Digital Development in East Africa: The Distribution, Diffusion, and Governance of Information Technology (Information Technology and Global Governance) [1st ed. 2023] 9783031221613, 9783031221620, 3031221613

Table of contents :
Foreword
Acknowledgments
Contents
About the Author
Abbreviations
List of Tables
1 (Introduction): The Project of Managing, Regulating, and Implementing ICT in East Africa
Purpose of the Book
Unpacking Information Technology Policy
Summary of Methodology
Broader Impacts and Significance of This Research
Analytical Approach
The Project of Regulating, Managing, and Distributing ICT
Policy
Infrastructure
Institutions and Organizations
Overview of ICTs in Development
Conclusion: Designing and Distributing Technological Systems
Notes
Bibliography
2 The Policy Paradox: Why ICT Outcomes in East Africa Do Not Reflect Conventional Wisdom
Explaining ICT Policy Success
Technology as a Political Resource
Science and Technology as Political Agents
Technology as a Resource and as a Representation
Technology Helps to Build and Maintain the “Winning Coalition”
Puzzles and Divergences
Measuring and Explaining Policy Success
Applying the Indicators
Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography
3 The Introduction of ICT Policies into East Africa
The Discourse of Development
International Origins of ICT Policy in East Africa
Rwanda: Top-Down, External Control
Tanzania
UNECA-NICI
E-ThinkTankTz
Digital Opportunity Task Force
Creating the Multi-Sectoral Steering Committee
Uganda
Kenya
Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography
4 Tanzania: Technological Lessons from the Past
Introduction
Tanzania’s Development History and Encounters with Modernization
The History of Computing in Tanzania: 1965–1990
Tanzania’s ICT Policy
Implementation of Tanzanian ICT Plan: Cautious but Bold
Tanzania’s Normative ICT Policy Goals
Narrow Scope of Implementation, Limited Distribution, Emphasis on Sustainability
Connecting the Bush: Tanzanian Tele-Center Initiative
“Serikali-Mtandao”: Networking Government
ICT and Agriculture in Tanzania
Mobile Telephony and Agriculture in Tanzania
Tele-Centers and Agriculture
Advances in ICT Infrastructure in Tanzania
TEAMS, SEACOM, and EASSY
Chinese Investment in ICT Infrastructure in Tanzania
ICT in Higher Education in Tanzania
Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography
5 Kenya: Innovation Without Distribution
Introduction
Explaining Policy Variation
Policymaking, Telecommunications, and ICT in Kenya
Kenyan Politics and Telecommunications: 1950–1979
Kenyan Politics and Telecommunications: 1979–1992
Kenyan Politics and ICTs from 1992 to 2002
Kenyan Politics and ICTs: 2002–2009
Discussion of Universal Access and the ICT Bill
Kenyan Politics and ICTs: 2009–2013
Kenyan Politics and ICTs: 2016–2022
Statutes, Agencies, Policies and Institutions
Building the Internet Backbone in Kenya
Distribution of ICTs in Public Facilities
Konza City
Cellular Telephony in Kenya
Mobile Money in Kenya
Analysis of ICT Implementation in Kenya
Process
Explaining Kenya’s ICT Outcomes
The Role of Donors
Kenyan Civil Society and the Private Sector
Democracy, Peace and Technology
Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography
6 Uganda: Distribution in the Shadow of Surveillance
Explaining ICT in Uganda: The Historical, Political, and Policy Context
Government in Uganda: After State Collapse, a Stable Hybrid Regime Emerges
How External Donors Shaped ICT Policy
Analyzing Motivations: Explanatory Political Variables
Analyzing Successes: What is Going Right?
Cyberoptimism: Visions Realized
Deployment of ICTs in Education and Health Facilities
Analyzing Challenges: Failures and Warnings
Challenges to Sustainability of ICT Infrastructure in Government Facilities
Cyber-Pessimism: Using ICT in Uganda for Surveillance and Control and Suppression
Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography
7 Rwanda: Rebuilding a Digital State from the Ashes of Genocide
Introduction
Past and Future
Embedded Hierarchy: Centralization as an Artifact of History
A Phoenix from the Ashes? the Reconstruction Government
Dreaming of a Rebuilt Nation
Getting ICT on the Agenda
“Flying Geese” Versus “Utopian Computing”
Citizen Participation in ICT PolicyMaking
Equity, Education, and Human Resource Capacity in Rwanda
Freedom, Democracy, and ICTs in Rwanda
Conclusion: Constructing Alternative Imaginaries
Notes
Bibliography
8 ICT Infrastructure, Governance, and Telephony in Comparative Perspective
Introduction
Overview of ICT Access in East Africa
Institutions, Regulations, and Statutes Regarding ICT in East Africa
Legislative Framework for the ICT Sector
Governmental Entities in the ICT Sector
Universal Service and Access Funds in East Africa
Kenya’s Universal Service Fund (USF)
Tanzania’s Universal Communications Service Access Fund (UCSAF)
Rwanda’s USAF
Uganda’s RCDF
ICT Infrastructure in East Africa
Strengthening the Internet Backbone in East Africa
ICT Infrastructure in Kenya
ICT Infrastructure in Uganda
ICT Infrastructure in Tanzania
Foreign Investment in Tanzania’s ICT Infrastructure
National Governance of the ICT Sector in Tanzania
ICT Infrastructure in Rwanda
National Governance of the ICT Sector in Rwanda
Mobile Telephony in East Africa
Competitiveness of the Mobile Market
Mobile Money
Affordability of the Mobile Market
The Economic Impact of ICTs in East Africa
Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography
9 (Conclusion) ICT in East Africa: A Shimmering Oasis on the Savannah
Technology as Politics
ICT as a Sociotechnical Imaginary
The Role of Donors
ICT as Political Pork
ICT as Modernity
Twenty Years of Progress
Universal Service and Universal Access
Mobile Telephony and Competitiveness
Governance and Infrastructure in Rural Areas
Foreign Investment in ICT Infrastructure in East Africa
Artifacts, Connected Systems, or Chaos
Contribution to the Literature
Cyberoptimism
Cyberpessimism
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Digital Development in East Africa The Distribution, Diffusion, and Governance of Information Technology Warigia M. Bowman

Information Technology and Global Governance

Series Editor Derrick L. Cogburn, American University, Bethesda, MD, USA

Information Technology and Global Governance focuses on the complex interrelationships between the social, political, and economic processes of global governance that occur at national, regional, and international levels. These processes are influenced by the rapid and ongoing developments in information and communication technologies. At the same time, they affect numerous areas, create new opportunities and mechanisms for participation in global governance processes, and influence how governance is studied. Books in this series examine these relationships and influences.

Warigia M. Bowman

Digital Development in East Africa The Distribution, Diffusion, and Governance of Information Technology

Warigia M. Bowman College of Law University of Tulsa Tulsa, OK, USA

Information Technology and Global Governance ISBN 978-3-031-22161-3 ISBN 978-3-031-22162-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22162-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: WLDavies/GettyImages This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Dedicated to my mother, Wairimu Tabitha Gethaiga Bowman and to my father James David Bowman

Foreword

In this deeply researched work, Professor Warigia Bowman examines the fine details of the digital revolution in East Africa. There may not, perhaps, be many general readers drawn to this topic as such. The region is remote and the phenomenon is apparently familiar. Can there be deeper meanings and half-hidden secrets in the spread of mobile telephony and Internet connections to yet another corner of the globe? Bowman shows that there are. The four countries—Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, and Rwanda—span wide spectra of political and economic development types, from neoliberal to socialist, from democratic to authoritarian, and from reasonable peace to horrific violence in the recent past. What Bowman demonstrates is that the introduction of new technologies is not—and cannot be—independent of the overlying political institutions, economic structures, and social history. Thus, for each country, the “digital revolution” emerges as a distinctive, made-to-measure phenomenon. In Kenya, the driving forces are those of profit-making firms in relatively unregulated markets, with a profound urban and inegalitarian bias to the deployment of communications networks. In Rwanda, the technology follows the designs of the post-conflict developmental state; in Uganda, surveillance and control are the underside of the spread of electronic communications. In Tanzania, Bowman finds the reflected legacies of ujamaa and the failures of structural adjustment.

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FOREWORD

There are, I think, general lessons to be drawn from this work of detailed historico-institutionalist comparison. The first is for historians of technology, whose absorption with artifacts often leads to a certain degree of material determinism, and to neglect of the interaction of state and market—of laws, regulations, and policies—in the very design of technological systems. Governments and institutions do not merely foster or discover new ways of being and doing. They create, they mold, and they leave their imprint on the fabric of the technology itself. The second lesson is for development economists. The field of development economics has been passing through a neocolonial phase of statistical experimentation, in other people’s countries and with other people’s lives. Warigia Bowman here demonstrates that the real work of development is inevitably, intrinsically, idiosyncratic, political, and pathdependent. Each country shapes technology, for better or worse, to its own circumstances, perceptions, opportunities, and vision. So there really is no substitute, in development studies, for the mastery of fine details. James K. Galbraith Lloyd M. Bentsen Jr. Chair in Government/Business Relations and Professor of Government Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs University of Texas Austin, TX, USA

James K. Galbraith holds the Lloyd M. Bentsen jr Chair in Government/ Business Relations at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, and a Professorship in Government at The University of Texas at Austin. He is a member of the Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei and the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Acknowledgments

This research was supported in part by National Science Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Improvement Grant 0621953. I would like to thank the Weatherhead Center for International Studies GSA Program at Harvard University for providing me an opportunity to present my work and giving me several small summer grants to support my research and my field work. I would like to thank the University of Tulsa College of Law for funding my summer research so that I could complete this manuscript. Clare Putnam of the Weatherhead Center has always been supportive of my work and has been a steadfast friend. She is one of the most positive people I know. Thank you to Dorina Bekoe, whom I also met in graduate school. Dorina is my best friend from my doctoral program, and I have relied on her throughout the publication process. She has helped me through many a publication, and through many a life transition, including motherhood. Thank you to my “work husband” Mike Craw. He has helped me sharpen my analytical approach and taught me an enormous amount about quantitative methods. He is also a dear friend. I count myself lucky to have Clare, Dorina, and Mike in my life. Thank you also to my friend and colleague Susanne Mueller for her work on Kenyan politics. My dissertation committee at the Harvard Kennedy School helped shepherd me as I wrote the initial draft of this book. I would like to recognize two of my dissertation committee members, Sheila Jasanoff and

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

L. Jean Camp, for staying engaged with me far beyond the dissertation. Sheila, whom I count as a mentor, helped me turn one of my dissertation chapters into a book chapter. Sheila helped me become a much stronger writer and taught me to interrogate the assertions of governments and multilateral agencies and look at their rhetoric with an analytical gaze. L. Jean Camp co-authored a peer-reviewed article as well as various short pieces with me. I am lucky to call them both colleagues and friends. Sanjeev Khagram and I remained in constant conversation regarding my career and my writing through the years. I am grateful for the enormous guidance and assistance that these individuals have given me in terms of my career, and I am grateful for their friendship. Professors Jamie Galbraith and Professor Gary Chapman supervised my master’s thesis at the LBJ School on telecommunications and the Internet in rural areas, and encouraged me to go on and earn my doctorate. I appreciate their confidence in the quality of my work, and their belief in my ability to be a successful academic. Thanks also to Hamid Ali of the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies for reading and commenting on several chapters as I revised them. We will always have Cairo! Thank you to my late mother, Wairimu Tabitha Gethaiga, for beginning the Ph.D. journey which I helped her to finish. My grandmother Ruth Wanjiro and grandfather Simon Wambugu made the brave decision to sell part of their land to ensure all their children were educated, including all of their girls. My mother was one of the first handful of women to attend Alliance Girls in Kenya. My mother passed away just before she completed her doctorate at UCLA on the changing status of women in Kenya. She was more intellectually gifted than anyone ever recognized. Unfortunately, structural factors such as gender, immigration status, and race limited the extent to which her gifts were recognized. I inherited my deep and abiding love for Africa, my affinity for foreign languages, as well as many of my best personality traits from her. I think that my ability to have an enjoyable conversation with nearly anyone, nearly anywhere in the world comes from my delightful, elegant, beautiful, and brilliant mother. I hope that this book is an honor to her memory, and to the memory of our family, our clan, our people, and our ancestors. Mungu ni kubwa. Thank you to my father, James David Bowman, for showing me how to conduct research. I thank him for helping me survive doctoral economics, including months of tutoring in higher-level math. I have enjoyed having him as a co-author, and a research role model. He has stood by me

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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through innumerable career and life transitions. I feel that I did not choose to be a researcher, rather research chose me. Hopefully, my father can recognize that I am simply “a chip off the old block.” Thank you to my extended genetic African family as well as my acquired African family both in Africa and the diaspora for helping me see infrastructure issues from the perspective of wananchi. Thank you to all the Kenyans, Rwandans, Tanzanians, and Ugandans in government, in the private sector, and in civil society who spoke to me in the creation of this book. Thank you to my delightful colleagues at the University of Tulsa College of Law. The University of Tulsa provided me with research funding, an office, a productive place to conduct my research, and the time and space that I needed to finish this book. I would like to acknowledge the assistance of my graduate assistants, Cheyenne Barnard and Madison Plumhoff for their hard work in helping me get this book ready for publication. Further, I would like to acknowledge Megan Donald of the Mabee Legal Information Center for helping to pull the research required to update this manuscript. Debbie Firestone, my favorite law student, and now my favorite Tulsa friend, performed yeoman’s work pulling together the index. Thanks to my mentor, Johnny Parker, for your advice, unsolicited and solicited, that sometimes veers into preaching. You have made my time at the University of Tulsa more meaningful. Innumerable friends and colleagues across multiple universities and multiple continents, co-workers, Weatherhead GSAs, conference panelists, and anonymous reviewers also helped this manuscript come to light. For your help, I am grateful. Shukran.

Contents

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2

(Introduction): The Project of Managing, Regulating, and Implementing ICT in East Africa Purpose of the Book Unpacking Information Technology Policy Summary of Methodology Broader Impacts and Significance of This Research Analytical Approach The Project of Regulating, Managing, and Distributing ICT Overview of ICTs in Development Conclusion: Designing and Distributing Technological Systems Bibliography The Policy Paradox: Why ICT Outcomes in East Africa Do Not Reflect Conventional Wisdom Explaining ICT Policy Success Technology as a Political Resource Science and Technology as Political Agents Technology as a Resource and as a Representation Technology Helps to Build and Maintain the “Winning Coalition” Puzzles and Divergences

1 2 4 5 6 7 9 11 13 19 25 26 29 29 30 31 34

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CONTENTS

Measuring and Explaining Policy Success Applying the Indicators Conclusion Bibliography

36 39 41 44

3

The Introduction of ICT Policies into East Africa The Discourse of Development International Origins of ICT Policy in East Africa Rwanda: Top-Down, External Control Tanzania UNECA-NICI E-ThinkTankTz Digital Opportunity Task Force Creating the Multi-Sectoral Steering Committee Uganda Kenya Conclusion Bibliography

47 48 50 51 54 54 55 57 58 61 64 72 78

4

Tanzania: Technological Lessons from the Past Introduction Tanzania’s Development History and Encounters with Modernization The History of Computing in Tanzania: 1965–1990 Tanzania’s ICT Policy Implementation of Tanzanian ICT Plan: Cautious but Bold Tanzania’s Normative ICT Policy Goals Narrow Scope of Implementation, Limited Distribution, Emphasis on Sustainability Connecting the Bush: Tanzanian Tele-Center Initiative “Serikali-Mtandao”: Networking Government ICT and Agriculture in Tanzania Mobile Telephony and Agriculture in Tanzania Tele-Centers and Agriculture Advances in ICT Infrastructure in Tanzania TEAMS, SEACOM, and EASSY Chinese Investment in ICT Infrastructure in Tanzania ICT in Higher Education in Tanzania Conclusion Bibliography

81 81 83 87 89 90 90 91 92 95 97 98 98 99 100 101 101 102 109

CONTENTS

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Kenya: Innovation Without Distribution Introduction Explaining Policy Variation Policymaking, Telecommunications, and ICT in Kenya Kenyan Politics and Telecommunications: 1950–1979 Kenyan Politics and Telecommunications: 1979–1992 Kenyan Politics and ICTs from 1992 to 2002 Kenyan Politics and ICTs: 2002–2009 Kenyan Politics and ICTs: 2009–2013 Kenyan Politics and ICTs: 2016–2022 Analysis of ICT Implementation in Kenya Explaining Kenya’s ICT Outcomes Conclusion Bibliography

113 113 114 116 116 117 119 125 130 132 140 143 147 155

6

Uganda: Distribution in the Shadow of Surveillance Explaining ICT in Uganda: The Historical, Political, and Policy Context Government in Uganda: After State Collapse, a Stable Hybrid Regime Emerges How External Donors Shaped ICT Policy Analyzing Motivations: Explanatory Political Variables Analyzing Successes: What is Going Right? Cyberoptimism: Visions Realized Deployment of ICTs in Education and Health Facilities Analyzing Challenges: Failures and Warnings Challenges to Sustainability of ICT Infrastructure in Government Facilities Cyber-Pessimism: Using ICT in Uganda for Surveillance and Control and Suppression Conclusion Bibliography

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Rwanda: Rebuilding a Digital State from the Ashes of Genocide Introduction Past and Future Embedded Hierarchy: Centralization as an Artifact of History A Phoenix from the Ashes? the Reconstruction Government

165 166 168 172 177 178 179 180 180 183 186 188 197 197 199 203 205

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CONTENTS

Dreaming of a Rebuilt Nation Getting ICT on the Agenda “Flying Geese” Versus “Utopian Computing” Conclusion: Constructing Alternative Imaginaries Bibliography 8

9

ICT Infrastructure, Governance, and Telephony in Comparative Perspective Introduction Overview of ICT Access in East Africa Institutions, Regulations, and Statutes Regarding ICT in East Africa Legislative Framework for the ICT Sector Governmental Entities in the ICT Sector Universal Service and Access Funds in East Africa ICT Infrastructure in East Africa Strengthening the Internet Backbone in East Africa Mobile Telephony in East Africa Competitiveness of the Mobile Market Mobile Money Affordability of the Mobile Market The Economic Impact of ICTs in East Africa Conclusion Bibliography (Conclusion) ICT in East Africa: A Shimmering Oasis on the Savannah Technology as Politics ICT as a Sociotechnical Imaginary The Role of Donors ICT as Political Pork ICT as Modernity Twenty Years of Progress Universal Service and Universal Access Mobile Telephony and Competitiveness Governance and Infrastructure in Rural Areas Foreign Investment in ICT Infrastructure in East Africa Artifacts, Connected Systems, or Chaos

207 209 210 218 224 229 229 230 233 233 234 235 240 241 254 255 255 257 258 259 264 273 274 275 276 277 277 279 280 281 282 283 283

CONTENTS

Contribution to the Literature Cyberoptimism Cyberpessimism Bibliography Index

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285 286 287 288 291

About the Author

Warigia M. Bowman teaches water law, natural resources law, and administrative law at the University of Tulsa College of Law. Bowman has extensive law and policy experience in local, state, and federal government, as well as in the nonprofit sector. Bowman has published widely on telecommunications, environmental and regulatory issues. She has consulted for the Government of Kenya, the United States Agency for International Development, the United Nations, the German Development Agency (GTZ), the Canadian Development Agency (IDRC), and the United States State Department. Bowman’s work is multidisciplinary and is informed by the fields of law, history, science, and technology studies, as well as political science. She is interested in energy, water, infrastructure, regulation, elections, and telecommunications.

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Abbreviations

CCK COMESA COSTECH CST DE-G Dot Force DSL EAC EAP&TC EASSY EPOCA ERSWEC ESATC FCC GITS GN GoK GSM ICT ICT4D IDRC ISP ITU IXP KANU

Communications Commission of Kenya Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology Commission for Science and Technology Directorate of E-government Digital Opportunity Taskforce Digital Subscriber Line East African Community East African Post and Telecommunications Corporation Eastern Africa Submarine Cable System The Electronic and Postal Communications Act Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation Eastern and Southern African Telegraph Company Federal Communications Commission Government Information and Technology Service Global North Government of Kenya Global System for Mobile Information and Communications Technology ICT for Development International Development Research Centre Internet Service Provider International Telecommunications Union Internet Exchange Points Kenya African National Union xxi

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ABBREVIATIONS

KICTAnet KIF KP&TC KPRSP MEST MIC MIT MTC MTI NARC NBP NCS NCST NDP NEPAD NGOs NICI NICIP NICTBB NITA-U NOFBI NTIA PRSP PSIC PSPND RCDF RITA RPF RURA SIDA TCRA TEAMS UAF UCA UCC UCSAF UNCSTD UNECA UNESCO USAID VAT VoIP VSAT WAN WTO

Kenya ICT Action Network Kenya Information and Communication Technology Federation Kenya Post and Telecommunications Corporation Kenyan Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology Minister of Information and Communications Ministry of Information and Tourism Ministry of Transport and Communications Ministry of Trade and Industry National Rainbow Coalition National Broadband Policy National Communications Secretariat National Council of Science and Technology National Development Plan New Partnership for Africa’s Development Nongovernmental Organizations National Information and Communications Infrastructure National Information Communications Infrastructure Plan National ICT Broadband Backbone The National Information Technology Authority of Uganda National Optic Fiber Backbone National Telecommunications and Information Administration Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Permanent Secretary of Information and Communications Permanent Secretary for Planning and National Development Rural Communications Development Fund Rwandan Information Technology Authority Rwandan Patriotic Front Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Authority Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority The East African Marine System Universal Access Fund Ugandan Communications Act Uganda Communications Commission Universal Communications Service Access Fund UN Commission for Science and Technology for Development United Nations Economic Commission for Africa United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization United States Agency for International Development Value Added Tax Voice over Internet Protocol Very Small Aperture Terminals Wide Area Network World Trade Organization

List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 2.2 Table 2.3 Table 3.1 Table 3.2 Table 6.1

Table Table Table Table

8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4

Country, level of democracy, and year of ICT policy passage Country, level of donor funding, and speed of passage Country, level of democracy, and scope of implementation Comparison of ICT policy processes across East African countries Comparison of ICT Policy Acquisition in East Africa Operators in the Ugandan information and communications technology sector from 1996 to 2015 Population, GDP, and other social indicators in East Africa Overview of ICT access in East Africa Universal access funds in East Africa Price of 1 voice and 1 GB data prepaid 2022 in selected African countries

36 37 39 51 64

169 231 232 237 260

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CHAPTER 1

(Introduction): The Project of Managing, Regulating, and Implementing ICT in East Africa

By the turn of the twenty-first century, significant research by practitioners, nongovernmental organizations and multilateral organizations established that developing nations were lagging behind developed nations in terms of most technological infrastructure indicators, and in terms of ICT in particular (Measuring Globalization 2001). As the new century opened, many developing countries, including African countries, lacked both the infrastructure and the human resources to support widespread access to technologies such as computers, the Internet, fixed and mobile telephone lines, and other communications technologies. As of 2001, Africa had the lowest telephone densities and the lowest level of Internet connectivity in the world (Telecommunication Indicators Update 2001; Okpaku 2003).1 In 2002, sub-Saharan African had one internet user out of every 250–400 people, compared to a global average of one user in every 15 people (The African Internet—A Status Report 2002). According to the International Telecommunications Union, as of 2003, almost every sub-Saharan African nation was a low-access nation in terms of digital access indicators such as access to mobile and fixedline telephones, literacy, computer, and Internet access (International Telecommunication Union 2003). The most extreme gap in technological access still exists between ICT access in African nations and the industrialized nations of the Global

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 W. M. Bowman, Digital Development in East Africa, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22162-0_1

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North. Yet, the gap is closing rapidly. African nations have witnessed an explosion in the availability of ICTs since the end of the 1990s (Mayer et al. 2011). Indeed, “ICTs have been a remarkable success in Africa” (Mayer et al. 2011). At the end of the mid-1990s, only 11 African countries boasted local Internet access (Jensen 2000). By the year 2000, however, every capital city in the continent had Internet access in the capital cities (Jensen 2000). As of 2000, according to Jensen, nine African countries had more than 5000 Internet subscribers: Egypt, Morocco, Kenya, Ghana, Mozambique, South Africa, Tunisia, and Uganda. Although much has changed in the past twenty years, the most extreme gap in technological access, including for ICTs, existed, and still exists, between Africa and the industrialized nations of the Global North. In 2011, an influential World Bank study observed, “In Africa, however, the Internet is still in its infancy. In most countries, access is limited and slow” (Mayer et al. 2011). Yet the gap is closing rapidly. Africa has witnessed an explosion in the availability of ICTs since the end of the 1990s. Indeed, “ICTs have been a remarkable success in Africa” (Mayer et al. 2011). By 2009, cellular telephony reached nearly half of Africa’s population. Referring to the mobile phone revolution in Africa, authors Etzo and Collender noted that “[t]he ubiquity of mobiles is matched only by the ingenuity of their users.”

Purpose of the Book In this book, I examine the policymaking and implementation processes for information and communication technologies (“ICT”) (Aduda and Ohaga 2004)2 in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Rwanda from 1990 to 2022. The efforts to write ICT policies in four East African nations have brought to the fore issues of modernization and distribution in each nation. These efforts have forced researchers in the ICT arena to pay attention to issues of agenda setting, interest group interaction, and negotiation between the government and other policy actors. The actors and stakeholders include local as well as international participants (Ruxin 2006). This policy process has engaged governments, domestic civil society, multilateral organizations, donors, indigenous private sector organizations, as well as multinationals in dialogue as well as conflict.3 The central purpose of this book is to consider the nature of changing East African politics in relation to an important and dramatic technological change. This research examines three important areas relevant

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to policy, law, political economy, and science and technology studies: first, how have matters of political and economic liberalization, including new markets and innovation affected ICT diffusion? Second, how have key ICT-related technologies, including hardware, and human resources been diffused in East Africa? how have policies related to ICTs been promoted, developed, and implemented? This book considers issues of networking, organizational innovation, and institutional practices along the way. The period of 1990–2020 was a period of significant change in these four countries, both politically and technologically. Accordingly, this time frame represents a key period for examination developments in this emerging policy sector. Because of the recent nature of this sector, studying ICT in East Africa provides an unusual opportunity to examine a bounded policy area from its emergence through its institutional stabilization. ICT is not a discrete technology; it is a bundle of technologies.4 At a minimum, ICT blends the old (landline telecommunications (i.e., telephone service), the new (computers and the Internet), as well as the innovations (wireless telephony, Very Small Aperture Terminals, Voice over Internet Protocol, GSM). Viewing this array of old, new, and emerging technologies as a “technological bundle” creates a larger technological entity—ICT—which can be named, regulated, and governed. An analysis of this topic has global implications for law, science and technology studies, economics, policy, comparative politics, development, and technology diffusion. ICT should not be conceptualized as a remote, technical topic that only engineers are allowed to discuss. Rather, information and communications technology policy should be conceptualized as a discrete domain at the heart of policy change across nations both developing and developed. The diffusion of this technology is being affected by decisions made by the nation-state, as well as by pressures from the private sector, multi-lateral organizations and civil society (Horwitz 2001).

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Unpacking Information Technology Policy This book attempts to unpack exactly how each of the countries adopted an ICT policy and began to implement that policy (Ferguson 1994).5 In other words, I open up the black box of “policy implementation” (Ferguson 1994) by using a specific development-focused policy initiative—ICT—spanning four countries. Importantly, I explore how the issue of “ICT for development” arrived as a prominent policy agenda item for African nations (See Horwitz 2001). Third, I explore what processes are used to decide whether and how ICT policies are drafted, adopted, and— most importantly—implemented in the four East African countries under examination. The answers to these questions can provide insights into the nature of law, policymaking and politics in emerging democracies. The answers to these questions may also help scholars understand the interplay of local and external actors in diffusing scientific and technological innovations. Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Rwanda are geographically close, economically similar, and interact extensively militarily, economically, and politically. The countries share a similar colonial history. In more recent times, the leaders of Tanzania, Uganda, and Rwanda have been intimately connected in Rwanda’s change of government and Rwanda’s struggle to rebuild in the post-genocide period. Kenya and Tanzania have long histories of absorbing refugee flows from Rwanda and Uganda. Linguistic and cultural similarities exist between all four nations. All four nations are participants in efforts to create a regional economic community, the East African Community. Indeed, all four countries have had very similar rates of robust economic growth in recent years (Secretary of State for International Development 2007).6 Importantly, all four countries are in the process of developing and implementing formal ICT policies and began that process at about the same time: the late 1990s. Given these similarities an observer might expect policies and outcomes in the four countries to converge: one would expect the four nations to develop similar ICT policies and implement them along similar timelines. Nonetheless, despite these similarities, The countries diverge significantly with regard to the distribution of ICT infrastructure and ICT artifacts and the scope of implementation of those policies (Kolko et al. 2003)7 as well as the process by which the policies are formulated. Although all four countries received the call to develop ICT policies at the beginning of the new millennium, they have diverged in how they

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have chosen to implement such policies and the extent to which they have implemented them. These four countries also have shown differences in how they have chosen to diffuse the technology to rural areas in relation to urban areas, and the level and amount of competition and innovation. Further, this work remains relevant to other countries in the region: is placing more “artifacts” on the ground sufficient to demarcate progress in this arena, or are other considerations—such as the sustainability of the infrastructure and the human capacity of citizens—of equal importance?

Summary of Methodology This book utilizes the comparative case study method, one of the tools of comparative political science as well as of comparative science and technology studies. Observations were made at the nation-state level in Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and Tanzania from the period of 2003 to the present. Methodologically, this is a small-n study. An in-depth case study of a few countries (multiple-case design) proves to be the best way to trace the factors implicated in the development and adoption of a specific policy (Yin 2003). This study aims to be explanatory. A large-n study loses the level of detail needed to expose the motivations for policy adoption, the actors who kept the issue on the policy agenda, and the interaction between local and external forces that help move policy issues from the national agenda into the realm of formal policy, legislation, and budgetary commitments. Comparative social science, argues Charles Ragin, has a long tradition of rich qualitative work, and often uses case methods as well as historical methods. My work fits well into the historically interpretive paradigm which gives due attention to the impact of history on current institutional arrangements (Thelen 1999). Data has been collected from both primary and secondary sources. This project emphasizes the use of multiple sources of data to enhance both internal and external validity (Erickson and Wittrock 1986). Data collection has focused on participant observation, review of documentary sources in addition to nearly one hundred interviews (Merriam 1988). Documentary sources8 used include clippings from the national and international print and electronic media, government documents, and selective use of secondary sources.9 Empirical and qualitative sources include interviews with key stakeholders, attendance at meetings and conferences in

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key countries, and focus groups.10 Empirical fieldwork was conducted in all four countries in 2004, 2008, in 2014 and 2015, and finally, in 2019.

Broader Impacts and Significance of This Research African governments as well as civil society activists have achieved governance goals in the ICT sector, bringing a positive focus on economic growth and the achievement of policy goals to a region where most studies tend to focus on conflict and corruption. Although part of the initial impetus for ICT Policy initiatives may have stemmed from encouragement by international organizations such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and the World Bank, local actors such as politicians, policy entrepreneurs, and community-based organizations have reworked and reframed those policies to match local norms, principles, practices, structures, and societal goals. Further, community-based organizations and nongovernmental organizations do not operate in isolation. Rather, local actors participate in and incorporate norms and values from international gatherings such as the World Summit on Information Society.11 The result is that the governments of many African nations, through the efforts of motivated political leaders, policy entrepreneurs, and local activists, have transformed externally imposed ICT frameworks from documents that focus on market liberalization into legal and policy documents concerned with development, social justice, and gender equity. Importantly, normative choices affect “how” technology is implemented and “what” technology is implemented, meaning that very similar-looking laws and policies may have very different outcomes. This study contributes in the area of law, policy science and technology studies and comparative politics. The results should be of great interest to foreign donors, including the United States Agency for International Development, The United Kingdom’s Department for International Development, Canada’s International Development Research Center, SIDA, and the United Nations who have committed large amounts of funding to ICT related initiatives in Africa. This research should also be of interest to domestic and foreign enterprises interested in investing in the ICT sector or other technological and development enterprises in Africa. New African governments emerging from internal conflict who are in the process of rebuilding their economies, such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Congo, Ethiopia, Egypt, Libya, and Southern Sudan, among others, will be the most direct beneficiaries of this research. More stable governments

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that have initiated ICT policy processes, such as Mozambique, Senegal, Nigeria, and Ghana stand to benefit as well as ICT matures across the continent. Analytical Approach Many possible factors affect the extent to which these countries distribute infrastructure. These include the competitiveness of the private sector, the role of donors, and the size and strength of civil society. However, I argue that two broad factors are key. First, different levels of ethnic volatility affect governments’ decisions regarding the placement and distribution of infrastructure and public goods in the four East African countries under examination. Countries with more fragile ethnic configurations encounter forces that make creating a ruling coalition more difficult. In the face of serious political competition, politicians have incentives to use public resources or policy concessions to maintain support. Their spending often takes the form of public goods that are observable, or measurable, and whose benefits are easy to trace back to politicians: These “pork” or club goods are patronage that is publicly and legally allocated (Green 2011). This book adds the important insight based upon empirical observation that in East Africa, ICTs, and ICT infrastructure should be viewed as a type of “side payment” or “pork” to constituents. These countries are under pressure to distribute ICT infrastructure more broadly and more equitably to different groups in the population. Countries with less fragile and less volatile ethnic configurations can adopt a more laissez faire approach with regards to infrastructure placement—in other words, in more peaceful countries, the government has the luxury of allowing the market to decide where infrastructure goes. Second, African governments invest in science and technology for a multitude of reasons. One incentive can be found in both the visibility of ICTs as well as their evocation of “the modern” (Jasanoff 2004a). Much like roads, ICTs should be viewed as a type of infrastructure (Horwitz 2001). Indeed, “communication[s] … technologies constitute the infrastructure of an increasingly information-based, trade-oriented economy and society” (Horwitz 2001). Accordingly, building ICTs across the country represents a type of “side payment” or “pork.” It can be distributed to key constituencies both inside helping governments make a statement to both domestic and foreign audiences. Indeed, ICTs are a

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special and compelling type of infrastructure. The visibility of ICTs allows national governments to point toward their efforts in this policy domain as a government accomplishment to both donors and citizens. This study supports the contention that technology, and specifically, information, and communications technology, is a political resource in East Africa. ICTs are used by politicians in the four countries under study to demonstrate their commitment to nation-building and economic development. In addition, control of information can be used to spread the word about positive government initiatives, while controlling opposition figures. The state in all four countries uses the placement of ICT in post offices, in schools, in hospitals, and in tele-centers as a way to demonstrate its commitment to particular ideas of development and progress. Legal and policy choices by national governments regarding types of infrastructure, the extent of regional deployment of that infrastructure, the organizational structures that build and maintain that infrastructure, and the funding mechanisms that pay for infrastructure determine key aspects of what types of technology are put in place at a national level (Bijker and Law 1992). Technology, specifically information and communication technologies, is one of the resources which politicians in the studied countries use to demonstrate their commitment to the populace (Ezrahi 1990; Jasanoff 2004a). In addition, Horwitz (2001) encourages scholars to look not just at the private and government sector but also at the formation and role of civil society itself as a powerful element in shaping communications policy in Africa. The approach taken by this study presumes, at its core, that technological change is a social process (Mansell 2012). As Sheila Jasanoff (2004a) and Yaron Ezrahi (1990) have pointed out, the placement and use of technology in a nation-state is far from accidental and is almost always a reflection of stakeholder interests and politically expedient ends. Technology has been used and is currently used as a political tool in all four countries to demonstrate commitment to constituents, to reward loyal voters, to consolidate power and signal the presence of power, and importantly, to demonstrate commitments about business conditions, development, progress, and fairness to both external and internal audiences. Further, ICTs are increasingly understood as a sociotechnical imaginary (Jasanoff and Kim 2015; Mansell 2012).

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The Project of Regulating, Managing, and Distributing ICT Creating and implementing an ICT system requires several components. In order to ensure implementation, some crucial components must be put into place. Policies must be written, laws must be passed, and regulations must be enforced. Infrastructure is the arena where politics and policy have the greatest ability to make an impact on rural access. Private sector companies build where they think they can make a profit. If a village is too remote, or too difficult to get to, it becomes less profitable to build infrastructure there. The laws of supply and demand generally result in weak infrastructure in rural areas. Only an aggressive policy approach and thoughtful laws can correct this. For example, in the developed world, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 in the US provides an example of such a combined law and policy approach. The people who are likely to fight for such a policy approach are found both in the private sector and in civil society. Finally, there is an organizational and institutional component to implementation as well: regulatory agencies must be created and made independent; funds must be collected and disbursed to ensure that rural infrastructure is built. Policy The project of regulating, managing, and distributing ICT takes place on several fronts. The first front—the policy front of managing ICT— emphasizes the invocation of political discourse in the form of law, policy, legislation, and regulation. In terms of policy progress, African countries that had developed national ICT strategies rose from 32 to 48 between 2007 and 2011 (Rwanda-High Tech Hub 2013). Sometimes, the written policies regarding ICT do not correspond with the physical commitments made. The written commitments, or policies, are often grander visions of what the government’s use of ICT could do for the nation, not what it is actually doing or will do. Less developed countries must implement laws and policy changes that allow regulators to manage this new technology in an environment in which the technology changes much more rapidly than the regulations themselves. One likely goal of any policy initiative is to encourage investor financial flows into the sector, either from foreign or indigenous entrepreneurs (Mobiles Surge in Developing Countries-Report 2008). This discourse can occur between actors speaking to external audiences at an international level (such as governments speaking to donors), or this discourse

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can occur between in-country actors speaking to each other at a domestic level (such as civil society speaking to government). As this discourse emerges from the donor community, it has been largely hegemonic, but in the four cases under study, indigenous actors have re-crafted the discourse to a certain extent to make it reflect their own goals, such as creating locally driven content in indigenous languages. In Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Rwanda, countries must write policies, write corresponding legislation, pass the legislation, and then write regulations to implement the legislation and policies in detail. Often, this process requires the creation of new organizations. Governments must, in the ideal case, follow their own policy: they must implement. Infrastructure The second front of managing ICT is the infrastructure front. Private sector companies make decisions about where it is profitable to build private infrastructure, while governments, and some donors, make parallel or related decisions, or occasionally, entirely disconnected decisions, about where to build public ICT infrastructure. To use a historical analogy, on the American frontier during the nineteenth century, there were publicly sponsored, government-built post roads, which often interconnected with privately built toll roads. Some areas only had post roads, some areas only had toll roads, and some lucky areas had dense networks of both public and private roads. The challenge in East Africa today is to coordinate the building of such ICT infrastructure grids in a manner that benefits the greatest proportion of the population. Where it is not profitable to the private structure to build or maintain that infrastructure on its own, the government, donors, and the private sector must coordinate, cooperate, or work separately to ensure that infrastructure is built. This is a challenge in remote and impoverished rural areas. Institutions and Organizations Yet a third front of the ICT management project is the creation of institutions and organizations which implement the policies and build and coordinate the infrastructure. In developed countries such as the United States, it was relatively simple to utilize existing established organizations. For example, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) was created inside the Department of Commerce in 1978 and was at the forefront of developing ICT policy for the United States in the 1990s. An even more venerable organization, the

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Federal Communications Commission (FCC), was established by the Communications Act of 1934 and is charged with regulating interstate and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable. When technological convergence took place, and telecommunications became “ICT” in the 1990s, the US had the organizational and institutional infrastructure to easily absorb this emerging set of technologies, and the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 helped to usher in a period of change. In developing countries, the organizations and institutions, the commissions, directorates, laws, and policies to deal with these new technologies, have had to rapidly co-evolve with the technologies themselves. Most of the regulatory agencies in East Africa were created at the same time as the African telecommunications sector itself was privatized in the late 1990s. For example, the Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK), which fulfills most of the functions served by the FCC, was founded in 1999 by the Communications Act of 1998. Kenya has seen a proliferation of agencies with responsibility for ICT-related tasks, including the Directorate of E-government in the President’s Office as well as a separate cabinet-level Ministry of Information. The Uganda Communications Commission was formed in 1997 after the passage of the Ugandan Communications Act. Tanzania also has a Tanzanian Communications Regulatory Authority with the specific mandate to regulate postal, broadcasting, and electronic media. Tanzania also has a Commission for Science and Technology which has significant responsibility for ICT. By contrast, Rwanda decided to merge energy, transport, and communications into one regulatory sector managed by an ombudsman agency, Rwanda Utility Regulatory Agency, which began operation in 2003. However, the implementation of the National Information Communications Infrastructure Plan is overseen by a separate, very powerful organization, the Rwandan Information Technology Authority (RITA). Although institutions exist in these countries, implementation is not always swift or even.

Overview of ICTs in Development There are a number of individuals, groups, and policy analysts working on issues related to ICTs in Africa. Accordingly, by examining related works in information policy, science, and technology, I attempt to place my work in the context of this ongoing discussion. Although this brief survey is not

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exhaustive, it helps to place the developments described in this book can be viewed within larger trends in information policy. In his seminal work Diffusion of Innovations (1995); Everett M. Rogers notes the difficulty of getting a new idea adopted. He urges us to consider diffusion as the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time throughout a social system (Rogers 1995). Mansell and Wehn, writing for the UNCSTD (1998), in their book Knowledge Societies, Information Technologies for Sustainable Development, observe that ICTs open up new opportunities for developing countries to harness technologies for development goals. Mark Thompson (2004, 2008) reminds us that there is a growing need for informed policy-level critiques of the way in which ICTs are planned and implemented within “developing” country environments. He also points out that the late 2000s witnessed an increasing focus on the potential of technology as a catalyst for economic and social development (Thompson 2008). He also cogently observes that ICT has the power to “create new inequities, as well as exacerbate existing ones” (Thompson 2008). Turning to Africa, Horwitz’ (2001) study, Communication and Democratic Reform in South Africa, examines the communications sector in South Africa in the period of transition out of apartheid and reminds us of the importance of civil society as a factor in the democratic process. He emphasizes the principal of universal service as a commitment to equalizing social access to information and communication. Reginald Cline-Cole and Mike Powell (2004) argue that the increasing use of ICTs for the political economy of Africa deserves more critical attention. Considering that same theme, Y. Z. Ya’u suggests that the World Trade Organizations strategy for configuring the ICT sector of developing countries, particularly those in Africa, appears to work in the interest of multinational corporations (Ya’u 2004). Claire Mercer makes several interesting points about ICT in Tanzania in a 2004 article. She notes that NGOs are not using ICTs in the ways imagined by donors. She argues somewhat critically that donors’ “ICT fetishism” pervades discussions of development. She suggests that scholars attempt to consider the broader social, cultural, and political relationships surrounding ICT use (Mercer 2004). She makes a point that I emphasize and develop in this study, that ICTs are a symbol of “modernity”, and are used by NGOs to project that concept. Writing in African Affairs (2006), Mercer claims that the discourse of the Internet as an inclusive development tool, which should be used to help Africa has become

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hegemonic. She explores the ideas that the Tanzanian government and citizens are investing in ICT and the Internet as part of national ambitions to modernize. Her work emphasizes that the majority of Tanzanians continue to be excluded from the information society. Carol Dralega (2007) considers the Uganda rural Nakaseke Women’s Development Association. She finds that a CD ROM project did yield some economic empowerment. Yet, she critiques the project as creating new rural, informational divide among different groups of women. In an interesting piece (2008), Thomas Moloney argues that, in fact, the much-vaunted effect of ICTs on reducing information asymmetry in markets may be exaggerated. Indeed, his work indicates that farmers have to accept the price they are told their crops are sold for, regardless of the increase of information technologies, because their buyers are also their creditors. By the time the millennium had moved into its second decade, it was an open secret that Rwanda, in particular, was attempting to reinvent itself as a regional high-tech hub (Rwanda-High Tech Hub 2013), while facing tough competition from East Africa’s largest economy, Kenya, which commands a lead in mobile banking. Joseph Kariuki Nyaga has done some innovative research on mobile banking services in the East African Community (“EAC”), the area under study in this book (Nyaga 2014). He notes that harmonization of laws and regulations represents a key tenet of the EAC. He makes the important point that mobile money blurs the distinction between telecommunications and financial sectors, which are usually regulated differently. He suggests that the current regulations in the EAC are fragmented, but that regional ICT statutes and regulations may be worth considering in the EAC (Nyaga 2014).

Conclusion: Designing and Distributing Technological Systems Diffusing ICTs to rural areas in East Africa has not been accomplished by the price mechanism of “the market.” The problem of diffusing ICTs to rural areas in East Africa (which include some of the poorest areas in the world) is not merely an engineering problem nor is it purely a regulatory problem. Rather, diffusing ICTs to rural areas in East Africa requires the simultaneous consideration of social, political, and technological factors. For East Africans in rural areas to use computers, ICTs must be accessible, and affordable. In addition, ICTs must be configured in a manner that allows them to withstand the rigors of a harsh climate and sporadic

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maintenance. Computers—and even cellular phones—are generally luxuries for individuals in much of Sub-Saharan Africa. Ensuring ICT access in rural East Africa means considering collective or group access (Rogers and Shukla 2001).12 In addition, getting ICT to rural areas requires finding innovative ways to reduce costs for both infrastructure and equipment. To enable access to ICTs, infrastructure must be built, equipment must be placed, organizations must be connected, and individuals must be educated. The construction of ICT infrastructure and the distribution of ICT artifacts present a different set of challenges in East Africa than in the Global North. Infrastructure-rich areas, such as urban areas in the United States13 and cities and towns in most countries in Western Europe, can overlay digital subscriber line (DSL) (Getting Broadband Q&A 2020)14 technology onto the widely distributed copper wire technology of traditional telephone service (landline).15 Most poor rural areas in Africa do not have well-distributed landline telephone service, and can only get access to telephony through cellular networks, which rely on comparatively expensive satellite infrastructure (Joint Team of Tanzania, CITCC and WorldTel 2005).16 Regulations, policies, and laws can affect the selection of technical solutions. Voice Over Internet Protocol (VoIP 2022)17 offers a cheap and innovative solution for long-distance calls carried over the Internet. It is a boon to consumers in the developing world due to its low cost; yet, it may also threaten government monopolies. Most Sub-Saharan governments had a state-owned monopoly on both landlines as well as the Internet for many years. Authoritarian regimes frequently feared the political impact of a liberalized communication market, as well as the loss of revenue to the state caused by competition. Indeed, VoIP was illegal under the Moi Government in Kenya. Accordingly, determining which technical protocols are legal and their regulatory status is of real concern when designing ICT facilities that work. For example, the information blackouts during the uprisings in Libya and Egypt demonstrate the dialectical interplay between technical and regulatory solutions. Multiple methods were used to take Egypt offline on January 27th, 2011. To get access to the rest of the Internet, Egyptian Internet Service Providers (ISPs) need a “gateway”: a physical link to other ISPs outside of Egypt, which ISPs lease from the Egyptian Government (Glanz and Markoff 2011). First, the government asked Internet Service Providers to disconnect their services or lose their licenses (Richtel

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2011). As the ISPs complied with the government’s order, network addresses within Egypt became unreachable (Squarcella 2011).18 To its credit, Vodafone resisted, until, in the words of the New York Times, “it was obliged to comply” (Camp 2011). Had ISPs chosen not to comply, Telecom Egypt could have physically cut off the connection to the network at the gateway level, which would have severely disrupted traffic in other countries (Novell Connection Primer).19 In addition, the government reportedly took down Egyptian country code Domain Name Servers (Johnson, 2), halting all traffic to and from local sites (ISOC Newsletter, 2). Finally, Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) (Fahim, 3) were disabled, severing in-country connectivity (McGinnis 2011). The autocratic information blackouts imposed by Mubarak and Qadaffi during the Arab Spring highlight the need for both technological and policy solutions to ensure that citizens have access to information and that citizens, civil society, and the private sector can protect that access from governmental interference. From a technological standpoint, activists, civil society, and the private sector in countries likely to experience similar problems should invest in “redundancy” as well as “distribution.” Redundancy is an information concept that emphasizes building multiple lines of communication, should one line fail. Distribution is the idea that more independent means of communication should be used, and should be distributed throughout multiple users, not centralized. Access to information is indeed a matter of politics and policy, not just infrastructure and technology. One possible lesson of the Libyan and Egyptian cases is that a move away from information centralization, particularly in the presence of autocratic governments, is crucial. Interestingly, the government of Uganda, which is one of the governments under study in this book, was unable to impose a blackout of social media during this “walk to work” protests. Despite a direct order by the Ugandan Communications Commission for providers to shut down Facebook and Twitter, ISPs in Uganda declined to do so. This resistance was made possible by the highly competitive telecommunications market in this country, which is not under the complete control of the government. As these salient examples show, technical considerations affect the manner in which regulations, policies, and laws are constrained in their choice of solutions. In addition, political environments may affect the technical solutions that are selected. As these examples illustrate, technical, social, economic, and political considerations “interpenetrate” and overlap in the arena of ICTs

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for development (Horwitz 2001; Bijker et al. 1987). Ensuring access to ICTs in rural East Africa presents both technical and policy challenges: simply buying computers and placing them in tele-centers and schools and hospitals in rural towns accomplishes little. This step is necessary but not sufficient. Rather, diffusing ICT to Rwanda, to East Africa or to the developing world, presents a complex set of interrelated problems. These problems comprise building technological systems that include regulations, and political decisions about placement, ownership, and control. These systems include commercial and state decisions about infrastructure as well as sociological concerns about access and human concerns about training and capacity to maintain the systems, and to maintain access, once the infrastructure is in place (Jasanoff 2004a; Bijker and Law 1992).

Notes 1. Sub-Saharan Africa achieved telephone density of one subscriber per 100 inhabitants in 2000. According to Professor G. Ollere Ajayi, of the Federal Ministry of Science and Technology of Nigeria, Internet penetration in Africa in 2001 fell below 1%. 2. According to the International Telecommunications Union, ICTs generally refer to old technologies, such as radios, televisions, fixed, as well as new information and communications technologies including cellular telephones, computers, and the Internet. Others define ICTs as “all hardware, software and services that relate to information processing, communication, and handling, as well as all business activities that depend substantially on the above” (Aduda and Ohaga 2004). 3. In the context of telecommunications and ICT in the countries studied, the private sector has two manifestations: European and American based multinationals (such as Vodafone, Terracom, Microsoft, and Celtel) and indigenous African companies (such as Wananchi Online and Symphony Software). I characterize companies as indigenous if their primary office is located in Africa, the majority of their staff is on the African continent, and the primary shareholders are African governments or citizens with at least a 50% stake in the company. Industry in the countries under study is limited. There is some computer manufacturing industry in South Africa. Attempts to initiate manufacturing in East Africa have been fitful and sporadic. The private sector tends to focus on service provision of cellular phone services, information service provision (i.e., Internet ISPs) and increasingly, software development.

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4. In Africa, ICT is generally defined much more broadly than in the North, and activists routinely cite telecommunications, broadcasting, radio, postal services, and even print as components of ICT. 5. The Anti-politics Machine: Development, Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1994), by James Ferguson, does an excellent job of assessing one specific development project, in one place. He uses an ethnographic lens to examine a specific livestock aid project. I employ a similar ethnographic approach in looking at the placement of ICT in these four countries. 6. According to the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development, Rwanda averaged between 5 and 10% economic growth between 1994 and 2004. Kenya has seen growth rates 4.3% in 2004 and 5.8% in 2005 and 6% in 2006. Uganda saw growth rates near 7% in the 1990s, however economic growth has slowed to still impressive figures around 6% in the last four years. Tanzania’s growth rates have remained consistently above percent per year since 2000. 7. Beth Kolko has conducted some pioneering work with regards to measuring implementation of ICTs in Central Asia. In a related vein, my work considers government implementation of ICTs in East Africa, although my work focuses significantly more on law and governance. 8. Collection and review of primary source documents has been part of my methodology. In addition to various secondary sources, the following primary source documents have been reviewed as part of this research. The Kenya Communications Act, 1998; The Kenya Draft Information Technology Act, 2002; Kenya’s Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (2003–2007), 2003; Kenya’s Draft National Information Communications Technology Policy, 2004; Final Report for the Universal Access to Communication Services, 2004; E-Government Strategy, 2004; Final Report for the Universal Access to Communication Services: Development of a Strategic Plan and Implementation Guidelines, 2004; National ICT Policy of Tanzania, 2002; Recommendations on Proposed Review of the Telecommunications Sector Policy, 2005 (Uganda); First Draft National Information and Communication Technology Policy, 2003 (Zambia); An Integrated ICT Led Socio- Economic Development Policy and Plan for Rwanda, 2001–2005. 9. A purposeful “snowball” sample was assembled to determine which organizations and individuals are key participants in the ICT policy process.The purposeful sample aims not to create a random, representative or average pool but to locate information rich informants. Over one hundred and fifty semi-structured interviews with key policymakers and participants in academia, government, the private sector and civil society comprise a crucial source of data. Documentary sources examined to date include government documents, including draft ICT policies of several African

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10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

nations, final policies, legislation, regulations, government websites, and comments of stakeholders, agendas of meetings, notes and minutes by participants in key meetings among others. The project also draws on press reports on ICT and telecommunications policy in the countries under study from both print and electronic media. Finally, where appropriate, secondary sources of data, such as journal articles and summaries of meetings, form part of the data base. I spent appreciable time in the field over a period of two and a half years as a participant observer attending meetings regarding the potential ICT policy with donors, academics, with advocates including directors of the New Economic Partnership for African Development and government officials, including numerous Members of Parliament, Ministers, Commissioners and Permanent Secretaries. I have interviewed government officials at the highest levels in all four countries studied, including the Ministers for ICT and the Directors of the Rural Communications Development Fund in Uganda and Rwanda, as well as the Permanent Secretary for ICT in Kenya and the Director for E-Government in Kenya, and the Director for E-government and the former Prime Minister of Tanzania. I also ventured into remote rural areas in all four countries to personally look at ICT facilities, such as tele-centers. The World Summit on the Information Society is an event sponsored by the United Nations, among others, which gathers together academics, civil society, and government representatives from around the world to discuss matters relating to Internet governance. Attendance and participation in such an event is an indicator of bilateral norms transmission. Furuholt and Kristiansen observe that expansion of Internet access in poor areas is facilitated by arrangements for public use, such as Internet kiosks, cybercafés, or multipurpose community tele-centers (Rogers and Shukla 2001). It is worth noting that there are rural and resource-poor areas in the United States that also have severe telecommunications infrastructure gaps, including the Appalachian mountains and several Native American reservations. Yet, in general, these areas are close enough to nearby existing landlines that these challenges are easier to overcome than is the case in East Africa. DSL is a family of technologies that provide digital data transmission over the wires of a local telephone network. DSL is a wireline transmission technology that transmits data faster over traditional copper telephone lines already installed to homes and businesses. Higher speed DSL connections have been developed to extend the range of DSL services on copper lines. Plain old telephone service describes the voice-grade telephone service that remains the basic form of residential and small business service connection to the telephone network in most parts of the world. It has been available

1

16.

17.

18.

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almost since the introduction of the public telephone system in the late nineteenth century, in a form mostly unchanged to the normal user. The system was originally known as the Post Office Telephone Service or Post Office Telephone System in many countries. The term was dropped as telephone services were removed from the control of national post offices. For example, in Tanzania in 1995, there were 88,000 fixed or landline telephones, and 2198 cellular telephones. By 2004, the number of landline telephones in Tanzania had grown only incrementally to 148,360, whereas mobile phone telephony had exploded to 1,942,000 lines. VoIP services convert your voice into a digital signal that travels over the Internet. If you are calling a regular phone number, the signal is converted to a regular telephone signal before it reaches the destination. VoIP allows consumers to make a call directly from a computer, a special VoIP phone, or a traditional phone connected to a special adapter. One of the only websites still active in the entire country was the AUC website. AUC owns the IP prefix 213.181.237.0/24 announced by the AS8524. This connects with RAYA Telecom and Noor Data Networks. AUC was able to maintain very limited connectivity by switching between these two service providers. ISPs operate at level three, whereas Telecom Egypt controls the gateway at levels 1 and 2.

Bibliography Aduda, Kenneth & Ohaga, Myra. “African Technology Policy Studies, Country Case Studies, Strengthening National ICT Policy in Africa: The Case of Kenya.” Nairobi: African Technology Policy Studies Network, 2004. Photocopied. Aker, Jenny C. & Isaac, Mbiti M. “Mobile Phones and Economic Development.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 24: 207–232, Summer 2010. Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism. New York: Verso, 1983. Benford, Robert D. & Snow David, A. “Framing Processes and Social Movements.” Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 26: 611–639, August 2000. Bijker, Wiebe E. & Law, John. (Eds.) Shaping Technology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992. Bijker, Wiebe E., Hughes, Thomas P., & Pinch, Trevor J. Reviewed Work: “The Social Construction of Technological Systems.” Reviewed Fischer, C. S. “Understanding Technology: An Agenda.” Science, New Series, Vol. 238(4830): 1152–1153, November 20, 1987. Camp, Lean J. Professor of Informatics, University of Indiana, Email communication, February 2, 2011.

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Cline-Cole, Reginald & Powell, Mike. “ICTs ‘Virtual Colonisation’ & Political Economy.” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 31(99), 2004. Compaigne, Benjamin M. (Ed.) The Digital Divide: Facing a Crisis or Creating a Myth? Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001. Dralega, Carol. “Rural Women’s ICT Use in Uganda: Collective Action for Development.” Agenda, Vol. 21(71), 2007. Dzidonu, Clement. “A Blueprint for Developing National ICT Policy in Africa.” Nairobi: African Technology Policy Studies Network, 2002. Eggleston, Karen, Jensen, Robert & Zeckhauser, Richard. “Information and Communication Technologies, Markets, and Economic Development.” in The Global Information Technology Report: Readiness for the Networked World. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Erickson, Fredrick & Wittrock, M. (Ed.) “Qualitative Methods in Research on Teaching.” in Handbook of Research on Teaching, 3rd ed. New York: Macmillan, 1986. Escobar, Arturo. Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. Ezrahi, Yaron. The Descent of Icarus: Science and the Transformation of Contemporary Society. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990. Ferguson, James. The Anti-politics Machine: “Development,” Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994. Fountain, Jane. Building the Virtual State: Information Technology and Institutional Change. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001. Glanz, James & Markoff, John. “Egypt Leaders Found “Off” Switch for Internet.” The New York Times, February 15, 2011. George, Alexander L. “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured Focused Comparison.” in Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy, Lauren, Paul Gordon ed., New York: Free Press, 1979. George, Alexander L. “Knowledge for Statecraft: The Challenge for Political Science and History.” International Security, Vol. 22(1): 44–52, Summer 1997. “Getting Broadband Q&A.” Consumer Guides. Federal Communications Commission, February 5, 2020, Available at https://www.fcc.gov/consum ers/guides/getting-broadband-qa. Goldstein, E. “(World Wide?) Web.” Foreign Policy (116): 164–165, Autumn 1999. Green, Elliot. “Patronage as Institutional Choice: Evidence from Rwanda and Uganda.” Comparative Politics, Vol. 43(4): 421–438 (18), July 2011. https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/cuny/cp/2011/00000043/000 00004/art00004

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Gusfield, Joseph R. Contested Meanings. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996. Gusfield, Joseph R. The Culture of Public Problems. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984. Horowitz, Robert B. Communication and Democratic Reform in South Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. International Telecommunication Union. “African Reaches Historic Telecom Milestone.” ITU Telecommunication Indicators Update. Geneva: ITU, 2001. International Telecommunication Union. “Executive Summary.” World Telecommunication Development Report: Access Indicators for the Information Society. Geneva: ITU, 2003. James, Jeffrey. Bridging the Global Digital Divide. Cheltenham: Edward Elberg Publishing, 2003. James, Scott. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999. Jasanoff, Sheila. Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005. Jasanoff, Sheila. (Ed.) States of Knowledge: The Co-production of Science and the Social Order. London: Routledge, 2004a. Jasanoff, Sheila. “The Idiom of Co-production.” in States of Knowledge: The Coproduction of Science and Social Order, Jasanoff, S. ed., London: Routledge, 2004b. Jasanoff, Sheila & Kim, Sang Hyun. (Ed.) Dreamscapes of Modernity: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the Fabrication of Power. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2015. Jensen, Mike. “Making the Connection: Africa and the Internet.” Current History, Vol. 99(637): 215–220, 2000. Joint Team of Tanzania, CITCC and WorldTel. “Technical Report of Feasibility Study for Implementation of The National ICT Backbone Infrastructure.” United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Communications and Transport, p. 12, June 2005, Available at http://www.tzonline.org/pdf/thenationalictb ackboneinfrastructure.pdf. Jorgensen, Dale. “Information Technology and the US Economy.” The American Economic Review, Vol. 91(1), March 2001. Jorgensen, Dale & Stiroh, Kevin. “Information Technology and Growth.” American Economic Review, Vol. 89(2): 109–115, 1999. Juma, Calestous & Yong Cheong, Lee. “Innovation: Applying Knowledge in Development.” Report of the UN Task Force on Science, Technology and Innovation. London: Earthscan, 2005. Kahin, Brian & Keller, James. (Eds.) Public Access to the Internet. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995.

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Kariuki Nyaga, Joseph. “Mobile Banking Services in the East African Community (EAC): Challenges to the Existing Legislative and Regulatory Frameworks.” Journal of Information Policy, Vol. 4: 270–295, 2014. King, Gary, Keohane, Robert O. & Verba, Sidney. Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. Kolko, Beth E., Wei Carolyn, Y. & Spyridakis, Jan H. “Internet Use in Uzbekistan: Developing a Methodology for Tracking Information Technology Implementation Success.” Information Technologies and International Development, Vol. 1: 1–19, 2003. Loubser, Jan J. “Review, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research, by Barney G. Glaser; Anselm L. Strauss.” The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 73(6): 773–774, May 1968. Mansell, Robin. Imagining the Internet: Communication, Innovation, and Governance. London: Oxford University Press, 2012. Mansell, Robin & Wehn, Uta. (Eds.) Knowledge Societies: Information Technology for Sustainable Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. ISBN 9780198294108. Marx, Leo & Smith, Merritt R. “Does Technology Drive History?” The Dilemma of Technological Determinism. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1994. Mayer, Rebecca, Minges, Michael & Williams, Mark D. J. Africa’s ICT Infrastructure Building on the Mobile Revolution. Washington, DC: World Bank, p. 2, 2011. McGinnis, Timothy. African Internet Infrastructure Consultant and Ambassador to the World Summit on Information Society Ambassador, Email communication. February 18, 2011. “Measuring Globalization.” Foreign Policy (122): 56–65, January/February 2001. Mercer, Claire. “Civil Society: ICT in Tanzania.” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 31 (99), 2004. Mercer, Claire. “Telecenters and Transformations: Modernizing Tanzania Through the Internet.” African Affairs, Vol. 105(419), 2006. Merriam, Sheran. Case Study Research in Education: A Qualitative Approach. San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1988. Miles, Matthew B. & Huberman, Michael A. Qualitative Data Analysis. 2nd Ed. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1994. “Mobile Phone Users Double, Says Report.” Business Section, The Standard, p. 10, December 10, 2004. “Mobiles Surge in Developing Countries-Report.” Cellular-News, Available at http://www.cellular-news.com/story/rpinter/19371.php. Accessed on May 6, 2008.

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Moloney, Thomas. “Running Out of Credit: The Limitations of Mobile Telephoney in an Tanzanian Agricultural Marketing System.” The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 46(4), 2008. Neto, Isabel, Best, Michael & Gillett, Sharon E. “License-Exempt Wireless Policy: Results of an African Survey.” Information Technologies and International Development, Vol. 2(3), Spring 2005. Norris, Pippa. Digital Divide: Civil Engagement, Information Poverty and the Internet Worldwide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Obulutsa, George. “Mobile Phone Explosion Helps to Boost Informal Businesses.” The Standard, July 19, 2005. Okpaku, Joseph O. (Ed.) Information and Communication Technologies for African Development: An Assessment of Progress and Challenges Ahead. New York: ICT Task Force, Series 2, p. xi, 2003. Oliner, Stephen D. & Sichel Daniel E. “The Resurgence of Growth in the Late 1990s: Is Information Echnology the Story?” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 14(4): 3–22, Autumn 2000. Ragin, Charles C. The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies. Oakland: University of California Press, 2014. Richtel, Matt, “Egypt Cuts Off Most Internet and Cell Service.” The New York Times, January 28, 2011. Rogers, Everett M. Diffusion of Innovations. 4th Ed. New York: The Free Press, 1995. Rogers, Everett M. & Shukla, Pratigha. “The Role of Telecenters in Development Communication and the Digital Divide.” Journal of Development Communication, Vol. 2(12): 26–31, 2001. Ruxin, Josh. “Fiber Optic Networks to Rwanda’s Rescue.” Opinion. SFGATE, January 15, 2012, Available at https://www.sfgate.com/opinion/amp/Fiberoptic-networks-to-Rwanda-s-rescue-2546066.php. Ruxin, Josh. “Fiber Optic Networks to Rwanda’s Rescue.” San Francisco Chronicle, Sunday, November 19, 2006. “Rwanda-High Tech Hub?” Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical Series, Vol. 50(10): 20174, 2013, Available at https://onlinelibrary. wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-6346.2013.05467.x. Secretary of State for International Development. “Annual Report 2007: Development on the Record.” London: Department for International Development, May 2007. Squarcella, Claudio. “Three Case Studies on the Egyptian Disconnection.” RIPE Labs, Roma Tre University, February 15, 2011, Available at https://labs.ripe. net/author/csquarce/three-case-studies-on-the-egyptian-disconnection/. “Status of Information and Communication Technologies in Africa: The Changing Regulatory Environment.” UNECA, December 2000.

