underminers of the socialist camp and the international Communist movement, and splitters of the forces of peace—was also proved correct.

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Profiting from the weakening of the struggle against the Titoist clique by the leaders of some Communist and workers parties, and fully assisted by imperialism, the Titoist clique intensified its hostile activities. This is shown in its efforts to divert the conference of nonaligned countries from the struggle against imperialism, headed by the United States, and to split the forces of the national liberation struggle, especially in Africa; in its vicious attacks against the CPR; in its direct participation in the organization of the plot against the Albanian People's Republic, and so forth. For its role in the service of imperialism, in addition to the more than 3 billion dollars received previously, the Titoist clique during 1961 received more than 197 million dollars from the United States and the other imperialist powers. All this proves the importance and correctness of the Statement's thesis that "the further unmasking of the leaders of Yugoslav revisionism and the active struggle to protect the Communist and workers movement from the anti-Leninist ideas of the Yugoslav revisionists continue to be indispensable tasks of the Marxist-Leninist parties." Our party has been rigorously faithful to the Statement of the Communist and workers parties signed in 1960 and has made it the basis of all its ideological and political activities, just as it has been faithful to and has fully executed the 1957 Declaration. But those who slander our party, attack it, and accuse it of thinking and acting in opposition to the Statement are the ones who trampled and are trampling on this collective document of the entire international Communist movement which Nikita Khrushchev, even before its publication, called "a compromise document of short duration." The events of the year which has elapsed since the Moscow Statement clearly prove who violated and who is violating the principles of the statement. Let us consider the question of the attitude toward imperialism. Was it not Nikita Khrushchev and his followers who, before the ink had dried on their signatures on the Moscow Statement and before Kennedy had established his power, began to spread

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all over the world the illusion that Kennedy would, so to speak, follow a peaceful policy? In complete contradiction to the Statement, which points out that American imperialism is the main force of aggression and of war and the bitter enemy of the peoples in the world, they believed Kennedy's beautiful words about "peace," the words of this worthy representative of American imperialism. These illusions dissolved like salt in water, however, because of the facts regarding the brief but intensive activity of the Kennedy government, which we have briefly summarized. In addition to all these facts, according to the news agencies, Adzhubei, member of the CPSU Central Committee, immediately after his interview with Kennedy declared to American journalists: "You Americans should be proud of your President!" These words are not accidental. On the contrary, they represent the entire opportunistic line persistently followed by Nikita Khrushchev and his group, who once solemnly declared "in all sincerity" before all the Soviet people and the Party and government of the Soviet Union: "Eisenhower sincerely desires peace and the liquidation of the cold war." And was it not he who called De Gaulle the "pride of the French people"? Those who today accuse our party of being afraid to assume its responsibility in the settlement of the German question are, in fact, the ones who prolong the settlement of this problem by making concessions to the imperialist powers. They are the ones who, following their opportunistic policy in flagrant contradiction to the Declaration, have almost completely halted the struggle to unmask American imperialism, hoping, as it seems, that this is the way to convert the government Of the United States into a peaceful government. Our party, which is faithfully guided by the teachings of Marxism-Leninism on classes and the class struggle and by the two statements of the Communist and workers parties, has never had any illusions about Eisenhower, Kennedy, Macmillan, De Gaulle, Adenauer, or any other imperialist leader. They cannot be for peace as long as they represent the interests of the most reactionary and most warmongering circles of the great

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capitalist monopolies. On the contrary, our party has faithfully followed the Leninist teachings of the Statement that as long as imperialism exists there will be a base for aggressive wars. For this reason, it has always kept the vigilance of our people high and resolutely unmasked the warmongering, aggressive activities of imperialism and its lackeys. It was precisely because it maintained and continues to maintain a resolute, vigilant attitude that our party was capable of unmasking and liquidating in time the plot organized against the People's Republic of Albania by the revisionist leadership of Yugoslavia and the Greek monarcho-fascists in cooperation with the U.S. Sixth Fleet. The violation of the Statement by Nikita Khrushchev and those who follow his opportunistic line and his unprincipled attacks against the A P L is also clearly shown by their attitude toward the revisionist clique of Tito. On December 6, 1960, Pravda published the Statement, signed on December 2, which stressed that "the Yugoslav revisionists pursue subversive activities against the socialist camp and the international Communist movement" and that "under the pretext of the policy of nonalignment with either bloc they carry out activities which endanger the cause of the unity of all the peace-loving forces and countries." Yet on December 23, 1960, Andrei Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee and U S S R Foreign Minister, told the U S S R Supreme Soviet with regard to Yugoslavia: "We must point out with satisfaction that our positions on basic international issues coincide." This statement is not only flagrantly contrary to the Statement of the eighty-one Communist and workers parties, but is also a serious offense against the consistent, peaceful policy of the Soviet Union. T o identify the foreign policy of the Soviet Union—which serves the great cause of peace, freedom, and friendship among peoples—with the divisive foreign policy of the renegade Tito—which serves the oppressive and warmongering aims of American imperialism— means to do disservice to the Soviet Union and the cause of peace. They seek to convince the simple-minded that the Titoist

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demagogy and lies are a "positive side" of this agency of imperialism. . . . T h e matter reached the point where Togliatti, at the plenum of the Italian Communist Party devoted to the decisions of the X X I I CPSU Congress, openly introduced the task of agreeing as much as possible with the Yugoslav Communists, while the leaders of certain socialist countries in Europe started implementing this long ago by continually developing and expanding economic, commercial, cultural, political, and even party relations with the Yugoslav revisionists. . . . In the light of these facts, it is by no means sheer coincidence that along with the furious attacks and slanders against the A P L , the renegade Tito enthusiastically welcomed the "new course" which Nikita Khrushchev took at the X X I I CPSU Congress. . . . What concerns and pleases the revisionist Tito is not the path and the brilliant prospects of the building of communism in the Soviet Union, but precisely the "positive" ideological and political course manifested at the X X I I Congress, and precisely the furious attacks against Stalin and against the A P L . This, in fact, should make certain people wonder why such a renegade of Marxism and such an experienced agent of American imperialism as Tito should praise them in this way. T h e 1960 Statement clearly defines the principles and the criteria of relations among socialist countries and Communist and workers parties on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. Proletarian internationalism demands, on the one hand, the resolute defense of the unity of the international Communist movement and the socialist camp on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the prohibition of any activity which may undermine this unity and, on the other, rigorous respect for the principles of equality, independence, and mutual assistance in relations among the socialist countries and the fraternal Communist and workers parties and the settlement of any disagreement which may take place among them by means of comradely consultations on the basis of equality.

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T h e period which elapsed since the proclamation of the Statement of the eighty-one Communist and workers parties shows indisputably that violation of these principles seriously harms the unity of the international Communist movement and the socialist camp. Experience and facts have also proved that these principles have been violated and are being brutally trespassed by Nikita Khrushchev and his followers in relations with the A P L and the Albanian People's Republic. . . . T h e state of affairs has gone so far that a few days ago the governments of the Soviet Union and the Hungarian People's Republic unilaterally canceled even the consular agreement which has existed between our countries for years, according to which no transit or visitor's visa for the citizens of our countries traveling between our countries was required from the respective governments. What can these anti-Marxist acts have in common with the explicit principles of the Declaration on cooperation and fraternal mutual assistance among the socialist countries? Now, in order to justify these unheard-of anti-Marxist actions to the public, Nikita Khrushchev and his followers unscrupulously slander our party and people, saying that we deny the aid given by the Soviet Union to Albania for the building of socialism, that we are ungrateful for it, and other such things. Where did Maurice Thorez learn that about which he so confidently speaks? This is only slander, and slanders cannot be evidence. Any honest man who wants to find out the truth should scrutinize the press of our party and he will see that our party and all the people, before and after the aggravation of our relations by the present Soviet leadership headed by Nikita Khrushchev, have always expressed and continue to express their deep gratitude for the generous and internationalist aid given by the Soviet Union to our country. They have considered and still consider this aid one of the important factors in the building of socialism in Albania. . . . F r o m the platform of the X X I I Congress Nikita Khrushchev, followed by certain other people, publicly and slanderously at-

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tacked our party. This anti-Marxist act, which is a serious blow against the unity of the socialist camp and the international Communist movement, is being extensively propagated by Nikita Khrushchev and his followers as the "apogee of Leninist principles." What hypocrisy and mockery of Lenin! These people who are now boasting so much of this brand of principle, which immensely pleased the sworn enemies of communism and which gave them weapons with which to fight us, until yesterday were furiously attacking with most offensive epithets the A P L and its leadership, because it expressed its views about our disagreements in an honest, open, and principled way and without cunning and diplomatic dealing. It expressed them not publicly, but at a meeting of the fraternal Communist and workers parties. At the X X I I Congress and after it, Nikita Khrushchev and his followers accused and are still accusing our party of not agreeing with the X X CPSU Congress line, and from this they derive the absurd conclusion that our party has betrayed Marxism-Leninism and has thrown itself into the arms of imperialism. It is true that our party has neither agreed nor agrees now with certain opportunist theses of the X X Congress. But are the decisions of one party binding on all the Communist and workers parties? This is in flagrant contradiction to the 1 9 6 0 Statement, which stresses clearly that "all the Marxist-Leninist parties are independent and equal, and that they formulate policies according to the concrete conditions of their own countries and on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles." With the aim of justifying his anti-Marxist action of publicizing our disagreements, which gave ammunition to the imperialists and revisionists all over the world, Nikita Khrushchev stated at the X X I I Congress that he had done all that was possible to bring into line the leaders of the A P L and that, with all possible means exhausted, he had no course other than to publicly condemn the Albanian Party of Labor and its leadership. After the X X I I Congress, this formula was repeated and is being reiterated by Maurice Thorez and certain other leaders of the European Communist and workers parties.

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Y e s , Nikita Khrushchev and his group have made and are making many moves in the direction of our party and country. Immediately after the notorious Bucharest meeting, pressure, blackmail, and blockades in the economic and military fields began against our party and country. In October, 1960, Nikita Khrushchev stated that he would treat Albania the same as Titoist Yugoslavia, whereas at the end of March, 1961, Khrushchev and Novotny stated that they would cut off all assistance to the Albanian People's Republic. This anti-Marxist pressure was repeated in many documents sent to the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor by the Soviet leadership and the leaderships of some other socialist countries in Europe. Thus the letter sent to the Council of Ministers of the Albanian People's Republic by the Soviet government on April 26, 1 9 6 1 , maintained, among other things, that "the Albanian leadership cannot hope that the Soviet Union will assist it any longer on the previous basis. This assistance is only for friends and true brothers." What can there be in common between the call of Nikita Khrushchev and his followers for counter-revolution to overthrow the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor and destroy our party and Marxism-Leninism, proletarian internationalism, and the principles of the Statement? What kind of discussions can there be and how can our disagreements be settled when the first condition is that our party should abandon its views, when unprecedented acts and pressure are being used against a Marxist-Leninist party and a socialist country, and when it is demanded that our party should at all costs subject itself to the ideas and anti-Marxist activities of Nikita Khrushchev? In fact, it was about such "efforts" that Nikita Khrushchev spoke at the X X I I Congress, and about which the leaders of some Communist and workers parties in Europe are now sounding off in their parties. Everyone can understand that they have nothing in common with real efforts to solve the disagreements on the basis of the Moscow Statement's principles of equality, independence, and consultations. Nikita Khrushchev has substituted for these principles the principle of die-

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tation and pressure, in order to dominate other parties which disagree with his opportunistic and revisionist views. . . . After the diplomatic break between Moscow and Tirana, polemics continued over the airwaves and in editorial columns. Vituperative and recriminatory arguments ranged over a variety of prior SovietAlbanian incidents, including the recall of Soviet specialists from Albania, surveillance of "fraternal" officials, the extent of promised Soviet aid to Albania, and the construction of the Palace of Culture in Tirana. On December 21, 1961, Zeri i Popullit published a lengthy editorial, "The Name and the Deeds of Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin Are as Immortal as Marxism-Leninism." After describing Stalin as the loyal, legitimate, and only logical successor of Lenin, and having enumerated his many accomplishments, the editorial proceeded to praise him for "exposing" traitors like the Titoists, and to pledge Albania's eternal gratitude to Stalin: "The content of Stalin's life was his struggle to defend Marxism-Leninism, his monumental work for the construction of socialism in the USSR, his boundless fidelity to the cause of the working class, his great contribution to the development and strengthening of the international Communist and workers movement, his struggle for the triumph of peace and communism—and not the 'crimes,' 'tortures,' 'murders,' and other repugnant slanders which N. Khrushchev served up for those who cannot see farther than the ends of their noses. . . ." The January 1, 1962, editorial of Zeri i Popullit did not hesitate to recognize the difficulties of the Albanian position. And yet, ". . . in the future, as in the past, our people will resolutely fight against contemporary revisionism, will fight to destroy every blockade and attempt at isolating us. The guarantee [of our success] is the correct Marxist-Leninist leadership of our party, the indestructible unity of our people around the Party and their passionate patriotism and revolutionary drive, and the strong economic base which we have built. Our country is not alone, and it does not lack assistance. People's China is giving us generous internationalist aid. . . ."

19.

"DEEPER

AND D E E P E R

IN T H E M I R E O F

ANTI-MARXISM."

Editorial in Zeri i Popullit, January 9, 1962. the X X I I CPSU Congress the N. Khrushchev group has continued a bitter campaign of recrimination against the A P L and the Albanian People's Republic. It is significant that this AFTER

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campaign is becoming more and more intense and more insulting at a time when the Soviet press not only is playing up the reactionary and warlike Kennedy interview but, surprisingly, is even finding space to talk about him in friendly terms, at a time when the Khrushchev group and followers are carrying out a series of démarches to come as close as possible to the revisionist and traitorous Belgrade clique. What is very striking is that the authors of this campaign are as afraid of facts as they are of fire. Thus they avoid facts, using instead general bombastic phrases—frequently contradictory—insults, and offensive remarks, such as N. Khrushchev and his followers have never used against even the worst imperialists and colonialists. Another fact which leaps to the eye is that N. Khrushchev and his followers seek by all means to avoid discussion of the essence of the ideological differences of principle which are at the base of the differences between our party and the Khrushchev group. . . . Why is such an uproar made about so-called Albanian "dogmatism"? . . . First, N. Khrushchev and his group need to make a lot of noise about the Albanian Party of Labor, among other things, to cast doubt on certain fundamental theses of the revolutionary doctrine of Marxism-Leninism which is defended by the APL and by true Marxists in all countries, and, secondly, to draw the attention of world public opinion to Albanian "dogmatism" and to make of the latter a smoke screen behind which they can spread their revisionist points of view with greater ease and speed in the international Communist and workers movement. The authors of the anti-Marxist articles and speeches against our party . . . charge that the leadership of the A P L radically altered its political line on the fundamental questions of present international developments and its attitude toward the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. . . No, the policies of the APL and the government of the Albanian People's Republic remain what they have been. Our attitude has in no way changed, neither toward imperialism and revisionism,

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nor toward the USSR and the other socialist countries; neither has it changed toward the national liberation movement, nor toward the cause of peace, peaceful coexistence, and so on. On the contrary, what has changed is the attitude of N. Khrushchev and those who follow him toward our party and country, toward the fundamental teachings of Marxism-Leninism. They have revised the fundamental teachings of MarxismLeninism about the reactionary and aggressive nature of imperialism and on this basis they deal in an opportunist way with questions of peace and peaceful coexistence, the struggle for national liberation by the enslaved peoples, the ways of passing from capitalism to socialism, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the like. They have gravely trampled underfoot the principles of proletarian internationalism in relations between Communist and workers fraternal parties and between the socialist countries. N. Khrushchev is seeking to replace the classical writings of Marxism-Leninism and the Marxist principles formulated in the two declarations of the Communist and workers parties in 1957 and 1960 with his revisionist platform. He wants to replace revolutionary Marxism-Leninism with opportunism and revisionism. This is clearly seen in the article published in Pravda, on December 14, 1961, under the title "On a Dangerous Path." This article says, among other things: "When one speaks of the line of the X X CPSU Congress, it is not merely a question of the decisions of a party, but of a new stage in the international Communist movement." Thus, N. Khrushchev seeks to impose the decisions of one party on all fraternal parties and to render absolutely useless and reduce to mere formalities the international meetings of Communist and workers parties and their collective documents. Such an attitude is in flagrant contradiction with the wellknown thesis expressed in the 1960 Statement, namely, that the Communist and workers fraternal parties "are independent, have equal rights, and draft their policies in relation to the concrete conditions in their countries, being guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism." . . . The Soviet leaders, in opposi-

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tion to the spirit of the declaration on the independence and equality of rights of fraternal parties, are using this thesis to impose on the latter the decisions of the X X Congress, although at the Moscow meeting of November, 1960, they had solemnly declared that they would never interpret it and would never use it with such designs. The true aims of Khrushchev and his followers are now appearing ever more clearly. In all this one can clearly perceive the hypocrisy of the Khrushchev proposal, proudly recalled by the authors of the Pravda article, not to include in the 1960 Statement the thesis "the socialist camp headed by the USSR." The APL, as is also proved by the protocols of the Moscow meeting of November, 1960, has been and continues to be of the opinion that the thesis "headed by the Soviet Union" is correct and useful. When we say that the Soviet Union is at the head of the socialist camp, we by no means want it to be understood that the USSR and the CPSU are the "supreme authorities" that lead and direct. . . . In certain Communist parties—for example, the Italian Communist Party—much propaganda has been made for "polycentrism." . . . A picture has been painted that is truly curious: when we defended the thesis "headed by the Soviet Union," Khrushchev and certain others attacked us and vehemently objected to this thesis; and now these very same people attack our party because it is allegedly following an "anti-Soviet" policy, and "is disrupting the Communist movement and has strayed from Marxism-Leninism," and all this merely because it is not in agreement with certain theses of the XX and XXII CPSU congresses! Along with his efforts to impose on other parties the decisions of the XX Congress, Khrushchev has organized a campaign to impose the new CPSU Program on them. While not denying the historic importance of this document as a program for building a communist society in the USSR, it nevertheless remains the program of a single party. Therefore it cannot be imposed on other parties and cannot replace the joint documents of the Communist movement—the statements of 1957 and 1960. Our party is not in agreement with certain opportunist

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theses contained in the new CPSU Program, particularly on questions of the present world evolution which are in direct opposition to the two declarations of the Communist and workers parties. But it thinks highly of those parts of the Program which present in a correct manner the valuable historic experience acquired by the CPSU in the socialist revolution and in the building of socialism and communism. As in the past, our party will study this experience with great care and make use of it in the struggle to build a socialist and communist society in our country. . . . We wish to establish diplomatic relations and to have good trade and cultural relations with all capitalist countries which want them, especially our neighbors, on the basis of rigorous respect for the recognized principles of peaceful coexistence. It is in vain that the N. Khrushchev group, pursuing its anti-Marxist designs for the political and economic isolation of the Albanian People's Republic, tries to accuse our party and government of being against peaceful coexistence; it is in vain that it tries to besmirch our party and slander it by alleging that "it draws closer to imperialism," when the government of the Albanian People's Republic makes every effort to put into practice the principles of peaceful coexistence in its relations with its neighbors. . . . In truth, what are the dangerous views which N. Khrushchev tries to impose on the international Communist and workers movement concerning general and complete disarmament? First, that general and complete disarmament is the only real way to ensure peace; that it represents the primary and most urgent task of the hour, on which depend all other tasks and all other problems of the international Communist movement and the present world development. According to N. Khrushchev and his champions, all the fundamental questions that preoccupy people today, such as national liberation, and so forth, can be settled only as a result of general and complete disarmament—the creation of a world which does not know arms, armies, or wars. The enslaved peoples will automatically be freed from imperialism because the im-

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perialists will no longer have arms to keep them under their yoke; and the workers in all capitalist countries will be able to take over power peacefully, because the bourgeoisie will no longer have arms to maintain its domination. From this, one inevitably arrives at the conclusion that the national liberation struggle of enslaved people, the struggle against the various forms of colonialism and neocolonialism, and the revolutionary struggle of workers to overthrow capitalist slavery are secondary problems which do not merit special attention and which depend entirely on the achievement of general and total disarmament. And this logical conclusion is confirmed and has been daily confirmed by the practical acts of treason of N. Khrushchev and his group. . . . Secondly, N. Khrushchev sets about achieving general and complete disarmament solely by issuing general appeals for disarmament and intentionally disregarding imperialism and the struggle to unveil the bellicose activity of imperialism, particularly American imperialism, which not only prevents disarmament by every means, but actually daily intensifies the frenzied arms race. It is clear that the pacifist bourgeois concepts of N. Khrushchev are not for the benefit of the people, but for that of imperialism and colonialism. This is also confirmed by the fact that, while N. Khrushchev and his group breathe not a word against American imperialism, but try to "watch" it carefully, on the other hand they do not refrain from using the most reactionary and base calumnies to accuse our party of being against peace, peaceful coexistence, and complete and total disarmament. . . . Not a single document or material of our party, not a single speech or article in our press, provides the smallest pretext for accusing the A P L and the government of the Albanian People's Republic of opposing the Soviet proposal for general and complete disarmament. . . . The Soviet leaders headed by N. Khrushchev, in the material on Albania which they have recently published, do not breathe a word about the role played by the Albanian people under the guidance of the A P L in the

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struggle to liberate the country, nor about the victory of the people's revolution in Albania, nor about the building of socialism here, but stress only the external factor, only the aid of the USSR. How can we regard such an attitude? Does it not lead to the anti-Marxist theory of exporting revolution? Let "theoretician" F. Konstantinov explain this to us. To find a way out of the embarrassing position into which they have placed themselves because of the policy of reconciliation and cooperation with the Tito gang, N. Khrushchev and his followers shamefully distort the attitude of our party concerning the appraisal of the counter-revolutionary events in Hungary in 1956. The APL clearly expressed its attitude on the counter-revolution of 1956 in Hungary. It has stated and states that this was organized by the imperialists—above all by the American imperialists—in close collaboration with internal reactionary forces, and with the revisionist gang of Tito and revisionist elements and Hungarian traitors such as Imre Nagy and his consorts, within the framework of the frontal attack unleashed by the imperialists and the revisionists on the socialist camp and the international Communist movement after the X X CPSU Congress. To achieve their ends, they also exploited certain errors of the former Hungarian leaders. This is clearly understood. Therefore, it would be superfluous to speak about it any longer. At the same time our party expressed criticism toward N. Khrushchev and his group concerning their attitude toward and appraisal of the counter-revolutionary events in Hungary. Our criticism on this question consists of the following main points: First, the counter-revolution in Hungary was prepared and unleashed by the imperialists and other counter-revolutionary elements under the slogan of "anti-Stalinism" borrowed from N. Khrushchev's "secret" report at the X X CPSU Congress. Second, when the Tito-Imre Nagy group, with the collaboration of the imperialists, were feverishly preparing the counterrevolutionary coup in Hungary, N. Khrushchev, A. Mikoyan, M. Suslov. and other Soviet leaders closed their eyes to the

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hostile activity of these traitors, put faith in them, and supported them. There is no justification for the fact that the Soviet leaders believed Imre Nagy's hypocritical "self-criticism" and kept it in their files to convince the others that Imre Nagy was a good man! It is also entirely unjustifiable that N. Khrushchev believed so much in the Yugoslav renegade revisionist clique that he went from time to time to Brioni for secret meetings with Tito, and was even deciding with him who should be appointed First Secretary of the HSWP Central Committee! This was, moreover, an inadmissible interference in the internal affairs of a fraternal party. This activity—surprising, to say the least—on the part of the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, is sufficiently proved by documents in the possession of our party—for example, the letter N. Khrushchev sent on November 9, 1956, to J. B. Tito, quoted in the speech by Comrade Enver Hoxha on November 7, 1961. To remove any doubt, we quote from this letter the passage in which N. Khrushchev wrote to Tito: "You were completely satisfied that the CPSU Central Committee has been trying since last summer, concerning the departure of Rakosi, to see that Comrade Kadar becomes First Secretary of the HSWP Central Committee." This requires no comment. . . . We have even reached a point where certain stupidities committed by Khrushchev which bring discredit upon the Soviet Union—such as when he took off his shoes in the UN General Assembly—are slavishly elevated to the level of theory and presented as "magnificant examples of the Marxist attitude." Amazing as this may seem, A. Adzhubei, in his speech during the XXII CPSU Congress which was published in the Soviet press, called this gesture something "truly magnificent!" Has this also been done within the framework of the struggle against the personality cult? After having attempted, by anti-Marxist methods, to dethrone J. V. Stalin and his work, N. Khrushchev and his followers have now unleashed base attacks and calumnies against the APL and

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its leaders whom they accuse of grave violations of Leninist norms in the life of the Party and of socialist legality . . . a regime of terror, and so forth. . . . What are the "facts" and "arguments" which they advance? The Pravda article of December 14, 1961, said, among other things: "As early as 1948, the First Congress of the APL resolutely criticized the serious mistakes committed in the political activities of the APL, pointing out that four years after the liberation of the country and the establishment of the people's power, the Party had no rules, program, nor press organ, and that military and police methods flourished in it. ." The most terrible aspect was that this "military and police" regime within the Party was "under the control of the state security organs," and that "police informing" flourished. Yes, the First Congress of our party severely condemned certain negative manifestations in the life of the Party, which resulted from the brutal intervention by the Tito gang in the internal affairs of our party and from the hostile and dangerous activity by the agent of this gang, Koci Xoxe. Koci Xoxe and his collaborators were severely condemned by our party during its First Congress for grave, hostile activity in the service of the Tito gang, and for putting the Party under the control of the state security forces—Koci Xoxe was Minister of Interior and, at the same time, secretary of the Party for cadres— for grave violations of socialist legality, and for preparing the physical liquidation of Party Secretary-General Comrade Enver Hoxha, Comrade Mehmet Shehu, and other sound cadres of our party who, in fact, in one way or another, were isolated or eliminated from the leadership of the Party. And if the Party successfully braved this grave situation and in a short time liquidated the alien manifestations and established Leninist norms in the life of the Party, special merit for this is due to the Secretary-General of the Party himself, Comrade Enver Hoxha. All this is documented in the resolutions of our party. These are the facts, but the authors of the aforementioned

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Pravda article write something else. They say: "We do not intend to enumerate the malefactors of this terror against the honest Albanian Communists." Let us point out that Hoxha has been Secretary-General of the Party since then. Why is it that Nikita Khrushchev's article writer does "not intend to enumerate the malefactors" but, on the contrary, slanderously attacks Comrade Enver Hoxha? Why is it that they try with great zeal to hide the hostile activities of the treacherous clique of Tito and its agents, Koci Xoxe and his companions? Why is it that they protect a rabid traitor and enemy of our party and people like Koci Xoxe? To remove any doubt, we shall state that as early as 1956 Nikita Khrushchev, through Suslov and Pospelov and through Liri Belishova, brought pressure to bear for the rehabilitation of Koci Xoxe, but our party has resolutely withstood it. Later, Pravda points out that in the Party conferences which took place before the Third Congress of the APL, "a severe criticism of principle was made of the Albanian leadership for violating Leninist norms of the internal life of the Party," for "repression" of party cadres, and so forth. This is a deliberately distorted allusion to the efforts of certain revisionist elements of the Tito clique who, encouraged by the revisionist theses of the XX Congress, unsuccessfully tried at the Party Conference in Tirana in April, 1956, to split the Party, to overthrow its leadership, and to create in Albania a situation similar to the one which was later created in Hungary—a fact which was stated by Vidic, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs and former Yugoslav Ambassador to the Soviet Union. It is crystal clear to all Albanian Communists that the organizers of the revisionist attack against our party and its leadership at the Party Conference in Tirana were such traitors as Panajot Plaku, Tuk Jakova, Bedri Spahiu, Liri Gega, Pajo Islami, Vehip Demi, Dhora Leka, and other degenerate elements unmasked as the agents of the Titoist UDB. The Central Committee of our party has documents which prove with indisputable facts that these traitors were linked to

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the Tito clique and, acting under its direction, plotted to liquidate the people's power in Albania. Why do Khrushchev's propagandists speak with so much ardor and assurance in favor of the activity of these antiparty elements? In this, one sees clearly a link between the Khrushchev group and the Titoist gang and its agents at the Tirana Conference. The Tirana trial against the agents of the Greek and American secret services—Teme Sejko, Tahir Demi, and their followers, who received the punishment they merited as traitors to the fatherland—confirmed through facts that they, too, were organizers of the antiparty activity which raised its head at the Tirana Party Conference. It is this very scum of our society which Nikita Khrushchev and his supporters are protecting, while they present the correct activities of our party and our trials against the spies and agents of imperialism and its lackeys as terrorism, as violations of socialist legality, as consequences of the existence of the personality cult, and so forth. In Kommunist Konstantinov writes that "the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor make arrests and persecute the Albanian specialists, military men, and civilians who have studied in the Soviet Union." Let us pass over the fact that this is a deplorable accusation which rightly revolts all the citizens of the Albanian People's Republic. We only say that this is an extraordinarily absurd accusation because, according to this accusation, the majority of the Albanian intelligentsia, which is composed mostly of elements who have studied in the Soviet Union, seems to be in prison and detained! And after this, Konstantinov (with astonishing acrobatics) writes that "the violations of legality and arbitrary actions are committed by Hoxha and Shehu in great secrecy." At the same time, in an article in Pravda published the same day, one reads the opposite: "At present in Albania police methods and violence are openly resorted to against those who defend the friendship with the Soviet Union." It would seem that these two papers have forgotten to agree with each other. According to the authors of the articles and speeches against

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the APL, the violation of the Leninist norms of party life and the violation of socialist legality, the persecution of honest Communists, and so forth, have been carried out in Albania for a long time. It is amazing that Nikita Khrushchev and his companions, who raise a great clamor about their "high Leninist principles," did not say these things earlier, but, on the contrary, until 1960 praised our party and its leadership. We do not want to start refuting one by one all these slanders and fabrications, because they are so banal and vile that they do not deserve to be mentioned. We are only surprised that certain people like Konstantinov, a philosopher and former member of the CPSU Central Committee, who was discharged from this position at the XXII Congress, have changed their trade and thus shifted from philosophical studies to the field of base fabrications. In so doing, does he think he will somehow strengthen his position and make a career? One thing is very clear to our party and to all Albanian Communists and citizens of the Albanian People's Republic, and that is that the clumsy fabrications about the "Stalinist terror" in Albania have been concocted by Nikita Khrushchev and his propagandists not so much for the Albanian Communists and our people as to discredit our party and its leadership in the eyes of the people of other countries. But our people cannot be deceived by such rot. Albania is a small country where one cannot hide even the head of a pin. In Albania there are no distant districts comparable to the virgin lands and Siberia. Therefore, any arrests become known immediately. If Nikita Khrushchev hopes, by supporting certain disgusting traitors, enemies of the Party and the people, and agents of the Titoist clique and of imperialist secret services, to disorient and shake our party and people, he is making a serious mistake. The protection given to the Titoist clique and Albanian traitors only shows more openly the face of Nikita Khrushchev as a traitor to Marxism-Leninism and as an enemy of our party and people who slanders us and brutally interferes in our internal affairs. This exposes him as a man who tramples with both feet on the

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principles of the declarations of the Communist and workers parties. Seeking arguments to make their absurd attacks against the APL and the Albanian People's Republic more credible, Nikita Khrushchev and his men have been unable to find a better way than to invoke the reactionary bourgeois papers, whose reports they consider the highest criterion of truth. We would rather not answer them by the same means and thus begin to quote articles from bourgeois papers, which, taking advantage of the fact that Nikita Khrushchev made our differences public at the XXII Congress, began to inflate and use them to divide the Communist movement and the socialist camp, although many reactionary papers have closely supported Khrushchev's line. Our party is not thinking of falling into the positions taken by the reactionary bourgeois papers and thus playing their game in dividing the Communist and workers parties, as Nikita Khrushchev and his supporters do. However, we would like to point out that Nikita Khrushchev's group has become the workshop where material in the interest of imperialist reaction against the Albanian People's Republic is being formulated. Things have gone so far that they use the most vile methods of provocation. Nikita Khrushchev's group prepares and gives for publication to Western bourgeois papers articles full of slanders against the APL and its leaders, and then reprints them on the pages of its official press with the tendentious aim of discrediting the Albanian leaders "through facts taken from reliable sources." Let the readers judge for themselves how "Marxist" this procedure is. This is how things stand. The enraged attacks of Nikita Khrushchev and his supporters against the Albanian Party of Labor and the Albanian People's Republic are further testimony to the way the Nikita Khrushchev group wallows ever deeper and deeper in the mire of its anti-Marxist campaign. Nikita Khrushchev, by unscrupulously exploiting the authority of the Soviet Union and the CPSU, has managed to influence certain personalities in the international Communist movement to follow

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him in the unprincipled fight against the APL. He tries to create the impression that the whole international Communist movement follows him in "condemning" our party and its leadership and also tries to cause hostility between the Communist and workers parties of other countries and our party. But he will never manage to draw our party into that trap by such provocations. Our party will determinedly continue its principled struggle against Nikita Khrushchev's group, fully convinced that even the most authoritative sources, which today are attacking us from the Communist and workers parties of the other countries, will, sooner or later, repent and see into what a dangerous, blind alley Nikita Khrushchev is leading them by his antiMarxist activities. . . . It might be amazing, but it is a fact, that someone has declared: "We are with Nikita Khrushchev, even when he is wrong." Our party and people are convinced that the recent hostile and anti-Marxist action of Nikita Khrushchev against our country—the closing of the Soviet Embassy in Albania and the expulsion of the Embassy of the Albanian People's Republic from the Soviet Union—did not even have the approval of Nikita Khrushchev's close friends in the Communist and workers parties of the other countries. This is not because they are particularly sympathetic toward the APL and its leadership, but because such an unprecedented action in the relations among the socialist countries is an open violation of the principles of the Moscow statements of 1957 and 1960. It discredits the Soviet Union in the eyes of international public opinion and places the Communist and workers parties in a delicate position, especially in the capitalist countries. It provides the imperialist reaction with weapons to fight us. It gravely prejudices our common cause of socialism and communism. . . . With his unbridled attacks on the APL and the Albanian People's Republic, N. Khrushchev prepares for actions to carry out designs still more ignoble, to the detriment of the unity of the socialist camp and the international Communist movement, to the detriment of our great cause. But he may be sure that each

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action of this kind will be fatal for him. The strong organization of the world Communist movement will heal the revisionist wounds which N. Khrushchev has inflicted on it. T h e revisionist elements which have become active in the ranks of the Communist and workers parties as a result of the anti-Marxist activity of N. Khrushchev and his group will be isolated and eliminated, thanks to the firm struggle of true Communists, faithful to the great revolutionary doctrine of Marxism-Leninism. This is a clear and inevitable process. The truth of Marxism will triumph.

20.

EXCLUSION

FROM WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION

PRO-

TESTED. Albanian Telegraph Agency, February 8, 1962. ON February 7, 1962, Nesti Nase, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Albanian People's Republic, received the chargés d'affaires ad interim of the People's Republic of Poland, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the People's Republic of Rumania, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, and the G D R [German Democratic Republic]. On this occasion, he delivered to them a note of protest from the government of the Albanian People's Republic addressed to their respective governments in connection with the meeting of the defense ministers of the member countries of the Warsaw Pact held in Prague from January 30 to February 1, 1962, in which the Albanian People's Republic was not invited to participate as a member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. After acknowledging the contents of the note, the chargés d'affaires ad interim of the People's Republics of Poland, Bulgaria, and Rumania, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Hungary, and the G D R refused to accept the note. As the Embassy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in Tirana is entrusted with the protection of the interests of the Soviet Union in Albania, the same note addressed to the Soviet government was handed to the chargé d'affaires ad interim of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to Albania, who, after acknowledging the contents of the note, refused to accept it.

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" K H R U S H C H E V H A S B E E N D E V O T I N G H I S T I M E TO A G G R A VATING T H E D I V E R G E N C I E S W I T H O U R PARTY AND S T A T E

INSTEAD OF SOLVING T H E M . " E d i t o r i a l in Zeri

i

Popullit,

March 25, 1962. . . BEFORE the Bucharest meeting, divergencies on certain ideological questions had never cast a shadow on the fraternal relations of our two parties. Since the Khrushchev group comments so much on the "efforts" it allegedly made to normalize relations with the A P L , we shall dwell on this question in this article. The ' efforts" of Khrushchev to normalize relations, or, more precisely, the procedures he chose to settle the ideological divergencies which have appeared between the A P L and the Soviet leaders —procedures which have consisted of extending these divergencies to the realm of state-to-state relations by means of economic, political, and military pressures, by means of threats and a blockade, while seeking to impose his own views on the A P L and the Albanian state—have resulted in the deterioration of relations, in their aggravation, which reached a culmination with the public attack launched against the A P L from the rostrum of the X X I I C P S U Congress, and with the de facto breach of diplomatic relations with the Albanian People's Republic by the Soviet government. The Bucharest meeting in 1960 was an about-face in the attitude of the Khrushchev group toward the A P L and the Albanian People's Republic, which has resulted in the exacerbation of Soviet-Albanian relations. Before this, between our two parties and our two countries fraternal and warm relations existed which served as a veritable model of relations of proletarian internationalism. Until then the leadership of the CPSU and the Soviet government observed toward our country a friendly internationalist attitude, and had granted to Albania much aid in all the realms of socialist construction, for which our party and our people are and will forever be grateful to

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the glorious C P S U and to the fraternal Soviet people. . . . One should stress that our fraternal relations have never been tarnished, although between our party and the Soviet leadership headed by Khrushchev divergencies on certain important questions existed for a long time. One knows, for instance, that our party is not in agreement with the criticism made of Stalin, with the manner in which it was made, and with the aims pursued through it by Khrushchev and his group at the X X C P S U Congress and after it. Our party has not been in agreement with the conciliatory and opportunist attitude of Khrushchev and his group toward the revisionist clique of Tito. It was not in agreement with the course set by Khrushchev on the question of peace and war and with the opportunist aims he sought to attain through it. It was not in agreement with his revisionist concept of the peaceful and nonpeaceful transition to socialism, etc. One knows, on the other hand, that Khrushchev has on various occasions spoken directly or indirectly against our party line, because of its principled stand regarding the Yugoslav revisionists and on other problems. He has tried to exert pressure on our party to put an end to the just and principled criticisms against the Belgrade revisionists, to rehabilitate traitors to our party and our people, such as Koci Xoxe, Panajot Plaku, and their associates. All this is documented. In spite of this, our party has constantly tried to settle these disagreements over the correct Marxist-Leninist road by means of negotiations and comradely criticism, while rejecting Khrushchev's propositions relating to the question of the Yugoslav revisionists and to the rehabilitation of Albanian traitors in the service of Tito's cliquc. It is a fact that in spite of the existence of the said disagreements, until the middle of I960 our party's relations with the Soviet leadership, especially the state-to-state relations between our countries, never became tense. On the contrary, they continued in the normal way of friendship and fraternal and international cooperation. But during this time, Khrushchev saw that the A P L was solidly upholding its principled positions and making no con-

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cessions. He saw that our party was not inclined to follow his revisionist course. He became even more convinced of that at the Bucharest meeting, where our party firmly opposed the antiMarxist procedures he utilized to catch the Marxist-Leninist parties unaware. Thus Khrushchev decided to be the first to start an offensive at Bucharest in harshly attacking the A P L and its leadership. As is known, at the Bucharest meeting and later at the Moscow Conference in November, 1960, the A P L expressed its view on certain problems of current world development and on the tactics and strategy of the international Communist and workers movement. It criticized certain opportunist views of Khrushchev and some of his anti-Marxist attitudes on the matter of relations among fraternal communist and workers parties. This criticism was made in the correct way from party to party, during a meeting of parties, and in complete accordance with the principles of proletarian internationalism, which prescribe that fraternal Communist and workers parties should base their relations on equal rights and arrive at unity of views and action through comradely criticism and consultations in a Marxist-Leninist way, and in the spirit of proletarian internationalism. While at the Bucharest meeting the A P L also showed composure and dealt with the question of the correct way of settling divergencies which, as appeared in Bucharest, existed not only with the A P L but also with other parties. Khrushchev, on the other hand, was even then embarking on a mistaken antiMarxist path. In reaction to the correct criticism of the A P L , he had recourse to a method which is alien to Communist and to Marxist-Leninist parties, to the method of counteroffensive, replacing comradely criticism with brutal interference in other people's internal affairs, in openly and brutally trampling on the principles of consultation, equality of rights, and proletarian internationalism, which should govern relations among Communist parties and socialist countries. Immediately after the Bucharest meeting, and especially after the Moscow meeting, the "efforts" of Khrushchev to normalize

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relations with the APL took an even more concrete form— credits granted to the Albanian People's Republic for its fiveyear plan were cut; Soviet specialists in Albania were recalled; all Albanian students in the USSR were sent back, etc. Khrushchev's "efforts," nicely portrayed by his propagandists, resemble the actions of the host who, having double-bolted his door and released his hounds, tells you: "Please come in." This "effort" and this "sincere desire" are clearly expressed in a Pravda editorial of February 21, 1962, entitled "The Banner of Our Era." In it one reads: "This criticism"—reference is made by Pravda to the attack made by Khrushchev against the A P L at the X X I I Congress—"appealed to the common sense of the Albanian leaders. It proposed to return them to positions of proletarian internationalism." How hypocritical this sentence is! According to the Pravda editors, Khrushchev's attack is comradely criticism which makes an appeal to the common sense of the Albanian leaders! Actually it appeals to counter-revolution for the overthrow of the leaders of a Marxist-Leninist party of a socialist country. . . . To dissipate any illusions about the "efforts" Khrushchev has allegedly made to normalize relations with the APL, let us refer to the correspondence between our two parties and to the main events which occurred after the Bucharest meeting. Numerous facts and documents are in our party's possession, some of which will be used in this article to show that, in his alleged "efforts" to "settle" differences with the APL, Khrushchev always sought our party's capitulation—he has sought to dictate unacceptable anti-Marxist conditions and to place it in a position of inequality and inferiority. One knows that at the Bucharest meeting Khrushchev, with no warning but not without premeditation, endangered the unity of the international Communist and workers movement. He trampled on the Leninist principles of consultation, of equal rights, and proletarian internationalism in relations between fraternal parties, and by arrogant and patriarchal methods tried to make various parties submit to his points of view and to his erroneous anti-Marxist acts. At the Bucharest meeting Khru-

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shchev did everything he could to make our delegation approve his acts, to make it approve his opportunist and divisive views. But our party maintained a resolute and principled attitude. It denounced Khrushchev's assertions and anti-Marxist positions and expressed its own points of view on the correct way to settle the differences which had arisen in the socialist camp and the international Communist movement. At this meeting the head of the Albanian delegation, Comrade Hysni Kapo, said: "This important question, which has been presented to us by Comrade Khrushchev without warning and without previous study, should be studied and discussed in a proper and prudent manner, coolly, in a spirit of comradeship, in accordance with Leninist norms, in the Marxist-Leninist way, as is the practice of our parties." That was the position of our delegation in Bucharest. T h e Central Committee of our party, through its representative, denounced Khrushchev's putschist methods and defended the idea of settling differences in accordance with Leninist norms at the meeting in November, 1960. Khrushchev did not appreciate the principled stand of our party delegation, which was opposed to his anti-Marxist views and efforts to destroy the unity of the socialist camp. He was stung by the correct criticism, made from party to party, by a small party, which he did not hesitate to call taking the offensive against the leadership of the CPSU. B e cause of this offense he started the pressures and vendetta against our party and country, which had the Marxist courage to obstruct the split in the socialist camp, deliberately initiated by Khrushchev. Immediately after the Bucharest meeting a radical change was evident in the attitude of the Soviet leadership toward the A P L and our country. T h e C P S U leadership based its policy and its position toward the A P L not on attempts to settle the differences but on the idea of making us submit at any price and of taking revenge on our party because of its resolute stand. From words they passed to deeds. T o the urgent request of the Albanian government for the purchase of a certain quantity of grain in the U S S R , at a time when our country was short of

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bread as a consequence of the big drought of 1960, Khrushchev replied with a refusal and, what is more, kept silent for a long time before giving his negative reply. Our country was obliged to secure its bread by applying to other socialist countries. This constitutes open pressure upon the APL. On the other hand, the personnel of the Soviet Embassy in Tirana, acting upon Khrushchev's instructions relative to a radical change of position toward Albania, began feverishly to attack the Marxist-Leninist line of the Albanian Party of Labor, to divide our party and to sow panic and confusion in its ranks, to detach the leadership from its party, and to turn the army cadres and other cadres which had studied in the Soviet Union against it. All these efforts, these pressures and brutal interventions, were designed to make the A P L abandon its principled stand taken at the Bucharest meeting and to oblige it at the November, 1960, meeting to support the opportunist and divisive views of Khrushchev and, with him, to make an assault on the unity of the socialist camp and the international Communist and workers movement, an assault against the revolutionary teachings of Marxism-Leninism. With this end in view, on August 13, 1960, Khrushchev sent a letter to the Central Committee of the A P L , asking for negotiations—not to settle differences existing between the A P L and the Soviet leadership, but to place the A P L in the same ranks as the Khrushchev group against a third party, and therefore to divide the socialist camp. The letter proposed: "We believe it to be important that the A P L and the CPSU go to the forthcoming November meeting in perfect unity of opinion. The CPSU Central Committee believes that, with this end in view, it would be reasonable to organize a meeting of representatives of our two parties before that conference." And out of the blue Khrushchev launched the threatening warning: "Let us extinguish the spark of misunderstanding before it becomes a fire." T h e point was therefore that the A P L should go to the Moscow meeting in "agreement" with Khrushchev's anti-Marxist views, that the A P L should renounce the correct principled

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position it had defended at the Bucharest meeting and which Khrushchev did not like. The proposed meeting aimed at this. This was, so to speak, "the first sincere effort" on the part of Khrushchev to solve the existing disagreements, to normalize relations with the APL. And unless the A P L accepted this solution, that is, unless it subordinated itself, the "spark" ignited in Bucharest would become a "fire." Is it not clear that Khrushchev's group already foresaw and consciously prepared, as early as August, 1960, the "fire" which was to break out at the XXII Congress? Does one not see clearly what Khrushchev's group understands by "efforts" to settle differences with the A P L —either submit or there will be a "fire"? The Central Committee of the APL, in its letter dated August 27, 1960, gave a worthy reply to this ill-starred attempt. After pointing out that the differences which came to light in Bucharest were the result of Khrushchev's unjust attacks against a third party, and that consequently "to go to the forthcoming meeting in perfect unity of views" amounted to saying that our two parties would have established a common attitude against a third Marxist-Leninist party, the letter stated: "Marxism-Leninism also teaches that it would be a violation of elementary Marxist-Leninist norms which govern relations between Communist and workers parties if it happened that two parties began negotiations with the object of criticizing the general line of another Marxist party. It goes without saying that such an action would not be correct, that it would not make a contribution to the cause, but would do it harm." It was absolutely logical and natural for the APL, in spite of Khrushchev's threats, to refuse such a meeting opposed to the most elementary rules of Marxism-Leninism, and which could give no positive result. Let us continue to deal with the "sincere efforts" of Khrushchev to negotiate with the leadership of the APL with a view to settling differences and normalizing Soviet-Albanian relations. On November 9, 1960, at the Moscow Conference, the Soviet leadership proposed that the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the APL, Comrade Hoxha, who had gone to Moscow

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as head of the Albanian delegation to the meeting, meet with the First Secretary of the CC of the CPSU, Khrushchev, for talks concerning relations between our two parties. Comrade Hoxha received this invitation with satisfaction and was getting ready to go to Khrushchev. A few moments before Comrade Hoxha left for this meeting, our delegation received from the Soviet party an important official CPSU document distributed to all delegations taking part in the Moscow meetings, a document which ignored the existence of Albania as a socialist country, which slandered the APL, undertook the defense of antiparty elements in our country, and accused the A P L leadership of settling party questions contrary to the rules of democratic centralism and of practicing anti-Soviet policies and activities. These cowardly calumnies against the APL were revealed to the whole international Communist movement by the Soviet leadership before they were made known to our party. It is perfectly clear: the Soviet leadership, on the one hand, was inviting the First Secretary of the A P L Central Committee for discussions while, on the other hand, it was simultaneously distributing materials filled with calumnies against our country for the obvious purpose of discrediting our party. Can one speak in this connection of the "desire" of the Soviet leaders to settle differences? Can one speak of Khrushchev's "desire" for talks? Khrushchev, to save appearances, was asking for negotiations to start, while in fact he was torpedoing them, making them conditional. "Admit the slanders which have been made public to the whole Communist movement, then come to an understanding with us"—this was in effect "the serious effort" made by Khrushchev and his group to come to an understanding with the APL. Do we not have here a deceitful, arrogant, insensible, and discriminatory attitude? Is this not an ultimatum—either submit or "fire" awaits you? Such an attitude has nothing in common with the Marxist-Leninist method of negotiations and the equalitarian, fraternal, and internationalist relations which should exist between fraternal parties. This is simply the attitude of an overlord, the attitude of the chauvinist, of a great power toward a small

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party. It was logical that in these abusive conditions the proposal for a meeting was rejected by our party with justified disgust. Despite this, and always motivated by the aim of settling differences and normalizing relations between our two parties and our two countries in the interest of the socialist camp and of the international Communist movement, the A P L delegation at the Moscow meeting, after acquainting itself with new proposals of the Soviet leadership, agreed to start negotiations on November 10 and 11, 1960, with the leaders of the CPSU, and on November 12 the entire delegation, led by Comrade Hoxha, met Khrushchev and a group of Soviet leaders. All through these meetings one saw clearly that the Soviet leaders were seeking not a way to settle differences but a means of forcing the APL to accept the views of Khrushchev's group and to bring it to a renunciation of Marxist-Leninist principles. The fact is that the document distributed on November 8 and 9 to all the representatives of the parties in Moscow slandering our party was not regarded as a mistake by the Soviet leadership, that the pressures against our party, the disruptive activities of the personnel of the Soviet Embassy in Tirana were described as matters of no importance. Finally Khrushchev came to the point of declaring that he was better able to understand Macmillan than the leaders of the APL. Actually he may have reached understandings with Macmillan, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the lackey Tito, by compromises, concessions, and flattery. This is a personal characteristic no one envies. But to force the A P L to follow his revisionist course is something which has not happened and will never happen. Thus the "negotiations" also yielded no results because of the fault of Khrushchev and his followers. This was the "second sincere effort" of Khrushchev to settle differences and normalize relations with our party. But in fact it was the second serious effort to divert our party further from the positions of MarxismLeninism and to subject it to his chauvinist diktat. After this setback, as expected, Khrushchev resorted to threats. He declared cynically that henceforth he would base

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relations with Albania on other foundations. This was no sooner said than done. Khrushchev passed from words to deeds. Ideological differences were transferred to the realm of interstate relations. All credits were cut. All Soviet specialists in Albania were recalled suddenly and unilaterally. Commercial and military agreements were trampled upon. With great patience, the A P L Central Committee tried to safeguard the good relations which existed between our countries, but with incredible persistence, Khrushchev and his group endeavored to undermine them. Facts and documents prove this. Thus our economic delegation, headed by Minister of Industry Spahiu, which had gone to Moscow to sign an agreement for the period 1 9 6 1 - 6 5 and to sign an agreement on credit granted to Albania by the U S S R for the mechanization of agriculture, was obliged to wait in vain for sixty-four days. While the meeting of eighty-one parties and the sessions between the two parties were taking place, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade and the State Committee for Economic Relations, acting on Khrushchev's instigation and example, created all sorts of difficulties for our economic delegation—prolonged the meetings while waiting for "instructions from above,'" etc. This went on until December 2 1 , 1 9 6 0 , when Semichastnyi, U S S R Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, during a conversation with members of the delegation, declared: " T h e Ministry is instructed to declare to the Albanian side that it would be advisable to postpone the question of the signing of a long-term commercial agreement for 1 9 6 1 - 6 5 and the agreement on granting credits to Albania, in view of the need to discuss this question on a higher level." And when the government of the Albanian People's Republic was getting ready to send Comrade Koco Theodhosi, VicePresident of the Council of Ministers and candidate member of the Politburo, to conclude the agreements, the Soviet government made it known on January 6, 1961, through a note from the Soviet Embassy in Tirana, that it did not accept this proposal and declared that economic questions "could only be discussed at the highest party and state level." In practice this meant that

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the Soviet government was linking negotiations on economic questions and the conclusion of agreements to efforts to make our party submit to the points of view of Khrushchev's group. This becomes even clearer if one realizes that on the basis of the top-level negotiations conducted in Moscow in December, 1958, between representatives of the parties and governments of the two countries, these questions were concluded and the relevant agreements signed respectively on April 3 and July 3, 1959. Therefore it is clear that the Soviet leadership was exploiting the question of economic aid as a means of exerting pressure on the A P L on the eve of its Fourth Congress, which was held in February, 1961, and to force it to renounce its Marxist-Leninist points of view. It would seem that this was the "third sincere effort" of Khrushchev to settle differences, to normalize relations with the A P L and the Albanian People's Republic. The A P L Central Committee, on January 14, 1961, again explained in a letter, with discretion and patience, where the truth lay, and declared itself ready to settle the differences in the correct Marxist-Leninist way. T h e Central Committee stressed in particular: "We are rightly astonished at the position adopted recently by the Soviet government on these questions, and we cannot understand on what basis it is asking unilaterally for a revision of the aforesaid questions, discussed and decided at the highest level and settled conclusively. The Albanian Party and government have regarded and always will regard with favor the meeting of delegations of our two parties and our two governments at the highest level, or at any other level, for our party, our people, and our country are linked by an eternal and indestructible friendship with the CPSU and the Soviet people and the USSR; but under such conditions as the Soviet government presents the questions, the A P L does not consider it reasonable and opportune to send a summit delegation. First, because, as said above, the matter in hand had been discussed and definitely decided by the two parties, in complete agreement and at the highest level, and, second, because the Soviet government is raising these questions in a mistaken manner, which contradicts the spirit of

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relations between socialist countries and is thus unacceptable to us." Time has shown that the APL full well understood Khrushchev's aims, his plans to make our party submit to economic pressures, to make economic aid conditional on approval of his opportunist line. It is clear that it was not the intention of the Soviet leaders to start negotiations to solve economic questions at hand, but to dictate conditions for our party's submission. This is shown in the letter of the Soviet government to us of April 26, 1961, signed by First Deputy Premier Kosygin, which said in particular: "Having weighed all the circumstances, the Soviet government is obliged to reexamine the question of future relations with the Albanian People's Republic. . . . The Soviet people and the peoples of other socialist countries would not understand us if we, while depriving our country of material resources, continued to satisfy the demands of Albanian leaders, who, at the expense of the interests of the Albanian people, have trampled on elementary norms in relations with the U S S R and its government. . . . It is understandable that the Albanian leadership cannot hope in the future that the USSR will help it as it has in the past, with aid by which only true friends and brothers have the right to benefit. The Soviet Union deems it necessary henceforth to build its relations with Albania on a new basis, taking into account the unfriendly policy practiced by its leadership toward the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. . . . As far as future relations between our countries are concerned, and USSR aid to Albania, these will depend entirely on the attitude the Albanian Party adopts." The APL has made sincere efforts to put an end to differences with the Soviet leadership in a Marxist-Leninist manner. Whoever studies the development of Albanian-Soviet relations, either through the excerpts we are reproducing, or the correspondence exchanged between our two parties, will notice that since the Bucharest meeting Khrushchev's group has solely endeavored to make the APL submit, in order to impose its points of view on it. In every letter from the Soviet leadership, in every "sincere

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effort" to improve relations, conditions are stipulated and pressure is exerted with regard to our party. This also is revealed in the excerpt of the letter we have just quoted. On the other hand, the Central Committee of the A P L and the Albanian government, to bar the way to what Khrushchev and his followers were deliberately preparing, have given proof of patience and sang-froid. This can be seen from the letter of reply the A P L Central Committee addressed on July 6, 1961, to the CPSU Central Committee. Our party expressed its point of view on the method of resolving differences between our parties, taking into account the objective concrete situations existing at this time. "Certainly," states the reply, "we are aware that to solve these differences we need time and patience on both sides and major efforts in order to create necessary conditions to liquidate the negative phenomena which made an appearance a year ago in the friendly, fraternal, and, we can say without a shadow of doubt, more than exemplary relations which previously existed between the two parties, our two countries, and our two fraternal peoples. First it is necessary to renounce the extension of ideological differences existing between our two parties to the interstate domain, be it in the economic field or the political and military one. Our party and government have never refused to start bilateral talks on any questions. But we have noted and we note that with this end in view necessary conditions must be created, conditions of equality for both sides." Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership, headed by Khrushchev, continued its dangerous practice of placing the A P L in positions of inequality, discredit, and discrimination, until at last, on August 24, 1961, it sent the A P L Central Committee a new letter which closed all roads to negotiation and settlement of differences. By this letter Khrushchev and his group embarked on the road of basest provocations and subversion. Khrushchev and his group transferred the ideological differences between the two parties to another field, that of security police, coming to a point at which they even treat the leaders of the A P L as agents of foreign intelligence services. This letter is in fact a prologue

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to what was said at the X X I I Congress, where Khrushchev made public before our enemies the differences in the socialist camp and in the international Communist and workers movement. This was Khrushchev's fourth "sincere effort" to settle the differences with the A P L , an effort which later at the X X I I Congress was made more concrete by his appeal for a counterrevolution in Albania. Therefore Khrushchev has consciously aggravated relations to the end, leaving no way out. In the meantime the Central Committee of the A P L , paying no attention to Khrushchev's provocations and monstrous calumnies, and realizing the great harm Khrushchcv was causing by his actions to the Communist movement in general, to the socialist camp, and to the friendship between the Albanian and Soviet peoples in particular, launched a new appeal to the CPSU to "examine calmly the situation which has been created." In its letter of reply, approved at the Plenum of the A P L Central Committee on October 12, 1961, addressed to the C P S U Central Committee which was to be elected by the X X I I Congress (and delivered to the Soviet Embassy in Tirana on November 11, 1 9 6 1 ) it is stated: "Deeply concerned with the undesirable and very grave state of Albanian-Soviet relations at this moment, which has its origin in the brutal anti-Marxist actions of Khrushchev and his group, the A P L and its Central Committee ask the Central Committee of the CPSU calmly to examine the situation which has been created and to take the necessary measures for its normalization. The Plenum of the A P L Central Committee is of the opinion that to cure this dangerous illness the urgent intervention of the C P S U Central Committee is necessary, a body in which the A P L has had and still has unshakable confidence." In this spirit, Comrade Hoxha in his speech of November 7, 1961, stated: " T h e A P L , with calm and clear conscience, is addressing an appeal to the CPSU, to the new Central Committee elected by the X X I I Congress, to judge with Leninist justice, objectivity, and sang-froid, and without bias, the situation created in relations between our two parties and our two countries. Our party has

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always been ready, in the name of the unity of the Communist movement and the socialist camp and of the interests of our countries, to resolve the existing differences, but it has always been of the opinion that these questions should be resolved justly and solely in a Marxist-Leninist way, under conditions of equality and not of pressures and dictation. We hope for and we are convinced of the justice of the C P S U . " If Khrushchev and his group had the question of the unity of the international Communist movement and the socialist c a m p close to their hearts, if they were guided by the desire to settle differences and not to aggravate relations to the breaking point, if logic were to triumph over the runaway passion of the person who wants to get his own way in everything, then one would stop to think. It is said that there is none so deaf as the person who does not want to hear. That is just what happened: Not only was the wise and sincere appeal of the A P L ignored, despite all that was said at the X X I I Congress of the CPSU, but events went even further—very f a r — a s far as the unheard-of act of breaking de jacto diplomatic relations, which can be explained only by the logic of one who says: I am everything. I am doing what I want and I am not asking anybody's advice. T h e misfortune is that today this " I " finds himself at the head of the CPSU and at the head of the Soviet state, and his revisionist views and actions do harm which is of immense cost to the Communist movement in general, the socialist camp, and all mankind. Numerous facts concerning Khrushchev's anti-Marxist positions toward our party and our country clearly indicate that he is acting consciously against the A P L and the Albanian people, against Albanian-Soviet friendship. Despite his ferocious attacks and his anti-Marxist actions, Khrushchev and his group cannot shake, even a little bit, the granitelike foundations of the sacred friendship of our country with the glorious Soviet Union. Despite his unrestrained attacks, our party has always held a correct and principled attitude toward friendship with the Soviet Union. In the USSR not a line can be read about our people's success

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in the construction of socialism, as if there were no such entities on the surface of the earth as the Albanian People's Republic and the Albanian people. Instead there are cowardly attacks and the most banal calumnies against our party and our country. (Since the X X I I Congress some 150 items have appeared in the central organs of Soviet propaganda, attacking the A P L . ) In the Albanian press items are constantly being written concerning the successes of the fraternal Soviet people in the construction of communism. The Fourth APL Congress was another clear indication that our party's line toward Albanian-Soviet friendship has remained immovable and always based on principle. "Friendship with the Soviet Union," says the resolution of the Fourth A P L Congress, "has been, is, and always will be the cornerstone of our foreign policy. Our heroic party rates it first in the struggle for freedom, socialism, and peace. It rests on principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. Friendship with the Soviet Union will strengthen further and there is no force in the world which can undermine it. In the Soviet people and the CPSU, our people have their cherished friend, just as the Soviet people have in our people." In the future as well our party will guard our people's friendship with the fraternal Soviet people. It will struggle with all its might to strengthen it. Our unshakable conviction is that eternal Albanian-Soviet friendship will always triumph over the antiAlbanian actions of Khrushchev and his men. The anti-Marxist positions of Khrushchev against the APL are the inevitable consequence of his abandoning positions of Marxist-Leninist theory. Khrushchev's anti-Marxist attitude toward the APL is by no means accidental—it is a link in the chain of his activities against the socialist camp and against the international Communist and workers movement, which he is trying to push onto a deeply opportunist and revisionist road, the dangerous road of unprincipled concessions to imperialism, and bourgeois pacifism. With his views and his passions he has provoked great confusion in the ranks of some Communist and workers parties, and this has

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weakened their positions. This course discredits and compromises them. T o achieve his anti-Marxist aims, Khrushchev, heedless of consequences, yields to nothing, consciously commits grave crimes which have harmed and are harming greatly the entire world Communist movement, the great cause of socialism and of communism. In fact he is dividing the socialist camp and the international Communist movement. A conspicuous proof of this is in his unprecedented actions against the A P L and the Albanian People's Republic. Only men who have lost all common sense can pretend that such actions by Khrushchev and his group as economic and political pressures and blockades against a socialist country such as Albania—they went as far as to break diplomatic relations with the Albanian People's Republic—allegedly serve to consolidate the unity of socialist c a m p and of the Communist movement! But does Khrushchev uphold such anti-Marxist attitudes solely against the A P L ? Not at all. The anti-Marxist group of Khrushchev has committed many acts of blackmail against the A P L . But does he direct this solely against our party? Is it solely against our party that he has committed blackmail and pressure in lobbies and behind the scenes? Each day Khrushchev and his anti-Marxist group involve themselves more deeply in their dangerous role. H e is preparing new crimes, even more grave, against the socialist camp and the Communist movement. Our party, just as is the case with Marxist-Leninists in all countries, is wholly conscious of and preoccupied with the serious danger which threatens the cause of socialism and communism by virtue of the anti-Marxist views and actions of the revisionist group of Khrushchev. While bearing full responsibility before the Albanian people and international communism, the A P L regards it as its lofty and principled task to wage, within the limits of its strength and capabilities, a determined struggle as a matter of principle to defend the purity of Marxism-Leninism and the solidarity of the socialist c a m p — in the Marxist-Leninist way and solely in the Marxist-Leninist way.

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O n l y by a determined and principled struggle is it possible to defend

Marxism-Leninism

from revisionist a t t a c k s by

Khru-

shchev and his group. Only thus is it possible to defend the Statement of the eightyo n e Communist and workers parties, which the supporters of Khrushchev now regard with contempt as a d o c u m e n t of "limited c l a u s e s , " and which " c a n n o t have the desired universal v a l u e " — i n other words, " a compromise and a worthless d o c u m e n t , " as Khrushchev regarded its draft in O c t o b e r , 1 9 6 0 . Only thus can o n e defend the unity of the socialist c a m p and the international Communist movement, which is trampled upon by the anti-Marxist Khrushchev group.

.

.

.

After this article, direct Albanian press and radio attacks on the C P S U and the U S S R subsided. On April 1, 1962, the Soviet press published a statement of the Executive Committee o f the Soviet Red Cross reporting that a Soviet offer of help to victims o f a severe earthquake in Southern Albania had been turned down by the Albanian authorities. Moscow considered this rejection an "unfriendly act." On June 6, 1962, the government of the Albanian People's Republic issued a statement arguing that the convening o f the forthcoming session of the Council for Mutual E c o n o m i c Assistance without the participation of Albania was "in open contradiction" to and in "conscious violation" of the Charter of the C M E A . Hence, the Albanian Council of Ministers held, the Council meeting was unlawful and its future decisions null and void. ( O n the C M E A session, see below, p. 6 5 4 . ) Similarly, after the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization met in Moscow on J u n e 7 without Albanian participation, the Council of Ministers in T i r a n a issued a statement reiterating the illegality o f its exclusion: " I t is a grave act consciously and maliciously carried out not only against the Albanian People's Republic but also against the interests o f the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the whole socialist camp. Responsibility for this very grave action and the decisions taken at the Moscow meeting rests with its organizers and with the governments which participated in the meeting." F o r the further course of Soviet-Albanian relations, see below, Chapter X .

CHAPTER

III

THE CHINESE POSITION

2 2 . MESSAGE

OF

GREETINGS

FROM

THE

CHINESE

R E P U B L I C TO THE SOVIET U N I O N ON THE OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION.

PEOPLE'S

ANNIVERSARY

Peking Review

(Peking),

No. 45, November 10, 1961. 1 N. S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: On the occasion of the forty-fourth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, we, on behalf of the Chinese people, the Chinese Communist Party, and the Chinese government, extend warm and fraternal greetings to you, and through you to the great Soviet people, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the Soviet government. The October Socialist Revolution was the greatest revolution in human history, opening up as it did for mankind a new epoch of transition from capitalism to socialism and communism. The victory of the October Revolution has exerted an incalculable influence on the development of world history. The path opened up by the October Revolution is a broad highway for the proletariat and all oppressed people and nations of the world in their struggle for complete liberation and in their advance to socialism and communism. No force on earth can prevent the people of all lands from advancing victoriously along this bright road. In the past few years, the great Soviet people, under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of COMRADE

1

The Peking Review

is an English-language weekly.

The Chinese

Position

201

the Soviet Union headed by Comrade Khrushchev, have scored brilliant victories in the all-round development of communist construction and in the cause of safeguarding world peace. The great achievements of the fraternal Soviet people in all fields fill the Chinese people with boundless joy. A deep, kinsman-like friendship exists between the peoples of China and the Soviet Union. Our two countries have always maintained close cooperation and supported each other in the cause of building socialism and communism and in the struggle against imperialist aggression and in defense of world peace. T h e great unity of the Chinese and Soviet peoples based on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism has long been tested and no force can undermine it. T h e Chinese people will spare no effort in continuing to work untiringly to strengthen the unity of the peoples of China and the Soviet Union and the unity of the socialist camp of twelve socialist countries. May the great Soviet people achieve new successes in the realization of the grand program of building communism in the Soviet Union adopted by the X X I I Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union! Long live the Great October Socialist Revolution! Long live the eternal and unbreakable friendship and unity between the peoples of China and the Soviet Union! Long live the great unity of the socialist camp! Long live the great unity of the people of the world! Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Liu Shao-ch'i, Chairman of the People's Republic of China Chu Tch, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China November 6, 1961

202 23.

The Chinese MESSAGE OF CHINA

OF GREETINGS

FROM

TO T H E A L B A N I A N

TWENTIETH

ANNIVERSARY

A L B A N I A N PARTY O F L A B O R .

OF

Position

THE C O M M U N I S T

PARTY OF THE

PARTY

LABOR ON

FOUNDING

Peking Review, No.

THE

OF

THE

46,

No-

vember 17, 1961. DEAR C O M R A D E S :

On the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the Albanian Party of Labor, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, on behalf of all party members and the whole Chinese people, extends the warmest fraternal greetings to your party and all the Albanian people. The founding of the Albanian Party of Labor was a decisive turning point in the history of the Albanian people. From the moment of its birth, the Albanian Party of Labor led the heroic Albanian people in waging a war of national liberation and in valiant struggles against the fascist occupation forces and domestic traitors. Since liberation, the Albanian Party of Labor has led the Albanian people in victoriously carrying on the socialist revolution and socialist construction, greatly changing the face of their motherland within a short historical period, and transforming Albania from an economically backward agricultural country into an agricultural-industrial one. A socialist economic basis has been laid both in the cities and in the countryside. The Albanian people are now striving with full confidence to carry out the resolutions of the Fourth Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor and the Third Five-Year Plan. Under the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor, the Albanian people stand firm at an outpost of the socialist camp in its struggle against the enemy, and, in the militant spirit of holding "a hoe in one hand and a rifle in the other," have made positive contributions in safeguarding the cause of socialism, defending world peace, and fighting against the imperialist policies of aggression and war. By steadfastly waging a principled, resolute struggle against the modern revisionism of Yugo-

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slavia, the Albanian Party of Labor has played an important role in preserving the purity of Marxism-Leninism. The history of the Albanian Party of Labor in the past twenty years, its activities and struggles and the great successes it has achieved, fully testify to the fact that the A P L is a militant Marxist-Leninist party steeled in revolutionary struggles. It has its roots deep in the masses of the people and maintains flesh-andblood ties with them. We are convinced that the Albanian people, under the correct leadership of the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor headed by Comrade Enver Hoxha, their long-tested leader, will certainly achieve still greater successes in socialist construction in the future and make fresh contributions in the struggle for promoting the cause of world peace, democracy, national liberation, and socialism. T h e C P C and the Chinese people have always followed with interest the struggles and achievements of the fraternal Albanian Party of Labor and the fraternal Albanian people. T h e Chinese Communists and the Chinese people deeply admire the heroic revolutionary spirit of the Albanian Party of L a b o r and the Albanian people. The two parties of China and Albania and the people of the two countries have forged a deep, militant friendship in their common struggle to oppose imperialism, defend world peace, and build socialism. We are deeply convinced that the great friendship and unity of the peoples of China and Albania based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism will certainly be further consolidated and developed. Long live the glorious Albanian Party of Labor! Long live the unbreakable unity of the Chinese and Albanian peoples! Long live the great unity of the socialist camp! Long live the great unity of the international Communist movement! Long live invincible Marxism-Leninism! The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China November 7, 1961

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The CPC's position, as outlined in the editorials and speeches commemorating the Soviet and Albanian anniversaries, emphasized the unity of the bloc, noted that the Albanian People's Republic was a member of the "socialist camp," and stressed the need for struggle against imperialism and for national liberation. The statements on the forty-fourth anniversary of the October Revolution mentioned Stalin favorably and appeared to question the applicability of the new CPSU Program outside the Soviet Union. The statements on the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the APL and on the seventeenth anniversary of Albania's "liberation" stressed Hoxha's ideological orthodoxy.

24. "Wu Y U - C H A N G ' S S P E E C H AT P E K I N G view, No. 45, November 10, 1961.

RALLY."

Peking

Re-

On November 6, Wu Yu-chang, a member of the CPC Central Committee and Vice-President of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, addressed a rally in Peking commemorating the Soviet October Revolution. . . . A F T E R Lenin's death J . V. Stalin, together with the other leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, carried on the cause of Lenin, defended Lenin's line, and waged resolute struggles against the enemies of Leninism and socialism —the Trotskyites, Zinovievites, and other counter-revolutionaries. Under their leadership, the Soviet people, with dauntless proletarian heroism and in the spirit of self-reliance, overcame serious difficulties and won great victories in socialist construction, thus preparing the conditions for the subsequent victory of the Soviet Union in the antifascist war. . . The victory of the Chinese revolution is another victory of great world historic significance following the victory of the October Revolution. It has extended the great influence of the October Revolution, breached the imperialist front in the East, and greatly accelerated the development of the national-democratic revolutionary movement in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; it dealt the world imperialist system an extremely heavy blow. The victory of the Chinese revolution has contributed in great measure to changing the world balance of forces in favor of socialism and strengthened the great socialist camp.

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Accounting for one-third of the world's population and a quarter of the land space of the earth, this camp embraces twelve socialist countries—Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, the Democratic R e public of Vietnam, the German Democratic Republic, China, the Korean Democratic People's Republic, Mongolia, Poland, Rumania, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia. T h e emergence of the socialist camp has fundamentally changed the world balance of class forces, marking a great new turn in the progress of human history. After the victory of the antifascist war, the Soviet people speedily healed the scars of war and further developed their national economy. In 1959, the Soviet Union started its SevenYear Plan of construction, entering a new period of the fullscale building of communism. It has achieved tremendous developments in both industry and agriculture and further raised the material and cultural well-being of its people. This year, the Soviet Union twice successfully launched manned spaceships into the cosmos and brought them back safely to earth, thereby making a brilliant contribution to man's conquest of the universe. Recently the X X I I Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union adopted a new Program; this Program sets forth a grand plan for building communism. The brilliant achievements gained by the Soviet people in the full-scale building of c o m m u nism have greatly added to the might of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist camp and inspired the people of the whole world in their great struggle for world peace, national liberation, democracy, and socialism. Here we extend our warm congratulations to the Soviet people, to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and to its Central Committee, headed by Comrade N. S. Khrushchev. Comrades and friends! The Moscow Declaration of 1957 summed up the experience of the international Communist movement of the last hundred years, and especially of the years since the October Revolution. It elucidated the common principles which the Communist parties of all countries must observe in socialist revolution and socialist construction. T h e Moscow Statement of 1960, with its correct analysis of the international situa-

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tion and of a series of vital issues facing the international Communist movement over the three intervening years, enriched the document of 1957. These two documents are the common program of the international Communist movement, the militant banner of all Marxist-Leninist political parties, and the guide to action which they must all observe. We should hold high the banner of Marxism-Leninism, the banner of the October Revolution, and the banner of the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement, and march forward with bold strides. . . . At present, the international situation is developing more and more in favor of world peace, national liberation, democracy, and socialism. The imperialists are having an increasingly difficult time of it. The forces of socialism are ever more markedly surpassing those of imperialism, and the forces of peace are ever more markedly surpassing those of war. But the imperialists, headed by the United States, will never reconcile themselves to their defeat. Both in the East and in the West, the U.S. imperialists are making trouble everywhere, creating tension, expanding armaments, making war preparations, and threatening war. In Berlin, Cuba, Laos, South Vietnam, South Korea, and other areas, they are continuously carrying out military provocations; and they continue to occupy by force China's territory of Taiwan. All this serves to expose fully the utterly ferocious face of U.S. imperialism behind the mask of "peace." As long as imperialism exists it will keep on making trouble. Just as Comrade Mao Tse-tung has pointed out, "Make trouble, fail, make trouble again, fail again . till their doom; that is the logic of the imperialists and all reactionaries the world over in dealing with the people's cause, and they will never go against this logic." To defend world peace and oppose the imperialist policies of war and aggression is the urgent demand of the people of the whole world. The people of the world have become more and more united and have formed a broad international united front, with the forces of socialism as its core and embracing the forces of national liberation, democracy, and peace. So long as they continue to strengthen their unity and persist in their struggle,

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the people of the world will surely be able to smash the war plans of imperialism, bring about a relaxation in international tension, and score new victories in the cause of world peace and human progress. Modern revisionism represented by the Tito clique of Yugoslavia is an instrument in the hands of imperialism. T h e modern revisionists of Yugoslavia are scheming to create dissension among the countries in the socialist camp, among the fraternal parties, and within each of these parties; they make it their job to subvert and undermine the socialist countries. In compliance with the desires of U.S. imperialism, they are doing everything they can to undermine the national liberation movements of the peoples in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, to sow discord between these peoples and the socialist countries, and induce them to depart from the correct path of opposing imperialism and colonialism. In the face of the frenzied attacks of imperialism, headed by the United States and its lackeys—the modern revisionists— it is of paramount importance to uphold and strengthen the unity of the international Communist movement, especially the unity of the twelve socialist countries. The unity of the socialist camp, the unity of the international Communist movement, is the nucleus of the great unity of the people of the world. This unity of ours has been cemented by common ideals and a common cause; it has been consolidated and developed in the joint struggles against our common enemy, and it is based on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. Unity is life, unity is strength, unity is victory. The peoples of the various socialist countries know that they must protect the unity of the socialist camp as they do the apple of their eye. All the enemy's plots to disrupt this unity are certainly doomed to ignominious failure. The unity between China and the Soviet Union is the cornerstone of the unity of the socialist camp and the international Communist movement; it is the cornerstone of the great unity of the people of the world. A profound friendship has long existed between the Chinese and Soviet peoples. In their cause of op-

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posing imperialist aggression and safeguarding world peace, the Chinese and Soviet peoples have always helped and cooperated with each other, and fought and marched forward shoulder to shoulder. In its socialist revolution and socialist construction, China has received support and aid from the people of the Soviet Union, the peoples of the other socialist countries, and all the other peoples of the world. This is something for which the Chinese people will always be grateful and which they will never forget. Comrade Liu Shao-ch'i has said: "Both the Soviet people and the Chinese people have a fervent desire to reinforce the unity between the peoples of the two countries. Whenever we speak about reinforcing the unity between the two parties and the two countries and the friendship between the two peoples, people are very happy. Conversely, any words or deeds which are not in the interests of the unity between our two parties and two countries, or which impair the basis of this unity—the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism—will not be countenanced by the people of China. Nor will such words or deeds be countenanced by the people of the Soviet Union. And I believe that they will not be countenanced either by the people of any of the countries of the socialist camp or by the people who constitute over 90 percent of the total population in the capitalist world." The unity and friendship between the peoples of China and the Soviet Union cannot be destroyed by any imperialists, reactionaries, or their lackeys; it will certainly grow with each passing day and last forever. . . .

25.

Ho

TSUNG.

"GLORIOUS

ALBANIAN

PARTY

OF

LABOR."

Peking Review, No. 46, November 17, 1961. ON November 8, the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the Albanian Party of Labor was warmly observed by the Chinese people. Press and radio, exhibitions, meetings, and rallies marked the occasion. . . . Albania is not only successfully working to build socialism but is also carrying on an unremitting struggle against imperialism

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and its stooges, the Yugoslav modern revisionists. T r u e to its revolutionary tradition, the Albanian Party of Labor displays a fearless militancy in the face of continuous provocations and other disruptive activities of these enemies. By steadfastly pursuing a peaceful foreign policy and resolutely struggling for world peace, by working for the realization of peaceful coexistence among countries with different social systems and opposing U.S. imperialist policies of war and aggression, and by actively supporting the Asian, African, and Latin American peoples' struggle for national independence, Albania is making outstanding contributions to the cause of world peace and human progress. These brilliant successes achieved by the Albanian people in their domestic and foreign policies are inseparable f r o m the correct leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor, which in its twenty years of existence has faithfully applied the general principles of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete conditions of Albania. As Jen-min jih-pao states in its editorial of November 8: " T h e Albanian Party of Labor, headed by C o m r a d e Enver Hoxha, the long-tested leader of the Albanian people, is a party which takes Marxism-Leninism as its guide to action, a party long tempered in the flames of revolutionary struggle and one that maintains close ties with the masses. It has always been loyal to Marxism-Leninism, to the principles of proletarian internationalism, and to the 1957 Declaration and 1960 Statement of the Moscow meetings. It has resolutely safeguarded unity with the Soviet people and the people of the other socialist countries and the unity of the international Communist movement. With its high Marxist-Leninist sense of principle, the Albanian Party of Labor has carried on an uncompromising struggle against the modern revisionists represented by the Tito clique of Yugoslavia and resolutely defended the purity of Marxism-Leninism, playing an important role in safeguarding and strengthening the unity of the socialist camp and of the international Communist movement." The Chinese people have long admired the Albanian people and the Albanian Party of Labor for their firm adherence to

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proletarian principles and revolutionary militancy in the struggle against imperialism and modern revisionism. They have rejoiced at the Albanian people's brilliant successes in socialist construction. At the same time they have always felt the fraternal Albanian people's sincere support for their own socialist construction and in their struggles in the international arena. Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism have bound the two peoples together in a militant friendship which transcends the vast geographical distance that separates them. As the celebrations of the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the Albanian Party of Labor demonstrate, no force on earth can shake this comradeship-in-arms between the Chinese and Albanian peoples. 26.

"FRATERNAL

ALBANIA'S

SEVENTEENTH

ANNIVERSARY."

Peking Review, No. 48, December 1, 1961. THE Chinese Communist Party and state leaders Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chu Teh, and Chou En-lai sent a message of hearty congratulations to the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor and state on the seventeenth anniversary of the liberation of Albania on November 29. The message, after expressing the warmest greetings, states: "In the past seventeen years, the Albanian people with their glorious revolutionary traditions, under the correct leadership of the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor headed by its long-tested leader, Comrade Enver Hoxha, have displayed unflinching heroism, given full play to the revolutionary spirit of indefatigable endeavor, overcome difficulties, and scored brilliant victories and tremendous achievements in the resolute struggle against their enemies both at home and abroad and in the building of socialism. The Albanian people are now working with selfless enthusiasm to implement the Third Five-Year Plan —the plan for further development of socialist construction in Albania—adopted at the Fourth Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor. We are fully convinced that the Albanian people,

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united closely around the Albanian Party of Labor, will overcome all difficulties in the path of their advance and will achieve new and ever more brilliant successes in socialist construction. "The Albanian People's Republic is a glorious member of the great socialist community; standing firm at the southwestern outpost of the socialist camp, jt has made important contributions to the defense of the security of the socialist camp. The government of the Albanian People's Republic is unswervingly pursuing a peaceful foreign policy and is waging an unyielding struggle in defense of world peace, for the realization of peaceful coexistence among countries with different social systems, against the imperialist policies of aggression and war, and in support of the revolutionary movement of the oppressed nations and peoples. T h e Albanian Party of Labor is steadfastly loyal to Marxism-Leninism and the principles of proletarian internationalism; it faithfully abides by the Moscow Declaration of 1957 and the Moscow Statement of 1960; it resolutely safeguards and strengthens the unity of the socialist camp and the unity of the international Communist movement. The Albanian Party of Labor, in waging an uncompromising, principled struggle against the modern revisionists represented by the Tito clique of Yugoslavia, has played an important role in the defense of Marxism-Leninism. " T h e Chinese and Albanian peoples are close brothers in the great socialist community. The people of our two countries support each other and cooperate closely both in socialist construction and in the struggle against imperialism and modern revisionism and for the defense of world peace. The friendship between the people of the two countries, based on MarxismLeninism and the principles of proletarian internationalism, fully accords with the interests of the people of our two countries and the whole socialist camp. The Chinese people will continue unswervingly to make the greatest efforts to develop the unbreakable friendship between themselves and the Albanian people and to strengthen the unity of the socialist camp and the unity of the people the world over." . . .

212 27.

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Position

"HOLDING A L O F T THE MARXIST-LENINIST REVOLUTIONARY

Editorial in Jertmin jih-pao (Peking), December 1, 1961. Translation in Peking Review, No. 49, December 8, 1961.B A N N E R OF THE M O S C O W S T A T E M E N T . "

T h e C h i n e s e C o m m u n i s t press likewise stepped u p its attacks on t h e "Yugoslav variety" of " m o d e r n revisionism." President Tito's speech at S k o p j e on N o v e m b e r 13, 1961 ( D o c u m e n t N o . 9 1 ) w a s reprinted by Jen-min jih-pao on N o v e m b e r 28, with an a c c o m p a n y i n g c o m m e n t a r y by " O b s e r v e r " entitled "Let E v e r y o n e See the F a c e of the R e n e g a d e . " A s if in passing, it declared with regard to "reactionaries" a n d "revisionists": " T h e y think they can get s o m e t h i n g f r o m the controversies within the socialist c a m p and the international C o m munist m o v e m e n t ; they h o p e to get f r o m this s o m e t h i n g useful f o r their counter-revolutionary activities. But they have rejoiced too soon. T h e imperialists, t h e reactionaries of all countries, and the m o d e r n revisionists n u m b e r only a h a n d f u l of persons, m a k i n g u p but a very small percentage of the population of the various c o u n tries. M o r e t h a n 9 0 percent a r e people w h o , basically speaking, stand o p p o s e d to t h e m and will not go along with t h e m . In t h e last analysis, they can never escape their d o o m . T h e scientific theses of M a r x ism-Leninism are irrefutable, and the unity of proletarian internationalism is indestructible." In t h e f a c e of growing, t h o u g h still cautious, Soviet use of r e f e r ences to C o m m u n i s t C h i n a (primarily by o t h e r C o m m u n i s t p a r t i e s 3 ) , Peking evidently decided to m a k e a c o m p r e h e n s i v e overt reply. T h e occasion was provided by the first anniversary of the 1960 Statement of C o m m u n i s t and w o r k e r s parties. (See D o c u m e n t s Nos. 17 and 18 f o r t h e Soviet a n d Albanian editorials on the same anniversary.) " Jen-min jih-pao (People's Daily) is the daily organ of the Central Committee of the CPC. "On November 21. Pravda summarized a resolution of the Hungarian Central Committee declaring advocacy of "patience" with Albania to be "inadmissible"; on November 22, it printed Antonin Novotny's statement attacking Chou's stance at the XXII Congress and supporting the Soviet position (see Document No. 42); on November 25. it carried Wladyslaw Gomulka's reference to China's position (see Document No. 45); on November 26, it republished Maurice Thorez's attack on the "Chinese comrades"; on November 27. it provided a summary, and on November 29 the text, of Walter Ulbricht's demand that the CPC take a stand on the Albanian issue (see Document No. 49). Before the end of November. Secretary Tsend, of the Mongolian Party, and Thorez had again publicly assailed the Chinese Party's leadership (see Document No. 68).

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. A YEAR ago, representatives of the Communist and . workers parties held a meeting in Moscow and unanimously adopted a Statement and an appeal to the peoples of all the world. The 1960 Moscow Statement was drawn up in collective effort by eighty-one fraternal parties. Like the Declaration of the 1957 Moscow Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers Parties, the Statement is the common program of the international Communist movement today and a standard of action to be observed by all the Communist and workers parties. The Moscow Statement points out that the main content of our times is the transition from capitalism to socialism. . . The Statement, on the basis of the new situation in the world balance of class forces, correctly points out that a new stage has begun in the current deepening of the general crisis of capitalism. This stage has emerged in the conditions of competition and struggle between the two world systems—socialism and capitalism—an increasing change in the balance of forces in favor of socialism, and a marked aggravation of all the contradictions of imperialism. It has taken place at a time when a successful struggle by the peace-loving forces to bring about and promote peaceful coexistence has prevented the imperialists f r o m undermining world peace by their aggressive actions, and in an atmosphere of growing struggle by the broad masses of the people for democracy, national liberation, and socialism.

The development of the international situation fully confirms these scientific theses of the Moscow Statement. . In the past year, imperialism and colonialism have suffered still heavier blows in the face of the mighty currents of the national liberation movement and the people's revolutionary movement. Since it came to power, the Kennedy administration, in which the U.S. monopoly groups have placed great hopes, far from being able to overcome U.S. imperialism's predicaments, has sustained a series of even more disastrous defeats. Besides, because of the uneven development of capitalism, the struggle among the imperialist countries, and in particular between new

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and old colonialism, for the redivision of the capitalist world has become still more acute: the entire imperialist camp is slithering further down the slope to disintegration. Overall, an excellent situation has unfolded before the world's people: The East wind is prevailing still further over the West wind. This is the result of the steadfast and united struggle waged by the people throughout the world. At the same time, this situation in turn has created most favorable conditions for the joint struggle of the world's people. However, it is precisely as the Statement has pointed out: the aggressive nature of imperialism will never change. As long as imperialism exists, there will be soil for wars of aggression. The 1960 Statement says that the source of war in the present era is imperialism, that "the system of exploitation of man by man and the system of extermination of man by man are two aspects of the capitalist system." The Statement devotes much space to the exposure of imperialism's maneuvers to increase armaments and war preparations, stressing that U.S. imperialism is the main force of aggression and war, the chief bulwark of world reaction and modern colonialism, an international gendarme, and the enemy of the people of the whole world. The Statement points out to all people of the world that "the danger of a new world war still persists," and that "the peoples must now be more vigilant than ever." These viewpoints defined in the Moscow Statement have been borne out continuously by a mass of new events. In the past year, the imperialist bloc headed by the United States has not only clung to its obstinate stand of rejecting general disarmament and a ban on nuclear weapons, but has been engaged more feverishly than ever in increasing its armaments and war preparations and in aggravating international tension. The Kennedy administration, while paying lip service to peace, is making preparations on an unprecedented scale and at a faster tempo than ever before for a new war. It is preparing for both all-out nuclear war and limited wars of various types, big and small. Both in the West and in the East, the United States has embarked on aggression and expansion and everywhere posed threats of war. Kennedy

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himself has even fulminated publicly that "the only way to maintain peace is to be prepared in the final extreme to fight f o r our country—and to mean it." This fully reveals the bellicose nature of U.S. imperialism. The Moscow Statement points out to all the people of the world that in order to prevent war and safeguard peace, it is necessary to wage a resolute struggle against the imperialist forces of war. As a result of the change in the international balance of class forces, a new world war can be prevented by relying on the joint struggle of the powerful forces of peace of the present era. The eighty-one Communist and workers parties declared confidently that "war is not fatally inevitable," and that "the time has come when the attempts of the imperialist aggressors to start a world war can be curbed. World war can be prevented by the joint efforts of the world socialist camp, the international working class, the national liberation movement, all the countries opposing war, and all peace-loving forces." H o w ever, should the imperialist war maniacs, regardless of all consequences, insist on imposing a global war on the people of the whole world, the peoples, as the Statement affirms, will "sweep capitalism out of existence and bury it." The documents of the Moscow meeting pay great attention to the national-democratic movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and to the people's revolutionary movement in the capitalist countries. It is pointed out that "the complete collapse of colonialism is imminent. The breakdown of the system of colonial slavery under the impact of the national liberation movement is a development ranking second in historic importance only to the formation of the world socialist system." [It is also pointed out] that "the struggle of the peoples for their freedom and independence weakens the forces striving for war and multiplies the forces of peace." The Moscow Statement makes an analysis of the situation, both internal and international, facing the countries striving for independence or having newly won independence. It condemns in strong terms new and old colonialism and, in particular, the suppression of the national liberation movement by U.S. neocolonialism. It gives firm support to the

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national-democratic movements and wars of national liberation of the Asian, African, and Latin American peoples. It declares emphatically that the socialist countries and the international Communist and workers movement regard it as their international duty to render the fullest moral and material assistance to the peoples fighting to free themselves f r o m imperialist oppression and to help the peoples to fight for and strengthen their national independence. The Moscow Statement points out that the tasks of Communists in the capitalist countries are to lead the economic and political struggles of the working class and other laboring people, oppose monopoly capital groups, safeguard the democratic rights of the people, improve their living conditions, and help millions of people to realize gradually that socialism is the only way to complete emancipation from class oppression, exploitation, and poverty. On the forms of transition from capitalism to socialism, the Statement reiterates the viewpoint laid down in the 1957 Moscow Declaration. The system of imperialism is the common source of the threat of war and colonial aggression. Therefore, the anti-imperialist national liberation movement and the people's revolutionary movement and the struggle in defense of world peace help and complement each other. The most reliable guarantee of world peace is the continuous strengthening of the socialist camp, of the national liberation movement, of the people's revolutionary movement, and of the anti-imperialist united front embracing the people of the whole world. Only when the imperialist and capitalist systems are wiped off the face of the earth can mankind's great ideal of everlasting peace be really translated into reality. As the Statement says: " T h e victory of socialism all over the world will completely remove the social and national causes of all wars." The Moscow Statement expounds the significance of peaceful coexistence among the countries of two differing social systems. "In conditions of peaceful coexistence," it says, "favorable opportunities are provided for the development of the class struggle in the capitalist countries and the national liberation movement

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of the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries. In their turn, the successes of the revolutionary class and national liberation struggle promote peaceful coexistence." For this purpose, "the Communists of all the world uphold peaceful coexistence unanimously and consistently, and battle resolutely for the prevention of war." The Statement further points out that "peaceful coexistence of states does not imply renunciation of the class struggle, as the revisionists claim." The great theory of Marxism-Leninism is the ever-triumphant battle standard of the proletariat. It is the sacred duty of the Communists of all countries to protect the purity of MarxismLeninism and to bring its scientific and revolutionary spirit into full play. The 1960 Statement reiterates the viewpoint given in the 1957 Declaration by pointing out: "The further development of the Communist and workers movement calls for continuing a determined struggle on two fronts—against revisionism, which remains the main danger, and against dogmatism and sectarianism." The eighty-one Communist and workers parties which took part in the Moscow meeting unanimously condemned the Yugoslav variety of international opportunism, a variety of modern revisionist "theories" in concentrated form. They pointed out that the leaders of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia had betrayed the revolutionary theory of Marxism-Leninism. They laid bare the disruptive activities of the modern revisionists of Yugoslavia against the socialist camp and the international Communist movement. Events in the past year have further attested to the absolute correctness of the conclusion made in the Moscow Statement that revisionism remains the main danger in the international Communist movement of today. The struggle against revisionism is a protracted one. Revisionism is not an accidental phenomenon. As the 1957 Declaration points out: "The existence of bourgeois influence is an internal source of revisionism, while surrender to imperialist pressure is its external source." To undermine the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat so as to avert their own fate of decline, imperialism and the reactionary forces of all countries have invariably resorted to every con-

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ceivable trick and device to influence the working class at all times, trying hard to lead it away from the correct path of revolutionary class struggle. Consequently, revisionists of every description emerge to meet the situation; under various pretexts, they distort and adulterate Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory to serve the needs of imperialism. Over the past few years, the international Communist movement has won important victories in the struggle against revisionism, but revisionism is far from being thoroughly crushed. The Yugoslav modern revisionists in particular still attack MarxismLeninism openly. After the publication of the Moscow Statement, the Central Executive Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia even adopted a resolution arrogantly announcing that they stood opposed to the Statement, would "limit" its "consequences" and "reduce reaction to the Statement to the smallest possible extent." Thus it is clear that to expose further and combat modern revisionism is the serious, militant task of the Communist and workers parties of all countries. Marxism-Leninism forms the indestructible basis of the unity of the socialist camp and of the international Communist movement. The Moscow Statement lays special stress on the importance of the unity of the socialist camp and of the international Communist movement. It says: "A resolute defense of the unity of the world Communist movement on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, and the prevention of any actions which may undermine that unity, are a necessary condition for victory in the struggle for national independence, democracy, and peace, for the successful accomplishment of the tasks of the socialist revolution and of the building of socialism and communism." Therefore: "It is the supreme internationalist duty of every Marxist-Leninist party to work continuously for greater unity in the world Communist movement." The Moscow Statement has defined not only the political program for the international Communist movement but also the criteria for mutual relations between fraternal countries and between fraternal parties. That is to say, on the one hand, all the

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219

socialist countries and Communist parties are closely linked with the revolutionary cause of the international proletariat and must support and assist each other in their joint struggle in accordance with internationalist principles, and, on the other hand, each socialist country and each Communist party is independent and stands on an equal footing. Historical experience shows that if these two aspects are not properly linked together and if either of the two is ignored, it will be impossible not to make mistakes. Only when persistent efforts are made to link the two aspects properly will it be possible to consolidate and enhance the unity and cooperation between the fraternal countries and between the fraternal parties. With a view to strengthening the unity of the international Communist movement and the common struggle of the international proletariat, the Statement further points out: " T h e Communist and workers parties hold meetings whenever necessary to discuss urgent problems, to exchange experience, acquaint themselves with each other's views and positions, work out common views through consultations, and coordinate joint actions in the struggle for common goals." The Statement also stresses: "Whenever a party wants to clear up questions relating to the activities of another fraternal party, its leadership approaches the leadership of the party concerned; if necessary, they hold meetings and consultations." This method of reaching unanimity through consultations is the most effective method of solving questions of mutual concern to the fraternal parties. The convening of the meetings of representatives of the Communist and workers parties in 1957 and 1960 and their important achievements are themselves the best examples of reaching unanimity through consultations on the basis of Marxism-Leninism. Imperialism and the reactionaries of all countries have never concealed their enmity toward the socialist c a m p and the international Communist movement. To attain their mad aims, they invariably use every opportunity and all manner of despicable means to sow discord, and encourage and support revisionists of every description in order to undermine the unity of the socialist camp and the international Communist movement. The nearer

220

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they approach their doom, the more foolish they become in pinning their hopes of salvation on a split in the socialist camp and in the international Communist movement. That is why we must protect the unity of the socialist camp of twelve fraternal countries and the unity of the entire international Communist movement as the apple of our eye. As in the past, the Communist party and the people of China will always unswervingly regard the safeguarding of the unity of the two great socialist countries—China and the Soviet Union —the unity of the socialist camp, and the unity of the international Communist movement as their own sacred international duty. Together with the Marxist-Leninist parties the world over, we will steadfastly abide by the agreement reached unanimously by all the fraternal parties and struggle for the fulfillment of the great tasks set forth in the 1957 Declaration and the 1960 Statement. We firmly believe that imperialism will eventually be overthrown by the people of all countries in the world and that the capitalist system will eventually be replaced by the socialist system. This is an inevitable law of history. No matter how desperately the imperialists and reactionaries may try to prevent the onward march of the wheel of history, and no matter what difficulties and twists and turns the unity and struggle of the people of the world may encounter, victory definitely belongs to the Communists of all countries and to the revolutionary people of the world. Let us hold still higher the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary banner of the Moscow Statement, ceaselessly strengthen the unity of the revolutionary forces of the world with the socialist camp as the core, wage a resolute and tireless struggle against imperialism and the reactionary forces as well as their agents, the modern revisionists, and strive for still greater victories for the cause of world peace and human progress! The Chinese Communist press had carried the essential Soviet and Albanian party documents since the X X I I C P S U Congress. In midNovember, Jen-min jih-pao began to publish extensive translations of speeches and editorials from the pages of other Communist

The Chinese

Position

221

parties' organs. N o instances of willful distortion or political selectivity f r o m these materials, which included s h a r p l y a n t i - C P C pron o u n c e m e n t s , have been identified. 4 O n the other hand, Peking waited several d a y s b e f o r e reporting the Soviet-Albanian break in diplomatic relations. 5 O n D e c e m b e r 15, Jen-min jih-pao published, without c o m m e n t , the exchange of notes between M o s c o w and T i r a n a ( D o c u m e n t s N o s . 1 2 - 1 6 ) . On ' O n November 16, 1961, Jen-min jih-pao carried passages from Polityka (Warsaw), October 28; Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw), October 21, 29, and November 2; Glos Pracy (Warsaw), October 30; Zolnierz Wolnosci (Warsaw), October 24 and November 4; Rude Pravo (Prague), October 25, 30, and November 2; Obrana Lidu (Prague), October 26; l.idova Demokracie (Prague), October 26; Prace (Prague), October 25; Mlada Fronta (Prague), October 25; Zemedelske Noviny (Prague), October 27; Svobodne Slovo (Prague), October 25; Nepszabadsag (Budapest), October 29 and November 4, 5, 9; Lupta de Clasa (Bucharest), October, 1961; Scinteia (Bucharest), October 22 and November 2; Scinteia Tineretului (Bucharest), October 24 and November 3; Aparare Patriei (Bucharest). October 24 and November 2; Rominia Libera (Bucharest), November 3; Neues Deutschland (East Berlin), November 12; Junge Welt (East Berlin), November 11; Rabotnichesko Delo (Sofia), October 23, 30; Narodna Mladezh (Sofia), October 23; Trud (Sofia), October 26, 31, and November 3; Narodna Armia (Sofia), October 31; Zemledelsko Zname (Sofia), October 19, 31; Otechestven Front (Sofia), October 24, 26, 31; Vecherni Noviny (Sofia), October 27; Unen (Ulan Bator), October 23 and November 2, 9; L'Humanité (Paris), October 18, 20, 23, 28; L'Unità (Rome), October 26 and November 12. On November 17, Jen-min jih-pao published Hoxha's speech of November 7. On November 26, Jen-min jih-pao carried Togliatti's November 10 speech and Thorez's speech of November 19. On November 30, Jen-min jih-pao carried excerpts f r o m Gomulka's report to the Polish Party's Central Committee ( T r y b u n a Ludu, November 24); Robotniczny Forum (Warsaw), November 26; Novotny's and Siroky's reports to the Czechoslovak Party's Central Committee and its resolution (Rude Pravo [Prague], November 21, 31); Kadar's report to the Hungarian Party's Central Committee (Nepszabadsag [Budapest], October 25); Narodna Kultura (Sofia), November 25; Novo Vreme (Sofia), November, 1961; and Ulbricht's report to his party's Central Committee. On December 1. Jen-min jih-pao carried Kim Il-sung's report to his party's Central Committee, November 27, and Aidit's statement of November 23. 5 According to informed observers (e.g.. Le Monde [Paris], December 13, 1961), Peking learned of the impending Soviet-Albanian break through its observer at the Warsaw Treaty Organization standing committee meeting in Warsaw, which ended on December 6.

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Position

December 16, it reprinted the Zeri i Popullit editorial of December 10, "Unprecedented Actions in Relations among Socialist States," and the Pravda editorial of December 14, "A Dangerous Road." The Chinese Communist press gave extensive publicity to SinoAlbanian exchanges, greetings, delegations, and trade agreements. It covered such events as the visit of a Chinese youth delegation to Albania (New China News Agency [NCNA], December 16), the visit of an Albanian writer to China ( N C N A , December 16), and a well-attended Albanian exhibit in Wuhan ( N C N A , December 12). Later in the month, and in January, a number of economic agreements were signed by the two countries. One provided for a SinoAlbanian shipping company ( N C N A , December 26), another for scientific and technical cooperation (Radio Tirana, December 30). The major trade agreement regulated the exchange of goods and payments in 1962, and provided new credits to the Albanian People's Republic (NCNA, January 15, 1962). In December, 1961, the CPC reiterated its militant line with regard to the "national liberation" movement, the "peace" movement, disarmament, and the United States. The CPC's attitude was also revealed in an attack on India's policy toward the border dispute with the CPR, in which the General Secretary of the Communist Party of India came in for censure for supporting the "bourgeois" Indian government on this question. (See below, p. 540.) The Chinese Communists used various international gatherings in December, 1961, to continue their debate with the Soviet leadership. These meetings included the Fifth World Congress of Trade Unions in Moscow, a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization in Gaza, a meeting of the AfroAsian Writers' Conference in Cairo, and the meeting of the World Peace Council in Stockholm. (See Documents Nos. 28, 29, 30.) 28.

LIAO

CHENG-CHIH,

MITTEE

FOR

CHAIRMAN

AFRO-ASIAN

OF

THE

SOLIDARITY.

CHINESE SPEECH

AT

COMTHE

GAZA M E E T I N G OF THE E X E C U T I V E C O M M I T T E E OF THE A F R O - A S I A N P E O P L E ' S SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION, D E C E M -

BER 9, 1961. Summary of speech, "Blow for Blow." Peking Review, No. 51, December 22, 1961. . . . "AT PRESENT," he continued, "the U.S. imperialists' aggressive and grasping hands are reaching out to every corner of Asia and Africa, seriously menacing peace and security on these two continents. It has stepped up its aggression and inter-

The Chinese

Position

223

vention in Laos and in the southern part of Vietnam, continues to occupy China's territory of Taiwan, and eggs on the reactionaries of South Korea and Japan to organize the so-called Northeast Asia military alliance. It has penetrated into and is trying to seize the Congo, supports the old colonialists in suppressing the national liberation movements in Algeria and Angola, and is actively preparing a new invasion of Cuba. A look at these U.S. activities is enough to show that the Kennedy administration is in no way better, but is worse than the Eisenhower administration—it is more cunning, more aggressive, and more adventurist." "Only by joining hands and waging a blow-for-blow struggle against its policies of war and aggression can we, the oppressed peoples of Asia and Africa and the world, win national liberation and achieve complete independence," the speaker emphasized. Dealing with the question of distinguishing between true and false friends, Liao Cheng-chih said: "In order to push through its neocolonialist policies, U.S. imperialism has been taking into its service such notorious traitors of Asian and African countries as Ngo Dinh Diem, Mobutu, and Ikeda, to name but a few. But these old running dogs have long become discredited and are so unpopular that they are becoming ever less effective in their role. U.S. imperialism is now eagerly buying up and making use of new agents to serve its aggressive policies. In our struggle against imperialism and new and old colonialism, it is of the utmost importance to find out through practice who are our true friends and who are our false friends. . . ." "We are happy to note that the national liberation movements of Asia and Africa have scored great successes and many countries have achieved independence," Liao Cheng-chih went on to say. "It is obvious that none of these successes were bestowed upon us by imperialism, nor were they obtained by begging. Every one of these successes has been won by the Afro-Asian peoples themselves, through heroic struggle and the shedding of their blood and the sacrifice of their lives. Imperialism will never grant us independence, nor will it give any genuine aid to the countries which have already gained independence. To achieve

224

The Chinese

Position

their own liberation and to build up their own countries, the Afro-Asian peoples must rely mainly upon themselves. This is an incontrovertible truth. Whoever attempts to deny or to emasculate this truth will find his efforts completely futile." "The struggle of the Afro-Asian peoples is by no means isolated," Liao Cheng-chih declared. "They have the active support of the people of the socialist countries and throughout the world. Unity is strength. Unity is the fundamental guarantee for our triumph over the imperialists and the colonialists. T o defeat imperialism and new and old colonialism completely, we must not only unite the people of our own country and the peoples of Asia and Africa, we must extend this solidarity to include the more than 90 percent of the peoples of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and of the world as a whole, excepting the imperialists and the reactionaries of various countries."

2 9 . LIAO CHENG-CHIH, HEAD OF THE CHINESE DELEGATION TO THE

WORLD

PEACE

COUNCIL.

SPEECH

AT

THE

WORLD

PEACE COUNCIL, STOCKHOLM, D E C E M B E R 1 6 , 1 9 6 1 .

Way to Defend World Peace," Peking December 2 2 , 1 9 6 1 . «

Review,

"The

No. 51,

FRIENDS, world peace is still being seriously threatened and the danger of a new world war still exists. To defend world peace most effectively, we need to heighten our vigilance and continuously expose U.S. imperialism, the most vicious enemy of peace. Facts prove that the United States has long since become the biggest militarist-imperialist country in the world. Even Eisenhower has admitted that the U.S. government is under the " N C N A released two versions of Liao's speech: one on December 18 in Chinese, the other on December 19 in English. Passages which appear in the December 18 version and in the Peking Review text but are omitted in the December 19 version are indicated by angular brackets; passages omitted in both the December 18 and 19 versions which appear in the Peking Review text are indicated by double angular brackets; and passages which appear only in the December 18 version have been inserted in italics.

The Chinese Position

225

control of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry (exerting a force of hundreds of millions of dollars which is hard to visualize). The recent interview given by Kennedy to Adzhubei, editor of the Soviet newspaper Izvestiia, (has exposed even more nakedly U.S. imperialism's unbridled ambitions for aggression and enslavement of the world). In that interview Kennedy demonstrated that on many pressing international questions of today, he clings obstinately to the reactionary stand of imperialism and refuses to budge an inch. On the German question, he insisted on the unification of Germany on his own terms and the continued occupation of West Berlin by the Western powers. On the question of disarmament and cessation of nuclear tests, he insisted on so-called "effective inspection" before the question could be considered. On the Cuban question, he held fast to the policy of intervention and aggression against Cuba. On the Laotian question, he sought to turn Laos into a protectorate of U.S. «imperialism». He made it clear that only when all these demands were satisfied would the United States begin to consider the question of improving SovietAmerican relations. Furthermore, Kennedy set forth two terms for what he called "peace for twenty years." In essence, these terms mean: "If you want peace, you must not carry out revolutions, nor support any revolution." This means that he wants to subject the peoples of the capitalist world, comprising two-thirds of the world's population, to permanent enslavement and domination by imperialism and colonialism; that he wants to change the social system of the socialist countries in Eastern Europe and, of course, also those in Asia; that he wants the total liquidation of the socialist camp (so that the Soviet Union will stand completely alone in an imperialist encirclement as it did twenty years ago). It is crystal clear that if these terms and Kennedy's wishful thinking were realized, darkness would prevail in all countries and everywhere on earth, and world peace would disappear into thin air. «What would be left then is not genuine peaceful coexistence but domination by U.S. imperialism.» It can thus be seen that U.S. imperialism is the most ferocious

226

The Chinese

Position

and most cunning enemy of the peace-loving peoples of the world, that the Kennedy administration can only be worse and not better than the Eisenhower administration. (No peace partisan, no righteous person will harbor any illusions about such a ferocious enemy of peace.) The socialist countries have consistently striven for peaceful coexistence among countries with different social systems on the basis of the Five Principles. 7 «Despite the fact that the Kennedy administration also talks about peaceful coexistence, the kind of peaceful coexistence it wants is one which would maintain intact and permanently the rule of imperialism and colonialism with U.S. imperialism as the world's supreme overlord.» In order to compel the U.S. imperialists to accept peaceful coexistence, it is necessary to mobilize the masses, to arouse them to vigorous action, and to wage a protracted, repeated, and hard struggle against imperialism. Such beliefs as that agreement can be reached with the imperialists and peaceful coexistence can be realized without relying on the people and without struggle will only serve to demoralize the fighting will of the people and damage the cause of world peace.) Here we want to point out emphatically that the struggle between the oppressed nations on the one hand and imperialism and colonialism on the other is a life-and-death struggle. It is difficult to bring about peaceful coexistence between the oppressed nations and imperialism and colonialism. 8 So long as the imperialist and colonialist system is not completely smashed, : On February 12, 1962, Mao Tun, head of the Chinese delegation to the Afro-Asian Writers' Conference in Cairo, told the conference: "There is a difference between unconditional peaceful coexistence and principled peaceful coexistence. What we mean by principled peaceful coexistence is the kind of peaceful coexistence based on the Five Principles [Pansh Shila]. . . . Sheep and wolves can never coexist peacefully. An oriental proverb says rightly: 'A wolf wants to eat the sheep even if he is breathing his last.' But the wolf before us today—imperialism—old and new colonialism—is not even breathing its last, though it has become weaker under the blow of the people's revolutionary struggle" ( N C N A , February 13, 1962). "Both N C N A versions read: "There can be no peaceful coexistence between the oppressed nations and imperialism and colonialism."

The Chinese

Position

227

the struggle of the oppressed nations for emancipation will not cease for a single moment. «General disarmament is a question which very much concerns our friends.» It is also the common desire of all peoples. Although the peace-loving people have striven for the realization of general disarmament, we are still a long way off from it. Why? The basic reason for this is that the imperialists can only maintain their rule by force. Innumerable facts have shown that the United States, while preparing for an all-out world war, is also preparing for local and limited wars; it also wants to engage in reactionary civil wars of a subversive type. The U.S. imperialists have no sincerc wish to achieve disarmament; they are obstinately opposed to it. Hence, in order to realize general disarmament, it is necessary to wage an active and resolute struggle against the imperialist forces of aggression. In order to defend world peace, we must mobilize the peoples of the world into the united front against U.S. imperialist policies of war and aggression and for the defense of world peace. This united front is a very broad one. It includes workers, peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie, and all other peace-loving people, constituting over 9 0 percent of the world's population. It is evident that the workers, peasants, and the oppressed nations are the basic forces in this movement. If our peace movement does not rely on these basic forces and lacks the courage to reflect the demands of the basic masses, but, instead, continuously accommodates itself to imperialism, then our peace movement is bound to alienate itself from the broad masses and become powerless. 9 (It can thus be seen that there are two different paths in the peace movement: either to rely on the masses while uniting with personalities of the upper layers of society, or to rely solely on a small number of personalities of the upper layers of society while ignoring the broad masses of the people. ' B o t h N C N A versions read: "The peace movement must rely on these basic forces and reflect the demands of the masses; otherwise, it is bound to alienate itself from the broad masses and will be weakened and rendered powerless."

228

The Chinese

Position

It is obvious that the imperialists would only be too happy to see our peace movement alienated from the masses.) The socialist countries always sympathize with and support the peace movements of the people of various countries. The peaceful foreign policy of the socialist countries is conducive to the growth of the peace movement. (However, the peace movement is a mass movement, a movement of the people. The peace movement should not be required to follow every step in the diplomatic moves of this or that country. This is a plain truth which calls for no further explanation.) Our peace movement is not an isolated one. It is closely linked with the national liberation movement, the socialist camp, and the international workers movement. Through reliance on the combined efforts of these four forces, a world war can be prevented. The national liberation movement of the oppressed nations is shaking the very foundations of imperialism and disintegrating the colonialist system. The greater the victories of the national liberation movement, the more will the imperialist forces be weakened and the more difficult will it be for the imperialist camp to carry through its policies of war and aggression; consequently, world peace will become more secure. It is clear then that the national liberation movement is of enormously great significance for the relaxation of international tension and the defense of world peace. (To regard the national liberation movement as running counter to the peace movement or to beg for peace from imperialism and in so doing dare not or do not extend active support to the national liberation movement is obviously wrong and extremely harmful. There is no doubt that all who cherish peace do give their praise and support to the national liberation movement.) The socialist camp, comprising twelve socialist countries, is the powerful bulwark for the defense of world peace. The unity of the socialist camp, the unity between «the peoples of» the socialist countries and the oppressed nations, the unity of the peoples throughout the world are the fundamental guarantees for the realization of lasting peace. Imperialism, the enemy of peace,

The Chinese

Position

229

has always hated our unity and is doing everything possible to disrupt this unity. U.S. imperialism, confronted with mounting opposition from the people all over the world, is finding itself in an increasingly difficult situation. That is why it is trying harder than ever to sow dissension and split the unity among peoples. We must take the strengthening and consolidating of unity as our inescapable duty. Words and deeds to whitewash imperialism and to throw mud at the people or failure to direct the struggle at imperialism will only be useful to imperialism; they are detrimental to our solidarity. We are confident that all who sincerely cherish peace will approve the idea of strengthening unity.

30.

L i u N I N G - I , VICE-CHAIRMAN OF THE CHINA PEACE C O M MITTEE. SPEECH AT THE WORLD PEACE COUNCIL, STOCKHOLM, DECEMBER

18, 1961. Jen-min jih-pao, December 21,

1961. 1U The Chinese delegation has listened attentively to the many views expressed by various friends in the full conference and small meetings. From these views it can be clearly seen that everyone does not agree as to the present tendencies and policies of the movement for the protection of peace. Among these views there are some who take general and complete disarmament as the sole road to peace, as the basic task in the protection of world peace and the key to solving various urgent problems of the present time. They say that only if general and complete disarmament is realized can lasting world peace be realized, can the oppressed peoples be liberated. Only then will the imperialist countries use the money saved by disarmament to help the backward countries and the newly independent states be able to develop flourishing DEAR FRIENDS:

10 The English-language summary of Liu's speech (printed in the Peking Review, N o . 52. December 29, 1961) blunted his attack on those w h o allegedly attached greater significance to disarmament than to the "national liberation'' movement. Significant changes in the Peking Review version of Liu's speech are indicated by footnotes; the sections of Liu's speech omitted by the Peking Review are indicated by angular brackets.

230

The Chinese

Position

independent economies, etc. That is to say, they believe that the national liberation movement should be subordinate to the movement for general and complete disarmament, and that only by striving for general and complete disarmament can all the m a j o r problems of the world be solved. Bearing responsibility for the fate of hundreds of millions of people, the Chinese delegation must state that it decidedly cannot agree with this erroneous and totally h a r m f u l view. 11 Everyone knows that in our time mankind is faced with the militant task of striving for peace, democracy, national liberation, and social progress. Many countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, inhabited by more than half the people of the globe, now are suffering from the enslavement and oppression of new and old colonialism, headed by U.S. imperialism. U.S. imperialism not only assists British, French, and other old colonialists in slaughtering oppressed peoples but is also intensifying its own aggression and exploitation of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America by new colonialist methods, such as subversive activities, military intervention, military treaties, political, economic, and cultural penetration, etc. Thus, the struggle against the old and new colonialism and the struggle for national liberation and complete independence have become the most urgent task confronting the people of these countries. We can see that the flames of the antiimperialist and anticolonialist national independence movement are raging everywhere from South Korea to the Middle East, from Algeria to South Africa, from Cuba to Argentina. This is u In the version of Liu's speech printed in the Peking Review, his condemnation of those who allegedly subordinate the "national liberation" movement to the struggle for complete and general disarmament was preceded by the following paragraphs: "We need peace and we must struggle for the defense of world peace," he declared. "It is our deep conviction that so long as the socialist camp, the international working class, the national liberation movement, and the forces defending world peace are united and carry on a steadfast struggle, lasting world peace can certainly be achieved." He said: "We always hold that the problem of universal disarmament is of great significance for the defense of peace. Therefore the Chinese government supports the proposals for universal disarmament." . . .

