Directions in Thai Foreign Policy 9789814377430

Table of contents :
CONTENTS
1. Nature of the Existing Pro blems
2. A Backgroung to Recent Trends in Thai Foreign Policy
3. Bilateral Relations
4. Internal Exigencies as Determinants of Thai Foreign Policy
5. Conclusion
6. Postscript
APPENDIX I
APPENDIX II
THE AUTHOR

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Directions in Thai Foreign Policy

by

Sarasin Viraphol

Occ asional Paper No. 40 Institute of Southeast Asi an Studies Price:

S $7. 00

Dr. Sarasin Viraphol's "Directions in Thai Fore i gn Policy" is the fortieth publication in the Institute's Occasional Palhrs seri es. This series was inaugurated in 197o and for e most part cons ists o f discussion and other papers presented at the Institute's Occasional and In-House seminars. The past few years have seen dramatic changes i n both the domestic and internationa l fr onts in Thailand. With regard to external relations, the co untry is once again in the pro cess of re-assessing its various f o reign policy positions and options . The paper that follows attempts to look at some of the trends and likely directions in Thai foreign policy over It should prove to be of considerable the next few years . interest to not only students of Thai and Southeast Asian affairs but also those of internationa l relations in general. Perhaps more impo rtant, like in th e case o f several other papers in th i s series, it is always ou r hope that such studies wo uld stimulate further analysis of the particula~ In the meantime, while wishing problems under investigatio n. best, it is clearly the Dr. Vi raph o l and his study all underst ood that responsibili ty for facts and opinions expressed 1n the work that f o llows rests exclusively with Dr. Vi raph ol and his in t erpretations do n o t necessarily refle ct the views or policy o f the Institute or its suppo rters . 26 May 1976

Director Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

CONTENTS Page

1.

Nature of the Problems

1

2.

Background to Trends in Recent Thai Foreign Policy

8

3.

Bilateral Relations

19

Thai-Chinese Relations

19

Thai-Soviet Relations

25

Thai-U.S. Relations

29

Thai-Japanese Relations

34

Relations with the Indochina States

38

Thai -ASEAN Relations

46

Internal Exigencies as Determinants of Thai Foreign Policy

50

5.

Conclus ion

57

6.

Postscript

60

4.

Appendix I

67

Appendix II

69

1 . Nature of the Existing Problems On 19 March 1975 M.R. Kukri t P ramoj outl1ned the f oreign policy o f his newly -fo rmed coaliti on government t o the House o f Representatives:! This g overnment will pursue an i ndependen t policy tak i ng in to account nat ional i nterests which are based on econ omic and securi ty considerations. This g overnment wil l promote peaceful co- existence by befrie nding every c o untry which demonst r ates go odwill t owards Tha iland, irrespective of d ifferences in ideo l ogies o r political sys tems : rather, n o n- i nterfere n c e i n internal affai r s , jus t ice, a n d equality will be the c onside re d pri n ciples [in o rdering bilateral r elations]. In o rder to create a balance in relati o ns with the [ sic] s uperpowers , thia government will endeavour to recognize and n ormali ze t i es with the People's Republic of China , to effect a withdr awal of foreign troops from Thailand with i n a year , thro ugh friendly negotiati on s and taking into account prevailing conditions in the regi on. This government will strengthen ties with neighb o uring countries and suppo rt co- ope ration with ASEAN in every way, wh ile continuing t o seek constructive contacts with the Democ ratic Republic of Vietnam. On foreign assistance, th is government will consider obligatio ns as being vital , and will not put itself in any disadvantage ous position , as the g o vernment i n tends t o go as far as possible - and as r apidly as possible - in creating a basis f o r econ omic and military sel f rel iance.

1 Poticy Address to the Bouse of RepNsentatives , 19 J.tzrch 1975 in Thai (Bangkok: Prime Ministe r's Offi ce, 1975). On 12 January 1976 K. R. Kukrit , exe r cising his prerogati ve as Premier, dissolved the House and set the da te for the election of a new one on 4 April 19 76. Sin ce then , his government has assumed a caretaker status.

2

Despite its brevity, the above statement represents the first systematic enunciation on foreign p o licy by any Thai Government for a long time. Conta~ning a number of concrete steps to be taken, it was the clearest policy announcement i n an ~ncreasingly fluid peri o d o f Thailand's foreign relations . From the time former U.S. President R~chard Nixon issued his Guam Doctrine in 1969, Thailand's foreign policy mainstay, which hitherto had been positively identified with the American containment policy, has become increasingly anachronistic. By 1972, the Thai Foreign Ministry was officially advocating an independent p o sture vis - a-vis Washington, but it was not until the early part of 1975, when the first popularly elected civili a n g o vernment came into being, that such a stanc e was reiterated as a legitimate and succinct course of action f o r the country. The ensuing political transf o rmat~on in neighbo uring Indochina after March of the s ame year has lent credence to such an alternative: the power realignment in Indochina has contributed to multipolarity in Asia which in turn has compelled Thai foreign policy-makers to further define the various options suggested in the policy statement. Foreign policy i ·s in sum a dynamic interactio n o f exogenous a n d indigenous forces. In examining the nature of Thai foreign policy one needs to consider a wide range of factors : d e velopments in the Southeast Asian mainland, intentions of extraregional powers towards Southeast Asia in general and Thailand in particular, internal exigencies at work such as the nature of interaction between the government and various power groups - military, students, bureaucracy, and business - all of which are manoeuvring into a position capable of directly influencing the country's destiny , as Thailand con tinues with its experimentation with democracy. Southeast Asia , comprising small and relatively weak polities which among themselves share more differen c es than similarities, has long been subject to outside interferences. Subsequently, the majority of the present states in the region have previously been under foreign tutelage, a fact which has considerably hampered the development of meaningful bilateral relations among Southeast Asian countries for a long time. Thailand, the only country which managed to escape Western colonialism, has in principle subscribed to the notion of a Southeast Asia free of external meddling and an orderly pattern of bil·a teral intercourse wi th entities

3

of the region , Unfortunately, in practice, the anomaly or disparity has been glaring. Th1s problem has arisen partly because Thailand in many instances was not in control of the situati on. Thus circumstances at time . propelled .. Thailand into acting contrary to its . intention , For example, Thai hostility towards North Vietnam in the 1960s and early 1970s was a consequence of Thailand.' s being drawn into the network of big-power interplay. Nevertheless, t he Thai . pol1cy . .and action were a lso predicated on conditions within Thailand itself, as well as on the th1nking and perception of individu aL l eaders who were at the helm of government ~ Hence, the fact that the military was in control of . the country throu ghout most o f the post-1932 period explains the kind of policy to be In t he same vein, the democrat1zation adopted and pursued . of the Tha1 polity after October 1973 has a d i r ec t effect upon the new foreign policy orientation, which i s designed to reflect both . the changing realities of internationa~ politics as well as the growing popular participation in the policy formulation process. During much of the past twenty-five years, Thai foreign policy has been reactive and simplistic; it reflected bas1cally the idiosyncracies of the small ruling m1litary o l1garchy on world affairs as they affected Thai national secur1ty and survival o With the crumbling structure of Cold War confrontation and alignment now apparent, Thailand is forced to abandon old opt1ons and search for new ones . To this end, the country's foreign policy must be decidedly more. creative and forceful . Such an end may be achieved . after internal conditions, i ncluding the continuation and vi ability of the . governmen~ , are stabilized . While such conditions are contingent upon the right kind of requirements present internally, for instance , i mprovement of th e people's lot and unity among the populace, they are also subject to t he whims and desires of the external powers acting on Thailand . Taking stock o f the enunciated. foreign policy of the short-lived Kukrit Government, one is left with a mixed Specif1 cal ly, the account of successes and failures. diplomatic relations normalizing in government had succeeded with the People ' s Republic of China, thus redressing an aberration whi ch had existed for some twenty-five years . Steady progress had also been made with regard to the

4

withdrawal of American forces from the Thai so1l which by 20 March 1975 would have been completed according to the By way of the establishments previously announced plan . of diplomatic contact with the People's Republic of China, Thailand was able to resume diplomatic relations with Cambodia by November 1975 (thus being one of the first few countries to do so) . The Thai Government had also chosen to work more close ly with ASEAN in adopting common political and economic programmes, while trying to improve ne ighbour ly ties with Burma . On the surface, at least, these happenings are seen as worthy achievements, the full credit of which must undoubtedly go to the bold and innovative policy of the Kukrit Administration. On the debit side, the government had still been unable to overcome or successfully cope with the basic ques~ for The most immediate and military and economic security. menacing rival, North Vietnam, continues to hold out differences Its periodic offer of peace notw1thstanding, with Thailand. Hanoi 1s still identified by the Thai side as the main support and source of materiel for local d1ssident groups who are carrying out an armed struggle to overthrow the Bangkok Government o Concurrently, Hanoi is seen as expanding its influence to other parts of Indochina , and the seizure of power by the Pathet Lao in recent months has been interpreted as a Hanoi-inspired move (as part of the latter's overall plan to seek hegemony in Indochina) . While diplomatic triumph had allegedly been achieved with Thailand's move to recognize Peking, the move itself had also entailed a unilateral concession on Thailand ' s part to the Chinese assertion of a distinction between bilateral relations at "s tate " and "party" levels . In other words , the Thai acceptance of ~his Chinese i ns1s tence represents an acknowledgement of the Chinese right to continue giving support - ideological or otherwise - to the local insurgent movement under the Communist Party of Thailand if and when Peking so chooses.2 To many Thais, especially the military, the Thai agreement to the Chinese argument seems hardly conduc1ve to the fostering of internal political and military security .

2

The Thai side conceded to this basic Chinese scand not without realizing the implication behind it, but it was at that t ime thought that Thailand needed the Chinese ties co offset the growing Hanoi i nfluence, at a time when Peking would be most l~kely to welcome formal intercourse wi th Bangkok out of consideration for i ts own poli cy. In addition, the Thais argued thac the extent of the Chinese support is debatable anyway.

5

Finally, even though diplomatic normalization has been effected with the Khmer Rouge , many continue to live in the uncomfortable apprehension that major differences are still outstanding in Thai-Carnbodian relations , and that the Khmer Rouge are not likely to forget so easily the Thai support given to Lon Nol.3 Generally speaking, the postVietnam period represents the first time in so many years that the Thai leadership has had to come to grips with crises while relying almost entirely upon its own resources. The communization of Indochina has made Thailand become the front line separating the communist states on one side and noncommunist ones on the other. The task of trying to ward off communist influence is made harder after the country had gone through years of dependence on an outside power to confront the problem for it, making Thailand rather unprepared to deal with the threat to its national security (which is generated both from within and without) . Because of this situation, i t seemed rather impossible for the Kukrit Government to be able to avoid failure . World-wide inflation and recession since the oil crisis in 1974 have caused havoc to the Thai economy as well. Spiralling prices of basic commodities have affected the common man ' s livelihood immensely, while little effort seems to have been effectively expended to bring about a more equitable distribution of wealth which might in the final analysis alleviate the hardship of the unfortunate The Kukrit Government ' s attempts to tackle this ones. problem had been controversial; some saw in its programmes to provide free busing and medical services to the urban poor, to rechannel funds to the rural area, to guarantee the padi price, and so on, earnest intentions on the government's part to resolve the income inequity problem , while critics interpreted these moves primarily as political tools (aimed at seeking popularity for the government), or at best impractical and misguided efforts. Whatever the true motive behind such programmes, difficulties in their implementation had sprung up because of haste - and therefore lack of adequate planning and study - and the overall The economic woe the country's economy had been facing. false prosperity and development of the 1960s have been grinding t o a slow-down: Thailand ' s traditional dependence

3

The sporadic border incidents since December 1975 have served as reminders of the fragile state of rel ationship between Phnom Penh and Bangkok .

