Development, Governance and Gender in South Asia: Perspectives, Issues and Challenges 9811651086, 9789811651083

Table of contents :
Preface
Introduction
Contents
About the Editors
Social and Economic Development
Analysing the Status of Human Development in South Asia
The Concept of Human Development
Historical Background and Intellectual Underpinnings
Measuring Human Development
Status of Human Development in South Asia
Gender Inequality and Human Development in South Asian Countries
Building Blocks and Stumbling Blocks in the Process of Human Development in South Asia
References
Repositioning South Asian States: Reinforcing Human Development
Understanding Human Development
Human Capabilities, The State and The Civil Society
A Trisector partnership
Defining Partnership
South Asian Human Development Scenario
The Role of States in South Asia
Conclusion
References
Debt, Deficit and Economic Growth in South Asia: A Comparative Analysis
Introduction
Asian Development Model
Economic Growth in Asia
Economic Growth in South Asia
India’s Growth Experience
India as Third-Largest Country
Deficit in South Asia
Deficit in India
Debt in South Asia
Debt in India
Comparability of Public Debt Statistics
External Debt in South Asia
External Debt to Gross National Income Ratio
External Debt to Exports
Debt Dynamics
Conclusion
Annexure 1: Economic Development in Asian Countries
Annexure 2: Overall Balance in South Asia and Other Selected Countries
Annexure 3: Primary Balance in South Asia and Other Selected Countries
Annexure 4: Public Debt in South Asia and Other Selected Countries (% of GDP)
Annexure 5: External Debt Stocks in South Asia (US $ million)
References
Promoting South Asian Migration to the Gulf Region: Reducing Poverty and Inequality as the Strategy
Presence of South Asian Workers in the GCC
Inflow of Remittances in South Asia
COVID-19 and Its Implications for Remittances
Emerging Trends of Indian Migration Since the 1990s
Indian Migration and Financial Flows
Economic Benefits of Migration
Social Benefits of Migration
Gulf Migration Policy for South Asian Workers
Migration, Human Rights and Gender
Conclusion
References
Skills for Employability and Development in South Asia: A Comparative Analysis
Introduction
Through the Literature
Skills and Education Stories of South Asian Economies
Reported Spill Overs
India’s Predominance: Overview, Survey and Analysis
Overview
Conclusion: A Suggestive Roadmap
References
Governance and Human Rights
6 Governance and Capability Contemporary Issues for Citizens and Governments
Issues in Governance
Institutional Capability
Conclusions
References
Shrinking Space of Minorities in South Asia: A Comparative Study of India and Pakistan
Introduction
Minority Rights in India
Minorities in Pakistan
Hindus
Christians
Ahmadis
Shias
Other Minorities
Conclusions and Recommendations: A Comparative Perspective
References
Corporate Governance in South Asian Countries: An Overview
Introduction
Corporate Governance in South Asian Countries
Corporate Governance in India
Statutory Provisions to Corporate Governance
Companies Act, 2013
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
Institutional Framework of Corporate Governance
New Powers of SEBI
SEBI on Corporate Governance Norms
Functioning of Regulatory Bodies
Corporate Governance in Bangladesh22
Corporate Governance in Pakistan23
Corporate Governance in Sri Lanka24
Corporate Governance in Nepal25
Conclusion
References
Good Governance and Human Rights: A South Asian Perspective
Introduction
South Asia and Governance
Characteristics of Good Governance
Good Governance: A South Asian Perspective
Human Rights in South Asia
Current Economic Situation in South Asia
Conclusion
References
Nuclear Weapons and Regional Cooperation in South Asia
Introduction
The Imbalance of Power Between India and Pakistan
Security Dilemma
Nuclearization of South Asia
Role of External Variables
China
Conclusion
References
Media and Literature
Role of Media in Conflict Management: A Case Study of 2016 Kashmir Unrest
Introduction
Kashmir Conflict
Sample Studied
Study Analysis
Detailed Analysis in Reference to the Parameters Studied
Political Cartoons
Detailed Analysis of Parameters Studied for Broadcast Media
Phrases
Conclusion
References
The Development Narratives in South Asia: A Case Study of Print Media
Introduction
Rationale for the Study
Objectives of the Study
Methodology
The Class, the Capital and the Development
The Future of Flashpoint
Footsteps of Communication
Data Collection
NMB—Nepal, Maldives and Bhutan
Analysis of the Data
A Parallel View
Conclusion: Patterns and Issues
References
Urdu Historiography, a Field of Urdu Literature in South Asia
References
Contribution of Arabian Nepali Literature to ‘New Nepal’ Building
Introduction
Nepali People’s Migration to the Arabs
Nepali Literary Activities in the Gulf Countries: Why Do They Write?
Themes of Arabian Nepali Literature: Discourse on Building ‘New Nepal’
Are These Writers and Writings Diasporic?
Conclusion
References
Representation of Literature Through Media: A Comparative Study of Sidhwa’s Ice Candy Man and Mehta’s Earth
Introduction
Ice Candy Man—The Novel
Earth—The Film
Conclusion
References
Gender and Development
Gendered Demonology: Women as Witches
Introduction
‘Masculinizing’ the Women: Strategic De/Reconstruction of Gender in the Fiction of South Asian Women Writers
Interrogating Femininity
Defeminizing/Masculinizing the Woman
Conclusion
References
The “Third Space” of Feminist Sensibility in South Asian Diaspora Literature
References
Sharing the Destiny: Women’s Political Representation in India in the South Asian Perspective
Political Representation and Women
Women Representation in South Asian Politics
Women’s Representation in Indian Politics
Political Participation and Representation
Women’s Representation in the Lok Sabha*
The Reservation Debate
Obstacles to Women's Political Participation
Political and Economic Barriers
Socio-Cultural Barriers
Prospects
Conclusion
References
Index

Citation preview

Anisur Rahman Niharika Tiwari   Editors

Development, Governance and Gender in South Asia Perspectives, Issues and Challenges

Development, Governance and Gender in South Asia

Anisur Rahman · Niharika Tiwari Editors

Development, Governance and Gender in South Asia Perspectives, Issues and Challenges

Editors Anisur Rahman UGC-Human Resource Development Centre Jamia Millia Islamia (Central University) New Delhi, India

Niharika Tiwari Department of Political Science Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Government P.G. College Saidabad, Uttar Pradesh, India

ISBN 978-981-16-5108-3 ISBN 978-981-16-5109-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-5109-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Dedicated to Late Dr. Nabila Sadiq one of the authors in this book who left this World for her heavenly abode on 17th May, 2021 due to COVID-19

Preface

South Asia is one of the most promising regions in the World. The geographical location of South Asia makes it geopolitically relevant in the world politics. South Asia was an epicentre of attraction for Europeans during colonial period due its strategic location and natural resources. South Asian countries share socio-cultural and historical legacies as well as commonality of interests. Even today, it is considered to be one of the most viable and important regions from an economic, political and social point of view. This region has in fact enormous potential that can generate opportunities and careers for the people of the region if it is governed efficiently. There are several challenges that region is facing such as mass poverty, unemployment and corruption that need to be fought collectively. Although, South Asia is seen to be well-compact region geographically, historically and geopolitically, but its internal divisions and deep mistrust among its states are significant factors that create impediments from realizing its potential of economic development, political empowerment and the cultural enrichment of its citizen. There is a need to draw a roadmap in order to achieve common economic frameworks that should be capable enough to eradicate poverty and hunger. It is equally important to formulate the viable strategies to utilize regional resources in a sustainable and equitable manner that could enhance better growth and development of the region. Keeping all the above-mentioned scenarios of South Asia, this book has been conceptualized to identify the building blocks as well as stumbling blocks in the South Asian region’s development trajectory. It offers a fresh, multidisciplinary and comprehensive approach to understand the trends and issues of governance, human development and regional cooperation in South Asian region. The variations and remodelling in social, economic, political and cultural life in this complex and dissimilar region have been explored in the context of governance, human development and regional cooperation. The number of literatures dealing with the status of governance and human development in South Asian region are limited. The reason could be interlinked to the fact that most of the literature, focussing on this region, moreover deals with the economic regionalism or with the political dynamics of this region in general. This book attempts to identify the factors and patterns behind

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the region’s persisting sluggish performance on good governance and human development indicators. It also provides country-specific and intra-country variations in particular, along with explanations and interpretations. It is evident that nearly onefourth of the global population lives in the region of South Asia. Imagining a better future for the region is the need of the day. For this, South Asian unity is necessary which is quite possible if concerted effort is made in this direction. It is also important to give primacy of human rights, democracy and governance for the establishment of a just society in the region. These institutions such as democracy and governance are interconnected and reinforce each other. Governance is understood as the instrument of the effectiveness of a society’s institutions. Good governance implies that problems and challenges are managed effectively, efficiently and in response to vital needs of society. The prime part of this book deals with the new conceptual and theoretical perspectives to understand the trajectories of social and economic development in South Asia. The part consists of papers that question the very premise of Development and PostDevelopment narratives in South Asia. Succinctly, the articles in this book broadly cover almost all relevant issues and perspectives on contemporary South Asia. The state, civil society, social movements, various forms of media and its role in the formation as well as deconstruction of power structures in this region, trajectories of economic growth and socio-political changes, etc., have been discussed in detail. This volume is in fact the outcome of few selected papers presented at the International Seminar held at Jamia Millia Islamia in April, 2017. This was organized by the UGC Human Resource Development Centre, JMI, in collaboration with the Institute of Kashmir Studies, University of Kashmir. I am grateful to Dr. Muslim Jan, the Coordinator of MA programme, that was running at the UGC HRDC on account of MOU between Jamia Millia Islamia and the University of Kashmir. She was in fact the main person who deserves credit for holding the international seminar. We are also thankful to all scholars who thoroughly revised and updated their paper for this volume. I also extend my special thanks to Prof. Abdul Rahim P. Vijapur who provided all possible help in bringing out this volume. My sincere thanks and gratitude are due to Prof. Najma Akhtar, Vice Chancellor, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, for promoting her faculty by giving more freedom to do more academic work so that Jamia Millia Islamia could excel nationally and internationally. We are thankful to HRDC staff members who helped us a lot in bringing out this volume. Ms. Shahla Tarannum and Mr. Faisal Farooqui deserve special appreciation who provided all support whenever required. Dr. Ansari P. A., PDF scholar, Mr. Waseem Ahmed and Naziya, Ph.D. scholars, West Asian studies, deserve special thanks and acknowledgement for their support and cooperation. I also would like to extend my heartfelt thanks to my colleagues, friends and well-wishers whose name has not been mentioned here, but they helped me in this academic endeavour. We will fail in our duty if we do not mention the name of Dr. Rushda Siddiqui who helped us in many ways to complete this volume. Finally, Springer Publications, New Delhi, deserves appreciation for bringing out the book entitled Development, Governance and Gender in South Asia: Perspectives,

Preface

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Issues and Challenges for the benefit of all stakeholders, especially South Asian scholars. New Delhi, India Saidabad, India

Anisur Rahman Niharika Tiwari

Introduction

South Asia consists of eight countries that are in close geographical proximity. These countries share socio-cultural and historical legacies as well as commonality of interests. The eight countries that constitute South Asia are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. It sprawls over 5.2 million km which is 11.71% area of the Asian continent. The region is also an epitome of unity in diversity. The geographical boundaries of South Asia are constituted by the Indian Ocean in the south and by Himalayan mountain spurs, Karakoram, and Pamir mountains on the north. The Arabian Sea borders India and Pakistan to the west, and rest of the Western boundary shares borders with Iran, and the Bay of Bengal embraces India and Bangladesh to the east. The region has variety of climate zones, rainforests, deserts, grasslands, river systems and plateaus. Broadly, South Asia is made up of three topographic regions that are: The Himalaya, Karakorum and Hind Kush mountain ranges, The Indo-Gangetic plain and The Deccan Plateau. Major river systems in South Asia like the Ganges, Indus and Brahmaputra are considered as the economic, cultural and civilizational backbone of South Asia. The region is a connecting link between West Asia, Central Asia, East Asia and South East Asia. The geographical location of South Asia makes it geopolitically relevant in the world politics. South Asia was a centre of attraction for Europeans during colonial period due its strategic location and natural resources. Now, the USA is immensely interested in the region in order to balance rising China. Similarly, Afghanistan, the backyard of erstwhile USSR, was made a strategic base by the USA during the Cold War era, and now, Afghanistan is a tipping point for the American projection of power in Eurasia (Kaplan, 2010). In contemporary international scenario, USA is trying to strengthen its position in South Asia in order to manage China. Similarly, China is strengthening its strategic ties with Pakistan and other South Asian countries seeing it as a priority zone. It is evident in the form of China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that is an essential part of China’s Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI). Many other such developments, viz a viz Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives, are also existing. Added to this, Indian Ocean, that surrounds South Asia, also has

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its strategic importance. Activities by the world powers in this ocean affect the intraregional politics as well as political alignments beyond the region. According to Cohen (2013), ‘Under the Raj’s system of direct and indirect governance, South Asia became a strategically coherent region. It served as an important commercial and military gateway to East and Southeast Asia; then as a source of capital, technology, manpower and investment for Britain’s African and Mideast possessions; and later as an imperial police force in two world wars’. Keeping all the above-mentioned scenarios of South Asia, this book has been conceptualized to identify the building blocks as well as stumbling blocks in the South Asian region’s development trajectory. It offers a fresh, multidisciplinary and comprehensive approach to understand the trends and issues of governance, human development and regional cooperation in South Asian region. The variations and remodelling in social, economic, political and cultural life in this complex and dissimilar region have been explored in the context of governance, human development and regional cooperation. The number of literatures dealing with the status of governance and human development in South Asian region is limited. The reason could be interlinked to the fact that most of the literature, focussing on this region, either deals with the economic regionalism or deals with the political dynamics of this region in general. This book attempts to identify the factors and patterns behind the region’s persisting sluggish performance on good governance and human development indicators. It also provides country-specific and intra-country variations in particular, along with explanations and interpretations. It is important to understand that no concept that we deal with in the contemporary world can be studied in isolation. If the world wars were a factor in sucking the world into an armed conflict, contemporary civil rights movements and conflicts have drawn governments into an integrated world. To understand contemporary issues, scholars have either compared and contrasted multiple cases across the world or dug into the history of another part of the world for precedents. This book embroiders some of the underlying debates, related to the governance, human rights, human development, human security, regional cooperation, media, literature and gender, etc., in South Asia. There is a series of research papers on subjects that have been analysed by policy makers and civil society movements. Some of the issues are topical, but most deal with the problems of narratives spun by policy makers and state authorities to ground realities. Added to this, what differentiates the collection of essays in this book from other books that attempt to analyse socio-political and economic developments in South Asia, is the perspective adopted by the chapter contributors. Through deconstructive and post-modernist approach, the scholars have attempted an objective analysis of concepts, developments and impacts of various issues. The socio-economic exclusion of people on the basis of gender, ethnicity and religion has also been dealt within this book. The book is in fact an outcome of few select papers presented in the international seminar on Governance, Human Rights and Regional Cooperation in South Asia: Opportunities and Challenges of Globalization, conducted by the UGC– HRDC Jamia Millia Islamia, in collaboration with UNESCO Madanjeet Singh Institute of Kashmir Studies, University of Kashmir, Srinagar, at Jamia Millia Islamia,

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New Delhi. Though the seminar saw a vast number of scholars presenting different viewpoints on various subjects, select papers have been included in this book that have discussed pertinent issues, contemporary challenges and new perspectives to the narratives of South Asia. Few invited papers were also added in the book in order to capture more suitable picture for our comprehensive understanding of South Asia. However, changes in South Asia have managed to make inroads in policy making on a global level. At the same time, developments in other parts of the world have left a mark on the socio-economic and political developments in South Asia. Economic, political, strategic, environmental and demographic developments have changed development trajectory in the region. Looking a little deeper into history, we realize that global and local factors have shaped the changes in the region. South Asia, as a region, has witnessed crucial changes in last decades as the countries known for their authoritarian regimes have opted for the process of democratisation. Similarly, some strong civil society-led movements also have come into existence. Beginning with decolonization to the post-Cold War liberalization, with the rise and growth of neo-liberal economies and regionalism, the region has been at the centre of regional as well as global dynamics. South Asia as a region needs to be explored academically because it can be seen vividly that regional cooperation has not only emerged as a reality, but also is irreversible. As an offshoot of globalisation, it has re/deconstructed the entire development paradigm. Now sovereign states, with geographical proximity, are realizing the need of a commitment to a greater regional integration in order to enunciate a system of good governance to provide better opportunities for human development. Governance and human development are the notions that work in a close symbiosis. Participatory, democratic and transparent governance can be ensured only when citizens are educated, proactive and well aware of their rights and duties. Similarly, only an inclusive and participatory political establishment can ensure an egalitarian socio-economic and political system to its people. It is further observed that along with religious diversity ethnic diversity is also prevalent in South Asia. India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka all have been struggling with ethnic conflicts of different magnitudes. The ethnicization of politics and politicization of ethnic differences is one of the common phenomena in South Asia. Ethnic dissonance has its roots in the ill-perceived colonial policies and continued to postcolonial South Asian states because institutions of governance in post-colonial South Asia followed discriminatory policies and certain ethnic groups were deliberately side lined by those who are the de facto owner of the power. Colonial master’s top priority was to exploit available natural resources, and, in this process, they drew borders without giving a serious thought to it and also displaced people and implemented official policies in such a manner as conflict emanated out of it. The ethnic conflict between Tamil and Sinhala in Sri Lanka is the glaring example of this. Partition of India in 1947 into two sovereign states India and Pakistan and in 1971 when Bangladesh was carved out of Pakistan on the basis on language are also the outcome of divide and rule policy implemented by the British. Moreover, India has been facing secessionist movements in its North-East area, and Tamil issue had been prominent in the past that culminated into the death of

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Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi. Pakistan has also witnessed several ethnic conflicts, and the country is still facing ethnic conflicts, particularly in the province of Baluchistan. In Bangladesh, Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) conflict is another example of ethnic dispute in South Asia. The CHT (consisting of Rangamati, Bandarban and Khagrachari districts) has been home to eleven ethnic indigenous communities, namely Chakma, Marma, Tripura, Tanchangya, Mro, Lushai, Khumi, Chak, Khiyang, Bawm and Pangkhua. In Afghanistan, age-old political power struggle between the country’s dominant ethnic community, the Pashtuns and the other ethnic groups: Uzbeks, Hazaras, Tajiks, Aimaqs and a modicum of other small ethnic groups is still continuing. Historically, Pashtuns have almost always been at the top of political power, despite of the fact that they constitute less than half of the total population. Madhesi vs Pahadi dichotomy is clearly visible in Nepal. In the 1990s, Bhutan expelled the Lhotshampa, an ethnic group with its origins in Nepal. Maldives is the only country of South Asia where no ethnic conflict has been officially reported so far. Added to this, South Asian countries have also witnessed intra-ethnic conflicts. Since most of the South Asian countries share border with each other, ethnic conflicts often cause spill-over effects. In South Asia, regional cooperation has been confined to formal declarations and summits. However, gradually, it is being understood that there are certain socioeconomic and political issues like governance, human trafficking, environmental challenges, terrorism and other non-traditional security threats that spread beyond the boundaries of the sovereign nations and cannot be resolved by a state singlehandedly. Therefore, the countries of a multicultural region like South Asia have no other option but to cooperate with each other. The sooner countries of this region realize this fact, the better it would be. The formation of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1985 and later on SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) and South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), although not very successful, can be seen as a positive step in this direction. Similarly, the amount of intra-regional trade of South Asia is very small. According to World Bank,1 intra-regional trade accounts for barely 5% of South Asia’s total trade, compared to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN region where intra-regional trade makes up 25%. Trade among South Asian countries currently totals just $23 billion—far below an estimated value of at least $67 billion. Border challenges mean it is about 20% cheaper for a company in India to trade with Brazil instead of a neighbouring South Asian country. Trade has been limited by several factors such as inadequate road, marine and air transport. Other constraints include protective tariffs, real and perceived nontariff barriers, restrictions on investments and a broad trust deficit throughout the region. Regarding South Asia, Human Development Report South Asia (2015, p. 205) analysed that ‘The region has adequate knowledge, ability, resource, technology, political strength and institutional capacity to create a fairer society’. This report has further identified seven areas which have sign of hope for this region. These are high

1

https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/south-asia-regional-integration/trade.

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sustained and broad-based economic growth, renewed attention to poverty reduction, improvement in human development, commitment to gender equality, restructuring and reforms of institutions of governance, role of technology for people’s empowerment and strengthened role of civil society. Human Development Reports have also highlighted that gender inequality is rampant in South Asia. Women are often treated as second citizen and face several restrictions on the name of religion and traditions; such as child marriage, female feticide, dowry system, son preferences, high-school dropout rates and limited access to health facilities. Patriarchy is deep rooted in the policy formulation and implementation in the countries of this region. Socio-economic fabric of South Asia is not favourable to women living in this region. This book is an effort to understand the nuances of patriarchy resulting into gender inequality in South Asia.

Social and Economic Development South Asia is also one of the world’s great cultural heartland where countries share their societal and cultural values. Almost all the South Asian countries except Nepal witnessed colonial past characterized by domination and exploitation. The colonial society was not just vertically differentiated; it was characterized by horizontal divides based on caste, religion and ethnicity. These divisions got transmitted from the colonial to post-colonial social system in South Asia. Since South Asia is a multi-ethnic society, an array of post-colonial political conflicts came into existence; therefore, struggle among ethno-linguistic groups also increased. However, the fact cannot be denied that due to the multicultural fabric of South Asia the way was paved for the coexistence of democracy with the strains of authoritarianism. Since, political leadership and society of the region believed that constitutionalism and rule of law are the only mechanisms to minimize ethno-religious differences. It is also true that South Asia is the region where adherents to every major religion and followers of different languages live together making this region a glaring example of pluralism. People in South Asia are multilingual and speak at least twenty major languages, and if one includes the more important dialects, the number goes up to over two hundred (Bose & Jalal 2018, p. 4). Due to this richness, South Asia has contributed immensely to world literature from ancient to modern times. Multiplicity of religion and secular traditions provided fertile ground where different arts, musics, theatres and dance traditions could flourish. For example, Sufi tradition is present in entire South Asia. Likewise, principles of aesthetics and gesture languages in Indian dance forms like Bharatanatyam Kathakali and Kuchipudi, a classical dance forms, are found throughout South Asia. Kandyan dance of Sri Lanka is famous everywhere. Similarly, Bhangra, Jhumar and Giddhaare are the most famous dance form in both India and Pakistan. Thus, classical dances, musics and languages are the bedrock of shared socio-cultural values throughout the South Asian region. That is why whenever Track one diplomacy seems to be failed Track two is adopted by heads of the states of this region to develop people-to-people contacts.

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Furthermore, religious pluralism of South Asia is unique and syncretic in character. This region is blessed with rich and dynamic religions. Almost all religious groups and sects are presented here. People believe in religion and are guided by religious teachings. It is the source of two of the world’s great religions and the home to more devotees of a third than either the Middle East or Southeast Asia. Hinduism, with its ancient roots, modern transformations and multiple interpretations, plays a vital part in the culture and politics of the subcontinent. Hindus form the majority of India’s population, but are distinguished along lines of languages and caste. While the formal adherents to Buddhism may have dwindled in the land of its birth, it continues to flourish in Sri Lanka and the Himalayas as well as in East and Southeast Asia. Some of the greatest cultural and political achievements of Islam have taken place in the subcontinent, where more than half a billion of the world’s 1.65 billion Muslims live today. Each of the three most populous countries in South Asia- India, Bangladesh and Pakistan- has over 175 million Muslims, next only to Indonesia as the largest Muslim countries in the world. South Asia also has significant Jain, Zoroastrian, Christian and Sikh minorities. (Bose & Jalal 2018, p. 4–5)

There has been positive as well as negative outcome of this religious diversity. For instance, since all religions teach humanity, people have lived together understanding the importance of religious values that teach the lessons of togetherness. However, in South Asia, religion has often been appropriated by the politicians to fulfil their vested interests within their country that sometimes destabilizes regional stability as well. Sometimes, secular disputes are interpreted through religious lenses. Religious feeling of the common people is incited by politicians to have political leverage. Consequently, this region has witnessed many communal riots and killings. One important feature of South Asia is that it is both the most populated and the most densely populated region of the world. UNFPA’s State of World Population Report 2019 illustrates that India is the most populated country of South Asia with 1368.7 million, followed by Pakistan with 204.6 million, and third position is occupied by Bangladesh with 168.2 million. Rest of the countries have relatively lesser population, viz. Afghanistan 37.2 million, Nepal 29.9 million, Sri Lanka 21 million, Bhutan 0.8 million and Maldives 0.5 million. Bangladesh is the second most densely populated country of the world after Singapore. Thus, South Asian countries have huge differences on the basis of geography and population both. However, the population growth on South Asia is facing steep decline and may turn negative in future. While South Asia faces many socio-economic challenges owing to its huge population, according to UNFPA (2019) report data, South Asia seems to have the advantage of ‘Demographic Dividend’.2 As per this report, more than 55% people of all the eight countries of South Asia come under 15–64 age group. The highest position is of Maldives with 72% population, and the lowest is of Afghanistan with 55% population coming under working-age group. In South Asia, 65.25% (average) 2

According to United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), demographic dividend means, ’the economic growth potential that can result from shifts in a population’s age structure, mainly when the share of the working-age population (15 to 64) is larger than the non-working-age share of the population (14 and younger, and 65 and older)’.

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population comes under working-age group that can boost up the economic growth of the region. Demographic dividend can be converted into demographic opportunity if good health, quality education, decent employment and many other capability enhancing supports are provided to the people. Due to the population pressure, poor as well as archaic system of governance and lopsided development, this region has been listed at the top of the extremely poor economic regions’ list. Per capita income (in current US$) of South Asia is lower than other regions of the world. GDP per capita income3 of South Asia, as per World Bank data based on 2018 is: 1902.8 (current US$). It is the lowest when compared with other regions as enumerated by World Bank (2018 data). For instance, East Asia and Pacific have (11,142.5 US$), Middle East and North Africa (8044 US$), Europe and Central Asia (25,130 US$) current US$. It is evident that all of the regions classified here enjoy better position than South Asia. The data provided by World Bank in 2018 demonstrate that GDP growth (annual %) of South Asia4 has been 6.7%. In 2011, it was 5.1%. However, the country-wise GDP growth rate (2018) has significant variations. For example, Afghanistan has 1.0%, Bangladesh 7.9%, Bhutan 3.0%, India 6.8%, Maldives 6.9%, Nepal 6.7%, Pakistan 5.8% and Sri Lanka 3.2% GDP growth. Recent COVID-19 catastrophe has negatively affected the entire world economy; consequently, South Asia will also get badly affected by it. It is projected that the GDP growth in South Asian countries would likely go downward. As far as country-wise GDP per capita is concerned (current US$, 2018); Afghanistan has 520.9 US$, Bangladesh 1698.3 US$, Bhutan 3243.2 US$, India 2010.0 US$, Maldives 10,330.6 US$, Nepal 1033.9 US$, Pakistan 1482.4 US$ and Sri Lanka 4102.5 US$. Due to this ordinary GDP per capita, South Asian people have faced vicious circle of poverty despite of several efforts made by the governments for poverty alleviation. There is a unique paradox whereby even after enjoying upward economic growth, since last few decades, the region continues to have a large number of poor people. As per Multidimensional Poverty Index5 of Human Development Report 2019, 31.0% population comes under multidimensional poverty in South Asia. Regionwise South Asia is at second position, and the first place is of sub-Saharan Africa with 57.5% population facing multidimensional poverty., whereas merely 1.1% of population of Europe and Central Asia, 5.6% of East Asia and the Pacific, 7.5% of Latin America and the Caribbean, 15.7% of Arab States are multidimensional poor. The situations get alarming due to a very large number of children facing severe poverty. According to UNDP (2019:07).6 3

https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=8S. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=8S&name_desc=true. 5 The Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) is published by the UNDP’s Human Development Report Office and tracks deprivation across three dimensions and 10 indicators: health (child mortality, nutrition), education (years of schooling, enrolment), and living standards (water, sanitation, electricity, cooking fuel, floor, assets). 6 http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/mpi_2019_publication.pdf. 4

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In South Asia 70 million children under age 5 (42.8%) are stunted or underweight. Intrahousehold disparities in deprivation in nutrition among children under age 5 in the region are stark. Some 22.7% of children under age 5 live in a household in which at least one child is malnourished and at least one child is not. In Pakistan over a third of children under age 5 experience intra-household inequalities in deprivation in nutrition. Across South Asia 36.7 million children do not attend school through grade 8. Some 32.3 million (88.0%) out-of-school children live in multidimensionally poor households.

Deverajan7 has observed that South Asia has one of the worst levels of human development deprivations. Child malnutrition levels of India are nearly double those of sub-Saharan Africa; similarly, one in ten Pakistani children die before their fifth birthday. Added to this, the gap between enrolment and completion in primary schools remains wide in South Asia. Government programmes to alleviate poverty are more often than not driven by political patronage rather than universal service provisions. This is evident from the fact that social schemes and its funding keep on changing with the change in political party in power in the South Asian countries. This fact cannot be denied that without healthy and educated workforce South Asia will not be able to sustain current levels of economic growth. Without substantial reductions in child mortality and the number of out-of-school children, it will be very difficult to end poverty in this region. Despite of several socio-economic and political constraints and limitations, South Asia has multiple global effects, and therefore, it remains a centre of academic as well as political attraction despite of being marred by turbulences time and again. It affects the dynamics of international affairs and gets affected by it. Since South Asia is world’s most poverty-ridden region, it attracts many funds spent by international organizations and gets benefitted by international poverty alleviation programmes initiated by the world Bank and UNDP, etc. International peace-keeping agencies and forces are also actively involved in this region. Afghanistan is the region where US forces have been involved since long back. Added to this, the South Asia has been perceived as breeding ground for international terrorism. Owing to this, almost all the major powers of the world believe in focussing on South Asia. Therefore, South Asia as a region has been gaining worldwide attention both strategically and academically. Nuclearization of South Asian region has also made it a priority zone in international politics because two nuclear powers, India and Pakistan, are often in strained relationship with each other. However, in a more optimistic context, South Asia provides a big and diversified market that attracts big economic giants. Apart from this, it provides relatively cheap labour to the Gulf countries and other regions. Succinctly, according to ILO Report (2018) International labour migration statistics in South Asia, collectively, there were over 38 million South Asian nationals living outside of their countries of origin in 2017. South Asia is rich in terms of natural resources like forest covers, hydropower and other sources of energy. Big river basins make the region fertile. Moreover, strategically, India is being considered very crucial in this region due to its location in Indian Ocean as it occupies a central position. Now, it depends on the bargaining 7

https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/can-south-asia-end-poverty-generation-more-inclusivegrowth-and-faster-human-development-are-key.

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power and diplomatic efficiency of India to get benefitted out of its strategic location. USA wants India to balance China, as China’s ambitious BRI initiative has enhanced the tension of USA. Consequently, the strategic importance of South Asia in general and of India in particular has increased. In contemporary world, a kind of quadrilateral system has evolved in this region where China and Pakistan are trying to balance India and USA. Now, the question is whether South Asia will be able to harness its strategic location or it will succumb to interests of the external powers. As argued by Stephen P. Cohen in terms of South Asia: The positive scenario for South Asia is that when regional integration and cooperation increase, connectivity will improve, restrictions on trade will be reduced, landlocked countries will be given full access to markets, energy shortages will be eased, and growth and investment will rise. It is widely assumed that this bottom-up approach would help improve the environment for regional politics, increase welfare, and promote peace and stability. In the real world, however, this scenario’s arrival date is always in the future. (Cohen 2013:19)

The first part of this book deals with the new conceptual and theoretical perspectives to understand the trajectories of social and economic development in South Asia. This part consists of papers that question the very premise of development and post-development narratives in South Asia. In this context, the parameters of modernity and emerging threats for the people beyond development have been questioned in this section. The perspective of human development and its dimensions have been analysed. The status of human development in South Asia by analysing the conditions of health, education and living standards of the people of this region has been explored. This part highlights the major challenges faced by South Asian countries while ensuring human development. Added to this, repositioning of South Asian States in terms of governance for human development has been analysed as a type of paradigm shift. Research papers in this part outline the arguments related to the discourse of the market and the state policies. It elucidates that the modern-world view has largely failed to understand the tribal world view. Apart from this, while discussing about debt, deficit and economic growth in South Asia, a larger picture has been drawn by comparing South Asia with East Asia in general and China and Japan in particular. Migration and in-flow of remittances has emerged as an exclusive characteristic of South Asian economic system. Therefore, South Asian migration to the Gulf Region has been examined as the best strategy for reducing poverty and inequality in the region. Skill development has emerged as a cardinal discourse in the South Asian development model. The theoretical findings on the subject are supplemented with the results of a primary survey on India, while exploring about the skills expected for employability and development in South Asia.

Governance and Human Rights Governance and human rights both are complementary to each other; however, it has been widely observed that while following the process of governance the human

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rights of the people, especially of those who are at the margins, gets violated by the state agency in South Asia. Because, more often than not, the principles of good governance are not followed and consequently, development process remains quantitative denying the idea of human development. Human rights violation is very much prevalent in case of South Asia where Rohingya issue, Kashmir issue, plight of the people, especially women in the prisons, killing of rationalists and media persons, etc., are rampant in South Asia. In South Asia, state agency either violates the human rights of the people or remains a mute spectator. Apart from this, human rights of the people are also undermined due to deep-rooted foundations of structural violence and vicious circle of poverty. The notion and status of human development and governance (now understood as good governance) provide insights to comprehend the regional cooperation in South Asia. The human development approach to development was put forward by the economist Mahbubul Haq, and it was further elaborated by the Nobel laureate Amartya Sen in his human capability approach. Freedom of choice is central to this approach. In order to quantify as country/region’s human development status, this approach uses three basic dimensions that have been further elaborated in successive human development reports. These dimensions are longevity, knowledge and decent living standards. On the basis of these, three dimensions human development Index, Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index, Multidimensional Poverty Index and Gender Inequality Index have been enumerated. Human development approach to development provides a parameter to evaluate the programmes and policies of the governments beyond the economic growth-oriented paradigm. Likewise, the notion of good governance has been accepted by the policy makers across the world to develop a transparent, accountable and responsible system of governance, wherein people are considered as an active agent of socio-economic and political change. Delving into the evolution of the concept of good governance, Henk Addink (2019) says that the international and European developments started at the end of the twentieth century. In the beginning of the 1990s, international organizations in the field of development aid and finance started to develop good governance norms to make sure that financial assistance is properly directed. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) were quite active in these fields. Not all international organisations have started with the same topics; global financial organizations have been more focussed on macro-economic reform, whereas political organizations sought a connection with human rights and the rule of law. It seems like there is now a growing consensus on the specification of good governance norms. Even the international organizations themselves have been reformed because of the need to abide by standards of good governance. The good governance is not only about appropriate use of the institutions of governance, it requires guarantee for the security of people and society to manage public sector in a transparent and accountable manner and to promote socio-economic development of the country in a democratic manner.

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Governance and human development are complementary to each other because both the perspective keep people at the centre stage. Moreover, a transparent, accountable and participatory governing system is required for the judicious allocation of the available resources in a country. Likewise, people with better human development conditions can work and think about their country’s multipronged development and fellow citizens’ well-being. Democratic values can be cherished only when a dynamic symbiosis between good governance and human development is established. The issues that are at the core of the concepts and process of governance and human development have points of convergence as well; for instance, both the notions consider human beings as an active agent of multidimensional changes. Therefore, it is imperative to comprehend the theoretical and conceptual interlinkages between governance, human development and regional cooperation in South Asia. It is noted that all South Asian countries have made efforts to establish democratic institutions and processes. They have succeeded to a certain extent in achieving procedural democracy, but substantial democracy is still a distant dream in case of South Asian nations. Despite of several claims made by the politicians to brand them as welfare states, South Asian States are institution-centric states and their policies revolve around traditional security threats instead of non-traditional ones. Therefore, dissenting voices of the citizens are often branded as traitors in South Asia due to authoritative and bias nature of the state apparatus. However, the recent rise of student’s movement and other social movements are strengthening the democratic institutions in this region. Ayesha Jalalhad observed the nature and repercussions of people’s dissent in South Asia long before: Though not unique to South Asia, the assertion of distinctive identities by variously defined social groupings has come to pose the biggest challenge to the dominant idioms deployed to sustain and legitimize post-colonial state structures in the subcontinent. In certain regions where clashes between dissenting social currents and state authority are especially acute, a key defining feature of the modern state has been seriously undermined its monopoly over the instruments of coercion. With identities spilling across porous frontiers, the acquisition of sophisticated weapons technologies by disgruntled segments of civil society are resulting in stronger linkages between domestic dilemmas and international tensions than ever before. ( Jalal, 1995:02)

One of the important features of South Asian states is that there is an ongoing struggle between dominance and resistance. Democratic politics and groups are struggling in almost every state of South Asia against the authoritarian state. However, a unique feature has been observed by recent researches done in the field of democracy in South Asia. It has been found that people tend to support authoritarianism over democracy. In 2017, the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) report on ‘The State of Democracy in South Asia’ showed that the percentage of the interviewees who supported democracy has dropped from 70% to 63% between 2005 and 2017. The 2017 Pew report reconfirmed the trend: 55% of the respondents backed ‘a governing system in which a strong leader can make decisions without interference from parliament or the courts’, while 53% supported military rule. Commenting upon this result, the Pew team added: ‘Support for autocratic rule is higher in India than in any other nation surveyed’, 38% in total, and India

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is ‘one of only four nations where half or more of the public supports governing by the military’. (Chatterjee et al. 2019, p. 07)

The reason behind this appears to be the role of post-colonial states and leadership in South Asia that left a large number of people disgruntled compelling them to develop a sort of apathy towards democratic institutions. This is so because the old colonial model of administration is still continuing in South Asia in the name of democracy. There is a need to think of bringing change in several ongoing colonial institutions which impede democratic functioning and spirit. As far as the political process in South Asia is concerned, political parties, the cardinal medium of political socialization, do not enjoy intra party democracy because parties are either dominated by dynasties, religion or such groups that claim to be apolitical, but they tend to control and dictate political future of the country. According to Paul Brass (2010), in India, there was one party-dominated congress system for a long time; in Pakistan, military has been a predominant force on politics; in Bangladesh, there has been predominance of bureaucracy in policy making, and similarly, Sri Lanka has been an illiberal democracy. Brass has further argued that in South Asia political process has been occupied by dynastic competition among prominent families, and in none of the countries of South Asia, despite bows to secularist ideals, there has been a separation between religion and politics. Chatterjee et al. (2019, p. 1–2) have also observed this, ‘The vision of a Hindu majoritarian polity held by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) combines cultural nationalism and political strategies aiming at flagrant social dominance by the upper castes, rapid economic development, cultural conservatism, intensified misogyny and a firm grip on the instruments of state power’. It seems that in South Asian countries, non-state actors and groups have a greater say in the functioning of the government, for instance RSS in India and military in Pakistan. However, the highly fragmented political parties have gradually instilled democratic values in the political system of South Asian states. Brass has shown his optimism by observing few developments in positive direction. He says that ‘Nevertheless, the predominant pattern of shift over the past half century has been towards pluralism, regionalism, and decentralization’ (Brass 2010, p. 8). This trend is prevailing due to the strong historical roots of this region that is embedded in the values of diverse but common cultural ethos. Nevertheless, South Asian countries have shown a strong desire for democracy, institutional reforms, poverty alleviation and human development. There has been a long tradition of civil society movements that are active towards a democratic system in South Asia. These movements involve activists, social workers, people of religious organizations to affiliates of political parties, development professionals, mass media and common people endorsing variety of causes for bringing vibrant social changes in South Asia. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Bank, etc., also have reached the conclusion that political structures and forms of governance of a state are directly linked to the human development of a country or a region. It has been vividly recognized that the state is responsible to provide basic conditions that enable

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people to enhance their right to choose that subsequently ensures their ‘right to life with dignity’. Therefore, it is inevitable to find out the structures and narratives, within and outside the state, that are inherently exclusionist and undermine the dignity of human beings in South Asia. The second part of this book discusses the dynamics and equilibrium between governance and human rights. From a scenario building exercise that tries to delve into how governance in South Asia could trigger better human rights to the citizens in South Asian perspective, the section focuses on the shortcomings of traditional models of governance. This section tries to figure out better yardsticks to the contemporary issues concerned with governance in South Asia. Issues of citizenship and governance have been discussed to comprehend the governance and capabilities within governments. The plight of religious minorities and the rights of people belonging to them in India and Pakistan has been analysed under the broader framework of human rights and governance. Significantly in this part, in a chapter on struggle for human rights in a south Asian periphery, the importance of call for the better corporate governance laws in the South Asian countries has been discussed. The need of democratic form of government and its normative analysis of good governance and human rights in South Asian countries, which stands unique from the Western notion of human rights and governance, have been delved into by the contributors. Principles of governance, human rights and regional cooperation in the post-globalized world have been used to contextualize the issues. The impact of perceived security threats that motivated India and Pakistan to develop nuclear bombs has been analysed in this book to find out the ways and means of enhancing the nuclear stability in the region.

Media and Literature Media is considered one of the strongest pillars of democracy, and literature is a medium to empower and enlighten the people. However, scholars like Michel Foucault have rightly pointed out the inter-linkages between knowledge and power. Likewise, in his famous work, Manufacturing Consent Herman and Chomsky have argued that media houses are regulated and influenced by powerful and those who are in the power because media houses are profit-oriented leading to the elite domination of the media and marginalization of dissenting voices. However, there are certain media groups and writers who keep on raising voices and work in an objective manner for those who are not the part of the mainstream society. Herman and Chomsky have identified the essential ingredients of propaganda model or set of news ‘filters’: (i) the size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth and profit orientation of the dominant mass-media firms; (ii) advertising as the primary income source of the mass media; (iii) the reliance of the mass media on information provided by government, business and ‘experts’ funded and approved by these primary sources and agents of power; (iv) ‘flak’ as a means of disciplining the media; and (v) ‘anticommunism’ as a national religion and control mechanism’. If South Asian media is

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put into this context too, we can see that media is often governed by the ruling party and elite domination is very much there. Similarly, there is a relationship between literature, the individual, and its social, historical and cultural context. There is always an element of power in the literature as well that justifies the wrongs of the powerful. Nevertheless, the myths, realities and imaginations of literary works are not far from the real world. They either narrate the reality or provide a perspective to comprehend the socio-economic and political incidents that unfold in particular contexts. In South Asia, secular, religious and mythological all kinds of literature is there. There is a dominant as well as subordinate literature. However, in contemporary South Asia, the literature has been deconstructed and new streams like Dalit literature, women’s literature or subaltern literatures are coming into existence. Media and literature are such mediums of communication that creep into the minds and psyche of the people. In South Asia, media and literature both have played crucial role in strengthening as well as weakening the efforts made for regional cooperation. Media and literature can be a medium for conflict management, or they can instigate the conflicts. In South Asia, media and literature has defined the issues such as conflicts, war, gender, minority and nationalism. Thus, both the medium work in close coordination with each other. Movies are produced on the basis of literary works to narrate the way events got unfolded during the partition in 1947 and again when Bangladesh came into existence in 1971. Similarly, the great literary works on women are often represented through films and shows. Therefore, the third part of this book emphasizes on the importance of media, literature and its changing dynamics in South Asian region. Media and literature are considered one of the most powerful mediums to portrait the society; influence the psyche of the people and the process of governance. This part unfolds the way media and literature narratives are created and marketed in South Asia. The part also deals with the power dynamics and socio-political narratives that work from behind the functioning of the media houses. Contributors have come up with research papers that describe the history of a language of those who are in conflict management. Special attention has been paid to comprehend the development narratives in South Asia, in terms of the print media. The unique feature of this part is that it discusses about Urdu historiography and country-specific analysis to recognize the role of the literature in nation building. The contribution of Arabian Nepali Literature to ‘New Nepal’ software building has been exclusively dealt with in this part. The Representation of Literature through Media in South Asia has been discussed in the context of Bapsi Sidhwa’s Ice Candy Man and its film version Earth directed by Deepa Mehta.

Gender and Development Due to the rampant corruption, poverty, structural violence and deeply rooted discrimination, the status of women and human development has not been very praiseworthy in South Asia. The trajectory of development has been gendered and lopsided in this

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region. It has not been able to include women, third gender, minorities, tribes and all those who are at the margins of the society due to discriminatory social norms and traditions. For instance, people migrate from this region in order to find better livelihood opportunities in other parts of the world. Likewise, human trafficking is also a big challenge before the countries of this region making women and children the worst sufferers. Human development report (2019) states that South Asia was the fastest-growing region in human development progress with 46% growth during 1990–2018, followed by East Asia and the Pacific at 43%. On the Human Development Index 2019, out of 189 countries, Afghanistan was ranked 170, Bangladesh 135, Bhutan 134, India 129, Maldives 104, Nepal 147, Pakistan 152 and Sri Lanka 71. This ranking of the South Asian countries, although quantitative, reflects the lower level of human development in this region. Similarly, in Gender Inequality Index (GII), gender bias is very much visible in the region. 17.1% women held parliamentary seats, whereas in Sub-Saharan Africa its 23.5%, only 39.9% women have reached at least secondary level of education as compared to 63.3% of their male counterparts. In labour force participation, only 25.9% female are there as compared to 78.8% of male. These data illustrate that despite of being the fastest-growing region in the world in terms of human development, deep-rooted inequalities based on social discriminations and political and economic marginalizations of women and other relatively weaker sections of the society still sabotage the realization of human development in this region. In several parts of South Asia, gender discrimination begins before birth and continues till a woman is alive. It starts from family and continues to almost every sphere of life, viz. politics, employment and law, etc. Therefore, the fourth part of the book exclusively deals with gender and its changing scenario in the South Asian context. Gender plays an important role in representing the demands in an unconventional fashion to improve the overall development pattern of democracy and development in the region. Women and children represent not only a demand but also a human need for growth and development of society. Addressing their needs is a test of governance and competence of the governments in power. This part deals with the various dimensions and manifestations of gender discourse. Gender stereotyping is investigated in the light of recent cases of killing of women in the name of witch craft in India and other nations and situates the question of human rights and gender justice against a backdrop of history and the present times. The part describes the changing narratives about South Asian women in terms of strategic de/reconstruction of gender in the fiction of south Asian women writers. A comparative study of the major works on feminism starting from Simone de Beauvoir to Anita Desai and Jhumpa Lahiri has been made. The ‘Third Space’ of feminist sensibility in South Asia Diaspora Literature has been analysed. Likewise, male migration and its impact on women in Bangladesh have been given special attention. The part also covers the debate surrounding the political representation of women in South Asia with special reference to India. The idea of breaking the glass ceiling for women in politics has been contextualized.

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Succinctly, the articles in this book broadly cover almost all relevant issues and perspectives on contemporary South Asia. The state, civil society, social movements, various forms of media and its role in the formation as well as deconstruction of power structures in this region, trajectories of economic growth and socio-political changes, etc., have been discussed in detail. The authors have argued that in order to make this region’s development process more inclusive and participatory, we should focus on two factors, i.e. economic growth as well as development with a humanitarian approach, and this can be achieved only when the region is able to develop people-centric institutions of governance. Anisur Rahman Niharika Tiwari

References Addink, H. (2019). Good governance concept and context. Oxford University Press. Bose, S., & Ayesha, J. (Eds.) (2018). Modern South Asia history, culture, political economy. Routledge. Brass, P. R. (Eds.) (2010). Handbook of South Asian politics India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal. Routledge. Chatterji, A. P., Hansen, T. B., & Jaffrelot, C. (Eds.) (2019). Majoritarian state: How Hindu nationalism is changing India. Oxford University Press. Cohen, S. P. (2013). Shooting for a century the India Pakistan Conundrum. The Brookings Institutions. Devarajan, S. (2020). Can South Asia end poverty in a generation? More inclusive growth and faster human development are key. Accessed on June 3, 2020. URL:https://www.un.org/en/ chronicle/article/can-south-asia-end-poverty-generation-more-inclusive-growth-and-fasterhuman-development-are-key Gellner, D. (Eds.) (2010). Varieties of activist experience civil society in South Asia governance, conflict and civic action: Volume 3. Sage Publication. Herman, E. S., & Noam, C. (1988). Manufacturing consent the political economy of the mass media. Vintage. ILO. (2018). International labour migration statistics in South Asia. ILO. Retrieved on June 29, 2020 from https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---sro-new_delhi/ documents/publication/wcms_645286.pdf Jalal, A. (1995). Democracy and authoritarianism in South Asia a comparative and historical perspective. Cambridge University Press. Kaplan, R. D. (2010). South Asia’s geography of conflict. Centre for a New American Security. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep06253. Accessed July 3, 2020. UNDP. (2019). Global multidimensional poverty index 2019 illuminating inequalities. Accessed on May 4, 2020. URL: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/mpi_2019_publication.pdf UNDP. (2019). Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today: Inequalities in human development in the 21st century. New York: UNDP. United Nations Development Programme. (2015).Work for Human Development. (UNDP Report). New York: UNDP. URL: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2015_human_development_r eport.pdf

Contents

Social and Economic Development Analysing the Status of Human Development in South Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . Niharika Tiwari

3

Repositioning South Asian States: Reinforcing Human Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D. K. Giri

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Debt, Deficit and Economic Growth in South Asia: A Comparative Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Md Nazmuddin

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Promoting South Asian Migration to the Gulf Region: Reducing Poverty and Inequality as the Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Anisur Rahman

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Skills for Employability and Development in South Asia: A Comparative Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Aarti Srivastava and Anjali Taneja

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Governance and Human Rights Governance and Capability Contemporary Issues for Citizens and Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . R. F. I. Smith

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Shrinking Space of Minorities in South Asia: A Comparative Study of India and Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Abdulrahim P. Vijapur Corporate Governance in South Asian Countries: An Overview . . . . . . . . 125 Qazi Mohammed Usman

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Good Governance and Human Rights: A South Asian Perspective . . . . . . 139 B. L. Meena Nuclear Weapons and Regional Cooperation in South Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . 147 Syeda Sumaya Mehdi Media and Literature Role of Media in Conflict Management: A Case Study of 2016 Kashmir Unrest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 Syeda Afshana and Heeba Din The Development Narratives in South Asia: A Case Study of Print Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 Vijay Kumar Soni and Sadananda Sahoo Urdu Historiography, a Field of Urdu Literature in South Asia . . . . . . . . 195 Alain Désoulières Contribution of Arabian Nepali Literature to ‘New Nepal’ Building . . . . 207 Ramji Timalsina Representation of Literature Through Media: A Comparative Study of Sidhwa’s Ice Candy Man and Mehta’s Earth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221 Sadaf Fareed Gender and Development Gendered Demonology: Women as Witches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233 Farhat Nasreen ‘Masculinizing’ the Women: Strategic De/Reconstruction of Gender in the Fiction of South Asian Women Writers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243 Afrinul Haque Khan The “Third Space” of Feminist Sensibility in South Asian Diaspora Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257 Shabina Nishat Omar Sharing the Destiny: Women’s Political Representation in India in the South Asian Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271 Nabila Sadiq Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289

About the Editors

Anisur Rahman is currently Professor and Director, UGC-Human Resource Development Centre, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi. He holds Masters in Economics (AMU) & Sociology, M.Phil and Ph.D. (JNU). His area of interest includes South Asian Migration and Diaspora and has published 5 books and over 50 Research Papers in Reputed Journals in India and abroad. Dr. Rahman has visited several countries and has presented over 70 research papers in national and international conferences. Niharika Tiwari is Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, DDU Govt. P.G. College, Saidabad, (Prof. Rajendra Singh ‘Rajju Bhaiya’ University), Prayagraj, Uttar Pradesh, India. She did her M.Phil and Ph.D. from Centre for South Asian Studies, SIS, Jawaharlal Nehru University. She has taught at Kalindi College, University of Delhi for three years (2011-14). Her areas of interest are South Asian Studies, Gender Studies and Multiculturalism.

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Social and Economic Development

Analysing the Status of Human Development in South Asia Niharika Tiwari

South Asian region is full of similarities as well as variations. Countries of this region have age-old bonds of common history and culture, for instance, the atrocities of colonialism have been faced by almost all of them. The ethnic composition of the countries is also connected. According to the Global Shapers Community at World Economic Forum, the top four issues for South Asia are; equitable growth, livable and suitable cities, education employment and entrepreneurship and regional collaboration. Added to this, it has been argued in Human Development Reports that socio-economic structures and the political system of a country/region are considered the major determinants of human development. As far as South Asia is concerned, according to world bank(2020) data, ‘In line with a global downward trend, growth in South Asia is projected to slow to 5.9% in 2019. A slight rebound in investment and private consumption could jumpstart South Asia’s growth up to 6.3% in 2020 and 6.7% in 2021’.1 Similarly, the political structure of the countries of this region also played a very crucial role in determining the status of human development in the South Asian region. Moreover, the ongoing conflicts in this region have hampered the entire socio-economic and political structure of this region. Before we enter into the analysis of the status of human development in South Asia, it is required to discuss the concept of human development in brief.

N. Tiwari (B) Deen Dayal Upadhyay Govt. P.G. College, Saidabad, Prayagraj, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Rahman and N. Tiwari (eds.), Development, Governance and Gender in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-5109-0_1

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The Concept of Human Development The concept of human development is multidimensional and dynamic. The first Human Development Report (1990) introduced a human development approach to development discourse. It is about expanding and enhancing the richness of human life, rather than simply the richness of the economy. Thus, it focuses on people, their choices and the opportunities available for them. Human development is a process of enlarging people’s choices. The most critical ones are to lead a long and healthy life, to be educated and to enjoy a decent standard of living. Additional choices include political freedom, guaranteed human rights and self-respectwhat Adam Smith called the ability to mix with others without being “ashamed to appear in publick”. (HDR1990, p. 10)

Noble laureate Amartya Sen has also interpreted the concept of human development in his ‘Capability Approach’. According to him, “the goal of human development should be to expand the capability that people have to enjoy as Valuable being and doings”. According to HDR (2019), capabilities evolve with circumstances as well as with values and with people’s changing demands and aspirations. Today, having a set of basic capabilities, those associated with the absence of extreme deprivations, is not enough. Enhanced capabilities are becoming crucial for people to own the “narrative of their lives”. The concept of human development is different from other similar concepts: like the concept of the basic needs which unlike the human development approach focuses on the fulfilment of the basic need of the people only. Similarly, human resource development focuses on investment in the education and health of people as a means of accelerating growth. Human development is a broader concept; it does not regard people as passive beneficiaries of services given to fulfil basic needs, nor does it focus on the expansion of the skill and health of the people to increase economic growth. Instead, people are seen as active agents of change. Moreover, the HDR-20022 has added a new dimension to the idea of human development, i.e. promoting participation through democratic governance. It encourages participation through collective as well as individual aspects. For example, collective action through social and political movements has often been acknowledged as a mechanism of progress for issues central to human development such as environment protection, promoting gender equality and fostering human rights. In addition, people’s participation and other aspects of human development gains can be mutually reinforcing. With political freedom, people get the opportunity to claim their

Analysing the Status of Human Development in South Asia

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social rights and economic well-beings. Similarly, with quality education, people are enabled to ask the government for policies that can respond to their social and economic needs and rights.

Historical Background and Intellectual Underpinnings The human development approach was put forward by the economist Mahbub Ul Haq, and it was further elaborated by the Nobel laureate Amartya Sen in his human capability approach. Freedom of choice is central to this approach. For instance, someone choosing to remain empty stomach (owing to a religious fast) is quite different to someone hungry because she/he is poor and cannot afford to buy food. Since GDP was never intended to comprehend the well-being of the people, scholars felt the need for a concept and its measurement that could focus beyond GDP such as on employment, judicious distribution of available resources and the availability of the basic needs of people. These ideas paved the way for human development. The early leaders of quantification economics provided motivation and showed some concern for the human development approach—William Petty, Gregory King, Francois Quesnay, Antoine Lavoisier and Joseph Lagrange, the grandparents of GNP and GDP. It is also clear in the writings of the leading political economists—Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Robert Malthus, Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill.3 There are the following definitions of human development.4 Aristotle argued for seeing “the difference between a good political arrangement and a bad one” in terms of its successes and failures in facilitating people’s ability to lead “flourishing lives”. The human being as the real end of all activities was a recurring theme in the writings of most of the early philosophers. Emmanuel Kant observed: So, act as to treat humanity, whether in their personal or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only.

These definitions indicate the centrality of human beings while taking any decision for society. The human development approach aims to develop a synthesis between the production and distribution of commodities and the expansion of human capabilities. It also focuses on choices—on what people should have, be and do to be able to ensure their livelihood. Human development is, moreover, concerned about the people’s participation in the socio-economic and political aspects as it considers human beings a dynamic entity. Therefore, it has universal applicability be it less developed or highly developed countries.5

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‘Different countries, communities and individuals will emphasize different dimensions and principles. Human development carries the melody of their culture, values and current priorities in a way that reflects inclusive democratic choices. Many people—activists, leaders, intellectuals and many others—help articulate human development in diverse contexts, as with the local and national HDRs, offering people more opportunities while fostering their ability to shape their lives and advance justice across society, now and into the future (HDR, 2010, p. 24).

Measuring Human Development It focuses on the three essential elements of human life—longevity, knowledge and decent living standards. Although, these factors have their limitations as well. These limitations along with the utility of the elements are mentioned here: For the first component, longevity the indicator is life expectancy at birth. The importance of life expectancy emphasizes the common belief that a long life is valuable in itself, and to achieve this adequate nutrition, access to health facilities that can ensure good health is closely associated with higher life expectancy. Thus, a comprehensive strategy and information about people’s health are required. In the presence of better health facilities, human development can be realized. For the second key component, knowledge–literacy rate of a country gives a crude reflection of the status of education. However, it is necessary for a better life in a society. There are various indicators to understand the quality of education such as the ability of education to develop mental faculties of the students, giving rise to innovative mindset, etc. The literacy rate is a quantitative mechanism; however, it is the first step to comprehend the efforts made in learning and knowledge-building in a society. Therefore, it has been included as an important indicator in the measurement of human development. The third key component, of human development, is a decent standard of living. It is considered the most difficult aspect of measuring human development because it requires resources such as good income, access to the house, drinking water and toilet. The Human Development Report that came in 2010 has broadened the indicator to a large extent. However, due to the scarcity of data on many of these variables, income has been taken as the best indicator to measure living standard while quantifying human development. Because, the most readily available income indicator—per capita income—has wide national coverage. Despite this usefulness, per capita income is not very useful while making international comparisons owing to the presence of non-tradable goods and services and the distortions from exchange rate anomalies etc. Formula to calculate Human Development Index 6 : HDI is a summary measure of human development. It measures the average achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development. Before the HDI itself is calculated, an

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index needs to be created for each of these dimensions. To calculate these indices— the life expectancy, education and GDP indices—minimum and maximum values (goalposts) are chosen for each underlying indicator. Performance in each dimension is expressed as a value between 0 and 1 by applying the following general formula: Dimension index =

Actual value−minimum value Maximum value−minimum value

The HDI is then calculated as a simple average of the dimension indices. There are other important dimensions as part of human development that has been added recently. Human Development Report 2010 provides this newly created HDI which is more comprehensive. This 2010 HDR makes the HDI more specific and inclusive. There are four human development indices for calculating HDI presented as follows; Human Development Index Components

Dimensions

Long and healthy

Knowledge

life Indicators Human

of living

Life expectancy at

Mean years of

GNI per capita

birth

schooling and

(PPP US$)

development

expected years of

index

schooling Dimension index

Life expectancy

Education index

index

Human development index

Source HDR (2010)

A decent standard

GNI index

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Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index measuring average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development—a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living. Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index Components Dimensions

Long and healthy

Knowledge

life Indicators

A decent standard of living

Life expectancy at

Mean years of

GNI per capita (PPP

birth

schooling and

US$)

expected years of schooling

Inequalityadjusted human

Dimension index

Life expectancy

development index

Years of

Income/consumption

schooling Inequality-

Inequality-

Inequality-

Inequality-adjusted

adjusted index

adjusted life

adjusted

income index

expectancy index

Education index

Human development index

Source HDR (2010)

Human Development Index, Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index value adjusted for inequalities in the three basic dimensions of human development mentioned in the graph. Gender Inequality Index (GII)

Analysing the Status of Human Development in South Asia

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Gender

Dimensions

Health

Empowerment

inequality

Indicators

Maternal

Female and

Female and

Female and

mortality rate

male

male shares of

male labour

and adolescent

population

parliamentary

force

fertility rate

with at least

seats

participation

index (GII)

Labour market

secondary

rates

education Dimension

Female

Female and male empowerment

Female and

index

reproductive

index

male labour

health index

Female gender index

market index

Male gender index

Gender inequality index (GII)

Source HDR (2010)

Gender Inequality Index is a composite index measuring loss in achievements in three dimensions of human development—reproductive health, empowerment and labour market, due to inequality between genders. Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) Dimensions

Health

Education

Standard of living

Indicators

Nutrition

Child

Years of

Children

Cooking fuel

mortality

schooling

enrolled

Toilet Water Electricity

(MPI)

Floor Assets Poverty measures

The intensity of Poverty and Head Count Ratio

Multi-dimensional poverty index (MPI)

Source HDR (2010)

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Multidimensional Poverty Index is the share of the population that is multidimensionally poor adjusted by the intensity of the deprivations. In this conceptual framework, the status of human development in the South Asian region will be analysed with the help of data provided by Human Development Reports.

