Diplomacy of Prudence: Canada and Israel, 1948-1958 9780773566194

Table of contents :
Contents
Note on Sources
Preface
Introduction
1 From Recognition to Full Diplomacy
2 The Non-internationalization of Jerusalem
3 Aiding the Palestinian Refugee
4 Arms and the Reluctant Middleman
5 Bureaucratic Dispositions
6 The Saga of the Unsheathed Sabres
7 In the Aftermath of Sinai-Suez
8 Summary and Conclusions
9 Epilogue
Notes
Index
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
R
S
T
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W
Y
Z

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The Diplomacy of Prudence Canada and Israel, 1948-1958

The Diplomacy of Prudence is an analysis of Canadian foreign policy during the first decade of Israeli independence. Zachariah Kay argues that the Canadian government was cautious in its support of Israel, attempting to maintain a balanced position between the warring Arab and Israeli sides. Using a case study approach, Kay explores Canada's response to key issues such as the recognition of the new state of Israel, the status of Jerusalem, the Palestinian refugee problem, arms sales to Israel, particularly the sale of F-86s in 1956, and the Suez war. He also provides a thorough account of domestic politics in Canada that influenced foreign policy and the effectiveness of pro-Israeli lobby groups in influencing policy decisions. Kay concludes that although Canada was a major middle power in terms of its policy towards Israel, the government tended to defer to the policy positions of greater powers, such as the United States and Britain, but maintained an independent mediatory role that was instrumental in quelling a prospective global conflagration, as witnessed during the Sinai-Suez crisis and its aftermath. The Diplomacy of Prudence brings new insights to the study of Canadian foreign policy during Canada's coming of age as ah international force. ZACHARIAH KAY was an elected member of the Canadian Political Science Executive and is an executive member of the Israel Association for Canadian Studies.

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The Diplomacy of Prudence Canada and Israel, 1948-1958 Z A C H A R I A H KAY

McGill-Queen's University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Buffalo

© McGill-Queen's University Press 1996 ISBN 0-7735-1435-x Legal deposit fourth quarter 1996 Bibliotheque nationale du Quebec Printed in the United States on acid-free paper

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Kay, Zachariah The diplomacy of prudence: Canada and Israel, 1948-1958 Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN o-7735-i435-x 1. Canada - Foreign relations - Israel. 2. Israel - Foreign relations - Canada. 3. Canada - Foreign relations - 1945- I. Title. FC251.17x39 1997 327.7105694 096-990013-9 FI029.5.I7K39 1997

To the Cherished Memory of My Mother Rose

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Contents

Note on Sources / ix Preface / xi Introduction / xiii I

From Recognition to Full Diplomacy / 3

2

The Non-internationalization of Jerusalem / 14

3

Aiding the Palestinian Refugee / 24

4

Arms and the Reluctant Middleman / 29

5

Bureaucratic Dispositions / 43

6

The Saga of the Unsheathed Sabres / 51

7

In the Aftermath of Sinai-Suez / 80

8

Summary and Conclusions / 100

9

Epilogue / 109 Notes / III Index / 129

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Note on Sources

Primary sources for this work included official publications from Canadian and Israeli government departments as well as the files of the National Archives of Canada (NA) and the Israel State Archives (ISA). Secondary sources are cited only in the endnotes. The reader should note that the Pearson papers contain many documents that originally appeared in the files of the Department of External Affairs and that in these cases reference has generally been to the DEH files. Many documents in the Israel State Archives series Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel (DFPI) are in English, some are in French, and quite a number are in Hebrew. The relevant texts have been translated into English. Canada, Ottawa. House of Commons, Debates, 1949-58 Senate, Debates, 1948-58 Department of External Affairs publications, statements and speeches Privy Council files, 1947-58 House of Commons: Standing Committee on External Affairs Minutes National Archives of Canada files of the Department of External Affairs RG 25 series Privy Council files from 1947, RG 2 series Papers of E.L.M. Burns, MG 31 John G. Diefenbaker, MG 26

x Note on Sources Lester B. Pearson, MG 26 Louis S. St Laurent, MG 26 Israel, Sdeh Boker. Ben Gurion Archives, diaries, 1948-58 Israel State Archives: Foreign Office Files: Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel, vols. 1-7, 1948-52 (English and Hebrew) and Companion vols., 1948-52 (English)

Preface

This book is a sequel to my previous study on the subject, Canada and Palestine: The Politics of Non-Commitment (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1978). It is an account of Canada's diplomatic relations with Israel based upon primary sources from the national archives of both countries. Once all documents became available for perusal, the work was carried out in Jerusalem and Ottawa. The late Michael Comay, who served as the first head of the (British) Commonwealth division in Israel's Foreign Ministry and subsequently its first ambassador to Canada during the decade under study was to have collaborated in this work. Tragically, he succumbed to cancer during the initial stage of the study. His centrality in the first decade is axiomatic and his sagacity was sorely missed. His contribution would undoubtedly have enhanced the end product. While the work was in progress, I presented four papers which were to eventually appear as chapters in the book. The presentations were made at the conferences of the Australian and New Zealand Association of Canadian Studies in Armadale, New South Wales, July 1990; the Association of Canadian Studies of the United States, Boston, November 1991; the Southwest Association of Canadian Studies, Lafayette, Louisiana, February 1993; and finally the Western Social Science Association, Oakland, California, April 1995. This study was made possible through a major grant from the Samuel and Sadye Bronfman Family Foundation enabling its inauguration and early sustenance. Several other grants facilitated its continuation which included the Programme in Canadian Studies -

xii Preface

now a Centre - of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; the Jewish Foundation of Manitoba; the late Arye Dulzin, chair of the Jewish Agency from the Chair's research fund; the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada; and the Israel Association for Canadian studies for research, travel and publication grants. My sincere thanks for their vital assistance. Thanks are also due to Avraham Avi-Hai, a former member of the Jewish Agency executive for his early assistance and encouragement; to David Smith and other members of the National Archives of Canada staff, with a very special thanks to Ian McClymont of the Manuscripts Division; the personnel of External Affairs Historical Division, library and the embassy staff in Tel Aviv; and to the staff of the Israel State Archives, with special thanks to Yehoshua Freundlich. I would also like to express my appreciation to the following who read and commented on segments of the draft manuscript: Michael Brecher, McGill political science professor; the late Avraham Harman, long-time president and chancellor of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Geoffrey Wigoder, editor-in-chief of Encyclopaedia Judaica; Yosef Yaacov, retired Israeli diplomat, and the McGill-Queen's editors. Finally, what follows is my sole responsibility.