6

on the export of i ts principal . agricultural products (rice , maize, tapioca, rubber, and jute) has b een affected by unfavourable market conditi o ns abroad, while the country ' s infant industry wh ich churns o ut export commodities such as textile and other primary con sumer goods is facing a satiated overseas market and stiff competitio n. Compoundedly the se difficulties is the drastic c ur tailment of investment from abroad. Global . recession, the political fluidity in the region after the communist victories in Indochina , and equally signifi cant, the labour unres t (as a result of long years of suppression by former governments) and the ass e rtion of popular nati o n alism (spearheaded by the students) have frightened away several prospective investors and resulted in foreign firms a lready active in the field curtailing their investment programmes. While the imminence of the danger facing Thailand is sometimes exaggerated, it is understandable that from the standpoin t of a businessman there is little reason t o run risks or face uncertainties. The prevailing situation has at least one positive effect : it has compelled the Thais t o look i nward and to examine more seriously than ever the necessity o f self-reliance. In the meantime , the ac celeration of i n volvement by the Soviet Un ion and the People ' s Republic o f China i n Thailand has necessitated th e a doption o f a balancing o f inte rests policy, with a mind toward keeping the two powers at arm ' s length. (S ome have called it a policy of equidistance.) The task , h owever, is r ather difficult. While announcin g a definite interest in improving ties with Moscow, the Thai leadership f o und itself striking up a much more intimate relationship with Peking. This is perhaps due to the relative unfamiliarity with the Soviet Union, while the Chinese economic, social, and cultural influence has been comparative ly more pervasive in Thailand . In strategic terms, the geographical proximity of China may also figure importantly , not to mention perhaps the s trong apprehension the Thais entertain towards the rapid increase o f the Soviet presence in South and Southeast Asia, and specifically the material support Moscow has rendered to North Vietnam, and more recently, Laos. Con currently, pro-American sentiment persists among those leaders, military and civilian alike, who continue t o doubt the sincerity of the communists and see communism as a threat to national securi ty . Such personalities still hold sizeable influence and considerable actual power. The y.~ ar 1975 was a wate rshed in Thai foreign policy . While all · 'indications pointed to a more independent line

7

of thinking and action - with the growing availability options - old signs were still much in evidence. Even th ough the long-held stereotyped image of Thai leaders capable of performing calliSthenic feats of "bending with the winds" is often cited to indicate the basic tendency in Thai f oreign policy, such an act is becoming more difficult to perform despite .the seeming existence of more freedom and leeway. Southeast Asia cannot expect t o avoid, in the foreseeable future, the continuing power rivalry o f outside s tates in one form or another , but what is becoming a complicating factor for the Thai policy planners is the emergence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) as a most serious challenge to Thailand. The latter , standing to bear the brunt of a Vietnamese threat (be it apparent or real), needs to order its foreign policy at two levels . With the dividing line between friends and f oes i n the international arena becomi ng blurred , adopting options with the traditional "bending-withthe - wind" tactic is by no means easy. Thailand finds itself incre asingly having to fall back on its own resources through di ploma c y and otherwise - in warding off exogenous challenges threate ning the well-being of the country. This is a requirement which the country 's leaders h ave been able to ignore f or the past decades , making the task at hand seemingly more difficult. The dissolution of the House of Representatives4 (over dome stic issues) creating once again another t'.ransit.ional period in government has 1'\ardly helped the con tinuity in Thai foreign policy. While the caretaker regime of Prime Minister Kukrit played a less assertive and innovative r o le, Thailand's options in foreign relations are not act ive ly pursue d, leaving room for both external and internal elements to take advantage of the unstable Should the continuing political instability situation. l ead to chao s and disorder, and thus inviting a military cou p (by s ome fact ions among the younger staff) in the name of nationa l peace, Thai foreign po licy could suffer an irreparable setback. After the l o ss o f the American pivot, Thailand is trying t o search for a new political alt ernative which It accepts seems to be predicated upon active neutralism.

4

The House of Representatives should be the most logical body to set the general guidelines in forei gn policy .

8

the inevitability of the continuation of the presence of outside powers in Southeast Asia and attempts to utilize this reality to enhance its own interests on the one hand, but desires simultaneously to have the freedom of ordering relations with intra-Southeast Asian .countries on its own terms . The direction of Thai foreign policy in recent months have been described by some as a "post-Vietnam voZte-faae " . The seeming haste to recognize the People 's Republic of China, North Korea, and the Khmer Republic, together with the stepped-up contact with the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European countries are cited as indications. At the same time, however, it has been pointed out that the path chosen is still far from clear or adequate. The Thai Government had been accused of being insincere in improving ties with North Vietnam and Laos, and practising inconsistencies which were refle ctive of the lack of a clear or firm vision . (An oft-cited example is the seeming contradiction between the recognition of Pyongyang and the signing of a declaration with Seoul over the issue of a security alliance for Asia .) The foreign policy- makers of Thailand are certainly facing the challenge of how best to devise a coherent programme for national survival. Obviously, in the initial period, they had fallen back on the traditionally strong asset in the Thai character: the instinct for survival. But as issues become more complex, this ability alone will not suffice. Talent and a clear perception which is derived from study and research of facts are also necessary components in Thailand's quest for survival and continuing self-fulfilment.

2 . A Backgroung to Recent Trends in Thai Foreign Policy Between the 1850s and 1930s Thailand found itself totally preoccupied with finding a basis for its own survival and strengthening itself through modernization . But traditionally Thailand has been a power in its own right within the region; it had engaged in struggles with other powerful states nearby (namely Burma and Vietnam) for hegemony. In addition, territorial losses incurred from forced concessions which were demanded by outside powers figured importantly in moulding the subsequent

9

nationali sm and irredentism . These sentimen ts manifested t hemselves 1n the nation a l ist regime o f Field Marshal Pibul Songkram, and partly explained the Thai decision to identify with Japanese m1 l 1tarism which was essentially ultranat1onalistic (Notwithstanding the fact that, on the eve and anti-Western . of the Pacific War i n 1941 and at the time Thailan d was faced with the urgen cy of deciding whether to jo1n or fight the Japanese, Thailand's plea for h e lp from England and the United States to defend the country against impending Japanese attacks was unanswered - h ence imposing a severe limitation on Thai foreign policy alternatives and driving the Pibul Government into the arms of the Japanese militarists - 1t should be poin ted out that the Thais also saw 1n such an alliance a golden opportunity to take back the lost territories while sav1ng the country from a potentially devastating invas1on The partne rsh ip won Tha1lan d a shor~ -l ived from Japan.) triumph in the return of certain French and British-held l ands . In the final analysis , the exper1ence proved to be detrimental to national interest, As Japan was decisively defeated in 1945, Thailand was left to stand judgement for its role in the war. But in the moment of defeat and potential catastrophe, the country was saved by a typically Thai political manoeuvre . Through able diplomacy by a group of civilians self-styled the Free Tha1 Movemen t during the war, an option emerged which eventually permi tted the Thais to obtain the1 r salvation fr om the fias c o a nd emerge fr om the havoc of the war relatively unscathed . The victorious All ies , particularly the United States , finally accepted the Thai argument that the country , be i n g weak, small and unable to resist the 1 nvad1ng Japanese , had to find a way out for itself under the circumstances ; they were also pers uaded that the military government of Marshal Pibul could not simply have represented the will o f the major1ty of the Thai people . If Thailand surv1ved the ordeal of the war relatively well {it was even able to fend off e xcessive demands for reparations made by the British , who were not quite as forgiv1ng as the Americans about th e Thai a l liance with the Japanese), its postwar problems were rather ser1ous . Wh1le on the international front the country man aged to restore 1 ts f ormer stature as an independent and sovereign stat.e under the United Nations , d omes~1c economic instabi l ity (inflation ) doomed the brief democratic experiment and brought back the military rul e. The traditionally conservative Marshal Pibul , let off rather l1ghtly after having nearly been charged as a war criminal for his alleged complicity

10

with the Japanese, staged a comeback . The circumstances surrounding . his .reemergence, besides being due directly to the economic dislocation , were also . linked to the prevailing i nternational situation at th e time: the Soviet Union , seen as the head of the communist movement for global expansion, was spreading its power across Eastern EUrope and thought concurrently to be aiding the Chinese communists in the latter's struggle against the Nationalist regime of Chiang Kai-shek. The looming communist spectre and the decision by Washington, D. C, , to try to oppose it gave rise to the phenomenon of polarizing the various states into two blocs essentially: the communist and -the so-called free world o The military regime had been anticommunist (as evidenced by the anticommunist act in .the 1930s, also instituted by the first Pibul Administration), and it was not difficult to see which side the Thais were inc lined to follow . The communist triumph on the China mainland in 1949, the takeover of Tibet, the . aid to the Vietminh movement against the French and the involvement in Korea served as positive signs of the communists' aggressive intentions . That the Thai Government finally decided to opt for the American side, ostensibly in the name of its own national interest, was perhaps legitimate, for concurrently, the country also profited materially by signing a treaty of co- operation with the United States which provided the basis for the subsequent American role in Thailand's . security and socioeconomic fate . Nevertheless, unknowingly the military regime once again created the basic blunder of committing itself to an outside power against another Asian neighbour, China - though the threat from Peking against Bangkok could not have been so imminent or direct since China is some . distance away. Benefiting also personally from co-operating with the Americans, the Thai Government leaders went so far as to commit combat forces to help fight the communists in Korea. From that moment onwards, Thai foreign policy invariably became dLrectly conditioned by the American crusading . spirit of anticommunism, which, as the next logical step, was developed into a concrete programme of containment against all the communist states . Thailand became identified with the American action when it chose to become an original charter member of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization . (SEATO), a symbol of military alliance against the communists in Southeast Asia. Hence by 195 4, the Thai Government had permitted itself to be subject to American policy . dictates, all in the name of preserving Thai interests in the face of the communist threat .

11

In spite of a brief spell . after th e conference of nonaligned nat1ons held in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955 when China for the first time displayed positive signs of a peaceful co-existence with neighbouring noncommunist states and Thailand consciously indicated . a favourable response to this gesture, the Thais had become too far involved . in the American policy to retract its erstwhile steps . Thus the trad1t1onal flexibility in Thai diplomacy was quashed by its subscription to the Dulles containment policy . Thaila nd further reduced its own options by leaning more heavily on the United States subsequent to the repla cement of the Pibul - regime with yet another military (The succ ession of rule under Marshal Sarit Thanarat . mil1tary regimes ensured a con ti n uity in the Thai at t 1tudc towards communism and alliance with Washington, DeC. ) This change of military rule was apparently for the greater preservation of national - interest through the strengthening of anticommunist measures (seen, for 1nstance, in the trade ban against China in 1958) even though the communist t hreat For the main organ , the was more imagined than real . Communist Party of Thailand (CPT ) , had yet to receive extensive external assistance, and the suspect Overseas Chinese had yet to take any action indicative of vigorous Peking support . Besides , the Indochinese communists were t o o preoccup1ed with the . pursuit of their localized and na t ionally-oriented aims . The only active communist movement within Thailand , the Communist Party of Malaya , seemed preoccupied with activities in neighbouring Malaya above all else . The truth of the matter was that such an a rrangeme nt would certainly continue .to benefit the military establishment as well as the country's economic development . Subsequent e v ents in Indochina compelled close r co-o peration between Thailand and the Un i ted States.5 5

After

The re was a degree of difference in the Thai and Amer ican pe r ceptions of the communist threat . In the 1950s and even early 1960s , the Ameri can view was predi c ated upon mono lith~ c communist expans i oni sm controlled by, o r commanded f rom, Mos cow . To the Thc.i thinki ng , this might have been the case, though the apprehens i on with Ch inese and Vietnamese communism was rat her s pe c1f i c and qu1te under &tandab l e , owing to the distance from the Sov~e t Uni on and t he abs ence of any requirement, as in the case of Lhe United States, t o Lake upon the Soviet challenge on a global s c ale . Neverthe less , th1s d1d no t mean that the concern over communism by t he Thai l eaders w8s ! E~~ ge n~ i ne .

