Dialogues on Intergovernmental Relations in Federal Countries (Global Dialogue on Federalism Booklet Series): Volume 8 [Illustrated] 0773536566, 9780773536562

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A Global Dialogue on Federalism

DIALOGUE S ON INTERGOV ERNMENTA L RELATIONS IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS

EDITED BY RUPAK CHATTOPAD HYAY AND KARL NERENBERG

I ~T E RCOV £ R:Ot £ 1'1TA L R £ LAT I 0 N S IN FEDERAL SYST£~ 1 5

.\GLOBAL DIALOCCt 0~ FEOERALISW

A Joint Progr:om orth< Forum or Federations and the lntcmadonal Assodalion of Cemers for federal Studies tOITOliAL IOARD CO·CIIAilS

George Andcnon. Forum of federat.ons

Cher) I Saund~n. AunrnHa SEN I OM lDITOM, "001-: $£R.I£S

john Kincnid, United Slales

R;,oul Ulindenbacht'r, Swiuerland Rupak Chauopadhyay. Forum of Federa.tioJl.s o~,id Cameron. C.1m\dZl J. bawa Elalr-u. Nigeria Thomas Fleiner. Switzerland Fernando Rc:-ze·nde. Br.ull Hont Risstt.>. Canada "'"'"''Jorumfcd.org '\""'"''.iacf1-org

A Clobal Dialogue on federalism public::ations a"ailable BOOK S f.Jt I F.$

Corutillltlonol Origms, S.t111tJurt, and Ournge in Ftdtml CAu11trin (2005), Volume 1 Dist,;b,lion oj flmlWS and Rtsfxm.sibilitia bf Ftdtml Courtln'tS (2006), Volume 2 1.-tgiJiathx, Ex«r41ivt, rmdjudirial Cowrnana in FtdcraJ CotmlritS (2006), Volume 3 1'1M ProtJitt ofFiswl Ftdtmlisrn: Comparative PmfJtcliws (2007), Volume 4 Fofflt'l RdatiOM ;, Ftdtral Cbtmtries (~009), Volume 5 LAcal Cwalel, Roderick Macdonell, Chris R.·\ndall. and Carl Stieren. We would like to thank the staff at lmprimerie Cauvin for their important wistanct- in the printing process. Finall), we thank !he staff at ~1cGili-Queen's t:niversit) Press for offering !heir >upport and ad,ice throughout the publication process. The Global Dialogue on Federalism Series continues !he Forum of Federations' tradition of publishing eilher independently or in partnership with other organizations. The Forum has produced a variety of books and multimedia matoin.er I Cheryl Saunders

pragmatic basis (Canada) . wh ile others are provided for in legal text (Spain). The degree of formalis.1tion doe• not appear to affect their importance or effectiveness howc,~r. ~1ost conferences include the Head of the central go,·ernment as wtll as those of CU. Increasingly, however,

the Heads of the CU also meet to develop common nrategies with regards to central authorities or to articulate t11eir respecth·e policies in areas of exclush·e Ct.: competences. Such Conference.) often attrnct media auenlion. \'t!t. most of the actual intergo,·ernmental management nov•., from meetings between sectOral ministers, as well as between civil servants and poliq advison. The web of IC meetings and networks can be extreme[) dense.

Civil U'J'Vice A non·politicised civil serviu seems to be ke)' to effective ICR at the technicalle'\-el. Professional chil ;.en-ants can main min efTec:rh·e relations. even in tlte face of open tensions it the politicallt'\el. All case studies show that regardles! of the degree of i'ormalis.1tion of ICR, personal relations, and informal interaction are essential element< of efTecti'e ICR. ~m/s betwem fedtrol J>arl>ot!n

Agreements are a significant method of coordination in all federations. In some cases. literally hundreds of such agreement< are concluded each year (Canada. Spain). They are used to coordinate and harmonise action. to set up common lnnituLions cr oudlne cooperatl\'e procedures. They may include dispute resolution mechanisms. Some are \'Chicles for

federal spending power: allowing for central influence on the exercise of Lhe competcnces of constiLUtive uni lS. In some cases, units are effcctivel)•

forced to conclude agreements, in ordeo· to obmin funding which they often desperately need, arguably u·ansfonning this instnunent of cooperative fcde1"a1ism into tools of coercion (for example, Austria, Canada,

Australia, Spain, Swiucl'iand). While some agreements are clearly of a P'"'el)' political nature, others are officially legally binding. In some cases, agreements are systematically published (Austria, Bra in South Africa or Spai n), they rarely do so. The case studies in this boo~let suggest that, wh ile IGR may be an unavoidable fact of federal li fe, and effective ICR may improve public servicesJ they may abo have a negative itnpact on cititen participation,

transparency. political accountability and the rule of law.