Status of Human Development in South Asia As far as the human development in South Asia is concerned, the most positive aspect has been the fact that it has observed upward movement, although slowly. The chief proponent of the concept of human development, Mahbubul Haq, invariably said that poor governance, corruption, tax evasion, etc. are the cardinal stumbling blocks in the path of human development in South Asia. Basics are changing but the pace is very slow. South Asia, as a region, needs a strong political commitment to achieve better human development indicators. South Asian region has both challenges as well as opportunities; therefore, the future depends upon the efficiency and vision to either achieve the opportunities or to bow before the challenges. Economic growth and human development correspond to each other: economic growth generates resources to expand human choices and consequently capabilities, which in turn foster future economic growth. According to Human Development in South Asia Report (2015, p. 1); In South Asia, this two-way relationship is yet to be firmly established. Over the past three decades reviewed in this Report, South Asia has done remarkably well on the economic growth front. Gross domestic product (GDP), both in absolute terms as well as in per capita, has increased. The region’s GDP growth has been one of the highest in the world, only behind East Asia and the Pacific. Robust economic growth has resulted in increasing employment opportunities, reducing poverty and hunger, and improving education and health. Yet, there have been failures to use the resources generated by economic growth to enhance people’s life. As a result, poverty and hunger still prevail in South Asia, and access to education and health infrastructure is inefficient and inadequate.

According to this report, South Asia has witnessed economic growth and not human development. This trend is continuing even today; according to World Bank,7 South Asia has regained its lead as the fastest-growing region in the world, supported by the recovery in India. With the right mix of policies and reforms, growth is expected to accelerate to 6.9% in 2018 and 7.1% next year. However, according to OPHI Briefing (May 2017), Forty-eight per cent of the poor people live in South Asia, and most of the destitute people—362 of the 706 million—live in South Asia. Thus, South Asia has to work a lot to achieve better choices for the people of the region. The quantitative indicator, i.e. Human Development Index (HDI) of this region illustrates the journey of this region as follows (Table 1). This Table illustrates that the curve of HDI for South Asia has been moving upward and this is the positive aspect regarding this; however, the HDI status of the countries of this region is not very satisfactory as no country could secure a place

0.529

0.525

0.786

Nepal

Pakistan

Sri Lanka

2011

0.752

0.529

0.538

0.675

0.590

0.581

0.557

0.463

2012

0.757

0.538

0.545

0.683

0.599

0.589

0.565

0.470

2013

0.760

0.542

0.551

0.693

0.607

0.596

0.570

0.476

Source http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/trends *Data available up to 2017

0.580

Bhutan

0.663

0.572

Bangladesh

Maldives

0.545

Afghanistan

India

2010

0.454

Country

Table 1 Trends in the HDI in South Asia 2014

0.764

0.548

0.555

0.701

0.615

0.604

0.575

0.479

2015

0.766

0.550

0.558

0.701

0.624

0.607

0.579

0.479

2016

0.768

0.560

0.569

0.712

0.636

0.609

0.597

0.494

2017

0.770

0.562

0.574

0.717

0.640

0.612

0.608

0.498

HDI status

High

Medium

Medium

High

Medium

Medium

Medium

Low

Average annual HDI growth (%) (2010–17*)

0.47

0.95

1.19

0.96

1.40

1.14

1.57

1.05

Analysing the Status of Human Development in South Asia 11

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Table 2 Composite HDI of South Asia in 2010 (Total—169 countries) Country

Rank

HDI9 value

IHDI10 value

GII11 value

MPI value and intensity (%)

Sri Lanka

91

Maldives

107

0.658

0.546

0.599

0.021

38.7%

0.602

0.508

0.533

n.a

India

119

n.a

0.519

0.365

0.748

0.296

53.5%

Pakistan

125

0.490

0.336

0.721

0.275

54.0%

Bangladesh

129

0.469

0.331

0.734

0.291

50.4%

Nepal

138

0.428

0.292

0.716

0.350

54.1%

Afghanistan

155

0.349

n.a

0.797

n.a

n.a

Bhutan

n.a

n.a

n.a

n.a

n.a

n.a

Source HDR (2010)

in the category of very high human development. The two major countries of this region India and Pakistan too are not having very praiseworthy HDI. According to The Hindu (2017)8 ; South Asia also had the highest levels of malnutrition in the world, at 38%, and the lowest public health expenditure as a percentage of the GDP(1.6%, 2014). India’s public health expenditure was even lower, at 1.4% of the GDP. However, it did make some gains between 1990 and 2015, improving life expectancy by 10.4 years in this period. Child malnutrition also declined by 10 percentage points from 2015, and there was a modest gain in infant and under-five mortality rates.

HDR 2010, introduced three more indicators to the HDR along with Human Development Index (HDI); these are Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI), Gender Inequality Index (GII) and Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI). A comparative analysis will be made between the status and improvements made by South Asian countries from 2010 to 2018 in terms of the above-mentioned index (Table 2). The above table shows that no country of South Asia could cross the value of 0.7 as far as HDI is considered. In 2010, two countries, i.e. Sri Lanka and Maldives, could cross the value above 0.6. Similarly, a larger difference between HDI and IHDI also reveals that Inequality-adjusted HDI is also abysmal in South Asia. GII of the region is also very poor and illustrates that women in these countries are facing discrimination. The intensity of MPI is also very severe as except in Sri Lanka (also countries for the data is not available) four countries of this region have MPI intensity above 50%. The quantitative analysis for the year 2010 shows that South Asian countries are lagging as far as the human development of the region is concerned (Table 3). The table illustrates that the condition of human development in South Asia has improved, however gradually, from 2010 to 2015. There is a remarkable improvement in almost all the heads of the composite HDI. GII has also moved in a positive direction. Added to this, MPI intensity has also decreased as except India and Pakistan, the two most populated countries of this region all are below 50%.

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Table 3 Composite HDI of South Asia in 2015 (Total—188 countries) Country

Rank

HDI12 value

IHDI13 value

GII14 value

MPI value and intensity (%)

Sri Lanka

73

0.757

0.669

0.370

n.a

n.a

Maldives

104

0.706

0.531

0.243

0.008

37.5%

India

130

0.609

0.435

0.563

0.282

51.1%

Bhutan

132

0.605

0.425

0.457

0.128

43.5%

Bangladesh

142

0.570

0.403

0.503

0.273

47.8%

Nepal

145

0.548

0.401

0.489

0.197

47.4%

Pakistan

147

0.538

0.377

0.536

0.237

52%

Afghanistan

171

0.465

0.319

0.693

0.293

49.9%

Source HDR (2015)

Human Development Report (2019) demonstrates that there is improvement in the composite HDI of the countries of the South Asian region, especially in terms of the intensity of deprivation.18 For instance, in 2015, the two major countries of this region that is India and Pakistan were having 51.5 and 52% intensity of deprivation (Average deprivation score experienced by people in multidimensional poverty), respectively. In 2018 as mentioned in Table 4, this has been reduced to 43.9% in the case of India. However, there is only a 1% decrease in the case of Pakistan. In Afghanistan, it has been reduced from 49.9% in 2015 to 45.6% in 2018. The comparative analysis of the quantitative values achieved by the countries of this region illustrates that the region is moving at a very slow pace when it comes to human development. Although HDI has its limitations, it provides an idea and basis for critically analysing the performance of the governments in power. Table 4 Composite HDI of South Asia in 2018 (Total—189 countries) Country

Rank

HDI15 value

IHDI16 value

GII17 value

MPI value and intensity (%)

Sri Lanka

71

0.780

0.686

0.380

n.a

n.a

Maldives

104

0.719

0.719

0.367

0.003

34.4%

India

129

0.647

0.477

0.501

0.123

43.9%

Bhutan

134

0.617

0.450

0.436

0.175

46.8%

Bangladesh

135

0.614

0.465

0.536

0.198

47.5%

Nepal

147

0.579

0.430

0.476

0.148

43.6%

Pakistan

152

0.560

0.386

0.547

0.198

51.7%

Afghanistan

170

0.496

n.a

0.575

0.142

45.6%

Source HDR (2019)

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Gender Inequality and Human Development in South Asian Countries According to HDR, 2019, gender inequality is correlated with a loss in human development due to inequality. No country has reached low inequality in human development without restricting the loss coming from gender inequality. Investing in women’s equality and lifting both their living standards and their empowerment is central to the human development agenda. “Human development, if not engendered, is endangered”, concluded the pioneer 1995 Human Development Report, based on similar evidence. Gender disparity is pervasive in the South Asian region. It begins at family, the oldest social institution and spreads with ideologies and expectations that are rooted in our social norms, traditions and values. Due to fossilized and rigid patriarchal mindset, women continue suffering and their full human potential is not realized. The human development of a region can only be improved when gender equality becomes the norm of society. In South Asia, there is a certain issue like low levels of education, employment, health, etc. that hinder the human development of women, and consequently, the entire region witnesses a low level of human development. Human Development Report syndicates that females have a comparative advantage over males in terms of life expectancy. Consequently, gender differences among the old age group are very much evident because more women survive into old age. In South Asia, women have poor access to health, education and often depend on the male breadwinner of the family therefore they experience illiteracy, ill health, unemployment, etc. Gender and reproductive health issues are at a crossroads of biology and social constructs that profoundly shape women’s roles and status. Deep-rooted patriarchal norms compel females to opt for early marriages and motherhood. Similarly, schools do not have good infrastructure to support the girls who menstruating. The incidents like rape, molestation, etc. do not allow women to realize their full potential. All these aspects are interlinked to each other. Added to this, the general health situation of a mother in South Asia has far-reaching implications. The prevalence of anaemia; lack of adequate nutrition, rest and leisure; the age of the mother, the mother’s weight, diabetes, depression or mental or psychological problems, maternal morbidity and births attended by skilled health professionals are crucial factors in the pre- and antenatal stages. South Asia’s performance when compared to other regions of the world has not been very impressive (Table 5). A comparative study of different regions of the world demonstrates that everywhere women are lagging. The GII, which exposes differences in the distribution of achievements between women and men, measures the human development costs of gender inequality (the higher the GII value the more disparities between females and males and the more loss to human development). GII of South Asia is not praiseworthy and similarly, seat share in parliament and labour force participation is also pessimistic. South Asia as a region has to cover a long distance to achieve better GII.

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Table 5 Gender Inequality Index, regional dashboard (2018) Region

Gender Inequality MMR * Index (GII) (deaths per 100,000 live births) (2015)

Some secondary education (% ages 25 and older (2010–2018 F

M

Arab States

0.531

148.2

45.9

54.9

East Asia and the Pacific

0.310

61.7

68.8

76.2

Europe and Central Asia

0.276

24.8

78.1

Latin America 0.383 and the Caribbean

67.6

Share of seats in parliament (% held by women)

Labour force participation rate (% age 15 and older)

F

M

18.3

20.4

73.8

20.3

59.7

77.0

85.8

21.2

45.2

70.1

59.7

59.3

31.0

51.8

77.2

South Asia

0.510

175.7

39.9

60.8

17.1

25.9

78.8

Sub-Saharan Africa

0.573

550.2

28.8

39.8

23.5

63.5

72.9

Source HDR (2019, p. 149)

Building Blocks and Stumbling Blocks in the Process of Human Development in South Asia Human development is a multidimensional and multicausal phenomenon. Earlier, it was a bit simple but later on especially since the publication of HDR 2010, the quantitative measurement of human development, i.e. HDR also became very comprehensive as it has been discussed in the first section of this paper. To make this paper more specific, further discussions would be based on two hypotheses that are; First, the problems related to governance in South Asian countries have worked as a major stumbling block in the path of human development. Second, judicious allocation and equitable access to the available resources can improve the abysmal status of human development in South Asia. However, socio-economic and other factors will also be discussed in brief. The role of governance has been selected as an important factor in this study due to the reason that governance influences all the three basic constituents of HDI in a very comprehensive way. According to Human Development in South Asia Report (2015, p. 210); Institutions of governance in South Asia, as in many other regions, are plagued by inefficiency, corruption and huge bureaucracies. But serious efforts are now underway to restructure and reform public sector institutions. Many ineffective and inefficient public sector corporations are being restructured or sold. The privatisation process, though needs to be

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N. Tiwari managed carefully and compassionately, is one of the effective ways to reduce the heavy public sector debt and expenditure.

According to HDR2002), democratic governance helps in human development due to three reasons. First, enjoying political freedom and participating in the decisions that shape one’s life are fundamental human rights: they are part of human development in their own right. Second, democracy helps protect people from economic and political catastrophes such as famines and descents into chaos. This is no small achievement. Indeed, it can mean the difference between life and death. Third, democratic governance can trigger a virtuous cycle of development—as political freedom empowers people to press for policies that expand social and economic opportunities, and open debates help communities shape their priorities. South Asia as a region can be analysed from this perspective. In nutshell, factors responsible for abysmal HDI in South Asia are historical baggage, poor management of resources, governments spend more on arms and less on health and education, ethnic struggles and divides within the countries of South Asia, aristocratic and colonial mindset still dominates the political elites leading to poor governance, the negative role of non-state actors, extremism, etc. According to Human Development Report South Asia (2015, p. 205), ‘The region has adequate knowledge, ability, resource, technology, political strength and institutional capacity to create a fairer society’. This report has further identified seven areas that have a sign of hope for this region. These are high sustained and broad-based economic growth, renewed attention to poverty reduction, improvement in human development, commitment to gender equality, restructuring and reforms of institutions of governance, role of technology for people’s empowerment and strengthened role of civil society. Added to this, the countries of South Asia have improved a lot in the areas of civil society activism, media and judicial fairness. At glance, one can find that certain initiatives have been more or less successful in South Asia. For instance, Bangladesh, India and Nepal have been the beneficiary of the microfinance system. In Bangladesh, Grameen Bank which works with the poor especially women has helped people a lot. Similarly, in India, Self Help Groups (SHGs) have worked wonderfully. In Nepal, strong presence of a traditional community-based social security system has provided a bedrock for the citizens. They are Guthis, Dhikur, Dharam Bhakari, etc. As far as another social security mechanism is concerned, Sri Lanka has emerged as the most successful country as she has achieved universal primary enrolment and completion; Sri Lanka spends almost 3.7% of its GDP on health; Cash Transfer Programme called ‘Samurdhi’ has been a success. In India, Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) through Anganwadi, Sarva Siksha Abhiyan, Mid-Day Meal, Ujjawala Yojana, Beti Bachao Beti Padhao, etc. has helped in improving the condition of vulnerable groups to a certain extent. In Pakistan, Anti-Poverty Programme got a boost due to targeted intervention by the government. Institutions providing social assistance like Zakat, Bait-ul-mal and Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund, food security programme, assistance for girl’s

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education, etc. have provided fertile ground for human development in Pakistan. Moreover, increased Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP) allocation for Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) has also helped the people. The tremendous growth in microfinance has also helped the people of Pakistan; the glaring example of this is ‘Khushali Bank’. According to Unicef (2009) report, Bhutan has a social insurance system but no social assistance programme. However, the government’s efforts to make free education and free health service universally available are impressive in South Asia. The report further says that in the Maldives, government employees were covered by formal social security but social assistance was introduced only in the 2000s with a programme like the Absolute Poverty Scheme. The government also introduced ‘Social Pension’ for all citizens. In the Maldives, healthcare assistance, voucher programme for poor to buy textbooks, uniform and other essentials for their children have changed the life of the people to a certain extent. Similarly in Afghanistan, cash for work, National Solidarity Programme, food for work, National Emergency Employment Programme for Rural Access, National Social Protection Strategy (2008), etc. are the positive initiatives. In Afghanistan, government has truly done very commendable work as the delivery of services is still a big issue there owing to lack of security. Above-mentioned signs of hope demonstrate that South Asia has enough potential to move up on the ladder of human development quantitatively as well as qualitatively. The above analysis also concludes that the areas of governance where the state has focused have given positive results, despite several limitations. Countries of this region are trying to do their best; however, a deep analysis reveals that whatever achievements of the countries of this region have in terms of human development are the fulfilment of the ‘basic needs’ of the people which is different from the concept of human development which considers human beings as an active agent of multidimensional change, whereas basic needs concept keeps human beings merely at the receiving end. There are areas to be addressed more seriously viz. informal sector welfare, human trafficking, qualitative education, comprehensive health facilities, terrorism, ethnic animosities, etc. For this, strong political will, cooperation and coordination among the countries of this region are inevitable. Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/sar. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/263/hdr_2002_en_complete. pdf. ibid. Defining and Measuring Human Development. (HRD-1990), P.9. Ibid. See HDR 2006. http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/sar. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-slips-in-human-developmentindex/article17566555.ece.

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HDI value (0–1) Greater is better. Under perfect equality HDI and IHDI are equal, the greater the difference between the two, the greater the inequality. Zero (0) stands for perfect equality and One (1) stands for total inequality. HDI value (0–1) Greater is better. Under perfect equality HDI and IHDI are equal, the greater the difference between the two, the greater the inequality. Zero (0) stands for perfect equality and One (1) stands for total inequality. HDI value (0–1) Greater is better. Under perfect equality HDI and IHDI are equal, the greater the difference between the two, the greater the inequality. Zero (0) stands for perfect equality and One (1) stands for total inequality. Average deprivation score experienced by people in multidimensional poverty.

References ADB. (2014). Access to education and training in South Asia: 12 things to know (ADB Report). https://www.adb.org/features/12-things-know-access-education-and-training-southasia. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-slips-in-human-development-index/articl e17566555.ece Alkire, S., & Robles, G. (2017). Global multidimensional poverty index 2017. http://www.ophi.org. uk/wp-content/uploads/B47_Global_MPI_2017.pdf http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/219/hdr_1990_en_complete_nostats.pdf India Slips in Human Development Index, Special Correspondent, 22 March 2017, 00:17 IST. www.thehindu.com › News › National. Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre. (2015). Human development in South Asia 2015: The economy and the people (Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre Report). Lahore, Pakistan. Unicef. (2009). Social protection in South Asia: A review. https://www.unicef.org/socialpolicy/files/ social_protection_in_south_asia_-_a_review_-_unicef_rosa_2009.pdf United Nations Development Programme. (1990). Defining and measuring human development (UNDP report). Oxford University Press. United Nations Development Programme. (2002). Deepening democracy in a fragmented world. (UNDPReport). Oxford University Press. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/263/hdr_ 2002_en_complete.pdf United Nations Development Programme. (2015). Work for human development. (UNDP Report). UNDP, New York. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2015_human_development_report.pdf United Nations Development Programme. (2019). Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today: Inequalities in human development in the 21st century. (UNDP Report), New York, USA. http:// hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2019.pdf United Nations Development Programme. (2010). 20th anniversary edition, the real wealth of nations: Pathways to human development. (UNDP Report). Palgrave Macmillan, New York. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/270/hdr_2010_en_complete_reprint.pdf United Nations Development Programme. Human development trends-1990–2015. http://hdr.undp. org/en/composite/trends World Economic Forum. (2016). Top 4 issues for South Asia’s millennials. https://www.weforum. org/agenda/2016/10/top-issues-for-south-asia-millennials/

Repositioning South Asian States: Reinforcing Human Development D. K. Giri

As I was finalizing the article, the coronavirus or COVID-19, some would call it Wuhan virus, hit the entire world, upending the social, political and economic systems in each country. Such never-seen-before crisis propels people to cocreate new ideas in order to combat the virus and conduct their systems. Without doubt, the challenges are humongous which call for radical shift in strategic thinking and systemic changes. While no one knows how long the pandemic will last, how many will feel it and how deep will be its health and economic consequences, the political paradigms are undergoing changes all over the world. Talking of South Asia, the commonplace issues like nationalism, territorial disputes, migration and terrorism have gone to the back burner. Building immunity of people and saving lives are the overriding priority. Obviously, the new political priority of saving lives and livelihoods is not the result of the elite decision-making, and it concerns all across the social and economic segments. If the Prince and the Prime Minister of Britain could be infected with the virus, any one, however, high and mighty could be a potential victim. Moreover, unless a country is fully free from the virus and is insulated against it, no one is safe. That is the enormity and gravity of the risk. Therefore, all countries have to concentrate their energies on human beings. Human beings, not goods or properties, have come into greater focus as never before. Even before the full impact of the pandemic could be felt and measured, its human effects have been already devastating. The lockdowns have left millions of migrant workers and daily wagers in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh with little choice but to return to their villages. That is jumping from the frying pan to the fire, as they do not have the means to survive. At the same time, the crash in consumer demands has made the global brands to cancel their orders hitting major textile producers like India and Bangladesh, thereby crippling and crushing the livelihoods of workers. The stronger-economy countries in the Asia pacific like Singapore, South Korea and Japan have injected stimulus packages to cushion their factories and workers. D. K. Giri (B) Jamia Millia Islamia University, New Delhi, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Rahman and N. Tiwari (eds.), Development, Governance and Gender in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-5109-0_2

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India too has set up generous stimulus packages. However, not all countries, mainly LDCs, and five of the South Asian countries are LDCs, will have the fiscal leverage to install this kind of safety windows for their small and medium business and workers. Governments have to deliver. There is no alternative. The ability of the states to protect the lives and limbs of their own citizens has been put to test, and the stakes are no less than proving the fundamental legitimacy of Hobbesian Leviathan. At the same time, scant resources allocated to health care and cutbacks on welfare provisions have crippled the service–delivery agencies. Many observers are anxious if the governments could cope with such a major crisis. What is certain is that this crisis will go deeper and wider than the 2008 financial crash. What is clear is that this pandemic should lead to radical change in political principles, attitudes and strategies. If not, the states in South Asia and elsewhere cannot survive another crisis even if they get past this one. What are the changes we are pontificating on? There are primarily two changes we are referring to; these changes were overdue; the pandemic has reiterated the urgency. One is to accept the aphoristic assertion that the human development is the key to the growth and prosperity of a country. The corollary assumption that needs to be deemphasized is that the production of goods and services contributing to GDP backed by development of infrastructure must succeed human development. The second change is the repositioning of the states so that they govern not rule for the sake of human development. The states in South Asia are democratic, socialist (Sri Lanka calls itself so), monarchical and military dominated; but within such political regimes, the states have to perform a different role and build new partnerships. An uncluttered understanding of concepts is a prelude to making viable policies and taking tangible actions. Sadly, discussion on theory before suggesting creative or remedial action plan is not a practice followed by Indian academia (Parekh, 1992). This article attempts to make up for such gap.

Understanding Human Development The opening lines of the first Human Development Report define the concept by debunking the myth that economic growth consists of production of goods and services. It reads, “The real wealth of a nation is its people. And the purpose of development is to create an enabling environment for people to enjoy, long, healthy and creative lives. This simple truth is forgotten in the pursuit of material and financial wealth.” The new growth theories have endorsed the contention that the human development is the key to growth and development of a country. Only economic growth cannot attain an optimum and self-sustenance path without human development. The noble laureate economist Joseph Stieglitz argues that the main engine of growth is the accumulation of human capital; physical capital plays an essential but subsidiary role in development. Health, education and income (more or less in that order) of a person constitute human capital. Note that improved education and health are not just a means to an end of increased output, but are ends in themselves. If a

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government seeks to reduce fiscal deficit by cutting back on human development, growth may actually suffer. Thus, improved education and health are the essential means of increasing GDP. The legendary development economist EF Schumacher had warned that, in South Asia, the defence expenditure is much higher than that of health or education. The causal relation between human development and growth has been overlooked in making policies and investment (Schumacher, 1975). He added that GNP could not measure the substance of a person. The statistics do not prove anything. Citing Buddhist philosophy1 Schumacher said, from Buddhist point of view, it is standing the truth on its head when one considers goods more important than human beings and consumption is more important than creative activity. Development of democracy has become an end in itself in many parts of the world including South Asia. There are quite a few values and aspirations associated with politics of democracy. But, what is the meaning of such values and aspirations like freedom, human dignity, standard of living, self-reliance and self-fulfilment? Is it a matter of goods or people? Of course, it is a matter of people, the primary stakeholder any society. Schumacher reiterated development does not start with goods; it starts with people, their education, organization and discipline. Without these, all resources remain latent, untapped potential. This is the basic postulate of human development. The theory formulation on human development begs certain philosophical and methodological questions. If we accept that, health, education and income are the ingredients for human development, what are the indicators of growth of people? How do we measure it, as we do GNP, the quantitative growth of objects? The human development is qualitative. Therefore, the indicators are the degree of improvements in people’s quality of life. The next question is what determines people’s quality of life? The answer could be, it depends upon the possibilities people being able to adequately satisfy their fundamental needs. That begs the next obvious questions, what are those fundamental needs and who determines them? Answering these will require some enquiry. It is traditionally believed that human needs tend to be infinite, they change the whole time vis-a-vis each period and place. However, such assumptions are inaccurate and are products of conceptual shortcomings (Max-Neef, 1991). The conceptual confusion stems from conflation of needs and satisfiers. One has to make a distinction between the two. Human needs must be understood as a system interrelated and interactive. The needs can be organized into two categories—existential and axiological (Max-Neef, 1991). The existential needs are being, having, doing and interacting, in other words health, education, food, shelter, work and community. The second category consists of things like protection, affection, understanding, participation, creation, identity and freedom.

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Human Capabilities, The State and The Civil Society There is yet another perspective on human development. Political and economic theorists argue that provision and access to needs are one of the ways securing human development. And the other more individually and social gainful approach is establishing the symbiotic link between social development and enhancing human capabilities. According to this perspective, development is essentially expanding human capabilities, not as the ultimate goal in itself, but as a means of generating increased productivity, that is the foundation of economic growth (Sen, 1999). Examine the implication of such a perspective in reconceptualizing the role of the state; some would call it developmental state (Evans, 2003). The mid-twentieth-century economic thinking was that the accumulation of capital was the driver of growth and the growth led to improvement in health, education and well-being. The current research findings on economic growth point to the improvement in human development lead to growth in income. The evidence of the validity of this assumption is rich and robust. In a number of research papers, authors have looked at the interactions between growth and human development (Ranis et al., 2000). Their data analyses from several countries challenge the conventional view that human development is an outcome of economic growth, not a critical input into the latter. They assert that human development must precede growth-oriented policies if growth is to be sustained. This builds on the impressive work of Barrow and Lee (Barrow, 1997) which demonstrates the rich growth consequences of investment in education. Thus, the economic connection between capability expansion and growth is quite strong across the wide range of economic contexts. The shift in capability-centred theory of development also touches upon the classic concerns of poverty and inequality, deeply prevalent in South Asia as obstacles to human development. A large literature confirms the debilitating consequences inequality for individual and community well-being (Hacker, 2006; Wilkinson, 2005; Zuberi, 2006). There is now a mountain of evidence to confirm that inequality can slow and even negate the poverty-reducing impact of growth. Even World Bank now recognizes that inequality in societies has perverse effect on institutions and undermine good governance. The relationship between democratic politics and economic growth is long debated and still is an unresolved theoretical issue. Prominent author like Amartya Sen, in his seminal works on famines, has argued that independent countries with even modestly democratic political institutions are capable of avoiding situations of famine. In 1986, Cald well showed through his research that democracy and social activism positively contributed, especially in low-income countries, to superior health outcomes (Caldwell, 1986). The state cannot perform on its own to promote human development. The state interacts with the business, most often in a nexus.2 That must change so far as to include the civil society into the equation. Therefore, the repositioning the state requires redirecting analytical attention from policy-making that is either internal to

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the state or in collaboration/collusion with a small elite in industries to a wide range of actors referred to as civil society. Before we reposition the state in close collaboration with the civil society or in partnership as formulated in the following, we need to understand and analyse the civil society. As a matter of fact, it is not a coherent, unified agency, it is diversified and operation-specific. On its political characteristics and organizational principles, civil societies ideally are at the core of democratic politics, but the associational life at the core of civil society is not inherently democratic. Some groups are clearly uncivil, denying associational rights to other groups. For example, there are a large number of Hindu and Islamic chauvinist groups in South Asia and KKK3 in America. So, whether the civil society expands rights-based conception of democratic inclusion or serves as an extension of state apparatus (Burawoy, 2003), or degenerates into an association that practices exclusion is an empirical question. The civil society is a full range of voluntary associations and movements that operate outside the market and the state and gives shape the public space. These would include social movements, advocacy groups and autonomous NGOs and CBOs. The actors in the civil society use social as opposed to bureaucratic or market modes of mediation among people, organizing collective action through shared norms, purposes and agreements (Warren, 2001). Thus, the civic (Varshney, 2002) or communicative (Habermas, 1996) mode of engagement is quite distinct from pursuit of political power or business profit. To illustrate, examining the Indian state in terms of its embeddedness or in terms of its interaction with the civil society, as a typical case for South Asia, it suffers from two anomalies. One, although it has embraced policies that are aimed at human capability expansion, the delivery continues to be top–down, monopolized and manipulated by bureaucratic political nexus (Giri, 2019) and subject to massive leakages. Second, the Indian state, namely the subnational states consisting of three tiers of local governments are embedded in society, but only through linkages of party representation. Interestingly, the counterfactuals are instructive and give optimism for the kind of structure we propose. The states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu have impressive social development through their historical patterns of social mobilization. For instance, the health movement in Kerala or the broad-based anti-caste movements in Tamil Nadu produced inclusive political formations that not only strengthened the demand side dynamic of the civil society, but created more competitive and redistributive party politics (Heller, 2000). Experts on Indian politics argue that the narrowness of the ruling collation in India help explain both the forces that have pushed the economic growth and the disproportionate distribution of the fruits of that growth (Kohli, 2012). India, namely the central government, seems to have recognized the need to enhance human development and to tackle the massive deficit in service delivery. These have been largely driven by NGOs and expert activists such as Jean Drez. As a result, India has new laws that empower citizens such as Right to Information, Food Security Legislation

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and MNREGA.4 Such engagements, productive as they are, appear to be a patronizing offer, not structured as coproduction of measures aimed at building capabilities and opportunities.

A Trisector partnership The cooperation between the government/state and business/private sector is in vogue today. The basic nature of the state is coercive. Therefore, the process of acquiring and exercising power needs to be well devised and regulated through appropriate mechanisms such as periodic elections for transferring power from one political party to another, and the autonomy of the legislature, executive and the judiciary should be maintained. Economic activity is regulated by market forces in terms of free exchange and open competition and motivated by material incentives. However, sometimes state intervention is required because often it is found that self-regulation by the market does not always succeed. Civil society is a space between market and the state, for free voluntary activity for citizen. It can and should moderate the authoritarian nature of the state and the rapacity of the market. A state may be authoritarian or democratic; the market could be monopolistic or competitive. Similarly, the civil society contains both negative and positive elements. In the final analysis, a good society is one in which the democratic polity, competitive market and the positive elements of civil society cohabit. Trisector cooperation refers to the synthesis of these positive dimensions. The three entities that is state, market and civil society produce three creatures the citizen, the consumer and the communitarian, respectively; and all of them belong to citizenry of a country. It is expected from the citizens to be committed to democratic values—a refrain we hear frequently; and the consumer is unleashed without any restraint, which is playing havoc not only in society but also in nature. The current issues such as climate change should be addressed by responsible consumer behaviour. Added to this, it is necessary to evolve a code of ethics for consumers. The creature that the civil society produces is the communitarian, whose concern is the welfare of not only his immediate community but also the wider society. All individuals combine three roles that is of citizen, consumer and communitarian. Nevertheless, these three roles need to be balanced to create a consensual equilibrium in society, which would be qualitatively different from the coercive equilibrium produced by the state-led and market-driven equilibriums, the mediating element being the role of communitarian propelled by civil society. The trisector approach thus endorses not only institutional interlinkages and cooperation between state, market and civil society, it also aims at creating aware individuals who can balance the interaction between citizen, consumer and communitarian. The product of such an endeavour would be neither a combination of capitalism and democracy nor a combination of socialism and one-party rule, both of which have

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failed, but that of socialism and democracy, call it democratic socialism if you are not prejudiced. As I see it, only the trisector approach can provide equity, nurture emancipatory identity, deliver dignity to all and be the instrument of comprehensive security. Operationally, active participation of citizen in all the three categories is the key ingredient for social policies. Thus, education is coproduced by students and their families (the consumers) with the state, and health is coproduced by the patients. Evidently, the state civil society (include business as the third component) interactions are key to policy innovation (Baiocchi et al., 2011). Trisector Partnership or TSP is the only way forward. Let us remember while organizational and institutional forms will vary depending upon the cultural and historical contexts, effective mechanisms of deliberation and delivery that include a broad cross section of society are the foundation of public policy and action (Evans, 2004). Trisector partnerships might not be exactly what you think they are. They are not public–private partnerships, which purport to unite the two sectors of government and business but often simply amount to government subcontracting. They are not corporate social responsibility initiatives, which are led by business involving a compliant NGO. Trisector partnership can be defined as a partnership for development between government, business and civil society, in which, the partners, with respect to their respective monetary and non-monetary contributions to the development process, accept parity. TSP offers an exciting opportunity to accelerate the human development process beyond CSR and PPPs. It is important to make it clear that you do not have to be the CEO of a multinational bank, a government minister or the boss of a multinational NGO to be an instigator of TSP. Trisector partnerships can take place in large, medium and small formats. Small and medium enterprises can get together with local political representatives and town NGOs to initiate dynamic change in their local communities.

Defining Partnership I would strongly urge anybody involved in a partnership to discuss with their partners what they think about the term. If I were to interpret, I would also say that this means that every partner is equally involved in some way in cocreating the partnership’s activities. If someone hands someone else something to deliver, that is not a partnership, that is not cocreation. Every partner must be recognized as bringing contributions—different contributions—but valued equally. It is easy for people who have the most resources, possibly the business people, to think that they lead the partnership, and civil society figures then feel like the poor relation. In a good partnership, that should not be the case. You are at the table because you know you need the kinds of resources that all sectors bring.

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South Asian Human Development Scenario The countries constituting South Asia5 in this essay are the eight members of SAARC—South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation set up in 1985. They are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. South Asia is home to one-fourth of the world population making it both populous and most densely populated region of the world.6 South Asia has the world’s largest ethnic populations of Hindus, Sikhs, Muslims, Jains and Zoroastrians. It accounts for 98.47% of global Hindus, 90.5% of global Sikhs, 31% of global Muslims and 35 million Christians and 25 million Buddhists. Sadly, twothirds of world population living below $1 day is located in South Asian countries. The whole of South Asia spends about 3% of its GDP on health, compared to 8.2% the world average. Let us cite certain indicators to measure the state of human development in South Asian region. In terms of positions in the Human Development Index,7 only Sri Lanka, at no, 71, comes among 100 countries in the world. All the rest are below 100, with Afghanistan the lowest at 168, followed by Pakistan at 152, Nepal 147, Bangladesh 136, Bhutan 134, India 129 and Maldives next to Sri Lanka at 104. In terms of indicators, we take three, per capita income per GDP; second on health, life expectancy at birth and child mortality under the age of five; and third on education, the literacy rate. Afghanistan ranks the lowest in all the human development indices cited above. Since 1970s, Afghanistan has gone through bloody and brutal civil wars including foreign military interventions mainly by former Soviet Union and United States of America. As Afghanistan is in the process to recover and rebuild, it continues to struggle against extreme poverty, poor infrastructure, a large placement of landmines, armed resistance, illegal poppy cultivation and opium trade. Out of 30 million people, two-thirds live below a dollar a day. The development is driven mainly by foreign donation. India is the third-largest donor to Afghanistan. The first ever HDR on Afghanistan concludes that despite considerable improvement in education and economy, the country still suffers from the challenges of poverty and inequality. It suggests that the human development and human security are the key factors. The condition of women is deplorable under Taliban influence. Only 14% of women are literate, and rate of pregnancy related deaths is 60 times higher than that of the industrial countries. In terms of political participation, the number of seats held by women in the lower house is 27.3 and 22.5% in the upper house (ibid). Bangladesh has witnessed significant decline in child mortality rate. Since the difficult years immediately after independence in 1971, Bangladesh economy has been consistently growing and is growing faster than those of its neighbours are. The distinguishing feature of Bangladesh is its NGO network, the biggest in South Asia, which fills the gaps created by deficiencies in democratic accountability and public administration.

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Bhutan’s per capita is growing fast. The standard of living is the highest in Asia. Bhutan rates Gross Domestic Happiness (GDH) a greater indicator of country’s wellbeing than GDP. The anecdote to coinage of the phrase GDH is that the Bhutanese king, in 1987, in response to the criticism by the correspondent of London Financial Times said, ‘GDH is better than GDP’ (ibid). Economists including Noble Laureate Daniel Kahneman have questioned the link between income and happiness. A survey conducted by the University of Leicester in the UK had ranked Bhutan as the eighth happiest place in the planet. India ranking in HDI is steadily improving. It is the second-most populous but densest country in the world. India has not been able to tap the fullest benefit of its demographic dividend. Out of all the countries in South Asia and in fact, the whole of Asia except Japan and South Korea, India has remained a democracy since its independence. Democracy has its demerits, one of which is slow reforms, which has affected the status of human development. In addition, India has not moved from political democracy to a social democracy, which could have accelerated the process of human development. Maldives is a small island country with a population of 0.51 million (2018). It has the second highest per capita GDP income. Despite being an LDC, Maldives has the most impressive HDI in South Asia. It invests adequately in health and education. The female literacy at 98% is higher than the male literacy of 96%. Maldives economy is largely dependent on tourism and fishery. Nepal is an agrarian economy absorbing 81% of employment and contributing 80% to the export sector. Manufacturing, though small in size, has experienced impressive growth. Tourism is another major sector for the economy, but both were hit by the Maoist insurgency. Women are in deplorable condition in Nepal due to the lack of education and ignorance of law, which cause the rise in cases of discrimination against them. Women trafficking for commercial sexual exploitation is a major social problem in Nepal. Every year 7000 girls and children are trafficked from Nepal to the other parts of the world. India alone has more than 200,000 Nepali women working as commercial sex workers (ibid). Nepal is making great strides in political and economic reforms, but it still faces a major challenge of creating a society based on principle of equity with education and health for all to carry on with a decent living. Pakistan despite a being a poor country at its independence in 1947 had a growth rate that was better than global average for four decades. However, subsequently, due to political instability and imprudent policies, social and human development tumbled in recent years. According to the SAPPE report, “Pakistan’s economy is in a state of crisis, years of fiscal and external deficits have resulted in the accumulation of large debts”. Pakistan unfortunately has the highest military expenditure as percentage of its GDP in the region closely followed by India. It spends less than 1% of its GDP on health and only about 2% on education. Sri Lanka over time shifted from a plantation economy to a modern economy. The development of ports across Sri Lanka made it a strategic centre for trade. From 1948 to 1977, Sri Lanka went down the socialist path, dismantling the colonial plantation, nationalizing its industries and establishing a welfare state. However, whereas the standard of living and literacy improved considerably, the country’s

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economy suffered from inefficiency, inequality, slow growth and lack of investment. In fact, “Sri Lanka has provided tremendous lessons in recent history to show that keeping the poor, the less powerful ethnic communities and social groups out of the economic policy making leads not only to increased poverty, and inequality, but also political unrest, instability and violence that in turn becomes serious obstacle to poverty eradication”.

The Role of States in South Asia South Asia is marked by large population, wide spread poverty, weak governance structure, feeble democratic institutions, increasing militarization and sectarianism. On the upside, there is a growing educated middle class, vibrant civil societies, large young population with potential and a big human resource. South Asia states have sought national security through military structures and have undermined internal security by not building harmony and harnessing the creative potential of its citizens. Arguably, the overarching concern in South Asia and the one that shapes all other issues is the quest for national unity (Embree, 1997). The power is defined in terms of money, position and possession of arms, not the productive capabilities of an individual. That is why perhaps the focus on human development has been de-emphasized. The other South Asian feature is that politics is considered a male domain, although ironically, the first woman head of a government in the world came from South Asia and there have been quite a few women heads in South Asian countries. Such traditions have not enhanced the conditions of women in this region. It has been observed that, in India, when women are in policy-making and project-delivery positions, the human development has been greater (Giri, 2019). Religion and language have played a big role in South Asian politics. To illustrate, India was partitioned into two states, at independence, based on religion. In 1943, Muhammad Ali Jinnah declared, “Never before in the history of the World, has a nation rallied around a common platform and a common ideal in such a short time as the Muslims have done in this vast sub-continent. Never before the mental outlook of a nation has been unified so effectively”. However, religion as a base for state formation became an untenable proposition with the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971, on the foundation, among other issues, of language. Similarly, there have been attempts in India to transform it into a Hindu Rashtra (Hindu Nation). That desire has been heightened by the accession of BJP, predominantly a Hindu party, to power since 2014, although it is debatable if the party gained power in 2014 and again in 2019 on a Hindu platform. A great many upperand middle-class Hindus view Hindu nationalism as a deeply divisive force, and the lowest caste Hindus perceive it as an attempt to restore historic pattern of upper caste dominance, whereas the Muslims see it as a threat to their existence as a community (Embree, 1994). With regard to the states, the South Asian states are deeply differentiated in their characteristics and in differential degree of structural development. Some of them,

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namely Afghanistan, Nepal, Pakistan and Bhutan, are endeavouring for democratic state formation in their respective countries. While the other South Asian states, Bangladesh, India, Maldives and Sri Lanka have maintained their democracies at least structurally if not optimally in functions. However, each of the states has to shift in favour of promoting human development. Axiomatically speaking, human lives and those of the systems are transient in nature, so paradigm shift is not only necessary, but also indispensable. Tracing the growth of the states in South Asian countries, Afghanistan continues to struggle for political stability and internal security. It is infested with Taliban militancy and terrorism by Islamic jihadists. Located at the trisection of South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East, Afghanistan occupies a unique geostrategic position for movement or trade and people. Hence, it became a theatre of big power rivalry starting with the Soviet intervention in 1979. Americans propped up Taliban as they started a proxy war with former Soviet Union. With withdrawal of Soviet forces, Taliban came to the centre stage of Afghan politics challenging the American advice and intrusion. The country has been plunged into an internecine civil war between the government and Taliban, the former supported by Western powers led by USA. The recent peace treaty between Taliban and USA lends some hope for durable peace and stability, but many commentators are not optimistic about Taliban honouring the commitments. Since the assassination of Mujibur Rehamn on 15 August 1975, by mid-level military officers (Mascarenhas, 1986), the national government in Bangladesh has gone through several coups, counter coups and destabilization. The country has witnessed assassination of two heads of governments, Mujib and General Ziaur Rehman, it has also the unique feat of having two women Prime Ministers, Khaleda Zia and Seikh Hasina, quite remarkable for a newly formed country. Since 2008, Bangladesh has had stable democratically elected governments. The kingdom of Bhutan is a small Himalayan country of 0.77 million (2020) people. Sandwiched between two big countries, India and China, Bhutan is landlocked and is quite isolated. The government to preserve the national culture and identity heavily regulates foreign influences and tourism.8 Since 1998, the king, Jigme Singye Wangchuk introduced significant political reforms transferring most powers to Prime Minister and more important, allowing for the impeachment of the king by a two-thirds majority in the national assembly. After two hundred years of British colonialism, India became independent on 15 August 1947 but with the partition of the country into two nations, India and Pakistan, the latter split again giving birth to Bangladesh in 1971. On independence itself, India became a democratic Republic. India adopted its constitution on 26 January 1950, by far the longest and most elaborate constitution of all in the democratic world. It has a parliamentary democracy with universal adult suffrage. However, the political democracy is somewhat weakened by absence of social democracy which means presence of inequalities, poverty, deprivation and marginalization. The Indian state has undergone several reforms, notably the establishment of local governments in 1992 empowering citizens, women and socially disadvantaged groups at local level.

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D. K. Giri

Yet, the human development indices are far from being satisfactory comparable to world standards. The first constitution of Maldives was proclaimed on 22 December 1932. During 1940s, Maldives began to inch towards a Republican form of government. Maldives became a Republic from monarchy on 1 January 1953 with Mohamed Amin Didi as its first president. However, the country fell into a serious economic crisis. So, within a year, it was overthrown in a coup. People voted in a referendum in favour of Sultanate. After independence in 1968, it became a Republic again. Ibrahim Nasir was sworn in as the first president of the second Republic (Bell, 1983). Nepal was caught in a long movement, often violent, for democracy. It became a constitutional monarchy in 1990 with the monarch retaining many powers. The arrangement between the king and the parliament did not work well. The Maoists took over large swathes of the country and fought a guerrilla war against both the monarchy and the major political parties. In 2006, the parliament passed a resolution to curtail the power of the king. In a year later, the king lost all powers as the head of the state, and head of the army, and the government decided to stop paying all allowances.9 Nepal became a Federal Republic on 29 May 2008 abolishing the 240-year-old monarchy. Since the creation of Pakistan on 14 August 1947, the government has altered between democracy and military. The civilian governments in Pakistan were toppled by the military in several coups. With the fall of Yaha Khan after the defeat in Bangladesh war, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto tried to move the state away from its heavy dependence on the military. His failure to do so was dramatized by the seizure of power by military under Zia ul Haq, on the grounds that the civilian government did not have the ability to manage law and order. Bhutto was arrested and executed. The last was by General Pervez Musharraf in 1999.10 In 2001, Musharraf transformed himself from a general to the president. The civilian government was restored in 2008 as Musharraf resigned as the president for fear of impeachment. Pakistan politics is dominated by three factors—the army, Islam and the Kashmir. The unstinting desire of the government and army of Pakistan to take Kashmir from India has driven them to make all kinds of compromises on their politics and development. They harbour terrorists to cause chaos and bloodshed in India and Afghanistan. Americans wrongly backed them for a long time on the premise that they (Pakistan) will help Americans weed out terrorism in Afghanistan.11 On the contrary, to the horror of the world, the dreaded international terrorist, Osama Bin Laden, the head of Al Qaeda was found sheltered in Pakistan. However, Pakistan state caught between the army and terrorism is hardly able to promote human development. The Constitution of Sri Lanka establishes a democratic socialist republic. It is also a unitary state. The government is a mixture of both presidential and parliamentary systems (90). Sri Lanka has the longest period of continuous multiparty democracy with universal suffrage in a non-Western country since 1931.Since 1948, Sri Lanka has been a member of Commonwealth of Nations and United Nations. It has also been a member of Nona-Aligned movement, Colombo Plan, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation and SAARC and BIMSTEC.12 Sri Lanka plunged into a bloody separatist war by Tamils from Jaffna area. The war continued with LTTE representing

Repositioning South Asian States: Reinforcing Human Development

31

Tamils for over 25 years putting heavy stress on the economy and the society. About 80,000–100,000 people were killed in the civil war that raged for 26 years in the island country.13 Following the LTTE defeat in the hands of Sri Lankan army, the Tamil National Alliance dropped its demand for a separate state in favour of federal solutions. Since then, politics and security have been fairly stable until the Easter bombings in 2019 which shook the nation. The enquiry is on to establish the trail of terrorism that has been found in Sri Lanka. From the brief political accounts of the south Asian states, looking at mainly the history of India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, it is evident that it is improbable to establish religious nationalism or ethnicity-based subnationalism in deeply rooted multiculturalism of South Asia. The argument is validated by the experiences of most South Asian countries. At the same time, a loose federalism suggested as a viable political arrangement may not be acceptable to its leaders after years of striving for nationhood based on some kind of uniform structure. Thus, in South Asia, the dual quest for statehood (democratic state) and nationhood (common language, religion, etc.) continues. This essay has attempted to dilute either of the purpose and to refocus on the human development irrespective of the nature of state and nationalism. We have found arguments and evidence for such an approach that is eminently applicable to and advisable for South Asia.

Conclusion It is obvious that refocusing attention away from capital accumulation to human development entails rethinking the role and position of the state. A stable state to deliver goods is important but not sufficient. Close ties with industrial elites are not enough. Being rhetorically supportive of the civil society will not do. What is needed is a multilevel structured partnership between all the three sectors, essential for good governance and human development. Diversely structured networks that create effective and mutually beneficial ties are to be set up. The partnership may or may not deepen democracy but should promote human development. Democracy may not be a precondition for human development, but it could be the result of enhanced human capabilities across the state, as some of human capabilities can only be enhanced in a democratic system. Therefore, some democracy will lead to more democracy. But frankly, as the prevailing mood goes, democracy is not the objective here, it has its own discontent and distortions, which of course self-correct. Admittedly, the quest for democracy in South Asia has been diluted in the approach adumbrated here. Democracy has been viewed as not an end itself, it is rather a mechanism. Unless it delivers collective goods and social objectives, democracy will be said to be dysfunctional. To strive for democracy must be accompanied with a collective desire for and efforts at human development. Interestingly, on 30 April 2019, in Pakistan, Jibran Bashir, a management consultant and a multifarious personality, formed the Pakistan Human Development Party (PHDP). The core purpose of the party is “to develop the Humans of Pakistan” and to “bring Pakistan among top ten

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D. K. Giri

countries in the Human Development Index by 2047, an adorable purpose indeed”. The party has defined Human Development, as is formulated in the present essay, “Human Development means improvement in education, health and economic status of human beings living in any country”. The conclusion drawn from the above analysis is the emphasis on primacy of human development irrespective of the political character of the state. The partnership needed for human development can be forged even with non-democratic states. There lies the essence of shift in focus from economic growth, development of democracy, to human development. The consensus is easier achieved for human development than for deepening democracy. That is the beauty of this approach. Notes 1. 2.

3. 4.

5.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

12.

E. F. Schumacher was the original author of Buddhist Economics, which formed a chapter in his legendary book, the Small is Beautiful. The noted economist Prof. Raj Krishna, once a member of the planning commission characterized this link as a nexus between Neta, Babu and Lala (politician, bureaucrat representing the state and businessmen) impeded the growth and development. So, we advocate collaboration, not collusion. Ku Klux Klan is a white supremacist hate group in America attacking nonwhite people. Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005. This act was held internationally to be a progressive act extending welfare provision for 100 days work per annum to every adult. This contributed to dignified poverty alleviation through access to work. The term South Asia apparently first used by the US state department after the Second World War to designate all the newly independent states of the area, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, also includes three other small states of Maldives, Bhutan and Nepal. Afghanistan was added to the list after it joined SAARC in 2007. South Asia Regional Overview, South Asian regional development Gateway, 21 November 2008. The figures are taken from Human Development Report 2018. Country Study: Bhutan Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, www. memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/bttoc.html. Nepal Royal allowance is scrapped, BBC News, www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ south_asia. www.newstelegraph.co.uk. Chapter 1, The People, The State, and Sovereignty, the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka- Government of Sri Lanka Official Portal. BIMSTEC is the acronym for Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multisectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation. The member countries are Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Thailand. It came into existence on 6 June 1997 and is headquartered in Dhaka, Bangladesh.

Repositioning South Asian States: Reinforcing Human Development

13.

33

ABC Australian, 20 May 2009.

References Baiocchi, G., Heller, P., & Silva, M. K. (2011). Bootstrapping democracy: Transforming local governance and civil society in Brazil. Stanford University Press. Barro, R. J. (1997). Determinants of economic growth: A cross-country empirical study. MIT Press. Bell, H. C. P. (1983). The Maldives islands, an account of the physical features, history and inhabitants, productions and trade, Colombo. Burawoy, M. (2003). For a sociological Marxism: The complementary convergence of Antonio Grams and Karl Polanyi. Politics and Society, 31, 193–261. Caldwell, J. (1986). Routes to low mortality in poor countries. Population and Development Review, 12:171–220. Embree, A. T. (1994). The function of the RSS; to define the Hindu Nation. In M. E. Marty & S. Appleby (Eds.), Accounting for fundamentalism (pp. 617–652). Chicago University Press. Embree, A. T. (1997). The challenge of statehood. Journal of International Affairs, 51(1), 1–18. Evans, P. (2003). Human development, state transformation and the politics of developmental state. In S. Leibfried, et al., (eds.), The oxford handbook of transformation of the state, OUP, London. Evans, P. (2004). Development as institutional change: The pitfalls of monocropping and potentials of deliberation. Studies in Comparative International Development, 38(4), 30–53. Giri, D. K. (2019). Tri-sector partnership, a strategic thinking. Vishwagyan Publication. Habermas, J. (1996). Between facts and norms: Contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy. MIT Press. Hacker, J. S. (2006). The great risk shift: The assault on American jobs, families, health care, and retirement and how you can fight back. Oxford University Press. Heller, P. (2000). Degrees of democracy: Some comparative lessons from India. World Politics, 52, 484–519. Kohli, A. (2012). Poverty amid plenty in the New India. Cambridge University Press. Mascarenhas, A. (1986). Bangladesh, a legacy of blood, hodder and stroughton, London. Max-Neef, M. A. (1991). Human scale development: Conception, application and further reflection. The Apex Press. Parekh, B. (1992). Poverty of Indian political theory, history of political thought, London (Vol. XIII, no. 3). Ranis, G., Stewart, F., & Ramirez, A. (2000). Economic growth and human development. World Development, 28(2), 197–219. Schumacherm, E. F. (1975). Small is beautiful: Economics as if people mattered, London. Sen, A. (1999). Development as freedom. Knopf. Varshney, A. (2002). Ethnic conflict and civic life: Hindus and Muslims in India. Yale University Press. Warren, M. (2001). Democracy and associations. Princeton University Press. Wilkinson, R. G. (2005). The impact of inequality: How to make sick societies healthier. Free Press. Zuberi, D. (2006). Differences that matter: Social policy and the working poor in the United States and Canada. Cornell University Press/ILR Press.

Debt, Deficit and Economic Growth in South Asia: A Comparative Analysis Md Nazmuddin

Abstract Asian countries are determining the global growth rate in the post-Second World War period. From the mid-1950s to the early 1970s, Japan’s high growth of roughly 10 per cent determined to the global growth. After Japan, China has determined global growth and achieved averaged 9.82 per cent growth rate from 1989 until 2016. China, therefore, placed at the second largest economy of the world. In recent years, India achieved the highest growth of more than 7.0 per cent at the time when the global economy was in a serious crisis and global growth has slowed down from 3.4 per cent in 2014 to 3.1 per cent in 2015. India now placed at third position in terms of GNI purchasing power parity. It is hoped that South Asia led by India would determine global growth in the coming decades.

Introduction Asian countries are determining the global growth after the Second World War. Firstly, it was Japan. Japan’s average real growth was roughly 10% from the mid1950s to the early 1970s. This double-digit and sustained growth is termed an “economic miracle”. By around 1970, Japan overtook Germany and became the secondlargest economy in the capitalist world measured by GNP size. After Japan, China has grown at an astonishing rate of 9.82% per annum and determined global growth from 1989 until 2016. China, therefore, placed as the second-largest economy in the world. Before the economic liberalization of 1991, the growth rate was stagnated around 3.5% from the 1950s to the 1980s in India. The low growth rate coined the term ‘Hindu rate of growth’ by Professor Raj Krishna. India achieved the highest growth of 7.6% in 2015, at the time when the global economy was in a serious crisis and global growth has slowed down from 3.4% in 2014 to 3.1% in 2015. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has hailed India as a ‘bright spot’ amidst a slowing global economy. M. Nazmuddin (B) Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, New Delhi, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Rahman and N. Tiwari (eds.), Development, Governance and Gender in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-5109-0_3

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M. Nazmuddin

The World Economic Forum has said that India’s growth is ‘extraordinarily high’. A recently released report of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) dated 28 February 2017 hailed India’s impressive performance as a star performer in gloomy times for the world economy. The emergence of China and India as a major force in the global economy has been one of the most significant economic developments in the recent past. Due to the imposing performance, achieved by India in the last few years, the country has placed as the third-largest economy in the world in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP). Remarkable performance has been achieved on the fiscal front also. The combined fiscal deficit of the Union and States was about 9.8% during the year 1999–2000. The debt–GDP ratio was also as high as 82% during 2002–03. India enacted Fiscal Legislation Rules called ‘Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act (FRBM)’ in 2003. After the enactment of the FRBM Act, debt and deficit are under control at 65.9% and 6.5% of GDP, respectively. ADB also projected promising growth for South Asia.

Asian Development Model The industrial development of the East Asian economies gives a unique pattern of interdependent industrial development between member countries. This pattern of industrialization is commonly described as “flying wild-geese” or “catch up product cycle” (CPC). It has an inverse V-shaped growth of import, domestic production and export. This pattern of industrial development is originally observed in Japan. Later on, the same pattern of industrial development has been observed in other East Asian economies like Taiwan, Korea and Singapore. Although this model of development is appropriately described by catch-up product cycles (CPC), yet the flying wild-geese has assumed greater popularity because of its poetic image. The East Asian development model resembles with the product cycle model of Vernon (1964). However, three versions of CPC have been discernible: (1) Basic types and its two variations: (2) Variant I and (3) Variant II. The basic type refers to the sequential development of import, production and export in a specific industry. Variant I refers to the sequential CPC development in other industries also termed as diversification of industrial structure. Variant II means the transmission of the CPC development among trading countries. There are five development phases of CPC: (1) introductory, (2) import substitution, (3) export, (4) mature and (5) reverse import. During the introductory phase, new products are introduced through import from advanced countries. Domestic production starts with the help of imported technology, and the import has been substituted by domestic production. At the export phase, domestic products are being exported. At a mature stage, both domestic demand and exports started declining. Exports declined because domestic production found increasing difficulty to face foreign competition due to cheap labour used by late comers. Finally, at the reverse import phase, domestic production is being replaced by import.

