Diaspora Engagement in Times of Severe Economic Crisis: Greece and Beyond (Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship) [1st ed. 2022] 9783030974428, 9783030974435, 3030974421

Table of contents :
Preface and Acknowledgements
Contents
Notes on Contributors
List of Figures
List of Tables
Chapter 1: Introduction: The Greek Crisis as a Critical Juncture in Homeland-Diaspora Relations
The Greek Diaspora and the Crisis
Thematic Areas
Homeland Reform and Diaspora Engagement
“New migration” and Diasporic Interactions
Diaspora Institutions Before and After the Start of the Crisis
Diasporic Identities and Transnational Mobilisation During the Crisis
Beyond the Greek Case
References
Part I: Homeland Reform and Diaspora Involvement
Chapter 2: Crisis and Change: The Right of Greek Citizens to Vote Abroad
Introduction
Introducing the Variables
Crisis as Critical Juncture
Agents of Change
The International Environment as Transnational Pressure
Methodology
The Pre-2009 Milestones on Homeland-Diaspora Engagement and Missed Opportunities for the Facilitation of the Diasporic Vote
The Post-2009 Era: The Crisis as Critical Juncture for the Vote Facilitation
The Critical Juncture: Economic Depression, Outward Migration, Reshaping of Party Politics
The Agents of Change: Political Parties, Press, Diaspora Actors
The International Norm: Greece as an Outlier
Conclusions
References
Chapter 3: International Portability of Social Benefits as a Bridge to the Crisis-Driven Diaspora
Introduction
Context: From Individual Emigration to Diaspora Formation
The European Union as a Facilitator
The Development of a ‘European social model’ and Rights Portability
Bridging Institutional Chasms: EU Institutional Convergence
The Past: Á la carte Solutions to ad hoc Problems
The Present: Does the New Pension System Pose Any Less of a Problem?
The Future: Could There Be a Migration-Friendly Pension System for Greece?
Conclusion: A Pandemic Opportunity
References
Chapter 4: Diaspora and Transnational Philanthropy During the Crisis and the Shifting Boundaries of State and Civil Society
Introduction
State and Civil Society During the Crisis: The Binary Framework
Diaspora and Transnational Philanthropy: Differentiating Propensity to Fill the Crisis-Generated Funding Gaps
Diaspora and Transnational Philanthropy: The Breaking Down of the Binary Framework’s Borders
Diaspora and Transnational Philanthropy in Crisis-Hit Greece: Acting in Tandem But at Different Degrees
The Crisis Is with Us for a Long Time Coming: Diaspora and Transnational Philanthropy in a Post-Crisis Context
Diaspora and Transnational Philanthropy, the State and Civil Society: An Assessment
References
Part II: Crisis-driven Emigration and Diasporic Interactions
Chapter 5: Remittance Behaviour of Greek Emigrants in the UK During the Long Recession
Introduction
Framework: Micro-Level Determinants of Remittance Sending Behaviour
Data
Description of the Dataset: Methods of Data Collection and Type of Information Collected
Features of the Individuals in the Sample
Results
Conclusions
References
Chapter 6: The Greek Diaspora in the UK during the Crisis: Socioeconomic Integration, Prospects of Return and Aspects of Engagement
Introduction
Data Collection
Brain-Drain and the ‘Diaspora’ and ‘Return’ Policy Options
The Greek Diaspora in the UK
A Small but Economically Vibrant Diaspora
Contemporary Migration to the UK
Greece’s Third Emigration Wave and the UK as a Major Destination
The Demographic Profile of the Greek Diaspora in the UK
Migration Motivations
Socioeconomic Integrations in the UK
Identification
Diaspora Engagement
Future Plans among the Greeks in the UK
Conclusion
References
Chapter 7: “When in Rome”: Do Recent Greek Migrants Adopt New Norms on Corruption While Living Abroad?
Introduction
Methodology and Data
Migration, Corruption and Social Remittances—Clarifying the Conceptual Terrain
Corruption and Emigration: The Case of Greece
Analytical Framework
Findings
“When in Rome …”: Perceptions of Corruption in Greece and Host Countries
Changes in Perceptions of Corruption
Not Exactly a Success Story: Interaction with Family and Friends
What Next (for Greece and Its Diaspora)?
References
Part III: Diaspora Institutions Before and After the Outbreak of the Crisis
Chapter 8: The World Council of Hellenes Abroad (SAE): From Great Expectations to Disillusionment and Crisis Irrelevance
Introduction
Portrait of an Institution: What Went Wrong?
SAE’s Infancy and Main Deficiencies
Delegate Selection
Absence of Subsequent Diaspora Generations and Younger Diaspora
Government Intervention
The Impact of the Greek Crisis
Appendix: Chronology of Events—World Council of Hellenes Abroad (SAE) Milestones
References
Chapter 9: The Greek Americans and the Greek Economic Crisis in Historical Perspective
Introduction
The Dual Orientations of Diasporas
Philanthropy in America
The Dual Orientation of Greek American Organisations
Greek American Mobilisation in the 1940s
Greek American Mobilisation in the 1970s
Greek America and the Greek Economic Crisis
Critiques and Responses Within Greek America
New Initiatives
Conclusion
References
Chapter 10: The Ecumenical Patriarchate: Bridging Greece, the Diaspora and the Orthodox World
Introduction
Orthodoxy, Greek Nationalism and Diaspora
The Archdiocese of America and the Greek American Diaspora
Environmentalism and the Call for Interreligious and Interethnic Tolerance
Ecclesiastical Geopolitics
Diaspora and the Greek State
The Greek Crisis
Conclusion
References
Part IV: Diasporic Identities and Transnational Mobilisation During the Crisis
Chapter 11: Diaspora Public Diplomacy at a Time of Homeland Crisis: The Philotimo Nation as Global Distinction
Introduction
Diaspora Public Diplomacy and the Washington OXI DAY Foundation
State and Non-state Sectors: Public Diplomacy, Branding, and Global Distinction
US Foreign Policy and Greek Global Distinction
Conclusion
References
Chapter 12: Diasporic Homecoming and Transnational Flows in Times of Crisis: Economic Strategies and Mobilities of Greeks from the Former Soviet Union in Thessaloniki
Introduction
Theoretical and Methodological Framework
Returning to the “Homeland” and the Emerging Ethnic Economies of FSU Greeks
Open-Air Markets
The Russian Products
Entrepreneurship, Economic Strategies and Migrations During the Financial Crisis of 2010
Surviving the Crisis: Re-considering Migration Patterns
Concluding Remarks
References
Chapter 13: Crisis, Identity and Diasporic Mobilisation: Perspectives from Young People and Parents in the Greek Diaspora in England
Introduction
The Greek Diaspora in the UK: Complex Identities and Ties with the Homeland
Young People in Diaspora: Identities and Mobilisation at Times of Homeland Crisis
Conceptual Approaches
Perceptions of Greece in Crisis
(Dis)Connections, In/Exclusions and Young People’s Multiple Identities in Diaspora
Conclusions: Opportunities and Challenges to Helping the Homeland at a Time of Crisis
References
Chapter 14: Greek-Australian Ethno-regional Diasporic Engagement with the Homeland During the Greek Economic Crisis: Ethnographic Insights
Crisis, Transnational Heritage and the Diasporic Ethno-regional Connection
Castellorizian Wartime Trauma as Transnational Heritage
Castellorizian “Homecoming” During the Crisis and Beyond: Cultural and Educational Projects
Transnational Initiatives with Global Orientation: Environmental and Philanthropic Projects
Conclusions and Further Thoughts
References
Part V: Beyond the Greek Case
Chapter 15: The Debt Crisis and Homeland-Diaspora Engagement in Portugal: Institutions, Remittances and Political Participation
Introduction
Methodology
Portuguese Diaspora Engagement: Drivers of Change and Policies in the Post-1974 Context
From Emigration Policy to Diaspora Policy: National Identity, Recognition and Defence of Social and Political Rights of Emigrants
Engaging the Portuguese Diaspora in Economic Development: The Impact of the Post-2008 Economic Crisis
Relations of the Portuguese Diaspora with the Country of Origin from the Emigrants’ Perspective
Remittances: An Older Form of Diaspora Engagement
Results
Political Participation
Concluding Remarks
References
Chapter 16: Ireland’s Homeland-Diaspora Engagement: Policy Responses to the Post-2008 Economic Crisis
Introduction
A Long Tradition of Emigration
A Developing Discourse of Diaspora and an Engagement with Diaspora Policy
Current Diasporic Engagement
Continuities
Divergences
Some Differences Between the Irish and Greek Cases
Conclusions
References
Chapter 17: Migration and Diaspora at Times of Crisis: Public Perceptions of Emigrants in Ukraine
Introduction
Methodology
Shifting Perceptions of Emigrants and Diasporas in a Global Context
Pre-Euromaidan Migration Discourses: A Soviet Heritage
National Context of Emigration and Formation of the Ukrainian Diaspora
Socio-economic Features
Migration Dynamics
The Euromaidan Revolution and the Ukrainian Crisis Complex: A Threshold Event
Diaspora Responses to the Euromaidan Uprising
Post-Euromaidan Discourses on Migration and Diaspora
Conclusions
References
Chapter 18: Conclusion: A New Model of Diaspora Engagement?
The Limits and Failures of the Pre-2009 Diaspora Engagement
New Fields of Engagement
Towards a New Model of Diaspora Engagement? Polycentricism, Pragmatism, Empowerment
References
Index

Citation preview

MIGRATION, DIASPORAS AND CITIZENSHIP

Diaspora Engagement in Times of Severe Economic Crisis Greece and Beyond Edited by Othon Anastasakis Manolis Pratsinakis Foteini Kalantzi Antonis Kamaras

Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship Series Editors Olga Jubany Department of Social Anthropology Universitat de Barcelona Barcelona, Spain Saskia Sassen Department of Sociology and Committee on Global Thought Columbia University New York, NY, USA

For over twenty years, the Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship series has contributed to cross-disciplinary empirical and theoretical debates on migration processes, serving as a critical forum for and problematising the main issues around the global movement and circulation of people. Grounded in both local and global accounts, the Series firstly focuses on the conceptualisation and dynamics of complex contemporary national and transnational drivers behind movements and forced displacements. Secondly, it explores the nexus of migration, diversity and identity, incorporating considerations of intersectionality, super-diversity, social polarization and identification processes to examine migration through the various intersections of racialized identities, ethnicity, class, gender, age, disability and other oppressions. Thirdly, the Series critically engages the emerging challenges presented by reconfigured borders and boundaries: state politicization of migration, sovereignty, security, transborder regulations, human trade and ecology, and other imperatives that transgress geopolitical territorial borders to raise dilemmas about contemporary movements and social drivers. Editorial Board: Brenda Yeoh Saw Ai (National University of Singapore, Singapore) Fabio Perocco (Università Ca’Foscari Venezia, Italy) Rita Segato (Universidade de Brasília, Brazil) Carlos Vargas (University of Oxford, UK) Ajmal Hussain (University of Warwick, UK) More information about this series at https://link.springer.com/bookseries/14044

Othon Anastasakis Manolis Pratsinakis Foteini Kalantzi  •  Antonis Kamaras Editors

Diaspora Engagement in Times of Severe Economic Crisis Greece and Beyond

Editors Othon Anastasakis University of Oxford Oxford, UK

Manolis Pratsinakis University of Oxford Oxford, UK

Foteini Kalantzi University of Oxford Oxford, UK

Antonis Kamaras Greek Diaspora Project – SEESOX Oxford, UK

ISSN 2662-2602     ISSN 2662-2610 (electronic) Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship ISBN 978-3-030-97442-8    ISBN 978-3-030-97443-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97443-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover image: © CarolLynn Tice/Alamy Stock Photo This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface and Acknowledgements

This book is an important milestone of the Greek Diaspora Project, a research project of SEESOX (South East European Studies at Oxford), at St Antony’s College, University of Oxford. The Greek Diaspora Project was originally conceived in Thessaloniki, one summer day of 2013  in a discussion between two of the co-editors of this book: Othon Anastasakis and Antonis Kamaras. Greece was in the midst of one of its worse economic crises, its international image in tatters, in deep debt and under pressure by its creditors to adopt reforms and severe austerity. The times were very challenging and agonising for the Greek people who were feeling the brunt of a plunging economy. The idea of looking into the role that the Greek diaspora could play to help the Greek homeland during a period of such deep crisis was immensely relevant not only from an intellectual point of view but also from a practical point of view. The project was understood from the beginning to have a dual vision: on the one hand, to explore the impact of the crisis on homeland-diaspora relations; on the other, to investigate how to make the most of the Greek human resources outside Greece. The four editors of this volume became the core group of the Greek Diaspora Project, in terms of steering as well as conducting research and working together with a network of research associates and diaspora scholars. In this, we owe an immense gratitude to our “co-conspirator” Kalypso Nicolaidis, the Chair of SEESOX, who, as with every other step of SEESOX, has always been an immense force and inspiration. This book is the proud outcome and a nostalgic tribute to more than four intense years of academic investigation and numerous brainstorming v

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sessions, publications, conferences, panel discussions, lectures and partnerships. In its eighteen chapters, the book contains: first, aspects of our own research at SEESOX, reflecting the core thematic priorities of our project (new migration and brain drain, diasporic philanthropy, political engagement and survey work on the Greeks in the UK); secondly, the work of colleagues from outside our project, most of whom participated in our international conference “Homeland-Diaspora Relations in Flux” in June 2018; and thirdly, some additional comparisons with similar contemporary European cases. We are delighted because this edited volume is unique in linking Greek diaspora engagement with severe economic crisis at home, and we believe it resonates with many other scholars dealing with similar experiences in Europe. We therefore want to thank, first and foremost, all the contributors to this volume, who worked diligently on their chapters and for being so patient and responsive to our requests and edits. This book has been a rich experience of intellectual exchanges on a subject we all feel passionately about. There are so many people to thank who helped directly or indirectly with the project and with this book, starting with our Greek Diaspora Project team, whose names are not included in this volume but who contributed in some form or another: Marilena Anastasopoulou, Renne Hirschon, Nikola Igniatovic, Eirini Karamouzi, Kira Gartsou-Katsouyanni, Lamprini Rori, Nikos Stampoulopoulos, Paulo Serodio, Harry Field-­ Theotokatos and Vassiliki Poula—each one made a substantial contribution on the progress and content of the Greek Diaspora Project. It is a pleasure working with each one of them. From the wider SEESOX “family”, we owe a big thank you to Julie Adams (our SEESOX administrator), David Madden, Jonathan Scheele, Mehmet Karli, Adrienne Chaisty, Charles Enoch, Jessie Hronesova, Belina Budini and Effie Voutira—each one of them supporting the effort and giving us feedback on different aspects of our work. In this context, we also want to thank our longstanding friend and Oxford colleague Dorian Singh who edited the volume, always on time and with a smile. Then we owe a big thank you to our colleagues from the European Studies Centre, to which SEESOX is part of. Timothy Garton Ash gave critical support in times when this was really needed, and to Paul Betts, Hartmut Mayer and Tim Vlandas for embracing this project as an integral part of the Centre.

  PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 

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Needless to say, that the University of Oxford is the place to be and our project enjoyed an immense intellectual boost from the scholars of the Centre for Migration Studies in Oxford (COMPAS) and the Oxford Diaspora Programme, whose feedback and advice was second to none. We refer here to Robin Cohen, Franck Duvell, Dace Dzenovska, Alan Gamlen, Nick Van Hear and Carlos Vargas-Silva, the “who is who” in diaspora and migration studies. In this endeavour, we received the firm support from the two successive Wardens of St Antony’s College, Margaret Macmillan and Roger Goodman, both of whom warmly endorsed the idea. During the course of the project we worked closely with the Bursar of the College, Kirsten Gillingham; the College Accountant, Billy Garnett; and the College Development Director, Wouter te Kloeze. We are grateful for their continuous support. We would also like to thank the Department of Politics and International Relations as well as the School of Anthropology and Museum Ethnography, two departments in Oxford with which we worked closely, as well as the University’s Development Office and Catherine Blishen, in particular. Among the many partnerships, in the different parts of the world, we would like to acknowledge three that stand out for their commitment and support. First, the Greek Programme at Sacramento State University and its Director Katerina Lagos, with whom we co-sponsored our international conference in Oxford in 2018 and who invited us to present our work at the Modern Greek Studies Association symposium in Sacramento; our partnership was an anchor for our work in the United States. Next, Dianeosis in Athens, and particularly Kyriakos Pierrakakis and Fay Makantasi, successive Directors of Research, with whom we worked very closely in order to bring about our landmark survey on the Greeks in the UK, and with whom we also co-organised a highly publicised event on the diaspora vote in Athens in October 2018; their support for the visibility of our work in Greece was paramount. Last but not least, we would like to thank the British Embassy and its Ambassador Kate Smith, who provided us two opportunities to showcase our work in their Greek-British Annual Symposia in Greece and the UK. The Greek Diaspora Project, and by extension this book, could not have been possible without the financial contribution of an impressive number of private donors from Greece and beyond. Indeed, thanks largely to the first Chair of the SEESOX-Hellenic Advisory Board, Nikos Karamouzis, then President at Eurobank, who was the first to believe in us

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and to personally provide financial support to our project; he also introduced us to some of the most prominent economic actors, from the world of business and banking in Greece, who contributed financially to our project. In alphabetical order our donors included Aegean Airlines, A.G.  Leventis Foundation, A.K.  Tsakopoulos Foundation, Athens International Airport, Bodossaki Foundation, Captain Vassilis and Carmen Constantakopoulos, Dianeosis, Eurobank, Eurolife FFH, Hellenic Bank Association, John Latsis Foundation, Mytilineos Company, National Bank of Greece, Onassis Foundation, Organisation Telecommunications (OTE), Raycap and Stelios Foundation. Their presence and feedback during the annual meetings of SEESOX-Hellenic Advisory Board was a unique experience of feedback and public-private partnership towards a common goal. In particular, the two of our co-editors owe huge gratitude to their respective foundations that sponsored their positions in Oxford: Manolis Pratsinakis, the Onassis Fellow; and Foteini Kalantzi, the A.G. Leventis Researcher. Finally, we would like to thank the second Chair of the Hellenic Advisory Board, Alexandros Sarrigeorgiou, CEO of Eurolife, for his commitment, intellectual engagement and continuing support of our project. The list of thank-yous is not exhaustive; the names of the people mentioned here were people who were continuously involved in the implementation of our project, in some form or another. We benefitted from many other colleagues in the UK, Greece, the United States, Australia, Germany, the Netherlands and Cyprus who offered feedback on the different aspects of our work as well as on comparative perspectives. From all of them we took ideas and emulated successful research recipes, but we also hope that we, through our project methodology and findings, have created new venues for the study of diasporas under exceptional circumstances. We hope this book will make a difference in the way we understand contemporary diasporas. This book is published on the 20th anniversary of SEESOX. What better way to celebrate! Oxford, UK June  2022  

Othon Anastasakis Manolis Pratsinakis Foteini Kalantzi Antonis Kamaras

Contents

1 Introduction: The Greek Crisis as a Critical Juncture in Homeland-Diaspora Relations  1 Othon Anastasakis, Foteini Kalantzi, Antonis Kamaras, and Manolis Pratsinakis Part I Homeland Reform and Diaspora Involvement  17 2 Crisis and Change: The Right of Greek Citizens to Vote Abroad 19 Othon Anastasakis and Foteini Kalantzi 3 International Portability of Social Benefits as a Bridge to the Crisis-Driven Diaspora 45 Platon Tinios 4 Diaspora and Transnational Philanthropy During the Crisis and the Shifting Boundaries of State and Civil Society 71 Antonis Kamaras

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Part II Crisis-driven Emigration and Diasporic Interactions  95 5 Remittance Behaviour of Greek Emigrants in the UK During the Long Recession 97 Manolis Pratsinakis, Daphne Nicolitsas, and Aymeric Faure 6 The Greek Diaspora in the UK during the Crisis: Socioeconomic Integration, Prospects of Return and Aspects of Engagement121 Manolis Pratsinakis and Anastasia Kafe 7 “When in Rome”: Do Recent Greek Migrants Adopt New Norms on Corruption While Living Abroad?153 Kostas Papangelopoulos and Ortrun Merkle Part III Diaspora Institutions Before and After the Outbreak of the Crisis 179 8 The World Council of Hellenes Abroad (SAE): From Great Expectations to Disillusionment and Crisis Irrelevance181 Marina Frangos and Othon Anastasakis 9 The Greek Americans and the Greek Economic Crisis in Historical Perspective197 Alexander Kitroeff 10 The Ecumenical Patriarchate: Bridging Greece, the Diaspora and the Orthodox World221 Ioannis N. Grigoriadis

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Part IV Diasporic Identities and Transnational Mobilisation During the Crisis 241 11 Diaspora Public Diplomacy at a Time of Homeland Crisis: The Philotimo Nation as Global Distinction243 Yiorgos Anagnostou 12 Diasporic Homecoming and Transnational Flows in Times of Crisis: Economic Strategies and Mobilities of Greeks from the Former Soviet Union in Thessaloniki267 Anastasios Grigorakis and Dimitris Kataiftsis 13 Crisis, Identity and Diasporic Mobilisation: Perspectives from Young People and Parents in the Greek Diaspora in England291 Elizabeth Mavroudi 14 Greek-Australian Ethno-regional Diasporic Engagement with the Homeland During the Greek Economic Crisis: Ethnographic Insights315 Vassiliki Chryssanthopoulou Part V Beyond the Greek Case 347 15 The Debt Crisis and Homeland-Diaspora Engagement in Portugal: Institutions, Remittances and Political Participation349 Maria Lucinda Fonseca 16 Ireland’s Homeland-Diaspora Engagement: Policy Responses to the Post-2008 Economic Crisis379 Liam Coakley and Piaras Mac Éinrí 17 Migration and Diaspora at Times of Crisis: Public Perceptions of Emigrants in Ukraine405 Iryna Lapshyna

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18 Conclusion: A New Model of Diaspora Engagement?433 Othon Anastasakis, Kalypso Nicolaidis, and Manolis Pratsinakis Index443

Notes on Contributors

Yiorgos  Anagnostou  is the Miltiadis Marinakis Professor of Modern Greek Language and Culture at The Ohio State University, USA. He is the author of Contours of White Ethnicity: Popular Ethnography and the Making of Usable Pasts in Greek America (2009), which is also published in Greek by Nisos (2021). He is the editor of the online journal Erγon: Greek/American Arts and Letters. Othon Anastasakis  is Director of the European Studies Centre, Director of South East European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX) and Senior Research Fellow at St Antony’s College, Oxford, UK. He is the Principal Investigator of the “Greek Diaspora Project at SEESOX” and of “Migration Diplomacy: Turkey-EU Relations” at University of Oxford. Vassiliki  Chryssanthopoulou  is a social anthropologist and Associate Professor of Folklore in the Department of Philology, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Greece. She has conducted research in Australia, Greece and the USA, and has written widely on folklore, ethnography and heritage in Greek regional, migration and diaspora studies. Her publications include a monograph on Sites of Memory in Castellorizian Migration and Diaspora. Liam Coakley  is a social/political geographer based in the Department of Geography at the University College Cork, Ireland. Coakley’s research seeks to understand the geographies of migration command and control in Ireland. He is particularly interested in the spatialities of Ireland’s International Protection applications and support process. xiii

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Notes on Contributors

Aymeric  Faure  is Research Fellow on Migrations at the Institut Open Diplomacy, France. He has worked in the humanitarian sector in Libya and Yemen and holds an MSc in International Relations from the London School of Economics. Maria  Lucinda  Fonseca  is Full Professor of Human Geography at the Institute of Geography and Spatial Planning (IGOT) and coordinator of the research cluster MIGRARE—Migration, spaces and societies at the Centre of Geographical Studies, Universidade de Lisboa. Marina Frangos  holds a PhD in Human Geography from the University of the Aegean, Greece, and has lectured for the Hellenic Open University. Her work includes “Thessaloniki: Cultural Capital 1997” and as the first Director of the World Council of Hellenes Abroad (1995–2000). Recent publications include “The Diaspora Matters!” in a Human Geography textbook (2020). She is working as senior advisor at the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Anastasios Grigorakis  holds a PhD in Sociology from Université Paris 8—Vincennes-Saint-Denis, France. He has taught sociology at the Sorbonne Paris Nord University and worked as a post-doc researcher at the University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece. He is a member of the Culture-Borders-Gender Lab, University of Macedonia. Ioannis N. Grigoriadis  is an Associate Professor and Jean Monnet Chair in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at Bilkent University, Turkey. He is also a Senior Fellow and head of the Programme on Turkey at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP). Anastasia  Kafe is a post-doctoral Researcher at Panteion University, Greece, and has worked as a research associate at SEESOX for the design and implementation of the survey “The Greek Diaspora in the UK”. Her research interests lie on the study of political behaviour, political radicalism and xenophobia, social movements and protest event analysis. Foteini Kalantzi  is the A.G. Leventis Researcher at the Diaspora Project at SEESOX, St Antony’s College, University of Oxford, UK, and the co-­ convenor of International Politics of Migration, Refugees and Diasporas BISA working group.

  Notes on Contributors 

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Antonis  Kamaras  is a SEESOX diaspora Research Associate and formerly a Research Officer at the Hellenic Observatory of the London School of Economics (LSE), UK. He served as advisor to the Governor of National Bank of Greece, to the Mayor of Thessaloniki and to Greece’s Minister of Finance. Dimitris  Kataiftsis  is a history/anthropology researcher, specialised in the Soviet and post-Soviet space. He has fulfilled two post-doctoral programmes and written and presented several papers in international scientific journals and congresses. He is Teaching Fellow of Social Anthropology in the Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies Department at the University of Macedonia, Greece. Alexander  Kitroeff is Professor of History at Haverford College, Pennsylvania, USA.  His research and publications focus on identity in Greece and its diaspora over a broad range of topics, from politics to sports. His most recent book is The Greek Orthodox Church in America: A Modern History (2020). Iryna  Lapshyna is an Associate Professor at Ukrainian Catholic University, Lviv, Ukraine, and a Research Associate at University of Oxford. Previously, Lapshyna was a senior researcher at COMPAS, University of Oxford. She held a British Academy grant for a project on the Ukrainian Diaspora in the UK and Poland. Piaras Mac Éinrí  lectures in the Department of Geography at University College Cork, Ireland. In 2015–2018 he participated in an EU Horizon 9-country study of intra-EU migration. In 2012–2013 he led a major survey of emigration from Ireland after the 2008 crash—a follow-up is under way. He has written widely on migration and integration-­ related topics. Elizabeth Mavroudi  is Reader in Human Geography at Loughborough University, UK. She is a migration scholar focusing on the geographies of diaspora. She has written widely on these themes, such as on theorisations of diaspora, Palestinian and Greek diasporic identity, politics and homeland development. Her most recent Leverhulme-funded project focused on Greek, Jewish and Palestinian young people’s identities and politicisation in diaspora.

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Ortrun Merkle  is a post-doctoral Researcher at UNU-MERIT (United Nations University – Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology) and Maastricht University working on corruption, gender and migration. She frequently teaches and writes on the topic and has conducted research for international donors to get a better understanding of the complex relationship of corruption and migration. Kalypso Nicolaidis  is Professorial Chair of Global Affairs at the European University Institute (EUI) School of Transnational Governance, Florence, Italy. She is on leave from the University of Oxford where she has been chair of South East European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX). More information can be found on her website: http://kalypsonicolaidis.com/. Daphne  Nicolitsas is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Crete, Greece. Prior to joining the department in 2014 she was the deputy director of the Economic Analysis Division at the Bank of Greece. Her research focuses on labour market and industrial organisation issues. Kostas Papangelopoulos  works as Sustainability Analyst for the Dutch Development Bank (FMO), Netherlands. He holds a double MSc in Public Policy and Human Development from the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance and the United Nations University. His interests focus on the concept of development and its environmental, social and economic implications. Manolis Pratsinakis  is Departmental Lecturer in Migration Studies and the SEESOX/Onassis Fellow at the School of Anthropology and Museum Ethnography and the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, University of Oxford, UK. He has done research and written on immigrant-native relations, ethnic boundaries and categorisation, everyday nationhood, migration decision-making, brain drain and intra-EU mobility. Platon  Tinios is an economist, and an Associate Professor at the University of Piraeus, Greece. He studied at Cambridge and Oxford. He served as special advisor to the prime minister of Greece from 1996 to 2004, specialising in the economics of social policy. His research interests include pensions, ageing, gender, insurance and public finance.

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Fig. 2.2 Fig. 6.1 Fig. 6.2 Fig. 6.3 Fig. 6.4 Fig. 6.5 Fig. 6.6 Fig. 6.7 Fig. 6.8 Fig. 6.9 Fig. 6.10 Fig. 6.11 Fig. 6.12

Variables associated with the facilitation of the expat vote 21 Emigration flows of Greek citizens. (Source: Eurostat http:// appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_ emi1ctz&lang=en)30 Yearly National Insurance Number registrations of Greek citizens in the UK. Source: Stat-xplore 132 Share of Greek tertiary graduate in the UK. Sources: SEESOXGDUK survey, Eurostat133 Average monthly income from all sources in the UK after tax. Source: SEESOX-GDUK survey136 Employment status. Source: SEESOX-GDUK survey137 Interethnic friendships. Source: SEESOX-GDUK survey138 Discrimination. Source: SEESOX-GDUK survey139 Closeness to British and Greek culture*. Source: SEESOXGDUK survey. *Mean values of self-placement in 10-point scale, where 1=Not at all close and 10=Very close140 Identification of Greeks in the UK. Source: SEESOX-GDUK survey141 Identification change as a result of migration to the UK. Source: SEESOX-GDUK survey142 Aspects of their Greek identity that are most important to the survey respondents. Source: SEESOX-GDUK survey142 Emotional and moral ties with homeland. Source: SEESOX-­ GDUK survey143 Emotions about Greece and the UK. Source: SEESOX-GDUK survey144

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Fig. 6.13 Fig. 6.14 Fig. 6.15 Fig. 6.16 Fig. 7.1 Fig. 8.1 Fig. 8.2 Fig. 8.3 Fig. 14.1 Fig. 14.2 Fig. 14.3 Fig. 14.4 Fig. 14.5 Fig. 14.6 Fig. 14.7

Fig. 14.8

Proposed ways for the Greek governments to engage with the UK diasporaa. Source: SEESOX-GDUK survey. aQuestion with multiple answers 147 Migration plans and aspirations for return to Greece in the short term. Source: SEESOX-GDUK survey 148 Aspirations for return to Greece in the longer term. Source: SEESOX-GDUK survey 148 To what degree have your plans changed due to the Brexit referendum results? Source: SEESOX-GDUK survey 149 Linking migration motivations, experiences and perceptions. Source: Authors’ own visualisation 162 Age distribution 189 SAE delegates by generation (1995) 189 Delegate responses on government involvement in SAE 190 View of the settlement of Castellorizo with the Turkish coast opposite. (Photo-credits: V. Chryssanthopoulou & N. Anastasiadis, 07.2018) 323 Map showing Castellorizo and cities where Castellorizians have settled in Australia. (Google Maps 2017 | Edited by: Paraskevi G. Kanellatou) 324 Bidding farewell to those migrating from Castellorizo in 1938. (Photo-credits: V. Zanailis | Source: N. G Pappas collection | Photo restoration: P. G. Kanellatou, 2021) 325 Report of the shipwreck, Images, October 1945. (Source: P. Boyatzis & N. Pappas 1995. Embers on the Sea. The Empire Patrol Disaster 1945, Halstead Press, p. 7) 326 www.empirepatrol.com homepage. (Source: http:// empirepatrol.com/index.htm)328 The monument to the memory of those perished in the shipwreck set up on Castellorizo in 2010. (Photo-credits: V. Chryssanthopoulou & L. Scopelitis, 2014) 329 The author with Rose Kailis, a second-generation Castellorizian from Perth who has restored her family home and returns to the island regularly. (Photo-­credits: V. Chryssanthopoulou, 07.2018) 332 Third-generation newlywed Perth Castellorizian Basil Zempilas with his bride, Amy Graham, and their wedding guests, posing for the traditional wedding photo in front of the Santrapeia School on Castellorizo. (Photo-credits: Basil Zempilas, 09.2009) 334

  LIST OF FIGURES 

Fig. 15.1 Fig. 15.2

Fig. 15.3

Fig. 15.4 Fig. 15.5

Municipalities with an Emigrant Support Office, January 2021. Source: Own preparation, with data available on the website of the Portuguese Communities Regional breakdown of the balances of deposits by Portuguese emigrants in banks, savings banks and credit unions in 2019 (%). Source: INE—Statistics on Credit Institutions and Financial Companies, with own processing Purpose of emigrants’ remittances, according to the duration of migration. Source: REMIGR survey data, 2014/2015 * Percentage calculated in relation to the total number of respondents who sent remittances. Note: The sum is higher than 100% because each emigrant may send remittances for different purposes Abstention rate in the elections for the Parliament: residents in Portugal and residents abroad, 1976–2019 (%). Source: PORDATA; Electoral Registration Database (registered voters) Participation of emigrants in Portuguese elections according to the time of migration, 2000–2007 and 2008–2015. Source: REMIGR survey data, 2014/2015

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364

365 369 370

List of Tables

Table 5.1 Table 5.2 Table 5.3 Table 5.4 Table 5.5 Table 5.6 Table 5.7 Table 6.1 Table 6.2 Table 6.3 Table 7.1 Table 7.2 Table 8.1 Table 15.1 Table 15.2 Table 15.3

Demographic and productive features of individuals in the sample106 Reasons for migrating 107 Financial situation of emigrants 108 Characteristics of the family in the country of origin 109 Trust in institutions 110 Attachment to Greece and willingness to help 111 Logit estimates of the decision to remit—marginal effects 112 Income by field of education 137 Offer help in organisations or develop professional collaborations in Greece 144 Attending Greek and British associations’ meetings per crisis migrant146 Respondents’ demographic characteristics 155 Main destinations of Greek migrants between 2010 and 2016 159 SAE delegate renewal 188 Basic structure of the sample 354 Engagement with homeland: sending remittances. Estimated odds ratios from logistic regressions of sending remittances to Portugal 367 Frequency of emigrants’ participation in the Portuguese elections according to the time of migration and the level of education371

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: The Greek Crisis as a Critical Juncture in Homeland-Diaspora Relations Othon Anastasakis, Foteini Kalantzi, Antonis Kamaras, and Manolis Pratsinakis

Greece went through an unprecedented economic crisis from 2009, the impact of which was felt intensely for more than a decade. This crisis was one of the worst to hit a Western nation during peacetime since the 1929 economic crash. It led to the decline of the country’s GDP by more than a quarter, rising and persistent unemployment reached 27.5% in 2013, and external debt escalated to a staggering 180.5% of the GDP in 2019 as a result of consecutive bailout packages from the creditors. This economic crisis has been one of the most consequential periods in the country’s modern history and has brought significant changes in the economic, political and social landscape of Greece. The political contestation that the crisis

O. Anastasakis (*) • F. Kalantzi • M. Pratsinakis University of Oxford, Oxford, UK e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected] A. Kamaras Greek Diaspora Project – SEESOX, Oxford, UK © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 O. Anastasakis et al. (eds.), Diaspora Engagement in Times of Severe Economic Crisis, Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97443-5_1

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engendered included contrasting perceptions of what it meant for Greece’s future: as a catalyst for much needed reforms; as a missed opportunity for positive change; as a period of backwardness and debt dependency that would take Greece many decades to recover from. Undoubtedly, the crisis, a unique period of austerity, economic pain and socio-political unrest, affected not just the country from within, but also its relationship with, and the very composition of, its diaspora communities abroad. First, the Greek economic crisis expanded the size of the Greece diaspora. More than half a million migrants left Greece to seek job opportunities in foreign destinations during the crisis. Greece is not new to emigration. Historically, and up to the mid-1970s, it was a net exporter of labour, having experienced two major waves of outmigration. The first one started in late nineteenth century until the early 1920s and the United States was the main destination. The second took place in the post-WWII era until the mid-1970s when more than one million Greeks left their country to fill the gaps in the booming industrial sectors in Western Europe or moved to more remote destinations such as Australia, USA and Canada (Cavounidis, 2016). The 2010s marked the third major emigration wave for Greece. Unlike the emigrants of the previous waves, the new emigrants were, for the most part, highly skilled and headed primarily to countries of the European Union (EU) facilitated by their right to free movement across the EU (Pratsinakis et al., 2017). Their migration reconfigured the socio-demographic characteristics of the local Greek communities in the countries where they settled. Secondly, the crisis altered the dynamics of the homeland-diaspora nexus and shifted the terms of interaction, not least due to the crisis-­ driven outward migration, but also due to the weakening of the Greek state’s position vis-à-vis the diaspora towards which it turned for support. Scholars have articulated and investigated “critical junctures” (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007; Collier & Collier, 1991), namely events and processes which have brought about catalytic changes in several fields of a homeland-­ diaspora interrelationship. “Critical juncture,” as a theoretical notion derived from historical institutionalism, together with its casual mechanism, that is path dependence, “emphasises the lasting impact of choices made during those critical junctures in history” (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007, p. 341). Koinova (2017) perceives the notion of “critical juncture” as a moment of transformative events which have the capacity to change the trajectory of diaspora mobilisations in place. The crisis in Greece, conceptualised as a critical juncture in homeland-­ diaspora relations, challenged and exposed the weaknesses of the

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institutional apparatus which had been gradually built since the 1970s to support and strengthen the Greek state’s engagement with its diaspora (Frangos, 2019; Venturas, 2009). At the same time, it triggered new forms of engagement. Many stemmed from bottom-up initiatives in the diaspora including advocacy on behalf of Greece and the Greek people, humiliated and besmirched in the global public square. The crisis also, stimulated the engagement of diasporic economic actors in the Greek economy and contributions to the subnational level by their diaspora communities of origin (Kamaras, 2019; Labrianidis & Pratsinakis, 2017). At the same time, disengagement was also recorded among members of certain established diasporic communities who expressed disappointment based on previous negative experiences (Mavroudi, 2015). Similarly, many of the new migrants expressed a disenchantment towards the Greek state and successive governments which they held accountable for the negative conditions that drove their migration in the first place (Labrianidis & Pratsinakis, 2016). These experiences call for the need to dissect the notion of diasporic obligation towards the homeland and to explore those factors that can produce immobility in diaspora and homeland relations even in critical periods. Conceptualising the Greek crisis as a critical juncture in this book we ask the following question: How did the Greek crisis affect patterns of engagement between the diaspora and homeland? More specifically, we aim to answer the following sub-questions: (a) To what extent, and in which areas, was the crisis a cut-off point and the catalyst for different modes of engagement? (b) What types of engagement do we identify and how do these differ from the pre-crisis ones? (c) Did the crisis result in missed opportunities or even disengagement between homeland and particular diaspora actors and cohorts? (d) Was the Greek crisis an exceptional and unique case, or is it generalisable and relevant to other similar or parallel interactions of homeland-­diaspora engagement in Europe during the years of the financial crisis?

The Greek Diaspora and the Crisis Over the past decades, the literature on diasporas has been burgeoning across different social scientific disciplines focusing, on the one hand, on the deterritorialisation and hybridisation of identities and, on the other,

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on the role of a variety of dispersed populations, such as ethnic minorities, refugees, expatriates and of various national and ethnic origins in homeland politics. Seen from a longue durée perspective, Greeks have captured the interest of diaspora scholars as a par excellence diasporic population. The Greek diaspora has been cited as one of the classical (Cohen, 2008) or archetypal (Armstrong, 1976) diasporas often studied along its Jewish and the Armenian counterparts. At the same time, there has been a rich and expanding literature on the modern Greek diaspora with the bulk of it focusing on the history, migration trajectories and integration patterns of different Greek communities in a wide array of countries of settlement (Afentoulis & Cleland, 2015; Chimbos, 1999; Price, 1975; Venturas, 1999; Vermeulen et al., 1985) and notably in the USA (Constantinou, 2002; Kaloudis, 2018; Kouvertaris, 1997; Moskos, 1989; Orfanos, 2002; Saloutos, 1964). There is an equally extensive body of literature focusing on different cultural manifestations of Greek diasporans abroad and related identity issues, as well as on class and gender (Anagnostou, 2009; Callinicos, 1990; Chryssanthopoulou, 2009; Kindinger, 2015; Kontos, 2009; Laliotou, 2004). More recently, considerable scholarly attention was also paid to different return migrations and the construction of so-called reverse diasporas (Christou & King, 2014; Pratsinakis, 2021; Pratsinakis, 2017; Voutira, 2011), as well as on the emergence of transnational lifestyles among Greeks abroad (Panagakos, 2004). However, with a few notable exceptions (Constas & Platias, 1993; Kitroeff, 2009; Mavroudi, 2015; Panagakos, 1998; Venturas, 2009) there is relatively limited focus on homeland-diaspora relations in general, and less so during the recent crisis (Kalantzi & Lapshyna, 2020; Kamaras, 2019) when the role of the Greek diaspora became more pertinent as its numbers increased substantially. Despite the recent proliferation of studies on diaspora engagement, research on the Greek case remains limited. The scholarly interest on diaspora engagement largely reflects the concept’s growing importance in policy and public debates. Diasporas have increasingly become a preoccupation of policy makers and practitioners of homeland states who aim to reach out to them (Gamlen, 2019). In fact, Greece has been among the early proponents of this approach setting out an institutional framework with the aim to maintain the sociocultural connection of diasporic Greeks with their homeland and potentially extract benefits from them (Venturas, 2009). Such state-centric strategies have generated scholarly critique, due to their treating the diaspora as the

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nation outside the state and the diasporans as subjects to be governed (Ragazzi, 2009). By doing so, such strategies reify notions of belonging and of the “roots” of migrants in places of origin (Sökefeld, 2006). Importantly, Brubaker (2005) proposes to treat diasporas as a category of practice. In this perspective, the researcher is invited to explore how the notion of diaspora is used to make claims, to articulate projects, to formulate expectations, to mobilise energies and to appeal to loyalties. In the same line of thinking, Sökefeld (2006) proposed that the formation of diaspora is not a natural consequence of migration but of processes of mobilisation in response to specific critical events. Indeed, community structures, discourses and perceptions of common origin as well as of a homeland orientation are all significant and can be the ground for the mobilisation of different diasporic projects. In this context, the state may be seen as an actor among others attempting to formulate certain diasporic stances. Additionally, the social movements theory approach to diasporas is very important in highlighting the critical role of events in shaping diasporic communities and driving diasporic actions. Adopting this perspective, this book aims to fill the research gap on Greek diaspora-homeland relations during the crisis. As such, it provides a compelling case to study diaspora engagement by a Western-advanced economy and consolidated democracy facing a deep and prolonged crisis, thus contributing to the literature on diaspora engagement beyond the Greek case. It addresses this topic through the presentation of original material of new unpublished research, adopting an interdisciplinary lens (Political Science, International Relations, Human Geography, Sociology, Political Economy, Anthropology, Cultural Studies and History) and drawing on a breadth of methodologies (interviews, surveys, discourse analysis and ethnographic research). The book is partly the product of research conducted by the University of Oxford-based Greek Diaspora Project at South East European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX), which has been operating since 2016 focusing on diaspora-homeland engagement in times of crisis. The research project at SEESOX has explored several pertinent issues including a study of Greek diasporic philanthropic giving, the understanding of the Greek diaspora in the UK whose numbers tripled during the years of the economic crisis, the diasporic-homeland political engagement including the diasporic vote and the significance of brain drain caused by the increase in outward migration. All these issues are included as chapters in the book.

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In addition, the book is enriched by further insights from a network of scholars who came to present their academic papers during an international conference, “Homeland-Diaspora relations in flux: Greece and Greeks abroad at times of crisis,” organised by SEESOX and held at St Antony’s College, at the University of Oxford in June 2018. Public panels and the outputs of brainstorming meetings also have contributed to the treatment in this book. Finally, the book gives a comparative perspective by looking at similar contemporary cases of homeland-diaspora engagements in countries hit by similar economic crises like Ireland and Portugal, or in countries hit by political crisis like Ukraine. In that way we hope to holistically cover our topic and offer a book with significant added value in the scholarly community of diaspora studies.

Thematic Areas Drawing upon this original and interdisciplinary material, the book is broken down into five main themes which correspond to different sections: 1. Homeland reform and diaspora involvement 2. Crisis-driven emigration and diasporic interactions 3. Diaspora institutions before and after the outbreak of the crisis 4. Diasporic identities and transnational mobilisation during the crisis 5. Beyond the Greek case The remainder of the introduction provides an initial presentation of these sections and a preliminary discussion of the sub-themes addressed in the book as separate chapters. Rather than attempting to summarise the chapters we offer here a very brief overview that integrates the chapters together as a coherent sequence. A synthesis of the book’s findings is outlined in the book’s concluding chapter. Homeland Reform and Diaspora Engagement Is crisis an opportunity for change in the homeland and can the diaspora play a catalytic role in this change? This section looks at the diaspora as an agent for change in the homeland and its transformative potential in the fields of electoral politics via the diasporic vote, the introduction of changes in the complementarity of the different national pension systems and the

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impact of philanthropic giving as a way of forging better synergy between the state and the non-profit sectors. Chapter 2 by Othon Anastasakis and Foteini Kalantzi focuses on the adoption of the law of facilitation of the diasporic vote which took place in 2019 as a noticeable example of reform in homeland-diaspora political relations that emanated from the crisis and the ensuing large scale emigration. The authors discuss the interaction of three important variables that led to this key institutional change, namely the crisis as critical juncture, the role of homeland political actors and the international environment conducive to this change. The chapter delves into the micro-politics of this policy change and argues that the recent crisis that triggered large-scale emigration and fundamental changes in the two-party system functioned as a catalyst for the redefinition of the homeland-diaspora political engagement. Platon Tinios in Chap. 3 then explores homeland-diaspora relations from an economic angle, focussing on the portability of social rights in origin and destination countries. He argues that this can offer continuity in migrants’ lives and act as a bridge between Greece and its diaspora. The matter of consolidating social benefits earned in different countries and at different points in people’s lives is important especially in the increasingly globalised economic environment. This issue is particularly salient in the case of Greece concerning the crisis outward migration and brain drain. In their decision to return to the homeland, diasporans will need to be able to ensure that their pensions and other social rights can be transferred. The chapter stresses the fact that there is an opportunity to enhance operational links between homeland and diaspora, given the need for reforming the Greek pension system, the subsequent pandemic crisis and labour flexibility. In Chap. 4, Antonis Kamaras analyses the response of the diaspora and the impact of transnational philanthropy on the Greek state as a response to the economic crisis and the sharp decrease in public expenditure. By doing so, he highlights the reconfigurations taking place between state and non-profit sector and evaluates the role of the increasingly active diaspora and transnational philanthropy towards these changes. The chapter focuses on three types of beneficiaries of such philanthropy, namely (a) state organisations under the control of central government and led by civil servants, (b) municipalities under the leadership of elected mayors and (c) private non-profits under the leadership of boards of directors or trustees. The chapter re-evaluates the bilateral relationship between state

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and civil society, and looks into the impact of diaspora and transnational philanthropy on pluralism and democratic legitimisation in Greece. “New migration” and Diasporic Interactions The third largest emigration wave in the history of the modern Greek state has been termed by some as “new migration.” This wave changed the composition of the Greek diaspora, including an unprecedented brain drain, but also witnessed the migration of lower-skilled emigrants. With the changing profile of most diasporic communities abroad, what kinds of remittances are expected to hit home? This section examines the flows of economic and social remittances, including perceptions of corruption by Greek migrants in Western European societies and their influence on the homeland, as well as the new migrants’ ties with Greece. Manolis Pratsinakis, Aymeric Faure and Daphne Nicolitsas in Chap. 5 start this section with a paradox during the crisis years: the increase of emigration rates on the one hand and the decrease of remittances inflows on the other. They explore the reasons behind this trend by using data from the SEESOX-led Greek Diaspora Project Survey in the UK. Their analysis indicate that the relatively low flow of remittances recorded during the crisis period may be attributed to the socio-economic selectivity of the recent emigration, as well as to the migration aspirations informing it. In Chap. 6, Manolis Pratsinakis and Anastasia Kafe examine the UK’s Greek diaspora, which tripled during the years of crisis. Importantly, the new emigrants not only changed the size of the UK’s Greek diaspora, but also its socio-demographic profile. The authors here analyse the factors obstructing or enabling diaspora engagement on the basis of research conducted in the SEESOX diaspora project survey. The data upon which this chapter is based suggest that personal relationships with people in the homeland are stronger than their sense of moral responsibility to help the homeland in times of crisis. In Chap. 7, Kostas Papangelopoulos and Ortrun Merkle address the question of whether Greek migrants adopt new norms on corruption while living abroad. By drawing examples from  Greek emigrants in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, their chapter discusses how experiences abroad shape perceptions on corruption and whether these new norms are remitted back to Greece. Their findings based on interviews suggest that while the emigrants’ attitudes towards corruption become more

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“westernised,” they fail to convey their changed views or to substantively influence the practices in the homeland. Diaspora Institutions Before and After the Start of the Crisis As noted, transnational diasporic institutions have become an increasingly influential agent in international and domestic affairs. But is their role efficient in times of crises? This section compares the impact of some of Greece’s transnational diaspora institutions at different points in time before and after the economic crisis and looks at their ability to mobilise diasporic engagement to support the homeland in times of need. More concretely, it looks at the World Council for Hellenes Abroad (SAE), whose significance deteriorated at a time when Greek diaspora was growing considerably. Moreover, it explores the interrelationship between the Greek Orthodox Church in America, the Greek American community leadership and the Greek homeland and their interaction during the crisis. Last but not least, this section discusses the role of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, as a traditionally powerful diasporic, religious, philanthropic and geopolitical institution and its impact during the times of economic crisis in Greece. Following this line of analysis, Marina Frangos and Othon Anastasakis in Chap. 8 engage with the history of the Council of Hellenes Abroad (SAE), a global state-sponsored organisation dedicated to the Greek diaspora and established with great hopes and high morale during the 1990s. The success of this institution at its inception was characterised by ambitious projects and the active participation of the diaspora. However, the economic crisis dealt a final blow to this important institution which fell into irrelevance and struggled financially. This development is paradoxical in a period where there was an increase in crisis-driven migration, when a strong global institution for the diaspora would arguably be essential. The writers shed light on this paradox by examining the state’s and the diaspora’s reluctance to support SAE’s continuation. Alexander Kitroeff, in Chap. 9, compares Greek American involvement with the homeland’s recent economic crisis with two previous comparable periods of crisis: the high degree of diasporic mobilisation during the early 1940s when Greece was under Nazi occupation and 1974 when the Cyprus debacle took place. He argues that the response to the recent economic crisis has been restrained in relation to the extensive support given from Greek American resources in the first two cases. The article examines

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the reasons behind this stance of the Greek diaspora through the prism of the Greek American relationship with Greece during the crisis and of the character of philanthropy in America shaping the initiatives of Greek American organisations. Finally, Ioannis Grigoriadis in Chap. 10 brings in the role of the Ecumenical Patriarchate as a transnational bridge of wider Hellenism and looks at the institution’s multiple role in religious, philanthropic, geopolitical and diasporic affairs. While the Patriarchate maintained a cultural bond with the diaspora Greeks, especially in the United States and built ties with the Greek American diaspora, the recent economic crisis has affected its engagement with them. In addition, the chapter also explores the relations of the Ecumenical Patriarchate with the Church of Greece, the Moscow Patriarchate as well as Turkey. Diasporic Identities and Transnational Mobilisation During the Crisis To what degree do crises affect diasporic stances towards homeland? This section gives prominence to diasporic identities, economic practices, perceptions and depictions that became particularly important during the time of the crisis. More specifically, it explores the themes of diaspora public diplomacy by looking at Greek American activism to improve Greece’s battered image during the crisis, and practices of diaspora economic entrepreneurship focusing on the creation of diaspora networks by Greeks from the former Soviet Union. It also looks at the attitudes of younger Greeks in the UK and their perceptions of their homeland in the time of the economic crisis, as well as micro ethno-topical identities and allegiances with regional ancestral communities back home in times of need. Yiorgos Anagnostou in Chap. 11 sheds light on diasporic diplomacy activism, highlighting the role of civic organisations and individuals in the advancement of national interests internationally. Drawing on discourse analysis from global diasporic media, Anagnostou identifies institutional sites where diaspora public diplomacy is practiced and the strategies through which this agenda is placed within the US political rhetoric. This kind of activism promotes a specific aspect of national culture, that is philotimo, which serves as evidence for the inherent moral values on the Greek people worldwide. The analysis is placed within a broader diaspora

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project of branding Greek identity and elucidates both the successes and the limitations of this strategy. Dimitris Kataiftsis and Anastasios Grigorakis in Chap. 12 explore the formation of economic networks of repatriates from the former Soviet Union in a context of subsequent changes and crises. Relying on ethnographic research and semi-structured interviews, they argue that the repatriates’ practices relied on their diasporic networks and were affected by national and international economic and political developments. Their kinship networks played a significant role in their survival strategies and the development of their business activities. Elizabeth Mavroudi in Chap. 13 investigates the perceptions by second-­ generation Greeks in England and their parents vis-à-vis their homeland, their lives as diasporans and their feelings towards assisting Greece at a time of a difficult crisis. The research results of this chapter are based on qualitative research which highlights that while younger generations often feel connected to Greece, they struggle at the same time to realise their role in helping the homeland. Vassiliki Chryssanthopoulou in Chap. 14 discusses the ways in which ethno-regional diasporas engage with the homeland. She looks into the cases of island diaspora communities of Australia, originating from Castellorizo, a small island at the geographical edge of the Dodecanese but with a substantial diaspora in Australia. She argues that the sense of shared identity becomes stronger during crises, as the well-being of those in Greece was threatened by the crisis, and therefore prompted help by the diasporans. Through fieldwork and multi-site ethnographic research, she examines “heritage projects” involving diaspora and regional homeland, illustrating the ways that transnational heritage of the diaspora was strengthened during the Greek crisis. Beyond the Greek Case Is the Greek case exceptional, or does it warrant comparisons with other countries in similar crises? The last section of the book compares the Greek case with three countries whose own crises worked as critical junctures for changes in the homeland-diaspora engagement. The cases used in this comparative framework are Portugal, Ireland and Ukraine. Portugal shares similarities to Greece in development and economic structure, and it has also experienced recession and increased levels of outward migration. A country with comparable economic experience to Greece during the

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Eurozone crisis and a large diasporic population is Ireland, whose diaspora increasingly influenced domestic affairs in the country especially in the last two decades. The third case is that of Ukraine, a non-EU member state with a different crisis, of a political nature, demonstrating how perceptions and attitudes towards diaspora can change substantially as a result of crisis at home. Maria Lucinda Fonseca in Chap. 15 analyses the case of Portugal, a country which tried to strengthen its economic, social and political ties with its diaspora. She builds on the concept of critical juncture, aiming to scrutinise the Portuguese diaspora policies and the changes that they underwent during the 2008 economic crisis. The writer uses secondary data on remittances and the electoral participation rate of Portuguese emigrants, in conjunction with a survey of emigrants that left the country after 2000. She argues that the main changes in diaspora policies coincided with critical moments in the national history; however, she stresses the inconsistencies of diaspora policies that mainly focus on the promotion of Portuguese communities abroad and the mechanisms for emigrant return. In Chap. 16 on Ireland, Liam Coakley and Piaras Mac Éinrí emphasise the shifting Irish discourses on diaspora in recent decades from ignorance towards emigrants to a recognition of the key role that they could play in the Irish affairs. This was expressed by a constitutional amendment and the creation of a support policy programme laying the foundations for more comprehensive policy strategy with the diaspora. The chapter explores the nature of that recent deeper outreach and argues that while the economic crisis of 2008 was not in itself a “critical juncture” in homeland-­diaspora relations, it did accelerate the pace and nature of a number of specific forms of diasporic engagement. Chapter 17 by Iryna Lapshyna looks into the case of Ukraine, a country which underwent a protracted political crisis followed by an economic one. Lapshyna analyses the ways that these crises affected the Ukrainian diaspora and the public perceptions of emigrants in Ukraine and argues that the Euromaidan Revolution in 2013–2014 constituted a major threshold event in Ukraine and has contributed to a significant shift in the representation of Ukrainian migrants and diaspora in political and public debates. In the conclusion (Chap. 18), Othon Anastasakis, Kalypso Nicolaidis and Manolis Pratsinakis return to the original question of how the Greek crisis affected patterns of engagement between homeland and diaspora. Benefiting from all the wise voices of the contributors, their analyses and

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findings, the three authors reflect on whether the crisis has created new spaces of interaction on the basis of lessons learned from the crisis. The book may be primarily about Greek diasporic stories in the shadow of a crisis, but the aim is to illuminate new ideas and analytical propositions pertinent to all homeland-diaspora relations, irrespective of national specificities.

References Afentoulis, M., & Cleland, A. (2015). Diaspora at the crossroads: The future of Greek communities in Australia – A case study of two regional migrant communities. In N. Miletic & T. Vekemans (Eds.), Discovering diaspora – A multidisciplinary approach. Inter-Disciplinary Press. Anagnostou, Y. (2009). Contours of white ethnicity: Popular ethnography and the making of usable pasts in Greek America. Ohio University Press. Armstrong, J. A. (1976). Mobilized and proletarian diasporas. American Political Science Review, 70(2), 393–408. Brubaker, R. (2005). The ‘diaspora’ diaspora. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 28(1), 1–19. Callinicos, C. (1990). American Aphrodite: Becoming female in Greek America. Pella Publishing Company. Capoccia, G., & Kelemen, D. R. (2007). The study of critical junctures: Theory, narrative, and counterfactuals in historical institutionalism. World Politics, 59, 341–369. Cavounidis, J. (2016). The emigration of Greeks and diaspora engagement policies for economic development. Centre of Planning and Economic Research (KEPE). Chimbos, P. D. (1999). The Greeks in Canada: An historical and sociological perspective. In R.  Clogg (Ed.), The Greek diaspora in the twentieth century. Macmillan. Christou, A., & King, R. (2014). Counter-diaspora: The Greek second generation returns ‘home’. Harvard University Press. Chryssanthopoulou, V. (2009). Gender and ethno-regional identity among Greek Australians: intersections. In E. Tastsoglou (Ed.), Women, gender and diasporic lives: Labor, community and identity in Greek migrations (pp.  197–227). Lexington Books. Cohen, R. (2008). Global diasporas: An introduction. Routledge. Collier, R. B., & Collier, D. (1991). Shaping the political arena: Critical junctures, the labor movement, and the regime dynamics in Latin America. Princeton University Press.

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Constantinou, S.  T. (2002). Profiles of Greek Americans. In K.  Berry & M.  Henderson (Eds.), Geographical identities in America: Race, place, and space. University of Nevada Press. Constas, C., & Platias, A. G. (1993). Diasporas in world politics: The Greeks in comparative perspective. Macmillan. Frangos, M. (2019). Failed institution: The World Council of Hellenes Abroad (SAE) since 2008. In SEESOX Diaspora Working Paper Series No. 11. SEESOX. Gamlen, A. (2019). Human geopolitics: States, emigrants, and the rise of diaspora institutions. Oxford University Press. Kalantzi, F., & Lapshyna, I. (2020). Ukraine and Greece  – two diasporas: Engagement and disengagement with the homeland at times of crisis. Central and Eastern European Migration Review, 9(2), 15–33. Kaloudis, G. (2018). Modern Greece and the diaspora Greeks in the United States. Lexington Books. Kamaras, A. (2019). Diaspora and transnational philanthropy in Greece. SEESOX. Kindinger, E. (2015). Homebound: Diaspora spaces and selves in Greek American return narratives. Universitätsverlag Winter. Kitroeff, A. (2009). The Limits of Political Transnationalism: The Greek American Lobby, 1970s–1990s. In D.  Tziovas (Ed.), Greek Diaspora and Migration Since 1700: Society, Politics, and Culture. Ashgate Publishing. Koinova, M. (2017). Critical junctures and transformative events in diaspora mobilisation for Kosovo and Palestinian statehood. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 1–18. Kontos, M. (2009). Greek migrant women in Germany: Strategies of autonomy in diaspora. In E.  Tastsoglou (Ed.), Women, gender, and diasporic lives: Labor, community, and identity in Greek migrations (pp. 31–48). Lexington Books. Kouvertaris, G. (1997). Studies on Greek Americans. Columbia University Press. Labrianidis, L., & Pratsinakis, M. (2016). Greece’s new emigration at times of crisis. GreeSE Paper No. 99, Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southern Europe, London School of Economics, [Online]. Labrianidis, L., & Pratsinakis, M. (2017). Crisis brain drain: Short-term pain/ long term gain? In D.  Tziovas (Ed.), Greece in crisis: The cultural politics of austerity. I.B. Tauris. Laliotou, I. (2004). Transnational subjects: Acts of migration and cultures of transnationalism between Greece and America. The University of Chicago Press. Mavroudi, E. (2015). Helping the homeland? Diasporic Greeks in Australia and the potential for homeland-oriented development at a time of economic crisis. In A. Christou & E. Mavroudi (Eds.), Dismantling diasporas: Rethinking the geographies of diasporic identity, connection and development. Ashgate Publishing. Moskos, C.  C. (1989). Greek Americans: Struggle and success. Transaction Publishers.

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Orfanos, S. D. (2002). Reading Greek America: Studies in the experience of Greeks in the United States. Pella Publishing. Panagakos, A. N. (1998). Citizens of the trans-nation: Political mobilization, multiculturalism, and nationalism in the Greek diaspora. Diaspora, 7(1), 53–73. Panagakos, A. N. (2004). Recycled Odyssey: Creating transnational families in the Greek diaspora. Global Networks, 4(3), 299–311. Pratsinakis, M. (2017). Collective charisma, selective exclusion and national belonging: ‘false’ and ‘real’ Greeks from the former Soviet Union. In M. Skey & M. Antonsich (Eds.), Everyday nationhood: Theorizing, culture, identity and belonging two decades after the publication of banal nationalism. Palgrave. Pratsinakis, M. (2021). Ethnic return migration, exclusion and the role of ethnic options: ‘Soviet Greek’ migrants in their ethnic homeland and the Pontic identity. Nations and Nationalism, 27(2), 497–512. Pratsinakis, M., Hatziprokopiou, P., Grammatikas, D., & Labrianidis, L. (2017). Crisis and the resurgence of emigration from Greece: Trends, representations, and the multiplicity of migrant trajectories. In B.  Glorius & J.  Domínguez-­ Mujica (Eds.), European mobility in times of crisis the new context of European South-North migration (pp. 75–102). J. Transcript Verlag. Price, C. (1975). Greeks in Australia. ANU Press. Ragazzi, F. (2009). Governing diasporas. International Political Sociology, 3, 378–397. Saloutos, T. (1964). The Greeks in the United States. Harvard University Press. Sökefeld, M. (2006). Mobilising in transnational space: A social movement approach to the formation of diaspora. Global Networks, 6(3), 265–284. Venturas, L. (1999). Greek immigrants in Belgium. Nefeli (in Greek). Venturas, L. (2009). Deterritorialising the nation: The Greek state and ecumenical Hellenism. In D.  Tziovas (Ed.), Greek diaspora and migration since 1700: Society, politics, and culture. Ashgate Publishing. Vermeulen, H., Van Attekum, M., Lindo, F., & Pennings, T. (1985). Minorities in European cities: The dynamic of social integration and social exclusion at the neighbourhood level. Coutinho. Voutira, E. (2011). The ‘right to return’ and the meaning of ‘home’: A post-Soviet Greek diaspora becoming European? Lit.

PART I

Homeland Reform and Diaspora Involvement

CHAPTER 2

Crisis and Change: The Right of Greek Citizens to Vote Abroad Othon Anastasakis and Foteini Kalantzi

Introduction In December 2019, the Greek Parliament approved with a large majority of 288 out of 300 a bill that allowed Greeks of the diaspora to exercise their voting rights from their place of residence. This was a major change in Greek politics and marked a successful conclusion in a series of prior unsuccessful attempts (2001 and 2009) to adopt a law that would facilitate the democratic right of Greek citizens abroad. Greece since 1975 had stipulated the constitutional right to all its citizens wherever they are, to vote in national elections, provided they returned to Greece on the day of the election. As such, the December 2019 adoption of the law on the facilitation of the diasporic vote abroad defined the modalities of a constitutional democratic right that had been exercised in a haphazard and clientelistic way.

O. Anastasakis (*) • F. Kalantzi University of Oxford, Oxford, UK e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 O. Anastasakis et al. (eds.), Diaspora Engagement in Times of Severe Economic Crisis, Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97443-5_2

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The fact that this reform took place in the year 2019 had to do with a number of factors connected with a decade-long economic crisis and significant socio-political changes. After 10 years of unprecedented economic crisis at home, a changing political class and a considerable wave of outward migration of Greece’s labour force of nearly half a million, the Greek political parties finally embraced a more inclusionary interpretation of the diasporic vote. In order to understand the underlying conditions that led to this political decision, the chapter attempts to respond to three important sub-­ questions. What was particular about the Greek economic crisis that led to the mobilisation around the expat voting issue? Who were the main actors that promoted this reform? What was the role of the external environment in this process? The following chapter is divided into three parts: first, it engages with a conceptual discussion of some relevant analytical tools from the field of politics and diaspora studies; second, it briefly outlines Greece’s political engagement with its diaspora before the crisis; and third, in the main section of the chapter, it traces the factors and narrates the story that led to the adoption of the law on the facilitation of the diasporic vote.

Introducing the Variables For the purposes of our study and in response to the above-mentioned sub-questions, we adopt three propositions. First, that the crisis acted as a critical juncture with a transformative potential; second, that internal and external actors, that is political parties, media and ‘diaspora entrepreneurs’1 (Koinova, 2017) mobilised towards the goal; and third, that the widespread international application of the diasporic vote (Gamlen, 2019) provided normative pressure on the Greek political class to address what was regarded as an exclusionary practice of non-facilitation. Our focus rests on a triptych of intervening variables comprising the crisis (critical juncture), the agency (homeland and diaspora actors), the international environment (transnational voting practice) and how these interacted to bring about this important institutional change. Through this triptych, we looked into what Délano Alonso and Mylonas (2017) called ‘microfoundations’ of diaspora politics, the ways in which internal 1  ‘A “diaspora entrepreneur” is a formal or informal leader in a certain diaspora group, who makes claims and organises on behalf of the original homeland’ (Koinova, 2017).

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political actors participated in the design of diaspora policies and their interactions with different groups that are connected with the diaspora. Our main argument is that the adoption by the Greek Parliament of the facilitation of the diasporic vote abroad was the outcome of these three conditions all of which were necessary but not sufficient in their own right; it was the combination of all three together that produced the outcome. As Fig 2.1 shows, the Greek crisis, with its increased wave of outmigration and internal political change, acted as a catalyst for the reconfiguration of the diasporic vote; important actors in the Greek homeland and abroad mobilised in favour of an inclusionary approach; in addition, the international practice turned Greece into a European outlier, with its non-facilitation practices. Crisis as Critical Juncture Our first variable looks at the crisis in terms of its temporality and profile. During the period that this chapter is investigating (2009–2019), major internal social, economic and political transformations took place in Greece. The country lost 25% of its national GDP, unemployment rates reached 28% in general and 60% in the youth (at their highest points in 2013), national debt rose to the level of 181% of the GDP in 2018 and governments had to adopt three consecutive externally imposed

Fig. 2.1  Variables associated with the facilitation of the expat vote

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memoranda and austerity packages (the last one ending in the autumn of 2018); but the most relevant catalyst for our analysis was the size of the outward migration. In our work, we lay emphasis on the significance of this crisis—economic meltdown cum migration—as a critical juncture, for the reconsideration of the facilitation of voting rights of Greeks abroad. The term critical juncture is of great exploratory value because it helps us identify the significance of a period as a catalyst for change, but also as a series of important moments, a chain of events that affect the attitudes and options of the relevant agents. According to Capoccia (2015, p.  148), critical junctures (in the context of historical institutionalism) are ‘those moments in which uncertainty as to the future of an institutional arrangement allows for political agency and choice to play a decisive causal role in setting an institution on a certain path of development, a path that then persists over a long period of time’. Koinova (2017), for her part, argues that critical junctures can transform state and societal structures by shifting the position of the strategic centre for pursuing a homeland-oriented goal, and that transformative events can change the trajectory of already existing diaspora relations. When looking at crises as transformative periods in diaspora-homeland relations, the overwhelming majority of case studies focus on homeland conflicts and how weak and conflictual states mobilise and/or divide their diasporas to gain legitimacy of their conflictual claims at home and abroad (Kaldor, 2001; Adamson, 2005; Koinova, 2011). The Greek case in this analysis is a crisis of a different nature, one of an advanced Western economy and consolidated democracy going through a period of severe economic stress expressed by a dramatic and prolonged recession, leading into a big migratory wave—the third biggest in the history of the modern Greece2—affecting the state’s relationship with an increasing and changing diaspora. Agents of Change The second intervening variable refers to the role of the agency, looking at the most relevant actors, their approaches and the alternative options as bearers of change. On the issue of the homeland agency related to 2  The first wave of emigration of Greeks took place between 1903 and 1917, and the second between 1960 and 1972.

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diaspora enfranchisement, Lafleur (2011) argues that domestic politics, and especially political parties’ interests and transformations in the political arena, are determining factors in the development of external voting. As the ones most affected by the outcome of the diasporic vote, political parties are the main agents of change because they are the ones that ultimately decide on the adoption of the required laws. While parties have the ability to connect with and mobilise their diasporic peoples through a number of roles such ‘as activists, fundraisers, lobbyists, candidates, influencers from afar, and symbols in party campaign messages’ (Paarlberg, 2017), the principal interest in them is as potential voters. They therefore have to make important calculations on whether to support an inclusionary or an exclusionary approach vis-à-vis the diasporic vote, given that citizens abroad are the most unpredictable constituency. In addition, the diaspora electoral processes tend to have higher administrative and logistical costs, and at times, lower participation rates (Turcu & Urbatsch, 2015, p. 430); yet in some cases they can have a significance either in creating a dynamic in favour of a political party during elections or even in affecting the outcome of elections in marginal circumstances. In addition, diasporic electoral engagement can be important to governments and political parties seeking political legitimation domestically and internationally (Waterbury, 2010, p. 140). Going beyond party interests, the issue of voting rights for citizens abroad is never a straightforward matter and is amenable to opinions in favour or against. On the favourable camp, the most common defence is that democracies should be inclusionary and equal and that expats should exercise their voting right unhindered just like citizens at home, and avoid creating divisions between first-class citizens at home and second-class voting citizens abroad. Voting is also a way to keep diasporans engaged in the affairs of the homeland which in itself can bring additional potential benefits such as financial remittances, investments, know-how (Lafleur, 2011; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003a, 2003b; Collyer, 2013) or benefits in foreign policy relations with host states (Collyer, 2013, p. xv). For those who disagree, the most common argument is that diaspora voters, and especially those who left the country many years ago, should have no right to decide on the fate of the country in which they no longer live in, and in cases of holding dual citizenship they should vote in the elections of the host country only. Having said that, within these two camps there are degrees of inclusion or exclusion, in terms of who should be allowed to vote abroad by using chronological, financial or other criteria, or for what

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representatives and electoral lists diasporans should be entitled to vote for, as well as how they should be facilitated to vote (postal, consulate, electronic). Such issues, in times of decision, usually capture the interest of various other actors, beyond political parties, including media, academics and policy makers at home, as well as diaspora entrepreneurs (individuals, press, associations or social media) abroad, all of whom have a stake as agents of change or resistance to reform. Moreover, these questions have been addressed differently by the growing number of governments that adopted the vote of their citizens abroad, especially since the breakdown of communism. The International Environment as Transnational Pressure The international environment and the problematisation of the diasporic vote as an expanding transnational norm is a third factor in favour of the adoption and facilitation of the vote abroad. As Bauböck (2003, p. 710) points out ‘political transnationalism is not only about the activities of governments and organized interests in society, but involves the idea of a political community that stretches across territorial boundaries’. The vote of the diaspora is an expression of political participation and allows expatriates to maintain political ties with their homeland. Considerable attention has been devoted to explaining why an electoral diasporic practice that was once seen as democratic ‘anomaly’ became in a matter of a couple of decades an established democratic international norm, resisted less and less by states (Hutcheson & Arrighi, 2015). Rhodes and Harutyunyan (2010) and Brand (2014) linked the phenomenon to broader democratisation processes, while Turcu and Urbatsch (2015) looked at geographic, cultural and linguistic proximities, as incentives for states to adopt similar policies. In fact, ‘the spread of extra-territorial voting indicates that states recognize citizens living abroad as holding “genuine ties” to home’ (Gamlen, 2019, p. 16). Voting at distance for emigrants is a distinguishing practice of political transnationalism, either as a symbolic act or as a way of influencing the political scene in the homeland. Gamlen (2019) points out that ‘diaspora voting is a highly symbolic issue because it cuts directly to the question of the extent to which a person can retain a meaningful stake in a place where they no longer live’. It is widely understood that direct or indirect influence of political processes in the homeland makes diasporas a dynamic hybrid actor carrying out transnational action overcoming the rigid

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concept of borders. Transnational practices create an international norm which may provide a boost or an indirect pressure with more reluctant countries feeling that they have to adjust. This in itself is a ‘norm internationalisation hypothesis’ (Arrighi & Lafleur, 2017; Lafleur, 2014), which in our case sees Greece as an outlier in the European context not just by not facilitating the constitutional right of citizens abroad but by pointing to the discrepancy between the facilitation of Greek voters as EU citizens versus the non-facilitation of Greek voters as Greek nationals abroad.

Methodology The method of investigation and analysis in this chapter is based on primary research starting with the reading of Parliamentary Hansards during the relevant plenary sessions in the Greek Parliament of the period 2009 and 20193 in order to understand the party positions. Moreover, scrutinising reports, such as those of the Special Permanent Committee on Greeks Abroad (SPCGA),4 further supported the evidence-based research. At the same time, we looked at relevant legal texts including articles from the Greek Constitution, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and EU Council decisions, which we thought were important milestones in the process towards the adoption of the law. We then focused on key moments during the crisis when the relevant debate would gain wider publicity, by conducting research on a wide range of online media, in order to retrieve more information on the positions of parties, the political leaders, as well as on the views of analysts, intellectuals and diaspora actors and to understand the unfolding of the public discourses. Finally, during our discussions with experts and through convening relevant panels on the issue,5 we were able to get a mοre rounded scientific view on the subject 3  We searched for three keywords in the first phase, that is ‘diaspora’, ‘omogeneia’, ‘apodimos’ (three words describing diaspora in Greek) during each year, and in the second phase, we searched for ‘psifos tis diasporas’ (diasporic vote). Then we analysed the content in terms of time, party ideology, party interests, institution building and government policies. 4  The Hellenic Parliament set up a Special Permanent Committee on Greeks Abroad on 15 October 2015 (decision no. 13891/8917) with 31 Greek MPs. The role of the SPCGA is to identify the problems of Greeks Abroad, to preserve the Greek language and disseminate philhellenism. It aims to promote Greek culture especially among the new generations of Greeks abroad as well as national issues with the support and co-operation of Greeks Abroad. 5  In the context of our Greek Diaspora Project at SEESOX, we organised a series of panels and conferences in Oxford and elsewhere on diasporic political engagement from a Greek and comparative perspectives. Among the most helpful to our research were two relevant

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matter. With this material at hand, we were able to understand the relative and increasing importance of the issue of the vote, compared with other diasporic issues during the period of the crisis. Our chapter contributes to the field of homeland-diaspora engagement by looking at the single case study of Greece in three ways: first, it enhances the wider diaspora studies discussion with its focus on crises as critical junctures with transformative effects in the politics of the homeland; second, through the single case study of the diasporic vote, it enriches the comparative literature on diasporic political engagement; third, it strengthens the empirical understanding of Greece’s interaction with its own diaspora, a country with a long diasporic tradition and a significant diasporic population.

The Pre-2009 Milestones on Homeland-Diaspora Engagement and Missed Opportunities for the Facilitation of the Diasporic Vote The birth of the Third Hellenic Republic in 1974 was a threshold moment in Greece’s politics, the start of a successful transition and consolidation of democracy, following a long period of twentieth-century political turbulence and authoritarian intervals which had culminated in the seven-year Greek military regime (1967–1974). The new constitution of Greece, which came into being in 1975, introduced some solid democratic parameters of the Republic, securing among others the separation of powers and important civil and political liberties. From this chapter’s perspective, the new constitution was an important milestone in Greece’s relationship with its diaspora because it acknowledged for the first time in a constitutional document Greece’s relationship with its diaspora and through Article 108 stipulated the obligation of the Greek state to ‘take care of emigrant Greeks abroad and of the maintenance of their ties with the Fatherland’ (Dufoix, 2003, p.  41). In this particular historical juncture, norms and values played a significant role in the strengthening of homeland-diaspora relations, taking place in a context of liberalisation and engagement with the Greeks beyond the borders of the country, adding a further layer on the legitimation of the new democratic polity. The turning point in the panels, one in Athens on 29 October 2018 on ‘The Political Participation of the Greeks Abroad’ and one in London on 17 October 2019 on ‘Greek Diaspora in the UK and Beyond’.

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implementation of the new constitutionally enshrined diasporic policy came eight years later with the creation of the ‘General Secretariat for Greeks Abroad’ (GSGA).6 One of the main goals of GSGA was the preservation of the national and cultural identity and the fostering of the Greek language, history and culture. The collapse of communism was another threshold moment in Greece’s relationship with its diaspora with the creation of new institutions dealing with the reception and repatriation of historic Greek communities living in the eastern bloc, especially in the former Soviet Union and Albania. At the same time, the Greek state proceeded with the creation of the World Council for Hellenes Abroad (SAE) in 1995 strengthening even further the diasporic institutional build-up, and proceeded with the formation of an originally ambitious General Assembly aiming to serve as a ‘parliament of global Hellenism’ (Frangos, 2019). Such institutional innovations were made in the spirit of a widening transnational diasporic institutional environment where more and more states were strengthening their ties with their diasporas and in the face of rising migratory movements from the former communist bloc. In Greece, while most of the transnational diasporic institutions continued to operate with varying degrees of success in the fields of foreign relations,7 culture8 or education,9 this was not complemented by a similar progress on the issue of the diasporic vote. In principle, constitutional provisions of the diasporic vote existed in Article 51 paragraph 4 of the 1975 Constitution stating that ‘matters pertaining to the exercise of the right to vote by persons living outside the country may be specified by law’ but were not applied as there was no law that passed through Parliament to facilitate the application of this provision and define its implementation (Poula, 2019). Despite the amendment of this article in 2001, asking for the specification by a statute to be adopted by two-thirds majority of MPs on the issue, no such statute was ever adopted. The most serious attempt came with the 2009 Bill called ‘Exercise of the right to vote in parliamentary 6  It started under the auspices of the Ministry of Presidency, then was transferred to the Ministry of Culture and since 1993 it became part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 7  The American Hellenic Institute was created in 1974 to strengthen US-Greek and US-Cyprus relations with a lobbying focus. 8  The Hellenic Foundation for Culture was created in 1992 aiming at the spread of the Greek culture and language abroad. 9  In the field of education, the Ministry of Education created the Institute of Education for the Greeks Abroad in 1996 dealing with matters of language and education.

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elections by Greek voters living abroad’ under the New Democracy (ND) government, but which failed to secure the majority of two-thirds, voted by just 159 out of 300 MPs. Throughout the pre-2009 period the diasporic voting issue never acquired any political urgency, it never reached the public debate but remained for the most part an esoteric debate between political parties, merely as a ‘matter of constitutional mechanics’ (Christopoulos, 2013, p. 4). It became an internal affair between the two dominant parties of centre-right ND and centre-left PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Party), approached through the prism of micro-political and electoral calculations. The diasporic vote was for the most part an unknown and unpredictable factor in the elections, a variable that could not be controlled or manipulated and whose potential to tilt the electoral outcome could go either way. On many occasions, domestic party-political divisions were reproduced abroad and the competition between the two major political parties, PASOK and ND, led to divisions in some diasporic circles (Prevelakis, 2000, p. 182). While the Greek governments on numerous occasions had sought the support of diaspora, in matters of foreign investment and financial remittances, lobbying in sensitive foreign policy issues, or boosting philanthropic giving in the fields of education or culture, they never offered any real ‘political carrots’ such as the facilitation of the right of expats to vote in their place of residence. For four decades since the introduction of the constitutional provision on the homeland-diaspora engagement, the Greek political system failed to cater for the exercise of the democratic right of Greek citizens abroad. And while Greek citizens abroad had the right to vote, they had to be physically in Greece at the time of elections. The only example of ‘facilitation’ was when the two main political parties mobilised Greek voters living abroad by subsidising air fares with Olympic Airlines during election times, bringing them to Greece for free in order to vote for them. This informal and dubious political practice suggested political expediency and financial waste, a small example of the clientelist political excesses of the post-1974 two-party system in Greece. For Greeks abroad, voting in the European Parliament elections was the only case where the Greek state provided the necessary arrangement that allowed

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them to exercise their voting rights through the setting up of polling stations in consulates in the EU states.10 All in all, the pre-2009 period of the Third Hellenic Republic lacked the critical juncture which would serve as a catalyst for the implementation of the expat vote. As it happened, the post-1974 period was one of uninterrupted economic growth, limited outward migration, considerable inward migration and remigration, thus weakening the urgency and topicality of the matter and confining the debate at the level of political parties and constitutional experts; it thus debilitated the role that the relevant agency (parties, press, diaspora actors) could potentially play in mobilising a public debate on the subject, it did not attain the two-thirds majority needed in the Parliament and kept the issue at the level of legalistic arguments and clientelistic practices for too long. The Greek crisis was to change the impact of all these variables drastically.

The Post-2009 Era: The Crisis as Critical Juncture for the Vote Facilitation The Greek crisis of the 2010s consisted of a series of setbacks to Greece’s economic, social and political life, turning the country for a while into an international economic pariah. The economic crisis took Greece to the economic levels of the 1990s, to party-political polarisation and huge societal disaffection. In some areas however, it did provide the ground for some positive reform, which had not been possible under normal circumstances. The diasporic vote is a case in point. In this section, which constitutes the empirical, research-based backbone of our work, we analyse the different factors that contributed to the passing of the law on the facilitation of the vote. In line with our originally designed ‘triptych’ of intervening variables of crisis, agency and international environment, we trace the impact of these variables and how these combined brought about a change of political significance.

10  Law 1427/1984 ‘Exercise of electoral rights for EP elections for Greek citizens residing on the territory of other States of the European Economic Community’.

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The Critical Juncture: Economic Depression, Outward Migration, Reshaping of Party Politics Greece experienced the impact of the global financial crisis in an unprecedented scale manifesting itself in the massive (for peacetime standards) drop of its GDP and the rise in debt and unemployment. The Greek economy came on the verge of collapse, three times, in early 2010, in mid-2012 and suffered a near exit from the Eurozone in the summer of 2015. One of the most damaging features of the Greek economic crisis was a dramatic rise in the unemployment rate, which reached a peak of 27.8%, with youth unemployment of 58.3%, in 2013 and remained at very high levels for some time to come. As a result, throughout the years of crisis Greece experienced a large wave of outward migration by those searching for better job prospects, amounting to nearly 500,000 emigrants. The Fig. 2.2 indicates the exodus of Greek citizens. Many of these emigrants were young, educated and dynamic, representing the so-called brain drain but there were many more of other social and professional backgrounds (Lazaretou, 2016; Peliccia, 2013; Labrianidis & Pratsinakis, 2016; Pratsinakis & Labrianidis, 2017). This

Emigration flows of Greek citizens 70000

65264

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Fig. 2.2  Emigration flows of Greek citizens. (Source: Eurostat http://appsso. eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_emi1ctz&lang=en)

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new wave of migrants, Greek citizens with strong connections with the homeland, became a default ‘electoral pressure group’, a ‘political constituency’ and a ‘louder Greek voice abroad’ that could not be ignored. The crisis brought about the weakening of Greece’s post-1974 dominant two-party system, ND and PASOK, seen as responsible for the economic mess and led to the strengthening of previously marginal parties or the emergence of new ones. The severe weakening of the two-party system was made evident in all the elections after 2012, whereby the centre-left PASOK took an irretrievable downturn at the benefit of the Party of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) and ND’s struggled to keep its percentages as the alternative pole, yet seeing some of its voters going to the more radical right parties of the Independent Greeks (Anexartitoi Ellines) and the neo-­ Nazi Golden Dawn (Chrysi Avgi). A major shift took place in Greek party politics when in 2015, in two national elections in January and September, SYRIZA secured the first place with 36.3% and 35.5% respectively of the national vote, with ND second at 27.8% and 28.1%. In July 2019, ND came back to power with a 39.7% and it was the government that achieved the parliamentary vote of the bill during its first months in power. The Agents of Change: Political Parties, Press, Diaspora Actors The positioning of political parties as the ultimate beneficiaries or losers of the vote abroad is crucial for the understanding of how the matter became gradually one of public interest, including in the Greek media.11 Looking at the parliamentary Hansards of the crisis period, the voting rights of Greeks abroad gradually dominated the discussion in the Greek Parliament, compared with other relevant diasporic issues, such as cultural ties, Greek language and education abroad or economic support from wealthy diaspora. Looking at the Greek parties’ rhetorical stances on the significance of diaspora, in general, we observe that there weren’t major party divisions, most of them appealing to diasporic sympathies and praising the role that Greek diaspora can play in Greece’s embattled economy and injured image abroad. Having said that, the facilitation of diasporic vote 11  Indicatively, we cite some articles on diasporic vote: Kathimerini.gr (19/3/17) ‘The unexpected consequences of the diasporic vote’; Euro2day (24/10/2017) ‘The external vote and the bras de fer of the decade’; protagon.gr (25/10/2017) ‘Who wants the vote of the diaspora?’; On brain drain: To Vima (7/8/14) ‘STOP Brain drain’; Kathimerini (10/9/18) ‘Brain-Drain 2018: Would you return?’; Kathimerini (18/7/19) ‘Brain Drain’; Kathimerini (24/9/19) ‘From Brain-Gain to Brain Retain’.