12

the Laotian Crisis of 1962, Bangkok for the first time permitted the stationing of Ameri can marines on Thai soil, and as a quid . pro quo , a bilateral agreement , the ThanatRusk Communique, was concluded & This . confirmed Washington, D.C o prerogative to come to Thailand's aid in any case of an emergency without having to wait for the other SEATO members to respond • . The occasion set a precedent for the subsequent dispatches . of more combat forces into Thailand in the name of fighting in neighbouring Indochina commun i sm which could eventually spread into Thailand if unchecked . Hence, the Thai military government saw wisdom in continui ng to be a part of the American crusade against communism , o n the grounds that it suited Thailand's national interest . The successors of Sarit found ample justification for continuing . the special . relationship with . the United States i n the face of the · public pronouncement by the CPT in 1965, which introduced - guerrilla . warfare into the countryr it confirmed the long- held notion by the military of the threat communism posed to Thailand and hence consolidated the raison . d'etre for a genuine co~operative effort with the best friend the country had known . The fate of this relationship had actually been sealed before then when a verbal un derstanding . was reached allowing the United Stat es the right .to construct . bases in Thailand ostensibly for use against the . Indochinese enemy , . and as a q uid pro quo the Thai hosts would .. benefi t from the American pledge to unilaterally defend . Thailand against future external attacks, presumably instigated by the communists . Increasingly, in the 1960s, Thailand .allowed its foreign policy to be led by . Washington.,. .. D .. C . ; whatever aation the Thai leadership ...undertook was . contingent upon this consideration. It was found to be an . expedient .measure because, . first, .the government did ~not need to initiate anything of its own which might result in ambiguity and uncertainty, and, secondly, it was . enjo~ing the (apparent ) economic prosperity . which .was taking place following the military spending by Washington , D. C. in Indochina, and the direct aid . and .assistance Bangkok was - receiving as compensation for the bases • . Thirdly, associat ion .wi t h a super military power such as . the United States had added p r esti ge and security to the military reg1me, whose mode of existence was entirely modelled upon the American ~ Finally, by she l teri ng under American protection, the . leaders .did not need t o ponder on unpleasant and . painful issues of . how to deal with the communist threat , . and were able to harbour only favourable memories . This fantasy perhaps revealed the i nadequacy of

13

the leader 's mentality in grasping and dealing w1th the complex natur e of the communist threat, which i n turn led to a wholesale rejection of c ommunism as being absolutely evil , As long as the American power preponderance persisted and the American policy remained unchanged , the Thai leaders could continue to seek comfort beh1nd this fa~ade of ant1cornrnunism. While the overcornrnitrnent of the military to an American stand might have affected the1r perception of the reality taking place around them, at least some small civil1an circ les were becoming more vocal about the direct i on of Thai fore1gn policy . The rapid escalation and build-up of the American mil1tary presence (to 48,000 troops 1n 1968 and 5 operational air bases , including the 1nfamo us U-tapao) had given the security- minded mil1tary offi c 1als se l fassurance and psychological comfort, but the turn of e vents in Indochina had 1ndicated an 1mpending change 1n the Ameri c an policy . Especial ly after President Johnson announced a ceili ng to the Arner1can bombings over Vietnam in 1968, the Fore1gn Ministry, under Dr. Thanat Khoman, began to see the lops1ded nature of the commitment to an increasingly troubled American policy and advocated a detente w1th China. However, wh1le the U.S , involvement in Indochina and the accompany1ng insurgency problem persisted , there was l1ttle l1keliho od of any s1gnificant breakaway from old practices. That the inertia was apparently quite strong may be further demonstrated by th e mil1tary regime's refusal to acknowledge another noted shift in the American policy : the pLonouncement of the Nixon Doctrine i n 1969. Shrouded in arnb1guous terms , the part in the Doctrine about the pledge by Wash1ngton , D.C . to provide protection to all i es threatened by a nuclear power was literally taken or bel1eved, witho ut paying close attention to t he a c company1 n g qual1fication about Washingt o n's right to determi ne which t hreatened nat1on(s ) would be treated as being vital enough to American interests to mer i t s uch a move by the U s . The lowness of the Thai m1l1tary re sponse could . perhaps be attributed to its being used t o easy aid and asso c1 ation w1 t h the Amer i cans . 6 While it i s corre ct that back i n t he 6

The inflow of eas y and abundant Ameri c an wealth which c aused a boom in the Tha1 economy i n the 1960s, as well as ~he 1ncul cati ou of the American-style affluen~ consume 1ism , created a pred i lect1on fv~ t hings American . Togethe r with the p reo -~upation with s ecu rity . 1c w~3 dtffl Gult to envisage an a l ternative response ro the preva1 l 1ng s i tu&t10L,

14

ea£ ly 1960s, at the beginning of the u.s . ground involvement in Indochina, a feeble start in regional co- operation was made with t he inauguration of the Association .of Southeast Asia (ASA) which ultimately was .expanded into the Association of Southeast Asian . Nations (ASEAN) in 1967, such efforts did not really reflect .Thailand ' s serious search for political a lternatives, but rather were me rely gestures to foster cultural and economic ties with some neighbouring states . So long as commitment to Washington, D. C. took first priority, regional co- operation was merely in name . The predominant poli cy was the anticommunist fight and continued reliance on the u. s . for the mode of existence to which the leaders were generally accustomed. In such a milieu , Thanat's early advocacy for f l exibi lity, especially in seeking peace with Peking, was n o t greeted with great enthusiasm . The military continued t o choose to believe that, in spite of _the growing opposition in the U ~ S . Congress to the Arnerican . arrned .intervention in Southeast Asia (especially when the method chosen by Washington, D.C . in the Vietnam War could not be called successful or effective) , t he e x ecut i v e b r anch unde:r t he formerly staunch anticommunist advocates, would uphold its commitment to defend Thailand against external aggression . (They were indeed led to believe . so partly through verbal assurances from the u.s . executive leaders involved, and through the fact that the anti - Indochina polemics was corning from only a few liberal and hostile legislators such as Senator William J . Fulbright.) As a matter of fact, Thanat himself, when confronted with the potential failure of the American poli cy and the subsequent deceleration of the U.S . involvement, . charged . that . the instigators behind such a movement were few and had personal vendettas against Thailand. They were not seen to .. represent the general mood prevailing in the U.S . with regard to the problem . Admi t tedly , a . crucial factor for the .rnilitary's adherence to the Americans was .. the intensifying local insurgency supported .by _Peking and Hanoi. Here , -it must be pointed out that the military failed to distinguish between the Peking- support ed menace and that of Hanoi (the disti nction was more discern i ble by the end of the sixties) and remained impass i ve instead of in i tiating explor ation i n t o the changing situation . ?

7

W. Sc ott Thompson, Unequal Partner s (Lexington, Mass . : Books, 1975), pp . 124-125 .

Lex ing~on

15

If the American signal of a fundamental policy change was not strong enough another relatively stronger one took place in early 1971 with the Chinese issue of invitation to a U.S . ping-pong team to visit China , thus marking a new orientation and a departure from the previous confrontation It seemed for a while that Thanat ' s advocacy and antagonism. - of seeking a detente with Peking and becoming less attached to the Americans - was being vindicated. Consequently a press campaign was launched by the Foreign Ministry to sell the public on the need of a rapprochement with the communists in light of the American action , while a North Vietnamese Red Cross delegation even visited Bangkok , ostensibly to discuss the Vietnamese refugees remaining in Thailand - an issue which had caused considerable strain in the past. For a few months , i t appeared that Thanat ' s influence was in the ascendancy , and that the generals had finally come around to accept the new r ea l ity . The Kissinger strategy of dealing predominantly with major powers - at the expense of smal l er s tates, if n ecessary , in shaping a new world order - as well as the volte faoe in the Chinese policy as a result of the imminent Soviet threat , which in turn was compelling the Chinese to seek the U.S. as a balance, seemed to be finally understood by the generals. But the "triumph" was rather prematurely predicted . In November 1971 , the Thanom-Prapat Govern ment staged a ooup against itself as a means to reorganize the adminis trative structure and abolish a parliament which was becoming increasingly uncontrollable. One important change in the foreign policy field was the ouster of Thanat as Foreign Minister , and with it his influence. The newlyformed National Executive Council (NEC) , confronted with the visible prospect o f a Sino-American detente which had recently (1971) been boosted by the Chinese admission into the United Nations, suffered another " shock" when in February 1972 President Nixon made his historic journey to Peking and issued the Shanghai Communique pledging further normalization It elicited an of contact between the two countries. admission that direct contact, which might lead to later formal dialogue, should be established under the watchful eyes of the Foreign Ministry (which had in the meantime come under the ministership of Premier Thanom himself) . Nevertheless, it was also argued that the move should be slow and cautious without upsetting the " delicate" internal balance , o r in othe r words, aggravating the communist insurgency problem . When the Chinese decided to invite a Thai team to participate in its First Afro- Asian Table Tennis Tournament in Peking in August that year , Prasit

16

Kanjanawat, a confidant of the NEC leadership acting in his capacity of being in charge of trade and commerce, deputized as head of the team; his mission was to put out political feelers by using trading prospects. A few more sports exchanges followed in 1972 . and 1973, but the pace of normalization was deliberately slowed down as the NEC continued to harbour doubts about .Chinese sincerity. While unable to tru ly fathom the change in China's foreign policy direction (as a result of the confrontation with the Soviet Union) , the military leadership persisted in its insistence on the cessation of all forms of Chinese support of the local insurgents as a precondition for a breakthrough in relations. It was.obvious that security remained the overriding factor blocking any acceptance of the Chinese, especially after the success over a long period of time in ignoring the problem. Any reconciliation to the inevitable would naturally be painful and unpleasant. In the meantime, the Thai mission in Washington, D.C. was reporting home about the growing pressure exerted against the executive branch. The years of Indochina agony had fermente:d a strong opposition from the legislative branch which now wanted a firmer control over foreign policy processes. The credibility gap resulting from the Watergate scandal further accentuated the damage of the executive power, even though in foreign policy, Nixon's successful understanding with Peking, a crucial landmark in the process towards disengagement from Indochina in 1973, was to be noted. The curtailment of the President's power to take military action overseas without prior consultation with Congress, and the latter's move to cut back direct funding for U.S. bases abroad also helped assure the inevitable : the e:ventual withdrawal of American fighting forces and the closure of most of the American bases. As a result of the military regime's inability to solve fundamental domestic problems, such as the rice shortage and the struggle over a constitutional rule for the country (thought to be long overdue by the people) , and the seemingly inadequate response to the changing Asian balance , the survival of the Thanom- Prapat Government became increasingly doubtful. That this problem should have arisen at a time when an increasing number of Thais were harbouring doubts about the actual value of the existing dependence on .the United . States, especially when the relationship reflected . primarily . the fulfilment of American interests, is noteworthy because it helped discredit the image of the military all the more . The

17

ens uing Tungyai incident (dubbed by some a s Thailand' s 'l;atergate scandal ) further s~.~rv~d to ag; r r1.vatc the cha~g e s o f the military abuse of pow2r.8 In Octobe r the issue of an early promulgation of the long-promi sed constitution precipitated student demonstra ti ons t h ~t brought d own the milit ary government, and, wit!1 t he p~s .:: ing of the old guard, Thailand was destined to face a nc,,; chapter in its foreign policy. As a result of the now-famous 14 October Incident culminatin g in the downfall of the military government which had stayed in power for fifteen years - Thailand , in a somewhat unprepared fashion, launched its first democratic experiment in decades . The tr a n s itional oeriod between 1 4 October 1973 and February 1 ~7 5 \.,rhich ,,.,as dominated by the two Sanya caretaker governme nts pro ved to be an uneasy First of all , the main one as far as foreign policy went. task entrusted t o the caretaker leaders was the preparation o f a constitution which would enable the country to advance o n the democratic path, and it was by no means easy, cons ide ring the inadequate experie nce the drafters had , their earnestness to try to seek for an " ideal " constitution (that is , o ne which would last), and the diverse backgro unds of the drafters themselves . Secondly , the composi t i o n of the National Legislative Assembly , the supreme legislative body o f the land entrusted with overseeing the government, was such that more conservatism than liberalism was reflected . The most notable accomplishment which had a direct impact o n the country's new phase i n foreign policy was the a nnulment o f the Fifty-Third Decree of the former Sarit regime which had prohibited trade with the People' s Republic o f China since 1958, but it came about o nly after nearly one year o f debate, and in its place a governmentdirected body ( trading corpo ration) was to be estab lished, aimed at c o ntrol ling the volume and nature of traffic between To many, it was just t he substttution Thailand and China. of one f o rm o f control for another. Whatever the mot i ve , this o nly reflects problems o f such n atu re emerging in the period of transition .

