Dewey’s theory of valuation and its bearing on educational aims

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NAME AND ADDRESS

DATE

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

DEWEY'S THEORY OP VALUATION AND ITS BEARING ON EDUCATIONAL AIMS

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS for the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

SCHOOL OF EDUCATION

BY CLAYTON H. GILL

EVANSTON, ILLINOIS AUGUST, 1942

P ro Q u e s t N u m b e r: 10101441

All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality o f this rep rod uctio n is d e p e n d e n t upon th e quality o f th e c o p y subm itted. In th e unlikely e v e n t th a t th e author did not send a c o m p le te m anuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if m aterial had to be rem oved, a note will in d ica te th e deletion.

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ii

ACKNOWLEDGMEHTS The person to whom the writer is most deeply in­ debted is Professor George E* Axtelle, whose courses and seminars were the inspiration of this work, and whose friendship, encouragement and constructive criticism con­ tributed greatly to its development*

Professors Paul

Schilpp and Delton T. Howard were generous with their time and suggestions in many a stimulating discussion of valuative and educational problems*

In addition to his

help in this project, Professor Schilpp should be men­ tioned for first awakening a major and lasting interest in philosophy during undergraduate years of study. There are at least two men to whom acknowledgment should be given, even though circumstance made it impossible for them to be of direct assistance in this undertaking. One Is Professor Walker H* Alderton, whose leadership in an altogether unusual educational program first made clear something of the significance of experimental education* The other Is Dr* William H. Kilpatrick, whose writings, whose courses, and whose friendly discussions deepened appreciation of the function and method of philosophy of education*

Acknowledgment is due, finally, to Elizabeth

0. Gill, who not only made it possible for this work to be done, but who assisted with many helpful criticisms*

ill PREFACE

In 1940, when Lewis Mumford published his im­ passioned appeal to recognize moral responsibilities in the iace of fascism and national socialism, he put forth his convictions against a background he termed ®pragmatic liberalism**(l)

Mumford was addressing himself to the

public mind, not to any particular philosophic school* The pragmatic liberal, he charged, Is a person unable to make moral distinctions because his moral feeling is sub­ merged beneath the bland intellectual pretense to see all sides of all questions.

The pragmatic liberal, he said,

wants to ^reason in the spirit of affable compromise.® (2) Along with his ®respect for rational science and experi­ mental practice,® he over-values ®intellectual activities as such® and under-values ®the emotional and affective sides of life.®(3)

Thus he Is rendered ®incapable of mak­

ing firm ethical Judgments or of implementing them with action.®(4) It is strange that Mumford, who has demonstrated his ability to Incorporate tremendous ranges of knowledge 1. Mumford, ”The republic * Oil for living* 2* Mumford, wThe republic* CII

corruption of liberalism,® The new (1940), 568-573; and Mumford, Faith corruption of liberalism,® The new (1940), 571.

iv

into his published deliberations, virtually ignored the philosophy and method of John Dewey in both of his ap­ peals*

He found it worthwhile to trace "pragmatic liber­

alism to Voltaire and Rousseau*

He refers to William

James, but only because in contrast to "pragmatic liber­ alism, James "called emotionality the sine qua non of moral perception."(l)

Thus, although Mumford levels his

attack at "pragmatic liberalism", he fails to consider the philosophic and moral point of view that in recent years has attempted, in pragmatic terms, to interpret the moral meaning of liberalism. There is no point in guessing why Mumford omitted reference to contemporary pragmatic philosophy.

The

omission was unfortunate, however, for critical considera­ tion of Dewey1s philosophy might have brought out more clearly where the issue lies*

For example, Mumford an­

nounces that "reason and emotion are inseparable," and opposes this view to that of "pragmatic liberalism." Thought that is empty of emotion and feeling, that bears no organic relation to life, is just as foreign to effective reason as emotion that is disproportionate to the stimulus or is without intellectual foundations and refer­ ences. (2) The statement might almost have been quoted from the 1. Mumford, "The corruption of liberalism," The new republic. G1I (1940), 570. S. 3!fel5?.~ P. 571.

V

works of John Dewey, pragmatic liberal that he is. is only incidental to the main point, however.

This

Dewey

very definitely believes that the functional relations of reason in life signify that inquiry is valuative. Valuative inquiry, he believes furthermore, can and should make use of the method of inquiry developed in ex­ perimental science.

But Mumford assumes the existence

of a basic dichotomy of method in science and valuation. He is not very clear in presenting what the method of valuation is, but he clearly and definitely states that the pragmatic over-valuation of experimental science is due to preoccupation with "problem-solving situations,” rather than with such areas of life as the moral, (l) Then, he charges, the pragmatic liberal, not having a method suited to moral determinations, denies the exist­ ence of such a territory.(2)

He closes his eyes on the

nworld of value and personality.” (3) Such a thesis is very simple.

Mumford would have

no difficulty in citing cases in the history of material­ istic and positivistic philosophy of the denial of the existence of either values or personalities.

But the

thesis would have run up against serious obstacles had «

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1. See below, p. 141. 2. Ibid. S. Mumford, "The corruption of liberalism,” The new republic. GII (1940), 570.

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vi

he dealt critically with the subject matters contained in Dewey1s pragmatic and liberal philosophy when discussing ttpragmatie liberalism*”

For Dewey not only does not deny

the existence of areas such as the moral, but finds the key to his interpretation of experience in value judgment. He insists, however, that value-judgment is experimental. This is an express denial of Mumford1s assumption of dis­ continuity of method.

The dichotomy Mumford holds to be

necessary, Dewey holds to be deplorable.

Thus, whoever

is right in the final analysis, Mumford falls to take issue.

He merely asserts that the dichotomy is necessary

and goes on from thefe to criticize ”pragmatic liberalism” — and in no way deals with pragmatic materials challenging his basic assumption. The real issue is whether experimental method, broadly conceived, is applicable in the realm of human values— not whether such a realm exists or not.

This

issue, although Mumford does not face it, underlies a host of criticisms hhat have been offered of Dewey1s philosophy and philosophy of education.

Mortimer Adler

has probably stated it as definitively as anyone. Philosophy is superior to science.... in the practical realm because philosophy establishes moral conclusions, whereas scientific knowledge yields only technological applications.(l) 1. Adler, nGod and the professors,” The daily maroon. Thursday, November 14, 1940, p. 3.

vii

According to Adler, the difference in types of knowledge found in philosophy and; science is due to their differ­ ent subject-matters and methods.

”....their methods*are

....distinct, each being adapted to a different object of inquiry." (l)

Moreover, scientific and philosophic knowl­

edge are each independent, (g) Although it would be a worthy topic of investiga­ tion, it is not our purpose in this dissertation to con­ sider and criticize Adlerfs conceptions of philosophic and scientific methods.

In stating that the two are dis­

tinct and the bodies of knowledge resulting from their applications are independent, he has said something that many educators have said only confusedly in their criti­ cisms of Dewey Ts philosophy.

He has thus summed up and

possibly clarified an issue. Within the field of philosophy of education, the issue has been formulated in terms somewhat different from those used by Mumford and Adler. around Dewey*s concept of growth.

The storm centered

Some years before

Professor Bode expressed his forebodings concerning ”growth” as the maxim of progressive education, there was a prophet.

Denton L. Geyer was prophetic, not in predict­

ing a course of events, but in setting a problem for 1. Adler, ”God and the professors,” The daily maroon. Thursday, November 14, 1940, p. 3. g. Ibid., p. 4.

viii

discussion.

He it was who originally stated in educational

terms the criticism that many others restated as original contributions to the discussion of pragmatic education. Brubacher and Horne give him credit, but few if any others bestow footnotes upon him.

His merit lies In the fact that

he misunderstood DeweyTs philosophy of education in the same way that many other critics misunderstand it, and that he did it first.

He wrote under the title, "The

wavering aim of education in Dewey Ts educational philo­ sophy,” and stated his charge In the following manners The two distinct aims or ends which seem to be set up for education In Professor DeweyTs out­ line are on the one hand a preparation for shar­ ing and improving the community life, and on the other a growth of the child fs powers simply for the sake of growth. (1) Geyer supports his criticism that Dewey fs philosophy of education involves a dualism of aims by quite a list of quotations, some of which deal with the end of education as growth, and some of which deal with education as the means of forming and sharing community life. Growth, then, was the issue. and still remains the issue.

It continued to be

Some years later, Hobert

B. Rusk, reviewing Dewey1s philosophy of education, noted two factst (l) that according to It the educational pro­ cess involves the formation of aims, and that (2) it 1* Geyer, "The wavering aim of education in Dewev1s edu­ cational philosophy,” Education. XXXVII (1917), 484.

ix

holds the educational process to be one of naturalistic growth*

Hence, Hush infers* Pragmatism*...evidently seeks to combine two in­ compatible standpoints and in doing so typifies the contradiction inherent in American life...* of industrial efficiency and material success on the one hand, with idealistic tendencies on the other.(l)

Although Geyer should receive credit for first expressing misunderstanding of Dewey’s concept of growth, Rush should have special award for carrying it out more thoroughly than any one else. followings

He ends up in such assertions as the

"To discount the conclusions of science Prag­

matism seeks to discredit the....means by which they have been secured... .”(2)

He believes (cf. Mumfordt) that

pragmatism lays emphasis non feeling and emotion*(3) to the under-valuation of "mental powers, especially the intellect...."(4) More recently, Dewey’s formulation of growth as the aim of education has continued to stimulate critical discussion.

Horne says:

"Growth aims at more growth,

and education is subordinate only to education. the theory.

This is

Its weakness is, growth needs a goal."(5)

Rupert G. Lodge maintains that the pragmatic educational 1. Rush, The philosophical bases of education, p. 33. ibid.- p* TO. 3. Ibid.. p. 78. 4. Ibid.. p. 71. 5. Horne, The democratic philosophy of education, p. 53

X

aim can be described in the following manner: Life, liberty, and the pursuit of an empirical happiness are ideals whole-heartedly accepted by the pragmatist educator, and it is definitely maintained by Dewey that it represents the genu­ ine national philosophy of America and the New World. It has its roots deep in the history of pioneer strugglings, and its fine flower bears upon its many-colored petals the slogan of in­ dividualism, *J3Tone for all, each for Selfln(l) Lodge clearly accepts one of the two aims Geyer mentions — individual growth in itself— -as the aim of pragmatic education.

Robert TJllch calls attention to the need for

direction of growth and says that in reality Dewey is inconsistent because he supplements ^growth” with more specific educational aims in his ’’practical” writings.(2) JSven among educators very close to the pragmatic, experimental philosophy of education, discussions of growth as the end of education have resulted in many differences and disagreements*

Brubacher interprets

Dewey to mean that nthe kind of teaching on which high value can be placed is that which results in a permanent disposition to continue onefs education, one’s growth, as long as one lives.” (3)

This interpretation, right in

so far as it goes, is confused, however, by remarks al­ most immediately following.

Brubacher adds that if

1. Lodge, Philosophy of education, p. 299. 2. Ulich, Fundamentals of democratic education. Ch. III. 3. Brubacher, Modern philosophies of education, p. 98.

growth Is the adequate aim of education: Other things being equal, it would seem that those learnings are of value which apply to the largest number of life situations. This is largely a statistical approach to value. One simply counts the frequency of recurrence. But other things are not always equal. Emer­ gencies sometimes arise. For these, children must be prepared, even though they rarely or never occur. The appropriate habits or skills here have a crucial value for growth. The whole sum of future growth may depend on one exercise of them, as, for instance, learning to swim well enough to save life.(l) Boyd H. Bode expresses almost the same views as Denton L. Geyer.

Growth, he says, may mean that Initia­

tive In learning comes from the pupil, or that the pupil responds to the ”wise guidance” or suggestions of the teacher.

Thus, there are two dangers involved in the

conception of growth as the aim of education.

One is

reverence for inner growth, whereas the other Is prizing of a student’s ability to accept the teachers opinions and prejudices. (2)

As with Geyer, the inner and the

outer are opposed to one another.

Is growth the de­

velopment of the individual In himself or is it adapta­ tion to the social milieu (represented in this case by the teacher)?

”We cannot have growth that Is directed

entirely from within and also growth that is directed from the outside.”(3)

Bode charges that the doctrine

1. Brubacher, Modern philosophies of education, pp. 98-99. 2. Bode, Progressive education at the crossroads, p. 78. 3. Ibid.. p. 81.

xii

of growth blinds teachers to the need for a social philo­ sophy by substituting ttwise guidance,” which really amounts to prejudice and opinion, for the value determinations in which social philosophy consists.(l)

He asserts that edu­

cation needs ”something more than the metaphor of growth to go by.

We cannot keep perpetually rotating on the axis

of ’self-direction.’”(2)

We cannot assume that ”growth,

in some mysterious way, provides for its own direction.”(3) It is evident that the foregoing materials have at least one element In common— the charge that Dewey’s comprehensive aim is inadequate.

Growth must have direc­

tion, and it is assumed that when growth Is held to be the end of education, no direction is specified, except possibly a direction of self-development considered apart from the social world. partially correct.

In a sense, this criticism Is

Few would deny, and last of all Dewey,

that the educational process must have specific direction. And the concept of growth does not lay down in advance what those specific aims and directions should be.

How,

then, are such aims to be determined, and what is the relevance of Dewey’s generalized formulation of the end of education to their determination?

The question Is

1. Bode, Progressive education at the crossroads, pp. 78-79. 2. TbJLd., p. 84. 3 . J£bid ., p . 85 .

xiii

one which, like Mumford and Adler, raises the Issue of method* The materials we have been considering may be classified into three groups*

The first consists of

those which, although not in every instance directed against Dewey* s philosophy of education as such, are relevant to the issue of method of value judgment*

The

second Is composed of those which assert that growth must have direction*

The third is made up of those which

point out that individual growth in itself is not an ade­ quate criterion for education*

Despite the varied philos­

ophies represented by those whose publications have been cited, anddespite the fact that in ophies many of

terms of their philos­

these men might hold their criticisms to

be unique,

the fact remains that in terms of Dewey*s

philosophy

the three criticisms boil down to one question:

that of the nature of value judgment. very obviously raise that question.

The first group The second fail to

see that value judgment is growth, that growth ^s value judgment, and that growth as the end of education sig­ nifies precisely that the process and method of valuation (the method of determining the direction of further growth) is the power to be attained In education.

The third as­

sumes that growth, even though it may possibly involve valuation, Is the growth of the individual— that the

xiv

concept does not involve reference to the social medium In which individuals function.

This, in turn, Is inter­

preted as causing a "wavering” (Geyer) from emphasis on individual, inner growth to "wise guidance" (Bode). The purpose of this dissertation is to show that: (A) Although Dewey* s concept of growth does not in Itself provide determination of each day’s or year’s aims for the classroom, it Includes the Idea of a method by which, and by which alone, Dewey maintains such determinations can be warrantably made; (B) that, according to Dewey, this method, experimental inquiry, in inherently social, not only in that it is itself a cultural growth, but In that It is the process of forming a community of experi­ ence within the realms in which It Is applied; and that (C) Dewey means by growth one process, not two, in which the forming of such a community and the development of the individual coalesce.

If these conclusions are es­

tablished, It follows that a great deal of contemporary discussion of Dewey’s educational aim is irrelevant to the subject matter to which It appears to relate.

No

discussion which assumes that experimental inquiry is not adaptable to moral determinations is relevant to Dewey’s pragmatism, unless it shows just how and why Dewey is incorrect in developing the hypothesis that It is capable of settling value problems.

No re-iteration

XV

of the platitude that growth must have direction is relevant to Dewey’s philosophy of education except as it recognizes that growth, according to Dewey, Is increase in the capacity of determining the aims and ends of life. No discussion of the individual and of society is rele­ vant, except as it deals with Dewey’s idea that the process of forming society is the process of individual growth, and vice versa. The three points mentioned above are established by means of a study of the relations of Dewey’s theory of value to his philosophy of education.

This study, in

turn, required treatment of several subsidiary questions. The dissertation may be summarized as follows: At the outset it is assumed that value judgment is not essentially different from scientific judgment. Later on this question is more thoroughly examined, but the purpose of the first chapter is to demonstrate that Dewey1 accepts the theses developed in great detail by George Herbert Mead that inquiry is a special form of social interaction, that associated activities underlie meaning. Chapter II relates Dewey’s theory of valuation to his theory of inquiry.

It concludes In the assertion that

valuation is inquiry and that scientific inquiry is valu­ ation.