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proved to be the most controversial issue once it entered the parliamentary and public domain. For a start, any change required a new law with a constitutional revision to take place. But more importantly, reaching the adequate number of votes was the main challenge in the face of the unpredictability of the diaspora vote, and the unidentified numbers of Greeks abroad. While the Greek political class was eager to follow the principle of ‘Once a citizen, always a citizen’, this generosity fell short of the facilitation of the expatriate vote (Christopoulos, 2013). The paradox is that Greece had an inclusionary approach for citizens of Greek descent living abroad who wanted to acquire citizenship, and a rather exclusionary one regarding the facilitation of the right to vote abroad. In the timeframe of our research, the subject of diaspora’s vote was discussed in the Parliament (mainly during law-making process), either in connection with the voting rights of legal migrants in Greece or as a proposal or question in the Parliament, mostly by the party of ND who became the most consistent supporter of the subject. ND’s governmental proposal in 2009 was not received well by the opposition parties and was outvoted in Parliament. As opposition, ND continued to play the diaspora electoral card, and in one of the debates on the electoral law, ND MP Prokopis Pavlopoulos accused the PASOK government of depriving Greeks abroad from their voting rights, because it had not supported the 2009 Bill (tovima.gr 3/2/2011). With ND back in power in 2012, the Minister of Internal Affairs, Evripidis Stylianidis, assured the SPCGA that his ministry had started the procedure for the adoption of the law that would allow Greeks to vote abroad (15th term of Parliamentary Republic, Session A 24/10/2012). In the 2013 Committee report, the members of SYRIZA stated that they were in favour of the vote of Greeks abroad, but on the condition that there was a fair and free vote and the equal representation of all the parties; they were also proposing the creation of a separate electoral region for the Greeks of the diaspora, from which a number of between six and ten MPs would be elected during national elections.12 The diasporic vote was discussed again in 2014, in the context of a bill relating European Parliament elections (13th term of Parliamentary

12  SYRIZA suggested that this electoral region should be divided into three constituencies: (a) Europe, (b) North and South America and (c) Africa, Asia and Oceania, from which the deputies of the diaspora would be elected, proportionally, based on the number of registered voters in special electoral registers of each region’s constituency (SPCGA, 2013).

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Republic, Session C 26/2/2014).13 The bill in question incorporated, in effect, provisions for the exclusion of legal immigrants in Greece and repatriated Greeks from voting rights and to stand as a candidate in local elections based on the 460/2013 decision of the Council of State.14 The far-right ANEL argued that the legislation lumped together the ‘foreigners’ and the diasporans, asking from the government to grant full voting rights to diasporans through facilitation of their naturalisation (13th term of Parliamentary Republic, Session C 26/2/2014). In December 2015, with SYRIZA in power, the SPCGA published a roadmap, setting out ‘a frame of priorities’ which included, among others, the expat vote.15 Moreover, PM Alexis Tsipras in a New Year interview to the Greek diasporic newspaper The National Herald claimed that ‘it is inconceivable that Greek citizens are the only EU citizens who are in effect deprived from the inalienable right to vote’ which was what he called ‘a longstanding governmental neglect’ (thenationalherald.com 16/1/2015). For his part, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, as new leader of ND in opposition, announced in the same newspaper (9/4/2016) that the bill for the voting rights of the Greeks abroad would go through, with ND in power. During that time, ND submitted a law proposal concerning the expat vote, igniting more parliamentary discussion on the subject.16 This proposal was discussed in conjunction with the reform of the voting system, from reinforced proportional representation to simple proportional representation which was of particular interest to the government of SYRIZA. On this occasion, SYRIZA argued that the expat vote required a reliable census of the Greek citizens abroad (17th term of Parliamentary Republic, Session A 19/6/2016). For its part, PASOK, a much smaller now party of the opposition, accused ND that in essence it brought back its 2009 law, on the basis of its ‘usual vote extraction’ mentality and suggested the election of 13  The bill related to the ‘Incorporation of Council Directive 2013/1/EU of 20th September 2012 for the amendment of the Directive 91/109/EC, regarding the details for the exercise of the right to stand as a candidate in elections of the European Parliament by citizens of the EU who reside in a member state where they are not subject to the Greek law, and amendment of law 2196/1994’ (A’ 41). 14  The Council of State considered that Law 3838/2010 (‘Current provisions for Greek citizenship and political participation of repatriated Greeks and lawfully resident immigrants and other adjustments’) to be incompatible with the Greek Constitution. 15  Roadmap of actions, SPCGA, December 2015. 16  The bill of the 8/4/2016 was entitled ‘Exercise of the right to vote during the parliamentary elections of diaspora Hellenism and Greeks who are abroad’.

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diaspora MPs on specially designated diaspora constituencies (naftemporiki.gr, 2016). The two leaders continued to compete for the affection of the diaspora, when in his 2017 New Year’s message to the Greek diaspora, Kyriakos Mitsotakis pledged once again that when in government he would legislate for the facilitation of the expat vote (tanea.gr 31/12/2016) and asked the government to support the ND draft bill (tovima.gr 23/10/2017). This was also connected with Tsipras’ visit to the USA, where he had engaged with what ND considered its own traditionally conservative and right-wing area diaspora clientele (efsyn.gr 2017). In general, ND assumed to hold a close affinity with a large section of the Greek diaspora, in terms of conservative values, nationalist foreign policy and closer connections with Church, and in addition Mitsotakis, himself, sought to establish special links with the recent wave of brain-drainers by appealing to their technocratic outlook. The fact that he was supported by a big number among the latter made him even more adamant to accommodate their vote abroad. In the ND January 2016 primaries, Mitsotakis got the biggest part of the diasporic votes against Vangelis Meimarakis.17 Gradually but steadily the diasporic vote became not just a prominent parliamentary issue but a public one as well. In October 2018, the government of SYRIZA set up a Special Committee of Experts to deliberate on the matter. It could be argued that an additional factor that led to this move was the reform of the electoral law of the EU whereby the government had to ratify the Council decision 2018/994 of 13 July 2018.18 Among other provisions, the Council encouraged EU Member States to motivate their citizens residing in third non-EU to vote in EP elections. It also stated that ‘in order to encourage voter participations in EP elections and to fully take advantage of new technological advances, EU Member States could provide opportunities of, inter alia, advance postal and digital voting, while ensuring, in particular, the reliability of the result, the secrecy of the vote and the protection of personal data, in accordance with the EU law’. There was also a provision for each Member State to designate a contact authority responsible for exchanging data on voters and candidates 17  For example, in the London polling station Mitsotakis received 48.27% to Meimarakis’ 7.83% of the vote (Kamaras, 2018). 18  The Council decision amended the Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, annexed to Council Decision 76/787/ ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 20 September 1976 (Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2018/994, 2018).

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with its counterparts in other Member States. The Council decision was discussed in the Greek Parliament, with ND MPs speaking in favour of extending this decision to the national elections as well (17th term of parliamentary Republic, Session D 31/10/2018). Τhe creation of the Special Committee of Experts was a turning point in terms of committing the government of SYRIZA to adopt a more inclusionary approach. The Interior Minister Alexis Haritsis said: ‘It is our duty to go to all lengths necessary to secure for those people the ability to participate in the political life and public life of our country’ (greekreporter.com, 2018). During its deliberations, the Special Committee had to address three main questions: (a) Who among Greeks abroad should be allowed and facilitated to vote abroad? (b) Whom—which list of MPs would they vote for? and (c) How would they be facilitated? (17th term of Parliamentary Republic, Session D, 21/11/2018). Among the most contentious points in the committee’s deliberations was whether the vote of diaspora Greeks should be counted in the final election result, on the grounds that doing so would give the diaspora disproportionate power over the outcome. But there was also a sense among the members that this was a unique opportunity that should not be missed (Alivizatos, 2019). The committee proposals were widely reported in the Greek diasporic media, raising further awareness on the matter.19 The committee proposed that all those who have Greek citizenship and are registered to vote have the right to vote abroad, regardless of how many years they were absent from Greece. They also proposed that they should vote through physical presence at the consulates or special constituencies set up for this purpose, and for state ballots (psifodeltia epikrateias) of the parties. The diasporic vote became an unwavering promise by ND in the run­up to the parliamentary elections in the summer of 2019 and once in power, ND brought the issue back to the parliamentary process adopting a maximalist inclusionary approach, that is all those with a Greek nationality should be allowed to vote abroad.20 Having a majority of 158 MPs, reaching the 200-threshold seemed once again a challenge to achieve, with SYRIZA, the second party in the parliament having 86 MPs, 19  Examples of diasporic Greek online media covering the issue with regular reporting include greekreporter.com, newgreektv.com, neoskosmos.com, greekcitytimes.com, thenationalherald.com and tornosnews.gr. 20  According to the Greek citizenship law, this is the right of all those born to a Greek parent. This means, if the father is registered in the male register or the mother in the municipal register (demotologio), their child born abroad can acquire Greek citizenship.

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becoming increasingly reluctant to adopt the maximalist view. Although SYRIZA was the one that had sparked the public debate through the special committee, it disagreed with ND on three points. First, on the unaccounted number of diaspora Greeks of the third, fourth or fifth generations, who could claim Greek citizenship and consequently had the right to vote, arguing that the right should be limited to those who are registered in the electoral rolls. Second, on the voting process, ND argued in favour of the additional inclusion of the postal vote which SYRIZA thought would jeopardise the validity and security of the process. Third, ND argued that the diasporic vote should be counted normally in the overall election result, even if they were just voting for state ballots (epikrateias) whereas SYRIZA claimed that they should count only for the election of extra-­ territorial MPs, and not added on the total electoral result (tanea.gr 2019). Despite its more restrained position on the new bill, SYRIZA decided to vote for the bill, which can be attributed to an increasing climate of consensus that was building up between the government and other opposition parties. Fearing isolation, SYRIZA withdrew from its initial position, joining the wider accord (Kathimerini.gr 19/10/2019). At the same time, ND retreated from its initial maximalist positions in order to find a common ground. Effectively, in December 2019, the Greek Parliament voted in favour of a bill that facilitated the voting rights of the Greek diaspora. Out of a total of 296 parliamentarians present, 288 voted in favour, 1 abstained and 7 voted against the bill. ND, SYRIZA, KINAL (PASOK’s successor), KKE and the new far-right party Greek Solution voted in favour, while the left-wing MeRA25 voted against the bill because it considered the bill restrictive, in terms of who would be finally eligible to vote. The final bill was a compromise between the different party positions, primarily those of ND and SYRIZA. Greeks abroad would be finally facilitated to vote from their country of residence but under certain conditions: to have lived for a total of 2 years in Greece during the past 35 years; to have submitted a tax return to the Greek authorities during the election year or the one preceding this; to be able to vote only for candidates who are the party’s chosen ‘state deputies’ and not the parliamentarians that represent a particular regional constituency. The law also required them to select areas where polling stations would be set up and could only vote if there were 40 voters eligible to cast their ballots in their districts.21 21  According to official estimates at the time of the vote, the number of diaspora Greeks affected by this bill was approximately 350,000 while the State General Accounting Office

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While the principal role lies with the political parties, the expat vote was supported by a large part of diasporic Greeks, according to diasporic newspapers as well as surveys,22 as well as by the activism of individuals (see below discussion on the Case of Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos), or emerging diaspora groups who through their social media presence were able to send a pressing message from abroad.23 In addition, the active involvement of expats in the elections for the leaderships of both ND and KINAL were another clear indication of the diasporic will for involvement in the electoral affairs of political parties. Additionally, there were several initiatives by other diasporic entrepreneurs demanding the facilitation of the right to vote. For example, a campaign titled ‘I Cannot Vote’ was launched in June 2012, with no links with any political party or state institution, but just expressing discomfort with not being able to vote from their place of residence (newdiaspora.com). Other social media initiatives like the New Diaspora Facebook platform24 engaged systematically with the expatriate vote with editorials, op-eds and videos. Finally, the Greek Diaspora Project at the South East European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX) organised panels on the subject matter and letters in favour of the adoption of relevant law (seesoxdiaspora.org, 2019). The impact of such initiatives and many others varied but all together they contributed to the right atmospherics and pressure from the agency abroad, for the first time on this matter. The International Norm: Greece as an Outlier Our third proposition concerns the degree to which the international normative environment contributed to this important reform. Indeed, looking at some comparative figures, Greece was an outlier within an estimated the cost of putting in place the necessary infrastructure at 9 million euros. See https://greece.greekrepor ter.com/2019/10/10/why-is-the-right-to-vote-fordiaspora-greeks-so-controversial/ 22  In countries of intense third-wave emigration like in the UK percentages according to surveys reached 75% http://seesoxdiaspora.org/assets/site/papers/GDP_article_on_ vote.pdf 23  For example, BrainGain, an initiative born in the midst of Greece’s migration crisis, collected 7000 signatures of Greeks living abroad and who wanted to have the right to vote (tornosnews.gr, 2016). 24  New Diaspora started out as a digital storytelling platform, focusing on the new generation of Greeks living abroad during the crisis in their homeland (newdiaspora.com).

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overwhelming majority of countries around the world which facilitated expat vote abroad. A research in 2007 showed that external voting had been sanctioned by 115 countries and territories in the world. Of those countries, some two-thirds allowed all their citizens a vote from abroad, and one-third partially restricted the right to an external vote (IDEA; The Federal Electoral Institute of Mexico, 2007). With variations and limitations in the conditions over the who, how and for whom to vote, most of the European states guaranteed and facilitated their expats’ right to vote from abroad in national elections. In Western Europe, all with the exception of Ireland provided for the expat voting right during national elections. In addition, most European post-­ communist states (with limited exceptions like Albania or Montenegro) provided soon after their transition to democracy for the right of vote abroad. This comprehensive list of countries left Greece in a minority of European states with no facilitation of the vote abroad in national elections and facilitation in European elections. A threshold moment for the transnationalisation of the issue was in 2012 as a result of the legal case of Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos v. Greece. The case concerned two Greek nationals who lived in France and had not been allowed to vote in their place of residence in the 2007 Greek national elections. The Greek Ambassador was forced to decline their request to vote at the Embassy in Paris, because of the lack of any relevant domestic legislation to permit this. Subsequently, the two applicants argued before the ECHR that because they were not allowed to vote in their place of residence, their right to vote was adversely affected. The core issue was whether the inability of Greek expatriates to vote from their place of residence amounted to disproportionate interference with the exercise of their voting rights under Article 3 of Protocol No 1 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR, 2012). In 15 March 2012, the Grand Chamber of the ECHR, in its judgement on the case, held that there was no violation by Greece of Article 3, on the right to free elections, pertaining to the applicants’ right to vote from abroad (Press Release, ECHR, 107/2012). Despite the fact that the applicants lost, this case was important because it constituted a legal and constitutional point of reference on the subject of the facilitation of the expat vote, as the ECHR in its judgement brought forward several aspects that were taken up by the subsequent public debates. Regarding the restrictions on expatriate voting rights based on the criterion of residence, in the Court’s assessment, the following points

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were challenged: first, the presumption that non-resident citizens are less directly or less continually concerned with their country’s day-to-day problems and have less knowledge of them; second, that non-resident citizens have less influence on the selection of candidates or on the formulation of their electoral programmes; third, the close connection between the right to vote in parliamentary elections and being directly affected by the acts of the elected political bodies; and, fourth, the legitimate concern the legislature may have to limit the influence of citizens living abroad in elections on issues which, while admittedly fundamental, primarily affect persons living in the country (Case of Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos vs. Greece, 2012). The decision of ECHR granted significant gravity to the matter, however it was not the definitive authority on rejection of the diasporic vote as a state duty, as it couldn’t dictate how the national authorities would address the constitutional provision of Article 51§4 and furthermore the Court faced fierce criticism for interfering with the sovereignty of the Member States (Poula, 2019). Additionally, the ECHR set a precedent, because it recognised the plaintiffs’ capacity to participate in public dialogue, influence positions of political parties and be impacted by laws legislated by Greece’s elected Parliament. The case raised awareness in the public sphere at the time, as media discussed the matter extensively.25 As noted earlier in our chapter, the 2018 EU Council decision constituted another important milestone of transnational pressure on the lawmakers, in view of the upcoming 2019 European and national elections. The original intention for these two to take place on the same day exposed the paradox, more glaringly, whereby Greek legislature allowed Greeks abroad to vote for their country’s representatives in European elections, but not in national elections.26 On this occasion, the issue was raised repeatedly as is pointed in one joint letter sent to the Prime Minister Alexis 25  Indicatively we cite some titles (translated from Greek) in online media that focused on the issue: ‘The right to vote has been violated for 30 years’ (enet.gr, 10/7/2010); ‘Trial against Greece because expatriates don’t vote in their residence’ (newsit.gr, 8/3/12); ‘The decision of the ECHR for the vote of the expatriates is acquittal’ (zougla.gr, 15/3/12); ‘It is legal for expatriates not to vote in the place of their residence’ (rodiaki.gr, 15/3/12); ‘ECHR: No violation in the case of the expatriates’ (Kathimerini 15/3/12); ‘The inability of Greek expatriates to vote in their place of residence does not constitute a violation of right’ (iefimerida.gr, 15/3/2012); ‘ECHR: Greek inaction for the vote of residents abroad’ (tvxs. gr, 9/7/2010). 26  In the end this did not happen and the European elections were held in May 2019 and the national elections in July 2019.

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Tsipras in July 2019 from several Greek diasporic communities. Among other things, the letter stated: ‘We believe that there is no reason to be deprived of the right to participate in elections. After all, already in the European elections, voting from our place of residence is allowed, and in fact this is endorsed by the EU. The current legislation creates unfair conditions for the vast majority of Greeks living and working abroad’ (kathimerini.gr 5/7/2019). The President of the Greek Associations of Germany Kostas Dimitriou stated: ‘How can we vote in the European elections and not in the national elections?’ (star.gr 13/2/2019). The Greek diasporic newspaper, the National Herald, commented that ‘once again, the Greeks of America will be mere spectators of these elections, if they don’t happen to be there [in Greece], by chance or on purpose’ (ekirikas.com 26/5/2019). This transnational pressure contributed as additional catalysing factors for ND to introduce the reform, as one of the priority items in its governmental agenda. Greek diasporic agents in favour of change, in the form of individuals, diasporic social media and newspapers felt the injustices of the system from first-hand experience arguing repeatedly the weakness of the system.

Conclusions This chapter looked at the political consequences of a deep national crisis on homeland-diaspora relations. By asking the question ‘how did the Greek homeland reach the decision to engage more intensely with its diaspora by facilitating voting abroad’, the analysis lies at the intersection between politics and diaspora studies. In the first place, this chapter sought to discuss the conditions that allowed the realisation of a not only important constitutional change but also to explain the unique support for Greek parliamentary standards. Furthermore, it looked at the micropolitics of homeland-diaspora relations by adopting a dynamic analytical framework of the interaction between internal and external agents for change. Through historical tracing it advanced our understanding of ‘critical junctures’ and ‘threshold moments’ with a potential transformative effect. In doing so it looked at the underexplored relationship between political parties’ interests and calculations vis-à-vis diaspora voters. Beyond the role of political parties, as principal agents of change, the chapter explored other relevant actors—print media, diasporic actors, social media, individuals—who contributed to the publicising of the debate in Greece and abroad.

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The facilitation of the Greek diasporic vote redefined the relationship between the homeland and the diaspora. Yet this was the starting point whose impact will become visible in the implementation phase during the actual conduct of national elections. It is at this next stage when it becomes clear what kind of political engagement the law will have generated? Whether diaspora Greeks will use the opportunity to vote? How will the Greek political parties relate with their voters abroad? Or what will be the issues that will resonate with Greek voters abroad? Undoubtedly, there will be more debates on the adoption and operationalisation of the diasporic vote in Greece and beyond, yet we hope that through this work we have provided a convincing generalisable case study of how a deep national crisis can be catalyst for change in homeland-diaspora relations and how such a critical juncture can mobilise agents for institutional and political change and redefine the terms of engagement.

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Lazaretou, S. (2016). Φυγή Ανθρώπινου Κεφαλαίου: Η σύγχρονη τάση της μετανάοστευσης των Ελλήνων στα χρόνια της κρίσης [Human capital flight: The new migration tension of Greeks in the years of crisis. Τράπεζα της Ελλάδος [Bank of Greece]. Østergaard-Nielsen, E. (2003a). International migration and sending countries: Perceptions, policies and transnational relations. Palgrave Macmillan. Østergaard-Nielsen, E. (2003b). The politics of migrants’ transnational political practices. International Migration Review, 37(3), 760–786. Paarlberg, M. A. (2017). Competing for the diaspora’s influence at home. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 45(3), 1–22. Peliccia, A. (2013). Greece: Education and brain drain in times of crisis. Istituto di Ricerche sulla Popolazione e le Politiche Sociali—CNR. Poula, V. (2019, November). The Greek diasporic vote: A constitutional duty or a political option? Retrieved July 17, 2020, from http://seesoxdiaspora.org/ publications/briefs/the-­g reek-­d iasporic-­v ote-­a -­c onstitutional-­d uty-­o r-­a -­ political-­option Pratsinakis, M., & Labrianidis, L. (2017). Crisis brain drain: Short-term pain/ long-term gain? In D.  Tziovas (Ed.), Greece in crisis: The cultural politics of austerity. I.B. Tauris. Prevelakis, G. (2000). The Hellenic diaspora and the Greek state: A spatial approach. Geopolitics, 5(2), 171–185. Rhodes, S., & Harutyunyan, A. (2010). Extending citizenship to emigrants: Democratic contestation and a new global norm. International Political Science Review, 31(4), 470–493. SEESOX Diaspora. (2019, November 24). The Greek Diaspora Team publish their opinion piece on the voting rights of Greeks abroad. Retrieved November 10, 2020, from http://seesoxdiaspora.org/news/the-­greek-­diaspora-­team-­ publish-­their-­opinion-­piece-­on-­the-­voting-­rights-­of-­greeks-­abroad Turcu, A., & Urbatsch, R. (2015). Diffusion of diaspora enfranchisement norms: A multinational study. Comparative Political Studies, 48(4), 407–437. Waterbury, M. A. (2010). Bridging the divide: Towards a comparative framework for understanding kin-state and migrant-sending state diaspora politics. In R. Baubock & T. Faist (Eds.), Diaspora and transnationalism: Concepts, theories and methods (pp. 131–148). Amsterdam University Press/IMISCOE Research.

CHAPTER 3

International Portability of Social Benefits as a Bridge to the Crisis-Driven Diaspora Platon Tinios

Introduction Greece during its decade-long financial crisis witnessed the formation of a new diaspora characterised by the exodus of young, educated women and men. It is too early to say whether that will evolve into new permanent Greek communities abroad with a geographically mobile entrepreneurial class, or whether it will reverse once Greece recovers. This chapter explores whether the rules in place for pensions and social benefits may have a role in influencing such possible future outcomes; more importantly, it speculates on whether certain reforms can make communication with the diaspora more productive, or even facilitate its return. The aim here is not to describe the past, nor to track the present. We ponder how social insurance may affect the situation in the future, over the coming decades. Given the nature of social protection, we need to anticipate decisions of people who are, at the time of writing, relatively young,

P. Tinios (*) University of Piraeus, Piraeus, Greece e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 O. Anastasakis et al. (eds.), Diaspora Engagement in Times of Severe Economic Crisis, Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97443-5_3

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often at the start of their careers and who may only realise the implications of this issue when it may be already too late to correct. A welcome side-effect of the pandemic was to rekindle links with the new diaspora, and in some cases to bring back recent emigrants. Kafe and Pratsinakis (2021) examine this process for the UK, but note that the return was temporary. Nevertheless, this development increases the importance of an institutional framework that does not discourage, and that could even promote, active links with Greece, while also bringing young emigrants into their first contact with Greek social insurance, in a kind of ‘trial run’. The promised restart of Greece in recovering from twin crises— a decade of financial crisis followed by the pandemic—provides an ideal environment to reassess any underlying issues and possibly correct them. This could be a part of the robust reform programme stretching to 2025, both delivering on commitments made during the supervised adjustment programmes and as part of the pandemic recovery. Fostering more active links with the diaspora, or even persuading some to return, is a feasible reform prize—provided the will exists to pursue it. To tackle the issue of international transferability of rights and to signpost areas of concern, we need to understand how social protection systems and their rules impinge on individual decisions. How individuals perceive and exercise their social protection rights can colour or prejudice their relations with Greece. Relatively abstruse social insurance (and other social benefits provisions) and the way these are administered enter many individual decisions on the frequency and nature of links between emigrants and their home country. The extent to which contacts with social insurance are the cause of bureaucratic friction or pose obstacles may vary between types of individuals and circumstances. These issues are multiplied when transfers between national jurisdictions are concerned. The problem will depend on the similarity or congruence of national social protection systems. Where interoperability of different countries’ systems affects a large enough number of individuals, this could lead to obstacles in transferring rights, operating as barriers between emigrants and their mother country, unless corrective action is taken. Applying this schema to the new crisis-era diaspora, this chapter first speculates about where problems lie and how widespread they are likely to be, given current trends in social protection systems. Greek migrants are likely to be especially at risk, potentially facing problems transferring rights earned in one jurisdiction back to Greece. The reason is the distance separating the Greek social protection system of that of its peers, both within

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and outside the EU, a distance which, even after the extensive bailout-era social reforms, is unlikely to shrink. A key reason is the peripheral importance accorded in Greek public discussion to international transferability of rights. Rather than seeing international movement of labour as an integral part of a modern, outward-facing society, a viewpoint of ‘Greek exceptionalism’ views it through a domestic lens—implying a reactive stance which dealt with isolated issues on a case-by-case basis. The result was extensive reliance on specific interventions, typified by bilateral agreements. The following section outlines the problems likely to be met by migrants. This is followed by speculation on whether this problem will grow with time because of European institutional convergence. This is followed by an overview of how social protection portability was handled in Greece. This in the past had been pursued through bilateral agreements, while institutional reforms since 2010 create hopes of greater congruence with international developments. The final section turns the question on its head by speculating what would need to happen were the arrest and reversal of the brain drain be seen, at long last, as a national priority.

Context: From Individual Emigration to Diaspora Formation The formation of a diaspora is always and everywhere the result of a plethora of individual decisions. The myriad factors which influence these decisions can have important implications for the size of the diaspora, its composition, its links to its origin and its key characteristics—most notably whether it is temporary, seasonal, circular or permanent. Through influencing individual decisions, public policy could steer collective developments. Individuals decide to relocate all the time—between neighbourhoods, cities, occupations, industries. However, even in the age of globalisation, when their decision involves crossing an international frontier, it can become qualitatively different: a relocation, which domestically could be unremarkable, if borders are crossed, could develop as a permanent fissure. If repeated by many individuals, such phenomena can become entrenched to create permanent diasporas with specific characteristics. In consequence, by examining how social protection rules impinge on individuals, we can derive insights on how these rules and the way they operate can be changed to favour some outcomes or discourage others.

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As individuals relocate, time and distance divide their lives, making islands of the different stages of their lives. In each stage, different priorities may apply—education, health, earning potential, family. Continuity between the life stages is aided, in economic terms, through the accumulation of a stock of ‘assets’. These can be understood broadly as accumulated capabilities and potential which may be beneficial in a later stage of life, similar to an investment. These resources can take the form of financial capital (savings), human (educational) capital, rights to social protection but also personal friendships and family ties (social capital).1 Their primary purpose for an individual—planning across life stages—is facilitated where those assets are fungible, so that transfer over time and space can be realistic. In this way, a shortfall in one stage of life—say studies or child-­ rearing—can be compensated by transferring resources, financial or otherwise from another. Fungibility places the spotlight on two classes of assets, both designed to transfer resources over time and between people: financial capital and rights to social benefits. It is important that these assets can transfer resources over time; it also matters that they can substitute one for the other. Fungibility between financial and social assets is complicated by bureaucratic rules that determine an individual’s access to the stocks accumulated and is also complicated by issues of understanding. Managing financial assets is often confusing to the individual, and the exercise of social rights is further complicated by legal and bureaucratic issues. The lack of understanding may introduce a chasm between what is theoretically optimal and what happens in practice. Behavioural economics has devoted much effort in pinpointing such issues and designing ‘nudges’ that work around them (e.g. Oliver, 2017; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). A key problem is procrastination in the face of uncertainty or difficulty in obtaining information. When faced with complicated choices, people have a tendency simply to postpone decisions, frequently leading to loss of rights in bureaucratic systems. The same process could leave them stranded or ‘locked in’ in unwanted or sub-optimal states of affairs. In short, a supposedly temporary stay in one country could, imperceptibly, morph into permanent residence.

1  Gratton and Scott (2016) identify types of such capital which can be used up or replenished and which are to some extent mutual substitutes. In their schema they also include aspects such as intangibles and regenerative friendships, which can in cases substitute for more tangible rights like the ones discussed above.

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Migration greatly complicates these transfers. As life phases occur in different countries, geographical and institutional distance act as wedges blocking fungibility. By doing so, they may force decisions which could override personal preferences. When many individuals face similar issues, and even if all would prefer to eventually return, this process could aid the formation of a diaspora or influence its characteristics. Even minor obstacles or bureaucratic irritations could metastasize into permanent ruptures. In the case of economic migration, the possibility of the transferability of savings or of social rights can end up dictating whether someone remains, whether they return, as well as the nature and frequency of links with what was left behind. Two types of assets matter to the average migrant: Financial assets accumulated through savings and social rights built up by working.2 Both of these can be seen as ‘lifecycle bridges’. Of these, transfers of financial assets are far easier and more transparent than in the past. Globalisation, the end of capital controls and exchange rate stability are smoothing over issues that in the past had often proved insurmountable. This only increases the importance of the other ‘lifecycle bridge’—social protection rights. The right to social benefits typically results as a by-product of employment and covers three kinds of needs—income smoothing in retirement (pensions), health care and looking after children or older family members (long-term care). Access to these benefits relies to a greater or lesser extent on social solidarity, implying that mechanisms to finance, administer and provide them involve the state or intermediate bodies. These rules differ from country to country far more than for financial assets. Being subject to political decisions and to bureaucratic administration, they cannot benefit from the smoothing tendencies that financial globalisation favours. It is ironic that social mechanisms designed to smooth life cycle transitions for the average worker end up operating as obstacles to the migrant. A gulf in institutional arrangements could develop between countries following different types of social provision. For people moving across borders, this could have a devastating impact on entitlements, and on occasion this may be large enough to be a factor affecting relocation decisions. Problematic cases could arise where (a) the needs involved are sizeable; (b) the ‘institutional distance’ between systems is large; (c) the development of ‘legal 2  This is a generalisation of the Life Cycle Hypothesis of Saving (Ando & Modigliani, 1963). Kay (2015) states that the average citizen’s portfolio is overwhelmingly in two assets: the family home and the rights to a pension.

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patches’ to ease portability is accorded low priority; and (d) if bureaucratic obstacles obscure how the transfer is to happen. These issues will each be examined for the specific case facing individuals in the Greek diaspora. Needs of migrants are specific to one’s stage in the lifecycle. The Greek diaspora is composed of two distinct groups. There is an older group of settled migrants—their primary concern lies in post-employment issues, should they decide to relocate to Greece permanently. Portability of existing pensions (already vested or even awarded) is a primary concern. As this group ages, access to quality health care and long-term care will acquire significance, both in financing and accessing services. Then, there is the new Greek diaspora, younger individuals who left Greece since the crisis, residing mostly in countries of the EU and the UK. Their relative youth and limited stay in host countries imply that they are currently relatively peripatetic; they could decide to return to Greece, or even relocate elsewhere. In their case, employment benefits, childcare and education are the current concerns, though elder care (mainly older parents) is a consideration. As social rights accumulate apace with their residence, commitment in the host country will grow, and social benefits may appear as a sunk cost hindering international movement. As this happens, other considerations may arise: the portability of pension rights will figure prominently, followed by health and (later on) access to long-term care. These concerns have yet to appear on migrants’ radar screens, who are, in many cases, less politically vocal and less well-connected than the older diaspora. The lack of clarity in future arrangements, institutional instability or even hesitancy to tackle bureaucracy favours procrastination. Often, this means that by the time the migrant acts, sunk costs will have grown to the point that return may be costly. In this way, and given the long lead times in social protection arrangements, waiting until an issue is raised politically might well mean that it would already be too late to correct. So, realistically, these issues will assume prominence only after 2030, when median members of the new diaspora will be entering their 40s. Whether one issue will prove most pressing with this group is currently unclear. As we are dealing with the congruence and interoperability of national social protection systems, themselves under constant revision, their likely shape in the mid-2030s will likely prove the decisive factor. It is possible that, as with financial transfers, some problems will be dealt with by general institutional changes likely to take place. In that case,

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national solutions would be superfluous. In other cases, the persistence of obstacles to movements must be addressed by national political initiatives. The long gestation of social reforms could mean that these gaps will need to be identified and actions taken well before, and certainly in the first half of the current decade. Recapitulating, we need to examine the extent to which social rights, namely pensions, health and long-term care, may prove obstacles to diaspora repatriation. We will first discuss the possibility that there might be international or European solutions of general applicability. This will set the stage to discuss the need and shape of specifically Greek responses.

The European Union as a Facilitator The European Union and its single market are built around the free movement of goods, services, labour and capital, the ‘four freedoms’ of the EU (Article 45 TFEU). Indeed, with its starting point as a Common Market, much of what happens in EU affairs can be understood as bringing together disparate economies, cementing them into an ‘ever closer Union’. The portability and transfer of financial assets certainly gained from this process, starting with the waning of capital controls and most recently with the definitive end to exchange rate uncertainty in the Eurozone. The free movement of labour is the underlying cause of the outward movement giving rise to the new diasporas across Europe. However, our problem arises from a lack of symmetry: EU rules facilitate movement out of Greece, but can impede movement back. This is owing to the asymmetric treatment accorded to social rights in EU law: movement of labour comes under EU law directly as does the implementation of non-discriminatory pay. In contrast, the (jealously guarded) principle of subsidiarity means that social policy remains national. If a social right comes under the rubric of social policy, then it’s up to member states; the transferability is subject to their discretion. This could be urged along or even coordinated, but not mandated. Subsidiarity thus creates a paradox: the EU can intervene if social rights are an extension of employment; if so, they are deemed to be part of remuneration, the rules of which must be harmonised. When applied to pensions, this means that occupational pensions (‘second pillar pensions’) fall

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within the ambit of EU regulation, as do ‘personal pensions (‘third pillar’).3 International portability of rights would in those cases be protected. However, a clear legal responsibility does not automatically guarantee ease of transfers. Even in occupational and personal pensions, the EU operates, not as a single market, but as 27 independent jurisdictions. This was the rationale of the EU Presidency’s 2019 initiative to launch a ‘Pan European Pension Product’ (PEPP) on its own, rather than waiting upon the interoperability of national systems (European Commission, 2017a, 2019a). Though, this attempt to short-circuit the laborious process of coordination has yet to bear fruit. It is a fair expectation that lack of portability will ultimately not prove an issue for the new diaspora. If so, to successfully relocate between two member states, both states would have to have sizeable second and third pillar systems. This potentially poses a problem for those looking to relocate to Greece as it relies monolithically on the state pillar (Tinios, 2020). In conclusion, the lion’s share of social rights capable of thwarting relocation would not automatically be affected by EU directives. This would certainly apply to health, long-term care and to all those pensions deemed to be part of social policy. This does not, in itself, imply obstacles; their presence would depend on differences between (pairs of) systems, as well as on the discretion of member states to legislate to bring their systems closer together. Differences between social protection systems are the underlying pragmatic reason for their different treatment; some systems are simply too different to reconcile easily.

The Development of a ‘European social model’ and Rights Portability Interoperability problems result from underlying differences between social systems. The historical dependence of social systems in states implied that they developed independently, while there were few tendencies for national systems to consolidate. Communication between pairs of systems would be easier if they adhered to similar principles or followed 3  Occupational pension schemes are those whose access is predicated by particular employment; personal pensions necessitate an individual contract commonly with an insurance company. In the famous ‘Barber case’ (Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group) of 1990, the ECJ decided that occupational pensions are part of remuneration and hence fall under EU jurisdiction.

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comparable logics. If not, corrective action would be needed to bridge differences and to help individuals transfer between countries. We therefore look in turn into the existence of different types of systems in Europe. This is followed by an examination of how and whether the attempts to forge a ‘European Social Model’ are making transfers easier. The categorisation of social protection systems in Europe is the subject of a voluminous literature. Differentiation between countries’ social systems is explained through their diverse origins and their prevailing logic. The most influential classification is Esping-Andersen’s ‘Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990). This distinguished the Scandinavian universalistic system, an Anglo-Saxon one relying to a greater extent on market principles and targeting, and a Continental system centred on social insurance, that is relying on earning rights through work. In his schema, Southern Europe, including Greece, was not separately identified, being usually thought of as a ‘thwarted Continental welfare state’. However, Ferrera (1996) countered with a separate Mediterranean welfare state model. States in the northern Mediterranean rim rely on a universal model for health, but place an overwhelming emphasis on pensions, to the detriment of other social services. Pensions are organised on social insurance lines and are occupationally fragmented. The gaps in social provision give rise to inequalities which require the family to step in, giving the social system a decidedly familial air, most evident in the provision of social services (Lyberaki & Tinios, 2014). According to this classification, one would have expected transfers to be smoother between systems belonging to the same ‘World of Welfare Capitalism’. Southern Europeans, and certainly Greeks, would be at a disadvantage. Likely, this would be less marked in health care, where universalistic rules hold, rather than in pensions or in other benefits. In the latter cases, any portability problems would wait to be dealt with through ad hoc bilateral arrangements, independent of the EU.

Bridging Institutional Chasms: EU Institutional Convergence Though outside the automatic jurisdiction of the EU, this does not preclude attempts to harmonise social policy as part of political will, with member states acting in concert. Indeed, given the importance of welfare states, differences would have exerted a negative influence in the single

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market and would, sooner or later, have proven obstacles to growth. At any rate, that was the rationale of the Lisbon process—a political process coordinating reforms across member states—around the turn of the millennium. ‘Modernising the European Social Model’ was a lever towards competitiveness; separate strands were set in train for social inclusion, pensions, health and long-term care. As diverse systems were facing similar challenges, reform was treated as an evolutionary process encouraging active comparisons between systems, the adoption of best practice and hence favouring interoperability. The ‘Open Method of Coordination’ for pensions was launched in 2002 (Tinios, 2012b). The member states are called to balance three objectives: sustainability (finance ageing-related rises in expenditure), adequacy (maintenance of living standards and prevention of poverty) and modernisation. The latter includes labour mobility, not only between occupations, but also, crucially, between countries. So, the institutional apparatus to discuss portability issues exists; the fact that it has still not yielded fruit is probably due to its being edged out by other, more pressing priorities. However, there exist tensions on the road to interoperability, as the case of non-pension social benefits illustrates. As life expectancies increase, there is a dawning realisation that well-being at older ages is not simply a matter of income security; for older people, access to Long-Term Care (LTC) services is equally important. Indeed, the EU Commission (EU, 2017b) included it in its ‘Pillar of 20 Social Rights’.4 Though no actionable rights results, it is an important signal of general policy drift at Union level. Nevertheless, countries like Germany, which operate a special social insurance regime for LTC, exclude non-residents. Denial of LTC introduces a new obstacle in border movements. So, while at Union level interoperability is a declared objective, nation states in trying to limit costs undermine it in practice. Where migrants have low political priority, obstacles of access or bureaucracy may be common. As the Greek ‘new diaspora’ is still young, it will only be affected directly by access to health and childcare. However, given that LTC in Greece is in practice overwhelmingly informal and familial (Tinios, 2017a), inadequacy of provision in Greece may constrain movements, especially in the case of females who comprise the majority of informal carers. For the older 4  ‘Everyone has the right to affordable long-term care services of good quality, in particular home-care and community-based services.’

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diaspora, if Greeks from Germany want to repatriate upon retirement, they lose an entitlement to LTC they have paid for (Reinhardt, 2019). As relocation of older citizens across Europe is becoming commonplace, differences and limitations in non-pension social rights—availability, finance and possible international transfer—will acquire salience. This process may, as in the past, be driven by decisions of the European Court of Justice probing the limits of national authority in social policy.5 We can only speculate how far these will be successful in practice, or whether their field of application will widen. Whatever the legal situation, over time there is a general process of smoothing out of differences and obstacles. Given that social systems were being reformed in the pursuit of similar objectives, it can be expected that systems would be brought closer together, easing interoperability problems. As Sapir (2006) concluded, EU welfare states in the Mediterranean lagged in terms of both efficiency and equity. A move to modernise the welfare states of the South would iron out idiosyncrasies and incompatibilities. A key feature is the familial nature of Mediterranean systems, most obvious in social services. According to Ferrera (2010), all southern states expressed in the 1990s a determination to ‘recalibrate’ familial systems— by developing new formal systems of care alongside the family. Greece joined in the declarations of intent, in contrast to Spain and Italy, though, this translated into few tangible results (Tinios, 2017b, 2018). The convergence of systems, even helped along by political will, could not solve the urgent problems of people migrating. In the 2010s, despite the legal precedence of member states, the EU still had to contend with three key facts: a. Bilateral agreements were becoming increasingly dated. As pensions reformed after the 2000s, bilateral agreements struggled to catch up. This is especially so, if (as in Greece) agreements presumed flows operating chiefly in one direction (towards destination countries only). b. Intra-EU migration after 2004 introduced new political urgency to define rights of migrants, especially where bilateral agreements lagged behind structural changes. 5  The European Court decided in 2019 that moving from Germany to Austria in the same border village was sufficient to disqualify a beneficiary from claiming LTC insurance, despite having vested rights.

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c. The Eurozone led to an asymmetry in unemployment insurance: as labour moves to work in low unemployment countries, say from Greece to Germany, social insurance revenue accrues in Germany, whereas the lack of employment opportunities persists as a problem in Greece. This primarily affects circular or temporary migration, an observation which motivates proposals for EU-wide unemployment insurance as a macroeconomic stabiliser (Beblavý et al., 2017). Permanent migration raises the issues of safeguarding pension rights. The EU attempted to do so through coordination between systems. Negotiations between member states started as a matter of urgency in 1971. The difficulties of subsidiarity can be illustrated by the glacial progress of Regulation 1408/71. This was only agreed after 31 years—as EU regulation 803/04, amended as 987/2009. It finally came into force as the ‘modernised coordination’ of social security systems in 2010 (Stergiou, 2017; Tsotsorou, 2012). Apart from reconciling conceptual differences, the regulation must respond to immense administrative and bureaucratic problems necessary to ensure interoperability of very diverse information and provision systems (European Commission, 2019b). Despite almost ten years’ experience, an individual seeking to transfer rights within the EU still faces a maze of uncertainty and years of bureaucratic frustration.

The Past: Á la carte Solutions to ad hoc Problems System convergence and coordination are hopes for the future. In the past the question of international transferability was seldom, if ever, seen as a general issue to be addressed (Tinios, 2010). The mechanisms currently in place are bilateral agreements, arrived at over the last 60 years in an ad hoc fashion.6 Most agreements were responses to political pressures, and hence reflected the problems of the past. These, oftentimes blunt instruments are the only recourse available to the new Greek diaspora. In the post-war period, Greece had to contend with all types of migration: outgoing, incoming, circular; return of diasporas and transcontinental migration of a more permanent nature. Issues raised by the differing types of 6  Holzmann (2016) examines bilateral agreements in the case of four ‘migration corridors’ between the EU and ‘third countries’ (not including Greece) and concludes that they smoothed obstacles to mobility. He notes however that the possibility of loss of rights remains, or could be an issue for the future.

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migration were handled separately, in different and sometimes inconsistent ways. Response depended on circumstances, geopolitics, but also the extent of organisation (and political influence) of groups affected. The preponderance of pensions in domestic social protection imposed its own blind spots, by obscuring rights in any social areas not developed in Greece, such as formal provision of long-term care or family benefits Certain features of domestic pensions were important to determine how international issues were dealt with. The fragmentation of the domestic system (Tinios, 2012a)  exponentially compounded the considerable bureaucratic problems in transferring rights. Moreover, the pension system’s insulation from public finance before the mid-1980s meant that cost considerations originally took a back seat. As cash problems intensified after 1990, arrangements favouring capital inflows were emphasised. Thus, agreements opening the door to relocating pensioners were prioritised. Cases where payments would have been in the opposite direction, such as recognising emigrants’ rights earned in Greece, were postponed or ignored. The US and (to a lesser extent) Australian diaspora had matured to the extent that earlier emigrants had retired and could spend their retirement in Greece. Bilateral agreements thus concentrated on facilitating foreign pension payments to Greek residents. This was easier in the case of the US which defined rights following a social insurance logic. In contrast, for Australia, where the public system follows needs, the bilateral agreement took much longer. Where there was danger of loss of foreign exchange, legislators were far more hesitant. Foremost in their minds was preventing flows on the part of foreigners working in Greece; rights earned in Greece of Greek emigrants were a kind of ‘collateral damage’. The first sizeable group of foreign workers in Greece were the Filipinos. They worked in Greek-owned ships from the 1970s and were paying contributions to the sailors’ pension provider (NAT). Another group was nurses and (later) homeworkers, locally insured in the main provider (IKA). The non-existence of a bilateral treaty with the Philippines meant that accumulated rights were either lost or necessitated the continued presence of the individual concerned in Greece.7 So, employment of foreign workers ended up subsidising the wider social security system. 7  The sailors were in a worse position, as in their case social insurance contributions were not even individually credited.

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From the 1990s Greece became a destination country for migrants, and later on, a node in migration routes into Europe. The new Greek diaspora shared with other migrants the need for periods of work in Greece to ‘count’ towards social insurance rights accumulated elsewhere. In this way, from implicitly seeing transferability as a one-way-game to help the Greek diaspora retain links with the mother country, Greece began to join the mainstream of advanced countries, taking part in general discussions about the international treatment of pensions. Nevertheless, the available toolbox, developed in previous decades, saw international working as the exception and accorded low priority to recognising rights that could have given rise to cash outflows. Can such an antiquated toolbox deal with the new diaspora? In the period before 2000, initiatives were the result of issues raised by collectivities (hardly ever individuals). The presumption was that pensions were a state responsibility. Pension rights were approached as flows and not as stocks; actuarial calculations quantifying the transfers involved were hardly ever used.8 A great deal depended on the extent of difference between systems. Systems prioritising need, such as Australia or Denmark, posed the greatest difficulties; if needs were central, and these change by relocation, it is hard to define what to transfer. Intergovernmental agreements were a response to three different types of migration, whose features they had to accommodate: 1. Resettlement of ‘Returning’ diasporas. This covered the forced migration of Greeks who settled abroad in the late nineteenth century. That was seen as a legacy problem, a one-off part of decolonisation. In the buoyant economic climate of the 1960s, Greeks leaving Egypt or Istanbul were accommodated when social insurance appeared financially robust. Pension rights were ‘recognised’ as equivalent to the main domestic pension provider (IKA). Law 1595/86, amending 1963 legislation, allowed careers to resume by giving the right to ‘buy in’ into IKA at concessionary rates, giving rise to accusations of privileged treatment. The absence of a unifying approach can be appreciated by comparing the partly forced ‘homecoming’ of Greeks from the ex-USSR in the 8  This led to domestic commentary (also not backed by actuarial calculations) that ‘privileges were extended to particular groups, usually returning diasporas, such as Greeks from Egypt or Romania’.

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1990s. They were seen as a social, rather than a social insurance, problem. Migrants were given Greek nationality and entitled to minimum social pensions at age 65 (subject to a means test). This created a template that was used by individuals of Greek descent from the former Soviet Union (including economic migrants), allowing them a foothold in the labour market, but not fully integrating them in social insurance. Periods of work outside Greece were ignored in calculating pension rights. 2. Circular migration. West Germany recruited directly from villages in the 1950s—the Gastarbeiter system. This was understood, both in Germany and in Greece, as temporary migration. As an individual career would contain periods of work in both countries, it was important to be able to ‘mix’ systems. Indeed, from the 1980s, Germany tried to reverse the flow, encouraging the return to Greece. Germany gave returning emigrants the choice either to receive contributions paid as a lump sum (and hence sever links with Germany), or to retain rights to (partial) German pensions. Most opted for lump sums (commonly invested in real estate). Similar bilateral agreements were made with other European countries hosting Greek workers (Sweden, Belgium, France).9 These agreements differentiate between people who returned before retirement and those who reside in Greece with a foreign pension. They had to bridge underlying differences in pension systems (social pensions; residency requirements; adding of periods worked in different jurisdictions; the legal equivalence of different providers). As a result, negotiations could stretch for a long time, leaving many individuals in legal limbo. These negotiations proceeded in parallel with discussions in the EU towards system coordination, before these finally came to fruition in 2009. Pension reforms, common after 2000, risked stranding aspects of the agreements. . Transcontinental migration. Migration to the US, Australia, South 3 Africa, Canada, Brazil, Argentina was treated as permanent, affecting the entire working career. The chief concern on the Greek side was the ability to reside in Greece after the pension was awarded, which then could be paid in Greece in hard currency. The recognition of ‘mixing’ systems to enable labour mobility was given lower (or no) priority.

9

 Psilos (1998) surveys intergovernmental agreements.

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Negotiation of bilateral agreements could stretch into decades,10 especially where systems followed a different logic. Length of residence is the source of problems.11 A large part of the total entitlement derives from occupational pensions (such as 401(k) pensions in the US or Superannuation pensions in Australia), yet there are problems to define an organisation in Greece which can receive the accumulated pension pot. So, the option of transferring a capital sum (rather than the monthly pension) was never on the table. To sum up, transferability of social rights was treated in Greece as an incidental issue of little intrinsic importance. The solutions offered resulted from the interaction of structures not designed to accommodate special circumstances of mobile individuals. Migration was seen as an exception; it was even possible that policy makers thought that their duty was to encourage foreign exchange inflows and that, hence, they had to discourage individual choices which risked outflows. The situation where mobile individuals are a ‘normal’ phenomenon in a globalised world, in which rights need to be portable, was never considered or discussed. Part of the explanation for this lay in the mindset of ‘Greek exceptionalism’, and part of it was also that the Greek pension system itself was a work in progress for almost a generation (Tinios, 2020). If one couldn’t be certain of which way the next reform would take things, what was the point of thinking ahead for migrants?

The Present: Does the New Pension System Pose Any Less of a Problem? The financial crisis brought pension reform to Greece with a vengeance. This took place in syncopated fashion over three bailouts between 2010 and 2019. Nevertheless, by 2019 a new system was in place. Is that new system capable of offering a convincing reply to portability worries of the new Greek diaspora? 10  Examples of bilateral agreements US L2186/94, Quebec L1317/83, New Zealand 2584/94, Revised Canada 2492/97, Australia 3677/08, Poland L1601/1986, Switzerland L20/74, Argentina 1602/80. 11  Canada requires a minimum of ten for an old age pension; Australia adds that there needs to be five years of consecutive residence, which in New Zealand needs to be after age 50 (SSA 2019).

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This new system answers some key issues, such as fragmentation. However, compared to its peers in Europe, the new Greek system remains relatively generous,12 exclusively state-run, bureaucratically inept and rigid (Nektarios & Tinios, 2020; Tinios, 2018,  2020). Financing pensions exclusively from current contributions, it resembles a 1960s-type state-run system; it remains essentially backward looking. It resisted setting up an occupational pillar. Its response to ageing ignores flexibility and relies on increasing contributions. Though domestic occupational mobility is no longer discouraged as before, international portability was not addressed. Internationally mobile individuals would be as before: on departing, they will have no idea what entitlements (if any) they are leaving behind. If they come back, they will be in the dark about what to do with rights earned abroad. If, as is increasingly the case outside Greece (Mackenzie, 2010), old age provision takes the form of an individual savings account, there would still be no Greek counterpart organisation in which to affiliate. Whereas systemic chasms were not filled, bureaucratic obstacles remain. Examining younger participants, mobile individuals are hit hard by non-wage cost increases; avoiding punitive contributions is commonly cited as a reason for emigration. Before the 2016 reforms, younger workers could avoid the high contribution rates levied on salaried employees by being classified as self-employed freelancers.13 The reforms initially treated all ‘gig economy’ work as ‘bogus self-employment’ and taxed it as salaried work. These changes were partly reversed in 2019 and 2020, returning self-employment to its pre-crisis status. How will the new system deal with looming portability problems? Will it be able to ‘keep with the flow’ of social protection systems in destination countries? As a kind of revived 1960s era system, the new Greek system presumes a world of steady work, where long-lived enterprises guarantee uninterrupted careers. To ‘future-proof’ the system, it should be able to cope 12  In this case, generosity means a high replacement rate, which for a full career is over 80%. Given the two-tier structure of the new system, replacement rates are higher for low earnings. Whether they are high relative to the contributions paid depends largely on the assumptions used in the actuarial model, and the extent of additional central finance (see Nektarios et al., 2018). For a system overview see US SSA, 2019. 13  Of course, being freelancers, they were entitled to fewer social benefits. As these were very heavily weighted towards pensions, their value to younger workers was limited. A further issue of importance was that social contributions were calculated using minimum wages as a floor; for those working for less than the minimum, this was equivalent to a higher (regressive) poll tax.

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with issues of the future. The primary challenge from an individual perspective is longevity—longer and more uncertain lives. Individuals must make greater provision for themselves, while migration could be common a feature in an evolving ‘multi-stage’ life (Gratton & Scott, 2016). This model already appears to be spreading from the EU outwards.14 The second challenge arises from the future of work.15 Globalisation and technology are altering how the global relates to the local. Migration will follow trends in the labour market, where opportunities grow at the top and bottom but not in the middle. At the top end, opportunities for cross-­ border careers will drive migration. At the other end, we may see the spread of what may be called ‘shock migration’—migration reacting to a ‘shock’ in the origin country. Such shocks could be political, economic or environmental; indeed, the wave of migrants in Greece during the crisis could be an example.16 Many think that shock migrants, unlike economic migrants, will only stay temporarily; this, however, may prove to be only wishful thinking. In conclusion, the new system, while partly addressing internal problems of Greek pensions, is unlikely to make much difference where mobile individuals are a ‘normal’ feature in a globalised world. As the new diaspora matures, the perception of portability issues as obstacles to return or even to productive integration of Greece is likely to grow. The institutional distance between Greece and other advanced countries will progressively be felt as something generating a sunk cost discouraging and perhaps even preventing return.

The Future: Could There Be a Migration-Friendly Pension System for Greece? The dysfunctions of the current system are already being felt, beyond social policy. The new diaspora operates to siphon off both capital and labour, as the parents of the migrants subsidise their exodus (Labrianidis, 2011). A possible return could therefore set the process in reverse— rewarding the recovery through a growth rebound; this would be all the 14  A consequence is the movement of retirees from Northern Europe, which could lead to Greece following the example of Florida for the US (Doxiadis & Tountas, 2019). 15   See the OECD future of work forum http://www.oecd.org/employment/ future-of-work/. 16  As would migrations from Venezuela to Spain or Argentina to Italy.

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better if pensions savings could be, somehow, brought to Greece. However, the marginal role accorded to savings in the new pension system implies that any accumulated balances of returning migrants may have nowhere to go, and they may well remain abroad. If pension savings are seen as a sunk cost, moving back to Greece would translate to a financial hit. Conversely, if pension contributions accumulated in, say, Germany or Holland can be seamlessly transferred to Greece, a return will be facilitated. Returning diaspora members bring back their human capital; if that is accompanied by a pot of pension money, the gain will be even greater. For older individuals, difficulties in exercising social rights could hinder the attraction of relocating members of the older diaspora. At the other end of the social scale, exits by new diaspora could, as in other countries, be replaced by low-skilled third-country immigrants. This has implications for LTC, where the supply of carers relies on migrants (Bettio et  al., 2006;  Lyberaki, 2011; Lyberaki & Tinios, 2018). Social administration is concerned with making these people pay contributions; it is less worried about whether the rights collected can be exercised. For migrants, social contributions are often one-way—they pay, but are unlikely to ever collect. The prospect arises that, as demand for personal care rises, the supply of carers may be drying up. In the past, the interests of emigrants and prospective returnees were served through incidental effects of structures introduced for other purposes; migration issues were never incorporated as organic features. Could such a migration-friendly system exist and what would it look like? Would it be feasible for Greece? A pension system prioritising savings could certainly aid Greece’s growth.17 • Private savings to finance investment have been negative since 2008. Growth policy is reduced to waiting for foreign investment (Lyberaki & Tinios, 2017). • In contrast to the 1950s, labour migration is linked to capital export, as migrants often take their parents’ savings with them, to finance studies and to ease the first steps of settlement. If high non-wage costs are a push factor, changes in the dominant social protection model could play a part in reversing this process.

 See, for example, the proposals in Meghir et al. (2017); Pissarides et al. (2020).

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• If accumulated pension savings can be repatriated, capital inflows could partly compensate for the earlier outflows. • Finally, return of migrants increases labour, skills and capital and can serve as a growth impetus. At the root of the problem is a pension system which sees social protection simply as an unproductive fiscal outflow, a simple redistribution of resources from some groups or generations to others. Social insurance, however, can be approached as a service provided to the working generation, and not simply as a means of unproductively distributing money after retirement. In other words, we can see social reform as social investment, preparing structures for future issues, rather than repairing problems after the fact (Hemerijk, 2015). The operation of pensions as a bridge between life stages can be an example of such a social investment. Another would be savings vehicles that can attract and absorb savings of migrants—both before and after their return. A migration-friendly pension system should be radically different from its current state centred on the rigid administration of bureaucratic rules.18 It should, in particular, provide clarity and transparency to allow lifecycle planning. It should be based on trust, buttressed by regular actuarial checks. It should mesh with other countries’ social protection systems tracking changes over time. Finally, once having established contact with contributors, it should keep communications open, providing full information of individual balances. Above all, the pension system should be seen as a service due to the working generation. The main alternative to the existing structure is a three-pillar system, of the kind that is gradually taking hold in Europe. A rapid transition to such a system is advocated by Panageas and Tinios (2017) and by Nektarios et al. (2018), with the weight of overall pension provision swinging decisively towards closer reciprocity and the second pillar. The financing gap caused by legacy costs is seen as social investment, to be rewarded over time by gains to competitiveness and incentives. The proposal would align Greece with economically advanced countries, as well as enabling individual career planning which can easily accommodate international careers; moreover, migrants could contribute to savings accounts even when not residing in Greece. 18  Genser and Holzmann (2020) examine how different kinds of pension and tax systems perform in a globalising world.

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The idea of moving towards a three-pillar system is gaining traction as the chief alternative to the current system. More gradual variants of the model have been proposed by Christodoulakis et  al. (2018) and IOVE (2019). The Greek government has legislated the start of a three-pillar system for labour market entrants from January 2022. Under law 4826/2021, a mandatory 6% contribution is directed to prefunded individual accounts (the second pillar). The scheme will be obligatory for labour market entrants, but will be open on a voluntary basis to individuals under 35 years of age. No special mention or allowance is made for returnees of the diaspora. Under the current law, someone returning from Germany in their mid-30s or older would only be able to join if they had never worked in Greece prior to 2022, even if they wanted to transfer German accumulated contributions.

Conclusion: A Pandemic Opportunity The overview of rights portability has highlighted the expectation that parochial orientations in social systems, where migration is seen as the exception, will increasingly pose obstacles to links with the new diaspora. This emphasis is usually placed on legal or administrative issues—how systems communicate. However, seen in more general terms, social risks should be addressed to aid smooth transitions between lifecycle stages. In a world where migration is becoming common, portability of social rights would not only be a service to migrants themselves, but can operate as a growth lever. The existence of a large, mobile, young and educated new Greek diaspora can thus be turned to an advantage. The COVID-19 pandemic is giving rise to a positive side-effect by rekindling links with the new diaspora. Many used the periods of lockdown as an opportunity to return to Greece (Kafe & Pratsinakis, 2021), while the boost given to distance working and other forms of flexible work contracts could also help. Their period of residence may have afforded them a first contact with Greek social insurance, yet given its (almost exclusive) preoccupation with dealing with a pensions application backlog, the experience is unlikely to have been salutary. Nevertheless, 2022 will see the presence of the diaspora coincide with the start of a three-pillar system for labour market entrants. This presents an intriguing prospect: the new system could be opened up to those wishing to return to Greece (or even those considering doing so). Even if the first-best solution of a three-pillar system for all is ruled out for fiscal

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reasons, its targeted introduction to cover the new diaspora could operate as an ingenious second-best: the availability of an individual savings account in a functioning organisation could prove an important career planning instrument for a group who demonstrably need it. The inauguration of a prefunded pension provider equivalent, say, to German Riester pensions or to Dutch occupational pensions, introduces the possibility of mutual recognition and possibly allowing easier transfers. The return of young people who left since 2010 is an objective embraced across the political spectrum. The danger that their continued absence will combine with relatively abstruse social insurance rules to raise increasingly high obstacles to their return is not yet understood. Social insurance and other social protection reform is discussed as if Greece was an island. The rights of relocating individuals are seldom, if ever, discussed as a separate design issue for pension and other systems. As a result, as time goes on, losses in pension savings will weigh more in decisions to return home. The introduction of the three-pillar system in Greece in 2022 will be equivalent to that in Western Europe. Combined with changes in labour law towards greater flexibility, this raises the possibility that something concrete can be done to help the new diaspora’s return. Indeed, the two changes, social insurance and labour law, combined, could easily be incorporated in the pandemic recovery programme as part of a general action plan to reintegrate the ‘Erasmus Generation’ to Greece. In this way, Greece can finally act so that social protection can, at long last, supply at least a section of a missing life cycle bridge.

References Ando, A., & Modigliani, F. (1963). The “life cycle” hypothesis of saving aggregate implications and tests. American Economic Review, 53(1), 55–84. Beblavý, M., Marconi, G., & Maselli, I. (2017). A European unemployment benefit scheme: The rationale and the challenges ahead. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 2F0958928706065598, CEPS, https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet? docId=16884&langId=en Bettio, F., Simonazzi, A.  M., & Villa, P. (2006). Change in care regimes and female migration: The ‘care drain’ in the Mediterranean. Journal of European Social Policy, 16(3), 271–285. https://doi.org/10.1177/2F095892870 6065598 Christodoulakis, N., Nektarios, M., Theoharis, H., et  al. (2018). Reset for the Greek economy. How the reduction of taxes, social insurance contributions and the fiscal surplus leads to growth, employment and a viable national debt. diaNEOsis,

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Research and Policy Institute, February 2018, Athens, https://www.dianeosis. org/wp-­content/uploads/2018/02/Drakoi_Upd120218.pdf (In Greek). Doxiadis, A., & Tountas, J. (2019). Development of old age tourism in Greece and the contribution of medical tourism, diaNEOsis, Research and Policy Institute, July 2019 https://www.dianeosis.org/wp-­content/uploads/2019/07/medical_tourism.pdf (dianeosis.org) (In Greek). Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Princeton University Press. European Commission. (2017a). Proposal for a pan-European pension product. https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/170629-­personal-­pension-­products_en European Commission. (2017b). The European pillar of social rights in 20 principles. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/deeper-­and-­fairer-­economic­and-­monetary-­union/european-­pillar-­social-­rights/european-­pillar-­social­rights-­20-­principles_en European Commission. (2019a). Capital markets union: Pan-European personal pension product (PEPP), Fact Sheet. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-­release_ MEMO-­19-­1993_en.htm European Commission. (2019b). Coordination of social security systems, frequently asked questions. https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=857&intPa geId=983&langId=en#navItem-­3 Ferrera, M. (1996). The ‘Southern Model’ of welfare in social Europe. European Journal of Social Policy, 6(1), 17–37. Ferrera, M. (2010). The South European countries. In F.  Castles, F.  Leibfried, et al. (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of the welfare state (pp. 616–629). Oxford University Press. Genser, B., & Holzmann, R. (2020). Pensions in a globalising world: How do (N) DC and (N)DB schemes fare on portability and taxation? In R.  Holzmann et al. (Eds.), Progress and challenges of nonfinancial defined contribution pension schemes, Volume 2: Addressing gender, administration and communication (pp. 289–316). World Bank. https://doi.org/10.1596/978-­1-­4648-­1453-­2 Gratton, L., & Scott, A. (2016). The 100-year life: Living and working in an age of longevity. Bloomsbury. Hemerijk, A. (2015). The quiet paradigm revolution of social investment. Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society, 22(2), 242–256. Holzmann, R. (2016). Do bilateral social security agreements deliver on the portability of pensions and health care benefits? A summary policy paper on four migration corridors between EU and non-EU member states. IZA Journal of European Labor Studies, 5(17), 1–35. IOVE. (2019). Pension reform and development. Pension Pillars Reform_ September2019 (iobe.gr), September 2019, (In Greek). Kafe, A., & Pratsinakis, M. (2021). The Greek diaspora in the UK during the pandemic. SEES-OX/DiaNeosis.

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Kay, J. (2015). Other people’s money: Masters of the universe or servants of the people? Profile Books. Labrianidis, L. (2011). Investing in flight, brain drain from Greece at the time of globalization. (In Greek) Kritiki. Lyberaki, A. (2011). Migrant women, care work and women’s employment in Greece. Feminist Economics, 17(3), 103–131. Lyberaki, A., & Tinios, P. (2014). The informal welfare state and the family: Invisible actors in the Greek drama. Political Studies Review, 12(2), 193–208. https://doi.org/10.1111/1478-­9302.12049 Lyberaki, A., & Tinios, P. (2017). Small firms as a blind spot in Greek austerity economics. IDS Working Paper 491. IDS. https://www.ids.ac.uk/publication/ small-­firms-­as-­a-­blind-­spot-­in-­greek-­austerity-­economics Lyberaki, A., & Tinios, P. (2018). Long-term care, ageing and gender in the Greek crisis. GreeSe paper 128, Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southern Europe, London School of Economics. https://www.lse.ac.uk/Hellenic-­ Observatory/Assets/Documents/Publications/GreeSE-­P apers/GreeSE-­ No128.pdf (lse.ac.uk) Mackenzie, G.  A. (2010). The decline of the traditional pension. A comparative study of threats to retirement security. Cambridge University Press. Meghir, C., Pissarides, C. A., Vayanos, D. & Vettas, N. (2017). The Greek Economy before and during the crisis – and policy options going forward. In C. Meghir, C. A. Pissarides, D. Vayanos, & N. Vettas (Eds.), Beyond Austerity. Reforming the Greek Economy (pp. 3–72). Cambridge: The MIT Press. Nektarios, M., & Tinios, P. (2020). The Greek pension reforms: Crises and NDC attempts awaiting completion. In R. Holzmann et al. (Eds.), Progress and challenges of nonfinancial defined contribution pension schemes, Volume 1: Addressing marginalization, polarization, and the labor market (pp.  141–166). World Bank. https://doi.org/10.1596/978-­1-­4648-­1453-­2 Nektarios, M., Tinios, P. & Symeonidis, G. (2018). Pensions for the young: A social insurance system focused on growth (In Greek). Oliver, A. (2017). The origins of behavioural public policy. Cambridge University Press. Panageas, S., & Tinios, P. (2017). Pensions: Arresting a race to the bottom. In C.  Meghir et  al. (Eds.), Beyond austerity: Reforming the Greek economy (pp. 459–516). MIT Press. Pissarides, C., et al. (2020). Development plan for the Greek economy. Final report (‘The Pissarides Report’), growth_plan_2020-11-23_1021.pdf [in Greek]. https://government.gov.gr/schedio-anaptixis-gia-tin-elliniki-ikonomia/ Psilos, G. (1998). Bilateral international social protection agreements. Deltio Ergatikis Nomothesias, 54(5), 664–680. (In Greek).

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Reinhardt, H.  J. (2019). The social right Of EU citizens to long-term care, SPRINT project. http://sprint-­project.eu/wp-­content/uploads/2018/09/ SPRINT_D3.1_Social-­Right-­of-­EU-­Citizens-­to-­LTC.pdf (sprint-project.eu) Sapir, A. (2006). Globalization and the reform of European social models. Journal of Common Market Studies, 44(2), 369–390. Stergiou, A. (2017). Social insurance law (3rd ed.). Sakkoulas Publishers (In Greek). Thaler, R. H., & Sunstein, C. R. (2008). Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness. Yale University Press. Tinios, P. (2010). The pension problem: A method to decipher. (In Greek) Kritiki. Tinios, P. (2012a). Τhe pensions merry-go-round: End of a cycle? In S. Kalyvas et al. (Eds.), From stagnation to forced adjustment: Reforms in Greece 1974–2010 (pp. 117–132). C. Hurst & Co. Tinios, P. (2012b). Pensions and the Lisbon strategy. In D.  Papadimitriou & P. Copeland (Eds.), The EU’s Lisbon strategy: Evaluating success, understanding failure (pp. 111–129). Macmillan Palgrave. Tinios, P. (2017a). Greece: Forced transformation in a deep crisis. In B.  Greve (Ed.), Long-term care – challenges and perspective (pp. 93–106). Routledge. Tinios, P. (2017b). Social policy, pensions and the legacy of modernization. In S. Economides (Ed.), Greece: Modernisation and Europe 20 years on (pp. 64–73). Hellenic Observatory, LSE. http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/ research/hellenicObser vator y/CMS%20pdf/Publications/ Modernisation_%20Publication.pdf Tinios, P. (2018). Pensioners and pension reforms during the Greek crisis. In F.  Karl (Ed.), Ageing in the crisis: Experiences from Greece (pp.  25–45). Lit Verlag GmbH. Tinios, P. (2020). Pensions in the Greek political economy. In K. Featherstone & D. Sotiropoulos (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of Greek politics (pp. 489–504). Oxford University Press. Tsotsorou, T. (2012). Free movement and residence of citizens in the European Union in the Member States: Regulation 803/2004 and Directive 2004/38. Epitheorisis Dikaiou Koinonikon Asfaliseon, 44(4), 894–906. (in Greek).

CHAPTER 4

Diaspora and Transnational Philanthropy During the Crisis and the Shifting Boundaries of State and Civil Society Antonis Kamaras

Introduction This chapter investigates how the crisis in Greece has catalysed the diaspora and transnational giving. It looks at giving to both state and private non-profit organisations and how the boundaries between the state and civil society have shifted. Scholarship during the crisis years has primarily focused on the evolving relationships between the state and the non-profit sector, and civil society at large. This has occurred in the context of a dramatic fall in state expenditure and the massive loss of prestige of the Greek party system and political establishment. The chapter seeks to contribute to, as well as qualify, this scholarship by evaluating how the increasingly active diaspora and transnational philanthropy have influenced the mission, governance and the means available to three types of beneficiaries: (a) state organisations under the control of central government and led by

A. Kamaras (*) Greek Diaspora Project – SEESOX, Oxford, UK © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 O. Anastasakis et al. (eds.), Diaspora Engagement in Times of Severe Economic Crisis, Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97443-5_4

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civil servants; (b) municipalities under the leadership of elected mayors; and (c) private non-profits under the leadership of boards of directors or trustees. Thus, the chapter, by focusing as much on the grantor as in the grantee, observes that the crisis has meant that policy experimentation and/or norms diffusion, rendered possible by diaspora and transnational philanthropy, have proliferated within both the state and the civil society. It consequently argues that we should think of the state and civil society not in terms of a binary, bilateral relationship, but rather of cohorts of organisations, both public and private, which engage with diaspora and transnational philanthropy. The chapter also addresses the possibility that philanthropy, originating in the great Greek diaspora and transnational wealth, can also restrict pluralism if it is so instrumentalised by the government of the day. Relatedly, it posits that philanthropy in Greece, in order to continue underpinning a vibrant civil sector as well as pluralism and innovation, in both Greek civil society and the Greek state, needs to be expanded and diversified via two avenues. First, by enabling the mobilisation of greater resources to Greek civil society via favourable changes in the taxation of philanthropic giving by resident Greek citizens and by legally facilitating the utilisation of volunteerism in Greece. Second, expanding reforms in such state domains as public health, state education and culture could considerably expand, and thus diversify, the cohort of diaspora philanthropic giving to Greece. In terms of the chapter’s structure, the next section briefly reviews the scholarly treatment of the impact of the crisis on state and civil society relations. Then the chapter analyses diaspora and transnational philanthropy in Greece, in a pre-crisis context, and gives an account of their differentiating propensity to respond to the crisis. The following section argues that a focus on diaspora and transnational philanthropy in Greece has important implications on how we understand the state and civil society in terms of similarities and differences between state and civil society grantees, the penetration of local government by civil society and the capacity of such philanthropy, on its own or in concert with civil society actors, to alter dominant norms as well as state policies. Subsequently, the chapter assesses how the diaspora and transnational philanthropy have engaged with Greece both before and after the crisis. It also focuses on the synergies, catalysed by the crisis, which have shaped important diaspora and transnational philanthropic interactions. The penultimate section looks at the ongoing impact of diaspora and transnational

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philanthropy in a post-crisis environment decidedly shaped by the crisis itself. Particular emphasis is placed on the instrumentalisation of primarily transnational philanthropy by Greece’s first post-crisis government. Finally, the last section sums up the key findings of the chapter.

State and Civil Society During the Crisis: The Binary Framework Scholarship on state and civil society relations during the crisis in Greece has sought to grasp the interplay between one of the weakest civil societies in Europe with a dominant state, albeit prostrate due to the crisis. Scholarly accounts have, by and large, highlighted low levels of volunteerism and charitable giving, denying civil society critical resources, financial as well as human. A number of factors contribute to this. Low societal trust and the family unit as the main focus of effort and collaboration, for example. Also, reliance on party-controlled patronage networks to secure interests is another factor. Party-state policies with preferential taxation for allies are another explanation for the current state of affairs (Huliaras, 2015). Additionally, due to the Greek Orthodox Church’s reliance on state funding for its operations and its limited own resources (Huliaras, 2015), the church is not a main actor in civil society. What has also been investigated is the reliance of a significant component of civil society on state funding, originating either in national disbursements or EU ones, which are allocated through Greek state intermediation. Before the crisis, such reliance created many parasitic NGOs which exhibited patron-client characteristics undermining their civil society status.1 That being said, scholars have also noted that part of such EU funding, in alignment with the rise of quality of life issues, such as environmental concerns, also assisted the growth of mission-oriented, competently run NGOs which proved capable of mobilising additional support from Greek society as well as from corporate social responsibility (CSR) and philanthropic foundations.2 Thus, scholarship has established that when the crisis broke out in Greece there was a severely unbalanced relationship between the country’s 1  On how dependence on state funding shaped dominant media and societal perceptions of NGOs in Greece see Frangonikopoulos and Pouladikakos (2016). 2  For analysis of how the impact of EU funding and novel quality of life concerns facilitated the evolution of Greek civil society see Botetzagias and Koutiva (2015).

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ruling parties and the state and Greece’s civil society. Greek civil society actors were overall underfunded and/or dependent on state funding. This circumscribed their ability to exert significant influence on Greece’s public life; civil society actors either lacked prominence or their reputation was undermined by their state dependence. Moreover, their operational capacity and normative impact were severely constrained. Finally, their integration into party-controlled patronage networks inherently compromised their aptitude and ability to act as autonomous agents in civil society terms (Sotiropoulos, 2017).3 Such autonomy, after all, could very well conflict with their patronage obligations. Research has established that the warlike impact of the crisis on Greek society and economy, with unemployment rising to 20% and loss of output reaching 25%, upset this unbalanced relationship in important ways. First, absent a minimum safety net provided by the state, the crisis-generated informal mobilisation, engaging a wide variety of actors, many of which originated from civil society. A rudimentary and uneven safety net was jerry-rigged comprising NGOs. The Greek Orthodox Church energised its traditional private supporters to set up multiple food provisioning programmes. Municipalities, the most immediate interface between the state and social distress, interacted with NGOs, CSR and philanthropic foundations to strengthen their previously nominal social support mechanisms. Second, radicalised citizens created informal mechanisms of support, operating often beyond legality, but with a degree of tolerance from authorities. These citizens aided in the running of informal, untaxed markets, bringing producers and consumers together. Additionally, such citizens rallied against the established political order, challenging its legitimacy through a variety of actions ranging from the regime-threatening attempt to storm the Greek Parliament, to refusing to pay tolls to concessionaires who managed part of Greece’s highway road network. Third, although the crisis did indeed create a material and normative vacuum filled partially by civil society actors and their alliances and mobilisations, in alignment or against state authorities (both local and national authorities), crisis-induced fiscal consolidation measures further denied financial resources to civil society. The modest, pre-crisis tax exemptions granted to philanthropic giving were eliminated or curtailed, and revenue generating property assets of Greek foundations and non-profits were 3  For a thorough discussion of Greece’s civil society before and after the crisis, see Sotiropoulos (2017).

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heavily taxed. This meant that civil society, during the crisis, became reliant on sources of funding that were unaffected by the crisis, namely philanthropic giving originating from either diaspora or transnational philanthropy.4 As it is examined immediately below, the level of such reliance was not determined solely by the level of wealth of different philanthropic cohorts, namely the diaspora and transnational ones. Rather, it was determined by their propensity to engage philanthropically with Greece, a propensity which was, in turn, shaped by the long-standing, pre-­ crisis nature of their engagement with the Greek society, polity and economy.

Diaspora and Transnational Philanthropy: Differentiating Propensity to Fill the Crisis-­Generated Funding Gaps Major crises have a bearing on diaspora and homeland relations, not least through the philanthropic channel. Diaspora communities, philanthropic foundations and individuals, including transnational ones (i.e., persons and organisations that simultaneously maintain important connections in the homeland and third states), are connected to their homelands through kinship relations, meso-level affiliations (e.g., professional and educational), through patriotic and socio-political identification with the homeland and/or maintain important economic and other interests. The catalysation of the philanthropic channel, including monetary and in-kind contributions and volunteerism, can have diverse as well as important consequences in a homeland’s socio-political, normative and even economic orderings (Johnson, 2007; Newland et al., 2010; Lessinger, 1992, 2003).5 The salient factor, in terms of diaspora and transnational philanthropy’s impact on crisis-hit Greece, has been the abundance of financial resources compared to the purely local philanthropic actors, bar very few exceptions. The Greek diaspora is well-represented in affluent countries, namely the 4  For an analysis of the impact of the crisis on the revenues’ streams of civil society grantees, see Tzifakis et al. (2017). 5  For an overview of diaspora philanthropy see, Johnson (2007). For the impact on philanthropy on a homeland’s developmental trajectory see, Newland et al. (2010). For the normative influence exerted by a diaspora’s engagement with the homeland see Levitt (1998). For transnationalism as a distinct category, within the diaspora and homeland interaction canon, see Lessinger (1992) and (2003).

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USA, the UK, Canada and Australia, where philanthropy, including cross-­ border, diaspora-to-homeland philanthropy, is a dominant mode of action among the wealthy. Such philanthropy is supported by favourable fiscal regimes, well-established networking and socialisation strategies of the wealthy and the compelling normative expectations of ‘giving back’. Moving to transnational philanthropy, Greece’s most competitive economic sector is shipping, an activity of global reach. Greek shipowners operate one of the largest merchant marine fleets in the world. Management is largely transnational, with Greek shipowners operating their fleets, and their overall business affairs, both from Greece and from other sophisticated business centres in such countries as the UK, the USA and Switzerland. Relatedly, since the 1950s, Greek shipping has enjoyed an effective tax exemption, enshrined in the Greek constitution. This is a highly favourable fiscal certainty not available to them anywhere else in the world. Therefore, philanthropy is a main vehicle through which Greek shipowners can demonstrate their commitment to the country. Thus, what Greek diaspora and transnational philanthropic individuals and entities have in common, and which sets them apart, from their purely local counterparts is (a) their ability to generate wealth either on a global scale or at the scale of some of the wealthiest countries of the world and (b) lower taxes on their wealth or tax deductions which means that a greater proportion of the wealth they generate can be directed to philanthropy. Diaspora and transnational philanthropists and entities are, however, distinctly different in terms of their respective disposition to engage philanthropically with Greece. In particular, following Greece’s entry into the European Community in 1981, diaspora remittances and other inflows were replaced in importance by transfers from the EC/EU. This decline in the economic importance of the diaspora has, as its corollary, the marginalisation of the diaspora in Greece’s collective deliberations and the public’s consciousness (Kamaras, 2017).6 Concurrently, in the decades leading up to the crisis, Greece underperformed in attracting foreign direct investment and the Greek economy in general proved to be inhospitable to inflows of capital and expertise from abroad, that is, these two qualities that the diaspora possessed in relative abundance.7 6  For an analysis of the diaspora’s positioning in public life post Greece’s EC entry see, Kamaras (2017). 7  For analysis of Greece’s problematic relationship with FDI, see Bitzenis et al. (2009).

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The availability of EU funding also marginalised the role of philanthropy in Greece. Particularly, state educational, cultural and health organisations—those institutional cohorts which globally and historically produced compelling claims to philanthropic resources—relied on state or EU funding. These organisations disdained the organised solicitation of philanthropic resources from abroad or actively resisted it, lest the control of influential, domestic stakeholders over these organisations be reduced. Indicatively, amidst the crisis there was ferocious stakeholder and political backlash to the 2011 educational reforms which brought more than one hundred distinguished diaspora academics to the leadership of Greece’s state universities, leading to the eventual annulment of these reforms (Kamaras & Anastasopoulou, 2019).8 This backlash took place despite the fact that diaspora academics offered their services for free—itself an act of diaspora philanthropy, that is, a voluntary contribution in kind. Such services included the know-how to fund raise among the diaspora on behalf of Greek state universities. In a connected development, leading educational, non-profit institutions incorporated as US charities and operating in Greece for decades, as well as being increasingly reliant on Greek-American support in the post-­ WWII period, faced an inhospitable regulatory environment in Greece. This environment created frustration among both American and Greek-­ American trustees and circumscribed their philanthropic commitment to the country (Kamaras, 2019).9 It was not the case that such US institutions could not fundraise among the diaspora. Rather, they could have been much more successful in their resource mobilisation efforts, absent such regulatory limitations. In fact, the increasing post-WWII philanthropic involvement of Greek-Americans in these US institutions provides a credible counterfactual demonstrating that non-profit organisations—the museum, the school, the college, the hospital—are  well capable of generating philanthropic inflows from the Greek diaspora.10 Therefore, Greek society, economy and polity did not exert themselves to countervail the natural distancing separating, with the passage of time, 8  For an analysis of resistance by domestic stakeholders to diaspora engagement in Greece’s educational institutions, private and public, see Kamaras and Anastasopoulou (2019). 9  For an account of Board of Trustees frustrations with the hostile regulatory environment facing these organisations see, Kamaras (2019). 10  The growing involvement of Greek-American philanthropists and volunteers in the governance of leading US non-profits operating in Greece is traced in McGrew (2015).

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the diaspora from the homeland, as important diaspora communities transitioned into the second and third generations. Rather, Greek societal, political and economic actors actually compounded such natural distancing by a range of either deliberate or non-deliberate choices. Comparing the Greek-American community to the Jewish-American one, it is evident that Greek-American elites, their socialisation and networking, were not at all structured through philanthropic engagement with Greece, as it is the case with giving for the State of Israel by Jewish-Americans (Kamaras, 2017).11 The relationship of transnational philanthropic foundations with the Greek state contrasts sharply with that of philanthropic institutions of the diaspora. The transnational foundations are funded primarily by Greek shipping interests. Greek shipowners maintain, as mentioned above, significant operations in Greece and live either in Greece or concurrently in Greece and other countries. Greek shipowners are linked to the country through their staff and associates. Their relationships with the Greek political and financial system are materially important to them, and their kinship and social ties and identities are inextricably woven with Greek society. Commensurately, their social status, within their own shipping community and Greece writ large, is both important and is, to varying degrees, competitively defined by the extent and range of their philanthropic giving in Greece, unlike the social status of elite Greek-Americans (Harlaftis, 1993).12 As we will see below, all these factors incentivised transnational philanthropy to become even more active, through its giving, to Greek public life during the economic crisis. Importantly, the crisis-driven scaling up of transnational philanthropy involved both state and non-state entities, thus providing a novel analytical framework through which to understand the state and civil society relationship in Greece.

11  For a discussion of how these two diaspora communities compare in their philanthropic engagement with their respective homelands, see Kamaras (2017). 12  Greek shipowners’ transnationalism, which encompasses multinational business operations as well as mutual interdependence with the Greek state and involvement in Greece’s economy, has been well documented, see Harlaftis (1993). Indicatively, the two leading transnational foundations, the Stavros Niarchos and Onassis Foundations, were endowed by respectively Stavros Niarchos and Aristotle Onassis. In their business trajectories they exemplified transnationalism, being prominent shipowners globally while also investing in leading sectors of the Greek economy, namely ship construction and air travel.