Introduction

Canada's development from colony to Dominion and quasi-sovereignty by the conclusion of the Second World War was accompanied by gradual evolution to measured self-reliant decision making in foreign policy. From Confederation until 1946, almost eight full decades, there was no separate External Affairs minister: from the department's founding in 1909 the prime minister always retained the portfolio. Between 1946 and 1948 the new, separate minister - and presumed successor to the long-time Liberal prime minister - remained very much under Mackenzie King's sway. Nonetheless External Affairs personnel were already asserting themselves and becoming quite active in the post-war international arenas. By then Canada had emerged as a major middle power due to its physical size, considerable industrial growth, and wartime contribution to the Allied effort. As a geographic titan, it was strategically interposed between the two superpowers: however, for economic, historical, ideological, political and social reasons, it was strongly allied to the United States. All such factors are reasons for a cautious approach to international relations. Canada's only palpable reason to engage in commitments beyond her alliances with the u.s. and Britain was to establish an international organization dedicated to peace and security. For pragmatic reasons, the Holy Land was too remote to be a logical place to which to make foreign policy commitments. The religious factors, while not necessarily based on Hebrew messianism, Koranic scriptures, or papal precepts on Protestant fundamentalism, were not primary considerations in decision making. Indeed, Canada followed

xiv Introduction

a policy of noncommitment as far as Palestine was concerned until Jewish sovereignty was restored there in 1948. That policy was predicated on the views of a very cautious and reluctant prime minister whose legacy the succeeding government somewhat modified for the post-1948 decade. Hence a natural transition from noncommitment to caution or weighty prudence that preceded Canada's de facto recognition of Israel was followed by another delay in de jure, recognition which came simultaneously with United Nations membership for the Jewish state. It was indicative of what was to follow. This study is based on the cases and issues which dominated the military and political relationship between Israel and Canada in Israel's first decade. The status of Jerusalem, a delicate issue, ordained a particularly cautious approach for a country headed by a Roman Catholic. Still Canada demurred from the Vatican's demands for the full internationalization of the city and its environs. Concern for the Palestinian refugee manifested itself in material support and was a factor in Canada's Middle Eastern concern for decades in spite of the commonly held perception of Canada's pro-Israel stance. The most pronounced manifestation of prudent diplomacy were armaments in general and the struggle over the Sabre jets sale in particular. Added to that were the predilections and proclivities of Ottawa's bureaucrats. The chapters dealing with those matters bring into sharper focus the theme of this study. The trauma of the Sinai-Suez operation in the autumn of 1956 was the primary factor which raised Canadian involvement in the ArabIsrael conflict to an apex from which it was to recede in subsequent decades. Yet the government - particularly its External Affairs minister and his close advisors, confirmed Canada as a major middle power with a proper sense of timing combined with circumspection and a palatable plan to quell a prospective global conflagration. The balance in the Canadian-Israeli relationship was maintained and continued even with the change in the federal government toward the first decade's conclusion. The first decade of Canada-Israeli relations is a story of a major middle power and its relationship with a new state that had already acquired a reputation as a regional power. In a world galvanized into bi-polarity with the Cold War, this decade appears to have been one of the chilliest periods.

The Diplomacy of Prudence

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i From Recognition to Full Diplomacy

More than seven months were to pass after the proclamation of the State of Israel on the Sabbath eve of 14 May 1948 before the Canadian government granted de facto recognition. During that period Canada reached a watershed in the course of its foreign policy in general and on the Middle East in particular. The significance lies in the changes in leadership at the apex of the Canadian federal polity. A civil servant had risen through the ranks to become External Affairs minister with a substantial control of his portfolio, unimpeded by a prime minister chary - as his predecessor - about international involvements. Secretary of State for External Affairs, Louis Stephen St Laurent, had been elected Liberal Party leader at the August 1948 convention in Ottawa and became prime minister on 15 November. He had finally succeeded William Lyon Mackenzie King who by then had established an apparently insurmountable record as the longest-serving prime minister in the British Empire and Commonwealth. St Laurent's successor in External Affairs and long-time civil servant Lester Bowles "Mike" Pearson had played a key role in the establishment of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) and in husbanding its majority recommendation on the partition of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states in the General Assembly the previous year.1 That had significantly enhanced his diplomatic standing in world forums. Pearson was sworn in on 10 September 1948, and entered the House of Commons after winning a by-election on 25 October. Pearson's move from deputy minister - formally known as undersecretary - to major political decision maker in the era of Liberal