This conclusion is drawn from several sets of

xvi

materials. inquiry.

The first deals with the place of practice in It is shown that, according to Dewey, inquiry

not only relates to practice, but Is a form of practice* As a form of practice, it Involves determination of what to do, a valuative determination.

The second is the

relation Dewey finds between valuation and common sense, the latter being the method of inquiry and the beliefs commonly employed in valuative, or practical, judgment. It Is shown that, although Dewey contrasts common sense and scientific inquiry, this can not be interpreted as a contrast of valuation and science.

The third deals

with the common pattern of scientific and common sense inquiry and Its significance for theory of valuation. It Is shown that Dewey’s belief in the existence of this common pattern Is equivalent to his conviction that the experimental method of science is applicable to value determinations.

The last part of the chapter takes up

the question of whether the abstract character of sci­ entific inquiry conflicts with the claim that inquiry is valuative.

It is shown that Dewey’s assertion that

qualities are eliminated from the objects of abstract Inquiry does not imply that they are eliminated from the process of inquiry.

Hence, scientific inquiry is valua­

tive, both In that its objects refer indirectly to quali­ tative events and in that it is always the determination of a qualitative and value-bearing situation.

xvii

Chapter III discusses further questions regarding the relation of inquiry and valuation, and is thus a con­ tinuation of the subject of Chapter II.

It shows first

that Dewey’s contrast of common sense and science, based on the nteleologicaln character of the first, does not conflict with his attribution of teleological character to all inquiry.

On the contrary, the movement of in­

quiry toward a determinate end is the very meaning of the statement that inquiry is valuative.

Thus Chapter

III shows that facts, according to Dewey, must be con­ sidered as values In the teleological, purposive movement of inquiry.

In this process facts have value status

both as means and as ends.

Values, on the other hand, do

not exist apart from determined meanings and consequently have the status of facts.

The ground Is thus cleared by

Chapters II and III for consideration of Dewey’s proposal to employ the methods of scientific inquiry to the prob­ lems of common life, which, he maintains, are largely valuative. Chapter IV takes up the question of the use of scientific method in solving common sense problems.

It

begins In showing that ^common sense,” as a term in Dewey’s philosophy, denotes a problematic situation, conflict and division In the common sense realm being traced to the use of conflicting and Incompatible methods of Inquiry.

The

xviii

second section of the chapter shows that according to Dewey we have already made a profitable beginning in ap­ plying scientific method to exactly the kind of problem uppermost in common sense determinations.

The third

part interprets the meaning of experimentation with reference to common practice--what it will signify in the development of common sense attitudes toward inquiry and uses of both fact and theory.

The fourth shows that

Dewey’s proposal to develop an experimental method ap­ propriate to value determinations represents his hypoth­ esis for resolving the problems now manifest in common sense as a problematic situation; and that the test by which he proposes to measure his hypothesis is the progressive integration of the human community. Chapter V brings the foregoing materials to bear on the problem of educational growth.

It shows that for

Dewey philosophy of education and theory of valuation are essentially one and the same.

The criteria of a valuative

experience may be translated into proposed educational procedures*

Educative experiences are thus held to be

valuative; education and valuation are what Dewey means by growth.

Valuation, it was shown in Chapter IV, is

a method for remaking common sense through the widening of the range of associated activities and shared experi­ ence by adoption of the experimental method.

In Chapter

V, then, we conclude that the criterion of growth is

xix

that growth must he such as to promote further sharing of experience.

As associated activity Is the very basis of

meaning (Chapter I), activities which sustain and increase the areas of association, which form society where before­ hand there was no social relation, are those which make experience meaningful for the Individual.

Activities

which promote sharing have a certain pattern which can be abstracted, studied, and evaluated itself. Is the pattern of valuation or inquiry.

This pattern

Thus to say that

the end of education is growth is to say that the method by which growth Is sustained beeomes a value.

Educational

growth Is that which is experimental and hence re-enforces the continuance of growth.

Experimentation is the way In

which the direction of growth may be determined, and hence becomes a meaningful value in the experience of the in­ dividual. The three propositions that were deemed crucial (l) are thus established.

(A) It Is shown that Dewey not only

believes experimental method is applicable to valuative problems, but that he points out that it is, wherever it Is being applied at all, the successful method of valua­ tion.

Hence, Dewey thinks we might profit from experi­

menting with experimental method— applying it to valuative realms at present insulated from experimental testing. 1* See above, p. xiv.

XX

Ho criticism of pragmatic p h i l o s o p h y meets the issue that fails to state precisely how Dewey1s formulation of ex­ perimental method as the method of valuation is inaccur­ ate •

(B) Experimental method, the method of valuation,

is inherently social.

Chapter I shows that the meanings

involved in inquiry are possible only through social in­ teraction, and that the process of inquiry is itself an associated activity or shared experience clarifying those meanings.

Chapters IV and V show that the clarification

of meanings involves the forming of society, the enlarge­ ment of the area of shared experience through the remaking of common sense.

(C)

Because meaning is founded in

shared experience, the forming of society through the process of valuation is at the same moment the method of enriching the meaning of Individual experience.

As, ac­

cording to Dewey, this enrichment in meaning includes the growth of critical method of determining meanings, no criticism that asserts that growth needs direction, without dealing specifically with Dewey’s hypothesis that growth is the formation of the method of determining aims and directions, is relevant to his philosophy of education. Likewise, no view that assumes Individual growth conflicts with social development is relevant, except as it specif­ ically takes up the question of whether the method of growth is not the method of forming society.

xxi

Although, neither the aim nor the method of this dissertation Is to criticize the philosophies of the educators quoted in the early portion of this preface, it may help In clarifying their meaning to apply the conclusions to some of the materials cited.

Three il­

lustrations are given. On pages x and xi above it was stated that Bru­ bacher confuses his own interpretation of growth as the aim of education.

He does this simply by assuming that

the method of valuation implicit in the concept of growth Is statistical.

But according to Dewey the method of

growth Is experimental.

Experimentation may Involve

statistical procedures, but surely it can not be reduced to them.

There is no assurance whatever that growth

will be promoted most if learnings are restricted to those ttwhich apply to the largest number of life situa­ tions. v

Brubacher can not find such assurance in the

doctrines of pragmatic philosophy.

The hypothesis that

growth will be promoted most under this condition might become a subject of experimentation, and, as Brubacher indicates, it is quite probable that educational proce­ dures directed by such an hypothesis would omit providing for development of capacities required in rare but cru­ cial situations.

Thus, in terms of the exnerimental

method inherent in Dewey’s conception of growth, the

xxii

particular statistical method which Brubacher assumes to be inherent in it would be invalidated. Boyd H. Bode refers to ’’the metaphor of growth,” and suggests that we cannot assume that "growth, in some mysterious way, provides for its own direction.”

If

growth as the aim of education is but a metaphor, and no one could deny that the formula has been only that to many people in the field of education, then, to be sure, any way In which growth might provide for Its own direc­ tion would indeed be mysterious.

But if the aim of edu­

cation is to develop a critical, experimental method of determining directions, of valuating experience, and if such a development is just the meaning of growth, then we are dealing, not with a metaphor mysteriously direct­ ing education, but with education become self-conscious and critical.

We are dealing, it may be added, with a

method which is incomplete apart from a social philos— ophy, for it is a method of forming society— of bringing into existence in areas where beforehand there was no communication, no sharing.

It is a method which, as Is

shown in Chapters IV and V, involves co-operative social planning in which ever increasing numbers participate. Thus it is strange that Bode should see in the concept of growth the antithesis of social philosophy.

On the

contrary, the need for such a philosophy Is precisely

xxiii

what is meant by the need for re-making common sense through adoption of experimental method* In conclusion, Robert Ulichfs criticism will be discussed*

Dewey is not inconsistent in maintaining that

growth Is the sufficient end of education and simultane­ ously suggesting more specific aims in his ^practical11 writings. this.

He would be Inconsistent if he did not do

For if growth involves a method of determining

aims, the failure to utilize the experience accumulating In the field of educational endeavor in making such de­ terminations would be In conflict with the general ideal Dewey sets up. formulated.

Dllei^s criticism has no point as it is

It would have point only If he demonstrated

that the method Dewey employed in determining specific educational aims is non-experimental*

xxiv

TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter

I.

II.

Page Acknowledgements . ................* . • . Preface . . • . . ....................

ii ill

The social foundations of value Judgment* The social approach to valuation. • » • Society and the emergence of mental behavior. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The social matrix of intelligence . . «

1 1 3 19

........... Inquiry and valuation • • • The practical matrix of inquiry . . . • Practice and problems . Valuation and common sense. . . . . . . Inquiry and valuation . . . . . . . . . The refinement of i n q uir y ............ Conclusion..............

34 35 44 47 59 64 72

III.

Facts and values. . . . . . . . . . . . . The teleology of inquiry. Facts as values . . . . . . . . . . . . Values as facts . . . * • • • . • • • • Values as means and ends.

78 78 91 104 118

IV.

The remaking of common sense. . . . . . . nCommon sense1*— a problematic situa­ tion. The social and moral qualities of sci­ entific inquiry Moral and social experimentation. . . . Social inquiry and common sense . . . .

123

V.

Education, the forming of society . . . . Theory of value and philosophy of education * ............. The criteria of a valuative experience. The valuative nature of educational experience............. * ......... Growth as the remaking of common sense. Bibliography.

123 131 140 152 171 171 176 181 201 216

1

CHAPTER I THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF VALUE JUDGMENT

The Social Approach, to Valuation Experience, when approached from the standpoint of the individual alone, does not provide data adequate for understanding value judgment, although, evaluation is always an individual act*

The pressures and exigencies of genu­

inely problematic situations and the acute emotional dis­ turbances experienced in them are basis enough for wanting to refer value theory to what we do and undergo as indivi­ duals in appraising*

Such interests should not, however,

lead us to overlook the social foundations of value judg­ ment^— foundations more deeply underlying and more profound­ ly entering into valuation than the specific commands or general rules enforced by social approval and disapproval* If "value judgment11 Is taken to mean the appraisal and outcome when one decides to cast his ballot in a hotly contested election, to indulge in the pleasure of attending a play or concert, to adopt a certain procedure and goal in the classroom, or even to use a colorful word In describing an event, it signifies a personal act, but one which is win­ dividualistic" only by virtue of abstraction.

George Her­

bert Mead writes; Social psychology has, as a rule, dealt with vari­ ous phases of social experience from the psycholo­ gical standpoint of Individual experience* The point of approach which I wish to suggest is that

2 of dealing with, experience from the standpoint of society, at least from the standpoint of communi— cation as essential to the social order * (l) A similar suggestion could be made concerning value theory and the valuative phases of experience* ^Experience ,n as Dewey uses the term, is not an isolated and individualistic affair.

Acting and undergo­

ing, liking and disliking, hoping, attempting, construct­ ing, failing and succeeding are intensely personal experi­ ences, but not individualistic.

Appreciation and criticism

involve processes occurring within the individual, but only as he is interacting with an environment that is social as well as physical and organic*

Dewey states:

The modern discovery of inner experience, of a realm of purely personal events that are always at the individual*s command, and that are his exclusively as well as inexpensively for refuge, consolation and thrill is....a great and liber­ ating discovery. It implies a new worth and sense of dignity in human individuality, a sense that an individual Is not a mere property of na­ ture, set in place according to a scheme inde­ pendent of him, as an article is put in its place in a cabinet, but that he adds something, that he marks a contribution. It Is the coun­ terpart of what distinguishes modern science, experimental, hypothetical; a logic of discov­ ery having therefore opportunity for individu­ al temperament, ingenuity, invention. It Is the counterpart of modern politics, art, relig­ ion and industry where individuality is given room and movement, in contrast to the ancient scheme of experience, which held individuals tightly within a given order subordinated to Its structure and patterns.(2) 1. Mead, Mind, self and society, p. 1. 2. Dewey, Experience and nature, pp. 172-173.

3 Regard for individuality does not, however, imply that human behavior "including those aspects of* experience accessible only to the Individual— can be successfully in— terpreted on a wholly individualistic basis*

In Human na­

ture and conduct. Dewey refers to impulses as ®the pivots upon which the reorganization of activities turn* •••agen­ cies of deviation, for giving new directions to old habits and changing their quality."(l)

But, he adds, if the in­

dividual Is Isolated and thought to be essentially complete in himself, impulses can no longer be conceived as the or­ ganic basis of creativity*

Instead, they are elements of

fixed patterns of response that ^account® for the status quo in industry, economics, ethics, politics and art. ^Generalize this Individualistic view, and we have an as­ sumption that all customs, all significant episodes in the life of individuals can be carried directly back to the operation of instincts .* (2) Society and the Emergence of Mental Behavior It is assumed at the outset that valuation includes intellectual behavior. (3)

Theory of knowledge and theory

of value are closely related.

The Individualism that has

characterized some value theories has also entered into 1. Dewey, Human nature and conduct, p. 93. 2. Ibid.. p. 94. 3. See below, Chapters II and III.

4 theories of knowledge*

The result is a host of* arbitrary

problems afflicting both areas*

Are intrinsic value stan—

dards to be found within or outside of the self?

Are

values absolute and objectively given, equally absolute but sub jectively given, or without foundation because sub­ jectively given?

Robert Rotbman, in his dissertation on

naturalistic theories of value, maintains that such prob­ lems arise from the hypostatization of the abstract dis­ tinction of subject and object; and the identification of experience as essentially consisting of the existences and events more intimately connected with one or the other of these aspects of experience. Cl)

Individualistic theories

of value and epistemologies represent hypostatization of the sihject phase. The scientist as well as the artist and artisan is engaged as a person in his problems.

Perplexity, anticipa­

tion, disappointment, and the thrill of successful consum­ mation accompany and enter into his activities*

In work­

ing toward the discovery of new data or the constructing of new theory, he is likely to feel that in a peculiar sense the problem is his, for he has taken it as his own to work with.

When he reaches a warranted assertion, he

is likely to feel, too, that that is his contribution; and, subject to the criticism and testing of others, it is. The 1. Rothman, The place of knowledge in valuation, pp. 19, 55, 58, passim.

personal and individual phases of such experience do not in the least conflict with the fact that his activity is part of a social process* however.

Behavior, including

mental "behavior, is "thoroughly saturated....with condi­ tions and factors that are of cultural origin and im­ port. " (l) Although Dewey has "been supposed by many to be a narrow individualist and practicaiist, the fact is that he regards intellectual experience as a manner of tran­ scending limitations found in the experience and practice of individuals.

It is a way of moving from the particular

to the general, the subjective to the objective, the tem­ poral to the non-temporal; and in doing so to create means for transforming arts and values.

Insofar as "transcend"

retains its meaning as a verb referring to human activity, and does not imply a realm of existence discontinuous with the natural, Dewey is a transcendentalist.

This means

simply that he believes man is capable of transforming himself and his environment, a capacity denied In any sig­ nificant degree to man by critics who have accused Dewey of neglecting the "spiritual" elements of experience, (g) 1. Dewey, Logic, pp. 42-43. 2* It is strange that critics of Dewey have so often ac­ cused him of holding views which are logically implied in their own. Years ago, A. v. C. P. Huizinga in The American uhilosoobv pragmatism charged that for prag­ matism, "bowels and brain have exchanged functions" (p. 56), so that thinking is reduced to serving

6

Dewey’s ”transcendentalism” is naturalistic. That human behavior involves goals and aspirations, a sense of* values other than physical and organic and those at pre­ sent attained, is apparent; but it is the pragmatic interests (presumably just as they are aside from think­ ing) , if not eliminated entirely* In 1935 Leo Ward, a more substantial critic, concluded In Value and reality that Dewey’s liking for democracy, experimentation, etc., is due to the fact that these are modern: ^Experiment is of the times, hence Dewey Is for it.*(pp. 140-141) He maintains, paradoxically, that Dewey’s value stan­ dard is the will of the majority (pp. 143-143) and that it is a blind imperative of change: *The old and an­ terior is always the unfit, the unworthy, the less good if good at all* (p. 143)• The element common to both criticisms Is that prag­ matism offers no way of transcending present Interests, except possibly to clamor for undirected change* Yet the assumption that human activity cannot transcend what are regarded as its inherent interests and values Is implicit in the views of both Ward and Huizinga. The latter identifies pragmatism’s supposed disregard for reason with rejection of ’’the search for absolute, in­ dependent truth? (p. 54) . The reasonable inference is that human nature, apart from the independent absolute, is to be conceived in the way for which he criticizes pragmatism. Leo Ward speaks eloquently of value as ”the perfect-perfective” (p. 190) and of the end of man as ’’fulness of human being” (p. 189). But the perfection of man involves the subordination of on© element of a dualism to another that derives from that which is above and beyond human life (pp. ISO, 308) • Reason, though that which ”makes us men,” serves only to instrument the divinations of ”practical judgment.” (p. 209). Thus it may rationalize subordination or compromise, such as found in the statement that we may need ”a faint bit of freedom, If that could be, in our political, industrial and economic life” (p. 202) • Though Ward Insists that both the material and spiri­ tual enter into human nature (p. 209), he can offer none but a non-natural hypothesis to account for the influence of the latter on the former. Human life is incapable of attaining spiritual values in Its own right.

contribution that accounts for these elements of experi­ ence as natural developments.