Debt, Deficit and Economic Growth in South Asia …

37

Variant I refers to the occurrence of CPC in other industries (particularly shift from labour intensive to capital intensive). It shows the diversification of industrial structure. It was made possible because of (1) capital accumulation, (2) entrepreneurship, (3) forward and backward linkage effect and (4) learning effects. Variant II refers to the transfer of CPC development in other countries. This is due to foreign direct investment and technology transfer. While the basic types with its Variant I have been based on empirical experience of Japanese development, Variant II, which describes the transmission of the CPC development among trading countries, has been noticed in Asian New Industrialized Economies (NIE) like Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea and ASEAN countries like Singapore and Malaysia. In Japan, CPC industrial development has been found in four industries: (i) cotton textile, (ii) steel products, (iii) automobiles and (iv) industrial machinery. The import and consumption of modern textile products dated back to the 1850s. The import substitution production has been reported during 1870–1879. The export phase was reached in 1909 and continued throughout the 1930s. Domestic production reached its peak by 1960, declined thereafter and by the 1970s reached the last phase of the product cycle, i.e. reversal of import. The CPC with its Variant I has been found in other industries: steel products, automobiles and manufacturing of machinery in Japan. In the case of automobiles, both import and domestic production were around 12–13 thousand in 1953. Later on, strict import controls were imposed till 1965, and only five thousand cars were imported while domestic consumption reached a level of 700 thousand. In 1965, Japan exported ten thousand cars primarily to Southeast Asia. Export to the USA started by 1970. The period of 1953–70 may be well identified as the import substitution phase and thereafter export phase. Thus, the same catch-up mechanism worked in other industries, say automobiles, and leads diversification of industrial structure in Japan. The CPC model with its Variant II has been observed in Asian NIE and ASEAN countries. For example, synthetic fabric weaving was introduced and very quickly became a core of the textile industry in these Asian countries. Taiwan began earlier and started export before 1970. This was followed by Korea and reached the export stage by the mid-1970s. In Thailand, the production/consumption ratio exceeded unity in the early 1970s, and this stage was attained by Indonesia after 1980. Although many East Asian countries like Korea and Taiwan have already exceeded Japan in consumer goods yet the catching-up process is slower in many producers’ goods. The catch-up type of industrialization particularly with its Variant II is still relevant in many developing countries. At present, the majority of countries including India have opened their economies. The process has become irreversible (Yamazawa, 1990). It is, therefore, hoped that with FDI and transfer of technology to trading countries, an interdependent pattern of industrialization will assume greater acceptability. In other words, regional integration and globalization have already sped up the catch-up type of industrialization in less developing countries.

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M. Nazmuddin 12

% age of GDP

10 8 6 4 2 0 -2

Japan

China

Thailand

Korea

Malaysia

India

Chart 1 Economic development in Asian countries

Economic Growth in Asia Asian countries are determining the global growth in the post Second World War era. Japan’s average real growth was roughly 10% from the mid-1950s to the early 1970s. This double-digit and sustained growth is termed as “economic miracle”. Japan recorded growth of more than 12% in 1961 (12.04%), in 1968 (12.88%) and again in 1969 (12.48%). Japan’s growth rates were between 10 and 12% in 1964 (11.68%) and again in 1966 (10.64%). This has been detailed in Chart 1 and Annexure 1. By the1970s, Japan overtook West Germany (now Germany) and became the second-largest economy in the capitalist world measured by GNP size. After the Japanese high growth rate, other East Asian countries particularly Korea achieved high growth particularly in the decade of 1970s and 1980s. In the decade of 1970s, Korean growth rate was 9.05%, which increased further to 9.74% during 1981–1990. In Korea, growth was more than 14% in 1969 (14.10%) and 1973 (14.79%). China reins the world from the decade of 1980s onward and determined global growth. China achieved an average growth of 9.35% from 1981 to 90 and still higher of more than 10% in the next two decades from 1991 to 2010. The average annual growth rate was more than 11.50 during 1991–97. The highest growth of 15.14% recorded in 1984, then 14.22% in 1992. Recently, China’s growth rate has been slowed down to 7–8%, which was still the highest in the world. India, however, achieved the highest growth of 7.56% in 2015.

Economic Growth in South Asia In South Asia, average yearly growth was 6.89% in 2001–10, then 6.31% in 2011, more than 6% in 2013 and 2014 and 7.11% in 2015. Among South Asian countries,

Debt, Deficit and Economic Growth in South Asia …

39

Chart 2 Economic development in South Asia

the highest decadal growth of 8.75% was achieved by Bhutan followed by India (7.42%), Afghanistan (7.3%), Maldives (6.96%) and so on during 2001–10. Sri Lanka achieved the highest growth rate of 9.14% in 2012, and subsequently, it declined (Chart 2).

India’s Growth Experience Before the liberalization of 1991, India’s growth rate was stagnated around 3.5% from 1950 to 1980s. The secular low growth rate has coined the term ‘Hindu rate of growth’ by Professor Raj Krishna. However, India moved onto a higher growth trajectory and achieved a growth rate of 5.57% in the decade of 1980s. In the 1991s, economic reforms were launched, and the government undertook measures of far-reaching importance. These measures included the devaluation of the Indian rupees, cuts in the fiscal deficit and the end of “License Raj” that had guided the industrial development of the country for many years. The Indian economy responded positively to these changes, and GDP growth crossed 7% mark. In recent years, India achieved the highest growth of 7.6% in 2015, at the time when the global economy was in serious crisis and growth has slowed down from 3.4% in 2014 to 3.1% in 2015. The IMF has hailed India’s impressive growth as a ‘bright spot’ amidst a slowing global economy. The World Economic Forum has said that India’s growth is ‘extraordinarily high’. A recently released report of OECD dated 28 February 2017 hailed India’s impressive performance in the following words: India has been a star performer in gloomy times for the world economy. OECD launch about 25 Economic Surveys every year, and it is not often to announce growth figures of 7%. This is more than double the current global growth figure, and four times the OECD average. At the same time, inflation, the current account deficit, and the central government deficit have all been brought down in the past few years.

The emergence of China and India, as major forces in the global economy, has been one of the most significant economic developments in the recent past.

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M. Nazmuddin

India as Third-Largest Country Internationally, the national income of a country is measured in terms of Atlas Method and purchasing power parity (PPP). Atlas Method of gross national income (GNI) is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (fewer subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. GNI, calculated in national currency, is usually converted into U.S. dollars at official exchange rates for comparison across economies. Under PPP method of GNI, the income of a country is converted into international dollars using PPP rates, which reflects the price differential among various countries of the world. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GNI that a U.S. dollar has in the United States. In terms of PPP of GNI, China had the highest GNI ($17,967 billion) in the world in 2014, marginally higher than even the USA ($17,823billion). With $7293 billion, India has placed at the third position (40.6% of China’s GNI), surpassing Japan having $4847 billion (27.0% of China). Germany placed at fifth position with GNI of $3843 billion (21.4% of China) and the UK at the sixth with $2550 billion (14.2% of China). However, in terms of per capita income of PPP (GNI), USA again placed at the first position, Germany the second position (84.9% of USA’s GNI), UK third position (70.7% of USA), Japan fourth (68.2% of USA), China fifth (23.6% of USA) and India at the sixth (just 10.1% of USA). India and China are the two most populous countries of the world, and their comparison may be fruitful in terms of per capita. Compared to India, however, China’s GNI is 2.5 times more and 2.3 times in terms of per capita (Table 1).

Deficit in South Asia A high growth rate is generally followed by a high fiscal deficit particularly during the initial period of industrialisation. It also arises due to the inability of the government to generate adequate resources to cover both revenue and capital expenditure. In common parlance, the fiscal balance is revenue over expenditure. Depending upon the nature of revenue and expenditure, the deficit is classified under the three categories (i) current balance, (ii) overall balance and (iii) primary balance. Current balance refers to current revenue and current expenditure, whereas the overall balance signifies total income and total expenditure. A major source of total expenditure is expenditure on interest payments. The interest payment is a reflection of past performance and not of the current one. Therefore, intersect payment is deducted from the overall balance, and the resulting indicator is termed as “primary balance”. These fiscal indicators are expressed in terms of GDP at current prices. Most of the countries of the world have negative overall balances. This pattern is also followed in Asian countries particularly in South Asia. In Bangladesh, the

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41

Table 1 Comparative position of selected countries in terms of GNI: 2014 (US $) Atlas method

PPP method

Billion

Per capita

Billion

Per capita

China

10,097

7,400

17,967

13,170

India

2,028

1,570

7,293

5,630

USA

17,612

55,230

17,823

55,900

UK

2,802

43,390

2,550

39,500

Japan

5,339

42,000

4,847

38,120

Germany

3,853

47,590

3,843

47,460

% of Maximum GNI of USA

% of Maximum GNI China/USA

GNI

Rank

Per Capita

Rank

GNI

Rank

Per Capita

Rank

China

57.3

2

13.4

5

100.0

1

23.6

5

India

11.5

6

2.8

6

40.6

3

10.1

6

USA

100.0

1

100.0

1

99.2

2

100.0

1

UK

15.9

5

78.6

3

14.2

6

70.7

3

Japan

30.3

3

76.0

4

27.0

4

68.2

4

Germany

21.9

4

86.2

2

21.4

5

84.9

2

Source World Bank

average overall deficit was − 3.34% from 2007 to 2016. The maximum deficit (− 4.3%) has been reported in 2016, whereas that of lowest (− 2.2%) in 2007 (Chart 3). The average overall deficit was − 7.01% from 2007 to 2016 in Sri Lanka. The maximum deficit (− 9.9%) was reported in 2009, whereas that of lowest (− 5.4%)

Chart 3 Overall balance in South Asia

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M. Nazmuddin

Chart 4 Primary balance in South Asia

in 2016 in Sri Lanka. With an average overall deficit of 0.08 %, the lowest deficit has been reported in Nepal. In the year 2013 and onwards, Nepal has a positive overall balance. In China also, a positive overall balance has been reported in 2007, 2008 and 2010 (Annexure 2). As far as primary balance is concerned, the average primary balance was (−) 1.37% of GDP from 2007 to 2016 for Bangladesh. The maximum primary deficit (− 2.2%) has been reported in 2016, whereas that of lowest (− 0.6%) in 2007 (Chart 4). In Sri Lanka, the average primary deficit was (−) 1.76% in 2007. The maximum primary deficit (− 3.4%) has been reported in 2009, whereas that of the lowest (− 0.8%) in 2016 and also in the year 2013. With the average primary deficit of 0.61% of GDP, the lowest deficit has been reported in Nepal. In the year 2012 and onwards, Nepal has a positive primary balance. In China also, a positive primary balance has been reported in 2007, 2008 and then again in 2010 and 2011 (Annexure 3).

Deficit in India In the Indian context, fiscal indicators are defined differently, and four measures of fiscal balance are in use. The internationally used concept of the current balance is called revenue deficit (RD) in India. It is defined as revenue receipts over revenue expenditure. However, revenue expenditure also includes capital components, particularly under ‘grants-in-aid’. The segment of ‘grants-in-aid’ used for the creation of capital assets is excluded from the revenue deficit. This measure of deficit or

Debt, Deficit and Economic Growth in South Asia …

43

adjusted revenue deficit is called effective revenue deficit (ERD). However, the treatment of grant-in-aid for the creation of capital assets encompasses many constraints. In the present government accounting system, grants-in-aid is treated as revenue expenditure. Moreover, if assets are created, then created assets should be owned by implementing agencies or local bodies or constitutional bodies to classify as assets. Therefore, ownership is another criteria for classifying created assets as an asset. In many schemes of the central governments like Indira Awas Yojana and Rajiv Awas Yojana, assets are created but not owned by entities such as implementing agencies, local bodies or constitutional bodies, but transferred in the name of beneficiaries. Hence, created assets are generally not considered as capital expenditure. Therefore, the treatment of grants-in-aid is more like accounting issues. The most comprehensive indicator of a fiscal indicator is the fiscal deficit. It is defined as excess expenditure over non-debt receipts. Therefore, all receipts which do not involve the future liabilities need to be included, while assessing fiscal deficit. To make things clear and to avoid any ambiguities, the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act (FRBM), 2003 itself provided a conceptual framework. Lastly, another commonly used indicator is primary deficit. In the calculation of the primary deficit, expenditure on interest payments is excluded from the fiscal deficit. In many countries like Japan, Interest payments are excluded while in the calculation of fiscal deficit. In India, an impressive performance has been achieved in the fiscal front also. The combined fiscal deficit of the Union and States was about 9.8% during the year 1999–2000. The Debt–GDP ratio was also as high as 82% during 2002–03. After enactment of FRBM Act, deficits are under control at 6.5% of GDP (Chart 5). 10.0 8.0

% of GDP

6.0 4.0 2.0

-2.0

1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16

0.0

Fiscal deficit

Chart 5 Fiscal deficit indicators in India

Primary deficit

Revenue deficit

44

M. Nazmuddin 90.0

% of GDP

80.0 70.0 60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 2007

2008

2009

Bangladesh

2010 India

2011

2012 Nepal

2013

2014

Pakistan

2015

2016

Sri Lanka

Chart 6 Public debt in South Asia

Debt in South Asia High deficits are generally followed by high debt. In recent years, debt is again a hot topic of discussion, research and analysis due to reported default cases by countries such as Italy, Greece and Spain. But it is difficult to determine the level of debt, which is sustainable. Moreover, sustainability does not depend just on the level of debt but also on composition of debt. As far as debt is concerned, Asia has a unique position as one Asian country say “Japan” always has a very high level of debt. In recent years, the debt–GDP ratio is more than 200% in Japan. It is 250.4% of GDP in 2016. But Japan has never defaulted in servicing its debt. In the USA also, debt–GDP ratio is more than 100%, in the last five years, while it is 89% in U.K. by the end of 2016. In South Asian countries, debt–GDP ratio is high in few countries like Sri Lanka (77.2%), Pakistan (66.1%) and India (68.5%). In Bangladesh, debt as a percentage of GDP was 41.9% in 2007, declined constantly and reached at 34.0% in 2016. It was 43.2% in 2007 in Nepal, which declined securely and stands at 27.3% in 2016. In Sri Lanka, debt–GDP relation was as high as 85% in 2007, declined continuously and reported at 77.2% in 2016, which is still high (Chart 6).

Debt in India In India, debt of the government comprises internal debt and external debt. Internal debt is raised from within the country. External debt, on the other hand, is raised from external sources. Technically, internal debt and external debt are called ‘public debt’, and it is contracted in the Consolidated Fund of India (CFI), whereas liabilities are contracted in the public account, called ‘other liabilities’. In respect of receipts into the public accounts, the government acts as banker, trustee and refunds the money on demand after the completion of contract or period. The total debt for the government of India comprises debt and liabilities. The total debt for the general government consists of debt of both central and states.

Debt, Deficit and Economic Growth in South Asia …

45

Internal debt consists of both marketable and non-marketable instruments. Marketable instruments are further divided under two groups: (a) Treasury bills and (b) Dated securities. Treasury bills (T-Bills) are discounted instruments, which are used for meeting short-term financing requirements of the government. They also offer short-term investment opportunities to financial institutions. These investments also work as a benchmark for the short-term interest rates in the economy. The maturity period of the treasury bills is less than one year. The central government currently issued three types of T-bills for 91,182 and 364 days. These are primarily issued under the normal auction programme of the government. While 91-days TBills are auctioned every week, 182-days T-bills and 364-days T-bills are put to auction every fortnight. The notified amounts for auction are fixed by the central government in consultation with the RBI. 14-Days T-Bills are generally not used for financing of deficit for the government but to take care of temporary mismatches and considered as non-marketable instruments. In case of dated securities, the tenor and rate are fixed and have a maturity period of more than one year. Dated securities are the most important instruments used for financing the fiscal deficit, and it roughly finances about 90% of the fiscal deficit. The external debt component of public debt, on the other hand, is raised from external sources. Most of the external debt is raised from multilateral agencies such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) also known as the World Bank, International Development Association (IDA), associated with the World Bank (IDA), Asian Development Bank (ADB), etc. External debt also came from bilateral agencies like Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA).

Comparability of Public Debt Statistics Public debt statistics need to be treated with caution. Firstly, the issue is related to external debt. Generally, official documents capture external debt as book value, i.e. historical exchange rates. RBI documents treat external components at the current exchange rate. Union Finance Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, however, tried to reconcile public debt giving statistics both at the current exchange rate as well as historical exchange rate. Secondly, the compilation of total debt of the general government is not a simple summation of two layers of government debts: union and states. It involves the treatment of double accounts, as the Government of India extends loans to state governments. Accumulation under the National Small Saving Funds (NSSF) is also extended to states, as well as a part of it is invested by the central government in special securities. External debt is largely used for financing specific projects at the centre as well as States. State governments are not permitted to raise external debt. Therefore, external debt first contracted in the CFI and then on lent to states. While computing the overall public debt for the country, intergovernment transactions need to be removed to avoid double counting. Latest publications of the Ministry of Finance such as ‘The Status

46

M. Nazmuddin 90.0

Debt as % of GDP

80.0 70.0 60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 0.0

Centre

State

Combined

Chart 7 Combined debt of centre and states in India

Paper on Government Debt’ and particularly ‘Handbook of Statistics on Central Government Debt’ have streamlined debt statistics to a large extent. The combined debt of the general government was less than 50% in 1980–81 and increased to the level of more than 80% during 2003–05. At present, general government debt is 66%, comprising about 22% of states and 44% of central (Chart 7).

External Debt in South Asia In the preceding paragraphs, public debt owned by the government has been discussed. In this section, external debt is discussed, which comprises public, publicly guaranteed, private and use of IMF credit. External debt is measured in different ways. It is measured in terms of absolute figure, growth, in relation to GDP, external debt–export ratio, reserve to exports and so on. In South Asia, the burden of external debt has increased considerably over the years. External debt was $189.16 billion in 2007, increased to $637.14 billion in 2015. Therefore, in a period of 8 years, external debt increased by 3.5 times (Annexure 5). Therefore, the burden of external debt deteriorated further in recent years in South Asia. The growth of external debt is depicted in Chart 8.

External Debt to Gross National Income Ratio External debt like total debt is measured in terms of GDP. External debt as a percentage of GNI increased from 18.0 to 23.9% during 2005–2015, an increase of 5.9% points in South Asia. In India, external debt to GNI ratio has increased

Debt, Deficit and Economic Growth in South Asia …

47

60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 Afganistan

Bangladesh

Bhutan

India

Maldives

Nepal

Pakistan

Sri Lanka

-10.0 -20.0 -30.0 -40.0 2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Chart 8 Growth of external debt in %

constantly from 14.6% in 2005 to 23.4% in 2015, an increase of 8.8% points. Therefore, an increase of about 9% points during the last 10 years is a matter of concern for India. In the case of Sri Lanka, the percentage increase in relation to GDP is 7.7 points during the same period (Chart 9). However, ratios have increased in three countries of the region, and countries are Bangladesh (6.8% points, from 25.4 to 18.6%), Nepal (19.5% points, from 39.1 to 19.6%) and Pakistan (7.5% points, from 22.9 to 30.4%). The maximum percentage increase of 24.5 points from 81.3 to 105.8% has been reported in Bhutan. The debt condition of Bhutan has worsened seriously. This is primarily due to construction of hydro-electricity projects with the assistance of India. However, the hydropower program has lost a lot of its financial sheen. 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 2007 Afganistan

2008

2009

Bangladesh

2010 Bhutan

Chart 9 External debt stock to GNI (%)

2011 India

2012

Maldives

2013 Nepal

2014

Pakistan

2015 Sri Lanka

48

M. Nazmuddin

External Debt to Exports The ratio of external debt to exports signifies a country’s capacity to serve its external debt. A lower ratio indicates higher capacity to serve external debt and vice-a-versa. On this criteria, Maldives and India fared well, and their ratio in question is below 100%. In the rest of the countries, external debt as a percentage of exports is more than 100%, showing that countries in question are poorly placed (Chart 10). Debt servicing as a percentage of GDP is depicted in Chart 11. High reserves compared to external debt signify that a country is comfortably placed. In the region, reserve-external debt is more than 100% in two countries, namely Afghanistan and Nepal. In the remaining countries, reserve-external debt is less than 100% indicating thereby that these countries are not well placed (Chart 12). 300

% of Exports

250 200 150 100 50 0 Afganistan Bangladesh 2008

Bhutan

2009

2010

India 2011

Chart 10 External debt stock to exports (%)

Chart 11 Debt servicing to exports

Maldives 2012

2013

Nepal 2014

Pakistan 2015

Sri Lanka

Debt, Deficit and Economic Growth in South Asia …

49

300 250 200 150 100 50 0 Afganistan Bangladesh 2008

Bhutan 2009

India 2010

Maldives 2011

2012

Nepal 2013

Pakistan 2014

Sri Lanka

South Asia

2015

Chart 12 Reserve to external debt (%)

Debt Dynamics Globally, debt–GDP ratio varies widely from as low as of less than 10% in Estonia (7%) to as high as of more than 200% in Japan (235% 2015). In the USA, gross national debt was below 40% in 1979, 63% in 1999 and more than 100% during 2012 to 2016. The debt–GDP ratio assumed renewed importance as many countries like Greece, Portugal and Italy have defaulted. In Greece, the debt–GDP ratio was 180% in 2014. Portugal and Italy have debt ratios in the range of 120–140%. In many countries like Japan, the level of debt is very high. But Japan has never defaulted. Therefore, debt sustainability depends upon a country’s ability to serve its debt obligation in future. The basic equation for debt sustainability is expressed as dt − dt−1 = pdt −(gt − rt )/(1 + gt ) × dt where d t refers to the debt–GDP ratio in time t; pd t the primary deficit in the time t, gt the nominal GDP growth rate and r t the nominal effective rate of interest (borrowing cost) on government debt. This equation shows that if the government is running a primary deficit (which is generally observed in most of the countries as discussed in the previous sections), then nominal growth rate must exceed nominal interest rate to have debt sustainability. In India, GDP has grown just over 6% in the last three and half decades (1981– 2015). India can grow conservatively at about 7–8% for the next 15 years. This combined with an inflation target of 4 (plus minus 2) percent (as notified by the Ministry of finance on the recommendation of Monetary Policy Committee). Therefore, nominal growth of India in the next decade would be in the 11–14% range. The interest rate would be 7–7.5. The growth-interest differentials, therefore, would be positive and in the range of 4–6.5%. As a result, debt dynamics for the next decade

50

M. Nazmuddin

will be very favourable for India compared with most advanced economics and even other emerging markets (Economic survey of India 2016–17, p. 109). In Bangladesh, average real growth rate is 6.46% during 2013–2017. The rate of inflation would be 6.64%. Therefore, the country’s growth rate, in nominal terms, would be 13.10%. It is expected that interest rate (based on government bonds) would be 11.16% in the near future. Hence, debt is sustainable as growth rate is more than interest rate in Bangladesh, but growth-interest differentials would not be much. Debt sustainability depends on composition of debt also. In Japan, most of the debt (about 95%) is held by domestic investors and largely financed by the Bank of Japan, postal savings, insurance, pension funds and so on. In case of Greece, more than 70% of government debt was held by foreign investors, at the time of defaults. Foreign investors fled from the country, because of an increase in global risk aversion. In the case of India, the share of external debt in total debt is about 4% and that too held by multilateral funding institutions like WB, IMF and friendly countries like Japan (JICA).

Conclusion In the post-Second World War period, Asian countries are determining the global growth rate. From the mid-1950s to the early 1970s, Japan’s high growth of roughly 10% was determined by the global growth. After Japan, China has determined global growth and achieved an averaged 9.82% growth rate from 1989 until 2016. China, therefore, placed at the second-largest economy of the world. In recent years, India achieved the highest growth of more than 7.0% at the time when the global economy was in a serious crisis and global growth has slowed down from 3.4% in 2014 to 3.1% in 2015. India now placed at third position in terms of GNI purchasing power parity. India’s contribution towards GNI PPP of South Asia is 80% ($7293 billion out of South Asia’s $9119 billion). So, it is hoped that South Asia led by India would determine global growth in the coming decades. However, the region faces unique challenges to growth: a devastating earthquake and political uncertainty in Nepal, a drop in high value tourism in Maldives and high debt in Sri Lanka.

Annexure 1: Economic Development in Asian Countries

4.06

0.00

4.03

0.00

2.52

7.24

4.16

4.29

Bangladesh

Bhutan

India

Maldives

Nepal

Pakistan

Sri Lanka

South Asia

4.96

9.30

6.49

Korea, Rep

China

Japan

Malaysia

Source World Bank

8.17

8.71

Thailand

II. Asia

–

1960–1970

Afghanistan

I. South Asia

Country Name

7.87

4.50

6.27

9.05

6.89

3.09

4.43

4.72

2.11

0.00

3.08

0.00

1.04

–

1971–1980

6.03

4.64

9.35

9.74

7.89

5.48

4.20

6.29

4.79

0.00

5.57

10.10

4.02

–

1981–1990

7.23

1.35

10.45

6.63

4.53

5.31

5.22

3.96

5.00

0.00

5.60

5.00

4.68

–

1991–2000

4.66

0.67

10.57

4.44

4.62

6.89

5.20

4.22

3.93

6.96

7.42

8.75

5.58

7.30

2001–2010

5.29

-0.12

9.54

3.68

0.83

6.31

8.40

2.75

3.42

8.71

6.64

7.89

6.46

6.11

2011

5.47

1.50

7.86

2.29

7.23

5.65

9.14

3.51

4.78

2.50

5.62

5.07

6.52

14.43

2012

4.69

2.00

7.76

2.90

2.70

6.26

3.40

4.40

4.13

4.70

6.64

2.14

6.01

1.96

2013

6.01

0.34

7.30

3.34

0.82

6.84

4.88

4.67

5.99

6.00

7.24

5.75

6.06

1.31

2014

4.97

1.22

6.91

2.61

2.83

7.11

4.79

4.71

2.73

2.85

7.56

6.49

6.55

0.84

2015

Debt, Deficit and Economic Growth in South Asia … 51

52

M. Nazmuddin

Annexure 2: Overall Balance in South Asia and Other Selected Countries Country

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Bangladesh

− 2.2

−4

− 3.2

− 2.7

− 3.6 − 3

India

− 4.4 − 10

− 9.8

− 8.4

− 8.2 − 7.5 − 7.6 − 7.3 − 6.9 − 6.7

Nepal

− 0.8

− 0.4 − 2.6

− 0.8

−1

Pakistan

− 5.1

− 7.5 − 5

−6

− 6.7 − 8.6 − 8.4 − 4.9 − 5.2 − 4.4

Sri Lanka

− 6.9

−7

− 9.9

−8

− 6.9 − 6.5 − 5.9 − 6.7 − 6.9 − 5.4

I. South Asia − 3.4 − 3.1 − 3.9 − 4.3

− 0.6

2.1

1.5

0.3

1.5

II. Asia Thailand

0.2 0.8

− 2.2

− 1.3

0

Myanmar

− 3.1 − 2.2

− 4.3

− 4.1

− 3.1 − 1.9 − 2.1 − 0.6 − 4.8 − 4.6

0

1.5

1.7

Korea, Rep Asia China

2.2 1.5 − 1.1 − 1.8 0.1 0

− 0.9 0.4 1.6

0.6

− 0.8 0.3 0.4

0.3

− 0.4 0.8

− 3.4

− 1.5

− 1.6 − 1.9 − 1.9 − 1.9 − 3.2 − 3.4

− 1.8

0.6

− 0.1 − 0.7 − 0.8 − 0.9 − 2.7 − 3

− 4.5

Malaysia

− 2.6 − 3.5

− 6.5

Japan

− 2.1 − 4.1

− 10.4 − 9.3

− 9.8 − 8.8 − 8.6 − 6.2 − 5.2 − 5.2

− 3.6 − 3.8 − 4.1 − 2.7 − 3

− 3.4

UK

− 2.9 − 4.6

− 10.5 − 9.5

− 7.6 − 7.7 − 5.7 − 5.6 − 4.2 − 3.3

USA

− 2.9 − 6.7

− 13.1 − 10.9 − 9.6 − 7.9 − 4.4 − 4.2 − 3.5 − 4.1

III. Advanced

Source IMF Fiscal Monitor (October 2016)

Annexure 3: Primary Balance in South Asia and Other Selected Countries Country

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

I. South Asia Bangladesh

− 0.6 − 1.9 − 1

India

0.4

− 5.3 − 5.2 − 1.9

− 0.8 − 1.9 − 1.1 − 1.4 − 1

− 1.8 − 2.2

− 4.2 − 3.9 − 3.1 − 3.1 − 2.8 − 2.3 − 2.1

Nepal

− 0.1 0.3

Pakistan

− 1.1 − 2.9 − 0.2

− 1.7 − 2.9 − 4.2 − 3.9 − 0.3 − 0.5 − 0.1

Sri Lanka

− 1.8 − 2.2 − 3.4

− 1.7 − 1.4 − 1.1 − 0.8 − 2.2 − 2.2 − 0.8

0

− 0.1 0.2

2.8

2

0.6

2.3

II. Asia Asia

0.5

− 0.5 − 2

− 0.2 − 0.3 − 0.6 − 0.7 − 0.7 − 1.9 − 2 (continued)

Debt, Deficit and Economic Growth in South Asia …

53

(continued) Country

2007

2008

2009

2010

Thailand

1.1

1.6

− 1.5

− 0.7 0.8

2011

2012

− 0.1 1.1

2013

2014

2015

Myanmar

− 2.6 − 1.7 − 3.5

− 3.2 − 2

− 0.7 − 0.6 0.8

Korea, Rep

1.4

1.2

− 0.7

0.8

0.9

0.8

China

0.4

0.4

− 1.3

1.1

0.4

− 0.2 − 0.3 − 0.4 − 2.1 − 2.2

Malaysia

− 1.9 − 2.1 − 5

− 2.9 − 2

−2

Japan

− 2.1 − 3.8 − 9.9

− 8.6 − 9

− 7.9 − 7.8 − 5.6 − 4.9 − 5.2

UK

− 1.3 − 3.4 − 9.1

− 7.1 − 4.9 − 5.4 − 4.3 − 3.8 − 2.8 − 1.6

USA

− 0.8 − 4.6 − 11.2 − 8.9 − 7.3 − 5.7 − 2.4 − 2.2 − 1.5 − 2.1

− 0.1 0.8

2016 0.2

− 3.4 − 3.2

− 0.2 − 0.3 − 0.4 − 0.3 − 2.2 − 0.8 − 1.4 − 1.5

III. Advanced

Source IMF Fiscal Monitor (October 2016)

Annexure 4: Public Debt in South Asia and Other Selected Countries (% of GDP)

Country Name

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Bangladesh

41.9

40.6

39.5

36.6

35.3

33.8

34.5

33.9

33.9

34.0

India

74

74.5

72.5

67.5

69.6

69.1

68

68.3

69.1

68.5

Nepal

43.2

41.9

38.5

34

31.7

34.5

31.9

27.4

28

27.3

Pakistan

52

57.3

58.6

60.7

58.9

63.3

64.2

63.7

63.6

66.1

Sri Lanka

85

81.4

86.1

81.9

78.5

79.2

78.3

75.5

76

77.2

Asia

40.1

36.9

40.5

39.9

39.4

39.5

41.3

43.5

45.9

48.4

Thailand

36

34.9

42.4

39.9

39.1

41.9

42.2

43.6

43.1

43.6

Myanmar

62.5

53.9

55.2

49.7

45

39.9

34.2

29.7

34.3

34.2

Korea, Rep

28.7

28.2

31.4

30.8

31.5

32.1

33.8

35.9

37.9

38.9

China

29

27

32.6

33.1

33.1

34

36.9

39.8

42.9

46.3

Malaysia

39.9

39.9

51.1

51.9

52.6

54.6

55.9

55.6

57.4

56.6

183

192

210

216

232

238

245

249

248

250

UK

42.2

50.3

64.2

75.7

81.3

84.8

86

87.9

89

89

USA

64

73

86

95

99

102

105

105

105

108

I. South Asia

II. Asia

III. Advanced Japan

Source IMF Fiscal Monitor (October 2016)

54

M. Nazmuddin

Annexure 5: External Debt Stocks in South Asia (US $ million)

2005 Afghanistan

2007

2009

2010

2012

2013

2014

2015

2013

2470

2425

2719

2577

2580

2489

Bangladesh

18,449

21,575

25,438

26,881

28,559

33,997

35,665

38,640

Bhutan

657

801

787

935

1450

1603

1836

1956

India

121,195 2,04,058 2,56,312 2,90,428 3,92,625 4,27,296 4,57,553 4,79,559

Maldives

362.3

772

1384

917

890

901

1054

943

Nepal

3191

3615

3778

3789

3888

4088

4010

4155

Pakistan

34,018

42,006

56,340

64,003

62,144

60,057

62,262

65,482

Sri Lanka

11,297

14,161

19,504

21,684

35,694

39,211

42,264

43,920

South Asia

189,169 289,001

366,012

411,061

527,968

569,730

607,224

637,143

Growth over previous year (%) 2008

2009

2010

2012

2014

2015

CAGR (2005–15)

Afghanistan

6.0

15.8

− 1.8

3.9

0.1

− 3.6

2.7

Bangladesh

8.5

8.7

5.7

4.7

4.9

8.3

7.7

Bhutan

− 13.5

13.5

18.8

35.3

14.5

6.5

11.5

India

11.3

12.9

13.3

17.4

7.1

4.8

14.7

Maldives

48.6

20.6

− 33.7

0.9

17.1

− 10.5

10.0

Nepal

2.3

2.2

0.3

1.5

− 1.9

3.6

2.7

Pakistan

17.9

13.8

13.6

− 5.2

3.7

5.2

6.8

Sri Lanka

15.2

19.5

11.2

38.4

7.8

3.9

14.5

International Debt Statistics 2017, World Bank

References Government of India. (2017). Economic survey of India (2016–17), India. International Monetary Fund. (2016). World economic and financial surveys, fiscal monitor: Debt— Use it wisely, Washington. Kojima, K. (1973). Reorganization of North-South trade: Japan’s foreign economic policy for the 1970s. Hitotsubashi Journal Economics, 13(2), 1–28. Singh, K., & Bery, S. (2005). India’s growth experience. In W. Tseng & D. Cowen (Eds.), India’s and China’s recent experience with reform and growth. Palgrave Macmillan, International Monetary Fund. Yamazawa, I. (1990). Economic development and international trade, the Japanese Model. EastWest Center, Resource Systems Institute.

Promoting South Asian Migration to the Gulf Region: Reducing Poverty and Inequality as the Strategy Anisur Rahman

International migration is considered to be an essential key for development, especially in developing countries. It is, in fact, a positive force for development in South Asian countries. The South Asian countries have been a significant source of migration to different parts of the world for a long time. The oil boom of the early 1970s had attracted a large number of South Asian workforces to the Gulf countries. The major countries sending their labour to the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. It is said that the primary strategy of these countries is to provide relief to local labour market pressures and receive foreign exchange earnings that have been used in the reduction of poverty, inequality and promoting economic growth in their respective countries. Migration from South Asia has constantly been growing for over four decades. This paper aims to discuss how migration and remittance inflows are playing an essential role in social and economic development in South Asian countries. This paper would also examine how labour migration is to be more beneficial to this region. The current study explores recent migration trends and vital factors that help nation-building and development in South Asian countries. It is known that migrant workers are exploited in the Gulf countries. So, this paper would also discuss how host countries secure the rights of these migrant workers to make them more productive. Let us first examine the presence of south Asian workers in the Gulf countries.

Presence of South Asian Workers in the GCC The presence of South Asian workers is quite significant in the GCC countries. They constitute about 15 million in the Gulf region. Of them, there are over eight million A. Rahman (B) Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Rahman and N. Tiwari (eds.), Development, Governance and Gender in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-5109-0_4

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A. Rahman

Indian workers which are found to be the largest share of the South Asian workforce. Gulf migration is considered to be prominently a male-driven phenomenon. A majority of the migrants are single men living in congested labour camps. According to the World Bank, in 2019, it was found that the total remittances received in South Asian countries were around $140 billion (Rajan and Oommen, The Hindu, 29 July 2020). Of them, India received $83.1 billion followed by Pakistan ($22.5 billion), Bangladesh ($18.3 billion), and Nepal ($8.1 billion). The inflows of the Gulf remittances are found to be quite notable in these countries. They utilize these remittances for the development of their economies and societies. It is noted that the South Asian countries have taken several development initiatives in order to reduce poverty and unemployment in their respective countries. The role of migrant workers has been recognized by the governments, and the need for policy initiatives has also been taken by few States to safeguard the interest of their workforce in their home countries. These migrant workers on the other hand contribute immensely to the Gulf economy and society as they work in every social and economic sector of developmental activities in the host countries of the Gulf. They are in fact considered to be the backbone of the Gulf economies and societies. It is said that the composition of the foreign labour workforce in the Gulf countries has been changing since the 1970s. In the mid-1970s, Arabs constituted a majority (50%) of the foreign workers in the region, followed by 36% Asians. During the same period, it was found that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait relied on foreign workers, whereas Oman and Bahrain were dependent on Asian workers. It is interesting to note that a majority of the foreign workforce had been found to be Asians since the 1980s. This is perhaps due to the availability of Asian workers on lower wages than those of their Non-Gulf Arab Workers. They were also willing to accept a less attractive job as compared to those of Arabs (Amjad, 1989). The South Asian workers in the host countries often do not bring their families with them. They are therefore considered as no threats to the Gulf countries’ existing political and social order in comparison with non-natives Arabs (Omran & Roudi, 1993). These workers are primarily from Asian countries like India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand and Nepal. In order to analyse the current dynamics and likely future trends of migration, it may be helpful to get a sense of the profile of migrant labours. For example, Nepal had an estimated 1–1.5 million workers in abroad, with more than 80% of them went to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). It was found that overwhelming majority of them was employed in lowskilled service jobs such as security guards, domestic workers, personal driver, and waiter in the cafeteria. It was estimated that there were around 6 million migrant workers in aboard from Bangladesh that is almost close to 4% of its total population. It was also estimated that more than 65% of Bangladesh’s remittances came from Gulf Countries and Over 50% of Bangladeshis workers went to the UAE in 2009 and 2010. In case of Saudi Arabia, for the last two years, only 2–3% of Workers from Bangladesh went to this country. This is mainly due to the country’s unofficial freeze on large-scale recruitment of unskilled Bangladeshi workers. This is also

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true that overall, most Bangladeshis in the Gulf are employed as unskilled workers, particularly in the construction sector. It is further noted that Saudi Arabia being the most significant recipient (86% of total departures in 2009) of migrants from Sri Lanka in the Gulf region. Sri Lanka’s migrant profiles stand out from the rest of South Asia, as the majority of (52%) overseas workers were women in 2009. It was found that 46% of total workers went abroad as housemaids. In case of Pakistan, it was reported that overall Pakistan received 64% of remittances from GCC countries of which about 50% of remittances came from Saudi Arabia and the UAE. It is also found that Pakistani workers are predominantly employed in low-skilled construction jobs. With $53.9 billion in 2009–2010, India is considered to be the World’s largest recipient of remittances received from the Gulf. India’s remittances receipt sources and migrant skill levels are quite diverse. It is estimated that the outflow of remittances from Gulf Countries to India would range between 27% (RBI) and 40% (MOIA) of India’s total receipt remittances. According to the World Bank report, 2018, the Indian diaspora sent a huge amount back home in 2018, as it is observed that India received 62.7 billion in 2016 that rose to USD65.3 billion in 2017 and then these remittances reached the USD79 billion in 2018 through which India holds world’s top position in terms of remittances recipient. At the growth rate of 14% in inward remittance, India had thus registered significant growth in the flow of remittances over the last 3 years.

Inflow of Remittances in South Asia It is known that the inflow of remittances is considered to be a big asset for the growth of economic activities at both macro- and micro-levels. At the macro-level, it is said that remittances play an important role in maintaining stable foreign reserves. They also help the country’s currency to hold its value against the US dollar and contribute a significant component of the GDP. On a micro-level, it is also evident that remittances have shown a positive impact on education, health care, entrepreneurship and overall economic development of the remittance recipient families. It was noted that these South Asian labour-exporting countries had received USD40 billion remittances in 2007. Of them, India received USD27 billion, Pakistan USD6 billion, Bangladesh received more than USD6 billion, Nepal and Sri Lanka received USD more than one and a half (USD1.6) billion and nearly USD3 billion, respectively. South Asian governments are establishing dedicated institutions to encourage and safeguard foreign workers as labour migration has become more vital. It is noticed that Pakistan and Bangladesh have already made such specialized official government departments to promote their nation’s employees to international employers, handle the agreements that allow them to go overseas lawfully, and supervise the recruitment agents who arrange most emigrants in overseas employment (South Asia: A Special Report). This is quite encouraging for their workers who could contribute more in terms of remittances and other benefits to the South Asian economy and society.

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It was further observed that the inflow of remittances to South Asian countries had declined as shown in Table 1 in 2016. This happened primarily due to the Gulf nationalization policies, decreasing oil prices and workforce restrictions. It was seen that the flow of remittances among South Asian countries remained relatively stable in 2017. But the GCC nation’s economic crisis has had a significant impact on the influx of foreign migrant workers from South Asia. In Pakistan, the number of registered expatriate workers in Saudi Arabia dropped from 522,570 to 462,895 in 2016 and 2015, while the number of registered migrant workers in the United Arab Emirates dropped from 326,689 to 295,747. The number of Indian workers moving to Saudi Arabia declined from 306,600 to 162,200 in 2014–15, while the number of Indian employees travelling to the United Arab Emirates came down from 225,500 in 2016 to 195,000 in 2015. The total number of workers from India decreased from 718,000 in 2015 to 560,000 in 2016 (Migration and Development, Outlook, 2017). Despite all, it is witnessed that remittances play a more vital role in countries’ development trajectory in South Asian economies. Remittances constitute a huge share of countries’ gross domestic product (GDP) in South Asian economies. For example, remittances comprise nearly 28% of GDP in Nepal and 8% of GDP in Pakistan. India still stands for the highest remittances receiving in the World today. Moreover, it is noted that the remittance plays a crucial role in South Asian economies as they received the highest remittances from the United Arab Emirates with 21.2% followed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (18%), Kuwait (7.4%), Qatar (6.2%), Oman (5.5%) and Bahrain (1.6%) in 2018 (Molvi, 26 May 2020). The UAE and Saudi Arabia together accounted for approximately 40% of all remittances to Table 1 Inflow of remittances in South Asian countries (2015 and 2016) and the percentage of GDP in South Asian economies (2016–17)

Country

2015

2016

2016–17 (%GDP)

India

US$68.9billion

US$62.5 billion

2.7

Pakistan

US$20.0billion

US$19.5 billion

27.2

Bangladesh

US$15.7billion

US$13.7 billion

5.4

Sri Lanka

US$7.1billion

US$7.0 billion

7.9

Nepal

US$6.0billion

US$6.8 billion

2.1

Total

US$122billion

US$109.7 billion

Source World Bank 2016, Migration and Remittances Factbook 2016 third edition https://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resour ces/334934-1199807908806/4549025-450455807487/Factbo okpart1.pdf. Sources IMF, World Bank World Development Indicators, 2016–17

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South Asia. The South Asian region has now emerged as the world’s second-highest remittance-receiving region in World. India still maintains the single largest remittance recipient country that had US$83 billion in 2019 from GCC countries, followed by Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal. These five South Asian countries have in fact a huge financial share from the remittances earned by migrant workers living in the Gulf region.

COVID-19 and Its Implications for Remittances According to the World Bank report 2018, it is found that the total remittances received from South Asian countries were estimated to be USD131 billion. The share of India’s remittance receipt was USD80 billion which is found to be the largest one in the World. This is noted that the huge share of remittances in South Asian countries often comes from GCC countries where the South Asian workers constitute a significant component of the workforce. The COVID-19 pandemic has badly affected social, economic and human life everywhere around the World. Similarly, the South Asian migrant workers have also been hit by this crisis in the GCC countries. It is reported that on account of coronavirus in the GCC countries, there were over 88 deaths with 13,213 confirmed cases as of 12 April 2020. Saudi Arabia is said to be the worst hit with 4033 cases and 52 deaths followed by UAE with 3736 cases including 20 deaths (Maini, 13 April 2020, NIICE Commentary). All these countries imposed lockdown and other measures to control the pandemic. Migrants are particularly vulnerable due to a lack of health care, poor economic situations, and overcrowding, all of which increase their risk of infection. This post pandemic situation will have serious implications for the outflow of Gulf remittances in South Asian countries. Further than 2019, the COVID-19 economic catastrophe would affect millions of people who rely on remittances from India to other South Asian countries. The remittances are likely to decline due to economic slowdown in the Gulf which would lead to the possible return of South Asian workers to their respective countries. Owing to this, the number of remittances was estimated to be lesser in 2019. Although it is noted that the remittance flows are relatively resilient to external factors and crisis, but the COVID-19 is different. It is witnessed that the pandemic has already adversely impacted the flow of 272 million international migrants by substantially curtailing their major source of livelihood and job security. In South Asia, it is projected that remittances will reduce by more than 22% in 2020. It will be slightly above the global trend as projected by the World Bank before recovering in 2021. It is reported that the remittances for the month of April declined by 25% in Bangladesh and 14% in Sri Lanka (World Economic Forum, 7 August, 2020). It is projected that this economic recession created by the pandemic will propel a large number of migrants to return to their countries of origin that would lead to economic and social unrest. As a result, there would be a possibility of gender-based violence and societal tensions in South Asian societies. This is also likely to happen

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that several development schemes and programmes in South Asian countries would be stopped on account of going down of the inflow of Gulf remittances. In a way, the growth and progress made by the region on poverty reduction, income inequality, nutrition, health and education are likely to be adversely affected due to this pandemic (World Economic Forum, 7 August, 2020).

Emerging Trends of Indian Migration Since the 1990s The economic boom of the 1970s resulted in a significant increase in the number of outflow from India to the Gulf countries. The substantial rise in the oil and oil-related products, which also prompted an income benefit in the labour-intensive markets of the Persian Gulf, was categorized by the mobility of workforce with skilled and semiskilled workers in manual or administrative opportunity during the mid-1970s and early 1980s. In contrast, the large diaspora from India has been believed to affect all immigrant populations in the Gulf region. Following China, the population of India has essentially fully dispersed all over the globe, leading to a sizable diaspora. The increased flow in the oil revenues at the time of the oil boom transformed the desert economies into one of the world’s fastest-growing regions. Indian labour migration as well as the demand for foreign workers for various infrastructural and developing projects in the Gulf countries increased dramatically after the 1990s. The migration trend during the 1990s can be seen in increasing order. This was due to increased industrial and economic activities (Rahman, 2001). The movement towards Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates was increased, indicated that these are the most preferred destinations for Indian emigrants in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In that specific year, 85% of the entire expatriate population worked in these two countries. The drop in Indian migrant workers occurred between 1997 and 1999 because most Gulf countries implemented immigration regulations to restrict expatriate populations under localization strategies such as Saudization. Almost 332,000 people were granted contractual work permits to work in the Gulf countries on an annual basis during this period of immigration. Local labour was mainly hired to manage the flow of remittances out of their country to other countries. From the year 2001 onwards, this period shows that Gulf countries like the United Arab Emirates remained one of the most popular locations for Indian immigration to the GCC countries. The UAE receives the most Indian immigrants, followed by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait. The trend for immigrants in Bahrain is practically constant. Between the periods 2000–2005, on average, around 417,000 workers annually obtained a contractual work permit for the Gulf Countries. From 2007 onwards, Oman has shown a consistent upward trend of migration till the year 2011. Skilled labourers or employees account for over 30% of the entire Indian migrant workers in the Gulf countries. Other kinds of immigrants, such as unskilled or semiskilled labourers or employees, account for over 70% of the entire Indian population

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of immigrants (Khadaria, 2010). The KSA and the UAE are the most popular destinations for Indian immigrants in the Gulf. Out of the overall Indian population of migrant workers, both the Arab nations received more than 60% foreign workers. According to the latest report by the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, Indian emigrants, including both NRIs and PIOs, comprise more than thirty million people in more than 129 countries (MOIA, 2012). According to the data fetched from the Ministry of External Affairs, there are seven million huge expatriates of Indian origin in the Gulf countries (Government of India’, Annual Report, 2015–2016). These migrant workers are essentially finding their jobs in the categories of blue-collar and white-collar workers. Interestingly, in recent times, increased worldwide attention and criticism of the host country’s treatment of blue-collar and domestic ex-pat workforce has placed the India-Gulf flow of migrants in a much less favourable light, triggering the Indian government to pay more attention to expatriates matters and worker issues. Despite this, migrant labourers continued to file complaints about numerous forms of abuse, mistreatment and misery. In recent years, there is a major change in the migration guidelines and policies of the Gulf countries that placed a more significant challenge for migrants and the Indian government. For demographic and labour market reasons in the Gulf countries, these countries are now working towards controlling the number of non-native or foreign workers by restricting immigrant employment and opening working opportunities for their native workers. The Gulf nations are worried due to the instant growth of foreign labour. A constant increase has been observed in the migration outflow of Indians to the Gulf countries. Between 1948 and the 1970s, the number of Indian labourers in Gulf countries climbed from 14,000 to 40,000. Furthermore, it is evident that when the price of oil rose, many Indians began to migrate to the Gulf, reaching a peak of 258,000 in 1975. Aside from India, the GCC countries have a disproportionately and large intake of international migrants from other nations. The composition of the national vs non-national population and labour force is used to justify restrictive migration policy. In the Gulf countries, the immigrant population has been growing faster for the last few decades. The number of Indians has consistently grown, as clearly shown in Table 2. The size of Indian migrants was 1.5 million that had risen to 8.7 million in 2017. During the last 25 years, the number of Indians has increased more than five times. It is also expected to grow the number of Indians communities in the GCC countries as the gulf employer prefers them. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member countries attract a significant number of temporary migrant workforce worldwide accounting for about half of their demographic population. Foreign nationals make up more than 85% of the population in countries like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Foreign nationals are still barred from becoming permanent residents of the GCC countries due to policies that exclude them socially and politically. As a result, contract workers account for the vast majority of migrants to the region, sometimes joined by their dependents (Shah P. F., Socio-economic Impacts of GCC Migration, 2012a, b). Generally, a local citizen of GCC country has expressed their displeasure in the popular press. They have highlighted the negative impacts that may occur on their

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Table 2 Size of Indian workers in the Gulf countries 1991–2017 Countries

1991

1999

2004

2008

2012

2017

Bahrain

100,000

150,000

100,000

233,951

340,000

316,157

Kuwait

88,000

200,000

450,000

411,167

589,390

919,453

Oman

220,000

450,000

450,000

432,342

718,824

738,909

Qatar

75,000

100,000

100,000

239,003

500,000

679,050

Saudi Arabia

6,00,000

1,200,000

1,500,000

1,350,650

1,987,000

3,525,468

UAE

400,000

750,000

1,000,000

1,411,010

1,057,000

2,308,571

Others

22,000

150,000

NA

NA

NA

NA

Total

1,483,000

2,850,000

3,600,000

4,078,123

5,192,214

8,487,608

Source Anisur Rahman Indian Labour Diaspora in the Gulf: An Overview in Indian Trade Diaspora in the Arabian Peninsula by Prakash C. Jain and Kundan Kumar, New Academic Publishers, New Delhi 2012, P 328; Annual Report Ministry of External Affairs http://mea.gov.in/images/attach/ NRIs-and-PIOs_1.pdf

culture in general and children in particular. Thus, government policies to reduce the number of foreign nationals are supported by common public perceptions. It is also believed that if the number of actual inhabitants is increased (through high birth rates), this may naturally result in the decline of foreigners. “Some other studies indicating the impact of domestic workers on living arrangements and care of elderly persons have been published. It has been reported, for example, that the probability of nucleation of families is aided by the presence of domestic workers in Kuwait. Also, the lack of coresident children increases the probability of care by domestic workers in the country” (Shah P. F., Socio-economic Impacts of GCC Migration, 2011). The composition of Indian communities has been rising as it was 11% in 2000 that rose to about 16% in 2017. Tables 3 and 4 show that overall there is a substantial increase in Indians in the GCC countries. Table 3 Composition of Indian diaspora in the Gulf, 2000 Country

Population

No. of NRIs

PIOs

% of population

Saudi Arabia

21,500,000

1,500,00

NIL

7

UAE

2,800,000

900,000

50,000

32

Kuwait

2,200,000

287,600

1,000

13

Oman

2,200,000

340,000

1,000

15

Bahrain

643,000

130,000

NIL

20

Qatar

525,000

125,000

1,000

24

GCC

29,868,000

3,282,600

53,000

11

Source High-Level Committee on Indian diaspora, GOI, 2000

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Table 4 Composition of Indian diaspora in the Gulf, 2017 Country

No. of NRIs

PIOs

Indian diaspora

Total population

% of Indian diaspora

Saudi Arabia

3,253,901

1963

3,255,864

31,742,308

10

UAE

2,800,000

3751

2,803,751

8,264,070

34

Kuwait

917,970

1384

919,354

4,411,124

21

Oman

783,040

919

783,959

4,599,051

17

Bahrain

312,918

3257

316,175

1,423,726

22

Qatar

697,000

500

697,500

2,673,022

26

GCC

8,764,829

11,774

8,776,603

5,311,330,110

17

Source Population of Overseas Indians (Compiled in December 2017) 34 https://www.mea.gov.in/images/pdf/NRIs-and-PIOs.pdf21

Indian Migration and Financial Flows India has retained its status as the world’s leading recipient of remittances for many years. The surge in remittance is because of two primary measures: migration and economic growth. The first wave was the massive exodus of workers from India to Gulf countries in the 1970s, owing to a spike in oil prices and, as a result, a boom in their economies. The influx of primarily semi-skilled and unskilled labour defined this (Nayyar, 1994). The second wave of emigration from India posted in 1990, mainly to high-income Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries characterized by highly skilled IT workers (Jadhav, 2003). This combined with a range of macroeconomic policies post-liberalization in 1991 to mobilize remittances. This mobilization triggered India’s remittances through official channels (Reserve Bank of India, 2006). The remittance flows play a significant role for poor as well as rich countries in the world. In the last 15 years, remittances inflow to developing economies has increased, from 1995 was $56 billion, and in 2011, it was estimated to be $343 billion. The remittance flows increase by 4.8% from 2016 to 2017 and further to $450 billion. The South Asian countries are largely dependent on remittances for economic development and job opportunities. It is estimated that remittances would increase by 5% in GDP during the year 2017–2018 for countries like Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka. In the Gulf countries, significant destinations for unskilled or semi-skilled migrants from South Asian and East regions become tightening due to dropping oil prices and anti-migrant policies that prevented and reduced the appointment of foreign workers and have additionally lowered outward remittance flows. • India is the world’s largest remittance recipient country, currently estimated to be around $71 billion (a global share of about 20%). • It was estimated to be less than $2 million in 1970–71, which rose to more than $2 billion in 1980–81. • Throughout the 80s, annual inflows remained more than $2 billion.

64 Table 5 Top ten remittance recipient countries in 2019

A. Rahman Country

Remittance recipient (Billion $)

India

80.0

China

67.0

Philippines

34.0

Mexico

34.0

Pakistan

20.9

Nigeria

25.0

Egypt

26.0

Bangladesh

15.0

Vietnam

15.9

Lebanon

7.7

Source World Bank Report, https://www.livemint.com/Politics/ hUCQ0ivvrXdrO3eDsFCc6N/India-expected-to-be-top-remitt ances-receiver-in-2019.html

• Since the 90s, there has been considerable rise in the annual inflows of remittances. • Remittances rose to more than $12 billion in 2000–01. • Remittances went up to $55 billion in 2009–2010, and it rose to $71billion in 2013–14. • The remittance declines to $65.4 billion in 2016–17. • The remittance again picked up and rose to $80 billion in 2018–19. • Substantial growth in remittance flows during the last two decades (Table 5).

Economic Benefits of Migration • Manpower migration from India is not only helping to reduce the situation of unemployment but also unable them the opportunities to earn foreign exchange. • This migration has also reduced poverty and bought prosperity in migrating regions. • The Gulf money has also improved the income level of the migrant households considerably. • This rising income level has improved the consumption, investment and saving patterns in migrating areas. • Having worked in the Gulf, they become more skilled. Hence, they are considered economic assets. • Expatriate workers are also the backbone of the Gulf economy.

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Social Benefits of Migration • • • •

Migrants were projecting India’s image abroad in the proper perspective. A visible change in their attitude towards education. Social mobility in migrants’ families. A family which was looked down on in the past is now welcomed in the social functions. • Poverty-stricken and desolated villages are suddenly becoming prosperous. • A sizeable proportion of the houseless population now has their own houses.

Gulf Migration Policy for South Asian Workers The migration policies of the GCC countries are changed from time to time. It is witnessed that since the early 1990s, they began to tighten their policies in order to have control over the migration process. They had started openly talking of those policies that could prevent the permanent settlement of migrant workers in their countries. In that process, they began to promote a short-term contract for migrant workers, temporary labour import from the labour sending South Asian countries like India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, etc. They also started to curtail the rights of migrant workers and how deportation could be made possible for undocumented or irregular migrants. This set of policies and practices for international migration management is known as the Gulf model. Further, it is noted that the Gulf countries have adopted several mechanisms to curtail the number of expatriate workers from their population and the workforce. They also formulated a policy that could increase the number of nationals through a high birth rate. The participation of women in the labour force has also been taken into account. At the same time, concerted efforts are made in order to limit the inflow of expatriate workers. It is interesting to note that despite these efforts to limit the percentage of outsiders, the outflows of South Asians appear to show an upward trend in all six GCC countries. It is said that there are many reasons for the growth of expatriate workers in these countries. The major reasons for the increasing number of non-nationals are the high demand for foreign workers which led to the stock of South Asian workers in the GCC countries. This is true that immigration to the Gulf cannot be a “temporary” phenomenon as considered and thought by the GCC states. It is observed that when migrants live here for many years, especially with their families, they have produced a second generation of migrants in the Gulf countries. It is evident that the GCC countries are expanding their infrastructure and also implementing several plans for socio-economic advancement. This creates the demand for foreign workers in these countries. Moreover, it is also noticed that the works not performed by the GCC citizens are taken up by foreign workers, especially in the private sector, such as construction and factory-related jobs. Nationals mostly prefer to work in the public sector that is considered a less arduous and less competitive zone. This is also true that the less participation of local women in the

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labour force is a responsible factor to reduce the number of indigenous workers. Gulf governments have, however, made intensive efforts to enhance the education and skill of women to boost their participation in the workforce. But it is still noticed that women are mostly interested in the occupations such as teaching and clerical work. Furthermore, it is noted that citizens in the Gulf have changed their lifestyles as their income has increased significantly. Consequently, they need domestic help for themselves. These domestic workers have been brought from the Philippines, Indonesia, India and Sri Lanka to work in the Gulf over the past few decades. The majority of these workers is sponsored by and work for particular families. Kuwait’s experience demonstrates the magnitude of this problem. In 2012, the country had 607,667 people (26.4%) on a domestic service visa out of a total population of 2.2 million lawful foreign nationals (Ministry of Interior data available in the GLMM Database).

Migration, Human Rights and Gender It is witnessed that the fundamental rights of migrant workers are often violated in GCC countries, despite their immense contribution to home and the host countries. It is noted that in a country with a non-democratic set-up and tradition, there are often reports of racial discrimination and human rights violations against South Asian migrant workers who lived in GCC countries. Their rights to conserve or to practice their own culture have been challenged if not denied. It is interesting to note that South Asian migrant workers make a significant contribution to both home and host countries. However, their fundamental rights are not ensured at both places. Neither the legal framework of the countries nor trade unions has addressed their interests in the true sense of terms. Their welfare is not sufficiently secured in the host society. The fact of the matter is that neither the governments from South Asian countries nor the Gulf countries have ratified ILO Convention. Individual states have taken care of the issue; they have formed alternative measures such as bilateral agreements and implementation of model contracts. Institutions have also been established to defend migrant worker’s rights partially. Moreover, the 1990 convention on the rights of migrant workers has not been ratified by any significant countries of the world. Early ratification of this convention by the powerful countries will have a positive impact on several countries that are beneficiaries of international migration. This will definitely be an important initiative in the direction of improving the conditions of migrant workers and their rights. An observable fact is that bulk of all foreign workers in GCC countries are from South Asia. In 2010, West Asia has around 11.32 million female migrants which are the highest in the world (Sasikumar, 2012). Two-third of migrant workers are men, while the rest are women. In the 1990s, among 7.4 million workers, 840,000 about 11.4% were women migrant workers in these oil-producing countries (Shah, 2004). Female migrant workers in GCC doubled from two decades that is 5.9 million in 2015

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from 2.9 million in 1990 (Thimonthy, 2012). The majority of these female workers are from the South East and South Asian countries such as the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and India. In 2002, among the migrants workers two-third were women from Sri Lanka. It has the highest number of women migrants to Gulf countries as in 2009 around 51.73% emigrants are Sri Lankan women out of which 89% were work as housemaids. In India also, there was a constant increase in the migration of women; in 2008, there were 10,416 women workers in GCC which further increased to 20,000 in 2010. Kerala witnessed a proportionate increase in female migrants workers from 9.3% in 1998 to 14.6% in 2008 mostly engaged in healthcare services. More than half of the men are engaged in low-skilled professions such as the construction and labour occupational category or the service sector. Liket, more than three-fourth of all Asian women migrants are involved in providing domestic service. In almost all GCC countries, reliance on domestic workers has been increasing, and such workforces consist of almost 10% of the total population in some countries such as Kuwait. 90% of Asian female workers are domestic workers in Kuwait. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have the largest female domestic workers population. In the region, most domestic workers are facing the problem of human rights violations. It is known that none of the GCC countries has ratified the ILO Convention and the UN Conventions relating to migrant workers and their family rights.