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Diaspora and Transnational Philanthropy: The Breaking Down of the Binary Framework’s Borders Both diaspora and transnational philanthropic entities, notwithstanding their varying degrees of engagement in Greece, demonstrate a single pattern of engagement during the crisis. This pattern features commonalities between state and non-state grantees and involves the joint production of goods and services by the state and diaspora and transnational philanthropy. However, it is primarily transnational philanthropy that is able and willing to fund state entities on a significant scale. This is a feature of their giving that is underpinned by their incomparably greater familiarity, as well as stakes, in the country. In this section, first we look at high culture grantees, state and private. Second, we look at Greece’s two leading municipalities, Athens and Thessaloniki, and the way their elected mayors interacted with philanthropy to amplify policy preferences that were integral to their political prospects. Third, we select and highlight case studies where joint production involving philanthropic and state resources embeds in its output normative content that would have otherwise been absent. Transnational philanthropy during the crisis years demonstrated the ability and willingness to conceive and/or fund projects of significant magnitude and high symbolic and public impact. This was juxtaposed with the state’s inverse inability to do likewise (Kamaras, 2019). These projects, to the extent that they used state resources, such as land, and the upgrade of the public missions of state organisations, such as the National Library and the National Opera, meant that transnational foundations were also able to determine the direction of state action. Whether these projects were conceived prior to the crisis or during they were seen by their foundation funders as a suitable response to the crisis. They also helped improve the quality of life of Greek citizens and also projected abroad a confidence in the ability to overcome the crisis. The most emblematic of these projects was the Stavros Niarchos Cultural Center (SNCC) in Athens, housing the National Opera and National Library, and funded by the Stavros Niarchos Foundation (SNF, 2021). Though the state was not absent in this project, we argue the state needs to share control. Ambitious state-­ appointed trustees and directors can leverage their relations with the supporting foundations—support which is ongoing due to crisis and post-crisis fiscal constraints—in order to define and pursue institutional missions. In

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that way, they thus resist, or negotiate more effectively, with the influence and authority of such stakeholders as ministers, political appointees at ministries, trade unionists and so on. At the same time, private, non-profit organisations, such as the Benaki Museum, a premier repository of Greece’s cultural heritage, and which prior to the crisis was greatly reliant on state and state-mediated EU funding, were compelled to actively solicit transnational and diaspora philanthropic support due to reduced funding streams. Indicatively, the Benaki Museum included on its board the prominent Greek shipowner Konstantinos Martinos, and fundraised among the Greek-American and Greek-Australian communities. As with the case of the National Library and the National Opera, the Benaki Museum, while still dependent on state funding, albeit at much reduced levels, utilised its prominent institutional status in order to engage with diaspora and transnational philanthropy and secure the survival and evolution of its mission amidst Greece’s severe economic crisis (Kamaras, 2019). At the local government level, social safety net philanthropic flows were operationalised through the co-production of social welfare services by an alliance of local governments and NGOs, often involving novel administrative arrangements. For transnational foundations, inaction in the social welfare domain would not be compatible or sustainable given their vested interests in the country’s common good and progress. Social welfare agendas that were either introduced or expanded by Greece’s major transnational philanthropic foundations also build on the tradition of either fealty to the provincial origins of many of their founders, or were rooted in the dire conditions that Greece faced in the aftermath of WWII and the civil war. Undoubtedly, transnational foundations and their founding families also had a stake in regime stability and survival. During a period of mass radicalisation, with the funding of the social welfare net mediated through local government and the Church, these transnational foundations and families were committed to restoring regime credibility (Kamaras, 2019). Importantly, in Athens and Thessaloniki, this imperative of the transnational foundations for social welfare action boosted the crisis-driven transition of civil society into unparalleled positions of political power in the post-junta period. Mayor of Athens, George Kaminis—previously Greece’s Ombudsman— and Mayor of Thessaloniki, Giannis Boutaris—a distinguished businessman, founder of NGOs and noted philanthropist himself—were elected in

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2010 with the support of centre left PASOK and Eurocommunist DIMAR parties. The ruling PASOK party, faced with the popular opprobrium engendered by the economic crisis, in particular sensed the need to share power in local government with prominent personalities, devoid of partisan associations. Importantly, Mayors Boutaris and Kaminis included in their winning tickets municipal councillors and staff with a civil society background as well.13 Faced with crisis cuts of municipal funding of 40%, and with social distress at their mayoral doorsteps, Boutaris and Kaminis were quick to solicit transnational philanthropic funding. In addition, they set up legal structures and other arrangements with the encouragement of their foundation donors meant to expedite social welfare action, such as building homeless shelters, the provision of primary health care centres, advisory services to financially struggling households, the acquisition of marketable skills by the unemployed and so on. Solutions included the use of municipal property for the provision of services funded by philanthropy and run by NGOs. Also, they created a legal entity, the Athens Partnership, in the case of the Athens Municipality, which could hire personnel and provide welfare services. The Athens Partnership, by being legally established outside civil service regulations and creditor imposed hiring freezes, was able to efficiently convert philanthropic funding into municipal services (Municipality of Thessaloniki, 2019). These solutions broke statist taboos on social welfare action being monopolised by tenured civil servants. They thus challenged norms privileging the interests of civil servants and shifted the emphasis to addressing citizens’ needs through a flexible matching of public and private resources. The two mayors also went beyond social welfare policies with the assistance of transnational and non-Greek global philanthropy, transforming civil society notions and concerns into public action. Transnational and non-Greek global philanthropy supported causes that were yet to be adopted by a risk-averse Greek party-political establishment. Specifically, unlike these two mayors, the national party-political establishment was both loath to offend publicly prevailing prejudices or 13  For example, one of Mayor Boutaris’ elected municipal councillors, who was appointed Deputy Mayor of Finance, was the first Jewish-Greek councillor to be elected in the Municipality of Thessaloniki after the 1930s and had a track record of engagement in the affairs of the Israelite Community of Thessaloniki. Likewise, Mayor Kaminis appointed deputy mayors with prominent track records in civil mobilisation and the environment and with no past affiliation to Greece’s ruling parties.

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to commit to policy action of no immediate political benefit. By contrast, (a) SNF agreed with the German government to co-fund the Jewish Holocaust Museum in Thessaloniki, a major policy priority of Mayor Yannis Boutaris, and (b) both the Athens and Thessaloniki Municipalities adopted resiliency strategies, with the support of the Rockefeller Foundation. These encompassed future-oriented environmental concerns at the metropolitan policy level, well ahead of national party programmatic commitments addressing environmental challenges (SNF, 2018). Yes, it was the crisis that brought together local government with transnational philanthropy. But, due to the civil society origins of leading crisis-era mayors, this alliance went beyond the crisis’ imperative to mitigate socioeconomic distress. Diaspora and transnational philanthropy’s influence during the crisis also acquired a strong normative overtone, independent of its partnership with elected municipal leaders who were legitimated by the local, popular vote to be normative actors. Greece’s bankruptcy challenged the claim of political parties to monopolise visions and notions of the public and even national interest. This meant that Greece’s political class was divested of the majoritarian cudgel with which, prior to the crisis, it could effectively intimidate entities and individuals whose voice on public affairs was not invested with the legitimacy of electoral support. Four such examples across all categories of diaspora and transnational philanthropy, including the sole significant non-diaspora/non-­ transnational philanthropist to emerge in the crisis period, demonstrate philanthropy’s growing impact during the crisis in the public domain, in policy and/or normative terms. These four examples involve (1) SNF and the teaching of charismatic children; (2) a Greek-American philanthropist, and his activism against tobacco smoking in Greece; (3) a Greek shipowner’s support of the Hellenic Navy and his advocacy in favour of rationalisation in Greece’s armed forces; and (4) a resident Greek businessman’s funding of policy-relevant research. The SNF funded the CTY programme, a John Hopkins University designed educational programme for exceptionally gifted children, to which, with Ministry of Education authorisation, all children in Greece were eligible to apply for. The Anatolia College-run CTY programme introduced the radical notion, in the context of decidedly egalitarian preferences dominant in the post-junta period, that provisions need to be made for gifted children. This notion did not only get the tacit approval of

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the Ministry of Education but also revived the moribund directorate for exceptionally gifted children at the Ministry (Kamaras, 2019). George D. Behrakis, a wealthy Greek-American philanthropist, funded the Institute for Public Health (IPH), an American College of Greece affiliated organisation tasked with the mission to curb tobacco use in Greece. IPH’s campaign against tobacco gathered momentum despite voices arguing that the state must be tolerant towards tobacco smokers in public spaces as in crisis conditions tobacco provided a succour to Greek citizens. As with the CTY programme, IPH worked with the state, receiving the active support of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Education, without which it could not run nearly as effective a public campaign as it has (Karaiskaki, 2019). The Laskaridis Foundation, funded by Panos Laskaridis, a prominent Greek shipowner, emerged during the crisis as the leading philanthropic funder of the Hellenic Navy, first purchasing critical components to the Navy’s frigates and then purchasing and donating to the Navy three logistical support ships. Panos Laskaridis also levied a scathing critique of Greece’s national defence policy during the crisis. This critique was informed by the relationships his philanthropy had built with high-­ranking retired military officers. It focused on the unwillingness of Greece’s governments to adopt the rationalisation measures necessary in order to maintain a credible military deterrence against Greece’s main national security threat, Turkey. Again, Greek governments desperate for cash not only accepted the Laskaridis Foundation’s funding but also did not challenge his coruscating critique of their own performance in national defence. Finally, Dimitris Daskalopoulos, a leading Greek businessman who sold his food industry holdings prior to the outbreak of the crisis, established and endowed diaNEOsis, an organisation that commissions and disseminates research pertaining to pressing areas in need of public action. diaNEOsis has increased the flow in Greek public debate of the accumulated research findings of Greece’s academic community.14 It has done so by incentivising, through financial backing and widespread media exposure, Greek state faculty members to enter the public fray and not to rest content with their status within the academic community itself. diaNEOsis 14  See diaNEOsis’ self-description, as well as the composition of its advisory board, which is a mixture of centrist, reform-minded Greek resident and diaspora academics, leading public intellectuals and prominent businessmen, at: https://www.dianeosis.org/en/about

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makes use of public resources—mainly state university academic faculty’s research output funded by state and EU resources—to methodically expose gaps in state policy. diaNEOsis’ crisis context is premised on the understanding of the crisis as an outcome of a polity and a society not habituated or interested in addressing policy failures and shortcomings. All four examples highlighted above involve civil society, foundations and/or their grantees, and are also dependent on the positive engagement of state authorities or state-appointed personnel. They thus drive home the fact that crisis-driven production of critical public goods and services, involving philanthropic participation and initiative, inevitably embeds within it normative content, blurring further the state/civil society binary relationship. Finally, building on the literature which has noted how philanthropic funding has strengthened governance and operations of civil society actors through a process of positive selection underpinned by the rigorous grant application procedures attendant to philanthropic giving, we must point out that this is a two-way street. By that we mean, philanthropic foundations were also influenced by civil society and other actors that fitted their selection criteria. The mayors, the non-profits, the scholars and even the retired armed forces officers that we mentioned above shaped the impact of philanthropic flows through their preferences and strategies. Yes, diaspora, and even more so transnational philanthropy, replaced the state as a patron of civil society and of other actors emancipated from traditional patron-client relations (Tzifakis et al., 2017). But by doing so, it mutually constituted itself with its independent-minded grantees and interlocutors.

Diaspora and Transnational Philanthropy in Crisis-­Hit Greece: Acting in Tandem But at Different Degrees The nearly ten-year-old crisis has incrementally strengthened philanthropic engagement via the diaspora with Greece. The crisis has given birth to new organisational forms entrusted with attracting and channelling diaspora philanthropic flows to Greece. This track record of crisis-­ driven incremental growth in diaspora philanthropy, modest as it was, demonstrated, as we will see below, the social and other links between diaspora and transnational philanthropy—their strong normative affinity

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and thus the complementary and synergistic nature of their philanthropic giving. The two organisations, one diaspora and one transnational, that best illustrate the above assertions are, respectively, The Hellenic Initiative (THI) (n.d.) and SNF. THI was created by elite Greek-Americans as a response to the crisis in Greece with a mandate to assist the country to transition to a more viable, internationally competitive, entrepreneurial economy and society as well as to mitigate the socioeconomic impact of the economic crisis. Its chairman, the ex-chairman of Dow Chemical, Andrew Liveris, exemplifies diaspora Greeks’ rise up the US’s corporate ladder. Several of the members of THI’s executive committee, its board and its donor base, belong to the top 50 list of most wealthy Greek-Americans, as reported by the National Herald, Greek-America’s most well-known newspaper. Subsequently, THI established charters in Canada, the UK and Australia, the three countries which also have a tradition of philanthropic giving.15 THI’s convening power, demonstrated through its membership and its annual galas held in the US and the UK, and its ability, through its field presence in Greece, to screen worthy grantees and causes undoubtedly constitute a crisis-borne innovation in homebound, diaspora philanthropy. In its giving to Greece during the crisis, THI surpassed both secular Greek-American organisations, such as the AHEPANS, as well as charitable organisations, such as Leadership 100, managed by the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of New York. That being said, since its foundation, THI has raised only US $65 million. This amount is dwarfed by the philanthropic giving of distinguished Greek-Americans, be they members of THI or not. In comparison, during the crisis, ex-CEO of Merck, Roy Vangelos, donated US $250 million to Columbia University (n.d.) for medical research, while influential actors within the Greek-American community rallied to fund raise US $95 million to complete the construction of the Greek Orthodox Church St Nicholas, the only religious establishment at the World Trade Centre site.16 Despite the modest fund raising performance of THI, leading members, such as John Katsimatidis and Dean Metropoulos, have lamented in the Greek press what they see as 15  See THI’s self-description and board composition at, respectively, https://www.thehellenicinitiative.org/ and https://www.thehellenicinitiative.org/leadership/ 16  See respectively https://www.cuimc.columbia.edu/news/roy-and-diana-vagelosdonate-250-million-columbias-medical-school and https://greekreporter.com/2021/06/ 03/saint-nicholas-shrine-fundraising-total/

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Greece’s poor governance. Such testimonials are corroborated by individuals in leading US educational non-profits in Greece who are familiar with elite Greek-American attitudes to Greece, as well as by scholarship on diaspora attitudes towards the homeland, in the case of Australia (Kamaras, 2019). THI’s performance can also be contextualised by SNF’s own contributions and commitments to Greece. These have probably exceeded US $2 billion, from 1996 to today, out of a total of US $3.2 billion in outlays in the same period—a record that easily compares with mega-gifts of US philanthropists to leading US universities, museums, hospitals and other such causes.17 That being said, SNF’s strong support of US educational non-profits in Greece, including the funding of partnerships between US universities Rutgers and John Hopkins and Anatolia College and American Farm School respectively, which have been assisted for decades by Greek-­ American philanthropists, also brings to the fore the strongly symbiotic relationship between diaspora and transnational philanthropy. It is no coincidence that SNF, which is the most important Greek philanthropic foundation and at the same time a recognisably US-oriented foundation in its structure, operations and deliberatively strategic aim, has identified worthy grantees in Greece such as educational non-profits, the governance and operations of which are of decidedly US provenance. Indeed, a closer look at THI’s own 44-strong executive committee and board membership composition reveals a noted minority, 6  in total, of transnational Greek individuals, that is, who were either born and raised in Greece or have sizeable business interests in Greece. These transnational Greeks include, among others, a leading shipowner as well as a beverages manufacturer. Both are noted philanthropists who were born in and reside in Greece. Certainly, the experience gained and the networking activated between diaspora and transnational philanthropy have the potential to be scalable in terms of inherent, resource mobilisation capacity, owing to Greek-­ American levels of wealth accumulation. As it will be discussed below, this potential is reliant on reforms being deepened in Greece and thus multiplying donor opportunities while closing, at the same time, the overall institutional distance separating Greece from those diaspora communities which reside in highly advanced countries, such as the US. 17  For an identification of some of the leading donations of SNF to Greece implemented or announced during the crisis years see, https://www.snf.org/en/about/history-mission/

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The Crisis Is with Us for a Long Time Coming: Diaspora and Transnational Philanthropy in a Post-Crisis Context The state-philanthropy-civil society nexus is at a crossroads, a bifurcation. The direction pursued will be determined by state action. Roughly speaking, the choice for public policy and the underlying political calculation is between moving to what we may call oligarchic, mainly transnationally based philanthropy and diffuse, pluralistic philanthropy. The latter kind would encompass a rising number of both diaspora and resident philanthropic and civil society actors in addition to the powerful, transnational philanthropic cohort, mostly of shipping origin. Importantly, the differences between the crisis and post-crisis period, which involved the change of government from the ruling coalition led by the far left Syriza to the single party rule of the centre right ND, are one of degree. For example, Syriza managed to establish a working, if uneasy, relationship with SNF in terms of the governance of the SNF-funded SNCC, which hosted the National Library and National Opera. Additionally, it was during Syriza’s rule that SNF announced a major donation to Greece’s national healthcare system. The ND government brought into greater alignment state grantees with private, philanthropic grantors by placing an ex-high-ranking SNF official at the leadership of SNCC.  Additionally, another ex-high-ranking SNF official has been appointed to the PM’s office for the purpose of liaising with philanthropists, powerful evidence of the ND’s government recognition of the need to be able to enlist philanthropy to its purposes (Huffington Post, 2020; Kathimerini, 2020). Major philanthropic projects such as the SNF’s US $500 million pledge to build four state of the art hospitals, the Onassis Foundation’s (n.d.) commitment to refurbish the buildings that will house the General Secretariat of Research and Technology, the Greek Shipowners Union pledge to revamp hospital facilities in the Attica region and the funding of the regeneration of the waterfront by shipowner Panos Laskaridis have all involved joint presentations to the PM with the philanthropic donor and/ or press releases by the PM’s Office (Mela, 2020). These pledges brought the government considerable political benefit due to the speed of execution, as donations are not constrained by onerous state rules on the management of public monies. The quality of delivery is also noteworthy, as donors invariably select high-quality vendors, contractors and materials.

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In effect, actions such as these clearly establish that the post-crisis ND government has systematised philanthropic funding in order to produce high impact results, in terms of policy and symbolism. This strategy has been made possible by the ideological leanings of the ND party, either with regard to the US-educated PM or leading members of the cabinet, such as his Minister of Education, who established her public reputation through civil society action supported by philanthropy and CSR. That being said, the ND government has also opted for continuity in public sector institutions where political patronage is well entrenched and has thus far refrained from governance reforms in public sector institutions where vested interests have put up formidable resistance. Both of these choices inevitably constrain its ability to catalyse not only transnational, but even more importantly, diaspora philanthropy. In particular, it is estimated that approximately 80% of the hospital governors appointed by the ND government were connected to the ruling party, with some appointees being glaringly unqualified (Protagon, 2019). In the domain of education, the ND government has, midpoint in its term, refrained from reconstituting the governance boards of universities—a reform ND supported when it was in opposition in 2011 and which was annulled, as mentioned above, by the Syriza-led coalition.18 Policy actions that could provide vital resources to philanthropy (including CSR) and civil society in the realm of fiscal policy and volunteerism were also not implemented by the midpoint of the ND government’s tenure, although they have been announced. The two bifurcated paths, the oligarchic and the pluralistic philanthropic, are clear. The oligarchic philanthropy path would involve (a) limited reforms on state organisations and maintaining party and insider control over appointments and governance in the majority of state organisations in public health, culture and education; and (b) a continued unfavourable regime with regard to tax exemptions of donations by foundations incorporated in Greece and with a Greek asset basis, by Greek companies and individuals as well as the maintenance of rigid restrictions on volunteerism. Consequently, diaspora philanthropy will continue to play second fiddle to transnational philanthropy. This despite the manifestly superior 18  Well-informed reporting points to the Ministry of Education which has been seeking ways to mitigate resistance to reforms in the governance of state universities that would recatalyse diaspora engagement, see Lakasas (2021).

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resources at the diaspora’s disposal, epistemic and financial, to that of transnational philanthropy which is mostly dependent on one single sector, Greek shipping. Additionally, the lack of fiscal and regulatory facilitation of resident philanthropic giving and volunteerism will constrain pluralism in philanthropic endeavours. Absent such facilitation, actors that do not have a strategic relationship with the government of the day, and can thus act with greater autonomy from government wishes and priorities, will continue to lack the human resources and funding that their autonomy requires to become impactful in the public realm. Concurrently, the crisis-driven opening of the Greek economy, continuing apace in the post-crisis period due to Greece’s high debt ratio, will increase the number of those wealth holders, originating in shipping or the diaspora, who are incentivised to instrumentalise their philanthropic giving in a way that is supportive of their relationship with the government of the day. Such a development may well further restrict the impact of philanthropy on pluralism in Greece. The pluralistic philanthropy path is the opposite version of the oligarchic philanthropy one: its key element is greater philanthropic engagement by both diaspora and resident actors, meaning greater resources allocated both to state and to civil society organisations. Particularly at the local level, where strong diaspora and resident loyalties reside, such a scenario could boost local autonomy and agency vis-à-vis national party structures and hierarchies. Ultimately, the pluralistic scenario could also manifest itself in contestability between philanthropic actors and their civil society allies with different perspectives of the common good, at both the national and local levels, mobilising opposing philanthropic and volunteer resources.

Diaspora and Transnational Philanthropy, the State and Civil Society: An Assessment A decade’s worth of greatly expanded diaspora and transnational philanthropic engagement in crisis-hit Greece allows us to arrive at an assessment on altered philanthropic-state-civil society relations, both in a crisis and in a post-crisis context. In a crisis context, it behoves us to recall that state organisations are the leading recipients of philanthropic giving. Such giving has certainly emancipated state functionaries to a degree, granting them considerable

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operational authority either for generally applicable fiscal constraints due to Greece’s fiscal travails or from reliance on discretionary fiscal resources dependent on relations with the government of the day and its political appointees in the relevant ministries. Relatedly, in civil society proper, as has been noted, diaspora and transnational philanthropy had a positive effect, in a crisis context, both due to the decline of state funding and its partial replacement of it. Decline in state funding reduced opportunities for patron-client relations that, pre-­ crisis, had brought disrepute to civil society and extended the societally prevailing low trust to the civil society actors. Conversely, the rise of rigorous diaspora and transnational funding enhanced professionalism and transparency of civil society actors. In that regard, we are really talking about a cohort of state entities which resembles their civil society peers, non-profits and NGOs, with an enhanced capacity to access philanthropic resources and thus contribute in a variety of ways to Greece’s common good. Diaspora and transnational philanthropy in Greece have created a distinct unit of analysis comprising both state and civil society entities necessitating an analytical approach that is not constrained by the framework of state-civil society relations. The selection criteria for inclusion in this unit of analysis are mission, ability to execute and other distinctive grounds on which solicitation of philanthropy is rendered effective, be they normative, policy-specific, high impact, high prestige and so on. Another area where the state-civil society framework needs to be revised is local government. Here philanthropy facilitated, through its funding, the transition of civil society aims previously not endorsed and pursued by ruling political parties—as in the case of the recognition of Thessaloniki’s Jewish past—to concrete policy action by elected local authorities of civil society provenance. Importantly, Greece’s political class lost its majoritarian, post-junta legitimacy in the crisis which had allowed it to dominate the ideas of public good. This allowed Greek philanthropy and its grantee allies, even unelected ones, a unique space and voice in the Greek public square. Diaspora and transnational philanthropy however demonstrated a widely divergent propensity to engage with Greece—with transnational philanthropic giving massively exceeding diaspora, despite the arguably much greater financial capacity of the latter. This divergence reflects the disparity between the vested interests of the mostly shipping-endowed transnational philanthropy in the Greek economic and social order in

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comparison with the post-EC/EU decline of the diaspora’s engagement in Greece. Moving to the post-crisis environment, the most prominent feature involves the systematic instrumentalisation of diaspora and transnational philanthropy by Greece’s first post-crisis government. The centre right ND ruling party, from the PM downwards, has methodically solicited philanthropic funds for state entities and policy priorities, keen to plug holes in crisis-shaped constraints in public finances, appreciative of the speed and quality of goods and services procured by philanthropy and normatively comfortable with this symbiosis between the state and philanthropy.

References Botetzagias, I., & Koutiva, E. (2015). When best is not enough: Greek environmental NGOs and their donors amidst the economic crisis. In J.  Clarke, A.  Huliaras, & D.  A. Sotiropoulos (Eds.), Austerity and the third sector in Greece—Civil society at the European Frontline (pp. 125–146). Routledge. Columbia University. (n.d.). https://www.cuimc.columbia.edu/news/ roy-­and-­diana-­vagelos-­donate-­250-­million-­columbias-­medical-­school Frangonikopoulos, C. A., & Pouladikakos, S. (2016). Greek NGOs in the press: Trends in the presentation of Greek NGOs before and during the financial crisis. Journalism, 18(6), 716–735. Harlaftis, G. (1993). Greek shipowners & Greece 1945–1975: From separate development to mutual interdependence. The Athlone Press. Huliaras, A. (2015). Greek civil society: The neglected causes of weakness. In J. Clarke, A. Huliaras, & D. A. Sotiropoulos (Eds.), Austerity and the third sector in Greece—Civil society at the European Frontline (pp. 9–28). Routledge. Johnson, P.  D. (2007). Diaspora philanthropy: Influences, initiatives, and issues. The Philanthropic Initiative Inc, and the Global Equity Initiative, Harvard University. Kamaras, A. (2017). On research literature. SEESOX. Kamaras, A. (2019). Diaspora and transnational philanthropy in Greece. SEESOX. Kamaras, A., & Anastasopoulou, M. (2019). Diaspora philanthropy and volunteerism as a contestable process: Tracing the connections and disconnections between diaspora and homeland. Working Paper Series. SEESOX. Karaiskaki, T. (2019, August 12). Professor Panagiotis Behrakis: The antismoking law will succeed. Kathimerini. https://www.kathimerini.gr/life/people/1037929/panagiotis-­mpechrakis-­o-­antikapnistikos-­nomos-­tha-­petychei/

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Kathimerini. (2020, November 16). G.  Zervakis advisor to the Prime Minister for the synergy with civil society. https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/ 561160516/o-­g-­zervakis-­symvoylos-­toy-­prothypoyrgoy-­gia-­ti-­synergeia-­me-­ tin-­koinonia-­politon/ Lakasas, A. (2021, March 19). Universities: Incentives for the return of the boards. Kathimerini. https://www.kathimerini.gr/society/561299524/ panepistimia-­kinitra-­gia-­epanafora-­ton-­symvoylion/ Lessinger, J. (1992). Investing in going home? A transnational strategy among Indian immigrants in the United States. In N. G. Schiller, L. Basch, & C. Blanc-­ Szanton (Eds.), Towards a transnational perspective on migration (Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences) (Vol. 645, pp. 53–80). New York Academy of Sciences. Lessinger, J. (2003). Indian immigrants in the United States—The emergence of a transnational population. In B.  Parekh, G.  Singh, & S.  Vertovec (Eds.), Culture and economy in the Indian diaspora (pp. 165–182). Taylor and Francis. Mela, R. (2020, January 23). Greek shipowners: 6 million donation for WCs and bedsheets at the hospitals. ygeia50plus.gr. https://ygeia50plus.gr/news/ ελληνες-­εφοπλιστές-­δωρεά-­6-­εκατομμυρί/ Municipality of Thessaloniki. (2019). Projects and actions of the Municipality of Thessaloniki funded by the Stavros Niarchos Foundation. Press Release. https://thessaloniki.gr/erga-­k ai-­d raseis-­d imou-­t hessalonikis-­m e-­d orea-­ idrimatos-­stavros-­niarxos/?fbclid=IwAR0Eu254Xy5T_k1vJefaDMEhfXLiMJo1-­ 0SBBJrU7a05xnCcBsNS4erfnVY Newland, K., Terrazas, A., & Munster, R. (2010). Diaspora philanthropy: Private giving and public policy. In K.  Newland (Ed.), Diasporas: New partners in global development policy (pp. 126–161). Migration Policy Institute—US AID. Onassis Foundation. (n.d.). Onassis Foundation undertakes to relocate the services of the General Secretariat of Research and Technology. https://www. onassis.org/el/news/onassis-­f oundation-­u ndertakes-­r elocation-­g eneral-­ secretariat-­research-­and-­technology-­services Huffington Post. (2020, June 17). New management board at SNCC—Who is the director. https://www.huffingtonpost.gr/entry/neo-­ds-­sto-­kpisn-­poia-­ einai-­e-­epikefales-­elle-­andriopoeloe_gr_5ee9cb3bc5b68bab2620c1a8 Protagon.gr. (2019, November 26). Reactions and awkwardness for the ‘blue’ hospital governors. https://www.protagon.gr/epikairotita/antidraseis-­kai-­ amhxania-­gia-­tous-­galazious-­dioikites-­twn-­nosokomeiwn-­44341951647 SNF. (2018). The SNF attends special event for the establishment of the Holocaust Museum in Thessaloniki. https://www.snf.org/en/newsroom/news/2018/ 0 1 / t h e -­s n f -­a t t e n d s -­s p e c i a l -­e v e n t -­f o r-­t h e -­e s t a b l i s h m e n t -­o f -­t h e -­ holocaust-­museum-­in-­thessaloniki/ SNF. (2021). https://www.snf.org/en/about/history-­mission/

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Sotiropoulos, D. (2017). The Greek civil society and the economic crisis. Potamos (in Greek). The Hellenic Initiative. https://www.thehellenicinitiative.org/ The Hellenic Initiative. (n.d.). https://www.thehellenicinitiative.org/leadership/ Tzifakis, N., Petropoulos, S., & Huliaras, A. (2017). The impact of economic crises on NGOs: The case of Greece. Voluntas-International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 28(5), 2176–2199.

PART II

Crisis-driven Emigration and Diasporic Interactions

CHAPTER 5

Remittance Behaviour of Greek Emigrants in the UK During the Long Recession Manolis Pratsinakis, Daphne Nicolitsas, and Aymeric Faure

Introduction Remittances represent an important flow of money worldwide with their total volume standing at US $719.4  billion in 2019 according to the World Bank. Their importance, however, both in an absolute and in a relative sense, compared to the receiving countries’ GDP, varies significantly and is to a large extent inversely correlated to the level of economic development of a country and its population (Yang, 2011).

M. Pratsinakis (*) University of Oxford, Oxford, UK e-mail: [email protected] D. Nicolitsas University of Crete, Rethymno, Greece e-mail: [email protected] A. Faure The Institut Open Diplomacy, Paris, France © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 O. Anastasakis et al. (eds.), Diaspora Engagement in Times of Severe Economic Crisis, Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97443-5_5

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As a result, the literature has focused primarily on developing countries while remittance flows and their determinants to developed economies have been less studied. This despite that for some developed economies the share of inward remittances in GDP is non-negligible. For instance, specific European Union (EU) countries, where legally unconstrained mobility for EU citizens facilitates interstate migration, have demonstrated significant flows of remittances as a share of GDP with the highest share in 2020 observed for Croatia at 7%, followed by Latvia, Romania, Luxembourg, and Belgium with shares around 3%.1 The 2004 and 2007 EU accession rounds not only considerably expanded the scale of intra-EU migration but also the flows of remittances along the European East-West axis, albeit not uniformly across receiving countries. Subsequently, the 2008 global financial crisis, which acutely impacted the weaker economies of the EU periphery, especially the southern tier, laid the foundations for a new wave of South-to-North migrations within Europe. This wave, however, had a much more modest impact on the flow of remittances, while once more significant differences were observed across countries. Such cross-country differences raise questions about the determinants of remittance flows among migrants from developed economies. Wage gaps seem to play a decisive role. For instance, at the time of its accession in 2007, the average per capita income in Romania stood at about one-­tenth of the corresponding EU-15 figure. While the ratio was less dramatic for the Central European 2004 accession countries and for Croatia (around a quarter) that joined in 2013, it was still substantial enough to drive large-scale westward migration and provide incentives for significant remittance sending (Recchi, 2015). In contrast, the much less pronounced income disparities between South European countries and the countries in Western and Northern Europe, where most migrants headed after the 2008 crisis, seem to have provided fewer incentives for remittance sending overall. Between country income disparities cannot, however, fully explain between country variation in remittance sending patterns. For instance, as Fonseca describes in this volume, remittances in Portugal increased after the post-2008 crisis, largely because of increased emigration, while, as we outline below, official data suggest a decrease of inward remittance flows to Greece even though wages in Greece and Portugal are at a similar level. 1  World Bank, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data—accessed on the 10th October 2021.

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Other factors, such as the socio-demographic characteristics of the migrants and the needs of their families back home, the motivations informing migration decisions, attachment to the country of origin and trust of the institutions in the country of origin, should also be considered when investigating the flows of remittances between countries. Drawing on individual-level survey data, our aim in this chapter is to explore what drives a migrant to include or not, permanently, or temporarily, remittances as part of their emigration project in the context of so-­called North-to-North migration. The focus here is on Greek migrants in the UK. Greece provides for a particularly interesting case due to the abruptness and severity of the country’s prolonged sovereign debt crisis, which erupted after the global financial crisis of 2008 and resulted in Greece producing around 24% less output in 2018 compared to 2007. The deep recession and austerity measures implemented resulted in soaring unemployment rates, decreased income and, in the absence of an effective safety net, led to impoverishment for a significant part of the Greek population (Koutsogeorgopoulou et  al., 2014). The economic developments triggered the resurgence of large-scale emigration from the country with most of the emigrants moving within the EU, with the UK emerging as the second most popular destination after Germany (Pratsinakis et al., 2020). World Bank data suggest that, contrary to expectations, remittance inflows decreased during the fiscal crisis despite the expansion of the Greek diaspora (Faure, 2017). Literature on developing countries suggests that in case of major financial crises or natural disasters, expatriates tend to send more money to assist their families and relatives back home. For instance, remittance inflows increased after the 1995 financial crisis in Mexico, as in the Philippines and Thailand after the Asian financial crisis in 1997 (Gubert, 2002; Yang & Choi, 2007; Yang, 2008; Mohapatra & Ratha, 2010; Correia & Martins, 2016). However, in the Greek case, the crisis context appears to have had a negative impact on the flows of remittances. Even if the paradoxical reduction in the volume of remittances to Greece during the period of the crisis reflects limitations of the available data, which do not capture the actual scale of remittances, still the overall picture of both balance-of-payments statistics and sample surveys does suggest that the crisis in Greece and the new emigration that followed did not trigger anticipated increased remittance flows (Koniordos, 2018; Faure, 2017; Pratsinakis, 2019). In examining the remittance sending behaviour of Greeks in the UK, our chapter aims to provide some insights on why this may have happened.

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Framework: Micro-Level Determinants of Remittance Sending Behaviour Remittances constitute one of the most stable sources of external financing for developing countries. They are often considered the opposite to the flow of the departure of human capital in measurements of the global economic impact of emigration (Glytsos, 1993). Literature on their microand macro-level economic effects for receiving societies’ remittances is prolific. It is characterised on the one hand by a wide consensus on their very positive role for poverty alleviation (Azam & Gubert, 2006; Beets & Willekens, 2009), while on the other hand their role as a potential lever for development is contested (Stahl & Arnold, 1986). Studies about the factors and motivation pushing migrants to remit are rarer (Brown & Jimanez-Soto,  2015). They often rely on theories that focus on the economics of the family (Becker, 1974). The seminal contribution in this area is the paper by Lucas and Stark (1985) on the case of Botswana. Lucas and Stark classify motives in three categories: pure altruism at the one extreme, pure self-interest at the other and an intermediate category referring to motivations that represent contractual agreements between the migrant and the family at the country of origin. Drawing on this categorisation, a large part of the research on remittance determinants attempts to specify the degree of altruism versus self-interest behind the act of remitting (see, inter alia, Rapoport & Docquier, 2006), thus focusing more on the reasons why people send remittances when they do, rather than on the circumstances explaining variation in remittance sending behaviour among migrants (Carling, 2008). In his review paper, Carling (2008) summarises and looks in a systematic way at the empirical evidence on the individual-level factors that potentially explain remittance behaviour, moving beyond the altruism versus self-interest debate. He looks at factors pertaining to potential senders and receivers, the relationship between them, and the socio-economic environment in which they belong, as well as the time since migration dimension. Importantly, he highlights the significance of the migration context and the need to account for the differing migration projects of potential remitters. Theoretical hypotheses about the determinants of remittances are commonly made with reference to a conceptualisation of migration decision making informed by the new economics of labour migration theory (NELM). This theory was developed in opposition to the neoclassical

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economic theory of migration. The latter views migration decisions as the response of individual rational actors to expectations for positive net economic returns from moving. In contrast, NELM suggests that migration decisions are made by larger units of related people. Specifically, migration is conceptualised as a project planned collectively by individuals in the same household, family, or community, not necessarily to maximise expected income, but primarily to minimise risks and to loosen constraints associated with a variety of market failures, besides those in the labour market (Stark & Taylor, 1991; Stark & Levhari, 1982; Lauby & Stark, 1988; Massey et al., 1993). The NELM approach describes multi-sited practices that combine migration and immobility. While some members of one household stay at the place of origin, others move domestically within the country, and others migrate internationally (Massey et al., 1993). In this context, decisions to remit or receive remittances are seen as fundamental to the decision to migrate in the first place. As a result, the need for remittances in the family back home, as well as the desire of the migrant to send money are taken as givens, which may also explain the limited research on the variation in remittance sending behaviour among migrants in the related literature. NELM theory has indeed proven to capture more accurately the process of migration decision making from developing countries compared to neoclassical economics theories of migration. As Carling (2008: 596) argues, however, changing migration contexts have ‘created new dynamics and weakened old lines of reasoning while diverse settings produce disparate findings’ that make the search for universal answers in remittance sending behaviour more difficult. The challenge is even greater if we consider North-to-North migrations, which are globally on the increase and whose characteristics require a different approach. Firstly, narrower wage gaps between receiving and origin countries make remittances sending less often a motivation of migration for North-­ to-­North migrants. At the same time, most individuals migrating between developed countries are single and highly skilled (González-Ferrer, 2013; González-Enríquez & Martínez-Romera, 2014; Tirabassi & del Pra”, 2014; Arango, 2016; Lafleur & Stanek, 2017) and not primarily from the lowest socio-economic strata. As a result, neither the need for remittances in the family back home nor the desire of the migrant to send money should be taken for granted while the relation between migration decision making and migrants’ remittance sending behaviours needs to be reconceptualised.

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For instance, looking at intra-EU migration, freedom of movement for EU citizens, together with the new communication technologies and the fall in transport costs, has led to more ‘fluid’ forms of migration; that is, forms of migration which are characterised by temporary moves with no definite time horizon. Individualisation, spontaneity in taking migration decisions, a ‘migrant habitus’ of open options, as well as the endorsement of lifestyles of mobility have been proposed as defining characteristics of intra-EU migration (Engbersen  et  al., 2010; Engbersen & Snel, 2013; Favell, 2008). Favell for instance describes how the possibilities granted through legally unconstrained mobility within the EU have impacted the life and mobility choices of young European workers, many of whom migrate to major European cities like London, Amsterdam, and Brussels for career reasons but also in pursuit of personal freedom, adventure, and self-fulfilment. Such migration projects are especially appealing to citizens of the EU periphery who leave their countries of origin frustrated with the limited career opportunities. In recent years, in a period of multiple crises and of economic and political uncertainty across the EU, motivations to ensure a grounded and secure life for oneself and one’s family, as well as aspirations for socio-­ economic stability and settlement, grew in importance as characteristics of intra-EU mobility (Bygnes & Erdal, 2017; Pratsinakis, 2019; Pratsinakis et al., 2020). Restricting our attention to Greece, most post-2010 emigrants left Greece due to a perception of a depressing lack of prospects in their home country and a deep-felt disappointment in the socio-­economic and political environment in Greece. Migration became an outcome of wider considerations rather than narrowly a choice for career reasons and adventure. The financial crisis in Greece pushed several  unemployed people and people of lower educational and income backgrounds out of the country. However, even though lack of a job seems to be a significant contributor driving people out of the country, it is not a necessary condition. One in two of the post-2010 emigrants was employed at the time of emigration. Similarly, despite the significant increase in the emigration of people from lower income categories, they form a minority among the crisis-driven migrants estimated by Labrianidis and Pratsinakis at around 28% in 2016 (Labrianidis & Pratsinakis, 2016). Most of the emigrants do not come from socio-economically vulnerable families. Most of them are also university graduates, thus intensifying ongoing brain drain trends. The latter was both a reaction to the sovereign

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debt crisis—and to more structural features such as the quality of institutions and lack of demand on part of the Greek economy for highly skilled workers (Labrianidis & Pratsinakis, 2017; Lazaretou, 2016). Overall, emigration from Greece in recent decades both before and after the financial crisis sharply differentiates from earlier migration and appears to be triggered by forces that differentiate from those described by both neoclassical theory of migration and NELM. In the past, emigration was seen to relieve pressure from the labour market. In certain time periods (see, e.g., Kasimis & Kassimi, 2004 on the emigration wave of the late nineteenth century and Nikas & King, 2005 on the Greek post-World War II emigration) authorities even encouraged emigration in the hope that remittances would help address balance-of-payments issues. Unlike the past, however, the current emigration has not assisted in lowering the unemployment rate. Furthermore, it has not assisted with addressing balance-­ of-payments issues as remittances from recent emigrants have been less substantial, with the crisis not appearing to constitute a major factor for the increase of remittances. Given the characteristics of the recent crisis-driven emigration from Greece, the focus of this chapter is on four issues: first, the relation between the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the emigrants and their remitting behaviour; second, the significance of needs of the relatives in the country of origin in explaining the decision to remit; third, the association between emigrants’ views of institutions and attachment in the country of origin and their decision to remit, and lastly on their plans to return to Greece or not. The direction of the impact of migrants’ income and education on the probability of remitting and the size of remittances is not clear a priori on theoretical grounds. On the one hand, the rise of migrants’ income relaxes the budget constraint subject to which the migrant maximises his utility, thus increasing remittances. Research has shown, however, that in several instances migrants who are under substantial pressure to support family members in the country of origin would give remittances a high priority irrespective of income levels (Carling, 2008). Likewise, the influence of educational attainments is contested. A number of studies (Faini, 2007; Niimi et  al., 2010) have found that remittances actually decrease with migrants’ level of education, while others (Bollard et al., 2011) have found a mixed pattern between education and the likelihood of remitting, and a strong positive relationship between education and the amount remitted.

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The institutional environment in the country of origin might also impact on remittance propensity; higher levels of trust in institutions in the country of origin are likely to increase the likelihood to remit as this implies that the attachment to the country of origin is closer (Funkhouser, 1995). Similarly, a stronger attachment to the country as expressed by feelings of loyalty but also in terms of frequent contact with people back home is expected to increase remittances. Finally, migrants who intend to return are found to be more likely to remit, and remit larger amounts, than those who consider their migration to be permanent (Carling, 2008). The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: the next section presents the data used (methods of data collection, information collected), definitions and descriptives of the variables used. The results of the empirical analysis are contained and discussed in the subsequent section and the final section summarises and concludes.

Data Description of the Dataset: Methods of Data Collection and Type of Information Collected The chapter uses micro-level survey data collected between October 2018 and May 2019 through the SEESOX-GDUK survey amongst immigrants from Greece living in the UK (Pratsinakis et al., 2020). The sample consists of 585 individuals. Due to the lack of a sampling frame, transnational populations, such as those in the present study, are impossible to reach using traditional survey modes. The survey was conducted using web-based respondent-driven sampling (RDS). A diverse group of respondents, the so-called seeds, initiated the respondent recruitment in the following manner: once they filled in the online questionnaire, they were asked to send invitations with a personalised survey link to up to four of their Greek acquaintances—people older than 18 who had been in the UK for a minimum of 3 months. Ten seeds were used. Appropriate RDS weights were applied to the sample and combined with a set of post-stratification weights derived from an external data source, that is, the UK Labour Force Survey to maximise the representativeness of the sample. The descriptive statistics outlined in the following section draw on the weighted sample. Details on the collection

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of the data and the calculation of the weights can be found in Pratsinakis et al. (2021).2 The questionnaire3 contains 90 questions structured in 7 blocks: socio-­ demographic profile of the interviewees; reasons for migrating; financial settlement in the UK; identity and social integration in Britain; links to Greece; views on contemporary Greece and political identity; and, finally, migrants’ plans. Features of the Individuals in the Sample The typical individual in the sample is young; the average (and median) age is around 36 with a standard deviation of 10.6 years (Table 5.1). The sample is evenly split between the two genders. About a third of the sample are married. Even if not married, most individuals in the sample (82%) are cohabiting with their partners in the UK. Around 28% of individuals have children. Migrants have been found to be more likely to remit if they have a spouse or children in the country of origin (Carling, 2008). However, the children and spouses of emigrants in the sample, in general, live with them and not in Greece. In only three instances the children of the family do not reside with their migrant parent in Greece and in eight instances married partners reside in different countries. Given the concentration of couples and families in one place, we do not distinguish emigrants according to whether their partners or their children live with them or not. As expected based on previous scholarship (Biavaschi et al., 2020), the share of highly educated and employed individuals in the sample is much higher than individuals of a comparable age in the population in the country of origin, but also when compared to the local population in the UK. The share of university graduates among UK-based Greeks is 75.2% in the sample excluding current first-degree students. This is more than double the share of university graduates in Greece and significantly higher than the share of university graduates in the UK, which were 33.8% and 45.1% respectively for the 25–54 age group in 2017 according to Eurostat data. In terms of post-graduate degree holders, the difference is even more marked with over 50% of our sample having such degrees (Table  5.1)  See also Chap. 6 in the this volume.   See online at https://www.dianeosis.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/1st-WaveData.zip (in Greek). 2 3

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Table 5.1  Demographic and productive features of individuals in the sample Feature

Whole sample

Remitters

Non-remitters

Gender Men (264,288) 49.2 54 54 Women (321,296) 50.8 46 46 Age Mean 35.7 37 35 St. dev. 10.6 9.6 11.1 Marital status Married 31.4 35.5 29.1 With children 28.3 27.4 28.8 Migrated post-2010 (crisis migrant) Mean 80 75 82.9 Highest education level Lower high school 1.4 3 0.4 Vocational lyceum 1.6 2.4 1.1 Upper high school 14.1 13.4 14.5 Post-secondary vocational 12.1 14.6 10.6 Non-university tertiary 4.9 5.2 4.7 University 13.4 12.8 13.7 Masters 39.5 30.6 44.5 PhD 13.1 17.9 10.3 Activity status Employed 84.3 92.8 79.3 Unemployed 2.7 1.3 3.5 Inactive 5.8 3.6 7.1 Students 7.2 2.3 10.1 Work experience before migration Yes 70.5 70.9 70.3 Activity status immediately prior to emigration for those with previous work experience Employed 57.6 56.7 58.1 Unemployed 42.4 43.3 41.9 NB: Numbers in brackets next to gender distribution refer to the absolute number of remitters and non-­ remitters men and women. Source: SEESOX-GDUK survey, weighted data

while the share of 30-year-olds with a post-graduate degree in Greece was only 5.3% in 2019. The families of emigrants also seem to be of a high level of education; the share of parents with a post-graduate degree is 14% (Table  5.4). Around 70% of the individuals had some work experience before leaving Greece (Table 5.1). From those, approximately 40% were unemployed immediately prior to migrating while the remainder were

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employed. While in the UK, most of the individuals in the sample are employed; 84.3% compared to 67% for this age group in Greece. The reasons for which individuals in the sample migrate are related mostly to lack of labour market progress (remuneration, career progression etc.) in Greece but include several other reasons relating to the expectation of finding a better and more meritocratic socio-economic environment abroad in which they can progress more widely in their life. This can be seen from Table 5.2 which shows the percentage of individuals who deem one of more of these reasons to be important. Percentages add to well over 100 as everyone reports up to 4 main reasons. Individuals were asked whether they had sent money to Greece, the frequency of payments, the approximate amount sent, as well as the use to which the money sent was put. The percentage of individuals who remit in the whole sample amounts to 36.1%, of which 24.5% do so occasionally and only 11.6% systematically. Of those who do not send remittances, 26.5% claim they do not have the financial capacity to do so and the remaining 37.4% say that there is no need to do so. Less than half of the migrants (45.1%) remit an amount of up to €1000 per year, approximately one third (34.3%) send between €1000 and €3000 per year and approximately one in ten sends either between €3000 and €6000 (11.1%) or over €6000 per year (9.5%). Most of the money sent is channelled for the Table 5.2  Reasons for migrating Looking for… Better remuneration Potential for career advancement Better working conditions Work in field of study A more meritocratic society Financial independence Restoration of personal life Adventure Better future for children Personal freedom Better socio-political environment Living with partner Better life More tolerant society Source: SEESOX-GDUK survey, weighted data

Whole sample

Remitters

Non-remitters

35.1 34.8 31.0 27.7 26.6 21.6 18.7 14.5 13.7 13.4 12.6 10.2 9.8 6.1

43.2 32.8 38.7 25.1 17.4 25.9 21.7 10.9 12.3 12.4 7.6 16.4 8.2 3.4

30.5 36.0 26.6 29.2 31.8 19.2 17.0 16.6 14.5 13.9 15.4 6.6 10.7 7.7

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repayment of debts (49.8%); 25.5% to consumption and 14.7% for health expenses and the remaining towards educational costs or for real estate purchase. We focus here solely on whether individuals sent money, restricting our attention to the employed individuals. As mentioned in the previous section, the probability of remitting depends on, inter alia, the ability to remit, the need for aid by those left behind, the plans of the migrants to either return home or to invest in their home country and their overall attachment to the country of origin and trust towards its institutions. The ability to remit is proxied here by the income of employed individuals and by whether individuals receive financial help from family or friends. Table  5.3 presents the distribution of  emigrants' income. In 2019, the median monthly salary in the UK was 2564.42  pounds sterling.4 Thus around 70% of the sample earns below the average UK salary. Furthermore, 12.1% of individuals receive financial help from their families at home systematically, with the rest never or only occasionally receiving help. Regarding the need to remit that obviously depends on the financial situation of the family in Greece. The financial situation of the family in Greece is presented in Table 5.4 and is described as either bad, average, good, or very good. It is a minority of respondents who present Table 5.3  Financial situation of emigrants Income 0–600 600–1200 1200–1800 1800–2400 2400–3000 3000–4500 >4500

Whole sample

Remitters

Non-remitters

4.6 16.0 25.2 23.6 17.5 8.8 4.4

2.2 7.3 23.1 30.9 18.0 11.7 6.8

6.3 22.0 26.6 18.6 17.1 6.8 2.6

Net monthly income of employed emigrants in pounds sterling Source: SEESOX-GDUK survey, weighted data Receive financial help from family/friends Receive help systematically: 12, 15.6, 38.4 4  Office for National Statistics, https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/personalandhouseholdfinances/incomeandwealth/bulletins/householddisposableincomeandinequality/financialyearending2020provisional—accessed on the 21st July 2021.

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Table 5.4  Characteristics of the family in the country of origin Feature Secondary education Graduate-level education Post-graduate education

Bad Average Good Very good

Bad Average Good Very good

Whole sample

Remitters

Non-remitters

Highest educational attainment of emigrant’s parents 49 57 44 36 31 40 14 12 16 Financial situation of the family in Greece Prior to the crisis Whole sample Remitters Non-remitters 2 4.1 1 21.7 31.9 18.2 51.2 44.9 53.9 25.2 18.9 27.9 After the crisis Whole sample Remitters Non-remitters 19.9 39.5 11.5 51.5 45.5 54.1 24.8 13.2 29.7 3.8 1.8 4.6

Source: SEESOX-GDUK survey, weighted data

their families’ financial situation as bad, which also to a large extent explains why the percentage of individuals who remit is not higher than 36%. However, the data show a significant deterioration in the financial situation of the families in Greece due to the crisis with the deterioration being more prevalent among the families of the remitters. Given the classification used to describe the financial situation before and after the crisis, looking at the change in the financial situation leads to seven potential distinct levels of change ranging from –3, a major deterioration, to +3, a major improvement. In the sample, changes range from –3 to +1 as improvements were unlikely. Zero corresponds to no change. For little over a quarter no change occurred in their financial situation due to the crisis. For very few individuals, less than 1% of the sample used, the financial situation after the crisis was better than prior to the crisis. Another determinant of the decision to remit is whether the individual plans to return to Greece soon; around 70% of individuals in the sample plan to return to Greece in the longer term with the percentage being slightly higher (71.9%) among remitters than non-remitters (68.5%).

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Table 5.5  Trust in institutions

Institution Armed forces Judicial system Police NGOs Church Government Banking system Unions Parliament Public admin Media

Whole sample

Remitters

Non-remitters

40.5 30.6 31.8 21.9 19.5 15.9 13.5 7.5 8.6 5.8 3.1

52.1 35.4 41.5 17.4 23.7 20.2 13.9 9.4 13.2 6.3 4.3

34 27.9 26.2 24.4 17 13.5 13.3 6.5 5.9 5.5 2.3

Source: SEESOX-GDUK survey, weighted data

Finally, an additional variable that could impact on the decision of individuals to remit is their trust with respect to the institutions in the country of origin and attachment to the country of origin. The survey asks about trust in 11 different institutions and Table 5.5 shows the percentage of individuals that exhibit trust (a great deal of trust or quite a lot of trust) in each of the institutions mentioned. The percentages trusting these institutions appear to be low, and for certain institutions, extremely low. Note that for each institution, except for NGOs, the percentage of individuals showing some trust is higher for remitters than non-remitters. For the regression analysis, we construct an index of the number of institutions that individuals trust. The index ranges from 0 (31.7% of the sample) to 11 (less than 0.5% of the sample). Attachment to the country of origin is operationalised by two survey items namely, (a) whether respondents offered some type of financial or non-financial help (such as voluntary work, know-how transfer, mentorship, fundraising action, professional advice) to organisations or professionals in Greece in the past years and (b) whether they feel they have a responsibility to help Greece during the crisis (see Table 5.6).

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Table 5.6  Attachment to Greece and willingness to help

Offer some type of help to Greece Responsibility to help Greece

Whole sample

Remitters

Non-remitters

5.9 34.9

10.5 51.1

7.6 40.7

Source: SEESOX-GDUK survey, weighted data

Results We turn next to the results from estimating a logit model of the propensity to remit on variables related to demographic features, to the productive characteristics of the individuals, their ability to remit, their intention to return to their home country, their attachment to Greece and to the people in Greece and finally, to the need of their families back home. As unemployed individuals are unlikely to be able to remit, we focus on the 446 employed emigrants in our sample. Column (1) of Table 5.7 shows the marginal effects from a logit regression of the decision to remit on the typical demographic characteristics used: gender, age, age squared, marital status, the existence of children and whether the emigrants left from Greece before or after 2010 or later (pre-crisis and crisis migrant). The results suggest that, ceteris paribus, older individuals are likely to remit more but there is a slowdown in the increase in the propensity to remit with age as can be seen from the significance of the squared age term. Column (2) adds information on the productive characteristics of individuals proxied here by their education level. The results suggest that those with less education remit more. An individual with at most post-­ secondary education has a 26% higher probability of remitting compared to an individual with post-graduate education (reference group). An individual with a university degree has a 13% higher probability of remitting compared to an individual with post-graduate education. These results are consistent with those of Faini (2007) and Niimi et al. (2010). The explanations typically provided for this result are, first, that more educated individuals are less likely to return to their country of origin and, second, that more educated individuals come from wealthier families and thus there is less need for them to send remittances. We proceed with an implicit test of these hypotheses by including information on variables proxying the

Don’t know

Move to another country

Return to Greece

University degree

10 communications Hospitality 3 Arts 3 Other 4 Public sector 2 Academia 1 Total 27 Total

N 15 6 5 1 27 N 11 10 6

27

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deeper contextual understanding (in terms of language, social norms etc.) (Chalari, 2012: 18) while the non-Greek researcher helped mitigate potential biases stemming from the lead researcher’s insider status. Another source of bias is related to the characteristics of migrants themselves. It is intuitive to assume that migrants with lower tolerance towards corruption would choose to emigrate, as suggested by the role of corruption as an indirect “push” factor (Merkle et  al., 2017: 28), which this study acknowledges as a potential limitation. Thirdly, corruption is a sensitive issue in which many feel naturally uncomfortable to admit a direct involvement, which could potentially harm the validity of this research. Reassuring participants of the confidentiality of the information they shared and discreetly encouraging them to elaborate on their experiences addressed this obstacle.

Migration, Corruption and Social Remittances— Clarifying the Conceptual Terrain Corruption is a multi-layered and complex phenomenon and efforts to analyse and define it can be traced in various fields, ranging from economics and law to political science, sociology and even psychology (Morgan & Asia Foundation, 1998: 5). The most common definition for corruption is “the abuse of public office for private gain” (Vito, 1998: 564). This definition importantly includes the private sector and therefore is a broader definition than many before (Pozsgai-Alvarez, 2020). It captures the above angles sufficiently but is also in line with literature going beyond the strictly legal or economic interpretations of the phenomenon (Wait & Allen, 2003) and suggests broadly perceiving corruption as a form of deviation from the way something “ought to be” (Euben, 1989; Philp, 1997). Another important aspect when conceptualising corruption is social norms, “rooted in shared attitudes and beliefs” that play an important role in sustaining and potentially fighting a collective behaviour like corruption (Jackson & Köbis, 2018: 3). Importantly, normative pressure does not only come from one source, and different groups exert different social pressure. As social norms play an important role in sustaining corruption, by making corrupt behaviour acceptable or expected, researchers have argued to adopt a social norms approach to anti-corruption as well, which “focuses on relieving and shifting some of the social pressures that sustain corruption” (Jackson & Köbis, 2018: 46). This chapter will add to this

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discussion by analysing on the one hand how social pressure from the receiving society, along with their wider lived experiences abroad, affects the migrants’ norms regarding corruption, and on the other hand by exploring the potential of Greek diaspora in applying social pressure for changing practices that perpetuate corruption in their home country. One way in which diaspora can influence social norms in the home country are social remittances. They are defined as “ideas, behaviour and identities that flow from receiving to sending countries through migrant communities” (Levitt, 1998: 926). Migrants transfer them upon moving to another country where they typically establish communication channels with their social network in the home country. Levitt (1998) distinguishes three types of social remittances: (a) normative structures, (b) systems of practice and (c) social capital. Normative structures are ideas, values and beliefs. They include, among others, forms of interpersonal behaviour, principles of community participation or expectations about organisational performance, concerning, for example, the state or judicial system. Systems of practice are actions shaped by normative structures. They encompass, for example, patterns of political or civil engagement, leadership styles, modes of membership and socialisation. Finally, social capital is the tangible formation of the above, usually shaped upon migrants’ return in their home countries (Levitt, 1998: 933). Normative structures and systems of practice are adopted and remitted during migrants’ stay abroad and are central for this study. Migrants already carry perceptions in the form of specific cultural and social norms from their home country and based on these perceptions they interpret their experiences in their new environment. As a result of migrants’ exposure to new social norms in their host country, they may share these new views with their social environment in their origin country. Social remittances can be transferred whenever migrants are in touch with individuals from the home country, either when they return to or visit their home country, or through long-distance communication (telephone calls, social media etc.). However, whether and how social remittances transmission really occur depends on different factors. For one, the degree to which migrants adopt new norms while living in the host country depends on various determinants, such as the level of interaction with the host society and the migrants’ socio-economic characteristics (Levitt, 1998). Whether remittances actually have an impact on the home country is not always a given. One important factor is the nature of the remittance itself, where vague concepts such as norms and values are more difficult to

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transfer compared to more tangible concepts such as organisational techniques or strategies. Furthermore, the nature of the social network between the host and the origin country matters. More formal systems— such as the relation between organisational units or community members—facilitate the remittance of social norms compared to more informal systems. Lastly, the individual characteristics of both the sender and the receiver of the social remittances play an important role. Concerning the first, the impact of social remittances is stronger when it is transferred by migrants occupying high status, for instance older individuals or community leaders. Concerning the latter, their receptiveness is dependent on factors such as their age, gender and social class (Levitt, 2005). The impact of social remittances is manifested in various forms. Among them are changes in practices and increased demand for political accountability in migrants’ origin countries. Overall, various quantitative studies indicate a positive link between international migration and demands for democracy (Batista & Vicente, 2011; Docquier et  al., 2011; Mahmoud Omar et al., 2013), political accountability (Beine & Sekkat, 2013) and lower overall corruption levels in migrants’ home countries (Ferreras, 2013; Ivlevs & King, 2017). These studies show that norms and values regarding these topics can be remitted, however, they reveal little as to the complex mechanisms through which migrants shift their perceptions. This is the main gap this chapter addresses, by studying (a) how Greek migrants’ perceptions of corruption might change upon arrival in a new country and (b) if and how they attempt to remit these changes back home, with focus given on their interaction with their social network in Greece.

Corruption and Emigration: The Case of Greece Corruption in Greece is frequently regarded as a systemic phenomenon (Danopoulos, 2014; Daskalaki, 2013) manifested in both the private and public sphere. Corruption is present in politics and public administration through bribery, patronage and clientelism (Papadoulis, 2006). Moreover, corruption has been well documented to play a role in different domains, such as the public health system (Liaropoulos et al., 2008; Public Issue, 2013) and to a certain extent, in education through nepotism and favouritism (Pastra, 2013). To gain a better understanding of corruption in Greece, as opposed to the lower corruption of the host countries studied in this chapter, one needs to focus on the interplay between the state, society and politics in

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Greece. Through this scope, corruption in Greece should be understood as the outcome of dense clientelist networks, where political elites act as a mediator between societal demands and the state (Daskalaki, 2013; Lyrintzis, 1984; Mavrogordatos, 1997). In such a system, there is a significant gap between citizens and the state which is “filled” by political parties acting as brokerage mechanisms in exchange for political support. Ultimately, this can be contrasted with the investigated host countries, where the gap between the state and citizens is relatively smaller and filled in by strong bureaucracies. These rationalised bureaucracies act as the mediator between the state and society, while corruption assumes more sophisticated forms manifested mostly at the elite level (Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2011). Greeks were among the least mobile populations in the European Union before 2010 (Labrianidis & Pratsinakis, 2016). However, the economic crisis led to a massive exodus abroad: migration flow between 2010 and 2014 is estimated between 355,000 and 427,000 (Eurostat, 2017), with Germany and the United Kingdom being the top destinations (Table  7.2). In the Netherlands, the Greek population increased from 16,000 to approximately 24,000 between 2010 and 2015 (GSGA, 2017). As it is further explained below, exploring migrants’ socio-economic background and migration motivations is relevant for research that investigates their perceptions as shaped by their experiences abroad. Rising unemployment, cuts in salaries and welfare allowances after 2010 are cited Table 7.2  Main destinations of Greek migrants between 2010 and 2016 Main migration destinations, 2010–2016 Destination country

Number of Greek migrants

Germany United Kingdom Australia Cyprus Denmark Norway Netherlands United States Austria Switzerland

157,055 (2015) 57,541 (2016) 49,500 (2015) 31,474 (2015) 10,962 (2016) 9901 (2016) 8500 (2016) 6340 (2014) 6165 (2015) 5000 (2016)

Source: General Secretariat for Greeks Abroad (GSGA), (2017)

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as push factors contributing to the emergence of a new emigration wave from Greece (Labrianidis & Pratsinakis, 2016). However, this outflow was not exclusively triggered by the crisis, but also had structural reasons which were only exacerbated by the crisis. Emigration, particularly of the highly skilled, emerged in the 1990s, albeit in relatively modest numbers. Its roots can be traced to the mismatch between the high supply of university graduates and the low demand for highly skilled labour in the private sector and academia (Labrianidis & Pratsinakis, 2016). Moreover, feelings of disillusionment and pessimism among Greeks were already evident before the consequences of the crisis were fully manifested. In a 2010 survey, only 28% of Greeks aged 25–34 believed that they could fulfil their personal and professional aspirations in Greece (Labrianidis & Vogiatzis, 2013: 474). Moreover, a study by Chalari (2012) examining social change in Greece during the crisis concludes that young Greeks responded in a fragmentary manner to the profound changes the country underwent. She highlights their feelings of depression, pessimism and anxiety, to which she attributes their “inability to produce specific projections of their future lives” (Chalari, 2012: 9). Overall, the crisis seems to have intensified pre-­ existing push factors, especially for the highly skilled. These structural factors, combined with a general disillusionment over politics and institutions in the country, were exacerbated by the crisis and radically increased the outflow of migrants (Labrianidis & Pratsinakis, 2016; Marinakou et al., 2016). Although most recent Greek migrants are considered highly skilled, no aggregate estimate of their socio-economic characteristics is available. Labrianidis and Pratsinakis (2016) estimated that more than two-thirds of Greek migrants following 2010 hold university degrees. However, their research also indicated a fragmentation of their educational and professional background per destination country. They find, for instance, that emigrants to Britain are mostly highly educated, as also supported by recent literature (Pratsinakis et al., 2021). On the other hand, Germany and the Netherlands seem to attract many with low- or medium-skills backgrounds as well (43% of the total inflow). Their motivation for migrating is primarily the search of employment (72%). Finally, the age composition is notable: the average age of the Greek migrants after 2010 is 30.5 years, two years higher than the 2000–2009 period and six years higher than the 1990s. This results from an increase in middle-aged post-2010 migrants, for whom the authors assume migration was an urgent necessity rather than a career choice (Labrianidis & Pratsinakis, 2016: 18).

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Overall, the existing data does not allow for reliable aggregate estimations of the socio-economic characteristics of the post-2010 Greek migrants. Nonetheless, their relatively high level of education is their distinct characteristic. The search for better work opportunities, the disappointment with the domestic political system and ultimately the unemployment caused by the crisis appear to be main migration motivations.

Analytical Framework Research investigating changes in migrants’ perceptions will have to examine various contextual factors determining these shifts. Such factors occur both before and after migration, formulating complex interaction mechanisms that may ultimately change migrants’ perceptions. This section presents a framework to show how migrants’ perceptions can be influenced (Fig.  7.1), which will be the basis for the subsequent analysis of the research findings. Changes in perceptions and their subsequent remittance are impacted by different factors in both the origin and the host country. These factors interact with each other through contextual mechanisms (or events) depicted in arrows in Fig. 7.1. Prior to migration, individuals have shaped a set of beliefs and norms which constitute their previous perceptions (Levitt, 1998). They carry them abroad and based on them, they interpret their experiences in their new country. At some point in their life-cycle, some individuals consider migrating to another country. Thus, they form specific migration motivations, which are shaped by various factors. Such factors may be exogenous, such as an economic crisis or conflict. Unlike the “traditional” Global South-North migration, within the context of Greece and the examined destination countries, migration motives may be more complex and express varied personal preferences (Luthra et al., 2014; Pratsinakis et al., 2020). In that context, migration motivations often derive from expectations shaped by individuals’ previous perceptions of other countries (stage 1, Fig. 7.1). Such expectations may be, for instance, aspirations of moving to a less corrupt, more socially progressive environment or broadly to a country that matches their personal preferences. Ultimately, these motives lead some individuals to move abroad (stage 2, Fig. 7.1). They are pertinent for this study for various reasons. Within this study, for instance, a labour migrant is expected to experience

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Fig. 7.1  Linking migration motivations, experiences and perceptions. Source: Authors’ own visualisation

corruption in their new country primarily through their working environment. Moreover, migration motives define their orientation to the receiving society and as such shape to considerable extent their migration experiences, which is a central concept in this study. Migrants are exposed to this set of experiences upon settling in their destination country. Again, these experiences, depending on their migration motives, may range from work to studies or simply be the result of the interplay with local societies. As mentioned, the scope through which migrants evaluate these experiences is, to some extent, dependent on the expectations they formulated prior to migration and thus based on their previous perceptions (stage 1, Fig. 7.1). A vindication or falsification of these expectations in the destination country would be crucial in shaping their perceptions in that new environment (Cerdin et  al., 2014: 159). Eventually, it is through the scope of these experiences that respondents

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form their perceptions of specific phenomena in their new country, such as corruption. Subsequently, migrants compare these experiences with similar experiences in their home country and interpret them through the scope of their previous perceptions (Levitt, 1998). Eventually, this contrast (stage 3, Fig. 7.1) is the vehicle through which a change in their previous views may occur (stage 4, Fig. 7.1) and lead to the formation of their new perceptions. Finally, migrants may remit their new views through communication channels (stage 5, Fig.  7.1) they establish with their social environment back home (Levitt, 1998), to which we turn in the remainder of this chapter. It should be noted that establishing a direct causal link between the migrants’ shift in perceptions of corruption and successful social remittances goes beyond the scope of this study. Rather, this chapter explores the interaction between the migrants and their social network in Greece, specifically whether the former attempt to communicate their experiences and views on corruption and the dynamics and outcome of this interaction.

Findings Migration coincided with the economic crisis in Greece for most respondents. However, out of the 22 participants who migrated after 2010, only 14 linked their decision to migrate directly with the economic crisis. Responses revealed three—often overlapping—principal migration motivations also recurring in relevant literature (Pratsinakis et  al., 2021): employment, studies and personal fulfilment, with employment being the most prevalent. With regards to the economic crisis, many respondents either linked it directly with their motivations or mentioned that it indirectly enhanced them. For Vasilis (M, 53),1 for instance, emigration to Germany was his response to unemployment: It was strictly for survival. I had been jobless for months, I was already 47 and there were no jobs in Greece.

Linking migration with a general disillusionment about Greece was another noteworthy pattern. In this case, respondents stressed the lack of meritocracy and prospects in Greece, which they placed within the 1

 All names have been changed to ensure anonymity of the respondents.

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framework of a broader “moral” crisis. Nikos (M, 26),2 an IT professional in the United Kingdom, mentioned the following: It’s never only about getting a job. That simply ignited a process of leaving your country and emigrating elsewhere. When you can’t find what you’re looking for, when there are problems and perhaps lack of meritocracy … it’s things that you can’t find (in Greece) so you need to search somewhere else.

The crisis also recurred in the responses of most student migrants, who stated that education abroad was a means to later seek employment in the host country due to the lack of opportunities in Greece (Toumanidou, 2018; Pratsinakis et al., 2017). Overall, the post-2009 economic situation in Greece appears as a dominant but not exclusive “push” factor (Pratsinakis et al., 2020). A significant number of participants mentioned more than one factor as their motivation to migrate, in line with the diverse migration profile presented in the literature review. Based on these factors, respondents shaped expectations of migrating to an environment with improved employment conditions, more meritocracy or broadly better living standards. “When in Rome …”: Perceptions of Corruption in Greece and Host Countries Respondents generally found that their living, studying and working experiences abroad met their pre-migration expectations. Regarding corruption, describing the lack of transparency and meritocracy as an endemic phenomenon in Greece monopolised the descriptions of over three fourths of the respondents. This was mostly justified through the mention of personal experiences, discussions with their social networks or anecdotal stories. The problem with corruption in Greece was mostly identified in the public sector and the negative role of the state and political elites in both the private and public sphere. The dependence on personal or political connections as a means of climbing the ladder of success or simply “getting things done” was a frequent mention in narrations often linked to personal experiences. Sofia (F, 28), for instance, an engineer living in Germany, cited an incident from her time as student in Greece that was mentioned by other respondents too: 2

 Reference is made to participants’ gender and age.

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For me, … a representative example (of corruption) was students passing their exams because they were members of a students’ political group. [φοιτητική παράταξη]

Next to the frequent expression of strongly negative feelings against corruption, a noteworthy pattern was the acknowledgement of personal responsibility followed by rationalisation and justification. Vasilis (M, 53), for instance, a migrant in Germany, provided the following rationale for using connections in public services: Ιf I was part of the system? Apparently I was. When I would look for someone to “help” me I would become part of the system. … But there is a proverb saying “When in Rome, do as the Romans do”, which means that there are two options in Greece: either abide by the rules hoping to have your job done or tell yourself “this is how things are and I need to find a way”.

With regards to the host country, the vast majority of respondents identified corruption as a generally less intense phenomenon compared to Greece. Even the few that expressed disillusionment about corruption in their host country acknowledged that it is less frequent than in Greece and that overall the system “functions better”. Next to this, many portrayed lower levels of corruption as a result of the successful interplay between the institutions and the society of the host country. Within this pattern, emphasis was given on two factors. Firstly, the importance of laws and institutions for the prevention of corruption. Secondly, people’s law-­ abiding behaviour and stance against the phenomenon. Concerning the first, respondents often added that people are essentially the same in both Greece and their host country. What makes the destination countries different is the existence of a relatively robust, efficient system of checks and balances. Its efficiency lies firstly within the role of the press and media which are more active in revealing high-level political scandals. Secondly, to the existence of a comparatively independent judicial system, which attributes justice faster and more impartially. That was often contrasted with the judicial system in Greece, which was viewed as too interlaced with the domestic political and economic elites. Thirdly, to a lesser extent, to a political elite which is in comparison less frequently involved in corruption scandals, thus setting the “good example” for citizens. In the words of Eirini (F, 37), a Greek living in the United Kingdom:

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Breaking the rules is something that naturally exists here too but there is consistency in implementing the law. Because if the law is not implemented (for everyone) then citizens won’t follow a good example. I have heard of so many corruption incidents in Greece where nothing happened, I’m afraid that’s a counter-motive for citizens. In England, even if it’s superficial, politicians often resign, charges are pressed against them, there is some kind of reaction.

Conclusively, almost all interviewees acknowledged that although corruption exists in their host country, it is a less intense phenomenon compared to Greece. Changes in Perceptions of Corruption Our findings suggest a change in perceptions of corruption for approximately two thirds of the interviewees, often in diverse and often non-­ straightforward ways. Change occurred mainly through the gaining of comparative experiences in their new environment, which allowed them to identify the two previously portrayed distinct systems between Greece and their host country. In Levitt’s (1998) terms, change was manifested in two different forms: either through a change in norms and beliefs or through a direct shift in systems of practice, such as the adoption of stricter behaviour towards corruption. Overall, 15 participants mentioned a direct change in their perceptions of corruption, while approximately one third mentioned that their perceptions did not shift due to their already previous low tolerance of the phenomenon. Most respondents stated that thanks to their experiences abroad, they were able to better identify corruption and its root causes. This shift, for them, occurred firstly thanks to their exposure to their host country citizens’ relatively lawful behaviour. Secondly and to a greater extent it occurred due to the relatively efficient function of institutions, including the state, media and the judicial system, which is a deterrent for engagement in corruption for both the masses and the elites. Respondents identified a change in their previous stance towards the phenomenon in Greece. This past stance ranged from apathy and passive acceptance to indirect involvement in mostly “petty” forms of corruption. Respondents emphasised that although they did not view it positively, they perceived corruption differently while living in Greece, namely treating the phenomenon neutrally or as a “normality” to which they had to adjust.

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For most respondents, change came about through their gradual exposure to the more lawful environment of their new country. Some more detailed narrations portrayed change as something inevitable, where compliance to the rules occurred either through fear of the law or through emulation of social norms. Kostas (M, 40), a migrant in United Kingdom, mentioned: My views and behaviour have changed radically ever since I settled at a new country. […] There is the sentiment of fear that you feel when you’re not in your country anymore, […] which makes you think “what if I get caught?” […] And fear leaves no latitude for corrupting or being corrupted. [διαφθείρειν και διαφθείρεσθαι]

For Giannis (M, 58), a migrant living in the Netherlands, change came gradually through his exposure to both the generally law-abiding behaviour of the Dutch and experiences with the better Dutch “control mechanisms” (e.g., regarding tax avoidance) through his job in the private sector: Well, change came step-by-step and through observing again and again, it’s not like it happened in one place, a store or a restaurant, you would see it everywhere. And you end up feeling like a “fly in the buttermilk” when everyone abides by the rules but you don’t, which makes you feel bad.

For some interviewees, on the other hand, living abroad led to disillusionment about corruption in their new country. Their experiences in their new environment helped them moderate their previous views of Greece as a highly corrupt country. Thomas (M, 26), for instance, moved to London at the age of 19. For him, corruption in the United Kingdom is manifested through the rules and laws favouring the corporate and political interests, which he backed with personal experiences with housing agencies in London that made him feel helpless as a tenant. He also mentioned examples from his student circle or even domestic politics, where retired politicians would receive enormous payments for guest lecturing as a means of political influencing, which led him to the following conclusion: Transparency and meritocracy here are nothing like we imagine them to be. […] Yes, vested interests for instance may not exist in the form they do in Greece but connections are important, where you come from probably plays a greater role here. […] So what I came to realise is … Corruption is something that

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exists everywhere, there’s no place where the concept of absolute justice as I had pictured it when I was 18 is implemented. […]. Therefore, I think Greece ranks somewhere in the middle.

Sofia (F, 34) emphasised on the sentiment of surprise her family and friends feel when she shared her views about corruption in Germany where she lives: They are all a bit surprised when I tell them that things here are exactly the same as in Greece, the only difference being that they […] do something to keep people calm. They all have this image of Germany as this perfectly-tuned apparatus.

It is noteworthy that although they didn’t initially identify any shift in their perceptions, some participants subsequently described concrete changes in their behaviour that was related to mostly “petty” corruption (e.g., non-issuance of receipts). Overall, approximately half of the respondents mentioned a change in practices related to corruption when they visit Greece. That can still be interpreted as a shift in perceptions. For example, low tolerance for corruption can eventually lead to change in practices when they are in Greece. These self-identified changes in practices were exclusively related to individual behaviours, within which two themes emerged: firstly, a stricter behaviour towards Greek public services and practices related to everyday routine, such as driving behaviour or ticket validation. Secondly, a lower tolerance towards incidents of petty corruption, such as the non-issuing of receipts in Greece. Some respondents placed the adoption of such behaviour within the framework of a more rational, respectful or “result-oriented” mentality they developed thanks to their experience abroad. Thomas’ (M, 26) narration on the impact of his life in London provided such an example: I try to follow a more British way of doing things—although I don’t exactly like it—if there’s something I disapprove of. That means that I try to distance myself from other people’s emotions, so that we all get our job done. And I also have more respect for some things, I never enter the metro without validating my ticket, and when friends of mine tell me that their parents don’t issue receipts at their stores, I’m not too judgmental, but I still think it’s wrong.

Finally, more than one third of the participants stated that there was no change in their previous perceptions of corruption. Most of them claimed

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that they had low tolerance of corruption before migrating. A smaller number among them claimed that they would already identify corruption as something negative when living in Greece, despite admitting compromising and often being indirectly part of the problem. The previously mentioned justification of “adjusting to the rules accordingly” re-emerged here. Vasilis’ (M, 53) response was indicative: I know what corruption is, I already knew it in Greece. I’m not justifying myself, although I said that in order to survive in Greece you have to play by the rules of the game. … I wasn’t feeling good every time I used connections to get my job done. But I would tell myself I couldn’t do otherwise. […] Therefore no, there has been no change (in perceptions).

Overall, this pattern may have implications for the extent to which migrants can be actual agents of change, either from abroad or upon a future return to Greece, a prospect examined in following sections.

Not Exactly a Success Story: Interaction with Family and Friends Most participants’ responses indicated an effort to transfer their new views on corruption, in either its “petty” (e.g., non-issuance of receipts) or “grand” (political) manifestations, to their family and friends in Greece. However, with few notable exceptions, this effort was hindered by certain factors examined below. Overall, all interviewees mentioned frequent contact with their social environment in Greece, mostly through social media, telephone or applications like WhatsApp and Skype. Most respondents stated that they visit Greece, although with varying frequency and mostly for holiday or short family visits. None of the participants mentioned any effort to transfer norms to their social environment through emulation of their own, less tolerant behaviour towards corruption when they visited Greece. On the contrary, remittance attempts were made through long-­ distance communication or through relevant discussions when they were in Greece. Such discussions revolved around a comparison between Greece and their host country, which in most cases involved debates on meritocracy, transparency and corruption. Discussions were followed by a realisation on behalf of both the respondents and the recipients that the destination countries have lower corruption levels and better functioning institutions

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compared to Greece. This realisation, however, was limited to acknowledgement and rarely transformed into more positive exchange or a substantive shift in the recipients’ beliefs. This limited receptiveness of their family and friends can be attributed to four patterns that emerged during the interviews. Firstly, the lack of relevant direct experiences of the respondents’ social environment abroad, which would have allowed a direct comparison between Greece and the host country and possibly a subsequent change in perceptions. For this group of interviewees, their experiences abroad were difficult for their social networks to comprehend through long-distance communication, let alone to lead to a shift in their perceptions. In the words of Maria (F, 37), a migrant living in the Netherlands since 2011, about her discussions with her social network in Greece: Yes, we do discuss, but they cannot comprehend it because they haven’t experienced it. When I was in their shoes (prior to migration) all this sounded unreal [“εξωγήινα”] to me too. They understand and like (what they hear) but for them it’s like watching a movie.

The second and most frequent pattern was the attribution of the recipients’ low receptiveness to their passiveness and lack of individual agency. Almost half of the participants explained that their efforts to alter their family’s or friends’ views were hindered by their limited willingness for change. Various and incomplete justifications were provided for this behaviour, with some respondents attributing it to the recipients’ personality (e.g., conservatism, lack of curiosity for life abroad), experiences in Greece or individual characteristics such as age or education. Concerning parents, participants interpreted their limited discussions or receptiveness to either age or scepticism about life abroad. Maria (F, 37) stated: My parents neither wanted to listen nor understand. They like their life the way it is. They are both over 60, you know, and it’s very difficult to dissuade them from their own beliefs.

When asked to elaborate on the recipients’ lack of individual agency, the terms “passiveness” and “compromise” emerged frequently in many respondents’ narrations. Equally frequently, they were followed by pessimistic comments revealing reluctance towards change in Greece. Giorgos

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(M, 35), a business executive living in the Netherlands, portrayed an image of resignation concerning his friends’ feelings about the situation in Greece: My friends express a kind of disdain, they don’t expect anything. … As years pass and things remain unchanged, they feel they lack the internal strength to change them. So they have simply accepted it as is and try to “process” them in a way that doesn’t influence their everyday life negatively.

The responses of Sofia’s (F, 34) friends and family to her own views about how things need to change in Greece were for her a reason that things remain the same: Essentially they tell me (i.e., family and friends) “yes, you are right, […] but will change begin from me?” It’s sad because these are young people and don’t think they can change anything.

More frequently, nonetheless, participants expressed empathy or condescension for the need to adjust to “how things are” in Greece, which leads to the previously emerging pattern of “adjustment to the current state of affairs”. This justification mechanism explained the low willingness of some participants to influence their environments’ perceptions, which is the third recurring pattern explaining the respondents’ unsuccessful interaction with their family and friends. Giorgos’ (M, 35) narration was indicative: It’s a bit difficult you know. What can I tell them? It’s something they live and experience, which they know and I know. All you can do is limit discussions to comparisons, e.g., how things are done here and how in Greece.

Linking the two aforementioned patterns with the implications of the economic situation in Greece was the last noteworthy theme that emerged. In some cases, respondents perceived the crisis as a factor that decreased the latitude or individual willingness for change or simply deepened the recipients’ feelings of compromise and negativity. George (M, 25), a chef living in Germany, described his friends’ response when he told them that in a hypothetical return to Greece, he would turn down an uninsured job offer:

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their response is “but what can we do? Since this is how the system works, we have to struggle and make some money, so we accept it because we have to survive somehow.”

In some other examples, respondents perceived the crisis as a factor exacerbating corruption nationally and locally. Giannis (M, 58) linked incidences of bribery in his hometown with the crisis: Everybody is having less and less money, so everyone is trying to save money in any way they can. […] And someone who works at a public service has the ability to help with that. … When you go to the tax office and you have a debt that you need to decrease, well it’s possible.

Last but not least, a small number of participants reported that transferring their views led to a perceived rise of the recipients’ awareness regarding corruption. Vasilis (M, 38) mentioned: They acknowledge, they confirm that what they experience in Greece is tragic, non-sensical and corrupt and needs to change. […] So I think it awakens them, it makes them wonder and perhaps not compromise.

Nikos (M, 26), on the other hand, added that receptiveness varied among recipients: It depends on the person. There are some who accept a different view. […] I can’t say much on their behaviour afterwards but based on what they told me during our conversation, their receptiveness made them look for more information on corruption, seek and learn.

Finally, one respondent identified a more tangible shift in the recipients’ perceptions manifested as a change in behaviour. When asked about his friends’ reactions to his views on corruption, Dimitris (M, 38), an artist living in Germany, initially portrayed the previous pattern of low receptiveness and pessimism. This contradicted, however, the visible change that he noticed in his parents’ perceptions after their visits in his host country: My parents have visited me 7-8 times so far. They spend 1-1.5 month each time and therefore get accustomed to what happens here, […] plus I often take my father with me when I visit a public service. So, they’ve experienced it from first

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hand. […] So there has been a change, in the sense that they can interpret what they experience in Greece better through coming to Germany.

Subsequently, he linked this change in norms with a shift in his father’s behaviour: “He is less tolerant and more vigorous when it comes to sending a letter of complaint to a public service”. What differentiates this case from the rest of the responses appears to be the recipient’s direct exposure to the different environment of the host country. Unlike the transfer of new views through long-distance communication channels, first-hand experience appears to have been the catalyst for this more tangible, positive outcome of the interaction between the respondent and his family. Again, rather than an example of successful social remittances, this can be considered as a case of positive exchange between the migrant and his social network strengthened by direct personal experience. Overall, with the exceptions examined above, the communication and discussions on corruption between the participants and their social network in Greece were constrained to a vague, general acknowledgement of the problem that was eventually limited to a mutual acceptance of the situation as is—perceiving Greece and host countries as two separate status quos.

What Next (for Greece and Its Diaspora)? The findings of this research suggested a change in perceptions of corruption for the majority of the interviewed migrants thanks to their experiences abroad. That verified our main hypothesis that their exposure to less corrupt environments may lead to a change in their relevant perceptions. Concerning the manner that change occurred, the detailed narrations of some respondents provided relevant insight: it was either through social emulation or, in some other cases, the sentiment of fear that the relatively more lawful institutional framework of the host country created. Thus, many participants responded to this new environment as what Levitt defines as “instrumental adapters” (1998: 931): Their exposure to comparative experiences at work, public services or simply the local society of the host country forced them to shift their reference frames, that is to say the previous perceptions they carried with them from Greece. This change was often the outcome of a pragmatic need of “getting along” in their new reality and meeting its challenges and constraints. Finally, some respondents identified corruption in their host countries as mostly a privilege of

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the elites, which however led to a form of disillusionment with the host society’s social environment and their expectations of it. In the words of Thomas (26, M) about corruption in Greece compared to the United Kingdom: Corruption in Greece is widespread but relatively primitive […]. Here, on the contrary, corruption is so sophisticated and wonderfully made that everyone in the system remains calm, without ever disrupting it.

This disillusionment is deemed significant, as it can lead to a shift in perceptions viewing Greece and these countries as two extreme cases. Thus, it could help mitigate the current Manichean beliefs held by some who deem Greece as a deeply corrupt country. These norms, as many respondents highlighted, are part of the Greek society’s pessimism concerning the current state of affairs and eventually an important impediment to any form of change in the country. Concerning social remittances, the interviewees’ attempt to communicate their new views to their social environment in Greece appears rather unsuccessful. Most respondents mentioned the limitations of the impact this interaction could have back home, which they attributed to the widespread character of corruption and people’s mentality of compromise in Greece. Moreover, they often portrayed Greece and the host countries as two non-comparable, non-interacting states of affairs. The respondents’ difficulty in remitting their new views back to Greece, ultimately, poses questions about the extent to which individual change in norms or practices can be transformed into tangible societal change including, in the case of our study, more active diaspora engagement. Thus, it brings forth the classic social science distinction between structure and individual agency. In this division, individuals are perceived as agents because they make choices in their attempt to achieve their goals. As for structures, they are the institutions within which individual actors function. To some extent, they define the type and limits of individuals’ behaviour (Roberts Clark, 1998). Viewed from this angle, Greek migrants’ exposure to the structure of the host countries initially led to a shift in their perceptions of corruption. That change, subsequently, was transformed into increased agency, as revealed by their changed behaviour when visiting Greece and their attempt to communicate their new norms. The main impediment for more successful communication about these norms in Greece was the embeddedness of corruption in Greece,

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exacerbated by the economic crisis. The economic situation appears to have a direct negative psychological impact on the recipients, which further decreased their receptiveness. This portrayal appears to be in line with the younger generation’s feelings and views in Greece on the threshold of the crisis presented in the literature review (Chalari, 2012; Labrianidis & Vogiatzis, 2013). Interpreting the unsuccessful communication and exchange regarding corruption among the respondents and their social network in Greece through the agency-structure framework reveals the existence of a vicious circle in the country. On the one hand, the problematic structure defined by widespread corruption and the Greek crisis have influenced individual agency negatively. At the same time, limited individual agency contributes to the perseverance of corruption. Concerning the first, it is encouraging that most of the interviewed migrants appear more critical towards corruption, which appears to be in line with the views of the younger generation living in Greece (Chalari, 2012). Concerning the structure, any attempt to mitigate corruption at the institutional level will be perceived positively by the public provided it is combined with policies tackling the long-term effects of the economic crisis. Thus, priority should be given to mitigating the negative perceptions of Greek society towards the state through tackling problems such as unemployment, precarious employment and heavy taxation.