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CHAPTER 2

The Policy Paradox: Why ICT Outcomes in East Africa Do Not Reflect Conventional Wisdom

Four African nations—Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Rwanda—have been working to develop information and communications technology (ICT) policies and implement them from 1990 to the present. These countries include two relatively democratic governments (Kenya and Tanzania) and two more authoritarian governments (Rwanda and Uganda).1 The ICT policies in these four neighboring nations show wide variation with regard to the speed of passage of policies, the scope of implementation of those policies and the distributive effects of these policies. However, the poorer, and more authoritarian governments of Rwanda and Uganda have made impressive strides in distribution, far more impressive than would be expected. By contrast, their wealthier and more democratic neighbors, Kenya and Tanzania underperform. Kenya does well particularly on measures of innovation, but does poorly on indicators of distribution. Further, Kenya does not do as well as might be expected, given its wealth and high level of democracy. How can we explain this puzzle? The diffusion of ICT in East Africa represents a case study of a development approach (ICT for development or “ICT4D”) favored by donors in Africa. This examination of “information technology for development” focuses on national governments in East Africa as key stakeholders with

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attention to the nature, extent, and quality of government interactions with donors, civil society, and the private sector. On their face, information and communication technologies are expensive, fragile, and hard to maintain. Why would East African governments with limited resources and many pressing social needs spend scarce cash to build expensive modern infrastructures? The answer, I argue, lies in both the visibility of ICTs as well as their evocation of “the modern.” The cases of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Rwanda demonstrate that legal and political institutions “lead society’s investments in science and technology,” and determine the scope, type, uses, and location of that technology (Jasanoff 2004b). In addition, it appears that the private sector and civil society play a crucial, if subtle role, in ensuring the sustainability and maintenance of the technology and ensuring government responsiveness to consumer demands. The focus of this study, in large part, is on the role of the state in diffusing this new technology. In each country, both the state and the private sector are attempting to diffuse information and communication technologies. However, due to the well-known economic principle of market failure, the private sector generally undersupplies rural areas with public goods. Yet, civil society has emerged as an advocate for those without access in East Africa.

Explaining ICT Policy Success This study identifies the dependent variable as the “success of ICT policy.” I use three indicators to measure the level of progress each nation is making on ICT policy: speed of passage, scope of implementation, and distribution. The indicators of the speed of passage, implementation, and distribution allow us to “measure” ICT policy success. I argue that an important factor that explains the final form of ICT policies in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Rwanda is efforts by each national government to maintain regime stability and expand the power of the state in the face of the threat of internecine violence, and impending state collapse. Maintaining a stable government is a high priority in a region haunted by a violent past in Uganda and Rwanda, and bounded by a threatening present in Congo, Sudan, and Somalia. Using the four cases at hand to develop grounded theory, I argue that African countries with stable developmental governments that are also concerned

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about controlling possible internecine violence will distribute technological resources more broadly than more laissez faire governments, and also more broadly than governments less concerned about instability. With regard to the state’s success in promoting ICT policy, I propose the following measures: Speed of passage reflects how quickly the ICT policy draft was passed. The more detailed indicator Scope of implementation reflects the extent to which objectives identified within the policy have actually been implemented. This factor draws attention to how many different types of government projects have benefited from active ICT infrastructure. Standard locations where ICT might be used include schools, hospitals, tele-centers, post offices, and government offices. Distribution considers to what extent rural areas receive access to the new technology as well as to what extent do areas with similar population levels have similar levels of access. I also pay attention to the ICT policy process. Other factors may also influence the outcome, including the role of the local civil society and the local private sector in each nation, and the role and extent of influence of donors in each nation. The policymaking process provides a window into the concentration of power in society and the extent to which each society is run by a small group of elites or by a larger group of citizens. The strength of civil society and the strength of the local private sector differ dramatically in each of the four countries, as does the manner in which civil society and the private sector interact with the government. Using the analytic framework I have developed to evaluate the cases, Rwanda and Uganda are cases that display a broad scope of implementation, and broad levels of distribution. By contrast, Tanzania and Kenya, despite higher levels of innovation, and much higher evidence of sustainability, have narrower scopes of implementation, and lower distribution of the physical markers of ICT (Fig. 2.1). This study argues that ICTs are a visible monument to a government’s presence. The government can point to ICTs as a sign that they are building the nation. ICT facilities—whether hospitals, schools, cell phone towers, or tele-centers—can be viewed as markers of a government presence, just as the Roman aqueducts were a technology marking the outskirts of that empire. Further, this book puts forward the argument that ICT facilities are one component of a basket of goods and services, including food aid, education, agricultural support, and medicine which have value and which can be distributed by politicians to their

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Increased Scope of Implementation

Increased Distribution of Technological Infrastructure

Increased donor dependence More autocratic

Rwanda

Uganda

Tanzania

Kenya

Hybrids or competitive authoritarian countries Stronger Civil Society

More participatory policy process

More sustainable Technological approach

Fig. 2.1 Characteristics of National ICT policies in East Africa

constituents. Although it is true that ICTs are expensive in an absolute sense, ICT networks are also among the cheapest forms of visible modern infrastructure development available. They are much cheaper, per unit, than dams, nuclear power plants, highways, and airports—and also easier to maintain. One particularly attractive quality of ICTs, however, is that they can be used to support government aid in all these areas. With regard to their symbolic value, politicians get a lot of value by placing ICT infrastructure. Americans and Europeans currently view access to the telephone as well as access to the Internet as a forgone conclusion. Internet connectivity and mobile telephony have not yet attained that ubiquitous status in Africa. Nonetheless, Africa is the fastest growing telephony market and contains some of the fastest growing Internet markets in the world. Accordingly, African citizens are demanding higher levels of service and more geographical access to services with each passing day. ICTs have value partly because of their “modern” foreign quality, partly because they

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“enable” other desirable social goals, and partly because satellite towers and computer centers are so visible and thus represent attractive markers of the government’s presence.

Technology as a Political Resource Politicians harness, display, and utilize technology to build reputations, prove their worth to constituents, and pursue policy goals. One compelling example of the politicization of technological infrastructure is Stalin’s often brutal efforts to build Russia into an industrial superpower in the 1920s and 1930s. FDR incorporated efforts to bring electricity and telephony to rural America in the 1930s into the New Deal. John F. Kennedy and the Soviets battled over the atomic bomb and space exploration in an effort to prove political might. More recently, contested debates have taken place regarding the placement and function of large dams in the developing world (Fitzpatrick 1994; Caro 1990; Khagram 2004). The placement and mismanagement of nuclear energy facilities in Japan have shocked and saddened the world in the wake of mighty tsunamis. Politics, and citizens’ ability to affect decision-making, affects what technology is chosen, how it is implemented, and how it influences other development objectives (Wade 1990; Evans 1995).2 These four African nations’ efforts to develop ICT policies and to implement those policies demonstrate that governments’ social and political choices about how to manage a new set of technologies fundamentally determine the usefulness of that technology to society, how redistributive and equitable the impact of the technology will be, and how well a society will be able to utilize the promise of new technology. Science and Technology as Political Agents This study provides empirical support for the insight that technology, and specifically, information and communications technology, is a political resource in East Africa. This book argues that ICT is used by politicians to demonstrate their commitment to nation-building and economic development. In addition, control of information can be used to spread the word about positive government initiatives, or technology can be used to control opposition figures. The state in all four countries uses the placement of ICT in post offices, in schools, in hospitals, and in tele-centers as

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a way to demonstrate its commitment to particular ideas of development and progress. Policy choices by national governments regarding types of infrastructure, the extent of regional deployment of that infrastructure, the organizational structures that build and maintain that infrastructure, and the funding mechanisms that pay for infrastructure determine key aspects of what types of technology are put in place at a national level. Technology, specifically information and communication technologies, is one of the resources which politicians in the studied countries use to demonstrate their commitment to the populace (Jasanoff 2004a; Ezrahi 1990). Technology as a Resource and as a Representation Technology can also be distributed by political leaders as a patronage resource. This can be done in one of two ways. The technology can be distributed throughout all regions of the country as part of an effort to provide universal goods and services to all constituents, such as health care and education. Alternatively, technology can be distributed in a particularistic manner, as a reward for political loyalty, or as a special investment in a favored area. The four cases under study here provide a range of technological distribution, from the most universal, broad, inclusive, and equitable (Rwanda), to the most particularistic (Kenya). My research indicates, that ICT distribution reflects patronage and particularism. Interestingly, the governments of Uganda and Rwanda have been fairly equitable about distributing ICT artifacts throughout their nations, although broad distribution alone does not guarantee that such systems are sustainable. Kenya, in line with a rich history of regional patronage, shows some particularism and patronage in distributing ICT. In addition, the private sector and civil society are pushing for equitable distribution in Kenya, with weak engagement from the government. This is in line with the theory that this book advances, that like roads or schools, ICT can be pointed to as a political/technocratic accomplishment of a government attempting to stay in power. Accordingly, technology can be used in the context of narratives of nation-building to demonstrate to constituents that the government “means business” about the business of progress and development throughout the nation. Technology can also be used in a different, more opportunistic narrative to show that government can reward its friends with patronage resources (Anderson 1983).

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There are two aspects to these representations. One representation is conducted at the rhetorical level, through the text of the ICT law or policy itself. In this regard, laws and policies that make protestations about social justice goals, moves toward modernity, and efforts to attain economic growth should be viewed in no small part as political documents. These laws and policies are not so much roadmaps about how to achieve ICT development goals as they are statements about governing ideology. A different representation is conducted at the physical level, at the level of building infrastructure and distributing hardware. For example, in Rwanda, at the beginning of the century, every primary school in the entire country received one laptop. Since this amount of hardware is clearly insufficient to actually have an effect on a school with a population of scores of students, it must be viewed, instead, as a political gesture about the government’s intent to be fair, to distribute desired goods widely, and to move forward in incorporating technology into the education process in the future.3 Written and published ICT laws and policies are an important mechanism—indeed a very important mechanism—for the country to communicate with a variety of internal and external clients. These laws and policies may signal to donors—in a game theoretic sense—that the nation is participating in donor-mandated liberalization efforts and that the national government is adopting donor-approved development approaches. In particular, under Kofi Annan, donors treated ICT as part of an agenda to promote socioeconomic growth, while some, particularly IDRC and SIDA, support the power of information to democratize. Policies may also signal a commitment to development which can be viewed and digested by citizens who participate in elections, the private sector, civil society leaders, and leaders of public opinion such as the press, political allies, and opponents. Another frequently unrecognized audience comprises nearby surrounding national governments and their regional political apparatus in the form of the East African Community or NEPAD. Technology Helps to Build and Maintain the “Winning Coalition” In order to stay in power, African political leaders must build winning electoral coalitions (De Mesquita et al. 1999). Longevity in office is based in part on the size of the winning coalition (ibid.). De Mesquita and his colleagues argue that “politicians attract a winning coalition and retain its support by distributing things of value.” Put coarsely, leaders

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“buy” office” (ibid.). To hold on to power, these authors argue, a leader must provide sufficient benefits to the winning coalition so that the least satisfied member still prefers to support the incumbent rather than defect to a rival (ibid.). Competition for office ensures that fully informed incumbents equal or surpass the deals promised by their challengers. Competition also ensures that leaders or rivals who do not make credible promises lose office. To the extent that peace and prosperity are valued by a society, de Mesquita and his colleagues argue, leaders with large winning coalitions have incentives to provide public policy pursuits (ibid.). Further, although political leaders in Africa can usually rely on their coethnics to vote for them, they must assemble a coalition of voters beyond their ethnic group in order to win the presidency, particularly when they face a competitive electoral environment (Baldwin 2014). This is particularly the case in Uganda and Rwanda, where the leaders come from small minority groups. Stable governments in East Africa, facing competitive elections, require the composition of larger “winning coalitions.”4 Regimes with long tenures and peaceful histories in East Africa, at least since Independence, are regimes that have mastered, at least to some extent the elaborate and delicate art of coalition politics in ethnically diverse societies. Politicians attract a winning coalition and retain support, in part, by distributing “things of value,” such as technological goods. The winning coalitions for election or political survival in all four countries require broad ethnic coalitions.5 Politicians who distribute things of value broadly throughout the country they rule are showing that they do not just provide particularistic favors to their own ethnicity (Green 2011). Rather, these leaders are using things of value, including ICT, to provide policies of value to at least the majority of the nation—not just one tribe in a manner that can reduce ethnic conflict, and downplay regional, tribal, or group competition which may occur in other arenas. Authoritarian systems that successfully resist civil war and state failure, such as Rwanda in the past 15 years, may do so because they demonstrate virtuosity in coalition politics. Benjamin Smith’s work (2005) provides the important insight that single parties in Africa facing organized opposition with little access to rent sources are likely to invest heavily in the institution and coalition building (Smith 2005). Where regimes have few rents, they must make significant policy and power-sharing concessions to numerous groups of constituents in return for their support. In African

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cases, this creates a “broad coalition based on ethnic power distribution” (ibid., 430). This idea was demonstrated by the Grand Coalition constructed in Kenya in the wake of the 2007 election unrest. In this context, ICT policies, and more importantly, ICT infrastructure, represent a beneficial “public policy that affect[s] the welfare of everyone in the state” by attracting investment and contributing to economic growth. Regime stability in the four African countries under consideration requires the composition of delicate ethnic coalitions. ICT as a thing of value can be used in an instrumental fashion to build the winning coalitions. Rwanda is recovering from a recent genocide, and Uganda has been plagued by civil wars of its own since Independence. The governments in Rwanda and Uganda are under much more pressure to demonstrate their commitment to development in order to stay in power. This demonstration is made to constituents who have lived through recent and extreme sectarian violence that has combined historical, structural, and ethnic factors in complex combinations. Accordingly, a political leader who can make a credible commitment that he will develop the entire country, not merely his own ethnic reserve, may be especially attractive into citizens in a war-torn country where the prevailing distribution pattern under previous leaders was directing private rents to one’s own ethnic group. Specifically, Rwanda and Uganda have both experienced complete state failure. Both countries have seen the collapse of the state and total disintegration of the government, regime, and state authority within recent memory. This is a much different and more serious political problem than that faced by incumbents in Tanzania and Kenya—although Kenya teetered perilously close to the brink in 2008—and requires either the use of significant military force or significant political persuasion or some combination of both to remain in power. Kagame and Museveni both belong to small minority groups. Kagame’s group represents a mere 15% of the population, and Museveni’s language group represents only 9% of the population. Neither of them can stay in power merely by relying only on their own ethnic group and allies. Both Kagame and Museveni took power by means of a military coup, and both are aware, in all likelihood, that they could face the same violent demise as their predecessors. The governments of Tanzania and Kenya, which are comparatively peaceful, have to do less in terms of distributing goods broadly to stay in power. Since both Kagame and Museveni also stand for elections, and since Museveni, in particular, has been facing increasingly competitive elections, both leaders must offer their constituents a persuasive package of goods

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and services to convince those constituents that they deserve to stay in power. ICT can be one highly visible, modern, and useful part of that persuasive package.

Puzzles and Divergences All four countries hold periodic elections, and all four countries exhibit some aspects of procedural democracies and some of authoritarian governments (Levitsky and Way 2002). Yet, these governments demonstrate some significant differences as well. Kenya and Tanzania are closely tied in terms of how democratic they are. Kenya is, on its face, the closest to a multi-party democracy. Yet observers can question how stable the parties are, and if they are not more closely tied with personalistic politics. Indeed, one can convincingly argue in the wake of the 2022 elections, that Kenya is simply a “competitive oligarchy,” to coin a phrase. Tanzania is democratic but has operated as a one-party dominant state since President Nyerere stepped down and thus is not a true multi-party system. Rwanda is authoritarian and, arguably, increasingly autocratic, although the autocrat seems to be developmentally oriented. Uganda combines elements of an authoritarian system with elements of multi-party elections, although again, Uganda seems to be going in the direction of Zimbabwe in terms of a permanent President. Kenya has competitive multi-party elections, which were won fairly by the opposition in 2002, but which were widely believed to have been rigged by the incumbent in 2007, resulting in a consensus coalition government between the incumbent and the opposition. Kenya conducted hotly contested democratic elections in 2013, in which the son of the first President won by a sliver. Free and fair and fraught elections were conducted in 2017 and again in 2022, with the results favoring historically recognizable ethnic power coalitions. Tanzania has been going through a multi-party transition and holds regular elections, but one party has consistently been elected since 1995. President Paul Kagame of Rwanda took power in a military coup and has been in power since 1994. Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni also took power in a military coup in 1986. The states of Rwanda and Uganda are both authoritarian, and Kagame and Museveni, who are lifelong colleagues and comrades, are both autocrats. However, Uganda is the more democratic of the two countries because Museveni has been reelected through increasingly contested polls, in 1991, 2001,

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and 2006. Over the period covered by this study, all countries remain partially democratic and partially authoritarian. Uganda held elections in 2001 in which President Yoweri Museveni won over opposition leader Kizza Besigye with 69.33% of the vote. In 2006, multi-party elections were held in which Yoweri Museveni’s was reelected for a third term with 59.26% of the vote. The strong showing of the opposition leader Besigye (close to 40% of the vote) indicates that the election was highly competitive. In addition, Museveni’s decreasing winning percentage of the vote indicates that overall, Uganda’s elections are becoming more competitive. By contrast, in Rwanda, President Paul Kagame won the 2003 election by 95.5% of the vote. This indicates a complete lack of competition in Rwandan elections. Accordingly, Rwanda is more autocratic than Uganda. I order the four countries accordingly. The disputed electoral results following the December 2007 presidential and parliamentary election in Kenya do not change this general outcome. Kenya is still the only country of the four in which an incumbent party has been replaced. Further, the elections in Kenya are by far the most competitive and have the highest participation of multiple parties of the four countries (Table 2.1). The four selected nations vary with regard to policy passage and implementation. For example, the Government of Rwanda passed its ICT policy through the cabinet in 2001 and is well into implementation. Rwanda has provided hardware for ICT in selected schools, post offices, tele-centers, and government offices in nearly every district of the country. The Government of Uganda passed its policy in 2003 and has also placed numerous government-sponsored ICT facilities in schools and hospitals, in addition to investing in ICT “backbone” communications infrastructure in every secondary town in the nation. Tanzania also passed its ICT policy in 2003 and was the earliest adopter in the region of telecenter technology, achieving outstanding results. However, hardware in Tanzania is somewhat randomly distributed with no discernible pattern or plan. By contrast, the Government of Kenya first passed its ICT policy five years later than Rwanda and can point to significant ICT implementation in one public arena only: post offices. Yet the only other major accomplishment Kenya can point to in terms of ICT policy is its efforts surrounding e-government.

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Table 2.1 Country, level of democracy, and year of ICT policy passage Countrya

Polity IV score (2015)

Freedom House global freedom score (2022)

Freedom House Internet freedom score (2022)

Level of democracy

Year of passage of ICT policy

Rwanda

−3 autocratic −4 autocratic +2 somewhat democratic +8 democratic

(22/100) Not free (34/100) Not free (34/100) Partly free

(37/100) Not free (50/100) Partly free NA

More autocratic Less democratic Somewhat democratic

2001

(48/100) Partly free

(68/100) Partly free

More democratic

2006

Uganda Tanzania

Kenya

2001 and 2003 2003

a I utilize the Polity IV scale and the Freedom House scale (2008) in conjunction with my own

fieldwork to measure the level of democracy in the four countries. The scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to −10 (strongly autocratic). The last reported year in Polity IV for Uganda was 1996. The last reported year for Kenya is 2002. The last reported year for Rwanda is 2003. The last reported year for Tanzania was 2000. I also consider the Freedom House Scale. The Freedom House Scale ranks countries on political liberties and civil rights, respectively, with 1 the most free, and 7 the least free. For example the UK and the United States, which are termed “free” receive a total score of 2 whereas Uzbekistan, which is termed “not free,” receives a total score of 14

Measuring and Explaining Policy Success The role of donors is an important explanatory factor in each of these countries. Interestingly, the actual physical presence of a donor’s office in the country is not a good indicator of donor involvement. At the beginning of this study, I assumed that Kenya would show better outcomes on ICT policy success because most donors in Africa have an office in Nairobi, Kenya, potentially leading to greater convergence between national and donor elites and interests. In fact, as indicated by Table 2.2, the amount of money donors give as a fraction of the government’s budget tends to be a much better predictor of the speed of passage and implementation than office location. According to government records, as of 2008, only about 12% of Kenya’s operational budget came from overseas grants. By contrast, more than half of the budgets of Rwanda and Uganda come from donors, and Tanzania also approaches that amount (Arbache and Mungai 2008). State centralization is the factor that most compellingly explains the scope of implementation and distribution. Once the political will to

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Table 2.2 Country, level of donor funding, and speed of passage Country

Net aid as percent of GDP

Net aid per capita from all donors (in US dollars)

Rwanda Uganda

26 17

53 42

Tanzania Kenya

15 4

46 19

Speed of policy passage 2001 2001 and 2003 2003 2006

pass an ICT policy has been demonstrated, implementation is undertaken by the executive branch of government. Authoritarian regimes shape the political expression of group interests through mechanisms like corporatism (Linz 1975). Authoritarian regimes are generally much more centralized than democratic regimes. Accordingly, they can drive through policy goals more quickly. Rwanda and Uganda belong to the mobilizational authoritarian regime type. Rwanda and Uganda are both authoritarian and autocratic. Tanzania’s state machinery is more centralized than that of Kenya and less centralized than that of Rwanda. Tanzania had a strong history of behaving like a developmental state at its inception but has backed away from that approach since the 1990s. The implementation indicator in all four states is best explained by the centralized nature, or alternatively the developmental nature of the regime. Distribution of ICT artifacts can be measured and counted. If infrastructure and hardware are distributed by the government and its partners broadly across the country, then infrastructure will be less concentrated in urban areas and more visible in rural areas. In addition, if all rural areas get approximately the same amount of infrastructure, that distribution may be viewed as facially equitable. If some rural areas are strongly favored while others were purposefully neglected then that distribution should be viewed as less equitable and probably particularistic. Perhaps surprisingly, the two countries with a recent history of civil war, Rwanda and Uganda, dramatically outperform the two countries with a more peaceful history. More importantly, however, not only have Rwanda and Uganda experienced civil war but they have also experienced complete state failure within recent memory. Tanzania’s distribution is the least inclusive and the nation is also the most peaceful. Kenya’s distribution of technology was very politicized and particularistic under Moi but has become more

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equitable under Kibaki as elections become more contested. In the four countries studied, distributive equity is largely explained by the nation’s history of civil war accompanied by state failure, and the attendant need of the government to craft a stable ruling coalition in an unstable political environment. Inclusiveness in power-sharing feeds into distribution. For example, in the post-genocide period, Rwanda’s government under President Kagame has built a robust single-party structure6 within a framework known as the Government of National Unity. I argue that the governments of Rwanda and Uganda governments maintain political stability in part by giving voice, and input and providing key goods and services to regions that could potentially belong to “the opposition.” Apparently, the 2007 election results essentially forced Kenya has failed to accomplish a weak version of this kind of horizontal distribution of power and resources. I argue that the winning political coalitions in countries that have recently experienced state failure yet are currently stable—Rwanda and Uganda— are significantly larger and are more “horizontally” engaged than would be predicted by conventional comparative political science theory (De Mesquita et al. 1999, 147–161).7 The result is that in Rwanda and Uganda, where governments must carefully attend to fairness, or risk the ever-looming threat of civil war, more citizens in more parts of the country get more resources. There are at least three alternative explanations for variations in the ICT policy success. First, one might reasonably assume that there is some correlation between the level of economic development of the country and the speed of passage and level of implementation in all policy areas, including ICT. Second, one might expect (as I initially did) that the more democratic countries would be more egalitarian in the distribution of infrastructure due to the pressure to be responsive to constituents throughout the nation. Third, one might expect countries with a more vibrant private sector, particularly in the telecommunications field, would outperform others. Nonetheless, the data I collected during extensive fieldwork indicates that Kenya lags furthest behind on policy passage, policy implementation, and particularly, distribution (Przeworski et al. 2000). By contrast, Rwanda, the country with the lowest per capita income, an economy recently devastated by war, a weak private sector, and a noncompetitive telecommunications industry, is furthest ahead on three out of the four indicators.

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Table 2.3 Country, level of democracy, and scope of implementation Country

Polity IV score Level of democracya

Rwanda

−3

Uganda Tanzania Kenya

−4 +2 +8

More authoritarian Less authoritarian More democratic Most democratic

Scope of implementation as of 2022 High Medium high Medium Low

a This is based on the author’s analysis of Polity IV as well as the author’s personal observations in

fieldwork

If economic development were a strong explanatory factor for the success of ICT policy, then observers would predict that Kenya, which consistently has the highest per capita income of the four countries, would be furthest ahead, and that Rwanda, the least developed, would be furthest behind. However, high economic development does not correlate with a strong implementation either, as one might have predicted. Also initially considered was that there might be a correlation between democracy and the indicator’s speed of passage, distribution, and scope of implementation. However, the speed of passage of ICT policy in Kenya and Tanzania, conducted with a relatively democratic process, has been slower than the speed of passage in neighboring countries, despite the fact that all four countries began deliberation on their ICT policies at roughly the same time, in the mid-1990s. Further, the scope of implementation does not increase with an increase in democracy. Policy success in the ICT arena does not neatly track regime type as one might assume: particularly in the areas of implementation and distribution, policy accomplishment actually moves in the opposite direction of democracy (Table 2.3).

Applying the Indicators Rwanda is a case of high speed of passage, broad scope of implementation, equitable distribution, and low process. Uganda is a case of medium speed of passage, a very broad scope of implementation, equitable distribution, and low process. Tanzania is a case of medium speed of passage, low scope of implementation, low distribution, and high process. Kenya is a case of low speed of passage, high process, low scope of implementation, and inequitable distribution.

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Rwanda has high donor involvement, an absent civil society, weak private sectors, and a history of brutal civil war. Uganda has high donor involvement, a weak but burgeoning civil society, a strong private sector, and a history of brutal civil war. Tanzania has high donor involvement, a strong civil society, a strong private sector, and a peaceful history. Kenya has lower donor involvement, a strong civil society, a strong private sector, and some electoral violence, but a comparatively peaceful history for the region. Where the political space is more expansive and policymaking more decentralized, as it is in Kenya, members of the private sector and civil society drive the debate and push the government forward. The result of this more open political space is a robust and vigorous debate that draws in donors, academics, private sector trade associations, and civil society activists. Although the debate is not so vigorous in Tanzania, it still takes place, with the result that the government has paid special attention not to the spread of the technology, but rather to ensure that ICT technologies in rural areas are sustainable, profitable, and maintained by local private sector actors with minimum government input. Thus, the goal of the Tanzanian government diverges from its more authoritarian neighbors. The shape of technology in Tanzania is carefully implemented in a sustainable fashion that meets the need of local residents. In the two more democratic contexts, Kenya and Tanzania, social debate about the shape of technology, its uses, and its placement are vigorous and contentious. The result is a slowed implementation, but close attention to the role of each stakeholder in that implementation, a deeper consensus, and a discourse that more closely reflects the will of “wananchi.”8 In the more authoritarian and more centralized contexts, civil society is weak. In Rwanda, civil society barely makes an appearance, as it was almost completely decimated by the 1994 genocide. In Uganda, by contrast, civil society is incorporated into decision-making in a corporatist fashion but has limited social muscle. In both Uganda and Rwanda, which have histories of wrenching and bloody sectarian conflict, the governments distribute technology consciously in an effort to demonstrate their commitment to an ethnically diverse rural populace. This effort at inclusion reaches its apex in the deeply divided Rwanda, where in light of genocidal memories, normative concepts of “fairness” and distribution may be the only thread holding the fragile governing coalition together. The machinery of historically centralized states in the two countries

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ensures that implementation comes from the top, which makes implementation faster, and broader. The risk, however, is that high-speed, top-down efforts to distribute infrastructure through every corner of the nation may be more successful at creating symbolism than at creating sustainability.

Conclusion In this chapter, I have presented four indicators to measure “success” in ICT policy. These are speed of passage, scope of implementation, distribution, and process. In addition, I have drawn attention to the qualitative process by which policy is passed, and the visions of technology which drive implementation. These measures are transportable across national borders and they are also transportable across policy areas involving infrastructure, such as energy, transportation, water, and electricity. The four cases studied in this book lend support to the assertion that, with regard to policy development and policy implementation, democracies do not always outperform authoritarian regimes. Impressive policy changes and growth in the ICT sector are seen in authoritarian cases as well as in democratic cases. Impressive policy changes and growth are seen in countries with competitive private sectors and state-controlled private sectors in nations with highly centralized governments and in nations with decentralized governments. A close examination of these four cases indicates that autocracies may be forced to distribute resources more broadly than one would predict based on regime type and seeming democracies may be less concerned about equity and fairness than one would predict. Domestic politics cannot be ignored. The way in which governance influences technological configuration and diffusion of a new innovation is the result of the precise historical institutional configuration in each country. ICT policy success can be explained partly as a result of political agency. Political will can be a function of pressure from donors, pressure from civil society or the private sector, the need to maintain stability in an ethnically fractured society, or the result of committed political leadership. A motivated statesman who finds modernization attractive, which is true in the case of Rwanda, and also, less charismatically perhaps, in Uganda, can act as an “ICT Champion.” The case of Rwanda in particular illustrates the insight that policy implementation may depend in part on the will of an authoritarian ruler (Przeworski et al. 2000). In Rwanda and Uganda, political will stems from a centralized state authority. Powerful leaders with a significant capacity to implement decisions taken from the center

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can quickly interpret and implement ideas from donors that help them stay in power. The risk in a highly autocratic country with a low degree of human resources is that the policy process is “only one man,” and thus prone to failure as soon as that person leaves power. Yet, structural factors are crucial. State capacity is higher if donors make additional funding available, if the state has the ability to coordinate and administer actions from its administrative center, or if the private sector has the resources, ability, or legal obligation to assist the government. The empirical evidence collected for this study suggests that, in fact, the authoritarian regimes found in Uganda and Rwanda more effectively promote and implement a technocratic agenda. Countries pass ICT policies more quickly and implement those policies more quickly in the presence of a highly centralized state, a concentration of power in the leader, and large amounts of donor funding. The higher effectiveness of implementing ICT policy in Rwanda and Uganda is affected by the ease with which a highly centralized authoritarian state can implement a policy agenda. Importantly, we see a very close correlation between the presence of centralized, authoritarian states, high levels of donor funding, and significant implementation. It is a historical accident that both Museveni and Kagame have had periods where they were very popular with international donor organizations. It is likely they would not have been able to accomplish as much as they have in the absence of strong donor financial support for implementing ICT policy. By contrast, the increased level of involvement by civil society and the private sector allowed by the emerging democracies in Kenya and Tanzania are likely to result in a much more robust, more credible policy with higher levels of local investment and involvement. Who gets what technology, and how much of that technology, requires a complex negotiation between civil society, the private sector, government, and donors in each case. In other words, democracy and deliberation may help build state capacity, the social capacity for democratic debate, the stability of organizations and institutions, and in the end, the sustainability of technology.

Notes 1. This classification follows Polity IV. Polity IV ranks countries from −10 (totally autocratic) to +10 (totally democratic).

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2. According to Robert Wade government leadership in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea in promoting certain industries, particularly those in manufacturing of car parts machine tools and personal computers, was crucial to economic success. Peter Evans provides a groundbreaking analysis of what makes some states more effective than others in promoting industrial growth, particularly in the field of local information technology (IT) industries, focusing on the newly industrializing countries of Brazil, India, and Korea. 3. Consider the representational use of technology as gesture in the United States’ decision to send a man to the moon and plant the American flag on the moon’s surface in 1969. This gesture conveyed (at a minimum) American power, technological domination, and hegemony, not just on a national territory but on a territory far beyond the earth’s borders. 4. Discussing ethnicity in Africa is a delicate matter, full of potholes, and occasionally landmines, which—as the daughter of an African immigrant— I approach with respect, and some trepidation. I pursue the topic with an effort to be delicate, precise, and sensitive. My interest is not ethnolinguistic accuracy, although I am an aficionado of this area. Rather, in this article. I paint with a broad brush in order to give a sense of political coalitions, knowing that many people move fluidly between ethnic and even national borders, and identify as much with nation, language or religion as with “tribe.” As always, I seek to increase reliability through the careful use of both academic and non-academic sources, as well as asking that my work be read carefully by citizens of the studied nations. 5. I reject a purely “primordial” position regarding ethnicity (Geertz 1973). Nor am I persuaded that a strictly “rational” analysis of ethnic competition is correct (Bates 1983). Rather, I am persuaded by those who argue that ethnicity represents a combination of voluntary choices regarding identity which are made within the framework of externally imposed limits and definitions. 6. According to the United States Department of State, there are nine political parties in Rwanda. The ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front leads a multi-party coalition. Rwanda’s 2003 constitution eliminates references to ethnicity. 7. Contrast my argument with that of De Mesquita et al. (1999, 147–161). De Mesquita characterizes the winning coalitions of autocracies as consistently smaller than those of democracies. In the cases I examine, I argue that the winning coalitions in Rwanda and Uganda are larger than those in Kenya. In the post 2007 election period, I predict that any government which wishes to rule Kenya successfully will be forced to expand participation in its “winning coalition.” 8. “Wananchi” is a Swahili word which means citizen. It is widely used throughout the region, to refer to the political wishes of the non-elite.

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Bibliography Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso, 1983. Arbache, Jorge & Mungai, Rose. Africa Development Indicators 2007 , Page, J. ed. Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2008. Baldwin, Kate. “When Politicians Cede Control of Resources: Land, Chiefs, and Coalition Building in Africa.” Comparative Politics, Vol. 46: 253–271, 2014. Bates, R. H. Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa. London: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Bowman, Warigia. “Widening the Circle of Opportunity: The Digital Divide and the Discourse of Technology as Progress.” Unpublished Qualifying Paper Cambridge, Kennedy School of Government, 2003. Caro, Robert A. The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Means of Ascent. New York: Vintage Books, 1990. Dahl, Robert A. A Theory of the Democratic Process, Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989. De Mesquita, Bruce B., Morrow, James D., Siverson, Randolph M. & Smith, Alastair. “Policy Failure and Political Survival: The Contribution of Political Institutions.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 43: 147–161, 1999. Evans, Peter. Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. Ezrahi, Yaron. The Descent of Icarus: Science and the Transformation of Contemporary Society. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990. Fitzpatrick, Sheila. The Russian Revolution. London: Oxford University Press, 1994. Geertz, C. The Interpretation of Cultures. New York, NY: Basic Books, 1973. Green, Elliot. “Patronage as Institutional Choice: Evidence from Rwanda and Uganda.” Comparative Politics, Vol. 43(4): 421–438, 2011. Jasanoff, Sheila. “The Idiom of Co-production.” in States of Knowledge: The Coproduction of Science and Social Order, Jasanoff, S. ed., London: Routledge, 2004a. Jasanoff, Sheila. “Ordering Knowledge, Ordering Society.” in States of Knowledge: The Co-production of Science and Social Order, Jasanoff, S. ed., London: Routledge, 2004b. Keck, Margaret A. & Sikkink, Kathryn. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998. Khagram, Sanjeev. Dams and Development: Transnational Struggles for Water and Power. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004. Khagram, Sanjeev, Riker, James V. & Sikkink, Kathryn. (Eds.) Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks and Norms. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002.

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Kingdon, John W. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. New York: Longman, 1995. Levitsky, Steven & Way, Lucan A. “Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism.” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13: 51–66, 2002. Linz, Juan. “Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes.” in Handbook of Political Science, Greenstein, F. & Polby, N. eds., Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1975. Macias, E., Cutler, R., Jones, S. & Barreto, M. Promoting Access to Network Technologies in Underserved Communities: Lessons Learned. Claremont: Tomas Rivera Policy Institute, 2002. Maggio, Paul D. & Powell, Walter W. “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields.” American Sociological Review, Vol. 48: 147–160, 1983. March, James G. & Olsen, Johan P. Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics. New York: The Free Press, 1991. Martin, Lisa L. & Simmons, Beth A. “Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions.” International Organization, Vol. 52: 171–189, 1998. Meyer, John & Rowan, Brian. “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony.” in Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, Powell, W. W. & Dimaggio, P. J. eds., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991. Przeworski, Adam, Alvarez, Michael E., Cheibub, Jose A. & Limongi, Fernando. Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Scott, James C. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998. Servon, Lisa J. Bridging the Digital Divide: Technology, Community and Public Policy. Malden: Blackwell, 2002. Simmons, Beth & Elkins, Zachary. “The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy.” American Political Science Review, Vol. 98: 171–189, 2004. Smith, B. “Life of the Party: The Origins of Regime Breakdown and Persistence Under Single Party Rule.” World Politics, Vol. 57: 421–451, 2005. Smith, Merrit R. & Marx, Leo. (Eds.) Does Technology Drive History: The Dilemma of Technological Determinism. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1994. Thompson, Charis. “Co-producing Cites and the African Elephant.” in States of Knowledge: The Co-production of Science and Social Order, Jasanoff, S. ed., London: Routledge, 2004. Wade, Robert. Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990. Weiss, Thomas G. “Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance.” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 21: 795–814, 2000.

CHAPTER 3

The Introduction of ICT Policies into East Africa

The project of regulating, managing, and distributing ICT takes place on several fronts. The first front—the policy front of managing ICT— emphasizes the invocation of political discourse in the form of policy, law, legislation, and regulation. One unusual feature of ICT policy in Africa was its importation from the outside. The number of African countries that had developed national ICT strategies rose from 32 in 2007 to 48 in 2011 indicating external pressure on African governments to create laws and regulations in this arena (Africa Research Bulletin 2013). Why might scholars, activists, and policymakers wish to understand the process by which East African countries chose to adopt ICT policies and laws? The process by which ICT policy was formed in East Africa highlights the extent to which donors played a key role in forming laws and regulations. In addition, looking at the ICT policy process in a comparative perspective allows observers to compare law, governance and policymaking in these four different countries. The initial approach of the Tanzanian case illustrates high levels of grassroots participation by civil society, as well as high levels of interaction between Tanzanian civil society, the Tanzanian private sector, and international civil society. The Kenyan case shows how waves of stronger or weaker governance, as democracy ebbs and flows in that country, affect the policy process. The Kenyan case further highlights the key

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 W. M. Bowman, Digital Development in East Africa, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22162-0_3

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role played by technocrats, often with ties to the private sector. Uganda’s ICT policy has been driven and developed by well-qualified technocrats, with an emphasis on distribution in rural areas and state-run facilities throughout the country. Yet, as Uganda lurches toward autocracy, the emphasis on policy and the role of technocrats has diminished. As might be expected, of process the Rwandan case represents the most hierarchical of these cases. However, the Rwandan case also represents a clear focus on benchmarks and outcomes.

The Discourse of Development As Clare Mercer observes, information and communication technologies (ICTs) have become increasingly important components “for the way in which discourses of development construct modernity” (Mercer 2006). Donors, particularly the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program, believed that the Internet could be a key component in helping to reduce poverty in the developing world. “The African Information Society Initiative … is not about technology. It is about giving Africans the means to improve the quality of their lives and fight against poverty.”1 By 2011, already two decades in, this discourse about the power of “information to transform lives and alleviate poverty,” proved to be remarkably sticky (Gollakota and Doshi 2011). By the late 1990s, the Internet had become a “serious development concern” (Mercer 2006), and the United Nations, World Bank, NEPAD, and African nations had decided that African governments should throw their energy into becoming “information societies.” Advocates and concerned policymakers generally envisioned ICT together with its social and political uses, not just its technological attributes (Mercer 2006). Scholars Robin Mansell (2012) and Chrisanthi Avgerou (2008) provide valuable discussions of the discourses surrounding ICT for development. Initially, policymakers, scholars, and activists often discussed and trumpeted the potential of information technology as a catalyst for economic and social development. Delegates from 174 countries adopted a resolution emphasizing the role of ICT in development and reducing poverty at the UN World Summit on the Information Society (“WSIS”) in Tunis in 2005 (Gollakata and Doshi, at 70). Development specialists in the early 2000s viewed the Internet as a technological panacea, able to solve a

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range of development problems ranging from tax collection, health care, freedom of information, and law enforcement (Mercer 2006). At least three relevant visions of ICT informed and influenced efforts to create policies that can regulate, control, encourage, and promote ICTs in Africa. The three relevant visions include the ideas that (1) ICT will make governance more efficient (Fountain 2001; Cordella and Iannaci 2010: (2) ICTs will improve productivity and lead to economic growth (UNDP 2001; World Bank 1998); and (3) finally, that ICTs can improve social and development outcomes leading to socio-political transformation (Stauffaccher et al. 2005). Economists and technocrats predominantly focus on ICT’s contribution to manufacturing productivity. These advocates believe ICT can improve African participation in the global marketplace (Dzidonou 2002), as well as economic participation in the domestic marketplace for small businesspeople. Further, information, in this worldview, is a major contributor to labor productivity, and therefore firms could use ICTs to enhance productivity and competitiveness (Kamssu et al. 2004). This vision of ICT by necessity requires nationwide infrastructure and connectivity—particularly in remote and rugged areas—meaning electricity, copper wires, satellite towers, very small aperture terminals, and fiber optic cables. The vision of ICT as a rural economic facilitator also requires improvements in the educational infrastructure. Students will have to become computer literate—no small task on a continent where most classrooms lack glass windows and where sums are done on blackboards with chalk. A more utopian vision, held by civil society activists, sees this technology as a tool that can help build social justice, and perhaps democracy. Many practitioners and scholars have argued that ICT may contribute to improved social, economic, and development outcomes in poor areas of the West, in developing nations, in general, and in Africa, in particular (Eggelston et al. 2002). According to these visionaries, access to ICT can empower women and give the poor increased economic opportunities while improving the quality of education and the delivery of medical services in rural areas. This most utopian version will require African governments to move from paper files to electronic files, invest in a welldeveloped infrastructure of electricity, optic fiber cables, satellite towers, and copper wires in both cities and rural areas, and utilize healthy doses of political will at the national, regional, and multinational level.

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International Origins of ICT Policy in East Africa Many African ICT policies were a by-product of the UN-driven, African Information Society Initiative. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa framed its work on the information society as part of a broader, anti-poverty initiative in Africa.2 In the mid-1990s, an All-Africa Ministerial Conference was held in order to discuss creating “an information society” in Africa. Two important conferences were held on this topic: one in Brussels, in February of 1995,3 which included members of the European Commission as well as G7 telecom and economic Ministers, and the Information Society and Development Conference in South Africa in May of 1995,4 which included representation from over 40 countries and 20 international organizations (including representatives from the G7, European Commission and World Bank). A follow-up initiative, the African Information Society Initiative, was launched at the Economic Commission for Africa’s Conference of Ministers in May 1996, endorsed by all African telecommunications ministers during the African Regional Telecommunication Development Conference in May 1996, and adopted by the Organization of African Unity Heads of State summit at Council of Ministers meeting in July 1996. It was out of these multilateral efforts that ICT policies emerged in the four countries. Another donor-based initiative focused on promoting ICT in the developing world was the Digital Opportunity Taskforce (“Dot Force”). The Dot Force was created by the Group of 8 (G8)5 heads of state in July 2000.6 The Dot Force was developed at the Kyushu-Okinawa Summit and was based on the Okinawa Charter on the Global Information Society. The July 2000 Kyushu-Okinawa Summit focused on the “digital divide,” and aimed to identify ways in which the “digital revolution could benefit the world’s poorest and most marginalized groups.” The summit determined that the digital divide “threaten[s] to exacerbate the existing social and economic inequalities between countries and communities.”7 The Dot Force concluding document recommended a multi-stakeholder structure for ICT policy development and also promoted the idea of universal and affordable access to communications infrastructure.8 The discourse emerging from this series of meetings focused on “bridging the international digital divide,” and focused on the need to integrate information technology development with other key development goals, such as poverty reduction.9 The Dot Force discussion

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Table 3.1 Comparison of ICT policy processes across East African countries Country

Bottom-up process or top-down process

Level of donor involvement

Level of local CSO involvement

Level of local private sector involvement

Kenya Uganda Tanzania Rwanda

Mixed Mixed Bottom-Up Top-Down

High High High High

High Medium High Low

High Medium High Low

Source Author’s views based on fieldwork

also focused on the policy environment in African countries, including increasing access, improving knowledge, and assisting in applications of information technology.10 The Dot Force documents discussed the need for national ICT policies and E-Government strategies, in addition to raising issues regarding “universal access”—meaning the need to develop communications infrastructure throughout all geographic areas of countries—the cost of access, and the need for pro-competitive policy regimes and regulatory frameworks in the communications sector.11 The Dot Force documents promoted ideas reflecting the popularity of “liberalization” based solutions among multilateral donors in the late 1990s,12 as well as the desire of private sector organizations in the G8 to attain preferred access to developing markets in the communications sector.13 The Dot Force process, and other similar meetings, such as the World Summit on the Information Society, represented a crucial moment in the trans-national conversations between activists, multilateral donors, and citizens of developing countries about how to best harness the promise of information communications technology.14 Key ideas from the Dot Force would re-emerge in the policy documents and discourse of African nations and civil society activists interested in ICT policy (Table 3.1).

Rwanda: Top-Down, External Control Remarkably, Rwanda developed the first ICT policy in the East African region in 2001, but modernization was not a grassroots creation. It was the result of direction from the topmost levels of government. As of 2007, Rwanda had already issued two ICT policies organized in

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five-year increments, entitled the National Information and Communication Infrastructure Plans. The Rwandan ICT Policy process produced a detailed document with clear implementation indicators and detailed time frames widely discussed and admired by other governments throughout the East African region. One adviser to the Rwandan government notes that “This country is very hierarchical, and whatever the government decides to do, it will do, and society will follow in a [...] disciplined way.” Since launching its ICT Policy in 2001, the Rwandan government has issued four policies running through the year 2020.15 Engagement of donors has been both a support and a source of resources for Rwanda, as well as a potential handicap. In a report on the use of ICTs in Rwanda post-conflict, the World Bank notes that Rwanda has received “a massive inflow of funds from the international community and donors” (World Bank 2013). Key donor countries have included the United States and the United Kingdom. Indeed, in 2011, close to 40% of Rwanda’s national budget, and 11% of its gross domestic product were financed by donor grants.16,17 According to the World Economic Forum, by 2016, nearly 40% of Rwandan government revenues still came from aid. The World Bank estimates that in the wake of the pandemic, Rwanda’s debt-to-GDP ratio approached 71% of GDP in 2020. The benefit of such engagement has been that Rwanda has had a steady flow of funding to pursue its ambitious ICT policy agenda, which is part of a larger national development strategy. The drawback of such high levels of engagement and investment is that the average Rwandan has little input into decision-making about ICT policy, or, indeed, most policies. The fact that the Rwandan government tends to be hierarchical amplifies donor voices. Further, the hierarchical nature of Rwandan government emphasizes the priorities of donors, whereas the needs and concerns of the average Rwandan may not be solicited or reflected. Indeed, civil society played a very limited role in the first round of ICT policy deliberations. Duhamic—the main umbrella organization which oversees the NGO sector in Rwanda—was one of the only strong nongovernmental organization visible in the Rwandan ICT policy process. In an interview, the organization’s director stated his belief that civil society “had not been consulted enough in the NICI process.” However, he qualified that statement by saying that “many NGOs do not understand the importance of ICT.” He stated his belief that the government does listen to civil society but also asserted that the government’s lack of engagement with civil society results from the weak and

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inactive nature of Rwandan civil society. He asserted that the government needs to make more concerted efforts to involve civil society in the policy process. One government supporter, a Rwandan with impressive foreign academic credentials who lives abroad, cautioned me to focus on the effectiveness of the government’s implementation, not on its autocratic nature. After all, he pointed out, there are African governments that are autocratic, yet not effective. By contrast, one could argue, in his view, that the Rwandan government is arguably both autocratic and effective. For example, he noted “what would a farmer say about ICT policy anyway?” He noted that there are certain prerequisites for any person to participate in a consultation and that significantly more education and capacity building are needed in Rwanda to allow citizens to exercise democratic rights, such as participation. Drawing on democratic theory, an observer could contend that perhaps the citizens are not as well qualified as they might be, but the correct response nevertheless—particularly in a country like Rwanda which is rebuilding society from the rubble— is to furnish citizens the opportunity to understand the ends and means of one’s interests, not to exclude them from decision-making altogether (Dahl 1989). In fact, this type of approach informed the gacaca process. The second round of ICT policy development in Rwanda did increase citizen participation to the level of “placation” (Arnstein 1969), in the sense that a few handpicked representatives of civil society and the Rwandan private sector participated in the National Task Force. In the words of one official at the Rwandan Information Technology Authority: There were stakeholders, but [the process] was not engaging the stakeholders. There were stakeholders in the writing. One consultant led the NICI I process. He engaged, but not as much as one would wish.18

As shown above, the ICT policymaking process supports arguments that the RPF government’s idea of citizen participation is one of guided and controlled consultation. Rwandan citizens do not have an effective way of voicing concerns about decisions the government is taking, with respect to ICT. Some observers argue forcefully that Rwanda is a society based on censorship, and observe that those who speak out against the government are punished, imprisoned, or worse (Reyntjens 2006). Some observers

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believe that the Government of Rwanda is guilty of co-optation or repression of independent forces in civil society. Indeed, according to the International Crisis Group, civil society in Rwanda “exist[s] between repression and coercion” (International Crisis Group 2002). In the past ten years, Rwanda’s civil society sector has shown some growth. Nongovernmental organizations and civil society organizations have come together to form the Rwanda Civil Society Platform. According to a 2011 UNDP/Civicus Report, civil society participation in non-partisan action is weak, and civil society is centered in cities. Further, the report indicates that civil society has had little impact in terms of encouraging government transparency in Rwanda (CCOAIB 2011) The report characterized dialogue between civil society and the state as “moderate and limited,” which corresponds with interviews conducted by the author. Further, the report indicates that Rwandan grassroots organizations tend to be passive vis-a-vis the Rwandan state and may be reluctant to challenge the government’s vision. Accordingly, there is no social organization that can provide a voice of dissent or even mild critique and, for that matter, criticism regarding the direction, pace, and design of Rwanda’s ICT policy and implementation or any other policy issue.

Tanzania Multilateral donors such as the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa introduced the idea of an ICT Policy to the Tanzanian policy agenda. Donors also influenced both policymaking style and substance in Tanzania. Nonetheless, Tanzanian nationals identified the importance of creating an ICT policy for the country, drafted the crucial text, and encouraged the government to adopt it. UNECA-NICI As in Rwanda, the beginning of the ICT policy process in Tanzania can be traced to the Economic Commission for Africa National Information and Communications Infrastructure (NICI) project. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) selected a number of countries, including Tanzania, to start working with on developing ICT policies and provided the seed money for that process.19 UNECA held two national workshops on the ICT Policy Process in Tanzania. In 1996 and 1997, Tanzanian Telkom worked with UNECA

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on the National Information and Communications Infrastructure Plan.20 A workshop on the “Elaboration of an Information and Communications Policy and Plan for the United Republic of Tanzania” was held in Dar es Salaam from May 12 to 15, 1997. The workshop was facilitated by the Tanzanian Planning Commission and brought together information technology experts, senior government officials, and private sector leaders.21 According to UNECA documents, the purpose of the workshop was to urge the Tanzanian government to develop an ICT Policy. In the following year, in conjunction with the Dutch donor International Institute for Communication and Development, a “National ICT Roundtable” was held in Dar es Salaam on June 4–10, 1998. The focus of the National ICT Roundtable was on deepening understanding of the “potential role of ICT in national development processes.”22 Tanzanian participants in the policy were generally skeptical of the NICI process. Simbo Ntiro, a private sector consultant and founder of E-Think Tank, stated that “UNECA tried to force Tanzania to develop a NICI plan, but the process failed. Tanzania specifically did not want to work with UNECA.” The UNECA-led ICT policy process inched forward in Tanzania throughout the late 1990s. This process stalled after a few years, probably due to a lack of local engagement, and did not move the country’s government forward to a formal policy.23 E-ThinkTankTz In a process that was parallel but independent from the UNECA-NICI efforts, around 1998, a “loose fraternity” of academics, entrepreneurs, Tanzanian expatriates in the Diaspora, private small institutions, and “concerned Tanzanians,” began discussing what they could do to create a national ICT policy outside of government. This group called themselves the “E-ThinkTankTz.”24 According to its participants, high-ranking Tanzanian government officials, and policy entrepreneurs in neighboring countries, E-ThinkTankTz played the primary role in getting Tanzania’s ICT issue on the policy agenda.25 The E-ThinkTankTz group emerged out of the legacy of the “Y2K” crisis. Concerns regarding a global computer catastrophe surrounded the advent of the new millennium. Motivated by this perceived crisis, the Tanzanian government worked with information technology experts in

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the private, public, and nonprofit sectors to eliminate bugs in the Tanzanian government’s computer systems.26 Key policy entrepreneurs and private sector individuals in the telecommunications and computing sector determined that most of Tanzania’s big investments in information and communications technology were relatively recent.27 According to participants, Y2K represented a unique opportunity to reflect on the emerging ICT sector in the nation.28 Eventually, an organization called the “E-ThinkTankTz” was established. The first meeting was held on February 8, 2000 in Dar es Salaam.29 The purpose of the group was to discuss the potential of ICT in Tanzania, “to discuss issues... of relevance to the development of ICTs in support of socioeconomic progress for Tanzanians,”30 and to track what the Tanzanian government’s plans were in this regard. Original members included several indigenously owned internet service providers, Tanzanian government organizations such as the Tanzanian Ministry of Agriculture and the Bank of Tanzania and selected representatives of multinationals. Every Thursday, members of the Tanzanian private sector and civil society would meet in KPMG’s conference room with the support of the Swedish government. The members of the group grew increasingly concerned that the National Information and Communications Infrastructure plan process was “fundamentally flawed.” They also were concerned that donors were imposing their vision of the policy, instead of providing support for a locally-driven initiative. The group members determined that a statement from the government regarding the ICT sector would reduce ad hoc efforts, and would allow people to work in a more coordinated and unified manner across sectors. They decided to develop an information document on their own to “kick start the policy process.”31 The initial meetings of the E-Think-TankTz were “physical meetings” in which people presented papers on the impact of ICT in different sectors of the Tanzanian economy.32 In addition, an email mailing list, which still exists and is still quite active, and a website were established to share discussion materials and agenda items. At its peak in early February 2001, the E-Think Tank membership approached one hundred physical and as many as 700 “virtual” members. As one founding participant put it, “The issue was to have a lively discussion with value coming out of it.” Although the E-ThinkTankTz had some members from government, it operated outside the confines of government. Indeed, the majority of

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the participants came from the private sector. The private sector participants were evenly distributed between Tanzanian entrepreneurs in the indigenous private sector and in the multinational sector. There was not a large civil society representation in E-ThinkTankTz but there was some, including outreach to the Economic and Social Research Foundation (a Tanzanian NGO). The E-ThinkTankTz actually operated and continues to operate as an informal civil society organization and was nearly registered as an NGO at one point.33,34 Over a period of two months, the E-ThinkTankTz put together a background statement about the ICT community in Tanzania and its areas of interest which they termed an “Information Document,” which was finalized in June 2000. 35 With the “Information Document” in hand, this informal group approached the United Nations Development Program for funding and support for the E-ThinkTankTz’s efforts to create a framework for a Tanzanian ICT Policy and help the group to develop and publish it.36 The United Nations Development Program committed its support on the condition that the Government of Tanzania was involved.37 The Tanzanian Communications Regulatory Authority also agreed to provide counterpart funds for the policy process. Digital Opportunity Task Force Eight developing countries participated in the Dot Force meetings: Bolivia, Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Senegal, South Africa, and Tanzania. The inaugural meeting of the Dot force was held in Tokyo in November 2000 and included participation from governments, the private sector, international organizations, and nonprofit organizations from G8 countries as well as developing countries. Tanzania sent four delegates to the Digital Opportunity Task Force plenary meetings38 in Tokyo, Japan in November 2000, and again sent representatives to meetings in Cape Town, South Africa in March 2001.39 In addition, Tanzanian representatives were invited to the Dot Force third plenary meeting held in Siena, Italy, in April 2001 as well as to an international workshop on ICT convened by the Dutch development agency at The Hague, and to workshops on ICT and E-Government sponsored by Swedish development agency, Microsoft and Oracle and the World Bank in the same year.40 The four Tanzanian delegates to Dot Force were participants in numerous international meetings organized by the multinational private

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sector and international donors on ICT and E-Government. These four delegates, August Kowero, David Sawe, Simbo Ntiro, and Emmanuel Ole Kambainei—would all become key players in the creation of Tanzania’s ICT policy, acting as contributors, transmitters, and interpreters of this international discourse through the mechanism of a Tanzanian organization “E-ThinkTankTz.41 These four Tanzanians attended the Dot Force plenary meetings and also participated in meetings on ICT policy in Africa held by the Swedish, the Dutch, the UN ICT Task Force, Microsoft, Oracle, and the Kananaskis G8 Heads of State Summit during the period between 2000 and 2002. The Tanzanian participants from Dot Force and other meetings became participants and leaders in E-ThinkTankTz and brought the lessons they learned in Tokyo, Siena, Pretoria, The Hague, and Silicon Valley with them back to Dar es Salaam. We learned lessons from the global stage which we tried to adapt locally….E ThinkTankTz was able to prove that the private sector talking to the government works …. Tanzania created its own process, and got support for that process.”42

A review of the Tanzanian ICT policy indicates that many of the ideas explored by the G8 Digital Opportunity Task Force43 found expression in the text of Tanzania’s ICT policy. Creating the Multi-Sectoral Steering Committee In 2001, the E-ThinkTankTz created a steering committee to write the terms of reference for the national ICT policy. The participants in the steering committee included members of the government, the donor community, and the Tanzanian private sector. Work on the framework began in February 2001, after a public inaugural meeting. Membership of the steering committee comprised three individuals: the Permanent Secretary of Public Service Management in the Tanzanian President’s office, the resident representative of the United Nations Development Program and the head of the United Nations in Tanzania, and finally a prominent Tanzanian businessman in the ICT industry—the Chairman and CEO of Infotech TZ. Below the steering committee was the “E-Secretariat,” which included a Tanzanian government representative, the United Nations ICT advisor,

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and Simbo Ntiro, a founding member of E-ThinkTankTZ and a Tanzanian employee of a multi-national consulting firm. All six of the steering committee and secretariat members met at the Permanent Secretary’s office and reached consensus. After reaching consensus, the secretariat drafted the components of the terms of reference of the Tanzanian ICT policy framework. Throughout the process, drafts of the framework were made available to the public for comment.44 As a final step, the United Nations ICT Advisor sent materials to the United Nations office in New York for further review.45 Concurrent with the work of the E-Think Tank, in April 2001, a meeting of Tanzanian Cabinet ministers determined that the Ministry of Communications and Transport should lead the Tanzanian Government’s ICT Policy process. The government component of the ICT process in Tanzania began with a technical committee termed the Special Task Force on National ICT Policy and an ICT policy workshop funded by Dutch donors.,46 47 The Government of Tanzania established an ICT Task Force in October 2001, with the assistance of funding from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency. All sixteen members of the Tanzanian Government’s ICT task force were Tanzanian citizens.48 The Government ICT Policy Task Force was chaired by the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Dar es Salaam,49 and hosted by the Tanzanian Ministry of Communications and Transport. Although the membership was dominated by government representatives–including several MPs, representatives from the Government of Zanzibar, and members from the Tanzanian Vice President’s Office and the President’s Office, there was also significant private sector participation. Representatives from a multi-national consulting firm (KPMG), as well as from local firms, including Infotech TZ, Intrinsic Technologies TZ Ltd, and Satellite TZ, a VoIP company were in attendance.50 In addition, the government invited members of the key opposition party (the UDP) to participate. Of Tanzania’s thirteen parties, three were represented on the national ICT Task Force. This indigenous leadership stands in sharp contrast to the Rwandan ICT policy process, which had significant participation by non-Rwandans. A “National ICT Policy Framework” in the form of a guidance document was submitted by the E-Think Tank Steering Committee and Secretariat to the United Nations Development Program and the Tanzanian President’s office in November of 2001.51 This framework document

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outlined issues that the E-Think Tank members believed that the Tanzanian ICT policy should address. After the E-Think Tank group forwarded their ICT Policy Framework to the Ministry in December 2001, the Ministry of Communications and Transport used the framework to draft the Tanzanian policy. The Tanzanian government proceeded to hold stakeholder consultations on the ICT process. At least five meetings were held from 2001 to 2002. Meetings were held “up country” (in rural areas) to provide information, discuss the opportunities ICT provides, to discuss the relevance of ICT to rural areas, and to solicit citizen input on the Tanzanian ICT Policy. The meetings were held in Zanzibar, Dar es Salaam, Arusha, Mwanza, Dodoma, Mtwara, and Mbea and at the University Cluster in Morogoro.52 The upcountry meetings were open meetings attended by heads of departments under regional administrative secretaries. In addition, meetings were attended by district heads and by business people and religious groups. As this process came to a conclusion, Vice President Mohammed Shein made a public launch of the first draft of the Tanzanian National ICT Policy document in May 2002 in Dar es Salaam, accompanied by presentations by National ICT Task Force Members.53 In May 2002, the Tanzanian ICT Task Force publicly launched the first draft of the Tanzanian ICT policy in Dar es Salaam54 Public contributions were also solicited through traditional media, email, public meetings, and articles in newspapers. A July 2002 seminar was held in Dodoma to allow Tanzanian Members of Parliament to examine the draft policy and contribute proposals. The content of the draft policy was amended and enriched based on public comments.55 The work of the Task Force concluded in December 2002, at which point the draft policy document was submitted to Minister Professor Mark J. Mwandosya of Communications and Transport. Minister Mwandosya forwarded the document to the Tanzanian Cabinet in early March 2003. The cabinet secretariat approved the policy and forwarded it to an inter-ministerial technical committee consisting of a committee of permanent secretaries, which made some minor adjustments, resulting in official cabinet approval and publication in July 2003.56 The final result of this collaborative process was the issuance by the Tanzanian Ministry of Communications and Transport of the “Tanzanian National Information and Communications Technologies Policy” (“Tanzanian ICT policy”) in March 2003. Tanzania produced one of the first ICT policies in the East African region, a slim, readable, intuitive guidance

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document, infused with goals such as poverty reduction, socioeconomic development, capacity building, and designs for infrastructure expansion. Whereas Rwanda’s ICT policy development process was almost entirely top-down, Tanzania’s policy process was almost entirely bottom-up.

Uganda The development of the Ugandan ICT policy could be termed “top-down consultation.” Civil society in Uganda, according to its members, has been active in ICT policy formulation. When setting policy, the Ugandan government generally calls upon civil society groups and requests their participation and input.57 Although input by Ugandan civil society is vigorous, it is also highly coordinated.58 Indeed, the Ugandan constitutional process also provided for extensive involvement of the general public over an eight-year process.59 This approach resembles a consultative or corporatist process. Using the mechanism of “state-hierarchic” coordination, the Museveni government helps to gain legitimacy for its policymaking process from the private sector and civil society (Schmitter 1985).60 The Ugandan government directed its ICT policy process through a unit called the National Planning Authority which established a national ICT working group. As was the case in Rwanda, Uganda’s ICT policy itself was drafted by consultants. Two consultants, Mr. Katiti, the egovernment advisor to NEPAD, and Mr. Musambu, the Executive Director of the UCC drafted the policy.61 One significant improvement over the Rwandan case from the standpoint of building local capacity was that one of the Ugandan consultants was a Ugandan with a major policymaking position. The Ugandan Communications Commission spoke to civil society, the government, and large telecommunications providers such as MTN and Celtel, as well as to Internet Service Providers. The UCC had individual meetings with the management of various private sector organizations and requested comments on specific aspects of the policy. Organizations had time to prepare. The UCC compiled recommendations, which were then discussed at public gatherings. The UCC then compiled a revision. There are approximately six ICT-related civil society and private sector groups in Uganda and three major groups: CIPESA, WOUGnet, and INetwork. One of the most important ICT civil society groups in Uganda

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is the Women of Uganda Network (WOUGnet).62 Founded in the mid1990s, WOUGnet aims to “engender” the ICT policy process. The organization attempts to represent local communities, particularly rural people. The organization also is evaluating the Rural Communications Development Fund program in Uganda to evaluate its gender impact and to determine whether women and men are benefiting equally from ICTs in rural areas. Importantly, WOUGnet focuses on raising awareness and building capacity around women who use ICT. They conduct significant amounts of training for citizens to use computers. WOUGnet is also conducting a policy assessment of the implementation of the Rural Communications Development Fund. CIPESA’s director says their organization focuses as a think tank which conducts research, prepares presentations, reports, and briefings on ICT-related issues. The organization collects and disseminates information in regional and national workshops. The organization also works on capacity development to train Ugandans how to use and maintain computer equipment. CIPESA also holds workshops to train policymakers about pressing ICT policy issues such as infrastructure, domain names and Internet governance, and intellectual property rights.63 I-Network is a trade association for the private sector in ICT in Uganda. The group holds roundtable workshops and topical seminars on issues such as the revision of the Telecommunications Act. It works with business owners and associates to develop the capacity of the Ugandan private sector to work with ICTs. The organization also tries to disseminate lessons learned from pilot projects and from efforts on ICT for development. Uganda’s ICT policy was presented to a national steering committee headed by Mr. Mugambi. This team of approximately 15 persons had representatives from civil society and private sector groups interested in ICTs such as WOUGnet, CIPESA, Kabissa, and I-network. In addition, this organization had representation from a private sector association known as I-network, and from government entities such as the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Information. In contrast to the process in Rwanda, no donors participated in the Ugandan ICT task force. Therefore, an argument could be made that the Ugandan process was more indigenized and less externally driven. In addition, in Uganda, Civil society organizations and private sector organizations were encouraged to review the government’s draft and give comments. After the group received guidelines from the ministry, the Uganda Communications Commission held workshops with civil society,

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the private sector, academia, and parliament. A consultation document was developed, and according to one private sector respondent, “the participatory consultation was extensive.” Relationships between the government and civil society sectors appear to be cordial. According to one civil society leader, We have been called upon, participated and given input. The output is not ours. Almost everything [we] proposed was accepted. We got our words into the document.64, 65

This civil society leader’s comments are almost self-contradictory. On the one hand, “the output is not ours,” points to the fact that although civil society participates, it does not have significant muscle or leverage to change the final outcome of policy. On the other hand, the leader states that almost everything they proposed was accepted, giving civil society the feeling of participation and buy-in. One significant failure in participation was that academia was not involved at all in formulating the policy other than giving their views at one of the public hearings. The internationally respected Makerere University in Kampala has a thriving Department of Computing. Three public hearings were conducted in 2004 and 2005 that were open and advertised in the major Ugandan newspapers. The academics did attend these public hearings, but one prominent Ugandan academic in the computing field noted that the comments from the national workshops were not necessarily incorporated (Bowman 2006). Importantly, the academic computing faculty of Makerere could have made a crucial contribution in the policymaking process. They are among the most educated of Ugandan citizens and also have subject matter expertise in the relevant policy domain. In the absence of significant citizen input, academics could have raised important policy concerns during the policymaking process. Uganda has a dramatically higher level of capacity than its neighbor Rwanda, due to a strong university system and an educated and literate populace, which has had over twenty years of peacetime to develop its skills. The omission of the views of the regionally renowned Makerere faculty indicates a significant flaw in Uganda’s participatory process. Devra Moehler’s research on constitution-making in Uganda indicates that political elites can strongly influence and guide political processes even when they have a participatory model (Moehler 2006). The policy

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Table 3.2 Comparison of ICT Policy Acquisition in East Africa Country

ICT Policy Formally Adopted

Key donor countries

UNECA UNICT Task Force Involvement?