Conclusion We can conclude by saying that South Asian Countries are the major source of the workforce that is sending a large number of migrants to the GCC countries. As a result, a huge amount of remittances is flowing into the South Asian countries which are utilized for the growth and development of the region. It can be stated that in today’s globalized world both the terms migration and development became interdependent with each other as labour acts as a source of growth and prosperity. Since the indigenous population is insufficient to fulfil the ambitious development plans, low labour force participation of indigenous women and preference among nationals for public sector jobs, it is important to rely on the South Asian workforce by the Gulf countries in order to continue for overall progress and development in the region. On the other hand, South Asian countries must develop the required skills among their workers that could meet the need of the post pandemic Gulf region. India which is considered to be a large reservoir of human resources must take advantage of its big pool of human resources. India including other South Asian countries must be ready to supply the labour force to the Gulf countries in order to meet their demand for labour force in the region. As a result, the South Asian countries would receive a huge amount of remittances that could be properly utilized for eradicating poverty, inequality and unemployment from the region of South Asia.

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References Amjad, R. (1989). To the gulf and back: Studies on the economic impact of Asian labour migration. Government of India. (2012). Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs. Jadhav, N. (2003). Maximizing developmental benefits of remittances: The Indian experience. In International conference on migration and remittances, DFID and World Bank. Khadariya, B. (2010). Paradigm Shifts in India’s migration policy towards the Gulf . Middle East Institute Viewpoints. Maini, T. S. (2020). The plight of South Asian migrant workers in the Gulf , April 13th, 2020, NIICE Commentary 4068. https://niice.org.np/archives/4068 Migration and Development Brief 28 migration and remittances: Recent developments and outlook. (2017). Retrieved February 24, 2018, from http://www.knomad.org/sites/default/files/ 201712/Migration%20and%20Development%20Report%2012-14-17%20web.pdf. Accessed on February 24, 2018. Molvi, A. (2020). Economic contraction across the Gulf chokes the flow of remittances to South Asia. In The Arab Gulf State Institute of Washinton. Availbale at: https://agsiw.org/economiccontraction-across-the-gulf-chokes-the-flow-of-remittances-to-south-asia/. Accessed on June 14, 2020. Nayyar, D. (1994). Migration, remittances and capital flows: The Indian experience. Oxford University Press. Omran, A. R., & Roudi, F. (1993). The Middle East population puzzle. Population Bulletin, 48(1), 1–40. Rahman, A. (2001a). Indian labour migration to the Gulf: A socioeconomic analysis. Rajat Publications. Rajan, S. I., & Oommen, Z. Z. (2020). The South Asian-Gulf migrant crisis. The Hindu, July 29th, 2020. https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/the-south-asian-gulf-migrant-crisis/articl e32215146.ece Reserve Bank of India. (2006). Reserve Bank of India Bulletin. Shah, N. M. Restrictive labour immigration policies in the oil rich Gulf: Implications for Asian countries. Accessed through internet, http://iussp2005.princeton.edu/download.aspx?submissio nId=50842 Shah, P. F. (2011). Socio-economic impacts of GCC migration. Gulf Research center Cambridge. Shah, N. M. (2012a). Socio-demographic transitions among nationals of GCC Countries: Implications for migration and labour force trends. Migration and Development, 1, 1. Shah, P. F. (2012b). Socio-economic impacts of GCC migration. Gulf Research Center Cambridge. Thimothy, R., & Sasikumar, S. K. (2012). Migration of women workers: From South Asia to the Gulf, UN Women. V.V. Giri National Labour Institute, https://www.ucis.pitt.edu/global/sites/def ault/files/migration_women_southasia_gulf.pdf. Accessed on June 9th, 2021.

Skills for Employability and Development in South Asia: A Comparative Analysis Aarti Srivastava and Anjali Taneja

Abstract The South Asia region is blessed with a growing reserve of human capital. Skills development and extension of qualitative education services are therefore vital ingredients for human capital development. This could enable the regional economies to adjust to the changes in working practices, advances in technology, and to the challenges of the globalised world. Most discussions concerning the workforce revolve around employability skills or job readiness skills which ensure them to sustain in the job market. This ultimately feeds into growth and development of a country. In this context, this chapter presents a comprehensive perspective on skills development, training and education for skills oriented employment generation and development in the region. The theoretical findings on the subject are supplemented with the results of a primary survey on India. The survey analysis, discussions, deliberations with thought leaders, industry players and policy experts reinforce that there exists immense developmental potential in South Asia region, India in particular. Therefore, focused initiatives and policies on promoting skills development and equitable education could go a long way in enabling the formation of a thriving skills-based employability-growth ecosystem. Keywords Technical vocational education and training · Higher education · Skills development · Emerging India · Capacity building · Training and workshops · Human capital investment

Introduction Knowledge and skills are binding instruments for economic growth and development in any country. The ability to sustain human capital (HC)-oriented growth depends on whether the nation can develop the skills, capabilities and capacities of its labour resource. In the context of the South Asia Region (SAR), HC has a significant role to A. Srivastava National Institute of Educational Planning and Administration, New Delhi, India A. Taneja (B) Ashoka University, Sonipat, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Rahman and N. Tiwari (eds.), Development, Governance and Gender in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-5109-0_5

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play, and hence, the focus on education and skills development (SD) of the workforce is a lot more. Let us look at some of the statistics to support our argument. HC accounts for the highest proportion of South Asia’s wealth, at nearly 51%, in comparison with produced and natural capital (World Bank, 2018). The region has also witnessed the highest growth rate in HC per capita globally, at 4% between 1995 and 2014. However, the region is yet to realize a demographic dividend through effective investment in this capital. Regionwise, South Asia (SA) is projected to add an average of 18 million people to its working-age population every year for the next two decades, resulting in the high inverse dependency ratio that could peak by 2040 at 2.2:1. Interestingly, global projections reveal that SA is likely to comprise more working-age people than any other subregion, with the largest surge by 2055 to a projected 1.6 billion, primarily contributed by India (UNDP, 2018). Such changes in the age structure create the potential for faster economic growth (Bloom, 2011). East and Southeast Asia confirm such a phenomenon. In the case of former, existing estimates suggest that one-third of the region’s economic growth during the ‘East Asian Miracle’ period can be accounted for by effects of demographic change (Bloom & Williamson, 1998). On the other hand, SA has witnessed some twists and turns in its growth pattern. But overall, it has been among the fastestgrowing regions over the period 1990–2018. UNDP (2018) has reported that the region has witnessed the highest growth at 45.3%, followed by East Asia and the Pacific and Sub-Saharan Africa. However, the region also suffers from development challenges. Despite an impressive two-decade decline, extreme poverty remains high in SA. Nearly 41% of the world’s poor live in this region, 39% of them being children which are considered multidimensionally poor (UNDP, 2018). Similarly, instances of multidimensional poverty are particularly acute in the region. Additionally, many countries in the region suffer from extreme forms of social exclusion, infrastructure gaps and income and gender inequalities. Sadly, among the developing regions, the gender gap is the widest in SA (16.3%—UNDP, 2018). Moreover, the qualitative development of HC has not been quite impressive in the region. In a comparative data analysis viz-a-viz other regions, UNDP (2018) has reported the lost health expectancy (an output indicator measuring the quality of health care) in SAR being the highest (at 13.7% in 2016) compared to other regions, owing to lowest numbers of physicians (7.8 per 10,000 people within 2007–2017) and hospital beds (8 per 10,000 people between 2007 and 2014). On the education front, besides the issue of inequitable access, the region suffers from insufficient trained manpower to teach. Available data suggest that the percentage of trained school teachers between 2009 and 2017 was the lowest (at 71%) in SA, compared to other developing regions (UNDP, 2018). There are almost three times more primary school pupils per teacher in SA than in East Asia and Pacific and Europe and Central Asia (35 versus 17 and 18, respectively). Moreover, this also results in enrolled students dropping out of schools early, even before they complete their schooling. As a result, the region is also witnessing growing instances of school dropout rates.

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According to World Bank (2012), there persists a related employment challenge as well—of absorbing its growing labour force considering that the region will add between 1 million and 1.2 million new entrants to the labour force every month for the next two decades. According to reports, the SAR comprises the highest percentage of vulnerable employment (nearly 72% in 2017 from 80% in 1991) compared to other regions, owing to skills mismatches, inadequate education opportunities, large informal sector and falling health standards (UNDP, 2018). The lack of provision to the workforce with the right skills to upgrade their capabilities could perhaps reflect a loss of potential talent across a generation. Therefore, the education and skills of the labour force play a vital role in promoting technological progress and innovation in an economy when it moves up the value chain transitioning from simple to sophisticated high-value products and in other words remain the binding constraint in South Asia (ADB, 2017). In this context, this paper examines the skills framework, and education needs in the context of employment generation and development of the SAR. A primary survey has also been conducted to map the skills and development needs at various levels of education. It is well known that India’s developmental contributions in the region and across the globe are immense. Therefore, the authors have taken into consideration the sample size from India to conduct the survey. In this respect, the paper presents the results of the primary survey, theoretical underpinnings and the overall understanding surrounding the subject. A suggestive policy roadmap, for enhancing skills-oriented employment growth and development in SA—is also summarized, based on the arguments of the paper.

Through the Literature The idea of ‘HC as an embodiment of knowledge and skills’ was first advocated by Theodore W. Schultz in his theory of human capital (Taneja, 2018a, 2018b). Schultz (1961) argued that the rise in national output in the Western economies was an outcome of the ‘deliberate investment’ in HC, which in turn also led to the rise of the earnings of the workforce. The investment input was particularly considered in the form of education, generation of knowledge, SD and improvement in the standard of living (Taneja, 2018a, 2018b). There is no universally accepted definition of SD because it is context-specific. However, there are several concepts that are widely accepted. In this case, Kenneth King and Robert Palmer (2006)’s definition on SD could be considered as a useful reference, i.e. Skills development is not equated with formal technical, vocational and agricultural education and training alone, but is used more generally to refer to the productive capacities acquired through all levels of education and training occurring in formal, non-formal and on-the-job settings, which enable individuals in all areas of the economy to become fully and productively engaged in livelihoods, and to have the opportunity to adapt these capacities to meet changing demands and opportunities of the economy and labor market.

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It must be noted that an organized SD initiative customarily translates in training (be it formal, non-formal and informal modes). However, the training required to overcome economic vulnerability and employ ability requires a much larger set of skills beyond the conventional technical and managerial skills. The employability skills, especially those in the generic category, constitute ‘transferable’ skills. These skills contribute to an individual’s overall employability by improving her/his capacity to learn, work and adapt independently. While the argument in literature revolves around the fact that generic employability skills are essential, there is no definitive list of such skills. These include fundamental (which includes literacy, numbers’ usage, technology-oriented skills), people-centric (that includes communication, interpersonal, the ability to influence); negotiation, teamwork, customer service and leadership skills; conceptualizing or thinking (such as problem-solving, planning and organizing skills, learning skills, creative thinking and reflective skills); personal skills and attributes (such as being enthusiastic, adaptable, motivated, reliable and responsible); skills oriented in the business industry such as innovation, enterprise, commercial and business awareness skills as well as skills related to the community. Existing studies examine SD, education as well as training in a larger context of national economic development. While there have been some early critics Arrow (1973), Stiglitz (1975) emphasizing their argument that education cannot be an instrument of enhancing the economic performance of a country1 ; the existing literature in this field has largely gathered enough evidence to prove the positive role of SD and training on HC development and its positive impact on growth of a country Barro (1991), Mankiw et al. (1990), Bloom and Williamson (1998), Barro and Salai-Martin (1995), Hanushek and Woessman (2008a, 2008b), Bloom (2011), Dutz and O’Connell (2013). New growth theories have also promoted the idea of ‘skilled’ HC2 contributing to long-run growth. Lucas (1988), Romer (1990), Benhabib and Spiegel (1992), Hanushek et al. (2015). Lucas (1988), for instance, in his model has underlined the positive externalities emerging out of the accumulation of HC, viz. knowledge. He has reinforced the fact that ‘educated and skilled’ HC contributes towards increasing total factor productivity and labour earnings (Taneja, 2020). It not only improves the labour force’s ability to absorb and adapt to existing technologies but also enhances a nation’s capability to drive innovation, improve productivity and develop new technologies, which in turn drive economic growth Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), Bosworth and Collins (2003). Moreover, literature has also recognized the positive effect of knowledge as well as education on the progression of technologydriven sectors. Lee (2001) finding was that the HC stock embodied with higher education and training helps in the growth of the information and communication technology industry, especially in developing economies. Some country case studies also confirm such findings. For instance, Collins (2007) proved that the output-per-worker growth was almost 2.4% in India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka during 1960–2003. Of this output, education accounted for over 0.3% points in India and Sri Lanka and 0.2% points in Bangladesh. According to ADB (2017), an increase in the educational attainment of about 0.3% points per year could

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lead to almost a rise of 10% in GDP per worker. The ADB report; Park (2012) have further emphasized the need to improve not only the quantity but also the quality of education attainment to promote progress. Similarly, studies reveal that evaluation indicators on education and SD such as international test scores and assessments3 could play an instrumental role in growth and developmentHanushek and Kimko (2000), Hanushek and Woessman (2008a, 2008b, 2012). An empirical exercise carried out by the former reveals that an increase of one standard deviation in student’s test scores on international assessments of literacy and mathematics could result in a 2% increase in annual growth of GDP per capita. Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (2018) has reiterated the need for investment in health and education for HC development. It reinforces investment in HC (comprising good health, knowledge and skills) as a significant contributor to growth in per capita GDP between countries. Similarly, according to UNDP (2018), achievements in human development should not only be expressed in terms of quantity but also in terms of the investment in education as well as skills. In this context, UNDP in 2018, for the first time, introduced SD of school teachers and lost health expectancy as essential input indicators for education and health, respectively. Investment in HC in the form of SD can also help in reducing multidimensional poverty, especially in the developing economies. In South Asian countries, for instance, it has been witnessed that the labour income growth in Bangladesh and Nepal during 2000–2010 and 1996–2003, respectively, accounted for more than half of the reduction in their poverty levels. Similarly, ADB (2017) has reported that investment in HC has led to more than two-fifth reduction in the poverty levels of Sri Lanka during 2002–2009. The existing literature has, therefore, extensively emphasized the need for SD and education for enhancement of employability, progression and growth.

Skills and Education Stories of South Asian Economies The countries of South Asia region differ in size and their contribution to regional GDP. India is the largest economy in the region and accounts for over three-fourth of South Asia’s GDP. It is interesting to note that South Asia has witnessed large periods of highest growth rates, in comparison with other regions. Moreover, skills investment in the region has played a major role in helping economies adapt and adjust to technology advancements and globalization. However, the countries in the region have also experienced widespread skill gaps as reflected in Table 1. For example, while Bangladesh has one of the highest LFPR, the gap between employment and unemployment has been widening over the years just as in Pakistan and Maldives. This could be attributed to skill mismatches. In Bangladesh, SD challenges include low labour productivity, changing skills demand, low participation and trust in SD, poor employability, shortage of skills training opportunities for workers, disconnects and institutional capacity constraints in SD ecosystem (World Bank, 2018). On the

2019

59.80

South Asia

59.26

52.43

88.13

55.14

60.60

59.65

70.79

58.97

48.76

56.51

53.61

85.53

64.65

58.48

56.17

70.47

58.55

48.79

54.36

55.08

85.45

70.55

59.47

53.17

68.59

58.54

49.86

53.80

54.58

86.28

72.07

58.69

52.10

69.67

61.41

50.46

55.15

50.31

84.39

49.30

51.18

55.20

69.31

56.48

42.32

Source International Labor Organisation, ILOSTAT Database (2020)

88.14

52.12

Pakistan

50.16

Maldives

Nepal

60.22

65.92

72.32

Bhutan

Sri Lanka

58.72

India

48.84

Bangladesh

54.40

50.75

84.25

53.19

52.51

54.28

67.79

55.85

41.97

2000

1991

2015

Employment (%)

2010

1990

2000

Labor force participate rate (%)

Afghanistan

Country Name

Table 1 Socio-economic scenario

51.75

51.21

82.06

59.75

52.02

50.98

66.02

54.99

41.98

2010

49.35

51.14

81.92

64.29

52.30

47.98

64.30

54.17

42.87

2015

48.49

50.23

82.63

65.51

51.65

46.65

65.15

56.52

43.46

2019

4.91

0.58

1.72

0.76

14.66

5.45

1.34

2.20

11.22

1991

5.02

0.63

1.80

1.97

7.74

5.66

1.64

3.27

11.52

2000

4.91

0.65

1.52

4.14

4.78

5.64

3.32

3.38

11.48

2010

Unemployment (%)

5.21

3.57

1.48

5.67

4.52

5.57

2.45

4.38

11.39

2015

5.11

4.45

1.41

6.14

4.20

5.36

2.34

4.19

11.12

2019

74 A. Srivastava and A. Taneja

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120.00 100.00 80.00 60.00 40.00 20.00 0.00

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2005

2010

2015

Afghanistan

Bangladesh

Bhutan

India

Maldives

Nepal

Pakistan

South Asia

2016

2017

2018

Sri Lanka

Fig. 1 Age dependency ratio (as a % of working-age population). Source World Development Indicators, World Bank Databank (2020)

contrary, for countries like Sri Lanka and India, this gap seems to be contracting over the years. Countries like Afghanistan and Bhutan have not witnessed much of a change. The differential gaps across the countries could be attributed to their level of education attainment achieved and the pattern of age dependency or percentage of working-age population gradually emerging on account of each country’s national initiatives on Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET). Figure 1 reflects age dependency ratio across the different South Asian economies over the years. It can be witnessed from the graph that the age dependency as a percentage of the working-age population was highest in Afghanistan, followed by Pakistan (which has reduced over the years but still among the highest) and Nepal. India and Bangladesh have witnessed more or less a similar demographic or youth bulge at around 20% since the 1970–80s (Navaneetham & Dharmalingam, 2012). Therefore, the relative share of working age has been rising in the two countries over time, and as a result, the age dependency ratios have been falling. Maldives and Sri Lanka have also witnessed a significant decline in this ratio or a massive rise in their working-age population, across decades. This diverse scenario could be attributed to the plans and strategies concerning HC development in the South Asian economies. For instance, following the conflict, Afghanistan suffered a shortage of skilled manpower. In order to address this problem, its national government formulated policies and strategies directed towards promoting education and skills development. These include the National Development Strategy (2007), the National Education Strategy-I (NESP, 2007–2008), NESP-II (2010) and interim strategy for education (2010–2011). Similarly in Nepal, the Council’s TVET was primarily involved

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in policy formulation on SD, quality control, generation of competency-based curriculum, creating skill standards under various occupations, undertaking skills testing of people, conducting research studies and needs assessment for training, etc. In Bhutan, the key SD initiatives include diversification of course structure to include skills accreditation courses, quality assurance mechanisms, enabling the provision of training services through the involvement of public and private sectors and incentivizing students to take up VET programmes as mainstream career choices. In the Maldives, several departments like the Ministry of Higher Education and Training, Ministry of Education, Education Development Centre and Centre for Continuing Education are involved in promotion of SD and vocational education. They integrate formal school learning with TVET and prepare students for employment besides enabling a continuity of their education part-time, till it gets completed. Sri Lanka’s Ministry of Vocational and Technical Training governs the VET structure through a formal course-based curriculum at vocational-technical training centres, apprenticeship at private or public organizations, National Vocational Qualifications Systems and non-formal vocational education program. In Bangladesh, the VET system comprises short courses and three levels of programs on SD under formal TVET accredited by Bangladesh Technical Education Board, Directorate of Technical Education (main public provider) and Technical Training Centers. The Ministry of Education and National SD Council are governing authorities for this field, under Government of Bangladesh.

Reported Spill Overs Several reports indicate that the SAR has been experiencing widespread challenges in terms of skills mismatches, underemployment and unemployment. These hinder the smoother execution of SD strategies, policies and plans in the respective countries. Some of such reported spill overs include 1.

2.

Mismatches between demand and supply of skills: One of the major issues governing the present framework of vocational training (VT) and SD is the mismatch between the level of skills that employers require and the supply of employable skills in the labour market. This is primarily due to the lack of effective education and training especially at tertiary levels, on account of outdated curriculum, insufficient infrastructure, changing skills requirements and weak engagement of the industry in the TVET processes. Lack of decent and productive employment: The SAR has been witness to growing instances of unemployment, especially among the youth or the working-age population, as a result of insufficient industry–academia–government engagements, low quality of higher education and often the sluggish responses of education institutional to meet the changing skills demand of the job market. According to ADB (2013), a large percentage of global youth having no education, training or employment are in SA.

Skills for Employability and Development in South Asia …

3.

4.

5.

6.

77

While the labour force as a whole is somewhat better educated in comparison with the general population, rates of unemployment continue to surge, especially among the youth. According to ADB (2016), unemployment rates are higher among people with higher levels of education, especially among the youth. The youth unemployment rates in South Asian countries are on average three to four times higher than adult unemployment rates (youth unemployment in developed countries is usually 1.5-2 times greater than adult unemployment). Part of the problem stems from demographic shifts in the structure of the population and the fact that many of the earlier youth absorbing jobs no longer exist. This adds to social instability. Lack of enterprise-based training: One of the challenges surrounding rising unemployment levels and frequent mismatches between demand and supply of skilled labour force is the lack of adequate on-the-job training in India and Bangladesh. OECD’s PIAAC has assessed the significant role of enterprise training on labour productivity and earnings. The Republic of Korea is one such country that participated in PIAAC and confirmed the positive impact of such training sessions on wages earnings of workers. However, the countries in South Asia have not been an active part of any of the international tests or surveys, conducted on skills assessment worldwide (this issue has also been underlined in chapter two of this research study). The region faces the challenge of inadequate investment in upgradation of workers’ skills on the job. Geographical constraints, mobility concerns and gender inequities: Geographic mismatch in the provision of skills, education and training is one of the serious problems plaguing the labour market in South Asian countries. South Asian countries are constrained with inadequate vertical and horizontal mobility in SD and TVET. For instance, it is difficult for graduates of vocational programs in secondary school to get admitted to the technical program at the university or polytechnic level. Similarly, horizontal mobility from general academic education to a vocational program or vice versa is restricted; the reason being lack of equivalent recognition of VT as that of general education. According to Lange et al. (2018), women account for less than 40% of HC wealth. Moreover, achieving higher gender parity in earnings could generate an 18% increase in HC wealth with notably large potential gains in SA. Weak labour market institutions: Generally, inadequate attention is provided to the role of (weak) labour market institutions. This results in poor enforcement and limited social dialogue, which together constrains national efforts to promote decent work. LMIs cover a whole range of activities and services, including employment services, career guidance, the provision of employability skills and information about employment opportunities. Inadequate qualified instructors and insufficient resources: The lack of trained and qualified technical teachers or instructors is one of the major constraints underlining the effective delivery of VET services. Most TVET teachers have little pedagogical or competency-based training, few practical skills and little or no industry experience. The identified constraints for such

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poor performance include lack of capacity and inadequate infrastructure to train teachers and instructors, underutilization of capacity and budget constraints and lack of motivation. Funding constraints and policy imperatives: In South Asian countries, SD initiatives continue to be largely dependent upon the government or public– private partnerships. Yet, investments in such programs are extremely low owing to governments and regulatory bodies’ negligence in ensuring adequate attention to education, TVET and healthcare needs of their population. Skills and training programs are often perceived as non-scalable initiatives owing to high capital requirements and low return on investments. As a result, the sector largely remains underinvested. Moreover, the dependency on donor organizations for funding such low key initiatives is large. It has also been found out that on average the financial institution’s willingness to lend for skill development activities is low as educational loans are perceived as high-risk products due to uncertainty concerning employment generation (ADB, 2017). Therefore, private institutions charge a heavy fee to render higher education and specialized training. Concerning policy formulation, Desjardins and Rubenson (2011) argue that policies on skills formation have to take into account both supply and demand as there is a distinction between skills mismatch and education mismatch. In this context, identifying the mechanisms that help to foster the optimal utilization of the existing skill base is essential. In case of South Asia, the governance structure surrounding SD, higher education and TVET are largely centralized and perhaps complex and cumbersome and attributed to several governing and policy-making institutions on TVET. Moreover, the education policies are largely directed towards increasing enrolment rates at primary and secondary levels of school education, downplaying the role of SD and VT in HC development.

India’s Predominance: Overview, Survey and Analysis Overview The largest and fastest-growing economy of SA, India, accounts for almost 80% of the regional GDP on purchasing power parity basis (IMF, 2015). The region has been among the fastest growing consistently with India being the largest contributor in SA’s growth and development. In fact, IMF (2019) has projected that over 152 million people are expected to enter the workforce in SA by 2030, with Indian workers accounting for about 130 million. Not only in the region, but also for the global economy as a whole, India’s developmental contributions over the next coming decades are expected to be immense.

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atleast completed short cycle tertiary

atleast completed post- secondary

atleast completed upper secondary

atleast completed lower secondary

atleast completed primary 0.00 Pakistan

10.00 India

20.00

30.00

40.00

50.00

60.00

Bangladesh

Fig. 2 Education attainment for population (25+ years) in %. Source World Development Indicators, World Bank Databank (2020a, 2020b, 2020c, 2020d)

HC investment via SD and education has also increased gradually. The following graph (Fig. 2) reflects the attainment of education at various levels, within the population (25+) in India in comparison with two other large economies of SA—Bangladesh and Pakistan. While the country has been the best performer in terms of education completion at all levels (in comparison with other economies of SAR), the percentage of population completing tertiary education is still at a low level. Focused SD initiatives and policy measures could be instrumental in this regard. In India, the process of SD, TVET and education are becoming more organized and systematic, gradually. The education process is governed by the Ministry of Human Resource Development. Higher education universities, institutes cater to the generation of formal means of education offered through different colleges specializing in arts, science and commerce, while engineering and polytechnics fall under the purview of technical education. The latter is offered through advanced, central and foreign training institutes. National Council of Educational Research and Training—the apex body of India—governs school education, Central Advisory Board of Education maintains coordination between the governments at the centre and states, University Grants Commission sets the standards for university education, and All India Council for Technical Education regulates technical education in India. UGC also governs the structure of funding and grants for higher education. In the sphere of VT, it is imparted through public and private institutions in India. These include Industrial Training Institutes run by the government, Industrial Training Centers, vocational schools, specialized institutes for technical training, Sector Skills Councils, apprenticeship training offered by the industry and private sector.

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Director-General of Employment and Training is the nodal institution under the Ministry of Labour and Employment for VT. DGET is responsible for formulating policies, establishing standards, granting affiliation to relevant agencies, conducting trade tests, providing certification, and offering employment-related services in vocational training. Moreover, a Ministry of Skills Development and Entrepreneurship (Central Ministry) has also been set up in 2014, entrusted with the responsibility of evolving an appropriate SD framework in India in consultation with relevant stakeholders from public and private sectors, ensuring skills upgradation and monitoring overall progress on skills and training scenario in the country. Similarly, at the state level, National Skills Development Agency—established in 2013, has been working with the state governments to rejuvenate and synergize the skilling efforts statewise. Participation of the private sector in SD has largely been driven through National Skills Development Corporation which is under the Central Ministry since 2015.

Primary Survey: Setting the Framework The diversity in economic development calls for an evaluation and assessment of skill needs with the help of a primary survey in India. Three regions have been selected to conduct the survey: Central, Northern and Western. There presenting cities selected under the study in each of the regions are Delhi, Mumbai and Bhopal. These cities were chosen on the basis of the size of their population, their prominence and the sector-specific availability of recruiters or responders. It must be noted that all the three identified cities have been classified under Class I cities (Census of India, 2011). New Delhi is the capital (as X Category) of India. Mumbai is the commercial and financial capital (as X Category), and Bhopal (as B1 Category) is the capital of State of Madhya Pradesh and is the hub for several industries. The themes that were circulated for discussions and deliberations were related to skills for employability, among school- and college-level pass-outs or those who completed school and college levels of education. The themes are as follows: • • • • • • • • • • •

Process of recruitment. Identification, selection of the right candidate. Process of determining skills requirement. Skill gaps in the current scenario. The nature of support sought by the industry from the educational institutions. Educational and training gaps. Provisions or facilities of on-the-job training. Listing of skills requirement categorywise. Perception of skills developed or cultivated at the school level. The nature of the State support as required. Suggestions over strengthening and developing skills.

The focused group discussion was divided into two technical sessions, centred around four relevant themes pertaining to SD. They were as follows:

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Skills’ perception. Generic requirement of skills. Skills’ development or generation at the school. Sector-specific gaps in skills.

The responses from the respondents were collated and analysed. The survey results are presented in the next section.

Primary Survey: Results and Analysis 1.

Skills expectations, development and training: Table 2 summarizes the responses from the surveyed group—the skill requirements of the employers in these three regions of the country, which are somewhat different. The population composition and the regional differences in the economic, social and cultural settings are key reasons for such differential results. Delhi’s population has strong interpersonal and personal skills. Skills requirements are more driven towards generic in the city, such as language communication in English. Mumbai and Bhopal, on the other hand, have generated a demand for more personal traits as well as interpersonnel skills. As we proceed hierarchically from Delhi to Bhopal via Mumbai, we observe the growing need for differentiated generic skills desired by the employers. The table also specifies the SD and training needs of the various cities.

2.

Potential Skills Oriented—Employment Generating Sectors of the Economy (Table 3).

Conclusion: A Suggestive Roadmap An interesting realization which is being witnessed in a globalized world is that SD and effective education can enhance the employability of the workforce, productivity of an enterprise and national development of a country. In this context, the countries in the SAR and especially India are taking significant measures to ensure HC development to realize a demographic dividend. Focused initiatives and policies on promoting SD and equitable education can go a long way in enabling the formation of a thriving skills-based employability-growth ecosystem. As Bloom et al. (2011) have rightly argued in his research study, If the governments are to capitalize on the high share of working-age people in the population, they will have to ensure that those people are healthy, well educated, and well trained in the skills demanded by the labor market.

This paper delves into delineating the various contours of SD from the aspect of theoretical research, South Asian countries’ national strategies and initiatives, the

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Table 2 Key takeaways: skill requirements, skills development and training New Delhi

Mumbai

Bhopal

Skills requirements/expectations from industry: Critical thinking, leadership, good communication (removing the language barrier), analytical

Skills requirements/expectations from industry: aptitude, reading, writing, arithmetic, appearance and personality, diligence and hardworking, influential/influencing personality, willingness to learn, multitasking, problem-solving approach

Skills requirements/expectations from industry: Quest for knowledge, good communication, habits-goals interface, teamwork and social interaction, values and ethics, commitment and dedication, honesty, physical fitness and stamina, positive thinking and attitude, time management, flexibility and adaptability, quick responsiveness oriented approach

Gender bender (equal opportunity employers/job market, addressing safety and security issues)

On-the-job training at entry level essential

Revamp the existing system of skill enrichment and development (to furnish the labor market skills’ requirements)

Skill appreciation (skill rewards, incentive oriented skilling initiatives, role models identifications)

Dignity of labor important, information dissemination of the concept among employers, stakeholders

Teacher training and quality teaching practices (through workshops, short term specialised training sessions, horizontal and vertical mobility across education levels, introduction of credit-based system of skills-oriented courses)

New/reformed labor market information system/mechanism

Market-based solution (to bring about internal and external systemic efficiency, barrier-free forward and backward linkages)

Employability indicators (for self-assessment and self-management) through academia-industry joint efforts

Teachers’ training (linked to the employability of students, interdisciplinary approach, policy-oriented learnings/teaching, innovative methods of teaching, strengthening critical skills of students to address socioeconomic challenges of the city, improving communication skills)

Teachers’ training (linked to the employability of students, interdisciplinary approach, policy-oriented learnings/teaching, innovative methods of teaching, strengthening critical skills of students to address socioeconomic challenges of the city, improving communication skills) (continued)

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Table 2 (continued) New Delhi

Mumbai

Pilot projects (need assessment/mapping of skills and training), specialized short term courses, interdisciplinary/employability courses, internships, workshops, amendments in the existing curriculum at school and college level (through industry interactions and academia- industry partnerships)

Capacity building (in PPP or otherwise to enhance partners’ productivity, learning new skill sets, expansion of employment choices to emerging avenues)

Bhopal

Education/academia-industry linkages (for higher productivity, entrepreneurial SD through short courses, workshops, internships, projects Summary of the primary survey conducted by authors

employers’ need-based skills assessment and academia’s perspective on promoting skills for employability as well as overall development. The primary surveys and discussions with thought leaders, industry players and policy experts reinforced that there exists immense potential in India and in the SAR to ensure effective development of skills, education and health care. Some of the challenges which were highlighted during such surveys, research and discussions include demand–supply skill mismatches, inadequate industry–academia linkages leading to growing instances of unemployment, lack in the redressal of quality issues on education and SD, inequities and inaccessibility to education, skills and training services on account of geographical, mobility and gender disparities, weak labour market institutions, various funding constraints and centralized policy framework, complex regulatory mechanisms and fragmentation on account of too many decision-making authorities which could lead to ineffective policy-making in this sphere. To address such issues, a well-coordinated plan of action could be formulated, governed by the following principles: • Shared policy responsibility (coordinated approach among all stakeholders, inclusive engagement of the academic community in the policy-making processes, assessment/mapping of need-based skills, ensuring that the benefits of a skillsoriented national economy reach to all, proactive policies). • Integrated approach (academia–industry interlinkages, public–private partnerships, employment-oriented curriculum, projects linked to development and employability).

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Table 3 Sectoral analysis of skills requirements and gaps Employment generating sectors

Responses from surveyed group: essential skills requirements

Responses from Surveyed Group: existing skills challenges/drawbacks

Automobiles

Servicing skills include basic literacy, analytical ability, comprehending ability, knowledge of work, ability to complete the assigned tasks, understand instructions, standard operating procedure, adhere to timelines and safety guidelines

Lack of multitasking attributes, insufficient knowledge of the trade, poor execution in servicing the automotive needs (generally attributed to the generic skills having learned), lack of desire to learn new skills or working on new machines (also originates from the weak understanding and lack of comfort in working with advanced or latest machinery); Lack of drivers, painters, operators to work on high-end technology driven machines. Inadequate inter-communication impacts quality; tendency to delve in union formation practices, thereby disrupting regular functioning; inadequate knowledge or understanding of disciplines, industry rules, procedures; absenteeism rampant; lack of standardization of skills across employees

In manufacturing of vehicles, technical skills essential. Besides, an understanding of the machine parts is ne e de d (the ability to understand large operational parts and ensuring that safety is maintained throughout)

Manufacturing—inadequate orientation/training of safety measures, handling equipment used in operations

Skills required in mechanics—primarily the understanding of assembly, critical assembly specifications, ability to follow given instructions

Mechanics—lack of understanding of the machine parts, inability to discern minute differences in parts, inadequate orientation of safety measures, tendency to rely on judgements more than instructions

Information Technology Functional skills include the ability to handle inquiries, operate computer/keyboard; strong analytical abilities; process knowledge, ability to provide technical support; ability to turnaround time requirements, understanding of information security and privacy issues

Functional skill gaps—weakness in analytics, lack of process compliance; inadequate attention to detailing and understanding of quality initiatives, information security and privacy issues

(continued)

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Table 3 (continued) Employment generating sectors

Responses from surveyed group: essential skills requirements

Responses from Surveyed Group: existing skills challenges/drawbacks

Desired soft skills—strong interpersonal communication skills, multi-tasking and problem-solving, perseverance

Soft skill gaps—in the field of communication, multi-tasking, perseverance, lack of aptitude for problem-solving

Banking, Finance and Insurance

Primarily soft skills such as good communication, perseverance, emotional intelligence, aptitude for repetitive work, having integrity, meeting expectations of the customers, an understanding of the industry, product knowledge, assets’ awareness, understanding of financial concepts, etc.

Gaps in soft skills, inability to comprehend the industry functioning, low enthusiasm, less emotional intelligence, insecurity of job arising due to employment opportunities available on a contractual basis

Tourism

Basic academic skills (including being literate), higher-order thinking skills (like knowledge of geography/destinations, safety measures), personal qualities (honesty, self- confidence, having good work ethics and team spirit, etc.), communication skills

Geographical understanding of destinations poor, lack of good communication skills, low understanding of safety measures, gaps in basic and personal skills

Construction and Real Estate

Skills of trained workmen should include—coordination abilities especially with unskilled workmen, operation of key equipment, can work at a height, deliver quality inputs, be adaptive, knowledge of construction-centric areas, understanding of machine functioning and managing troubleshooting as well as basic knowledge of construction engineering

Inadequate knowledge of construction-sites, lack of knowledge of basic machine operations and functioning, inability to comprehend instructions, guidelines, less orientation of safety measures, insufficient work-station skills like maintaining discipline, cleanliness and maintaining job loyalty

Skills expected out of the unskilled workmen—ability to conduct operations like excavations, carrying, cutting, mixing, etc. ability to undertake intensive manual labor. Must be medically fit, must have an orientation of safety measures and possess the ability to execute instructions, etc.

Many of the respondents attributed these skill gaps to the less practical or theory-driven nature of VT offered by Indian institutions with almost negligible real-time training sessions

(continued)

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Table 3 (continued) Employment generating sectors

Responses from surveyed group: essential skills requirements

Responses from Surveyed Group: existing skills challenges/drawbacks

Textiles

Operator level—ability to operationalise machines, monitoring operations, read and understand basic indicators, etc., ensure smooth functioning of machines, ability to work on different machines. Possess and ensure work-oriented skills like ensuring discipline, punctuality at the workplace, adherence to cleaning, maintenance schedules of machines and to comply with quality norms or practices

Inadequate machines’ knowledge, quality challenges, and inability handle multiple tasks at one time

Supervisory level—extensive knowledge of the machines, production processes, possess ability to train workers and manage them, should have complete understanding of the work, processes, ensure quality and safety maintenances as well as machines’ cleanliness schedules Summary of the primary survey conducted by authors

• Reform pedagogy (incentive-driven teaching practices, innovative teachings, career development-oriented initiatives, teachers/faculty training mechanism, laws governing mandatory skills-oriented teachings, training). • Inclusiveness (especially to ensure the participation in education and SD from remote areas, formulation and implementation ICT strategies that are affordable and effective in reaching out, especially to the under-served, gender-sensitive work environment to ensure a balanced participation of the female and male labour force in the job market). • Monitoring and evaluation (periodic monitoring and evaluation of performance/scrutiny of providers and receivers of education and training, participation in international skill assessment mechanisms to examine the progress on SD, create demand-oriented TVET system, institutionalize tracer and tracking studies to measure the effectiveness of training programs regularly; ensure a continuous process of reforming the training programs in synergy with the changing needs of the job market; provide incentives to training providers and employers for meeting the job-centric performance standards in terms of quantity and quality

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of recruitment; ensure availability and accessibility of authentic data on HC indicators; make training institutions autonomous with proper safeguards, scrutiny mechanisms and accounting controls). The demographic transition in SA offers a window of opportunity in the form of a demographic dividend. This could be realized if the workforce is effectively skilled and educated and ready for the job market. In other words, investing in SD, training, education and R&D would help to unlock productivity and innovation, reduce poverty, generate employment, create opportunities for growth, ensure prosperity and foster progress in the SAR. Notes 1.

2.

3.

Arrow (1973), for instance, argued that education—especially higher education—has no inherent social and cognitive value; it rather serves as a screening device in that it sorts out individuals with differing abilities and that professional schools impart real skills valued in the market [taken from Taneja (2018a; 2018b)]. In one such study, Hanushek et al. (2015) inferred from their analysis that cognitive skills have a strong positive impact on the earnings of an individual [taken from Taneja (2018a; 2018b)]. Such as the Third International Mathematics and Science Study and the Programme for International Student Assessment, International Adult Literacy Survey, the Adult Literacy and Life Skills Survey, Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies [taken from Taneja (2018a; 2018b)].

References Arrow, K. (1973). Higher education as a filter. Journal of Public Economics, 2, 193–216. Asian Development Bank. (2013). Skills development for inclusive and sustainable growth in developing Asia-Pacific. Technical and Vocational Education and Training: Issues, Concerns and Prospects (Vol. 19). Asian Development Bank. (2016). Skill development in India. ADB Briefs, No. 61. Asian Development Bank. (2017). Human capital development in South Asia: Achievements, prospects, and policy challenges. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/385696/ hcd-sa.pdf Barro, R., & Sala-i-Martin. (1995). Economic growth (1st ed.). MIT Press. Barro, R. (1991). Economic growth in a cross-section of companies. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(2), 407–443. Benhabib, J., & Spiegel, M. (1992). The role of human capital in economic development: Evidence from aggregate cross-country and regional U.S. data. Starr Center for Applied Economics, Working Paper N 9224. Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. (2018). Goalkeepers: The stories behind the data 2018. https:// www.gatesfoundation.org/goalkeepers/report

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Bloom, D. E. (2011). Population dynamics of India and implications for economic growth. Harvard Institute for Global Health, Program on the Global Demography of Aging, Working Paper No.65. Bloom, D. E., Canning, D., & Rosenberg, L. (2011). Demographic change and economic growth in South Asia, Harvard Institute for Global Health, Program on the Global Demography of Aging, Working Paper No.67. Bloom, D. E., & Williamson, J. (1998). Demographic transitions and economic miracles in emerging Asia. World Bank Economic Review, 12(3), 419–455. Bosworth, B., & Collins, S. M. (2003). The empirics of growth: An update. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 113–206. Collins, S. M. (2007). Economic growth in South Asia: A growth accounting perspective. In A. Ahmed & E. Ghani (Eds.), South Asia: Growth and regional integration. World Bank. Desjardins, R., & Rubenson, K. (2011). An analysis of skill mismatch using direct measures of skills. OECD Education Working Papers No. 63. OECD. Dutz, M., & O’Connell, S. (2013). Productivity, innovation and growth in Sri Lanka: An empirical investigation. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper. No. 6354. Hanushek, E. A., & Woessmann, L. (2008a). Assessing national achievement levels in education. National assessments of educational attainment (Vol. 1). World Bank. Hanushek, E. A., & Woessmann, L. (2008b). The role of cognitive skills in economic development. Journal of Economic Literature, 46(3), 607–668 Hanushek, E. A., & Woessmann, L. (2012). Do better schools lead to more growth? Cognitive skills, economic outcomes, and causation. Journal of Economic Growth, 17, 267–321. Hanushek, E. A., et al. (2015). Returns to skills around the World: Evidence from PIAAC. European Economic Review, 73, 103–130. Hanushek, E., & Kimko, D. (2000). Schooling, labour-force quality and the growth of nations. The American Economic Review, 90(5), 1184–1208. International Monetary Fund. (2015). South Asia: Robust growth amid global uncertainty, South Asia regional update. https://www.imf.org/external/country/IND/rr/2015/103015.pdf International Monetary Fund. (2019). Building on South Asia’s economic success, report. https:// www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2019/11/01/NA110219-building-on-south-asias-economic-suc cess Klenow, P. J., & Rodriguez-Clare, A. (1997). Economic growth: A review essay. Journal of Monetary Economics, 40(3), 597–617. Lange, G., Wodon, Q., & Carey, K. (2018). The changing wealth of nations 2018: Building a sustainable future. International Bank for Reconstruction, WB Group. http://documents.worldb ank.org/curated/en/727941517825869310/pdf/123137-Replacement-PUBLIC.pdf Lee (2001) Education for technology readiness: Prospects for developing countries. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, 2(1), 115–151. Lucas, R. (1988). On the mechanics of economic development. Journal of Monetary Economics, 22, 3–42. Mankiw, G., Romer, D., & Weil, D. N. (1990). A contribution to the empirics of economic growth. Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper N 3541. Navaneetham, K., & Dharmalingam, A. (2012). A review of age structural transition and demographic dividend in South Asia: Opportunities and challenges. Journal of Population Ageing, 5, 281–298. Park, J. (2012). Total factor productivity growth for 12 Asian economies: The past and the future. Japan and the World Economy, 24(2), 114–127. Romer, P. (1990). Endogenous technological change. The Journal of Political Economy, 98(5), S71–S102. Schultz, T. W. (1961). Investment in human capital. The American Economic Review, 51(1), 1–17. Stiglitz, J. E. (1975). The theory of screening education and the distribution of income. American Economic Review, 65, 283–300. Taneja, A. (2018a). Skills development in South Asia: Setting the momentum for demographic dividend. Education India Journal, 7(3), 25–49.

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Taneja, A. (2020). Human capital investment—Economic growth linkages in South Asia: Ensuring skills development, accessible education and healthcare (An empirical analysis of India and Bangladesh, 1991–2018). Research Paper (Presented at the IV Annual Economics Conference, NMIMS, Mumbai). Taneja, A. (2018b). Human capital development in South Asia: Realizing a qualitative demographic dividend. International Journal of Economic Research, 15(3), 827–837. United Nations Development Programme. (2018). Human development indices and indicators: A statistical update. Human Development Report. http://hdr.undp.org/en/2018-update World Bank. (2012). More and better jobs in South Asia. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOU THASIAEXT/Resources/2235461296680097256/7707437-1316565221185/Jobsoverview.pdf World Bank. (2018). Skills for tomorrow’s jobs: Preparing youth for a fast changing economy (Bangladesh), Report. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/684441522921114827/pdf/ AUS0000069-revised-PUBLIC.pdf World Bank. (2020a). Data bank. https://databank.worldbank.org/source/education-statistics:-Edu cation-Attainment (South Asia). World Bank. (2020b). Data bank, age dependency ratio as a % of working-age population (South Asia). World Bank. (2020c). Data bank, labor force participate rate (South Asia). World Bank. (2020d). Data bank, employment and unemployment rates (South Asia).

Governance and Human Rights

Governance and Capability Contemporary Issues for Citizens and Governments R. F. I. Smith

This paper is about governance and capability. Current public policy challenges give these topics bite. Citizens in many countries are dissatisfied with how governments treat them; faith in market-led approaches in public policy and management has dropped, often dramatically; issues that do not stop at national borders continue to generate conflicts that representative democracy struggles to contain. A focus on governance is relevant because it examines how citizens, community organizations, private sector enterprises and governments organize themselves and relate to each other. A focus on capability is relevant because it relates what governments wish to do to what they actually do and how they go about it. Such examination probes the different ways in which social, economic and political coordination takes place, the skills and resources that participants bring to the task, the different arenas in which outstanding issues are confronted or avoided and the ambiguities and complexities that ensue. An important threshold issue is that many variations are possible. Governance can exist without government, as for example in local communities, the internal arrangements of community and private sector organizations and in international affairs. The ambitions of government can vary from minimal, for example, in reliance on markets and the private sector to provide services to citizens, to highly intrusive, for example, in reliance on rafts of official bureaucracies and government-run businesses. Similarly, boundaries between sectors and jurisdictions may be tightly or loosely drawn. Issues may shunt between sectors and between levels of government; local, subnational, national and international, sometimes determined by an institution with authority, sometimes determined by negotiations between different and often competing institutions and sometimes not determined at all. Capabilities too may be generated by many different sources, for example, constitutional and institutional arrangements, the skills of political leaders, the skills R. F. I. Smith (&) Melbourne, Australia e-mail: rfi[email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Rahman and N. Tiwari (eds.), Development, Governance and Gender in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-5109-0_6

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of civil servants and the application of management systems and information technology. For these reasons, relationships between governance arrangements and capabilities are important. So is the extent to which citizens can themselves influence preferred policies. Close examination may reveal, on the one hand, effective coordination without a central coordinator and on the other, despite the existence of apparently appropriate arrangements, gaps in authority, responsiveness, accountability, legitimacy, capabilities and results. The paper focuses on governance and capabilities within government and on how governments relate to citizens. It draws examples from current issues in public policy and management in India and Australia. In both countries, questions about how governments are organized, relate to citizens, deliver services and discharge legal responsibilities are keenly canvassed and often contested. Attention is directed not only to formal arrangements but also to practice and results. Comparative insights are explored where they help to sharpen understanding of issues at stake. However, simply transferring experience from one country to another rarely works and is not recommended. The paper begins by examining emerging issues in governance in India. It then examines how approaches to governance and the development of relevant capabilities are related. It argues that effectiveness in government depends to a significant extent on judgments about how relationships between governance arrangements and appropriate capabilities are managed.

Issues in Governance Because of the wide range of meanings that can apply to governance, use of the term in specific cases can rarely be taken at face value (Smith, 2017). Differences in usage in India and Australia make this clear. While discussion in India tends to view governance, at least at first, as effective and accountable political and policy leadership, discussions beyond India, including in Australia, tend to use governance to refer to phenomena that extend beyond government and do not necessarily start with it (Bevir, 2013). In the latter perspective, government and administration are seen in relation to wider webs of institutions. Government is about the institutions of state— constitutions, legislatures, executives, judiciaries, laws, elections and other formal arrangements. Governance is about rule and coordination and how they are shaped, whether in society at large, firms, non-government organizations, governments, relations between governments (as in federations), relations beyond governments (as in international affairs), management of complex systems (as in information technology), or in pursuit of desired outcomes (as in effectiveness, probity, transparency or accountability). Such topics may also be addressed in separate literatures, for example, corporate governance, global governance, IT governance and good governance. Further, questions about whether governments should provide services themselves or through outsourced or privatized entities may be analysed using approaches such as transaction cost economics (Coase, Williamson).

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In India, the convincing election of the Modi government in 2014 raised high hopes for a new direction. Even critics of the BJP, and of Mr. Modi personally, were attracted to promises of improved economic opportunities and effective governance. During the campaign, he emphasized that he would provide ‘good governance’. However, in Hindi, the term for governance (shaasan, शासन) is used also for administration and other terms that invoke direction and rule. In the promise of ‘minimum government, maximum governance’ (nyoonatam sarkar adhikatam shaasan, न्यूनतमसरकारअधिकतमशासन), firm leadership and sound administration soon overshadowed other meanings. Expectations that ‘minimum government’ would mean an early reform program, including cuts in the size of government, reform of the civil service, and privatization of public sector undertakings (PSUs) were dashed. It seemed to be more about giving direction to the civil service, smartening up civil service offices, cutting out needless bureaucracy and making PSUs more efficient. From the beginning, the Prime Minister followed the pattern he had set as Chief Minister in Gujarat (Verma, Kumar)—direction of key civil servants, personally and through carefully selected and highly skilled members of the Prime Minister’s Office; meetings with groups of senior civil servants to canvass new projects, set objectives and check on progress and demanding that civil servants turn up on time. He encouraged ministers and ministries to collaborate; set a personal example of integrity credited with cutting corruption at senior levels; continued his prolific use of social media to communicate directly with citizens and publicized government activities in high profile speeches emphasizing goals of transformation. He led from the front and set a cracking pace. But he made only one significant structural change. In a move away from central direction towards a more inclusive way of developing policy options and managing relations with state governments, he abolished the already ailing Planning Commission. It was replaced with the NITI Aayog (National Institution for Transforming India, reflecting the Hindi for policy, niiti, नीति). Much other early action, including the first two budgets, also exhibited policy and administrative caution. Approaches to economic reform were described as “fixing the plumbing” (Jain, 2017). However, in the government’s third year, 2016, patterns of caution were punctuated by dramatic initiatives. As a result, the range of meanings of governance relevant to the work of the government widened. Key initiatives included demonetization of large denomination banknotes, promotion of cashless transactions and introduction of a goods and services tax. Later initiatives included the introduction of incentives to promote foreign investment, consolidation of selected publicly owned banks, proposals for consolidation or disinvestment of other selected PSUs, changes to machinery and recruitment arrangements in the public service, wider roles and more staff for the NITI Aayog (despite the resignation of Dr. Arvind Panagariya as Vice Chairman) and streams of announcements about proposed new infrastructure. But while possible measures to redirect the public sector became more visible, canvassing of such measures in public by the government was done in a cautious manner. Even some commentators sympathetic to the government called for a bolder approach. Indeed, one well-known commentator stated: “Ideally,

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simultaneous action on all fronts is required” (Kashyap: 22). Issues of governance emerged in four arenas: operations within the national government; relations with and operations within state and local governments; engagement with foreign governments, international agencies and diplomatic and trading arrangements and relations between the government and citizens. Meanwhile critics probed gaps between frequent claims about transformation, economic development and benefits for citizens and what they perceived as actually being done. First, within the national government, questions arose about the effectiveness of personal leadership without also strengthening a sense of direction within government agencies. Could methods of communication and direction developed in a medium-sized and relatively homogeneous state be adapted for the much bigger and more complex government of a very diverse country? How far could the Prime Minister, even supported by a strong private office, give sustained direction to a civil service organized in colonial era bureaucracies, even though staffed with highly qualified officers? Could Cabinet be used more effectively to nurture institutional relationships to support government initiatives? To this end should Cabinet roles be consolidated and the size of the ministry reduced? Second, relations between levels of government assumed greater importance. State governments already exercised considerable influence on business regulation. The substantial devolution of financial resources to states following abolition of the Planning Commission added to their independence of action. The effective negotiation of introduction of a Goods and Services Tax took place without assistance from formal arrangements for intergovernmental relations. However, as the management of intergovernmental relations assumed greater importance, the one-off arrangements for the GST drew attention to an institutional gap. They also drew attention to options for filling it. Whether the role of the NITI Aayog would be the most effective option to fill the gap remained an open question. Third, the sensitivity of links between foreign policy and domestic policy became more apparent. Seeking a higher international profile and pursuit of the economic growth that would buttress such a profile intersected. On the one hand, the Prime Minister’s personal diplomacy promised to open up new opportunities for business and for the diffusion of Indian culture. On the other, it raised questions about the extent to which domestic concerns, including commitment to the values of a long-lived civilisation and demands for the indigenisation of the economy, would allow adjustments to facilitate greater international engagement, especially in trade and foreign investment. Further, as the local impacts of international engagement take many forms, such questions not only posed policy challenges for the national government but also reinforced questions about its relations with the states and local governments. Fourth, questions arose about the impacts for citizens of government initiatives and the extent to which decisions reflected assumptions about what would benefit citizens rather than feedback from citizens themselves. In particular, questions arose about whether estimates of high economic growth were reflected in the experience of people looking for jobs. Further, in communicating government policies, two-way channels seemed to be less emphasized than top-down communication.

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Policies aimed to enable people to grasp opportunities; but access to such opportunities was less clear. An example was the increased use of digital communications and transactions. Access to information through Websites and other digital channels gave people opportunities to know more about what was being done but less opportunity to provide direct feedback. Access to digital delivery speeded up transactions but came with conditions about how identity was determined and dependence on reliability of the technology on the day. It reinforced questions about whether citizens were empowered people exercising rights or subjects complying with official requirements. In combination, these questions raised questions of institutional capability. They are explored below by examining how political leadership interacts with the institutions of government and other institutions in society.

Institutional Capability Capability is the power or ability to do something. Effective governance in government is about how politics, public policy and management are brought together to do things that citizens value. This draws on Moore (1995) who investigated selected cases in the United States to show how political leaders and civil service officials worked together to understand problems, choose between alternatives and make decisions that could be implemented effectively and produce valued results. It is used hereto aid understanding of important relationships in, admittedly, very different contexts, constitutionally and culturally. The following diagram illustrates Moore’s approach. The reciprocal relationships between the three nodes in the diagram are mediated by institutions—within government and between government and the community—in which political leaders have a critical but not exclusive role. Polics

Policy

Management

Source Adapted from Moore (1995)

In government, political leaders show the way and provide authoritative backing. But to make wise choices and to get things done, they also depend on the skills and commitment of others. How they use the institutions of government is important.

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Institutions organize what participants see as issues and how they go about dealing with them. For this reason, Kapur et al. (2017: 3) have suggested that “improving the capacity of India’s public institutions is the single biggest challenge that India faces in the twenty-first century”. They nominate many needed improvements, including in policy design and formulation, implementation and coordination between agencies (2017: 6, 12). Examination of the inner workings of institutions is important to understanding how such improvements might be brought about. Examination of the different circumstances in which institutions operate is also important. As Kapur et al. point out, some institutions such as the Electoral Commission are strong and able to carry out complex tasks under pressure. But others are very busy, while lacking influence and effectiveness. Although the Prime Minister came to office with a record that suggested a preference for working around institutions rather than through them, experience in government has begun to develop an agenda of institutional reforms. Parts of such an agenda arise from the government’s own actions; others arise from reflections by external commentators on the government’s performance. An important question will be how far the Prime Minister’s leadership in the domain of politics extends to integrating relationships with the domains of policy and management. Issues include the sheer number of issues demanding time from the Prime Minister personally, the work load and influence of the Prime Minister’s Office, Cabinet’s role in policy development, improvements needed in the effectiveness of ministries and the shape and effectiveness of the government’s overall program. In a system of responsible cabinet government, the role of the Prime Minister is at the centre of government activity. The following diagram shows its location. The example is the national government in Australia, but a similar diagram could readily be drawn for India.

Community NGOs Media Business

Polics -Ministers -Ministerial Staff

Prime Minister -PMO -Chief of staff -Secretary, PMC

Policy -Cabinet/ Ministers -PMC -Senior Departmental Officers

Management -Departmental Secretaries -PMC -Departments

Source Adapted from Althaus et al. (2013)

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Although the symmetry of the diagram is rarely matched in practice, it shows three things: first, the essential leadership role of the Prime Minister; second, that discharge of the roles of the Prime Minister and Ministers is related to the domains of policy and management as well as politics; and third, that governments work within a wider community framework. How a particular Prime Minister approaches the role is determined by personal style as well as political and institutional context. However, how ministers work together and how they direct and receive advice from the civil service depends often on the leadership and example of the Prime Minister. Cabinet is a resource that can give coherence to a government program. A cabinet system that links civil service policy and management work to political authority in a non-partisan way reinforces this resource. In a federal system, such relationship building extends also to the management of intergovernmental relations. Running through all of these factors is how the Prime Minister relates to the community at large. Prime Minister Modi is known for careful selection of ministers initially and in reshuffles. Suggestions from external commentators include cutting the size of the ministry and selective merging of portfolios with consequent implications for civil service. However, his centralized approach continues to draw questions about options for widening the front on which reform and performance are driven. Two examples from Australia may be relevant. First, the Prime Minister who led Australia from a highly protected to a more open and internationally competitive economy in the 1980s was noted for a consultative style with ministers and state governments, for running an effective cabinet process and for sponsoring reform in the public service (as the civil service is known in Australia). Second, two recent Prime Ministers suffered removal during their first terms: one for over-centralisation on policy; the other for micro-management through an unpopular chief of staff. Closer to home, the incoming Vice Chairman of NITI Aayog in a recent book suggested that to assist the Prime Minister achieve his objectives additional help would be useful (Kumar). The domains of policy and management are closely linked to each other as well as to the domain of politics. Policy options evolve not only from systematic analysis but also from interaction between relevant participants, including lower level managers and officers. Relations with political leaders are often reciprocal: work on options is commissioned by political leaders; in turn, civil servants submit suggestions based on emerging issues (for a current discussion of how this is important in the making of economic policy in India see Swarajya 2017a). Such work may flow, for example, from experience in implementation of new programs or from problems driven by external sources. Policy work may be centralized or it may be diffused. Either way it suffers if it does not incorporate experience from people who have to implement new policies. For this reason, processes guiding the preparation of proposals for consideration by Cabinet tend to promote wide consultation. Reinforcing the need for consultation is an important role for political and civil service leaders.