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PART III

Diaspora Institutions Before and After the Outbreak of the Crisis

CHAPTER 8

The World Council of Hellenes Abroad (SAE): From Great Expectations to Disillusionment and Crisis Irrelevance Marina Frangos and Othon Anastasakis

Introduction The World Council of Hellenes Abroad (known by its Greek acronym, SAE1) was founded in 1995 as an ‘organisation of organisations’ and sought to serve as, essentially, a parliament of Global Hellenism. A presidential decree instituted World Council of Hellenes Abroad (SAE) to consult and advise the Greek state on issues concerning the Greeks abroad. The last General Assembly was held in December 2006, electing an 11-member Executive Board for a three-year term. This was later silently

1

 SAE = ‘Symvoulio Apodimou Ellinismou’ (literally Council of Diaspora Hellenism).

M. Frangos (*) Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, Greece O. Anastasakis University of Oxford, Oxford, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 O. Anastasakis et al. (eds.), Diaspora Engagement in Times of Severe Economic Crisis, Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97443-5_8

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extended without elections through a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Decree (Decision 4091/22.07.2010). The General Assembly was also postponed citing Greece’s dire financial situation at that time. After 2009, there was very little activity on the part of SAE:2 no conferences or events were held, just an occasional press release congratulating a victorious Greek athlete, offering condolences for a renowned Greek’s passing or just sending holiday greetings to far-reaching Greek communities from Executive Board members. Amidst vast public spending cuts during the Greek crisis, SAE’s meagre funding continued via the Greek government budgets as late as December 2012,3 but was used for the sole purpose of compensating the three employees at the Thessaloniki offices (the institution’s world headquarters). This was a drastic scale-back compared to the original intentions and ambitions that had accompanied the creation of this important institution less than two decades earlier. The chapter will look at SAE’s lifecycle and its fall into irrelevance during the years of the Greek crisis. Indeed, it is a great paradox that this fall took place at a time when this important transnational institution was greatly needed for the support of a country in deep crisis. Why would an institution whose purpose was to provide information and statistics on diaspora and to cultivate business and networks between homeland and Greeks abroad, as well as to promote issues of social security abroad, fall into obscurity during the years of Greece’s economic depression? Why would an institution whose purpose was to improve Greece’s international public profile fall into irrelevance at precisely the moment when Greece’s image abroad needed rehabilitation? In this chapter we argue that disillusionment with the SAE had started some years before the Greek economic crisis, but the crisis dealt the final blow for three reasons: first, from a financial and political perspective, the Greek state was unable to sustain it; second, the institution itself had become irrelevant to the needs of a changing diaspora, defined by a big wave of emigration composed by a young, dynamic and mostly educated cohort, altering the wider

2  The institution’s website can still be accessed online, www.sae.gr. There are no postings after 2014 on the website. 3  See the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Decision 3727, December 14, 2012, where SAE Funding ‘for the amount of 22,750 euros is approved and is to be deposited in President Stefanos Tamvakis’ account to cover expenses of the SAE Thessaloniki Office for the year 2012’. Accessed on www.diavgeia.gov.gr on April 5, 2018 (Internet Uploading Number, ΑΔΑ: Β4Μ7469Η9Χ-ΠΗΨ).

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socio-­economic profile of Greek diaspora; third, the institution of SAE was unable to operate along the new forms of digital communication and network interaction. Despite SAE’s importance in the Greek diasporic transnational architecture and its relatively broad coverage in the Greek media, there are very few studies focusing on the institution itself. This lack of studies is aggravated by the lack of a permanent organisational structure that would allow for proper data collection, storage and subsequent analysis. Any researcher attempting to gather data on SAE will realise that there are no accessible SAE official records.4 SAE’s General Assembly proceedings have been published by the relevant Greek government agency (General Secretariat for Greeks Abroad), but these are mainly political speeches (almost always in Greek) made by government officials and SAE members. Nonetheless, this material serves as background information for this chapter, especially pertaining to SAE’s pre-crisis projects and achievements.5 As expected, the material on SAE in the form of official documents, interviews and articles in the press is significantly reduced during the years of crisis. This analysis rests on two wider analytical streams, namely (a) the upsurge and growth of diaspora institutions globally and (b) the potential impact of a crisis on a diasporic institution, its operability and effectiveness. Indeed, the number of diaspora institutions during the last three decades has risen to an unprecedented degree. The main reasons for the establishment of diaspora institutions lie within the fact that states are interested mainly in their diasporas for economic and/or diplomacy interests (Gamlen, 2015). More concretely, their aims are twofold: to ‘tap’ diasporas for resources vital to origin-state development and security; and to ‘embrace’ diasporas to help define origin-state political identity and achieve domestic political goals (Gamlen, 2019). Diaspora institutions operate in ‘the grey zone between domestic politics and international relations’ and this is a growing form of managing homeland-diaspora 4  SAE Board members obviously have kept their own personal records; similarly, the General Secretariat for Greeks Abroad (the Greek government agency funding and organising SAE’s General Assemblies) has a department head assigned SAE’s business. But, as with other Greek government services, the collection and storage of data would generally be considered rudimentary and public record digitisation has not yet been fully completed. 5  The main author of this chapter, Marina Frangos, has a collection of quantitative data from questionnaires completed by SAE members collected during SAE’s General Assemblies of 1995, 1999 and 2006. This chapter is further enhanced by a qualitative within-case empirical analysis of SAE’s history based on participant observation of the institution.

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engagement (ibid). They are more likely to emerge in states that depend on remittances and suffer brain drain and wider human drain. Within this context, the creation and rise of the SAE took place at a time of increasing transnationalisation of diasporic institutions after the fall of communism, and was in tune with a wider global trend. On the other hand, the downfall of the institution is explained in the context of the inherent structural weaknesses of the institution itself to which the crisis gave a final blow. While the expectation is that transnational diaspora engagement increases during a time of crisis, the Greek crisis had the opposite effect on the relationship between the Greek state and diaspora at the institutional level. The negative impact of the crisis was apparent in the performance of various institutions, namely the downsizing of consulates, the shrinkage of their budgets and the reduction of cultural and educational activities (Anastasakis & Kalantzi, 2021). The Greek economic crisis proved to be ‘the straw that broke the camel’s back’ for SAE rather than an opportunity for awakening the dormant institution.

Portrait of an Institution: What Went Wrong? The original mission of SAE was to bring together the Greeks of the diaspora, creating a global network aimed at planning and delivering programmes for the benefit of the Omogeneia, literally people of same descent. When SAE’s inaugural General Assembly was announced in December 1995, it was welcomed with anticipation by the numerous Greek communities. Although not many were certain of what the new institution would mean, it sounded promising and SAE initially won the support of most major Hellenic organisations. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (diaspora portfolio) at the time, Grigoris Niotis, was put in charge of the undertaking as he embarked on an extensive globe-trotting mission to reach out and consult with Greek diaspora leaders worldwide. Just one year after Niotis’ appointment, a Foreign Affairs Ministry press release claimed that the project of creating a global Greek Council was in its final stage of development. In March of that same year, Odyssey6 magazine’s cover story was entitled ‘Is there a Global Greek Village? The Puzzle of Global Hellenism’, with publisher and founder Gregory Maniatis by-lining the six-page article 6  Odyssey-The World of Greece magazine’s first issue appeared in 1993 (August/September), but the magazine is no longer published.

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on the proposed Council of Diaspora Hellenism7 that included ‘discussions with over 30 prominent figures in the Greek diaspora’, ‘ten hours of discussion held by Odyssey with Minister Niotis and his advisors’ and access to SAE’s working documents ‘made available to Odyssey by ministry sources’.8 Almost all those interviewed by Odyssey9 centred their concerns about SAE’s creation on two major themes: the need to differentiate among the substantially varied Greek communities abroad and the need to avoid any direct link between the Greek state and the diaspora organisations, made up mostly of citizens of other countries. George Savidis, the Director of Public Relations of the American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association (AHEPA), was wary of any potential direct links between the Greek government and the Greek-American lobby. ‘My main concern’, he stated, ‘is that diaspora Greeks will engage in reverse lobbying with the Greek government, saying, for instance, they ought to take a harder line with Macedonia’.10 Savidis also stated that AHEPA had never been contacted by the Foreign Ministry, despite being the largest organisation of Greek Americans after the (Greek Orthodox) (C)hurch (Maniatis, 1995: 28–29). SAE’s Infancy and Main Deficiencies As established in the 1995 Presidential Decree founding SAE, the latter is the advisory body to the Hellenic Republic on all matters of interest to Hellenes abroad (i.e., Hellenes who reside in, or are citizens of, a country other than Greece). Such matters include, among others, strengthening cultural and economic ties between Greece and the countries in which Hellenes reside, strengthening the Hellenic identity and the role of 7  This was the translation used in the magazine article. The English name used for SAE after it was created was World Council of Hellenes Abroad. 8  Maniatis, G. (March/April 1995). The Puzzle of Global Hellenism. Odyssey, pp. 27–31, 74. 9  Interviewees included Van Coufoudakis, Director of the Greek Studies Program at Indiana University; Peter Pappas, Director of the North American branch of the Foundation for Hellenic Culture; Nicholas Gage, author and president of the Pan-Epirotiki Federation of USA and Canada; and George Savidis, AHEPA Public Relations Officer. 10  The name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia had become by then a pertinent and sensitive issue of Greece’s foreign policy, which managed to mobilise Greek diasporic communities around the world against the former being called Republic of Macedonia, on the grounds that it was part of the Hellenic historical past and should not be appropriated by the northern neighbour of Greece.

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Hellenism and Orthodoxy, supporting Greek organisations worldwide and assisting Hellenes who return permanently to Greece. Members of SAE could be community organisations abroad, assemblies of Greek community parishes or other influential expatriate organisations. Elections would take place every four years and representatives would vote for their regional representatives in the Council’s geographical branches (one per continent) as well as for the President of the Council. SAE’s inaugural General Assembly took place over ten days in early December 1995. Roughly half of Greece’s cabinet ministers, as well as the presidents of Greece and Cyprus, spoke to 255 delegates and over 700 other diaspora guests in Thessaloniki amidst much fanfare and rhetoric. The greatest boost SAE received in its early years was the fact that its first elected president was Andrew Athens, a Greek-American multimillionaire. Athens was one of Archbishop Iakovos’11 closest allies and a major contributor to the Church; he was also one of the biggest financial backers of Greek-American lobbying in Washington. Athens was viewed by almost everyone, including the Greek government, as the one who could best ensure the Council’s influence in its infancy. President Athens soon embarked on an ambitious project, initially known as the SAE Primary Health Care Initiative (later renamed Hellenicare). It is considered by many as SAE’s greatest achievement and its plans aspired to the creation of 22 medical centres to provide free medical services to the residents of six former Soviet Union republics in areas where forgotten Hellenic communities struggled to survive. By 2008, there were six medical centres in operation (three in Tbilisi, Tsalka and Tsikhisjvari in Georgia; one in Alaverdi, Armenia; one in Mariupol, Ukraine; and one in Georgoutsates, Albania, with the support of Archbishop Anastasios). In 2011, a Hellenicare press release announced plans to expand the medical programme in Armenia, citing the support of a special grant from the US Department of State (Office of Humanitarian Assistance). At that time, Andrew Athens still headed Hellenicare (an independent legal entity) but was no longer the World President of SAE.  SAE was not mentioned in this press release. There is no

11  At that time, Iakovos was the Archbishop of North and South America. That Archdiocese has since been separated into different entities for the United States, Canada, Mexico and Argentina.

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information on these medical centres presently, though they may still be in operation, but not associated with SAE or Hellenicare,12 which also appears to be defunct. Beyond Hellenicare, SAE’s standing within the diaspora communities began to erode early on, as its structural deficiencies quickly became a handicap and the subject of much criticism. Delegate Selection One of the most basic problems that plagued SAE from its founding was the issue of representation. Exactly how were delegates chosen to participate in SAE’s proceedings? How could an organisation become an SAE member? As the Greek government had organised the founding convention in 1995, it seemed logical that the relevant government agency, the General Secretariat for Greeks Abroad, would manage the invitations on that occasion. But even during the last convention of SAE held in 2006, the issue remained problematic, despite SAE resolutions issued as early as 1997 unrelentingly proclaiming that (the representation issue) ‘should not continue’. Subsequent ministerial decrees regarding SAE’s structure allowed for the SAE Executive Board to be consulted during the invitation process, but other provisions in the same legislation granted the Greek government the freedom to invite ‘noteworthy’ individuals and other organisations, blatantly influencing the electoral process. To make matters worse, the Greek government could also invite delegates to participate in various associated fora (such as those for youth, business, academia and culture, women and diaspora politicians); other representative boards were elected during these fora and these delegates automatically became voting members of the General Assembly. In addition, as shown in Table 8.1, almost one-third of the delegates in 2006 had attended all six General Assembly meetings in Thessaloniki (only 23% attending for the first time, close to 50% having attended more than four times), completely substantiating the claim that the diaspora was hardly being properly represented.

12  Hellenicare appears on Bloomberg’s company profile listings as a non-profit organisation. However, the phone number listed has been disconnected and no information has appeared anywhere since 2011. See: https://www.bloomberg.com/profiles/companies/ 0421905D:US-hellenicare-inc.

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Table 8.1  SAE delegate renewal Participations

Once

Twice

Three times

Four times

Five times

Six times

SAE delegates (2006)

23%

15%

15%

11%

7%

29%

Absence of Subsequent Diaspora Generations and Younger Diaspora At the first SAE General Assembly it became evident that most delegates from the various organisations were first-generation Greek-speaking immigrants who had fled Greece in the migration waves of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s: the overwhelming majority (87%) of SAE representatives were over 40 years old (60% over 50 years old), as demonstrated in Fig. 8.1. In addition, 71% had been born in Greece, a percentage that was greatly inconsistent with the cross-generational total diaspora membership (see Fig. 8.2). Americans of Greek descent were already in the third and fourth generations of migration in 1995, and yet 80% of SAE delegates from the USA were Greek-born at that time. Despite repeated promises that this would change by the second convention, the percentage of SAE delegates born in Greece had dropped only slightly to 65% by SAE’s third General Assembly in 1999. It seemed that representatives of the Greek political establishment simply felt more comfortable dealing with diaspora members who spoke the ‘same language’, both literally and figuratively. Government Intervention One of the most important criticisms of SAE was the degree of governmental interference. Critics argued that it was essentially an organisation dominated by the Greek government, a justified claim if one considers that the Greek state financed the whole endeavour, provided offices for its Thessaloniki headquarters and funded the salaries of several employees over the course of approximately 15 years. Though President Athens was quite successful in leveraging donations for SAE’s Primary Health Care Initiative from both diaspora organisations and wealthy individuals, very little was done to change the legislation which granted the Greek government authority to organise General Assemblies and provide administrative and financial support of SAE’s daily business. Perhaps not so surprisingly, even SAE delegates believed that Greek government involvement was strong, whereas a significant percentage

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DELEGATE DISTRIBUTION BY AGE SAE Founding Convention Other 1% 20-30yrs old 1%

30-40 yrs old 11%

Over 60 yrs old 30%

40-50 yrs old 27%

50-60 yrs old 30%

Fig. 8.1  Age distribution DELEGATE MIGRATION HISTORY/GENERATION FOUNDING SAE CONVENTION 3rd …generation

Other 11%

2nd Generation 13%

Migrants 71%

Fig. 8.2  SAE delegates by generation (1995)

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DELEGATE RESPONSES ON GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT (3RD GENERAL ASSEMBLY)

48% Strong

37% Appropriate

15% Government agency

Fig. 8.3  Delegate responses on government involvement in SAE

(15%) thought SAE was a genuine government agency. Not a single delegate thought that government involvement was ‘little’ or ‘none’—despite all the many references to SAE as a non-governmental organisation, as shown in Fig. 8.3. Indeed, it was SAE’s close ties to the Greek government that led AHEPA—the largest Greek grassroots organisation worldwide—to withdraw its membership for a period. The Greek government appeared fearful of wider diaspora representation and continuously postponed taking action that would significantly change SAE’s electoral body and therefore possibly lead to the election of an Executive Board that was unpredictable and potentially uncontrollable. Out of the six SAE General Assemblies held in Thessaloniki (1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003 and 2006), the first five were held with PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) in power in Greece.13 In 2004, the 13  Since the fall of the military dictatorship in 1974, a two-party system dominated Greece’s electoral politics, the centre right New Democracy (ND) and the centre-left Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK). The New Democracy party habitually limited its involvement

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conservative ND (New Democracy) party won the elections, but missed the opportunity to significantly change legislation pertaining to SAE. In 2006, the sixth, and last, SAE General Assembly was held in Thessaloniki with ND still in power, but funding for SAE’s operations and General Assemblies, as well as the invitation process and setting the agenda, remained in the hands of the Greek government. At the last General Assembly held in Thessaloniki in 2006, Andrew Athens did not run for World President after having served for five terms (totalling 11 years) and Stefanos Tamvakis, a well-respected businessman from the historic (but practically non-existent) Greek community of Alexandria, Egypt, was elected for a three-year term. The Presiding Board elected in 2006 had 11 members, 10 men and 1 woman, showing that the SAE was moving slowly with times in terms of gender balance. As for the seven Regional Coordinators these were all men too. The Impact of the Greek Crisis When Greece was faced with the global financial crisis of 2008, the situation for SAE became increasingly unpredictable and precarious. SAE was already suffering from structural and organisational deficiencies. As such, it had developed into a public relations vehicle for Greek politicians seeking to leverage the diaspora’s allure for a domestic audience and a junket for ‘professional Greeks’ the world over who flew free to the homeland every two or three years, a common complaint throughout diaspora organisations and media. This image was completely inconsistent with the austerity that bedevilled Greece during the crisis. In 2009, a ministerial decree postponed the planned General Assembly for a year and extended the term of the elected Executive Board for the same period. A similar decree was issued in November of 2010. By late 2012, all SAE operations had virtually ceased. Be that as it may, in 2013, the issue of restructuring SAE was even opened to public debate on opengov.gr, the Greek government platform that aspired to ensure with the Greek diaspora to the well-educated elite of the United States and/or the United Kingdom, while PASOK had created ties with the Europe-based Greek diaspora (mainly in Germany, Belgium, Holland and Sweden), primarily belonging to lower middle classes. Eventually, diasporic party preferences became more evenly split which was reflected in the European Parliamentary elections, the only elections where Greek citizens abroad were allowed to vote from their place of residence (albeit the numbers of voters remained very low).

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transparency and maximise citizen engagement. At the same time, however, SAE’s headquarters in Thessaloniki, previously housed in spacious quarters donated by benefactor Thomas Makrides, were now being used for other municipal services, while the sole three remaining employees were left unpaid for numerous months. They filed suit against SAE and the Greek government.14 As a new bill was required for the re-establishment of SAE, a draft bill was discussed by the Special Parliamentary Permanent Committee for the Greek Diaspora. However, discussions came to a deadlock in 2014 due to political parties’ differences concerning the provisions for the re-founding of SAE (Cavounidis, 2016: 102). The main issues of contention were the membership—whether individuals or organisations/associations would be members—and its funding—whether it would be self-funding or receive funds from the Greek state. On March 11, 2018, Terence Quick, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (diaspora portfolio), was interviewed on ERT-3’s ‘Hellas Pandou’ weekly programme at a time when Greece’s economy was showing some signs of a meek recovery. Quick stressed the need to redevelop SAE, as is required by the Greek constitution,15 but emphasised that he would first and foremost propose that its name be changed during a subsequent revision of the Greek constitution, as ‘SAE is a word our diaspora hears and freaks outs’.16 Quick was also adamant about the necessity for the new 14  See the Legal Opinion issued by the Legal Council of the Hellenic State in May 2014 in response to an inquiry submitted by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Kostas Tsiaras (in office from June 2012 to June 2013) pertaining to the compensation of three employees of the Foundation for Diaspora Hellenism (‘Idrima Apodimou Ellinismou’, the legal entity created for SAE) whose salaries had been halved on July 26, 2012, and who had not received any salaries during the periods April–July 2012 and January 2013–May 2014. It is mindboggling that the Legal Council deemed the employees’ plea as just (advising that they should receive full salaries and social security payments) but could not hold either the defunct SAE Executive Board, nor the Greek state accountable or responsible to take any action. In closing, the Legal Opinion states that a temporary administration for both SAE and the Foundation be created. No timeframe is mentioned. On www.diavgeia.gov.gr, Internet Uploading Number, ΑΔΑ: 7ΑΧΖΟΡΡΕ-ΚΤΦ, last access April 5, 2018. No subsequent Legal Opinions or rulings on this matter have appeared on ‘diavgeia’. 15  In 2001, amendments to the Greek constitution included the addition of a second paragraph to Article 108, which now reads: ‘Legislation designates the structure, function and responsibilities of the World Council of Hellenes Abroad (SAE), whose mission is to express all forces of global Hellenism’. 16  Transcript of an interview (in Greek) with Terence Quick on ΕλλάςΠαντού (=Greece worldwide), broadcast on ERT-3 on March 11, 2018.

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institution to be fully financially self-sufficient and independent of the Greek government. On July 7, 2019, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, leader of the centre-right New Democracy party achieved victory and became Greece’s prime minister. Prior to the elections, Mitsotakis had made consistent campaign promises to alter existing legislation so that Greek citizens living abroad would be granted the right to postal voting and parliamentary representation, an issue that has been on the Greek political agenda for decades, but never realised. Just a few months after Mitsotakis was elected, the Greek Parliament approved with an overwhelming majority of 288 out of 300 MPs a ground-breaking bill allowing diaspora Greek citizens to vote from their place of residence for the first time. Apart from facilitating diaspora voting procedures, the bill also introduced dedicated seats for elected diaspora representatives within the legislature, increasing the number of state deputies from 12 to 15 and requiring political parties to include candidates from diaspora electoral rolls. Diaspora representation in the Hellenic Parliament received far less attention in the media or party discourse compared to the bill’s provision on the voting process and voter eligibility. However, having even a small number of elected diaspora members within the legislature may be an indication of a rather different course of action regarding diaspora engagement—one that significantly differs from the extravagant fanfare and wasteful government spending involved in the history of the World Council of Hellenes Abroad (SAE). This may be the result of the increased awareness of the Greek people who have had to deal with greatly unpopular cuts to public spending and would not tolerate another round of government overspending, especially at a time of dwindling trust in government institutions. On February 26, 2021, the Greek Parliament adopted Law 4781/2021 on the organisation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which included articles 452–457 on the re-operation of SAE. It reaffirmed the objectives and added special mention of the representation of the new generation of Greeks that left the country after 2010. It emphasised that finances would come from self-financing and not from the state budget. This was a point for which SAE had been criticised: spending mainly for the organisation of large meetings instead of actions in favour of the expats. It also designated the number of representatives (50) from the seven world regions, preferably not the same as the ones during the period 1995–2012 but from younger generations with a desire for action.

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In sum, SAE was created in the affluent mid-1990s but fell into irrelevance after 2008. This outcome was connected with inherent problems in the structures and operations of the institution, as well as a growing reality of a decline of diaspora engagement with the homeland for third, fourth and subsequent-generation-Greeks that are probably completely integrated and assimilated in their countries of residence, especially in key host countries such as the US. The fact that during the crisis a new Greek diaspora came to being with hundreds of thousands of mostly younger mobile and educated Greeks abandoning their homeland due to the financial crisis made the need to reconsider the effectiveness of such institutions and to plan and organise any new entities responsibly and thoughtfully more critical. Despite its shortcomings, SAE’s existence and achievements raised awareness about the diaspora’s history and potential, both in Greece and abroad.

Appendix: Chronology of Events—World Council of Hellenes Abroad (SAE) Milestones 1982

1989 1994 1995 Dec. 1995

Jan. 1995 1996 1997

The General Secretariat for Greeks Abroad is established at the Ministry of Culture. In 1993, this government agency is placed under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Article 17 of Law 1876/1989 calls for the founding of a worldwide organisation representing diaspora Greeks. Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou appoints Grigoris Niotis as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (Greek diaspora portfolio). Niotis travels the world and meets with representatives of diaspora organisations who submit proposals for the creation of SAE. The first founding General Assembly takes place in Thessaloniki, hailed ‘capital of diaspora Hellenism’. Greek-American tycoon Andrew Athens is elected as SAE’s first president; also elected are a vice-president, four regional presidents (the Americas, Europe, Oceania, Asia/Africa) and three secretaries. In subsequent elections, a treasurer and a president for the Cypriot diaspora are added to the Executive Committee. Due to PM Papandreou’s illness, Kostas Simitis becomes prime minister of Greece. He not only ousts Niotis but abolishes the position of Greek diaspora MFA Deputy Minister. Regional SAE conferences are held in Europe, Africa, the Americas and Australia. The first employees are hired for SAE headquarters in Thessaloniki (housed in a Macedonia-Thrace Bank building on lease). The 2nd General Assembly convention is held in December and Andrew Athens is re-elected. (continued)

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(continued) 1998

May 1998

Dec. 1998 June 1999 July 1999 Dec. 1999 2001

Dec. 2001 Dec. 2003 June 2006

Dec. 2006 2009

2012

Boston is the first ‘Hellenic Cultural Capital’ (SAE N. & S. America). Cultural events are held throughout the year. The first diaspora youth conference is held in Thessaloniki. $20 million is pledged at a Global Mediathon involving Greek communities worldwide and ERT17 for the Primary Health Care Clinics in the former USSR. The first clinic is opened a year later in Tbilisi, Georgia, by Kostis Stephanopoulos, president of the Hellenic Republic. Another legal entity (Foundation of (S)AE = ‘Idrima Apodimou Ellinismou’) is created to by-pass bureaucracy and allow SAE to function as a charitable organisation (not linked to the Greek government as SAE was). After years of political bargaining, the Makrides building (donated to the city of Thessaloniki to serve the Greek diaspora) is established as SAE’s headquarters. The first SAE Summer Youth Camp is held at Skotina, Pieria (Northern Greece). 3rd SAE General Assembly: Andrew Athens is re-elected. Amendments to the Greek constitution name SAE as an ‘advisory body’ to the Greek government on diaspora issues (Article 108) and provide for legislation to enable Greeks abroad to vote in national elections (Article 51). 4th SAE General Assembly: Andrew Athens is re-elected. Plans to create an SAE Fund (Tameio Omogenon) to ensure the institution’s financial autonomy are announced. 5th SAE General Assembly: Andrew Athens is re-elected for three years (legislation now specifies three-year terms for all elected officers). Further legislation on SAE’s structure and function is passed. Law 3480/2006 gives SAE an advisory role to the Greek state on matters pertaining to diaspora, increases the number of SAE regions from four to seven18 and the term in office for all its members from two to four years. Networks are to be established through a decision by the corresponding Regional Assembly. The establishment of Youth Networks is mandatory for each region. 6th SAE General Assembly: Stefanos Tamvakis (a businessman from Alexandria, Egypt) is voted in as SAE World President. SAE Executive Board’s terms are silently extended for another three years. No General Assembly is held in Thessaloniki and the Greek government attributes the postponement to the lack of funds and the Greek financial crisis. SAE’s Executive Board’s members cease referring to their association with SAE. (continued)

17  ERT = Greek National Television (there are three public stations, all part of ERT: NET and ERT3 televised the Mediathon, and many Greek community TV and Radio stations/ programmes broadcast it throughout the world). 18  USA; Canada; Central and South American; African-Near-Middle East; Oceania-Far East; Former Soviet Union countries; Europe.

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(continued) 2013 2013

2018

2019

2021

Three employees at the SAE headquarters in Thessaloniki are left unpaid for months. They file suit against SAE and the Greek government. SAE’s future is opened to public debate through opengov.gr, the government platform. Almost all contributions are sent by people previously associated with SAE. The whole debate is conducted in Greek. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Terence Quick begins a global tour of Greek communities promising a new SAE (but with a different name) within the next few years. In December 2019, 288 out of 300 MPs vote in favour of a bill which allows Greek citizens abroad (provided they fulfil certain criteria) to exercise their voting rights from their place of residence. Law 4781/2021 (FEK 31/A/28-2-2021) ‘Organisation and operation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the World Council for Greeks abroad, settlement of issues of international development cooperation and humanitarian aid and other provisions’ including special clauses 452–457 for the re-operation of the Council of Hellenes Abroad.

References Anastasakis, O., & F. Kalantzi. (2021, June). Homeland crisis, party politics and the Greek diaspora vote. SEESOX Diaspora Working Paper series. Retrieved October 28, 2021, from http://seesoxdiaspora.org/publications/working-­ papers-­series/homeland-­crisis,-­party-­politics-­and-­the-­greek-­diaspora-­vote Cavounidis, J. (2016). The emigration of Greeks and diaspora engagement policies for economic development. Reports No. 76, Centre of Planning and Economic Research, Athens. Gamlen, A. (2015). The rise of diaspora institutions. In N. Sigona, A. Gamlen, G. Liberatore, & H. Neveu Kringelbach (Eds.), Diasporas reimagined: Spaces, practices and belonging. Oxford Diasporas Programme. Gamlen, A. (2019). Human geopolitics: States, emigrants and diaspora institutions. Oxford University Press. Maniatis, G. (1995). The puzzle of global Hellenism. Odyssey, 2(4), 27–31.

CHAPTER 9

The Greek Americans and the Greek Economic Crisis in Historical Perspective Alexander Kitroeff

Introduction During Greece’s nearly decade-long economic crisis, which began in 2009, the Greek diaspora in the United States was expected to support its homeland at a time of need as it had on several occasions during the past. Most notably, this happened in 1940 when Greece entered World War II (WWII) and in 1974 in the wake of Turkey’s invasion and occupation of the northern part of Cyprus. These three cases share a common characteristic in that they are examples of the way the Greek Americans function as a diaspora community with strong ties to its homeland. Yet compared to the extensive deployment of Greek American resources in the 1940s and the 1970s, the response to the economic crisis, while significant, appears to have been relatively restrained. This hypothesis is supported by historical surveys of the Greek experience in the United States, which show quite clearly how central the support for Greece was for the Greek Americans in

A. Kitroeff (*) Haverford College, Haverford, PA, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 O. Anastasakis et al. (eds.), Diaspora Engagement in Times of Severe Economic Crisis, Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97443-5_9

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those past instances (Moskos, 1989: 49–50, 120–122, 166–168; Saloutos, 1964: 332–335; Kaloudis, 2020: 196–202). In contrast to those two occasions, Greek America’s attention was not overwhelmingly focused on Greece during the recent economic crisis. This comparison among Greece’s wartime experiences in the 1940s, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and its immediate aftermath, and what Greece endured to the economic crisis of 2008, is based on that these three occasions stand out as critical moments in which the Greek homeland (understood in a broad sense as Greece and Cyprus in 1974) found itself in great need. In the 1940s, war and occupation cost Greece almost half a million lives and left its economy in ruins. In the 1970s, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus displaced almost 400,000 persons and turned them into refugees in their own country, Turkey occupied the northern part of the island and Greece and Turkey were on the brink of war. The post-2009 debt crisis had a different effect, but it was certainly a period that brought intense suffering to a segment of Greece’s population, and in that sense merits comparison with the 1940s and the 1970s. During the debt crisis the country’s creditors imposed strict austerity measures that cut wages, increased taxes and undermined the ability of the Greek health services to offer help to thousands of persons in need. Mortality rates increased as did the rates of suicide and depression. Hospitals lacked basic supplies, and patients could not obtain the drugs they needed. Youth unemployment peaked at 58% at the height of the crisis and it remained at 40% by 2018 even though about 400,000 persons had left Greece in search of a better future (Kitsantonis, 2019; Coppola, 2018; Mijatović, 2018). In the words of one of the many news articles, describing how the austerity measures affected Greek society, a Deutsche Welle correspondent wrote that “in Greece even the middle class is suffering because of the crisis. Soup kitchens and food donations for the needy are being organised—even in fancy suburbs of Athens” (Papadimitriou, 2013). Thus it can be argued that these three historical moments represent crises that invite an examination of the ways the Greek Americans responded to each of them. In all three cases, of all the Greek diaspora communities, it was the Greek Americans who were primarily involved in aiding Greece. This chapter argues that the recent economic crisis elicited a more limited Greek American mobilisation in comparison to the two other instances and seeks to explain why this was the case. Towards that purpose, it begins by framing the Greek American relationship with Greece during the crisis within the broader dynamic of diaspora–homeland

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relations in order to highlight the ways the Greek American case can help us understand the functions of the Greek diaspora more broadly. Second, also in terms of framing, given that the particular Greek American connection to Greece during the crisis was essentially one of philanthropic contributions, this section addresses the character of philanthropy in America which shapes those types of domestic and international initiatives of Greek American organisations. A third section surveys the Greek American organisational landscape and identifies the main actors. Fourth, this chapter briefly describes Greek America’s actions during WWII and fifth, it examines the period immediately after the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974. The chapter then moves on to describe the ways Greek Americans sought to help Greece during the recent economic crisis; to delve into the strengths and weaknesses of that response; and finally to explain why the response during the crisis, compared to the two earlier instances, was relatively restrained.

The Dual Orientations of Diasporas Academics and policy makers have paid increasing attention to the role of diasporas, and sometimes this has led to exaggerated claims about their capacity to act on their own. In the era of globalisation that unfolded in the wake of the Cold War, academe witnessed the emergence of transnationalism as a lens through which to understand international relations. Scholars suggested that diasporas could or in fact did operate as autonomous, deterritorialised international actors. This suggestion applied especially to the first of what are three very general usages of the term diaspora. The first usage refers to the political definition of an ethnic group with ties to its homeland which is based on the so-called Jewish model and is often also associated with the Armenian and Greek cases. In the case of this particular understanding of the term diaspora there is a focus on the relationship between homelands and dispersed people but also on host states because these diasporas exist in a triangular socio-cultural relationship with the host society and the homeland (Dufoix, 2006; Safran, 1991). Their specific impact in some cases has been well documented (Shain & Barth, 2003). Turning to the other two common usages of the term diaspora, the cultural definition stresses common identity or consciousness rather than ties with the homeland which is based on the African model. The third definition or usage of the term diaspora refers to migrants abroad who

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retain the citizenship of their homeland. This third category has resulted from transnational migration over the past few decades and has yet to be considered very systematically by the literature as transnational actors in the international political arena (Vertovec, 1999). Whatever the particular usage of the term diaspora, the initial assertion of autonomously operating diasporas as “endemic to the international system, having a capacity for independent and assertive political action” (Shain, 2002) is now considered open to debate (Koinova, 2012). This political definition of diasporas suggests that, notwithstanding the agency with which globalisation imbued diasporas, these bodies were still beholden to their character as an ethnic or religious group within a host country as well as a notional part of a nation located within another state. If the political definition of a diaspora naturally uses a national lens, their definition as ethnic-religious-national diasporas affords an even clearer picture of their functions, their capacities to act as well as the restraints they might face. To operate as an ethnic group that maintains ties with the homeland requires a range of strategies that highlight the challenge that these groups face. In the most thorough listing of those strategies, diaspora scholar Gabriel Sheffer mentions the need to integrate and acculturate in the host society while also preserving a degree of separateness; combining that separateness with integration, creating community institutions which in turn have to balance between existing in the host society and pursuing their own autonomous goals. These strategies are necessary in order to preserve their ethnic or religious identity in the face of pressures of assimilation, to consolidate their numbers in terms of membership of their various organisations, finding ways to relate to their ancestral homeland as the central reference point of their identity, handling issues of dual orientation or loyalty between their host state and their homeland and determining ways to support their homeland (Sheffer, 2006; Hu-Dehart, 2005).

Philanthropy in America Philanthropic contributions are the most common means that Greek Americans express their connections to Greece and Cyprus, next to efforts to shape US policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. The primacy of philanthropy, especially among wealthy Greek Americans, is not surprising given its cultural significance in the United States. It is generally accepted that giving and volunteerism are distinctive and important aspects of American

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society. Beyond the cultural imperative, philanthropy in America is driven by religious beliefs and ethnic identity but is also encouraged by the government with generous tax-exempt regulations and the opportunity to use philanthropic capital to invest and enhance the original capital. Next to religion, ethnic identity is a primary motivation behind philanthropic contributions by Americans, and several studies identify Jewish Americans as the ethnic group with the most extensive and sophisticated network of philanthropic organisations. Assuming that ethnic Americans would be loyal to America’s aims worldwide, the government allowed those organisations to send funds overseas, treating those private funds as America’s soft power abroad (Ostrower, 1995; Berman, 2020). Greek American philanthropy has only recently begun to receive academic attention (Kamaras, 2020). But it is clear, as a recent study of diaspora philanthropy by the SEESOX Diaspora Project demonstrates, that it fully conforms with “the tendency of ethnic minorities in the US to absorb dominant norms of noblesse oblige to build their social profile and advance their business connections through charitable giving; the rise to affluence and prominence of second and third generation hyphenated Americans; the US’s generous fiscal regime towards charitable contributions” (Kamaras, 2019: 20).

The Dual Orientation of Greek American Organisations A dual orientation, first towards America and then to Greece, is the hallmark of the major Greek American organisations. The largest of these is the Greek Orthodox Church of America, led by the New York City-based Archdiocese formed in 1922 with five hundred parishes throughout the United States. Currently, it has about 440,000 members but claims a following of almost two million persons. In the 1960s, the head of the Archdiocese, Archbishop Iakovos, declared that the Greek Orthodox Church was no longer an “immigrant” church but had become an “American” one by virtue of the assimilation of the largest part of the faithful who by then were American born. Ever since then the church has sought to balance, on the one hand, its increasingly American character, which is evident with the growing use of the English language, and on the other hand, its cultural ties to Greece and Cyprus and its “mother Church”

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the Greek Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople which is located in Turkey (Kitroeff, 2020: 119–124). The Greek Orthodox Church is not only the largest Greek American organisation in terms of the numbers of its members and of the faithful more generally, it is also by far the wealthiest. After the US Internal Revenue Code defined the regulations governing private, philanthropic foundations and before the emergence of any Greek American philanthropic foundations, Archbishop Iakovos established in 1984 a foundation organically linked to the Church and therefore was able to operate on an entirely tax-exempt basis as a religious institution. Its purpose was to operate as an endowment fund of the Archdiocese and “to provide Greek Orthodox leaders to support the life-sustaining ministries of the Church.” Membership in the organisation, named “Leadership 100” because members pledge $100,000 paid over ten years, quickly became a status symbol for wealthy Greek Americans. It also ensured that a considerable part of their capital which was available to go to philanthropic causes went to causes prioritised by the Church (Kitroeff, 2020: 195–196, 242–243; Leadership 100). Remarkably, the Church succeeded in forming another such foundation in 2004, the Faith Endowment, whose members reportedly pledge a million dollars over a period of time (Faith Endowment, 2021). Thus the Church managed to redouble its efforts to absorb a sizeable sum of the available Greek American philanthropic capital and employ it towards its own needs and preferred projects. The second largest Greek American organisation, the American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association (AHEPA), is a fraternal association whose members are Americans of Greek descent. AHEPA was formed in 1922 as a mutual aid association but with an explicit purpose to advocate for the assimilation of Greek immigrants into American society. From the mid-1930s onward, with its original goal fulfilled, AHEPA kept widening the scope of its activities to benefit its members, promote what it defined as “Hellenic values” in the United States and to offer philanthropic aid to Greece (Leber, 1972; Kitroeff, 1993; Anagnostou, 2004). By the mid-­ twentieth century AHEPA had a membership of about 20,000 which has remained roughly at that level despite the turnover in its membership, and it presently has over 400 chapters formed not only in the United States but also in Canada and Europe—including Greece and Cyprus. AHEPA has also historically balanced between its American character and its

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offering of support to Greece, Cyprus and the Ecumenical Patriarchate. It explains its dual role by invoking a set of putatively common “Hellenic and American” values such as democracy and freedom and the Classical Greek civilisation that inspired America’s founding fathers. The same vocabulary is employed by a range of smaller Greek American organisations. These include lobbying organisations based in Washington DC such as the American Hellenic Institute and Manatos & Manatos. These are Greek American associations which, like the Hellenic American Leadership Conference or the National Hellenic Society, promote Greek heritage in the United States. The Greek America Foundation similarly promotes Greek heritage in the United States and also engages in philanthropic activities in Greece, including sending students to undertake volunteer internships. There are a number of foundations that are non-profit philanthropic corporations named after either the family that has provided the capital to establish them or named so as to reflect its primary focus. Many of the wealthiest Greek American families have established such foundations, not all of which are involved in philanthropic activities that also relate to Greece. There are also “Hellenic”oriented private foundations, the one with the most active involvement in Greece is “The Hellenic Initiative” (THI), an organisation that regards its goals as quite separate from those of the Greek Orthodox Church. All of these are explicitly American organisations with varying degrees of connection to Greek American issues or issues that relate to Greece and Cyprus. The diasporic character of Greek Americans and their organisations does not mean that all 1.6 million persons who reported they had Greek heritage in the US census of 2000 feel some sort of affinity towards their homeland. Yet, it would be true of most who are or have been involved as members or attendees in the activities of Greek American organisations. The exact numbers are difficult to ascertain because all of these organisations, and especially the two largest, the Church and AHEPA, are generally coy about sharing the percentage of fully active paid up members and the number whose membership has lapsed. It’s likely that there are just over half a million current or lapsed members of Greek American organisations currently (Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America, 2013). There is some opposition within the Church to the policy of maintaining close ties with Greece but it remains for now a minority position. In

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the late 1990s, there emerged a group within the ranks of the Church, the Orthodox Clergy Laity (OCL), that advocated that all the Eastern Orthodox Churches in the United States form a supra-ethnic American Orthodox Church. This would mean that those Churches, the Greek, Russian, Serbian, Syrian (known as Antiochian) and Ukrainian, would leave behind their ethnic character and by extension reduce their involvement with their respective homelands (Kitroeff, 2020: 207–217; Orthodox Clergy Laity). Yet the early moves of newly appointed Archbishop Elpidophoros, who became head of the Church in 2019, suggests that the Church will continue to maintain close ties with the homeland while taking steps to adapt to the steady Americanisation of the Greek Orthodox faithful in the United States. And scholars such as Victor Roudometof argue that the Greek Orthodox diaspora experience has always oscillated between universal and national purposes (Roudometof, 2000).

Greek American Mobilisation in the 1940s Greek American mobilisation in support of Greece during WWII stands out as a prime example of diaspora engagement with the homeland during a crisis that affected both Greece and the United States. It was made possible by a felicitous combination of several factors. The first was a strong attachment to Greece because most of the Greek American leaders had been born in Greece. The second factor was that on the whole, Greek governments in the 1920s and the 1930s had maintained close ties with the Greeks in the United States, not least because it recognised the value of the remittances they sent back to their families in Greece. The third factor was that although the United States would enter WWII in December 1941 after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, it was already clearly aligned against the Axis powers in October 1940 when Greece entered the war. In 1940 when Greece successfully repelled Italy’s attack, it was generously praised in the American media with editorials and articles and the photograph of an Evzone sounding the bugle with the Acropolis as the background in the cover of Life Magazine (Life, 1940). All this reflected positively on the Greek Americans. In addition, the xenophobia that immigrants from Southern Europe had confronted contrinued to weaken in the late 1930s. But with the advent of the war this process gained ground. In battling fascism and Nazism, American spokesmen portrayed

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the United States as a nation whose values were antithetical to its enemies. This meant that if totalitarianism demanded conformity, mocked freedom and preached racial hatred, then Americans were surely plural and instinctively democratic (Guglielmo & Lewis, 2003). The result of this almost ideal combination of factors enabled the Greek Americans to offer support to Greece during its war against the invading Axis forces from October 1940 through May 1941, and then throughout the period of Axis occupation that ended in 1944. Immediately after Greece entered WWII a group of Greek Americans formed the Greek War Relief Association (GWRA). The GWRA’s purpose was to raise funds to provide much needed clothing, food and medical supplies to the population in Greece (Kyrou, 1993). The GWRA had the support of the entire community including AHEPA and the Church. In the 5-month period between the Italian attack in October 1940 which brought Greece into the war and the Axis occupation of Greece in May 1941 the GWRA had sent $3,766,000 to Greece. These funds were used to supply civilians with food, heating fuel, clothing and medical attention as well as outfitting ambulances, the construction of bomb-proof shelters and the support of distressed families of slain soldiers. After Greece was occupied by the Axis the GWRA continued its relief work. Its aid was especially critical during the awful winter of 1941–1942 when famine swept throughout Greece. By March 1945, the GWRA had dispatched 101 individual fleet shipments to Greece which delivered 647,153 tonnes of wheat and other foodstuffs, 2878 tonnes of clothing and 19,601 tonnes of medicine and related supplies (Kitroeff, 2019). After the United States entered the war, the Greek Americans were quick to show they were loyal Americans as well. Greek Americans participated in the sale and purchase of the US War Bonds that were issued to raise funds for the war effort. By all accounts they combined contributions to the GWRA with buying war bonds seamlessly and distinguished themselves with their support for the American war effort (Saloutos, 1964: 350–353). What also mattered were the different conditions in the two countries. While Greece suffered famine, deprivation and the brutality of foreign occupation, the Greeks living in the United States enjoyed the benefits of a society that had left the Great Depression of the 1930s behind, largely thanks to the economic activity the war generated.

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Greek American Mobilisation in the 1970s The other major example of Greek American support for Greece came with an effective nation-wide lobbying effort to impose a US arms embargo on Turkey in the wake of that country’s invasion and occupation of the island of Cyprus in the mid-1970s. Congress managed to impose the embargo over the objections of the White House and the State Department and it stayed in place from 1975 to 1978 (Rourke, 1983; Watanabe, 1984; Kitroeff, 1994; Shain & Barth, 2003; Kitroeff, 2009). A sovereign and independent state since 1960, Cyprus had been plagued by intercommunal strife between the Greek majority and Turkish minority on the island. In 1974, the military junta that had been in power in Greece since 1967 engineered a coup in Cyprus designed to overthrow the president, Archbishop Makarios. This gave Turkey the pretext to invade the island and occupy the northern third of its territory in the name of protecting the Turkish-Cypriot minority. The coup failed but the Turkish army remained in place forcing thousands of Greek Cypriots to flee for their lives from the occupied territory. The United States was either unable or unwilling to prevent Turkey’s actions, even though, along with Greece it was an allied country and a fellow member of NATO. The Greek American community reacted immediately to the US government’s inaction by mobilising its major institutions and creating lobbying groups to put pressure on Congress to enact sanctions on Turkey for having illegally used arms provided by the United States in its attack on Cyprus. The “Greek lobby” as it was known was ultimately successful and with the crucial help of supportive Congressmen and Senators, among them Greek Americans, Congress kept the arms embargo on Turkey in operation until 1978. The lobby’s success was due to a number of factors. The 1970s were an era that witnessed the legitimation of the celebration of ethnic origins and many assimilated second- and third-generation Americans were rediscovering their connection with Greek culture and Greece. The climate at the time was captured nicely by Greek American and journalist Nicholas Gage in the phrase “it is chic to be Greek” in article published in 1975 in the New York Times (Gage, 1975). The leaders of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese and AHEPA had enjoyed an especially close relationship with the dictators that ruled Greece from 1967 and 1974. Close relations with Athens continued following the collapse of the dictatorship in 1974. The

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newly installed democratic government, fully recognising the value of Greek American mobilisation over Cyprus, quickly established close ties with the Church, AHEPA and the other Greek American leaders engaged in the lobbying effort. The most important factor was that the lobby was able to exploit the weakened office of the president and Congress’ growing assertiveness in the field of foreign policy. President Nixon resigned on August 8, 1974, because of his involvement in the break-in at the Democratic Party offices in the Watergate Building in Washington DC. Gerald Ford, his successor, faced a newly assertive Congress that wished a greater say in the formulation of foreign policy. Ford and Henry Kissinger, the National Security Advisor and architect of US foreign policy, were strongly opposed to the embargo but were unable to prevent Congress’ action. Congress’ resurgent role in foreign policy coupled with a moment the presidency was relatively weak enabled the lobby’s success. And lastly, the lobby was successful because it argued its case on American principles. It insisted it was working in the name of respecting “the rule of law” because Turkey’s use of US-supplied arms during the invasion of Cyprus was illegal because the United States supplies arms to countries for use only for defensive purposes. The embargo was presented as an American cause and not as a Greek or Greek-Cypriot issue (Coufoudakis & Hadji, 2017). The Greek American mobilisation over the issue of the embargo entailed the type of mass mobilisation witnessed in the 1940s when local AHEPA chapters and Greek Orthodox parishes raised funds for the GWRA. In the 1970s, Cyprus “justice” or “relief” committees were formed across the United States, and the town- or county-based committees were coordinated by a statewide committee, often led by locally prominent Greek Americans. For example, the committee in the state of Connecticut was headed by George Athason the mayor of the city of Hartford, CT. Other well-known Greek Americans helped in other ways: the actor Telly Savalas narrated a documentary about the situation on Cyprus that was shown publicly by many of the local Cyprus committees. And the most public signs of the grassroots mobilisation were several rallies held in Washington DC which attracted thousands of Greek Americans (The Bridgeport Post, 1975; Bishop Gerasimos, 1975; El Paso Herald Post, 1975; Greek News, 2018).

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Greek America and the Greek Economic Crisis On the eve of the outbreak of the Greek debt crisis, the sociological profile of the Greek American community had changed considerably compared to the 1970s. However, the Greek governments seemed unaware or disinterested in tailoring their relationship with Greek Americans in order to address those changes. The first change to be noted was that Greek business persons and entrepreneurs had benefitted from the economic policies initiated by President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, especially the reductions in federal income tax and capital gains tax and the reduction of government regulations. This approach remained largely unchallenged by subsequent administrations at least until the United States experienced the so-called housing bubble that caused an economic recession between 2007 and 2009. The post-Reagan era of wealth saw a few Greek American names appearing in various “wealthiest Americans” lists and this prompted the English language weekly National Herald newspaper to publish its own list of the “fifty wealthiest Greek Americans” (National Herald, 2005). Alongside overall upward social mobility, Greek Americans continued to become more and more assimilated, especially in the case of the third- and fourth-generation immigrants. This was the case for other European ethnic groups, and this was acknowledged in a significant way by the questions posed in the 2000 US Census. While there were questions soliciting ethnic identity among Asian and Hispanic Americans, for all others the question was not whether they had an ethnic “identity” but whether they had an ethnic “heritage.” It was a choice of words that signalled an assumption that ethnic identity had eroded and become diffused into a sense of heritage (Hirschman et al., 2000). During the 1990s and early 2000s there appeared to be no visible adjustments to these changes on the part of the Greek government’s attitudes towards Greek Americans, much less an approach that would assess those changes against the claims of the role of diasporas in an era of transnationalism. Greece continued to invoke the overused phrase of “Global Hellenism,” like in its annual New Year’s greetings to all Greeks abroad. However, it did not take steps to form, as other countries have done, a centralised organisation to administer contributions from the diaspora. A study by the US-based Migration Policy Institute published in 2010 listed several countries with such bodies and mention was made about special arrangements facilitating philanthropic contributions from the United States towards Israel and Mexico. Greece did not appear at all in that

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study. A report by the SEESOX Diaspora group, focused specifically on diaspora philanthropy and Greece published in 2019, confirms that almost a decade later no central agency existed for administering Greek diaspora contributions to the homeland (Newland & Tanaka, 2010; Kamaras, 2019). If anything, these were signs of an overall disinterest in the diaspora on the part of governments in Athens. The Council of Greeks Abroad (SAE), which the government formed amid great publicity in 1995, had not managed to sustain its momentum for much more than a decade. A constitutional amendment in 2001 that paved the way for Greeks abroad to vote in the Greek elections was never followed up with legislation that could lead to its implementation. With regard to the diaspora, the effects of assimilation notwithstanding, one might have expected some coordinating body to emerge as the GWRA had in 1940, but that was not the case. One of the obvious candidates would have been the Archdiocese, the leading body of the Greek Orthodox Church but at the time the Church appeared to be focused primarily on the ambitious and costly project of restoring the church of St. Nicholas which had stood at the foot of New York’s “Twin Towers” and was destroyed on 9/11. The plan’s approval from the local authorities took up a lot of time and money, and its execution was even more challenging. One can discern the Church’s priorities by examining the Archbishop’s keynote address the Church’s Archbishop 41st Biennial Clergy-Laity Congress in 2012, the first after approval was gained for the project and a time when the crisis in Greece was in full swing. The approval of the project came earlier than any reference to aiding Greece, which was listed as a cause that was pursued by the Ladies’ Philoptochos, the women’s-based lay organisation which was responsible for all the Church’s philanthropic projects. This was followed by thanks to the contributions of the Leadership 100 Foundation and the Faith Endowment towards Church connected projects (Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America, 2012). Evidently the Church regarded aiding Greece as one of many projects it was pursuing and was not taking any initiative to coordinate efforts to aid Greece. AHEPA did not consider playing any coordinating role either. Indeed, it had left direct action to help Greece to the AHEPA chapters in Greece that had been established there in the early 2000s. The first were founded by Greek Americans who had returned to Greece but membership was not restricted to Greek Americans. Thus their contributions during the crisis, which included the provisions of medical supplies to hospitals and food

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and heating oil to needy persons, cannot be counted as diaspora contributions although the then President John Grossomanides claimed they reflected positively on the entire organisation (Grossomanides, 2012).

Critiques and Responses Within Greek America The early reactions of those two major Greek American organisations towards the unfolding situation in Greece did not go unnoticed. Complaints about their perceived inaction were aired nationally in an article that appeared in the New York Times newspaper in May 2012 and that reported on internal rumblings within the Greek American community. It opened by recounting how a student organised a fundraising walk at the National Mall in Washington DC to aid Greece. This was after he learned from his grandmother in Greece of the dire difficulties many persons there were facing because of the country’s economic downturn (Emery, 2012). The article moved on to mention both private and public criticisms made by Greek Americans about the insufficient help thus far that Greek American institutions have offered Greece. One of the most effective public critiques was issued by Gregory C. Pappas, the publisher of the Pappas Post, a widely read website with news about Greek America and Greece and founder of the Greek America Foundation, a non-profit philanthropic organisation. Both reasons for the inaction that Pappas offered were connected with the need of ethnic groups, notwithstanding their ties with their homeland, to adapt and assimilate into their current country, or in more academic terms, “integration impacts.” The first was that Greek Americans “have become so far removed (generationally) from Greece and no direct family connection remains to the ‘old country.’ As a result, they have created their own ‘Greek American’ identity and ethnicity that has no direct connection to the actual nation of modern Greece.” The second reason Pappas gave was to cite an article by influential Greek journalist Alexis Papachelas who had written that Greek Americans were not unsympathetic or indifferent towards Greece but they could not understand aspects of Greece that included conspicuous consumption by the nouveau riche, the younger generation’s cafe culture, and the obstacles to any initiatives posed by the Greek state and its legendary bureaucracy. Pappas acknowledged the validity of those reasons but concluded by stating “I don’t care if Greeks haven’t paid a penny of taxes, or have sat aimlessly at coffee shops or have bribed their way through life. … For now, let’s just focus on helping the most vulnerable in society and helping them

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get through this mess they are in. Greece needs its diaspora community to step up” (Pappas, 2012). These observations which are echoed in the case of Greek-Australian reactions to the Greek debt crisis raise several broader issues in connection with both sides of the philanthropic nexus between Greece and its diaspora (Mavroudi, 2018). With regard to the diaspora, first, its reserved early response confirms Sheffer’s point that diasporic organisations are concerned with issues relating to the country they have settled in, not only issues connected with the homeland. In his keynote speech at the Church’s Clergy-Laity Congress in 2010, then Archbishop Demetrios talked about the economic recession in the United States and how it had affected the Church’s operation because of reduced contributions from parishes. He did not mention the situation in Greece at all (Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America, 2010). And in response to the criticisms levelled against AHEPA, its president said among other things that “times are tough for families everywhere, including here in the United States” and went on to list AHEPA actions to help the needy, military personnel and disaster victims in the United States (Grossomanides, 2012). The second point about the diaspora corresponds to the generally accepted view that there is steady assimilation of Greek Americans. A sense of distancing from Greece on the part of Greek Americans has been documented in a recent survey by Angelyn Balodimas-Bartolomei (Balodimas-Bartolomei, 2012). One also has to take into account how Greece’s actions—or better, its inaction— with regard to the diaspora shaped these responses to the debt crisis. The lack of an institutionalised form of coordination of donations from abroad must have inevitably fed uncertainty if not suspicions about where and how the funds would be used. Archbishop Demetrios told the New York Times reporter that it was because of that uncertainty he went to Greece and personally handed over the $500,000 check to the head of the Greek Orthodox Church in Greece (Emery, 2012; Grammenos, 2018; Kitroeff, 2020: 259–264). The criticisms aired in 2012 made an impact and galvanised great Greek American involvement. Within weeks of those criticisms being made public in early 2012, AHEPA announced a charitable drive and reported that it raised $150,000. Over the next few years it addressed the public health crisis in Greece that was exacerbated during the economic crisis. AHEPA partnered with International Orthodox Christian Charities (IOCC) to secure ten shipping containers of medical supplies for delivery to as many as nine different hospitals all across Greece. Each shipping container

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carried between $650,000 and $850,000 in medical supplies. And by the end of the crisis it had raised $500,000 to feed those in need (Ellis, 2019). The Church could also point to a list of initiatives it had taken. The then Archbishop Demetrios told the New York Times that Greek Orthodox churches across the United States had responded with extra collections during Masses and assembled emergency kits for children and the sick. The IOCC, the Church’s relief arm, had shipped medical supplies and equipment in April. According to the IOCC website, the overall assistance it offered Greece during the economic crisis included 70,000 parcels and 600,000 meals to families; 44,000 school kits have been distributed at public schools (and refugee sites); 3600 school-supply vouchers were distributed to families to purchase necessary supplies; machinery, equipment and business mentoring benefiting over 1500 families working in agricultural cooperatives and businesses and more than $34 million worth of medical essentials like surgical gloves, syringes and blood-sample vials were donated to hospitals throughout the economic crisis (IOCC). The IOCC received a matching grant from the Rangos Family Foundation, a Greek American philanthropic institution based in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, to study how to most efficiently distribute food to those in need in Greece. This triggered contributions from other Greek American organisations such as the Jaharis Family Foundation and generated more publicity about conditions in Greece from other organisations such as the American Hellenic Institute (Lambrou, 2014). But even that increased response appears to have been relatively limited, certainly compared to the huge sums of money that went towards completing the St. Nicholas project in Lower Manhattan. In 2017 the Greek American newspaper Ethnikos Kyrix broke the news that the Archdiocese announced there had been gross mismanagement of its $30 million per annum budget over the previous years and $3.8 million that had already been raised for St. Nicholas had been illegally siphoned away to fund deficits in its general operating expenses. Later reports increased that sum to $15 million. Soon after it became known that there had been “mismanagement” of the St. Nicholas Shrine construction project, the Archdiocese defaulted on payments to the construction company and work at the site was halted (Kalmoukos, 2017, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c). Less than two years later, in May 2019, Archbishop Demetrios resigned and was replaced by Archbishop Elpidophoros whose calls for the completion of the St. Nicholas project were met with a new wave of donations. The principal donor, the Faith Endowment, had contributed a total of

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$18.7 million by early 2021. The statement accompanying the most recent instalment mentioned “The grants to St. Nicholas presented a unique opportunity of tremendous historical significance to showcase the Greek Orthodox faith and the story of Greek immigration to the US while preserving the values of our community for future generations” (Faith Endowment, 2021). It would be very difficult to argue with such an assertion, which also underscores where the priorities of the wealthiest of all Greek American organisations lie.

New Initiatives With the well-established organisations overly attentive to the needs of their members in the United States an opportunity opened up for new organisations to emerge with an exclusive focus on offering aid to Greece. It was a sign that moments such as the debt crisis in the homeland can generate new activities and organisational forms and initiatives within the diaspora. Formed in 2012, “The Hellenic Initiative” (THI) describes itself as representing the entire diaspora but is based in the United States with branches in Canada and Australia. Its executive committee includes former President Bill Clinton as honorary president and a number of wealthy Greek American philanthropists as its members, as well as basketball player Giannis Antetokounmpo. The chairman is Greek American Andrew Liveris, the former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of The Dow Chemical Company and former Executive Chairman of DowDuPont. There are a number of prominent Greek Americans on its executive board. Aside from the impressive array of executive members, the Hellenic Initiative is distinguished from other organisations because it favours grants for development rather than “handouts” and also because it has established a working relationship with several philanthropic agencies based in Greece. Its website states that its members are “committed to Greece, faults and all” and it is working for its better future. They state their work “is about investment, not handouts” and that they are “focused on impact and outcomes, whether it’s a grant to a nonprofit organisation, mentorship for an emerging entrepreneur, or investment in a small business. What matters is impact, not effort.” THI maintains “that across our global community we have what it takes to create a twenty-first century powerhouse, both within Greece and across the diaspora. And we will build it together”.

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There were several other innovative moves within the community. Pappas, the president of the Greek America Foundation, who was publicly critical of AHEPA’s efforts in 2012, launched the “Project Hope for Greece” through his own foundation in 2013. The project was designed to “inspire philanthropy among Greek North Americans and engage our network of friends and supporters to come together on a grassroots level and raise funds for deserving individuals and accredited charitable organisations in Greece.” The organisation remains active to this day and it reports that it has raised more than $750,000 “for reputable charitable organisations and individuals doing important work to alleviate the crisis in Greece” (Sirigos, 2013). This is a case of a smaller diaspora organisation engaged in a broad programme of cultural and philanthropic activities being able to direct a big part of its work towards relief initiatives. An example of an entirely new organisation emerging for the single explicit purpose of helping Greece is the Hellenic Relief Foundation based in Mineola, New York. It was founded in 2012 as a non-profit organisation with the goal of “raising funds in the United States to be used towards the purchase of food items, and other basic necessities for the underprivileged in Greece that have increased in numbers due to the current crisis.” Still active today, it reports that “around $655,000 dollars have been remitted, and with donations within Greece, as well as volunteered social and medicinal services, the true value of the aid is roughly $1.5 million dollars” (Greek News, 2020; Sirigos, 2014).

Conclusion As they had done in the 1940s and in 1974, the Greek Americans were expected to come to Greece’s side during its debt crisis. However, Greek American mobilisation appeared to be more limited both in terms of resources marshalled and in terms of ability to channel the focus of their major organisations towards Greece. This conclusion might sound surprising because one would have expected that the dire living conditions some Greeks faced might have elicited overwhelming shows of empathy and material solidarity from the diaspora. Yet there is a set of clear reasons why this was not the case. They relate to the changing sociological profile of the Greek Americans as well as Greece’s own attitude towards its diaspora in the United States and its policies towards its diasporas more generally. Compared to the 1940s and the 1970s, Greek Americans have become more assimilated and Americanised, with the percentage of Greek-born

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among them shrinking and the numbers of third, fourth and even fifth generations growing steadily. The Greek part of the Greek American hyphen is becoming more and more an attachment based on a sense of heritage rather than ethnic identity, and this is reflected in the way the US census bureau gathers its information. By the same token, the American element is growing stronger and this is reflected in the orientation of Greek American institutions which are concerned with preserving and burnishing that sense of Greek heritage with initiatives taken within the United States. A prime example is the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese’s overwhelming focus in reconstructing the St. Nicholas Church, a project of undoubted significance but so large that it absorbed most of its resources at the expense of other initiatives. If Greek America’s gradual distancing from its homeland is easy to understand in sociological terms, Greece’s attitude—or better put, lack of systematic policy towards its diaspora—is much harder to understand given the costs it entails. When a systematic policy was eventually formulated there was a remarkable failure to take any emergency steps, for example to establish an agency that would guarantee an accountable and transparent process of handling philanthropic contributions from abroad. It may well be that Greece is becoming increasingly politically and culturally oriented towards the European Union, from where remittances were compatible to those from the United States. But there is no easy explanation why this trend should somehow relegate the diaspora in the eyes of Greek policy makers. While the debt crisis exposed a growing distance between Greece and Greek America, it also yielded a silver lining. New organisations emerged and others adapted their programmes towards providing assistance to Greece—proof that the ties between Greek America and Greece are still viable.

References Anagnostou, Y. (2004). Forget the past, remember the ancestors! Modernity, ‘whiteness,’ American Hellenism, and the politics of memory in early Greek America. Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 22, 25–71. Balodimas-Bartolomei, A. (2012). Greek American identities in the 21st century: A generational approach. Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, 38(1&2), 71–97. Berman, L. C. (2020). The American Jewish philanthropic complex: The history of a multi billion dollar institution. Princeton University Press.

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Bishop Gerasimos. (1975, February 28). US urged to seek just Cyprus pact. Letters to the Editor, The Pittsburgh Press. Coppola, F. (2018, August 31). The terrible cost of Greece’s bailouts. Forbes. Retrieved April 30, 2021, from https://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2018/08/31/the-­t errible-­h uman-­c ost-­o f-­g reeces-­b ailouts/?sh= 5d6807874b31 Coufoudakis, V., & Hadji, S. B. (2017). The rule of law lobby: Grassroots mobilization and the U.S. arms embargo on Turkey, 1974–1978. American Hellenic Institute. Dufoix, S. (2006). Diasporas. University of California Press. El Paso Herald Post. (1975, February 27). Cyprus mercy film is scheduled. Ellis, T. (2019, September 11). AHEPA president spells out support for Greece. Kathimerini English Edition. Emery, T. (2012, May 18). Greek Americans struggle with response to fiscal crisis. New York Times. Faith Endowment. (2021, April 16). FAITH endowment issues final grant supporting St. Nicholas Greek Orthodox Church. Retrieved May 1, 2021, from https://www.thefaithendowment.org/2021/04/16/2324/ Gage, N. (1975, December 26). America discovers that Greek is beautiful. New York Times. Grammenos, A. (2018, September 6). Facing a new crisis in the Greek Orthodox Church in America. Kathimerini English Edition. Greek News. (2018, July 14). Greek American community’s reaction to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Greek News. (2020, July 21). Food distribution from the Hellenic Relief Foundation. Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America. (2010). Keynote Address of Archbishop Demetrios of America at the 40th Biennial Clergy-Laity Congress, Atlanta 2010. Retrieved April 27, 2021, from https://www.clergylaity.org/-­/keynote-­ address-­of-­archbishop-­demetrios-­of-­america-­at-­the-­40th-­biennial-­clergy-­laity-­ congress?inheritRedirect=true&redirect=%2Farchives%2F2010 Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America. (2012). Keynote Address of His Eminence Archbishop Demetrios of America for the 41st Biennial Clergy-Laity Congress, Monday, July 2, 2012 Phoenix, AZ. Retrieved April 28, 2021, from https://www.clergylaity.org/-­/keynote-­address-­of-­his-­eminence-­archbishop-­ demetrios-­of-­america-­for-­the-­41st-­biennial-­clergy-­laity-­congress?inheritRedire ct=true&redirect=%2Farchives%2F2012 Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America. (2013). Yearbook Greek orthodox archdiocese of America. Greek Orthodox Society of America. Grossomanides, J. (2012, January 23). AHEPA supreme president responds to Gregory Pappas. Greek News.

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Guglielmo, T. A., & Lewis, E. (2003). Changing racial meanings: Race and ethnicity in the United States 1931–1964. In R. Bayor (Ed.), Race and ethnicity in America (pp. 167–192). Columbia University Press. Hirschman, C., Alba, R., & Farley, R. (2000). The meaning and measurement of race in the US census: Glimpses into the future. Demography, 3(37), 381–393. Hu-Dehart, E. (2005). Concluding commentary: On migration, diasporas, and transnationalism in Asian American History. Journal of Asian American Studies, 8(3), 309–312. Kalmoukos, T. (2017, September 2–9). Ecumenical Patriarchate wants embattled Demetrios out. National Herald. Kalmoukos, T. (2017a, September 9–15). Bankrupt Archdiocese layoffs, budget cuts. National Herald. Kalmoukos, T. (2017b, September 23–29). Deficit, lack of transparency discussed at executive meeting. National Herald. Kalmoukos, T. (2017c, September 30–October 6). $15 million missing from St. Nicholas special account. National Herald. Kaloudis, G. (2020). Modern Greece and the diaspora Greeks in the United States. Lexington Books. Kamaras, A. (2019). Diaspora and transnational philanthropy in Greece. SEESOX Greek Diaspora Project, University of Oxford Kamaras, A. (2020). Renewing diaspora studies in Greece: A research agenda. Policy Paper #34/2020 ELIAMEP (Hellenic Foundation for Research and Foreign Policy). Kitroeff, A. (1993). Greek-American ethnicity, 1919–1939. In J.  Stanojevich Allen et al. (Eds.), To Hellenikon studies in honor of Speros Vryonis, Jr. (Vol. 2, pp. 353–371). Caratzas. Kitroeff, A. (1994). Diaspora-homeland relations and Greek-American lobbying: The Panhellenic emergency committee, 1974–1978. Journal of Modern Hellenism, 11, 19–40. Kitroeff, A. (2009). The limits of political transnationalism: The Greek American lobby. In D. Tziovas (Ed.), Greek diaspora and migration since 1700. Society, politics and culture (pp. 141–153). Ashgate. Kitroeff, A. (2019). Greek Americans and WWII. In The hour of Greece: Americans respond to October 28, 1940 (pp. 21–23). Hellenic American University. Kitroeff, A. (2020). The Greek Orthodox Church in America: A modern history. Northern Illinois & Cornell University Press. Kitsantonis, N. (2019, February 3). Greece 10 years into the economic crisis counts the costs of mental health. New York Times. Koinova, M. (2012). Autonomy and positionality in diaspora politics. International Political Sociology, 6(1), 99–103. Kyrou, A.  K. (1993). Greek nationalism and diaspora politics in America. 1940–1945: Background and analysis of ethnic responses to wartime crisis. Ph.D. dissertation. Indiana University.

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Lambrou, E. C. (2014, March 8–14). AHI’s Larigakis says IOCC recognition is well deserved long overdue. The National Herald. Leadership 100. http://www.l100.org/ Leber, G. (1972). The history of the order of AHEPA 1922–1972. The American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association. Life Magazine. (1940, December 16). Mavroudi, E. (2018). Deconstructing diasporic mobilization at a time of crisis: Perspective from the Palestinian and Greek diasporas. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 8(44), 1309–1324. Mijatović, D. (2018). Report of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, Following Her Visit to Greece from 25 to 29 June 2018. Council of Europe CommDH(2018)24. Moskos, C. (1989). Greek Americans struggle and success (2nd ed.). Rutgers University Press. National Herald. (2005, February 26). The 50 Wealthiest Greeks in America. Newland, K., & Tanaka, H. (2010). Mobilizing diaspora entrepreneurship for development. Migration Policy Institute. Orthodox Christian Laity. “Our Mission”. Retrieved May 1, 2021, from https:// ocl.org/orthodox-­christian-­laity/our-­mission/ Ostrower, F. (1995). Why the wealthy give: The culture of elite philanthropy. Princeton University Press. Papadimitriou, J. (2013, January 14). Soup kitchens for the Greek middle class. Deutsche Welle. Retrieved May 1, 2021, from https://www.dw.com/en/ soup-­kitchens-­for-­the-­greek-­middle-­class/a-­17358673 Pappas, G. C. (2012, January 2). The diaspora to the rescue in Greece… Well, almost. Huffpost. Retrieved April 27, 2021, from https://www.huffpost.com/ entry/the-­diaspora-­to-­the-­rescu_b_1176562 Roudometof, V. (2000). Transnationalism and globalization: The Greek Orthodox diaspora between Orthodox universalism and transnational nationalism. Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies, 9(3), 361–397. Rourke, J. (1983). Congress and the presidency in U.S. foreign policymaking. Westview Press. Safran, W. (1991). Diasporas in modern societies: Myths of homeland and return. Diaspora, 1(1), 83–99. Saloutos, T. (1964). The Greeks in the United States. Harvard University Press. Shain, Y. (2002). The role of diasporas in conflict perpetuation or resolution. SAIS Review, 22(2), 116. Shain, Y., & Barth, A. (2003). Diasporas and international relations theory. International Organization, 57, 449–479. Sheffer, G. (2006). Transnationalism and ethnonational diasporism. Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies, 15(1), 121–145.

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Sirigos, C. S. (2013, January 19–25). Project Hope for Greece fundraiser under way by Greek American Foundation. National Herald. Sirigos, C.  S. (2014, February 15–21). Hellenic Foundation boite night raises funds, lifts many spirits. National Herald. The Bridgeport Post. (1975, February 21). Dinner Sunday to aid Greek Cypriots? The Hellenic Initiative. Leadership. Retrieved April 27, 2021, from https://www. thehellenicinitiative.org/leadership/ The Hellenic Initiative. History. Retrieved April 27, 2021, from https://www. thehellenicinitiative.org/our-­history/ Vertovec, S. (1999). Conceiving and researching transnationalism. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 22(2), 447–462. Watanabe, P. Y. (1984). Ethnic groups, Congress and American foreign policy: The politics of the Turkish arms embargo. Greenwood Press.

CHAPTER 10

The Ecumenical Patriarchate: Bridging Greece, the Diaspora and the Orthodox World Ioannis N. Grigoriadis

Introduction With a history of more than 17 centuries, the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople has become one of the oldest institutions of our era. Operating under three empires and one nation-state—the Republic of Turkey—the Ecumenical Patriarchate has aimed to serve its mission beyond the limitations state institutions have sometimes attempted to introduce. Having safeguarded its seat in Istanbul, following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of republican Turkey, the Ecumenical Patriarchate has emerged as one of the leading institutions of the Greek diaspora. The Ecumenical Patriarchate occupies an important sui generis position, despite the demographic decline of Istanbul’s Greek minority (Alexandris, 1983, pp.  144–173, 194–206, 234–251). Being

I. N. Grigoriadis (*) Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 O. Anastasakis et al. (eds.), Diaspora Engagement in Times of Severe Economic Crisis, Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97443-5_10

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based outside the borders of the Hellenic Republic, but not in Greek diaspora territory, it bridges homeland and diaspora. It stands as a powerful symbol of Greek culture and identity while maintaining a cosmopolitan character and vision which would have been unsustainable had it been located within the borders of Greece. Orthodoxy has proven one of the strongest identity badges for diaspora Greeks, particularly in the second and third generations where language and other cultural bonds to Greece have waned. The Ecumenical Patriarchate, both due to its leading status within Orthodoxy, and its residency in Istanbul, has been able and motivated, respectively, to become the pre-eminent religious institution, as far as diaspora Greek communities are concerned. Concurrently, the Ecumenical Patriarchate has been an advocate, domestically and internationally, of interreligious coexistence and interethnic tolerance. Last but not least, as the emblematic institution of the Greek minority of Istanbul, and as the leading religious institution of the Greek diaspora, the Ecumenical Patriarchate has been supported by the Greek state. It has provided an alternative vision of Greek Orthodox Christianity to that offered by the Archdiocese of Athens, to Greek society and polity. In examining the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s relevance during the Greek economic crisis, in the context of the above, this chapter will proceed as follows. The first section briefly traces the historical dynamics that facilitated the transition of the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s role—from religious leadership among all Greek Orthodox communities, regardless of their ethnic origin, within the Ottoman Empire, to religious leadership in the post-Ottoman Empire era, among all diaspora Greeks worldwide, including most prominently the Greek Americans. In the second section, the purchase of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the Greek American community will be reviewed. This prominence accorded to the Greek American community, among all Greek diaspora communities, will be maintained throughout the chapter both (a) due to this community’s capacity, in terms of its wealth and size, to play a meaningful role in the ability of the Greek polity and society to meet the challenges of the crisis; and (b) the US global strategic weight, which means that the Ecumenical Patriarchate needs be sensitive to the US geopolitical priorities, considering also Greek American advocacy on its behalf in the United States.

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In the third section, the chapter reviews the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the post-Cold War era, particularly in championing causes such as environmentalism, interreligious and interethnic tolerance. The Ecumenical Patriarchate bolstered its position within Turkey itself by raising its international profile and by lending its support to Turkey’s Europeanisation path as much as to Greek government policy to support this Turkish path. The fourth section evaluates the efforts of the Greek government and Greek American personalities linked to the Ecumenical Patriarchate to develop the Greek state’s diaspora policy through, among other means, engaging with and aiding Greek diaspora communities in the former Soviet Union. In the fifth section, the rise of the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s geopolitical importance is charted. Particular attention is paid to the vying for influence in the post-Soviet space, as the Russian Federation aimed to restore its dominance in its “Near Abroad.” In the sixth section, the chapter delineates how these three post-Cold War developments were affected by the Greek crisis and shaped the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s role in Greece during the crisis also from the point of view of the Patriarchate’s privileged, but not unconstrained, relationship with the Greek American community—a community, potentially pivotal in terms of diaspora and homeland relationships under economic crisis conditions in the latter. The seventh and concluding section will seek to tie the threads of the chapter together by elucidating the influence that pre-crisis trajectories and relationships had on the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s role, or lack thereof, in diaspora and homeland relations during Greece’s economic crisis.

Orthodoxy, Greek Nationalism and Diaspora The rise of nationalism since the late seventeenth century has posed a critical challenge to an institution that brought together diverse ethnic groups under a single religious and cultural identity. While the specifics of the non-territorial autonomy that the millet system prescribed has raised fruitful academic debates (Barkey & Gavrilis, 2016, pp. 28–30), most would agree that the Ecumenical Patriarchate as an Ottoman institution has undertaken a significant representative role. Its identification with Greek language and culture contrasted with the diverse linguistic and cultural background of the Ottoman Orthodox subjects that were under its

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jurisdiction. This is one reason why some of the emerging nationalist movements took aim at the Ecumenical Patriarchate, accusing it of becoming an instrument of Greek nationalism1 and made efforts to establish their own ecclesiastical institutions. The rise of the Bulgarian question, the Bulgarian schism and the fierce competition about the religious loyalty of the Bulgarian-speaking Orthodox peasants throughout the Balkans, is a prime example. Despite its affinities with Greek nationalism, the Patriarchate soon realised that its status and very survival could come under question if nationalist movements succeeded in dismantling the Ottoman Empire. While Greek nationalism was spreading within Ottoman Greek elites, the Patriarchate and its circles professed that the best interests of the Patriarchate would be served not through the dismemberment of the Empire into nation-states but through its transformation to a liberal democratic polity respecting equal rights for all its citizens. Balancing between the Ottoman order and nationalist irredentism became all the more difficult in the seventeenth century when Orthodoxy was instrumentalised by several nationalist movements in the Balkans and beyond. The end of the Ottoman Empire and the transition to republican Turkey were among the most critical periods in the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s long history. While the future of the Patriarchate was put into question, it proved resilient. Despite persecution by republican Turkish governments, the Patriarchate was able to consolidate its presence and benefit from the rapprochement in Greek-Turkish relations and from building its ties with Western churches and governments. Despite the decline of its influence within the borders of republican Turkey, the Ecumenical Patriarchate maintained its role as the global spiritual centre of Orthodoxy. Being an indispensable spring of symbolic resources and through its ecclesiastical jurisdiction in countries where Greek diasporic communities have thrived, it also maintained a pivotal role for Greece’s diaspora politics. In that respect, one should not forget that despite the rise of Greek nationalism, religion has remained the most vital Greek national identity marker. Early efforts to introduce a secular, anti-religious version of Greek national identity failed to gain any traction. Mainstream Greek nationalism followed Zampelios and Paparrigopoulos in identifying Orthodoxy as one 1  The Archbishopric of Ohrid and the Patriarchate of Peç, whose jurisdictions roughly represented the territory of the medieval Bulgarian and Serbian kingdoms, were liquidated in 1767, and all their dioceses came under the administration of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.

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of the essential components of Greek national identity (Grigoriadis, 2012, pp. 25–30). This was not only due to the millet system, the confession-­ based organisation of the Ottoman society but was mirrored in the treaty that underscored the establishment of the Greek and Turkish nation-­ states. Religion, and not language or ethnicity, was the criterion set for the mandatory population exchange between Greece and Turkey in 1923. Beyond metaphysical considerations, religion has proven to be a crucial repository of cultural norms and values that have led to its instrumentalisation by various nationalist movements worldwide. This proves rather relevant in the case of diaspora communities. As language skills decline generation after generation, religious affiliation appears to be a more robust identity marker.

The Archdiocese of America and the Greek American Diaspora The significance of religion is even greater concerning the Greek diaspora community in the United States, given the relatively high religiosity degree in US society. The special links between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Greek diaspora in the United States were not only due to the emigration of a substantial part of Ottoman Greeks to the United States and the 1922 appointment of the Kadıköy-born and Bishop of Rodostolon Alexander as first Archbishop of North and South America. They became substantially reinforced by the 1948 rise of Archbishop of North and South America Athenagoras to the Patriarchal throne and the 1959 rise of the Imbros-born and Athenagoras’ close aid Iakovos to the helm of the Archdiocese of North and South America. The Greek diaspora of the United States (Papaioannou, 1985; Saloutos, 1964; Scourby, 1984) was at the heart of all these initiatives because of its demographic weight, wealth and political significance. Consisting of diverse subgroups which emigrated to the United States under different circumstances, Greek Americans vacillated between different identities and norms, assimilation (Saloutos, 1973, pp. 395–401) to the American mainstream and integration while maintaining some sense of Greekness (Scourby, 1994, pp.  128–133). This reflected their view on the Greek diaspora, as well. Intergenerational gaps within the Greek American community were also shaping competing definitions of Greek American identity (Scourby, 1980, pp.  43–45). As linguistic and cultural links with

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Greece became weaker after the first generation, religion remained the most robust identity marker.2 Developing a Greek diaspora identity would be more comfortable through collaboration with the local parish or diocese. This was particularly the case in the United States, where secularisation did not advance as in other Western societies, religiosity remained at high levels and religion remained one of the most critical identity badges. In Moskos and Moskos’ words, “It is mainly through the Church that new generations continue to be aware of sharing a destiny somehow connected with other people called Greek Americans” (Moskos and Moskos, 1989, p. 67). Local churches remained strong identity reference points transmitting values and norms, aiming to keep the identity alive in future generations. Their mission often faced challenges. In some cases, Americans of non-­ Greek descent became members of local churches, which raised the question of using English as a liturgical language. Declining Greek language skills among US-born members of the community was an additional factor in that direction. Despite these developments, the Greek Orthodox Church remained a crucial agent in producing and managing symbolic resources related to Greekness. In the words of Jusdanis, [T]he church is appropriating cultural production in Greek America. Nearly all events, from the Greek festival, Independence Day celebration of Greece (March 25), music performances, talent shows, culinary demonstrations, sports, and dances, take place physically or symbolically within the church. If ethnicity is produced and maintained institutionally, then Greek Americans can relate to one another and experience their shared culture mostly within the church. Insofar as the church serves as the locus of liturgy and culture, it is assuming a double role, secular and sacred, in the maintenance of Greek-­ American identity. (Jusdanis, 1991, p. 221)

In other words, the church is not only reflecting but actively contributing to the redefinition of Greek American identity through its own symbolic resources but also through appropriate nationalist symbolic resources. Given the above, the Archdiocese of America’s influence on Greek diaspora affairs could not be overstated. The establishment of the Greek Orthodox Church of America was linked to the conditions which shaped the emigration of hundreds of 2  Moskos came to point of arguing that Greek identity was bound to be submerged to an Orthodox one in the absence of new immigration waves from Greece.

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thousands of Greeks from the Kingdom of Greece and the Ottoman Empire, as well as the relations between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Church of Greece (Moskos, 1989, pp. 25–32). Ever since Patriarch Athenagoras moved to the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s helm from the Archdiocese of North and South America, the relationship between the two religious organisations has remained close, albeit not uncomplicated. The Archdiocese of America remains the most populous and influential of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The emergence of the church as a key diaspora actor was evident in the United States. Archbishop Iakovos’ long tenure between 1959 and 1996 as Archbishop of North and South America was identified with the growth of church organisation and the development of the United States’ diaspora activities (Efthimiou, 2000, pp. 193–210). Iakovos’ organisational skills and political acumen allowed for the emergence of the Archdiocese as a considerable political actor in the United States and for the rise of a Greek American lobby advocating Greek interests in the United States. His work reinforced the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s sui generis diasporic leadership role as an institution bridging Greece and the diaspora, due to its unique position outside the domains of Greece and the Greek diaspora. Yet, the Orthodox congregation in the United States remained divided under several ecclesiastical jurisdictions, which posed a formidable theological challenge and raised several practical issues (Kishkovsky, 2004, pp.  42–46) and identity questions for both parish members and the Archdiocese (Karpathakis, 1994, pp. 114–119). Meanwhile, the administrative dependence of the Archdiocese of America on the Ecumenical Patriarchate also raised discontent. Calls for administrative independence from the Patriarchate and establishing an autocephalous Church of America or even a Patriarchate of America were often linked to personal ambitions, local disputes or power struggles within the Greek American community. They were also related to a different understanding of the Orthodox Church as a defining element of the Greek American diaspora. A narrower Greek nationalist outlook contradicted the more cosmopolitan, global definition of Orthodoxy suggested and promoted by the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The fact that the Moscow Patriarchate remained under the full control of the Soviet regime meant that the Ecumenical Patriarchate would avoid its challenge against its spiritual leadership of the Orthodox world in the West. Moreover, since Africa remains within the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Alexandria, and a large part of Asia was under the

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jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Antioch, Western Europe, North America and Oceania were the areas of primary interest for the Patriarchate. These were also the territories with the largest Greek diasporas, together with other Orthodox communities that had established their separate ecclesiastical organisations (Grigorieff, 1972, pp. 138–146; Papathomas, 2014, pp. 435–441).