8

In 1973, a helico ~·te ~ cr ?sh at Tungyai i n ~es ter n Thailand led t o the dis cove ry t h at certain hi gh rank ing army officers were using government prope r ty for illegal activities including hunting. Th e scandal which was kept from the publi c until the students uncovered i t a cc entuated the co rrupt image of the military and fan ned the opposi ti on to it.

18

Nevertheless, th e 14 October Incident did further a degree of popular nationalism . (in th e most part instilled by student and other activist groups) which was projected into the field -of . inte rnational relations. If the antiJapanese movement staged in the form of the boycott of Jap anese goods in 1973 re presents the first active participatio n of students in the international issues - that is , Japanese economic imperialism. - . the . uncovering of CIA interference in Thailand's i n ternal matters (the letter-sending incident for instance) in early . l974 . provided . a .· further impetus for students to campaign against the . United States' role in Southeast Asia, a n d to eventually demand the withdrawal of It may be argued that after American forces from Thai soil. long years of suppression and /or nonchalance about international affairs, students had - finally become aware of the ongoing configuration .. in _the -power .. balance of the region . The conclusion of the Paris Agreement in early 1973 _ensured a definite end. to further American involvement in Indochina (except the continuing, . albeit limited, material assistance) and an open ground . for further - expansion by North Vietnam against the South. _.Thailand .. could . live in the illusion - of the American -protection even when its direct military role was scaled down rather significantly after 1970 (except for a brief period before the Paris Accord in 1973 when bombings against North . Vietnam were .stepped up to force the North Vietnamese to the conference table) ~ust as long as some u.s. combat forces remained in South Vietnam. The Paris accord , however, meant that the United States would definitely wish to back out . f~om its previous . Indochina commitments, thus .making the desirability and worth of the continuing military presence of the u.s. in Thailand · increasingly doubtful . As an alternative, the Thais were forced for the first time to seriously regard China as a power to reckon with. The ameliorating s~ance in Peking's international relations - directly encouraged by the serious differences with the Soviet Union - helped to enable Thailand's new orient ation toward the erstwhile enemy to be endorsed by students and other activist groups at large. The wind of change had gathered force as popular parti¢ipation in international issues became increasingly marked after 14 October.

19

3. Bilateral Relations Thai-Chinese Relations. The v oZ t e fa ae in Thai-Chinese relations has been the single most significant event in recent Thai f oreign policy , and will likely have an impact on Thailand's reorientation towards a pos t-American stance . When China was admitted into the United Nations in 1971 and a joint u .s.-Chinese Communique signed in Shanghai in the following year, it became obvious that the Thais ' attitude of ignoring the China problem (as a convenient way out of the need for serious deliberation) was no longer tenable . Thai policy toward Peking was shrouded in ambiguity, justified primarily by assumed security In retrospect, the perceived Chinese threat considerations. to Thai security was more apparent than real: in spite of the oft- cited, overt statement by Foreign Minister Chen Yi in 1965 to start guerrilla warfare in Thailand , the rousing attacks by the Yunnan-based Voice of the People of Thailand Radio, and other f orms of verba l an d written vituperative at the height of the Thai embroilment in the Vietnam conflict, the Thanom-Prapat Government could never concretely prove any substantial Chinese backing given to the local insurgents for the forcible overthrow of the Bangkok regime. Coupled with the ~ruptness of th e American action , the Thais were caught unprepared to disengage from the former policy of hostility. Nevertheless , differences were not actually so irreconcilable as to permit some sort of "cautious exploration" '.to be launched , particularly when · the Chinese side was showi ng encouraging signs o f receptiveness toward detente with Thailand , being motivated especially by the wo rsening confrontation with the Soviet Union for influence Hence, prior to the debacle of the in Southeast Asia. in 1973 , a series of informal, regime Thanom-Prapat initiated as feelers t o the climate were exchanges s emi f ormal o f political change, presumably - under Peking ' s drive and Thai responsiveness. Thailand was invited to participate in the Asian Table Tennis Union Champions h ip in Septembe r 1972, and Prasit Kanjanawat , being i n charge o f economic affairs in the National Executive Council , became th e f irs t r anking Thai of f ice r to hold a talk with Prime Minister Chou En-lai This was in Peki ng on economi c and pol itical - matters. quickly followed up by a Tha i comme rc ial mission to the Canton Trade Fair in October at China's i n vitation (ostensibly f or commercial promot1on).

20

In the meantime contacts were also started at the United Nations, and beginning in January 1973, instructions were given out to Thai ambassadors in cities where there was Chinese representation - for example, Washington, Islamabad, Vienna, etc. - to increase the contact. Subsequently such - talks were conducted at Stockholm, _ Tehran, Tokyo , Washington, Canberra, Brussels, Madrid, Karachi, and the Hague. In 1973, the Chinese device of cultural diplomacy was put to use more vigorously . China sent a return table tennis team in June, accompanied by a foreign ministry official . Another Thai badminton team toured China in August, accompanied by the director of the Thai Foreign Ministry ' s Political Department; it was greeted by VicePremier Teng Hsiao- p'ing. In the same month, a second table tennis team was sent, and formal telecommunications links (telephone and telegraphY were restored . Such, however, was about the furthest extent the military autocracy could go without taking great risks . The continuing search for means of diplomatic normalization faced the obstacle of the supposed . apprehension that the establishment of a Chinese Embassy in Thailand would only bring Peking physically closer, which in turn would facilitate the support of local . insurgents' operations . Furthermore, such a happening could create a great repercussion in other respects, for . instance, in rekindling Overseas Chinese nationalism. Despite Malaysia's decision to recognize Peking in June 1973 and thereby accepting the Chinese premise that there could be - and was - a distinction between government and party operations in China (and hence there was actually no contradiction in separating government-to-government affairs from the inevitable fraternal relationships among communist parties) ,9 the Bangkok Government insisted on no less than China's open renouncing of and desisting from all types of supportive activities ·'.in the local insurgency movement as a precondition of settlement. The influential National Security Council in Bangkok had recommended, in December 1972 in the light of

9

The Malaysian outlook was that since it could not avoid the clandestine relationship between the Peking and local communist parties, the recognition of the Peking argument was a foregone conclusion and might in another respect serve as a restraint on Chinese activities ,

21

the growing contact with China , that Thailand would be "adversely affected" by formal relations with China with It argued that in the the following rationalization. announcements that it public Peking's first place , des pi te internal affairs, countries' other in would never interfere chose to it that true: was in practice , the contrary continue to work for subversion and advancement of its own goals . Seco ndly, the current state of Thailand ' s internal stability was already problematic without facing further possible complications arising from legalized trade and other cont acts with China. Thirdly , formal contact with Peking would only lead to open collaboration with local insurgents and aggravate the sensitivity of the hard - core Overseas Chinese whose allegiance to Thailand remained dubious. Th e National Security Council ' s recommendations stressed the need for further vigorous suppress ion of communist insurgents , for continual strengthening of national defence regardless of the state of relationship with Chi n a, and the desirability of postponing any deliberation of r elations with Peking until the successful suppression of ins urgen cy activities. Staffed primarily by military personnel , the National Security Council reflected the fundamental thinking of the military regime on top policy matters. The downfall of the Thanom- Prapat Government confirmed the need for an improvement in Sin o-Thai relations , espe cially when it became more apparent that there were growing areas of mutual interest arising out of the p attern of regional politics. Although the caretaker governments of Prof . Sanya Dhamasak fo r various reas ons were not in a position to push f or or implement radical changes , sufficient progress was accomplished in that period in the betterment of the two countries' relations - especially the successful, albeit belated , rescind i ng of the trade prohibition decree to At the end of 1973, the October maintain a continuing thaw. war in the Middle East l e d to the Arab embargo of crude oil exports. The resultant energy crisis compelled Thailand to In December 1973, look to China for a measure of relief . Deputy Foreign Minister Chartichai Choonhavan led a delegation - the first ministerial-level party - to Peking to negotiate th e p urchase of diesel fuel , which led to the signing o f a f irst contract for 50 , 000 tons. The Ch1nese goodwill gesture, corning at a time of great need, was made even more meaningful by the special " friendship " price , and Following its psychological impact was not to be underrated .

22

a few more sports and medical exchanges (six in all, three from each side) in 1974, the Thai National Assembly finally abolished the trade prohibitions decree instituted against Peking by Marshal Sarit in 1958, thus ending a long era of "trade discrimination". Immediately following the act, an official ministerial-level trade delegation left for Peking (and Pyongyang) to further explore trade avenues, while General Chartichai led another delegation in January 1975 to negotiate the purchase of another 75,000 tons of diesel oil . All along, foreign policy matters were concurrently discussed in sessions with high-ranking Chinese officials, including Premier Chou En - lai. In the first six months of 19 75 , more athletic and scientific exchanges were made . In March, the firs t popularly- elected civilian government was formed with a platform to see to diplomatic intercourse with China. The pace of this move was sped up considerably by the drastic turn of events in Cambodia and South Vietnam, so that by June, the ground had been prepared for the long - ·awai ted normalization. (The visits of a delegation from the major opposition party, the Democrat Party, and a parliamentary delegation under pro-government Speaker of the House of Representatives, Prasit Kanjanawat, played a role in bringing the relationship closer to realization.)lO

10

Although the Thai leaders had long since had misgivings about the viability of the Vietnamization programme instituted by the United States after the Paris Ac co rd in early 1973, as well as about the survival of the Lon Nol regime which was confined by the early 1970s essentially to the immediate environs of Phnom Penh, the pace of the debacle of the Lon Nol and Thieu regimes caught the Thais almost completely by surprise , and resulted in policy-makers, who had been accustomed to avoid the "unthinkab le", reeling under the speed of change. But the events, which also proved the U. S . 's total unwillingness to stand up any longer to the communist threat in the region, made it imperative for the Thais to face the issue squarely for the sake of their own survival. The decision on China was hastily c oncluded without the privilege of allowing themselves enough time to consider all the outstanding differences in detail . For the Chinese side, normalization could not have come at a more opportune time as the conflict with the Soviet Union was spilling over i nto Southeast Asia (with the triumph of the Russian-sponsored North Vietnamese). With the hope of mi nimizing or neutralizing the Soviet influence in Southeast Asia, Peking stepped up aid to Hanoi, established a foothold in Cambodia, and saw Thailand as a logical

23

The joint communique signed on 1 July by Premier Kukrit and Chou En-lai in Peking represents a reconciliation and acknowledgement of a need for collaboration to promote mutually satisfactory ends, despite existing divergences on both sides. Specifi cally, the Thai side managed to win assurances from the Chinese on the adherence to the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence , the Chinese agreement on the right of Overs eas Chinese residing in Thailand to choose nationalities for themselves and without any Chinese In conjunction , China chose to ignore the claim over them. American troops issue (but there was a verbal clarification that China was basically opposed to the stationing of foreign troops in a third country as breach of sovereignty) as a precondition for n o rmalizati on , hence leaving the withdrawal timetable to be worked out by the Thais themselves . Thailand, nevertheless, made one major compromise over the question of Chinese support o f local communist insurgents . The Kukrit Government conceded to the Chinese claim that while Peking owed it a moral obligation to endorse revolutionary movements abroad , its basic aim was not to export revolutions. In other words, the Chinese convinced the Thais to accept what Malaysia, and later the Philippines , had accepted: that e v en though the Chinese Communist Party might continue its aid to local movements, the Chinese state should not be constrained fr om pursuing a "business as usual" approach vis -a-vis governments plagued by such an insurgency problem. Despite vehement objec tions from national security affairs bodies (the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Age n cy) as to the wisdom of such a concession, the Kukrit Government , owing to the urgency of the situation, felt that the acceptan ce of the Chinese posture was within the larger realm of national interest . During the first months of diplomatic intercourse, Thailand has shown great enthusiasm for China. For histor1cal, cultural, and ethnic reasons, the cordiality in the Thai-Chinese relationsh i p is quite readily understandable, despite the argument by some that Thailand , in wishing to

extension of China's bid to secure the region within its own sphere, or at least to keep it beyond the reach o f other states threateni ng China's position i n the region . The convergence of th1 s sense oi urgency enab led both sides to follow the Malaysian pre cedent and conclude a broad enough document pledging a determinat1on by be th sides to settle their differences in an amiable fashion