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Three current strategic issues for policy and management in India are the public sector’s role in providing incentives for economic growth, especially job producing growth, how policies involving both the national and state governments are meshed, and how domestic arrangements equip the country to manage external relations. The approach of the Modi government to the former is to make the public sector more efficient and effective. Recent experience in countries which over enthusiastically pursued market-based approaches suggests that this may be wise. However, it still leaves open the question of what changes in the public sector might be beneficial and how they might be brought about. Current directions in the public sector suggest incremental steps. Under the previous government, the Aadhar project used the approach of an internal start-up —respecting bureaucratic hierarchy but putting together teams of existing officers based on competence (Nilekani and Shah). Recent initiatives draw on studies of HR practices internationally and include “360° feedback” to identify officers with skills for senior jobs in Delhi (Mahurkar). There is no shortage of further suggestions for consideration: for example Vaishnav and Khosla (2016), in a data-driven analysis, suggest that officers with local ties are often linked to improved service delivery and that examination of how state civil services work would be worthwhile. However, improving civil service performance, especially ability to push complex programs to implementation valued by citizens, may extend to more than systems adjustments. Entrenched cultures and work practices can get in the way of ensuring that elegant policy solutions negotiated at senior levels are understood and applied at points of service. Apparently straightforward proposals for performance improvement often turn out to be anything but simple to bring about. The on again/off again interest in lateral recruitment to the civil service, described by one commentator as, among other things, “a work around for the civil services’ structural failings” (Swarajya, 2017b), reflects not simply timidity but persistent internal barriers to lateral entry (Chalam: 20). In Australia, overcoming barriers to lateral entry took particularly firm leadership. The small size and tendency to insulation from domestic issues are also questions that arise about the diplomatic service and other institutions responsible for international relationships as is their ability to communicate the benefits of international links to sceptical domestic interests. As so many of the government’s initiatives depend on smooth vertical and horizontal relationships that link policy decisions to implementation, the case for more far-reaching change in the civil service is likely to become more pressing. With PSUs in India, the government has, as it has in the civil service, moved cautiously. “Cleaning up the business”, improving corporate governance and the accountability of executives for financial performance have taken priority over privatization. However, providing exposure to competition in regulated markets, the second step to improve performance, is a work in progress. This entails institutionalization of a national regime of business regulation, also needed to create a national market and promote foreign investment, which in turn involves negotiations with the states (Smith, 2010). Negotiations to introduce the GST have

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provided a model that might be applied to other issues involving the states. State governments have begun to talk to each other and to see the value in doing so. However, developing a national understanding of how to conduct intergovernmental relations, especially in time of intense disagreement, is yet to evolve. Use of a formal arena, such as the NITI Aayog the governing body of which includes Chief Ministers, may be helpful. However, if Australian experience is at all relevant, the personal involvement of the Prime Minister and influential Chief Ministers will be critical as will the competence in diplomacy of civil servants at both national and state levels. In addition to governing their internal relationships, governments need to manage relationships with members of the community. At present in India, this tends to mean getting services and entitlements to citizens faster and more directly. There is a heavy reliance on technology, for example, in development of a master app for access to services by mobile phones (Alawadhi). It also means providing space on websites for citizens to comment and make suggestions. Claims for more participatory engagement with citizens have yet to make an impact. However, if they do, the government will find that, once entered into, public participation and consultation prove very challenging. In these circumstances, it is relevant that experience in Australia, in the states as well as the federal government, has tended to involve rethinking the whole basis on which the public sector works—basic roles, competencies needed, selection criteria and methods, career management, contract employment, performance management, relations with citizens and much more. Problems with lateral entry, introduced as an early reform, fuelled demand for more far-reaching institutional changes. But heavy internal resistance, in government business undertakings as well as in the public service, to such reform also provided opportunities for advocates of market-based approaches that contributed to the breaking down of career services, widespread contracting out of services, extensive use of public/private partnerships and extensive privatization of not only government business enterprises but also of public service functions. The impacts of such experience have sparked continuing debate about, first, whether contemporary public services have the people, skills and systems to provide appropriate advice to ministers and to implement programs, including management of extensive contract arrangements, and, second, whether privatization, especially of public utilities, has been a mistake. Significant questions of transparency, accountability, value for money and ethical compliance persist. One way in which the federal and some state governments in Australia have tried to keep up with changes in needed skills is through regular capability reviews. The following diagram displays the wide range of functions examined, including from setting directions to ultimate delivery and from motivating and developing people to management of performance.

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Source Australian Public Service Commission: http://www.apsc.gov.au/priorities/capability-reviews

Reviews are conducted by teams of external peers and internal staff and aim to develop capability to meet emerging needs. However, input on political directions is directed by the government of the day. Departments that have participated in such reviews state that they are useful, but how useful they are in meeting strategic changes of policy direction as governments change is yet to become clear. In these circumstances, some former senior public officials are calling for a major commission of inquiry into the federal public service of a kind not seen since the 1970s when major reform initiatives began (Burgess). The discussion above suggests that for India questions of institutional capability are likely to demand increasing attention. Economic performance may be a critical driver. If economic management is not seen to provide inclusive opportunities, demands for more far-reaching changes in public policy and in the role of the public sector may emerge.

Conclusions This exploration of governance and capabilities has focused on how governments organize themselves. But it has done so with recognition that governance in government is just a part, albeit a very prominent part, of wider governance arrangements. An important part of governance in government is to organize the institutions of government so that they have the capability to discharge their responsibilities not just for the government of the day but for society at large. It has proposed also that capabilities extend beyond skills, systems and technology. Critically they are about management of relationships within government and between public institutions and citizens. How such relationships are most

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effectively nurtured is a question that may never fully be answered. However, how countries seek to answer it is intimately related to the nature of the opportunities available to their citizens.

References Alawadhi, N. (2016). Coming soon! UMANG, the master app for government services. 3 November. http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/55216912.cms?utm_source= contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst. Access August 8, 2017. Althaus, C., Davis, G., & Bridgman, P. (2013). The Australian policy handbook (5th ed.). Allen and Unwin Bevir, M. (Ed.). (2013). The sage handbook of governance. Sage. Burgess, V. (2017). Mandarins say it’s time for a new royal commission to rethink future and role of the federal public sector. The Mandarin, 26 July. http://www.themandarin.com.au/81812verona-burgess-dennis-richardson-royal-commission-job-of-the-australian-public-service/. Access August 9, 2017. Chalam, K. S. (2017). Introduction. In K. S. Chalam (Ed.), Governance in South Asia—State of the civil services. Sage. Coase, R. H. (1994). Essays on economics and economists. University of Chicago Press. Jain, S. (2017). The great architect, fixing the plumbing. Financial Express, 22 May. http://www. financialexpress.com/opinion/narendra-modi-kissinger-the-great-architect-fixing-the-plumbing/ 679188/. Access August 2, 2017. Kapur, D. et al. (Eds.) (2017) Rethinking public institutions in India. Oxford University Press, New Delhi, ppxvii+527. Kashyap, S. (2017). Glocalisation and federal governance in India. South Asia Politics, 15(11 and 12). Kumar, R. (2016). Modi and his challenges. Bloomsbury. Mahurkar, U. (2017). Modi government is laying the foundation for a new India. Swarajya, 4 August. https://swarajyamag.com/politics/-modi-government-is-laying-the-foundation-for-anew-india-uday-mahurkar. Access August 8, 2017. Moore, M. H. (1995). Creating public value. Harvard University Press. Nilekani, N., & Shah, V. (2015). Rebooting India: Realizing a billion aspirations. Allen Lane. Smith, R. F. I. (2010). Where corporate governance and public governance meet: Issues and agendas. In R. K. Mishra et al. (Ed.), Corporate governance-beyond the boundaries. Macmillan. Smith, R. F. I. (2017). Governance. South Asia; Journal of South Asian Studies, 40(2), 323–326. Swarajya. (2017a). Needed: A new generation of policy economists. 8 August. https://swarajyamag. com/ideas/needed-a-new-generation-of-policy-economists. Access August 9, 2017. Swarajya. (2017b). A step for better governance—Lateral entry in civil services, 19 July. https:// swarajyamag.com/politics/a-step-for-better-governance-lateral-entry-in-civil-services. Access August 9, 2017. Vaishnav, M., & Khosla, S. (2016). The Indian Administrative Service meets big data. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://milanvaishnav.com/2016/09/02/new-paper-on-theindian-bureaucracy/. Access August 14, 2017. Verma, S. (2014). Narendra Modi: The game changer. Daryaganj, Vitasta. Williamson, O. E. (1996). The mechanisms of governance. Oxford University Press.

Shrinking Space of Minorities in South Asia: A Comparative Study of India and Pakistan Abdulrahim P. Vijapur

Abstract The objectives of this paper are to study the plight of religiousReligious minorities Minoritiesand the rights of people belonging to them in India and Pakistan. This study examines the role of these two South Asian states to protect minority rights Minority rightsin the light of their constitutional precepts and their international human rights treaty obligations. In doing so, instances of violations of rights of minorities in both countries occurring in recent decades are critically evaluated, though some incidents of earlier decades find their mention, which establish a pattern of systematic/gross violation of their rights. The paper makes some concluding observations besides making policy recommendations to improve human rights and minority rights situations in their respective jurisdictions of governance.

Introduction Today probably, there is no country in the world, which does not have minorities of one or the other kind. In fact, according to Daniel Elezar, there are some 3000 ethnic or tribal groups in the world conscious of their respective identities and rights. Felix Ermacora states that only 9% of the states in the world today are technically homogeneous (Vijapur 2006, p. 367). South Asian states too are not homogenous and have many religious, ethnic, tribal, cultural and linguistic minority groups (see Ahmad, 1998; Aleaz et al. 2003; Das, 2010; Gorringe et al., 2016; Hussain and Ghosh 2002; Khan & Rahman, 2012; Mahan, 1991; Manchanda, 2009; Manchanda 2010). South Asia accounts for a fifth of the world’s population. The civil and political rights are severely restricted in the region, especially of the minorities. One of the critical reasons for the past and ongoing conflicts between the states and its minorities is due partly to the fact that these groups are excluded from participating in power sharing and decision-making process of their political system. Unless formal or informal arrangement of power sharing with all minorities is guaranteed besides

A. P. Vijapur (B) Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Rahman and N. Tiwari (eds.), Development, Governance and Gender in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-5109-0_7

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according them legal protection or practising tolerance towards them, peace is not possible in these multi-ethnic states.

Minority Rights in India India is a mosaic of different religious, cultural and linguistic minorities. It is a home of all major religions of the world. There are eight major religious communities: Hindus form the majority. According to 2011 census, Hindus constitute 80.5% and the rest are minorities—Muslims (13.4%), Christians (2.3%), Sikhs (1.9%), Buddhists (0.8%), Jains (0.4%) and other religions like Jews, Zoroastrians, etc. (0.6%). Its linguistic diversity is reflected in 22 major languages which are recognized in VIII Schedule of the Constitution. Besides the religious and linguistic minorities, there are different cultural, tribal and untouchable groups in the country. The Indian government has been denying that the term “ethnic minority” applies to Indian society. To ensure peaceful coexistence of divergent groups, the Indian Constitution provides a comprehensive framework to safeguard the group rights of religious, cultural and linguistic minorities against majority encroachments. However, for reasons of space, this paper deals mostly with the religious minorities. It studies the rights of minorities and their violations in a comparative perspective of international and national law (see also Vijapur, 1999: 242–267). The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion is included in Articles 25–29 of the constitution. Article 25 guarantees not only freedom of conscience, free profession and practise of religion, but also the right to propagate religion. Freedom to manage religious affairs is granted in Article 26; and freedom as to payment of taxes of promotion of any particular religion is guaranteed in Article 27. Article 28 prohibits imposition of religious beliefs on the persons attending any educational institutions receiving state aid. It further adds that no student can be required to take part in any religious instructions that may be imparted in such an institution recognized by state or to attend to any religious worship that may be conducted in such institutions without the individual’s consent or without the consent of the guardian in case the student is a minor. Articles 29 and 30 of the constitution deal with cultural and educational rights. The former guarantees any section of the citizens having a distinct language, script or culture of its own the right to conserve the same. No one can be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the state or receiving aid/funds from it on the grounds only of religion, race, caste, language, etc. The latter guarantees the minorities, both linguistic and religious, the right to establish and administer educational institutions. It further adds that the state cannot discriminate such institutions either in granting recognition or providing aid. Article 30 offers an important space to the minorities to shape their educational situation in accordance with their desires and should be encouraged as it helps the state in dealing with culture-specific factors behind their educational backwardness (Vijapur & Harris, 2017). To safeguard the interests of linguistic minorities, a special

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officer is appointed to investigate all matters relating to the constitutional rights of the minorities (Article 350B). There is one draconian article in the constitution. Article 22 (4) of the constitution provides for preventive detention (PD) up to 3 or 4 months. Merely on the basis of suspicion, any person can be detained under PD laws (like POTA, TADA, MISA, NSA, Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act and NIA Act), and such detainees need not be produced before the magistrate within 24 hours of the arrest/detention. Habeas Corpus writ under Article 32 of the constitution is not applicable to these detainees. India is one of the few countries in the world to have the provision of PD in the constitution. The laws passed under PD give arbitrary powers to the government to arrest anybody without showing any reason to the detainee or his/her counsel. However, Article 22 (4) stipulates that after three or four months, as per the law under which a person is detained, the advisory boards under PD laws will review all detentions and the boards have power to extend the period of detention. During the last 70 years, these laws are most often misused by successive national and state governments and invoked against the people of religious minorities. Besides these constitutional precepts, India is obliged to promote international human rights treaty obligations. It may be noted that on 9 April 1979, India ratified International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (article 27 of which states that people who belong to ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities have right to maintain and preserve their ethnic identity, profess, practise and propagate their religions and preserve and speak their languages) and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. On 3 December 1968, it had ratified Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. In India, collective rights form the core of human rights conception. There is a great paradox about this. On the one hand, Indian Constitution and its political system appear to be the best in the world as far as conceptualizing the grand framework of minority rights is concerned, but on the other hand Indian polity appears to be one of the worst as far as working to put in operation this constitutional paradigm. Let us elaborate this paradox. Pritam Singh of Oxford University argues that there is a Hindu–Hindi bias in the text of the constitution. Its Article 1 names the country, as Bharat, which reflects Hindutva ideology. The naming of India as Bharat reflected the power of the Hindutva-minded sections in the Constituent Assembly of India who wanted the name to reflect the ancient pre-British and pre-Muslim era of a ‘glorious’ Hindu past. Other provisions reflecting this bias are Article 25 (definition of a Hindu is expansionist/imperialist, as it construes Hindus to include the people professing the Sikhism, Jainism or Buddhist religions), Article 48 (ban on cow slaughter), Article 343 (Hindi to be the national/official language), Article 351 (development of Hindi language, promoting vocabulary of Hindi language by relying primarily on Sanskrit) (Singh, 2005). Rochna Bajpai, in her Oxford University dissertation, captures the dominant Hindu majoritarianism and nationalist mood in the Constituent Assembly Debates and points out that ‘minorities’ were referred to as “disfigurement”, “cancerous”, “poisonous”, for the body politic (Bajpai, 2002, p. 13). Sunil Khilnani notes in his

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book, The Idea of India (1997), that ‘Hindu Voices’ had become ‘emboldened’ in the Congress Party after the 1947 partition. Similarly, a demand of Muslims to guarantee in the constitution to provide primary education to their children in Mother Tongue (i.e. Urdu) was not approved in the Constituent Assembly. Muslim minority is under-represented in parliament and state assemblies. Among the various minorities the plight of Muslims is very deplorable as far as their representation in parliament/state assemblies and government jobs is concerned. According to one study (Ansari, 1998, pp. 222–223), their members in Lok Sabha were around 5% (average). For instance, in 1952, they constituted 4.4%; in 1962, 4.7%; in 1967, 5.5%; in 1977, 6.2%; 1980, 9.2% (it was the highest number so far); in 1984, 8.7%; in 1989, 5.4% and in 1996, 4.9%. In some state assemblies, there was not a single Muslim member: Madhya Pradesh (1993), Orissa (1961), Pondicherry (1977), Goa, Daman and Diu (1972 and 1974) and Nagaland (1974 and 1987). The problem of Muslim representation in civil services is far more deplorable than their representation in legislative bodies. Their share in government jobs is far less compared to other minorities like Christians and Sikhs. The Gopal Singh Panel report provides many tables on minorities’ representation in Indian Administrative Service (IAS), Indian Police Service (IPS) and other central services and state government services, etc. These tables disclose startling facts. Between 1971 and 1980, the representation of Muslims in IAS was 2.86%, which was extremely low compared to their population proportion of 11.20%. The share of Christians was 5.64% (their population proportion was 2.60%) and of Sikhs was 4.71% (their population proportion was 1.89%). In IPS, the representation of Muslims, Christians and Sikhs was 2%, 2.27% and 5.34%, respectively (Vijapur, 2003a, b, pp. 225–226). Many scholars and politicians are demanding affirmative action programmes for Muslims. The same trend of under-representation has continued till this day. Confirming this, Sachar Committee Report states that “in a pluralistic society, a reasonable representation of various communities in government sector employment is necessary to enhance participatory governance”. The report reveals that though Muslims have a share of 13.4% in the country’s population, their representation in government jobs is a mere 4.9%. In the elite civil services like the IAS (3%), IFS (1.8%) and IPS (4%), their representation is as low as 3.2% (Sachar Committee Report 2006, p. 165). There is more to it. The report reveals that under-representation is acute in states in which Muslims constitute large minorities. In West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh and Assam, where Muslims constitute 25.2%, 18.5% and 30.9% of the population, respectively, the representation of the community in government jobs is as low as 4.7%, 7.5% and 10.2%, respectively (Ibid., p. 170). The share of Muslims in all recruitments by State Public Service Commission is about 2.1%, whereas their share in the population is about 12.4% in the states that provided the committee with data. This shows a deficit of about 83% in recruitment (Ibid., p. 175). It is a great paradox that the constitutional precept of equality in public employment is not transformed into reality by successive Indian governments. The present policies and practices of the government and certain organizations which not only adopt policies of discrimination towards minorities, especially the Muslims, but also weaken the very foundations of India’s unity, secularism and legacy of coexistence,

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tolerance and accommodation of diversities (see Vijapur, 1999: 242–267, 2006). Muslim minority is a marginalized community in the political and decision-making process, as not more than 4% of them are represented in parliament and even less number in higher civil services. This step motherly treatment of Muslims by the state has its roots in the ideological statement made by M. S. Golwalkar, the prominent and articulate Sar Sanghchalak of the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS), who wrote in 1939 in a Pamphlet, We or Our Nation Defined that The non-Hindu people in Hindustan must learn to either adopt the Hindu culture and language, must learn to respect and hold in reverence Hindu religion, must entertain no idea but those of glorification of the Hindu race, and culture… may stay in the country, wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation, claiming nothing deserving no privileges not even citizens rights. In this country, Hindus alone are national, and Muslims and others, if not actually anti-national, are at least outside the body of the nation.

The writings and speeches of V. D. Savarkar and M. S. Golwalkar contributed greatly to the rise of Hindutva ideology. In the ideological framework of Hindutva and Hindu Rashtra (Nation), the people of Semitic religions—Muslims, Christians and Jews—are considered to be hostile “other”, whose loyalty to India is considered to be doubtful. They have been kept outside the purview of the Hindu Rashtra. Thus, the ideology of Hindutva is antithetical to the concepts of pluralism, secularism and the accommodation of cultural diversities. The present national government is headed by Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP), which subscribes to this fascist ideology and is a political wing of this hegemonic cultural group. During the last six years (2014–2020), the BJP-led Union Government has been quietly and consistently pursuing the agenda set by Golwalkar of making India a “Hindu nation”, in place of secular and inclusive India. The party and the government, while falsely accusing the successive Congress governments of appeasing the minorities, have started appeasing the majority community by encouraging mob lynching of Muslims and Dalits in the name of protecting the cow, starting programmes of “ghar wapsi” (reconversion of minority people to Hinduism), “love jihad” (opposing Hindu–Muslim marriages), “beef ban” (to enforce ban of cow slaughter) and rewarding the perpetrators of mob lynching. The lynching and killing of Mr. Akhlaq in September 2015 by Hindu mob led by local BJP leaders on the suspicion of killing a calf and storing beef in his refrigerator at his Dadri residence is a case in point. Two years later, one of the accused dies in police custody. A Union Minister, Mr. Mahesh Sharma, wraps his body in the tricolour and announces a compensation of Rs. 8 lakhs and a job for his wife. Noted journalist, Ziya Us Salam, writes that “it is probably the only instance in the history of independent India that a murder accused is sent on his last journey in the national flag”. Other 15 accused are soon given a job at the NTPC (a public undertaking) in Dadri. This rewarding took place after a meeting at the BJP MLA’s residence with NTPC officials (Salam, 2018, p. xxi). Salam further writes that there have been killings in the past in the name of cow, but it is for the first time that the murder accused are rehabilitated by the ruling political dispensation. India is changing and gradually moving towards the idea of a Hindu Nation (Ibid.).

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Shashi Tharoor had remarked on 12 July 2018 that if BJP repeats its win in 2019 parliamentary election, it will move towards writing a new constitution so that a Hindu Pakistan is created. Not surprisingly, it won majority in the election and its project of making India a Hindu Pakistan was finally reflected in the passage of Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019. This Act aims to provide citizenship to persecuted Hindu and other minorities (except Muslim) from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh. It must be noted that the latest report of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom criticizes India and says that religious freedoms in India deteriorated sharply during 2019 as the PM Modi allowed “campaigns of harassment and violence” against Muslims and other religious minorities to continue. The commission recommends the US government to categorize India under “country of particular concern,” (CPC) because it “tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom”. The most “startling and disturbing”, according to the report, was India’s passage of a citizenship amendment act (CAA) that fast-tracks citizenship for newcomers who belong to six religions but excludes Muslims (Boorstein and Stater, 2020). Though the Modi government has unequivocally dismissed the report, the former foreign secretary and Indian ambassador to the USA, Nirupama Rao, took a different view. She stated that the report could not be “ignored altogether”. “To be clubbed with China, and Burma, Pakistan and North Korea as a country of concern is unfortunate”, she said. Also, in her view “There is a reputational issue involved, for India, as the world’s largest democracy that draws strength from the protection of diversity” (The Hindu, 3 May 2020). If the recommendation to put India under CPC is accepted by the US government, it may lead to punitive measures against India. It may be recalled that PM Modi’s visa was cancelled by US government in 2005 for his role in Gujarat riots, and travel bans were imposed on him (from 2005-till he became PM) as India was placed under CPC. All governments, whether headed by BJP or the Congress are guilty of tolerating violations of minority rights and violence against them. On this aspect, we cannot go into greater details here. Following few representative facts are enough to corroborate this. (i)

India has witnessed the unprecedented scale of intercommunity violence, especially between Hindus and Muslims (Christians, Buddhists and Sikhs have also suffered). Since independence, several Hindu-Muslim riots have taken place, the most heinous among them being Bihar Sharif riots (1981), Meerut and Baroda (1982), Nelli in Assam (in 1983, where over 1800 Muslims were butchered according to India Today, 6 October 1997), the Bhagalpur riots in 1989 (1000 dead), Aligarh in December 1990 (120 died) and post-Babri demolition riots all over India leaving 1200 dead and 4000 injured seriously. However, one report says that in the 1980s, more than 7000 people were killed in some 4500 communal incidents, almost a fourfold increase in the toll for the 1970s (see Vijapur, 1999, 2006). Hundreds of such anti-Muslim incidents have been taking place in many parts of the country (e.g. in Bombay riots of January 1993) which reveal direct involvement of law enforcing agencies in the killings of the people of religious minorities. The

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(iii)

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frequent occurrence of such incidents prompted an Allahabad High Court Judge to remark that the police represent the most organized group of criminals in India (Amnesty International, 1993, p 76). A statement of Vibhuti Narain Rai, a senior serving IPS police officer in the Uttar Pradesh cadre, in this regard may be recalled here: “no [communal] riot can continue for more than 24 h unless the state wants it to continue” (cited in Manchanda, 2009, p. 187). On 6 December 1992, a large number of IAS probationary officers belonging to a particular community at the National Academy of Administration, Massourie, celebrated the demolition of Babri Masjid. Only one journalist, Praful Bidwai, reported this in his column in Times of India (Vijapur, 1999, p. 261). Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act (TADA) was misused. According to India’s the then Minister of State for Home Affairs, M. M. Jacob, a total of 26,915 people had been detained under TADA between 1988 and 1991. Surprisingly, the highest figures were recorded in Gujarat (9569 people) where the menace of terrorism was very low compared to Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir and Assam. According to the report of Amnesty International, TADA was disproportionately used against tribals and Muslims. In Gujarat, three quarter of those held under TADA at the end of 1989 were Muslims (Amnesty International, 1991, p. 114). Political violence against the minorities reached its peak with the consolidation of Hindutva forces (under the umbrella of BJP rule in some states), leading to the communalization of institutions of governance like the police and the administration. In Gujarat, e.g. of the 300–400 persons arrested, only three were Hindus. The provisions of TADA and Prevention of Terrorist Act (POTA) have been often misused to arrest persons belonging to minorities. A study conducted by People’s Tribunal, an NGO, in ten states in July 2004 found that 99.9% of those arrested under POTA were Muslims (cited in Manchanda, 2009, pp. 187–188). Often innocent Muslims are arrested by communally biased police under TADA or POTA whenever or wherever bomb blasts occur in India. Many times, the higher judiciary acquits the accused persons. For instance, Nisarud-Din Ahmad, who was one of accused for December 1993 bomb blasts in trains across the country, was arrested under TADA in Hyderabad. He was wrongfully framed in the case. After spending 23 years in custody, he was released when the Supreme Court found him innocent. The First People’s Tribunal on Innocent Acquitted Report of the Jury (October 2016), headed by Justice A. P. Shah, former Chief Justice of Delhi High Court, lists cases of nine innocent victims who spent their lives in jail for periods ranging between 3 and 23 years. The report (https://sabrangindia.in/sites/default/ files/jury_report_0.pdf?311) made a strong recommendation that adequate financial compensation should be given to these victims of poor functioning of criminal justice system (since in India, there is no law of compensation for wrongful custody by state). ICCPR also provides for such compensation.

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There is another problem. All cases are not impartially investigated and prosecuted. For example, the cases of all those who were accused of carrying bomb blasts in Mumbai after December 1992–January 1993 communal riots in the city were pursued and brought to logical conclusion. Those found guilty were punished with imprisonment (film star Sanjay Dutt) or given death sentence (Yakub Memon). But those found guilty by Justice Shri Krishna Commission Report for killing Muslims in Mumbai in post-Babri mosque demolition riots have not been prosecuted. This is a policy of double standard followed by the state. It destroys the principle of rule of law. Shri Krishna Report also indicts many police officers. According to the testimonies of people, majority community people involved in rioting and killings of Muslims were heard saying “Ye Andar ki Bat hai, Police Hamare Saath Hai” (it in a secret that police is on our side) (Vijapur & Haque 2006) It has been duly recorded that more than 12,500 people have been killed in intercommunity riots between 1954 and 1992 involving Hindus and Muslims. In 2002, Gujarat riots nearly 1000 Muslims were killed. The BJP Government has been continuously engaged in revising history books to project distorted view of minorities’ role in the past. Around 2,987 Sikhs were killed in Delhi following the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by her two bodyguards. There were ten enquiries. Justice Rangnath Misra Commission Report (1987), Jain-Agarwal Committee Report (1990), and Justice R. S. Narula panel report (1994), and Justice Nanavati Commission (2000) were some of the prominent ones. All of them had indicted 72 police officers, two Union Ministers and a Congress MP, but all indicted have not been punished. Though minorities constitute 19% of the population (Census 2001), budgetary allocations for schemes meant specifically for them were just above 5% of the total plan allocation in financial year, 2010–11 (Hassan & Khair, 2016, p. 180). Hate speeches against minorities by Union Ministers of Modi government and its allies have become very common. A recent civil society report on violence against minorities noted (Hassan & Khair, 2016, p. 159):

A central government Minister, Sadhvi Niranjan Jyoti describes those who do not worship Ram (the Hindu god) as ‘haramzade’ or bastards. A Shiv Sena MP force-feeds a Muslim canteen functionary during his roza fast. Another, Sanjay Raut, calls for the disenfranchisement of Muslims.

Gradually, the saffronization of governance at the centre is taking place since 2014. The government is implementing the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS) agenda of coercion and isolation of religious minority groups. There has been infiltration of RSS people in administrative structures, police and education. The incitement to violence and coercion is one facet of it. It is because of anti-Muslim, anti-Sikh riots and killings and anti-Christian violence and killings in India during the last 70 years that many scholars and nations accuse India of tolerating “slow genocide” of minorities. Thus, it is worth recalling

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here Mahatma Gandhi’s words on minority rights. He had once said that “a civilization can be judged by the way it treats its minorities” (cited in Vijapur 2006, p. 52). In the light of this statement, and our above analysis, one cannot describe India as one of the civilized nations as far as the protection of minority rights is concerned.

Minorities in Pakistan Like India, Pakistan is a multireligious, multicultural and multilingual and pluralist state. Religious minorities make up only 4% of Pakistan’s 220 million population. According to 2017 census, Muslims make up 96.2%, Hindus 1.6%, Christians 1.59%, Ahmadis 0.22% and other minorities 0.07%. For census purposes, Hindus, Christians, Ahmadis and the “Scheduled Castes” (Dalits) are regarded by government as religious minorities. Other minorities include Parsis, Zikris, Bahais and Sikhs. The 1973 Constitution of Pakistan (like the 1956, 1962 and 1969 constitutions) says that “all citizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal protection of law” (Article 25 (1) and Article 20 (a)) “Subject to law, public order and morality, every citizen shall have the right to profess, practice and propagate his religion; and (b) every religious denomination and every sect thereof shall have the right to establish, maintain and manage its religious institutions”. However, Article 20 does not protect all manifestations of religion. Only citizens of Pakistan are protected. Foreign missionaries may face restrictions in propagating their religion. The right to change one’s religion is not protected; it is considered apostasy for a Muslim to renounce Islam and so it is forbidden among Muslims (Boyle & Sheen, 1997, p. 228). Article 22 assures freedom from forced religious instructions. And although students of other religious groups are not legally required to study Islam, they generally are not offered parallel studies in their own religious beliefs and by default are required to take up Islamic studies (The Hindu, 2016). Article 25 talks about equality of citizens, while Article 26 prohibits discrimination on any ground in accessing public places. Article 1 declares that Islam is to be state religion, implying that persons other than Muslims cannot hold posts of President or Prime Minister. Article 27 guarantees non-discrimination in public service appointments. Article 36 guarantees the right to protection of religious minorities. Article 28 guarantees the protection of language and culture, and Article 33 discourages racial, sectarian and provincial prejudices. Pakistan has ratified three important human rights treaties—International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (on 23 June 2010), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights (on 17 April 2008) and Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (on 21 September 1966), which impose international obligations to promote human rights of all persons (not necessarily of citizens alone) on non-discriminatory basis within its jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the constitutional and human rights treaty obligations to protect human rights of all, including persons of minorities, the plight of minorities in Pakistan is deplorable and falls far short of fulfilling constitutional and international

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law obligations. Minorities experience everyday violence, discrimination, persecution and exclusion by the Islamic state. Abduction and forced conversions of Hindu women, accusations of blasphemy against Islam, targeted killings, frequent attacks on places of worship and growing intolerance of minorities are leading to shrinking of their space in Pakistani society. The ensuing discussion testifies this. The constitutional requirement for all laws to be consistent with Islam means that many provisions of the right to freedom of religion are neutralized. Blasphemy laws too are Muslim specific (i.e. only against Islam and are not applicable to Muslims defiling non-Muslim places of worship) and prescribe extremely strong penalties (Sections 298A, 298B and 298C of the Pakistan Penal Code). Persons are subject to death for ‘defiling Prophet Muhammad’ to life imprisonment for ‘defiling, damaging, or desecrating the Quran’ (Section 295C) and to 10 years’ imprisonment for ‘insulting another’s religious feelings’. These changes were introduced by the regime of General Zia-ul Haq in 1986. According to the annual ranking of Peoples under Threat, produced by Minority Rights Group International (MRG) since 2008, Pakistan has consistently been one of the top ten countries where the ‘large-scale violence’ is the greatest. The following incidents of violence against its religious minorities, discussed below, confirm this.

Hindus Since 1947, levels of animosity towards Hindus have correlated closely with the vicissitudes of Indo-Pakistani relations (Malik, 2002). Issues and tensions on the international level have fed into the characterization and targeting of Pakistani Hindus as foreign agents. Widespread violence perpetrated against them flared, for instance, in the form of large-scale killings, desecration of temples and the kidnapping and rape of women during the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1947–1948, 1965 and 1971. The destruction of the Babri Mosque in India in December 1992 also led to reprisals against Hindus in Pakistan (ibid.). There have been many recent reported cases of Hindu women being kidnapped and forced to convert to Islam before being coerced into marriages with Muslim men. Desecration of places of worship and burial sites has persisted as well: in October and December 2013 angry mobs in Badin district, Sindh, dug up Hindu graves and disinterred the bodies. Due to mounting threats of violence and poor economic conditions, in April 2013 approximately 500 Hindus reportedly left Pakistan in the hopes of finding safety and security in India. There had also been an alarming rise in attacks on Hindu temples in 2014. According to Life for All, an NGO, there were five attacks in March 2014 alone—the most violent month in terms of attacks on Hindus in two decades. The increase in violence has resulted in large-scale migration of the Hindus, out of Pakistan to India. According to Ramesh Kumar Wankwani, a PML-N lawmaker and head of the Pakistan Hindu Council, around 5000 Hindus migrate from Pakistan to India every year due to religious persecution (Khaliq & Aslam, 2016, p. 287).

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Most of the violence against Hindus takes the form of forcible conversions, especially of women, to Islam. Cases of Hindu girls being abducted and then being forcibly converted to Islam and married to Muslim men are common. The Secretary General of the All Pakistan Hindu Panchayat reported that approximately 1000 girls in Sindh had been victims of forced conversions to Islam. However, many incidents of forced conversions go unnoticed and are hence not reported (Khaliq & Aslam, 2016, pp. 286–287). The 2019 Religious Minorities in Pakistan report compiled by Members of the European Parliament has stated that independent NGOs estimate every year at least 1000 girls are forcibly converted to Islam, although the number may be probably more due to under-reporting (Economic Times, 14 May 2019). Kidnapping of Hindu traders too takes place with regularity, especially in Balochistan. Attacks against Hindu places of worship too are common. Reports point to the destruction and takeover of temples after Partition. A recent report commented that ‘thousands of temples have been destroyed or converted into mosques in the years since then, and there are an estimated 360 temples remaining (with a smaller number still functioning)’. In retaliatory violence against the destruction of the Babri Masjid in India in 1992, there was a spike in temple attacks in Pakistan (Khaliq & Aslam, 2016, pp. 286–287). According to The New York Times (8 December 1992), Muslims attacked more than 30 Hindu temples across Pakistan on 7 December 1992.

Christians Since 2001, violence and discrimination against Christians have increased. Seen as connected to the ‘West’ due to their faith, Christians have at times been scapegoated for the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, as well as the immense human suffering seen as a consequence of interventions in other countries with large Muslim populations (Malik, 2002: 22). Violence has not abated in recent years, with an unprecedented suicide attack on a Christian church in September 2013. In what was also the largest attack against the Christian community in the country’s history, suicide bombers massacred more than 100 people at the All Saints Church in Peshawar as the service was ending. Prior to this, over 100 Christian homes were destroyed by two large mob attacks against Christian communities in Punjab in March and April 2013 (ibid.). Other cases of violence perpetrated against Christians include land-grabbing in rural areas; abductions, forced conversion and marriage of women; and the vandalizing and torching of homes and churches. In addition, many Pakistani Christians have been convicted of blasphemy under the country’s repressive laws. On 23 September 2012, a mob of protesters in Mardan, angry at the anti-Islamic film Innocence Muslims, reportedly “set on fire the church, St Paul’s high school, a library, a computer laboratory and houses of four clergymen, including Bishop Peter Majeed.” and went on to rough up Zeeshan Chand, the pastor’s son. On 12 October 2012, Ryan Stanton, a Christian boy of 16 went into hiding after being accused of blasphemy and after his home was ransacked by a crowd. Stanton stated that he had been framed because he had rebuffed pressures to convert to Islam. (“Teenager

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is Hiding after Blasphemy Accusation, Pakistan Police Say”, The New York Times, 13 October 2012). In March 2013, Muslims attacked a Christian neighbourhood in Lahore, where more than 100 houses were burned after a Christian was alleged to have made blasphemous remarks. On 22 September 2013, 75 Christians were killed in a suicide attack at the historic All Saints Church in the old quarter of the regional capital, Peshawar (New York Times, 23 September 2013). The terrorist organizations affiliated to Islamist parties attacked on 15 March on St. John’s Catholic Church and Christ Church in Lahore which left 19 dead and 70 injured. Identical attacks against Christians took place on 26 and 27 May 2015 (Khaliq & Aslam, 2016, p. 280). On 27 March 2016, at least 70 persons were killed and over 340 wounded when a suicide bomber targeting Christians celebrating Easter attacked a playground in Lahore. The Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility for the bombing (The Express Tribune, 27 March 2016). There are other forms of violence too against Christians. According to a report of the Movement for Solidarity and Peace in Pakistan, every year around 700 Christian women were abducted, forcibly converted to Islam and then married to Muslim men. As a consequence of this violence and lack of security, thousands of Christians have migrated out of the country (Khaliq & Aslam, 2016, p. 285). It may be noted that converting a Christian wife to Islam is not mandated by Quran as it allows marriages with the “people of the book” (Jews and Christians); such wives can retain their religious faith. Many of the educational institutions which were run by Christians have been nationalized by Pakistani government. This has made them poor—both educationally and economically.

Ahmadis By a constitutional amendment in 1974, Ahmadi community was declared as nonMuslim minority by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto government, though they were treated as Muslims till 1974! Ten years later, in April 1984, President Zia-ul Haq issued Ordinance XX which inserted Sections 298-B and 298-C in the PPC which make it a criminal offence for Ahmadis to call themselves Muslims, to employ nomenclature and appellations associated with Islam, to use Muslim practices of worship and to propagate their faith. They are unable to exercise their right to vote because, in order to do so, they must declare themselves non-Muslims, which they are unwilling to do. Ahmadis live in constant fear of harassment or assault either to themselves or their homes, workplaces and places of worship. For example, in December 2012 suspected militants desecrated 120 Ahmadi gravestones in Lahore, while in March 2013 an Ahmadi family in Kasur was brutally attacked in their home by local clerics after they allegedly refused to convert to Sunni Islam. On 28 May 2010, 94 people were massacred when gunmen attacked two Ahmadi mosques in Lahore (Ahmad, 2018, p. 190).

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Shias Recent trends of assaults on the Shia community are a worrisome tendency that started developing in the mid-1980s. The site of many of these attacks was Punjab province—especially Jhang district—as well as urban areas across the country. According to available reports, between 1985 and 1989, over 300 Shias were killed in Jhang. Between 1989 and 2003, 1468 Shias were killed and 3370 injured in approximately 1813 incidents. Over time anti-Shia violence has spread to other parts of the country, especially large urban centres. According to one report, in Karachi alone 293 people died of whom 200 were Shias in different riots between 1994 and June 2002. According to a report by the Jinnah Institute, violence against Shias peaked in 2012–2015: ‘The overall number of bomb blasts and targeted attacks have reached unprecedented levels with 1304 people killed from explosions, and another 601 people falling victim to targeted killings.’. The number of people injured in bomb blasts was 950; 23 Imambarahs also came under attack in 2012–2015 (Khaliq & Aslam, 2016, p. 281). Recent incidents include an attack in August 2012 when 25 Shi’a from GilgitBaltistan were forced off a bus travelling from Rawalpindi and summarily executed on the basis of the ID cards they were carrying. In January 2013, a suicide attack followed by a car bomb in the same location killed a total of 91 people in Quetta. In the following month, another bomb attack in Quetta’s Hazara Town left 110 dead. In March 2013, two explosions outside a Shi’a mosque in Karachi killed at least 50 people. Another 30 people were killed in a further suicide attack in June outside a mosque in Hazara Town. Similar incidents have occurred consistently since, including a very high-profile suicide attack in January of 2014 on a busload of Shi’a pilgrims, which left at least 22 dead (Ahmad, 2018, p. 194).

Other Minorities Dalits are still socially and physically excluded from the mainstream, as they are compelled to live in segregated housing and are denied fundamental social, political and economic rights. As a religious minority, Dalits fall victim to double discrimination, because they suffer discrimination as non-Muslims and because of their caste status. According to MRG, the lives of religious minorities are under persistent threat in Pakistan. Discrimination and violence against them is rife; perpetrators enjoy impunity; and repressive blasphemy legislation is still in place and is applied disproportionately against minority communities. The blasphemy laws require no proof of intent nor penalty for false allegation and so are easily manipulated or abused, leaving many minority members vulnerable. In fact, they serve as a basis for institutionalized religious and caste-based discrimination, as well as violence and oppression carried out by both state and non-state actors. Many international NGOs called upon Pakistan to repeal these laws and take steps to replace them with laws

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against incitement to hatred. (see https://minorityrights.org/2012/10/23/un-reviewof-pakistan-urgent-protection-needed-for-minorities/). To recapitulate, following factors are considered mainly responsible for the ongoing violence and targeting of minorities: (a)

(b)

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(d)

Islamization process of polity, society and life, especially since 1970s and 1980s is one of the factors for violence against minorities. Ahmad Salim, writing in 2006, describes how Pakistani laws, and the way they are applied, have turned minority groups into second-class citizens. In his Reconstructing History in 2008, Salim presents the critical views of leaders or articulate members of the religious communities as well as the bottom-up experiences of ordinary people from these communities (Rahman, 2012, p. 304). Blasphemy laws are mainly applied to Christians and Ahmadis. Many persons were falsely charged of blasphemy against prophet of Islam. For example, in 2010 Asia Noreen (Asia Bibi) was convicted of blasphemy by Pakistani court and was sentenced to death by hanging. In October 2018, the Supreme Court of Pakistan acquitted her based on insufficient evidence. After the review, petition was rejected by the Supreme Court on 29 January 2019, Asia, who spent eight years on death row, was allowed to migrate to Canada, where she arrived on 8 May 2019. There have been more than 4000 cases of the charges of blasphemy, according to Kunwar Khuldune Shahid, since the law was enacted in 1986. He advocates an argument that Pakistan’s blasphemy law needs to be sentenced to death— not so-called blasphemers (Shahid, 2019). In those cases, 75 accused have been murdered before their trials by vigilante mob. Some were killed in police custody. Often those accused of “blasphemy” have been burnt alive outside police stations with no culprits identified or punished (Ispahani 2013, p. 58). Though no one has been officially hanged, as the higher courts have acquitted them on appeal finding insufficient evidence, those who advocated for revision of blasphemy laws or sympathized Asia Bibi were assassinated; this included a governor and a federal minister. As a governor of Punjab, Salman Taseer had visited Asia Bibi in prison in 2010. Taseer had appealed to President of Pakistan to pardon her. Only a few weeks later, he was assassinated by his own bodyguard. Many clerics glorified his murder in religious sermons, and his killer was welcomed with rose petals by lawyers at his first court appearance! Later when the killer was executed after he was convicted by courts, his grave became a place for pilgrims! Like Taseer, Shahbaz Bhatti, a Christian and Federal Minister for Minorities, who not only favoured revision of blasphemy laws but also wanted to act against their misuse, was assassinated on 4 March 2011. The Tehrik-e-Taliban claimed responsibility saying he was a blasphemer. Farahnaz Ispahani, a former member of Pakistan Parliament, makes a critical observation that contrary to the common perception the ostensibly secular military dictators Field Marshal Ayub Khan and General Yahya Khan carried out clearly bigoted policies promoting religious intolerance where they “characterized Hindus as “the other” and emphasized Islam as Pakistan’s raison

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d’etre”, which “legitimized the view that the religious minorities lived in the country only at the sufferance of the Muslim majority”. The most maligned military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq merely picked up from where his civil and military predecessors had left. Ispahani is on the dot to say that the Islamization of Pakistan—and the marginalization of the minorities—has thus been incremental. The net outcome of using the state as a crucible for Islamization, according to her, has been that “instead of the modern conception of inalienable human rights, the minorities’ survival and religious freedom was made dependent on various interpretations of traditional Islamic law” (Ispahani 2016). Also according to her, Pakistan government has never invoked seriously and in a disciplined way Article 33 of the constitution which says that it is the duty of the state to discourage parochial, racial, tribal, sectarian and provincial prejudices against the citizens and the minorities (Ispahani 2013). The textbooks used in Pakistani state schools are highly propagandist. They distort history, politics and social studies to create hatred for India support for aggressive nationalism and use Islam to justify the policies of the state (Rahman, 2012, p. 309). Non-Muslim children are forced to attend classes of Urdu, history, social studies or ethics which implicitly or explicitly undermine or denigrate their beliefs. A report on the education of minorities in Pakistan tells us: Islamiyat is a compulsory subject in all schools. Non-Muslim students in government-run schools in Pakistan struggle with studying Islamiyat … A small effort on the part of the education board has been the introduction of ‘Akhlaqiyyat’ or Ethics for non-Muslim students. Most state-run schools in the country do not allow non-Muslim students to opt for it. The most dangerous and alarming aspect of this particular issue is that in many cases, teachers often force these students to sit in Islamiyat classes. (Rahman, 2012, p. 310)

In view of its anti-minority and pro-Islam policies and practices, together with the pressures of radical Islamic groups, who are law to themselves, it is not wrong to concur with the view of Fuchs and Fuchs that “contrary to popular perception, Pakistan is not only a dangerous place for minorities, but indeed for a great number of its citizens” (Fuchs & Fuchs, 2020, p. 58).

Conclusions and Recommendations: A Comparative Perspective Behind poor national commitment and effort for minority protections is the play of majoritarian nationalism in both India and Pakistan, i.e. the projects of Hindutva and Islamization of the polity and society. Religious intolerance has been rising in both the countries. In fact, violence against religious minorities has become an increasingly acceptable pastime in India and Pakistan. Both the states are following neo-liberal economic policies, privileging private capital and outsourcing of services to private providers, besides heavy military spending, in place of redistributive policies and effective universal services for all citizens. These factors too are responsible

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for their poor record of promoting and protecting rights of minorities. Minorities suffer in silence, unable to challenge the systematic patterns of discrimination and disadvantage due to the lack of power—political and economic. Spaces of minorities are shrinking. There is deficit of good governance in both the states. They have failed to uphold constitutional norms of equality of all citizens. They have shown lack of political will to enforce rule of law without favouring or disadvantaging any minority group. Also, they are guilty of not complying with international human rights obligations emanating from their ratification of various human rights treaties, which is reflected in non-submission or late submission of periodic reports on compliance of treaty obligations to UN human rights monitoring bodies. To improve the situation of minorities, there is need to undertake many measures with the intension to provide them equal spaces with the people of majority communities. This will enable both the states towards making their nations plural, inclusive and democratic. In the following paragraphs, we are advancing certain policy recommendations for both the states. If serious efforts are made by Indian political system to initiate the process of implementing the following recommendations, the plight of minorities will improve and lead to greater stability, peace and development. (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)

(v)

(vi) (vii)

There is need to enact anti-discrimination legislation. An equality commission should be established. Enactment of hate crime legislation to punish those who spread the virus of hatred towards religious groups, including religions of minorities is needed. Include Muslim and Christian Dalits within the definition of Scheduled Castes for affirmative action policies, and under the purview of the SC and ST Prevention of Atrocities Act, 2005 and implement Sachar Committee recommendations. Initiate police reforms as per the 2006 directives of the Supreme Court. These are seven in number: having fixed tenure for DGPs and other key functionaries, separation of investigation and law and order functions, setting up independent police complaints authorities at the state and district levels, establishing state security commissions for policy and oversight of police functioning and to lessen undue interference, setting up police and establishment boards in the states and the national security commission at the centre for managing personnel matters professionally. Enact legislation for compensation for unlawful detention or arrest under preventive detention laws. Ratifying of First Optional Protocol to ICCPR to enable individual citizens to send complaints of human rights violations to UN Human Rights Committee.

Similarly, the Government of Pakistan should undertake to act promptly to implement the following recommendations: (i)

Repeal blasphemy laws. It must be recalled that Quran never prescribes death penalty for insulting the Prophet or leaving the faith of Islam. No death penalty is mentioned for blasphemous acts.

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Persons from Hindu or Christian minorities should not be forced to convert to Islam, as it is against the Quranic spirit of religious liberty. Quran pronounces that “there shall be no compulsion in faith”. (Quran, 2:257). “Proclaim: It is the truth from your Lord’, wherefore let him who will, believe, and let him who will disbelieve” (Quran, 18:30). The 1973 law declaring Ahmadis as non-Muslims should be repealed. Rights of religious minorities should be respected in the light of Constitution of Madina, developed by Prophet Muhammad, which granted rights to minorities to profess their religions and order their lives on the basis of their personal laws. Non-Muslim students should not be forced to study Islamiyat or Islamic Studies by their teachers in violation of Article 22 of the constitution. Pakistan should ratify the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR and First Optional Protocol to ICCPR enabling its citizens to petition UN Human Rights Committees for violations of their rights. Pakistan must take effective measures to facilitate increased employment quotas in the public sector for religious minorities, taking into consideration their share of the total population, and must fully implement the quotas. There needs to be a review and removal of textbooks and curricula that endorse discrimination against minorities. Authorities should engage in teacher training in order to increase faculty knowledge of the issues that religious minorities face and develop educational materials and syllabi to encourage learning about Pakistan’s diverse society.

IN Conclusion it can be said that if both India and Pakistan give serious thought to put the above policy recommendations into practice, they will be contributing towards improving the plight of their minorities and their integration into the national mainstream. This will, undoubtedly, put to halt the process of their shrinking spaces. They may, in due course of time, qualify to be treated as civilized nations in Mahatma Gandhi’s view.

References Ahmad, I. (1998). State, Nation and Ethnicity in Contemporary South Asia. Pinter. Ahmad, S. (2018). Pakistan: Striving for Realization or Hitting Dead-ends. In South Asia Collective, South Asia State of Minorities Report 2018: Exploring the Roots (pp. 185–234). Books for Change, Missal Foundation. Aleaz, B., Ghosh, L., & Dutta, A. K. (Eds.). (2003). Ethnicity, Nations and Minorities: The South Asian Scenario. Manak Publications. Amnesty International. (1993). Human Rights in India – The Updated Amnesty International Report. New Delhi: Vistaar publications. Amnesty International. (1991). Amnesty International Report 1991. London: Amnesty International.

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Ansari, I. (1998). Federal Nation Building: Non-regional Dimensions of Pluralism and Representation of Muslims in Elected Bodies. In A. P. Vijapur (Ed.), Dimensions of Federal Nation Building. Manak Publications. Bajpai, R. (2002). Minority Rights in the Indian Constitution Assembly Debates, 1946–1949. QEH Working Paper Series, June 2002. Available at: http://workingpapers.qeh.ox.ac.uk/RePEc/qeh/qehwps/qehwps30.pdf Boorste, M., & Stater, J. (2020). Religious freedoms in India deteriorated last year, U.S. government watchdog says, Washington Post, April 29, 2020. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/ religion/2020/04/28/india-receives-low-rating-us-government-watchdog-religious Boyle, K., & Sheen, J. (1997). Freedom of Religion and Belief—A World Report. Routledge. Das, S. K. (Ed.). (2010). Minorities in South Asia and in Europe—A new agenda. Samya. Available at: http://www.eurac.edu/en/research/autonomies/minrig/Documents/Eurasia/EURASIANet_Deliverable_No.7_Minorities_SA-Europe.pdf Fuchs, M.-M., & Fuchs, S. W. (2020). Religious Minorities in Pakistan: Identities, Citizenship and Social Belonging. South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 43(1), 52–67. https://scholar.goo gle.com/scholar_url?url=//www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00856401.2020.1695075& hl=en&sa=T&oi=ucasa&ct=ufr&ei=KdunXrjrBoOkywSWpICoCw&scisig=AAGBfm2Biz3O cAGyA1tHCkRfVVu6Q4WvKQ. Gorringe, H., Jeffery, R., & Waghmore, S. (Eds.). (2016). From the Margins to the Mainstream— Institutionalizing Minorities in South Asia. Sage Publishers. Ispahani, F. (2013). Cleansing Pakistan of Minorities. Hudson Institute, July 31, 2013. Available at: https://www.hudson.org/research/9781-cleansing-pakistan-of-minorities. Ispahani, F. (2016). Purifying the Land of the Pure—A History of Pakistan’s Religious Minorities. Harper Collins. Hassan, S., & Khair, N. (2016). India: Is the idea Unraveling? In The South Asia Collective, South Asia State of Minorities Report 2016—Mapping the Terrain. Books for Change (pp. 155–228). Available at: http://www.misaal.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/e-Book_South-Asia-State-ofMinorities-Report-2016.pdf Hussain, M., & Ghosh, L. (Eds.). (2002). Religious Minorities in South Asia: Selected Essays on Post-colonial Situations. Manak Publications. Khaliq, B., & Aslam, K. (2016). Pakistan: Need to Go Back to Founding Principles. In The South Asia Collective, South Asia State of Minorities Report 2016—Mapping the Terrain. Books for Change (pp. 271–322). Available at: http://www.misaal.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/eBook_South-Asia-State-of-Minorities-Report-2016.pdf. Khan, B. U., & Rahman, M. M. (2012). Protection of Minorities—Regimes, Norms and Issues in South Asia. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Mahan, R. (1991). Minority Dilemmas in South Asia—Review Article. Indian Journal of Asian Studies, 4(1–2), 67–84. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/44898308. Malik, I. H. (2002). Religious Minorities in Pakistan. MRG International. Manchanda, R. (2009). The No Nonsense Guide to Minority Rights in South Asia. Sage. Manchanda, R. (Ed.). (2010). States in Conflict with Their Minorities: Challenges to Minority Rights in South Asia. Sage. Rahman, T. (2012). Pakistan’s Policies and Practices towards the Religious Minorities. South Asian History and Culture, 3(2), 302–315. Salam, Z. U. (2018). Of Saffron Flags and Skullcaps—Hindutva, Muslim Identity and the Idea of India. Sage. Shahid, K. K. (2019). Pakistan’s blasphemy law needs to be sentenced to death—Not so-called ‘blasphemers’. The Diplomat, December 24, 2019. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2019/ 12/after-the-junaid-hafeez-verdict-time-to-face-the-truth-about-pakistans-blasphemy-law/. Singh, P. (2005). Hindu bias in India’s ‘Secular’ Constitution: Probing flaws in the instruments of governance. Third World Quarterly, 26(6), 909–926. The Prime Minister’s High Level Committee (Sachar Committee). (2006). Social, Economic and Educational Status of Muslim Communities in India. Government of India.

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Vijapur, A. P. (1999). Minorities and Human Rights: A Comparative Perspective of International and Domestic Law. In D. L. Sheth & G. Mahajan (Eds.), Minority Identities and the Nation-State. Oxford University Press. Vijapur, A. P. (2003a). Domestic Application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—With Special Reference to Rights of Minorities in India. In K. P. Saksena (Ed.), Human Rights and the Constitution—Vision and Reality. Gyan Publishing House. Vijapur, A. P. (2006). International Protection of Minority Rights. International Studies, 43(4) (2006). Available at: http://isq.sagepub.com/content/43/4/367.full.pdf+html Vijapur, A. P. (2003b). Withering Minority Rights in India?—Domestic Implementation of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Social Action, 53(4). https://www.aca demia.edu/6711620/Withering_Minority_Rights_in_India_-Domestic_Implementation_of_Int ernational_Covenant_on_Civil_and_Political_Rights Vijapur, A. P., & Haque, M. M. (2006). Endangered Minorities in India: Understanding the Role of Police. In A. A. Engineer & A. S. Narang (Eds.), Minorities and the Police in India. Manohar. Vijapur, A. P., & Harris, J.: Rights of Minorities to Establish and Administer Educational institutions in India: Some Constitutional Reflections. Indian Journal of Politics, 51(1–2), 1–23 (2017). Available at: https://www.academia.edu/38169888/_Rights_of_Minorities_to_Establish_Educat ional_Institutions_in_India_Some_Constitutional_Reflections_-freedom/

Corporate Governance in South Asian Countries: An Overview Qazi Mohammed Usman

Introduction Good governance is the lifeblood of any effective organization and is considered as the bench mark of any organization. The concept of corporate governance jurisprudence has established over a period of time. The corporate governance is a corporate transaction between the management, shareholder and the stakeholder.1 The corporate governance is aimed to emphasize on the accountability, integrity and the risk management. The emphasis is not only on the working of corporate in a smooth manner but also ensure the principles of corporate governance in day-to-day affairs of the corporation. Now, corporate governance is a norm among all the corporations and has achieved the foundation of any credible organization. Corporate governance is the amalgamation of the various principle established by national and international organizations. Basically, it involves a transaction between the management of company, board, shareholders and other stakeholders. It provides the structural set of things which provides a framework and monitoring mechanism for the effective implementation of the principles of corporate governance. Corporate governance provides the structural framework through which the corporation set down their objectives, targets and the means to achieve the targets within the stipulated time. The corporate governance models not only ensure the transparency and accountability in the working of corporation but ensure that the companies adhere to the fair business deals and the principles settled out for the same. The various corporate affairs miss management cases including Satyam and Bhopal gas case have pushed towards best to better incorporation of principles of corporate governance. These cases not only expose the working of corporations but also exposed their miss-governance and gaps in its affairs. Now, with these scams, corporates started focusing on efficient, transparent and flawless corporate governance in Q. M. Usman (B) Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Rahman and N. Tiwari (eds.), Development, Governance and Gender in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-5109-0_8

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their companies for better future. These scams not only exposed the ill affairs of the corporations but also exposed its legislative and administrative gaps in its affairs. The corporate governance principles enhance not only accountability but stability, fairness in the affairs of corporation. Good corporate governance is utmost crucial for the developing countries to achieve economic goals. The corporate governance enhances the working culture and its reputation in the eyes of public to increase and ensure the attractiveness of its customers, investors, suppliers and for those who are associated with the working of company either directly or indirectly. In the era of globalization, the effective governance of any corporation is the life blood of any organization to sustain and present its name in global markets. It is now considered as a fundamental and basic criteria in international trading, international business for any organization. The corporations require best corporate governance for many reasons; few among them are quoted as below. 1.

2.

3. 4. 5.

Corporate governance ensures the transparency, accountability, discipline and rule of law in the affairs of corporations which led to better reach and adherence to the best accepted principle. Corporate governance ensures the credibility of the operations of the corporations and enhances its image in the global markets which affect its trade capacities in the global markets. It ensures the credibility in the operations of the corporations and ensure that the best practices of fair deal shall be adopted in the operations of the corporation. The corporate governance principles maintain the better relationship between the shareholder, stakeholder and the management. The principles of corporate governance are a tripartite triangle between the shareholders, management and the stakeholders and ensure that the governance shall be conducted in a transparent manner.

Apart from the above, these points are inclusive in nature and are subject to constant change. The corporate governance models are constantly changing and have been affected by the frequent global and local changes.

Corporate Governance in South Asian Countries South Asia is an important part in globe and has occupies around 24% of the global population. This part consists of eight countries including India, Afghanistan, Maldives, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Pakistan and the Sri Lanka. The peace in South Asia is essential for the globe as the emerging economies are from the region. However, the region is not free from poverty, malnutrition, hunger, illiteracy, corruption and many more. The CSR is an important and handy tool through which the common evils in the part of globe can be removed either jointly or single. The South Asian countries must and should develop the common minimum targets for the safe and

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secure of region. The brief sketch of the CSR practice in the countries of South Asia can be summarized in the below stated paragraphs.