Kenya Uganda Tanzania Rwanda

2006 2003 2003 2001

Finland, Canada Denmark, UK Holland, Sweden US, UK

Yes Yes Yes Yes

Source Various government documents reviewed by the author

process in Uganda was more consultative than the policy process in Rwanda. Using Sherry Arnstein’s ladder of participation, the ICT policy process in Uganda allowed government-selected citizens to hear and be heard, but those citizens lacked the power to ensure that their views would be considered. Thus, the ICT policy process in Uganda falls under the category of “informing and consultation”: it was not truly participatory (Arnstein 1969) (Table 3.2).66

Kenya Upon Kibaki’s entry into office, the NCS initiated a formal ICT policy process in February 2003 by publicly releasing the first draft of an “ICT policy.” The decision to release a policy document for public review was itself a watershed moment. This first ICT policy was initially based on a model67 advocated by the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). The NCS did call a stakeholders workshop in 2003. However, most of the entities giving input at that workshop came from the government itself. After the stakeholders provided inputs by verbally commenting at an invitation-only meeting, it was agreed that the NCS should call for a second workshop. No second workshop was held. The NCS did forward a policy to the Cabinet. However, the policy was not acted upon because the broadcasting sector had not been integrated into that policy due to the fact that broadcasting and telecommunications were housed in separate ministries.68 Upon arriving in office, Kibaki faced a wide dispersion of ICT components throughout the Kenyan government. The government entities that work on the various components that are viewed as comprising “ICT”

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have been politically weak. Furthermore, these entities did not coordinate closely. Until 2004, responsibility for media, computing, and telecommunications was distributed between at least two ministries: the Ministry of Transport and Communications as well as the Ministry of Information and Tourism. The Ministry of Transport and Communications was responsible for telecommunications and postal matters whereas Information and Tourism was in charge of the electronic media and broadcasting. According to some observers, the Minister of Transport and Communication, John Michuki, an old-guard KANU MP, had an uneasy relationship with the private sector. In addition, he paid almost no attention to “Communication,” as a part of his portfolio. As was the case with his predecessors, the Permanent Secretary’s attention under the old ministry was primarily focused on the transportation sector with almost no attention paid to the telecommunications sector. Further, the Ministry of Trade and Industry established a national task force on e-commerce without involving the Ministry of Transport and Communications or the Ministry of Information and Tourism. The Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology had undertaken very little activity on ICT despite its mandate under the National Council of Science and Technology. According to interviewees, the byzantine old system created delays and logistical problems. In a well-received structural change, in June 2004, President Kibaki eliminated the old Ministry of Information and Transportation and merged broadcasting and telecommunications into the newly created Ministry of Information and Communications. In July 2004, Minister Raphael Tuju was promoted to become the first Kenyan Minister of Information and Communications. As a result of this restructuring, there are now five organizations which coordinate the Kenyan government’s actions in the ICT sector. These are (1) the Ministry of Information and Communications, (2) the Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK) (the regulator); (3) the Government Information Technology Service (GITS) which provides computer and technology support for ministries; (4) the National Communications Secretariat (NCS) whose role is to advise the government on Communications policy; and (5) the Directorate of E-government. This major institutional reform which resulted in the rationalization of these Ministries was greeted with enthusiasm by the private sector in telecommunications, computing, and information. The creation of the new Ministry of Information and Communications

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reduced logistical problems in the sector and presented a new opportunity for unifying the policy framework. With the creation of the new ministry, information technology gained a more visible and more transparent policy profile on the government’s agenda. The year 2004 was a banner year for ICT policy in Kenya. A flurry of policymaking ensued, in a variety of fora. Under the more open and active leadership of Director Okech, Kenya successfully issued its EGovernment Strategy in March of 2004.69 The strategy was developed by a preparatory team, which drew its membership from numerous agencies and organizations. The e-government strategy states that the Government of Kenya aims to use information technologies to improve service delivery, “transform government operations and …promote democracy.” The E-government strategy promises the development of websites, the networking of all ministries, the developing computer literacy among government staff, and computerizing office operations among other goals. The strategy created a Directorate of E-government housed within the Office of the President. The Director of the Office of E-Government operates at the level of a Permanent Secretary, the highest civil service, non-political post within the Kenyan Government. In this period, the Kenya Private Sector Association agreed with the head of the civil service that private sector constituent organizations should meet with the Permanent Secretary in charge of each relevant agency on a bimonthly basis. The Kenya ICT Federation initiated frequent meetings with Permanent Secretary for Information and Communications, James Rege and Juma Okech after 2004 which continue with Permanent Secretary Bitange Ndemo to date. This set of actions represented a new open institutionalization of dialogue between the private sector and the Kenyan government unseen under the previous clientelist system. In collaboration with the Canadian donor, the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) the CCK commissioned a team of Kenyan academics led by Dr. Tim Waema and Katherine Getao of the University of Nairobi to issue a Universal Access Report. The purpose of this Universal Access Report was to examine how to get ICTs to remote rural areas of Kenya.70 The Universal Access Report was data-driven and included significant information on the extent of electricity and ICT penetration throughout the country; it was publicly presented with great fanfare at the Norfolk hotel in Nairobi in November 2004. In addition, the Ministry released the second ICT policy draft on November 18, 2004, in a “National ICT Visioning Workshop”71 organized by the private

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sector Kenya ICT Federation, the civil society organization KICTAnet and the multilateral donor IDRC.72 The session was opened by remarks from the director of KIF, the private sector federation for ICT, and a keynote address by the Ambassador from Finland. The Finnish Ambassador stressed the social justice themes surrounding ICT, including the need for a welfare society, and the role of government in promoting liberalization and privatization. Permanent Secretary for ICT, Engineer James Rege, and Minister Tuju conducted the official opening of the workshop. Multi-sectoral teams were formed, which developed sector visions around education, health, government, trade and industry, small and medium enterprises, and agriculture. All the groups reported back to the main conference how they viewed the potential for ICT to change their sectors. The Permanent Secretary for Planning and National Development closed the workshop by focusing on the need to create a roadmap for ICT implementation. By 2005, the communications sector in Kenya was earning about 714 million dollars annually, and creating 12,000 direct jobs.73 On March 9, 2005, the entire Kenyan ICT community, including representatives from the largest private sector operators, academics, and nonprofits, gathered for the Second National Kenyan ICT Convention organized by the Kenya ICT Action Network (KICTAnet) in the luxurious tourist Safari Park Hotel and Casino in Nairobi. Civil society was represented by Catalyzing Access to ICTs in Africa, the Association for Progressive Communications, the Kenya WSIS Civil Society Caucus, and the Kenya Community Media Network. The private sector was represented by KIF, the Telecommunications Service Provider Association of Kenya, and the Computers Society of Kenya. Journalists from the Nation, the Standard Group, and People as well as KComnet were in attendance, as were donors such as the Canadian IDRC, UNDP, and UNESCO. A variety of presentations and speeches were given by representatives of UNESCO, by the media council of Kenya, and by the Open Source Council of Kenya. The Convention launched specific sector working groups to comment on segments of the draft ICT policy. Despite the festive atmosphere of the conference, tensions had been building in the sector as it became clear that the CCK was not in fact independent. A major power struggle over regulatory authority and enforcement had taken place between the fixed line national operator, Telkom Kenya, and the CCK over further liberalization of the sector. The Internet Service Providers, ISP Kenya had been using their lines to make phone calls

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using Voice Over Internet Protocol, undercutting Telkom’s high prices. In response, Telkom had disconnected ISP lines in violation of the CCKs enforcement authority.74 The regulator ordered Telkom to reconnect ISP Kenya’s lines, as licenses recently issued by the CCK gave numerous players the right to use their lines to sell a variety of voice and data applications, including telephony.75 In another manifestation of this conflict, Minister Tuju had cancelled a number of licenses issued by the CCK in late 2004 (Gitau 2005). The independent CCK had attempted to license a third operator, Econet, in line with the mandate of the Communications Act, an action which would have opened up the cellular telephony sector to three operators, increasing competition and reducing prices. Tuju had decided not to issue the license, due in part to heavy financial interests by sitting politicians in the two national operators, Celtel and Safaricom. Minister Tuju had dismissed the entire Commission and indefinitely suspended Sammy Kirui, the director of the nominally independent regulator, the CCK, despite the Director’s security of tenure under the Communications Act. In addition, Tuju had appointed the head of the secretive NCS, James Kulubi, in the director’s place.76 In the following days, this extra-legal dismissal was roundly condemned by the Kenyan media. The editorial board of the Daily Nation urged the creation of a more public and transparent review mechanism for dismissals and demanded that Tuju explain.77 Despite the national uproar, Minister Tuju was unapologetic for his actions stating “I act for the Government, and the President was fully aware of the decision that I took.”78 Tuju’s nonchalance lent credence to reports which had emerged that a powerful cartel was interfering with CCK operations.79 Further indications were that senior government officials had personal stakes in the lucrative stateowned Telkom. The Central Organization of Trade Unions deemed Tuju’s action “outrageous.” The Kenyan Parliament’s Committee on Energy, Communications and Public Works called Tuju to appear before them to investigate the public’s concerns over the firing, calling Tuju’s actions “drastic.”80 After Tuju’s appearance in parliament the Committee stated that “he had no evidence to support his allegations” and condemned his actions.81 Tuju’s action drew reprimands from as far afield as the COMESA Secretary General, who expressed concern about the independence of the communications regulator for the smooth operation of the sector.82 Delegates at the NewCom Africa Conference in London called on the

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Kenyan government to respect the autonomy of its regulator. The Ghana Internet Service Providers’ Association stated that Tuju’s action represented a breach of due process, and was an act of sabotage toward the Kenyan economy and the African economy as a whole.83 The sector was in an uproar, as investors worried about retrenchment of further liberalization, and policy uncertainty in the face of an impotent regulator. The Minister was forced to retreat and reconstitute the board. In response to the massive public outcry, upon the nomination of PS Rege, the newly reconstituted CCK Board contained the first female and first civil society member in the history of the organization, Alice Wanjira Munyua, the Kenyan representative of the nongovernmental organization dedicated to ICT in Africa, CATIA.84 Following the tumult regarding the dismissal of the CCK Board, in a precedent setting move, the Ministry solicited public comment on the draft ICT policy. The CCK developed a website where they stated they would solicit views from stakeholders on ICT policy. A group of academics, private sector representatives, and civil society activists gathered together to compile comments. First, an electronic discussion forum was established, hosted on the o.ke domain courtesy of the Telecommunications Service Providers of Kenya. Each policy area was led by one group leader, who was trained in electronic list facilitation by KICTAnet. For example, the academia group was facilitated by Ben Sihanya, a faculty member of the Nairobi School of Law with a doctorate of law from Stanford. Each policy area facilitator led an electronic discussion group, compiled all the comments of that group over a period of two months, and then developed a report for KICTAnet detailing the main comments. Comments covered issues regarding the environmental sustainability of ICTs, acknowledging the role of youth as a force for development, that gender mainstreaming be strongly and separately stated among the policy objectives, using ICTs for poverty eradication, improving human resource development, ensuring universal access in rural areas, identifying and promoting local content, putting in realistic deadlines, converging ICT regulations, putting in place a monitoring and evaluation tool, and finally, protecting the CCK from arbitrary political interference. The director of KICTAnet, Alice Wanjira Munyua, Ben Sihanya, Alari Alare, and several other representatives of the private sector, media, academia, and private sector met together in the conference room of the Jacaranda Hotel with all of the compiled comments. The representatives spent the next twelve hours taking the initial draft which the Ministry had released in October

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2004, and making changes and edits which reflected the numerous comments prepared by academia, the private sector, civil society groups, and legal observers. These comments were submitted to the Ministry in mid-April 2005. Under the leadership of the new Permanent Secretary for Information and Communications, an ICT policy was adopted by the Cabinet in January 2006.85 By the time of publication, however, the policy included significant revisions taken from public comments submitted by the private sector, academics, and civil society groups. According to a press release issued by the Communications Commission of Kenya, the ICT Policy “will replace the Telecommunications and Postal Sector Guidelines of December 2001 and set up an enabling framework for the…. communications industry in Kenya.” Kenya’s ICT Policy was published as official policy guidelines on March 31, 2006.86 In addition, under the tenure of permanent secretary James Rege, who had initiated frequent and friendly contact with private sector and civil society organizations, the Ministry of Information and Communications issued a draft Kenya Information and Communications Bill in February 2006. This pattern of increased participation was well illustrated by the process of attaining an actual formal ICT policy document in 2006 after nearly a decade of thwarted efforts. After significant pressure from the local private sector, local civil society, and selected donors, the government solicited and finally chose to incorporate almost all public comments into the Gazetted ICT policy itself. The intense public interest in the ICT policy process, and the response of policy entrepreneurs within Kenya’s government to that interest “seemed to herald the beginning of a truly new regime of public participation in policymaking.”87 Initial efforts to promulgate a policy on ICTs—which began in the 1990s—reflected the lack of democracy in Kenya as a whole. The development of this policy has tracked the development of a multi-stakeholder, participatory, democratic process. The development of Kenya’s ICT policy represents a change in how the “business of government” is conducted in this emerging democracy. The history of ICT policymaking in Kenya illustrates the transition from the old, secret, highly centralized authoritarian style of doing the government’s business to a more participatory, transparent multi-stakeholder approach, in which domestic civil society and the domestic private sector help in the authoring and development of the policy itself. During the first term of the Kibaki administration, the country witnessed not just the emergence of a new

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policy in Kenya, but the emergence of a new more participatory democratic policymaking process. Kenya’s ICT policymaking process has taken place in a relatively democratic context. In particular, formal participation by civil society and the private sector has been high. As the country has moved from a semi-authoritarian state to a more democratic state, the nature of policymaking changed at least for one term. After the NARC election in 2002, there were changes within the government in the ICT policy arena. In terms of organizational and administrative changes, the effort to create an ICT policy has resulted in the reorganization of ministries, as well as the creation of organizations at the sub-ministry level. The creation of the Ministry of Information and Communications did seem to rationalize the sector and result in a burst of policymaking. One of the benefits of a new more democratic government under the Kibaki administration was that policymaking emerged out of the darkness of closed internal executive branch deliberations into the light of public discussion. The 2004 decision of the Ministry of Information and Communications, to release to the public, and then solicit, and indeed, incorporate public comment on the Kenyan ICT policy represents the first time that the Kenyan government has ever solicited comments on any policy in any sector. In the United States, under the Administrative Procedure Act, every regulation must go through a process called “notice and comment.” Although such a process is far from being institutionalized in Kenya, the development of the Kenyan ICT policy represents a dramatic move toward an era in which the public plays a real role in policymaking. Whereas the very first drafts of the ICT policy were closely held, and only discussed confidentially within a very closed group of political appointees, the most recent versions, and the 2006 policy itself have been the result of conversations, debates, and indeed a conflict between the executive branch of the Kenyan government, civil society, the private sector, and some donors. Although the Kenyan government has become increasingly responsive to public pressure regarding policymaking, who comprises the “public” remains a matter for debate. In the arena of ICT policy, the interests of the political elite and the technocrats dominate the discussion almost entirely, which is not necessarily a negative, but does not include many rural voices. Those who participate in this arena are a small overlapping group. Many of them are Western-educated. They tend to live and work in Nairobi, or occasionally, Mombasa. Although they come from every ethnic group,

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they are overwhelmingly from the upper class or upper middle class. In general, the persons who participate in this policy arena tend to be local business owners who have a financial stake in ICT policy, consultants and activists who derive some income from tracking ICT policy from donors, media owners such as the directors of local newspapers and television companies, and finally, local academics. These civil society activists do pay rhetorical attention to distribution of ICT resource to rural areas but often have no personal investment in ensuring that actually occur. Interestingly, the local private sector, including Internet Service Providers and the Kenya ICT Federation, has been one of the most vocal advocates for ensuring that rural areas are not ignored. To the extent that government-sponsored deliverables or results are apparent in the ICT field in Kenya, they are attributable to a few policy entrepreneurs, particularly Juma Okech and Bitange Ndemo. In line with their historical role of pushing the Kenyan government toward change, the private sector and civil society remain in a somewhat confrontational role in the Kenyan ICT policy process. The policy entrepreneurs were able to open a window of collaboration and communication, but results have been slow to arrive. Civil society and the private sector have been successful in encouraging the passage of key policy documents, but have been unsuccessful in ensuring implementation of those policies. The challenge for civil society and the private sector in the next few decades will be hanging on to the hard-fought victories they won in the early part of the millennium.

Conclusion All four countries under examination in this book were encouraged by external actors, particularly donors, to adopt an ICT Policy. Although it is correct to say that there was more civil society participation in Tanzania and Kenya, than in Rwanda and Uganda, it is also correct to note that there was some civil society participation in all countries. In addition, all countries used model documents provided by donors. The ICT process was initiated in the mid-1990s in the Global North by motives both altruistic and businesslike. Encouraging ICT policy formation in Africa was pitched as an anti-poverty initiative, but also had a secondary function of opening critical emerging markets to telecommunications providers. Key donors included UNECA, the World Bank, the G7, the European Commission, and various private sector stakeholders.

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High levels of public participation in the creation of policy documents do not necessarily correlate with high levels of implementation. Indeed, although Uganda and Rwanda had relatively lower levels of public participation in policy development than their more democratic neighbors, twenty years later, they have succeeded in distributing the artifacts of ICTs throughout the nation in state-sponsored venues such as hospitals, schools, and government offices. By contrast, Kenya has led the way in innovation, centered primarily in urban areas. Yet, the Government of Kenya has pursued a laissez faire approach to ICT distribution, which has resulted in high inequality between ICT access in rural and urban areas and an apparent inability to successfully launch a Universal Access Fund. In addition, twenty years later, Tanzania and Uganda are the most competitive telephony and ICT markets, whereas Kenya’s ICT market remains captured by three large providers and reflects relatively high costs. These observations deepen the point that outcomes in this sector are not predicted by conventional wisdom nor are they easily predicted.

Notes 1. See “What is AISI?” available at http://www.uneca.org/aisi/. Accessed May 12, 2008. 2. “The African Information Society Initiative …. is not about technology. It is about giving Africans the means to improve the quality of their lives and fight against poverty.” See “What is AISI?” available at http://www. uneca.org/aisi/. Accessed May 12, 2008. 3. “G7 Meeting Maps Global Paths toward Information Society/GII,” Telecommunications Reports International, Vol. 6, No. 5 March 2, 1995; Flesch, C. “Brussels and the Global Information Society,” Internet Research Electronic Networking Applications and Policy, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1997): 43; “A Global Information Society,” International Information Communication and Education, Vol. 14, No. 2 (September 1995): 221–224. 4. Cogburn, Derrick L. and Christopher P. Foss and Global Information Infrastructure Commission. Information & Communications for Development: Nationalism, Regionalism, & Globalism in Building the Global Information Society: GIIC Report on the Global Information Society & Development Forum, Midrand, South Africa. Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1996; ISAD–Conference Details [Homepage] [Computer File] URL: http://www.csir.co.za/isad/index. html.

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5. The Group of Eight is an international forum for the governments of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. The University of Toronto Library houses a G8 Information Centre which contains exhaustive resources. Most resources are available electronically at http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/. 6. First Meeting of the Digital Opportunity Taskforce, Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan on the inaugural meeting of the dot force in Tokyo, 27–28 November 2000, Available at http://www.mofa. go.jp/policy/economy/it/dfoo11.html. Accessed on April 16, 2008. 7. Digital Opportunities for All: Meeting the Challenge-Report of the Digital Opportunity Task Force (DOT Force) including a proposal for a Genoa Plan of Action. Dated May 11, 2001. Available at http://www.g8. utoronto.ca/summit/2001genoa/dotforce1.html. Accessed on April 16, 2008. 8. Digital Opportunities for All: Meeting the Challenge, Report of the Digital Opportunity Task Force (DOT Force) including a proposal for a Genoa Plan of Action. May 11, 2001. G8 Information Centre, University of Toronto: Toronto (2001), p. 5. The final Dot Force report was delivered in May 2001. 9. Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 10. Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 11. Okinawa Charter on Global Information Society, July 22, 2000. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2000: 2. 12. Some citations of economic literature or world bank documents in this vein would be helpful here, 13. “G8: The ‘Dot Force’” Challenge, Patrick O’Connell, July 23, 2000, BBC News Online. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/business/ 847532.stm. Accessed on April 30, 2008; See also Summit Meeting in Tokyo Among President Olesugun Obasanjo of the Federal republic of Nigeria, President Thabo Mbeki of the Republic of South Africa, President Adelaziz Bouteflica of the Democratic People’s Republic of Algeria, Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai of the Kingdome of Thailand and G8 Leaders, Tokyo July 20, 2000. Available at http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/ 2000okinawa/devs.htm. 14. See Introduction Chapter (pp. 1–19). 15. Appendix 2: The NICI-2005 Plan Steering Committee, “An Integrated ICT-Led Socio-Economic development Policy and Plan for Rwanda, 2001–2005: The NICI-2005 Plan.” 16. Action Aid states that Rwanda’s dependence on foreign aid could be measured at 45% in 2010. Ivan R. Mugisha, September 13, 2011. The New Times, Rwanda’s Dependence on foreign aid drops 45%.

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17. Rosamund Hutt, Five Things to Know about Rwanda’s Economy, April 7, 2016. www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/04/5-things-to-know-aboutrwanda-s-economy. 18. Anonymous RITA official, August 16, 2007. 19. See generally, http://www.uneca.org/aisi/. Accessed May 8, 2008. 20. National Information and Communication Infrastructure (NICI) Policies and Plans (e-strategies), Country Pages, Tanzania. Available at http:/ /www.uneca.org/aisi/nici/Tanzania/tanzania.htm. Accessed on May 5, 2008. 21. NICI Policies and Plans: Tanzania, p. 1. 22. NICI Policies and Plans: Tanzania, p. 2. 23. Interview with Professor Beda Mutagahywa, August 23, 2007. 24. NICI Policies and Plans: Tanzania, p. 2; 25. Interview with David Sawe, March 26, 2008; Interview with Prof. Beda Mutagahywa, August 23, 2007; Interview with Simbo Ntiro, August 24, 2007, Interview with David Sawe, August 24, 2007; http://www.ethink tanktz.org. Accessed on May 5, 2008. 26. Sawe, “The E-ThinkTankTz and ICT Policy Making in Tanzania,” in At The Crossroads, p. 250. 27. Sawe and Nungu, March 26, 2008. 28. Interview with Professor Beda Mutagahywa, Managing Director, University Computing Center, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Interview conducted August 23, 2007. 29. Sawe, “The E-ThinkTankTZ,” p. 251. 30. Sawe, E-ThinkTankTZ, p. 251. 31. Interview with Simbo Ntiro, August 24, 2007. 32. Interview with David Sawe and Amos Nungu, March 26, 2008. Amos Nungu is an assistant lecturer at the Dar es Salaam Institute of Technology. He is also the project manager for the Tanzanian “ICT for Rural Development” project hosted by the Tanzanian Commission on Science and Technology and funded by SIDA. 33. Sawe, “E-ThinkTankTZ,” p. 251. 34. Interview with David Sawe, March 26, 2008. 35. Sawe, “E-ThinkTankTZ,” p. 252. 36. Sawe, “E-ThinkTankTZ,” p. 253. 37. Sawe Interview, March 26, 2008. “We approached UNDP. They said that actually, [they] hadn’t been doing much in ICT work, so that was a starting point for them as well.” 38. “Timeline of Some of the Activities of E-ThinkTankTz and Various E-Thinkers. Available at http://www.ethinktanktz.org/esecretariat/news. htm. Accessed April 30, 2008. 39. Interview with Simbo Ntiro, August 24, 2008. 40. See Timeline, p. 2.

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41. The author of this book interviewed three of the four original DOT Force participants. 42. Interview with Simbo Ntiro, August 24, 2008. 43. Digital Opportunities for All: Meeting the Challenge, Report of the Digital Opportunity Task Force (DOT Force) including a proposal for a Genoa Plan of Action. May 11, 2001. G8 Information Centre, University of Toronto: Toronto (2001), p. 5. 44. Sawe, “E-ThinkTankTz,” p. 253. 45. The Swedish International Development Authority provided significant assistance in the funding of the government led policy process, including a donation of 400 million Tanzanian Shillings specifically targeted for the development of a Tanzanian national ICT policy. SIDA also provided an ICT advisor from the Swedish embassy who participated in E-Think Tank and promoted the idea of SIDA supporting the Tanzanian government’s efforts at developing an ICT policy. In addition, the UNDP provided technical assistance by paying a consultant from KPMG to work as a full time technical international consultant. SIDA funded the Tanzanian government’s ICT policy task force from October of 2001 to December 2002. 46. See “Who We Are and What We’re Doing,” available at www.ethinktan ktz.org/secretariat/whoweare.htm., p. 2. Accessed May 8, 2008. 47. A Dutch donor, IICD, organized an ICT Policy workshop on September 5, 2001 which involved private, non-profit and public participants. 48. Interview with Sawe, March 26, 2008. 49. The Vice Chancellor and Chair of the ICT Task Force was Professor Matthew Luhanga. 50. Task Force Members also included Dr. Batilda Burian (MP), Prof. Henry Mgombelo (MP), Mr. Theophilius Mlaki (COSTECH), Dr. Zaipuna Yonah (Tz Telecoms Co. Ltd.), Mr. George Nangale (East Africa MP), Prof. Beda Mutagahwya (UDS Computing Centre Ltd.), Ms. Anita Ngowi (Vice President’s Office), Mr. Suleiman Tawakal (Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar), and Mr. David Sawe, (President’s Office-Civil Service Department). 51. Sawe Interview, March 26, 2008. 52. Interview with Simbo Ntiro, August 24, 2008. 53. Sawe, “E-ThinkTankTz,” p. 254. 54. See “Who We Are and What We’re Doing,” available at www.ethinktan ktz.org/secretariat/whoweare.htm., p. 1. Accessed May 8, 2008. 55. Sawe, “E-ThinkTankTz,” p. 255. 56. See “Who We Are and What We’re Doing,” p. 2. 57. C. Cannon, NGOs and the State: A Case-Study from Uganda. Development in Practice, 6, 262–265. 58. Ugandan Civil Society leader, July 27, 2006.

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59. D.C. Moehler, “Participation and Support for the Constitution in Uganda,” Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 44 (2006): 275–308. 60. W. Streeck and P.C. Schmitter, “Community, Market, State and Associations? The Prospective Contribution of Interest Governance to Social Order,” European Sociological Review, Vol. 1 (1985): 119–138. 61. W. Bowman, Interview with Dr. Baryamureba. Kampala, Makerere University (2006a). 62. Members from WOUGnet participated in the World Summit on the Information Society. The Ugandan Communications Commission invited WOUGnet to be a member of a national task force that attended the WSIS, but did not provide funding to participate. The Ugandan Communications Commission conducted four meetings with WOUGnet in May of 2005, before the WSIS process, on August 2005, after the WSIS process in November 2005 and in January 2006. 63. W. Bowman, Interview with Ugandan Civil Society Group 2. Kampala (2006f). 64. W. Bowman, Interview with Ugandan Civil Society Group 1. Kampala (2006e). 65. W. Bowman, Interview with Ugandan Civil Society Group 2. Kampala. Both groups made similar comments regarding their relationship with the government (2006f). 66. S.R. Arnstein, “A Ladder of Citizen Participation,” American Institute of Planner’s Journal (1969): 216–224. Perhaps a “bottom-up, top-down accountability” method as described by Fung would work well in the East African policymaking context. A. Fung, Empowered Participation: Reinventing Urban Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004): 79–83. 67. The standard version of this policy can be viewed at http://www.comesa. int/ict/. 68. Ministry of Transport and Communications (2004). 69. Office of the President (2004). 70. Waema (2004). 71. Kihanya and Oloo (2004). 72. Another “confidential”—yet widely distributed— draft was released to a select group of stakeholders in January 2004 (Republic of Kenya Ministry of Information and Communications, October 2004). 73. Mulunda (2005). 74. Shimoli (2005). 75. Mulunda (2005). 76. Reporter (2005). 77. Board (2005). 78. Mogusu (2005). 79. Martin Mutua and Alare (2005).

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80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85.

Martin Mutua and Alare (2005). Alare (2005). Muriuki (2005). Weidermann (2005). Kathuri (2005). Policy becomes formalized in Kenya when a document has the seal of approval from the cabinet. 86. (Republic of Kenya Ministry of Information and Communications, 2006) Issued March 31, 2006. 87. Tim Waema, “A Brief History of the Development of an ICT Policy in Kenya,” in Florence Etta and Laurent Elder (eds.) At the Crossroads: ICT Policymaking in East Africa (Nairobi: International Development Research Center, 2005).

Bibliography Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical Series, Vol. 50(10): 20174, 2013. Alare, A. “Minister under Fire for Sacking CCK Board.” The Standard, March 9, 2005. Arnstein, S. “A Ladder of Citizen Participation.” Journal of the American Planning Association, Vol. 35(4), 1969. Avgerou, C. “Information Systems in Developing Countries: A Critical Research Review.” Journal of Information Technology 23(3): 133–146, 2008. Bowman, W. “Interview with Dr. Baryamureba.” Kampala, Makerere University, 2006. “CCOAIB. The State of Civil Society in Rwanda in National Development.” Civicus: Kigali (2011). Cordella, A. & Iannacci, F. “Information Systems in the Public Sector: The eGovernment Enactment Framework.” The Journal of Strategic Information Systems, Vol. 19(1), February 2011. Dahl, R. “A Theory of the Democratic Process.” in Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989. Dzidonou, C. “A Blueprint for Developing National ICT Policy in Africa.” Nairobi: African Technology Policy Studies Network, 2002. Editorial Board. “Tuju, Tell Us More on Cck.” Daily Nation, March 9, 2005. Eggleston, K., Jensen, R. & Zeckhauser, R. “Information and Communication Technologies, Markets, and Economic Development.” Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government, 2002. Fountain, J. “The Virtual State: Transforming American Government?” National Civil Review, Vol. 90(3), Fall 2001.

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Gitau, J. “Politicising Business.” The Standard, January 2005. Gollakota, K., & Doshi K. “Diffusion of Technological Innovations in Rural Areas.” Journal of Corporate Citizenship (41): 69–82, 2011. International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 53. “Rwanda at the End of the Transition: A Necessary Political Liberalisation.” Nairobi/Brussels November 13, 2002. Kamssu, A., Siekpe, J. & Ellzy, J. “Shortcomings to Globalization: Using Internet Technology and Electronic Commerce in Developing Countries.” The Journal of Developing Areas, Vol. 38(1), Autumn 2004. Kathuri, B. “CCK to Get New Board This Week.” The Standard, May 10, 2005. Mansell, R. Imagining the Internet: Communication, Innovation, and Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Mercer, C. “Telecenters and Transformations: Modernizing Tanzania through the Internet.” African Affairs, Vol. 105(419), 2006. Moehler, D. “Participation in Transition: Mobilizing Ugandans in Constitution Making.” World Bank, 2007. Moehler, D.C. “Participation and Support for the Constitution in Uganda.” Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 44: 275–308, 2006. Mogusu, T. “Minister Answers Critics of His Move on Cck Board.” The Standard, March 11, 2005. Muriuki, M. “Tuju Defends His Decision to Dissolve Cck Board.” Daily Nation, March 11, 2005. Mutua, M. & Alare, A. “House Committee Summons Minister over CCK Saga.” The Standard, March 10, 2005. Republic of Kenya Ministry of Information and Communications. “Information and Communications Technology Sector Policy Guidelines.” In Vol. CVIII, No. 24, 693–706. Nairobi The Kenya Gazette 2006. Reyntjens, F. “Post-1994 Politics in Rwanda: Problematizing ‘Liberation’ and ‘Democratisation.’” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 27(6), 2006. Schmitter, P. C. “Neo-corporatism and the State,” in The Political Economy of Corporatism. Sociology, Politics and Cities, Grant, W., ed., Palgrave: London, 1985. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-18041-7_2. Schmitter, P. & Wolfgang, S. “Community, Market, State and Associations? The Prospective Contribution of Interest Governance to Social Order.” European Sociological Review, Vol. 1(2) (1985). Staff Reporter. “Tuju Dissolves CCK Board.” Daily Nation, March 8, 2005. Stauffacher, D., Drake, W., Currion, P. & Steinberger, J. “Information and Communication Technology for Peace: The Role of ICT in Preventing, Responding to and Recovering from Conflict.” United Nations Information and Communication Technologies Task Force: ICT for Peace, 2005. The World Bank. “Annual Report 1998.”

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The World Bank. Towards Transformation? ICT in Post-Conflict Rwanda. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Washington, DC, 2013. United Nations Development Programme. “Annual Report 2001.” Waema, T. “A Brief History of the Development of an ICT Policy in Kenya.” in At the Crossroads: ICT Policymaking in East Africa, Etta, Florence and Elder, Laurent, eds., Nairobi: International Development Research Center, 2005. Weidermann, R. “Shock over Kenyan Regulator Saga.” IT Web, March 30, 2005. World Bank. “The World Bank Annual Report 2013.” © Washington, DC. http:/ /hdl.handle.net/10986/16091. World Bank stands for International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2013.

CHAPTER 4

Tanzania: Technological Lessons from the Past

We all recognize that the only constant in the world is change and that survival depends more on being able to live with change than on just having strength. Therefore, the biggest single challenge is managing the change process. ICT now offers tools to help us create awareness and mold expectations concerning impending changes. ICT also helps us to formulate, evaluate, and support those change processes, plus to implement and later to monitor and analyze the outcomes. But, this will only happen if we are cautious but bold enough to implement those ICT tools with such a focus in mind (Nagu 2004).1

Introduction This chapter makes four arguments about ICT policy in Tanzania. First, I argue that Tanzania’s history of failure in development schemes with an emphasis on modern technologies has resulted in a cautious policy approach. The Tanzanian development approach currently favors grassroots initiatives and eschews donor-driven, top-down initiatives. As a result, Tanzania has a narrow scope of implementation and exhibits limited distribution of ICTs. Tanzania, nonetheless, has had one of the more inclusive and “bottom-up” policy processes in the region. Finally, Tanzania’s integrated approach to ICTs reflects a policy approach

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 W. M. Bowman, Digital Development in East Africa, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22162-0_4

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that eschews the placement of technological “artifacts” (Bijker 1995)2 in favor of more integrated, and potentially sustainable, “technological systems” (Bijker et al. 1987; Shrum 1985; Edwards 1995).3 Tanzania quickly passed a national ICT Policy in 2003. Just as the renowned African scholar and statesman Mwalimu Julius Nyerere4 would have wished, Tanzania’s ICT policy is distinguished by its visionary development goals. Despite the expansive and idealistic rhetoric found in Tanzania’s ICT policy, the Tanzanian government has not distributed ICT artifacts as widely throughout rural areas as Rwanda and Uganda. The scope of implementation in Tanzania is also narrow. Out of several possible sites of public implementation, the nation has focused on limited and selected sites of implementation such as tele-centers, government networking projects, and some infrastructure development. This apparent disconnect between visionary goals, yet deliberate infrastructure development, can be explained by key elements of Tanzania’s development history. Tanzania had significant experience, and “sometimes spectacular” (Moore 1979)5 failures with modernization and development experiments in the early 1960s and 1970s, which have shaped the country’s current “bottom-up” approach to development endeavors. Tanzania has been a laboratory for a succession of development policies from colonialism and neo-classical development ideologies, including modernization theory, socialism, and neoliberal reform (Waters 2000).6 I argue that Tanzania’s current reluctance to embrace massive, centralized, statist-type reforms reflects an unwillingness to repeat the development mistakes the Tanzanian government made in the post-Independence era. Despite the country’s cautious approach to distribution and implementation, Tanzania had one of the most participatory and integrated policy processes in the East African region. Tanzanian citizens adopted, reshaped, and indigenized the ICT policy debate, and ensured that the topic stayed (and indeed stays) on the national policy agenda. As discussed in Chapter 4, the Tanzanian ICT policy development process was highly collaborative and included participants from the private sector, the Tanzanian government, donor agencies, and civil society. Importantly, and in contrast to the externally driven Rwandan process, the Tanzanian ICT policy process was conceived of, executed, and finalized by citizens who were Tanzanian nationals.7 Tanzania was the first country in East Africa to successfully connect multiple government agencies (including hospitals, clinics, schools, and

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local government offices) in rural areas with ICT and communications infrastructure. The Tanzanian government has also constructed four innovative “ICT for Development” sites which connect multiple rural state-supported entities in Bagamoyo, Bunda, and the Serengeti. In comparison to its neighbors, Tanzania has made strides in considering the interrelated nature of creating technological systems to support ICTs.

Tanzania’s Development History and Encounters with Modernization The area currently known as Tanzania was carved out of lands under the sovereignty of the Sultan of Zanzibar. In 1885, the German government named the territory of Tanganyika a protectorate, while in 1890 Zanzibar came under British control. In 1922, most of German East Africa became a League of Nations Mandate under the control of the United Kingdom. Tanganyika experienced a relatively peaceful struggle for independence from Britain, and Tanganyika obtained independence in 1961. Zanzibar attained independence in 1963. The two sovereign republics of Tanganyika and Zanzibar joined to form the United Republic of Tanzania in 1964, selecting Mwalimu Julius Nyerere as President of Tanzania in 1964. Upon independence, Tanzania replaced the Westminster model— which the British had imposed at the end of the colonial period—with a constitution that enshrined the “democratic one-party state” in 1965. From 1965, The Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) served as the only political party for mainland Tanzania (Tanganyika) and the Afri Shirazi Party remained the only party in Zanzibar. In 1977, TANU and ASP merged to form the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi Party (CCM), which functioned for many years as the sole legal political party and the main state organ of Tanzania (Ngasongwa 1992; Tripp 2000).8 Tanzanian politics at the beginning of the country’s history were heavily centralized under a socialist-style single party. Political clientelism was weak, in sharp contrast with neighbor Kenya, where clientelism was the order of the day. TANU in the post-independence era sincerely tried to implement development plans. Indeed, historically, politics in Tanzania have been defined in large part in terms of development, which itself was bound up with massive modernization efforts (Sundet 1994).9 Initially after independence, in the period spanning from 1964 to 1969, Tanzania adhered to the principles of a mixed economy (Sahn

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and Sarris 1994).10 After the issuance of the Arusha Declaration of 1967, however, TANU called for a revolutionary transformation of society. TANU began to stress ideological conformity and party dominance. Mwalimu Julius Nyerere tried to develop a uniquely African form of socialist (Nursey-Bray 1980)11 development known as ujamaa (Waters 2000).12 The state-controlled the marketing system for staple foods. Private marketing was prohibited, estates were nationalized, and communal farms were established. As part of TANUs efforts to craft development along socialist lines, Tanzania had two development schemes that were remarkably unsuccessful; so unsuccessful in fact, that they have become textbook examples of how not to conduct development (Stiglitz and Squire 1998; Scott 1998; Sahn and Sarris 1994).13 They were both characterized by state-led developmentalism, heavy donor involvement, central planning, a topdown approach, a pro-modernization ideology, and, tragically, failure. The first of Tanzania’s failed modernization efforts was the attempt to eliminate peasant forms of production in agriculture (Spalding 1996).14 With extensive assistance of international aid organizations, the state attempted to modernize the economy by establishing state farms and industries. Nyerere’s laudable objective was to relieve the backbreaking toil entailed in subsistence agriculture while increasing efficiency. The Tanzanian government encouraged farmers to use modern technologies such as tractors, improved seeds, fertilizer, and pesticides. However, this effort soon became a victim of the doctrine of unintended consequences. Efforts to modernize traditional agriculture required high overheads and high capital inputs, making them prone to corruption (Sundet 1994). Early credits from donors required that Tanzania import all the materials to build infrastructure, credits, and other items, making recurrent maintenance expenditures unbearable (Verbit 1971). In addition, Tanzania became increasingly dependent on foreign aid and the importation of mechanized inputs. Parallel markets developed for staple foods, unauthorized markets for export crops developed, and farmers withheld supplies of cash crops (Sahn and Sarris 1994). Once replacement parts were needed or maintenance had to be performed on expensive, imported equipment, farmers often abandoned the unfamiliar technology, leading to the image of “tractors rusting in the fields.” The result was inefficiency, resistance, dependence on foreign exchange for spare parts and fuel, a decline in real currency holdings, and disastrous environmental results.

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One of Tanzania’s, and indeed, one of Africa’s most disheartening experiments with development and modernization was the 1970s effort (1973–1978) to modernize the country through “villagization.” An effort that started with the best of intentions devolved into a coercive scheme with poor outcomes. Ujamaa villages encompassed the effort to relocate peasants into planned socialist villages in an effort to rationalize agriculture, increase production, and move peasants closer to shared community goods such as water, health care, and education (Sahn and Sarris 1994; Spalding 1996; Pratt 1999).15 The collective agricultural model of the villagization program was influenced by a Western consulting firm (Sahn and Sarris 1994) but also tried to mimic the kibbutz movement in Israel, as well as Chinese agricultural communes (Verbit 1971).16 This technocratic solution to the problems of peasant subsistence agriculture placed a highly quantitative emphasis on “development per se, that is modernization and production” (Nursey-Bray 1980).17 Significant emphasis was also placed on mechanization. The program was “highly effective” and a “success” from the standpoint that as many as twelve million peasants—nearly 80% of the population—were resettled into villages by 1977 (Spalding 1996). Yet, the villagization experiment represented a dramatic failure from the standpoint of economic viability, agricultural productivity, the provision of basic infrastructure, communal production, and administrative management (Omari 1974).18 The initial effort at villagization was supposed to be voluntary, but peasants resisted (Spalding 1996) and the state ended up depending on compulsion and coercion (Ingle 1970).19 Ten million peasants were forcibly moved into centralized villages (Spalding 1996; Scott 1998).20 Yet, this failed development effort was not Nyerere’s alone. The World Bank was a key driver in encouraging the planting of cash crops in new villages, such as tobacco and cotton. By the 1980s, state-society relations in Tanzania had degenerated into conflict (Spalding 1996). The state struggled to control production, and citizens, who at that point were merely trying to survive, struggled to regain control over their labor and subsistence (Spalding 1996).21 In an effort to make the country more independent from outside influences, Nyerere made a concerted effort in the early 1980s to decouple Tanzania from the policy directives of the World Bank and IMF, but he was unsuccessful (Pratt 1999). The Tanzanian economy faced a general economic collapse by the 1980s. Economic growth was stagnant, real wages fell, and real incomes declined.

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As the Tanzanian economy moved toward collapse in the late 1980s, the government was forced to become extremely responsive to donors in an effort to survive. The Tanzanian development failures of the 60s and 70s were used as proof positive by neoliberal advocates who argued that African states must embrace development guided by a minimal state and an open market economy integrated into the international capitalist economy (Pratt 1999). In the 1980s and 1990s, the country subsequently stepped away from the predominantly central planning, statist approach it had adopted under President Nyerere and moved toward a laissez faire, free-market approach under President Ali Hassan Mwinyi and his successors. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the World Bank and IMF instituted widespread restructuring plans, focusing on liberalization relaxing import restrictions, and relaxing laws governing trading (Waters 2000).22 Under President Mwinyi, Tanzania embraced IMF reforms and liberalized internal and external trade, and allowed foreign investment. Tanzania was undoubtedly influenced by international pressure on African governments to adopt multi-party democracy in addition to market economics (Ngasongwa 1992).23 Multi-party politics were introduced under the second term of Ali Hassan Mwinyi—in 1992—when Tanzania changed from a one-party state to a multi-party democracy, bringing the political monopoly of CCM to an end. The country’s third multi-party elections since 1992 were held in December 2005, naming Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete the fourth President of the United Republic of Tanzania (Ngasongwa 1992).24 Tanzania can claim status as a multiparty democracy, although Chama Cha Mapinduzi is the ruling party and has remained the ruling party throughout the country’s history. After serving two consecutive terms, President Benjamin Mkapa stepped down in accordance with the Constitution of Tanzania. Tanzania has seen peaceful transitions between all four of its presidents. By the mid-2010s, the trend toward economic liberalization, which had hit most of the globe in the 1990s, was fully in effect in Tanzania. Economists suggested that liberalizing regulatory barriers against both foreign and domestic service providers would result in substantial gains to the Tanzanian economy (Jensen et al. 2010). The trend toward liberalization continued apace in the early 2000s (Mercer 2006). Much of the investment in telecommunications in Tanzania has come from donors. The World Bank, European Union, African Development Bank, SIDA, CIDA, Danida, and the governments of Japan and Kuwait spent $250

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million on the Tanzanian Telecommunications Restructuring Programme between 1995 and 1998 (Mercer 2006). Many donor initiatives in Tanzania have focused on rationalizing the Tanzanian civil service, in an attempt to move it closer to a Weberian bureaucratic ideal (Kelsall).25 Interestingly, both Vision 2025, a long-term policy planning document that prioritizes ICT, as well as the E-government effort in Tanzania, both stem from this effort to streamline the public service. For example, the Ministry of Finance is utilizing a computer software package to track expenditures and manage government employees. Tim Kelsall notes presciently that with regard to capacity building, “technical solutions and political-cultural solutions are inscribed within the other. The interventions are techno-cultural” (Kelsall).26

The History of Computing in Tanzania: 1965–1990 The first computer in Tanzania was installed in the Ministry of Finance, in 1965 (Mgaya 1994).27 According to Klodwig Mgaya, the country boasted seven computers by 1974, and the Ministry of Finances possessed an old ICT 1500 as well as a new ICL 1900, a centralized card-based computer. Initially, installations of computers in Tanzania were largely dependent on foreign experts. Applications were often improperly documented and could only run if these foreign experts were around. A lack of budgeting and recordkeeping meant that the government made a heavy loss in its first investments “as the government could not tell how much money it had spent or collected as revenue” (Mgaya 1994).28 The country also suffered from uncoordinated planning within the government and its parastatals (Masalu 2005).29 The Tanzanian government attempted to computerize its accounting systems in the 1970s (Masalu 2005). The Tanzanian government faced a lack of qualified indigenous experts, making computer installation dependent on foreign experts (Mgaya 1994).30 Further, the foreign experts often failed to adequately train indigenous staff to operate the computers (Masalu 2005).31 Accordingly, when the foreign staff left the country, systems deteriorated. Some expatriates even uninstalled computer programs as they left the country (Masalu 2005).32 Even more distressingly, some firms that imported computers never installed them because of this lack of expertise (Masalu 2005).33

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The efforts to computerize the Tanzania government accounting system in the early 1970s were particularly unsuccessful. The Tanzanian government attempted to conduct this computerization with an ICL 1900, a centralized card-based system (Mgaya 1994).34 Such an approach was unrealistic in an extremely large and rural nation with very rudimentary communications (Mgaya 1994; Masalu 2005).35 Pressure from external consultant McKinsey for Tanzania to decentralize operations and accounting (Masalu 2005)36 at the same time that the government was attempting to process all government accounts with a highly centralized card-based system conflicted sharply. The efforts to computerize Tananzia was further hampered because the Tanzanian parastatal State Trading Corporation (STC) hired McKinsey as well as other foreign consultants to study operations. The studies were not coordinated, and in fact contradicted each other. As a result, the computerization effort failed, the parastatal fell into crisis, and the government dissolved the agency due to financial and managerial failures. Partly because of these failures the Tanzanian government banned the importation of computers and all related equipment into Tanzania in 1974 (Mgaya 1994).37 No public organization managed to import a computer until the end of the decade. Just as consumers continue to drive vintage cars in Cuba, Tanzanian organizations were forced to use computers built in the 1960s. Unlike vintage cars in Cuba, the computers built in the 1960s were obsolete and prone to mechanical failure (Mgaya 1994).38 This dearth of information technology in Tanzania persisted until the mid-1980s. The ban was informally relaxed for numerous reasons, including the decline in price for personal computers, improvements in how user-friendly computing became, and increased pressure on the government to ensure the sustainability of the Posts and Telecommunications, Railways, and Airlines after the breakup of the East Africa Community (Masalu 2005).39 Early in 1989, the Tanzanian government declared that computers were essential for the future development of the country as it entered the twenty-first century. The Tanzanian government proceeded to remove all taxes on computers, computer accessories, and peripherals. From a regulatory standpoint, the government attempted to create a positive environment for the development of information technology in Tanzania (Masalu 2005).40 The ban of slightly more than one decade created stagnation in the field of information and communication technology in Tanzania (Masalu 2005).41 As a result, Tanzania entered the 1990s

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with a shortage of computer and information specialists and low levels of computer literacy.

Tanzania’s ICT Policy In 1994, the Tanzanian Postal and Telecommunications Corporation was separated into the Tanzania Telecommunications Company, the Tanzanian Postal Corporation, a Regulator, known as the TCRA or the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority. Under pressure from donors, the telecommunications sector was partially liberalized, and mobile operators and data communication services were allowed. As part of this process, the importation and installation of electronic equipment were liberalized. Finally, the national incumbent, TTCL was privatized in 2001 and given 4 years exclusivity period for fixed and international services up to the 23rd of February (The United Republic of Tanzania 2007). After a collaborative process, the Tanzanian Ministry of Communications and Transport issued the “Tanzanian National Information and Communications Technologies Policy” (“Tanzanian ICT policy”) in March 2003. Tanzania produced one of the first ICT policies in the East African region, a slim, readable, intuitive guidance document, infused with goals such as poverty reduction, socioeconomic development, capacity building, and designs for infrastructure expansion. Whereas Rwanda’s ICT policy development process was almost entirely top-down, Tanzania’s policy process was almost entirely bottom-up. Tanzania’s ICT Policy of 2003 contains a very broad vision of Tanzanian modernity based on ICT. Like neighboring Rwanda, Tanzania’s policy contained a goal to “become a hub of ICT infrastructure and ICT solutions” (Mercer 2006). Yet, at the time of the passage of Tanzania’s ICT policy, Internet access was a highly urban phenomenon (Mercer 2006). As of 2008, Internet use was still quite limited in remote rural areas of Tanzania. In general, in 2008, Internet access was available only in the main district towns (Gillman et al. 2008). By 2013, the National ICT Broadband Backbone had been launched, surrounding Tanzania with a series of fiber optic cables, and lowering internal wholesale rates significantly. The Tanzanian mobile market is considered to be among the most competitive in Africa, with eight mobile operators competing nationally or regionally

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(Esselaar & Adam 2013). Although the government is ranked highly for readiness, business and individual use in Tanzania are ranked lower.

Implementation of Tanzanian ICT Plan: Cautious but Bold According to its text, the Tanzanian ICT Policy was motivated to head off a perceived looming national crisis: “the danger posed by the digital divide” and the “risk of being excluded from the knowledge economy and social development.” The Tanzanian ICT policy begins with a reference to the “digital divide,” both within nations and between nations which it defines as the gap between those able and unable to participate in the so-called global “knowledge economy.” The policy also indicates the government’s concern that Tanzanian citizens will not be able to participate meaningfully in the global economy if the country does not improve human capital development, local content, ICT infrastructure, and access. The goal of the policy is to “enable,” “coordinate,” and “harmonize” economic and social sectors. Tanzania’s Normative ICT Policy Goals Some of the boilerplate discourse in the Tanzanian ICT policy reflects the hegemonic (Mercer 2006) impact of the Economic Commission for Africa’s NICI process. For example, like Rwanda, the Tanzanian government’s vision of ICT emphasizes a future in which Tanzania will become a hub of ICT infrastructure that enhances sustainable socioeconomic development and accelerates poverty reduction (TZ ICT Policy).42 ICT is viewed as an enabler for poverty eradication and is also incorporated into the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty and is charged with an expansive brief: creating “high-quality livelihoods; peace, stability and unity; good governance; a well-educated and learning society, and a strong competitive economy capable of producing sustainable growth”.43 As was the case in the earlier Rwandan policy, the Tanzanian ICT Policy acknowledges that it is guided by focus areas articulated by the Tanzania Development Vision 2025.

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Narrow Scope of Implementation, Limited Distribution, Emphasis on Sustainability Despite the articulation of these laudable and desirable social goals in Tanzania’s ICT policy, the scope of implementation in Tanzania has been limited and distribution of ICT artifacts has been restricted, and somewhat ad hoc. Indeed, rural provision of ICTs in the early 2000s was subject to a piecemeal development approach (Mercer 2006). The Tanzanian approach to implementing ICT Policy was initially based around twenty pilot tele-centers scattered throughout the country, a handful of networked government sites, as well as an effort to build out ICT backbone infrastructure (Mahegere).44 Tanzania’s approach to developing publicly sponsored ICT facilities focuses on creating sustainable low-cost connectivity which can provide high bandwidth applications in rural areas (Nungu 2007).45 The drawbacks of the Tanzanian approach are that it is limited to a restricted number of sites and that infrastructure and artifacts are not evenly or widely distributed throughout the country. Stated succinctly, Tanzania—with significant assistance, and most likely pressure from donors—has built some excellent, carefully thought-out, and wellintegrated government-sponsored ICT projects, but it has built very few of them. The explicit objective of the Tanzanian approach is to develop “Information and Communications Technology for Rural Development.” The Tanzanian government works with development partners (i.e., donors), academics, as well as with small entrepreneurs and local civil society activists, with careful attention to assessing the success of outcomes, “troubleshooting,” and ensuring financial sustainability and long-term viability for government-sponsored ICT projects. The emphasis is on connecting multiple sites in one rural location, enhancing the utility of the network to all users. By using pre-existing infrastructure, the Tanzanian approach cleverly reduces the most onerous cost of ICT diffusion: infrastructure development. As one Tanzanian Commission on Science and Technology official observed “rural areas need ICT.” Infrastructure is very expensive. If we can use the existing infrastructure, we can reduce the cost of bringing ICT to rural areas” (Nungu 2008).46 By utilizing pre-existing infrastructure, the government of Tanzania increases the likelihood of financial sustainability for each project.

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Connecting the Bush: Tanzanian Tele-Center Initiative At the turn of the millennium, Tanzanian government officials and academics believed that ICT infrastructure in rural areas was so inadequate that the market cannot solve the problem, and accordingly, the national government was obligated to step in to fill the breach. This perspective is well-founded. Tanzania’s population of 32 million persons is overwhelmingly rural (75%), and as is the case in most developing countries, there are dramatic differences in the ability to access the Internet and ICT in rural versus urban areas in the country (Furuholt and Kristiansen 2007).47 As of 2006, although it was easy to find computer access in Dar es Salaam, the ability to access ICTs dropped off sharply even 30 miles outside of the capital, limited by restrictions in electrical supply, teledensity, and purchasing power (Mercer 2006). In developing countries, home access to computers or the Internet is a luxury. In addition, only the biggest of employers have the capital to provide computers. Thus, in East Africa, public Internet cafés tend to be a main method of accessing ICTs. The expansion of Internet access by means of physical locations with computers in rural areas began to proliferate globally with Internet Kiosks, privately run cybercafés, or nonprofit community tele-centers (Rogers and Shukla 2001; Gollakota and Doshi 2011, 70).48 In addition, Internet cafes are the main means for the rural population of Tanzania to access the Internet (Furuholt and Kristiansen 2007).49 Thus, setting up public Internet access points is a reasonable government intervention that can be expected to improve the ability of people in rural and poor regions to access ICTs (Gollakota and Doshi 2011).50 As a result of this rural-directed approach, much of the governmentdirected ICT development in Tanzania is occurring through multisectoral collaborations on tele-centers (Nungu 2007).51 An important distinction should be made between privately run Internet cafés, which are for profit, and provide users access to phones, computers, the Internet, and even electrical outlets in urban areas of Tanzania, and publicly run or nonprofit tele-centers. Internet cafés and tele-centers generally provide the same service yet have different types of ownership and financing. Whereas tele-centers operate as not-for-profit ventures and generally

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receive government subsidies or donor subsidies, Internet cafes are forprofit ventures owned by small entrepreneurs (Furuholt and Kristiansen 2007).52 The Netherlands-based donor, the International Institute for Communication and Development, has supported the creation of a tele-center network in Tanzania named “SWOPnet.” SWOPnet partners with the Tanzanian government, particularly with the Tanzanian Commission on Science and Technology (COSTECH) as well as with E-ThinkTankTz and the University Computing Center, all of which are also supporters of the Tanzanian ICT4D networking initiative (Masalu 2005; Mercer 2006).53 Tele-center construction in Tanzania began around 2001. By the early 2000s, Tanzania had approximately twenty active tele-centers which were built by government and donors and are managed by an eclectic assembly of donors, academics, government agencies, and private sector sponsors.54 By 2005, Tanzania boasted over 1000 internet cafes (Masalu 2005).55 At a very basic level, a tele-center is a physical place that provides community access to ICTs for educational, personal, social, and economic development (Gollakota and Doshi 2011).56 Nonprofit tele-centers have the potential to provide useful information, particularly to farmers, and enhancing service delivery for items such as birth certificates, marriage certificates, and death certificates. Tele-centers have been promoted due to their ability to minimize the information gap in rural and marginalized urban areas (Mtega and Malekani 2009). Of course, tele-centers may help with education, or with communicating with distant friends and relatives (Gollakota and Doshi 2011). Most tele-centers feature a small number of computers (less than 20) some ability to connect to the Internet and some staff. Tele-center facilities include items like access to telephone handsets, World Space radios, library services, and IT support services. Other facilities possess printers, faxes, photocopiers, scanners, and projectors, which can be used by local citizens for a small fee. Importantly, in Tanzania, these facilities generally have a reliable supply of electricity, which means they can charge a small fee for items like charging phones. In addition to these basic “copy-shop” type services, some tele-centers provide more advanced training to users. For example, the Sengerema Community Center, which receives support from the Tanzanian Commission on Science and Technology, offers computer classes, secretarial services, and has staff trained as information managers (Ngowi et al. 2015).

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Specialized centers may include FM radio stations. The Family Alliance for Development and Cooperation in Karagwe has begun supplying Internet services to two schools. The Kibengwe Rural Communication Access and Development Center provides Internet services to a nearby secondary school, a convent, and a development organization. The most sophisticated organization appears to be an NGO named The Crop Marketing Bureau located in Mwanza. This tele-center collects and provides market and agriculture price information for farmer groups, trains women and youth groups in the field of development and ICT, and assists local residents, including the district commissioner of Magu, to complete higher education (Tan 2007).57 Farmers who work with the Crop Marketing Bureau have reported a sharp rise in income from using the facilities. Some of these tele-centers connect to the Internet over traditional landlines through the national telecommunications provider TTCL.58 Other tele-centers connect to the Internet through very small aperture terminals, which are essentially small satellite dishes installed at end user locations other typical means of connectivity are uses of a wireless connection, like those used by cellular phones. The two biggest technological barriers to Tanzanian tele-center sustainability are the high cost and low reliability of Internet access, as well as unstable access to electric power, which has turned out to be a crucial limiting factor throughout the region. In addition, tele-centers have closed due to financial problems, or even due to a lack of interest from the rural population (Gollakota and Doshi 2011).59 Tele-centers established by “outsiders” are likely to fail if they do not have local support, given the severe technological and institutional constraints these organizations work under. For tele-centers to succeed, they must provide information that builds on community exploration, the information provided must be useful, and the information must be easily obtained. Further, the onus is on the tele-center to help users find information, instead of expecting them to have browsing and search skills. As noted by Gollakata and Doshi, “just dropping technology in a rural setting is not going to result in development if users have no skills to use the technology.” This is particularly critical for older users (Gollakota and Doshi 2011).60 In addition, to be successful, tele-center owners should consider providing complementary products, such as soil-testing kits for farmers, banking services, bill-payment facilities, and credit information to

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help ensure that learning from the tele-center can be applied (Gollakota and Doshi 2011).61 Importantly, the role of the government in the tele-center movement in Tanzania is not just limited to national government support as a sponsor and planner. Rather, the involvement of local government officials, according to donor IICD, enhances the legitimacy of service delivery, thus leading to long-term sustainability. In addition, it adds value to the content on offer, as local government offices can avail tele-centers to distribute information of interest. Further, local government offices can use much-needed services to enhance access for their offices, while they wait for e-government initiatives to stretch out to the “bush.” This makes local government officials “consumers” who can act as a push factor for expanding rural ICT access. The Sengerema MCT was Tanzania’s pilot rural tele-center, supported by the IDRC (Canada), the ITU, and UNESCO (Mercer 2006; Ngowi et al. 2015). Sengerema, in the Mwanza Region, was chosen because it was rural and remote but also, relatively well connected to transport (Ngowi et al. 2015). The Mwanza region has low literacy in terms of reading and writing, and many residents rely on subsistence agriculture. The tele-center was carefully placed in a town near the district market and the bus stand to optimize traffic (Mercer 2006). “Serikali-Mtandao”: Networking Government In addition to the tele-center initiative, another key component of Tanzania’s rural infrastructure development was conducted under the auspices of a pilot project on “ICT for Rural Development” (ICT4D 2008). Tanzania’s information and communication technology for rural development project began in 2006. The objective of this initiative is to facilitate public investments in infrastructure by creating local area networks (Williams 2008) 62 to strengthen service delivery in education, health, local government, and services for rural entrepreneurs (Nungu 2008).63 The project aims to facilitate information between the different entities. The ICT4D project borrows existing fiber optic cable previously deployed by the Tanzanian Utility Power Company and the Tanzanian Ministry of Water which allows the networked entities to share large amounts of data very quickly.64 The ICT4D project is a joint government-donor project between The Swedish Royal Institute of Technology, the Dar es Salaam Institute of

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Technology, and the Tanzanian Commission on Science and Technology which is housed at the national headquarters of COSTECH in Dar es Salaam. The project is conceived of as a research project and operates on a nonprofit basis. The collaborative approach aims to build capacity by creating a cadre of Tanzanian individuals with expertise in local area network construction. In addition, the project allows members of the consortium to absorb lessons regarding the creation of communication markets and the appropriate roles for different actors.65 The project uses pre-existing infrastructure (including optic fiber, wireless, and microwave links) put in place for other purposes by Tanzanian utility companies to enhance rural infrastructure. The project tests various pilot sites, which utilize different infrastructures and different business models to ensure sustainable connectivity. Beginning with a pilot project allows the Tanzanian government to “troubleshoot” potential difficulties with the selected approach. First, as part of an e-government initiative, the Tanzanian government built a wide area network to connect districts, regions ministries, departments, and agencies. Initially, the main underlying infrastructure was a satellite. Unlike the Kenyan government, which has concentrated on connecting ministry officials inside of the capital city of Nairobi, the Tanzanian government is emphasizing creating connections between the capital and localities first. Indeed, Tanzania built wide area network between the capital and the periphery before it connected ministries in the cities of Dodoma and Dar es Salaam. Tanzania also established pilot networking projects in three locations: Bagamoyo, the Mara region, and the Serengeti region. The project in the Mara region is located around the town of Masomo. The project in the Serengeti region is located in the Bunda and Serengeti districts. Another pilot project in Cherinze in Bagamoyo uses fiber optic cable owned by the Ministry of Water. In Bunda, the project connects the government offices of the district council, the district primary health centers, the district hospitals, and the secondary schools. In Bunda and Serengeti, the ICT4D project uses fiber connecting two districts through a Ministry of Water pipeline. One secondary school is located in Bunda, and one secondary school is located in Serengeti. Each school has received one computer, and they will receive the second computer in April 2008. In addition, each school has received a VoIP phone. Each of the four health centers in the region will receive a desktop computer, a VoIP phone, and a video camera. The secondary school staffs receive training on open-source

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software on education applications, to facilitate e-learning. In addition, the district councils will receive desktop computers and VoIP phones. A local area network connects Bunda to Serengeti town which allows the district councils to communicate effectively with both the schools and the hospitals. In Bagamoyo, the project connected three secondary schools, three primary health centers, and the office of the Member of Parliament. Because fiber is already on the ground in Bagamoyo, a local area network connects schools and hospitals to the Member of Parliament Each school and each health facility received two computers. Each district office in the selected sites has received one computer and one VoIP phone. In addition, each village receives a basic computer training session for local government officials. Through this project, villagers learn how to operate “Microsoft Office” software as well as how to operate the Internet. In the Mara region, the district hospital is connected to local dispensaries. Accordingly, the local dispensaries can request medicine and ask for advice, as well as report cases. Initially, the project aimed to give at least one computer to each hospital and to facilitate email access. This allows the hospitals to exchange files with each other. In addition, the Mara hospitals and clinics are to receive VoIP phones to facilitate communication via voice, email, and data. Each of these facilities was provided with basic computer training. The staff was trained to use open-source software to create a hospital management information system. This project allows remote public community health centers to communicate with the district hospitals through multiple avenues: voice, email, and videoconferencing. Since rural public community health centers have limited medical expertise, this technology allows them to contact the district hospitals for assistance on difficult cases. In addition, this project should support hospitals in terms of recordkeeping and record retrieval.