The Chinese

Position

231

a law of historical development that cannot be changed by the will, by the likes or dislikes of men. This national liberation movement is a completely just movement. It should have the warm sympathy and positive support of all men of good will. It is clear that as far as the oppressed peoples are concerned, whether in Laos, Algeria, Angola, or the Cameroons, their most pressing concern is definitely not the elimination of the few armaments they have but the building and expansion of their armaments to oppose imperialism and colonialism. How could we possibly consider requesting Algeria to sit down with France and discuss general and complete disarmament? Whether it is Cuba or some other newly independent nations, their present need is certainly not the disarming of the forces they have just built but the strengthening of their forces to defend the independence of their homeland. (How could we possibly consider it realistic for Cuba to sit down and discuss general and complete disarmament with the United States? The view that striving for disarmament should become the central task of all countries and peoples is clearly not in accordance with the practical situation of the oppressed peoples and of states suffering aggression. To force this point of view upon the oppressed peoples and the states suffering aggression would of necessity harm their liberation struggle. There are those who say that after general and complete disarmament is achieved imperialism will have no weapons and that the oppressed people will then be able to achieve liberation. This is wishful thinking and self-delusion.) All the oppressed peoples are suffering untold miseries. They hope to achieve liberation soon. Experience has shown that only through their own struggles can they achieve liberation and peace. Hence, why should we ask these suffering people to abandon various kinds of effective struggles and wait for liberation until the glorious day when complete and general disarmament is realized? U.S. imperialism has consistently used atomic weapons to frighten the oppressed peoples and nations, preventing their revolutions. Thus the people of all countries, while opposing nuclear war, must increase their vigilance and not fall into the trap of

232

The Chinese

Position

U.S. atomic blackmail. Since the war an important experience which very many oppressed peoples have gained in achieving liberation has been daring to despise American atomic blackmail and daring to carry out a revolution. In discussing disarmament and opposition to nuclear weapons we need to make this point clear. T h e national liberation movement serves to shake and cripple the very foundation of imperialism and colonialism. The greater the strength of the national liberation movement, the more will the imperialist forces of war be weakened and the hands and feet of imperialism be tied in launching a war and world peace safeguarded. Consequently, the peace movement must be joined with the national liberation movement; the peace movement must support the national liberation movement (not tie it down and weaken it or cause it to take the wrong path). The development of the national liberation movement is a great help to the struggle for democracy and social progress of the people of the capitalist countries. In recent years, friends from the national liberation movements of Asia, Africa, and Latin America have realized f r o m their own experience that the national liberation movement has become a great force indispensable to the defense of world peace. This has become common knowledge recognized by all. (But even today there are some who think of putting the national liberation movement in opposition to the peace movement. This truly shows an absurd lack of common sense! Any method which would limit, tie down, or hinder the national liberation movement is harmful to the cause of protecting peace.) Friends, we have always believed that the question of universal disarmament has great significance for the safeguarding of peace. T h u s the Chinese government has supported the proposals for universal disarmament. But when discussing the question of safeguarding peace, we should not discuss only the question of disarmament, and even less should we discuss disarmament in isolation from other questions. One of the foremost and essential tasks of the peace movement is to inform the people frankly who is the most vicious enemy of peace. That is, we must continu-

The Chinese

Position

233

ously and repeatedly inform the people that U.S. imperialism is the most vicious enemy of peace. For only when the people see clearly who is the enemy of peace will they be able to maintain their vigilance and wage a stubborn struggle against it. (In the course of the meetings some friends who have advocated making general and complete disarmament the sole task in the protection of peace have underestimated and even willfully disregarded the fundamental task of pointing out the enemy in the movement for protecting peace. Such men say that the Kennedy-Adzhubei talk was intelligent. This kind of talk ignores Kennedy's murderous words and conceals them with a beautiful cover. How can this serve the purpose of teaching people who the enemy of peace is? These friends when discussing the danger of war discuss only the West German threat to world peace and do not talk about the threat of U.S. imperialism to world peace. True, West German militarism endangers world peace but the supporter and backer of West Germany is none other than U.S. imperialism. Why should we spare this vicious enemy, U.S. imperialism, from denunciation? These friends, when discussing disarmament, talk very little or not at all of the facts of U.S. expansion of armaments and preparation for war; they only talk of disarmanent in an abstract manner. This gives people the impression that the enemies of peace and the peace-loving states are both building up armaments in preparation for war. This has confused people as to the source of war. How can this increase people's awareness to oppose world war and support world peace?) U.S. imperialism not only stubbornly hinders disarmament talks but is frantically engaged in arms expansion and war preparation. This is plain for all to see. Thus, to bring about disarmament is no easy task but requires the mobilization of people to carry out an active and resolute struggle against U.S. imperialism. (To talk only of disarmament and not to point out that U.S. imperialism is the chief obstacle to disarmament, to speak only of the agreements on disarmament and not to mention that the disarmament talks have achieved no concrete agreement

234

The Chinese

Positiom

which is truly beneficial to peace is to make impossible tthe mobilization of the masses to struggle for disarmament.) W e always support the world peace movement and we always acdvocate the broadening and strengthening of the world peacce movement. In order effectively to mobilize the masses, our peacce movement should set forth different tasks and demands in a c cordance with the conditions of different countries and regioms and the level of the people's consciousness. To insist that the comclusion of disarmament is the sole task in the safeguarding cof peace is not completely practical. This method does not furthter the peace movement. In accordance with what has been stated above, the Chinesse delegation cannot agree to the summoning of a peace congresss next year with disarmament as the only item on the agenda. Biut we agree to the proposal of Mr. Sekou Diallo that the achievcement of peace, independence, and disarmament be put on thie agenda of the conference. Friends! We need peace and we must struggle to protect worlld peace. Moreover, we firmly believe that lasting world peace cain be realized only if the socialist camp, the international workimg class, the national liberation movement, and the forces defending world peace are united and wage a resolute struggle.

31.

"A

YEAR-END

MINISTRATION'S

BALANCE POLICIES

SHEET OF

OF

THE

KENNEDY

AGGRESSION."

Ta-kung Pao (Peking), December lease in English. 12

30,

AID-

Editorial iin rce-

1961. N C N A

. . . OF COURSE, Kennedy is still waving the olive branclh. Most indicative of this is his view on negotiations, which empluasizes that they must be carried out on U.S. terms so as to realizze so-called "glorious peace." A clear-cut explanation of his termis and his "glorious peace" was given in the interview he gave tto the editor of the Soviet newspaper Izvestiia, Aleksei Adzhube:i, in which Kennedy put forward a series of demands under thie u

Ta-kung

Pao is a Peking daily.

The Chinese

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pretext of improving U.S.-Soviet relations—to wit: Kennedy wants to maintain the reactionary position pursued by U.S. imperialism on the pressing international questions, such as West Berlin, Germany, and disarmament; he would not budge an inch but would insist on multiplying his gains. On the question of keeping the so-called "peace for twenty years," he went further in putting forward two most preposterous and arrogant terms, the essence of which is an ultimatum to the people of the world to surrender to U.S. imperialism—in other words, a demand that the people in the capitalist world, comprising two-thirds of the world's population, docilely accept U.S. rule, and a demand that the socialist countries, in which one-third of the world's population lives, be wiped out. Now isn't it clear enough that the olivebranch-waving President talks the language of the wolf disguised as granny, and that the teeth bared in the sinister grin are also those of the wolf? . . . The "achievements" of the Kennedy administration in the past eleven months or more fully attested to the fact that the aggressive nature of U.S. imperialism has undergone not the slightest change. What have changed are merely its tactics and methods for realizing its aggressive ambitions. In the name of such fine and sweet words as "peace," "negotiations," and "anticolonialism," the Kennedy administration has done the vicious deeds which its predecessor dared not do. . . . It must be pointed out that the above record of the Kennedy administration since its establishment, whether the order for the invasion of Cuba by mercenaries or the saber-rattling talk to Aleksei Adzhubei, is based on both Kennedy's writing and his speeches. It is undeniable. And no one can excuse or mitigate his criminal responsibilities. His personal participation in everything being done, which was lauded by American journalists, serves well to testify to the criminal record of his administration in the past eleven months, and in the first place, to President Kennedy's personal criminal record. If there should have been no illusions about his predecessor Eisenhower, still less should one harbor the slightest illusions about Kennedy. Nevertheless, as everybody sees, the situation of the East

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wind prevailing over the West wind is becoming ever more obvious, and the victorious march of the forces of socialism, national liberation, democracy, and world peace is irresistible. . . . In the first place, as to the contradiction between the socialist camp and the imperialist camp headed by the United States, it is an irreconcilable and fundamental contradiction of an antagonistic nature. With the growth of the might and international influence of the countries in the socialist camp, the attempt of the Kennedy administration to use the threats of nuclear warfare or "limited warfare" to prevent the growth of the socialist forces has failed, and its smug calculations to demolish the socialist camp through its "peace strategy" will, likewise, surely be smashed by events. Secondly, as to the contradiction between U.S. imperialism on the one hand and the national liberation movement and the nationally independent countries on the other, the events in the past year have told us that this contradiction is becoming increasingly acute with each passing day. In the face of these insurmountable and yet increasingly acute and deepened contradictions, the Kennedy administration could not but suffer defeats, since the more desperately and frenziedly it struggled, the harder were the jolts it received. A combination of adventurism and frailty marks U.S. imperialism at the present stage, and this has been borne out by the events following Kennedy's accession to power early this year. But it must be pointed out that the growing strength of the people and their struggle have played the leading and decisive role in all these contradictions. To deepen the contradictions which beset U.S. imperialism and to inflict more defeats on the U.S. policies of aggression and war and to smash the Kennedy administration's counter-revolutionary, double-faced tactics, it is necessary for the people the world over who cherish peace and oppose aggression to unite more closely, form a broader international united front, and intensify the blow-for-blow struggle against U.S. imperialism.

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CHI-CHOU.

"HAIL

THE GREAT VICTORIES OF

THE

Hung-ch'i (Peking), No. 1, January 1, 1962.13 Translation in Peking Review, No. 1, January 5, 1962, and No. 2, January 12, 1962. NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT."

In addition to the harsh attacks on American "neocolonialism," the Chinese press emphasized the need for the c o n t i n u e d "national liberation" struggle. T h e following article repeated the argument that the struggle for "national liberation" must be given priority over the struggle for "peace."

. . AT THE recent conference of nonaligned countries, certain people expressed the view that "the era of classic colonialism is gone and dead" and that anti-imperialism, anticolonialism, and antiracial-discrimination are all questions of "secondary" importance; it was also alleged that the question of war and peace is the "most vital and important problem of the day" and that, if the question of war is not settled first, "no other problem remains: they are submerged in the terrible disaster of war." To say that "the era of classic colonialism is gone and dead" is obviously entirely contrary to the facts. Such views are cast in the same mold as Kennedy's. Defining the question of war and peace as the most important question, while relegating the fight against imperialism and colonialism to secondary importance, amounts in essence to placing the fight against imperialism and colonialism in opposition to the struggle in defense of world peace. It takes no account at all of the great significance of the national liberation movement in defending world peace. The danger of undermining world peace comes from imperialism. In order to defend world peace, therefore, we cannot but oppose imperialism and colonialism. To hold the view that the fight against imperialism is only a matter of "secondary" importance, as if there were some other better means of getting peace than the struggle against imperialism, actually amounts to conniving at the imperialist policies of war and aggression. The national liberation struggle, including the 13

Hung-ch'i (Red Flag) is the semimonthly theoretical organ of the Central Committee of the CPC.

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armed national liberation struggle, is not only not detrimental to the cause of defending world peace but, like the revolutionary struggles of the people of all countries, deals blows at imperialism, which is the source of the danger of war, and reduces its scope of activity; it disperses, ties down, and depletes imperialism's armed forces, thereby making important contributions to the cause of peace. The more the anti-imperialist national liberation struggle develops, the more secure is world peace. Regarding the fight against imperialism and colonialism as a question of secondary importance will impede the development of the national liberation movement, and is extremely harmful to the defense of world peace. . . . Kennedy pretends to "sympathize" with national independence and puts forward a solution to what he calls the question concerning the people of the "dependent territories" who constitute 2 percent of the world's population, saying that "peaceful" methods will be taken to enable those "dependent territories" to change "from the status of colonies to the partnership of equals." According to Kennedy, the oppressed nations can wait for the imperialists to show their benevolence and then they will achieve the independence they demand by peaceful means; struggle is not necessary, still less armed struggle. But historical facts have proved that the independence, though only partial, won by the colonies and dependent territories is the result of the people's struggles. Without such struggles, the imperialists and colonialists never make any concessions of their own accord. Armed struggles waged by the oppressed nations against imperialism arise from the armed oppression by imperialism against the people of these countries. The imperialists send their own troops or make use of their stooges to carry out bloody repressions against those nations demanding independence; this makes it necessary for the oppressed nations to resort to armed struggle against the imperialists and their stooges. The armed struggles waged by the oppressed nations against the imperialists and their stooges are completely just struggles. Lenin pointed out: "National wars against the imperialist powers are not only possible and probable: they are inevitable, they are progressive

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14

and revolutionary." In striving for their own liberation, the Chinese people gained a deep understanding of what it means to wage armed struggle against the imperialists and reactionaries. The imperialists and their stooges threatened the very lives of the Chinese people, forcing them to accept war. The Chinese people paid them back in their own coin; they took up arms to wage a resolute struggle against their enemies. The Chinese people won their revolutionary victory precisely in this way. The oppressed nations in the vast areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America are today confronted with the same situation. When the new and old colonialists take up swords and strike at the people of Cuba, Algeria, Angola, Laos, and South Vietnam, is there any other way out left to the peoples there but to take up swords to defend themselves and wage revolutionary wars against the counter-revolutionary wars imposed on them if they do not wish to place themselves at the mercy of the new and old colonialists? . . . Kennedy says: "My nation was once a colony—and we know what colonialism means." In speaking thus he hopes to trade on the historical fact of the United States once having been a colony, to suggest that present-day U.S. imperialism sympathizes with anticolonialism, and in this way cover up the criminal activities of the United States in upholding colonialism. Kennedy, however, has pointedly ignored an important historical fact: that the independence of the people in North America was won in war against Britain, their suzerain state. Although many of those then demanding North American independence were descendants of Britishers, this failed to move the rulers of Britain to bestow independence on their North American colonies in a "peaceful" way. In opposing the waging of armed struggles by the oppressed peoples, the Tito clique of Yugoslavia has never let slip an opportunity of serving imperialism. The absurd argument of opposing all wars which the Tito clique propagates is to the ad" "On the Pamphlet by Junius." (Sochineniia. 4th ed. [Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1941—], XXII, 298.—Ed.)

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vantage of imperialism. It is most disadvantageous to the national liberation movements. Kardelj, "theoretician" of the Tito clique, holds that wars should not be differentiated into just and unjust ones; his idea is to "oppose war of every kind." He even absurdly declares that "even the most just wars can have a reactionary effect." It is common knowledge that, at the present time, just wars are simply wars of national liberation waged by the people in the colonies or semicolonies against imperialist oppression and enslavement, revolutionary civil wars of the proletariat in the imperialist countries, or wars of self-defense waged by the socialist countries against the wars of aggression launched by imperialism. According to Kardelj, when imperialism engages in armed aggression, the victimized country should not offer armed resistance to aggression, because if it does, it "too can have a reactionary effect"; or when imperialism and its lackeys use arms to suppress people in cold blood, the oppressed should not take to arms and revolution, for if they do, this "too can have a reactionary effect." This fully exposes the face of those renegades, the Tito clique. . . . Kennedy vainly hopes to prevent the socialist countries from supporting the national liberation movements by sowing discord between the socialist countries and the oppressed nations; but he will never succeed in doing this. Kennedy, of course, wishfully hopes that the socialist countries will shut themselves up and completely engross themselves in their own national construction, and not give support to the revolutions of the oppressed nations; that way he thinks the latter will have to continue to live under imperialist rule without ever getting a chance to stand on their own feet. If the socialist countries do not act as he wants, he is sure to throw mud at them, libeling them with such slanders as that they are "exporting revolution," pinning on them such labels as "Communist empire," or calling them "die-hards," charging them falsely with "being warlike," "opposing peace," and so on. Kennedy will, of course, never get what he wants when he is dealing with steadfast MarxistLeninists; they will certainly not budge an inch from their Marxist-Leninist positions because of his threats. All genuine

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Marxist-Leninists have always been of the opinion that the socialist countries must closely combine the tasks of carrying on their own national construction well with the tasks of lending a hand to all oppressed nations throughout the world in achieving their complete emancipation. U.S. imperialism is spreading the slander that the socialist countries are "exporting revolution," and at the same time it is using this charge as a pretext for trying to prevent the socialist countries from giving support to the oppressed nations. But this argument cannot stand. It is imperialist oppression and exploitation that has given rise to the struggle of the oppressed nations seeking their liberation. Wherever there is imperialist oppression and exploitation, there are people who will rise in revolution. Marxist-Leninists have always held that revolution in a country is the business of the people of that country; that revolution cannot be "exported," nor "imported"; that the struggle of all oppressed nations seeking liberation is something that no other country can stir up, something that no other country can hold in check. It is, however, the lofty internationalist obligation of the socialist countries to support the national liberation movements in every possible way. Lenin held that the proletariat which has already seized power must, on the one hand, unite with the proletariat of all lands and, on the other hand, unite with all the oppressed nations of the colonies and semicolonies to wage resolute struggles against imperialism and to consolidate and develop the revolutionary cause of the proletariat. Lenin also held that the proletariat which has won victory is not only the representative of the proletariat of the whole world but also the representative of the oppressed nations. It was Lenin who made the call: "Proletariat and oppressed nations of the whole world, unite!" Guided by this brilliant idea of Lenin's, the socialist countries give firm support to the national liberation movements. The socialist countries also regard support to the national liberation movements of the oppressed nations as their glorious, international obligation because the national liberation move-

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ments are the ally of the socialist revolution. In order to achieve favorable international conditions for the building of socialism, the victorious revolution must also have the support of the national liberation movements. Comrade M a o Tse-tung once said: "Ever since the monster of imperialism came into being, world events have become so closely interconnected that it is impossible to separate them one from another." In the common cause of fighting against imperialism, the struggles of the people of all lands inspire and support each other. T h e existence and growing strength of the socialist camp provides a most favorable condition for the development of the national liberation movements; it also provides a most favorable condition for the fight for peace, democracy, and socialism of the broad masses in the imperialist countries. At the same time, the various struggles waged by the oppressed nations and peoples against imperialism and its lackeys are a great support to the countries of the socialist camp. It is very important that the oppressed nations should seek to get the assistance of the international revolutionary forces in their struggle for liberation. But, in the last analysis, if they want to win victory, their own struggle is the decisive factor. T h e struggle of the Laotian people is an obvious instance. An important factor in enabling the Laotian people to win major victories in the fight for the peaceful settlement of the Laotian question is the support they have received from the socialist countries and other countries which respect Laotian independence and neutrality. But, what is more important, the Laotians have won major victories because they have waged a consistent and resolute, blow-for-blow struggle against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys and increased their own strength in the struggle. T h a t the peoples of Cuba, Algeria, and Angola and of all other oppressed nations have been able to win ever new successes in 1961 is due chiefly to the fact that their struggles have been unremitting. Imperialism headed by the United States is now trying to suppress the national liberation movements with ever greater ferocity, cruelty, and cunning. The struggle of the oppressed

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nations against imperialism will be a long-term one; in some areas, it will take time for the revolutionary forces to grow and the struggle there will be rough and tortuous. A s to the nations which have already won independence or gained a basic degree of independence, they will also have to wage further serious struggles to safeguard and develop what they have already gained in struggle, and in order to smash all the schemes of the old and new colonialists to stage a comeback. But there is no doubt whatever that the tide of the entire national liberation struggle will surge forward in mounting waves. The oppressed nations will hold high the banner of national liberation, they will rise in revolution and overthrow the rule of imperialism and colonialism—this is the inevitable law of historical development, something no reactionary force of any kind can stop. The forces of national liberation, born and maturing in struggle, by giving serious attention to summing up their experience and drawing lessons from past struggles, will certainly be able to defeat the new attacks launched by U.S.-led imperialism and its lackeys and win still more brilliant victories in the future.

33.

"NEW

Editorial in Jen-min release in English.

YEAR'S GREETINGS."

January 1, 1962.

NCNA

jih-pao,

. . . 1961 was a year of fierce struggles between socialism and imperialism, between the oppressed nations and imperialism, between the revolutionary and reactionary forces, and between the forces of peace and those of war. It was a year in which the people of the world gained one victory after another in their struggles. The imperialist clique headed by the United States carried out its policies of aggression and war with greater intensity. After coming to power, the Kennedy administration of the U.S. showed a greater fervor in aggression and adventurist activities than its predecessor. Lip service to the liquidation of colonialism was an outright fraud. It unleashed armed invasion of Cuba, strengthened its control of and interference in the Latin American countries, used the United Nations Organization to railroad

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through its colonialist scheme for annexing the Congo, stepped up its interference and aggression in Laos, and sent reinforcements of military personnel to take direct part in the sanguinary suppression of the people in South Vietnam. The Kennedy government's lip service to general and complete disarmament was another outright fraud. It frenzicdly engaged in armaments expansion and preparations for war on such an unprecedented scale and tempo that it increased its military appropriations to 70 percent of the annual budget of 96,200 million U.S. dollars. It increased the number of military effectives by more than 200,000 during the past year, bringing the total strength of its army, navy, and air force up to 2,780,000. It spared no efforts to develop guided missiles and nuclear weapons and. while intensifying its preparations for all-out nuclear war, actively planned for limited conventional wars. Where aggression and oppression exist, there are struggles against them. Most conspicuous in this respect were the new heights of the national democratic movements of the peoples in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. By wiping out the invading U.S. mercenaries, the heroic Cuban people carried the Cuban revolution to a new stage, thus setting a brilliant example for the other Latin American peoples. U.S.-hatched reactionary coups were crushed by the people of Brazil and later of Ecuador. Repeated anti-U.S. and antidictatorship struggles were waged by the Dominican people. The Algerian people went from strength to strength in their war of national liberation. The Congolese people, holding high the banner of Lumumba, continued to fight for independence. Armed uprisings broke out in Angola. New advances were made in the national independence movement in East Africa. The Laotian people persisted in their patriotic and just struggle against U.S. imperialism and the Phoumi-Boun Oum rebel clique. The people in South Vietnam expanded their forces in their struggle against the U.S. aggressors and the Ngo Dinh Diem clique. The struggle waged by the people in South Korea against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys grew steadily. India recovered Goa. The Indonesian people have been making ever greater preparations for the

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struggle to liberate West Irian. The struggle of the Japanese people against the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries mounted, and its gigantic scale, long duration, and broad mass character have rarely been found in the mass movements of the people of capitalist countries. More than two-thirds of the population of the capitalist world live in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These areas are focal points of all kinds of contradictions and also the weakest links in imperialist rule. The upsurge of the national democratic movements in these areas indicates that the main basis for exploitation by the world's imperialists is collapsing and that their strategic rear has turned to a still greater degree into a forefront of struggle. This is of extremely great historic significance to the future of mankind. The national democratic revolutionary movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and the forces of socialism, the mass struggles by the people in the capitalist countries, and the world peace movement have converged into the torrent of the times, breaching one after another the dikes of world imperialism. The path of international struggle, naturally, is neither smooth nor straight. Dark clouds may appear in the skies and storms may suddenly rise on the sea. Certain events that cannot but grieve one have now occurred in the socialist camp and the international Communist movement. Kennedy, Tito, and their ilk have grown cocky, as if this was their chance. Most revealing is that Kennedy has gone to the length of demanding the elimination of the people's revolutionary movements in all countries and, still further, the elimination of the socialist camp as his conditions for twenty years of living together peacefully between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Tito and company have made great efforts in trumpeting their fallacy of so-called "positive coexistence." In a word, the imperialists and modern revisionists are conjuring up a host of demons to make mischief, trying every trick to wreck the solidarity of the socialist c a m p and of the international Communist movement and to enervate and paralyze the peoples' struggles in all countries against imperialism and its lackeys.

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C o m r a d e M a o Tse-tung has always taught us that when we look at things we should first carry out investigation and study, and should grasp the essence and not be confused by temporary phenomena. It is after all a temporary phenomenon when the sun is overcast by a cloud. Investigation and study show that imperialism really still exists in the world; investigation and study show that capitalism really still exists in the world; and investigation and study show that oppressed nations and people still really exist in the world. In a word, investigation and study show that the contradictions between imperialism and socialism, between imperialism and the oppressed peoples in the colonies and dependent countries, between monopoly capital and the working class and other toiling people in the capitalist countries, between the imperialist countries, and within the ruling cliques of the imperialist countries—these all really exist. All these contradictions are irreconcilable. The imperialists and the modern revisionists like Tito and his ilk absolutely cannot cover up, eliminate, or solve these contradictions. Since contradictions exist, there must be struggle. There is only one way out to solve these contradictions, that is, revolutionary struggle by the people of various countries. There is no alternative. T h e workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie, revolutionary intellectuals, and revolutionary national bourgeoisie, who account for over 90 percent of the world's population, all demand a change in the status quo, oppose the imperialist policies of aggression and war, and want to be rid of oppression and exploitation by imperialism and reactionaries and become the masters of their own destiny and march toward a bright future. This is an objective law independent of the subjective wishes of anyone. The attempt of the imperialists and their lackeys to change the course of historical development is no more than a dream. The tide of the struggle of the people of various countries for world peace, national independence, democracy, and socialism is irresistible. T h e Chinese people have always firmly opposed the policies of aggression and war of the imperialist clique headed by the U.S. and actively supported the national democratic movement

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of the people of various countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, supported the workers movement in West Europe, North America, and Australia, and supported the world peace movement and all the just struggles of the people of all countries. These are sacred international obligations of the Chinese people. The Chinese Communist Party, always loyal to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, has persistently adhered to the 1957 Moscow Declaration and the 1960 Moscow Statement. The general line of China's foreign policy is: to safeguard and strengthen the unity and cooperation among the socialist countries; to support the revolutionary struggle of the oppressed peoples and nations against imperialism and colonialism; to coexist peacefully with countries having different social systems; and to oppose the imperialist policies of aggression and war. This general line conforms to the interests of the Chinese people and the interests of the revolutionary people who make up over 90 percent of the world population. Precisely because of this, China's international prestige and influence have grown with each passing day and we have won the support of more and more friends the world over. T h e imperialists and revisionists and all other reactionaries regard the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people as a thorn in their side. Time and again they launched the anti-China campaign, only to meet ignominious bankruptcy time and again. We must take note, however, of the possibility that the recent antiChina, anticommunist, and antipeoples waves may develop along more frenzied lines. The Chinese people, the Communists of all countries, and the people all over the world should be fully prepared for this ideologically and keep vigilance high against it. Historical experience shows us that, provided the people are fully prepared ideologically for any counter-revolutionary reverse current, they can definitely resist it and beat it back. True gold does not fear fire. In the furnace of international struggles, the Chinese people, together with the revolutionary people of other countries and all those who uphold world peace and just struggle, will grow stronger through tempering. T h e people's revolutionary struggle will keep advancing, and the general

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situation of the East wind prevailing over the West w i n d is irreversible. . . . Chinese Communist pronouncements were pursuing a line distinctly at variance with Moscow's in regard to the United States, in particular the Kennedy administration. The difference was illustrated, in addition to Documents Nos. 32 and 33 above, by the Statement of the C P C Central Committee condemning the persecution of Communists in the United States. (See Hung-ch'i, January 16, and Peking Review, No. 3, January 19, 1962.) T h e statement charged that "the ruling group in the United States does not hesitate to adopt the methods used by Hitler, Mussolini, and Tojo; that is, under the cover of anticommunism they are carrying out fascistization internally and paving the way externally for world domination and the launching of world war." By implication, those unnamed comrades who seriously engaged in negotiations and cultivated exchanges with the imperialists were deluding themselves in a most dangerous fashion. Leading Chinese Communist officials, including Chou En-lai and Chen I, from the New Year's receptions on, began reiterating China's ability (and perhaps need) to "rely on its own efforts" in the future. References to self-reliance usually occurred in the context of studied avoidance of references to Soviet aid. 34.

C H O U E N - L A I . S P E E C H TO THE ALBANIAN TRADE

DELEGA-

TION, JANUARY 1 3 , 1 9 6 2 . N C N A r e l e a s e .

. . DEAR Albanian c o m r a d e s : A l t h o u g h C h i n a a n d Albania are separated by m a n y m o u n t a i n s and seas, w e are closely linked by the great cause of c o m m u n i s m . T h e Chinese people are h a p p y to see that under the correct leadership of the A l b a n i a n Party of L a b o r , h e a d e d by its long-tested leader C o m rade E n v e r H o x h a , the heroic A l b a n i a n people have o v e r c o m e one obstacle after another on their road of advance by rallying themselves a r o u n d great goals and working painstakingly, and have won i m p o r t a n t achievements in the cause of building socialism. T h e s e achievements have also e n h a n c e d the strength of the socialist c a m p a n d heightened the fighting will of the p e o p l e of the socialist countries. W e wish the f r a t e r n a l A l b a n i a n p e o p l e m o r e a n d greater achievements in the f u t u r e .

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The government and people of China have always held in high esteem and admired the immense efforts made by the government and people of Albania in international affairs. The government and people of Albania have consistently adhered to a foreign policy of peace, resolutely opposed policies of aggression and war of the imperialist bloc headed by the United States, striven for peaceful coexistence with countries under different social systems, and actively supported the people's national liberation struggles in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, thus making outstanding contributions to safeguarding world peace and promoting the progress of mankind. The glorious Albanian Party of Labor is a stanch and militant Marxist-Leninist party, which has always held aloft the brilliant banner of Marxism-Leninism, remained loyal to the principles of proletarian internationalism, abided by the 1957 Declaration and the 1960 Statement of the Communist and workers parties of various countries, and worked to strengthen the great solidarity of the socialist camp and the international Communist movement. The Albanian Party of Labor has firmly defended the purity of Marxism-Leninism and waged an uncompromising struggle against modern revisionism represented by the Tito clique of Yugoslavia, and it enjoys great prestige among the Chinese people and the working class throughout the world. . . 35.

" A G R E A T D A Y O F F R I E N D S H I P . " Editorial in Jen-min jihpao, February 14, 1962. Translation in Peking Review, No. 7, February 16, 1962.

While the CPC's support for the Albanian leadership did not seem to weaken, the Chinese press apparently did not reprint the Zeri i Popullit editorial of January 9. 1962, "Deeper and D e e p e r in the Mire of Anti-Marxism," a comprehensive rebuttal of the C P S U position. (See D o c u m e n t N o . 19.) On the other hand, the celebrations of the twelfth anniversary of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950 were markedly restrained. They came o n the heels of a new barrage of Soviet criticism (see Documents Nos. 9 8 and 9 9 b e l o w ) . TODAY is the twelfth anniversary of the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. This

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great festival of friendship is being enthusiastically celebrated by the Chinese and Soviet peoples. The Sino-Soviet Treaty is a crystallization of the proletarian internationalist friendship formed by the peoples of the two countries in their protracted revolutionary struggle; it is the logical outcome of the historical development of this friendship. The profound friendship between the Chinese and Soviet peoples is well established and of long standing. The October Revolution brought the Chinese people Marxism-Leninism. Victorious in their revolution, the Soviet people have always sympathized with and supported the revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people. Both in their war of resistance to Japanese imperialism and in their war of liberation the Chinese people had the righteous support of the Soviet people. Similarly, the Chinese people also regard support for the revolutionary struggles of the Soviet people as their lofty duty. During the time of the Civil War in the Soviet Union and its fight against foreign intervention, many Chinese workers joined the Red Army to defend the world's first workers' and peasants' state power shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet people. The peoples of the two countries strengthened the militant bonds of their friendship still further during the war against the Hitlerite fascists and Japanese militarism. After the victory of the revolution of the Chinese people and the birth of New China, China and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. This has sealed the friendship of the peoples of the two countries in the form of a treaty. Comrade Mao Tse-tung said at the time of the signing of this treaty: "The unity of the peoples of the two great countries, China and the Soviet Union, sealed by the treaty, will be lasting and indestructible and no one can split it. This unity will inevitably contribute not only to the prosperity of the two great countries—China and the Soviet Union—but also to the future of all mankind and the victory of peace and justice throughout the world." On the basis of this treaty, China and the Soviet Union assist, support, and cooperate with each other in the fields of economy,

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science, and culture, etc., and this has promoted the common upsurge of the socialist and communist construction in the two countries and strengthened the might of the socialist camp. In the course of their socialist construction the Chinese people have received tremendous assistance from the Soviet Union, and we will always be sincerely grateful for this. The Sino-Soviet alliance is a powerful bastion guarding F a r Eastern and world peace. The efforts made by the peoples of the two countries in the struggle to oppose U.S. imperialist policies of aggression and war and to defend Far Eastern and world peace have had a tremendous influence on the world situation. T h e Chinese government and people have actively developed relations of friendship, mutual assistance, and cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries; they have striven for peaceful coexistence with countries of different social systems on the basis of the Five Principles and opposed the imperialist policies of aggression and war; they have supported the liberation struggles of the oppressed people in the various countries and the oppressed nations—all this has powerfully promoted and safeguarded peace in the Far East and throughout the world. The Chinese government and people have always actively supported the various Soviet proposals which are beneficial to the defense of world peace and are sincerely grateful to the Soviet government and people for their support of the Chinese people's righteous struggle to liberate China's territory of Taiwan and for their efforts for the restoration of China's legitimate rights in the United Nations. A t the present time, U.S. imperialism continues to cling obstinately to its policies of aggression and war and is engaged in a frantic arms drive and war preparations. In particular, it is stepping up the revival of Japanese militarism in the Far East, doing its utmost to push ahead the Japanese-South Korean talks to rig up a Northeast Asian alliance, and intensifying intervention and aggression in Laos and South Vietnam to threaten peace in Southeast Asia. At such a time, it is a matter of great importance to consolidate and strengthen the Sino-Soviet alliance further.

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The unity of the socialist camp and the unity of the international Communist movement are the core of the great unity of the people of the world; they are an important condition for the victory of the struggle of the peoples to win world peace, national liberation, democracy, and socialism. Precisely for this reason the imperialists, the reactionaries of various countries, and the modern revisionists of Yugoslavia are doing all they can to sow discord and rabidly attempting to undermine this unity. The Chinese people, the Soviet people, the people of the various countries in the socialist camp, and all peace-loving people in the world, however, well understand that they must protect this unity as one does the apple of one's eye. The great unity of the Chinese and Soviet peoples is the cornerstone of the unity of the socialist camp and the unity of the international Communist movement, and the cornerstone of the great unity of the people of the world. It not only corresponds to the interests of the Chinese and Soviet peoples but also corresponds to the interests of the peoples of the various socialist countries and the peoples of the whole world. It is highly treasured by the Chinese and Soviet peoples, the peoples of the various socialist countries, and all just-minded people throughout the world. Chairman Liu Shao-ch'i put it well when he said in December, 1960, on concluding his visit to the Soviet Union: "Both the Soviet people and the Chinese people have a fervent desire to reinforce the unity between the peoples of the two countries. Whenever we speak about reinforcing the unity between the two parties and the two countries and the friendship between the two peoples, people are very happy. Conversely, any words or deeds which are not in the interests of the unity between our two parties and two countries, or which impair the basis of this unity—the fundamental principles of MarxismLeninism—will not be countenanced by the people of China. Nor will such words or deeds be countenanced by the people of the Soviet Union. And I believe that they will not be countenanced either by the people of any of the countries of the socialist camp or by the people who constitute over 90 percent of the total population in the capitalist world." We are deeply

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convinced that the peoples of China and the Soviet Union will certainly make consistent efforts to consolidate the friendship and unity of the two countries. The Chinese people have always looked upon the safeguarding and strengthening of the unity between the Chinese and Soviet peoples, the unity of the socialist c a m p , and the unity of the international Communist movement as their loftiest internationalist duty. The Chinese people will forever hold high the banner of Marxism-Leninism, the banner of the 1957 Declaration and the 1960 Statement, and the banner of proletarian internationalist unity, and, together with the Soviet people, the peoples of the various socialist countries, and the people of the world, strive for new victories in the cause of world peace, national liberation, democracy, and socialism.

3 6 . "FRATERNAL

FRIENDSHIP

OF G R E A T

PEOPLES—ON

THE

T W E L F T H ANNIVERSARY OF THE SIGNING OF THE SOVIETC H I N E S E T R E A T Y . " Pravda,

F e b r u a r y 14, 1962.1"'

TODAY, February 14, is the twelfth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance between the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic. This document further strengthened the good-neighborly relations that had evolved historically between the peoples of our great powers. The years that have elapsed since its signing have demonstrated convincingly the vital strength of the close alliance between the peoples of the USSR and China, have brought impressive victories to the world socialist system in peaceful economic competition with capitalism, and have been marked by a consolidation of forces and a growth in the power of the commonwealth of socialist states and by substantial successes in the struggle for peace and the triumph of Leninist principles, for democracy and socialism, and for the national liberation of oppressed peoples. The working people of our country observe the anniversary " Translation f r o m The Current N o . 7 ( M a r c h 14, 1962).

Digest of the Soviet

Press, Vol. X I V .

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of the Soviet-Chinese treaty under conditions of the further growth of the international authority of their great motherland, of the successful working out of the tasks raised by the X X I I Congress of the CPSU. The Soviet people, as never before so closely rallied around the Communist Party and its Leninist Central Committee, are increasing their efforts in the construction of communism, easing and quickening the movement toward communism of the entire world socialist system. "The Party," stresses the new Party Program, "regards communist construction in the USSR at the great international task of the Soviet people, which corresponds to the interests of the entire world socialist system, the interests of the international proletariat and of all mankind." It is pleasant to know that the fraternal Chinese people are happy about our successes and have a high appreciation of the Soviet people's contribution to the common struggle of working people of the world over for the triumph of the ideas of peace and communism. They have become convinced that the peoples of the Soviet Union are their loyal and reliable friends and that they harbor feelings of enormous respect and the most profound sympathy for the Chinese people. The treaty, which multiplies the power of the two fraternal countries, has played a great role in their destinies and has had a beneficial effect on the development of international events and on the improvement of the international situation. The Chinese People's Republic, by joining the family of the commonwealth of socialist countries, gained an opportunity to overcome the consequences of the economic blockade organized by the imperialists, headed by the United States. All mankind can now see the enormous significance of the treaty for the preservation of peace in the Far East, for the strengthening of the position of the socialist countries there, and for the consolidation of the international position of the Chinese People's Republic. This document has been a stern warning to the imperialists, who have been hatching plans to attack the Chinese People's Republic. It has become clear that if they commit aggression, they will have to confront the strongest state on earth, the Soviet Union. The statement of the head of the Soviet government, Comrade

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N. S. Khrushchev, which received wide international response, stressed: "An attack on the Chinese People's Republic—which is a great friend, ally, and neighbor of our country—is an attack on the Soviet Union. Faithful to its duty, our country, together with the people of China, will do everything to uphold the security of both states, the interests of peace in the Far East, and the interests of peace in the entire world." The Soviet government emphatically supports the struggle of the Chinese people for the liberation of the island of Taiwan, stressing that Taiwan is the age-old territory of China and is inseparably linked to her, and that the reunification of this part with the whole republic must be an internal affair of China. The Soviet government consistently unmasks the notorious "theory of two Chinas," invented by the imperialists with the aim of tearing Taiwan from the Chinese People's Republic and with the aim of preserving a center of constant tension in the Far East. The governments of the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic have repeatedly favored the establishment of a system of collective security in Asia. There has been wide approval in the countries of Asia and in the world as a whole for the Soviet government's proposal to set up a zone of peace, in the first place, a zone free of atomic weapons in the Far East and in the entire Pacific basin. There has also been wide approval by the world public of the Chinese government's proposal to conclude a collective peace pact among the countries of Asia and of the Pacific Ocean, including the United States of America. For a period of many years, the Soviet Union has waged a tireless, persistent struggle for the restoration of the legal rights of the Chinese People's Republic in the United Nations Organization. The day is not far when the rotten corpse of the Chiang Kai-shek delegation will stop poisoning the atmosphere of this organization, and the genuine voice of the representatives of the free Chinese people will resound in its chambers. The achievements in socialist construction of our great friend and ally—the Chinese people—which it has scored under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, sincerely gladden

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the Soviet people. We note with satisfaction how, inspired by the immortal ideas of Marxism-Leninism, the working class, the peasantry, and the intelligentsia of China selflessly toil in the name of the transformation of their homeland into a powerful socialist state with a highly developed economy and advanced science and culture. The Soviet people value highly the friendship with the Chinese people and are constantly concerned about strengthening it. " T h e Soviet people," says Comrade N. S. Khrushchev, "regard the Chinese people as their brother, friend, and ally. The friendship of our peoples grows stronger in the common struggle for the victory of socialism, for peace in the entire world. The Soviet people and the CPSU will do everything necessary for the further strengthening of this friendship, for the cementing of unity and the unity of the entire socialist camp. Soviet-Chinese friendship corresponds to the basic interests of our great peoples, of the peoples of the entire socialist camp—it is an invincible bulwark of peace and security of the peoples, the guarantee of the future victory of socialism and communism." The manifestations of Soviet-Chinese friendship are countless. It finds a living embodiment in the comprehensive and selfless aid that our people have given and are giving to the fraternal Chinese people with all their hearts and all their spirit. Twelve years ago, in concluding the treaty, the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic undertook to engage in the necessary economic cooperation. The past years have shown how extensive and beneficial this fraternal cooperation has been. With the assistance of the Soviet Union, which has delivered full lines of equipment, designs, and other technical documentation, about 170 industrial enterprises and other installations have been built and put in operation in the Chinese People's Republic to form a skeleton for socialist industry. Among them are such industrial giants as the An-shan, Wuhan, and Pao-tao metallurgical enterprises, the Ch'ang-ch'un automobile and Lio-yang tractor plants, the heavy machine plant at Wuhan, and the machine construction enterprises of Harbin. Furthermore, with the assistance of the USSR large shops and units which produce

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finished goods have been put into operation in thirty-three enterprises. The Chinese People's Republic in turn delivers to the Soviet Union raw materials and manufactured goods needed by our national economy. A comprehensive cultural exchange is being carried out between our countries. In 1962, for example, there will be exchanges of collectives of artists, musicians, theater people, and other workers in the arts. Similarly, cooperation in the fields of education, enlightenment, radio, television, and sports will be continued. Close cooperation with the Soviet higher school and a study of its experience have contributed to China's successful solution of the important task of training a large detachment of highly qualified specialists capable of solving complicated technical problems. A large number of Chinese students are now studying at Moscow, Leningrad, and Central Asian universities, at the D . I. Mendeleyev Chemical Technology Institute in Moscow, at the Leningrad Electrotechnical Institute, and at other Soviet higher educational institutions, and a large group of Chinese graduate students are preparing to defend candidate's dissertations. A remarkable example of the fraternal cooperation of the people of our countries is their common participation in the solution of important scientific problems. The scientists of the USSR and China together with the physicists of other socialist countries in the Joint Institute of Nuclear Research are carrying out work which has fundamental significance for the development of science. The scientists of both countries coordinate their efforts in work of such great national economic significance. Thousands of Soviet specialists have participated in China's economic and cultural construction and have given it fraternal aid. The Chinese people have noted with gratitude their contributions to the establishment of new industrial bases; to the mastery of production of modern locomotives, railroad cars, ships, boilers, powerful turbines, transformers, precision instruments, highly productive machine tools, and other types of out-

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put; to the discovery of rich mineral deposits; to irrigation construction; and to the development of education and art. Soviet-Chinese friendship is perpetuated in the names of buildings, of leading workers collectives, in songs and poems dedicated to it by the composers and poets of the fraternal countries. The new main railroad line, which is the shortest route uniting our country with the western regions of the Chinese People's Republic, is called the "Road of Friendship" in the USSR and China. A people's commune near Peking is called "Chinese-Soviet Friendship." The state farm "Friendship," located in the northeast, to which the Soviet Union presented a gift of a complete set of modern agricultural machinery, illustrates the advanced economy in China. The activity of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society, based on mass voluntary organizations, is a brilliant expression of the fraternal feelings of the Soviet people toward the Chinese people. This society carries out a great, beneficial work. It widely acquaints the Soviet public with the life of the Chinese people, its history and culture, and with the successes of the Chinese people in political, economic, and cultural construction. In these days our people, according to an established tradition, observe the anniversary of the Soviet-Chinese treaty. They warmly wish the great Chinese people new successes in the construction of socialism, in the struggle for the strengthening of peace in the Far East and in the entire world.

37.

H S I A O S H U AND M A C H ' U N - P I N G . " O N B E R N S T E I N I A N SIONISM."

REVI-

Hung-ch'i, Nos. 3 / 4 , February 10, 1962.

In February, 1962, the central journal of the C P C began a series of detailed "theoretical" articles ostensibly dealing with various aspects of revisionism and reformism. (See D o c u m e n t s Nos. 37, 38, 40, 4 1 . ) In these articles, unmistakably relevant to the current debate, the Chinese Communist leadership invariably emerged as the protector of Leninist orthodoxy.

. . . AT the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, world history entered a new

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p h a s e — a phase in which free capitalism changed into imperialism. Further development of capitalist contradictions foretold an end to the "peaceful" years after the Paris Commune and the impending outbreak of new political turmoil and of a revolutionary upsurge. Class struggle became acute. At this critical moment in history, serious divergences occurred within the international workers movement. The struggle was intensified once more between the Marxists who upheld the revolutionary line of proletarian revolution and proletarian dictatorship, and the opportunists who preached the line of class cooperation and social reform. All the opportunists within the social democratic parties of various countries, such as the followers of Bernstein in Germany, those in favor of joining bourgeois governments in France, the Fabians in Britain, and the critics in Russia, united and attacked the so-called old, dogmatic Marxism. This struggle was waged on the international scene, but was initiated first within the German Social Democratic Party. At that time, there appeared in the German Social Democratic Party an anti-Marxist group which proposed, in a most blatant manner, the most complete revision of Marxist doctrine. Its representative figure was Bernstein. Bernsteinism was a product of the development of imperialism at that time, a product of bourgeois policy, and at the same time a natural outcome of the development of right opportunism within the German Social Democratic Party. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, the German working class stood in the forefront of the international socialist movement. Under the direction of Marx and Engels, the German Social Democratic Party achieved great victories in disseminating Marxism, building up and preparing the revolutionary forces and opposing the bourgeoisie, and accumulated a wealth of experiences. But the Party, from the time of its merger, made concessions in principle to the opportunism of the Lassalleans in its program (i.e., the "Gotha Program"). Later, while "left" tendencies occurred within the Party under conditions of protracted peace and legality, right opportunism was from the beginning to the end the main danger actually existing. . . .

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The article then outlined the "reforms" introduced by the German government to "placate" the proletariat. Opportunities were thus increased for the legal activities of the Party. T h u s the opportunists within the Party became active. They considered that the "new policy" of the government was genuinely friendly toward the workers. They regarded the deceptive concessions made by the reactionary rulers as genuinely well intended, believing that the government could act "in the interests of the whole people." They used this viewpoint to idealize the bourgeois states. While spreading the illusion of taking only a peaceful and legal road, they accused all those who talked about armed revolution and civil war of being anarchists and Proudhonists. . . . In this manner, within the German Social Democratic Party, which occupied a leading position in the Second International, a right opportunist line was gradually formed, following the changes in the tactics of the ruling class and the increase in the possibilities of legal activities of the Party. Bemsteinism was the most perfect theoretical representation of this line. At Zurich, he [Bernstein] and Karl Höchberg and Schramm ran the Jahrbuch für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik journal. These three men published an article, " T h e German Socialist Movement in Retrospect." They declared in this article that the working class could not rely on its own strength for emancipation and should obey the leadership of the "cultured and propertied" bourgeoisie, who alone had the "time and possibilities" to study all things that worked for the well-being of the workers. T h e article also put forward the following theoretical points: the working class need only concern itself with the most immediate practical tasks and carry out reform "step by step." It is not necessary for the working class to talk about any ultimate aim, the article said, adding that "excessive demands" would frighten the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie. (See Selected Works of Marx and Engels, II [Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1955], 479, 8 6 ) . This was actually the first appearance of the slogan, " T h e movement is everything, the

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final aim is nothing," announced later by Bernstein. Marx and Engels severely condemned this "Zurich Trio," pointing out that these bourgeois intellectuals, while joining the workers movement, did not accept the proletarian world view, that on paper they recognized class struggle but actually they were afraid of proletarian revolution, and that the road they proposed was nothing but an attempt to patch up the capitalist system by means of minor reforms. Marx and Engels demanded that these dissidents be purged from the Party. . . In 1899 [Bernstein] wrote a book entitled Evolutionary Socialism. This book was a collection of the revisionist "theories" of that time and was an anti-Marxist program of the right wing of the Social Democratic Party. In this "renegade work," as Lenin termed it, Bernstein, in order to cover his renegade actions, did his best to profess that he had a "strong personal friendship" with Engels and was "exceptionally trusted" by Engels, and pretended to be an "orthodox" Marxist. Under the pretext that the doctrine of Karl Marx was far from being completed, that history brought to light the "defects and contradictions" of Marxism, and that Marxism was "old" and "outdated," he suggested that one should not "forever repeat again and again the words of the master," saying, "Criticism of the Marxist theory must be the first step toward its development and perfection." In this manner, Bernstein comprehensively revised Marxism under the pretext of "opposing dogmatism" and "completing the Marxist theory." . . . He charges that dialectics is the most fatal part of the Marxist doctrine and is a noose that impedes logical observation of every aspect of things. He considers that society will only evolve gradually and slowly and cannot leap forward. He says: "I am convinced that there is no leap forward at the important period of national development." . . . Bernstein takes the view that capitalism has the means of "preventing economic crises" and is increasingly showing its "adaptability" and that the collapse of capitalism is not inevitable. He denies the theory of class struggle and considers that it is not applicable to a "really democratic" society. He says: "The feudal system with a strict hierarchy has to be destroyed by

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violence almost everywhere. The free systems of modern society are entirely different from the systems of the feudal time precisely because of their elasticity, capacity for transformation, and capacity for evolution. For this reason, these systems should not be destroyed but should be enabled to continue to evolve." Obviously, Bernstein demands substitution of bourgeois social reform for proletarian revolution. Bernstein strongly denies that the state is an instrument of class rule and that the bourgeois state is a machinery of violence with which the bourgeoisie oppresses the proletariat. . He therefore considers that the parliamentary system is the "most effective means" of realizing the demands of the proletariat. The Social Democratic Party must "base itself on the universal franchise and democracy," strive to win the majority of votes and a majority in the parliament in order to pass peacefully to socialism; "otherwise it will have no better way of promoting the realization of its cause." For Bernstein, who glosses over the class essence of the bourgeois state and idealizes bourgeois democracy, it is naturally out of the question to guide the proletariat to concentrate its aim on smashing the state machinery of the bourgeoisie; on the contrary, he demands preservation of this machinery and "perfection" of it. Lenin says: "In accepting Marxism in the past and at present, Bernsteinists exclude the Marxist aspect of direct revolution. Instead of regarding the parliamentary struggle as a means of struggle exclusively applicable to a given historical period, they regard it as the principal and almost the only form of struggle and, consequently, have no need for 'violence,' 'seizure,' and 'dictatorship.' " ("The Victory of Constitutional Democracy and the Tasks of the Workers Political Party," Collected Works of Lenin, X [Peking: People's Publishing House, 1958, in Chinese], 219.) Sometimes Bernstein says a few words demanding revolution and seizure of state power as if he were still a "revolutionary," but they are intended only to deceive the masses; actually, what he wants to prove is that revolution and seizure of state power are entirely unnecessary. He considers that, with respect to the bourgeoisie, "violent ex-

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propriation should not be generally enforced under any circumstances, but gradual buying-out should be enforced through institutional and legal means." Bernstein is resolutely opposed to revolutionary violence— revolution of the proletariat to smash the bourgeois state machinery—cursing revolutionary violence and revolutionary expropriation as "Proudhonism" and "senseless sacrifice of survival." He says: "The revolutionary action program of the Communist Manifesto is out-and-out 'Proudhonist.' " He considers that, in advanced capitalist countries, it is necessary only to carry out peaceful, orderly reform in order to pass over to socialism because "the more democratic the political organizations of modern countries are, the less the inevitability and opportunity for political upheavals." With the introduction of the parliamentary system and universal franchise, further talk of violent revolution and armed struggle is nothing but "subjectivism" and "dogmatism." He explains: "This is not because I am satisfied and long for peace but because I believe great achievements have been made and the working class itself has a weapon, which is comparable to the one of which Archimedes, the great physicist of ancient time, spoke: 'Give me a lever and I will overturn the world.' The working class may also say: 'Give me universal, equal franchise, and the basic social conditions for liberation will be gained.' " (What Is Socialism?, translated from the 1922 German revised edition.) On the ground of progress in military technique, Bernstein considers violent revolution and armed struggle to be no longer possible. To prove this point, Bernstein wickedly distorts a passage in which Engels mentioned that the development of military techniques would create greater difficulties for street barricade fighting. Engels himself pointed out that he "recommends this tactic merely for the Germany of today and moreover with many reservations." "Even for Germany this tactic may become unacceptable tomorrow." Against certain leaders of the German Social Democratic Party, who at that time distorted his theoretical points by ignoring the context, Engels lodged a strong protest long ago, declaring that they quoted from his

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work "everything which unconditionally defends peaceful and nonviolent strategy" ("Engels' Letter to Lafargue," Marx and Engels Oppose Opportunism [People's Publishing House, 1958], p. 2 0 0 ) , and tried to portray him as "one who begs for peace and observes the laws at any price" ("Engels' Letter to Kautsky," Selected Works of Marx and Engels, 1 [1954 ed.], 9 5 ) . Disregarding these explanations and protests from Engels, Bernstein unreasonably represents things as if Engels had already abandoned his viewpoint of violent revolution. He attempts to defend, in the name of Engels, his opportunism that opposes violent revolution. He says: " A generation ago, the last means of the masses to defend their rights was street barricade fighting. This means has been rendered ineffective by modern city construction and modern arms technique." (Political Mass Strikes, translated from the 1905 German edition.) Further, Bernstein uses the armed force of the bourgeoisie to frighten the working class, saying, "Large-scalc clashes with the army are a means of impeding the constant development of the Social Democratic Party and even of causing it to retreat temporarily." Proletarian dictatorship—this most important point of Marxism—is always evaded by the opportunists. Bernstein uses bourgeois democracy to negate the necessity of proletarian dictatorship and does his best to make it ugly. H e says: "Marx and Engels took the reign of terror during the French revolution as a typical instance when they founded the doctrine of proletarian dictatorship." In his opinion, "the term proletarian dictatorship has greatly fallen behind the times today." He asserts that, whether from the standpoint of economic development or from the intellectual standpoint, the proletariat is still not able to "carry out independent political rule" and that if the proletariat prematurely seizes state power, the dictatorship of the proletariat merely "amounts to a dictatorship of club orators and writers." Bernstein avoids mention of the proletarian dictatorship as the means of realizing the most extensive democracy insofar as the great masses of the people are concerned, but shows a particular hostility to the coercion enforced by the proletarian dictatorship over the bourgeoisie, saying that it

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would be a "dictatorial rule of terror." "Only by divesting the term dictatorship of its real meaning and by giving it a slightly more moderate meaning can it be brought into harmony with reality." . . . Bernsteinism as an outgrowth of imperialist development stands for "class cooperation," opposes proletarian revolution internally, and supports the imperialist colonial policy and opposes proletarian internationalism externally. Bernstein represents his nationalism as being in harmony with Marxism. Despite the fact that he frequently quotes from Marx and Engels certain words while disregarding their contexts, Bernstein's chauvinism is quite clear, particularly when the issue no longer remains in the theoretical domain and has a direct bearing on concrete policies. Bernstein considers that "internationalism is still too remote today and is a thing that seems to belong to the future age." While outwardly he dares not oppose the slogan "Workers of the world, unite!" as proposed by Marx and Engels, actually Bernstein entirely disagrees with it. Whenever a question involves the foreign relations of the German nation, he always takes the stand of its bourgeoisie without hesitation. He says: "The state holds the whole nation together and defends its enormous common interests. So far as this state function is concerned, the workers and the state are in harmony." (What Is Socialism?, translated from the 1922 German edition.) For this reason, the proletariat "cannot remain indifferent to the interests" of the German empire. Deliberately confusing the dividing line between bourgeois nationalism and proletarian patriotism, he could say: "It is very difficult to determine the dividing line beyond which the upholding of the national interests is no longer justifiable and is transformed into false patriotism." . . . In 1897, German imperialism occupied the Kiao-chow Bay of China. Bernstein was the first to declare that he did not entirely endorse the socialist papers' condemnation of German imperialism, claiming that "the acquisition of Kiao-chow Bay is not the worst move in German foreign policy." He kent on: "As long as the lease of Kiao-chow Bay is intended, in the past and at present, to provide the future interests of Germany

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in China with a safeguard, then the Social Democratic Party may favor this action without impairing its principles in the least." This sufficiently indicates Bernstein's stand of greatnation chauvinism and shows that he was a loyal defender of imperialism. What is this set of Bernstein's revisionist theories in substance? Despite his claim that it is "a viewpoint acquired from a probe into social p h e n o m e n a " and despite his claim of "new principles" and "new views," actually it says nothing new. When Bernsteinism emerged, many leaders of the German Democratic Party expressed disapproval but, since they themselves actually took a right opportunist stand, their criticism of Bernsteinism was impotent. A s Bernstein himself said, although they "denounce m e , " actually "they themselves act in the same manner." Plekhanov, who once waged a determined struggle against Bernsteinism in philosophy, wrote to Kautsky: "The question today is who buries whom: Should Bernstein bury the Social Democratic Party or the Social Democratic Party bury him?" But Kautsky still sheltered and even "thanked" Bernstein in many respects. Later, although Kautsky shared in the criticism of Bernstein, he evaded such a fundamental question as the dictatorship of the proletariat. As he stood for conciliation with Bernstein, he eventually took the side of revisionism. Although some revolutionary Marxists in Germany and the international field waged some struggle against Bernsteinism at that time, they underestimated its danger. Lafargue held that Bernstein's "critique" of Marxism was nothing but a result of "mental fatigue." Wilhelm Liebknecht said that Bernsteinism is a process of intellectual development and may be ignored. Franz Mehring maintained that revisionism was by no means produced by the social and historical conditions in the development of the workers movement. "Except for revisionist feelings, revisionism has never existed in Germany." Plekhanov, too, failed to persist in the antirevisionist struggle in the end.

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Lenin was a great standard-bearer in upholding Marxism and combating revisionism. Upon publication of Bernstein's Evolutionary Socialism, Lenin severely criticized Bernsteinism, focusing primarily on its Russian version, namely "legal Marxism" (that is, the Economists). In the subsequent struggle against the opportunists of the Second International, chauvinists, Mensheviks, and Liquidators in Russia, Lenin united with the revolutionary Marxists of other countries, criticized the revisionist outlook comprehensively and thoroughly, and pushed Marxism forward under the conditions prevailing at that time. Revisionism for quite a time ran rampant. It was not only a phenomenon in Germany but also an international phenomenon. It occupied a predominant position in the parties, trade unions, cooperatives, and parliamentary parties and leagues of many countries. It was not merely a question of a few rightist party leaders; it had a certain social foundation. It not only formed a quite integral system but carried out its reformist line in practice. Further, it was backed by imperialism. However, on the basis of a scientific analysis of imperialism, Lenin firmly believed that capitalist contradictions had become acute, conditions were ripening for socialist revolution, and the great working masses demanded revolution and opposed the capitalist system. He believed that this revolutionary will of the masses would be realized sooner or later and that no one could obstruct it. That is why Lenin was fully confident and determined in the struggle, firmly believing that the principled stand of Marxism was the only correct stand and that revisionism would eventually end in failure. The struggle against revisionism, Lenin pointed out, was of extremely great significance for the development of the international workers movement: "The ideological struggle of revolutionary Marxism against revisionism is merely a prelude to the great revolutionary battle to be fought by the proletariat in forging ahead toward the complete victory of its cause, regardless of the vacillations and weakness of philistines." The great victory of the October Socialist Revolution fully testified to this

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judgment made by Lenin. Bernstein's revisionism went completely bankrupt. Lenin often pointed out that as long as the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat continues and imperialism still exists, revisionism has a base. Bernsteinism has gone bankrupt, but it will continue to manifest itself in this or that form under different conditions. Yugoslav revisionism is nothing but a modern version of Bernsteinism. Owing to the fact that Marxism-Leninism has won still more brilliant victories and the socialist ideal has become a great reality, the neo-Bernsteinism of the Tito clique of Yugoslavia will appear to be more fierce, despicable, and cunning than its predecessor, but there is no difference between them on fundamental points. Like Bernsteinism, neo-Bernsteinism substitutes sophistry for revolutionary materialistic dialectics in philosophy. Neo-Bernsteinism defends monopoly capital, confuses the fundamental distinction between the capitalist system and the socialist system, and stands for the peaceful growth of capitalism into socialism in political economy. It preaches the theory of a state which is above classes and opposes the proletarian revolution politically. It idealizes the bourgeois dictatorship and brings discredit upon the dictatorship of the proletariat, distorts the character of the political party of the working class and denies the leading role of the party. It substitutes reactionary bourgeois nationalism for proletarian internationalism. The struggle of Marxism-Leninism against neo-Bernsteinism reflects the acute struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and between the socialist camp and the imperialist camp in the international domain at present. While opposing imperialism, Marxism-Leninism must firmly oppose Yugoslav modern revisionism. In the favorable situation in which the East wind prevails over the West wind, Marxism-Leninism will certainly win greater victories in the struggle and the international Communist movement will certainly see a more vigorous development in the struggle.

The Chinese 38.

WU

CHIANG.

LECTICS.' "

269

Position "OUR

AGE

AND EDVARD

KARDELJ'S

'DIA-

Hung-ch'i, No. 5, March 1, 1962.

. . . THE object of Kardelj's booklet [Socialism and War, 1960] was to meet further the current needs of imperialism in its world-wide efforts to organize an anti-Chinese, anti-Communist, anti-peoples movement as well as movements to split international Communism. At the same time his booklet strove to provide certain theoretical bases for the treasonous formulations of modern revisionism. . . . Moreover, the basis for the change of things is always found within, not without, the things, and external conditions act only through internal factors. Take, for example, the relationship between socialism and imperialism. The state of imperialism will not undergo so radical a change that imperialism will be no longer imperialism, merely as a result of the growth of the strength of the socialist countries and without any decisive change within the imperialist countries. By the same token, the imperialist system itself will not change merely because of changes in the relative strength of the classes in imperialist countries, without going through a revolutionary upheaval. On such an important question, Kardelj confuses external conditions with internal factors, quantitative changes with qualitative changes. . . The article then criticizes the following passage from Kardelj's book. "The growing strength of socialism, the persuasiveness of its model, the steadily increasing material influence of socialist relations on the world economy, and the increasingly deep realization that one can no longer live in old ways—all this strongly accelerates the process of collapse of capitalism and continually compels and stimulates the leading forces of capitalist society to come to terms with and make concessions to the working class. Meanwhile, this reinforces the position of the working class so that it can more easily utilize the parliamentary

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means of struggle and the forms of bourgeois democracy for increasing its political influence in the society and realizing its socialist demands and targets. Finally, this can enable political forces jar broader than the Communist parties of various countries to adopt the building of socialism as their program." Behold, how wonderful the situation is! Owing to the existence of the socialist states and to the "persuasiveness of the model" of socialism, the ruling forces of the capitalist society (of course they refer to Wall Street tycoons and Kennedy, De Gaulle, Adenauer, et al.) will continue to "come to terms with and make concessions to the working class." These ruling forces will sooner or later prostrate themselves before the "model," lay down the butcher knives, and become buddhas. There is therefore no need at all for the working class and other working people to conduct any revolutionary struggle and no need at all to get prepared to smash the reactionary state machinery of the bourgeoisie. All such are unavailing "adventures." All the working class and other working people have to do is wait for the bourgeois ruling force to prostrate itself some day before the "model" and to withdraw from its ruling position of its own accord. In the same way, on account of the "persuasiveness of such a model," "political forces" (including, of course, the right-wing socialists and various kinds of bourgeois representatives) far broader than the Communist parties of various countries will all "accept" the socialist program and vie with one another in "dashing" toward socialism! Speaking of the "model" of the socialist countries, there is no doubt at all that the existence of socialist countries gives a tremendous impetus to the process of world development. The socialist countries are bastions of world revolution and world peace. They enable the oppressed people and oppressed nations of the world to see their hope and future, inspire them with confidence in the struggle against monopoly capital and imperialism and for peace, and encourage them to take revolutionary actions to hasten the collapse of the imperialist system. All the oppressed people and oppressed nations can expect more and more support in their struggle from the people of the so-

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cialist countries. (Their revolutionary struggle also gives tremendous support to the struggle and construction in the socialist countries.) In a word, the model of socialist countries of course cannot take the place of the revolutionary struggle of the people of various countries, but can greatly encourage the revolutionary struggle of the people of various countries. But in the case of modern revisionists of Yugoslavia, what we find is this: the "model" of the socialist countries becomes not a thing that inspires the oppressed peoples and oppressed nations with a revolutionary fighting will, but a pretext for liquidating the revolutionary struggle; the collapse of the imperialist system is not a result of the revolutionary struggle of the people but a direct result of the existence of the socialist "model"—for, according to what they say, the "model" can "persuade" the ruling forces of capitalist society to surrender their position willingly. From March 27 to April 16, 1962, the second session of the National People's Congress of the CPR met in Peking. (See Document No. 39.) N o information about the Congress was forthcoming while it was in progress. However, a Jen-min jih-pao editorial on March 29, entitled "Proceed Steadily and Gradually on Firm Ground, - ' was widely taken to suggest a retreat from "stage-skipping" and "great leaps" to a more moderate program of economic development. The lengthy article, based on the experience of harnessing the Urumchi River, in Sinkiang, cautioned against undertaking too much too soon, for "this will result in a great waste of energy with little achievement or total failure." Jen-min jih-pao used appropriate quotations from Mao's writings to underscore the point that "we reject the theory of a quick victory" and "must strive to secure all the indispensable preconditions" before driving on to final victory. Pravda, which had given scant space to Chinese developments, reprinted the Chinese editorial prominently on April 3. On April 4, Pravda republished parts of Foreign Minister Chen I's speech at the Hungarian Embassy in Peking, in which he had stressed the unity of the socialist camp (but omitted Chen I's references to Albania). The same day, Izvestiia carried parts of the Jen-min jih-pao editorial of April 3 on the Geneva disarmament negotiations, in which the Peking organ had come out in support of the Soviet proposals, endorsed general disarmament, and blamed the United States for the failure of negotiations. Unlike certain earlier statements by CPC leaders (see Documents Nos. 29 and 30 above), the April 3

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editorial maintained that the struggles for "national liberation" and disarmament "support and sustain each other." A s was disclosed a year later, the C P C agreed to a temporary cessation of public polemics with the C P S U . ( F o r details, see Chapter X . ) 1 8 At the s a m e time, the differences in ideology and strategy appeared to remain unaltered, as w a s made clear in the continuing series of "theoretical papers" ( D o c u m e n t s N o s . 4 0 and 4 1 ) .

3 9 . N C N A PRESS COMMUNIQUE ON THE NATIONAL P E O P L E ' S

16, 1962. Translation in Peking No. 16, April 20, 1962.

CONGRESS, A P R I L

Review,

THE Second National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China held its third session in Peking between March 27 and April 16. Before this, a preparatory meeting was held on March 22. At the beginning, the session heard a report on the work of the government made by Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council. Premier Chou En-lai's report fell into two parts. The first dealt with the international situation and China's foreign policy, and the second part discussed the domestic situation and the tasks of the Chinese people. Analyzing the international situation, Premier Chou En-lai first expounded the fact that "the East wind prevails over the West wind" was the main trend in the development of the international situation. He emphatically pointed out that the formation and growing strength of the world socialist system and the upsurge of the national liberation movement together with the emergence of a series of newly independent countries on the basis of this movement were two great tides of historic significance since World War II. They supported and inspired each other, pushing history forward and changing the face of the world. The world capitalist system was going through a process of further decline and disintegration. The imperialist camp was riddled with contradictions and was splitting up at an accelerated 19 For a simultaneous abatement in Soviet-Albanian attacks, see above, p. 199.

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rate. Whatever the twists and turns, the tide of history was irresistible; the struggle for peace, national liberation, democracy, and socialism of the people of the world would surely continue to forge ahead and the revolutionary cause of the world's people would surely triumph all over the world. Premier Chou En-lai then dealt with the question of opposing the policies of aggression and war of U.S. imperialism and defending world peace. He pointed out that since its inauguration the Kennedy administration had been playing various "peace" tricks while still further intensifying its arms expansion, war preparations, and aggressive activities. Premier Chou En-lai stressed that in opposition to the U.S. imperialist policies of aggression and war, we should strengthen the unity and might of the socialist camp, support the struggle of the masses of the various countries against U.S. imperialism and its followers, unite with all forces that can be united with, isolate U.S. imperialism to the maximum extent, and strive for lasting world peace. Premier Chou En-lai explained in detail China's foreign policy. H e said that China had consistently pursued a foreign policy of peace. It firmly and unswervingly developed its relations of friendship, mutual assistance, and cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries; strove for peaceful coexistence on the basis of the Five Principles with countries having different social systems; opposed the imperialist policies of aggression and war; and supported the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed peoples and the oppressed nations against imperialism and colonialism. This was the general line of China's foreign policy. China had always advocated the settlement of international disputes through negotiations, firmly stood for the banning of nuclear weapons, and supported the struggle of the peace-loving countries and peoples of the world against the arms expansion and war preparations by imperialism and for the realization of disarmament. China firmly opposed the forcible occupation of Taiwan by U.S. imperialism and its schemes of creating "two Chinas." Premier Chou En-lai said that China's foreign policy had won widespread praise and support f r o m the people of the world. China had friends all over the

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world. U.S. imperialism and its followers had vainly used every means to isolate China and venomously slandered it. But all their efforts had ended in ignominious defeat. Premier Chou En-lai then reviewed the situation at home and the tasks of the Chinese people. In an analysis of the current domestic situation, he pointed out, first of all, that under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and Chairman Mao Tse-tung, and on the basis of the successful completion of the First Five-Year Plan, the people of various nationalities of the country had embarked in 1958 on the Second Five-Year Plan for national economic construction. In the past few years, the general line of going all-out, aiming high, and achieving greater, faster, better, and more economical results in building socialism had demonstrated its great power and had been still further developed. People's communes, which were of great historic significance, had been set up in China's vast rural areas and had gradually embarked on the road of sound development. A big leap forward had taken place in the economic and cultural construction of the country; this had brought tremendous achievements and laid the preliminary foundation for the building of a system of national economy which is independent, complete, and modern. At the same time, China had suffered from serious natural calamities for three consecutive years from 1959 to 1961, and considerable difficulties had occurred in the national economy. The people of various nationalities throughout the country had made tremendous efforts and achieved outstanding results in overcoming the natural calamities and economic difficulties. Many new problems which had emerged during the great development of the socialist cause had been tackled step by step. At the present time, the economic situation of the country had already begun to take a turn for the better. . . . Referring to the work of adjusting the national economy and the current tasks, Premier Chou En-lai stated that the policy of adjusting, consolidating, filling out, and raising standards centered on adjustment must continue to be carried out in the work of the national economy. He put forward ten tasks in the adjustment of the national economy in 1962:

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( 1 ) to strive to increase agricultural production, first and foremost the production of grain, cotton, and oil-bearing crops; ( 2 ) to make a rational arrangement of the production of light and heavy industry and increase the output of articles of daily use as much as possible; ( 3 ) to further shorten the front of capital construction and use material, equipment, and manpower where they are most urgently needed; ( 4 ) to reduce the urban population and the number of workers and staff members to an appropriate extent by persuading, first of all, those workers and staff members who have come from the rural areas to return to rural productive work and strengthen the agricultural front; (5) to take stock inventories and to examine and fix the amount of funds for each enterprise so that the material and funds lying idle can be used where they are most needed during the present work of adjustment; ( 6 ) to ensure that the purchase and supply of commodities are well handled and market supply conditions improved; (7) to work energetically to fulfill tasks in foreign trade; (8) to adjust cultural, educational, scientific research, and public health undertakings, and improve the quality of their work; ( 9 ) to carry out, firmly and thoroughly, the policy of building the country with diligence and thrift and to economize on expenditures and increase revenue; (10) to improve further the work of planning and ensure an all-round balance between the branches of the national economy in the order of: agriculture, light industry, and heavy industry. . . . Premier Chou stressed that in the political life of the state it was essential to develop democracy still further and carry out democratic centralism thoroughly, making efforts to create a vigorous and lively political situation in which there was both centralism and democracy, both discipline and freedom, and both unity of will and personal ease of mind. It was necessary to strengthen ceaselessly the people's democratic united front

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under the leadership of the working class and on the basis of the worker-peasant alliance, to continue to carry out the policy enunciated by the Chinese Communist Party of "long-term coexistence and mutual supervision" with the democratic parties, and to unite all forces that could be united to serve socialism. It was necessary to unite further all patriotic intellectuals, the overwhelming majority of whom were already intellectuals of the working people, to enable them to play a greater role in socialist construction, and to continue to carry out thoroughly the Party's policy of "letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend" in the fields of scientific research, literature, and art. It was necessary to continue to unite the patriotic elements of the national bourgeoisie and help them further in educating and remolding themselves and to prolong the period of paying a fixed rate of interest to them for three years beginning with 1963. . . . Premier Chou also pointed out the necessity of strengthening the dictatorship against the enemies of the people. H e said that it was necessary to continue to strengthen the national defenses and the People's Liberation Army as well, so as to safeguard the socialist construction of the country and the peaceful life of the people. He pointed out that the Chiang Kai-shek clique entrenched in Taiwan was still carrying out sabotage activities with the support of U.S. imperialism. U.S. imperialism was still using the many military bases around China to carry out military provocations and war threats against the country. We must sharpen our vigilance, he said. In conclusion, Premier Chou En-lai declared: We are deeply convinced that under the guidance of M a o Tse-tung's thinking and the radiance of the brilliant red banners of the general line, the big leap forward, and the people's commune, the workers, peasants, intellectuals, and other working people of various nationalities of the country, the democratic parties and nonparty democrats, the patriotic elements of the national bourgeoisie, and patriotic overseas Chinese will certainly unite still closer around the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Government with one heart and one mind, working energetically for the prosperity

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of the country, and making persistent and untiring efforts to overcome all the difficulties on the road ahead, to fulfill the tasks of adjusting the national economy and finally get rid of economic poverty and cultural backwardness, so as to turn China into an advanced, prosperous, and powerful socialist country. . . . 40.

L I F U , L I S S U - W E N , AND W A N G F U - J U . " O N

KAUTSKYISM."

Hung-ch'i, Nos. 8/9, April 25, 1962. . . KARL KAUTSKY was a man who once exercised tre. mendous influence in the history of the international Communist movement. He was a representative of the opportunists in the Second International, who appeared as "Centrists," and was a renegade of the proletariat who had once been a Marxist. Lenin said that Kautsky was a most striking example of those "who, by means of sophistry, rob Marxism of its revolutionary spirit. They recognize everything in Marxism except revolutionary methods of struggle, advocacy of it, preparation for it, and training the masses precisely in this sense." ("Socialism and War," Complete Works of Lenin, XXI [People's Publishing House, 1959], 291.) 17 Kautskyism was a social product of the contradictions within the Second International and a combination of loyalty to Marxism in words and subordination to opportunism in deeds. As an international trend at that time, Kautskyism, Lenin pointed out, "is on the one hand a product of the disintegration and decay of the Second International, and, on the other hand, the inevitable fruit of the ideology of the petty bourgeoisie, who, by the whole of their conditions of life, are held captive to bourgeois and democratic prejudices." ("Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism," Complete Works of Lenin, X X I [People's Publishing House, 1959], 184.) . . .

As Lenin pointed out, the "orthodox" Marxists headed by Kautsky were virtually hidden opportunists. Under their leadership the Second International adopted some revolutionary manifestos and declarations, but their aim was not to put them into 17

All references are to the Chinese edition of Lenin's

Works.—Ed.

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effect but to win the trust of the masses by fraud and to continue to manipulate the workers movement. But at the stage of open class conflict and revolution, the hidden opportunism was completely exposed. War accelerated the development of opportunism. After the outbreak of World War I, the opportunist leaders of the Second International betrayed the socialist cause and took the stand of social chauvinism. Thus, the Second International as an international organization of the proletariat went completely bankrupt. Lenin gave this appraisal to the history of the Second International: The Second International "has accomplished the very important and useful work of spreading socialism and organizing the social forces in preliminary and simple ways" ("Dead Chauvinism and Living Socialism," Complete Works of Lenin, XXI [People's Publishing House, 1959], 7 9 - 8 0 ) , but the extensive expansion of the workers movement inevitably kept the level of revolution low and temporarily strengthened opportunism. The Second International "has given the proletariat many necessary and valuable skills, particularly the skills of proceeding with continued, systematic organizational work in slow and persistent ways." ("The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Country's Revolution," Complete Works of Lenin, X X I V [People's Publishing House, 1957], 54.) But at the same time the majority of the leaders of the workers political parties tended to lose the capacity for revolutionary struggle because they lived in a peaceful period. It was in such an historical setting that Kautskyism grew and developed. . . . In the entire period of the Second International, the revolutionary groups within the social democratic parties of various countries waged a sharp struggle against opportunism. In this struggle, Kautsky showed on more than one occasion his vacillation and apostasy over many questions of principle—such as the question of opposing Lassallism, the question of opposing Bernsteinism, and the question of opposing Millerandism in France. Although Kautsky opposed Bernstein's revisionism, he made opportunist concessions to it and even defended Bernstein.

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He even said at the Stuttgart Congress of the German Social Democratic Party: "Bernstein has not caused us to lose confidence but has set us thinking. For this we should thank him." (Quoted from Plekhanov, Against Revisionism in Philosophy [People's Publishing House, 1957], p. 24.) He said as late as 1903 that he was not clear whether there was Bernsteinism within the Party. And he openly admitted: "I have been most reluctant to come out against Bernstein, but I have been forced to do so." (Quoted from B. A. Aizin, Rise of the German Workers Movement at the Beginning of the 20th Century [Moscow, 1954, in Russian], p. 102.) At the Paris Congress of the Second International in 1900, a new group was formed—the "Centrists"—of which Kautsky became the principal leader. The "Centrists" spoke of themselves as being Marxists who were neither left nor right, but they always leaned toward opportunism on all the important questions. During the period of World War I, Lenin described the "Centrists" in these words: "Those who belong to the 'Center' vow and swear that they are Marxists, internationalists, that they are for peace, for bringing every kind of 'pressure' to bear upon the governments, for 'demanding' in every way that their own governments should 'manifest the people's will for peace,' " but they "do not preach such revolution; they do not carry on determined revolutionary struggles; but in order to evade such a struggle, they resort to the tritest 'ultra-Marxist'sounding excuses." "The 'Center' consists of routine-worshipers, slaves of rotten legality, corrupted by parliamentarism—bureaucrats accustomed to snug positions and 'soft' jobs." ("The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Country's Revolution," Complete Works of Lenin, XXIV [People's Publishing House, 1957], 53, 54.) Such a "Center" was nothing but a more cunning and hidden opportunism that had changed its face. It was no accident that Kautsky later became a model of complete betrayal of Marxism. In the imperialist era the contradictions inherent in capitalism were intensified as never before. How to recognize the nature and fate of imperialism and how to deal with imperialism—such

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was a main hallmark that distinguished true Marxists from those who paid lip service to Marxism but were actually opportunists. To expose the reactionary nature of imperialism or to cover up the imperialist contradictions? "Whether to go forward to sharpen and deepen the contradictions which imperialism engenders, or to go backwards, toward allaying these contradictions —this is the basic question in the critique of imperialism." ("Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism," Complete Works of Lenin, XXII [People's Publishing House, 1958], 279.) It was precisely over this fundamental question that Kautsky completely departed from Marxism and betrayed the revolutionary cause of the proletariat. After the outbreak of World War I in 1914, Kautsky published a series of articles in Neue Zeit and wrote pamphlets like National State, Imperialist State and League of States. In these articles and pamphlets, posing as a "theoretician," he concocted a set of so-called "theories" on "ultraimperialism," and, in the guise of "orthodox" Marxism, devoted himself to covering up the numerous contradictions in imperialism. . . In Kautsky's eyes, imperialism was not a special stage in capitalist economic development. What then, in his opinion, was imperialism? He said: "Imperialism is a product of highly developed industrial capitalism. It consists in the striving of every industrial capitalist nation to bring under its control or to annex larger and larger agrarian regions, irrespective of what nations inhabit those regions." (Kautsky, "Imperialism," Neue Zeit, September 11, 1914.) Further, he said that imperialism was one "policy" among various "policies" adopted by the industrial nations to bring the agrarian regions under their control as their direct colonies or dependencies (Kautsky, "Imperialist Wars," Neue Zeit, February 16, 1917); was a special form by means of which the capitalist industrial nations realized their "demand for expansion"; and was one of the means and not the only means of making super-profits. (Kautsky, "Imperialist Wars," Neue Zeit, February 16, 1917.) Kautsky's definition is completely wrong and anti-Marxist. The characteristic feature of imperialism is not industrial capital but finance capital, not

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annexation of agrarian regions but the carving up of any land in the world, including annexation of the industrially developed nations. In this definition, Kautsky regards imperialism merely as a policy and regards this policy as an isolated thing; he divorces it from the economic base of imperialism. In doing so, he rejects the basic principle of Marxism that politics is a concentrated expression of economics. Although Kautsky verbally opposes imperialism, he merely opposes the imperialist policy of annexation and not the imperialist economic system that gives rise to this policy. "Kautsky separates imperialist policies from imperialist economics and separates political monopoly from economic monopoly, thereby paving the way for such vulgar bourgeois reformism as so-called 'disarmament' and 'ultraimperialism' and similar piffle." ("Imperialism and the Split in the Socialist Movement," Complete Works of Lenin, XXIII [People's Publishing House, 1958], 105.) This opportunist viewpoint held by Kautsky with regard to imperialism is the "basis of his ideological system that runs counter to Marxist theory and practice." ("Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism," Complete Works of Lenin, XXII [People's Publishing House, 1958], 262.) After Kautsky separates imperialist policy from its economic base, he goes a step further and claims that this policy is not "absolutely necessary" and that the aggressive nature of imperialism may be changed. He says: "Nor do I regard imperialism as immutable. I consider that it can be changed through another policy of finance capital." (Kautsky, "Two Books for Relearning," Neue Zeit, April 30, 1915.) What is the other policy of finance capital? He says: "From a purely economic point of view, it is not impossible that capitalism will yet go through a new stage, that of the extension of the policy of cartels to foreign policy, the phase of ultraimperialism." ("Imperialism," Neue Zeit, September 11, 1914.) So called "ultraimperialism" (it may also be called international imperialism) is the form of imperialism under which financial groups of various countries reach agreement to set up a monopoly combine of world financial capital that extends beyond the limits of one

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country. Kautsky considers that in this way "the struggle among world finance capital can be replaced by the common exploitation of the world by united international finance capital. This new phase of capitalism is entirely conceivable." (Kautsky, "Two Books for Relearning," Neue Zeit, April 30, 1915.) Since the contradictions among imperialists weaken their own strength, "any farsighted capitalist will call out to his colleagues: 'Capitalists of the world—unite!' " (Kautsky, "Imperialism," Neue Zeit, September 11, 1914.) If this situation can arise, then imperialism which is warmongering by nature may become "peaceful" "ultraimperialism." Proceeding from his "ultraimperialism" theory, Kautsky advises imperialism that "the most rational solution would be to deal with the most important agrarian regions in peaceful and democratic ways instead of with imperialist violence" (Kautsky, National State, Imperialist State and League of States [German ed., 1915]) in order to achieve the aim of capital expansion. By so-called "peaceful and democratic ways" is meant the "establishment of very frequent contacts and friendly relations with agrarian regions, which will facilitate the export of commodities and capital to those areas and likewise facilitate the acquisition from them of raw materials. The best way to achieve this is to sign trade agreements which as far as possible approach free trade." (Kautsky, National State, Imperialist State and League oi States [German ed., 1915].) He even maintains that free-trade agreements are the most effective means of establishing and safeguarding world peace. Further, he describes imperialism in such a way that it seems able to help the backward countries "raise their productive capacity" and the people's standard of living, to help them achieve "independence and prosperity." Actually, Kautsky advises the colonialists to adopt more deceitful means to allay the contradictions between the colonial people and imperialism and to avert the struggle of the colonial people against imperialism. To realize the "peaceful" "ultraimperialist" stage, Kautsky pins his hopes on "disarmament" among the imperialist countries. He says: "If it comes to pass that the various nations reach

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agreement, reduce armaments, and realize a lasting peace, then these worst causes for the growing prewar moral decay of capitalism may disappear." (Kautsky, "Two Books for Relearning," Neue Zeit, April 30, 1915.) He definitely held that there had appeared at that time "tendencies toward disarmament" and that it was "possible" to expect the emergence of a new "epoch" of disarmament and lasting peace. For, according to him, "with the lessons of war learned, there is no economic necessity for continuing the armaments race. This is also the case from the viewpoint of the capitalist class itself." (Kautsky, "Imperialism," Neue Zeit, September 11, 1914.) In other words, Kautsky believes that even while imperialism still exists, the class base of the armaments race has already disappeared. Denouncing Kautsky for preaching such "ultraimperialism," Lenin considers that it merely "diverts the attention of the masses from the contemporary sharp contradictions and acute problems to the illusory prospects of so-called 'ultraimperialism,' and comforts the masses in extremely reactionary ways with the hope that permanent peace can be achieved under capitalism." ("Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism," Complete Works of Lenin, XXII [People's Publishing House, 1958], 287.) Further, Lenin says: "Abusing Marxism to an astonishing degree, Kautsky has become a veritable preacher. The preacher persuades the capitalists to adopt peaceful and democratic methods and claims that this is dialectics: if in an earlier period there had been free trade, followed by monopoly capitalism and imperialism, why can there not be free trade again following a period of ultraimperialism? The preacher consoles the oppressed masses by extravagantly describing the merits of 'ultraimperialism,' though he dares not say whether such a thing can be 'realized'!" Lenin continues: "Consoling the oppressed, the preacher pamts a picture of the future in which suffering and sacrifice will be mitigated under the same class rule (which is particularly easy to promise because there is no obligation to guarantee its 'realization' . . . ). Thereby he makes them put up with class rule, causing them to give up their revolutionary activities, dampening their revolutionary ardor, and destroying their revolutionary

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determination." ("Collapse of the Second International," Complete Works of Lenin, XXI [People's Publishing House, 1959], 207, 208.) Kautsky's analysis of the character of war and his attitude toward war during the period of World War I indicated, in the clearest manner, the opportunist substance of this "ultraimperialism." During the war this preacher Kautsky became a champion of imperialist war and an opponent of revolution. . . . On the basis of the lessons of the Second International, Lenin drew a very clear and concise conclusion. "International Marxism opposed imperialism, while international opportunism was even then for imperialism." ("Socialism and War," Complete Works of Lenin, XXI [People's Publishing House, 1959], 290.) . . . On the question of the state and the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Kautsky "was consistently gravitating toward opportunism." ("State and Revolution," Complete Works of Lenin, X X V [People's Publishing House, 1958], 464.) He consistently adopted an "evasive attitude toward and passed over in silence" such fundamental questions as the smashing of the bourgeois bureaucratic and military machinery and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. As far back as the nineties of the nineteenth century, Kautsky's opportunist leanings concerning these questions began to be revealed. In 1891, Kautsky drafted a program for the impending Erfurt Congress of the German Social Democratic Party. In this draft program he evaded the question repeatedly raised by Karl Marx and F. Engels concerning the necessity of smashing the bourgeois state apparatus, and evaded all talk of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Later, compelled to oppose Bernstein, Kautsky wrote a book in 1899, Bernstein and the Social Democratic Program, in which he criticized revisionism mainly from the economic side, but did not say a single word about the wicked conduct of Bernstein, who distorted Karl Marx's idea of "smashing the bourgeois bureaucratic and military machinery." In this manner, he glossed over the divergence between Marxism and revisionism on this fundamental question. He said: "We can safely leave the solu-

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tion of the problem of the dictatorship of the proletariat to the future." (Quoted from Complete Works of Lenin, XXV [People's Publishing House, 1958], 465.) Lenin pointed out: "This is not a polemic against Bernstein but, in essence, a concession to him, a surrender to opportunism; for at present the opportunists ask nothing better than that all fundamental questions of the tasks of proletarian revolution be 'safely left to the future.'" ("State and Revolution," Complete Works of Lenin, XXV [People's Publishing House, 1958], 465.) . . . Because of his consistently opportunist tendencies on the question of the state, Kautsky eventually, on the eve of the revolutionary storm, completely turned his back on Marxism. And when the Russian proletariat rose to smash the reactionary state machinery of the bourgeoisie and established the dictatorship of the proletariat, he went a step further to take a stand against proletarian revolution and proletarian dictatorship. . . . Lenin said: "The growth of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat in various countries has caused the bourgeoisie and its agents in the workers' organizations desperately to seek ideological and political arguments for defending the rule of the exploiters. The most important among these is to denounce dictatorship and uphold democracy." ("The First Congress of the Communist International," Complete Works of Lenin, XXVIII [People's Publishing House, 1956], 435.) Taking a liberalist stand, Kautsky talked at length about general democracy and "pure" democracy, without analyzing the class character of democracy in a class society and without distinguishing between bourgeois democracy and proletarian democracy. The October Revolution sounded the death knell of bourgeois democracy. He regarded this event as the last day of world civilization and the last day of democracy. He joined the chorus of imperialism and all reactionaries against Soviet state power and adopted despicable means to distort and discredit, in the name of protecting "general democracy," Marx's doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat. . . . Kautsky denies that, owing to the unevenness of the political and economic development of imperialism, it is possible for the

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socialist revolution to score its first victories in the weak links (i.e., in individual states) of imperialism. In the imperialist era, he persistently holds that socialist revolution can be carried out only in industrially developed and advanced capitalist states. He says: "Unless the proletariat has become the greatest class among the population and unless capitalist society has developed to such an extent that small peasants and petty bourgeoisie are no longer numerically larger than the proletariat, the proletariat cannot emancipate itself." (Kautsky, The Dictatorship of the Proletariat [Peking: Sanlien Book Store, 19581, pp. 16, 51.) Further, Kautsky particularly emphasizes that if the proletariat has not attained a certain cultural level and has not acquired political experience and managerial ability, it should not prematurely engage in revolution. Instead of training the proletariat to conduct a revolutionary struggle and display its initiative, Kautsky wants the proletariat passively to wait for the collapse of capitalism. Nor is that all. He goes so far as to use the so-called "prerequisites for socialism" to limit and restrict the revolutionary activity of the proletariat. He says: "We should expect that the proletariat will grow and the productive forces will develop to such an extent as to supply the people with abundant materials, and that the forms assumed by the productive forces will simplify the social institutions that utilize these forms; and finally, that the economic knowledge necessary for the working class and the instinct of guaranteeing effective use of productive forces will be developed: such are the premises of socialist production." (Kautsky, The Materialist Conception of History [German ed., 1927].) Kautsky holds that the socialist revolution is not the result of capitalist crisis and decline but the result of capitalist development and prosperity, for capitalist economic crisis has "changed its character" and capitalism has acquired "far greater vitality than half a century ago." He considers that the view that capitalist crisis will inevitably be replaced by "socialist adjustment" no longer holds good today; on the contrary, he tries to prove that the greater the prosperity of capitalism and the more the wealth of the capitalists, the riper the conditions for socialism. H e says:

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"The more prosperous and developed the capitalist mode of production is, the better are the prospects for the socialist system replacing the capitalist system." ( T h e Materialist Conception of History [German ed., 1927].) "Socialism (which means that each and all enjoy happiness within the limits of modern civilization) can be achieved only through the tremendous development of the productive forces brought about by capitalism and by relying on the wealth created by capitalism and the wealth concentrated in the hands of the capitalist class." ( T h e Dictatorship of the Proletariat [Sanlien Book Store, 1958], pp. 16, 51.) What then is the task of the proletariat prior to this? Kautsky holds that its task is not to struggle against the bourgeoisie but to "raise its productive capacity"; in other words, to "increase the ability of the capitalist class to create surplus-value." According to Kautsky, this will "prolong the life of bourgeois society" but is "a starting point that leads to a new, higher form of society." (Kautsky, "May Day and the Struggle against Militarism," Neue Zeit, April 26, 1912.) Basing himself on this reactionary "theory of productive forces," Kautsky concluded that owing to economic backwardness and the small peasants forming the majority of the population, Russia could not carry out a socialist revolution; in particular, owing to the sharp decline in the production level resulting from war devastation, Russia could not even become the starting point of socialism. He said that the October Revolution in Russia was not the first socialist revolution but merely the last bourgeois revolution. He went so far as to throw mud at the Bolsheviks: "Bolsheviks believe in the omnipotence of will and strength and, without taking into consideration the backwardness of Russia, want the Russian revolution to proceed along the socialist line." (Kautsky, The Dictatorship of the Proletariat [Sanlien Book Store, 1958], p. 33.) As both the economic and the cultural conditions were not ripe, the Bolshevik Party had to rely on force, "attempting to remove, through reckless leaps, the obstacles that appear at each stage of social development." ( T h e Labor Revolution [English ed., 1925].) Such was the so-called "economic analysis" made by Kautsky. Lenin said: "Instead

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of an 'economic analysis' we have a first-class hodgepodge and muddle. Instead of Marxism we have fragments of liberal doctrine and the preaching of servility to the bourgeoisie and kulaks." ("Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky," Complete Works of Lenin, X X V I I I [People's Publishing House, 1956], 2 8 0 . ) T h e tremendous efforts exerted by the Bolshevik Party to overcome the economic backwardness of Russia and the revolutionary measures taken by the Party to transform the national cconomy were swecpingly slandered as Weitling-Blanquist "Utopian communism." He held that the Russian proletariat was not yet able to control production directly and could not transform political democracy into economic democracy. Kautsky blamed the Bolshevik Party for the nationalization of industry, saying that it was "Tatar socialism" carried out "merely by an order and the Red G u a r d s . " (Kautsky, The Dictatorship of the Proletariat [Sanlien Book Store, 1958], p. 70.) Kautsky was opposed to the Bolshevik Party's "heading toward socialism," and at the same time he passed off liberalist reform as socialism. He advocated nationalization of monopoly enterprises like railways, shipping, steel works, and machine-building plants, and state sale of part of the factories to the producers for operation along the line of producer cooperatives. Kautsky said: "In a socialist society, different forms of enterprises may exist side by side: bureaucratic, industrial, federal, cooperative, and individual." "Some enterprises may be assigned to trade unions for management while others may be organized as cooperatives." (Kautsky, Social Revolution, quoted from Complete Works of Lenin, X X V [People's Publishing House, 1958], 4 6 7 . ) Such was Kautsky's "socialization program." Obviously, it was not socialism but reformism that did not touch the economic foundation of capitalism. . . . Exposing Kautskyism, Lenin pointed out: "Opportunism is not an accident, nor the result of sin, neglect, or betrayal by individuals, but the social product of an entire historical period." ("Collapse of the Second International," Complete Works of Lenin, X X I I I [People's Publishing House, 1958], 4 6 7 . ) As long

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as definite social conditions exist, opportunism of one form or another will appear. Burying Kautskyism, Lenin predicted: "We believe that in several decades new Plekhanovs, Scheidemanns, and new sentimental conciliators like Kautsky will grow up from the depths of 'united' social democracy." ("A Turn in World Politics," Complete Works of Lenin, XXIII [People's Publishing House, 1958], 275.) Today, several decades later, the emergence of modern revisionism represented by the Tito clique of Yugoslavia fully bears out the correctness of Lenin's prophecy. Yugoslav modern revisionism is but a continuation of old revisionism. To review the old can aid us to learn the new—this is the reason why we cannot simply forget Kautskyism, although it went bankrupt long ago. 41.

PIEN

CHUNG-YIN.

"THE

REVOLUTIONARY

P O L I T I C A L PARTIES OF THE P R O L E T A R I A T . "

TRADITION

Hung-ch'i,

OF

No.

10, May 16, 1962. . SIXTY years ago, Russia found herself on the eve of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. Russia being the focal point of contradictions in the capitalist world, the Russian proletariat was confronted with a task more revolutionary than all the tasks facing the proletariat of any country. 1S Therefore, the question of building a centralized, unified militant political party of the revolutionary proletariat was all the more pressing. Such a party had not yet been founded in Russia at that time. The workingclass movement in Russia found itself in a period marked by ideological and organizational confusion, dispersion, and vacillation, and in the process of establishing itself the party encountered various obstructive and disruptive activities on the part of opportunists. Lenin gave this description in the conclusion to his book:

"It was not so much the downright rejection of 'grand phrases' that the heroes of this period engaged in as in their vulgarization: U n l e s s otherwise indicated, all the quotations in this article are taken f r o m What Is to Be Done'.' See Collected Works of Lenin, Vol. V (Peking: People's Publishing House, 1 9 5 9 ) . — E d .

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scientific socialism ceased to be an integral revolutionary theory and became a hodgepodge 'freely' diluted with the contents of every new German textbook that appeared; the slogan 'class struggle' did not impel them forward to wider and more strenuous activity but served as a soothing syrup, because the 'economic struggle is inseparably linked with the political struggle'; the idea of a party did not serve as a cause for the creation of a militant organization of revolutionaries but was used to justify some sort of a 'revolutionary bureaucracy' and infantile playing at 'democratic reforms.'" Economism was the main ideological root of confusion and vacillation in this period and was the main obstacle to the founding of a really revolutionary Marxist political party. Economism in the Russian working-class movement was a variety of Bernsteinism. The Economists worshiped the spontaneity of the working-class movement, fell in with and represented the demands of backward workers, opposed instilling socialist ideas into the minds of workers, and confined the working-class movement and the tasks of the party to economic struggle and political support for bourgeois liberalism. They neglected and disparaged the function of revolutionary theories, demanded "freedom of criticism" of Marxist principles, and slandered Marxist principles as "dogmatism" while they themselves became intoxicated with fashionable propaganda in favor of opportunism. They justified the confusion, disunity, and vacillation of the working-class movement at the time. They did not recognize the necessity of building a centralized, unified Marxist political party capable first and foremost of leading the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat. These stands taken by the Economists were tantamount to disarming the working class in the face of the pressing revolutionary tasks and the powerful enemy. It was the greatest danger to the Russian working-class movement at that time. In order to put an end to the confusion and vacillation and build a really revolutionary political party based on Marxism, it was necessary, first of all, to combat this opportunist clique, criticize their erroneous views and ideology, and "clearly draw a line of

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demarcation" against them. This task was carried out by Lenin

in his What Is to Be Done?

.

.

It was only natural that the revolutionary Marxists should struggle for eliminating the spontaneity of the movement and raising the consciousness of the masses as soon as possible. The higher the spontaneous struggle of the masses, the greater the necessity for raising the consciousness of the political party of the proletariat so as to lead and elevate this struggle. This was what Lenin did at that time. But the Economists sang praise in their press to the spontaneity of the movement and criticized Lenin for "belittling the significance of the objective and spontaneous elements in the process of development," "exaggerating the role of ideology," and exaggerating the role of "planned and conscious elements." They stated: "Because people do not wish to forget about political ideals, they neglect the economic basis of the movement." . . . Why did the spontaneous development of the working-class movement tend to be dominated by bourgeois ideology? Because in a society of private property, the origin of bourgeois ideology was distant, compared with that of socialist ideology. Bourgeois ideology had gone through a thorough and elaborate refinement and possessed numerous means of disseminating propaganda. Therefore, although "the working-class movement inclines spontaneously toward socialism, widespread bourgeois ideology— which, moreover, is revived from time to time in various forms —automatically and most outrageously commands acceptance by the workers." This thesis formulated by Lenin was of most profound and great significance. It applied to a society in which bourgeois ideology predominated. But even in a society in which socialist ideology predominates, it is possible for bourgeois ideology to be "revived in various forms" as long as bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideological influence remains strong, and as long as the society is encircled by imperialist ideology. In the latter case, although a socialist system has been established, the people's scientific socialist ideology still cannot develop spontaneously without education by the political party of the pro-

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letariat. Here there still exists a struggle between two kinds of opposing ideologies. Each foothold acquired by proletarian thought can only be consolidated and enlarged through a conscious struggle conducted under the leadership of the political party of the proletariat. The fundamental interests and historical mission of the proletariat consist in overthrowing the capitalist system by revolutionary means, thoroughly eliminating classes, and guiding the world eventually to communism. The socialist ideology of the proletariat is a scientific explanation of these fundamental interests and historical mission. Engels said : "To accomplish this act of universal emancipation is the historical mission of the modern proletariat. To comprehend thoroughly the historical conditions and thus the very nature of this act, to impart to the now oppressed proletarian class a full knowledge of the conditions and of the meaning of the momentous act it is called upon to accomplish—this is the task of the theoretical expression of the proletarian movement, scientific socialism." (Socialism: Utopian and Scientific [People's Publishing House, 1954, in Chinese], p. 83.) The political awakening of the workers and the socialist consciousness of the workers consist first of all in their knowledge of their basic interests and historic mission. Neither can the working class awaken politically nor can there be a real social democratic struggle unless a thorough political struggle against capitalism, as well as its unmasking, is carried on, and unless the political struggle goes beyond economic struggle and is raised to the leading position. That is why Lenin said that the political awakening of the workers could be brought to them only from outside the economic struggle and that knowledge of scientific socialism could be drawn only from the political relations existing among various classes. The core of the question of the relation between consciousness and spontaneity is precisely one of the relation between politics and economics, the question of which of the two occupies the leading position. Proceeding from worship of spontaneity, the Economists twisted the Marxist principle that economics plays a decisive

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role, and held that in a class struggle economic struggle was even more important than political struggle. They said: "The economic interests of each class have played a decisive part in history. Hence the struggle conducted by the proletariat in its own economic interests should be of primary significance to its class development and liberation struggle." On this point, Lenin waged a sharp struggle against the Economists and against all tendencies toward Economism. Lenin refuted them: "On no account should we draw from the principle that economic interests play a decisive role the conclusion that the economic (i.e, trade-union) struggle is of primary significance." Marxists do not belittle the significance of the economic struggle, which is an important part of the whole class struggle, but they do not exaggerate the significance of this struggle. In social history, economics is the base and a decisive factor, and, in the final analysis, it determines superstructures like politics. But "politics is a concentrated expression of economics." Lenin said that the "most important and 'decisive' class interests of a class could be satisfied only by fundamental political reforms; for instance, the basic economic interests of the proletariat could be satisfied only by a political revolution that substituted proletarian dictatorship for bourgeois dictatorship." The viewpoint maintained by the Russian Economists, namely, abandoning the political tasks and political aim of the working-class movement, was nothing but a blunt manifestation of the notorious formula preached by Bernstein that "movement is everything and the ultimate aim nothing." This viewpoint completely betrayed the fundamental interests of the proletariat. "Politics cannot help but have superiority over economics." (Once More on Trade Unions, the Present Situation and the Mistakes of Trotsky and Bukharin [People's Publishing House, 1958, in Chinese], p. 72.) . . . Lenin says: "The 'Economists' merely recognize the class struggle at the rudimentary stage and do not recognize its more developed forms; in other words, the 'Economists' merely recognize what is most tolerable in the class struggle from the standpoint of the liberal bourgeoisie, and reject the class struggle at

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a higher level which is unacceptable to the liberals. This was how the 'Economists' gradually turned into liberal workers' politicians. This was how the 'Economists' renounced the Marxist, revolutionary conception of class struggle." ("On the Liberal and Marxist Conception of the Class Struggle," Collected Works oj Lenin, XIX [People's Publishing House, 1959], 107.) The class struggle at the "rudimentary stage" tolerable to the bourgeoisie referred to here means merely (or mainly) struggle for economic reforms and certain political reforms, struggle which does not touch the fundamental question of revolution, namely, the question of state power. The so-called "struggle at a higher level which is unacceptable to the liberals" is a revolutionary struggle aimed at overthrowing the whole political power machinery. "Marxists hold that only when class struggle not only embraces politics but also grasps the very essence—namely, the political power machinery—can there be fully developed a nation-wide class struggle." ("On the Liberal and Marxist Conception of the Class Struggle," Collected Works oj Lenin, XIX [People's Publishing House, 1959], 107.) . . . The struggle conducted by Lenin at the beginning of the twentieth century in order to build such a political party of the proletariat, as described above, is of inestimably great significance for the development of the international Communist movement. The party for which Lenin struggled during his whole life is one that sets communism as the ultimate target of struggle and leads the class struggle of the proletariat politically, economically, and ideologically. It has the ambitious aim of emancipating the world and knows how to integrate the principles of Marxism with the long-range and immediate interests of the proletariat and the whole body of working people; how to integrate the ultimate aim of communism with the concrete task at each stage; and how to lead the masses to achieve the ultimate aim step by step on a firm footing. Such a party is the hope and mainstay of the proletarian cause. Without such a party, there can be no proletarian revolution or proletarian dictatorship. Without such a party, it is not possible to lead the whole body of people to attain communism eventually; nor

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is it possible to carry out the internationalist obligations of the proletariat persistently in the great cause of emancipating the world. It was precisely because of the building of such a party under the leadership of Lenin that the Russian proletariat made the Great October Socialist Revolution, opened a new era in human history, and built the first socialist country in the world. The proletariat in many countries have built their new parties according to Lenin's thoughts on party organization and the brilliant example of the Bolshevik Party, and have opposed and stamped out the opportunist influence of the Second International within their ranks. It is precisely because of this that the cause of world revolution has attained today's great development. The Communist Party of China was built under the guidance of Lenin's ideas on organizing the party and according to the example of the Bolshevik Party. At the very outset it accepted the fine revolutionary traditions of a Leninist political party of the proletariat; generally speaking, it has carried on no traditions of the social democratic parties of the Second International. The Communist Party of China represented by Comrade Mao Tsetung integrated the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, correctly solved a series of new problems raised in the Chinese revolution, resolutely opposed and rectified various kinds of opportunism within its ranks, continuously fostered the fine traditions of the advanced political parties of the proletariat, and consolidated and strengthened the ideological, political, and organizational unity of its ranks, thereby leading the Chinese people to win great victories in revolution. It is now leading the Chinese people to win victories in building socialism. Today, conditions for struggle are more complicated. The political parties of the proletariat in various countries, whether they have already won victories in revolution or are striving for victories in revolution, are required to strengthen their fighting capacity and to apply creatively the general principles of Marxism-Leninism and the international experiences of the proletariat in the light of the concrete conditions in their countries. The

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domestic and international tasks of the proletariat are heavier, not lighter. Meanwhile, the international Communist movement is confronted with the danger arising from modern revisionism. Modern revisionists of Yugoslavia attack the basic principles of Leninism concerning party organization and demand that the Communist Party be transformed from a militant revolutionary organization into a political party of reformism and that "the real vanguard of the revolutionary proletariat" be reduced to a "rear-guard of opportunists." In such circumstances, to reread What Is to Be Done? will be most instructive for us. We should draw great ideological strength from Lenin's works, defend and develop Lenin's fundamental thought concerning political parties of the proletariat, oppose revisionism and dogmatism of any form, and struggle for fostering the revolutionary traditions of political parties of the proletariat. 19 ™ For Soviet replies to the implication that the CPSU had succumbed to "Economism," see below, pp. 653-54.—Ed.

CHAPTER

IV

THE EAST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES

T h e reaction of the East European Communist parties—of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, Rumania—to the issues raised by the XXII CPSU Congress varied in part with the degree of autonomy in their relations with the C P S U since 1953. Presumably they also reflected pressures for more liberal policies exercised by the party rank and file, the degree of dissension among the party leaders, and their attitude toward "controlled" liberalization from above. At the X X I I CPSU Congress, the delegations f r o m all the East European Communist parties endorsed the C P S U attack on the A P L leadership. Plenary meetings of each party's Central Committee were convened promptly following the XXII Congress. All the parties followed the CPSU's lead, particularly with regard to the A P L , but also with regard to the evaluation of the international balance of forces, the meaning of "peaceful coexistence," and the need for general and complete disarmament. However, dissension was ap>arent in the fact that some of the Communist leaders emphasized he "peaceful" aspect of Soviet foreign policy, while others stressed its more militant aspects. For example, no other East European Communist leader repeated GomuLka's assertion: "Of the two basic elements of the old reality of war—victory and defeat—a thermonuclear war does not contain the element of victory, only the element of defeat, or to be more accurate, the element of disaster which would befall all mankind." Individual parties differed in their assessment of the relative dangers to the international Communist movement which would result from "revisionism" and "dogmatism." Ulbricht, for instance, interpreted the danger of "dogmatism" in a more restricted manner than K a d a r or Gomulka. Some leaders (the Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Polish) used the issue of the "personality cult" to attack the indigenous Stalinists. Others, however (the Rumanian, Czechoslovak, and East G e r m a n ) ,

?

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turned it around to justify the purges during the Stalin era with which they themselves had been closely identified. CZECHOSLOVAK

COMMUNIST

PARTY

(CCP)

4 2 . ANTONIN NOVOTNY, FIRST SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY. REPORT TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE C C P ,

NOVEMBER 15, 1961. Rude Pravo (Prague), November 21, 1961.1

. . IN our view the great significance of the XXII CPSU Congress, which was one of the most momentous in the history of the CPSU, rests primarily on the fact that it adopted an important political document, a true "Charter of a New Society" —the program for the construction of communism in the USSR. This program stems not only from the experience of the CPSU and the Soviet people in the construction of socialism; it is founded upon the accumulated experience of the Communist parties and peoples of the socialist countries and upon the wealth of experience of Communist parties working under conditions of capitalism. The CPSU Program evaluates the contemporary phase of the development of human society, the great changes which mankind is passing through in the struggle for a new order, and the gigantic revolutionary changes which the struggle against colonialism and imperialism—the struggle of the oppressed nations and all progressive people for freedom— has brought about in the world. This Program, therefore, will not only guide the CPSU and Soviet people in the construction of a communist society, but as an outstanding document, international in character, it marks out the path for the Communist parties and people of the socialist countries in the further building of socialism and in the ' O n November 22, 1961, Pravda published a summary of Novotny's speech. Considerable sections of his speech were summarized or deleted, presumably for reasons of space. Passages omitted by Pravda which affect the meaning of his speech are indicated by angular brackets. Rude Pravo is the daily organ of the Central Committee of the CCP.

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preparation for the transition to a communist society. At the same time it also reveals great prospects for all mankind and shows all nations how they can cross over to the path of progress, freedom, and socialism. Second, the significance of the XXII CPSU Congress lies in its condemnation of everything which is incompatible with the correct Leninist understanding of the principles and practice of communism in both the Soviet Union and other countries. It fully confirmed the correctness of the actions and decisions of the XX CPSU Congress which opened the road toward a full application of Leninist norms in the life of each Communist and workers revolutionary party. Third, the XXII Congress confirmed the prodigious growth of the world Communist movement and the great strength and appeal of its ideas for all mankind. It demonstrated the great political, economic, and cultural power and growth of the Soviet Union, the great growth and superiority of the entire socialist system, and the conclusive prospects for the certain victory of socialism over capitalism. Taking as its point of departure the great peace aims of the Soviet Union and the people's democracies, the Congress at the same time clearly affirmed the socialist camp's desire to follow the road of peace, peaceful co-existence, and cooperation among the nations—the road of preventing wars. True to its mission as vanguard, the CPSU was the first party in the world to work out the teachings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin in a concrete plan for building a communist society, making this a matter of daily practice for millions of Soviet people. It is the immense merit of the CPSU and its Leninist Central Committee and the persistent initiative and work of Comrade Khrushchev that, on the basis of the rich experience of Soviet Communists and the knowledge of the other fraternal parties— on the basis of the bold and creative development of MarxismLeninism—it is consistently translating the scientific theory of communism into actual reality. This historic initiative of the CPSU constitutes a further development of the Leninist rally which began at the X X Congress and confirmed the CPSU's

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role as a proven and recognized vanguard of the world Communist movement. . . . The XXII CPSU Congress was really a review of all these forces of the international Communist movement. The course it took showed that CPSU congresses are an increasingly significant rostrum of the international Communist movement, where all its sections can and do draw new invincible revolutionary energy from the experience of struggle and long-range plans formulated by their vanguard, the CPSU. The new Program, approved by the XXII Congress, was accepted by MarxistLeninist parties of all continents as the Communist Manifesto of our era, summarizing the highest attainments of the science of Marxism-Leninism and translating the revolutionary experience of the CPSU and all fraternal parties into a concrete plan for peaceful communist construction. The conclusions embodied in this Program express the militant revolutionary principles of Leninist unity of the entire Communist movement and contain the fundamental and universally applicable characteristics of the progress of the working class and all people toward communism. They once more confirm that the CPSU is accomplishing its task as the revolutionary vanguard primarily because, by virtue of its political and ideological initiative, it is the center of creative Marxist-Leninist thinking. If Marx and Engels changed socialism from a Utopian dream into a science, then Soviet experience in building socialism is changing the scientific theory of communism into reality. This is likewise the fundamental gauge, now and still more in the future, of the enormous historic significance of the XXII Congress and the CPSU Program. Each of us who experienced the great moments of the XXII Congress rightly saw it as the highest point yet attained by the mighty progress of creative Leninism—progress that was made possible by the decisions of the X X CPSU Congress in 1956. The X X Congress actually opened the way for great Leninist ideas to penetrate the entire international Communist movement, and it planned the direction that the Communist movement had to take to head the struggle for victory of the working class, for

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the defeat of imperialism and colonialism, for national freedom, and for winning peace for mankind. Despite the joy of the reactionaries and the seeming failures in 1956, the revolutionary movement experienced a tremendous upsurge. The increase in the strength of the international Communist movement and in its influence on world development was never so evident as in these years after the X X Congress. It was during this period that several socialist countries reached the apex of building socialism. The unwavering unity of the socialist camp, which allows all the merits of socialism as a world system to become ever more conspicuous, was forged on the Leninist principles of equality, mutual cooperation and aid. The bold conclusions of the XX Congress also gave the signal for the new powerful offensive in the struggle for peace, the actual prospects of which became increasingly clear. There is no area in which the X X Congress's contribution did not prove an effective step toward strengthening all the forces of peace, progress, national liberation, and socialism. The open and uncompromising criticism of the cult of Stalin's personality at the XX Congress, the energetic elimination of serious negative consequences deriving from the cult of personality, and the decisive struggle for the renewal of Leninist norms in party and state activity strengthened the leading role of the CPSU in Soviet society and cleared the path for the powerful upsurge of creative forces and the initiative of Soviet working people. . . . We can say that actually the crushing of the antiparty group of Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Bulganin, Voroshilov, Saburov, Pervukhin, and Shepilov opened entirely free passage for the realization of the life-giving policy of the XX Congress without any restrictions whatsoever. It became possible to complete such important measures as reorganization of agriculture, the purchase and sale of agricultural machinery to collective farms, uniform prices, completion of the cultivation of virgin lands, comprehensive application of Leninist principles of party life, and full development of broad initiative in international affairs. . . .

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At the XXII Congress a shocking picture was presented of abominable violations of socialist legality and of mass reprisals against innocent party, state, army, and Komsomol cadres, for which—together with Stalin—Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and others gave their consent and issued direct instructions. All the members of the Congress were profoundly shocked upon hearing the facts concerning the undoubtedly provocative murder of Kirov, the criminal excursions of Malenkov and Kaganovich to the individual republics and oblasts, and the brutal and inhuman comments of individual members of the antiparty group written upon the rosters of party and state functionaries —who by a mere stroke of the pen were sentenced to physical liquidation. For example, information furnished by the then President Benes as to Tukhachevsky's probable involvement in German espionage, which the Gestapo itself had planted as an act of provocation, was taken without inquiry as a pretext for the execution of a substantial part of the officer cadres of the Red Army. . . . Molotov, for instance, tried to interfere with the new Party Program itself, and in his letter of October of this year slanderously accused it of nonrevolutionism, pacifism, and even revisionism. This naturally caused justified indignation and revulsion among all delegates to the Congress and representatives of the fraternal parties, who clearly proclaimed from the Congress's rostrum that they regard the CPSU Program as our era's charter of communism. It is necessary for the entire Party to become aware that it must do all it can to prevent such things from happening again, and that by a full application of Leninist norms of intra-party life and their daily development it must create the most effective guarantees and prerequisites, so that every Communist, be he a leader, regular functionary, or member, always defends the standpoint and interests of the entire Party, is responsible to the Party for his work, and is under its continuous control. . . .

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This was the whole spirit of the XXII Party Congress. This was the tenor of the evaluation of the Leninist activity of Comrade Khrushchev, who repudiated very sharply and correctly in his concluding speech all exaggerations of his personal merits and again reminded us of the qualities that leading cadres must possess and what must be the basis of their authority. It is loyalty to their party, continuous fulfillment of the pledge always to adhere to the collective will and wisdom of that party, and always to act as Lenin did. It is from this viewpoint that we must evaluate the Program and the new CPSU Rules, in which this Leninist legacy is anchored as a most effective weapon of the Soviet people in their progress toward the communist future. . . . Thus the Congress energetically and finally settled political accounts with the activity of the antiparty fractional group. It was quite natural for the Congress to draw the conclusion that Stalin's body could no longer remain side by side with V. I. Lenin in the mausoleum. This decision is completely just, since one cannot revere a man who so greatly disgraced Lenin's bright memory and so greatly offended Lenin's legacy. This corresponds to the interests of the Party and the Soviet people, who during this present era of progress toward a communist future carry Lenin's banner as a symbol of the pure and immortal truth of communism. I am convinced that we express the opinion of our entire party when we again declare at this Central Committee session our unconditional agreement with all measures of the XXII CPSU Congress for the final elimination of all malignant vestiges of the personality cult. . . . One must note that as a rule the personality cult manifests itself not in one official alone, but that— after the example of this leading official—it naturally also appears in others and consequently degenerates into the idea that "I can do anything and nothing can happen to me." The activities of such people in such a period paralyzes party work, intra-party democracy, criticism, and initiative. The Party is governed in an administrative and bureaucratic way; it di-

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vorces itself from the working people; the party leadership ceases to feel the daily pulse of life in the country; and a dam is erected between the party leadership and the people. In our country this happened between 1948 and 1953, in my opinion. If we are to pin down when we became fully aware of this situation, it was in 1953, during the currency reform. This was a great political lesson on the occasion of so serious, but also so necessary, a measure for decisive economic recovery. We again unequivocally confirm the conclusion that in our country the main bearer and disseminator of the depraved methods used in the Soviet Union by Beria and others was Slansky and his closest collaborators and aides in the top positions of the then-existing security apparatus and in central as well as regional party organs. Slansky's main accomplice in these methods and the instigator of security proceedings against the comrades was Taussigova, of the Party Control Commission. Together with her and Svab, Slansky created a system of surveillance of comrades and a network of personal informers. . . . Slansky and the others tried to put the Party under control of the security apparatus. They also established various illegal committees of "three" and "five" who made arbitrary decisions on the fate of people who were falsely accused, with many tragic results. In line with this there was a paralysis of party activity, which Slansky wanted to degrade to some kind of official function, to a command operation. . . . Cadre policy, too, building not upon experienced and capable people, but often upon unprincipled flatterers, relied in large part upon documents supplied by the security organs. Its moving force was reports and not the work with and experience of people. Slansky's political power, elevated above the Party and the elected state and people's organs, had no support except with these flatterers and a small part of the security apparatus. The rest of the party members and officials did not like Slansky, as you all know. We have seen what a similar policy produced in Hungary in 1956, and we therefore repeat that it was a great good fortune for our party that this group was crushed in time. Thus, not only

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were further reprisals which these people had prepared for honest party cadres prevented, but also a complete divorce of the Party from the masses, which was nearly brought about by the Party leadership's failure to understand them. Although Slansky's activities in the Party did not last very long, they undoubtedly caused great harm by introducing into its work many incorrect and inadmissible methods. . One can properly ask how it was possible that Party Chairman Gottwald, such an experienced functionary who in the thirties introduced correct Leninist norms, did not see these events (although he himself neither supported nor advocated them). 2 I personally was not at that time a member of the inner party leadership, but I will try to outline the role played by C o m r a d e Gottwald. C o m r a d e Klement Gottwald was a great revolutionary fighter of our party. He put our party on revolutionary foundations—on firm positions of Marxism-Leninism. He was a true leader and the moving lever of the entire party. His name will remain inscribed in bold letters in the revolutionary history of our party. (You know that Comrade Gottwald was also a prominent functionary of the Comintern, and that in the thirties he time and again was a member of and worked in the Executive of the Communist International. In 1938 he left for the Soviet Union and lived in Moscow until 1945. From there he directed the activity of the Czechoslovak Communist Party both abroad and at home.) After his return home in 1945 he worked at the head of our party, and this period, too, until February, 1948, provides convincing proof of his political capabilities and determination. The victory of the working people over reaction in February, 1948, will be forever linked with the name of Comrade Klement Gottwald. It is, however, also necessary to point out certain shortcomings which began to become apparent in Comrade Gottwald's work after February, 1948. After his election to the presidency, Com' In the Pravda version of this speech, the clause within brackets was changed into a separate sentence reading: "Didn't he support them himself and didn't he advocate them?"