Environmentalism and the Call for Interreligious and Interethnic Tolerance The election of Bartholomew I to the helm of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 1991 was a good match for the opportunities that the post-Cold War era offered to the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Being one of the most cosmopolitan and moderate prelates of the Orthodox Church, he was best qualified to lead the effort of opening up the Orthodox Church to the world and contribute to the transformation of the Ecumenical Patriarchate to a global actor. Promoting intercommunal dialogue became a key priority. The improvement of relations with the Catholic and Protestant Churches was unprecedented. The exchange of visits of the Ecumenical Patriarch and the Pope to Rome and Istanbul respectively and official meetings between high-ranking prelates of the Orthodox and Catholic Church have now become common. Interreligious dialogue was also promoted. Taking bold initiatives of establishing dialogue with leading representatives of Islam and Judaism aimed to point at the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s pivotal role in interreligious and intercultural dialogue. The Patriarchate established relations with leading Islamic and Jewish organisations with strong followings within their respective communities. These initiatives’ importance became even more pronounced following the September 11 attacks and the beginning of the US war on terror. Distinguishing between eradicating al-Qaeda and an anti-Muslim crusade was crucial in that respect, and dialogue with moderate Islamic figures represented a vital parameter of this. The UN Dialogue of Civilizations initiative fit very well this paradigm. Nonetheless, it was the environmental campaign of the Ecumenical Patriarchate that attracted most recognition. In the early 1990s, the Patriarchate adopted the cause of environmental protection. It became one of the leading religious institutions in putting forward an agenda of ecological conservation long before the issue acquired global attention

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due to the climate crisis. The organisation of a series of environment conferences worldwide consolidated the image of the Patriarchate as an environmental leader, and Bartholomew was called the “Green Patriarch.” This was an essential recognition of the work that the Ecumenical Patriarchate has put on raising awareness on environmental issues. Protecting the environment has been an issue with solid theological foundations, as it referred to the degradation of God’s creation by means of human action. At the same time, it appealed to an agnostic or atheist global audience that embraced post-material values and was disappointed with global governance responses to environmental problems, and most importantly, the climate crisis. The growing appeal of the Ecumenical Patriarchate was reinforced by the personality of its head. Patriarch Bartholomew succeeded in increasing the Patriarchate’s soft power (Yannas, 2009, pp. 85–93). He also raised it into a global actor not only in issues of Orthodox theology but in environmental, intercultural and interfaith issues (Chryssavgis, 2009, pp. 61–101). In an era where worldwide terrorism and the clash of civilisations debates drove a wedge between Western states and the Middle East, Christianity and Islam, the Patriarch emerged as a global leader of conciliation, peace, environmental protection and sustainability. To strengthen its material and political resources, the Patriarchate became a primary religious actor at the European Union level. By gaining legitimacy through its regular high-level contacts with EU institutions and member state governments, the Ecumenical Patriarchate succeeded in reinforcing its spiritual role over the Greek diaspora across Europe, as well as its ecumenical character. With the advent of the AKP administration in 2002 in Turkey and the democratisation wave which swept Turkish politics from 2002 to 2010, the situation improved considerably. Some of the confiscated churches and buildings were restored to their rightful owners, most important of which was the Greek Orthodox Orphanage in the island of Prinkipos (Büyükada). State restrictions to the Patriarchate’s activities were loosened, while high-­ level state officials met with the Ecumenical Patriarch for the first time in decades. While the Turkish citizenship requirement for the Ecumenical Patriarch was not lifted, Turkish citizenship was awarded to several non-­ Turkey-­born bishops, priests and deacons of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. There was increasing tolerance of the international role of the Ecumenical Patriarchate; in the Turkish media there emerged arguments that its flourishing was not a security threat, but a valuable foreign policy asset for Turkey.

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Relations between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Church of Greece were nuanced by their different views of Greek nationalism and national identity. As an institution whose status and appeal had suffered heavy blows by the prevalence of nationalism, the Patriarchate was somewhat relieved by the emergence of cosmopolitan and supranational views reinforced by European integration. In contrast to that, the Church of Greece, which had turned into a pillar of Greek nationalism, felt uncomfortable—if not threatened—under the conditions of globalisation. Hence, it undertook a defensive stance that identified with the most conservative and xenophobic segments of Greek society. These differences became more apparent than ever under the administration of Archbishop Christodoulos whose moves brought the relations between the Patriarchate and the Church of Greece to the lowest point in decades. The main dispute referred to the ecclesiastical status of about 60 dioceses straddling over Ottoman territories annexed to Greece between 1912 and 1920. The Patriarchate tentatively ceded the administration of these dioceses of the Greek regions named “New Lands” to the Church of Greece in 1928. Yet, no formal cession of their jurisdiction took place. When Archbishop Christodoulos signalled his intention to pursue a complete takeover of the dioceses by the Church of Greece, the Patriarchate objected to such a fait accomplit. This dispute reflected deeper divisions and different views on the role of Orthodox Christianity in the global era. While Christodoulos’ public discourse used themes favoured by the Greek far-right and appealed to those who sided with nationalist, anti-­ globalisation, Eurosceptic and anti-Western movements, the Ecumenical Patriarchate expressed a more cosmopolitan and liberal view of Orthodoxy, which would not espouse any nationalism but sought a new role for religion in the global era of post-material values (Grigoriadis, 2009, pp. 65–68). This apparent difference was first reflected on divergent views on Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus issue. While Greek diasporas would normally take a strongly nationalist stance on issues such as Greek-­ Turkish relations and the Cyprus problem, the Ecumenical Patriarchate exercised its influence to promote moderation. While the Ecumenical Patriarchate, itself a victim of Greek-Turkish nationalist confrontation and negative reciprocity in terms of minority rights, espoused moderation and conflict resolution in the outstanding bilateral disputes and the Cyprus question, most of the bishops of the Church of Greece identified with hard-core nationalist views on Greek-Turkish disputes, the Cyprus question and warned against any conciliation or compromise efforts.

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Arguably, this was the period, from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, when the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s institutional interest by coinciding with top Greek foreign policy priorities, namely the facilitation of Turkey’s EU accession process, allowed the former to exert its maximum influence on Greek society and polity. The Ecumenical Patriarchate produced a contesting vision of Greek Orthodox identity as it relates to national identity and interest, to that of the autocephalous Archdiocese of Athens. This was so precisely because Greece’s government during that period, namely the centre-left PASOK government led by Prime Minister Costas Simitis, redefined national interests and identity along the same lines. By such an alignment, the Ecumenical Patriarchate challenged the monopoly of the Archdiocese of Athens in terms of what it meant to be Greek and Greek Orthodox at the same time. Conversely, such an alignment must have disappointed major cohorts of the Greek American community which mediated, through their religious fealty, Greek nationalism and anti-­ Turkish sentiments.

Ecclesiastical Geopolitics The end of the Cold War brought opportunities, as well as challenges for the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The independence of former Soviet republics, which hosted Orthodox populations, raised sensitive questions. The wish of the Estonian and Ukrainian authorities to sever all ties with Russia also involved ecclesiastical bonds between the Ukrainian and Estonian Orthodox Churches and the Patriarchate of Moscow. Requesting their attachment to the Ecumenical Patriarchate was a confirmation of the ecumenical role of the Patriarchate, yet it would inevitably generate trouble with Russia. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of communist rule in Eastern Europe also meant the re-emergence of the Moscow Patriarchate to ecclesiastical politics and a reconfiguration of the relations between Constantinople and Moscow. Relations with the Moscow Patriarchate soon became one of the most sensitive points of the Patriarchate’s activities. Central and Eastern European states that escaped from the grip of Moscow and newly independent post-Soviet states whose population included a substantial number of Orthodox often wished to reconsider the canonical ties of their dioceses with Moscow, which were consolidated in the Russian imperial and Soviet era, especially since the end of the Yeltsin era and the advent of the Putin administration meant that Russia would develop an antagonistic relationship with the West. This

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became a stronger trend given the full identification of the Moscow Patriarchate with the Russian state. The complete subordination of the Moscow Patriarchate to Russian foreign policy also meant that relations between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Moscow Patriarchate would be indexed to the state of relations between Russia and the West. As relations between the European Union, Greece and Turkey stagnated in the late 2000s and there were no realistic prospects for the resolution of Greek-Turkish disputes, the Cyprus problem and Turkey’s EU membership, Turkey’s closer relations with Russia on the one hand and the emergence of conflict in Ukraine meant that the role of the Ecumenical Patriarchate would become even more delicate. Friction in the relations between the two Patriarchates started early in the post-Cold War era. First, the Orthodox Church of Estonia’s decision to move from the jurisdiction of Moscow to that of Constantinople rocked the already chilly ties. Skirmishes were also noted at the local level when disputes between prelates in different Orthodox Patriarchates and Archdioceses in Eastern Europe were often interpreted as proxy disputes between Constantinople and Moscow. The controversy that could bring their relations to the brink of a meltdown was a similar initiative in Ukraine (Mitrokhin, 2001, pp.  173–179; Wasyliw, 2007, pp.  305–317). The Ukrainian Orthodox Church was divided into four. First, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, which followed the Uniate tradition and was administered by the Vatican, although it maintained the Orthodox liturgical ecclesiastical tradition. Second, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-­ Moscow Patriarchate which held relations with the Moscow Patriarchate and represented the Russophile elements of the Ukrainian Orthodox population. Third, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev Patriarchate, which emerged as a result of the 1995 split between Archbishop Philaretos and the Moscow Patriarchate (Du Quenoy, 2018, pp.  6–9). Fourth, the Autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church which remained independent from Russian influence and aspired to become the sole legitimate representative of the Orthodox faith in the country. Given Ukraine’s historic and cultural links with Russia, any attempt to move the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from Moscow to Constantinople was expected to raise furore in Moscow. Yet following the sharp escalation of Russian-Ukrainian relations, the 2014 occupation of Crimea and parts of the Donbass by Russia such concerns became weakened. There was little additional cost that Moscow could impose on Kiev in order to prevent a clear move from the Orthodox Church of Ukraine to renounce its bonds

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with Moscow and restore its links to Constantinople. This was not the case, though as far as relations between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Moscow Patriarchate were concerned. Moscow would promote its efforts to challenge the ecumenical character of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, in particular through criticism of its intercommunal activities and by undermining efforts to forge Orthodox unity under the aegis of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Russia’s involvement in the Middle East following the 2011 Arab uprisings and the subsequent Syrian civil war became an additional challenge given the alliance between the Assad regime and Russia, which had its repercussions on the relations between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Patriarchate of Antioch. These confrontations threatened to weaken the soft power appeal of the Ecumenical Patriarchate across the Orthodox world, which also reinforced its role as a unique bridge connecting Greece with the Greek diaspora and other Orthodox populations of the Ottoman-era Greek Orthodox millet. Under these circumstances, the Patriarchate took initiatives aiming to promote Orthodox unity. Organising an Orthodox synod that would confirm the united vision of the Orthodox worlds regarding global political challenges, intercommunal and interreligious dialogue would boost the appeal and the prestige of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The Patriarchate received permission to use the Hagia Eirene Museum, an early Byzantine church, close to and second in importance only to Hagia Sophia, on that occasion. Nevertheless, the sharp deterioration of Russian-Turkish relations following the downing of a Russian fighter jet in November 2016 led the Moscow Patriarchate to request the Synod’s relocation. The Panorthodox Synod meant to take place in Istanbul for the first time had to be moved to Crete. Despite the decision of the Ecumenical Patriarchate to heed to the last-minute request and transfer the venue from Istanbul and the Hagia Eirene museum to Crete, this did not prevent Moscow and its client Orthodox churches from boycotting the meeting, citing grievances with participating Orthodox Patriarchates and Churches, in particular between the Patriarchate of Antioch and that of Jerusalem. The failure to give a strong message of Orthodox unity highlighted the low state of relations between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Moscow Patriarchate. Taking the grand overview of this intra-denominational contest, one can observe three elements that if not necessarily in active and deliberate coordination with each other they are highly compatible and mutually reinforcing. The first element is the desire of the Ecumenical Patriarchate

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to renew its very claim to ecumenicity due to the dynamics set in train by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the desire of national and religious authorities in the successor states to contain Russian influence via the channel of Orthodox faith, represented by the Moscow Patriarchate acting in coordination with the Kremlin. The second element is the obvious usefulness of such an ecumenical ambition to US strategic interests and thus the reanimation of US foreign policy’s investment in the continued existence and protection of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Turkey. The third element is the natural helping hand that this coincidence of the Patriarchate’s claims to ecumenicity with US strategic interest gave to the Greek American elites in both lobbying on behalf of the Patriarchate in Washington DC and also being figures of influence, as Greek Americans, within the US capital’s governing circles.

Diaspora and the Greek State The end of the Cold War offered new and unprecedented opportunities and allowed closer relations with countries and regions where Greeks have maintained a strong presence since antiquity. Greek foreign policy in the 1990s was keen on projecting Greece’s image as the European country of the Balkans, while increased interest was shown in the Black Sea and the Caucasus. Maintaining a Greek lobby in the United States and other countries where diaspora Greeks resided was another consideration (Watanabe, 1993, pp.  35–42). Forging strong links with Greece’s diasporic communities required some institutional steps. Establishing the Council of Hellenes Abroad (Symvoulio Apodimou Ellinismou-SAE) in 1995 was understood as a pivotal move in capitalising on the Greek diaspora. SAE was expected to operate as an umbrella organisation for all diasporic NGOs, coordinate joint action, contribute to their emancipation from and serve as a liaison with the Greek state (Roudometof, 2010, pp. 160–162). Greece’s growing interest in nurturing links with diaspora Greeks was expressed through the foundation of a Secretariat General for Diaspora Greeks in 1983 within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This was understood as an essential administrative step in recognising the critical role of diaspora and building institutions aiming to provide a bridge between Greece and diaspora communities. The Ecumenical Patriarchate’s administrative organisation were crucial partners in the Greek government’s efforts to build a diaspora network. The diocese and parish network of the

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Ecumenical Patriarchate provided a strong venture point for any diaspora mobilisation activities. Finding the optimal way to regulate the relations between the Greek state, the Ecumenical Patriarchate and diaspora organisations was not an easy task. The establishment of SAE was meant to provide an institutional framework that could enable the independent and sustainable growth of a diaspora network independent of Greek state institutions. Establishing links with the Council of Greeks Abroad was a first step, which worked mainly concerning the diaspora in North America. The collapse of the Soviet Union, which allowed unimpeded access to the Greek communities of the Black Sea and the Caucasus, which found themselves in distress due to the politico-economic crises that were engendered, offered the tantalising opportunity of SAE being mobilised in a tripartite fashion to address commonly agreed aims between the Greek government, wealthy diaspora communities such as the Greek American ones and the diaspora communities of the former Soviet Union. Andrew Athens, SAE president during the 1990s, exemplified this process, as a wealthy Greek American, active supporter of the Archdiocese of America and the Ecumenical Patriarchate. In this capacity he fundraised in order to provide Greek language education to Greeks of the former Soviet Union as well as medical support. However, ongoing weaknesses among the Archdiocese of America, the political patronage of SAE by Greece’s ruling parties and the lack of bureaucratic depth of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, conditioned by enduring constraints placed by the Turkish state, all together meant one thing: that it was beyond the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s ability and resources to catalyse linkages and the flows of resources from the wealthy Greek American community to the distressed but newly accessible diasporic communities of the Caucasus and the Black Sea.

The Greek Crisis The outbreak of the Greek crisis dealt a heavy financial blow against the Ecumenical Patriarchate. As a significant part of its budget depended on donations and fundraising from Greece, the Greek economic turmoil limited its ability to promote flagship projects such as protecting the environment. The restoration of one of the essential immovable assets of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, recently recovered thanks to a European Court of Rights decision, the Prinkipos (Büyükada) Orphanage building and the establishment of a Centre of Environmental Studies in its premises were delayed indefinitely due to lack of the necessary funds. The

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reconfiguration of the use of minority buildings that used to operate as high schools but had no more that function due to the demographic decline of the minority was also delayed. The new functions of the Kentrikon Parthenagogeion (Merkez Kız Lisesi) and the Ioakeimeion Parthenagogeion (Yuvakimiyon Kız Lisesi) were debated, but no breakthrough could be achieved given the financial shortcomings and adverse domestic developments in Greece and Turkey. All these complicated the potential role of the Ecumenical Patriarchate as a cultural and educational centre for the Greek diaspora in fields well beyond theology. As the Greek society and polity turned to itself to address the impact of the economic crisis, foreign policy considerations declined in importance, and so did bilateral Greek-Turkish relations. Thus, the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s previous role, as a shaper of public attitudes in Greece of one’s twin identity as a Greek Orthodox and a Greek citizen, commensurately declined. In effect, the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s bully pulpit not only declined, in terms of its volume, but also in terms of the size of its interested audience in Greece. The Ecumenical Patriarchate’s age-old antagonist, the Archdiocese of Athens, as well as dioceses all over Greece, be they under the former’s actual control or under the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s nominal suzerainty, reoriented their efforts from expounding their version of fiery ethno-religious nationalism to attempting to mitigate, in alliance with Greek philanthropy, the severe socioeconomic consequences visited upon the faithful by the crisis. A potential opportunity would have been for the Ecumenical Patriarchate, geographically proximate to Greece and thoroughly familiar with conditions in the country through its relations with dioceses and with prominent and less prominent members of Greece’s laity, to take the lead in mobilising philanthropic support for Greece through the Archdiocese of America and the latter’s organic links with the wealthy Greek American and Greek Canadian communities. In fact, the Archdiocese of America’s own financial crisis turned it from an economic asset to a liability, as the realisation of flagship projects came under question. The deep crisis of the Archdiocese of America, despite the wealth and numbers of its faithful Greek American community, has pointed to the limits of the abilities of the Ecumenical Patriarchate to manage its diaspora organisation. Financial mismanagement and corruption allegations brought the financial situation of the Archdiocese to an unprecedented low point. Institutional weakness was manifested through the scandals around the construction of the St. Nicholas Greek Orthodox Church and

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National Shrine at the World Trade Centre, in downtown Manhattan. The temporary suspension of the project due to alleged financial mismanagement hurt the prestige of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese and jeopardised a rare opportunity to raise its profile on a global level.3 The ambitious steps of the 1990s towards the establishment of a sustainable and independent diaspora network fell below expectations. The umbilical cord connecting SAE with the Greek state was never cut. It never became possible for these activities and mobilisation to become self-­ sustained and self-funded. Most depended on the willingness of the Greek state, which provided funding for certain joint activities. Nonetheless, there was no institutional infrastructure with the aim to secure fundraising and the organisation of diaspora activities in the long term. This dependency meant that the outbreak of the Greek crisis would have a substantial effect on such activities. As the state budget suffered unprecedented cuts, so did the ability to support the diaspora network and associations. SAE was left to decline, and eventually suspended its operations, as well as the Foundation for Hellenic Culture, an organisation established to promote Greek cultural heritage within the diaspora and beyond that. The Ecumenical Patriarchate itself had to cut down on the budget of its activities in light of declining revenues from Greece, in particular given that the Archdiocese of America had its own qualms and was proving unable to deliver any significant financial support.

Conclusion In the years between the end of the Cold War and the Greek economic crisis, both the potential and the limits of the role of the Ecumenical Patriarchate as a sui generis bridge between Greece, the Greek diaspora and Orthodox populations across the world were manifested. The economic crisis also brought to light some vital institutional shortcomings that lurked for many years preventing the realisation of its potential. Due to its unique historic and cultural weight, the Ecumenical Patriarchate remains an indispensable repository of crucial symbolic resources to mobilise and revitalise the Greek diaspora. To play such a role, serious development of its human capital and infrastructure capacity is necessary, both within its headquarters and beyond, in Europe, America, Oceania 3  The St. Nicholas Greek Orthodox Church and National Shrine was finally inaugurated by Patriarch Bartholomew on 2 November 2021.

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and the Far East. The Archdiocese of America clearly remains the pivot for these activities. It is not only the demographic strength and its potential to become the key financial lifeline of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, but its symbolic position within the hegemonic Western power that provides it with additional prestige (Labriniadis, 2009, pp.  245–248). It is also its privileged position in shaping discussions on the meaning of being Greek in future generations of the Greek diaspora. Working with mainland and diaspora associations and the Greek government is essential in that respect. Maintaining transparency and good governance is vital for the Ecumenical Patriarchate to bolster its crucial role as a bridge between Greece, the Greek diaspora and other Orthodox populations, as an indispensable repository of symbolic resources defining Greek national identity. On the other hand, the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s material limitations should be acknowledged. The lesson of the economic crisis, for all those political and societal actors in Greece and in the most important Greek diaspora communities, is that diaspora and homeland relations need to be reinforced by secular actors if they are to become vital to both the homeland and the diaspora. This partial secularisation does not suggest the marginalisation of either the Ecumenical Patriarchate or its most important diaspora dioceses, such as the American one. On the contrary, such a secularisation could energise the way the Orthodox Church outside Greece relates to the homeland both through expanded partnerships between the secular and religious domains and competitive emulation.

References Alexandris, A. (1983). The Greek minority in Istanbul and Greek-Turkish relations 1918–1974. Center for Asia Minor Studies. Barkey, K., & Gavrilis, G. (2016). The Ottoman millet system: Non-territorial autonomy and its contemporary legacy. Ethnopolitics, 15(1), 24–42. Chryssavgis, J. (2009). In the world, yet not of the world: Social and global initiatives of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew. Fordham University Press. Du Quenoy, I. (2018, October 30). Christian geopolitics and the Ukrainian Ecclesiastical crisis. War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2018/10/ christian-­geopolitics-­and-­the-­ukrainian-­ecclesiastical-­crisis/ Efthimiou, R.  M. B. (2000). A brief history of Greek Orthodoxy in America 1880–2000. Greek Orthodox Theological Review, 45(1/4), 193–216. Grigoriadis, I.  N. (2009). The Orthodox Church and Greek-Turkish relations: Religion as source of rivalry or conciliation? In J. Haynes (Ed.), Religion and politics in Europe, the Middle East and North Africa (pp. 51–70). Routledge.

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Grigoriadis, I.  N. (2012). Instilling religion in Greek and Turkish Nationalism: A  ‘sacred synthesis’. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/ 9781137301208 Grigorieff, D. (1972). The Orthodox Church in America: An historical survey. The Russian Review, 31(2), 138–152. Jusdanis, G. (1991). Greek Americans and the diaspora. Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies, 1(2), 209–223. Karpathakis, A. (1994). “Whose Church is it anyway?” Greek immigrants of Astoria, New  York, and their Church. Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, 20(1), 97–122. Kishkovsky, R. L. (2004). Orthodoxy in America: Diaspora or church? Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe, 24(3), 5. Labriniadis, V. R. A. E. (2009). Challenges of Orthodoxy in America and the role of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The Greek Orthodox Theological Review, 54(1-4), 241–254. Mitrokhin, N. (2001). Aspects of the religious situation in Ukraine. Religion, State & Society, 29(3), 173–196. Moskos, C.  C. (1989). The Greek Orthodox Church in America. Journal of Modern Hellenism, 6, 25–37. Moskos, P. C., & Moskos C. C. (1989). Greek Americans: Struggle and success. Transaction Publishers. Papaioannou, G. (1985). The Odyssey of Hellenism in America. Patriarchal Institute for Patristic Studies. Papathomas, G. (2014). Ethno-Phyletism and the [So-called] Ecclesial “Diaspora”. St Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly, 57(3–4), 431–450. Roudometof, V. (2010). From Greek-Orthodox diaspora to transnational Hellenism: Greek nationalism and the identities of the diaspora. In The Call of the Homeland (pp. 139–166). Brill. Saloutos, T. (1964). The Greeks in the United States. Harvard University Press. Saloutos, T. (1973). The Greek Orthodox Church in the United States and assimilation. International Migration Review, 7(4), 395–407. Scourby, A. (1980). Three generations of Greek Americans: A study in ethnicity. International Migration Review, 14(1), 43–52. Scourby, A. (1984). The Greek Americans. Twayne Pub. Scourby, A. (1994). Ethnicity at the crossroads: The case of Greek America. Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, 20(1), 123–133. Wasyliw, Z. V. (2007). Orthodox Church divisions in newly independent Ukraine, 1991–1995. East European Quarterly, 41(3), 305–322. Watanabe, P. (1993). Ethnicity and foreign policy: Greek-American activism and the Turkish arms ban. In D. C. Constas & A. G. Platias (Eds.), Diasporas in world politics: The Greeks in comparative perspective. Palgrave Macmillan. Yannas, P. (2009). The soft power of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Mediterranean Quarterly, 20(1), 77–93.

PART IV

Diasporic Identities and Transnational Mobilisation During the Crisis

CHAPTER 11

Diaspora Public Diplomacy at a Time of Homeland Crisis: The Philotimo Nation as Global Distinction Yiorgos Anagnostou

Soft power works by convincing others to follow, or getting them to agree to, norms and institutions that produce the desired behavior. Soft power can rest on the appeal of one’s ideas or the ability to set the agenda in ways that shape the preferences of others. ––Joseph S. Nye Jr., 2004a

Introduction Public diplomacy expands the practice of traditional diplomacy by involving nongovernmental entities for the purpose of promoting a nation’s interests among the general public in foreign societies. It entails, in other words, the activities of social entities such as nonprofit organisations, think tanks, cultural institutions, diaspora associations, and other sectors of civil

Y. Anagnostou (*) The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 O. Anastasakis et al. (eds.), Diaspora Engagement in Times of Severe Economic Crisis, Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97443-5_11

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society with the aim of generating favourable perceptions of a country internationally. Now valued as a key supplement to traditional diplomacy, public diplomacy is advocated as a necessary strategy to reach out and win over the hearts and minds of people in realms where a government appears ineffective either because of people’s mistrust of it as a self-interested institution, or its relative weak positioning to engage these audiences. Public diplomacy involves more than the dissemination of news, images, and information. It relies on cultural narratives, such as human interest stories, documentaries, films, the arts, as well as academic and cultural exchanges such as fellowships, conferences, residencies, all of which the nongovernmental sector can produce and claim to deliver independently from governmental control. Public diplomacy posits the power of culture––values and ideas––as the means to engage and attract international audiences, a constituency that “may prove a harder nut to crack” (Melissen, 2005: 25) via state-centred initiatives. Public diplomacy’s function as potentially constitutive “soft power” emerges as a significant player in the political business of advancing national interests (see Nye Jr., 2004b). In this respect, public policy functions as a mode of governing global perceptions of national identity. This chapter discusses how public diplomacy matters as a mode of US Greek diaspora engagement on behalf of the homeland in the context of the Greek debt crisis. A development whose advent is traced to the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the debt crisis not only brought about the Greek state’s catastrophic financial collapse and the ensuing humanitarian and social devastation; it also generated a crisis of national identity. In international media and popular explanations of this crisis, Greece’s reputation was tarnished via an onslaught of negative stereotypes about the corrupt and inefficient Greeks, images that undermined the county’s respectability and credibility. With the national image seriously damaged internationally, a discourse was set in motion across the English-­ speaking work via a broad array of agents––Greek American grassroots initiatives, the American Embassy in Athens, US diaspora organisations, and entrepreneurs, among others––for the purpose of countering the devaluation of the Greeks (see Anagnostou, 2017). The public policy engagement represents a component of this cultural politics, which, operating in tandem with nation-branding, was effective in shaping US diplomatic as well as popular language towards Greece. What were the strategies and mechanisms through which the US Greek diaspora deployed the narrative of public diplomacy? How did this

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engagement connect with pre-crisis diaspora discourses advocating Greek national interests in the United States? A political ritual that takes place annually at the White House in Washington DC offers the departure point for this inquiry. This event, hosted by the president of the United States, honours Greek Independence Day, March 25, which officially commemorates the Greek Revolution against the Ottoman empire. Since the Carter administration issued the annual Presidential Proclamation that put this recognition into effect, the ceremony has become an institutionalised diplomatic occasion. In 2010, then President Barak Obama proclaimed March 25 as “Greek Independence Day: A National Day of Celebration of Greek and American Democracy.” The document focused, as it has been customary, on “the Hellenic ideal of democracy,” which the United States inherited, and which “reinforces the enduring bonds” between the two nations (United States, Office of the Press Secretary, 2010). This position, of recognising the US indebtedness and commitment to the Hellenic ideal, is a consistent theme in establishing a common ground for diplomatic purposes. Indeed, the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs foregrounds “the two countries’ common values––freedom and Democracy––” as one of the foundations “of Greek-US strategic cooperation” (Greece in the USA, 2012). In full display at the White House event is an enduring ideology that structures this bilateral political relation. I draw attention to the 2010 event because it represents an important moment of diplomacy in the history of the Greek crisis, namely a time when Greece was finding itself at the brink of default in what proved to be a devastating economic and social upheaval. In attendance at the White House ceremony were Greek American civic and religious leaders, Greek diplomats, US high-ranking officials, and, exceptionally for that year, the prime minister of Greece, part of his diplomatic tour of the United States and Europe for the purpose of requesting international bailout emergency financial aid.1 The stakes were exceedingly high. Presiding over the ceremony, President Obama pledged solidarity with Greece. It is of significance that a Greek cultural value––philotimo (love of honour)––organised his speech. The president foregrounded it as the value shaping the political and cultural bonds between the United States and Greece throughout history. He portrayed philotimo as a diachronic essence of the Greek nation and the driving force in the making of Greek ancient 1  In early 2010s, Greece “was forced to request international bailout emergency financial aid, which was granted [110 billion (euros)] in May 2010” (Pappas, 2014: 3).

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democracy, whose political significance for the founding fathers and US ideals of citizenship makes the United States indebted to Greece. The president recognised philotimo as a potent force resonating cross-culturally across institutions as well as between individuals. One finds it in the “timeless texts” of ancient Greece, he noted, offering a personal example: Greek mythology as a source influencing the president himself (Honoring Greek Independence Day, 2010). The speech highlighted the attribute of philotimo as an ethic of compassion towards embattled populations, which President Obama saw as a shared global commitment aligning US and Greek strategic interests. Culture was utilised by the government for building bilateral political mutuality. There is nothing exceptional, at a first glance, to this evocation of philotimo by a US leader. It “has become almost a cliché,” Charles and Peter Moskos (2014) note, “for non-Greek politicians to evoke the concept of philotimo when addressing Greek American crowds” (37fn15). In doing so they apply a cardinal principle of diplomacy, the recognition of an important component of an American ethnic group’s self-definition. Philotimo is a multisemantic term denoting an array of meanings in relation to the moral category of honour, including an individual’s adherence to and acting upon a moral code of social expectations. While in traditional communities it entails conformity to dominant values, in modernity it displays semantic plasticity, making it applicable to a multitude of personalised moralities––from religion to patriotism to compassion towards vulnerable groups (see Anagnostou, 2021). In the Greek American case, it refers to a constellation of virtues––translated as courage, self-esteem, dignity, integrity, obligation to a collective, compassion––but also, as I will show, as an immutable national essence. It has been central to Greek American identity historically, both for internal and external purposes, including lobbying. When President Jimmy Carter, for example, retreated from his 1978 campaign promise to retain the US arms embargo against Turkey, Greek American political leaders framed their opposition in terms of offended philotimo (Moskos, 1990: 8fn16). Culture intermeshes with diaspora politics. A pioneer in the practice of public diplomacy, through its highest representatives, the United States incorporates a key identity term of an ethnic and diaspora group in the interest of bilateral relations, and, later in the 2010s as we will see, of broader geopolitical considerations. The highly visible adoption of philotimo by American diplomatic circles during the crisis represents the culmination, in fact institutionalisation, of a pre-crisis

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cultural narrative, which a Greek American civic elite employed to engage with the US government. The crisis led this elite to institutionalise this narrative, which it connected with a narrative of Greek exceptionalism. Promoted via public policy, this initiative proved successful––as I will show––in placing philotimo at the centre of the US diplomatic vocabulary as well as global popular and media discourse about Greece. The diaspora-driven engagement I will discuss in this chapter offers insights about the importance of national history and culture as a public policy tool to advance not only the interests of the homeland, but also those of the diaspora. For the crisis of national identity also presents a crisis for diaspora identity. By fostering a positive national image, the diaspora extols the global Greek nation, and in this manner safeguarding its own social distinction in relation to the home society. The crisis then implicates the diaspora and the homeland in a transnational field of political action with global implications. As my discourse analysis will show, diaspora public policy reverses global socioeconomic hierarchies, portraying the Greeks as a moral exemplar of global citizenship.

Diaspora Public Diplomacy and the Washington OXI DAY Foundation Diaspora public policy is a component of a broader phenomenon of diaspora engagement for the purpose of empowering itself along with its historical homeland. In a world of global interconnectedness, diasporas have emerged as major non-state actors who commonly exercise both “hard (economic) and soft (cultural) power” (Stone & Douglas, 2018: 711), two interconnected operations which seek to constitute positive public perceptions about the identities they promote. Diasporas represent “sources of financial, human, and social capital,” contributing to the production of prestige-enhancing knowledge and images. They do so through various techniques––websites, campaigns, documentaries, social events–– aiming to regulate the way international audiences think and talk about a nation and its identity. This function renders diasporas as practices of governmentality (Larner, 2008). Diasporas, particularly socioeconomically powerful ones, are often at the forefront of public diplomacy on behalf of their historical homeland. Their political, civic, and business interests place them within a dense network of influential institutions at home, which in turns enables their

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reaching out deeply and quickly to diverse target audiences, including their own constituencies (Leonard et al., 2002). It is frequently the case that some diasporas cultivate long-term relations with government officials and policymakers in the context of lobbying, which is an essential dimension of public diplomacy. In particular, diasporas that are historically entrenched in the fabric of their home societies possess an additional advantage. Their proven loyalty to their home nation cancels the negative prospect of being seen as a tool of a foreign government and therefore antagonistic to national interests. The Greek American diaspora represents such an example. When President Obama, for example, honoured “the accomplishments of Greek Americans and their immeasurable contributions to the United States,” in his 2010 Presidential Declaration, he was unequivocally recognising this group as an asset for the nation (United States, Office of the Press Secretary, 2010). The question of diaspora allegiance came up prominently in the context of a contentious issue between the Greek American leadership and the Greek government in the 1990s regarding diaspora’s global governance. As journalist and author Nicholas Gage maintained during the controversy, “any official link between Greek Americans and the Greek government can only be damaging. ‘It would undermine our [Greek American] influence in the US because it will make it look like we’re an instrument of the Greek government’” (Maniatis, 1995: 28). A parallel political thinking also guides Greek American lobbying historically. It is not an accident that lobbying and civic organisations such as the American Hellenic Institute (AHI), American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association (AHEPA), and Hellenic American Leadership Council (HALC), among others, operate first and foremost as American groups. Greek American political support of Greece expresses the “continuing support that Americans of Greek ancestry give to the causes of the old country,” Charles Moskos (1990) writes. It represents a politics predicated on “a deep and abiding belief that what is good for America is good for Greece and vice versa” (169). Diaspora lobbying is mediated by the alignment of home national and diaspora interests. Greek American public policy at the time of the Greek crisis takes place within this history of political mutuality. It is most prominently articulated by The Washington OXI DAY Foundation, a nonprofit organisation established in 2011, in the immediate aftermath of the crisis. The Foundation’s mission links a Western value––advocacy for freedom and democracy––with a particular historical Greek stance that defended this

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virtue during the Second World War, and, significantly, includes the aim of improving “the perception of Greece today” (About The Washington OXI DAY Foundation).2 The main strategy of restoring the dramatically damaged image of the historical homeland is to place the Greek people as a major player, in fact an exemplar, in the history of heroic global opposition to authoritarianism. The Foundation’s narrative commemorates the refusal of Greece to surrender to the Axis powers, extolling the national heroism in the fight against Mussolini and the Nazi invasion, with particular reference to the battle of Crete. The battle is foregrounded as a key act of defending national freedom, ultimately shaping the outcome of the Second World War: “Greece’s disruption of Hitler’s war timetable forced him into the debilitating Russian winter where he met defeat” (Greece in World War II). Had it not been for Greece, as world political leaders recognised at the time and which the Foundation cites, the outcome of the war would have been all-together different. The “Oxi Day” marks Greece’s entrance to the Second World War, on October 28, 1940, when the Greek dictator Ioannis Metaxas refuted Mussolini’s ultimatum for surrender.3 It led to the Greco-Italian war (October 1940–April 1941), and Mussolini’s defeat, which was heralded in the West as a sign of Axis vulnerability. “The Amazing Greeks Win Freedom’s First Victory,” the December 1940s edition of Life Magazine declared, featuring the now iconic image of a triumphant Evzone on its cover. The New  York Times similarly praised Greece’s fight for independence, placing it as a part of a diachronic “heroic tradition,” which “establishes once more the title to nationhood of a brave and ancient people” (in Karapidaki et  al., 2019: 53). Distinguished leaders of the free world 2  It is now standard practice for governments to engage their diasporas through public diplomacy. It is of interest to note that the intensification of Greek American public diplomacy coincides with the Turkish state’s launching of the Office of Public Diplomacy within the Turkish Prime Ministry in 2010,” in an initiative to utilise “public diplomacy ‘as a platform for the implementation of soft power,’” which included the US Turkish American diaspora (Köşer Akçapar & Bayraktar, 2017: 140). Greece and Turkey vie for influence in Washington over a variety of contested issues between the two states. 3  The fact that Ioannis Metaxas was a dictator poses a challenge for the democracy-centred narrative of The Washington OXI DAY Foundation. The foundation privileges his alliance with the democratic powers against the Axis while it refrains from referencing his oppressive regime. “The ideological content of Metaxas’s reforms,” Mogens Pelt (2001) writes, “had much in common with Fascism and Nazism, and can be seen as an attempt to reorient Greece in a direction which would also make it conform with the planned Axis ‘New Order’ in Europe” (57).

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extolled the Greeks for displaying unprecedented heroism, as the oft-cited statement by Winston Churchill––“we will not say that Greeks fight like heroes, but that heroes fight like Greeks”––famously declared. It is this historical moment of world recognition for Greece that The Washington OXI DAY Foundation foregrounds to restore in global memory this forgotten heroism, and, consequently, acclaim Greece as an exceptional case. Greece stands out as the “Only Non-Big Three (United States, Great Britain and Russia) Country Credited with Nazi Defeat,” which exemplifies a “David vs Goliath” fight for freedom (Greece in World War II). In an information-saturated world, public diplomacy consultants stress the importance of simple and resonant strategic messages. The communication of Greece’s heroism via biblical imagery of underdog resilience in valiant defence of freedom is positioned to draw attention and generate admiration across the US public because it dovetails with national and religious ideals. The succinct semiotics in the title of the Foundation also commands attention, as the phrase “Oxi Day” underlines a particular nation’s contribution to defending a universal value. It inserts a Greek word in the global vocabulary of resisting authoritarianism. In this respect, the Foundation continues the politics of the Greek American alignment with American ideals. It highlights Greek values associated with Second Word War––courage, sacrifice, obligation, service to the country and community, and resistance to authoritative regimes––which are also US patriotic and civic virtues. Best practices in public diplomacy dictate the identification of a target audience, the understanding of its interests, the articulation of a relevant message, and the building of long-term relations based on common interests. The Washington OXI DAY Foundation, now more than ten years into its operation, follows all these principles in the sphere of civil society via cooperative diplomacy within a powerful network of US political and civic leaders advocating democracy beyond the US shores. As its statement of purpose makes clear, the Foundation is “dedicated to informing American policymakers and the public about the profound role Greece played in bringing about the outcome of World War II and celebrating modern day heroes who exhibit the same courage as the Greeks did in continuing to fight to preserve and promote freedom and democracy around the world” (Our Mission). The Foundation makes a case for the contemporary global relevance of a modern Greek example, and in doing so it places itself as a player among those US institutions advocating democracy abroad as an essential component of US foreign policy.

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Public policy calls for formal activities that reinforce an organisation’s core message (Leonard et al., 2002). The linkage between the Greek past of heroic resistance to authoritarianism and the Foundation’s commitment to advocate this heroism in the present is performed during the Foundation’s signature Annual Washington OXI DAY Celebration. This black-tie awards gala brings “together senior US policymakers and other international opinion leaders and influential Washingtonians, along with prominent Greek-American leaders,” to recognise high-profile global figures committed to fighting authoritarianism, often at high personal risk. Awardees include democracy icon at the time and recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize (1991) Aung San Suu Kyi and, posthumously, the late journalist and dissident of Saudi Arabia’s government Jamal Khashoggi. This is in accordance with policy strategies advocated by US civic and governmental advocates of democratisation in target regions such as the Middle East. According to Jennifer Windsor (2003), executive director of the Washington DC-based Freedom House, a nonpartisan organisation that promotes democracy and human rights, “democratisation has always been primarily an indigenous process, often generated and sustained by courageous men and women who push for political change within their societies.” Extending support “to those struggling for reform within their societies” is seen as the best policy practice (50). Recipients are extolled for their courageous activism on behalf of democratic openness. In an obvious analogy with Greece’s Second World War global example, they are also portrayed as the “modern-day Davids who have demonstrated the same courage as the Greeks in fighting for democracy and freedom” (Annual Celebration). In addition, the Foundation extends awards to Greek Americans and US citizens for their service to the armed forces and community, a recognition that takes place at the highly symbolic National World War Memorial in Washington DC. What is more, its virtual wall of heroes honours Greeks and Greek Americans who distinguished themselves in the Second World War. This is niche public diplomacy of mutuality par excellence. It places Greek national, ethnic, and American citizens within a common imaginary of active resistance to authoritarianism and sacrifice for the nation, endowing distinction to global Greeks and the Foundation that represents them.

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State and Non-state Sectors: Public Diplomacy, Branding, and Global Distinction In 2012, in a severe stage of the crisis, the Greek government embraced branding as part of its policy, creating a network of governmental organisations and think tanks to “effectively protect the image and reputation of Greece in the international markets” (Bisa, 2013: 64). The preliminary step involved “extended market research to get more ‘out-of-the-box’ ideas on how to resuscitate Greece’s reputation in the U.S. and reach a more targeted audience that will ‘create a new segment of the market’” (65). The discourse moved beyond campaigning––which was commonly utilised even in the pre-crisis environment to promote tourism––to mobilise a branding process that connected the making of a positive national image with the recovering of Greece’s credibility in the global markets and attracting investment capital. A governmental organisation, Marketing Greece, proposed a synergy between “the public and private sectors to share the costs of marketing practices and boost the country’s image abroad” (Bisa, 2013: 64). Parallel to this early state-driven mobilisation a new form of direct public diplomacy emerged: initiatives by the private (corporate) sector and the diaspora reaching out to foreign publics with the aim of restoring Greece’s international image. Some were propelled by brand professionals and involved citizen participation. A voluntary group called Up Greek Tourism, for example, raised funds to pay for billboard space in Times Square in New York City and Piccadilly Circus in London. Corporations and businesses initiated “Greece is Changing” and “Give Greece a Chance.” Greek America engaged too, via “Reinventing Greece,” a media project conducted by “young Greek Americans … to report on how Greeks are addressing” the crisis (Vaxevanidou, 2017: 65). The majority of these organisations were short lived. The common assumption is that the absence of a “central authority” “that should have been responsible for connecting and directing the several ‘voices’ of Greece abroad” is the reason for this kind of failure (64). In its focus to transmit a positive national image that reduces identity to an essence, public diplomacy often approximates the ideological work of branding. In the Greek American example, this coupling was carried out via a synergy across various state, civic, cultural, and private organisations––including The Washington OXI DAY Foundation–––which elevated philotimo as a central branding image. This Greek American

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branding, as I have explained elsewhere, linked the moral attributes of philotimo with capital investments in Greece in the context of countries competing internationally for economic resources (Anagnostou, 2021). Below, I consider how the Greek American coupling of public policy with branding informed an identity politics that posited the moral superiority of the Greeks globally. The crisis revived with vengeance a contentious historical debate about the right of modern Greeks to legitimately claim themselves as heirs of the classical Greek legacy. In broad circulation in Western media was the notion that the Greek bankruptcy invalidated the Greek claim to the prestigious ancient pedigree. In the hands of cartoonists, to mention an example, classical images––the Acropolis, Venus de Milo, the Discobolus––that Western Hellenism has endowed classical Greece with international recognition and prestige are resituated in the context of the crisis and “depicted in shambles, clearly suggesting that the country has disgraced its patrimony” (Talalay, 2013: 269). Seen as unworthy of their illustrious ancestors, “Greeks don’t deserve Greece” (Tziovas, 2017: 32). The philotimo narrative explicitly intervenes in this devaluation. The charge of Greeks as lesser in relation to both ancestors and Western contemporaries is answered through a common trope in Greece’s history of engagement with externally imposed hierarchies: reversal of power relations by demonstrating the moral superiority of the Greeks in the face of political and economic subordination by outsiders (Herzfeld, 1987). Philotimo served this politics centrally. It is posited as a diachronic Greek ideal––a national possession often cast as a biological attribute of the Greeks––and of supreme relevance for the world today regarding global citizenship. This reification of philotimo utilises a basic tenet of public diplomacy, namely the notion of “a deeper [national] identity” (Leonard et al., 2002: 14) as the means to establish positive uniqueness. Cultural nationalism, in other words, was put into the service of conferring modern Greek culture with global distinction. The ideology that links philotimo with ancient and modern Greece, and in turn global citizenship, is popularised by the founder of the Philotimo Foundation, an academic, popular writer, and intellectual of the philotimo discourse: Although one may be too quick to argue that modern Greeks have a long way to go before escaping the shadow of their ancestors, let alone be in a position to give lessons to the rest of us (especially following Greece’s

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s­ capegoating as a central culprit behind the latest global economic crisis), I would once more urge you to consider the (mostly unanswered) question of philotimo, as a question of what makes a good citizen who knows right from wrong and to whom falls the duty of protecting the well-being of the Polis. Searching for the “Greek Secret” [philotimo] may not seem like an important concern for the average English-speaking reader, but asking ourselves what defines the American, British or German Secret, could prove of paramount importance during times where civic unrest in the name of social justice is shaking the foundations of Western democracies. (Hatzimalonas, 2014/2015)

The reference to the “Greek Secret” testifies to the synergies involved in this mode of public diplomacy. The author circulates the gist of The Washington OXI DAY Foundation’s message, as expressed in its influential short film “The Greek Secret of Philotimo” (2014). Philotimo is asserted as an intrinsic property of the Greek people, the national “secret” that explains diachronic achievements, from the formation of ancient Greek democracy to Greece’s resistance of the Nazis to the socioeconomic mobility of Greek Americans. The author weaves national distinctiveness, globality, and collaborative public policy on behalf of Western democratisation. The potential for a Western alliance to advocate social justice across the globe is framed in terms of both international cooperation and (implied) national competitiveness. Philotimo offers the Greek answer as to what makes ethical global citizenship. Powerful countries, in contrast, have yet to figure out the specifics––the secrets––of their potential contribution. The coupling of public diplomacy with branding requires national distinctiveness––and distinction––via a value unique to a nation. Hence philotimo cannot be proposed as a template available for replication by others, but, significantly, as a leading catalyst for other nations to discover their own corresponding values, their own national secrets. This is consistent with the logic of nationalism. From its perspective, as Gregory Jusdanis (2001) observes, following Herder, “nations should desist from copying others, look for strength in themselves, and value their own unique qualities” (9). Cultural nationalism intervenes in the international devaluation of the Greeks when it posits philotimo as a unique essence of global Greek ethical citizenship and a resource of ecumenical value. According to one of its organic intellectuals, philotimo is “a principal character virtue for over 18  million Greeks around the world [and] is a distinct, timeless, and

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relevant phenomenon that is at once acutely culture specific yet abounds with universal moral implications” (Hatzimalonas, 2018: 483). The value of compassion for vulnerable populations, for instance, “often thought of as being conducive to a thriving society,” is seen as authentically in excess in Greece “while being in short supply across modern societies of the world today.” “[I]t provides a distinctly resourceful look at cultural traits at the center of a modern global crisis,” and therefore “could form a model for prototyping the pursuit of virtue in Western society” (483–84). If for Western media the Greek crisis construes the contrast between modern and ancient Greeks as “never in unison, nor in harmony” (Tziovas, 2017: 39), the philotimo discourse counters this accusation when it posits philotimo as a direct link between the two, and, in fact, the living Greeks as prototypical Westerners. If the ideology of continuity advances the claim of Europe owing a debt to Greece, the philotimo narrative extends this debt to modern Greeks. Contemporary Greek citizenry embodies a fundamental social worth which is positioned to inspire the West––in fact the world––in the context of a moral global crisis. In the hierarchical global marketplace of culture, philotimo as national possession positions Greeks as the world’s exemplary moral citizens. In addition to commanding universal appreciation, its nationalist usage performs further work by reversing socioeconomic and political hierarchies and placing the Greeks at the highest peak in the “global hierarchy of value” (Herzfeld, 2004). This mode of public diplomacy therefore moves beyond the mere rehabilitation of the tarnished national image on the international stage. It advances the idea of Greece as a moral nation whose principles make it a constitutive player in discussions about global citizenship. In fact, it takes the crucial step of claiming modern Greek identity as an exemplar for global citizenship, the foundation for global morality.

US Foreign Policy and Greek Global Distinction Philotimo figured prominently in President Obama’s speech on November 16, 2016, at the Stavros Niarchos Foundation Cultural Center in Athens, Greece. The president’s visit to the country was part of a European tour, whose itinerary also included Berlin, prior to his stepping out of office. A close look at the rhetoric of his speech in Athens indicates that it was designed to reach more than the immediate Greek public and include as its target audience the “overhearing” high-ranking European gatekeepers in power of managing the Greek debt. Crafting the speech as “a eulogy to

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democracy,” President Obama crafted his oratory to express a multifaceted appreciation of modern Greece and deliver a powerful foreign policy statement directed to Greece’s creditors. It advocated debt relief, which was eagerly sought by the country (Theodoropoulou, 2020). The speech was a paean to Greece, ancient and modern, praising the two as global exemplars of democratic practice. It reiterated the common American admiration of ancient Greece as the cradle for democracy while extolling contemporary Greece as a democratic exemplar of empathy towards vulnerable Others. The president asserted that multiethnic inclusion lies at the core of democracy and drew a parallel between democratic openness in the United States and Greece to subsequently extend special credit to the host country. Because our democracies are inclusive, we’re able to welcome people and refugees in need to our countries. And nowhere have we seen that compassion more evident than here in Greece. The Greek people’s generosity towards refugees arriving on your shores has inspired the world … the fact that your democracy opens your heart to people in need in a way that might not otherwise be the case. (United States, Office of the Press Secretary, 2016)

The praise is consistent with President Obama’s foreign policy, which emphasised “universal rights and principles,” and the view of democracy as a process “not just about freedom and elections but also about the rule of law, justice, dignity, and other values” such as acceptance of religious and ethnic pluralism (Carothers, 2013: 198). Along these lines, the speech amplified the international recognition in 2016 of Greek people’s extensive solidarity with the refugees entering the country. Greece––particularly a host of islands in the northeastern Aegean––along with Italy and Malta, were major entry points for thousands of refugees and economic migrants who were fleeing zones of war and violence in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, among other countries, seeking entrance to the European Union. International media were replete with stories of ordinary Greeks extending vital support to the newcomers. The New  York Times, for example, featured on its front page the Oscar-nominated short documentary “4.1 Miles,” a story of a coast guard captain’s valiant efforts to save refugees from drowning (Matziaraki, 2016). What is more, the image of three elderly women feeding a refugee baby on a Greek island––a photograph that went viral in global media––served as an icon of Greek humanness (anthropia). It resulted in the official nomination of one of the women for

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the Nobel Peace Prize. The Greek prime minister at the time and the president of the Greek Republic lauded this gesture of solidarity as an iconic representation of Greece as the “good face of Europe” (Papataxiarchis, 2016: 4). In a paradigmatic foreign policy gesture, President Obama did not miss the opportunity in this juncture to foreground Greece’s exceptional compassion––an integral element of the philotimo narrative––for a domestic and global audience. The following statement attests his policy acumen: In every corner of the world, I have met people who, in their daily lives, demonstrate that despite differences of race or religion or creed or color, we have the capacity to see each other in ourselves. Like the woman here in Greece who said of the refugees arriving on these shores, “we live under the same sun. We fall in love under the same moon. We are all human––we have to help these people.” Women like that give me hope. (United States, Office of the Press Secretary, 2016)

The example of ordinary people exhibiting humane behaviour operates indeed as soft power for foreign policy. Anthropologist Evthymios Papataxiarchis (2016) aptly captures how empathy may serve political interests. “In public discourse,” he writes, “the disinterested generosity of ‘ordinary individuals,’ … is transformed from an inalienable quality of action into an alienable substance that can be further circulated, shared in various directions with various people and used for various political, social and economic purposes” (4). For the Greek government, as I mentioned, Greek humanness represents “the good face of Europe”; and for the US government, Greek humanness serves as an inspiration for the world. This alignment creates a common diplomatic ground, endowing Greece with global distinction. Ultimately, President Obama moved away from cultural nationalism to render Greek philotimo a cross-cultural value. He saved an explicit reference to this crossing for the conclusion of his speech after registering his unease about the dramatic rise in global socioeconomic inequality, xenophobia, and corporate abuses, identifying them as major threats to democracy as well as forces miring globalisation––which he otherwise endorsed. Philotimo is proposed as a citizen’s duty to confront the excesses of capitalism and the evils of nationalism. It represents the ethical core of the engaged citizen.

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In all of our communities, I still believe there’s more of what Greeks call philotimo—love, and respect, and kindness for family and community and country, and a sense that we’re all in this together, with obligations to each other. Philotimo—I see it every day and that gives me hope. Because in the end, it is up to us. It’s not somebody else’s job, it’s not somebody else’s responsibility, but it’s the citizens of our countries and the citizens of the world to bend that arc of history toward justice. And that’s what democracy allows us to do. … The most important title is “citizen.” (Applause.) And in all our nations it will always be our citizens who decide the kind of countries we will be, the ideals that we will reach for, the values that will define us. In this great, imperfect, but necessary system of self-government, power and progress will always come from “We, the people”. (United States, Office of the Press Secretary, 2016)

If the aim of public diplomacy is to achieve the international recognition of a nation’s projected image, the activism of The Washington OXI DAY Foundation and its collaborating diaspora networks could claim some success: the US president embracing philotimo as a major component of his diplomacy. Turning one’s self-perception into a perception by Others is the goal and the measure of effectiveness in public policy (Vaxevanidou, 2017). President Obama of course neutralised the implications of philotimo as a singular national possession, framing it instead as a shared ideal across nations. In fact, he universalised the concept, moving beyond cultural nationalism, and placing it centrally in the discourse of global democracy. The international devaluation of the Greeks is not only cancelled out, but it is reversed as the Greek example becomes the paradigmatic centrepiece for active citizenship across the world. How much political power is there in the soft power of philotimo? There is a gap, of course, between a government’s diplomatic rhetoric and its actual geopolitical manoeuvring. Indeed, commentators juxtaposed the speech’s loftiness with its substantive shortcomings in terms of realpolitik. President Obama’s visit to Athens was seen as “amount[ing] to empty gestures of reassurance, and little more than a courtesy visit, by a US president eking out the last leg of his term.” The president “made no attempt to hint at any US intention to give Greece a leg up on the IMF [International Monetary Fund] negotiations,” journalist Maria Paradia (2016) notes, nor did he allude “to any ways the US could actually allow Greece to rekindle its lost hope.” Philotimo may be lauded by world and civic leaders as compassion towards the vulnerable and those in need, including the sectors of Greek society experiencing acute humanitarian crisis, but other

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factors such as economic interests enter into the equation when it comes to geopolitical power relations. Dissonance always lurks between diplomacy talk and corresponding political action or inaction. Still, what is missing in this critique is the fact that President Obama took an unequivocal stance on behalf of granting debt relief to Greece on his speech (and perhaps behind closed doors with German Chancellor Angela Merkel whom he met when visiting Berlin next). The debt relief eventually materialised in 2018. One thing is for certain, though. In an international arena where countries compete for attention and prestige, President Obama’s diplomacy brought Greek culture into the global limelight, lending presidential authority to the endorsement of Greece’s contemporary relevance globally. Philotimo provides a rhetorical space to cultivate the goodwill between the United States and Greece and in doing so in public it carries this message over to the international arena. The discourse percolates into US popular culture, as non-Greek professionals and ordinary citizens further endorse it. “Become a philotimo person,” an author holding a Ph.D. urges the readers of Psychology Today. “Americans need to take notice and assimilate the principles of philotimo into the fabric of our society. The Greek word that has no meaning can bring meaning back into all our lives” (Schafer, 2015). Philotimo saturates the discourse of self-making beyond the United States (Anagnostou, 2021). It is influential in the global industry of wellness and positive psychology. But President Obama’s speech intervened against the rendering of this value as a political panacea. He acknowledged the paramount role of governmental institutions in shaping the political ethos of country, of which a citizen’s ethics is but one component.

Conclusion This work offers insights about the mediating importance of national culture for diaspora public diplomacy. A particular national value serves as the soft power for the making of a shared discursive space between diaspora elites and the US government. This strategy is enabled in the context of a historically enduring Greek American politics that construes its values and political interests in alignment with dominant US cultural values and geopolitical interests. In this diaspora–home confluence, the deployment of philotimo as the guiding strategy of public diplomacy to rehabilitate, and in fact endow global prestige, to the tarnished Greek image proves

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successful in entering US foreign policy language in solidarity with Greece. In other words, a historical relationship built on mutuality mediates the creation of a common space of interconnections, which is a constitutive feature of diplomacy. Can this strategy continue to organise diaspora public diplomacy on behalf of Greece? Is national branding an effective strategy for public diplomacy? Small countries, scholars of public diplomacy note, cannot afford to brand themselves around a positive stereotype, no matter how closely this stereotype approximates the social realities. Despite the well-­ meaning intentions of a government, non-state agencies, or sectors of civil society, one cannot predict how populations or governments may respond or transform themselves in an exceedingly fluid cultural, economic, and political environment such as current globality. “It is too easy for a country to be discredited, and soon forgotten about,” Alan Henrikson (2005) cautions, “even though its efforts are inherently worthwhile and are made for the best of motives. For this reason, national ‘branding’ is an especially dangerous idea” (84). Indeed, as I explain below, the wide circulation of recent negative images of Greece in the international media undermine the public diplomacy notion of Greek philotimo as a national essence. This policy recommendation anticipates the ever-evolving dynamic of Greece’s relations with migrants and refugees. In the early and mid-2010s, the Greek social reality unequivocally endowed credibility to the image of the Greek people as broadly compassionate. The solidarity movement in Greece towards refugees and immigrants was extensive and impressive. Increasingly, however, national and international reports of refugee exploitation and exclusion from certain public spaces such as schools and restaurants––particularly intense in some localities––compromise the brand’s credibility of a universal Greek philotimo. The continuing influx of refugees connects with “increasing trends in anti-refugee attitudes” (Kalogeraki, 2019: 362). In fact, significant opposition stems from viewing refugees from Syria, “most of whom are Muslims,” as “symbolic threats to natives’ culture and national identity” (384). Nationalism can be notoriously selective in its display of compassion. In addition, the inefficiency of the Greek government to cope with the vast scale issue of refugee accommodation, coupled with European Union passivity, receives negative coverage by high-profile English-language media such as The New  Yorker in the United States and The Guardian in Britain. Most recently, The New York Times published two scathing articles about vigilante practices in Greece––“Greeks once generous with refugees are

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turning hostile”––the subtitle of one article read, and another critiqued the Greek government for what is presented as a hardline posture violating international rights (Kingsley & Shoumali, 2020; Stevis-Gridnef, 2020). The readership reacted in a variety of ways, though if one judges by a significant volume of comments the image of the Greeks and Greece as compassionate is seriously challenged. Several human rights groups maintain “that holding migrants and refugees in … [horrid] conditions is a violation of European and Greek laws that mandate adequate living standards for asylum seekers” (Niarchos, 2019). New policies implemented by the Greek state, such as the massive creation of refugee detention centres, is deemed inhumane and punitive (Fotiadis, 2020). In this respect, state-driven hard power collides with non-state soft power. As scholars of public diplomacy note, “arrogant use of hard power can erode soft power” (in Hocking, 2005: 33). All-in-all, there is a profound dissonance between the reification of philotimo as a constellation of unambiguous virtues defining a collective, and the complexities, contradictions, and limits in the moral universe of specific localities and state-driven policies vis-à-vis the place of the newcomers in the country. It comes as no surprise, then, that strategists of diplomacy warn about the value of branding as a tool for public diplomacy. But beyond rational calculus about the unsustainability of making philotimo-branding the centrepiece of public policy, branding violates the democratic principles of reflexive citizenship. Instead of inviting citizens to deliberate about the complexity of an issue, it expects citizens to accept at face value an image stripped from its social contingencies. What are the alternatives for establishing international relevance? Scholars propose a shift from the vertical and monologic (having the international public being spoken to) self-driven manipulation of a nation’s brand, to the horizontal and dialogic (having a conversation) for building relations with others around a specific cause in partnership and reciprocity. Scholars of Greek diplomacy recommend a comparable shift. It “can only be successful,” Christos Frangonikolopoulos (2012) notes, “if it is designed to operate within a ‘polylateral’ world of multiple actors.” “The challenge … is to be inclusive and collaborative, facilitating substantive dialogues with broader foreign societies and actors” (17). In this horizontal mode, Greek diaspora’s contribution to the international conversation about the ethics of compassion as shared morality towards refugees, for example, would be an invitation for a reflective conversation about the

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Greek example. Indeed, the Greek case raises questions of global relevance regarding the political and economic conditions that might compromise a population’s compassion, and the responsibilities of states and supranational institutions (such as the European Union) to govern in ways that could promote policies of inclusion. In this approach, social distinction for the US diaspora policy stakeholders derives not from the epistemologically and morally problematic claim of philotimo as a national essence, but from the quality of the ideas and perspectives that the diaspora constituencies bring to the conversation. This mode departs from branding-centred diplomacy though it is consistent, in the most substantive manner, with the diaspora’s strategic mission to build partnerships and reciprocities to deliver its commitment for the making of inclusive democracies.

References About The Washington OXI DAY Foundation. The Washington OXI DAY Foundation. Retrieved June 15, 2019., from https://oxidayfoundation. org/about-­us/ Anagnostou, Y. (2017). Citizenship and entrepreneurship: Greek America as diaspora at a time of crisis. In D. Tziovas (Ed.), Greece in crisis: The cultural politics of austerity (pp. 107–132). I.B. Tauris Publishers. Anagnostou, Y. (2021). Private and public partnerships: The Greek diaspora’s branding of philotimo as identity. Journal of Greek Media & Culture, 7(1), 3–25. Annual Celebration. The Washington OXI DAY Foundation. Retrieved June 15, 2019., from https://oxidayfoundation.org/annual-­celebration/ Bisa, S. (2013). Rebranding Greece: Why nation branding matters. Exchange: The Journal of Public Diplomacy, 4(1), 61–67. Carothers, T. (2013). Barack Obama. In M.  Cox, T.  J. Lynch, & N.  Bouchet (Eds.), US foreign policy and democracy promotion: From Theodore Roosevelt to Barack Obama (pp. 196–213). Routledge. Fotiadis, A. (2020, February 16). Greece refugee plan is inhumane and doomed to fail. The EU must step in. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/ commentisfree/2020/feb/16/greece-­refugee-­plan-­eu-­detention-­centres-­refu gees?fbclid=IwAR3hGiAvaGFYeJbm6YwivIU8K8N73UBxDUSTirPgXF62Q upChxpgi-­awKXc Frangonikolopoulos, C. A. (2012). Strengthening Greek public diplomacy: Present conduct and future potential. Discussion Papers in Diplomacy No 124 (June). Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael”. Greece in the USA. (2012). Hellenic Republic. February 24. Retrieved June 3, 2019, from https://www.mfa.gr/usa/en/greece/greece-­and-­the-­usa/ political-­relations.html

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Melissen, J. (2005). The new public diplomacy: Between theory and practice. In J. Melissen (Ed.), The new public diplomacy: Soft power in international relations (pp. 3–27). Palgrave Macmillan. Moskos, C. (1990). Greek Americans: Struggle and success (2nd ed.). Transaction Publishers. Moskos, P.  C., & Moskos, C.  C. (2014). Greek Americans: Struggle and success (with an introduction by Michael Dukakis) (3rd ed.). Transaction Publishers Niarchos, N. (2019, June 13). On a Greek island that welcomed migrants, residents and refugees feel abandoned. The New Yorker. https://www.newyorker. com/news/dispatch/on-­a-­greek-­island-­that-­welcomed-­migrants-­residents-­ and-­refugees-­feel-­abandoned Nye, J. S., Jr. (2004a). The benefits of soft power. Working Knowledge: Business Research for Business Leaders, August 2. Retrieved December 25, 2019, from https://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/the-­benefits-­of-­soft-­power Nye, J. S., Jr. (2004b). Soft power: The means to success in world politics. Public Affairs. Our Mission. The Washington OXI DAY Foundation. Retrieved June 15, 2019., from https://oxidayfoundation.org/about-­us/mission/ Papataxiarchis, E. (2016). Being “there”: At the front line of the “European refugee crisis,” part 2. Anthropology Today, 32(3), 1–7. Pappas, T. S. (2014). Populism and crisis politics in Greece. Palgrave Macmillan. Paradia, M. (2016, December 15). The danger of ‘turning inward’: Obama’s foreboding farewell to Athens and Berlin. Occupy.com. https://www.occupy.com/ article/danger-­t urning-­i nward-­o bama-­s -­f oreboding-­f arewell-­a thens-­a nd-­ berlin?qt-­article_tabs=3#sthash.P3n2e31U.dpbs Pelt, M. (2001). The establishment and development of the Metaxas regime in the context of Nazi fascism, 1936–41. Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 2(3), 143–172. Schafer, J. (2015, August 16). Philotimo: A Greek word without meaning but very meaningful. Psychology Today. Retrieved August 10, 2019, from https://www. psychologytoday.com/us/blog/let-­t heir-­w ords-­d o-­t he-­t alking/201508/ philotimo-­greek-­word-­without-­meaning-­very-­meaningful Stevis-Gridnef, M. (2020, March 7). Vigilantes in Greece say “no more” to migrants. The New York Times (Updated August 14). Stone, D., & Douglas, E. (2018). Advance diaspora diplomacy in a networked world. International Journal of Cultural Policy, 24(6), 710–723. Talalay, L. E. (2013). Drawing conclusions: Greek antiquity, the economic crisis, and political cartoons. Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 31(2), 249–276. Theodoropoulou, I. (2020). Speech style as political capital: Barack Obama’s Athens speech. Journal of Multicultural Discourses. https://doi.org/10.108 0/17447143.2020.1800715. The Greek Secret. (2014). The Washington OXI DAY Foundation. Retrieved June 15, 2018, from https://oxidayfoundation.org/media/the-­greek-­secret-­with-­ greek-­subtitles/

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CHAPTER 12

Diasporic Homecoming and Transnational Flows in Times of Crisis: Economic Strategies and Mobilities of Greeks from the Former Soviet Union in Thessaloniki Anastasios Grigorakis and Dimitris Kataiftsis

Introduction In the decade that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, more than 150,000 ethnic Greeks living in various regions of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) migrated to Greece which was considered by most of them as the “eternal homeland” despite the fact that most of them had barely any ties with it prior to migration (Voutira, 2004). Migration flows, which peaked between 1990 and 1993, were mainly directed to northern Greece as the majority of immigrants (60%) settled in the region of Macedonia and half of those stayed in the city of Thessaloniki (33%) where employment opportunities were higher and the diasporic networks denser.

A. Grigorakis (*) • D. Kataiftsis University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 O. Anastasakis et al. (eds.), Diaspora Engagement in Times of Severe Economic Crisis, Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97443-5_12

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While diasporic networks from the FSU are mostly studied in terms of social identities and political and social integration (Voutira, 1991, 2004, 2006; Pratsinakis, 2013; Hionidou, 2012; Lavrentiadou, 2011; Vergeti 1991, 1994; Chaliapa, 2009; Katsavounidou & Kourti, 2006; Karanou, 2003), as well as a product of kinship ties that form migratory practices (Voutira, 2011), our aim here is to analyse the networks of migrants from the FSU as frameworks of economic activity. The focus is on how these networks serve economic action and social reproduction within (inter) national market economies with a special focus on periods of economic uncertainty. Our main argument is that the way economic activities take place and change over time is directly related to the structure of the diasporic networks of Greek migrants from the FSU, which often cohere in transnational communities (Tsakiri, 2005). We also want to highlight how social networks affect various mobility strategies as part of social reproduction or survival strategies within a changing context, as global economic mutations shape, as well as the way these networks are structured and the opportunities they offer. More specifically, this chapter discusses the development and transformation of the economic activities of Greek migrants from the FSU in Thessaloniki,1 and how these were shaped through two different periods of uncertainty and crisis: by the transition shock following the fall of the Soviet Union which led to various migration waves all along the 1990s, officially referred to as repatriation by the Greek authorities, and by the Greek financial crisis of 2009–2010. Both crises shaped migration patterns, and encouraged the development of transnational networks in Western Europe and Russia. These networks embedded economic activities which were affected by socio-economic developments in countries of birth and destination. In the first part of this chapter, the methodological and theoretical framework of our research is discussed. We focus on theoretical approaches in the sociology of migration and economic sociology and anthropology to understand how economic networks of ethnic communities work and we then outline our methodological approach to empirically assess the economic strategies of Greeks from the FSU in Thessaloniki. In the second part of the article, we discuss the development of the primary 1  The chapter is based on a research project which is co-financed by Greece and the European Union (European Social Fund—ESF) through the Operational Programme “Human Resources Development, Education and Lifelong Learning 2014–2020”.

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ethnic economic fields in which FSU Greeks engage after repatriation and their first migratory practices in Western Europe. We argue that within changing economic conditions both collective and individual economic strategies of Greeks from the FSU seem to walk a tightrope between formality and informality. In the third part, we explore the ways in which the Greek crisis of 2010 affected ethnic economies of FSU Greeks, leading to patterns of onward or return migration, especially to Russia and challenged the ways ethnic economic networks work.

Theoretical and Methodological Framework Literature in economic sociology and anthropology defies the idea that economic action in market societies is based solely on impersonal and individualistic ties within the market—thus, challenging Polanyi’s (2018) views on how human economy is historically embedded and enmeshed in economic and noneconomic institutions. In this perspective, economic activities cannot be analysed as merely an aggregate of rational individual pursuits of profit maximisation since they take place within a framework of network relations, social interactions, structural limitations or even moral premises (Thompson, 1993; Fassin, 2009). In other words, as part of wider social processes economic action is socially constructed. Similarly, we consider the economic strategies of Greeks from the FSU as embedded in wider social and economic structures. The concept of embeddedness, widely discussed in economic sociology and the sociology of migration, aims to show how overarching social structures affect the form and the outcome of economic action (Portes, 1995) and how concrete and ongoing systems of social relations affect economic transactions and entrepreneurship within market economies (Granovetter, 1985). Economic transactions, strategies and activities along with access to employment can rely on these relations and networks in both individual and collective terms. The level of embeddedness of economic action can be relational, depending on the personal networks of economic actors, or structural, in the way the structure of entire networks and communities can affect the development of economic activities. Moreover, the pursuit of economic goals can be accompanied by noneconomic ones which rely on the social and symbolic implications of belonging to the diasporic community while cultural factors and social norms can shape economic strategies and limit economic rationality (cultural embeddedness). Normative

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and cultural premises can restrict egoistic economic calculations and regulate the way market and employment function. Despite the narratives on the return to the eternal homeland, life trajectories of FSU Greeks are more complex and less straightforward. In most cases, migrants from the FSU did not cut off their ties from the place of birth to return to Greece but instead several goings and comings took place, or even links and ties to other countries were added through onward migration patterns. The notion of transnationalism, that is the process of sustaining multi-stranded social relations between the societies of origin and settlement (Basch et al., 1994), is highly important when examining migration and economic action among FSU Greeks. Examining the transnational aspect of their trajectories helps us shift the focus from migration as an adaptation process to the continuing relations of migrants with their place of origin which seem to structure economic action and shape complex social fields (Portes et  al., 2002). As part of livelihood and social reproduction strategies, some migrant families do not abandon their former identities and affiliations. Instead, they use them in order to invest in the country of origin (e.g., real estate investments) or develop business activities between the two countries. In this framework they co-exist in two national spaces drawing advantages from each of them (Voutira, 2004; Popov, 2016). As we will show, the ability of some FSU Greek migrants to move between two homelands and participate in economic networks in both countries remained central not only in their initial survival economic strategies but also later on in what we term as their reproduction strategies of investment. They thus seem to accumulate a sort of migratory capital, which includes different types of know-how, such as knowledge of transport networks, facility with authorities and bureaucracies and access to different labour markets. This aspect played a crucial role while coping with the two aforementioned crisis periods. Another important aspect when it comes to the study of the economic activities of migrants and diasporic groups is the construction of ethnic economies. When access to the mainstream native economy is restricted and when there is substantial demand for specialised products and services within ethnic communities, mobilising resources from a transnational social space may lead to the emergence of ethnic economies in the receiving society. Ethnic enterprises tend to recruit almost exclusively their co-­ ethnics, while their products and services also target mainly members of their ethnic community. In this way, ethnic social networks play a crucial role in the opportunity structure that shapes economic action and

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immigrant entrepreneurship (Kloosterman & Rath, 2001). While residential proximity and space concentration are factors of entrepreneurial activities, ethnic economies should not be regarded as fixed categories based on spatial concentration as they are also characterised by flexibility, mobility and reorientation (Valenzuela-Garcia et al., 2017). As we will see in our case, Russian products stores and ethnic tourism industry developed through transnational networks which share the Russian language and satisfy specific needs of Greek (or other) diaspora(s) from the FSU. At the same time, the economy of the diaspora cannot be seen as a separate entity from the national and international economy. If local economic activities are affected by the way diasporic networks are structured, they are also dependent on (or embedded within) global economic transformations. The transformations of the economic activities of the repatriates take place within a changing framework of Greek capitalism and are affected on the one hand by transnational capital movements, and on the other hand by economic crises and political transitions in the host country or the country of origin. These conditions, which led to the emergence of Greek-Russian capitalists acting in both Greek and Russian economic environments, provoked important mutations of the diasporic economy itself. However, these mutations do not simply reflect transformations of the national and international markets. The way diasporic networks are affected by broader economic transformations has important implications in the way ethnic economies change through time and especially during periods of uncertainty. Therefore, the economic activities and strategies of Greeks from the FSU are not simply embedded in concrete social networks of immigrants but they are also embedded more abstractly in the socio-economic environment of the countries of settlement or birth (Kloosterman & Rath, 2001). Throughout our research we intend to demonstrate transformations, continuities and/or ruptures in economic activity of FSU migrants, and how they are related to the crisis of transition and the Greek debt crisis. The examined forms and levels of economic activity are not necessarily linear or evolutionary; however, some transformations in the national and international economic frameworks affected more radically the economies of FSU Greeks. For example, the absence of any regulation of the Russian market during the 1990s helped Greek transnational capital flourish, when

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tchelnotshestvo2 was at its peak. Its gradual decline under Putin turned out to be critical for FSU Greek migrants who had to find other means of survival or other markets to invest in. In parallel, the explosion of the construction sector, and the tourist industry, in which many migrants participated, were equally important. At the same time, we also examined the extent to which FSU Greeks, having experienced multiple migrations, forced or voluntary, felt the consequences of the crisis the same way as the locals, and the degree to which the crisis gave birth to new forms of economic adaptations, individual or collective. We chose to focus on Northern Greece and the Thessaloniki region in particular, due to the important migrant flows to this region, along with the fact that Thessaloniki is also the main field of activity of some of the most prominent businessmen of the post-Soviet Greek diaspora such as Ivan Savvidis and Boris Mouzenidis. Our research methodology is twofold: on the one hand, it’s based on 20 semi-directed interviews with migrants living in Thessaloniki, most of whom arrived in Greece during the early 1990s at a period when migration from the FSU was at its peak. Our research participants were chosen mainly according to the development of their professional career and work and the sample is characterised by considerable diversity including people who have worked in open-air markets (laikes agores), the construction sector, the russkie produkty (Russian product stores) or are employees of bigger companies owned by Greeks from the FSU originating from the Pontus region.3 Most of our informants come from territories that today belong to Georgia, Abkhazia and Russia. Many of them live in the western suburbs of Thessaloniki and mainly in the municipality of Nikopoli, where a great part of the migrant flows settled on. Our objective is to investigate the pursuit of livelihood strategies and economic activities by the Greek diaspora from the FSU but also to trace how these activities have changed over the years and during the financial crisis, within a developing transnational framework. For this reason, while the interviews focus on economic practices and strategies, 2  Shuttle trading, a very common practice in Yeltsin’s Russia developed by individuals who travelled all over Russia, the ex-Soviet Asian Republics, Turkey and Greece, selling products in open markets. 3  Even though the majority of our informants originate from the Pontus region, we mostly refer to them as Greeks from the FSU to avoid implying that all FSU Greek migrants are of Pontic origin. In any case, the question of the identity of these populations is complex as it implicates both top-down definitions coming from the Greek state and social interaction imperatives between them and local Greeks (see Voutira, 2004; Pratsinakis, 2017, 2021).

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we left space for life-story narratives to understand how life courses evolve throughout time and how they correspond/relate to the repercussions of the debt crisis in Greece; the rise of unemployment,4 the general fall of the construction sector5 and the ups and downs due to cross-border traffickers and parallel marketing circuits of the fur market (Dagalidis, 2012) shaped the economic and migratory practices of FSU Greeks. This led also to a reconsideration of their prospects of returning to Greece, the so-called historical homeland.6 In addition, our study is also based on material and information gathered during fieldwork and participant observation conducted by one of the researchers while employed in a real estate company owned by a FSU Greek entrepreneur, from 2017 to 2019. This fieldwork offered important insights into how family structures and diasporic community networks affect working relations and recruitment strategies, as the company recruits mainly either members of the extended family of the owner or members of the diasporic community. It also allowed us to better understand how Greek entrepreneurs from the FSU conceive of their businesses and their place within transnational networks where the use of the Russian language is the main medium for business development, and to understand how entrepreneurial practices have evolved since the financial crisis.

Returning to the “Homeland” and the Emerging Ethnic Economies of FSU Greeks The economic and political repercussions of the collapse of the Soviet Union created a transition shock for FSU Greeks. Beyond the general effects in economic life after communism, a result of “shock therapy” policies (Métais, 1992), local realities in Southern Russia and the Caucasus played a major role in the decision to migrate to their ethnic homeland of Greece. The Georgian-Abkhazian war of 1992–1993, as well as the rise of 4  According to the official statistics, from 2010 to 2015 unemployment raised by more than 200%: https://www.statistics.gr/documents/20181/9b33edd0-1c51-41e6-ab81401c29681599. 5  For Statistics from 2010 to 2018: https://www.statistics.gr/documents/20181/6dc92 0dd-6c88-49f8-8d2e-fc076ffbe499. 6  Georgi Anastasov, president of the Greek Association of Tatarstan, Demos, expressed his love for his three different homelands: Georgia, his birthplace; Tatarstan, his living place; and Greece as the historical homeland where his ancestors used to live: http://grk.addnt.ru/ moya-istoricheskaya-rodina-greciya-pe/.

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radical nationalism in Georgia after communism (Sabanadze, 2010), had a determining role in the formation of their future livelihood strategies. Those developments left a strong mark of their sense of belonging and led to the transformations of their conception of homeland. Among the mass flow of returnees to Greece in the early 1990s, some thousands of migrants settled in Thessaloniki, despite the incentives given by the Greek government to encourage them to settle in underpopulated rural zones in the region of Thrace. This happened mainly for two reasons: firstly, because members of their family or the community had already settled in the city (Voutira, 2006) and secondly for economic reasons as the local labour market in industry and construction offered more opportunities for employment.7 By the end of the 1990s, more than 50,000 people who had left the FSU lived in Thessaloniki (Kamenidis, 2002), mainly in the western parts of the city (Polikhni, Neapoli, Sykies, Stavroupoli, Evosmos, Evkarpia, Kordelio, Menemeni etc.). The first diasporic networks that formed played an important role during their period of settlement. Solidarity networks, informal or organised around associations, offered important economic support through loans or other exchanges through the gift scheme and based on the community ethos (Mauss, 2011; Lavrentiadou, 2011). Greeks that stayed behind (in post-­ Soviet successor states) often organised solidarity missions, collecting foodstuff and sending packages to their poor compatriots in Greece, and vice versa. Migration relied heavily on family and kinship (Voutira, 2011), notably during the first period of settlement in Thessaloniki. The integration of FSU Greeks into the local labour market was challenging due to their insufficient knowledge of the Greek language, alongside the fact that diplomas and degrees from FSU schools and universities were not widely accepted. The accreditation of their degrees by the Greek Ministry of Education sometimes required long waiting periods, thus making their recruitment in public or private sector jobs in the Greek labour market difficult (Glytsos, 1995). Therefore, Greeks from the FSU often ended up in jobs below their qualifications and lower-paid compared to those available for native Greeks. Social marginalisation due to employment status and low income was often aggravated by discrimination. As Pratsinakis argues, native Greeks contested the Greekness of Greeks from

7  According to the census of 1999–2000  in the Macedonia region, 46% of post-Soviet Greek refugees worked in industrial or craft sector (Ministry of Macedonia and Thrace, 2000).

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the FSU considering them to be false Greeks whose culture, language and habits differed substantially from native, true Greeks (Pratsinakis, 2017).8 Involvement in entrepreneurial activities along with solidarity diasporic networks was crucial during the first years in order to cope with local labour market exclusions. Nikos, who came from Moscow in 1993 and settled in Thessaloniki, had a university degree prior to his arrival in Greece. He settled in Eptalofos, a western suburb of Thessaloniki, where family and friends were already present. As he recalls, in the beginning solidarity among FSU Greeks was considerable. Apart from their important role in the survival strategies of the newcomers, solidarity networks served also as a framework for commercial and entrepreneurial activities. Kinship or friendship relations were the basis for developing “companies of trust” that led to work-ethnic communities and new business networks. After working briefly as a manual labourer, craftsman and chief-craftsman, Nikos wanted to start his own business. He chose to collaborate with a close friend not only because he was also an FSU Greek repatriate, but mostly because he was “a man of trust” and “people support the ones they know”,9 as he said. Many such solidarity partnerships developed in Greece in early years and extended economic networks between FSU Greeks and those who stayed back in the FSU.  As a result, commercial activity, especially in late 1990s flourished. These commercial activities are, according to Nikos, characteristic of the collective identity of FSU Greeks due to their cooperative spirit and partnership. This commercial spirit was kept alive inside them during the communist era. Nikos recalls that even before the fall of the Soviet Union, Greek construction workers and builders from Georgia were forming work brigades of 20 or 30 people and travelling in Russia to undertake building projects. As Russian became more marketised, activities such as that became more common. The tourism industry, fur trade and open-air shopping markets were some of the main economic activities Greeks from the FSU got involved after repatriation. These activities not only relied on networks, but they also involved the mobilisation of transnational ties. The fur trade was one of the activities in which, according to Nikos, many FSU Greek migrants were involved in Northern Greece. Low-cost quality fur was one of the 8  Native Greeks preferred to refer to Greeks from the FSU by the term Russo-Pontians, literally Pontians from Russia, which through time acquired a pejorative meaning (Pratsinakis, 2017). 9  Cf. Granovetter on trust and entrepreneurship within networks (1985, pp. 489–490; 2003).

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most profitable businesses with extended, and very often, transnational networks of agents like manufacturers, truckers, sellers, advertisers, tourist agents and others. Kastoria, a northwestern city a few kilometres away from the Albanian border soon became the exporting centre of fur, attracting mainly Russian clients. FSU Greeks with their Russian language ability were successful middlemen who could mediate between the buyers and the producers. Working mainly with commissions (bonuses), the fur trade was for some a seasonal (summer) or a more temporary activity, based on informal payments. As Dimitris, a FSU Greek who worked as a middleman between fur traders and tourist agents, recalls, during the 1990s roughly 180 fur boutiques opened in Thessaloniki. An informal activity in the beginning, it lost ground gradually with falling profit margins after 2000 (Dagalidis, 2012). Notably, the development of the tourism industry in Northern Greece, mostly due to Boris Mouzenidis’ prominent travel agency (Christodoulou, 2013), which helped facilitate the massive flux of Russian tourists in Northern Greece, especially Khalkidiki, was directly connected to the fur economy of Kastoria and the strong presence of FSU Greeks in both sectors. The choubtour (fur-tour) was one of the most attractive selling points for Russians wishing to visit Greece. It offered affordable travel to Greece and stipulated that one fur at least be purchased in one of the agency’s collaborators. However, for middle- or upper-class Russians, the fur shopping was not the only motive for visiting Greece after the fall of the Soviet Union. The “sun and sand” concept of a holiday attracted thousands of Russians to visit Khalkidiki, while others preferred to visit the monasteries of Mt. Athos or Meteora, in a kind of pilgrimage or religious tourism. In Northern Greece, Mouzenidis’ enterprises allowed a flourishing of FSU Greeks in Thessaloniki in various job roles:10 travel agency, cargo services, real estate agency, aviation company and hotel management, among others. Some of our informants working for him in various posts confirmed the major role of FSU post-Soviet migrants in his companies, something that improved his status inside the diasporic communities.

 Mouzenidis Travel started operating in 1995 and is still operational.