24

play a true balancing act, should not identify too closely with a major power with such proximity to it. But the popular sentiment has guaranteed a natural inclination towards China , while the activist elements in the society marvel at the Chinese socialist reconstruction experience and feel a strong urge for its imitation and incorporation into Thai development. Literature in praise of China has been plentiful , and it is noteworthy that almost all the major political factions within the society favour the maintenance of a sound relationship with China . As long as China gives an appearance of championing the Third World cause and of being interested in endorsing and promoting peaceful co- existence in Southeast As~a, its popularity is bound to persist. Thai-Chinese relations have never been better - in spite of certain fundamental divergences that still exist on both sides. Nevertheless, some are not yet able to share the euphoria of normalization . ll The National Security Council , for instance , continues to hold firm to its belief that China ' s sincer~ty towards Thailand cannot be completely subscribed to so long as it does not renounce the support of the local communists or comes out with a truly clear stand on its relationship vis - a - vis the Overseas Chinese, and that its argument of non-aggression is seen in the absence of Chinese troops outside Chinese borders is not tota lly convincing. Furthermore , they see the periodic political struggles in - China (ideological campaigns, and so forth) as reflecting a basic uncertainty in its fore~gn policy . The geographical proximity and the size of China also produce a sense of . overwhelming Chinese might in the minds of some , and . this alone is sufficient to create an atmosphere of suspicion. China will probably be demonstrating more positive effects as it continually seeks to . enhance . its ties with Thailand. The speed . with which the Thai - Chinese rapprochement was accomplished was also due to the Chinese perception of the power balance and the possible role Thailand plays in it. So long as Thailand ' s external relations were closely identified with the United States , like in the 1960s, Thailand did not figure so importantly, but acted only as a corollary

11

There were reports openly circulating that Taiwan was lobbying hard against any early Thai recognition of Peking, even to the extent of feeding information to . the National Security Council which was favourable to the Taiwan side , The Council's use of Taiwan-supplied reports has been noteworthy ,

25

to the United States interest . However , with the country veering towards a policy o f i ndependence {of action) si n ce 197 4, Thailand has become a potential centre for SinoSoviet rivalry, enhanced by th e growing fluidi ty of the political situation . I n the fores ~ e able future , gi ve n the con t inuation in the Sino- Soviet confront ation , China will emphasize its relations with Thailand . l2 Officials of the Soviet Embassy Thai-Soviet Relations . in Bangkok h ave b ee n publ icly voicing their d issatis facti on and dismay with the p erformance o f t h e Thais . Since the establishment of ties with Peking in July 1975 , while praise for Chi na has been . o n the increase critical feelings have augmented against the Soviet Union . Geopolitically , Thailand desires the fr i endship of the Soviet Un ion - which is a power from afar wh ose states are less clearl y i dentified in the reg1on to balance agai n st th e might of China . But , practically spe aking , the Soviet Union is separated culturally, socially, linguistically and histor1cally from Thailand . In add ition, Moscow h as expressed the manifest intention o f extending its arena of confl ict with Chi na up There is consequently hesitat ion to Thailand's doorstep. with the Soviet Union . tifying n ide by t o get involved Unt1 l recently , Thailand did not fig ure so import antly in the Sov1et strategy , for the obvious fact that the c ountry, being identi f i ed totally with the U.S. , was not within the reach o f either Moscow or Peking. But with the requirement f o r a reorientation in the power configuration, Thailand's 1mportance as a principal So utheas t Asian mai nland state i n vites the Soviet attempt to extend its influence . Although Tha1-Russian relat ions date back to th e 1860s , and the Russians have been interested i n Thailand politically s1 nce the 1890s, there was hiatus of a n y sign1f1cant 1nte rcours e until recently . The Bolshe vik vi ctory in 1917 and the subsequent establishment o f a communist government i n Russia further put th e Russ1ans out o f Thai minds . When the military regime was established first 1n the 1930s, Thailand adopted an anticommunist stand and legislated aga1 n st cornrnun1st activities , t hus setting back the already cool relationsh1p with Moscow .

12

Already China has scheduled the holdi ng ~n Bangkok ~n Mac ch 1976 of a s ~ zeable trade exhibition which is satd to b e the largest the Chinese have staged in Asia .

26

The defeat of Thailand on the side of the Axis powers and the ensuing desire of the country to apply for membership i n the United Nations necess itated the concession allowing the Soviet Union to establish a diplomatic mission in Bangkok (in return for Moscow's pledge not to veto the above application). Nevertheless the intercourse continued to be cool and correct for the next twenty years, though in 1960, a trade agreement was signed to fa cilitate two-way commerce , and despite the fact that three years before then, the Soviet mission was upgraded to Embassy status. The Soviet Union became especially interested in Thailand after 1969 when the ongoing Sino-Soviet conflict came to a head. With the u.s. showing signs of change in its commitment to Southeast Asia, Thailand came to be perceived as an area which, though perhaps not as strategic as the Middle East or Africa, . could become significant under the follow ing considerations: (1) to contain China ( 2 ) to counter the u.s. influence and to take its place 1f possible and (3) to expand Soviet . economic and political activities in East Asia (particularly to circumscribe Japan and China by controlling the vital channels through naval buildup ) . Thus far, the Soviet effort to establish influence in Thailand has been political , cultural and economic. Political ly, the crux of the Soviet offensive has centred around a proposal made in 1969 in the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine. Advanced as Moscow's political programme for Asia and known as the Asian Collective Security System proposal, it was meant to anticipate a "vacuum" effect which would be filled hopefully by the Soviet Union after the scheduled withdrawal of the U.S . military forces and a waning of the American political influence. Ostensibly the propagandists have argued that the scheme would benefit all the small Asian states, Thailand included , because it stands for : (1) the renunciation of force in orderly state relations (2) the respecting of each other's sovereignty and the principle of inviolability of national frontiers (3) noninterference in the state's internal affairs and (4) broad economic and other forms of co-operation on a basis of full equality and mutual benefits.l3 While the proposal sounds attractive , Thailand, along with the other noncommunist states , has refrained from any 13

Speech by Soviet Ambassador Boris I. Illychev at the Foreign Correspondent's Club in Bangkok on 25 J une 1975.

27

public endorseme nt of the Soviet offer . The main cons ideration s centre a ~ound t he basic reservatio n on its In the first place, the Soviet help to genuine sincerity . North Vietnam and Laos is a constant reminder of the Soviet readiness to intervene , by arms if need be. Secondly , Thailand is suspiciou s that the offer is designed to promote anti-Chin ese moves by allying the Southeast Asian states to (However , Soviet leaders have repeatedly the Soviet Union . assured China that Moscow would welcome Chinese participa t ion in the region. Brezhnev in 1973 state d that the Soviet Union would welc ome China's role i n strengthen ing Asian security by joining the proposed plan.) Thirdly , despite the similarity in the contents of the Soviet proposal and the ASEAN principle s concernin g the creation of a zo ne of peace , freed om and neutralit y, Thai leaders have n oted that the Soviet mass media, in particula r the party tabliod Prav da , has voiced strong reservatio ns about ASEAN's pros~ects. Finally , Thai and other Southeast Asian leaders, in observing the Soviet Union's relations with Japan, can apply the questionin g o f Soviet sincerity here to their own case. While actively pressing Tokyo to subscrib e to and join the Asian Collectiv e Security System, Moscow will not i ·tselfyiel d to repeated Japanese requests to return the four n orthernmo st islands seized at the end of Norld War Two . For the Thai leaders , especiall y, it is difficult to gauge Soviet intention s in a straightfo rward fashion. Apart from the above considera tions , the Thais are of late wary about the increasin g intelligen ce and subversi on activitie s. Soviet intelligen ce operative s are allegedly engaged in recruiting sympathiz ers and soli citing support in the urban areas, and the major target have been student, (Astronom ical sums labour, and political organ izations. are rumoured to have flowed into the hands of such bodies, but there is no definite basis to substanti ate or verify In the rural areas , the the authentic ity of these reports.) Soviets are said to be trying to penetrate the tradition ally pro- Peking and Maoist-st ructured Communist Party of Thailand in an effort to seize control from the Chinese. Recent Soviet activitie s in Laos and the increased naval presence from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific serve as further signs for the Thai leaders to view with suspici on the concerted (That efforts by the Soviet Un i on to dominate the region. the Soviet Union has been demanding the staffing of a defence attache at its Bangkok Embassy also raises the Thais' appre hen sion . ) In the cultural and exchange realm, Moscow has also expended considera ble effort to win over the Thais.

28

Scholarships have been offered to students, though never approved by the Thai Government , .while Soviet proposals to aid Thailand ' s environmental and other technological problems have also been made. When Boris Illychev was posted as the Soviet envoy to Bangkok in February 1974 he initiated further cultural assault . For that year alone , Soviet cultural and sports teams were dispatched to Thailand ; contacts with various student groups were broadened , with i ncreased funds channelled for clandestine activities. The Soviet authorities have also been keen on personal exchanges as a means of establishing a foothold inside the In February 1974, a Thai education delegation country. visited the Soviet Union while the . mayor of Moscow travelled to Bangkok. Princess Kalayanee, th e Thai King's sister, and Dhamanoon Tiengern, Governor of the Bangkok Administ~ation, were among the V. I.P , s invited to visit the Soviet Union . \Princess Kalayanee ' s visit in May was sponsored by the Pres1dium of the Supreme Soviet Council . ) In addition , trade has been encouraged (a Soviet trade exhibition was held in 1974 , and Trade Minister Nicholai Ptolichev ~isited Thailand) and no effort is made to hide the Soviet Union's desire to seek co-operation .with Thai capitalists. An airline as well as a news bureau further added to avenues for Soviet In the fi e ld of trade, however , activities in the Ki ngdom. not much has come out of bilateral dealings partly due to the state trading law which the Soviet Union feels is discriminatory. The Soviet interests have also been augmented by the establishment of the Sino-Thai ties i n July 1975, and the subseque n t stre ngthening of this relationship . But Soviet popularity (or the efforts for it) at the moment suffers from the fact that at the popular level , the presence of a large Chinese minority has conditioned the pattern of external relations vis - a - vis Peking and Moscow to favour the former much more than the latter. Thai students have organized Ch1nese cultural and other exhibitions to praise the Chinese achievements , while the Soviets have made little headway at the basic level. At the official level , the government and concerned leaders have shown a . predilection for the American and Western-oriented values , and it would seem that i~ is a ll the more difficult for th e Soviet Union to penetrate effectively at this level. Nevertheless, the Soviet influence is undoubtedly on the rise , even as the Kukrit Government had advocated a need to cultivate closer ties with powers other than the United

29

States, so that the balance in Thai foreign policy may finally be rlghted o . In Moscow ' s planning, Thailand still does not hold priority in its forward strategy . But as the People ' s Republic of China establishes a firmer foothold in Thailand, it is expected that the Soviet Union will attempt to match this challenge. For the Russians, however, the problem of soliciting sympathy from the Thais is greater, but it does not necessarily follow that Moscow would not be in a position to exert a greater influence on Thai thinking. Already , some influential Thais (for example, former Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman) have voiced concern about Soviet displeasure over the present honeymoon between Thailand and Ideally, he has argued, Thailand desires a policy China. of equidistant relations with the two communist powers but in reality this is difficult to apply , given the influences, both potential and real , exerted in varying degrees by the Soviet Union and China . Clearly , for the moment, the pendulum swi n gs in China ' s favour . It seems that Moscow ' s words and action are dichotomous, and it is this lack of credibility which makes for the haltlng development in the implementat i on of a closer relationship with the Soviet Union . Thailand wa tches the Soviet embroilment in Angola and elsewhere in Africa , and often wonders if Moscow will not carry out a similar th r ust against Thalland i n the future . The spectre of KGB agents in large numbers ~rying to incite local groups to subvert internal stability is also an image . with negative implications for Moscow not to mention the concern arising over the alleged presence of Cubans in Laos (who are there at Moscow ' s If anything, Thailand will probably need a beckoning). great deal of assurance from the Soviet Union (more i n deeds ) of its honourable i ntenti ons in accordance with the It proclaimed Asian Collective Security System proposal . would also be heartening for the Thais i f the Soviet Union would be less directly involved in Laos and Vietnam which figure importantly in Thai security thinking . Thai- U.S . relations have understandab l y Thai-U . S. Relations . been predicated upon certain "unequal " considerations . The past military governments had acquiesced to the American policy and action so much that Thai foreign policy was thought to be merely an adjunct to Washington ' s thinking. This began t o change when Sino- American detente was set in motion, leading to the necessity of Thailand ' s readjustment. By 1975 , the stage was set for a significant shift in Thai thinking towards th e United States .