4 Canada and Israel, 1948-1958

parliamentary hegemony also enhanced his position in the house and on the hustings. It enabled him to further pursue his career as a seeker of detente in interstate relations.2 As a consequence of his subsequent efforts, particularly during the Sinai-Suez crisis and in the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), he won the international acclaim that culminated in the Nobel Peace Prize at the end of 1957, almost at the conclusion of the decade in which he was the dominant figure in laying the foundation for prudential CanadianIsraeli relations in the far more pacific decade which followed. The period has been described as "The Emergence of Liberal Internationalism, 1947-1957."3 Paradoxically, the decade began with the conclusion in power of the self-effacing and British-oriented William Lyon Mackenzie King. Indeed, King's attitudes had become anachronistic in the post-war world in which Canada had emerged as a major middle power. Moreover, as under-secretary, Pearson was too politically active for the likes of Mackenzie King in his role at the United Nations and had caused a cabinet crisis over the partition plan. In fact, he "had stuck out his neck."4 In his new ministerial capacity and with a firm grip on the External Affairs portfolio, "sticking (his) neck out" as a cabinet member and trusted successor to the new prime minister would certainly be in contrast to Pearson's previous status. The decade proved sufficiently rewarding for him on the national political stage as well: he was to succeed St Laurent as party leader and prime minister half way through the second decade of Canadian-Israeli relations. Canada's midwifery role at the conception and birth of the UN General Assembly's partition plan has been well recorded.5 Yet Canadian policy makers were chagrined by the subsequent behaviour of the two main anglophone powers. Pearson's predecessor as undersecretary and then High Commissioner in London, Norman Robertson, was annoyed with the British government. In a communication to Pearson he stated that we "may soon see the United Kingdom moving out of its exasperatingly negative role and taking its share of responsibility in the task of conciliation."6 That of course was not to be. In a subsequent communication to Robertson in the wake of Israel's declaration of independence, Pearson stated: "So far as I am concerned, my own impatience with the attitude and policy of the United Kingdom and the United States toward Palestine has not been diminished by the developments of the last week. The legal argument of the United Kingdom that there is no difference between Arabs invading Palestine and Jews who may be attempting to set up a state within a United Nations resolution, does not impress me very favourably, though no doubt it is explained by strategy and oil. On the other hand,

5 From Recognition to Full Diplomacy

the United States revolving-door policy, each push determined to a large extent by domestic political considerations and culminating in the sorry recognition [of Israel] episode of last Saturday, inspires no confidence and warrants little support."7 While Pearson might have been irked by United States President Harry Truman's rapid grant of de facto recognition of Israel's statehood, he could well have anticipated that the renascent Jewish state would seek Canada's recognition, particularly in the light of its role at the United Nations. On 7 June Michael Saul Comay, head of the fledgling Israel Foreign Ministry's British Commonwealth division, met with George Ignatieff, who was then with the Canadian delegation at the United Nations. General A.G.L. McNaughton, who headed the Canadian delegation, was very much of the Mackenzie King mind insofar as the prime minister desired a non-activist role for Canada. The same could be said of Justice Minister J.L. Ilsley, who had cast Canada's vote for partition on 29 November 1947. Ignatieff, on the other hand, was very much a "Pearsonian" who felt the Jews should have some territorial guarantee. He had established a rapport with Israelis Eliahu Elath (ne Epstein), Abba Eban, and foreign minister Moshe Sharett (ne Shertok), who tried to make the best of the partition plan. Ignatieff was reporting directly to Pearson8 and suggested that Comay go to Ottawa to present Israel's case for recognition, which he did on 21 June.9 Comay argued that there was a legal and moral obligation for recognition which flowed form the partition resolution of 29 November 1947. Noting Canada's middle power status and that it was "unencumbered by any special status in the Palestine issue," Comay cited the country's membership in the UN Security Council. Since the partition resolution contemplated the new state's admission to the United Nations, a Security Council recommendation was a prerequisite, making Canada's recognition indispensable. Aware of British policy and its impact on the Mackenzie King government, Comay felt assured that the United Kingdom would follow the anticipated Canadian "lead in due course."10 Comay's brief was followed with additional correspondence seeking to ascertain the Canadian government's attitude on Israel's United Nations membership.11 Pearson was well aware that there should be some time lag between Canadian and British recognition of Israel. Indeed, the External Affairs minister was ahead of cabinet and even his staff on the recognition question as he related it to Israel's Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett at the November General Assembly sessions in Paris: "Pearson even confessed that he, personally, was in favour of recognition, but that the majority of the cabinet wishes to avoid a clash with Britain."12

6 Canada and Israel, 1948-1958

In the conversation with Sharett, Pearson advised Israel not to become "so dazzled by her might that she attempt to seize the remainder of western Palestine by force." He further suggested that a compromise had to be found with Israel's demand for the Negev region, which was opposed by the British. As for the current United Nations session, Pearson concluded that "(i) there was no need to finalize the borders during this session; (2) the [Palestine] Conciliation Commission should be a Good Offices Committee;13 (3) Israel should be admitted to the United Nations during this session, so that she might enjoy equal status with the Arabs before the Commission."14 Pearson's conclusions still had to be confirmed by his own government and even bureaucrats where the British impact was still intact. External Affairs' Elizabeth MacCallum noted in a memorandum to the acting minister that "Canada would be reluctant to become the state casting the deciding vote," while Escort Reid, her External Affairs colleague, noted for Pearson that the admission issue should be distinct from recognition.15 Deep Israeli disappointment was communicated to Pearson on 18 December, with Comay claiming that Canada was one of those responsible for the rejection of Israel's application.16 Eliahu Elath, Israel's representative and subsequently its first ambassador to the United States, noted, "Vacillating Canada followed France under British pressure" on the United Nations membership issue.17 According to Israel's United Nation's representative Abba Eban, 'Pearson was favourably disposed, but unsure as to the appropriate timing."18 To some it was clear the External Affairs minister was being restrained by his government's responsiveness to British miasma and was avoiding any sole responsibility for blocking Israel's application. Sharett surmised that if France had been favourably disposed, then Canada would not have blocked the application; however, Canada would have borne part of the responsibility with France: "The matter hinged on France."19 So a Franco-Canadian entente produced a compromise to defer the admission application for one month. Having failed to be adopted, the application was voted upon. Only Argentina, Columbia, the Ukraine, the United States, and the Soviet Union supported the recommendation; Syria opposed, and Belgium, Canada, China, France, and the United Kingdom abstained, and the membership application was rejected. Britain's quasi-negative influence held, but the anglophone-francophone entente's position could not be sustained lest British credibility be impaired. Britain in particular could not maintain its negative policy toward Israel. With the adjournment of the United Nations session, it had now become quite clear that Canada itself could no longer procrastinate in its official stand on Israel's statehood. As Pearson was later to recall:

7 From Recognition to Full Diplomacy

"In my speech to the First Committee of the Assembly on 22 November, I spoke in favour of limited recognition which was given in Ottawa on 24 December with no demur from London."20 Such was formally communicated by the Secretary of State for External Affairs to the Foreign Minister of the provisional Government of Israel. In fact the United Kingdom was to follow the Canadian recognition in a month's time. At the start of 1949 the increased tension between Britain and Israel reached undisguised military confrontation. Canada's United Nations representative, General McNaughton, assumed the Security Council's presidency for the month of January. On 14 January Eban formally complained to McNaughton over British interpretations of the truce and of British troop movements which the Israeli representative regarded as a challenge to the Council. The "hysteria" in London was common knowledge, and McNaughton promised to check with Ottawa on the matter of British troop movements.21 Israel's United Nations representative Eban had remarked on McNaughton's cordiality which he ascribed to Canada's recent recognition. As previously noted, McNaughton had been regarded as one of Mackenzie King's trusted lieutenants, and the former prime minister had been more comfortable with him than with Pearson at the United Nations.22 McNaughton's alternate, Ignatieff, unlike McNaughton, was less prone to British influence. According to Ignatieff, "St Laurent agreed with Pearson; McNaughton tended to side with the Arabs."23 Sharett had cited British truculence in cables to Commonwealth foreign ministers regarding Royal Air Force sorties over battle areas. "Such activities involving the Egyptian forces were leading to an undesirable and unwarranted crisis."24 British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin's hostile attitude was having a deleterious effect on the domestic and international fronts. He was being subjected to severe criticism in the British parliament and press which pointed to the bankruptcy of his obdurate stand. The United Kingdom cabinet finally decided to temper the situation and grant de facto recognition on 18 January, a week prior to Israel's first general election. The official announcement was made on the 29th, four days after the election. British de facto recognition was both related to recent events and part of a quid pro quo with the American administration. Since the British wanted to elevate its Trans Jordanian client's international standing, the United States agreed to recognition of the Hashemite Kingdom. In the interim, France maintained its own credibility and granted Israel de facto recognition on 24 January. Israel continued to press Canada as well as other states - particularly Security Council members - on the admission issue. In February,

8 Canada and Israel, 1948-1958 Elath visited Ottawa and was favourably impressed with his meetings with senior cabinet ministers, some officials, and some Liberal and CCF (Co-operative Commonwealth Federation Party) parliamentarians.25 He remarked that Pearson was apologetic on Canada's vote at the Paris United Nations session in December, in which he had instructed R.G. "Gerry" Riddell not to vote for Israel's admission, indicating that the brakes had been put on the External Affairs minister. Elath found Defence Minister Brooke Claxton, Trade and Commerce Minister C.D. Howe agreeable, and United States Ambassador Lawrence Steinhardt helpful. That was also true of the two Jewish Liberal MPS (Members of Parliament), David Croll of Toronto (Spadina), and Maurice Hartt of Montreal (Cartier). He did, however, specifically mention CCF leader M.J. Coldwell and CCF foreign affairs spokesperson Alistair Stewart the latter representing the sizeable Jewish populated constituency of Winnipeg North - as "very friendly."26 The Canadian bureaucracy responded coldly to Elath. According to Elath External Affairs Under-Secretary Escott Reid was unfriendly, his views probably having been influenced by the pro-Arab Elizabeth MacCallum.27 Still, policy was the minister's decision, and he and Eban felt assured that Canada's vote for admission to the United Nations would be positive barring any "new attack by us."28 Moreover Eban felt confident that success in the February armistice talks (between Egypt and Israel) would probably remove any hesitation on Ottawa's part.29 Canada's intention to push for a vote on 4 March again fell subject to British pressure designed to delay Israel's membership.30 Israel's tack was to urge the Canadians to protect British prestige, since the latter intended to abstain. What had appeared to be an unshakeable Canadian support become somewhat muted.31 Yet knowledge that British forces were still moving about the region and causing considerable embarrassment incensed the Americans and now especially the Canadians.32 No one wanted a repeat of the 7 January incident when Israeli fighter aircraft downed five British military planes which had crossed over into Israeli-held territory originally assigned to the proposed Jewish state. Ignatieff strove to convince the British to be more receptive and fall into line.33 On another matter, Israel was disappointed and somewhat miffed at Canada's abstention on the vote for Israel's participation in the International Wheat Conference as well as its negative vote on Israel's participation in the Food and Agriculture Organization's (FAO) conference.34 Canada's votes were particularly important in view of its position as one of the world's major grain and food producers. The seriousness of Israel's application was given greater attention during April, when the Security Council finally recommended Israel's