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Intergovernment al Relations in Argentina WALTER F. CA R :-IOTA, PH.D.

t. Terminology There i.s an cxtCIHh·e Argentinean literature on intergovernmeiHal relations

altl1011gh in Argentine political and legal circles writers do 1101 often use the term, ·•intergovernmental relations". Over the years, a great many Atgentine

expcns - beu·aying a legalistic approach - have preferred the expa·cssion "'interjurisdiclional relations''. Ollters have opted to write about a particular type of cooperative federalism, "fttkrolism d• ronm1ori6rr", "•hich they

describe as an ideal, if unrealized, model for in1ergmernmemal relations. The term intergO\·ernmental relations has on I> recently gained "idespread current) in Argentina, as federal studies in the countr> have a~rbed the influences of contemporarr sociologr. economics and political science. 2. ffutorical backgroWid With the adoption, in 1853, of a national Constitution, Argentina became (technicall), at Ull) rate) a federal state. In doing so it reaffirmed pr.-.ious pacts

bctwe~n

the national go\'ernment and the "'historical"' fourteen

prminces (which did not include the most populous, Buenos Aires). In 1860, Buenos Aires rejoined the nation a] fa mil)', afler the constitution was modified to bring about a greater degree of decentralization. DUling the period from 1816, when Argentina gained independence ftom

10

Spain, to the adoption of the 1855 Constitution, there were violent struggles between centralist and decemmlizing political forces in the county. 111e fow·teen pro"inc.es, excluding Buenos Aires. believed themseh•es lObe subservient to the strong-.,illed rule of the G and meeting> of officials sotTOunds CO;\C, all of which are either attended or supported b) secreI iowt.~·cr, \\'hi1e state: r- electoral imperati•es: the wealmeu of pan-Canadian political parti"s; interest in sharing experiences; the promotion of national unily; CJ and C\'Cn human nature. . relations comAnother frequent explanation is that imerg0\'ernmem.1.1 pensate for the relative rigidity of the Canadian connitutional framework. Still, the general scope of these explanations does not account for some underlying Lrend.s thaL charactetize intergovernmental relations in Canada. Especially notcwoothy is the fact that fedcral-provincial-tcrritooial forums, which are by r:u· the most numerous ofintcrgovcrnment:ll meetings, focus essen Lially on issues of provincial jurisdiction. In l11is: reg;trd, to understand the dp1amic.s at work, it is essential to consider the central role of finance. After \\'orld \\'ar tl, the federal government~ with its larger fiscal resources. was able to become increasingly acrh·e in pro,~ncial jurisdictions through the use of conditional grants to the pro\inces. In tl1is way, the federal gO\'ernment pla)ed a major role in bwlcling the welfare state, e\en though health care, education and social senices are, in principle, prO\incial responsibilities. This "federal spending power· is not explicitl) pro,;ded for in the Constitution, but numerous authors support itS mlidit)·. Such feder.al financial inten·ention in priDincial areas of jurisdiction contributed corHiderabll to the development of an intergo,ernmcntal dialogue, particularly at the sector level. While at the outset most provinces generally welcol'ned Ottawa's financial involvement. significant irritants e'·entttally began to appear, especiaUy with the tightening of the public pur\t~rn· centraliLation, as well as in the \'ariety of opinions mcm\ (K:hJ>e majority pal'ly tl>roughout gO\•ernment · \.,tith :a near two thirds majori[)1 in Parliament nnd conLtOI of all

nine prminces and most municipalities. Until recentl)•, the President of the A-'IC appointed candidates for provincial premier and municipal mayor. Political interference in the appointment of public se"'-anLS and procurement. corruption and parronage arc grO\\ing problems, particularly in local gO\'emn>enL In 200i, a biuer contest over leadership of the A-'\C split the part)' into two f.'lCtiOil"- One faction formed a new party. TI•= di\isions .UU run deep in gO\·emment and in some cases have paralyzed intergo,emmental relations.. The new AXC leadership wants more Slate inten·ention in the economy,

which \\ill further reinforce national control ofintergo,ernmental relation•. Decentralitalion to local go,·ernment. is a countervailing ttend in