30

Since : Henry Kissinger ' s appointment as Secretary of State , the American foreign policy has seemingly been geared towards what some would call the "big power syndrome" . l4 Kissinger has never truly paid great attention to the Pacific or Southeast Asia, concentrating his policy on Moscow and Peking. The manner in which the Paris Peace Accord was concluded indicated the Kissinger style of foreign diplomacy: the accord was reached through consultation with the Soviet Union and China but with little regard to South Vietnam. While the U. S. attained the objective of disengaging itself from Southeast Asia, South Vietnam and Cambodia were left to fend for themselves . The final outcome of events in Cambodia and South Vietnam in April 1975 showed a total lack of action on the U. S.'s part to reverse the declining trend of the American fortunes in Southeast Asia, another obvious reminder to Thailand o f the ongoing American strategy. But what caused the Thai leaders to finally break from the traditional reliance on Washington was the disregard for small nations' rights and sovereignty, as demonstrated in the Mayaguez Affair . Accustomed to the habit of dealing with the ruling group rather informally and perhaps casually , the United States showed a high-handed approach in using Thai territory to launch retaliation against the Khmer Rouge. The incident not only unleashed a popular outburst (in the form of student demonstrations against the U.S. Embassy) , but gave cause for the Kukrit Government to announ ce a revision of all existing treaties and agreements between the two countries . Thl.s move amounted to the first real decision to revamp Thailand ' s stand and reflected the many problems of the nonformal treaty agreements of the past. Hence , while the military argued that because of the new development in Indochina, Thailand had good reason to demonstrate its continued goodwill towards the United States, the civilian government sent a memorandum to the U.S. on 7 May , as a reaction to the Mayaguez Affair, stating its intention to review all the existing bilateral agreements. The news was greeted with dismay by many who saw it as reflecting a "lack of wisdom" on the government's part . One notable critic, former Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, urged the government to continue identifying with the United States for the country ' s survival . He thought it unwise to

14

Frank C. Darling , '' United Staces Po lL ey in Southeast Asia: and Change, 11 Asian Survey (July, 19 74): 623-624 .

Permanency

31

forfeit one ' s own bargaining power without demanding a quid pro quo from the chief riva l , North Vietnam , and thereby throwing - away the chances of acquiring a negotiated settlement. He argued , "There is no valid reason f or Thailand to present Hanoi with what it has been clamouring for - the withdrawal of American forces - for years while it gives nothing worthwhile in return." This line of reasoning was predicated upon Thanat's assumption that the United States would still very likely play a role in deterring foreign aggression against Thailand; he noted - that th e Americans were not going through a period of - "isolationism", but rather " increasing nationalism".l5 Howeverr this view, supported also by topranking Thai military leaders (for instance , Commander- inChief of the Army, General Boonchai Bumrungphong who openly declared that the Thai military would be helpless without American support) , has b e en rejected by those who point out that as far as Southeast Asia is concerned , the obduracy of Washington (specifically , the - Congress) to act in the face of the Indochina "debacle" was itself ample proof of the American intention. Furthermore , President Gerald Ford's Pacific Doctrine given at Honolulu in December 1975, was true to the Kissinger style of foreign policy: the stress was put on Japan as the "main pillar " of U.S. Pacific policy, while U.S. commitments to Southeast Asia were most vaguely termed and devoid of any strong pledge of an active u.s. role in the region . Most importantly, since the nature of the American military presence in Thailand has been to play a supportive role to the Vietnam conflict (and not to assist Thailand directly - in fighting insurgency or any possible external aggression) , and since the form of external threat against Thailand is l ikely to be the external support of internal subversion and not a direct invasion (as Dr. Thanat himself admitted at the end of his speech) , 16 the functional effectiveness of the .-Amer.ican military . presence in the country is quite . limited. On . the other hand, the presence indeed provides a - ready - made excuse for Hanoi and others to direct hostile activities against Bangkok; consequently it may be equally valid to argue that the American forces

15

Thanat Khoman, "The Consequences for Southeast Asia of Events in Indochina." Paper delivered at the "Asian Business in 1976" conference held in Hong Kong between October 21-23, 1975, p. B5.

16

Ibid., B2.

32

constitute an obstacle to any meaningful rapprochement between Thailand and I n dochina . Developments since May 1975 have - accentuated the divergence in the .. thinking . on the issue .. The - continual threat posed by Vietnam and Vietnam- inspired elements against Thailand has grown more £ormidable , espe cially after the drawing of Laos into the Hanoi orbit, and has polarized the various groups directly concerned with natlonal security and . foreign poliC¥ matters. Even within the government . itself, there has b e en a division between the progressiveswho wish to see a new· relatlonship with Washington and . those who see virtue in the old arrangement ,. There is an increasing . number of individuals opting for the proposal to retain. American advisers who would be in a position to dispense of technical knowledge to the Thais , The same people also advocate the maintaining of certain facilities such as the sophisticated electronics and communications centres {the Ramasoon in Korat and Koh Kahin Lampang) . related to u.s . military movements in Southeast Asia and the Indian . Ocean as well as military intelligence gathering on China and the Soviet Union as long as Thailand would exercise legal jurisdiction over them (or at least cognizant of . the . activiti e s conducted } . The official government position, that is , one publicly taken by M. R . Kukrit himself, was for a total withdrawal of American combat forces and the . taking over of all the American facilities that exist in the . country . (This actually represented . a modification of the original stand made on 19 March 1975: by using ~·combat forces" allowance was made for the remaining behind of some Ame rican military elements which would be class i fied otherwise . ) Prime · Min i s t er Kukrit had announced that Thailand would be willing to negotiate directly with Washington so as to permit the latter to conduct certain activities and to keep a certain number of American military advisers . (Reportedly, the American . Embassy had been bypassing the Kukrit Government and negotiatin g with the mi l itary , the Supreme Command Headquarters , in a clan destine manner obviously playing on the military ' s concern about the upcoming severance of all forms of American military activities which might jeopardize the country's stability. If this . was the case, i t would go to show that Washington , D.C. had failed to understand the significance of 14 October , a n d had continued to deal with the Thai Government in an unchanged manner, putting the emphasis on the military.)

33

While desirous of using the Amer1can military presence as a psychologica l deterrent against the external enemy, Thailand has to exercise caution about its political implication, especially when American role in the country would be more relevant to their interest, for example, surveillance against China and the Soviet Union, and so In addition, this would continue to cause friction forth. with Hanoi, whi ch has been vehemently condemning what it has termed a "Thai-U. S. collusion". In the domestic scene, the continued presence of the American forces would aggravate the already serious polarization and evoke dissensi on among student and progressive groups, leading to the devel opment of a p olitical crisis. The former Tha1 Government ' s position with regard to this question was to create a firm understandin g with Wash1ngton, , o.c. on the question of equity in any future bilateral relations. The Kukrit Government had sa1d it did not mind having a number o f American advisors remain as long as they were under Thai direction. Thai jurisdiction would be exercised~ver all the existing American m1litary facilities in the country, and the Thais should be trained t o take over their operations. Thailand is apparently unhappy with the sum of direct military aid to be provided by the Uni ted States. In 1975 , the figure was already quite low: some US$28.3 million which constituted less than 10% of the year's budget. For 1976, the amount would be slashed to only US $10 million, the smallest sum since the United States military aid programme for Thailand began in 19So.l7 Many Thais feel that the United States should show more sympathy towards Thailand, which is now one country in Southeast Asia genuinely trying to develop an open society. This is because such a pursuit is in line with the political ideal cherished by the Americans and it is the k1nd of political model the United States has professedly been trying to promote in the world during the past two decades. Nevertheless , the direction in Thai-America n relations is rather clear for the foreseeable future: Thailand will have to

17

Jaturas , 11.32 (t7 Feh ruary •1976):· 1). In comparison , U.S . aid to

Indonesia for 1976 stands of US$13 million, but in the previous year of 1975, the figure figure stood at US$19.4 million. Hence the reduc tion has been less, and indications are that more mi l itary assistance will be provided to Jakarta in the future, showing perhaps a shift in emphasis of the U. S. strategy for Southeast As1a ,

34

forge ahead with or without the Unite d States , though in the final analysis , the latter naturally continues to exert considerable influence over the Thai state at different levels (mili tary, political, eco n omic , and cultural), and there is therefore some special relationship to be maintained. Nevertheless, the old style of intercourse, unequal and informal , is clearly on the way out as· Thai land continues to foster more political awareness at a popular level. In the final analysis, howe ver , o ld habits for some still die hard. The extreme Right, the Navapol movement , whose membership includes several influential personalities i n the military, public and private sectors, has come out strongly against the withdrawal. Through its use of the Red Gaurs, the radical vocational student group known for its v iolen t tac tics, a campaign has been launched to intimidate other groups that have been clamo uring for the withdrawal, branding them as communist sympathisers. To them, the departure of the Americans would amount to Thailand's being made defenceless, and hence the worst and certainly most unpatriotic move to make. The total American military withdrawal will n o d oubt cause economic hardship to those who have depended directly on the American military for a living: bar girls, entertainment operators, and so forth. Even the economy of certain towns situated close to the U.S. military bases, such as Udon would suffer . But the 100,000 pers ons to be affected and the towns fac ing recession can be a~ded by the government and in no case should pose as the main argument for the American stay . Thai - Japanese Relations . Over the past two decades , Thailand ' s relations with Japan have been predominantly economic in character , but the implicatio ns arising have significant political overto nes, especially reactions which have stemmed from economic d ispa rities and imbalan ces from the economic intercourse.l8 18

Japan ' s poli cy has been to keep relations with other countries strictly economic, as this arrangement has been found t o be most suitable and prosperous for Japan (for i nstance i t does not have to be overburdened by defence expenditures). Thailand, having experienced the taste of militarism, would also like to keep the bilateral relationship e conomi c .