Social experience and com­

munication transform response from crude involvement in the course of events into purposive conduct manifesting at least in some areas precise and effective correlation of means and ends.

The pragmatist claims that analysis

of communication leads to understanding of how It is pos­ sible to reconstruct lines of action and even the objec­ tives directing them. The theory that mind is a social produdt and that analysis of the general features of language and communi­ cation is necessary in an explanation of mental behavior Is in conflict with what Mead calls the *philological* conception of language.

According to the latter view,

language is only the medium of expression of antecedently existing mind or minds, (l)

The doctrine appears to gain

support from the facts that private deliberation sometimes precedes public discussion, and that the highly developed language we use itself presupposes intelligence.

The vari­

ety of terms and the flexibility with which they can be combined In ordinary conversation— to say nothing of ab­ stract language systems such as those used in science and mathematics— are inexplicable apart from prior intelligent behavior.

As Mead has said, mind "makes possible the

8

development of

• [the social! process into much more

complex; forms of social interaction among the component individuals than was possible before it had arisen. »(l) Be re—emphasizes his statement by addings

*The most

characteristic features £of human society as we know it] presuppose the possession of minds by its individual members.n(2)

Such commonly admitted facts have been in­

terpreted as evidence that language is but the medium through which minds, individually existing independently of the medium, communicate with one another.

If the prag­

matist accepts the facts, he makes a double assertion that may superficially appear to constitute a paradox: Meaning­ ful social intercourse as we know it is the outcome of an­ tecedent intelligence and presupposes the existence of in­ dividual minds, but minds are the product of meaningful social intercourse. The paradox disappears If we regard mind, not as an entity, but as a process. The distinction between physical, psycho-physical, and mental is....one of levels of Increasing com­ plexity and intimacy of interaction among natural events. The idea that matter, life and mind rep­ resent separate kinds of Being is a doctrine that springs, as so many philosophic errors have sprung, from a substantiation of eventual functions. (3) The Idea that mind is a certain kind of natural interaction, 1. Mead, Mind, self and society, p. £26. 2. Ibid.. p. 227. 3. Dewey, Experience and nature, p. 261.

that *mental* characterizes a level of the natural process opens the way to an tinderstanding of how that which is nec essarily antecedent to present-day communication is never­ theless the outcome of* communication.

*The re is nothing

odd about a product of a given process contributing to, or becoming an essential factor in, the further development of that process••(!) George Herbert Meadfs social psychological theory is integral to the growth of pragmatism, for it provides a reasonable account and interpretation of the natural emer­ gence of reflective behavior*

Mead asserts that intelli­

gence depends upon a physiological mechanism of a special level of complexity* (2)

That the brain and the nervous

system are natural biological developments would be denied by few today.

But mind is more than the physiological

equipment involved in thinking; and it is frequently main­ tained that this 11plus factor* is introduced in some man­ ner inexplicable from a naturalistic standpoint.

Mead be­

lieves, in contrast, that we can account for mind in terms of a social matrix within which conduct slowly emerges from what Dewey calls a psycho-physical (sensitive) level to mental levels, while in emerging, it continually reacts upon and reconstructs the matrix intself, sometimes in a 1. Mead, Mind* self and society, p. 226 . 2. Ibid** pp. 2, 227, 236n, 237n.~ 3. Ibid.* p. 11.

10

manner that prepares it for fostering the continued growth of mentality. Mental behavior is not reducible to non—mental be­ havior. But mental behavior or phenomena can be explained in terms of non-mental behavior or phe­ nomena , as arising out of, and as resulting from complications in, the latter, (l) The " conversation of gestures” is the stage of be­ havior with which the pragmatist can appropriately b egin his analysis.

It is among the basic terms in which the

development of mental behavior can be stated. poses many generalizations, such as:

It presup­

Behavior is one as­

pect of a dynamic interaction of organism and environment; The interaction is objective, "subjects” and "objects" en­ tering Into processes that may not only result in but are real changes in both (2); Behavior is more or less 1. Mead, Mind, self and society, p. 11. 2. This may be said despite the fact that prior to the emergence of meaningful behavior, "objects” are not ob­ jectified, nor are "subjects" subjectified (Mead, Mind, self and society, pp. 77-80, 130, 13In). Note espe­ cially the latter reference: "Nature— the external world— »Is objectively there, in opposition to our ex­ perience of it, or in opposition to the individual thinker himself. Although external objects are there Independent of the experiencing individual, neverthe­ less they possess certain characteristics by virtue of their relations to his experiencing or to his mind, which they would not possess otherwise or apart from these relations. These characteristics are their meanings for him, or in general, for us. The distinc­ tion between physical objects or physical reality and the mental or self-conscious experience of those ob­ jects or that reality——the distinction between ex­ ternal and internal experience— lies in the fact that the latter is concerned with or constituted by meanings. Experienced objects have definite meanings for the indi­ viduals thinking about them."

XX organized response tending in general to adapt both organ­ ism and environment in snch a way as to contribute to the functioning of the individual or group of organisms.(l) The conversation of gestures develops within behavior ex­ hibiting these characteristics, but its importance lies in foreshadowing those additional qualities denoted by ”men­ tal.*

The term refers merely to the fact that animals re­

act to one another— to postures and shifts in position, for example, when thqy are fighting*

The actions of one serve

as stimuli to the other.(2) It is essential to note that the conversation of gestures arises in a situation that is "social*, if "so­ ciety" be understood as having only the minimum and un­ doubtedly deficient meaning, "interacting organisms."

If

it is true that even at this level, "experience*— and the term is hardly warranted here— Is not the completely indi­ vidualistic thing It has sometimes been supposed to be, 1. Dewey, Experience and nature, pp. 170, 254—258* Dewey writes: "If we Identify, as common speech does, the physical as such with the inanimate we need another word to denote the activity of organisms as such. Psy­ cho-physical is an appropriate term. Thus employed, *psycho-physical1 denotes the conjunctive presence In activity of need—demand—satisfaction*... .In the com­ pound word, the prefix *psychof denotes that physical activity has acquired additional properties, those of ability to procure a peculiar kind of interactive sup­ port of needs from surrounding media" (pp. 254-255). 2. Mead, Mind, self and soeletfY. pp. 14, 65*

13

this will be of the greatest significance in study of much more complex experience having valuative and educational qualities*

The second noteworthy point is that the atti­

tude of one organism serves to stimulate the response of the other* (l) The stimulations^ provided by attitudes and gestures may under appropriate circumstances become communicative* These circumstances seem to consist, first, of an indirect means of expressing attitudes— that is, a means other than those used in acting directly in and upon the situation in which the organism is immediately involved— and, second, of ability to separate elements of the act.

Both of these

characteristics of meaningful behavior may seem at first to contravene integrity of attitude and act.

This unity

is perhaps more obvious at lower levels of interaction in which lengthy periods of inhibition and deliberation do not intervene, than in mental behavior which relates the individual to situations so complex and which involves so many delays and inhibitions of response that a person may be deceived even about the nature of his own attitudes* However, the separable character of the act and indirect means of expressing attitudes do not primarily signify 1* "Attitude” may be defined as the "beginning of the act" (Mead, Mind* self and society, p. 5) or as "the adjust­ ment of the organism involved in an impulse ready for expression” (ibid** p. 363)*

13 disorganization of behavior, but the possibility of recon­ struction of activity at higher levels of organization. Im­ pulses are freed from the set responses that characterize instincts and become Msusceptible to. ♦. .analysis and re­ combination in the presence of obstacles and inhibitions(l) This freedom is what in large measure constitutes the wtran— scendental*1 quality of human behavior already referred to. Although the conversation of gestures foreshadows mental behavior, it is a vastly different level of inter­ action.

The processes of deliberation and calculation are

missing; attitudes and complete responses are integrated in the inferior sense of being inseparable phases of direct action; activities are not broken up, analyzed, and recom­ bined; there is no means of expressing attitudes indirectly without completing associated activities.

The conversation

can, of course, take place among organisms lacking the physiological equipment to support more complex forms of behavior.

But mental behavior is more than the conversa­

tion of gestures plus an adequate nervous structure.(S) In the case of the unconscious conversation of gestures, or in the case of the process of com­ munication carried on by means of it, none of the individuals participating in it is conscious of the meaning of the conversation— that meaning does not appear in the experience of any on© of the separate individuals involved In the conver­ sation or carrying it on; whereas, in the case 1. Mead, Mind, self and society, pp. 71—73. S. Ibid.

14 of the conscious conversation of gestures, or in the case of the process of communication carried on by means of it, each of the individuals parti­ cipating in it is conscious of the meaning of the conversation, precisely because that meaning does appear in his experience, and because such ap­ pearance is what consciousness of that meaning implies•(l) The problem then is to account for the transition from unconscious conversation of gestures to that in which meanings appear in the experience of the individual in­ volved,

Mead defines gestures as "that part of the act

which is responsible for its influence on other forms" (organisms)* (g)

He adds that whereas the gesture, es­

pecially at non-mental levels, calls forth a response in the other organism different from that of the organism making it, "language seems to carry.*.*a set of symbols answering to certain content which is measurably identical in the experience of the different individuals."(3)

Co­

operative behavior can of course occur without the use of symbols having the same meaning for all concerned. (4) In the unsymbolized conversation of gestures there may be a ....highly complex social activity in which the gestures are simply stimuli to the appropriate response of the whole group; in the human situa­ tion there is a different response which is me­ diated by means of particular symbols or partic­ ular gestures which have the same meaning for all members of a group. (5) 1. Mead, Mind, self and society, p. 72n. Ibid.. p. 53. 3. Ibid.. p. 54. 4. Ibid* * p. 55. 5. Ibid., p * 56.

15 The instinct of imitation has been summoned by psy­ chologists and philologists to explain the phenomenon of identical or similar meanings, but Mead rejects such an explanation as inadequate* If one assumed that the mind is made up out of ideas, that the character of our conscious ex­ perience Is nothing but a set of impressions of objects, and if one adjusts to these Impressions, so to speak, a motor tendency, one might con­ ceive of that as being one which would seek to reproduce what was seen and heard. But as soon as you recognize in the organism a set of acts which carry out the processes which are essen­ tial to the life of the form, and undertake to put the sensitive or sensory experience into that scheme, the sensitive experience, as stimu­ lus, we will say, to the response, cannot be a stimulus simply to reproduce what is seen and heard; it is rather a stimulus for the carrying out of the organic process.(l) Although no instinct of imitation can reasonably be employed to explain shared meanings, there is no doubt that the latter are grounded in shared activities.

The area of

shared responses may become quite extensive prior to the development of language and meaning,

^o Illustrate this,

Mead analyzes the vocalization of birds to show that an organism may learn to react in the same way to a self—pro — duced stimulus that others do. The stimulus that calls out a particular sound may be found not only in the other forms in the group but also in the repertoire of the particular bird which uses the vocal gesture. This stimulus A calls out the response B. Now if this stimulus A is like B, and if we assume that A calls out B, then if A 1. Mead, Mind, self and society* p. 60.

16 is used by other forms these forms will respond in the fashion B * If this form also uses the vocal gesture A, it will be calling out in it­ self the response B, so that the response B will be emphasized over against other responses be­ cause it is called out not only by the vocal ges­ tures of other forms but also by the form it­ self. (l) The songs of birds are vocal gestures related to the or­ ganic process* (2)

In this they are similar to other ges­

tures non-vocal in character.

They are of peculiar impor­

tance , however, for the nature of the gestures is such that the individual influences ”himself as others influence him, so that he Is under the influence not only of the other but also of himself in so far as he uses the same vocal gesture.w (s) The range of shared response is significant!y in­ creased by the processes just outlined.

It Includes cer­

tain self-stimulated activities as well as those dependent primarily on external stimuli.

The organism responds, not

only to the gestures of other forms, but to its own— -and In a manner identical to that in which others respond to the gesture.

This is not the case in the conversation of

gestures where vocalization is but an incidental accompani­ ment to the action in course.

There, the response of one

organism stimulated by the gesture of another is different 1. Mead, Mind, self and society, pp. 64-65. 2. Ibid.. p. 64. 5. Ibid.. p. 65.

17 from tl® response of ’the second*

The gesture has no com­

mon referent, and therefore lacks a necessary if not suf­ ficient condition of operating as a sign* An organized set of x*esponses to a stimulus is an idea in behavioral terms* (l)

When a vocal gesture, which

is not necessarily part of the direct course of action un­ folding in the situation, becomes related to such a set of responses, it is a significant symbol*

Its significance

lies in the fact that it is, in the experience of the in­ dividuals concerned, related to a set of responses which they share*

As we have already seen, vocal gestures may

serve as stimuli to the individual making them.

Hence, a

response one Is on the point of making can, when symbolized and expressed in symbolic terms, itself become a stimulus* The same can also be said of a response someone else is about to make*(2)

The complications these factors Intro­

duce into behavior elevate it to a reflective or mental level*(3)

They permit the later phases of possible activi­

ties to influence present conduct through deliberation! and they extend indefinitely the range of co-operative action* We say the animal does not think. He does not put himself in a position for which he Is responsible! he does not put himself in the place of the other person and say, in effect, "He will act in such a way and I will act in this way." If the 1* Mead, Mind, self and society* p* 71. 2. Ibid* * p. 72. 3* Ibid* * p. 73.

18

individual can act in this way, and the atti­ tude which he calls out in himself can b ecome a stimulus to him for another act, we have meaning­ ful conduct* ^here the response of the other person is called out and becomes a stimulus to control his action, then he has the meaning of the other person*s act in his own experience* That is the general mechanism of what we term ,fthought,” for in order that thought may exist there must be symbols, vocal gestures general­ ly, which a^rouse in the individual himself the response which he is calling out in the other, and such that from the point of view of that response he is able to direct his later con­ duct. (l) This brief outline of some of the stages in the emersion of mental behavior is stripped of many subtle­ ties, parenthetical ideas, and suggestive lines of dis­ cussion which alone demonstrate the full and rich devel­ opment Mead gave to the concept of mind as a social pro­ duct and process.

Nevertheless, several fundamental

generalizations, all of them having important bearing on value theory, are expressed in it* mentioned:

Two have already been

(A) The conversation of gestures, even at a

non—mental stage, occurs in a social situation; and (B) the attitude of one individual serves as stimulus to others.

We may now add: (C) Gestures, especially vocal­

ized gestures, may stimulate the individual using them as well as others in his environment; (b ) the stimulus may be related to a set of responses which is shared by the individuals involved in communication; thus (E) a 1. Mead, Mind, self and society, p. 73*

19 means Is available for controlling present activities by possible future actions, and (F) a gesture may be used -IS o^der to control the conduct of another individual* In addition (G) an individual may put himself in the place of another— that is, mentally rehearse what would be dene in the situation in which another is implicated; and (H) the means for testing ideas is available in the fact that a symbol which supposedly refers to an organized set of responses gains a refined meaning whenever some element of that set proves unreliable in action or some new response proves effective•

(I)

The fact that shared

responses are related to shared symbols permits the indi­ vidual to make use of the experience of others in this testing. The Social -Matrix of Intelligence The discussion up to this point has rested on the work of George Herbert Mead.

It nevertheless fits intim­

ately into Deweyfs conception of cognitive experience.

In

.Reconstruction in philosophy. Dewey writes: The conceptions that are socially current and im­ portant become the child1s principles of Interpre­ tation and estimation long before he attains to personal and deliberate control of conduct. Things come to him clothed in language, not in physical nakedness, and this garb of eommunication makes hjm a sharer in the beliefs of those about him. These beliefs coming to him as so many facts form

20 Ills mindj “they furnish, the centres about which his own personal expeditions and perceptions are ordered.(l) Dewey of course did not mean that such beliefs are to be accepted unquestioned, but that mind develops within a social matrix.