9 From Recognition to Full Diplomacy

admission to membership. Pearson specifically instructed the Canadian delegation not to oppose Israel's application in the UN General Committee. The External Affairs minister was concerned about (i) Israel and Jerusalem and the Holy Places; (2) finding the late United Nations mediator Count Bernadotte's assassins;35 and (3) Israel's responsibility regarding the Palestinian refugees.36 On 27 April Pearson cabled Arnold D.P. Heeney, the new High Commissioner in London, that support should be given to the United Nations General Committee's reference to Israel's application to the Ad Hoc Committee. He also noted that he had no objection to sponsoring a resolution to admit Israel providing that sponsorship included respectable states like Australia and the United States.37 Canada on 6 May joined Australia, Guatemala, Haiti, Panama, Uruguay, and the United States in sponsoring an admission resolution in the Ad Hoc Committee. At that time, there were many telegrams drawing attention to the Argentinian and Greek-Saudi proposals about the Holy See's concerns which sought to delay Israel's admission. The St Laurent government demurred and abstained from the Argentine sponsored proposals, but the Canadian co-sponsored resolution on Israel's admission was carried in the General Assembly's plenary session on n May. With the passage of the resolution and Israel's admission to United Nations membership, Canada had granted implied dejure recognition. In a letter Pearson notified fellow Liberal MP Maurice Harrt that full recognition then existed.38 That was subsequently confirmed by Pearson in a 19 August 1949 communication on the subject to Sharett, who acknowledged it on n October.39 With full recognition of Israel, the word Palestine did not entirely fade. Canada never recognized Transjordan's annexation of eastern Palestine, also called the West Bank or Judaea and Samaria, hereafter the territories: the United Kingdom and Pakistan were the only states to do so. Use of the term Palestine was to be explained by Jean Lesage, then parliamentary assistant to the External Affairs minister, when responding to fellow Liberal MP Leon Crestohl's question about the term. Lesage stated on 25 March 1952 that "the word Palestine referred to the country on both sides of the Jordan":40 (in its historical and quasi-legal connotation that remains valid). Moreover, the Gaza strip controlled by Egypt was never recognized as part of Egyptian territory. Israel now began to move to increase and consolidate its diplomatic relations. Comay requested that Elath inform the Canadian government during his February 1949 visit to Ottawa of Israel's desire to establish a consulate.41 One of the Jewish-Canadian community's leaders, D. Lou Harris, informed Arthur Lourie of Israel's Foreign

io Canada and Israel, 1948-1958

Ministry that the consul should speak "the language as well as the natives, and understand the behaviour and manners just as well as the natives do themselves."42 The request might have been the desire for a cloned Canadian, but the intent was at least for a native anglophone. The appointee was English-born Avraham Harman, then with the Press and Information division of Israel's Foreign Ministry.43 Elath was requested to obtain Canadian approval of Harman's appointment as Israel's first consul general in Canada.44 At the beginning of March, Pearson had indicated, "I think they [Israelis] should be permitted to go ahead with their consular appointment as soon as they are admitted to the United Nations. Until that time they could send us a consular agent if they so desire - there is a precedent for this in their representation in Washington prior to dejure recognition."45 Actual notification was designed to coincide with Israel's admittance to the United Nations. As consul general to Canada, Harman was to be stationed in Montreal due to its proximity to the nation's capital and because it housed the country's largest Jewish community and was headquarters for the major Jewish organizations. In July Harman arrived to assume his duties accompanied by Arie Ben-Tovim as consul. The official appointment had been preceded by United Zionist Council of Canada chairman S.J. "Sam" Zacks, meeting with Pearson and Under-Secretary Arnold Heeney in late March. On i April Hume Wrong, Canada's ambassador in Washington, communicated with Elath, and Harman's appointment was formalized on 25 May. With Israeli's diplomatic status formally inaugurated, the Canadian government felt impelled to maintain an equilibrium with the Arab states. The Lebanese consulate in Ottawa was raised to consulate general, and in mid-December the government agreed to the opening of an Egyptian consulate general in Ottawa as well. As to the reception of the Israeli diplomats, Harman noted that the External Affairs people did not accord the consul general "the same informal diplomatic status which is the practice with us."4 32, 35-41, 45-51, 54, 56-9, 62-8, 70-9, 83, 86, 93-7 Commons. See House of Commons Commonwealth, formerly British Empire and Commonwealth, 5, 7, ii, 33. 53. 65, 67, 85, 91, 105, no Communist states, 56 Conciliation Commission. See Palestine Conciliation Commission Confederation, xiii Conroy, Pat, 17 Conservative Party (British), 45 Conservative Party (Canadian). See Progressive Conservative(s) Constantinople Convention, 46

Consul General. See individual names Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), 18, 26, 45, 52, 54-5, 59, 69, 82, 85-6, 92, 96, 98, 104 Cornell trainers, 30 Corpus Separatum, 15 Crestoll, Leon, 9, 20, 48, 65-6, 72, 97 Crimes Conference, 109 Croll, David, 8, 12, 30, 32, 34-5, 38, 44, 48, 65-6, 95 Crown Assets Disposal Corporation, 35 Cuba, 19 Curia, 19 Czechoslovakia (Czech), 40, 44, 61-2, 64-5, 104 Czechoslovakia-Egyptian arms deal, 40, 49, 58, 65 Davies, Clement, 65 Dayan, Moshe, 77, 88 Declaration of Independence, 4 Defence Research Board, 36 Dennis, Eric, 59 Detente, 4 Devoir, Le (Montreal), 16 Diarchic, 19 Diaspora, 98 Diefenbaker, John G., 13, 22, 24, 27, 49-50, 52, 55- 57-9. 67, 69, 71, 77-8, 81-2, 85-6, 88-91, 95-9, 104,106, 108-9 Doyen, 12 Drew, George, 52, 55, 57, 59, 67-8, 78, 82 Droit, Le (Ottawa), 17, 19 Dulles, John Foster, 34, 38, 47-8, 52, 54-6, 60-2, 64-6, 68, 73, 88, 90, 96, 98