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rade Gottwald transferred all his work to the Prague Castle. The de facto leader in the Party was Slansky, who, owing to Comrade Gottwald's passivity, became the middleman between the Party and Comrade Gottwald. Although Klement Gottwald presided over the Presidium of the Party Central Committee, he had little practical knowledge of contemporary life and ceased to feel the pulse of the life of our party and people. The question arises: Why? The cult of personality undoubtedly also affected the work of Comrade Gottwald and became apparent in his behavior and decisions. This personality cult invaded our entire party and was deliberately used to increase artificially the authority of its officials. In my opinion the state of health of Comrade Gottwald also played an important role at that time. (After 1943, when he had suffered his first stroke in the USSR, his health was not good, and his condition continued to deteriorate.) I think that the Central Committee should know that Comrade Gottwald was aware of the grave state of his health. His state of health was very effectively exploited by many people, including Slansky, who also exerted pressure on him. These people, in particular Slansky, exploited this situation to the full, telling party officials that they could not disturb Comrade Gottwald, that he needed rest, and so forth. Thus a halo of inaccessibility and superiority was created around Comrade Gottwald. His views were made known to us in the Party through Slansky or Gottwald's secretary. On the strength of my own experience in 1952, when I came into contact with Comrade Gottwald, I can confirm that the unmasking of Slansky, in whom Gottwald had placed great trust, affected him very strongly and brought on a certain depression. Comrade Gottwald admitted to himself his own guilt for having let things go so far in the Party. He felt personally responsible to the Party, and this situation was a very heavy burden on his mind. Understandably, this did not improve his health. On the contrary, his condition grew rapidly worse. This then was the role played by Comrade Gottwald in the

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activity of our party, and I think that despite his faults and shortcomings, Comrade Gottwald will remain a prominent revolutionary personality in the history of our party, who won great credit in building our party and in the victory of the working class. The Party, however, always had in mind the full revival of consistent socialist legality and true justice for the people. In all those cases where innocent people who had committed no crimes against the Party or republic had suffered under Slansky or as a result of other illegal acts, we have made amends. They were completely rehabilitated and indemnified, Party membership was returned to them, and they enjoy full confidence and again work in party, state, and social organizations or scientific institutions. The wrongs were set right, and they have every opportunity to work fully and put their abilities at the service of our socialist society. Naturally, the Central Committee even today holds with absolute firmness and frankness the view that government and party justice must take its full course in all cases of violations. Therefore, whatever cases there are of violation of socialist legality which have not yet been dealt with, the Party will justly judge them. We will of course not permit anyone under any circumstances, however, to misuse matters already settled, for demagogic attacks on our party. We also reject as completely unfounded irresponsible calls for the rehabilitation of those people who themselves were guilty of gross violation of socialist legality in the Slansky era, who committed injustices and used violence, who were initiators of anti-Leninist methods introduced at some time or other into party and state life, and who were rightly punished for this according to the law or the Party's Rules. Many of them must realize that they got caught in the mill they themselves had helped to set in motion, and that they, too, share responsibility for the violation of party and state legal norms. Therefore, in judging their innocence they should first look at their own deeds. We see no reason why our party, which with respect to the liquidation of all remnants of the personality cult has con-

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sistently followed a Leninist road, should change its standpoint in connection with these cases. In this respect I should like to inform the Central Committee that the Politburo recently approved a decision abolishing the existing names of factories, schools, cooperatives, and so on, which were named after living comrades. Although there are not many cases of this kind, because we have been gradually liquidating this sort of thing and since 1955 have not allowed new names to be used, this is very much a matter of principle. This decision must therefore be carried out everywhere without exception. Let it be left to the future to evaluate the work of every individual. In this connection I should like to say that during the Congress we reviewed our previous considerations as to what should be done with the Stalin monument in Prague. We came to the conclusion that the draft of an appropriate decision about this matter must be submitted to the Central Committee. The Stalin monument is one of the results of the cult of personality. Its megalomaniacal and bombastic nature, and above all its reflection of such a personality are at variance with the warmth, frankness, and purity of the fraternal relations between ourselves and the Soviet people. It runs counter to the political conviction of our party, which, as early as before the X X Congress and throughout the period following it, always took a clearly negative stand on the cult of the personality and its consequences. It runs counter also to our evaluation of Stalin's role, and, to tell the truth, it also runs counter to the traditions of our people and the beauty of Prague. The attitude of our party is honorable and Leninist and has nothing in common with either the petty-bourgeois hysteria of certain individuals or the malicious hints of bourgeois propaganda, which tries to turn the problem of the Stalin monument into a petty-bourgeois sensation and to insult our party. We feel that the most correct approach is for the Central Committee to appoint a commission of political figures and experts, consisting of party and public personalities, architects, and graphic artists, to submit proposals for utilization of the site on which

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the Stalin monument stands. The proposals should be based on the revolutionary traditions of our people and the revolutionary traditions of Prague of May, 1945, and February, 1948, and should be in harmony with the overall panorama of the capital of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. . . . I should like, however, to bring up another important problem. H o w are we to proceed with regard to the Klement Gottwald Mausoleum? I think that this method of exhibiting the remains of a meritorious party representative does not conform with the traditions and feelings of our people. Nor is it in harmony with the Leninist interpretation of the role of the individual and collective leadership. Respect for Gottwald's memory will in no way suffer if his body is interred on Vitkov Hill in the same manner as other leading party fighters. In our view it will be right to solve this problem as well. This is certain to be in complete accord with the views of the workers. . . A very broad discussion of problems connected with implementation of the conclusions of the X X and X X I I congresses is also extraordinarily significant because the struggle against the cult of personality is still a topical task in the international Communist movement. In this respect we are thinking mainly of the situation in the Albanian Party of Labor. At the X X I I Congress so much proof of the deeds of the leadership of the A P L was offered that today it will suffice to supplement them with some of our findings and experiences. What do we consider the main reason for the present way the Albanian representatives are acting? The reason is furious resistance to the line of the X X Congress and disagreement with criticism of the personality cult, accompanied by extravagant, even irresponsible, nationalism. Between 1956 and 1960 their disagreement was repressed and masked by servile proclamations of loyalty to the Soviet Union and the unity of the socialist camp. This was contradicted, however, by a domestic policy marked by an ostentatious personality cult of Enver H o x h a and Mehmet Shehu. The true face of the Albanian representatives became apparent last year when they emerged with their dogmatic sallies

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against the CPSU. T h e Albanian representatives fully showed their color. At the Bucharest Conference they did not yet openly declare their standpoint, but immediately after it Comrade Liri Belishova and the old Communist and worker of the Communist International, Koco Tashko, were eliminated from the A P L Central Committee for defending the Leninist positions of the CPSU. The Albanian leadership gradually embarked on open conflict with the CPSU and the other fraternal parties. It must be said that by furiously propagating the cult of Stalin the Albanian representatives are defending mainly themselves. Upon the pages of their criminal record flows the blood of honorable Albanian Communists and patriots, murdered because they had the courage to raise their critical voices against the actions of Hoxha and Shehu. These people were eliminated because they stood in the way of Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu, between whom had developed a relationship similar to that between Stalin and Beria. The psychosis of the espionage mania now reigning in Albania serves to consolidate the unlimited power of the despotic clique, also allied by bonds of kinship, and serves to silence all honorable Communists. The price for all this must be paid by the Albanian people, who by their sincere efforts in the construction of socialism have proved that they deserve a better leadership than they presently have. T o make it clear with whom we are dealing, it suffices to mention, for example, Hoxha's loathsome accusation at last year's Moscow Conference that the CPSU Central Committee and Comrade Khrushchev are allegedly responsible for, if not the direct inspiration of, the counter-revolutionary putsch in Hungary. A continuation of this attitude was manifested at the Fourth Congress of the APL, whose main mission was to unleash an even more unbridled cult of personality. At the Fourth Congress of the A P L the Albanian leadership embarked on an openly anti-Soviet course. In that Party, life is ruled by the principle proclaimed by Mehmet Shehu at the Congress that everyone who dares raise a critical voice will get a spit in the face, a blow on the mouth, and, if necessary, a bullet

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in the head. Shortly afterwards the same Shehu proclaimed to the socialist countries that they are obliged to assist Albania under all circumstances, and that Albania has the right to criticize them without limitation. How it interprets its so-called critical attitude is demonstrated by the fact, for instance, that the CPSU draft Program was published in Albania in a grossly distorted form, although even the leading bourgeois papers printed it. Furthermore, the communiqué of the September conference of leading Communist party secretaries on the German question, in which Enver H o x h a refused to participate, was not published in Albania. Instead a "separate" Albanian statement was made public. The culmination of the anti-Soviet campaign is the present attitude of the leading representatives of the A P L to the X X I I Congress. To the basic and sober criticism expressed by Comrade Khrushchev in his report to the X X I I Congress, they replied with a cynical and spiteful statement that is a heap of rude insults to the USSR, Comrade Khrushchev, and the other fraternal countries. Also, various organized manifestations of loyalty for Enver H o x h a and the dirty articles recently published in the Albanian press describing Comrade Khrushchev's attitude as anti-Leninist and revisionist when he revealed the darkest sides of Stalin's activities clearly show that the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor trampled under foot its commitments entailed in the Statement of the Eighty-one Communist and Workers Parties and knowingly started down the path of separation from the socialist camp. Therefore we positively cannot agree with the reservations expressed by Comrade Chou En-lai on behalf of the C P C at the X X I I Congress regarding the attitude of the CPSU Central Committee toward the leadership of the A P L . We fully endorse the viewpoint of the Soviet comrades, which has also been fully justified by developments since the X X I I Congress. Our party, too, had done everything within its power to bring the Albanian leaders back to the right course. In a number of letters and statements it pointed to the serious consequences of the actions of the Albanian leaders and appealed to their re-

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sponsibility toward the socialist camp and the Communist movement. These endeavors were entirely in vain and failed to yield any results. For this reason the Politburo decided several months ago that future relations with Albania could develop only on the basis of mutually advantageous trade relations, and that unilateral aid cannot be continued. We have also taken necessary steps to make it impossible for the Albanian diplomatic mission in Prague to propagate views hostile to us and to prevent the misuse of Albanian students for this purpose. In this connection it is noteworthy that out of 183 Albanian students who studied in our country before the vacations, the Albanian authorities allowed only five to return to Czechoslovakia in September. We were compelled to expel three of those as provocateurs who tried to spread anti-Soviet slander. The struggle against a dogmatic and sectarian distortion of the Leninist line in the international Communist movement has become increasingly one of the foremost tasks of the international activity of our party. Its course u p to now has been fully in line with this, since it has been creatively applying Leninism to conditions of our country and decisively opposing the danger of dogmatic sectarianism and the threat of revisionism, the main danger in the Communist movement. Present experience has shown that although dogmatism and revisionism proceed from different starting points and cannot therefore be put on the same level, their common denominator is usually nationalism. That is why the struggle against all varieties of nationalism must be conducted with all determination, because all nationalist trends are, as was pointed out by the CPSU Program, an immense danger to the great international work of the construction of communism. Nationalist manifestations are also an integral part of those revisionist concepts that we know from the practice of Yugoslav Communists. Not for a moment shall we deviate from the basic fight against revisionism, and we fully agree with what has been said in this regard at the X X I I Congress. Revisionism harms the

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Yugoslav people and threatens their revolutionary achievements on the road to socialism. Our standpoint is clear, and we express it openly. As long as Yugoslav representatives adhere to these revisionist theses, normalization of relations along party lines is out of the question. We shall, however, continue to develop our relations along state lines, particularly regarding our common interests in the fight for peace, disarmament, the solution of the German problem, and mutually advantageous economic and cultural relations. . . . 43.

VLADIMIR MITTEE

KOUCKY, OF

THE

SECRETARY

OF THE CENTRAL

CZECHOSLOVAK

COMMUNIST

S P E E C H AT T H E P L E N A R Y SESSION OF T H E C E N T R A L MITTEE OF THE C C P , NOVEMBER

15, 1961. Rude

COMPARTY. COM-

Pravo,

November 24, 1961. . . . OUR party is consistently conducting a Leninist fight on two fronts: against revisionism as the principal danger and likewise against repugnant dogmatism. I wish to make a few observations on both aspects of this problem. The new Program of the CPSU was not published at all in Yugoslavia. Evidently, it would have placed the revisionist program of the League of Yugoslav Communists in an ugly situation — a program whose falseness has become even more obvious since the XXII Congress of the CPSU. It is true that just recently a positive approach to the results of the XXII Congress has begun to prevail in the Yugoslav press, but only further experience will reveal to what extent such an approach will last. Numerous erroneous theories, particularly on the fight for peace, are bearing their poisonous fruit in the activities of the revisionists of various countries. The Danish revisionist heretic Larsen even considered it necessary to attack the measures taken by the German Democratic Republic on August 13 and shed tears over the "threatened freedom" of West Berlin reaction. In contrast with this

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position, Enver Hoxha, on the contrary, as an ultra-leftist, naturally attacked the Soviet Union and its policy on the German question, which he said it could have settled long ago if it had maintained the "hard" Albanian line. It is difficult to say where these adventurist outbursts may in fact lead. They definitely have nothing in common with a responsible approach to the setdement of international problems. The vigorous and flexible attitude which the XXII Congress of the CPSU maintained on the German question and on the question of the final settlement of the German peace treaty is the only correct one. Only this attitude is in full agreement with the interests of socialism and world peace. Besides being an attack on the "line" of the XXII Congress, Enver Hoxha's above-mentioned speech of November 7 contains a whole heap of spiteful slander against the XXII Congress, against the Soviet Communists and the other fraternal parties, and defends anew the injustices and crimes perpetrated during the era of the cult of personality in order to conceal Hoxha's own crime. Hoxha speaks with unconcealed blind hatred of Comrade Khrushchev. The entire sixty-seven-page-long speech constitutes an unbroken chain of proofs of how stubbornly Hoxha is trying to isolate Albania from the socialist camp and the Communist movement. It is hardly possible to go further in chauvinistic hatred. The Moscow Statement of last November contains a significant paragraph setting forth the prominent international role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as the most experienced section and the proven vanguard of the international Communist movement. Nevertheless, the idea of so-called polycentrism has recently come once more to the fore with regard to the suitability of establishing several centers for our movement. Is it not true that such a claim today sounds like a lack of confidence in the correctness of the policy of the CPSU, just at the moment when the XXII Congress witnessed a new, shining victory of creative Leninism, when it accepted the historic Program which Communists of every continent rightly consider the Communist Manifesto of our era? Is it not true that, given

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present-day conditions, polycentrism necessarily weakens internationalism? In practice it would degenerate to the point of view that the European parties, for example, ought to leave the solution of Asian problems exclusively to the Asian Communist parties, not being competent to express any opinion about them, etc. There is certainly no question of diminishing the responsibility and independence of any one of the fraternal parties, but where would such an approach lead us at a time when the influence of nationalism is still great? And here I shall not even mention the fact that as a result of technological development today's world is indivisible, that as a result of the development of new war technology with its gigantic destructive power, world peace is likewise indivisible. F a r less, then, can there be in any way a division into various centers of our Communist movement, which has a decisive responsibility for the future fate of mankind. Our party stresses that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at the X X I I Congress and in its new Program not only affirmed but, in addition, very significantly and very fundamentally strengthened its vanguard position in the world-wide Communist movement as well as enhanced its immense international authority. It has likewise increased it indisputably by its resolute handling of the serious consequences of the cult of personality. . . .

44.

VILIAM

SIROKY,

CZECHOSLOVAK

MEMBER

OF

COMMUNIST

THE

POLITBURO

PARTY.

SPEECH

OF

THE

AT

THE

PLENARY SESSION OF THE CENTRAL C O M M I T T E E OF THE

C C P , NOVEMBER 1 5 - 1 7 , 1 9 6 1 . Rude Pravo, November 2 4 , 1961.3 . . . THE entire course and the results of the X X I I C P S U Congress most convincingly confirmed its close and inseparable ' O n November 30, 1961, Jen-min jih-pao reprinted part of Siroky's speech. The Chinese version of the paragraphs within angular brackets reads: " I f we only think back to the development of the international

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connection with the Leninist conclusions of the X X CPSU Congress, which truly opened a new phase in the development of the international Communist movement. The conclusions had the effect of a fresh, life-giving current in the work of the Communist and workers parties throughout the world and particularly in the socialist countries. They contributed toward the implementation and development of dynamic, creative Leninism in the practical activity of all fraternal parties. The determined condemnation of the cult of the personality of Stalin and the restoration of Leninist norms in all respects in the activity of party and state were of fundamental importance for increasing the revolutionary vigor of the entire Communist movement and the formation of fighting ranks for the struggle for peace and socialism. . . . (Recalling the development of the international workers movement since the X X CPSU Congress, we see that apart from the Yugoslav revisionists, who criticized the Congress's conclusions from a position of right-wing opportunism, it was the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor that either openly or covertly did not agree with the conclusions of the XX CPSU Congress. It did not agree with the determined condemnation of the personality cult and did nothing to overcome its consequences workers movement since the X X CPSU Congress, we can already see that aside from the Yugoslav revisionists, who criticized the conclusions of that Congress from a rightist opportunist standpoint, there are two Communist parties—the Chinese Communist Party and the Albanian Party of Labor—which entertain doubts about those conclusions, and, it can even be said, directly disagree with them, no matter whether openly or surreptitiously. "They do not agree with the resolute criticism of the cult of the individual and have not taken any step whatever to eliminate its consequences within their countries. On the contrary, since the X X CPSU Congress, they have further intensified their cult of the individual. They have never made any effort to restore Leninist norms in the life of the party and the state. They are not in agreement with the conclusions reached at the X X Congress of the CPSU." Curiously enough, the printed Czechoslovak text omitted Siroky's explicit mention of China, while the Chinese Communists retained it in their own version.

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in its country. On the contrary, it even expanded the personality cult after the X X CPSU Congress. It made no efforts to renew Leninist principles of party and state life and did not agree with the conclusions of the X X CPSU Congress.) At the X X I I CPSU Congress Comrade Khrushchev asked what would have become of the Party and the state if the Party had not put an end to the personality cult and its consequences and if it had not restored Leninist principles. Comrade Khrushchev answered: There would have been the danger that the Party would become separated from the masses, from the people, that socialist democracy and legality would have been seriously violated, that the economic development of the country would have been retarded, construction would have been held up, thus causing a deterioration of the living standards of the working people. In the international sphere this would have entailed a weakening of the international authority and position of the state and a deterioration of relations with other countries. Only one road lies ahead—the road pointed out by the X X and X X I I congresses, the road of the consistent elimination of all consequences and remnants of the personality cult, the road of a broad and creative development of Leninist thinking and of a consistent struggle for the victory of new, bold ideas and conclusions. . . . It is only natural that our Leninist Czechoslovak Communist Party took this road with full determination and considers it the logical road for all its work. . . .

POLISH

UNITED

WORKERS

PARTY

(PUWP)

Support of the C P S U position by the P U W P on critical issues— such as Albania, Stalin, war and peace, peaceful transition, and the significance of the X X and X X I I C P S U congresses—was expected and, despite the surprise of the Polish party leadership over developments at the X X I I Congress, was promptly made explicit. The celebrations in Warsaw of the anniversary of the October Revolution, on November 6, provided one opportunity for anti-APL and anti-Stalin speechmaking. The Central Committee meeting, later in November, provided a more formal occasion.

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WLADYSLAW G O M U L K A ,

F I R S T SECRETARY OF T H E

TRAL

THE

COMMITTEE

PARTY.

REPORT

PUWP,

NOVEMBER

OF

TO T H E

POLISH

CENTRAL

UNITED

COMMITTEE

22, 1961. Try buna Ludu

CEN-

WORKERS OF

THE

(Warsaw),

November 24, 1961.4 . . . THE present and the future economic development of the Soviet Union and the whole commonwealth of socialist states provides the key to the understanding of the Leninist idea of peaceful coexistence of states, the idea which has now found its expression in the CPSU Program, the idea by which the socialist states are guided in their foreign policy and in their relations with states of different social systems. The ideologists and the politicians of the imperialist bourgeoisie are trying to discover an alleged contradiction between the thesis of peaceful coexistence of all states and the thesis which proclaims the inevitable victory of socialism over capitalism in the peaceful competition of the two social systems. If a contradiction exists here, then it is the contradiction between life and death. This contradiction cannot be resolved. Men die and social systems disappear in history. Peaceful coexistence signifies the elimination of war in relations among states. The peaceful coexistence of socialism and capitalism is based on the premise that under the influence of the achievements of socialism and communism every nation will choose the socialist forms of life, will overthrow in its own country the old system, and will carry out a socialist revolution by peaceful or nonpeaceful means. One cannot oppose the idea of the peaceful coexistence of states to the idea of a social revolution carried out by the people, even through civil war—as imperialist bourgeois and their partisans try to do—by hypocritically and falsely proclaiming that our principle of peaceful coexistence of states conceals a striving ' O n November 25, 1961, Pravda published a summary of Gomulka's speech. Considerable sections of his speech were summarized or deleted, presumably for reasons of space. Passages omitted by Pravda which affect the meaning of his speech are indicated by angular brackets. Trybuna Ludu is the daily organ of the Central Committee of the PUWP.

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for war as a means of achieving the world-wide victory of socialism. Nothing speaks more convincingly for the peaceful policy of the socialist countries than the fact—already proved to the whole world—that they can develop their economy more rapidly than capitalist countries in times of peace. War is a terrible obstacle to their economic development. The CPSU Program and the possibilities of building the material-technical basis of communism within twenty years have at their root world peace and a powerful desire to ensure such peace. Although the victorious socialist revolution in Russia, out of which the great Soviet Union was born, broke out during World War I, and although in a number of countries capitalism was overthrown and socialism was established as a result of World W a r II, this by no means signifies that in the past war was a necessary element for the emergence of a victorious socialist revolution. Still less does this mean that at present, in our time, war is necessary for the victory of socialism in other countries and in the whole world. The socialist revolution is a social revolution born not of war but on the basis of class antagonism, on the basis of contradictions tearing apart capitalist society. Imperialist wars only intensify these contradictions, increase dissatisfaction among the working masses, reduce living conditions to a level at which a social revolution becomes a vital necessity for these masses. Thus wars which are an inherent characteristic of imperialism speed u p the social revolution but do not in any way condition it. Socialism can defeat capitalism without wars, along the road of peaceful coexistence of states. This assertion, which stems from Marxist-Leninist teaching on the laws governing the development of society, and which is increasingly corroborated by the practice of socialist construction, is not the only reason why socialist states and the world Communist movement now oppose war with all their might. Today, in the era of genocidal thermonuclear weapons and ballistic rockets, war has become unacceptable to a sane mind. War has lost its old meaning. (Of the two basic elements of the old reality of war—victory and defeat

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— a thermonuclear war does not contain the element of victory, only the element of defeat, or to be more accurate, the element of disaster which would befall all mankind.) Thermonuclear war would be the grave of hundreds of millions of people, of whole nations, and would destroy the achievements of man over the course of centuries. The atomic era, with its wonderful prospects for the development of mankind and also with its terrible dangers, has created a historic necessity of peaceful coexistence of states, of general and complete disarmament, of the exclusion of war from the life of mankind. The tests of new types of thermonuclear weapons conducted in the Soviet Union during the Congress serve to ensure peace and prevent imperialist aggression. The imperialist states conduct atomic weapons tests as a preparation for war; the Soviet Union does it to preserve peace, to show to the potential aggressor that war would be tantamount to his own destruction. This is the reason for the difference in our attitude toward the testing of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union and that of imperialist states. The adoption of the new CPSU Program and Rules is undoubtedly the most important result of the work of the X X I I Congress. Among other questions which emerged at the Congress a foremost place is occupied by the problem we briefly call the personality cult. (This is not a new problem; it was solved long ago. But in a particular way it is still topical and important, both for the CPSU and for the whole Communist movement.) As we know, the distortions of the socialist idea due to the personality cult took place in the Soviet Union in Stalin's time and were to a greater or lesser extent reflected in other Communist and workers parties, especially in the socialist countries. In the past the CPSU has occupied, and is occupying at present, a special place among all the Communist and workers parties of the world. (The leading role of the CPSU is determined not only by the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia which was carried out under its leadership and by the

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establishment of the first socialist state in the history of mankind—the Soviet Union. This belongs to the past, and the past alone does not entitle any party, any state to occupy a special place in the present.) The CPSU occupies this place now, too, primarily because the Soviet Union, which is led by the CPSU, is the main force of our era, the era of socialism and communism, because the Soviet Union is the main factor in the security of all socialist countries and the main barrier on the road of imperialist war designs, the main guarantee for the success of the historic mission of the international Communist movement, the mission of preventing a new war and of eliminating war from the life of nations; because the Soviet Union is the main moving force in the development of the world toward socialism. The leading role of the CPSU in the international Communist movement and of the Soviet Union in the whole socialist system is not changed and cannot be changed by the fact that among the glorious pages of their history, there is also a black page of the "personality cult." The criticism to which this phenomenon was subjected already six years ago at the X X CPSU Congress, criticism which was continued at the X X I I CPSU Congress, not only strengthens the political position of the CPSU among other Communist and workers parties, but also expresses the feeling of profound responsibility of the CPSU leadership for the role which the CPSU and the Soviet Union objectively play in shaping the general line of the world Communist movement and the foreign policy of the socialist camp. T h e X X I I Congress with full force and consistency confirmed the political line of the X X Congress, which marked the turning point in the life of the CPSU and the Soviet people and was of great positive importance for all Communist and workers parties. The line of the X X Congress, in the course of its realization, encountered a determined opposition from a part of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, headed by Molotov, Kaganovich, and Malenkov. This group intended to restore in the CPSU the former Stalinist methods and organizational practices; it intended to turn the CPSU away from the

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road outlined by the X X Congress. This group was motivated by dogmatism and sectarianism, with which its members were permeated and which spread during the time of the personality cult, and by fear of responsibility for crimes committed in that period, with their knowledge and even with their approval. The XXII CPSU Congress returned to these questions and condemned the antiparty group not because—as correspondents of bourgeois papers surmise—it constitutes a danger to the Party. This group has no support whatever in the CPSU. (It did not do so because of alleged intentions to make these people criminally responsible before the court; there are no such intentions.) The criticism of the antiparty group should be considered in the general context of a preventive immunization of the CPSU against the diseases of the period of the personality cult; in the general context of broadening internal democracy within the Party and the application of Leninist norms in party life; in the general context of the transformations to which the methods of party work in the leadership of the society and of the Soviet state are subject and will be subject in the future as the construction of communism progresses; and also in the general context of the importance of this criticism for other Communist and workers parties. This criticism is at the same time an expression of the great strength of the CPSU, of the cohesiveness of its ranks, and of the high level of political experience of its ten-million-strong membership which is united around the Central Committee of the CPSU on the basis of democratic centralism. As we know, the XXII Congress adopted a resolution on the transfer of Stalin's remains from the Lenin Mausoleum. The coffin with Stalin's remains was deposited at the Kremlin cemetery beside the graves of especially meritorious leaders of the Party and Soviet state. This decision is a direct result of the disclosure before public opinion of crimes which took place in Stalin's time and for which he is morally and politically responsible. No one is erasing Stalin's name as a great revolutionary, nor his contributions to the struggle of the Party, and of the work of the nation in the construction of socialism in the Soviet Union.

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But nothing can justify or erase the t r e m e n d o u s evil d o n e to socialism by his personality cult, a cult he not only failed to counteract, but which he even carefully fostered. In this respect nothing is more characteristic of Stalin than the fact t h a t though Lenin already had designated a site in Moscow f o r a m o n u m e n t to M a r x , this m o n u m e n t was unveiled only d u r i n g the X X I I C P S U Congress, while the whole country was strewn with Stalin m o n u m e n t s , not without his acceptance. T h e t r a n s f e r of Stalin's remains and the restoration of the original c h a r a c t e r of the Lenin M a u s o l e u m , as well as the erection of the m o n u m e n t to M a r x in Moscow, eloquently symbolize the changes which have taken place within the C P S U and the Soviet Union since Stalin's d e a t h . T h e criticism of the antiparty group, the return to the p r o b l e m of the personality cult, the disclosure to public opinion f r o m the rostrum of the X X I I Congress of a n u m b e r of crimes c o m m i t t e d during that period, the removal of Stalin's coffin f r o m the Lenin M a u s o l e u m , the criticism of the leaders of the A l b a n i a n Party of L a b o r — a l l this evoked a wide response in the o t h e r C o m m u n i s t a n d workers parties. Here and there anxiety is arising a n d questions are asked whether this was necessary a n d w h e t h e r it would not have a negative effect on the international w o r k e r s movement, its unity and its political and ideological positions, etc. In some parties incorrect opinions are voiced f r o m d o g m a t i c positions; in others a note of revisionism is perceptible. (The question of how the personality cult could arise a n d why this aspect of the matter was not fully explained at the X X I I C o n gress is frequently posed.) O u r p a r t y must also express its opinion a b o u t these matters and define its attitude. Let us take first the question of the p e r sonality cult. (Undoubtedly, our Soviet c o m r a d e s have the most to say a b o u t this matter. If until now they have n o t said everything concerning the origin of the personality cult, this means that apparently it is still too early for it.) In o u r opinion, to u n d e r s t a n d the reasons for the emergence of t h e personality cult, it is enough to realize the conditions u n d e r which the Soviet U n i o n has built socialism and to take into a c c o u n t Stalin's character. Lenin himself drew attention to Stalin's c h a r a c t e r

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when he warned against keeping him in the position of General Secretary of the Party. (The Soviet Union embarked on the construction of socialism from a very narrow economic base left by tsarist Russia. The social base corresponded to this economic base: a working class, small in comparison with the total population, but militant and conscious of its aims; and a peasantry, which constituted the overwhelming majority of the multinational population. Tsarist absolutism, the persecution of Russian revolutionaries, and the long civil war against counter-revolutionary generals, as well as the war against imperialist interventionists, conditioned the stern character of Russian Communists. The Soviet Union was the first country to turn socialist ideas into material and social reality.) In its practical work and struggle the CPSU searched out and blasted the road of socialist construction. Socialism as a social order was being established in a single country surrounded by the hostile sea of the capitalist world. The working class and toiling masses laid the foundations for the current might of the Soviet Union solely by their own efforts without material aid from abroad, under conditions of a blockade, isolation, and frenzied attacks by the imperialist states; under conditions of economic backwardness of the country; under conditions of an acute class struggle against the forces of the counter-revolution; under conditions of a great shortage of food and all articles of daily need; under conditions of military provocations and a constant danger of military attack. No other socialist country had such difficult conditions for building socialism, and no other country that embarks on the path of socialism will have them. Under these circumstances the Soviet state of the dictatorship of the proletariat had to be merciless in its struggle against the enemies of socialism. The Party could tolerate nothing which might undermine the unity of its ranks, its fighting power; the Party had to remove from its ranks the Trotskyites, who did not believe in the possibility of building socialism in one country, which, in practice, amounted to a capitulation of the revolution; the Party could not tolerate other opposition groups, which,

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under pressure of difficulties, sought a false way of solving them. (The leaders of the opposition should have been removed from the Party, and this should have closed the settling of accounts. But guided by his despotic character Stalin settled his score with them in a bloody manner. Trying to live and to create for itself prospects of life in the future, the Soviet Union first of all had to develop industry rapidly. The Soviet Union had to accumulate from its own economy the means for this development, and since agriculture predominated, it was agriculture that had to provide the maximal part of the means for the industrialization of the country. This was impossible under the conditions of dispersed, small-commodity peasant farming. Without mentioning other reasons, the collectivization of agriculture in the Soviet Union—called the second revolution—was a necessity also from this point of view. On the whole, information about the situation produced by collectivization is scarce, but we know that collectivization encountered strong resistance from the wealthier part of the peasantry, and this along with the transition to new forms of agricultural production inevitably led to a temporary decline in agriculture output. As a result, difficulties in supplying the working class and urban population with food increased. This could not fail to cause discontent among the workers also.) Kulak resistance in rural areas, which was widespread and assumed acute forms including sabotage, subversion, and murder, was bound to lead to repressions on the part of the state authorities. There is nothing unusual in this. Every revolution— and especially a socialist revolution, transforming the old system right down to the foundations and socializing the means of production in town and countryside—must encounter resistance and struggle from the classes at which it strikes. But the scope of repressions applied by a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat must correspond to the scope of the counter-revolution, must strike the enemy and not strike out blindly. Unfortunately, this limit was overstepped by the organs called upon to fight the enemy and counter-revolutionary activities, organs supervised

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and inspired by Stalin. (It appears that the overstepping of this limit began in the period when Soviet rural areas were being shifted to the path of collectivization. This period must be regarded as the beginning of the process of growing lawlessness, violation of socialist legality, the establishment of an atmosphere of fear, and the growth on this foundation of the personality cult, the cult of Stalin. This was subsequently supported by Stalin's theory of the inevitability of the sharpening of the class struggle paralleling the development of socialist construction, a theory accompanied by the slogan of "enemies of the people" and the idea that these enemies were also to be found in the ranks of the Party. N K V D organs inspired by this theory could include in the category of enemies of the people anybody who dared to utter a word of criticism. Accusations of working for foreign powers spread widely. This only facilitated the work of imperialist intelligence.) There can be no doubt that provocations and the activity of foreign intelligence services contributed in n o small measure to the mass arrests, particularly in 1936-37. Foreign intelligence services made their foul contribution to this criminal affair, helped create the atmosphere of suspicion and fear in which crimes were born and which favored and even was essential to the rise of the cult of the individual. History will someday clarify these questions. Unquestionably, the safes of foreign intelligence services hide more than one secret, such as, for example, the reports published at one time in the British press and cited by Comrade Khrushchev at the Congress that the treason indictments of Marshal Tukhachevsky and other commanders of the Soviet Army were based on materials fabricated by the intelligence service of Hitler Germany. . . . Stalin constantly emphasized the danger of a military attack on the Soviet Union. Everything indicates that if he embarked on the step he took toward his own army, on which after all the security of the Soviet Union depended, it was as a result of a fiendish provocation by Hitler's intelligence service. Stalin's suspicious and mistrustful nature, which looked for treason everywhere, killed common sense in him, dulled vigi-

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lance toward the enemy's intrigues, let him believe that a Gestapo falsehood was the truth. Stalin, crushing the Soviet Army command and the army's leadership cadres, was convinced that he was crushing enemies of socialism. (In his opinion, this was confirmed by the forced admissions of the unjustly arrested people. The legal principle of the Holy See applied by the Roman Catholic Church during the Inquisition, that an admission of guilt extorted by torture constitutes proof of crime, was extensively applied in investigation and legal proceedings in the Soviet Union through the actions of Vyshinsky, then Procurator-General of the Soviet Union. Under conditions when the heads of marshals, generals, and high party and state officials were rolling, people were engulfed by fear, suspicion spread, and an atmosphere of "spy mania" grew. The role of the security organs, of the NKVD, was increasing because theirs was the main duty of combating the enemy. In a climate of suspicion, with need for these organs to keep the investigation secret, they became more and more independent of the Party until, finally, they stood above the Party. As a sociopolitical organization called upon to lead the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat and to control its activities, the Party could not properly carry out these functions. Weighed down by difficulties resulting from the general conditions in which the Soviet people were building socialism, the Party yielded to the will and pressure of the high-handed Stalin. From the fundamental organizational principle of the Party, democratic centralism, the first term, democracy, was removed. Only the second, centralism, remained. The top decided everything, and the top was Stalin. Many a Communist, many a Party leader, understood this abnormal state of affairs, and no doubt not a few were convinced of the groundlessness of many accusations and repressions, but they were faced with a dilemma: What to do? The attitude of Communists cannot be measured only by the atmosphere of fear. One should not think that they kept quiet about Stalin's violence and crimes only for fear of losing

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their own heads. Of course, everyone's head is dear to him. But Communists are courageous, highly principled people. They have proved during the entire history of revolutionary struggle that they value the cause of socialism more than their heads. T o take up the struggle against Stalin is not the same as joining in the struggle for a socialist revolution or in the fight against counter-revolution. Stalin had been directing the building of socialism in the Soviet Union. This is why his remains, removed from the Lenin Mausoleum, have been laid next to the graves of meritorious leaders and builders of socialism.) Although he adopted inadmissible methods in his work, methods contrary to the principles of socialist legality, and even resorted to crimes, yet every Communist who more or less knew, saw, or heard something about it was bound to face the question: By opposing Stalin would he not be acting to the detriment of socialism? Would this make the construction of socialism in the Soviet Union easier or more difficult? Given the conditions in which the Soviet Union existed at that time, this question disarmed Communists from the struggle against Stalin. We know this full well from the history of our party, the Communist Party of Poland. How many comrades who feared neither prison nor death would not talk even to people closest to them about the criminal annihilation of numerous cadres of Polish Communists during the years of the personality cult, although they were profoundly convinced that the arrested or executed had been completely innocent! They did not want to talk about it so as not to harm the idea of socialism, so as not to provide the enemies with fuel for the anti-Soviet campaign. Neither the party rank and file nor the Soviet people knew the truth. They were dominated by the Stalin cult, which was spread by every means of propaganda. He who does not carefully consider the whole situation existing at that time inside the Soviet Union and in the world, the conditions accompanying the construction of socialism in that country, he who thinks in terms of current times, finds it difficult to understand how the phenomenon of the personality cult could arise. (The general reasons are not very difficult to find, and they are universally

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known, although they may need greater clarification by our Soviet comrades. But u p to the X X I I CPSU Congress, the general public did not know the consequences of the personality cult and the fact of the direct responsibility of Stalin and some of his collaborators for the death of innocent people.) This could be disclosed to the public now, for there is consciousness of the force that socialism now constitutes, consciousness of the requirements and necessity of combating the remnants of the dogmatism and sectarianism that were nurtured in the years of the cult of personality. This is the background against which one must consider the criticism voiced at the X X I I CPSU Congress of the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor. We already spoke at length about their political position at the meetings of the Sixth and Seventh plenums of the Central Committee, when we reported on the Bucharest and Moscow conferences of Communist and workers parties. Despite the sharp criticism of their political stand and their actions toward the Soviet Union by nearly all parties, with few exceptions, who took part in these debates, the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor not only did not withdraw from their dogmatic positions, but by their actions began to demonstrate them more and more clearly. They now have gone so far as to attack openly the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its leadership, under the banner of fighting revisionism and defending Marxism-Leninism. In their opinion, all the parties that stand by the positions of the X X Congress of the C P S U are revisionist. T h e concepts of dogmatism and sectarianism do not properly reflect the nature of the position of the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor and their policy, which is not a policy but senseless political adventurism. Thus, for instance, in a speech delivered recently in Tirana, Enver Hoxha accused the leaders of the Soviet Union of being afraid of imperialism and therefore of postponing from year to year the settlement of the German problem and of the West Berlin question. This is a mixture of conceit and adventurism. "The Albanian Party of Labor and the government of the People's Republic of Albania," says

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Hoxha, "never feared and never will fear imperialism." ("We are not against the principle of peaceful coexistence," continues Hoxha, " b u t we do not agree with some opportunist views held by Nikita Khrushchev and by those who joined h i m — those who consider peaceful coexistence as the general line of foreign policy of socialist countries.") It is precisely from these positions that the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor and the Albanian government have for a long time been waging a struggle against all parties which d o not share their views. And probably no Communist or workers party shares them. The adventurist policy pursued by the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor is contrary to the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism and to the decisions adopted by the C o m munist and workers parties at the 1957 and 1960 conferences; it is contrary to common sense. The leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the most sharply attacked by the Albanian Party of Labor, deemed it necessary to state at the X X I I Congress what it thinks and how it evaluates the policy of the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor. Of the eighty Communist and workers parties whose representatives took part as guests in the work of the X X I I Congress of the CPSU, not one party disputed the fundamentally correct criticism addressed to the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Only the representative of the Communist Party of China voiced the view that the dispute with the Albanian Party of Labor should not have been brought out into the open, and that it is necessary to try to settle all differences of views among the parties by internal consultations. It is hard to agree with this opinion when, as in the case of Albania, all attempts to settle a dispute by this means do not yield results. This particularly applies to a dispute on such an important question as the general line of the foreign policy of the socialist states. (This policy cannot be concealed because one cannot conceal from the world a difference on attitudes among

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the various countries in their foreign policy. In this sphere the dispute with Albania ceased to be secret long ago.) T h e attitude toward the general foreign policy line of the socialist countries, which is based on peaceful coexistence of all states irrespective of their political and social systems, expresses the attitude toward the unity of the socialist camp and also toward the unity of the international Communist movement. The leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor are undermining this unity. Public criticism of their position became imperative. Some comrades from fraternal parties are of the opinion that in the present situation, when the international Communist movement has widely expanded and is operating under different objective conditions, the differences in political activity and methods of work dictate the need to adopt a concept of polycentrism, not rigidly defined by them. The differences in the political activity and working methods of the various C o m m u nist and workers parties do not always stem f r o m objective conditions, from the specific conditions of the country in which a given party is active. They can also be an expression of dogmatic or revisionist tendencies influencing their policy. For example, the present policy of the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor, the methods they employ in Albania's domestic life, do not stem from objective conditions, they stem f r o m dogmatism, sectarianism, and adventurism; whereas in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, a country neighboring on Albania, revisionism has triumphed. Consequently, it is not only objective conditions that dictate the policy of a given party. Creative and undistorted Marxism-Leninism, taking the conditions of each country into account, should mold the correct policy for each party. Today there exists no one center directing the activity of the individual Communist and workers parties. Nor is it necessary. One may doubt whether any regional centers of such a type are needed, which absolutely does not exclude the advisability of regional interparty conferences for mutual exchange of information and experience, for determining the forms of political

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struggle and methods of activity of the parties operating in that region. Each party is completely independent and autonomous; it bears full responsibility for the country in which it rules and for its policy in a country in which it is fighting for democracy, progress, and socialism. All the parties are united by proletarian internationalism. The fundamental principles of policy and action for all Communist and workers parties should be worked out, and have been worked out in 1957 and 1960, at their joint conferences. In the documents of these conferences each party should see an international, central guide for its activity. The most important problem of our time is the problem of war and peace. The historic mission of the world Communist movement is to prevent war and to save mankind from a nuclear catastrophe. It must be repeated here once again that the main force for peace is the Soviet Union. This defines its position in the international Communist movement. The principle of peaceful coexistence of all states lies at the basis of the XXII Congress of the CPSU, at the basis of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, at the basis of the resolutions adopted by all Communist and workers parties at their international conferences. The policy of peaceful coexistence increases the strength and importance of the socialist camp; it multiplies the strength of the international Communist movement and of all peace forces in the world. . Comrades, our party has every reason to express its solidarity with the XXII Congress of the CPSU, just as it accepted with deep satisfaction the decisions of the XX Congress of the CPSU. It is so because these decisions also helped our party carry out a real change in its work, which took place at the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee, in October, 1956. The five-year period which has elapsed since then fully confirms the correct direction of the changes then made. We have overcome revisionist tendencies, we have uprooted dogmatism and sectarianism in our party. We shall continue to fight against everything that may harm the unity and monolithic character of the ranks of our party. . . .

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TADEUSZ DANISZEWSKI, DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE OF PARTY HISTORY OF THE CENTRAL

COMMITTEE

OF

THE

POLISH UNITED WORKERS PARTY. SPEECH AT THE PLENARY SESSION OF THE CENTRAL C O M M I T T E E

NOVEMBER 2 2 , 1 9 6 1 . Polityka cember 2 , 1 9 6 1 . 5

OF THE

PUWP,

( W a r s a w ) , No. 4 8 ,

De-

. . IT WAS not possible to advance along the road of renewal which had already been taken by the X X Congress without boldly demonstrating to the Soviet Party and people all the consequences entailed by the complex of perversions and distortions which had grown into a menacing system of the so-called cult of the individual. A s is known, the sphere of influence of the phenomena in question reached beyond the borders of the Soviet state. In this connection I should like to offer some comments on Stalin's influence and on the system of which he was the principal creator and at the same time a product, on the Polish and international Communist movement in the years preceding World War I I . In speaking of Stalin and quoting Stalin, we shall always keep in mind not so much the man personally as specific methods glaringly inconsistent with Leninism. W e should note that the positive contribution of Stalin to the cause of so-called Bolshevization of the Communist parties in other countries cannot be completely denied. B u t here I want to deal with only one aspect: how the phenomenon which we have b e c o m e accustomed to term conventionally "cult of the individual" influenced the activities of the Communist International and its sections. Such an approach presupposes extreme onesidedness, which is inevitable, however, when a partial but immensely important problem is treated. T h e various negative factors which will be discussed obviously cannot conceal from us the important and lasting merits of the Comintern, the leading staff of the international C o m m u nist movement in the difficult period between the wars. s Polityka is a weekly assumed to reflect the views of the leadership of the PUWP.

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The young Communist parties deriving from the left wing of the Second International and for a number of years burdened to a certain extent with the ballast of social-democratic views learned the art of leading the masses only in the fire of the class battles. The existence of a cohesive international organization called upon to elaborate the fundamental strategic and tactical principles in the struggle to overthrow the powers of capital was a historic necessity at that time. As a matter of course, the leading role in the Comintern fell to the party which was the first to break the front of world imperialism, and the first to initiate the building of the foundations of socialism. "Bolshevism," Lenin stated, "has become the world theory and tactics of the international proletariat." 8 Hence, the objection is not against the principle of a maximal closing of the ranks of the international Communist movement under a common banner, but rather the perversions which occurred in the fulfillment of this important task during the period of the so-called cult of the individual. These matters, by the way, are not merely of historical interest. For as long as the international Communist movement exists, the problem of coordination—in one form or another— of the individual units of this movement, coordination appropriate for the given era, will continue to be of immediate interest. Apace with Stalin's directly growing influence on the leading elements of the Communist International, increasingly farreaching changes took place in its life, deviating from the standards obligatory during the time of Lenin. Lenin, in defending properly conceived internationalism, demanded of the Comintern—he was, after all, its acknowledged leader—such an application of the fundamental principles of communism which "would properly modify these principles in their details, and correctly adjust and adapt them to national and national-state differences." 7 A bitter ideological struggle was waged during Lenin's life* Lenin, Works [Polish ed.], X X V I I I , 110. * Ibid., X X X I , 79; italics in original.

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time with erroneous views and trends, but with a strict observance of the principles of democratic centralism. As a rule, the Comintern congresses were convoked yearly and were held in an atmosphere of free, although frequently fierce discussion. After Lenin's death these standards were violated systematically and to an ever greater degree. At the Fifth Congress of the Communist International in 1924, methods of mechanically overcoming ideological differences without going thoroughly into their nature, by the drawing of the most far-reaching organizational consequences, were employed for the first time. The new course, of which Stalin was the co-initiator, was strongly felt by the Communist Party of Poland. Warski, Kostrzewa, and Walecki,8 who already had made no little progress in the cause of adopting the cardinal principles of Leninism for the Party, despite the opposition of the dogmatic-sectarian group, were removed from the leadership under the accusation of having committed certain errors. Representatives of precisely this trend, which to the end opposed the entry of the Communist Party of Poland onto the path of Leninism, replaced them. This "change of clothes" necessarily, and in a short time, led to a new crisis in the Party. As the chairman of the Polish Commission appointed by the Fifth Congress to investigate the ideological dispute in the Communist Party of Poland, Stalin characterized the group of leaders headed by Warski as "the Polish branch of the opportunistic opposition in the Russian Communist Party." This was one of Stalin's favorite tricks, aimed at "discrediting the opposition leaders" in the sections of the Comintern. Stalin's conclusion as to the sources of the rise of divergences in the Communist parties is typical. At the Seventh Enlarged Plenary Session of the Executive Committee of the Communist International in 1926, he argued that there were two sources: ( 1 ) the pressure of the bourgeoisie and bourgeois ideology on the proletariat and its party under the conditions of the class " W a r s k i ( A d o l f Warszawski), Kostrzewa ( M a r i a K o s z u c k a ) , Walecki ( M a x Horowitz) were leaders of the Communist Party of Poland liquidated by Stalin during the late 1930's.—Ed.

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struggle; and ( 2 ) the existence of different strata within the working class. From this Stalin drew the very simple conclusion that every aggravation of the class struggle "must inevitably be reflected in the form of certain divergences in the Party." 9 On the basis of such theoretical assumptions Stalin treated any differences of opinion in the Communist parties as a direct reflection of the class struggle, and the representatives of the opposition as a rule as exponents of the ideological pressure of the class enemy. There is no need to explain what this scholastic method of reasoning led to. Threats of "smashing," "bone-crushing," and the like were hurled in the statements by Stalin and his then closest collaborators in the Czechoslovak, Polish, and other commissions of the Communist International. This evoked the memorable reply by Kostrzewa: "People like us whose bones can be broken for such reasons are not dangerous to you; it is those who have no bones at all."10 Whereas Lenin strove to have the documents drawn up by the Comintern based on the experience of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the entire international workers^movement (as was the case, for example, with the resolution on the organizational structure of Communist parties adopted at the Third Congress of the Communist International), Stalin branded as a manifestation of nationalism those proposals which took into account the specific nature of a given country. The period of the postwar revolutionary tide ended in the capitalist world after 1923, and an era of a relative and rotten stabilization of capitalism—but stabilization nevertheless—ensued. This called for the drawing of definite strategic conclusions and the employment of much more flexible tactics. Characteristic of Stalin, however, was a systematic overrating of potential revolutionary capabilities. Molotov, who started to be deeply involved in the affairs of the Comintern, in a speech at the Tenth Plenary Session of the Executive Committee of the ' Stalin, Sochineniia, IX, 19-21. 10 The Polish Question at the V Congress of the Communist tional (Moscow, 1924), p. 91; italics in original.

Interna-

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Communist International in 1929, also asserted authoritatively that in such countries as Germany, Poland, and France we were approaching "a direct struggle for power." 11 Such estimates were reflected in the official resolutions of the Comintern, which at the Twelfth Plenary Session of the Executive Committee, in September of 1932, that is, several months before Hitler's seizure of power, spoke of the occurrence at that time of a "transition . . . to a new round of revolutions and wars," adding that "the time of ripening of the revolutionary crisis is near." 1 2 The Thirteenth Plenary Session of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, held in December of 1933, that is, after the lapse of nearly a year of Hitler's dictatorial government, arrived at the conclusion "that at the present time, the world is closely approaching a new round of revolutions and wars." 13 Such evaluations, repeated over the years, resulted in the systematic failure of the sections of the Communist International to fulfill the frequently unrealistic tasks assigned to them, and time after time gave rise to crises within the parties, the real causes of which must be sought not in the objective conditions or incorrect instructions from above, but in subjective errors of the leaders of the given Communist party. Congresses of the Communist International were convoked less and less often. During Lenin's lifetime, as we have said, they were convoked yearly. But later, over a period of nearly twenty years, they were convened only three times. The collective thought of the fraternal Communist parties was ignored more and more. The climate became increasingly worse for creative discussions and critical observations. An overestimation of opportunities was accompanied by simplified analysis of the alignment of sociopolitical forces in the capitalist countries, by the slogan, simplified in conception and execution, of "class against class," and by a simplified evaluation of social democracy. 11

X Plenum lspolkoma Kominterna (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1929), p. 28. Stenograficlieskii otcliet XII Plcnuma IKKI (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1933). pp. 163, 166. 13 Theses Adopted bx the Xlll Plenum of the ECCI, p. 3. 13

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Stalin was the spiritual father of the theory of social fascism, which did so much damage, first of all to the Communist parties themselves. In September, 1924, he wrote that "objectively social democracy is a moderate wing of fascism. . . These organizations are not mutually exclusive, but mutually complementary. They are not antipodes, but twins." 14 Formulations of this type subsequently began to appear in the official documents of the Comintern: "A division of labor takes place between the political leaders of the bourgeoisie and leaders of counter-revolutionary social democracy." 1 5 Social democracy "directly carries out the orders of the imperialist bourgeoisie as its secret agent," et cetera. 16 In addition, the following statement by Stalin was taken as a guide: "In order for the struggle with social democracy to be effective, special emphasis must be placed on struggle with the so-called 'left' wing of social democracy." 17 The assertion that the left wing of the Social Democratic Party is the number one enemy at whom fire should be principally directed is repeated fairly frequently in the publications of the Communist International and its sections. There is no need to explain what international social democracy was and is and what are the results of the policy of collaboration with the bourgeoisie, obstinately pursued by its right-wing leaders. But the position expressed in the statements quoted above made it impossible for many Communist parties in capitalist countries to transform themselves into truly mass revolutionary parties, and isolated them from the broad strata of society. Such being the conditions, the Communist Party of Poland also did not avoid, especially during the years 1929-33, certain sectarian approaches and standpoints, both in evaluation of the " Stalin. Sochineniia, VI, 284. 15 "Theses of the V Congress of CI [Comintern]," Nowy Przeglad, No. 2, 1924, p. 140. w Manifesto of the VI Congress of the CI. 17 Stalin, Sochineniia, XII, 33.

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situation and in adapting itself to the ever more acute friction between the petty-bourgeois and bourgeois-democratic camp and the fascist camp in Poland. In 1931 a letter was published from Stalin to the editor of the journal Proletarskaya Revoliutsiya under the heading "On Certain Problems of the History of Bolshevism," in which Stalin in effect equates the ideology of the Social Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania and the entire left wing of the Second International in the West on the one hand, and Kautskyism and Trotskyism on the other, at the same time reproaching the small group of left-wing Germans for the fact that it did not split the Socialist Party of Germany before World War I. As far as the Polish Communist movement is concerned, for many years this letter paralyzed straightforward critical investigation, from positions of Leninism, of the ideological legacy of the Social Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania. It was not until 1935 that the Seventh Congress of the Communist International revised the entire work of the Comintern and its method of operation. The report obligated all the sections of the International "to overcome in the shortest possible period the survivals of the sectarian tradition which have made it difficult to find an approach to the Social Democratic workers," emphasizing at the same time that the Executive Committee of the Communist International must, in solving all problems, "be guided by the concrete conditions and characteristics of each country and as a rule avoid direct intervention in the internal organizational affairs of the Communist parties." Georgi Dimitrov stated at the Congress: " A set pattern has been employed in the tactics and slogans for all countries, and the concrete situations in each individual country have not been taken into account"; and this despite Lenin's persistent warning against schematization and mechanical leveling of tactical principles. It is worth while to quote the earlier statement by Brand, the prominent activist of the Communist Party of Poland, that "all the more important parties of the Comintern must share the

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responsibility for the management of the Communist International," 18 and Kostrzewa's appeal that "the important sections of the Communist International be more self-reliant in the policies of their own parties and that they have a greater sense of responsibility for international affairs." 19 At that time, this was considered by the sectarian elements in the Communist Party of Poland to be a violation of internationalism. If the Seventh Congress of the Communist International did not have the salutary effects which could have been expected f r o m it, this was due to a very great extent to the mass repressive measures prevailing at the time in the USSR, this having the result of torpedoing a number of united-front and popular-front activities in Poland and other capitalist countries in the West. Stalin's speech at the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) in M a r c h of 1937, on the aggravation of the class struggle apace with the progress of socialism in the USSR, on the widespread sabotage in the ranks of the Party itself,20 also had uniform repercussions in the other Communist parties and above all the Communist Party of Poland. T h e dissolution of the Communist Party of Poland, with all the well-known consequences of this decision, occurred in a situation in which the Party was going through the peak period of its ideological development, in which it was setting patterns of correct implementation of the resolutions of the Seventh Congress of the Communist International, and in which it had started becoming the party of the working class and the people. T h e tragedy of Polish Communists was all the greater and more painful for this reason. T h e initiation of thorough studies of the past of the international Communist movement, of its heroic and beautiful as18

Brand's letter to the Central Committee in Poland. January, 1924. " K o s t r z e w a ' s letter to the party leadership in Poland, quoted by Czerwiec at the III Congress of the C P P , pp. 122-23. [The III Congress of the C o m m u n i s t Party of Poland took place in March. 1925. in Minsk, Soviet Belorussia.—Ed.] " Lenin a n d Stalin. On Parly Construction (Warsaw. 1952), II, 752.

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pects, but its tragic sides as well, is the common concern of all the Communist and workers parties. It must be stated with the greatest emphasis that the present leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, headed by Comrade Khrushchev, deserves thanks that the Communist Party of Poland has been fully rehabilitated in world Communist opinion and that today, with our heads high, we can speak of the contributions and heroism of our great forerunner [party], . . . The same issue of Polityka carried the text of the speech made at the Central Committee Plenum by Oskar Lange, economist and former Polish Ambassador to the United States. His speech included the following passage: ". . . There was a time when it was impossible to practice even disciplines like cybernetics and mathematical logic as allegedly contradictory to Marxism. These very sciences are the basis for the construction of all kinds of self-regulating and self-steering equipment, mathematical machinery, rockets and sputniks, also of the automation of industry. Einstein's theory was also blacklisted for a time; yet it not only has application in astronomy and cosmology but also is being confirmed today in nuclear physics laboratory practice. I do not even speak of the harm done to the social sciences, and most of all to economic science, by the dogmatism which grew out of the phenomenon of the personality cult; of its damaging influence on the application of modern scientific methods, especially on mathematical-accounting methods and on modern electronic machines in economic administration. It hampered a full utilization of the great opportunities for economizing on expenditures and for achieving effective results provided by a planned socialist economy. Research and scientific methods in these fields have now been restored to their rightful place in the Soviet Union, and it is in these very fields that Soviet science has scored important achievements. "As Marxists we know that the phenomenon of the personality cult cannot be reduced solely to the problem of one man's character, or of a small group of people. We deal here with a social phenomenon, which demands a Marxist analysis. Comrade Gomulka presented an outline of such an analysis in his speech, indicating how the phenomenon of Stalin's personality cult originated in the specific historical conditions of the Soviet Union. This can be comprehended if we place it against the background of a civil war and foreign intervention, capitalist encirclement and foreign intelligence activi-

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ties, economic and cultural backwardness of the country, the weakness of the proletariat in a country with a predominantly peasant population, the exhaustion resulting from civil war and tensions due to collectivization, etc. We still lack a clear picture of what the other alternatives were and why they were not chosen. This is a difficult and complicated matter; its analysis will require time. This task belongs, first of all, to the Soviet comrades. "It is not exclusively a problem of satisfying our theoretical curiosity; the whole international workers movement needs such an analysis for practical reasons. The phenomenon of the personality cult and everything linked with it is not an inevitable stage through which all countries, and especially underdeveloped countries, must pass in the process of building socialism. . . ." 47.

" T H E D I R E C T I O N OF R E N E W A L AND THE M A R C H T O W A R D

COMMUNISM." Editorial in Nowe

Drogi

( W a r s a w ) , De-

cember, 1961. 21 . . . W H E N we evaluate the achievements of the XXII Congress we sometimes hear some comrades asking: Was it really necessary to return to those painful matters of the past, matters which have already been condemned by the X X Congress; has the disclosure of the truth about the past not brought and does it not bring now more harm than benefit to our movement? Everything which was said up to now proves that an open and decisive break with the cult of Stalin, finally accomplished during the XXII Congress, was not only needed but was a condition for further development. The construction of communism does not mean only the creation of a material-technical basis, but also ridding interhuman relations and relations between people and the state of everything that deforms and strains these relationships. But one more thing must be added. The very asking of this question shows that the comrades who try to weigh the damages and the gains in such a way assume that to reject some distortions and mistakes, to give up mass repressions against innocent 71 Nowe Drogi is the monthly theoretical organ of the Central Committee of the PUWP.

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people, is enough, while it is still possible to rule, to direct the society and the Party by methods which are an inseparable part of the whole system of that past period. They do not understand that the whole complex of these methods is a unit, that there is an unbreakable chain which leads from the replacement of political leadership by administrative activity, from the violation of collegiality and self-elevation of particular leaders above the collectives and their control, to a brutal autocracy and bloody repressions against the faithful and valuable cadres of the Party. Moreover, these comrades do not understand that it is not the disclosure of the consequences of Stalin's cult that did most harm to our system, but that most harm was done by the system itself, whose overthrow and liquidation was impossible without a bold disclosure of the whole truth concerning the system. Lastly, they do not understand an extremely important fact: Not only has the liquidation of the system linked with the socalled cult of Stalin become an historical necessity, but also the forces and objective conditions in which this task can be accomplished have fully matured. Any sort of historical fatalism is foreign to Marxism. A disclosure of the sources and objective preconditions that allowed the growth and established the cult of personality does by no means constitute its historical justification. Today, we already know some of these circumstances: the isolation of the Soviet Union; the need to accomplish a sudden leap in economic development, a leap which required strong central leadership and great sacrifices from the masses; the backwardness of the country; the lack of strong democratic traditions in the nation, which for hundreds of years was under the autocracy of the tsars; the weakening of the working class, bled by the revolution and civil war. But the existence of these objective factors does not mean at all that the development had to proceed the way it did. After all, aside from the objective factors there are also subjective factors. There is no situation in which a party or particular individuals have no choice, and where it would be impossible to solve particular

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contradictions by different methods, at a smaller cost, avoiding a great deal of useless suffering and negative consequences. Moreover, when these objective factors began to disappear, when, as a result of the activity of the Party and the Soviet people themselves, the face of the Soviet Union underwent a fundamental change, then the cult of Stalin, the whole system related to him became, in a historical sense, suspended in a vacuum. It had to be unmasked and overcome. The unity of our movement is being strengthened and becomes more profound as these truths are being understood, as they are being put into practice, not by pointless contemplation of the past, but by building on the inspiring perspectives which the XXII Congress and its program of the construction of communism in the USSR, its new and creative appreciation of basic questions and problems of the international proletariat opens to the whole international Communist movement. It is a new unity, qualitatively different from that of the past era, which was to a large degree an illusory unity. Because, in point of fact, the premise that there may exist a total unanimity in every matter and at every moment among various parties, as well as among members of each of these parties acting in different and frequently in completely dissimilar conditions, faced by variable problems, was profoundly undialectical. Such a unity resulted in reality in the fact that the views and opinions of one party, or to be more precise, the views and opinions of its leadership were being imposed on all parties. A true unity of the international workers movement cannot be based on such a fictitious unanimity. A real unity postulates, as the XX Congress proclaimed and the Moscow conferences and the XXII Congress reaffirmed, the independence of every party in solving its own specific problems. It postulates an exchange of views, a discussion in which a common position is worked out, a common attitude in regard to decisive and general problems basic to all parties. Such a unity is based on the fact that Communist and workers parties are founded on a common ideology, that they utilize one mighty weapon—Marxism-Leninism—to resolve their problems. Moreover, this unity is based on a fundamental

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factor—the international character of the proletariat and of its struggle; the common nature of the basic problems and the existence of a common enemy—the bourgeoisie, which is also an international force. To justify the willful acts committed by them in the past and still committed at present in their country, the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor, by defending Stalin's methods of activity condemned by the XX Congress and by the whole international workers movement, break away from this unity. They also break this unity when they attack from extremely dogmatic positions the peaceful policy of the USSR and of other socialist countries. International Communist opinion, including that of our party, regards their position with indignation and condemnation. . . . 4 8 . MIECZYSLAW

RAKOWSKI,

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

"CONTENT AND FORMS OF UNITY." Nowe

OF

Polityka.

Drogi,

N o . 1,

January, 1962. . . . AS is justly pointed out, the Statement of November, 1960, formulated new principles of unity and cooperation of the world Communist movement. The relationship among parties was based on Leninist principles. However, it is not only a return to ideas proclaimed and implemented by Lenin. The participants of the Moscow Conference, creatively applying Marxism-Leninism, took into account various conditions in which Communists are operating in the second half of the twentieth century—conditions which could not be foreseen by Lenin. These new conditions, discussed at length in the Statement, explain why the Communist parties not only pledged themselves to abide by the principles of the adopted document, but also acknowledged the form of conferences, mutual consultations, and discussions to be the best and most adapted to our times. This means that at the present stage of the development of the movement, organizations like the Comintern or the Cominform were judged to be obsolete. In studying it we cannot fail to see that the Statement is the opposite of the Stalinist

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conception of the unity of the international Communist movement. The concept of unity outlined in the Statement excludes the existence of a chief center, also of a single privileged party which could impose its own views on others. There are no dominant and subordinate parties. All parties are independent and autonomous. Adherence to this principle by no means contradicts the vanguard place of the CPSU in the world Communist movement. This place of the CPSU was determined by the past development of the movement, by the conditions in which it operates at the present time and the task which it has to perform. . . . The CPSU deserves great credit for the decisive way in which it declared war on the system of the cult of personality, thus initiating a great and creative process of the rebirth of the world Communist movement. The CPSU is the first party which prepared a concrete program for the construction of communism. The XXII Congress of the CPSU, which strengthens the position of world Communism, testifies as to this party's leading role. The vanguard role of the CPSU results then from fact, from experience, and from concrete results. Let us stop to consider the problem of the independence and the autonomy of all parties. Such a system of relationships among parties by no means exempts the whole movement from a mutual, so to speak, collective responsibility for what is happening within world Communism. For example, if the situation arises in which some party violates the pledges which it undersigned, if it pursues a policy harmful to the interest of socialism, then the whole Communist movement, in view of these facts, not only has the right but has the duty to take a stand; it must protest and demand explanations; it must cut itself off with full determination from that party which by its activity actually weakens the positions of world Communism. Such is the situation in our movement at the present time. The leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor, although they acknowledged the correctness of the political line of the XX Congress and have placed their signatures under the State-

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ment of the participants of the Moscow Conference, demonstrated their attachment to the system of the cult of personality; they act in the spirit of dogmatism and sectarianism and practice an adventurous policy. The views advocated for quite some time by the leaders of the A P L do not concern matters of trifling or secondary nature. Hoxha and Shehu have been stating more or less clearly for quite some time that they oppose the policy of peaceful coexistence as the general line of our movement. In February, 1961, at the Fourth Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor, Enver Hoxha, in his general report, confined himself only to a repetition of that part of the Moscow Statement which dealt with the aggressiveness of imperialism and its desire for war. However, he did not mention at all the possibility of avoiding wars under the present circumstances. T h e statements of the leaders of the A P L after the X X I I Congress, which publicly revealed their views on key problems of the second half of the twentieth century, and which were expressed previously only at closed conferences, indicate that in matters of war and peace their attitude is in contradiction to the Declaration of the Moscow Conference. Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu pursue a policy which clearly attacks the unity of the international Communist movement. The CPSU was right in raising this problem at its X X I I Congress. A further silence could have led only to a weakening of the position of world communism, to a blunting of the drive of o u r movement. An attempt at patching u p the situation created by the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor, the concealment of the evil things which take place in Albania today f r o m world Communist opinion, has certainly nothing in comm o n with the principles of Marxism-Leninism. To speak of the humanistic content of our ideology and at the same time consciously to be silent about facts which clearly contradict communist ideology would be plain hypocrisy. N o r is it possible to speak of the unbreakable unity of world communism at the time when one party brutally violates the principles of this unity. The argument that the truth brought out about the activity

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of the APL leadership provides the bourgeoisie with a weapon cannot be defended. Is it possible to hide from the world for any length of time the true attitude of the leaders of the APL, the policies practiced in that country? Surely not. But such facts compromise the socialist system and the whole international Communist movement. The interests of the Communist movement have only gained from the fact that we ourselves exposed the situation which arose in Albania. Our movement cannot tolerate a brutal violation of humanistic principles. Never again do we want to see a chasm grow between theory and practice. This should be remembered especially by those who are inclined to minimize the significance of the adventurous policy of the leaders of the APL. The problem of the unity of the international Communist movement was also placed on the agenda of the XXII Congress of the CPSU. The CPSU confirmed its loyalty to the Statement of the Moscow Conference and justly stated that in the years since the XX Congress the international unity and solidarity of Communists has been strengthened. This is unquestionably the result of the struggle against the manifestations of the system of the cult of personality in this field. When examining the problem of the unity of the international Communist movement a question naturally arises: What next? It was not by accident that we cited at such length fragments of the Statement of the Moscow Conference, concerning principles that eighty-one parties accepted as the basis of unity. Here we find the answer to the above question. There is no need to search for other principles. This does not mean, however, that the unity of the movement is a forbidden subject which cannot be discussed or deliberated on. When examining the development of the world Communist movement since the XX Congress of the CPSU, it is easy to see that the rejection of the practices and theories of the cult of personality and the return of the movement to Leninist positions are taking place through struggle, a struggle which is not yet concluded. This is quite a natural phenomenon. It is simply im-

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possible to imagine that such a great change in the movement could be accomplished smoothly and without conflicts. The emergence of various attitudes and views is a natural phenomenon, especially in our complicated times. This is so because the present era requires a réévaluation of many suppositions and views, which have been hardened through decades. This réévaluation is talcing place in every sphere of life, and hence in the field which is the subject of our discussion. We cannot exclude in advance the possibility that polemical and controversial problems may arise within the Communist camp. The most important thing, however, is that the unity of the movement, which is being shaped in struggle, is not an artificial and illusory unity; that it is not based on dogmas and diktats, but is the result of a free choice made by the Communist parties. While carefully examining the exchange of views now taking place in the Communist movement on the form and content of unity, one should not forget that above various differences of opinion as to various problems facing daily the Communist movement, there exist mutual goals and mutual ideological premises. The struggle for peace and peaceful coexistence, the struggle with imperialism, the support of national liberation movements, the defense of the working man's interests—these are the common goals which unite the movement. Each of these general goals may be divided into individual problems. A full unanimity neither must exist nor can exist on all of these problems. But we must protect cohesion and unity in matters which are most important and most essential for the whole of humanity; and first of all—in matters of war and peace. The interests of the whole of humanity demand so. The Communists carry too great a responsibility for the fate of the whole world to accept any deviations from the main strategic premise, which is the peaceful coexistence of the two systems. All Communists and all parties must never forget it. Our party is faithfully observing the principles outiined in the Statement of the Moscow Conference, both the principles which stress the full autonomy and independence of the parties, and

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those which stress the significance of the unity of the international Communist movement. This is so because we believe that these principles are and ought to be inseparable. We believe that the respect and the implementation of all principles presented in the Statement constitute the true manifestation of internationalism, not only in words and speeches, but—above all—in practice. SOCIALIST (GERMAN

UNITY PARTY OF GERMANY (SED) DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC [GDR])

4 9 . WALTER ULBRICHT, FIRST SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE SOCIALIST UNITY PARTY OF GERMANY. R E P O R T TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE S E D , NOVEMBER 2 3 - 2 6 ,

1 9 6 1 . Neues

Deutschland

(East Berlin),

N o v e m b e r 2 6 and 2 8 , 1 9 6 1 . 2 2

. . . (IT was not necessary for anyone to speak at this Congress about the leading role of the CPSU, because the role of the CPSU as the Party which was the first to lead the proletariat to victory in the Great October Socialist Revolution, which was the first to construct socialism, and which is now showing the way to the communist society is beyond doubt.) . . . One can see from the press of the Albanian Party of Labor that only the Albanian leadership confronts the problems of the present era with a complete lack of understanding and that it is isolating itself. It would have been desirable and it would have helped the Albanian party, had the Chinese friends commented in some way on the anti-Soviet attacks and on the violations of the Warsaw Treaty by the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor. . . . (Comrade Khrushchev has shown how under the leadership 22 On November 29, 1961, Pravda published a summary of Ulbricht's speech. Considerable sections of his speech were summarized or deleted, presumably for reasons of space. Passages omitted by Pravda which affect the meaning of his speech are indicated by angular brackets. Neues Deutschland is the daily organ of the Central Committee of the SED.

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of Stalin, the crimes of Beria and others were kept hidden. Even after Beria's arrest rather long investigations were necessary before everything came to light. Some comrades are asking, even now, why these matters were discussed in such detail at the XXII Congress. They had to be, dear comrades! First of all, the XXII Congress was a regular congress, at which an account was rendered for the entire period since the X X Congress, that is, since 1956.) The detailed treatment of the mistakes and of the incredible abuse of power was also necessary in order to make impossible a repetition at any time or at any place. I think we all agree with the decisive condemnation of the mistakes and crimes which were committed under the leadership of Stalin. I think that we are also agreed that decisive and fundamental measures had to be taken in order to prevent the recurrence of such things. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Comrade Khrushchev personally, have earned the deep gratitude of the entire international workers movement for their consistent and successful struggle for the elimination of the harmful personality cult. But that it is necessary to continue the open struggle in this sphere is shown by the conduct of the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor and of the Albanian government. They have not only violated the decisions of the Communist and workers parties, jointly adopted by all, as well as the Warsaw Treaty, but they are also glorifying ideologically the Stalinist course and are making the same mistakes. The treatment of these questions at the Congress was necessary also in order to overcome once and for all the consequences of the activities of the antiparty group of Malenkov-MolotovKaganovich-Bulganin-Pervukhin-Saburov as well as of Shepilov and Voroshilov. Comrade Voroshilov, who is an honest Communist, was criticized at the Congress for his mistakes and made a written declaration. (Since the question of how these mistakes were possible has been raised, I want to refer to the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU of June, 1956. We must realize that the Soviet Union, surrounded in those times by enemies, was waging

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a hard internal class struggle. Under these conditions Stalin abolished the Leninist party norms, eliminated collective leadership, and abused state power. The root of the mistakes and crimes thus lies in the absence of collective leadership, in the abolition of the Leninist norms of democratic centralism in party and state. In this way was begotten soulless bureaucratism.) The question is posed: What guarantees are there that such mistakes will never recur? This question is treated in detail in the report of the CC of the CPSU. Firm guarantees against a repetition of such mistakes have been created through the restoration of the Leninist norms of work of the party and of the soviets, through the decisions on the new norms of legality in the USSR and the securing of personal freedoms of the citizens as well as through the ties of the leadership of the party and of the state with the people, and last but not least, through the unsparing unmasking of all mistakes. . . . Naturally the consequences of the personality cult have also manifested themselves in the German Democratic Republic. The Central Committee of our party, making full use of the knowledge and experience gained by the CPSU, after the XX Congress waged a decisive struggle against distortions and dogmatism, and worked out new problems and new tasks for our party. We have also endeavored to attain a relaxation of tensions in the relations between the two German states (and to bring about a new relationship with Social Democracy. We discarded a number of regulations and practices which had resulted from the severity of the "cold war.") Care was taken to ensure the strict observance of democratic legality. We have oriented the Party and the working class in a forward direction, have set forth the clear perspectives of the struggle, and have at the same time overcome mistakes and weaknesses of the past. We have solved the problems which emerged from the XX Congress step by step, without permitting the opponent to break in on us. In this period our party has again proved its mettle. In this connection, it must be considered that the G D R has had to wage the struggle against aggressive

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West German imperialism under the most complicated circumstances on the open western border of the socialist camp. It was characteristic of that earlier confrontation that the enemy struck his main blow against the construction of socialism in the G D R and in this way adopted the position of Beria. As is known, Beria had opposed the construction of socialism in the German Democratic Republic. He advocated a policy of retreat and capitulation to the imperialist forces of the West German Federal Republic. Beria's and Malenkov's rejection of Leninist party norms and of the principles of Soviet democracy was connected with a policy of capitulation before imperialism. Beria was indignant when I opposed his policy in regard to the German question in 1953. Shepilov too turned against my characterization of the mistakes of Stalin at the Higher Party School in Moscow. Well—these things have been overcome. As far as the personality cult is concerned, it had been proven in the previously cited declaration of the Politburo of 1956 that under the conditions of the development of the SED such a cult could not arise, precisely because from the beginning collectivity of leadership was an important element in the ideological fusion of the KPD and the SPD, and because distortions which manifested themselves were corrected in time. All the shouting about the "personality cult and Stalinism in the G D R " is nothing but an expression of the ideological class struggle against Marxism-Leninism, against the leading role of the working class, against the consistent Marxist-Leninist policy of our party, and against the first German state of workers and peasants which is successfully building socialism. (Thus there are people who don't like the German WorkerPeasant State. Even the name is unpleasant for them, as is the name German Democratic Republic. They believe that they can gain some advantages in their inflammatory propaganda by speaking of the "Ulbricht state" or "Ulbricht regime" as synonyms for the German Worker-Peasant State or the German Democratic Republic. In the final analysis this is only the expression of the inability of these people to grasp the historic

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meaning of the first German Worker-Peasant State, of the leading role of the German working class and its Party, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany. Otherwise, they would not be so foolish as to attempt to tell themselves and others that in the GDR there is no working class which has something to say, and that there is no Socialist Unity Party of Germany, but only "Walter Ulbricht." Hundreds and thousands of letters from factories, towns and villages, from individuals and collectives are almost daily sent to my address. But everyone in the German Democratic Republic knows that when these citizens of the GDR write to me, they are turning in this way to the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party or to the State Council, that is, to tested collectives to whom they want to entrust their problems for advice and decision. No matter to what person these petitions are directed—all the basic questions contained in them are discussed and decided collectively in the Central Committee of the SED as well as in the State Council. International monopoly capital and its lackeys, the right-wing Social Democratic leaders, have utilized the mistakes and shortcomings of the past, which were condemned and removed at the X X Party Congress of the CPSU, for a wild campaign of slander and calumny against the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist camp, against Marxism-Leninism, and against the unity and solidarity of the Communist and workers parties. Under the influence of the enemy's diversionary ideological work against our party, revisionist phenomena manifested themselves in the GDR at that time, especially in higher schools, universities, theaters, and at other artistic institutions, as well as on the part of some journalists, writers, and artists— phenomena with which the Party came to grips. This revealed basic differences of opinion between the Party leadership and the group of Schirdewan, Wollweber, and Ziller. This fractionalist group was of the opinion that the policy of international relaxation pursued by the Soviet Union and the GDR required also a "relaxation" of our state organs of power

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and the use of the tactic of the "safety valve." The fractionalist activity of this group was directed against the implementation of the decisions of the Third Party Conference and of the Central Committee and thus objectively supported the subversive activities of the enemy. This group wanted to juxtapose an opportunist line to the general line of the Party and wanted to alter the party leadership. The opportunistic conceptions of the Schirdewan group were the result of an incorrect assessment of the situation and of the underestimation of the danger of the NATO policy as well as of the attempts of the West German militarists to undermine the GDR. . . . Besides dogmatism in ideological work, there appeared for some time pronounced dogmatism and schematism in organizational and cadre work, of which Schirdewan was the main exponent. He developed a rigidly schematic type of work, which tied quite a number of party workers to their desks and prevented them from helping the primary organizations to solve their tasks on the spot. Such a system was bound to impede work with individuals and the development of cadres, the further development of intra-party democracy, the consistent application of Leninist norms of party life, and it impeded the further consolidation of the ties between the Party and the masses.) . . , 2 3 BULGARIAN

COMMUNIST

PARTY

(BCP)

5 0 . TODOR ZHIVKOV, F I R S T SECRETARY OF THE C E N T R A L C O M M I T T E E OF THE BULGARIAN C O M M U N I S T PARTY. TO THE CENTRAL C O M M I T T E E

28, 1961. Rabotnichesko

OF THE B C P ,

REPORT

NOVEMBER

Delo (Sofia), December 2, 1961. 24

. . . COMRADES, what did the work of the X X I I CPSU Congress show? The X X I I CPSU Congress was literally a tri" Pravda summarizes the passage within brackets: " W . Ulbricht dwelt on concrete problems of party work." On December 8, 1961, Pravda published a summary of Zhivkov's speech. Considerable sections of his speech were summarized or deleted,

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umph of the line adopted by the XX CPSU Congress, the triumph of this line in all respects. The Leninist norms of party and state life were fully restored in the Soviet Union. The Leninist principles of work and collective leadership are most strictly observed. The fighting efficiency and leading role of the Party have been considerably increased. The creative initiative and activity of the masses have grown beyond recognition. This is the result of the decisive condemnation of the personality cult, and of the consistent struggle to liquidate its harmful consequences. However, the XXII CPSU Congress considered it necessary to raise again some of these problems for discussion in order to bring the matter to an end, to put, as the saying goes, "a dot over the ' i ' " on the question of Stalin's cult. Was it necessary and was it appropriate that the Congress should dwell again on the cult of personality? Yes, this was not only correct but necessary. After the XX Congress, the XXII Congress was the first regular congress of the CPSU. During the whole period between the two congresses of the CPSU an immense work was carried out to overcome the cult of Stalin's personality, to restore the Leninist norms and principles of party and state life and leadership, and to liquidate the vicious methods of work, distortions, and abuse of power, all of them connected with the personality cult. Therefore the Central Committee of the CPSU was obliged to sum up at the regular XXII Congress its efforts to liquidate the harmful consequences of Stalin's personality cult and to implement the political course outlined by the XX CPSU Congress. The discussion of the question of the Stalin personality cult at the X X I I CPSU Congress was also dictated by the interests of the international Communist and workers movement. It is no secret that the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor disagrees with the position taken at the X X CPSU Congress on the cult of Stalin and the cult of personality in general. It is presumably for reasons of space. Passages omitted by Pravda which affect the meaning of his speech are indicated by angular brackets. Rabotnichesko Delo is the daily organ of the Central Committee of the BCP.

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not only a matter of theoretical differences on such a question of principle. T h e point is that the cult of personality has grown deep roots in the Albanian Party of Labor and in the Albanian People's Republic and determines the direction of their entire development. Although the personality cult was condemned by the international Communist movement, there are still enough remnants of it, and they are alive and entrenched in the consciousness of some strata of the party membership as well as in some nonparty circles. (Reports coming from the various parts of our country reaffirm also that among certain circles of the Party and workers there are still people who are strongly contaminated by the germs of the personality cult, people who show hesitation in regard to the decisions of the X X and X X I I congresses about the cult of Stalin, and who do not understand clearly enough the sense and essence of these decisions. Therefore in our country, too, the work in this respect has not been completed. What is in fact the objective appraisal of the role and activity of Stalin? Up to the year 1934 Stalin's role was of one kind, and after that year it was of a different character. We cannot but have a positive attitude toward Stalin's role and activity up to the year 1934. Stalin merits praise for his part in the preparation and execution of the October Socialist Revolution, in the Civil War, in the struggle of the Communist Party for the industrialization of the country, the collectivization of agriculture, and the construction of socialism in the Soviet Union. His role in the Party's struggle against Trotskyism, against the right-wing opportunists and bourgeois nationalists, for the ideological defeat of all enemies of Leninism, and for the protection of Leninism is positive. During this period Stalin indeed greatly served the CPSU and the international Communist and workers movement; this is why we cannot fail to make a positive appraisal of Stalin's role and work up to 1934, when he still followed the instructions and admonitions of Lenin. However, Stalin's role and activity after 1934, and until his death, are a different matter. As you know, Lenin, in his testament to the Thirteenth Congress of the Bolshevik Party, cor-

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rectly described Stalin by emphasizing that he was very rude, insufficiently considerate of his comrades, capricious, and abusive of power. Stalin's negative features, which during Lenin's lifetime appeared only in their embryonic form, developed in the period after 1934 into a strong abuse of power. During this period, Stalin, as is well known, was put on a pedestal and held up as a classic of Marxism-Leninism, as the leader and teacher of the Bolshevik Party and Soviet peoples, as the teacher and leader of the international Communist and workers movement.) The glorification, indeed the cult, of Stalin inflicted heavy damage on the CPSU, on the Soviet socialist state, on the Soviet peoples, and on the international Communist and workers movement. This period of Stalin's activity is associated with the physical destruction of many Soviet citizens—mainly Communists—the physical annihilation of three generations of cadres of Lenin's party tested in struggles and devoted to the cause of communism. Mass repressions against party, state, economic, military, and Komsomol cadres were undertaken. In order to have a theoretical base for the policy of mass repressions and terror, Stalin also created a special theory. According to this theory, simultaneously with the construction of socialism the class struggle had to be intensified more and more, while according to him, the main enemy was inside the Party—the enemy with the party card. This, as proved by life and experience, is an incorrect, anti-Marxist, and harmful theory. It inflicted great damage on the CPSU and on the international Communist and workers movement. . Owing to the thoughtless, irresponsible, and impervious attitude of Stalin to the threat of Hitlerite aggression, the Soviet Union proved to be unprepared to meet the sudden attack, to beat off at once the attack of Hider's hordes. . . . The errors, distortions, and abuses committed during the period of the Stalin personality cult resulted in great defeats, for which the Soviet peoples paid with great sacrifices, blood, and devastation. Otherwise the sacrifices during the war would have been considerably smaller. . . . On the one hand, during the period of the cult of personality

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dogmatism and sectarianism were introduced in the theory and practice of the international Communist and workers movement. They created serious difficulties in the development of the fraternal parties and the entire world Communist movement. Dogmatism and sectarianism were a serious obstacle in the rallying of the working class and of all progressive forces around the Communist parties. It is dogmatism and sectarianism which, in certain countries, resulted in the isolation of the Communists from the broad masses of the workers. This led either to passivity or to risky action in the revolutionary struggle. After World War II, dogmatism and sectarianism hindered the use by certain fraternal parties of the new possibilities created as a result of the profound changes in the situation and in the balance of power in the world, in the interest of the victory of the working class and the democratic forces. On the other hand, during the period of the cult of Stalin's personality, many of the cadres of the international Communist and workers movement, tested in struggle and faithful to Marxism-Leninism, were subjected to repressions. During that period well-trained cadres of our party, who had passed through the fire of the September uprising of 1923 and through a difficult underground struggle against monarcho-fascist dictatorship and who are now rehabilitated, were also repressed. . . . Let us now place on the scales of history—this implacable and objective mirror of the actions of peoples, classes, parties, and eminent personalities—Stalin's positive and negative roles, Stalin's pluses and minuses. What will they show? What will be the balance? Stalin's negative role, his minus factors, predominate on the scales. . . . With complete unanimity, clearly realizing that it was carrying out a just and absolutely necessary act, the XXII CPSU Congress decided to remove Stalin's body from the Lenin Mausoleum. The Congress, with hard logic and well-founded arguments, proved the necessity for the complete and final destruction of Stalin's cult and the cult of the personality, so that they should be eradicated, not repeated, and should never be displayed elsewhere. As a result of this profound conviction,

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the X X I I CPSU Congress introduced in the Party Program and Rules stipulations which raise to a higher level the principle of collectivity in party and state leadership, bar the possibility of life tenure in the most responsible party and state posts by individuals, guarantee constant renewal of the responsible organs, and all this excludes the possibility of reviving the cult of personality. All this clearly bespeaks the strength and vitality of our socialist socioeconomic and political system. Regardless of the cult of the personality and the additional difficulties and negative consequences linked with it, during all that time, including the period of the cult of personality, the Soviet Union was faithfully marching along the path of socialism and communism, the Soviet people under the leadership of the CPSU attained great successes. . . . Regardless of the cult of personality and the negative consequences linked with it, our people's democratic countries have eliminated the exploiting capitalist order and, with the fraternal help of the Soviet Union, have advanced on the path to socialism. . . . The restoration of the Leninist norms and principles for party and state life in the Soviet Union after the complete liquidation of Stalin's cult is closely linked with the struggle for the ideological, political, and organizational defeat of the fractional antiparty group of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and others. The struggle against the antiparty group is a fundamental question not only for the CPSU but also for the international Communist and workers movement. For the fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties the struggle against the antiparty group was a fundamental and sharp political struggle, a struggle of the new with the old. The question was whether the Leninist policy of the XX CPSU Congress would be pursued or whether the vicious methods used during the period of the cult of the personality which were condemned by the CPSU and the entire international Communist movement would be restored again. This is the main thing, the core of the question about the antiparty group. After the X X CPSU Congress a sharp about-face was made in the development of the Party and the Soviet Union as well

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as in the development of the international Communist movement. Such sharp reversals have never happened anywhere and will not happen without a struggle of the new with the old. Unfortunately certain leading workers directly linked with the cult of Stalin, who had detached themselves from life, attempted to offer fierce resistance to the implementation of the Leninist course which was outlined by the X X CPSU Congress. They did not even refrain from the most shameful acts for a Communist—they began fractionalist and subversive activities. Behind the back of the Presidium and the Central Committee they reached a secret agreement to try to gain control of the party and state leadership, made use of various methods of struggle and intrigues unworthy of Bolshevik political workers. . . These were not disagreements pertaining to specific organizational or individual political problems, but disagreements pertaining to the essence of party and state policy, disagreements pertaining to the general line of the Party. And not only this— the fractionalists were afraid that they would have to answer for the abuse of authority during the period of the cult of Stalin because they were personally and directly responsible for many mass repressions against party, state, economic, military, and Komsomol cadres. . . . As is well known already, at the X CPSU Congress in 1921, on Lenin's proposal, a special resolution was approved against factions and groups in the Party. This resolution provides for the complete eradication of all fractionalism. It is emphasized that those who fail to follow this decision of the Congress must be unconditionally and at once expelled from the Party. This resolution became the basis for strengthening the unity and cohesion of the CPSU. The antiparty group of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and others also flagrantly violated this Leninist principle of the Party. Reality and the XXII CPSU Congress have passed a severe but just sentence on the members of the fractionalist group. . . . The complete unmasking of the fractionalists was all the more imperative because of the fact that the Albanian leaders are tak-

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ing under their protection, together with the cult of Stalin, the most inveterate members of the antiparty group. . . (The policy of peaceful coexistence does not mean a perpetuation of the division of the world between capitalism and socialism. It contributes to the development of the forces of progress and socialism; it assists the struggle of peoples against aggressive military blocs, and contributes to the successes of the national liberation movement. The policy of peaceful coexistence is a form of class struggle between socialism and capitalism, a form of strenuous struggle of the proletariat against the aggressive forces of imperialism in the international arena. This should be clear to all, but it appears that over the question of the policy of peaceful coexistence misunderstanding and hesitation are manifested in some places. I am not speaking here about the fact that the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor, owing to its disagreement with the substance of this policy, has attempted to distort and falsify it, to equate it with pacifism, with a kind of blunting of our revolutionary tactics and strategy. The Moscow Conference of November, 1960, has clarified this question.) 25 (However, there are, even in our country, some people who are vague about this, who do not understand the policy of peaceful coexistence. This was shown in regard to our efforts on behalf of the signing of a peace treaty with Germany. When world tension over the question of West Berlin increased, certain comrades were at a loss and asked: "Are we not for peaceful coexistence? Why then have we definitely decided to sign the treaty by the end of the year? Why should we be in such a hurry?" 26

These three paragraphs were summarized by Pravda as follows: "The policy of peaceful coexistence, stressed T. Zhivkov, has raised high the authority of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries in the eyes of all peoples, has strengthened their influence in all corners of the world. "Developing the question of the essence of the policy of peaceful coexistence, T. Zhivkov unmasked the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor, which has tried to distort and falsify this policy, identifying it with pacifism, with a certain blunting of our revolutionary tactics and strategy."

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Obviously such comrades hold the opinion that peaceful coexistence is a kind of idyll between the two camps, that peaceful coexistence is conceivable without diplomatic, political, economic, and ideological struggles, which sometimes assume very sharp forms. At the XXII CPSU Congress, N. S. Khrushchev declared that if the Western countries show a readiness for negotiations for reaching a real settlement of the West German problem, then we will not insist that a peace treaty with Germany be signed by the end of this year. There were other comrades who declared that this was a retreat from our position, that we were thus exposing ourselves, and thus harming the prestige of the Soviet Union and socialist countries. The least that could be said about the approach of such people to the solution of the important problems in the international arena—toward the problem of peace and war—is that their approach is sectarian and doctrinaire. Their field of vision is limited; they fail to take into account the changes that are taking place in the world and the main factors that determine the development of these processes. What do such comrades want? That we should follow a policy of adventurism, as recommended with criminal flightiness by the Albanian leaders? . . .) In stressing most categorically the role of the Central Committee as a collective organizer and leader of the Party and country, the Congress, as you are aware, underscored the exceptionally great merits of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, N. S. Khrushchev, for the victory of the Leninist line of the X X Congress in all spheres of life, and for the gigantic progress made by the Soviet Union in recent years. This of course is fully justified and well grounded. It is in full accord with the spirit of Marxism-Leninism. Marxists cannot be nihilists in regard to the role of the individual in history. They would commit a grave mistake if they were to deprive leaders of their individuality both in the Communist and workers movement and in the socialist state as well. . . . (Does all this mean that at present a kind of new personality cult of Comrade Khrushchev is in the making, as some people

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are trying to suggest? No, we cannot say that this is so.) After all, it is precisely the CPSU Central Committee, headed by Comrade Khrushchev, which is the most consistent, firm, and resolute fighter for the complete liquidation of the negative consequences of the cult of Stalin's personality and against the emergence of any kind of personality cult at all. . . . The love of the masses for their leader and his authority is needed for our successful advance. The leader, whether big or small, can gain authority among the people solely by his work, energy, creative thought, and organizational gifts. . . Zhivkov went on to discuss the response of other Communist parties to the CPSU policy and the XXII Congress. Reaffirming the "vanguard role of the CPSU" in the international movement, Zhivkov continued:

In the Leninist CPSU Communists throughout the world see a model for selfless service to the people, a model of fidelity to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, to the appraisals and conclusions of the Moscow conferences of 1957 and 1960, a model of creative development of Marxist-Leninist theory and of irreconcilability toward all manifestations of revisionism, dogmatism, and sectarianism in theory and practice. Representatives from MarxistLeninist parties at the XXII CPSU Congress as well as the Congress itself criticized once more and condemned the revisionist, anti-Leninist views and position of the Yugoslav leaders as expressed in the program of the League of Yugoslav Communists. We, the Central Committee and our entire party, declare once more that we have resolutely condemned and condemn the revisionist theories of the Yugoslav leaders, that their course of isolation and development apart from the world socialist system is harmful and dangerous for the Yugoslav peoples, because finally it may lead to the loss of socialist achievements. As long as the Yugoslav leaders have not renounced their revisionist ideas, we are unable to maintain relations with the League of Yugoslav Communists along party lines. As is well known, our country maintains state, economic, and cultural re-

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lations, and we must say that they are developing successfully. As far as we are concerned, we shall make the necessary efforts for our relations and ties with Yugoslavia to develop successfully in the future along state, economic, and cultural lines. . . . Zhivkov next reviewed the behavior of the Albanian leadership, enumerating major policy differences and some specific grievances.

All these actions and behavior of the Albanian leaders do not correspond either to the interests of the Albanian people, who are building socialism, or to the interests of the socialist camp and the international Communist and workers movement. Such actions and behavior of the Albanian leaders actually lead to the isolation of the Albanian People's Republic from the socialist camp and to the isolation of the Albanian Party of Labor from the international Communist and workers movement. (Thus the thesis has once more been confirmed that by virtue of the logic of the struggle, the right- and left-wing opportunists would ultimately betray Marxism-Leninism and the basic principles of proletarian internationalism, and finally would lead their countries to lose their socialist achievements.) The case of the Albanian Party of Labor is convincing confirmation of the thesis that dogmatism can also become the main danger for a party which stops struggling against it. (This adventurist line and the actions which the Albanian party and state leadership pursue, and the inclusion on the agenda of the question about the behavior of the Albanian leaders are not a surprise for the Central Committee of our party. The Central Committee of our party, as you know, was informed at the appropriate time about the anti-Marxist policy and actions of the present leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor and has a clear and definite position regarding them.) Was it correct to discuss openly and take a principled stand at the XXII CPSU Congress on the behavior of the Albanian leaders? Yes, it was. After several attempts had been made and after all means had been employed to convince the Albanian leaders to renounce their sectarian actions and their adventurist course, and after

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their behavior became known to our ideological enemies, it was found that open discussion of the anti-Leninist behavior of the Albanian leadership and the open call to look for methods to overcome the existing disagreement were the only correct and serious Marxist-Leninist approach to this question. This stand was expressed at the XXII CPSU Congress, by the great majority of the fraternal parties; it was clearly expressed also in the message of greetings from our party delegation. We hope that our Chinese comrades, who through Comrade Chou En-lai's message to the Congress expressed a certain support for the Albanian leaders, will come to understand the anti-Leninist and adventurist course of the Albanian leadership and the harm which this course inflicts on the socialist camp and the international Communist and workers movement. . . . 20 Zhivkov dwelt at length on the changes wrought in Bulgaria since the shift in policy formalized at the Central Committee plenum in April, 1956. (. . . We must not close our eyes to the fact that in our country, in our party, there are certain members, although few in number, who manifest ideological and political instability. They cannot yet understand the truth of the XXII CPSU Congress and the essence of its decisions and are wandering as if in the dark. There are party members who cannot understand the need for a complete unmasking of the Stalin cult and the fractionalist group; they are unable to see the great matter of principle of this decision of the XXII Congress for all fraternal parties; they think that at present a struggle is being waged in the CPSU against certain old Bolsheviks. There are also party " The resolution on Zhivkov's report adopted by the Central Committee of the BCP stated: "The Central Committee of our party hopes that the Chinese comrades who, in the greeting of Comrade Chou En-lai at the Congress, expressed a certain support for the Albanian leaders, will understand the erroneous anti-Leninist and adventurist course of the Albanian leadership and the harm caused by this course to the socialist camp and the international Communist and workers movement." This was the first Communist party resolution to question the role of the C P C in the dispute between the CPSU and the APL.—Ed.

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members who, unwilling to understand the truth, the essence of the decisions of the XX and the XXII CPSU congresses, are trying to open discussions. Their behavior is fraught with danger. They do not take into consideration our party discipline and policy, believing something without taking real facts into account. They are poisoning the atmosphere around them with their unhealthy moods and talking. It must be admitted that such phenomena in our country are not accidental. They show very clearly that the educational work in our party and among the people concerning the cult of Stalin and the cult of personality in general, and about its harmful consequences, has not been completed. Our work of clarifying the great historic significance of the April Plenum of the Party's Central Committee, the restoration of Leninist norms in oui country, has also not been completed. Owing to all this, in many areas of our country there remain in the minds of some of our party members and workers, attitudes favoring the remnants of the personality cult in various forms. These have been manifested in several ways: in propaganda, in rallies, in the decoration of public places, in state and other establishments, offices, clubs, schools, barracks, and so forth. We must not, however, look for an explanation for this only among our comrades in these places. We are still naming large projects, dams, streets, mountain peaks, and so forth after Stalin. This does not help to unmask the cult of personality completely.) Obviously, it is necessary to complete the work of renaming all projects now named after Stalin. It is necessary to purge propaganda of vestiges of veneration and devotion to Stalin. This propaganda must be fully based on the principles of MarxismLeninism. Comrades, the Politburo of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee also thinks that it is necessary to explain and completely overcome the cult of Comrade Vulko Chervenkov's personality, a cult which was created in the past. This cult, as is well known, grew during several years with the help of all ideological, political, and organizational means. The image of

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Comrade Vulko Chervenkov which was created during the period of the cult of the personality does not correspond, as was pointed out at the April Plenum of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee, either to the real capacities and qualities of Comrade Vulko Chervenkov or to his real services to the Party and the people. Comrade Vulko Chervenkov is one of the workers of the Bulgarian Communist Party, and very incorrectly and artificially he was extolled and placed above the collective, above the Politburo and the Party's Central Committee. This is why we think that it is necessary that all exaggerations of Comrade Vulko Chervenkov's role and services, all remnants of the false halo which still surrounds his personality here and there be purged, so that he may appear in the Party and among the people as he is in reality. We must say in this connection that the XXII CPSU Congress and the complete exposure of Stalin's cult are also a great help personally for Comrade Vulko Chervenkov because he may thus also realize completely and precisely the harmful consequences of the cult of his own personality. The complete eradication of all traces of the cult of Comrade Vulko Chervenkov is a necessary condition for the further Marxist-Leninist education of the Party and people and for drawing all the lessons and conclusions for the work of our party from the decisions of the XXII CPSU Congress. (Certain comrades are trying to link the mistakes and illegalities as well as the incorrect methods of work in our country during the cult of Comrade Vulko Chervenkov's personality with the internal and international situation or with the influence of the cult of Stalin. Such an explanation is incomplete, incorrect, and un-Marxist because it does not take into consideration the "subjective" and negative aspects of the experience and character of Comrade Vulko Chervenkov.) Everyone knows that the situation after World War II in which Georgi Dimitrov lived and worked was far more complicated and difficult. International relations were far more aggravated, the international situation of the People's Republic

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of Bulgaria was considerably more difficult, the opposition was active inside the country, the exploiting classes were not yet defeated, and the class struggle was being carried on both openly and secretly. In this complicated situation Georgi Dimitrov observed the Leninist principles of leadership and the method of collectivity in work: he did not abuse power and did not violate the laws of the country. The laws were observed even toward the most malignant enemies of the people's regime. This is why, for us, Georgi Dimitrov has been and will remain a great and consistent pupil of Lenin, the most eminent leader of our party and people, and a distinguished figure in the international Communist and workers movement. . . . Some of the implications of the "personality cult" were discussed by Nikolai Iridzhabakov in an article, "Dogmatism and Creative Marxism," printed in Novo Vreme (Sofia), No. 1, 1962: ". . In practice, contemporary dogmatists often neglect some most important philosophical principles of Marxism-Leninism, on which the entire Marxist-Leninist theory is based. Above all the dogmatists betray Marxism-Leninism by their views on the central problem of philosophy—the relationship of thought to being, the theory of objective reality. . . . Two extremely important conclusions follow: "First, the only criterion for the correctness of a given theory is its coincidence with objective reality; "Second, an absolute, self-contained and immutable theory of nature and society, in their unity and evolution, is impossible. . . . "In the field of philosophy dogmatism is primarily characterized by the literary-scholastic, basically idealistic, and metaphysical treatment of questions. Dogmatists look upon Marxism-Leninism as a self-contained system of firm truths. . . . While the dogmatists speak of the unity of theory and practice, their principal error consists in their inability to produce a fruitful unity of theory and practice, as Marxism understands it. "Marxism maintains that an indivisible unity must exist between theory and practice. But in this unity practice is decisive. It is the source, the end of cognition, the criterion of truth. The dogmatist, on the other hand, reverses this relationship of theory to practice. He uses practice merely to gain new examples so as to confirm old truth. . . ."

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RUMANIAN

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5 1 . GHEORGHE CENTRAL

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GHEORGHIU-DEJ, COMMITTEE

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(RWP) FIRST SECRETARY OF THE

RUMANIAN

PARTY. R E P O R T TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE RUMANIAN WORKERS PARTY, NOVEMBER

THE

WORKERS OF THE

30-DECEMBER

5, 1961. Scinteia (Bucharest), December 7, 1961. 27 . . COMRADES: Fulfillment of the historic tasks facing the Soviet people in the stage of all-out construction of communism would have been impossible without open, courageous condemnation by the XX Congress of J. V. Stalin's personality cult, without the firm and consistent drive to do away with its consequences. The steadfast, indefatigable work carried on during this period by the CPSU and its leaders with a view to reestablishing and developing Leninist standards of party and state life, to constantly widening socialist democracy, to solving certain vital problems of economic and social development has given an immense impetus to the creative activities of the Party and people, has stimulated the initiative of the masses, releasing fresh energy and powerful forces of progress in all spheres. The struggle against the consequences of the personality cult has paved the way for the speedy progress of Soviet society toward communism. . . . The further development of the analysis made by the XX Congress is of outstanding importance not only for the CPSU but also for the entire Communist movement. It is only by such criticism that sure conditions can be created making a repetition of the phenomena of the personality cult impossible. . . .

.

Gheorghiu-Dej outlined the charges made against Stalin in the light of the XXII CPSU Congress and turned next to Rumanian affairs. 27 On December 10, 1961, Pravda published a summary of GheorghiuDej's speech. Considerable sections of his speech were summarized or deleted, presumably for reasons of space. The passages omitted or summarized by Pravda did not significantly affect the meaning of his speech. Scinteia is the daily organ of the Central Committee of the RWP.

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Comrades, Stalin's personality cult was also manifest in our country. Stalin's name and person were extolled. While Stalin's works were translated and printed in mass editions, the translation and publication of the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin were neglected. The study of Marxism-Leninism was largely made on the basis of Stalin's works; in ideological activity there were powerful manifestations of bookishness and dogmatism leading to the mechanical propagation of certain theses, without our social and economic realities being taken into account. Although no statue of Lenin had been erected, statues of Stalin were raised in Bucharest and in other towns of the country. A t the same time, his name was given to several enterprises, institutions, localities, and streets; I believe that measures must be taken to change this state of affairs. Under the influence of the personality cult, methods and practices contrary to Leninist standards and violations of democratic rules in party life made their way among us as well. It must be underlined, however, that the methods generated by the personality cult and by its consequences did not assume with us the proportions they did in other countries. It is a great merit of our party and its basic aktiv that, although great pressure was brought to bear upon them for a long time, both f r o m within and from without, the Party treasured its fundamental principles; it did not yield to pressures and unflinchingly defended the life and dignity of party cadres. Returning to the country in September, 1944, f r o m the Soviet Union, where they had been in emigration, the fractional antiparty Pauker-Luca group, later joined by Teohari Georgescu and actively assisted by Iosif Chisinevschi and Miron Constantinescu, promoted the cult of Stalin's personality with great intensity, and insistently tried to introduce into party and state life—and unfortunately succeeded to a certain extent—the methods and practices alien to Leninism generated by this cult. Violation of the Leninist standards of party life, of the principle of collective work in the leading bodies, defiance of the democratic rules of party and state construction, creation of

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an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion toward valuable party and state cadres, their intimidation and persecution, abuse of power and encroachments upon people's legality characterized the whole activity of this fractional, antiparty group. That was a great danger to our party for quite a long time. . . . Having returned to this country, Pauker and Luca, who subsequendy proved to be an old agent of the bourgeois secret police, grossly violating the most elementary standards of party life, crudely seized control of the party leadership through intrigues and treachery. As was later learned, they had agreed upon this antiparty action as early as the emigration period. It is a significant fact, comrades, that Ana Pauker enjoyed a warm esteem particularly among the dogmatic, antiparty elements exposed by the CPSU after the XX Congress, and especially Molotov. . . . Gheorghiu-Dej proceeded to denounce what he considered the Rumanian equivalent of the "antiparty group," giving considerable detail about the activities of Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca, and others, from 1944 on. Ana Pauker, Luca, and Teohari Georgescu, continuing to act as a separately constituted group, outside the elected bodies, ignored the Central Committee; the Secretariat replaced, in point of fact, the Political Bureau, which acted almost as a commission of the former—the most important problems of the party and state leadership being solved by the Secretariat, where they had a majority and where the General Secretary, on many of the most important problems, was isolated and put in a minority. In order to ensure the promotion of their policy, they first agreed among themselves, establishing a common position on the problems to be discussed by the Secretariat or the Political Bureau. Taking advantage of the positions they held and ignoring the Political Bureau and the Central Committee, they gave the party and state bodies directives which were contrary to the Party's political line. It may be stated that throughout the period from September, 1944, until their removal in May, 1952,

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Leninist standards were seriously infringed in the party leadership. . . . After charging this "antiparty" grouping with fractionalism, lack of vigilance, terror, intimidation, and other errors and crimes, Gheorghiu-Dej continued his attack on its members:

We may safely say that there is no comrade in today's leadership of the party whose dignity as a Communist and a human being was not offended. Such epithets as "antiparty," "antistate," "anti-Soviet," "Titoist" were used provocationally to intimidate people and suppress criticism. In the party leadership an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion was created in which one could hardly breathe. Party cadres who had faced savage terror during the war— when arrest and the firing squad always lay in wait for them— who had borne the brunt of imprisonment in jails and concentration camps—were slandered, were labeled "fossilized" and "sectarian," and removed from their jobs. The criminal, antiparty actions of the fractional group reached its climax in the period when, as a result of the methods generated by Stalin's personality cult, in certain socialist countries there were repressions against party and state activists, the consequences of which are well known. At that time, Ana Pauker and Luca felt that particularly favorable conditions existed for removing and repressing the leading cadres who stood in the way of their antiparty policy. They exerted pressure in order to remove from responsible jobs and to indict many old party members, especially from among the comrades who had fought Franco's troops in the International Brigades in Spain, from among the comrades who had fought the Hitlerite occupants in France, and from among the activists and party members who, during the underground period, had successfully escaped arrest. . Comrades, I would like to draw your attention to the need to resolve the question of the way certain places, streets, public institutions, enterprises, and socialist units of agriculture are named.

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In the first place, I consider it incorrect that some of them have been named after persons who are alive, and I suggest that an end be put to that state of affairs. In the second place, there is no system governing the naming of places and units after persons who are no longer alive; often such names are given without any approval, and the same names are given to a great number of streets, collective farms, and so on. It is necessary to proceed to the reexamination of such names, and in the future such names should be given only with the approval of the central organs. Comrades, the importance of the X X Congress in developing the world Communist movement, in strengthening its ideological cohesion is demonstrated by life itself. . . . The decisions of the X X Congress have also had particular significance for the ideological activity of the Communist and workers parties, stimulating Marxist-Leninist thinking. The impetus of the creative theoretical activity of the Communist movement has found its expression in the contribution made to the development of Marxism-Leninism by the X X , X X I , XX11 congresses of the CPSU, by the congresses of other fraternal parties, as well as by the 1957 and 1 9 6 0 meetings of the Communist and workers parties. . . . Since the X X Congress of the C P S U the Communist and workers parties have developed the most suitable form of organizing relations among themselves, on the basis of full equality, thus ensuring the unity of thought and action, the consolidation of ideological cohesion, the exchange of experience, and the coordination of the joint struggle. This form is provided by meetings, consultations, or broader conferences at which common viewpoints are worked out and the guiding lines for action are established. T h e interests of the Communist movement, says the Statement of the 1960 meeting, require the unanimous observance by each Communist party of the views and conclusions, jointly elaborated at their meetings by the fraternal parties, concerning the common tasks of the struggle against imperialism for peace, democracy, and socialism.

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In promoting these principles of activity, an outstanding role devolves on the CPSU, which is the unanimously recognized vanguard detachment of the Communist and workers movement. Our party has made its contribution to strengthening the internationalist unity of the socialist countries and Communist and workers parties, struggling for the steady development of this unity, for the defense of the purity of Marxist-Leninist theory. . . . Comrades, the Central Committee informed the Party in time about the anti-Leninist schismatic line adopted by the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor headed by Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu, which line was manifest in the stand taken by the representatives of the Albanian Party of Labor at the Bucharest Conference of fraternal parties held on the occasion of the Third Congress of our party, and which then burst out with particular intensity at the [November] 1960 meeting. The leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor fiercely attack the line and the decisions of the XX and XXII congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the open and resolute exposure of Stalin's personality cult and of its nefarious consequences. Why do they rise so fiercely against the criticism of the personality cult, why do they defend the grave infringements perpetrated by Stalin in his activity? Because they themselves have set up and maintained in Albania for many years situations identical with those against which the congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union have risen—practicing throughout both Party and state methods peculiar to the personality cult, with its whole paraphernalia of abuses. Assuming the role of "defenders of the purity" of MarxismLeninism in a most ridiculous way, they attack—in the name of the struggle against contemporary revisionism—the general line guiding the Communist parties on the main problems of our days; they attack the fundamental theses of the 1957 and 1960 conferences of Communist and workers parties, without heeding the fact that these documents bear their signature as well. The same people, having camouflaged their true feelings

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for many years, couching them in false phrases, outdoing each other in hypocritical vows of "love" for the USSR, now libel the CPSU and its Central Committee, as well as the other Marxist-Leninist parties. The Albanian leaders have violated the principle accepted at the 1960 meeting, according to which differences in the views of the parties are solved by way of meetings and direct consultations; they have obstinately rejected the repeated proposals and the patient efforts of the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to clarify by comradely discussions the situation that has been created. Together with other fraternal parties, our party has made efforts in order to contribute to the abandonment by the Albanian leaders of their wrong positions and in order to bring them back to the road of unity with the other socialist countries and fraternal parties. But these efforts have come up against the refusal of the leaders of the APL. We entirely agree with the decision to bring up in an open and principled way at the XXII Congress of the CPSU the problem of relations with the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor and of the line followed by the latter. Most of the Communist and workers parties represented at the Congress, including our own party, resolutely condemned the anti-Leninist line of the Albanian leaders. We cannot agree with the opinion of the delegation of the Communist Party of China that openly raising the problem of the relations with the leadership of the APL at the Congress could harm the cohesion of the socialist camp. The open criticism of the line adopted by the leaders of the APL was correct and necessary; in the working-class movement, there can be no relations other than principled ones, based on faithfulness to Marxism-Leninism and to the principles of proletarian internationalism. We share the opinion expressed at the Congress that if the Chinese comrades desired to make efforts to normalize the relations between the APL and the fraternal parties, nobody could make a better contribution to the solution of this task than they. That would indeed be profitable for the cohesion of

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the Communist movement and would correspond first and foremost to the interests of the Albanian people and of the APL. As you know, after the XXII Congress, the leaders of the APL intensified even more their slanderous attacks against the general line of the Communist and workers parties and especially against the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its leadership. The leaders of the APL assume a heavy responsibility for their line, which is harmful to the interests of building socialism in Albania, to the interests of the socialist camp and of the world Communist movement. . . .

HUNGARIAN 52.

SOCIALIST

WORKERS

PARTY

(HSWP)

J A N O S KADAR, F I R S T SECRETARY OF T H E C E N T R A L M I T T E E OF T H E HUNGARIAN SOCIALIST W O R K E R S " L E N I N ' S IDEAS W I L L T R I U M P H . "

Pravda,

COMPARTY.

DECEMBER

26,

1961.

After endorsing the policies and analyses voiced at the XX and XXII congresses, and in particular the strategy of peaceful coexistence, Kadar raised the question of Stalin and Albania. IN the work of the X X I I Congress the determined, bold, and principled criticism of the personality cult has great theoretical and political importance. People with a Marxist frame of mind who cherish the Communist cause accord great respect and gratitude to the CPSU and to its Central Committee, headed by Comrade N. S. Khrushchev, for their staunch struggle in unmasking the personality cult and liquidating its harmful consequences. The international Communist movement understands and approves the conclusions of the X X I I Congress, which continued the general line of the XX Congress and inflicted another blow upon the personality cult so that it might be fully and finally liquidated. The X X I I Congress is of great benefit to the entire international workers movement in finally exterminating the ideological and political remnants of the personality cult.

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The reaction of the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor, however, is bewildering. As is known, the leaders of the APL continue to exalt the cult of Stalin's personality and of their own personalities, cultivated and supported in their country in its most flagrant form. Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu, casting a shadow over the fraternal Albanian party and its glorious past, and injuring the cause of the Albanian People's Republic, the socialist camp, and the international Communist movement, did not take to heart the warnings given them at the Moscow Conference of eighty-one fraternal parties and at the XXII CPSU Congress, and proceed further on their dangerous and adventurous road. They do not disdain any means to justify their criminal activities and positions, which are beneath any criticism. They use slander and provocation and try to fling mud at us. Recendy they stated with upside-down reasoning that the Hungarian counter-revolution was produced by the XX CPSU Congress's condemnation of the cult of Stalin's personality. The HSWP has already clearly described the cause of the 1956 counter-revolution. This description, incidentally, was accepted by the entire international Communist movement and also by the Albanian leaders. As early as December, 1956, our party's Central Committee stated that the counter-revolution had been produced, first, by the dogmatic and sectarian course of Rakosi and his clique; second, by the revisionist treason of Imre Nagy and his accomplices; third, by the Hungarian bourgeois counter-revolutionary forces; and fourth, by the criminal actions of international imperialism. The Marxist-Leninist analysis made by our party five years ago proved to be true and has withstood the test of time. The correctness of our conclusions was confirmed by new facts that have been brought to light in the past few years. All this was confirmed in the 1957 allHungarian Party Conference and then by the Seventh HSWP Congress in December, 1959. Nobody can revise the decisions of our party, least of all Enver Hoxha and his stooges who deviated very far from Leninism and truth. Our party has indicated repeatedly that if only one of the four main reasons for the 1956 Hungarian counter-revolution

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had been missing, there would not have been any counter-revolution at all. Nobody will ever be able to relieve of their responsibility and of all the weight of their crime the revisionist traitors, the reactionary domestic bourgeois counter-revolutionary forces, and international imperialism headed by the American monopolies, who in the fall of 1956 organized a counter-revolutionary uprising that brought incredible suffering to the Hungarian people. To make those concerned in the given case understand the essence of the problem, we must stress the following: But for the personality cult in Hungary, and but for Rakosi and his clique undermining the strength of our party and its ties with the masses by their dogmatic and sectarian policy and their arbitrariness, thereby weakening our system, Imre Nagy and his treacherous revisionist group, the counter-revolutionary Hungarian bourgeois circles, and international imperialism would have been unable, either separately or together, hard as they might have tried, to bring about a counter-revolutionary uprising in our country. Life itself proved that this is correct: we smashed the counterrevolution, our party is united with the people, the socialist transformation of agriculture has been completed, our socialist national economy is successfully developing, and the cultural level of our working people is steadily rising. Our people achieved all this by struggling and working heroically, and also thanks to the help of the Soviet Union, the socialist camp, and the international workers movement. None of the efforts made and the support received during the past five years would have helped us, however, to achieve these successes had not our party eliminated the cult of Stalin's and Rakosi's personalities and all resulting harmful consequences. Only by liquidating the personality cult and its consequences was our party able to regain the people's confidence and support, which had been undermined by the policy of the Rakosi group. This was the indispensable condition for an effective unmasking of the revisionist treason. For our party this was one of the most important historical lessons of the past decade. We

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therefore sincerely support the positions of the X X and X X I I CPSU congresses concerning the struggle against the personality cult and condemn the position of the Albanian leaders and of all those who, despite the stern lessons of the past, have still been unable to get rid of the cult of Stalin's personality and are either unable or unwilling to overcome its consequences. In my opinion we Communists act correctly if we consider the condemnation of the personality cult not just abstractly, but in connection with the enormous successes achieved after the XX Congress by the Soviet Union, the entire socialist camp, and the international Communist movement. After the liquidation of the cult of Stalin's personality we see Marxist-Leninist theory thriving, liberated from the fetters of dogmatism; we see a remarkable economic, scientific, and cultural upswing of the Soviet Union and of all other countries of the socialist camp that put an end to the personality cult. There is no doubt that, without liquidating the cult of Stalin's personality, the XXII CPSU Congress would have been unable to adopt the program of building a communist society in the Soviet Union during the next twenty years. After the liquidation of the personality cult in the Soviet Union and in the other countries of the socialist camp, the internal strength and international authority of the socialist countries increased enormously. Owing to the elimination of the personality cult, the ranks of the allies of the working class were replenished in all the countries of the globe. The international Communist and workers movement is expanding and developing, and the same applies to the national liberation movement and the peace movement. All this contributes to intensifying the general crisis of capitalism. The liquidation of the personality cult and the adoption of a truly Leninist foreign policy prevented the conflagration of another world war. The personality cult is alien to Marxism-Leninism and alien to the very essence of socialist society. V. I. Lenin showed in his works more than once that the overthrow of the bourgeois landowner regime and the creation of the dictatorship of the pro-

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letariat as such do not immediately liberate society and the working masses from the influence of bourgeois and pettybourgeois attitudes. The personality cult is the idealistic distortion of the Marxist-Leninist view of the historical role of the individual. Idealistic views find nourishing soil among the petty bourgeoisie, and pseudoradical dogmatism opened a road for them into the revolutionary party of the working class. The experience of the recent past proves that at a specific stage of the struggle of the revolutionary party of the working class the personality cult brought into its ranks fawning, careerism, pseudoradicalism, and other kinds of petty-bourgeois attitudes. Among the harmful views that grew in the unhealthy soil of the personality cult the most obvious and overt one is bourgeois nationalism, penetrating the revolutionary parties of the proletariat together with the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie in the very period of the parties' stormy growth. Under the conditions of the personality cult some people— former fighters for the cause of the proletariat—can slip, and indeed did slip, into the swamp of petty-bourgeois pseudodogmatism. Revisionism and dogmatism both have petty-bourgeois roots. It is true that revisionism shows more clearly the features of petty-bourgeois opportunism, but pseudoradical sectarianism, although camouflaging itself behind revolutionary phrases, is the embodiment of the same petty-bourgeois spirit. It is no mere chance, after all, that V. I. Lenin called "leftism" the infantile disorder of communism. We could, unfortunately, observe that this disorder appears in some people as a "senile disorder," and in combination with power it can assume a harmful and revolting character. Attributing to a human being supernatural faculties, the personality cult appears in the revolutionary workers movement as the reflection of an idealistic outlook on life. There was at first "our lord," who, according to religious creed, saw and knew everything and wisely governed the fate of the world. In the personality cult period they made out of Stalin, Rakosi, and the like a kind of omniscient supermen who wisely governed

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everything. Such a view is alien to our scientific outlook on life—Marxism-Leninism—and has nothing in common with dialectical materialism. It goes without saying that it is just as alien to the socialist system of society, created by the working class of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. Nevertheless, there are people who ask: "Do not the arbitrariness and unlawful actions against party members and nonparty people that occurred in the Soviet Union and in other socialist countries prove that the mistakes are rooted in the system itself?" This is just what imperialist "theoreticians" would dwell on. But in fact arbitrariness is alien to the socialist system. It is a quality of capitalism, resulting from its very essence. The leading party of a socialist society itself reveals the errors that come up and hamper development, and the party itself corrects them, thus speeding up the rate of advance and setting free all the creative forces of society. After liberating itself from arbitrariness and the violation of legality connected with this arbitrariness, the social system of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries has consolidated and entered a new stage of development. Any soundly reasoning man without prejudices can confirm this. At the same time, however, the history of our century shows that the capitalist system produces arbitrariness, turns it into a capitalist tool, and maintains itself by relying on this tool. Naturally, we cannot expect the imperialists and their "theoreticians" to approach this problem without bias. It is, however, to be expected of the socialists who call themselves "leftist" representatives of the working class in capitalist countries. The builders of socialism reveal the shortcomings themselves. They overtly oppose the errors committed during the advance on untraveled roads in the building of a new society, and they overcome these shortcomings with the strength of their healthy young organism. Capitalism, however, hides its incurable sores. Its crisis is deepening, and its essence is becoming increasingly obvious, and can be characterized by one word—arbitrariness.