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Open-Air Markets Commercial activity in open-air markets was another very important activity of the newcomers throughout Greece, which used transnational networking and involved shuttle trading. As we will show, the opportunities that this kind of trade offered were crucial not only for the initial integration process of the repatriates in Greece but also in terms of social reproduction and economic stabilisation. Using their personal networks to gain inside information before coming in Greece, many FSU Greeks had already prepared their personal or household goods for sale in open-air markets. At that time, it was impossible to transfer or exchange large amounts of roubles, so those selling their houses had to convert money into other products in order to transfer them in Greece. Thus, they started to buy household products (sheets, tablecloths etc.) from the Russian market to sell once in Greece. The amount of roubles11 they obtained after selling their houses could be transformed in much larger amounts in drachmas (Greece’s currency at the time) once the products were sold in Greece. But was this primary merchandise for sale enough to sustain a long-term economic activity? According to Panagiotis, who came to Greece in 1971 (one of the FSU Greeks that came before the massive waves of 1992–1993) and started working in open-air markets in 1990, for the newcomers in Greece these markets were in the beginning a survival rather than an economic strategy per se. Many of them transformed this survival strategy to a commercial one thanks to shuttle trading and community networks. They kept returning periodically to the FSU to buy more products which were consequently transported along with the household effects of other families who were willing to emigrate to avoid customs by declaring those as household goods rather imports for sale. These small cross-border merchants convinced the often-poor emigrating families to transport their imports together with their household goods in Greece by offering them free transport for all goods. Networks between Greek returnees and those who stayed behind were rather fluid and unstable. Some sellers started visiting Russia and other post-Soviet states to search for stocks or warehouses in order to buy goods at a low price. Some of them managed to develop business relations with the local warehouse directors who previously purchased large stocks directly from the Russian state. This practice  Around 20–30,000 roubles for an average rural house.

11

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allowed them to resell the stock in Greece at a two or three times mark-up. Many FSU Greeks took full advantage of the economic and political conditions in the FSU during the 1990s working independently as shuttlers, which in Yeltsin’s Russia became commonplace (Burawoy & Verdery, 1999; Humphrey, 2018). The economic activity in open-air markets started to decline when profit margins fell due to price increases and tightening of border controls.12 As Panagiotis explains, by the end of the 1990s, Russian and eastern financial markets started to stabilise followed by rises in both salaries and prices of goods. Today, some goods in Russia are even more expensive than in Greece. People who remained steadfast participants in open-air markets also enjoyed a marked economic upswing. Involvement in open-air markets was often accompanied with the selling of various goods in panigiria, a seasonal activity that occurred during religious events and helped traders expand and diversify their revenue sources.

The Russian Products Local groceries, bakeries and small restaurants also opened in the regions of settlement in the western suburbs of Thessaloniki by FSU Greeks. Russkie produkty stores13 are arguably one of the most significant types in operation. These stores constitute the best example of an ethnic enclave economy within a transnational framework. While initially they intended to satisfy the demand of FSU Greeks for products from their countries of origin, they gradually gained ground among all people with ties to the FSU seeking tastes of home.14 Natalia, a woman from Russia with Jewish origins, and her husband, a FSU Greek from the village Mertsan of Krasnodar region, started their business in Thessaloniki’s Kordelio in 1997. At the beginning they set up a kiosk with Greek products which soon failed. After a brief reassessment of the particular needs of the neighbourhood, they switched their business to a russkie produkty store, which became one of the most popular in the area. In the current state of play, this family business has expanded and 12  According to Zabyelina and her study on the Cherkizovsky market, the shuttlers’ economy started to lose ground gradually after the 1998 Russian crisis and declined further after 2004 due to several reasons, one of which was falling sales (Zabyelina, 2012). 13  Stores that sell exclusively Russian products, in the beginning at least. 14  Cf. Pechurina (2017).

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they now own and manage four different stores with FSU or Russian-­ speaking populations, in different districts of Thessaloniki: Kordelio, Ksirokrini, Evosmos and Kalamaria. This shift to an expansive, rather than survival economic activity, seems also related to generational shifts of migration. As Natalia told us, for her parents’ generation migration to Greece was mainly a symbolic return to the homeland, for her own generation migration had purely economic motivations. The involvement of FSU Greeks in the retail sale of food is significant. The supermarket Mix Markt group, with 293 Slavic stores throughout Europe, including several stores in Thessaloniki and Athens, is controlled and managed (in Greece) by FSU Greeks. However, these business networks seem to be more post-Soviet than Russian: companies like Luckmann Food Group in Germany’s Baden which supplies (and largely controls through financing) various russkie produkty in Greece, was founded by post-Soviet diasporas. According to Natalia, Luckmann Food Group owners come from the German diaspora of Kazakhstan. Although these stores initially intended to sell products imported from Russia or other FSU countries, gradually the so-called Russian products were mostly produced outside the FSU. According to Panagiotis, there is an important production of this kind of products in Greece, albeit they’re still labelled as Russian. As a result, Greek migrants from the FSU who invested in russkie produkty stores were integrated in a more extended, transnational, business network. This type of business network was characterised by the use of Russian as the language that connected clients, producers, sellers and businessmen of food sector, a true passport for entering in these networks. Far more than having FSU origins, knowledge of the Russian language was and still is the essential element for someone who wants to work in that business. As we will see later, knowledge of Russian language has shaped subsequent transformations in the way FSU Greek entrepreneurship has been structured over the last years. One emerging question is whether the Russian products stores, or other food stores (bakeries etc.), constituted an entrepreneurial advance or professionalisation of their business from open-air markets. While these stores existed from the early 1990s, along with businesses in open-air markets, the explosion of Russian product stores that took place after 2000s and continues today coincided with a decline of trading in open-air markets. However, Russian products stores are indeed a more refined and organised commercial activity than trading in open-air markets and seem

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to require a more extended network of transnational relations. This kind of entrepreneurship is unlikely to be merely an evolution from more elementary types of economic activities. While trading in open-air markets profited mainly from the import of goods at low costs, aided by loose border controls along with informality, Russian products stores constitute a formal, sophisticated and capital-intense undertaking. “Russian products” stores form an important ethnic enclave economy and have expanded to other European countries where post-Soviet diasporas settled after the collapse of the FSU. All these forms of economic activity, born into the crisis of transition, to a new homeland, were reinforced by three major facts often interrelated: informality, networking and transnationalism. FSU Greek diasporas benefited from opportunities arising in markets where speaking Russian was essential—creating closed markets and networks based on linguistic, cultural and kinship affinities, making profit through mediation between the eastern and western world. Their economic practices were shaped by the general economic condition in Greece and in Russia and by the ups and downs in specific markets and sectors as well.

Entrepreneurship, Economic Strategies and Migrations During the Financial Crisis of 2010 Apart from its detrimental impact on Greece’s national economy, the debt crisis of 2010 also affected the job market, and the diasporic economies of FSU Greeks, who once more were forced to cope with dramatic economic transformations. However, the repercussions of this second crisis were not the same for all, and for many of our informants did not constitute a “rupture with the past” like the transition shock of 1990s. As we will describe in the following, some of them stayed in Greece and adopted new survival strategies, changing career orientation to adapt. Others chose new migration destinations during the debt crisis, mostly for short periods in order to improve their economic condition and then return in Thessaloniki. Since the dissolution of the National Foundation of Reception and Rehabilitation of Foreign-Living Greeks (ΕΥΙΑPΟΕ) in 2003, specific statistics concerning FSU Greek settlements have not been produced, making a general assessment of the 2010s consequences harder. We will make some remarks on the broader effects of the financial crisis on the economies of the FSU Greeks and outline their migration adaption strategies, as

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well as the formation of new networks and the dissolution of older ones. These two aspects seem to be interrelated. The fur industry and the tourism sector, two key sectors discussed earlier, were both affected by the 2010 crisis. The informal networks around fur industry declined as traders of Kastoria phased out intermediaries from the FSU (Dagalidis, 2012). The fur market proved to be unstable and declining during the crisis years, and especially between 2013 and 2018 (Greek Consulate of Moscow, 2019). On the other hand, Russian tourism to Greece, a sector employing many FSU Greeks via Mouzenidis’ businesses, was less impacted by the crisis. However, the fall of the rouble in 2015 along with the repercussions of the conflict in Donbas and the following economic sanctions inflicted by the West say a decline in this sector (Chatzidakis, 2015; INSETE, 2021). Over the last decade, tourism from the Russian Federation has fluctuated greatly, creating instability for FSU Greeks in the tourism sector. At the same time, repatriates that worked outside the ethnic post-Soviet economy and had financial hardships now faced some serious uncertainties in the hard-hit national job market forcing them to reconsider their survival strategies. Such was the case with the construction sector which attracted many Greeks from the FSU during the 1990s and was undoubtedly affected by the financial crisis, as the total number of construction firms was reduced by 39,000, during the period 2009–2017 (Vettas, 2019). One of our informants, Alexandros, described how the crisis shook his professional status within this economic sector: after starting his career as a contractor, he turned to apartment renovation during the crisis, which he considered a professional downgrade, as construction was severely hit by the economic depression. As of 2019, he managed to become a contractor once again, building villas for Russian clients in Khalkidiki. In Thessaloniki, larger franchises of Russian products stores remained economically resilient during the crisis. However, even the expansion of the food sector was not able to compensate for the decline of the fur industry or tourism, thus leaving many FSU Greeks financially vulnerable. The economic crisis in Greece impacted not only on the way FSU ethnic economies and entrepreneurship were structured but also individual economic strategies and practices. Within a new economic framework shaped by uncertainty, the relations that FSU Greek professionals kept with their ethnic networks transformed as well. Today, trying to promote themselves, professionals like doctors, dentists, lawyers, accountants, use internet portals and magazines, popular amongst Russophones of the

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city.15 In this case, FSU or migrant identity is not enough in order to attract their compatriots as clients. In a similar manner, the latter are not expected to prefer professionals solely due to their common origin, but increasingly due to their competitive prices. In this context, their bilingualism (Greek and Russian) helps them to broaden their customer base in  local markets, in Kordelio, Evosmos, Nikopoli, Vardaris and so on. Economic rationalisation has displaced diasporic solidarity and identity, which seemed to shape their economic and survival strategies during their early days in Thessaloniki.

Surviving the Crisis: Re-considering Migration Patterns Migration strategies of FSU Greeks also changed in response to the changed economic reality. According to our research, interviews and fieldwork, many FSU Greeks fled from the eternal homeland to find better living conditions in countries like Germany, Austria, England and Russia. Unlike the period following the collapse of the USSR, the (re)-migration of the Greeks from the FSU during the financial crisis years was not a rupture with the past, as it had purely economic motivations. However, migration patterns varied depending on the country of re-migration. The case of these repatriates that chose to take advantage of their bilingualism and dual nationality in the republics of the ex-USSR is particularly interesting, as the migratory experience depended heavily by the place of birth. On one hand, FSU migrants who previously lived in today’s Russian territories, or those who had relatives there, could find some refuge back in Russia when their life in Greece worsened after 2010. Olga, one of our informants, returned to Sochi when it became impossible to continue to pay her debts and make ends meet in Greece. Her sister, who never repatriated, helped her with her new beginning: she guaranteed a place to live, even a part-time job in a local school, where she was also working. Apart from pre-existing kinship and/or community networks, a return to Russia was also facilitated by the Russian Federation’s (RF) policies about the “repatriation” of Russian citizens and Russophones abroad. In 2017, the organisation Russian Initiative inaugurated its project You Are From Russia (Ty iz Rossii) which aims to attract post-Soviet diasporic groups around the globe to seek professional opportunities in the RF,  See https://grekobook.ru and its printed version, the magazine Thessaloniki city.

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FSU Greeks included.16 In this context, resettlement in Russia is not considered a “return to the past”, rather, like for Olga, merely a shelter. Greece holds “a special place in her heart” and therefore she would not consider a permanent resettlement in Russia. In general, the economic opportunities in Russia seemed to some extent comparable to those offered in the richer EU countries, given also the important advantages FSU Greeks had as Russian citizens. On the other hand, a return to post-Soviet Georgia, where several of our informants were born and lived before migration to Greece, was more complicated for a variety of reasons. Transformation of the ethnic character of some of its regions was one factor. Historically Greek regions such as the Tsalka region experienced an influx of internal economic immigrants from Adjarian villages (eco-migrants in Georgian and Russian). The newcomers took residence in homes formerly owned by FSU Greeks.17 Therefore, especially, for migrants who sold their house in order to settle in Greece, the uprooting seemed definitive making a return to those regions almost impossible. But even for those who didn’t sell their properties, the economic conditions were far from ideal for a possible return during the crisis. Since 2000, life in Tsalka has been extremely hard, with many enterprises closed and plundered, and mainly only the elderly left there (Komakhia, 2005). However, the existence of kinship or ethnic networks influences migration practices significantly even in some less privileged post-Soviet regions, such as the autonomous Republic of Abkhazia. Our informant, Eleni, started to sell local goods in an open-air market outside the monastery of Novii Afon in Abkhazia as a seasonal activity to help fund her existence in Greece. In her case, most of her relatives were still living in Abkhazia ­making this seasonal commercial activity a viable strategy. Unlike Olga, Eleni feels that home is “where her people are”, and in Greece no one except her daughter remains. Thus, she admitted that if Thessaloniki was not her daughter’s home, she would have permanently resettled in Abkhazia. 16  https://youfrom.ru/2019/04/02/krizis-v-gretsii-nashi-sootechestvennikivozvrashhayutsya-v-rossiyu/. 17  The eco-migrant phenomenon is not new in Georgia’s Tsalka region. Since the end of 1980s the Soviet Georgian authorities tried to change demographically Tsalka, after favouring the implantation of Georgians who suffered from natural disasters in several regions of Adjaria and Svanetiia. See on this topic: Komakhia (2005).

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Eleni belongs to a category of Greeks from the FSU who challenge the narrative of Greece as the eternal homeland. These migrants, often disappointed by the living conditions in Greece, grew nostalgic for their homes in the former Soviet republics and chose to repatriate. In this way, they constitute what Christin Hess describes as reversed diasporic movements, which calls into question the myth of destination to an historic homeland (Hess, 2008). Apart from those who repatriated to the FSU, there are many cases of FSU Greeks who “go West” in order to work and accumulate some capital. The most common migration course after 2000s, and especially during crisis, is towards the Western Europe and especially Germany. Undoubtedly, this is a labour migration pattern, a decision taken for economic reasons. Sofia Prokopidou, a well-known member of Thessaloniki’s FSU diaspora, author of several novels (Prokopidou, 2006, 2012) who works as a journalist, describes how whole families of repatriated Greeks immigrated to Germany after 2010s for better opportunities. Through hard work and social networking, many have managed to embed themselves in German life, though they miss Greece and visit when possible (Prokopidou, 2018). Post-Soviet emigration to Germany is not a phenomenon that started in the years of the Greek crisis. Some of our informants migrated to Germany in the 1990s, eventually returning and settling in Greece. Again, the presence of relatives was a key element in the decision to migrate to Germany, but not the only one. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Germany remains one of the main destinations for several post-Soviet diasporas, especially the Soviet Germans (Herwartz-Emden & Berez, 2007). Among our informants, Stelios migrated from Greece to Germany in 2010 with his son in order to work, doing mainly manual labour in different cities where he could find employment. His plan was to accumulate some capital and then return to Greece and restart his life in better living conditions, something that eventually happened. He described how groups of 5–6 people were working and living together sharing the rent and cost-sharing. In this way, local diasporic networks were relocated in the countries that FSU migrants settled. Many post-Soviet Greeks did not choose labour migration to Germany just for accumulating capital, but to pay off the supposedly favourable conditioned housing loans that the Greek state had offered them in the beginning of 2000s. In 2004, the beneficiaries were more than 34,000 FSU Greek families, who had received from 60% to 100% of the total price of an apartment or house purchase (Papadopoulos, 2015). Even though

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50–60% of the monthly interest was granted by the state, the surge of unemployment rates during the crisis period severely undermined the ability of many FSU Greeks to pay off their loan. For this population of FSU Greeks, the decision for migration had mostly survival motivations, rather than been a strategy for capital accumulation. Despite the cultural and economic particularities of their mobility patterns, since the 2010 crisis, FSU Greeks are impacted by similar migration practices to those of native Greeks, the so-called brain drain. According to some of our informants, their children or grandchildren choose to go in order to study and work in high-skilled jobs, a common practice of native Greeks especially since the 1990s. The son of Odysseas, an ex-­ worker in the construction department of the group of companies owned by Mouzenidis, works as an engineer in the international film industry. Contrary to the case of Stelios and his migration as part of a survival strategy, the son of Odysseas achieved upward mobility through studies and work abroad, not uncommon within the Greek middle class (Panayotopoulos, 1998). Compared to the period of the repatriation to Greece, subsequent migration flows during the financial crisis had some notably different characteristics. The most important element is that migration during crisis seems to happen exclusively for economic reasons and unlike the initial period of migration to Greece, it doesn’t rely on symbolic imperatives (like attachment to a mythologised homeland). As migration is now based on economic pursuits, it is more individual or family based rather than being a collective or community-based event like the massive flows of the early 1990s. Greeks from the FSU now make their decision to migrate based on their personal or family economic needs and they move independently of their communities, albeit the existence of kinship or community networks is still a key element of the migratory practices. These differences between the two periods of migration of FSU Greeks raise also a question about ethics and values and how they affect their decisions to migrate and eventually their relation to their community in general. The question that current practices pose is whether the repatriates are now acting on purely individualistic or familial terms, leading to an erosion of their ethnic community. Konstantinos, a Greek from Tsalka and ex-contractor in Boris Mouzenidis’ company, insists that during crisis a process of transfiguration of their system of values, their mirovozrenie (the way to see the world), is taking place. He sees in his co-ethnics behaviours

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as individualistic, “from the common good to the rational ego”, resulting in the erosion of their communities. On the other hand, it is arguably doubtful that we are witnessing a structural decline of diasporic networks writ large. Even FSU Greeks who migrated individually to western European countries relied on co-ethnics in order to cope with the new conditions of life (Prokopidou, 2006, 2012). Meanwhile, new types of (online) communities of a growingly dispersed ethnic population have started to emerge. Broader mutations of the way diasporic communities work seem to twin with the transforming framework of transnational economic networks.

Concluding Remarks In this chapter we show how Greeks from the FSU coped with two different crises: the one after the collapse of the USSR and the subsequent “repatriation” to Greece, and the second during the Greek debt crisis since 2010. We argued that the economic strategies and practices of the repatriates relied heavily on their diasporic networks and were conditioned to an extent by national and international economic and political mutations. Trading and early entrepreneurship were significantly structured around (or embedded into) diasporic networks who thus managed to cope with the precarious and uncertain conditions in Greece’s labour market. These networks also served as source of labour and/or customer base for the development of ethnic economies of the Greeks from the FSU. The Russian products industry mainly, but also clusters of tourism in Thessaloniki, still constitute a dynamic framework of economic activity with important transnational ties for FSU Greeks. On the other hand, changing economic conditions since the 2010 economic crisis seem to have launched a process of transformation of the economic strategies of the repatriates on both collective/entrepreneurial and individual level. Within changing economic conditions and an increasingly competitive market, origin as a quality for recruitment seem to decline in favour of other, more market-oriented, qualifications. As entrepreneurship remains structured around Russophone and often transnational networks, speaking Russian remains an entry passport in the networks of Greeks from the FSU, even for non-members of the diasporic community. In this aspect, ethnic economies of FSU Greeks seem nowadays more accessible to others, provided that they can speak Russian which

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consolidates the rationalisation at the expense of the ethnic part of ethnic entrepreneurship. In a similar manner, economic distresses have pushed some repatriates to re-emigrate, sometimes permanently but mostly temporarily. In some cases, returning to the country of birth was part of a disillusionment after their return to the eternal homeland had proved unsuccessful. Though important, this disillusionment and alteration of national belonging sentiments seem to also depend on different factors such as the conditions in the country of birth or the economic background of migrants. In any case, it marks an important step in life trajectories and in the general history of Greek “repatriation” from the FSU.  Whether collective identity and belonging will increasingly rely on more “rationalised” economic strategies is still uncertain but, regardless, recent mutations in the structure of the economic networks of FSU Greeks show us the direct correlation between economic activities and social, cultural and normative frameworks.

References Basch, L., Glick Schiller, N., & Blanc-Szanton, C. (1994). Nations unbound. Transnational projects, postcolonial predicaments and deterritorialized nation-­ states. Routledge. Burawoy, M. & Verdery, K. (1999). Uncertain transition: Ethnographies of change in the post-socialist world. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Chaliapa, A. (2009). The integration of immigrants in Greece: The question of the second generation. PhD Thesis, Charokopeio University of Athens [in Greek]. Retrieved April 30, 2021, from http://estia.hua.gr/file/lib/default/ data/8286/theFile Chatzidakis, A. (2015). Tendencies in tourist flows. National Printing Press [in Greek]. Retrieved May 5, 2021, from http://www.gnto.gov.gr/sites/default/ files/files_basic_pages/Xatzidakis_2015.pdf Christodoulou, K. (2013, November 4). The first verticalized tourism business group. Fortune Greece [in Greek]. Retrieved April 30, 2021, from https:// www.fortunegreece.com/article/ke-­e geneto-­o -­p rotos-­k athetopiimenos­touristikos-­omilos-­stin-­ellada/ Dagalidis, A. (2012, March). The fur industry: Sector study. Pireos Bank. Fassin, D. (2009). Les économies morales revisitées. Annales HSS, 64, 1237–1268. Glytsos, N. P. (1995). Problems and policies regarding the socio-economic integration of returnees and foreign workers in Greece. International Migration, 33(2), 155–176.

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CHAPTER 13

Crisis, Identity and Diasporic Mobilisation: Perspectives from Young People and Parents in the Greek Diaspora in England Elizabeth Mavroudi

Introduction This chapter uses qualitative research on Greeks in England in order to examine how young Greeks (aged 11–25) in diaspora perceive Greece and the economic and political crisis there and how this relates to their identity negotiations. The chapter links youth perceptions of Greece and connections to it to wider issues around increasingly complex and diverse identities. This is because propensity to help the homeland at times of crisis is bound up with perceptions of and connections to it, both materially, but also in terms of belonging. There are a range of perceptions and realities around helping a crisis-ridden homeland but this and previous research demonstrates that for Greeks in diaspora this often revolves around: (1) economic connections, for example sending money for specific causes and

E. Mavroudi (*) Loughborough University, Loughborough, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 O. Anastasakis et al. (eds.), Diaspora Engagement in Times of Severe Economic Crisis, Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97443-5_13

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to family and friends; trying to set up businesses; (2) political connections, for example trying to help by raising awareness of issues via different avenues; and (3) socio-cultural connections, for example being aware of what is going on in the homeland and actively negotiating identities in relation to the homeland (Mavroudi, 2015; Mavroudi, 2018). The chapter is broadly based in diasporic mobilisation perspectives in order to shed light on how younger Greeks can potentially play a role now and in the future, as well as the challenges and opportunities in doing so. Perceptions of crisis are therefore linked to the potential for mobilisation around issues those in diaspora feel are important (Mavroudi, 2018; Koionova, 2018). In this context a focus on the young people can shed light on the new ways in which diasporic attachments to host countries and homeland complicate but also potentially enable political action and homeland-oriented activities. This is because young people in diaspora will be those engaging with the homeland in the future so their formative and ongoing experiences and perceptions of the homeland can play a role in the extent and nature of future diasporic mobilisation and homeland-oriented development. It is this new diaspora that will be at the forefront potentially of future initiatives and activities to help their homeland. Young people in diaspora can and do have an important role to play in helping a homeland in crisis, however as has been illustrated in the literature, this is not necessarily an easy one (King et al., 2016; Horst, 2018). This is not only because there are limits to what they can do in material ways but also because if the connections and feelings of belonging to a homeland are weak or the homeland is perceived in negative ways, this does not necessarily bode well for any current or future mobilisation and attachment. However, if one frames helping in a broad sense, one can see that there are potential opportunities for young people to demonstrate commitment to helping a homeland through, for example, raising awareness and through homeland-oriented identity constructions which can also pave the way for future diasporic mobilisation. Here it should be noted that in addition to focusing on young people, this chapter also considers the perspectives of their parents and how they assess the experiences and viewpoints of their children. This is done with the aim to get their view on the perspectives of their children and assess the influence of the family environment to which young people are exposed to. It is also important to note that most of the members of the families that participated in this research are recent arrivals in the UK and whose decision to move to the UK has been influenced by the crisis in Greece.

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Parents together with their children effectively form what I refer to in the chapter as the ‘new diaspora’ which may have a crucial role in shaping diaspora-homeland relations in the future. In terms of its structure, the chapter starts with a section that briefly outlines the context of Greeks in the UK as well as the methods. Then the conceptual framework is outlined, followed by the empirical sections which are structured around two main themes: perceptions of Greece in crisis; and identities, (dis)connections and in/exclusions in diaspora. The chapter concludes by stressing the important role that young members of the Greek diaspora can potentially play in mobilising around the homeland at a time of crisis and that this is closely linked to dynamic and diverse identity negotiations, belonging and (dis)connections to Greece.

The Greek Diaspora in the UK: Complex Identities and Ties with the Homeland Conceptually, this chapter takes as its starting point the reality of Greeks in diaspora as a complex, heterogeneous entity (Christou, 2011; Tsolidis & Pollard, 2010) with different generations and lengths of time away from Greece, and with different connections to Greece. There has been a great deal of work on Greeks in diaspora. Recent work has increasingly focused on the complexities of home and belonging for Greeks in diaspora, as well as their relationships to Greece through, for example, the lens of religion (Trantas, 2020; Kallis et al., 2019), nostalgia (Theodoropoulou, 2021), complexities of language and identity (or ‘Greekness’) for young Greeks across contexts (Papalexopoulou, 2020; see also Pelliccia, 2017 on the hybridity of Greeks in Italy). Finally, there has been increasing work on the new wave of Greeks leaving Greece as a result of the economic and political crisis (Pratsinakis et al., 2017). In the UK, there has been less work specifically on Greeks originally from Greece although there has been more research on Greek Cypriots (see, e.g., Kallis et al., 2019 on religion and intergenerational differences; Papapavlou & Pavlou, 2001 on language issues amongst others). Previous research on Greeks in the UK has stressed the need to critically interrogate gendered notions of home and family as well as the processes of remembering and changes through the life-course (Evergeti, 2006). Work has started to examine the brain drain of more recent Greek migration to the UK in terms of reasons for leaving and perceptions of homeland, for

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example (Chalari & Koutantou, 2020). Pratsinakis’s work has also focused especially on crisis-related migration (Pratsinakis et  al., 2020) and the need to create work and family security abroad using a case study of the Netherlands and the UK and in relation to brain drain (Pratsinakis, 2019), examining how this does not necessarily have to be detrimental to Greece (see also Labrianidis, 2014). Georgalou’s (2021) research on Greek migrant usage of social media in the UK examines the ways in which emotions are displayed through a blog, signalling new ways for Greeks to engage in identity performances on and offline and through different media (also see Panagakos, 2003; Koukoutsaki-Monnier, 2012; Pelliccia, 2019; Piperoglou, 2020). Gartzou-Katsouyanni (2019) outlines preliminarily findings of a project on Greeks in the UK which suggest that Greek identity is important, and that although they are put off Greek politics due to negative perceptions of it, they still wish to be involved and help their homeland. Pratsinakis et al.’s (2021) report on recent survey work on the Greek diaspora provides a thorough overview of the demographics and perceptions of this youthful and educated diaspora. Cavounidis’s work (2016) on the Greek diaspora and homeland development outlines many initiatives but ultimately states that there is a danger that Greece will not capitalise on its diaspora because its actions are ‘ill-suited’; she notes that Greek state strategies for engaging with diaspora may be ‘out of tune’ with younger people in diaspora and those that they are trying to reach. She highlights that this is partly to do with new ways to connect, on and offline but also to do with new ways to belong in a global world. Finally, it is worth noting Labrianidis and Pratsinakis’s (2017) plea that Greece better capitalises on its emigrants who are seen as constituting valuable human capital in meaningful ways, through, for example, processes of brain circulation, collaboration and co-operation. Such ‘bridging’ activities pave the way for migration to be beneficial for sending and receiving contexts (Mavroudi, 2022). This is important but also raises the question of what happens over time and through space, which is why exploring different contexts and also different generations can be useful. What happens when this ‘new diaspora’ of younger people and new migrants move away from the homeland, and when they have grown up in diaspora? What does this mean for their senses of home and belonging and their dynamic relationships with a sometimes distant homeland? In turn, what does this then mean for any potential current and future activities which they could engage in to help Greece? It is important not to make assumptions around diasporic obligations towards the homeland,

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especially at times of crisis (Mavroudi, 2018) and this is arguably even more the case with such a ‘new diaspora’, as this chapter explores. Furthermore, it is also important to appreciate that such diasporic obligation is entangled with identity negotiations as well as perceptions of the homeland and (dis)connections to it, which is why this chapter also explores these issues. Diasporic belonging can shine a light on the potentially exclusionary visions and versions of nationalism that states can perpetuate and expect from territorialised, and who they see as their de-territorialised populations. This is because those in diaspora often have more ambivalent, hybrid and multiple identities and attachments as they sit in-between nations and states (Mavroudi, 2007). However, it is also important to remember that national identity constructions continue to be important to those in diaspora and they also may perceive homeland identity in potentially more narrow ways (Mavroudi, 2020; Blumer, 2011; Koukoutsaki-Monnier, 2012). This is why it is important to conduct grounded research on diasporic lives and identities which explores the tensions, disunities and materialities of such communities and how there are differing ways to be and feel Greek in diaspora. This is especially the case as generations continue and as marriages become mixed and identity becomes potentially ever more plural. What is important to state here at the outset is that I view identity as malleable, and non-essentialised, and as in-the-making. Therefore, one can trace and unpack the ways in which those in diaspora actively construct, articulate and perform their identities in particular times, places and spaces (Blunt, 2007; Christou, 2011; Ni Laoire, 2003; Mavroudi, 2019). This is also the case for children and young people in diaspora whose identities and belonging is also seen as negotiated in especially dynamic, complex and fluid ways in relation to host and home contexts but also in relation to their peers and intergenerational relationships (Burdsey, 2006; Reynolds & Zontini, 2016). In the Midlands region of the UK, from 2018 to 2019, I spoke to1 young people aged between 11 and 25, their parents and also gatekeepers such as Greek teachers. This chapter uses data from 13 young people of Greek (not Greek Cypriot) origin and 13 parents.2 Parents were not included in the initial research plan but it quickly became obvious that 1  I am grateful for a Leverhulme Trust Research fellowship, which enabled me to conduct this research. 2  This data collection formed part of a wider project on young people’s politicisation in diaspora, focusing on the Greek, Jewish and Palestinian diasporas in England.

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their views were particularly useful and important. This is because they help explicate processes of intergenerational transmission and the family environment that young people were exposed to. Their own opinions about their migration background, Greece, and the prospects of return, were also important to help assess the wider context of their children’s perspectives. The young people ranged from those who were born and raised in the UK to those who had arrived when they were very young, to those who had arrived more recently. For ethical reasons, interviews with under 18-year-olds were conducted individually or in pairs and in some cases family members were in the vicinity; ethical protocols were rigorously followed. Over 18-year-olds were interviewed individually.

Young People in Diaspora: Identities and Mobilisation at Times of Homeland Crisis Conceptual Approaches Work has increasingly paid attention not only to children within migrant families, but also to children and young people as migrants in their own right and with their own valid opinions about their migration or diasporic experience (Tyrrell et  al., 2013; Moskal, 2015; Zontini & Reynolds, 2018). From being hidden in analyses of migration, work is now focusing on them as actors, listening to their voices and experience and valuing them as political beings (see, e.g., Salih et al., 2020; Leurs, 2015; Mansouri & Mikola, 2014). Work has also increasingly focused on the need to examine different generations, and the difference this makes in terms of, for example, identity, politics and connections with homelands and places of origin (Mansouri & Johns, 2017). The chapter is also influenced by wider work on the relationships between migration and development, and the ways in which emigrants or those in diaspora attempt to ‘help’ or contribute to the homeland and loved ones left behind both long term and at times of crisis and the challenges they may face in doing so. Such activity has been theorised in different ways, from mobilisation (Koionova, 2018; Brinkerhoff, 2009) to economic, political and social remittances, to diaspora and transnational politics. In terms of young people, it is especially important to note the potential value of social remittances (Levitt & Lamba-Nieves, 2011) which can lead to broader social change through the exchange of new ideas and

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practices, which can be especially useful in trying to help deal with crises from afar. Finally, there has been work on diasporic obligation—this highlights the complexities around the positive and negative emotions involved in helping the homeland in top down ways, but also via personal connections and family commitments (Mohan, 2006; Jones, 2014; Werbner, 2002) and which is not a given because it is a dynamic learning process (Page & Tanyi, 2015). What is clear is that it is hard to assess diasporic or migrant contributions to the homeland without having an understanding of what are often complex, diverse identities and myriad, dynamic connections to their homelands or places of origin. Therefore, assumptions around what it means to be and feel in diaspora should not be made and it is important to have broad, flexible and inclusive notions of diaspora and diasporic belonging (Jöns et al., 2015). This is especially the case for governments and the ways in which they engage with ‘their’ diasporas in diaspora strategies (Cohen, 2017). As they seek to potentially engage different generations of emigrants and diaspora, they need to be aware of the different ways in which people negotiate belonging to often multiple contexts and that this process is not necessarily easy or straightforward (Dickinson, 2017; Ho, 2011; Larner, 2007) and the diaspora strategies of sending governments need to address this (Ancien et al., 2009). With this in mind, it also important to recognise that younger migrants and young people in diaspora may also have complicated notions of home and belonging which span multiple scales and spaces and that there can be no easy or simplistic assumptions around loyalty or obligation to a homeland or place of origin. Research has demonstrated that young people in diaspora do indeed negotiate multiple identities (Burdsey, 2006) in creative, hybrid ways which are classed as well as gendered. This demonstrates how young people can be seen as agents, but also constrained by structures which they also have to navigate (Belloni, 2020). The liminal third or ‘safe spaces’ (Gembus, 2018) which migrant children and young people create point to the realities faced by young people ‘on the move’ as they attempt to navigate not only multiple contexts, but also generational differences, wider economic and political uncertainties (Michail & Christou, 2016) and their own place and politics within a globalising world (Blachnicka-Ciacek, 2018), off as well as online (NurMuhammad et al., 2016). This highlights the necessity of viewing identity and politics as enmeshed and entangled, in relation to the often multiple times and

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contexts of these young lives, which recent work on diasporic youth politics has demonstrated (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2013; Godin & Doná, 2016; Müller-Funk, 2020; Horst, 2018; Graf, 2018; Orjuela, 2020; Wilmers & Chernobrov, 2020). This work in particular stresses the important role that these young people in diaspora can play in not only helping a homeland at a time of crisis but more broadly in cultural, political and economic development, life, representations and performances across borders. For example, Horst’s (2018) work focuses on the Somali diaspora and demonstrates the important relationships between belonging and civic action for young people as they negotiate what Horst terms ‘multi-sited embeddedness’ or attachment and politicisation in relation to multiple contexts in flexible ways. Müller-Funk’s (2020) work shows how young people in the Egyptian diaspora are influenced by host and homeland contexts as they engage in political mobilisation in dynamic ways. This builds on work that underscores the need for deeper engagement with the ways in which on and offline spaces interact and form part of diasporic lives and spaces (Budarick, 2014). Perceptions of Greece in Crisis The section discusses perceptions of Greece of young Greeks in the UK as well as parents. It should be said at the outset that no questions specifically on whether Greece was in crisis were asked. Rather, what often emerged were negative depictions of a homeland which were then linked to either the Greek economic and political crisis more specifically (but which they still saw as ongoing at the time of research) or framed more broadly in terms of Greece being in crisis more long term and without specific references to the post 2009 crisis. The main point to note is that participants saw Greece as a country of continued crisis (as do others—see, e.g., Maris et al., 2021) which, at the time of research, had not been resolved because they found it to be a country with multiple issues which needed addressing such as bureaucracy and corruption. This is important because one of the main criteria for diasporic mobilisation is seen to be a crisis in the homeland; therefore, assessing to what extent those in diaspora feel a homeland is in crisis is a useful first step to analysing current and future diasporic mobilisation. I would like to start off this section with the views of Aleka, a young Greek mother in her late 20s, who has been in the UK for less than 5 years, lives in the East Midlands and is married to a non-Greek. She explained

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that she feels that young people in the Greek diaspora are aware that Greece has been and still is in crisis because they can see changes occurring which include the influx of Greek families to the UK and because of conversations they have with their parents and other family members as well as their peers. Aleka was clear that she sees her life, and that of her young child, as now being based in the UK, and not in Greece, even though she is connected to Greece emotionally. She perceived the life and identity of her child as diverse and multiple and sees this as a positive and not a negative; this is especially because her partner is not Greek. She originally came to the UK because of the crisis in Greece and has had to rebuild her life. Interestingly, she noted that she felt that younger Greeks who had left Greece because of the crisis there feel bitter and resentful about the fact that they were in effect forced into leaving and that means they end up not caring about their homeland initially: So for a few years [after I came], I didn’t care [about Greece] … I’m [now] getting older. … I start, you know, I start caring again. But I think at the beginning and while you’re younger, you’re more angry, you don’t care, you leave for a reason, you leave because you want to punish your country. But after all, yeah, you’re getting more mature, you’re thinking that whatever you could do, it’s good to do, not like we can do much. Whatever we can do, mm.

This is why perceptions of crisis in host and homeland contexts are important: they can affect feelings of belonging and diasporic mobilisation now and in the future. She stressed that although she has started ‘caring’ about Greece again and wanting to help, there was not much she felt she could do. The temporal aspect of bitterness and then caring is interesting because it demonstrates that feelings towards the homeland are dynamic and can become both negative and positive. Above all, it shows that perceptions and (dis) connections to the homeland are intensely emotional for those in diaspora (Christou, 2011). This was certainly the case for two young women I spoke to, Penelope (first generation female, age 13, East Midlands, UK) and Klara (first generation female, age 15, East Midlands, UK), who have been living in the UK for between 5 and 10 years, as they responded to a question on politics in Greece: Penelope: Messed up. Klara: Ah, there we go! She said it for me! It’s terrible.

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Penelope: It’s … it’s to the point where you think to yourself, why is there anyone in charge if they’re just going to mess it up even more than it already is? Klara: Yeah, they all want to have their go at it, don’t they? It’s just like …. Penelope: Yeah, and then they all fail.

The girls went on to discuss the state of politics in Europe and beyond in negative terms, especially in relation to Brexit and climate change, which were concerns many other young people had as well. It seems, therefore, that political and economic crisis in different contexts can merge together to create apathy and disillusionment in young people. These girls’ strong opinions were shared by other young people, such as Aris (second generation male, 11 years old, West Midlands, UK). He was interviewed with his mother in the background, who was clearly a little shocked with some of his responses and demonstrates that children do not necessarily have the same opinions as their parents: No, I think she’s [Theresa May] better than Tsipras but … I don’t know, I hope they get them out as quick as possible, so we can get Grexit too. Aris’s mother: My God! So what don’t you like about Tsipras? Aris’s mother: Do you like him? Nothing really!

Such negativity was mirrored by other young Greeks who, despite having what they feel are valid ideas, and feel they should be listened to, feel helpless. Pavlos (second generation male, 11 years old, East Midlands, UK) described this in answer to a question on the role of young people in helping Greece: Yes, but I think … I feel very powerless, there’s nothing I can do to save Greece. I know many things that could be done …. Like what? One example, reducing our spending, and maybe the UN could also help out Greece in helping remove the debt and making sure that it’s not in the position it was during the financial crisis. So I feel like there were many things that could have been done that if they listened to young people, young people’s opinions, some good ideas would have come out that could have helped Greece out of this crisis. Yeah.

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Such strong opinions can lead to feelings of detachment and disinterest. This leads to the final part of this section and highlights that younger Greeks in diaspora view themselves and their politics in a wider, more globally oriented perspective, as seen with other young people in diaspora (Salih et al., 2020; Blachnicka-Ciacek, 2018). Although they may be sad about the situation in Greece, this does not completely define and limit them because they see their position as being part of a more global world, rather than just in terms of a country of origin and settlement. This paves the way for a more positive outlook, in which the internet and social media have a role to play in widening horizons. This more positive framing is also embedded in their positionalities and materialities of connectedness to multiple contexts and border crossings. Here Pavlos reflects on the need for more cross-border mixing and interactions between Greece and the UK so that countries can learn from one another. This signals a more universal, multilateral approach in which countries are seen as needing to work together to solve problems: I think a lot of … ideas that we have in England and other countries don’t come to Greece, and a lot of ideas in Greece don’t come to England. And I feel like countries need to communicate their ideas to each other more to be able to decide what they should do. I definitely see politics very differently to everybody else. I see consequences that many other people wouldn’t see, like travelling, trading between different countries that many people wouldn’t imagine, but I need to imagine it because I’m from Greece and it will affect me.

Therefore, although there is apathy and disillusionment, their mobilities and more expansive views of their belonging and connections to Greece, which although important, form part of wider, more global, plural frames of reference when it comes to politics. Coupled with negative perceptions of Greece in crisis, more global views such as these signal the need to reframe our understanding of what diasporic politics entails for young people in diaspora. They are aware of their position, as being connected to elsewhere, but they are also pragmatic and perceive economic and political struggles through a lens of global, as well as national economic and political issues. Framed in such terms, diasporic obligation towards a homeland in crisis is not a given because it competes with and forms part of other struggles. However, this more expansive orientation and understanding of themselves as mixed, or more global and with a migrant background, can also potentially lead the way to a more positive

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outlook on homelands and the ways in which such young people can help and achieve social, political and economic change, in multiple contexts, because of this very background, which becomes an asset rather than a hindrance. However, the ability to feel that one can make a difference also stems from how these young people are positioned where they live, in terms of identity and feelings of in/exclusion both in hostlands and in homelands. (Dis)Connections, In/Exclusions and Young People’s Multiple Identities in Diaspora This section focuses on primarily parental (dis)connections to Greece and in/exclusions within the Greek diaspora and what they thought this meant for their children and other youth in the UK in terms of identity negotiations and future mobilisation. It was clear that the parents I spoke to felt connected to Greece, either in material ways through visits and family, and/or through emotional belonging and attachment to a place they perceive as a home or homeland. However, such connections were also tinged with sadness and frustration. This is because despite these connections, there can be feelings of difference when they return, which for some were not so problematic, but for others, signified a rupture with their past life in Greece: Yeah, that’s it and … yeah, we go and visit our families and you know clothes and everything is like in a suitcase, feeling like you know strangers, visitors. Yeah, we are visitors, we are ghosts in Greece. So yeah, this played quite a big part of to help us as well to settle now and realise, OK [their son] is happy, we are happy … that’s it, end of story, we’re buying a … so then we decide, alright, so then we have to move on, OK, come and look, buy a house, settle, then that’s it. Now Greece is only for holidays. (Leonidas, first generation male, 30–40 years old; North Midlands, UK)

This lack of material connection can make it hard to imagine living and working there, or getting involved in any substantial way. This was compounded by perceptions of corruption and bureaucracy in Greece, and the very different ways of working there. Parents felt younger people born in the UK or who left Greece when they were very young may struggle to navigate Greek systems and that may influence whether or not they feel they can actively get involved in Greek affairs and diasporic mobilisation in

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the future. Many Greeks I spoke to in the UK therefore felt that it is not easy to navigate bureaucracy and the different systems and ways of doing things in Greece and that things are much easier in the UK. This view was expressed by two parents: Ariadne, a first generation female Greek parent, aged 40–50, who has been living in the West Midlands region of the UK for 15–20 years, outlined concerns in relation to getting a Greek passport. Second, Vasiliki (first generation female, aged 30–40, North Midlands, UK) talks about bureaucracy in comparison between the UK and Greece: Yeah they [her children] were born here, yeah, but they have British passport because it’s much easier to have British than a Greek one. For the Greek one, you have to go to Greece or to the embassy which is in London, book an appointment and sometimes people just don’t make it to their appointments for some reason and it gets cancelled and bring all the paperwork. So it’s easier, it’s just easier to do the British passport! But with Brexit I think that we’ll need to have Greek passport. Big question is could I live in Greece? And at the moment, no. To start with it’s job opportunities and I’m really sorry to say that I love my country but … it has some really big faults. When here I can call the tax office and I can do my job from the comfort of my house, from the phone call and everything will come from us to what I requested from them in my house is great. When I lived in Greece for the same job, just running around for a week to a month, going from one office to the other, and then not being able to do what I want, there’s a problem. So the Greek system just does not work.

Although Greeks in diaspora may feel this emotional attachment to Greece, and feel a personal responsibility to Greece in terms of identity and in more material ways, this is not necessarily enough to galvanise them into action beyond more basic involvement such as the sending of remittances and occasionally raising money for earthquakes and fires. This is also linked to perceptions of being part of a Greek ‘community’ and the in/exclusions this can entail. Yes, somehow, you know the expectation of being Greek is that you know you go to the church every Sunday and you go to their events and you support here. So it does have to do a little bit about expectations, whereas we try to be a diverse group and include everyone you know who loves Greece. So yes, it has to do with inclusion, exclusion criteria! So I feel the community here is like … sometimes because I do go to the church every Sunday and some … and I speak to people, and some, most of the times I feel like I’ve been transported in a Greek village,

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in a village in Greece. Everyone knows you and everyone is having an eye on you, you know, of what you’re doing and how, so you need to be aware of what you say or what you behave. (Anastasia, first generation female, 30–40 years old, West Midlands, UK)

Anastasia was talking about the need to create new groups and initiatives in diaspora which are inclusive. Such generational differences also play out in terms of the development and continuation of community activities, in which newer migrants and young people in the Greek diaspora may feel are not relevant to them. Therefore, there is a need to recognise that the new emigrants and younger members of the diaspora need space, time and opportunity to carve out meaningful interactions and connections with one another and Greece, but in their own ways and on their own terms. Thus, any attempts to try and engage the ‘new diaspora’ comprised of young Greeks and those more recently arrived in order to help Greece need to recognise and act upon the reality that there are particular challenges and opportunities associated with this group and that these are not static through time and space. This understanding, from some older Greeks and those in the UK longer, that new migrants and young people see themselves as part of multicultural societies like the UK means that their outlook on issues such as identity, religion and language are more open-minded and flexible (Fanany & Avgoulas, 2019). This does not mean negating Greekness but involves recognising these young people’s perceptions of their place in this world and their complexities of belonging, as this young woman who has been in the UK less than five years reflected: Yes, I think there’s a tendency now to be … have everything as a neutral or grey area and that’s … that’s fine but in terms of … of history, of … identity, how can identity be defined if there are not criteria or … certain aspects make you feel Greek or … I think you can be a citizen of the world and have … and still have your Greek identity strong. (Aspasia, first generation female, 20–30 years old, East Midlands, UK)

Looking back towards Greece can go hand in hand with looking forward and being aware of both contexts in realistic ways. Also, it is possible that they can make valuable contributions to homelands and to other contexts too. This is echoed by an active community member in the East Midlands who is a parent and grandparent and has been involved in education for many years:

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But we still, our history, our culture is very valuable, and I believe it’s important for children to have, you know understand their roots and to have two cultures. And we live in a multicultural, multi-ethnic society, we teach them how to be tolerant, to respect each other and to recognise that even though we’re maybe from ethnic minorities, we’re part of a whole and we have a lot to contribute, try and make them proud of their heritage. (Adonis, first generation, aged 60–70, East Midlands, UK)

There was a broader understanding of diasporic Greekness as being part of here and there, and also beyond but also parental recognition that being in diaspora can be hard for younger Greeks in terms of feelings of difference: and it’s a shame if they didn’t take advantage of it and know the language and know the culture and … know the whole idea of … belonging somewhere and … I want them to be proud of coming from Greece. … I think that the child should feel strong about having two different backgrounds and not feeling … because some of them are bullied at school and they should feel strong about having two different … backgrounds in terms of … parentage and the culture. … So we try to connect them with the world basically and not just being an individual, to feel part of a community and part of the world as being as unique as you are. (Danae, first generation female, 30–40 years old, North Midlands, UK) My genuine feeling is like if the younger generation, that they are mixed, Greek and English, if they can actually identify the good parts of two, of both languages, their voice perhaps will get the good, proper, ideal country at the end. (Vasiliki, first generation female, aged 30–40, North Midlands, UK)

There was thus a perception that young people in diaspora can get the best of both worlds, and that this mixing can be a positive thing in terms of galvanising change in Greece. The ‘community’ was one that was not imagined in narrow, ethno-­ national ways. Rather, it was seen in broader, more inclusive ways, in which there is sharing and it forms an active and more meaningful part of family lives. In turn this can mean that younger generations could also better and more fruitfully engage in activities associated with Greece, and beyond. However, they will arguably only be able to do this if they feel they have a stake in such communities and that their opinions and voices are heard in Greece and in diaspora. Older generational and homeland tensions and interests are not always the interests of the ‘new diaspora’

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who will potentially feel alienated as a result. However, it was clear that in many families there was intergenerational connection in terms of either similar views or outlooks on the world, or in terms of young people framing their views in opposition to their parents. It should be noted that the former was more common but there was evidence of the latter in a minority of cases. This demonstrates the important role that parents and grandparents play in helping and shaping young diasporic views on their identities, politics and views of the world (also see, e.g., Kallis et al., 2019). Diaspora strategies and initiatives aimed at young people and newer migrants need to be mindful that youth identity and politics are negotiated in complex ways and that these young people need to feel able to have a voice, be listened to and engage in change on their own terms. Their interest in social, political and economic change, which is often strong, is expressed less in terms of narrowly defined identities and affinities to Greece but in broader terms, as part of wider needs to engage with social and political justice and to belong in more plural ways.

Conclusions: Opportunities and Challenges to Helping the Homeland at a Time of Crisis This chapter has stressed the need to support and value the views and experiences of young people in diaspora who may feel negatively about Greece and what, at the time of the research, they perceived to be a prolonged crisis there, resulting in a range of emotions such as disillusionment and apathy. This is also linked to the realities they face in terms of negotiating their lives and identities within and across national borders. The idea and reality of a crisis for young people and their parents is imagined both in terms of a specific economic and political point in time, which they did not see as having ended at the time of research, but also more generally and widely in relation, for example, to the European crisis around Brexit. For young people in particular, the notion of a crisis was framed not only in relation to Greece and Brexit, but also in relation to environmental issues such as the climate crisis. The lives of the participants across generations were undoubtedly affected by the Greek crisis but young people also framed the idea of crisis more broadly, which forms part of their identity-making, (dis)connections with Greece and potential for diaspora mobilisation. For young people, the crisis in Greece was seen as part of a wider series of crises which characterised their lives and those of their

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families and peers. Their complex and flexible negotiations of identity in relation to Greece, UK, Europe and more globally take place with this backdrop, as multiple crises compete for their attention. The research did not set out to target specific elites or Greeks in any particular positions of authority, but rather to speak to a cross-section of the Greek diaspora. This means that the findings reflect the more general views of those in diaspora, rather than activists or those actively involved in diasporic politics or economic development of the homeland. This can therefore provide insights into more mundane everyday practices and perceptions of identity and connection, which is important in assessing the role that people can play in helping homelands in times of crisis and beyond. This is because such homeland-oriented practices need to be placed within diasporic people’s everyday lives, in realistic ways. Migrants and those in diaspora should not necessarily be relied on to provide magic solutions to homeland crisis and development more broadly; rather, “they are an ambiguous and complex phenomenon characterised by conflicting interests and ambitions, and embedded in both local and transnational power relations” (Kleist, 2008: 112). This complexity is also down to differences and diversities within diasporas and the reality that ‘helping the homeland’ can be an abstract notion which requires work and nurturing and also which needs to be conceptualised more broadly. A wider appreciation of youth migrant knowledge and skills is needed which can in turn broaden the notion of human capital beyond specific skill levels into something more intangible and harder to quantify (Lulle et  al., 2019). Lulle et  al.’s (2019) discussion of the “knowledgeable migrant” in which the skills, capital and knowledge of migrants and those in diaspora are viewed in more inclusive, holistic and open terms is useful. This is especially the case with younger and newer migrants and those in diaspora and their increasingly complex mobilities, diversities and identities: their potential contribution is harder to assess but it doesn’t mean that it is not important. Such latent social, economic and political remittances may be more hidden but there is potential in the minds and actions of diasporic and migrant youth in terms of caring about homelands and other contexts; they may want to achieve social, political and economic change and development but their ideas may be ignored or marginalised or they may struggle to voice them because of their age. Young people need to feel they can freely express themselves and their identities and opportunities for them to do so should be created, rather than conform to potentially narrow ideas around ethno-national

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belonging. This ties in with the reality that although young people do care about Greece, they also care about where they live too and the rest of the world. They may have multiple loyalties, commitments, interests. Governments need to be aware of this, but this “transnational family habitus” (Zontini & Reynolds, 2018) can be seen as a strength rather than a weakness. The Greek government and anyone trying to engage with diasporic youth also need to have a broader understanding of the diversity of diasporic lives, experiences and identities and be better “in tune” with their wishes (Cavounidis, 2016).

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Pratsinakis, M., King, R., Himmelstine, C.  L., & Mazzilli, C. (2020). A crisis-­ driven migration? Aspirations and experiences of the post-2008 South European migrants in London. International Migration, 58, 15–30. Reynolds, T., & Zontini, E. (2016). Transnational and diasporic youth identities: Exploring conceptual themes and future research agendas. Identities, 23(4), 379–391. https://doi.org/10.1080/1070289X.2015.1024129 Salih, R., Zambelli, E., & Welchman, L. (2020). “From Standing Rock to Palestine we are united”: Diaspora politics, decolonization and the intersectionality of struggles. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 44, 1135–1153. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 01419870.2020.1779948 Theodoropoulou, I. (2021). Nostalgic diaspora or diasporic nostalgia? Discursive and identity constructions of Greeks in Qatar. Lingua, 263, 102697. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.lingua.2019.05.007 Trantas, G.  E. (2020). Greek-Orthodox diasporic glocality and translocality in Germany and Great Britain. Journal of the British Association for the Study of Religion, 22, 71–88. http://www.jbasr.com/ojs/index.php/jbasr/article/ view/48. https://doi.org/10.18792/jbasr.v22i0.48 Tsolidis, G., & Pollard, V. (2010). Home space: Youth identification in the Greek Diaspora. Diaspora, Indigenous, and Minority Education, 4(3), 147–161. https://doi.org/10.1080/15595692.2010.490728 Tyrrell, N., White, A., Ní Laoire, C., & Carpena-Mendez, F. (Eds.). (2013). Transnational migration and childhood. Routledge Taylor Francis. Werbner, P. (2002). The place which is diaspora: Citizenship, religion and gender in the making of chaordic transnationalism. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 28, 119–133. Wilmers, L., & Chernobrov, D. (2020). Growing up with a long-awaited nation-­ state: Personal struggles with the homeland among young diasporic Armenians. Ethnicities, 20(3), 520–543. https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796819866973 Zontini, E., & Reynolds, T. (2018). Mapping the role of ‘transnational family habitus’ in the lives of young people and children. Global Networks, 18, 418–436. https://doi.org/10.1111/glob.12185

CHAPTER 14

Greek-Australian Ethno-regional Diasporic Engagement with the Homeland During the Greek Economic Crisis: Ethnographic Insights Vassiliki Chryssanthopoulou

Crisis, Transnational Heritage and the Diasporic Ethno-regional Connection This chapter explores the topic of Greek homeland-diaspora engagement during the post-2009 economic crisis that so severely affected Greece. This I do through a consideration of relations and projects created and/ or promoted between a Greek ethno-regional community in Australia and its ancestral ethno-regional homeland in Greece over the past decade. In

To the memory of Michael Tsolakis whose love for Castellorizo inspired everybody, Castellorizians and non-Castellorizians alike V. Chryssanthopoulou (*) National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Athens, Greece e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 O. Anastasakis et al. (eds.), Diaspora Engagement in Times of Severe Economic Crisis, Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97443-5_14

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order to examine this engagement, I compare it to what existed before the crisis, thus locating differences and similarities between both periods. To do so I analyse ethnographic and bibliographical material concerning Castellorizian Australians, who originate from the island of Castellorizo on the southeastern borders of Greece. I examine how their transnational relations, diasporic belonging and diasporic heritage evolved before and during the Greek economic crisis. In doing so, I explore the role ethno-­ regional identity plays in the forging of Greek diasporic identities. I suggest that more attention should be paid to this largely overlooked factor, which is very important in any attempt to interpret how diasporic Greeks engaged with the homeland during the crisis and beyond. In my view, the Greek “crisis” is a “critical juncture” (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007; see Introduction), in that the crisis has indeed brought about socio-economic, political and cultural changes in Greek society, including changes in the homeland-diaspora relationship. However, from an anthropological perspective, we also need to consider how Greeks at home and abroad viewed the crisis and its impact upon their homeland in the light of their experiences and/or “postmemories” of other past crises (Hirsch, 2008). Knight has used the term “cultural proximity” to refer to the phenomenon whereby individuals link some economic crises to certain past experiences through “recognising, and eventually embodying, representations of the past within the context of the present”, thus rendering the crisis a “polytemporal” event (Knight, 2012, p. 350; Tziovas, 2017, p. 22). Research on societies in Southern Europe, which have experienced austerity over the past decade, shows that people “are looking to the past to inform coping strategies or conjure strength, to express fear or to provide glimpses of hope for the future within the murky waters of this critical event” (Knight & Stewart, 2016, p. 4). Papataxiarchis draws our attention to “local, on-the-ground usages” of terms such as “crisis”. He suggests viewing the Greek economic crisis not simply as “‘a moment of truth’, suggesting a historical turning point […] that merely indicates ruptures and deep discontinuities”, but rather as the climax of “trouble” which had already existed for a long time and had preceded the crisis, thus viewing the crisis in terms of both process and event (Papataxiarchis, 2018, pp. 229–230). A reflexive re-evaluation of the crisis-ridden present of their ancestral homeland against the background of the past is especially significant in the case of migrant and diasporic populations. Diasporic individuals and groups often regard the post-2009 Greek crisis as a re-enactment of the

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events that drove them or their ancestors from Greece. By the same token, however, diasporic Greeks have endeavoured to help Greece stem the flow abroad of its human resources. In this they were inspired by past diaspora benefactors to offer benefactions to their regional and/or national Greek homeland, these examples constituting part of Greek national, ethnic and diasporic myths and ideologies (Tomara-Sideris, 2016). However, as individual cases from the Greek-Australian diaspora show, there emerge distinct trends and patterns in the ways diasporic individuals and groups have dealt with the recent Greek economic crisis which point to significantly different kinds of engagement with the homeland. In this chapter, I employ the term “diaspora” in a non-essentialist, non-­substantivist manner to mean a “category of practice, used to make claims, to articulate projects, to formulate expectations, to mobilize energies, to appeal to loyalties”, in the manner suggested by Rogers Brubaker (Brubaker, 2005, p. 12; see Introduction). I examine how, during the Greek economic crisis, Castellorizian Australians reconfigured their views of their ancestral ethno-regional and ethno-national homeland, that is Castellorizo and Greece respectively, and redefined their relations with it. These recent kinds of diaspora-homeland engagement are either group—or individually—orientated and consist of diversified strategies and efforts. “Homeland orientation” is crucial to the definition of diasporic identities. Such an orientation involves maintaining a collective memory or myth of the homeland, viewing the homeland as the true, ideal home, making constant efforts to ensure that the homeland flourishes and, finally, drawing on the homeland as a means of shaping diasporic identity (Safran, 1991, pp. 83–84, in Brubaker, 2005, p. 5). Until recently, the Greek state functioned as the main hub in the structuring of its relationship with diasporic Greek communities and individuals. The crisis helped change this pattern, however. As Anagnostou has shown in his study of Greek Americans during the period of the crisis, their engagement with the homeland was inspired by the ideology of “diaspora as best practice”. This involvement suggested a new model for the Greece-diaspora relationship, which “recentres Greece from a national centre for the diaspora to a pole within the transnational space of Greece— United States, a domain that governmental policies and economic institutions are in the business of shaping” (Anagnostou, 2017, pp. 124–125). By “ethno-regional” I mean diasporic individual and group identities, which are linked to their “attachment—socio-economic or symbolic or both—to the particular region within or even outside Greece (but still

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within the Greek-speaking world of the present or past), where they themselves or their families originate from”, that is to their “small” regional homelands (Chryssanthopoulou, 2009, p.  202). For Greeks, regional identity is essential to the formation of their national, ethnic, diasporic and personal identities. Although this was recognised early on in studies concerning Greece (e.g. Dimen & Friedl, 1976), insufficient attention has been paid to it in Greek migrant and diasporic contexts (Chryssanthopoulou, 2009, pp. 202–203; Afentoulis & Cleland, 2015). Nevertheless, one can comprehend certain aspects of Greek diaspora lives only in reference to ethno-regional origin and belonging. Diasporic Greeks’ ethno-regional identities involve a level of identification below that of their national identities in regard to both the nation of (ancestral) origin, Greece, and the nation of their current citizenship, Australia—or another country, such as the USA and Canada, since ethno-­ regional identification is a general phenomenon in the Greek diaspora. Those involved believe that relations between ethno-regional diasporas and their regional homelands in Greece exist at a grassroots level and rest on ancestry and kinship and so are affective, reciprocal, horizontal and non-hierarchical. Such relationships are clearly different from relations with the Greek state, which, as already mentioned, are hierarchical, generally unilaterally directed from Greece to Greeks abroad and mediated by Greek state administration. This neglect of subnational, ethno-regional bonds by scholars studying migration and diasporas may be connected to what Wimmer and Glick Schiller have termed “methodological nationalism”, namely the “naturalization of the global regime of nation-states by the social sciences” (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2003, p. 576). Thus ethno-­ regional engagement with the ancestral homeland is sometimes subsumed by diasporic engagement with the national homeland. Wimmer and Glick Schiller note that methodological nationalism may also inform transnational studies, since transnational communities may be regarded as homogeneous and bounded groups, thus “overlooking the importance of cross-community interactions as well as the internal divisions of class, gender, region and politics” (ibid., p. 598). Examining diasporic engagement with the homeland as practice renders us sensitive to such attempts at generalising and essentialising diasporas. Studies of Greek-Australian diasporic engagement with Greece during the crisis have not fully explored diasporic engagement with ancestral ethno-regional homelands in Greece, although they may have touched on them (Mavroudi, 2015, pp.  178, 180; Piperoglou, 2018, pp.  3, 7–9). In-depth, long-term research on

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ethno-regional groups, however, can illustrate the vital importance of this kind of subnational diasporic bonds and engagements (as I hope this paper shows). The segmentary model of the organisation of Greek identity, used by anthropologists such as John K.  Campbell (1964), Michael Herzfeld (1985), Evthymios Papataxiarchis (2006, pp.  25–39) and Vassiliki Chryssanthopoulou (1993), maps the structuring of Greek national and diasporic identities. Ethnicity is multi-layered and can be viewed as “nesting dichotomizations of inclusiveness and exclusiveness” (Cohen, 1978, p. 387). An Australian Castellorizian considers himself/herself linked to various groups and possessing a multitude of features and symbols that derive from co-existing and intersecting layers of identity: he/she is Greek, Australian, a Perth or Sydney resident, and a global citizen with a specific ethno-regional background. All these aspects are subsumed into his/her identity as Castellorizian, a term that summarises their ancestry and sense of belonging, unique for each Castellorizian individual, albeit tying them to the “imagined community” of Castellorizians worldwide (Anderson, 1983). To quote prominent Castellorizian businessman Nick Paspaley of Darwin, “If asked how I identify myself, I simply consider myself as a Kastellorizian who is an Australian citizen” (Paspaley, 2020, p. 134).1 It is through this strong identification with a grassroots ancestral “small” homeland that diaspora engagement with the national homeland, Greece, is often mediated and implemented. Castellorizo, “the guardian of the [Greek] border in the Aegean Sea” (o akritas tou Aigaiou), thanks to its position on Greece’s and the European Union’s southeastern border, opposite and very close to Turkey, is invested with positive connotations of resistance to the national threat that Turkey has always represented for Greece. The island has also acquired a particular symbolism regarding the Greek economic crisis, since it was here that then Prime Minister, Georgios Papandreou, officially announced Greece’s agreement with the European Stability Mechanism and the International Monetary Fund on 23 April 2010 (Chryssanthopoulou, 2015, p.  81). Here I will explore in depth the ways in which Castellorizian Australians have engaged with Castellorizo in safeguarding, transmitting and promoting elements of its past, natural environment and culture during the economic crisis for the benefit of all involved: of their own ethno-regional 1  On the identity-related issue of the spelling of “Castellorizo” and “Castellorizian” either with a C or with a K, see footnote 3.

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diasporic community in Australia, their ancestral regional homeland, Castellorizo, their national homelands, Australia and Greece, and humanity as a whole. This transnational engagement has taken the form of the heritagisation of these elements, namely, of re-evaluating and utilising them as heritage resources during the economic crisis period and beyond. I conceptualise “heritage” as a “social/cultural process and practice”, rather than as linked to a specific thing or essence. It concerns the ways in which individuals and groups actively position themselves in relation to places, buildings and stories, thus becoming “a way of knowing and viewing things” (Smith, 2006, p.  52). Individuals and groups reinterpret aspects of their past and present lives and environments and re-evaluate them as resources, thus reacting to the values and needs imposed by today’s consumerism and globalisation. Heritage is concerned with us as we are now, rather than as we were in the past. It is a process of “self-­ knowledge, self-evaluation, modification and claim of a cultural background” (Hafstein, 2012, pp. 508, 511–512). Butler and Rowlands define it as “the way in which a group slowly creates a collective identity by narrating stories about itself”. These stories are transmitted from one generation to the next, thus uniting the present of individuals and groups with their past and providing them with “a sense of dignity and self-respect, and with the right to have a future” (Butler & Rowlands, 2012, pp. 130–131). Greek Australians are well aware of the significance and applications of heritage in Australia, where the dialogue surrounding the heritage of the Aborigines and of the various ethnic groups living in Australia, has been widespread and enhanced through multicultural ideology and practices. Thus Australian Castellorizians participating in the conferences held by the World Castellorizian Brotherhood during the period 1977–1987, in their quest for the sustainable development of the island on the basis of “tradition”, demanded that the safeguarding of Castellorizo’s heritage become a priority. During the economic crisis, diasporic concern with heritage coincided with a speedily developing interest in it in Greece itself. The practice of “branding” living aspects and elements of Greek culture as “heritage” has proliferated in Greece since 2006, when Greece signed the 2003 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (ICH) (https://ich.unesco.org/doc/src/15164-­EN. pdf). During the decade of economic crisis, a large number of elements of ICH were listed in the Greek National Inventory for ICH, while several of them were placed on the UNESCO Representative List of the ICH of

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Humanity (http://ayla.culture.gr/en/). The convergence of this concern with heritage on the part of diasporic and homeland Greeks, to be explained by the importance of the global recognition of local cultural heritage in so far as it is linked to sustainable development, is important, when we examine the transnational heritage projects which diasporic Greek Australians have pursued over the economic crisis. My material for this chapter draws on longitudinal and multi-sited research on Castellorizian individuals and groups in Australia and in Greece, my aim being to study aspects of, and transformations in, their ethnic, diasporic and transnational relations and identities. My research material consists of both fieldwork observation and notes, interviews and archival, digital and media material. In the view of Marcus, in contemporary deterritorialised and globalised research settings, such as those pertaining to migrant or diasporic populations, researchers no longer focus on single sites of activity to procure their data. Instead, they should examine “the circulation of cultural meanings, objects, and identities in diffuse time-space” thus producing ethnographies “in/of the world system”. They do so by following “the people, the thing, the metaphor, the plot, story, or allegory, the life or biography, and the conflict” (Marcus, 1998, pp. 79–104; see also Appadurai, 1996). Thus I have been following the development of the Castellorizian community of Perth in space and time since the mid-1980s, when I embarked on studying it for my doctoral dissertation (Chryssanthopoulou, 1993, 2021).2 This long-term perspective has allowed me to witness and analyse the “return” of people belonging to the second, third and even fourth diasporic generation to their ancestral homeland, either physically or virtually, after several decades of absence of the members of this diaspora from Castellorizo, and to see the changes and reconceptualisations of Castellorizian identity that each generation has brought about, as it responds to new needs and challenges (Chryssanthopoulou, 2010, 2015, pp. 79–83). In particular, I have been able to study and document the new ways whereby transnational spaces, projects and aspects of heritage become (re)created and transmitted through the internet. An ethnography 2  Over 36 years, I have conducted fieldwork and interviews with individuals and groups of different ethno-regional origin, gender, class, and diasporic generation in Australia (Castellorizians in Perth, Karpathians and Kytherians in Canberra and Sydney) and, recently, in the USA (Kalymnians and other Dodecanesians in Tarpon Springs, Florida). This research was complemented by fieldtrips and interviews in these people’s regional homes in Greece.

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conducted in close collaboration with my collocutors, common nowadays in anthropological research, has given me a deeper understanding of diasporic Castellorizians’ “emic” or insiders’ feelings, views and attitudes towards their ethno-regional homeland during the economic crisis and beyond it; it also shows my own involvement as a researcher in the (re) creation and analysis of their representations and ensuing engagement with their homeland (Lassiter, 2005; Chryssanthopoulou, 2017, pp. 29–36).

Castellorizian Wartime Trauma as Transnational Heritage “Past events inform present crisis experience” (Knight, 2015, p. 18). In this section I will analyse how a traumatic event from World War II was memorialised and reconfigured as a story of endurance underlying the Castellorizian (Cazzie) narrative of survival, resilience in dire conditions and success in Australia. Diaspora Castellorizians (re)introduced this story to their regional homeland, Castellorizo, as transnational Castellorizian heritage during the period of the Greek crisis.3 Castellorizo, also known as “Megisti”, a small, one-settlement island on the southeasternmost border of Greece, only 1.5 miles off the Turkish coast, with a population of 492 people, is ancestral home to a large and influential ethno-regional diaspora in Australia, numbering several generations and settled in the main cities, with large communities in Perth, Sydney, Adelaide, Melbourne, Brisbane and Darwin (see Figs. 14.1 and 14.2). Australians with a familial link to Castellorizo, an island that at its zenith supported a population of no more than 10,000 people, are 3  Australian Castellorizians are generally known as “Cazzies” in Australia, a term employed both by themselves and by non-Castellorizians. Interestingly, Castellorizians often spell “Kastellorizo” and “Kazzie” with a K instead of a C, following Kastellorizo’s spelling in Greek (Καστελλόριζο). This tendency developed only recently among Australian Castellorizians, who are thus distancing themselves from the internationally accepted spelling of these words (i.e. with a “C”). This change probably illustrates their desire to stress the Greekness of Castellorizo, which represents their own sense of Greekness in the context of an anglophone environment. I used to spell, and still do spell, “Castellorizo” with a “C”, faithful to its Latin-based etymology from the word “castellum”. However, I felt that I had to follow the spelling with “K”, which was adopted by all the other authors, mostly Castellorizian, in the special issue 45 (2020) “Greece Is Kastellorizo”, published by the newspaper I Kathimerini (Chryssanthopoulou, 2020).

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Fig. 14.1  View of the settlement of Castellorizo with the Turkish coast opposite. (Photo-credits: V. Chryssanthopoulou & N. Anastasiadis, 07.2018)

estimated to amount to over 80,000 today (Pappas, 2020, p. 132). They constitute a group with a distinct history, socio-economic characteristics, an ethno-regional myth and symbols, high socio-economic status in Australia, and a hegemonic position in the Greek-Australian community. The Castellorizians were successful traders in the eastern Mediterranean and developed diasporic settlements in Asia Minor and in Egypt during the nineteenth century. A socio-economically stratified society consolidated itself on the island, where merchants and captain-traders made up its hegemonic classes. The stories surrounding the riches and influence of these families derived from the sea and from commerce formed the basis of the ideology of cultural continuity employed by the Castellorizian elite constituted in Australia after migration (Chryssanthopoulou, 2003). Castellorizian chain migration to Australia took place between the first decade of the twentieth century and 1960 and did so in waves (cohorts) triggered by a series of political events and socio-economic challenges.

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Fig. 14.2  Map showing Castellorizo and cities where Castellorizians have settled in Australia. (Google Maps 2017 | Edited by: Paraskevi G. Kanellatou)

The Young Turk Revolution of 1908, accompanied by the rise of Turkish nationalism and followed by the Castellorizians’ rebellion against the Ottoman Empire in 1913, caused political upheaval and a significant decline in trade, which persuaded a large number of Castellorizians to migrate to Australia, whither their pioneer, Athanassios Avgoustis (Arthur Auguste) had migrated and settled successfully in Perth towards the end of the nineteenth century. The island was occupied by the French (1915–1921) and was bombed during the war between the French and the Germans, leading to a reduction in its population from 5000 to 2200 due to migration and flight. The Castellorizians continued to emigrate during the Italian occupation of the island (1921–1943), when to the deteriorating economy were added restrictions on the use of Greek in education and the population was reduced to ca. 1100 (see Fig.  14.3). During World War II, the British used Castellorizo as a military supply base for the Allied fleet between 1943 and 1945. In October 1943, the island was bombed by the Germans, whereupon the British transferred the population to refugee camps in Cyprus and Palestine. When the Castellorizians returned in 1945, they found the island devastated by bombing, fire and looting. The last wave of Castellorizian migration to

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Fig. 14.3  Bidding farewell to those migrating from Castellorizo in 1938. (Photo-credits: V. Zanailis | Source: N. G Pappas collection | Photo restoration: P. G. Kanellatou, 2021)

Australia occurred in the aftermath of this plight (Chryssanthopoulou, 2015, pp. 71–73).4 At the conclusion of World War II, the Castellorizian refugees had to return to their homeland, Castellorizo, having spent two years in Gaza. About 1100 Castellorizians were transported to Port Said, where they boarded three ships to sail back to Castellorizo. On 29 September 1945, the last ship, the Empire Patrol, under the British flag and transporting the last contingent of 497 repatriating refugees, caught fire and sank ca. 70 miles off Port Said, resulting in the death of 33 refugees, mostly women and children, and of two crew members. The survivors were taken to Port Said. Meanwhile, the refugees had learned of the dreadful state of the 4  On the history of Castellorizo see Vardamidis, 1996; Chatzifotis, 1982; Pantelis, 2002; and Pappas, 1994, on the French occupation of the island. On the history of the Castellorizian migration to Australia see Chryssanthopoulou, 1993, 2015, 2017, pp. 129–152; Yiannakis, 1996, 2009.

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island. Some of them returned to Castellorizo, while others left for Australia, to join their relatives who had already settled there before the war. Among those who left for Perth was Paul Boyatzis, then a young survivor who carried with him a page from a French magazine describing the shipwreck and showing him with other refugee children in Port Said after the event (see Fig. 14.4).

Fig. 14.4  Report of the shipwreck, Images, October 1945. (Source: P. Boyatzis & N. Pappas 1995. Embers on the Sea. The Empire Patrol Disaster 1945, Halstead Press, p. 7)

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Paul migrated to Perth and became a doctor, but never forgot this traumatic event. He started to record and preserve the memories and to share the experience of the event with the general Castellorizian and Australian community. He did so by producing a book in collaboration with second-­ generation Sydney historian Nicholas Pappas (Boyatzis & Pappas, 1995), by publishing articles in mainstream Australian newspapers, and by organising memorial services in Perth. Finally, he instigated the creation of a website, www.empirepatrol.com (2010), containing survivors’ narratives of World War II and of the shipwreck crises, photographs, poems and so on (see Fig. 14.5). The memorialisation and heritagisation of the shipwreck, of vital importance for the (re)construction of identity among Australian-born Castellorizians, was later introduced by them to Castellorizo. In 2010 a sculpted marble monument bearing the names of those who had perished, the result of a joint project between diasporic Castellorizians and the Municipality of Megisti, was placed in St. George of the Well Square, also known as “Australia Square”, on Castellorizo (see Fig. 14.6). Meanwhile, diasporic Castellorizians visited the site to learn of the island’s history during World War II, to reflect on the post-memory-inducing photographs (Hirsch, 2008) of the Castellorizians’ refugee and shipwreck experience and to exchange information with other “descendants of the shipwreck” (apogonoi tou navagiou), as they call themselves, in the site’s Guest book. Apart from being a “lieu de mémoire”, a site of memory (Nora, 1984, 1989), the site is also a repository for their heritage, “so we may have some history to pass on to our grandchildren” (Chryssanthopoulou, 2017, p. 207). The website prompted Castellorizians to regard the World War II-linked events as the crisis that precipitated their migration to Australia in search of “A New Life”. As Arthur Athans, who was 14 when he survived the wreck, wrote describing his family’s return to Castellorizo: The family’s treasured possession was the house key of the front door; but there was no front door nor was there a house standing. […] Our biggest disappointment following the hardships of refugee life and the tragedy of the Empire Patrol disaster was the site of the near total destruction of our island. (http://www.empirepatrol.com/return.htm)

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Fig. 14.5  www.empirepatrol.com homepage. (Source: http://empirepatrol. com/index.htm)

Like many other families, Arthur Athans’ family migrated, first to Cyprus and then to Australia. This crisis is depicted in a mournful narrative song or rima composed by Castellorizian survivors of the shipwreck, which is hosted on the website. Its last two verses urge Castellorizians to remember the shipwreck as a valued piece of communal heritage:

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Fig. 14.6  The monument to the memory of those perished in the shipwreck set up on Castellorizo in 2010. (Photo-credits: V. Chryssanthopoulou & L. Scopelitis, 2014)

But we and our children will always remember them/and we will feel proud of our beloved generation. (http://www.empirepatrol.com/poems.htm)5

My book, “Sites of Memory in Castellorizian Migration and Diaspora” (Chryssanthopoulou, 2017), inspired by the website, contributed further to the islanders’ and diasporic Castellorizians’ shared sense of collectively owning this traumatic past, now reconfigured as transnational heritage. Proof of this was the fact that in 2019 first-year students of the senior high 5  For an analysis of this narrative song, see Chryssanthopoulou, 2017, pp.  246–249, 319–327.

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school (Lykeion) on Castellorizo, drawing on my book and encouraged by their art teacher, Leonidas Ghelos, interviewed and recorded on camera islanders who had experienced life as refugees in Gaza in their youth, thus pursuing this transnational heritage project on the island (Chryssanthopoulou, 2021, p. 285). Post-World War II Castellorizian migrants/ex-refugee survivors of the shipwreck added their polyphonic, grassroots memories to the pre-war Castellorizians’ collective representations of Castellorizo, thus reconfiguring the collective Castellorizian narrative and myth in Australia. Post-­World War II Castellorizian migrants differed substantially from their pre-war compatriots in terms of both age and socio-economic status and ideologically and culturally. The latter had been subjected to the ideology of AngloAustralian assimilation, while post-war Castellorizian migrants enjoyed the benefits of Australian multiculturalism. Several second-­ generation Castellorizians were part of an ethno-regional elite, whose collective myth of socio-economic success and claim to cultural superiority, held hegemonic sway in the Greek and even in the general Australian community, as mentioned above (Chryssanthopoulou, 2003). The post-­war survivors of the Empire Patrol shipwreck added to this myth their traumatic, yet heroic experience of suffering and endurance in dire circumstances as well as their commitment and final success in serving their new homeland which gave them the opportunity for a “New Life” (http://www.empirepatrol.com/ anewlife.htm; see also Chryssanthopoulou, 2015, pp. 75–79).6 Castellorizians linked the traumatic heritage of the Empire Patrol to their Australian identity and to Australian public history, as is clear from the following excerpt: Our story is certainly one of tragedy and survival but I feel it goes beyond that. It is not only a story of an event that occurred in those troubled times, now so far away, to a group of people. We are writing about Australians, many of whom still remember those horrifying hours, whilst thousands of their relatives and descendants relate to the tragedy with deep emotion and interest. I sincerely hope that some of their often-asked questions have now been answered. (Boyatzis & Pappas, 1995, p. 6)

6  For an analysis of Castellorizian diasporic generations in Australia, see Chryssanthopoulou, 2015, 2017, pp. 140–152.

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Heritage has been defined as “the way in which a group slowly creates a collective identity by narrating stories about itself” (Butler & Rowlands, 2012, pp. 130–131, mentioned above). The shipwrecked victims reinterpreted the Empire Patrol event, once a Castellorizian crisis, as a tale of survival and endurance leading to their prosperity in their new home, Australia. In this form they handed it down to their descendants and endeavoured to have it publicly recognised on Castellorizo as transnational Castellorizian heritage during the period of the economic crisis, which had impacted upon the society of the island. However, the memory of the crisis had already been reinterpreted in Australia as a narrative of empowerment and success resting on endurance, thus potentially expressing hope for an analogous recovery and the final attainment of prosperity by Castellorizian islanders, too. This was to be achieved through diasporic Castellorizians’ physical and symbolic return to the ancestral homeland to revitalise it, examined in the following section.

Castellorizian “Homecoming” During the Crisis and Beyond: Cultural and Educational Projects By “homecoming” I mean different types of connection experienced by Australian-born Castellorizians. It includes a physical return to the island, either temporarily or permanently, but it also refers to transnational, internet-­ mediated connections with the island, which, nevertheless, express diasporic Castellorizians’ spiritual and symbolic “return” to their ancestral homeland. The terms “ancestral return”, “ethnic return”, “roots migration” and “counter-diasporic migration” have been proposed by scholars, with an emphasis placed on diasporic individuals’ physical return to their ancestral homelands (Christou & King, 2014, p. 2). The examples analysed in the rest of this chapter employ the expanded physical, spiritual and symbolic meaning of “homecoming”. In the mid-1980s very few first-generation Castellorizians visited Castellorizo, with several declaring to me that they preferred to remember it in a state of prosperity. From the 1990s onwards, however, Castellorizians began to return systematically, a process that may have been stimulated by the idyllic picture of Castellorizo given in the highly successful film of the time, “Mediterraneo” (1991), which encouraged tourism (Blatsiou, 2020, p. 108). In addition to migrants, mostly aged, who returned, it was mainly second- and third-generation Castellorizians who undertook these

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Fig. 14.7  The author with Rose Kailis, a second-generation Castellorizian from Perth who has restored her family home and returns to the island regularly. (Photo-­ credits: V. Chryssanthopoulou, 07.2018)

“pilgrimages” to the ancestral homeland. They wished to discover their roots and become physically acquainted with this central symbol of their identities, transmitted to them through family and community narrative and practice in Australia (Chryssanthopoulou, 2009, 2012). Since they had been away for so many years and because the island had undergone so many upheavals, many Australian Castellorizians had lost their ancestral homes to families which had moved in upon returning to Castellorizo at the conclusion of World War II, as the houses of these families had been destroyed. Some Australian Castellorizians have attempted to get their ancestral houses back through legal channels, while others have simply bought land and built new houses on Castellorizo, thus contributing significantly to the island’s economy (see Fig. 14.7).7 7  These legal struggles are carried out mostly by Castellorizian women, since family homes went to the first daughter traditionally on Castellorizo (Chryssanthopoulou, 2006).

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At the beginning of this century, several Australian-born Castellorizians started conducting their weddings on the island and did so employing Castellorizian wedding customs and rituals. With the death of the old generation, of “the authentic Castellorizian women, those who knew [the customs]”, the Castellorizians who could afford the expense often decided to hold their weddings on the island, bringing along their families and close friends, to strengthen their bonds with the place and with the imagined community of their ancestors who had once lived on the island. The case of Basil Zempilas, a second-generation Castellorizian and the current Lord Mayor of Perth, whose marriage to a non-Greek-Australian took place on Castellorizo in September 2009, was typical of this trend. As he said to me in answer to my questions about his decision, he wanted to honour his mother, who had been separated from her parents and siblings at the age of five, when her family migrated to Australia leaving her behind with her grandparents. He also wanted to bring friends and family to Castellorizo and experience the wedding rituals on the island, thus re-­ affirming his own and his family’s bonds with the place and with their ancestors. I quote from his email: Perhaps my favourite moment, from a historical sense and in terms of uniting the present and the past, came just after the wedding ceremony itself. Just as many Kastellorizian wedding parties had done, including in 1927 my paternal grandfather, Basil Zempilas with his bride Dialecti Boyatzis and their wedding party and guests, my bride and our wedding party and guests posed for a photo on the school steps next to the church of Ayio Kostantino kai Eleni. We may not live in Kastellorizo anymore—but that doesn’t mean we have forgotten what it means to be Kastellorizian. Like the symbol of the island (which we used in our wedding invitations) we continue to honour the cross, the anchor and the heart of our ancestors. (Email to the author from Basil Zempilas, 19.10.2009) (see Fig. 14.8)

The transnational “homecomings” implemented by “Friends of Kastellorizo” (FK) express strongly and clearly diasporic Castellorizians’ engagement with the island for the past 15 years, which started before and continued during the Greek economic crisis. This charitable organisation was created in 2007 by Australian Castellorizians, initially as “Australian Friends of Kastellorizo” (AFK). Its vision and core purpose is “to help create a positive future for Kastellorizo, recognising our proud heritage, and giving something back to the island of our forefathers”. Its main focus is

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Fig. 14.8  Third-generation newlywed Perth Castellorizian Basil Zempilas with his bride, Amy Graham, and their wedding guests, posing for the traditional wedding photo in front of the Santrapeia School on Castellorizo. (Photo-credits: Basil Zempilas, 09.2009)

the exploration and transmission of Castellorizo’s heritage, which this organisation endeavours to achieve transnationally, through collaboration and exchanges between diaspora and islander Castellorizians. Their engagement with Castellorizo is ecumenically orientated, as they wish “to work together with all those who love and are committed to the island”. Their cultural projects since 2008 have included a youth festival, held on Castellorizo in the summer, viewed as “an opportunity for Australian children and teenagers to immerse themselves in their cultural heritage on their ancestral soil” and comprising “a crash course in dance, music, art, language, history, walking tours and architecture”.8 They endeavoured to promote publications on literature inspired by the environment and history of Castellorizo, such as “Orlif the Gentle Giant”, by Ethel Kanganas 8  For information on (A)FK see the presentation uploaded on their website of their third meeting on 17 February 2009: https://kastellorizo.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ AFKpresentation1.pdf, from which information quoted in this paragraph derives.