Xn its development, beliefs perhaps neces­

sarily accepted uncritically to begin with are subjected to testing and rejection or revision. Intelligence is not something possessed once for all. It is in constant process of forming, and its retention requires constant alertness in ob­ serving consequences, an open-minded will to learn and courage in re-adjustment. (2) In Human nature and conduct Dewey is at pains to clear his psychology of association with what Sorokin calls *sociologistic* schools of thought. (3) To talk about the priority of **society* to the in­ dividual is to indulge in nonsensical metaphysics. But to say that some pre-existent association of human beings Is prior to every particular human being who is born into the world is to mention a commonplace The problem... .of how those es­ tablished and more or less deeply grooved systems of interaction which we call social groups, big and small, modify the activities of individuals who perforce are caught-up within them, and how the activities of component individuals remake and redirect previously established customs is a deeply significant one. Viewed from the stand­ point of custom and its priority to the formation of habits in human beings, who are born babies and gradually grow to maturity, the facts which are now usually assembled under the conceptions of collective minds, group-minds, national-minds, crowd-minds, etc., etc., lose the mysterious air 1. Dewey, Reconstruction in philosophy, p. 92. 2* Ibid.. pp. 96-97. , Ch. VIII 3. Sorokin, Contenrpora of John Dewey. p. 283. Schilpp fed.). The

21

they exhale when mind is thought of (as ortho­ dox psychology teaches us to think of it) as something which precedes action. It is diffi­ cult to see that collective mind means anything more than a custom brought at some point to ex­ plicit , emphatic consciousness, emotional or intellectual.(l) His criticism of the 11group—mindw theories does not im­ ply conflict with Mead?s position.

He continues:

The problem of social psychology is not how either individual or collective mind forms so­ cial groups and customs, but how different cus­ toms, established interacting arrangements, form and nurture different minds •(2) That which is distinctively windividual in behavior and mind is not«..*an original datum,*(3) though previous ci­ tations and the general tenor of Dewey* s writings Indicate he believes it to be an extremely significant datum In the ongoing social process.

Theories, like those to which

Mead referred, which trace mental and cultural qualities back to individual minds as their exclusive source, em­ phasize nstates of consciousness, an inner private life, at the expense of acts which have public meaning and which incorporate and exact social relationships.* (4) Native activities——those which may be thought of as belonging to the individual apart from or prior to the development of social interaction and mind— are without 1. 2. 3. 4.

Dewey, Ibid.. Ibid., Ibid..

Human natureand conduct, pp. 59-60. p. 63* p. 84. p. 86;Italicsmine.

meaning in themselves •

f?The meaning of* native activities

is not native; it is acquired.

It depends upon interac­

tion with a matured social medium

although. .. .phenom­

ena which have a meaning spring from original native reac­ tions to stimuli, yet they depend also upon the responsl ve behavior of otters **(1)

Mead suggested that an Idea can

be behaviorally stated in terms of an organized set of responses.

Dewey says:

Objects represent habits turned inside out.... out of shock and puzzlement there gradually emerges a figured framework of objects, past, present, future. These shade off variously in­ to a vast penumbra of vague, unfigured things, a setting which is taken for granted and not at all explicitly presented. The complexity of the figured seer® In its scope and refinement of content depends wholly upon prior habits and their organization.(g) Habits, developed in and taken from the social milieushared organized sets of responses—-are what underlie our ideas of objects. These quotations from Dewey, although expressing ideas shared with Mead, do not stress the specific func­ tion of laaguage in the growth of Intelligence.

An anal­

ysis similar to Mead?s is intimated in the statement: Language grew out of unintelligent babblings, in­ stinctive motions called gestures, and the pres­ sure of circumstance. But nevertheless language once called Into existence is language and oper­ ates as language. It operates not to perpetuate 1. Dewey, Human nature and conduct, p. 90. 2. Ibid.. p. 182.

the forces which produced it but to modify and re-direct them* It has such transcendent im­ portance that pains are taken with its use* Literatures are produced, and then a vast ap­ paratus of grammar, rhetoric, dictionaries, literary criticism, reviews, essays, a derived literature ad lib* Education, schooling, be­ comes a necessity; literacy an end* In short language when it is produced meets old needs and opens new possibilities* It creates de­ mands which take effect, and the effect Is not confined to speech and literature, but extends to the common life in communication, counsel and instruction*(l) l&CMgienee- and nature* The quest for certainty, and Logic:

the theory of inquiry, the significance of lan­

guage as the mechanism through which social processes operate to create mind is more fully stated* The introduction to "Nature, communication and meaning” in Experience and nature summarizes ths quali­ ties added to experience by communication: Of all affairs, communication is the most won­ derful* That things should be able to pass from the plane of external pushing and pulling to that of revealing themselves to man, and thereby to themselves; and that the fruit of communication should be participation, sharing, is a wonder by the side of which transinstantiation pales* When communication occurs, all natural events are subject to reconsideration and revision; they are re-adapted to meet the requirements of conversa­ tion, whether it be public discourse or that pre­ liminary discourse termed thinking. Events turn into objects, things with a meaning* They may be referred to when they do not exist, and thus b© operative among things distant in space and time, through vicarious presence In a new medium. Brute efficiencies and inarticulate consummations as soon as they can be spoken of are liberated from 1. Dewey, Human nature and conduct, pp* 79-80.

24 local and accidental contexts, and are eager for naturalization in any non-insula ted, communicat­ ing, part of tiro world* Events when once they are named lead an independent and double lire. In addition to their original existence, they are subject to ideal er linentat ion: their meanings may be Infinitely combined and re-ar­ ranged in imagination, and the outcome of* this inner experimentation-—which is thought— may is­ sue forth In interaction with cruele or raw events. Meanings having been deflected from the rapid and roaring stream of events into a calm and traversible canal, rejoin the main stream, and color, temper and compose its course. Where communication exists, things in acquiring mean­ ing, thereby acquire representatives, surrogates, signs and implicates, which are infinitely more amenable to management, more permanent and more accommodating, than events in their first state.(l) Although it is Dewey* s contention that intelligence is in­ strumental, that it is bound up with the use of instruments of all Icinds, he also says that "at every point appliances and applications, utensils and uses, are bound up with di­ rections^ suggestions and records made possible by speech; what has been said about the role of tools Is subject to a condition supplied by language, the tool of tools."(2) Intelligence and thought depend upon language and communi­ cation.

"Psychic events, such as are anything more than

reactions of a creature susceptible to pain and diffuse com­ fort, have language for one of their conditions."(5)

Even

soliloquy is possible only as "the product and reflex of 1. Dewey, Experience and nature, pp. 166-167. 2. Ibid.. p. 168. 3. Ibid., p. 169*

25

converse with others."(l)

"Through speech a person dra­

matically identifies himself with potential acts and deeds? he plays many roles, not in successive stages of life but in a contemporaneously enacted drama.

Thus

mind emerges•w (2) Dewey* s account of language begins with the ges­ ture— an action serving primarily to influence others. He terms it a "signalling act."(3)

The gesture or signal­

ling act is not a sign, but a direct stimulus, so it is but an insufficient condition of language.

In human inter­

course, however, gestures become signs— ‘they portend, for the individual "puts himself at the standpoint of a situa­ tion in which. •».parties share*ff(4) Meaning is not indeed a psychic existence; it is primarily a property of behavior, and secondarily a property of objects. But the behavior of which it is a quality is a distinctive behavior; cooper­ ative, in that response to another’s act involves contemporaneous response to a thing as entering into the other’s behavior, and this upon both sides.(5) Through co-operative action gestures may become symbols and have reference to objects or modes of action that are com­ mon to a group.

The gesture or mark which operates as a

symbol does not have this property in itself; it is simply 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Dewey, Ibid. ? Ibid., TETd.. Ibid. . social

Experience and nature, p. 170. p. 176. p. 178* p. 179. See also Dewey, "Social psychology and progress," Characters and events. II, p. 715.

26 an event, an existence, without meaning apart from the so­ cial process.

tfTha physical sound or mark gets its meaning

in and by conjoint community of functional use •n (l)

Mean­

ingful objects emerge in a cultural context, their meanings being determined with reference to shared activities. Sym­ bols are surrogates for possible operations, more or less organized.(2)

The organization of responses, and, conse­

quently, the relationship system of symbols, may exist on any level from the undertakings of a primitive community to the experimental operations of advanced inquiry; but in any case, language symbols are grounded in and react back into a community of experience. (3) Dewey, like Mead, believes that the language pro­ cess is an emergent within social interaction, permitting individuals to put themselves in the roles of others. Liv­ ing in a cultural environment ”compels them to assume in their behavior the standpoint of customs, beliefs, insti­ tutions, meanings and beliefs which are at least relatively general and objective.n (4)

Inquiry, however, is the inten­

tional generalizing of meanings.

It i s undertaken In such

a way as to eliminate influence of merely personal factors, to transcend the temporal connections in immediate situations 1. Dewey. Ibid.. 3. Ibid.. 4. Ibid..

Logic, p. 46. pp. 49-50. p. 50. p. 45.

27

by stating them in terms of non-temporal relationships, (l) The process of generalization, arising in a rough, common sense way wherever community undertakings are mediated by language, develops into an organization of conjoint activi­ ties itself with its own language system.

Meanings enter­

ing into the former activities nare sure to contain much that is irrelevant and to exclude much that is required for intelligent control of activity.® (2)

Inquiry is the

effort to eliminate and expand meanings by generalizing the process of generalization; that is, by controlling what beforehand occurred sporadically and in limited form in order to increase precision and flexibility of action. The use of meaning-symbols for institution of pur­ poses or ends-in-view, for deliberation, as a re­ hearsal through such symbols of the activities by which the ends may be brought into being, is at least a rudimentary form of reasoning in connec­ tion with solution of problems. The habit of reasoning once Instituted is capable of indefi­ nite development on its own account. The ordered development of meanings in their relations to one another may become an engrossing interest.(3) The consequence is development of both science and logic--of controlled Inquiry in all its forms.

11The ideal

of scientific—language is construction of a system in which meanings are related to one another in inference and dis­ course and where the symbols are such as to indicate the 1. Dewey, Logic. pp. 44-45. *, p • 50 . s • ibid., p* 57.

2*

28

relation**(1)

Such an outcome is possible only through

efforts to free deliberation from the particular and per­ sonal bias of the individual, the limitations in outlook of special groups, and the peculiarities of definitely restricted situations*

This signifies that common sense

intelligence, emerging in language communities wherein the individual can regard his situation from the point of view of others as well as himself, serves ultimately as the matrix for a new emergent--the effort to extend the community of activities to an ideal limit— to generalize the point of view from which problematic situations are questioned as far as possible beyond that belonging to a particular community and its institutions*(8) It can readily be seen that Dewey’s analysis cul­ minates in the same generalizations about meaningful be­ havior as Mead’s* (3)

The list of statements on pages

eighteen and nineteen above is representative of basic 1. Dewey, Logic * p. 51* 8. Ibid* * p* 50; Ch. Ill, uassiau 3* Dewey, in a deeply appreciative talk, acknowledged his indebtedness to Mead. Speaking of Mead’s social in­ terpretation of life and the world, he said: MIt is perhaps here that his influence is already most widely felt; I know that his ideas on this subject worked a revolution in my own thinking, though I was slow in grasping anything like its full implications* The in­ dividual mind, the conscious self, was to him the world of nature first taken up into social relations and then dissolved to form a new self which then went forth to recreate the world of nature and social institutions (”George Herbert Mead,” Journal of Philosophy* XXVII 1931, p. 313).

29

agreements shared by the two men.

Eliminating those which

characterize behavior even on non-mental levels, and tele­ scoping the others, these agreements can be re-stated as follows:

(A) Mental behavior is a product and manifesta­

tion of the social interaction of organisms possessing neural equipment sufficiently complex; (B) In this inter­ action gestures have reference to shared modes of response, thus providing for symbolic rehearsal of possible activi­ ties——for deliberation founded upon examination of the situ­ ation from the standpoint of others as well as of the Indi­ vidual; (C) The process of generalization can itself develop into a set of conjoint activities with its own symbolic systems . The standpoint of the community can be purposively generalized.

In other words, if common sense consists of

generalizations based on a community of experience, science consists of generalizations based on such a community created specifically for the purposes of inquiry.

Generalizations

need not be opinions precipitated from the crude day to day experience of anv group, no matter how extended, but may be experimentally verified hypotheses relevant to the undertakings of any group, no matter how limited.

If

meanings emerge when individuals assume the role of others in dealing with events, they are revised, corrected, and expanded when this role itself becomes subject to question

30 — when it begins to constitute a problem because of ir— relevancies and Inaccuracies in common sense beliefs. The techniques developed for dealing with such problems even­ tuate In connections of symbols and responses— in mean­ ings— appropriate to a wider and wider range of situa­ tions and usable by a potentially universal community. Dewey states that through language: Qualitative Immediacies cease to be dumbly rap­ turous, a possession that is obsessive and an incorporation that involves submergence: con­ ditions found in sensations and passions. They become capable of survey, contemplation, and ideal or logical elaboration.....Learning and teaching come into being, and there is no event which may not yield inf ormat Ion. (l) If communication releases us from submergence in the Im­ mediate, inquiry frees us from the oppression of the merely local and transitory. Some of the statements just made are anticipatory; they have not been specifically stated in the materials we have reviewed, but will be more fully presented in later chapters.

They do, however, Indicate the connection of

mind with language as a medium of social interaction. Dewey means by language something more than vocal or printed symbolic systems.

In discussing the cultural ma­

trix of Inquiry, he says: Language Is taken in its widest sense, a sense wider than oral and written speech. It includes 1. Dewey, Experience and nature, p* 167.

51

the latter* But it includes also not only ges­ tures but rites, ceremonies, monuments and the products of industrial and Tine arts* A tool or machine, Tor example, is not simply a simple or complex physical ob ject having its own physical properties and effects, but is also a mode of language. For it says something, to those who tinderstand it, about operations of use and their consequences. To the members of a primitive com­ munity a loom operated by steam or electricity says nothing* It is composed in a foreign lan­ guage, and so with most of the mechanical de­ vices of modern civilization* In the present cultural setting, these objects are so intimate­ ly bound up with interests, occupations and pur­ poses that they have an eloquent voice* (l) This quotation relates the point of view we have examined with that expressed in Chapter IV of Experience and nature, wherein Dewey connects the development of intelligence with the use and testing of instruments.

While steam engines

and airplanes may 11say** nothing to primitive communities, arrows, lances, axes and hoes do.

Significance accrues to

physical objects other than sounds where these enter into community activities* It is unnecessary to show In detail that Mead shares this view.

It is sufficient to call attention to his em­

phasis on the importance of the hand* If we took our food as dogs do by the very organ by which we masticate it, we should not have any ground for distinguishing the food as a physical thing from the actual consummation of the act, the consumption of food. We should reach it and seize it with the teeth, and the very act of tak­ ing hold of it would be the act of eating it* But with the human animal the hand is interposed 1* Dewey, Logic * p* 46.

32 between the consummation and the getting of the object to the mouth. In that case we are mani­ pulating a physical thing. Such a thing comes in between the beginning of the act and its final consummation. It is in that sense a uni­ versal. (l) Intervention of the hand permits objects to be regarded not only as ends, but as means; perhaps it would be more ac­ curate to say that it is a condition of things being re­ garded as either means or ends, Instead of being engulfed in an undifferentiated immediate flux.

Mead calls the In­

termediate stage of the act ,fimplemental." (2)

How truly

fundamental he considers this implemental or Instrumental stage In the growth of intelligence is, he Indicates in the statements There is.... [a] very Important phase in the development of the human animal which Is perhaps quite as essential as speech for the development of man's peculiar Intelligence, and that is the use of the hand for the isolation of physical things. Speech and the hand go along together in the development of the social human being. There has to arise self-consciousness for the whole flowering-out of intelligence. But there has to be some phase of the act which stops short of consummation if that act Is to develop intelligently, and language and the hand pro­ vide the necessary mechanisms.(3) Mead's statement may be compared with Dewey's discussion of "activities having preparatory and having consummatory status."(4) 1. 2. 3. 4.

Mead, Mind, self and society, p. 184. Ibid.. p. 248. Ibid.. p. 237. Dewey, Experience and nature. p. 269.