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Deprive the capitalist system of this its intrinsic feature—arbitrariness—and you will see the consequences. . . . Comparison of the capitalist system with the socialist one is not to the advantage of the imperialists. They know this very well! This is precisely why they wished to use for their own goals some facts from the materials of the X X I I CPSU Congress concerning the condemnation of the personality cult, thinking t h a t — taken out of context—they would serve their interests. But they were mistaken. The imperialists would like to profit from the discussions and the differences in views between the Communist and workers parties and the Albanian leaders. They will now shout from each housetop: Look here, the Communists are quarreling, and there is a split in the socialist camp. Yes, there is indeed a discussion among the Communists. Discussion has occurred before, and it will occur in the future. But none of our discussions will ease the situation of capitalism. Communist discussions result every time in the consolidating of Marxist-Leninist ideas, and in the overcoming and elimination of erroneous views. The Communist parties and the entire international Communist movement represent a union of like-minded people, and Marxism-Leninism is not a code of dead dogmas, but a living and steadily developing science. The struggle between new and old is going on in the ideological sphere as in any other sphere of life. As a rule, broad discussions in a revolutionary movement usually arise at the turning points of social development. At the end of the past century the revolutionary workers movement was dominated by the view that socialism would triumph first in the most highly developed capitalist countries. Discovering the rules of the development of imperialism, V. I. Lenin disproved this thesis; and indeed the dictatorship of the proletariat, the first worker-peasant rule in the world, triumphed in backward Russia. After the victorious end of the civil war in 1921, another discussion came up about how to go on. Trotsky asserted that it was impossible to build socialism in one country alone, and that a world revolution must come

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first. Trotsky refused to see that the revolutionary wave in the capitalist countries had ebbed. At the same time he did not believe in the possibility of building a socialist society in backward tsarist Russia. He cloaked his disbelief in "leftist" phrases and demanded a "permanent revolution." V. I. Lenin's position was that a country like Soviet Russia can build socialism alone. Lenin triumphed in this discussion, and a socialist society in the Soviet Union was in fact consolidated. At present there are more than a billion people living in the socialist world system and in the countries of the socialist system. The Soviet Union has built in full a socialist society, and the countries of the socialist camp have basically entered the period of the building of a more developed socialist society. Concurrently, the general crisis of capitalism has deepened. Another discussion is now under way about how to go further. Regardless of the existence of capitalism in a great part of the world, history poses the question of a higher stage of society to be attained by mankind, a society without exploitation—the building of communism. The views of Enver Hoxha and his stooges strikingly remind one in many respects of the views of the Trotskyites, who in the early twenties refused to make daily efforts to build socialism, and even resorted to adventurism and phrasemongering. As is known, this tendency of the Trotskyites suffered a shameful defeat, and at the present stage of its development the world Communist movement, having matured, dooms similar views to failure in advance. The XXII CPSU Congress proclaimed that it is indispensable to struggle to preserve general peace and completely liquidate the colonial system, to achieve general and full disarmament, restrain the aggressive imperialist forces, and compel them to accept peaceful coexistence by challenging them to peaceful economic competition. During the next twenty years the Soviet Union will create the material and technical basis of communism and will create and show to all enslaved people of the globe a society of peace, work, freedom, equality, fraternity, and happiness. And what do the Albanian leaders propose? Nothing but a

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leftist and adventurous policy of pseudoradicalism and mere abuse of the imperialists, which will do them no harm. . . . Differences of opinion can be overcome by strict observance of Marxist-Leninist principles and by the repudiation of nationalism, which can manifest itself both in the form of revisionism and in leftism and the glorification of the Stalin cult. The overcoming of differences of opinion demands true loyalty to internationalism and sincere and comradely discussions and conferences. The aim of a principled discussion among Communist parties is the further consolidation of the unity and solidarity of the socialist camp and further consolidation of the unity and solidarity of the forces of socialism and peace. Our discussions must always lead to precisely these results. And this principled platform, worked out by all of us, will give us invincible strength. The particular problem has come up as to whether the socialist world and the international Communist movement must have one or several centers. Our view is that only loyalty to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism as well as ideological and political mutual understanding can guarantee the unity of the international Communist movement. If we are going to consolidate this mutual understanding, any discussion about one or several centers will be unnecessary. The CPSU possesses the richest revolutionary experience of all the Communist and workers parties of the world. It was always a pioneer, and today still marches in front of all. Nevertheless, every party has equal rights and responsibilities in the international Communist movement, and among the Communist parties there is not one party, nor are there several parties, either leading or being led. Each party is equally responsible for its activities to its own working class and people and to the international working class. The forum for working out joint views now is the conference of Communist and workers parties of the world. Jointly workedout principles and directives, included in jointly adopted documents, constitute the obligatory guide to action for our parties. Our present fighting banner is the Statement of the eighty-one

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fraternal parties, adopted at the 1960 Moscow Conference. Our parties are working in the spirit of this Statement, and thanks to this we are daily achieving new successes in the struggle for the cause of socialism and peace. The entire activity of the CPSU is imbued with the spirit of the Statement of the Eighty-one Communist and Workers Parties adopted in 1960. The CPSU prepared for its X X I I Congress by using the principles of this historical document. The ideas of the Statement were further developed at the Congress, and its banner was raised high. Only by implementing the principles of the Statement will our parties be able to achieve a further consolidation of the alliance of the socialist countries and of the international Communist movement. . . .

CHAPTER

V

COMMUNIST PARTIES IN ASIAN "SOCIALIST" STATES

KOREAN

WORKERS PARTY

(KWP)

At the X X I I CPSU Congress, Kim Il-sung, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party, hailed the CPSU as the "recognized vanguard of the international Communist movement," and noted that the "consolidation of unity with the CPSU is the duty of Communists of all countries and is a principle of proletarian internationalism." However, Kim did not condemn the leadership of the APL. In fact, the Central Committee of the K W P sent the APL, on the occasion of its twentieth anniversary, a congratulatory telegram which included the statement: "We are convinced that friendship and solidarity between the Korean and Albanian peoples will be strengthened in the big family of socialist countries headed by the Soviet Union, on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and of proletarian internationalism." (Nodong Sinmun [Pyongyang], November 7, 1961.) Kim Il-sung and Choi Yong Kun, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the D P R K , also sent a message of greeting to Enver Hoxha, Haxhi Lleshi, and Mehmet Shehu on the occasion of the seventeenth anniversary of the liberation of Albania. (See Document No. 5 4 . ) ' 1 For the background of the KWP's problems, see John Bradbury, "Sino-Soviet Competition in North Korea," The China Quarterly, No. 6 (April-June, 1961).

388 53.

Communist KIM

IL-SUNG, CHAIRMAN

Parties

in Asian

OF T H E C E N T R A L

States

COMMITTEE

O F T H E KOREAN W O R K E R S PARTY. R E P O R T TO THE

CEN-

TRAL C O M M I T T E E

1961.

Kulloja

O F THE

KWP,

NOVEMBER

27,

(Pyongyang), December, 1961. 2

Kim Il-sung first described Soviet economic, scientific, and technological achievements. Next he turned to the new Program of the CPSU. THE PROGRAM not only indicates clearly the gigantic plan and the concrete ways and means for the construction of a communist society in the Soviet Union, but also expresses the ideals and aspirations of all of progressive humanity. People in the whole world see in this Program the stirring features of communist society and their own bright future. Communist construction in the Soviet Union is a most powerful factor for increasing the might of the socialist camp, maintaining a durable world peace, and ensuring the complete victory of socialism on a world-wide scale. It also boundlessly inspires the struggle of the peoples of the world for peace, national independence, and socialism, and further strengthens their confidence in the victory of socialism and communism. The CPSU is the publicly recognized vanguard of the international Communist movement. The place held by the CPSU in the Communist movement is an immutable historical fact. . . . Under the leadership of the Leninist party the Soviet people carried out the first socialist revolution in history and built a socialist society, thus illuminating the road of freedom and liberation for the people of the world. T h e existence of the Soviet Union as a socialist state and the steady growth of its might have exerted a great revolutionary influence on the exploited classes and oppressed nations throughout the world. T h e great Soviet Union liberated the people of a large number * On D e c e m b e r 4, 1961 Pravda reprinted K i m Il-sung's speech. Passages omitted by Pravda which affect the meaning of his speech are indicated by angular brackets. Kulloja is the monthly organ o f the Central C o m m i t t e e of the KWP.

Communist

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of countries in Europe and Asia from fascist enslavement and colonial oppression by routing fascist Germany and Japanese imperialism in the Second World War. T h e C P S U and the Soviet people have made a great contribution to the development of the international Communist movement and the progress of mankind, accumulated a wealth of experience in socialist revolution and socialist construction, and won unshakable prestige and trust among the Communists and peoples of the world. Today, under the leadership of the Communist Party, the Soviet people are exploring the path to communism as the vanguard of mankind. The CPSU and the Soviet people will make a new, great contribution toward the victory of socialism and communism and the general progress of mankind by building a communist society successfully. It is natural that the world's Communists respect and trust the CPSU and the Soviet people, treasure their solidarity with them, and strive to strengthen this solidarity. All the representatives of the fraternal parties at the recent X X I I Congress warmly congratulated the Congress, paid high tribute to the historic exploits of the CPSU and the Soviet people, and wished them new, greater successes in the struggle for communist construction. T h e X X I I Congress of the CPSU also discussed questions of the internal life of the CPSU and questions of its relations with fraternal parties. At the Congress much mention was made of the cult of Stalin's personality and of the question of the antiparty fractionalist elements which arose in the internal life of the C P S U . Stalin was the leader of the CPSU for a long period, and his activities exerted great influence on the international Communist movement as a whole. Stalin's name is well known to the Communists and peoples of the world. But the members of the C P S U themselves must know Stalin better than anyone else, and the question of how his activities and role are appraised in the Soviet Union is an internal affair of the C P S U . T h e question of the antiparty fractionalist elements is also entirely an internal affair of the C P S U . (We always consider that no party is entitled to interfere in

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any form in the internal life of the fraternal parties. This is one of the fundamental principles which all fraternal parties should abide by in their mutual relations. Therefore the questions concerning Stalin and the antiparty sectarians within the CPSU have nothing to do with our party, nor can they become an object of discussion within our party. We only hope and will be glad to see the CPSU or any other fraternal parties firmly rally around their Central Committee and successfully fulfill revolutionary tasks.) The Albanian question was also discussed at the XXII Congress of the CPSU. Divergent views on a number of questions have cropped up in recent years between the CPSU and the Albanian Party of Labor, and their mutual relations have become abnormal. Much was said about this question at the recent Congress of the CPSU; however, up to now relations with the Albanian Party of Labor have not improved, and a solution to this question remains still to be found. (On the contrary, relations between the CPSU and the Albanian Party of Labor have become further complicated. Should this situation continue, it will cause grave damage to the unity of the socialist camp, to the solidarity of the world Communist movement and to its general development, and it will be advantageous only to our enemy.) The Korean Workers Party expresses its deep concern over this situation. (Our party wishes to see a satisfactory solution to the Albanian question achieved through enduring efforts to remove present disputes and differences of views and to attain mutual understanding in the full spirit of internationalist solidarity, based on the principle of respect for the interests of the entire socialist camp and the world Communist movement.) . . . Kim then turned to the international scene and noted: The great Soviet Union is the mighty bulwark of peace, national independence, and socialism. The growth of the might of the Soviet Union and her firm, peace-loving foreign policy play a great role in repelling military provocations and the in-

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Parties

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trigues of the imperialists, and in the cause of the preservation and the strengthening of world peace. . . . The Soviet Union, along with all socialist countries, continues to maintain peaceful coexistence with the countries of different social systems and strives to solve international disputes by means of negotiations. . . . We also support all the reasonable plans and persistent efforts of the Soviet Union which are directed toward the relaxation of international tensions and toward the strengthening of peace, including the proposals for disarmament, the liquidation of all types of colonialism, and the creation of an atom-free zone in Europe and in the Far East. The imperialist powers, led by U.S. imperialism, are persisting in a policy of war preparations; they are turning down the peaceful proposals of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries; and they are openly stepping up the criminal scheme of plunging mankind into a holocaust of nuclear war, further intensifying the arms race, particularly in connection with the question of concluding a peace treaty with Germany. Such a situation demands that the peace-loving peoples of the world maintain the utmost vigilance and aid all the more in the struggle for the defense of peace. A lasting world peace can be preserved and the security of mankind ensured only by fortifying in every way the socialist camp and all peace forces; by the further active development of the workers movement in capitalist countries, a national liberation struggle of the peoples in colonial and dependent countries, a general democratic movement, a struggle for the defense of peace; and by waging all other types of struggle against the policy of war and aggression of the imperialists. While staunchly fighting for world peace, the socialist countries are always on guard against any possible reckless adventures of the imperialists. . . . All the achievements of the Soviet people in the building of communism are the common achievements of the socialist camp. Today all the socialist countries in Europe and Asia are successfully building socialism, following in the path pioneered by the Soviet people, enjoying the open support and help of the Soviet Union; they are contributing to the common cause of

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Communist Parties in Asian States

strengthening the might of the socialist camp, and they are hastening the development of the international Communist movement. . . . Today we are living in an era of great revolutionary change in which the world socialist system has turned into the decisive factor in the development of human history, imperialism is going to ruin, the colonial system is finally disintegrating, and socialism and communism are triumphing. The balance of forces in the world arena has changed decisively in favor of the people fighting for peace, national independence, and socialism. T h e present situation demands more than ever the strengthening of the unity of the socialist camp and the solidarity of the international Communist movement. When all the socialist states unite firmly and all the Communist and workers parties rally closely and fight staunchly for our common cause, they will be able to smash any aggressive machination of the imperialists, maintain a durable world peace, and markedly accelerate the victory of socialism and communism and the progress of mankind as a whole. Solidarity is our strength and the most important guarantee of victory. That is why the imperialists and the revisionists, their henchmen, are resorting to pernicious machinations to undermine the unity and solidarity of our ranks. The meeting of the representatives of Communist and workers parties held in Moscow last year dealt a decisive blow to such schemes of the foes of communism and played a great role in strengthening the unity of the socialist camp and the solidarity of the international Communist movement. The Statement unanimously adopted at the meeting clarified the fundamental principles of the mutual relations among the socialist states and the Communist and workers parties. (All fraternal parties are completely equal and independent, and they shape their policies independently, proceeding from Marxist-Leninist principles and the concrete conditions of their countries. T h e fraternal parties should duly learn from each other's experiences the principles of mutual respect, but the question of drawing or not drawing on each other's experiences

Communist

Parties

in Asian

States

393

is a question that should be decided independently by each party in accordance with its own actual conditions and needs. At the same time,) the fraternal parties, guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, must support each other and closely cooperate with each other, work out identical views on questions of common concern through consultations, unanimously observe the result of agreement, and ensure unity of action. The solidarity of the fraternal parties can be a truly voluntary and firm one only when these principles are strictly observed. It is the sacred internationalist duty of Communists the world over to strengthen the unity of the socialist camp and the solidarity of the international Communist movement, based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, on the principles of the Statement of the Moscow meeting. It must be made the paramount principle in the relations among the fraternal parties to strengthen the solidarity among them and safeguard the unity of the entire international Communist movement. . . . Life proves that such a Marxist-Leninist stand on relations among the fraternal countries and fraternal parties is entirely correct. At present the relations of friendship and cooperation between our people and the peoples of the Soviet Union and all other socialist countries are developing further day by day, and the internationalist solidarity between our party and all the fraternal parties is being consolidated still further. The Fourth Congress of our party was a graphic demonstration of such internationalist friendship and solidarty. All delegates of fraternal parties present at the Congress warmly congratulated the Congress on its work and our people on their achievements made in the construction of a new society, and expressed their firm support of the just cause of our party and people. The Korean Workers Party and the Korean people will in the future, too, firmly unite with the great CPSU and always march with the Soviet people in the struggle against imperialism and for the common cause of socialism and communism. Our party and our people will continuously strengthen the militant friendship and

394

Communist

Parties

in Asian

States

solidarity with the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people. Our party will do everything in its power to defend the unity of the socialist camp and the solidarity of the international Communist movement, strengthen friendship with the peoples of all the fraternal countries, and consolidate solidarity with the Communist and workers parties. We must decisively oppose revisionism, the main danger in the international Communist movement at present; resolutely safeguard at all times the purity of Marxism-Leninism; repudiate doctrinairism (and establish individuality more thoroughly); and bend our efforts creatively to apply the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete reality of our country. . . . 5 4 . K I M IL-SUNG AND CHOI YONG K U N . MESSAGE OF G R E E T INGS TO ENVER SHEHU.

HOXHA, HAXHI LLESHI,

Radio Pyongyang, November

28,

AND

MEHMET

1961.

On the occasion of the seventeenth anniversary of the liberation of Albania, the glorious national holiday when the Albanian people were liberated from the fascist yoke, we extend, in the name of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party, the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly and the DPRK government, and the entire Korean people, warm congratulations to you and, through you, to the fraternal Albanian people. In the past seventeen years since liberation, the Albanian people, who have become the master of the country, under the correct guidance of the Albanian Party of Labor have waged a devoted labor struggle for the creation of a new life and turned their backward motherland into a socialist agricultural-industrial state courageously overcoming manifold difficulties. On the basis of the brilliant successes in socialist economic construction, the material and cultural life of the working people is being enhanced day by day and the long-standing national culture is flowering and developing. Today, with confidence in the bright prospect, the Albanian people have DEAR COMRADES!

Communist

Parties in Asian

States

395

risen up as one for the successful fulfillment of the Third FiveYear Plan which provides for the further consolidation of the material-technical foundation of socialism in the country, and are achieving great labor successes. The Albanian people are resolutely fighting for the defense of the cause of socialism, exposing and shattering at every step all the provocative machinations of the imperialists and the Yugoslav revisionists, their stooges. The Korean people rejoice over all the successes scored by the fraternal Albanian people in the socialist construction of the country and warmly greet them. The Korean and Albanian peoples are closely linked by bonds of friendship in the big family of the great socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union. The Korean people value the proletarian internationalist friendship and solidarity with the fraternal Albanian people and firmly believe that such relations of friendship will be further consolidated and developed in the struggle for the common cause of Marxism-Leninism. We wholeheartedly wish the Albanian people fresh success in the struggle for the prosperity and development of their motherland and for peace. The following months showed a continuing effort of the North Korean leadership to avoid explicit commitment to, but also increasing support of, the Chinese Communist position. The Pyongyang press was the only one, other than the Albanian, to give editorial support to Chinese claims in the border dispute with India as early as December, 1961. After November, 1961, Radio Pyongyang no longer relayed Korean-language broadcasts from Radio Moscow. North Korean delegations reportedly sided with the Chinese Communists at international meetings, such as the World Peace Council in Stockholm and the W F T U Congress in Moscow in December, 1961. North Korea experienced no "de-Stalinization." (See also below, p. 663.)

VIETNAMESE

WORKERS

PARTY

(VWP)

In the dispute between the CPSU and the CPC, the Vietnamese Workers Party (Lao Dong) avoided committing itself to either

396

Communist

Parties

in Asian

States

3

side. At the XXII CPSU Congress, Ho Chi Minh did not condemn the leaders of the APL. He remained in Moscow after the conclusion of the Congress, returning home via Peking in what was evidently an effort at mediation. In the months after the XXII Congress, the Vietnamese Workers Party made statements which supported the CPC but balanced them with expressions of loyalty and support for the CPSU. In an interview over Radio Moscow on November 6, Ho spoke of the "twelve" members of the "socialist camp." (Radio Moscow's home service deleted this in rebroadcasting the interview on November 10.) On November 8, the Party's daily, Nhan Dan, published a message of congratulations dispatched to the APL (and a photograph of Hoxha); the next day, the paper corrected an "omission": the earlier text had failed to include the sentences, "Faithful to Marxist-Leninist principles, your party has always struggled to strengthen its ranks and has fought untiringly against Yugoslav revisionism. Your party's influence and prestige among the masses of the Albanian people have grown daily." Nhan Dan greeted the twentieth anniversary of the APL with an article entitled "Brilliant and Victorious Twenty Years of the Albanian Party of Labor." Until the Soviet-Albanian diplomatic break, reported in Hanoi on December 14, 1961, North Vietnamese accounts almost invariably deleted references to Soviet and other Communist party attacks on the APL leadership.

55.

H o C H I M I N H , PRESIDENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC R E P U B L I C OF

VIETNAM,

TIONAL

TRUONG

ASSEMBLY

CHINH,

STANDING

PRESIDENT

OF

COMMITTEE,

THE

AND

NA-

PHAM

V A N D O N G , PREMIER OF THE DEMOCRATIC R E P U B L I C OF V I E T N A M . MESSAGE OF GREETINGS TO COMRADES ENVER HOXHA, HAXHI LLESHI, AND M E H M E T S H E H U , NOVEMBER

28, 1961. Radio Tirana, November 29, 1961. ON THE occasion of the seventeenth anniversary of the remembrance of the glorious historic day of the brotherly Albanian people, we convey to you, and through you to the brotherly Albanian people, our most cordial wishes. ' For background on alignments and orientations in the Vietnamese Communist movement, see P. J. Honey, "The Position of the DRV Leadership and the Succession to Ho Chi Minh," and Bernard B. Fall, "Power and Pressure Groups in North Vietnam," both in The China Quarterly, No. 9 (January-March, 1962).

Communist

Parties in Asian

397

States

During these seventeen years, the heroic Albanian people, headed by the Albanian Party of Labor and the government of the Albanian People's Republic, have given proof of great revolutionary vitality and have made creative achievements in building an ever more progressive Albania. The great successes of the Albanian people make a great contribution to the increase in the forces of the socialist camp and to the defense of peace in Europe and the world. The Vietnamese people sincerely wish the Albanian people greater and more numerous victories in their efforts to fulfill the Third Five-Year Plan, to convert Albania into a country with progressive agriculture and industry, and successfully to build socialism in Albania. Long live the friendship between the peoples of the two countries, and may it further prosper with every passing day!

56. "ALBANIA—A

FIRM

ADVANCE POST O F THE

CAMP." HOC Tap ( H a n o i ) , November,

SOCIALIST

1961. 4

IN NOVEMBER, the Albanian people, their hearts filled with pride and confidence, will celebrate two of their historic and glorious anniversaries: the twentieth anniversary of the foundation of the Albanian Party of Labor (November 8, 1941-November 8, 1961) and the national day of the People's Republic of Albania (November 29). The Albanians are a heroic people. They have made themselves famous for their glorious anti-aggression tradition. Over the centuries, Turkish, German, and Italian imperialists in turn trampled on Albanian territory. But they failed to destroy the will of this insubmissive people. Under the resolute leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor and with the help of the Soviet Army, the Albanian people wiped the German and Italian fascists out of Albanian territory and set up the People's Republic of Albania on November 29, 1944. In the past sixteen years, under the clear-sighted and resolute ' Hoc Tap is the monthly organ of the VWP.

398

Communist

Parties in Asian

States

leadership of the A P L and guided by the slogan "one hand holds a pickax and the other a rifle," the Albanian people consolidated their sovereignty and independence, carried out the socialist revolution, and successfully built socialism though besieged by the capitalist countries. Socialist Albania is as firm as a rock and is setting a good example in socialist construction in the Balkan and Adriatic areas. . . The article continued by describing at some length Albania's industrial and agricultural achievements and then dealt with its political development. The great achievements of the Albanian people cannot be separated from the leadership of the APL. During economic transformation and socialist construction, the Party has paid constant attention to the task of party building. To expand party ranks, the APL has paid attention to recruiting new members, first among workers, second among agricultural cooperative members, and, in general, among the youth. While carrying out its political and ideological tasks, the APL has constantly declared that the main objective of these tasks is to serve the construction of socialism. The Party has ceaselessly helped its members to realize clearly the important role of subjective factors and the voluntary spirit in the work of constructing socialism. On the one hand, the Party has paid special attention to preserving and developing the age-old moral traditions of the Albanian people: patriotism, gallantry, self-respect, righteousness, chivalry, and so forth. On the other hand, the Party has paid special attention to teaching Marxist-Leninist thinking and struggling to preserve the purity of these thoughts. To reach this goal, the Party has extolled the study of the classics of Marxism-Leninism, the history of the APL, and the Statement of the 1960 Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers Parties. The Albanian Party of Labor has directed the main strikes of the entire party and all the people against imperialism, especially United States imperialism, and the revisionist ruling clique in Yugoslavia.

Communist

Parties in Asian

States

399

By resolutely struggling against enemies—the imperialists and revisionists—the APL thus paid special attention to rearing its members and the Albanian people in an internationalist proletarian spirit and the spirit of unity and cooperation in the socialist camp. The Party and the people of Albania have correctly supported unity and cooperation in the socialist camp —especially the generous and disinterested aid of the Soviet Party and government. Albania and Vietnam are two fraternal countries in the great socialist family of which the USSR is the center. "Vietnam is the Albania of the East, Albania is the Vietnam of the West." (Comrade Enver Hoxha's statement—Hoc Tap.) Having a historic situation quite similar to that of the Albanian people, the Vietnamese people are fired with enthusiasm by the successes achieved by the Albanian people in the last twenty years under the leadership of the APL headed by Comrade Enver Hoxha. The Vietnamese people wish the Albanian people greater successes in the task of completing socialist construction in Albania, thus contributing to strengthening the socialist camp and ensuring peace in the Balkan-Adriatic area and the world.

5 7 . COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE V I E T NAMESE WORKERS PARTY CONCERNING THE X X I I CONGRESS.

CPSU

Pravda, December 5, 1961.®

T h e Central C o m m i t t e e of the V W P met f r o m N o v e m b e r 3 0 to D e c e m b e r 2, 1961. It heard the reports of the V W P delegation to the X X I I C P S U Congress and o n D e c e m b e r 4 issued a c o m m u n i q u é . . . THE PLENUM considers that the new Program of the Party adopted by the XXII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—the first and great Program of the construction of communism—has enormous significance for the 8

Significant passages omitted by Pravda which appear in the December 4 Radio Hanoi version of the communiqué are indicated by angular brackets.

400

Communist Parties in Asian States

Soviet Union, the socialist camp, the international Communist and workers movement, and the prospects of mankind as a whole. . . Under the leadership of the glorious Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet people for more than half a century, thanks to their revolutionary struggle, thanks to their sacrifices and creative labor, have illuminated for mankind a practical path to liberation and have in large measure promoted the birth and growth of the world socialist system (the development and growth of the international Communist movement, and the national liberation movements in the colonies and dependent countries). At the present time the Soviet people opens to mankind the path to communism. Each step taken by the Soviet Union on the path to communism will increase its invincible might and the invincible might of the socialist camp, of which the Soviet Union is the center, and will increase the might of the international Communist and workers movement and of the forces of peace in the whole world. Each success attained by the Soviet people on the path of the construction of communism will show even more strikingly the superiority of socialism and communism over capitalism and will compel new millions of people to turn their thoughts toward socialism and communism. The bright example of the building of communism in the Soviet Union and the support from the Soviet Union and from the socialist camp will stimulate the world movement against imperialism, for peace, democracy, national independence, and socialism, and will contribute to the achievement of new, even greater victories. The construction of communism in the Soviet Union has enormous significance for the revolutionary cause of the Vietnamese people. It encourages and spurs our people to build socialism in the north and to struggle against the U.S.-Diem clique for peaceful reunification of the country. The support, assistance, and cooperation rendered us by the Soviet Union, China, and the other countries in the great socialist camp constitute an extremely important factor in our revolutionary cause.

Communist

Parties

in Asian

States

401

This is why the Program adopted by the XXII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has given rise to boundless joy and enthusiasm on the part of the entire Party and all the people of Vietnam. . . . As it always has and always will, our party is exerting maximum efforts for the strengthening of the solidarity of the Vietnamese people and the Vietnamese Workers Party and the people and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—the vanguard of the international Communist movement. Our party considers this to be one of its most important international responsibilities. Our party has devoted and will devote all its strength to the further strengthening of the solidarity and unity of the countries of the socialist camp (with the Soviet Union at the center), among all the Communist and workers parties on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and on the basis of the decisions of the conferences of representatives of the Communist and workers parties which were held in Moscow in 1957 and 1960. The Plenum of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Workers Party fully approves of the activities of the delegation of the Vietnamese Workers Party at the X X I I Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Plenum sends its most cordial greetings to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union headed by Comrade N. S. Khrushchev. . . . After the break in diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the Albanian People's Republic, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam continued to identify the APR as a member of the "socialist camp." Enver Hoxha and Ho Chi Minh exchanged New Year messages, the contents of which were not disclosed. (Radio Tirana, January 5, 1962.) While in the following months both the Soviet and the Chinese Communist parties made unmistakable attempts to win the VWP completely over to their respective sides, Hanoi seemed to follow a studied course of careful "neutrality," regardless of the sympathies of the VWP leadership. Then, and again a year later, it had a decisive part in the attempts to mediate between the CPSU and the CPC. (See below, Chapter X . )

402

Communist

MONGOLIAN (MPRP)

PEOPLE'S

Parties in Asian

REVOLUTIONARY

States

PARTY

At the XXII CPSU Congress the delegation from the MPRP supported the CPSU attack on the leadership of the APL. The M P R P approved its delegation's position and in the following months continued to endorse the general Soviet line of conduct and argument. On the seventeenth anniversary of the Albanian People's Republic, the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) sent the APR a message which read: "The Presidium of the People's Great Hural of the MPR and the MPR Council of Ministers express the hope that the friendship between our peoples will grow further and become stronger on the basis of the great principles of MarxismLeninism and proletarian internationalism, in the interest of strengthening the unity and solidarity of the mighty socialist camp and in the interest of further consolidating world peace. The Presidium of the Great People's Hural and the Council of Ministers of the MPR wish the Albanian people prosperity and happiness in the great family of peoples of our mighty socialist camp." (Radio Ulan Bator, November 29, 1961.) 5 8 . LUYSANTSERENGIIN

TSEND,

SECOND

SECRETARY

OF

THE

C E N T R A L COMMITTEE OF THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S R E V OLUTIONARY PARTY, AND M E M B E R

OF THE

DELEGATION

O F THE M P R P TO THE X X I I C P S U CONGRESS. R E P O R T TO THE PARTY Aktiv

OF U L A N BATOR, N O V E M B E R 2 8 ,

1961.

Pravda, November 30, 1961. THE X X I I CPSU Congress is the greatest event of our time, attracting the attention of all progressive mankind. It took place under the unconquerable banner of creative Marxism-Leninism and has an exceptionally great significance not only for the CPSU and the Soviet Union, but for the entire Communist and workers movement as well. The X X I I CPSU Congress represents the classic example of party principles, firmness, unity of theory and practice of communist construction, the model of the creative development of Marxism-Leninism. The CPSU Program adopted by the Congress is the guiding star for the peoples of the entire world. It opens up an exciting page in the struggle for a radiant future. Guided by the rich

Communist

Parties

in Asian

States

403

experience of socialist construction in the Soviet Union and in fraternal socialist countries, based on the study of MarxismLeninism, the CPSU Program gives a concrete, scientifically founded plan for the construction of communism in the USSR. The XXII CPSU Congress has made a profound analysis of the international situation, has scientifically proven the inevitability of the victory of communism, has defined the strategy and tactics for the Communist and workers parties in the struggle for peace, democracy, and socialism. It has demonstrated the monolithic unity of the CPSU and the Soviet people, the unity and solidarity of the Communist and workers parties under the banner of Marxism-Leninism. . . . We must clearly understand that these successes [of the Soviet people and other "fraternal socialist countries"] would have been impossible were it not for the XX CPSU Congress, were it not for the Central Committee of the CPSU, headed by Comrade N. S. Khrushchev, which led the courageous struggle against the personality cult and its consequences. Without the liquidation of that monstrous phenomenon, it would have been impossible to develop communist construction successfully. . . . The Central Committee of the CPSU, and Comrade N. S. Khrushchev personally, conducted a genuine revolutionary struggle against the personality cult and its consequences. In this way, its duties to the Communist and workers movement were fulfilled. The Central Committee of the CPSU defeated the antiparty group of Molotov, Kaganovich, and others, who wanted to turn the Party and the people back to the methods of the personality cult and who carried on a cruel struggle against restoration of socialist legal norms. Our party, as well as the other Communist and workers parties, completely and totally supports the measures adopted by the Central Committee of the CPSU. . . . The leadership of the APL now finds itself in a state of profound corruption; it does not refrain from slandering the CPSU and the Soviet people, the other fraternal parties and socialist countries. These vicious activities of the APL leadership are

404

Communist

Parties

in Asian

States

h a r m f u l to the international Communist m o v e m e n t and, a b o v e all, to the cause of socialist construction in Albania. U n d e r present conditions the activities of the A P L leadership benefit the imperialists only. T h e delegation of the M P R P unanimously supported the X X I I C P S U Congress in its criticism of the subversive activities of E . H o x h a a n d M . Shehu, a n d c o n d e m n e d their l o a t h s o m e attacks against the C P S U and countries of the socialist c a m p . O u r party considers it its duty to support constantly a n d unwaveringly the principle of proletarian internationalism, t o struggle against revisionism, d o g m a t i s m , and sectarianism, and always to keep pure the great teachings of Marxism-Leninism. .6 According to the Pravda report, Tsend emphasized that the Mongolian People's Republic supported all the measures of the USSR directed toward the lessening of international tension and the achievement of general and complete disarmament. T h e great Leninist party is the inspiring and organizing force of all the successes of the Soviet people. All the d o c u m e n t s adopted at the X X I I C P S U Congress will enter history as creative models of Marxism-Leninism. T h e Mongolian people and the M P R P warmly support the results of the X X I I C P S U Congress; they have always considered, and consider now, that it is their duty to learn f r o m the heroic Soviet people and f r o m the great C P S U , and to m a k e use of their rich experience of socialist construction. Therefore, the M P R P and the Mongolian people view the C P S U Program as the plan for the great work which will be carried out in our country t o m o r r o w . According to Pravda, the meeting unanimously approved a resolution acclaiming the XXII CPSU Congress, and discussed the tasks " Pravda omitted the following passage carried by the Mongolian press service MONTSAME (November 29): "As you know, only the delegates of the CPC, although they did not touch on the content and direction of the criticism, expressed the opinion that it would appear that such a problem could be solved without exposure, by means of mutual consultations. However, as is obvious to everybody, any attempt to conceal an already known truth, in a situation in which contradictions regarding the evaluation of problems have already come to the surface, would be a futile effort deviating from the truth."

Communist

Parties

in Asian

States

405

awaiting the MPRP and the Mongolian people in fulfilling their Third Five-Year Plan. During the following months, public pronouncements by leading MPRP spokesmen continued to reflect consistent support of the CPSU policies in dispute. (See, for instance, Tsend's article in Izvestiia [Moscow], December 29, 1961, and Tsedenbal's remarks in Pravda, January 21, 1962.) 5 9 . YUMZHAGIIN TSEDENBAL, FIRST SECRETARY OF THE C E N TRAL C O M M I T T E E OF THE MONGOLIAN P E O P L E ' S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY. R E P O R T TO THE CENTRAL

COMMITTEE

OF THE MPRP. Pravda, February 3, 1962. . . . OF EXCEPTIONALLY great importance in the matter of strengthening the unity of the socialist countries were the decisions of the X X Party Congress reestablishing the Leninist spirit and style in the life of the fraternal parties of the socialist countries and opening the way for consistent and complete implementation in relations among them of the principles of unity and cooperation based on the unshakable foundation of proletarian internationalism and the principles of mutual aid and equal rights. . . . At the XXII Party Congress the delegations of the Communist and workers parties, including the delegation of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, unanimously condemned the schismatic actions of the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor within the ranks of the international Communist movement. Hoxha, Shehu, and the other leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor refused to heed comradely criticism about their mistaken position and deliberately embarked on a path of violation of the principles of proletarian internationalism and diverged from the commonly agreed-upon line of the world Communist movement with regard to the most important problems of our times. By their violent and slanderous attacks on the CPSU and other fraternal parties, they were attempting to split the unity of the socialist camp and the international Communist movement, thus actually performing a service for the enemies of socialism.

406

Communist

Parties

in Asian

States

The schismatic and anti-Marxist activities of the leadership of the APL are harmful above all to the entire Albanian people, because they lead to the isolation of Albania from the countries of the socialist camp. . . The basis for the anti-Marxist position of the Albanian leaders is narrow nationalism, as opposed to proletarian internationalism. This has led them to a hostile attitude toward the international Communist movement and to schismatic activities against the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist camp. This is the source of the hostile slander against Soviet aid, given generously to the Albanian people, and of the distorted interpretation of proletarian internationalism as a unilateral obligation for other socialist countries to satisfy all their inordinate demands, etc. Nationalism and national narrowness can be the root of both revisionist and dogmatist opportunism. At the Moscow Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers Parties in 1960, our party through its representatives warned the Albanian leaders that if they did not seriously reconsider their mistaken position, they would ultimately be placed by the logic of events in the same company as their former antagonists, the revisionists. It is no accident that the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor are now intensifying their ruinous policy of betraying proletarian internationalism and that they are creeping closer and closer to the position of the revisionists and are moving into the camp of the opponents of Marxism-Leninism. That is why we are in complete agreement with the frank and principled criticism of the anti-Marxist positions of the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor made by the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties and cannot agree with the reservation expressed in this matter at the X X I I Party Congress by the Communist Party of China, for example. The events subsequent to the XXII Party Congress have again and again confirmed the correctness of these conclusions. At the XXII Party Congress the representatives of all the fraternal parties gave particular emphasis to the need for a further campaign to strengthen the great cooperation among the

Communist

Parties

in Asian

States

407

socialist countries and solidarity in the Communist movement against attempts to weaken its monolithic unity. . . . The X X I I Party Congress emphasized that the question of war and peace has been and still is the most pressing question of our times. The Congress pointed out that the only true way to maintain world peace is peaceful coexistence between states with differing social systems. The events of recent years have fully confirmed the correctness of the conclusions of the X X and X X I I Party congresses that there is no fatal inevitability of war. T h e Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, as one of the detachments of the world Communist movement, gives special attention to criticism of the theory and practice of the cult of the individual, which is alien to Marxism-Leninism. It is known that as early as the April, 1956, plenary session of the M o n golian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee, which proceeded under the fresh imprint of the historic X X Party Congress, the first criticism was made of the serious political errors and distortions of revolutionary legality that had occurred in the Mongolian People's Republic as a result of the cult of the individual. At the plenary session there was a detailed discussion of the fact that in addition to the Stalin cult and the worship of him here in the Party and the country, there were extreme exaggerations of the role and contribution of C o m r a d e Choibalsan, and as a result the role of the Party and the masses of the people in the historical process were belittled. On the basis of the decisions of the April plenary session of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee, a large and meticulous job was done to reveal and correct instances of gross violation of revolutionary legality that took place under the influence of the cult of Comrade Choibalsan in state security agencies at the end of the 1930's and the beginning of the 1940's. . . .

CHAPTER VI

THE COMMUNIST PARTIES IN THE WEST

ITALIAN

COMMUNIST

PARTY

(PCI)

T h e response of the Italian C o m m u n i s t P a r t y ( P C I ) to the X X I I Congress indicated a resumption of the public criticism of the C P S U begun after the X X Congress in 1956. O n N o v e m b e r 5, 1961, two days after the Party's Secretary-General, P a l m i r o Togliatti, returned f r o m Moscow, the P C I daily, L'Unità, reprinted parts of his f a m o u s Nuovi Argomenti interview of 1956, in which Togliatti had called for a thorough "Marxist" analysis of "why a n d h o w " Stalin's crimes had become possible, a n d had suggested that the international C o m munist movement was becoming "polycentric." His views had been c o n d e m n e d by the C P S U Central C o m m i t t e e resolution of J u n e 30, 1956. 1

6 0 . PALMIRO TOGLIATTI, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY. REPORT TO THE CENTRAL C O M MITTEE

OF

THE

PCI,

(Rome), November

11,

NOVEMBER

10,

1961.

L'Unità

1961.2

O n N o v e m b e r 10-11, the Central C o m m i t t e e and the Central Control Commission of the PCI met in joint session to discuss the X X I I Congress. T h e session began with Togliatti's report. T h e first part of the speech dealt chiefly with the economic advances of the 1 For English translation of both documents, see The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), pp. 97-139 and 275-306. 8 On November 16, 1961, Pravda published a summary of Togliatti's speech. Considerable sections were deleted, presumably for reasons of space. Omissions by Pravda which affect the meaning of Togliatti's speech are indicated by angular brackets. L'Unità is the daily organ of the PCI.

The Communist

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Soviet Union and the new CPSU Program. In the second half of the speech, Togliatti turned to the questions of Stalinism, the "antiparty group," and Albania.3 . . . FROM start to finish, the recent gathering of the Soviet Communists has given us, with regard to all questions, a full confirmation of the policy set in 1956 at the XX Congress. (We have been reminded of the essence of this policy, and the importance of this fact cannot escape anyone. In fact, the X X Congress not only renewed the trends of the economic construction and the internal life of the Soviet Union but gave new orientation to the entire Communist and workers movement. I do not say anything new when I affirm that we had remained perplexed and even discontented and critical when there appeared in previous gatherings the tendency to forget or deemphasize this fact. The decisions of the X X Congress, and particularly the texts relating to the possibility of avoiding a new world conflict, or to the various ways of reaching socialism, etc., had great importance for us, not because they caused us to revise the policy we had followed for twenty years but because, by confirming the correctness of that policy, they enabled us to go more deeply into it, give a better justification for it, develop it with greater courage in today's circumstances, and forge a better link, in all our work, between practice and theory, thereby achieving a wide regeneration of our forces.) Therefore, there emanates from the X X I I Congress a new impetus for us to proceed along this road. And it is in this spirit that we shall examine some of the questions which, in relation to the recent Congress, are today being debated by the public, by the international labor movement, and also by the ranks of the Party. The assertion that war is not inevitable has been reaffirmed ' E a r l i e r in 1961, prior to the Soviet airing of charges against Hoxha, Togliatti had assumed a position consistent with his advocacy of autonomy for each party. While recognizing that developments in the Albanian party were "incorrect and dangerous," he went on to say that "we did not feel that we were by any means directly responsible for such mistakes or for their correction" (see Rinascita [Rome], April, 1961).

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without any reservations, even though the Congress had to take into account the way in which the international situation has worsened in the past few months. It is precisely in this highly serious situation that it became clear that the power of the Soviet Union, the solidarity of the socialist camp, the attachment of a strong group of nonaligned states to the cause of peace, and the resistance of peoples all weigh in the balance to such an extent as to make it more difficult, for whoever should desire it, to unleash a new armed conflict. (This was partially evident as well on August 13, when the German Democratic Republic decided to make for itself a normal border, such as all states have, and the boasts and threats of the Western powers came to nought.) The XXII Congress has contributed to the relaxation of international tension by reaffirming that the policy of the socialist countries is one of peaceful coexistence and nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries (by the way in which the problem of the peace treaty with Germany was presented, by the clear declaration that with regard to this problem and all others unresolved today, the Soviet Union is ready to conduct negotiations in which the interests of all parties will be considered. . . >. Directly linked to the decisions of the X X Congress are positions adopted by the XXII Congress which directly concern the international Communist and workers movement, just as they concern the internal life of the CPSU. Such in particular are the renewed severe denunciations of arbitrary, unlawful, and 4 On J a n u a r y 21, 1962, Togliatti discussed the problem of war and peace in a speech in Florence. H e stated: " A t o m i c weapons have changed the very n a t u r e of war. Neither party can claim to have a m i n i m u m degree of certainty that it would c o m e out safely f r o m an a r m e d clash with an antagonist. . . . In case of an atomic conflict, not only would there be h u n d r e d s of millions of dead, but h u m a n civilization itself—as we understand it in its various aspects—would disappear. T h e new society f o r which we fight and toward which we strive could not b e born of and rise f r o m the ashes and smoking ruins of civilization. This society must spring f o r t h , instead, f r o m the very b o s o m of present-day society by a work of regeneration, and not of devastation" ( L ' U n i t à , J a n u a r y 22, 1962). Pravda's report of this speech ( J a n u a r y 24, 1962) m a d e n o mention of the above passage.

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criminal acts committed both by Stalin and under his direction; the consequences which have resulted from these denunciations; the criticism of the leaders of the A P L , which, as you know, gave rise to a divergence of opinion with our Chinese comrades. (We are not astonished that the usual specialists in anticommunist agitation have sprung upon this part of the debate and these decisions of the Congress. We must instead be concerned with debating these problems ourselves, just as we did in 1956, so as to understand the situation better, to arm the Party better against all enemies, be they overt or disguised, and to take a better hold of our own positions. We are asked whether it was really necessary to reopen the chapter on the denunciations and to concentrate fire on a group of Stalin's former collaborators who were expelled f r o m the Central Committee in 1957. It is not easy to give an exhaustive reply to such a question, as we are not acquainted with all of the internal life of the Soviet Party and of its directing organs. It is certain that the severe attack by the Congress against this group enables us to understand better many things which at the X X Congress we were not in a position to grasp completely. Thus, it turns out that the change then decided upon for the Party's political courses of action and work had to be put into effect with a continuous struggle against a group of leaders that was rejecting it, opposing every measure of regeneration, and remaining tied to old things and methods, even when experience showed that they had to free themselves from that at all cost. T h e events in Poland and Hungary were probably exploited by that group to promote its retarding and disruptive action until in June-July, 1957, it was actually about to make a sudden attack to change the leadership of the Party and bury the decisions of the X X Congress. The X X I I Congress could not do otherwise than react to this in the way that it did. The danger encountered was indeed very serious. Perhaps if a more complete explanation had been given about that attempt immediately or soon afterwards, it would have helped the international C o m m u nist movement. Clarity is never harmful in these matters; the more light shed, the more securely and quickly one can proceed.

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In any case, the political essence of the attacks against the socalled antiparty group is completely clear to us, and we share it without any hesitation, all the more so because we, too, in the past few years, have had to take a stand openly against dried-up dogmatism and against the fear of new things. The CPSU, assigning itself the task of transition to a communist society, cannot do otherwise than simultaneously give itself such tasks and objectives as require a radical regeneration of all its activity. In the building of a communist society, it is not the structure alone that undergoes transformation. The superstructure must change as well, and hence so must the Party's working methods, its ties with the masses, its manner of exercising its leadership function in a stage that must be one of expansion of democratic life and of the creative efforts of the workers. In such a situation, dogmatism and sectarianism, devotion to the past, and hatred for new things become fundamental obstacles. Here, certainly, lies the real connection between the fundamental decisions of the X X I I Congress and the renewed struggle against the "antiparty group." As for the new denunciations, these do not add much to what one was able to read in the famous "secret report." They involve new episodes that probably came to light through the investigations conducted by the special commission set up by the X X Congress, and in part involve facts already known. It may be that for us these latest denunciations were no longer necessary, and it may even be that they will cause some emotion and perplexity here and there. However, we must make an effort to understand the situation existing in the Soviet Union.) The violations of legality and the crimes committed at the summit of the Party, the armed forces, and the state under Stalin's authority constitute a terrible tragedy which still weighs upon the minds of both the old and the new generations and from which we are not yet freed. (It is quite probable that the request for full light on the matter is coming from below: Communists cannot behave like certain Catholic historians, who rank Alexander VI as one of the great popes, neglecting to say what he was in reality. The denunciation, then, is indispensable when it is a matter

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of placing an impassable barrier to the return of a past that must be buried forever, if not forgotten.) The transfer of Stalin's remains from the Lenin Mausoleum to the place where the remains of other prominent Communist leaders lie was essentially a measure that had already become necessary at the time of the X X Congress, and I believe it would not have been deferred if it were not that public opinion at the time would not yet have understood it. (I personally am perplexed, however, by the decision to change the name of the city of Stalingrad, and I do not feel so through any regard for Stalin, but because by that name millions and millions of people have identified and will continue to identify the famous battle which changed the course of World War II. Our Soviet comrades should realize the actual conditions and the sensitivity of popular feeling in capitalist countries and should not demand things that are not absolutely necessary.) The problem of Stalin is a serious, profound one which transcends the individual denunciations of inhuman acts and touches on basic questions of the Communist and workers movement, a discussion of which cannot be evaded. For that reason, we feel that what is being done by the Albanian Communists, who are supported in part by the Chinese comrades, is wrong and sets a bad example. The Albanians counter the denunciations of our Soviet comrades with mere superficial exaltation consisting of words devoid of any critical meaning. That must be unhesitatingly rejected. (No one denies the merits Stalin did have, just as it would be absurd to deny the greatness which the working class and the peoples of the Soviet Union succeeded in attaining when Stalin was the leader of the Party and the state. But was his personal action, from a certain point on, not an obstacle and a negative element in the entire situation? This is one of the conclusions which must be reached with regard to his doctrinal formulations as well. If we reread today, for example, his last work on the problems of the socialist economy, we note there the expression of a conservatism which had to be broken in order for progress to be made. One can imagine how harmful that must have been

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when he, at the summit of the Party, was the only one who could express an opinion, to which all then had to conform. This is a serious danger, which we must be wary of and always avoid. A political party that is inspired by Marxism and has to direct a vast action among the masses cannot reduce itself to a singleheaded organism. In its rank and file and also in its own directing organs it must stimulate debate, the training of various leaders, and the continuous exchange of opinions, but without having every divergence of opinion lead to ruptures and sanctions. That is all the more necessary today, when we have grown so much, when the situation confronting us is so complicated, and when new problems continually arise and political invention must be continuous. Unity and solidarity in work and action must be complete, but only open and sincere debate makes it possible to create and maintain them. What particularly shocked and repelled us at the last congress of the A P L was the total ignorance of this method, the reduction of party meetings to the continuous, tiresome exaltation of the merits of a single individual, along with scorn for any principle of internal democracy. This is not the Marxist-Leninist model according to which a Communist party must be organized and developed. In those conditions, no doctrinal research and therefore no progress in theory are possible any longer. Anyone who says something new or different is looked upon as a heretic, which means therefore that one ends up permitting and valuing only a repetition of things already said. How can new forces be won over to Marxism among the workers, intellectuals, and youth if we are reduced in this way to a sect of talmudistic hosanna-singers? A party which is in power, such as the Albanian, and which is undergoing this kind of transformation, inevitably comes to think of the very problems of power merely in terms of material forces, which is a serious political error but was one of the errors into which Stalin himself felL Besides this, there are two great questions which arise from the denunciations of what was done for many years under the direction and responsibility of Stalin, in brutal violation of the Constitution itself and the laws which the Soviet state had

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solemnly promulgated. How were such serious things possible and how can it be guaranteed that they will not be repeated? I still do not find completely satisfactory the reply to the first question, which consists of reducing everything to the negative personal qualities of Stalin himself, which, moreover, were discovered and denounced by Lenin in his time. It turns out that there were other persons around Stalin who collaborated with him in violating the laws; how then does one explain the fact that the Party, which heard Lenin's serious warning at one of its congresses, did not want to take it into account? It is necessary to probe further, to arrive at an analysis of the actual conditions of development of Soviet society and not to justify that which is being denounced today by asserting—and this is wrong and must be rejected—that it "could not have been otherwise," but to understand things better and draw from them a lesson for everyone. In 1956, in agreement with the comrades of the Party leadership, but under my responsibility alone, I made an attempt, through the well-known interview I gave to Nuovi Argomenti, to get down to this matter, and I still maintain that the partial conclusions I reached then are completely valid. At least they have not to this moment been refuted through adequate argumentation. The new revelations of the XXII Congress do not contradict these conclusions, but rather confirm them. It is therefore necessary to continue the inquiry, to make deeper analyses; and the Soviet comrades should lend their valuable assistance to this investigation, because they need it in their country as well, to answer the questions which no doubt are arising in the minds of the new generation. From what has been said at the XXII Congress, the mysterious Kirov crime appears now to have been the point of departure, the turning point toward the subsequent deformations. Let us look back to 1934 when, despite the fact that there persisted a degree of economic dislocation, the Soviet Union could boast to all the world of the success of the First Five-Year Plan and of the agricultural collectivization. How could there arise, at that very moment, the sharp contradiction of an action which came from the party summit to violate, negate, and

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destroy socialist legality? It must be admitted that at that moment there arose, on the very foundations of the successes, real contradictions and a new kind of difficulty, which the Stalinist leadership did not succeed in understanding and thought it could resolve by establishing a regime of suspicion and unjust repression. It must be admitted that Lenin was right when he said that even successes could be a cause of bureaucratization. It is also necessary to go back in time to the things that preceded, to the long years of the Civil War, of foreign intervention and terror, which had created a certain pattern and method of work and explain to us how a part of the ruling group could be transformed, around Stalin, into a mere power group, for whom every question was reduced to a clash of material forces. These naturally are only general observations which ought to be examined on the basis of the facts, so as to give every criticism and denunciation its proper proportion, contrasting them with the immense work of economic construction achieved by the working masses under the direction of the Party and the Soviet government, the foundation and building of a new society, and, at the same time, an international policy of peace which found its greatest echo in the hearts of the peoples. We committed ourselves in 1956 to carrying this investigation forward, and something was done through contacts with the leading comrades of the Soviet Party, the sending of study delegations, extensive press coverage, and the publication of studies and books with which you assuredly are acquainted. More must be done, and we must commit ourselves to doing so, appealing for new assistance to both the Soviet comrades and the scholars of other parties. The worst thing for our entire movement would be to limit ourselves to opposing denunciation with exaltation, without concerning ourselves about anything else. In addition, the difference of opinion which exists over this matter between ourselves and the Chinese comrades needs to be better defined by means of investigation, study, and debate.) But the question of guarantees against a repetition of what took place in Stalin's time has been amply and convincingly dealt with by the Congress. (This is the purpose of all those

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measures proposed and adopted to extend democracy to all the levels of the social structure, the important modifications in the Party Rules, the demand for a more intensive activity in the soviets, the trade unions, and so on, the criticism of erroneous doctrines of penal law, which were used to cover up real and manifest violations of legality, and lastly the proposal to consider a more precise elaboration of the juridical principles relating to the defense of personal liberty. The affirmation, solemnly repeated by all, that there will be no turning back, has therefore been supported by specific political, legal, and organizational measures. On the other hand, we cannot accept the position maintained by Comrade Nenni, according to whom it is necessary to have institutional changes as the only guarantee against a repetition of what happened under Stalin's responsibility and through his fault. Soviet institutions are the result of a long historical process which cannot be done over in reverse. Their legitimacy is proved, if there is still any need to do so, by the very existence and continuous economic and political progress of Soviet society, by its victory in the last war, by its policy of peace today, and by the march begun toward communism. It is absurd to contrast Soviet institutions in an abstract manner with the institutions of the bourgeois-democratic state and to suppose that one can and must return to the latter. After all, what do these famous institutions of the democratic state, the Western state, so to speak, really guarantee? Have they perhaps given the French people sufficient guarantee against the advent of a regime of personal tyranny, against the villainous war in Algeria, against the Suez adventure, against today's massacre of the Algerians? Do they perhaps safeguard the American people against the follies of the generals in the Pentagon? The true guarantee of liberty lies not so much in institutional principles as in the democratic will of the popular masses and in their capacity for action and for defense against reactionary attacks. We too have seen this in our country, in June, 1960. In a state where power is in the hands of the working class and its party, the true guarantee lies in the development of a democratic spirit

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and a democratic life in all the existing organizations; it lies in economic progress and in the progress of the education, culture, and political and social activity of all the citizens. The Soviet Union is today already quite different from what it was at the start, when everything had to be won and defended by struggle, and quite different also from what it was in Stalin's time. And it will change even more, with the advent of new generations, with the self-improvement of the socialist society, and with the transition to a communist society. But it is on the basis of and within the framework of the Soviet institutions that this will happen, because it is these institutions which have made and are making possible the qualitative change in economic and social relations that comprises the transition to communism. For us who work and fight to open to the Italian working class and the Italian people a way of our own for the advance toward socialism, the problem of guarantees against deviations from a democratic course of action lies at the heart of our policy formulations and was at the heart of the decisions of our Eighth and Ninth congresses. It is precisely to give and to have this guarantee that we affirm the necessity and possibility of moving toward socialism by following a democratic course peculiar to the conditions of our country and the conquests already achieved by the working class and the people in their struggle against fascism. It is to give and to have this guarantee that we have been careful above all to maintain and develop the democratic character of our party, continually encouraging in it debate and the confrontation of ideas, and at the same time always accepting debate and confrontation with any adversary whatsoever, convinced as we are that our strength does not lie in shutting ourselves up in an ivory tower but rather in tackling without prejudice all new questions that come up today; it lies in never fearing what is new or fearing to face reality, whatever it may be. If there are mistakes to correct and errors to denounce, it is this way of putting things to the test that will be the basis of correction and denunciation. We followed this course of action, for example, after the X X Congress, the events in Poland, and those in Hungary, and this enabled us to ensure a bitter dis-

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appointment for those who were saying that these shocks would lead us to a fatal crisis. And I am convinced that the same thing will happen now. Certainly we cannot deny that this way of acting of ours has given our party a particular, original stamp in the very extensive c a m p of the international Communist movement of today. But this does not at all disturb us—quite the contrary. We have found nothing in Marx, Lenin, or Gramsci that contradicts or condemns the manner in which we are moving. We have always been persistent advocates, for quite a long time now, of the belief that the struggles of the working class and the vanguard party of the working class must have a stamp of their own, corresponding to the conditions and traditions of the country, and a corresponding course of political action. It is for that reason as well that there was such great value for us in the decisions of the X X Congress, especially the affirmation of the political and organizational autonomy of every Communist party. We have been among the first, besides the Soviet comrades, to maintain that today there can be neither a guiding state nor a guiding party, and this is now accepted by all. T h e widespread nature of the Communist movement in countries far f r o m one another, the diversity of actual conditions, and the inevitable diversity of political action and working methods make it necessary to have this multiplicity of directing centers. These differences can also give rise to diverging positions taken on specific issues, and this necessitates debate and the continuous exchange of opinions.) The meeting of Communist and workers parties which took place in Moscow in 1957 and the subsequent large conference of the eighty-one parties in 1960 have made a decisive contribution toward determining the common elements of our policy throughout the world, furnishing an unshakable basis for the ideological and political unity of our entire movement. (What we are asserting and doing does not, however, in any way contradict the principles of proletarian internationalism and international solidarity among all the Communist and workers parties. O n the contrary, the better the conditions of one's OWD.

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country can be understood, the greater the probability of success in the struggle for democracy, for socialism, and for peace, and the greater therefore is the contribution that can be made to the common cause. Nor do we believe that there is another party that has sought, in the past few years, more contact with other Communist parties for the purpose of continually bettering our knowledge of one another, and for the purpose of discussion, in order to clarify mutual misapprehensions and to dispel misunderstandings. One great success in this field consisted of the meeting in Rome, organized in 1959 by us together with our French comrades, from which there emerged a platform that still retains its validity. With our French comrades in particular we hope to have continual contacts, so that we shall know what task our two parties must concern themselves with for a proper orientation of the entire Communist movement, at a time when it is totally impossible that there can arise again—and we would be opposed to its arising again—a centralized international organization. There have also been numerous study meetings on matters of doctrine and interpretation of the existing situation, and these will have to continue. We believe there is nothing scandalous in the fact that a discussion can take place among the Communist parties in a calm, objective tone.) Our movement has today become so great, so extensive, and holds so many and such diverse positions, that it is unthinkable that we can be harmed by a comparison of opinions that do not coincide always and in every respect, provided that the fundamental principles of our doctrine and of proletarian internationalism are not violated. What the Albanian Communists cannot be forgiven, aside from the violation of all the principles of democratic centralism, is their having reached the point, in their relations with the Soviet Union and the other socialist parties, of repudiating and trampling on international proletarian solidarity. The objection raised by Comrade Chou En-lai to Comrade Khrushchev's criticism of the Albanian leaders involved only the form of the relations between parties; but even with this limitation I do not believe it was acceptable, because in this case the public criticisir

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came after all the questions had been raised and discussed in private, but without any results. We have also had contacts and maintain friendly relations with the Yugoslav Communists. That is not solely a necessity of our geographic position; it is more than that. We have criticized and maintain our criticism of the program approved by the last congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists. But we cannot do less, vis-à-vis the present regime in Yugoslavia, than ask ourselves what it is like. It is not like the regime which exists in the Soviet Union or the people's democracies (yet it is neither a feudal nor even a capitalist regime), nor, it seems to us, a regime which, having moved toward socialism, is now turning back toward forms already superseded. This points to the necessity for acquaintance, study, and reflection. This also points to the error of treating Yugoslavia and its regime as enemies, whereas it is necessary instead for the Yugoslav Communists to feel that there can indeed be disagreements with them, but that there is no preconceived hostility toward them. It would be strange indeed if, while seeking contact with the Social Democratic movement, we were to reject contact with the Yugoslav Communists. This, moreover, was our position at the conference last year of the eighty-one Communist and workers parties. In conclusion, we find that the X X I I Congress was an exceptional event, one of decisive importance for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, for our party, for the world Communist and workers movement, and for all working humanity. . . .

61.

T H E D E B A T E IN THE C E N T R A L C O M M I T T E E AND T H E C E N TRAL C O N T R O L COMMISSION OF THE P C I CPSU

CONGRESS.

L'Unità,

November 12,

ON T H E

XXII

1961.

The ensuing Central Committee debate on Togliatti's report evoked greater diversity of opinion than the Secretary-General may have anticipated. The following is the major portion of the debate, according to the (presumably edited) version published in L'Unità.

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The original does not distinguish between direct quotation, paraphrase, and editorial summary. Ezio Santarelli, Member, Central Committee; Parliamentary deputy: The X X I I Congress of the C P S U was not only a congress of struggle against the cult of personality. It went beyond the X X Congress in the denunciation of the conservative and dogmatic positions which hold back the advance of the Communist parties and even the realization of the Communist program in the U S S R , and hinder a correct appraisal of the international situation. Every Communist party must examine its own position from this point of view. Even here in Italy, for example, the policy of coexistencc is viewed by certain strata of the Party from a tactical and instrumental point of view, rather than as a basic element of a new revolutionary strategy in a period in which the balance of forces has shifted in favor of the socialist camp. Consequently, today, in the face of the resumption of nuclear tests, there is in the party a certain group which is wavering, the precise and documented position of the leadership notwithstanding. This wavering can be precisely attributed, at least in part, to the fact that antiquated, dogmatic positions have survived for a long time in the shadow of a correct line, which has often been accepted only formally. . . . We must take account of the new elements in the international Communist movement and aim at new forms of coordination, ever more articulate and more responsive to the actual situation, which is that of a polycentrism in fact. Our party must express its opinion on this question too with full autonomy, and work thus for the unity of the socialist camp, conscious of its responsibility toward the workers of its own country and toward the international movement. Paolo Robotti, Member, Central Control Commission: Comrade Robotti lived in the U S S R for a long time, and was one of the victims of the illegal acts committed during the period of the repressions. Arrested, he spent many months in prison

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before his innocence was recognized. Today in the Central Committee he describes his experience. Why, Comrade Robotti asks himself, did we not speak out, even though we knew from experience what the situation was? Because it was up to the Soviet comrades to denounce what should have been denounced. We could not join the rabble of adversaries of communism. During that period every true Communist had to fight alone, facing sanctions and, worse, the humiliation of accusations and condemnations. How to behave? There were old comrades who thought that everything they had built was collapsing. Others, and I was among them, held that the persecutions were the fruit of a conspiracy organized abroad, against which there had not been an adequate defense. Now, at the Congress, Comrade Khrushchev has confirmed that the trial of the generals was based on false documents, prepared by Hitler's Gestapo and passed in good faith by Benes to Stalin. Our opinions at that time, therefore, had a certain truth, but that does not explain everything. The cult of personality had its origin in particular circumstances. Let us remember how socialism was built, with what struggles. Of 25,000 Communists sent to the country to work with the peasants, only 10,000 returned alive. The others were killed by the counter-revolutionaries. Against the "barbarous violence" of the enemy, as Lenin defined it, repressions were necessary. They became an illegal method within the Party when the dizziness born of success, the initiative of the little followers who lived in the shadow of the cult, the international tension which required exceptional measures created an atmosphere of suspicion and fear. To this were added the ideological errors: the increase of anticommunism in proportion to its successes was postulated; the assertion that confession alone was sufficient proof of guilt was elevated to a juridical principle. How did the accused behave? Many resisted, denied the truth of confessions which had been made, and were condemned on the basis of the confessions of others. Others averred that it was necessary to confess anything and even go so far as to

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involve as many people as possible, so as to incite public opinion and the Party and necessitate a revision of all the judicial inquiries. It was not easy to find the right course of action. What is certain is that, while the cult corrupted the upper echelons and in lesser measure the middle ranks, most of the population remained steadfast and unaffected. I remember when I returned rehabilitated from prison, the manager of the factory greeted me with enthusiasm, and so did the chief of the Internal Commission and the workers. It is this steadfastness of the masses which has allowed the Party and the country to progress and obtain ever new successes, in spite of everything. Today it is possible to throw full light on that period. It is necessary that it be done. But let us not forget that along with the crimes there was the heroism of those old cadres whom Khrushchev wished to have on the rostrum of the Congress, who never yielded, and who bore high their own faith and the banner of communism even in the harshest times. . . . Umberto Terracini, one of the founders of the PCI, member of the Comintern Presidium in 1922; Member, PCI Directorate and Central Committee; Senator: The report of Comrade Togliatti placed the X X I I Congress and its conclusions in the perspective of the stormy and difficult progress of the Revolution which, from 1917 to date, in an uninterrupted succession of conquests, saw the creation of a socialist society. And there is no doubt that if the Congress had, at the opening, when there was an atmosphere of enthusiasm for the communist society, taken a stand no longer just on the ideological and theoretical plane, but on its definite future prospects, this would have given a powerful impetus to further positive developments in thought and action, not only to the Party and the Soviet people, but to the entire Communist movement. But the Congress, contrary to every expectation, began to change the very nature of its work and its guidelines

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from what was thought to be its general orientation, the one found in the proposed agenda, to a different agenda consisting of the problems of the antiparty group and the Albanian Party. Now these problems were inserted naturally in the Congress debates, since it was the duty of the outgoing Central Committee to report to the Party both on the execution of the decisions of the XX Congress and on the tension which had arisen from the position of another party of the socialist world. But perplexity and anxiety arise when it is seen how, altering the proportions, these two questions have been given more weight in the Congress's debate than the theme formerly considered prevailing and fundamental, as is evident from all the addresses given. Hence the concern and the legitimate desire of the comrades to be more fully informed, to comprehend the reasons which led the leaders of the Soviet Party to turn the Congress into a platform for making renewed denunciations and renewed condemnations of a past on which the most severe judgment had already been pronounced. Denunciations and condemnations which, involving names and persons formerly surrounded with authority and respect, give a new tenor to the phenomenon already defined as the cult of personality. From Stalin, responsibility was now broadened, in fact, to include all of the old ruling group of the Stalin era. Actually, that could have been understood from the day after the X X Congress, since it was absurd to believe that the monstrous degenerative process unexpectedly unveiled at that time had a single and exclusive author and actor. And it was a mistake to accept, even if only on the surface, this absurd hypothesis, instead of resolutely carrying forward the work of restoring the teaching and practice of Leninism, so deformed and changed by the personality cult. Hence the rebellious state of mind in the face of the new denunciations. Hence the inevitable (even if not formulated) question of whether future denunciations may not still occur, perhaps overcoming even Comrade Khrushchev himself. For it must be said that in fact Comrade Khrushchev was also in the ruling group which, around Stalin, shared all responsibility. But Khru-

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shchev is also the comrade who, from within that group, understood the necessity of smashing it, denouncing and rejecting its repellent heritage. Moreover, he faced resolutely and courageously the fatally risky struggle provoked by the application of his timely proposals for radical regeneration of the old system. This is his merit, for which he has the right to the recognition and trust of all militant revolutionaries. But the question arises as to why the leaders of the CPSU reopened and broadened this front of political struggle at the XXII Congress. They have not said so, but it may be thought that they did so because of the persistence—aside from the antiparty group—in the Party and the administrative apparatus, of forces of resistance to the complete elimination of all the putrescent layers with which the cult of personality had covered every little ganglion of the Soviet system; to defeat them definitely, all the moral and political energies of the Soviet peoples had to be mobilized by this renewed and greater denunciation. Since even the most self-sacrificing dedication of a group of leaders, in itself limited, proved unequal to the task of liberation in the sense decided upon by the X X Congress and confirmed by the XXII, this task has been entrusted to, indeed urged upon, the masses of militants and citizens, who have been made witnesses of the undertaking and therefore participants in it. As regards the Albanian Party of Labor, it is necessary to guard against the danger that the divergence which has arisen, no matter how bitter, may not result in a juxtaposition of opposing ideological principles and political theses, but may degenerate into virulent phraseology and organizational actions such as could also be feared in the wake of the things said at the XXII Congress. This does not mean acceptance of or indulgence toward the errors, which are obviously most serious and deplorable, which for some time have characterized the work of these [Albanian] leaders, but only that moral and material pressure can no longer be permitted as a means of mediating or resolving the controversial problems that arise within the world revolutionary movement.

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Mario Berti, Member, Central Control Commission: One can take as a point of departure the emotional element which has taken over since the denunciations of the errors of the past pronounced from the rostrum of the XXII Congress of the CPSU assumed the prominence they have. Our press has done well to mirror this aspect adequately, even though perforce other elements which emerged from the debate of the XXII Congress were sacrificed. We must proceed from the methodological lessons implicit in the report presented by Comrade Togliatti: that is, to place a critical examination of the Congress within the framework of the grandiose prospects of development which are opening up for Soviet society. This does not mean that we must be limited to illustrating the various points contained in Togliatti's report. The whole Party feels the need for a better understanding of the causes which could lead to the affirmation of the "cult of the personality," with all the errors, the violations of legality, the repressive acts that followed it. And the whole Party, at the same time, dwells on the problem of the "guarantees," that is, on the problems of the development of socialist democracy in the USSR. The contribution which we can make to the clarification must be based upon a greater acquaintance with the social and political life of the USSR and its democratic manifestations, to prevent our critical task from becoming abstract, and to ensure indeed that it starts from those structural and superstructura] elements which are native to Soviet society. As for relations among Communist parties, we must note that we have already entered upon a new phase in which the need for substantial unity becomes more urgent. If we are able to conduct our debate by starting from the Program approved by the Congress of the CPSU, we shall succeed in having a serious debate, be it with the socialist comrades or with all those forces in Italy which are interested in a profound social regeneration. We shall thus avoid two perils which are already manifest: on the one hand, the tendency to "justificationism" of the past; on the other, a sectarian isolationism which avoids, rather than seeks, such a debate.

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Achille Occhetto, Editor of Youth Federation (FGCI) weekly, Nuova Generazione; Member, FGCI Directorate: It is a mistake to separate the two elements which are present in the XXII Congress: on the one hand, the Program for communism; and on the other, the attack on the antiparty group and the criticisms of the Albanian Party. There is a profound interdependence between the elements. The dramatic nature of the attack, which in a certain sense replaces historical analysis, is explained by the harshness of the political struggle which developed in the USSR, but also by the fact that the suggestion contained in Togliatti's interview in Nuovi Argomenti was not acted upon; therefore the tendency remains to overcome obstacles with slogans instead of with a more probing historical analysis. Difficulties are encountered in facing certain problems, such as the relationship between planning and the masses, or the problems of culture. One also perceives a certain limit in the Program for communism, particularly as regards superstructural problems such as the birth of the new, integral man, without whom it seems more appropriate to speak not of construction of communism but of the technical-material bases of communism. On another point, the impossibility of continuing to accord the function of leader state to the USSR presses us more sharply to make a contribution of our own to the problems of the relationship between socialism and democracy, as a contribution also to the political development of the USSR itself in the right direction. But our autonomy must be viewed in the right way, that is, in the framework of our internationalist tradition. It is necessary to repulse the attempt to confound us with Social Democrats, or even with certain Socialist positions which tend to reduce the problems of socialist democracy to a marriage between planning from above and bourgeois democracy. One cannot think of a restoration in the USSR of typical superstructures of bourgeois democracy. There is posed, however, the problem of the institutionalization of freedom at a new level. In 1917 it was not a "slice" of revolution that was accomplished,

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but a part of the world revolution which is also ours. Therefore, the choice made by the Party in '21 was right, as was the building of socialism in one country, and it is from these positions that one must debate with the forces which would now enclose the Italian workers movement in its "little niche," in a narrowminded, "parochialist" view of its problems. Polycentrism means not this, but different analyses of different situations, a confrontation of ideas, and debate, in the conviction that the problems of the workers and Communists of one country are of close concern to the workers and Communists of all the other countries. Moreover, the battle against the "parochialist" attempt, against whoever tries to put us in a radical and petty-bourgeois [i.e., nonsocialist] setting and to have us accept the myths created by the forces of the CenterLeft coalition, is not fought by shutting oneself up in conservatism, but by courageously carrying the critical process to its end, broadening to the maximum the democratic debate within the Party. This [debate] must be channeled within Lenin's view of democratic centralism—a view, that is, which presupposes the possibility, during the discussion phase, for dissent to become organized, and, in the final analysis, for majorities and minorities to organize themselves. Giorgio Amendola, Member, PCI Directorate, Secretariat, and Central Committee; Parliamentary deputy: I shall concentrate my presentation on three points: the importance of the victory in the XXII Congress of the line of the X X Congress; the necessity of a public political debate in the international Communist movement; and the development of internal democracy in the Communist parties. With the reaffirmation of the theses of the XX Congress— the theses of peaceful coexistence, socialist democracy, and national roads to socialism—the XXII Congress has given a new, formidable impetus to a regeneration and advancement of the Communist movement. The criticism of the methods and the limitations of the XXII Congress, while still necessary, must in no way obfuscate the importance of such a victory, which was

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neither certain nor easy, and which was the fruit of a hard and bitter struggle, a struggle which is still in process, and which certainly has not yet reached its end. Bearing in mind the bitter struggle of 1957, and the peril then overcome, let us therefore salute the victory of a line which corresponds to our necessities, aspirations, and political formulations. Let it not be forgotten that the polemical fury, the passion, as it was called, with which the criticism of the Stalinist degenerations was made corresponds to objective necessities. Just as the "secret report" was an effective weapon for breaking certain forces of resistance, so today a new violent political and emotional charge has been necessary to blow up the ideological, bureaucratic, and organizational barriers which were obstructing new developments in the USSR, the accomplishment of change, and the developments in the process of regeneration. Now it is ever more difficult to turn back, and the new forces, the forces of regeneration, can advance faster through the breaches opened in the old edifice. The removal of Stalin's remains, or the change in the name of the city of Stalingrad, can be disturbing, but we must accept them as the expression of a desire to destroy a myth which has weighed heavily on the life of the Soviet Union. Millions of Soviet citizens request these changes. At the base of the building of communism there must be the satisfaction of all those who, unjustly injured in their own persons or in those of their families, today ask for justice, because the building of communism requires not only technicaleconomic bases, but also bases of justice, of liberty, of morality. At this point the question arises: What was our contribution to the victory of Khrushchev's line? Perhaps certain cautions and obstacles have hindered our making all the contribution we could have made. After Hungary, the necessity of safeguarding the unity of the socialist world and the international workers movement led us, in a conscious act of self-discipline freely decided upon by us, to approve a line expressed in some documents approved in international meetings—documents which undoubtedly were not mistaken, but which certainly did not

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contain all that was positive in the X X Congress, and did not refer to all the themes set by it. Today, however, the political struggle revealed by the X X I I Congress and the disagreements existing among Communist parties revealed by that Congress have led to a basic change in the situation. The fictitious unanimity decreed by some documents, but not corresponding to a real unity, disappears. It is necessary to recognize the diversity of the situations and the positions of the USSR and China, Italy and France, Yugoslavia and Cuba. Such diversity is a necessary and inevitable consequence of the Communist advance in the world. It necessitates polycentrism, which does not weaken internationalism, but is rather the condition of a real internationalism, not formal but profound, which can broaden to the whole world. Only through an open public discussion about real problems can unity be recreated on a higher level. We Italian Communists cannot retreat within ourselves, but must participate in the debate on all questions, expressing an autonomous judgment on the policy of the other parties, on the causes of their victories and setbacks. The defense of international unity was proper. However, it has also discouraged us from carrying out creative research, not only on the subjects of socialist democracy and criticism of Stalinism, but also in the analysis and elaboration of polycentrism, national roads, the economic development of the capitalist world, and the new possibilities of approaching socialism by original roads, even where there is no Communist party. We are proud of the themes of our VIII Congress, but we recognize frankly that in a certain measure these themes were later set aside. . . . 5 The regeneration must also be ideological and must face all the problems of the class struggle in the world as they appear today, in 1961, in the new situation created by the advance of socialism in the world and by the general crisis of capitalism. Now, to carry forward this process of regeneration, the system of bilateral meetings, of internal polemics, of contacts at the sum' T h e VIII Congress of the PCI was held in December, 1956.—Ed.

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mit, of conferences, no longer suffices and is even an impediment. Our whole party, besides, asks to participate in the debate in the international field. We cannot permit the publicity on our disagreements to be given out only by other parties, and must not let ourselves be faced with faits accomplis. For example, the debate with all the other Western European Communist parties is of fundamental importance to us, because we cannot advance much in Italy without a revival of the workers movement in the whole European capitalist world. It is a matter of returning to Leninism also in the sense of a revival of political discussion on the international level. That naturally implies a debate on the problems faced in their real terms, not with ritualistic jargon, and this demands critical study of the political documents of the Communist parties of other countries. The XXII Congress has therefore represented the end of a formula of fictitious unanimity, which had nothing to do with a real ideological and political unity. This fact is to be greeted as positive. In our party, too, debates must be held from time to time on various problems, if necessary, right up to the point of forming minorities and majorities. This does not mean the organization of factions which would crystallize and restrict debate, as in other parties; it means the ever broader development of a democratic internal dialectic. Such a development is possible thanks to the habit which already exists in our party, educated by Gramsci and Togliatti to a proper conception of democratic centralism. This development of democracy is a necessary condition for the attainment of clarity, for carrying forward the work of regeneration and strengthening of the Party, and therefore for opening perspectives of new advances of the Italian people toward democracy and socialism. Alfredo Reichlin, Member, Central Committee; Editor of L'Unità: The XXII Congress represents for us an excellent opportunity to bring up again a series of ideological and political problems which have been pending for some time. . . .

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The bomb of de-Stalinization is politically very effective because it strikes right at the heart of that typically Stalinist development, the formation of a bureaucratic crust, not as a simple routine phenomenon, but as an important political and social one. The discussion begun at the XXII Congress must surely be made more explicit, not in order to limit it, but to deepen and advance it. However, the gravest error would be that of putting the denunciation in the shadows, or of separating it from the program presented to the Congress. In reality, the Congress, with all its limitations, is of exceptional value because it has begun to weld the delineation of the economic and productive objectives with a political, even if summary, discourse on the necessity of new political and ideological instruments to realize these objectives. . . . Our autonomy should not be a parochial self-containment, but, on the contrary, must be an original contribution to the elaboration of a revolutionary strategy for the capitalist West which will be dialectically tied to the struggles of the socialist and underdeveloped countries. We have always maintained that in the West the struggle to win power must progress through the creation of a new and highly organized historical bloc and through the formation of a new system of political and social alliances. True, this has always been the basis of our discussions and positions in these past years. However, to date, our debate has not had the necessary breadth. We feel the need to resume and broaden debate on the characteristics of the present transitional phase, that is to say, on the character of modern capitalism, on state monopoly capitalism, on the new character the state has assumed in the epoch of the monopolies. We feel the necessity of deepening the discussion of our action program in an effort better to relate our struggle for structural reform to the strategic problem of political objectives. In other words, we cannot limit ourselves to indicating the reforms we want, but must state how they can be obtained and why we want them.

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Armando Cossutta, Member, PCI Directorate and Central Committee: The debate on the problems raised by the XXII Congress is lively and impassioned at all levels of our party. There is a substantial difference between the discussion which took place in 1956 and that of today: today it concerns us more directly, and our party is asked to take clear policy positions. In his presentation, Togliatti indicated the two issues on which it is necessary to give answers: One, what was the cause in the USSR of the illegalities so clamorously denounced, and two, what are the guarantees against a repetition? There is also a third point which we must make clear: What are, already today, the consequences of the XXII Congress for Communist action and, in particular, for that of Italian Communists? In this connection it is necessary to reaffirm unequivocally the line we had put forth, of autonomy in the international movement—autonomy understood as an autonomous capacity for criticism, for responsibility, and for political formulations. Today we find ourselves faced with the fact that there is no longer an absolute unity in the international Communist movement, and this on some essential points. Hence an uneasiness at the base of our party, which is not aware of the different positions, the causes of the disagreement. It is urgent to give openly such explanation as is urged by all the comrades, since such an explanation also covers the fundamental themes of our policy—that is, the themes of coexistence, of the struggle against imperialism, of the possibility of the creation of communism. . . . This debate will undoubtedly have repercussions on the internal life of our party and on the development of our new forms of democracy. Certain positions denounced from the rostrum of the XXII Congress also exist among us, and will manifest themselves again because there are other parties in the Communist ranks which maintain them. How to resolve this situation? Not, certainly, with administrative or disciplinary measures. But precisely through that debate and that frank and explicit political struggle which can carry us to a real political

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unity, which is quite a different thing, as has been said, from an artificial unanimity. Rino Serri, Secretary, F G C I : The regenerating impetus of the X X I I Congress provides a basis on which the Party, carrying the debate to its conclusion, must establish a new relationship of esteem and trust with the new generations. The problems debated do not represent "internal difficulties" of the international Communist movement or of the Party in the USSR but, on the contrary, are the great problems of the modern world: those of the development of democracy, of peace and war, of coexistence. We demonstrate our mastery of the situation by squarely facing up to these problems and by finding new strength to bring them closer to solution. This impulse toward regeneration must coexist with a profound historical analysis which should become political analysis and, therefore, active policy. That is, it is not a matter of writing a dissertation on the crimes, but of analyzing the roots of the question, that is, the reason for the insufficient participation of the masses in the exercise of power, the reason for the lowering of the level of culture and ideology in the U S S R , the reason for the weakening of the functions of the Party. Such historical research must be undertaken in the context of the relation between structure and superstructure in the U S S R ; not with the demand to reintroduce bourgeois structures into a socialist country, but to examine the content and worth of the socialist structure, developing Gramsci's views on the organization of civil society. We must ask our Soviet comrades to help us in this research. The second aspect of this question is how to advance our formulation of the Italian road to socialism. Here the relationship which we establish between the institutions of bourgeois democracy which we intend to keep (parliament and parties) and the new forms of direct democracy is decisive. Finally, the third and still more urgent problem connected with this debate of ours is that of peace and war, on which today

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there are also discussions among the various Communist parties. Here it does not suffice to affirm the principle that war is avoidable, but rather to agree on how to organize the policy for coexistence. This seems to be the true tenor of the difference between the Soviets and Chinese. We Italian Communists have a position of our own, already delineated by Comrade Togliatti : it brings out the new character which war is assuming in consequence of the development of new weapons of mass destruction. If the character of war is modified, the struggle for peace is also modified. The policy of coexistence must take account of this. Therefore, still more than in the past, the strength of the socialist countries is not the only element in a perspective of coexistence; but the articulate initiative of the individual parties, of the peoples, and of the socialist countries themselves is needed to advance that prospect. Mario Alicata, Member, PCI Directorate and Central Committee; Editor, L'1Jnità\ Parliamentary deputy: . . . The point on which we must concentrate our attention is that of finding a just balance between the requirement that we defend and carry forward the general line of the X X I I Congress and the no less indispensable duty to raise critical objections. The decisive contribution of the X X I I Congress is the prospect of increased liberty which it offers all humanity; but an organic part of this prospect is the denunciation of the errors of the past. We must examine this denunciation from a historical point of view, eliminating all forms of "justificationism." It is not in fact true that a directing group, moving in a correct general direction, must necessarily have only one concrete path which it can follow; there exists always an element of political choice as to which path to follow. We must, therefore, discuss this type of question in a historical frame of reference, since the deepening of knowledge cannot be achieved solely through clarification of deviations of a "detective story" nature and of judicial problems. The process of development of Soviet democracy is certainly not that of a revision of the system

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suggested to us by the Social Democrats, traditionalists, and Comrade Nenni. Nevertheless, even for a socialist society the question of its institutions is always open, institutions which must yield to the necessities of the present, starting with the Party, which is the fundamental institution of Soviet society, and the radical regeneration of which—as Togliatti has said— is the determining factor for the liberating development of the whole society. And we are also speaking in terms of ideological and cultural regeneration, fields where the most entanglements and delays are to be found. There are ideological and cultural questions pertaining to the whole international Communist movement which interest us greatly. These questions stem directly from the X X Congress. One of the fundamental questions is that of national roads to socialism, the elaboration of which question, from the XX Congress to date, demonstrates what appear to us to be misunderstandings or inadequacies. Thus we must state that, from this point of view, even the first part of the Program approved by the XXII Congress (that devoted to problems of general strategy) does not represent a step forward. When this Program states that there is only one way to pass into socialism, because the general laws of development of socialist construction are always and everywhere the same, it results in reviving as an issue precisely the substance of national roads. In connection with this there is the other important theme which we are advancing: the connection between the struggle for democracy and the struggle for socialism, our affirmation that there is no "Chinese wall" between the struggle for democratic development and that for socialism. On this point as well we have found positions which do not coincide with that expressed by our party, both at the international conference of the eighty-one Communist parties and elsewhere, and we cannot be satisfied with compromises which are often only formal. . . . Giorgio Napolitano, Member, Central Committee; Parliamentary deputy: We must achieve an effective unity in the Party, and not a

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general consent, on the guiding line of the XX Congress, confirmed by the XXII. This line does not consist only of affirmed theses, but of the reversal of other theses which had been affirmed under Stalin's direction. What are the causes of the "emotion" and "perplexity" which—as has been said—are to be seen today? First, the fact that the process of clarification, begun after the X X Congress, has not been carried out thoroughly enough in our party. Second, the break in continuity in the Soviet comrades' denunciation of the errors of the past (to the extent that the XXI Congress seemed like a suspension of sentence). Third, the rupture of a certain balance which seemed to have been attained in judging the works and the personality of Stalin, which has today sharply posed the problem once again to the comrades. Fourth, the fact that no general judgment has ever been attained regarding the dialectical relation between achievements and mistakes and outright criminal deformations in the process of building socialism in the USSR. We must today fully win over the Party to the line of the X X and the X X I I congresses, eliminating the traces of the myth of Stalin. To do this, however, historical analyses and critical explanations are necessary. It is with this intent that we dwell so much on the general historical and national conditions which explain how certain forms of bureaucratization and violations of legality grew up in the Soviet Union. Now, if one is reduced to emphasizing the profound diversity of the general historical and national conditions in which the Communist parties in different countries function today, one remains within the framework of an analysis of the "justificationist" type. Instead, we must try to understand the deformations and errors which may prove contagious and against which, therefore, it is necessary to immunize the whole international workers movement. What concrete organizational forms of party and state, what theoretical, political, and cultural directions were at the basis of the deformations and errors? It is on these points that henceforth our effort at analysis must be brought to bear. And from this analysis we must map solutions to the problem of democratic

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guarantees (even though in this field important experiments have been caried out in the USSR ever since 1956) and to the problem of relations within the international Communist movement. These are essential questions. We must say, in fact—Comrade Robotti reminded us of it in his speech—that there has been in the past, in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and in the international workers movement, a tragic incapacity to counteract degenerative processes at work in the USSR. The trend toward open debate among Communist parties and toward the autonomy of judgment of individual parties imposes itself today in compelling fashion. The denunciation and adoption of positions a posteriori do not help to consolidate a position of autonomy for us. Articulation within the international workers movement is therefore indispensable, and a difference of opinion on certain levels, which expresses a diversity of historical and objective situations, is legitimate. However, on fundamental questions which have to do with the revolutionary strategy of the socialist movement, it is equally necessary to work toward research and the adoption of a general platform by means of open debate, which represents the only possible road, even if the process be a difficult and slow one. Gian-Carlo Pajetta, Member, PCI Directorate, Secretariat, and Central Committee; Parliamentary deputy: . . . In other socialist countries, too, there have been new developments. They are progressing along different roads. No longer do they follow mechanically the experience of other countries; the errors of one country no longer necessarily have repercussions on another; problems are met with original attempts at solution. Our party, too, is more mature today, fortified with a greater consciousness and maturity than it had immediately after the XX Congress, and with a prestige won by its vigorous participation during these last years in the debate opened in the international workers movement in 1956 by the Soviet "great turn." . . . Many questions arise when we try to understand the causes of faulty political choices,

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ideological deformations, the why and how of the affirmation of the so-called personality cult. These things happen when the Party begins to think that every revolutionary transformation is necessarily connected with the elimination of every type of opposition and internal dissension, when monolithism becomes a doctrine and the dissenter, public enemy number one, almost more dangerous than the class adversary. The precedent for the "cult" is the struggle against opposition, a deliberate and serious political struggle, which subsequently degenerated. But in what measure have monolithism and the myth of unanimity retarded the development of the socialist society? Here is one question, out of many, to which an answer must be given. Our approval of all that is positive in the XXII Congress and in Soviet policy is a critical approval, in the sense that it must be accompanied by a thorough examination, without which our favorable judgment would lose force. It is a matter of approving all that opens the pathway to the new, that liberates the forces of regeneration. Certainly, the problems of democracy present themselves in a new way. It is not enough to point out the limits of bourgeois democracy. The simple juxtaposition of bourgeois and socialist democracy does not suffice when the problem can be posed and solved in a new way. Even the innovations introduced in the USSR, and the measures taken to guarantee a change in the political direction of the Soviet state and to transfer certain functions of the state to popular organizations, demonstrate the weight of institutional problems and the fact that the value of juridical guarantees cannot be denied. The question is posed of relations among Communist parties in a situation which is new compared to that of 1956. At that time, we based on the report of the XX Congress, as Togliatti did in the interview given to Nuovi Argomenti, an affirmation of the possibility of polycentrism and of national roads. Today we must reaffirm these positions, but we must also progress. The reality, one must recognize, is that there are Communist parties and Communists who today are already developing policies which differ in many respects.

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The question does not even arise as to whether unanimity would be better than diversity, if it were to be a fictitious, mythical unanimity. And, starting from the affirmation of the necessary diversity of orientations, of judgments, of lines, we will necessarily advance still further, in a framework which can remain one of basic unity. We will have to go forward, keeping in mind the concrete reality of the ideas, situations, and needs of others, without believing in the possibility of always being able to agree on everything, or of always achieving definite results. Therefore, the new problem is raised: how to coordinate the international workers movement in the midst of diversity, autonomy, mutual respect, yet have critical, open, frank debate, without reticence—because it is not true that "each man is right in his own home"; but at the same time we must keep in mind the diverse situations with which we must be familiar before voicing doubts or criticism. It is necessary to affirm the legitimacy of dissent, which will make differences in viewpoints less dramatic and at the same time avert needless splits. This is a problem which must be attacked and solved with a high sense of responsibility. A further problem which arises in our party is that of the confrontation of different opinions and the circulation of ideas. These must crystallize into trends which promote, rather than impede, discussions and political action. In Lenin's days no one in the Bolshevik Party was afraid to vote; there were majorities and minorities on every issue; unity was not always identified with unanimity. A majority vote is surely better than false unanimity. The whole Party must draw the consequences from the present situation, with courage and a sense of responsibility, raising the problems which demand a solution, without nostalgia for a past which recedes in time and, in its worst aspects, stands irrevocably condemned. Mario Fabiani, Member, Central Committee: The degeneration of socialist legality began in the USSR when the myth of unanimity, of monolithism, was created: a myth with poor grounding in theory and false in reality, because

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there can be no unanimity when the problems are as great as those regarding the construction of the socialist society. The various positions must confront each other, freely expressed in a free discussion. . . . I do not think that our failure to accept this formal unity would have reinforced, even at an extremely delicate moment (after Hungary, and so on), the "antiparty group." You do not help progress by making concessions to mistaken ideas. And in fact the unity thus attained was formal, the concessions unilateral, and in the end the accord was broken. Let us not theorize on the myth of unity. The construction of socialism requires that debate become ever clearer and more impartial, with full citizenship rights for all ideas, without anyone being stamped by his ideas as an enemy of the revolution, a bearer of bourgeois ideology, or even antiparty. To have differing views does not mean to set oneself against his party. One is against the party when one acts in bad faith and knowingly takes positions contrary to the interests of the socialist world. In my opinion, this is one of the limitations of the XXII Congress: it preserved schemes of a period which we must not allow to return. Let us also be done with this jargon in our party; and in an autonomous and original manner, let us make that contribution to the international movement which we have been able to make even in the most difficult periods. Benevento Santus, Member, Central Control Commission: . . . Today the Party no longer has the trusting confidence that it once had. It wants explanations and facts. It is therefore necessary, even on a historical plane, for us to take some initiative of our own to reveal the truth fully. We Italian Communists can attest to the fact that Stalinism counts its victims in our party as well. The case of Robotti is not by any means unique, and there are comrades' families in Italy who are still waiting to find out how their relatives vanished—by imprisonment or by deportation. Such cases must be made known through our work, and not merely through the tabloids. The Central Committee and the Control Committee could set up a

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commission to examine them. This would contribute to clarity, to understanding, and to the progress of our democracy. Antonello Trombadori, Member, Central Committee: I refer to the questions by Comrade Amendola, with whom I fully agree, particularly in his suggestions of what must be done promptly to give a correct orientation to the internal debate of the Party and against the anticommunist campaign. This kind of action cannot be conceived as purely defensive, nor as a categorical refusal to consider any objections, at a time when, thanks precisely to the XXII Congress, we can advance and win new forces from among the workers and intellectuals for the Communist Party, or at least for its cause. That this should be possible requires in the first place that we choose with the utmost clarity between the alternatives offered by the XXII Congress, which means giving all our support to the ideas which influence such a choice and to the men who rendered it possible. Such a choice must not be uncritical. But there is one type of criticism in which we must not indulge: that which tries to reintroduce elements of "justificationism" and its consequent delays, and which may even sabotage the work of destroying the Stalinist edifice. Everything that tends to attenuate a firmly negative judgment of the Stalinist edifice objectively weakens the full development of the choice made at the XXII Congress. . . . It does not seem right to me, therefore, to refer to the facts in Hungary and to the positions of open condemnation and of struggle against the anticommunist campaign which at that time we freely used as a partial justification of our own delaying action. Its cause was rather something else. It is to be found in the way in which, within our party, we got bogged down for long periods of time in abstract and static debate on the so-called principal danger. We must guard against a similar type of debate, fully recognizing that we must definitely repudiate sectarianism, not only because it is a mistaken political method and ideological position, but because it is a cultural and moral habit which threatens to separate us from

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life in all its complex reality, and to make sterile our relations with the masses. . . . Vittorio Vidali, Member, Central Committee; Parliamentary deputy: . . . Stalinist policy is now being subjected to a rigorous sifting, a strongly critical one, particularly by the young comrades. An answer is fervently sought to the questions which arise. Was it, one asks, solely the responsibility of Stalin? Of course, Stalin's responsibility was tremendous. But the origin of the grave errors and crimes can be sought in a political factor: the erroneous theory of the increased bitterness of the class struggle as socialism advances. In this profound political and ideological error, into which many fell who were subsequently to become victims, an error which did not become established in the USSR without bitter political infighting, may be found the most profound causes of those grave distortions denounced forcibly, but with as yet insufficient evidence, by the XXII Congress of the CPSU. It is probable, indeed it is to be hoped, that the analysis of the errors and crimes may proceed and the investigation be broadened, to the point of reexamining the famous trials. In regard to the question of relations among Communist parties, Vidali is in agreement with the criticism leveled against the Albanian leaders, but expresses reservations regarding the way in which this criticism was made. One should not fall—he warns—into a repetition of the error perpetrated in dealing with Yugoslavia. Vidali therefore affirms his complete adherence to a continued development of the original and autonomous policy of our party as being an important element of its progress, and, alluding to the question of Stalingrad, while manifesting reservations as to the change of name, points out the danger that such a marginal problem may distract us from the present discussion regarding the substance of the problems raised by the XXII Congress.

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Finally, he asks that Togliatti's report be given the fullest circulation in the ranks of the Party. Pietro Secchia, Member, Central Committee; Senator: It is fundamental for us today to give clear answers to the questions of the millions of men who have put trust in our party and are therefore justly troubled. Since congresses are not political academies but aim at definite political objectives, we understand the motives which impelled Khrushchev to reveal the bitter truth to the Soviet people. Our own situation, however, does not permit our limiting ourselves to merely repeating what the Soviet comrades say. We have masses of young people, of workers, who do not know history and to whom we cannot offer merely a list of crimes as constituting the history of communism without bringing to light what the PCI, the CPSU, and the Soviet Union have been in the past and are today. . . . We therefore frankly state that we were struck, not by the importance given to the denunciation of the cult of personality, but rather by the fact that this denunciation took the same form that it had taken five years ago. What weight, for example, was given to our criticism of the subject? Khrushchev justly explains that one of the serious consequences of the "cult" was that of ignoring the collective thought of the fraternal parties. It is precisely for this reason that we are surprised that the denunciation was not accompanied by that Marxist historical analysis which other parties, we ourselves, and, in particular, Comrade Togliatti had asked for. Why were the higher and older cadres so bloodily destroyed? The moralistic explanations do not satisfy us. The Marxist method obligates us to place those facts in their historical context and to view them from all sides in order really to understand them. It is undeniable that during these years progress has been made toward the reestablishment of democracy. But at times one gets the impression that certain errors persist and reappear

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in new forms. We should recall that execution by firing squads did not come on the scene all of a sudden, but rather through a long process which began neither in 1937 nor in 1934, but even earlier when minorities were no longer able to express themselves and were isolated, then considered suspect, and finally expelled and imprisoned. This point was reached through a series of mistaken choices, but again not suddenly; there was a time when Stalin himself opposed the introduction into the Party of what he referred to as "guillotine" methods. Consequently, we cannot content ourselves today with the fact that there is no longer any opposition in prison. This is not sufficient. It is necessary to re-create the possibility of changing the ruling groups in a normal and dialectical manner. To this end, statutory norms do not suffice, even though they are useful. Rather, it is necessary to create a new democratic mentality and conscience, and begin a réévaluation of principles. . . . Pietro Ingrao, Member, PCI Directorate, Secretariat, and Central Committee; Parliamentary deputy: What lies behind the need for a historical reconstruction of the past, which has been asked for by so many comrades? In my opinion, it is a question not solely of method but also of merit. It is a political opinion, two elements of which I wish to underline rapidly. The first element is the conviction that the errors and damages of the cult of personality arose not from instances of individual degeneration, but from certain mistaken political choices, which were made while moving in a fundamentally correct direction representing a great revolutionary act: this direction was toward the construction of socialism in a single country, industrialization and the collectivization of agriculture, and the construction of a powerful international Communist movement. In this process historic victories were won which not only changed the structure and fundamental bases of the society, but also led to great progress in socialist consciousness in the USSR and throughout the world. In this way, enormous human energy was released and put into motion, which, while subsequently developing and

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advancing, came into conflict with the methods of the cult of personality, and from within the system—this is an important point—led to the break at the XX Congress. . . The second element which I wish to emphasize is the belief that even at the XXII Congress not enough emphasis was given to the most important and far-reaching damage wreaked by the cult of personality: the application of coercive and administrative methods to the development of political debates on fundamental political questions; and, as a consequence, the reduction of party organizations to mere organs of implementation and execution of policies decided on from above. Certainly, in this opinion there is, in my estimation, a criticism of the present or, better yet, a critical and self-critical consciousness of the inadequacies which still exist in the manner in which our movement conducts the struggle against the cult of personality. I do not believe that this element of criticism and selfcriticism can in any way be confused with "Stalinist"-type reservations. I believe, rather, that it stems directly from a profound adherence to the line of the XX Congress and the political desire that this line be advanced with the necessary coherence and depth. Does this element of criticism and self-criticism have to be rendered explicit? I recognize the delicacy of the question, because it deals with the CPSU and consequently with the force which has made and is making the greatest contribution to the march of socialism in the world, and because today we rightly wish above all else to indicate our support for the great and courageous political battle in which the ruling group of the CPSU is engaged. Nevertheless, it seems to me that this element of criticism and self-criticism must be present in the debate taking place within our party, within the framework of our positive opinion of the XXII Congress and of the great significance which it has for us. . . . Giuseppe d'Alema, Member, Central Committee: In view of the new course which the Soviet comrades embarked upon at the XX Congress and which they reaffirmed at the XXII, we must ask ourselves whether this new course

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has enhanced and is enhancing the democratic life of the masses. It seems to me that we can give a distinctly positive answer to this query. The democratic life of the masses has been enhanced. The USSR has a new face, born of the far-reaching changes and regenerations which have been put into effect. Perhaps we can also add that the greatest task performed by the Soviet ruling group is that of having once again put in motion the surge of the masses. However, let us not remain silent about the fact that resistance to these innovations has manifested itself within the international Communist movement, and this resistance has constituted a base of support for demonstrations by the antiparty group in the USSR itself. The reluctance to accept the new course which has manifested itself on the international level has in itself constituted a serious hindrance to the internal regeneration of certain parties. We must emphasize the fact that real unity of the movement cannot be achieved through a summit debate and even less through definitive documents ratifying some sterile compromise. Throughout the movement, and within our party as well, the comrades want to know, want to be able to contribute on all levels to the common development. Democracy is knowledge of the problems and the possibility of contributing to their resolution. . . . Cesare Luporini, Member, Central Committee; Senator: . . . ( 1 ) It is possible to begin with the statement already made here of the de facto existence of a polycentrism in the international Communist movement. But how can we move toward the achievement of a real, not formal, unity which would allow the full autonomy of the various parties, on the one hand, and frank mutual criticism, on the other, when the errors of the one would then affect the other? In this connection we must keep in mind that certain differences of viewpoint can be found on such decisive questions as those of revolutionary strategy, the bounds of peaceful coexistence, and the problems of revolution within the colonial countries. In these countries, the Communist movement finds itself confronted with new situ-

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ations. In fact, the direction of the struggle for independence is often no longer in fact in the hands of the Communist parties. ( 2 ) Why is it that the theoretical formulation of polycentrism today lags behind its practical realization? This lag, it seems to me, is connected with a certain "freezing" of revolutionary theory which does not date only from the last few years and which is to be found in the language used in current documents of the Communist movement. It is difficult, for example, to accept a formulation neither Marxist nor logical, which states that "eternal laws" exist in Marxism. It is obvious that a general criticism of Stalin as a theorist of MarxismLeninism is involved here. There is an intrinsic connection between the analysis to which we refer concerning the causes of past errors, and the new evaluations of a critical-historical nature which relate either to structural or to superstructural problems and which do not impose limits on this research. We enthusiastically welcome certain theoretical principles endorsed by the CPSU program, and stress the courage of criticism displayed by Comrade Khrushchev when he completely did away with the "sacredness" of the past. At the same time, however, we wish to note a theoretical courage which corresponds to his demonstrated political courage. ( 3 ) On the problem of the "institutions" of a socialist society, it is necessary to point out that this essentially entails analyzing the interrelation between the political society and the civil society, between power and the populace, between cultural development and the collective life of the masses. Is it possible to speak only in terms of "liberalization"? Let us rather attempt to distinguish between the concept of emancipation and that of liberty, which represent different moments in the development of a society and of a people. Nor is it correct to emphasize unduly the differences in the development of civil society in the various countries so as to make the observation that certain problems relating to juridical and institutional guarantees arise predominantly in countries having a more pronounced cultural heritage and a richer democratic experience. Taken at their extremes, these interpretative tendencies may hide dangers of

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opportunism, in that some problems relating to institutional guarantees appear in all societies and not only in those typical of the Western world. It is not by chance that these problems arise in the USSR after the turn made by the X X Congress and in a situation of great development of the whole of Soviet society. Mauro Scoccimarro, Member, PCI Directorate, Central Control Commission; Senator: 6 He does not take the floor because at this point in the debate the speech that he should make is no longer possible, because he would have too many things to say which could not be included in such a brief period of time, and also because certain questions which fundamentally affect the life and action of the Party should first be discussed privately within the leadership. We are dealing with questions concerning the new way in which the relations between Communist parties must be developed, with problems of intra-party democracy, with methods of leadership, with questions of principle and ideology, and so on. Too many questions have been treated in confusion in this debate, important questions which demand clarity and which cannot be settled by brief and marginal discussion. These questions will require an exhaustive discussion; we will certainly have it because we are dealing with real needs, and we shall have to accomplish this without creating confusion within the Party. I shall have the opportunity, says Scoccimarro, to express my thoughts fully on all the new problems which present themselves today. Meanwhile he limits himself to expressing disagreement with the proposal to convene a congress, which would objectively be an extraordinary one. An extraordinary congress is justifiable only when the causes and motives are extraordinary and exceptional. The CC and the CCC have full authority to provide for and to decide the 'L'Unità paraphrased and summarized the statement of Scoccimarro, a noted "Stalinist" reputed to be an outspoken critic of Khrushchev and his policies.

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immediate needs of the Party concerning those questions which we have raised today. The session closed before a number of additional members of the Central Committee had an opportunity to speak. Aldo Natoli, an old member of the Central Committee, called for a new PCI congress to discuss the crisis. 6 2 . ITALIAN C O M M U N I S T PARTY COMMUNIQUÉ ON THE

C P S U CONGRESS. L'Unità,

XXII

N o v e m b e r 2 8 , 1961.

Togliatti's statement concluding the debate of November 10-11 was not published. The Central Committee instructed the sevenman Secretariat to draft a resolution embodying the "conclusions" reached at the November 10-11 session. The resolution, released on November 14, was far less critical of the CPSU than the debate had suggested. Since Togliatti had evidently drafted the statement himself, he evidently faced considerable opposition from other members of the PCI Directorate. The new statement, released on November 28 in the name of the Secretariat, reflected more adequately the diversity of views in the Central Committee.

. . . ( 1 ) THE GREAT significance of the XXII CPSU Congress lies above all in the approval of the Program for the transition to the building of a communist society. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, the Soviet people have been able—by overcoming tremendous obstacles and by struggling against powerful enemies—to build a new socialist society, to open the way for the establishment of a system of socialist states which has changed the structure of international relations, thus giving a powerful impetus to the liberation movement of oppressed peoples. Today the Soviet people propose to build, over the next twenty years, the technical and material foundations and the essential features of a communist society, on the basis of past victories and achievements, in which all men will be equal and free; each man will give according to his ability, and will receive according to his need. This is a hard task indeed, because an egalitarian society must be built not on a low subsistence level but on a high standard of living, such as a communist society must have. To this

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end, a further steady and progressive development of productive forces is of foremost importance. . . Undoubtedly, these and other objectives represent a big, complex, and difficult task. Success in this area is subject not only to the preservation of peace, but to a new, original, and adequate political and theoretical development, to an increase of the creative initiative of the entire party and the working masses, to the spreading of socialist democracy, to profound organizational changes, to a new surge of idealism, and to a new and vigorous revolutionary spirit. . . . ( 2 ) Such a program obviously hinges on a policy of peace and the struggle for peace, so as to prevent an outbreak of war, which under present conditions could not but destroy human civilization. Today, the only way to achieve such an objective lies in a profound change of the present international situation by the establishment of a regime of peaceful coexistence. . . . The XXII Congress has confirmed and spelled out the basic theoretical thesis advanced by the XX Congress—that the main problem of the contemporary era is the problem of war and peace, and that today war is no longer inevitable. Today, in the struggle against imperialism which is by nature aggressive, which threatens mankind with thermonuclear war, but which is no longer the dominant world force and can no longer do whatever it pleases, the concerted efforts of the powerful socialist camp, the peaceful nonsocialist states, the international working class, and all those who are fighting for peace are able to prevent a new world war. The growing superiority of the forces of socialism over the forces of imperialism and of the forces of peace over the forces of war creates a situation in which there is the real possibility of eliminating war from the life of society, even while the capitalist system survives in one part of the world, prior to the complete victory of socialism on the earth. The world-wide victory of socialism will definitively eliminate the causes for war. Communism's historic mission is to eliminate wars and to establish everlasting peace in the world.

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The X X I I Congress has reaffirmed that coexistence is the basis for peaceful competition between socialism and capitalism on a global scale, and that coexistence brings about more favorable conditions for political and economic construction in socialist countries, working-class struggles in capitalist countries, and struggles for liberation and independence in colonial and dependent countries. The struggle for peace and for a regime of peaceful coexistence and competition permits the crystallization of divisions within the bourgeoisie and the imperialist world, and the isolation and defeat of the most aggressive, reactionary, and war-minded extremist forces. ( 3 ) The Program of the XXII CPSU Congress is not a list of attractive gratuitous promises. It is a program of struggle for a further revolutionary development. An integral part of such a revolutionary spirit is the struggle, inaugurated at the X X Congress and reaffirmed at the X X I I Congress, against the errors of the past in connection with Stalin's personality cult, and against conservative and dogmatic resistance to the changes launched at the X X Congress. Such obstacles have hampered—and are hampering—a full implementation of the policy adopted by that Congress. The fearless condemnation of those errors and aberrations, and the severe and even ruthless criticism and self-criticism cannot be separated from the adoption of a line appropriate to the transition to communism and the struggle for peace. ( 4 ) Five years ago, the Italian Communist Party was one of the first to greet the XX Congress as a great event which would strengthen and develop not only Soviet society but the international workers movement as well. In the decisions made at that congress, our party found confirmation for our political line and for our struggle for socialism in accordance with the national conditions of each country. The XX Congress also encouraged our party to correct certain errors, to search for and make more specific its own political line, and to foster activities leading to internal regeneration and greater strength. All these years the Italian Communist Party has tried to make an active contribution, on the level of international

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relations among Communist parties, on behalf of the soundness and historical importance of the X X Congress. Today, our party expresses its solidarity with the decisions adopted by the X X I I Congress, which reaffirm and develop all the theses advanced by the X X Congress and represent a further contribution to the advance of the international Communist movement. ( 5 ) A t the X X I I CPSU Congress specific accusations were leveled against a group of old Party and state leaders who, from conservative positions, had rejected the policy of regeneration adopted by the X X Congress, who had tried to prevent its implementation, and who finally organized themselves in a fractional group and tried to take over the party leadership by a surprise coup and to nullify the decisions reached by the Congress. The X X I I Congress has justly condemned the fractionalist activities undertaken by that group against the Party. The political significance of the attacks leveled during the Congress at this group is clear, and we support it without reservations. In general, it must be said that it is impossible to set for oneself tasks such as those concerning the transition to communism without changing at the same time not only the previous structure but also the superstructure. This means that there must be a change and an adjustment in the methods of leadership and the work of the Party, the trade unions, the soviets, and all agencies of soviet democracy. There must be a change in the relationship between the Party and the masses, in the way the Party fulfills its leadership role with regard to state and social organizations and cultural undertakings, at a time when socialist democracy and the creative initiative of the masses will be in full development. All this necessarily demanded and still demands a firm struggle against the heavy legacy of political resistance, bureaucratism, and dogmatism, and makes necessary a clear-cut break with the past so as to make possible a new process of regeneration. T h e harsh condemnation of governmental and administrative methods which flourished under Stalin, that is, methods which eliminated the principle of collective leadership and made Stalin the sole authority not only in the political but also in the

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theoretical field—with all the attendant abuses and tragic violations of socialist legality—should be viewed from the vantage point of that urgent need to open up a new road. Those evil and impermissible methods had brought about an increasingly serious contradiction between the basically democratic substance of the new society grounded on a socialist type of economy and on the power of the soviets, on the one hand, and a type of leadership in many ways authoritarian and coercive, coming from the very top of both Party and state, on the other hand, which prevented the development of socialist democracy and ideological and cultural creativity and which made the building of a new society more difficult. The denunciation and condemnation of such errors and methods is needed not only to raise an impregnable wall against them, but above all to break the fetters which are jeopardizing the development of Soviet society. It must, however, be recognized that the problem does not consist simply in a denunciation of Stalin's negative qualities and errors, along with an acknowledgment of his undeniable merits. The problem is much more complex. Above all, it raises the question of how it was possible for such errors and distortions to take place during the construction of a socialist society and of how their repetition can be avoided. To be able to answer such a question, it is necessary to undertake a more thorough investigation of the objective conditions and processes of the construction of the first socialist society in a country such as Russia, the circumstances and conditions under which such abuses could take place, and the methods and procedures that were followed during the building of socialism in a single country. The need for a thorough historical investigation is based not only on reasons of historical interest, but also and above all on concrete political reasons, namely, on the fact that the masses of Communists, workers, and democrats who have been shocked by the gravity of those revelations are asking for more satisfactory answers. On the other hand, the fact that such errors and distortions can be explained within the framework of a particular historical

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period—which has been an era of great struggles, of heroic deeds, and of very important victories for the defense and progress of human civilization—cannot be accepted as a satisfactory justification. Those errors and distortions, in fact, have nothing to do with the unavoidable harshness of a revolutionary process. Indeed, they have hampered the development of the revolution. ( 6 ) It is certain that a thorough examination of those problems would imply a careful study of the conditions and methods under which the building of the foundations of socialism took place during the first few years; this is a task to the achievement of which our Soviet comrades could contribute significantly. Some general—but cautious—remarks, however, can be made already. Under Lenin's and Stalin's leadership, the CPSU made some great historical choices and drew the main lines of action which were of key importance for the construction and the victories of socialism, for the defeat of fascism, and for maintaining peace. History has already attested to the soundness of those choices and basic trends, such as the revolution and the taking of power, the soviets as the foundation of the new state, and the success of socialism in a single country after the defeat of the revolutions that were either carried out or attempted in central and western Europe, and so on. A series of necessary events brought about by the harshness of the class struggle on the internal and international level required the centralization of decision-making in the hands of the Bolshevik party to enable its leaders, first, to deal with the reaction, civil war, and imperialist intervention and, second— following the New Economic Policy, which implied the need to approach a more advanced stage of the class struggle—to prevent a resurgence of capitalism and to start the reconstruction work on new, socialist foundations. This meant the need for the development of socialist heavy industry, collectivization of agriculture, and the execution and implementation of the early Five-Year Plans. All of that made it necessary to fight deviations of the left and right and—owing to Lenin's premature death—to

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undertake a difficult struggle to guarantee a unity of goals, leadership, and action. Accurate and thorough research would be required to determine whether at that early stage the first signs could be detected of a tendency which, along with certain peculiar features of Stalin's personality, gave rise to the predominance of a topheavy bureaucratic party and state apparatus which led to solving problems not by following the usual practices of proletarian democracy, but by the imposition from the top of decisions which were being taken by an increasingly restricted group of leaders. It must be acknowledged that those great and just political choices by necessity put a tremendous pressure on all proletarian, popular, and national energies, and brought about a high degree of power concentration in a country which found itself in the unique situation of being the first and only country in the world where socialism was being built The key mistake made at the time was probably the failure on the part of the Soviet leaders to recognize that the need to centralize decision-making implied a concomitant need to develop proletarian democracy; that is to say, that democracy and centralization are not contradictory terms for a revolutionary movement, but, on the contrary, they are closely interrelated and mutually reinforcing. What happened was that—once the more difficult stages of socialist construction had been overcome—those extraordinary leadership methods were not only retained but were rationalized, extended, and even given theoretical justification. Thus the just and well-motivated fight against Trotskyite and rightist opposition degenerated into the impossibility for any members to offer any new political theses. A disproportionate praise for the successes achieved, a formalistic idea of party "monolithism," and the practice of the personality cult became increasingly important. This was all the more serious because a new era was dawning, just after the First Five-Year Plan had achieved extraordinary results in creating socialized heavy industry and—in spite

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of mistakes and undue haste—in changing the social structure of the countryside. Objective difficulties and contradictions arose at this time which should have been acknowledged openly so as to summon the working masses to deal with them more effectively by conscious effort. The consequences of those errors are well known. The tendency to consider any and all difficulties the result of sabotage or the work of class enemies or counter-revolutionists was of particular gravity. Stalin developed this tendency into the wellknown but mistaken thesis that the further socialism progresses, the sharper the class struggle becomes. Thus, in reacting against the sabotage that was being carried on by real enemies, any ability to discriminate and separate the good from the bad was lost. A comrade and an honest citizen could not be distinguished from a saboteur and enemy; and objective difficulties, contradictions, and routine errors could not be distinguished from hostile acts. Unheard-of violations of socialist legality followed, assuming aberrant and criminal forms. Thus, serious damage was done to the entire revolutionary movement and to Marxist-Leninist theory, above all in the USSR but also on a world-wide scale. And yet—at the same time—the movement achieved victories of historic importance. The structure of old Russia was changed radically. Impetuous progress was made in all branches of economy, technology, and mass culture. In spite of the mistakes made, a new force activated numberless masses of men, created new productive forces, and brought about a new consciousness by releasing latent, powerful human energies. The years which witnessed the most serious manifestations of errors, deformations, and repressive actions were also the years which saw the Seventh Congress of the Communist International condemn severely all sectarian tendencies and adopt a platform of democratic unity in the struggle against fascism. At the same time, the Soviet Union was developing its policy of peace and laying the foundations of the great antifascist alliance. Later on, during the Great Patriotic War, thanks to immense sacrifices, heroism, and moral and political unity based on the solid

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foundations of socialism, the Soviet peoples, rallied around the Party and government, repelled aggression and struck a deadly blow at Nazism, thus gaining the admiration and gratitude of all progressive mankind. Following the war, the conflict between mass initiative and elan, and bureaucratic and coercive practices grew even more acute at a time when heavy sacrifices were required by the struggle to maintain peace against the aggressiveness of an imperialism which had a monopoly of atomic weapons. But it was also a new era characterized by the formation of a number of socialist states, above all the victory of the great Chinese revolution, the liquidation of colonialism, and the enthusiasm and self-assurance of Communists and the Soviet people, who had been victorious in the war. Errors and distortions—no matter how serious—did not jeopardize or destroy the profoundly democratic substance and foundations of socialist society. In fact, the forces that brought about the turns of the X X and X X I I congresses sprang forth from the very bosom of that society and of the Communist Party. (7) The problem concerning guarantees for the future was debated amply at the last congress. A number of steps intended to expand and guarantee democracy at all levels of Soviet organization have been proposed, adopted, and partly realized. To this end, the Party Rules have been amended; reforms have been adopted in the field of economic planning; the activity of soviets, trade unions, and other workers and mass organizations has been stepped up; and new legal safeguards have been studied to ensure personal freedom. When the state power is in the hands of the working class and its party, the best guarantee of freedom lies in the development of a democratic life in all its organizations, in economic and social progress, and in the development of culture, education, and the political and civic activities of all citizens. The problem of institutional safeguards of socialist legality and the development of democracy must be placed within this framework. In dealing with this fundamental problem, one

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should realize the real advances made by democracy in the Soviet Union, and also realize that democracy in the Soviet Union cannot possibly develop—as our adversaries and also certain socialist leaders would seem to think—in a fashion similar to bourgeois democracy, but that it must be realized within the mainstream of Soviet democracy. At the same time, it should be acknowledged that this is an open question. Owing to its institutions, contents, and objectives, socialist democracy is profoundly different from bourgeois democracy, not simply from the viewpoint of its historical development in the Soviet Union and in the other socialist countries, but also from the viewpoint of its future possible development in other countries, even though it may follow patterns and forms which today are typical of bourgeois democracy, such as the parliamentary system, party pluralism, the existence of a majority and a minority, etc. . . . ( 8 ) Following the X X Congress and the denunciation of the tragic mistakes of the Stalin era, the issue arose of the political responsibility of other Communist parties, including our own party, together with the negative influence of the personality cult on their development. With regard to this problem, we did not— and will not—simply reject our enemies' attacks by throwing back at them the mud with which they are trying to cover the Italian Communist Party and its leaders. That would be much too easy, in any case. All attempts to defame the Italian Communist Party have always achieved a result which has been the opposite of the one intended. The Communist Party, in fact, by its correct policy and struggle, by its self-sacrifice and exemplary honesty, has always been a decisive force in the fight against fascism, for democracy, and for the regeneration of our country. While fighting not only against enemy attacks but, even more, against the insidious and corrupting actions inspired by the Social Democrats and the petty bourgeoisie, we have also tried, following the X X Congress, to engage in severe self-criticism and to correct our activity accordingly. Our party did not ignore but accepted the harshness of the

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revolutionary process as it was carried out in the Soviet Union and was aware in part of the bitter struggles within the Soviet Party and of certain painful events. What our party did not know and did not understand was the fact that some of that harshness was in no way justified by the need to defend the revolution against hostile acts and subversive activities, but that it was, on the contrary, simply the consequence of errors and abuses. This was due to a large extent to our lack of knowledge of specific events, unavoidable under the very difficult and particular circumstances of the antifascist struggle, the underground political emigration, the Spanish War, and the need to face the Nazi aggression united. On the other hand, the very system of government established by Stalin made it impossible f o r all other parties to have precise knowledge about the internal life of the CPSU. O u r responsibility lies in two objective errors which we were able to identify and acknowledge at our Eighth Congress. The first error was the uncritical acceptance of Stalin's groundless thesis concerning the inevitable and progressive sharpening of the class struggle within the Soviet Union as the construction of socialism is victorious and advances. This thesis reflected a profoundly sectarian inspiration, which we failed to identify and reject. Yet it was that very thesis which made us justify the repressive actions such as the great trials, which had already been made public. O u r second error was that, following Soviet practice, we steadily and one-sidedly overestimated our successes and proceeded f r o m an understandable acknowledgment of the ability and merit of a revolutionary and statesman such as Stalin to an exaggerated exaltation of his personality and role. Furthermore, we did not reject certain rhetorical and misleading forms of propaganda which were in conflict with the reality of socialism. This took place in spite of the fact that the prevailing trend, mentality, and attitude of our party had always been oriented toward the goal of equipping the Party with the ability to engage in objective analyses and to develop effective propaganda, free f r o m rhetoric and superficiality.