ICT and Agriculture in Tanzania The Tanzanian economy depends mostly on agriculture which represents 30% of exports and employs 70% of the workforce (Ngowi et al. 2015). In addition, 70% of the population lives in rural areas, subsisting on smallholder agriculture and livestock keeping. ICT holds the potential to create jobs and economic growth in rural areas, and support gains in agricultural efficiency. Telecentres were designed to develop appropriate strategies for

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the application of ICTs services for sustainable livelihoods in the rural areas. Mobile Telephony and Agriculture in Tanzania One of the more promising implications for ICTs in Africa has been the ability to cut out the middleman in agricultural transactions. Mobile phones and the Internet may provide farmers with the ability to share local experiences, learn from one another, and more accurately track market prices (Gillman et al. 2008).66 Farmer market spies or mukulima shushushu can investigate markets, collect information on prices, and quantities, and about how farmers can best sell their produce using text messages on their cell phone, particularly with farmers’ groups, such as those in the Mwawama farmers group. The efforts of such individuals can help farmers get better access to markets, reduce inefficiencies along the market chain, and maximize profits, helping them to get the best prices for beans, paprika, and potatoes (Gillman et al. 2008). In addition, such individuals can use the Internet to share experiences and ideas with peers throughout Tanzania and neighboring countries. Members of the Mwawama farmers group, who live in a town 15 kilometers from the nearest village with electricity, have seen dramatic increases in profits utilizing this approach because it has allowed them to reduce their dependence on middlemen. This effort was funded by the International Fund for Agricultural Development and the Government of Switzerland and is implemented in conjunction with the Tanzanian Government’s Agricultural Marketing Systems Development Program (Gillman et al. 2008). It is effective because it reduces information asymmetry and connects farmers with processors, traders, and consumers, using mobile phones and email. The district teams were composed of district officials for agriculture, a representative of the local partner NGO, and representatives of local farmers, processors, and traders. Tele-Centers and Agriculture Tele-centers in the rural areas of Tanzania help to integrate ICTs into the dissemination of agricultural and livestock-keeping information to agropastoralists. Agricultural pastoralists in Tanzania require time-sensitive information about credit, weather conditions, and market conditions (Ngowi et al. 2015). In a study of rural tele-centers in an agricultural

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community Tanzania, Ngowi, found that nearly 40% of the tele-centers were poor, 37% were moderate, with only 23% of the tele-center users being well-off. Tele-centers located near moderately wealthy or well-off agro-pastoralists had a much higher chance of being sustainable. Agro-pastoralists particularly searched for information on subsidized agricultural inputs, information on modern agricultural practices, and information on subsidies for farming (Ngowi et al. 2015). Within the tele-center, radio services were highly valued. Tele-centers also provide a variety of information-based services to Agro-pastoralists, including information on new products such as pesticides and seeds, availability and costs of agro-inputs, capacity building, rural finance, weather information services, and communication with government entities. Many tele-center users cannot understand the language on the computer, due to literacy constraints. Yet, community radio operations in rural tele-centers are extremely popular, particularly because they often broadcast in local languages.

Advances in ICT Infrastructure in Tanzania Tanzania is the largest country geographically in East Africa, covering nearly 365,000 square miles. The nation’s large size makes distributing ICT infrastructure particularly challenging. To deal with this challenge, Tanzania has established a successful Universal Access Fund. As discussed in Chapter 9, the purpose of Tanzania Universal Access Fund is to build telecommunications and ICT infrastructure and provide access to rural areas and the urban underserved areas through tele-centers and public phones, with an emphasis on serving the most economically unviable areas (The United Republic of Tanzania 2006). In conjunction with the World Bank, the Tanzanian government is aiming to ensure that the national fiber backbone reaches 80% of the population (Developing Telecoms 2022). The Tanzanian USAF experienced some successes, including upgrading existing signal towers to improve digital connectivity (Akuku et al. 2021) and extending communication services Zanzibar. Further, the USAF is being used to install computers and projectors as well as the Internet in schools and provide ICT training to schoolteachers. Further, in conjunction with the Digital Tanzania project, the Tanzanian government is working to utilize the USAF to provide remote areas receive access

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to communication services, including mobile telephony, and Internet connectivity (Malakata 2021). The Tanzanian government issued a national ICT policy in 2003 and aimed to reach all regional and district headquarters by 2010.67 In 2005, the Tanzanian Ministry of Communications and Transport issued a feasibility study for the Implementation of the National ICT Backbone Infrastructure.68 As Tanzania approached 2009, most businesses had developed strategies based on a low bandwidth environment. This was caused by the fact that most Internet access was obtained over satellite, resulting in a state of affairs known as “bandwidth starvation” (MateruBehitsa and Diyamett 2010). As of 2009, Tanzania had one of the lowest rates of Internet penetration in Africa, at 1.55 per 100 inhabitants.

TEAMS, SEACOM, and EASSY This low bandwidth environment changed rapidly after the first major undersea cable (SEACOM) landed in Dar es Salaam in July 2009. Costs dropped sharply in Tanzania after the landing of Seacom submarine cable. Internet connectivity in Tanzania also improved after the introduction of fiber optic networks through the East African Submarine Cable System (EASSY). Like its neighbors, the Tanzanian government developed an Internet backbone project, the National ICT Broadband Backbone (NICTBB). The Tanzanian government-sponsored construction of the National ICT Broadband Backbone was completed with the assistance of a soft loan from China (Esselaar & Adam 2013).69 As discussed in more detail in Chapter 9, the NICTBB connected to SEACOM in July 2009 and to EASSY in 2010 (Materu-Behitsa and Diyamett 2010). As of 2021, the NICTBB had deployed 7910 kilometers of fiber. In 2021, the GoT announced plans to extend that national backbone network from about 8300 to 15,000 km by 2023 (Lancaster Telecoms 2022). The NICTBB is generally considered a success, assisting industries, businesses, and individuals, and significantly increasing broadband connectivity in Tanzania (Agbebi 8; Sinda 2021). Institutions of higher learning have benefited from last mile connectivity. Investment in the NICTBB has helped Internet access to increase, and voice costs to decline.

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Chinese Investment in ICT Infrastructure in Tanzania Tanzania is one of the countries which has benefited from Chinese investment in ICT Development. China has invested heavily in Tanzania’s ICT infrastructure as part of its Digital Silk Road Initiative (Agbebi et al.). The NICTBB was financed in large part by loans from China’s Exim Bank (Agbebi). Construction was implemented by the Chinese International Telecommunications Construction Corporation (“CITCC”) in collaboration with Huawei. Yet, critics state that Chinese investment in Tanzania’s NICTBB was not as successful as it could have been in terms of job creation and technology transfer. Jobs emerging from the CITCC were on the lower end of the technology value chain, and goods and services were restricted by Chinese procurement regulations (Agbebi). Technology transfer from China to Tanzania about how to manage the infrastructure could have been more substantive and may be a long-term problem for Tanzania in the future. ICT in Higher Education in Tanzania The example of higher education in Tanzania well illustrates how ICT infrastructure, hardware, and human resources interact to make an educational system function. For ICTs to be fully used in a higher education setting, ICT infrastructure is necessary, but far from sufficient. Indeed, for ICT to be optimally used in higher education setting, a university requires electricity, an Internet connection, affordable and available hardware, and devices (such as a computer and a mouse), software, (such as an operating system), reliable electricity, audiovisual equipment, top management support, ICT skills among students and faculty (Pima et al. 2016). Institutions of higher education illustrate the interaction between the mere existence of ICT infrastructure and the existence of enabling conditions which make that infrastructure operational. For example, ICTs only work in the presence of electricity. In addition, even if ICT infrastructural components are available, and hardware and software are also available, students and faculty also need ICT skills (Pima et al. 2016). According to Pima, Odetayo, Iqbal, and Sedoyeka, a combined effort of the government and private partners, including Internet Service

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Providers, Data Service Providers, Cellular Network Operators, government agencies, and the management, faculty, and staff of higher education institutions are required to optimize the use of ICTs in a higher education setting in Tanzania. This study found that broadband networks provide reliable internet connections to all institutions of higher education in Tanzania. High competition in Tanzania between ISPs is lowering costs and increasing the quality of services. Although cost was not considered to be a serious problem for access, electrical power cuts did pose a problem for students and lecturers (Pima et al. 2016).

Conclusion As described above, Tanzania is a case of high participation and medium implementation. In the case of Tanzania, written ICT policy statements correlate loosely with outcomes. Tanzania can claim great success in ICT implementation in two areas: rural connectivity, particularly in the field of networked governance and improved e-governance. Further, Tanzania can claim significant success in terms of creating grass roots-driven participatory policy process. More so than the other three cases, the assemblage of actors in Tanzania that is in charge of developing infrastructure focuses not just on the construction of “artifacts” (i.e., the placement of computers in every school) but also on the engagement and involvement of a society that can accept, use and validate those items, creating both knowledge and institutions. Tanzania learned two crucial lessons from its development failures in the 1970s which are reflected in its current approach to development. The first lesson the Tanzanian government learned is that the population should be involved in planning and that projects that are forced on an unwilling population are likely to fail. The second lesson that the Tanzanian government learned was that large, top-down, technologically intensive development projects are unpredictable, hard to control, and may easily become financially unsustainable and lead to issues with maintenance and dependence. As a result, the ICT implementation process in Tanzania continues to be a cooperative venture between the Tanzanian government, donors, the local private sector and academics. Regarding policy implementation, the Government of Tanzania seems inclined to focus on “what works,” before investing large amounts of government and donor money into grandiose building projects. In addition, the Tanzanian approach uses pre-existing infrastructure and connects

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multiple government-sponsored entities, such as schools, hospitals, and local government offices to maximize inter-organizational communication ability. This emphasis on using existing infrastructure and creating highly networked organizations works well with an emphasis on technological sustainability. Governance in Tanzania is one area that has been changed significantly by ICT. The public service reform program in Tanzania encompasses e-government (Sawe 2007).70 According to Kaaya, Tanzania began implementing e-government in 1998, and gradually increased its rate of adoption reaching a peak in 2001. Since then, progress in e-government has continued. Information science units have been established in each Ministry as well as in each executive agency. In contrast to neighbor Kenya, whose e-government efforts focus almost exclusively on the capital of Nairobi, Tanzania’s e-government plan incorporates connecting the capital to the periphery. For example, by 2009, in Tanzania, 120 district government offices out of 140 had computers. Tanzanian government officials evince awareness of the efficiency and service improvements emerging from extending services outside of the capital, which may explain the effort to connect districts with the capital. Furthermore, the Tanzanian government has trained thousands of public servants around the country in basic computer skills since the launch of its ICT Policy. Tanzania’s public discourse on ICT combines two visions: first it enunciates a radical citizen-centered view of e-government, and second it echoes a utopian view of ICT as a tool for social justice (Nagu 2005).71 Further, the Tanzanian government emphasizes the need to use ICT inside of a gradual strategic planning process to boost productivity, transparency, efficiency, and responsiveness in the public sector. In addition, the focus on e-government claims to consider “processes, organizations and staff” (Nagu 2005).72 The government’s Ministry of Finance claims that computerizing public records has enhanced transparency and efficiency, for example, eliminating ghost workers and helping detect fraudulent claims. The second major accomplishment which the government of Tanzania can point to in the ICT arena is that of development of rural ICT infrastructure. Tanzania’s approach to placing ICT infrastructure in rural areas appears innovative, and forward-looking and has the potential to dramatically improve the ability of government entities to improve service delivery in rural areas. Tanzania’s approach enhances government communication between the center and the periphery, while increasing

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government coordination at the local level. A truly functional approach to building ICT capacity in the developing world must train users to operate equipment, train specialists to maintain equipment, build infrastructure that makes the equipment function, such as connectivity and stable electric connections, and finally, consider what use the equipment will be put. The collaborative assemblage of actors in rolling out tele-centers in Tanzania has given donors, COSTECH and local communities an opportunity to adjust business plans and determine how best to cover expenses related to infrastructure, electricity, and hardware. In addition, as is the case with any small business, whether for-profit or not-for-profit, it may take a few years to determine which services each facility offers and at what cost they should be offered to the public. It may be that Tanzania, like the fabled tortoise, is building integrated technological systems slowly and steadily, not just placing “tractors in fields.” Although the development of this new infrastructure may be slow, that slow yet steady pace of building combined with a financially low-risk approach and a broad-based social consensus, may be its strength. Further, it may be that the hares, Rwanda, and Uganda, by building massive top-down projects which are heavily reliant on outside funding and direction, maybe creating infrastructure which is at risk. The more democratic governments of Kenya and Tanzania have much more inclusive and “bottom-up” policy processes. As the case of Tanzania illustrates the most clearly of the four cases, more participatory efforts to develop and implement ICT policy may produce less physical evidence of progress; importantly, however, such participatory efforts may produce both technological and social outcomes that are sustainable in the long run.

Notes 1. Opening Speech by Honorable Dr. Mrs. Mary Nagu (MP) Minister of State, President’s Office for Public Service Management, to the 5th S.A.D.C. Executive Program Seminar on E-Government, Held at the Golden Tulip Hotel, Dar es Salaam, September 14, 2004. 2. Wiebe E. Bijker defines technology as having three layers of meaning: physical artifacts (such as dikes, or computers), human activities (such as making the dikes, or laying fiber optic cable), and knowledge, such (as the know-how to build dikes, or design an Internet infrastructure plan). Wiebe E. Bijker, “Socio-historical Technology Studies,” in Sheila Jasanoff

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4.

5.

6. 7. 8.

9. 10.

11. 12.

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et al. (eds.) Handbook of Science and Technology Studies (Sage: Thousand Oaks, 1995), pp: 229–256. Bijker, STS handbook, p. 251; Wesley Shrum, Organized Technology: Networks and Innovation in Technical Systems (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1985). On the topic of the interaction of technology with politics, society and culture, see Paul N. Edwards, “From “Impact” to Social Process: Computers in Society and Culture,” in the Handbook of Science and Technology Studies. Edwards makes the important point that researchers must be aware of the ways in which a new computer system will be inserted into an existing network of social relationships. Julius Nyerere was President of Tanzania from 1964 until 1985. He held office under the political party TANU, which changed into Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). Despite his policy errors, some of which were profound, President Julius Nyerere was recognized as a leader of vision, idealism and integrity who was committed to developing his country, and working in the interest of the Tanzanian nation’s welfare (Pratt 1999). John E. Moore, “The Villagisation Process and Rural Development in the Mwanza Region of Tanzania,” Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography, Vol. 61, No. 2 (1979): 65–80, p. 66. Waters, Development in Tanzania: 636. I term the policy style which emerges from an examination of ICT policymaking in Tanzania indigenous cooperation. Ngasongwa, “Tanzania Introduces a Multi-Party System,” p. 112; Aili Mari Tripp, “Political Reform in Tanzania: The Struggle for Associational Autonomy, “Comparative Politics, Vol. 32, No. 2. (January 2000): 191–214. President Julius Nyerere was succeeded by Ali Hassan Mwinyi (1985–1995) and Benjamin Mpaka (1995–2005). The current President is Jakaya Kikwete. All four presidents have been members of the ruling party, CCM. Geir Sundet, “Beyond Developmentalism in Tanzania,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 21, No. 59 (March 1994): 39–49. David E. Sahn and Alexander Sarris, “The Evolution of States, Markets and Civil Institutions in Rural Africa,” The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2 (June 1994): 279–303. P.F. Nursey Bray, “Tanzania, the Development Debate,” African Affairs, Vol. 79. No. 314 (January 1980): 55–78. Tony Waters, “The Persistence of Subsistence and the Limits to Development Studies: The Challenge of Tanzania,” Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, Vol. 70, No. 4 (2000): 614–652. Joseph E. Stiglitz and Lyn Squire, “International Development: Is it Possible?” Foreign Policy, No. 110, (Spring 1998), pp. 138–151; J. C. Scott, Seeing Like A State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); David

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20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

25. 26. 27.

28.

29.

30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

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E. Sahn and Alexander Sarris, “The Evolution of States, Markets, and Civil Institutions in Rural Africa,” The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2 (June 1994): 279–303 at 288. Nancy Jackson Spalding, “State-Society Relations in Africa: An Exploration of the Tanzanian Experience,” Polity, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Autumn 1996): 65–96. Nursey- Bray, the Development Debate: 67. Nancy Jackson Spalding, “State Society Relations in Africa: An Exploration of the Tanzania Experience,” Polity, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Autumn 1996): 65–96 at 81. Gilbert P. Verbit, Review, “TANU Builds the Nation,” Yale Law Journal, Vol. 81, No. 2 (December 1971): 334–358. Nursey-Bray: 68. Olowu: 212. C. K. Omari, “Tanzania’ Emerging Rural Development Policy,” Africa Today, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Summer 1974): 9–14. Clyde R. Ingle, “Compulsion and Rural Development in Tanzania,” Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Winter 1970): 77–100. Spalding: 83. Spalding: 86. Waters, Development in Tanzania: 635. Ngasongwa, Tanzania Introduces a Multi-Party System: 114. The historic decision to make Tanzania a multi-party state was taken at the national conference of the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi party (CCM) in February 1992. Juma Ngasongwa, “Tanzania Introduces a Multi-Party System,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 54 (July 1992): 112– 116. Kelsall: 599. Kelsall, 601. Klodwig Mgaya, Development of information technology in Tanzania, available at https://archive.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu19ie0i. htm#:~:text Klodwig Mgaya, Chapter 4. Development of Information Technology in Tanzania. https://archive.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu19ie/uu1 9ie0i.htm: 1-8. Desiderius C.P. Masalu, “Evolution of information and communication technology in Tanzania and its impact on ocean data and information management,” Ocean and Coastal Management, Vol. 48 (2005): 85–95. Mgaya, unupress, at 1. Masalu at 86. Masalu at 86. Masalu at 86. Mgaya at 1. Mgaya at 1; Masalu at 97.

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48.

49. 50. 51.

52. 53. 54. 55. 56.

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Masalu at 87. Mgaya at 1. Mgaya at 2. Masalu at 88. Masalu at 88. Masalu at 88. TZ ICT Policy, 2. United Republic of Tanzania, National Information and Communications Technologies Policy, p. 1. Emails provided by John Mahegere, Tanzanian Commission for Science and Technology. Interview with Amos Nungu, Project Manager, ICT4D Tanzania, Tanzanian Commission for Science and Technology. Interview with Amos Nungu, March 26, 2008. Furuholt, B and Kristiansen, S. (2007), “A Rural–Urban Digital Divide? Regional Aspects of Internet Use in Tanzania,” Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Social Implications of Computers in Developing Countries (Sao Paulo: Brazil (May 2007)). According to Furuholt and Kristiansen, Tanzania has approximately 300 Internet cafes, predominantly located in the commercial areas of Dar es Salaam. E. M. Rogers and P. Shukla, “The Role of Telecenters in Development Communication and the Digital Divide,” Journal of Development Communication, Vol. 2, No. 12 (2011): 26–31; Kamala Gollakota and Kokila Doshi, “Diffusion of Technological Innovations in Rural Areas,” Journal of Corporate Citizenship, No. 41 (2011): 69–82. At 70. B. Furuholt and S. Kristiansen (2007), “A Rural–Urban Digital Divide?”. K. Gollakota and K. Doshi (2011), “Diffusion of Technological Innovations in Rural Areas”. Interview with Amos Nungu, August 23, 2007, Project Manager ICT for Rural Development and Lecturer at Dar Es Salaam Institute of Technology. B. Furuholt and S. Kristiansen (2007), “A Rural–Urban Digital Divide?”. Masalu at 89; Mercer, 2005 at 248. This information is based upon the author’s own data collection, in conjunction with the Tanzanian Tele-center Initiative and COSTECH. Masalu at 88. Kamala Gollakota and Kokila Doshi, “Diffusion of Technological Innovations in Rural Areas,” Journal of Corporate Citizenship, No.41 (2011): 69–82 at 72. Tan, Liang, International Institute for Communication and Development, “Rural Communication Access Centers in Tanzania: Lessons Learned from setting up and managing IICD supported RCA centers,” The Hague: July 2007.

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58. In general Internet access in Tanzania takes place over landlines, although Dodoma and Dar es Salaam also have Internet access over CDMA, which is a technology frequently used for cellular telephony. 59. Kamala Gollakota and Kokila Doshi, “Diffusion of Technological Innovations in Rural Areas,” Journal of Corporate Citizenship No. 41 (2011): 69–82 at 70. 60. Gollakota at 78. 61. Gollakata at 79. 62. A local-area network (LAN) is a computer network covering a small geographic area, like a home, office, or group of buildings. A good example of a local area network is a group of computers connecting a school. The defining characteristics of LANs, in contrast to widearea networks (WANs), include their much higher data-transfer rates, and smaller geographic range. In general, A LAN refers to a network which combines a group of buildings. LAN’s are used to connect desktop computers, and allows users to access data and devices throughout the network. It also facilitates communication, particularly over e-mail; between users on the network. The first LAN put into service occurred in 1964 at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in Berkeley, California, to support atomic weapons research. LANs spread in the late 1970s and were used to create high-speed links between several large central computers at one site. See Texas State Library and Archives Commission, Available at http://www.tsl.state.tx.us/ld/pubs/wireless/chapter6.html. Accessed on May 7, 2008. 63. ICT4D draft website. Accessed with permission of webmaster April 24, 2008. Interview with Amos Nungu, March 26, 2008. 64. Fiber optic cable consists of strands of optically pure glass insulated inside of a protective coating which can carry digital information over long distances. Traditional land line telephones were built with copper wire and could carry lower amounts of data. Fiber optic cable is cheaper to manufacture than copper wire and also can carry significantly more data. Further, in Africa, copper wire may be subject to theft. Fiber optic cable can be expensive to install and requires significant infrastructure development due to digging costs. In addition, fiber optic cable is often fragile. 65. The ICT4D project has been funded primarily by SIDA, which also funded Tanzania’s rural electrification program. The ICT advisor in SIDA was also the energy advisor. 66. Lightfoot, Gillam, Scheuermeier, Nyimbo, “The First Mile Project in Tanzania: Linking Smallholder Farmers to Markets Using Modern Communication Technology,” Mountain Research and Development, Vol. 28, No. 1 (February 2008): 13–17.

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67. Lusekelo Philemon, “Govt: Installation of national ICT Backbone almost ready,” The Guardian, 13 June 2008. 68. United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Communication and Transport, Technical Report on Feasibility Study for Implementation of the National ICT Backbone Infrastructure, June 2005, p. 14. 69. United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Communication and Transport, Technical Report on Feasibility Study for Implementation of the National Backbone Infrastructure, Presented by Joint Team of Tanzania, CITCC and WorldTel, June 2005. 70. Interview with David Sawe, August 24, 2007. The Tanzanian Egovernment directorate is in the President’s Office for Public Service Management. David Sawe is the director for Management Information Systems and E-government, as well as the advisor to the President on E-government. 71. Nagu speech; United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Communication and Transport, Technical report on Feasibility Study for Implementation of the National ICT Backbone Infrastructure, June 2005, p. 14. 72. Nagu speech.

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using Information and Communication Technology (IJEDICT), Vol. 5(2): 68– 87, 2009. Mwalongo L. & Hussein, A., “Creating a Level Playing Field: The Tanzanian Telecoms Sector Overview.” Regional Meeting of the Tarriff Group for Africa, Tanzanian Communications Regulatory Agency, Powerpoint, 2007. Nagu, M. “To the 5th S.A.D.C. Executive Program Seminar on E-Government.” The Golden Tulip Hotel, Dar es Salaam, September 14, 2004. Nagu, M. “Technical report on Feasibility Study for Implementation of the National ICT Backbone Infrastructure.” United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Communication and Transport, June, 2005. Ngasongwa, J. “Tanzania Introduces a Multi-Party System.” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 54: 112–116, July 1992. Ngowi E., Mwakalobo A. & Mwamfupe, D. “Making ICTs work for Agropastoral Livelihood: Using the Telecentre as Learning Tool for Agropastoralists Communities in Tanzania.” Journal of Sustainable Development, Vol. 8(2), 2015. Nungu, A. Project Manager, ICT for Rural Development and Lecturer at Dar Es Salaam Institute of Technology. Interview, August 23, 2007. Nungu, A. Project Manager, ICT4D Tanzania, “Tanzanian Commission for Science and Technology.” Interview, March 26, 2008. Nursey-Bray, P. F. “Tanzania, the Development Debate.” African Affairs, Vol. 79(314): 55–78, January 1980. Omari, C. K. “Tanzania’ Emerging Rural Development Policy.” Africa Today, Vol. 21(3): 9–14, Summer 1974. Pima, J. M., Odetayo, M., Iqbal, R. & Sedoyeka, E. International Journal of Education and Development using Information and Communication Technology (IJEDICT), Vol. 12(1): 37–52, 2016. Rogers, E. M. & Shukla, P. “The Role of Telecenters in Development Communication and the Digital Divide.”Journal of Development Communication, Vol. 2(12): 26–31, 2001. Sahn, D. E. & Sarris, A. “The Evolution of States, Markets and Civil Institutions in Rural Africa.” The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 32(2): 279–303, June 1994. Sawe, D. Director for Management Information Systems and E-government, and advisor to the President on E-government. Interview. August 24, 2007. Scott, J. C. Seeing Like A State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998. Shrum, W. Organized Technology: Networks and Innovation in Technical Systems. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1985.

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Sinda, A. A. “Tanzania: Overview of Data Infrastructure in East Africa, Bowmans,” April 20, 2021. https://bowmanslaw.com/insights/technologymedia-and-telecommunications/overview-of-data-infrastructure-in-east-africatanzania/. Smith, R. L. & Marx. (Eds.) Does Technology Drive History: The Dilemma of Technological Determinism. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1994. Spalding, N. J. “State-Society Relations in Africa: An Exploration of the Tanzanian Experience.” Polity, Vol. 29(1): 65–96, Autumn 1996. Stiglitz, J. E. & Squire, L. “International Development: Is it Possible?” Foreign Policy (110): 138–151, Spring 1998. Sundet, G. “Beyond Developmentalism in Tanzania.” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 21(59): 39–49, March 1994. Tan, L. “Rural Communication Access Centers in Tanzania: Lessons Learned from Setting Up and Managing IICD Supported RCA Centers.” International Institute for Communication and Development, Thematic Report, The Hague, July 2007. The United Republic of Tanzania, “Ministry of Communications and Transport.” National Information and Communications Technologies Policy, March 2003. The United Republic of Tanzania, The Universal Communications Service Access Act, Act No. 11, 2006. Tripp, A. M. “Political Reform in Tanzania: The Struggle for Associational Autonomy.” Comparative Politics, Vol. 32(2): 191–214, January 2000. Verbit, G. P. Review, “TANU Builds the Nation.” Yale Law Journal, Vol. 81(2): 334–358, December 1971. Waters, T. “The Persistence of Subsistence and the Limits to Development Studies: The Challenge of Tanzania.” Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, Vol. 70(4): 614–652, 2000. Williams, R. L. “Chapter 6. Building a Local Area Network.” Wireless Community Networks: A Guide for Library Boards, Educators, and Community Leaders. Texas State Library and Archives Commission. Available at http:/ /www.tsl.state.tx.us/ld/pubs/wireless/chapter6.html. Accessed on May 7, 2008. Winner, L. The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in the Age of High Technology. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1986.

CHAPTER 5

Kenya: Innovation Without Distribution

Introduction The effort to write an ICT policy in Kenya has brought to the fore issues of modernization and distribution in that nation. These efforts have forced researchers in the ICT arena to pay attention to issues of agenda setting, interest group interaction and negotiation between the government and other policy actors. The actors and stakeholders include local as well as international participants (Ruxin 2006). This policy process has engaged governments, domestic civil society, multilateral organizations, donors, indigenous private sector organizations, and multinationals in dialogue as well as conflict.1 This chapter examines what process was used to decide whether and how ICT policies are drafted, adopted, and finally, implemented in Kenya? This chapter also considers what indicators can we use to measure policy success for ICT policy. In addition, this research evaluates whether implementation actually correlates with written ICT policy statements, laws and rhetoric? Has governance changed, has infrastructure been strengthened, and have new institutions been built? The answers to these questions can provide insights into the relationship between politics and policymaking in emerging democracies. After the most recent presidential election which demonstrated a smooth transfer of power, there are signs that Kenyan democracy and

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Kenyan development may move forward on a positive trajectory. There are also signs that Kenyan democracy is trapped in a competitive oligarchy, and that violence looms just below the surface. The Kenyatta feudalistic clientelism of the 1960s built a regional power boasting the best roads, the best universities, and the most vibrant economy in the region. As Kenya’s democracy faltered during the 1980s and the early 1990s, so did Kenya’s infrastructure. The 1980s and the early 1990s saw a government founded upon a viciously extractive clientelism that fed narrow parochial interests and a semi-autocratic political machine: in the absence of democracy, the country’s infrastructure crumbled and the economy neared collapse.2 What lies ahead for Kenya in this new era? The nation’s path forward under multi-party democracy has much to tell us about this journey, and the fate of the policies surrounding one of the nation’s new economic engines, Information and Communications Technology.3 In order to explore these themes and explain outcomes in the Kenyan case, this chapter is organized as follows. First, I briefly define some of the nongovernmental actors in Kenya: in particular civil society and the private sector. Second, I consider the history of policymaking in Kenya. Third, this chapter discusses the history of ICT policymaking in Kenya. Finally, I reflect on the implications of this policymaking process for the future of both ICT and democracy in Kenya.

Explaining Policy Variation Kenya is a troubled democracy with authoritarian tendencies (Levitsky and Way 2002).4 With regard to ICTs, Kenya is a case of slow policy passage, low implementation, and low distribution in the ICT arena, but very high public participation and very high innovation. Structurally, the slow pace of policy implementation may be due in part to the weak influence of donors in a comparatively wealthy African nation. Another factor contributing to slow implementation may be the complex winning coalition required for governance in Kenya. To the extent that law and policymaking has moved forward at all in Kenya, civil society and the private sector—in conjunction with policy entrepreneurs inside the government—have been the main actors in forcing government movement. Civil society and the private sector pushed a recalcitrant government to liberalize and to open up the ICT process. The lack of distribution of ICT policy implementation may be attributed to the

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fact that Kenya has generally been a clientelist state which distributed particularistic resources to regions in favor with the sitting regime. In addition, unlike its neighbors, Kenya is not a developmental state, and the government has historically shown little interest in distributing ICT infrastructure to rural areas. Counterintuitively, increases in democracy have not necessarily dramatically changed this tendency. The policymaking process provides a window into the concentration of power in society and the extent to which each society is run by a small group of elites or by a larger group of citizens. The strength of civil society and the strength of the local private sector differ dramatically in each of the four countries under consideration in this book, as does the manner in which civil society and the private sector interact with the government. Process is best explained by the strength of civil society and the private sector, and the manner in which those social groups interact with the government to make policy. Stated another way, was the ICT process a broad inclusive participatory process, or a secretive closed process? Kenya is a case of slow speed of passage, low scope of implementation, low distribution, but high process. The side effects of the strong private sector in Kenya are, arguably, high rates of innovation, but the country is highly unequal, and opportunities are concentrated in urban areas such as Nairobi. As I will attempt to demonstrate in this chapter, Kenya’s ICT policy has evolved along with Kenya’s democracy. Initial efforts to develop an ICT policy originated toward the end of one-party rule in the early 1990s and accelerated by the end of the decade. The high-water mark of ICT policymaking was between 2002 and 2007. The five years of the first Kibaki government saw the finalization of an e-government strategy, the issuance of a universal access report, and the development of several ICT policy drafts. Indeed, not one but two drafts of the National ICT Policy were issued in 2004. This policy activity culminated in the approval by the Cabinet of an official Kenyan ICT Policy which was gazetted and published in March of 2006 (The Kenya Communications Act 2006). This spurt in policymaking activity continued with the publication of a Draft ICT Bill in April of 2006.5 Unfortunately, after the disputed elections of 2007, progress in the ICT arena, as well as in other areas of social development slowed to a crawl.

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Policymaking, Telecommunications, and ICT in Kenya In order to have a solid understanding of the ICT policy process in Kenya, we need a deeper familiarity with the history of politics and policymaking in post-colonial Kenya. Placing forward movement in ICT policy in the context of efforts for political, legal and policy reform in Kenya aids in contextualizing the changing role of civil society, the private sector, and government in the period following independence (Ross 1992; CIA 2007; Throup 1993).6 Kenyan Politics and Telecommunications: 1950–1979 The first submarine telecommunications cables connected Kenya to the outside world in 1888 and were laid by the Eastern and Southern African Telegraph Company (Aduda and Ohaga 2004). During the 1920s, the British colonial administrations in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika became linked by a common telephone system. Nairobi’s first telephone exchange had 28 subscribers. By 1933, the postal and telephone services had been consolidated and were managed by a single Postmaster General. The then East African Post and Telecommunications Corporation (EAP&TC) was the main provider of telecommunications and postal services in the region and was owned and directed by the three nations. The first mainframe computer was installed in Kenya in 1961. In December 1977, the East African Community collapsed, leading to the break-up of EAP&TC. Each nation then formed monopoly parastatals run by their respective governments (Chijoriga et al. 2004). In the 1970s and 1980s, the governments of Kenya and Tanzania viewed new technologies with suspicion. Civil society, electoral politics, and policymaking have been closely connected in the independence and post-independence period in Kenya. The roots of civil society in Kenya were in opposition parties created in the 1920s designed to protest British colonial policies, advocate for civil rights for indigenous people, and to demand the repatriation of land. Initially, Kenya’s civil society also comprised pan-tribal political groupings such as the Kenya African Union created in the 1940s, and quasi-military organizations which advocated for independence and land repatriation (Edgerton 1989; Ross 1992). The first African members were elected to the Legislative Council in February 1957 (Throup 1993).7 Two major political bodies began

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to form from the merger of district parties, trade unions, and other social organizations, the Kenya African Democratic Union, and the Kenya African National Union (KANU) (Throup 1993; Klopp 2001). Kenya attained independence in 1963, at which time it possessed a single-party political system dominated by KANU under the presidency of Jomo Kenyatta.8 In December 1964 “the opposition dissolved itself and its remaining members joined KANU, creating a de facto single-party state,” (Throup 1993; Ross 1992; Klopp 2001). A brief phase of multi-party politics reigned in the period between 1966 and 1969 (Throup 1993; Widner 1994). The one-party state dominated by KANU after 1969 became increasingly repressive, banning opposition parties and detaining their leaders (Throup 1993; Ross 1992).9 After independence, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania formed the East African Common Services Organization, the precursor to the East African Community. The then East African Post and Telecommunications Corporation (EAP&TC) was the main provider of telecommunications and postal services in the region and was owned and directed by the three nations. The first mainframe computer was installed in Kenya in 1961. Mainframe computers were mainly installed in government ministries, major parastatals, international airlines, and universities, as well as banking, finance houses, and manufacturers. Policymaking under President Jomo Kenyatta was neo-patrimonial, and based on clientelism and particularistic patronage (Barkan and Chege 1989; Throup 1993; Klopp 2001).10 Under British colonial rule, Kenya acquired an administrative structure that containerized African Kenyans into divisions, districts, and provinces on the basis of perceived ethnicity and “tribe” (Klopp 2001). These divisions powerfully affected political decisions and the texture of democracy in the nation. Kenyan policymaking in the post-Independence era has been clientelist, and patrimonial. For most of this period, the policy was determined in Nairobi and disseminated outwards. Kenyan Politics and Telecommunications: 1979–1992 In December 1977, the East African Community collapsed, leading to the break-up of EAP&TC. From 1977 to 1998, the Kenya Post and Telecommunications Corporation (KP&TC)—a monopoly parastatal of the Government of Kenya—was established by an Act of Parliament to take over the assets and provide the services of EAP&TC, and become

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the sole provider of telephone services in Kenya (Chijoriga et al. 2004; Aduda and Ohaga 2004). In the 1970s, the government imposed punitive fiscal measures on the importation of computers. Such measures were justified by the belief that such equipment might increase unemployment (Aduda and Ohaga 2004). In the 1980s, as was the case in neighboring Tanzania, computers were viewed with suspicion by the authoritarian Moi government. Perhaps because of the fear of computers, an autocrat was placed in charge of a technology perceived as threatening. The Minister of Transportation and Communications, John Michuki, who started the era of ICT in Kenya at the turn of the millennium, gained prominence as a minister with autocratic tendencies and corrupt contacts. Despite these anti-innovation tendencies, by 1982, a basic telecommunications infrastructure allowed intra-African telecommunications traffic (Odongo 2012). Politically, the period between 1979 and 1991 saw a gradual increase in authoritarianism in Kenya (Throup 1993) Daniel arap Moi was appointed by President Kenyatta as Vice President and after Kenyatta’s death, Moi ruled Kenya as president from 1978 until 2002 (Bennett 1967; Ross 1992).11 The 1980s saw declining economic conditions, which reduced patronage resources (Throup 1993). Under Moi, resources were allocated on the basis of political support for the government. In addition, there was an effort to reallocate resources to regions that had not been favored by the Kenyatta government (Barkan and Chege 1989). Moi began by purging Provincial Commissioners loyal to Kenyatta.12 In comparison with Kenyatta, Moi generally decentralized policymaking. Resources were allocated in a particularistic manner to areas that provided Moi with key political support, such as the Kalenjin areas of Rift Valley. Importantly, decentralization under Moi was not aimed at reducing inequity between rich and poor. Rather, it was aimed at removing resources from areas favored by Kenyatta and sending them toward areas favored by Moi (Klopp 2001; Throup 1993).13 Despite being a showcase in the 1960s and 1970s, Kenya’s economy stagnated in the 1980s, and remained in crisis for two decades. The country’s strong basic infrastructure crumbled due to capital shortfall, mismanagement and corruption, leaving infrastructure, including roads and telecommunications dilapidated, even in Nairobi. (Shrum et al. 2011). Under Moi, resources were distributed in a relentlessly particularistic manner, with close attention to rewarding clients, voters loyal to the

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government in power, or courting new voters. Under Moi, the technology of his era—electricity, telephones, and postal services—were visible in vertically “stove piped” regional pillars which corresponded closely to provincial boundaries. Technological facilities were used to reward loyal constituents and distribute particularistic patronage resources. The government of President Moi placed far more post offices with electricity in Rift Valley—his home province President—while dramatically under-developing the communications infrastructure in his opponents’ regions. The early years of the Moi government saw significant new restrictions on freedom of speech and association (Widner 1994). Moi’s critics— even those from his own language group and his own area–were swiftly silenced. The 1979 general election in the Rift Valley was a blatant example of rigging, and intimidation at the polls by the troops of the General Service Unit (Widner 1994; Throup 1993, 389; Ross 1992).14 By the early 1990s, there had been a noticeable “decay” in Kenya’s civil society. In the period spanning from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, members of the opposition faced arrest and imprisonment for “subversion” (Ross 1992).15 Coercion, as well as cash, was used liberally to reward supporters (Throup 1993). As Ross notes, plays were banned, journalists were detained, public meetings stopped, rallies disrupted, the judiciary weakened, and dissidents tortured (Ross 1992).16 Elections became increasingly violent and expensive throughout the 1980s, and public meetings of the opposition were stopped (Throup 1993). Although elections were held, they were not considered free and fair (Fox 1996).17 The 1988 election “was the most rigged in Kenya’s history” (Throup 1993). By the early 1990s, the independence of the judiciary had been impaired, the operation of nongovernmental organizations restricted, the secret ballot tampered with, and candidates’ freedom to campaign curtailed. By 1991, corruption had accelerated the rule of law had corroded, tarnishing Kenya’s reputation as a politically stable democratic polity (Ross 1992). Kenyan Politics and ICTs from 1992 to 2002 Democratic politics in Kenya has been a continuum with incremental increases toward democracy from 1992 onward.18 External pressure from international donors and political powers like the United States pushed Kenya in the direction of multi-party democracy. The United States

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stated that it would condition aid on political reform. In 1991, donors to Kenya decided to suspend $1 billion of aid unless the Moi government instituted political reforms and allowed free elections (Throup 1993). Yet internal pressure from civil society for multi-party elections were also a significant factor in the movement toward political openness. Pro-democracy riots took place in Kenya in 1990. Popular religious figures compared Kenya unfavorably to Eastern European states in the throes of reform. Former government ministers called press conferences and organized rallies, which were quickly declared illegal (Klopp 2001). Opposition politicians called for the repeals of the constitutional ban on the opposition. Human rights lawyers filed suit to repeal the law which had made Kenya a de jure one-party state. Church leaders and opposition political figures condemned corruption and single-party politics (Throup 1993).Yet, the Kenyan opposition was fragmented and riven by acrimonious factionalism. Multiple opposition political parties formed. At the same time that pressure was building for increased democracy in Kenya, efforts were also building to develop a computing policy in the early 1990s. Due to the punitive importation system, by the 1990’s the cost of microcomputers in Kenya were three times the cost in the country of origin (Aduda and Ohaga 2004). Policy concerns focused on reforming the telecommunications policy in the country and on managing the introduction of computing into the country. In the period of the 1990s, the Internet was primarily used by nongovernmental organizations, companies with international business interests, and computer scientists (Mureithi 2017). The Moi government throughout the 1990s tended to view efforts to import computers and other hardware, as well as software, into the country with extreme suspicion (Mureithi 2017). The official position was that computers might cause a loss of state secrets or a threat to national security.19 As a semi-authoritarian regime, the Moi government likely viewed computing technology as an alternative information source, and a potentially damaging tool in the hands of the increasingly powerful opposition. In addition, President Moi publicly stated that he believed that computers would take away jobs. In 1993, the head of the Public Service Commission went as far as to warn government departments not to convert to the Internet. In 1995, the Kenya Posts and Telecommunications Corporation declared Internet services illegal, and the Internet was banned entirely in the government civil service until 1999 (Mureithi 2017). Yet, by 1997, the Telecommunication and Postal Sector Policy

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recognized ICT’s contributions to development, and by 1999, Kenya had passed the Kenya Information and Communication Act, a new telecom law establishing a multi-operator environment. At the same time that the head of the Public Service Commission was fighting against the Internet, in 1993, the Computer Society of Kenya created a draft “informatics” policy.20 At the same time that private sector efforts proceeded in Kenya, UNESCO was working to develop a regional informatics network for Africa in conjunction with outside universities. Aduda and Ohaga note that the African Regional Computing Centre introduced the first full Internet service in Kenya, opening the way for privately owned Internet service providers. The Permanent Secretary of the then extant Ministry of Research, Technical Training and Technology expressed support for the development of such a policy which UNESCO helped fund. The initial draft of the Committee on Informatics Policy focused on information technology. Drafts of the initial informatics policy developed in the early 1990s remained internal to the executive branch. The first ICT policy drafts were closely held government documents with no stakeholder participation and no public input. They were written and reviewed in secret by the NCS housed in the Office of the President. No citizen, no civil society group, and no private sector group had input. In particular, the private sector and academia were not involved in reviewing the report. Conflicts between various Kenyan ministries for control of the project prevented the document from being presented to Cabinet. The first multi-party general elections in independent Kenya were held on December 29, 1992 (Throup 1993). Moi won with only 36.7% of the national vote, suggesting that the election was competitive, and the scholarly consensus is that the 1992 elections were not crudely rigged. However, the elections were “unfree and unfair” (Fox 1996). The Moi government strongly resisted the move toward multi-party democracy. The registration process was interfered with by attacking opposition voters and bussing in KANU supporters (Klopp 2001).21 Rural voters in particular experienced an unprecedented level of intimidation through overt threats and acts of violence (Klopp 2001).22 Further, votes for KANU counted more than votes for the opposition, due to the inequitable distribution of parliamentary constituencies (Fox 1996). KANU won 100 seats in Parliament and won the presidency in the 1992 general elections. Although the majority of voters voted against Moi, the splintered nature of the opposition prevented his defeat (Throup 1993).23

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Many civil society leaders were persecuted and jailed under Moi. Nobel Prize winner Wangari Maathai’s Green Belt Movement battled for green space and democratic rights in Kenya, and as a result, Maathai was jailed. Kenyan churches and church-affiliated organizations, such as the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, were instrumental in mobilizing for multi-party democracy in Kenya during the 1990s. Radical opposition and urban civil society groups mobilized mass marches to demand constitutional and electoral reforms in 1997 (Orvis 2003). In 1997 Kenya held its second multi-party elections. President Daniel arap Moi and his ruling party KANU swept to a five-year term on the 29th of December 1997. The opposition remained splintered and President Moi was re-elected with 40% of the votes cast, while his nearest rival, Mwai Kibaki, won 31% (Dagne 2008). The election was regarded as “highly flawed, highly controversial and thoroughly divisive of Kenyan society” (Southall 1998). According to Stephen Ndegwa, the 1997 election was carried out because of Moi’s use of coercion (Ndegwa 2003). Nonetheless, Barkan and Ng’ethe observe that the 1997 election reinvigorated democratization and strengthened civil society. The Moi government ruled Kenya for 25 years. Whereas the postIndependence Kenyatta regime was not particularly democratic, it was, nonetheless, respected for its efficient functioning as a state. In contrast, the Moi government was rife with grand corruption, and successively weakened the instruments of service, while simultaneously strengthening the instruments of power, often through the use of violent intimidation of opponents. The elements of an ethnicized kleptocracy (Southall 1998) developed. Government agencies were looted, infrastructure deteriorated, roads crumbled, and primary schools had to be financed, not by government coffers, but by local fundraisers. During the long period of single-party rule, the Kenyan state became “hollow.” The executive became increasingly powerful (Ross 1992) while providing fewer and fewer services to citizens. The weakness of the Kenyan state from 1979 to 2002 became the strength of civil society. Civil society stepped in to fulfill some of the most basic functions of government. Kenyan civil society benefited and drew on the multitude of churches and religious organizations of all denominations, faiths, and creeds, including Catholics, Protestants, and Muslims. Women’s self-help groups or “Maendeleo” became an increasingly important component of this sector. Community-based organizations—often supported by international donor funds—provided education, supplied

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health care, assisted with relief food in times of drought and famine, and even built housing. The relationship between civil society and the government was characterized by confrontation and conflict during the Moi era. The main role of civil society under Moi was to advocate for improved conditions for “wananchi” (citizens). In addition, the private sector and civil society played a minimal role in policy formulation during the last years of the KANU regime (Etta 2005). By the late 1990s, despite the Moi regime’s paranoia regarding computerization, efforts were underway from other quarters to liberalize Kenya’s telecommunications sector, a key component of the emerging ICT industry. Major policy shifts in telecommunications and broadcasting began in the 1980s with the advent of Structural Adjustment Programmes (Aduda and Ohaga 2004). The privatization of Telkom was made a condition of the resumption of talks with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Aduda and Ohaga 2004; Etta 2005).24 In 1997, sixty-nine governments consented to a World Trade Organization proposition that they liberalize domestic telecommunication markets to foreign competition beginning in 1998 (Kiyongi and Mijumbi 2004). Additional privatization pressure was felt by the International Telecommunications Union. The early 1990s saw the liberalization of the radio and television airwaves in Kenya, while the late 1990s saw the liberalization of the telecommunications sector. In Sessional Paper No. 2 of 1996, the Government of Kenya issued a major policy statement regarding the liberalization of the telecommunications sector. The deregulation process was further spelled out in a 1997 Sector paper. The 1998 Kenya Communications Act, which repealed the Kenya Posts and Telecommunications Act, provides the current framework for regulating the communications sector in Kenya. The act had two major impacts. First, the 1998 Act liberalized the telecommunications sector. Second, the Act unbundled Kenya Post and Telecommunication into five separate entities including a fixed line operator (Telkom) and a regulator known as the Communications Commission of Kenya; and the internal policymaking organ known as the National Communications Secretariat. Moi did his best to maintain control of the new technological advances sweeping the continent by burying the ICT policymaking entity within the Office of the President. Policymaking in the telecommunications, computing, and eventually, ICT arena, was delegated to the secretive, agency known as the National Communications Secretariat. The agency culture of NCS was characteristic of the closed Moi style of governance.

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The NCS would not release drafts of documents, or even grant interviews or audiences with researchers, activists, or private sector companies, and struggled with a “culture of secrecy” (Odongo 2012). The regulator tasked with overseeing telecommunications in Kenya—the Communications Commission of Kenya—is a nominally independent parastatal with a board drawn mainly from the private sector. Under the 1998 Act, Telkom’s monopoly in the fixed line arena was limited to five years. The monopoly was to end, at least de jure, on June 30, 2004. The Act further allowed the operation of two predominantly private sector mobile phone providers25 licensed various Internet Service Providers as well as private courier companies, and even allowed for the licensing of regional telecommunications operators.26 Kenya’s quick accession to demands for liberalization indicated that the Kenyan government was at a political weak point vis-à-vis international multilateral donors and lenders in the late years of the Moi government. The liberalization of the telecommunication sector was envisioned by multilateral donors as part of an Africa-wide shift toward economic privatization which also conveniently opened new markets for globalizing multinational telecommunications corporations. Aside from the move away from government-controlled monopolies, this liberalization and unbundling would have then unimagined implications for technological innovation down the line: opening up new industries and increasing competitiveness, efficiency, and creating an entirely new sector of the economy in Kenya and the region. Due to the increasing economic activity in the computing and telecommunications sector globally, the private sector did its best to push forward policy reforms that would open up the sector for locally owned companies. Efforts were renewed to bring some structure to the telecommunications and computing policy area by the National “Y2K” Steering Committee established to coordinate initiatives to prepare Kenya’s computer systems for the year 2000. The committee consisted primarily of high-level government civil servants and chairmen of major private sector associations. The committee recommended that such a committee be made permanent so as to integrate ICT into “national and regional and social development”. This effort did not reach the Kenyan Cabinet for discussion due to a lack of interest by President Moi.

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Kenyan Politics and ICTs: 2002–2009 Despite the Moi government’s suspicion and detachment with regard to computing and telecommunications, the topic was again placed on the government’s agenda at the beginning of the new millennium by multilateral donors through Kenya’s participation in the Kenyan Poverty Reduction Strategy Process (Ministry of Finance and Planning 2001).27 The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (June 2001)—developed under the coordination of the United Nations Development Program, The International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank—identified ICT as one of eight strategic sector priorities that the Government of Kenya should address to help reduce poverty and spur economic growth (Ministry of Finance and Planning 2001, Vol. I 58–61). Part of the World Bank mandated process of the early 2000s included participation by and consultation with a wide variety of extra-governmental actors. The PRSP itself commented that the poverty reduction strategy process incorporated “government, civil society, the private sector, religious organizations, women, youth, people with disabilities and the poor” (Ministry of Finance and Planning 2001, Vol. II Forward). In the 2002 presidential and parliamentary elections, the opposition National Rainbow Coalition, (NARC) led by Mwai Kibaki defeated Moi and his ruling KANU party. After the 2002 elections, in which multiparty and multi-stakeholder politics emerged victorious, both civil society participants as well as private sector trade associations became more assertive about their role in policymaking and enjoyed an increase in political space to advocate on key policy issues (Etta 2005, 9). In the ICT arena, the Kibaki placed increasing emphasis on technocratic competence than naked regional and clientelist ties. President Kibaki appointed Dr. Juma Okech, who had served as director of the Rwandan Information Technology Authority, as the ICT Secretary in the Office of the President and the director of e-government. Okech brought significant energy and a regional, East African perspective to his post. He was widely respected for his experience as a former college don and as the Director who helped Rwanda to build the Rwandan Information Technology Authority from the ground up. In addition to his intellectual abilities and experience, however, Okech was also a savvy politician. He combined a strong survival instinct with a desire to see structural and policy reform in his area of expertise.28

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The first Minister of Information and Communications, Raphael Tuju, held a master’s degree in Mass Communication from the University of Leicester. His first permanent secretary, James Rege, was an electrical engineer with a master’s degree from George Washington University. The second permanent secretary, Bitange Ndemo held a doctorate from the University of Sheffield. The director of E-government, Juma Okech held a master’s from Canada and a doctorate from Japan and was a professor of mathematics and computer science at Jomo Kenyatta University. This team comprised skilled individuals with significant expertise in their subject area. Their goal was to make policy that made sense, not to score political points. In part because of the placement of policy entrepreneurs in government such as Rege, Okech and Ndemo, civil society and the private sector in Kenya were able to open policy conversations about ICT with the government under the first NARC government. Importantly, all of these policy entrepreneurs were open to working with the private sector and civil society in Kenya. In February 2003, the newly elected NARC government convened an Economic Recovery workshop to encourage private sector participation in efforts to promote economic growth. As a result, in this economic policy manifesto of the new NARC regime, ICT merited inclusion as a “crosscutting issue” (Kenya 2003, 55–56). The Poverty Reduction Strategy process, which was replicated under World Bank supervision throughout sub-Saharan Africa, was followed by the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (June 2003). As a component of that process, the Kenyan government divided the economy into eight sectors, one of which was ICT. The government proposed to establish an interministerial committee to incorporate ICT into government operations; invest in adequate ICT education and training; implement tax reductions and tax incentives on both computer software and hardware allegedly “to make them affordable to micro-enterprises and low income earners”, and review the legal framework to remove impediments that have discouraged the adoption and use of e-commerce. The National ICT Policy development process started in the year 2003 as a result of a perceived lack of guidance on ICT. The process was encouraged by UNESCOs willingness to fund the process (Odongo 2012). Finally, the government stated its intention to develop a “master plan” for e-government by the end of June 2004.

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Upon Kibaki’s entry into office, the NCS initiated a formal ICT policy process in February 2003 by publicly releasing the first draft of an “ICT policy.” The decision to release a policy document for public review was itself a watershed moment. This first ICT policy was initially based on a model29 advocated by the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). The NCS did call a stakeholder’s workshop in 2003. However, most of the entities giving input at that workshop came from the Kenyan government itself. After the stakeholders provided inputs by verbally commenting at an invitation-only meeting, it was agreed that the NCS should call for a second workshop. No second workshop was held. The NCS did forward a policy to the Cabinet. However, the policy was not acted upon because the broadcasting sector had not been integrated into that policy due to the fact that broadcasting and telecommunications were housed in separate ministries (Ministry of Transport and Communications 2004). Upon arriving in office, Kibaki faced a wide dispersion of ICT components throughout the Kenyan government. The government entities that work on the various components that are viewed as comprising “ICT” have been politically weak. Furthermore, these entities did not coordinate closely. Until 2004, responsibility for media, computing, and telecommunications was distributed between at least two ministries: the Ministry of Transport and Communications as well as the Ministry of Information and Tourism. The Ministry of Transport and Communications was responsible for telecommunications and postal matters whereas Information and Tourism was in charge of the electronic media and broadcasting. In a well-received structural change, in June 2004, President Kibaki eliminated the old Ministry of Information and Transportation and merged broadcasting and telecommunications into the newly created Ministry of Information and Communications. In July 2004, Minister Raphael Tuju was promoted to become the first Kenyan Minister of Information and Communications. As a result of this restructuring, there are now five organizations that coordinate the Kenyan government’s actions in the ICT sector. These are (1) the Ministry of Information and Communications; (2) the Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK) (the regulator); (3) the Government Information Technology Service (GITS) which provides computer and technology support for ministries; (4) the National Communications Secretariat (NCS) whose role is to

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advise the government on Communications policy and (5) the Directorate of E-government. This major institutional reform which resulted in the rationalization of these Ministries was greeted with enthusiasm by the private sector in telecommunications, computing, and information. The creation of the new Ministry of Information and Communications reduced logistical problems in the sector and presented a new opportunity for unifying the policy framework. With the creation of the new ministry, information technology gained a more visible and more transparent policy profile on the government’s agenda. Under the leadership of the new Permanent Secretary for Information and Communications, an ICT policy was adopted by the Cabinet in January 2006.30 Kenya’s ICT Policy was published as official policy guidelines on March 31, 2006 (Republic of Kenya Ministry of Information and Communications 2006). The Ministry of Information and Communications issued a draft Kenya Information and Communications Bill in February 2006. Discussion of Universal Access and the ICT Bill A report on universal access in Kenya was publicly presented to the Ministry of Information and Communications in November 2004 (Waema 2004). This document provided crucial data and recommendations that could be used in guiding policy in the distribution of ICTs throughout the nation. The report advocated for a Universal Access Plan for Kenya to provide accessible, available, and affordable communications services and to create sustainable rural communications development. The report noted that ninety of Kenya’s divisions were unserved by most basic communications services and recommended that the government target improvements in tele-density, electrification, Internet points of presence, as well as local content on the Kenyan Internet, as well as on local TV and radio stations. Further, the report recommended the establishment of integrated tele-centers, and ICT training institutions with a focus on the affordability of communication services in rural areas. Finally, the report recommended the establishment of a Universal Access Fund (UAF) to be funded jointly by the Government of Kenya and telecommunications operators and service providers as well as grants from development partners. Accordingly, the Universal Access Study of 2004 embraces the social justice vision, the e-government vision, as well as the economic facilitation vision of ICT.

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Some of the detailed, well-researched, and far-reaching recommendations of the report have made their way into actual policy documents, although implementation remains on the horizon. The ICT Bill contained some language relevant to universal access or universal service. The bill establishes a universal access fund, much like that already in operation in Uganda and Rwanda. However, in an extremely problematic development, the ICT bill did not clearly explain how the universal access fund will be funded and allowed the Minister for Information and Communications to issue regulations regarding funding31 and subsidies in consultation with the CCK. In addition, the bill established a Universal Access Advisory Council, which is mandated to determine project identification. No clear goals or deadlines regarding the nature or extent or type of universal access for Kenya’s rural areas were contained in the policy or the bill. Although there is some rhetoric in the current formal ICT policy regarding rural access, in the text itself, there was little indication that the government intended to distribute ICTs to rural areas. The ICT Bill did not include the extensive pro-rural rhetoric of the ICT policy. Indeed, even in e-government, where the Kenyan government has been most aggressive from both a policy and an implementation standpoint, the scope of implementation only extended to central ministry offices in Nairobi. When interviewed in the mid-2000s, the Director of Egovernment did not indicate any timeline by which the district or provincial ministries will be connected and seemed uncomfortable about the query itself. It is, of course, possible that after the eventual establishment of a universal service fund or universal access fund that Kenya will move from the rhetoric to action in terms of rural connectivity. Critics of the Kenyan ICT Policy observe that the policy vision, mission, and objectives of Kenya’s policy lacked milestones, was somewhat “generic,” and did not have a clear plan on how to achieve universal access (Odongo 2012). Further, the policy did not provide details on how it would support local software development. To the extent that voices have expressed an interest in rural participation in the distribution of this set of technologies, it is the private sector trade association, the Kenya ICT Federation, as well as the civil society group, the Kenya ICT Network who have been the advocates of rural areas, not the government. As of the second decade of the 2000s, the high degree of participation seen in the policy process in Kenya has not yet translated into tangible outcomes which reflect the 2006 ICT policy rhetoric of distribution and equity. Kenya’s results in

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terms of scope of implementation and distribution still remain “wished for,” and not “realized.” The December 2007 presidential election, the most competitive in the country’s history, began peacefully on Dec. 27 but ended in violence (Bowman 2008; Mueller 2008). International and domestic observers declared the elections as rigged and deeply flawed. Following the announcements of the disputed election results, violence erupted throughout the country, and the nation emerged shaken one month later with 1300 killed and 350,000 displaced. With the assistance of former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the government and the opposition reached an agreement in which the opposition and the incumbent, which also represented two large ethnic coalitions, would share power on March 18, 2008. On April 3, 2008, Mwai Kibaki, the President of Kenya, and Prime Minister Raila Odinga approved a bloated 44-member coalition cabinet. Kenyan Politics and ICTs: 2009–2013 In 2007, the Kenyan government published a long-term national “development blueprint” called Kenya Vision 2030. This policy incorporated a strong belief in top-down urban master planning, and a commitment to ICTs for development (Cairns et al. 2022). This plan aims to use ICT to help Kenya benefit from the “fourth industrial revolution.” The 2007 development blueprint reads like one more donor-driven development policy, which interestingly incorporates infrastructure investment by China. Vision 2030 outlines plans for two flagship “smart” cities to be built from scratch, Konza and Tatu, with ominous reminders of the modern cities discussed by James Scott. Interestingly, just as the ICT policies of the early 2000s were driven by consultants, Kenya Vision 2030 was produced in collaboration with the international consulting company, McKinsey and Co. (Cairns et al. 2022). The ICT sector is the flash point for battles between those parts of society that advocate for increased multi-party democracy, and those who cling to the perquisites of authoritarianism. Former Transport and Communications Minister, John Michuki, in his new capacity as Minister of Internal Security ordered the raid on The Standard newspaper and the affiliated KTN television station in March 2006 (Machuka 2009). This action was widely condemned by Kenyan and international press and diplomats. In the wake of the December 2007 elections, coercion is

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sweeping the ICT sector. In early January 2009, President Mwai Kibaki unleashed police against protesting the Kenya Communications Amendments Bill, a version of the original bill drafted in 2006, which journalists claim gags the broadcast media, part of the ICT constellation in Kenya (Ongiri 2008). The bill was passed by Parliament on December 10, 2008, and signed into law by President Kibaki on January 2, 2009. The bill includes heavy fines and mandates prison sentences for press offenses. This bill also turned the previously progressive CCK into a censor, allowing it to switch off television stations and seize equipment.32 By the end of 2012, the Communications Commission of Kenya (now the Communications Authority of Kenya) reported that the percentage of the Kenyan population with access to the Internet stood at about 41% (increasing from 28% in 2011) with an estimated 17.4 million users. By contrast, access to cellular telephony, and by extension, text messaging, is much more widespread in Kenya. Cellular telephone penetration rates in Kenya are extremely high and text messages are a widely used form of communication. At the end of 2012, the number of Kenyan mobile phone subscribers stood at over 30 million, with a 78% penetration rate. Although some elites had smartphones—which would allow them to use the Internet on their phones—such devices were not yet commonplace in Kenya. Indeed, one reason that access to cellular telephony has been so pervasive in Kenya is the affordability of basic handsets. In addition, communication over text messaging is extremely low cost, as low as one shilling per text message within a network, and two shillings across other networks. The 2013 Kenyan general election, for all its other flaws, had one of the lowest levels of politically motivated violence in Kenyan general elections in the past twenty years. The peaceful nature of the 2013 elections was due to a combination of political and social factors, which included concerted efforts by several parties to keep the peace: among them the NGO sector, donors, the government of Kenya (GoK), the media and citizens. These peacekeeping efforts included heavy police and military presence. Further, multilateral NGOs, donors, the GoK, and the Kenyan media itself promoted a sustained, intense media effort intended to promote a message of peace and non-violence ahead of the elections (e.g. Brown and Raddatz 2014). Finally, in the run-up to March 2013, the GoK implemented a system of heavy regulation and even censorship of information and communication technologies.