131 Index Dutch-Swedish proposal, 15-17

Ferguson, Julian, 85 Fleming, Donald, 52, 55, 72 Eban, Abba, 5-8, 11-12, Flour. See Wheat Food and Agriculture 15-16, 18-19, 29-3°. Organization (FAO), 8 32-4, 43-4, 48, 56, 74, Ford, R.A.D., 21, 40-1, S3- 91- 93 47-50, 72, 74, 78 Eden, Anthony, 38, 50, Foreign Enlistments Act, 54-5 60 Edmonton Journal, 59, 76 Egypt(ian), 7-11, 13, 21, France, 6-7, 14, 18-19, 27, 29, 31, 37, 39-42, 30, 32, 36, 47, 52-3, 44, 46-8, 52-63, 71-2, 55-7, 61, 63-6, 68, 70-1, 73, 78, 80-1, 91, 74, 76-8, 80-7, 89-94, 103, 105 100, 102, 104-5, IO7 Franco-Canadian entente, Egyptian-Israeli conflict, 6 39 Egyptian-Israeli patrols, Francophones (French 48 speakers), 16-17, 26 Eilat, 92 French. See France French-Canadians. See Eisenhower Doctrine, 83, Francophones 91 Fulton, David, 35 Eisenhower, Dwight D,, 56, 88, 90, 98, 106 0-7, no Elath, Eliahu, 5-6, 8-10, Gaitskell, Hugh, 65 65 Garber, Michael, 12, 65, El Hama, 43 98 El Salvador, 15 Garreau, Roger, 18 Embargo, 29, 32, 40, Gaza, 9, 24, 27-8, 48, 63, 52-4- 58 82-5, 87-94, 96, 99, English speakers. See 102, 105, 108 Anglophones Gazette (Montreal), 75 Envoy extraordinaire and Gelber, Edward, 46 minister plenipotenGeneral Assembly. See tiary, 10, 12 United Nations GeneErell, Moshe, 77, 79 ral Assembly Eshkol, Levi, 77, 79, 89, Geneva, 18 96 German Reparations, 43 Export and Imports Globe and Mail (Toronto), Permits Act, 53 16, 55, 59, 69, 75 Export Credit Insurance Glubb, John Pasha, 45 Corporation, 72, 74, 77 Golden, David, 78 External Affairs (EXA), Good Offices Committee, passim 6 Eytan, Walter, 10, 12-13, Greece, 12 65 Greek-Saudi proposal, 9 Green, Howard, 85, F-86. See Sabre Jets 89-90, 92-5, 98-9 Falastin, 64 Guatemala, 9 Fawzi, Mahmoud, 50 Guns, 25 pounders, 32 Fedayeen, 63, 92

Habitat, 109 Haifa, 46, 50 Haiti, 9 Half-track vehicles, 72 Halifax, 35, 81 Halifax Chronicle-Herald, 59' 6 9 Hammarskjold, Dag. See United Nations Secretary-General Harkness, Douglas, 52 Harman, Avraham, 10, 30-2 Harris, D. Lou, 9 Harris, Walter, 85-6 Hartt, Maurice, 8-9 Harvard trainers, 30, 42, 52-5, 71, 78, 105 Hashemite. See Jordan Hebrew messianism, xiii Heeney, Arnold D.P., 9-10, 16-17, 31-2, 56-7, 64, 73-4, 102 Helicopters, 70, 73 Herzog, Chaim, 80 Hindus, 65 Hitler, Adolf: Mein Kampf, 91 HMCS Magnificent, 81 Holies. See Holy Places Holmes, John, 27, 30, 45-6,103 Holy Father. See Pope Holy Land, xiii, 17, 101 Holy Places, 9, 14-21, 101 Holy See. See Vatican House of Commons (HC), 3-4, 16, 25-7, 35, 38, 44, 54-7, 62, 65, 68, 71, 77, 81-94, 96-7, 104,106 Howe, C.D., 8, 33-8, 57, 64, 66-7, 72, 75, 77-8 Hungary(ian), 81, 95 Ignatieff, George, 5, 7, 102 Ilsley, J.L, 5 Ilyushin bombers. See Soviet Jet Bombers India(n), 16, 82

132 Index Interceptor planes. See Sabre Jets International Court of Justice, 96 Internationalization, chap. 2, and passim Iran, 40, 47 Iraq(i), 13, 40, 43, 98 Iron Curtain, 41 Italy, 65-6, 68 Jerusalem, chap. 2, and passim Jewish Agency, 97 Jewish-Canadian community, 9, 52 Jewish-Canadian leadership, 77, 97-8 Jewish community, 10, 92 Jewish doctors (Soviet), 46-7 Jewish (Arabian) refugees, 24, 101 Jewish organizations, 10 Jews, xiv, 4-5, 12, 14-16, 26, 43-7, 57, 65, 77, 86, 95, loo-i, 105-6, 108, no Jodoin, Claude, 40 Johnson, D.M., 43-4 Johnston Plan, 49 Joint Intelligence Board, 36 Jordan(ian), 7, 9, 14-20, 22, 26, 40, 44-5, 50, 63, 92, 98 Joseph, Dov, 34 Judaea(n), 9, 13 Kennedy, Howard, 25 Kidd, George, 13, 21-2, 40, 47, 57, 67, 77 Kidron, Michael, 93 King, William Lyon Mackenzie, xiii, 3-5, 7, 100 King David Hotel, 22 Kirkwood, Kenneth, 45, 60, 64 Kitchener-Waterloo Record, 59

Knesset, 17-18 Knights of St John (Malta), 21 Knowles, Stanley, 26, 52, 98 Koranic Scriptures, xiii Korea, 32 Khrushchev, Nikita, 61 Labour Zionist, 12, 52 Lacoste, Ambassador, 73 Lakes: Hulah, 43; Success, n Latif, Omar, 89 Latin America(ns), 19, 30 Lebanon(ese), 10-11, 13, 15, 21, 26, 40, 47, 64, 92, 98, 109 Leger, Jules, 19, 22, 39-41, 46, 49, 55, 57, 61, 64-5, 70-1, 73, 76, 78, 86,102,104 Lesage, Jean, 9 Lethbridge Herald, 76 Levy Brothers, 37, 95 L'Herioux, C, 17, 19 Liberal Party, xiii, 3, 8-9, 13, 16, 28, 30, 33, 52, 55, 76, 82, 84, 96-8, 106, 108 Link trainers, 29 Lloyd, Selwyn, 54-5, 62, 73 Locke, Justice, 12 Lodge, Jr, Henry Cabot, 83,88 London. See Britain London Suez Conference, 82 Lourie, Arthur, 9, 13, 48, 59-60, 79, 97 Low, Solon, 49, 71, 92 Loyalists (Spain), 81 MABAR, 59, 77 MacCallum, Elizabeth, 6, 8, 19-21, 35, 39, 43-4, 47, 96, 102-3, no MacDermott, T.W.L. (Terry), 13, 21, 30-1, 47. 64-5