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Substantial progress has been achieved since our Eighth Congress. New initiatives have been undertaken, such as the visit to the socialist countries of our study groups, and the publication of books, articles, and special reports contributing to a more objective and deeper evaluation of problems and conditions in the socialist countries. It should be acknowledged, however, that the progress achieved is still inadequate. Yet the basic problem is a different one. It concerns the autonomy which the Party must enjoy in its struggle to achieve socialism by an original, democratic, and national way, while practicing the kind of international solidarity which has always existed between our party, the Soviet Union, and the international Communist movement. The bonds of proletarian internationalism were never imposed on us by anybody. They are the natural expression of the class and international character of our movement, of the community of ideals and revolutionary principles, of our great political objectives, and of the common enemies we face. This ideological and political interrelationship and solidarity with the Soviet Union and the international Communist movement has always been a basic source of strength for the Italian workers movement and for our party, and a decisive element in their proper revolutionary orientation. Since October, 1917, during the most trying moments of the struggle against fascism, during the war of liberation and the struggle for peace and democracy in Italy, internationalism, far from obstructing it, has helped our party in the search for a revolutionary road consistent with the national situation and with the grand design of democratic unity against fascism, for a democratic and socialist regeneration of the country. When we chose a solidarity with the Soviet Union, throughout the various stages of development in the Soviet Union and in international relations, we made a conscious political choice whose historical and political soundness—and not merely its validity as a principle—we wish to reaffirm in full. Proletarian internationalism is and will remain one of the cardinal pillars of our policy, along with a profound attachment

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and adjustment to the national situation and to a search for new methods guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism. It should, however, be acknowledged that our party's autonomy—which no one has interfered with—was nevertheless limited by the acceptance of the above-mentioned theses and propaganda methods and by the fact that our original political outlook and experience were not always given the kind of explicit theoretical justification which could have afforded our party a sounder perspective and greater spirit. The recognition of such defects in our party is of basic importance for a more creative political and theoretical search, in order to carry on our struggle with new vigor, and in order that our party may contribute as much as possible to a greater political and theoretical unity of the international Communist and workers movement. This effective and full autonomy of a Communist party can be realized the better, the more we are able to react against any kind of hostile and Social Democratic influence; can be realized by strengthening the international consciousness of our party and by disseminating among the popular working masses more knowledge of and support for the Soviet Union. ( 9 ) The XXII CPSU Congress has also dealt with the problem of guaranteeing and furthering—at the present stage of development—the unity of the international Communist movement. Attention was focused on this problem, because of the open dissension manifested between many parties and the Chinese Communist Party with regard to the just and severe public condemnation of Albania's authoritarian degeneracy, involving serious violations of democracy and of international solidarity. It would be a serious mistake to interpret such dissension and other differences and divergences of opinion which have taken place or may take place on other occasions among Communist and workers parties as a sign of lack of unity and solidarity in the Communist movement on a world scale, or as the start of a series of rifts and breaks. In spite of all differentiation and dissension, even on important problems concerning the overall evaluation of the inter-

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national situation or the strategy and tactics of the workers movement, there is among all Communist parties a basic identity of common principles and objectives. If such a common basis were to break up, there would be very serious consequences for the movement as a whole and for the development of its individual member parties. No party can therefore shun the responsibility and the fundamental duty of defending and strengthening the international solidarity and unity of our movement. Yet it should be realized that today this problem presents profoundly new characteristics. In particular, this should be kept in mind: (a) At present, the Communist movement has attained an unprecedented expansion and comprises parties which operate in all parts of the world and under the most varying conditions. There are parties directing socialist and communist construction in a host of countries having widely varying historical traditions and different levels of economic and social development. It is from this fact that the necessity arises of adopting a different attitude toward the paths leading to socialist construction in different countries, and, at the same time, of gradually overcoming the differences and existing contrasts, be these even of national character. These contrasts exist, and will inevitably continue to exist and manifest themselves for a long period of time during the phases of economic and political construction. Even in capitalist countries there are great differences in existing conditions and in the development of Communist parties. Side by side with some great and politically advanced mass parties there are other parties which, owing to objective and subjective reasons, have thus far been unable to play an important role in the political life of the workers movement and of their countries. Finally, there is an ever-increasing number of young parties which have been organized during the last few years in colonial countries and in countries which have achieved their independence only recently. These parties find themselves at the very outset of an autonomous political and ideological development. From this peculiarity of the present phase in the development of

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the Communist movement it follows that today there does not and cannot exist a guiding party or state, or one or more directing centers of the international Communist movement—as our party has repeatedly asserted. The present situation requires— and must increasingly require—a great articulation in the movement and a full autonomy of individual parties. This is the only way by which individual parties will be able to fit their ideological principles, political objectives, and form of organization to different national situations, the only way they will be able to strengthen themselves ideologically and politically, thereby acquiring the necessary political strength in their countries. ( b ) There are today, as there were in the past (and, in some instances, more than there were in the past), certain problems and needs which are commonly shared by the entire Communist movement. Their solution calls for the cooperation and support of all parties. Problems such as the struggle against imperialism and reaction, for peace and coexistence, freedom for all peoples, and further development of the workers socialist and democratic struggle along lines in keeping with the conditions of the capitalist West are no doubt problems which each party should pursue in accordance with its specific national situation. Yet they also demand that every effort be made to overcome dissension, to seek and consolidate a common evaluation of the international situation and a common strategy of the workers movement on a world scale. (10) At present, an acute task common to the whole movement consists in the need to ensure new creative developments in Communist ideology and in its ability to cope with the new problems created by the profound and complex changes of the world structure and of class struggle, on both a national and an international level. It must be acknowledged openly that the great expansion experienced by our movement during the last ten to fifteen years, the great successes achieved, and the growing influence of Communist policies and ideals on contemporary life have not been paralleled by a similar progress and growth of our ideology. This serious lag is due mainly to the dogmatic fetters and

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distortions introduced by the practices of the personality cult into many phases of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Together with other deeper reasons rooted in the trends of European and world history of recent decades and the conditions of the workers movement in Europe and elsewhere, this has slowed down and hampered the creative development and adaptation of Marxism-Leninism. Even from this viewpoint we considered the X X CPSU Congress an event of international value and the beginning of a new turn for the entire Communist movement. Our party has already advanced along the road which was traccd by the Congress, and has redefined its positions and adapted its relations with other parties accordingly. It should be said, however, that the international meetings of 1957 and of 1961 [sic] did not entirely meet the need for a further development of our theoretical and political positions. It is therefore necessary to go forward and do away with dogmatist incrustations so that the work of ideological and political research may advance. In particular, it is necessary to carry on the struggle for a greater role and influence of the workers and democratic movement in Europe and in the capitalist West. Thus, the principle of autonomy of each party—and of respect for the autonomy of other parties—should not in any sense be understood as national-minded indifference to the world-wide class struggle, or to the great problems of ideological development concerning the movement as a whole. Only a multiplicity of ideological and political contributions can allow these problems to be resolved positively, even though it is necessary to be on constant guard against that particular form of parochialism which brings one to hasty and presumptuous public pronouncements concerning all aspects of the policies of other parties. Those having this parochial mentality do not consider the complexity and variety of situations in which the various parties function and their methods of operation. The results are thus superficial and unacceptable generalizations. A new system governing interrelationships among Communist parties should be set up corresponding to these manifold and

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complex needs. The new system should envisage, first of all, the promotion of bilateral contacts and meetings among parties operating in similar conditions, such as the November, 1959, Rome meeting of seventeen parties of capitalist Europe, and similar meetings which have taken place in other parts of the world. Under certain conditions, general conferences of all parties will also be useful to reach common evaluations of the international situation and general agreement on the broad lines of world Communist policy. We believe, however, that it is not necessary to pretend at all times to reach agreement on all problems, because such agreement would most probably be a formal agreement only. On the contrary, within certain limits, one should allow for the expression of differences of opinion, obviously without allowing them to develop into irreparable conflicts and political breaks. Furthermore, in so far as the great problems of our ideological and political development are concerned, one should hope that our internal debates, the confrontation of opinions, theses, and diverse contributions would be carried on even in public with the requisite fraternal spirit and sense of responsibility. Our party will move forward on these foundations, conscious that our contribution to the progress of the whole movement and to the solution of the problems which stand before it will be so much the greater once we learn to develop our own policies and action in our country. At the same time, we must also be conscious of the necessity and utility of a more explicit generalization of our own experiences in comparison with other experiences, especially those occurring in capitalist countries. ( 1 1 ) Our present party debate must remain closely linked with the Italian political situation, with the direct repercussions of the XXII Congress on various other political groups, and more generally with present problems and perspectives. . . . (12) The achievement of the above tasks calls for further development of the Party's internal democratic life. To reach this goal any attempt leading to a change in the nature of our party, as a party of action and struggle, or im-

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plying an alteration of the basic features acquired during many years of work, should be rejected firmly. Thought and action, policy and organization, are to us things which cannot be separated or juxtaposed to one another. Furthermore, one should never forget that the starting and ending point of all of our debates is the recognition of a common basis and the search for a unity of policy and action of the entire Party. This implies the inadmissibility of factions and organized currents within the Party, which would bring about a progressive disintegration of the Party's democratic life. The development of this democratic behavior does not exclude but implies a more extended and increasingly more conscious participation by the party members in the Party's political life, a free manifestation and expression of opinions and even dissensions, during debates and votes, in accordance with our Party Rules. The practice by all of an attitude based on understanding and tolerance must prevent any divergences from developing into open breaks and disciplinary actions. After debating all problems freely, and agreeing on a given line, there must be full support of the decisions taken, and of their fulfillment, by all comrades and organizations. The Leninist principle of democratic centralism which—together with other rights and duties—is embodied in our Party Rules should be held as a guarantee that the Party's internal democratic practices and ability to function will be strengthened, and should be used as a means to encourage an increasingly larger and more active participation by the members in party life, and to correct bureaucratic distortions and small-minded "administrative" methods of repression.

63. "THE X X I I CPSU

CONGRESS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE PERSONALITY C U L T . " E d i t o r i a l in

Pravda, November 21, 1961.7 The public response of the CPSU to the PCI's questions and conclusions was limited. There was no official censure comparable 7 Translation from The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XIII, No. 47 (December 20, 1961).

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to the resolution o f June 30, 1956. On N o v e m b e r 2 1 , 1961, without specifically mentioning the PCI, a Pravda editorial responded to the charges of Soviet "degeneration" under Stalin. ( L ' U n i t à reprinted most of the Pravda editorial, noting that it had only "partially" met the need to investigate the historical and political causes of Stalinism.)

. . . SOME ASK: Why did the Party, at its X X I I Congress, return to the question of the cult of the individual, [already] condemned at the XX Congress, the decisions of which had been unanimously approved by the whole Party and all the people? As we know, the XX Congress instructed the Central Committee consistently to carry out measures to ensure the full overcoming of the cult of the individual, the elimination of its consequences in all spheres of party, state, and ideological work, and the strict application of the norms of party life and the principle of collective leadership devised by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. It is natural that the Central Committee, accounting to the X X I I Congress for its activity during the entire period since the X X Congress, should have reported on the great work the Party had conducted to eliminate the harmful consequences of the cult of the individual, to develop intra-party democracy in conformity with the spirit of Leninism, and to restore revolutionary legality and develop Soviet democracy. It must be remembered that the application of the policy of the X X Congress was accompanied by a sharp political struggle against the antiparty group of fractionalists, zealous adherents of the cult of the individual, who tried to steer the Party and the country off the Leninist path. . . . At the X X and XXII congresses the comprehensive and fundamental criticism of the mistakes and distortions of the period of the cult of the individual convincingly showed that the cult of the individual is alien to our Marxist-Leninist party and to the nature of the Soviet socialist system, which is based on broad, genuine people's democracy. The resoluteness and vigor with which the Party and the whole Soviet people put an end to the cult of the individual show graphically that the cult

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of the individual does not and cannot have roots in our social system. . . . In some foreign publications now, as after the XX Congress, voices are heard claiming that the cult of the individual was related to some "degeneration" of the Soviet system. Such claims have no basis whatsoever; they grossly distort reality. They are essentially only repetitions of old, slanderous fabrications. Bourgeois ideologists and their henchmen, the Mensheviks and Trotskyites, have been making such claims for many decades. Unfortunately, even some honest persons abroad who have failed to analyze deeply the essence of the matter, the nature of Soviet socialist society, echo what others say. Those who seize upon the bourgeois thesis of the degeneration of the Soviet system remind one very much of persons who are lost in a forest of three trees. In effect they fall into idealism when they ascribe to a single individual the power to change our sociopolitical system fundamentally. To think that a single individual, even if he occupied such a lofty position as Stalin's, could change the economic and social nature of a system would be to depart from the Marxist interpretation of history, to grant the individual some supernatural qualities. History contains examples of restoration of the old feudal-monarchist social and political order after bourgeois revolutions. This was reflected in the return to power of classes overthrown by the revolution, the restoration of old economic relationships in this or that form, the restoration of property, etc. But can one speak of anything of this sort in respect to the Soviet Union? Of course not. Not a single person in his right mind would claim that private capitalist ownership was reintroduced in the Soviet Union under the influence of the cult of the individual or that classes of landowners and capitalists were returned to power. The cult of the individual is by its nature profoundly alien to socialism, to the Soviet system. The best refutation of the lies about "degeneration" of the Soviet system is the tremendous successes attained by the Soviet people under the leadership of the Communist Party. The fact that the Soviet Union achieved these tremendous successes de-

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spite the cult of the individual actually shows the mighty power of socialism, the strength of our great party and of the Soviet people. Soviet society throughout its history has invariably developed along the path of socialism and communism, its productive forces have grown, and socialist production relations have developed. Then what talk can there be of "degeneration" of Soviet society? . . . The cult of the individual was an alien excrescence on the healthy body of Soviet socialist society, an excrescence that our party laid open and successfully removed, thanks specifically to the fact that the foundation of the social system, the socialist structure of the Soviet state, was and remains healthy. Removal of this growth facilitated the rapid development of all the creative forces of our society and helped accelerate its advance along the path to communism. . . . A ridiculous and pitiful sight is presented now by those who, forcing an open door, cry that it is necessary to turn to "enriching" theory and fail to notice how tempestuously the process of developing theory is going on in the Soviet Union, in indivisible connection with the practice of communist construction, with scientific generalization of the great historical experience of the world socialist camp and the international Communist movement. . . . The fresh wind of history will disperse and carry off the dust raised along the road by the ideologists of imperialism and their witting and unwitting henchmen. Nothing can conceal from the peoples the great and immortal Leninist cause of our party, our people—the cause of building communism. Having committed itself to " f r a n k discussion," the PCI leadership felt compelled not only to divulge further information on the debates at the 1960 Moscow Conference of Eighty-one Communist Parties, but also to defend itself against challenges from the younger generation. On December 1, Gian-Carlo Pajetta and Mario Alicata, members of the PCI Directorate, held a press conference reported in L'Unità the following day. W h e n asked to comment on rumors that the PCI delegation at the 1960 Moscow Conference had threatened not to sign the final statement unless it contained explicit approval of the general principles of the XX CPSU Congress, Alicata

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confirmed the reports, indicating that this had been one of several issues on which a "lively discussion" had ensued. 8 Alicata and Pajetta were asked if for the Communists "truth comes before or after revolutionary faith." Pajetta answered: "I am convinced that the Revolution coincides with the broadest zone of truth." When questioned about a critical réévaluation of Lenin's decisions, Pajetta replied, "We do not make our profound Leninist faith consist of approving every single one of Lenin's acts." Another leading Communist, Alfredo Reichlin, in an article in L'Unità (December 3) discussed a major theme of the Central Committee debate—the PCI's conception of the role of Communist parties in the advanced "capitalist" society of Western Europe, and their need for autonomy within the international Communist movement: ". . . This is why one looks precisely at our party, at the Italian Party of Gramsci and Togliatti, that is, at the party which first, and with utmost clarity, posed the problem of a new path [to socialism] for the peoples of the advanced capitalist countries, of a revolutionary strategy for the West. Here is the problem which springs from our debates. It is to this problem that our comrades refer when they speak of autonomy. Autonomy is not posed by the Italian Communists against someone, but for something. If we prune the debate of sentimental elements, of confusions and resentments . . . we see that the debate proceeds on solid ground: to rediscover and exalt, not in words but in deeds, the function of the working class and the Communist parties in this old and new Western Europe, to elaborate a program and a political platform corresponding to the exigencies of the times, in the framework of an autonomy which does not mean detachment from the revolutionary process, more unitary than ever on the world scale." Soon after the XXII Congress, Nuova Generazione, the weekly organ of the Italian Communist Youth Federation ( F G C I ) , embarrassed the Italian Party by demanding a reexamination of Trotskyism. On November 17, a front-page editorial urged "a critical revision of all of Soviet history, including the most recent, in order to encourage a more objective analysis, without any value judgment, of the role played by Trotsky in the October Revolution." The article asserted that the new generation had not witnessed the "Stalinist epoch" and would not be content with "a ritualistic and fictitious unanimity." 6

In January, 1962, the PCI published a pamphlet containing Luigi Longo's speeches at the 1960 Moscow Conference as well as a memorandum from the PCI delegation to Khrushchev. (See Documents Nos. 117-119.)

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Nuova Generazione's treatment of the Trotsky issue led to reprimands from party officials. At his December 1 press conference, Pajetta criticized the FGCI organ: ". . If by rehabilitation is meant establishing that Trotsky was a revolutionary who was not tied to the imperialists for criminal, anti-Soviet purposes, I believe that this problem has not only been posed but has already in fact been solved. However, if you are posing another problem, that is, that of political rehabilitation, to affirm that Trotsky was right in his opposition to Soviet and Stalinist policy, we think that Trotsky was wrong on a whole series of positions on which he was politically defeated, long before criminal charges were added. For example, he was wrong on the problem of the construction of socialism in a single country. The Soviet Party and Stalin were right. Nuova Generazione has posed the problem in a way we have criticized . . . in a very hasty and superficial way. . . ." (L'Unità, December 2, 1961.) The Central Committee of the FGCI met on December 5-7, 1961, for a debate which covered many of the issues which the PCI had discussed a month earlier. In addition to elaborations on such themes as "the Italian road to socialism" and the concept of polycentrism, speakers commented on what one member called a "schism between two generations of Communists." (L'Unità, December 7, 1961.) Critical remarks on the Nuova Generazione discussion of Trotsky seemed to reflect the Party's disapproval of raising the issue. Finally, in the December 15 edition of Nuova Generazione, an unsigned editorial attempted to justify the "error" of which the newspaper had been accused. The article claimed that the paper had sought an historical analysis of Trotsky's ideas in order to evaluate fully "the correct and positive choice which Stalin made in 1924." On the other hand, the editorial continued, Trotskyism did have a positive side, for it recognized the historical limitations of the Bolshevik revolution: ". . The contradiction and the limitation of Stalinism lie in the fact that it never managed to recognize itself as a phase of the world revolutionary process, . . . that it theorized on the selfsufficiency of the Bolshevik revolution. "This, then, is the actual political value of the Trotsky problem. Today we can reject and defeat Trotskyism in a way that was never possible in the past. But it is also possible, even necessary, to grasp its positive side, that which affirms the irreplaceable value, the qualitative contribution of the Western revolution, as opposed either to a potential tendency toward the self-sufficiency and isolation

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of Soviet society, or—above all—to an Afro-Asian deformation of Marxism into a revolutionary doctrine for backward countries. . . . " (Nuova Generazione, December 15, 1961.)

64.

LUIGI LONGO, D E P U T Y SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE ITALIAN C O M M U N I S T

PARTY.

STATEMENT

AT

THE

CENTRAL

Paraphrase of Longo's statement, in L'Unita, December 23, 1961. COMMITTEE DEBATE, DECEMBER 2 1 - 2 2 , 1 9 6 1 .

While the appearance of an intra-party consensus was soon reestablished, the debate within the PCI continued. Some of the same issues saw further elaboration in the December, 1961, issue of Rinascita, and at subsequent meetings of the PCI Central Committee. Meanwhile, Luigi Longo, the "number two man" of the Party, who had not attended the XXII CPSU Congress, returned from a trip to Moscow. One of his reports constitutes a summary of the essence of disagreements in international Communism.

. . . IT is Longo's opinion that the disagreement between the CPSU and the Chinese Party goes beyond the questions of peaceful coexistence, avoidability of war, and cult of personality. At the root of this disagreement there is perhaps a different conception of the march toward socialism and communism of the countries of the socialist system. According to one conception, this march should occur as a single whole—the more advanced countries should set the pace according to that of the more backward countries, putting all their material advantages at the disposal of the latter to accelerate their march. It is clear that such a conception cannot be reconciled with the economic challenge hurled at the capitalist countries by the USSR, with the strategic and tactical position of peaceful coexistence, with foreign economic aid to ex-colonial countries, and not even with the program for the transition to communism and related measures for the democratization of Soviet institutions, including the transformation of the dictatorship of the proletariat into an all-people's state. The Chinese comrades do not conceal their reservations on

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these aspects of Soviet policy [L'Unità added: ". . . while we hold it to be the most useful policy on several grounds"]. 65.

P A L M I R O T O G L I A T T I . S P E E C H IN F L O R E N C E , J A N U A R Y

21,

1962. L'Unità, January 22, 1962. . . T H E SOVIET UNION is advancing toward communism on the crest of a new wave of industrialization and expansion based on the success of a socialist regime which was founded more than forty years ago. Other countries are less advanced, others still find themselves at the outset of a revolutionary process, and, finally, there are Communist parties fighting in the West and in capitalist countries which operate under different and particular conditions. This being the situation, how can we achieve unity? By acknowledging a difference in the various tasks, within the framework of mutual help and solidarity. Someone has asked the question whether the Soviet Union should move toward communism or rather should concentrate her efforts and resources on more backward countries in order to foster a socialist advance. But the advance toward communism by the Soviet Union is based on actual conditions and on the very high degree of development of Soviet society. It is, therefore, an objective fact which it would be absurd or impossible to reject. Naturally, this does not mean that the Soviet Union does not devote a large part of her resources to helping other socialist countries. Such help is given, and to a very high degree, and will become increasingly substantial and effective as the first socialist state approaches communism. .

Hence, unity and solidarity against the common enemy are strengthened by an acknowledgment of a difference in tasks and therefore of the possibility of particular roads for advancing toward socialism, without ever forgetting the basic common objectives, namely, the struggle against war and in behalf of general disarmament in order to repel and finally erase the threat of nuclear destruction, and thus open the way to new revolutionary advances all over the globe. . . .

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The French Communist Party ( P C F ) remained firmly loyal to the CPSU but generally reluctant to implement some aspects of "deStalinization." Under the leadership of Maurice Thorez, the PCF has long competed with the PCI for seniority in the "Western" Communist movement. Ever since 1956 the two parties have disagreed sharply over such issues as polycentrism, Titoism, the "personality cult" and its causes, and the toleration of diversity within the Communist parties. The first official statements of the PCF about the XXII CPSU Congress appeared in the November 7 speeches of Maurice Thorez and Waldeck Rochet, the Secretary-General and Deputy SecretaryGeneral of the PCF.

6 6 . MAURICE THOREZ, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY. SPEECH AT THE SALLE DE LA MUTUALITÉ, NOVEMBER 7, 1 9 6 1 . L'Humanité (Paris), Novem-

b e r s , 1961. 9 . . . THE XXII Congress confirmed the June, 1957, condemnation of the antiparty group, which had tried to prevent the implementation of the line adopted a year before and which had wanted to make the Party and the Soviet people regress. The Central Committee of our party had at that time approved the decision of our Soviet comrades. The leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor at that time claimed to be in agreement. It is now obvious that they did not agree at all. They question the general orientation of the X X Congress. They no longer accept the condemnation of the cult of personality, which they still hold in honor. They practice a sectarian and adventurist policy which places them in opposition to the other countries of the socialist camp and to the whole international workers movement. ' Pravda reprinted Thorez's speech on November 10, 1961. Passages omitted by Pravda are indicated by angular brackets. L'Humanité is the daily organ of the PCF.

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They compromise the future of the heroic Albanian people. As it did last year, during the Conference of the Eighty-one Communist and Workers Parties, our delegation to the X X I I Congress forcefully condemned the harmful attitude of the Albanian leaders. (Loudapplause.) (We can only regret that our Chinese comrades felt that they had to express reservations about the public statement of the divergences objectively presented by Comrade Khrushchev. It would be better if they used their influence to bring the leaders of the A P L to a better understanding of their duty.) . . . Waldeck Rochet's November 7 speech dealt primarily with the achievements of the Soviet Union and with the twenty-year plan of the CPSU. Like Thorez, he expressed the French Party's support of the condemnation of the "antiparty group" and the public denunciation of the leaders of the APL at the XXII CPSU Congress, "because it was neither possible nor just—as the delegation of the Chinese Party would have liked—to remain silent about such a situation." On November 19, Thorez delivered a speech at Gennevilliers, in which he supported "de-Stalinization" and defended his own leadership against charges of doctrinaire rigidity. He also condemned the CPC for its dissent from the attack on the APL. Pravda's summary of Thorez's speech stated: "Maurice Thorez declared that the Chinese comrades were incorrect when they reproached Comrade Khrushchev for voicing criticism of the Albanian comrades at the XXII Congress, because, in their words, this was a deviation from the Statement of the eighty-one parties. 'This reproach was unjustified. The Soviet comrades had exhausted all means outlined in the Statement for the settlement of differences between parties. It was impossible to delay open criticism further.'" 10 Thorez's speech hinted that the XXII CPSU Congress had caused some dissension within the PCF, including doubts about the CPSU's handling of "de-Stalinization" and its attack on the APL. On November 25-27, the P C F Central Committee met at Ivry. Adhering closely to the CPSU's position on the "cult of personality" and the actions of the APL, Waldeck Rochet and Maurice Thorez launched an attack on both "dogmatists" and "revisionists" within the international Communist movement. 10

Pravda, November 26, 1961.

478 67.

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W A L D E C K R O C H E T , D E P U T Y S E C R E T A R Y - G E N E R A L OF THE FRENCH COMMUNIST

PARTY.

COMMITTEE

PCF.

OF

THE

REPORT

TO THE

CENTRAL

L'Humanité, November

27,

1961.

. . SOME comrades have asked themselves why the X X I I Congress came back to the consequences of the personality cult, which had been denounced at the X X Congress in 1956. First of all, the X X I I Congress had to draw up the balancesheet of the policy defined by the X X Congress, because the X X I Congress was an extraordinary congress, solely devoted to the adoption of the Seven-Year Plan. Moreover, the investigations continued since the X X Congress and the speeches by militants from the Congress rostrum have helped better to assess the wrong done to the Party and the people. It was therefore necessary to liquidate all the consequences of the cult of personality, that is, to eliminate all obstacles, hesitations, or habits adopted, so as to make possible the mobilization of all the forces of the Party and the people for the construction of communism. In this connection, Molotov's letter sent to the Central Committee at the beginning of the Congress reaffirming his opposition to the party line shows that the former members of the antiparty group, defeated in 1957, have not all recognized their errors and their mistakes. 11 Finally, the position of the leaders of the Albanian party, which has some support, also shows that there is a certain opposition on the international level to the line determined by the X X Congress and confirmed by the X X I I Congress. Under these conditions, the courageous denunciation of the abuses, of the arbitrary acts, and of the crimes committed during the period of the cult of personality, and the condemnation of the antiparty Molotov-Malenkov-Kaganovich group—which in 1957 wanted to make the Party regress—were indispensable for 11 Luigi Longo, in his speech of December 21, 1961, indicated the Molotov letter had gone to the members of the Party Presidium.—Ed.

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the maximum development of the creative spirit of the Soviet people in the struggle for the construction of communism. T h e X X I I Congress therefore had to reassert the will of the entire Party and that of the Soviet people to prevent any recurrence of the cult of personality and to be done forever with a period and with practices which gravely prejudiced the Party and the Soviet Union. The same care led the Congress to make the decision to erect a monument to the victims of the arbitrary acts, and to restore the Lenin Mausoleum to its original purpose by placing Stalin's body next to the Kremlin [wall], where the bodies of other eminent party leaders repose. . . . Now there is the case of the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor on which our delegation has had to express its opinion. In the report on the work of the C P S U Central Committee, Comrade Khrushchev made public from the Congress rostrum the abnormal and worrisome situation that has come about in that [Albanian] party. T h e leaders of that party have for some time violently questioned the general orientation of the X X Congress. They do not accept the condemnation of the personality cult, which is still honored by them and under which arbitrary decisions and violence reign. In all areas they practice an adventurist and sectarian policy, which opposes them to the other countries of the socialist camp and to the international workers movement, and which at the same time gravely damages the very interests of the Albanian people. In the speech recently given in celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the Albanian Party of Labor, Enver Hoxha publicly expressed his hostility to the policy of peaceful coexistence practiced by the Soviet Union and tried to convince his listeners of a retreat by the Soviet Union with respect to the German problem and Berlin. B y multiplying attacks and slanders against the C P S U and its Central Committee, the Albanian leaders foster imperialist propaganda.

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The delegation of the Chinese Communist Party did not want the attitude of the Albanian leaders brought publicly to the Congress rostrum. But it was neither possible nor just to remain silent about such a situation, and speaking in the name of our delegation Maurice Thorez deplored and condemned the attitude of the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor, who have veered from the principles of unity of the international Communist and workers movement. A single comrade, Comrade Giovoni, made it known to us that in his opinion the CPSU, by bringing the debate publicly before the Congress, distorted the provisions of the Statement of the eighty-one parties concerning relations among parties, and he reproached our delegation for having approved the criticisms made by Comrade Khrushchev of the methods and policy of the Albanian leaders. But since it is a matter of form as well as of substance, we believe that this reproach is unfounded, because, as Comrade Khrushchev showed in his closing speech, many attempts were made by the CPSU to normalize its relations with the Albanian Party of Labor, but these attempts had no result in view of the attitude of systematic hostility on the part of the Albanian leaders. Furthermore, in view of the positions which they took at the Conference of the eighty-one parties—and which our delegation then fought—it is well known that the Albanian leaders are against the line of the XX Congress and against the policy of peaceful coexistence pursued by the Soviet Union. Thus they publicly broke the solidarity with the other countries of the socialist camp by refusing to associate themselves with the proposals for disengagement and disarmament for the Balkan countries made by the governments of Bulgaria and Rumania. Consequently, our delegation took its position with full knowledge of the facts and in conformity with its political line and the line of the international Communist and workers movement.

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In his report on the Central Committee's activity, Comrade Khrushchev explained that the CPSU fully understood that the revelation of past mistakes and errors could provoke a certain feeling of bitterness and even of discontent within the Party and the people, and thus cause certain difficulties, temporary ones, for the fraternal Communist parties. It is true that all the Communist militants, to whatever party they belong, were moved and felt bitter upon learning that Stalin could have resorted to such profoundly condemnable methods. But at the same time as we were moved, we told ourselves that the CPSU Central Committee was completely right in facing the difficulties, in openly telling the people the whole truth, and in applying the line of the XX Congress. Therefore the Party's Political Bureau, which devoted two meetings to the work of the XXII Congress, unanimously approved its delegation's actions at this Congress. Of course, the Central Committee in turn will say whether the Political Bureau was right or not. . . . The denunciation of the cult of Stalin's personality and of its consequences has naturally led to the clarification of certain basic issues, such as that of the dictatorship of the proletariat. After the X X Congress, a discussion on this subject took place which remains more or less relevant to this day. This is the question: How could the cult of personality, with all its negative consequences, have come about and developed under the conditions of the Soviet socialist regime? Obviously, as was to be expected, the adversaries of the Soviet Union and of socialism, the partisans of bourgeois democracy, and the Social Democrats supported the idea that the cult of personality was the product of the Soviet socialist system itself. And we know that there were some Communists in certain parties who inclined to the same opinion. Our party has firmly maintained that the cult of personality is not derived from the socialist regime, that on the contrary it constitutes a violation of socialist principles. However, since it was developed under a socialist regime, it was necessary to analyze what the historical conditions were

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which, without justifying it, nonetheless allowed the development of the cult of personality. After the XX Congress, as early as June 18, 1956, our Political Bureau gave the following explanation: "The development of the cult of personality was facilitated by the situation in the Soviet Union, for a long time exposed alone to the schemes of a world of enemies, which produced extreme pressure on the forces of the people, an iron discipline, and a rigorous concentration of the power of the proletarian state. These circumstances help one to understand the enormous difficulties which the Soviet Union had to face, without justifying Stalin's deeds." The same explanation was given by the Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee of June 30, 1956, starting with an analysis of the historical and concrete conditions of the period under review. The resolution points out that for more than a quarter-century the Soviet Union, the only socialist country, found itself under conditions of capitalist encirclement, like a surrounded fortress. After the intervention of fourteen capitalist states from 1918 to 1920, the enemies of the Soviet Union continued to prepare for war against her. Thousands of spies were sent to the USSR by the capitalist countries to work at the dismemberment of the first socialist state. After Hitler's accession to power in 1933, fascism openly declared that its aim was the annihilation of communism, of the Soviet Union. These maneuvers by international reaction were all the more dangerous because a hard class struggle went on for a long time within the country to determine which would win out, socialism, or capitalism. Finally, after Lenin's death, within the Party itself Trotskyite, opportunist, and bourgeois nationalist tendencies had to be fought; [these tendencies] rejected the Leninist theory according to which socialism could be achieved in a single country, a rejection that would have led to the restoration of capitalism in the USSR.

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Under such conditions, the Party has had to wage a merciless struggle against the enemies of Leninism. . . . All these difficulties on the road to the building of socialism have been overcome by the Soviet people under the leadership of the Communist Party and its Central Committee. In this political and ideological struggle, Stalin, who for a long time held the post of Secretary-General of the Central Committee, acquired great authority and great popularity. However, as the resolution states, there was a tendency to connect with his name all victories and successes attained, and the praise he received turned his head. In these conditions the cult of Stalin's personality was gradually developed, which was favored to a large extent by ccrtain personality traits of Stalin, whose negative character Lenin had noted before his death. Stalin, inordinately exaggerating the value of his merits, then persuaded himself that he was infallible. He started to violate the rules of democracy within the Party and the state. Central Committee sessions and congresses were no longer held regularly and then ceased to be called altogether. Finally, it was Stalin's erroneous thesis that the class struggle would get worse and worse as the Soviet Union advanced along the road of socialism, and it was given ranking importance in 1937, that is, at a time when socialism was already victorious in the country and when the exploiting classes had been liquidated. In practice, this false thesis makes it possible to justify the most brutal violations of socialist legality, which have gravely prejudiced the Party and the Soviet Union. This perfectly correct analysis makes it possible to explain the origin and propagation of the cult of Stalin's personality, which, far from having its origin in the Soviet socialist system, on the contrary became a restraint on the development of socialist democracy and the transition to communism. The best proof of vitality of the socialist regime, basically democratic, is the very fact that the Party has itself posed the question of eliminating the cult of personality. This denunciation of mistakes and errors made does not mean —as the revisionists suggest—that the necessity of the dictator-

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ship of the proletariat must be questioned as a transitional step in the passage from capitalism to socialism. As a matter of fact, those who pretended to find in the X X Congress a pretext to abandon the Marxist idea of dictatorship of the proletariat were mistaken, as were those who tended more or less to justify the arbitrary acts of a small group or of a single man by confusing them with the Marxist idea of dictatorship of the proletariat. On the contrary, the latter presupposes respect for revolutionary legality in the state and respect for the principles of democratic centralism, including collective leadership, in the Party. Our party has fought for both, that is, for a correct interpretation of the X X Congress and for the creative application of the principles of Marxism-Leninism. That is undoubtedly why our adversaries, who dreamt of a crisis in the Party, have to note with astonishment—so they say—and mainly with spite, that the French Communist Party is united ideologically and politically. This does not mean that we do not have our weaknesses and mistakes, but that is a matter to which we shall return. . . . In the Central Committee's report on the draft Program, Comrade Khrushchev explains that the C P S U , basing itself on the profound analysis of the forces at work in the international arena, affirms with assurance that the present generation has every possibility of averting world war if the peoples defend the peace.

"In adopting its new Program," he said, "our great party solemnly declares to all humanity that it considers it the main objective of its foreign policy not only to avert world war, but to banish wars forever from the life of society in our generation." Certain hardened dogmatists and conservatives, such as Molotov, reproach the C P S U Central Committee for simplifying or softening the evaluation of the international situation when it insists on the need for peaceful coexistence under the present circumstances. These sectarian elements do not see what is new in the world situation, and they do not agree with the analysis of the character of our epoch. Now then, these are very important

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issues. It will be remembered that they were already the subject of discussions with the Chinese comrades at the Conference of the eighty-one parties. This conference, correctly analyzing the character of our epoch, showed that the sectarians were wrong in hanging on to formulas that were valid for a different epoch and in not seeing that the new relationship of forces on the international scale is in favor of the forces of peace. The imperialists have to take this into account, and it consequently gives a vital importance to the principles of peaceful coexistence under present conditions. Peaceful competition between the two social systems does not mean the disappearance of the class struggle. On the contrary, the affirmation of the superiority of socialism and communism will bring more and more new peoples into its camp. Of course, the imperialists will try to interfere in the affairs of the peoples to maintain reactionary regimes. But it will be more and more difficult for them. Cuba is already an example of this. . . . Finally, in giving an account of the X X I I Congress, there is one thing which must be emphasized, namely, that it was a brilliant demonstration of proletarian internationalism, in the presence of representatives of eighty fraternal parties. What gives the XXII Congress its international significance is above all the grandiose Program for the construction of communism and all the theses developed and adopted by the Congress. Therefore all the members of our delegation were convinced that Maurice Thorez expressed the profound feelings of all the French Communists when he affirmed, from the rostrum of the X X I I Congress, that our Communist Party for more than forty years has been intimately concerned with the struggles, the trials, and the successes of the CPSU, and that the latter remains for us the model and the experienced, considerate, and fraternal vanguard of the whole international Communist movement. Therefore we shall draw from this historic congress all the lessons which are fitting for our own party.

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The X X I I Congress, like the X X , is of universal value for all Communists. The Political Bureau has already taken all necessary measures to publish the materials of the X X I I Congress, and all party members have been invited to study carefully the work of the Congress and to popularize it widely among the workers. We in the Political Bureau—and the members of the Central Committee will give their opinion—believe that our party must continue its efforts to contribute with all its forces to the strengthening of the ideological unity of the international Communist and workers movement, which was jeopardized by the attitude of the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor. They have entered into open battle with the CPSU and with the line of the international Communist movement, which was reaffirmed in the Statement of the Eighty-one Communist and Workers Parties. Though the Statement of the eighty-one parties states that the Marxist-Leninist parties are all independent and equal in rights and work out their own policies on the basis of the concrete conditions of their countries, it also states that they are to work out this policy inspired by the great doctrine of MarxismLeninism, and that all Communist parties must be united in the common struggle which they wage for its execution. . . Contrary to the opinions voiced in the Italian Party by certain opportunist and revisionist elements, we believe that the unity of the international Communist and workers movement is necessary for victory. Therefore we firmly hold to the principles of the Statement of the eighty-one parties, which affirm that the strengthening of the unity of the Communist movement is the supreme duty of each Marxist-Leninist party. With regard to the problems of the Party, we have always defended and we will continue to defend the Leninist concept of the Party. The revisionist elements, which are against the unity of the international Communist movement, also try to question the Leninist concept of the new type of party, thus favoring the old

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Social Democratic concept of a party based on the existence of divergent ideological tendencies. But we will not allow such concepts to be developed in our party, in which we have defeated opportunist and revisionist elements, because, as our XVI Congress mentioned, the whole experience of the international workers movement shows that the working class can struggle victoriously for its objectives —to abolish capitalism and to achieve socialism—only if it is headed by a revolutionary party of a new type, a party that is ideologically united, a Marxist-Leninist party. . . . We must take care constantly to improve the work of our party and of its organizations, especially by watching over internal democracy in the Party, by always improving the operation of all party organs, and by assuring collective leadership at all levels. To accomplish all these tasks, including our international duty, our party will continue to wage the struggle on both fronts: against opportunism and revisionism, which remain the principal danger; and against dogmatism and sectarianism, which, if they are not fought consistently, can also become the principal danger at a given stage of development of the different parties. . . . 68.

MAURICE

THOREZ. S T A T E M E N T

MITTEE OF THE

TO THE CENTRAL

COM-

PCF. L'Humanité, November 30, 1961.

. . EVERYONE knows that the dictatorship of the pro. letariat, which in the USSR assumed the shape of soviets, may take on different forms. As Lenin stated in State and Revolution, a book he wrote during the Menshevik period of power [i/c] in 1917, before October, "the passage from capitalism to socialism cannot . . . help presenting a great multitude and a large diversity of political forms." Indeed, we now know the dictatorship of the proletariat represented by the system of people's democracy in the countries of Europe and Asia where the working class has taken power since World War II.

The appearance of new types is explained by the original

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conditions under which the working class of those countries established its power, relying on the peasantry and the middle classes, and constituting with these strata a democratic front. The people's democracies also had from the beginning the support of the USSR, which resulted in very different conditions from those in the Russia of the Soviets after 1917, alone in a sea of capitalism. To build socialism, it is everywhere necessary to expropriate the expropriators and nationalize heavy industry, transportation systems, and the banks. It is also necessary to give the working peasants the lands of the idle large landowners and to organize the peasantry, with its agreement, into producers cooperatives. Unlike the USSR, most of the people's democracies of Central and Eastern Europe have not nationalized the soil; they have left it or given it to working peasants, as private property. It was considered that in these countries small farm ownership had existed for centuries. This is also the case in France, contrary to the state of affairs in Russia, where communal ownership had existed for a long time and lots were periodically redistributed. As may be seen, land nationalization does not necessarily accompany the socialist revolution, and in any event it is a democratic measure. What is encouraged everywhere is free cooperation, with the help of socialist power, which places at the peasants' disposal machines, fertilizers, and all other means of progress and technology. Thus cooperation leads to higher forms of socialist agriculture. Another peculiarity of the people's democracy is the use of a parliament. Needless to say, this use was made possible only by associating with the parliamentary struggle a powerful popular movement directed by the working class and its Communist party. Under these conditions, the parliament could be converted from an instrument of bourgeois domination to a tool of socialist transformation of the country. Finally, many people's democracies have permitted and retained multiple parties. As a matter of fact, even in Soviet Russia it was that way at the beginning. Lenin stated this well: "We wanted," he said, "a Soviet coalition government. We excluded

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no one from the soviet." For months the Left Socialist Revolutionaries, who claimed to represent part of the peasantry, were in the government with the Bolsheviks, and it was only when they sank into counter-revolution that they were removed. Then the best elements in that party, as well as the best elements of the Mensheviks, came into the Communist Party. In many of the people's democracies there exist agrarian parties, petty-bourgeois parties from social strata that supported the revolution. This is the case in Poland, in the German Democratic Republic, in Czechoslovakia, in China, etc. At first the Socialist parties participated in the government. Later on they followed the logical path and the desire for unity of the working class: since parties have their reason for being only to the extent that they express the interests of a particular class, it was natural that the two parties calling themselves working class should fuse. In unified workers parties, many militants highly placed and occupying positions of great responsibility are former Socialists: Grotewohl in the German Democratic Republic, Cyrankiewicz in Poland, Fierlinger in Czechoslovakia, etc. In France too it is becoming more and more evident that the socialist revolution will assume forms different from those in which it took place in Russia in 1917. This we had emphasized as early as 1946. A Communist party inspired by living Marxism —this "guide to action" opposed to any dogmatism—cannot help but take into the widest consideration historical peculiarities, national traditions, varying conditions, and such laws of universal character that govern the transition from capitalism to socialism. The parliament—a truly democratic parliament—can play its part in a peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism, in conjunction with the mobilization and struggle of the masses. As we have already said, the proposals made by our Sixteenth Congress to the Socialists and other republicans go further than a temporary union; they tend toward a collaboration for the very construction of socialism. . . . To accomplish the grandiose program of building communism,

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the Soviet people need peace. Peace is the condition for realizing the program. It will also be its crowning achievement. When the Soviet Union becomes the first industrial power on earth and the socialist system definitively constitutes the decisive factor of world evolution, the scales will tip forever in favor of the forces of peace, and, according to Comrade Khrushchev's expression, the international barometer will read: "Fair weather. Danger of world war gone forever." Henceforth, the existence of a danger of war is not in conflict with the aspiration to banish war from the life of humanity. Taking as its point of departure a thoroughgoing analysis of the forces at work in the international arena, the XXII Congress affirmed with assurance, following the XX, that the present generation had every possibility of exorcizing world war. Indeed, the most powerful state of our epoch, the Soviet Union, and with it all the countries in the socialist camp, devote themselves exclusively in foreign policy to achieving the triumph of the cause of peace. Historical experience has fully confirmed that if war is inherent in the nature of imperialism, the struggle against war and for the reinforcement of peace is the characteristic of socialism; it represents for the socialist countries a policy of principle. This policy of principle has much greater chances of winning the day than formerly. We are no longer in the "epoch of imperialism and wars" that Lenin spoke of. Imperialism is no longer the determining factor in the world, the sole master of the five continents. . . . Lenin said that it is essentially through its economic progress that socialism would exert its influence on international development. The increasing influence of the construction of socialism and communism on the peoples of the nonsocialist countries is in itself a revolutionary factor that accelerates the progress of humanity; at the same time it is a powerful factor for peace. The fact that the superiority of strength belongs to the socialist commonwealth is a great blessing for all mankind. . . .

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Our Central Committee unreservedly approves the theses and decisions of the X X I I Congress, just as it approved those of the XX. These two congresses, along with the declarations adopted by the international conferences of 1957 and I960, point to the only correct path. The theses of the X X and XXII congresses have been commonly accepted by the international Communist movement. Alone, apparently, the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor are in opposition to this orientation. They withdrew from the general line of the world Communist movement on the great issues of our time: the possibility of avoiding war, the possibility of peaceful forms of the transition to socialism, and the struggle against the cult of personality. The Albanian leaders did not accept the X X Congress line, the practice of peaceful coexistence, the Soviet government's disarmament proposals. They publicly broke the solidarity of the socialist camp by refusing to associate themselves with the disengagement and disarmament proposals for the Balkans that were presented by the Bulgarian and Rumanian governments. In Albania they practice the cult of personality and apply leadership methods that were condemned by the Statement of the eighty-one parties. Sinking into nationalism, the Albanian leaders shamefully slander the Soviet Union. The documents relating to the USSR's generous aid to Albania are known; for instance, the 1957 Soviet-Albanian declaration, which lists the plants and all installations built by the Soviet Union in Albania and presented free to that country. The Chinese comrades have reproached Comrade Khrushchev for raising publicly in the XXII Congress the question of the harmful orientation of the leaders of the APL, referring to the Statement of the eighty-one parties. This is to forget that our Soviet comrades patiently exhausted all the means outlined by that Statement. What remained to be done? Hide the truth from the Soviet people, publish in Pravda the hypocritical telegram of congratulations from the leaders of the Albanian party to the XXII

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Congress that swore eternal friendship with the Soviet people, and hush up the real situation? This was not possible; it would have been both a lack of frankness toward the Soviet people and a poor service to the Albanian people, to the cause of international unity. The declaration of the Chinese comrades concerning the form of the discussion is somewhat illuminated by the present efforts of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party to spread the erroneous theses of the Albanian leaders, who are represented to be the guardians of the "purity of Marxism-Leninism." In his report Waldeck Rochet stated that Comrade Giovoni, the only one in the party leadership to express such an opinion, had not approved the attitude of our delegation to the XXII Congress concerning the public criticism addressed to the leaders of the APL. In his statement, Comrade Giovoni again said that it was a matter of the form. He stressed: "That the A P L did not respect the Statement of the eighty-one parties seems to me to have been demonstrated." Further thought will convince him that our delegation, and therefore the XXII Congress, adopted the only correct position conforming to the Statement of the 1960 Conference. . . . In an obvious allusion to Italian Communist views, Thorez continued:

In one quarter they persist in developing the thesis of "polycentrism." This formula conceals, we fear, a tendency toward fractionalism, and we are resolved to preserve international cohesion against such a danger. True, there is no longer a Communist International, nor an Information Bureau. Last Sunday I recalled the reasons for this: the considerable extension of the Communist movement, the diversity of objective conditions, and the inevitable differences in methods of work. Each Communist party is fully independent, from the point of view of organization and of policy. That is precisely why the thesis of polycentrism causes surprise and concern.

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There is no longer a single center of direction; why talk of setting up several? It is obvious that such a position denies the universal validity of the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution. One would be right in stressing within legitimate bounds the national peculiarities and the concrete historical conditions of the socialist revolution in such or such a country. But it is wrong to emphasize them exclusively to the detriment of the great laws enunciated in the 1957 Declaration: the necessity of the dictatorship of the working class, "whose nucleus consists of the Marxist-Leninist Party"; the socialist transformation of industry and agriculture; the defense of revolutionary conquests; etc. The X X I I Congress has also been represented as a sort of correction of the 1960 Statement, putting an end to a "fictitious unanimity." In the matter of party organization, there are those who believe possible the formation of a majority and minorities, that is to say, in effect a return to factions and abandonment of the Leninist concept of the new type of party. A national Communist youth organization has just come out with a newspaper with the following headline sprawled across a whole page: ' T h e degeneration of the socialist state." 111 They even talk of rehabilitating Trotsky! On the role of Trotsky I shall repeat in two words what I told the militants of the twentieth [Paris] arrondissement yesterday. I took part in the meeting of the Executive Committee of the International which in 1927 excluded Trotsky from its ranks. This exclusion was handed down at the end of a fouryear political battle carried on within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and within all the fraternal parties. Trotsky was excluded because of his political positions and his fractional acu Thorez apparently was referring to an article by Michelangelo Notarianni entitled "The Bureaucratic Degeneration of the Socialist State," which appeared in the November 17, 1961, issue of Nuova Generazione. —Ed.

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tivity in the USSR and in the international Communist movement. Contrary to the legend that tends to be spread, Trotsky was never either a Leninist or a Bolshevik. He was a fellow-traveler at the time of the revolutionary movement. He joined the Bolshevik Party a few months before October. Until then he had been a resolute adversary of Lenin and the Bolsheviks. In 1912 he had been the instigator and main leader of the famous August Bloc, which grouped together all the Mensheviks, Trotskyites, and other opponents of Leninism. . . . With his slogan, "Neither war nor peace!" which was properly resisted by Lenin, he would have plunged the Soviet Union into adventure and catastrophe. He had no confidence in the creative forces of the Soviet people and in the possibility of building socialism in a single country. He wanted to "stimulate revolution through war." We read that ostensibly the XXII Congress did not represent a step forward because it maintained the thesis of the existence of universally applicable general laws for the transition to socialism. The thesis, we are told, is contrary to the affirmation of national roads to socialism. Let us add that Trotsky knew the art of flattering youth. Comrades: While struggling against revisionist and opportunist currents, we cannot neglect sectarian and dogmatic deviation, which could become the greatest danger if we ceased to struggle against it. Dogmatic elements assume the appearance of revolutionary purity. But in reality they are elements which have no more faith than the opportunists in the strength and progress of the socialist camp, of the world-wide workers movement, and of the peoples in general. They fail to see what is new in the international situation. They do not take account of the decline of imperialism. The XXII Congress denounced the fractional, antiparty group of dogmatists, who had not accepted the theses of the X X Congress and who in 1957 tried by a coup to prevent the

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Party from applying them. They wanted to pull backward the Soviet people and the Communist Party. Waldeck Rochet reminded us that at that time our party at once and unreservedly approved the measures taken by the Central Committee of the Soviet Party against this group. If the group had not been unmasked and reduced to impotence, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, in particular, would have taken a different direction, and the positions of the Soviet Union would have been weakened in the world arena. International relations would have deteriorated. By thus fighting on both fronts, against defeatist opportunism and against sectarian dogmatism, we are reinforcing our party. . . . T h e Italian response to the French leaders' charges was immediate and direct. On D e c e m b e r 1, L'Unità printed a résumé of Thorez's speech and quoted extensive passages from it. Saverio Tutino, in an a c c o m p a n y i n g c o m m e n t , accused Thorez of misrepresenting the position of the PCI and rebuked L'Humanité for failing to report fairly the discussions in the Italian Party. T h e following day L'Unità published—presumably for the benefit of the C P F — a restatement of Togliatti's conception of "polycentrism." 6 9 . SAVERIO TUTINO. "STATEMENT OF THOREZ AT THE C E N TRAL C O M M I T T E E OF THE P C F ON THE PROBLEMS RAISED

BY THE X X I I CONGRESS." L'Unità,

December 1, 1961.

WE PUBLISH HERE a s u m m a r y a n d s e l e c t i o n s f r o m t h e s p e e c h of

the Secretary-General of the French Communist Party, Comrade Maurice Thorez, to the Central Committee which met at Ivry on November 25. It is our duty, however, to point out that the attacks against the Italian Communist Party (expressed through several hints) are not acceptable since they misrepresent the actual position of our party. This comment is particularly necessary in regard to the thesis of polycentrism, which, in several statements released by the Italian Communist Party, the last of which was the one included in the report on the X X I I CPSU Congress, is expressed in com-

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pletely different terms from the ones used by Comrade Thorez in his attacks. Our remarks also concern the criticism made by the Secretary-General of the French Communist Party of a magazine of a "national organization of Communist youth." The magazine is apparently Nuovo Generazione, and the topic which evoked the hint was the Trotsky question. In this connection, it is proper to point out that Nuova Generazione, in the caption under a picture (No. 42, 1961), simply asked for "a more objective analysis, without any value judgment of Trotsky's contribution," which is not quite the same thing as asking that Trotsky be reinstated in his rightful place, that is, asking for Trotsky's rehabilitation. In fact, in the next issue of the same weekly, the correct meaning of the sentence was explained in answer to the unwarranted deductions of certain members of the bourgeois press. Similar considerations also apply to other attacks by the Secretary-General of the French Communist Party. Our main purpose in bringing to the attention of the public the incorrect and ill-founded criticism of Thorez is—it is necessary to clarify this point—to state once more that a debate can be useful, constructive, and well founded only when it is based on unambiguous references and on accurate information and quotations (while to the best of our knowledge, L'Humanite never published any information concerning our Central Committee and the statements issued by it). . . . 70.

PALMIRO TOGLIATTI. S T A T E M E N T

in L'Unita, December 2,

1961. . . THE MEANING of the expression "polycentrism," in relation to the forms of organization of the international Communist movement, has been questioned in the course of the present discussion on the problems of the international workers movement. The document approved by the Secretariat of our party, acting on instructions from the Party leadership, clearly states that

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"polycentrism" was discussed in our party in terms of the absence of a single center and, therefore, in terms of emphasizing the full independence of the different parties within the limits of principles on which the party ideology and struggle is founded, but not in terms of demanding the formation of different regional centers. Since the leaders of the French Communist Party insist on the latter, incorrect interpretation, Comrade Togliatti was asked to state once more his point of view, and this is his answer: "The polemical interpretation adopted by the French comrades puzzles me, especially as it comes from such competent leaders who are fully aware of all the details of the present situation. Since the dissolution of the Information Bureau in 19S6, we have consistently stood for the autonomy of the various parties, of course within the limits defined by those ideological principles and by those practical aims which are the foundation of the whole Communist movement, of our international unity, and of proletarian internationalism. "We particularly asked that this point of view be clearly stated in the Resolution approved in November, 1957, at the meeting of the Communist parties [in Moscow], It must be remembered, however, that in 1956, during the XX CPSU Congress, in the course of a meeting attended by the representatives of all the parties that belonged to the Information Bureau, a proposal was made to try a certain type of 'regional' organization based on a more closely knit exchange of information among parties which operate under similar conditions. This proposal, though, did not come from our party. It won tentative approval as an experiment, but there was some feeling of uneasiness. Attempts to implement such a proposal were also made, especially by the French comrades and by us, but no useful result was achieved, and this idea was abandoned without further mention. My statement can be confirmed, either by Comrade Scoccimarro who attended the XX CPSU Congress with me, or by the comrades who were, at the time, in charge of this branch of our activities."

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Dissents from the policies advocated by the Italian Communist Party continued to be voiced, particularly with regard to "polycentrism." In addition to the criticism voiced by French and Czechoslovak Communists, Hermann Axen, a leading East German Communist, attacked the PCI "line" in the SED daily, Neues Deutschland, on December 2, 1961. L'Unità invariably reported, and replied to, these charges. 7 1 . JACQUES D U C L O S . " P R O B L E M S OF UNITY IN THE NATIONAL C O M M U N I S T AND WORKERS M O V E M E N T . "

INTERL'HU-

manité, December 9, 1961. . . . THE FUNDAMENTAL laws which the building of socialism necessarily obeys, wherever it may occur, namely, the accomplishment of the socialist revolution under one form or another, the founding of the dictatorship of the proletariat under one form or another, the existence of a Marxist-Leninist party, the alliance of the working class with the peasant masses and the other strata of the working population, the abolition of capitalist property, the defense of the conquests of socialism, etc., must naturally be applied by taking into account the concrete situation in each country; but they are valid everywhere. This position of principle, contained in the common Declaration of the Communist and workers parties of twelve socialist countries, did not gain the adherence of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, which, in response to the 1957 Moscow Declaration, elaborated a revisionist and anti-Leninist program, which was condemned by the whole international Communist and workers movement. But the position [contained in the Declaration] was approved unanimously by the Conference of Communist and Workers Parties which met in Moscow on December 14-16, 1957. The unity which was thus manifested was unfortunately questioned during the Conference of Eighty-one Communist and Workers Parties, which met in Moscow in November, 1960, by the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor, who perpetrated inadmissible anti-Soviet attacks and questioned the policy defined at the X X Congress of the CPSU, with which they had declared themselves in agreement.

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As Comrade Nikita Khrushchev emphasized, the reason this state of affairs was exposed publicly at the X X I I Congress of the CPSU was that all the attempts made by the C P S U to normalize relations with the A P L did not achieve any result. As is well known, the Chinese comrades had reservations regarding the public exposure of disagreements which was made at the X X I I Congress; however, the Soviet comrades were correct in proceeding as they did. It was because all attempts which had been made to convince the leaders of the A P L had been completely unavailing that it had become indispensable to tell the truth in the interest of the very unity of the international Communist and workers movement. Our party fully approves the attitude adopted on this question by the C P S U , just as it approves the decisions of the X X I I Congress, the congress that assures the world-wide victory of socialism, of communism. Comrade Nikita Khrushchev said at the X X I I Congress: " T h e day will come when the children, the grandchildren of those who today do not understand and do not accept communism will live under communism." It is beyond the realm of doubt that this is the objective toward which the development of society is leading; but it is the people who make their own history, and it behooves us French Communists to prepare such a future for France in the conditions which are peculiar to it, by joining our efforts with those of the popular masses in fidelity to the tested principles of Marxism-Leninism. Of course, it is necessary to take into account the experience of the international Communist and workers movement, primarily the rich experience of the Soviet Union. And, accustomed as they are to distorting the truth, the enemies of socialism do not miss an opportunity to pretend that our French Communist Party is "unconditionally" subordinated to the C P S U . In this fashion, reaction is trying to achieve a double objective: it would like to insinuate, on the one hand, that the international Communist and workers movement is a ward of the C P S U , and, on the other hand, have it believed that our party only implements a policy which has been decided by someone else. Nothing is further from the truth.

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The unity of the international Communist and workers movement, to which we adhere and which it is indispensable to preserve, is not based on the existence and functioning of an international organization. The Communist International has been dissolved for many years. The Information Bureau no longer exists, and this is because the Communist and workers parties have attained a degree of development that makes necessary their full independence, permitting them to determine their policy in accordance with the particular conditions in each country and applying the essential laws which are valid for all countries. The principles of Marxism-Leninism, which constitute the most precious asset of the international Communist and workers movement and which are common to all Marxist-Leninist parties, must be defended, for they constitute not only the basis of international unity, which is more essential than ever before, but the ideological weapon without which the transformation of society could not be carried out. . . . As became known a year later, the P C F Secretariat wrote the C P C on January 24, 1962, vigorously objecting to the Chinese delegates' behavior at the Stockholm meeting of the World Peace Council. The first months of 1962 saw the PCI largely absorbed in domestic problems acccntuated by the "Center-Left" government coalition, which completed the political isolation of the Communists. At the same time, the "moderate" or "right" wing of the party leadership, represented by men like Giorgio Amendola and institutions like the PCI's Gramsci Institute in Rome, pressed further in several areas, such as establishing closer contacts with Yugoslavia, discussing the changing nature of capitalism, and displaying a willingness to acknowledge the progressive consequences of the European C o m m o n Market for Italian prosperity. T h e latter view also found expression in a joint declaration of the PCI and a Belgian Communist Party delegation, which met with the PCI leadership in Rome on May 10-13, 1962. (See Le Drapeau Rouge [Brussels], May 18, 1962.) Their joint statement, calling among other things for a unity of workers action and organization "within each country and internationally," was distinctly milder in its appraisal of the C o m m o n Market than statements emanating f r o m the French and Netherlands parties.

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The PCI Central Committee met in April, 1962, in preparation for the X Congress of the PCI, scheduled for December. Although placing primary emphasis on domestic problems, such as the theory of "structural reform," the plenum also heard Luigi Longo declare with regard to conflicts within the international Communist movement: "We are not of the opinion that differences, wherever they arise, should and could be concealed, unless in exceptional cases or as a temporary measure. We believe that the present conditions of the movement, its structure, the respect for the autonomy of each party demand a debate, for only thus will it be possible to clarify issues and reach common conclusions." Togliatti added that, under conditions of autonomy of each Communist party, "relations among [them] require certain rules and also call for debate, and within certain limits for public debate." He promptly added, however, that debate did not mean insults and injuries. (L'Unità, April 27 and 28, 1962.) WORLD

FEDERATION

OF TRADE

UNIONS

(

WFTU)

The disagreements between the PCI and the PCF continued at the Fifth World Congress of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), which met in Moscow on December 4-16, 1961. The WFTU has been under Communist control, though its leadership and especially its membership has included many noncommunists. Delegates, observers, and guests from ninety-seven countries (including Albania and Yugoslavia) attended the Congress. The WFTU General Council meeting in Peking (June, 1960) had provided a forum for the airing of Sino-Soviet differences; the delegations had debated the nature of imperialism, strategy in underdeveloped areas, and disarmament.13 The Chinese delegation to the 1961 WFTU meeting, supported by the Albanian, North Korean, and North Vietnamese delegations, called for greater organizational cohesion of the WFTU, and greater militancy in aiding the trade unions engaged in "national liberation" struggles. However, the Chinese delegation did not precipitate any crisis. In fact, the 1961 WFTU draft Program (adopted by the WFTU Executive Bureau in June, 1961, and circulated to all member organizations) seemed to mirror the Soviet conception of priorities in international affairs. The debate between the French (CGT) and Italian (CGIL) trade13 For Liu Chang-sheng's speech, see G. F. Hudson. Richard Lowenthal, and Roderick MacFarquhar (eds.), The Sino-Soviet Dispule ( N e w York: Praeger, 1961), pp. 123-26.

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union delegations revolved a r o u n d t h e n a t u r e of the W F T U . In M o s c o w Agostino Novella, President of the W F T U and SecretaryG e n e r a l of the C G I L , clashed with L o u i s Saillant, t h e F r e n c h Secret a r y - G e n e r a l of the W F T U . T h e Italian delegation objected t o the d r a f t p r o g r a m and submitted a n u m b e r of a m e n d m e n t s . 1 4 " U n l i k e the Soviet press, the PCI's L'Unità (December 7, 1961) published a selection from Novella's speech, which included the affirmation of "the need for a trade-union policy which can constantly take into account the divergence of situations [in different countries], their positive and negative dynamism, and which seeks working class unity not in formal plans but in specific action." Novella went on to stress the need for unions to concentrate on basic problems of labor, rather than "mechanically" to adopt slogans and objectives of a transient political or diplomatic nature. He continued with regard to "labor unity": "To us, we wish to say openly, the accusations of a moral sort made against the leaders of the other trade-union organizations [outside the W F T U ] are useless and even harmful. We must start out by seeing that millions of workers still believe in these leaders and that such accusations have no effect on them. Experience proves this. What does all this mean? Does it mean perhaps that the leaders of the I C F T U and C C T U must not be criticized, and that there must be no discussion about these groups? Not at all. In fact, we think that discussion must always be accurate and specific—but related most of all to current problems. . T o promote unity of action means to select our objectives very carefully. For instance, it does not seem proper to us to consider the draft Program of Action offered to the Congress 'a specific basis for unity of action which can cover all trades and all countries.' This position, which is to be found in the report of Comrade Saillant, seems completely erroneous to us. . . . We think that there are today many progressive labor organizations belonging to the ICFTU which cannot accept unity of action on this basis. ". . Even the problem of organic unity poses very serious problems today. I think that it is still not acute and that in any case it must be prepared for by unity of action on various levels. T o the extent that the problem arises, I believe that we must openly bar any attempt to solve it by means of formal and factual absorption of other organizations into the W F T U . . . . "The diversity of conditions in which the trade-union struggle is developing does not decrease but increases the highly unifying function of the WFTU. It poses problems of increasing recognition of divergent national realities. In the capitalist countries and especially where there are several labor parties, trade-union unity can be achieved only on the basis of separating the trade-union movement from the parties, even if friendship between unions and parties is natural and necessary. . . ."

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7 2 . AGOSTINO NOVELLA, PRESIDENT OF THE W O R L D FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS. PROPOSED A M E N D M E N T S TO THE D R A F T PROGRAM OF THE W F T U S U B M I T T E D AT THE F I F T H CONGRESS OF THE W F T U IN M O S C O W , D E C E M B E R ,

1961

(Unpublished). . . . 89. BORN of trade-union unity, the W F T U regards the reestablishment of international trade-union unity as one of its principal tasks and makes all efforts to attain this objective. Profound differences in the general orientation and in the actual practices of the various organizations, however, make it difficult to accomplish this task; to establish and promote unity of action of workers and trade unions on the national and international level, and to overcome the obstacles raised by the adversaries of unity—these are the basic ways of achieving it. The development of united action in all countries proves convincingly that this unity is more necessary and possible than ever before. 90. In the development of the policy of unity of action, the WFTU is mindful of the fact that the trade-union situation and even trade-union dissension do not in all countries have the same characteristics—which are conditioned by the historical, economic, social, and political development of each country. Regard for these characteristics is shown by its respect vis-à-vis problems of organization and other special problems of national unity of the trade unions not affiliated with the W F T U of this or that continent. . . . The WFTU always takes into account the fact that, within these organizations, there are also leaders and militants who understand the justification for the policy of unity and who furthermore understand that this policy of trade-union unity must be conducted on all levels, among the working masses and in the trade-union organizations. It is necessary to place discussions and initiatives for unity at the center of the policy of trade-union unity—the most important and most urgent problems, for it is precisely on the

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basis of these problems and in conformity with the positions taken on these problems by the trade unions that the forms of the struggle of the working masses are determined and unity is achieved. 91. As the only international trade-union organization which represents workers belonging to all social systems and, therefore, an organization which most completely represents all the diversity of trade-union reality, the W F T U calls upon all national trade-union headquarters to follow the policy of tradeunion unity, which is in full conformity with the situation and with the need for promoting the struggle of the workers in their respective countries. The Soviet delegation sought to avoid an overt clash with the Italians. It was probably instrumental in persuading the CGIL to have another of its veterans, Renato Bitossi, accept the W F T U presidency in place of the outgoing Novella, if only to avoid the impression that the CGIL was "disengaging" from the W F T U . The Italian position was generally supported by the Polish, Indian, and (on some issues) Yugoslav delegates; it was evidently also endorsed by some of the non-WFTU observers from Japan, Africa, and Austria. 15 OTHER

PARTIES

At the XXII CPSU Congress, nine "Western" parties had indicated their disagreement with Khrushchev's open attack on the Albanian party leadership: these were the Communist parties of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Northern Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Later on, some of these parties joined in the condemnation of the APL; others (as of 1962) had still not taken an official position or identified themselves with the policy of the CPSU. 16

For the Yugoslav position, see the speech of Svetozar Vukmanovic: "We are Communists and convinced that the working class will solve its problems by building socialism. Yet we must not impose our ideas and views on anyone. The right of each [country's] working class to choose the path best suited to it must be respected." (Borba [Belgrade], December 12, 1961.) For the Polish position, see the report by Ignacy LogaSowinski, in which he stresses "broad discussions, exchanges of views, as well as maximum elimination of differences and increasing accord on problems wherever this is possible" as the "starting point for gradual unity" of international labor. (Glos Pracy [Warsaw], January 2, 1962.)

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The Netherlands Communist Party, headed by Paul de Groot, followed the French lead. De Groot had committed himself to Soviet leadership in 1960 despite his qualms about "revisionist" elements in Khrushchev's program. In endorsing the policies adopted at the XXII Congress, he repeatedly argued that Stalinism was a uniquely Russian phenomenon, presumably implying that Western Communist leaders, like himself, were not suspect by analogy: "The understanding by our comrades in the CPSU of the 'personality cult' differs vastly from the impression conveyed by our use of 'glorification of a person.' They make a basic distinction between the authority of a leader and the personality cult. A party cannot operate without a leader, and the masses cannot fight without leaders. Hence we must firmly reject any anarchist idea or nihilist tendency, which sometimes takes the shape of struggling against the glorification of an individual. . . . And as for the Communist parties in capitalist countries, at present and in the future, one need hardly say that the methods which existed in the Soviet Union during the Stalin regime cannot and will not be able to exist in these parties." (De Groot, in De Waarheid [Amsterdam], November 22, 1961.) On another occasion be stressed "the peculiar circumstances in Russia under which these errors, which are alien to the Communist movement, could have taken place: a country scarcely freed from feudalism, without democratic traditions, for a long time the only country in which socialism had been established, and surrounded only by enemies." (De Waarheid, January 5, 1962.) Similarly, the Finnish Communist Party, after some internal resistance, continued its loyally pro-Soviet conduct. The anti-Albanian statements made by its delegation to the XXII Congress were promptly approved by its Central Committee, and Pravda (November 14, 1961) could quote the Finnish comrades among the first of many references to foreign Communist endorsements of the CPSU "line." The leadership of the three Communist parties "in exile"— Spanish, Portuguese, and West German—gave full support to the CPSU's position. BELGIAN

COMMUNIST

PARTY

(PCB)

The Belgian Communist Party (PCB) found itself subjected to conflicting pressures. After refraining from joining in the attack on the Hoxha regime at the XXII CPSU Congress, the PCB's President, Ernest Burnelle, sent greetings to the APL on its twentieth anniversary—the only "Western" Communist leader to

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do this. While the dispatch of such a message suggested "breaking ranks," its contents clearly divorced the Belgian Party from the APL's position. The Belgian message did not refer to the APL as a "fraternal" party, nor did it acknowledge that the A P L had a "correct Marxist-Leninist leadership." It wished the Albanian comrades "greater" successes in building socialism in the future, and endorsed symbols which the APL had attacked—"struggle for world disarmament and peaceful coexistence and the lessons of the XX, XXI, and XXII CPSU congresses." (Radio Tirana, November 8, 1961.) The Belgian Party then began to move away from its position adopted at the XXII Congress. On November 11-12, the Central Committee of the PCB approved the criticism of the APL as part of the campaign against "dogmatist" and "adventurist" elements in the international Communist movement. An editorial in its daily organ, Le Drapeau Rouge (November 14), condemned the Albanian leadership (and was approvingly quoted by Pravda on November 17). 73.

J E A N B L U M E , M E M B E R OF THE POLITICAL B U R E A U OF THE

Article in Le Drapeau (Brussels), December 7, 1961. 1 8

B E L G I A N C O M M U N I S T PARTY.

Rouge

Jean Blume discussed the "political differences which set the majority of Communist parties against the Chinese Communist Party and the Albanian Party of Labor." The "great questions of the moment" were "criticism of the cult of personality, the possibility or impossibility of attaining peaceful coexistence, and the following of a bloodless path to the establishment of workers power in the countries under capitalist monopolist rule." Blume asked for "respect for fraternal equality among the parties and rejection of irrational methods of discussion," as well as for "not affixing labels hastily and at every turn—like 'dogmatic,' 'sectarian,' 'revisionist,' 'opportunist'—on other theses, parties, and men." . . OUR PERPLEXITY before the positions taken by our Chinese comrades is so much the greater as it is in exact proportion to the affection and respect we have for them. We do not understand the support they are giving the Albanian leaders, protagonists of methods of government and

" Le Drapeau Rouge is the daily organ of the PCB.

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party direction which the Communist movement has condemned. No more do we understand their considering the struggle for peace, for world disarmament, for peaceful coexistence, as a questionable hypothesis, instead of seeing it for what it is: a vital necessity, an essential basis for world progress, a battle to win. There, besides, resides the principal difficulty of the debate. Our Chinese comrades formulate criticisms and reservations on the new ideas which came out of the X X Congress of the CPSU; they do not oppose to these ideas another conception, clearly defined, of the present battle. That amazes us, as it comes from a party whose experience is so rich in all fields. How to eliminate the points of misunderstanding? First of all, by redoubling the efforts for the admission of the Chinese People's Republic to the UN, for her recognition by the Belgian government. Then, by finding a system of exchange of information more effective than the one now existing. The world is vast. We cannot pretend to a complete knowledge of Chinese and Far Eastern problems. In their turn, our Chinese comrades can very well have an imperfect view of the workers movement in the capitalist countries, underestimating their revolutionary resources. The reading of texts is insufficient in this area; direct contact would be preferable. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia: Here, the years have done their work. Certain dramatic aspects of the conflict have disappeared. On the other hand, becoming accustomed to a situation of divergence does not facilitate the incisive and lucid ideological debate everyone feels the need for. . . Our concern, in the event, is the same as everywhere else: to eliminate what divides, promote what can unite, clarify ideological problems, facilitate action. After all the foregoing, it would be paradoxical not to note the possibility and the utility of one or several international conferences of the Communist parties. We believe that should be done, with, of course, every desirable preparation and taking its inspiration from the experience

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of the seventeen-party meeting in Rome, whose working style and concrete, militant manner are among the best we have known. 74. JEAN TERFVE, MEMBER OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE BELGIAN COMMUNIST PARTY. "ON DIVERGENCES OF OUTLOOK AMONG COMMUNIST PARTIES." Le Drapeau

Rouge, January 5-17, 1962. The eight-part series by Jean Terfve, from which the following exccrpts are drawn, constituted a major contribution to the "open debate" decreed by the Central Committee of the PCB and reported in its resolution of January 7, 1962.

LENIN studied the uneven development of capitalist countries extremely carefully. From this study he drew the theory of the possibility of establishing socialism in a single country. The correct application of this theory gave birth to the Soviet Union as the first socialist country. The emergence of a socialist world system in the past fifteen years reveals another phenomenon: uneven development in the socialist countries. This uneven development is evident on several planes: political, economic, cultural, and so forth. It is a consequence of particular circumstances. In recent years different countries have come to socialism under very different circumstances. . . . In some countries—Albania, Vietnam, and even China—the numerical strength of the working class remains small in comparison with the total population. These variations in circumstances and evolution necessarily entail different heritages, different traditions, and varying levels of working-class consciousness. . . Thus, for instance, it is normal that the Chinese, Vietnamese, and Korean parties have very similar viewpoints on some issues, viewpoints that differ from those held by the parties of Central and Eastern Europe, or from those of the parties in capitalist countries. . . . The contradictions which have become apparent, far from being able to be settled easily, run the risk of developing into

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antagonistic positions. The development of antagonism within the Communist movement and among socialist countries constitutes a danger whose consequences are likely to be alarming for all of us. The different views held by the parties cease to be internal problems, confined only to the parties in question. To the extent that these views involve critical points related to the essence of policy and to the strategy, or even to the tactics, of the international Communist movement, they become the business of the whole movement. . . . If in the name of socialism people favor attitudes which remove the real content from the policy of peaceful coexistence, increase the risks of a world war, tear down the alliances which are indispensable for the safeguarding of peace, then it is no longer a problem interesting only China and the USSR, nor only the members of the international Communist movement. The fate of all of humanity may depend on the correct evaluation of the basic data involved in the problem of war and peace. And it is precisely on this point that there are differences. Furthermore, these differences set our Chinese comrades in opposition to our Soviet comrades and to the majority of the other Communist parties. For months patient efforts have been made within the Communist movement to overcome these differences, but they have not yet been eliminated. From now on this opposition goes beyond the framework of the movement. . . . The main concern of the Chinese seems to be to show not what is radically new in the world situation, but, on the contrary, what is constant in the positions taken by the imperialists. Two Chinese brochures distributed in our country—Long Live Leninism! and Two Tactics, One Goal—are particularly instructive from this point of view. They represent a collection of reports and articles by very responsible militants and journalists who undoubtedly reflect the orientation of the propaganda services of the Chinese Communist Party. These quotations do not contain erroneous views. But their impact and their intent are infinitely clearer when they are stated, as they should be, in a more general context. The view

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they express can be summarized as follows: "Yes, there are dangers; yes, there are possibilities for peaceful coexistence, BUT imperialism remains imperialism, with its essential nature and its fundamental characteristics, and whoever speaks of imperialism, speaks of the likelihood of war." We think that in terms of today's situation, of the essential obstacles which must be overcome to increase mass action, it would be more effective to say: "In view of the profound changes which have taken place, for the first time war has ceased to be inevitable, since mass action has become capable of preventing the start of a world war. However, this does not at all mean that the threat has been removed, that imperialism has changed its character, and that from now on war will be impossible. Everything depends on the action and the watchfulness of the masses." Contrary to what may appear to be the case, we are not confronted by a purely intellectual problem, but face a question of orientation, tendencies, and impulses leading to action. It is primarily a political problem. The constant appeal [by the Chinese Communists] to vigilance and perpetual watchful waiting leads at least to the blurring, if not erasing, of the significance of the new element which has emerged in the present situation. The tenuous basis of de facto peaceful coexistence would collapse if imperialism, even for a short time, found the means of becoming stronger. Therefore the socialist camp must wage a policy in two directions: (1) Toward the organization of peaceful coexistence, toward its establishment as a recognized and accepted system for states having different social systems; its main concrete form is the realization of general disarmament; (2) Toward maintaining superiority in basic armaments as long as the imperialist bloc does not yield to the need of organized peaceful coexistence. To achieve disarmament demands a tremendous effort and concentration of political action on the part of the socialist camp. Do our Chinese comrades commit themselves unreservedly in this direction? It is not certain. I find support for my doubt about this in the speech made by their delegate at the recent

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meeting of the World Peace Council in Stockholm. . . . He seems to consider the struggle for the national liberation of the colonial peoples as the decisive factor for peace, inasmuch as it is the essential factor in the weakening of world imperialism and, more particularly, that of American imperialism. The movement for national liberation of the colonial and dependent peoples is undoubtedly one of the most important events of recent years. . . . The Statement of the eighty-one parties to a very large extent reflects this situation. But we have to see where it stands in regard to the present and immediate problems of the struggle to obstruct those who would start a third world war. This threat is a real one right now. East-West opposition is a fact of our time. As the Moscow Statement of November, 1960, states: "The essential point is to subdue the aggressors in time, to avert war, to prevent it from breaking out." To start real negotiations about disarmament and to achieve the first stage—that is an objective suitable to the present state of affairs and the realization of which can prevent the outbreak of a third world war. Let us not make a mistake—war is a constant threat under the present circumstances. The outbreak of this third world war—with the fantastic destruction which it would bring—would significantly affect the liberation movement of the colonial and dependent peoples and would risk changing their basic situation. Deprived of the main sources of aid they need to meet the requirements of accelerated development and resistance to neocolonialist pressure, the underdeveloped countries would find themselves isolated. Their development would risk being delayed for a long time. The countries of the "Third World" understood this perfectly at the recent Belgrade Conference, when they concentrated their main attention on the German problem and on the need to lessen East-West tension, and when they recognized that the resumption of nuclear tests by the USSR was a helpful factor in the present political circumstances. At the present time, armed offensive struggle is imperative for 17

See Document 30 above.—Ed.

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countries such as Algeria and Angola, and countries such as Cuba must strengthen their defense against foreign intervention. However, the main issue for the majority of the countries of the Third World is to organize themselves socially and economically in order to give their populations a standard of living high enough to take care of their elementary needs. Unable to settle this problem by their own means, they have turned to the outside world to ask for help and assistance. Another need of equally great general importance is the strengthening of the countries of the socialist camp, that is, the development of their economic power and the resulting rise in the standard of living of their populations. The needs are not the same for all countries, as a result of the inequality of their development. The immediate needs of China and the USSR are not identical. The stage of industrialization achieved by the USSR poses different problems of investment from those in China, which is still in the stage of developing its heavy industry. The prolonged effort made by the USSR, the fact that in essence it has achieved socialism and that it has already started on the road toward communism, have created inevitable pressure on the part of its population to achieve a substantial rise in its standard of living soon. It is obvious that in the future socialism must provide the same rise in the standard of living in each of the countries of the socialist world, by organizing cooperation among the socialist countries on the basis of a comprehensive, scientifically directed plan. . . . It is practically impossible to achieve a complete community and equalize the standards of living of each of the countries now. Furthermore, it would risk dangerously weakening the socialist world and might in addition cause serious tensions within it. It appears that our Chinese comrades do not approach this difficult problem with a complete understanding of the realities. The backwardness in which they have been confined for centuries, the vastness of their country, the density and rate of increase of their population, on the one hand, and the rapid political changes which have come about, plus the aspirations

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which the achievement of socialism has aroused among the masses, on the other, have increased their desire to speed up the rate of development and to shorten or even to do away with some phases of development altogether. All this has played a very important role in the road traversed by the People's Republic of China over the past ten years. It underlies certain changes which appear almost as miracles. But not everything is possible. Although objective laws of development of societies can be influenced by men's deliberate action, they cannot be abolished or even suddenly radically changed. Equalization of the standard of living of the socialist countries by the immediate joint utilization of each one's resources may appear to be the means for solving the difficulties, and may figure in instinctive popular demand. But such a solution would not be based on reality, and its achievement, far from strengthening the socialist world, would risk weakening it at a time when the growth of its power is a decisive factor in the struggle against the threat of a third world war. . . . It may be tempting to establish as a primary political obligation the fulfillment of the aspirations of the underdeveloped countries to come out from under their crushing difficulties and the guarantee of their real and total independence. It may be equally tempting to try to regulate and to take the lead of this movement. However, this would mean an erroneous evaluation of the real state of affairs. . . . The probable, let us even say almost certain, consequences of a thermonuclear war force us to examine it from a different angle than that applied to previous wars. The essentially peaceful positions of the socialist countries and of the international workers movement gain a much greater importance. War can no longer be viewed only as a sign of the disordered state of capitalism, but as an undisguised waste of energy, as a source of destruction and misfortune, whose whole burden falls on the working masses. It appears as an intolerable calamity, as an event capable of destroying an important part of humanity, if not all of humanity, of drying up the source

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of progress, of making men take a tremendous leap backwards, of making the very conditions required for the establishment of a socialist society disappear. . . . Are our Chinese comrades completely aware of the full extent of the changes that have taken place and, more important, have they drawn all the proper conclusions? Some of their writings arouse our doubts. In their publication, Two Tactics, One Goal, they called the struggle for peace an "important task," but said nothing further. On page 43, in dealing with the question of the eventual outbreak of a new war, they referred to an answer by Mao Tse-tung: "But if the imperialists stubbornly insist on starting a new war, we must not be afraid. Our attitude towards this question is the same as that to all 'disorders': primo, we are against it, secundo, we are not afraid. The First World War was followed by the birth of the Soviet Union, with a population of 200 million people. The Second World War was followed by the establishment of the socialist camp, which includes a population of 900 million people. It is certain that if the imperialists start a third world war, hundreds of millions of people will go over to socialism and a very small territory will remain in the hands of the imperialists; the complete breakdown of the whole imperialist system is also possible." This same idea is taken up again in the publication Long Live Leninism!, pages 23-24: "If the American or other imperialists some day dare to defy the will of all mankind by starting a war waged with atomic and nuclear weapons, the result could only be the very rapid destruction of these monsters themselves, who will be surrounded by the peoples of the whole world, and the result will certainly not be the annihilation of mankind. . . . "But if the imperialists obstinately insist on imposing these sacrifices on the peoples of the different countries, we are convinced that, just as the experience of the Russian Revolution and the Chinese Revolution has demonstrated, these sacrifices will have their compensation. The victorious peoples will, on top of the ruins of dead imperialism, establish very rapidly a civiliza-

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tion a thousand times superior to the capitalist system and, for themselves, a truly radiant future." The authors of these lines obviously underestimate the dangers which a thermonuclear war would present for all of humanity, including the socialist world. Perhaps the geographic location of China and the very limited number of its vital industrial centers give it the illusion that if a third world war were to occur, it would not be a target and would be relatively spared atomic bombing. This is possible. But this reasoning cannot be generalized. The people of the Soviet Union, or those of the majority of Western European countries, and of the United States cannot reason thus, because they are absolutely sure that they will suffer from the mass destructive effects of the new weapons. Consequently, they are less disposed to accept the tremendous risks of a war easily. Furthermore, the reminder that both world wars have been followed by victory for socialism and the prediction that a third world war could easily result in the general world-wide triumph of socialism dangerously echoes certainly widely held imperialist theses which portray misery and war as causes of socialism. There is no doubt that the birth of the USSR in 1917 and the growth of the socialist world immediately after 1945 were consequences of the two world wars. The rise of socialism resulted from the rational use that the popular masses of some countries made of the conditions generated by an imperialist war which they did not want and for which they were not responsible. But socialism is not bought at the price of a war. Even less so at the present time, with the risks what they are. A thesis based on the idea that the establishment of socialism on a world scale demands the acceptance of a thermonuclear war cannot be proposed to the masses. They would reject it. In the present circumstances the further extension of socialism within a relatively short time has become a certainty. The Communists' effort must be concentrated on eliminating a world war whose eventuality is desired only by the imperialists, who aim precisely at preventing or delaying socialism's success. That is one of the reasons why the struggle to prevent the start

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of a thermonuclear war is one of the strategic objectives of the international Communist movement. Our Chinese comrades do not appear to accept the strategic nature of this objective; they seem to reduce it to simple tactics. . . . This concept seems to be based on the idea that the imperialists ultimately constitute a homogeneous whole whose final aim is to provoke the outbreak of a third world war. Their acceptance of the hypothesis of peaceful coexistence appears to our friends as a pure tactical maneuver to gain time, to hoodwink their adversary, and to prepare the conditions for achieving superiority more easily. The natural consequence of this is that our basic task must be to denounce the maneuvers of false pacifism indefatigably and clearly and to prepare to reply victoriously to an armed attack. Our friends have placed the tactics of the socialist world in opposition to the imperialist tactics. The achievement of peaceful coexistence ceases to be a basic objective and becomes merely a temporary method of struggle, a valid but temporary means for achieving a set aim. This idea seems erroneous to us. It runs the risk of compromising the widespread system of alliances on which, in the short run, the efficacy of the struggle against war rests. . . . If peaceful coexistence seems to them a purely tactical hypothesis, a temporary expedient to be abandoned en route, they will hesitate to become involved in the struggle, they will remain passive, and they will refuse to recognize and to accept the leading role of the Communist parties. The question is even more delicate with respect to the countries of the Third World. We have already shown that a large number of them have not yet made the political choice between imperialism and socialism. . . . Our Chinese friends seem to neglect the internal contradictions of the leaders of the imperialist camp. They see these leaders as forming a united bloc with a common policy whose ultimate end is the necessary recourse to war. They seem to forget that within the imperialist camp itself there

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are elements which are conscious of the changes which have come about. Apparently some imperialist leaders are aware that changes in the nature of weapons and the dangers resulting from the use of thermonuclear weapons have begun to make world war obsolete as a method of annihilating the adversary and assuring supremacy and that the anticipated results of war are likely to be reversed and to cause self-destruction. They are also aware that the balance of power is not in their favor, that they do not have strategic superiority, or superiority in armaments, that they cannot legitimately hope to rectify this situation, and that even the simple development of events constantly goes against them. . . . We think that, despite certain contemptuous evaluations by the Chinese of the imperialists, whom they refer to as "paper tigers," our Chinese comrades have, nevertheless, overestimated imperialist power and, more important, have not correctly evaluated the decrease in their opportunities. . . It is understandable that they are particularly sensitive to the misdeeds of American imperialism and to its persistently aggressive policy. . . . The Chinese positions are useful to the extent to which they draw attention to persistent imperialist aims and to the extent to which they maintain a watchfulness which it would be dangerous to relax even momentarily. They cease to be useful if they block the perspective, if they upset the proper order of the tasks to be carried out, if they compromise the maximum growth of alliances, and if they create difficulties for the unity of action of all forces capable of acting for peaceful coexistence and against the outbreak of a thermonuclear war. Let us have confidence. The different viewpoints are not so great that they must necessarily change into opposition and that they cannot be overcome by an honest confrontation of the positions and patient search for a synthesis. We Belgian Communists have a duty to participate in this effort, even if our own contribution is necessarily small.

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The "open debate" on the pages of Drapeau Rouge produced vigorous and conflicting contributions. Following Terfve's series and another by the Party's Chairman, Ernest Burnelle (January 19-29, 1962), most writers proved to be in sympathy with the "official" position. On the other hand, Jacques Grippa, a member of the PCB Central Committee, revealed himself as a proponent of the "Chinese" line. His lengthy article, entitled "For MarxistLeninist Unity of the Party and of the International Communist Movement," appeared on February 22, 1962, along with a detailed reply by the PCB Politburo, which in effect terminated the "open debate." Grippa's paper covered a wide range of issues. He assailed "the rule-of-thumb boys, the empiricists, who have for so many years slighted and underestimated the ideological struggle." He denounced the efforts of some Communists to depict dogmatism and sectarianism, rather than revisionism, as the principal danger to Communst action. Calling the Soviet handling of the Albanian issue a "regrettable error," he in turn deplored the blunting of anti-Titoist themes in the CPSU-oriented parties. Grippa vigorously defended Mao's China, rejecting Jean Terfve's charge of the predominantly "military" development with respect to the "socialist camp." Accusing the majority of the PCB leadership of "abandoning Marxist-Leninist criteria" and of opportunism with regard to domestic Belgian politics, the Congo, and foreign policy, Grippa reaffirmed: "The strategic goal of the international Communist movement in our time, the time of the general collapse of capitalism, is and will continue to be the victory of the socialist revolution on a world scale. . . . In this sense, our struggle for peaceful coexistence between states with opposite social systems is a tactical goal." He proceeded to attack those who transferred the concept of peaceful coexistence from the international scene "onto the plane of the clash between antagonistic classes within a capitalist country. Negotiation is in fact contrary to the struggle of the working class. . . ." Likewise, diplomatic negotiations "are after all merely the reflection of a balance of power." As for the chances of war, Grippa concluded that since 1955, "despite the fact that the power balance has continued to shift in favor of the socialist countries and of the forces for world peace, the danger of war has increased." Moreover, "imperialism does not act solely as a function of absolutely rational and conscious thought. . . . It is an inborn strain of capitalism, of imperialism, to overestimate its own power and to underestimate the revolutionary power, the power of socialism." He concluded with a call for "Marxist-Leninist unity."

The Communist 7 5 . STATEMENT

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BY THE

POLITICAL

BUREAU

MUNIST PARTY OF BELGIUM. Le Drapeau

OF

Rouge,

THE

COM-

February

22, 1962.

. . . THE VIEWS currently espoused by the Communist Party of China, and which constitute the basic framework of Comrade Grippa's article, are not new. They were expressed and defended during preliminary meetings and at the plenary sessions of the [1960] Conference of the eighty-one. They did not carry the day. . . . But, since we have positions here that have been raised and commented upon within our party, as well as throughout the international Communist movement, we have no objection to a confrontation of ideas. We want the Party as a whole to be able to judge for itself as to the value of the views before us; but we do so as leaders with an awareness of our responsibilities, taking an unequivocal position in favor of the line which we, together with an overwhelming majority of the representatives of the world Communist movement, consider correct and most appropriate to the present needs of the workers in our country. . . . Strategy and Tactics. Is the struggle in defense of peace and for the establishment of peaceful coexistence a strategic or a tactical objective for the international Communist movement? This point marks one of the fundamental differences at present between the Communist Party of China and most of the other Communist parties. The view that peaceful coexistence is a tactical objective is held by our Chinese comrades, and has been taken up and developed here by Comrade Jacques Grippa. We believe that it is both incorrect and dangerous. First of all, it is not correct to hold up the achievement of socialism on a world scale as the strategic aim of all Communists, as Comrade Grippa has done. The establishment of socialism everywhere is something quite different from a strategic objective.

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It is a fundamental datum, an objective law of the very development of society. It is not the Communists who decide, in a political line they have worked out, that a socialist regime must replace capitalism. This inevitable transformation is the expression of life itself, and the consequence of the evolution of human society in its march toward progress and happiness. The role of the international Communist movement, its reason for existence, is to provide an orderly form for the achievement of socialism, to bring it closer, to shorten the phases that lead to it, to make use of theoretical lessons and experience to avoid blind groping and pitfalls, and, in a word, to make the transition to socialism an organized operation in which the deliberate actions of men will play a determining role. In its concern to order that action correctly, it relies upon an ideology, Marxism-Leninism, which is the expression of a systematic and scientific study of the objective laws governing the evolution of society, and particularly those of the class struggle. It is also concerned with keeping constantly informed of the disposition of the class forces at any given moment and within each individual situation. It is within this framework that the concepts of strategy and tactics have their place. Strategy is the determination of the general line of action for a given historical period. It establishes the essential objective or objectives for that period, and lays down the general plans for achieving them. Strategy changes at the moment of transition from one historical phase to another. During any given phase, it remains essentially unchanged. Tactics are a part of strategy, subordinate to it and designed to serve it. Tactics are more limited in scope. They determine the line of action for shorter phases, and for the achievement of partial objectives.

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They are essentially variable. They are constantly being adapted to suit the practical situation. . . . Under the conditions which have developed since the end of the war and which characterize the present period, the essential element is the risk of an atomic war of extermination. . . . In this situation, the strategic aim of the international Communist movement is to keep the peace, and to prevent the outbreak of an atomic world war. The means of achieving this strategic goal is the organization of peaceful coexistence. In this framework there are tactical measures designed to create optimum conditions for organizing peaceful coexistence. These measures are variable. They may differ from party to party as a function of the regimes under which they live and act, or as a function of particular power relationships. They may be modified because of the development and various aspects of action. We feel that when our Chinese comrades, and Comrade Grippa with them, place the organization of peaceful coexistence on the level of tactical goals, they are guilty of more than a simple error of classification. They place it in this category because it does not look to them like a sound means for achieving the strategic aim, but more like a temporary means, a useful one, no doubt, but one of doubtful efficacy and ill-suited to the magnitude of the risk of war. . . . The Characteristics of a Thermonuclear War. We have calculated that a thermonuclear war would show a qualitative difference from previous world wars, because of the risks it involves for all the belligerents and because of the frightening extent of foreseeable destruction. This statement particularly seems to have shocked Comrade Jacques Grippa, since he delivers himself of some fairly chaotic polemics on the subject. Nevertheless, we still believe we are right. The use of weapons of mass destruction in case of war would inevitably, in a very short space of time, bring about the total

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annihilation of vital economic centers and the total depopulation of whole regions. . . . War by itself has no value to anybody, not even to the imperialists. They look upon it as a means, we might even say as a last resort, for getting out of conflicts that seem impossible to resolve by other methods, for making sure of victory, for establishing hegemony. Before they resort to it, they weigh the advantages it has to offer and the chances of its success; then they start it when it appears to them that it will be effective. The risks the imperialists themselves would run if they started a thermonuclear war under the present conditions of the balance of power lead us to believe that they have ceased to look upon "war as a suitable means for trying to settle the problems that face them. . . . We must not be afraid of the imperialists, say the Chinese comrades, and Comrade Grippa with them; we must not allow them to use our fear of a thermonuclear war against us, to browbeat us into unacceptable compromises. True enough. And the answer to this concern is the unending effort which the socialist world devotes to its defense, and the firmness it shows in the negotiations over all issues connected with disarmament. . . . It is likely that imperialism will emerge from a third world war completely crushed, if that war becomes a thermonuclear conflict. But, as Comrade Maurice Thorez so clearly put it, one still wonders how life could blossom anew on emerging from the atomic hell, and just how we could sell socialism as the reward for the sacrifices the people would have to make in an atomic war. Alliances. The very nature of the object we are pursuing— prevention of thermonuclear war and the organization of peaceful coexistence—implies an extremely broad system of alliances. It implies a modification of the balance of power on a world scale and endowing the forces of peace with a weight such that

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they will become the permanently decisive element in the development of international politics. Therefore, one of the principal tasks confronting us is that of fostering alliances and of broadening them in all necessary directions. In his article, Comrade Jacques Grippa indicates that he agrees on the need for very broad alliances. He also admits the existence, in the advanced countries, of certain groups that have gained an awareness of the need for peaceful coexistence. On the other hand, he seems to lump together all the imperialist leaders, particularly those of the United States. He seems to consider them as irrevocably committed to a policy of aggression. . . . To make Kennedy out as a champion of peaceful coexistence is simply stupid. On the other hand, to state that he is necessarily trapped in the gears of a policy of aggression is a mistaken and shortsighted view. . . Apropos of the Statement of the Eighty-one Parties. Unquestionably it was the Communist Party of China that most enthusiastically and steadfastly defended most of the ideas that did not square with those adopted by the majority. The Albanian Party of Labor distinguished itself chiefly by repeatedly urging these divergent ideas to the point of verbal outrage. Let it be said in the interest of truth that the Chinese Party never once disavowed such verbal excesses, even when they became most insulting. Having said that, let us recapitulate the major ideas set forth by the Communist Party of China at the Conference of the eighty-one. First thesis: We must stop referring to the X X Congress of the CPSU as if its teachings were valid for the entire world Communist movement. As the Chinese delegation sees it, ever since the X X Congress of the CPSU, that Party has led the majority of the Communist parties along the road of surrender to the imperialists. The Albanian Party of Labor believed it was clarifying this reasoning when it accused the CPSU of revisionism.

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Here we have our finger on the key difference: there is a blanket denial of the validity and the usefulness of the criticism of the cult of personality; there is anger at the idea that it is possible and useful to prevent the start of a third world war; there is doubt as to the political advantage to be gained by giving greater weight to the existence of different paths to socialism; and there is scorn for the "utopian" belief in the theory of bloodless ways for the working class to come to power in some countries and under some conditions. Furthermore, the necessary unity of the workers movement against the dictatorship of the capitalist monopolies and of the forces of war is reduced to a matter of secondary importance, yielding its place to the verbal denunciation of the Social Democratic leaders and their mistakes. Second thesis: The struggle for peaceful coexistence can be considered only as a tactical maneuver, a means of moral disarmament of the peoples of the capitalist countries and of material disarmament of those same countries. World disarmament and true peaceful coexistence will be possible only when there are only socialist countries left in the world. The gravity of such a thesis is immediately apparent. First of all, it goes back to the old view that a third world war is inevitable and that our first duty is to get ready to win it, no matter what the cost in human lives and destruction. Several theories logically follow from this. One is that of the necessarily harmless and safe nature of "local wars," insofar as world peace is concerned. Another is the foolishness of the efforts made by many Communist parties in capitalist countries to work out plans of action the object of which is to develop democracy, to limit the power of the monopolies, and profoundly to change the policies of their respective countries. And yet another puts the revisionist stamp on the [1959] Rome Conference of the seventeen Communist parties from capitalist countries. . . . Third thesis: In the world Communist movement, a minority is not bound to adopt the general political line adopted by the majority. It has the right to devote its full attention to continuing partisan activity, without any limitations.

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In this connection, one can well imagine that the debate became a bit heated. The more so since at the Moscow Conference the Chinese and Albanian delegations rose up against the principles of fraternal equality among the parties and went all-out for the erroneous conception of the "leading party," which, until the "new order," had been the CPSU. Yes, we mean what we said: until the new order. And actually, once one perceives that the "leading party" can be ideologically and politically wrong, one begins to wonder about its possible replacement, and consequently about another candidate for the position. In his speech at the Moscow Conference, Comrade Ernest Burnelle stressed the dangers to which this sort of thinking exposed the unity of the world Communist movement. We shall not dally over the other theses upheld by the Chinese and Albanian delegations. For example: humanism is a bourgeois concept—which amounts to giving the bourgeoisie a present which it has in no way deserved. Or again: it is "kowtowing to imperialism" to show good manners in addressing statesmen of capitalist countries. There is no point in dwelling at length on the naïveté of such statements. What is obvious is that the Statement of the Eighty-one Communist and Workers Parties could not, under such conditions, be a perfectly homogeneous document. It contains certain highly original and very important elements of analysis: for example, the third phase of the general crisis of capitalism, occurring in the absence of a world war. On the other hand, it is peppered with what we call "restrictive clauses." These are the clauses that make it possible for the Chinese and Albanian Parties to quote from the Statement of the eighty-one, even though they were opposed to its general orientation. These are the clauses that allow Jacques Grippa to maintain that he is defending the Statement, whereas his entire dissertation on peaceful coexistence is diametrically opposed to the fundamental ideas embodied in that document. . Shall We Go Back? . . . In a world that is changing at a dizzy pace it is normal and indispensable for Marxist-Leninist ideology to enrich itself with new ideas.

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Our congresses and our Central Committee hailed the X X [ C P S U ] Congress and the great rejuvenating ideas it brought with it. Our party has m o u n t e d a sustained ideological effort to elicit n e w and stimulating ideas. T h e entire international C o m m u n i s t m o v e m e n t is m o v i n g toward n e w things in the field of ideology and of practical action. It is around these great new ideas that the unity of the world C o m m u n i s t m o v e m e n t will be built. . . .18

AUSTRIAN

COMMUNIST

PARTY

(KPO)

T h e Communist Party of Austria ( K P O ) faced greater dissension in its midst than its initial pronouncements indicated. On November 15-16, 1961, its Central Committee witnessed "a lively discussion on a high level," in which twenty-five members spoke out. Sidestepping some of the issues in dispute, the resolution adopted condemned the leadership of the A P L for using "methods of coercion," for "dogmatically" ignoring the "changed world situation," and for "stubbornly refusing" to discuss the points of conflict.^ (Volksstimme, November 17, 1961.) Considerable differences remained in the K P O on the question of Stalin and on the inevitability of war. In an interview with the nonCommunist Wochenpresse (December 2, 1961), the Party's veteran chairman, Johann Koplenig, admitted: "It is true that at the moment there is n o absolutely identical appraisal of the person of Stalin by the members of the Austrian Communist Party; in this respect there may be differences of opinion, but at this time this is only natural. It is in general a widespread mistake to believe that among us Communists there exists immediate and complete agreement on all questions at all times." For the following crisis in the PCB and Grippa's ouster from Central Committee, see below, p. 827. " Pravda on November 23 paraphrased the Austrian resolution made no mention of a paragraph which called on both the CPSU the Chinese Communist Party to "overcome" the disagreements on basis of their joint commitment to the 1960 Statement.

the but and the

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7 6 . FRANZ M U H R I , D E L E G A T E TO THE X X I I C P S U

527 CONGRESS

FROM THE AUSTRIAN C O M M U N I S T PARTY. R E P O R T TO THE CENTRAL

COMMITTEE

OF

(Vienna), December 28-29,

THE

KPO.

Volksstimme

1961.20

. . . OVERCOMING the effects of the Stalin personality cult was a difficult and painful process in our party, too, particularly among older comrades. Very many good, active comrades have endeavored to minimize Stalin's mistakes and to excuse them because of his great merits and accomplishments and because of the objective difficulties in the construction of socialism in the Soviet Union. Doubts concerning the possibility of preventing a new world war and the possibility of a peaceful road to socialism were also expressed in the discussion. From this it is evident that complete clarity and determination do not yet exist in our party on these basic questions that constitute the main content of our activity and represent the entire perspective of our struggle. . . . Questions on Albania were raised again and again in [our] discussion of the XXII Party Congress. We condemn definitely the attitude of the Albanian Party leaders, who have set off on a road of provocation. The Albanian Party leadership has pursued a policy of adventurism which stands in sharp contrast to the interests of socialism, democracy, and peace. In the discussion of the X X I I CPSU Congress very many anxious questions were also rightly raised about the attitude of our fraternal Chinese Party. On the occasion of the seventeenth anniversary of the liberation of Albania, at the end of November, the Chinese comrades sent congratulations to Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu in which, contrary to political facts, it stated the Albanian Party of Labor was "true to Marxism-Leninism and stood on the basis of the Moscow declarations of the Communist and workers parties." The Peking People's Daily wrote in an article (published in part in Volksstimme—as was conw

Volksstimme

is the daily organ of the KPO.

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firmed by the Editorial Board itself—under the politically false, misleading tide "Defeat for Stevenson") that after an atomic war provoked by the imperialists, which can end only in the destruction of imperialism, the victorious peoples would build a fine future on the ruins of imperialism. It is right that imperialists would perish in a new world war, but today, on the basis of changes in the world balance of power, a real possibility exists for building a fine socialist future under conditions leading to the prevention of a new world war. T h e r e fore we attach the most importance to just this task, this goal, in accordancc with the Moscow Declaration of the Eighty-one Communist and Workers Parties and the decisions of our own Eighteenth Party Congress. At the same time we turn decidedly, as before, against the revisionist course of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, which, among other things, is based on a completely false notion of the policy of peaceful coexistence, sacrifices the class standpoint, and hushes up the chief contradiction in the world, the contradiction between capitalism and socialism. In the discussion of our fraternal Italian Party, the term "polycentrism" was used repeatedly. By this one can understand several centers in the world Communist movement. We are of the opinion that the CPSU is acknowledged by all as the vanguard of the world Communist movement and that neither one nor several centers are necessary. A policy of polycentralization would stand in contradiction both to the principle of full autonomy for each individual party and also to the principle of unity of the world Communist movement. Our fraternal Italian Party later changed its attitude and declared itself, too, against any directing centers in the world Communist movement. The personality cult of Stalin led to a certain extent, even in our party, to the uncritical adoption of various false concepts and theses, as well as to the inadequate observation of the norms of party life. On the other hand, it led to our seeing only the results in the development of the Soviet Union, without our seeing the difficulties against which they had to be and

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still must be attained. In 1956-57, revisionists made the correction of these mistakes in our party difficult. Our party quite properly and very decisively cut itself off from these revisionists who came forward with the slogans of putting ourselves at a distance from the Soviet Union and struggling against the "dogmatic leadership" of our party. . . .

77. RESOLUTION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF AUSTRIA. Volksstimme, February 20,

1962. Since the discussion of the disputed issues had not yet been completed, the Party postponed taking an official stand and instructed its Political Bureau to prepare a draft resolution for the next Central Committee session. The Central Committee met again on February 8-9, 1962, and adopted the following resolution. .

.

.

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE c o n s i d e r s t h e struggle f o r

peace and for peaceful coexistence the most important task of all Communist parties, this struggle being carried out with the conviction that under present-day conditions war is not predestined and inevitable. Proceeding from the postulate that the safeguarding of peace and the struggle for general disarmament are the central problems of our age, the Central Committee condemns the attitude of the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor, who in these decisive questions have turned against the Statement issued by the Conference of Eighty-one Communist and Workers Parties, have stabbed in the back the peace struggle of the Soviet Union and of the peoples, and who have thus inflicted great harm on the international workers movement. The Central Committee of the Austrian Communist Party welcomes the decisions of the Stockholm meeting of the World Peace Council and declares that the Party will support the decisions of this meeting with all its might. The present situation requires the maximum intensification of the struggle for general disarmament in order to banish the danger of an atomic war. For this reason the Austrian Commu-

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nist Party cannot agree with the views presented at the Stockholm meeting by the Chinese delegation on the disarmament question. These views would result in weakening the activity of peace forces on behalf of general disarmament, in narrowing the front of the peace forces, and in rendering more difficult the enforcement of the policy of peaceful coexistence. The Central Committee is of the opinion that discussions aimed at clarifying differences of opinion on questions stemming from the heterogeneous conditions and problems in individual countries can certainly play a positive role as long as these discussions remain within the framework of the principles and findings worked out jointly by all parties at the Moscow Conference of November, 1960. The Communist party of each country determines its own policy, but all parties jointly bear the responsibility for safeguarding and strengthening the unity of the Communist world movement, for implementing the decisions adopted by all parties. This requires a further improvement of contacts, the exchange of information, and discussions among the parties on questions and problems which might come up at any particular time. . . . The implementation of the new CPSU Program will exert a pronounced influence on developments throughout the world, not only because the balance of power between the socialist and capitalist camps will shift year after year in favor of socialism, but also because the working people in capitalist countries will step by step draw the appropriate lessons from the living example of the development of the Soviet Union. . . .

SWISS

COMMUNIST

PARTY

The Swiss Communist Party (Partei der Arbeit) failed to endorse the Soviet policy at the C P S U Congress or thereafter. Its Central Committee, after discussing the Congress, adopted a resolution voicing support of the C P S U Program and Moscow's "peace" policy but failing to condemn either the A P L leadership or the "personality cult." ( R a d i o M o s c o w , November 21, 1961.) The Party, split into rival wings for a number of years, was evidently unable to reach

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an effective consensus. While its Geneva organ, La Voix Ouvrière, endorsed the PCI position (November 18 and 22, 1961), the Party's Secretary-General, Edgar Woog, appeared reluctant to follow in Moscow's footsteps. His attitude is reflected in the report he delivered to the Zurich organization of the Party (as paraphrased bv its German-language organ, the Basel Vorwärts, January 12, 1962): ". . . [Stalin's] ideological war against the earlier opposition of Trotskyites and Bukharinites was surely not unjustified. It was Stalin's merit that he isolated the skeptics and pessimists and dogmatists in the Party—those who did not believe that one could build socialism in a single country. On the other hand, events proved that Lenin was right when he sent the Central Committee his letter warning against Stalin's character weaknesses. In the war against sabotage and espionage, which grew ever stronger amid fascist war preparations, Stalin let the police become too powerful and let an atmosphere of mutual distrust develop which led to the abuses and crimes that were revealed at the XX Congress and subsequently as the files were opened. Nevertheless, the Party was strong enough to overcome all this and to stride forward. 'How had it been possible?' asked Comrade Woog. He pointed to the example of Comrade Rakosi, who was an outstanding revolutionary and had survived all the tortures of fascist prisons, yet was too weak to wield power collectively and democratically by Leninist principles. The same is unfortunately true today of the leaders of the Albanian Party. That is why their policy was condemned by the [CPSU] Congress. The constant clandestineness of the Albanian Party before it came to power strengthened this attitude. Likewise, the decades of civil war during which the Chinese Revolution took place conditioned the attitude shown by the Chinese and the Albanians in these matters. . .

SCANDINAVIAN

COMMUNIST

PARTIES

At the XXII CPSU Congress, the Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish Communist parties had failed to join in the condemnation of the APL. These parties had difficulty in clarifying their subsequent position. The Danish Communist Party had a hard core of pro-Soviet veterans; the dominant "Titoist" elements had been purged in 1958 and the "little Molotovs" (as a critic had labeled them) had been pushed into the background. On November 13, the Danish Party's paper, Land og Folk, condemned Hoxha for open violation of the 1960 Moscow Statement.

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The Central Committee debate and resolution were based on a report by Preben Henriksen, chairman of the Copenhagen Communist Party organization.

7 8 . PREBEN HENRIKSEN. REPORT TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE DANISH COMMUNIST PARTY. Land og Folk

(Copenhagen), December 20, 1961. 21 .

.

.

FOR SOME TIME n o w relations b e t w e e n t h e

Soviet

Union and China have been much discussed. The matter was further sharpened when the Chinese delegation turned out to be the only one opposed to bringing relations with Albania out into the open. It wanted to have the problem discussed "behind closed doors" despite the fact that this had already been tried. Furthermore, as I said earlier, this is a problem that concerns all who signed the [I960] Statement. The Soviet Union and China also have a difference of opinion regarding the value of people's communes. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union emphasized that it did not wish to debate the matter at a time when it is about to increase its agricultural production threefold and said that it could not understand why the Chinese did not want to learn a lesson from the Soviet Union's own experiments with people's communes in the twenties. A three-year drought and the resulting poor harvest in China make it difficult to evaluate the worth of the people's communes. As far as I am concerned, only history will tell. Only time will tell whether it is possible to bring the individual feudal peasant into large people's communes with a positive result from the point of view of education as well as of production. Another problem, which in my opinion is more important, is the attitude toward peace. There is no doubt that China accepts peaceful coexistence and has established agreements with countries that have a different social system. In my opinion the question boils down to a difference of views between China and the Soviet Union as to the chances of avoiding a new world " Land og Folk is the daily organ of the Danish Communist Party.

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war. In all fairness, one has to admit that the Chinese have some basis for their attitude. They are excluded from many international organizations, such as the UN, as a result of which they stand somewhat isolated with respect to international cooperation. There is Formosa and its provocations, and the threat of American warships in China's waters, and the grave obstacles facing its foreign trade. All of this is bound to influence Chinese opinion regarding the chances of maintaining peace. This is indeed an important question, because it forms the basis for the belief in victory over the capitalist world through peaceful competition. I believe that these problems will be solved in a peaceful manner and in a fraternal atmosphere, because both countries base themselves on Marxism-Leninism, as a result of which there does not exist a cause for war in either country. What is of greatest importance in this connection is that we must uphold the dedicated view of many of our party comrades who ask: "If the socialist countries and the Communist parties cannot agree, then who in the world can?" The Communist parties are all built on the same foundation, Marxism-Leninism; but we encounter various difficulties because our approach and our circumstances differ. As a result, now as well as in the future, differences of opinion between our parties will arise; but the important thing is that these differences are not insurmountable and that they can and shall be overcome. . . . The Central Committee resolution approved Henriksen's report, endorsed the policies set at the XX and XXII CPSU congresses, and in moderate tones supported the Soviet position with regard to both the "personality cult" and the Albanian leadership, but failed fully to endorse the CPSU Program. (Land og Folk, December 18 and 30, 1961.) The Chairman of the Norwegian Communist Party, Emil L0vlien, endorsed the CPSU's position with considerable reserve. His statement at the XXII CPSU Congress was vague; two months later Pravda was finally able to refer to his criticism of the APL leadership's "narrow nationalism." (Pravda, December 20, 1961.) Still later, a systematic article in the Party's newspaper supported the

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policies initiated at the X X CPSU Congress and the new CPSU Program. It stated: "These [Soviet] experiences carry a message to all Communists, to the workers of all countries," but remained silent on the APL, the Chinese position, and the organization of the international Communist movement (Henry Hoff in Friheten [Oslo], January 2 5 - 2 6 , 1962). This reticence continued throughout 1962. In fact, the Norwegian Communist leadership appears to have been among the elements in the international movement which publicly called on Peking and Moscow to come to terms. Friheten s appeal (December 20, 1 9 6 2 ) , promptly reprinted by Jen-min jih-pao (December 24, 1 9 6 2 ) , indicated a failure to accept the positions of either protagonist, warned against the "loss and damage to other Communist parties" as a result of the Sino-Soviet dispute, and called for unpublicized, honest exchanges of opinion rather than an extension of political differences to inter-state tensions. The internal conflicts within the Swedish Communist Party were more apparent than in the other Scandinavian parties. The Party's Chairman, Hilding Hagberg, had praised Khrushchev and strongly condemned the "personality cult," but had remained silent on the APL at the X X I I CPSU Congress. Subsequent letters to the editor of the Party's daily, Ny Dag, revealed that some party officials had complained of the "pro-Chinese" coverage of the X X I I Congress; for example, Chou En-lai's speech had been published verbatim, while Khrushchev's reference to the APL in his October 27 speech had been omitted. The party Chairman replied in a series of articles mildly criticizing the A P L and CPC, and expressing his support of the Khrushchev leadership (November 2 3 - 2 7 , 1 9 6 1 ) . While Ny Dag denied a rift in the Party, it confirmed that several Communist officials demanded a review of past policies in the light of revelations about the Stalin era and protested against "an attempt on the part of certain Communists to hush us up." Sven Landin, a spokesman for the opposition, invoked Khrushchev's authority in arguing for a franker discussion: "In our party, which for nearly a quarter of a century uncritically accepted, 'explained,' and defended all the manifestations of Stalinism, it is still regarded as quite improper to raise the question whether there might possibly be a connection here with the [difficult] position in which our party found itself for long periods of time" (Ny Dag [Stockholm], December 14, 1 9 6 1 ) . After vigorous arguments, the Central Committee worked out a compromise formulation. On February 24, 1962, it issued a brief statement which ( 1 ) affirmed its belief in coexistence and the desirability of disarmament; ( 2 ) found the Hoxha regime's policy to be "harmful" to the Albanian people; ( 3 ) called for an

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end to all manifestations of the personality cult; and ( 4 ) recognized the new C P S U Program as an "inspiration" to all Communists and progressive people. In early 1962, Hagberg was one of five Communist leaders who offered their services to mediate the differences between the C P S U , the CPC, and the A P L . The division within the Icelandic United Socialist Party into orthodox Communist and "revisionist" elements prevented a clear stand on the problems debated in the international movement. A showdown came only at the X I I I Congress of the Party, in November, 1962, which saw a victory of the "national" right wing—along with some Titoists and Left Socialists—and the ouster of the remaining "Stalinists" from the Central Committee.