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In the run-up to the 2013 election, the Government of Kenya adopted a hybrid censorship strategy that relied in part on regulation, in part on the presence of a strong security apparatus, and in part on the willingness of Kenyans to self-censor. These efforts to limit and censor speech may conflict with the free speech guarantees of the recently passed Kenyan Constitution. This approach to controlling political speech combined a mixture of regulation, requirements that telecommunications firms install specific software and hardware, and repeated public pronouncements designed to affect citizen behavior. Further, the GoK created an extensive regulatory regime to deal with ICTs in the run-up of the election. This regulatory framework had three key components: (1) eliminate the anonymity of subscribers to better allow tracking and (most likely) prosecution of hate speech; (2) force information service providers to employ sophisticated software and hardware that can assist in filtering information; and (3) cooperate with media houses to launch a pervasive peace campaign to reduce violent election-related behavior. The GoK’s efforts to control political communication during the 2013 election present a dilemma for policymakers, activists, civil society, and scholars. Few people want to sanction or facilitate ethnically charged speech. A compelling argument can be made that reducing “hate speech” had a beneficial impact on the 2013 election. Certainly, the Rwandan case (which resulted in genocide), as well as the case of the Kenyan election in 2007/2008 (which resulted in massive loss of life and displacement), demonstrate that hate speech can have a devastating effect on promoting genocide as well as interfering with free and fair elections. Yet, scholars and policymakers must also ask themselves what is the appropriate role for the government in monitoring or controlling both old and new media, and when do such efforts slide into censorship or even repression? This question of state-controlled media during African elections became even more urgent in the face of efforts by President Yoweri Museveni to shut down social media and mobile money sites “as a temporary security measure” during the Ugandan election of February 2016 (Daily Nation, 18 February 2016). Kenyan Politics and ICTs: 2016–2022 By 2016, few Kenyans had access to their own computer. In addition, most rural counties did not have good Internet connectivity, nor did they

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have access to a constant electricity supply. Importantly, Internet connectivity relies on electricity to work, whereas cellular telephones generally utilize batteries, making them less susceptible to power outages. As of 2016, most Kenyans obtained access to computers and the Internet at cyber-cafes or at work. Hence, a strong argument can be made that access to the Internet, and associated applications in Kenya tends to be the province of an urban elite. Kenya experienced two competitive, contentious, contested, yet relatively peaceful elections in 2017 and 2022. In a promising shift, the outcome of those elections was not determined in the street, but rather by the Kenyan Supreme Court. In 2017, the country watched nervously as it took two rounds of voting to determine the winner of Kenya’s presidential election. The Supreme Court of Kenya nullified the results of the August 2017 election, forcing a rerun, in which President Uhuru Kenyatta, son of President Jomo Kenyatta, was declared president (Moore 2017). Numerous scholars believe that the resolution of the 2017 electoral conflict was resolved through informal, unwritten, uncodified elite-level pacts (Cheeseman et al. 2019). These observers emphasize that political stability in Kenya has been ensured by historically rooted patron–client ties and elite collusion. Mr. Kenyatta stepped down at the end of his two presidential terms, backing his former opponent, Raila Odinga—son of the famed opposition leader Oginga Odinga—over his former running mate, William Ruto. The run-up to the election was fraught with tension. After the violent outcome of the 2007 election, international observers watched the 2022 election with trepidation as they worried about acute intra-elite tensions (ICG 2022). In September 2022, William Ruto was sworn in as Kenya’s president following a narrow election victory over Raila Odinga, winning an election with 50.5% of the vote to Odinga’s 48.8%. The Kenyan Supreme Court handed down a unanimous decision holding the election to be free and fair (Macauley 2022). Observers were pleased to see the resolution of the election through the courts, which may indicate a strengthening of Kenyan political and judicial institutions. Statutes, Agencies, Policies and Institutions The Kenya Information and Communications Act was passed in 1998. By 2008, the goals of the 2006 ICT policy had crystallized into a National ICT Master Plan with objectives, time frames, and supporting policy (Saraswati 2014). The Kenya Communications Act (as amended) of 2009

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provided for the establishment of a Universal Service Fund administered and managed by the Communications Authority of Kenya. After the passage of the new Kenyan Constitution in 2010, the Communications Act was aligned with Articles 33 and 34 of the Constitution which provided for freedom of expression and freedom of the media respectively. The Kenyan Information and Communications Act was revised in 2013 in an effort to create a regulatory body that is, in theory, independent of political, commercial, or governmental interests. Kenya’s National ICT Policy Guidelines aim to guide regulation, encourage growth in the sector, and build ICT infrastructure and services throughout the country. By 2020, former Tespok Chair, Joseph Mucheru, had been named Cabinet Secretary for Information, Communications and Technology, and Jerome Ochieng was serving as Principal Secretary for ICT and Innovation. In October 2022, through an Executive Order, the Ministry of Information was split into two components: the State Department of Broadcasting and Telecommunications and the State Department of ICT and Digital Economy. According to its website, the Ministry “aims to make Kenya a competitive knowledge based economy, and facilitate universal access to ICT infrastructure all over the country”. This reformulated entity houses the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Authority. The Authority aims to rationalize and streamline the management of all Government of Kenya ICT functions. The ICT Authority is also supposed to enforce ICT standards inside the Kenyan government. Despite the ambitious rhetoric displayed on its Ministry of ICT Mission Statement, although Kenya is arguably more developed than its neighbors, it was a notably late entrant into the Universal Service arena. The sources of the Fund include levies on licensees, appropriations from the GoK as well as grants and donations. USAF’s Administration of the fund was not operational by 2010. Mobile operators have resisted the implementation of universal service targets because, in their view, they are already meeting their universal service obligations (Calandro et al. 2011). In 2013, Kenya passed the National Broadband Strategy. By 2014, Kenya’s USF had not yet been fully implemented.

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Building the Internet Backbone in Kenya The Kenyan government used the opportunity provided by the building of SEACOM, TEAMS, and EASSY to strengthen the country’s internal Internet backbone known as the National Optic Fiber Backbone (“NOFBI”). As many as 4300 Kilometers of Kenya’s backbone was completed by 2009. The first phase of the national backbone passed through 58 towns in 35 counties. According to the ICT Authority of Kenya, the second phase of the backbone was intended to extend 1600 kilometers, with the goal of linking all county headquarters. The national backbone is a project spearheaded by the Government of Kenya, under the auspices of the Ministry of ICT, and implemented by the ICT Authority. The project was funded by the Government of Kenya and a loan from the Chinese government and built out by Huawei Telecommunications Company at a cost of $71 million in 2012 (Agbebi 2019). In terms of providing connectivity to the national and regional governments, the first phase of the national backbone project connected several district headquarters. The second phase of the national backbone project aims to connect all county governments with the national government. The ICT sector in Kenya has seen significant growth in the period spanning 2010–2020. The government of Kenya has been systematically increasing the amount of the national budget spent on ICT in recent decades. In the 2022/2023 financial year, the country allocated USD$132 million to support ICT related projects. Government sectors receiving large allocations for ICT include agriculture and criminal justice (Ominde et al. 2021). The main Chinese Information and communication technologies (ICT) investment company, Huawei, launched its investments in Kenya in 1998 (Calzati 2022). China has invested into ICT infrastructure in Kenya, as well as in many other African countries, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Cameroon, and South Africa. The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative hinges its global development strategy on infrastructure development (Ominde et al. 2021). Many development experts believe that well-developed Infrastructure contributes to economic growth (Pradhan et al. 2022). According to some observers, however, ICT infrastructure in the country has not developed uniformly (Ominde et al. 2021). As will be discussed in a later chapter, China’s investment in African infrastructure is far from benign and comes with both benefits and costs.

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Distribution of ICTs in Public Facilities As the millennium approached its second decade, Kenya began to introduce ICT into education, at least rhetorically. The Kenyan Ministry of Education developed a sector policy on ICT in June 2006. Yet, in Naivasha, a town relatively close to Nairobi, and well known for its wealth, by 2012, only 50% of schools had ICT tools, and significant percentages of teachers and students failed to use them. One reason for this lack of use, according to research, is the lack of a proper vision or plan. This is in sharp contrast to Rwanda and Uganda which both build computer labs, but also have a more comprehensive vision of how to use them. In Kenya, distribution of ICT in schools was limited by the cost of purchasing computers and installing Internet in schools. In addition, connection to the electricity grid remained a significant limiting factor. Other researchers found functional ICT infrastructure within county governments in Kenya lacking, and recommended that ICT infrastructure at the county level ought to facilitate collection, storage and real-time sharing of procurement data (Odongo and Kazungu 2022). Konza City As noted above, the Kenyan government published a long-term national development blueprint, which has characteristics of a state-led, donorinfluenced master plan, called “Kenya Vision 2030” in 2007. This document espouses a development discourse that Kenya “leapfrog into a industrialised information society and knowledge economy.” In 2013, President Mwai Kibaki launched a $14.5 billion project to create Africa’s first world-class technology city: Konza City (Saraswati 2014). “Smart cities” were pioneered by the Korean government to match IT to citizens’ problems. Korea selected Sejong and Pusan as smart city pilot projects (Kim 2022). Smart cities are built on IT, which requires infrastructure including IT and electricity. Konza City began as a 5000-acre tract of barren savannah in Machakos County southeast of Nairobi. This flagship smart city would be built from scratch, with the hope that transnational corporations would relocate their call centers to Konza (Cairns et al. 2022). Conceptually, people will live and work in this “smart city” where start-ups, universities, services, and housing are located. The Konza concept was created with Tetra Tech Inc., and American company based in Denver, Colorado, and is modeled on the South Korea Institute, Songdo in South Korea, or Silicon Valley (New African 2019). The “smart-city” concept contains hopes for an

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Afro-optimistic narrative of economic growth and modernization. Critics worry that due to their master plan origins and donor conceptualization, they may be “dreams produced by others.” Further, Konza is already in competition with Kigali Innovation City (New African 2019). In addition, despite the growing cost of the project, and the fact that it was launched in 2007 but is still not complete, the government’s claims have been subjected to little scrutiny, drowned out by the enthusiastic rhetoric of the media and the government (Saraswati 2014). Konza city is illustrative of the pattern in Kenya of multiple statutes, statements, lofty rhetoric and ambitious policies but low levels of implementation. As discussed below, two areas where Kenya can claim true leadership include cellular telephony and mobile money. Cellular Telephony in Kenya Before the mobile telephony revolution, working landlines were scarce and rarely worked. By the second decade of the 2000s, it was widely understood that mobile phones constitute a fundamental component of ICTs (Parlasca et al. 2020). Kenya represents one of Africa’s leading mobile phone markets and has high mobile phone ownership which exceeds 87% (Mayo-Wilson et al. 2022). The Kenyan Demographic Health Survey and the Communications Authority of Kenya buttress these results. Although Telkom’s monopoly ended in 2004, there were only two major cellular telephony providers in Kenya until late 2008, Safaricom and Celtel/Zain (Weidermann 2005). However, after enormous internal pressure from the Kenyan private sector, a third cellular operator was licensed. This noncompetitive state of affairs was particularly noteworthy and disturbing given the sheer size of Kenya’s market and the vibrancy and extreme competitiveness of neighboring Tanzania and Uganda. The third operator’s entry into the Kenyan telecommunications market has resulted in great improvements in tariffs and services for consumers. In 2002, according to Pew Research Center, roughly one in ten citizens in Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya owned a cell phone (Pew 2015). Cellular telephony in East Africa has exploded exponentially since the early 2000s. As of 2020, 96% of the Kenyan population was covered by a mobilecellular network, with 94% of the population covered by at least a 3G mobile network, and 77% of the population covered by at least a 4G mobile network. Further, 47% of Kenyan individuals owned a mobile phone, and mobile phone ownership was fairly evenly divided between

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men and women. Approximately 18% of Kenyan households had Internet access at home in 2019, and 9% of Kenyan households had a computer at home. As Mayo-Wilson and her co-authors point out, mobile phone coverage is still unevenly distributed and inaccessible to some populations such as women and girls, rural communities, the elderly, and the poor (MayoWilson et al). Rural communities have a high need for digital connectivity, but have suffered from poor connection and inclusion in the past (Parlasca et al. 2020). Increasingly, mobile phones are becoming available to most pastoralists in Northern Kenya. Increasingly, research indicates that mobile phones can help these communities, with income, income equality, financial development, and gender equality. In addition, farmers in Laikipia, Kenya began to acquire mobile handsets between 2003 and 2010 (Chepkwony et al. 2018) In addition, mobile phones help farmers share information on control of pests and diseases, market produce and share knowledge on the best practices in agriculture to improve their productivity (Chepkwony et al. 2018). In essence, although most of the nation is covered by cellular telephony, rural communities are often left out, and distribution is unequal. The most impressive success Kenya can point to in the telephony sector is early innovation in mobile money, which has only recently reached the US. Mobile Money in Kenya Most Kenyans were “unbanked,” at the turn of the millennium, and wananchi often had to resort to sending money home via matatu (minibus taxis), which was both inconvenient and prone to theft. In 2003, Safaricom, Kenya’s biggest mobile phone company which has a 50% ownership stake by GoK began a project to see if microfinance could be delivered over mobile telephony. By 2007, Safaricom launched “MPesa” (Pesa is Kiswahili for money). M-Pesa is one of the first and most successful mobile money services in the world and has inspired similar innovations globally (Lashitew et al. 2019). M-Pesa allows users to load money onto their phones and then send that money to another phone via text message. Wananchi trusted mobile companies more than they did banks, and started lodging money to their M-Pesa accounts, using their accounts to pay for groceries, education, public utilities, medicine, and transport. Business people used their accounts to order inventory from wholesalers. By 2012, nearly 70% of Kenyan adults transferred money to

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each other via their mobile phones. Eventually, the system handled 20% of Kenya’s GDP. By 2017, 55% of Kenyan adults and 19% of Tanzanian adults had a bank account. Similarly, 58% of Kenyan adults and 32% of Tanzanian adults had a mobile money account (Naito and Yamamoto 2022). Estimates vary, but by 2022, Naito and Yamamoto found that as many as 78% of Kenyan adults used mobile money, whereas Lepoutre and Oguntoye put that number higher, stating that 80% of Kenya’s adult population used mobile money. Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda all have a mobile money model led by telecommunications providers. The relevant operators are licensed by the countries’ Central Banks. Operators must pay a licensing fee and comply with reporting and regulatory requirements. All countries require the operators to maintain an aggregate deposit of the individual mobile money accounts in an escrow account in a commercial bank. In Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda, mobile money services are straightforward as are the regulations; in Kenya in particular, the success of mobile money has been widely attributed to a fairly low level of regulation. In Kenya, the same services are offered, but some other services have evolved including payments into bank accounts, withdrawals from ATMs, small loans, and via partnership with Equity Bank, access to an interest-bearing deposit account (MKESHO). Kenya uses a Mobile Network Operator (Lepoutre and Oguntoye 2018). In Kenya, the presence of a well-resourced private sector helped coordinate functions across a network of actors. Further, in Kenya, a regulatory environment that reduced market uncertainties helped to make investments in new technologies more attractive for commercial businesses (Lashitew et al. 2019). A study examining Bangladesh, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Tanzania, and Uganda found that in the long run, the use of mobile money has contributed to savings and financial resilience in Kenya (Naito and Yamamoto 2022). More than 82% of farmers in a recent study on Kenya indicated that they used mobile money. Yet only 15% of those farmers used mobile money for making or receiving agriculture-related payments in the past 12 months. And fewer than 10% of the farmers in the study indicated that they had used mobile money as a source of agricultural finance. The study indicated that mobile money is not yet well-tailored to the needs of Kenyan farmers (Parlasca et al. 2022). Although work remains to combat inequality in cellular telephony, Kenya can certainly

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count mobile money as one of its most important contributions to the African continent, and indeed, the global financial system. Analysis of ICT Implementation in Kenya One way of measuring Kenya’s progress is by seeing how it does in relation to nearby countries. Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania all share a similar colonial history. Despite these similarities, the countries diverge with regard to the distribution of ICT infrastructure and artifacts, as well as the process by which laws and policies are formulated. Rwanda and Uganda, two geographically isolated, resource-poor countries with recent histories of brutal civil war, demonstrate much stronger government involvement in ICT policy, and faster progress toward objective outcomes in ICT policy implementation than their more democratic and more stable neighbors, Kenya and Tanzania. Despite a robust and inclusive policy process, Kenya did not effectively develop an implementation strategy for its ICT Policy, nor did it implement a monitoring approach (Odongo 2012). Kenya lags behind its regional neighbors in terms of ICT policy passage, and passed its ICT policy last among all four countries, in 2006. Kenya passed its ICT Policy three years later than Uganda and Tanzania, and six years later than Rwanda. A three-year difference in policy passage is not huge, but by 2022, the time gap between proposal and implementation had widened. Indeed, Kenya was the only country of the four that had failed to fully implement its Universal Service Access Fund. Kenya’s scope of implementation is extremely narrow: The only site in which major progress has been made in terms of ICT policy implementation is the postal service. The one government-led accomplishment in terms of infrastructure is the provision of Internet access using CDMA and GSM technologies at “most” Kenyan postal facilities according to the Permanent Secretary for Information and Communications.33 In contrast to Kenya’s limited success, for example, Rwanda has distributed computers to schools, built tele-centers, and strengthened their national backbone. Tanzania has built a strong national backbone, increased tele-centers, and created coordinated projects linking health centers and schools, with local government. One of the most serious problems with ICT in Kenya is inequality and an urban focus, leaving rural areas underserved in public facilities, in infrastructure, and even in cellular telephony.

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Despite achievements in the arena of participation, the Kenyan government has not succeeded outside of Nairobi with regard to the scope of implementation, and it fails almost completely on measures of distribution, particularly in terms of ensuring rural access to ICTs. As noted in the section on the history of ICT policymaking in Kenya, the CCK in conjunction with the IDRC commissioned a study on the need for universal access in advanced information and communications technology services in rural Kenya, yet has largely failed to implement its recommendations. Process This pattern of increased participation was well illustrated by the process of attaining an actual formal ICT policy document in 2006 after nearly a decade of thwarted efforts. After significant pressure from the local private sector, local civil society, and selected donors, the government solicited and finally chose to incorporate almost all public comments into the Gazetted ICT policy itself. The intense public interest in the ICT policy process, and the response of policy entrepreneurs within Kenya’s government to that interest “seemed to herald the beginning of a truly new regime of public participation in policymaking”. Initial efforts to promulgate a policy on ICTs—which began in the 1990s—reflected the lack of democracy in Kenya as a whole. The development of this policy has tracked the development of a multi-stakeholder, participatory, democratic process. The development of Kenya’s ICT policy represents a change in how the “business of government” is conducted in this emerging democracy. The history of ICT policymaking in Kenya illustrates the transition from the old, secret, highly centralized authoritarian style of doing the government’s business to a more participatory, transparent multi-stakeholder approach, in which domestic civil society and the domestic private sector help in the authoring and development of the policy itself. During the first term of the Kibaki administration, the country witnessed not just the emergence of a new policy in Kenya, but the emergence of a new more participatory democratic policymaking process. Kenya’s ICT policymaking process has taken place in a relatively democratic context. In particular, formal participation by civil society and the private sector has been high. As the country has moved from a semi-authoritarian state to a more democratic state, the nature of policymaking changed at least for one term. After the NARC election in 2002, there were changes within the government in the

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ICT policy arena. In terms of organizational and administrative changes, the effort to create an ICT policy has resulted in the reorganization of ministries, as well as the creation of organizations at the sub-ministry level. The creation of the Ministry of Information and Communications did seem to rationalize the sector and result in a burst of policymaking. One of the benefits of a new more democratic government under the Kibaki administration was that policymaking emerged out of the darkness of closed internal executive branch deliberations into the light of public discussion. The 2004 decision of the Ministry of Information and Communications, to release to the public, and then solicit, and indeed, incorporate public comment on the Kenyan ICT policy represents the first time that the Kenyan government has ever solicited comments on any policy in any sector. In the United States, under the Administrative Procedure Act, every regulation must go through a process called “notice and comment.” Although such a process is far from being institutionalized in Kenya, the development of the Kenyan ICT policy represents a dramatic move toward an era in which the public plays a real role in policymaking. Whereas the very first drafts of the ICT policy were closely held, and only discussed confidentially within a very closed group of political appointees, the most recent versions, and the 2006 policy itself have been the result of conversations, debates, and indeed a conflict between the executive branch of the Kenyan government, civil society, the private sector, and some donors. Although the Kenyan government has become increasingly responsive to public pressure regarding policymaking, who comprises the “public” remains a matter for debate. In the arena of ICT policy, the interests of the political elite and the technocrats dominate the discussion almost entirely. Those who participate in this arena are a small overlapping group. Many of them are Western-educated. They tend to live and work in Nairobi, or occasionally, Mombasa. Although they come from every ethnic group, they are overwhelmingly from the upper class or upper middle class. In general, the persons who participate in this policy arena tend to be local business owners who have a financial stake in ICT policy, consultants, and activists who derive some income from tracking ICT policy from donors, media owners such as the directors of local newspapers and television companies, and finally, local academics. These civil society activists do pay rhetorical attention to distribution the ICT resource to rural areas, but often have no personal investment in ensuring that that actually occurs. Interestingly, the local private sector, including Internet Service Providers

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and the Kenya ICT Federation, has been one of the most vocal advocates for ensuring that rural areas are not ignored. To the extent that government-sponsored deliverables or results are apparent in the ICT field in Kenya, they are attributable to a few policy entrepreneurs, particularly Juma Okech and Bitange Ndemo. In line with their historical role of pushing the Kenyan government toward change, the private sector and civil society remain in a somewhat confrontational role in the Kenyan ICT policy process. The policy entrepreneurs have opened a window of collaboration and communication, but results have been slow to arrive. Civil society and the private sector have been successful in encouraging the passage of key policy documents, but have been unsuccessful in ensuring implementation of those policies. The challenge for civil society and the private sector in this new coalition era will be hanging on to the hard-fought victories they won in the early part of the decade. Explaining Kenya’s ICT Outcomes The low point for ICT policy in Kenya was certainly the Moi era, which viewed computing and advanced telecommunications services with paranoia and suspicion. The high point for ICT policy was under the first term of President Mwai Kibaki, during which an ICT policy was finally passed, although it was the last in the region. In addition, exceptional policy entrepreneurs emerged inside the executive branch as democracy opened up interactions between government, civil society, and the private sector. As the country fights to maintain minimal political stability, ICT policymaking in Kenya may be on a downward trend again. The Role of Donors From a structural standpoint, one very important reason for the slow pace of policymaking and implementation in Kenya is that donors are not as powerful in Kenya as in neighboring countries. Kenya has a low level of donor dependency, and only receives a fraction of its national budget in the form of foreign aid. Accordingly, the Kenyan government is under some pressure to be responsive to donors, but is not so dependent that it must respond with alacrity. The result is that Kenya generally publishes numerous and often repetitive massive policy documents requested by donors, such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan and the Economic

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Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation as well as laws based on these pronouncements. However, in contrast to highly indebted nations like Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania which have much higher levels of donor dependency, Kenya is under less pressure to actually follow through on its paper commitments. Follow-up and implementation of such extensive laws and policy documents has accordingly tended to be haphazard and ad hoc in the Kenyan case. The role donors have played in Kenya has been a behind the scenes one of encouragement. In Rwanda, donors were the major authors of the nation’s ICT policy. By contrast in Kenya, they have played a much less visible role in facilitating conversations, sponsoring research, and encouraging relationships. The donors do seem to have been successful at encouraging a more participatory policy process which included more “stakeholders.” Donors have kept the issue of ICT policy on the Kenyan government’s policy agenda, but have not gone much further than that. Due to the country’s recent struggle to keep the governing coalition intact, structurally, donors may be more concerned with ensuring the country’s stability than ensuring its economic development at this point. Kenyan Civil Society and the Private Sector Kenya represents the case with the most input from both the private sector and civil society in the policymaking process in the region. Participation in ICT policymaking in Kenya broadened significantly between 1998 and 2008. More organizations participated over the observed time frames, but the composition of participation did not change markedly. Participation was consistently by elites and representatives of civil society organizations with close ties to donors and the private sector. Perhaps the most important participants were the private sector trade associations, as represented by the Kenya ICT Federation and the Telecommunications Provider Association, another key civil society participant was the Kenya ICT Network, (KICTAnet). In contrast with other countries in the region, participation in ICT policymaking had significant civil society input in Kenya. Kenyan civil society is heterogeneous and robust. Yet, civil society in Kenya is not synonymous with the polity, or the electorate (Murunga 2000).34 Civil society also includes community-based grassroots organizations which receive most of their funding from members located in Kenya, and which are founded and run by Kenyans. Kenyan civil society should be distinguished from the donor community, although civil society organizations often have relationships with multilateral donors (Orvis 2003,

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249).35 In Kenya, civil society has been an indispensable element in the push for democratization.36 Although relationships between civil society and the state improved under President Kibaki,37 this sense of tension and confrontation re-emerged after the December 2007 election violence. Membership within the civil society convener for ICT Policymaking in Kenya—KICTAnet—has been network driven. Membership was open, and people were invited to participate who were acquaintances of existing members of KICTAnet. KICTAnet includes representation of non-governmental organizations, community-based organizations, and donors. As a result, there has been a high membership overlap between the different private sector and civil society groups in the ICT sector. Of the members named by KICTAnet itself on an “active member list” at a meeting held on January 27, 2006, twenty-one percent of member organizations were for-profit entities or entities which could be categorized as trade associations. Further, KICTAnet received the bulk of its funding for its lobbying work from a project of the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development. KICTAnet is a hybrid organization then: part donor, part civil society, and part private sector advocate. Nonetheless, this may be an organizational strength, as according to private sector informants, the traditional divisions and suspicions between the private sector and civil society have broken down over the past two years, and a fairly powerful coalition has formed. As evidenced in the episode of the dismissal of the CCK Board, Kenyan civil society “acts as a check on the arbitrariness of the state” (Makau Mutua 2008). Just as Kenyan civil society is heterogeneous, so also do we see a continuum in the Kenyan private sector from the micro-firm to the multinational. The private sector in Kenya is far from monolithic. The smallest components of the Kenyan private sector are the “jua kali” businesses. Jua Kali is a Swahili term that means “under the hot sun.” These small businesses are the largest sector of paying employers and generate huge amounts of revenue and jobs for the Kenyan economy. Most sellers of “airtime” and repairers of cellular phones fall into this category. A step up from this is any artisan who actually rents or owns a physical structure, and thus has a physical address for his business. A variety of middle-level businesses can also be found in all sectors, from tourism to banking, and to the manufacturing concerns found in the industrial area on Mombasa Road on the outskirts of Nairobi. At the upper end of the privatesector scale are such multinationals with billions of dollars in revenue like Safaricom Telecommunications, one of the largest businesses in Kenya

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today, half owned by the Kenyan government and half owned by foreign investors. The multinational telecommunications sector, represented by companies such as Vodafone and the Microsoft juggernaut, is interested in the relatively wealthy Kenya as a new, potentially lucrative market. In the telecommunications and ICT industry, the interests of the domestic private sector, such as software developers and smaller scale Internet Service Providers, are often aligned more closely with those of the domestic civil society and consumers. Their profit lies in providing affordable, local solutions. To the domestic private sector, rural markets look like an attractive prospect. One of the key nongovernmental participants in ICTs emergence onto the Kenyan policy agenda has been the Kenya ICT Federation. KIF began as the Nairobi Stock Exchange High Tech/Growth Committee in 2000. This was part of an effort to promote private sector competitiveness and growth and to encourage more firms to access the capital market. In April 2004, this organization was registered as the Kenya Information and Communication Technology Federation (KIF). The new organization, KIF, is a member of the Kenya Private Sector Alliance. This alliance enables the private sector of Kenya to speak with one voice to the government to influence public policy formulation. KIF comprises several member ICT associations and is run by an executive board composed of the chairmen of the member associations and other key ICT leaders. The domestic private sector has demanded clarity, with limited success, on the legality of technologies such as Voice over Internet Protocol and has pressured the government to increase the competitiveness of the cellular phone market, resulting in a partial victory with the 2008 licensing of the third national operator, Econet. Democracy, Peace and Technology The Kenyan state has an important role in the regulation, management, and governance of ICT to ensure that it becomes stabilized to outside and inside investors, as well as civil society practitioners and donors interested in the diffusion of ICT in Africa (Scott 1998). The Kenyan state has not taken full advantage of its power to stabilize this policy area. The Kenyan government has been explicitly encouraged by donors, civil society, and the indigenous private sector to develop a regulatory regime for the emerging technologies comprised by the term “ICT.”

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The ICT policy process illustrates that the transition to multi-party democracy in Kenya has been rocky and that the engines and organizations of technological transformation and information and communications are a key component of democratic organizations, with resistance from secretive government organizations, crackdowns on a free press, and the dismantling of organizations such as the CCK that are seen as threatening to the political order or the profits of a corrupt kleptocracy. The main contribution that democracy has had on Kenyan ICT policy has been that of opening up the policymaking process to public participation. Unfortunately, however, Kenya has an imperial executive, and an almost powerless legislative branch. As in the US case, the executive branch is in charge of the policy agenda. The private sector and civil society in Kenya have fought to keep ICT on the policy agenda, but as in the case of healthcare policy reform in the United States, the process of moving from agenda to implementation can take decades, as issues fall on and off of the policy agenda. On paper, ICT policy in Kenya seems to be moving in a more participatory, democratic direction as the country does. The challenge in the Kenya case is moving from policy to implementation. Although Kenya is a democracy, sitting Kenyan governments have historically not had to rely heavily on the rural vote outside of their areas of clientelist favor due to the way political majorities align in Kenya. Because Kenya has a comparatively non-violent and stable history, the Kenyan government has had the luxury of not being forced to redistribute goods—including ICT—equitably in the rural areas. As elections become more competitive in Kenya, rural majorities may increase in importance.

Conclusion This chapter has attempted to examine what process was used to draft and adopt ICT policy in Kenya. This chapter also considers what indicators can be used to measure policy success for ICT policy. In addition, this research evaluates whether implementation actually correlates with written ICT policy statements and rhetoric. This research indicates that implementation has not closely tracked ICT policy statements in Kenya. Governance has changed for the better, infrastructure has been built, and new institutions have been created. The most impressive outcome in the ICT arena in Kenya has been private sector innovation, and the most disappointing outcome in the ICT arena in Kenya has been striking inequality and the lack of distribution of ICT infrastructure in rural areas.

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At the beginning of this study, the conventional wisdom suggested that Kenya would make quicker progress than its neighbors because of external perceptions that it was democracy and that it was the wealthiest country in the region. Over a decade of study indicates that these assumptions do not bear out. But, by the end of the study, my reflections on the roots of Kenya’s policy failure are less grandiose and more mundane. The main factors for Kenya’s policy outcomes can be summarized as follows. Donors are weak in Kenya. Donors may believe ICT policy is advantageous, and they can encourage, cajole, research, support, and advocate. From a structural standpoint, donors were crucial for getting ICT onto Kenya’s policy agenda, and managed to keep it there long enough for some policy activity to occur. However, also structurally, donors were not influential enough to externally impose their policy agenda, however beneficial, in a country that is wealthy in comparison to its regional peers. Second, in an effort to maintain the authoritarian elements of his rule, President Moi maintained his distrust of technology for much longer than his peers. While the leadership of Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda had already determined the social benefit of ICTs by the late 1990s, Kenya was delayed until at least 2002 by the government’s distrust of technology. Although this looks like an agency issue, it is an institutional issue, as the authoritarian apparatus in the late 1990s was the true bottleneck for ICT policy in Kenya. After the 2002 elections, a sustained burst of ICT policymaking did occur as participation increased and the policy apparatus became more open in an environment of high economic growth and political stability. In Kibaki’s first term, Kenya almost caught up to the rest of the region. However, this dramatic progress was essentially halted in its tracks by the electoral violence of December 2007. In the post-election period, the country’s resources were drained by the massive side payments required to support the governing Grand Coalition. Although Kenya has been able to maintain political stability from 2008 to 2022, it has been on a knife’s edge. Political stability is an important limit, then, to this kind of tremendous policy undertaking. Social and political choices about how to design and manage new technologies fundamentally determine the usefulness of that technology to society, how redistributive and equitable the impact of the technology will be, and how fully and effectively a society will be able to utilize the promise of new technology. For Kenya, dreams of a more equitable ICT may have to wait for increased political stability. Kenya

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has generally let “the market” decide where ICT infrastructure will be developed, with little or no intervention through regulation or law to date regarding these choices. Because the market generally undersupplies collective goods such as telecommunications, the predictable result of this laissez-faire approach, although arguably economically efficient, has resulted in poor distributive outcomes. In a nation where eighty percent of the population lives in rural areas, it is a telling statement about the political perception regarding the value of rural majorities there is very little ICT infrastructure38 outside of Nairobi and Mombasa. In contrast to its neighbors, Uganda and Rwanda, both of which have prioritized rural areas in ICT infrastructure development and have made a conscious choice that distribution of ICT technology to rural areas is a key element in the usefulness of ICT as a development tool to their countries, even during the heyday of ICT policymaking between 2002 and 2007, the Kenyan government did little to build ICT infrastructure for residents in rural areas. The main beneficiary of infrastructure has been the government itself; and then, only the government in the capital, through the wiring of the ministries in Nairobi. The Kenyan government has done little to develop infrastructure outside of the capital. The choice of the Kenyan government to concentrate resources on urban ministries, while disregarding the effort to connect those ministries to their rural counterparts, means that urban citizens will receive improved services, while rural citizens remain isolated. Like so many policies passed in Kenya before—including the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper process of 2001 and the Kenya Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation—the Kenyan ICT policy of March 2006 may be “window dressing,”39 a mere “political gesture” with implementation desired, yet not likely. There is an alternative scenario, however: the participatory air surrounding the creation of ICT policy (and other policies) in the nation of Kenya may continue. The goal for civil society and the private sector during this period is to resume the vigil of pressuring the government for improved outcomes for Wananchi that they were used to under the Moi era. These organizations must continue to pressure the government to move from rhetoric to implementation while holding on to the process gains they obtained between 2002 and 2007.

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There is no question that the Kenyan citizenry has the capacity to write its own laws, program its own software, build its own hardware, install its own infrastructure and, most importantly, develop its own country educationally, politically, economically, and technologically. More so than any of its neighbors, Kenya has a population with the education, the skills, the drive, the know-how and the capacity to fully utilize the promise of ICT socially and economically. What is under question is whether there is the leadership and political will in Kenya to make the most of this socio-technological innovation as a tool for good governance, a tool for socioeconomic growth or a tool for social justice.

Notes 1. In the context of telecommunications and ICT in the countries studied, the private sector has two manifestations: European and American based multinationals (such as Vodafone, Terracom, Microsoft and Celtel) and indigenous African companies (such as Wananchi Online and Symphony Software). I characterize companies as indigenous if their primary office is located in Africa, the majority of their staff is on the African continent, and the primary shareholders are African governments or citizens with at least a 50% stake in the company. Industry in the countries under study is limited. There is some computer manufacturing industry in South Africa. Attempts to initiate manufacturing in East Africa have been fitful and sporadic. The private sector tends to focus on service provision of cellular phone services, information service provision (i.e. Internet ISPs) and increasingly, software development. 2. There is no doubt that there was significant corruption under the Kenyatta regime. The corruption under the Kenyatta regime seemed to interfere less with the state’s ability to build the country’s infrastructure and maintain a robust economy. 3. The material in this section is based on sixty-five qualitative semistructured interviews conducted from 2004 to 2008 in Kenya. Additional interviews were conducted in Tanzania, Rwanda and Uganda. I also conducted participant observation, and sat in on dozens of meetings of the organizations KIF and KICTAnet as well as several national and transnational conferences on ICT. I conducted interviews in Kenya with former members of parliament, high ranking government officials, academics, private sector participants, and civil society advocates. I take responsibility for all content and interpretations. No individual named below can be held responsible for any insights or conclusions made in this article. All

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errors are my own. Several interviewees requested anonymity. Nonetheless, the sample below of those who allowed their names to be used gives a sense of the scope and depth of the interviews conducted. Several individuals deserve special thanks, including Juma Okech, the Secretary of E-Government, Bitange Ndemo, the Permanent Secretary for Information and Communications, Marcel Werner, the Secretary of the Kenya Information and Communications Technology Federation, Alice Munyua, the Kenyan representative of APC, and CCK Board Member, Amos Opiyo of the Ministry of Planning, Dr. Eric Aligula of the Kenya Institute of Public Policy Research and Analysis, Henry Belsoi of Telkom Kenya, Jonathan Campaigne, Director of Pride Africa, Kevit Desai, the President of Kenya IEEE, Mike Eldon, CEO of Symphony Software, James Gachui, Founder of Wananchi Online, Dr. Kathryn Getau, Computer Science Faculty of the University of Nairobi, Dr. Tim Waema, Computer Science faculty of the University of Nairobi, Wallace Gichoho of Call Center Africa, Mirjana Ilic of UNESCO, Michael Katundu, Communications Commission of Kenya, Joseph Kiplagat, Computer Science Faculty, Moi University, Brian Longwe of AFRISPA, Charles Nduati of Kenyatta University, Dr. Florence Etta, formerly of IDRC, Edith Adera of IDRC, as well as various staff members, directors and participants from the Computer Society of Kenya, KICTAnet, the Directorate of E-Government, the National Communications Secretariat, Kenya Pipeline Company, and many other organizations. 4. Indeed, in the wake of the presidential election of 2022, I would argue that Kenya is not a democracy at all, but is rather a competitive oligarchy. 5. As of March, 2007. 6. By virtue of demographics, the two most politically powerful language groups in Kenya have historically been the Dholuo (Luo) and the Agikuyu (Kikuyu). Out of a population of roughly 36 million persons, the Kikuyu represent the largest language group, comprising 22% of the population or 7.9 million persons. According to the Government of Kenya, the Luo are the second largest language group in Kenya. Two post-Independence presidents have come from the Agikuyu: Jomo Kenyatta and Mwai Kibaki. The Luo and the Kalenjin have been important factors in Kenyan politics, with the Kalenjin contributing Kenya’s second President, Daniel arap Moi. Two of the most powerful post-Independence leaders have come from the Luo, Oginga Odinga and Tom Mboya. Oginga’s son, Raila Odinga, carries his father’s mantle as the undisputed leader of the loyal opposition and acts as a veritable force of nature in Kenyan politics. Kibaki has tacitly recognized the crucial political role of the Luo and the Luyha by giving the Vice Presidency to the Luyha, and by naming various Luos to crucial ministries. In particular, the Luo have recently controlled the powerful

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7. 8. 9.

10.

11.

12.

13. 14.

15.

16.

17.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Akamba group, who are small in population, are nonetheless a powerful political swing group, a role which echoes their historic position as traders between other language groups in Kenya. At independence the Kikuyu and Luo comprised nearly 40 percent of the total population. Nationwide parties began to form after the Lancaster House conference in London on the transfer of power. The main opposition party in Kenya during this period was the populist Kenya People’s Union. The Commission of Inquiry implicated Kenyatta’s brother-in-law, Mbiyu Koinange, in J. M. Kariuki’s death. The result was suppression by the Kenyatta government of backbenchers critical of the regime, through a combination of rewards, detention, and intimidation. Klopp (478) points out that each of Kenya’s provinces has a provincial commissioner at the apex of a bureaucratic hierarchy that stretches through the chief and his assistants into local areas. The chief is an appointed bureaucrat invented, created, and imposed by the British. Traditionally, Kenyan societies were not ruled by chiefs. Bennett’s article lends support to the position that Kenyatta appointed Moi to be Kenya’s Vice President to broaden the ethno-regional base of his regime, to defuse the Kikuyu-Luo power struggle, as well as in order to prove that he was “not a tribalist.” On Christmas Day of 1991, after being demoted from the Vice-Presidency and reassigned as Minister of Health in 1988, Mwai Kibaki abandoned KANU to form the Democratic Party of Kenya. Klopp argues that Moi built a trusted support base in the Rift Valley, and alienated Kikuyu, Luo, Pastoralist and Coast constituencies. In 1982, President Moi amended Section 2A of the Kenyan constitution, making Kenya into a de jure one-party state. Throup states that this decision was precipitated by the efforts of Oginga Odinga and George Anyonga to register a Kenya Socialist Party. It is not essential to my narrative to discuss the rampant and massive corruption of the Moi era. However, this was a notable characteristic of the second Kenyan Presidency. I remember traveling to Kenya during this time period to visit my family. I poignantly recollect the giant trash heaps outside beautiful estates and the profusion of street children playing in the drainage ditches, indicating a nearly complete breakdown of government services to the general population. One rough indicator of the level of democracy versus autocracy in Kenya is the “Polity Score.” The composite polity score ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to −10 (strongly autocratic). The combined polity score in Kenya went from −6 in 1979, to −2 in 1997 In other words, throughout

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18. 19. 20.

21.

22.

23. 24. 25.

26. 27.

28.

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the seventies, eighties and nineties, Kenya was a semi-authoritarian. In 2002, the composite polity score for Kenya rose to +8, close to a strong democracy. The Fox article provides a helpful and detailed discussion of the 1992 Kenyan elections. I thank Steven Levitsky for this insight. Interview with Dr. Shem Ochuodho, former member of Kenyan Parliament. I acknowledge the invaluable contribution of Dr. Shem Ochuodho for sharing his memories with me in his office in Kigali regarding early ICT policy process in Kenya. This section also relies heavily on discussions with Professor Tim Waema of the University of Nairobi. Mike Eldon of KEPSA and the Kenya ICT Federation gave many insights regarding the period between 2000 and the present. Relying on a wealth of ethnographic and historical evidence, Klopp argues persuasively that the Moi government and KANU transported warriors to Kikuyu areas and paid them to kill opposition leaders as well as Kikuyu in-migrants in an attempt to counter the onset of political liberalization in Kenya. Klopp notes that so called “ethnic violence” was actually government violence which was carried out by game rangers, police and army personnel. 1.9 million votes were cast for Moi, and 3.3 million votes were cast for the three main opposition candidates. More than ten years later, Telkom remains a state owned monopoly. With regard to the SAP process and its effect on policymaking. The two main telecommunications providers in Kenya are Safaricom, which is owned 50% by a strategic outside investor and 50% by Telkom Kenya, as well as Kencell/Celtel, a large multinational operator with massive interests in the African telecommunications market, Vodacom. No regional telecommunications operators have been commercially successful in Kenya to date. Former Kenyan Assistant Minister for Education, Science and Technology, Mr. Adams Karauri, stated in a 2001 workshop that the Kenyan government was in the process of establishing a framework for ICT policy. In December 2001, the then Ministry for Transport and Communications issued the Telecommunications and Postal Sector Guidelines. Multiple interviews were conducted with Director Okech from 2004 to 2006. In addition, several of his staff members were interviewed repeatedly. Director Okech passed away in early 2009. The standard version of this policy can be viewed at http://www.comesa. int/ict/. Policy becomes formalized in Kenya when a document has the seal of approval from the cabinet.

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31. By contrast, Uganda and Rwanda set funding for their Universal Access fees at a clear 1% of gross revenues of all telecommunications operators. 32. In terms of leadership, one of Kenya’s great ICT policy entrepreneurs, Juma Okech Director of E-government, passed away in January of 2009, leaving his colleague Ndemo to soldier on alone. 33. By contrast, post office facilities with electricity, which would have been constructed during the Moi era, were distributed inequitably and greatly favored provinces favored by Moi. 34. The author notes, presciently that “Civil society is a broad concept. Its history is decidedly western. But, we live in a world where the West comes up with concepts, and indiscriminately employs them in the African context without due regard to the peculiarities of the African social formations. This does not mean that there is no civil society in Africa or Kenya for that matter. Civil society in Kenya has its own peculiar history, which does not in any way have to conform to the western one.” 35. At their most avaricious, “civil society groups [in Kenya] can present themselves as “briefcase NGOs’ which exist only to garner grant money.” 36. Development focused donor organizations which are part of national governments in the US, UK and other countries often provide funding for civil society organizations in the global south. A further distinction could be made between national or indigenous civil society groups and transnational groups, such as Amnesty International or Greenpeace, although national groups often have links to transnational civil society. For example, an organization like “Jamii Bora” was founded by a Swede, but is entirely staffed by Kenyans. It draws funding streams from both Kenyan sources and external entities like the Acumen Fund. 37. By 2004, over 1000 non-governmental organizations had been registered in Kenya. 38. By infrastructure, I am referring to the fiber optic cables, the satellite dishes and the electric wires, or even solar power or wind power generators which allow Internet connectivity, as well as well-functioning sustainable computing in rural areas. 39. Another way of formulating this situation is that, in game theoretic terms, the Kenyan government may simply be “signaling” through policy, with no intention of actually following through.

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Chepkwony, R., Van Bommel, S., & Van Langevelde, F. “Citizen Science for Development: Potential Role of Mobile Phones in Information Sharing on Ticks and Tick-borne Diseases, in Laikipia, Kenya.” Wageningen Journal of Life Sciences, 86–87, 123–135, 2018. Chijoriga, M. M., Mlaki, T. E., & Mpenzwa, E. “Information and Communication Technology Policy: Tanzania.” In Strengthening National Information and Communication Technology Policy in Africa: Governance, Equity and Institutional Issues, Ayogu, M., ed., Vol. 2, 2004. CIA. “Kenya, the World Factbook.” Central Intelligence Agency, 2007. Dagne, T. Kenya: The December 2007 Elections and the Challenges Ahead, D. Foreign Affairs, and Trade Division, ed., Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, p. 13, 2008. Edgerton, R. B. Mau Mau: An African Crucible. New York Free Press, 1989. Etta, F. “Policymaking: The New Development El Dorado” In At the Crossroads: ICT Policymaking in East Africa, Etta, F. E., & Elder, L., eds., Nairobi East African Educational Publishers and International Development Research Center, 2005. Fox, R. “Bleak Future for Multi-Party Elections in Kenya.” The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 34 No. 4: 597–607, 1996. Gichuki, C. N., & Mulu-Mutuku, M. “Determinants of Awareness and Adoption of Mobile Money Technologies: Evidence from Women Micro Entrepreneurs in Kenya.” Women’s Studies International Forum, Vol. 67: 18–22, 2018. Gitau, J. “Politicising Business.” The Standard, January 16, 2005. Kathuri, B. “CCK to Get New Board this Week.” The Standard, May 10, 2005. Kenya, G. O. “Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation: 2003–2007.” Nairobi: Government Printing Office, 2003. KICTAnet. “Communique Kenya ICT Convention March 2005.” Safari Park Hotel, Nairobi, 2005. Kihanya, J. N., & Oloo, L. M. “Rapporteurs Notes and Report: Kenya National ICT Visioning Workshop.” Norfolk Hotel, Nairobi: KICTAnet, 2004. Kiyongi, G. W., & Mijumbi, R. “Strengthening National ICT Policy in Africa: The Case of Uganda.” Nairobi African Technology Policy Studies Network, Vol. 1, 2004. Kim, J. H. “Smart City Trends: A Focus on 5 Countries and 15 Companies.” Cities, 2022. Kiragu, C. N, Osero, J. O., & Wanyoro, A. K. “Mobile Phone Use Among Mothers Seeking Postnatal Services in Kakamega County, Kenya.” African Journal of Midwifery and Women’s Health, Vol. 16 No. 2: 1–13, 2020. Klopp, J. M. “Ethnic Clashes and Winning Elections: The Case of Kenya’s Electoral Despotism.” Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol. 35 No. 3: 473–517, 2001.

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CHAPTER 6

Uganda: Distribution in the Shadow of Surveillance

The distribution of information and communications technology in Uganda represents an infrastructure challenge, a planning challenge, and a political challenge. This chapter investigates the following research question: What are the political factors that affect the distribution of ICT in Uganda? What are the politics of the rollout, uptake, and distribution of ICTs in Uganda? Specifically, the paper considers political factors as potential explanations regarding the manner in which this infrastructure has been distributed, while recognizing that other factors may be at play also. In spite of a vibrant private telecommunications sector, and more than a decade of Ugandan Government initiatives for enhancing the utilization of ICT, pockets of the Ugandan population are left behind with regard to access to ICTs. Molony (2006) observes that even in developing countries with high net ICT uptake, ICT is still out of reach to

As of the time of publication, this is the most recent data available. Data can be viewed at http://reports.weforum.org/global-information-tec hnology-report-2016/networked-readiness-index/ As of the time of publication, this is the most recent data available. Data can be viewed at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD

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many groups due to a lack of appropriate projects, cost, education, and literacy gaps. This is certainly the case in Uganda. In Uganda 65% of residents own a smartphone or a cell phone, far lower than the ownership rate then in South Africa, Nigeria, or Kenya (Pew Research Center, 2015) According to the World Bank’s Open Data system of World Development Indicators (2014), only 5.8% of Uganda’s households owned a computer and only 17.7% of individuals used the Internet. This suggests that Uganda’s level of ICT distribution is currently far below the world average of 44.2% of households owning a computer and 40.7% of individuals using Internet, and the Sub-Saharan Africa average of 9.4% of households owning a computer and 19.2% of individuals using Internet (World Bank 2016). The ICT story in East African nations then, is a story of unevenness. ICTs in East Africa have grown explosively, yet coverage and access are not uniform. For example, mobile usage has increased exponentially in African nations over the past decade, yet Internet penetration lags behind. Despite the rapid, and indeed, remarkable, diffusion of ICTs in African nations over the past twenty years, infrastructure is not evenly distributed inside Uganda, nor is it evenly distributed across national boundaries. ICT penetration levels also vary within countries so that within the same nation there may be pockets of high and low access levels, particularly along rural–urban divides (Rao 2005). Diffusing ICTs to rural areas—and more specifically to rural areas in Uganda—has not been accomplished by the price mechanism of “the market.” Left to market forces alone, some areas or societal groups that the private sector considers unprofitable may never get access to ICTs. Accordingly, diffusing ICTs to rural areas in Eastern Africa requires the simultaneous consideration of social, political, legal, and technological factors, and the national government’s role in increasing ICT diffusion warrants examination. For East Africans in rural areas to use computers, ICTs must be both accessible and affordable. Further, ICTs must be configured in a manner that allows them to withstand the rigors of a harsh climate and sporadic maintenance. Computers—and even cellular phones—are generally luxuries for individuals in Uganda (Fourati 2009). Providing access to ICTs in rural areas requires finding innovative ways to reduce costs for both infrastructure and equipment. To enable access to ICTs, laws must be passed, infrastructure must be built, equipment must be placed, organizations must be connected, and individuals must be educated.

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This leads to the important, yet somewhat philosophical inquiry: why should ICT be a national development priority in a country like Uganda which is one of the poorer countries in East Africa? First, the Ugandan government implanted its ICT policy in no small part as a response to significant pressure exerted by external donors. ICTs were introduced into Africa in the late 1990s, as the technology diffused from the Global North to the Global South, with significant assistance from multilateral organizations. Policies, including ICT policy, diffuse across borders, including across states and countries Arguably, ICTs and information policy arrived in the Ugandan national state through both “imitation” as well as “incentives” (Shipan and Volden 2012). Multilateral organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund, can facilitate policy diffusion in a way that may combine both incentives and coercion. (Shipan and Volden 2008, 2012). Further, the World Bank specifically focused on a topdown, long-term, and capital-intensive project of introducing ICTs to lower income countries. Numerous multilateral organizations such as ITU, UNESCO, the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program and UNCTAD allocated resources to ICT interventions in African nations in the 1990s and 2000s in the name of “development” (Mansell 2011). African nations, such as Uganda, did not really have significant agency in terms of accepting ICT as a component of their development approach. As the discussion below will investigate, however, Uganda did have some agency in the way it implemented its ICT policy. Along those lines, African countries who have passed ICT policies are arguably implementing an external sociotechnical imaginary (Jasanoff 2015), which they have accepted, and to some extent, transformed. Sociotechnical imaginaries are “collectively held and performed visions of desired futures” related to advances in science and technology. Indeed, Adesina observes that although ICT has significant potential, it has also “become a signifier of the developmental mindset, and the alleged solution to Africa’s development problems” (Adesina 2006). Similarly, Dobra (2012) notes that the discourse around ICT in developing countries is often overly optimistic, and “grants ICT a normative and telic essence, throwing the analysis into a myth of technology.” In Uganda, the sociotechnical imaginary of ICT as a development tool is held at the executive level and is relatively centralized, and relatively top-down, although it has a more technocratic spin than in neighboring Rwanda.

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This chapter argues that Ugandan officials prioritized ICT as a national development priority in part because those leaders held an explicitly modernist vision of the future. Museveni embraced the developmental and modernization paradigms of his university education, which took place in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Kassimir 1999). There are many possible factors that affect the extent to which countries in East Africa distribute infrastructure. These include the competitiveness of the private sector, the role of donors, and the size and strength of civil society. One incentive may be found in the ICTs evocation of “the modern”. Indeed, Mercer (2006) reminds us that many African stakeholders view ICTs as a symbol of modernity. Adesina calls ICTs as a development tool a manifestation of the “neo-modernisation” thesis (Adesina 2006), which may make them particularly attractive to Museveni, who was intrigued by modernization theory. Further, ICTs are a desirable form of “pork.” Politics, including citizen demand, may be a key factor in the distribution of public goods (MacLean et al. 2016; Kramon and Posner 2013). Brass (2016) finds that receiving services can improve citizen perceptions of state legitimacy and also notes that politicians claim credit for service provision in an effort to reap political benefits. Where politicians face serious political competition—as is the case in contemporary Uganda—they have incentives to use public resources to win elections or win support. Their spending, notes Green (2011), often takes the form of public goods that are both observable and measurable. This study argues that ICTs are a type of infrastructure and are a non-reversible public good. “Pork” goods are highly prized: they are highly visible, and can be viewed as evidence of patrons fulfilling their promises to clients (Green 2011). Viewing ICT as a club good, or “pork,” helps to explain the way in which the Ugandan government has utilized ICTs in schools and hospitals. One particularly attractive quality of ICTs, however, is that they can be used to support government aid in health, education, and economic growth. In summary, ICTs have value partly because of their “modern” foreign quality, partly because they “enable” other desirable social goals including the developmental objectives of national politicians, and partly because they are so visible, and can be used as evidence that patrons are fulfilling their promises to clients. Finally, the incumbent government in Uganda faces a challenge: it must demonstrate its legitimacy to constituents who have lived through extreme sectarian violence, as well as state collapse within the past generation. Regional conflicts abound, including civil war in South Sudan and

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Congo, and an ongoing conflict in the country’s North. Accordingly, although military control represents “the stick” in Museveni’s governance strategy, I argue that his efforts to distribute a desirable type of modern infrastructure—ICT—may represent part of “the carrot.”

Explaining ICT in Uganda: The Historical, Political, and Policy Context Understanding the way Ugandan politics and policymaking look today requires an understanding of Uganda’s difficult political past. Following the lead of MacLean, Gore, Brass, and Baldwin in a series of articles considering electricity provision in African states (2016, 2019, and MacLean et al. 2016) this chapter posits that politics and public service provision are linked. Taken by itself, ethnicity does not fully explain ICT distribution, because as will be shown below, ICT artifacts are widely distributed throughout the nation public access points. Further, donor access does explain the arrival of ICT in African nations, but it does not by itself explain why some countries exceed expectations for the diffusion of the technology despite similar levels of donor involvement. As discussed in the theoretical section above, placement of ICTs in Uganda may be explained in part by three political variables, including efforts by the state to attract a witnessing public (Ezrahi 1990); efforts to show a commitment to modernity (Mercer, 2006) and finally, efforts by politicians to distribute a form of rents, club goods or “pork” to citizens (Green 2011). These political variables must be grounded in an understanding of the nation’s politics to be fully understood. Historical analysis and process tracing (Collier 2011) helps scholars to understand how and why Uganda under Museveni focused on ICT as a key component of infrastructure, and in particular, why Uganda outperforms some nations which have higher per capita incomes, and higher levels of democracy. Accordingly, this section explores some of the historical and political factors that have played a role in the evolution of ICTs in Uganda. Uganda records one of the most diverse ethnic compositions of any nation on the globe (Occiti 2000). The country experienced a nonviolent transition to independence, However, the 1960s and 1970s saw the country devolve into violence and chaos. After Yoweri Museveni’s

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military victory in the mid-1980s, Uganda stabilized politically, although it has not completely transitioned to a democracy. The Ugandan government, as currently configured, exhibits a combination of authoritarian and democratic elements (Freedom House 2022; Kagoro 2015; PolityIV 2013; Tripp: 2010; Carbone 2008). The Ugandan military plays an outsized role in Ugandan governance, particularly for a country that counts itself a democracy. The military has retained significant control over Uganda’s transition to democracy, resulting in a reserved domain for the military in that nation leading to creeping authoritarianism (Tusalem 2014).

Government in Uganda: After State Collapse, a Stable Hybrid Regime Emerges After a peaceful transition to independence, Uganda initially experienced a vibrant multi-party system. The years following independence, however, were characterized by “widespread civil conflict” (MacLean et. al., 2016). Soon after independence, Prime Minister Milton Obote suspended the 1962 constitution and made himself head of both state and government (Saul 1976; Uzoigwe 1983). Obote utilized the method of divide and rule, resulting in a high level of tribal and religious tension throughout the country. Obote’s approach facilitated the rise, in 1971, of General Idi Amin, a high-ranking military office from the North, who seized power in a coup d’état, and imposed a brutal dictatorship. Amin relied on a narrow constituency and used murder, fear, and abuse of human rights to ensure compliance and to stay in power (Short 1971). Under his rule, the GDP declined 20 percent and the country was reduced to “howling anarchy” (Uzoigwe 1983). Amin was overthrown in a violent coup in 1979. In the post-Amin period, the Ugandan government lacked representativeness and encouraged high levels of political violence. After a protracted armed struggle, the National Resistance Army, led by Yoweri Museveni, came to power in Uganda in 1986, after more than two decades of civil war (Katusiimeh 2017) establishing “no-party” democracy. In order to establish territorial control throughout the country, Museveni had to co-opt people from diverse and even opposing groups, religions, languages, and parts of the country (Carbone 2008). Initially, Museveni’s “movement ideology” aimed to include all of Uganda’s main ethnic and religious groups in an organization based on national unity,

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perhaps in imitation of the Tanzanian model. Despite these efforts, Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army has been destabilizing northern Uganda since 1987 displacing hundreds of thousands, and dramatically disrupting the economy of parts of the country (Ward 2001; Dunn 2004; Okori 2016). However, although Museveni originally distributed political power broadly through the country, power has slowly shifted toward his loyalists in the West (Tripp 2010; Green 2011). Museveni’s began his rule of Uganda as a military dictator characterized by anti-democratic actions and human rights abuses (Omara-Ottunu 1991). Yet, at times, Museveni has enjoyed status as a statesman, and as a donor’s darling, in part because of his ready acceptance of liberalization (MacLean et al. 2016). On the positive side, Carbone (2008) argues that under Museveni, human rights abuses have declined, and popular participation as well as respect for the rule of law has increased. Uganda has moved quite slowly to consolidate democracy, yet the outcomes of elections are neither wholly credible nor completely legitimate. Although Museveni’s government operates in a semi-authoritarian manner, the leader must nonetheless consider how the policies he chooses will be received by those groups in the society that pose a credible threat of unrest (Stasavage 2005). Superficially, the Ugandan government observes the trappings of democracy. Elections are held regularly and multiple candidates from multiple parties compete in Ugandan national elections.,1 ,2 ,3 4 and 5 Although Uganda holds regular procedural elections, substantively, the nation shows many signs of being an authoritarian state. Indeed, MacLean, Gore, Brass, and Baldwin (2016) refer to the nature of the regime in Uganda as “electoral authoritarianism.” Museveni forced through a controversial 2005 amendment to the Constitution to allow him to run for the presidency for a third term. Further, his percentage of the vote has been steadily declining from 75 percent of the vote in 1996 to only 63.8 percent of the vote in 2011 (New Vision 2015). Museveni was re-elected as President of Uganda in February 2011. Privacy International states that the electoral process was marred by widespread evidence of vote-buying and misuse of state funds. The removal of constitutional term limits has interfered with the development of multi-party democracy (Makara 2010) On February 18, 2016, Museveni ran for another five-year presidential term against Kizza Besigye, the leader of the Forum for Democratic Change, winning with 60% of the vote to Besigye’s 35% (Ugandan Electoral Commission, 2016). Besigye was placed under house

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arrest by the government for much of the time leading up to and during the election. Katusiimeh observes how Museveni has manipulated state institutions and the government in an effort to remain in power, and argues that he has brought “the state virtually under his total control.” (Katusiimeh 2017). He further observes that there has been a blurring of the Ugandan state and the person of Museveni, who has “concentrated power in the executive and himself.”

How External Donors Shaped ICT Policy In addition to understanding how Uganda’s post-colonial history has shaped the emergence of ICTs, understanding the arrival of ICTs onto the Ugandan policy agenda requires attention to the role of external donors. The late 1990s witnessed a global frenzy of deregulation, and as part of this wave, the World Bank emphasized an open trading regime, liberalization, foreign investment, and technology licensing designed in part to help open African telecommunications and ICT markets for external investment. In the late 1990s, donors, particularly the UN, promoted an ideology that verged on “cyber-euphoria” in Africa. Many believed “there could be a ‘cyber bullet’– the Internet—with the instant power to improve everything from gross national product, to health care, to education” (Lynch 1999; Opoku-Mensah 1998). Uganda entered the 1990s as an information-poor state. In the late 1990s, Uganda had only 70,000 phone lines, and citizens had to travel to Kampala to get crucial information. (Opoku-Mensah 1998). In that period, Uganda had one national telephone operator, two mobile cellular operators, two Internet service providers (“ISPs”), and two international data gateways. In the 1990s, telecommunications, computing, and information technologies began to converge. As a result, companies that previously could only provide telephony were able to provide Internet, Voice over Internet Protocol, and build infrastructure. At the turn of the millennium, Uganda was an attractive telecommunications market to outside investors in terms of telecommunications. Uganda’s communications minister at the time, John Naasira, observed that these untapped markets represented an opportunity for high profits in the telecommunications sector (Lynch 1999). The Ugandan Parliament explicitly wanted to encourage investment and also aimed for full liberalization. As a result, Uganda entered its ICT policymaking period with one of the most competitive telecommunications sectors in the region.

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The Uganda Communications Act of 1996 unbundled the postal service, the banking service, and the monopoly telecommunications agency and created the regulator: The Ugandan Communications Commission (“UCC”) (Nyaga 2014; Econ One 2002; Kiyingi and Mijumbi 2003). The World Bank was the driving force behind liberalization in all East African countries, but whereas some countries were saddled with “conditionalities,” Uganda received incentives, including increases in the size of grants and loans (Dasgupta 1997). The telecommunications agency was privatized (becoming UTL), with the Ugandan government retaining a 49% strategic stake and 51% being sold to a strategic investor from a South African consortium, with second and third national operators licensed shortly thereafter (Table 6.1). Multilateral donors were heavily involved in the Ugandan ICT policy process, and remain closely involved in both the ICT policymaking process as well as in funding and overseeing implementation. In the year 2000, the Uganda National Council for Science and Technology initiated the process of developing a national ICT Policy.6 The initial development of the policy framework was supported by IDRC, UNESCO, and UNECA and was completed in 2001. The draft ICT policy framework was submitted by the Minister for Works, Housing and Communication to the Cabinet in June 2002. UNDP provided funding for the implementation of the policy in conjunction with the Ministry of Finance, Planning, and Economic Development, and the UCST. Buoyed by the optimism surrounding information communication technologies, donors became heavily involved in both the development of Ugandan ICT policy, as well as in building out experimental projects. Table 6.1 Operators in the Ugandan information and communications technology sector from 1996 to 2015 Year

Telephone Operators

ISPs

FM Radio Stations

International Data Gateways

Television Stations

1996 2004 2015

1 3 5

2 17 36

4 117 292

2 8 8

4 22 28

Sources Uganda Communications Commission Post, Broadcasting and Telecommunications Market and Industry Report (2015); Kiyingi and Mijumbi (2004) International Telecommunications Union (2001)

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For example, the Acacia Initiative of the Canadian International Development Research Center (IDRC) readied five Ugandan districts for hook up to modern telecommunications through “tele-centers” that aimed to provide public access to a telephone, fax, email, and the Internet. The World Bank enthusiastically touted tele-centers as a mechanism for jumpstarting rural development reducing poverty. These one-stop shops were viewed as places to improve access to government services, market prices, education, and libraries (Opoku-Mensah 1998). Taken as a whole, ICTs have been a good investment for the Ugandan government, which receives revenues from the private sector, and grants from the multilateral sector. The funding mechanism for the RCDF is a 1% service levy of gross revenues on the annual turnover of all Ugandan communications service providers (Kiyingi and Mijumbi 2003; UCC 2014; USAF performance evaluation 2014). In addition to this levy, several donors helped to fund the RCDF including the Swedish government and the World Bank. By 2004, the World Bank credited Uganda with US $5 million under the Energy for Rural Transformation Project. By 2007, the country had received about $8.4 million from the World Bank, comprising about 50% of the RCDF’s operating budget. Complying with the wishes of the multilateral donors and pursuing an aggressive ICT policy has helped fill the coffers of the Ugandan government. The Ugandan case stands out because distribution of the infrastructure by the government has been influenced by a national vision and distribution of ICT artifacts has been broad and relatively even in public access points. Unlike its neighbors in Kenya and Tanzania which were undertaking similar reforms, the Ugandan government specifically focused on increasing the geographic coverage of service and linking telecommunications provision with socio-economic development and poverty alleviation (Econ One). According to his advisors, President Museveni “was concerned that the rural areas would be left out.” In addition to liberalizing Uganda’s advanced telecommunications environment, The Ugandan Communications Act of 1996 established a universal service fund (the Rural Communications Development Fund or “RCDF”) to be administered by the UCC. The Rural Communications Development Policy (RCDP) was commissioned in 2001 and completed in July 2001, with “the goal of developing communications infrastructure in rural Uganda, and ensuring that people in rural areas have reasonable and affordable access to communications services” (Kiyingi and Mijumbi

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2003; UCC 2014) The RCDF was officially launched in 2003. The fund has been guided by policy documents in the form of somewhat Soviet like “five year plans” spanning 2003–2009 and 2010–2014. The flurry of activity in the public sector had positive spill overs in the private sector. Expansion in the Ugandan ICT sector was rapid in the first decade of the new millennium. By 2011, the country had three cellular operators, 17 ISPs, eight international data gateways, 117 private FM radio stations, and 22 private television stations (Kiyingi and Mijumbi 2003). By 2012, Uganda boasted five major mobile operators as well as approximately twenty Internet and data technology providers (Ndiwalana and Tusubira 2012). Yet, the influence of the state and politics in Uganda’s ICT sector was already apparent by the turn of the millennium, and this influence was not always positive. Corruption began to seep into the ICT sector. Thirty percent of MTN’s interests in Uganda were owned by a Ugandan businessman, Charles Mbiire, who was also a close associate of Museveni’s brother, Major General Salim Saleh. Other politicians writing at the time noted that Uganda was missing an opportunity to create local subsidiaries to produce phone cards or assemble handsets instead of importing these accessories (Sebunya 2001). Meanwhile, at the same time that the private telecommunications sector was burgeoning, and multilateral flows were flowing into government accounts, the Ugandan government was making strides toward developing a regulatory framework (Econ One, 2002). By 2004, the Ugandan National Council for Science and Technology had formulated a National Information and Communication Technology Policy Framework (July 2002) to guide the growth of ICTs in the country and submitted the policy to the Cabinet for adoption. The Ministry of Information and Communications Technology was created in 2006 (Tusubira et al. 2007). This consolidation of multiple ministries with overlapping duties undoubtedly provided unified policy oversight, but it also may have been an effort by President Museveni to centralize control of the ICT Sector, as he has centralized many other aspects of the Ugandan government (Katusiimeh 2017).