35

In 1975 , Japan accounted for about 31% of the total Thai imports, or in monetary value, over 2,000 million baht. In direct investment , however, the percentage dropped sharply when compared to that in 1974: from 49 to 17 . When projected against the spiralling trade imbalance Thailand has been suffering (17,937 million baht in 1975), and the unfavourable investment picture especially after 14 October {1 , 767 million baht in direct investment in 1975) , it may be said that Thai - Japanese relations are not at their best. Thailand's economic prosperity and political order have been indeed contingent upon the economic relationship with Japan in recent years. During the 1960s when Thailand was going through a period of accelerated development and Japan itself was also experiencing a rapid growth i n export {of capital and goods) , the pattern of economic intercourse between the two countries was established. The Japanese , encouraged by Thai invitations for foreign investment, saw a potential area for their economic development extension, and hence became overnight Thailand ' s main supplier , while Thailand became a faithful recipient . The Japanese invested heavily in production for the domestic market and little in (Given the expanding needs of export- oriented enterprises. the Thai market itself and the protective import barriers set up by the Japanese Government, this mode of economic intercourse seemed l ogical .) Consequently , as some economists have argued, the Thai- Japanese economic pattern , in terms of trade and investment , was the outcome of trade and industriall9 policies of both countries and of their stages of economic development. ' But the economic and political trends in the 1970s have made the previous relationship no lon ger desirab l e. As the Thai economic take - off was at such a stage where the country had begun to seriously pursue export promotion, not only of agricultural products, but also of processed consumer goods , a basic reorientation of the relationship with Japan was necessary. In addition, the glut of Japanese imports and the resultant trade imbalance motivated the Thais to seek essentially two remedial measures. Fi rst, the Thais have submitted to the Japanese a list of exports that Thailand can offer to Japan as a means of offsetting some of the

19

Seiiji Naya and Narongchai Akrasanee, Thai - Japan Economic ReZation (Econcen No. 9). Bangkok , December 1974, p . 63 .

36

imbalance . But , thus far, of about seventy items and the volume suggested by the Thai Government, the Japanese have fa1led to place orders according to the proposed quantity. No more than twelve items on the list were purchased. 20 Concurrently the . Thais have requested for more Japanese 1nvestment but less direct importation. It is hoped that Japanese investment will stimulate local investment through JOint ventures . Such a form of business activity will also aid technological transfer, the creation of a larger labour market, and the generation of greater capital earning and capital flow . Thailand has grown increasingly critical of alleged Japanese "exploitation " of the country. Since the policy in the 1960s was to promote, without the slightest hesitation, unlimited Japanese assistance in meeting the growing demands of Thai consumers , the Thais have allowed themselves to become inextricably tied to Japanese economic strength by allow1ng Japan to become Thailand's number one trading partner and investor . Since Japan is not likely to help Thailand much i n sending finished consumer products to Japan tin spite of the fact that the latter i s already shifting to the production of . more sophisticated products and subsequently would have greater demands for consumer imports) , some friction is bound . to arise . The difficulty has further been compounded by the economic . disaster caused by the oil crisis since 1973, . which has resulted in a retrenchment in Japanese overseas aid and investment. Furthermore the anti-Japanese sentiment generated in Thailand since 1972,21 coupled with the general economic, political, and labour unrest within the countryr have been crucial factors affecting Japan ; s willingness and/or capability to seriously help Thailand achieve a decent degree of equity with Japan . Nevertheless , there are favourable conditions on both sides which may prove to be mutually beneficial. In spite of sentimental outbursts , Thailand continues to vigorously see Japan as a market and source of investment (though

20

Chung-hua jih-pao , Bangkok, 12 March 1976, p. 8. Be cause of the Japanese failure to act a c cording to the Thai recommendations, the Commerce Ministry of Thailand has seriously been pondering over some sort of restrictive measures against Japanese impor t s

21

Th~

lack of success in the boyco~c of Japanese consumers goods in 1972 showed the extent of Japanese en t renchment in t he Thai market .

37

attempts are being made to diversify the country's economic relationship abroad and to advocate self-reliance) . In keeping with the traditional Thai practice , the Kukrit Government welcomed Japanese business investment and economic intercourse as a vital source o f economic deve lopment , realizing the dominant position Japan occupies . Despite more protective attitudes, the Thai Government continued to ins t itute inducement schemes (such as promotional privileges) to attract Japanese capital. Thailand, on the other hand, hoped to export primary agricultural produce - rice, maize, poultry, and so on - as well as finished goods, such as But all these commodity products are subject to textiles. price fluctuati o ns and market conditions , which often put the exporter in a precarious position. Notwithstanding the initial reactions to anti-Japanese feelings, Japan has come round to realizing its previous shortcomings and to endeavour to remedy the situation. Many observers have noted Japanese interests moving away from Southeast Asia to other parts of the world - notably the Middle East - where the Japanese are more welcome and where larger opport unities are often more available. But the fact remains that Southeast Asia as a region continues to figure importantly in Japanese strategic thinking. Southeast Asia is a potential natural resource supplier as well as an important market for its processed products, not to ment ion being the life-line of Japan ' s energy supplies from the Middle East. In the past, Japan was so thoroughly absorbed in big-power diplomacy that it ignored the smaller nations . The Japanese thinking essentially evolved around an east-west axis . Since 1972, after the series of "shocks " (shokku) - Nixo n's China visit, the Arab oil embargo, the anti-Japanese movements in Southeast Asia, and Indochina , Japan has turned more attention to a north-south a r rangement i nvolving more co-operation and partnership with the developing Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa told the seventy wo rld. fifth session of the Diet in January 1975 that one o f the two policy goals of Japanese foreign policy was to seek divers ified diplomacy while continui ng to regard the United States as a cornerstone and maintaining peaceful co-existence with the Soviet Union and China. The new element is the strengthening of ties with Southeast Asi an nations.22 Miyazawa said on another occasion that such goals could be implemented by Japan's seeking co-operation with the industrialized

22

"Foreign Poli cy Address," 4 January 1975, pp. 19-20.

38

democracies in a joint effort. 23 (Policy planners i n Washington have of late also recommended the same approach: that the Un ited States co-operate with other developed nations to bring about economic development in Southeast Asia.) Japan would like to see a status quo maintained in Southeast Asia , and for this reason it has viewed the Indochina development with concern . While paying attention to emerging bodies such as ASEAN for alternati ves, Japan is approaching the various nations in a cautious manner and taking into account the heterogene ous nature of the ruling regimes . While outwardly Japan would continue ~o endorse the idea of ASEAN as an attempt at regional integration , it is likely to place emphasis on bilateral relations . Hence, Japan is giving priority to economic investment in the Indonesian marke t due to more conducive conditions existing there: resources, co- operation with the leaders, and other favourable investment factors that used to exist in Thailand in the 1960s. The basic disparity in the l evels of development between Thailand and Japan will remain a source of friction regardless of what remedy is sought. Nevertheless, it seems that the Japanese are beginning to understand Thailand and the Thais more than before, and to try to pattern their approaches in order at least not to cause abrasion to Thai nationalist sensitivities. On the Thai side, efforts are being made to project Japan's goodwill towards Thailand through meaningful economic and cultural co-operation. Relations with ~ Indochina States. Developments in the past year have made Indochina the focal point of Thailand ' s external relations. It is here where much of the tension and acrimony in interstate dealings have taken place . When the French were still in control of Indochina, Thailand found i t within its national interest to assist (for example, by providing sanctuary, food , and shelter, etc.) the various national liberation movements, particularly the Vietminh , in their fight for independence. The phobia against communism which led to the country's subscription to the American containment programme, and the apprehension of

23

Address to the Foreign Correspondents Club, Tokyo, 10 J uly 1975 .

39

the potential rivalry the Vietminh pos ed in Thai land after their successful liberation of North Vietnam reversed the orig inal sympathetic stand, resurrecting the feelings o f the precolonial days when the Thais and Vietnamese were the two dominant powers on mainland Southeast Asia, each vying for Laos and Combodia as s pheres of in fluen ce . The eventual participation i n the Indoch i nese conflagration - first in Laos and Cambodia - while carried out with n ational interest consideration, was a radical step towards estrangement and hostility. The declared support of the local insurgency movement by Hano1 in the mid-196 0 s adde d another d imension to the estrangement between Thailand and North Vietnam, and the latter's activities in ne i ghb o ur1ng Laos and Cambodia were viewed in Bangko k not only as being part of the Hanoi effort aga1nst So uth Vietnam but also as Hanoi's plan to exert its influence i n the entire Indochina area. Thus in spite of signs of change i n the Indochinese devel opment since the late 1960s Thailand found itself unable (or unwilling) to modify its view toward the communist menace in Indochina, being stro ngly motivated by the development of internal insurgency and the existence of a large number of Vietnamese refugees along the border with Laos who could be the potential The strategy then was to create "F1fth Co lumn" for Hanoi. a buffer zone or cushion separating the North Vietnamese from the Thais. Laos and Cambodia would naturally serve this purpose for Thailand. Hence, it seemed na~ur al that the Thanom-Prapat Government should have acceded t o the United States request and dispatc hed "vo lunteers" to Laos to fight against Leftist elements, and that even when the Lon Nol regime was established in Cambod1a in 1970 , the Thai Governme nt went ahead in recogn1zing and actively supporting it for f our years. (Thail and became a ~r ai ning base for Cambodian for ces . ) It was the swift victor1es of the Khmer Rouge and ~he North Vietnamese in April 1975 that awakened the Tha 1s to the reality of be i ng all along antagonists of the Indochinese peoples , and thus placing the country at the frontline o f a potential communist retaliatory onslaught . The urgency was made even more apparent with the takeo·Jer of Laos by the Pathet Lao which followed a few months thereafter. After twenty years of warding of f communist aggres s \ on, Thailand f o und itself con fr ont1ng the communist staces of Indochina. To a large extent, the gravity of the situati o n has been the product of past po licies which did not take into account the aspirations of the ne1ghbo uring peoples .

40

Of the three Indochina states, North Vietnam has of course been the most serious rival. Following the takeover of the South in April 1975, Hanoi dispatched a delegation under Than Hien, Deputy Foreign Minister, to discuss several matters with the Thai side, including the immediate return of combat craft which had been brought into Thailand by fleeing South Vietnamese officers prior to the surrender. Apparently, the move was a psychological weapon against a shaken enemy who had just witnessed not only the swift downfall of Saigon - a thing that had been predicted but whose speed had been a total surprise - but also the crumbling of its main p~llar of support, the United States. Fortunately for Thailand, the then newly-formed civilian government of Kukrit took a firm stand on the military craft issue and moved to counter the North Vietnamese offensive by a diplomatic manoeuvre: turning toward a China which itself was growing increasingly uneasy about the expanding Soviet influence over North Vietnam. Nevertheless, the issue has become an obstacle in the continued worsening of relations between Vietnam and Thailand and has been raised by the Vietnamese side on countless occasions to demonstrate the lack of insincerity on Thailand's part in seeking normalization of relations with North Vietnam. But there are other outstanding major controversies which are keeping both sides apart. For the . Vietnarnese, while they might, in the final analysis, be prepared to drop the demand for the military craft ' s return, or even to try t o forget the participation of Thailand in the Indochina \'lar and the persecution of Vietnamese refugees, they are still deeply concerned with the continuing presence of u. s. military forces on Thai soil. Although the Thais have pledged . to see to such a withdrawal, it could perhaps be Hanoi's belief that the Thai Government will still keep American "advisors" and retain several American installations(whether run by Americans or Thais) that can be used against Vietnam. The North Vietnamese are understandably .unhappy about any remnants of the United States forces in the area, with recent propaganda by Hanoi demonstrating this feeling. This problem, more than any other, is likely to keep the relationship between Bangkok and Hanoi on ice. It has been argued by the Thai Government that military relations with Washington cannot be totally severed as long as Hanoi continues to overtly and covertly promote revolution in Thailand . Bangkok was at the beginning (in 19 75) eager to establish ties with Hanoi, but the subsequent hostility demonstrated by Hanoi has dampened this eagerness, and has