MacDonald, Donald, 40 MacDonnell, R.M., 41, 72-3, 76 McGill University, 34 Mclnnes, C.S., 77 Maclnnis, Angus, 67 MacKay, R.M., 37-8, 102 Mackenzie King. See King, William Lyon Mackenzie McNaughton, A.G.L., 5, 7, 16, 18, 29-30, 32, 103 McNaughton, A.R.L., 32, 35 MacNaughton, Alan, 85 Machine guns, 32 Major middle power, xiii, xiv, 4-5, 78, 101, 103, 105-6 Maghreb, 24 MAPAI, 82 Martin, Paul, 66, 74, 85, 92, 109 Massey, Vincent, 50 Mayrand, Leon, 17, 19-20 Meagher, Margaret, 13, 96 Mediterranean, 13, 23, 39 Meir, Golda, 75, 82, 88, 90 Menon, Krishna, 82 Merchant, Livingston, 56, 70-1, 73 Meroz, Y., n Middle East(ern), xiv, 3, 12, 27-9, 31, 34, 36-7,

44, 47, 49, 52-3, 55-6, 58, 61-2, 69-70, 72, 75- 77- 79-gl. 8386-7, 91, 94-6, 98-9,

102-4, II0 Middle power. See Major middle power "Middle" school, 15 MIG jet fighters, 56, 63, 71 Military Aid Figures, 54 Military Attache, n Montreal, 10-11, 95 Montreal Star, 18, 44, 55, 59.76 Moslem, 47, 65

133 Index Mosquito aircraft and parts, 31-2 Mulroney, Brian, 109 Murphy, Robert, 73 Mystere jets, 40, 56-7, 63, 65-7, 73, 78 Naccache, Alfred, 21 Naples, 89 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 39-41, 47, 49, 50, 61, 70-1, 73, 76, 80-1, 85-6, 89, 91-2, 94-5, 97. 98 National Defence Board, 30, 36, 52 National Defence College, 47 Nazareth, 14 Negev, 6, 50, 94 Nehru, Pandit, 82 Nevo, Yosef, 33-4, 44 New York, 32-3, 35, 37, 75.85 Nickle, Carl, 94 Nile, 92 Nitzan, 49 Nobel Peace Prize, 4, 80, 102 Norman, Herbert, 75 North Africa, 73 North American Aviation Company, 38, 47 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 33, 47, 49, 52-3, 57, 59, 62, 68-9, 75, 96, 98, 104

"Northern Tier," 47, 49 Norway, 29 Nova Scotia, 35 Nowlan, George, 35, 55, 91 Nutt, J.S., 60 Orenda engine, 67-8 Ottawa, passim Ottawa Jewish Community, ii Ottawa Journal, 16, 55, 69

Pakistan(i), 9, 33, 45, 47 Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC), 6, 14-15, 20, 101 Palestine(ian), xiv, 4-6, 9, chap. 3, 29, 31, 45, 60, 68, 72, 109-10, passim Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 109 Panama, 9 Paris, 5, 8, 60, 62, 67, 73, 75 Parliament. See House of Commons (HC); Senate Partition. See United Nations Partition Patterson, A.B., 26, 89 Pearkes, George, 52, 55, 7i Pearson, Lester B. "Mike," 3-11, 13-16, 20, 24-7, 30-41, 43-68, 70-4, 76, 80-91, 93-7, 99-100, 102-6,108-10 Peres, Shimon, 33, 77 Persian Gulf, 24 Philippine, 21 Pilots (training), 64 Pipeline debate, 62 Polish, 44 Pope, 16 Port Arthur, 75 Prague, 64 Press, American, 62 Press, Canadian. See individual newspapers Presse, La (Montreal), 59, 64 Prime Minister/Premier. See individual names Prince Albert Daily Herald, 59 Proclamation of Independence, 3 Progressive Conservative^) (PC), 13, 22-3, 27-8, 35, 52, 54-5, 66-7, 71, 77, 85-6, 96-8, 101, 104, 106, 108

Protestant Fundamentalism, xiii Province (Vancouver), 59, 64, 69 Qibiya, 44 Quay d'Orsay, 57 Quebec, 15, 20 Queen"s Own Rifles (Canada), 77, 81, 89, 93 Rafael, Gideon, 30, 44 Rand, Ivan, 17 Recognition, de facto and dejure, xiv, chap, i, and passim

Red Cross (Canadian), 25 Refugee, Arab-Palestinian. See Arab Palestinian; Jewish-Arabian Regional power, xiv Reid, Escott, 6, 8, 102 Remez, A., 33 Reuters, 69 Riddell, R.G. "Gerry," 8, J 9 Rideau Club, 38 Ritchie, A.E., 34-6, 38, 40, 57, 62, 78 Ritchie, C.S.A., 19, 36-7 Robertson, Norman, 4, 57, 62, 66, 102 Robertson, R.G., 31 Robinson, Basil, 89, 96 Roebuck, Arthur, 31 Roman Catholic, xiv, n, 15-17, 19-20, 31, 101, 107 Rome, 19 Rowe, Earl, 81 Roy, L.P., 16 Roy, M. 66 Royal Air Force (RAF), 7, 77 Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), 76-8 Russia. See Soviet Union Sabre jets (F-86), xiv, 34-5' 37-8' 4°' 42- IO 5°. chap. 6, 81, 102-5, 7