35 Speech and tools, both arising in and conditioned by the cultural interaction of men, are the mechanisms which so transform behavior as to make it meaningful. The term "meaningful11 is appropriate, for this chapter has point only if value and scientific judgments are so closely interwoven as to be virtually inseparable*

While the term

does not prove the case, it carries with it the sense of consummation and fulfillment as well as instrumentality and need.

A meaningful experience is one in which mean­

ings operate in the direction of activities culminating in some end.

The end may carry with it the satisfaction of

consimimation or the sorrow of failure, but in either case it is a fulfillment of the means and meanings employed. As a fulfillment it has a status other than that of a mere

event, for meanings are caught up into it and become part of it, rendering it meaningful.

CHAPTER II

34

INQUIRY AND VALUATION

Intelligence is the natural social interaction of organisms raised to a new level through the medium of lan­ guage*

But this fact is of little significance to theory

of valuation if deliberation does not enter into valuation. The relation of inquiry and valuation Is therefore the theme of this chapter.

The topic has been discussed be­

fore by students of Dewey's philosophy, especially by Orlie A. H* Pell and Robert Rothman.

Both assert that

Dewey1s philosophy gives a more adequate and comprehen­ sive account of the relation of knowledge and valuation than others to which it Is compared* (l)

Miss Pell says,

"In order to find out whether.... [a] 'value1 is valuable, we must subject it to reflective inquiry."(£)

Criticism

...is judgment, applied to the enjoyments and goods of life, in order that the goods may be richer and more secure* It is therefor© syn­ onymous with the process of valuation, the process of establishing a new value. Thus in Dewey's system theory of value and theory of criticism coincide; to value is to appraise*(3) Rothman says that "theoretical cognition is the broadest kind of interpretation or valuation. "(4) 1. Pell, Value-theorv and criticism. Ch. V; and Rothman, The place of knowledge in valuation, pp. 151-164. 2. Pell, Value-theorv and criticism* p. 49. 3* Ibid.« pp. 49-50. 4* Rothman, The place of knowledge in valuation* p. 117.

35 The Practical Matrix of Inquiry If inquiry is valuation, it is practical, for valu­ ation is practical judgment.

Valuations are "appraisals of

courses of action as better and worse, more and less ser— vicable."(l)

The refined products of inquiry ultimately

arise from and play back Into the gross and macroscopic ex­ perience of common life; the latter serves as the ultimate practical matrix of Inquiry. Scientific subject-matter and procedures grow out of the direct prcblems and methods of common sense, of practical uses and enjoyments, and react into the latter in a way that enormously refines, ex­ pands and liberates the contents and the agencies at the disposal of common sense.(2) Statements of this kind have been misinterpreted as signifying that Dewey *s philosophy is, in the final analysis, an accolade of common sense practicalism and "empiricism" of the crude type.

Confusion has perhaps

been increased by the fact that "pragmatic" as well as "empirical" Is susceptible to several interpretations. It may be correctly used to characterize something as belong­ ing to the day-to-day business of mankind; or it may per­ tain to specifically scientific procedures in determining the connections among events. Illustration of the problems created by the term is found in recent charges that pragmatism means that type of 1. Dewey, Thaorv of valuation, p. 22; Italics mine. 2. Dewey, logic. p. 66.

36

^practicalism” or wish—thinking which limits the test of consequences to those which are desired*

The illustra­

tion is pertinent, for if the charge is true, ”pragmatism” is reduced to a level of criticism even lower than that of common sense, which is replete with maxims such as the one about having and eating cake*

So eminent a thinker as

Bertrand Russell repeats the old fiction that desired re­ sults are the pragmatic test of truth: Perhaps* *« *we may say that there is ”need for doubt11 so long as the opinion at which we have arrived does not enable us to sec tire desired re­ sults, although we feel that a different opinion would do so* When our car breaks down, we try various hypotheses as to what is wrong, and there is ,fneed for doubt” until it goes again, (l) It may be that in common life we do not recognize the ex­ istence of a problem until the attainment of some specific objective is obstructed*

It may be also that practical

difficulties of this sort stimulate inquiry where it other­ wise might not exist.

In recognizing the importance of

such facts, however, Dewey does not imply what Russel makes out of the point.

Russell states his case against pragma­

tism more clearly a few paragraphs later on:

”A hypothesis

is called *true* when it leads the person entertaining It to acts which have effects that he desires*”( Dewey, Dewey,

p in m

n

The problem Is not constituted simply by » 11■

ai-r>

m\

■

n

m

r» i i n

l—

------------------------------

~~

—— — —

Logic. p. 50. p. 115. p. 50. The quest for certainty» p. 256. Logic. p. 77.

■

r i nn

163

the fact that beliefs and categories are carried in a ~ cultural tradition, but by the inflexible and uncritical nature of the tradition itself.

"The impact of scien­

tific method is feared as something profoundly hostile to mahkindts dearest and deepest interests and values.*(l) Under these conditions it is not surprising that "in the things of greatest import there is little inter­ communication. n(2)

Language and communication have "in—

trinsic connection with community of action* (3), but communities are physically, economically, socially, cul­ turally and traditionally set apart from one another. Where activities are not shared, there is no basis for common meanings or communication.

The meanings of terms

vary as the matter of common experience differs; and "if a word varies in meaning in intercommunication between different cultural groups, then to that degree, communica­ tion is blocked and misunderstanding results."(4)

Varia­

tion of basic concepts as well as specific beliefs is marked. It is a commonplace that every cultural group possesses a set of meanings which are so deeply embedded in its customs, occupations, tradi­ tions and ways of interpreting its physical environment and group-life, that they form the basic categories of the language-system by 1* Dewey, Logic. p. 77 4. Dewey# Logic. p. 47.

164 which details are interpreted. Hence they are regulative and "normative* of specific beliefs and judgments, (l) The consequence is that "in an intellectual sense, there are many languages, £even] though in a social sense there is but one."(2) Communication and understanding are tragically lacking even among those who ride the same conveyances and work in the same buildings, to say nothing of those living beyond national, racial and language barriers. The very means devised to foster communication are used to confine it within measured areas and among limited groups.(3) Dewey locates our moral failures in "some one-sided bias that makes us perform the judgment of concrete cases care­ lessly or perversely."(4)

So deep seated are these biases

that even activities directed toward the creation of a wider community of experience are often frustrated by perspectives unconsciously involved in fundamental be­ liefs and categories operative in the Interpretation of concrete cases and facts.

Our knowledge is "divided

against Itself* except in areas Instrumental to more fun­ damental concerns.

Xt is for this reason that:

Man, a child In understanding of himself, has placed In his hands physical tools of 1. Dewey, Ibid.. 3. Dewey, 4. Dewey,

Logic. p. 62. p. 50. Liberalism and social action, pp. 89-90. The public and its problems, p. 175*

165 incalculable power. He plays with them like a child, and whether they work harm or good is largely a matter of accident. The instrumen­ tality becomes a master and works fatally as if possessed by a will of Its own— not because it has a will but because man has not. (l) According to Dewey, common sense may Involve "the demand that group interests and concerns be put above private needs and interests," but hardly an "intellectual disinterestedness beyond the activities, interests and concern of the group."(2 )

Submergence In the local and

traditional is characteristic of common sense.

Under

restricted conditions and In the Interests of special groups, the very appropriateness of our beliefs and ef­ fectiveness of our valuations may be at the expense of larger and more comprehensive adjustment.

"Adaptation

to immediate circumstances* often unfits beliefs "to meet more enduring and more extensive needs.*(3) nifies

This sig­

that "Intellectml disinterestedness beyond the

activities, Interests and

concern of the group" is one

phase of a positive interest in and valuation of prob­ lematic situations.

Mind Itself may be defined as

"response to the doubtful as such. "(4)

From this stand­

point, our need may be described as the growth of mind capable of dealing with social affairs, mind transcending 1. 2. 3. 4.

Dewey, Dewey, Dewey, Dewey,

The public and Its problems»p.175. Logie. p. 115. The public and Its problems.P*145. The quest for certainty, p. 224.

merely local interests and the concerns of Isolated groups— ability to respond appropriately to doubtful so­ cial arrangements and policies even though they be deeply engrained in the life of the group. To doubt is to recognize conflict. does not hinder communication.

Conflict alone

"All the serious perplexi­

ties of life come back to the genuine difficulty of form­ ing a judgment as to the value of the situation; they come back to a conflict of goods."(l) avoid such situations.

Ordinarily we

"Outside of physical inquiry, we

shy from problems; we dislike uncovering serious diffi­ culties In their full depth and reach; we prefer to ac­ cept what Is and muddle along."(2)

Growth of communica­

tion and understanding does not suprevene, however, when conflicts are ignored and problems are explained away. In problematic situations there Is "conflict of acts.... the same object calls out mutually antagonistic re­ sponses." (3)

It is precisely this characteristic which

makes a problem the means to more secure knowledge and more complete communication—-when recognized and acted upon.

Comparing social crises to scientific problems,

Dewey says:

1. Dewey, The quest for certainty, p. 226. Ibid.. p. 251. 3. Mead, Philosophy of the act, p. 59; Cf. Dewey, Human nature and conduct, p. 191.

167

There Is something critical in every problematic situation; It marks a qualitative turn, a divergence; It Is of the nature of a "mu­ tation* rather than a Darwinian "variation. *(l) There is a new conflux of events in which new connections and dependencies may be manifest——to those willing to assume the risk of experimentation.

"The

scientific attitude Is experimental as well as intrin­ sically communicative."(2)

It is intrinsically communi­

cative because It is experimental and thereby turns con­ flict and confusion into means for more secure meanings. Problems are no longer accidents nor crises catastrophic.(3) Social conflicts and moral crises can be employed as means to deeper and more widespread social understand­ ing and communication.

The title of one of Dewey* s ar­

ticles, "The crucial role of Intelligence" (4), is sug­ gestive.

Its role Is crucial because intelligence Is

the means of dealing with crises*

Here lies the contrast

of common sense unliberated by critical Inquiry and in­ telligence habituated In common life.

In the common sense

realm, "conflicting responses" create antagonisms, intense 1. Sphilpp (ed.), The philosophy of John Dewey, p. 593. 2. Dewey, Individualism, old and new, p. 156. 3. Batner ted.J. Characters and events. I, 129: "Events that have no attributed meanings are accidents and if they are big enough are catastrophes.... .nothing is a catastrophe which belongs In a composed tale of mean­ ings." 4. Dewey, "The crucial role of intelligence," The social frontier. I, ffebruary, 193§) , 9.

168 because so much is at stake, but antagonistic because habit and custom lend an aura of certainty to what we believe and unquestioned rightness to what we do. Whereever scientific attitude and method function, conflicting beliefs and programs are hypothetical and tentative means leading to activities of reconstruction and meanings pos­ sibly appropriate beyond "the specific and limited en­ vironing conditions under which the group lives."

"Every

defeat is a stimulus to renewed inquiry, every victory won is the open door to more discoveries, and every dis­ covery is a new seed planted in the soil of intelligence." (l) One of the most far-reaching consequences we may expect with the remaking of common sense is that social division, conflict and failure will contribute to social unification, understanding and growth. Communication is more than the use of symbols and language intercourse.

Although there may be little com­

munication concerning our basic values, there is much con­ versation and disputation.

"We hear speech, but it Is al­

most as if we were listening to a babel of tongues."(2) Language and thought apart from shared experience are not communicative.

They must reflect and lead Into a more

intimate, direct and immediate sharing of experience In 1. Dewey, A common faith, p. 32. 2. Dewey, Art as experience. p. 335.

169

the life and activities of a community. both means and end.

Communication is

It Is

•. •.uniquely Instrumental and uniquely final. It Is instrumental as liberating us from the other­ wise overwhelming pressure of events and enabling us to live in a world of things that have mean­ ing* It is final as a sharing In the objects and arts precious to a community, a sharing whereby meanings are enhanced, deepened and solidified in the sense of coxmnunion. (!) Communication In the final sense Is the sharing of experience; it Is experience made common.

Dewey refers to

a "community of experience that Issues only when language in Its full import breaks down physical Isolation and ex­ ternal contact."(2)

Language In Its full Import "includes,

not only gestures but rites, ceremonies, monuments and the products of industrial and fine arts."(3)

Hence, If in­

creased communication and deepened understanding is the effect of social experimentation, this consequence In­ volves greater sharing in the concrete values of a cul­ ture.

T. V. Smith, interpreting Dewey’s theory of value,

writes: To make values common to all men, to deepen them, and to guaranty them— this is the three­ fold problem Common to philosophy, to science, to government. This is the Problem of Man. (4)

1. 2. 3. 4.

Dewey, Dewey, Dewey, Smith, 348.

Experience and nature. pp. 204-205. Art as experience, p. 335. Logie. p. 46. v "Dewey’s theory of value," Monist. XXXII (.1922;,

17Q Dewey remarks that "one of the few experiments in the attachment of emotion to ends that mankind has not tried is that of devotion,, so Intense as to he reli­ gious, to intelligence as a foree in social action, "(l) He believes that the test, the verifying consequence, In this experiment will be the progressive Integration of the human community, bringing an "understanding of our relations to one another and the values contained in these relations *" (2)

Common sense will be made truly

common as a profound and stirring sense of the values contributing to "the continuous human community in which we are a link."(3) When the emotional force, the mystic force one might say, of communication, of the miracle of shared life and shared experience, is spontane­ ously felt, the hardness and crudeness of con­ temporary life will be bathed In the light that never was on land or sea*(4) 1. Dewey, A common faith, p. 79. 2. Ibid., p. 87; John Herman Randall says of Dewey’s ^faith in intelligence," "It would be Interesting were Dewey to bring his critical method to bear, as he has not here, upon the real values in experience of pre­ cisely that unifying function of an Inclusive ideal which he accepts without question* ("Art and religion as education," The social frontier. II (1936), 112). While Randall may be justified in insisting that D^wey has not critically examined the values and resources in religious Institutions and experience, the fact is that Dewey’s thought has given itself very directly to criticism of "the real values in experience... .of that unifying function of an inclusive Ideal...." His faith is grounded In the real values created wherever the scientific attitude has been persistently maintained and the experimental ideal consistently sought after. 3* Ibid. 4. Dewey, Reconstruction in uhj^osonhv. p. 211.

CHAPTER V

171

EDUCATION, THE FORMING OF SOCIETY Theory of Valuation and Philosophy of Educating Dewey’s theory of value culminates In proposals for remaking common sense.

In this he follows his own

principle that the abstract and universal should lead back Into the concrete and particular events of life. If wide social application contributes to theoretical ad­ vance In the physical sciences, It can be no less im­ portant In realms more directly humane in quality. Springing from the events closest to human welfare, value theory would indeed be a travesty if it did not return to them with a clarifying and directing function. Dewey does not claim to present a complete theory of valuation.

The attempt to do so would violate basic

experimental principles. An actual theory fof valuation] can be completed only when inquiries into things sustaining the relation of ends-means have been systematically conducted and their results brought to bear upon the formation of desires and ends. For the the­ ory of valuation is itself an intellectual or methodological means and as such can be devel­ oped and perfected only In and by use. Since that use does not now exist in any adequate way, the critical considerations advanced and con­ clusions reached outline a program to be under­ taken, rather than a complete theory.(1) Theory of valuation represents only the outline of a program to be undertaken, developed and perfected through 1. Dewey, Theory of valuation, pp. 53-54.

172

experimentation.

The program may be summed up as the re­

making of common sense; hut essential to this Is the re­ construction of behavior in the common sense world. It will be remembered that Dewey differentiates moral judgments as those In which emphasis falls on re­ construction of the self. (1)

Social inquiry, if it Is

inquiry and not mere analysis ,ex post facto, must similar­ ly Include the Idea of "organized association among those who are to execute the operations it formulates and di­ rects." (2)

Social and moral inquiry thus have in common

the character of focussing attention on human behavior as a factor to be reconsidered and, If necessary, re-formed. The same holds of any value judgment, Dewey claims.

In

value judgment, it is "means and ends" that receive pri­ mary attention. (3)

Valuations are "appraisals of courses

of action as better and worse."(4)

Their subject matter

Is "the intelligent conduct of human activities, whether personal or associated*"(5) Dewey’s theory of valuation eventuates in a program 1. See above, pp. 137-138. 2. See above, pp. 155-156; Dewey, Logic. p. 503. The two propositions are virtually equivalent. The first could be restated: Moral inquiry must Inelude the Idea of a self executing the operations formulated and directed. Only as the self and its modes of behavior are included in the hypotheses can its reconstruction be the intel­ ligent outcome of Inquiry. 3. Dewey, Theory of valuation, pp. 23, 53. 4. Ibid.. p. 22; Italics mine. Ibid.. p. 57; Italics mine.