Corporate Governance in India The legislative background of Companies Act was mainly controlled and administered by the British Companies Act. For the first time during British era, the Companies Act was introduced in 1866 which was duplicate copy of British Act. The act was drafted on the lines of British Act. However, the same act was amended number of times keeping in view the circumstances of the time. However, the legislative intent of the pre-independence Companies Act was mainly inclined towards the companies. It was amended which was reflection of British amendments. However, after post-independence era the Indian government has setup the Tariff Commission and the Bureau of Industrial Costs and Prices, the Companies Act, 1956 came into existence.2 During 1970s to 1980s, India has witnessed the rise of banking institutions which were developed at a greater speed; as a result thereof, several laws and regulation framed to regulate these institutions keeping in view their credibility and security of these institutions. During the period of 1990s, globalization, privatization and liberalization (LPG) was occurred as one of the important developments took place in the field of corporate governance and investor protection by establishment of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) in 1992.3 The institution was developed to provide a smooth functioning and to facilitate the working of corporate sectors in India”. The Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), in year 1998, has adopted the fundamental code for corporate governance which provides laws, polices and regulations for the companies for the better relationship between themselves. It has constantly emphasis on the adoption of principles which enhances greater transparency, credibility in the affairs of listed companies.4

Statutory Provisions to Corporate Governance Companies Act, 2013 The statutory provisions with respect to the corporate governance was mainly governed by the Companies Act of 2013; however before 2013 Act, it was governed by the 1956 Companies Act and the Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement of the SEBI. But in the new Companies Act of 2013, various new provisions were introduced which brings a radical change in the affairs of corporate sector. This Companies Act deals with 470 sections spread over 29 chapters and 7 schedules, which replaced the old Act of 1956 which was short and 6 decades older. The basic objective of

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the act is to promote self-regulation and introduces novel concepts including oneperson company, mandatory CSR. Small company and dormant company5 and to promote fairness and introduced many principles of governance in the affairs of corporate sector. It also promotes investor protection and transparency by introducing concepts of insider trading, class action suits, creation of a National Financial Reporting Authority and establishment of Serious Fraud Investigation Office for investigation of serious fraud. These new changes were aimed to change the affairs of the company in its working and introduce the transparency in its operation. New definition: The Companies Act, 2013 deals with new definitions and also existing definition in broader sense on accounting standards, auditing standards, financial statement, independent director, interested director, key managerial personnel, voting right, etc.6 Prohibition on issue of shares at discount: Under the Act of 2013, the companies cannot issue shares at discount except sweat equity shares subject to fulfilment of certain conditions as given under section 54 of the act.7 Prohibition on acceptance of deposits from public: The current act totally prohibits the acceptance of deposits from public.8

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) The concept of corporate social responsibility was duly acknowledged by the Companies Act of 2013 under its section 135. The act provides three threshold of 500 crore net worth or 1000 crore turnover or the net profit of 5 crore or more. Any of the corporation qualifying any of the threshold has to participate in CSR where they are required to spend at least 2% of their annual profit on any of the activity provided under schedule VII of the act.9 The activities as provided under the schedule VII of Companies Act of 2013 mainly revolve around the basic necessities of the life which are fundamental in the existence of life. Companies which qualify for CSR have to constitute the CSR committee of three directors out of which one shall be independent director.10 The company has to adopt the CSR policy as per the CSR rules of 2014. Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO): This act under section 212 has given more power to SFIO to investigate frauds in corporate sectors. It has the power to arrest in respect of certain offences and act by penalty for frauds. Maximum number of directors: Section 166 of the Act of 2013 provides that a company may have a maximum 15 directors on the board.11 However, on the requirement of more directors, the company need special resolution and requires shareholders’ approval. Directorship and women director: Under the new act, the maximum number of directorships of a director is 20 out of which 10 can be public companies.12 Under

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the new act, at least one women director is compulsory in Board of directors of some class or classes of companies.13 Independent Director (IDs): The new act states that all listed companies must have at least one-third of the board as independent directors and the term of the IDs is five consecutive years. Special Courts: Under the Act of 2013, the concept of Special Courts to deals with speedy results for offences has been introduced in new act.14

Institutional Framework of Corporate Governance The SEBI was enacted in 1988 by Government of India and given statutory status under SEBI Act of 1992. The act provides its powers, functions, role, and responsibilities and creates different authorities for its effective functioning. Indian government on August 25, 2014 notified the Securities Laws (Amendment) Act, 2014 (SLAA, 2014).The SEBI is managed by its members and authorities created under the act and is situated at Mumbai. The main objective of the SEBI is to protect the investors in securities and regulate the matters incidental thereto. There is appeal mechanism in order to provide accountability where an appeal can be made before Securities Appellate Tribunal, which is a three-member tribunal.15

New Powers of SEBI The Securities Laws (Amendment) Act, 2014 empowers the Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI) to clamp down on illicit money-pooling schemes, arrest of defaulters, to access call data records and other frauds. It would also facilitate setting up of a special SEBI court to fast-track the investigation and prosecution process. It also grants approval for search and seizure operations in suspected cases of frauds.

SEBI on Corporate Governance Norms The new amendment act of Companies Act, 2013 has introduced Clause 35B and Clause 49 of listing agreement, which provides for the independent directors, party transactions, disclosures and many more which are considered as a step towards more effective corporate affairs. Clause 49(ii) (A) (I) provides for the appointment of women director w.e.f. April 1, 2015.16

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Whistle Blower Policy Revised Clause 49 of the listing agreement has adopted the whistle blower policy and its requirements. The clause mandates the companies to establish an effective mechanism for the directors and its subordinates to report about the unethical behaviour, suspected fraud or actual fraud and the violation of the companies established code of conduct or any act which is against the ethical policy of companies. The whistle blower policy should ensure that the company respect its policy of code of conduct in its working and affairs. The whistle blower policy shall and must provide adequate safeguards for the persons who report any unethical behaviour of corporations against their victimization in any case. The companies are duty bound to disclose such policies, safeguards in their website for public access.17 The whistle blower policy is aimed to protect the interest of corporation, public and its shareholders.

Functioning of Regulatory Bodies The 1956 Companies Act was replaced by 2013 Companies Act. The revised act has incorporated number of changes and has repealed many outdated provisions. The act has introduced number of changes and principles which are fundamentals of corporate governance including corporate social responsibility, one-person company, and fairness in the working of affairs of company. These changes were designed to incorporate accountability, fairness, transparency and many more. The act was designed to have a more effective eye on the working of company and to have a better result. The act has established various authorities few among them are explained as below. (A)

National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT)

The national company law tribunal and national company law appellate tribunal was constituted under the Companies Act of 2013 and replaced the earlier company law board. The replacement of company law board was a long pending demand of various groups for the smooth administration of provisions of company law. The national company law tribunal and national company law appellate tribunal shall consist of both judicial members and technical members so that a balance is maintained in their judgments.18 However, the president is the head of the Tribunal, while the chairman is the head of appellate tribunal. Both these tribunals were aimed to facilitate the working of Companies Act and to facilitate the working of corporation and corporate sector in India. Possible Impact of NCLT and NCLAT The growth and development of corporate sector poses some unique questions to the already existing system one such question was with respect to dispute settlement

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mechanism. To cater on the development, the Companies Act of 2013 was enacted which provided the establishment of NCLT and NCLAT for effective settlement of disputes. The objective was to handle the disputes in a more effective and speedy manner and avoid the multiplicity of pending litigation in various courts throughout India. The objective was to facilitate the effective and efficient dispute redressal mechanism of the matters pertaining to the company law. (B)

National Financial Reporting Authority (NFRA)

This new regulatory authority is known as National Financial Reporting Authority (NFRA),19 and the body is quasi-judicial body in nature and is introduced under the revised 2013 Companies Act, which replaced the National Advisory Committee on Accounting Standards (NACAS). The authority was established to advice, enforce and monitor the compliance of accounting and auditing standards of national and international standard as well as to act as a regulatory body for the accountancy profession and ensure that the established principles are duly compiled with. The authority suggests the administration of the best auditing and financial governance for smooth administration of financial norms of company. Possible Impacts on Corporate Governance The national body is supposed to regulate financial and non-financial matters and suggest the necessary measures to strengthen of these issues to the government. The institution is supposed to recommend the measures for formulating the measures and lays strengthen measures on financial, auditing standard and other affairs of the company. The body is also mandated to check and enforce the best polices of auditing and accounting standards in a best possible manner. (C)

Investor and Education Protection Fund

The Companies Act, 2013 provided for the establishment of the Investor Education and Protection Fund (IEPF) Authority20 to educate and protect interest of investors from undue advantages and frauds. Possible Impacts on Corporate Governance The Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Government of India, has provided rules for the investor education and protection fund for companies to file e-form 5INV containing the information of the unclaimed and unpaid amount. Therefore, through this new rules, shareholders and debenture holders shall be liable to have information about their unclaimed amount along with the interest if any every financial year from the website of company. This process will lead to bring clarity and transparency in the accounting affairs of the company. (D)

Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO)

This multidisciplinary organization consist of amalgamation of various fields expert including auditing, accountancy, business administration, capital market, taxation,

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law, information technology, investigation and other related field. The SFIO receives the cases from department of company affairs in case of fraud and the same conduct its own investigation and necessary action. The SFIO has received statutory status and has been governed by its own statute. Possible Impacts on Corporate Governance: According to the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, during the last three years, sixty four cases were referred to SFIO, out of which the SFIO has completed 55 cases. Now, Ministry of Corporate Affairs had developed a new model known as the “fraud prediction model” in SFIO for generating early warning signals for prediction of fraud and malfeasance in the corporate sector. It is aimed to provide the speedy disposal of the cases. The ministry also set up a high-powered steering committee with technical experts in various fields to design and assist in developing a comprehensive framework for a fraud prediction model. The director of the SFIO has got the power to arrest a person if he has reason to believe that such persons are guilty of certain offences as provided, including fraud. The investigator of the SFIO has same powers as vested to a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure with respect to the discovery and production of books of accounts and other documents, summoning of accused and enforcing of attendance of persons. Some of the major cases as investigated by SFIO are Satyam case, Reebok and now Saradha Group scam, where SFIO proved its efficiency by bringing some unknown facts in open. The investigation has exposed the nexus of rulers and the corporate as well. The SFIO has to upgrade its modules on constant manner in order to cope itself from the growing challenges and issues faced by the authorities. (E)

SEBI Special Court to Fast-Track

The new Securities Law Amendment Act, 2014 has proposed to set up a designated court to hear SEBI cases on speedy manner without following the rigid technicalities or delayed techniques of law, which will have the power of search and seizure, to crack down on fraudsters in the wake of several cases of illicit money-pooling activities, including by Ponzi operators, across the country.21 The court will have all the powers of arrest, seizure, call of witness for record and other as are necessary for dispensation of justice.

Corporate Governance in Bangladesh22 Bangladesh was five decades older country and was created as separate nation from Pakistan. The corporate governance in the Bangladesh is governed by various statutes and administrative guidelines. Although the state has failed to attract the multinational corporations from the other countries. During recent times, the Bangladesh economy has shown significant results and constant growth. The Companies Act of 1994 is the primary legislation which governs the mechanism pertaining to domestic

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entities. The Act provides the statutory framework for the creation or development of company its dissolution, governing board, audit, functions of directors, discoursers, dispute mechanism and other associated things. The other legislations pertaining to companies are as below. • • • • • •

Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 Bangladesh Bank Order, 1972 Bank Companies Act, 1991 Financial Institutions Act, 1993 Securities and Exchange Commission Act, 1993 Bankruptcy Act, 1997.

The Act of 1994 provides the legislative Skelton for the legislative position of companies. It also provides the rights of shareholders including minority and majority rights shareholders. Shareholders do not get involved in day-to-day affairs of the company. However, the Act of 1994 provides certain supervisory functions for shareholders including attending of the meetings, directors and their appointment and removal, to obtain the financial information and balance sheet from the office bearers of the corporation. The Act has provided certain safeguards for the enforcement of these rights. The dispute redressal mechanism in the Bangladesh with respect to companies law is separate. In the highest court of Bangladesh, there exist company law benches which deal with the disputes pertaining to company law and at lower level money courts hears the financial matters of parties. The same is aimed to provide the speedy disposal of cases and to facilitate the dispute resolution process in more effective and speedy manner.

Corporate Governance in Pakistan23 The Pakistan although faces some hard challenges in economic sector and its corporate sector had faced a crush due to instability and security issues in the state. The economy of Pakistan is currently supported by foreign debts and loan from international monetary fund. The Pakistan is currently in grey list which pushes its economy from dark to darkest. With respect to corporate governance, Regime Pakistan has a multifaceted corporate governance regime. Laws fall into one of the following six categories: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

General corporate law. Rules and regulations made under corporate laws. Stock exchanges’ listing regulations and by-laws. Civil laws, including those that provide remedies for seeking declarations, enforcement of a claim and recovery. Criminal laws for breaches of trust, fraud, etc.

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Special prosecution under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 for corporate fraud and misappropriation.

The Pakistan constitution provides that all the legislative skeletons has to be in line with the Islamic principles. Accordingly, the Companies Act has to be in line with the Islamic principles. Impartiality is the basic norm of all legislative mechanism. The national accountability ordinance which was introduced in 1999 to eradicate the corruption and malpractice in the affairs of governance. Section 9 of the ordinance clearly prohibits corruption in the public offices and the apex court of Pakistan has held the public company with the definition of public office.

Corporate Governance in Sri Lanka24 In Srilanka, the concept of corporate governance has evolved at a very low speed and has changed its dimensions over the period of time. The Srilankan authorities constantly try to invite the corporates around the globe for their investment and try to create an environment which is feasible for the advancement of corporate atmosphere in the country. The international principles which were evolved over a period of time remains phenomenal in developing the corporate governance in the state. In Srilanka, the focus on corporate governance was led by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Srilanka who developed the Code of Best Practice on Corporate Governance in 1997. The principles of corporate governance evolved in Srilanka believes in the fact that corporations must not only remain confined to earning of profit but must give its due share to people, planet and environment which in corporate governance is termed as triple bottom line theory. The principles provide that the corporation must not only protect its own interest but shall protect the interest of shareholders, society, community, employees, environment and other sectors associated with it.

Corporate Governance in Nepal25 For the last few years, the corporate governance has been a matter of growing academic interest in the policy studies. Given the infant stage of securities market development and gradual transformation of the external sources of corporate finance from bank to market, Nepal is passing through a transitional phase of institutional and governance reform. The high concentration of corporate ownership structure and dominance of family business groups in corporate affairs have become major constraints in exercising good corporate governance. Nevertheless, a number of governance reforms are underway, and some positive symptoms have been observed in the banks and financial institutions. To ensure a good corporate governance in Nepal, it requires a joint effort of the investors who need to be more transparent,

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responsible and socially accountable; the shareholders who must actively participate in their corporate affairs to help prevent any fraudulent and insider practices and; the regulatory authority that should effectively enforce rules and regulations in order to protect the rights of all stakeholders and create favourable environment to enhance good corporate governance culture.

Conclusion From the above study, it is clear that really, the governments of the South Asian countries have taken all the best initiatives by amending different provisions to provide good corporate laws to regulate corporates in almost all the South Asian countries. In India, the new Companies Act, 2013 introduced many significant changes in the provisions related to governance, e-management, compliance and enforcement, disclosure norms, auditors and mergers and acquisitions. Also, new concepts such as one-person company, small companies, dormant company, class action suits, registered values and corporate social responsibility have been included. In addition to that, the major initiatives have been taken to setting up SEBI courts and SFIO, and the establishment of other regulatory bodies to monitor governance and stop corporate frauds. Now, it is the time to wait and watch the positive and negative aspects of these new laws and guidelines on corporate governance. In Bangladesh, the share capital market is very weak and not a preferred source of funds for corporations. The debt market is non-existent and insurance market is not a major force in the financial sector. In Pakistan, business ethics believes that the best way to safeguard the corporate governance and thereby to promote the interests of all corporate stakeholders is to ensure that business is conducted in accordance with the highest prevailing ethical standards. A survey of CG practices in Sri Lanka has revealed that companies do not actually do what they say in relation to corporate governance. Nepal is passing through a transitional phase of institutional and governance reform. The high concentration of corporate ownership structure and dominance of family business groups in corporate affairs have become major constraints in exercising good corporate governance. The principles of corporate governance are constantly evolving and has introduced new principles ranging from fair business dealing to impart impartiality in its operation, from sharing employer to employees, from shareholder to environment. Thus, the principles of corporate governance have left no stone unturned to protect the people, planet and the environment. In short, it can be safely concluded that corporate governance is considered as part of business strategy to enhance its operation, stability, competitiveness and opertalization. These principles ensure better reach and act as bridge between the stakeholders and the shareholders. The corporate governance ensure the better public perception with respect to affairs of company. The scholar is of firm belief that like Internet, which is prerequisite now in globalized

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market similarly is the effective corporate governance principles for company to survive. Notes 1.

2. 3.

4.

5.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

Stijn Claessens and Burcin Yurtoglu, ‘Corporate Governance and Development—An Update’, (Global Corporate Governance Forum, 2012, Focus 10). Available at http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/518e9e804a70d9e d942ad6e6e3180238/Focus10_CG%26.Development.pdf?MOD=AJPERES, accessed on April 6, 2021. Sharma J. P. Governance, Ethics and Social responsibility of Business, Ane Books Pvt. Ltd. 2014, New Delhi, India. For a detailed history of developments in Indian corporate governance, see Afra Afsharipour, ‘Corporate Governance Convergence: Lessons from the Indian Experience’, (2009), Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 335; Rajesh Chakrabarti, Corporate Governance in India—Evolution and Challenges (2005), unnumbered working paper no 2005–20. Available at http:// ssrn.com/abstract=649857. Accessed on November 9, 2020. Confederation of Indian Industry, (March 1998) Desirable corporate governance: A Code (Based on recommendations of the national task force on corporate governance, chaired by Shri Rahul Bajaj). Geetika Vijay (2014), “Corporate Governance under the Companies Act 2013: A More Responsive System of Governance”, Volume: 4 | Issue: 4 | Apr 2014 | ISSN-2249-555X. See section 2(60) of the Companies Act, 2013. See section 53 of the Companies Act, 2013. See section 73 of the Companies Act, 2013. See section 135 of the Companies Act, 2013. See section 149(6) of the Companies Act, 2013. See section 149(1) (b) of the Companies Act, 2013. See section 165(1) of the Companies Act, 2013. See Proviso to section 149(1) of the Companies Act, 2013. See section 435 of the Companies Act, 2013. Available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Securities_and_Exchange_Board_ of_India#cite_note-6 accessed on November 18, 2020. Available at http://www.ingovern.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Govern ance-Watch-October-2020.pdf accessed on November 18, 2020. Available at http://gtw3.grantthornton.in/assets/Strengthening_Corporate_ Governance-Revised_Clause_49.pdf accessed on November 19, 2020. See sections 408 and 410 of the Companies Act, 2013. See sections 132 of the Companies Act, 2013. See sections 125 of the Companies Act, 2013. Available at http://freepressjournal.in/special-court-to-hear-sebi-matters-lik ely-soon/ accessed on 18th November 2020.

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http://bei-bd.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/whc4f4bb192762221.pdf. (A Comparative Analysis of Corporate Governance in South Asia: Charting a roadmap for Bangladesh, edited by Farooq Subhan and Wendy Werner). http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan048461. pdf. (Corporate Governance in Pakistan: Analysis of current challenges and recommendations for future reforms by Ali Adnan Ibrahim, pp. 323–332). http://bei-bd.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/whc4f4bb192762221.pdf. (A Comparative Analysis of Corporate Governance in South Asia: Charting a roadmap for Bangladesh, edited by Farooq Subhan and Wendy Werner, pp. 265–304). http://www.nepjol.info/index.php/sedp/article/view/1182. (Corporate Governance in Nepal By Dilli Ram Pokhrel in Socio-Economic Development Panorama, Nepal).

References Chakrabarti, R., Corporate governance in India—Evolution and challenges. http://unpan1.un.org/ intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN023826.pdf Confederation of Indian Industry, Desirable Corporate Governance: A Code (1998). CII sets up task force on corporate governance. Business Standard, January 12, 2009. Ibrahim A. A., Corporate governance in Pakistan: Analysis of current challenges and recommendations for future reforms (pp. 323–332). Institute of Company Secretaries of India (2009, December) ICSI recommendations to strengthen corporate governance framework. Available at www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/latestnews/ICSI_Reco mmendations_Book_8dec2009.pdf Kuchhal, M. C. (2013). Corporate laws. Shree Mahavir Book Depot. Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Government of India. (2009, December). Corporate governance voluntary guidelines 2009. Available athttp://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/latestnews/CG_Volunt ary_Guidelines_2009_24dec2009.pdf. Narayana Murthy, N. R., Report of the SEBI committee on corporate governance (p. 5). http://www. sebi.gov.in/commreport/corpgov.pdf NASSCOM announces formation of corporate governance and ethics committee. Business Standard, February 11, 2009. National Foundation for Corporate Governance. (2004, September). Corporate governance in India: Theory and Practice. Pokhrel, D. R., Corporate governance in Nepal. In Socio-economic development panorama, Nepal. Sharma, J. P. (2012). An easy approach to corporate laws. Ane Books Pvt. Ltd. Sharma, J. P. (2014). Governance, ethics and social responsibility of business. Ane Books Pvt. Ltd. Subhan, F. & Wendy W., A comparative analysis of corporate governance in South Asia: Charting a roadmap for Bangladesh (pp. 265–304).

Good Governance and Human Rights: A South Asian Perspective B. L. Meena

Introduction In South Asia, there are eight countries, namely Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, and the region was known for conflict and widespread extreme poverty. In the 1950s, when most South Asian countries gained their independence from the colonial actors, the political leadership in the region was motivated by the idealism of balanced growth, labour-intensive industries and low technology and self-sufficiency. South Asia adopted import substitution growth strategies with large trade protection, curbed the growth of private firms and introduced restrictive labour laws to protect workers. The outcome of these policies turned out to be very different from what the leadership had in its mind. South Asia delivered sluggish growth, continued dependence on low-productivity agriculture, low levels of industrialization, weak export performance and inadequate creation of good jobs. Much of the labour force was engaged in low-income activities in agriculture and informal services, and around 45% of the population lived below the poverty line. It was growing at a feeble growth rate of 3.7% per annum popularly known as the ‘Hindu rate’ of growth in India between 1960 and 1980. Destiny changed in the 1980s. South Asia adopted pro-growth policies. It opened up markets, replaced the public sector with the private sector as the engine of growth, increased competition and improved economic management. South Asia averaged an annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of around 5.7% during 1980–2000, which further accelerates to 6.5% during 2000–2007. It is now the second fastest-growing region in the world after East Asia. Growth rates in South Asia and East Asia appear to be converging. In 2007, India experienced a GDP growth of 9%, close to that of China. Other South Asian countries like Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka experienced a growth rate of 6.5%. Private investment has increased and supported by B. L. Meena (B) Sri Aurobindo College, University of Delhi, New Delhi, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Rahman and N. Tiwari (eds.), Development, Governance and Gender in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-5109-0_9

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rising national saving rates in South Asia. There are two things, asset demography and geography that have not yet been fully utilized. More workers will join the labour force over the coming years. Though the small size of the manufacturing sector has prevented the region from converting demographic dividend into a window of opportunity, the large and potentially competitive labour force could be the catalyst that could attract regional and global production centres to be located in South Asia as firms move in response to wage differences and globalization benefits low-income countries. South Asia’s geography also has the potential to accelerate growth. It has the highest population density in the world and the second-largest proportion of the population living in the border areas after Europe. High population density and better access to markets can benefit growth by allowing the South Asian perspective to take advantage of agglomeration economies. However, poor connectivity of infrastructure, low mobility and conflict has prevented the region from taking advantage of its geography and spatial characteristics. The new model of governance is allegedly based on neoliberal assumptions such as free market, minimal state and individual choice and has led to the emergence of the so-called new public management dominated by business principles. In the present scenario, with such a global trend, in developing countries, the state-entered model of development administration has gradually been replaced with this marketdriven model of governance borrowed largely from advanced capitalist nations. The type of this state–citizen relationship is a critical factor in shaping the role of public governance. It is crucial to evolution the citizenship question in the new context of governance mentioned above. It is relevant because the public sector is being used privatized and deregulated in favour of market forces and individual choices. The entitlement of citizens to social justice and basic needs has come under challenge. In addition, as the citizens are redefined as utilitarian consumers or clients, their capacity to exercise collective power has allegedly weakened. Thus, there is an increasing concern to reinforce citizenship in public governance, enhance citizen’s empowerment and adopt a “citizen first” approach. Most countries in South Asia have adopted this market-centred model, especially through structural adjustment programmes that tend to blame the public sector’s inefficiency, favour market competition and prescribe premarket policies. The rationale for this reinvention in public governance is to enhance performance by increasing the level of efficiency and economic growth.

South Asia and Governance Etymological governance can be traced back to the Greek verb kubernan and was used by Plato concerning the designing of a system of rule” (Kjaer, 2004: 3). In simple words, governance is the preservation of prescribed and unofficial political setup of laws of the game. It refers to those actions that engross setting the rules for the implementation of power and resolving differences over such rules. But the new use of governance does not highlight state actors and other institutions as the single applicable institutions and actors in the authoritative share of ideals (Easten,

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1965). “Every part of them, to some level, emphasize the role of networks in the quest of universal aspirations. These networks could be inter-governmental or interorganizational. They could be trans-national or they may perhaps be networks of conviction and reciprocity crossing the state-society divide”. The concept of governance is largely accompanied by institutional transformation, and it occupies human group. This presumption, therefore, establishes a component of change that is often missing in institutionalism. Ideally, governance merges rule structures with the agency. From an institutional standpoint, governance is about touching ‘the frameworks within which citizens and officials proceed and politics transpire and which contour the distinctiveness and institutions of civil society (March & Olsen, 1995: 6). A wide-ranging institutional classification would hence denote governance as “the setting of rules, the appliance of rules and the enforcement of rules” states that “Good” is a value-laden expression that entails a contrast between two things or methods by using some standard of measure. A government or a system of governance is thought to be good if it reveals certain basic characteristics recommended by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which puts forward the most comprehensive definition and an idealistic model of good governance. Good governance is among other things participatory, transparent and accountable. Good governance concept was launched on the agenda by the World Bank since it necessitated explicating why several countries remained unsuccessful in the build-up, regardless of the reality that they had adopted the Neo-Liberal Adjustment policies imposed on them by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. The response was ‘bad governance’ implicit as self-serving public officials and corruption in the public service (Moore, 1993: 60). Thus, the developing countries were to increase transparency and accountability in the public sector. The overall model to be transferred “was one of expenditure, reduction, privatization and public sector reform not only less but also better government (Kjaer, 2004: 139). Governance is an uncomplicated notion fundamentally, ‘good governance is good government’. The idea is related to the eminence of liaison between government and the citizens whom it subsists to dole out and defend”. Governance in weak states is often considered an uphill task. Economic governance in these states is about managing institutions that have often developed in such a way that they constitute obstacles to development, and they may be difficult to change for states that are very different from that of the developed economies (Kjaer, 2004: 140). About 50 years back, political economists started to presage countries in the developing world, that were initiating the practice of ‘premeditated development’, that soaring rates of growth can, indeed, frequently carry out and generate societal apprehensions which cannot be immersed by feeble political systems. As an analytical concept, governance was introduced as an extension of the institutionalist approach to democratization. The governance concept is relevant to a wider range of regime types of democracy because it shifts the attention away from a pre-defined set of ideal institutions towards examining how legitimacy for the public realm is affected. The governance in democratization theory is accordingly in a sense and meta policy-making. It talks about the rules that steer rulemaking. Securing peace and ending armed conflict and indiscriminate acts of violence

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against civilians present significant challenges to peace and the protection of human rights in South Asia. Central to an effective response to this challenge is to understand how public discourse, especially within the media, can be steered towards enabling a more transparent, well-informed policy response with positive human rights outcomes. A discussion that critically reflects on the South Asian scenario is timely and pertinent, given contemporary South Asian realities, the post-conflict situation in Sri Lanka, insurgencies in Jammu and Kashmir and the North East of India, the turmoil in Pakistan over the blasphemy law and other issues, the political tensions in Nepal and the struggle in Bangladesh to deepen democracy. All of this are happening in a context where the media has become increasingly commercialized and simultaneously subject to state controls of various kinds.

Characteristics of Good Governance Good governance is composed of the following components; (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)

Public involvement, Conformity to law, Transparency, Receptiveness, Harmony among diverse and conflicting interests, Impartiality guaranteed to all individuals, Effectual, well-organized, conscientious and responsible public institutions and the statecraft, Strategic revelation of the leaders towards wide range long-standing perceptions on sustainable human growth. There are the following six major measures to evaluate the situation of governance

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Degree of denial, Representative character of institutions, Stage of decentralization of governing bodies, Recognition of primary and fundamental rights, Security of life and liberty, Uneven development and access to services and increasing income disparities.

Good Governance: A South Asian Perspective South Asian countries share a common history of colonial dominance under the British Raj (Brass, 2010: 1), though Nepal and Bhutan have not been proper colonies and Afghanistan too is an exception. Apart from that, these nations differ in terms of geography, territorial and population size, religion, culture and language. The political governance has also been entirely different in all these countries.

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South Asia has fine track evidence of democratic institutions; however, history divulges that the democracy cherished by people in their particular countries has not added a great deal to change and is not at all encouraging to the well-being of the people. It is even more pathetic to know that hundreds of billions of dollars given by international donors as an aid to the poor have been unsuccessful to attain the target population except in trickle and had produced instead an erroneous group of beneficiaries. South Asia is in front of a calamity in governance that, if left unrestricted, can close down the region’s democratic growth and the economic social comfort of its heaving millions. Approximately, all South Asian countries face rampant corruption, social segregation and ineffective/non-pro-people bureaucracies, which hamper all programmes of progress together with efforts for a vigorous and advantageous open planet. For instance, Bangladesh’s state-owned telephone company for a decade is putting off the laying of optical fibre network to form a global Internet doorway for the country fearing loss of income. Economic liberalization and globalization have added to an additional increase in income disparities, whereby the more advantaged groups have enjoyed the fruits of development by controlling the partial resources. The rule of law in South Asia is extensively overlooked and diluted concerning the economic rights and egalitarianism for all, even though SAARC member states are signatories of an international mechanism. Lawlessness plays a prevailing role in endorsing bad governance in most South Asian countries. Three-stage process of South Asian Governance is as follows: (1) (2) (3)

Corrupt governments exploit the majority through deceptive measures like distorted electoral process, misinformation, manipulation and blackmail. Majority is deprived of political power and fundamental rights through denial of adequate access to resources. Disillusionment of the majority after falling into a state of helplessness.

Human Rights in South Asia The Kathmandu Roundtable on Conflict, the Media and Human Rights in South Asia (jointly organized by the International he Kathmandu Roundtable on Conflict, the Media and Human Rights in South Asia (jointly organized by the International Council on Human Rights Policy, the Centre for Media and Cultural Studies of the Tata Institute of Social Sciences and Panos South Asia) brought together senior media professionals, social scientists, peace and human rights advocates and security analysts (see Appendix A) to consider how conflict, peace and human rights questions are discussed in the public domain, especially in the media, in South Asia. The Roundtable was held in Kathmandu on 20 and 21 November 2010. The Roundtable was intended to strengthen ongoing efforts towards developing a more layered representation of internal conflicts in South Asia, including human rights concerns. The discussions were aimed at developing a better understanding of the nature of the state, media and civil society interactions and dynamics in the region, which has such a significant impact on public discourse and policy. Hence,

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in addition to analysing and questioning the dominant vocabularies within the media on contemporary conflicts in the region, the Roundtable also intended to enable consideration of working towards a plural media that reflects the diverse positions on these conflicts. This report presents, succinctly, some of the most important issues and questions discussed at the Roundtable. While it broadly reflects the structure of the agenda, it is not a detailed record of discussions at the Roundtable. On the contrary, it focuses on some of the most important broad themes of the discussion and seeks to present important insights emerging from the discussions relevant to these themes. The report also includes brief contributions from some of the participants on specific issues. At the outset, it might help to clarify the perspectives that framed the Roundtable discussions in considering the place of the media in the construction of the discourse on the conflict in South Asia. The media is not an institution that mirrors a given reality ‘out there; if that were the case then the kind of questions one would ask would be different—for example, objectivity and reliability would be an important focus. Rather, in this Roundtable, the focus was on critically examining how the media imagines specific versions of reality, within given and dynamic relations of power and resistance. Such a perspective underlines the need to understand what are the exclusions, the taken for granted terms of debate, the unspoken and unquestioned premises, the ‘normal’ space from which the media gazes at the world of conflict. This perspective eschews an assessment of how true to reality the media are; rather, it seeks to map how the media both reproduces and questions the dominant framings of conflict.

Current Economic Situation in South Asia To understand the system of governance in South Asia, one needs to understand how it developed historically and what were the normative sources for its present state of affairs. The most important characteristic of South Asian governance is extreme centralization of the authority, personalized leadership, and patriarchy that have great implications for the system of governance from policymaking to interpersonal relationships. The transformation might well function as a considerable aspect in spiralling the region’s economies; however, there is a dire need that the policies are in the right position to guarantee the pervasive prolific employment, and in this regard, the factors distant from demographics might play an influential role. The economic forecasts cannot be made easily, since they bank on a much wider range of factors. Nevertheless, the impending demographic shifts present most of South Asia an opening to gain from a demographic dividend. Policies that effectively endorse prolific employment are indispensable if this surplus is to be recognized. Other factors are prone to play even bigger roles in shaping the region’s economic future; nevertheless, making an effort to take benefit of the demographically obsessed prospect is a prudent shift, particularly for the reason that increasing work chances and enhancing

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the population’s health and education are favourable in their own right and would be good policy choices even in the absence of a demographic spur. A Human Development Commission (HDC) Report states that “South Asia is one of the most poorly administrated regions across the globe, with the omission of an unvoiced majority, unbalanced political regimes and deprived financial administration. The system of governance has become impassive and immaterial to the needs and apprehensions of the masses” (Masud, 1999). Therefore, “there is substantial demographic and interrelated economic heterogeneity both across countries and within them in South Asia. That heterogeneity has been and will prolong to be a dominant driver of economic disparity. In addition, one might project that the lack of common conditions advocates that South Asian leaders will persist to voice broadly contrasting interests. This creates a challenge to South Asia’s coherence as an economic and political power” (Bloom & Rosenberg, 2011). In contemporary years, there is a promising agreement among progress and development economists that good governance and sound institutions are a precondition for persistent expansion in living standards. Nevertheless, evaluating governance creates numerous troubles. This is a very large subject, and there is no consensus on either of the indicators or of the modes of gauging governance. There has also been disparity over who is best positioned to offer insights on the worth of governance in a particular country and how to compare it with other countries? The problems associated with governance measurement are well summarized by Court et al. (2002) as “Measuring issues of governance poses challenges that are not encountered in the economic and social development fields. It is very difficult to find and agree upon the indicators of a political macro-phenomenon like governance. There exists no regular, systematic and cohesive data on the concept of governance. There is very little objective data for many countries and even less that is comparative in a meaningful way”. Historically, the notion and practice of governance and public administration have a strong basis in South Asia. From the time of Kautilya to the reign of Mughal emperors and the British Raj, public administration and governance have had different connotations leading to different organizations forms and functions, administrative structure, nature of authority and political systems. The period before the advent of British rule was the rule of kings. The colonization of most of South Asia by the British ushered in a new dimension of governance.

Conclusion The governance structure of any country is composed of the judiciary, executive and legislature. If the entry to the institutions of governance for its general public is hard, protracted and pricey, then the remunerations from development are disseminated haphazardly as only those who enjoy privileged access to these institutions get the real benefit. Good governance in the context of South Asia must go beyond ‘good’ politics or even the development of a decent society. It should facilitate the government, civil

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society as well as private sectors to improve their social developments and economical growth to make them the means of greater human progression and improved levels of human well-being. Globalization has levelled the playing field in international trade, creating equal opportunity for all, and brought unexpected prosperity to many poor countries. However, it is only an opportunity for new prosperity, not a guarantee. It requires astute planning, determined action and a bit of luck for a country to find its unique offering to the world. Only then would it be able to exchange its unique goods, services and talents to buy the necessities and luxuries it needs to better the lives of its citizens. The case of Sri Lanka illustrates the challenges of globalization for industries that based their feasibility and prosperity on artificial protections and privileges afforded to them by past trade regimes in contrast with those based on their natural distinctive strengths a situation typical of many Asian countries.

References Acemoglu, D., & Johnson, S. (n.d.). Unbundling institutions. Journal of Political Economy. Retrieved from http://economics.mit.edu/files/4467 Bharat Textile. (2012). http://www.bharattextile.com/features/research-brief/ Bloom, D. E., Rosenberg, L. (2011, February). The future of South Asia: Population dynamics, economic prospects and regional coherence. In PGDA working paper no. 68. Working paper series. Retrieved from http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/program-on-the-global-demographyof-aging/WorkingPapers/2011/PGDA_WP_68.pdf Brass, P. (2010). Introduction. In P. Brass (Ed.), Handbook of South Asian politics: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal (pp. 1–24). Rutledge. Brass, P. (2010). Introduction. In. P. Brass (Ed.), Handbook of South Asian politics: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lank and Nepal. Rutledge. CIA. (2012). The world factbook 2012. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/index.html. Accessed May 12, 2012. Easten, D. (1965). A framework for political analysis. Prentice-Hall. Jmail, I., Askvik, S., & Dhakal, T. N. (2013). Administration, governance and globalization. Retrieved from http://www.springer.com/978-1-4614-7371-8 Kahler, M. (2004). Economic security in an era of globalization: Definition and provision. The Pacific Review, 17(4), 485–502. Kjaer, A. M. (2004). Governance. Polity Press. EUROPA Publications. Retrieved from eprints.soas.ac.uk/9915/1/CorruptionAndGovernance.pdf Malik, Q. A. (2012, April 1). Need for good governance in Pakistan. World Time. Retrieved from http://jworldtimes.com/Article/42012_Need_for_Good_Governance_in_Pakistan March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1995). Democratic governance. The Free Press. Masud, S. I., Shamsul, M. (1999). Governance in South Asia for a peaceful world. European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS). Retrieved from http://www.eias.org/publications/briefing/1999/wea kdev.pdf.pdf Moore, M. (1993). Declining to learn from the East? The World Bank on Governance and Development. IDS Bulletin, 24(1). The Court, J., Hyden, G., Mease, K. (2002). Assessing nations: Methodological challenges. In World governance survey. Discussion paper 2. Retrieved from http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org. uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/4096.pdf

Nuclear Weapons and Regional Cooperation in South Asia Syeda Sumaya Mehdi

Introduction The debate on deterrence is as old as the advent of nuclear weapons. During cold war, the USA, being the leading nuclear state, perceived the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other states as a major challenge to its national security and supremacy and wanted to maintain a monopoly over it. Soviet Union too acquired nuclear weapons in 1949 followed by Britain, France and China. The lack of a great power war and the ensuing stability during cold war is largely attributed to acquisition of nuclear weapons by both the USA and the USSR. Direct wars were not considered an option between the nuclear states because the cost of a war was greater than its benefits. In academia, the serious debate on the utility of nuclear weapons and structural reasons for their proliferation started in the early 1980s. The most famous debate between Kenneth Waltz and Scott D. Sagan too revolves around the question of whether acquisition of nuclear weapons by more states leads to stability. Kenneth Waltz argues that acquisition of nuclear weapons creates a sense of absolute deterrence that leads to stability which conventional deterrence is unable to do. On the other hand Scott Sagan favoured the abolition of nuclear weapons which according to him accelerates the problem of proliferation and threats of nuclear-armed terrorists that may lead to an extremely dangerous world. Kenneth Waltz argues against the monopoly on nuclear weapons by certain states like Israel in West Asia that creates instability and can only be mitigated by Iran and other regional powers acquiring their own deterrence vehicles.1 There is a vast array of literature that informs us about the relationship between the nuclear weapons and the strategic decisions made by great powers during the cold war period. This huge corpus of literature has offered a generalized theoretical framework by interlinking great power’s nuclear experiences with other nuclear S. S. Mehdi (B) Academy of International Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia University, New Delhi, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Rahman and N. Tiwari (eds.), Development, Governance and Gender in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-5109-0_10

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power experiences. However, this view is challenged by Vipin Narang2 who argues that superpower cold war experiences are inadequate to explain the nuclear strategies adopted by regional powers like India and Pakistan. This is because “an overwhelming majority of the modern nuclear weapon states are regional powers with limited resources and specific security interests often confined to their respective regions. Indeed, out of the existing nine nuclear weapon states, only two can be categorized as having a global nuclear weapon capacity with the remaining seven being regional nuclear powers”.3 Narang asserts that the experiences of superpowers cannot be implemented on regional powers because the systemic factors and domestic constraints of regional nuclear powers are different than super powers. There is a voluminous literature on the deterrence discourse in South Asia contributed by all schools of deterrent optimists and pessimists. The deterrence theorists have mostly debated whether the presence of nuclear weapons in the subcontinent has resulted in strategic stability. In this paper, I will try to explain, using the theoretical framework offered by posture optimization theory, that fear of nuclear war and ultimate annihilation has deterred India and Pakistan from fighting major wars. Nuclear deterrence has ensured strategic stability and is more stable than conventional balance of power as empirical evidence shows that South Asian region is spared from major wars despite recurrent crisis. Former Indian army Chief K. Sundarji predicted: A mutual minimum nuclear deterrent will act as a stabilizing factor. Pakistan will see it as a counteracting India’s superior conventional power potential and providing a more level playing field. The chances of conventional war between the two will be less likely than before.4

The Imbalance of Power Between India and Pakistan States in South Asia are disproportionately weaker than India, the strongest country in the region. India is bigger in size and more powerful than rest of the South Asian states combined5 and this enormous disparity in the population, size and economic and military strength of India with the other neighbouring South Asian States creates wariness among these states about India’s potential hegemonic dominance in the region.6 In South Asian region, India shares borders with all neighbouring countries (except Maldives) but none of the other countries are linked to each other (except Afghanistan–Pakistan), and this geographic contiguity buttresses the Indo-centric nature of the region. Due to this geographical centrality of India, it appears to be a constant factor in all the major problems in the region. This creates a unique paradoxical situation, wherein the main regional power in “itself is seen as constituting a security threat”.7 Pakistan thinks that India perceives it as an obstacle to Indian regional hegemony and is increasing conventional and nuclear capability to eliminate this impediment. This perception of India as a hegemon is a threat to identity and survival of Pakistan which always define its identity as “not India”. Three wars (1947–1948, 1965 and

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1999) were fought over the territorial disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. This dispute is of important significance because it symbolizes the main raisons d’être of two countries.8 Pakistan conceives its identity as incomplete without the accession of Kashmir (a Muslim majority state) within its territorial borders. India, on the other hand, wants to hold on to Kashmir for completing its imagination of a secular state. The imbalance of power between the two states of India and Pakistan is the main reason behind their enduring conflict. To undo this imbalance of power, Pakistan has formed two pronged strategy that is increasing internal capabilities and forging alliances externally with powerful states. Internally, Pakistan has increased its military and economic capabilities, and externally, it has forged alliances with the major powers of the world. India is stronger militarily and economically and “its economy is more than six times as large as Pakistan’s. It is also much broadly industrialized, and its defence military base is largest in the developing world”.9 Pakistan’s industrial strength and its defence industry is heavily dwarfed by India. At partition, the British India military was divided on a 2:1 basis between India and Pakistan, and this ratio has not changed much in last five decades.10 Pakistan to correct this imbalance has formed alliances with China and USA and increased its defence expenditure to balance India, which is being described as “defence-oriented economy” rather than “development-oriented economy” by various scholars. Pakistan spent around 4% of its Gross National Product (GNP) on defence during 1950s, by late 1960s, it was increased to 6% of GNP and by 1975, Pakistan spent 6.28% of GNP on defence.11 Despite such imbalances in military capability and disparity in geography, Pakistan has tried to balance India by for gingalliances, increased its military capability and has acquired a strong nuclear capability which has established a sense of deterrence at the strategic level between the two countries, thereby weakening the strong security dilemma faced by Pakistan’s policy-makers.

Security Dilemma The independence of India and Pakistan based on antagonistic ideology and identity resulted in perennial divergences. These asymmetries in their military and economic power, territorial disparity and unresolved territorial disputes resulted in intractable conflicts. These disputes, where each state perceives its interests in zero-sum games, security enhancement by way of forging alliances with powerful states, increasing military capability and acquisition of nuclear weapons becomes a necessary condition for survivability and security of a state. In such an environment where security dilemma prevails, enhancement and modernization of military in one state creates a sense of security threat in another which leads to arms race. The Chinese military threat which made India to enhance it conventional and nuclear capabilities after its defeat in 1962 war resulted in exacerbation of Pakistan’s security dilemma. To balance its conventional military superiority and contain India from becoming a regional hegemon, Pakistan forged alliances with USA and China. Further, the humiliating defeat of Pakistan in 1971 war was a terrible blow to its

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pride and Pakistan considered acquisition of nuclear weapons as a necessary step to offset India’s conventional superiority. Since its inception, “Pakistan’s nuclear weaponization has been undisputedly India-centric”.12 To ensure its survival against conventional military superiority of India buttressed by a highly threatening cold start doctrine, Pakistan developed tactical nuclear weapons, like Nasr to counterweight India’s proactive strategy.13 Islamabad was helped by China to build its nuclear and missile capabilities to prevent India from becoming a major power which is possible through planned support of regimes surrounding India, particularly Pakistan.14 John Graver argues that “China wants to keep Pakistan independent, powerful and confident in order to present India with a standing two-front threat”.15 This encourages New Delhi to build a balance of coalition with the other states that see China as a threat including the USA and Japan.

Nuclearization of South Asia India started its nuclear programme immediately after its independence under the charismatic leadership of Homi Bhabhato meet its chronic civilian needs of power and electricity. The nuclear programme was started with peaceful civilian intentions but it later started nuclear weapons programme after China tested its first nuclear device in 1964 at Lop Nur.16 Pakistan too wanted to develop nuclear capability which became explicit when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, then foreign minister made a famous statement, “if India builds the bomb, we will eat grass to get one of our own”. Further, the 1971 war and creation of Bangladesh precipitated the launch of Pakistan’s nuclear programme. Pakistan was a de facto nuclear power by the late 1980s but was unwilling to introduce nuclear weapons in South Asia due to the probability of a colossal international reaction and sanctions by the non-proliferation regime. India conducted the second round of five nuclear tests in Rajasthan in May 1998, when Pakistan, using the political cover of Indian tests, responded with six tests in the same month. Nuclearization of South Asia resulted in condemnatory reactions from global community and proliferation of literature on consequences of nuclear weapons. Deterrence theorists argue that “overt presence of nuclear weapons has contributed to strategic stability” by reducing the capability of a full scale war. Proliferation pessimists argue that nuclearization leads to escalation or full scale war. Nuclear deterrence is robust in South Asia, as the outcomes of 1999 and 2001–02 crisis show and acquisition of nuclear weapons has led to limited wars, preventing escalation to a full blown conventional war. In Kargil war of 1999, India confined the conflict to Kargil region and Sumit Ganguly asserts that “source of Indian restraint was actually the overt possession of a nuclear arsenal by Pakistan”. Further, the terrorist attack on 13 December 2001 which had its roots in Pakistan was sufficient for India to retaliate militarily against Pakistan. Still, India, was unwilling to take military action against Pakistan. The reason for not taking military action against Pakistan can be

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explained on the basis of India’s limited nuclear capacity. This issue has been well captured by India’s foremost defence analyst and well-known political commentator K. Subrahmanyam in 1993: The awareness on both sides of a nuclear capability that can enable either country to assemble nuclear weapons at short notice induces mutual caution. This caution is already evident on the part of India. In 1965, when Pakistan carried out its “Operation Gibraltar” and sent in infiltrators, India sent its army across ceasefire line to destroy the assembly points of the infiltrators. That escalated into a full scale war. In 1990, when Pakistan once again carried out a massive infiltration of terrorists trained in Pakistan, India tried to deal with the problem on Indian territory and did not send its army in Pakistan occupied Kashmir.17

But this gives rise to a more important question. Why has the possession of nuclear weapons by Pakistan induced caution in India while Pakistan is continuing its policy of a low intensity war against India unabated? The evidence suggests that Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons has deterred India, whereas India’s possession of nuclear weapons has not deterred Pakistan. To understand the dynamics of deterrence and its differential effect, Vipin Narang “offers a theory what he calls posture optimization theory or simply optimization theory”. Optimization theory is “based on four sequenced and identifiable variables that include both the structural and domestic factors. States optimize their posture based on a series of sequential variables ‘that are prioritized–from the structural to unit level-to produce a specific posture”.18 Narang argues that mere acquisition of nuclear weapons is not significant factor to determine deterrence but it is nuclear posture that is more important. He defines posture as the capabilities (actual nuclear forces), command and control procedures (how they are managed, deployed and potentially released) and employment doctrine (conditions under which to use).19 Narang identifies three nuclear postures namely catalytic, assured retaliation and asymmetric escalation posture and argues that a state changes its posture according to its security environment and civil-military relationship. He argues that the selection of a specific posture has a significant effect on “nature of the threats faced by a state because some nuclear postures deter conflict better than others”.20 Nuclear posture is mainly determined by state’s security environment which consists of threats or trustworthy allies. State’s determining of a specific posture depends on both states security environment and domestic variables. Domestic variables determine a specific posture only if state’s security environment fails to do so. The domestic variables consist of two primary factors: organizational management and resource availability. Both these factors play a crucial role in determining nuclear posture of a particular state. Asymmetric escalation posture adopted by Pakistan can be explained in relation to its unstable security environment. It is overtly designed to counter India’s security and conventional attacks. This explains Pakistan’s first use of nuclear weapons against any conflict with conventionally superior India. Narang’s optimization theory predicts that Pakistan’s adoption of a catalytic nuclear posture depends on the availability of a trusted third party like that of USA. This can be better understood in Brasstacks crisis that happened in 1987. Pakistan adopted a catalytic nuclear posture against India during this crisis which compelled USA to intervene and diffuse the war like situation. In South Asia, during cold war,

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US policy was always pro-Pakistan because of their support in ousting USSR regime in Afghanistan in 1979. However, after the cold war, USA lost interest in Afghanistan, and thus, its policy of supporting Pakistan also changed. This left Pakistan vulnerable leading to a change in its nuclear posture. In order to contain India, Narang argues that Pakistan shifted to a new posture that is asymmetric escalation posture. Pakistan would adopt this posture by limiting its conflict in Kashmir against India. Jalil Jilani, the director general of Pakistan for South Asia, explained the situation in the following words: Since Pakistan’s acquisition of [an overt] nuclear capacity, Pakistan has felt much less threatened by Indian conventional capabilities, and thus more confident vis-a-vis India. This increased confidence has enabled the Pakistani’s to adopt policies that put a check on Indian ambition in South Asia. At Kargil, Pakistan was able to block the supply of [Indian] troops in Kashmir and their [were] limits as to what India could do in response.21

This emboldened Pakistan to wage limited wars in Kashmir, and since then, Pakistan is following the same policy in Kashmir against India. V. P. Malik, the former Indian army chief of staff, explains this policy of Pakistan in these words: Kargil showed the way. If Pakistan could do Kargil, [without escalation to the strategic level] India could do something similar, in response to continued Pakistani provocations, in Kashmir without fear of nuclear confrontation. Thus, in the wake of the Kargil war, there was an increasing realization in India that stability exists in strategic balance.22

India’s response to 2001–02 terrorist attack on parliament can be seen in this light where India mobilized roughly 500,000 troops along LOC and the international border. However, India could not launch an offensive across the international border due to the threat of Pakistan’s use of nuclear weapons against the Indian troops. Narang argues that India adopted assured retaliation posture because it is buffered against China’s conventional military capability by inhospitable terrain. Furthermore, the nuclear posture of India makes “crisis more stable as adversaries do not have to fear that India will initiate nuclear use”. Ambiguity is considered to enhance deterrence and “India introduced such ambiguity in its 2003 doctrine by stating that it reserved the right to respond the chemical or biological weapons use with retaliation”. Nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan helped in maintaining stability, by creating strategic balance and power parity in Pakistan which always considered India’s conventional superiority as an ‘existential threat to its survival’. The development of 60-km (37 mile) Hatf-IX or Nasr ballistic missile in response to India’s limited war strategy is a means of reinforcing deterrence and enhancing stability at higher levels of conflict.

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Role of External Variables China The 1962 war with China had many consequences for India–Pakistan relations. It massively increased India’s defence spending and resulted in significant changes in military balance in South Asia. Pakistan related India’s defeat with China to India’s military weakness and tried to capitalize this situation by achieving a more favourable settlement of the Kashmir dispute. This was evident in 1965 when Rann of Kutch incident was not settled decisively in India’s favour. This emboldened Pakistan, leading to infiltration of troops across the border in hopes of a rising a popular revolt.23 China exploded its nuclear device in 1964 which increased security dilemma of India. India did not want to repeat the 1962 episode and hence started building its military and defence capabilities and building nuclear deterrent. The humiliating defeat of Pakistan in 1971 war provided a huge impetus for Pakistan’s nuclear programme. China is both a cause and a contributor to nuclear and missile proliferation in the region of South Asia. Its nuclear and missile capabilities are seen as threatening by India, which launched its own comprehensive missile development programme in 1983 formally known as Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP).India’s security dilemma has also been exacerbated by Chinese nuclear and missile assistance to Pakistan. China’s motivations in transferring nuclear materials and technology are driven by the two vital factors of regional balance of power and containment of India. China’s predominance in the region would get upset if India emerges as a leading power in the region; hence, China fully supports Pakistan for countering India’s rise in the region giving itself enough strategic space.24 According to Robert Ross, China has fully backed Pakistan by providing missile and nuclear technology as “China views a credible Pakistani deterrent as the most effective way to guarantee the security of its sole ally in Southern Asia against Indian power”. The specific nature of Sino-Pakistani nuclear cooperation is still ambiguous, but US intelligence sources have revealed that it was impossible for Pakistan to turn nuclear without the full backing of china’s support.25 Without the assistance of China, Pakistan would never have been able to design its nuclear programme and built its nuclear reactors. China has “even supplied the CHIC-4 weapon design along with fifty kilograms of HEU in 1981, material sufficient for two bombs”.26 Pakistan was helped by China in the construction of “Khushab reactor and Chasma reactor and Plutonium reprocessing facility and the PARR-2 research reactor at Rawalpindi”.27 Through this nuclear weaponization programme, Pakistan was capable enough to build its nuclear capability in late 1990s and counter any threat stemming from India. Over the years, the “Pakistani nuclear programme evolved into the most significant symbol of national determination and a central element of Pakistan’s identity”.28

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Conclusion Posture optimization theory correctly predicts the nature of strategic completion in South Asia especially the nuclear strategies of various actors and the effect of changing balance of power on stability in South Asia. It correctly predicts that Pakistan’s nuclear inventory is only going to increase29 due to its extreme reliance on nuclear deterrence against a conventionally superior India. India’s missile capabilities and conventional arms spending would also increase continuously due to a gradual rise in Chinese military and nuclear capabilities. Chinese defence policies are overwhelmingly focused on the American military and nuclear capabilities in the region. This has created a vicious security triangle in South Asia, which seems irresolvable in the near future. States optimize their postures according to their security interests which are primarily determined by the capabilities of rival states and the overall balance of power in the region. Regional stability is only possible if the states feel that that the capabilities of other states do not pose a significant threat to its territorial integrity and sovereignty. The biggest threat to regional stability is the ensuing arms race in the region that is exacerbated by the strategic and conventional arms race between China and America. Due to these factors, regional cooperation at the strategic level is not completely possible only by the efforts at the bilateral level between India and Pakistan. De-escalation at the Sino-American strategic competition level can only ease pressure on India and Pakistan and hence provide fresh avenues for regional cooperation. Notes 1. 2. 3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

Kenneth N. Waltz, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb”, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2012. Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in Modern era: Regional Powers and International Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), p. 27. Russia inherited all the nuclear arsenals from the erstwhile USSR which helped it to project itself as a global power. On the other hand, Chinese nuclear capabilities have been reactionary towards its immediate neighborhood. Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence: Its Evolution, Development and Implications for South Asian Security (Islamabad: Oxford University Press, 2010). India is the largest state in South Asiawhich accounts for 72% of the area in the region. India is 4 times larger in area than Pakistan. Moreover, India constitutes 77% of the population in the region; and generates 76% of the region’s total exports. For an elaborate discussion on this point, see Rajshree Jetly (2003) Conflict management strategies in ASEAN: perspectives for SAARC, The Pacific Review, 16:1, 53–76, https://doi.org/10.1080/0951274032000043244 Ibid.

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8. 9.

10. 11. 12.

13.

14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

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Sumit Ganguly, “Nuclear stability in South Asia”, International Security, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Fall, 2008), pp. 45–70. Rajesh Rajagopalan,”Neorealist Theory and the India-Pakistan Conflict” in Kanti Bajpai and Siddharth Mallavarapu (eds.) International relations in India: Theorizing the Region and Nation (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2005). Ibid. p. 155. Ibid. p. 157. For a comprehensive account of Pakistan’s nuclear acquisition, see Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012). Mansoor Ahmad, “Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons and their impact on Stability”, Regional Insight, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 30, 2016. T. V. Paul, “The Cause and Consequences of China-Pakistan Nuclear/Missile Collaboration”. in Lowell Dittmer (ed.), South Asia’s Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and China (New Delhi: Routledge 2005), p. 180. Cited in Paul (2005, p. 181). Saira Khan, Nuclear Weapons and Conflict Transformation: The Case of IndiaPakistan (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 77. Cited in Ganguly (2008, pp. 45–70). Narang (2014, p. 27). Ibid. Narang (2014, p. 300). Cited in S. Paul Kapur, “India and Pakistan’s Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not Like Cold War Europe”, International Security, Vol. 30 (Fall 2005), 127–152. Ibid., p. 148. Dittmer (2005, p. 114). Ibid., p. 176. Paul (2005, p. 181). Khan (2012, p. 188). Paul (2005, p. 181). Ibid., p. 2. For evidence, see Kristensen, and Norris (2015). Pakistani Nuclear Forces. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 71 (6), 59–66.

References Kapur, S. P. (2005). India and Pakistan’s unstable peace: Why nuclear South Asia is not like cold war Europe. International Security, 30, 127–152.

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Khan, F. H. (2012). Eating grass: The making of the Pakistani bomb. Stanford University Press. Kristensen, H. M., & Norris, R. S. (2015). Pakistani nuclear forces. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 71(6), 59–66. Narang, V. (2014). Nuclear strategy in modern era: Regional powers and international conflict. Princeton University Press.