134 Index St Laurent, Louis S., 3-4, 7, 9, 11-12, 20, 25, 33, 40, 50-1, 54-6, 63, 65-7°. 74-5- 77- 80-2, 85, 89-90, IOO-2, IO7

St Lawrence River, 76 Samaria, 9 Sanctions, 86-8, 90-2, 95 Saudi Arabia, 40, 93 Scandinavia(n), 30, 47 Scorpion Pass, 45 Secretary General. See United Nations Secretary General Secretary of State. See Dulles, John Foster Security Council. See United Nations Security Council Senate, 82, 95; Report, 109 Sharett, Moshe, 5-7, 9, 15-16, 22, 30, 34, 41, 44, 48-50, 54-7, 64, 82 Sharm-el-Sheikh, 83, 88, 90 Sinai, 63, 80, 82, 106 Sinai-Suez, xiv, 4, 27, 50-1, 54, chap. 7, 105-6, 108 Sino-Soviet bloc, 53 Siroky, Premier, 64 Six Day War, 23, 89, 91, 95, 109-10 Slemon, Roy, 76 Smith, I. Norman, 16 Smith, Sidney E., 27, 97-9 Social credit, 26, 49, 54, 71, 82, 87, 89, 92, 96, 104, 106 Soleil, Le (Quebec), 16 South Africa, 47 Soviet Union, 6, 15, 44, 46-7, 49-50, 57-8, 60-3, 71, 74, 81, 83, 98, 103 Soviet bloc, 39-41, 52, 97, 103, 105, 109

Soviet jet bombers, 56, 62-3, 71 Spain, 40-1 Speech from the Throne, 81 Spy Trials, 46-7 Stanfield, Robert, 23 Starr, Michael, 86 Steinberg, Henry, 97 Steinhardt, Lawrence, 8 Stewart, Alistair, 26, 52, 57, 72, 92, 98, 104 Sudbuiy Star, 59 Suez: Canal, 43, 46, 49, 70-1, 77, 82, 85-7, 91-2, 96; Canal Company, 70-1, 103; crisis, 72-4 Sumac, 35, 80 Superpowers, xiii Swedish, 19-20 Syria, 6, 31, 40, 43, 63, 92, 97-8 x-33 trainers, 35 Tanks and parts, 37, 39, 54-73 Tel Aviv, 12-13, 17, 21-2, 61, 67, 77, 96, 101, 104 Telegram (Toronto), 59, 69, 76 Tennessee Valley Authority, 82, 92 Territories. See Judaea; Samaria Thant, U., 95 Third World, 39, 108-9 Thompson, Tyler, 57 Tiran, Straits of, 80, 83-4, 87-8, 90 Tory. See Progressive Conservatives Tisserant, Cardinal Eugene, 19 TNT, 34 Trades and Labour Congress (TLC), 40 Transjordan(ian). See Jordan Treasury Board, 53 Tripartite Declaration/

Powers, 32, 35, 44, 53-4, 61, 102-3, 107 Trudeau, Pierre, 109 Truman, Harry S., 5 Trusteeship. See United Nations Trusteeship Turco-Iraq treaty. See Baghdad pact Turkey, 12, 14, 47, 49 Ukraine, 6 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). See Soviet Union United Arab Republic, 98 United Church, 75 United Kingdom. See Britain (ish) United Nations (UN), 4, 6, 8-9, ii, 14-17, 19-22, 24, 27, 29, 31, 34, 43-4, 46, 53, 58, 61, 6 7- 73- 77- 79. 81-3, 85-94, 96-100, 105, 108; Ad Hoc committee, 9, 16, 20; Childrens Emergency Fund (UNICEF), 25; Commissioner, 15-16; Emergency Force (UNEF), 4, 77, 81-3, 85-7,

93-6,

99, IO2,

105; First Emergency Special Session, 80; Force, 45, 55, 81-4, 89, 95; General Assembly (GA), 3, 5, 7, 9, 14-20, 25-7, 31, 44, 46, 80, 83-4, 86-8, 90, 94, 97, 107; Membership, xiv, 5-6, 9-10; Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL), 99; Partition, 3-5, 14, 92, 106; Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), 25, 27-8, 87; Secretary General (SG), 5, 37, 58-60, 63, 67-9, 80-1, 83-5, 87, 90, 93-6, 102, 104-5; Security

135 Index Council (sc), 5, 7-8, 15, 17, 29, 45-6, 63, 68, 74, 83, 86, 91, 103; Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), 3, 17, 102; Technical Assistance, 87; Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), 39, 45-7, 57, 59, 66; Trusteeship, 14, 17-18, 21 United States (u.s.), xiii, 4-11, 14-16, 19, 21-2, 30-41, 45-9, 52-3, 55-62, 65-6, 68-70, 73, 78, 80-1, 83, 88-91, 93-4, 96-8, 101-6 United Zionist Council of Canada (uzc), 10, 13, 34, 40, 43-4, 46,

48-9, 65, 69, 96, 98, 105

University of Toronto, 97 Uruguay, 9 Vachon, Alexandre, 17, 19 Vatican, xiv, 9, n, 15-16, 19-20, 101, 107 Victoria Day, 62 Watkins, J.B.C., 77-8 Wershof, Max, 22, 46 West Bank. See Judaea; Samaria West Germany, 69 Wheat, 8, 28 Whig-Standard (Kingston), 76 White Sulphur Springs, 56 Wilgress, Dana, 33

Wilson (External Affairs), 35-39 Wilson, Charles, 67 Winch, Harold, 69, 85 Winnipeg Free Press, 17-18, 55, 69, 76 Wrong, Hume, 10, 12 Yafeh, Aviad, 36, 46-7 Yom Kippur War, 109 York, Archbishop of, 45 Yuval, M., n Zacks, S.J. "Sam," 10 Zionist, 52, 57 Zionist Council. See United Zionist Council of Canada Zionist Organization of Canada (zoc), n, 29