175

both because it is itself a methodological means and its subject matter is judgments intimately concerned with problems of human behavior• his theory of valuation*

That program is outlined in

It finds richer and fuller ex­

pression in his philosophy of education* The blunt claim that Dewey *s philosophy of educa­ tion represents the program implicit in his theory of valuation may seem oversimplified to the point of danger* Certainly one can not be dialecticaliy derived from the other*

Deweyfs philosophy of education, if it is to be

consistent with his own principles, must relate primarily to existential educational problems*

Educational prac­

tice, says Dewey: *** .is the beginning and the close: the beginning, beeause it sets the problems which alone give to investigations educational point and q uality; the close, because practice alone can test, verify, modify and develop the conclusions of these in­ vestigations. (l) Referring directly to philosophy of education, he notes that iti •••.neither originates nor settles feducational] ends*•••.Concrete educational experience is the primary source of inquiry and reflection because it sets the problems, and tests, modifies, con­ firms or refutes the conclusions of intellectual investigation. (2) A philosophy of education must spring from the matrix of 1* Dewey, Sources of a science of education* PP* 33—34* 2. Ibid* r p. 56*

174 educational Institutions, practices, and experiences-— the present art of education*

It cannot be a mere sub­

ordinate aspect or application of a general scheme of values independently constructed* Dewey suggests that the function of a philosophy of education is to criticize and interpret educational practice "in the light of a general scheme of values*" (l) It Is claimed here that his philosophy of education out­ line s the program Involved in his theory of value* Neither of these statements implies that philosophy of education is subordinated or externally related to theory of value* They do imply that theory of value and philosophy of edu­ cation are essentially one and the same* De^ey, philosophy is theory of education*

According to "The most

penetrating definition of philosophy which can be given is*.**that it is the theory of education In Its most general phases*"(2)

Yet philosophy jis, basically, theory

of value. Philosophy is inherently criticism, having Its distinctive position among various modes of criticism in its generality; a criticism of criticisms, as it were* Criticism is dis­ criminating Judgment, careful appraisal, and judgment is appropriately termed criticism wherever the subject-matter of discrimination concerns goods or values*(3) 1. Dewey, Sources of a science of education* p* 56. 2. Dewey, Democracy and education* p. 386. 3* Dewev. Experience and nature. p* 398*

175 The present discussion Is devoted to two related theses*

The first Is that the implications apparent when

the two passages just cited are taken together are liter­ ally and profoundly true to Deweyfs thinking.

The state­

ments do not represent an inconsistency, nor are they to he considered rhetorical remarks to confer prestige on a sdb ject matter Dewey was absorbed in at the moment of writing.

His philosophy of education and theory of value

are essentially the same, despite differences of terminolo gy that may appear In writings under the two headings. Philosophy is criticism of criticisms, theory of valua­ tion, and, as Dewey sayss ....education proposes to philosophy q uestions which challenge all its resources and which test all Its theories. If philosophy Is to come forth from a closeted seclusion and submit to the test of application, the problems of educa­ tion furnish it with its most direct and most urgent opportunity.(l) Hence "the philosophy of education is not a poor rela­ tion of general philosophy..... it is ultimately the most significant phase of p h i l o s o p h y (2) The second thesis Is that if we look Into those publications representative of Dewey's philosophy of edu­ cation, w© find them to be occupied with the program and 1. Schilpp (ed.), Higher education faces_the future, p.

2B2.

2. Dewey, "The relation of science and philosophy as the basis of education," School and society. XLVII (1938) , 471.

176 proposals developed in his theory of valuation; that is, with the remaking of common sense*

Many routes could be

followed, all leading to the conclusions in which this chapter rests*

Probably the best, because it preserves

the pattern and method of Dewey's own thought, is that which stresses the experience to which his theories re­ late* The Criteria of a Valuative lihrperl ence Dewey's theory of value suggests criteria for determining what is a genuinely valuative experience. His philosophy of education contains proposed ways of creating genuinely educational experience.

The relationship be­

tween these criteria and suggested rules of procedure is intimate * According to Dewey, a genuinely valuative experi­ ence does not exist apart from a problem.

There is a

confused, conflicting, or obscure situation which In­ cludes some one or group in whom confused, conflicting or obscure responses are called forth.

There Is, as was

just shown, a question of action involved in the problem­ atic nature of the situation.

This is equivalent to as­

serting that the consequences of acting in ways suggested by constituents of the situation are Indeterminate.

It

means also that the Individual or group has interest in the situation.

Something vital, but not fully known,

177 depends upon its outcome.

There is something at stake.

A valuative experience is marked by a special kind of reaction to the problematic situation.

Forced

compromise is not valuative, but a means of avoiding valu­ ation.

Application of traditional or accustomed standards

is not valuative unless there has been some question re­ garding their applicability, and their appropriateness has been determined on grounds Inherent In the situation* Precipitate action is not valuative, but Is ignoring the need for valuation.

A valuative experience, If it begins

in a problem, Is made possible only by the attitude of doubt.

Preservation of this attitude and action imbued

with its quality are essential to the existence of valu­ ation, (l)

Doubt is not sustained because it is something

good in Itself, isolated, but because it is pregnant with the meanings found in acting doubtfully.

These meanings

order and regulate activities stimulated by and expressing doubt.

Thus In a valuative experience, doubting involves

a program.

To doubt is to do something about a situation. (2)

Inquiry, the ordered program of doubting, can be analyzed into several phases which, however, because of earlier discussion, need nothing more than mention here. The first is search for suggestive aspects of the problem. 1. See above, pp. 160-161. 2. See above, p. 161.

178 Suggested meanings are then considered In their relations with one another, and their implications drawn out in so far as they appear helpful In solution of the problem, (l) Criticism formulates alternative plans of action and their probable consequences (2), and experimentation is then conducted along the lines Indicated*(3)

New data, sug­

gesting new ideas and experiments are then disclosed. (4) In a complete valuative experience the process concludes only when facts and values, the various critical phases of the problem, are ordered into a meaningful whole. As the doubtful and conflicting nature of the problem Includes a person or group to begin with, the harmonized situation that consummates valuation involves reconstruction of attitudes through Incorporation of new meanings.(5)

It completes a change or growth, the change

being legitimately called growth because of added capacity to respond constructively In situations formerly problema­ tic.

It is unique, not merely in the sense that every­

thing that happens is un&que in some respect, but in the sense that it Is a memorable experience. perience . Dewey says that oftentimes: 1. See above, 2. See above, 3. See above, 4. See above, 5. See above,

pp. 170-172 . pp. 170-172; 151. pp. 149ff. p. 121-122. pp. 121-122, 134—140*

In Art as ex­

179

Tilings are experienced but not in such a way that they are composed into an experience* There is distraction and dispersion; what we observe and we think, what we desire and what we get, are at odds with each other* •••• Xn contrast with such an experience, we have an experience when the material experienced runs its course to fulfillment* Then and then only is it integrated within and demarcated in the general stream of experience from other ex­ periences* A piece of work is finished in a way that is satisfactory; a situation, whether that of eating a meal, playing a game of chess, carrying on a conversation, writing a book, or taking part in a political campaign, is so rounded out that its close is a consummation and not a cessation* Such an experience is a whole and carries with it its own individualiz­ ing quality and self-sufficiency. It is an experience, (l) Such an experience does not merely happen. filment, marks a growth.

It is a ful­

Each "part leads into another"

and "carries on what went before" (2), as the whole "moves toward a close."(3) The continuity and integration characteristic of valuative experience incorporate a developed art.(4) is not an external instrument producing unity.

Art

If we de­

fine It as the habits and practices Influencing the situatioh, It Is Itself reformed as part of the emerging unity. 1. 2* 3. 4.

Dewey, Art as experience, p. 35. Ibid*, p* 33* Ibid.* p* 41* Note the two statements* "JTo experience of any sort Is a unity unless it has esthetic quality" (Dewey, Art as experience. p* 40); "Art denotes a process of doing or making" fibid.» p. 47).

18G There is.**.an element of undergoing, of suffer­ ing in its large sense, in every experience. Otherwise there would he no taking in of what preceded* *.*.."taking in" ....involves recon­ struction which may he painful, (l) Whether pleasurable or painful, there is a reconstruction that probes into one*s life.

Habits are reorganized as

their relation to what is undergone is understood. Dewey says, an experience is nnot

As

doing and under­

going in alternation, but consists of them in relation­ ship. w(2)

If a consumxnatory experience reflects artistry

in doing, it mirrors also the intelligent growth of artist­ ry*

"Perception of relationship between what is done and

what is undergone constitutes the work of Intelligence.”(3) Artistry, creative activity, is activity reconstructed and controlled by such perception.

"Doing or making Is

artistic when the perceived result Is of such a nature that its qualities as perceived have controlled the ques­ tion of production."(4) be separated because they

"Creation and criticism cannot the rhythm of output and

intake, of expiration and Inspiration, in our mental breath and spirit."(5)

1. 2. 3* 4. 5.

Dewey, Ibid», jjjjtjd*, Ibid. * Dewey,

Art as experience* p. 41* p • 44* p. 43* p. 48* Construction and criticism* p. 21.

181 The Valuative Nature of Educational Bxoerl e n ^ In Dewey*s philosophy of education we find the criteria of a genuinely valuative experience translated Into educational rules and procedures*

Thus the develop­

ment of the present discussion parallels, In general that of the one just preceding.

A valuative experience, Dewey

says, emerges only In a situation in which a person has an interest or stake*

In Democracy and education he

writes that lack of interest signifies that the situation **lacks connection with purposes and present power; or that if the connection be there, it is not perceived.n(l)

Yet

the whole nquestion of method is ultimately reducible to the question of the order and development of the child ts powers and interests**1(2)

Where there is no perceived

connection between the child *s purposes and his echool activities, there is no educational method.

Whatever

skills and plans the teacher may possess are then Ir­ relevant*

**The constant and careful observation of inter­

ests is of the utmost importance to educatorsw(3), and its importance lies in directing the control over school life that an educator exercizes*

A teacher is obliged to de­

termine 11that environment which will interact with the 1* Dewey, Democracy and education* p* 150* 2. Ratner Ced.) » Education tOdayT p. 12. 3• jd*., p* 13*

182

existing capacities and needs of those taught to create a worthwhile experience ."(l) Xt should he noted that Dewey does not mean by Interest a subjective feeling isolated within the self* An Interest Is a relationship to objective conditions* "Every interest*...attaches itself to an object."(2) "Interest, concern, mean that self and world are engaged with each other in a developing situation."^)

The very

definition of interest, together with Deweyfs suggestion regarding its function in education, imply that an educa­ tional experience is one in which the self is Included in an objective situation, and that this inclusion is marked by some vital connection* A host of educational principles relate to these facts.

A few Illustrations must suffice.

The control of

subject matter, for example, in an educational experience is determined in terms of Interest* The subject matter of the learner-*• •cannot be Identical with the formulated, the crystallized, and systematized subject matter of the adult. ....the latter.«..enters Into the activities of the expert and the educator, not into that of the beginner.. ..^4) The material for learning must be found In experience. (5) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Dewey, Ibid.. Dewey, Ibid.Dewey,

Experience and education. P* 44. p. 19. Democracy and education, p. 148* p. 215. Experience and education, p. 89*

183 Whatever prevents subject matter from being of real in­ terest, whether it be form of organisation, remoteness from common concern, or lifelessness of interpretation, also prevents It from being educative* Principles of educational motivation are obvi­ ously suggested in the function of interest in learning. Interest, says Dewey, "is a name for the fact that a course of action, an occupation, or pursuit absorbs the powers of an individual in a thoroughgoing way.«(l) Motivation, If educative, Is not a process of dressing up, of sugar coating, of enforcing by constraint.

It is

the selection and presentation of materials In relation to developing Interests and plans of action.

From the

standpoint of the learner, motivation Is a sense of the bearing of present activities on some need or aim. (2) The problematic character of the situation in which an educational as well as a valuative experience grows is implied In Dewey* s statement that motivation and Interest have reference to aims and purposes.

Dif­

ficulties have an important function in education. If one mean by a task simply an undertaking In­ volving difficulties that have to be overcome, then children, youth, and adults alike require tasks In order that there may be continued development* (3) 1* Dewey, Interest and effort in education, p. 65. 2. Dewey, Democracy and education, p. 147* 3. Dewey, Experience and education, p. 54*

184

It Is only In reference to the problematic that aims and interests function.

If there Is no problem, no difficul­

ty, no confusion, experience has no need to be anything but what It Is, no forward propulsion nor need for growth* The words, "concern, Interest,**..suggest that a person Is bound up with the possibilities inhering in ob Jects" (l) , not merely with what Is already present. According to Dewey, "Probably the most frequent eause of failure in school to secure genuine thinking from students Is the failure to Insure the existence of an ex­ perienced situation of such a nature as to call out think­ ing. •.*"(2)

Such a situation "Is In some fashion uncertain,

perplexed, troublesome, if only in offering to the mind an unresolved difficulty, an unsettled question."(3)

Educa­

tional methods fail when the demands made on the student are artificial and arbitrary*

This may create problems

for the student, it Is true, but problems that inspire learning to avoid questions, assigned tasks and disci­ plinary exercizes*

The problem, the one so carefully and

painstakingly outlined by the teacher as an educational means, may not be a problem to anyone but the teacher. Educators must ask concerning a problem, "Is it the pu­ pil* s own problem, or is the teacher *s or the textbook *s 1. Dewey, Democracy and education, p* 146. 2. Dewey, How we think* p. 99* Sbid*. p* 100.

185 problem made a problem for the pupil only because he cannot get the required mark or be promoted or win the teacher* s approval, unless he deals with it?"(l)

If the

latter, the problem and the learning have shifted.

Learn­

ing is then relative to the aims of promotion, marks, approval. A pupil has a problem, but it Is the problem of meeting the peculiar requirements set by the teacher. His problem becomes that of finding out what the teacher wants.. •• .Relationship to subject matter is no longer direct.(2) Educative and valuative experiences, Dewey affirms, emerge only when one is engaged In and with a problematic situation Involving desires, interests, obstructions to their full satlsfaction,and consequent perplexity.

A

valuative experience, It was said, arises only under the further condition of a special kind of reaction within a field of this nature~the reaction of doubting.

Doubt,

and the activities it Includes, are likewise distinctive characteristics of education. Dewey1s book, How we think.

This is the meaning of It was shown above that

Dewey regards scientific method as the art of doubting constructively, and that the scientific attitude is one which values doubting as a means to increased under­ standing. (3)

In the preface to How we think. Dewey notes

1. Dewey, Democracy and education, p. 182. 2. Ibid., p. 183. 3. See above, p. 137.

186

the need for "some clew of unity, some principle that makes for simplification" for teachers striving to di­ rect educational programs.

He then states:

This book represents the conviction that the needed steadying and centralizing factor is found In adopting as the end of endeavor that attitude of mind, that habit of thought, which we call scientific.....this book also repre­ sents the conviction....that the native and unspoiled attitude of childhood, marked by ar­ dent curiosity, fertile imagination, and love of experimental inquiry, is near, very near, to the attitude of the scientific mind, (l) It is unnecessary to recapitulate details of the scientific method, as our purpose is only to demonstrate that the educational procedures Dewey advocates fulfill the program of his theory of valuation.

The famous

"five phases of reflective thinking," together with cer­ tain related educational principles, serve this purpose well.

They are: (A) observation and suggestion, or the

search for meaningful aspects of the situation; (B) in­ tellect ualizat Ion, or the locating of the problem in terms of the meanings suggested; (C) development of hypotheses, or tentative planning; (D) determination of the relations of the hypotheses in a system of Ideas; and (E) experimentation, or testing of hypotheses.(2) Dewey *s entire philosophy of education could be stated in expanding the meaning of the above five points1. Dewey, How we think, p. v. 2. Ibid.. pp: 107-115.

187 This does not Imply that the Intellectual Is overs tressed; on the contrary, it signifies that reflective thinking is more than manipulation of ideas*

Dewey charges that un­

fortunately, "Thinking is often regarded both In philo­ sophic theory and In educational practice as something cut off from experience, and capable of being cultivated in isolation*.•• .Thinking is experience." (l)

Deweyfs stress

on activity In education is due to the original need for "immediate crude handling of the familiar material of ex­ perience* as a basis for thinking to build upon (2 ), and the subsequent need, as we shall see, of projects in which ideas take effect in reordering experience* The material of an educational experience must be in some way uncertain, but in itself this criterion Is in­ adequate*

Subject matter must also be suggestive.