Media and Literature

Role of Media in Conflict Management: A Case Study of 2016 Kashmir Unrest Syeda Afshana and Heeba Din

Introduction According to Alert 2019—a report on conflicts, human rights and peace building funded by United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs— “during 2018, 83 scenarios of tension were identified around the world. These cases were mainly concentrated in Africa (33) and Asia (18), whereas the remaining cases were spread around Europe (12), Middle East (11) and the Americas (nine). The report marked the figure of 68.5 million people to have been displaced by the conflicts by the end of 2017, making it one of most significant impacts of the ongoing conflicts. The report also suggested that 30% of armed conflicts experienced an escalation of violence from previous years. These included Cameroon, Mali, the Western Sahel Region, RCA, Colombia, Afghanistan, the Philippines (NPA), India (Jammu and Kashmir)—where the highest number of fatalities since 2009 were registered including Israel–Palestine—with the worst figures since 2014—and Yemen (Houthis)” (Milián et al. 2019). As we are speaking, the numbers would very unlikely be on decline. Considering such huge levels of conflict situations across the globe, which inherently by nature tend to be long drawn, continuing and interspersed, an emerging way of dealing with such dynamic situations is being sought under the enquiry of Conflict Management. “Conflict management is the process of reducing the negative and destructive capacity of conflict through a number of measures and by working with and through the parties involved in that conflict” (Atieno et al., 2014). The basic approach of conflict management is being proactive, encompassing aspects like conflict limitation, containment and litigation (Olajide, 2011). Burton (2001 as cited in Ikyase & Olisah, 2014) said that the term can be used to connote containment of conflict S. Afshana (B) · H. Din Media Education Research Centre, University of Kashmir, Srinagar, India e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Rahman and N. Tiwari (eds.), Development, Governance and Gender in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-5109-0_11

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through steps introduced to promote conditions in which collaborative and valued relationships control the behaviour of conflicting parties. “The term ‘conflict management’ is perhaps an admission of the reality that conflicts are inevitable, but that, not all conflicts can always be resolved. Therefore, what practitioners can do is to manage and regulate them” (Olayinka et al., 2015). In today’s modern world, the dynamic shared by conflict and mass media is one of its most prominent scenarios. The two entities often play a crucial role in shaping today’s conflict. In times of conflict, information becomes of critical importance and how the information gets further disseminated, advances and sets the discourse which in turn sets the reaction towards the discourse. The information of Iraq having weapons of mass destruction and its subsequent fallout is one of the many examples of how information in today’s modern conflict is used to win not only wars but hearts and minds of public as well. On the other hand, the mass audiences/public depends on media to distinguish between facts and fictions, to cut through the spin and deliver an unbiased and reliable narrative. And as such how media disseminates the information about the conflicts, its causes and actors would inevitably set in motion the narrative through which the event would be painted in public memory. Furthermore, media is also been used by conflict actors (state and anti-state) to push forward their agenda. Instances of this can be seen in the embedding of journalists in Afghanistan and Iraq by US army or the kidnapping of journalists by anti-state actors to publish their accounts or garner attention. But the moot point is how crucial is conflict reportage to the conflict itself? While scholars and researchers have unanimously given their verdict that media does play a part in conflict but not much has been said about the impact. This paper is an attempt to assess the impact of media reportage on shaping the dynamics of conflict. Basically, “the media role can take two different and opposed forms. Either the media takes an active part in the conflict and has responsibility for increased violence, or it stays independent and out of the conflict, thereby contributing to the resolution of conflict and alleviation of violence. Which of the role media takes in a given conflict, and in the phases before and after, depends on a complex set of factors, including the relationship the media has with actors in the conflict and the independence the media has in comparison with the power holders in society” (Voices of War, 2006). “With technological and societal development, mass media has gained a still stronger influence in building national and group identities. The internal wars, which are fought on divisions between these identities, have consequently left the mass media playing one of the key roles in instigating the violence” (Seaton, 1999). “As disseminators of symbols, canvassing stereotypes and prejudices against the ‘others’, it is well documented that the mass media has been of great importance in the wars leading to the dissolution of former Yugoslavia, the genocides in Rwanda as well as in many other internal conflicts” (Thompson, 1999; Chrétie, 1995). On the other hand, it has also helped in securing peace in Northern Ireland (Spencer, 2004). The genocide in Rwanda along with the Balkans war led to serious debates regarding the power and responsibilities of media. In both these cases, the media played a malicious role directly provoking violence, using Radio Mile Colines in cases of Rwanda and virulent nationalism in former Yugoslavia.

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“Over the past few decades, awareness has increased with regard to the role local civilian population play in armed conflict. They are no longer considered a passive factor, but instead their needs and perceptions have explicit influence upon the success of a mission. Triggered by rapid technological change in the media, information no longer simply describes on-scene developments, but increasingly shapes the dynamics by influencing perceptions, opinions and loyalties” (Galtung, 2004; Jakosben, 2000 as cited in Chebii, 2015). “This has made information to be an important means of warfare used by governments, military and leaders in all ages everywhere for propaganda or disinformation purposes or for great potential to promote peace building” (Galtung, 2004 as cited in Chebii, 2015). “The role or power of media influence in conflict was witnessed during Vietnam War, which saw US involvement in the war due to the significant growth in information technology posed by discovery of television” (Praeger, 1994). As said by Colonel Harry G. Summers—a battalion and corps operations officer in the Vietnam War, “…there is a tendency to blame our problems with public support on the media…. it was this horror, not the reporting, that so influenced the American people.” (Kull, 1995). The Vietnam War and its coverage made the military aware about the influence of media. The military realized that it needs to control the media and the images that the media disseminates in order to control the narrative of war itself. Besides, the level to which media allocates primacy to covering conflicts also plays a critical role in shaping the responses to the respective conflicts; other aspect of it is the difference of attention given to various conflicts through exposure to media wherein some receive global attention and others are neglected. Many of the African conflicts in recent time are an example. Media coverage has also led to action on part of international community; the classic example of it would be the displacement of Kuwaitis from Iraq during the Iraq and Kuwait War. While the Western governments maintained their indifference, it was the pressure built by the media coverage that proved stronger than the will of governments. This event also poses serious questions about the contours of state sovereignty, wherein increased pressure was built on Western governments to act and protect people. However, the geopolitical agendas also play a key role for Western governments to intervene. Iraq being a prime example. This paper attempts to build upon the above-mentioned arguments and statements pertaining to contribution of media coverage in conflict and try to come to an understanding what is the role of media in conflict management. For the same, the paper has focused on the coverage of 2016 unrest in conflict torn region of Kashmir—a territorial dispute between India and Pakistan since 1947.

Kashmir Conflict The Kashmir dispute originated during the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, which resulted in the formation of India and Pakistan. Maharaja Hari Singh, then the Hindu monarch of the Muslim majority Kashmir, was unable to

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decide whether to merge with India or Pakistan in 1947. However, he maintained the sovereign nature of the Kashmir region by signing a standstill agreement with Pakistan which allowed transport and other services from the country (Bose, 2003). In October 1947, tribesmen from Pakistan’s North Western Frontier Province attacked Kashmir. It had been reported that the Muslims in Kashmir were under attack, and the Hindu monarch was indecisive about joining either dominion (BBC, 2014). After the attack, Hari Singh pursued India’s military support, even as “India’s Governor-General, Lord Mountbatten, believed peace would best be served by Kashmir joining India on a temporary basis, pending a vote on its ultimate status” (Ibid.). “Kashmir was divided into two parts in 1948: Indian-controlled Jammu and Kashmir, with approximately 10 million people; and the smaller Pakistani-controlled part of Jammu and Kashmir, with a population of around three million” (Bose, 2003). The 460-mile de facto boundary between the two parts of Kashmir is now known as the Line of Control or LOC. However, the dispute over Kashmir continued. On 1 January 1949, India took the issue to the United Nations Security Council. The United Nations called for a free and impartial plebiscite within the region to decide whether Kashmir’s population wanted to join either India or Pakistan. The Kashmir dispute remained a festering issue between the two nuclear-armed countries. They fought two wars in 1947–48, in 1965 and a low intensity war in 1997, in the heights of Kargil, to claim the region, besides countless political stand-offs on the floor of the United Nations and other diplomatic venues (Khalid, 2015). After 1989, there has been an armed insurgency in the region against Indian rule. In response, the Indian state sent more than half a million troops, including army, paramilitary, police and irregular forces, to quell the rebellion in Kashmir (Structures of Violence, 2015). India has also imposed emergency laws such as the Disturbed Areas Act and the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, which allow soldiers to shoot a suspicious person on sight. According to government figures, the fighting has left 43,460 dead, since 1990 (TOI, 2011). This figure is disputed by human rights organizations who say more than 70,000 (Burke, 2011) people have been killed during the fighting between the armed guerrillas and Indian troops, besides leaving thousands of orphans and widows. Over the decades, Kashmir has seen sporadic cycles of public protests escalating into months of violence and conflict where dominant profreedom sentiment on ground coupled with armed resistance gets pitted against the armed forces. The summer of 2016 witnessed another such period of violence, which sparked off after the death of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen militant commander Burhan Wani on 8 July 2016. What followed was a 7-month-long unrest in the valley that claimed more than 100 lives, injured 15,000 + (Greater Kashmir, 2016) and blinded 117 civilians (Economist, 2016).

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Sample Studied In order to try to ascertain the role of media in conflict management, the 2016 Kashmir unrest was identified. The paper studied the coverage of mainstream Indian media, including both print and broadcast media—The Times of India and The Indian Express from print media and Times Now’s—‘The Newshour debate’ along with NDTV’s ‘The Buck Stops Here’ as the sample from a time period of 10 July–11 August 2016. The parameters identified and studied were language, frames, headlines, editorials and opinion pieces (for print), political cartoons, visuals and phrases used to come to an understanding about the discourse which the media tried to establish during the Kashmir unrest and thereof analyse what role media played in the conflict management during the 2016 unrest in Kashmir. A code sheet was prepared for the both print and broadcast samples, with the aim to code the samples in a way that would help to establish the role of media coverage.

Study Analysis A quantitative analysis of the sample revealed that in print media (TOI and Indian Express) a total of 47 stories appeared on front page. In addition to that, a total of eight editorial and 24 opinion pieces along with six political cartoons were also published. As such, the event received a fairly decent coverage in both mainstream papers. Quantitatively studying the coverage of The Times of India from 10 July to 11 August 2016, it was found that a total of 17 front-page stories were published, a total of ten political cartoons, two TOI editorials and eight opinion articles were also published during this time period. In case of The Indian Express, it was found that a total of 30 front-page stories were published along with six The Indian Express editorials and 16 opinion pieces and three political cartoons during the said time period. In broadcast media coverage, Times Now’s Newshour broadcast ten debates and NDTV’s The Buck Stop Here broadcast a total of 13 debates in the said time period. Analysing the overall coverage, it was found that while the amount of coverage that the conflict received was substantial but the overtones of coverage oscillated from ultra-nationalistic jingoism furthering the “Us v/s Them” binary to a restrained event diary which merely stated the events and lacked any in-depth reportage. Even in some cases where the coverage was at times balanced and not biased, it was followed by an either a defensive opinion piece or argument to reiterate the nationalistic overtone that put the nation above its people. Though the main issue of reportage was Kashmir and the ongoing unrest, the broadcast media repeatedly brought Pakistan as a key stakeholder and the reason for the unfolding crisis in Kashmir. The broadcast media while attempted to lay threadbare but the event and the conflict dynamics but the coverage was lopsided to a mainstream understanding of the Kashmir conflict which

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refuses to identify the matter as a dispute. This made the role of media more as voice of the state in furthering the state’s agenda rather than actively controlling the negative implications of the conflict through the parties involved. Further sections of print and broadcast media themselves were seen at loggerheads at the stands they took on Kashmir unrest. While one section of media (NDTV and The Indian Express) was seen to give voice to different opinions from all the stakeholders, which ranged from debating the army excesses and human rights violations and also including separatists in the valley for a dialogue towards solving the crisis. The other section of media (Times Now) labelled raising questions on army excesses, the encounters or bringing separatists into dialogue as anti-national and pseudo-liberalism. This further diverted the main focus of the issue, that is Kashmir unrest, with media channels both print and broadcast trying to show and prove whose nationalism was better. It was also seen that the coverage was mostly from an outsider’s point of view, rarely were Kashmiri voices included in the debates or their opinions published. This further widened the “Us v/s Them” ideology. What it further did was create two separate discourses regarding the matter: one in the valley and one for rest of the India. While the discourse in the valley was a mix of anguish and anger which stemmed from being talked upon but not given a chance to speak up, the discourse for rest of the country was that of a rogue mob and violent protestors targeting the security personnel who are away from the comfort of their homes saving the country and countrymen. The stories in print media were mostly hard news stories, baring a few instances in both TOI and The Indian Express. While TOI focused on stories like the entrepreneurs of Kashmir, who ironically were out of business during the unrest, labelling it as ‘the voices’ which are mostly unheard in valley due to the unrest. In this instance, the role of media can be identified as that of acting as a conflict mediator where through its coverage, it highlighted the unreported aspects of the conflict and directed the discourse of conflict from violence to development. The Indian Express, on the other hand, focused on the sufferings of the pellet victims which blinded 117 civilians. The terminology while referring the lethality of pellet guns (a non-spherical projectile loaded with lead and designed to be fired from an air gun, which once fired disperse in huge numbers without following a set path) also differed across media. While The Times of India plainly chose to refer pellet guns as non-lethal weapons, The Indian Express chose to question the non-lethality of the pellet guns using the quotation marks. Furthermore, all the coverage seemed superficial; no real investigative reportage came forth from either of the media, except a series of stories done by The Indian Express. The broadcast media though debated Kashmir issue every now and then in the said time period, but very little genuine information was laid forth. The debates circled around forming a narrative of law and order situation in which a few miscreants were responsible on the behest of Pakistan. The prolonged history of Kashmir conflict and the context of the present condition in Valley in the backdrop of 2008 and 2010 unrests were hardly ever debated and talked about. What these selective debates and reportage did was that it created a discourse that supported the claims of

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India’s foreign policy on cross-border terrorism and Pakistan’s role in it, rather than informing public about the Kashmir conflict and the current unrest.

Detailed Analysis in Reference to the Parameters Studied For Print 1. 2. 3.

Headlines (Front page) Editorials Cartoons.

For Broadcast 1. 2. 3.

Themes Phrases Language.

Headlines: The Times of India Front Page (10 July–11 August 2016) S. No. Date

Headline

Space

1

10 July

11 killed, 200 hurt as valley erupts over Wani’s death: centre rushes 1200 paramilitary troops to J&K

4 column

2

11 July

Mob drowns cop in Jhelum, toll now 23 Mehbooba vows to probe whether security-men used excessive force

5column

3

12 July

India hits back as Sharif uses Wani’s Killing to stoke J&K fire 4 column Pak PM Seeks Plebiscite as toll reaches 30

4

13 July

J&K Protestors snatch 70 police guns, build armory Forces Brace for trouble after Friday prayers

3 column

5

14 July

Mehbooba must protect J&K from more bloodshed

1 column

6

15 July

House of the man who leaked Wani’s info razed

1 column

7

16 July

Now, Pak targets PM directly, blames him for J&K violence Cop among 3 more killed in Kashmir-toll 40

4 column

8

17 July

“Gagged”, J&K papers shut down for 3 days

1 column

9

18 July

Center rushes more troops as another protester dies in J&K

2 column

10

19 July

Pak behind J&K Crisis: Rajnath in RS

1 column

11

21 July

PC pitches for more autonomy for Kashmir

1 column

12

3 August

Petrol Bomb Hurled at PDP mantri’s house

1 column

13

6 August

3 killed in fresh firing in Kashmir

1 column

14

7 August

Wani’s father new face of Stir: offers daughter to struggle

2 column

15

9 August

Hizb Kills 3 BSF men to avenge Wani

1 column (continued)

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(continued) S. No. Date

Headline

Space

16

10 August

Human touch missing in J&K, Key to curb unrest SC PM: Sad that Valley youth given stones not laptop

3 column

17

11 August

Willing to talk to moderate groups in Kashmir: Rajnath India ready to discuss only POK with Pak

4 column

Analysing the headlines, it was found that the language used to describe the protestors was highly provocative/offensive describing them as angry, belligerent, unruly and unfazed mob/crowd/protestors. At the same time, the news about the death of security men was given precedence to the death of almost 100 civilians’ lives, thus allowing the discourse to be set from the perspective of state. Headlines like—Mob drowns cop in Jhelum; J&K Protestors snatch 70 police guns, build armoury; Cop among 3 more killed in Kashmir-toll 40—very subtly laid the narrative of how violent the protestors were with the security personnel. On the other hand, mentioning the deaths of civilians as “death of protestors” and not mentioning how and who were responsible for it also created a biased narrative. This only revealed the violent nature of the protestors and not the excesses of the security personnel. According to critical linguistics, in order to find the ideological bias being furthered by language, focus on the absences rather than what is written makes it clear (Fowler et al., 1979). Using the same critical observation, it was found that by focusing on the casualties of the security men and the violent nature of the protestors, a subtle ideological narrative was established by the media which presented the young aggrieved stone pelters in negative light. Headlines: The Indian Express Front Page (10 July–11 August 2016) S.

Date

Headline

Space

1

10 July

11 killed over 200 hurt as Burhan’s death sparks violence, 5 column protests CM calls for peace, cautions against disproportionate force

2

11 July

Cop Killed as protestors push vehicle into Jhelum, toll 21 Rajnath assures help

3

12 July

15 CRPF men injured in grenade attack firefighting in J&K 4 column Rajnath reaches out to Sonia, Omar Pellet takes a toll-92 eye surgeries

4

13 July

Will seek accountability, Says Mehbooba Policemen will be answerable for use of excessive force

5 column

5

14 July

Riding on faith and Army help, Amarnath yatra hits road

3 column

6

16 July

State Killing its own citizens, Self injury of worst sort: IAS 3 column topper from Kashmir 2 died in valley

7

17 July

Kashmir Gagged: Newspaper presses raided, editors says staff held

No.

4 column

3 column (continued)

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(continued) S.

Date

Headline

Space

8

18 July

Thank all for stand on Kashmir, now need to pass GST bill: PM No newspapers for second day running, lines down, restlessness grows in valley

4 column

9

19 July

Will talk to Kashmiris: Govt. in House 6 column 2 killed in fresh firing, Rajnath says forces told to use max restraint

10

20 July

Court order FIR against DSP for killing J&K youth Army regrets killings, says it was self defense Editors refuse to resume publication

2 column

11

22 July

Day 1 of valley schools, gates locked, students & teachers absent

2 column

12

23 July

Mehbooba Govt. must step down: PDP minster’s wife

2 column

13

24 July

Pak’s dream of Kashmir will not be realized till end of eternity: Sushma Of 317 pellet injuries in action by CRPF, 50% have been hit in eye

5 column

14

25 July

No role for 3rd power, want to have emotional bond with Kashmir: Rajnath Behind hot pursuit, hunt for informer who turned cold

5 column

15

26 July

Feel sorry for youth but pellet guns are least lethal option says army chief As rage gets younger, new hotspots emerge in Valley’s island of calm

5 column

16

27 July

How 21 year-old’s killing left behind skeletons of steel in valley town

3 column

17

29 July

J&K CM speaks on July 8 encounter, deaths during protests Sacrifice of Children won’t go waste: Mehbooba Had security men known Burhan was one of three at spot there was chance

5 column

18

31 July

Mehbooba’s dark hour: as Kashmir erupts following Burhan’s Killing, Mehbooba is walking a tight rope again but this time with hands tied

Headline panel

19

4 August

21 years old body found in Srinagar, Pellets inside

1 column

20

6 August

3 killed, 300 injured in fresh clashes in J&K 3 column Hazratbal March stopped Terrorist of one nation, can’t be martyr for another: Rajnath

21

7 August

Lost in Paradise: just another day in Kashmir is often not Ear Panel about school, fun, or games for a child. Violence has cast a long shadow on children of valley

22

9 August

Mehbooba to PM: revive Atal’s dialogue, heal J&K’s wounds

No.

4 column (continued)

168

S. Afshana and H. Din

(continued) S.

Date

Headline

Space

No. 23

10 August Insaniyat, Kashmiryat We walk the road Vajpayee mapped: PM

2 column

In comparison with TOI coverage, The Indian Express gave a more comprehensive coverage both in terms of quantity and balance. While the terminology did not vary much in addressing the protestors, The Indian Express reportage also highlighted the army excesses as well as the violent nature of the mob. Headlines like ‘Of 317 pellet injuries in action by CRPF, 50% have been hit in eye’ (Tiwari, 2016), ‘21 years old body found in Srinagar, Pellets inside’ (Ehsan, 2016a, b),‘Court order FIR against DSP for killing J&K youth’ (Masood, 2016), ‘Army regrets killings, says it was self-defence’ (Ehsan, 2016a, b), helped to present a balanced view of the things on ground by giving voice to both sides. Unlike TOI coverage which mostly focused on violent protestors, The Times of India only published two editorial pieces during the said time period. Editorials S. No. Editorial (The Times of India)

Date

Main theme

1

Healing Touch: It devolves on 13 July everybody to call for calm in Kashmir

Ensuring peace and call for dialogue

2

Kashmir Unrest: Centre must engage in sustained dialogue with all stakeholders

Initiating dialogue with Pakistan as well as Hurriyat

9 August

Both the pieces maintained neutral stand and asked for initiating peace and starting dialogue with all stakeholders including Pakistan and separatists’ faction—Hurriyat. The editorials tried to iterate the importance of dialogue for solving Kashmir and the need for all political parties to work together rather than mudslinging and scoring political points. Here again the role of media as the mediator of the conflict can been seen. However, the sheer lack of in-depth coverage and lack of persistence with which they case were followed by the media and make their own efforts reap no benefits. Furthermore, in the 13 July editorial, labelling shutting down of cinema halls and abundance of extremists’ narrative on social media as factors fuelling the crisis seems short-sighted and loosely explained in the editorial which begets the idea that entertainment avenues and social media policing can somehow control the situation as well as the anger which is deep seated in the backdrop of decades long turmoil the region has seen.

Role of Media in Conflict Management … S.

Editorial (The Indian Express)

169 Date

Theme

No. 1

Shadow in the Valley: violence, 11 July protests after Burhan Wani killing are a grim reminder: Kashmir needs big political steps

1. Disenchantment of Kashmiris is not restricted to few dozen people 2. Questions the fallout after the encounter an

2

Re-engage, Retrieve As Mehbooba Mufti attempts to step up to a grim moment, centre must support her wholeheartedly

1. Follow agenda of alliance in letter and Spirit 2. Need to support PDP govt

3

Living in Denial: Gag on media in 18 July valley shows bankruptcy of ideas in both centre State governments

1. Media Gag in Kashmir 2. Kashmir issue not because of media or entirely because of Pak role but because of years of discontent and failures of successive govts. in addressing it

4

Talking it Over: A dialogue 20 July encompassing all the stakeholders is the way forward in J&K

1. Imp to see state Govt. as an administrative set-up rather than representatives of people’s aspirations 2. Need for dialogue with all stakeholders

5

Mending Fences: Platitudes aside, 26 July centre must take meaningful steps to reach out to the people of Kashmir

Centre should see Kashmir as a political issue and not through development or security prism

6

Kashmir Needs More: Govt. calls for all party meeting, speaks of dialogue. For these to succeed, it needs a political plan

13 July

11 August As long as centre does not address the underlying political issue, the summer of 2016 will keep replaying itself The issue of Kashmir is not tourism or economy, it’s about years of alienation

Analysing The Indian Express editorials, it was found that the editorials largely tried to break away from the jingoistic sentiment and called for rationalistic measures like dialogue with all stakeholders and support of all political parties to find a solution to the Kashmir crisis. The editorials also played a role in creating a discourse which allowed seeing the unrest as a political issue which though was spontaneous but had deep roots in years of alienation and lack of governance by political parties and central governments. Overall, the editorials of The Indian Express perfectly tried to sum up the measures needed to be taken in order to see a solution through and not put the matter in the familiar overtones of economic and tourism issues.

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Political Cartoons The Times of India published a total of six political cartoons from the said period of 10 July–11 August 2016. However, it needs to be mentioned that the cartoons sometimes were used as illustrations for news stories as well as opinion and editorials pieces, while The Indian Express only published three political cartoons in the said period. S. No. The Times of India Cartoons

Main theme

1

By Sandeep Adhwaryu: Depicting Separatists stoking the fire & unrest on separatists paying homage to Kashmiri behest of young boys who take up guns Youth who have taken up guns. With the and lose their lives subtext that dead Kashmiri Youth saying “I Sink” and Separatists paying homage answering “therefore I am”

2

By Sandeep Adhwaryu: Depicting Rajnath No clear-cut policy on Kashmir Unrest by trying to formulate policy of NDA to Central Govt control Kashmir Unrest by calling Sonia Gandhi to ask what was UPA’s policy and copy pasting the same under NDA banner

3

By Sandeep Adhwaryu: Depicting Mehbooba speaking to Rajnath over phone on his desire to visit Kashmir and Mehbooba offering him to stay in an “ivory tower” as high as Qutub Minar which was built by incessant supply of stones. The cartoon also shows boys throwing stones at the tower

Using the metaphor of living in an ivory tower, cartoonist is mocking the state of aloofness of centre and state Govt. with which they are addressing the Kashmir unrest

4

By Ajit Ninan: Depicting Rajnath completely surrounded by security-men with guns while saying “we want emotional ties with Kashmir-forces won’t use pellet against youth”

The cartoonist has used irony as a tool to send the message that centre wants emotional connection with Kashmir while alienating itself behind guns

5

By Ajit Ninan: Depicting India’s Kickstart The cartoonist tries to show the end of foreign policy where J&K is seen kicking talks as well as staunch stand by India on Hafiz Saeed, a terrorist and a politician cross border terrorism with Pak flag on their behinds and a symbol of heart with Indian tri-colour on it in the foreground

6

By Sandeep Adhwaryu: Depicting a Kashmiri sitting on top of parliament house with his back pierced by pellets wounds and a saffron colored pen drawing a heart shape on the back of the Kashmiri by joining the dots. With a caption “We love Kashmir” and Parliament connects dots of Kashmir unrest

The cartoonist has used irony to point the double-speak that centre iterated on non-lethality of pellet guns and the statement that we love Kashmir

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The cartoons published by The Times of India were loaded with satire, irony and metaphors that sometimes provided a much-needed critical commentary and sometimes gave a provocative narrative to the entire situation on ground. The cartoon by Sandeep Adhwaryu using the metaphor of ‘Ivory Tower’ perfectly summed up the approach of government towards the unrest or the cartoon where a heart shape symbol was drawn on pellet hit back of a Kashmir Youth, with the message “we love Kashmir” points to the irony that the same government which is endorsing the use of pellet guns, which blinded close to 100 young lives, is also claiming to love Kashmir. On the other hand, the cartoon by Sandeep, which shows separatists are using young Kashmiris as baits to keep themselves alive, is quiet provocative. The cartoons managed to cut away from the mainstream narrative and critically analysed the event, calling out both sides for their lack of intention in solving the crisis. This made the coverage of cartoons radically different from the print coverage. S.

The Indian Express Cartoons

Main theme

No. 1

By Unny: Depicting Unny’s main character The cartoonist has tried to show where the telling Modi “Truly Gandhian task await BJP’s main agenda was in J&K, even from Kashmir to…! While Modi is shown when the unrest was unfolding carrying a bag with Jammu written on it

2

By Unny: Depicting Rajnath check-listing Sonia and Omar Abdullah on J&K and Unny’s character saying “Even Swamy has helped by not tweeting so far”

The cartoonist has tried to show an apprehensive Rajnath who is trying to control Kashmir Unrest by check-listing talking to Sonia and Omar. While Unny’s main character takes a jibe by saying even the blunt Subramaniam Swamy has helped by not tweeting on the issue so far (continued)

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S. Afshana and H. Din

(continued) S.

The Indian Express Cartoons

Main theme

By Unny: Depicting Unny’s main character telling Mehbooba to stick to mainstream as things got better with a Irom Sharmila placard in hand

Published on the day when Irom Sharmila broke her fast and announced to join politics, the cartoonist uses the same event to drive the message of Mehbooba to stick it out

No. 3

Analysing the cartoons, it was found that The Indian Express cartoons were not much loaded or provocative. The cartoonist tried to subtly use the symbols and signs in the cartoons to drive the message home. The cartoons were light and not overly critical as compared to TOI cartoons. The Indian Express cartoons lacked any substantial commentary or punch which would have established an alternate narrative.

Detailed Analysis of Parameters Studied for Broadcast Media Themes: Phrases The Newshour Debate Coverage S. No.

Date

Title

Theme

1

11 July

Hafiz Saeed and Syed Salahuddin Stop Romanticizing terrorists March to Wagah Border

2

11 July

Kashmir clashes due to death of terrorist Burhan Wani

Is Pakistan’s backing of terror official line now?

3

12 July

Nawaz Sharif supports terrorist Burhan Wani

Pakistan’s double standard between Kashmir issue and that of Balochistan

4

18 July

Battle between Kashmiri separatists and India

Why give any credibility and legitimacy to separatists by engaging in talks with them?

5

18 July

Should Political Parties stay united on Kashmir

Divergent views on Kashmir Issue as threat to national interest

6

26 July

How to deal with Pro Pakistanis and Anti Indians?

Pseudo liberals who question the credibility of army or for talks with Pak are anti-nationals

7

28 July

Terrorist Hafiz Saeed with Asiya Andrabi started Kashmir Clashes

If terror and protests in Kashmir are home grown, why would Hafiz Saeed be exhorting people in Pak to help people of Kashmir? (continued)

Role of Media in Conflict Management …

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(continued) S. No.

Date

Title

8

1 August

Hafiz Saeed and Syed Salahuddin Pakistan’s role in supporting terror in March to Wagah Border Kashmir and raising question of Kashmir unrest being homegrown

Theme

9

9 August

PM Modi Speaks on Kashmir Issue

Development key to solving Kashmir issue and not separatism or being soft on Geelani or Burhan Wani

10

10 August

Should India trust Kashmiri Separatists leaders

Why should separatists be engaged in talks?

The Buck Stops Here Coverage S. No. Date

Title

Theme

1

11 July

“Stop Eulogizing Terrorists”, India warns Pak: The Burhan Wani aftermath

Is Delhi in Denial? Wasn’t this crisis waiting to happen?

2

12 July

Kashmir Crisis: PM appeals for calm, restraint

When will peace return to Valley? What strategies can Govt. adopt to restore normalcy

3

13 July

From ground zero: Wounded Valley: Who will bring healing touch to Kashmir?

Moral, ethical and tactical questions raised by the use of pellet guns

4

14 July

PDP leaders say probe Burhan Wani killing-playing with fire?

Is PDP playing with fire by questioning Burhan Wani encounter?

5

18 July

Have tea with Kashmiris not Nawaz, Sena tells PM Modi: No healing touch for Valley

Has the Prime Minister wasted political capital across the border rather than spend it at home?

6

19 July

Modi-Mehbooba alliance frightens Kashmiris, A grave provocation: Chidambaram

Chidambaram views on Kashmir crisis

7

19 July

Burhan encounter may have been extra-judicial: PDP lawmaker’s shocker

PDP lawmakers views on Burhan encounter

8

28 July

Mehbooba on Burhan Wani; Hafiz Saeed provokes: PM Modi’s Pak policy confused?

Is the Modi government’s Pakistan policy cohesive or confused? Has the government now turned a ‘dove’on Pakistan?

9

4 August

Rajnath Packs A Punch, Pak Back to Kashmir Rant: Will PM Modi change Policy?

Will blacking out of Rajnath’s speech in SAARC mark a shift in Prime Minister Modi’s Pakistan initiative?

10

8 August

Kashmir needs first aid but doctor PM’s silence on Kashmir issue watching tamasha, PM must speak: Ghulam Nabi Azad (continued)

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S. Afshana and H. Din

(continued) S. No. Date

Title

Theme

11

8 August

Mehbooba to PM Modi, ‘Start the Dialogue’: Will he do a Vajpayee on Kashmir?

Will PM Modi break silence on Kashmir? Will he take part in the Kashmir debate? And are Ms. Mufti and PM Modi on the same page on Kashmir?

12

9 August

‘India’s Azaadi is your Azaadi’: Can PM Modi’s words heal wounded Kashmir?

Can PM speech bring healing touch to wounded valley?

13

10 August Kashmir Burning, Rajnath Singh blames Pakistan: Can Delhi build bridges?

Will parliament resolution heal the wounded Valley? And is Delhi still in denial on internal turmoil?

Analysing the themes debated on both the shows, it was found that both the shows offered and focused on different issues related to the unrest. The Newshour debate took a radical stance, where it labelled involving separatist faction in Kashmir in peace process as anti-national and pro-Pak, while The Buck Stops Here took a more humanistic and people-oriented approach. The anchor in the Newshour Debate clearly made the analogy of anyone questioning the army’s role in Kashmir or the Burhan Wani encounter as being antinational. While the debate on The Newshour was titled to be on Kashmir issue, the debate mostly focused on role of Pakistan in fuelling fires in Kashmir and questioning Pakistan’s raising the Kashmir issue, when it is following similar policy in Balochistan. The coverage on The Newshour debate majorly revolved around taking a hard stand on terror, so much so that the show opposed any kind of dialogue process with separatists in valley. In another debate titled “How to deal with Pro-Pakistanis and Anti-Indians”, the anchor debated the irrational approach of some pseudo-liberals who are questioning the authenticity of Burhan Wani encounter or questioning army excesses. Towards the end, the anchor draws the conclusion that, “we have proven Indian army was vilified. Anyone self-doubting, Burhan Wani is flaunting Pakistan’s narrative and is a symbol of terrorists movement in Kashmir”. Such statement further had the potential to flare up the situation in Kashmir, where while the anchor was drawing battle lines, more than 100 eye surgeries were performed within first week of the unrest itself due to the use of pellet guns. On the other hand, the coverage by NDTV’s The Buck Stops Here tried to present a balanced coverage showing both the sides of the story. The show not only allowed nationalist voices to be heard but also allowed voices like Mirwaiz Farooq, Chairman of the All Jammu and Kashmir Awami Action Committee, also a separatist’s voice, to be heard on the show. The coverage in The Buck Stops Here usually was preceded by a news capsule regarding the situation on ground, which allowed the viewers to have proper context of situations on ground before the debate on Kashmir unrest actually started. Another point that needs to be highlighted in The Buck Stops Here’s coverage is the breaking the “Us v/s Them” binary that many media houses sought to give

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precedence to. In one of the debates, when the spokesperson of BJP implied that people who are creating trouble in Kashmir should be flushed out as rats, the anchor of the showed emphatically replied to the politician by saying, ‘these boys who are being blinded on streets are also our boys, who belong to this country. If we believe Kashmir is an integral part of India, we should treat it that way also’.

Phrases ‘#united-against-terror, Hurriyat or Kashmiryat, #Pro Pak Doves Silent, Pak spreads terror, #open Pak terror push, why should India engage with separatists when every time they have betrayed the initiative of dialogue by endorsing violence, why should there be any scope for engagement with separatists, when they have continually festered unrest in valley? Why give credibility to a group of people who glorify and romanticize terrorism? Why give credibility to a group of people who have repeatedly called for boycott of elections? Why give credibility to a group of people who try to incite hate against India by describing terrorists as freedom fighters? If terror and protests in Kashmir are homegrown, why would Hafiz Saeed be exhorting people in Pakistan to help people of Kashmir?’—These are few of the phrases and captions flashed across. The Newshour Debates from 10 July to 11 August 2016—These clearly point to the radical stand with which Times Now approached the Kashmir unrest. On the other hand, phrases like #wounded valley; New age militancy, old age solutions; Between battle lines; Why are Kashmiri toppers becoming terrorists? The Kashmir crisis-is Delhi in denial?; Burhan, headmaster’s son, face of new militancy; Where is healing touch?; Pellets: Non-lethal weapons, lethal injuries; Lack of vision in Kashmir: Pellet guns take a toll flashed across NDTV’s show The Buck Stops Here. There is a clear shift in the tones in both the coverage; NDTV’s tone if not neutral, was not radical either.

Conclusion Analysing all the parameters for both print and broadcast, the findings led to the conclusion that the sections of media themselves were at loggerheads when it came to forming an editorial policy on Kashmir unrest. The coverage oscillated between radical stand by Times Now and sometimes by The Times of India which solely blamed Pakistan raking up the Kashmir unrest and adding fuel to the fire. Times Now particularly played the nationalistic card many a times and went up to calling people with opposite views as anti-nationals and pro-Pakistan. On the other hand, media houses like The Indian Express and NDTV through their coverage tried to present a balanced reportage of the situation on ground and gave opportunities to both the radical and liberal voices.

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Throughout the study, it was found that the mainstream media is divided and offering polarized information. While one section of media literally launched a battle cry, other section of media opted for a neutral stand. It must be mentioned here that if media has to opt for playing a crucial role in conflict management, then media cannot be neutral towards peace, it has to be propeace, which was missing in the majority of the reportage under the study. While some factions of the media (NDTV and Indian Express) tried to lay the ground of peace through dialogue but due to lack of persistence in following the approach, the peace discourse was lost. This can partly be attributed to radical stand of the other faction of the media (Times Now) whose harsh stand and ultra-nationalistic sentiment made it hard for other media groups to create a middle ground whereby media could have played an active role in managing the conflict. Rather the study finds that the media under this study failed to play any active role in conflict management. It either mostly adopted a neutral stand where it merely played the role of imparting information and statistics or donned the role of an instigator which slanted towards aggression than conflict resolution.

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Jakosben, P. (2000). Focus on the CNN effect misses the point: The real media impact on conflict management is invisible and indirect. Journal of Peace Research, 37(2), 131–143. Jason, B. (2011). Kashmir unmarked graves hold thousands of bodies. Guardian. http://www.the guardian.com/world/2011/aug/21/kashmir-unmarked-graves-thousands-bodies Kashmir profile, NNC, November 26, 2014. www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11693674 Khalid, W. (2015). Media propaganda and the Kashmir dispute: A case study of the Kashmir floods. Reuters Institute Fellowship Paper, University of Oxford. Kull, S. (1995). What the public knows that Washington doesn’t. Foreign Policy, 101, 102–115. Masood, B. (2016). Kashmir unrest: Court orders FIR against DSP for ‘killing’ J&K youth. Indian Express. Retrieved from: https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/kashmir-pro test-burhan-wani-killed-youth-death-indian-army-2924781/ Milián, N. I., Aspa, R. J. M., Arestizábal, U. P., García, U. J., Ariño, V. A., & Ariño, V. M. (2019). Alert 2019! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding. Escola de Cultura de Pau. Nandal, S., Randeep. (2011). State data refutes claim of 1 lakh killed in kashmir. Times of india. Retrieved from: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/state-data-refutes-claim-of-1-lakh-kil led-inkashmir/articleshow/8918214.cms Olajide, O. (2011). Towards the resolution of conflict for research and sustainable development in the developing countries: The role of libraries and information centers. International Journal of Library and Information Science, 3(9), 195–198. Praeger, N. (1994). Armed conflicts and diplomatic crises. Politics and Public Policy, Working Paper, 94(1). Puddephatt, A. (2006). Voices of war: Conflict and the role of the media, report, April 2006. © International media support. International media support. Randeep, S. N. (2011). State data refutes claim of 1 lakh killed in Kashmir. The Times of India, June 20, 2011. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/state-data-refutes-claim-of-1-lakh-killed-inkashmir/arti-cleshow/8918214.cms. Seaton, J. (Eds.). (1999). The media of conflict (p. 276). Zed Books. Spencer, G. (2004). The impact of television news on Northern Ireland peace negotiations. Media, culture & society, 26(5), 603–623. The death of a militant sparks fury but little change. The Economist. Thompson, M. (1999). Forging war: The media in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (2nd edn.). University of Luton Press. Tiwary, D. (2016). Kashmir unrest: Of 317 with pellet injuries in action by CRPF, over 50 per cent have been hit in eye. Indian Express. Retrieved From: https://indianexpress.com/article/ india/india-news-india/kashmir-unrest-of-317-with-pellet-injuries-in-action-by-crpf-over-50per-cent-have-been-hit-in-eye-2932343/

The Development Narratives in South Asia: A Case Study of Print Media Vijay Kumar Soni and Sadananda Sahoo

Introduction Development has been variously defined depending on disciplinary approaches. But when we talk about a geographical region or a natural contagious zone, the algorithm of development changes. It considers a much larger, encompassing view of the concept. It becomes more expansive than national development. It includes the interconnectedness among the nations. Here, the history of regional cooperation and ‘friendliness’ and ‘enmity’ comes to impact the present-day perception about developmental issues. The historical infrastructural development coupled with political will of the stakeholders comes to play a deterministic role in giving fillip to further development. In the case of South Asia, this cannot be far from the truth, as these nations form natural geographical nation states, of which economic development is the beginning of the forgone conclusion. Another striking feature is that a large number of these South Asian nations have traditionally been a laboratory for the colonial powers and the footprint of their policies could be traced even today. In the globalized economy, human capital has come to play a critical role, especially in the knowledge-driven economy. Here again, we see a lopsided view of the development. While India has significantly taken a stride in harnessing its human capital, other South Asian countries have either lagged behind or have stuck to their traditional economic strength, or else have capitalized on their geopolitical locations. Bangladesh, for example, has become a global hub of garment manufacturing without scaling up its human capital, resulting in the loss of value-added bargaining power in the global trade. Likewise, Afghanistan can be seen exploiting its geopolitical location to garner developmental grants by aligning with global powers from time to time, without developing a valuable economic activity for itself. There have been

V. K. Soni · S. Sahoo (B) IGNOU, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Rahman and N. Tiwari (eds.), Development, Governance and Gender in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-5109-0_12

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political uncertainties in Afghanistan and Nepal, and the pangs of their suffering have been long and arduous. If a nation takes its regional responsibility seriously, then the onus of its neighbours’ smooth transition to democracy lies with them. In the dominant player of the region like India, democratic institutions have developed strong and deep roots. India, Pakistan and Bangladesh have to play a much larger, proactive role in their neighbours’ transformation rather than unstabilizing any such attempt as in the case of Nepal and Afghanistan. Shiv Visvanathan has aptly expressed the moral responsibility of India in his book Theatres of Democracy (2016, HarperCollins, New Delhi) when he says, “The caution might say that silence is a sign of maturity. But caution is a failure of the moral imagination. We let down democracy in Myanmar, treated electoral democracy in Nepal with contempt…our eyes are too focused on a United Nations Security Council seat where we will exchange ethics for table manners”. Unfortunately, South Asian countries have been living in their own self-believed ghettos rather than looking at the larger picture of regional development. As we know, development and democracy do not stop at the border and need nourishment from the soil across the border as well. For the development of a region, traditional hostility needs to be put on the backburner lest it destroys the peace and jeopardizes the development. It is here that media and communication networks come to play either a constructive or destructive role as it has happened in the case of India and Pakistan. Our media has been shrill and silly about Pakistan. I can understand its angst against a rogue state, a military regime that was always in cahoots with militarism and fundamentalism. The Pakistan regime has always encouraged crime and terror in India…(But) Pakistan as a society has suffered more from terror than India. (Visvanathan, 2016)

How can regional peace and development be achieved? The author suggests creating new structures of law for South Asia, an alternative idea of knowledge, creating a constructive role of religion in societies. The countries of South Asia need to look into creating dual citizenship, common academic platforms, open trade collaborative projects and porous borders for people to float across the border. Bollywood, sports and folklore are other integrating cements of cohesiveness (Visvanathan, 2016). India needs a theory of lived peace if this is to be a South Asian century. An Indian century without a sense of South Asia is an abomination.” However, the ground realities suggest that South Asian countries have not been able to make best use of its optimum resources for regional development, an example could be cited of our academic institution. “We have a SAARC university but an object created by administrative fiat is born half dead. We need to redream it as South Asian University to create alternative metaphors, new attitude of peace, ecology and civilization. (Visvanathan, 2016)

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Rationale for the Study Media plays a significant role in creating the perception in the minds of people. The same stands true in the development narrative of South Asia. The national mass media while catering to the information needs of citizens more often than not give precedence to local news, which have the power of grabbing the eyeball. As a consequence, regional developmental issues are either given less importance or are ignored all together. Public opinion is easily formed on issues, which are given wide coverage by the local media. “Most media operate on national agendas set by the elite of the nation rather than the information need of the masses” (McCombs and Shaw, 2004). The contexts in which news stories are set, the juxtaposition of headline, narrative and the accompanying photographs, the staging of the photographs and the wider debates to which these elements refer. We argue that rather than being descriptive and neutral, such instances are almost always contained within a framing narrative (Said, 2007). In South Asia, people who are at the helm of power and have vested interest often determine the framing and media narratives. Such media manoeuvring is more common in countries, which have authoritarian and communist regime or are influenced by it. In the past, there have been several attempts to beef up trade ties and bilateral relationships between the South Asian nations, but only few and sporadic attempts have been made to develop a strong and robust people-to-people communication network and to make them stakeholders in the developmental story. It is these gaps which this study sets forth to bridge and suggest measures to re-energize ‘development communication’ dialogue.

Objectives of the Study The research work focuses on examining the causal relationship between the media coverage and the regional development. It identifies the issues, which dominate the national and regional discourse in the media and the reasons behind its dominance. It also examines the social and political issues and their impact on the development of the region. Thus, the objectives of the study are as follows: a. b. c.

To investigate the relationship between media content and local, national and regional development To understand the role of media in disseminating developmental stories To find the pattern and compare the narratives in the dominant South Asia media.

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Methodology To explore the dichotomy between communication network and regional development critically, the study selected two leading print media of the eight South Asian countries to examine the coverage of news, features and narrative stories. As there was less coverage of regional developmental stories by small and medium newspapers (which largely covers local news for local consumptions), the study selected leading national newspapers so as to have larger sample base. It was a cautious decision that the two leading print media do not belong to the same media house so as to avoid owners’ prejudices and bias. The study also provides the latest available circulation figures of these newspapers to give a fair idea about its reach among the masses. To avoid falling into the trap of regional choices, we have chosen dailies with varied editorial approach and editorial content. The method of searching for South Asian developmental stories was based on the internal search engine of the newspapers by using the key words ‘South Asia’ and analysing the number of stories and content to reach out an estimation of the news/features covered for the period of 3 months, starting from 1 February to 11 April 2017. Where the internal search engine was either ineffective or yielded erroneous results, the researchers made use of either Google Search engine or archival stories of the newspapers. In one of the instances, the time frame was compressed because of the unavailability of the data, within the specified period. The study has used content analysis for an in-depth understanding of the editorial content. After analysing the data, the study offers suggestions for greater synergy, by using state-of-the-art technologies, in reaching out to policy-makers for effective communication vis-a-vis development paradigm. The study after analysing the collected data has classified the information in two broad groups. While the dominant group forms a club of five countries, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, the other group includes countries like Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives. There were three reasons why this grouping was the basis of the natural selection—first, countries having a similar geographical location and sharing a contiguous national boundary; second, their political and economic influence; and third, the strength of their media presence.

The Class, the Capital and the Development The foreign policies of most South Asian countries are limited to their national needs and are often determined by historical and political exigencies. There was almost complete absence of regional policies, which could delineate the working relationship with the rest of the globalized world. An example could be cited of labour and manpower workforce, of which South Asian countries become an easy prey. “Globalisation has (made) capital freer to traverse the globe than ever before…that

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the prosperity of the First World depends on the freedom of ‘global’ capital while its privileges depend on the control of global labour (Khair, 2016)”. One of the reasons for the underdevelopment of South Asia, as cited by the economist, is its lack of developed capitalist modes of production. South Asia, for historical reasons, has not been as fortunate as Europe in accumulation of capital as it fell victim of colonization spree of Western nations. The other reason was that while Europe was able to do away its surplus human population by sending them to colonies, which again worked as instruments of capital accumulation, the South Asian countries were in no position to sell their labour at a competitive rate. There is yet another angle from the growth of bourgeoisie in Europe which was conspicuously lacking in South Asia. It is the bourgeoisie who played an exploitative role and was instrumental in capital formation. There was no such social class in South Asia, except the middle trading class who were loosely connected with each other through caste, kinship, religious belief and occupational practices. Third world and fourth world countries have undeveloped or underdeveloped modes of capitalist production. This combined with the lack of historically favourable conditions for the development of Europe-style capitalism leaves these countries with a small and insecure bourgeoisie, which does not have the success or wealth to incorporate or force the other classes to accept its hegemony. (Khair, 2016)

The question that has often been debated is about the form, structure and the type of development best suited for the South Asian nations. The capitalist model of the West and the concept of modernity have had its own disastrous consequences. The development model that is most favoured for South Asia is the one based on regional ethos and the aspirations of people as it has higher sustenance abilities than the one superficially imposed from outside. These days, media conversation is mainly preoccupied with the success of Asian countries (China and India) and the mention of South Asia hardly finds a place in the global discussion. It is the economic power of the nations that catches media attention and not the poverty, alienation or underdevelopment. “Rising Asia is something you see in Western Journalism all the time. It is like China’s rise” (Bilal, 2016). The above discussion about Asia’s position in the geopolitics economy highlights two vital aspects of the regional development, which is directly proportional to the size of the region and more importantly its impact on the world affair. South Asia is home to 1.67 billion people and 40% of the world’s global poor population. On the other side, the share of its contribution to the global trade is as low as 1%. The intraregional trade accounts for a mere 5% as compared to 25% of the ASEAN and 60% of the European countries. South Asia also happens to be least integrated region in the world. For a country like India, the cost of trading with Brazil is cheaper by 20% than trading with Pakistan (World Bank, 2016). South Asia also happens to be the least open among all the regions of the world and does not contribute significantly to the world trade (Batra, 2013). The reasons for low intraregional trade are stringent transborder trade regulations, poor infrastructural and logistic facilities, lack of political will and historical mistrust have eaten the vitals of the mutual cooperation.

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The Future of Flashpoint There are two distinctive and striking features of South Asia, which demarcate it from the rest of the world. First, 30.6% of Muslims live in South Asia, which is the largest population of Muslims in the world. Second, the region is highly militarized and has often been called a nuclear flashpoint because of India and Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities. Third, the region also happens to be highly strife torn and a focal point of armed conflict. From Baluchistan in Pakistan to Kashmir and Northeast in India, Tamil struggle in Sri Lanka; Islamism in Bangladesh and Islamic radicalism in Afghanistan, the region has become a theatre of destabilizing forces. In South Asia, as elsewhere in the world, military occupation “increasingly informs the politics of both democracies and dictatorships, capitalist and formerly socialist regimes, raising questions about its relationship to sovereignty and the nation state form” (Visweswaran, 2013). While military spending across the globe has been declining for the third running year, it is on the rise in Asia (SIPRI, 2015). The result of rising military expenditures within three major South Asian countries—India, Pakistan and Bangladesh—has reflected the increased use of the military within state borders, on their own citizens (Kazi, 2014). It is no secret that during the Afghan War, more than 15,000 Arabs, Uzbeks and Chechens were settled in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) to fight a ‘holy war’ against the Soviets across the border in Afghanistan (Rana et al., 2010). And it is the poverty, poor governance and the structural weaknesses of the state, which have all contributed to the rise of religious extremism in South Asia (Bari, 2010). The dislocation and displacement of people in South Asia have also assumed a permanent narrative. In Pakistan, five million people have been displaced since 2004. Sadly, as Laxmi Murthy, in Introduction to Garrisoned Minds: Women and Militarisation in South Asia (Speaking Tiger, New Delhi) says, “the daily misery of a displaced people does not make it to the front pages of a media saturated with sensational stories of horror.” In Balochistan, Murthy says, acute poverty, unemployment, malnutrition and illiteracy have fuelled numerous separatist armed movements and counter-insurgency operations. “The media in Balochistan is vulnerable to attack merely for reporting from the ground about death and disappearance, disease and delivery.” A more worrying recent development, as pointed by some of the experts, has been the filtration of militarization in popular culture. Armed control and rebellion have become a permanent discourse in South Asian popular media. As Murthy says, “What we are witnessing in South Asia today is a growing culture of occupation” and what scholar Cynthia Enloe describes as ‘an increasing diffusion of military ideas into social working. The military is used as an arm of civil governance in territorially remote regions’ (Siddiqa, 2007). The reference, she is citing, is that of Kashmir and North East India, which are both remote and have huge presence of Indian armed forces.

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But it must be pointed out that it is a fallacy that needs to be corrected. Historically and traditionally, armed forces were used to govern far-flung areas by early empires of the Indian subcontinent. The Mauryans (322–185 B.C.E.), the Gupta Dynasty (320–550 CE), the Mughals (1526–1857) and even the British had their armies and provincial governors posted at the frontiers, who controlled and administered these areas. The concept of Mansabdari and Jagirdari system during the Mughal period combined the twin responsibilities of civil governance and as a provider of armed forces to the central pool of imperial forces. The armed forces were often used, not only against external aggressors, but also in quelling the internal rebellions. Unfortunately, South Asia has now emerged as a haven for terror outfits, especially after the 9/11 attack, leading to congregation of Al Qaeda, Taliban, ISIS and other Islamists forces, which hog media limelight by its terror acts. Human survivals in such cases assume larger significance than the development narrative of the region. The media, especially the print media, is influenced by larger narrative of militarization, which directly impact the polity, the society and the media itself. In fact, in conflict zones where militarization is strong, freedom of press is often compromised. Embedded journalism, which became a common phenomenon during the invasion of Iraq in 2003, is a good example of how media operating in conflict zones is impacted. This is equally true for the South Asian countries. Another aspect that directly impacts the media and its editorial freedom is its ownership. The space the media owners share with the politico-economic-military elites directly reflects in its operation. As a result, media often falls an easy prey to manipulation and propaganda controlled by the privileged and the economically powerful. The history and growth of media in South Asia share a colonial and feudal legacy.

Footsteps of Communication But despite the regional strife for greater access and control of natural resources, the Indian subcontinent was integrated with major civilizations and regional powers, whether on the East or the West of the globe. The ancient sea trade route to South East Asia for spice trade, the Silk Route, the roads travelled by Anbdur Razzaq, Alberuni, Fa-Hien, Hiuen-Tsang, Ibn Batuta helped in opening communication network to far-flung areas. These trade routes were precursors of modern transport network. Religion and trade played an important role in the development of communication network. Buddhism was transmitted with growing energy by the Sogdian merchants who played a vital role in linking China with the Indus Valley. These were traveling merchants from the heart of Central Asia, classic middlemen whose own close-knit networks and use of credit left them ideally positioned to dominate long-distance trade. (Frankopan, 2015)

The trading of silk from China and horses from Central Asia and the spices from the South East Asia opened new trade routes and communication networks. Here,

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what we witness is a communication network formed as a natural corollary to regional and transgeographical development. This is evident in the early trade routes, which linked transcivilization cultures and were responsible for the development of empires and the regions, including the South Asia region. The second archetype of communication network can be traced back to medieval and premodern phase during which navigational connectivity preceded industrial development of colonial Europe. During this phase, communication network was followed by massive deprivation of European colonies, resulting in unprecedented prosperity of European nation states on the other hand. The discovery of sea route to India by Vasco da Gama and that of America by Christopher Columbus during the fifteenth century are examples of communication network preceding the development of European nation states. In the third and the final model, one can see the augmentation of communication network and regional development to achieve the next-generation network connectivity and material prosperity. The examples of European Union, BRICS, SAFTA are some of the examples, which offer insight into twentieth-century communication network. The formation of economic unions is based on the principle of mutual interest and cooperation of the nations involved. Such artificially formed unions, however, are not always successful when national interest starts overriding the regional interest as it happened in the case of Brexit, when Britain voted to withdraw itself from the European Union’s economic bracket. A recent case of regional cooperation in developing communication network came to the fore with the launch of South Asia Communication Satellite, GSAT-9 by India in May this year. It was a giant step in regional cooperation as heads of the states of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives came together on a common platform to hail the new opportunity. Earlier named as SAARC Satellite, the name was changed to South Asia Satellite as Pakistan walked out of the project after India said that it would “build, launch and operate the satellite solely”. However, it did not dampen the regional spirit as Indian Prime Minister said, “Even sky is not the limit when it comes to regional cooperation. As governments, our most important task is to secure growth, development and peace for our people and communities…when we join hands and mutually share the fruits of knowledge, technology and growth, we can speed up our development and prosperity”. The GSAT-9 is a communication satellite with Ku band transponders and can be used by South Asian countries for broadcast services, tele-medicines and teleeducation and direct to home TV viewing. Critics have cited it as an exercise in “neighbourhood diplomacy” to keep China out of the gambit of regional control. China has already helped Pakistan and Sri Lanka in launching communication satellite and its further inroads into South Asia could have been detrimental to India’s influence in the region. The above issue also highlights the fact that new attempts to regional cooperation are hijacked by changing geopolitical realities on the ground.

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Data Collection IPABS—India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka. For studying the coverage of developmental stories of South Asia in Indian media, we selected two leading newspapers, The Times of India and The Hindustan Times. While the Times of India is the fourth-largest circulated dailies in India with a circulation of more than 27 lakhs (ABC, 2016), Hindustan Times has a circulation of more than 11.6 lakhs (ABC, 2015), the figures include both the print and digital edition of the broadsheet. In the Times of India, there were in total 77 articles with the key word ‘South Asia’, out of which 27 stories were related to terror which included violence and killings in Afghanistan and Pakistan and bomb blast in Bangladesh. The politics segment was dominated by Bangladesh PM Sheikh Hasina’s visit to India. The articles on economy and developmental issues received least priority with 2 and 3, respectively. The three articles that could be categorized under South Asia were SAARC countries pull up Pakistan, ask it to pay up $7.85 mn for South Asian University, Pakistan skips South Asian speakers’ summit and China ‘Silk Road’ project in Sri Lanka delayed. In the Hindustan Times, there were 29 articles related to South Asia, out of which the majority could be categorized under terror-related news, including blasts, attacks and the bloggers’ death in Bangladesh. Surprisingly, there were some four articles, a higher share of the total related to exclusive South Asian News. The internal search engine of Hindustan Times did not show the stories prior to 27 February. So, it was one of the reasons why there was less number of stories. The period covered was between 27 February and 11 April 2017, and it included the following: UK’s South Asian restaurants feel betrayed by Brexit, China will fight back India’s attempts to sour our South Asia ties: State media, US issues travel warning to its citizens heading to South Asia, it has become dangerous to be a blogger or a journalist in South Asia and Indo-Pak dispute hampering regional cooperation: Musharraf. Dawn is an English daily published from Islamabad, Karachi and Lahore and has a circulation of 109,000, as per the 2010 audit report. It had 19 stories related to South Asia during the period under consideration. Majorities of the articles and news were related to political events in New Delhi. Surprisingly, it mentions only one terror and one South Asia story related to nuclear race in the region. Although there were number of news related to terror, they were categories under the ‘Nation’ section as the newspaper caters to local national audience. The result yielded one story: ‘Pakistan, India, China, US part of South Asia’s N-puzzle’. Published from Karachi and Lahore, Pakistan Observer has a daily circulation of 150,000. The internal search engine of the newspaper was most efficient of all the newspapers studied on the subject. It showed very specific and only articles/news, which had South Asia as part of its headline. Some of the news covered included: South Asia: Disputed borders hindering growth, East Asia far ahead of South Asia, CPEC to boost Pakistan’s role in South Asia: Marriyum, Resolution of Kashmir issue essential for durable peace in South Asia: Irfan, People of entire South Asia to benefit from CPEC: Bao, Kashmir lies at heart of tension in South Asia: US Study, Pakistan

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enjoys most conspicuous strategic locations in South Asia, PPAF wins South Asia Procurement Innovation award, Kashmir resolution must for peace in South Asia and Trump’s policy vis-à-vis South Asia. The daily Outlook Afghanistan is the first English daily published from Afghanistan and has a circulation of 10,000. The website of the newspaper does not have an internal search engine. So, the researcher had to resort to Google Search engine to fish out stories related to South Asia. The researcher could find only one story for the period under study ‘Women can Play A Greater Role in Realizing South Asia’s Potential’. Established in 1962, Kabul Times was the first English language newspaper in Afghanistan. There was no information about its circulation figure. Unlike Outlook Afghanistan, the Kabul Times had a better categorization and segregation of stories. It covered 41 news/feature stories out of which only two related to South Asia. CE meets new SAARC Secretary General and Afghanistan seeking regional support to fight terrorism. The Daily Star, published from Dhaka, is the leading English newspaper with a circulation of more than 41,000 copies. It had only four news stories under the South Asia tag for the period under studies. The stories were—Women in parliament: Nepal tops South Asian countries, Human Rights in South Asia, Myanmar joins ADB’s South Asia economic body and Pakistan to boycott South Asian Speakers’ meet in India. The Daily Sun is another English newspaper published from Bangladesh. While searching for South Asian developmental stories, there was a snag in the internal search engine of the website. The result showed the following four stories for the period 10 April–12 April 2017: Dhaka, Delhi for early finalization of reports on BCIM-EC Study Group, Kalboishakis storms a threat to South Asia, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina stresses fraternity among South Asian nations for prosperity, Deals signed with India for welfare of people, region: Prime Minister and SAARC expert consultation meet begins at BAU. The Daily Mirror is an English daily published from Sri Lanka. The internal search engine was not very effective in searching South Asia news/stories, as it showed Page not found error after the first page, which listed articles till April 3, 2017. The given search could yield only news related to South Asia and the researchers had to make use of Google search engine for the remaining two news for the period under study. The stories were Global challenges to South Asia, India’s Asian integration strategy and Sri Lanka is a key growth market in South Asia for General Electric: CEO. Ceylon Today, another English daily of Sri Lanka, not only showed more South Asia stories on the internal search engine but also relevant news/features. Some of the news included: A Chinese chakravyuha in South Asia, Colombo most suited to be South Asia’s commercial hub, Asian firms should look to South Asia for more growth, Women can play a greater role in realizing South Asia’s potential, DIMO wins 1st place for Best Integrated Annual Report in South Asia, Ranil invites Japan to invest in S. Asia, Bolstering SAARC Intra-regional trade and Fix ISFTA before ETCA.