41

on the contrary causej the Thais to react adversely to the constant North Vietnamese threats . The growing closeness with Peking is in one respect an outcome of the Thai feeling that Hanoi is unwilling to use reason to settle existing differences. That Han oi is taking every opportunity to lambast Thailand for "col luding with the U. S. imperialists" is an excuse f or the military to argue for the continuing U.S. presence in Thailand, especially when they are aware of the formidable arsen al which Hanoi has come to possess after its victory in the South . In addition, Hanoi ' s attacks on ASEAN, and the declaration of its support for communist insurgents i n Southeast Asia have also drawn adverse reactions from other ASEAN member states. The North Vietnamese belligerence has e n abled ASEAN states to obtain more solidarity which might not otherwise have come about so read i l y . This has undoubtedly stre ngthened the Thai position vis-a-vis Hanoi. For Thailand, it seems that an endeavour has to be made t o eradicate the anti-Vietnam ese 1mage that has been round for s ome t1me . Given the V1 e tnamese sensibil1ty about the l i kel1hood o f a Thai - U. S. "collusion " , the Thai Government has t o fi nd ways to di s count t h e possibility . While us1ng ASEAN as one f o rum to b argain with Han oi , Tha1l a nd endeavours to continue to 1mprove t he bilateral relations at the same time . The task , howe ve r , is by no means an easy one , especially when Han oi chooses to show too much arrogance and self-co nfidence which may be interpreted by the opposite Nevertheless , Hano1 at the moment is also side as threats. formidable task of nation-bui l ding and the with ed preoccupi between the Soviet Union and China. game g playing a balancin fr1ction with Peking, such as, continuing It a lso has to face c l aims over the Paracels the f or instance , in the cas e of and Spratleys in the South China Sea . In the long run, Vietnam has reasons to fear China more than Thailand (the geographical prox imity , historical animosity, fricti o n i n political policies , the South China Sea islands issue, etc.); this partly explains the tilt towards Moscow in the cu rrent Hanoi policy. Another important objective is of course to have influence 1n the rest of Indochina, for It would seem that the both offensive and defensive reasons. way to achieve this objective with relative ease is to seek a temporary detente with Thailand , though admittedly 1t wo uld be within Thailand ' s i n terest to discourage or preven t any Vietnamese attempt at influence in Indo china even though it might n ot be in any real position to prevent it . Furthermore , Vietnam can indeed benefit from Thailand in its re cons truct l o n,

42

with the latter's potential, vast supplies of cement , building materials and rice; this would help lessen dependence on the Soviet Union and China, and would demonstrate Hanoi's earnest desire to live with its neighbours in peace . Laos . Since at least 1954 (when the Geneva Agreement was signed guaranteeing the neutrality of Laos), Thai foreign policy towards the land-locked sparsely populated country has been to keep it as a buffer against communism . As a matter of fact, it was the political instability in Laos in the early 1 960s that drove the Sarit Government to allow direct U.S. mi litary presence in Thailand, as well as the subsequent Thai military intervention in the name of safeguarding Laotian sovereignty. Although racially Laotians and Thais are quite closeknit , the relations between two countries in the past have been unequal, a fact that was taken for granted by the Thai side. As a matter of fact, the majority of the ethnic Laotians live on the Thai side of the Mekong River ( 8 million as compared to 4 million in Laos), and they have looked t o Bangkok, not to backward Laos. Laos has relied on Thailand as the source or transit point for almost all its material needs, as the country produces practically nothing of its own . For this reason, the Thais have tended to maintain a condescending attitude, while the Laotians living in Laos have quite naturally not felt particularly happy about this state of affairs. When the Right - wing faction, and later theneutralist elements under Souvanna Phourna, were . in control of Laos in the 1960s and early 1970s, the Thai military government reached several tacit understandings with Vientiane, one of which was the stationing of . Thai volunteers (some 21,000 at the height) under the u.s. funding - a violation of both neutrality agreements of 1954 and 1962. When the American funds dried up and the CIA activities in Laos ceased, the programme was discontinued. Nevertheless, since the formation of the Laoti an coalition government in 1973, the Bangkok Government watched the growing Leftist power in the country with concern, unable to intervene partly because of the cessati on of the American programme. All the same, the complete takeover of Laos and the abolition of the monarchical institution by the Pathet Lao in 1975 carne as a shock, especially when i t

43

followed closely the events in Vietnam and Cambodia. The main line of Thai thinking has baen . that the political change was engineered by the Pathet Lao with the full backing of, and dire.c t help from the North Vietnamese - for the Laotians alone would have been unwilling or unable to carry this .out .. In addition,. many Thais have continued to believe that since the .change has been imposed , there will come . a .. moment in the near future for the Laotian people to overthrow it. Accordingly the Bangkok Government has maintained a relatively patient posture in the face of Laot i an provocation s against Thailand . Despite several border incidents (including the gunboat episode in November 1975 , which was thought to be instigated by the North Vietnamese) as well as the.numerous verbal attacks, the policy of Thailand has been to treat Laos , in spite of the change .in government , in a brotherly fashion - in order to achieve the .. goal of keeping Laos from becoming hostile to Thailand . It has continued with its aid programmes, and on the political side , the Thai Government has allayed the fear of the Pathet Lao about the possibility of the Right wing and other anti- Pathet Lao .elements . using Thailand as a base against them; most of . the . important former Laotian leaders who sought refuge in Thailand have been sent out of the country to France and the .United States (including the famous CIA- trained General Vang Pao, the former leader of the CIA- financed Meo army, who sought political asylum in the United States) . At the same time, however , the Kukrit Government demonstrated a firm stand on certain issues. The entire Thai - Laotian border was kept closed for a few months following the gunboat shooting incident , which caused great economic hardship for the Laotians who have been dependi ng on Thailand for their outside imports of clothing, foodstuffs, medicine , and so forth.24 But the .military would like perhaps to take a tougher stand towards the Pathet Lao regime. Feeling partly .that the " insolent " Laotians needed to be taught a lesson, and being alarmed by reports of growing

24

There have been some who . argue against the wisdom of the b order closure . By doing so, they say, Thai land has driven the Laotians into the hands of the North Vietnamese. Indeed the Laotian Premier, Kaysone Promvihan, seemed .favourably inclined to Hanoi' s of fer to provide the Laotians with an access to the .South China Sea a cross Vietnam. It remains to be seen if the new route will prove to be a viable alternative to the transit arrangements through Thailand ,

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Sov1etp Vietnamese, and even Cuban involvements in Laos, they support a move to aid former Right- wingers in their anti-Pathet Lao activities . In short the position of the Thai Government is , to ameliorate the current Laotian hostility towards Thailand, while at the same time keeping a firm stand in protecting Thai sovereignty and preventing elements in Laos to operate against Thai in terests within Thai territories. In pursuance of this, however, it has to be clearly unders tood that . there is a basis for the present resentment the Pathe t Lao has expressed towards Thailand . Thailand in the past had violated Laotian sovereignty in the name of security . The sentiment has also stemmed fr o m an 1nferior pos1tion Laos has occupied vis-a-vis Thailand. It may also be explained that the current veering towards Hanoi by Laos is to counter the Thai inf l uence and to force some concessions from the Thai side . In Thai thinking , Laos has far too long been accorded the image of a passive and .weak country being acted upon by other powerful states, and this notion has made the Thais feel it their duty to control the situation in Laos: some Thais are arguing that it is perhaps time to reorient this thinkingp and begin regarding Laos from a more enlightened angle, allowing for the fact that the Pathet Lao, in its process of retaining and maintaining Laotian sovereignty, is free to choose its own options . The feeling that Laos is for Thailand to have and to own has also to be shed _before Thailand is able to pursue positive relations with its close neighbours (and to demonstrate ~o the Laotians the respect due them) . Whatever unpleasant experiences to be caused, so this argument runs, the Thai Government has to shoulder a larger part of the responsibility in righting its relations with Laos. Cambodia . Cambodia and Laos have historically shared a similar fate: they are weak states acted on by their more pmverful neighbours and outsiders alike. But there was a degree of difference between Thai -Lao and Thai-Carnbodian relations . While for a long time the Laotians had acquiesced to the Thai interference, Sihanouk's Carnbod1a had posed a challenge to the Thai author1 ty by demonstrating its equality and ab1lity to exert a big voice in the international arena . Furthermore, the strained relat1ons between the two countries in the 1950s and 1960s (as a result of the Khao Pra Viharn dispute and other reasons) in one way generated some kind of respect for Cambodia.

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The years of support given to the Lon Nol Government (in the name of extending Thai national security) also stemmed from the nature - of the relationship that had In one sense, the Thai Government existed before then. felt more at ease with the Lon Nol regime, being able to even impose the Thai will on Phnom Penh on occasions (whereas previously Sihanouk was himself a leader of calibre to be reckoned with, and the nationalism in him caused discomfort to the Thai military leaders). After 1973 when it became apparent that the Lon Nol regime would eventually be defeated by the Khmer Rouge, the Thai Government refused to seek an alternative to meet this antic1pated outcome because it could not reconcile itself to the fiercely nationalisti c Khmer Rouge as well as because it wanted to discard the illusion that the Lon Nol regime could somehow hold off for a considerably longer period. 25 However, when the moment of truth final ly came, Thailand was faced with the urgency of adapting to the new situation. It quickly expressed a desire to befriend the Khmer Rouge, and to turn a new leaf in its relations with Cambodia by accepting the Peking-based royal government of Prince Sihanouk a.nd the Khmer Rouge . By a stroke of luck, the transition was achieved with relative ease because, for one thing, the Khmer Rouge, the real power behind the new regime, was economically hard-pressed and needed Thai help in its upcoming economic reconstructio n , and for another, it was the policy of China to see a reconciliatio n between Thailand and Cambodia (a factor which would help to forestall the influence of Hanoi and strengthen the Chinese position in the Sino- Soviet contest in Southeast Asia). Consequently through the good offi ces of the Chinese Government , which had strongly supported the Khmer Rouge as well as Sihanouk all through the struggle , !eng Sary , Deputy Premier for Foreign Affairs, journeyed to Bangkok in November, 1975, at the invitation of the Thai Foreign Ministry. The talks produced a communique normalizing Thai-Cambodi an relations and commiting Thailand t o aid Cambodia in the latter's national

25

As a matter of fact. Thailand had earlier made one gesture which

ind i cated its readiness to accommodate Sihanouk ' s exile governmen ~ and the Khmer Rouge should they be victorious: when the ailing mother of Prince Sihanouk was passing through Thailand on her way to join her son in Peking, she was well re ceived by the Thai Government .

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reconstruction . Both sides also agreed to establish liaison offices at the border to co- ordlnate future programmes. How long this state of affairs between Cambodia and Thailand will last is an open question . Currently, the Cambodian Government forges ahead with its nation-building, keeps the Chlnese satisfied, and is able to check the Vietnamese lnfluence . All these factors are strengthened by the ties with the Bangkok Government. Nevertheless , a few incidents have already taken place which threaten the delicate state of the relationship and cast doubt on the durability of future intercourse . · The border flareups, the bombing incident in Siem Reap, and the disagreement on certain commodity prices , are major sparks that can cause The fact that the long the development of a major fire. postponed second meeting between Foreign Minister Chartichai Choonhavan and Ieng Sary never materialized is an indication of the fluid nature of the relationship. It is uncertain if the Khmer Rouge are not viewing the present ties with Thailand as being a temporary measure to support the existing requirements , especially in their dealing with China and Vietnam, or that they simply have been unprepared, owing to domestic reasons, to widen their intercourse with Thailand . Concurrently, even though the Thais have shown more eagerness to befriend the new Cambodian regime, they must work hard to convince the Cambodian rulers of the value in maintaining an amicable relationship with Thailand. (The value will somehow have to be spelled out in concrete terms also, for instance , in the volume of economic aid.) Taken as a whole, Indochina has become for the first time in recent history Thailand's major foreign policy problem. Direct invasions from Vietnam have been talked about , and are indeed a possibility - though not a probability. Nevertheless , it is accepted that the current local insurgency is in some way endorsed and aided by at least one state in Indochina, and so domestic and international affairs are closely intertwined here. It is also the first time Thailand is compelled to consider matters close to home . In the past, lt had been able to ignore this largely because of the help rendered by foreign powers in its foreign policy orientation. Now it will have to rely primarily on its own resources . Since the Indochinese events in Thai-ASEAN Relations. 1975 , Thailand ' s foreign policy seems to have been pegged on

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to ASEAN. The "los s 1 ' of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia has brought the problem of survi val and security closer to horne, thus prornptin