Obser­

vation, the first phase of reflective thinking, can not occur apart from materials that have at least some mean­ ing to the student.

In the beginning this meaning may

be no more than that which accrues in crude handling or simple play, expressing naive interest in widening the "range of acquaintance with persons and things*"(3)

But

curiosity, which Dewey likens to the scientific attitude itself, Is preserved only where the range of acquaintance 1. Dewey, Democracy and education, p. 180. S. Tbid.. pp. 178-180. 3. Dewey, How we think, p. 248.

188

Is stimulating and suggestive.

Otherwise It quickly sub­

sides into indifference to dull routine or scattered ex­ citation that lead nowhere*

Undue emphasis on repetitive

drill secures "automatic skill at the expense of percep­ tion." (l)

In drill of this sort, materials are organized

without reference to their function in suggesting meanings. What meaning they have is soon lost; the function of mean­ ings is to lead experience forward, but here external con­ ditions force experience back upon itself In endless cycles of repetition. The same principle limits the degree and range of uncertainty consistent with an educational outcome. perplexity is not educative.

Utter

It reflects a situation void

of helpful suggestions, without meanings adequate even for experimentation.

Difficulties

.... sometimes... .overwhelm and submerge and dis­ courage. ....A large part of the art of instruc­ tion lies in making the difficulty of new prob­ lems large enough to challenge thought, and small ehough so that, in addition to the con­ fusion naturally attending the novel elements, there shall be luminous familiar spots from which helpful suggestions may spring.(2) Valuation and education, born in uncertain and incomplete circumstances, have a career to follow, aims to achieve, suggestions to take up; but they can not do this unless materials supply meanings. 1* Dewey, Democracy and education, p. 60. Ibid.. p. 184.

189

Educational principles relating to the second phase of reflective thinking are suggested in the mater­ ials just cited*

An educational experience depends upon

the existence of sufficient meanings to support the pro­ cess of inteilectuali zation.

Intellectualization means

location and definition of the problem, (l)

The relation­

ships and meanings residing in the situation must be capable of having some focus.

Outside of school this

occurs in the course of experience because meanings and suggestions are taken up with reference to some blocked aim or purpose.

But the control teachers exercise over

the school situation, while it may result in the presence of problems more fruitful, may also deprive students of the experience of locating and defining problems.

Dewey

contrasts jyi experience with distraction and dispersion. (2) Meanings are present, but they cannot be related together In terms of any one factor or series of possible alterna­ tives.

These factors must be, ultimately, means-conse­

quence continuities.

A teacher presumably might present

materials rich in meaning In his own frame of reference and possibly exciting to students.

But unless provision

is made for the excitation^ to work out into some accom­ plishment, the experience is not educative. 1. Dewey, How we think, p. 108. 2m See above, p. 180.

"The relation

190

of means-consequence Is the center and heart of all under­ standing. n(l)

Dry and meaningless material Is that which

Is considered apart from its hearing as a means to achieve­ ment.

Distractive and dispersive material is that which

permits no continuity from means to consequence.

Both

kinds are such as to prevent the process of intellectualization, or locating and defining a problem. The third phase of reflective thinking is develop­ ment of an hypothesis, a tentative solution to the probXem in hand.

An hypothesis is a suggestion, corrected, modi­

fied, expanded in the process of locating the problem. (2) Familiar aspects of the situation suggest possibilities, an hypothesis formulates expectations in terms of them and the action supposed to effect them.(s)

Some educa­

tional principles bearing on the Instrumental function of ideas have already been presented, for ideas can be In­ strumental only in relation to something to be attained, some Interest or purpose.

The nature of hypotheses

throws important additional light on what is an educative experience.

Hypotheses are hypothetical.

The seeming

truism expresses the fact that education is exploratory* An hypothesis Is a supposed relation of means and conse­ quence*

It is an idea to be tried out.

Thus the function

1. Dewey, How we think, p. 146. 2. Ibid.. pp. 109-110. 3. Dewey, Democracy and education, p. 189.

191

of hypotheses direct us to examination of school condi­ tions that re—enforce or weaken this use of ideas. Perhaps the most common error in schools is to present ideas in Isolation— or rather, to attempt to pre­ sent them apart from experienced subject matter.

"Uo

thought, no idea, can possibly be conveyed as an idea from one person to another."(l)

Lessons which lie in

the realm of theory can not be educative except as they build upon a groundwork of actual experience and lead to directed action in further experience. as thoughts are Incomplete.

"Thoughts just

At best they are tentative;

they are suggestions, indications.

They are standpoints

and methods for dealing with situations of experience."(2) Because the attempt is made to present ideas in Isolation, education and valuation are often replaced by memorizing meaningless verbal formulas.

The effect is to repeat

back what the teacher has said rather than to press for­ ward Into new experiences. In manipulating symbols so as to recite well, to get and give correct answers..«.the pupil’s at­ titude becomes mechanical, ratter than thought­ ful; verbal memorizing is substituted for in­ quiry into the meaning of things, (s) A second and equally unfortunate practice is to assume that students possess the experience needed for 1. Dewey, Democracy and education, p. 188. 2. Ibid.. p. 189. 3« IpId. . p. 238.

192

giving point and reality to ideas merely because they show evidence In recitation of linking them to what they have experienced.

The reaction is deceiving to both stu­

dent and teacher.

Because an idea may seem related to

experience already had, may seem to sum up and interpret the meaning of what has gone before, it appears adequate. The experience needed for giving point and reality to ideas projects Into the future as well as the past. the experience of trying them out.

It is

"Only application tests

them, and only testing confers full meaning and a sense of their reality."(1)

Likewise, It is only as Ideas are ap­

plied and tested that there is full realization of their nature as tentative Instruments.

Ideas that relate back

only are divorced from the means of correction and revision. The demagogue and the pedagogue, the one because he does not want people to know the consequences and real aims of his proposals, the other because he has no real aims or proposals, delight In formulas that seem to sum up ele­ ments of past experience but fail to disclose ideas rel­ evant to the present and future. An hypothesis is tentative both in the sense that It has to be tested by the empirical consequences of act­ ing on It and that it is subject to revision and correc­ tion through its relations with other ideas. 1. Dewey, Democracy and education, p. 189.

The fourth

phase of reflective thinking Is reasoning— the deliber­ ative rehearsal of plans of action, their probable con­ sequences, the meaning and further effects of those con­ sequences.

This Is one of the most liberative and edu­

cative activities open to us, yet Is easily subject to perversion and misuse.

On the positive side it can be

a means In virtually dissolving the confining walls of the classroom and incorporating the historic past, the present life of community and world, the challenge of the future, Into educative experience.

Or, it may be a

means of escaping the facts that a school room has confIning walls and the experience of the learner is restricted and inadequate. Experience is miseducatlve when ideas are Isolated from their function.

The fact that they can be Inter­

related almost without end is tempting to substitute ab­ stract reasoning for the conditions of growth.

Deduction

Is not profitable "without first making acquaintance with the particular facts that create a need for definition and generalization."(l)

Correlative with this error is

the failure to direct Ideas back "Into further cases..*. Of experience•* (2)

The net result is random experience,

disguised, perhaps, by the appearance of dialectic _________________________

_

_

-

1. Dewey, How we think, p. 187. 2. Ibid.

-

|

,

,

M -

-

n. 1T1TTi r ------ —

194

proficiency.

Yet reasoning may bring the remote to bear

on the immediate, may Integrate present activities as functions in a scientific, economic, social, artistic— or for that matter any other— world of events.

Ideas

"are anticipations of some continuity or connection of an activity and a consequence which has not as yet shown it­ self, "(l)

Through reasoning the potentialities of exper­

ience are more fully appreciated.

Thought is "incursion

Into the novel. .. .Is original in a pro jection of considera­ tions which have not been previously apprehended."(2) The final phase of reflective thinking, experi­ mental testing, is implicit in Dewey’s discussion of all other four.

If reasoning is an element of valuative and

educational experience, it is only because by Its means a problematic situation is rendered less confining.

We

are not restricted to the meanings directly apprehended in its easily recognizable aspects.

Suggestions may be

developed through a "serial order of conceptions, one leading to another in regular sequence*(3 ), to the point where that which occurs locally and is transitory can be Interpreted in relation to wide areas of experi­ ence formulated in standardized concepts.

Dewey does

not deny, but expressly affirms the educative and 1. Dewey, Democracy and q^uc^tion. p. 189. 2. Ibid., pp. 186-187. 3. Dewey, How we think, pp. 179-180.

195

valuative character of reasoning itself.

"Ho one, it

is safe to say, has ever become distinguished as a thinker in any field of science or philosophy who did not have an absorbing interest in the relation of Ideas for their own sake.*(l)

Yet this activity, "absolutely

indispensable to the growth of science and to high per­ sonal Intellectual cultivation* (2) , must be recognized for what it is— playing with and considering possibili­ ties.

Only as these possibilities direct operations

disclosing consequences can we be sure restricted ex­ perience has been correctly related within broader fields of endeavor, for this is the only means of knowing whether the restrictions, confinements and obstructions can be overcome • The question of authority in education may be treated In terms of experimentation.

Dewey notes that

the very attempt to be scientific in education may dis­ tort educational procedures.

"No conclusion of scien­

tific research can be converted into an immediate rule of educational art.*(3)

He illustrates with the case

of one, who, finding that girls mature more rapidly than boys, Inferred that they should be segregated from one another in school.(4) 1. 2. 3. 4#

Even though the fact were

Dewey, How we think, p. 183. Ibid. Dewey, Sources of a science of education, p. 19* Ibid., p. 18.

196

experimentally determined., Its meaning for educational practice was not.

Education, Dewey believes, Is "a

kind of social engineering."(l)

Like all engineering,

it draws upon a wide range of scientific knowledge, but only as it is experimentally shown how this knowledge is relevant.

The engineer:

....employs....scientific results as Intellectual tools jjn his empirical procedures. That is, they direct his attention. In both observation and re­ flection, to conditions and relationships which would otherwise escape him...... scientific re­ sults furnish a rule for the conduct of observa­ tions and inquiries....$3) The implication is that the teacher cannot submit un­ questioning to the authority of the psychologist or sociolo­ gist, but must be an Investigator himself.

Furthermore,

this requirement does not exist because of the needs of teachers alone.

In replying to the charge that teachers

are incapable of participating In educational research, Dewey comments: The objection proves too much, so much that it Is almost fatal to the idea of a workable scientific content in education. For these teachers are the ones through whom the results of scientific find­ ings finally reach students*....1 suspect that if these teachers are mainly channels of reception and transmission, the conclusions of science will be badly deflected and distorted before they get into the minds of pupils.(3)

1. Dewey, Sources of a science of education, p. 39. 2. Ibid.. p. 30. 3. Ibid.. p. 47.

197

The manner In which science Is "deflected and dis­ torted* In the process of transmission is that its find­ ings are interpreted as "recipes to he followed. "(1)

Sci­

entific conclusions are thus easily employed as instrumen­ tal to "the hiaaan desire to he an ’authority’"(2)

Recog­

nition of authority Itself Is not miseducatlve• Dewey has phrased his proposal for the remaking of common sense in terms of making science authoritative in every-day life. (3)

The method of experimentation is proposed for

common sense because of the authority it has earned whereever continuously and consistently applied. Scientific method is not just a method which It has been found profitable to pursue in this or that abstruse subject for purely technical rea­ sons. It represents the only method of thinking that has proved fruitful in any subject.(4) The authority of science is not

one thatclaims toregu­

late externally, however, but by drawing enlarging areas of experience into its fold.

Thus, returning to con­

sideration of an educative experience, the theoretical conclusions reached in deliberation, even when the mean­ ings employed have been standardized through scientific experimentation, have but one elaim~to guide activities that may disclose how and in what ways they may be 1. 2. 3. 4.

Dewey, Sources of a science of education, p. 47. Ibid. See above, p. 129. Ratner (ed.), Characters and events. II, 774.

198 authoritative.

The "role of the individual, or the self,

In knowledge* Is "the redirection, or reconstruction of accepted beliefs•*(!)

This role is cast aside when

teachers simply present conclusions reached outside the experience of the child— or, for that matter, fail to provide opportunity for testing and revising the conclu­ sions that may hajre been reached by the student himself. Learning— coming to know— Is replaced by the crowding of experience Into arbitrary categories, for "learning means something which the Individual does when he studies."(2) It would be a mistake, of the order just discussed, to convert Dewey’s analysis of reflective thinking into a recipe.

The sequence of the five phases of reflective

thought Is not fixed, nor does equal emphasis fall upon them in every undertaking. (3)

Some situations call for

extensive theoretical criticism, while in others the em­ phasis must lie more on observation and the search for suggestions.

It Is not the analysis alone, but the situa­

tion that controls what stress must be given to each phase and what order Is most fruitful.

This recalls attention

to Dewey’s re-lterated point that reflective thinking is intermediary in valuation and education, a special way of moving from the doubtful to the determinate. 1. Dewey, Democracy and education, p. 346. 2. Ibid.. p. 390. 3. Dewey, How we think - pp. 115-119.

In this

199

process, observation, reasoning, experimentation inter­ act continuously* (1) The term "determinate situation" is abstract* It names a kind of situation, but does not express the rich, variety of experiences that may have determinate charac­ ter In common*

To say that the processes of valuation

and education end In a determinate situation may be the truth, but not the whole truth.

It would be patently

false if "determinate" were interpreted as "absolutely determinate."

But even when correctly interpreted, the

statement lacks any pretension of artistic representa­ tion of what such situations are or may be like.

let

Dewey would be the first to stress the need for fuller appreciation of their qualities, for to do so is to un­ derstand more of that in which education and valuation consist* The office of mind Is to liberate experience from dogma and unmeaning, "from routine and from caprice." (2) In terms of valuation, it is to free us from the control of unintelligent desires, purposes that are "shortsighted and irrational*"(3) panions *"(4) 1* 2* 3* 4.

"Creation and criticism are com­

In terms of education, the office of mind

Dewey, How wethink* pp* 115-118. Dewey, Creative intelligence* p. 63. Dewey, Theoryof valuation, p. 52. Dewey,Cons tr taction and criticism, p. 18.

200

is to emancipate experience not only from arbitrary ex­ ternal control, but from the dictation of "immediate whim and caprice ."(l)

Education, valuation, Inquiry**^

whatever term is used— means experience freeing Itself through the re-ordering of impulse into purpose and the transforming of blind activity into intelligent control. (2) It Involves "the progressive development of what Is al­ ready experienced into a fuller and richer and more or­ ganized form. ..."(3) A determinate situation is one in which growth is manifested.

It testifies to Increased capacity and powerz

"power to frame purposes, to judge wisely, to evaluate de­ sires by the consequences which will result from acting upon them; power to select and order means to carry chosen ends Into operation."(4)

It represents what Dewey calls

an experience, achieved only In and through art, "that recreation of experience which is the essence of educa­ tion." (5)

It Is not something that merely happens to

fall into harmony and order; but something that has been ordered and harmonized, through the growth of capacities that were beforehand lacking. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Dewey, Experience and education, p. 75. Ibid.. p. 78. Ibid., p. 87. Ibid.. p. 74. teandall, "Art and religion as education," The social frontier. II (January, 1936), 113.

201

In every integral experience there is form be­ cause there is dynamic organization. I call It the organization dynamic because it takes time to complete it, because it Is a growth. There is inception, development, fulfillment, (l) The word "determinate" may call attention to the intel­ lectual contributions to a eons mama tory experience, but the growth attained is the growth of a living being, not a bare intellect. It is not possible to divide in a vital experi­ ence the practical, emotional, and intellectual from one another* ....The emotional phase binds parts together into a single whole; "Intellectu­ al" simply names the fact that the experience has meaning; "practical" indicates that the or­ ganism is Interacting with events and objects which surround it.(2) Valuation, education, are "the ordering of a growing ex­ perience, one that involves....the whole of the live creature, toward a fulfilling conclusion."(3) Growth as the Remaking of Common Sense The end and aim of education, Dewey says, Is growth. (4)

To some this has seemed to imply that educa­

tion must then be without criteria, for growth can be In any direction.(5)

Dewey’s answer Is that some growths

1. Dewey, Art as exoerience. p. 55*

. Ipift*« P»

2. Tb^d

81. 4. Dewey, Democracy and education. Chapter IV. 5. Note especially Ulich, Fundamentals of democratic education. Chapter III. Professor Ulich believes that Dewey does not really hold his own formulation of the end of education is adequate, for in his "practical" writings he specifies the directions of education.