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and Margaret Sauer (1997), a story encouraging students to plant trees on the island, which AFK translated into Greek for the children at the local school and donated copies to students on Castellorizo. In 2010 AFK published “Kastellorizo: My Odyssey”, a bilingual children’s history, in which Castellorizo itself, as a character, tells its own story (Tsolakis & Johnstone, 2010). The purpose of this book is to pass on the cultural knowledge linked to their background to all Australian children and teenagers whose origins are from Castellorizo, as well as to children born on the island. Interestingly, the island narrates the story of diasporic Castellorizians’ “return” to their ancestral island and their transnational engagement with it on its final page: My people, who I thought had gone forever, were now coming back. Many found their family homes, old stone ruins, and rebuilt them in beautiful colours. […] The twenty-first century brought the hope of new prosperity for my people. I realised that my people would always leave, for some reason or another. But they would once again return. […] My odyssey is one of leaving, and once again, returning. (Tsolakis & Johnstone, 2010, p. 57)

One of the most valuable transnational projects initiated by AFK in 2008 was the Student Exchange scheme, whereby two school students from Castellorizo spent a month in Australia and two Australian students of Castellorizian background were hosted by families on the island. This is how Maraya Takoniatis, an exchange student from Australia, expressed the impact upon her of this project: Stories are just stories, until you have witnessed them in some way yourself. […] the island had turned into something more than just a holiday destination. It had always been my family’s history, but now it had finally become my history. […] Australia will always be my birth place, but Kastellorizo will always be my home. (Maraya Takoniatis, 2015–2016)

Another “homecoming” Castellorizian is Pantazis Houlis, mathematician and formerly Associate Professor at the University of Western Australia, who settled on Castellorizo in 2012. He established the first Puzzle Museum of Greece on Castellorizo, organises international and local competitions, held the first Puzzle festival on Castellorizo in September 2021 and has canvassed the idea of turning

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the island into a science hub (https://neoskosmos.com/en/204708/ my-­dream-­is-­to-­turn-­kastellorizo-­into-­a-­science-­hub-­says-­top-­academic/). An increasing connectivity of diasporic Castellorizian Australians with Castellorizo took place from the 1990s onwards, manifested in physical, symbolic and virtual returns to and investments for the island. I now turn to consider the continuation of these ethno-regional homeland-diaspora bonds during the period of the economic crisis.

Transnational Initiatives with Global Orientation: Environmental and Philanthropic Projects Diaspora Castellorizians demonstrated their continuing engagement with Castellorizo and with Greece, in general, over the crisis through philanthropic projects inspired by globally oriented environmental consciousness. This is clear, for example, from an interview with Andrew Liveris, a Castellorizian notable. I’m a product of immigrants, of courageous but impoverished people. I believe where we come from is, in a sense, who we are and where we are going. I think you prepare your future by using your memories and the lessons from your past. Your history shapes you. We are, after all, creatures of our environment and the legacy we’ve been given is most definitely a large part of our environment, so we have to care about it. A big piece of that is caring about the traditions and the cultural heritage that shaped you into who you are. (Tsiros, 2020, p. 126)

Andrew N. Liveris, Officer of the Order of Australia (AO), is a second-­ generation Castellorizian born in Darwin, former CEO of Dow Chemical and co-founder and continuing Global Chairman of the charitable organisation “The Hellenic Initiative” (THI). In July 2021 he was honoured as Kastellorizian of the Year 2021 by the Kastellorizian Association of Victoria, having fulfilled all four criteria for the award: being of Castellorizian descent; having demonstrated excellence in his field of endeavour; having made an outstanding contribution to the Castellorizian, Greek and/or Australian community; and being an inspirational role model for Castellorizians (https://greekherald.com.au/community/1-­p eople-­c ommunity/ global-­business-­leader-­andrew-­nicholas-­liveris-­ao-­named-­kastellorizian-­ year-­202/). With his splendid record, Andrew N. Liveris is a good example of the segmentary organisation of diasporic Greek identity: He has benefitted all

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the communities to which he belongs, starting with his birthplace, Darwin, through considerable donations aiming at supporting education, innovation and leadership. He has also benefitted Castellorizo and Greece through his leadership of The Hellenic Initiative, a global movement of the Greek Diaspora “investing in the future of Greece through direct philanthropy and economic revitalisation” (https://www.thehellenicinitiative.org/mission/). Since 2013, together with its partner organisations, THI has provided relief to families in Greece hardest hit by the economic crisis. It has also endeavoured to enhance economic development by “reigniting the Greek entrepreneurial spirit”, thus facilitating innovation and slowing the “brain drain” of young Greek professionals. It has done so by establishing funds and offering awards to small and midsized companies and start-up businesses, by providing training, internships and placement in the job market worldwide for the young people of Greece to prevent further loss of human capital from the country (https://www. thehellenicinitiative.org/entrepreneurship-­economic-­development/). The President, Nicholas Pappas, and several members of the Board of Directors of The Hellenic Initiative Australia (THIA) are of Castellorizian origin. In their efforts to help Castellorizo, they hope to make the inhabitants of the island fully aware of the fact that their island is inextricably bound to the fortunes of the world as a whole and aware, too, of the value of the resources of their own natural and cultural environment. Social scientists have presented the Greek inclination for commerce and business as a matter of Greek cultural heritage in the countries where Greek migrants settled (Price, 1963, p.  160 for Greeks in Australia; Saloutos, 1964, p.  258 for Greeks in America). These scholars have stressed Greek migrants’ independence, determination to succeed and hard work, values cherished by the host society (Chryssanthopoulou, 2003, p.  120). Anagnostou has analysed the case of diaspora Greek Americans as “ideal American and transnational citizens” by virtue of being self-reliant and entrepreneurial and abiding by “universal values”, such as those of civil society based on the rule of law, participatory democracy, gender equity and philanthropy (Anagnostou, 2017). In the following excerpt, Andrew Liveris makes an analogous claim for Castellorizian Australians. He presents them as model Australian citizens who are nevertheless linked to their ethno-regional background, which clearly differentiates them from other Greek Australians:

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In Australia, there are many diaspora groups from Greek islands—Kalymnians, Kytherans, Rhodians, Cretans and more. But Kastellorizians take it to another level. We have been given DNA from our forebears that is, of course, Greek, but that’s uniquely Kastellorizian as well. We’re fighters, we’re survivors, hard workers, we’re loyal, we’re respectful and we get things done, and these are attributes that are treasured in the Western world. What’s more, I think we bond well together; you know, the judgment often made of the Greeks is that we don’t work well together, and maybe there’s some truth to that, but Kastellorizians do work well together. (Tsiros, 2020, p. 128)

Liveris believes that diasporic philanthropic involvement with Castellorizo rests on an equitable triangular relationship among the society of the island, its diaspora and the Greek state, and that its aim is to create infrastructure with a view to long-term sustainability: “the Kastellorizian diaspora has to know that they can be part of the solution, while the people on the island need to understand that it’s not a takeover; it’s your cousins and uncles and brothers and sisters from a long way away, and they’re here to help you. And it’s not just about writing checks, it’s actually about helping to build more effective systems—the hospital, the airport, and wastewater treatment facilities.” Diasporic Castellorizians’ philanthropic contribution to their ethno-regional homeland would have to be accompanied by “a very strong statement from the Greek government that Kastellorizo matters” (Tsiros, 2020, p. 129). These initiatives would need to lead to the sustainable development of the island: They would have to create “an investment stimulus”, channel EU funds for green infrastructure, making the island carbon-friendly. Thus, money spent on public infrastructure would benefit the local economy immediately, while it would also contribute to its long-term development, once the economic depression is over. Physical contact with the ancestral homeland is crucial to the construction of diasporic individuals’ identities and far more effective than any virtually created symbolic identification with the homeland as a deterritorialised concept. For several diaspora Castellorizians who no longer possess property or close relations on the island, to link oneself to the very land of their ancestral homeland is to express a strong claim to their right of ownership and belonging to the island. These transnational projects are “glocal”, as they involve “localising strategies framed in global terms” (Eriksen, 2001, p.  310). They develop as conscious efforts by ethno-­ regional diasporas, in collaboration with the communities of their

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ancestral homelands, to sustain and transform these communities, both for themselves and for humanity as a whole. Diasporic Castellorizian transnational initiatives, sensitive to ecological issues and concerned with the island’s environment, proliferated during the economic crisis. Notably, these initiatives were inspired by an awareness of the universal importance of the environment. The involvement of the diaspora in the natural and cultural features of land on Castellorizo, however, started much earlier. During the seven conferences organised by the World Castellorizian Brotherhood in the period 1977–1987  in Castellorizo, Rhodes and Perth, Australia, participants resolved to protect all aspects of the island’s environment. The first walking guide to the island, with maps, historical and cultural information, was produced by a diaspora Castellorizian in 1995: “observing many a bewildered lost ‘searcher’ on top of the mountains, I felt a desperate need to provide a grassroots guide on how to appreciate this magical island, and to finally record a part of my origins” (Pitsonis, 2002, p. 3). While on a fieldtrip to Castellorizo, I witnessed groups of islander and diaspora children clearing rubbish from various areas of the island, a project jointly organised by the Municipality and the Friends of Kastellorizo. Pantazis Houlis, mentioned above, has, with the help of other Castellorizians, restored old paths and trails over the island, so making them accessible to tourists (Karavelatzis & Achladioti, 2020, p. 5). Two Castellorizian Australians, Michele Kiosoglous, a lawyer, and Philippa Adgemis, an educationalist, have produced a series of books, “Stories of Megisti”, through which they hope to promote the culture of Castellorizo and a knowledge of its natural environment among Australian children. In 2021, they also held children’s art competition, which drew entries from many parts of the globe. As we read in the Friends of Kastellorizo newsletter for May 2020, “the authors want to encourage children and visitors to tread lightly on the earth and to respect the unique flora and fauna of the island” (http://friendsofkastellorizo.createsend1.com/t/ViewEmail/ y/5C971A5AC244B853/0D4E9BCD9D301E410F8C96E86323 F7F9).

Conclusions and Further Thoughts In this paper, I have dealt with how diasporic Greek Australians originating from Castellorizo addressed the effects of the Greek economic crisis on their ethno-regional (Castellorizo) and on their wider ancestral

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homeland (Greece). Diasporic Australian Castellorizians (Cazzies) had already engaged intensively and variously with Castellorizo, in that they had initiated transnational cultural, educational and environmental projects on the island during the two decades before the crisis. When the crisis struck, they continued these projects through their physical, virtual and symbolic acts of “homecoming”. I have examined how post-World War II Castellorizian migrants and their Australian-born descendants used an Australian-based website to record and memorialise the collective memory of their traumatic experiences, centred around the wreck of the Empire Patrol, and to reintroduce this memory to Castellorizo, now presented as a piece of transnational heritage, reinvested with positive connotations of suffering, endurance and success. These traumatic events and crises gave shape to a collective identity formed around a narrative of hardship, survival and success. This narrative informs diasporic and islander Castellorizians’ segmentary identities as Greeks and has influenced how they connect with Greece in times of crisis. Diasporic and islander Castellorizians could then re-evaluate their crisis-ridden present against the background of such serious past crises, thus proving that “the dialogics of past and present involves the resignification of the past and the recontextualization of the present. The crisis has made the past more public, more controversial and more relevant” (Tziovas, 2017, p. 54). I have also looked at diasporic cultural, educational and ecological projects which took place on Castellorizo a few years before and during the crisis. Their aim was to achieve sustainable development for the island and they were implemented transnationally, involving islander and diasporic Castellorizians in a spirit of equality and sharing. Thanks to these transnational projects, diaspora Castellorizians have both supported their ancestral regional homeland economically and culturally and have contributed to the transformation of Castellorizian collective identity, both in diaspora and on Castellorizo, to something that now embraces the Castellorizian community worldwide and even includes philo-Castellorizians in it. The intensified diasporic Castellorizian transnational engagement with Castellorizo immediately before and during the crisis has created a new narrative which has empowered the society of the island by transforming islander Castellorizians into conscious and active members of the imagined community of Castellorizians worldwide. This new sense of transnational belonging is being achieved through systematic socialisation of younger Castellorizian generations into the shared environmental,

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cultural and historical heritage of Castellorizo, as the initiatives of the charitable organisation Friends of Kastellorizo show. After 2009, Greek Australians gave help to Greece to varying degrees, as, for example, Mavroudi has demonstrated (Mavroudi, 2015). However, we need to take into account the fact that such engagement often rests on the grassroots, kinship-based, ideological and affective ethno-regional bonds that link diasporic individuals with their ancestral homeland societies. Such grassroots bonds generate a sense of individual and communal diasporic obligation and an effective chance for the individual to help the homeland in crisis. Thus the diaspora circumvents Greek state institutions, often viewed as corrupt, extremely bureaucratic and inefficient by diasporic Greeks. Mavroudi herself mentions that there was still evidence that her Greek-Australian collocutors “were loyal to the regions of Greece they and their families were from as they would make an effort to visit towns and villages of ancestral origin and know what was going on there” (ibid., p. 180). She notes that the Karpathian Greeks of Canberra contributed generously to Karpathos (ibid., p.  178). The Karpathians and the Castellorizians are not exceptions. Many diasporic Greek individuals and groups engaged in joint projects with their ancestral ethno-regional homelands before and during the crisis, thus helping their ethno-regional compatriots. Even when their efforts were addressed to Greece as a whole, their commitment to the ancestral homelands “of their hearts” drove them to pioneer worldwide philanthropic projects to aid Greece during its economic crisis. This is clearly the case with several important Castellorizian leaders who have instigated and supported The Hellenic Initiative project in Australia and globally. In their own words, it is their Castellorizianness that permeates and inspires their activities in Greece, Australia and the world, a feature to be explained by the segmentary organisation of Greek identity. If one is to comprehend transnationalism, at least in the case of the Greek diaspora, one cannot ignore its currently insufficiently studied subnational, ethno-regional dimension. Social scientists should employ a long-term research approach to the study of ethno-regional diasporas, if they wish to achieve a fuller comparative understanding of transnationalist phenomena. We need to explore more deeply the intimate, historic grassroots feelings and bonds among diasporic and ancestral homeland individuals and groups. The Greek crisis is a case study in how strong this transnational engagement that develops around ethno-regional commitment is.

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Knight, D. M. (2012). Cultural proximity: Crisis, time and social memory in central Greece. History and Anthropology, 23(3), 349–374. Knight, D. M. (2015). History, time, and economic crisis in central Greece. Palgrave Macmillan. Knight, D.  M., & Stewart, C. (2016). Ethnographies of austerity: Temporality, crisis and affect in Southern Europe. History and Anthropology, 27(1), 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/02757206.2015.1114480 Lassiter, L. E. (2005). The Chicago guide to collaborative ethnography. University of Chicago Press. Marcus, G. E. (1998). Ethnography through thick & thin. Princeton University Press. Mavroudi, E. (2015). Helping the homeland? Diasporic Greeks in Australia and the potential for homeland-oriented development at a time of economic crisis. In A. Christou & E. Mavroudi (Eds.), Dismantling diasporas: Rethinking the geographies of diasporic identity, connection and development (pp. 175–187). Ashgate. Nora, P. (1984). Les lieux de la mémoire. La nation. Gallimard. Nora, P. (1989). Between memory and history: Les lieux de mémoire. Representations, 26, 7–24. Pantelis, P. K. (2002). The history and the dialect of the inhabitants of Megisti island (Castellorizo): Grammar, glossary, oral literature. Eleftheri Skepsis Publications (in Greek). Papataxiarchis, Ε. (2006). Introduction. The burdens of otherness: Dimensions of cultural differentiation in early 21st century Greece. In E. Papataxiarchis (Ed.), Adventures of otherness: The production of cultural difference in contemporary Greece (pp. 1–85). Alexandria Publications (in Greek). Papataxiarchis, E. (2018). Afterword. Pragmatism against austerity: Greek society, politics and ethnography in times of trouble. In D. Dalakoglou & G. Agelopoulos (Eds.), Critical times in Greece. Anthropological engagements with the crisis (pp. 227–247). Routledge, Taylor & Francis. Pappas, N. G. (1994). Castellorizo. An illustrated history of the island and its conquerors. Halstead Press. Pappas, N. (2020). A tale of cultural endurance. Greece is Kastellorizo, issue 45, 130–134. Paspaley, N. (2020). Voices from Australia. Greece is Kastellorizo, issue 45, 134–135. Piperoglou, A. (2018). Engaging Greek-Australia: A key to advancing Greek relations with the Asia-Pacific region. SEESOX Diaspora Working Paper Series No 1. Pitsonis, M. (2002). Capture Kastellorizo (2nd ed.). Sue Hergenhan / Marina Pitsonis. Price, C. A. (1963). Southern Europeans in Australia. Oxford University Press. Safran, W. (1991). Diasporas in modern societies: Myths of homeland and return. Diaspora, 1(1), 83–99. Saloutos, T. (1964). The Greeks in the United States. Harvard University Press.

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Smith, L. (2006). The uses of heritage. Routledge. Takoniatis, M. (2015–2016). Student exchange. Long way home. Filia, 27 (Friends of Kastellorizo). Tomara-Sideris, Μ. (2016). Philanthropy and modern Greek reality. Kerkyra Publications (in Greek). Tsiros, G. (2020). Andrew Liveris. The island in his heart. Greece is Kastellorizo, issue 45, 124–129. Tsolakis, M., & Johnstone, J.  A. (2010). Kastellorizo: My odyssey. An illustrated children’s history. Australian Friends of Kastellorizo Ltd. Tziovas, D. (2017). Narratives of the Greek crisis and the politics of the past. In D. Tziovas (Ed.), Greece in crisis: The cultural politics of austerity (pp. 19–64). I. B. Tauris. Vardamidis, Ε. Ν. (1996). History of the island of Megisti (Castellorizo) since the Dorians and Minos to the present day and the annexation of Castellorizo to Greece. Ellinika Grammata (1st ed., 1948) (in Greek). Wimmer, A., & Glick Schiller, N. (2003). Methodological nationalism, the social sciences, and the study of migration: An essay in historical epistemology. International Migration Review, 37(3), 576–610. Yiannakis, J.  N. (1996). Megisti in the Antipodes. Castellorizian migration and settlement to W.A. 1890–1990. Hesperian Press. Yiannakis, J.  N. (2009). Odysseus in the golden west: Greek migration, settlement and adaptation in Western Australia since 1947. Australian Public Intellectual (API) Network.

PART V

Beyond the Greek Case

CHAPTER 15

The Debt Crisis and Homeland-Diaspora Engagement in Portugal: Institutions, Remittances and Political Participation Maria Lucinda Fonseca

Introduction Emigration has been a structural feature of Portuguese society, reaching its peak between 1966 and 1973. Afterwards, a period of declining outflows began due to the combined effects of restrictive immigration policies imposed by the main European destination countries on Portuguese emigration, in response to the economic crisis of 1973, and the expectations created by the revolution of 25 April 1974.1 Integration into the Eurozone, 1  The Portuguese revolution of 25 April, also known as the Carnation Revolution, was a military coup that took place in Lisbon, on 25 April 1974. It brought down more than 40 years of dictatorship in Portugal and ended the Portuguese colonial war, leading to the

M. L. Fonseca (*) Centre of Geographical Studies, Institute of Geography and Spatial Planning, University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal Associated Laboratory Terra, Portugal, Portugal e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 O. Anastasakis et al. (eds.), Diaspora Engagement in Times of Severe Economic Crisis, Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97443-5_15

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and especially the period that followed the sovereign debt crisis, corresponded with a new phase of expansion of Portuguese emigration2 (Malheiros, 2011; Peixoto et al. 2016b, Pires et al., 2020b). In terms of migrant stock, according to United Nations estimates, in December 2017, Portugal was the EU country with the highest emigration rate. The native population of Portugal residing in a foreign country was equivalent to 22% of the number of inhabitants of the country. Europe is the continent where more Portuguese emigrants reside, concentrating 66.3% of the total, followed by America with 26.1% (Pires et al., 2019).3 In 2019, France had the largest proportion of Portuguese emigrants, due to the great migratory wave of the 1960s and 1970s, followed by Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, Germany and Spain. Upon entry to the Eurozone, Portuguese migrants4 enjoyed a greater diversity of destinations, including the resumption of intra-European flows to Germany, France, Switzerland, Luxembourg and, above all, to the United Kingdom (Pires et  al., 2020b). Outside Europe and North America, some Portuguese-speaking countries, former Portuguese colonies, stand out, namely Angola, Brazil and Mozambique, although the flows to these countries are much lower than those to the main European destinations. Another aspect that should be mentioned concerns the emergence of different types of migration (short-term, long-term, seasonal), and the increase in the emigration of highly qualified young people (Gomes et al., 2018; Peixoto et al., 2019). Given the relevance of Portuguese communities abroad, and the growing interest of policymakers and scholars in the relationship between migration and development in migrant-sending countries, this chapter explores the drivers of change of Portuguese diaspora policies, since the independence of African colonies (Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and S. Tomé and Prince). 2  Portugal’s integration into the Eurozone represented a change in economic regime. This change coincided with the start of a decade of weak economic growth, rising unemployment and divergence in relation to the European Union. The economic stagnation, explains the increase in emigration, due to the effects it had on the labour market. 3  Data Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017). Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2017 revision (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2017POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2017). 4  This is mainly due to the access to legally unconstrained migration within EU and also to the activation of migrant networks in traditional European destinations of Portuguese emigration.

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establishment of the democratic regime, and particularly how the 2008 economic crisis has influenced these policies and has affected diaspora mobilisation and engagement with homeland. Diasporas can play an important role in the development of their countries of origin by maintaining multiple forms of transnational relations (Faist, 2008; Gamlen, 2014; Kuznetsov, 2006). In addition to sending remittances, which are fundamental for balancing external accounts and improving the living conditions of family members left behind, diasporas also contribute to business creation and stimulate entrepreneurship. Furthermore, they promote knowledge transfer and the internationalisation of the economy through trade, tourism and foreign direct investment (Orozco, 2003; Vaaler, 2013). Therefore, in the context of globalisation and increasing international mobility of the population, the dynamics of international migration and its effects on development processes are more easily understood from a perspective of transnational analysis focused on the lives of migrants and their belonging to multiple places (Vertovec, 1999). This approach contrasts with traditional perspectives that tend to emphasise, for example, the negative effects of migration on countries of origin and the positive effects on countries of destination, through the transfer of human capital (brain-drain) from the former to the latter (de Haas, 2010). In turn, the recognition of the transnationalism of migrants and diaspora engagement with homeland is also evident in the growing interest of governments of migrants’ countries of origin in promoting relations with their diasporas by adopting policies to attract remittances, investment incentives and other contributions of emigrants and their descendants to development (Portes, 2001, p. 190; Vezzoli & Lacroix, 2010). In Portugal, emigrant remittances played a central role in the balance of external accounts in the decade before the revolution of 25 April 1974. The shock of the international crisis in 1973, combined with the economic impacts of the independence of the former Portuguese African colonies, the political change brought about by the Carnation Revolution and the decline in remittances observed from 1974 onwards, led to a desperate need of external financing and the intervention of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1977. Consequently, after the revolution, and particularly since the early 1980s, subsequent governments have adopted diaspora-building and diaspora-engagement policies with the aim of promoting the creation of a community and a sense of cultural heritage and establishing political, cultural and socio-economic ties with its citizens living abroad. These policies have been marked by continuities and also changes in terms of progress towards a stronger diaspora engagement.

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Migrants, through the transnational relations they develop with the homeland, are increasingly considered agents of change, especially in situations of economic or political crisis (Koinova, 2018). Following this trend, Portuguese diaspora-engagement policies to boost investment attraction to homeland, and promote the internationalisation of Portuguese companies, gained momentum after the intervention of the Troika5 in Portugal, in 2011 (Marques & Góis, 2013; Santana-Pereira & Horta, 2017; Teixeira & Mendes, 2020). In addition, the national state is also quite generous in granting political and citizenship rights to emigrants and their descendants (Lisi et al., 2019; Lobo, 2007). Given this background, and building on the concept of “critical juncture” (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, Collier and Collier 1991, Koinova, 2018 and the introduction of this book), the main aim of this chapter is to shed light on how the 2008 international crisis, conceptualised as a critical juncture, reconfigured Portugal’s relationship with its diaspora and the forms of diaspora engagement with the homeland. The chapter is organised in the following manner: following a brief outline of the methodology, the first section reviews the evolution and actual diaspora policies in Portugal, with emphasis on the main drivers of change. Then the empirical section is introduced, exploring the transnational relations of Portuguese emigrants who left Portugal from the beginning of the twenty-first century, seeking to understand the impacts of the economic and financial crisis on these relations. Due to the economic relevance of remittances and to the progressive extension of political rights granted to Portuguese citizens living abroad, two dimensions of diaspora engagement are analysed in more detail: sending financial remittances and political mobilisation, including the participation rate in the national elections and the interest in national politics. In the final section, we offer the main findings and point out avenues for future research.

Methodology As mentioned before, the analysis of the transnational relations of Portuguese diaspora with the homeland focuses on the evolution of economic and political links. For this purpose, I combine secondary data, on 5  Troika is a group of international lenders—the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank—that provided the Portuguese bailout in exchange for a strict austerity policy.

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remittances and the electoral participation rate of Portuguese emigrants, in the elections for the national Parliament. In addition, I have also used primary data collected through an online and paper survey to emigrants who left Portugal after 2000. This survey provided relevant information on the willingness and ability to engage with Portugal in different destination countries. It was conducted within the scope of the REMIGR project “Back to the Future: New Emigration and Links to Portuguese Society”6 and was addressed to individuals aged 18 or older, residing in a foreign country, who left Portugal after the year 2000 or had Portuguese nationality. In order to obtain the largest possible number of answers and cover different respondent profiles, the survey was distributed online between May 2014 and May 2015. In addition, face-to-­face surveys were also carried out in six countries selected as case studies for the REMIGR project: United Kingdom, France, Luxembourg, Brazil, Angola and Mozambique. The fieldwork in these countries took place between mid-2014 and the end of 2015. A total of 6086 valid responses were obtained, of which 4428 were online and 1658 on paper (Peixoto et  al., 2016a). Although it is not a representative sample, mainly due to the over-representation of highly qualified emigrants (70% had higher education), due to its large size, it includes a wide range of respondents, allowing us to analyse how the individual characteristics of immigrants (gender, age, stage in the life cycle, level of education), migration project, integration in the country of destination and macro-economic and political context in Portugal affect the type and intensity of ties with the country of origin. Some of the basic features of the respondents are summarised in Table 15.1. Fifty-two per cent of the respondents are women and 47.9% are men. The average age is 34.9 years and the median age is 33 years. Approximately half of the participants (49.2%) were married or cohabiting and 40.2% have children. Sixty-six per cent of respondents lived in a European country, the main destination being the United Kingdom. Outside Europe, Angola, Mozambique and Brazil stand out. The majority of the respondents in our sample arrived in the destination country after 2011, that is, during the most acute period of economic and financial crisis and the Troika’s intervention in Portugal. Therefore,

6  Project funded by FCT-Fundação Nacional para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, Contract No. PTDC/ATP-DEM/5152/2012,

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Table 15.1  Basic structure of the sample

Sex Male Female Nonresponse Age >=50 35–49 25–34 18–24 Nonresponse Marital status Married/cohabiting Having children Yes No Nonresponse Year of arrival at destination 2000–2010 2011–2015 Destination country Europe France Germany Luxembourg Spain Switzerland UK Other regions Angola Mozambique Brazil USA Education level Up to secondary education Secondary education Higher education Source: REMIGR survey, 2014–2015

Frequency

%

3168 2914 4

47.9 52.1 0.1

526 2358 2849 297 56

8,6 38.7 46.8 4.9 0.9

2993

49.2

2448 3628 10

40.2 59.6 0.2

2143 3943

35.2 64.8

4014 598 369 367 129 222 1454 2072 579 415 496 107

66.0 9.8 6.1 6.0 2.1 3.6 23.9 34.0 9.5 6.8 8.1 1.8

683 1122 4263

11.2 18.4 70.0

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unemployment, low wages, lack of prospects for developing a professional career, combined with the desire for new experiences, especially for the most qualified young people, were the main reasons for emigration. In addition, the pursuit of studies, mentioned by 14.9% of respondents and family reasons indicated by 12.3% of the surveyed population, should be also highlighted as important reasons of emigration.

Portuguese Diaspora Engagement: Drivers of Change and Policies in the Post-1974 Context From Emigration Policy to Diaspora Policy: National Identity, Recognition and Defence of Social and Political Rights of Emigrants According to Santana-Pereira and Horta (2017), in Portugal, the transition from an emigration policy to a diaspora policy, in order to promote the strengthening of cultural, political and economic ties with Portuguese citizens living abroad and their descendants, occurred from the early 1980s following the establishment of the democratic regime and the decolonisation process. However, the promotion of the Portuguese language and culture among the Portuguese communities abroad dates back to the late 1960s and early 1970s, during the government of Marcelo Caetano.7 It was at that time that the Portuguese authoritarian government established for the first time holiday camps for the children of Portuguese emigrants, started to provide financial support for the cultural and recreational associations of emigrants and made the first inventory of existing Portuguese non-governmental organisations abroad (Teixeira & Mendes, 2020). These measures were accompanied by a reform in migration policy, fitting it into the national employment policy and opening legal channels for emigration, since there was an effective excess of labour supply. These changes aimed to curb clandestine emigration to France, reduce the social vulnerability of emigrants in the countries of destination, promote the maintenance of identity ties with Portugal and prevent them from abdicating their Portuguese citizenship. It should also be noted that the conditions of extreme poverty of undocumented immigrants in France

7  Marcelo Caetano was the last prime minister of the dictatorial Estado Novo that was overthrown by the Carnation Revolution in 1974.

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had a strong echo in the French press, increasing external opposition to the Portuguese dictatorial regime. From the start of the transition to democracy, following the Carnation Revolution of 25 April 1974, and the end of the colonial empire, Portuguese emigrants were seen as full national citizens. The proclamation of the Constitution, in 1976, put an end to the restrictive policy of emigration,8 enshrining the right to emigrate and giving Portuguese citizens living abroad the right to political participation in elections for the Assembly of the Republic. To this end, two emigration constituencies were created—one for Europe and the other for the rest of the world. In terms of external relations, the policy of the Portuguese communities was marked by the defence of the social rights of emigrants in the countries of destination.9 The attempt to strengthen the ties of the Portuguese state with the emigrated population was also expressed by Portuguese communities dispersed around the world celebrating Portugal’s national day, which, from 1977, became known as the day of Portugal, of Camões and of the Portuguese Communities. In 1980, the Council of the Portuguese Communities was established as a consultative body of the government for issues related to the Portuguese Communities, which also intended to function as a platform for dialogue between Portuguese organisations and those living abroad (Decree Law 373/80, 12 September). The end of the authoritarian policy of control of emigration to Western Europe and the opening to emigration after the revolution of 25 April 1974 resulted from the transition to democracy, from the economic and financial crisis that followed the revolutionary period, and the returnees of the former African colonies after their independence. Therefore, emigration was one possible way out for the returnees as well as for a large number of unemployed. Given these circumstances, the Portuguese government 8  Before the revolution of 25 April 1974, the emigration policy was marked by contradictory guidelines. On the one hand, an authoritarian control of emigration towards Western Europe was maintained, seeking to channel the migratory flows towards the African colonies, namely Angola and Mozambique. On the other hand, the figure of the Portuguese emigrant workers was dignified and incentives were created to attract remittances, which were essential to sustain the effort to finance the colonial war (Fonseca, 1990). 9  In the programme of the First Constitutional Government (1976–1978), led by Mário Soares, the importance of establishing agreements with the host countries of Portuguese emigrants, namely with France and the Federal Republic of Germany, stands out, with the objective of guaranteeing for Portuguese workers labour rights equivalent to that of national workers of those countries.

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sought to renegotiate existing emigration agreements and to establish new ones with other countries to open up opportunities of emigration and to guarantee the social protection of Portuguese citizens abroad. In addition, an effort was made to improve support services for emigrants and to promote the teaching of the Portuguese language to their children. However, the opportunities of emigrating were limited by the effects of the economic crisis which followed the first oil shock in 1972/1973 in Western economies, and the establishment of restrictions to immigration. The increase in return migrants from France and Germany in the second half of the 1970s was also reflected in measures to support the return and reintegration in Portugal of returned emigrants there. Thus, the VI Constitutional Government (1980/1981) marks the transition from a policy focused on defending the rights of emigrants in the countries of destination to a policy that takes into account the whole migratory cycle, from leaving Portugal through the eventual return (Santana-Pereira & Horta, 2017; Santos, 2004; Teixeira & Mendes, 2020). It should also be noted that the right to dual nationality for first-generation Portuguese emigrants and their descendants was recognised for the first time by the Nationality Law of 1981, contributing through the principle of jus sanguinis to the construction of identity and continuity of the Portuguese diaspora. Portugal’s integration into the European Economic Community in 1986 coincided with the beginning of a period of economic growth, a sharp reduction in emigration and an increase in immigration to Portugal, beginning a new cycle of relations with Portuguese communities living outside the national territory. Like other countries of emigration, in the transition from the 1980s to the 1990s, Portugal began to look at Portuguese communities as agents of development that could strengthen cooperation between the societies of origin and host societies, and as a structural element of the Portuguese Nation, affirming Portugal in the world in the context of globalisation (Rodrigues et al., 2013; Teixeira & Mendes, 2020). With European integration, Portuguese residents in Europe acquired the status of European citizens. This new political and economic position of Portugal corresponded with the affirmation of diaspora policies, to the detriment of emigration policies. This change materialised in the 1987 designation change of the Secretariat of State of Emigration and Portuguese Communities to Secretariat of State of Portuguese Communities and in the expansion and qualification of the consular services network. Also, in

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the support for teaching the Portuguese language and disseminating Portuguese culture, and in the investment in the diffusion of information and intensification of “triangular” communication between the Portuguese communities and Portugal. In this context, the creation of a global television channel in Portuguese, RTP international, which began its transmissions on 10 June 1992 (Jesus, 1990; Teixeira & Mendes, 2020), stands out. Another important milestone in the growing proximity of the Portuguese state to emigrant communities was the reactivation and expansion of the competences of the Council of Portuguese Communities in 1996 (Marques & Góis, 2013; Teixeira & Mendes, 2020). In addition to maintaining the responsibility of promoting the connection of emigrants to Portugal, it was also assigned two other functions: to foster the civic and political participation of the Portuguese citizens in the host countries and to promote cooperation with immigrant organisations from other countries, namely with the communities of nationals of Portuguese-­ speaking countries (Law No. 48/96 of 4 September). From the end of the 1990s onwards, in addition to the strengthening of institutions that seek to strengthen cultural and political ties with the Portuguese diaspora in Europe, and within the framework of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP), economic diplomacy has gained importance, especially since the beginning of the twenty-­ first century. Engaging the Portuguese Diaspora in Economic Development: The Impact of the Post-2008 Economic Crisis Portugal, along with other southern European countries, especially Greece, was severely affected by the economic crisis of 2008 in the context of the so-called sovereign debt crisis of the Eurozone. The accelerated growth of unemployment, from 200810 onwards, together with the reduction in wages, the lack of career progression prospects, and above all the austerity measures imposed by the Troika intervention from 2011 onwards, triggered an intense emigration wave and caused a marked reduction in

10  The unemployment rate rose from 7.6% in 2008 to 13.9% in 2014, after reaching a maximum of 16.2% in 2013, whereas the severe material deprivation rate changed from 9.7% in 2008 to 10.6% in 2014. The material living conditions index dropped from 100, in the reference year of 2004, to 83.0 in 2013 (Source: Statistics Portugal and PORDATA).

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immigration to Portugal (Malheiros, 2011;  Marques & Góis, 2013; Peixoto et al. 2016b). According to estimates by the Observatory of Emigration, the average number of departures per year rose from 58,000 between 2001 and 2005, to 79,000 between 2006 and 2010 and 108,000 between 2011 and 2015, reaching a peak of 120,000 departures in 2013.11 More recently, with the resumption of growth in the Portuguese economy, from 2014 onwards, emigration has decreased again, with a trend towards stabilisation of flows around 75,000 departures per year. However, it should be noted that in 2019 the number of emigrants was higher than that observed in 2018, mainly due to the higher number of Portuguese entries in the United Kingdom, possibly because they feared the impact of Brexit on migration opportunities (Pires et al., 2020a). In this context, the political discourse of the centre-right coalition government of the Social Democratic Party (PPD/PSD) and the Social Democratic Centre—People’s Party (CDS-PP), in power between 2011 and 2015, came to see emigration as an opportunity to tackle unemployment and reduce the burden of social security. In turn, the relations of this government with the Portuguese diaspora were characterised by the dominance of an economic and utilitarian logic that would contribute to the exit from the deep crisis in which the country was immersed. One of the most emblematic measures was the creation in 2013 of the Diaspora Investor Support Office (GAID), part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the aim of supporting and facilitating investment in Portugal by Portuguese emigrants and their descendants. It should also be noted that despite the high reduction in public expenditure, imposed by the Troika’s intervention, the foreign policy of this period favoured: economic diplomacy to renew the country’s external prestige and credibility, strengthening links with diaspora, promotion of exports, the internationalisation of Portuguese companies, and to attract foreign investment. This initiative was continued and deepened by the subsequent governments of the Socialist Party, so that besides supporting investors from the diaspora, the GAID started to promote and support the internationalisation of small and medium enterprises, with a regional and local base, which intended to expand their activity through the Portuguese communities. In 11  These figures include both Portuguese nationals and immigrants in Portugal who, in the reference period, and after having remained in the country continuously for at least one year, left it with the intention of residing in another country.

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this way, the diaspora-engagement policy was articulated with the country’s development and territorial cohesion strategy, seeking to take advantage of the relations of the Portuguese communities with the municipalities and regions of origin, in the promotion and enhancement of the territory, through tourism and the expansion of the market for local products. In order to fulfil these objectives, GAID still carries out its activity in coordination, externally, with the diplomatic and consular network and, internally, with various state entities and bodies and, at the local level, with the Emigrant Support Offices. The Emigrant Support Offices (GAE) are the result of Cooperation Agreements between the Directorate General of Consular Affairs and the Portuguese Communities (DGACCP) and the City Councils, established through protocols signed between the two entities and based on two basic principles: availability of service and proximity to the user.12 On 8 January 2021, 144 of the 278 municipalities in mainland Portugal had an Emigrant Support Office. The first GAE date back to the early 2000s and were aimed at supporting the reinsertion in Portugal of emigrants who had returned or were about to return, providing information on their rights in Portugal, portability of pensions, equivalence of studies acquired abroad and so on. The most recent ones, called second generation (GAE-2G), are also responsible, along with the Diaspora Investor Support Office, for promoting local investment and development projects. As can be seen in Fig. 15.1, the geographical distribution of the GAEs largely reproduces the regional pattern of Portuguese emigration of the older migratory waves which mainly originated from northern and central regions. However, it should be noted that, according to statements by the Secretary of State for Communities, Berta Nunes, made in August 2020, it is the government’s intention to extend them to all municipalities in the country, as part of the transfer of competences of central administration services to local authorities (DN, 11 August 2020). In addition to the measures aimed at attracting investment mentioned above, the creation of support structures for returning emigrants or those wishing to return to Portugal, and programmes to encourage return, especially for highly qualified young people who left Portugal, should also be highlighted. Among the initiatives developed in this area, the Support Office 12  Municipalities with an Emigrant Support Office—Support for Communities—Portal das Comunidades Portuguesas (Portuguese Communities Portal) (mne.gov.pt). Viewed on 5 February 2021.

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Fig. 15.1  Municipalities with an Emigrant Support Office, January 2021. Source: Own preparation, with data available on the website of the Portuguese Communities

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for Emigrant Returns (GARE)13 was created in 2015, by the High Commission for Migrations (ACM), and has played a central role. This is a structure that, in addition to monitoring, responds to questions regarding the return support policy instruments, such as the Global Professional Mobility Platform, the VEM Ideas Competition (Valuing Migrant Entrepreneurship) or the Empowerment of Emigrant Entrepreneurs. The Global Professional Mobility Platform is a network that aims to: stimulate the connection and contact between professionals living in Portugal and abroad; promote contact and meetings between employers and professionals; accompany Portuguese professionals regardless of where they are; promote studies and debates that deepen the knowledge of professional mobility and the opportunities that result from it; get to know qualified Portuguese human resources and their skills and pathways. The VEM Ideas Competition was launched in 2015 on an experimental basis with the aim of supporting Portuguese emigrants who wanted to start a small business in Portugal. Still within the scope of policies encouraging the return to Portugal, the creation of the Regressar Programme [Return Programme] (Council of Ministers Resolution no. 60/2019) is also important. Emigrants and their families returning under this programme benefit from financial support for resettlement in the country, a more favourable tax regime and a credit line to support business investment and the creation of new businesses in the national territory. This programme aims to strengthen job creation, increase revenues from social security contributions and combat demographic ageing. Although there is not a consistent strategy targeting highly skilled workers specifically, a competitive process facilitated by the Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT) provides study grants, doctoral and post-­ doctoral scholarships for Portuguese students, researchers and doctorates residing abroad who wish to return to Portugal. The growing relevance of the diaspora-engagement policy in the country’s development strategy was also expressed in the launch of the PNAID—National Programme for the Valorisation of Portuguese Communities in 2020, and approved through the Resolution of the Council of Ministers no. 64/2020, of 18 August. This Programme is part of a more integrated governmental strategy that seeks to articulate the diaspora-engagement policy with other policy domains, and is therefore  https://www.acm.gov.pt/ad-pt-c-gare. Viewed on 5 February 2021.

13

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coordinated by the members of the government responsible for the areas of Portuguese communities and the enhancement of the country’s inland regions. The PNAID contemplates two fundamental lines of action: (i) return and/or investment of the diaspora in Portugal and (ii) promotion of Portuguese exports and investment abroad through the diaspora. In sum, although there is not yet an integrated and coherent strategy of the different domains of diaspora, the financial crisis had a great impact on the policies of engagement. Specifically, it has acted to mobilise and maximise the potential to attract investment to Portugal, to promote the internationalisation of Portuguese companies and to promote tourism.

Relations of the Portuguese Diaspora with the Country of Origin from the Emigrants’ Perspective Remittances: An Older Form of Diaspora Engagement Although they fluctuate over time, both in volume and as a percentage of GDP, emigrants’ remittances have been a fundamental source of income for many Portuguese families and an important contributor to the country’s Gross Domestic Product since the middle of the last century. Despite the decline in Portuguese emigration and the increase in immigration to Portugal since the mid-1990s, the balance between incoming and outgoing remittances has always been positive, representing 2.5% of the national GDP in 2001. From then on, they began to decrease in volume and as a percentage of GDP, so that in 2009 their contribution to GDP fell to half of the value observed in 2001. However, with the increase in emigration resulting from the economic crisis and the austerity measures imposed by the Troika intervention, the volume of remittances grew again. According to Eurostat data, in 2019, Portugal was the EU27 country that received the most money from remittances (3645 million euros), the second in terms of balance between remittances received and sent, and the third as a percentage of GDP (1.7%). Thus, as seen in other periods of economic downturn in Portugal, namely in late 1970s, after the intervention of the International Monetary Fund in 1977, remittances acted as a buffer from the effects of the crisis. More than half of the remittances received in Portugal in 2019 came from France and Switzerland, traditional destination countries for less

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qualified Portuguese emigration, (29.9% and 27%, respectively). Third place, with 9.8% of the remittances received, came from the United Kingdom, which is currently the main destination for emigration in Europe. Germany placed fourth with 7.5% of remittances received, followed by Angola (6.8%) and the United States of America (6.3%). Together, these six countries account for 87.3% of the total value of remittances received in Portugal in 2019. The regional distribution of remittances largely reproduces the territorial pattern of the incidence of emigration. Thus, in 2019, the northern and central regions of the country concentrated 71% of Portuguese emigrants’ deposits in banks, savings banks and credit unions (Fig.  15.2). Indeed, for many municipalities in the north and centre, emigrants’ remittances are still an important component of local income. According to the results of the REMIGR survey, 50.2% of the respondents sent remittances to Portugal in the year prior to the survey, although this proportion varies greatly between countries. Among the main destination countries of the most recent migratory wave, the highest values correspond to Angola (73.7%), Switzerland (64.9%), Mozambique (63.2%) Algarve 4% Alentejo 3%

Madeira 5%

Azores 1%

North 38%

Lisbon Metro Region 16%

Centre 33%

Fig. 15.2  Regional breakdown of the balances of deposits by Portuguese emigrants in banks, savings banks and credit unions in 2019 (%). Source: INE— Statistics on Credit Institutions and Financial Companies, with own processing

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and Luxembourg (59.3%). This fact may be due to a higher incidence of temporary emigration, in the case of African countries, or to the greater dependence of families in the emigrants’ country of origin, as in the cases of Switzerland and Luxembourg, as they are older destinations, characterised by a more traditional type of emigration (Peixoto et al., 2019). Interestingly, the percentage of emigrants sending remittances to Portugal is much more frequent among those who left the country after the emergence of the 2008 crisis (51.7%) than among those who emigrated in the period from 2000 to 2007 (43.3%). This result indicates that the increase in the volume of remittances observed from 2009 is mainly a result of the increase in emigration caused by the economic recession, and does not mean that there is a greater mobilisation of the diaspora to help the country out of the economic crisis. With regard to the destination of remittances, as can be seen in Fig. 15.3, the accumulation of savings, the payment of loans (to buy one’s own house) and expenses to meet the family’s basic needs in Portugal are the purposes mentioned by the largest number of respondents in the two periods under 60 50

%

40 30 20 10

2000-2007

0

2008-2015

Purpose of remittances

Fig. 15.3  Purpose of emigrants’ remittances, according to the duration of migration. Source: REMIGR survey data, 2014/2015 * Percentage calculated in relation to the total number of respondents who sent remittances. Note: The sum is higher than 100% because each emigrant may send remittances for different purposes

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analysis. However, it is interesting to note that savings and the payment of bank loans were prominent in the period following the economic and financial crisis of 2008, to the detriment of consumption expenditure of family members who remained in the country of origin. The proportion of respondents who made capital transfers for investments corresponds in both cases to 14.7%. The percentage of those who reported spending on the education of their children also underwent a slight increase, while the health expenses of family members evolved in the opposite direction. Seeking to identify the main factors that explain the remittances sent by emigrants who left Portugal before and after the 2008 crisis, we performed a logistic regression analysis. We considered six sets of independent variables: (i) individual characteristics (sex, marital status, having or not having children and age); (ii) time of migration (number of years of residence in the destination country); (iii) destination countries; (iv) region of origin in Portugal; (v) future mobility perspectives (intention to stay or not in the destination country); and (vi) ties to Portugal (frequency of visits to Portugal and pride of being Portuguese). The analysis was conducted using SPSS (version 24—using the Enter method).

Results The results of the logistic regression model are summarised in Table 15.2. The best predictors for sending remittances are not the same for emigrants who left the country before and after the 2008 crisis. For the first group only marital status (being married or living in a consensual union), country of residence (France, Switzerland and Angola), region of origin (Lisbon and Porto metropolitan areas), frequency of visits to Portugal and having intentions to stay in the destination country have a statistically significant effect on the probability of sending remittances to Portugal. Therefore, married or cohabiting emigrants are 1.566 times more likely to send remittances than unmarried emigrants. As regards the country of destination, residents in Angola and Switzerland are also more likely to send remittances than those living in other countries. Emigrants who visit Portugal at least once every six months are also more likely to send remittances. In contrast, residing in France and having future plans to stay in the destination country, according to the model results, decrease the chances of sending remittances to Portugal (Table 15.2). With more recent emigrants, there are a higher number of statistically significant independent variables than in the model concerning emigrants

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Table 15.2  Engagement with homeland: sending remittances. Estimated odds ratios from logistic regressions of sending remittances to Portugal Dependent variable: sending of remittances in the last year Independent variables

Sex (male) Marital status (married/cohabiting) Parenthood (having children) Age (years) Graduate college (yes) Time of residence in the destination country (years) Country of residence France Switzerland Luxembourg UK Angola Mozambique Residence before migrating (Lisbon or Porto metropolitan areas) Frequency of visits to Portugal (at least once every six months) Do you intend to stay in the destination country in the future? (yes) In the future, do you intend to re-emigrate to another country? (yes) Are you proud to be Portuguese? (yes) Do you believe in the future of Portugal? (yes) Pseudo R2 Cox and Snell Nagelkerke

Odds ratios Time of migration, 2000–2007

Time of migration, 2008–2015

1.051 1.566** 1.108 1.008 1.054 0.965

1.258*** 1.325*** 1.321** 1.016*** 0.818* 1.076***

0.639* 4.504** 1.273 0.797 5.274*** 1.653 1.374*

0.629*** 1.561** 0.934 0.816* 1.912*** 1.413** 1.257***

1.841***

1.697***

0.702*

0.778***

0.677

1.075

1.269 1.009

1.396*** 0.932

0.124 0.166

0.086 0.115

***, ** and * stand for significance at p < 0.001, p < 0.01, and p < 0.05 Source: REMIGR survey data, 2014/2015

who left Portugal between 2000 and 2007 (15 and 7, respectively). Thus, in addition to the factors identified in the first model, it was found that being male or female, parental status, age, educational attainment, the number of years of residence in the destination country and being or not

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being proud of being Portuguese, are also factors associated with a higher or lower propensity to send remittances. On the other hand, with regard to the country of destination, France, Switzerland, Angola, the United Kingdom and Mozambique are also significant predictors, with the odds ratio of sending remittances lower than the average in the case of residents in France and the United Kingdom, and higher in the other three cases, especially in Angola. The differences observed between the two models allow us to infer the effect of the time of migration and the migratory context on sending remittances to Portugal. Migration in the crisis period is seen by many migrants as an emergency solution and therefore as a temporary project, so that more young people, especially men, migrate alone, even when they have children. This explains why the likelihood of sending remittances is higher for men and for individuals with children, while in the group of older migrants, gender and parenthood had no significant influence on the frequency of sending remittances. On the other hand, the lower odds ratio for sending remittances associated with having more education or residing in the United Kingdom reflects the increase in skilled emigration to that country, tending to have a lower propensity to savings and higher local consumption levels. Another interesting aspect that emerges from the comparison of the two models is the fact that the feeling of pride in being Portuguese only has a statistically significant differentiating effect on remittances sent to Portugal in the group of emigrants who left the country after 2008. Considering that the percentage of respondents who feel proud to be Portuguese is similar in both groups, it is legitimate to hypothesise that in contexts of crisis, identity factors play a more important role in the form and intensity of the relations of the diaspora with the country of origin. Political Participation The transnational practices of political participation by emigrants are increasingly seen as an important factor in the transformation of contemporary societies. As noted, Portugal recognises the right to dual nationality for its emigrants and, since the establishment of the democratic regime, enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of 1976, Portuguese citizens living abroad have the right to vote in the elections to the Assembly of the Republic. With the fourth constitutional revision in 1997, the political rights of Portuguese emigrants were again extended, and they can

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now vote in the election for the President of the Republic and in national referendums (Lisi et al., 2019). A recent amendment to the 1981 Nationality Law (Organic Law no. 2/2020 of 10 November) simplifies access to Portuguese national citizenship for the spouses and grandchildren of emigrants. The recognition of the political rights of Portuguese citizens living abroad is not reflected in high electoral participation. Indeed, as can be seen in Fig. 15.4, the abstention rate, besides being very high and largely higher than that of residents in Portugal, has been increasing, reaching 89.2% in the last legislative elections (2019). However, it is important to note that the increase in the abstention rate observed in the 2019 elections is largely explained by a legislative change that determines the automatic registration of Portuguese citizens living abroad with a valid citizen card (Law no. 47/2018 of 13 August). This change increased the number of registered voters outside the national territory from 302,282 in 2015, to 1,475,797 in the voter registration of 31 December 2018. The number of voters in emigration constituencies (Europe and outside Europe) in the

100.0 90.0

Abstention rate (%)

80.0 70.0 60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 0.0

1976 1979 1980 1983 1985 1987 1991 1995 1999 2002 2005 2009 2011 2015 2019 Residents in Portugal

Residents abroad

Fig. 15.4  Abstention rate in the elections for the Parliament: residents in Portugal and residents abroad, 1976–2019 (%). Source: PORDATA; Electoral Registration Database (registered voters)

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legislative elections of 6 October 2019 (158,252) was also much higher than that observed in the 2015 electoral act (28,354 voters). The fact that the two emigrant constituencies elect only two MPs each, together with the voting system and weak mobilisation by political parties, have been mentioned by several authors as factors explaining the low electoral representation of citizens living abroad (Lisi et  al., 2019; Lobo, 2007; Malheiros & Caldeira, 2003). Indeed, emigrants’ votes have little influence on national electoral results, given that they elect only 4 of the 230 members of the national Parliament. Moreover, the system for converting votes into mandates is based on the system of proportional representation and the highest average Hondt method, which tends to favour the large national parties. The results of the REMIGR survey indicate that the most recent immigrants have a higher participation rate in the Portuguese elections than the total of registered voters outside of the national territory, with statistically significant differences between those who emigrated before and after the emergence of the 2008 crisis (Fig. 15.5). Although more than half (58.5%) of the respondents who left the country between 2000 and 2007 stated that 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

2000-2007

2008-2015 Time of migration

Never

Rarely

Occasionally

Often

Whenever possible

Fig. 15.5  Participation of emigrants in Portuguese elections according to the time of migration, 2000–2007 and 2008–2015. Source: REMIGR survey data, 2014/2015

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they had never voted, this percentage is much lower than the abstention rate observed in constituencies outside of Portugal in all legislative elections held since 1983. In turn, the electoral participation rate of respondents who emigrated during the period of the sovereign debt crisis is similar to that observed in the 2019 legislative elections, as only 43% stated that after migration they had never voted in Portuguese elections. The reversal of the downward trend in the electoral participation of emigrants, evidenced by the results of the REMIGR survey, combined with the increase in the proportion of highly qualified emigrants, traditionally with lower abstention rates, gives substance to the idea that this change cannot be dissociated from the context of the crisis and the size and composition of the associated migratory wave. An analysis of the frequency of electoral participation of REMIGR respondents, disaggregated by level of education, shows that, in the two periods considered, the percentage of individuals with higher levels of education who state that they vote whenever they can is higher than that of all the others (Table 15.3). However, it is interesting to note that, in the group of respondents who left the country during the crisis years, the level of education has a less differentiating effect on voter turnout rates than in the previous period. Thus, it seems that the shock of the economic and financial crisis reinforced the political mobilisation of emigrants in the wave of migration induced by it. Yet, it did not affect in the same way the global universe of the Portuguese diaspora, given that, as we have seen above, the abstention rate has continued to increase.

Table 15.3  Frequency of emigrants’ participation in the Portuguese elections according to the time of migration and the level of education Frequency of voter participation

Never Rarely Occasionally Often Whenever possible Total

2000–2007

2008–2015

Higher education (%)

Other (%)

Higher education (%)

Other (%)

55.0 16.7 8.7 4.2 15.4 100.0

76.6 8.9 5.0 2.2 7.4 100.0

38.9 17.5 11.7 5.5 26.4 100.0

43.6 20.0 11.2 7.9 17.2 100.0

Source: REMIGR survey data, 2014/2015

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The differences in the interest in national politics of emigrants who left the country between 2000 and 2007 and between 2008 and 2015 are corroborated by the frequency with which they hear and read news about politics in Portugal. According to the results of the REMIGR survey, 30.9% of the respondents of the first group and 23.9% of the second group state that they never or very rarely listen to or read this type of news, while the proportion of those who do it frequently or whenever possible are 51% and 53.7%, respectively. The remainder (18.2% and 22.5%) carry out this activity occasionally. The weak political mobilisation of the Portuguese diaspora, expressed in high rates of electoral abstention and in the disinterest in news about Portuguese politics of a large proportion of the respondents of the REMIGR project survey, is accompanied by a lack of trust in political institutions and disbelief in the future of the country: 80.3% of the respondents said they disagreed with the statement, “I trust in Portuguese political institutions”; 13.6% neither agree nor disagree, and only 6.1% expressed agreement. The predominant view on the future of the country is also quite negative: only 25.1% of the surveyed emigrants agree with the statement, “I believe in the future of Portugal”; 30.6% neither agree nor disagree and 45.3% disagree. In summary, the relationship of the Portuguese diaspora with the country of origin cannot be dissociated from the national economic, social and political context of each moment. The increase in remittances, in volume and as a percentage of GDP, observed during the most acute years of the crisis is a good example of the contribution of the Portuguese diaspora cushioning the effects of the economic crisis. The data pertaining to the political participation, contrary to the remittance flows, show that the shock of the economic crisis did not translate into greater political mobilisation of the Portuguese diaspora, maintaining a very high abstention rate in the national elections and a marginal interest in Portuguese political life. This behaviour results from the convergence of several factors, such as lack of trust in political institutions, lack of knowledge of the Portuguese political system, especially among less educated people, and weak mobilisation of political parties in emigration constituencies. Finally, it should be noted that macro-structural conditions of economics and politics in Portugal, and in the destination countries of emigration, interact with individual factors such as the level of education, age, gender, state in the life cycle and aspirations of each individual. Therefore, shocks

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such as the emergence of the economic crisis of 2008 and the intervention of the Troika in 2011 did not produce the same effects, at the individual and aggregate level.

Concluding Remarks Following the trend observed in other countries, Portugal has also sought to strengthen economic, social and political ties with Portuguese citizens and their descendants living outside national territory. An analysis of the evolution of diaspora policies in Portugal since the revolution of 25 April 1974 has shown that the main changes coincide with events that have profoundly altered the course of national history, such as (i) the establishment of the democratic regime and the decolonisation of the African territories; (ii) European integration; and (iii) the global economic crisis at the beginning of the twenty-first century. As Teixeira and Mendes (2020) argue, after the end of the dictatorship and the fall of the colonial empire, Portuguese communities abroad played a key role in the identity reconstruction of Portugal as a “global nation”. In this context, we highlight the initiatives to support the preservation of Portuguese language and culture, the political discourse of valorisation of the diaspora dimension and the association of the Portuguese communities with major national celebrations. At the institutional level, the state’s closeness to Portuguese communities is evident in the expansion of the consular network, the strengthening of external relations with the countries of destination of emigrants and the creation of support services for Portuguese communities. Closer ties with Portuguese communities, on the political level, are also expressed through the granting of citizenship rights and political participation to Portuguese citizens living abroad and through recognition of the principle of dual nationality. The integration into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986 marks the entry into a new phase of the Portuguese state’s relations with the diaspora. As a peripheral country with weak hard power resources in the context of the EEC, later the EU, Portugal can take advantage of the soft power of its emigrants established in other member states, such as France, Germany and Luxembourg to defend national interests (Santana-­ Pereira & Horta, 2017). Therefore, the political action changed its focus to the promotion of diaspora-building identity through the consolidation of the Portuguese language and culture among the Portuguese

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communities spread out over the world, in order to retain their loyalty to the country of origin (Rodrigues et al., 2013). With the economic crisis and the resulting great emigration wave, the economic and business approach of the diaspora-engagement policies gained relevance. In other words, the strengthening of ties with Portuguese communities living abroad is part of the strategy to respond to the effects of the crisis. Portuguese emigrants and their descendants are now seen as agents of national development and informal ambassadors representing the interests of Portugal in the countries where they live. In fact, although the volume of remittances from emigrants still represents a relevant portion of the Gross Domestic Product (1.8% in 2020), in terms of discourse and political practices, the economic valorisation of the Portuguese diaspora has been increasingly focused on its contribution to the internationalisation of the Portuguese economy, by attracting investment, promoting the Portugal brand, creating commercial networks and transferring knowledge and valuing the human capital of Portuguese emigrants and their descendants (Sousa, 2017). The evolution of the volume of emigrants’ remittances and the results of the REMIGR survey are convergent in the sense that they indicate an increased propensity to send remittances after the shock of the economic and financial crisis. However, this growth is mainly due to increased emigration and does not correspond to a general mobilisation of the diaspora to contribute to the economic recovery of the country. It should be noted that these results do not yet reflect the effects of the most recent political guidelines to include diaspora-engagement policy in the country’s development strategy, expressed in the PNAID—National Program for the Valorisation of Portuguese Communities. Therefore, in terms of future research, it is important to study the impacts of these policies on investments, knowledge transfer and return to the homeland. With regard to political participation, weak mobilisation of the Portuguese diaspora was also evident, expressed both in the high abstention rates and in the lack of interest in news about Portuguese politics. However, in terms of diaspora-engagement policies, it is important to highlight the change in the electoral law in 2018 which broadened the electoral weight of the diaspora. Thus, it is possible that in the future there will also be greater mobilisation of political parties to increase their influence with the communities living abroad.

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CHAPTER 16

Ireland’s Homeland-Diaspora Engagement: Policy Responses to the Post-2008 Economic Crisis Liam Coakley and Piaras Mac Éinrí

Introduction Ireland has long been a country of emigration and a diasporic consciousness has played a role in the construction of Ireland and Irish identity from pre-independence to the modern day. However, it has really only been in the past two decades that the Government of Ireland began to create a comprehensive, directed, diaspora engagement infrastructure. These diaspora engagement policies have begun to attract the attention of academic commentators and Ireland’s policy infrastructure has become a significant topic of study during that period. While a range of conceptual positions may be identified, most present-­ day treatments of Irish diaspora policy engagements tend to be anchored in critiques of Ireland’s established tendency to extend its cultural

L. Coakley (*) • P. Mac Éinrí University College Cork, Cork, Ireland e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 O. Anastasakis et al. (eds.), Diaspora Engagement in Times of Severe Economic Crisis, Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97443-5_16

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imaginary “from home” in an effort to garner an economic return “from abroad”. In particular, many authors favour such an economic conceptualisation when seeking to contextualise the motivations behind Ireland’s more recent post-Celtic Tiger1 diasporic engagements (see, e.g., Tian & Wu, 2016, p. 562). Boyle and Kavanagh (2018) offer some strong conceptualisations of direct and indirect Irish diasporic outreach as part of their wider engagement with governments’ established tendency to harness the financial potential of the diaspora for the benefit of economic development at home. Mary Hickman (2020), a long-established and respected commentator on many aspects of Irish diaspora policy (see, e.g., Hickman, 2002 and MacPherson & Hickman, 2014), presents a comprehensive treatment of the “diasporic infrastructures” being put in place in Ireland as part of her wider engagement with the social protection measures built into the state’s diasporic engagement (Hickman, 2020, pp. 260–262). Others adopt a more nuanced view. Boyle and Kitchin (2013, pp. 80–81), for example, reflect that more nuanced view when they summarise the broader imperatives that lay behind Ireland’s initial post-Celtic Tiger global reach-out and anchor the Government of Ireland’s attempts to engage the Irish diaspora in a recognition of the reciprocity that sits at the heart of the relationship between a geographically bounded state and its wider nation. Direction of flow has been subjected to comment as well. For some, Irish policies remain grounded in an imaginary anchored in (and for the benefit of) the island of Ireland and Ireland’s diaspora policy engagements are criticised for their asymmetrical character. Lulle et  al. (2019, p. 13) certainly offer such a summation when they state that Irish policy rhetoric’s appropriation of the “global” Irish is “an easy way of talking about emigration and return” in times of crisis and that the relationship between Ireland and its diaspora must continue to be seen as asymmetric. Gray (2012, p. 249) on the other hand, deploys a more complex conceptualisation when she harnesses the idea of the “network nation” beyond its neo-liberal institutionalist base to illustrate the nodular nature of the Irish diaspora and to go beyond a linear construction of homeland-diaspora relations. 1  A term referring to a period of rapid growth in the economy of the Republic of Ireland from the mid-1990s to the economic crash of 2008, characterised by high rates of inward investment and high rates of immigration and return migration by earlier generations of Irish emigrants, notably those who left in the depressed 1980s.

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In this chapter, we draw upon this literature and seek to situate particular policy developments against Ireland’s: (1) long, evolving relationship with its diaspora and (2) recent reconceptualisations of its primary, territorially bounded connection. We begin with a short summary of emigration from Ireland before moving to a close reading of Ireland’s two most recent diaspora policy engagements—(1) Global Irish: Ireland’s Diaspora Policy (2015) and (2) Global Ireland: Ireland’s Diaspora Strategy (2020). In this, we hope to illustrate the factors shaping current Irish diaspora policy and demonstrate how these engagements have evolved in recent years, in particular since the 2008 international economic crisis. We argue that the crisis may actually be less of a pivotal moment in diaspora policy terms in the Irish case than in that of Greece.

A Long Tradition of Emigration Emigration has long been seen as a defining characteristic of Irish life. Although much of the Irish experience has in reality been shared by other peripheral European countries and the story of emigration from the island of Ireland is not unique, certain distinctive features stand out. One was the impact of the Great Potato Famine of 1845–1851, one of the last major famines in Europe, with substantially higher mortality rates being recorded in Ireland than in subsequent cases in other countries and exceeded in absolute numbers only by the man-made catastrophe of the Holodomor in Ukraine in the 1930s. This Great Famine led to initial large-scale forced migration of more than a million during the Famine, but then developed into decades of involuntary departure, owing to continuing economic hardship and under-development as well as agrarian and political upheaval. This normalised emigration from Ireland to such an extent that the population of the country continued to fall constantly for over a century. Emigration from Ireland thus became a life-choice sanctioned by habit, expectation and opportunity and aided by highly developed informal social networks, which played a particularly influential role in the choice of destination. As Fitzpatrick (1980, p. 126) states “for both Irishmen and Irishwomen emigration became an expected episode in the life-cycle, akin to marriage or inheritance”. Those circumstances, combined with the low likelihood of return (Gould, 1980) and the fact that many of these Irish emigrants did not receive a warm welcome either in the USA or in the other significant destination country of Britain, inevitably led to the emergence of a strong and often defensive diasporic identity amongst Irish

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emigrants and their descendants in the wider diaspora (cited in Fernihough & O’Grada, 2020, p. 1). Whilst there is a danger of over-­simplifying the experiences of these largely white, English-speaking migrants, many of whom ultimately assimilated successfully into the societies they settled into2, it seems reasonable to us to describe the Irish case in the classic terms of victim diaspora. This pattern of prolonged and substantial outward migration did not change when most of the island of Ireland obtained independence from Great Britain in 1922. An impoverished, underdeveloped, largely rural and economically dependent country struggled to find a new place for itself beside its powerful neighbour and erstwhile ruler. By the 1950s, when emigration reached the highest level since the Famine a century earlier, questions were beginning to be asked about the very viability of the new state, as over 500,000 people emigrated from Ireland between 1945 and 1960 (Walter et al., 2002). Notwithstanding these continuing high numbers and the fact that significant economic remittances were being sent home, discourses of emigration were largely confined to the private domain of the emigrant letter and the “American parcel” posted home by Irish emigrants; official attitudes towards emigration can best be characterised as a mixture of denial and even occasional resentment. As then Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Éamon de Valera put it in 1951, whilst decrying the upsurge in post-war emigration, notably to Britain— there is no doubt that many of those who emigrate could find employment at home at as good, or better, wages—and with living conditions far better—than they find in Britain. Moreover, not only do they fail to improve their own circumstances by going abroad, but they leave enterprises for the development of our own national resources without sufficient labour to enable progress to be made as rapidly as we would all desire. (Daly, 2006, p. 270)

In this light, and while accepting that these attitudes began to change as some in the Irish administration began to address the problem of ongoing emigration, early Irish policy initiatives were limited, almost entirely, to measures designed to mitigate the levels of emigration rather than exploring 2  A number of significant political figures in the battle for independence, including Eamon de Valera and James Connolly, were born into this Irish diaspora, while other Irish-born figures became significant political figures in their countries of adoption. For example, the current President of the United States, Joe Biden, has probably made more of his Irish ancestry than any American president since John F. Kennedy.

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ways of fostering a new and more pro-active relationship with the diaspora itself. It was left to the Roman Catholic Church to develop outreach and support for the diaspora, notably for those whose migration experience had not been an unqualified success. The time was not yet ripe to think of the diaspora in terms of an official policy of outreach or the political, material and other benefits which might come from a pro-­active policy. In the decades which followed change did occur, albeit slowly. By the 1960s, state policy increasingly focused on an industrialisation strategy driven by foreign direct investment and the lowering or abolition of tariffs. Employment boomed, marriage rates improved and emigration fell dramatically. Following the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement of 1965, Ireland became a member of the EEC in 1973, generating new market opportunities. By the late 1970s, the country actually experienced a period of net immigration, for the first time, as Irish migrants returned with their families to work in a booming construction sector and other parts of the expanding economy. Meanwhile, the state took a far-sighted decision to invest heavily in third-level education and in the upskilling of the Irish labour force, preparing the way towards a more high-tech manufacturing and exporting economy. While it became possible to believe, for the first time, that a corner had been turned in the long history of excessive emigration, these changes also deflected attention from any sustained consideration of the nature of homeland-diaspora relations. The 1980s, by contrast, were a period of crisis and challenge. Much Irish industry proved unable to withstand the competition from the country’s new EEC neighbours. Poor macroeconomic policy management and high inflation made conditions more difficult still. Jobs were being lost at the very time when the baby-boomers of the 1960s were entering the labour market. The result was a return to an all-too-predictable pattern, as emigration resumed at high levels. Seventy-thousand and six-hundred people, the highest figure for any year that century, left Ireland in 1989 (Government of Ireland, 2002, p. 93). Towards the end of the twentieth century, emigration and the related question of the diaspora were back on the agenda.

A Developing Discourse of Diaspora and an Engagement with Diaspora Policy Ireland’s first woman President Mary Robinson was elected in 1990. In her inaugural speech as President, Robinson (1990) explicitly reached out to the diaspora, for the first time, and stated:

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Beyond our State there is a vast community of Irish emigrants extending not only across our neighbouring island—which has provided a home away from home for several Irish generations—but also throughout the continents of North America, Australia and of course Europe itself. There are over 70 million people living on this globe who claim Irish descent. I will be proud to represent them. And I would like to see Áras and Uachtaráin serve—on something of an annual basis—as a place where our emigrant communities could send representatives for a get together of the extended Irish family abroad.3

Robinson’s approach was ground-breaking, gesturing as it did towards an inclusive and deterritorialised vision of nationhood. Her particular use of the term “extended Irish family abroad” in place of the unfamiliar and (to some) overly academic term “diaspora” contributed to a strong reframing of the idea of diaspora itself, and her successors’ development of the term—“global Irish family”—gained even greater traction in the public imagination.4 The Presidency itself, for the first time, came to be seen as the symbolic representation of that global Irish community even though the Diaspora had no say in the electoral process. Robinson did not seek renewal of her office in 1997, becoming instead an international statesperson of renown, but her impact is well summed up by Irish-American journalist Niall O’Dowd (1997) who, writing in The Irish Times of 13 March, states: When she was elected we were told that the office was essentially powerless, that she would be merely a figurehead; but she understood the power of symbols, which other Irish politicians before her did not, and she used them to wield a moral force abroad which made her one of the most effective Irish political figures ever. Irish Politicians paid lip service to the notion of a diaspora before Mary Robinson, but never understood the wellspring of emotion that many emigrants and ancestral Irish feel on this fundamental issue of their identity.5

That diasporic outreach created the basis for a new way of thinking about Irish identity in the world. It also formed part of the necessary backdrop to the other major development in 1990s Ireland—the negotiation 3  https://president.ie/en/media-library/speeches/address-by-the-president-maryrobinson-on-the-occasion-of-her-inauguration 4  President Mary McAleese succeeded President Mary Robinson. Her successor is the current president of Ireland—Michael D. Higgins. 5  https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/president-who-brought-special-affection-to-theirish-diaspora-1.51825

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and signing of the Belfast Agreement (or Good Friday Agreement) in 1998 and the achievement of peace on the island of Ireland—achievements which owed their success in no small part through the leveraging of support from key figures in the US-based Irish diaspora as well as the backing of the EU. It was accompanied by the adoption of an amendment that year in the national constitution, which replaced the aspiration for the territorial political unity of the whole island with a declaration concerning nationhood which, for the first time, also recognised the role of the diaspora. The constitution of Ireland, as amended, consequently states that: It is the entitlement and birth-right of every person born in the island of Ireland, which includes its islands and seas, to be part of the Irish Nation. That is also the entitlement of all persons otherwise qualified in accordance with law to be citizens of Ireland. Furthermore, the Irish nation cherishes its special affinity with people of Irish ancestry living abroad who share its cultural identity and heritage.6

Crucially, this vision, first set out by Robinson and ably continued by her successors, led to practical developments in the domain of diaspora policy. The groundwork was laid in 2001 for a Task Force on Policy Regarding Emigrants to be appointed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, which reported the following year (Government of Ireland, 2002). Subsequently, and for the first time, an integrated diaspora strategy was accepted as a clear policy aim of the Government of Ireland. Notable interventions at this time included the creation of the Emigrant Support Programme (ESP) in 2004, with substantial funding. This programme is still in place today and is still the major conduit of official funding from the Government of Ireland to the Diaspora. Ireland, along with a number of other EU economies (notably Portugal, Italy, Spain and Greece) was badly affected by the economic crisis of 2008. Construction and related activities collapsed, unemployment soared, national indebtedness increased and, inevitably, emigration roared back after the years of the Celtic Tiger when net immigration had become the norm (Fitzgerald, 2014). But could the impact on diaspora engagement in the period following this crisis, as serious as it was, be characterised as a critical juncture in the country’s historical development? 6  https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/5929/file/Ireland_Constitution_ excerpts_en.pdf

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We contend that the developing engagement was indeed given increased impetus by the crisis of 2008, as evidenced in particular by the fact that a number of core structures were put in place at this time. The Global Irish Economic Forum (2009) and the Global Irish Network (2010) were two such engagements. Both were accorded a very high profile by successive administrations and were developed as mechanisms by which the most influential Irish and Irish-connected people abroad could commit to provide Ireland with valuable international expertise, at a time of unprecedented economic difficulty. Nonetheless, given the slowly increasing engagement already taking place prior to the international crisis, it is difficult for us to conceptualise the crisis of 2008 as an epochal pivot leading to new modes of homeland-diaspora engagement. Rather, we believe that the severity of Ireland’s economic crisis in 2008 prompted an acceleration of an evolutionary process already in train. In the following section, we review two of Ireland’s most current diasporic engagement policy documents in order to illustrate this pattern.

Current Diasporic Engagement In this section, we draw on these developing understandings and offer an initial reading of the Government of Ireland’s two most recent Diaspora Policy/Strategy documents: (1) Global Irish: Ireland’s Diaspora Policy (2015) and (2) Global Ireland: Ireland’s Diaspora Strategy (2020).7 As already argued, many of the initiatives and forms of networking put forward in these two documents represent an extension of initiatives which were already under way, notably through the Emigrant Support Programme, building in most cases on the work of existing communitybased organisations and programmes. Whilst accepting that successive Irish governments had already engaged, to one degree or another, with individuals and organisations in the Irish diaspora, we contend that the increased level of diaspora engagement evident in these policy documents was impacted by the 2008 financial crisis and by the resultant collapse of the Irish economic system, international bail-out and slow recovery. However, we stop short of presenting the economic 2008 crisis as an absolute “juncture-inducing cleavage” (see Collier & Collier, 1991, p. 30) in 7  For ease of use, Global Irish: Ireland’s Diaspora Policy (2015) and Global Ireland: Ireland’s Diaspora Strategy (2020) will be termed “Global Irish” (2015) and “Global Ireland” (2020), respectively.

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the Irish policy space. Rather, we see it as a moment prompting an increased post-crisis diasporic engagement and the adoption of a more comprehensive approach along with an accelerated nuancing of what had been, up until that point, a relatively crude definition of projected Irishness. In this, we particularly hope to demonstrate how older, stretched, but still-geographically bounded conceptualisations of the Irish nation have been gradually extended and developed over the years since the crisis— principally on the basis of the Government of Ireland’s slow acceptance of Ireland as a diasporically networked-nation, and how current notions of Ireland are finally beginning to coalesce with the Good Friday Agreement’s implicit projection of a “global Irish” imaginary that transcends bounded space (see, e.g., Cauvet, 2011, p. 78). In the following sub-sections, we extract a series of salient continuities and divergences from the Global Irish (2015) and Global Ireland (2020) policy documents and use them to illustrate the nature of what we see as an evolving process in 2020. Continuities Global Irish: Ireland’s Diaspora Policy (2015, p.  4) was the “first clear statement of Government of Ireland policy on the diaspora”. This document set out to present a broader and more coherent position on Irish homeland-diaspora relations than had previously been in evidence in Ireland and the initially narrow economic framing of Ireland’s post-Celtic-­ Tiger outreach to the diaspora (such as that envisioned by the biennial Global Irish Economic Forum and its associated Global Irish Network) was broadened and deepened. With it, official Irish Government diaspora engagement began to move, somewhat self-consciously, “beyond self-­ interest” (Government of Ireland, 2015, p. 14). This document contains a series of forewords by Ireland’s political leaders and presents an integrated policy platform, to be enabled by a range of direct engagements with the diaspora. Pre-existing local organisations are recognised and valued.8 As Boyle and Kitchin (2013, p. 330) state, Ireland 8  Such assistance draws strongly on the work of an existing global network of voluntary organisations and charities, generally with a specific focus on particular topics such as welfare for the elderly (e.g. Irish Elderly Advice Network GB), Traveller issues (e.g. Traveller Movement GB), Irish citizens in prison abroad (e.g. Irish Council for Prisoners Overseas), mental health issues and issues affecting undocumented migrants.

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has always successfully projected a form of light-touch administration in this area. However, the document also references a range of very direct and top-down interventions. With Global Irish, the Government of Ireland committed to continue to (1) provide financial support to the diaspora— principally through the ESP; (2) connect with and facilitate engagement with a range of relevant diasporic networks, partnerships and organisations; and (3) evolve national diaspora policy through innovation. “Global Irish” was followed in November 2020 by the “Global Ireland” policy document. Whilst some modifications are discernible, “Global Ireland” (2020) is best seen as a current iteration of the Government of Ireland diaspora policy platform that was first articulated in “Global Irish” (2015). This most recent policy statement is structured around five core engagements: (1) Our People, (2) Our Values, (3) Our Prosperity, (4) Our Culture and (5) Our Influence—each a distillation of patterns outlined in 2015. Although concise, “Global Ireland” does offer a strong reiteration of the ideals presented in 2015 and the promise of continued Irish governmental interest and support for the diaspora. Thus, the document concludes with a strong statement of its intention to continue support for the diaspora (principally through the ESP) under the auspices of Ireland’s diaspora engagement infrastructure—coordinated by the Government of Ireland’s “Interdepartmental Committee on the Irish Abroad” and overseen by the office of the Minister of State for Overseas Development Aid and Diaspora.9 On the surface, many of the pronouncements included under these headings draw upon a linear conceptualisation of Homeland-Diaspora relations. The opening sections of the document—“our people” and “our values”—are discursively constructed around a two-pronged commitment to (1) improve government outreach to the diaspora of Irish-born emigrants resident at a distance from their “Irish homeland” and (2) present a more diverse construction of Irish “home” identity, encompassing a diverse palette of Irish identity-positions, irrespective of difference. Vulnerable Irish emigrants and those illegally resident in other jurisdictions are identified as being worthy of increased governmental attention and support. Irish traveller and LGBTQi groups are prominently mentioned. Similarly, the succeeding sections—“our prosperity” and “our 9  Ireland’s current Minister of State for Overseas Development Aid and Diaspora is Colm Brophy TD.  He was appointed to this “junior ministry” in the Department of Foreign Affairs, Government of Ireland in July 2020.

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culture”—build out from conceptualisations of (1) the Irish diaspora abroad as a development-driver for Ireland “at home” (our prosperity) and (2) the projection of Irish culture “from home” as the worthy signifier of Irish diasporic identity “abroad”. The classic cultural troika of Irish language, the activities of the Gaelic Athletic Association10 and the Irish literary culture are all presented as “exportable” elements of a favoured diasporic cultural imaginary—albeit anchored in a construction of Irishness that is more overtly inclusive of difference than in previous times. Thus, the Irish diaspora is wrapped in a very twenty-first-century commodification of cultural memory over territory—a memory that may be “real” or (maybe) even “imagined”. At the same time, Ireland continues to harness a wider “diaspora-for-economic-development” agenda (see, e.g., Boyle & Kavanagh, 2018, p. 59). Many “official” Irish diasporic engagements have certainly borne the imprint of economic necessity over the past 10–12 years. For example, Ireland’s two afore-mentioned flagship post-2008 events—The Global Irish Economic Forum and the Global Irish Network—were accorded a very high profile by the Irish Government and had the express aim of encouraging “the most successful Irish overseas to connect with Ireland and identify ways to contribute to Ireland’s continued recovery and economic development” (Government of Ireland, 2015, p. 14). The “Global Irish” and “Global Ireland” documents are no different. Such a diaspora-­ for-­ development pattern is particularly evident under the former’s “Facilitating Diaspora Engagement” heading and successive subsidiary sections are firmly framed in broadly economic terms. The Global Irish Network, for example, was deemed to be in need of a more targeted definition in relation to advantageous economic sectors, whilst potential diaspora business networks were presented as opportunities to promote Ireland as a potential recipient of inward investment (Government of Ireland, 2015, p. 44). Even inputs designed to support return migration to Ireland tended to be framed in terms of the dividend that could accrue to Ireland on foot of that return whilst the contribution of “new diasporic communities” was reduced to the “positive contribution that these new groups can and do make to Ireland’s ongoing development” (Government of Ireland, 2015, p. 52). When seen in these terms, the Global Irish policy document clearly continues to rely on the deployment of notions of 10  Ireland’s largest amateur sporting organisation, encompassing a number of indigenous games, principally Gaelic football and hurling.