GREEK

AND CYPRIOT

COMMUNIST

PARTIES

The Greek Communist ( K K E ) leadership rallied solidly behind Khrushchev's policy. In exile, it was dependent on Soviet good will. In the course of the Soviet-Albanian dispute, Hoxha charged that Khrushchev had raised the hopes of Greek expansionists to detach southern Albania—the long-contested "northern Epirus." T h e Greek Communists revealed that they had walked out of the February, 1961, Congress of the A P L after being "grossly insulted." They accused the Albanian leaders of "increasing the difficulties" of the Greek Party and, from exile in Rumania, began a prolonged radio debate with the Albanian Communists. Meanwhile, the Central Committee of the Greek Party "unreservedly approved" the CPSU's condemnation of the A P L leadership. The Cypriot Party ( A K E L ) supported the C P S U ' s position, and on November 9, 1961, its Central Committee approved the condemnation of the A P L and the "personality cult." The accompanying debate revealed that some Central Committee members questioned this "rubber-stamp" procedure. Secretary-General Ezekias Papaioannou defended this action, declaring that the minor parties of the world-wide Communist movement must acknowledge the superior wisdom of the leading contingents.

ISRAELI

COMMUNIST

PARTY

The leadership of the Israeli Communist Party was faced with an upsurge of rank-and-file objections to its endorsement of the C P S U . As in some other parties, there were more questions concerning the implications of Soviet revelations about the Stalin era than about the A P L .

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Secretary-General Shmuel Mikunis continued his full support of Khrushchev. After his return from the XXII CPSU Congress, Mikunis dwelt on the programmatic and economic aspects of the C P S U ' s Program, avoiding the issue of the "cult of personality," and seeking to minimize the significance of the APL's and the "antiparty group's" resistance. (See, for instance, his article in Kol Haam [Tel-Aviv], November 24, 1961.) Demands for "explanations" multiplied, and party officials were impelled to reply to those who defended Stalin, asked why the "democratic" CPSU did not allow Molotov to defend himself at the X X I I Congress, and inquired who had empowered Mikunis to support the C P S U against the A P L . T h e intermittent debate continued to embarrass the party leadership, which was apparently unable to suppress it.

COMMUNIST PARTY

OF THE UNITED

STATES

T h e American Communists, represented at the X X I I Congress by Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, Chairman of the National Committee, followed the CPSU's lead as usual. Public statements made by a few of the leaders, such as G u s Hall, endorsed the CPSU position on the A P L and "de-Stalinization." Articles in the Party's monthly. Political Affairs, elaborated on these positions. The New York State Communist Party announced that its former labor secretary, Milton Rosen, and three other party members were expelled for adopting a "pro-Albanian" position. Rosen had been removed from all party positions in August, 1961. He was identified as leader of an "antipartv group": "Stating that the C P U S A is thoroughly revisionist, as is the leadership of the whole international Marxist movement except Albania, he now openly advocates the liquidation of the Communist Party and the establishment of a new Marxist-Leninist Party with his neo-Trotskyite group as its base." (The Worker [New York], January 7, 1962.) Rosen and his associates started their own paper, Progressive Labor. In October, 1962, a newsletter, Hammer and Steel, made its appearance with an explicit endorsement of M a o and an attack on both the CPSU and C P U S A leaderships. It circulated a program. "Toward a Marxist-Leninist Party in the United States," sharply condemning the "revisionism" of Khrushchev and those who followed him. (See also below, p. 827.)

COMMUNIST PARTY

OF GREAT

BRITAIN

At the XXII Congress, John Gollan, General Secretary of the British Communist Party, failed to condemn the Hoxha regime o r to iden-

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tify himself with the CPSU position. Two weeks later, he was still vague regarding the A P L issue, but he did condemn the "personality cult" and the "antiparty group" in the C P S U — a s indeed he had done on earlier occasions (Pravda, November 12, 1961). A resolution adopted by the Executive Committee of the C P G B in mid-November declared that the Albanian leaders "deviated" from the 1960 Moscow Statement, and expressed the hope that they would find their way back into the fold (Pravda, November 16). This statement did not seem to satisfy the advocates of a more explicit position. The issue was debated again; in mid-January, the Executive adopted a resolution which stated that the A P L leadership had slandered the Soviet Union, using language typical of fractionalists and schismatics, and had violated the eighty-one-party Statement. The same declaration approved the Soviet-sponsored theses of peaceful coexistence and peaceful transition to power (Pravda, January 22, 1962). On the other hand, in early 1962 and again in early 1963, the C P G B leadership played an active role in the efforts of "uncommitted" Communists to mediate between Moscow and Peking. (See also below, p. 827.)

COMMUNIST

PARTY

OF

CANADA

At the XXII Congress, Tim Buck, the veteran Secretary-General of the Canadian Communist Party, followed the example of the British Party and failed to attack the Albanian leadership. Yet his continued loyalty to Moscow was not in doubt. On November 18, 1961, Pravda printed an article by Tim Buck warning the Albanians of possible exclusion from the international Communist movement: " T h e leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor will understand that in cultivating a hostile attitude to the USSR, they are in fact following the path of withdrawal of Albania f r o m the [socialist] commonwealth, one of the important aspects of which is the Warsaw Pact. . . . If the Party's leadership succeeds in continuing to lead the people astray and in leading it along the road of reckless adventurism, along the path now being followed by Enver Hoxha and his accomplices, this may place Albania outside the camp of peace and socialism . ." (Pravda, November 18, 1961). T h e majority of the Canadian leadership found no reason to question the course taken by the CPSU. When the XVII Congress of the Canadian Party opened in Toronto, on January 21, 1962, Tim Buck supported the orientation symbolized by the X X CPSU Congress and the new CPSU Program, stressing the importance of "peaceful coexistence." The Congress backed him on this issue but

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replaced him with Leslie Morris as the new party Secretary. The Congress concentrated on the evolution of a new slogan of "national independence" for Canada ("Let's be masters in our own house!"), and left the divisive issues in the background (Pravda, January 21, 1962; Canadian Tribune, January 29, 1962).

CHAPTER VII

COMMUNIST PARTIES OF ASIA, THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, AND LATIN AMERICA

COMMUNIST

PARTY

OF INDIA

(CPI)

The Communist Party of India has long been divided. In recent years "leftists" have tended to look to the C P C for ideological guidance; the "rightists" and moderates, largely in control of the CPI, have tended to turn to the CPSU, while other factions align themselves between these extremes. For a time, the leadership gained from the anti-Chinese feeling prompted by the Sino-Indian border dispute, while the rifts in the CPI were masked by compromise resolutions. However, several regional CPI organizations retained their pro-Chinese orientation and favored "direct action" rather than a parliamentary path to power. 1 At the X X I I C P S U Congress, General Secretary Ajoy Ghosh did not support Khrushchev on either de-Stalinization or the A P L . His stand was based not on any sympathy for the A P L , but rather on the hope of avoiding the bitter internal struggle which explicit CPI support for the C P S U line might provoke. On October 29, 1961, the Communist weekly New Age published a dispatch from its Moscow correspondent which praised the C P S U as "a heroic party which has thrown the moth-eaten ideas of doddering dogmatic intriguers on the rubbish heap of history," and continued to publish materials on the X X I I Congress, including those "exposing" Stalin, until mid-November. While a pro-Ghosh member of the Party, Mohit Sen, gave mild support to de-Stalinization in New Age (November 19, 1 9 6 1 ) , the well-informed Indian periodical Link claimed that the majority of the CPI Secretariat voted to postpone discussion of the X X I I Congress until after the February, 1962, elections. ' For background on the CPI, see Sevak Katrak, "India's Communist Party Split," The China Quarterly, No. 7 (July-September, 1961), and Harry Gelman, "The Indian CP between Moscow and Peking." Problems of Communism, November-December, 1962.

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The split between the factions of the CPI was exacerbated by the Sino-Indian border dispute. New Chinese border incursions, reported on November 20, 1961, forced the CPI leadership to take a stand. Ajoy Ghosh, acting for the Secretariat and the Central Executive, on November 21, strongly condemned the People's Republic of China's actions and backed the Indian government's defensive measures. This was opposed by the "leftists," who refused to condone Communist support of a "bourgeois" government against a Communist state. Now the CPC openly attacked Ghosh. A Jen-min jih-pao editorial (December 7, 1961), "The Truth about the AntiChinese Campaign Launched by Nehru in India," stated: ". . . On the day following Nehru's attack on China's so-called 'incursions' into India on November 20, General Secretary Ajoy Ghosh of the CPI, without bothering to find out the truth or look into the rights and wrongs of the case, trailed behind Nehru and hurriedly issued a statement in condemnation of China. This is what really fills one with 'surprise and regret.'" While individual provincial organizations of the PCI supported the Chinese view, the Central PCI organs spelled out their differences with the CPC with increasing clarity and publicity.

7 9 . A J O Y GHOSH, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE C O M M U N I S T PARTY OF INDIA. " C O M M E N T S ON THE X X I I C P S U

CON-

GRESS." New Age ( N e w D e l h i ) , December 10, 1961. 2 After praising Khrushchev's reports to the Congress as examples of "creative Marxism," and outlining the tremendous economic progress made by the Soviet Union, Ghosh's article continued: . . . IT WOULD, of course, be wrong because of all this to claim that Soviet society has been or is even today perfect. A s is well known, the X X Congress made a scathing criticism of the cult of personality that had persisted for many years. It drew sharp attention to the fact that together with big advances in every sphere, there had also taken place in the Soviet Union, in a certain period, many mistakes and many excesses. There had been violation of socialist legality, abuses of power, repressive measures of which many innocent and honest people had been victims. The XX Congress took important measures to ' New Age is the weekly organ of the CPI.

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rectijy these mistakes and to ensure that such things should not happen again. There can be no doubt that the criticism of the cult of the personality was necessary. There can be no doubt that the measures taken by the CPSU in the last few years have helped considerably to expand socialist democracy and to unleash popular initiative in the task of laying the foundation of communism. The CPSU declares that the Soviet Union is no longer a state of proletarian dictatorship. The specific conditions which necessitated the state of proletarian dictatorship have disappeared. Today, the Soviet state has become a state of the entire people. The armed forces which the Soviet Union is compelled to maintain because of the threat posed by imperialists are meant exclusively for defense of the country and of the socialist system against aggression. They are not meant to be used against any section of the people of the country. Can any capitalist country make a similar claim? There, the use of armed forces of the state to put down struggles of workers and peasants is becoming an increasingly common phenomenon. . . . It was Lenin who taught that whenever the Party faces new tasks, it has to elaborate organizational forms, rules, and norms which would enable it to carry out those tasks. At a time when the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has become the party of the entire Soviet people, the new Rules will undoubtedly be a powerful weapon to further consolidate the Party, broaden intra-party democracy, encourage initiative, and facilitate the tasks of communist construction. These Rules cannot, of course, be mechanically copied by all other parties, but certain principles which form their basis are of importance for all. It is the bounden duty of all Communists to grasp all this and to stress it continuously. If one does not do that, one is bound to commit serious errors in appraising the XXII Congress and drawing correct lessons from it. That does not mean, however, that there cannot be genuine and honest differences, even among Communists, with regard to

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a number of aspects of the XXII Congress and certain conclusions reached by it. Such differences, as we know well, can and do exist. Comrades from many parts of our country have raised a number of questions: Was it a correct decision, they ask, to have condemned the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor—no matter what their mistakes—from the Congress of the CPSU without giving them an opportunity to place their point of view before the representatives of all Communist parties? Did the Congress make a correct appraisal of J. V. Stalin, and was the decision to remove his body from the mausoleum proper? In dealing with these questions, we shall have to take into account what the Soviet leaders have pointed out, viz., that repeated attempts on their part to discuss issues with the Albanian leaders failed owing to the latter's intransigence, that they carried on a campaign of vituperation against the CPSU and acted in several other ways in such a manner as to weaken the unity of the socialist camp. We shall also have to take into account their explanation that while they recognize the merits of Stalin, he cannot be equated with Lenin and given the same status, in view of his many grave defects and shortcomings. Also that his body, though removed from the mausoleum, has been accorded a place of honor near the Kremlin wall alongside the bodies of such outstanding leaders as Kalinin, Dzerzhinsky, and Sverdlov. Nevertheless, it is a fact that a big majority of members of our party and many others, too, have been deeply hurt by the decision to remove Stalin's body from the mausoleum. Many have communicated their sentiments to us. What our delegation felt on this issue, we have conveyed to the CPSU. Some others argue that in view of revelations made at the XX and XXII congresses, the decision was logical. Some comrades also ask whether the very practice of embalming bodies of dead leaders and preserving them is proper. Several other questions have been raised. Moreover, the revelation of a number of horrid facts such

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as condemnation and punishment of persons by lists that occurred in a certain period of Stalin's leadership as a part of methods of repression have shocked the conscience of our comrades, of our friends and sympathizers, of every decent person. Naturally they ask: How could such things happen for such a long period without protest from anybody and how was it that they were not even known to us and to many Soviet citizens themselves? Can they be fully explained by the thesis about the cult of personality alone? What role did leaders other than those who have been condemned play in the building or combating of the cult of personality? Besides these specific questions, certain bigger issues have been posed before the entire Communist movement. In the main they are: What kind of guarantee should be created in socialist society in order to prevent arbitrary acts? Or more broadly, what should be the features of socialist democracy—especially today when socialism has already triumphed in one third of the world? What rules and what practices can ensure that, together with centralization, there is also effective intra-party democracy? What principles and considerations should guide Communist parties in their mutual relationships and how [are] these principles to be implemented? That such questions are asked and such issues are raised is not surprising. All Communist parties consider the CPSU to be the vanguard of the world Communist movement. Moreover, it is the CPSU and the Soviet people that in the final analysis have the right to decide as to what is good for the USSR. Nevertheless, the XX Congress of the CPSU, which condemned the cult of personality, did not merely end the deification of Stalin, but demolished the belief in the infallibility of any party or any leader. This way necessary, for such a belief is contrary to the very spirit of Marxism-Leninism. In view of this, it is inevitable and good that questions like those formulated above and others are being asked. Discussion—Not Now. It would have been good if the National Council of our party could have met, discussed, and

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given its opinion on these questions and issues. It would have been good if a thoroughgoing discussion could be organized in our party on these problems which concern not the CPSU alone, nor even only the countries where socialism has triumphed, but all Communist parties and all Communists. Unfortunately, it is difficult to have such a meeting and such discussion today in view of the nearness of the third general elections. The Central Secretariat of our party elicited the opinion of National Council members on this point and the overwhelming majority of the replies received are against the holding of such a meeting. The issues, therefore, though of great theoretical and practical importance, can be taken up only after the general elections are over. As soon as possible after the general elections, we shall have to hold a meeting of the National Council to discuss these issues. By then members of the National Council as well as others will have studied the relevant documents. We, members of the delegation, shall also place before the National Council the discussion and exchange of views that we had with the Soviet leaders and their point of view. Then only the considered opinion of the National Council can be given. In the meantime, all comrades must refrain from publicly uttering their views on these issues. At the same time, on certain events that have taken place since the XXII Congress, I feel it necessary to say a few words. The criticism of the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor that has been made by the CPSU as well as the comment made by Chou En-lai on the propriety of making such open criticism are evidently matters on which opinion has to be given by the National Council after hearing the report of our delegation. A t the same time, we cannot but take note of the fact that the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor have, in their recent utterances, started assailing the very basis of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and also the decisions of the XX Congress. This attitude cannot be considered to be in conformity with the Statement adopted at the eighty-one-party meeting. The eighty-one-party conference also criticised the cult of

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personality. Our party has fully endorsed that criticism. Evidently Stalin cannot be placed in the same category as Lenin. From the facts that have come to light, it is indisputable that, together with great achievements, there occurred in the USSR —especially during the latter part of Stalin's leadership—mistakes, excesses and misdeeds of an extremely serious nature, for which Stalin bears main political and moral responsibility. . . . At the same time, the fact remains and cannot be erased from history that Stalin was an outstanding Marxist-Leninist of exceptional talent and ability, who upheld the teachings of Lenin against deviators and developed those teachings in several spheres, who made great contributions to the building of socialism in the USSR and toward the growth and development of the world Communist movement. Stalin's Role. This dual role of Stalin—his positive as well as negative aspects—has to be constantly borne in mind in determining exactly how, without in any way glossing over his dejects, the struggle against the cult of the personality has to be conducted and what concrete steps have to be taken in pursuance of that struggle. Taking all this into account, one cannot but regret deeply that the struggle against the cult of Stalin's personality was carried to the length of changing the names of a number of places—above all, the name of Stalingrad, which has such historic associations. Also I feel that while many details of the excesses that took place in the USSR have been revealed by the X X I I Congress, the question as to how they happened and why they happened has not been satisfactorily answered. A far more comprehensive and deeper analysis than what has been done hitherto is needed —not merely in order to understand the cause of these deplorable happenings, but also and above all in order to ensure that they never occur again in any socialist country. In other words, the process of expansion of democracy initiated by the XX Congress and continued in the XXII Congress has to be carried forward still further. . . .

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Whatever opinion one may have on certain matters, the big and basic fact is that the whole trend of events since the X X Congress—in internal matters as well as in the sphere of foreign policy—has been in the correct direction, has enormously helped the cause of socialism, democracy, and peace. Entire History. We Indian Communists shall draw correct lessons from the entire history of the CPSU—its mighty achievements as well as grave mistakes. We are determined that the mistakes and misdeeds which occurred in the Soviet Union and some other socialist countries, the violation of socialist democracy that took place, must not happen in our country. The XXII Congress has carried forward the process initiated at the XX Congress to a new stage. It has enriched Marxism-Leninism by tackling concrete problems related to the task of communist construction. It has adopted a program of world historic importance, a document which will be a powerful weapon in the hands of all Communist parties in the ideological battle with capitalism. It has opened up magnificent vistas before the whole of humanity. A s such the X X I I Congress will ever be remembered as a landmark in the march toward communism—the noblest dream of man. Despite the attempts of the CPI leadership to avoid a general debate on the issues raised by the XXII Congress, differences of opinion appeared in the CPI press and in the statements of various leaders. E. M. S. Namboodiripad, Chief Minister of the 1957 Kerala government, told the press (November 5, 1961) that Stalin had made a "great contribution" and that Indian Communists could appreciate "much of what is positive" in Stalinism. The Kerala CPI organ Janayangam also defended Stalin's record, while the Hindu weekly Jan Yug (Uttar Pradesh) publicly praised the APL. One provincial Communist paper called the de-Stalinization "disgraceful," while another hailed it as an example of "proletarian democracy." K. K. Nair, a Kerala CPI official, declared that the CPI would "respect and revere" Stalin's body if the CPSU gave it to them. The West Bengal, Punjab, and Andhra Communist Party organizations, traditionally pro-Chinese, opposed the ambiguous position of the CPI leadership. The Andhra and West Bengal organi-

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zations reportedly adopted resolutions o p p o s i n g criticism of the "cult of personality" and the "antiparty group." T h e y also d i s a v o w e d the c o n d e m n a t i o n of the A P L leadership as a violation of the 1 9 6 0 Statement, and c o n d e m n e d the stand taken by G h o s h o n the SinoIndian border dispute.

8 0 . EDITORIAL STALIN'S

COMMEMORATING BIRTH.

Swadhinata

THE

ANNIVERSARY

(Calcutta),

December

OF 21,

1961. :t THE PROGRESSIVE peoples all over the world will pay their sincerest respects to the memory of immortal Stalin on the occasion of his eighty-second birthday anniversary. The contribution of the CPSU and the Soviet peoples under the leadership of Comrade Stalin toward the achievement of socialism in Russia, the safeguarding of the tiny socialist country against imperialist onslaughts, the transformation of underdeveloped Russia into a mighty bastion of socialist strength, the defense of its honor and defeat of the forces of Hitler in the antifascist war, and the assistance of the anti-imperialist and anticolonial struggles of the oppressed peoples will be written in gold in the history of humanity. It is impossible to wipe the name of Stalin from the history of the progress of mankind. That is why he is remembered with profound respect by progressive people all over the world. By the Communists all over the world, Stalin will always be regarded as a great Marxist-Leninist. Stalin's name is integrally linked with the glorious struggle launched to protect the purity of Marxism-Leninism against the ultra-leftism of Trotsky, and revisionism and opportunistic deviations of the right. T o the progressive peoples and working class all over the world, Stalin is immortal. One cannot but recall the immortal contribution made by Stalin to the fund of Marxist knowledge on the issue of establishing communism. One recalls the report placed by Stalin * Swadhinata, the daily organ of the West Bengal Communist organization. was considered a stronghold of pro-CPC, "neo-Stalinist" sentiments.

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before the X V I I I CPSU Congress on March 10, 1939. Enriching Leninist teachings by his twenty years of experience in regard to stabilizing the possibilities of achieving a full-fledged socialist society in a single country, Stalin said in this report that communism, by coexisting with capitalism, could achieve a faster rate of progress in the Soviet Union. On the occasion of Stalin's birthday anniversary, we note with pride that the Soviet Union is now carrying out the task of establishing a communist society. The contributions of J. V. Stalin were immense in the Soviet struggle for socialism, and helped give realistic shape to the plans and policies of the Soviet Union. The contributions of Stalin were unforgettable in the international Communist movement. His theoretical publications were extremely significant in the explanation of Marxism-Leninism. His depth of thought combined with his facility of expression make the reading of his works a unique experience. These works indubitably have a tremendously important role to play in the task of building up socialist consciousness among workers and developing Communists. The name of Stalin is integrally linked with the solution of the problem of nationhood. Freedom-loving patriots of enslaved countries could never forget the immortal Stalin. It was Stalin who drew the attention of the European working class to the tremendous revolutionary potential of the struggles for freedom in the Asian countries in the context of the all-out anti-imperialist struggle. Stalin said: " A new path has been charted by the October revolution in the progress of struggles against imperialism." This path has now stretched from the working class in Europe through the Soviet Union to the oppressed humanity in the Far East, and has thus linked oppressed humanity with the socialist countries. The lesson that can be drawn from Stalin is that, to be preserved, peace needs to be emphasized constantly by the peoples all over the world. This lesson is now directing lakhs of peacesoldiers against the war provocateurs of the day. The Soviet Union now enjoys the glory of being the most formidable protector of world peace and amity among nations. T h e force of

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peace is invincible against the forces of war. This force is shaping the history of mankind at the present. It is not entirely impossible that lapses might occur in the formative period of establishing socialism in an extremely difficult historical situation. Lapses and mistakes did occur in the latter part of Stalin's life because of the cult of personality. T h e intrinsic force and strength of international Communism are such today that its ability to overcome the serious consequences of such mistakes remains unquestioned. In addition, the international Communist movement is also formidable enough to draw lessons from such lapses and apply the correct remedial action. Despite such lapses, Stalin will go down in full glory in the annals of history as the wisest Marxist of all ages. Stalin as the builder of socialism, thinker, and leader of the working class will remain immortal. Mistakes will be corrected. Stalin's contribution in the struggle for liberation will continue to inspire millions. The Soviet coverage of the CPi's position was extremely meager. On December 28, Pravda published a short dispatch f r o m the TASS correspondent in New Delhi which noted that Ajoy Ghosh had praised the XXII CPSU Congress as a "great event in the history of the communist movement" and had hailed the new C P S U Program as the most "significant work" of the Congress. See also below p. 827.

INDONESIAN

COMMUNIST

PARTY

(PKI)

D. N. Aidit, Chairman of the Central Committee of the PKI, failed to support the CPSU's attack on the leadership of the A P L in his speech at the XXII CPSU Congress. While Aidit had allegedly supported the CPSU's general position during the debates at the 1960 Conference of Eighty-one Communist and Workers Parties, he had been known to question some aspects of Soviet policy. Other PKI leaders were, in 1960-61, reported to be more "pro-Chinese" in their analyses of the world situation and of their own prospects to attain power. Press dispatches reported rumors that Aidit's speech at the XXII CPSU Congress had been severely edited for publication, and that Aidit had absented himself f r o m the session of the Congress which voted to remove Stalin's body from the mausoleum.

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8 1 . DIPA

AIDIT,

CHAIRMAN

of Asia OF

THE

and Middle

CENTRAL

East

COMMITTEE

OF THE C O M M U N I S T PARTY OF INDONESIA. STATEMENT ON THE X X I I C P S U CONGRESS [ N o v e m b e r 2 3 , 1 9 6 1 ] .

Rakjat

Harian

( D j a k a r t a ) , December 15, 1961. 4

T h e P K I s e n t g r e e t i n g s t o t h e A P L o n its t w e n t i e t h a n n i v e r s a r y , t h u s i d e n t i f y i n g itself w i t h t h e o t h e r A s i a n p a r t i e s w h i c h failed t o s u p p o r t t h e C P S U ' s c o n d e m n a t i o n of the A P L l e a d e r s h i p . Aidit s t o p p e d o v e r in C h i n a f o r d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h t h e l e a d e r s of t h e C P C b e f o r e ret u r n i n g h o m e f r o m M o s c o w . A f t e r several d a y s of w h a t w e r e reported to be serious disagreements within the P K I leadership, the f o l l o w i n g s t a t e m e n t w a s issued. ON THE AFTERNOON of N o v e m b e r 2 2 , 1 9 6 1 , t h e P K I f r i e n d s h i p

delegation to the X X I I Congress of the CPSU, which was headed by the Chairman of the PKI Central Committee, D. N. Aidit, returned to this country. According to a November 23 release of the Secretariat of the PKI Central Committee, Aidit made a brief statement to his welcomers in the office of the PKI Central Committee. This statement contained the following remarks among others. The PKI friendship delegation to the X X I I Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union ( C P S U ) left Indonesia about one and one-half months ago. Some of the members of the delegation have remained in the Soviet Union to tour industrial, agricultural, cultural, and scientific projects. Comrade Delegate Anwar Sanuai had to enter a hospital in Moscow; there he has had one operation and he will undergo another. I myself did not make any tours, but returned to this country via Peking, Canton, and Hong Kong. ' O n January 6, 1962. Pravda published a report on the Plenum of the Central Committee of the PKI of December 30-31. The report included quotations f r o m Aidit's earlier statement. Omissions and excerpts by Pravda f r o m the Politburo resolution approved by the plenum (Document N o . 82) which affect the meaning of his statement and of the resolution are indicated by angular brackets. Harian Rakjat is the central daily organ of the PKI Central Committee. It was banned f r o m N o v e m b e r 3 to D e c e m b e r 14, 1961. Aidit's statement was carried in full by Jert-min jih-pao (December 1, 1961).

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While en route to Moscow, the PKI delegation stopped in and toured Prague for two days and Warsaw for three days. Friendly discussions were held with the leaders of the Polish United Workers Party. In addition to attending the XXII Congress of the CPSU, I engaged in discussions on West Irian with Communist parties from five continents. All of the Communist parties with which I talked side with the Indonesian people in the struggle for West Irian and in the struggle against imperialism generally. Furthermore, a discussion was held with the Communist Party of the Netherlands ( C P N ) , which was represented by its SecretaryGeneral, Comrade Paul de Groot, and a joint statement was signed by the PKI and the CPN. The joint statement declares firmly that the CPN and the progressive people in the Netherlands would side with the people of Indonesia if war should break out between Indonesia and the Netherlands over West Irian. The CPN considers that such a war would be a war of liberation for the people of Indonesia, and therefore a just war; and a colonial war for the Dutch, therefore an unjust war. Discussions in the same spirit were held between the PKI and the Communist Party of Australia, which was represented by its Secretary-General, Lance Sharkey; and a press communiqué was issued. While in Moscow I also engaged in warm and friendly discussions with the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade N. S. Khrushchev; and while in Peking, with the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party ( C P C ) , Comrade Mao Tse-tung, and other CPC leaders. These discussions were very important to [achieving] a good understanding of what is now taking place in the world Communist movement, in the development of communism in the Soviet Union, and in the development of socialism in China. In these meetings I frankly advanced my ideas and expressed my hope that all sides would participate in strengthening the unity of the Communist movement and the movement of the world's progressives so that all forces could be mobilized for [dealing] the death blow to imperialism, the main enemy of all

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the people in the world. The Communists of Indonesia, without exception, must also work in this direction with all their might. Differences of opinion within the ranks of the Communists, progressives, and revolutionaries of the world must not result in a weakening of the struggle against the common enemy, namely, world imperialism, which is headed by the United States. For Communists, above all else, loyally implement the classic but perennially youthful call made by Karl Marx more than one hundred years ago: "Proletarians of the World, Unite!" The X X I I Congress of the CPSU has historic significance because it approved the Program for the development of communism, [a Program] for the development of the most just society in the world. The Program . . . is a new factor in the world Communist movement; therefore it is fitting that Communists and progressives throughout the world should study it and follow its implementation. The goals contained in the Program are knives which pierce the hearts of the imperialists. The existence and implementation of this Program benefit all people who oppose imperialism. {During and after the XXII Congress of the CPSU, the imperialists, revisionists, Trotskyites, and all reactionaries rejoiced over the criticism of Albania and the renewed criticism of the late Stalin, the antiparty group, and others. In connection with Albania they have created an atmosphere which would suggest that a problem of "who else will leave the socialist camp" exists. Like brothel keepers, they would profit from everyone who goes out. As a matter of fact, this problem is a completely different one, and it is also a different [situation] from the SEATO, NATO, and CENTO military alliances, which exist by virtue of treaties. The socialist camp is made up of socialist nations, regardless of treaties and agreements. As long as a country genuinely conducts a socialist political, economic, and social system, although it is not bound by a treaty and even though matters exist which create opposition between that country and another socialist country, the country remains a part of the socialist camp. Whether [a given country] belongs in the socialist camp is not decided through subjective evaluation, but by the

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objective fact that the country is genuinely building socialism, a society where there is no exploitation of man by man. Albania is a country which is building this type of society, a socialist society. Comrade Khrushchev himself does not deny this. If one wishes to use the terms "leaving" or "entering" the socialist camp at this time, the problem, therefore, is not what country will leave the socialist camp, but what other country will enter the socialist camp and build socialism. This is the question now confronting our world, because the idea of socialism has spread more widely and because the social forces that support this idea have increased in many countries which are not yet socialist.) Following the X X I I Congress of the C P S U , the imperialists repeated the idle chatter about "the collapse of the Communist movement and the socialist camp" which they had propagated during and after the X X Congress of the C P S U , which criticized Stalin in connection with the cult of the individual. However, the facts demonstrate that after the X X Congress of the C P S U the Communist movement did not weaken but, far from collapsing, became even stronger. The Communist movement will not collapse, just as the heavens never have collapsed and never will collapse. T h e case is not the same for imperialism, which is old and becoming more rotten day by day. Like an old house, imperialism is decaying and will eventually collapse. T h e Communist movement, which was begun by Marx and Engels at one place in the world more than one hundred years ago, has spread throughout the world and is organized in more than ninety parties with forty million members. (In the midst of the fog which the imperialists and their lackeys have deliberately spread about Albania, Stalin, the antiparty group, and other matters connected with the X X I I Congress of the CPSU, are many honest men, Communists included, who have been taken in and who forget that the Program for the development of communism was approved by the X X I I Congress of the CPSU.) According to this Program, in twenty years the Soviet industrial product will increase no less than sixfold, the agricultural product three-and-one-half-fold, and the

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national income of the Soviet state fivefold. These are blows to the imperialists, and that is why they deliberately shift the attention of men from the real problems of the XXII Congress of the CPSU. They fear greatly that the working people of the world will discover, through concrete and demonstrable figures, that within twenty years a society will exist in the Soviet Union wherein the people will be able to obtain many of the needs of life without charge, for example, care for children and for elderly people who are unable to work, education, medical care, housing, transportation, rest homes, noon meals, and so on. Certainly the Soviet people must work for all of this, but they do not have to work as hard as they would in the firms of the imperialists, where wages are practically nothing and are inadequate for the purchase of food and decent clothing. (In regard to Albania, the PKI was one of the Communist parties that did not criticize Albania in its greetings at the XXII Congress of the CPSU. I must explain and give an accounting to the Communists and working people of Indonesia concerning this. The reasons are as follows. First, the PKI friendship delegation to the XXII Congress of the CPSU came to the Congress carrying a message drafted by the Politburo of the PKI Central Committee. The draft program of the CPSU was used as an orienting point in drawing up the message, and it was definitely not known that Albania would be criticized at the Congress. Second, I myself, as head of the delegation, do not believe that differences of opinion and existing conflicts can be settled more easily by criticizing one Communist party at the congress of another Communist party. In settling differences of opinion, I hold to [the principle of] "consultation and common consent," not only among Communists, but also among parties, and between groups and forces that oppose the main enemy—imperialism. Third, if I had joined in the criticism of Albania, the PKI members who have been trained in the spirit of the Communist Declaration [1957] and Statement [1960] would not have understood my action. The Declaration and Statement say, among

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other things, that if a party wants to clear up problems connected with the activity of another fraternal party, the leaders of the party sound out the leaders of the other party and, if necessary, hold meetings and consultations. From the time the Statement of the Eighty-one Communist and Workers Parties was signed in November, 1960, until I delivered my welcoming speech to the XXII Congress of the CPSU on October 21, 1961, as far as I know no meeting was held between the CPSU and the Albanian Party of Labor. Since the problem has now become public, I expect all PKI members to make a good study of materials from the CPSU, from the Albanian Party of Labor and other Communist parties, on problems which now involve the world Communist movement. I must explain once more that as long as the problem is still one between Communists and Communists, as long as the Communist parties hold to the Communist Declaration [1957] and the Communist Statement [1960], all differences of opinion, no matter how great, can be overcome. As I have said time and again, and this is in accordance with the spirit and content of the 1960 Statement of Communist parties, the PKI is an independent Marxist-Leninist party. It has the same rights as other Communist parties; it does not accept the leadership of another party, and it certainly does not lead other parties. Guided by Marxism-Leninism, the PKI determines its policies itself. The PKI is responsible to the working class and the working people of Indonesia. However, the PKI is responsible to the international working-class movement at the same time. Therefore, Indonesian Communists cannot remain passive in facing the fact that antagonism exists among the Communist and workers parties of the world. Now as for Stalin, on the one hand, he was the principal leader of the CPSU. It is the right of the Soviet Communists to do whatever they like about their former leader Stalin (criticize him, put his body in the mausoleum and then remove it, change the name of Stalingrad to Volgograd, and so on). Viewed from this angle, all of the CPSU's actions toward Stalin can be con-

556

Parties of Asia and Middle

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sidered an internal affair of the CPSU in which other Communist parties do not have the right to, and cannot, interfere. It is impossible for other Communist parties to be familiar with the details of the internal life of the CPSU, just as it is impossible for the CPSU to be familiar with the details of the internal life of other Communist parties. On the other hand, Stalin was an international figure who led the continuation of Lenin's effort to build socialism in the Soviet Union, and he played an important role in the defeat of fascism. Every Communist and democrat can speak of Stalin as an international figure. In its criticism of Stalin for the cult of the individual, the CPSU has the support of the Communists of Indonesia. At the same time, the Communists of Indonesia continue to respect Stalin, many of whose speeches and writings are still useful, for example, those dealing with revolutions in Eastern countries, including the Indonesian revolution. I will not fall into the trap laid by the imperialists, who represent the Soviet Communists as having "expelled" Stalin at the XXII Congress. This picture does not fit the facts. The Soviet Communists did not "expel" Stalin. Stalin simply is no longer placed on a level with Lenin, but is side by side with such other prominent leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet Union as Kalinin, Sverdlov, Ordzhonikidze, Dzerzhinsky, Zhdanov, Frunze, and others. Also, the method used in combating the antiparty group within the CPSU is an internal affair of the CPSU. Other parties have no right to interfere in this, because it is impossible for them to have a full understanding of the situation and problem. I simply draw the conclusion that the method used in settling a conflict within a party depends on the tradition, history, situation, and leadership of the party, and therefore each party can have its own way of settling internal conflict. Indonesian Communists do not interfere in the internal problems of other parties or lead other parties, nor does the PKI want interference in its internal problems. This does not mean that Indonesian Communists do not want to hear from fraternal parties about internal

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problems. However, the Communist party concerned has the full right to make its decision on its internal problems. Only in this way will the friendship between the PKI and other Communist parties, and the friendship among Communist parties generally, be maintained and become closer. The interference of one party in the internal affairs of another party will only create unnecessary difficulties and disruption in the party interfered with. In regard to the Communist movement, differences of opinion have been found in the Communist movement ever since its creation by Marx and Engels, ever since the First International ( 1 8 6 4 - 7 6 ) . Even the Second International ( 1 8 8 9 - 1 9 1 4 ) , which was established by Engels (Marx died in 1883), was led astray by Bernstein, Kautsky, and others, and became a movement of reformists and opportunists. At that time many men assumed that the Communist movement, the Marxist movement, had collapsed. However, this was not the case; for Lenin not only held high the banner of Marxism, he also brought victory to the first socialist revolution and established the revolutionary Third International ( 1 9 1 9 - 4 3 ) . Marxism triumphed in onesixth of the world, namely, the Soviet Union; and Communist parties spread throughout the world.) In Indonesia many persons assumed that the PKI would collapse at the time its political and organizational errors were harshly criticized in the resolution on the "New Road for the Republic of Indonesia" and even more so after the PKI was attacked by the white terror in the latter half of 1948. However, this was not the case. The PKI did not become weaker, but just the opposite. In short, the Communist movement, the movement of revolutionaries and progressives, will not collapse, just as the heavens will not collapse. Surely, there are reasons for this. The reasons are that the working class, the toiling people, and enslaved peoples want to be free of oppression and want revolution. This will for revolution will not be thwarted; therefore the Communist movement, the movement of revolutionaries and progressives, will not be stopped, come what may.

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(Differences of opinion will always exist within the ranks of Communists as Communists proceed with revolutionary practice. However, there is no difference of opinion that cannot be resolved as long as the problem is still one between Communists and Communists, as long as the problem is still one between the men and parties who hold high the glorious banner of M a r x ism-Leninism. The Communist parties' 1957 Declaration and 1960 Statement were brilliant results of resolving differences of opinion within Communist ranks. In the course of resolving differences of opinion among Communists within a single party and among Communist parties, the thinking of Communists is sharpened, and their capacity and fighting strength are increased.)

82.

R E S O L U T I O N OF T H E P O L I T B U R O OF T H E C E N T R A L M I T T E E OF THE P K I ON THE W O R K O F T H E P K I

TION TO THE X X I I C P S U C O N G R E S S , D E C E M B E R 1 5 ,

Harían Rakjat,

COM-

DELEGA1961.

December 16, 1961.

THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF the PKI Central Committee, having heard the report on the work of the P K I friendship delegation to the X X I I Congress of the CPSU, which was headed by the Chairman of the PKI Central Committee, Comrade D. N. Aidit, wholeheartedly declares its approval of the activities of the delegation and supports its judgment. The Politburo of the PKI Central Committee notes with satisfaction that since the issuance of the Declaration of the C o m m u nist and Workers Parties ( 1 9 5 7 ) , which was strengthened by the Statement of the Eighty-one Communist and Workers Parties ( 1 9 6 0 ) , the Communist movement has increased in scope and strength. The existence of Communist and workers parties in nearly 90 countries and areas, with a membership of nearly 4 0 million persons, constitutes not only a force which must be reckoned with by the imperialists and other reactionaries, but also a very important factor in world development at the present time. All the world witnesses defeat after defeat being suffered by the imperialist and capitalist camp, and victory after

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victory being scored in the socialist camp, in newly independent nations, and by the working class in capitalist nations. The superiority of the system of socialism to the system of capitalism is being ever more finally established. The Politburo of the PKI Central Committee welcomes enthusiastically the staunchness displayed by the Soviet Communists, at the X X I I Congress of their party, in beginning to build communism on a grand and all-encompassing scale. In so doing they will translate the best aspirations of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and all progressive men into reality. No matter how the imperialists may attempt to conceal its advantages and to obstruct its implementation, the Program of the CPSU, the twenty-year Program for the development of communism, will certainly be carried out and will change even further the balance of forces in the world. This is why the Program inspires progressive people throughout the world to intensify their struggle for the achievement of full, national independence, true democracy, lasting peace, and socialism. The Politburo of the PKI Central Committee also welcomes enthusiastically the results of the discussions of Comrade Aidit's delegation with Communist and workers parties of five continents, which produced pledges from all parties consulted that they would support wholeheartedly the demand of the people and the republic of Indonesia for the liberation of West Irian, and particularly the joint statement of the P K I and the Communist Party of the Netherlands and the press communiqué of the PKI and the Communist Party of Australia. All of these constitute important support for the national struggle of the Indonesian people to liberate all of their country. Further, the Politburo of the PKI Central Committee instructs every PKI member who journeys abroad always to do everything possible to strengthen our national claim to West Irian. The Politburo of the PKI Central Committee also regards as very important and beneficial the warm and friendly discussions held between the chairman of the PKI delegation, Comrade Aidit, and the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade N. S. Khrushchev, in early November, 1961, and be-

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tween the chairman of the PKI delegation and members of the Politburo of the C P C Central Committee, including the Chairman of the CPC, Comrade M a o Tse-tung, in mid-November, 1961. These warm and friendly discussions have created deeper understanding between the PKI and both of these fraternal parties. With respect to the special problems which arose at the X X I I Congress of the CPSU, the Politburo of the PKI Central Committee has the following opinions. The condemnation of the personality cult was necessary to the strengthening of the Party's connection with the masses and, particularly, to the developing of the initiative and creative power of the masses. At the same time, it is necessary always to distinguish between the cult of the individual and the prestige of leaders, since the latter emerge in fact and are necessary in every class struggle and national struggle. The cult of the individual has its source in failure to maintain a link with the collective and with the masses; therefore, ties with the collective and with the masses must be affirmed in struggling against the personality cult.

EXPLICATION

AND

ESCALATION

As late as December 9, a Pravda editorial, expressing satisfaction w ith the condemnation of the APL at the four recent party con* Review of International 1963). p. 20.

Affairs

(Belgrade), No. 308 (February 5,

670

From Calm to

Crisis

gresses, still alluded to the Chinese party by indirection—"those w h o support the Albanian leaders in their schismatic activities." T h e very next day saw a new departure. Pravda named the Chinese C o m m u n i s t s by name—still, not in its o w n behalf but by reproducing excerpts f r o m the speeches of N o v o t n y and Togliatti which referred to the CPC's "ideological" position and to its delegation's p e r f o r m a n c e at the respective congresses. M o s c o w was getting ready to a c k n o w l e d g e the Sino-Soviet rift.

1 0 4 . NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV. R E P O R T TO THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THF. U S S R , DECEMBER

1 2 , 1 9 6 2 . Pravda,

December

13, 1962. 28 Khrushchev presented the report o n the international situation in person. Its first part a m o u n t e d t o a defense of Soviet policy in the Cuban crisis.

. . . REVOLUTIONARY Cuba was obliged to take every measure to strengthen its defenses. The Soviet Union helped it to set up a strong army to stand guard over the gains of the Cuban people. In connection with the increased menace from the USA, the government of Cuba asked the Soviet government this summer to provide additional help. Agreement was reached on a number of new measures, including the stationing of a few dozen Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba; these weapons were to be in the hands of the Soviet military. What purposes did this decision pursue? Of course, neither we nor our Cuban friends intended the small number of mediumrange missiles that were sent to Cuba to be used for attacking the United States or any other country. Our purpose was only the defense of Cuba. Everybody saw how the American imperialists were sharpening the knives and threatening Cuba with a massed attack. In the face of this highwayman's policy that contradicts all standards of relations among states and the UN Charter, we could not remain indifferent bystanders. We decided to hold out a helping hand to Cuba. (Prolonged applause.) We saw a possibility of defending the freedomM Translation from The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XIV, Nos. 51 and 52 (January 16 and 23, 1963).

From

Calm to

Crisis

671

loving people of Cuba by stationing missiles there so that the American imperialists, if they really dared to invade, would feel that the war they threatened was on their own borders, so that they would have a more real awareness of the danger of thermonuclear war to themselves. Such was the step we took, a step dictated by the serious aggravation of the situation. We were confident that this step would bring the aggressors to their senses and that they, realizing that Cuba was not defenseless and American imperialism not omnipotent, would be obliged to change their plans. Then, naturally, the need to keep missiles in Cuba would disappear. Indeed, had there not been a threat of invasion and had we had assurances earlier that the United States would not invade Cuba and would restrain its allies from doing so, had the United States been guided by this in its policy, there would have been no need to place our missiles in Cuba. Some people present matters as though we installed the rockets for an attack on the United States. This is, of course, stupid reasoning. Why do we have to install rockets in Cuba for this purpose when, possessing sufficient intercontinental missiles of the necessary range and power, we have had and have the possibility of striking a blow from our own territory? (Applause.) We do not need military bases on foreign territory at all. It is well known that we have dismantled all our bases abroad. People who have even the slightest understanding of military matters know that in the age of intercontinental and global missiles Cuba, that small and distant island, in some places only 50 km. wide, has no strategic value for the defense of the Soviet Union. We installed missiles on Cuba specifically for defense of the Cuban Republic and not for an attack on the USA. Such a small country as Cuba cannot, naturally, build up forces capable of launching an offensive against so large a country as the USA. Only someone who has taken leave of his senses could claim that the Soviet Union chose Cuba as a staging ground for invasion of the American continent—of the USA or of Latin American countries. If we had wanted to start a war against

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the USA we would not have agreed to dismantle the missiles installed in Cuba that were ready for launching, for battle; we would have fired them. But we did not do this because we did not pursue such aims. TTius all the talk that Cuba had been turned into a base for an offensive against the United States of America is a malicious concoction. The purpose of these allegations was to disguise plans of aggression against Cuba. We are loyal to the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence and believe that disputed issues among states should be settled peacefully by negotiation. After discussing U.S. military moves and the proclamation of a "quarantine" of Cuba on October 22, Khrushchev continued: In the face of these intensified war preparations we, on our part, were obliged to carry out appropriate measures. The Soviet government instructed the USSR Defense Minister to put the entire army of the Soviet Union, and above all the Soviet intercontinental and strategic missile troops, the country's surface-to-air antiaircraft missile defenses, fighter planes of the antiaircraft defenses, strategic aviation and naval forces, in a state of combat readiness. Our submarine fleet, including atomic submarines, took up positions as instructed. A state of heightened combat readiness was proclaimed for the ground forces, and the discharge from the Soviet Army of the older contingents of the strategic rocket troops, the antiaircraft troops, and the submarine fleet was postponed. The armed forces of the Warsaw Treaty countries were also placed in full combat readiness. In these circumstances, if one or the other side had failed to show restraint, failed to do all that was necessary to prevent the outbreak of war, an explosion would have followed, with irreparable consequences. The Soviet government's peaceful initiative toward settling the Cuban crisis met with full support from the socialist countries and the peoples of the majority of the other UN membercountries. UN Secretary-General U Thant made great efforts to settle the conflict.

From Calm to Crisis

673

However, the government of the United States of America continued to exacerbate the atmosphere. The U.S. military forces pushed the development of events so as to carry out an attack on Cuba. We received information from Cuban comrades and from other sources on the morning of October 27 directly stating that this attack would be carried out in the next two or three days. We interpreted these cables as an extremely alarming warning signal. And the alarm was justified. Immediate action was necessary to prevent the attack on Cuba and to preserve peace. A message was sent to the U.S. President prompting a mutually acceptable solution. It was still not too late at that moment to extinguish the wick of war that had already begun to smolder. In sending this message we took into account the fact that the messages of the President himself also expressed alarm and a desire to find a way out of the situation that had taken shape. We declared that if the USA pledged not to invade Cuba and also restrained other ally-states from aggression against Cuba, the Soviet Union would be prepared to remove from Cuba the weapons the USA calls "offensive." In reply, the President of the United States, for his part, declared that if the Soviet government agreed to remove these weapons from Cuba, the U.S. government would lift the quarantine, that is to say the blockade, and give assurance of the rejection both by the United States and by other countries of the Western hemisphere of an invasion of Cuba. T h e President declared in all definiteness, and the whole world knows this, that the United States would not attack Cuba and would also restrain its allies from such actions. But, after all, this was why we had sent our weapons to Cuba, to prevent an attack on her! Therefore the Soviet government confirmed its agreement to withdraw ballistic missiles from Cuba. Thus, in short, a mutually acceptable settlement was reached that signified a victory for reason and success for the cause of peace. The Cuban question moved into the phase of peaceful negotiations and, as concerns the United States of America, was

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there transferred, so to say, from the hands of generals into the hands of diplomats. On October 29 negotiations began in New York between representatives of the USSR, the USA, and Cuba, with the participation of U Thant. Comrade Mikoyan, First Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, flew to Havana for an exchange of views with the government of Cuba. Meanwhile, both sides set about fulfilling the commitments they had undertaken. T h e Soviet Union withdrew from Cuba all the missiles that the United States called offensive weapons. The Soviet personnel servicing the missile installations also left. The United States was given the opportunity of convincing itself that all the ballistic missiles that had been placed in Cuba were really withdrawn, and this was confirmed in statements by U.S. officials. At the same time, seeking to expedite the settlement of the Caribbean crisis, we agreed to the withdrawal of Soviet IL-28 planes from Cuba within a month's time, even though they were outdated as bombers. By December 7, these planes had been withdrawn from Cuba. They had been sent to Cuba only with a view to their potential use as a kind of flying artillery for coastal defense, operating under cover of antiaircraft weapons. On November 21 the U.S. government, for its part, lifted the naval blockade of Cuba and recalled its warships from that area. The American command withdrew the troops and planes that had been concentrated in the Florida area for attack on Cuba and demobilized the reserves called up. The additional troops that had been sent to Guantanamo in the crisis period were also withdrawn from that base. At the same time, the President reaffirmed the U.S. pledge that Cuba would not be invaded. In view of this, we also cancelled the military measures that we had been obliged to take in the light of the exacerbation of the crisis over Cuba. The Cuban Republic, in turn, set about demobilizing those who had been called up to defend their homeland, and they are returning to peaceful work and to their families.

From

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At present, favorable conditions have been created for liquidating the dangerous crisis that arose in the Caribbean. Now it is necessary to bring the negotiations to completion, to put on record the agreement reached as a result of the exchange of messages between the government of the Soviet Union and the U.S. government, and to seal this agreement with the authority of the United Nations. The Soviet government is convinced that it is not in the interests of peace to delay completion of the settlement of the Caribbean crisis, and we hope that the government of the United States also understands this. Some results of the normalization of the Cuban situation that has begun become clear from the above. First, it proved possible to prevent the invasion that threatened the Republic of Cuba from day to day, and consequently to prevent an armed clash. It proved possible to overcome a crisis that threatened a general thermonuclear war. Second, the United States took a public pledge before the whole world that it would not attack the Republic of Cuba and would restrain its allies from doing so. Third, the more rabid imperialists, who had counted on starting a thermonuclear war over Cuba, were unable to do this. The Soviet Union, the forces of peace and socialism, showed themselves capable of imposing peace on the adherents of war. (Prolonged applause.) Which side was victorious, who won? Here it can be said that reason won, that the cause of peace and of the security of nations won. (Stormy applause.) The sides displayed a sober approach and reckoned with the fact that unless measures were taken that would help overcome the dangerous development of events, a third world war could have broken out. As a result of mutual concessions and compromise, agreement was reached that made it possible to remove the dangerous tension and to normalize the situation. Both sides made concessions. We withdrew the ballistic missiles and agreed to withdraw the IL-28 planes. This gave the Americans satisfaction. But both Cuba and the Soviet Union

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received satisfaction: The American invasion of Cuba was averted, the naval blockade was lifted, the situation in the Caribbean is being normalized, people's Cuba exists, is gaining strength and developing under the leadership of its revolutionary government, its fearless leader Fidel Castro. (Stormy applause.) Some allege that the United States forced us to make concessions. If we employ such a yardstick, these persons should have said that the United States, too, was obliged to concede something. Settling disputes between states without war, by peaceful means—this is precisely the peaceful coexistence policy in action. If we agreed to construct our relations on this basis, if the relations of the USA with Cuba were based on the UN Charter, there would have been no necessity to send our rockets and install them in Cuba. We are pleased with this outcome of the events in the Caribbean, and all the other peoples who adhere to the positions of peaceful coexistence are undoubtedly pleased. They have gained the possibility of living and working in peaceful conditions. But now let us imagine for a moment what might have happened had we acted like die-hard politicians and refused to make mutual concessions. It would have been like the tale in which two goats met on a small bridge over an abyss and, both of them refusing to make way, butted one another. As you know, both of them crashed into the abyss. Is it sensible for men to behave like that? Among the U.S. ruling circles are politicians who are rightly called "lunatic." The "lunatics" have insisted and continue to insist on unleashing war against the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist camp as soon as possible. Is it not clear that if we had taken an uncompromising stand we would only have helped the "lunatic" camp to utilize the situation in order to strike at Cuba and unleash a world war? To be just, it should be pointed out that among the ruling circles of the United States there are also persons who appraise the situation more soberly and, proceeding from the existing balance of forces in the world arena, realize that the USA, if

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it unleashed a war, would not win it and would not achieve its aim. . . . We solemnly declare that the Soviet Union has been and continues to be with revolutionary Cuba. We shall continue to help the Cuban people to build a happy future. ( S t o r m y applause.) Overcoming the crisis enables them to return to peaceful labor. But the forces of peace must maintain vigilance. The Soviet government hopes that the pledges taken by the United States of America regarding Cuba will be strictly kept. After all, violation of these pledges would be dangerous not only for the given region, since it would inevitably give rise to a new and acute conflict; it would create a new menace to peace. What is more, it would kill all faith in such commitments, and this would exclude the future possibility of resorting to the method of peaceful settlement that played its positive role in resolving the crisis over Cuba. We for our part will firmly abide by the agreement reached as a result of the exchange of messages with the U.S. President. We should like to give clear warning that our commitments will remain binding as long as the other side carries out the terms of agreement. (Applause.) But if the commitments undertaken are not carried out by the other side, we shall be obliged to take such action as the situation may demand of us. (Applause.) It must be clear to everyone that our country will never leave revolutionary Cuba in trouble. (Prolonged applause.) The Soviet Union will carry out its promise to help revolutionary Cuba. Revolutionary Cuba will not remain defenseless. (Stormy applause. ) In our times the imperialists cannot fail to reckon with the growing might of the Soviet Union, of the socialist countries. We have the necessary number of powerful intercontinental missiles for us to inflict a retaliatory blow on an adversary who unleashes a war. Those militarists who boast that they have submarines alerted against the Soviet Union with Polaris missiles on board and other "surprises," as they put it, should remember that we too

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do not depend on luck alone. (Stir in the hall. Prolonged applause.) . . Comrade Deputies! It must be said that in the period of the peaceful settlement of the conflict in the Caribbean loud cries of dissatisfaction also issued from another quarter, from people who even call themselves Marxist-Leninists, although their actions have nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism. I have in mind, in particular, the Albanian leaders. Their criticism of the Soviet Union essentially harmonized with the criticism emanating from the most reactionary, bellicose circles of the West. Why is it precisely the Albanian leaders who are more vociferous than anyone? On this score I should like to relate an incident from my life. I spent my childhood and youth in the coal fields. Whereas Gorky went through the schooling of the people's universities, I was brought up in the miners' "university." For a working man this was a kind of Cambridge, a "university" of the downtrodden of Russia. My father entered it, and I too went through this "university" in my childhood and youth. I remember that in the miners' towns foulmouths used to do this: They would find a little boy who had barely learned to repeat words and did not understand their meaning; they would teach him the dirtiest oaths and would tell him: "Go under the windows of people's homes and say these words to the people." Or, worse, they would say to such a child: "Go to your mother and repeat these words to her. Here is three kopeks for this, and afterwards we shall give you five more." The child would run under the windows of houses or run around to his mother, repeating the oaths; this would provide a form of entertainment for the foulmouths. Now the Albanian leaders are acting like those silly boys. Someone taught them to pronounce foul words, and they walk under windows and shout hooligan curses at the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. But this is their mother! For their swearing they get the promised three kopeks. And when they begin to swear more violently and colorfully, they get another five kopeks and are praised.

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What do these people, who call themselves Marxist-Leninists, want? Why are they seeking essentially the same thing that Adenauer seeks, that is, egging on toward conflict, toward exacerbation of the international situation? It is truly said that if you go left, you come out on the right. If one looks at matters objectively, then during the Cuban crisis they actually behaved like people trying to provoke a conflict; they wanted to bring on a clash between the Soviet Union and the United States. But what is the meaning of bringing on a clash between these two great world powers? It means causing a world thermonuclear war. It would be interesting to see how they would conduct themselves in such a war. I do not think they would want to take part in it. Evidently they would prefer to sit it out. But then the question arises: What do they want? Can it be that they want the peoples of the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other socialist countries to shed their blood? The Albanian leaders, to judge by their declarations, are obviously dissatisfied with the liquidation of the crisis over Cuba. They call the solution reached a retreat, while some go so far as to allege that the Soviet Union surrendered to imperialism. One asks, in what respect have we retreated? Socialist Cuba exists. Cuba remains a beacon of MarxistLeninist ideas in the Western Hemisphere. The power of its revolutionary example will grow. The government of the USA has pledged on behalf of its country not to invade Cuba; the menace of thermonuclear war has been averted. Is this retreat

ours? (Stormy applause.) The critics of the peaceful settlement of the conflict claim that one cannot take the word of the United States of America, that history knows many instances of treaties being violated. Yes, history contains such instances. But if one proceeds on this basis alone, then one must admit that people now have no other prospect than mutual destruction. To assert this means, willynilly, to take the path of militarism, to regard war as the sole method of settling disputes. Must international disputes necessarily be settled by war and

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not by negotiation? No, the preachment of settlement of disputes among states by means of war is madness that can only bring suffering and calamities to the peoples. It has nothing in common with the teaching of Marx and Lenin. It is tantamount to denying the principle of peaceful coexistence. Sensible norms of international relations exist. And we should not undermine them but strengthen them. Vituperation does not help to settle disputed issues. Some people, basing themselves on the fact that the nature of imperialism has not changed, say that it must be exposed and cursed. Imperialism should, of course, be exposed, it is an evil to the peoples of the world; but vituperation alone, however justified, will not weaken it. It is true, of course, that the nature of imperialism has not changed, but imperialism is now no longer what it used to be when it held undivided rule over the world. If it is a "paper tiger" now, those who say this know that this "paper" tiger has atomic teeth. It can put them to work, and it cannot be regarded frivolously. In relations with the imperialist states it is possible to agree to mutual compromises, but on the other hand one must possess all the means to crush aggressors if they start a war. (Prolonged applause.) When grave conditions arose for Cuba, some people limited themselves to vituperation. The imperialist forces did not become weaker from the loud outcries, and it is doubtful also whether this made matters easier for Cuba. The Soviet Union acted otherwise. It did not merely expose the imperialist intrigues of the USA. It sent its arms to Cuba, sent its people, who were prepared to give their lives in the struggle to defend Cuba. (Applause.) And when a menace hung over Cuba, our people received orders to defend Cuba against invasion, to fight together with the Cubans, and to stand to the death with the Cuban people. (Prolonged applause.) Here you have genuinely fraternal sentiments, a fraternal attitude, fraternal solidarity. (Stormy applause.) Of course, this was a critical time, and the government of the United States of America realized the possible course of events.

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It realized that if the American armed forces kindled war in Cuba and if Cubans and Soviet people in Cuba were consumed in this conflagration, then no force could restrain the Soviet Union from a crushing retaliatory blow. (Stormy applause.) Therefore at the decisive moment of the crisis the U.S. government displayed prudence. In proposing a mutually acceptable solution, we took into account the totality of all circumstances. And war was averted. Now we say to our critics: Your abuse is praise of our government, our party, our people, praise of all the Marxist-Leninist parties that stand on the positions of the 1957 Declaration of Communist and workers parties and the 1960 Statement of eighty-one parties, that uphold the ideas of peaceful coexistence of states with differing sociopolitical systems. (Prolonged applause.) One must be very careful not to cast irresponsible accusations, such as that some pursue an orthodox policy and others pursue a mistaken policy, that some wage an offensive against imperialism and are uncompromising toward it while others allegedly show liberalism. These questions can be correctly understood and one or another action can be correctly appraised only if one takes into account the time, place, and circumstances in which one has to act. India, for example, achieved the liberation of Goa, Diu, and Damao. These were vestiges of colonialism on Indian soil. Even after the British colonialists were driven out of India, Portugal kept its colonies there, spreading the stench of colonialism. India, its government, showed patience, put up with this for several years, then threw out the colonialists. Were they right in doing this? Of course they were! When Indonesia achieved freedom, the Dutch colonialists tried to keep West Irian. But the Indonesian people and their government forced the colonialists to get out of West Irian. We gave Indonesia such help as we could in its struggle, and we welcome the liberation of West Irian and the reunification with free Indonesia. (Applause.) On the coast of China, near the mouth of the Chukiang, lies

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Macao. It is a small territory, even hard to find on a map. The Portuguese leased it in the middle of the sixteenth century, and in 1887 they completely wrested it from China and turned it into their colony. The British colony of Hong Kong also exists there, situated in the delta of the Hsikiang and literally alongside the heart of so important a city as Kwangchow [Canton], The aroma coming from these places is not a bit better than the smell from colonialism in Goa. But would anybody condemn the Chinese People's Republic for the fact that vestiges of colonialism remain intact? It would be wrong to prod China to actions it considers untimely. If the government of the Chinese People's Republic tolerates Macao and Hong Kong, evidently there are weighty reasons for doing so. Therefore it would be absurd to pounce upon it with the accusation that this is allegedly a concession to the British and Portuguese colonialists, that this is allegedly conciliation. Is this perhaps a retreat from Marxism-Leninism? Nothing of the sort. It signifies that the government of the Chinese People's Republic reckons with the actual situation, with the actual possibilities. And it is by no means because the Chinese take a less sharp attitude toward colonialism than the Indians that they show greater tolerance of Salazar than India does. No, our Chinese friends have the same hatred of colonialism that every revolutionary has. But evidently they proceed from their own conditions, from their own understanding, and show patience. Should we then condemn them for this and claim that they have retreated from Marxism-Leninism? No. This would be stupid. Thanks to many circumstances, one sometimes has to live not among fragrant roses but amid thornbushes and at times even next to a colonialist toilet. But the hour will come when the Chinese friends will recognize the situation to be intolerable and will tell the colonialists at the top of their voices: "Get out!" (Prolonged applause.) We shall greet this move. But let the Chinese friends themselves decide when to do this. We are not pushing them. On the con-

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trary, we say: "Decide this matter in the interests of your country, in the interests of the whole socialist c a m p . " But what would have happened if during the Cuban events we had not shown proper restraint but had heeded the promptings of the "ultrarevolutionary" loudmouths? We would have entered the stage of a new world war, a thermonuclear war. Our vast country would have withstood it, of course, but tens and tens of millions of people would have perished! And Cuba probably would have simply ceased to exist as a result of thermonuclear warfare. Other densely populated countries that do not have vast expanses would have been drawn into the conflict and also would have perished completely. And even those who remained alive, and future generations too, would have suffered incredibly from the consequences of atomic radiation. Was this the path of mankind's development outlined by Marx and Lenin? No. Those who try to ascribe such a world outlook and such designs to our great teachers only insult their memory. When the revolution began in tsarist Russia, our slogan was: "Peace to the huts, war on the palaces!" This accorded with the Party's policy of turning imperialist war into civil war; it was a call to class struggle, to the struggle against the landowners and capitalists. And when the revolution triumphed, the first decree of the Soviet regime, drawn up by V . I. Lenin, was the Decree on Peace. And although the Germans then occupied quite a large part of the territory of Russia, V. I. Lenin and our whole country sought to put an end to the war and conclude a peace treaty with the Germans. A delegation headed by Trotsky, who at that time likewise called himself a Marxist, was sent to Brest to sign the treaty. But he went against the Party, provocatively wrecked the peace negotiations with the Germans, and left Brest. Vladimir Ilyich was then obliged to send Chicherin, and the peace treaty was signed. History has confirmed the correctness and geniuslike foresight of V. I. Lenin. It has shown that the path that V . I. Lenin set forth and defended in struggle against pseudorevolutionaries was the only sensible and true path. T h e Brest Peace

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was, of course, a temporary concession to German militarism. But what was the final outcome? Who surrrenderd to whom? The Marxist-Leninist banner now not only waves over the whole territory of the Soviet Union but has marched beyond its boundaries and has been established in other states, including the territory of the German Democratic Republic, while the German militarists who invaded our country lie in the earth. Now judge who was right! The Leninist approach to the settlement of such a complicated problem triumphed. (Prolonged applause.) It is certainly not a matter of some analogy between the Brest Peace and the settlement of the conflict in the Caribbean. The point is that each time it is necessary to take into account the specific situation and the specific conditions. A dogmatic approach, without taking sober stock of the actual situation, is harmful, since it is the source of the gravest mistakes. MarxistLeninists should remember that there is no abstract truth; truth is always concrete. Some dogmatists have taken to Trotskyite positions and are seeking to push the Soviet Union and other socialist countries onto the path of unleashing a world war. They would like to impose the same provocational policy that Trotsky pursued in his day. Evidently the Albanian leaders and those who are prodding them on have lost faith in the possibility of the victory of socialism without war among states, or perhaps they never understood this possibility at all but believed that communism can be reached only through war, by destroying millions of lives. But this madness cannot attract the peoples of other countries to follow the Communist parties. What is more, it can repel millions and millions of people from the Communist movement. The Albanian dogmatists are disappointed that a compromise solution was reached and that the dangerous crisis on which the American imperialists embarked in the Caribbean was liquidated. They are apparently disappointed that thermonuclear war was not unleashed and that the peoples, having avoided the dangerous crisis, are living and working in peace. But for us who are building communism, as for our brothers who are establishing socialism, there is no point in dying either

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with music or without it. We must carry the cause of communism to final victory. (Stormy, prolonged applause.) Why should we ask the devil to invite us to be his guests, why should we, as they say, rush off to the next world? After all, no one has yet returned from there and told us that it is better than on earth. (Laughter in the hall.) Are you, Comrade Deputies, disappointed at having gathered in this hall to discuss questions of the further development of our country in peaceful conditions, when we have succeeded in averting a thermonuclear war? No, we are all glad of this. (Stormy, prolonged applause.) . . . In forty-five years we have traveled a tremendous path, and now our stride has become longer—we now cover in a month what used to take five years. Do we have something to cherish? Of course we do! We have prospects, we have confidence in the ultimate victory of our ideas. We seek those victories not on the roads of war but in the paths of peaceful creation, of competition with capitalism. We reject not only world thermonuclear war but all wars among states except just wars of liberation and wars of defense that a people who have been victims of aggression are obliged to wage. Khrushchev proceeded to develop the similarities between the "lunatics" in the West and the "dogmatists" in the East as contrasted with "men of reason" and believers in peaceful coexistence o n both sides. H e went on to urge the application of reason to the "peaceful settlement" of other issues, ranging from disarmament to Berlin, and from Y e m e n to the Congo.

Comrade Deputies! In surveying the present international situation one cannot overlook the deplorable events that have taken place in the area of the Indian-Chinese frontier. As we know, the border conflict that arose there began not a week ago but back in 1959. This conflict became acute in recent times and grew into military clashes, in the course of which thousands of persons perished on both sides. The position of the Soviet Union toward the Indian-Chinese border conflict was set forth in a well-known TASS statement

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back in 1959. In this statement the hope was expressed that the government of the Chinese People's Republic and the government of India would not allow forces that do not want a relaxation of international tension to warm their hands over their border incident; and that both governments would settle the misunderstanding that had arisen, settle it with regard for mutual interests and in the spirit of the traditional friendship between the peoples of China and India. TTie Soviet Union expressed great regret over the incident that arose. We sincerely hoped that the governments of both countries would quickly find a way to peaceful settlement of the dispute. Even now we regret that the sides did not use in time all the possibilities of extinguishing the border conflict from the very beginning. We are particularly sorry that the blood of sons of the fraternal People's Republic of China and of the friendly Republic of India was spilled. For the first time a situation arose in which a border conflict between a socialist country and a country that has taken the path of independent development and is pursuing a policy of nonalignment with blocs led to serious armed conflicts. . . . We adhere to Leninist views on the question of border disputes. The forty-five-year experience of the Soviet Union tells us that there are no disputes of a border nature that, given a mutual desire, cannot be settled without resort to arms. This is the stand from which the Soviet people judge the events on the Chinese-Indian frontier. . The logic of war is such that the more blood is spilled, the more is needed to wash it away. Where is the limit to this? The Moloch of war will consume more and more victims each day. He is insatiable. Only reason can stop the bloodletting, and statesmen must possess such reason. Therefore we consider sensible the step taken by the government of the Chinese People's Republic when it announced that it was unilaterally ceasing fire and beginning to withdraw troops as of December 1. We are very glad of this and welcome these

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actions of the Chinese comrades. (Prolonged applause.) . . . Some are already saying that China, if you please, ceased hostilities apparently because India began to receive support f r o m the American and British imperialists, who are providing that country with arms. Consequently, say such people, the Chinese People's Republic felt that if the conflict were to develop further it might grow into a major war that would require even greater sacrifices. Yes, evidently the Chinese friends took account of the situation, and this again speaks for their wisdom and awareness that when w a r breaks out between friendly neighboring states the imperialists always try to benefit by it. The U S A and Britain have an overproduction of arms, and when a war arises they gladly supply them to other countries that are prepared to waive their national sovereignty to obtain arms, not realizing that they are thus putting their heads in a noose and falling into dependence. . . . A f t e r all, it is no accident that arrests of Communists and other progressive figures have been going on lately in India. Tomorrow, if the war continues, anyone who utters a word against war will be considered a Communist. Consequently, pacifists also will be placed in this category. Here you have a debauch by reactionary forces, by the most brazen militarists and reactionaries. Evidently the Chinese comrades also took this into account when they decided the question of a cease-fire and withdrawal of troops. It is beyond dispute that the actions of the government of the Chinese People's Republic will be properly appraised by peaceloving peoples. Indeed, why wage war? Did China ever set herself the aim of invading India? No, we reject such assertions as slander. And, of course, we likewise absolutely do not accept the idea that India wanted to start a war with China. This is exactly why we sincerely welcome the steps taken by the government of people's China and do not at all consider that it has beaten any kind of retreat. No, the government of the Chinese

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People's Republic showed wisdom and a correct understanding of the situation and made efforts to stop the military conflict and normalize the situation. . . . Finally, in a survey of Soviet relations with other states, Khrushchev dealt with Yugoslavia and Albania. Unfortunately, the friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were spoiled shortly after the end of the Second World War. I shall not discuss the causes of the impairment of these relations. The Yugoslav comrades, as we know, consider that the blame for this lies entirely with Stalin. Stalin in his time accused the Yugoslavs of everything. We have our own definite opinion about this. We have already said, and we repeat, that unquestionably Stalin, who engaged in gross and utterly unjustified arbitrariness toward Yugoslavia, bears the chief share of the blame for the impairment of Soviet-Yugoslav relations. But we would not be completely sincere if we did not say that the Yugoslav comrades also bear their share of the responsibility for the way in which the relations between our countries and our parties developed in that period. This was how matters stood in the past. But we Communists should look ahead, should see the future of our peoples. At present our relations with Yugoslavia are good. Comrade Tito, accompanied by Comrades Rankovic, Veselinov, and other state figures, who came to the Soviet Union at our invitation, are spending a vacation in our country and are present here. (Stormy, prolonged applause.) We greeted them as friends and have already had a number of useful talks with them that have yielded a great deal in better mutual understanding. We see that the Yugoslav leaders, like ourselves, are making efforts to overcome the existing differences and are seeking improved relations with our country. I must say that it has been confirmed once again that on many international issues, on problems of interstate and economic relations, we share a common understanding, common views. We and the Yugoslav leaders are deeply convinced that the further development of ties between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia corresponds not only to the in-

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tercsts of both our countries but also to the interests of strengthening all the forces fighting for peace, for democracy, for socialism and communism. ( A p p l a u s e . ) As for our position on the question of the development of relations with the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, it follows completely from the line laid down by the X X and X X I I Party congresses. This line aims at strengthening the unity between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and all the fraternal parties, at consolidating all the forces of the antiimperialist front. The Yugoslavs used to swear at us, and we used to repay them in the same coin. (Stir in the hall.) Now both we and the Yugoslav Communists follow the path of improving our relations. It cannot be said that all the encrustations and difficulties in the mutual relations between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia have been eliminated. There have been and remain serious differences on many ideological questions, differences reflected in the Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, as was noted in the Statement of the Conference of fraternal parties. But we for our part are prepared to do everything to overcome the differences. This depends not only on us but also on the position of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, of its leadership. We are convinced that the restoration and strengthening of unity on ideological questions between the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and all the fraternal parties on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism would be in the interests of both our parties and of the entire international Communist movement. We Communists should take into account the way the historical process is proceeding, how the struggle for socialism in various countries is developing in practice. Many countries of Europe and Asia have now already taken the path of socialism. It is natural that each Communist party in these countries tries to apply the principles of Marxism-Leninism creatively to the specific historical, geographical, and other conditions of its own

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country and on this basis exercises its leadership of the people in the building of socialism and communism. It is understandable that there cannot be a completely identical interpretation of all questions that arise before one or another Communist or workers party in the struggle for building the new society. A different interpretation of specific questions of socialist construction, a different approach to this or that question, is not excluded. So it is in practice, and evidently so it will be in the future when other peoples embark on the path of socialism. Therefore it would be wrong to work out a stereotype and apply it in mutual relations with other socialist countries; it would be a mistake to condemn as renegades all who do not fit the stereotype. Well, then, in such a case are we to seek the complete expulsion of a Communist party from the ranks of our movement? Can one ignore the fact that the people of such a country are building socialism? Or should we perhaps close our eyes to the very fact of the existence of such a people or fight against them? To act thus would be to borrow the jungle law of the capitalist world and to apply it in mutual relations among Communist parties and among socialist countries. But this is precisely the jungle morality that the Albanian sectarians and splitters propose that we follow in mutual relations with Yugoslavia. They are literally ready to cut the throats of the Yugoslav Communists for their mistakes, although they themselves deviate much further from Marxism-Leninism than those whom they accuse. Such a morality is profoundly alien to us Communists. We are fighting for a better future for mankind, we are fighting for communism, in which the genuine brotherhood of the peoples of the whole world will be achieved. We are deeply convinced that with the complete victory of communism, in the future, as V. I. Lenin taught, state borders that now divide peoples will disappear entirely, national separateness will wither away, and the peoples will merge into a single family, like brothers. Marching toward this cherished goal, we must do everything to eliminate differences if they arise among Communists of different countries. It is our duty to help parties that have erred or

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deviated from the norms of the international revolutionary workers movement, from Marxism-Leninism, to realize their mistakes and to correct them so that they may occupy a worthy place in the family of all the fraternal parties. It must be stated that the steps taken in recent times by the Yugoslav Communists, by their leaders, in both domestic and foreign policy, have removed very much of what we considered mistaken and harmful to the cause of building socialism in Yugoslavia. This has found reflection in a number of decisions of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, in the speeches of Comrades Tito, Rankovic, and other Yugoslav personalities. But if we still do not have common views on some questions, this does not at all signify that we should construct our relations on the basis of the remaining differences, that we should shut our eyes to the steps that the Communists of Yugoslavia have now taken toward rapprochement and unity with the entire world Communist movement. This would be a policy aimed not at unity but at disunity. It would be all the more incorrect to carry over the remaining differences into state relations. On the contrary, strengthening and developing economic ties and relations between our countries along state and public lines creates the basis for bringing our positions closer together on ideological questions also. The Albanian sectarians and dogmatists are trying by every means to hamper improvement of the socialist countries' relations with Yugoslavia. They have raised a howl, particularly now when Comrades Tito, Rankovic, Veselinov, and other Yugoslav figures have come to the Soviet Union. The Albanian splitters obviously do not like the fact that we are welcoming the Yugoslav comrades in fraternal fashion. We are being told that it is reprehensible to have good relations with Yugoslavia along state lines and in the economic sphere until certain ideological differences with the League of Communists of Yugoslavia are overcome. And those who say this call themselves Marxist-Leninists! But this is simply stupid. After all, even the imperialists try to overcome and smooth over their contradictions in order to survive in the struggle against

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the advancing forces of the Communist, workers, and national liberation movement. Now they are feverishly reinforcing and enlarging the Common Market union of countries, despite the contradictions among the member states. Yet in our camp people are found who want to disunite our forces. This is not our policy, it is not a Marxist-Leninist policy. Some claim that Yugoslavia is not a socialist country. One might ask, what kind of country is it? In answering this question, one must proceed from Marxist-Leninist teachings, from an objective analysis of the social development of the country, the nature of its sociopolitical system. Here subjectivism is impermissible. It cannot be thought that someone can, like Buddha, utter truths without regard to the facts and determine which country is socialist and which is not. Here knowledge of MarxistLeninist theory and a deep analysis of reality are essential. It is well known that for a long time there have been no landowners or capitalists in Yugoslavia, n o private capital, no private enterprises, landed estates, or private banks. We see, too, that the Yugoslav Communists and their leaders are directing their efforts toward developing the economy, strengthening the gains of socialism. Therefore, if one proceeds f r o m objective laws, from the teaching of Marxism-Leninism, it is impossible to deny that Yugoslavia is a socialist country. It is f r o m this that we proceed in our policy and on this that we build our mutual relations with Yugoslavia as a socialist country. Now there are grounds for further development of relations between our countries. {Prolonged applause.) . . . Now the Albanian leaders cling to exactly that which was most negative in Stalin's activity, that which marked his departure from Marxism-Leninism. What attracts them most is the methods of repression and gross administrative pressure employed by Stalin, alien to the very spirit of a socialist state. You see, they want to become mainstays of the international Communist movement, infallible defenders of Marxism-Leninism. But these are the efforts of the proverbial frog. Y o u remember the fable of the frog who wanted to be as big as the ox.

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Everybody knows how it ended: The frog burst and left only a puddle. (Stir in the hall.) The anti-Leninist ideology of the cult of the individual underlies the whole present fallacious line of the Albanian leaders. They are trying with might and main to preserve a situation in Albania in which they may uncontrolledly and with impunity violate all the standards of party and state life to satisfy their personal interests. Hoxha and Shehu know that they would not remain in power if they relaxed the regime of repressions and summary brutality. The people would not tolerate them as leaders, for their hands are stained with the blood of the best sons of the Albanian Party of Labor. . . . Some persons, repeating the correct propositions of the Statement of the Conference of Communist and Workers Parties, put a one-sided emphasis on the danger f r o m revisionism and mention Yugoslav revisionism both when relevant and when irrelevant. But we must look at matters concretely. In the crisis that we went through over Cuba, the Yugoslav Communists took a correct position, while the dogmatists, who proclaim themselves genuine Marxist-Leninists, took a provocational stand. Hence one cannot repeat, without Marxist analysis, a proposition once set forth in writing, or interpret it one-sidedly. T h e crisis over Cuba demonstrated precisely that the chief danger was represented by those who held and who continue to hold the positions of dogmatism. The present-day left opportunists and sectarians, whose most open spokesmen are the Albanian leaders, mask their struggle against the Leninist policy of peace and peaceful coexistence by noisy pseudorevolutionary phrasemongering. As already mentioned, they have slipped down into Trotskyite positions. It is not hard to see that this policy undermines the forces opposing imperialism and plays into the hands of the most aggressive imperialist circles of the Western powers and encourages their anti-Communist designs. This "leftist," dogmatic policy was properly appraised at the congresses of the Communist and workers parties of Bulgaria,

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Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Italy. The representatives of the fraternal parties exposed and sharply condemned this provocational policy in their speeches at these congresses. (Prolonged

applause.) If one thoroughly scratches the "leftist" shouters, the dogmatists, one can easily discover that underlying their show of bravery is nothing but fear of imperialism, distrust of the possibility of defeating the capitalist system in peaceful economic competition. This is exactly the characteristic trait of pettybourgeois instability and wavering that V. I. Lenin so mercilessly exposed and ridiculed. He told such shouters outright: "Your role, objectively speaking, is that of a tool of imperialist provocation. And subjectively your 'psychology' is the psychology of the infuriated petty-bourgeois who swaggers and boasts but knows full well that the proletariat is right . . ." (Sochineniia, 4th ed. [Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1941—], XXVII. 297). How sharply and aptly Vladimir Ilyich put it! It was as though he had in mind the present shouters in Albania. Forty years ago V. I. Lenin penetratingly pointed out the serious danger that left opportunism represented for the Communist movement. He said that if leftist doctrinairism in that period could be called an "infantile disorder" in communism, it was only because it was a quite young trend, barely beginning to sprout. One of the negative effects of the Stalin cult in the international Communist movement was the spread of left-sectarian, dogmatic views, which wrought serious harm to the great cause of the struggle for socialism and weakened the influence of Marxism-Leninism upon the broad masses of the people. As V. I. Lenin had warned, underestimation of the struggle against left opportunism caused neglect of the disorder, so that it ceased to be infantile long ago. Peculiarities of the development of the Communist movement in our times, when the people of countries of the most diverse economic and social levels are taking the path of socialism, create favorable conditions for the spread of "left-wing" communism. It has always found a soil for itself in

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the instability of representatives of the petty bourgeoisie, in their swinging from one extreme to another. The left-sectarian disorder is fed by nationalism, and in turn it nourishes nationalism. It becomes intolerable when it manifests itself in the activity of a ruling party, upon the policy of which the destinies of the people in large measure depend. It becomes dangerous in so far as it is directed against the Communist movement's line on such vital questions as those of war and peace, which affect the destinies of all mankind. It cannot be denied that for all these reasons left opportunism, dogmatism, and sectarianism are more and more becoming a serious danger in the international Communist movement. Not to see this means to be afraid to face the facts, to turn away from reality and not to realize the full responsibility that lies upon Marxist-Leninists in our times. Soviet Communists, for whom the unity of the ranks of the international Communist movement is uppermost, will wage a resolute struggle against both right and left opportunism, which is now no less dangerous than revisionism. (Applause.) Promptly after Khrushchev's speech of D e c e m b e r 12, the C h i n e s e C o m m u n i s t leadership appears to have decided to reply "in kind." O n D e c e m b e r 15, the C P C delegation's Statement delivered in Prague a week earlier was released to the press (see D o c u m e n t N o . 103 a b o v e ) . T w o major editorials in Jen-min jih-pao—one, on D e c e m b e r 15; the other, on D e c e m b e r 31—constituted the most detailed and most systematic public exposition of the Chinese C o m munist point of view. 1 0 5 . "WORKERS OF A L L COUNTRIES, U N I T E TO O P P O S E O U R

Editorial in Jen-min jih-pao, December 15, 1 9 6 2 . N C N A release in English. COMMON E N E M Y ! "

IT is painful that recently, at the very time that imperialism and the reactionaries of all countries are doing everything in their power to oppose the socialist countries, undermine the international Communist movement, and suppress the revolutionary struggle of various peoples—at a time when there is a pressing need for the Communists of all countries to strengthen their

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unity and to stand together against the enemy, there has a p peared in the ranks of the international Communist m o v e m e n t an adverse current against Marxism-Leninism, against the C P C and other Marxist-Leninist parties: an adverse current undermining the unity of the international C o m m u n i s t movement. D u r i n g the past m o n t h and more, one after the another, the VIII Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party, the V I I I C o n gress of the H u g a r i a n Socialist Workers Party, the X Congress of the Italian Communist Party, and the X I I Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party have been held in E u r o p e . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the rostrums of these party congresses were used as platforms for attacking fraternal parties. This adverse current of undermining unity and creating division reached a new high at the Italian and Czechoslovak C o m m u n i s t Party congresses. C o m r a d e s of some fraternal parties not only c o n tinued to attack the Albanian Party of Labor but also openly, by n a m e , attacked the C P C and even censured the K o r e a n W o r k e r s Party, which objected to the attack on the C P C . T h i s is an utterly outrageous violation of the 1957 Moscow Declaration and the 1960 Moscow Statement unanimously adopted by the C o m m u n i s t and workers parties of various countries. T h i s is an event of the utmost gravity in the international C o m m u nist m o v e m e n t . . The editorial then repeated the substance of the Statement of December 8 (Document No. 103). Here let us recall what happened at the Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. At the Czechoslovak C o m m u nist Party Congress, some comrades of that party and c o m r a d e s of certain other fraternal parties wantonly vilified and attacked the C P C as "adventurist," "sectarian," "splitter," "nationalist," and " d o g m a t i c . " T h e C P C delegation in its statement resolutely opposed this practice of creating splits. The Statement pointed out: " T h i s erroneous practice has already produced serious consequences, and, if continued, it is bound to produce even m o r e serious consequences." However, this attitude of the C P C of

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prizing unity failed to cause those persisting in this erroneous practice to change their minds. Certain leaders of the Czechoslovak Communist Party made it clear that they could "not agree" with the view of the C P C delegation, and insisted on "going further" in this practice. They went so far as to ask the C P C to "reconsider" its position on major international problems and even to publicize this slander and attack against China to the whole world. Under these circumstances, we cannot but make the necessary reply. Some comrades of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and comrades of certain fraternal parties accused the C P C of committing so-called adventurist errors. They attacked China by alleging that it was opposed to a "sensible compromise" on the Cuban question and wanted to "plunge [the whole world] into a thermonuclear war." Are things really as they claimed? T h e people of China, like the people of all other socialist countries and the rest of the world, love peace. China has always followed a peaceful foreign policy. We have consistently and energetically fought for the relaxation of international tension and the defense of world peace. China was an initiator of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence; we have consistently advocated peaceful coexistence with countries of different social systems on the basis of the Five Principles, stood for the settlement of international disputes through negotiations, and opposed recourse to force. T h e C P C has always maintained that in order to preserve world peace, realize peaceful coexistence, and relax international tension, it is necessary, first of all, to oppose resolutely the U.S. imperialist policies of aggression and war and to mobilize the masses of people to wage a head-on struggle against U.S. imperialism. We believe, as the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement point out, that a joint struggle by the forces of socialism, the forces of national liberation, the forces of democracy, and all the forces of peace can frustrate U.S. imperialist plans for aggression and war and prevent world war. On the question of how to deal with imperialism and all reactionaries, the C P C has always maintained that one should

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slight them strategically but deal seriously with them tactically. T h a t is to say, on the one hand, imperialism and all reactionaries, in the final analysis, are doomed to failure and the masses of the people will certainly triumph. Without this understanding, it would not be possible to encourage the masses of people to wage resolute revolutionary struggles against imperialism and all reactionaries with full confidence, nor would it be possible to lead the revolution to victory. On the other hand, f r o m the tactical point of view, on each immediate, specific issue, it is necessary to deal with imperialism and all reactionaries seriously, to proceed with care and caution, and to pay attention to the art of struggle. Without this understanding, it also would not be possible to wage victorious revolutionary struggles, there would be the danger of suffering setbacks and defeats, and it would not be possible to lead the revolution to victory. This concept of slighting the enemy strategically and dealing seriously with him tactically, to which the C P C has always adhered, is the concept of the imperialists and all reactionaries being paper tigers—to which we have often referred—and this is an entirely Marxist-Leninist concept. We are opposed both to capitulationism and to adventurism. All who want to conduct a revolution and win victory must adopt this and no other attitude in dealing with the enemy. The reason is that if one does not dare to slight the enemy strategically, one will inevitably commit the error of capitulationism. If one takes heedless and reckless action tactically, in any particular struggle, one will inevitably commit the error of adventurism. If one does not dare to slight the enemy strategically while at the same time acting heedlessly tactically, one will commit both the error of capitulationism strategically and that of adventurism tactically. With regard to the question of how to deal with nuclear weapons, the Chinese Communists have always advocated a complete ban on nuclear weapons, which are highly destructive, and have always opposed the imperialist criminal policy of nuclear war. They have always held that with the great superiority of the socialist camp, it is also possible to reach an agreement on the banning of nuclear weapons through negotiations and

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through continuously exposing U.S. imperialism and struggling against it. But no Marxist-Leninists or revolutionary peoples have ever been paralyzed with fear by the nuclear weapons in the hands of imperialism and given up their struggle against imperialism and its lackeys. We Marxist-Leninists are not advocates of the theory of the omnipotence of weapons or of nuclear weapons. We have never believed that nuclear weapons can decide the destiny of mankind. We are profoundly convinced that the masses of people are the decisive force in the development of history. They alone can decide the course of history. We are resolutely opposed to the imperialist policy of nuclear blackmail. We also hold that the socialist countries have no need whatsoever to use nuclear weapons as a gambling counter or for frightening others. To do this would mean truly to commit the error of adventurism. Having blind faith in nuclear weapons and failing to recognize or have confidence in the strength of the masses of people, and being scared out of one's wits by imperialist nuclear blackmail, would be likely to lead one to jump from one extreme to another and to commit the error of capitulationism. We hold that in their struggle against U.S. imperialism the heroic Cuban peope have neither committed the error of capitulationism nor the error of adventurism. Like all other peoples in the world, they ardently love peace and are working energetically for it. But as Comrade Fidel Castro has said: "The way to peace is not the way of sacrificing or infringing upon the people's rights, because that will be the way leading to war." The National Directorate of the Cuban Integrated Revolutionary Organizations and the Cuban Revolutionary Government declared solemnly in their joint statement of November 25: "The best form of settlement is through peaceful channels and discussion between governments. But we reiterate at the same time that we will never become renegades in the face of the imperialists. We shall oppose the imperialist position of strength with our firmness. We shall oppose the imperialist attempt to humiliate us with our dignity. We shall oppose imperialist aggression with the determination to fight to the last man."

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The Cuban people, who, under the firm leadership of the Cuban Integrated Revolutionary Organizations and the Cuban government headed by Fidel Castro, united as one, waged a resolute struggle against U.S. imperialism under most complex and difficult conditions and insisted on their five just demands, were not frightened by U.S. nuclear blackmail, and. with the just support of the people of the whole world, succeeded in winning another great victory in the struggle against U.S. aggression. The Communist Party, the government, and the people of China resolutely support the correct line of the Cuban Integrated Revolutionary Organizations and government, the five just demands of the Cuban people, and their heroic struggle. In so doing, China is fulfilling its inescapable obligation in accordance with proletarian internationalism. If, as is alleged, China's support for the Cuban people's just struggle against the U.S. aggressors was "adventurist," we would like to ask: Does this mean that the Chinese people would have to refrain f r o m giving every possible support within their power to Cuba's struggle against U.S. imperialist aggression, in order not to be adventurist? Does this mean that only by forcing Cuba to give up its sovereignty, independence, and five just demands could one avoid being called adventurist or capitulationist? T h e whole world sees that we neither requested the introduction of nuclear weapons into C u b a nor obstructed the withdrawal of "offensive weapons" from that country. For us, therefore, there is no question whatsoever of "adventurism," still less of "plunging [the whole world] into a thermonuclear war." Some people have also censured China for its correct stand on the Sino-Indian boundary question—as if China had precipitated a disaster. But what are the facts? China has consistently stood for settlement of boundary questions with its neighbors through peaceful negotiations, and has, on the basis of the Five Principles, successfully settled its boundary question with B u r m a and Nepal through friendly consultations and in the spirit of mutual accommodation. On the Sino-Indian boundary question, it is already clear who,

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for a long period, has rejected peaceful negotiations, who has occupied whose territory, who has conducted armed provocations, and who has mounted massive attacks. In the face of the Indian reactionaries' attempts to alter by force of arms the situation on the Sino-Indian frontier and their encroachments on China's border areas on an increasing scale, the Chinese people have for years exercised forbearance, striving time and again to find a fair and reasonable solution through peaceful negotiations. Nevertheless, the Nehru government has categorically rejected negotiations. It has mistaken China's forbearance as a sign that it is weak and can be bullied. On October 12, Indian Prime Minister Nehru flagrantly ordered the launching of attacks on China, to clear Chinese frontier forces from Chinese territory. It was at this point that the Chinese frontier forces had no choice but to strike back in self-defense. China is a peaceable socialist country but will never allow others to bully it at will. China's counterblow in self-defense, in the face of massive attacks by Indian troops, was a minimum legitimate measure that any sovereign state would take under similar circumstances. Having repulsed the Indian attacks, China immediately proposed an end to the conflict, disengagement, and the reopening of negotiations, and took the initiative to cease fire and withdraw. Facts have proved that, precisely because the Chinese people waged the struggle that was necessary against the expansionist ambitions of the reactionary Indian nationalists, the situation on the Sino-Indian frontier has begun to ease and a de facto cease-fire has been realized. China's consistent and sincere efforts for the peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question are universally acknowledged. But the strange thing is that some people who claim to be Marxist-Leninists have forgotten Marxism-Leninism completely. They have never bothered to make an analysis from the class viewpoint of Marxism-Leninism of the Nehru government's reactionary policy of starting the Sino-Indian boundary conflict and all along refusing reconciliation. These people arc willing neither to see that this policy arises out of the need of the big bourgeoisie and big landlords of India to

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oppose the people and the progressive movement of that country, nor to see that this policy both exactly suits the needs of imperialism, especially those of U.S. imperialism, and has imperialism's support. As a matter of fact, the Nehru government has in recent years persecuted the people at home with increasing brutality and has become more and more a protégé of U.S. imperialism, acting as its accomplice in many important international questions, such as the Congo. T h e Nehru government's persistence in its anti-China stand is the very outcome of the fact that his domestic and foreign policies have become more and more reactionary. Those who accuse China of having pushed the Nehru government toward the West are mistaking the very cause for the effect. Throughout the Sino-Indian boundary dispute, they have all along confounded right and wrong, pretending to be "neutral," calling China "brother" while actually regarding the Indian reactionaries as their kinsmen. Should not these people examine their own consciences and ask themselves what has become of their Marxism-Leninism and what has become of their proletarian internationalism? . The editorial next reiterated the position of the CPC with regard to the APL, the public venting of disagreements among parties, and the binding nature of the Moscow Declaration and Statement on relations among Communist parties and states. T h e principles governing relations among fraternal parties and fraternal countries laid down in the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement are the very embodiment of the principles of proletarian internationalism regarding relations among fraternal parties and fraternal countries. Those who violate these guiding principles will inevitably fall into the quagmire of bignation chauvinism or other forms of bourgeois nationalism. But those who accused the C P C of having committed the error of so-called nationalism evidently never bother to ask themselves with respect to their relations with fraternal parties and fraternal countries, what status is accorded these fraternal parties and fraternal countries. Although it is clear that they themselves have violated the principles governing relations among the

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fraternal parties and fraternal countries, launched attacks on another fraternal party and fraternal country, and followed the wrong practice of nationalism and big-nation chauvinism, they have insisted that everybody else follow their example and have accused anyone of "nationalism" who refused to obey their orders. Does this conform to the principles of proletarian internationalism? Is this erroneous practice not the very worst manifestation of splitting, sectarianism, nationalism, and big-nation chauvinism? . . The minimum demand that can be made of a Communist is that he should make a clear distinction between the enemy and his own comrades. He should be merciless toward the enemy and be kindly toward his own comrades. But there are some who do just the opposite. While being so "accommodating" and making such "mutual concessions" to imperialism, they treat fraternal parties and fraternal countries as implacable enemies. They may make "sensible compromises" and exercise "moderation" in the face of the saber-rattling enemy, but refuse to be conciliatory toward fraternal parties and fraternal countries. To be so "kindly" toward the enemy and so "merciless" toward fraternal parties and fraternal socialist countries is obviously not at all the stand a Marxist-Leninist should take. The Moscow Statement affirms that revisionism is the main danger now confronting the world Communist movement. . . . But there are some Communists who laud to the skies that renegade to Communism, Tito, and are on intimate terms with the Tito group. At the recent Czechoslovak Communist Party Congress, some people went so far as to oppose the exposure of the Yugoslav modern revisionists by the CPC. In a word, those with whom these people want to "unite" are precisely those who should be opposed; and those whom they oppose are precisely those with whom they should be united. Is this not an open, crude violation of the Moscow Declaration and Moscow Statement? Where does such a line lead? These people think that if they just hang out the signboard of "antidogmatism" and clamor about so-called creativeness they can distort Marxism-Leninism and tamper with the Mos-

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cow Declaration and the Moscow Statement as they like. This is absolutely impermissible. We want to challenge these people: Are these two historic documents of the international C o m m u nist movement, unanimously adopted and signed by all the Communist and workers parties, still valid? Are they still to be observed? Some people have said: "We are the majority and you are the minority. Therefore, we are the creative Marxist-Leninists and you are the dogmatists; we are in the right and you in the wrong." But anyone with a little c o m m o n sense knows that such questions as who is right and who is wrong, and who has the truth on his side, cannot be determined by who is in the majority or minority at a given moment. Truth is an objective thing; being in the majority at a given moment, after all, cannot turn falsehood into truth; being in the minority at a given moment, too, cannot after all make truth turn into falsehood. History abounds with instances in which in a certain period, under certain circumstances, truth is not on the side of the majority but on the side of the minority. At the time of the Second International, Lenin and the Bolsheviks were the minority in the international workers movement, but truth proved to be on the side of Lenin and the Bolsheviks. In December, 1914, after the start of World War I, when a vote was taken on the war budget in the German Reichstag, the majority of the deputies of the German Social Democratic Party voted for it, and only Karl Liebknecht voted against it, but truth proved to be on his side. . . . We only submit to truth and the fundamental interests of the people of the world; we will never submit to the dictates of any anti-Marxist-Leninist bludgeon. No matter how the imperialists, the reactionaries, and the modern revisionists may abuse and oppose us, our stand in upholding Marxism-Leninism and truth is absolutely unshakable. We wish to remind those attacking the C P C that unreasoning abuse is entirely useless. Abuse, however scurrilous and violent, can in no way mar the glory of any Marxist-Leninist party. Ever since the first Communist party was founded, no one has ever

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heard of a true Communist party which was not subjected to abusive attack, nor has anyone ever heard of a true Communist party which was defeated by abuse. The C P C has grown, tempered itself, and won one victory after another precisely amid the curses of the imperialists, the reactionaries, the revisionists, and other opportunists. Their curses have not done us the least harm. On the contrary, this just shows that we have done the right thing, that we have persevered in Marxist-Leninist principles, and that we have safeguarded the fundamental interests of the people of the world. We also wish to remind those attacking the C P C that U.S. imperialism is now conducting an anti-China chorus. Even Kennedy has come out himself to dcclare that "a major problem" now facing the West is how to "contain" "Communist China." At a time like this, don't you think you should draw a demarcation line between yourself and U.S. imperialism and its lackeys? The wrong practice of creating splits that has emerged in the international Communist movement can only help imperialism and all reactionaries. Don't you see that the imperialists, the reactionaries of all countries, and the modern revisionists of Yugoslavia are applauding and gloating over the unfortunate happenings and looking forward to a split in the international Communist movement? Dean Rusk recently declared openly: "They [the disagreements among Communists] are very serious and very far-reaching. . . The confusion that Communist parties all over the world have been thrown into . . . has been helpful to the free world." Those attacking the C P C and other Marxist-Leninist parties should pause and think: the enemy is acclaiming this as very helpful to the "free world." Do you think this is something to be proud of? All the imperialists, reactionaries, and modern revisionists will become nothing but the refuse of history left behind by the torrents of the international Communist movement and of the great revolutionary struggles of the peoples of the whole world. The Communists of all countries share the same great ideals and the same noble cause, and they face a common enemy. We have a thousand and one reasons to unite, but not a single

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reason to create splits. Those comrades who are engaged in creating splits should now come to their senses! The C P C is willing, together with the other fraternal parties, to do its utmost to strengthen unity on the basis of MarxismLeninism and proletarian internationalism, and to oppose a split and strive for new victories in the cause of world peace, national liberation, democracy, and socialism. Let us unite and spare no efforts in fighting unremittingly for the defense of the great unity of the international Communist movement, the great unity of the socialist camp, and the great unity of the revolutionary peoples of the world and all peace-loving peoples! Let us raise once again the great slogan of Marx and Engels: Workers of all countries, unite!

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" T H E D I F F E R E N C E S B E T W E E N C O M R A D E T O G L I A T T I AND

U s . " Editorial in Jen-min jih-pao, December 31, 1962. Translation in Peking Review, No. 1, January 4, 1963. . . IN ACCORDANCE with its consistent stand of strengthening friendship with fraternal parties, the Communist Party of China sent its representative to attend the X Congress of the Communist Party of Italy, which was held in early December, at the latter's invitation. We had hoped that this congress would help to strengthen not only the common struggle against imperialism and in defense of world peace, but also the unity of the international Communist movement. But, at this congress, to our regret and against our hopes, Comrade Togliatti and certain other leaders of the PCI rudely attacked the Communist Party of China and other fraternal parties on a series of important questions of principle. They did so in violation of the principles guiding relations among fraternal parties as set forth in the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement, and in disregard of the interests of the united struggle of the international Communist movement against the enemy. The representative of the Communist Party of China at the Congress was thus compelled to declare solemnly in his address that we disagreed with the attacks and slanders leveled at the

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Communist Party of China by Togliatti and certain other leaders of the PCI. Nevertheless, Togliatti and certain other leaders of the PCI "very firmly rejected" the views put forward by the representative of the CPC, continued their attacks upon the C P C and other fraternal parties, and persisted in conducting "the debate in public." Thus, the X Congress of the Communist Party of Italy became a salient part of the recently emerged adverse current which runs counter to Marxism-Leninism and is disrupting the unity of the international Communist movement. In such circumstances, we cannot remain silent but must publicly answer the attacks on us by Comrade Togliatti and other comrades. . . . We wish to say frankly that on a number of fundamental questions of Marxism-Leninism there exist differences of principle between Comrade Togliatti and certain other PCI leaders, on the one hand, and ourselves on the other. A f t e r reading Togliatti's general report and his concluding speech at the X Congress of the Communist Party of Italy and the theses of the Congress, one cannot help feeling that he and certain other PCI leaders are departing further and further from Marxism-Leninism. Although Comrade Togliatti and certain others have, as usual, covered up their real views by using obscure, ambiguous, and scarcely intelligible language, the essence of their views becomes clear once this flimsy veil is removed. They cherish the greatest illusions about imperialism; they deny the fundamental antagonism between the two world systems of socialism and capitalism and the fundamental antagonism between the oppressed nations and oppressor nations; and, in place of international class struggle and anti-imperialist struggle, they advocate international class collaboration and the establishment of a "new world order." They have profound illusions about the monopoly capitalists at home; they confuse the two vastly different kinds of class dictatorship—bourgeois dictatorship and proletarian dictatorship—and preach bourgeois reformism, or what they call "structural reform," as a substitute for proletarian revolution. They allege that the fundamental

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principles of Marxism-Leninism have become "outmoded," and they tamper with the Marxist-Leninist theories of imperialism, war and peace, the state and revolution, and proletarian revolution and proletarian dictatorship. They discard the revolutionary principles of the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement; they repudiate the universal laws of proletarian revolution or, in other words, the universal significance of the road of the October Revolution; and they describe the "Italian road," which is the abandonment of revolution, as a "line common to the whole international Communist movement." In the final analysis, the stand taken by Togliatti and certain other PCI leaders boils down to this: the people of the capitalist countries should not make revolutions; the oppressed nations should not wage struggles to win liberation; and the people of the world should not fight against imperialism. Actually, all this exactly suits the needs of the imperialists and reactionaries. In this article we do not propose to discuss all our differences with Comrade Togliatti and certain other PCI comrades. Here we shall set forth our views on only a few of the important questions at issue. The Question of War and Peace. Comrade Togliatti and certain other comrades differ with us, first of all, on the question of war and peace. In his general report to the X Congress of the Communist Party of Italy, Togliatti declared: "This problem was widely discussed at the Conference of Communist and Workers Parties held in Moscow in the autumn of 1960. The Chinese comrades put forward some views, which were rejected by the meeting." He spoke in deliberately vague terms and did not mention what the views put forward by the Chinese comrades were, but went on to speak of the inevitability of war as the source of the disputes, which made it apparent that he was accusing the Chinese Communists of having no faith in the possibility of averting a new world war, and China of being "warlike." This accusation leveled against the Communist Party of China by Comrade Togliatti and certain other comrades is completely groundless and trumped up. . . .

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Since Togliatti and certain other comrades know perfectly well where the Communist Party of China stands on the problem of war and peace, why do they keep on distorting and attacking this stand? What are the real differences between them and us? They are manifested mainly with respect to the following three questions: First, the Communist Party of China holds that the source of modern war is imperialism. The chief force for aggression and war is U.S. imperialism, the most vicious enemy of all the peoples of the world. In order to defend world peace, it is necessary to expose the imperialist policies of aggression and war unceasingly and thoroughly, so as to make the people of the world maintain a high degree of vigilance. The fact that the forces of socialism, of national liberation, of people's revolution, and of world peace have surpassed the forces of imperialism and war has not changed the aggressive nature of imperialism and cannot possibly change it. The imperialist bloc headed by the United States is engaged in frenzied arms expansion and war preparations and is menacing world peace. Those who slanderously attack the C P C allege that our unremitting exposures of imperialism, and especially of the policies of aggression and war of U.S. imperialism, show our disbelief in the possibility of averting a world war; actually what these people oppose is the exposure of imperialism. On many occasions they have publicly opposed the exposure of imperialism. Although they admit in words that the nature of imperialism has not changed, in fact they prettify U.S. imperialism in a hundred and one ways and spread among the masses of the people illusions about imperialism, and especially about U.S. imperialism. It will be recalled that three years ago, following the " C a m p David talks," some persons in the international Communist movement talked a great deal about Eisenhower's sincere desire for peace, saying that this ringleader of U.S. imperialism was just as concerned about peace as we were. . . . Now we again hear some people saying that Kennedy is even

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more concerned about world peace than Eisenhower was and that Kennedy showed his concern for the maintenance of peace during the Caribbean crisis. . . . It is crystal clear that if one went by what these people say, U.S. imperialism would have ceased to be the enemy of world peace, and therefore there would be no need to fight against its policies of aggression and war. This erroneous view, which openly runs counter to the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement, can only make the peace-loving people of the world lose their bearing, damage the fight for world peace, and assist U.S. imperialism in carrying out its policies of aggression and war. Secondly, the Communist Party of China holds that world peace can only be securely safeguarded in the resolute struggle against imperialism headed by the United States by constantly strengthening the socialist camp, and by constantly strengthening the national and democratic movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the people's revolutionary struggles in various countries, and the movement to defend world peace. To achieve world peace it is necessary to rely mainly on the strength of the masses of the people of the world and on their struggles. In the course of the struggle to defend world peace, it is necessary to enter into negotiations on one issue or another with the governments of the imperialist countries, including the government of the United States, for the purpose of easing international tension, reaching some kind of compromise, and arriving at certain agreements, subject to the principle that such compromises and agreements must not damage the fundamental interests of the people. However, world peace can never be achieved by negotiations alone, and in no circumstances must we pin our hopes on imperialism and divorce ourselves from the struggles of the masses. Those who attack the Communist Party of China misrepresent this correct viewpoint of ours as showing lack of faith in the possibility of averting a world war. As a matter of fact, they themselves have no faith in the possibility of preventing a world war by reliance on the strength of the masses and their struggles,

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and they are opposed to relying on the masses and their struggles. T h e y want the people of the world to believe in the " s e n sibleness," the "assurances," and the "good intentions" of imperialism and to place their hopes for world peace on "mutual conciliation," "mutual concessions," "mutual a c c o m m o d a t i o n s , " and "sensible compromises" with imperialism. T o beg imperialism for peace, these persons do not scruple to impair the fundamental interests of the people of various countries, to throw revolutionary principles overboard, and even to demand that others also sacrifice revolutionary principles. Innumerable historical facts prove that genuine peace can never be attained by begging imperialism for peace at the e x pense of the fundamental interests of the people and at the e x pense of revolutionary principles. On the contrary, this can only help to inflate the arrogance of the imperialist aggressors. C o m rade Fidel Castro has rightly said that " t h e way to peace is not the way of sacrifice or infringement of the people's rights, because that is precisely the way leading to w a r . " Thirdly, the Communist Party of China holds that the struggle for the defense of world peace and the national liberation movements and the people's revolutionary struggle in various countries support each other and cannot be separated. T h e national liberation movements and the people's revolutionary struggle are a powerful force weakening the imperialist forces of war and defending world peace. T h e more the national liberation movement and the revolutionary struggle of the people develop, the better for the defense of world peace. T h e socialist countries, the Communists of all countries, and all the peaceloving people of the world must resolutely support the national liberation movements and the revolutionary struggle of the peoples in various countries, and must resolutely support wars of national liberation and people's revolutionary wars. In branding this correct view of ours as " w a r l i k e , " those who attack the Communist Party of China are, in fact, placing the struggle in defense of world peace in opposition to the movements of national liberation, the people's revolutionary struggle, wars of national liberation, and people's revolutionary

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According to them, all that the oppressed nations and the oppressed peoples can do is to receive what is "bestowed" by imperialism and the reactionaries, and they should not wage struggles against imperialism and the reactionaries, or they would be disturbing world peace. These persons assert that if oppressed nations and oppressed peoples were to oppose counter-revolutionary war with revolutionary war when confronting armed suppression by imperialism and the reactionaries, this would have "irreparable consequences."' This erroneous view of theirs can only mean that they are opposed to revolution by oppressed nations and peoples, and demand that these nations and peoples abandon their revolutionary struggles and revolutionary wars and forever submit to the dark rule and enslavement of imperialism and reaction. . . Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear War. On the question of war and peace, the differences which Togliatti and certain other comrades have with us find striking expression in our respective attitudes to nuclear weapons and nuclear war. The Communist Party of China has consistently held that nuclear weapons have unprecedented destructive power and that it would be an unprecedented calamity for mankind if nuclear war should break out. It is precisely for this reason that we have always called for a complete ban on nuclear weapons, that is, a total ban on the testing, manufacture, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons. Time and again the Chinese government has proposed the establishment of an area free from atomic weapons embracing all the countries of the Asian and Pacific region, the United States included. Besides, we have always actively supported all the just struggles waged by the peace-loving countries and peoples of the world for the outlawing of nuclear weapons and the prevention of a nuclear war. The allegations that the Communist Party of China underestimates the destructiveness of nuclear weapons and wants to drag the world into a nuclear war are absurd slanders. On the question of nuclear weapons and nuclear war, the first difference between us and those who attack the Communist Party of China is whether or not the fundamental Marxist-

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Leninist principles on war and peace have become "out of date" since the emergence of nuclear weapons. Togliatti and certain others believe that the emergence of nuclear weapons "has changed the nature of war" and that "one should add other considerations to the definition of the just character of a war." Actually they hold that war is no longer the continuation of politics, and that there is no longer any distinction between just and unjust wars. Thus they completely deny the fundamental Marxist-Leninist principles on war and peace. We hold that the emergence of nuclear weapons has not changed and cannot change the fundamental Marxist-Leninist principles with regard to war and peace. In reality, the numerous wars that have broken out since the appearance of nuclear weapons have all been the continuation of politics, and there still are just and unjust wars. In practice, those who hold there is no longer any distinction between just and unjust wars either oppose waging just wars or refuse to give them support, and they have lapsed into the position of bourgeois pacifism which is opposed to all wars. On the question of nuclear weapons and nuclear war, the second difference between us and those who attack the Communist Party of China is whether one should view the future of m a n kind with pessimism or with revolutionary optimism. Togliatti and certain others talk volubly about "the suicide of mankind" and the "total destruction of mankind." They believe that "it is idle even to discuss what would be the outlook for such remnants of the human race with regard to social order." We are firmly opposed to such pessimistic and despairing tunes. We believe that it is possible to attain a complete ban on nuclear weapons in the following circumstances: the socialist camp has a great nuclear superiority; the people's struggle in various countries against nuclear weapons and nuclear war becomes broader and deeper; having further forfeited their nuclear superiority, the imperialists are compelled to realize that their policy of nuclear blackmail is no longer effective and that their launching of a nuclear war would only accelerate their own extinction. There are precedents for the outlawing of highly de-

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structive weapons. One such precedent is the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, concluded by various nations in 1925 in Geneva. If, after we have done everything possible to prevent a nuclear war, imperialism should nevertheless unleash nuclear war, without regard to any of the consequences, it would only result in the extinction of imperialism and definitely not in the extinction of mankind. . . . On the question of nuclear weapons and nuclear war, the third difference between us and those who attack the Communist Party of China concerns the policy to be adopted in order successfully to reach the goal of outlawing nuclear weapons and preventing a nuclear war. Togliatti and certain others zealously advertise the dreadful nature of nuclear weapons and blatantly declare that "it is justified" to "shudder" with fear in the face of nuclear blackmail when U.S. imperialism parades it. Togliatti has also said that "war must be avoided at any cost." According to what he and certain others say, should not the only way of dealing with the U.S. imperialist policy of nuclear threats and blackmail be unconditional surrender and the complete abandonment of all revolutionary ideals and all revolutionary principles? Can this be the kind of stand a Communist should take? Can a nuclear war really be prevented in this way? It is unthinkable that "shudders of fear" will move U.S. imperialism to become so benevolent that it will abandon its policies of aggression and war and its policy of nuclear blackmail. Facts prove the opposite. The more one "shudders" with fear, the more unbridled and greedier U.S. imperialism becomes, and the more it persists in using threats of nuclear warfare and raising ever greater demands. Have there not been enough object-lessons of this kind? . . . We would like to advise those who attack the Communist Party of China to discard their fallacious pessimistic arguments, to have confidence in the truth of Marxism-Leninism, to pull themselves together and take an active part in the great struggle

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of the masses against the imperialist policy of nuclear blackmail and for the defense of world peace. The Question of the Paper Tiger. Comrade Togliatti and certain other comrades have strongly opposed the Marxist-Leninist proposition of the Chinese Communist Party that "imperialism and all reactionaries are paper tigers." In his report to the recent congress of the Italian Communist Party, Comrade Togliatti said that it "was wrong to state that imperialism is simply a paper tiger which can be overthrown by a mere push of the shoulder." Then there are other persons who assert that today imperialism has nuclear teeth, so how can it be called a paper tiger? Prejudice is further from the truth than ignorance. In the case of Comrade Togliatti and certain other comrades, if they are not ignorant, then they are deliberately distorting this proposition of the CPC. In comparing imperialism and all reactionaries to paper tigers, Comrade Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Communists are looking at the problem as a whole and from a long-term point of view and are looking at the essence of the problem. What is meant is that, in the final analysis, it is the masses of the people who are really powerful, not imperialism and the reactionaries. Comrade Mao Tse-tung first put forward this proposition in August, 1946, in his talk with the American correspondent Anna Louise Strong. That was a difficult time for the Chinese people. The Kuomintang reactionaries, backed to the hilt by U.S. imperialism and enjoying immense superiority in men and equipment, had unleashed a nationwide civil war. In the face of the frenzied enemy attacks and the myth of the invincibility of U.S. imperialism, the most important question for the Chinese Revolution and the fate of the Chinese people was whether we would dare to struggle, dare to make a revolution, and dare to seize victory. It was at this crucial moment that Comrade Mao Tse-tung armed the Chinese Communists and the Chinese people ideologically with the Marxist-Leninist proposition that "imperialism and all reactionaries are paper tigers." . . . In his speech at the meeting of representatives of Communist and workers parties of socialist countries in Moscow, in Novem-

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ber, 1957, Comrade M a o Tse-tung expounded the same proposition. . . . Comrade Mao Tse-tung's analysis of imperialism and all reactionaries is completely in accord with Lenin's analysis. In 1919 Lenin compared the "all-powerful" Anglo-French imperialism to a "colossus with feet of clay." . . . Isn't the reasoning of Lenin in his description of the "colossus with feet of clay" the same as that of Comrade M a o Tse-tung in his reference to the "paper tiger"? We ask, what is wrong with Lenin's proposition? Is this proposition of Lenin's "outmoded"? In history there have been countless instances proving that imperialism and reactionaries are all paper tigers. In 1917, before the February and October Revolutions the opportunists said that because the tsar and the bourgeois government were so formidable it would be sheer madness for the people to take up arms. But Lenin and the other Bolsheviks resolutely combated this opportunist view and firmly led the masses of the workers, peasants, and soldiers to overthrow the tsar and the bourgeois government. History proved that the tsar and the bourgeois government were nothing but paper tigers. On the eve of and during World War II, the adherents of the policy of appeasement and capitulation said that Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese imperialists were invincible. But the people of various countries resolutely combated appeasement and capitulation and in the end they won the war against fascism. Again, history proved that Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese imperialists were nothing but paper tigers. We hold that the question of whether one treats imperialism and all reactionaries strategically as the paper tigers they really are is of great importance for the question of how the forces of revolution and the forces of reaction are to be appraised; is of great importance for the question of whether the revolutionary people will dare to wage a struggle, dare to make a revolution, dare to seize victory; and is of great importance for the question of the future outcome of the world-wide struggles of the people and the future course of history. Marxist-Leninists and revolutionaries should never be afraid of imperialism and the reaction-

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aries. Now the days are gone forever when imperialism could ride roughshod over the world, and it is imperialism and the reactionaries who should be afraid of the forces of revolution and not the other way round. Every oppressed nation and every oppressed people should above all have the revolutionary confidence, the revolutionary courage, and the revolutionary spirit to defeat imperialism and the reactionaries; otherwise there will be no hope for any revolution. The only way to win victory in revolution is for Marxist-Leninists and revolutionaries to combat resolutely every trace of weakness and capitulation, and to educate the masses of the people in the concept that "imperialism and all reactionaries are paper tigers," thereby destroying the arrogance of the enemy and enhancing the spirit of the great masses of the people so that they will have revolutionary determination and confidence, revolutionary vision and stanchness. The possession of nuclear weapons by imperialism has not changed by one iota the nature of imperialism, which is rotten to the core and declining, inwardly weak though outwardly strong; nor has it changed by one iota the basic Marxist-Leninist principle that the masses of the people are the decisive factor in the development of history. When, in his talk with Anna Louise Strong, Comrade Mao Tse-tung first put forward the proposition that imperialism and all reactionaries are paper tigers, the imperialists already had atomic weapons. In this talk Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out: "The atom bomb is a paper tiger which the U.S. reactionaries use to scare people. It looks terrible, but in fact it isn't. Of course, the atom bomb is a weapon of mass slaughter, but the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not by one or two new types of weapons." History has proved that even when imperialism is armed with nuclear weapons it cannot frighten into submission a revolutionary people who dare to fight. The victory of the Chinese Revolution and the great victories of the peoples of Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, Algeria, and other countries in their revolutionary struggles were all won at a time when U.S. imperialism possessed nuclear weapons. Imperialism has always been armed

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to the teeth and has always been out for the blood of the people. No matter what kind of teeth imperialism may have—whether guns, tanks, rocket teeth, nuclear teeth, or any other kind of teeth that modern science and technology may provide—its rotten, decadent, and paper-tiger nature cannot change. In the final analysis, neither nuclear teeth nor any other kind of teeth can save imperialism from its fate of inevitable extinction. In the end the nuclear teeth of imperialism, and whatever other teeth it may have, will be consigned by the people of the world to the museum of history, together with imperialism itself. Those who attack the proposition that "imperialism and all reactionaries are paper tigers" have obviously lost every quality a revolutionary ought to have and instead have become as shortsighted and timid as mice. Our advice to these people is, better not tie your fate to that of the imperialists! The Question of Peaceful Coexistence. The differences Comrade Togliatti and certain other comrades have with us are also manifest with regard to the question of peaceful coexistence. The Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese government have always stood for peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems. China was an initiator of the wellknown Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. On the basis of those Five Principles, China has established friendly relations with many countries, concluded treaties of friendship or treaties of friendship and mutual nonaggression with Yemen, Burma, Nepal, Afghanistan, Guinea, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Ghana, and achieved a satisfactory settlement of boundary questions with Burma, Nepal, and other countries. No one can deny these facts. . . . The obstacles come from imperialism and from the reactionaries of various countries. It is inconceivable that peaceful coexistence can be achieved without struggle. It is still less conceivable that the establishment of peaceful coexistence can eliminate class struggles in the world arena and can abolish the antagonism between the two systems, socialism and capitalism, and the antagonism between oppressed nations and oppressor nations. . . .