Sourh Africa. The con•tiwtion

a~d

national policy give local government

a strong de,'elopmental mandate and significant powers. The six largest

cities are home to the m~ority of the population and the major economic centres in the country. National policy further requires that the integrated

43

South Africa

development plans of municipalities guide all statt expenditure plans. A StatUtor,- association represenLS organized local go\·tornment in intergovernmental forums at all levels. Such institutions prO\ide an opportwlity for subnational gO\-e rnments to assen their interests. In practice, ho\\·C\·er, national concerns generally pre"'ai.l. [)toccmlrali7ation to ln line with national goals intergovernmental locttl guvr.rnnwnl i" a structures ha'e placed a high priority on municipal t:l)llnle Confederation regulates the amonom) of the cantons in a number of wa)-.: b)• a system for financial equalization. b)' a formal taX harmonization ...tnd b)• requirements based on connitutional CMC law. There is a new system of fmaocial equalization. separate from the prC\ious practice ofsub.sidizing indi.;dual tasks. This new s~-.tem consists of pa)mtnlS made by the Confederation and the 'rich" cantons according to their potential t:tx revenues, and based on the coslS of special structuml burdens (such as the "geographic" costs of mountain regions and socio-dcmographic costs of the urban areas). As well this system is supplemented by a new type of federal subsidies to the cantons through (strategic) p•·ograms. Obligation to cooperate and the resolution of disputes Cooperation and financial equalization are supplemented b)' the obligation to share financial burdens among the cantons. If and when cooperation in the "sharing of burdens" fails, the federal Parliament (sometimes follo\\ing a referendum) ma) impose an "obligation to contract", in indi1idual cases. In the new reforms the S\\iss uadition of mutual respect and consensus is no\\ expressly stated: disputes among cantons or bet,\·ccn cantons and the Confederation are settled if possible b)• means of negotiations and

mediation. The Confederation bas the final say, but it must balance the interests of the Confederation and the intereslS of the individual cantons. The example of European poljcy- challenges for intergovernmental relations A special test for the Swiss federalism is European policy. The relationship with an evolving European Union has engendered many changes. In fact, si nce the 1990s, it h:u sen-cd as a driving force behind tl>e

51

reform of federalism. Foreign policy is now an of the Confederation, but "ith three "federalist Confederation muSt pay heed to cantonal responsibilitie5 and interests; the cantons may participate in "preparations" for decision-making at the federal le•el; and the cantons ha•e the power to pursue their own special horiz.omal foreign policy, and in particular to enter into agreernents. Meanwhile, cooperation with the EU

express responsibility counter,. eights": the

In the nc.""' rc.-·fonns tht> Swi'1 1racliaiun

ll._ U l ht'lW('eJl with the result that lt is possible to speak of nmltHI' .md ahe Switzerland h.-,~ng :u1 associaLion·type relalion· (:olllf:clcr;,uion ;m: ship with the £U. '(·u1t.·d if pc>......iult~ Mo•·e act.ive cooperation with the new·Jook EU hy Hh:o•n~ ot' ncgohas resulted in more limitations on the cantons t.i.llion' omd mt•0\'·C'rs of a dhision ('~tion") are ltft to the . Principle that tasks should ~>( making laws and regulation!! compalible b~twcen jurisdictions (without necessarily making them uniform). HORIZONTAL cOOPI:.RATION. Cooperation between governments of the 00}1.:$Tlll.l'l l::'\ITS of a federation indcpendcntJy of lhe Centra) 80\'"Crnment. HORilO' TAL fiSCAL E.Ql.'ALIZATIOX ( HFE ) . An arrangement for the redis-tribution of ~enues within a fedtralion to pr'O'ide a minimum scandard of resourcing acrou jurisdictions and the-reby msure citizens a compMablc lc\"el or gO\ernment s.en'ices regardless cLtbeir place of residence. 1)"Piall) base:d on a ·formula' tl'1:u takes into account either or both the 0\\"ll·.SOurce m-enuc capa-cil) and the txp4!nditure requiremdhp), forum of foderatioru. India (Ag_r Colt no, L"ni\~rsid;ad ~acional de Educacion a Oisuncia, Spain Jordi Conde, Cenerali!alunya. Spain ~terce Con't'tia, Cnhenitat de Cirona. Spain Char1e)-Enunanue1 C61.e, t:ni\·enit(la\'al. Canada Tom Courchene. Qu«-n's Vnh·crsitv, Canada Xa,·ict d