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Analyzing Motivations: Explanatory Political Variables This section of the chapter discusses the empirical foundations which strengthen the theoretical idea that political influences represent can help us understand the manner in which ICTs have been adopted in Uganda. As documented above, multilateral donors were heavily involved in the Ugandan ICT policy process, and both funded and oversaw the implementation. What distinguishes Uganda is the unique way in which ICT, which arrived in many African nations as a continent-wide initiative, has been distributed. This paper presents fieldwork data which strengthens the proposition that in Uganda, ICTs should be viewed in part as a sociotechnical imaginary that politicians are trying to implement (Jasanoff 2015; Bowman 2016). Further, this paper provides empirical support for the proposition that the uneven placement of ICTs in Uganda may be explained in part by efforts by politicians to attract a witnessing public to a form of development (Ezrahi 1990); efforts by politicians to show a commitment to commitment to “modernity” (Mercer 2006) and finally, efforts by politicians to distribute a good which can be viewed as rents, club goods, or “pork” to citizens (Green 2011) or, alternatively, that Museveni believes that ICTs are part of the politics of attribution (Brass, 2016; Harding and Stasavage2014). Finally, I show the evidence supporting that ICTs can be used in less beneficial ways by politicians (Morozov 2011) Indeed, in Uganda, increasingly ICTs have been used by politicians as a tool for surveillance and censorship of political opponents. The relatively broad distribution of ICT artifacts in Uganda suggests that a vision of ICTs as socially transformative motivated the Ugandan government (See e.g., Jasanoff 2015). Kassimir (1999) observes that Museveni styles himself as a bit of an intellectual who has commented on Africa’s economic and social development. Importantly, Museveni has always advocated the developmental and modernization paradigms of his university education in the late 1960s and early 1970s.7 In an interview with Al Jazeera in 2012, Museveni focused on how Africa would transition “from backwardness to modernity.” (Burnett 2012). In a visit of the President of the Republic of Korea to Uganda in 2016, Museveni focused on the socioeconomic transformation of Uganda through the modernization of infrastructure, and the development of ICT (Museveni 2016). In a 2018 speech, Museveni emphasized the importance of ICT backbone

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as a kind of infrastructure, and noted the role of infrastructure, including roads, electricity and ICT as an “indispensable base of production,” and noted that through this emphasis on infrastructure development, the NRM has been able to “resurrect a small island of modernity.” Governments in East Africa have been caught up in the excitement of ICT as an economic driver, and possibly as a development tool (Bowman 2016). For example, Graham notes that the government of Rwanda has invested heavily in IT infrastructure to bring high-speed Internet connections to its remote areas (Graham 2010). Kenyan policymakers and businesspeople want to focus on the economic potential of international business outsourcing (Mann and Graham 2016). East African entrepreneurs have been inspired by the possibilities ICTs offer to work with businesses around the world (Graham 2010). This study notes that, compared to its neighbors, Uganda’s government has been aggressive at distributing the technological artifacts mentioned in that policy, placing technology in hospitals, schools, post offices, Internet cafes, and tele-centers. These accomplishments are particularly impressive given the fact that Uganda is the second poorest nation in the East African Community. Distributing infrastructure means reaching into the most remote rural areas, which is more difficult in an area with difficult terrain, or a large territory. About 82 percent of Uganda’s population is located in rural areas (Uganda Census Bureau 2014). Indeed, an emphasis on rural development is evident both in the third revision of Uganda’s poverty eradication action plan as well as the Ugandan Telecommunications Policy. History suggests that one lesson of the failed Amin and Obote administrations is that force alone is insufficient to rule Uganda. Accordingly, the Ugandan government has to make a convincing show of distributing desired goods and services throughout the country to stay in power. For example, Uganda’s establishment of free primary education is a dramatic example of an African government increasingly spending on basic service provision as part of an effort to maintain political legitimacy (Stasavage 2005). Arguably, the Ugandan government realizes that it can use ICTs to support the Ugandan government’s developmental efforts to provide basic services like health and education. ICTs can be distributed to key constituencies to make a statement to both domestic and foreign audiences. In this sense, ICTs simultaneously fulfill a “witnessing function” while also fulfilling a developmental function. Several Ugandan individuals who were interviewed—from academia,

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to government, to the private sector—referenced the political benefits of ICTs. Because they are highly visible, ICTs are useful for demonstrating that the NRM keeps its promises to rural voters. In the mid-2000s, the role which ICT might play in garnering rural political support was described by an executive from the Ugandan Telecommunications Limited Company. His comments point to both the witnessing function of ICTs, as well as the “pork” function. The ideology of the NRM is that you have to serve rural people. Most of the rural people vote in one block. To keep that block, they have to roll out services. If the roads are not tarmacked, they should at least be well graded. During the elections NRM made speeches. They said we brought you better telephone services. We improved your schools, your health clinics and your telephone. They will say, we brought your telephone here. You used to have to go to town to make a call. Now you can go to your farm, and call, and ask the price of maize flour at Owino Market.8

According to one Makerere Professor, the ICT project built by the government is “politically motivated.” His remarks emphasize the witnessing or political attribution aspect of ICTs. Some of these ICT centers are being set up just to set up. I am a politician. I want to show my communities that I am doing something, for them, so I build a tele-center.9

When asked why the Ugandan government and Museveni were so enthusiastic about supporting ICTs, a top official at the RCDF reinforced the idea that distributing ICTs has political benefits and emphasize that it is a visible demonstration of the “government supporting the people.” What he [Museveni] gets is very clear. It is the government supporting his people. And the Rural Communications Development Plan is one of the only national programs of its kind that has worked. Here, with ICTs, you can see what is being done, and it is being done throughout the country, in every corner: everywhere. And any president, even if he did not start the project, would want to be associated with it.10

The focus on rural distribution of ICTs in Uganda has been consistent and unflagging between the years 2004 and 2014. Observers in civil society lauded the government’s success in building infrastructure.

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For example, one observer noted that “there has been a tremendous development in payphones in rural areas.” A high-ranking official in the Ugandan telecommunications sector observed that getting ICT infrastructure to every corner of the country is crucial. He noted that the motivations for technocrats to complete the project aligned well with the political motivations of building a successful project that politicians could reference. If you leave out one district, you leave out several people. We tend to want to do it using professional motivation, not political motivation. But we get support from politicians because it is in line with them getting re-elected. So our interests are the same. It didn’t start with them as politicians, it started with equitable distribution. Along the way you meet stakeholders. You must get the stakeholders to guide the project, to own the project. And politicians are some of those stakeholders.11

This idea of stakeholders may also be relevant to the manner in which the ICT policy itself was developed. By engaging key parts of Ugandan society in developing the policy, the Ugandan government may be better able to get their buy-in. Part of the development of the Ugandan ICT policy was a public consultative process. The Ugandan government directed its ICT policy process through a unit called the National Planning Authority which established a national ICT working group. This team of approximately 15 persons had representatives from civil society and private sector groups interested in ICTs such as WOUGnet, CIPESA, Kabissa, and I-network, as well as numerous Ugandan government entities. NGOs and private sector organizations were encouraged to review the government’s draft and give comments, and the UCC held workshops with civil society, the private sector, academia, and parliament. According to one private sector respondent, “the participatory consultation was extensive.” During the development of Uganda’s ICT policy, relationships between the government and civil society sectors appeared to be cordial. According to one NGO leader, We have been called upon, participated and given input. The output is not ours. Almost everything [we] proposed was accepted. We got our words into the document.12

On the one hand, the civil society members comment that “the output is not ours,” points to the fact that although civil society participates, it

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does not have significant muscle or leverage to change the final outcome of policy. On the other hand, civil society, academia and the private sector had a voice in ICT policymaking, but in a controlled manner. Input from Uganda’s vigorous civil society has remained highly coordinated (Cannon 1996). This approach resembles a consultative or corporatist process (Streeck and Schmitter 1985; Moehler 2006) and is in line with observations that Ugandan civil society has been coopted (Tripp, 2010). Katusiimeh (2017) observes that civil society organizations exist, but are not strong enough to demand accountability from the national government. Although the consultation that the state conducted on ICTs may not have been as in-depth as some would desire, this paper suggests that the consultation process may be motivated by another, subtler form of thinking. Having a consultative process that engages large parts of society enhances the “witnessing” quality of the ICT policy. Large parts of the Ugandan intelligentsia were involved in forming and commenting on the government ICT policy, enhancing awareness, and possibly the credibility, of the project inside of their formal and informal social networks. The rhetoric of the RCDF, found in the ICT policy and the ten-year monitoring and evaluation report, suggests that the Ugandan government holds visions of ICT as a driver of economic growth, increased government efficiency, and social transformation simultaneously. The enabling language of the RCDF explicitly articulates a view that “Uganda’s rural and underserved communities should be able to harness ICT for social and economic development.” (UCC 2014). In fact, Uganda’s RCDF has successfully increased communication access in rural and underserved regions (UCC 2014). Uganda is divided into four roughly equal major administrative regions: Central and Southern, Eastern, Northern, and Western (Ugandan Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives 2016). As of 2015, Uganda had 112 districts, 249 counties, and 1403 sub-counties. (Ugandan Electoral Commission 2015). A conversation with former ICT Minister, Dr. Ham Mulira, provided a developmental focus on distributing ICTs to rural areas, which he viewed as necessary to attain economic growth, as well as to improve government service delivery. ICT can help promote growth. ICT can assist the government to deliver services more effectively and help ensure rural people access to

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markets, because people in the villages do not have the basic means of communication.13

Because basic forms of communication are not present in the village, giving rural citizens access to computers and connectivity, particularly in public access points, may be viewed as a form of “pork.” Pork and patronage are a prevalent aspect of governance in Uganda. One example of such patronage is found in the fact that the contemporary Ugandan state has experienced a proliferation of subnational administrative units (Grossman and Lewis 2014), which may reify ethnic boundaries while creating a sense of improved group control over local affairs. Green (2011) suggests that the creation of these new districts is a form of “pork”. Political patronage is the order of the day in Uganda, takes many forms, and is highly visible. The International Crisis Group believes that the Museveni government focuses on patronage instead of addressing widespread economic needs. (ICG 2017) For example, the cabinet boasts 72 ministers. Whatever the benefits of patronage to defined constituents, it is costly to taxpayers. ICTs buttress the already popular social justice and developmental goals of improved education and improved healthcare (Singh and Ovadia 2018). They are popular with donors, and they are “modern.” Much like roads and electricity, facilities such as computer laboratories in schools, tele-medicine facilities in hospitals, and tele-centers are a tangible, visible symbol of government effort which can enhance citizen perceptions of state legitimacy (Jasanoff 2004; Brass 2016; Hern 2016). By pointing to computers in schools and hospitals, Museveni and his political allies can demonstrate the contributions his government has made throughout the country.

Analyzing Successes: What is Going Right? This study has provided empirical evidence that the broad distribution of ICTs throughout the Ugandan countryside may result in political benefits for the government. On the positive side of the ledger, ICT policy in Uganda is an example of a functioning institutional capacity. Importantly, USAID has noted that Uganda’s RCDF is among a handful of African countries which has collected and disbursed funds, and built infrastructure, and that “it may serve as [an] examples to other African funds more recently formed or now becoming operational” (USAF 2014). Further,

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Uganda has one of the most competitive ICT private sectors in the Eastern African Community. Cyberoptimism: Visions Realized There is some reason for optimism regarding visions of ICT outlined earlier in the paper. Fourati suggests that increasing levels of mobile penetration are correlated with increases in GDP in developing countries (2009). ICTs constituted 6% of Uganda’s gross domestic product by 2010 (RIA 2012). The Market Information System in Uganda (MIS) has resulted in higher farm-gate prices, supporting the hypothesis—much ballyhooed at the advent of the new millennium—that market information improves farmers’ relative bargaining position vis’ a vis local traders (Svensson and Yangaziwa 2009). Extending this work, farmers in neighboring Kenya who participated in an ICT based MIS system demonstrated a positive and significant effect on labor productivity and land productivity. (Ogutu et al. 2014). Despite challenges with distribution, connectivity, and electrification, ICTs show great promise in Uganda in the health sector. One study looking at neonatal and infant mortality in Masindi and Kiryandongo districts (Mangwi Ayiasi et al. 2015) suggests that a combination of home visits and mobile phone visits positively influenced maternal and newborn care. Improved information infrastructure, among other upgrades, could improve health delivery services in East Africa (Gathoni and Kamau 2015). In a northern Uganda study, Yagos et al (2017) observe that healthcare in Uganda is decentralized, and Uganda’s rural areas lack qualified healthcare workers. They suggest that the use of ICTs may reduce the isolation of rural health care workers. One study conducted in Mbarara, Southwestern Uganda reported a high level of success for an Internet based, HIV prevention system for adolescents (Ybarra et al. 2014). Interestingly, this project utilized computers located in schools, thus indicating a potentially significant health benefit of increasing the presence of ICTs in educational settings. With regard to socio-political transformation, advocates viewed ICTs as “harbingers of a bright future with universal, ICT-supported, personal and collective empowerment”. Former Secretary of State Hilary Clinton trumpeted the perceived possibility of the Internet to “spread freedom and democracy” (Morozov, 2011b). Researchers have been intrigued by the “revolutionary” possibilities created by the mobile

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nature of cellular telephony (Molony 2012; De Bruijn 2008). Chambi Chachage observes that ICTs open new spaces for citizen engagement in Africa (Chachage 2010). Often, notes Molony, the mobile phone and radio are the only technologies owned by individuals in the developing world, indicating a democratizing aspect of these small and affordable ICTs (Molony 2012). Further, observers hope that the rapid growth of Internet use in Africa will democratize knowledge production (Ojanpera and Graham 2017). At a minimum, ICTs strengthen the ability of citizens to communicate with each other across regional and language borders through shared access points which may strengthen civil society and community-based organizations. These views have some basis. Grossman, Humphreys, and Sacramone-Lutz (2014) have found that opening a new SMS channel in Uganda increased access by marginalized groups to their elected officials. However, they also found that prices matter and that small increases in cost can really reduce the usability of such political communication channels. Deployment of ICTs in Education and Health Facilities Recent research on the use of ICTs in Uganda indicates that ICTs can be a useful tool, if adopted and implemented appropriately, to support educational outcomes, and provide young people with skills they need to participate effectively in the global economy (Landon et al. 2013). ICT hardware and software have been broadly deployed in Ugandan schools. By 2014, the government had subsidized 1027 school ICT labs. Computer studies has been made a compulsory subject for all schools in Uganda. Indeed, by 2014, according to the Ugandan government, 1027 of the 1150 government secondary schools (97%) have ICT laboratories. A field visit by the author to a secondary school computer lab in Jinja in 2015, and found it to be well equipped, with well-qualified teachers. The RCDF has pursued a strong expansion plan in the health sector. The UCC has focused its efforts on public facilities (Lyazi, 2015 In the health sector in Uganda, ICT is supposed to have two main roles. First, ICT is supposed to be used for data management, and second, ICT is to be used for clinical purposes. Each public general hospital in Uganda’s 112 districts is supposed to be provided with a basic level of computer support. In addition, each public hospital in the district should have three computers, connectivity, a local area network, and a “Wide

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Area Network” (WAN). Computer software is supposed to help doctors and government officials conduct analysis more quickly and efficiently. By 2014, according to the Ugandan government, all the government hospitals and 50 of the 144 health center facilities in the country were interconnected, and given access to Internet.

Analyzing Challenges: Failures and Warnings By 2015, the World Economic Forum ranked Uganda 116 out of 148 countries in the world in terms of its Network Readiness Index (Global Information Technology Report, 2015). According to this index, Uganda is strongest on affordability and is weakest on individual usage. The country scores relatively well on the political and regulatory environment and the business and innovation environment and scores lower on infrastructure and skills. Sustainability is not discussed as a factor in this index. As this chapter observes, sustainability remains a problem for ICTs in Uganda, in part due to challenges with electricity infrastructure. Challenges to Sustainability of ICT Infrastructure in Government Facilities Despite the successes with ICTs in Uganda’s health sector, however, challenges remain. Sustainability and usability continue to be a challenge for ICT facilities, both governmental and nongovernmental in Uganda. The Ugandan Communications Commission notes that at the inception of the RCDF in 2002, no post office had a postal tele-center. By 2013, 45 postal centers had ICT facilities in place. Despite these impressive efforts, connections between the rural government offices and the capitol were not as strong as one might expect, given the high level of distribution of ICT artifacts. A lack of electricity (Gore, Brass, Baldwin, MacLean, 2019; MacLean, Gore, Brass, Baldwin, 2016) hampers usability, and a lack of maintenance and technical support hampers functionality. Even government officials concede that the government has not been completely unified in its commitment to ICTs. In a candid interview, the director of the RCDF indicated that the. parent sectors, such as the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture are not doing enough to integrate ICT into their respective ministries.14

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Wells and Wells (2007) observed that educational ICT in Uganda reflects efforts to integrate ICT into schools and curricula, but with mixed effort and success. Further, as of the date of this article, many teachers, students, and subject areas lack access to ICT. As the millennium approached its second decade, this unevenness remained. The HIV intervention study piloted in schools in Mbarara, Uganda mentioned good Internet access in the schools utilized but found overall that access to the Internet in Ugandan schools was often limited (Ybarra et al. 2014). However, observations in a more remote area, Ruchinga, Uganda in the Southwest of the country saw far fewer computers, departing from the Ugandan government’s rosy narrative. Indeed, the only computer noted by the researcher in a secondary school was in the principal’s office. In addition, secondary teachers were often reduced to drawing a picture of a computer on the chalkboard, trying to label the different components on the chalk picture (Campos 2018). Despite vigorous efforts by the central government to distribute information hardware to the health sector in Ugandan rural areas, the reality observed in the field diverged considerably from the ideal. Indeed, fieldwork supported Katusiimeh’s assertion of poor infrastructure in public healthcare (2017). A 2017 field visit to a public hospital (Mukono Health Center IV) approximately 100 kilometers from Kampala revealed three laptops present. Conversations with doctors and staff members, however, indicated that two of the laptops were not functional, and the Internet was intermittent. More importantly, electricity was extremely unreliable, rendering it very difficult to use the computers at all. We received computers from the UCC two years ago. We use technology for creating patient records and ordering lab tests. We then send the records to the district health office. This has increased our efficiency because we can easily retrieve patient records. However, power outages are common. We can have power outages which last up to one week long.15

Finally, the doctors and hospital officials were unable to use the software to send data to the district health office. The software had not been configured in the same way at all government offices, and all hospitals.

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The Ministry of Health is not engaged. There is no unified software due to the lack of engagement. We need inpatient computing. We need ultrasound and imaging. We need standardized software. One doctor can talk to another doctor about a patient, but over email, not through a LAN.

As a result, doctors and nurses had to print out their data regarding patients and ailments and walk it across the road about half a mile to the district health office where the information was entered manually into the Ministry of Health’s system, nearly eliminating the benefits of electronic interconnectivity. Equally concerning, ICT facilities in rural Northern Uganda health clinics are often often “rudimentary and may not be functional” and many healthcare workers in Uganda lack the skills to operate ICTs, should they have access to them (Yagos, Olok, Ovuga 2017). Similar problems with sustainability, equipment function, and usability were found in the postal sector. A visit to the Jinja post office indicated gaps in maintenance and repair and business savvy. In 2010, the UCC donated five computers to the Jinja post office. Initially, postal officials stated that they had 10 to 20 citizens visiting the post office and using the computer daily. Yet, by 2015, only four out of those five computers were working. Further, the Posta employee in charge of running the computer center left. The staff of the Posta unit complain that the computers are slow and that since the computer specialist left, there are no customers. Further, despite technical problems, Posta still charges the same price as the local Internet cafes which offer on-the-spot technical support. Staring at the computers on clean desks with empty chairs, a postal official stated glumly, Customers can go somewhere else, get faster speeds, and help.16

These problems with technical support and hardware adequacy stretch to the regional government. A visit to a Resident District Commissioner’s office in Jinja indicated that the office had one computer, which the commissioner and the deputy commissioner share. The officials stated that they used the computer to write reports, type internal memos, and type press statements, and then send them to the national government with the Internet. The sub-county chiefs have not been given computers by the government, although some NGOs give them computers. Other subcounty chiefs buy their own computers. Regardless, as in the case of the health centers, reports are usually delivered from the sub-county level to

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the district level in person, with hard copies, again dramatically reducing the efficiency benefits of computerization. The increase in the proliferation of administrative units (Grossman and Lewis, 2014; Green 2011) may place strains on the resources needed to fully equip these new political entities. Importantly, merely receiving a computer is not sufficient to ensure connectivity. The deputy resident district commissioner observed, We need technical support. The government used to provide someone to repair the computers. The government used to pay for Internet and repair. Now our office repairs the Internet. More technology would be better.17

Finally, the lack of electrification represents a serious challenge to ICT access in Uganda, regardless of the sector. Indeed, the ICT healthcare intervention piloted at a school in Mbarara, Uganda discussed above had to rely on a car battery to power the router (Ybarra et. al., 2014). Although this solution is ingenious, it points toward a long term problem with technological sustainability. According to Yagos, Olok, and Ovuga (2017), most rural areas in northern Uganda are not electrified. According to MacLean, Gore, Brass, and Baldwin (2016), Uganda has one of the lowest electrification rates on the continent. The Ugandan government’s strong emphasis on the distribution of ICT hardware “artefacts” at the same time that the nation does not have strong electrification presents a policy and infrastructure paradox which merits further study. Cyber-Pessimism: Using ICT in Uganda for Surveillance and Control and Suppression Given the problems with sustainability in the Ugandan context documented above, the developmental benefits of ICTs may be more difficult to attain then originally envisioned (Sahay and Avgerou 2002). Critics have noted that many analysts have overly optimistic expectations for the developmental role of ICT (Avgerou 2008; Dobra 2012). Further, establishing the socially transformational effects of ICTs has been difficult (Byrne, Nicholson & Salem 2011). One set of authors used Sen’s capability approach and note that although perceptions of the impact of ICTs on the quality of life in Uganda are high, the actual impact was relatively low (Kivunike et al. 2011).

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Far before the phrase the Internet was a household word, Langdon Winner (1980) warned us that a variety of technologies including the automobile, the telephone, the radio, and the space program have been viewed as potential guarantors of democracy and social justice, yet failed to fulfill those lofty expectations. Theories such as those propounded by James Scott (1998) also support a darker view of e-government. Scott’s theories suggest the possibility that e-government could expand the reach and control of the state over its population. Although the Ugandan ICT sector is competitive in terms of a large number of outlets, most FM radio stations are owned by NRM politicians limiting how competitive the views expressed may be. Other limits on free speech are occurring. Increasingly, the Ugandan government blocks and disperses public assemblies (Human Rights Watch 2018). Authoritarian governments have been finding ways to use ICTs to control society through technical regulations, monitoring communications, and creating campaigns to co-opt social media. (Deibert 2015). Often, governments invoke “the familiar mantras of anti-terrorism and cybersecurity” to justify their actions (Deibert 2015). A range of countries are involved in such malfeasance, ranging from Egypt to China, from Ethiopia to Thailand. One egregious example of an authoritarian use of ICTs in Uganda was the use of malware against opposition leaders. In the 2011 elections, which were marked by significant violence, and attacks on the opposition candidates, the Ugandan Police Force and parts of the military used malicious software (malware) to infect the communication devices of opposition leaders (Privacy International 2015). The application FinFisher, purchased with Ugandan state funds, allows a person’s computer or phone to become monitored in real time. This effort targeted key opposition leaders, as well as media leaders (Privacy International 2015) The goal of this covert surveillance effort was to obtain personal information for use in blackmail. The Ugandan government is also attempting to set up a communications monitoring center. The Ugandan Parliament passed the Regulation of Interception of Communications Act, and the inter-agency ICT Technical committee invited bids from seven countries, including China, Israel, and the UK (Privacy International 2015) In addition to the Regulation of Interception Act, which makes targeting political opponents for surveillance illegal, the Ugandan Parliament passed the Anti-Terrorism

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Act in 2002, which permits significant discretion to intercept communications and conduct surveillance (Privacy International 2015). In a shocking move to limit free speech, a research fellow at the storied Makerere University, Dr. Stella Nyanzi, was charged in 2017 with “cyber harassment” and “offensive communication” for challenging the President and the Education Minister for failing to fulfill a campaign pledge (Human Rights Watch 2018). Such efforts present a strong counter to the narrative of ICTs as democratizing and also suggest that the Ugandan government is moving in an increasingly authoritarian direction. In addition to employing malware and engaging in ICT based surveillance, as elections in Uganda become more competitive, the Museveni government has attempted to censor political communication over ICTs. This echoes similar moves by the governments of Kenya, the Congo, the Sudan, and Egypt, to name a few (Deibert 2015). During the 2016 Uganda presidential elections social media networks such as WhatsApp, Facebook, and Twitter were shut down, to great outcry. (RedPepper Uganda Feb 18, 2016). This Internet shutdown was carried out by the electoral commission itself “for security reasons,” and lasted throughout the voting, until February 21, 2016. (ChapterfourUganda 2016) Mobile money services in Uganda were also affected during this period. The Ugandan government blocked social media again before Museveni’s inauguration in the second week of May 2016. However, civil society—and indeed, the very spread of ICTs—has proved a limit to such censorship. Interestingly, the government of Uganda was unable to impose a complete blackout of social media during the 2011 Spring’s “walk to work” protests (Privacy International 2011). Despite a direct order by the Ugandan Communications Commission for providers to shut down Facebook and Twitter, ISPs in Uganda declined to do so. Many Ugandan users were still able to access social media during the election using virtual private networks (encrypted private networks) (Propa 2016; CNN 2.18.2016). One of the numerous candidates challenging Yoweri Museveni’s multi-decade presidency, Amama Mbabazi, tweeted to his followers how to set up a VPN for his 138,000 followers. (The Atlantic, 2.18.2016) At least 15 percent of the Internetusing Ugandan population downloaded VPN software to return to social media (Motherboard 2016). A number of African civil society organizations, including two Ugandan ICT groups who were active in the ICT Policy planning process—CIPESA, and Wougnet—among others sent a forceful letter to the African Union, the East African Community,

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NEPAD, and several Ugandan ministries protesting the shutdown of the Internet which affected Facebook, Twitter, and other communications platforms.

Conclusion As this chapter attempts to illustrate, technical, social, economic, and political considerations “interpenetrate” and overlap in the arena of ICTs (See e.g., Horwitz 2001). The Ugandan government—through the leadership of technocrats at the UCC and RCDF—has distributed ICTs widely. This paper has argued that an examination of ICT policy and ICT distribution in Uganda from 2000 to 2022 indicates that the political benefits of distributing ICTs have made it possible to distribute a key technology broadly both throughout the country. This study provides empirical support for the contention that technology, and specifically, ICTs, represent a political resource in Uganda. This study has presented evidence that politicians in Uganda have used their placement of ICTs in an attestive manner, creating infrastructure that can be “witnessed” by the public as evidence of development (Ezrahi 1990) in part as a form of “pork barrel” or rents which can be distributed to constituents (Green 2011). ICTs are used by politicians in Uganda to demonstrate their commitment to modernity, nation-building, and economic development to both internal and external audiences. Despite the enthusiasm and utopian visions surrounding the application of ICTs in the developing world, this study has presented evidence that Uganda faces significant challenges with regard to the sustainability of this technology. Ensuring access to ICTs in rural Uganda presents technical, policy, and human resource challenges. The government’s approach is top-down. Further, technology has not been distributed evenly throughout the country, nor have all sectors benefited to the same extent. Fourati (2009) observes that although Uganda had been cited by the ITU as an example of best practices in terms of universal services, ICT infrastructure and services remain low in the country. This study provides empirical support for that contention. A lack of electrification in Uganda—with less than twenty percent of households with electricity— means that ICTs often cannot be used to their full effect (MacLean et al. 2016). Importantly, although the Ugandan government has placed a high degree of emphasis on the distribution of artifacts and infrastructure, insufficient efforts have been paid to the sustainability of the

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technology. As Kleine observes, a more bottom-up approach with a focus on participation may reduce the failure rate, and increase the holistic benefit of ICT technology (2010). One takeaway from the examination of ICTs in Uganda is that a naïve supply side approach does not—in and of itself—automatically increase access. Buying hardware alone, which is to say the computers themselves, and placing them in tele-centers, post offices, schools, and hospitals in rural towns accomplishes little, particularly when required electricity is unavailable and intermittent. Repair and maintenance of ICTs remain problematic, even in key government facilities. Skilled workers are needed to train others to use and maintain the technology (Steinberg 2003). Electricity is uneven, the software is incompatible, Internet is sporadic, and language barriers remain, limiting the usability of this promising technology. The Ugandan state has addressed different policy priorities unevenly, and in ways that may conflict with each other. Finally, despite the optimistic visions of the use of ICTs in Africa at the beginning of the twenty-first century, ICT is not inherently democratizing (Morozov 2012). The story of Ugandan ICTs reveals that the government can, and does use ICTs for repression. In 2011 and 2016, the Ugandan government used ICTs for surveillance of the opposition and social control. Diffusing ICT to Uganda, the African continent, or the developing world presents a complex set of interrelated problems. These problems comprise building technological systems that include regulations, and political decisions about placement, ownership, and control. These systems include commercial and state decisions about infrastructure as well as sociological concerns about access and human concerns about training and capacity to maintain the systems. A commitment to transparency and accountability can help ensure that the technology, which is in and of itself neutral, is used, on balance, for good and not for ill.

Notes 1. Samuelson (1954) observed that public goods are generally undersupplied by market based arrangements. Accordingly, government intervention is often required to correct these deficiencies. 2. Braman observes that an interdisciplinary approach to information policy considers information and communications technologies, applications, users, institutions, business and cultures. It brings within its umbrella policy issues “as disparate as access to broadband networks, privacy rights,

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3. 4.

5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

and intellectual property into the same conversation.” This article utilizes such an umbrella approach. Braman at 2. This approach may also be viewed as the politics of attribution (Brass 2016, Harding and Stasavage 2014). Documentary sources examined include government documents, including draft ICT policies, final policies, legislation, regulations, government websites, and comments of stakeholders, agendas of meetings, notes and minutes by participants in key meetings among others. The project also draws on press reports on ICT and telecommunications in Uganda. Finally, where appropriate, secondary sources of data, such as journal articles and summaries of meetings, form part of the data base. Sub-Saharan African countries often received loans with many conditions and rigorous oversight. Dasgupta at 1095. BL (2015). Interview with BL. Kampala. RCDF. Kassimir at 652. JB (2007) Interview with JB. UTL. MB (2007) Interview with MB (2007). Makerere University. BL (2015) Interview with BL. Kampala. RCDF. BW (2010) Interview with BW. Kampala. Ministry of ICT. DO (2010) Interview with DO. Kampala. ICT Related NGO. Mulira, H. (2007) Interview with former Minister Ham Mulira, Kampala, Ministry of Information Technology. Doctor 1 (2017). Interview with Doctor 1. Mukono Health Center. Doctor 2. (2017) Interview with Doctor 2. Mukono Health Center. Postal Official 1 (2017) Interview with PO. Jinja Post Office. Deputy RDC (2015) Interview with Deputy RDC. Jinja, 2015.

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CHAPTER 7

Rwanda: Rebuilding a Digital State from the Ashes of Genocide

Introduction The reopening of the Nyamata tele-center on August 17, 2007, was a grand affair. The Deputy Director of the Rwandan Information and Telecommunications Authority, Mr. Patrick Nyirishema, cut the red ribbon to much applause. In attendance were representatives from the national electric, gas, and water companies, development representatives, local government officials, and various businessmen. An audience of local citizens filled every folding chair in the room. Many of the women were attired in Rwanda’s simple yet elegant national dress: a silk sleeveless top covered by a floor length piece of patterned chiffon draped over one shoulder and belted at the waist. In the manner of formal African celebrations, the eminent personages were seated at a high table on the side of the room. Speeches were delivered in Kinyarwanda and simultaneously translated into English. A representative of the Rwandan Development Gateway noted that the nation had a goal to build two hundred tele-centers and told the assembled crowd that “tele-centers will show that ICTs can benefit people of all walks of life, not just the very educated.” Ten Rwandese schoolchildren sang a song in Kinyarwanda. Accompanied by cardboard props representing technology, the children then performed a humorous skit that

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they had written themselves about the ways in which their lives would be transformed by the ability to use computers. Nyamata is close to Kigali. Yet poor roads extend its distance from the capital. Nevertheless, the Nyamata tele-center has grown from its beginnings in 2004 when it had six desktop computers, six chairs, six tables, and two employees. The tele-center provides valuable services in high demand in the community. For a small fee, community members may utilize a veritable cornucopia of services. Two full-time staff members provide secretarial services, lessons about what the Internet is and how to browse the Internet, small business support services, receipt and delivery of federal express packages, translation of documents, and even charging of cellular phones. Despite the opportunities and resources it provides, by 2007, the Nyamata-tele-center already faced serious challenges. Of four tele-centers established by the Academy for Educational Development in 2004 with support from USAID, three (in Gitarama, Nyanza, and Nyagatare) collapsed because they were unable to cover their expenses. Only Nyamata (founded in October 2004) remains active, making it the oldest telecenter in Rwanda. The technical components of the tele-center, including the computers, the scanner, and the fax, are not fully utilized, in part because few people in Nyamata read English. Rwandan literacy rates are low even in the native tongue of Kinyarwanda. In his speech, Nyamata tele-center founder Paul Barera referred to infrastructural challenges that occasionally stop the tele-center from operating. The Internet network at the center often goes down owing to power shortages. Outages lasting up to two days mean that tele-centers cannot always recharge the batteries for their generator on a daily basis. As a result, electricity supply remains uneven, cutting deeply into profitability, as without electricity computers are simply inert metal boxes. Internet connectivity is expensive, more than most community members can pay. Despite the best efforts of Barera to expand the tele-center’s revenue stream, the services provided are costly compared with the purchasing power of the local people. The problem is not a lack of vision, energy, or commitment. Rather, the questions are whether these noble efforts are financially sustainable and whether the capacity of indigenous Rwandans is sufficient to maintain this technology over the long term. The Rwandan state took responsibility for the development of information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure with the intent of rebuilding a shattered economy, turning Rwanda into a second

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world country, and modernizing the nation. Most of the early work of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) government, headed by the charismatic president and former RPF general Paul Kagame, was devoted to rebuilding and reconstruction. The government’s work also included explicit exercises in envisioning a new nation. As part of its reconstruction effort, the government created a national consultative process in 1998–99 aimed at answering questions like, how Rwandans envision their future? What kind of society do Rwandans want to live in? What transformations are needed to emerge from a deeply unsatisfactory social and economic situation? These are fascinating questions. Rwanda’s future depends on eliciting meaningful responses from the people, but, as this chapter suggests, that effort faces serious difficulties because of institutional deficiencies that an ideology of technologydriven modernization may be insufficient to correct. ICT development is a central element in the government’s imagination of a modern Rwanda. As such, ICT policy is a key site for investigating the role of sociotechnical imaginaries in rebuilding that shattered nation. In the early twenty-first century, President Paul Kagame and the Rwandan state were in the midst of simultaneously building a variety of imaginaries, both political and sociotechnical. First, Kagame wished to knit Rwandans into a nation not divided by ethnicity or caste but unified in imagining a shared national identity. Second, he wished to rebuild a nation shattered by civil war and depressed by poverty into a modern state with strong economic prospects. Third, he wished to show that his government could provide for all Rwandans in terms of security, prosperity, and economic advancement. Kagame used ICT in particular to build this sociotechnical imaginary. He publicly performed a vision of Rwanda as a modern and prosperous country, projecting a desirable future for a country haunted by a bloody past. He believed, and indeed evangelized, that Rwanda could attain a positive social order of peace and unity, modernity and prosperity, through vigorous advances in science and technology.

Past and Future In 1994, humanity lost its way in Rwanda, a small, hilly, densely populated, landlocked country in central-east Africa (Uvin 2001). A civil war1 between the RPF, based in Uganda, and the Habyarimana government of Rwanda turned into genocide against Tutsis and moderate

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Hutus. Violence directed largely at civilians on the basis of ethnicity took “appalling, barbarous forms” (Allen 1999). The Rwandan génocidaires put their hands on the levers of state power, with deadly results (Mamdani 2001; Semujenga 2003; Dallaire 2003; Gourevitch 1998). The international community, including the United Nations (UN) and the United States, stood by and watched passively (Dallaire 2003; Melvern 2004; Allen 1999). Engulfed in violence and warfare, the Rwandan state and political system collapsed completely (Allen 1999). More than a million people were killed, two million fled the country as refugees, and approximately three million were internally displaced out of a total population of about eight million. Further, the country suffered a disastrous drop in professional capacity, particularly in science, technology, and public administration, losing a generation of teachers, entrepreneurs, civil servants, and doctors (UNDP 2004). The gross domestic product was halved in a single year. The nation’s productive physical infrastructure was completely destroyed (Republic of Rwanda 2000). Despite Rwanda’s devastating history and its status as one of Africa’s poorest countries, the nation’s self-proclaimed “ICT Champion,” Paul Kagame, imagined that one day Rwanda would be the information technology hub of the region. Following Kagame’s ascension as president in 2000, his government implemented a sweeping agenda to reshape the Rwandan economy and society. The government believed that information and knowledge, powered by ICT, would be the primary source for job creation, wealth generation and redistribution, and rapid economic development. Sociotechnical imaginaries represent collectively held, institutionally stabilized, and publicly performed visions of desirable futures (Cairns et al. 2022). In the South Korean national imaginary nuclear power was viewed through the lens of “atoms for development” (Jasanoff and Kim 2009). In the Rwandan national imaginary telecommunications and the Internet are viewed as “ICT for Development.” Kagame’s government envisioned a Rwanda in which citizens coexist peacefully and collaboratively to build an economically productive future. For Rwanda to move beyond the history of bloodshed and the failures of the post-independence period, the state would endeavor to create a unified nation out of two groups who are extremely close culturally but yet have experienced bitter and long-standing social and political divisions. The government reimagined a Rwandan nation in which ethnicity was not the key factor in inclusion or exclusion and in which real power

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sharing occurred between the Tutsi and the Hutu. Kagame and the RPF government attempted to provide the Rwandan people with a common narrative of who they were, where they had come from, and where they were headed (Jasanoff, Introduction). This new narrative emphasized linguistic and cultural similarities, attempting to elide the differences so sharply delineated and reified by the Belgians. The ICT policies embraced by Kagame attempted to implement three goals that together constituted Rwanda’s sociotechnical imaginary of mod erization and development. The first was the construction of Rwanda as an “African Singapore,” thoroughly modern, wealthy, and powered by ICT. The second was the formation of an inclusive and nonracial state. The final—and most externally directed—element of this imaginary was that of changing the political culture of the fractured nation, perhaps even moving toward a more participatory democracy. Technology, more specifically ICT, represented a “crucial constitutive element” in the emerging Rwandan national imaginary (Jasanoff and Kim 2009). Indeed, the RPF government could claim great success in distributing ICT infrastructure throughout the country. The government prioritized state reconstruction (Ottaway 1999), rebuilding heavily damaged telecommunications infrastructure, such as damaged phone lines, and simultaneously upgrading and replacing them with infra structure that can carry data. At the same time, Rwanda resisted adapting to a vision of its political future largely conceived by international donors. Donor money and advice flooded Rwanda in the late 1990s, aiming to create a Westernstyle democracy from the top down, as was also attempted in Iraq and Afghanistan. RPF leaders feared that this externally generated vision of governance in the Western mold would conflict with the nation’s peace and security. A discourse of democracy was adopted in Rwanda, but elections were not heavily contested nor competitive at the national level. On its face, a Western observer might cry foul; yet a persuasive argument could be made that simple reliance on majority rule would result in permanent disenfranchisement—or worse—for the minority Tutsi, the main victims of the 1994 genocide. Like the rapidly developing countries known as the “Asian tigers,” the ruling government in this small East African country determined—for good or for ill—that peace and economic progress were more desirable than Western-style democracy, at least in the short term.2 Since the Rwandan state has not embraced participatory democracy as understood in the sense of the European Union or the United States,

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neither the Rwandan people nor Rwandan civil society have had little input into whether ICT is a beneficial way for the country to move forward for development. In addition, Rwandans had little input into how this technology should be configured or where it should be distributed. They were not empowered to put forth alternative imaginaries. Instead, the government of Rwanda, firmly steered by the RPF, laid out a clear plan about how the building of ICT would proceed, a plan with little room for discussion and debate. So, will a top-down imaginary take hold in Rwanda? What is needed for it to become the shared goal of many rather than the vision of one leader or an elite few? Kagame’s vision of Rwanda as a modern, technologically advanced, middle-income country was clearly popular with both the RPF political machinery and donors. How could it be made popular with the common Rwandan? The former Soviet Union may provide a model for this kind of spread of a top-down ideology to the common people. The Soviet Union— particularly under Stalin—had a similar sociotechnical imaginary that combined manufacturing, technology, and production. Like Rwanda, which had just gone through a genocide, the Soviet Union had gone through the devastating Second World War, in which millions died brutal deaths on the Western front. Yet Russians today, with ominous repercussions, longingly remember the stability, the order, and the pride of the old Soviet Union. Stalin tapped into two key themes that tugged at the heartstrings of his fellow country people: pride and reconstruction. If Kagame can build a similar semblance of national pride and identity (which at this point is very much still a possibility) and overcome the vicious ethnic divisions of the past, there is a chance that his sociotechnical vision may take deeper root. However, this is no easy task. Kagame and the RPF government have had only decades to imagine a new nation, build a national identity, reconstruct the nation’s economic capacity, and push forward the image of a scientifically based economy while maintaining peace. The Rwandan leadership has been simultaneously involved in creating “an imagined political community” (Anderson 1983) and a “collectively held, institution ally stabilized, and publicly performed vision of a desirable future” based on ICTs (Jasanoff 2015). To make these two intertwined imaginaries take root together is not impossible, but the task may be Herculean.

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Embedded Hierarchy: Centralization as an Artifact of History ICT policy in Rwanda reflects and reinforces the nation’s tradition of hierarchical rule as well as the new economic and political visions for its future. Centralization in Rwanda reaches back centuries. In sharp contrast to its neighbors, Rwanda existed as a fairly coherent whole from precolonial times (Fisiy 1998). The Kingdom of Rwanda was a monarchy with an administrative structure that emanated from the court as early as the mid-sixteenth century (Melvern 2004; Fisiy 1998). A strong military system powered by an expansionist state began to develop by the eighteenth century. During the nineteenth century, the Rwandan state embarked on empire building and reached a height of centralization, becoming a powerful state respected by neighboring rulers (Semujenga 2003). The state system of Rwanda before the genocide has been characterized as “hierarchical, omnipresent and forceful” (Van Leeuwen 2001). Scholars note that Rwanda had an “entrenched culture of obedience,” which facilitated the swiftness of the genocide (Paluck and Green 2009). Before Rwanda came under Belgian rule after the First World War, there were deep cultural commonalities across the nation that made many ethnic distinctions meaningless (Mamdani 2001; Fisiy 1998). All Rwandese speak one language, Kinyrwanda, share one style of religious celebration, and perform the same set of traditions and rituals.3 Perniciously, however, the Belgians constructed artificial “racial” distinctions between the Hutu and Tutsi. Under colonialism, the Hutu were brutally discriminated against in all walks of life, and social divisions were reified and strictly enforced (Mamdani 2001; Semujenga 2003; Melvern 2004,). These actions privileged the Tutsi socially and economically (Fisiy 1998). Rwanda attained independence from Belgium in 1962, but the colonial ordering of Hutu and Tutsi into a visible socioeconomic hierarchy poisoned the period following Independence. As colonialism came to an end, the Hutu majority called for a change in Rwanda’s power structure that would accord them more rights (Semujenga 2003). In 1959 the Hutu Revolution called for majority rule and overthrew the Tutsi chiefs with the support of the Belgian government. In response to the rise of political majority in the 1959 “peasant revolution,” a first wave of killings against Tutsis took place, resulting in the deaths of 20,000 Tutsi. Those Tutsi who survived were expelled from political life and became stateless refugees. Many fled to Uganda (de Lame 2004).

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Kagame’s family belonged to this massive wave of refugees. Kagame was born into an aristocratic Tutsi family with ties to King Rudahigwa of Rwanda (Grant 2010), but the family lost all wealth and status as refugees. As a child, Kagame remembered houses burning as a Hutu death squad ran toward his family’s car. His family fled from Rwanda, spent time in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) and Burundi, and finally landed in Uganda in 1960. Kagame was raised in a Nshungerezi refugee camp in southern Uganda (Thompson 2004). As a refugee, he had to queue for food and study under a tree (Grant 2010). As Kagame reached manhood in Uganda, a 1973 military coup installed Major General Juvenal Habyarimana, an ethnic Hutu, into power in Rwanda.4 The coup led to a period of relative calm between the Hutu and the Tutsi; however, under Habyarimana, the Rwandan economy declined, corruption escalated, and health and education services collapsed. In the 1980s, Kagame fought in the bush in the Ugandan civil war alongside the leftist National Resistance Army organized by Yoweri Museveni, and, as a military intelligence officer, he helped Museveni ascend to the presidency. Both Kagame and Museveni were raised in Southwest Uganda, attended the same secondary school in Mnarara district, left Uganda for Tanzania in 1978 to fight against Idi Amin, and fought together against President Milton Obote in the 1980s (Green 2011). Museveni arranged training for Kagame, first in Cuba in 1986 and later in 1989 at the US Army Command and Staff College. Seeing the success of Museveni’s armed struggle, in the late 1980s, Kagame and his childhood friend from the Ugandan refugee camp, Fred Rwigyema, began building an army of Rwandan exiles within the Ugandan army, which would become the RPF. Despite Museveni’s support for Kagame, Rwandan refugees were not granted Ugandan citizenship. The Ugandan president encouraged the departure of Rwandan refugees back to Rwanda, because they had become a political liability in a country with its own long history of ethnic civil war. In October 1990, the RPF crossed the border into Rwanda, where they were routed, but a “low- intensity civil war” began (Reyntjens 2006). Kagame assumed command and rebuilt the RPF in the Virunga Mountains. On July 17, 1994, the RPF, led by Major General Kagame, defeated the remnants of Rwandan government troops and declared the end of the civil war. Four days later, under the Arusha Accords, a multiethnic Government of National Unity was formed.

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From the start, one of the most pressing problems facing the RPF government was how to enact the imaginary of a Rwandan nation distinct and separate from its bloody past and comprising a newly unified future. Under Kagame, leadership shifted to the Tutsi minority, which at the time comprised approximately 15% of the population; by contrast, the Hutu majority comprised 84%, and only 1% was Twa (Central Intelligence Agency 2007). As Mamdani noted early on, “Rwanda’s key dilemma is how to build a democracy that can incorporate a guilty majority alongside an aggrieved and fearful minority in a single political community” (Mamdani 2001). Kagame’s experiences as a refugee, as a stateless man alienated from his homeland, as a military commander raised up and then rejected, and as a rebel fighting for his people’s place in their homeland forged his iron personality. A passionate yet pragmatic man, his life was dedicated to righting an injustice, yet above all to surviving. Kagame was a military man through and through, trained and mentored under Museveni, himself both a nation builder and an autocrat. Kagame’s background, training and associations put him on a path toward authoritarianism. He also inherited institutions that had been crafted before, during, and after colonialism to support a style of governance that favors centralized, hierarchical rule. At the same time, the Rwandan state also inherited a nation whose civil society and administrative leadership had been destroyed by war. The most effective societal bulwarks against authoritarianism were missing from the start of Kagame’s presidency. A Phoenix from the Ashes? the Reconstruction Government Critics observe that Rwanda’s post-genocide government remains militaristic and authoritarian (Uvin 2001). The Tutsi-dominated RPF agreed to share power with the moderate Hutu parties, the Democratic Republican Movement, the small Social Democratic Party, and the Liberal Party (Lemarchand 2007). Over time, however, power became concentrated in the hands of the RPF. In 1995, Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu resigned and became an exile, as did President Bizimungu and other leading Hutu members of the coalition. Later that year, the moderate Hutu party, the Mouvement Democratique Republicain was banned on grounds of “divisionism.” Respected Africanist and scholar Rene Lemarchand states that “Rwanda had become for all intents and purposes, a oneparty state” (Lemarchand 2007).

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On April 22, 2000, Kagame became the fourth president of independent Rwanda. He was reelected in 2010 in an election that was considered “transparent and efficiently run” by some (CNN Wire Staff 2010). That he received 93% of the vote, however, called into question the fairness of the election. In his governance style, Kagame emerged as a player of established Rwandan political scripts as well as a ruler in the well-worn style of the African Big Man. Rwanda’s policy apparatus provides neither a tradition nor an established set of practices for participation by average Rwandans or, more strikingly, for the opposition to have a voice. Regardless of whether one is an admirer or a critic of the RPF government and its leader, Rwanda’s hesitant return to governability in the 2000s displayed few systemic checks and balances on the ruling party (Allen 1999). As the leader of a minority government, Kagame was under pressure to demonstrate that he intended to treat all areas of the country and all citizens “fairly,” partly in accordance with its mission of reconciliation and partly to ensure its own survival. According to former US Ambassador Herman Cohen, “In Brussels and Paris, Hutu intellectuals continue to plot revenge” against the RPF. Kagame himself observed, “Without successful reconciliation, political stability and security, private investors will not develop confidence in the country.” Despite this decorous statement, more is at stake than just the level of private investment in Rwanda. The very existence of the Rwandan nation is at risk because of external threats on the Congo border and internal challenges to Kagame’s rule. Inside the country, growing numbers of political opponents view armed resistance as a real option. Heirs to the Hutu Power movement led an insurrection at the end of 1997 in the northwestern provinces. Enemies mass at Rwanda’s borders. Burundi and the Congo house large contingents of exiled génocidaires who would be happy to see Kagame overthrown. On taking office, Kagame developed a strong national agenda (Ottaway 1999). His government aggressively pursued policies for eliminating the ethnic distinctions that led to the genocide (International Crisis Group 2002). It brought relative order, security, and stability to a country that had endured almost forty years of ethnic bloodshed. Eight political parties joined in the government of national unity. Kagame consistently respected the central tenets of the Arusha Accord and treated the accord as a fundamental law (International Crisis Group 2002). His supporters note that his government has been highly effective in rebuilding the country and responsive to the needs of the majority.

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The electoral system pays careful attention to the representation of various vulnerable social groups in both the parliament and ministries. Members of parliament are mainly elected indirectly by organizations of youth, women, and the disabled. On a positive note, as of 2004, Rwanda had the highest number of female parliamentarians in the world. Further, Hutu held at least fifteen of the twenty-nine positions in the 2004 government and thirteen of the eighteen ministerial portfolios. Participatory democracy, however, has been slow to take root in the new Rwanda. The International Crisis Group states that political parties are “only tolerated if they agree not to question the definition of political life drawn up by the RPF.” The party has banned local political meetings and grass roots meetings. It has banned opposition political parties and imprisoned political opponents. Indeed, Mrs. Victoria Ingebire, a moderate Hutu whose brother was killed in the genocide, returned to challenge Kagame in the 2010 presidential election but was placed under house arrest and accused of “genocide ideology.” Human rights observers have expressed serious concerns over government efforts to muzzle the press, which has resulted in the flight of some editors, including those of the formerly pro-RPF Imboni, into exile. One critical newspaper editor died mysteriously in an automobile accident and was found with his head nearly severed. The vice president of the Democratic Greens died of machete wounds days before the election. Dreaming of a Rebuilt Nation Nearly two decades after the genocide, Rwanda has crushing social and economic problems. In a country that ranks among the world’s least developed, approximately 60% of Rwandans earn less than a dollar a day (Baldauf 2007; Barigye 2008). Life expectancy at birth is only fortyfive years. Rwanda’s population is set to double by 2030. The economy is predominantly agricultural, and 91.1% of the population is actively involved in agriculture, with only 1.7% working in the industrial sector of the economy. The Human Development Index ranks Rwanda 165 out of 177 countries (HDI 2022). Against this background, the sociotechnical imaginary of ICT for development represents a crucial ingredient for Rwanda to transform itself from an agricultural third world country into a technologically driven second world country. In 2008, Kagame announced his aim to “use the power of science and technology to transform” Rwandan society

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(Kagame 2008). He sought rhetorical inspiration from the United States, promising to lever age science and education to permit “a more rapid socioeconomic transformation” and help the country make better development choices (Kagame 2008). He argued that he had a “developmental vision” and that he aimed for Rwanda’s public sector to play a leading role in this matter. Enormous support from the outside world for this vision translated into significant resources from donors. Rwanda’s economy began growing at 7.5% a year. It had a competent government with a transformative vision (Kinzer 2008). At the heart of Kagame’s vision for the country’s economic rebirth was a new technological tool: ICT. The RPF government believes, in a manner reminiscent of Walt Rostow, the father of modernization, that ICTs offer Rwanda the opportunity to “leap- frog the key stages of industrialization and transform her subsistence agriculture dominated economy into a service- sector driven, high value added information and knowledge economy that can compete on the global market.”5 Kagame asserts that “Rwanda is at risk of being... marginalized if she fails to embrace these technologies to transform her economy and society.”6 He believes the potential of ICT can help achieve the “vision of a modern economy for Rwanda.”7 Albert Butare, Minister of State for Energy and Communications, seconds Kagame, calling ICT “an indispensable tool for... modernization” (Bowman 2007b). Postulations of what ICTs and might mean for African societies frequently draw on modernization paradigm shifts about the development concepts (Chepkwony et al. 2018). According to Dr. Pius Ndyambaje—the president’s ICT advisor in 2004—Rwanda’s first ICT policy is borrowed directly from Malaysia’s Vision 20208 and Singapore’s vision of transforming the country into an “Intelligent Island,”9 using ICT as the main engine for promoting accelerated development and growth (Dzidonou 2002). It is hard to determine whether this vision is in competition with other competing choices because the government of Rwanda since 1994 has not been transparent. Indeed, Rwanda’s reconstruction has occurred through central planning, massive national consultations, and elaborate white paper guidance documents that combine Soviet-style planning with American-style motivational mission statements. Whereas in the American and to some extent the Korean cases the educational and scientific capacity to attain the desired sociotechnical imaginary was not at issue (Jasanoff and Kim 2009), in Rwanda the national vision of ICT as a socioeconomic engine

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did not evolve over time. Instead, it emerged fully formed from the forehead of a Zeus-like United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), in detachment from questions of the population’s actual capacity. Getting ICT on the Agenda The American discourse of the digital divide seeped into Africa gradually via multiple authors and international organizations. Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan firmly believed that, by overcoming the divide, ICT could help Africa’s developing nations to “modernize” while allowing them to pursue social welfare goals. Annan stated “Information and Communication technologies can help us turn the [potential for investment growth in developing countries] into concrete opportunities that will help the poor work their way out of poverty while, at the same time benefiting the world community as a whole.”10 The African Information Society Initiative (AISI) was launched concurrently with the rise of ICT as a social goal in 1996, only two years after the genocide ended and Rwanda’s Government of National Unity was formed. According to the UNECA, “Africa needed a common vision for its quest not only to bridge the digital divide between Africa and the rest of the world but more importantly to create effective digital opportunities to be developed by Africans and their partners, and to speed the continent’s entry into the information and knowledge global economy” (UNECA 1996). UNECA—a major donor body—encouraged the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Heads of State Summit to adopt the AISI in 1996. The initiative supported the efforts of twenty-eight African countries to develop “national information and communication infrastructure” policies. In March 2001, under Annan, the UN established an Information and Communication Technologies Task Force in part to support Africa’s drive for self-development. This project presumed that ICT can be used to contribute to the elimination of poverty, human development, the elimination of gender disparities, and the combating of disease. Indeed, Goal 8, Target 18, of the UN Millennium Development Goals urges the international community to distribute the benefits of ICT more equitably.11 African and global activists participated in internationally sponsored ICT forums such as the 2001 World Summit on the Information Society, organized by the UN’s International Telecommunications Union and

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endorsed by the UN General Assembly. The summit drew together civil society members, private sector organizations, governments, UN organizations, and other donors. Social activists observing the emergence of the new set of technologies recognized ICT as a potential economic and political resource and, importantly, one that acts as a vehicle to discuss long-held social justice objectives such as combating poverty, empowering women, and improving education and health care in a modern context. These activists followed the lead of US actors and set about creating a discourse that emphasized the need to distribute that resource equitably. This commitment garnered results. By 2012, the International Telecommunication Union had named Rwanda among the top six developing countries in the world in terms of the strength of its ICT market (Buteera 2012). Kagame again was in the lead. As cochair of the UN Broadband Commission for Digital Development, he called on world leaders to place access to broadband on the policy agenda of the Millennium Development Goals. His vision coupled ICT’s technological potential with imagined solutions to the region’s most urgent problems: “As we look to the future we realize that we need to do more and faster, the world is waiting, and our people are counting on us, whether it is central databases of crop yields and market information for farmers, integrated school curricula for pupils, and entrepreneurial opportunities for youth” (Kagame 2008). “Flying Geese” Versus “Utopian Computing” As Kagame’s words make clear, Rwandan advocates and policy makers imagine ICT as an instrument of social and political betterment, not just as a technological tool. A closer investigation suggests that two somewhat different imaginaries are at work in the Rwandan context: that ICTs will improve productivity and lead to economic growth and that ICTs will improve social and development outcomes. I refer to the first as “flying geese” and the second as “utopian computing.” Economists and technocrats predominantly focus on ICT’s contribution to manufacturing productivity. These advocates believe ICT can improve African participation in the global marketplace (Dzidonou 2002) as well as economic participation in the domestic marketplace for small businesspeople. This vision of ICT focuses on nationwide infrastructure and connectivity—particularly in remote and rugged areas—meaning electricity, copper wires, satellite towers, very small aperture terminals,

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and fiber optic cables. The vision of ICT as a rural economic facilitator also requires improvements in the educational infrastructure. Students will have to become computer literate—no small task on a continent where most classrooms lack glass windows and where sums are done on blackboards with chalk. A more utopian vision, held by civil society activists, sees this technology as a tool that can help develop social justice and perhaps democracy. Many practitioners and scholars have argued that ICT may contribute to improved social, economic, and development outcomes in poor areas of the West, in developing nations in general, and in Africa in particular (Eggelston 2002). According to these visionaries, access to ICT can empower women and give the poor increased economic opportunities while improving the quality of education and the delivery of medical services in rural areas. This most utopian version will require African governments to move from paper files to electronic files, invest in a well-developed infrastructure of electricity, fiber optic cables, satellite towers, and copper wires in both cities and rural areas and utilize healthy doses of political will at the national, regional, and multinational levels. The rapid economic growth of the Asia Pacific region between the 1960s and 1990s, termed by some economists as an economic miracle, provided the main source of inspiration behind Rwanda’s ICT planning. Following this flying-geese model, Rwanda seemed to be aiming to move up in technological development by following the pattern of the countries ahead of it in the development process (Radelet and Sachs 1997). On the basis of both his rhetoric and his planning priorities, it is clear that Kagame’s focus was on ICT as “a symbol of the power of science and technology that [a nation] should actively seek to acquire in order to develop into a strong, modern nation,” just as the Korean state once viewed nuclear energy (Jasanoff and Kim 2009). Yet the RPF vision of ICT as a socioeconomic driver lacks contestation, lacks debate, and lacks discussion with the grass roots. ICT policy in Rwanda has been developed and implemented by donors and the state, not crafted by citizens. Citizen Participation in ICT PolicyMaking Remarkably, Rwanda developed the first ICT policy in the East African region in 2001, but modernization was not a grassroots creation. It was the result of direction from the topmost levels of government. As of 2007, Rwanda had already issued two ICT policies organized in fiveyear increments. This process produced a detailed document with clear implementation indicators and detailed time frames widely discussed and

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admired by other governments throughout the East African region.12 One adviser to the Rwandan government notes that “This country is very hierarchical, and whatever the government decides to do, it will do, and society will follow in a [...] disciplined way” (Baldauf 2007). The representative from Duhamic—the main umbrella organization that oversees the nongovernmental organization (NGO) sector in Rwanda and one of the only strong NGOs visible in Rwanda—Mr. Innocent Benineza, stated his belief that civil society “had not been consulted enough in the National Information and Communications Infrastructure plan (NICI) process” (Bowman 2007a); however, he qualified that statement by saying that “many NGOs do not understand the importance of ICT” (Benineza 2008). Benineza believes that the government does listen to civil society but also asserted that the government’s lack of engagement with civil society results from the weak and inactive nature of Rwandan civil society. Benineza asserts that the government needs to make more concerted efforts to involve civil society in the policy process. One government supporter, a Rwandan with impressive foreign academic credentials who lives abroad, cautioned me to focus on the effectiveness of the government’s implementation, not on its autocratic nature. After all, there are many African governments that are autocratic yet not effective. For example, he remarked, “What would a farmer say about ICT policy anyway?” He observed that there are certain prerequisites for any person to participate in a consultation and that significantly more education and capacity building are needed in Rwanda to allow citizens to exercise democratic rights, such as participation. Drawing on democratic theory, an observer could contend that perhaps the citizens are not as well qualified as they might be, but the correct response nevertheless—particularly in a country like Rwanda, which is rebuilding society from the rubble—is to furnish citizens the opportunity to understand the ends and means of their interests, not to exclude them from decisionmaking altogether (Dahl 1989). In fact, this type of an approach informed the gacaca 13 process. Although a small number of “stakeholders” were recruited during the ICT policy development process, even the most generous account by government officials suggests that participation by the average Rwandan, or even elite representatives of major social sectors, was low. By contrast, the Rwandan government, multilateral donors, and the multinational private sector enjoyed high levels of participation and influence in the development of the Rwandan ICT policy.14 The second round of policy

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development increased citizen participation to the level of “placation” (Arnstein 1969), in the sense that a few handpicked representatives of civil society and the Rwandan private sector participated on the National Task Force. In the words of one official at the Rwandan Information Technology Authority, “There were stakeholders, but [the process] was not engaging the stakeholders. There were stakeholders in the writing. One consultant led the NICI I process. He engaged, but not as much as one would wish.”15 As shown above, the ICT policymaking process supports arguments that the RPF government’s idea of citizen participation is one of guided and controlled consultation. During the policy adoption process, Rwandan citizens did not have an effective way of voicing concerns about decisions the government is taking, with respect to ICT. Some argue that Rwanda is a society based on censorship and that those who speak out against the government are punished, imprisoned, or worse (Reyntjens 2006). Some observers believe that the government of Rwanda is guilty of cooptation or repression of independent forces in civil society. Indeed, according to the International Crisis Group, civil society in Rwanda “exist[s] between repression and coercion” (International Crisis Group 2002). Opposition parties are not given permission to register or take part in the electoral process, and dissent at the level of civil society is not allowed (Ansoms and Rostangno 2013). Accordingly, there is no social organization that can provide a voice of dissent or even mild critique and, for that matter, criticism regarding the direction, pace, and design of Rwanda’s ICT policy and implementation or any other policy issue. Equity, Education, and Human Resource Capacity in Rwanda Rwanda integrated ICT into the nation’s Vision 2020, which imagines Rwanda as a middle-income country. The NICI Plan 2011–2015 highlights ICT as an engine to transform the Rwandan economy, particularly in higher education. By 2013, Rwanda averaged about 8 percent growth a year, yet strong economic growth was concentrated in the hands of an elite. Furthermore, the country remained highly dependent on foreign aid (Ansoms and Rostagno 2012). By 2015, Rwanda had not yet attained its goal of becoming an information and knowledge society (Mukamusoni and Holmner 2013). The centerpiece of the Rwandan government’s effort to distribute ICT to the Rwandan population is education. Education is one of the

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eight pillars in the nation’s ICT policy. Education-related ICT projects are wide-ranging, and span training teachers, rolling out computers, installing Internet connectivity, pursuing monitoring and evaluation, writing content in Kinyarwanda, and digitizing math, biology, chemistry, and physics. Rwanda has made primary school education free and has extended this free education to the first three years of secondary school. As of 2008, the Rwandan government was spending 1.6% of its gross domestic product on the promotion of science. The government places an especially strong emphasis on science and technology in education. In the words of the director of planning for the Rwandan Ministry of Education, “We want to use ICTs for education. We want a skilled workforce.”16 One of the government’s key goals is to deploy the technological resources needed to implement educational reform and ICT initiatives.17 A specific objective is to “transform Rwanda into an IT literate nation” and improve the educational system over a period of ten years. As part of the process of attaining digital literacy, the government initiated a comprehensive program to deploy and “exploit” computers in schools. This effort included the placement of computers in schools, work to bring the Internet to schoolchildren, attempts to put a computer science curriculum in place, and a program to train thousands of teachers in basic computer literacy in cooperation with Microsoft. In 2006, the Rwandan government began placing computers in schools, both public and private. The aim was, by 2007, to identify every single school in the country and give each an identical number of computers, regardless of its size and location. Primary schools received one laptop each, while secondary schools were slated to receive ten laptops each. In addition, each of Rwanda’s thirty districts was to receive precisely one tele-center. Rwanda has received significant funding to integrate ICT into education from the African Development Bank, the European Commission, SIDA, DFID, and the World Bank (Byungura 2016). This distributive strategy essentially ignored a school’s needs in allocating hardware such as laptops. Giving each school exactly the same number of computers regardless of “need” maximized blame avoidance, but at the expense of educational utility or the efficient use of resources. Computers were distributed with little regard for general literacy, computer literacy, staff conditions, electrification, or student needs. To some extent, this blueprint for distributing technological artifacts evenly could have the perverse effect of actually reinforcing existing inequalities. Areas of the country that already had more schools would

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have more computers than areas that were educationally more deprived. At the same time, schools with extremely high student populations would receive too few laptops for their size. The adoption of such a numerically egalitarian notion of equity underscores the state’s power but also the perverse constraints created by the imaginary of equity in post-genocide Rwanda. The government was aware of the concern that sending out the physical artifacts of ICTs before attempting to accomplish other core social objectives, such as reducing poverty,18 or ensuring universal literacy (Baldauf 2007). But Education Ministry officials have a ready response: “Europe did not wait until everyone had a car before building airplanes.” Echoing these sentiments, Rwanda’s Minister of State, Energy, and Communications Albert Bu tare recounted in a 2007 interview an exchange with Rwanda’s development partners: “‘You are too ambitious. Do you really need computers and the Internet or [do you need] sufficient drinking water, good shelter and food?’ We said, [they are] not exclusive. We need all of them” (Kimani 2008). According to the Government of Rwanda, public services including education, health, and service delivery are primarily delivered through ICTs (Uwizeyimana 2022). The Government of Rwanda embarked on implementing a “one-stop” e-government. Initiative in 2014 in order to provide a number of online public services via a single portal (Bakunzibake et al. 2018). The “one stop” e-government approach is designed to allow various departments to provide public services and information via a single point of access. The Rwandan project was established under the name “Irembo” meaning main entrance in Kinyrwanda, and operates in French, English, and Kinyrwanda. The stakeholders include the Ministry of Information Technology and Communications (MITEC) and the Rwanda Information Society Agency (RISA). The Ministry of Local Government and all 30 Rwandan districts also help provide services through the portal. Scholars assessing the program indicated that there is a strong need for improvements at the local government level, and observed that the top-down design of the e-government technical systems created problems in terms of engaging local government in implementation (Bakuzinbake et al. 2019). The efforts to computerize schools in Rwanda must be termed a limited success. By 2019, 84.2% of schools in Rwanda had computers. One of Rwanda’s premier ICT efforts is the “One Laptop Per Child Program.” By 2018, the national pupil to computer ratio was about 16:1

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(Karunaratne and Hansson 2018). One of the major challenges to the full computerization of Rwandan schools has been the lack of infrastructure, and the high costs to acquire power, equipment, and connectivity. Another limiting factor to the success of the OLPC program, according to scholars, is the hierarchichal nature of decision-making in Rwanda (Karunaratne 2018). Technology during the Covid-19 lockdown was limited to children from well-to-do families in big cities, particularly in Kigali. Further, according to MINEDUC, only 30% of Rwanda schools had access to the Internet (MINEDUC 2019; Uwezimana 2022). Two major constraints on the dream of Rwanda as a technological hub include a lack of access to stable electricity, and a lack of education around digital literacy. 52.4% of Rwandans have access to electricity and as many of 84% of rural households lack electricity (Uwezimana 2022). These indicators suggest that Rwanda needs to increase Internet penetration in both rural and urban areas of Rwanda. Further, the government needs to ensure that mobile applications and government investment in the Internet focus on public service delivery. Importantly, 91.6% of Rwandan citizens lack computer literacy and cannot access smart devices without assistance (Uwezimana 2022). The Rwandan government has attempted to make some inroads into ICT distribution. One interesting such experiment was the allocation of 53,352 subsidized mobile handsets to rural areas through the nation’s Universal Access Fund in an attempt to enhance rural connectivity. Local governments handled distribution in their region (Björkegren and Karaca 2022). In general, most accounts were used in the rural areas that were prioritized. Further, recipients generally used these handsets in a similar manner to individuals who paid market prices for their phones. A significant digital divide exists between rural and urban areas in Rwanda (Uwezimana 2022). Further digital divides exist even inside the largest city, Kigali. Whereas areas of high ICT access exist in Kigali’s urban core, as well as the northeastern and southwestern Kigali, other parts of the city remain underserved, and ICT access remains gendered Cyber cafes remain a dominant means of accessing the Internet in Kigali (Otioma, Madureira and Martinez 2019). In Rwanda, mobile phones represent the main form of ICTs. Yet, transaction costs, operational skills, the high price of mobile phones, and a lack of digital literacy represent significant stumbling blocks for rural Rwandan farmers to effectively use ICTs to improve agricultural outcomes (Kabirigi et al. 2021). In addition, these authors found that raising the level of education is key to overcoming

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barriers Rwandan farmers face with regard to using mobile phone-based agricultural services. In addition, providing agricultural applications in a local language, such as Kinyrwanda, would enhance use by those with low literacy skills. (Kabirigi et al. 2021). The University of Rwanda represents the only public higher education institution after the merging of all former public institutions. The university has adopted an integrated computer-based management information system which utilizes software from South Africa. Training of university staff is still ongoing. Huge investments have been made in the Rwandan higher education sector for procuring ICT resources and digital skills development, yet technology uptake has not been rapid (Byungura et al. 2016). University staff indicated that they need additional hardware, software, and maintenance as well as skill training and awareness to make optimal use of the university IT system. Yet as scholars Byungura, Hansson, and Ruhinda observe (2019), buying software is not enough to ensure that it is used effectively. Scholars studying the implementation of this computer system indicate that additional work needs to be conducted to adapt the system to the institutional, cultural, political and social aspects of the University of Rwanda. Technology-based stratgeies are abundant at the national level, but less prevalent at the local and institutional level (Byungura 2016). Further, scholars recommend that the NUT should set up mechanisms to operationalize, implement, and monitor its technology policy. Freedom, Democracy, and ICTs in Rwanda Rwanda and its neighbor Uganda exhibit a high degree of similarity across regimes (Green 2011). According to scholar Green, patronage in contemporary Rwanda is centralized, and relatively invisible. Both Uganda and Rwanda, states Green, have created “semi-democracies” which have authoritarian tendencies. Opposition politicians in both countries are regularly arrested.19 The chain of accountability goes upwards toward authorities, not downwards toward the population (Ansoms and Rostagno 2012). Rwanda has one of the lowest levels of press freedom in the world (Freedom House 2022). Nongovernmental organizations in Rwanda face onerous registration and reporting requirements, several are banned, and others self-censor (Freedom House 2022). Rwanda possesses one daily newspaper and one television station. Covid-19 resulted in significant restrictions on public gatherings (Freedom House 2022).