202

may intersect and cut short others, while some re-en­ force one another.

Some may hinder further growth in

any direction, iiicludji^ that; along which growth first .started.

Like cancer, or certain parasites, they may

grow until they check and destroy the springs of their nourishment.

Education Is concerned with "retention

[and increase} of capacity to grow...."(l)

"Any exper­

ience is mis—educative that has the effect of arresting or distorting the growth of further experience."(2) Dewey stresses that the "initiative in growth comes from the needs and powers" of the individual. (3) Much of Dewey’s educational thought is concerned with means of preserving rather than destroying this initia­ tive.

He believes that "each individual that comesinto

the world Is a new beginning; the universe itself is,

as

it were, taking a fresh start In him and trying to do something^ even if on a small scale, that It has never done before."(4)

Balanced against this is the fact that

only In a social medium can this Initiative function in­ telligently.

"The meaning of native activities Is not

native; It is acquired.

It depends upon interaction with

a mattered social medium."(5) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Dewey, Dewey, Ratner Dewey, Dewey,

"The inchoate and scattered

Democracy and education, p. 206. Experience and education, p. 13. Ted .TV Education today. t>. 290. Construction and criticism, p. 3. Human nature and conduct, p. 90.

203

impulses of an infant do not co-ordinate Into service­ able powers except through social dependencies and com­ panionships ." (l) Education faces this basic fact;

Growth must be,

is. manifested In a social medium. The end of education is said to be the harmonious development of all the powers of the individual. Here no reference to social life or membership is apparent, and yet many think we have in it an adequate and thoroughgoing definition of the goal of education. But if this definition be taken Independently of social relationship we have no way of telling what is meant by any of the terms employed. We do not know what a power is; we do not know what harmony is. A power is a power only with reference to the use to which It is put, the function It has to serve. (2) Growth is miseducative when it destroys the conditions of further growth.

It Is miseducative, for instance,

when the end of growth, as with the pedant, Is a state in which all Impulse and originality is suppressed in deference to external authority.

It is equally misedu-

cative, and for the same basic reason, when the organiza­ tion and development of personal powers are such as to break down the social medium which is the sustenance of continued maturation.

Education is life— "Learning? cer­

tainly, but living primarily, and learning through and in relation to this living."(3)

"This living" is, for

1. Dewey, Human nature and conduct, p. 94. 2. Dewey, Moral principles in education, pp. 11-12. 3. Dewey, School and society, p. 37.

204

human beings, basically a social undertaking.

Hence,

while Deweyfs philosophy of education is "individualis­ tic" in the sense that it is designed to foster the initiative, creative impulse and reconstructive interest of the individual, it is social in stressing that this can be attained only in and through social interaction. In the school and in all educative experience, "Indivi­ dualism and socialism are one."(l) It is this fact which is controlling in determin­ ing whether the direction of growth Is fruitful or de­ structive.

It should be noted that the emphasis is on

the proposition that living j£s social. descriptive, not normative.

The statement is

Yet it is in the situation

described that we find basis for the normative assertion that education should be social as opposed to anti-so­ cial.

The conversion is neither direct nor simple.

Cer­

tainly educational growth Is not equated with learning to support present social arrangements.

On the contrary,

education questions the past and present to determine what aspects "are relevant to our own lives and how shall they be reshaped to be of use." (2)

The clew lies

in the materials presented in earlier chapters.

The

mea-nlr>p of experience Is grounded in shared activities. 1. Dewey, School and society, p. 3. 2. Dewey, Construction and criticism, p. 24.

205

Past and present social arrangements may be such as to binder full sharing, to provincialize the meanings en­ tering into It*

Adaptation to present circumstances may

therefore re-enforce Isolation and bias.(l)

It may pro­

mote a growth that cuts short further growth. Chapter I was devoted to Dewey’s theory of the emergence of mental behavior*

It concluded in the asser­

tion that, according to Dewey, mind and Intelligence emerge when language supervenes upon the activities com­ mon among groups of men.

Chapters II and III showed how

and why scientific inquiry, In the large sense, and valu­ ation are held to be one and the same.

Chapter IV de­

veloped the theme of reconstructing common sense.

In

doing this, It showed first that Dewey believes secure knowledge has been attained only concerning technical values which, although they are capable of absorbing the interest and zeal of a small group of specialists, are Instrumental to the controlling values and commitments of mankind*

Second, the realm of common sense inquiries,

those determining value standards outside of restricted technical areas, was presented in terms of a problematic situation.

Third, the division and conflict regnant

within this realm were attributed to failure in develop­ ing a unified method of Inquiry adapted to the creation 1. See above, p. 166

206

of ever increasing ranges of shared experience, and the scientific method was presented as the means for over­ coming this failure*

The order of progression, then,

was from shared activities, originating haphazardly and by chance, to the controlled use of those activities to enlarge and deepen the process of sharing.

This order

is exactly what DeWey means In saying that the end of education is growth, or that education, which Is growth, is its own end.

"Since growth Is the characteristic of

life, education is all one with growing; it has no end beyond itself."(l) Dewey points out that social groups influehce individuals in at least two ways, which he calls training and education. If a parent arranged conditions so that every time a child touched a certain toy he got burned, the child would learn to avoid that toy as automatically as he avoids touching fire....we are dealing with what may be called training in distinction from educative teaching.(2) In these cases: ....the activity of the immature human being Is simply played upon to secure habits which are useful. He is trained like an animal rather than educated like a human being. His Instincts remain attached to their original objects of pain or pleasure. But to get hap­ piness or to avoid the pain of failure he has to act In a way agreeable to others.(3> 1. Dewey, Democracy and education, p. 62. S. Ibid.. p. 15. 3* ., p . 16.

207

In education, by way of contrast, the individual: shares or participates in the common activity.... .his original impulse is modified. He not merely acts in a way agreeing with the actions of others, but, in so acting, the same Ideas and emotions are aroused in him that animate the others, (l) In education, original impulses and desires are "socIalIzed"**-that Is, they are modified by perceived re­ lations to other Interests and desires that have come to b© shared In the group*

The worth of activities Is not

measured by whether they match those of the group or con­ form to its usages, for there Is no assurance that cur­ rent modes of social interaction provide for the utmost of shared experience.

"A progressive society counts in­

dividual variations as precious since It finds In them the means of Its own growth." (2) It is clear that much social interaction of the present day has more of the quality of training than of education, for training consists in the "fixing," through arbitrary control, of consequences that deter activity not conforming to the aims and procedures of those who control*

This not only deprives the individual of the

opportunity to discover the meaning of his own inter­ ests, but Insulates controlling aims and purposes from the only source of constructive revision* 1. Dewey, Democracy and education, p. 16. 2. Ibid.. p. 357.

Dewey believes,

208

"It Is our social problem. •« .that method, purpose, un­ derstanding shall exist In the consciousness of the one who does the work, that his activity shall have meaning to himself."(l)

It is our social problem be­

cause meaning Is social in origin, and the degree to which an individual1s experience is meaningful marks the degree to which he is a member of society. Dewey defines a society as na number of people held together because they are working along common lines, In a common spirit, and with reference to common aims."(2) The effort to "train" is the effort to control regardless of method, purpose, understanding.

It Is the expression

of divided spirit and conflicting aims externally imposed. When Dewey writes of the school as an "embryonic society" (3), he means not only that the school Is a min­ iature society, reflecting "the life of the larger soci­ ety," but that education is the process of society form­ ing.

There should be no need at this point to recapitu­

late the materials presented In Chapter I. ing is obvious.

Their bear­

Underlying the intellectual process Is

the basic fact of associated activity. (4)

But the as­

sociation may be adventitious, enforced by geographical 1. 2. 3. 4.

Dewey, Ibid., Ibid.. Dewey,

School and society, p. 21. p. 11. p. 15. Democracy and education, p. 6.

209

proximity or constituted by the mere discovery of pre­ existent interests not too divergent to be compromised. Thus a group may be formed that is social only to limited degree.

"We are....compelled to recognize that within

even the most social group there are maiy relations which are not as yet social. "(1)

There is no prior guaranty

that the incomplete society formed through accidental identify of interests will prove capable of full growth, even though it has its own educative influence. A clique, a club, a gang, a Fagin’s household of thieves, the prisoners in a jail, provide edu­ cative environments for those who enter into their collective or conjoint activities, as truly as a church, a labor union, a business partnership, or a political party. Each of them is a mode of associated or community life, quite as much as is a family, a town, or a state.(2) In the school, the teacher’s function is to lead Interests and spontaneous activities into those that are "common and productive."(3)

Taken by itself, however,

this function, Important as it is, is but another acci­ dental force molding the life of the group.

That it pro­

motes sharing, provides the opportunity for meanings to ripen in experience and direct joint activities, Is of the utmost importance.

It signifies that the teacher,

1. Dewey, Democracy and education, p. 6; The public and its problems. p. 188: "The fact of association does not of itself make a society." 2. Dewey, Democracy and education, p. 25. 3. Dewey, School and society, p. 12.

210

drawing upon the resources of a wider range of experience in the human community, can contribute to the Integration of the school society within the larger sphere.

Yet It

also signifies that the teacher, to the degree that his experience Is narrow and biased, may create a growth that Is socially cancerous, destructive in its final effect. "There is a profound statement of Aristotle’s that the Individual who otherwise than by accident is not a mem­ ber of the state is either a brute or a god.^Cl)

If the

aim of education is growth, growth in such a direction that growth Is sustained and continued, it must be shared by student and teacher alike.

Otherwise, even vitally

educative experiences are married by something of the quality of training— control by external aim. Seemingly in direct conflict with this point, Dewey writes: "The deeper and more Intimate educative formation of disposition comes, without conscious intent, as the young gradually partake of the activities of the various groups to which they may belong. "(2)

In another

place, he calls unfavorable attention to school procedures that make the act of learning "a direct and conscious end in itself."(3)

These statements are not cited for the

purposes of bickering.

They can be explained in reference

1. Dewey, Influence of Darwin on philosophy. p. 49. 2. Dewey, Democracy and education, pp. 26-27. 3. Ibid.. p. 193.

211

to their context, which is a discussion of the isolation of educational method from subject matter and the presen­ tation of material that has none other but a school room meaning for the student, so that "the pupil’s attitude to it is just that of having to learn it."(l)

It is a

way of asserting that students should be occupied with their lessons "for real reasons or ends."(2)

They call

attention to the fact, however, that at some stage in the process of growth,the process itself must become an object of study, and, in reconstructed form, an objec­ tive to be pursued.

For unless education Itself is a

real aim, learning is not likely to take part aside from lessons.

If, in the educative process, a communicating

group has been formed, the forming process is among the shared resources it has to draw upon.

"Anything--event,

act, value, Ideal, person, or place— may be an object of thought."(3)

The mode or way in which a group is formed

has had consequences of Its own in group life, and the relations between the method and its effects can be formulated as Ideas operative in the growth and recon­ struction of method.

The development of scientific method

and the attitudes appropriate to it is "the supreme intel­ lectual obligation."

"Every course in every subject

1. Dewey, Democracy and education. p. 199* 2. Ibid. S. Dewey, Studie s in -log leal theory. pp» 1-2.

212

should have as its chief end the cultivation of these attitudes of mind."(l) No educational objective is adequate save love of learning.

Yfhat has been said may be translated directly

into valuative terms.

Dewey believes that the child’s

curiosity, furnishing energy to drive him along path­ ways originally cleared by the teacher, may eventually become transformed into a value— a value criticized and reconstructed as activities disclose Its meaning and develop it into a method suitable for expression in a social environment. The purpose of school education is to Insure the continuance of education by organizing the powers that Insure growth. The inclination to learn from life Itself and to make the conditions of life such that all will learn In the process of living is the finest product of schooling.(2) "Inclination" is perhaps not the best word, for Dewey here is not speaking of a blind tropism, but a highly conscious value, an absorbing Interest and aim 1. Dewey, "The supreme Intellectual obligation," Science, t.yy t v (1934), 242; Note also Dewey’s statement that science will not have won its appropriate place in the curriculum "until every subject and lesson is taught in connection with its bearing upon creation and growth of the kimd of power of observation, inquiry, reflec­ tion and testing that are the heart of scientific in­ telligence. Experimental philosophy is at one with the genuine spirit of a scientific attitude in the endeavor to obtain for scientific method this central place in education." (Dewey, "The relation of science and phil­ osophy as the basis of education," School and, society, XLVII (1938), 472. 2. Dewey, Democracy and education, p. 60.

213

refined through the study of its influence in a forming social group and judged worthy in the light of those consequences.

"The attitudes and general habits which

mark scientific method may themselves become an increas­ ingly Intense object of desire on the part of an ex­ panding public."(1)

The purpose of school education Is,

in short, to habituate intelligence in common life; to provide not only for growth, but for the development of a critical method of growth. Method means or is Intelligence at work; denial of the existence of any attainable method signifies, therefore, continuation of the present chaos and impotency of aesthetic appre­ ciation: that is, continued non-performance of that educative function from absence of which our civilization is suffering so disastrously. (2) The school is an embryonic society, first In the sense that It forms a group or society in terms of com­ mon aims or purposes, but plater in the more mature sense that Its aim is the development of attitudes and methods appropriate to the controlled forming of society, increase In communication and sharing of experience where at pre­ sent division and external friction hold sway.

Education

is "a means of correlating a vast variety of specialized topics and Interests, scientific and social, so as to 1. Dewey, "Science, folk-lore, and the control of folk­ ways," The new republic. LII (1927), 317. 2. Dewey, "Art in education-—and education in art, The. new republic. XLVI (1926), 12.

214

bring them Into vital unity in a human and humane per­ spective." (l)

This is one with saying that education in

achieving Its goal remakes common sense, the beliefs and attitudes relating to affairs of common concern, in such a way that there is ever Increasing intelligent partici­ pation in the direction of life, the great social ex­ periment.

The work of education is:

....to develop the insight and understanding that will support participation ....In the great work of reconstruction and organization that will have to be done, and....the attitudes and habits of action that will make* ♦. .understanding and insight practically effective.(2) In conclusion it is worthwhile to emphasize that in considering education as the remaking of common sense, we are not neglecting education as the means through which memorable and meaningful experiences are attained. The kind of social

direction

we need, says Dewey, is:

.♦..the direction which comes from heightened aooreeiation of common Interests and from an understanding of social responsibilities, an understanding to be sec tired only by experimen­ tal and personal participation in the conduct of common affairs.(3) The valuation in which education cuLminates—-a genuinely religious faith in the possibilities of human nature and devotion to the ways these possibilities may become 1. Dewey, "The direction of education," School_and society. IXVTI (1928), 496. . 2. Dewey, "Education and social change," The social frontier. Ill (May, 1957), 2 36. 3. Ratner led.), Education today, pp. 142-3; Italics mine

215

manifest— contains within Itself the condensed meaning of all the really educative experiences an individual has had.

Max Otto quotes Dewey: flickering inconsequential acts of selves dwells a sense of the whole which claims and dignifies them. In its presPJJ* off mortality and live in the universal* The acts in which we express our per­ ception of the ties which bind us to others are Its only rites and ceremonies .(l)

Love of learning incorporates meaningful appreciation of the nyriad ways in which obstacles have been overcome, Isolations removed, new Interests, friendships and as­ sociations formed*

It is enriched with the sense of

brotherhood, for it is the very method of forming societyAnd in the same moment It is pulsing in anticipation and expectancy of new values, as yet uncreated, but to be formed in the ongoing process of remaking the values, the beliefs, the ideals, common to men* For the ultimate aim of education Is nothing otter than the creation of human beings in the fullness of their capacities. Through the mak­ ing of human beings, of men and women generous In aspiration, liberal In thought, cultivated in taste, and equipped with knowledge and com­ petent method, society itself is constantly re­ made, and with this remaking the world itself is re-created.(g)

1. Otto, "John Dewey’s philosophy," The social frontier. Ill (June, 1937), 266. 2* Schilpp (ed.), Higher education faces the future. p. 282.

216

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Name:

GILL, CLAYTON HAROLD

Birth: Berkeley, Califomia, August 30, 1913 Education:

1930-34 1934-38 1937-41

College of the Pacific A .B. 1934 Chicago Theological Seminary B.D. 1938 Northwestern University