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But Comrade Togliatti and those who attack China hold that through "peaceful coexistence" it is possible to "renovate the structure of the whole world" and to establish "a new world o r d e r " ; to build throughout the world "an economic and social order capable of satisfying all the aspirations of men and peoples for freedom, well-being, independence, and the full development of and respect for the human personality, and f o r peaceful cooperation of all states" and "a world without war." This means that it is possible through "peaceful coexistence" to change a "world structure" in which there exists antagonism between the systems of socialism and capitalism and between oppressed and oppressor nations, and that it is possible to eliminate all wars and to realize "a world without w a r " while imperialism and reactionaries still exist. In taking this stand, Comrade Togliatti and other comrades have completely revised Lenin's principles of peaceful coexistence and discarded the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of class struggle; in reality they are substituting class collaboration for class struggle on a world scale, advocating a fusion of the socialist and capitalist systems. . . . In the present situation, it is possible to prevent imperialism from launching a new world war if all the peace-loving forces of the world unite into a broad international anti-imperialist united front and fight together. But it is one thing to prevent a world war and another to eliminate all wars. Imperialism and the reactionaries are the source of war. In conditions where imperialism and reactionaries still exist, wars of one kind or another may occur. The history of the seventeen postwar years shows that local wars of one kind or another have never ceased. Oppressed nations and oppressed people are bound to rise in revolution. When imperialism and the reactionaries employ armed force to suppress revolution, it is inevitable that civil wars and national liberation wars will occur. . . On peaceful coexistence we have another difference with those who are attacking us. We hold that the question of peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems and the question of revolution by oppressed nations and op-

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pressed classes are two different kinds of questions, and not questions of the same kind. The principle of peaceful coexistence can apply only to relations between countries with different social systems, not to relations between oppressed and oppressor nations, nor to relations between oppressed and oppressing classes. For an oppressed nation or people the question is one of waging a revolutionary struggle to overthrow the rule of imperialism and the reactionaries; it is not, and cannot be, a question of peaceful coexistence with imperialism and the reactionaries. But Togliatti and those attacking China extend their idea of "peaceful coexistence" to cover relations between the colonial and semicolonial people on the one hand and the imperialists and colonialists on the other. They say that "the problem of starvation which still afflicts a billion people" and "the problem of developing the productive forces and democracy in the underdeveloped areas" "must be solved through negotiations, seeking reasonable solutions and avoiding actions which might worsen the situation and cause irreparable consequences." They do not like sparks of revolution among the oppressed nations and peoples. They say that a tiny spark may lead to a world war. Such a way of speaking is really asking the oppressed nations to "coexist peacefully" with their colonial rulers, and asking them to tolerate colonial rule rather than to resist or wage struggles for independence, much less to fight wars of national liberation. Doesn't this kind of talk mean that the Chinese people, the Korean people, the Vietnamese people, the Cuban people, the Algerian people, and the people of other countries who rose in revolution have all violated the principle of "peaceful coexistence" and done wrong? It is very difficult for us to see any real difference between such talk and the preachings of the imperialists and colonialists. Even more astounding is the fact that Togliatti and certain other people extend their idea of class collaboration in the international arena to cover "joint intervention" in the underdeveloped areas. . . The socialist countries should never second the colonialist policy of the imperialists toward the under-

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developed countries, much less "jointly intervene" with them in the underdeveloped areas. For anyone to do so would be to betray proletarian internationalism and to serve the interests of imperialism and colonialism. When the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted its resolution for international intervention in the Congo, there were some people in the international Communist movement who believed this to be a shining example of international cooperation. They believed that colonialism could be wiped out through the intervention of the UN, which would enable the Congolese people to obtain their freedom and independence. But what was the outcome? Lumumba, the national hero of the Congo, was murdered; Gizenga, his successor, was imprisoned; many Congolese patriots were murdered or thrown into jail; and the vigorous Congolese struggle for national independence was seriously set back. The Congo not only continues to be enslaved by the old colonialists but has also become a colony of U.S. imperialism, sinking into ever deeper suffering. We ask those who are clamoring for "peaceful coexistence" between the oppressed nations and peoples, on the one hand, and the imperialists and colonialists on the other, and for "joint intervention" in the underdeveloped areas: Have you forgotten the tragic lesson of the Congo incident? Those who slander China as being against peaceful coexistence attack her with the charge that she has committed mistakes in her relations with India. Disregarding the true facts and failing to discriminate between right and wrong, they invariably blame China for having clashed with India. On this question, Togliatti said, "We know all that is reasonable and right in the claims of the People's Republic of China. We also know that the military actions began with an attack from the Indian side." This was a little fairer than the attitude of some self-styled MarxistLeninists who invariably make the false charge that China started the clashes on the border. Nevertheless, Togliatti, making no distinction between black and white, still asserts that the Sino-Indian armed clashes were "unreasonable and absurd." . . .

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The position taken by Comrade Togliatti and certain other comrades on the Sino-Indian boundary question reflects their point of view on peaceful coexistence, which is that in carrying out this policy the socialist countries should make one concession after another to the capitalist countries, should not fight even in self-defense when subjected to armed attacks, but should surrender their territorial sovereignty. May we ask, is there anything in common between this point of view and the principle of peaceful coexistence which a socialist country ought to follow? How can one possibly interpret the resolute support which the Chinese people gave to the Cuban people in their struggle against international inspection and in defense of their sovereignty as meaning that China was opposed to peaceful coexistence or wanted to plunge others into a thermonuclear war? Does this mean that China, also, should have applied pressure on Cuba to force her to accept international inspection, and that only by so doing China would have conformed to this so-called peaceful coexistence? If there are people who give verbal support to Cuba's five demands but are actually opposed to the Chinese people's support for Cuba, are they not merely exposing the hypocrisy of their own support for Cuba's five demands? The CPC and the Chinese people have always maintained that the course of history is decided by the great strength of the masses of the people and not by any weapons. On more than one occasion we have made it clear that we neither called for the establishment of missile bases in Cuba nor obstructed the withdrawal of the so-called offensive weapons from Cuba. We have never considered that it was a Marxist-Leninist attitude to brandish nuclear weapons as a way of settling international disputes. Nor have we ever considered that the avoidance of a thermonuclear war in the Caribbean crisis was a "Munich." What we did strongly oppose, still strongly oppose, and will strongly oppose in the future is the sacrifice of another country's sovereignty as a means of reaching a compromise with imperialism. A compromise of this sort can only be re-

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garded as one hundred percent appeasement, a "Munich" pure and simple. A compromise of this sort has nothing in common with the socialist countries' policy of peaceful coexistence. The Question of Peaceful Transition. In fact, not only do Comrade Togliatti and certain other PCI comrades call for class collaboration in place of class struggle in the international arena; they also extend their concept of "peaceful coexistence" to relations between the oppressed and the oppressing classes within the capitalist countries. . . . In fact, they take the state to be an instrument above class and believe that the bourgeois state, too, can carry out socialist policies; they take bourgeois democracy to be democracy above class and believe that the proletariat can rise to be the "leading class" in the state by relying on such democracy. This theory of "structural reform" is a complete betrayal of the MarxistLeninist theories of proletarian revolution and proletarian dictatorship. . . . The theory of "structural reform" held by Togliatti and certain other leaders of the Italian Communist Party stems not from historical materialism and the scientific study of objective reality but from idealism and illusion. Yet they have been energetically propagating views which they themselves know are unreliable and describing them as a "line common to the whole international Communist movement." Such a practice on their part serves only to vitiate and attenuate the proletarian revolutionary struggle, preserve capitalist rule, and completely negate the socialist revolution. Isn't this a new kind of socialdemocratic trend? . . From the Marxist-Leninist point of view, it would naturally be in the interests of the proletariat and the entire people if peaceful transition could be realized. Whenever the possibility for peaceful transition appears in a given country, the Communists should strive for its realization. But, after all, possibility and reality, the wish and its fulfillment, are two different things. Hitherto, history has not witnessed a single example of peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism. Communists should not pin all their hopes for the victory of the revolution

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on peaceful transition. The bourgeoisie will never step down from the stage of history of its own accord. This is a universal law of class struggle. Communists must not in the slightest degree relax their preparedness for revolution. They must be prepared to repel the assaults of counter-revolution and to overthrow the bourgeoisie by armed force at the critical juncture of the revolution when the proletariat is seizing state power and the bourgeoisie resorts to armed force to suppress the revolution. That is to say, Communists should be prepared to employ dual tactics, namely, while preparing for the peaceful development of the revolution, they should be fully prepared for its nonpeaceful development. Tito—That Renegade to Communism. The extent to which Comrade Togliatti and certain other comrades have departed from Marxism-Leninism and from the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement is more clearly revealed by their recent ardent flirtation with the Yugoslav revisionist group. A representative of the Tito group—renegades from MarxismLeninism—was invited to the recent congress of the Italian Communist Party and was given a platform from which to denounce China. At the same congress, Comrade Togliatti and certain other comrades publicly defended the Tito group and lavishly praised it for "the value of what it has done and is doing." We wish to ask Comrade Togliatti and certain other comrades: Do you still recognize the Moscow Statement as binding on you? . . . After all, facts are facts and renegades to communism remain renegades to communism. The judgment arrived at in the Moscow Statement cannot be overturned by anyone, whoever he may be. Far from giving up their thoroughly revisionist Program, the Titoists have stuck to it in the draft Yugoslav Constitution which they published not long ago. The Tito group has not changed its "unique road" of building "socialism" through selling itself to imperialism. On the contrary, it is working harder and harder in the service of the U.S. imperialist policies of aggression and war. Recently U.S. im-

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perialism has tipped the Tito group with extra " a i d " amounting to more than 100 million dollars. Under the same old camouflage of "being outside blocs" and of "positive coexistence," the Tito group is doing everything it can to sabotage the national and democratic movements of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and to undermine the unity of the socialist camp and of all the peace-loving countries. . . . The restoration of capitalism in Yugoslavia has occurred not through any counter-revolutionary coup d'état by the bourgeoisie, nor through any invasion by imperialism, but gradually, through the degeneration of the Tito group. In this connection, as Lenin pointed out long ago, "the main question of every revolution is, undoubtedly, the question of state power. In the hands of which class power is—this decides everything." T h e character of a state depends on what class wields state power and on what policy it carries out. In Yugoslavia today, state power is in the hands of the Tito group, a group which has betrayed MarxismLeninism and the cause of communism, betrayed the fundamental interests of the Yugoslav working class and the Yugoslav people, and which is enforcing a whole set of out-and-out revisionist policies. In the Yugoslav countryside, the rich peasant and other capitalist forces are rapidly growing, and class differentiation is being accelerated. The capitalist laws of free competition and of profit are playing the dominant role in all spheres of Yugoslav economic life, and capitalist anarchy is rampant. . . . The phenomena of political degeneration and of the emergence of new bourgeois elements after the victory of a proletarian revolution are not difficult to understand. Lenin once said that historically various kinds of degeneration had occurred and that, under given conditions, it was possible for a handful of new bourgeois elements to emerge from among Soviet functionaries. It is precisely the new bourgeois elements such as Lenin referred to who have occupied the ruling positions in Yugoslavia. . . . It is particularly surprising that certain people, while loudly boasting of their intimate relations with the renegade Tito

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group, vigorously attack the Chinese Communist Party, asserting that our unity with the Albanian Party of Labor, which is based on Marxism-Leninism, is "impermissible." . . Scientific Socialism: A Universally Applicable Truth. In the final analysis our differences on a whole series of problems with Comrade Togliatti and certain other comrades who hold similar views involve the fundamental question of whether the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism are outmoded, and whether the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement are out of date. . . . The path of the October Revolution charted by Lenin, and the common laws governing socialist revolution and socialist construction as set forth in the Moscow Declaration of 1957, are the common path along which the peoples of the world are advancing toward the abolition of capitalism and the establishment of socialism. In spite of the great changes in the world since the October Revolution, the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism, which are illustrated by the path of the October Revolution, shine forth today with ever greater brilliance. In defending his erroneous point of view Togliatti said that the line pursued by the Chinese Communist Party "actually did not correspond to the strategic and tactical line pursued, for example, by the Bolsheviks in the course of the revolution from March to October [1917]." This definitely does not conform with the historical reality of the Chinese Revolution. In its long revolutionary struggle, in its struggle against dogmatism and empiricism as well as against "left" and right opportunism, the Chinese Communist Party under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung has creatively developed Marxism-Leninism by integrating the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete reality of the Chinese Revolution. Despite the fact that the Chinese Revolution, like the revolutions of other countries, has many special characteristics, the Chinese Communists have always regarded the Chinese Revolution as a continuation of the Great October Revolution. It was by following the path of the October Revolution that the Chinese Revolution was won. Togliatti's distortions about the Chinese Revolution only show that he is trying to find pretexts for his own peculiar line,

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which runs counter to the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism and the common laws governing the socialist revolution. It is necessary for a Marxist-Leninist party to integrate the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the revolution in its own country and for it to apply the common laws of socialist revolution creatively in the light of the specific conditions in its own country. Marxism-Leninism develops continuously with practice. Certain propositions advanced by a Marxist-Leninist party during a certain period and under certain conditions have to be replaced by new propositions, because of changed circumstances and tiines. Failure to do so will result in the error of dogmatism and losses to the cause of communism. But under no circumstances is a Marxist-Leninist party allowed to negate the fundamental principles of Marxism-Lenism, to substitute revisionism for Marxism-Leninism, and to betray communism. A t a certain stage in the development of a Communist party, dogmatism and sectarianism may become the main dangers. The Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement are fully correct in pointing out the necessity of opposing dogmatism and sectarianism. Nevertheless, under present conditions modern revisionism is the main danger to the international Communist movement as a whole, just as the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement point out. . . . If a resolute struggle is not waged against modern revisionism, the international Communist movement will be seriously harmed. . . . Calling for a Representative Conference of Communist and Workers Parties. We have been forced into a public discussion of the major differences between ourselves and Comrade Togliatti and certain other comrades in the Italian Communist Party. It has occurred against our wishes and would not have occurred if they had not publicly challenged us first and insisted on a public debate. But even though we are obliged to enter into public debate, we still sincerely hope it will be possible to eliminate our differences through comradely discussion. Although, to our regret, we find that Togliatti and the comrades who share his views are increasingly departing from MarxismLeninism, we still earnestly hope they will not plunge further,

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but will recover their bearings and return to the stand of Marxism-Leninism and the revolutionary principles of the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement. We desire to look ahead. On several occasions, we have suggested the holding of a representative conference of the Communist and workers parties of all countries to settle the current differences in the international Communist movement. . . . On December 31, Radio Peking denounced "the conspiracy of the imperialists, reactionaries in various countries, and modern revisionists to isolate us." The same amalgam of enemies appeared in the January 1, 1963, editorial of Jen-min jih-pao, which concluded that "in international affairs we shall continue to encounter this or that adverse current or turbulence. However, the Chinese people, armed with Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's thinking, will never be frightened by stupendous tasks and difficulties." Hung-ch'i on January 5, 1963 (No. 1), carried an extensive analysis of "modern revisionism," as the CPC saw it. "Modern revisionism," it argued, "is trying hard to cover up the contradictions of capitalism and imperialism and to deny that imperialism is moribund. . . . It has gone so far as to describe modern imperialism as 'peaceful' and 'democratic' 'supra-imperialism.'" It speaks of nationalization and "state economic intervention" in such terms as "the growth of socialist factors" and the beginnings of "socialist transformation." The revisionists, Hung-ch'i went on, "prate about 'gradual change,' 'the integration of revolution and reform,' 'entering deeply into the socialist era," and so on. But they never have a single word to say about the need, in the transition from capitalism to socialism, to make a revolution that will smash the bourgeois state machine and to replace bourgeois dictatorship with proletarian dictatorship." "In championing 'democracy in general' or 'democracy of the whole people,' they are actually making a fetish of bourgeois democracy, i.e., of bourgeois dictatorship." They "deny the class character of democracy and strive to achieve step by step their objective of eliminating the dictatorship of the proletariat in order to facilitate the restoration of capitalism step by step in a certain form. On the question of the fight for world peace and peaceful coexistence, too, the modern revisionists have vulgarized Leninism in the extreme and have completely adulterated it." Above all, recognition that peaceful coexistence is possible must not "substitute or negate" the overriding "class struggles within the capitalist countries and the revolutionary anti-imperialist struggles of the oppressed nations."

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The editorial went on to deny that the Chinese Communists rejected all compromise. In fact, in their own experience they had "reached compromises on many occasions with our enemies, internal and external." So they had compromised with Chiang Kai-shek and "with the U.S. imperialists, in the struggle to aid Korea and resist U.S. aggression." The question was "how to distinguish compromises that are permissible and in the interests of the people's cause from those compromises that are impermissible and are an expression of treachery. . . . It is perfectly clear that only those guilty now of adventurism, now of capitulationism, are the ones whose ideology is Trotskyism, or Trotskyism in a new guise." The cumulative effect of the Chinese publications and statements since December 15 was such as to require a considered Soviet response. Some of the reaction was still indirect and piecemeal. Thus an unsigned article in Pravda developed the theme that "the ideas of socialism came to Asia from the center of Russia" and that the Russian Communists, ignoring all irony and skepticism, had successfully developed the formerly backward areas of Central Asia and made possible the rapid progress of the neighboring states. 27 But the major statement came in the form of an unsigned article, published in Pravda and widely reprinted in the Communist press. 107.

"STRENGTHEN MENT

FOR

THE U N I T Y OF THE

THE T R I U M P H

OF

COMMUNIST

PEACE

AND

MOVE-

SOCIALISM."

Editorial in Pravda, January 7, 1963. Translation in New Times (Moscow), No. 2, January 16, 1963.'-,R . . . THE RECENT congresses of the Communist and workers parties of Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Italy clearly •^"Socialism Scores Victories," Pravda, December 26, 1962. In a rather symbolic gesture, the monthly journal of the M o s c o w oriented Communist parties. Problems of Peace and Socialism (and its Hnglish-Ianguage edition. World Marxist Review), as of January, 1963, dropped the Chinese-language edition. The Albanian edition had been suspended as of March, 1962. Whether the Chinese edition was terminated by choice of the editors (the editorial offices in Prague were under a Soviet editor-in-chief, with staff members delegated by the various parties) or because of obstruction from Communist China is not clear. The coverage of Chinese affairs had been strikingly spotty and inadequate for several years, perhaps because of a refusal of C P C officials to contribute. Raymond Guyot, in his report to the Central Committee of the French Communist Party on December 1 3 - 1 4 , 1962, spoke of evidence that the Chinese comrades "multiplied the difficulties" of the World Marxist Review. a /Vi'ii Times is a weekly Soviet journal of world affairs.

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demonstrated the beneficial results, for Communist parties of both socialist and capitalist countries, of undeviating realization of the international Communist movement's strategic and tactical line. At their congresses, our fraternal parties in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia defined the ways and means of completing the construction of socialism and making the gradual transition to building the material and technical basis of communism. The Congress of the fraternal Italian Communist Party drew up extensive measures for intensifying the fight against monopoly capital, for peace, democracy, and socialism. All these congresses made valuable contributions to the Marxist-Leninist theory and practice of the people's democracies' transition to the completion of socialist construction, and helped cement the broad masses of working people for resolute struggle for the victory of socialism and against imperialism. The international Communist movement is following a correct Marxist-Leninist path. Heartening prospects open before it. The main things required of Communists are fidelity to the Leninist course they have charted out and unity of their ranks. Unfortunately, however, views are being disseminated in the ranks of the international Communist movement directed against a number of basic propositions of Marxism-Leninism and aimed at undermining the unity of fraternal parties. These dogmatic, schismatic, and thoroughly anti-Leninist views have been most frankly expressed by the top leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor ( A P L ) . At the XXII CPSU Congress, and later at the Communist and workers party congresses in Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, and Czechoslovakia, the Chinese Communist Party delegations asserted that it was wrong to subject the policy of the Albanian leaders to open criticism and tried to place on fraternal parties responsibility for the differences that had arisen. But to make such assertions is to go against the irrefutable facts and to absolve of responsibility those who are fighting the common policy of the Marxist-Leninist parties. The international Communist movement knows that the Al-

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banian leaders began their open attacks on the policy formulated at the X X CPSU Congress and on the propositions set out in the 1957 Declaration as far back as November, 1960, at the Conference of eighty-one Communist parties. . . . They rejected every attempt by the CPSU Central Committee to normalize relations. Who, then, it is legitimate to ask, has violated the principle of consultation? Who started the attacks on the Communist movement, on collectively formulated programmatic documents, and has persisted in these attacks for several years? How are we to regard the arguments of those who substitute untruth for truth and, ignoring the will of the international Communist movement, openly encourage the splitters by spreading their views and defending them against justified criticism? . . . T h e controversy over what line the Communist movement should follow is not an abstract one. It concerns m a j o r principles and is of immense importance. The Marxist-Leninist line of promoting peaceful coexistence of states with differing social systems, of economic competition between socialism and capitalism, and of ensuring the victory of communism in these conditions lends our movement unparalleled attractive power and earns it the broadest mass support. In contrast, the policy the sectarians and dogmatists are seeking to impose is a policy of disbelief in the strength of communism and the masses, disbelief in the possibility of socialism emerging victorious in new countries without wars, without a world war. That policy, were it to prevail, would repel the people in the capitalist countries from the countries of socialism, estrange millions from the Communist movement, push the Communists into isolation, and retard the whole process of the popular liberation struggle. The most important, the most vital, problem of our time is the problem of peace and war. Reality has posed the question thus: either peaceful coexistence of states with differing social systems, or a destructive war. There is no other alternative. That being the case, what stand should Communists take? There can be only one—peaceful coexistence. The Albanian leaders—Enver Hoxha, for instance—boast

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of their disagreement with those w h o " c o n s i d e r p e a c e f u l coexistence to be t h e general foreign-policy line of the socialist countries." B u t in that case, what is t h e general line? W a r ? If that is so, then w h a t is there to distinguish this a p p r o a c h to t h e question of t h e victory of c o m m u n i s m o r capitalism f r o m the views of adventurist imperialist elements? T h e only real difference is that the imperialist wild men h a v e lost all faith in capitalism winning t h e race with socialism, while the dogmatists d o not believe t h a t c o m m u n i s m can win in conditions of p e a c e ful coexistence of states with differing social systems. But what Marxist-Leninist is likely to agree that the p a t h to the victory of c o m m u n i s m lies t h r o u g h t h e r m o n u c l e a r w a r ? Even the imperialists now find it difficult openly t o o p p o s e peaceful coexistence. A n d that is still m o r e difficult f o r m e n w h o consider themselves C o m m u n i s t s . T h a t is why t h e A l b a n i a n dogmatists say, reluctantly, that they " d o not o b j e c t " to the idea of peaceful coexistence. But they immediately a d d that peaceful coexistence of states of differing social systems is a "policy of r a p p r o c h e m e n t a n d merger with imperialism," that the question of w h e t h e r or not there will be w a r is decided by the chiefs of the G e n e r a l Staffs of the imperialist countries, that the preservation of world peace can be facilitated only by b u r y ing imperialism. T h a t is a direct a n d f r a n k retreat f r o m the C o m m u n i s t parties' Statement [of I 9 6 0 ] , . . . T h e dogmatists emphasize that t h e r e is no reason to f e a r nuclear war, that m o d e r n w e a p o n s are monstrously destructive only "in the view of imperialists and r e a c t i o n a r i e s . " that t h e "nuclear b o m b is but a p a p e r tiger." T h i s is outright r e p u d i a tion of the central aim of the struggle f o r peace f o r m u l a t e d in the Statement, repudiation of the policy of peaceful coexistence. T h e dogmatists try to represent p e a c e f u l coexistence as " r e nunciation of t h e exposure of imperialism," " a b a n d o n m e n t of the struggle against imperialism." T h e y fail to u n d e r s t a n d that competition in conditions of peace is a key sector in the battle between socialism and capitalism. T h e y call f o r a struggle against imperialism, b u t they have reduced it t o high-sounding denunciatory phraseology a n d abuse. C a n any Marxist-Leninist

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party in power confine the struggle against imperialism to that? T o fight imperialism in practice, uphold peace, and make a maximum contribution to the progress of the world liberation movement, the socialist countries must, first and foremost: —successfully develop socialist society and, primarily, ensure uninterrupted economic progress. The more effective the economic development of the socialist countries, the stronger they are economically and politically, the greater will be their influence on the direction and pace of the march of history, and the more resolutely and reliably will they uphold peace; —firmly and consistently pursue a policy of peace which weakens the foundation of imperialism, helps to rally the peace forces, and facilitates the struggle of the workers and oppressed peoples for freedom and independence; pursue a policy that does not allow the foes of socialism the slightest opportunity to sow division among the forces of peace, democracy, and socialism; —display the greatest vigilance with regard to imperialism, maximize the might and defense capacity of the entire socialist camp, take every measure to safeguard international security and peace; —indefatigably expose imperialist policies, closely watch all the warmongers' intrigues and machinations, rouse the wrath of the peoples against those who are aiming at war, heighten the organization of all the peace forces, constantly strengthen and intensify mass activity in defense of peace, work in closer cooperation with all states that are not interested in war; —promote fraternal friendship and close cooperation with Asian, African, and Latin American countries fighting to achieve or consolidate their national independence, and render assistance and support to the national liberation movement; —help in every way to strengthen the militant solidarity of all detachments and organizations of the international working class. It is this effective struggle against imperialism that is being conducted by the CPSU and the other Marxist-Leninist parties firmly abiding by the Declaration and Statement.

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The socialist countries are creating the prototype of mankind's future. By every aspect of their activity, their peoples are making that prototype increasingly attractive, so that every working man, when he looks at life in any socialist country, will say: "This is my vision of a radiant future worth fighting for with every ounce of strength!" . . . The Communists of the Soviet Union and the entire Soviet people stint n o effort in making this great goal a reality. T h e course of history has been such that the brunt of the burden in the struggle against the imperialist warmongers has fallen on the Soviet people. And it is not a light burden. T h e Soviet people often have to deny themselves even necessities. But they do that consciously, knowing that this is needed for the peoples of the world, for present and future generations, for the victory of communism. Who extinguished the raging flames of war in the Suez area in 1956 and compelled the Anglo-Franco-Israeli aggressors to retreat? Who prevented the imperialist-prepared invasion of Syria in 1957? Who prevented war in the Middle East and in the Taiwan Strait in 1958? This was done by the Soviet Union, by all the countries of the socialist camp, by the peace-loving forces. It was they and, above all, the might and vigorous actions of the USSR that compelled the imperialist warmongers to retreat. . . . Citing further evidence of the Soviet Union's "consistent struggle against the imperialist colonialists," the editorial took up the charge that Soviet policy in the Cuban crisis had resulted in a "second Munich." There has been nothing in the postwar years to match the sharpness of the international crisis the American imperialists engineered in the Caribbean area, with its clear menace of a global thermonuclear holocaust. What was the attitude of the shouters in Tirana at this crucial hour? Did they support the Soviet Union, the main force protecting revolutionary Cuba and barring the path to the nuclear maniacs? No, and what is more, they, in effect, helped the imperialist provocateurs inflate the

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conflict toward a clash between the USSR and the USA, and were thereby pushing the world toward the abyss of war. But, fortunately for mankind, that did not happen. T h e peoples were saved from the all-consuming flames of nuclear and thermonuclear bombs. And the whole world admits that credit for this must go to the Soviet Union. The firm and flexible policy of the Soviet government and its head, Comrade N. S. Khrushchev, prevented a thermonuclear disaster, and this is highly appreciated by a grateful humanity as a shining example of statesmanship, reasonableness, and sincere concern for the world's peace and future. The dogmatists, however, are not prepared to accept that. Now that the most acute stage of the crisis has been passed, these heroes of the "left phrase" have come out with the slanderous contention that the Soviet Union surrendered to imperialism, that it even consented to a "second Munich." But everyone who has objectively analyzed how the crisis was overcome knows that there is not a grain of truth in these dogmatists' accusations, and that their statements are, in effect, designed to provoke war. Critics of the peaceful adjustment of the conflict maintain that we cannot trust any agreement with the imperialists. But if we proceed only from that premise, then we would have to recognize that controversial questions can be settled only through war. Marxist-Leninists believe that the power of the socialist countries has grown to the extent that the imperialists are forced to reckon with it, and consequently can be made to abide by their commitments. But Marxist-Leninists never overlook imperialist perfidy and summon the peoples to heightened vigilance and heightened struggle against aggressive, warmongering plans. What are the chief results of the settlement in the Caribbean? Socialist Cuba's sovereignty and independence have been fortified. F o r the first time the ruling elements in the USA, who treated Cuba with contempt and were preparing aggression against it, have now declared, through their President, that they will not attack Cuba. Of course, the struggle continues, and precisely for that reason the Soviet Union fully supports the five demands of the Cuban Republic and is rendering it extensive

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and all-round assistance. It should be perfectly obvious to everyone that Cuba's position and international prestige have been considerably strengthened. The Cuban people, their tested leaders headed by Comrade Fidel Castro, have displayed exemplary courage, firmness, and determination to uphold their socialist gains and have made an immense contribution to the preservation of peace. The beacon of freedom in the Western Hemisphere shines more brightly than ever. Is that a "Munich"? Is it a retreat? Apparently the men who bandy words like a "second Munich" about are ignorant of elementary history and talk of things of which they have not the slightest knowledge. . . . The editorial then shifted to the offensive, reiterating Soviet criticism of the Chinese view that imperialism was merely a "paper tiger."

Lenin trenchantly criticized and mercilessly ridiculed the "left" phrasemongers as men who were unable properly to weigh the objective circumstances at a given turn of events, in a given situation. He wrote: "We must fight against the revolutionary phrase, we have to fight, yes, fight without fail, so that some day the bitter truth would not be said about us: 'The revolutionary phrase about the revolutionary war has ruined the revolution' " (Sochineniia, 4th ed. [Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1941—], XXVII, 10). The international Communist movement knows and has for decades been guided by Lenin's definition of imperialism. Lenin's definition is profound and all-embracing, containing neither an overestimation nor an underestimation of imperialism's strength. Like the analysis of capitalism given by Marx, it has for many long years inspired in class-conscious workers confidence in their inevitable victory over the forces of capitalism and imperialism. What need was there to oppose to these definitions of Marx and Lenin the homespun definition of imperialism as a "paper tiger," which is an underestimation of imperialist strength? The "paper tiger" definition disregards the fact that imperialism has atomic teeth. It is being presented, in an attempt to impose it on the Communist movement, as equivalent to Lenin's

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definition of imperialism as a "colossus with feet of clay." Yet we know that Lenin's metaphor neither covers, nor is a substitute for, all the elements of his comprehensive definition. Besides, emphasized in this metaphor is the fact that imperialism is still strong ("colossus") but that it stands ("feet of clay") on an unstable base and is torn by internal contradictions. In contrast, the definition of imperialism as a "paper tiger" refers only to its weakness. What we need is not persistently imposed paper definitions, but a genuine analysis of present-day imperialism; an analysis that would disclose all its evils, weaknesses, and the laws that doom it, but one that would also soberly assess its strength, including its huge nuclear and other military potential. In its practical implications, the expression "paper tiger" tends to demobilize the masses, for it instills the idea that imperialist strength is but a myth and need not be taken into account. That kind of talk can only encourage complacency among the masses and lead to the loss of vigilance. The men who spread these statements also claim that, from the strategic standpoint, the enemy should be despised, but from the tactical standpoint should be regarded in all seriousness. That "double approach" is contrary to Marxism-Leninism. In the Marxist understanding, strategy and tactics are closely linked in a single unity. Tactics serve the achievement of strategic aims; strategy does not contradict tactics but serves the achievement of bigger, long-range aims. Marxism-Leninism teaches that we must realistically appraise the enemy both in terms of his long-range prospects and in terms of his real strength today, and shape strategy and tactics accordingly. The international Communist movement is fully aware of the fact that imperialism is on the decline, that, historically. it has outlived its day. But it also knows that it has atomic teeth, and can use them. A nuclear war would mean annihilation of hundreds of millions, gigantic destruction of productive forces. It would be extremely difficult to build the new society on the ruins of a global nuclear war. Communists have no right to remain silent on that point. They must forthrightly tell the masses of the existing menace. TTiat will help

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rouse them to fight for lasting peace and against imperialism. The Communist movement believes that, should the imperialists start another war, it will end in the final destruction of the decadent system of capitalism. But socialist revolution does not require that its path be hewed with nuclear or thermonuclear bombs. Whether or not world war can be averted, whether or not peace can be made durable, whether or not the program of general and complete disarmament can be carried out and the people's ideal realized of a society based on justice, of a "world without weapons, armies, and war"—these are questions of fundamental and overriding import. And he who claims that peace defense slogans only sow "illusions" is in opposition to the policy of the international Communist movement. Now, as always, Marxist-Leninists believe that the destinies of humanity are shaped by the masses. That is why they do not regard the power of weapons, nuclear weapons included, as absolute. But we should not artificially oppose the power of the masses to the power of arms. All forces must be brought to bear to defend peace and avert world war: the struggle of the masses; the defensive might of the socialist camp; and the socialist countries' correct foreign policy, which should be firm and principled, but at the same time flexible and cognizant of the relation of forces, and should not preclude—depending upon circumstances —either the "spear-against-spear" method or negotiation. T o commit oneself to only one of these methods and contemptuously shun others is an unwise and un-Leninist policy. Lenin wrote: "It would be absurd to concoct a recipe or general rule ( ' N o compromises!') to serve all cases. One must use one's own brains and analyze the situation in each separate case. That, in fact, is one of the functions of a party organization and of party leaders worthy of the title, namely, through the prolonged, persistent, variegated, and all-round efforts of all thinking representatives of the given class, to evolve the knowledge, the experience, and—in addition to knowledge and experience—the political instinct necessary for the speedy and correct solution of intricate political problems" ( " L e f t - W i n g "

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Communism [Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1947], pp. 6 7 - 6 8 ) . Only in their sum-total can all the forces, methods, and forms of the peace struggle make it possible to avert another world war. And this is a task of cardinal importance, for the ultimate aim of the working class is not to die a "spectacular" death but to build a happier life for the whole of mankind. . . . Next, the editorial turned to the question of the transition to socialism. The CPSU believes that the peoples can acquire genuine happiness only on the path of socialism and communism. In common with the entire international Communist movement, the C P S U works on the premise that it would be desirable for the working class and its vanguard, the Marxist-Leninist parties, that the socialist revolution be carried out by peaceful means. But the CPSU constantly emphasizes that, under conditions in which the exploiting classes resort to violence, the possibility must always be borne in mind of a nonpeaceful transition to socialism and of the need for armed struggle. . . . They [the dogmatists] actually reject the proposition of a variety of forms of transition to socialism, their usual argument being: "Up to the present, history has not known a single case of peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism." But if Marx and Engels had proceeded from that manner of "argumentation" they could never have drawn their conclusion about the inevitability of the victory of socialism and about the dictatorship of the proletariat, inasmuch as at that time they did not yet exist anywhere in the world. The potency of Marxist-Leninist theory lies in the ability thoroughly to analyze the principal features of the era and draw conclusions that illumine the path of the revolutionary forces for decades ahead. The dogmatists, on the other hand, want to orient the fraternal parties only on armed struggle for power, under ail circumstances and conditions. That view is manifestly at odds with Leninism. . . . Left sectarianism is a disease fed by nationalism and in turn feeds nationalism. Experience has shown that left sectarianism

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becomes especially intolerable when it is projected in the activities of a party in power. It is particularly dangerous, also, because it is directed against the policy of the Communist movement on such crucial issues as war and peace, in which the destinies of the human race are involved. That is why left opportunism, dogmatism, and sectarianism are increasingly emerging as a grave danger within the world Communist movement. T h e fraternal parties have accumulated much experience in combating revisionism, which, incidentally, is more easily detected. It is more difficult to expose left opportunism, because it conceals its capitulatory substance behind "ultra-revolutionary" phraseology and plays on the sentiments of the masses. That being so, the only correct line for Communists is determined struggle against both right and left opportunism, that is, against revisionism and dogmatism and sectarianism—irreconcilable struggle against any and every distortion of Marxism-Leninism. In common with other Marxist-Leninist parties, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union considers it its international duty faithfully to adhere to the propositions of the documents of the Moscow meetings and to base its relations on the principles formulated therein. That is why Communists are bound to be seriously concerned by the recently proclaimed thesis that there is a "temporary majority" in the international Communist movement which "persists in its errors," and a "temporary minority" which "boldly and resolutely upholds the truth." Insistence on this thesis would factually push matters toward fragmentation of the international Communist movement, toward undermining the ideological and organizational principles on which the movement rests and which have won socialism epochal victories. The sole purpose that thesis can serve is to justify a split in the Communist movement and rejection of the common positions of the Marxist-Leninist parties. That thesis is especially harmful because it is part of an incredible claim by one party to be the true heir of Lenin, while all the other parties, it is alleged, have defected from MarxismLeninism. To announce to the world that there has arisen within the international Communist movement a situation similar to that

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which existed on the eve of the split in the Second International, or similar to the position in the German Social Democratic Party in December, 1914, when its leadership took a chauvinist stand, is tantamount, in effect, to telling the international Communist movement that it has landed in the quagmire of opportunism, social-democratic revisionism, and that only one party adheres to correct Marxist-Leninist positions. But who has the right to put himself in the place of the great Lenin, who upheld the principles of revolutionary Marxism and raised aloft the banner of struggle against opportunism? There need be no doubt that the Communist parties will reject this presumptuous claim of some to take the place of Lenin and proclaim themselves the sole guardians of the "truth." That pretentious claim is not only fundamentally wrong. It is absolutely unwarranted, for it should be perfectly clear that this attempt to draw an analogy with Lenin's struggle against opportunism in the Second International and thereby justify all m a n n e r of divisive activity is totally at odds with the facts of history and the real position within the international Communist movement, which is undeviatingly following the revolutionary, Leninist path. Furthermore, this claim is evidence of inordinate haughtiness, of total lack of respect for the overwhelming majority of fraternal parties, which have rendered immense services to the international proletariat and have a rich revolutionary experience. It is evidence, also, of lack of any desire to heed their unanimous opinion and appeals. . . . T h e methods the Albanian leaders and those who support them employ against the international Communist movement are alien to Leninism. In substance, they consist in substituting, distorting, and falsifying the views of the CPSU and other fraternal parties, ascribing to them views they have never held. They allege, for instance, that in the opinion of these parties the peoples of capitalist countries should not resort to revolution; oppressed nations should not fight for liberation; the peoples of the world should not combat imperialism, etc. It has to be said that since the days of Trotskyism, no opportunist trend has had recourse to so monstrous a method, which grossly

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perverts the truth and deceives the people of their own country and world public opinion. Is it worthy of a Communist to allege that the glorious fraternal parties of France, the USA, Italy, Spain, Britain, Greece, Belgium, Denmark, Portugal, Iraq, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and many others now in the crucible of class struggles, daily waging a truly heroic battle against capitalism, subjected to persecution and repression by the imperialist police machine—that these parties stand on the sidelines of the mass struggle and support imperialism? T h a t is an insult to valorous and devoted fighters. It is giving virtual assistance to the enemy the Communists are fighting. . . . Quoting Lenin to the effect that unity signified abiding by majority decision—at least "among all sensible people"—the editorial closed with an appeal for harmony in the international Communist movement. The Communist movement is confronted with exceptionally complex and responsible tasks. T h e vital interests of the masses, promotion of successful struggle against imperialism, for elimination of the disgraceful system of exploitation and national oppression, and for the triumph of socialism and communism, imperatively require a strengthening of the international alliance of Communist parties and its durable, indestructible unity. History will never forgive any leader who in this crucial period fails to appreciate the paramount need perseveringly and in every way to strengthen the unity of the Communist parties and acts contrary to the vital interests of the peoples. The present differences between the world Communist movement and the Albanian leaders and their supporters should not be allowed to obscure the tasks of the world's Communists in the battle against imperialism, for national independence, peace, democracy, socialism, and communism. Differences between individual Communist parties on specific questions have no deep roots in the social system of the socialist countries. Under capitalism, contradictions are based on objective factors and are therefore of an antagonistic character. Contradictions between Communist parties are primarily

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of a subjective character. Consequently, all the grounds are there for successfully resolving them. We must proceed f r o m the supreme aims and interests of the international Communist movement and seek ways and means of rapprochement, cooperation, and unity. If one does not persistently cling to one's own special position, if one is guided by Marxism-Leninism, by the supreme and common interests of the movement, if one finds the "physical strength of mind" to march in step with the entire movement—the international unity of the Communist movement will be assured. I n the interests of this unity and solidarity, the 1960 Conference defined the principles governing relations among parties, principles by which they should be guided in their activities. These principles have two interrelated aspects: examination of all questions at the conference table on a basis of equality; at the same time it was emphasized that "a resolute defense of the unity of the world Communist movement based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, and the prevention of any actions which may undermine that unity, are a necessary condition for victory in the struggle for national independence, democracy, and peace, for the successful accomplishment of the tasks of the socialist revolution and of the building of socialism and communism." It is impermissible to separate these closely linked laws of our movement. Splitting activities in the ranks of the international Communist movement are impermissible. Disregard of these demands is equivalent to undermining the very foundation of the Communist parties' fraternal unity, to encroaching on the very principle of proletarian internationalism. In the beginning that can lead to the emergence of a "minority" trend, and subsequently to the danger of a split in the international Communist movement—which would be to the joy of its common enemy, international imperialism. There are no "superior" and "subject" parties in the Communist movement. There are only fraternal parties sharing one ideology, Marxism-Leninism, and one aim, the struggle against imperialism and for the triumph of communism. All Commu-

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nist parties are equal and independent; all of them bear responsibility for the destiny of the Communist movement, for its victories and setbacks. These propositions were first enunciated by our party. On its own initiative the CPSU proposed that the Statement and other documents of the Communist movement should not contain the formula that the Soviet Union stands at the head of the socialist camp, and the CPSU at the head of the Communist movement. This is one of the indications of how scrupulously the CPSU abides by the principles of proletarian equality and solidarity of fraternal parties, and how supremely loyal it is to the principles of proletarian internationalism. Fidelity to proletarian internationalism has become an intrinsic feature of our party, and numerous facts are constantly convincing the peoples of this. T h e party of Lenin, the first to blaze the path to socialism, the first to storm the heights of communism, the party that is rendering all-round brotherly assistance to the builders of socialism in other countries, to fighters for national liberation; the party that has so perseveringly worked to unite the Communist movement and has raised aloft the banner of struggle for peace, for sparing mankind the horrors of thermonuclear war—has by these and other deeds proved that it is discharging its internationalist duty with honor. Anyone who, contrary to the facts, tries to cast aspersions on the internationalism of the CPSU, on the immense contribution it has made to the world liberation movement, is doing a disservice to the liberation struggle of all the peoples. The Communist parties have a tried and tested method of resolving controversies. That method is collective discussion, and it has always been urged by our party. The CPSU is deeply convinced that collective discussion of cardinal problems of international development in our time makes it possible to cement the unity of the international Communist movement. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union will continue its tireless efforts for the unity of the great socialist commonwealth of nations, and will combat any and every divisive action, in.

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order to strengthen the unity of the international C o m m u n i s t movement o n the basis of the great principles of M a r x i s m Leninism. With the Sino-Soviet dispute thus publicized in extensive, though still not entirely explicit, statements by both parties, other C o m munist parties began once again to take public positions. ( F o r instance, the P C I replied to the Jen-min jih-pao editorial of D e c e m ber 31, 1962, in L'Unità of January 10 and Rinascita of J a n u a r y 12: and the P C F , in addition to the information released at the Central Committee plenum of December 13-14, 1962, published a pamphlet of relevant documents and a series of articles by Yves Moreau, "Le mouvement communiste international et al coexistence pacifique," in Humanité, January 5 - 1 6 , 1963.) Each day Pravda reported c o m m e n t s f r o m other Communist parties on the J a n u a r y 7 editorial. Interest was heightened by the revelation that M o s c o w a n d Peking not only were competing for the support of other parties but were again debating, or negotiating, the possibility of convening another international conference of all Communist parties, such as the C P C h a d requested in April and again in December, 1962. O n e of the obstacles to such a conference was Yugoslavia. T h e Chinese insistence on making the 1960 Statement the point of departure of any new discussions implied, as a prerequisite, Soviet agreement to jettison Tito and revert to the attacks on Yugoslav revisionism which that Statement had reaffirmed. M o r e broadly, the Yugoslav, Chinese, Cuban, and Albanian problems all raised the question of what membership in a Communist family and "unity" of the international movement meant. A f t e r the mutual appeals for "unity" and warnings of "splits" b y both Moscow a n d Peking, the VI Congress of the ( E a s t ) G e r m a n Socialist Unity Party ( S E D ) on January 15-21, 1963, provided another international " f o r u m " (Moscow's t e r m ) for a c o n f r o n t a tion of the two m a j o r "camps" within international c o m m u n i s m . T h e expectation of a showdown was heightened by the announcement that N . S. Khrushchev would attend in person—as did several other (but not all) First Secretaries of bloc C o m m u n i s t parties. Prior to the Congress. Khrushchev is known to have consulted Gomulka, Ulbricht, and Z+iivkov. In view of the control which the CPSU was assumed to exercise over the SED, the procedural innovations at the Congress were viewed as reflecting Soviet "orchestration." T h u s the demotion of the Chinese party in the rank order of attending parties was

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29

considered a calculated insult. Likewise, a new rule required the signatures of at least twenty German SED members to give a foreign delegate the floor at the Congress. In his opening address, Ulbricht bore down on the Chinese Communists with regard to the Sino-Indian dispute, adding the complaint that Peking had neither consulted nor informed its allies in the "socialist camp" about the operation.

108.

N I K I T A K H R U S H C H E V . S P E E C H AT T H E V I CONGRESS O F THE SOCIALIST U N I T Y PARTY O F G E R M A N Y , JANUARY

1963. Pravda, January 17, 1963. Translation in Times, No. 4, January 30, 1963.

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of the fraternal parties of socialist countries are highly important for generalizing the experience of building the new society. The role of the congresses has particularly increased of late, when the consequences of the Stalin personality cult have been eliminated and Leninist standards restored both within the various parties and in the international Communist movement. In our time it is impossible to work successfully for socialism if one relies in everything solely on one's national experience and one's own knowledge, without paying regard to how neighbors are getting on and closely studying the experience of one's class brothers. The internationalism of Communists is evidenced, among other things, by the great importance they attach to studying and using the collective experience of socialist construction. If we want to do our common job better and quicker, we must constantly, regularly, take the best from each other, or, as the saying goes, check the time with each other. The recent congresses of the fraternal parties of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia summed up the results of an CONGRESSES

" Already at the Czechoslovak party's congress, in December, 1962, Novotny had listed the C P C after all the European bloc parties, i.e., in eighth place, instead of the previously customary second. (See above, pp. 2 - 3 , for the practice of Soviet congresses.) At the VI S E D Congress, Ulbricht cited the C P C in ninth place, i.e., after all C M E A member states including Mongolia.

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entire stage of socialist construction. They examined the concrete problems of socialist construction in their countries not in isolation from, but in closc connection with, the common tasks of the world Communist movement as a whole. The work of the recent congress of the Italian Communist Party was also imbued with the spirit of internationalism. The Italian Communists, like those of the socialist countries, displayed an active, creative approach to the burning problems of the age. Thanks to the fact that representatives of most of the fraternal parties participated in the work of these congresses, the latter were of the nature of international Communist forums. They furnished convincing proof of the steadily growing fighting strength of the international working-class and Communist movement. They demonstrated the Communists' unshakable fidelity to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and their firm determination to strengthen the great socialist camp and cement the unity of their ranks in the struggle for peace, democracy, and socialism. . . . After reviewing Soviet domestic achievements, surveying the tasks of "socialist construction" in the GDR, and discussing the problem of Berlin, Khrushchev addressed himself to the topic of "peaceful coexistence." As far as the world socialist system is concerned, we stand, as we have always stood, for the strengthening of peaceful cocxistence, for peaceful economic competition between the two systems and the settlement of disputed issues by negotiation. People advancing confidently along the road of growth and progress and looking optimistically to the future do not need war—they have a vital interest in peace. And we, Comrades, have no grounds for pessimism! (Applause.) Men of politics, statesmen, have no right to forget their responsibility to the peoples. T o us fell the honor of being the first in the world to raise the standard of struggle for socialism, for communism; and today the Soviet Union and the socialist community as a whole oppose the capitalist world like a sranite cliff against whose mighty bulk all storms are shattered. It is not for us Communists, men of progressive ideas and con-

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victions, to engage in adventurism and thereby enable the aggressive imperialists, who are losing faith in the victory of their system, to unleash a world war. I repeat, Comrades, that has nothing in common with reason or heroism; that is lack of faith in the strength of the working class, in the strength of socialism. . . . The increased influence of the forces of peace and socialism, the effectiveness of our foreign policy of peace, were saliently demonstrated during the Caribbean crisis. You know that in 1961 U.S. imperialism organized an invasion of Cuba by Cuban counter-revolutionaries. It clearly underestimated the Cuban people's resistence, the strength of the Cuban revolution, and met with defeat. In preparing another invasion of Cuba, it no longer confined itself to using the Cuban counter-revolutionaries, who to this day receive support, money, and arms. The United States's own armed forces were to be brought into play. -r But when already fully prepared, the invasion was prevented. By the efforts of the Cuban people, the Soviet Union, and other socialist countries, as also of other democratic, anti-imperialist forces, the U.S. aggressive imperialist elements were compelled to retreat and publicly declare that they would not invade Cuba. There are people who say that Cuba and the Soviet Union were defeated in the Caribbean conflict. But theirs is a strange logic: revolutionary Cuba is there and getting stronger, and yet we are supposed to have suffered defeat? Who really retreated and who won in this conflict? Let us see once more what aims each of the two sides set itself. The Cuban people, on accomplishing the revolution, set out to build socialism in Cuba. The U.S. aggressive elements declared that they would not tolerate the existence of a socialist country in the Western Hemisphere and would do all in their power to overthrow Cuba's revolutionary government and restore the rule of the U.S. monopolies. That was how the matter stood. We realized that unless some exceptional measure was taken

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to stop the U.S. imperialists, the United States would commit aggression against the Cuban people. The Soviet government and the Cuban government pondered on what could be done, and weighed various possibilities. We wanted to bring it home to the U.S. imperialists that if they launched an aggressive attack on Cuba, they would have to reckon with the eventuality of thermonuclear retaliation. This forced measure that we adopted did give the imperialists a shock. But only such measures could make the U.S. statesmen appraise the realities of the situation more soberly. It will be recalled that in his message to the Soviet government the U.S. President pledged before the whole world that the United States would not invade Cuba and would restrain its allies from doing so. Thus, the U.S. government was in effect compelled to renounce armed intervention against the Republic of Cuba. This was a defeat for the policy of the most aggressive imperialist circles and a victory for the peaceful coexistence policy, for the policy of combating imperialism; it was a triumph for the policy of preventing the export of counter-revolution. ( L o u d applause.) and prolonged We are told that since we withdrew our rockets from Cuba, we retreated. But this is a view that can only come from people who do not see all the complexity of the political struggle of today, which requires flexibility and ability to maneuver. Yes, this was a concession we made in return for a concession by the other side; it was a mutual concession. T h e imperialists had to make a concession by renouncing invasion of Cuba. And our whole purpose in installing the rockets had been to safeguard Cuba against imperialist invasion. Consequently, our rockets did their job. . . . The United States has not abandoned its intention of doing away with Cuba's socialist gains. But the point is that, together with Cuba, we have forced it to declare that it renounces armed invasion of Cuba. The struggle to consolidate the position of countries that have

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taken the socialist path is a long process. It will go on until one of the two systems achieves final victory—which means abolition of the capitalist system. (Applause.) F r o m the standpoint of those who consider that we stationed our rockets in Cuba to launch a thermonuclear attack on the U.S. and so start a world thermonuclear war, and that we then gave this u p and withdrew the rockets from Cuba, it may seem that we retreated from our purpose. But the point is that the Soviet Union never had any such purpose. T h e only reason why we stationed our rockets in Cuba was to stop U.S. imperialist aggression against Cuba. It may be argued that under the influence of the most rabid elements the U.S. imperialists will break their pledge and again turn their arms against Cuba. But then, the forces which defended Cuba have not ceased to exist either and are growing mightier f r o m day to day. Whether the rockets are in Cuba or elsewhere is not the point. They can be used equally well in either case against any aggression. (Applause.) I repeat that in stationing our rockets in Cuba we were not out to precipitate war between the socialist countries and imperialism. We had a different aim in view—to prevent an imperialist invasion of Cuba, to prevent another world war. If the events are assessed from this standpoint, we are the winners. It is a gain for the peace forces, a gain for the forces of socialism, the forces building communism. (Prolonged applause.) Some people who consider themselves Marxists opine that the way to combat imperialism is not, above all, by building up the socialist countries' economic strength—that tangible factor with which our enemies reckon; no, they have invented a new method of doing it, probably the cheapest ever known. This method, you see, does not depend on a country's economic level, it does not depend on the quality and quantity of armaments; it consists in nothing but abuse. These people imagine that to engage in endless swearing and cursing at imperialism is to do what will best help the socialist countries. This is a sort of voodoo belief in the power of curses and incantations.

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If cursing were all that was needed against imperialism— well, that too, you know, is something the Russian is pretty good at. ( A m u s e m e n t . ) You Germans also have some juicy cursewords, but I think in a cursing-match with you we Russians would come out on top. (Amusement.) But cursing, abuse is no great weapon against enemies—it's so much water off a duck's back. And so the way to combat imperialism is not by showering abuse on it; the thing to do is to compete with the imperialists, the capitalists, on the economic plane. And in order to have a solid basis in that competition, we must develop the socialist countries' economic potential—and also possess tangible strength, nuclear-rocket strength, that would warn the imperialists: stick your nose in and you'll lose your head! That is something they understand. ( L o u d applause.) As a child I lived in a mining village. When people became sick there, they would go to the "wise woman," she would mumble a charm, and they'd think they felt better. Now everybody knows that is ignorance; and of course it was ignorance then too. But many people believed, for example, that you could learn a charm against being snake-bitten, and it would help. But it was only benighted ignorance that made people believe that such things worked. The same with abusing the imperialists; it has very little effect on them: you can curse them all you want, they still go on sucking the people's blood. Anyone with an elementary understanding of Marxism realizes that no amount of cursing and abuse will make imperialism any the weaker. Of course, one must expose the imperialists' machinations; it mobilizes the masses to fight the exploiters, it helps them to see the bestial nature of imperialism. But one must remember that the imperialists reckon only with tangible strength. Communists at the helm of state are therefore duty bound to do everything to increase our strength. And that means going allout to build up the economy and to improve the people's living standards on the basis of socialism's ever-growing economic might. This will serve as the best example for all working people and all nations fighting for their freedom. And with the

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growth of the socialist countries' economic might, their defensive power increases too. (Applause.) Comrades, allow me to deal with some important and pressing issues of the world Communist movement. T o begin with, I would like to stress the interconnection between the struggle for peace, for peaceful coexistence, and the revolutionary struggle of the working class and all the working people for the triumph of socialism on earth. The position today is that the struggle for peace has become a key factor in the struggle for socialism. N o problem of the revolutionary movement of the working class or the national liberation movement can now be considered in isolation from the struggle to preserve peace, to avert a world thermonuclear war. This is the important lesson of the recent events in the Caribbean for the tactics of the world Communist movement. Before now there have been cases in the history of the working-class movement when the struggle for peace became the prime factor in the struggle for socialism. T h a t was how matters stood at the time of the October Socialist Revolution. . . . The Bolsheviks gave the peoples of Russia peace, deliverance from the imperialist war, and rallied the great masses of the working people to Soviet power in the struggle for socialism. . . . Numerous historical facts show that Marx, Lenin, and their followers fought relentlessly against predatory unjust wars and worked to unite the masses of the people on this antiwar platform. Now some people who call themselves Marxist-Leninists declare that the defense of peace and the struggle against the war danger are contrary to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism and hinder the development of the revolutionary movement. T o accept their scheme of things, it would appear that Lenin, Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, and the Russian Bolsheviks were no Marxists, since they opposed war. Only people who do not understand the substance of the Marxist doctrine of revolutionary struggle can talk like this.

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The theory of scientific socialism created by Marx and Engels maintains that in the course of its development, as a result of the antagonistic contradictions arising and growing in society, capitalism inevitably meets its doom. The concentration and centralization of capital lead to monopoly and to the ever-increasing decay of capitalism, which provides the conditions for transition to a higher social system, socialism. . . . In the course of its development, Marx said, capitalism creates its own gravedigger, the working class. Events have fully borne out the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. According to that doctrine, the working class defeats capitalism by its class struggle against the exploiters, not by starting wars between nations. History so willed it that the Russian proletariat achieved victory for the revolution during the First World War. After the Second World War there arose a number of socialist states. When war breaks out between imperialist countries, all the internal and external contradictions of imperialism become aggravated, the machinery of the bourgeois state is shaken, and a favorable situation arises for the victory of the working class —particularly in the countries defeated in the war. It was with all this in mind that Lenin, at the beginning of the First World War, put forward his historic thesis about turning the imperialist war into a civil war. And the Russian Bolsheviks, the working class of Russia, did it. (Prolonged applause.) But that certainly is not to say that the Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, started a war between nations to bring about the victory of the revolution. On the contrary, Lenin and the Bolsheviks did everything to prevent the outbreak of war; but since they could not prevent it, they set out to turn the imperialist war into a civil war. That is something very different from what the newly hatched theoreticians want who would create a "theory" to the effect that the road to victory for socialism runs through war between nations, through destruction, bloodshed, and the death of millions of people. Were the Communists to follow a "theory" such

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as that, it would repel the masses f r o m them instead of attracting them. And it is a "theory" all the more repellent in this rocket and nuclear age. Marxist-Leninists have always devoted a great deal of attention to the problems of war and peace, and have always considered them in their specific historical context. One cannot solve problems of war and peace without taking the actual situation into account. One must have the courage to face up soberly to the facts as they are and to weigh with scientific precision the eventual results of a modern war, should it prove impossible to prevent it. Foreign scientists and military experts estimate that the United States now has roughly 40,000 nuclear bombs and warheads. The Soviet Union, too, as everyone knows, has more than enough of this stuff. What would happen if all these nuclear weapons were brought down on people? Scientists estimate that the first blow alone would take a toll of 700 to 800 million h u m a n lives. All the big cities not only of the two leading nuclear powers, the U.S. and the USSR, but of France, Britain, Germany, Italy, China, Japan, and many other countries of the world would be wiped out or devastated. The effects of a nuclear war would continue to tell through the lifetime of many generations, causing disease, death, and hideous deformities. I am not saying these things to frighten anyone. I am simply stating the data in the possession of science. The data cannot be ignored. There can be no doubt that a world nuclear war, if the imperialist maniacs were to start it, would inevitably result in the downfall of the capitalist system, a system breeding wars. But would the socialist countries and the cause of socialism all over the world benefit f r o m a world nuclear disaster? Only people who deliberately shut their eyes to the facts can think that. As for Marxist-Leninists, they cannot propose to establish a communist civilization on the ruins of the centers of world culture, on land laid waste and contaminated by nuclear fallout. And this quite apart f r o m the fact that in the case of many peoples the question of socialism would no longer arise at all, because

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they would have disappeared bodily from the face of the earth. . . . In short, Comrades, as I already said in my speech at the USSR Supreme Soviet, wise men will not want to hasten their arrival in the next world: no one has ever come back from there and told us it's better than this one. (Amusement, prolonged applause.) It's not the kingdom of heaven we want, it's a kingdom of labor on earth. For that we are fighting with all our might, will go on fighting, and will win. ( L o u d and prolonged applause.) T h e Soviet Union, which has rockets and nuclear arms, is well aware of the potentialities of these weapons. We have made them to defend our country and the other socialist countries. We therefore take a responsible attitude toward the problems of war and peace. We do not want war, but neither are we afraid of it. Should war be forced on us, we shall be able to repel the aggressors in no uncertain fashion, and the aggressors know it. T o use a familiar phrase, blessed is he who talks about war without knowing what he is talking about. The Albanian leaders talk a lot about rocket and nuclear war, but nobody is worried by their talk. Everyone knows that they have nothing to their name but idle talk, that they command no practical potentialities. ( A n i m a t i o n . ) As you see, our positions and our responsibilities in these matters are different. . . . Some people misrepresent our Marxist-Leninist position, making out that by proclaiming the policy of peaceful coexistence we are calling on the revolutionary forces and Communist parties of the capitalist countries to renounce the class struggle, the struggle to establish the rule of the working class, of the working people, and to abandon the national liberation struggle of the peoples. That is a stupid and slanderous invention. The Soviet Union supports the just wars of peoples not only through its declarations and statements; its support has more than once taken the form of concrete assistance. Many peoples have used our arms in their liberation struggle and have won, have freed themselves from colonial oppression. The wars of

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colonial peoples for their liberation are holy wars, and for this reason we have been, are, and always will be on the side of peoples battling for their independence. (Prolonged applause.) T h e advocates of the "theory" of the victory of socialism through war also deny that socialism can win by peaceful means, saying that this is a departure from Marxism. Let me say for the information of these admirers of the Stalin cult that none other than Stalin himself, in an interview with British C o m m u nists after the Second World War, spoke of using the peaceful, parliamentary way to bring about the victory of socialism. That idea is set down in the Program of the Communist Party of Great Britain, and the leaders of the British Communist Party know that this formulation was suggested by Stalin. The Albanian leaders claim that the CPSU advocates the peaceful way only and rules out the way of armed struggle. Can they cite an instance, may one ask, when a Communist party considered that there was a revolutionary situation in its country and wanted to start an uprising, but the CPSU opposed using the method of armed struggle? Have they got such an example, perhaps? No, they haven't, because there isn't one. The Albanian leaders consider that a revolution can be induced artificially whenever they may wish, that no objective or subjective conditions are required to make a revolution. According to their "theory," everything happens very simply: heroes appear who come along and raise an uprising. But there have been no such cases in history and never will be. This "theory," if such it may be called, has nothing in common with Marxism. . . Revolution is the cause of the great masses themselves. It is only their own experience in revolutionary struggles that makes the working class and all the working people of a country readv for revolution. In the eventful history of the emancipation movement of the Russian proletariat there were cases of revolutionaries trying to ignore mass struggle. The fight against the bourgeois-landlord order in Russia was at first carried on by individuals, by the heroic members of the Narodnaia Volia, by the Bakuninists and

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Kropotkinists. They tried to skip the historically necessary stage of building up a revolutionary movement of the masses. These people believed that one must take an axe and commit terrorist acts against the powers that be, and that this would ensure the success of the revolution. They organized conspiracies and plotted to assassinate tsars, believing that a hero could make a revolution by himself and win happiness for the people by his blood. Many of the finest sons of our people, the cream of our intelligentsia, lost their lives in this fruitless struggle. You know that Lenin's brother, Alexander Ulianov, also took this path and was executed for an attempt on the life of the tsar. On the day of his brother's execution Lenin said: "We will take a different p a t h . " Only struggle by the masses, led by the party of the working class, can bring victory. Lone heroes can die gloriously but they cannot alter the social and political system, cannot gain victory for the revolution. . . . Finally, Khrushchev took up the question of unity within the international Communist movement. Comrades, solid unity of the world Communist movement is a most important condition for our success in the struggle for peace and socialism throughout the world. . . . T o be sure, Communists of different countries may evince a different understanding of certain questions, even very important ones. The Marxist-Leninist doctrine has become practice for one-third of the human race. Over 1,000 million people are building the new life, achieving splendid results in socialist construction. The countries of the world socialist system are at different stages of the building of the new society. Nor is their experience in relations with the outside world identical in every respect. Because of these circumstances, there may be a difference of approach to certain problems. While that is not an altogether agreeable fact, it has to be taken into account because it is a reality. Differences may and do arise, but we must not forget that the differences among the Communist and workers parties are

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no more than fleeting episodes, whereas the relations between the peoples of the socialist countries are being shaped for centuries to come. Accordingly, relations between the fraternal parties, and still more so between the socialist states, which have a common social and economic system and set out to build communism, can and must be determined only by the basic things that unite us. Everything else, in the final analysis, is of secondary importance by comparison. (Applause.) Therefore, we must not let our tempers run away with us when differences arise. We must be patient, must deal in essentials, must see the main thing. And the main thing for the fraternal parties, especially those of the socialist countries, is the common cause for which they are fighting—the building of socialism and communism. We must properly understand and appreciate all this, and must not be subjective when differences arise on this or that issue. If we diverge over certain ideological questions, possibly even rather important ones, we must work for a proper understanding of these questions. Moreover, we must not go to extremes and lapse into subjectivism in appraising the general position in a country. We must not, for example, assess the political system of this or that socialist country only by the leadership's erroneous views which have temporarily gained ascendancy there. The main thing by which to judge is not subjective, but objective, factors; and that means, first of all, who owns the means of production, who holds the power, on what lines th© country is developing. If, falling out over some question, we should thereupon proceed to declare that the socialist country whose leaders disagree with us was not socialist, that would be the sheerest subjectivism; it would be like the church excommunicating people for ceasing observances and so on. It ill befits us to emulate the clerics and "excommunicate" people f r o m socialism. ( A p -

plause.) T o cite an example, we differ with Yugoslavia on certain questions of an ideological character; but that is not reason enough to say that it is not a socialist country. Such a statement

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would be unwarranted, because objective indications show that the system existing there is socialist. The means of production and state power in Yugoslavia, won by its peoples in heroic struggle, are in the hands of the working people. There are no landlords, bankers, capitalists. The peoples of Yugoslavia are working to build socialism and communism. What reason, then, to "excommunicate" Yugoslavia from socialism, to exclude it from the ranks of the socialist countries? We have great disagreements with the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor. Are we therefore to declare, on these subjective grounds, that Albania is not a socialist country? T h a t would be a false, subjective approach. Although the Albanian leaders show a failure to understand a number of highly important questions, and we seek to alter that, we consider that Albania is a socialist country, and that its peoples have displayed true heroism in the struggle for the victory of socialism. . . . Everyone knows how much patience and restraint our party has shown in its relations with the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor. Even though from the very start of our differences their attitude toward the CPSU was frankly hostile, we repeatedly made overtures, proposing talks to settle the issues in dispute. But the Albanian leaders rejected all these proposals of ours. They departed more and more from Marxism-Leninism and the principles of proletarian internationalism, heading for a rupture with the world Communist movement. But even today we are prepared to repeat what we said in the Report of the Central Committee of the C P S U to the X X I I Party Congress: If the Albanian leaders cherish the interests of their people and the cause of socialist construction in Albania, if they want friendship with the CPSU and with all the fraternal parties, let them renounce their erroneous views and come back to the path of unity and close cooperation in the fraternal socialist community, to the path of unity with the entire world Communist movement. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union follows Lenin's behests. While not compromising on fundamental questions of the Communist movement's theory and tactics, we have done

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and will do everything to persuade those who err or who have lost their bearings and lack a clear understanding of the tasks facing us in our struggle under present conditions. The unity of world Communism on the basis of MarxismLeninism is infinitely sacred to our party, and we will spare no effort to strengthen it. (Prolonged applause.) In their relations with each other the Communist parties should show tolerance, should not be subjective in their appraisals, should not gladden the hearts of our class enemies by controversies. To our mind, in appraising any development one should procccd from the cardinal thing: the position of the Communist party in question on the problems of the struggle for the victory of the working class, for the victory of socialism. The parties of countries whose peoples are already building socialism and communism should exercise particular caution and restraint in argument. It is our common duty not to disunite our forces in the face of the imperialist camp; on the contrary, we must consolidate them to the utmost all along the line—economically, militarily, ideologically, and politically. The record shows that sometimes we see things differently where matters pertaining to a country's internal development are concerned. In these matters our relations have in recent years been more or less what they should be, with tolerance and, so to speak, abstention from lecturing, let alone interference in other countries' affairs. In matters of foreign policy and questions relating to the international working-class and Communist movement, there are also differences of approach sometimes, a different understanding of events. This may of course involve a certain divergence of viewpoints, and there can be arguments to hammer out the right, agreed line. But here restraint and patience are particularly necessary. The Central Committee of our party thinks it would be a good thing to call a halt at this point to controversy between Communist parties and criticism of other parties inside one's own, and to let a certain amount of time elapse so that passions may die down. (Applause.) Some comrades suggest holding a meeting of all the fraternal

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parties to discuss outstanding issues. Our party has always favored such meetings. We believe, however, that such a meeting at the moment would probably hold out little hope of eliminating differences. Such a meeting now would not lead to a calm and sensible ironing out of differences, but to their aggravation and the danger of a split. We must not forget that there is such a thing as the momentum of a struggle, and political passions are at high pitch. The Soviet Communists are stanch and determined advocates of unity of all the Communist and workers parties, of the consolidation of our common forces on the basis of MarxismLeninism. And just because of this we think that the interests of the working class, the interests of our future, will best be served by stopping the press controversy on the questions in dispute. (Applause.) Let us give time a chance to do its work. It will help us to see who is right and who is wrong. Moreover, during this time we should clear away all the extraneous, irrelevant stuff that has been dragged in. Then we will be in a better position to talk things over, make a summing up, and work out a common view on the fundamental issues of the development of the world Communist and working-class movement. . . . During the following two days, spokesmen for several other European Communist parties joined, in different degrees, in the condemnation of the Chinese and Albanian positions. Perhaps in response to the implicit charge that the CPC did not understand Western conditions, Wu Hsiu-chuan shed his customary blue tunic for a business suit when he came to address the Congress on January 18. Khrushchev was studiedly absent from the session. Wu's speech raised no new issues but amounted to a refutation of Ulbricht's comments on the Sino-Indian conflict; an attack on those who aired differences among Communist parties at congresses: a bitter denunciation of the "Tito clique" along the lines of other Chinese Communist statements of the same period; and a retort to Khrushchev on the holding of an international Communist conference, insisting that those who had begun the debate must initiate a reconciliation, revealing the CPC's earlier offers to hold such a conference, and accepting Khrushchev's proposal to hold such a conference after a preparatory period.

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It was Wu's references to the Yugoslav p a r t y — w h o s e representatives were attending the C o n g r e s s — w h i c h , s o m e w h a t unexpectedly, produced cries of "pfui!," rhythmic stamping of feet, boos, and whistles of protest from the audience. T h e chairman, alternate S E D Politburo m e m b e r Paul Verner, rang his bell f o u r times to stop Wu's "provocational" remarks. 8 " T h e m o o d o f the Congress was distinctly hostile to the "dogmatist" parties. A m o n g others, the North Korean and Indonesian delegates tried in vain to get the floor. It was reported that they lodged official protests against this treatment. 3 1 Yet both Khrushchev's and Wu's speeches had reopened the door for further talks preparatory to a new "cease-fire" a m o n g the C o m munist parties.

1 0 9 . "LET U S UNITE ON THE BASIS OF THE MOSCOW DECLARATION A N D THE M o s c o w STATEMENT." E d i t o r i a l in

min

jih-pao,

Review,

January

27,

1963.

Translation

in

JenPeking

N o . 5 , F e b r u a r y 1, 1 9 6 3 .

THE V I C o n g r e s s of t h e S o c i a l i s t U n i t y P a r t y of G e r m a n y

was

held January 1 5 - 2 1 . I n their a t t e m p t s t o s t o p t h e s u c c e s s f u l d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e people's struggles for world peace, national liberation,

democ-

racy, a n d s o c i a l i s m , t h e imperialists, the r e a c t i o n a r i e s o f v a r i o u s c o u n t r i e s , a n d t h e Y u g o s l a v revisionists are u s i n g e v e r y m e a n s t o disrupt the u n i t y of the p e o p l e s of t h e w o r l d , a n d e s p e c i a l l y 30 Chinese and other delegates later expressed the belief that the incident must have been planned in advance, given the noted discipline of SED officialdom. T A S S initially reported Wu's speech in a mere twentyseven words. Three days later, Pravdn printed an extensive report on his speech in a dispatch f r o m Peking, not East Berlin. Excerpts f r o m it appear in Peking Review, No. 4 (January 25, 1963). 81 The Washington Post, January 22, 1963. The same dispatch reported: "Despite Khrushchev's pose of amity, the Russians here made no effort to get together with the Chinese. At evening parties, when most real work of Communist congresses is done, there were no Chinese present or invited. Instead, Khrushchev and the seven other members of the Russian delegation [which included Ponomarev, Ilyichev, and Adzhubei] concentrated on building up support for the Kremlin line a m o n g European satellites, French and Italian parties, and those African, Asian and Latin American parties not yet fully committed to either side. . . ."

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the unity of the socialist camp and of the international Communist movement. The Communists of all countries and all progressive mankind are deeply worried and disturbed over the ever increasing harm that is being done to the unity of the international Communist ranks, and they are eagerly demanding the ironing out of differences and the strengthening of unity in the common struggle against the enemy on the basis of the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement. T h e outstanding features of the Congress were that while much was said about stopping attacks and strengthening unity among the fraternal parties, extremely crude attacks were continued against the Chinese Communist Party and other fraternal parties, attacks which further widen differences and damage unity; and that while much was said about supporting the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement, brazen attempts in open violation of the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement were made to reverse the verdict passed on the Tito clique of renegades to Marxism-Leninism. When, in the course of his speech, the head of the Chinese Communist Party's delegation, which attended the Congress by invitation, quoted and expounded the criticisms of Yugoslav revisionism made in the Moscow Statement, the executive chairman of the Congress repeatedly stopped him. Prompted by this cue, there was an uproar of booing, whistling, and foot-stamping in the congress hall. It is indeed strange and almost incredible for such a phenomenon to occur in the international Communist movement. When the delegate of the Chinese C o m m u nist Party ended his speech, the executive chairman of the Congress went so far as to protest. He stated that he "most decidedly rejected" the criticism of Yugoslav revisionism made by the delegate of the Communist Party of China and described it as "contradicting all the norms prevailing among Communist and revolutionary workers parties." Following this, the Soviet newspaper lzvestiia attacked the delegate of the Communist Party of China for his criticism of Yugoslav revisionism, stating that it was "utterly impermissible." . . . The Communist Party of China has consistently worked to

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uphold and strengthen the unity of the socialist camp and of the international Communist movement. In 1956, the imperialists, the reactionaries of various countries, and the Yugoslav revisionists organized a world-wide anti-Soviet and anti-Communist onslaught and engineered a counter-revolutionary revolt in Hungary. Together with other fraternal parties, the Communist Party of China waged a resolute struggle, thus safeguarding Marxism-Leninism and defending the socialist camp. Through their joint efforts and full consultations at the 1957 and 1960 Moscow meetings, the other fraternal parties and the Communist Party of China formulated a common line for the international Communist movement and established common principles guiding the mutual relations of fraternal parties and countries. At these two meetings, we conducted a necessary struggle against certain wrong tendencies detrimental to unity and also made necessary compromises on certain matters, thus contributing to the unanimous agreement reached at the meeting. At the X X I I Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1961, when there occurred the first serious incident in which one party at its own congress made an open attack by name on another fraternal party—that is, on the Albanian Party of L a b o r — t h e delegation of the Communist Party of China voiced firm opposition and proffered sincere advice. . . In its desire to uphold the principles guiding the mutual relations of fraternal parties and countries and to strengthen unity, the Chinese Communist Party in April, 1962, gave its active support to the proposals made by some fraternal parties for easing relations and improving the atmosphere, and, in a letter to the fraternal party concerned, formally expressed its opinion that a meeting of representatives of the Communist and workers parties of all countries should be convened to iron out differences and strengthen unity through comradely discussion and consultation. We also pointed out that, prior to such a meeting, all fraternal parties should make extensive preparations, including the cessation of radio and press attacks on another fraternal

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party, in order to create favorable conditions for the meeting and ensure its success. T o our great distress, these positive proposals of the C o m m u nist Party of China and some other fraternal parties have not evoked a corresponding response from the fraternal party concerned. On the contrary, the practice of violating the principles guiding relations among fraternal parties and countries, and especially the vicious practice of openly attacking other fraternal parties by name at a party congress, has gone from bad to worse. At every one of the recent congresses of fraternal parties the attacks on the Albanian Party of Labor were continued and attacks were made against the Communist Party of China, while at one congress the Korean Workers Party, too, was attacked. . . . The editorial continued, with reference to the VI Congress of the SED: On the one hand, they used every conceivable method to deprive delegates of fraternal parties opposing Yugoslav revisionism of the opportunity to speak, and, on the other, they applauded the betrayers of Marxism-Leninism. This outrageous practice was all the more serious because it was carefully planned. Here we must state in all seriousness that the international Communist movement is at a critical juncture. T h e Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement—the common basis of the unity of the Communist and workers parties of all countries — a r e in great danger of being publicly torn up. T h e unity of the socialist camp and of the international Communist movement is under a grave threat. After an extensive discussion of the nature of the "Tito clique," the editorial turned to the "protectors" of Titoism. What is particularly astonishing is that certain people have publicly declared the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement to be a "stereotyped formula." They do not allow any fraternal party to expose and condemn Yugoslav revisionism.

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Whoever insists on condemning Yugoslav revisionism, they say, "follows the jungle laws of capitalism" and "adopts this same jungle morality." O n e might ask, what is the object of describing the Moscow Statement, which was unanimously agreed upon by eighty-one fraternal parties, as "a stereotyped formula" or "the jungle laws of capitalism"? Is it not the object to tear up the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement? If it is "jungle morality" to condemn Yugoslav revisionism in accordance with the Moscow Statement, what kind of morality is the violation of the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement and the eagerness to "strangle" a fraternal party and fraternal country? We also note that Comrade Togliatti has gone so far as to say: ". . . This amply justifies the stand which we and others have taken toward the Yugoslav comrades, hence correcting the 1960 Statement which is wrong on this point." W e want to ask, what right has Comrade Togliatti to declare one part or another of the Moscow Statement, which was unanimously agreed upon by the fraternal parties, to be wrong? What right has he to "correct" or tear up a solemn international agreement at will? If one or several parties may do as they please in "correcting" agreements unanimously reached by all the Communist and workers parties, will it be possible to speak of any principle that all must abide by? Certain people are contemptuous of solemn documents adopted unanimously by the international Communist movement; they not only refuse to abide by documents which bear their own signatures but abuse others for abiding by them. Clearly, this is perfidy. . . Since the international situation is complicated and is changing rapidly, and since each fraternal party finds itself in different circumstances, the emergence of different views among fraternal parties on one question or another can hardly be avoided. The important thing is that, once differences have emerged among fraternal parties, they should straighten out their differences and achieve unanimity through interparty consultation on the basis of equality, basing themselves on the

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principles guiding relations among fraternal parties as set forth in the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement. In no circumstances should they make the differences among the fraternal parties public in the face of the enemy, nor should they make use of the press and other propaganda media for open attacks on other fraternal parties, and still less should they make use of congresses of one party for this purpose. Clearly, if open attacks are directed against one fraternal party today and another tomorrow, will there be any unity of the international Communist movement to speak of? . . Better a single good deed contributing to unity than a thousand empty words about unity. It is time to rein in on the brink of the precipice. To do so late in the day is better than not to do so at all. We sincerely hope that the fraternal party which launched the first attack will suit its action to its words, take the initiative, and return to the path of interparty consultation on the basis of equality, to the principles guiding relations among fraternal parties and countries as set forth in the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement. . . . The Third Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference, in Moshi, Tanganyika, provided another opportunity to air Sino-Soviet differences. Several sources reported that the Chinese Communist delegates identified the Soviet representatives with the "imperialists" as white people, and did have the East European "observers" barred. It also gave vigorous support to the Cuban invitation to convene a "three-continent" (Asian, African, and Latin American) conference in Havana. Unable to obtain what it considered a fair hearing regarding the Sino-Indian border dispute, the Indian delegation walked out of the Political Committee in protest. Liu Ning-I, in his address on February 4, stressed the community of the Afro-Asian struggle against imperialism, the "lessons" of the Congo crisis, the imperative not to leave world problems to "one or two countries alone - ' to decide, and opposition to "any great power using 'aid' as a means of bartering away the rights of a recipient country in international bargainings." Liu's reiteration of the priority of national liberation struggle over disarmament precipitated a confrontation with the Soviet delegation. The February, 1963, issue of the World Marxist Review carried an editorial, "Cementing the Unity of the Communist Movement Is

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Our International Duty." Speaking on the differences among the parties, it declared: "The differences are serious indeed. Some party publications have actually called for an outright split." Among "vital questions of strategy" over which disagreements existed, it listed the problems of peaceful coexistence, disarmament, the transition to socialism under different national conditions, and the Cuban crisis. It went on, for the first time, to acknowledge: "Outright attacks were leveled against the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Its leaders were accused of revisionism and cries were raised for their removal." Admitting the possibility that such attitudes "may lead to a split," the editorial denied the propriety of drawing an analogy with "majority" and "minority" (Bolshevik and Menshevik) factions in the Second International before the First World War. The present differences, the editorial alleged, "stem exclusively from subjective reasons." "Particularly dangerous is a situation when people persistently cling to erroneous concepts, and try to impose them on the movement as a whole." Stressing the propriety and utility of fraternal debates, the Review argued that "it is important not to give free rein to passions," but, on the contrary, "it is necessary to display tolerance and respect for each other's viewpoints."

110.

"FOR

MARXIST-LENINIST

MOVEMENT, CIALISM."

UNITY

OF

THE

COMMUNIST

FOR SOLIDARITY OF THE C O U N T R I E S OF S O -

Editorial in Pravda,

February

10,

1963.:I-

. . NEVER BEFORE has the Communist movement possessed such possibilities of influencing the entire course of world development as it has in our time. Never before has it borne such historic responsibility to the peoples of all countries as in our days. Communism has become the practice and the vital cause of many hundreds of millions of people in the world. Communists are at the helm of state in a large group of socialist states, which account for more than one-third the population of the world. In our time the peoples judge communism not only by its programmatic slogans and ideals but by the benefits it brings to society, to man. They see the economic successes of the countries of socialism, the rise in the well-being of the peoples of .

"Translation from The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XV. No. 6 (March 6, 1963).

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those countries, as an eloquent embodiment of the advantages of socialism over capitalism. The peoples see in the friendship and cooperation of the countries of socialism the birth and development of a new type of international relations, incompatible with the enmity and hatred, the nationalism and chauvinism, to which capitalism gave rise. All mankind looks hopefully to the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries as a force able to free the present and future generations from the catastrophe of world thermonuclear war. The concepts "socialism" and "peace" are ever more closely associated in the minds of millions. The world socialist community is the dependable ally of the peoples in their struggle against imperialism and colonialism, against any of the forms of social and national oppression. The world socialist system has entered a stage of its development in which economic, political, and cultural cooperation among the countries of socialism is rising to a new and higher level. This is dictated by the interests of the socialist c o m m o n wealth as a whole. This is necessary in order to win the economic competition with capitalism on a world scale in the shortest possible historical span. The firmer the unity of the socialist countries, the closer will their efforts be joined in economic development, in the struggle for improving the welfare of the peoples; the closer their political cooperation, the more strikingly will socialism demonstrate its superiority over capitalism and the more effective will be the influence of the socialist countries on world development, on the revolutionary struggle of the working class, on the national liberation movement. All this shows time and again the very great responsibility of the socialist countries, of the Communist and workers parties and their leaders, for carrying out a consistent internationalist policy—a policy of solidarity and unity of all the progressive, anti-imperialist forces, so that every step they take promotes the strengthening of genuinely fraternal relations among the peoples. The awareness of this historic responsibility must also serve as a guiding, defining principle in resolving the disagreements arising in the Communist movement, so that all the prac-

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tical actions of Communists can be directed toward strengthening the unity and solidarity of the movement. To be true to Marxism-Leninism, to proletarian internationalism, the Communists of each country must march in step with the entire Communist movement, in its common ranks, always remembering that the strength of the proletariat and its Communist vanguard lies in solidarity and not in division. . . . T h e principles enunciated in the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the entire practical activity of our party are the embodiment of proletarian internationalism, of Leninist concern for the interests of the international workers movement. T h e Party and the entire Soviet people regard communist construction in the USSR as an integral part of the struggle of the working people of all countries for the victory of socialism. T h e Communist Party of the Soviet Union attaches special importance to the strengthening of the socialist commonwealth — t h e main achievement of the world Communist and workers movement. T h e Soviet Union, firmly adhering to Leninist principles, is consistently following the line of solidarity of all socialist countries. These principles, reflecting the experience of the development of the world socialist system, have been recorded in the very important documents of the Communist movement, the Declaration [1957] and the Statement [1960] of the Moscow conferences. Marxism-Leninism proceeds from the fact that the struggle to carry out the socialist revolution and build socialism is based on a number of common laws. . . . At the same time, despite unity among the fraternal parties of the socialist states on basic questions, a different approach to problems, frictions, and even disagreements on various questions can arise. We must clearly understand the reasons for these phenomena. Fourteen countries are already following the road of socialist development now. Each of these countries has its own historical, national, and geographic features. Lenin taught that national and state differences among peoples and countries would continue for a very long time even

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after the establishment of proletarian dictatorship on a world scale. Therefore, he pointed out, unity of the international tactics of the Communist workers movement of all countries does not call for ruling out diversity, for eliminating national differences, but for such an application of the basic principles of communism "as will correctly modify these principles in certain particulars, correctly adapt and apply them to national and national-state differences" (Sochineniia, 4th ed. [Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1941—], X X X I , 7 2 ) . One cannot fail to consider also that our countries started the transition to socialism from different levels of economic, political, and cultural development and are still at different stages in the struggle for socialism and communism. Each country has its own specific experience in the sphere of international relations, and their responsibility for the solution of various international problems is not the same in everything. It is not ruled out that this can be a source of differing interpretations of specific problems of socialist construction, for dissimilar approaches to various problems of our times. We must, moreover, look ahead and take into account that when dozens of other peoples in Europe, Asia, Africa, America, and Australia embark upon the road of transition to socialism, they undoubtedly will introduce much of their own into the solution of questions of building socialism. The task is to ensure, despite existing differences, unity in the approach to fundamental questions, in the struggle for the triumph of the cause of peace and socialism on earth. The CPSU, in its relations with the fraternal parties, has done and is doing everything to seek in practice to strengthen the solidarity of the socialist commonwealth, of the world Communist movement; it takes into account the actual conditions and situation of each party, strives to find the most effective ways of overcoming the difficulties, frictions, and disagreements that arise. It is known that a polemic on a number of important fundamental problems of present-day world development has lately arisen in the Communist movement. T h e mere fact of different

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approaches to various specific questions of our common struggle would not give rise to alarm and anxiety. Exchange of opinion and experience, comradely discussions, are a quite logical and natural feature in the practice of Marxist-Leninist parties. But what does cause serious anxiety is the fact that representatives of certain parties, instead of a comradely exchange of opinions, have chosen the path of attacks on the line of the world Communist movement collectively worked out by all the MarxistLeninist parties, a path that is utterly inadmissible in relations among fraternal parties. In these circumstances continuation of an open polemic can lead only to a deepening of existing disagreements, which would bring serious harm to the unity of the world Communist movement. The Central Committee of the CPSU, taking into consideration the situation that had developed, took the initiative in the direction of settling the differences that had arisen, of strengthening the international solidarity of the Communist movement. At the VI Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, Comrade N. S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, made a proposal that an end be put to the polemic among Communist parties on disputed questions in order that the most favorable circumstances might be created for holding a conference of Communist and workers parties. The representatives of the Communist and workers parties supported the CPSU's proposal, which conformed to the interests of the struggle for unity of our whole movement. The central organ of the Communist Party of China, the newspaper Jen-mitt jih-pao, published an editorial in connection with the VI Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany. This editorial said: "We are ready to take, together with all other fraternal parties, every step favorable to a relaxation in relations and to the strengthening of solidarity, with a view to improving the atmosphere and preparing the conditions necessary for convening a conference of fraternal parties." Such a statement could only be welcome. Unfortunately, this declaration by the Chinese comrades was accompanied by groundless and harsh criticism of the speeches of the representatives of Com-

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773

munist and workers parties at the VI Congress of the Socialist Unity Party and a one-sided interpretation of the Declaration and the Statement of the Moscow conferences, of principles and practices in relations among socialist states and Communist parties. T h e editorial contained groundless attacks on the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Should the publication of this editorial be evaluated as an effort to continue the polemic with other fraternal parties? We would like to believe that this is not so. Our party is sincerely desirous that the Communist movement not be drawn into a new round of polemics that could damage its unity. Guided by these considerations, we wish to set forth our position on certain questions of principle and to appeal once again for a strengthening of unity on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. . . . How is it possible to depict matters as though the difficulties that have arisen in the Communist movement stem f r o m the fact that there is in process an improvement in the relations of Yugoslavia with other socialist countries and a rapprochement of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the international Communist movement? The question of relations with Yugoslavia is a serious question of principle. What is essentially at issue is the line in the mutual relations among the Communist parties of socialist countries, the principles of relations among these countries. It is a matter of objective evaluation of the processes taking place in one socialist country or another, of the purposes of criticism by fraternal parties of mistakes committed at a certain time and under certain conditions, of the methods and forms of the struggle for the solidarity of all the forces of communism. What is needed is not a subjective but a genuinely scientific Marxist-Leninist approach to this question. . . . The international Communist movement has set the goal of aiding Yugoslavia and its leaders to correct the existing errors and to return to the path of unity with the world socialist system, with the fraternal parties. Precisely such an approach underlies the policy of the Soviet

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state and the CPSU with regard to Yugoslavia and the L C Y . At the XXI Congress of the CPSU, C o m r a d e N. S. Khrushchev, while subjecting the mistakes of the Yugoslav comrades to criticism, pointed out: "We have the very friendliest feelings for the fraternal peoples of Yugoslavia, for the Yugoslav Communists, heroes of underground and partisan struggle. On many questions of foreign policy we speak a common language. We shall continue to develop trade with Yugoslavia on a reciprocal basis. We shall seek to cooperate with Yugoslavia on all the questions of the anti-imperialist peace struggle on which our attitudes shall coincide." "How will matters stand in the Party sphere? Everything will depend on the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Its leaders themselves have isolated themselves from the international Communist movement. Therefore it is u p to the Yugoslav League of Communists to make a turn toward rapprochement with the Communist parties on the basis of Marxism-Leninism; this would also be in the interests of the Yugoslav people themselves." The steps our party and the Soviet government have undertaken with regard to Yugoslavia conform fully to the idea of the Statement on the necessity for solidarity of all the forces of peace and socialism and take into consideration the processes taking place in Yugoslavia itself. Marxist-Leninists are obliged to analyze real life, concrete facts. The distinctive feature of Marxists is that, on the basis of their study of life, they soberly and impartially determine the direction in which one party or another, one country or another, is developing. Life is the best teacher; it verifies the correctness of this or that concept, sweeps away all that is untrue or superficial, confirms all that keeps pace with it, and promotes the development of the forces of socialism. . . Measures recently taken by the leadership of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in the areas of party life, economics, and domestic and foreign policy have corrected much that the international Communist movement considered erroneous and

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harmful to the cause of building socialism in Yugoslavia. This is an unalterable and positive fact. . . . Yugoslavia's positions on basic international questions— on war and peace, peaceful coexistence, disarmament, the liquidation of colonialism, the German question, and a number of other questions—are identical or close to the positions of the USSR and other socialist countries. The Yugoslav leaders are taking steps to strengthen economic, cultural, and political contacts with socialist countries. . . . If the facts are analyzed, then it is impossible not to come to the conclusion that in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and in the Federated People's Republic of Yugoslavia there is a continuous process in the direction of a rapprochement with the socialist commonwealth and the world Communist movement. One can only marvel that it is precisely now that voices are heard alleging that there has been a "restoration of capitalism" in Yugoslavia and that its leaders should be anathematized. We would like to recall the evaluation that Jen-min jih-pao used to give of the character of the social structure of Yugoslavia. Here, for instance, is what the newspaper's editorial of September 12, 1957, devoted to the arrival of a Yugoslav delegation in China, had to say: "Now the peoples of our countries are going forward on the road of building socialism. We view many international problems identically. Unity on these basic questions serves as the basis for friendly cooperation between our countries. . . ." The editorial noted that " Y u goslavia has achieved important successes in building socialism. At the same time, Yugoslavia has been very active in international affairs." This was written six years ago. How is it possible now, in the light of the above-mentioned facts testifying to positive changes in Yugoslavia, to maintain that socialist gains are being forfeited there? . . . What would happen if each Communist party were willfully to excommunicate other Communist parties from socialism, strive for their exclusion from the ranks of the Communist movement, and, further, refuse whole nations the right to co-

776

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operate in the building of socialism? This inevitably could seriously hinder the world revolutionary process, the cause of the struggle for the victory of the new order, for the creation of a new society. What end is served by driving peoples who are seeking to improve friendly relations, to strengthen cooperation and unity with us, into the camp of capitalism? To behave in such a fashion would mean permitting doctrinairism of the worst type; it would mean sacrificing the real political interests of the struggle for socialism under the cover of loud phrases about the "purity of Marxism-Leninism." But, after all, the struggle for the genuine purity and effectiveness of our theory is the struggle for the successful construction of socialism and communism, for expanding the ranks of its adherents, for uniting all the forces that come forward for socialism, and for creating the very broadest anti-imperialist front. The CPSU has always sacredly guarded the purity of MarxistLeninist teaching, creatively developing it in conformity with new historical conditions. It waged a struggle against Menshevism and Trotskyism, against right and "left" opportunism in its own country, and against the opportunism of the Second International and Social Democratism, against revisionists, sectarians, and dogmatists in the international arena. In the future as well our party will act resolutely against all apostates from Marxism-Leninism both on the right and on the "left." . . . Everyone knows that our party has taken the initiative in restoring genuinely Leninist principles in mutual relations among socialist countries and Communist parties. It was precisely on the initiative of the CPSU that the elements of inequality that existed in mutual relations among socialist countries and fraternal parties under Stalin were eliminated. It must be said directly that Stalin made mistakes on the national question, as Lenin indicated. In connection with the solution of the national question in our country, Lenin, noting Stalin's vindictiveness and passion for ruling by fiat, emphasized that "vindictiveness in general in politics usually plays the very worst role" (Sochineniia, X X X V I , 5 5 4 ) . The CPSU has forever ended within its own party Stalin's

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methods of cutting off those who, although they make some mistakes, are sincerely fighting for communism. . . . If the Leninist line on the solidarity of the Communist movement on a principled basis is followed, then all the necessary conditions are present for overcoming any difficulties and differences that arise. We cannot agree with the allegation that the Communist movement is "on the verge of disaster." There is n o foundation for such an evaluation. Of course, the CPSU, like the other fraternal parties, deeply regrets the presence of differences in the ranks of the Communist movement on a number of important questions. But are these differences insurmountable? It is our profound conviction that what unites the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Communist Party of China, and all Marxist-Leninist parties is immeasurably greater and more significant than the existing differences. . . . Marxist-Leninists have always distinguished between strategic and tactical questions of the international Communist movement. The class struggle against exploitation and capitalism, for the victory of socialism and communism, for the triumph of the national liberation movement; the struggle against imperialist wars—this is the foundation of the united strategy of the Communist parties. As for tactical questions—the forms and methods of struggle for the common aims—they can be variously applied by the parties, depending on specific conditions, places, and times. The Communist parties should take great care to judge the tactics and methods of struggle that one party or another chooses in relation to its historical, economic, geographical, and other conditions and with the experience of the international liberation movement taken into account. N o one knows the conditions in a country better than the Communist party operating in it. Identity of views on basic questions of strategy— this is the basis for the unity and solidarity of Marxist-Leninist parties. In addition, of course, the fraternal parties seek to achieve unity on questions of the tactics for their struggle in the international arena and to overcome differences that arise on these questions in order to work out together the forms and

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methods that will allow the most effective implementation of strategic aims. . . . The chief thing that is necessary is, under all conditions, to proceed from the common ground that unites us, from our common class position, from our strategic aims, and from the principles of Marxism-Leninism. It must not be forgotten that the differences that arise among the Communist parties of socialist countries, however serious they may seem today, in the final analysis have minor significance compared to the basic things that forever unite us. If we are always guided by an understanding of this indisputable truth, then any differences will be overcome and the unity of the Communist movement and of the socialist countries is ensured. Our duty is to do everything for the rapprochement of socialist peoples, to strengthen economic, political, and cultural cooperation among them, to assist their unification into one fraternal family. As Communists, we all bear great responsibility before our peoples, before world socialism, before all mankind for creating in fact a model of genuinely fraternal relations among the peoples of the socialist countries. Not only is this of importance for our countries; it will also exert an enormous influence on the entire course of world developments. The Communist and workers parties of the socialist countries are the parties that occupy the leading positions in these countries. They bear responsibility not only for the activity of their own party but also for the entire economic and social-political development of the country and for the way its relations with other socialist states are shaped. The development of economic cooperation, the expansion of trade, the ever deeper socialist division of labor, cooperation and specialization in production—these are vitally important problems for each socialist country and for the socialist commonwealth as a whole. The stability and dependability of economic ties are an indispensable requirement for the successful development of the economy of each socialist country and of the entire socialist world economy. It is understandable, there-

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fore, that the mechanical transfer of differences on ideological questions into the field of economic and state relations is i m permissible. T h e relations among the peoples of the socialist countries are being established now for ages to c o m e . T h e r e f o r e , under all conditions we must constantly concern ourselves with strengthening our economic, cultural, and political tics. W e Communists may argue among ourselves. B u t under all conditions our firm principle and sacred duty is to educate the people of each country in a spirit of profound solidarity with all the peoples of the socialist commonwealth. W e are obligated

to inculcate in the people a love not only for their own country but f o r the other socialist countries as well, so that each person will feel that he is a patriot both of his own country and of the entire world socialist commonwealth. T h e differences on a few ideological and tactical questions that arise among the Communist parties must not be used to inflame nationalistic feelings and prejudices, mistrust, and dissension among socialist peoples. The primary duty of the C o m munist parties of the socialist countries is to educate the peoples in the spirit of the immortal slogan "Proletarians o f all countries, u n i t e ! " In countries where the working class, the working people are in power, the best conditions have been created for solidarity, fraternal friendship, and mutual help among peoples. T o serve the cause of the slogan "Proletarians o f all countries, u n i t e ! " means not to allow manifestations of nationalism under any circumstances; it means to inculcate in the masses an implacability toward the nationalist policy that has been pursued by our class enemies, the capitalists and landowners. With full responsibility the C P S U declares that it never has taken and never will take even one step that might sow enmity among the peoples of our country in relation to other peoples. On the contrary, in all conditions our party constantly and c o n sistently propagandizes among the population the idea of internationalism and of warm friendship with the peoples of the socialist and other countries. W e are convinced that the differences that have arisen in the Communist movement are generated by temporary factors

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and must not overflow into a profound conflict. If good will toward the settlement of differences is shown, then no difficulties can prevent us from marching shoulder to shoulder along the common road to the single goal. . . . In the practice of developing the world Communist movement a variety of forms and methods of overcoming differences and agreeing on the common line have been worked out—bilateral and multilateral meetings, mutual consultations, exchanges of party delegations and party information, personal contacts among leaders of parties, mutual participation in the work of congresses and conferences, joint scientific-theoretical and research work. The most important form for the exchange of experience of Marxist-Leninist parties, for working out united views on actual contemporary questions, and for enriching revolutionary theory is provided by international conferences of Marxist-Leninist parties. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union was the initiator of both Moscow conferences. The CPSU also favors calling a new conference if the fraternal parties consider it desirable. Our party, like other Marxist-Leninist parties, is convinced that the success of such a conference would be facilitated by proper preparation for it. It was precisely this that dictated the initiative of the CPSU Central Committee in halting open polemics among the fraternal parties. The CPSU proceeds from the assumption that it is necessary to allow time to do its work, that this will help us to understand who is right and who is in error, will help to remove all the superficial and accidental matter introduced in the windy polemics and to expose the points of view that really need discussion and agreement. We are convinced that this is an important condition on the path of preparation for a conference of Communist and workers parties. Our party considers it desirable to conduct bilateral and broader meetings that will make possible the creation of better conditions for a conference of all the fraternal parties. The CPSU declares: If, in answer to this initiative of ours, any party, no matter how considerable the differences between us

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may be, shows an interest in a bilateral meeting, our party is ready to go to such a meeting at any level and at any time acceptable to both sides. We favor real elimination of existing differences and attainment of genuine unity. It is not enough merely to cease open polemics, to freeze the existing differences and remain in our previous positions. Our party is for actively seeking to overcome the differences that have arisen and for promoting by every means the strengthening of unity on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism, of the Declaration and the Statement. . . . The Chinese Communists' demand for an international conference of Communist parties, reiterated publicly in December, 1962, had set the stage for Khrushchev's agreement in principle, voiced on January 16, 1963. His insistence on a cooling-off period and preliminary explorations among the principal parties concerned was reiterated by the Pravda editorial of February 10. Other parties, such as the Indonesian, British, Norwegian, and Swedish, had made substantially similar proposals. After February 10, evidence of mediation by other parties, including the Vietnamese and Czechoslovak, multiplied, even though the CPC continued to demand the ouster of the Yugoslavs as a prerequisite to a new conference. On February 21, the CPSU sent its (as yet unpublished) letter to the CPC (Document No. 114). A variety of press dispatches during the following week reported from Moscow and Peking such tokens of "reconciliation" as a "friendly" reception of Soviet Ambassador Chervonenko by Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, and Wu Hsiu-chuan; a luncheon given by Foreign Minister Gromvko for the new Chinese ambassador to the USSR, Pan Tsu-li; the reappearance of the Chinese Russian-language magazine Kitai on the Moscow newsstands on February 24; and, on February 27, Khrushchev's reaffirmation of solidarity with Communist China and Cuba, to the point of warning the West to take note of the Soviet guarantee of their integrity. Steps were under way to prepare M An otherwise unconfirmed report stated that on January 27 the CPSU had sent the CPC a memorandum in effect threatening the stoppage of economic aid unless the CPC came to terms. "The other parties are said to have received copies of the memorandum, which distinguishes carefully between economic assistance and bilateral trade." (Paul Wohl. "Communists Seek to Patch Rift," The Christian Science Monitor, February 13, 1963.)

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tor Sino-Soviet talks. Yet, as the following documents showed, manifestly none of the issues in dispute had been resolved.

111. "WHENCE THE DIFFERENCES?" Editorial in Jen-min jih-pao, February 27, 1963. Translation in Peking Review, No. 9, March 1, 1963. COMRADE Thorez, Secretary-General of the French Communist

Party, and certain other members of the P C F have a prominent place in the present adverse current of attacks on the Chinese Communist Party and other fraternal parties, a current which is undermining the unity of the international Communist movement. Since the latter part of November, 1962, they have made numerous statements in quick succession attacking the Chinese Communist Party and other fraternal parties and have published many related intra-party documents. . . The main content of these statements has already been published in Jen-min jih-pao, February 24. It is evident from these statements that in the recent anti-Chinese chorus and in the emulation campaign against the Chinese Communist Party, Thorez and other comrades have been particularly energetic and have outdone many other comrades in assailing the Chinese Communist Party. Besides their assaults on us, Thorez and other comrades have leveled malevolent attacks at the Albanian Party of Labor, censured the fraternal parties of Korea, Burma, Malaya, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Japan, and have even gone so far as to assail the national liberation movement, which is heroically fighting imperialism and colonialism. They have slanderously alleged that the "sectarian and adventurist" positions taken by the Chinese Communist Party "have found some echoes in certain Communist parties, particularly in Asia, and within nationalist movements," and that they "feed the i e f t i s m ' which exists at times in these parties and movements." The attitude of certain French comrades toward the revolutionary cause of the oppressed nations is indeed shocking. They have truly gone

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too far in disrupting the unity of the international Communist movement. We should like to tell those comrades who have wantonly attacked the Chinese Communist Party and other fraternal parties: T h e fraternal parties are equal. Since you have publicly lashed out at the Chinese Communist Party, you have no right to demand that we should refrain from publicly answering you. Similarly, since you have made public and vicious attacks on the Albanian Party of Labor, the Albanian comrades have the full and equal right to answer you publicly. At present, certain comrades of fraternal parties, while talking about a halt to the public polemics, are themselves continuing to attack the Chinese Communist Party and other fraternal parties. This double-faced attitude actually implies that only you are permitted to attack others and that it is impermissible for others to reply. This will never work. In the words of an old Chinese saying, "Courtesy demands reciprocity. It is discourteous not to give after receiving." In all seriousness we feel it necessary to bring this point to the attention of those who have been assailing the Chinese Communist Party. In attacking the Chinese Communist Party, Thorez and other comrades . . . have merely repeated other people's stale arguments. Since we have already answered their erroneous arguments on these questions in our editorials entitled "Workers of All Countries, Unite to Oppose Our Common Enemy!," " T h e Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us," and "Let Us Unite on the Basis of the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement," and also in the editorial entitled "Leninism and Modern Revisionism" in the periodical Hung-ch'i, there is no need to go over the same ground again. Since Thorez and other comrades have brought up the question of who is responsible for the emergence of differences in the international Communist movement, let us discuss it. Whence the differences in the international Communist movement? Thorez and other comrades state that these differences arose because the Chinese Communist Party did not accept the theses

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of the X X Congress of the CPSU. This very statement is a violation of the principles guiding relations among fraternal parties as set forth in the Moscow Declaration and Statement. According to these two documents, which were jointly agreed upon, the fraternal parties are equal and independent in their relations. No one has the right to demand that all fraternal parties should accept the theses of any one party. No resolution of any congress of any one party can be taken as the common line of the international Communist movement or be binding on other fraternal parties. If Thorez and other comrades are willing to accept the viewpoints and resolutions of another party, that is their business. As for the Chinese Communist Party, we have always held that the only common principles of action which can have binding force on us and on all other fraternal parties are Marxism-Leninism and the common documents unanimously agreed upon by the fraternal parties, and not the resolutions of the congress of any one fraternal party, or anything else. As for the X X Congress of the CPSU, it had both its positive and negative aspects. We have expressed our support for its positive aspects. As for its negative aspects, namely, the wrong viewpoints it put forward on certain important questions of principle relating to the international Communist movement, we have held different views all along. In talks between the Chinese and Soviet parties and at meetings of fraternal parties, we have made no secret of our views and have clearly set forth our opinions on many occasions. But in the interests of the international Communist movement, we have never publicly discussed this matter, nor do we intend to do so in the present article. The facts are clear. The differences in the international Communist movement in recent years arose entirely because certain comrades of a fraternal party had violated the Moscow Declaration, which was unanimously agreed upon by all the Communist and workers parties. . . But, because certain comrades of a fraternal party repeatedly attempted to place the resolutions of the congress of one party above the Moscow Declaration, above the common program of

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all the fraternal parties, differences within the international C o m munist movement inevitably ensued. Particularly around the time of the Camp David talks in September, 1959, certain comrades of a fraternal party put forward a series of erroneous views on many important issues relating to the international situation and the international Communist movement, views which departed from Marxism-Leninism and violated the Moscow Declaration. They contravened the Moscow Declaration's scientific thesis that imperialism is the source of modern wars, that "so long as imperialism exists, there will always be soil for aggressive w a r s . " They incessantly proclaimed that even while the imperialist system and the system of exploitation and oppression of man by man continue to exist in the greater part of the world, "already in our time, the practical possibility is being created of banishing war from the life of society finally and forever," and that "a world without weapons, without armies, and without wars" can be brought into being. . . . They pinned their hopes for defending world peace on the "wisdom" of the heads of the major powers, holding that the historical fate of the present epoch is actually decided by individual "great men" and their "wisdom," and that summit meetings of the major powers can determine and change the course of history. . . . They were especially ardent in lauding Dwight Eisenhower, the chieftain of U.S. imperialism, as one who had a "sincere desire for peace," who "sincerely hopes to eliminate the state of 'cold war,"" and who "also worries about ensuring peace just as we do." They violated the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence between the two different social systems as set forth in the Moscow Declaration, and interpreted peaceful coexistence as nothing but ideological struggle and economic competition, saying: "The inevitable struggle between the two systems must be made to take the form exclusively of a struggle of ideas and peaceful emulation, as we say, or competition, to use a word more common in the capitalist lexicon." They even extended peaceful

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coexistence between countries with different social systems to the relations between oppressor and oppressed classes and between oppressor and oppressed nations, maintaining that for various countries peaceful coexistence is the road leading to socialism. All this represents a complete departure from the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint of class struggle. They thus actually used the pretext of peaceful coexistence to negate the political struggle against imperialism and for the liberation cause of the people of all countries, and to negate the international class struggle. Although they occasionally spoke of the necessity of supporting national liberation wars and people's revolutionary wars, they repeatedly stressed that "a war under contemporary conditions would inevitably become a world war," that "even a tiny spark can cause a world conflagration," and that it was necessary to "oppose all kinds of wars." This amounts to making no distinction between just and unjust wars and to opposing wars of national liberation, people's revolutionary wars, and just wars of all kinds on the pretext of preventing a world war. How did these differences come to be exposed before the enemy? Thorez and other comrades allege that the differences were brought into the open with "the Chinese Communist Party's publication of the pamphlet Long Live Leninism! in all languages in the summer of 1960." But what are the actual facts? The truth is that the internal differences among the fraternal parties were first brought into the open, not in the summer of 1960, but on the eve of the Camp David talks in September, 1959—on September 9, 1959, to be exact. On that day a socialist country, turning a deaf ear to China's repeated explanations of the true situation and to China's advice, hastily issued a statement on a Sino-Indian border incident through its official news agency. Making no distinction between right and wrong, the statement expressed "regret" over the border clash and in reality condemned China's correct stand. They even said that it was "tragic" and "deplorable." Here is the first instance in his-

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tory in which a socialist country, instead of condemning the armed provocations of the reactionaries of a capitalist country, condemned another fraternal socialist country when it was confronted with such armed provocation. . . . After the Camp David talks, the heads of certain comrades were turned and they became more and more intemperate in their public attacks on the foreign and domestic policies of the Chinese Communist Party. They publicly abused the Chinese Communist Party as attempting "to test by force the stability of the capitalist system," and as "craving for war like a cock for a fight." They also attacked the Chinese Communist Party for its general line of socialist construction, its big leap forward, and its people's communes, and they spread the slander that the Chinese Party was carrying out an "adventurist" policy in its direction of the state. . . . In May, 1960, the American U-2 spy plane intruded into the Soviet Union, and the four-power summit meeting in Paris was aborted. We then hoped that the comrades who had so loudly sung the praises of the so-called spirit of C a m p David would draw a lesson from these events, and would strengthen the unity of the fraternal parties and countries in the common struggle against the U.S. imperialist policies of aggression and war. But, contrary to our hopes, at the Peking session of the General Council of the World Federation of Trade Unions held early in June of the same year, certain comrades of fraternal parties still refused to denounce Eisenhower, spread many erroneous views, and opposed the correct views put forward by the Chinese comrades. It was a fact of particular gravity that late in June, 1960, someone went so far as to wave his baton and launch an all-out and converging surprise attack on the Chinese Communist Party at the meeting of the fraternal parties in Bucharest. This action was a crude violation of the principle that questions of common interest should be solved through consultation among fraternal parties. It set an extremely bad precedent for the international Communist movement. Thorez and other comrades have alleged that the delegate of the Albanian Party of Labor "attacked the Communist Party

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of the Soviet Union" at the meeting in Bucharest. But all the comrades who attended the meeting are very well aware that the Albanian comrade did not attack anyone during the meeting. All he did was to adhere to his own views, disobey the baton, and take exception to the attack on China. In the eyes of those who regard the relations between fraternal parties as those between patriarchal father and son, it was indeed an appalling act of impudent insubordination for tiny Albania to dare to disobey the baton. From that time on they harbored a grudge against the Albanian comrades, employed all kinds of base devices against them, and would not be satisfied until they had destroyed them. After the Bucharest meeting, some comrades who had attacked the Chinese Communist Party lost no time in taking a series of grave steps to apply economic and political pressure—even to the extent of perfidiously and unilaterally tearing up agreements and contracts they had concluded with a fraternal country, in disregard of international practice. These agreements and contracts are to be counted, not in twos and threes or in scores, but in hundreds. These malicious acts, which extended ideological differences to state relations, were out-and-out violations of proletarian internationalism and of the principles guiding relations among fraternal socialist countries as set forth in the Moscow Declaration. It is clear from the foregoing facts that the aggravation of differences in the international Communist movement after the Moscow meeting of 1957 was due entirely to the fact that with respect to a series of important issues, certain comrades of fraternal parties committed increasingly serious violations of the common line unanimously agreed upon by the fraternal parties and of the principles guiding relations among fraternal parties and countries. The fact that Comrade Thorez disregards the facts and perverts the truth is also strikingly manifested in his distortion of what actually happened at the 1960 Moscow meeting. He has charged that the Chinese Communist Party "did not approve the line of the international working-class movement . . . and thus created a difficult situation" for the meeting.

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For the good of the international Communist movement we prefer not to go into detail here about what went on at this internal meeting of the fraternal parties; we intend to give the true picture and clarify right and wrong at the proper time and place. It must be pointed out here, however, that the Chinese Communist Party was an initiator of the 1960 meeting of all the Communist and workers parties of the world. We made great efforts to bring about its convocation. During the meeting, we upheld Marxism-Leninism and the Moscow Declaration of 1957 and opposed the erroneous views put forward by certain comrades of fraternal parties; at the same time, we made necessary compromises on certain questions. Together with other fraternal parties, we made concerted efforts to overcome a variety of difficulties and enabled the meeting to achieve positive results, reach unanimous agreement, and issue the Moscow Statement. . . . Since the Moscow meeting of 1960, who is it that has committed increasingly serious violations of the Moscow Declaration and Statement with respect to a number of issues? Shortly after the Moscow meeting there was a further deterioration in the relations between the Soviet Union and Albania. . . . It has been our earnest hope that the relations between the two countries would improve and we have done our internationalist duty to this end. We have offered our advice to the Soviet comrades many times, stating that the larger party and the large country should take the initiative in improving SovietAlbanian relations and should settle the differences through interparty consultation on an equal footing; and that even if it were not possible to settle some differences for the time being, they should exercise patience instead of taking any steps that might worsen relations. Accordingly, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party wrote to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, expressing the hope that the question of Soviet-Albanian relations would be resolved through consultation. But no consideration was given to our sincere efforts.

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On the eve of the XXII Congress of the CPSU, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party once again gave the Soviet comrades comradely advice concerning the improvement of Soviet-Albanian relations. But to our surprise, at the XXII Congress there occurred the grave incident in which the Albanian Party of Labor was publicly named and attacked, and the odious precedent was thus created of one party using its own congress to make a public attack on another fraternal party. Referring to Khrushchev's comment about Chou En-lai's declaration at the XXII Congress, the editorial continued:

If it meant to hold the Chinese comrades responsible for the deterioration of Soviet-Albanian relations, that was shirking one's own responsibility and trying to impute it to others. If it meant that the Chinese comrades should help to bring about an improvement in Soviet-Albanian relations, we would point out that some comrades actually deprived other fraternal parties of the possibility of effectively contributing to the improvement of those relations by completely ignoring our repeated advice and by obdurately exacerbating Soviet-Albanian relations, even to the extent of openly calling for a change in the leadership of the Albanian Party and state. After the CPSU Congress these comrades broke off the Soviet Union's diplomatic relations with the fraternal socialist country of Albania without any scruples. Did this not convincingly demonstrate that they had not the slightest desire to improve relations between the Soviet Union and Albania? . Those who claim to be "completely correct" have published one article after another attacking Albania, but they are mortally afraid of the Albanian comrades' replies; they dare not publish them and are afraid of others doing so. It simply shows that justice is not on their side and that they have a guilty conscience. . . . These comrades insist on making "every effort for disarmament" the overriding task, and they energetically peddle the wrong idea that "a world without weapons, without armies, without wars" can be realized while imperialism and the system of exploitation still exist. It is this that has given rise to continual

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sharp controversies in these [international mass] organizations [such as the World Peace Council and the W F T U], . . . . . . In fact, what these persons want is that, while waiting for all this, the oppressed nations should not fight imperialism and colonialism or resist armed suppression by their colonial rulers, for otherwise, they say, a world war would be touched off, causing the death of millions upon millions of people. Proceeding precisely from this absurd "theory," these persons have vilified the national independence movement as a "movement for piling up corpses." It is these persons, and not the Chinese comrades, who violated the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement. . . . T h e editorial next turned to the Cuban and Sino-Indian crises of October, 1962, in essence reiterating comments made earlier in the Chinese Communist press. It took issue in particular with charges of "revolutionary phrasemongering" by states which possessed no nuclear weapons.

As Thorez and certain other French comrades see it, if those who do not possess hydrogen bombs support the Cuban people, they are simply using "fine words" and indulging in "speculation," while the Cuban people, who do not possess hydrogen bombs, must submit to the countries which have them, sell out their state sovereignty, accept "international inspection," and allow themselves to be sacrificed on the altar of U.S. imperialist aggression. This is naked power politics. It makes an unqualified fetish of nuclear weapons. It is no way for Communists to talk. . . . After mentioning the congresses of five European parties, held between November, 1962, and January, 1963, at which the Chinese Communists were subjected to "large-scale and systematic public attacks," the editorial turned to the Yugoslav question.