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Given Rwanda’s experience with ICTs during the genocide, particularly with radio, it is no accident that Kagame wished to keep his hands firmly on the levers of ICTs. The deposed Hutu government used both official and unofficial radio sources to incite the genocide (Metzl 1997). The Rwandan media, encouraged by the Akazu—a powerful circle around the widow of President Habyarimana—attempted in 1994 to convince Hutu that they would soon be victims of a genocide mounted by the Tutsi (Chalk 1999). The Arusha Accords, signed in 1993,20 barred the government-owned Radio Rwanda from inciting hatred, so the Akazu created their own private radio station, the RTLM, blending African music, talk radio, and coded attacks on Tutsi and their allies, deliberately targeting youth gangs like the Intera hamwe (Chalk 1999). RTLM was founded in part in response to reforms that allowed moderates to take positions inside the Ministry of Information, which controlled Radio Rwanda (Metzl 1997). One may speculate that Kagame wished to keep control of the means of communication, including radio, television, and information technology, firmly within his own grasp so he could control the message. It was, however, precisely such centralized government control of the radio that facilitated the genocide. The RPF’s top-down approach gives the government more access to ICTs without addressing the structural dangers of centralized, top-down communications systems. What do these political indicators mean for ICTs? First, they indicate that over the period spanning 2000–2022, information technology remains firmly in the hands of the Rwandan state. Second, they indicate that the top-down tendencies of the Rwandan government are stable, and have not changed over this time period. Third, they indicate that the destruction of civil society and NGOs wrought by the genocide have been reified by the RPF as convenient to their top-down, authoritarian rule. Civil society has been as significant strength in Tanzania, and even more so, in innovative Kenya. Limiting the vibrancy of civil society can only limit the vibrancy of ICT in Rwanda.

Conclusion: Constructing Alternative Imaginaries As the first government to be elected to power after the genocide, the ruling RPF regime adopted a transformative vision of the role of information and communication technologies in rebuilding Rwandan society. The goal of nationwide connectivity proved successful in terms of securing the access of the average Rwandan to ICTs. However, the Rwandan

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planners envisioned and built a top-down, centrally controlled, state-run Internet. The Rwandan state succeeded in distributing hardware but was less successful in building capacity or local ownership and buy-in of the technology. Rwanda under Kagame has emerged both as authoritarian in practice, while democratic in form. At the same time, the Rwandan government appears to be “developmental” with a specific focus on economic growth (Galgiardone and Golooba-Mutebi 2016). Malaysia and South Korea represent two other states who have invested in ICTs as both a source of legitimacy and a source of progress. Kagame, say observers, has been unrelenting in focusing on ICTs as the path to Rwanda’s renaissance. For example, the GoR played a key role in securing investments by MTN, Korea Telecom, and Positivo BGH. An important part of the ICT story in Rwanda is that approximately 38% of Rwanda’s budget is donor funded (Gagliardone 2016). Kagame and the government of Rwanda have repeatedly announced their ambition to be an African Singapore, but what would this mean in practice? Singapore is wealthy and technologically advanced, but it is also autocratic and, with regard to human rights, repressive. The Singaporean government relies on the Internal Security Act “to hold, without charge or judicial review, those suspected of subversion, espionage, and terrorism.” Freedom of expression is sharply limited in Singapore. Government authorities curtail rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly. They deny legitimacy to associations of ten or more, if they deem the groups “prejudicial to public peace, welfare or good order.” The government requires police permits for five or more people planning a public event, and it uses contempt of court, criminal and civil defamation, and sedition charges to rein in critics (Human Rights Watch 2013). Accordingly, imitating Singapore economically comes with an implied imitation of its less than democratic process. Interestingly, the idea that African urban development should emulate countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea China, and India proved remarkably sticky, emerging in other African countries in the second decade (Cains et al. 2022). Kagame imagined ICTs as a gift from the state to the people, not as a collaborative or, even more profoundly, a grassroots effort. In Rwanda, the state is the dominant player in designing ICT policy (Galgliardone and Golooba-Mutebi 2016). This approach was implemented at the cost of

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determining what a town or a school actually needed or what was appropriate for people in particular localities. Increased participation might have slowed deployment, especially if it meant including people with little prior understanding of or use of new technologies. Nonetheless, the effect would have been to construct a more contentious but possibly more productive set of state-society relationships from those that the RPF found tolerable. Further, the effect would have been to educate the public and get them involved in their own development decisions. Given that Kagame selected a technology that evolves most quickly, and most innovatively from the users themselves, it seems a crucial oversight to keep Rwandan users in the dark about the power of this potential engine of socioeconomic transformation. By 2022, Kagame remained as Rwanda’s President, apparently mimicking his neighbor and former mentor, President Museveni in Uganda. Yet Rwanda remains in a very delicate situation, with a sharply divided population and enemies massed at the border. A class of landless, unskilled laborers is arising in the context of limited employment opportunities (Ansoms and Rostagno 2013). Singapore offers Rwanda the idea of stability, which gives the economy time to develop and the population time to become more unified and to gain the educational and technical capacity they need to compete. Transition to multiparty democracy and a free press shook neighboring Kenya to the core in 2007, nearly plunging the country into a bloody civil war. Indeed, to avoid ethnically based violence, the Kenyan press voluntarily chose to limit itself to messages of peace for nearly one week before the 2013 election. What alternative could Rwanda follow? A managed transition toward democracy on the model of countries like Ghana, South Africa, and Kenya might be an effective way to move Rwanda toward a more democratic future, while avoiding the backward slide of neighboring Uganda. The voices of smallholder peasants must be heard, and efforts at broad-based agricultural reform implemented, not simply a rigid technocratic focus on modernizing the economy through ICT (Ansoms and Rostagno 2012). Consistent with such a plan, an alternative socio-technological imaginary could have focused more on infrastructure and hardware sustainability, while acknowledging that agriculture remains the heart of the country’s economy. Given that fewer than 50% of Rwandans had access to electricity in 2022, the government of Rwanda’s rapid effort to distribute resources such as laptops seems at best loosely connected to a broader effort to create interconnected systems that could enhance the ability

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of the Rwandan people to communicate (Majtenyi 2008). This failure to put necessary infrastructure in place before distributing the artifacts of the proposed development is particularly problematic in the case of ICTs, which quickly become obsolete and require sophisticated human resources for optimal use. An imaginary rooted in concerns for sustainability might also have placed greater emphasis on grassroots participation. Local people need to be listened to, not just “consulted” or “educated.” There should be sufficient room for the voices at the bottom to be heard (Ansoms and Rostagno 2012). The citizens of Nyamata, and indeed, the citizens of all of Rwanda, could be talked to and incorporated into a decision-making process about how to make their tele-center more sustainable and what infrastructure as well as educational requirements they need to keep that tele-center running and to allow schools and hospitals to most effectively utilize new technologies. Criticism and input could actually strengthen the development of a durable, technologically sophisticated framework, as well as a durable system of governance that further develops with use. The creativity on display by the children of Nyamata on opening day could be harnessed to help design Rwandese software, write local content in Kinyarwanda, and acquire know-how to repair and maintain the computers. Under Kagame, dramatic changes were wrought in post-genocide Rwanda. The country elected more women political leaders than any other country in Africa and possibly the world. Progress has been made in attaining the political imaginary of Rwanda as a single nation uniting once fiercely divided social groups. Nonetheless, rumblings of discontent indicate that the process of national unification will take time to complete. Kagame and the RPF accused and jailed political opponents for “genocide ideology” and “ethnic divisionism.” Some Hutu leaders feel that Kagame—who appeared to be president for life, not unlike his neighbor Yoweri Museveni—has reinstalled the Tutsi as a de facto politically, if not socially, privileged group. ICTs can, of course, be governed in a top-down fashion, as is the case in China and Iran, or from a bottom-up fashion, as is largely— although not exclusively—the case in the United States. Because ICTs emerged in the West as an academic experiment, although one with government funding, ICT governance remained an unregulated and even anarchic domain for many years. Indeed, there are at least two types of

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ICT governance: the governance of the technology inside the technological community, for example, the distribution of domain names like Rwanda.go.rw; and the more overt regulation of gateways, access points, and information providers. In the Rwandan case, a largely authoritarian government created an interesting paradox. On the one hand, the government promoted broad access and national immersion in this innovative technology. On the other hand, access was provided, and controlled, by the state and not the private sector. And what the state giveth, the state can also take away. In many ways, Rwanda’s ICT policy presumed more capacity and more unity than actually existed. For the government’s ambitious efforts to be successful in the long run, dramatic strides must be made in developing the capacity of the Rwandan population to understand, manage, maintain, and make choices about both ICT and their own governance. This is, in its essence, an endeavor to nurture the capacity of the grass roots. Technological systems are social as well as material, and people need to have a deep enough understanding of and intellectual investment in technology to fully utilize it, maintain it, and prevent it from decaying and becoming obsolete. Similarly, for the sociotechnical project of a sustainable state to succeed, Kagame and the government of Rwanda must gradually step back from centralized control and make space for creativity, independence, and innovation, lest their efforts to build a new, modern, economically successful Rwanda decay owing to peoples’ lack of participation in and maintenance of the institutions of governance.

Notes 1. The Rwandan Civil War began in 1990. 2. My analysis is based on several visits to Rwanda over a four-year period spanning 2004–2008 during which thirty-five ethnographic interviews were conducted with high-ranking Rwandan policy makers, private sector participants, and nonprofit activists. In addition, I have consulted numerous primary and secondary sources. 3. In precolonial times, the designations of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa were historical social roles representing forest, pasture, and field, with social mobility among these groups. 4. The Habyarimana regime, which drew its strength from the Hutu of the north, broadened its discriminatory lens, discriminating against the Tutsi as well as against Hutu from the south of the country.

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5. National Information Communications Infrastructure Plan (NICI) I, preamble, para graph 5; NICI II, Foreword. 6. NICI I, preamble, paragraph 8. 7. NICI II, Foreword. 8. Information on Malaysia’s plans for information and communications technology is available at http://www.american.edu/initeb/ym6974a/ nationalictpolicies.htm (accessed December 12, 2008). 9. Mahatir Mohamad, “Malaysia on Track for 2020 Vision,” speech given on January 10, 1999. 10, “ICT: A Priority for Africa’s Development,” remarks by Kofi Annan to the Opening of the third meeting of the United Nations Information and Communication Technologies Task Force. 11. “Information and Communication Technologies: A Priority for Africa’s Development,” A Statement by H.E. Kofi A. Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations, contained in ICT Task Force Series 2 at xv. 12. The membership of the NICI-2005 Plan Steering Committee can be found in Appendix 2 of the NICI I Plan. The final plan was produced by Clement Dzidonou, a Ghanaian, in consultation with a steering committee consisting primarily of Rwandan government officials. Appendix 2: The NICI-2005 Plan Steering Committee, “An Integrated ICT- Led SocioEconomic Development Policy and Plan for Rwanda, 2001–2005: The NICI-2005 Plan. 13. The gacaca court is part of a system of community justice inspired by tradition and established in 2001 in Rwanda, in the wake of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. 14. As noted above, donors were crucial in the planning and development phases of the NICI process. The most important donor was UNECA. Donors have also played a key role in implementing the NICI process. Most other donors began their involvement in implementation of the NICI process after 2001. The donors who have been most involved after implementation in Rwanda are the United Kingdom Department for International Development, which has worked with the Rwandans on education and capacity building in the realm of ICT; the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, which supported the establishment of Rwandan Information Technology Authority and has provided strong support for the National University of Rwanda; and the United Nations Development Program, which provided significant financial support to the Rwandan Ministry of Infrastructure for the formulation of the NICI II plan and for the development of a feasibility study for the construction of tele-centers in Rwanda. Indeed, the United Nations Development Program worked with RITA, the Rwandan Ministry of Infrastructure, and the UNECA to supervise the completion of NICI II and to design Rwanda’s tele-centers, relying heavily on high priced

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international consultants. The World Bank did not begin showing serious interest in Rwanda’s ICT plans until 2005 but became very engaged at that point in the E-Rwanda program. Anonymous RITA Rwandan Information Technology Authority official, August 16, 2007. Bowman 2007c. NICI I, Strategy E. According to NICI I, the government of Rwanda also aims to develop human resources in ICTs; develop ICT applications for education; computerize the civil service, particularly within the Ministry of Education; develop the necessary standards for deployment of ICTs in schools; and create conditions that allow ICT to be fully utilized in education. Approximately 60% of the Rwandan population lives below the poverty line. Many indicators suggest that Uganda is more democratic than Rwanda. Somewhat confusingly, the Arusha accords began on August 4, 1993, before the genocide was completed, between the then government of Rwanda and the then rebel RPF, to end the three-year—old Rwandan Civil War. They were an international effort to bring peace to Rwanda that was not completely successful. The genocide began on April 7, 1994, against Tutsi and Hutu moderates, after Hutu president Habaryimana was killed in a plane crash on April 6, 1994.

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CHAPTER 8

ICT Infrastructure, Governance, and Telephony in Comparative Perspective

Introduction Providing citizens access to information and communications technologies, as suggested in the introduction, is a complex, multi-layered process. The transition from policy to implementation often requires an extended period. Policies must be written, laws must be passed, and regulations must be enforced. Once the governing apparatus of a nation decides that it wants to distribute ICTs broadly, it must then determine how to implement that decision, which requires interaction between the private sector, the public sector, and the nonprofit sector.1 Developing ICT infrastructure requires legal, physical, institutional, and human resources (Gillwald 2013). This chapter provides an overview of the development and interaction of these three interwoven elements of ICT in East Africa, and then proceeds to provide a more detailed discussion of how these elements look in each of the four countries under examination. A government can be very effective at some of these elements but not others. For example, the Ugandan government has made impressive strides at distributing hardware to many different sites including clinics, schools, and post-office. Yet, the Ugandan government has been less effective at interconnecting the hardware, installing the appropriate software, and making sure that the hardware and the software are maintained leaving clinics and government offices in Jinja disconnected, for

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 W. M. Bowman, Digital Development in East Africa, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22162-0_8

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example. Conventional wisdom is that Kenya is an Internet hub. The nation possesses more sophisticated ICT human resources than neighboring countries, allowing Kenyans to pioneer concepts like “mobile money.” These successes may be a byproduct of high levels of education and a culture of innovation. Yet, strong ICT outcomes cannot, for the most part, be attributed to the Kenyan government, which has largely taken a “hands-off approach” and has made few efforts to distribute hardware, software, or training to rural areas whatsoever.

Overview of ICT Access in East Africa Of the four countries examined in this study, Kenya scored highest on access for mobile telephony, Internet penetration, and computer ownership. Whereas close to 10% of Kenyan households owned a computer, less than five percent of Tanzanians, Rwandans, and Ugandans owned a home computer. This statistic correlates fairly well with per capita income. All four countries reported mobile cellular coverage rates in between 90 and 100%. All countries reported Internet usage in between 20 and 30%, with the highest Internet usage being in Kenya (29%) and the lowest Internet usage in Uganda (20%). ICT access, coverage, and penetration statistics must be viewed in the context of both population and wealth. Kenya has a national population of nearly 55 million, with a GDP per capita of nearly $2,007. Tanzania’s population is close in size to Kenya, with 59 million citizens, but a GDP per capita of only $1,136 per annum. Rwanda is dramatically smaller, both geographically and in terms of population, with approximately 13 million citizens and a per capita GDP of about $834.00. Finally, Uganda is more like Kenya and Tanzania in terms of population, with a population of about 46 million, but more like Rwanda in terms of GDP, with a per capita GDP of $858 (Table 8.1). Increasingly, affordability has become a critical issue with regard to ICT access. Inequality remains an issue with Internet access (Gillwald 2013). The issue of whether Internet access is available in any given locality comprises both an infrastructure and a governance issue. In addition, analysts should ask whether people can afford to use the Internet, which is more of a governance issue, although it has an infrastructure component. Importantly, electricity and electrification are a major constraint, and a major limit on access to ICTs. In all four countries under

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Table 8.1 Population, GDP, and other social indicators in East Africa Country

Population

GDP (p/c)

Kenya Tanzania Rwanda Uganda

54,985,702 61,498,438 13,276,517 47,123,533

$2007 $1136 $834 $858

Growth (%)

Electricity (%)

GINI index

Poverty

7.5 4.3 10.9 3.4

71.4 39.9 46.6 42.1

40.8 40.5 43.7 42.7

37.1 49.4 56.5 41.0

Notes Electricity refers to access to electricity as a percentage of the population; GDP refers to GDP per capita in US dollars as of 2021; Growth refers to GDP growth (annual %); GINI index is a measure of economic inequality. A GINI index of 0 represents perfect equality. A GINI index of 100 represents perfect inequality; Poverty headcount at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population). Source World Bank Data. Accessed August 2, 2022, https://data.worldbank.org/country

study, access to electricity is among the lowest in the world (Mugisha et al. 2021). As of 2020, 96% of the Kenyan population was covered by a mobile cellular network, with 94% of the population covered by at least a 3G mobile network, and 77% of the population covered by at least a 4G mobile network. Further, 47% of Kenyan individuals owned a mobile phone, and mobile phone ownership was fairly evenly divided between men and women. Approximately 18% of Kenyan households had Internet access at home in 2019, and 9% of Kenyan households had a computer at home. Kenya reported 47 active mobile broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants. As of 2020, only 16% of the Tanzanian population was using the Internet, and of those, approximately 8% of women in the country had access, and 19% of men had access. At least 61% of Tanzanian owned a mobile phone in 2016, but only 3% of Tanzanian households had a computer at home. Only 14% of the Tanzanian population had an active mobile broadband subscription in 2020 (ITU DDD 2020).2 Rwanda had 100% mobile cellular network coverage, which is the highest mobile telephony coverage among the four countries. According to the ITU, as of 2017, 22% of Rwandans used the Internet. In 2020, 9% of Rwandan households had Internet access at home, and two percent had a computer at home. In rural Rwandan communities, about four percent of households had Internet access, whereas 34% of urban communities had Internet access (ITU DDD Rwanda 2020). Rwanda reported 82 mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 inhabitants in 2020, but only

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43% of those were active. Further, the Internet penetration rate in Rwanda stood at 39.8% in 2017, but most Internet users were concentrated in Kigali, reflecting a high geographical divide (Uwezimana 2022). Although uptake of ICTs like radios and mobile phones was relatively high in Rwanda, with 36.7% of urban households owning a mobile phone, nearly 95% of those phones were owned by the male head of household (Muzo and Debnath 2022). Muzo and Debath suggest that better access to ICT devices for women would help them to build a more resilient rural-business network. As of 2020, Uganda surpassed Kenya in terms of mobile network coverage. As of 2020, 98% of Ugandans were covered by a mobile cellular network, 74% of the Ugandan population was covered by at least a 3G mobile network, and 40% of the population was covered by at least a 4G network. Unfortunately, the ITU did not report data on the percentage of individuals owning a mobile phone in Uganda, but did note that 61% of Ugandans have a mobile cellular subscription.3 In 2020, 4% of Ugandan households had a computer at home (ITU DDD Uganda 2020). In summary, Rwanda has the highest level of mobile network coverage of the four countries, but it is an outlier in terms of geographical size. It is closely followed by Uganda (98%), Kenya (96%), and finally, Tanzania. Rwanda had higher Internet access than Tanzania, but much lower Internet access than Kenya or Uganda. Kenya had much higher Internet penetration rates than neighboring countries, with 29% of Kenyans using the Internet (ITU DDD 2020) (Table 8.2). Table 8.2 Overview of ICT access in East Africa Country

Mobile Network Coverage (%)

Mobile Phone ownership (%)

Mobile telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants

Percentage of People Using the Internet (%)

Household Internet Access (%)

Households with a computer at home (%)

Kenya Tanzania Rwanda Uganda

96 95 100 98

47 61 NA NA

114 86 61 82

29 22 20 26

18 NA NA 9

9 3 4 2

Source International Telecommunications Union (“ITU”), Digital Development Dashboard. Data selected and organized by author. Underlying Data Available at https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Sta tistics/Pages/IDI/default.aspx. Accessed on May 27, 2022

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Institutions, Regulations, and Statutes Regarding ICT in East Africa Governance can help determine whether citizens of a nation have adequate access to ICT infrastructure, and governance can determine who has access, at what cost, and under what conditions. Importantly, “good governance” is a key element in ensuring the fulfillment of social visions of ICT as an economic driver and an enabler of social justice goals. In an ideal world, each of the four countries under study would have an enabling policy environment for investment, competition, and innovation (Gillwald 2013). Shortly after the advent of colonialism the British colonial administrations in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika became linked by a common telephone system in the 1920s. By 1933, the postal and telephone services had been consolidated and were managed by a single Postmaster General. The then East African Post and Telecommunications Corporation (EAP&TC) was the main provider of telecommunications and postal services in the region and was owned and directed by the three nations. In December 1977, the East African Community collapsed, leading to the breakup of EAP &T. Each nation then formed monopoly parastatals run by their respective governments (Chijoriga et al.). Legislative Framework for the ICT Sector In 1996, the Government of Kenya (“GoK”) promulgated a policy supporting liberalized competition among telecommunications providers (Mureithi 2017). The Kenya Information and Communications Act of 1999 recognized ICT’s contributions to development and provided the legal framework for regulating the communications sector in Kenya. The Kenya Information and Communications Act was passed in 1998. After the passage of the new Kenyan Constitution in 2010, the Communications Act was aligned with Articles 33 and 34 of the Constitution which provided for freedom of expression and freedom of the media respectively. The Kenyan Information and Communications Act was revised in 2013 in an effort to create a regulatory body which is, in theory, independent of political, commercial, or governmental interests. Kenya’s National ICT Policy Guidelines (2020) aim to guide regulation, encourage growth in the sector, and build ICT infrastructure and services throughout the country.

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Uganda established The National Information Technology Authority of Uganda through the passage of the NITA-U Act (2009). A later statute, the Ugandan Communications Act 2013, regulates telecommunications, broadcasting, radio, post, and data communication and infrastructure. Importantly, the UCA requires license holders to share infrastructure. The National ICT Policy (2014) tries to enhance ICT services in the government—the not-for-profit sector and the broader public (Nyombi 2021). The Uganda Communications Licensing Regulations (2019) provide for the regulation and licensing of telecommunication service. In 2018, the Ugandan Government established the National Broadband Policy highlighting the role of broadband Internet as an enabler for socio-economic development (“NBP”). The National Information Technology Authority of Uganda rolls out the operation of the NBP. In Rwanda, Law no 39/2001 created the Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Authority with the mission to regulate various public utilities. The Law was revised in 2013, and emphasizes the role of RURA as coordinating between licensed service providers, consumers, and the policy maker. Rwanda’s 2013 National Broadband Policy aims to transform Rwanda into an information society driven by “universal access to high speed, reliable, affordable and secure broadband infrastructure.” In 1994, Tanzania began to liberalize the ICT sectors in response to the Communications Act of 1993 and the National Telecommunications Policy of 1997, which provided the framework for sector reforms and private sector engagement (Sinda 2021). The Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority Act of 2003 represented a milestone in liberalizing Tanzania’s telecommunications sector. The Electronic and Postal Communications Act of 2010 (“EPOCA”) provides a comprehensive regulatory regime for electronic communications service providers and postal communications service providers. Governmental Entities in the ICT Sector After the breakup of EAP&TC, Kenya’s telecommunications sector was regulated under the Kenya Postal and Telecommunications Company Act of 1977, which entrenched KP&TC as the exclusive monopoly provider of telecommunications services. In 2000, Kenya created a new institution, the Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK), as the nation’s telecommunications regulator. The ICT capacity investment arm in Kenya

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is the ICT Authority. The Sector is governed by the Ministry of ICT, Innovation and Youth Affairs (Njeru 2021). The Ministry formulates, administers, manages, and develops policy in the ICT sector. The ICT Authority is supposed to rationalize and streamline the management of all government ICT functions, and enforce ICT standards within government. The ICT Sector in Uganda is governed by the Ministry of ICT, which oversees the sector and provides a policy framework. The Uganda Communications Commission (UCC) implements the provisions of the UCC Act in 2013, regulates the telecommunication sector (Nyombi 2021), and undertakes functions in licensing and standards, spectrum management, and tariff regulation, as well as policy advice and implementation. The UCC encompasses three entities, the Uganda Communications Commission, the Rural Communications Development Fund (RCDF), and the Uganda Institute of Communications and Technology. The RCDF focuses on rural communications development (UCC 2014). The Rwandan Ministry of ICT and Innovation monitors and evaluates the implementation of national policies, strategies, and programs to promote technology and communication (MINICT 2022). This ministry develops five-year sector plans aligned with national development goals. The Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Authority (RURA) was created in 2001 as a multi-sector regulator, which is responsible for regulating telecommunications, media, post, water, energy, sanitation, and transport. RURA also has responsibility for the Rwanda Internet Exchange and the Universal Access Fund (RURA 2022). Further, the creation of the Tanzania Communication Regulatory Authority (“TCRA”) as an independent regulator for the postal, broadcast, and communications industries allowed the TCRA to promote competition and economic efficiency in the sector, as well as protecting consumer interests. The Ministry of Communications, Science and Technology has three sub agencies. The Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority, the Tanzania Telecommunications Company,4 and the Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH). Universal Service and Access Funds in East Africa Universal Service and Access Funds are public funds which are financed primarily through contributions made by mobile network operators and other telecommunications companies. As noted above, the continent of

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Africa represents the region with the lowest rate of Internet Penetration (22%). Accordingly, if used wisely, USAFs can be powerful tools to expand communication services to underserved areas and populations (Web Foundation 2018). Over 68% of African countries have some kind of Universal Service Access Fund in place. If properly administered, a USAF serves as a collective investment mechanism for the telecommunications industry as a whole. The USAF approach tackles the problem of market failure in extending service to underserved poor and rural communities. Ideally, one of the principal policy goals of telecommunications regulators and ministries should be to make telecommunications services accessible to the widest number of people at affordable prices (Laddcomm 2014). Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and Tanzania all have active USAF’s, and all publish reports on USAF activities, although the outcomes of these funds vary widely (Web Foundation 2018). The most successful in terms of projects built and outcomes achieved is likely the Ugandan RCDF, and the least successful is likely the Kenyan USF. According to a 2013 ITU report, the Ugandan RCDF is a high activity fund, the Rwandan account was a moderate activity fund, and the Tanzanian UCSAF was a low activity fund, but no information on the Kenyan fund.5 According to UN Women, Kenya has $42.01 million in US dollars that have been collected but not spent, whereas Uganda and Rwanda have spent all of their collected funds. According to UN Women, by 2016, Kenya had not disbursed any funds (Web Foundation 2018). Uganda is one of a very small number of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa which publishes accurate financial reports regarding funds collected and disbursed (Laddcom 2014). Uganda has been recognized as one of the two funds (along with Ghana) which come closest to reflecting best practice in the development and administration of universal service funds (Laddcom 2014) (Table 8.3). Kenya’s Universal Service Fund (USF) The Kenya Communications Act (as amended) of 2009 provided for the establishment of a Universal Service Fund administered and managed by the Communications Authority of Kenya. Problematically, although Kenya is arguably more developed than its neighbors, it was a notably late entrant into the Universal Service arena. The sources of the Fund include levies on licensees, appropriations from the GoK as well as grants and donations. USAF Administration of the fund was not operational by

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Table 8.3 Universal access funds in East Africa Country

Year

Levy (%)

Nature of Levy

Statute

Kenya

2009

1

Tanzania

2006

0.3

Rwanda

2004

2

Uganda

2003

1

Levy on one percent of gross revenue charged on all communications licensees, including broadcast, telecom, post, and courier Levy on yearly gross operating revenue from all communications service operators including ISPs, post, and courier companies Levy on gross annual revenues, net of interconnection payments from all operators Levy on gross annual revenues net of interconnection payments, from all operators, including the postal service couriers and ISPs

Kenya Communications Act (as amended) 2009 The Universal Communications Service Access Act 2006 Presidential Order 05/01 of 13/03/ 2004 Rural Communications Development Fund (RCDF) 2002

2010. In 2013, Kenya passed the National Broadband Strategy. By 2014, Kenya’s USF had not yet been fully implemented (ITU 2013; Edwards and Bowman 2014). Mobile operators have resisted implementation of universal service targets, because in their view, they are already meeting their universal service obligations (Calandro and Moyo 2010). Tanzania’s Universal Communications Service Access Fund (UCSAF) Like its neighbors, Uganda and Rwanda, Tanzania established a universal access communications fund in December 2006. This account is funded through a 1% levy on telecommunications operators. As of September 2007, the Tanzanian Universal Access Fund was not operational, as no actual projects had been funded or built with these resources. The Universal Communications Service Access Fund (UCSAF) became operational in 2009 (Mwololo 2021). By 2014, Tanzania had prepared its initial UCAF Strategic Plan (Edwards and Bowman 2014). The purpose of Tanzania Universal Access Fund is to build telecommunications and ICT infrastructure and provide access to rural areas and the urban underserved areas through tele-centers and public phones, with an emphasis on serving the most economically unviable areas. The Tanzanian UCSAF has a ten member board which includes representatives

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of the private sector (Tanzania UCSAF 2022). According to Tanzanian Minister Ndugulile, with a population of just over 61 million people, as many as 86% of people in rural areas do not have Internet connectivity, compared with 44.6% in urban areas. The Universal Communications Services Access Fund will be critical to solving this problem. As of 2021, in conjunction with the World Bank, the Tanzanian government is aiming to ensure that the national fiber backbone reaches 80% of the population (Telecompaper 2021). Since 2009, the UCSAF has been instrumental in providing ICT equipment to public schools, establishing telecentres in Zanzibar, and providing ICT training to school teachers. The fund has also upgraded existing signal towers from 2G, 3G, and 4G to improve digital connectivity (Mwololo 2021). Currently, the UCSAF is working to extend communication services in 42 areas in Zanzibar. The UCSAF plans to extend communication services to 1235 wards, and has currently extended services, and built towers in 829 of those wards. Approximately 12.9 million Tanzanians are expected to benefit from proposed UCSAF projects, which will serve 3292 villages (Mwololo 2021). As many as 150 schools received computers and projectors as well as Internet in 2021/2022. Further, the fund will help extend Braille machines, voice recorders, and other equipment to special needs public schools. Finally, in 2021, the UCSAF provided ICT training to 621 school teachers in public schools that benefited from UCSAF school connectivity projects. Further, in conjunction with the Digital Tanzania project, the Tanzanian government hopes that the UCSAF can help ensure that remote areas receive access to communication services, including mobile telephony, and Internet connectivity (Malakata 2021). Rwanda’s USAF Rwanda’s USAF was established by presidential order in 2003 (Presidential Order 2004). It is managed by the regulator, RURA, and financed by a 2% contributed from licensees as well as by international donors. By the end of 2008, Rwanda’s Universal Access Fund had disbursed USD 1.49 million. By 2021, the government had disbursed RWF 3.828 billion, with most expenditure focusing on building telecom towers to increase network coverage in underserved areas. In addition, funds subsidized broadband at as many as 193 public and private sites was on lowering bandwidth costs and the extension of ICTs in rural and poor urban areas.

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Network extension is being accomplished by connecting key Rwandan institutions. According to RURA, Rwanda is implementing numerous projects using the Universal Access Fund. Yet a careful review of the literature revealed few statistics or tangible outputs. RURA claims to be working on supporting ICT Literacy in rural areas by establishing e-learning and e-service centers in rural areas. Further, RURA aims to subsidize bandwidth acquisition to the rural communities for private and public institutions. Finally, RURA aims to use Rwanda’s Universal Access Fund to support people with disability to have equal opportunity and access to ICTs (RURA Website 2022). According to UN Women, the Rwanda Universal Access Fund supports a competition run by Girls in ICT Rwanda which encourages girls to participate in the fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. Uganda’s RCDF In the Ugandan case, the distribution of the infrastructure by the government was coordinated through a national vision. The Ugandan government specifically focused on increasing the geographic coverage of service, and linking telecommunications provision with socio-economic development and poverty alleviation (Econ One). According to his advisors, President Museveni “was concerned that the rural areas would be left out.” Compared to its neighbors, Uganda’s government has been aggressive at using its universal Access fund to distribute the technological artifacts mentioned in that policy, placing technology in hospitals, schools, post offices, Internet cafes, and tele-centers. In addition to liberalizing Uganda’s advanced telecommunications environment, The Ugandan Communications Act of 1996 established a universal service fund (the Rural Communications Development Fund or “RCDF”) to be administered by the UCC. The Rural Communications Development Policy (RCDP) was commissioned in 2001 and completed in July, 2001, with “the goal of developing communications infrastructure in rural Uganda, and ensuring that people in rural areas have reasonable and affordable access to communications services” (Kiyingi and Mijumbi 2004; UCC 2014). The RCDF was officially launched in 2003. The fund has been guided by policy documents, much like Rwanda’s, in the form of somewhat Soviet like “five year plans” spanning 2003–2009 and 2010–2014.

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The funding mechanism for the RCDF is a 1% service levy of gross revenues on the annual turnover of all Ugandan communications service providers (Kiyingi and Mijumbi 2003; UCC 2014; USAF Performance Evaluation 2014). In addition to this levy, several donors helped to fund the RCDF including the Swedish government and the World Bank. By 2004, the World Bank credited Uganda with US $5 million under the Energy for Rural Transformation Project. By 2007, the country had received about $8.4 million from the World Bank, comprising about 50% of the RCDF’s operating budget. Complying with the wishes of the multilateral donors and pursuing an aggressive ICT policy has helped fill the coffers of the Ugandan government. By 2015, the Ugandan RCDF had completed an impressive array of projects, including School ICT laboratories, installation of broadband at 622 sites, retooling of 225 private school teachers, community ICT training, installation of education content in 246 schools, the construction of at least 139 Internet cafes, integrating ICTs into at least 167 health clinics and hospitals, integrating ICT into at least 46 post offices, and developing 226 government websites (RCDF 2015). By 2022, the RCDF could report more accomplishments, including the construction of 1000 computer labs in secondary and tertiary schools as well as universities. Further, the RCDF is funding a variety of ICT educationrelated initiatives such as 45 ICT clubs in secondary schools, continuing retooling of teachers, and community ICT training by utilizing local schools. One exciting project is providing ICT literacy training for small and medium enterprises. Strengthening ICT access at post offices and libraries continues. In addition, the RCDF worked with telecommunications provider MTN to build 22 3G base stations to provide broadband connectivity in areas unserved and underserved by the private sector (UCC Blog 2022). In sum, Uganda’s RCDF can boast numerous important projects in rural areas, and should also be commended for an excellent job of reporting on outcomes.

ICT Infrastructure in East Africa ICT infrastructure has several components. It includes hardware, such as the machinery, tools, and equipment which make up ICTs as well as software, which includes programs and applications which help run the hardware. Human resources and policy can be critical aspects of the ICT sector (Ominde et al. 2021). Some researchers have found

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that the presence of ICT infrastructure exerts a positive and significant impact on inclusive growth in Africa (Nchake and Shuaibu 2022). Well-developed ICT infrastructure reduces transaction costs, productivity, and firm output. Strengthening regional policy and regulatory frameworks which encourage a competitive ICT sector, and promote nondiscriminanorty access to critical ICT infrastructure can improve access to ICTs in rural and poor areas. In addition, complementary infrastructure, such as electricity, is critical (Nchake and Shuaibu 2022). Technological infrastructure still includes the wires and cables which comprise ICTs as well as electricity. Electricity is unevenly distributed and frequently absent in East African rural areas. In particular, many African countries have very low levels of electrical coverage or landline telephone coverage in rural areas, making it even more difficult for African countries to expand old types of infrastructure to accommodate new applications (Hesselmark 2003). In this new century, technological infrastructure still includes copper wire for telephones in addition to fiber optic cables, satellite towers for cellular telephone access, and connectivity to the Internet. As noted above, active Universal Service and Universal Access funds can play an important role in distributing Internet in rural areas. Strengthening the Internet Backbone in East Africa The Internet—which can be thought of as a massive global interconnected wide area network—relies on a “backbone” to carry data over long distances. These connections can be made via copper wire over landline telephones, over fiber optic cable, or via satellite transmission.6 Multiple—and often redundant—networks of cable, copper, or satellites ring Europe and the United States. The “Internet backbone” is made up of a large collection of interconnected commercial, government, academic and other routers that carry data across countries, continents, and oceans. It is a “network of networks” and consists of several high bandwidth connections that link together many different nodes around the world. Before reaching the “last mile,” Internet traffic generally travels through a national backbone often constructed by the national incumbent, with branches to smaller areas built by private telecommunications companies (ITU 2013). One of the challenges to getting Internet to rural areas is getting infrastructure connections for the “last mile.” In 2000, Africa as a continent possessed less international Internet bandwidth than the country of Luxembourg (ITU 2001; Hjort and

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Poulson 2019). By 2013, whereas 36% of individuals globally used the Internet, only 13% of Africans used the Internet (Hjort and Poulson 2019). These low usage rates are due in part to a lack of Internet infrastructure, including fiber cables, copper cables, wireless transmission using cell towers, and satellites. Before 2009, all data and voice traffic in East Africa, whether over the Internet or the phone, had to be carried over satellite, resulting in high tariffs, and delays (Buryamburemba 2008).Phone calls or data sent from East Africa often had to pass through satellite traffic in the UK or France before returning to Africa. Almost all Internet connections in the East African region were carried over expensive satellite connections (Barton 2021). Like a connecting flight from New York to Dallas that stops in Miami and Chicago along the way, these remote connections slowed traffic, reduced capacity, and increased charges. Accordingly, high-speed bandwidth—largely taken for granted in the Global North—was nearly unobtainable in many rural parts of East Africa until the advent of undersea cables. It is important to observe how much smaller Rwanda is than its neighbors. Rwanda, one of the smallest countries in East Africa, is 10,169 square miles. By contrast, Uganda is about 93,000 square miles. Kenya is nearly 225,000 square miles, and Tanzania is nearly 365,000 square miles. In other words, Rwanda is not even 10% as large as its neighbors, Tanzania and Kenya, and is about 10% of the size of neighboring Uganda. This size factor is significant because it is much easier to law infrastructure in a smaller country. In this sense, Rwanda is a major outlier. Further, Rwanda is completely landlocked. Accordingly, it must receive its regional fiber optic connections through neighboring countries: Uganda and Kenya in the North, and Burundi and Tanzania in the South and East. Between 2006–2014, submarine cables were brought to shore in Africa at landing points across the coast (Mahlknecht 2014). East Africa and the Eastern part of Southern Africa gained a fiber connection to the rest of the world for digital and voice communications in 2009 and 2010 through three initiatives, TEAMS, EASSY, and SEACOM. SEACOM and The East African Marine System (TEAMS) landed in 2009, transforming connectivity in the region. SEACOM is a private venture. By contrast, TEAMS is a public–private partnership between the Kenyan government and local operators (Waema and Ndungu 2012), in which the Kenyan government owns a 20% interest in the cable. The Eastern Africa Submarine Cable System (EASSY) landed in 2010. EASSY comprises a joint

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initiative of the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and other development banks, as well as the SEACOM cable system (Sinda 2021). A drop in prices was not seen as quickly as anticipated after the landing of SEACOM and EASSY, although quality and speed improved quickly, amounts of broadband available increased (Waema and Ndungu 2012). The arrival of submarine cables increased both average speeds and the amount of use of the Internet (Hjort and Poulson 2019). With the arrival of cables, ICT technology has become more useful to potential users. The arrival of the cables led to drastic drops in prices for ISPs, which generally pass on those lower processes to consumers. After a robust fiber connection was established for East Africa, each East African country faced the challenge of creating its own national backbone, while connecting to larger backbones in Europe, Asia, and America. The type of infrastructure needed to correct this deficiency is a massive and spectacularly expensive undertaking,7 which requires collaboration among donors, multiple governments, and the multinational as well as the indigenous private sector. China has prioritized ICT development, and has promoted the construction and interconnection of ICT in Africa as part of its Digital Silk Road Initiative (Agbebi et al. 2021). Some countries which have benefited from the DSRI include Tanzania, Kenya, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Cameroon, and Guinea, the Ivory Coast, and Sierra Leone. Chinese investment has helped the African countries to develop their infrastructure, while giving China access to consumer markets, and possibly also to rare earth minerals. China has acted as financier, builder, owner, and operator of the digital silk road. African projects are largely governmentto-government initiatives. Observers have expressed concerns that China could improve its efforts to use local labor, and observe local legal frameworks in Africa. Other concerns regarding Chinese infrastructure projects in Africa include weak efforts at high-level technology transfer, and the inability of African governments to recoup the costs of expensive ICT infrastructure installations (Agbebi et al. 2021). ICT Infrastructure in Kenya Voice cellular telephony began in Kenya in 1992, and data (Internet) took hold in the nation in 1995, with two ISPs Africa Online and Formnet. According to Mureithi (2017), the African Regional Centre for Computing introduced the Internet to Kenya. The Kenyan government officially recognized the Internet around the turn of the twenty-first

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Century. Throughout most of the 1990s, and well into the first decade of the new millennium, Kenya had a gateway controlled by the stateowned incumbent operator (Telkom Kenya). Internet connections were routed through satellite connections in the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean, with earth-based stations in Longonot and Kericho, which eventually used very small aperture terminals (“VSAT”). Internet connections were primarily routed through copper wire. By 1997, Kenya boasted 50,000 computers, but state-based regulation had to go through Telkom Kenya, limiting innovation and keeping prices elevated. Similarly, by 1997, Kenya had 77,163 people waiting for telephone services, but KP&TC only had the capacity to connect around 10,000 lines a year. The main switching exchange systems were outdated and obsolescent, prone to theft, and rodent damage and the network suffered from congestion. In an innovation which would herald the development of “Internet cafes,” KP&TC also licensed 250 telephone bureaus which offered faxes, telephony, and other services at reduced prices (Mureithi 2017). By the end of 2000, the ISPs built the Kenya Internet Exchange to switch local traffic, but Kenya Telkom shut down the Exchange because it interfered with the state-run monopoly. The Kenyan government began to build out the National Optic Fiber Backbone Infrastructure in the period of 2009 (Waema and Ndungu 2012). The competitiveness of the Internet market increased between 2001 and 2015. As of 2006, Safaricom and Celtel controlled the market. By 2009, there were four licensed GSM operators8 : Safaricom, Zain, Orange, and Yu, as well as seven main Internet Service Providers, including Kenyan Data Network, Wananchi Online, and AccessKenya. The Kenyan government used the opportunity provided by the building of SEACOM, TEAMS, and EASSY to strengthen the country’s internal Internet backbone known as the National Optic Fiber Backbone (“NOFBI”). As much as 4300 Kilometers of Kenya’s backbone was completed by 2009 (Kenya ICT Authority 2022). The first phase of the national backbone passed through 58 towns in 35 counties. By 2012, however, observers noted that utilization of the backbone was lower than anticipated (Waema and Ndungu 2012). According to the ICT Authority of Kenya, the second phase of the backbone was intended to extend 1600 kilometers, with the goal of linking all county headquarters. The national backbone is a project spearheaded by the Government of Kenya, under the auspices of the Ministry of ICT, and implemented by the ICT

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Authority. The project was funded by the Government of Kenya and a loan from the Chinese government and built out by Huawei Telecommunications Company at a cost of $71 million in 2012 (Agbebi et al. 2021). In terms of providing connectivity to the national and regional governments, the first phase of the national backbone project connected several district headquarters. The second phase of the national backbone project aims to connect all county governments with the national government. ICT Infrastructure in Uganda The cellular telephone was introduced in Uganda by Celtel Ltd. in 1995. The Ugandan government launched the National Data Transmission Backbone Infrastructure (NBI) to boost the usage of the Internet among citizens and government departments. Both the Ugandan government and the private sector have invested in data infrastructure. Looking at both government and private owned networks, the total optical fiber network covers about 12,000 km, and covers 49% of Ugandan districts. Uganda boasts 3,517 mobile towers, but an additional 3,500 are required for full connectivity. In Uganda, high-speed Internet infrastructure is planned in the same way as other national public services including roads, water, energy, and oil pipelines (Nyombi 2021). In 2018, the Ugandan government established the National Broadband Policy to facility the implementation of the National Development Plan (“NDP”). Uganda’s NDP recognizes that the ICT sector plays a central role in “enabling economic and social transformation.” In spite of a vibrant private telecommunications sector, and more than a decade of Ugandan Government initiatives for enhancing the utilization of ICT, pockets of the Ugandan population are left behind with regard to access to ICTs. According to the World Bank’s Open Data system of World Development Indicators (2014), only 5.8% of Uganda’s households owned a computer and only 17.7% of individuals used the Internet. As of 2014, then, Uganda’s level of ICT distribution was currently far below the world average of 44.2% of households owning a computer and 40.7% of individuals using Internet, and the Sub-Saharan Africa average of 9.4% of households owning a computer and 19.2% of individuals using Internet (World Bank 2016).

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Taken as a whole, ICTs have been a good investment for the Ugandan government, which receives revenues from the private sector and grants from the multilateral sector. These accomplishments are particularly impressive, given the fact that Uganda is the second poorest nation in the East African Community. Distributing infrastructure means reaching into the most remote rural areas, which is more difficult in an area with difficult terrain, or a large territory. Indeed, Uganda’s territory spans about 93,000 square miles. Approximately 82% of Uganda’s population is located in rural areas (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2023). Indeed, an emphasis on rural development is evident both in the third revision of Uganda’s poverty eradication action plan, as well as the Ugandan Telecommunications Policy. As noted above, the Ugandan government has been organized and assertive in using its Rural Communications Development Fund to bring infrastructure and hardware, and indeed, ICT training, to Uganda’s rural areas. The flurry of activity in the public sector had positive spillovers in the private sector. Expansion in the Ugandan ICT sector was rapid in the first decade of the new millennium. By 2011, the country had three cellular operators, 17 ISPs, eight international data gateways, 117 private FM radio stations, and 22 private television stations (Kiyingi and Mijumbi 2004). By 2012, Uganda boasted five major mobile operators as well as approximately twenty Internet and data technology providers (Ndiwalana et al. 2010). ICT hardware and software has been broadly deployed in Ugandan schools. By 2014, the government had subsidized 1,027 school ICT labs. Computer studies have been made a compulsory subject for all schools in Uganda. Indeed, by 2014, according to the Ugandan government, 1,027 of the 1,150 government secondary schools (97%) have ICT laboratories. The author conducted a field visit to a secondary school computer lab in Jinja in 2015 and found it to be well equipped with well-qualified teachers. The UCC has focused its efforts on public facilities (Lyazi 2015). The RCDF has also pursued a strong expansion plan in the health sector. In the health sector in Uganda, ICT is supposed to have two main roles. First, ICT is supposed to be used for data management, and second, ICT is to be used for clinical purposes. Each public general hospital in Uganda’s 112 districts is supposed to be provided with a basic level of computer support. In addition, each public hospital in the district should

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have three computers, connectivity, a local area network, and a “Wide Area Network” (WAN). Computer software is supposed to help doctors and government officials conduct analysis more quickly and efficiently. By 2014, according to the Ugandan government, all the government hospitals and 50 of the 144 health center facilities in the country were interconnected and given access to Internet. Yet, the influence of politics and cronyism in Uganda’s ICT sector was already apparent by the turn of the millennium, and this influence was not always positive. Corruption began to seep into the ICT sector. 30% of MTN’s interests in Uganda were owned by a Ugandan businessman, Charles Mbiire, who was also a close associate of Museveni’s brother, Major General Salim Saleh. Other politicians writing at the time noted that Uganda was missing an opportunity to create local subsidiaries to produce phone cards or assemble handsets instead of importing these accessories (Sebunya 2001). ICT Infrastructure in Tanzania Tanzania is the largest country geographically in East Africa, covering nearly 365,000 square miles. Tanzania’s population is close in size to Kenya, with 59 million citizens, but a GDP per capita of only $1,136 per annum. Tanzania’s per capita GDP is higher than that of neighbors Rwanda and Uganda, which are closer to $850 per annum, yet it lags far behind the per capita GDP of Kenya. The Tanzanian government issued a national ICT policy in 2003, which aimed to reach all regional and district headquarters by 2010.9 As Tanzania approached 2009, most businesses had developed strategies based on a low bandwidth environment. This was caused by the fact that most Internet access was obtained over satellite. Behitsa and Diyamett call this state of affairs “bandwidth starvation” (Behitsa and Diyamett 2010). As of 2009, Tanzania had one of the lowest rates of Internet penetration in Africa, at 1.55 per 100 inhabitants. In 2005, the Tanzanian Ministry of Communications and Transport issued a feasibility study for the Implementation of the National ICT Backbone Infrastructure.10 The study was issued by a National Steering Committee composed of eight government agencies, the Chinese Government, the Chinese International Telecommunications Construction Corporation, and the telecommunications development company WorldTel.11 The study proposed a national backbone network that covers all 21 regions of the Tanzania mainland. The cost of the network was

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initially estimated at between US $170 million and US $220 million. Most of this cost would be for the construction of the fiber optic infrastructure. Additional major cost items include ensuring an adequate supply of electric power and installing transmission equipment. The first major undersea cable (SEACOM) landed in Dar es Salaam in July, 2009, although its deployment was not as well choreographed as might have been desirable, with the result that very few ISPs connected to the backbone after it landed. Costs dropped sharply in Tanzania after the landing of Seacom submarine cable. The state-owned telecommunications company, TTCL, for example, reduced its Internet prices by 50% by October of 2009. Internet connectivity in Tanzania also improved after the introduction of fiber optic networks through the East African Submarine Cable System (EASSY). Like its neighbors, the Tanzanian government developed an Internet backbone project, the National ICT Broadband Backbone. The Tanzanian government has sponsored the construction of the National ICT Broadband Backbone (NICTBB).12 Work on the NICTBB began in 2009, with a soft loan from China of 170 million (Esselear and Adam 2013). The backbone is managed by a special unit in COSTECH. NICTBB connected to SEACOM in July 2009 and to EASSY in 2010. By 2021, NICTBB covered 7,500 km in regions and districts around Tanzania. The project envisioned that the backbone would be owned by the Tanzanian government, and operated by the state-owned TTCL. The government aimed to complete the national backbone by 2011 (Behitsa and Diyamett 2010). The national backbone project aimed to connect Tanzania with its eight neighbors: Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, the DRC, Zambia, Malawi, and Mozambique. In addition, the fiber consortium, which comprises Airtel, Tigo, Vodacom, and Zantel, has laid an additional 1500 km of backbone fiber linking Dar es Salaam, Dodoma, Arusha, and Moshi. The Tanzanian government has encouraged foreign participation to promote economic growth and social development. In addition, Tanzania has implemented a converged licensing regime, and has adopted a progressive licensing framework, facilitating the introduction of new technologies in the sector. These low costs of entry represent an important regulatory difference between Tanzania and its neighbors. Whereas Tanzania has attained a truly competitive cellular telephony sector, Kenya, with a much larger subscriber base, just recently emerged from a duopoly

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to license a third provider, and Rwanda still operates under a telecommunications monopoly. This regulatory and policy decision to have an open-ended licensing framework and low costs of entry for operators has had an enormous impact. Another major infrastructure challenge facing Tanzania that has a direct effect on the availability and accessibility of ICTs is electricity. Tanzania has a very weak electricity infrastructure (World Bank 2012; Esselear and Adam 2013). According to Esselear and Adam, by 2013, only 15% of the Tanzanian population had access to grid electricity. Tanzania often faces frequent power interruptions, and the only way to ensure a steady power supply is by having a back-up generator. One of the goals of building Tanzania’s ICT national backbone project was to improve economic development in Tanzania’s rural areas. Further, in building this infrastructure Tanzania’s government aimed to create a high-speed network to ensure that the backbone supports the latest generation of telecommunications applications. When completed, the backbone would provide long-distance telephony; allow transmission of large quantities of data, and extent Internet bandwidth throughout the country. In June 2008, Professor Peter Msolla, Tanzania’s Communication, Science and Technology Minister, claimed that “the government is in the final stages of installing the national ICT infrastructure backbone.” The Tanzanian government invested in local Internet exchange points, migration to Internet protocol version 6, and construction of the NICTBB (Sinda 2021). The government-backed NICTBB connected to SEACOM in July, 2009 and to EASSY13 in April 2010, extending over 7,500 km across Tanzanian regions and districts. A fiber consortium of mobile providers comprising Airtel, Togo, Vodacom, and Zantel laid an addition 1,500 km of backbone fiber linking the cities of Dar es Salaam, Dodoma, Arusha, and Moshi in addition to 400 kilometers of fiber inside of the metro areas of those cities (Sinda 2021). As of 2021, the NICTBB had deployed 7,910 km of fiber. In 2021, the GoT announced plans to extend that national backbone network from about 8,300 to 15,000 km by 2023 (Lancaster Telecoms 2022). The NICTBB is generally considered a success, assisting industries, businesses, and individuals and significantly increasing broadband connectivity in Tanzania (Agbebi et al. 2021, 8; Sinda 2021). In particular, institutions of higher learning have benefited by receiving last mile connectivity. Investment in the NICTBB has helped Internet access increase and voice costs to decline. In addition to the NICTBB, other

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technologies are used throughout Tanzania to boost connectivity particularly for the “last mile,” including very small aperture terminal Internet (VSAT), GSM, 3G, 4G, LTE, and microwave. Tanzania fully migrated from analog to digital technology ahead of the agreed deadline of June 2015 (Sinda 2021). Foreign Investment in Tanzania’s ICT Infrastructure The World Bank has collaborated with mobile operators and other stakeholders to sponsor the Digital Tanzania Program to help the country harness its digital potential, particularly with regard to high quality, lowcost connectivity, easily accessible online initiatives. The Digital Tanzania Program also aims to ensure that the digital economy drives growth, innovation, and job creation (Sinda 2021). The project aims to encourage private sector investment in infrastructure and services by creating a conducive regulatory environment (World Bank 2021, 61). The World Bank aims to strengthen a “thriving digital ecosystem,” in Tanzania by strengthening laws, regulations, and policies (World Bank 2021). The Digital Tanzania program aims to build digital skills, strengthening cybersecurity, and working to close the digital divide, among other goals. Tanzania is one of the countries which has benefited from Chinese investment in ICT Development. China has invested heavily in Tanzania ICT infrastructure as part of its Digital Silk Road Initiative (Agbebi et al. 2021). The NICTBB was financed in large part by loans from China’s Exim Bank of about $264 million (Agbebi et al. 2021). The (somewhat unoriginal) goal of the backbone was to provide high-speed ICT services at affordable costs in an effort to transform Tanzania into East Africa’s digital hub (Agbebi et al. 2021). Construction was implemented by the Chinese International Telecommunications Construction Corporation (“CITCC”) in collaboration with Huawei. Yet, critics state that Chinese investment in Tanzania’s NICTBB was not as successful as it could have been in terms of job creation and technology transfer. Jobs emerging from the CITCC were on the lower end of the technology value chain, and goods and services were restricted by Chinese procurement regulations (Agbebi et al. 2021). Technology transfer from China to Tanzania about how to manage the infrastructure could have been more substantive, and may be a long-term problem for Tanzania in the future.

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National Governance of the ICT Sector in Tanzania By February 2005, Tanzania had liberalized its telecommunications sector (Sinda 2021). The Tanzanian government consciously decided as a policy matter to create a competitive mobile telephony market, reducing the value added tax (“VAT”) on the sale of smartphones, and reducing taxation on mobile money transactions as well. The Tanzanian government has succeeded to a large extent on focusing on citizens in rural areas, and reducing Internet costs and voice costs. In addition, through TTC which has a mandate to develop telecommunications services and manage infrastructure, the Tanzanian government has played an active part in the development of Tanzania’s data infrastructure (Sinda 2021). Because of its progressive licensing scheme, Tanzania has created a highly competitive market for a variety of ICT services. This competition gives consumers more choice, and pushes prices lower. The Internet market in Tanzania is even more competitive than the cellular telephony market. By 2006, there were at least 25 internet service providers in Tanzania, the majority of which are Tanzanian owned.14 In addition, the subscriber base for regular telephony had exploded. This telecommunications explosion was facilitated by the presence in 2006 of 4 mobile operators, and least 20 data operators, and 2 fixed line operators. In addition, Tanzania boasts five national television stations and twentynine total television stations, five national radio stations, and forty seven national radio stations. After the introduction of mobile broadband, the mobile network operators are also the leading Internet Service Providers. Given Tanzania’s expansive geography and varied terrain, providers make extensive use of technologies such as VSAT, GSM, 3G, 4G, LTE, and microwave. Private sector independent service operators have also invested in network upgrades (Buddecom 2021). The example of higher education in Tanzania well illustrates how ICT infrastructure, hardware, and human resources interact to make an educational system function. For ICTs to be fully used in a higher education setting, ICT infrastructure is a necessary component, but far from sufficient. Indeed, for ICT to be optimally used in higher education setting, a university requires electricity, an Internet connection, affordable and available hardware and devices (such as a computer and a mouse), software, (such as an operating system), reliable electricity, audiovisual equipment, top management support, ICT skills among students and faculty (Pima et al. 2016).

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Institutions of higher education illustrate the interaction between the mere existence of ICT infrastructure and the existence of enabling conditions which make that infrastructure operational. For example, ICTs only work in the presence of electricity. In addition, even if ICT infrastructural components are available, and hardware and software are also available, students and faculty also need ICT skills (Pima et al. 2016). According to Pima, Odetayo, Iqbal, and Sedoyeka, a combined effort of the government and private partners, including Internet Service Providers, Data Service Providers, Cellular Network Operators, government agencies, and the management, faculty and staff of higher education institutions are required to optimize the use of ICTs in a higher education setting in Tanzania (Pima et al. 2016). This study found that broadband networks provide reliable internet connections to all institutions of higher education in Tanzania. High competition in Tanzania between ISPs is lowering costs and increasing the quality of services. Although cost was not considered to be a serious problem for access, electrical power cuts did pose a problem for students and lecturers. ICT Infrastructure in Rwanda The Rwandan genocide of 1994 resulted in the loss of more than one million people. The genocide left the Rwandan economy devastated and the nation’s infrastructure destroyed. After the genocide, the Rwandan state took responsibility for the development of information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure with the intent of rebuilding a shattered economy, turning Rwanda into a second world country, and modernizing the nation. Rwanda’s Vision 2020 aimed to turn the country into a regional ICT hub, and create a knowledge-based, technology-led economy by 2020 (Murenzi 2008). The Government of Rwanda claims that it has prioritized distributing advanced telecommunications services to rural Rwanda (Murenzi 2008). As part of this plan, the Government of Rwanda stated its intent in 2008 to develop a physical fiber network (Internet Backbone) linking all 30 district offices in Rwanda to provide nationwide coverage, with an emphasis on linking communities, schools, and health centers. A fiber optic backbone of 4000 kms has been laid across Kigali, districts and border posts. Yet, Rwanda has focused primarily on Kigali City, leaving out rural areas, including other cities and towns (Uwezimana 2022). Rwanda also has failed to generate infrastructure investment from the private sector, and some scholarly observers argue that most Rwandan

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people still lack access to e-services and e-government, particularly in rural areas (Uwezimana 2022). National Governance of the ICT Sector in Rwanda ICT Infrastructure in Rwanda is managed by the Ministry of Youth and ICT (MYICT). In Rwanda, the Ministry of Youth and ICT has responsibility for sector policy and strategy. This ministry develops fiveyear sector plans aligned with national development goals. Rwanda’s 2013 National Broadband Policy aims to transform Rwanda into an information society driven by “universal access to high speed, reliable, affordable and secure broadband infrastructure.” The Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Authority (RURA) was created in 2001 as a multi-sector regulator, which is responsible for regulating telecommunications, media, post, water, energy, sanitation, and transport. RURA also has responsibility for the Rwanda Internet Exchange and the Universal Access Fund. Finally, RURA regulates electronic transactions and e-government, and safeguards data privacy (Nkusi 2017). In the view of the World Economic Forum, the forward-looking digital policies of the GoR have been drivers of Rwanda’s economic transformation. From a policy perspective, Rwanda has created detailed five-year plans spanning a twenty year period from 2000–2020 titled the National Information and Communications Infrastructure, or NICI. The Rwandan government has emphasized the importance of ICT for economic development, and President Paul Kagame has championed ICT from the very start of his leadership. Impressively, Rwanda is one of only 13 African countries who have passed legislation to safely dispose of e-waste. Rwanda enacted an ICT law in 2016 which replaced its 2001 statute governing Telecommunications Law. In 2010, Rwanda passed a statute relating to electronic message, electronic signature, and electronic transactions. The 2016 Law is the most comprehensive ever adopted in the Rwandan ICT industry, and establishes a comprehensive legal framework for ICT law and policy (Nkusi 2017). The statute applies to electronic communications, the information society, the broadcasting sector, and the postal sector. It also, importantly, addresses data protection and privacy. On November 2, 2015, Rwanda’s Cabinet approved the Smart Rwanda Master Plan. According to USAID officials, MYICT has worked closely with academia, the private sector, development partners, telecommunications companies, and public institutions to develop the ICT sector

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in Rwanda (MINICT 2015). As of 2022, Paula Ingabire served as Rwanda’s Minister of ICT and Innovation. In January of 2022, President Kagame appointed Ernest Nsabimana as the new Minister of Infrastructure, replacing Claver Gatete, who was seconded as Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations. Nsabimana holds a PhD in civil engineering from Kyung Hee University in South Korea, and served as the Director General of Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Authority, replacing the long serving Patrick Nyirishema.