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essentialised Irish-Ireland outreach to the members of its distant diaspora, for its own benefit. Regional business groupings, Irish university alumni networks and return-to-Ireland schemes are all deemed to be core areas of activity in this regard. At one level, Global Ireland (2020) is no different from the earlier document. For example, returning emigrants are deemed to “bring with them skills and knowledge gained abroad that can help develop both the national and local economies” (Government of Ireland, 2020, p. 11). It is worth noting that such pronouncements are generally anchored in a wider reciprocal pattern and significant attention is given to the mechanisms used by the Government of Ireland to disburse aid to the diaspora and to engage a geographically dispersed Irish nation (e.g., the Emigrant Support Fund, already mentioned). But the message behind a strong discursive pattern is clear. Irish diaspora categories may have become socio-economically and ethnically diversified in the five years and a more inclusive imaginary is being extended since Global Irish, but a still essentialised and spatially bounded construction of homeland-diasporic connection continues to sit at the heart of even this most recent of iterations of Irish diasporic engagement. In this document, in the Government of Ireland’s eyes, the island of Ireland remains the hub of the global Irish diasporic imaginary and spatially distant members of the diaspora continue to be viewed as potential sources of economic advantage. In Ragazzi’s (2014, p. 80) terms, Ireland is acting as a global-nation-state, extending social rights and entitlements to members of its diaspora in return for a potential economic dividend, from abroad. The above notwithstanding, a deeper and more nuanced reading of the document is also possible, one which allows for a potentially different conceptualisation, and we therefore contend that Ireland’s current policy platform points to a tentative but discernible evolution of Irish diasporic engagement—beyond these monetising tendencies and essentialised idealisations. We extract two core departures from previous practice and hold these as indications of such an evolution. Divergences In this section, we point to a de-essentialisation of the Irish-Ireland discourse and the global projection of a more multi-cultural Irish-identity-­ field than had previously been the case and anticipate the expected projection of a diasporic political field, predicated on the possible

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extension (for the first time) of some voting rights and entitlements to members of the diaspora. These reorganisations do much to create a base from which a repositioned discourse of Irish diasporic identity can be projected into the world, and a more effectively de/reterritorialised conceptualisation of nation is potentially more possible now than has been the case, in the past. We will treat of each, in turn. Essentialised Irish cultural signifiers have always been deployed in the Government of Ireland’s diasporic engagements. The celebration of Ireland’s national day—St Patrick’s Day, Irish language, Irish music and dance and the sporting/cultural federation—the Gaelic Athletic Association, are all given centre-space in this context. These markers of Irish identity feature in the Government of Ireland’s most current engagements as well. In this manner, recent engagements can only remain framed in the two-way terms of homeland-diaspora attachment common in years past. However, whilst deploying these predictable mechanisms of cultural engagement, Global Irish’s (2020) use of such standard cultural markers is extended towards a more diffuse conceptualisation of the diaspora than has previously been the case. Irish citizens living overseas continue to be positioned as members of this diasporic community as are those born outside Ireland to Irish families, but now, so too are those deemed to be members of Ireland’s wider (1) “heritage”, (2) “reverse” and (3) “affinity” diasporas. Three particular diffusions are discernible: (1) Global Ireland 2020 (building out from Global Irish) recognises the connections that members of the so-called Irish affinity diaspora have to the Irish nation. For example, non-Irish-born partners of Irish emigrants and members of their wider local community groups are deemed to be entitled to consideration in these terms; (2) Global Ireland 2020 expressly identifies Northern Irish/Ulster-Scots diasporic groups (as well as those from African-American, Caribbean and Central American contexts) as part of a wider Irish diasporic imaginary and (3) Global Ireland 2020 suggests that Irish experience in fostering diaspora relations can be harnessed for the benefit of other diasporic identities as well. This turn towards a diffuse construction of Irish diasporic identity reveals a clear intention—that the diversity of the global Irish community is recognised and welcomed by the Government of Ireland. Whilst the inclusion of geographically dispersed regional groupings was signalled in the 2015 document’s acceptance of the need to include Irish-born Polish returnees to Poland in any recategorisation of Irish diasporic identity, and whilst the move to position Ireland as a key expert in the world of diaspora

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engagement is a somewhat obvious and self-serving conceit, the prominence given to spatially distant members of the Ulster-Scots emigrant diaspora is an interesting departure from previous positions. This recognition goes far beyond the Government of Ireland’s commitment to “explore working with connections in Northern Ireland” (see Government of Ireland, 2015, p. 5) and does seem to signal a de-facto reconceptualisation of Irish diasporic identity for the 2020–2025 period. Whilst notional membership of the Irish nation has long been extended to people from both North and South of the Irish border, this express extension of diasporic identification to members of the Ulster-Scots diaspora represents a departure from established patterns of identity-recognition favoured by the Government of Ireland—beyond the historically more commonly articulated “all-island” imaginary. In this way, if we continue to hold that the core aim of successive Irish diaspora policy has been “to contribute to the activation and mobilisation of the Irish overseas and further a sense that they are part of a community” (Government of Ireland, 2015, p. 14) then this extension of the Irish diasporic imaginary to include Ulster-Scots does indeed point to a mature evolution of Irish identity in more recent times and to a clear deterritorialization of an de-essentialised Irish imaginary beyond the strict bounds of the Island of Ireland. It may also be seen as evidence of the post-Belfast Agreement discourse of a shared island and multi-stranded histories and identities—in itself a significant departure from an earlier, one-dimensional and sometimes implicitly confessional emphasis, notably in representations of the Irish diaspora in North America. Indeed, a striking feature of much conventional academic scholarship to date concerning the Irish diaspora (broadly defined) in North America has been the extent to which research and publications about the two major strands, reflecting historical confessional divisions, have remained largely separate. While emigrants were sometimes constructed as “traitors” to the fledgling state, in Ireland’s immediate post-independence period, the Irish diaspora have not really been subjected to a widespread negative discourse “from home” (for comparison, see Gamlen, 2013, p. 238 for a solid treatment of this topic in the context of New Zealand’s evolving diaspora policy) but emigrant status has been a difficult designation for many, and members of the Irish diaspora have internalised the “distance” of exile in terms of a tragic dislocation from (and resultant dissatisfaction with) homeland. The historical lack of firm Irish governmental policy has not been helpful here and it is reasonable to suggest that generations of Irish

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emigrants have not felt cherished by Ireland’s political classes and have developed negative attitudes towards Ireland’s wider political system, whilst resident abroad. O’Leary and Negra (2016, p. 130), for example, cite correspondence contained in The Irish Times’ popular and influential “Generation Emigration” section (in itself a sign of change) where one prospective returnee was advised to rethink his plan of return to Ireland with the warning that he would be “robbed twice within a week of returning, once by a junkie and once by a politician”. This “trust gap” (Kennedy et  al., 2014, p.  21) is ample evidence of successive Irish governments’ failure to effectively foster a sense of transnational community amongst the very people they have recently been trying to engage. This is particularly so, in the case of Ireland’s historical failure to extend an effective political franchise to emigrants who would otherwise have been eligible to vote in Ireland and the country remains a significant hold-out against the growing international move to extend a political franchise to emigrants living abroad. Adamson and Demetriou (2007, pp. 501–502), for example, point to a number of international instances where emigrants’ political participation has been favoured by the relevant national government. Greece, for example, finally extended the right to vote from abroad to members of its diaspora in 2019 (Moutselos & Mavrodi, 2020, p. 231). If it were possible to operationalise, the extension of a similar suite of electoral rights by the Irish state would be greatly appreciated by members of the wider Irish diaspora. Glynn et al.’s (2013, p. 92) significant research on the post-Celtic Tiger upsurge in emigration from Ireland certainly leads them to suggest that such a move would be broadly welcomed by the Irish abroad. It is not easy to explain this ongoing reluctance to extend the franchise in any meaningful way to Irish people in the diaspora, but it seems likely that part of the explanation can be found in the intensely local and clientelist nature of Irish electoral politics and an accompanying reluctance by most political parties to venture into a different and potentially challenging political arena. A further factor is the challenge inherent in extending the franchise to a significant number of potential voters much closer to home—residents of Northern Ireland with Irish citizenship. The current Irish electoral system does not offer a way in which they can readily be accommodated, although in principle it should be possible to create a constituency in the Seanad (Upper House). It is probably no coincidence either that there has long been a fear among centrist and right-of-centre political parties that an extension of the franchise might benefit radical

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parties or those outside the orthodox centre, notably Sinn Féin. This is in spite of the fact that little evidence exists to support this hypothesis.11 Finally, the argument has been advanced that the size of the Irish diaspora in relation to the home country population poses a specific challenge when compared to other countries with proportionally smaller diasporas. In Ireland, bottom-up diasporic engagement has occasionally exposed the inadequacy of this “democratic deficit” (Hickman, 2020, p. 271) and members of the wider Irish diaspora have been engaged by the issues current in Irish political life. Mackle (2018, p. 110), for example, charts how members of the Irish diaspora played a significant role in Ireland’s 2015 Constitutional Referendum which extended marriage equality to members of the LGBTQ community and how grassroots diasporic engagements such as the #HomeToVote campaign impacted significantly on the outcome of the proceedings—not to mention gaining huge traction in the public imagination, at the time.12 Some very limited voting rights are extended to some members of the Irish diaspora. Some non-resident emigrants, principally certain university graduates, are entitled to vote in some elements of elections to the Government of Ireland’s upper house—The Seanad. However, the wider political franchise is not extended to people resident outside Ireland. This has been a feature of much debate, in both policy circles and in the public sphere, in general. More particularly, having been the object of much discussion since the 1980s at least, the extension of voting rights to non-­ resident members of the Irish Diaspora has been part of recent public discourse on both the nature of the diaspora and on the nature of the Irish voting franchise, more generally. Unfortunately, whilst the necessary constitutional amendment to allow for non-resident members of the Irish diaspora to vote in presidential elections was initially scheduled to take place in 2019, such a referendum has yet to take place and members of the wider Irish diaspora do not yet have even this limited form of political representation in Ireland. Global Ireland however (2020, p. 4) does contain a strong commitment to hold a referendum on “extending the franchise in presidential elections to citizens resident outside the state” in the 11  Research carried out by Mac Éinrí (1991) with Irish-born migrants in the Paris region explored this issue with a question on voting intentions in the event of the extension of the franchise. The data indicated that, while there would be some shift towards opposition parties and against the Government of the day (no surprise in a decade of hardship and high emigration), there would be no significant political dividend for Sinn Féin. 12  This, despite the fact that emigrants lose the right to vote after 18 months.

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near future and this does indeed point to a willingness to create a wider, less-bounded, political imagining of Irish political representation than has been in evidence in Ireland to date. That said, even if such a limited franchise is extended to members of the diaspora, it seems extremely unlikely that a more meaningful franchise by way of seats in the Seanad or Upper House will be proposed. As explained above, the question remains a fraught one. In our final section we seek to situate these developments by comparing some relevant topics, across both the Irish and Greek cases.

Some Differences Between the Irish and Greek Cases In considering the different responses in Greece and Ireland to the crisis of 2008 and its aftermath, it may be worth noting the relative impact of that crisis on both countries in the first place. Emigration is one of the most obvious markers of that crisis—especially in countries where, as has been noted, it is almost a default response to adversity. If the emigration of own-country nationals, in the years 2009–2015, is taken as an indication of a vote of no confidence in the economic prospects of a country, the situation was indeed dramatic—over 340,000 Greek nationals left Greece and more than 280,000 Irish nationals left Ireland in that period.13 But Greece’s population in 2009 was more than twice that of Ireland. Putting it another way, almost 6% of the population of Ireland, the great majority young people, left in just six years—an extraordinary figure, compared to roughly 3% in the case of Greece. However, emigration is not the only yardstick. In the case of Greece the consequences of the crisis included a major political crisis and the distinct possibility that political stability risked being fundamentally undermined. In Ireland the consequences for the political party in power at the time of the crisis were indeed dire (and arguably it has not recovered), but even the situation of extreme austerity which prevailed for some time afterwards did not fundamentally threaten political stability at a more basic level and governments continued to be formed through alliances of essentially centrist and conservative parties. Moreover, the remedies implemented by successive governments during that period, while painful, were conservatively managed and less ambitious than those proposed, say, by 13  https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/MIGR_EMI1CTZ__custom_1331984/default/table?lang=en

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the Government of Spain. Ultimately, the Irish economy recovered and by 2014 the country was experiencing net immigration, albeit mainly of new immigrants rather than return migrants. None of this is to underrate the legacy of anger and bitterness left in the wake of an exodus of this scale and the perception that those who left did so by constraint rather than choice, contradicting the rhetoric of Government ministers who spoke of “lifestyle choice” and opportunity. In retrospect it may be possible to see emigration from Ireland as a kind of a safety valve in the response to the post-2008 crisis, rather than as a further factor in exacerbating that crisis. Moreover, the shift in the socio-­ demographic nature of modern emigration compared to that traditionally experienced meant that the vast majority left with reasonably good prospects—as the Emigre survey of 2013 revealed (Glynn et al., 2013), over 60% of emigrants had a third-level education or a skilled trade. This new wave of emigration was much criticised at the time but can hardly be seen as a renewal of older patterns of victim diasporas which characterised past migration flows. That may also go some way to explaining why the response to this new phenomenon was different in character in Ireland than in Greece. The Government’s early responses, as noted, included the establishment of the Global Irish Economic Forum and the Global Irish Network already referred to. They also included a major one-off initiative in 2013, The Gathering, a call specifically to Irish emigrants, recent and remote, to consider re-connecting with and visiting the homeland. Derided by some, in the words of New York-based Irish actor Gabriel Byrne as “a scam” and “a shakedown of the diaspora” (McGreevy, 2012), the initiative showed a certain lack of sure-footedness in the official response by Dublin to this new diasporic wave. Nevertheless it was a largely successful initiative and generated substantial tourist revenues for the country. We draw attention to two aspects of particular diasporic experiences: (1) cultural attachment and (2) political representation. Ideas of cultural attachment remain central to the Government of Ireland’s outreach to the diaspora. However, this diaspora has changed, particularly in the years since 2008. Nowadays, Irish emigrants are to be found in a more geographically dispersed range of destinations than at any other time and destinations in the USA (where immigration is now difficult for all but those with specific high-level qualifications) and UK are no longer as dominant in the Irish diasporic imaginary as before. Equally, Irish migrants are less likely to be resident in mainland Europe than in the

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1990s. Simply put, the Irish are now more scattered than in previous generations. That said, Irish emigrants do continue to favour English-speaking countries (UK, USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) where they are generally made welcome, and it is reasonable to suggest that most Irish emigrants have moved well beyond any residual sense of victimhood that may have been experienced by previous generations. The need to hold on to an essentialised view of diasporic cultural identity does not therefore seem to be as prominent a driver of the twenty-first-century Irish diasporic experience as it was for previous generations. Arguably this also stands to weaken the homeland/diaspora nexus of relations. The more fluid nature of twenty-first-century life, the “easier”, open and more tolerant nature of Irish society and the much more fluid nature of twenty-first-century migration and return (not to mention the fact that, as noted, many current Irish emigrants are far better educated than those who moved in previous generations) does suggest that a somewhat weakened sense of diasporic solidarity may be more discernible today than in years past—in the Irish case, at least. The Government of Ireland’s increasing twenty-first-century engagement with the diaspora (in cultural terms, at least) could therefore be seen as somewhat of an irony. Irish people moving outwards have finally arrived at a point where the perceived benefits of continuing ongoing strong ties with the homeland may be seen as no longer as existentially crucial to them, just at the time that the Government of Ireland has embraced its need to include the diaspora in its central organising imaginary. Of course, this then begs the question—what motivates the Government of Ireland to continue to project such an identity outwards to the diaspora? Maybe the answer to this question lies in a change of intended audience—the wider affinity and heritage diasporas who are now firmly included in such Irish governmental constructions? For example, the Irish language remains a core pillar of Irish diaspora engagement in 2020 but Global Ireland’s emphasis on the provision of support for the teaching of the language “in third level colleges around the world” is particularly worthy of note (Government of Ireland, 2020, p. 12). Irish is being presented as an academic area of study—not as a supported everyday language. It certainly is tempting, in this light, to suggest that such Irish cultural components are not being projected outwards in the hope of encouraging members of the Irish-born diaspora to retain their connections to the homeland but in the hope of forging firmer links with wider diasporic communities and the homeland-diaspora nexus is further deterritorialised.

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It seems to us that this may constitute an axis of departure between the Irish and Greek experiences, post-crisis. Greek language provision features more prominently in engagements with the Greek diaspora. Whilst Mavroudi’s (2020, p. 137) work on the Greek diaspora in Australia leads her to believe that language is not necessarily a part of the Greek diasporic experience either, we do note how Cavounidis (2016, p.  96) recognises how the Government of Greece’s main office for diaspora affairs—the General Secretariate for Greeks Abroad (GSGA)—focuses “on the promotion of Greek language, history and culture in order to create and maintain a shared national identity” and how these activities account for the most significant portion of the monies spent by the agency. Equally, we note the likely generational experience of diasporic language in this context (see also, Canagarajah & Silberstein, 2012) and are confident in postulating that the experience of English-­ speaking Irish migrants settling in an English-speaking country is likely to be qualitatively different to those who have to learn the language of their country of residence. While Irish people’s command of English as their first language coupled with the tendency to settle in English-speaking contexts does need to be acknowledged in this context, the different emphasis placed on language-acquisition programmes constitutes a potential axis of difference between the two cases and the relative emphasis that needs to be placed by different diasporic engagement infrastructures. Whatever sentiment may suggest, the focus on academic aspects of language promotion simply confirms the Irish diasporic reality of embeddedness in an English-speaking world in which they are perfectly at home. Another axis of difference lies in the firm secularisation of the Irish diasporic imaginary. Ireland has long been recognised as a pre-dominantly Catholic country, and the Roman Catholic Church did provide service provision for significant sections of the Irish diaspora in years past, but the Irish diasporic imaginary was always located on a continuum stretching from the island of Ireland to location of residence, and not between country of residence and a religious core in Rome. Roman Catholicism may indeed be an operational element of many older diasporic communities’ identities but allegiances tend to be very local, and a global (Irish) Catholic identity pattern is not commonly invoked. It seems to us that this constitutes a strong area of divergence between the Irish and Greek cases—insofar as the religio-political importance of the Greek Orthodox Church worldwide draws members of its faith-community naturally back to its homeland in a manner that is very different to Irish Roman Catholic

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allegiances. In this regard, we see religion, at least in the sense of formal allegiance to a particular confession, as potentially being more central to constructions of Greekness abroad than to the equivalent construction of an Irish identity. A particularly notable feature of this identity for previous generations of Irish emigrants was the manner in which local parish allegiances, for instance, in urban America actually constituted a key element in identity formation, but more in terms of integration in the new country than diasporic connection to the homeland. Even that use of Catholicism as a vector of integration is more attenuated now—a factor which may also explain the focus on cultural rather than identity in contemporary diaspora discourse. In this way, Irish and Greek diaspora engagements are operating in different contextual spaces. Policy responses must correspondingly diverge. Irish and Greek diaspora engagement projects also differ in their structural character and wider political context. Greek homeland-diaspora relations have been a key element of Greek Government policy for quite a considerable length of time now and those relations have been managed through a variety of powerful organisations with Government support. Cavounidis (2016, pp. 94–108) certainly outlines the elements of a very significant diaspora engagement infrastructure although it has also been argued that the General Secretariat of Greeks Abroad has been allowed to run down during the crisis years, while the Council of the Hellenes was allowed to lapse even though it is now planned to revive it. Even today, there is no really equivalent infrastructure operating in Ireland. Ireland’s diaspora policy apparatus is managed by a dedicated Minister of State and the wider policy platform is in the process of being set out, but most Irish diaspora engagement continues to be indirect (and indeed somewhat light touch) in nature. Irish ESP funds tend to be disbursed to a wide range of scattered cultural and welfare organisations, for example. Overall, the Irish approach continues to be rather voluntarist in nature, relying on an outsourcing of effort. It supports third-party bodies (sporting, welfare and cultural groups, for the most part) but does not yet seek to impose a centralised State policy in a manner akin to the Greek engagement model (even though the latter also supports diaspora entrepreneurship as part of its wider approach). A further core divergence between the two cases lies in the political arena. Greek responses to the 2008 crisis resulted in a significant reorganisation of the Greek political landscape. Whilst the ultimately short-lived challenge of Syriza signalled a sea-change in Greek political life no

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equivalent reorganisation took place in Ireland at the time and the established political classes did not lose control of the Irish political landscape. Some reorganisation of the political landscape did occur, mainly the decline in the support for the Fianna Fáil party, which had been in power or participated in government for more years than any other party, but a structural change did not happen and the politics of Irish homeland-diaspora relations remained unchanged by the crisis. The seemingly intractable question of extending a full political franchise to members of the Irish diaspora, already referred to, is a case in point. Despite some significant developments (post-crisis) members of the diaspora do not have full electoral rights and entitlements in Ireland. This stands in stark contrast to the Greek experience where full electoral franchise has been extended to Greeks in the diaspora. Greek diasporic members are able to exercise their electoral vote, from their residential location—bestowing a level of political visibility and influence to the Greek diaspora that can only be imagined by members of the Irish. An equivalent pallet of participatory rights and entitlements is simply not available to members of the Irish diaspora—and is unlikely to be granted at any time in the near future.

Conclusions Ireland’s diaspora engagement policies evolved with the publication of Global Irish and Global Ireland. Whilst anchored in earlier developments, this more inclusive and “culturally softer” conceptualisation of Irish policy has really taken effect since the 2008 crisis. As the Government of Ireland’s press release on the publication of Global Ireland states: “Ireland is today a more diverse and multicultural country and so too is our diaspora. This is something we value and will celebrate.” This evolution of policy cannot be reduced to one event, such as the 2008 economic crisis. Rather, the crisis is best seen as a tipping-point serving to accelerate evolutions that were already in the offing in Ireland, and not as a key juncture in Irish diasporic engagement. Much current Irish diaspora policy certainly remains firmly “in the process of becoming”, more than a decade after the crisis of 2008. We particularly note that earlier dominant economic constructions of diaspora continue to have traction in Irish engagements in the 2020s but postulate that the discourse of the monetised diaspora is increasingly balanced by a powerful shift towards narratives of a shared but de-essentialised “Irish” culture for the twenty-first century—especially since 2008. Furthermore, whilst it would be attractive to frame Global

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Ireland (2020) as a clean departure from more established Irish diasporic discourses of the early twenty-first century, it remains the case that the motive-force behind this iteration of official Irish diasporic engagement continues to be drawn from a linear construction of the primary Ireland-­ Irish relationship. That said, Irish policy has evolved over the time period under study. Irish discourses have shifted from a position where emigrants and their descendants were largely ignored, to a gradual recognition of the potentially key role the global Irish community can play in the affairs of Ireland, especially in economic terms, in the immediate post-Celtic Tiger period to the present construction of a more significantly diffuse diasporic identity. Recent Irish diasporic outreach can therefore be conceptualised more as a pattern of enhanced engagement and increased nuance than a completely new message in the twenty-first century. This shift from a traditional defensive or embattled diaspora and what might in another time and place been a more interventionist and statist policy, to a more postmodern, deterritorialised, inclusive one, based primarily on concepts of soft power, cultural identity and a light-touch, decentralised official approach, did come at the right time to enable Ireland to develop new and appropriate contemporary responses, notably after the crisis of 2008.

References Adamson, F., & Demetriou, M. (2007). Remapping the boundaries of ‘state’ and ‘national identity’: Incorporating diaspora into IR theorizing. European Journal of International Relations, 13(4), 489–526. Boyle, M., & Kavanagh, A. (2018). The Irish Government’s diaspora strategy: Towards a care agenda. In J. Devlin-Trew & M. Pierse (Eds.), Rethinking the Irish diaspora: After the gathering. Palgrave Macmillan. Boyle, M., & Kitchin, R. (2013). Diaspora for development: In search of a new generation of diaspora strategies. In Y. Kuznetsov (Ed.), How can talent abroad induce development at home: Towards a pragmatic diaspora agenda (pp. 315–345). Migration Policy Institute (MPI). Canagarajah, S., & Silberstein, S. (2012). Diaspora identities and language. Journal of Language, Identity and Education, 11, 81–84. Cauvet, P. (2011). Deterritorialisation, reterritorialization, nations and states: Irish nationalist discourses on nation and territory before and after the Good Friday Agreement. GeoJournal, 76, 77–91. Cavounidis, J. (2016). The emigration of Greeks and diaspora engagement policies for economic development. Centre for Planning and Economic Research (KEPE)

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Report no. 76. http://repository.kepe.gr/kepe/bitstream/20.500.12036/ 1407/1/KEPE_Reports_76.pdf Collier, R. B., & Collier, D. (1991). Shaping the political arena: Critical junctures, the labour movement and regime dynamics in Latin America. Princeton University Press. Daly, M. E. (2006). The slow failure: Population decline and independent Ireland, 1920–1973. University of Wisconsin Press. Fernihough, A., & O’Grada, C. (2020). Across the sea to Ireland: Return Atlantic migration before the First World War. Queens University Centre for Economic History Working Paper Series 2019-08, 1–35. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=3491676 Fitzgerald, J. (2014). Ireland’s recovery from crisis. CESifo Forum 2/2014 (June). https://www.esri.ie/system/files?file=media/file-­u ploads/2015-­0 7/ JACB201418.pdf Fitzpatrick, D. (1980). Irish emigration in the later 19th century. Irish Historical Studies, 22(86), 126–143. Gamlen, A. (2013). Creating and destroying diaspora strategies: New Zealand’s emigration policies re-examined. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 38, 238–253. Glynn, I., Kelly, T., & MacEinri, P. (2013). Irish emigration in an age of austerity—Report on an Irish Research Council funded study of contemporary Irish emigration. https://www.ucc.ie/en/media/research/emigre/Emigration_ in_an_Age_of_Austerity_Final.pdf Government of Ireland. (2002). Report of the task force on policy regarding emigrants. https://www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/alldfawebsitemedia/ourrolesandpolicies/TaskForceReport.pdf Government of Ireland. (2015). Global Irish: Ireland’s diaspora policy 2015. https://www.dfa.ie/media/globalirish/global-­i rish-­i relands-­d iaspora-­ policy.pdf Government of Ireland. (2020). Global Ireland: Ireland’s diaspora development strategy 2020–2025. https://www.dfa.ie/media/globalirish/Diaspora-­Strategy-­ 2020-­English.pdf Gray, B. (2012). Irish State diaspora engagement—The network state and diaspora netizen member: A case study in Irish diaspora engagement. Eire-Ireland, 47(1 and 2), 244–270. Hickman, M. (2002). Locating the Irish diaspora. Journal of Irish Sociology, 11(2), 8–26. Hickman, M. (2020). Diaspora policies, consular services and social protection for Irish citizens abroad. In J. M. LaFleur & D. Vintila (Eds.), Migration and social protection in Europe and beyond (Vol 2): Comparing consular services and diaspora policies (IMISCOE Research Series) (pp. 259–272). Springer Publishing.

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Kennedy, L., Lyes, M., & Russell, M. (2014). Supporting the next generation of the Irish Diaspora: Report of a research project funded by the emigrant support programme, Department of foreign affairs and trade. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Government of Ireland. Dublin. Lulle, A., Coakley, L., & MacEinri, P. (2019). Overcoming crisis: Mobility capabilities and ‘stretching’ a migrant identity among young Irish in London and return migrants. International Migration, 58(1), 31–44. Mac Éinrí, P. (1991). The Irish in Paris: An aberrant community? Geographical Society of Ireland Special Publications. Mackle, D. (2018). Marriage equality North and South: The journey after the gathering. In J. Devlin-Trew & M. Pierse (Eds.), Rethinking the Irish diaspora: After the gathering. Palgrave Macmillan. MacPherson, D. A., & Hickman, M. (2014). Women and Irish diaspora identities: Theories, concepts and new perspectives. Manchester University Press. Mavroudi, E. (2020). Feeling Greek, speaking Greek: National identity and language negotiation among the Greek diaspora in Australia. Geoforum, 116, 130–139. McGreevy, R. (2012, November 10). Gabriel Byrne and the Gathering ‘shakedown’. Irish Times. Moutselos, M., & Mavrodi, G. (2020). Diaspora policies, consular services and social protection for Greek citizens abroad. In J.  M. LaFleur & D.  Vintila (Eds.), Migration and social protection in Europe and beyond (Vol 2): Comparing consular services and diaspora policies (IMISCOE Research Series) (pp. 227–243). Springer Publishing. O’Leary, E., & Negra, D. (2016). Emigration, return migration and surprise homecoming in post-Celtic tiger Ireland. Irish Studies Review, 24(2), 127–141. Ragazzi, F. (2014). A comparative analysis of diaspora policies. Political Geography, 41, 74–89. Tian, Z., & Wu, J. (2016). Ireland’s diaspora strategies and economic development. Proceedings of the 2016 second international conference on social science in education (pp 562–564). Atlantis Press. Walter, B., et al. (2002). A study of the existing sources of information and analysis about Irish emigrants and Irish communities abroad. Department of Foreign Affairs, 7.

CHAPTER 17

Migration and Diaspora at Times of Crisis: Public Perceptions of Emigrants in Ukraine Iryna Lapshyna

Introduction In the distance I heard the sound of a trumpet, and I asked the servant what it meant. He knew nothing and had heard nothing. At the gate he stopped me and asked: “Where is the master going?” “I don’t know”, I said, “just out of here, just out of here. Out of here, nothing else, it's the only way I can reach my goal.” “So you know your goal?” he asked. “Yes”, I replied, “I've just told you. Out of here—that's my goal.” Kafka, “The Departure”.

In his chapter in the edited volume, The Great Regression, Zygmund Bauman starts with a quote from a Kafka short story to highlight that more and more people “hear trumpets” and go on the move (Bauman, 2017). However, under current conditions—the recently staged, and in all likelihood still far from complete drama of the “migration panic” in

I. Lapshyna (*) Ukrainian Catholic University, Lviv, Ukraine © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 O. Anastasakis et al. (eds.), Diaspora Engagement in Times of Severe Economic Crisis, Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97443-5_17

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Europe and elsewhere—it is not a good time for being a migrant. This chapter takes the case of Ukraine and specifically the changing perceptions in the national discourse on emigrants and the Ukrainian diaspora in the USA, Canada, Russia, Poland, Germany, Greece, Italy, the UK and many other countries. Since Ukraine’s independence (1991), and partly rooted in Soviet traditions, the migration discourse in Ukraine has been dominated by a negative public perception of migration. Ukrainian media, politicians, public officials and even sometimes academics have contributed to the construction of negative stereotypes about “the Ukrainian emigrant” in public discourse. Emigrants were often portrayed as betrayers of the nation, defectors, non-patriots and women as “prostitutes”, abandoning a (newly) independent Ukraine rather than staying to help “build the new Ukraine”. The diaspora was seen as naïve outsiders in “vyshyvankas”1, and resident Ukrainians often chided émigrés for leaving. There is a joke in Ukraine about the diaspora reflecting this view: “Are you missing Ukraine?” “Yes, very much, soon we will celebrate 20 years of how much we miss Ukraine.” (Tolkachev, 2010)

Yet another depiction of the Ukrainian diaspora is that of a union of the millionaires who only think about how to send money to Ukraine (Ambassador Andrey Shevchenko quoted in Poskannaya, 2016). Only in recent years have these depictions begun to change. This change is related to the Euromaidan Revolution in 2013 which swept away the old political regime and brought to the fore a more modern liberal elite which subscribed to European values, and with it a more positive perspective on migration and diaspora. This shift in perceptions towards diaspora could be explained by the interplay of several factors. Firstly, Ukrainians abroad were very actively involved in the Euromaidan Revolution, the defence against the Russian aggression and post-­ Euromaidan events. The diaspora became a more visible actor in Euromaidan’s developments through various activities including solidarity events, humanitarian aid, advocacy and serving as conduits of information. Not only did these activities resonate inside and outside of Ukraine, they 1  Ukrainian vyshyvanka is the colloquial name of the traditional Ukrainian embroidered shirt.

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also served as a trigger to unite diaspora across borders and across generations on unprecedented levels. Secondly, Ukrainians abroad appear now willing to continue to invest time, resources, efforts and expertise for Ukraine’s development beyond the events of Euromaidan. Thirdly, President Zelensky continuously acknowledges the active role of Ukrainian diaspora in support of Ukraine and sees it as an important partner for Ukrainian government strategies aimed at improving political, social and economic outcomes. This chapter investigates how Ukrainian emigrants and diaspora were represented in post-Soviet Ukraine in national discourses during the pre-­ crisis period (1991–2013). It argues that the Euromaidan Revolution, the Russian aggression in the East, annexation of Crimea and subsequent war and the related economic crisis, here understood as a crisis complex consisting of these overlapping individual crises (often in short referred to as the crisis of 2013–2014), was a major “threshold event”. It is important to understand that the Euromaidan was the primary crisis and trigger of the subsequent event and is often depicted as the denominator of the crisis complex. The political crisis of the Euromaidan ended with a change of government, but certain post-crisis developments, and in particular the economic crisis and the war, impacted the country well into the 2020s. This chapter specifically analyses how the crisis complex has affected domestic perceptions of Ukrainian migrants and diaspora. It discusses the fundamental shift in the perceptions towards Ukrainian emigrants and diaspora “from villains to investors” and ambassadors for Ukraine after the 2013–2014 crisis. The main argument of this chapter is that the Ukrainian migrants’ and diaspora’s extensive involvement in the Euromaidan uprising and the defence of the country was a trigger which contributed to changing the image of migrants and the diaspora for the better. It is important to stress that this paper adopts a broad definition of diaspora communities offered by Agunias and Newland (2012, p. 15) as “emigrants and their descendants who live outside of the country of their birth on temporary or permanent basis, yet still maintain affective and material ties to their countries of origin”. Thus, not all migrants will cohere into communities, not all migrant communities will imagine themselves as transnational and not all transnational communities are simultaneously diasporic communities. The key markers are diasporic identities and practices. I sometimes cluster diaspora and emigrants because of shared behaviour—like their response to the Euromaidan Revolution and the

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subsequent events in Ukraine. The same applies to discourses towards diaspora and emigrants. One key difference between the groups is that in the pre-Euromaidan period, the theme of diaspora was almost absent in the Ukrainian national discourse. Whereas, emigrants were actively represented in the national media and policy discourse negatively.

Methodology This chapter is based on two consecutive studies both addressing specific research questions whilst applying content analysis. The first study sampled and analysed media and policy discourses whereas the second one conducted and analysed qualitative interviews with diaspora actors. The set of research questions in the first study asks, (1) in what way have Ukrainian emigrants and diaspora predominantly been represented in the Ukrainian media in pre- and post-crisis period after 2013 and (2) what are the discursive frames commonly used by these media to cover issues of the Ukrainian emigrants and diaspora. To this end, I analyse the media representation of migrants and diaspora in several local and major Ukrainian print and online media multiple media outlets covering the period January 1991 and March 2021. The media were selected due to their coverage of national and international affairs and their influence on public opinion and public policy. Among these were the main national (TSN, UNIAN, Ukrinform, Radio Svoboda) and two key regional online news portals (DailyLviv, Galytskiy Correspondent). This study also analyses political speeches, namely of the president of Ukraine, other government representatives and statements published on the official website of president of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Parliament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine. The question of the second study asks how Ukrainian diasporas and international migrant communities responded to the crisis of 2013 and the conflict following the crisis. To this end, I conducted two case studies with diaspora activists and organisations, businesses and other stakeholders of the Ukrainian diasporas in Poland and the UK2. Empirical research took place in 2015 and 2016; notably, 43 in-depth semi-structured interviews and field observations were carried out. The sample consists of 21 interviews in the UK, 20 interviews in Poland and 2 interviews in Ukraine. Amongst these were 20 representatives of diverse Ukrainian diaspora 2

 It is based on the results of a British Academy-funded research project.

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organisations: 3 community leaders, 9 professionals/activists/volunteers, 3 business people, 3 embassy representatives and 2 Church representatives. I also conducted two expert interviews in Ukraine. Each interview lasted between 45 and 90 minutes. The material was anonymised, coded and analysed using NVivo software.

Shifting Perceptions of Emigrants and Diasporas in a Global Context Since the 1990s governments and state agencies around the globe have dramatically shifted migration narratives from denouncing migrants as deserters and traitors to celebrating them as national heroes and model citizens (Gamlen, 2011). At the forefront of this shift was Irish President Mary Robinson who, in the early 1990s, declared her wish to “represent” the “vast community of Irish emigrants” living beyond her state (Robinson, 1994), stating that, “if we are honest, we will acknowledge that those who leave do not always feel cherished” (Robinson, 1995). Since then, “all of a sudden it seemed that states everywhere were casting aside their long-­ held suspicions about emigrants, and recasting them in a new and positive light” (Gamlen, 2011, p. 4). This shift in attitudes was connected with the recognition of the mostly positive economic effects of migration, for instance by the World Bank (Russels, 1995). Many origin countries emphasise the role of diasporic economic impacts when shaping state policies towards emigration. One part of these common strategies is to adopt a positive discourse and celebrate migrants who send back remittances as “national heroes”; countries like the Philippines, Guatemala, El Salvador, India, Indonesia, Mexico and Sri Lanka developed this strategy. Mexico’s President Vicente Fox overturned the traditional negative image of Mexican emigrants as “pochos”3 who have abandoned their roots, and declared them “the cultural engine, the permanent ambassadors of Mexican culture” (Martinez-Saldana, 2003, p. 34). In the past, it was almost exclusively developing countries that sought to design policies to make use of their diasporas abroad, whereas today developed countries too increasingly implement diaspora engagement policies. For instance, in Ireland the shift involved the “rediscovery” of the 3  “Pocho” is a term used by Mexicans (frequently pejoratively) to describe Chicanos and those who have left Mexico. Stereotypically, “pochos” speak English and lack fluency in Spanish.

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diaspora, to a large extent in a more positive fashion than it has ever featured in national rhetoric before. Former Irish President Mary Robinson’s remarks about the “Fifth Province” and “cherishing the diaspora” were key moments in legitimating the place of the diaspora (Kearney, 1990). Using Ireland as an example of how the diaspora could be leveraged to increase flows of talent and foreign direct investment, and thereby to boost economic growth, in 2007 Andrew Grant, then Director of the New Zealand Office of the management consultancy firm McKinsey and others put the case to government ministers that “we’re just not proactive enough around the New Zealand diaspora”. The idea of harnessing and engaging the diaspora emerged within the wider context of the business– government rapprochement, and the formulation of a strategy to cope with long-term economic decline. By 2001, key figures in the Government had begun to embrace the idea of recasting the so-called brain drain as a potential gain. Recent government initiatives towards diaspora as part of neoliberal “diaspora strategy” have aimed at casting emigrants as part of a community of knowledge-bearing subjects, in order to help the New Zealand economy “go global”. New Zealand has shifted from disparaging emigrants to celebrating expatriates as heroes (Gamlen, 2011). Regardless of some remaining scepticism about the ability of diasporas to help the homeland at a time of crisis (Carter, 2005; Cochrane, 2007; Antwi-Boateng, 2012) themes like the growing role of diaspora in development, diaspora mobilisation, diaspora engagement or contribution of diaspora at times of crisis continue to acquire more weight in academic and public debate. According to one widespread view, because many diaspora communities retain emotional, financial and familial ties to their ancestral home, they have far-reaching potential as partners development. At times of crisis, diasporas have been reconsidered and reconceptualised as agents of changes.4 The sketch of the dynamics in the perception of diasporas presented above resonates well with the Ukrainian case where, for almost 20 years, Ukrainians abroad were often perceived negatively. Emigration was considered a problem, serious security threat, or seen as being mainly the behaviour of 'losers' and emigrants were viewed with suspicion as traitors, defectors, spies and even some women as prostitutes. The diaspora was 4  For example, a lead article, “The Magic of Diasporas” in The Economist (2011) has suggested that diasporas can be a beneficial force for origin countries.

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often regarded as unwelcome outsiders: either those who “knew better” than those who remained, or beggars who constantly wanted something. Yet, some regarded the diaspora as “cash cow” as well (Lapshyna, 2019). However, since 2013, Ukrainian emigrants and diaspora have been perceived more favourably in the national discourse. This is because of the economic benefits associated with emigrants and their remittances, and also because of growing diaspora engagement. The emigrants’ aid to the homeland during and after the time of this crisis complex, for instance, has helped improve attitudes about these groups. Also, some have now returned to Ukraine as investors and lobbyists. In the Ukrainian academic literature, increasingly migration and diaspora responses to the crisis complex have received more attention (Carment et  al., 2021; Nikolko, 2019; Oleinikova & Bayeh, 2020; Tatar, 2020; Vollmer & Malynovska, 2016). Yet, to date, hardly any study has examined the migration and diaspora discourse in the Ukrainian media, nor the question of how the Ukrainian crises related to the Euromaidan Revolution have affected representation of Ukrainian migrants and diaspora in national discourses. This chapter examines the national discourse on migration and diaspora in times of crisis. It covers this gap and looks at perceptions towards Ukrainian emigrants and diaspora in a changing social and political domestic context. It thus contributes to the ongoing debate on shifting views related to an acknowledgement of the increasing significance of diasporas as contributors to the home countries’ development.

Pre-Euromaidan Migration Discourses: A Soviet Heritage Before we proceed with the contemporary Ukrainian context, it is important to give some historical and socio-political background on how the discourse of “defectors” came into being during the Soviet times. As is well documented in the literature, Soviet migration policies were overwhelmingly restrictive and repressive under the totalitarian control of the communist state (Light, 2012). Over the course of the 1920s the Soviet regime gradually imposed an effective ban on emigration and even foreign travel, so that “the right to cross the Soviet frontier … soon became a rare political privilege” (Matthews, 1978, p. 83).

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Under 1935 legislation, the death penalty was applied for people that were “illegally leaving USSR”. In 1958 after Stalin’s death, the death penalty for illegal emigration was withdrawn; however, tough restrictions on emigration lasted until 1990. Key features of the Soviet system of migration control were established under Stalin, and were retained under subsequent Soviet leaders, notably Nikita Khrushchev (in power between 1953 and 1964) and Leonid Brezhnev (in power between 1964 and 1982). Citizens of the Soviet Union who wanted to emigrate had to obtain exit visas. Many who applied for exit visas were denied. Those who tried to escape the USSR and did not succeed were branded traitors, fired from their jobs and became targets of public hatred. Emigration and immigration were basically abolished and pervasive bureaucratic controls enforced on internal migration. Those who nevertheless received exit visas had to pay an exit tax and lost their Soviet citizenship. This can be traced back to Stalin who had created a system whereby “every contact with foreigners was watched. Every visitor to foreign consulates was investigated. Every immigrant was suspected as a possible foreign agent” (Kuromiya & Pepłoński, 2014). Contacts with foreigners were related to espionage and counter-espionage and framed as threat to national security. From the Soviet standpoint, all those who left the country were traitors and those who came to the country qualified as spies. In independent Ukraine, from 1991, the negative discourse on migration persisted. Emigrants were often perceived as “betrayers of the nation”, “defectors” and even “prostitutes” in the cases of some women (Solari, 2014). Overall, they were seen as unpatriotic for not staying to help “build the new Ukraine”. There was an opinion that those who were perceived as only having selfish economic reasons rather than noble political ones should be ashamed of “abandoning” Ukraine. Even Leonid Kuchma, the first president of Ukraine, claimed in 2003 in an interview (Castagnone et al., 2007) that “our Ukrainian women abroad are prostitutes who do not want to work in Ukraine”. Further to this, in Ukraine women migrants to Europe were also blamed for a range of social issues including the “degradation of the family”, “orphaned” children, men’s alcoholism and even men’s moral debasement by driving men into the arms of mistresses (Lutz, 2010; Vianello, 2009). In general terms emigration is often shown as a shameful social problem. In 2004, The National Commission for matters concerning Ukrainians worldwide was created and this did not succeed in changing the generally negative discourses. The outflow of workers from Ukraine

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was still widely recognised as problematic, with local businesses often unable to fill vacancies and some of the most affected rural areas experiencing seasonal depopulation. In the debate about migrants’ children left behind in Ukraine, the new term appeared—“Euro-orphans”—also known as “social” or “national” orphans. Lutz and Palenga-Möllenbeck (2012) argue that the terms “Euro-orphan” or “social orphan” became buzzwords in the media and are often uncritically adopted in academia without being clearly identified or critically reflected upon (Lutz & Palenga-Möllenbeck, 2012, p. 26). Another negative narrative was that emigrants are seen as cash machines by their families. In a documentary, Ukrainian ladies who work in Italy are labelled “ATM women”. One lady who had been caring for the elderly for many years said that in Ukraine people made jokes about women who are caretakers, who “entertain” elderly seniors in Italy. “Everybody is laughing but I sometimes want to cry”, she said, referring to how hard her job is mentally and physically. Faced with a choice staying in Ukraine and starving or going abroad to make a living she chose the latter. In the end of this documentary the presenter concludes that “they become cash machines for their family for as long as they can manage”. There is no doubt that the documentary raises important issues of children left behind and the challenges migration poses to traditional family values. However, it unintentionally adds one more stereotype with negative connotation to women who work hard and endure harsh working and living conditions in order to help their families. Petro Symonenko, a Ukrainian politician and the leader of Communist Party, suggested that “labour migration contributes to the spread of alcoholism, drug use and HIV/AIDS in Ukraine” (Zimmer, 2007). In his Facebook post about emigration, Mustafa Nayyem, Ukrainian journalist, former MP and public figure stated: “Leaving our country in a search of a better world, we capitulate as a generation”. Further, he suggested that many emigrants “will remain second-class people in the receiving country” (Nayyem, 2017). Ukrainian politicians, public officials and media are thus contributing to the demonisation of migration and the construction of the 'emigrant' as a negative stereotype. Content analysis of the representation of Ukrainian emigrants in news coverage published in local Ukrainian print and online media showed that the language used vividly mirrored the existing public narrative of migrants and shapes it at the same time. One could not help noticing hard hitting titles of articles like “HIV—disease of zarobitchan [migrant workers]?”

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(Golomidova, 2009); “Labour migrants: traitors or heroes?” (Gatuccho, 2010); and “Labour migration: salvation or shame for Ukraine?” (Lashenko, 2020), among others. A big part of the discourse in Ukraine associated emigration with the “brain drain”. Ukrainian mass media were concerned with emigration of the high-skilled. For instance, when reporting on emigration, national mass media emphasised themes like, “Ukraine might lose its future due to brain drain” (Kuzmenko, 2012), “Ukraine is losing its golden gene pool” (Kondratyuk, 2012), and “Five ways to entice Ukrainians to come home” (Hunder, 2018). Ukrainian academics, too, refer to “brain drain” issue as “national crisis” (Semchuk, 2019), “one of the main problems of modern Ukrainian society” (Nikolaevskyy & Prohorenko, 2010) or as “a national security threat” (Polkovnitchenko & Kurotchka, 2016). Unsurprisingly, a very critical reference to the danger of brain drain was made by the President of The National Academy of Science of Ukraine: “If the brain drain from Ukraine can’t be stopped, science will die before the middle of the 21st century” (Zagorodnij, 2020).

National Context of Emigration and Formation of the Ukrainian Diaspora This section provides the background to the analysis of the shifts of discourses on emigration and diasporas in Ukraine. Socio-economic Features Few other republics of the former USSR have gone through so many crises as Ukraine. It was once one of the most economically affluent republics of the former USSR. After the dissolution of the Soviet bloc, it was the second largest European country in size, and the fifth-biggest nation by size of population (52 million in 1991). Post-Soviet Ukraine aimed at becoming a functioning democratic state with a competitive economy, integrated with both post-Soviet and European markets (Sutela, 2012). Instead of the prosperity that was hoped for, Ukraine over the past 30 years has experienced economic crises and social upheavals over and over again. This rollercoaster of crises means that the country has been unable to recover effectively from one crisis before another occurs (Guz, 2021).

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In 2004, public dissatisfaction with political and economic realities resulted in the Orange Revolution that changed a previously pro-Russian political orientation of Ukraine to a pro-Western one. This was in part driven by the activism of younger generations. But within four years, Ukraine was hit hard by the global financial crisis. Economic growth dropped, the economy shrank by 15% in 2009 and the country went into deep recession. The official unemployment rate increased to 9.5% at the beginning of 2009. Most Ukrainians to this day still suffer from severe poverty and a dysfunctional social welfare system. The Eurozone crisis and its ripple effect on Ukraine—combined with internal failures such as lack of effective anti-corruption reform in virtually all sectors, government debts and the power of oligarchs—have overshadowed Ukraine’s economic future. Slowly the Ukrainian economy has recovered and in the first quarter of 2010 it enjoyed positive GDP growth. By October 2013, the Ukrainian economy again lapsed into recession. The early 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia, and the War in Donbas that started in the spring of 2014, severely damaged Ukraine’s economy. In 2013, Ukraine saw zero GDP growth and in 2014 the economy shrank by 6.8%; this continued with a 12% decline in GDP in 2015. But by 2016 Ukraine’s economic growth rate was 2.3%, thus ending the recession (World Bank, 2017). In 2019, economic growth was solid at 3.2% (World Bank, 2020) only to collapse again due to coronavirus pandemic when in 2020 GDP shrank by 4.4% (National Bank of Ukraine, 2021). Consequently, Ukraine experienced a widespread rise of dissatisfaction with economic opportunities, public services and the political class. A large-scale study (EUMAGINE, N = 2000 age 18–39) on migration aspirations of Ukrainians (2010–2013) found that 82% of the respondents expressed particular dissatisfaction with policies addressing poverty, 76% believed it was difficult to find a good job, 75% believed politicians do not serve the people’s best interests and 70% believed health care is bad or very bad. Migration Dynamics The demographic situation including migration patterns of Ukraine have changed fundamentally (Strielkowski & Šperková, 2016). The first cohort of Ukrainian emigration dates back to the late nineteenth century–early twentieth century. This early wave of migration was mainly rural populations. Up to 10% of the population of western Ukraine, then part of

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Austria-Hungary, went to the USA, Canada, Argentina and Brazil. From the Ukrainian territories, which were part of the Russian Empire, the settlers went to the East (Siberia and the Altai). The second cohort comprised of economic and political emigrants left during the interbellum. During Soviet times, at least one million of Ukraine’s dispossessed peasants were forcefully displaced internally to other regions of the USSR. The Second World War and its aftermath caused the emigration of a third cohort. Westward, it was almost entirely political; Eastward, it consisted of several components: forced evacuation migration; repressive deportation of opponents of the Soviet regime and so-called unreliable populations from the territory annexed by the USSR that forms part of today’s western Ukraine (in 1939–1940, up to one million people were deported; in 1944–1952, more than 200,000 people); and the organised relocation of the labour to Siberia and the Russian Far East. The fourth cohort of emigrants is associated with Ukraine’s independence in 1991 and was primarily motivated by socio-economic considerations. In response to economic hardship and political frustration, large numbers of Ukrainians have left since 1991. There are an estimated 2–7 million Ukrainian emigrants (estimates vary depending on definition, source, year and season), mostly to Russia and the European Union (Duvell & Lapshyna, 2015); or up to 8.2 million (according to the foreign countries’ census) to 20 million (according to various estimates) people of Ukrainian origin living abroad (Malinovska, 2016). Since 1991, the country’s population shrank from 52 million to 41.5 million in 2021, nearly a 20% drop due to a mix of a high emigration rate, coupled with high death rates and low birth rates (State Statistics Service of Ukraine, 2021). As a result of the fourth migration cohort, the old diasporas increased in numbers but were also greatly enriched. New diasporas were also formed in the countries where previously there were almost no Ukrainians, particularly in southern Europe (Malinovska, 2016). This fourth emigration movement continues today and Ukrainians continue to “vote” with their feet by leaving, as conceptualised by Hirshmann (1970). The numbers are increasing due to a combination of low life-satisfaction at home and the attraction of many EU countries and Russia, combined with increasingly liberal visa regimes. The EUMAGINE study found that in response to the dissatisfying conditions described above, 49% of respondents expressed the ambition to emigrate. Another small-scale survey carried out at Lviv Polytechnic/ National University in 2014 revealed that 82% of its students want to work

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abroad, 80% want to study abroad and 44% plan to live abroad (Pyatkovska, 2014). Emigration has since increased even further after visa-free travel to the European Union was introduced in July 2017. Since then, 17.6 million have crossed the EU border, according to Ukraine’s State Border Guard Service (UNIAN, 2018). These short trips have provided an opportunity for more Ukrainians to job seek in Europe, work illegally, conduct business, attend university and connect with Ukrainian communities that help them to permanently relocate. Ukrainian migration to the EU is the largest of all post-USSR migratory movements to the EU. In 2018, Ukrainian nationals were the largest group of temporary migrants in the European Union. That year, over 700,000 first-time residence permits were issued to Ukrainian nationals, 635,335 by Poland (78% of all EU first residence permits). Meanwhile, Czechia issued 71,201 first residence permits to Ukrainians, Slovakia 21,040, Lithuania 12,267, Latvia 8852 and Estonia 5143. Poland currently is the main EU host country of Ukrainians; this is due to geographical proximity, extensive migration networks, a liberal procedure for legalising residence and easily available work permits (Eurostat, 2019). Between 2009 and 2017, the number of Ukrainians studying abroad also increased by 186% reaching 77,424 students in 34 countries (Shpak, 2018). The emigration of workers, experts and the youth remain a large challenge for Ukraine. The next section describes briefly the Euromaidan Revolution which triggered a major transformation of the perception of migration and diasporas.

The Euromaidan Revolution and the Ukrainian Crisis Complex: A Threshold Event Along with the 2004 Orange Revolution, the second uprising, Euromaidan Revolution, is another important milestone in Ukraine’s post-Soviet journey. In late November 2013, nearly ten years after the Orange Revolution, after then-President Viktor Yanukovych refused to sign an association agreement with the European Union anti-government protests erupted again in Ukraine. The protests were more than a demand for closer EU relations. They were a rejection of injustice as a way of life and of the post-­ Soviet politics of grand corruption and nepotism practised by ex-President Yanukovych and his peers (Open Society Foundations, 2019). As the

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protests in Kyiv’s Independence Square, or “Maidan Nezalezhnosti”, continued into 2014, the government began cracking down on the demonstrators. The size of the protests only grew in reaction and turned into what was termed “the Revolution of dignity” or the Euromaidan Revolution. Approximately 100 protesters and 17 police and government troops were killed during the unrest. On February 22, President Yanukovych fled the country and parliament voted to oust him and hold new elections. On May 25, Petro Poroshenko was elected president, and after October parliamentary elections a new pro-reform coalition government came into power in December 2014 (Open Society Foundations, 2019). Russia exploited some discontent with these developments and militarily intervened in Eastern Ukraine and annexed Crimea. The subsequent war plunged the country into a deeper economic crisis. Living standards in Ukraine plummeted even further to levels not seen since the early 2000s in a country that was already among the poorest in Europe. In addition to the politico-military aspects at its centre, this crisis complex led to a complex humanitarian emergency, complete with asylum seekers and internally displaced persons. But the Euromaidan Revolution also mobilised the Ukrainian diasporas across the globe. The scale of the 2014 mobilisation was broader and the numbers on the streets significantly higher than in 2004. This is because the Euromaidan protests in 2013–2014 were marked by outbursts of extreme violence on the part of both the government and the demonstrators culminating in the massacre of 21 February 2014. Notably, the Russian intervention and the war in Donbas, threatening the sovereignty of the country, mobilised Ukrainians abroad who organised a great number of solidarity events worldwide.

Diaspora Responses to the Euromaidan Uprising From the first days of the Euromaidan protests, the Ukrainian diasporas throughout the world supported the uprisings for democratic change. From the interviews with the representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora, it became clear that these events opened up opportunities for diaspora engagement that were not available before. Diaspora groups set up solidarity groups like “London EuroMaidan”, “Warsaw EuroMaidan”, “Euromaidan Berlin” and others, organised demonstrations, public awareness-raising events or collected money and engaged in Ukrainian matters. The work of the diaspora demonstrated support for a pro-­Western

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and democratic uprising combined with national defence against an external enemy. The mobilisation of civil society was remarkable in terms of the levels of engagement and participation across all segments of the Ukrainian diaspora. On the one hand, traditional diaspora groups reported a surge in members, participants and activities, and subsequently in Ukrainian diaspora identity. On the other hand, almost every Ukrainian NGO and many active citizens abroad made efforts to help and support individual victims, civil society, the army and Ukraine in general. A member of the Ukrainian diaspora in London stated: What we have seen are joined efforts of all the migrants who came a long time ago, recently and even more recently, in order to support the Revolution of Dignity and then to protest against the Russian annexation of Crimea and war in the East. So, if there is anything positive coming out of the tragic and horrendous news and developments in Ukraine it is that our community has grown strong and is more united in its effort. [UK3]5

Another interviewee in Warsaw commented: When the Euromaidan started, many people who were friends and trusted one another assembled. This was a locomotive and other people joined this locomotive. A common enemy united different groups in Poland, older diaspora, youth, newcomers. When the situation in Ukraine deteriorated all were united. [P41]

The mobilisation of humanitarian aid to Ukraine was an important focal point. As one diaspora representative in London summarises: One of the things I was very proud of when the Euromaidan started in Ukraine was that each and every Ukrainian community group was doing its bit. ‘The Ukrainian Medical Association in the UK’ took over medical issues, issues with hospitals, wounded people. ‘London Euromaidan’ had people to collect, fundraise and get supplies for the front line, for volunteering battalions. [UK 3]

A co-founder of the British-Ukrainian charity organisation explained how they contribute to the homeland: 5  UK3 is a code for the interviewee, where UK refers to the United Kingdom, P for Poland and 3 is the number of the respondent.

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We developed three main areas of help [to Ukraine]. Firstly, help with prosthetics, help with providing medical treatment. Secondly, help to families, internally displaced people. The third area is children of heroes that were killed during the war. [UK 9]

Almost all my interviewees agreed that apart from financial help the Ukrainian diaspora has an ability to counter misinformation on Ukraine: The other thing the diaspora might be able to help with is trying to stop the propagation, or stem the flow, of misinformation about Ukraine. [UK 10]

Essentially, the Ukrainian diaspora in the UK and Poland claim to be important stakeholders in the development of Ukraine. The leaders of the “Maidans” in London and Warsaw referred to the political influence they can leverage through lobbying and awareness-raising campaigns: We became very active in political terms. Another area of Euromaidan work is political lobbying. Our activists attend different sessions in Parliament, speak to members of Parliament. [UK 4]

A representative of the “Warsaw Euromaidan” described their activities as follows: One of the most important [activity] is political activity, which includes preparation of official letters, petitions to Ukrainian and international politicians who can influence the situation in Ukraine. We are also preparing political events, marches and pickets of embassies. Also, we do lobbying for Ukrainian interests. [P10]

Thus, the Ukrainian diaspora was very actively involved in processes taking place in Ukraine between November 2013 and February 2014, becoming a visible actor in Euromaidan's developments. Meanwhile, as a side-effect, its response to the homeland’s crises became a more prominent topic in the emigration debate in Ukraine and, as will be shown below, caused a major change in the perception of emigration and diasporas. The following section depicts the new post-Euromaidan Revolution discourses of migration and diaspora.

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Post-Euromaidan Discourses on Migration and Diaspora Successively, from 2014, a rhetorical shift in the government's attitude towards migrants and diaspora became evident in the national discourse, moving away from the view of “traitors” and towards greater recognition of their contribution to Ukraine’s development. The focus on remittances stands at the heart of the shift in the migration debate. Remittances are now viewed in a more positive light. After 2014, labour migration became an increasingly important factor contributing to Ukraine’s economic growth. In 2019, Ukrainian labour migrants transferred more than US $12.2 billion to Ukraine, amounting to 7.8% of the country’s GDP. This is a record number since the National Bank of Ukraine started maintaining statistics in 2015 (Semchuk, 2020). The International Organization for Migration (IOM) and some Ukrainian officials acknowledged that Ukrainian migrant workers have been the biggest investors in Ukraine’s economy. According to the head of the IOM in Ukraine, Profazi, “private money transfers of Ukrainian expatriates are already larger than foreign direct investment and official developmental aid combined” (2016). In line with some Ukrainian officials the migration debate in the media, too, acquired a more positive tone. Migrant workers are often represented as investors in the Ukrainian economy who have an important economic role: “Ukrainians abroad are the biggest investors in Ukrainian economy” (IOM, 2016), “migrants are not traitors but our asset” (Andruchovych, 2020) and “the main asset of Ukraine for 30 years is labour migrants” (Daily Lviv, 2021). In 2015, the Ukrainian parliament adopted a new Law on External Labour Migration. This was followed by the 2017 Strategy of State Migration Policy until 2025, which contained a set of ambitious goals such as “creating the necessary conditions for the return and reintegration of Ukrainian migrants into Ukrainian society” (Dubenko, 2020). Cooperation with Ukrainians abroad increased in 2015–2019, primarily due to the Russian aggression and strengthening of Ukraine’s Euro-­ Atlantic integration policy. Ukraine adopted the State Programme for Cooperation with Ukrainians Abroad in effect until 2020; it also opened the Ukrainian Institute, created a separate department at the MFA and boosted foreign diplomatic missions’ efforts in this area (Ukrainian Prism, 2020). In 2017, Parubiy, Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada (the Ukrainian parliament), met Choliy, President of the Ukrainian World Congress,

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initially set up in 1967 and recognised the contributions made by the Ukrainian diaspora in Ukraine’s struggle against Russian intervention. He stated: “We all do feel grateful to the Ukrainian World Congress as well as the whole Ukrainian community abroad for their wide and active assistance in defending Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” (Verkhovna, 2017). The mass media debate in the Euromaidan and post-Euromaidan period mostly focused on specific events such as active support of the Euromaidan protests and the organisation of humanitarian aid to Ukraine. Much of the news coverage during and after the Euromaidan actually discussed mobilising humanitarian aid and help to Ukrainian soldiers. For example, “Ukrainians in Germany actively collect aid for their compatriots” (Schneider, 2014); “Ukrainians of Great Britain transferred money to the soldiers wounded in АТО zone” (Ukrainskyi Poglyad, 2016); “Ukrainian diaspora in the Netherlands helps Ukraine and Ukrainians not only with the words” (Stozary, 2020); “Ukrainians of Poland transferred further help to Ukraine” (Ukrinform, 2020); “How Ukrainian diaspora in the USA helps wounded soldiers” (Ukrinform, 2019). The leadership of Ukraine expresses political interest in Ukrainians abroad, understanding the importance of this cooperation for pursuing Ukraine’s foreign interests. In particular, in the inaugural address by President Zelensky, he made clear how important the cooperation is with representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora, and called on Ukrainians who live abroad to repatriate or return to their homeland. “There are 65 million of us …—those born on Ukrainian soil. Ukrainians in Europe and Asia, in North and South America, Australia and Africa”, Zelensky claimed and continued, “we really need you. To all who are ready to build a new, strong and successful Ukraine, I will gladly grant Ukrainian citizenship. You must come to Ukraine not to visit, but to return home. We are waiting for you”, he underscored (Zelensky, 2019). In 2019, he issued a range of measures to attract Ukrainian workers to return. These included policies designed to encourage job creation and the launch of long-term, low-­ interest loans for small and medium-sized businesses. The foreign policy section of the president’s Decree, “On urgent measures for reforming and strengthening the state” (8.11) pays special attention to cooperation with Ukrainians abroad, in particular it promises “pursuing an effective foreign policy of Ukraine aimed at satisfying the national-cultural and linguistic needs of Ukrainians abroad, protecting their rights as national minorities in other countries”.

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The 2019 election process in Ukraine showed that political parties and their leaders now also care about Ukrainians abroad. This was especially evident in the statements and election programmes of the Servant of the People, European Solidarity, Voice and Svoboda parties. The main issues raised during the election campaign were regularity of contacts with the diaspora, economic and investment cooperation, protection of the rights of migrant workers, and dual citizenship (Ukrainian Prism, 2020). Over the past years, President Zelensky also began emphasising the importance of the Ukrainian diaspora in visits to host countries. For instance, in September 2019 during his official visit to the United States, President Zelensky met with the Ukrainian diaspora and stated, “You are our best diplomats, you are in fact our lobbyists. You defend our sovereignty, our territorial integrity here, in the United States, and throughout the world. We are very thankful to you” (quoted in Nikolaenko, 2019). In his interview with Mark Mackinnon about his visit to Canada, President Zelensky acknowledged the contributions of the Canadian diaspora: “We really have a very strong diaspora in Canada. I am always grateful to them, because at the beginning of the war in our country in 2014, the diaspora collected money and humanitarian aid and helped us a lot” (Zelensky, 2020). This new focus on the diaspora was also underlined by Ukraine’s parliamentary speaker, Dmytro Razumkov, during his early March 2020 visit to Switzerland. There, he made it a priority to meet members of the country’s Ukrainian community and listen to their suggestions regarding ways to improve ties with Ukraine. Razumkov’s welcome gesture indicated an eagerness to hear from the Ukrainian diaspora, while also hinting at the untapped benefits Ukraine could enjoy from greater interaction (Lushnycky, 2020). Meanwhile, the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine (2019) has recognised labour migration among its priorities. Furthermore, attention has increasingly turned to the working conditions of Ukrainians working abroad. Ukraine’s Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated in an interview with the Ukrainian Radio, “the mission of Ukraine as a state is to defend the interests of our fellow citizens and guarantee Ukrainians have decent working conditions in Europe. This is the first time this issue has been raised at this level. We are talking about insurance, official wages, accommodation, conditions for returning home. And most importantly— treatment, including in the case of coronavirus infection” (Shmyhal, 2020). This nicely illustrates how the discourse has changed from demonising emigrants to defending the wellbeing of emigrants. To sum up, the post-­ Euromaidan and crises-related national migration discourse on migration

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and diaspora fundamentally changed over the past 20 years. It has changed from demonising emigrants to defending their wellbeing and recognising the important contribution the Ukrainian diaspora makes to the homeland.

Conclusions Diasporas undertake wide-ranging and significant activities within and across host and home countries. Politicians and media play significant roles in determining public opinions on migration and diasporas. The analysis presented here of the migration and diaspora representations in government discourses, official statements and Ukrainian media sketches some broad patterns and important changes over time and its drivers. Notably, the crisis complex triggered by the Euromaidan revolution acted as a critical juncture for the changes observed in media and political representations about emigration and the Ukrainian diaspora. The extensive involvement of the Ukrainian diaspora in the Euromaidan period, notably solidarity actions as well as support against Russian aggression greatly enhanced its visibility whilst highlighting its benefits to the country. This caused a fundamental transformation of the discourses on emigration and diasporas. In the post-independence period from 1991, and in continuation of Soviet traditions, negative coverage of migration prevailed the Ukrainian policy and media discourses. Migrants were presented in a highly unfavourable fashion. They were often framed as traitors, defectors, prostitutes or threats to the economy, demography, culture or security. Migration was also viewed as “brain drain”. At the same time, the diaspora was perceived as unwelcome naïve outsiders in vyshyvankas who felt they “knew better” than those back home, or as union of the millionaires and a “cash cow” for much needed foreign currency. However, recently, migrants and diaspora have been perceived more favourably in the political and public debate due to the economic benefits associated with migration; migrants are increasingly viewed as a resource for promoting economic development back in their home country. In line with the various statements by Ukrainian politicians, as quoted above, the media now also recognises and appreciates the diaspora’s contribution to the homeland at times of crisis and during the post-crisis period. Meanwhile, the media perception has largely shifted from viewing diasporans as villains to goodwill ambassadors, investors and lobbyists for Ukraine.

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The argument put forward here is that the Euromaidan Revolution in 2013–2014 was a major "threshold event" in Ukraine because it triggered a series of other crises but also removed a pro-Russian government, firmly shifted the political orientation west, facilitated political and economic reforms, increased civil society and media activities, and advanced the fight against corruption. Diasporas too played an important role in the event which drove a substantial shift in the representation of Ukrainian migrants and diaspora in political and public debates. Regarding the Ukrainian diaspora’s response to the crisis complex around the Euromaidan and the subsequent occupation of Crimea and the war in East Ukraine, it can be observed that the migration and diaspora debate has acquired a more positive tone. This transformation suggests that Ukraine is slowly leaving behind some of the values and culture of its Soviet past as well as the thinking that informed its initial nation-building years. Instead, perspectives have become more outspoken which reflect the realities of global integration and increasingly mobile societies.

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CHAPTER 18

Conclusion: A New Model of Diaspora Engagement? Othon Anastasakis, Kalypso Nicolaidis, and Manolis Pratsinakis

We conclude this book in a highly symbolic year, 2021, the bicentennial anniversary of Greek independence, to muse about a community older than the country itself: its worldwide diaspora. This anniversary reminds us the ties that bind, the ties that continue to connect the diaspora with the homeland as we remember the wealthy Greek merchant communities abroad who funded the pre-independence revival in the West or the secret revolutionary ‘Society of Friends’ (Phiiliki Etairia), founded by three young Greeks in Odessa in 1814, which helped spark the Greek revolt. Whether this means that Modern Greece was constructed by and for a trans-territorial national community, at least we learn from history that

O. Anastasakis (*) • M. Pratsinakis University of Oxford, Oxford, UK e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] K. Nicolaidis EUI School of Transnational Governance, Florence, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 O. Anastasakis et al. (eds.), Diaspora Engagement in Times of Severe Economic Crisis, Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97443-5_18

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Greece and the homogénia, a term used by Greek state officials to refer to the Greek world outside its borders, have long been bound in a mutually recognised solidaristic relationship. To be sure, most Greeks abroad traditionally gathered around their Greek Christian orthodox identity and national language and kept strong links with their roots in their respective local communities. However, the fact that the Greek diasporic communities existed long before the creation of the modern Greek state meant that the inter-generational engagement between Greeks abroad and the homeland was never a straightforward matter of direct identification with a central state. Having said that, various diaspora actors kept a consistent involvement with Greek national politics and Greece’s economy or through major benefactions, primarily in education, in the development of the Greek society, nationally and locally. For its part, the Greek state developed institutional links with the diaspora only after the return to democracy in 1974, by establishing new institutions (General Secretariat of the Greeks Abroad, World Council of Hellenes Abroad), as well as financing a number of institutes and operations abroad for the promotion of Greek language and culture. In that way, the state aspired to become the main actor in structuring its relationship with diasporic Greek communities and individuals. However, when the Greek economic crisis struck, not only was the state its main victim and perpetrator, but most Greek diasporic communities were also left bewildered as to how to help a bankrupt state recover from its unprecedented economic calamity, caught between the Scylla and Charybdis of high deficit and huge external debt. At the same time, the 2009 economic crisis created another wave of emigration, a new generation of diasporans, mostly younger people with high educational attainments who emigrated from Greece deeply disillusioned by their homeland. Given their low expectations that the conditions that led to their departure could be ameliorated soon, most of them continued to harbour ambivalent feelings of repudiation and solidarity towards their country in crisis. Asking, ‘how did the Greek crisis affect patterns of engagement between homeland and diaspora?’, we assumed that this particular crisis, a rupture with many past political, economic and social practices in the Greek homeland, would unavoidably have an impact on the homeland’s relationship with Hellenes abroad. Our initial stance was premised on the expectation of crisis-engendered engagement with the

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homeland, albeit encompassing a diversity of responses in terms of their intensity and impact. On one hand, we expected to find the Greek diaspora as an entrepreneurial and politically progressive economic force for the homeland, a voice in favour of a post-crisis ‘enlightenment’ of a country in desperate need for socio-­political and economic regeneration, and even an agent of positive public diplomacy to counter the image of Greece as an international pariah. On the other hand, we knew that there is not one but many Greek diasporas around the world with different socio-political agendas and levels of attachment to Greece and whose attitudes to the crisis would range from total indifference or apathy to activism and commitment. As illustrated throughout this volume, it is impossible to identify a uniform type of diaspora engagement stemming from the crisis. Nevertheless, we can argue that the crisis did reconfigure this multi-faceted and multi-­ actored relationship, both by highlighting the outdatedness of the previous system of engagement and by creating new spaces for interaction. We examine them in turn in this conclusion.

The Limits and Failures of the Pre-2009 Diaspora Engagement The first overriding message shared by the contributors of this volume is that the depth of the crisis challenged the resilience of earlier patterns of engagement at a time when a framework facilitating the diaspora’s contribution to Greek affairs was needed the most. Several chapters address the limits and failures of the previous system in institutional, economic, political and geopolitical terms. For instance, the diasporic institutional landscape of Consulates, the World Council of Hellenes Abroad, and  the Foundation for Hellenic Culture were the first victims of austerity and had to shrink most of their activities abroad. On this point, Frangos and Anastasakis show how the World Council of the Hellenes Abroad was already waning while the crisis gave it the final blow, leading to the ultimate termination of its operations. Kitroeff argues that Greek-American communities—among the most dynamic and pro-active in the diaspora—proved less able and willing than expected to come to the rescue of the Greek state due to assimilation but also to the perceived and actual lack of capacity on the part the Greek state to guarantee an accountable and transparent way of handling

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philanthropic contributions from abroad. This cautious attitude and lack of trust was not only due to the legacy of past unsuccessful attempts, but also to the further discrediting of the Greek state in the period of the crisis. The Ecumenical Patriarchate, Grigoriadis adds, traditionally a focal point of diaspora activity, especially with the Greek-American community, also failed to mobilise the kind of philanthropic support which would have made a real difference to many segments of the Greek impoverished society. The Patriarchate itself had to cut down its budget in light of declining revenues from Greece, in particular given that the Archdiocese of America had its own qualms and was proving unable to deliver any significant financial support. The limited economic support from established diasporic communities could potentially have been partly counterbalanced by the resurgence of large-scale emigration. In the past,  primarily in the post-World War II period, emigration was encouraged by the authorities not only as a means of taking the pressure off from the labour market but also so that remittances would help address balance of payments issues. In contrast this time around, the vast emigration of half a million mainly young Greeks, had limited impact on unemployment. And, as Pratsinakis, Nicolitsas and Faure argue, remittances from recent emigrants were thin, while the combined effect of the prolonged recession along with the loss of an often highly educated labour force risked imposing a cycle of underdevelopment on the Greek economy. As a result, a discourse gradually emerged that the crisis-led flight of young and educated Greeks symbolised Greece’s economic and political downfall, pointing to grim prospects for the future. Hence, the return of the ‘brain drain’ generation has been deemed a sine qua non for Greece’s regeneration, with successive governments making all sorts of promises to provide incentives for repatriating Greek professionals who left, bringing the Diaspora back as it were. Unsurprisingly, when such promises are not met, they lead to mutual recriminations and the further politicisation of the issue of return. In the meanwhile, we ask, to what extent do mainland Greeks really understand and engage with the needs and preferences of this ‘new Diaspora’? What would they find out if they did? In their contribution, Pratsinakis and Kafe answer that aspirations to come back ‘home’, at least in the short term, remain low. Expatriates do not seem to endorse the same kind of ethos of return than earlier generations of migrants. This may be due to the fact that this crisis changed perceptions of emigration from

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the earlier traumatic experience of forced desertion of the homeland into an opportunity for change and better life abroad. Those young migrants left not only disillusioned about Greek institutions and their prospect for a bright future in Greece, but also without the sense that this would be an all-or-nothing choice as it had been for their forefathers, when the ease of communication and travel makes it so much easier to keep contact with Greece. There is however a counter-narrative whereby the new emigration while a blow to Greece, also led to positive change in homeland diaspora relations through the revitalisation of diasporic communities abroad. Relatedly, when many young Greeks voted with their feet to escape the crisis, they also took their voting rights and political preferences with them, making the diaspora vote an issue that could no longer be ignored. As a result, and as argued by Anastasakis and Kalantzi, the law on the facilitation of the diasporic vote in 2019, despite the many restrictions and conditions that it entailed, significantly reshaped homeland diaspora relations, strengthening the political ties between diasporic Greeks and their homeland. This is indeed, one of the ways in which migrants remain members of a transnational political community rather than exclusively integrate in their new societies. Importantly, the flow of monetary remittances towards Greece may have been relatively limited but expatriates expressed willingness to contribute to Greece in other ways such as through knowledge transfer, participation and contribution to civil society organisations, engagement in partnerships with professionals and institutions in Greece as well as by transferring social remittances to Greece, as the chapters by Pratsinakis and Kafe, and Papangelopoulos and Merkle show. As the latter argue, interaction between the ‘new diaspora’ and the people back home is not always harmonious but we can confidently say that patterns of engagement have begun to shift rather dramatically and constructively.

New Fields of Engagement This leads us to our second observation on the crisis impact, namely the emergence of new spaces of engagement between diaspora and homeland. According to Kamaras’ contribution, the decline in state funding has opened up space for transnational diaspora philanthropy, thus enhancing the professionalism and transparency of civil society actors, a sector traditionally tied to the Greek state. Such philanthropy has also enhanced

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policy and normative pluralism in Greece, clearly spilling over to the country’s politics. Conversely, Tinios argues that the increased transferability of pensions and other social rights within the EU, which can now be accumulated abroad, will ultimately affect incentives for return and the diaspora’s attitude to policy reform in Greece, in particular the need for pension reform as one of the sectors most affected by the crisis. A change towards a more migration-friendly system to allow for more mobility but also to bring back capital, labour and pensions in Greece, Tinios argues, ought to be the way forward in the post-crisis environment. Anagnostou, for his part, approaches this new space through the angle of national rebranding by the Greek-American diaspora itself, to counter the tarnished image and negative stereotypes that dominated the global coverage of their Greek homeland. Delving to a more micro level, Chryssanthopoulou explores the ways Australian Greeks hailing from the border small island of Castellorizo have supported their region of origin economically and culturally thus helping transform the very meaning of Castellorizian collective identity, both in the diaspora and on the island. This shift in turn has informed world-linked philanthropic initiatives and engagement with the island. Her chapter also illustrates the need for considering the rather insufficiently studied subnational, ethno-regional dimension, which adds to our understanding of the emergence, development and varied features not only of diaspora-homeland interaction, but also from a more horizontal viewpoint, diaspora-to-diaspora relations. Finally, and in this vein, Grigorakis and Kataiftsis discuss the role of transnational diasporic networks in shaping economic action at times of economic hardship. Their chapter raises the issue of diasporic entrepreneurships, networks and start-ups leading to new attitudes towards business and innovation. Greece as a latecomer in this new mentality has had to adapt to a better use of internet services to support their businesses, while traders tried to engage in export activities by using diasporic networks and new methodologies. From a wider geopolitical perspective, homeland and diaspora relations are embedded within a multipolar international environment, characterised by the rise of emerging great powers, which challenge US hegemony and open up more destination spaces. Up until recently, Greeks chose to emigrate to places where past generations of émigrés had already settled, in the United States, Germany, Australia, Canada, with free movement within the EU providing further incentives for intra-European migration. No wonder that the majority of Greeks went to Germany, Britain,

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Netherlands while also discovering Central and Eastern European countries like the Czech Republic or relocating their businesses in the neighbouring Bulgaria, Romania or Albania where the opportunities and taxation were more advantageous. But in keeping with the changing ‘geography of opportunity’ of our times, Greeks also tried new destinations in the lands of Qatar (where the Greek community now includes between 3000 and 5000 people), Saudi Arabia (which attracted Greek doctors by offering much higher wages), Singapore and Shanghai. While these destinations have not been explored by the book they are deserving of further study, primarily from the point of view of similarities and contrasts with the more traditional destinations we examined, in the ways these newly found diaspora communities engage with the homeland, or fail to do so.

Towards a New Model of Diaspora Engagement? Polycentricism, Pragmatism, Empowerment As we take stock of the limits and failures of the old system and the creation of new spaces of interaction, can we talk of a new post-crisis model in the relationship between Greece and its diasporic communities abroad? This book offers a tentative yes. In our view, as the old habits are laid bare, and new spaces are introduced, Greeks at home and abroad are progressively crafting a new model of engagement. In closing our investigation, we suggest that to reach its full potential, such engagement ought to rest around three principles, namely polycentrism, pragmatism and empowerment. Polycentrism. The post-crisis environment gives us the opportunity to rethink the positioning of Greece away from a state-centric model, with diasporic satellites evolving more or less close to the homeland, towards a polycentric model, where Greece only constitutes an important pole within a transnational space of Hellenism. This view is embedded in a wider discussion on the need to move beyond statist paradigms in the study of diaspora engagement (Karabegovic, 2018; Koinova, 2017). As we observe the old state-centred territorial approach progressively being replaced by networks of interdependence between homeland and diaspora agents and horizontally between the Hellenic diasporas themselves, we need to ask how these new patterns may build on rather than replace pre-­ existing connections. We offer many examples in the book pointing to emergent ways where the state may be retreating from its position as a

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financier and mobiliser of resources, thus recalibrating its role as only one of several enablers for strengthening the ties that bind. In a period of drastically reduced fiscal spending by Greece’s state, diaspora engagement at the subnational level of particular localities and regions and diaspora philanthropic and volunteer engagement with Greek civil society organisations are two such pointers. This decentring of the state as the main actor in the formulation and mobilisation of diasporic stances may be in fact a welcome development. It remains to be seen what kind of new actors are emerging in the Greek transnational diasporic picture. Pragmatism. Turning from the centrality of the Greek state to a more polycentric mode, we argue that the latter’s renewed credibility in the eyes of Greeks abroad remains a prerequisite for any kind of renewal. Policy aims should be framed in such a way as neither to appear patronising nor to treat diaspora Greeks as owners of resources that can ‘be tapped’, but rather as partners in a shared mission. We need to move from the vision of the ‘savior diaspora’ to a more pragmatic understanding of diasporic needs, aspiration and resources. As they revisit or even to some extent design anew the diasporic relationship, public and private actors in Greece must pay greater attention to identifying the areas where expatriates continue to be frustrated about lags in necessary action, the continued need for reform, and the desire to grab opportunities as they arise. Such a renewed focus needs to be as inclusive as possible, addressing both recent emigrants and established communities, even as this may sometimes create tension, especially due to inter-generational gaps in expectations. It also needs to take into consideration, much more systematically the concrete proposals emanating from the diaspora itself and to support bottom-up initiatives. As Brinkerhoff argues, the aim should be to target interventions to those members of the diaspora who are already mobilised, willing and able to contribute (Brinkerhoff, 2012). While this point was already floated in the mist of the Eurozone crisis, we believe that the post-crisis, more-stable environment provides a strategic opportunity to put such a pragmatic approach in practice on a day-to-day basis. Empowerment. Last but not least, engagement must be continuously predicated on what we know of the widely different experiences prevailing among diasporans, shaped as they are by their diverse sense of transnational belonging, and by the ways they embrace plural cultural identities and multiple loyalties and affiliations. These diasporic populations, taken individually and collectively, are par excellence dynamic and fluid social entities whose continuous transformation is not an intrinsic consequence

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of migration, but rather the product of social constructions and fluctuating processes of mobilisation (see Sökefeld, 2006). Diasporas come and go, and may return again, existing for the most part as silent transnational imagined communities. We live in an era when communication technologies and social media, despite their potential pitfalls, are making it easier than ever to foster transnational virtual communities which in turn can bring new face to face encounters into being. If this is true, empowerment of those who define themselves as part of the Greek diaspora through the practices of their everyday lives need to find platforms where they can be heard and listen to others. The internet is already spurring the creation of online diasporic agoras and thus promoting dialogue and exchange that may ultimately shape a virtual diasporic community from the interaction of Greeks across the world. The SEESOX diaspora project which we initiated during the years of crisis has sought to contribute to this emergence through the Greek diaspora map (http://seesoxdiaspora.org/the-­greek-­ diaspora-­map) which we hope to develop into a fully fledged transnational multi-level digital platform. The emerging younger diasporic generations (descendants of earlier migrants or new migrants themselves) will play a crucial role in multiplying such initiatives. To what extent are these developments and recommendations specific to the Greek case? This is of course a vast question which touches on the field of diaspora and migration studies in general. But what we can say from our specific vantage point is that while Greece has suffered an exceptionally deep and long crisis, asymmetrical comparisons with Portugal, Ireland and Ukraine were offered in this book precisely in order to show that inter-country comparisons can nevertheless be fruitful, especially with similarly small size countries with disproportionally large diasporic populations. After all, Ireland and Portugal were both hit by the same Eurozone crisis, saw their young generations flee their countries as a result of rising unemployment and received bailouts, albeit for a shorter period and without such severe conditionality as in Greece. We find that both countries used the crisis as an opportunity to accelerate the pace and intensity of their diasporic engagement both in their legislation and their policies and that there may be fruitful lessons to learn from them too. Turning to our third case, the severe political crisis and Russian invasion in the mid-2010s aroused a wave of diasporic mobilisation in favour of Ukraine’s Euromaidan moment and democratic politics, and changed the national attitudes towards emigration to more positive representations. Beyond these three countries, we hope and believe that the issues discussed in this book are

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relevant for other diasporic experiences, and that some of the lessons that we draw can provide a useful fulcrum for developing the kinds of ties in the world that might support better understanding across borders, a dedramatisation of migration issues and thinking of diasporic actors as agents of interdependence in transnational space.

References Brinkerhoff, J. M. (2012). Creating an enabling environment for diasporas’ participation in homeland development. International Migration, 50(1), 90. Karabegovic, D. (2018). Aiming for transitional justice? Diaspora mobilisation for youth and education in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 44(8), 1374–1389. Koinova, M. (2017). Beyond statist paradigms: Sociospatial positionality and diaspora mobilization in international relations. International Studies Review, 19(4), 597–621. Sökefeld, M. (2006). Mobilising in transnational space: A social movement approach to the formation of diaspora. Global Networks, 6(3), 265–284.

Index1

A American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association (AHEPA), 185, 185n9, 190, 202, 203, 205–207, 209, 211, 248 Archbishop Demetrios, 211, 212 Archbishop Iakovos, 186, 201, 202, 227 Asset fungibility, 48 Athens, Andrew, 186, 191, 206, 235 B Bartholomew I environmentalism, 228–231 Behrakis, George D., 83 Benaki Museum, 80 Boutaris, Giannis, 80 Brain circulation, 127, 294 Brain drain Greece, 7, 122, 125, 128, 149, 436 Ukraine, 414

C Castellorizo environmentalism, 336–340 ethno-regional diaspora, 322 memories of shipwreck, 327, 329, 330 origins, 337, 438 present-day Australia, 11, 320, 324, 326, 330, 335 Corruption perceptions of, 8, 158, 163–169, 173, 174, 302 Crisis migrants, 111, 134, 141 D Daskalopoulos, Dimitris, 83 The demographic situation, 415 DiaNEOsis, 83, 83n14, 84 Diaspora remittances, 76

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 O. Anastasakis et al. (eds.), Diaspora Engagement in Times of Severe Economic Crisis, Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97443-5

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INDEX

Diasporic vote, 5–7, 19–21, 23, 24, 25n3, 26–29, 31, 31n11, 32, 34–36, 39, 41, 437 E Ecumenical Patriarchate, 9, 10, 202, 203, 221–238, 436 Turkish citizenship, 229 Egotropic attitudes, 143 Emigrant Support Offices (GAE), 360, 361 Employing many FSU Greeks, 281 EUMIGRE project, 147 Euromaidan diaspora response to, 418–420 threshold event, 12, 407, 417–418, 425 F Former Soviet Union (FSU) Greeks, 235 Thessaloniki, 267–287 open air markets, 277–278 fur trade, 275–276 Russian product, 278–280 G “Global Ireland,” 386n7, 388, 391, 394, 400 Global Irish, 380, 384, 386n7, 387–389 Greek-American philanthropy, 77n10, 82, 83, 86 Greek Orthodox Church, 9, 73, 74, 85, 201–203, 209, 211, 212, 226, 236, 237n3, 398 philanthropy, 9, 74, 202 Greek Orthodox Church of America, 201, 226

Greek War Relief Association (GWRA), 205, 207, 209 Greek youth diaspora connections to Greece, 293, 302 perceptions of Greece, 291, 293, 298 H Hellenicare, 186, 187, 187n12 (The) Hellenic Initiative (THI), 85, 203, 213, 336, 337 I International Orthodox Christian Charities (IOCC), 211, 212 Invasion of Cyprus, 198, 207 embargo, 207 Ireland Eurozone crisis, 441 history of immigration, 380n1, 383 Irish diaspora, 379–381, 382n2, 385, 386, 389, 390, 392–394, 397–400 voting, 394 K Kaminis, George, 80, 81, 81n13 L Laskaridis, Panos, 83, 87 Lifecycle bridge, 49 Liveris, Andrew, 85, 213, 336–338 M Mediterranean welfare system, 53 Methodological nationalism, 318 Migration motivations, 134–135, 159, 161–163

 INDEX 

Migration pattern, 268, 270, 282–286 educational attainment, 149 Mitsotakis, Kyriakos, 33, 34, 34n17, 193 Moscow Patriarchate, 10, 227, 231–234 Mouzenidis, Bori, 272, 276, 285 N New Democracy (ND), 28, 31–37, 40, 87, 88, 91, 190n13, 191, 193 New economics of labour migration theory (NELM), 100, 101, 103 NGOs, 73, 73n1, 74, 80, 81, 90, 110, 234, 419 philanthropy, 81, 90 Niotis, Grigoris, 184, 185 North-to-North migration, 99, 101 O Obama, Barack, 245, 246, 248, 255–259 Greek American relations, 248 OXI DAY Foundation, 247–252, 254, 258 P Pappas, Gregory C., 185n9, 210, 211, 214 PASOK, 28, 31–33, 36, 81, 190, 190–191n13, 231 Pension portability, 50 Philotimo, 10 Portugal Eurozone crisis, 12, 441 migration, 353, 368

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Portuguese diaspora political participation, 350, 357, 372 remittances, 12, 353, 372, 374 Pre-crisis migrants, 136, 145, 149 R REMIGR survey, 364, 365, 370–372, 374 Remittances Greece, 76, 98, 99, 114, 115, 169, 204, 215, 437 Portugal, 12, 98, 349–374 variables influencing, 8, 104, 368 Robinson, Mary, 383–385, 384n4, 409, 410 S Savvidis, Ivan, 272 SEESOX-GDUK survey, 104, 123, 139, 147 Shipping community, 78 philanthropy, 78 Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos v. Greece, 38 Social insurance, 45, 46, 53, 54, 56–59, 57n7, 64–66 Social remittances, 8, 115, 153, 156–158, 163, 173, 174, 296 Social rights, 7, 48–52, 55, 60, 63, 65, 356, 390, 438 Sociotropic attitudes, 143 Stavros Niarchos Foundation (SNF), 79, 82, 85–87, 86n17, 255 St. Nicholas Church project, 85, 209, 212, 213, 215 Stores, 167, 168, 271, 272, 278–281 Germany, 279

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Subsidiarity, 51, 56 SYRIZA, 31–36, 32n12, 87, 88, 399

V Volunteerism, 72, 73, 75, 88, 89, 200

T Tsipras, Alexis, 33, 34, 39–40, 300

W World Council for Hellenes Abroad (SAE), 9, 27, 181–194

U Ukraine, 414 brain drain, 414 perceptions of migrants, 424 post-Soviet migration, 407, 414

Z Zelensky, Volodymyr, 407, 422, 423 policies toward diaspora, 407, 423