In particular, it must be pointed out that the question of how to treat the Tito clique is a major question of principle. It is not a question of how to interpret the Moscow Statement but of whether to defend it or tear it up. It is not a question of what attitude to take toward a fraternal party but of what attitude to

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take toward traitors to the Communist cause. It is not a question of helping comrades rectify the mistakes they have made but of unmasking and denouncing enemies of Marxism-Leninism. Adhering faithfully to Marxism-Leninism and the Moscow Statement, the Chinese Communist Party will never allow the common agreement of the fraternal parties to be either doctored or scrapped, will never allow traitors to be pulled into our ranks, and will never agree to any trading in Marxist-Leninist principles or bartering away of the interests of the international Communist movement. . . . If Thorez and the other comrades dare to face the facts and believe themselves to be right, they ought to publish the material of the Chinese Communist Party which explains its views, including the relevant articles we have published recently, and let all the members of the French Communist Party and the French working class learn the truth and decide for themselves what is right and what is wrong. Comrade Thorez and the other comrades! We have already published your statements accusing us. Will you do the same? Do you have that kind of statesmanship? Do you have that kind of courage? . . . Finally, the French Communist Party was accused of performing a number of "complete turns of 180 degrees" to comply with shifts in Soviet policy, most notably in its assessment of President Eisenhower, its attitude toward the 'Tito clique," and its policy toward Algeria. Instances of this sort are too numerous to mention. Turning about in this way and following the baton so unconditionally cannot possibly be regarded as indicative of the normal relationships of independence and equality that should exist among fraternal parties, but rather of abnormal, feudal, patriarchal relationships. Some comrades apparently believe that the interests of the proletariat and of the people in their own country may be disregarded completely, that the interests of the international proletariat and of the people of the world may also be completely disregarded, and that it is good enough just to follow others. Is it right to go east or is it right to go west? Is it right to advance or is it right to retreat? About all such questions

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they do not care at all. What someone else says, they repeat word for word. If someone else takes one step, they follow with the same step. Here there is all too much ability to parrot and all too little of Marxist-Leninist principle. Are "creative MarxistLeninists" of this kind something to be proud of? . . . We have always maintained that debates should be conducted only among the fraternal parties and not in public. Although this stand of ours is irrefutable, it has been under attack by certain comrades of fraternal parties. After having publicly attacked us and other fraternal parties for more than a year, they have now changed their tune and say they want to stop open polemics. We should like to ask: Do you or do you not consider now that the public attacks you have been making on fraternal parties were a mistake? Are you or are you not ready to admit this mistake and to apologize to the fraternal parties you have attacked? Are you truly and sincerely ready to return to the proper course of interparty consultation on the basis of equality? In order to eliminate differences and strengthen unity, the Chinese Communist Party has many times proposed, and still holds today, that a meeting of the representatives of Communist and workers parties of all countries should be convened; moreover, the Chinese Communist Party is ready to take the necessary steps together with all the fraternal parties to prepare the conditions for the convening of such a meeting. One of the preparatory steps for such a meeting is a cessation of the public polemics which are still going on. The Chinese Communist Party made this proposal long ago. We are of the opinion that in ceasing public polemics actions must suit words, and that the cessation must be mutual and general. While professing to terminate these polemics, some persons have continued to make attacks. Actually they want to forbid you to strike back after they have beaten you up. This will not do. Not only must attacks on the Chinese Communist Party cease; the attacks leveled at the Albanian Party of Labor and other fraternal parties must also stop. Moreover, it is absolutely impermissible to use the pretext of stopping polemics in order to forbid the exposure and condemnation of Yugoslav revisionism, because this

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violates the provision of the Moscow Statement on the obligation to expose further the revisionist leaders of Yugoslavia. Some persons now want to oust the fraternal Albanian Party of Labor from the international Communist movement on the one hand, and to pull in the renegade Tito clique on the other. We want to tell these people frankly that this is absolutely impossible. A necessary step for preparing such a meeting is to hold bilateral and multilateral talks among the fraternal parties. This was proposed by the Chinese Communist Party as far back as ten months ago. We have always been willing to have talks with all the fraternal parties which share our desire to eliminate differences and strengthen unity. As a matter of fact, we have had such talks with a number of fraternal parties. We have never refused to hold bilateral talks with any fraternal party. In their statement of January 12 the Executive Committee of the British Communist Party alleged that the Chinese Communist Party had not accepted the CPSU's request "for joint discussion." It has been said that they were told this by another party. However, we must point out in all seriousness that this is a sheer fabrication. We wish to reiterate that we are ready to hold talks and to exchange views with any fraternal party. . . 112. " M O R E ON THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COMRADE T O -

Us." Hung-ch'i, No. 3 / 4 , March 4, 1963. Translation in Peking Review, No. 10/11, March 15, 1963.

GLIATTI AND

This editorial, carried serially in Jen-min jih-pao (February 2 8 — March 4, 1 9 6 3 ) , largely recapitulated v i e w s already publicly advocated by the C P C ( s e e D o c u m e n t s N o s . 105, 106, 109, 1 1 1 ) . A number of passages shedding additional light o n the rift in international C o m m u n i s m are reproduced below. F o r the c o m p l e t e text in English of this book-length d o c u m e n t see Peking Review, No. 1 0 / 1 1 , M a r c h 15, 1 9 6 3 , or the separate edition (Peking, 1 9 6 3 ) . T h e editorial described the present rift as the third great debate in the history of C o m m u n i s m : the first had been Lenin's fight against Kautsky and Bernstein, the second, Stalin's fight against Trotsky and Bukharin. . . THE WORKERS and Communists of all countries must unite, but they can be united only on the basis of the Moscow .

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Declaration and the Moscow Statement, on the basis of setting forth the facts and discussing them rationally, on the basis of consultations on an equal footing and reciprocity, and on the basis of Marxism-Leninism. If it is a case of masters wielding batons over the heads of servants, incanting "Unity! Unity!," then what is actually meant is "Split! Split!" T h e workers of all countries will not accept such splittism. We desire unity, and we will never allow a handful of people to keep on with their splitting activities. As a result of the challenge the modern revisionists have thrown out to Marxist-Leninists, a widespread debate on issues of theory, fundamental line, and policy is now unfolding in the international Communist movement. This debate has a vital bearing on the success or failure of the whole cause of the proletariat and the working people throughout the world and on the fate of mankind. In the last analysis, one ideological trend in this debate is genuine proletarian ideology, that is, revolutionary MarxismLeninism, and the other is bourgeois ideology which has infiltrated into the ranks of the workers, that is, an anti-MarxistLeninist ideology. To sum up, the new ideas advanced by C o m r a d e Togliatti and others present us with a picture of the contemporary world as they envisage it in their minds. . . . They attempt to substitute class collaboration for class struggle, "structural reform" for proletarian revolution, and "joint intervention" for the national liberation movement. . . . Lenin's view was correct. Precisely as he foresaw, the forces of socialism have exerted increasing influence on the international situation. But Lenin never said that the building of a Soviet state could take the place of the struggles of the people of all countries to liberate themselves. Historical events during the forty years and more of the Soviet Union's existence also show that a revolution or a transformation of the social system in any country is a matter for the people of that country, and that the policy of peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition followed by socialist coun-

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tries cannot possibly result in a change of the social system in any other country. What grounds have Togliatti and other comrades for believing that the pursuit of the policy of peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition by the socialist countries can change the face of the social system in every other country and establish an "economic and social order" capable of satisfying all the aspirations of men? . . . How can it be said that the distinction between the two social systems of capitalism and socialism will automatically vanish as a result of the change in the world balance of forces? How can it be said that the various inherent contradictions of the capitalist world will automatically disappear as a result of this change in the world balance of forces? How can it be said that the ruling forces in the capitalist countries will voluntarily quit the stage of history as a result of this change in the world balance of forces? . . . A fundamental task is thus set before the international Communist movement in the contemporary world, namely, to support the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations and people of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, because these struggles are decisive for the cause of the international proletariat as a whole. In a sense, the revolutionary cause of the international proletariat as a whole hinges on the outcome of the people's struggles in these regions, which are inhabited by the overwhelming majority of the world's population, as well as on the acquisition of support from these revolutionary struggles. The proletariat of the capitalist countries in Europe and America, too, must stand in the forefront of those supporting the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations and people of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In fact, such support simultaneously helps the cause of the emancipation of the proletariat in Europe and America. Without support from the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations and people of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, it will be impossible for the proletariat and the people in capitalist Europe and America to free themselves from the calamities of capitalist oppression and from the menace of imperialist war. Therefore, the proletarian parties of the

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metropolitan imperialist countries are duty bound to heed the voice of the revolutionary people in these regions, study their experience, respect their revolutionary feelings, and support their revolutionary struggles. They have no right whatsoever to flaunt their seniority before these people, to put on lordly airs, to carp and cavil, like Comrade Thorez of France who so arrogantly and disdainfully speaks of them as being "young and inexperienced" (Thorez's report to the session of the Central Committee of the PCF, December 15, 1960). Much less have they the right to take a social-chauvinist attitude, slandering, cursing, intimidating, and obstructing the fighting revolutionary people in these regions. . . . The national liberation movement and the people's revolutionary movement in Asia, Africa, and Latin America give great support to the socialist countries; they constitute an extremely important force safeguarding the socialist countries from imperialist invasion. Beyond any doubt, the socialist countries should give warm sympathy and active support to these movements, and they absolutely must not adopt a perfunctory or selfishly national attitude, or an attitude of great-power chauvinism —much less hamper, obstruct, mislead, or sabotage these movements. Those countries in which socialism has been victorious must make it their sacred internationalist duty to support the national liberation struggles and the people's revolutionary struggles in other countries. Some people take the view that such support is but a one-sided "burden" on the socialist countries. This view is very wrong and runs counter to Marxism-Leninism. It must be understood that such support is a two-way, mutual affair; the socialist countries support the people's revolutionary struggles in other countries, and these struggles in turn serve to support and defend the socialist countries. In this connection, Stalin put it very aptly: "The characteristic feature of the assistance given by the victorious country is not only that it hastens the victory of the proletarians of other countries, but also that, by facilitating this victory, it ensures the final victory of socialism in the first victorious country." (Stalin, "The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists," Works, VI

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[Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1953], 419.) Some persons hold that peaceful economic competition between the socialist and capitalist countries is now the chief and most practical way to oppose imperialism. They assert that the national liberation struggles, the people's revolutionary struggles, the exposure of imperialism, etc., are nothing but "the cheapest methods of struggle" and "practices of medicinemen and quacks." Like opulent and lordly philanthropists, they tell the people in Asia, Africa, and Latin America not to display "sham courage," not to kindle "sparks," or hanker after "dying beautifully," or "lack faith in the possibility of triumphing over the capitalist system in peaceful economic competition," but to await the day when the socialist countries have completely beaten capitalism in the level of their productive forces; for then the people in these areas will have everything, and imperialism will automatically tumble. Strangely enough, these persons fear the people's revolutionary struggle in these areas like the plague. Their attitude has absolutely nothing in common with that of Marxist-Leninists; it runs completely counter to the interests of all oppressed people and nations, to the interests of the proletariat and other working people of their own countries, and to the interests of the socialist countries. In such a situation, the attitude toward the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations and people of Asia, Africa, and Latin America becomes an important criterion for distinguishing between revolution and nonrevolution, between internationalism and social chauvinism, and between MarxismLeninism and modern revisionism. It is also an important criterion for distinguishing between those who genuinely work for world peace and those who encourage the forces of aggression and war. . . Since the imperialists and reactionaries incessantly foment wars in various regions of the world to serve their own political ends, it is impossible for anybody to prevent the oppressed people and nations f r o m waging wars of resistance against oppression. Certain self-styled Marxist-Leninists may not regard the many wars cited above as wars at all. They acknowledge only

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wars which take place in "highly developed civilized regions." Actually, such ideas are nothing new. Lenin long ago criticized the absurd view that wars outside Europe were not wars. . . . People exactly like those Lenin criticized are still to be found today. They think that all is quiet in the world so long as there is no war in their own locality or neighborhood. They do not consider it worth their while to bother whether the imperialists and their lackeys are ravaging and slaughtering people in other localities, or engaging in military intervention and armed conflicts, or provoking wars there. They only worry lest the "sparks" of resistance by the oppressed nations and people in these places lead to disaster and disturb their own tranquility. They see no need whatsoever to examine how wars in these places originate, what social classes are waging these wars, and what the nature of these wars is. They simply condemn these wars in an undiscriminating and arbitrary fashion. Con this approach be regarded as Leninist? . . . Being incapable of explaining the question of war and peace from the historical and class angle, the modern revisionists always talk about peace and about war in general terms without making any distinction between just and unjust wars. Some people are trying to persuade others that the people's liberation would be "incomparably easier" after general and complete disarmament, when the oppressors would have no weapons in their hands. In our opinion this is nonsensical and totally unrealistic and is putting the cart before the horse. . . . Being firmly opposed to the policy of nuclear blackmail, the socialist countries advocate the total banning and destruction of nuclear weapons. Such is the attitude, line, and policy of the People's Republic of China and the Communist Party of China on the question of nuclear weapons. Such is the attitude, line, and policy of all Marxist-Leninists. The modern revisionists deliberately distort our attitude, line, and policy on this question and fabricate mean and vulgar slanders and lies; their purpose is to cover up the nuclear blackmail of the imperialists and to conceal their own adventurism and capitulationism on the ques-

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tion of nuclear weapons. It must be pointed out that adventurism and capitulationism on this question are very dangerous and are an expression of the worst kind of irresponsibility. . . . On the question of war and peace, the Chinese Communists, now as always, uphold the views of Lenin. . . There are people today who unblushingly compare themselves to Lenin and allege that Lenin, and Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, too, opposed war in the same way as they do. They have emasculated Lenin's theories and policies on the question of war and peace. Marxist-Leninists must expose the hypocrisy of bourgeois constitutions, but at the same time they should utilize certain of their provisions as weapons against the bourgeoisie. In ordinary circumstances, refusal to make use of a bourgeois constitution and carry on legal struggle wherever possible is a mistake, which Lenin called a "left" infantile disorder. But to call upon Communists and the people to place blind faith in a bourgeois constitution, to say that a bourgeois constitution can bring socialism to the people, and that respect for, and defense and integral application of, such a constitution "form the pivot of the whole political program of the Party" (Elements for a Programmatic Declaration of the PCI) is not just an infantile disorder but, again in Lenin's words, mental subservience to bourgeois prejudices. . . . Comrade Togliatti's idea is: ( 1 ) there is no need to smash the bourgeois state machine, and (2) there is no need to set up a proletarian state machine. He thus repudiates the experiences of the Paris Commune. . . . Lately, some people who call themselves Marxist-Leninists again burst out in noisy opposition to the thesis of the Chinese Communists that imperialism and all reactionaries are paper tigers. One moment they say this is "underestimation of imperialism" and "demobilizing the masses," and the next moment they say this is "slighting the strength of socialism." One moment they call it a "pseudo-revolutionary" attitude and the next moment a thesis based on "fear." These people are now vying to outshout and outdo each other, with the latecomers striving

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to be first and prove they are not falling behind. Their arguments are full of inconsistencies and are practically nonsensical. History teaches us that all revolutionaries—including, of course, bourgeois revolutionaries—come to be revolutionaries because in the first place they dare to despise the enemy, dare to struggle, and dare to seize victory. Those who fear the enemy and dare not struggle, dare not seize victory, can only be cowards, can only be reformists or capitulationists; they can certainly never be revolutionaries. . . . Certain people, although calling themselves Marxist-Leninists, have in actual fact become muddled and have allowed a kind of fin de siècle pessimism to take the place of cool reason. They have no intention of leading the people in delivering themselves from the disasters created by imperialism, and they have no confidence that the people can overcome these disasters and build a new life for themselves. It would be nearer to the truth to say that they are concerned about the fate of imperialism and all reactionaries than to say that they are concerned about the fate of socialism and the people of all countries. Their purpose in boosting and exaggerating the strength of the enemy and beating the drums for imperialism as they do today is not to oppose "adventurism" but simply to prevent the oppressed people and oppressed nations from rising in revolution; their so-called opposition to adventurism is merely a pretext to achieve their purpose of opposing revolution. . . . In his essay " O u r Revolution," Lenin had the following to say about the heroes of opportunism: "They all call themselves Marxists, but their conception of Marxism is impossibly pedantic. They have completely failed to understand what is decisive in Marxism, namely, its revolutionary dialectics." (Lenin, Marx, Engels, Marxism [Moscow, 1951], p. 547.) In the same article, Lenin also said: "Their whole conduct betrays them as cowardly reformists, who are afraid to take the smallest step away from the bourgeoisie, let alone break with it, and at the same time mask their

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cowardice by the wildest rhetoric and braggadocio." (¡bid., p. 548.) To those who are attacking the Chinese Communist Party we commend these lines of Lenin's for careful reading. Assuredly, they may well serve as a political mirror for certain people. . . . Don't some people frequently say that we ought to "synchronize our watches"? Now there are two watches: one is Marxist-Leninism and the Moscow Declaration and Statement, and the other is modern revisionism as represented by the Tito clique. Which is to be the master watch? The watch of MarxismLeninism, of the Moscow Declaration and Statement, or the watch of modern revisionism? There are even those who violently assail what they term "dogmatism," yet who delight in biblical dogmas. Their heads are full of the Bible and similar matter but contain not a shadow of Marxism-Leninism. Lenin constantly cited the words of Marx and Engels, "Our theory is not a dogma but a guide to action." Now that certain persons are spreading the notion that we are "dogmatists," we have to tell them bluntly: The Chinese Communist Party is rich in experience in combating dogmatism. More than twenty years ago, under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, we fought an outstanding struggle against dogmatism, and ever since we have paid attention to struggles of this kind. . . Those who are now vigorously railing at dogmatism have absolutely no idea of what it really is, let alone of how to combat it. They keep on proclaiming that times and conditions have changed and that one must "develop Marxism-Leninism creatively," but actually they are using bourgeois pragmatism to revise Marxism-Leninism. They are utterly unable to grasp the essence of the changed times and conditions, to understand the contradictions in the contemporary world, or to locate the focus of these contradictions. They cannot grasp the laws of development of things that objectively exist and they stagger to and fro, plunging now into capitulationism and now into adventurism. Accommodating themselves to the immediate turn

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of events, they forget the fundamental interests of the proletariat, and this is characteristic both of their thinking and their actions. Thus they do not have a policy founded on principle, frequently fail to differentiate between the enemy, ourselves, and our friends, and even reverse the relationships between the three, treating enemies as if they were our own people and vice versa. Lenin said that the philistine "is never guided by a definite world outlook, by principles of integral party tactics. He always swims with the stream, blindly obeying the mood of the moment." (Lenin, "The Political Situation and the Tasks of the Working Class," Collected Works, [Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1962], X I , 390.) Now, are not these people exactly the same? . . . Only yesterday, some people put their signatures to the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement, expressing approval of the fundamental revolutionary principles set forth in these two documents, and yet today they are trampling these principles underfoot. Hardly had they signed the Moscow Statement and agreed to the conclusion that the leaders of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia have betrayed Marxism-Leninism than they turned round and treated the Titoite renegades as dearly beloved brothers. They concurred in the conclusion in the Statement that "U.S. imperialism is the chief bulwark of world reaction and an international gendarme, that it has become an enemy of the peoples of the whole world," and yet soon afterwards they maintained that the destiny of mankind depended on "cooperation," "confidence," and "agreement" between the heads of the two powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. They concurred in the principles guiding relations among fraternal parties and countries laid down in the Declaration and the Statement, and yet soon afterwards they abandoned these principles and at their own party congress publicly and willfully condemned another fraternal party and country. Though talking glibly about never allowing ideological differences between fraternal parties to spread to the economic field and to state relations, these people have wantonly torn up numerous

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economic and technological contracts between fraternal countries, and have even gone to such lengths as virtually breaking off diplomatic relations with a fraternal country. They concurred in the conclusion in the Declaration and the Statement that revisionism is the main danger in the international working-class movement, and yet soon afterwards they began to spread the idea far and wide that "dogmatism is the main danger." And so on and so forth. Is there any principle in these actions of theirs? What kind of principles are their policies based on? . . Marxist-Leninists approach the question of compromise as follows: They never reject any necessary compromise that serves the interests of the revolution—namely, principled compromise; but they will never tolerate a compromise that amounts to betrayal—namely, unprincipled compromise. . As is well known, Trotsky played a most despicable role in connection with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk as well as in the entire history of the Russian Revolution and of Soviet construction. He opposed Lenin and Leninism on all the main problems. He denied that the socialist revolution and socialist construction could triumph first in one country. He lacked all principle on the question of revolutionary strategy and tactics, and this manifested itself now in "Left" adventurism, now in Right capitulationism. In the case of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, he first blindly pressed for an adventurist policy; then, in violation of Lenin's directive, he refused to sign the treaty at the BrestLitovsk negotiations and at the same time made the traitorous statement to the German side that the Soviet Republic was preparing to end the war and demobilize. The German aggressors thereupon became more arrogant and laid down even more onerous terms. Such was Trotskyism in the matter of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Now certain people have arbitrarily lumped together the Cuban events and those of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, although the two were completely different in nature, and they have drawn an historical analogy in which they liken themselves to Lenin and brand those who opposed sacrificing the sovereignty of another country as Trotskyites. This is most absurd.

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Lenin was perfectly right in wanting the Treaty of BrestLitovsk to be signed. Lenin's purpose was to win time to consolidate the victory of the October Revolution. . . . Events confirmed Lenin's foresight, and the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk proved to be a revolutionary compromise. How about the Cuban events? That was a completely different story. In the Cuban events, the Cuban people and their leaders were determined to fight to the death to defend the sovereignty of their fatherland; they displayed great heroism and high principle. They did not commit the error of adventurism, nor did they commit the error of capitulationism. But during the Cuban events certain people first committed the error of adventurism, and then committed the error of capitulationism, wanting the Cuban people to accept humiliating terms which would have meant the sacrifice of the sovereignty of their country. These persons have tried to cover themselves by using the example of Lenin's conclusion of the Treaty of BrestLitovsk, but this has turned out to be a clumsy sleight-of-hand, for they have actually uncovered themselves all the more clearly. . . After launching and organizing a series of preposterous attacks on the Chinese Communist Party and other fraternal parties, certain people have suddenly begun to strike up the tune of "unity." But what they call unity consists of giving themselves permission to abuse others, while not allowing the others to reason with them. By "calling a halt to open polemics," they mean permission for themselves to attack others as they please, while the others are forbidden to make whatever reply is called for. While talking of unity, they continue to undermine unity; while talking of calling a halt to open polemics, they continue their open attacks. What is more, they say threateningly that unless those whom they attack keep their mouths shut, it will be "imperative to continue and even step up the decisive struggle against them." But when it comes to the Tito clique, these people really seek unity. Their desire is unity with the Tito clique, not the unity of the international Communist movement; they desire

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unity on the basis of modern revisionism as represented by the Tito clique, or unity on the basis of the baton of certain people, and not unity on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, of the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement. In practice, therefore, tlicir unity is a pseudonym for a split. Using unity as a smoke screen, they are trying to cover up their actual splitting activities. . . . There are people who are working frantically to create a split by resorting to many dishonest tricks, spreading rumours, slinging mud, and sowing dissension. But the overwhelming majority of the people of the world want unity in the international Communist movement and are opposed to a split. The activities of certain people in creating a split, attacking the Chinese Communist Party and other fraternal parties, and undermining the unity of the socialist camp and of the international Communist movement, go against the desires of the overwhelming majority of the people of the world and are extremely unpopular. People can see through their tactics of sham unity and actual splitting. Historically, none of the splitters who betrayed Marxism-Leninism ever came to a good end. We have already advised those who are working to create a split to "rein in at the brink of the precipice," but certain people are unwilling to take our advice. They believe they are not yet at the "brink," and they are not ready "to rein in." Apparently they are very much interested in continuing their splitting activities. Let them go on creating trouble if they must. The masses, and history, will pass judgment on them. Something very interesting is happening on a wide scale in the international Communist movement today. What is this interesting phenomenon? The doughty warriors who claim to possess the totality of Marxist-Leninist truth are mortally afraid of the articles written in reply to their attacks by the so-called dogmatists, sectarians, splitters, nationalists, and Trotskyites whom they have so vigorously condemned. They dare not publish these articles in their own newspapers and journals. As cowardly as mice, they are scared to death. They dare not let the people of their own countries read our articles, and they

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have tried to impose a watertight embargo. They are even using powerful stations to jam our broadcasts and prevent their people from listening to them. Dear friends and comrades who claim to possess the whole truth! Since you are quite definite that our articles are wrong, why don't you publish all these erroneous articles and then refute them point by point, so as to inculcate hatred among your people against the "heresies" you call dogmatism, sectarianism, and anti-Marxism-Leninism? Why do you lack the courage to do this? Why such a stringent embargo? You fear the truth. The huge specter you call "dogmatism," i.e., genuine Marxism-Leninism, is haunting the world, and it threatens you. You have no faith in the people, and the people have no faith in you. You are divorced from the masses. That is why you fear the truth and carry your fear to such absurd lengths. Friends, comrades! If you are men enough, step forward! Let each side in the debate publish all the articles in which it is criticized by the other side, and let the people in our own countries and the whole world reflect and judge who is right and who is wrong. That is what we are doing, and we hope you will follow our example. We are not afraid to publish everything of yours in full. We publish all the "masterpieces" in which you rail at us. Then in reply we either refute them point by point, or refute their main points. Sometimes we publish your articles without a word in answer, leaving the readers to judge for themselves. Isn't that fair and reasonable? You, modern revisionist masters! Do you dare to do the same? If you are men enough, you will. But having a guilty conscience and an unjust case, being fierce of visage but faint of heart, outwardly as tough as bulls but inwardly as timid as mice, you will not dare. We are sure you will not dare. Isn't that so? Please answer! . . . 34 34 Beginning in mid-February, 1963, the Chinese C o m m u n i s t press systematically republished the major documents of other C o m m u n i s t parties. Thus, Khrushchev's speech of D e c e m b e r 12, 1962, appeared in Jen-min jih-pao on February 20; the Pravila editorial of January 7, 1963. o n February 21; Khrushchev's speech of January 16, 1963, at the S E D Congress, o n February 22; and the Pravda editorial of February 10 ( D o c u ment 1 1 0 ) , on February 23. On March 8, when publishing a reply to

808 113.

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" A C O M M E N T ON THE S T A T E M E N T OF THE C O M M U N I S T

PARTY OF THE U . S . A . " Editorial in Jen-min jih-pao, March 8, 1 9 6 3 . Translation in Peking Review, N o . 1 0 / 1 1 , March 15, 1 9 6 3 . O n January 9, 1963, the C o m m u n i s t Party of the United States issued a statement " O n C u b a , China, and the U S S R . " (See Political Affairs, Vol. X L I I , N o . 2 [February, 1963].) T h e following excerpts indicate the substance of the statement. " T h e peaceful resolution of the C a r i b b e a n crisis demonstrates the soundness of the eighty-one party Statement, of the thesis of the X X I I Congress of the C P S U that it is possible to banish general war f r o m the earth even while the world is still part capitalist a n d imperialist. . [As a result of the C u b a n crisis] P r e m i e r Khrushchev stood f o r t h as o n e of the great statesmen of o u r times. " T h e American C o m m u n i s t Party feels it necessary to take s h a r p public issue with the policy of the Chinese Communist Party in respect to the Caribbean crisis and in respect to its w r o n g position on peaceful coexistence in general. In effect, the position of t h e C P C , like that of certain p o w e r f u l U.S. monopoly circles, is that the resolution of the Caribbean crisis is a victory for U.S. imperialism. . . Not only is it h a r m f u l a n d incorrect, but the C P C is systematically and openly pushing this line in all countries a n d Marxist parties of the world. . . . T h e C P U S A cannot b e indifferent to the fact that the C P C seeks converts for its dangerous policies in our country, and that the open promulgation of its policies can only spread confusion and disruption. . A f t e r asserting that the " e r r o n e o u s and dangerous" views of the C P C had been apparent for "a n u m b e r of years," the statement condemned the Jen-min jih-pao editorial of December 31, 1962 (Document No. 106): "This is indeed an unbelievable and irresponsible slander against the C P S U — t h e party of L e n i n — a n d against the parties of other the CPUSA Statement of January 9, 1963, it gave the full text of this document. On March 21, it reprinted French and Italian Communist documents and editorials, with the comment that it would publish the attacks made by "44 fraternal parties" on the CPC; it would do so without fear, as "genuine gold stands the test of fire." In addition, the Chinese Communist press gave extensive coverage to sympathetic statements from the Albanian, North Korean, Indonesian, Japanese, and other parties.—Ed.

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lands of socialism as well as the fighting Marxist-Leninist parties of the capitalist countries and others who adhere to the eighty-one party Statement. It only emphasizes how the Chinese Communist leaders have failed to grasp the realities of today and because of this how far they have already departed from Marxism-Leninism. ." The Chinese Communists replied in the form of a Jen-min jih-pao editorial on March 8, 1963, which, in addition, took the opportunity to raise publicly an issue not theretofore injected in the debates: the "unequal treaties" imposed by Russia on China in the nineteenth century. ON JANUARY 9 of this year, the Communist Party of the United States of America issued a statement publicly attacking the Communist Party of China. Certain comrades of the CPUSA have also made a number of other attacks on the Chinese Communist Party in recent months. T h e C P U S A statement was particularly vicious in slandering the Chinese Communist Party for the position it took on the Caribbean crisis. It said that the Chinese Communist Party had advocated "a policy leading to thermonuclear war," and that "this pseudo-left dogmatic and sectarian line of our Chinese comrades dovetails with that of the most adventurous U.S. imperialists and gives the latter encouragement." . . . What kind of talk is this? People cannot help being amazed that U.S. Communists should utter such shameful slanders. It is not hard to see that there is a line which does dovetail with that of U.S. imperialism. On the question of the Caribbean crisis, certain leaders of the C P U S A direct the spearhead of their struggle not against U.S. imperialism, the criminal aggressor against Cuba, but against the Chinese Communist Party, the resolute supporter of Cuba. In this respect, aren't they really cheek by jowl with the most adventurous U.S. imperialists? Since you describe the Chinese comrades, who resolutely oppose U.S. imperialism, as being "pseudo-left," we would like to ask: What do you consider to be genuinely left? Can it be that those using the sovereignty of another country as a counter for political bargaining with U.S. imperialism are to be considered the genuine left? T o act in that way is indeed

810 to be through-and-through right. . . .

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genuinely

Criticizing "certain leaders" of the CPUSA for having done "their utmost to prettify U.S. imperialism, to prettify Kennedy, the U.S. imperialist chieftain, and to affirm their loyalty to the U.S. ruling class," and attacking "certain persons" for asserting that revolutionary propaganda against U.S. imperialism was "nothing but 'curses,' 'vilification,' 'verbal weapons,' 'incantations,' and 'cardboard swords,'" the editorial next turned to the question of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. These persons have no confidence in the masses and pin their hopes, not on the unity and struggle of the masses, but mainly on the "wisdom" and "good will" of the imperialists and on talks between the heads of two great powers. They are infatuated with the idea of summit meetings of great powers and laud them as marking "a new stage," "a turning point in the history of m a n k i n d , " and as opening "a new stream in world history." In their opinion, the course of history and the fate of mankind are determined by two great powers and two "great men." In their opinion, the statement that all countries are independent and equal irrespective of size is an empty phrase, and the hundred and more countries in the world ought to allow themselves to be ordered about by these two great powers. In their opinion, the statement that the masses are the makers of history is another empty phrase, and every matter under the sky can be settled if the two "great m e n " sit down together. Isn't this greatpower chauvinism? Isn't this the doctrine of power politics? Does this have anything in common with Marxism-Leninism? . . . The editorial then took up the CPR's policy toward Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao, linking this matter with a discussion of "unequal treaties." With an ulterior purpose, the statement of the C P U S A referred to Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao. It said that the Chinese comrades were "correctly not following the adventurous

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policy in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao that they advocate for others. Why this double standard approach?" We know from what quarter they have learnt this ridiculous charge. And we know, too, the purpose of the person who manufactured it. Here we should like to answer all those who have raised this matter. For us there never has been a question of a "double standard." We have only one standard, whether in dealing with the question of Taiwan, whether in dealing with the questions of Hong Kong and Macao, or whether in dealing with all international questions, and that standard is Marxism-Leninism. In international struggles we are opposed both to adventurism and to capitulationism. These two hats can never fit our heads. Inasmuch as some persons have mentioned Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao, we are obliged to discuss a little of the history of imperialist aggression against China. In the hundred years or so prior to the victory of the Chinese Revolution, the imperialist and colonial powers—the United States, Britain, France, Tsarist Russia, Germany, Japan, Italy, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal—carried out unbridled aggression against China. They compelled the governments of old China to sign a large number of unequal treaties—the Treaty of Nanking of 1842, the Treaty of Aigun of 1858, the Treaty of Tientsin of 1858, the Treaty of Peking of 1860, the Treaty of 111 of 1881, the Protocol of Lisbon of 1887, the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895, the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong of 1898, the International Protocol of 1901, etc. By virtue of these unequal treaties they annexed Chinese territory in the north, south, east, and west and held leased territories on the seaboard and in the hinterland of China. Some seized Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, some occupied Hong Kong and forcibly leased Kowloon, some put Macao under perpetual occupation, etc., etc. At the time the People's Republic of China was inaugurated, our government declared that it would examine the treaties con-

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eluded by previous Chinese governments with foreign governments, treaties that had been left over by history, and would recognize, abrogate, revise, or renegotiate them according to their respective contents. In this respect, our policy toward the socialist countries is fundamentally different from our policy toward the imperialist countries; we take differing circumstances into consideration and make distinctions in our policy. As a matter of fact, many of these treaties concluded in the past either have lost their validity, have been abrogated, or have been replaced by new ones. With regard to the outstanding issues, which are a legacy from the past, we have always held that, when conditions are ripe, they should be settled peacefully through negotiations and that, pending a settlement, the status quo should be maintained. Within this category are the questions of Hong Kong, Kowloon, and Macao and the questions of all those boundaries which have not been formally delimited by the parties concerned in each case. As for Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, they were restored to China in 1945, and the question now is the U.S. imperialist invasion and occupation of them and U.S. imperialist interference in China's internal affairs. . . . Why is it that after the Caribbean crisis this correct policy of ours suddenly became a topic of discussion among certain persons and a theme for their anti-China campaign? These heroes are apparently very pleased with themselves for having picked u p a stone from a cesspool, with which they believe they can instantly fell the Chinese. But whom has this filthy stone really hit? You are not unaware that such questions as those of Hong Kong and Macao relate to the category of unequal treaties left over by history, treaties which the imperialists imposed on China. It may be asked: In raising questions of this kind, d o you intend to raise all the questions of unequal treaties and have a general settlement? Has it ever entered your heads what the consequences would be? Can you seriously believe that this will do you any good? Superficially, you seem to agree with China's policy on H o n g

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Kong and Macao. Yet you compare it with India's liberation of Goa. Anyone with a discerning eye can see at once that your sole intention is to prove that the Chinese are cowards. To be frank, there is no need for the Chinese people to prove their courage and stanchness in combating imperialism by making a show of force on the questions of Hong Kong and Macao. The imperialists, and the U.S. imperialists in particular, have had occasion to sample our courage and stanchness. . . Don't you feel it "stupid" and "deplorable" on your part to taunt us on the questions of Hong Kong and Macao? We know very well, and you know too, that you are, to put it plainly, bringing up the questions of Hong Kong and Macao merely as a fig leaf to hide your disgraceful performance in the Caribbean crisis. But all this is futile. There is an objective criterion for truth, just as there is for error. What is right cannot be made to look wrong, nor can wrong be made to look right. To glory in your disgraceful performance will not add to your prestige. How can the correct policy of the Chinese people on the questions of Hong Kong and Macao be mentioned in the same breath with your erroneous policy in the Caribbean crisis? How can such a comparison help you to whitewash yourselves? . . . We say to these friends who are acting the hero, it is you, and not we, who really have a "double standard." With regard to the U.S. imperialists, one day you call them pirates—and the next you say they are concerned for peace. As for revolutionary Cuba, you say that you support her five demands for safeguarding her independence and sovereignty, but on the other hand you try to impose "international inspection" on her. With regard to the Sino-Indian boundary dispute, you speak of "fraternal China" and "friendly India" on the one hand, but on the other you maliciously attack China and support the Indian reactionaries in diverse ways. As for Hong Kong and Macao, while you ostensibly speak for China, you are actually stabbing her in the back. Are you not applying a "double standard" in all your actions? Is this not a manifestation of a dual personality? . . .

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1 1 4 . L E T T E R FROM THE CENTRAL C O M M I T T E E OF THE C O M MUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION TO THE C E N T R A L C O M M I T T E E OF THE C O M M U N I S T PARTY OF CHINA, F E B RUARY 2 1 ,

1963. N C N A

r e l e a s e in E n g l i s h , M a r c h

13,

1963.33 DEAR COMRADES: G u i d e d b y t h e h i g h e s t i n t e r e s t of o u r

common

cause, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has decided to write this letter to you in order to express our views on the necessity of making a common effort to strengthen the unity of the world Communist movement in accordance with the principles of Marxism-Leninism, proletarian internationalism, and the Declaration and the Statement of the Moscow meetings. We are writing to you with the deep conviction that, for Marxist-Leninist parties, no other task is more important in the present circumstances than to strive for the solidarity of our ranks and for the strengthening of the unity of all the socialist countries. All those who treasure the great cause of peace and socialism cannot but be seriously concerned about the state of affairs which has recently arisen in the Communist movement. T h e public and daily intensifying polemics are shaking the unity of the fraternal parties and seriously damaging our common interests. T h e debate which has arisen within the ranks of the international Communist movement is obstructing successful struggle against imperialism, weakening the efforts of the socialist countries in the international arena, and exerting a negative influence on the activities of the fraternal parties, and especially of those in the capitalist countries, where the domestic political situation is complicated. The enemies of socialism are trying hard to make use of the differences which have arisen in the Communist movement to split the socialist countries, disrupt the national liberation movement, and strengthen their own position. In the conditions of the new correlation of forces in the world, the imperialist aggressors are unable to vanquish the united " F o r a translation f r o m Pravda, M a r c h 14, see The Current the Soviet Press, Vol. X V , N o . 11 (April 10, 1963).

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socialist commonwealth by means of war. Therefore, they bank primarily on disrupting our unity. If we fail to unite in the struggle against the common enemy, if we act separately in the face of imperialism, this will only weaken our efforts and consequently strengthen the position of the enemies of socialism. The clear obligation on Marxist-Leninist parties, and first of all the biggest parties like the CPSU and the CPC, is not to allow events to develop in a direction which will place the Communist movement in serious difficulties, to exert all efforts to eliminate the present abnormal situation, to attain unity in the ranks of the Communist movement, and to achieve solidarity in the socialist commonwealth. We deeply believe that the difficulties being experienced by the Communist movement at present are of a temporary character and can be entirely overcome. We possess everything that is necessary to strengthen our unity and solidarity. If the existing situation is appraised from the historical perspective of the development of world socialism, one cannot but draw the following conclusion: the paramount features which unite the CPSU, the CPC, and all Marxist-Leninist parties are incomparably loftier and more significant than the existing differences. We are united by the unity of the class interests of the proletariat and of the working people of the whole world, and by the great teachings of Marxism-Leninism. No matter how serious our present differences may appear, it must not be forgotten that in the great historic struggle of the socialist forces against capitalism we are with you on the same side of the barricades. Being aware of all the complexity of the situation, we hold at the same time that the existing differences should not be exaggerated and should not be inflamed. An objective analysis of the debate going on in the Communist movement shows that in many cases during the polemics the differences which have arisen have been artificially exaggerated and aggravated and the attention paid to the controversial questions has been overaccentuated. The heat of polemics usually prevents a calm and sober estimation of the nature of the problems which have arisen, covering up the main things which form the basis of our unity.

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The Marxist-Leninist parties are in possession of the programmatic documents jointly worked out—the Declaration and the Statement of the Moscow meetings—to which they have at all times emphasized their loyalty. Consistently carrying out the common line unanimously agreed upon by the world Communist movement, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is waging an active struggle against imperialism and for the triumph of the great ideals of socialism and communism over the whole globe. O u r party spares no effort in the struggle to prevent a new world war and to consolidate peace and the security of all peoples. T h e CPSU and the Soviet government support the national liberation movement by all means—economic, political, and goes so far as to render assistance by arms. Being loyal to proletarian internationalism, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has always followed the militant slogan "Workers of all countries, unite!" The CPSU seeks to consolidate the family of world socialism and to strengthen its influence on the whole course of historical development. The successes of Communist construction in the Soviet Union are a contribution of our people to the cause of strengthening world socialism and raising its prestige and force of attraction. The Communist Party of China on its part has constantly pointed out that it firmly stands by the Declaration and the Statement and persists in their conclusions and viewpoints, and that its main aim is to struggle against imperialism and for the victory of socialism and communism in the whole world. The C P C stresses its loyalty to the policy of peaceful coexistence among countries having different social systems and points out the correctness of the conclusion in the Statement concerning the possibility of preventing a new world war. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China recognizes the principle of proletarian internationalism as the main principle guiding relations among Communist parties and socialist countries and affirms its loyalty to the slogan "Workers of all countries, unite!" Unanimity in the stand on these fundamental questions is a good basis for strengthening solidarity and overcoming the

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difficulties which have arisen. If the documents of the two Moscow meetings are resolutely followed, then there is no sound reason for further sharpening the existing differences, because they can be correctly solved. Of course, it is not excluded that in the Communist movement there may emerge, and there are emerging, different approaches in understanding certain questions of current world development. This can be explained by the different conditions in which this or that detachment of the international Communist movement is working. However, such differences in opinion, if not artificially exaggerated, should not, in any case, turn into a sharp conflict, and can surely be overcome through joint comradely consultation. Proceeding from all this, the Central Committee of the CPSU deems that it is especially important to take concrete and practical steps without delay to ensure our unity and improve the atmosphere in the reciprocal relations of all the fraternal parties. It was precisely these considerations that prompted the proposal made on behalf of our party by Comrade N. S. Khrushchev. First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, at the VI Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, for the cessation of polemics among the Communist parties and the cessation of criticisms of other parties inside one's own party. As is well known, this proposal has received wide response and support in the world Communist movement. In writing the present letter the Central Committee of the CPSU wishes to take a new step along the road of overcoming the difficulties that have arisen. In the interest of strengthening our friendship and obtaining a better mutual understanding, we propose to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China that bilateral talks be held between the representatives of the Communist parties of the Soviet Union and China. In view of the importance of the talks and in order to be more sure of achieving the set aim, we would rather have the abovementioned talks held at a high level. During the negotiations all important questions in which both parties are interested, and especially those concerning the common task of our struggle,

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can be discussed point by point. As for those questions on which different points of view actually prove to exist, agreement should be reached on measures which will help bring our positions closer to each other. If you agree to hold such talks, the place and time for the talks can be settled at another time. Talks between representatives of the CPSU and the Communist Party of China, the significance of which is clear to all, will also play an important role in preparing for a meeting of Marxist-Leninism parties and in creating a favorable situation without which its successful work will be impossible. Like many other fraternal parties, the CPSU has stood for, and stands for, convening a meeting, believing that there is sufficiently serious ground for doing so. The center of attention of such a meeting, as we see it, should be the common tasks of struggle against imperialism and its aggressive plans and for the further advance of the liberation movement of the peoples, for solidarity and all-round development of the world socialist family and the strengthening of its influence throughout the world, and for the consolidation of the unity of the Communist movement. In our letter of May 31, we already have expressed our opinion on the necessity of convening a meeting, and we now reaffirm it once more. Our common obligations are to do everything so that the meeting may lead to the further strengthening of the solidarity of the Marxist-Leninist parties and the strengthening of unity. We are ready to make a careful study and support any initiative aimed at overcoming the present difficulties. The principal thing that is necessary now is to demonstrate the good will to settle the existing questions on the basis of MarxismLeninism, and not to allow any action which might obstruct the strengthening of our unity. Dear Comrades! All Marxist-Leninist parties are aware that at present the world Communist movement has reached an extremely crucial juncture in its development. It depends on us, on our parties, and on the correctness of our policies whether we are going to march together in the same ranks, or to plunge ourselves into an arduous and needless struggle, which can only lead us to estrangement, to weakening the forces of socialism,

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and to undermining the unity of the world Communist movement. On our parties rests the historic responsibility of enabling the peoples of the Soviet Union and China to live like brothers. The unity of the Communist parties of the Soviet Union and China is of great significance to the family of socialism and to the Communist movement as a whole. Future generations will not forgive us if, in the present situation in which acute struggle is going on between the two systems, we should fail to find the courage and strength in ourselves under the guidance of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism to surmount the existing differences. History has placed on the first detachments of the revolutionary movement, which have delivered their countries f r o m the yoke of capitalism, the great task of establishing and developing relations of a new type—fraternal and friendly relations between peoples—and of setting an example of the future socialist society for all mankind. O u r parties are duty bound to seek a way out of the existing situation and courageously and resolutely to sweep away what is obstructing our friendship. This is the only road which Marxist-Leninists can and must take. We are deeply convinced that to overcome the differences that have arisen accords not only with the interests of the Communist parties of the Soviet Union and China but also with the basic aim of the common struggle of the international Communist movement for peace, national independence, democracy, and socialism. If only there is good will and a deep understanding of the aim and interest of our struggle, no obstacle can obstruct us in strengthening and developing our friendship and the solidarity of the international Communist movement.

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115.

L E T T E R FROM THE C E N T R A L C O M M I T T E E OF THE C O M MUNIST PARTY OF CHINA TO THE C E N T R A L OF

THE

COMMUNIST

PARTY

OF

THE

COMMITTEE

SOVIET

UNION,

MARCH 9, 1 9 6 3 . NCNA release in English, March

13,

1963.

DEAR COMRADES: The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has received the letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union dated February 21, 1963.

When Comrade Mao Tse-tung received Comrade Chervonenko, the Soviet Ambassador to China, on February 23, he explained our estimation of your letter. We welcome your letter. We welcome the desire for unity expressed in it; we welcome the normal attitude of equality toward fraternal parties as shown in it; we welcome your definite approval of the proposal to call a meeting of representatives of all the Communist and workers parties of the world. To safeguard the unity of the socialist camp, to safeguard the unity of the international Communist movement, to safeguard the unity of our two parties and two countries—this is and has been the consistent position of the Communist Party of China. We have never spared our efforts in the interest of unity. We are always distressed by and opposed to anything that is not in the interest of unity. We always rejoice at and support anything that is in the interest of unity. We ought to face the fact that at present there are serious differences in the international Communist movement on a series of important questions of principle. As for the causes of these differences, which your letter says "can be explained by the different conditions in which this or that detachment of the international Communist movement is working," the more important factor, in our opinion, is the question of how MarxismLeninism is understood and what attitude is taken toward it, and the question of how the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement are understood and what attitude is taken toward them.

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The Chinese Communist Party has always advocated that when differences on questions of principle arise between fraternal parties, the fraternal parties should start with the desire for unity, carry on comradely discussion and mutual criticism so as to distinguish right from wrong, and reach the goal of unity on the basis of Marxism-Leninism. That is to say, differences between fraternal parties should be settled inside the international Communist movement through consultation on an equal footing in bilateral or multilateral talks, or at a meeting of the fraternal parties, in accordance with the principles and methods set forth in the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement. The Chinese Communist Party is and always has been opposed to public exposure before the enemy of differences between fraternal parties. We are even more strongly opposed to the inflammation of debate and the complication of matters by the use of such methods as the convening of party congresses, the issuance of resolutions or statements by party central committees, and the publication of articles and speeches by party and state leaders. We knew full well and have said so more than once, that such practices would gladden our enemy and create difficulties for our own ranks, and especially for the fraternal parties in capitalist countries. Events have proved that our concern was not unfounded. More and more fraternal parties have now expressed the wish that public polemics should cease. This is a good sign. We ardently hope that the public polemics among the fraternal parties will cease in the shortest possible time. The international Communist movement has indeed reached a critical juncture. The time has indeed come when the differences among the fraternal parties have to be settled. We have before us a very good international situation, one that is most favorable for revolution in the world. There is no reason why we should not eliminate our differences and strengthen our unity. In the world balance of forces, the superiority is on the side of socialism and the revolutionary people, and not on the side of imperialism and its running dogs. The two great historical currents of our time, the forces of

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socialism and the forces of the national and democratic revolutions in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, are battering the wall of reactionary rule by imperialism, headed by the United States of America. The contradictions among the imperialist powers, and especially those between U.S. imperialism and the other imperialist powers, are becoming deeper and sharper, and new conflicts are developing among them. In this situation, what is of decisive significance for the international cause of the proletariat as a whole is the struggle against imperialism, headed by the United States, and support for the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations and people of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In this situation, the possibility of preventing a new world war and of preserving world peace will increase with the further development of the strength of the socialist countries, the further development of the national liberation movement, of the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed people, and of the movement in defense of world peace, and, at the same time, the full utilization of the contradictions in the imperialist camp. In this situation, what is necessary first of all is to strengthen the unity of the socialist c a m p and the unity of the international Communist movement. With the unity of Marxist-Leninists as the nucleus, the strengthening of the unity of the world proletariat, the strengthening of the unity between the world proletariat and all the oppressed nations and people, and the strengthening of the great unity of all the people in the world who favor opposition to imperialism are the guarantees for the victory of our common cause. The Moscow Declaration and Statement set forth the common line, course, and policies for our common struggle. These two documents present clear-cut conclusions on the nature of the present epoch; on the socialist camp; on the common laws of socialist revolution and socialist construction; on the struggle against imperialism; on war and peace; on peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems; on the national liberation movement; on the tasks and tactics of the working-class

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movement in the capitalist countries; on the struggle against revisionism as the main danger at present and the struggle against dogmatism; on continuing the struggle against Yugoslav revisionism, which has betrayed Marxism-Leninism; and on the principles guiding relations among fraternal parties and fraternal countries—independence, equality, and attainment of unanimity through consultation, etc. In our words and deeds, we Chinese Communists have unswervingly followed and maintained this correct line, this correct course, and these correct policies. We are very glad that the Soviet comrades, too, have in their letter expressed their loyalty to these two programmatic documents. To eliminate differences and to strengthen unity on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and on the basis of the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement accords with the interests of the people of the whole world, with the interests of the Communists of all countries, with the interests of the people of the socialist camp, and with the interests of the peoples of China and the Soviet Union. Conversely, if the differences should be further exacerbated and unity further undermined, it is not only future generations that would not forgive us—we would not be forgiven by the masses of the people in our own time. With the purpose of eliminating differences and strengthening unity, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party wrote a letter to the Central Committee of the CPSU on April 7, 1962. In that letter, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party expressed its support for the proposal to convene a meeting of the fraternal parties put forward by the Communist Party of Indonesia, the Vietnamese Workers Party, the Communist Party of Sweden, the Communist Party of Great Britain, and the Communist Party of New Zealand, and explicitly proposed that a meeting of representatives of the Communist and workers parties of all countries be convened to discuss problems of common concern. We are very glad that in its recent letter the Central Committee of the CPSU also favors calling a meeting of representatives of the Communist and workers parties. In our letter of April 7, 1962, we also pointed out that, in

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order to convene and make a success of a meeting of the fraternal parties, many obstacles would have to be overcome beforehand and much preparatory work would have to be done. At that time, we advanced the following points: First, that the fraternal parties and countries having disputes should take steps, however small, which would help to ease relations and restore unity, so as to improve the atmosphere and prepare the conditions for the convening and the success of a meeting of the fraternal parties. Second, that we supported the proposal of the Vietnamese Workers Party that public attacks should ccase. Third, that where needed, certain fraternal parties should hold bilateral or multilateral talks to exchange opinions. Fourth, that we sincerely hoped that the Soviet comrades and the Albanian comrades would both take positive steps to remove their differences and restore normal relations between the two parties and the two countries. In this connection, it seemed necessary for the Soviet comrades to take the initiative. Fifth, that according to the decision of the meeting of the fraternal parties in 1957, the CPSU was responsible for convening meetings of representatives of the Communist and workers parties, after consultation with the fraternal parties. At present, we still hold that the foregoing points are important for the success of a meeting of the fraternal parties. We are very glad that in its recent letter the Central Committee of the CPSU has also advanced valuable proposals for making the meeting of the fraternal parties successful. We agree with your view that "it is especially important to take concrete and practical steps without delay to ensure our unity and improve the atmosphere in the interrelationships of all the fraternal parties." In order to create a favorable atmosphere for convening a meeting of the fraternal parties, we have decided that, apart from the articles which we have already published as replies, we shall from now on temporarily suspend public replies in our newspapers and periodicals to the public attacks which were directed by name against the Chinese Communist Party by com-

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rades of the CPSU and other fraternal parties. It goes without saying that, basing ourselves on the principle of equality and reciprocity between fraternal parties, we reserve the right to make public replies to all the statements of fraternal parties which publicly attacked the Chinese Communist Party by name. On the suspension of public polemics, it is also necessary that our two parties and the fraternal parties concerned should have some discussion and reach an agreement that is fair and acceptable to all. We welcome the proposal in your letter that talks be held between the Chinese and Soviet parties. We hold that such talks constitute a necessary preparatory step for the convening of a meeting of representatives of the Communist and workers parties of all countries. In his conversation with Comrade Chervonenko [on February 28], Comrade Mao Tse-tung expressed the hope that Comrade Khrushchev, while making his visit to Cambodia, would stop over in Peking for talks between our two parties and for an exchange of views. If this is not convenient for you, the Central Committee of the CPSU can send a delegation to Peking headed by another responsible comrade, or we can send a delegation to Moscow. We agree with your view that "during the negotiations all important questions in which both parties are interested, and especially those concerning the common tasks of our struggle, can be discussed point by point." We hold that the questions that need to be discussed in the talks between the Chinese and Soviet parties are also the questions that need to be discussed at the meeting of representatives of the Communist and workers parties of all countries, and that they are, in the first place, the following: the question of the strategy and tactics of revolution in the contemporary world; the question of opposing imperialism and defending world peace; the question of the liberation struggle of the oppressed nations and people; the question of strengthening the unity of the international Communist movement; and other questions of common interest. All these questions ought to be discussed in a comradely way, point by point, to the full and in detail, in accordance with the fundamental

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teachings of Marxism-Leninism and with the revolutionary principles set forth in the Moscow Declaration and Statement; and the consultation ought not to be a mere formality but should be conducted on a footing of real equality. Whatever is agreed upon by both sides can be settled at once and an agreement can be concluded. Existing differences that cannot be settled immediately may be laid aside, pending later settlement. We propose that if we cannot finish our discussions in one session, several should be held, or that our parties should hold further bilateral talks. It is the common desire of the people of China and the Soviet Union, of all the people in the socialist camp, of the Communists of all countries, and of all the oppressed nations the world over to strengthen the unity of the socialist camp, and especially to strengthen the unity between our two parties and countries. We are conscious of the responsibility that falls on our two parties; we must not disappoint these expectations. Let us unite on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, on the basis of proletarian internationalism, and on the basis of the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement! In a letter to the CPC Central Committee, dated March 30, 1963, the CC of the CPSU replied to the Chinese proposals by indicating that N. S. Khrushchev was planning no trip to Cambodia. Instead the CPSU invited Mao Tse-tung to come to Moscow about May 15 for negotiations. These would meet one Soviet precondition for a new international conference of Communist parties; the other two were "an end to open polemics in the press" among Communist parties, and an end to "criticism of other fraternal parties within our own parties." Arguing that the Albanian and Yugoslav questions, "although fundamental, cannot and must not overshadow the main problems of the day," the CPSU letter restated at some length "several questions of principle which we believe to be at the center of attention of the fraternal parties." (For translation of this document from Pravda, April 3, 1963, see The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XV, 14 [May 1, 1963].) On May 9, Chou En-lai Peking, Stepan Chervonenko, named Teng Hsiao-p'ing, its member of the Politburo and

informed the Soviet ambassador to that the CPC Central Committee had General Secretary, and P'eng Chen, of the Secretariat, to head the delega-

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tion to Moscow for talks between the two parties, for which Peking suggested mid-June as a suitable time. On May 11, the CPSU gave its agreement but asked that, in view of prior scheduling of other activities in June, the meetings begin on July 5. On May 14, Peking informed the Soviet envoy of its consent. On its part, Moscow named Mikhail Suslov to head the delegation which would deal with the Chinese; its other members included Yuri Andropov, Leonid Ilyichev, Boris Ponomarev, and Stepan Chervonenko. (See Pravda, May 16, 1963, and Peking Review, No. 20, May 17, 1963.) All Communist parties hailed the CPSU-CPC agreement to hold conversations. Yet almost all had failed to change their own positions on the major issues in dispute. Except for Albania, the East European parties remained formally committed on the side of the CPSU (whatever the differences among them). So were the small and the "illegal" Western parties (such as the Spanish, Portuguese, West German, Luxembourg, Israeli, and Greek). The Italian Communist Party—itself twice the object of vigorous verbal attacks from Peking—responded in a point-by-point rebuttal (Rinascita, January 12, 1963). Its reply to the "ultra-leftists," its electoral victory in April, 1963, and its willingness to differ openly with the CPSU (for instance, on the propriety of controls over arts and letters) all contributed to a sense of considerable strength in the PCI. The weaker Belgian party leadership, whose majority considered itself close to the PCI, succeeded in having the vocal "proChinese" group around Jacques Grippa (Brussels Federation) expelled from the PCB at its Antwerp Congress (April 13-15, 1963). The French party had loyally followed the Soviet line and thereby invited a vigorous assault by the CPC. The Central Committee meeting at Malakoff (December 13-14, 1962) sanctioned the release of additional details and documentation on the nature of disagreements among Communists and the previous role of the PCF in the dispute. The CPGB managed to conceal its internal difficulties. Over some opposition, it endorsed the Soviet policy in the Cuban crisis (National Executive Committee statement of January 12, 1963), and at its XXVIII Congress reaffirmed the general line of "peaceful coexistence" with its customary implications. (London Daily Worker, April 15, 1963.) The Mongolian party continued to be fully in the Soviet fold, as its leadership made unmistakably clear (e.g., Tsedenbal's speech in Peking on December 25, 1962). On the other hand, the North Korean movement inched further into the "Chinese" camp. After the crisis of October, 1962, Kim II-sung and others expressed openly

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their sympathies for Peking and Havana (e.g., editorial in Nodonx Sinmun, January 30, 1963). While the Vietnamese Communists sought to perform a mediating function, several pronouncements (such as the V W P Politburo Statement of February 10, 1963) indicated a growing commitment to the "Chinese" orientation. The Indonesian Communists likewise sought to avoid an open break with the CPSU; but, like the Japanese and Vietnamese, in the winter of 1962-63 they became more explicit in stating their sympathies. In the Sino-Indian conflict, the P K I C C heard an important statement by Aidit, which included a vigorous condemnation of all "modern revisionists . . . whereever and in whatever form they appear." Aidit's advice—presumably, to Moscow—was, "However bad a Communist or a Communist party may be, it is still better than a bourgeois or a bourgeois party as long as it opposes imperialism." The Japanese party produced an analogous resolution of its Central Committee, "Communist and Workers Parties of the World, Firmly Unite!" (February 15, 1963), but it went on to admonish its followers that " J C P members must guard their tongues." T h e Indian Communist Party suffered considerable losses in the intervening period. After Ajoy Ghosh's death (January, 1962), a new and moderate leadership had negotiated several compromises between the feuding factions within the CPI. At the Hyderabad meeting of the CPI National Council (August, 1962), the XXII C P S U Congress was finally hailed and the A P L leadership condemned. But the Chinese incursion promptly created a crisis within the C P I . On November 1, the majority of the leadership, under S. A. Dange, gave full support to the government and the country's defense efforts. Meanwhile hundreds of "leftists" were arrested and the pro-Chinese CPI organizations (e.g., in West Bengal and Punjab) destroyed. While, with the resignation of E. M. S. Namboodiripad, the leadership of the CPI seemed to be solidly in the hands of moderates, considerable uneasiness within the party remained, and defections from its ranks continued. While after the XXII CPSU Congress the Australian Communists snapped back from their "Chinese" position, the leadership of the New Zealand Communists remained wedded to it. Formally the Latin American parties were all with Moscow; in fact, at the S E D congress, in January, 1963, a single guest (Orlando Millas, of the Chilean C P ) spoke "on behalf of 17 Latin American fraternal parties." Such solidarity was perhaps somewhat misleading, as activist elements in these parties were attracted by the Cuban and Chinese experiences. The Sino-Soviet competition thus enhanced the significance of the realignment of Fidel Castro's state and party with the USSR and CPSU (May 25, 1963).

APPENDIX One by-product of the exchanges a m o n g C o m m u n i s t parties in 1 9 6 1 - 6 3 was the revelation of information about earlier developments, including the Moscow C o n f e r e n c e of Representatives of Eightv-one C o m m u n i s t and W o r k e r s Parties in N o v e m b e r , 1960. Of the successive rounds of tension felt within the international C o m m u n i s t movement, the phase beginning in April, 1960, was o n e of unusual recrimination and bitterness. At the Bucharest Congress of the R u m a n i a n Party in J u n e , this new phase p r o d u c e d — b e h i n d closed d o o r s — a m a j o r c o n f r o n t a t i o n between the C P S U leadership and those w h o m K h r u s h c h e v labeled "sectarians" and "dogmatists." A m o n g the decisions adopted in Bucharest was the a p p o i n t m e n t of a twenty-six party d r a f t i n g commission, chaired by Mikhail Suslov of the C P S U . This b o d y proceeded to d r a f t the Statement submitted to the eighty-one party Conference, which convened on N o v e m b e r 10 a n d remained in session until D e c e m b e r 2, 1960. In addition to Belgian and Chinese documents, cited earlier, the materials released by the P C I and the P C F at a later date are of substantial importance for an understanding of the unfolding crisis. 1 As the following selections indicate, the C o n f e r e n c e heard protracted arguments over a wide range of issues. T h e d r a f t Statement submitted by the commission was subjected to numerous a m e n d ments. With N . S. K h r u s h c h e v as the m a j o r spokesman for the C P S U , a n d T e n g Hsiao-p'ing as leader of the Chinese delegation, the conflicting positions of the t w o wings of the m o v e m e n t were placed in s h a r p relief b e f o r e the gathering. T h e Italian materials reproduced below are taken f r o m a booklet nominally destined f o r P C I m e m b e r s only, printed in J a n u a r y , 1962. T h e speech by Luigi L o n g o was reprinted in translation in Polityka ( W a r s a w ) o n F e b r u a r y 17, 1962. T h e F r e n c h materials are taken f r o m an analogous b r o c h u r e labeled "Internal d o c u m e n t s reserved f o r militants of the P C F . " 1

For some details on the Conference, see, for example, G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, and Roderick MacFarquhar (eds.), The SinoSoviet Dispute (New York: Praeger, 1961); Edward Crankshaw's articles in The Observer (London), February 12-19, 1961; and William E. Griffith, "The November, 1960 Moscow Meeting," The China Quarterly, No. 11 (July-September, 1962).

830

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From November 10 on, the Conference heard a number of speakers from each party comment on the draft Statement and the major amendments tabled (of which the most important were evidently the proposed reference to the relevance of Soviet experience for all other parties, moved by the Polish and Czechoslovak parties; the amendment which would have made majority decisions binding on all Communist parties, moved by the Cuban and Brazilian parties; and the various charges of "fractionalism" and deviation relating to the Chinese and Albanian parties). During the first days the Conference heard Khrushchev, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and Hoxha, among others, speak for their respective parties. Circumstantial evidence suggests that Thorez's first speech came on November 15 (Document No. 116), and Longo's on November 17 (Document No. 117). After each party's representatives had stated their views, Teng was evidently given the floor a second time. Both Thorez's (Document No. 118) and Longo's (Document No. 119) second statements followed Teng's comments on November 24, 1960.

116.

MAURICE

THOREZ.

SPEECH

AT

THE

CONFERENCE

E I G H T Y - O N E C O M M U N I S T AND W O R K E R S P A R T I E S ,

OF

MOS-

1 9 6 0 . P C F , Interventions de Maurice Thorez [et] déclaration de la délégation du Parti Communiste Français, Paris, 1961.

COW, NOVEMBER,

COMRADES! We are meeting to examine the most burning questions of the hour for the international working class and for all humanity. We have to determine the general orientation of the international Communist movement. The French Communist Party approves in its entirety the draft Statement of the editorial committee. It also approves the report presented to this Conference on behalf of the committee by Comrade Suslov. From the very beginning we want to state our deep and unreserved agreement with the high-level speech delivered here by Comrade Khrushchev on behalf of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. However, we state our absolute disagreement with the ideas put forth by Comrade Teng Hsiao-p'ing on behalf of the Chinese

Appendix

831

Communist Party. We consider them opposed to the general line defined in the November, 1957, Declaration, which was adopted by the entire international Communist movement. We regret that our Chinese comrades believed it necessary to raise the problem of their state relations with the Soviet Union at this conference, whose objective was the discussion of the political and ideological problems of the international Communist and workers movement. This procedure, which only diverts the discussion, is prejudicial to the Conference and prevents it from achieving the results which we all expect of it. On July 1, the Central Committee of our party handed the comrades of the Chinese Party a considered resolution expressing our disagreement with their political positions and disapproving certain of their methods. At the end of September, the Chinese Party comrades acknowledged receipt of our resolution, which was drafted, they said, on the basis of one-sided information. That was actually not the case; our position was founded on the study of texts collected by the Chinese comrades in their anthology, Long Live Leninism!, which was widely distributed in France as in other countries. Moreover, we also had available the information furnished our Central Committee by Comrade Frachon, Vice-President of the World Federation of Trade Unions and delegate to the present conference. He related to us the fractional activity which the Chinese Party comrades were conducting during the WFTU General Council meeting in Peking. It is true that we have since then become cognizant of the letter addressed by the Chinese comrades to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and have also heard Comrade Teng Hsiao-p'ing's speech. We are now certain that the issue is not a disagreement limited to two or three points of the Statement proposed at this Conference, but a complete line opposed to that of the international Communist movement. We also have confirmation that it is not a question of differences of opinion between the Chinese Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, but a deep disagreement

832

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of the Chinese comrades with the whole international Communist movement. . . . Is our world still the one which Lenin saw before him when he wrote his masterful book on imperialism? There was no socialist country in existence at that time. Today socialism has triumphed definitely in the USSR. The country of the Soviets, whose prosperity increases without letup, has reached a level of power without precedent; it is at the head of world development, not only from a social and political viewpoint, but from the standpoint of science and technology in both their peaceful and their military applications. . . . Today imperialism has not only ceased to be the unchallenged power, but it faces a powerful world socialist system which includes more than a billion people and extends from the Elbe to the Pacific. Together with Asian, African, and Latin American countries freed from the colonial yoke, this socialist camp forms a vast zone of peace. The positions of socialism grow increasingly solid, and those of imperialism increasingly shaky. . . Today the international workers movement, inspired by Marxism-Leninism, has grown enormously in numbers, in lucidity, in vigor. A powerful World Peace Movement unites men and women from all social strata, differing on numerous questions, but in agreement to fight against the danger of war and the oppression of peoples. Today, thanks to the struggles conducted under the banner of Leninism, we have entered the era of the breakup of imperialism, the era of the transition from capitalism to socialism, the era of the formation and reinforcement of the world socialist system. . . . To pass by without seeing the profound changes in the world, to hold on to Lenin's half-a-century-old definition and continue to consider imperialism as the determining force, is to lose the sense of reality, to lack the creative spirit of Marxism. Nor does it suffice to proclaim in words one's agreement with the proper assessment of our epoch. We must draw practical conclusions which enable us to orient correctly the policy of the Communist and workers parties and to use thoroughly all the possibilities created by the new situation.

Appendix

833

In particular, we cannot today deny the possibility of preventing imperialist war, of banishing it from the life of society, unless we seriously underestimate the changes which have come about to the advantage of the camp of peace. . . . For the first time in history, force is on the side of peace. Thus it is reasonable to give the peoples the objective of preventing war. We must uproot the nefarious idea of the inevitability of war, anchored in the mind for thousands of years and nurtured intentionally by the exploiting classes. To communicate to the masses the certainty that war can be averted is to deal a blow to its ideological and practical preparation by the imperialists. . . . We must not allow the imperialists the opportunity to accustom the peoples to a situation balanced "between war and peace;" that is, to the maintenance of the cold war, with the triggering of local conflicts, which are apt to be transformed into a world war, where the nuclear weapon would be used. The firmness of the USSR, China's attitude, the behavior of all the socialist states, and the peoples' struggle prevented the Korean war from evolving into a general conflict and, in the end, imposed an end to hostilities. The 1956 aggression against Egypt was stopped by the energetic intervention of the USSR, supported by the peaceful states. We must not forget for an instant that the countries recently liberated from colonialist oppression are among those peaceful states. The peoples of these countries keep the hatred of imperialism close to their hearts. Thus, this accounts for the peaceful foreign policy of states such as India, Indonesia, etc. It is impossible to place these states on the same plane as the imperialist countries. This would call into question the very existence of a zone of peace. The Chinese comrade raised the question of the recent border conflict between China and India. I must say openly that, although we understand and approve the reaction of the People's Republic of China to incursions of foreign armed forces on its territory, we are less well able to understand why the question of frontiers should be raised at such a time. We were alarmed by

834

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the tense situation which was created between the two great Asian states, both constituent parts of the peace camp; and we saluted, as did all the workers of France, the political wisdom of the Soviet Union on this question. . . . . T h e facts show that peaceful coexistence does not weaken the class struggle; on the contrary, it creates favorable conditions for a more intense and expanded political struggle of the masses. In our epoch, it is a higher form of class struggle, and not, as was written in the anthology of Chinese articles, "an extension of the imperialist policy" (page 2 9 ) , nor a "tactic" (page 3 3 ) for the Communists. Peaceful coexistence requires the reinforcement of the ideological battle against the imperialists and all their auxiliaries. We have battled vigorously, particularly in our country, against the liquidating concepts of a few revisionists, who maintained that peaceful coexistence was bound to result in our renouncing the socialist revolution. We have adopted completely the conclusions of the X X and X X I congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: At the cost of a continuous struggle, we can avoid war in our time. We are conscious of being faithful to Lenin's teachings when we take this position. On the one hand, Lenin did not consider war necessary to the establishment of socialism. On the other hand, he did not estimate that war must always remain inevitable, even while a certain number of capitalist states remained. . . What Lenin hoped for has happened. There have been a number of victorious revolutions and, with them, the possibility of eliminating war, even before the establishment of socialism throughout the world. The fight for general and complete disarmament and, at the same time, for partial measures to reduce armaments has come into focus. T o achieve disarmament is to eliminate the material possibilities for starting a war. T h e slogan of disarmament has a long battle tradition of

Appendix

835

the workers and democratic movement in France. Disarmament has always been socialism's ideal and is in the forefront of the deep aspirations of our people. To tell the peoples that, by their struggle, they can impose effective measures toward partial disarmament and even achieve general disarmament is not to show bourgeois pacifism or nourish an illusion; on the contrary, it means grasping an incomparable lever for the mobilization of the masses against the threat of war. On this level, the World Peace Movement, as an organized mass movement, has played a great role in the past and must continue to play it. It happens that we have been warned against an imaginary lowering of the level of party principles in the Peace Movement, and also that people have spoken ironically of the Peace Movement, of peace partisans who are recruited in the parlors, and of the tendency to welcome into the Movement elements of the petty bourgeoisie and even the bourgeoisie, etc. In this connection, we cannot help but think of the tragic error of certain comrades in 1932. We have known comrades who refused to participate in the Amsterdam Movement, because they considered that such methods of fighting against war were good for the petty bourgeoisie but that the working class should not interest itself in it. These comrades confused the mobilization of the masses against imperialism with bleating pacifism, which relies on the "good feelings" of the imperialist states. They did not see that Leninist style, as far as the defense of peace and other questions are concerned, consists precisely in addressing ourselves to the largest masses, in alerting them, in setting in motion the most diverse layers of society. This is what Lenin had in mind in his action for peace, starting with the Decree on Peace in November, 1917. . . . The Chinese comrades say that we must not propagandize the terrors of atomic war. But the imperialists themselves have taken on the task of displaying the horrors of such a war. Everyone is aware of the strength of the movement against the atomic

836

Appendix

bomb in Japan. Everyone also knows that the campaign for the Stockholm Appeal contributed mightily to preventing the Korean war from leading to general nuclear war. Atomic war would mean massive extermination. A n y tendency to underestimate the effects of a nuclear conflict is difficult to comprehend; in the event of an atomic war, what would be left, for example, in Europe, of the populations of states like Albania, Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia? What would be left of France? And how could life resume more beautifully at the exit from the atomic hell? How can socialism be presented as "the reward for sacrifices" accepted by the peoples in an atomic war? That is why our party calls the people to struggle with all its might for the banning of tests and nuclear weapons, for universal and complete disarmament, to impose on the imperialist governments the settlement of all disputes by means of negotiation. Another of the principal traits of our era is the awakening of the peoples until recently under the colonial yoke. The development of the national liberation movement, prompted by the October Revolution and the success of the socialist camp, is precipitating the disintegration of imperialism, whose domination over the major part of humanity has ended. The overthrow of the old colonial system has taken on gigantic proportions. The political face of Asia and Africa has become unrecognizable. Within only fifteen years, close to a billion and a half people, that is, half the world's population, have freed themselves. The wave of national emancipation reaches as far as Latin America, as can be seen in the heroic example of the Cuban people. . . In our time, the roads of change to socialism are and will be more and more varied. And possibilities of peaceful change will come to light more and more. The working class and its Marxist-Leninist vanguard aspire to carry out the revolution peacefully. This would correspond to the interests of the proletariat, of all the people, of the whole nation. A n d under certain circumstances that is possible.

Appendix

837

A particular case of this peaceful transition is represented by thee use of a truly democratic parliament, provided, of course, th;at there be a powerful revolutionary impulse of the masses ouitside of parliament, oriented and led by the Communist vainguard. Concerning this, each Communist party makes a decision depetnding on the concrete conditions of its country at the given mcoment. F o r us, French Communists, these ideas are not new. Immeediately after the Second World War, under conditions in whnich the movement of the masses was spreading in our countryy, where the Party and its influence were being consolidated, wee had already indicated this direction publicly. We said in an intterview on November 18, 1946, with the English newspaper, THie

Times:

"Despite rare exceptions which confirm the rule, the progress of democracy throughout the world permits us to foresee other ro?ads in the march to socialism than those travelled by the Ruissian Communists. In any case, the road is necessarily differentt for each country. We have always thought and stated that thee French people, rich in glorious tradition, would find its own ro?ad to more democracy, progress, and social justice. However, hisstory shows that there is no progress without a struggle. There is no traced route on which men may advance without effort. Thhey have always had to overcome obstacles. It is the essence of : life." We were not helped at that time; we were hardly encouraged in 1 that direction. Some did not want to understand us and treated thids opinion as a manifestation of opportunism and parliamentarrianism. At the first conference of the Information Bureau, the Yuugoslav delegates directed a would-be leftist criticism at us on thi:is subject; their attitude later on showed adequately the value of : such a claim.22 The reference is to the September, 1947, meeting at Szklarska Poreba whnich established the so-called Cominform. The Yugoslav delegation attaacked the PCF and PCI for their allegedly complacent, legalistic, and oppportunist policies. (See Eugenio Reale, Avec Jacques Duclos au banc dess accusés [Paris, 1958].)—Ed.

838

Appendix

To state that the possibility of peaceful means is always, in all cases, an extremely rare exception, because Lenin said so half a century ago in a world radically different from today, is to neglect the concrete character of scientific truth. It is to substitute citing a text laid down as dogma for the precise study of reality. Nevertheless, that is what the authors of Long Live Leninism! are doing. Three times in less than three pages it is repeated that Lenin considered the peaceful road as an "extremely rare possibility." But great care is taken not to recall that he also qualified it as "extremely precious" and requested that it be tried "even if there is only one chance in a hundred" (Sochineniia, X X V , 2 8 3 84). Moreover, Lenin himself had encountered that possibility in Russia in 1917, in the period between the February Revolution and the July Days. It follows from Lenin's stand at that time that the possibility of a peaceful development of the socialist revolution appears when there exists a superiority of overwhelming forces on the side of the working class and its allies, and the bourgeoisie is obliged to yield. If Lenin encountered such a situation for a time in 1917, there is all the more reason that we should expect its appearance, since we live forty-three years later, in a totally different world. That is precisely why the possibility of peaceful transition to socialism is not a simple propaganda slogan. . . . It is also said that the theory of peaceful paths has not yet been verified by experience. Why does that mean that this theory is false? It is characteristic of vanguard theory to outdistance action, to light the roads where action will take place. To begin with, when Lenin formulated his thesis on the possibility of victory for the socialist revolution in a single country, where was the practical verification of this theory? It was lacking. Nevertheless the theory, which was based on an accurate and attentive study of reality and of the imperialist situation, was absolutely correct and irreproachable. . . The unity of our movement would be inconceivable without

Appendix

839

the recognition, in words and deeds, of the vanguard role played by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This role is due not only to historical reasons—the fact that this party led the first victorious socialist revolution and opened the first breach in the imperialist front. This role is due also to the present situation—to the fact that the USSR builds a communist society and thus puts itself at the head of social development. The existence and consolidation of the Soviet Union, led by Lenin's Party, were decisive in the victories of the socialist camp. They were the determining factors in the great progress of the Communist labor movement in the capitalist countries. This was well noted during and after the Second World War; the victory of the Soviet Union over fascism was the determining factor in the national and social liberation of a number of peoples in Europe and Asia. We reject any position which might tend to weaken the unity of the socialist system and the international Communist movement by considering that they might have several centers. Our party has fought this erroneous viewpoint already. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the most experienced party from every point of view. Its X X and X X I congresses reflected the experience of the whole international labor movement; they drew the general conclusions. That is why the teachings of these congresses concern all the parties. And that must be emphasized in the Statement. From this viewpoint we support completely the amendment proposed by the Polish comrades. And we are surprised that the Chinese comrades no longer accept in 1960 what they acknowledged three years ago. The 1957 Declaration states in fact, "The historic decisions of the X X Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union are not only of great significance for this party and for communist construction in the USSR; they also marked the beginning of a new stage in the international Communist movement and contributed to its development on the basis of MarxismLeninism." By opposing this estimate, the Chinese comrades indicate

840

Appendix

that it is precisely the principled line elaborated by the XX Congress and confirmed by the 1957 Declaration which they reject, in order to substitute their own line. The concrete recognition of the pre-eminent role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union seems to us preferable to the formula according to which the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is "at the head" of the international Communist movement. We approved the position adopted on this subject by the X X I Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and we approve what Comrade Khrushchev has said about it here. The formula rejected by Comrade Khrushchev is unnecessary to characterize the particular role which the Communist Party of the Soviet Union plays in our movement. It may be prejudicial to the extent that it furnishes a pretext for calumnious bourgeois propaganda against the parties. On the other hand, we observe that, under the cover of such a formula, attempts are being made to injure the prestige of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the authority of its leadership, in particular that of Comrade Khrushchev. Such procedures cannot be condemned enough. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union draws its inspiration from the rules of proletarian internationalism in all its activities, and particularly in its dealings with its fraternal parties. It helps with all its strength in the progress of the whole socialist camp, in the development of the labor movement and the movement of national liberation, in the consolidation of the Communist parties. All our experience confirms the exemplary character of the internationalist attitude of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The unity which we need is the voluntary but real unity of all the detachments of our movement around the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This unity is not and cannot be formal. It rests on a community of principles which experience verifies and enriches unceasingly. The 1957 Declaration recalls that "Marxism-Leninism requires that the general principles of socialist revolution and construction be applied by taking into account the concrete historical

Appendix

841

conditions of each country. . . . Lenin insisted over and over again on the necessity of applying correctly the fundamental principles of Communism in conformity with the specific characteristics of each nation, of each national state." This profoundly correct thesis has nothing to do with the curious theories defended by the Chinese comrades on the "Sinicization" of Marxism-Leninism, or even, if we stick to their own French translation, on the "adaptation" of Marxism-Leninism to China. What would be left of the universal principles of MarxismLeninism after its "Sinicization" by some, its "Frenchification" by others, or its "Russification," to revert to the Social Democrats' argument against Lenin? Each Communist party contributes to the enrichment of our theory within its-country's conditions, and not to its "adaptation," that is, in a word, to its degeneration, to its narrow limitation to a specific country. The unity of will and action is no less necessary than the unity of thought. For these reasons we approve completely the section of the draft Statement which calls for the defense of the MarxistLeninist unity of our movement and the repulse of all group or fractional activity which might undermine this unity. This principle is familiar to Communists. Its reaffirmation in the Conference document is indispensable. We approve the amendment on this point proposed by the representatives of the fraternal parties of Brazil and Cuba. It is known that the capacity for action characteristic of a Communist party derives precisely from its refusal to permit any factions whatsoever within itself. In the same fashion, there would no longer be a unitary international Communist movement if groups could form or factions crystallize. The concept according to which this movement might accept the presence within itself of a permanent and organized minority, the right of that minority to pursue an activity contrary to the line determined by the documents adopted by the majority— this concept threatens the unity of the movement. Some say that the principles of democratic centralism can no

842

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longer be invoked on a world scale because there no longer exis.s a Communist International. They forget what Marx wrote, fighting national narrow-mindedness, in the Critique of the Gotha Program: "The international action of the working classes depends in no way on the existence of the International Workingmen's Association." This fundamental truth is in no way altered by the fact that the Communist and labor movement has grown considerably stronger and that certain of its detachments govern a number of states today. On the contrary, the responsibility of the parties toward their people, toward all peoples, is thus increased, and a strengthened unity of thought and action must result from it. Apparently, the Chinese comrades are no longer in agreement with these elementary ideas. That is why they oppose the condemnation of fractional work. They confuse the right to their own opinion on the problems being discussed with the "right" to spread their erroneous ideas after the majority of parties has rejected them. We consider the convening of the Communists of the various parties present in Peking, during the General Council of the World Federation of Trade Unions, in an attempt to have them revise the policy of that organization, to have been a fractional activity. At that meeting the Chinese comrades questioned the principles of the 1957 Declaration. Among other things, they declared: To permit the belief that war can be prevented as long as capitalism exists is to deceive the working class; to speak of disarmament and intimate that it can be imposed on the imperialists is to deceive the working class and to create illusions among it; to believe that we can achieve peaceful coexistence is to revise the accepted idea of imperialism. At the meeting of Communists of the World Federation of Trade Unions, Comrade Liu Ning-I devoted a large part of his speech to the denunciation of modern revisionism in a manner which was unequivocal; it was the policy of the USSR, and particularly of Comrade Khrushchev, which he had in mind. Moreover, the Chinese comrades questioned the resolution

Appendix

843

adopted at the Rome Conference of the seventeen [European] parties last year. What is all this, if not work of a fractional nature? The militant Communists who were present raised a vigorous protest against such methods, which are not conducive to the unity of the international Communist movement. We regret that analogous observations must be made concerning the behavior of the Chinese representatives at other international organizations, such as the World Peace Movement. The fractional activity showed itself again recently at the International Congress of Democratic Jurists in Sofia. The president of the Chinese delegation met with two French delegates, one of whom was not a Communist, and held an inadmissible conversation with them. Specifically, he reproached the French Communist Party for what he called its "systematic and unconditional alignment" with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. We are accustomed to this parody of the close bonds that have always united the French Communists with the Soviet Communists. But until now, it issued only from our opponents —reactionaries and socialist leaders. This is the first time that it has been picked up by our comrades. We agree with the Editorial Committee's restatement of one of the essential tenets of the 1957 Declaration: The interests of the Communist and labor movement require that the battle be energetically pursued on two fronts, against revisionism, the principal danger, and against dogmatism and sectarianism. Our party has not let up for a single instant in its struggle against revisionism, against this manifestation of bourgeois ideology that paralyzes the revolutionary energy of the working class and calls for the upholding of capitalism. It has not ceased to denounce the theories of "national communism," developed particularly by the Yugoslavs, at the same time as it has unmasked their splitting activities. Even during the moments of its most active struggle against the revisionists, our party never lost sight of the damage which sectarianism and dogmatism could cause a broad policy of

844

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mass action. Moreover, the two deviations meet on many points, and both end in the negation of mass actions, in passivity. In our country, at a time when the mass movement against the Algerian war is rising, certain petty-bourgeois elements have yielded to impatience. Using leftist phrases, they lately claimed to have incited the peace partisans to a test of force with the Gaullist government during a prohibited demonstration. We rejected these adventurist attempts, which would have played into the hands of personal power and disorganized the alignment of the largest possible mass against its war policy. We recall that it was precisely during a period of upsurge of the revolutionary movement that Lenin deemed it necessary to warn the young Communist parties against the dangers of leftism and sectarianism, against this childhood disorder of communism. Sectarian and dogmatic tendencies can be most prejudicial to the development and action of mass organizations. These organizations have a very important role to play. To require them to adopt all the Communist party slogans is to deny their character, to narrow their possibilities of action, to hamper their growth, and seriously to underestimate the value of democratic mass organizations. Basically, it is to confuse the vanguard with the masses; to deny the guiding role of the party under the pretext of affirming it. Dear comrades, we expect a great deal of the present conference and we take the opportunity to extend to all the representatives of the parties meeting here the fraternal greetings of the French Communists. As far as we are concerned, we have a great deal of esteem and consideration for the fraternal parties, big and small, and for their leaders, even when we happen not to share all their ideas. At the same time, we think that mutual criticism can be useful and necessary, as long as it is principled and within the forms which correspond to the interests of our cause. It is only by basing ourselves on the collective experience of our movement, by respecting the principles which regulate the relations among Communist parties, and by coordinating our efforts that we shall continue to go forward.

Appendix

845

We shall have fulfilled our task at this conference if we work out together a single line of conduct on the solid basis of Marxist-Leninist principles, if we present ourselves as a united international force. To rally the working class, all the toilers, all the forces attached to liberty and peace, we must have, above all else, the international cohesion of the Communist parties. The adoption of the draft Statement will bear witness to this cohesion. It will certify that at the end of our discussions, unity exists on the understanding of the international situation and on all the fundamental questions of our movement. Thus we shall have served well the great cause of communism, the cause of peace and the progress of Humanity. 1 1 7 . LUIGI LONGO. FIRST SPEECH ON BEHALF OF THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST OF

PARTY DELEGATION TO THE

EIGHTY-ONE

COMMUNIST

AND

CONFERENCE

WORKERS PARTIES,

MOSCOW, NOVEMBER, 1960. P C I , Interventi

delta

Dele-

gazione del PCI alia Conjerenza degli 81 partiti communisti e operai (Mosca, Novembre, I960), Rome, 1962. DEAR COMRADES, the delegation of the Italian Communist Party hails the convocation of this new Conference of the representatives of the Communist and workers parties of the entire world. Let us say at the outset that we approve the draft Statement that was submitted to us for discussion, despite our conviction that it would profit by condensation and a judicious pruning of repetitions. We shall suggest some changes in its text at the proper time. We approve the Statement chiefly because it reaffirms the full validity of the statements of principle on the prime issues of our time, defined by the XX and XXI congresses of the CPSU and by the Declaration and the Appeal for Peace of the Conference of Communist and Workers Parties held in Moscow in 1957. In the second place, we approve the new Statement because, taking these positions as its point of departure, and inspired by the creative concepts of Marxism-Leninism, it sup-

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plies additional guidance on the problems that have emerged in the last three years. These are problems of great importance and moment, as was pointed out in the introductory remarks of Comrade Suslov and thoroughly demonstrated in those of Comrade Khrushchev, with which we are in complete agreement; their importance has been highlighted by the discussion in which we are now engaged. It is on the basis of this attitude that the Italian delegation completely approves of the assertion in the new Statement that "the decisions of the X X and X X I CPSU congresses have had very special meaning for the entire international workers movement and for all the socialist countries; they are a model of creative development of revolutionary theory." Our Chinese comrades ask us to suppress this passage. The Italian delegation must oppose this suggestion with an absolute "No." To strip the Statement of an explicit recognition of the international import of the decisions of the X X and X X I congresses of the CPSU would be to fall short of historical truth and to downgrade the value of the principled positions taken on that occasion. The entire political line of our party is a recognition of the validity of those political principles. Furthermore, there can be no doubt whatsoever that the CPSU, with the decisions of its last two congresses and with the practical application of those decisions, has not only given proof of a fine creative MarxistLeninist spirit; it has also supplied potent aid to all the Communist and workers parties in developing their own creative work. Specifically, it has stimulated them to shake off the shackles of inflexibility and of dogmatism. In this way, it has set them free to fight wholeheartedly against revisionism, both in the workers movement and in their own ranks. Thus, by means of the decisions of the X X and X X I congresses, the CPSU has once again not only raised and strengthened its own authority and prestige, and that of the Soviet Union and its leaders, all of which were already very great; it has also contributed to raising the authority and the prestige of its fraternal parties, particularly of those that were wise enough to

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profit by its example and its contribution to Marxism-Leninism. To get down to minute detail, let us say that we are not only particularly enthusiastic about the statements on peaceful coexistence, on the noninevitability of war, and on the possibility of peaceful transition to socialism in many capitalist countries, even under present conditions; we are also well aware of the value of the criticism of the cult of personality and of the errors of Stalin. Everybody knows that this criticism was a necessary starting point for a full restoration of the Leninist principle of democratic centralism in the inner life of the parties, and for providing a new drive, a new incentive, to socialist democracy. Any attempt, whether cloaked in an easygoing approach to the function of the leaders or in any other disguise, to retreat on these issues would be a criminal mistake. At the same time, everyone knows how the CPSU came to define these positions and to translate them into consistent political action. Hence it is impossible to fail to recognize that it was Comrade Khrushchev who was their chief architect, the most single-minded and the most determined. The steps taken by the Soviet Union in defense of peace, for peaceful coexistence, for summit meetings and disarmament, for the protection of the independence of nations threatened by imperialist aggression, and for the liberation of all the colonial peoples have had the widest and deepest possible repercussions in the hearts and souls of the people. These are the actions that have made it possible to strike a decisive blow at the entire campaign of lies and duplicity that has been mounted, particularly in the capitalist countries, by the enemies of the workers movement and the foes of socialism. Thanks to these actions, the calumny of the cold-war mongers and the reactionaries about alleged Soviet "aggression," about the Communist parties being "tools of Moscow," and about communism defined as "the enemy of freedom" has sunk even deeper into the quicksand of the ridiculous. As a consequence, the Soviet Union's fervent will for peace, and its mighty economic, technical, and scientific achievements, along with those of all the other socialist countries, have given heart, of recent years and in every land, to the Communist

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militants and their sympathizers in the great working masses, and have fired the imagination and the interest of all classes of the population in communist ideas and activities. This has opened up new vistas of action and of progress before all our parties. All this, in our opinion, adds up to a highly positive fact, one which, like our own experience, confirms the soundness and the validity of the decisions taken at the X X and X X I CPSU congresses, and of their application ever since by its leaders. This is why we are so taken aback by the statement of our Chinese comrades, who maintain that the CPSU Central Committee, on a whole range of matters of principle, has drifted away "most obviously, from the proper road of Marxism-Leninism and from the Moscow Declaration." We hold that this accusation is false and even slanderous, in that it is utterly unfounded, and in that it transcends the bounds of admissible criticism. We hold, on the contrary, that the Central Committee, and Comrade Khrushchev in particular, during all these years have shown, in working out issues of principle and in their implementing them, the clearest possible evidence of their loyalty to Marxism-Leninism and to the Moscow Declaration; indeed, this loyalty has been most consistently and most convincingly proven. Words fail us for proper denunciation of the Albanian delegation's attempt to cast doubt, at this conference, on the justicc of the condemnation of the personality cult and of the errors of Stalin; on the propriety of the effort made in 1955 to woo Yugoslavia back to more correct political positions, and, in any case, to improve relations between Yugoslavia and the other socialist countries; and on the accuracy of the analysis, in n o way mysterious, of the political causes of the Hungarian counterrevolution and of the events in Poland, as courageously made by the international Communist movement, particularly by the valiant comrades who now lead our fraternal parties in Poland and Hungary. This attempt by the Albanian delegate is beneath contempt, both because of the content of the political positions on which

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it is based, and because of the method employed. In connection with the method, we refer to two issues. The first is the hypocrisy with which he stated, on the one hand, that until the Bucharest Conference in May [June] of 1960, there was perfect agreement between the Soviet Communist Party and the Albanian Party of Labor. No sooner does he say this than he turns about and clearly proves that there was no such agreement on a whole series of essential issues from 1956 on. If such hypocritical doubletalk methods can take firm root within our own movement, then whither, comrades, are we drifting? In the second place, we refer to the duplicity with which he tried to twist the ideological and political disagreement that obviously exists between the Albanian Party of Labor and the great majority of the Communist and workers parties into a personal attack on Comrade Khrushchev and on the leaders of the Soviet Party and government. This procedure is dishonest, but it is also childish. We would warn our Albanian comrades against such illusions. Insofar as we are concerned, we should like to say to our Albanian comrades that all the Italian Communists, and millions of Italian workers whom our party leads and influences, not only agree with the positions Comrade Khrushchev has taken during recent years, as well as with those of the leaders of the Soviet Party and government, but feel for Comrade Khrushchev a deep, sincere affection that is anything but formal. A shock now and then does us good; this is how we feel about the shock that Comrade Khrushchev, as head of the Central Committee of the CPSU, has provided for Communist thinking and activity. We must all strive to grasp the enormous good Comrade Khrushchev has done to the cause of socialism, and to be grateful to him for it. Italian Communists and workers would consider it a very great misfortune and a serious threat to the unity of the international Communist movement if even a suspicion were to be born that the positions elaborated by the international Communist movement, beginning with the X X Congress, were in any slightest detail to be called into question by the movement itself.

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It should also be obvious that we cannot disguise the ideological and political dissension of which we speak as a dispute involving nothing but relations among certain socialist countries. We don't want to intervene directly in interstate relations, but we cannot refrain from pointing out that certain insulting insinuations made by the Albanian delegate in connection with the policies of the Soviet government struck our ear as an insult to the entire assembly. The action of the Albanian delegate appears to us all the more offensive the more it is masked behind oily assurances of friendship and fraternity, with epithets and turns of expression that one can conceive of addressing only to a class enemy. . . . We hope, finally, that our disagreement with our Albanian comrades does not also involve the concept of socialist legality and democracy, in connection with which we have heard remarks from the Albanian delegate that left us worried indeed. To go back to our disagreement with our Chinese comrades, we should like to state that it turns on issues that have already been thrashed out at considerable length, whose solutions have been accepted by all the parties, and have provided the inspiration for basic undertakings in the Soviet Union, orienting the activities of the entire workers and Communist movement. Thus the attack and the criticism made by the Chinese comrades on the Central Committee of the CPSU and on Comrade Khrushchev himself undermine the value and the scope of the policy implemented, in recent years, by all the parties; that policy was based on the decisions taken at the XX and XXI congresses of the CPSU, and on the documents of the 1957 Moscow Conference. Those decisions must be defended, if we are to protect the results we have already achieved with them and to go on to new ones. The creative spirit of each party must be stimulated, not reined in. On the basis of Marxism-Leninism, and within the framework of the decisions of the 1957 Moscow Conference, and of those that will be made at this Conference, every party should, we feel, try to cling ever more closely to the real conditions and potentials in every situation, and to find, in every situation and circumstance, the ways and means and reliable

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support for furthering the workers and Communist movement. The facts have shown that peaceful coexistence does not lead to any letup in the fight against imperialism on the international level, nor to a slackening in the class struggle within each country. One need only think back over the events of this last year to be convinced of this. . . . The great issue at stake in this Conference is whether, under present conditions, and given the enormous power of destruction, even of extermination, of thermonuclear weapons, war can or cannot be avoided. The Moscow Declaration of 1957 and the Peace Manifesto both prove, scientifically, on the basis of a Marxist analysis of our time, that war today can be avoided. We say that war can be avoided; we do not say that it is impossible or that imperialism can do nothing that would cause a war. When we say that war can be avoided, we are not counting on the good intentions of the imperialists, nor on our chances of converting them with our honeyed discourse. The imperialists will go right on being what they have always been: ready for aggression, for destruction, for plunder. The new element in the situation is this: The imperialists can no longer do what they once could, because there are in the world today people who can bridle them, and who can draw their fangs. Therefore when we say that war can be avoided, we are well aware of the greedy and aggressive nature of imperialism; but we are also confident of the power and of the will for peace of the socialist countries, and of the power and the will for peace of the people. In a word, we are confident that the forces of peace will carry the day against those of imperialist war. But this victory can come about only in so far as the forces of peace remain vigilant, mobilized, ready to stamp out any attempt at imperialist aggression. The Soviet Union and the socialist countries have shown, and prove every day, that they are tireless guardians of peace, that they take the initiative wherever it may ward off the danger of war, that they are capable of nipping in the bud any provocation, any act that might lead to war. This vigilance, this mobilization of the people is

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what the Communist parties everywhere should strive to foster, particularly in the countries still subject to imperialism. In so far as we are concerned, we would report that the Soviet Union's policy of peaceful coexistence, and her proposals for disarmament and for a solution of pending international issues by a summit conference, have caused considerable embarrassment to the Italian groups and spokesmen most deeply committed to the cold war, and have deepened the rifts within the parties closest to the Atlantic policy and to the vendetta policies of Adenauer's Germany. It is in the mobilization of the people in defense of peace that the real importance of having a clear-cut stand on the possibility or impossibility of war, under today's conditions, becomes so important. This mobilization will be successful in so far as we reject any notion of inevitability of an imperialist war. Such an idea would quickly dampen any enthusiasm or vigor in mass action. You cannot get the masses to fight for goals that can't be won, particularly if it is you yourself who have said that they can't be won. Keep in mind, furthermore, that without clear and forceful action on our part in mobilizing the people against imperialist war, we should be leaving the field clear for imperialist propaganda, which, in order to cloak its preparations for war, will try to distract or to lull the vigilance of the masses and will seek to spread the slander that the Communists are not against war, that the Communists believe that "the worse things are, the better," because they want to use war to achieve socialism. If we fail to give the lie to such slander by taking a clear-cut stand on the fact that imperialist war is not inevitable, and by keeping up our work of organization and of struggle in defense of peace, we risk alienating the sympathy of the broad masses who aspire to peace as an ultimate good. Our Chinese comrades set down different degrees of inevitability of imperialist war: they believe that a world-wide nuclear conflict is avoidable, but that little local imperialist wars of aggression will be with us until imperialism is banished from the earth. This differentiation, however, does not stand up. Under

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present international conditions, every type of imperialist war can be avoided. If it is possible to avoid a world-wide nuclear war, it must be even easier to avoid brush-fire wars, since in both cases the deciding element is the pressure of the people and of all the forces for peace, starting with the power of the socialist countries. Furthermore, this is not even an abstract hypothesis any longer, nor does it require further proof. The facts have already proved this possibility. It is a matter of fact that the Soviet Union's forthright stand forced the imperialist aggressors to stop their aggression against Egypt and Lebanon. I don't think it necessary, in an assembly of Communists, to point out that, just as we fight against all imperialist aggression, we support every struggle and every war of national liberation. In many countries, we were the ones who mounted and led such wars against the fascist and Nazi occupying forces. We shall support any people who are doing so now or who may do so in the future. The relationship between the forces of peace and those of war has changed, but so has the nature of thermonuclear warfare compared to previous wars. If we look at it in yet another way, this still further increases our chances of avoiding war. It is known that, in a thermonuclear war, there would be no way to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants. There is practically no limit to the death-dealing power of thermonuclear bombs; they would strike every form of life—animal and vegetable—peoples, countries, and entire continents, regardless of whether or not they were involved in the war. A thermonuclear war would practically destroy the foundations of modern civilization. This destructive nature of war broadens the possibility of mobilization in defense of peace, and of attracting strata and groups who are determined not to place the life of their nation in danger, although these same strata and groups, in previous wars, were ready and willing to face up to unspeakable trials and struggles solely in order to maintain their positions as privileged characters and exploiters. We are not saying that an awareness of the futility and

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the madness of a thermonuclear war is already a fait accompli, or even that it can be grasped by every order of society. But it is a lesson that has been learned by many, and one that can be learned by all the masses of the people and by the majority of honest and sensible citizens. It is the mobilization of all these forces that can isolate, restrain, and render harmless the leaders and the others who will not face the evidence of the facts. In this way, we can create a situation in which it will be possible to force the capitalist governments to take practical measures to ease tensions and to further disarmament, and to create a situation in which, thanks to the steady strengthening of the socialist camp, the spread of the national liberation movement, the struggles of the masses of the people, and the action of the other forces interested in peace, war will become impossible in human society, even though socialism has not yet conquered everywhere. Our struggle for peace has a deeply humane character. W e understand the terrible threat that hangs over mankind. We want to ward off that menace, and to free the peoples from the fear of extermination. We want to preserve our heritage, material, cultural, and human, which is the basis of modern civilization, because we intend to use this heritage for socialism. Furthermore, the socialist revolution does not need thermonuclear bombs and ruins and endless battles to pave its way. And no toiler, no worker, would ever agree to pay such a price for socialism. What we want is to free mankind from capitalism and from imperialism with the least possible suffering for mankind. Lenin glimpsed this possibility between May and July of 1 9 1 7 ; it vanished in the violence and the brutality of the reaction. In the present situation, it becomes real once again in certain countries, thanks to the existence of the socialist system, to the changed power relationship between capitalism and socialism, to the power, experience, and potential for action of the workers and Communist movement in many countries, to the possibility of making fighting alliances with new social groups, against the ever more suffocating domination which the monopolies hold

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over the entire political, economic, social and cultural life of the countries of the imperialist camp. In this connection, it was pointed out by the X X Congress of the C P S U , and confirmed by the Moscow Declaration of Communist and Workers Parties, that it is possible in several countries to achieve a peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism, by the development of democracy, without any previpus insurrection or civil war, and without going through any new international wars. Our Chinese comrades ask us to show them what country is making progress by this means. We answer, with firm confidence, that our own PCI has long acted on this belief, which best fits the Italian situation, and that so far it has had undoubtedly significant successes. At our last two congresses, in Comrade Togliatti's remarks and the discussion that followed, we defined exactly what we mean by the democratic way, the Italian way to socialism. We mean a way of mass democratic struggle, directed at changing the balance of power in Parliament and the political leadership of the country, by changing the real relationship among political and social forces. . . . It seems to us that our experience is the best possible proof of the soundness of the line we have followed—to limit the powers of the monopolies, to thwart any attempt at authoritarian transformation of the democratic state, and to achieve the program of radical democratic reform that was adopted by the R o m e Conference of the seventeen [Communist] parties [in November, 1959]. With these struggles we have checkmated the reactionaries and pushed the democratic workers and people's movement forward into new positions that will shorten its march to socialism. This is the way the P C I sees and lives its struggle for the Italian path to socialism, which is, we repeat, a path of democratic struggle, of parliamentary struggle, of mass pressure and of clashes, even violent ones, to shatter the resistance of the conservative and reactionary forces and any attack on the rights and the will of the people, to extend and consolidate the alliance of the working class with the peasants and with other levels of the working middle class, and, within this

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alliance, to affirm the leadership function of the working class. This is the way we believe we can rally the majority of the people to our socialist program, thus creating the conditions for the working class and its allies to achieve political power; and that achievement is still the sine qua non for the socialist transformation of society. Whether we keep our struggle on this peaceful and democratic plane does not depend upon ourselves alone. It depends on the attitude of the conservatives and the reactionaries toward the advance of the workers and the people. We agree that we should always be mindful of the fact that the reactionaries, failing to stem the popular tide on the democratic level, may resort to open violence to stop it. But in our opinion this need for alertness need not lead us into a double outlook, or a double set of practical preparations. Our Chinese comrades ask us: How then do you go about building up the revolutionary forces needed to achieve the socialist revolution, and to defeat any recourse to violence on the part of the reactionaries? And we answer: We cling a little more tightly to the cause of the defense and development of all the democratic freedoms; we go all-out in organizing, mobilizing, and fostering the fighting temper of the people; every day, we add a little more strength, a little more breadth, to the fighting alliances between the working classes and the great masses of the people, thus achieving in the course of the struggle the working class's proper function of leadership. The tenor of this mobilization and of this fighting temper is the most effective of all means for discouraging the reactionaries from recourse to open violence, or, in case they should resort to it at any cost, it is the best way to ready ourselves to beat them on their own ground. In conclusion, we affirm that our experience in democratic mass struggle and in resistance to authoritarian and police efforts to bar the road to the advance of the democratic and proletarian forces, completely bears out, in our opinion, the correctness and the timeliness of the political approach of the PCI and of the principle affirmed by the XX Congress of the CPSU and the Moscow Declaration regarding the possibility of

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a peaceful and democratic transition to socialism in a number of capitalist countries. Our Chinese comrades urge us not to forget the differences between Communists and socialists, and not to generalize about the positions of specific left wings of the individual leftist parties. We are not forgetting the differences between ourselves and the Social Democrats, between ourselves and left-wing groups like the republicans and the radicals, between ourselves and our comrades in the Socialist Party. But neither d o we forget the de facto agreements, the real convergences, the identity of demands that exist between our own social and political action and real interests and aspirations of the major and most advanced part of the membership of these parties and even of some of their leaders. T o note and to point out the differences that exist between the Communist Party and other parties on the left should not lead us to overlook the possibility of influencing and of winning over to united and democratic action the rank and file of these parties and in certain cases the parties as a whole. We should point out and criticize the shortcomings, the mistakes, and even the betrayals of the leaders of these parties whenever the circumstances require it; but we must d o so bearing constantly in mind the agreement and the goals we share with the better part of the rank and file of these parties, so as to influence and win over this rank and file to united action, encouraging it, if we can, to fight within its own organization against this attitude and this orientation. . . Of course, we make no claim to hold up our own experience as a model for all to follow. The situation differs f r o m country to country, and so does the nature and makeup of the various Socialist and Social Democratic parties. We make bold to recount our experience simply in order to show our fraternal parties how the PCI, within the given Italian situation, went about furthering its policy of broad alliances, denouncing and criticizing the leaders and the parties that oppose united popular action, but trying at the same time to establish contact and

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collaboration with the members and leaders of every party, including even the Catholic organizations and the Christian Democrats, who are ready to work with us, albeit on limited grounds and for specific objectives. Thanks to this policy, which we believe to be quite free of any dogmatism and any sectarianism, we have without too much difficulty managed to combat revisionism within our own ranks, discredit it, isolate it among the ranks of the democratic workers movement. Our experience proves to us that you cannot fight revisionism except on the basis of a sound political line, built on the solid foundations of Marxism-Leninism, and inspired by the principles formulated in the Declaration of the Communist and Workers Parties in 1957. This Conference of ours was called to allow a fraternal debate on the problems that have arisen since the 1957 Moscow Conference, and to clarify certain points in the documents that were approved at that time, but on which differences have since emerged. The purpose of our debate, therefore, is together to identify the aspects and the scope of new elements in the situation, in order to get over any differences in interpretation, and to work out common stands which will serve as guides for the orientation and action of our parties. In this connection, we hereby state our complete agreement with the text of the new Statement, where it reminds us that the interests of the Communist movement require the constant and united application, by all Communist parties, of the decisions taken collectively by the fraternal parties at their conferences. Furthermore, for the maintenance of good relations among Communist parties, and in order that the authority and autonomy of each of them be respected, every party must refrain, and order its members to refrain, from all fractional activity among the rank and file and within the bodies of the other parties. All exchange of information and all critical observations between party and party must be channeled through the responsible organs in each of them. All the Communist parties are independent, with equal rights, and are responsible for working out their own policies in relation to actual conditions in their respective countries. We recog-

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nize the gigantic merit of the CPSU, the great value of its decisions in the orientation of the Communist movement throughout the world. But we agree with Comrade Khrushchev when he asks us, in the name of the CPSU, to avoid any expression that might lead to the notion of leading parties and led parties. It was recognized at the X X I CPSU Congress that the situations in individual countries are now so varied, and that the tasks required differ so widely from case to case, that there can be no single world directorate of the whole Communist movement. Furthermore, the Communist parties are full-grown now and quite capable of handling their own affairs. Hence any formulation that might imply subordination of some Communist parties to others is incorrect and therefore useless, as Comrade Khrushchev observed. It would simply make trouble for the Communist parties, and make the CPSU responsible for the political line of each individual party, whereas the only people who can properly take the responsibility are the party's own leadership. For the same reason, the Italian delegation feels that it would be unwise to adopt the suggestion made by several delegations and establish, at the conclusion of our conference, a secretariat or any other permanent body of this kind. In our opinion, such a body could render no practical service to the Communist parties. We feel that for the exchange of experience and coordination of Communist party activities all that is needed is an occasional exchange of information and of delegations, the convocation of special conferences of several or all the parties, to work out special issues of political orientation, as was done at the Moscow Conference of 1957, the Rome Conference of seventeen parties, the Bucharest Conference, and the Conference at which we are present now. The Chinese comrades, and Comrade Teng Hsiao-p'ing in his remarks in connection with the points of divergence, raised the point that history will tell who was right. I trust that our Chinese comrades will allow me to differ. Communist parties exist not to record the verdicts of history but to make history.

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And they want to make history on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, assisting one another and moving together, under the conditions peculiar to each country, toward our common goal, which is communism. This Conference was summoned in order to arrive, through fraternal discussion, at a joint elaboration of the basic concepts that should provide the practical inspiration for the action of each party, and not to wait for history to judge which party is right and which is wrong. This is a luxury we cannot afford, because, among other reasons, history will not wait while we make up our minds. History moves continuously ahead, always raising new problems to solve, new goals to reach. In order to intervene effectively, in order to influence and determine the course of history, the Communist movement must be united. Out of this Conference must emerge unity of our ranks and unity of action. There should be no question of formal unity but rather effective and substantial unity. Our Chinese comrades will allow me to say to them that I failed to note, in their remarks or in their proposals, any real desire to arrive at such unity. You do not work for unity when you lodge against the CPSU, its leaders and Comrade Khrushchev—who shoulder such a heavy weight of responsibility in the international workers movement and in the leadership of the socialist camp—such serious accusations as did the Chinese delegation, or couched in such a form. You are not working for unity when you claim the right to maintain and propagate, even after the Conference, all your own views, which will not be embodied in the closing Statement, and you call upon history for the final judgment. None of us has any right to consider himself the sole repository, by his own decision, of MarxistLeninist truth. The creative nature of Marxism-Leninism demands a continuous elaboration of all experience of the workers and Communist movement, and the active participation of all parties in that elaboration. It is conferences like this, it is the decisions we shall reach at the conclusion of our work here, that should represent for all of us the Marxist-Leninist basis of our own orientation, the unfailing guide for our own actions.

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The PCI has the greatest esteem and admiration for the Chinese people, for the Chinese Communist Party, its leadership, and the great achievements it has made. It is therefore in the most fraternal spirit that, in the name of the Italian Communists, I make bold to conclude my remarks with an appeal to our Chinese comrades to stop and think, to consider all the consequences their attitude may have on the international workers and Communist movement. Theirs also is the responsibility for the fact that in this very assembly, their own portentous words were followed by others like those of the Albanian delegate, which ( a n d not by mere chance) one of the most respected leaders of revolutionary mass struggles, Comrade Passionaria, has had to characterize as provocative and unfit to be uttered by a proletarian militant. I hope that our Chinese comrades will give careful thought to what has been said here by almost all the Communist and workers parties, and will sincerely accept and apply the conclusions at which we arrive at the end of this Conference. Those conclusions will be the guide and the axis for the immediate future for the world-wide Communist movement.

118.

M A U R I C E T H O R E Z . D E C L A R A T I O N AT THE C O N F E R E N C E O F E I G H T Y - O N E C O M M U N I S T AND W O R K E R S P A R T I E S ,

MOS-

COW, NOVEMBER, 1960. PCF, Interventions de Maurice Thorez [et] déclaration de la délégation du Parti Communiste Français, Paris, 1961. HAVING heard the representative of the Communist Party of China, Comrade Teng Hsiao-p'ing, the delegation of the Communist Party of France would like to address itself particularly to our Chinese comrades. In his speech, Comrade Teng Hsiao-p'ing has, on several crucial problems submitted to the Conference, maintained ideological and political positions considered erroneous by almost all the parties here represented. H e has rejected in an absolute and haughty manner all criticism directed at the Communist Party of China: either those

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critics have "misunderstood" the Chinese comrades, or else their own parties have allegedly strayed from the sound line laid down in the Declaration of 1957. The two addresses of the Chinese delegation have in no wise contributed to the hoped-for result of our Conference: the adoption of a declaration on the character of our epoch and the consequent tasks faced by the international Communist and workers movement. Those addresses were not what was expected by the delegations of the fraternal parties. Up to now the delegation of the Communist Party of China has turned a deaf ear to the fraternal appeals launched from this rostrum in an effort to save the unity and cohesion of the international Communist and workers movement. An abnormal situation, fraught with dangers, has thus been created. Should this situation continue, it could result in considerable damage to the world revolutionary movement. Imperialism, though weakened, would doubtless seek to exploit it. Think again, comrades of the Communist Party of China! Surely you cannot entirely ignore the opinion of the overwhelming majority of parties represented at the Conference. Surely you cannot persist in an attitude so prejudicial to our common cause. We are profoundly convinced that the draft Statement charts the right course for our movement. All our parties voice the ardent wish that it be adopted unanimously, and that it should thus become the common charter and battle flag of the whole international Communist movement. We ask you to communicate to the Central Committee of your party this pressing appeal which we make to you. The delegation of the Communist Party of France insists that no effort be spared in order that the deliberations of our Conference may come to a close in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism. This is the burden of our declaration.

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L U I G I L O N G O . SECOND S P E E C H ON B E H A L F O F THE I T A L IAN C O M M U N I S T

PARTY D E L E G A T I O N

TO THE

CONFER-

ENCE OF E I G H T Y - O N E C O M M U N I S T AND W O R K E R S P A R T I E S ,

MOSCOW, NOVEMBER, 1960. PCI, Interventi della Delegazione del PCI alia Conjerenza degli 81 partiti communisti e operai (Mosca, Novembre, 1960), Rome, 1962. MY DEAR COMRADES, we asked for the floor merely to make a few remarks on the second speech of Comrade Teng Hsiao-p'ing. We wish first of all to state that we absolutely cannot agree with the interpretation the Chinese comrades would put upon the discussion that has engaged the international Communist movement of recent months. According to our Chinese comrades, almost all the C o m m u nist parties, under the influence of the CPSU, have strayed from the spirit and the substance of the 1957 Moscow Declaration, and have surrendered, on a whole number of major issues, to revisionist and opportunist views. According to them, it is only the Chinese Communist Party that would have corrected this trend, and therefore its actions here are useful and necessary. We flatly reject this statement as contrary to fact. The real state of affairs is altogether different. It was the Chinese comrades, with their articles and their positions, which they have developed within international organizations, who again brought under discussion the Moscow Declaration, the great ideological and political victories that have been achieved on that basis by the individual parties and by the international Communist movement as a whole. The Chinese comrades have, by their actions, sown the seeds of doubt, uncertainty, and confusion within the international Communist and workers movement, and have made the tasks of many parties far more difficult by creating the impression that the Communist movement wanted to turn back towards old and outworn dogmatic and sectarian positions. We therefore reject the interpretation suggested by the Chinese comrades of the position taken at this Conference by almost all the Communist and workers parties—a position reflected in the draft statement.

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We regret that the Chinese comrades, in their second intervention, showed no signs of wishing to take account of the arguments and the exigencies set forth by the spokesmen of the various fraternal parties. This is the attitude that gives us the greatest concern for the political unity and the unity of action of the Communist movement. We believe that discussions are legitimate insofar as the stipulation of the forms in which unity within the movement and respect for decisions jointly reached are concerned. But precisely as a consequence of the attitude taken by our Chinese comrades, we feel it more than ever necessary that our Conference confirm forcefully, in its concluding resolutions, the inadmissibility of any party's opposing the general line agreed upon in this Conference or in any other international conference. In conclusion, we maintain that it is still necessary to extend once again an appeal to our Chinese comrades expressing the hope that their delegation and the Central Committee of their party will reflect on the consequences that their stand may have for the international Communist movement, and take due account of the arguments, positions, and needs of all their fraternal Communist and workers parties. 120.

LETTER

FROM

THE

PCI

DELEGATION

SHCHEV AND TO THE C P S U FERENCE

OF

EIGHTY-ONE

TO N .

DELEGATION COMMUNIST

S.

T O THE AND

KHRUCON-

WORKERS

1960. P C I , Interventi deila Delegazione del PCI alia Conferenza degli 81 partiti communisti e operai (Mosca, Novembre, 1960), Rome, 1962. PARTIES, NOVEMBER,

We should have liked to tell you again in person about some of our concerns over certain problems discussed at the Conference of Communist and workers parties. In view of the need to inform you of our concern before the end of the work of the drafting committee, and in view of the difficulty because of your other engagements of obtaining an interview with you immediately, we take this opportunity of DEAR COMRADES:

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expressing our views to you in writing, directly, and in confidence. We would like first of all to tell you once again, as we said when we took the floor at the Conference, that we are in complete agreement with your party in the defense of the correct positions on principle and policies which were accepted by some parties but unfortunately rejected by others in completely unjustifiable tones. We feel that the draft Statement submitted to the Conference, although a bit too prolix, substantially reflects these correct positions. However, in our opinion, it is a step backward on certain issues by comparison with the precision and the clarity of the 1957 Moscow Declaration, and with the draft you presented at the September meeting. Beyond any doubt, this is a result of the need to find formulations acceptable to all. We understand that this was perhaps inevitable, in view of the situation that has arisen; and yet we cannot conceal from you the fact that our party in particular would find itself in serious trouble in carrying out its overall action if a proper solution were not provided for at least some of the problems covered in the Statement. The first of these, and the most important for us, is the problem of the XX Congress. We feel that it would do serious harm to the entire Communist movement, and would constitute a deadly blow to our party, if there should be no explicit declaration in the Statement in favor of the meaning and the permanent validity of its [the X X Congress's] decisions. Therefore we believe that the Communist and workers parties cannot be allowed to be the object of any compromise or any retreat on this point. Further, we place particular importance on the passage in the statement dealing with Yugoslav revisionism. On this point we have prepared an amendment, which we attach. In it you will find, as is only correct, a harsh condemnation of the ideological and political positions and of the practical activities of the Yugoslav leaders. In this, our amendment does not stray from the substance of the concepts expressed in the draft Statement. However, it is couched in less bitter and offensive terms, so as

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not to provoke any irremediable break with Yugoslav public opinion, which we know by experience is very sensitive to anything that can be used by the Yugoslav leaders to twist and distort criticism of themselves into an insult to the national feelings of the people. Our amendment also tries to reduce to more accurate proportions the influence of Yugoslav revisionism today within the international Communist movement. Lastly, our amendment completely eliminates the view, which we feel altogether erroneous, that one of the basic tasks of the Communist and workers parties is to "isolate Yugoslavia from the workers movement." This, in our view, is a mistake, first of all because it contains an implicit condemnation of the action taken in 1955 by the CPSU in agreement with all the Communist parties, in connection with the Yugoslav Communist League. In the second place, it is a mistake because practically it could tend to hamper present contacts, which often prove fruitful, between the Yugoslav unions, organizations for peace, et cetera, and those in many socialist and nonsocialist countries. We cannot take a position towards the Yugoslav Communist League that conflicts so radically with our attitude toward the Social Democrats in general, the left-wing socialist parties, the labor and working-class organizations of many countries, and even many of their leaders. We should like here to point out a fact that often escapes some comrades who do not work in capitalist countries. The tone in which we speak of our quarrel with the Yugoslav Communist League is one of the units of measurement by which the Social Democratic parties and unions, and public opinion in general, evaluate the sincerity of our unity policies, and our capacity for collaboration with groups ideologically and politically foreign to us. Lastly, we should like to express our approval of your happy solution, acceptable to all, of the question of the unity of the international workers and Communist movement. We agree wholeheartedly that the Statement should exclude any possibility of fractional subversion by one party toward its fraternal parties, or within the international organizations. But we feel

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that it would be more helpful, at the point to which the discussion has carried us, to express this need in positive terms, stating that the essential criteria to which the Communist and workers parties must refer should be reflected in their mutual relations. This is what we attempted to do in the first part of our amendment, which we have not yet submitted, and whose text we attach herewith for your opinion. T h e standards set forth in it exclude, in word and in fact, any possibility of fractional subversion between parties. Should this part of our amendment be adopted, it would be superfluous to retain the reference to the "inadmissibility of fractionalism" in the draft Statement. W e are certain that you will understand the motives and the spirit that inspired this letter. With fraternal greetings, Luigi Longo ( O n behalf of the Italian Communist

Party

delegation)