Mobile Telephony in East Africa From a baseline perspective, at the turn of the century, telephone networks in Africa were highly variable. Some countries, like Madagascar and Uganda, possessed analog systems with poor national links among urban centers (Jensen 2000, 218). Landline telephones were extremely difficult and expensive to obtain in Eastern Africa, and owning a landline was considered a status symbol (Oteri et al. 2015). As of 1999, Kenya only possessed 300,000 landline telephones (Mengistu and Imende 2013, 2). Long-distance calls were extremely expensive. Those who did not possess a landline at home often had to queue at a telephone booth to make a call. By contrast, by 2000, Botswana and Rwanda had already obtained 100% digital main lines, nearly 50% more than the US at the same time period. As of 2000, the African continent had only 14 million landlines, which were concentrated in urban areas. At the beginning of the millennium, cellular phone coverage was confined to capitals and secondary cities, and Internet dial up calls were generally long distance (Jensen 2000). Very few African residents could afford a private telephone, and public telephones were rare: number about 1 for every 17,000 people compared to a world average of 1 for 200 (CTA 1999). Celtel brought mobile telephony to Uganda in 1995, and initially, cell phones in Uganda cost as much as $1,000 (New Vision 2019). Cell phones first came to Tanzania in 1994, through TIGO but cell phone usage did not really take off in that country until 2002. Kenya deployed mobile cellular in 1992 (Mureithi 2017). In 1999, mobile operators Safaricom (state-owned) and Celtel opened up the telecommunications market in Kenya (Oteri et al. 2015). Rwanda’s mobile provider, MTN Rwanda Cell, began offering GSM service in 1998.

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Mobile telephony may improve the livelihoods of rural communities in developing countries and increase agricultural productivity (Gichuki and Mulu Mutuku 2018). Further, the adoption of mobile technologies can increase agriculture productivity and help farmers increase yields (Kirui et al. 2012; Murendo and Wollni 2016). Competitiveness of the Mobile Market Between 2002 and 2006, the number of mobile phones increased tenfold, from one million to 10 million (McGee 2016). Although mobile phone penetration in Kenya exceeds 90%, the mobile phone market in Kenya’s mobile telephony market significantly lags behind the markets of Uganda and Tanzania in terms of competitiveness. As of 2006, Safaricom and Celtel controlled the mobile phone market in Kenya. By 2009, there were four licensed GSM operators15 in Kenya, Safaricom, Zain, Orange, and Yu. As of 2015, the Communications Authority of Kenya reported the presence of four mobile operators. As of 2018, Rwanda had three mobile operators: MTN a subsidiary of the South African mobile group, TIGO a subsidiary of a Luxembourgbased group, and AIRTEL, owned by an Indian mobile group, which absorbed the assets of the defunct incumbent Rwandatel. Tanzania is the second largest telecommunications market in East Africa behind Kenya. Tanzania has the most competitive mobile telephony market in the region with at least seven mobile service providers, although Uganda is close behind16 (Sinda 2021). In 2021, Tanzania’s mobile operators included Airtel, Halotel, Smile, TIGO, TTC, Vodacom, and Zantel (Sinda 2021). Mobile Money Mobile money has transformed the lives of many Africans in the period spanning 2010 to 2020 (Lepoutre and Oguntoye 2018). Kenya leads the world in mobile money, and indeed, may have invented the concept (McGee 2016). Mobile money allows clients in need of cash to use their phone to bank money. This lets them worry less about the insecurity of carrying money and the distance, cost and time to travel to bank branches. Mobile money agents are small shops that are authorized by mobile money providers sell scratch cards with specific monetary value to clients. The client then texts the card’s codes to the number provided

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and will be credited the value of the card. In Kenya, 61% of mobile owners used their cell phone to transfer money as of 2015, whereas 42% of Ugandans, and 39% of Tanzanians did the same. According to Shrum, Mbatia, Palackal, and Dzorgbo et al., (2016) mobile telephony has diffused more rapidly than any technology in the history of sub-Saharan Africa. The East African region has led the money revolution (Lashitew et al. 2019). Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda all have a mobile money model led by telecommunications providers. The relevant operators are licensed by the countries’ Central Banks. Operators must pay a licensing fee and comply with reporting and regulatory requirements. All countries require the operators to maintain an aggregate deposit of the individual mobile money accounts in an escrow account in a commercial bank. In Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda, mobile money services are straightforward as are the regulations; In Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda, mobile money services basically relate to storage and transfer of funds as well as some basic bill-payment services (e.g. electricity). Transfers are usually the largest individual transactions (Davidson and Penicaud 2011), and are an important benefit for the low-income and rural population. Across the EAC, but in Kenya in particular, the success of mobile money has been widely attributed to a fairly low level of regulation (Donovan 2012). Indeed, research indicates that the regulatory approach matters. Mobile Network Operator systems are much more conducive to the diffusion of mobile payments than a bank-led model (Suarez 2016; Lepoutre & Oguntoye 2018). Other authors note that a regulatory environment that effectively reduces market uncertainties was a key factor in the rapid diffusion of mobile money innovations. (Lashitew 2019). By the end of 2020, Uganda possessed 27.7 million mobile money accounts, translating into at least two registered lines for every three Ugandans in terms of financial service penetration. In Uganda, MTN Mobile Money was the main provider (Pew Research 2015). Other Ugandan providers included M-Sente from UTL and Zap from Zain (Ndiwalana et al. 2012). Mobile money was introduced in Tanzania in 2008. The user rate jumped to 32% in 2013 and 55.8% in 2017 (Naito and Yamamoto 2022). Tanzania has six operators in the mobile money arena: Vodacom with M-Pesa (39%), Tigo with Tigo Pesa (30%), Airtel with Airtel Money (20%), Halotel with Halopesa (7%), TTCL (3%), and Zantel with Ezy Pesa (1%) who compete for a market of 26 million active users. The

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market reached a value of close to $55 billion in 2021 and is expected to grow to $120.4 billion by 2027 (Tanzania Invest 2020; Okafor 2023). Rwanda allowed MTN a monopoly until 2006, until Rwandatel became the second mobile operator. Tigo launched services in 2009 creating competition among three operators. Rwanda is a smaller mobile money market than neighboring countries. As many as 60% of Rwandans used mobile money in 2020. Mobile money platforms seem to have had a broadly positive effect in East Africa. Mobile money allows mobile phones to be used as payment devices, providing access to savings, credit, and remittances (Qiu 2022). Mobile money has made important contributions to financial inclusion and poverty alleviation in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda (Lashitew et al. 2019). In Uganda, mobile money users have been found to receive remittances more frequently and have higher per capita consumption than non users (Naito and Yamamoto 2022; Blumenstock et al. 2016). Mobile money users in East Africa are likely to spend more on health and medication, and are also more likely to utilize formal healthcare facilities (Ahmed and Cowan 2021). The long run effect of mobile money in Kenya seems to enhance savings and financial resilience, moving at least 2% of families out of poverty (Naito and Yamamoto 2022; Jack and Suri 2016). Mobile money may also increase human capital accumulation (Abiona and Koppensteiner 2020). However, mobile money may increase inflationary pressures in developing countries (Qiu 2022). Affordability of the Mobile Market As of 2021, Tanzania had the lowest mobile Internet prices in East Africa at $0.75 for every gigabyte of data (Telecompaper 2021), bringing its Internet prices below that in some European nations (Telecompaper 2021). Tanzania is followed by Rwanda at $1.25 m Uganda at USD 1.56 and Kenya, USD $2.25. Tanzania’s prices are low in part because the country is reaping dividends from a huge investment made in constructing the optic fiber backbone, which is managed by TTCL. In addition, the Tanzanian government is receiving revenue by providing backbone services to neighboring countries, including Zambia, Malawi, Burundi, and the DR Congo.

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The Economic Impact of ICTs in East Africa The improvements in Internet connectivity that came with the arrival of fast Internet through the construction of broadband cables created new and new types of jobs in Africa and East Africa, enables exporting, and increases productivity. For example, Nairobi has become a base for high-tech multinationals like Google, IBM, and Intel (Hjort and Poulson 2019). Some of the new jobs include positions at technology start-ups, e-Commerce, new forms of manufacturing, and innovative supply chain management companies. In addition to creating new jobs in higher-skilled occupations, the landing of the submarine cables made bandwidth prices tumble, improving the global competitiveness of the ICT industry in East Africa (McKinsey 2013). Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria, and South Africa have all developed a manufacturing sector producing Internet capable devices for the African market, such as low-cost cell phones and computers (Hjort and Poulson 2019). Kenya has been hailed as a technological hub, linking programmers, designers, entrepreneurs, and investors, thus accelerating the cultivation of ideas and innovation (Ofori et al. 2022). The Kenyan Tea Development Agency adopted a cloud-based supply chain management system, connecting 60 tea factories with the farmers that supply them, and reducing delays at collection points, as well as fraud, and increasing tea factories productivity, and farmers’ income (Ngatia 2013). Further, in Kenya and Tanzania, economic researchers have found an increase of between 6.9% and 13% in the probability that an individual is employed when fast Internet arrives (Hjort and Poulson 2019). These researchers found that the arrival of fast Internet in Africa led to a large increase in employment rates in connected areas compared to unconnected areas. Economists have further found that for every 1% improvement in ICT skills, access, and usage, inclusive economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa also shows a statistically significant increase (Ofori et al. 2022). ICT diffusion can foster commercial connectivity and information dissemination while enhancing innovation (Ofori et al. 2022). The Information and Communications Technology Sector in Uganda is increasing its contribution to the country’s gross domestic product. The sector’s contribution has increased from 2.5% in 2015 to 3.1% by 2021 (Nyombi 2021). The communication sector’s contribution to tax revenues increased from $42,465,753 in 2008 to $132,492,545 in 2014. In 2020, the total tax revenue collected by the government of Uganda

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was approximately $267,123,287 (Nyombi 2021). This represents a change of $224,657,534 in revenue over about 12 years. As of 2015, the ICT sector contributed up to 3% to the Rwanda’s GDP, attracting $61 million USD of foreign direct investment into the country (MINICT 2015). According to the World Economic Forum, by 2022, the technology sector still represented 3% of Rwanda’s annual GDP. Rwanda is a popular location for investment by donors. The Rwandan Innovation Fund was created as a public–private partnership between the GoR and Angaza Capital in 2021 to support innovative companies. Also in 2021, the Swedish Norrsken Foundation opened an innovation hub in Kigali which aims to host 1,000 entrepreneurs (World Economic Forum 2022). Out of 54 African countries, Tanzania is the fifth largest in terms of population, the ninth largest in terms of economy, and the thirteenth largest in terms of geographical size. According to the World Bank, Tanzania moved from low-income to lower middle-income status in 2020 (World Bank 2023). The World Bank believes this transition occurred due to sustained macro-economic stability, low inflation, and political stability, among other factors. Although Covid-19 adversely affected Tanzania’s growth, the country avoided recession. Further, the poverty rate in Tanzania has gradually declined from 34.4% of the population in 2007, to 26.5% in 2018 (World Bank 2023). Approximately 70% of the Tanzanian population still lives in rural areas. In the opinion of the World Bank, the digital economy is “a key driver of Tanzania’s future growth and prosperity” (World Bank 2021, 9). The countries telecommunications sector contributed $859 million to real GDP in 2018, a 24% increase over 2014. This growth has been attributed to the increase in mobile usage and the expansion of broadcasting and Internet services, which have undoubtedly been strengthened by the improved connectivity provided by the NICTBB (Table 8.4).

Conclusion This chapter has explored the uneven distribution of ICT Infrastructure in East Africa. As noted in earlier chapters, Africa was a late entrant to Information and Communications and Technology (ICTs). In the “Global North,” access to the Internet, satellite television, and cellular phones are widespread, and many consider these services to be a basic utility. Yet, at the turn of the twenty-first Century, telephony in Africa was restricted

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Table 8.4 Price of 1 voice and 1 GB data prepaid 2022 in selected African countries17

Country

SMS voice 2020

Nigeria Uganda Tanzania Kenya Rwanda Chad

$1.97 $4.63 $1.39 $0.85 $3.98 $14.02

Price of 1 GB Price of 1 GB 2020 2021 $2.41 $2.72 $2.18 $1.94 $1.98 $8.41

$0.88 $1.56 $0.75 $2.25 $1.25 $23.33

Source RIA RAMP BVI Index (available at https://researchi ctafrica.net/2016/07/14/bundled-value-index-methodology/; and see https://researchictafrica.net/research-ict-africa-ramp-index-2/). Countries have been selected from the index as illustrative by the author). Paula Gilbert, Connecting Africa, “Sub-Saharan Africa has world’s most expensive data prices,” April 12, 2021

and concentrated in urban areas. Yet, by 1999 only 700,000 people in Africa had basic Internet access (0.1% of the population) (CTA 1999, 4), and despite having 20% of the world’s population, Africa had only 2% of the world’s phone network (CTA 1999, 5). Indeed, in 1999, 35 African countries had less than one telephone per 100 people. As the millennium has progressed, Africa is catching up. In the Mid-2000s Africa contained some of the fastest growing mobile telephony and Internet markets in the world (ITU 2011) 0.1 By the early 2000s, new applications such as the I-phone and Android allowed people to access Internet over a telephone; applications such as Voice over Internet Protocol allow people to use telephony over the computer (Bowmanslaw 2022).18 Significant gaps remain, however, between countries, and between urban and rural areas inside countries. As noted in this chapter, of the four countries examined in this study, Kenya scored highest on access for mobile telephony, Internet penetration, and computer ownership. Yet, Kenya does not lead on every count. Rwanda has the highest level of mobile network coverage of the four countries, but it is an outlier in terms of geographical size. It is closely followed by Uganda, Kenya, and finally Tanzania. Interestingly, Kenya does very poorly in terms of its Universal Access Fund. The most successful in terms of projects built and outcomes achieved is probably the Ugandan RCDF, and the least successful is likely the Kenyan USF. According to a 2013 ITU report, the Ugandan RCDF

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is a high activity fund, the Rwandan account was a moderate activity fund, and the Tanzanian UCSAF was a low activity fund, and multiple sources had no information on the Kenyan fund. Uganda has been recognized as reflecting best practices in the development and administration of universal service funds (Laddcom 2014). Historically, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and Tanzania all had very poor connections to the “Internet backbone.” The arrival of three initiatives in 2009–2010, TEAMS, EASSY, and SEACOM transformed telephony and Internet in East Africa and the Eastern part of Southern Africa, improving quality, speed, and a drop in prices. Efforts of individual national governments in East Africa to install national fiber optic backbone have significantly improved the state of ICT infrastructure in East Africa (Pima et al. 2016). Certainly, China has prioritized ICT development, and has promoted the construction and interconnection of ICT in Africa (Agbebi et al. 2021). In East Africa, the largest beneficiaries of Chinese investment have been Tanzania and Kenya. China has acted as financier, builder, owner, and operator of these projects, which are largely government-togovernment initiatives. China has been criticized from not using sufficient local labor, and for disregarding local legal frameworks in Africa. In addition, these projects have not provided high-level technology transfer, and African governments cannot always recoup the costs of expensive ICT infrastructure installations. One of the most surprising ICT advances has been the explosion in mobile telephony, particularly mobile banking. Mobile telephony has exploded in East Africa as ICT infrastructure has expanded. Assisted by improvements in the Internet backbone, mobile money, Internet banking, and e-wallets have made huge inroads. Kenya is by far the leader in terms of mobile money, but Tanzania is the leader in terms of a competitive mobile telephone market with at least seven mobile operators, followed closely by Uganda, whereas Kenya and Rwanda were far less competitive with three operators each. As the globe entered the second decade of the new millennium, more than 70% of Ugandan and 67% of Ethiopian Internet users were using the Internet on a mobile phone, compared to Tanzania, Namibia, and Nigeria, where about 50% of the population used the Internet on a mobile phone (Gillwald 2017). Mobile Internet access does not require electricity (except to charge the cellular telephone), requires fewer skills from the user than computer-based access, and is prepaid, making it more accessible

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for lower-income groups in Africa. Many citizens in East Africa conduct a variety of transactions online. Residents can pay school fees, and sign up for and pay for utility services, like water and electricity. The blackouts of Internet and telephony in Egypt and Libya in 2011 and in Uganda in 2016 highlight the need to construct this backbone carefully, with attention to the political elements of control of the infrastructure. If the “gateway” is owned and controlled by the Government, as is the case in Egypt, China, and other authoritarian states, it is very easy to shut down. If there are multiple gateways, the process of shutting down the Internet becomes much more challenging, as recent elections in Uganda demonstrate. Importantly, building out physical ICT infrastructure—which may include electrification, the laying of cables, and the construction of satellite towers—requires both organizational and institutional structures. Regulatory agencies must be created. Funds must be collected and then disbursed. Building out infrastructure is both a physical task, but also a governance task. Left alone, the private sector will distribute infrastructure only where it is profitable. If governments wish to distribute infrastructure to areas where the market will not provide it, the government should make a plan regarding the placement of key infrastructure elements and then pay for construction. Building ICT infrastructure in remote or rural or unprofitable areas requires a stable government willing to invest in its people, as well as a government with effective institutions to ensure that plans can be implemented in a timely fashion. Computer hardware, like desktops and laptops, must be procured and installed. Software such as operating systems requires initialization. Finally, after all of these physical elements are in place, the task is not yet complete: citizens must be trained to program the software, and maintain the hardware and infrastructure so that it is sustainable. Accordingly, infrastructure, governance, and institutions (including educational institutions) are interconnected and interwoven. Broadband access helps facilitate social and economic inclusion, but by itself, it is not sufficient to ensure social and economic access to ICT services. Accordingly, extending infrastructure by itself, may not be sufficient to address digital inequality.

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Notes 1. This chapter is primarily descriptive in nature. It represents a thorough literature review which gives researchers new to the field of telecommunications and ICTs in Africa a strong starting point. 2. The ITU did not report data on how many Tanzanians have Internet access at home. 3. The ITU did not report data on individuals using the Internet in Uganda. 4. The Tanzanian state telecommunications provider (the incumbent) was known as Tanzania Telecommunications Company Limited. It provided fixed line telephony. After January 2018, the government acquired Bharti Airtel’s 35% stake in TTCL and became TTC. 5. The Laddcom report had no information on Kenya. 6. A local backbone refers to the main network lines that connect several local area networks together. The result is a wide area network (WAN) linked by a backbone connection. 7. In resource poor states with high indebtedness levels to external donors, who pays for ICTs is a crucial question. The person who pays is often the person who decides what the technology looks like, and who will receive it. 8. CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access) and GSM (Global System for Mobiles) are shorthand for two older radio systems (also known as 2G and 3G) used in cell phones. 9. Lusekelo Philemon, “Govt: Installation of national ICT Backbone almost ready,” The Guardian, June 13, 2008. 10. United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Communication and Transport, Technical Report on Feasibility Study for Implementation of the National ICT Backbone Infrastructure, June, 2005, p. 14. 11. WorldTel is a telecommunications development company started by the International Telecommunications Union. World Tel structures and funds telecommunications projects in emerging markets. 12. United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Communication and Transport, Technical Report on Feasibility Study for Implementation of the National Backbone Infrastructure, Presented by Joint Team of Tanzania, CITCC and WorldTel, June 2005. 13. EASSy, an initiative of the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and other development banks. 14. In an interview with August Kowero, conducted August 24th, 2007, Engineer Kowero suggested there were more than 35 ISPs operating in Tanzania; See also 2006 data on ICTs are available from the United Republic of Tanzania, Tanzania in Figures 2006, National Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, Economy and Empowerment, June, 2007, p. 29. Some of the larger ISPs include SimbaNet, AfSat, AfricaOnline and Datel.

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15. CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access) and GSM (Global System for Mobiles) are shorthand for two older radio systems (also known as 2G and 3G) used in cell phones. 16. Uganda is close behind. 17. The BVI methodology adds the value of bundled voice minutes, SMSs and data and divides it by the prices. The value of bundled minutes is derived by multiplying the number of minutes with a fixed US$ value based on quarterly average, inclusive of tax. It is constructed from the perspective of smartphone use. The higher the BVI, the better the performance. Accordingly Morocco is the highest performer on this list, and Chad is the lowest performer on this list. 18. The line between “plain old telephone service” (“POTS”) and computing is increasingly blurred. The recent information blackouts in North Africa, however, demonstrate the utility of maintaining some level of POTS, and also emphasize the need for redundancy and distribution of communication technologies, as well as variation in the manner which countries approach connectivity (Bowman and Camp 2012).The deposed governments of President Mubarak of Egypt, and Colonel Muammar Qadaffi of Libya both imposed Internet and phone blackouts in their countries in an attempt to suppress revolution.

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Tanzania Invest, Tanzania Mobile Money Subscriptions Market Shares, 2020. Available at https://www.tanzaniainvest.com/mobile-money “Tanzanian Minister Says 86% of Rural Inhabitants Have No Internet Access.” Telecompaper, May 31, 2021. Thakur, Dhanaraj. “Universal Service and Access Funds: An Untapped Resource to Close the Gender Digital Divide.” Washington DC: World Wide Web Foundation, 2018. The World Bank, Tanzania Economic Update: Universal Access to Water and Sanitation Could Transform Social and Economic Development, 2023. Uganda Bureau of Statistics. Table, Distribution of the working population by selected characteristics (14–64 years), UNHS 2009/10, UNHS 2012/13 and UNHS 2016/17,” 2023. https://www.ubos.org/explore-statistics/23/ Uganda Communications Commission, “About UCC.” Available at https:// www.ucc.co.ug/about-ucc/. Accessed on September 9, 2022. Uwezimana, D. E. “Analyzing the Importance of E-government in Times of Disruption: The Case of Public Education in Rwanda During Covid-19 Lockdown.” Evaluation and Program Planning, Vol. 91, 2022. Waema, T. M. & Ndungu, M. N. Understanding What is Happening in ICT in Kenya: A Supply and Demand Side Analysis of the ICT Sector, Evidence for ICT Policy Action, Policy Paper 9, 2012. http://www.ResearchAfricaICT.net “Welcome to EASSy: About.” Eassy.org, 2017, Available at http://www.eassy. org/index.htm. “When Mobile Phones Came to Uganda,” (2019) New Vision. Available at https://www.newvision.co.ug/news/1508780/mobile-phones-happeneduganda. World Economic Forum, “Rwanda is Tackling Digital Development Challenges and Succeeding,” 2022. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/07/rwa nda-is-tackling-digital-development-challenges-and-succeeding/

CHAPTER 9

(Conclusion) ICT in East Africa: A Shimmering Oasis on the Savannah

Africa represents the technological frontier with regard to Information and Communications Technology (ICT). On the edge of technology, and at the edge of policy, the technological and political orders in Africa have been produced simultaneously, and have influenced each other. ICT in Africa is an emerging and changing bundle of technologies whose adoption and uptake require the creation of a new expert and political order. An international policy discourse has transformed “information and communication technologies” into a new political-technological object. Scholars, practitioners, and politicians used to talk about telecommunications; now they talk about information and communications technology. How ICT is framed, named, and governed has been undergoing a process of evolution and stabilization in Africa from the dawn of the millennium to the present. The late 1990s witnessed a global frenzy of deregulation, and as part of this wave the World Bank emphasized an open trading regime, liberalization, foreign investment, and technology licensing designed in part to help open African telecommunications and ICT markets for external investment. In the late 1990s, donors, particularly the UN, promoted an ideology which verged on “cyber-euphoria” in Africa. Many believed there could be a “cyber bullet”– the Internet—with the instant power to

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improve everything in Africa, from gross national product to health care, to education in Africa. Governments in East Africa were swept up in the excitement. The Rwandan government invested heavily in IT infrastructure to bring highspeed Internet connections to its remote areas. Meanwhile, Kenyan policymakers and businesspeople tended to focus on the economic potential of international business outsourcing. Across the region, East African entrepreneurs have been inspired by the possibilities ICTs offer to work with businesses around the world. Despite the enthusiasm of donors and entrepreneurs, rural residents in East Africa, as in much of Africa, still lack access to “old” types of infrastructure (like electricity) while also not receiving adequate access to new types of infrastructure (like Internet connectivity). The difference between the access of rural and urban citizens in these countries raises questions about governance, resource distribution, equity, and fairness.

Technology as Politics This book is premised on the idea that technology is a political phenomenon. Importantly, social and political choices about how to design and manage new technologies fundamentally determine the usefulness of that technology to society, how redistributive and equitable the impact of the technology will be, and how fully and effectively a society will be able to utilize the promise of a new technology. The private sector, civil society, and the government all shape technology, This book has provided empirical support for the assertion that state intervention plays an important role in shaping technology. The four African states studied here have played an important role in the regulation, management, and governance of ICT. Their governments, in conjunction with the private sector, civil society, and to some extent donors, have worked to ensure that technology becomes understandable, manageable, and stabilized to outside and inside investors and donors. Governments, businesses, donors, and civil society activists make decisions and undertake actions which affect the manner in which this technology will potentially change the social, political, and economic orders of their nations and regions. Further, governments, businesses, and civil society make decisions about how Internet and telephony infrastructure will be built. They make decisions about who will own and have access to the infrastructure. In several countries, new governmental entities, regulatory

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mechanisms, policies, and laws have been built to manage this technology, to license its producers and its users, to create and control the market for its expansion and use, and to develop new uses and technological configurations appropriate for the Sub-Saharan environment.

ICT as a Sociotechnical Imaginary Uganda, Rwanda, and Tanzania, and to a lesser extent Kenya, all envisioned and implemented a sociotechnical imaginary with regard to Information and Communications Technology. According to Sheila Jasanoff, sociotechnical imaginaries are collectively held and performed visions of desired futures related to advances in science and technology. Sociotechnical imaginaries are culturally particular, and thus have different trajectories in different societies. In the four countries examined here, each imaginary emphasizes a different experience and highlights the country’s different receptivity to, and indigenization of high-modernist development. These imaginaries have different levels of coherence, from the most intact and well-developed imaginary in the Rwandan case, to the most amorphous, fractured and fluid imaginary in the Kenyan case. In Rwanda, the imaginary is held by President Paul Kagame, and by implication, by the Rwandan Patriotic Front central government he controls. Because Rwanda is semi-authoritarian, governance in that country occurs in a highly centralized, top-down fashion. One might argue that Kagame is exercising significant leadership as an “ICT champion.” The fact that President Kagame has endorsed a sociotechnical imaginary for ICT means that it has been rapidly implemented throughout the country. In Uganda, the sociotechnical imaginary is also held at the executive level, although it has a more technocratic spin, which has been managed through a very efficient parastatal. Interestingly, different parts of the government in Uganda have different ways of implementing ICT policy. In both Kenya and Tanzania, different players, including civil society, donors, and government, hold different, and sometimes conflicting, sociotechnical imaginaries with regard to ICT. In Kenya, in particular, the private sector and civil society play powerful roles in determining the sociotechnical imaginary, whereas the Government of Kenya is less engaged in creating a vision of the technology. As President Paul Kagame tried to rebuild his country in the period following the genocide, he embraced a high modernist and top-down vision of ICT as a crucial tool for economic development and growth,

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relying on the Singaporean model. In Uganda, President Museveni was likely affected by institutional isomorphism from the countries around him, particularly Rwanda. In Uganda, the sociotechnical imaginary is a technocratic one, sited mainly in a well-run and efficient parastatal with support from the executive branch, with limited input by civil society. In Tanzania, the design of the imaginary is the most sophisticated, and comes closest to an approach focusing on a technological system. In Kenya, the government was initially suspicious of technology in general, and ICT in particular, particularly during the long administration of President Daniel arap Moi. Under pressure from the private sector and civil society, Kenyan Government responses to ICT have become more coherent, and more technocratic.

The Role of Donors This study demonstrates that Kenya is an outlier with regard to governmental policy on ICTs. Conventional wisdom would predict that Kenya, the wealthiest and arguably the most democratic country in the region, would be ahead on all ICT metrics. Kenya definitely leads in innovation. Yet, donors are not as powerful in Kenya as in neighboring countries. Kenya has a low level of donor dependency, and receives approximately twelve percent of its national budget in the form of foreign aid. Accordingly, the Kenyan government is under some pressure to be responsive to donors, but is not so dependent that it must respond with alacrity. Highly indebted nations like Rwanda, Uganda, and Tanzania have much higher levels of donor dependency. Because Kenya owes donors less, it is under less pressure to follow through on its paper commitments. Follow up and implementation of such extensive policy documents has accordingly tended to be less deliberate in the Kenyan case. The role donors have played in Kenya has been a behind the scenes one of encouragement. By contrast in Kenya, they have played a much less visible role of facilitating conversations, sponsoring research and encouraging relationships. The donors do seem to have been successful at encouraging a more participatory policy process which included more “stakeholders.” Donors have kept the issue of ICT policy on the Kenyan government’s policy agenda, but have not gone much farther than that.

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ICT as Political Pork Counter-intuitively this research has demonstrated high levels of engagement, leadership, and implementation by the semi-authoritarian governments of Uganda and Rwanda. I have argued that the incumbent governments in Uganda and Rwanda face a challenge: they must demonstrate their governments’ legitimacy to constituents who have lived through extreme sectarian violence, as well as state collapse within the past generation. Regional conflicts abound, including civil war in South Sudan and Congo, and an ongoing conflict in the Northern Uganda. Accordingly, although military control represents “the stick” in Museveni and Kagame’s governance strategy, I argue that their efforts to distribute a desirable type of modern infrastructure—ICT—may represent part of “the carrot.” Highly visible ICTs, are a desirable form of “pork,” which is both observable and measurable. Providing services for citizens can improve citizen perceptions of state legitimacy and also provides politicians an opportunity claim credit for service provision in an effort to reap political benefits. Where politicians face serious political competition or other internal threats, they have incentives to use public resources to win elections or win support. “Pork” goods are highly prized, in part because they may be viewed by the public as evidence of patrons fulfilling their promises to clients. One particularly attractive quality of ICTs, however, is that they can be used to support government aid in health, education, and economic growth. In summary, ICTs have value partly because they can be used as visible evidence that patrons are fulfilling their promises to clients.

ICT as Modernity Ugandan and Rwandan officials may have prioritized ICT as a national development priority because those leaders held an explicitly modernist vision of the future. In Uganda, Museveni embraced the developmental and modernization paradigms of his university education, which took place in the late 1960s and early 1970s. There are many possible factors that affect the extent to countries in East Africa distribute infrastructure. These include the competitiveness of the private sector, the role of donors, and the size and strength of civil society. One incentive may be found in ICTs evocation of “the modern.” Indeed, Adesina and Mercer remind us

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that many African stakeholders view ICTs as a symbol of modernity. One new iteration of modernity is found in “smart” cities or “techno” cities which aim to facilitate a transition to a knowledge economy which can benefit all (Flynn 2022; Cairns et al. 2022). The ICT policies embraced in Rwanda by Kagame attempted to implement three goals that constituted Rwanda’s sociotechnical imaginary of modernization and development. The first was the construction of Rwanda as an “African Singapore,” thoroughly modern, wealthy, and powered by ICT. The second was the formation of an inclusive and nonracial state. The final—and most externally directed— element of this imaginary was that of changing the political culture of the fractured nation, perhaps even moving toward a more participatory democracy. ICTs represent a key element in the emerging Rwandan national imaginary. Indeed, the RPF government could claim great success in distributing ICT infrastructure throughout the country, rebuilding heavily damaged telecommunications infrastructure, such as damaged phone lines, and simultaneously upgrading and replacing them with infrastructure that can carry data. Tanzania learned two crucial lessons from its own efforts at “modernization.” The development failures of the 1970s are reflected in the current approach of the Tanzanian Government to development. The first lesson the Tanzanian government learned is that the population should be involved in planning and that projects that are forced on an unwilling population are likely to fail. The second lesson that the Tanzanian government learned was that large, top-down, technologically intensive development projects are unpredictable, hard to control, and may easily become financially unsustainable and lead to issues with maintenance and dependence. As a result, the ICT implementation process in Tanzania continues to be a cooperative venture between the Tanzanian government, donors, and academics. Regarding policy implementation, the Tanzanian focus is on determining “what works,” before investing large amounts of government and donor money into grandiose building projects. In addition, the Tanzanian approach uses pre-existing infrastructure, and connects multiple government-sponsored entities to maximize inter-organizational communication ability. This emphasis on using existing infrastructure and creating highly networked organizations works well with an emphasis on technological sustainability. Kenya has generally let “the market” decide where ICT infrastructure will be developed, with little or no intervention through regulation or law

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to date regarding these choices. Because the market generally undersupplies collective goods such as telecommunications, the predictable result of this laissez faire approach, although arguably economically efficient, has resulted in poor distributive outcomes. In a nation where eighty percent of the population lives in rural areas, it is a telling statement about the political perception regarding the value of rural majorities there is very little ICT infrastructure outside of Nairobi and Mombasa. In contrast to its neighbors, even during the heyday of ICT policymaking, the Kenyan government did little to build ICT infrastructure for residents in rural areas. The main beneficiary of infrastructure has been the government itself; and then, only the government in the capital, through the wiring of the ministries in Nairobi. The Kenyan government has done little to develop infrastructure outside of the capital. The choice of the Kenyan government to concentrate resources on urban ministries, while disregarding the effort to connect those ministries to their rural counterparts, means that urban citizens will receive improved services, while rural citizens remain isolated.

Twenty Years of Progress In 2000, Africa as a continent possessed less international Internet bandwidth than the country of Luxembourg (ITU 2000). By 2013, whereas 36 percent of individuals globally used the Internet, only 13 percent of Africans used the Internet (Hjort and Poulson 2019). These low usage rates are due in part to a lack of Internet infrastructure, including fiber cables, copper cables, wireless transmission using cell towers, and satellites. Before 2009, all data and voice traffic in East Africa, whether over the Internet or the phone, had to be carried over satellite, resulting in high tariffs, and delays (Buryabarema 2008). Historically, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and Tanzania all had very poor connections to the Internet backbone. The arrival of undersea cables represented a remarkable transition for ICT in East Africa. East Africa and the Eastern part of Southern Africa gained a fiber connection to the rest of the world for digital and voice communications in 2009 and 2010 through three initiatives, TEAMS, EASSY, and SEACOM. The arrival of three initiatives transformed telephony and Internet in East Africa and the Eastern part of Southern Africa, improving quality, speed, and a drop in prices. Efforts of individual national governments in East Africa to install

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national fiber optic backbone have significantly improved the state of ICT infrastructure in East Africa. The Kenyan government used the opportunity provided by the building of SEACOM, TEAMS, and EASSY to strengthen the country’s internal Internet backbone known as the National Optic Fiber Backbone (“NOFBI”). The Ugandan government launched the National Data Transmission Backbone Infrastructure (NBI) to boost the usage of the Internet among citizens and government departments. As of 2021, the Tanzanian government had deployed the NICTBB. By 2020, Rwanda had experienced significant success rolling out broadband in the small landlocked country.

Universal Service and Universal Access Importantly, this study demonstrates that ICT access, coverage, and penetration statistics must be viewed in the context of both population and wealth. Kenya has a national population of nearly 55 million, with a GDP per capita of nearly $2,000. Tanzania’s population is close in size to Kenya, with 59 million citizens, but a GDP per capita of only $1,136 per annum. Rwanda is dramatically smaller, both geographically and in terms of population, with approximately 13 million citizens and a per capita GDP of about $834.00. Finally, Uganda is more like Kenya and Tanzania in terms of population, with a population of about 46 million, but more like Rwanda in terms of GDP, with a per capita GDP of $858. By 2020, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and Tanzania had all established active Universal Service and Universal Access Funds, although the outcomes of these funds vary widely. Universal Service and Access Funds are public funds which are financed primarily through contributions made by mobile network operators and other telecommunications companies. As noted above, the continent of Africa represents the region with the lowest rate of Internet penetration. Accordingly, if used wisely, USAFs can be powerful tools to expand communication services to underserved areas and populations Uganda has been recognized as reflecting best practices in the development and administration of universal service funds, whereas Kenya has not disbursed any funds from its USAF to date as it waits for more input from private sector stakeholders. In line with its strong private sector, by 2020, of the four countries examined in this study, Kenya scored highest on access for mobile telephony, Internet penetration, and computer ownership. Whereas close to

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10% of Kenyan households owned a computer, less than five percent of Tanzanians, Rwandans, and Ugandans owned a home computer. This statistic correlates fairly well with per capita income. All four countries reported mobile cellular coverage rates in between 90 and 100%. All countries reported Internet usage in between 20 and 30%, with the highest Internet usage being in Kenya and the lowest Internet usage in Uganda.

Mobile Telephony and Competitiveness Mobile telephony has grown exponentially in Eastern Africa. Although mobile phone penetration in Kenya exceeds 90%, the mobile phone market in Kenya’s mobile telephony market significantly lags behind the markets of Uganda and Tanzania in terms of competitiveness. As of 2015, the Communications Authority of Kenya reported the presence of four mobile operators. As of 2018, Rwanda had three mobile operators. Tanzania is the second largest telecommunications market in East Africa behind Kenya. By 2021, Tanzania had the most competitive mobile telephony market in the region with at least seven mobile service providers, although Uganda is close behind with at least five operators. One of the most surprising ICT advances in East Africa has been the explosion in mobile banking. Many citizens in East Africa conduct a variety of transactions online. Residents can pay school fees, and sign up for and pay for utility services, like water and electricity. Assisted by improvements in the Internet backbone, mobile money, Internet banking, and e-wallets have made huge inroads. Kenya is by far the leader in terms of mobile money with three operators each. As the globe entered the second decade of the new millennium, close to three quarters of Ugandans were using the Internet on a mobile phone, compared to Tanzania, where about half of the population used the Internet on a mobile phone. Mobile Internet access does not require electricity (except to charge the cellular telephone), requires fewer skills from the user than computer-based access, and is prepaid, making it more accessible for lower-income groups in Africa.

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Governance and Infrastructure in Rural Areas This study demonstrates that a capable state with a national regulatory agency will help optimize consumer welfare and safeguard citizens’ rights. Healthy institutions are required to implement national policy, and ensure that it adequately balances the needs of industry against the needs of the consumer. The process of creating policy and translating policy into practice requires input from the public, non-profits, and the private sector. Poor planning and poor governance of the ICT sector may lead to graft and corruption in procurement, failures of implementation, and an inability to keep pace with a technologically complex global environment. The Governments of Rwanda and Uganda, despite being semi-authoritarian governments, should be lauded for their leadership in the ICT Sector. By contrast, despite the heyday of innovation and entrepreneurship present in the country, the Government of Kenya has focused on profits, not people. The market tends to underinvest in public goods, including infrastructure. Yet, this distribution is problematic since all four countries are still predominantly rural and agricultural societies. In order to adequately care for their citizens, as well as in order to continue growing economically, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Rwanda need to continue to build core infrastructure, both old and new. Yet, to optimize both economic growth as well as ensure positive social outcomes—such as a reduction in inequality—that infrastructure needs to be distributed throughout the country, not just in cities. Broadband—or High-Speed Internet—access may help facilitate social and economic inclusion, but extending infrastructure without doing anything else fails to ensure social and economic access to ICT services, nor does it address digital inequality. Broadband networks require significant financial investment, as well as investments in education, materiel, and human capital. As the scope of ICT infrastructure expands, access to technology also requires access to new types of education with an emphasis on the human resources and planning that will make adequate utilization of such technological transformation possible.

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Foreign Investment in ICT Infrastructure in East Africa Certainly, China has prioritized ICT development, and has promoted the construction and interconnection of ICT in Africa (Agbebi et al. 2021). In East Africa, the largest beneficiaries of Chinese investment have been Tanzania and Kenya. China has acted as financier, builder, owner, and operator of these projects, which are largely government to government initiatives. China, nonetheless, has been criticized from not using sufficient local labor, and for disregarding local legal frameworks in Africa. In addition, these projects have not provided high-level technology transfer, and African governments cannot always recoup the costs of expensive ICT infrastructure installations. Korea has also become a major funder of Rwandan efforts.

Artifacts, Connected Systems, or Chaos An “artifacts-only” approach, which arguably is underway in Rwanda, focuses only on distributing computing equipment. In the absence of computer training, which is a rare commodity in rural East Africa, a computer is simply a box constructed of metal and wires. In the absence of electricity and connectivity, a computer can be a device which isolates the user, instead of being a device which helps one communicate. Tanzania’s more holistic approach to ICT development which emphasizes training and capacity building more than the deployment of state of the art equipment will become increasingly important as donor funds dry up. In a resource-constrained environment, equipment maintenance and infrastructure resilience are likely to be crucial strategies for technological survival. Infrastructure, the building of railroads, roads, dams, a school system, an electricity grid, even a postal system, and by extension, ICTs, can take a decade, a generation, or even a century to build. Therefore, any discussion of building an infrastructure as fragile, as breakable, as technologically vulnerable, and as dependent on human maintenance and interaction as ICT must pay careful attention not only to hardware but also to human design: how those artifacts are being placed, and who is placing them. Yet, Rwanda, Uganda, and Tanzania should be applauded for trying to ensure that rural communities are not left out of the computer revolution. Kenya

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boasts a strong educational system, high levels of innovation, and sophisticated human resources in part because the country is awash in donor offices and boasts a vibrant private sector. Kenya’s laissez faire government, however, has done little to promote the distribution of computing or ICT training in rural areas. By building tele-centers and linking various government facilities, Tanzania’s government is using the technology of ICT in a way which can be witnessed by viewing publics, as suggested by Ezrahi, although on a more limited scale than in neighboring countries. The desired demonstration in Tanzania, however, is not one of broad public works, but one of developmental sustainability. The governments of Uganda and Rwanda have chosen to use technology to demonstrate the pervasiveness of state reach as well as a commitment to a certain type of technologically equitable distribution. Tanzania’s technological demonstration aims to convince witnessing publics that its current development approach is based on community involvement and developmental sustainability. Indeed, in Kenya and Tanzania, it may be that the public and participatory process of building out technology has a demonstrative benefit to the population. Whereas in Uganda and Rwanda, the demonstrative benefit of the technology is witnessed through the construction of the technological artifacts themselves, in the more democratic countries, the participatory design of the technological process may be part of the demonstration. As the case of Tanzania illustrates the most clearly of the four cases, more participatory efforts to develop and implement ICT policy may produce fewer artifacts, yet produce both technological and social outcomes that are sustainable in the long run. Surprisingly, in terms of efforts to connect the rural periphery with urban areas—one of the most promising aspects of ICTs—Kenya seems to be the outlier of the four cases. The free market is the driving force in Kenya, and the Government of Kenya is relatively hands off. There is significant innovation in Kenya, but with less attention to the distribution of infrastructure or artifacts to rural area than in the other cases. Conventional wisdom would predict that Kenya, the wealthiest, and arguably the most democratic of the countries examined should demonstrate the best outcomes in terms of ICTs. It is true that Kenya is a center of innovation and a hotbed of entrepreneurship. But among the four countries, it is the least distributive. The Government of Kenya has shown little interest in ensuring that rural areas are able to equally participate in the information

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technology revolution. I argue that this is so because the Government of Kenya is less dependent on side payments and demonstrations of visible distribution to stay in power than the other three countries.

Contribution to the Literature This book contributes to the scholarly literature in a variety of ways. The ICT policy area provides an opportunity to study a distinct and emerging policy field. The study of information and communication technology policy emerged as a distinct field in the last fifty years. This technology moved onto the African continent even more recently, in the last thirty years. Therefore, it is intriguing to study activities in this policy area on the “frontier.” Focusing on a distinct policy area allows observers to examine how the East African states go about implementing policy and building out infrastructure. Accordingly, the findings from this research may be of use to scholars of politics and policy, to donors and in-country stakeholders, as well as the governments of countries facing similar issues with ICT diffusion, such as Brazil and India. Based on exhaustive fieldwork, this book demonstrates how East African politicians have attempted to use infrastructure development for political purposes. Further, this book explores how the state has chosen to distribute the physical artifacts of an important type of modern infrastructure. Dramatic strides that can be made by an independent, technocratic government commission with support from donors as well as the leaders like Kagame and Museveni. This research, however, also illustrates how various state agencies do not always cooperate with infrastructure distribution initiatives, leading to patchwork policy implementation, uneven technological penetration, and sustainability challenges. In addition, in contravention of the conventional wisdom that ICTs are inherently democratizing, there are indications that the Ugandan and Kenyan governments are threatened by certain uses of information communications technology which threaten its political hegemony. Future research should investigate the extent to which East African governments have turned to repressive uses of ICT such as surveillance and censorship. Covid-19 led to a contraction of economic growth in Africa, and it also laid bare weak points in each countries ICT infrastructure. Since the Covid-19 epidemic took hold as this manuscript was in preparation, literature on the impact of Covid-19 on ICTs in Africa is only now beginning to emerge. Future research should focus on the

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specific ways that Covid-19 demonstrated the strengths and weaknesses of ICT in each nation. Further, low access to electricity is a significant problem across East Africa, and future research should be conducted to look for solutions, including off-grid solutions.

Cyberoptimism With regard to socio-political transformation, Mansell observes that advocates viewed ICTs as harbingers of a bright future with universal, ICT-supported, personal, and collective empowerment. Former Secretary of State Hilary Clinton trumpeted the perceived possibility of the Internet to spread freedom and democracy. Researchers have been intrigued by the revolutionary possibilities created by the mobile nature of cellular telephony. Scholar Chachage observes that ICTs open new spaces for citizen engagement in Africa. Often, notes Molony, the mobile phone and radio are the only technologies owned by individuals in the developing world, indicating a democratizing aspect of these small and affordable ICTs. Further, observers hope that the rapid growth of Internet use in Africa will democratize knowledge production. At a minimum, this book demonstrates that ICTs strengthen the ability of citizens to communicate with each other across regional and language borders through shared access points which may strengthen civil society and community-based organizations, as well as increase access by marginalized groups to their elected officials. An emerging literature increasingly documents the benefits of ICTs for Africa. Mobile phones can help increase welfare for rural populations (Parlasca 2020; Aker and Mbiti 2010; Asongu 2015; Asongu and Nwachuku 2016; Rotondi et al. 2020). ICTs can also improve economic development in low-income countries and in household welfare. Further, ICTs can be valuable for disseminating health information (Mayo-Wilson 2022), and can enhance record keeping and data collection. Specifically, ICTs can enhance postnatal care outcomes and improve HIV treatment (Mayo-Wilson 2022). In a SIDA funded study which examined twelve nations including Tanzania, Uganda, and Rwanda found that factors for success and failure were connected. In other words, if a factor was present, it could ensure success, whereas its absence could ensure failure (Karunaratne and Hansson 2018). Successful projects were produced in Rwanda (One laptop per child), Tanzania (An Assistive Technology Program for Visually

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Impaired Students), and Uganda (A Blended Learning environment using Moodle at a teacher training college). Limiting factors including lacking sufficient computers, a lack of stable electricity, inadequate access to the Internet, and a lack of competency in using ICT tools. Success factors included the availability of expert knowledge, an integration of ICT with existing tools and processes, acceptance of ICTs by the top management, and having a strategic plan for the use of ICT inside the organization (Karunaratne and Hansson 2018). ICTs may help simplify tax regulations and increase efficiency in tax collection and government efficiency (Kpognon 2022). Adrianaivo and Kpodar confirm that ICT contributed significantly to the economic growth of African countries over the period spanning from 1988–2007. ICTs can assist refugees ability to access information and resources while maintaining anonymity (Canevez et al. 2022). Information and communication technologies can help boost efficiency and sustainable agricultural production by facilitating information exchange regarding agricultural innovations (Kabirigi et al. 2022). According to many authors, ICTs, particularly mobile telephony can help women gain employment (Hilbert 2011; Cummings and O’Neil 2015), and increase economic power. Cyberpessimism Along those lines, not all ICT applications are benevolent and ICT not inherently democratizing. Sadly, governments can and do use ICTs for repression. The Internet can be controlled and shut down. In addition, ICTs can be used for dark means, such as surveillance and censorship. The blackouts of Internet and telephony in Egypt, Libya, and Uganda in the past decade highlight the need to construct the Internet backbone carefully, with attention to the political elements of control of the infrastructure. If the “gateway” is owned and controlled by the Government, as is the case in Egypt, China, Iran, Rwanda, and other authoritarian states, it is very easy to shut down. If there are multiple gateways, which is a side effect of both a free market and a somewhat democratic government, the process of shutting down the Internet becomes much more challenging. Diffusing ICT to the African continent, or the developing world presents a complex set of inter-related problems. Simply placing computers into citizens’ hands, without ensuring sufficient electrification does not enhance ICT access. Recent research reminds us that all

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technologies are mediated by humans. Even in the presence of adequate infrastructure, electricity, and hardware, a lack of technical know-how, high prices for ICT devices and low levels of ICT literacy can limit the effectiveness of these new technological tools (Kabirigi et al. 2022). A UNHCR study indicates that refugees are most likely to benefit when provided with ICT skills training programs (Canevez et al. 2022). ICT uptake in Rwanda remains extremely gendered. Nearly 95% of phones in Rwanda were owned by the male head of household (Muza & Debnath 2021). Women in particular benefit from ICT skills training and assistance in enhancing their sense of self-efficacy (Canevez et al. 2022). According to Summers, Baird, Woodhouse, Christie, McCabe, Terta, and Peter (2020), Ultimately, mobile phones do not empower women. Empowerment is contingent. Phones may be used, either by women or men, to empower or disempower women.

These problems comprise building technological systems that include regulations, and political decisions about placement, ownership, and control. These systems include commercial and state decisions about infrastructure as well as sociological concerns about access and human concerns about training and capacity to maintain the systems. A commitment to transparency and accountability and education can help ensure that the information and communication technology in Africa, which is in and of itself neutral, is used by those who can most benefit from it, and can ensure that this tool is used for good and not for ill.

Bibliography Asongu, Simplice. “The Impact of Mobile Phone Penetration on African Inequality.” International Journal of Social Economics, Vol. 42, 706–716, 2015. Asongu Simplice & Nwachukwu Jacinta. “The Mobile Phone in the Diffusion of Knowledge for Institutional Quality in Sub-Saharan Africa.” World Development, Vol. 86(C), 133–147, 2016. Buryabarema, E. “The Monitor (Kampala).” All Africa, March 12, 2008. Accessed on October 29, 2008 Cairns, R., Onyango, J. Stirling, A. & Johnstone, P., “Imagining Urban Transformation in Kenya.” Environmental Science and Policy, Vol. 135, 86–95, 2022.

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Index

A Acquisition, 239 Active member list, 145 Adam, Lisham, 248, 249 Agenda setting, 2, 113 Apartheid, 12 Artifacts, 4, 5, 14, 73, 82, 91, 102, 140, 165, 214, 215, 221, 283–285 Arusha, 60, 84, 224, 248, 249 Authoritarian governments, 25, 34, 184, 222 Autocrat(ic), 15, 34–37, 42, 53, 118, 205, 212, 219 B Backbone, 35, 89, 91, 99, 100, 135, 140, 172, 238, 241, 243–245, 247–250, 252, 257, 261, 262, 279–281, 287 Bandwidth, 91, 100, 238, 239, 241, 242, 247, 249, 258, 279 Besigye, Kizza, 35, 167 Blackouts, 14, 15, 185, 262, 287

C Civil war, 32, 33, 37, 38, 40, 140, 164, 166, 199, 204, 220, 277 Clientelism, 83, 114, 117 Cline-Cole, Reginald, 12 Coalition politics, 32 Coercion, 54, 85, 119, 122, 130, 163, 213 Colonial history, 4, 140 Commission for Science and Technology, 11 Communication(s) technology(ies), 1 Comparative case study method, 5 Connectivity, 1, 15, 28, 49, 91, 94, 96, 99, 100, 102, 104, 129, 132, 133, 135, 138, 177–179, 183, 198, 210, 214, 216, 218, 238, 240–242, 245, 247–250, 258, 259, 283 Copper wires, 14, 49, 210, 211, 241, 244 Corporatism, 37 Coup, 33, 34, 166, 204 Cross-cutting issue, 126

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 W. M. Bowman, Digital Development in East Africa, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22162-0

291

292

INDEX

CST. See Commission for Science and Technology Culture of innovation, 230

D Dams, 28, 29, 283 Dar es salaam, 55, 56, 58–60, 92, 96, 100, 248, 249 Decay, 119, 222 De facto single-party state, 117 De jure, 120, 124 De Mesquita, Bruce, 31, 32, 38, 43 Democracy, 25, 34, 39, 42, 47, 49, 70, 86, 113–115, 117, 119–122, 130, 141, 143, 147, 148, 165–167, 178, 184, 201, 205, 207, 211, 220, 278, 286 Department of Commerce, 10 Digital access indicators, 1 Digital divide, 50, 90, 209, 216, 250 Digital Subscriber Line, 14 Distribution, 2, 4, 7, 14, 15, 25–27, 30, 33, 36–41, 48, 72, 73, 81, 82, 91, 113–115, 128–130, 136, 140–142, 147, 149, 161, 162, 164, 165, 170, 172, 174, 177, 178, 180, 183, 186, 216, 222, 239, 245, 259, 274, 282, 284, 285 Dodoma, 60, 96, 108, 248, 249 Donors, 2, 6–10, 12, 18, 25–27, 31, 36, 40–42, 47, 48, 51, 52, 54, 56, 58, 59, 62, 67, 70–72, 84, 86, 89, 91, 93, 102, 104, 113, 114, 119, 120, 124, 125, 131, 141–146, 148, 163, 164, 168–170, 172, 177, 201, 202, 208, 210–212, 223, 238, 240, 243, 259, 263, 273–278, 285 Dralega, Carol, 13 DSL. See Digital Subscriber Line

E EAC. See East African Community East African Community, 4, 13, 31, 116, 117, 173, 185, 233, 246, 256 Economic driver, 173, 233 E-government strategy, 66, 115 Egypt, 2, 6, 14, 15, 57, 184, 185, 262, 287 E-learning, 97, 239 Equitable distribution, 30, 39, 121, 175, 284 E-Secretariat, 58 E-service centers, 239 Esselear, 248, 249 Ethicized kleptocracy, 122 E-ThinkTankTz, 55–59, 93 Ethnic volatility, 7 European Union, 86, 201 Ezrahi, Yaron, 8, 30, 165, 172, 186, 284 F Facebook, 15, 185, 186 FCC. See Federal Communications Commission Federal Communications Commission, 11 Fiber optic cables, 49, 89, 95, 96, 211, 241 G Gatete, Claver, 254 Génocidaires, 200, 206 Ghana, 2, 7, 220, 236, 258 Global North, 2, 14, 72, 163, 242, 259 Global System for Mobile (GSM), 3, 140, 244, 250, 251, 254, 255 Good governance, 90, 150, 233 Grassroots participation, 47, 221

INDEX

Green Belt Movement, 122 H High-water mark, 115 Horwitz, 3, 4, 7, 8, 12, 16, 186 I ICT4D. See ICT for Development ICT Champion, 41, 200, 275 ICT fetishism, 12 ICT for development, 4, 48, 62, 83, 93, 95, 96, 200, 207 ICT industry, 58, 123, 146, 253, 258 ICT infrastructure, 4, 7, 10, 14, 27, 28, 33, 89, 90, 92, 99, 101, 103, 115, 134, 136, 140, 147, 149, 175, 186, 201, 233, 237, 240, 241, 243, 249–253, 259, 261, 262, 278–280, 282, 283, 285 ICT’s diffusion, 3, 91, 146, 162, 258, 285 ICT skills, 101, 251, 252, 258, 288 IDRC. See International Development Research Centre Impending state collapse, 26 Informatics policy, 121 Information and communication technologies (ICT), 1–4, 6–14, 16–18, 25–42, 47–62, 64–67, 69–73, 75, 76, 81–83, 87–92, 94, 95, 97, 99–105, 108, 113–116, 118, 121, 123–131, 133–136, 140–150, 153, 154, 161–165, 168–187, 198–203, 207–224, 230, 232–235, 238–241, 243–247, 249–254, 258, 259, 261, 262, 273–288 Infrastructure, 1, 5, 7–11, 14–16, 26, 28–31, 35, 37, 38, 41, 49–51, 56, 61, 62, 82–85, 89, 91, 95, 96, 101–104, 113, 114, 118,

293

119, 122, 130, 136, 140, 147, 149, 150, 161, 162, 164, 165, 168, 170, 172–174, 177, 180, 181, 183, 186, 187, 198, 200, 201, 209–211, 216, 220, 221, 230, 234, 239, 241–243, 245, 246, 248–253, 262, 274, 277–279, 282–285, 287, 288 Ingabire, Paul, 254 Interest group interaction, 2, 113 International Development Research Centre, 66, 67, 95, 141, 169, 170 International participants, 2, 113 International Telecommunications Union, 1, 95, 123, 163, 186, 209, 231, 232, 236, 237, 241, 260, 279 Internecine violence, 26, 27 Internet, 1–3, 12–14, 28, 48, 56, 62, 89, 92–94, 97–102, 120, 121, 124, 128, 131–133, 135, 136, 138, 140, 162, 168, 170, 171, 173, 178–187, 198, 200, 214–216, 219, 230–232, 234, 238–249, 251, 252, 254, 257–262, 273, 274, 279–281, 286, 287 Internet Exchange Points, 15 Internet Service Provider (ISPs), 14, 15, 61, 67, 68, 72, 102, 142, 146, 168, 169, 171, 185, 237, 243, 244, 246, 248, 251, 252 ISP. See Internet Service Provider ITU. See International Telecommunications Union IXP. See Internet Exchange Points J Jasanoff, Sheila, 7, 8, 26, 30, 104, 148, 163, 172, 177, 200–202, 208, 211, 275

294

INDEX

Jua Kali, 145

K Kagame, Paul (President of Rwanda), 33–35, 38, 42, 199–202, 204–208, 210, 211, 218–222, 253, 254, 275, 277, 278, 285 Kenya, 2, 4, 5, 10, 11, 13, 14, 25–27, 30, 33–40, 42, 51, 64, 66–68, 70–73, 83, 103, 104, 113–126, 128–131, 133–150, 162, 170, 178, 185, 220, 230–234, 236, 237, 242–244, 247, 248, 254–258, 260, 261, 275, 276, 278–284 Kibaki government, 115 Kinyarwanda, 197, 198, 214, 221 Kleptocracy, 147

L Land repatriation, 116 Last mile, 100, 241, 249, 250 Liberalization, 6, 31, 51, 67, 69, 86, 123, 124, 167–169, 273

M Mansell, Robin, 8, 12, 48, 163, 286 Market failure, 26, 236 Mercer, Claire, 12, 48, 49, 86, 87, 89–93, 95, 164, 165, 172, 277 Ministry of Information, 11, 62, 65, 134, 218 Mobile-cellular network, 137, 231 Mobile money, 13, 132, 138, 139, 185, 230, 251, 255–257, 261, 281 Mobile network coverage, 232, 260 Mobile phone revolution, 2 Moderate and limited, 54 Moehler, Devra, 63, 176

Morocco, 2 Moshi, 248, 249 Mozambique, 2, 7, 248 Msolla, Peter, 249 Multi-layered process, 229 Multi-operator environment, 121 Multi-party, 34, 35, 86, 114, 117, 119–122, 125, 130, 147, 166, 167 Museveni, Yoweri, 33–35, 42, 61, 132, 164–168, 170–172, 174, 177, 185, 204, 205, 220, 221, 239, 247, 276, 277, 285

N Nairobi, 36, 66, 67, 71, 96, 115–118, 129, 136, 141, 142, 145, 149, 258, 279 National “Y2K” Steering Committee, 124, 247 National Information Communications Infrastructure Plan, 55, 212, 223, 253 National Telecommunications and Information Administration, 10 Neo-patrimonial, 117 NEPAD. See New Partnership for Africa’s Development New markets, 3, 124 New Partnership for Africa’s Development, 31, 61, 186 NGO. See Non-governmental organizations NICIP. See National Information Communications Infrastructure Plan Non-governmental organizations, 1, 6, 12, 52, 54, 57, 69, 94, 98, 119, 120, 131, 145, 175, 182, 212, 217, 218 Nsabimana, Ernest, 254

INDEX

NTIA. See National Telecommunications and Information Administration Nyirishema, Patrick, 197, 254

O One-party state, 86, 117, 120 Open source Council of Kenya, 67

P Pan-tribal political groupings, 116 Particularism, 30 Patrimonial, 117 Patronage, 7, 30, 117–119, 177, 217 Policy actors, 2, 113 Policy front of managing ICT, 47 Policy implementation, 4, 38, 41, 102, 114, 140, 278, 285 Political and economic liberalization, 3 Political divisions, 200 Political gesture, 31, 149 Pork, 7, 164, 165, 172, 174, 177, 277 Post offices, 8, 27, 29, 35, 119, 173, 180, 182, 187, 239, 240 Poverty, 48, 50, 61, 69, 72, 89, 90, 125, 170, 173, 199, 209, 210, 215, 224, 231, 239, 246, 257, 259 Powell, Mike, 12 Process, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 27, 31, 39, 41, 42, 47, 51–64, 69–72, 82, 88–90, 102, 103, 113–116, 121, 123, 125–127, 129, 140–144, 147, 149, 165, 167, 169, 172, 175, 176, 185, 199, 211–214, 219, 221, 223, 243, 262, 273, 276, 278, 282, 284, 287

295

Q Quasi military organizations, 116

R Rege, James, 66, 67, 70, 126 Rhetoric, 31, 72, 82, 113, 129, 134, 136, 137, 142, 147, 149, 176, 208, 211 RITA. See Rwandan Information Technology Authority Rogers, Everett M., 12, 14, 18, 92, 107 RURA. See Rwanda Utility Regulatory Agency Rural, 5, 9, 10, 13, 14, 16, 26, 27, 29, 37, 40, 48, 49, 60, 62, 66, 69, 71–73, 82, 83, 88, 89, 91–99, 102, 103, 115, 128, 129, 132, 138, 141–143, 146, 147, 149, 162, 170, 173–178, 180–183, 186, 187, 211, 216, 230–232, 235–242, 246, 249, 251–253, 255, 256, 259, 260, 262, 274, 279, 282–284, 286 Rwanda, 2, 4, 5, 10, 11, 13, 16, 25–27, 30–42, 51–54, 61–64, 72, 73, 82, 89, 90, 104, 125, 129, 136, 139, 140, 144, 148, 149, 163, 173, 197–222, 224, 230–232, 234, 236–239, 242, 247–249, 252–257, 259–261, 275–284, 286–288 Rwandan Information Technology Authority, 11, 53, 125, 213, 223 Rwanda Utility Regulatory Agency, 11, 234, 235, 238, 239, 253

S Satellite towers, 29, 49, 210, 211, 241, 262

296

INDEX

Scope of implementation, 4, 25–27, 36, 39, 41, 81, 82, 91, 115, 129, 130, 140, 141 Semi-authoritarian, 71, 120, 141, 167, 275, 277, 282 SIDA. See Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency Side payment, 7, 148, 285 Social justice fulfilment of social visions of ICT, 233 Social justice goals, 31, 233 Socio-economic development, 61, 89, 90, 170, 234, 239 Sociotechnical imaginary, 8, 163, 199, 201, 202, 207, 208, 275, 276, 278 Soviets, 29, 171, 208, 239 Speed of passage, 25, 26, 36, 38, 39, 41, 115 Stakeholder, 2, 5, 8, 25, 40, 53, 60, 64, 69, 72, 113, 121, 127, 144, 164, 175, 212, 213, 215, 250, 276, 278, 280, 285 State failure, 32, 33, 37, 38 Submarine cables, 100, 242, 243, 248, 258 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, 6, 31, 59, 86, 214 T Tanzanian Communications Regulatory Authority, 11, 57, 235 TCRA. See Tanzanian Communications Regulatory Authority Technocrats, 42, 48, 49, 71, 85, 125, 142, 163, 175, 186, 210, 220, 275, 276, 285 Technological bundle, 3

Telkom, 54, 68, 123, 124, 137, 244 Thompson, Mark, 12 Tribe, 32, 117 Tuju, Rafael, 65, 67–69, 126, 127 Twitter, 15, 185, 186 U Uganda, 2, 4, 5, 10, 13, 15, 17, 18, 25–27, 30, 32–43, 48, 51, 61–64, 72, 73, 77, 82, 104, 116, 117, 129, 136, 137, 139, 140, 144, 148–150, 154, 161–187, 199, 203, 204, 217, 220, 224, 230–237, 239, 240, 242, 245–248, 254–258, 260–264, 275–277, 279–284, 286, 287 UN Commission for Science and Technology for Development, 12 UNCSTD. See UN Commission for Science and Technology for Development United States Agency for International Development, 6, 198, 253 United States (US), 10, 14, 52, 71, 119, 142, 147, 200, 201, 208, 221, 241 USAID. See United States Agency for International Development V Voice over Internet Protocol, 3, 14, 59, 68, 96, 97, 146, 168, 260 VoIP. See Voice over Internet Protocol W Wananchi, 40, 123, 138, 149 Wehn, 12 Window dressing, 149 World Trade Organization, 6, 12, 123 WTO. See World Trade Organization

INDEX

Y Y2K, 55, 56, 124

Yau, Y.Z., 12

297