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NMB—Nepal, Maldives and Bhutan The Bhutan Observer is a leading online news website of the Himalayan country. While searching for the South Asian developmental stories, the researcher could only access the archival stories, which were beyond the timeline under study. An alternate method of searching for the news on Google too did not yielded any story. So, the data was best kept untabulated. The Bhutan Times is a privately owned newspaper, second to government-owned Kuensel. The newspaper has well-organized archival stories and covers local news and events. But there was a complete absence of South Asian developmental stories in its edition. The researcher could find only one story and that too related to local developmental programme with the headline ‘13th RTM sees developmental partners reaffirming support for Bhutan’. The internal search engine showed old articles beyond the specified period under study. As a result, the archival stories were accessed month-by-month to take out relevant data. The Himalayan Times is Nepal’s largest selling English Daily; however, there was no information on its circulation. The search result on South Asia showed following news stories: South Asia lawmakers meet to discuss child welfare, Dalit, non-Dalit South Asian lawmakers’ conference kicks off in Kathmandu and South Asian Peasants’ Convention kicks off in Kathmandu. The Kathmandu Post is another leading English newspaper of Nepal. The search on South Asia resulted into three stories: South Asia’s lawmakers meeting begins to discuss child welfare, South Asian corridor and Kathmandu third most expensive city in S Asia. Maldives Independent is one of the major media houses of Maldives. A search for South Asian news showed only one story: Maldives calls for ‘environment conducive to holding SAARC summit’ for the period under study. Maldives Times on the other hand, showed two stories related to South Asia: Secretary General of SAARC pays courtesy call on the President and Nepal Tourism Board Endorses the South Asian Travel (Table 1).

Analysis of the Data A study of the data collected on South Asia media shows that the developmental narratives remain confined to myopic version of national storytelling. It hardly goes beyond the limits of catering to local audience. The developmental narrative of South Asia does not only find few takers but is hardly given a push to create interest, enthusiasm and understanding among the national audience of the neighbouring countries. While India, Pakistan and Afghanistan media realize the significance of their development vis-à-vis regional cooperation, the sentiment was missing in smaller countries like Bhutan, Maldives and Nepal because of political uncertainty and absence of deep-rooted institutional democracy.

Sri Lanka

Nepal

Nepal

Maldives

Maldives

14

15

16

Bangladesh

8

13

Bangladesh

7

12

Afghanistan

6

Sri Lanka

Afghanistan

5

11

Pakistan

4

Bhutan

Pakistan

3

Bhutan

India

2

10

India

1

9

Country

No.

Maldives Times

Maldives Independent

Kathmandu Times

The Himalayan Times

Ceylon Today

The Daily Mirror

The Bhutanese

Bhutan Observer

Daily Sun

Daily Star

Kabul Times

Outlook Afghanistan

Pakistan Observer

The Dawn

Hindustan Times

Times of India

Newspaper

6

4

–

12

–

–

19

–

–

–

10

–

3

8

9

13

Politics

Table 1 Countrywise coverage of South Asian news by countries

4

1

–

1

–

–

28

–

2

–

10

–

1

–

–

2

Economy

–

–

–

3

–

–

24

–

–

–

2

–

–

3

1

10

Social

7

3

–

2

–

–

34

–

–

–

8

–

1

5

4

18

Events

–

–

–

–

–

–

1

–

–

–

5

–

–

1

8

27

Terrorism

2

1

3

3

8

3

1

–

5

4

2

1

4

1

4

3

South Asia

5

3

–

6

–

–

37

–

5

–

4

–

1

1

3

4

Others

24

12

3

27

8

3

120

–

12

4

41

1

10

19

29

77

Total

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For Pakistan, Afghanistan and to some extent Bangladesh, it is the security and fight against radicalism that draws media attention; while for Bhutan, it is the local infrastructural development that got the limelight. For Maldives, tourism and education garnered greater media eyeballs. There was an abysmal lack of diversification in the news coverage. An issue, which finds appeal among the readers, gets cross-media coverage, undermining the more important regional economic stories. In this study, the visit of Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to India received greater media coverage, which could have swung the result in favour of greater coverage of news related to South Asia. To discount such irregularity in the data collection, the study clubbed such events as political rather than development narrative of the South Asia. The 11% of media coverage given to the issues of South Asia has its flip side too. During the study, we realized that most such coverages were event-based and did not include diversified coverage of South Asian issues. If there was a news related to SAARC University, the same news delivered by wire services was carried by all media houses of the South Asian countries. Barring two articles, we hardly came across any in-depth analysis of the issues related to South Asian regional development. In such cases, the pitfall of quantitative data needs to be accounted so as to reach a qualitative understanding of the subject under study.

A Parallel View Books and literature are yet another mass media which has played a key role in disseminating local stories, be it human strife of existential living to regional disparity which finds representation in the literature of the day. Pakistan and Afghanistan authors writing in English have made special contribution to this genre of mass media. Aamer Hussein, Bapsi Sidhwa, Bilal Tanweer, Bina Shah, Kamila Shamsie, Mohammed Hanif, Mohsin Hamid, Musharraf Ali Farooqi, Shehryar Fazli and Uzma Aslam Khan are some of the prominent names writing on the issue regularly. The DSC prize for South Asian Literature has come to occupy a special place of prestige among the South Asian writers. Their books were shortlisted for the prestigious award including that of Mohsin Hamid, Uzma Aslam Khan and others. Madeline Clement’s monograph “Writing Islam from a South Asian Muslim Perspective: Rushdie, Hamid, Aslam, Shamsie” (2015) is an exploration of how Islam is portrayed in the works of South Asian fiction writers. David Waterman’s collection of essays ‘Where World Collide: Pakistani Fiction in the New Millennium’ (2015) talks about Pakistani identity and its relationship with Islam, Pakistan’s colonial past and the trauma of Partition (Bilal, 2016). Although books and local media have been at the forefront of covering local development news of South Asia, the equation of news coverage changes when it comes to contentious issues. Majority of local media houses avoid giving news coverage to issues where local interests of warring parties are involved. In such

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occasions, international media comes in to fill the space as pointed out by Shazia Irram Gul in her study on Pakistan titled No Woman’s Land.

Conclusion: Patterns and Issues Communication network and mass media have a major role to play in creating conducive environment for regional development. Apart from reporting news from grassroots, these narratives have to play a transforming role as well. As the mother of development communication Nora C. Quebral said, “(It is) the art and science of human communication linked to a society’s planned transformation from a state of poverty to one of dynamic socio-economic growth”. In the case of South Asia, development issues need to be planned in a way to integrate hyper-local news to national and regional narrative. Although there have been few such attempts in the past, they were knee-jerk reactions rather than phasewise development of a communication network which could bridge the existing gap between communication network and the regional developmental models. For the South Asian countries, there is no need to follow the Western concept and construct of either the development model or the communication network. What is true for Latin American countries may not yield desired result when transported to an alien cultural setting as that of South Asia. The basic premises of such a model should be based on hope, aspiration and expectations of the people, who are in throes of existential survival. It should be in tune with the need of the masses and need to be communicated in a language understood by them. The five-tier development and communication network need to be developed and synchronized at every step—starting from hyper-local to local to provincial to national to the South Asia region. There needs to be a compatibility between the model of development vis-à-vis model of media communication so as to avoid ‘interference’ and ‘noise’ for effective communication of developmental stories.

References Books/Edited Books ABC (Audit Bureau of Circulations 2015). (http://auditbureau.org/files/Details%20of%20most% 20circulated%20publications%20for%20the%20Audit%20period%20July%20December%202 015.pdf. Accessed on March 11, 2017). ABC (Audit Bureau of Circulations, 2016). http://www.auditbureau.org/files/Highest%20C irculated%20amongst%20ABC%20Member%20Publications%20(across%20languages).pdf. Accessed on March 1, 2017). Bari, F. (2010). Gendered perceptions and impact of terrorism/Talibanization in Pakistan. Heinrich Bol Stiftung. Batra, A. (2013). Regional economic integration in South Asia: Trapped in conflict? Routledge.

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Bilal, M. (2016). Writing Pakistan. HarperCollins. Frankopan, P. (2015). The silk road: A new history of the world. Bloomsbury. Khair, T. (2016). The new xenophobia. Oxford University Press. Kazi, S. (2014). States of denial. In Himal Southasian. McCombs, M. E., & Shaw, D. L. (1972) The Agenda-setting function of mass media. Public Opinion Quarterly, 36 (summer 1972), 176–187. Rana, M. A., Sial, S., & Basit, A. (2010). Dynamics of Taliban insurgency in FATA. Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies. Said, E. W. (2007). Covering Islam: How the media and the experts determine how we see the rest. Vintage Siddiqa, A. (2007). Military Inc: Inside Pakistan’s military economy. Pluto Press. SIPRI, (2015). SIPRI Year Book 2015 (https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2016-03/YB-15Summary-EN.pdf, Accessed on April 5, 2017). Visvanathan, S. (2016). Theatres of democracy. HarperCollins. Visweswaran, K. (2013). Everyday occupations: Experiencing militarism in South Asia and the Middle East. University of Pennsylvania. World Bank. (2016). Why #OneSouthAsia? (https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/south-asiaregional-integration/trade, Accessed on March 15, 2017).

Websites https://ejournals.unm.edu/index.php/nsc/article/view/635. Accessed on 8 Apr 2017. http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/opinion/story/199465.html. Accessed on 8 Apr 2017. http://www.livemint.com/Politics/vxvVONyVlbRrwNnuvwhazK/Bangladesh-PM-Sheikh-Has ina-pitches-for-more-trade-channels.html. Accessed on 9 Apr 2017. http://www.mediasouthasia.org/aboutus.asp. Accessed on 9 Apr 2017. http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2015/miles-april-2015. Accessed on 10 Apr 2017.

Urdu Historiography, a Field of Urdu Literature in South Asia Alain Désoulières

For quite a long time, Urdu historiography was ignored by the historians of Urdu literature. It was understood as a hobby or at best as a secondary source for modern Indian history. However, a close look at Urdu historiography often shows an original political point of view as well as a unique literary tradition. For example the Indian Revolt of 1857 is well described in Urdu sources, including newspapers. Details can be found in Zia Ud Din Lahori’s Bah¯adur Shah Zafar ke Shab o Roz (Nights and Days of Bahadur Shah Zafar) Farid Book Depot, 2013.1 The centenary celebrations of the revolt of 1857 and the observance of its hundred fiftieth anniversary saw the publishing, republishing and translation of many such sources. In the post-colonial times, it developed a trend of a renewed interest in local historiography as opposed to seeing just the Imperial and Eurocentric point of view. Javed Ali Khan’s enlightening study Early Urdu Historiography, Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Public Library Patna, 2005, is important to understand the origin and trends of Urdu historiography. We focus here on Maulana Sayyid Abu Zafar Nadvi’s historical work in Urdu about the Kingdom of Gujarat (cf our previous study partly published, Désoulières, 2016 p. 97, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Sixth CAAS Proceedings), a very important work on the history of medieval Gujarat produced by the Nadwa-t ul UlamaIndian Muslim school of thought (Lucknow). The first part includes most of political history of medieval Gujarat but excluding the part dealing with archaeology (for want of money) was completed in 1928 by Maulana Nadvi (his abridged name, from the Nadwa) and published in 1939, the whole T¯ar¯ıx was 1

Regarding the political and literary Urdu biography of last Mughal Emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar, Aslam Parvez’s pioneer work Bahadur Sh¯ah Zafar, three editions 1986, 2008, 2013, 16 illustrations, 458 p. must be quoted as a well documented primary source. Aslam Parvez further edited an important Urdu volume San sat¯awan k¯ı Dill¯ı aur Bah¯adur Sh¯ah Zafar (1857 Delhi and Bahadur Shah Zafar) 379 p. in 2008, 16 conributors including himself, both books published at Anjuman e Tarraqi e Urdu (Hind)

A. Désoulières (B) INALCO Paris Sorbonne University, Paris, France © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Rahman and N. Tiwari (eds.), Development, Governance and Gender in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-5109-0_13

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published in 1958 in Delhi with a second edition in 2005 in Azamgarh therefore published many years after its writing like just his Gujarat k¯ı tamaddan¯ı t¯ar¯ıx: A cultural History of Gujar¯at, (1957–1958, after his death). When I wrote the original paper for a UGC HRDC Jamia Millia Islamia international Seminar in April 2017, New Delhi, I was not aware of Dr. Javed Ali Khan’s enlightening study Early Urdu Historiography, Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Public Library Patna, 2005, which I saw only in January 2018 in Patna. Dr. Javed Ali Khan’s introductory chapters are now a must to understand the origin and trends of Urdu historiography, However, although he does quote the Nadwat ul Ulama school of thought, Maulana Nadvi’s historical work in Urdu about the Kingdom of Gujarat and is not quoted.]

Written in the beginning of twentieth century, but published much later (mostly posthumous, Nadvi, 1958), Maulana Nadvi’s writings are based on Sanskrit, Arab and Persian, chronicles and Gujarati traditional sources. Nadvi’s Cultural History of Gujarat has long chapters devoted to Gujarati naval traditions, those give important information about the destruction of Gujarati ports and suppression of its naval industry from the Portuguese times up to the Second World War with the British Navy. Inspite of lengthy descriptions of monuments, libraries, cultural institutions, types of sailing ships with technicalities, list of forgotten maritime locations and ports and quoting so many historical sources, neither a single picture nor a map is provided in either the original edition or its 2005 reprint. The following is a translation from Maulana Nadvi’s Cultural History of Gujarat: (p. 17 onwards). ‘The (Gujarati) Sailing Fleet (introduction). The South West coast of Hindustan is situated on the shores of the Arabian Sea and Gujarat is in the middle part of it. That is why every King of Gujarat had to maintain a sailing fleet for the safety of the country as well as external commercial purpose. In the very beginning Ahmad Shah the First [founder of the dynasty and a convert to Islam] ordered [ocean] sailing fleet to be made and used it in the war of the Maha’i river region. The port of Cambay [Khamb¯ayat] was its main mooring post. Mahm¯ud the First made it even stronger and, in order to beat the Malabar Pirates who were ransacking the seas he ordered a fleet out of the Port of Ghugh [Gogha] that came back victorious. In those days ships were built in Khamb¯ayat [Cambay] and armed with all kind of war material; when a fleet departed to attack the port of D¯abh¯ul [Dabhol, south of Mumbai now in Maharashtra] then it comprised of three hundred warships. It is at the time of the reign of that king that [heavy] guns were mounted on warships and they inflicted a severe defeat on the Portuguese fleet during a naval battle (p. 18). Malik Ayaz Sultani was the admiral of that fleet. In the sixteenth century AD, [the Gujarati King] Sult¯an Bah¯adur gave priority to his war fleet. And he had all kinds of ships built in Khambayat: Turki as well as Portuguese, and he made the island of Diu the main centre of his fleet. The admiral of that fleet, Malik Tugh¯an was residing there. And he was such a formidable and powerful enemy at sea that during the whole time of his tenure, the Portuguese would not dare to sail towards Gujarat. Had not the Portuguese committed treason with Sult¯an Bah¯adur, he would have chased them out of the Indian seas and Hindustan would never have to witness that [conquest]. Different kinds of ships would have different kind of names. Among the warships they would have a Birisht [The Cutter] or a Ghur¯ab [The Crow/corvette] (p.18). A

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passenger ship would be called a Safariy¯a [a Travelling ship] and would be often mentioned as samb¯uq [a conch]. In all there were three kinds of vessels: warships, commerce and passenger ships. Among those they would have specific names, for example for the category of passenger ships one would have a vessel named Mad¯ın¯a [the Holy City of Medina] or Zohr¯a [the Shining, feminine name] but also Changez¯ı [from Gengis Khan]’. The following translation is of a portion entitled: The High seas Fleet of Gujarat (Nadvi, 1958, p. 265 sqq): ‘The High seas Fleet of Gujar¯at: The geographical position of Gujar¯at [Gujarat]: A part of South West Hindustan, the country [of Gujarat] is by nature positioned in such a way that the Arabian Sea surrounds it, it has Oman in front, on its right is the Persian Gulf, and on the left the Strait of Aden, Aden being the old port of Yemen, Hadramaut is situated in front of Gujarat and Bahrain is the maritime centre of the Persian Gulf. Because of these natural positions the intercourse of Gujarat with Arabia is a natural fact. From Gujarat the way into Sindh [Sind] was also open, and ships would go from here [Gujarat] to the ancient harbour of Dewal [Debal], so that both maritime and land routes to the Dakkan [South of Hindustan] would be open. On the East [of Gujarat] the land route to Marwar, Malwah, Khandesh, etc. was there and the caravan trade was active, going and coming. To sum it up Gujarat having land on one side and the ocean on the other, indeed had an excellent geographical position: There were constant and frequent comings and goings of ships from Europe, Egypt, Arabia, Sh¯am [Syria], Iraq and Iran. Ships going to Lanka [Sri Lanka], Madras [Chennai], Bengal, Assam, Burma, and China, would necessarily have to call to one or another harbour of Gujarat, and from the very beginning that was the reason of happiness and prosperity of this country. ‘[Note: refer to Map n° 1]. ‘The Ancient ports of Gujarat: [p. 184]: [Note: in square brackets Anglo Indian modern name are added whenever possible]. ‘It is not an easy task to ascertain where exactly the ancient ports of Gujarat were and their precise condition, the [maritime] history of Hindustan is obscure, we include here those ports recorded during the islamic era, but also those which can be found among Greek and Roman histories such as Dw¯ark¯a, Somn¯ath, Katch [Kutch], Khanb¯ayat [Cambay/Khambhat], Walbh¯ı P¯ur (Gogh) [Walbhipur/Gogha], Dholer¯a (Dhand¯ukh¯a) [Dholera, near Dhandukha], Bhar¯uch [Broach/Bharuch], Rurakh [Rudrakh ?], Gandh¯ar [Gandhar], Cham¯ıvar [Cham¯ıp¯ur], Sau P¯ar¯a [Sau, Para], Th¯ana [Thane]. Most people [writers] have added the following names: Nau S¯ar¯ı [Naosari/Navsari], Mal¯ı Mora [Mor¯a?], Kah¯ım [?], Porbandar [Porbandar], Mangrol [Mongrel], Thab [?], S¯ury¯a P¯ur [Surya Pur], Gandev¯ı [Gandevi], Gop N¯ath [Gop Nath], Mohr¯a [Mohra]’. ‘Ports of the Muslim Era [p. 191]: According to what I wrote above, Gujarat is facing exactly Arabia, and more precisely because of Arab [maritime] expansion, their ships would go trading up to China, and back, loaded with commercial goods, and they had to call and stop in the Gujarati harbours for different purposes; firstly, for trading commercial goods and secondly for voyage supplies and drinking water.

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When Islamic rule was established in Gujarat and when the autonomous Gujarati Sultans tried to develop this country, then many harbours were opened in Gujarat and Kathiawar, so much so that in the [Persian Chronicles] Mir’¯at i Sikandari, Mir’¯at i Ahmadi, and Zafar ul Wala it is precisely written that in the times of the Sultans of Gujarat there were eighty-four established harbours. But I was not able to find the names of all those eighty-four ports, however after proper investigation, whatever I could ascertain is listed below: Gujarat is divided in three parts: Gujarat proper, Kathiawar (Surath) [Surat] and Katch [/Kutch], then the ports of Kutch [Gulf Kutch] were the following: Lakh Pat [Lakhpat], Mandvi, Madra [Mandra?], Jhakhau, Kand¯al¯a [Kandla], T¯un¯a [Tuna]. And the ports of Kathiawar are the following: Nau Lakh¯ı (Nav P¯ar¯a), Chaudya [Chaurya ?], Bed¯ı (Jam Nagar) [Bedi], Sal¯ay¯a [Salaya], Aukh¯a [Dwarka], Porbandar, Nav¯ı Bandar [?], M¯adhp¯ur [Madhapur], Mangrol, Jor¯awar [Jorawar], Der¯awal [Derawal], Somn¯ath [Somnath], Kaur.¯ı N¯ar [Kauri Nar], Dev, Jafar¯ab¯ad [Jafarabad], Mohr¯a [Mehra], Bh¯a’o Nagar [Bhavan Nagar], Dholer¯a [Dholera], Walbh¯ıP¯ur [Walbhipur], Gogh [Gogha], Nawa Nagar (Near Dev) [Nawanagar], G¯anf (near Dhandukh) [Ganf], Jh¯un Jh¯un W¯ar¯a [Jhunjhun]. Regarding Gujarat proper, there were the following ports: Khanb¯ayat [Cambay/Khambhat], (Param) Bhar¯uch [Broach/Bharuch], Bh¯ar. Bhot [Bhar], Gandh¯ar [Gandhar], Anlkeshwar, Hansaut, S¯urat [Surat], R¯andher [Randher], D.os [?], Nau S¯ar¯ı [Naosari/Navsari], Gandev¯ı [Gandevi], Daman, T.ank¯arya [Tankaria], Deh Haj, same as the village K¯av¯ı [Kavi], S¯anjan [Sanjan], Ball¯ı Mor (near Gandev¯ı) [Balli ?], Che Mor (near Bombay/Mumbai) [Chemor], Mah¯a’im Th¯ana [Mahim Thane], Sau P¯ar¯a [Sau, Para] Basa’i [Bassai ?], Kaly¯an [Kalyan], Wah¯ano [Wahan?]. Those ports were of three categories: the first-class ports were those where heavy and very big vessels [jah¯az] would enter, like Gogha, Dev, Broach, Derawal, Somnath, etc. Second-class ports were those where middle size vessels would enter. Third class ports were those where mostly very small ships, such as boats [ki´st¯ı], spoons/dingy [d.ong¯ı], canoes/flat bottom boats [hor.¯ı] could moor. Those moorages are generally called « ghats» [gh¯at.] in Bengal, Bihar, etc. Sometimes, big ships would come from the sea and moor there at high tide, and they would unload their goods and load again and wait for the return of the flux [for sailing]. Those ships would be caught on broadside while mooring, and because of their weight would reach dryland’. ‘The Administration of the Ports (ibid pp. 186–188): How were the Gujarati ports administered? It is difficult to answer that in a definite way. However, rewards [for that] are mentioned several times in the chronicles, indeed in the era of the Rajas [i e before the Muslim Sultans], there was a Maritime Department (Authority) with an appointed minister [waz¯ır] for that, consequently during the reign of Siddhar¯aj Solanki (in 1143 AD/ 538 H) a minister named Bh¯ar Mal was posted at this post. He would come every month from Pattan to Khambhat, and every port had also an officer with whose permission ships could come and cast anchor. For commercial ships that officer’s permission was enough, but if a ship carried passengers who would intend to stay in this country, then that officer had to seek permission from the Raja. There was also a custom office that would check the goods of the merchants and collect the corresponding duty. That custom office would have jurisdiction over both export

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and import. Big harbours like Khambhat or Bharuch generated a great income, no wonder the Chinese visitor wrote that at Bharuch the neighbouring Rajas would keep a very close look at him because of his riches and property.’ We do have information on the Maritime Department of the Medieval times from the testimonies of visitors. During the reigns of the Khalj¯ıs and the Tughlaqs, not much progress was seen in those matters, but during the times of the Gujarati Sultans, there were infinite improvements: the officer in charge of the administration of the seas was called admiral [am¯ır al bahar, prince of the sea in Arabic, Urdu: am¯ır ul bahar]] that title was equivalent to minister of the sea [Urdu: waz¯ır e bahar] he functioned directly under the King. During the reign of Ahmad Shah, the First in 834 H/1430 AD, Mukhlis ul Mulk was am¯ır al bahar. In the beginning, the office of harbour master or shah bandar [´sah-e -bandar > s´ah bandar], and the post of admiral/am¯ır al bahar [Urdu: am¯ır ul bahar] would be held by the same man who would administrate both the harbour and the fleet. In the times of Sult¯an Qutub ud D¯ın up to 861 H/1456 AD Khwaja ‘Ala ud D¯ın was the shah bandar, in 862 H/1457, the shah bandar at Diu was Ism¯a’¯ıl N¯a’et a ¯ and in 857 H/1472, that is during the reign of Mahmud i ‘Azam [Mahm¯ud the Great], Farhat ul Mulk AmirTu˘ga¯ n was appointed admiral/am¯ır al bahar. During the reign of Sult¯an Muzaffar from 926 H/1519 up to 928 H/1521 AD, Malik Ay¯az remained am¯ır al bahar, and then, in 968 H, he had a son [successor ?] but in the beginning the reign of Bah¯adur Shah he [Malik Ay¯az] was made governor [h¯akim] of S¯urath [Surat] ¯ a was appointed am¯ır al bahar in his post, then Qaww¯am ul Mulk and Mahm¯ud Aq¯ became shah bandar (h¯akim/governor of Diu) and in 937 H/1530 AD Malik Tu˘ga¯ n Bin Ay¯az, after that Mustafa Bahr¯am R¯um¯ı Kh¯an became shah bandar and Diu, Surat, Rander [R¯andher], Thane, Daman, all [these ports] were under his government. After that Khud¯awand Khan Safar Sulaimani became am¯ır al bahar, and after his [Bah¯adur Shah’s] martyrdom, when Khudawand Khan was appointed, in 946 H, Am¯ır Sheikh Burh¯an ul Mulk Binb¯ani was am¯ır al bahar, in 955 H N¯asir Habsh Kh¯an was shah bandar of Diu. After that Diu and Daman were occupied by the Portuguese, Broach, Surat, Khambhat, a few [other] ports were left, and they came into the hands of the Nobles of the Realm [Umr¯a] [i.e. after the death of Bah¯adur Shah Gujarati] […]. When a merchant ship would come, the captain would send the list of goods to the shah bandar, and if the shah bandar thought it proper, he would also inform the King [Sultan]. The Sultan would purchase whatever good he fancied and then allow the merchants to proceed for the sale of the rest of the cargo. Until the shah bandar was not completely confident and satisfied, he would not allow the ship to enter nor go [out of the harbour]. And for the passengers, a licence to circulate [parw¯ana e r¯ah dar¯ı] was needed. Indeed, without permission of the shah bandar, no ship could enter the harbour nor go out. Three kinds of ship would be under his jurisdiction: first merchant, second passenger, and third war ships. In the passenger ships, in addition to the necessary equipment, so much goods would load on board as to ballast the ship at sea. In principle war ships where in the jurisdiction of the am¯ır al bahar, but in the harbour the loading and ballasting, repairs and cleaning the supply of voyage provisions, etc., would need permission from the shah bandar. In the final chapter of

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Mir’¯at i Ahmad¯ı, there is a list of different departments, and from that we can figure that the total number of the employees of the port could reach three hundred’. The Navigation of the Gujarati people (ibid). ‘Even today the inhabitants of the coastal areas of Gujarat and Kathiawar are very fond of rivers and oceans. They were always dedicated to commerce and navigation: their ships sailed up and down from Sind to Sri Lanka and it can be also said that they sailed as far as Java and Sumatra. From first to fourth century AD the Sharb dynasty ruled equally over land and sea and expanded trade greatly, in the sixth century AD the commercial links between Ceylon and Surat were very wide. In the same century people ousted Mahar Ahmad J¯at. from Katch and other people went to Bahrain and settled there. The Chinese traveller Huang Tswang [Xuanzang] writes that he saw also «hindus» settled in the towns of Iran and « these J¯at. work as experienced pilots [mu’allim] on the ships traveling between Iran and Gujarat». In the ninth century AD the Gujarati became so strong that they became the rulers of Java, which explains why the [Javanese] civilization was closer to Hindu civilization and culture than to the neighbouring Chinese culture, consequently the Rajas of that country had the title of Maha Rajas, a fact also recorded in the travel books of Arab navigators. That is the reason why the Javanese coinage was also circulating in Gujarat which is called tat¯ariya [refer to the Gujarati Rulers of Java further para quoted below]. Arab travelers also wrote that the Gupta [gupt] coinage was circulating in Madagascar and that the traders of Madagascar understood the language of Java. The Arab travelers recorded that Hindus would come to Basra and Siraf [S¯ır¯af, Iran] but this people would not meet and eat together, although they number more than a hundred. Buzurg Bin Shaharyar [the Great Bin Shaharyar Al Balkhi, 11th Cent AD] who is a traveler of third century H in his book mentions many times the Hindu Banias [merchants] saying that they would go to Yemen where they maintained a quite profitable trade. A Bania from Gujarat called V¯ın¯ayak used to keep a commercial network in Yemen and would go there in person from time to time. Bh¯ım Dev the Second [Bh¯ıma Deva Chaulukya of Gujarat] had a high sea fleet in 640 H/1242 AD and Arjun Dev [Arjuna Deva Chaulukya of Gujarat] in 674 H/1275 AD had a Muslim as am¯ır al bahar, from that we can figure that the Arab had made it a very regular administrativefeature.’ Maritime Centres: ‘In the ancient history of India, the history of Indian navigation is obscure; however from some related events, we come to know that in Northern Gujarat in 200 BC Dwarka was a maritime centre, and in the South [so was] Broach and in 950 BC (Rorakh) Broach [?] appears as a maritime centre. In the first century AD, we note the development of Khambhat [as a maritime centre] although during Walabh¯ı rule, that is in sixth century, Gogh¯a became the main maritime centre, but the very place of trade was Khambhat, while in the South Broach was keeping its position. In the seventh century, Broach and Khambhat remained maritime centres just as recorded by the Chinese traveller Huang Tswang [Xuanzang]. In the eighth century, although Broach and Khambhat remained as centres, Chemor (near Bombay/Mumbai) and Sau P¯ar¯a also became important because they were closer to M¯an Khar. [Mankar] the capital city of the R¯as´t. Kat. Rajas [R¯asht.rakut.a], a fact that was very precisely recorded and in a very detailed way by Arab travellers. Similarly,

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under the Chaur.a¯ [Ch¯avad.a] dynasty, the seat of power, Pattan, was moved closer to Khambhat. In the eighth century, the importance of Broach fell down and Khambhat became the [main] maritime centre. Under the Sol¯ank¯ı Rajas and during the reign of the B¯akhel¯a [V¯aghel¯a], dynasty up to 704 H/1304 AD Khambhat remained the main centre. Also, during the Khalj¯ı and Tughlaq times, it kept its prevailing position. Under the rule of the Sultans of Gujarat from the beginning to Mahm¯ud Shah although Khambat remained the main centre, Diu [Div] started to prosper. During the reigns of Sultan Muzaffar and Bahadur Shah, Diu became [the main] maritime centre and its commercial status also increased a lot. But during the times of Mahm¯ud Lat¯ıf Kh¯an when Diu was occupied by the Portuguese Khambat again became the main centre. Very big vessels were used to moor at Gogha, and from there, boats were used to carry and unload the goods at Khambat. During the reign of Muzzafar Shah, the last of the Gujarati Sultans, because of internecine wars between the grandees of the Realm the central government ceased to exist, and separate governments were settled in Broach, Surat and Khambat. During the Mughal era, Khambat and Surat were still ¯ important centres but Broach collapsed. During the reign of Alamg¯ ır [Aurangzeb] (after 1600 AD) Surat knew a period of great prosperity but Khambat fell into decline. ¯ Momin Kh¯an the Second was the shah bandar Under [Mughal emperor] Shah Alam of Khambat and Gogh¯a and Broach were under his jurisdiction […]’. [Definition of a maritime centre]. ‘The meaning of maritime centre [bahar¯ı markaz]: it is a place [a port] where the high officer for maritime affairs, the shah bandar or the am¯ır al bahar [admiral] are posted provided with all the offices for maritime matters, and the other ports are under their jurisdiction. The office holder is directly appointed by the King and the holder of the post ex officio appoints the vice shah bandar or rather governor of every port under his jurisdiction and these governors consider that it is their duty to execute his orders’. ‘The Gujarati fleets during the Islamic Era: ‘After the death of the Holy Prophet (Peace be upon him), the very first sailing ship that was equipped was made in Bahrain in the Arab Gulf. Bahrain being in the ocean, it was a very convenient place both for building and sailing ships. The very first Arab ship in the Arab Gulf sailed from Bahrain in the year 15 H/632 AD and reached Thana, the second came to Broach and the third one to Deval [Debol, Sind]. After that along with the growing of trade, [Arab] navigation was also expanding and at the end of the first century [Islamic era] the Arabs’ ships would set sail to [Sri] Lank¯a, J¯ava [Java], up to China. Therefore, those were the Arab ships that the pirates pillaged and upon their refusal to return the stolen goods and women Muhammad Bin Qasim attacked Sindh [Sind] and conquered it. At the end of the second Hijri year, the Arab trade was prosperous in the Arabian Sea and all the important ports of Gujarat were full of Arab ships. During the reign of Yog R¯aj Ch¯adr.a [Yog¯a R¯aja Ch¯avad.r.a] in 191 H/806 AD Sh¯ım R¯aj looted the Arab ships in the harbour of Som Nath: those ships were loaded with one thousand horses and elephants, with additional goods worth hundreds thousands of rupees [footnote by the author: Ratan M¯al¯a Chronicle of Ch¯adr.a Dynasty: the value of those horses was seventeen lakhs (hundred thousands) and twenty thousand

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rupees, from that one may guess the value of the elephants and of the other goods] that gives an idea of the commercial prosperity of those days. At the close of the seventh century AD, the maritime trade of the Arabs expanded and reached such a climax that not a single Gujarati port was lacking of their commercial goods and the Raja of the country himself as well as his subjects benefitted from that situation, but it is quite surprising regarding this trade that there is no mention of the Gujarati fleets in any book, perhaps the art of navigation of the Arabs and the abundance of their ships had put the Gujarati fleets out of business. We learn through the travel stories of Suleim¯an Basr¯ı, Abul Hasan Zaid Ser¯an¯ı and M’as¯ud¯ı that the Rajas of this country [Gujarat] had a great respect for the Arab merchants, the import of their shipment was the source of a very consistent revenue for the Raja. At the end of the seventh century, the Sol¯ank¯ı and V¯aghel¯a dynasties focussed their attention on the ships and, with the help of the Arabs they had a fleet built; consequently, the am¯ır al bahar of Arjun V¯aghel¯a was an Arab. During the Khalj¯ı and the Tughlaq dynasties, the circulation of those merchant ships increased all the more so because during the era of the R¯asht. Kut. [R¯asht.rak¯ut.a 800–900 AD] Muslim Arabs and Iranians settled in big numbers in all the Gujarati ports. Mas¯ud¯ı wrote that in Cham¯ıp¯ur there was a total of ten thousand houses of Arabs and Persians who were almost all merchants or concerned with commerce and the situation was the same in Khambat, Broach, Somnath, J¯un¯a Gar.h [Junagar.h], etc., in the times of Sindh R¯aj [Sindhu R¯aja? 11th Cent AD], at the instigation of the Parsis the Hindus broke out in revolt, killed so many Arabs and demolished their mosque. Which provides an indication of the importance of the Arab settlements. During the era of the Khalj¯ı and the Tughlaq there were merchant settlers whose ships were sailed by individuals or by their community, it is possible that some ships would be sailed in the name of the State but so far books [chronicles] do not mention any merchant nor passenger fleet sailed by the government. From the travel stories of Ibn Battuta we also come to know that all the ships were the property of those foreign, new settlers merchants, [and that] some local landlords also owned ships, and Chinese ships are also mentioned in the sea of Sri Lanka and Madras [Chennai], the Coast of Malabar as coming to Gujarat. Most of the profit of maritime trade was going to the Banyas [Vanya, merchants] and they were earning lakhs [of rupees] but among them none was a ship owner. However, there is a mention of a Gujarati Bania of Wattu Wah¯an [?] who was the owner of innumerable ships. Among the Gujarati Sultans, Ahmad was the first to have royal ships equipped for his government: in 934 H [834 H/1431 AD] when the general of the Bahman¯ı Sult¯an, Malik ut Tujjar Hasan Basr¯ı conquered the region of M¯ahim [now in Mumbai] that was in the control of Gujarat, [Ahmad Shah] Sult¯an confronted him by sending an order to Mukhlis ul Mulk, the governor of Diu to sail a naval fleet, thereupon Mukhlis ul Mulk assembled a fleet of seventy ships from Som Nath, Gogha and Khambhat which he led to M¯ahim, and he returned victorious from there [footnote by the author: refer to Firishta, Account of Ahmad Shah Gujar¯at¯ı the First]. From that we can conclude that in the above-mentioned three ports there were [war] ships ready for action at any time. This could be mentioned as the [first] Islamic Gujarati naval fleet operating in the sea.

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Sult¯an Muhammad the First and Sult¯an Qutub ud D¯ın did not have any spare time to engage in maritime ventures, but Sultan Mahm¯ud Begar.a¯ the First took a special interest in those matters and the arrival of some Turkish am¯ır al bahar give him even more incentive and because of him the Gujarati naval fleet became very strong and protected the borders from the sea-shores of Sindh to the port of D.a¯ bh¯ul [160 km south of Mumbai]. Mahm¯ud armed his vessels with artillery thus equipping them according to the Turkish method. In 896 H/1490 AD, Sult¯an Muhammad Bahm¯an¯ı ordered his waz¯ır [minister] of foreign affairs to be killed and himself deceased a few days after, Bah¯adur Gil¯an¯ı took advantage of the weakness of the central sultanate and took possession of the coastal areas, and having equipped a naval flee he set on pirating the sea and from the Dakkan [Southern Gujarat] he came to the Gujarati ports and started to sack and lay waste. He pillaged twenty Gujarati ships [Footnote by the author: quoting Burh¯an e M¯asir p. 147], and thus, in almost all of the Gujarati ports the maritime traffic was stopped, and because all the imported goods had ceased to come panic swept through the country, people started using coriander seeds instead of lentils. Sult¯an Mahm¯ud was informed of the situation so he sent a navy fleet of three hundred ships armed with cannons to attack the port of D¯abh¯ul and [Footnote by the author: quoting Mir’at e Sikandari, p. 115, 2nd ed. Bombay]. From that fact we can figure what was the strength of the naval fleet of Sult¯an Mahm¯ud, as he had a special experience of the seas and had a great knowledge of ships. In 913 H/1507 AD Sult¯an Mahm¯ud learnt that the Portuguese had arrived in great numbers and wanted to occupy a site somewhere on the coast to build a fort and he ordered his am¯ır al bahar Malik Ay¯az to wage war against them and taking ships from Diu, Daman and M¯ahim to confront them the am¯ır set sail. […] p. 194’. Regarding the wealth and importance of Diu as a port and trade with China via Java and Malacca for porcelain (and silk) trade that motivated Chinese merchants’ network with Gujarat a curious passage of the 16th Cent Portuguese chronicler Barros is really worth quoting for commenting our above translation of Maulana Nadvi’s passage about the Gujarati fleet as well as for further analysis. We feel it is important to introduce here Barros as a reliable, albeit official 16th Cent Portuguese chronicler of Asia, focussing on his chapters about the Kingdom of Gujarat. We only quote here a short passage of Barros’ Chronicle (Second Decade Chapter V, 1553, p. 377–378) describing a naval meeting between the Portuguese Governor Alfonso D’Albuquerque and Malik Ay¯az at Diu harbor in August 1513: Malik Ay¯az would show the greatness of his status in this manner: he came out with a fleet of up to a hundred of rowing ships, all of them so much provided with vessels louçainha, [precious and expensive pottery/porcelain], just like they would go for a wedding, but also so much equipped with artillery, munitions and arms just like they had to fight (For details Re Désoulières 2017). Indeed, the Gujarati and Indian involvement with Javanese and Chinese trade was very old as reminded by Maulana Nadvi who quotes Greek and Roman sources (it is a fact that the Chinese silk and porcelain trade was reaching Europe through Indian navigation though not exclusively in Greek and Roman times) as he comments the

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early dominating position of the Indians and Gujarati merchants in Java and China trade: ‘In the ninth century AD, the Gujarati became so strong that they became the rulers of Java, which explains why the [Javanese] civilisation was closer to Hindu civilisation and culture than to the neighbouring Chinese culture, consequently the Rajas of that country had the title of «Maha Rajas», a fact also recorded in the travel books of Arab navigators. That is the reason why the Javanese coinage was also circulating in Gujarat which is called t¯ataryia [tat¯ariya]. Arab travellers also wrote that the Gupta [gupt] coinage was circulating in Madagascar and that the traders of Madagascar understood the language of Java’.

Let us precise that the Gupta Dynasty and Empire lasted c.320-547 AD, but the origin of the word t¯ataryia [tat¯aryia?] in the Urdu text translated from Arabic to the Greek or Indo Greek coin stater as suggested by Paule Charles-Dominique, the editor of the French version of Arab navigators’ travel stories quoting an anonymous Information [Akhbar]on India and China (Voyageurs arabes 1995 p. 13 and foot note 2 p. 1069) is not very satisfactory: we suggest the title of the noble of the Realm Tat¯ar Kh¯an as plausible origin. We see that Maulana Nadvi had access to this anonymous arab travel story. Further Maulana Nadvi comments: ‘The very first Arab ship in the Arab Gulf sailed from Bahrain in the year 15 H/632 AD and reached Thana, the second came to Broach and the third one to Deval [Debol, Sind]. After that along with the growing of trade, [Arab] navigation was also expanding and at the end of the first century [Islamic era] the Arab’s ships would set sail to [Sri] Lank¯a, J¯ava [Java], up to China. (Nadvi 1958.2 p. 188)’.

Another important point that can be deduced from Maulana Nadvi lengthy historical description of The Gujarati navigation and the Gujarati naval fleets is that the late fourteenth century and the early decade of the sixteenth century saw the apex of Gujarati inter Indian and Sino Indian navigation and trade through Java (Malacca) succeeding the Arabs and the Persians though not putting them out of the game. About the Persians in India and in Java, like Barros, he does not forget to quote the commercial rivalry between the Muslim Arabs and the Parsis (not Muslims/Persian settlers), that too much before the coming of the Portuguese ships. Thus, important Urdu works such as the History of Gujarat and the Cultural History of Gujarat by Maulana Nadvi, and his uncle’s Sayyid Suleiman Nadvi Arabõ ki jah¯az r¯an¯ı, Navigation of the Arabs, Azamgarh, 1958 so meaningful for the history of Gujarati navigation, do need critical and illustrated (with maps) modern editions. In fact, all authors of Urdu writings deserve much more attention than what they are given, particularly in the fields of Indian medieval navigation and cultural history. Instead of simple English translations, bilingual critical editions would preserve the originality of their writings. Their readership should also be enhanced. They indeed add immense value to our understanding of the past and the present.

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References Kanhaya L¯al, T¯ar¯ıx e Panj¯ab [History of Panjab], reprint Lahore, Sang e mil, 1987 (original edition c. 1884). Latif Sayyid, M. (c.1880). T¯ar¯ıx e Panj¯ab, ma’ H¯al¯at e Shahar e L¯ahor [History of Panjab, with description of present City of Lahore]. Nadv¯ı, Maul¯an¯a Sayyid Abu Zafar, Gujar¯at k¯ı tamaddan¯ı t¯ar¯ıx: A cultural History of Gujar¯at, D¯ar ul Musannif¯ın, Ahmadabad, and Azamgarh, 1958 (posthumous, c. 1930), reprinted in 2005, at Azamgarh (Shibli Academy) Nadv¯ı, Maul¯an¯a Sayyid Abu Zafar, T¯ar¯ıx e Gujar¯at (History of Gujarat), D¯ar ul Musannif¯ın, Ahmadabad, and Azamgarh, 1958 (posthumous, c. 1930). Sabah Ud Din, Sayyid. (1963). Hindust¯an ke Musulm¯an hukumranõ ke ahad ke tamaddan¯ı jalwe, Indo Muslim Institutions and Governments, cultural features. Azamgarh, India, M’aruf Press. Sayyid Ahmad Khan. (2003). Aas¯ar us Sanad¯ıd (history of Delhi and its monuments) first edition in 1847, new edition by Khaliq Anjum, 3 vol. Ill. Plus photographs. Sayyid Sulaim¯an Nadvi. (1929–1958). Arabõ k¯ı jah¯az r¯an¯ı (The Navigation of the Arabs), Lucknow Kanhaya L¯al (1884), T¯ar¯ıx e L¯ahor [Urdu], reprint: Lahore, Sang e mil, 300 p

Portuguese de Barros, J. (1553). (1974 reprint). Segunda decada da Asia de Joam de Barros: dos feitos que os portugueses fizeram no descobrimento e conquista dos mares e terras do Oriente, por Germão Gallarde, em Lisboa MDLIII, Lisboa, Impresa Nacional Casa da Moeda, 465 p.

English References Arunachalam, B. (1987). Heaven Finding Art in Indian Navigational Traditions and cartography in The Indian Ocean Explorations in History, Commerce and Politics. In Chandra, S. (Ed.), Sage Publications India. Arunachalam, B. (Ed.). (1998). Essays in Maritime studies, MHS 1. Maritime History Society. Edward, M. R. (2013). Maritime Heritage of Gujarat, Kathiawad and Kutch, MHS 16. Maritime History Society. Rajeshirke. (2014). Pre-Modern Kutchi navigation techniques and voyages. National Museum, New Delhi and Darshak Itihas Nidhi, Vadodara, Gujarat. Susan, S. (1989). Indian Maps and Plans, from earliest times to the Advent of European surveys. Manohar, New Delhi.

Personal Studies Desoulières. (2014). Images of Lahore (Panjab) in Historiography and Cinema (Urdu and English), Myths and Reality, 16 p. illustr. In Proceedings of 4th CAAS Symposium, 28–30 January 2013, National University of Singapore (NUS) on line publication, .pdf format, (ref. book of abstracts, 20 pages, same title, NUS, January 2013) March 2014. http://ofias.jp/caas/activities/proceedings_ nus.html.

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Desoulières. (2017). 16th Cent. Gujarati Navigation (2): From Diu to Malacca and beyond (Portuguese and Indian Sources), 11 pages. Short paper published in the Proceedings of 7th CAAS, TUFS, Tokyo, March 2017. Also, on line TUFS site, pp. 75–85 included http://www.tufs. ac.jp/ofias/caas/activities/proceedings_7th.html.

Contribution of Arabian Nepali Literature to ‘New Nepal’ Building Ramji Timalsina

Introduction A very popular song of Nepal in 2016 was “Suna Saainlee” [“Listen [My Dear] Sainli”]. The speaker in the song is a young Nepali migrant to the Arabs. He is compelled to leave his dear family and motherland in search of a job that is a must to sustain his family. This compulsive separation has created an emotional chasm between him and his beloved wife left back in Nepal. So, he tries to convince her that they have to wait for the age 40 when he will permanently return home and their pleasures of life will start. The third and fourth decades of their lives are destined to be spent being separate from each other because of current socio-economic trend of Nepali labour migration to the Arabs. Reviews of this song in terms of its socio-political and economic background discuss the reasons behind the popularity of this song and establish that it is ideological and emotional address to contemporary reality of millions of Nepali youths who have left their nation while their better halves and other dear family members are there waiting for their return and a happy life together. It addresses not only the socio-economic reality of the nation, but it also makes the listeners and viewers of the song aware of the condition of their nation at present. And ultimately, the emotion that is exerted in their heart and the thoughtful pain in the mind compel them to think about their roles in the building of the better future of this nation so that this pathetic fate will come to an end very soon. Every one of them is supposed to feel that it is a time to work in the development of the nation so that no youth has to be an emigrant in search of a reliable job in a foreign land. At the same time, the youths who are Nepali immigrants in different countries of the globe feel that it is time even for them to contribute to the building of the nation spending their skills there itself; not to go away from it. This is an example of how a literary creation (art) addresses the current socio-economic issue of a nation, how it motivates its citizenry to work for R. Timalsina (B) Mahendra Multiple Campus (Tribhuvan University), Dharan, Nepal © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Rahman and N. Tiwari (eds.), Development, Governance and Gender in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-5109-0_14

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the nation-building and finally how it emotionally and ideologically binds the people of the one origin, i.e. one nation so that they, together, would be committed to work for the better future of their motherland. A research conducted by Williams, Thornton, Ghimire, Young-DeMarco and Moaddelin (2010) proves that such a condition really prevails in Nepal. They state that “the largest share of remittances to Nepal comes from the GCC countries, equalling 35 per cent” (p. 3) and “the vast majority of Nepali migrants (90%) reported that their main job was some form of labour” (p. 9). Their findings further suggest that “Nepali migrants in the GCC countries were relatively similar to their non-migrant counterparts in Nepal, in terms of age, marital status, childbearing, education, religion and ethnicity” (p. 14). They have also found that “the great bulk of migrants retain most of their historical Nepali values centred on marriage, family and the restriction of sex and cohabitation to marriage” (p. 15). These conditions create the emotional chasm between family members spread across the borders. On this practical ground, it can be inquired whether literature seriously plays a role in nation-building; how it is done; and how current Nepali literature created in the Arabs has been able to contribute to the building of ‘New Nepal’. Here, the term ‘New Nepal’ is taken from current Nepali socio-political discourse that indicates the federal republic Nepal that has completed its formation of the federal constitution which has politically guaranteed provincial and local bodies-based decentralization of power and has opened up an avenue for the opportunity and space of every responsible citizen in the finding of his/her role in the development of the self and the nation together. This is the idea that was conceived with the Maoist-armed movement that started in 1996; was endorsed by the April Movement 2006; was ideologically and systematically established by the promulgation of the Constitution of Nepal with the federal republican spirit in 2015; and finally brought into practice with the completion of the three-tier elections in 2017–18. Similarly, the concept of Arabian Nepali literature incorporates the literary creations by the people of Nepali origin staying and working in the Arabs: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. As the background of this discussion, the article starts from the history of Nepali people’s migration to the Arabs. It moves ahead with the discussion on various themes of Arabian Nepali literature and the connection of these themes with their contribution to the building of the software ‘New Nepal’. For this, the primary sources are the literary texts published in Registaana ra sapanaa [Registaana and dreams] (2012), Aneka daayasporaakaa kavita [Poems from several diasporas] (2012), Paradeshi Bimbaharoo [Foreign Images] vol. 7, 2015, and Poems of the Nepali diaspora 2015. The study is analytical one and so uses theoretical tools that deal with diaspora, nation-building, transnationalism and socio-economic discourse of literature.

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Nepali People’s Migration to the Arabs The major destinations of Nepali labour migrants in last two and a half decades are the Arabian countries. International Labour Organization’s (ILO) Report (2017) states that “close to 50 per cent of Nepalis rely on financial help from relatives abroad” and “the top-five destinations for Nepali migrant workers are Malaysia (40.9%), Saudi Arabia (22.9%), Qatar (20.3%), United Arab Emirates (11.2%) and Kuwait (2.1%)”(p. 2). Similarly, another ILO Report (2015) states that the ECC countries are the migration destinations of low educated Nepali people: “international labour migration from Nepal has increased quite remarkably in recent decades, primarily due to the oil boom in the Gulf countries and economic growth in countries of East and Southeast Asia” (p. 10). It further states that “there has been some fluctuation in the numbers going to Malaysia and Qatar, while Saudi Arabia and the UAE have shown a steady but increasing trend”. At the same time, it finds that “in the case of Bahrain and Oman, there has been almost no change from 2006 till mid-2014” (p. 16). In terms of the social identity of migrants, the report states that: marginalized groups such as Muslims and other minorities along with Hill Dalits show the highest probability of having a labour migrant in their household. On the one hand, this trend speaks to the exclusion of these groups from domestic labour market opportunities but on the other it also points to the possibility of migration and remittances serving as a basis for their future social and economic upliftment. Having said that, there is significant variation in terms of migrants’ social backgrounds and the destination countries they work in. For instance, the highest proportion of Nepali migrants to India are Hill Dalits, in the Gulf countries it is the category Muslims/Other Minorities, in Malaysia it is the Madhesi Middle Castes, and in other countries, it is Hill Janajatis. (p. 22)

It has left a great impact on the inflow of remittance to the nation. Thornton et al. (2010) also support this condition. Rai, Bhetwal, and Paradeshi (2012) summarize the reality behind such migration and state that because of the lack of employment and peace, the Nepali people could not sell their skill and certificates in the nation; so that they have to leave their motherland. They conclude that it is the source of Nepali migrants’ tear, dishonour and discrimination as well as some emotional achievements and success (p. 3). ILO report 2015 also forwards similar findings: the population with no education is very unlikely to be seeking employment opportunities abroad, not at least beyond India, since the cost of migration to these destinations is too prohibitive. Likewise, those with high levels of education are likely be absorbed domestically, especially as the economy shifts from agriculture to the service sector and wages continue to increase for this population group. The population groups that are likely to have difficulties finding employment within the country are those with primary to secondary levels of education, and these groups are likely to be the ones who will be seeking employment opportunities abroad…. the continued demand for lowskilled workers, especially in Malaysia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. (p. 10)

This discussion establishes that the major destination of Nepali foreign migration is the GCC Countries. This has opened up many avenues for both the achievements and dreams within and outside Nepal.

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Nepali Literary Activities in the Gulf Countries: Why Do They Write? From the beginning of the Nepali people’s migration to the Arabs, there are some kind of literary consciousness and activities related to it. As all the migrants are young citizens and are conscious of the condition of the nation back home, they try to reflect the same in their creations. A good example of such activities can be found among the Nepali migrants to Qatar. There International Nepali Literary Society (INLS) Qatar Chapter and Nabodit Literary Mobile Library Doha have been organizing literary activities. Rai et al. (2012, p. 3) state that they are growing a Nepali literary tree in the Arabian desert that has extended its branches and leaves up to Nepal, too. It has played a creative role in bringing Nepali literary creators in the Arab together, providing them the opportunities for creating literature, forum for their disseminations, inspiring them for the study of Nepali literature, and continuing reviews and critical readings and writings on Nepali literature from the Arabs and outside. Similarly, they celebrate the anniversaries of major Nepali literary figures such as Bhanubhakta Acharya, MotiramBhatta and Laxmi Prasad Devkota. These are the occasions for all the above-mentioned literary activities. From 2009 onwards, they have been inviting established Nepali literary figures on these occasions. Similarly, every second Friday of each month, the local Nepali creators from Doha gather to listen to each other’s Nepali literary creations despite the fact that it is a tough task to organize such gatherings. They report that non-literary people of Nepali origin also help in the promotion of Nepali literature there (p. 5). A renown Nepali critic and literary figure Abhi Subedi finds that they write their literature after their day long works in the hot desert; they collect friends for each others’ presentations; make documentary films; publish their writings on Facebook; create and sing songs; write dramas and stage them; and with all these activities, they preserve and promote Nepali culture among them and inspire other Nepalis outside Nepal to feel and work for the same. The admixture of their pain and happiness has created the situation and the consequent literary artistic creations. Thus, Subedi concludes that such activities help in the creation of a type of creative identity that works as the background of their unity and search for commonality (in Rai et al., 2012, pp. 5–6). They are building a software Nepal using their emotion and ideology. The people migrated to Arab for temporary settlement and work are called ‘Arabe’ in colloquial Nepali. The derogatory term for it is ‘Arape’. Poet Narathunge (2015) gives the meanings and separate full forms of the three morphemes ‘a’, ‘ra’ and ‘pe’ used in the word ‘Arape’. His description of the condition of these migrants and their possible connotations reveal the intricacies of pain and possibilities of their life in the Arabs. According to Narathunge, the first morpheme ‘a’ connotes aparichita thaaumaa [in a strange land], arukai khaatira [for others’ sake], anaginti peedaaharoo chapaaera [munching uncountable pains], atripta sapanaaharoo puraagarna [to fulfil the unfulfilled desires], antatah [finally] or aghori bhansaara chhicholepachhi [after crossing the flesh devouring custom]. These all meanings

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indicate very bad condition of the migrants from the time they leave the nation to the point they work in the Arabs. Similarly, the second morpheme ‘ra’, for him, connotes rabarajhai [like rubber], ragadiera dinaraata [being rubbed the day and night], raharaharoo jhyundyaaudai kyaalendaramaa [hanging the desires in the calendar], ramaaudai pathaaera remityaansa [sending remittance with happiness], rasajati nichorera [being squeezed off], or ramaram umanga bokera [carrying little delight]. In the same way, the final morpheme ‘pe’ connotes pelinu [to be oppressed], peski thaapnu jeevanako [to receive the allowance of life], pecha kasnu bhitteghadiko [to tighten the screw of a wall clock], penakilaramaa baachnu aaphoo [living on pain killer], peppa bani pharkanu desha [to return to the nation being physically bankrupt] or pesha hunu aaphantako haatamaa [to be submitted to the relatives’ hands]. These descriptions mostly connote a negative image and emotional condition of the Arabian Nepalis. Amid the ocean of pain, there are some trickles of hope, too. This socio-psychological reality is reflected in their literary creations. The poems created by the Arabian Nepali poets collected in Poems of the Nepali diaspora (2015) have the same undertone. Their titles are: “Me and Routines of an Employee” by Innocent Rajan Basnet, “Brother is a Martyr—His Wife an Emigrant” by Tirth Sangam Rai, “Yes, This is How We Live Abroad” by Nirajan Prabhat, “Acceptance” by Rajan Rai, “A Casket” by Ram Kunwar, and “Brother Outlander” by Binod Khadka. Similarly, the poems published in Aneka daayasporaakaa kavitaa[Poems from several diasporas] (2012) also have the similar tone: “Gadhi Daanda Kaatnu Chha [Have to Cross the Gadhi Hill]” by Kedar Shrestha Gagan, “Timi Kina Aayau Yo Saharamaa? [Why did You Come to this Town?]” by Deepak Bhetwal, “Desha Khojirahechhu [I am Searching for the Nation]” by Nimesh Giri, “Hosiyaara! Deshakaa Mahisaasuraharoo [Be Aware! The Demons of the Nation]” by Minus-Plus Sangraula, “MaileDekhekoMarubhumi [The Desert I Have Seen]” by Sagar Shrestha, “Jawaapha Parkhirahechhu Aaja [Today, I am Waiting for the Reply]” by Hemant Paradeshi, and “Jindagee/ Registaanako Chauramaa [Life/ In the Field of Registan]” by Hom Bahadur Chhetri. The common theme of all these poems is seen in Innocent Rajan Basnet’s lines: “another sleeping tablet reduces/ Because/ Under this pillow rings—the siren of death/ And begins the routine of tomorrow!!” (in Giri et al., 2015, p. 45). It shows that they write to express their condition and to make people aware of it so that all of them may be motivated to work together to make a better Nepal in the days to come.

Themes of Arabian Nepali Literature: Discourse on Building ‘New Nepal’ Arabian Nepali literature centres on the themes of the condition of Nepal and the people there and outside it. According to Subedi (2012), their anxieties are that of the nation and its condition even though they are residing and creating outside it (p. 7). Even the readings of their creations reveal that their major themes are Nepali

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national identity, ethnic identity politics, idea of social inclusion and culture of the republican Nepal. Subedi finds that their creations help to form the concept of identity about them: their pains in economic emigration, separation from family, condition of decease and degradation, memory and worry of Nepal and actions in Qatar. These are the conditions and feelings of millions of Nepalis spread around the globe. Subedi adds that most of their creations focus on their common identity with the memory and imagination of better Nepal in future (p. 7). Poet Chudamani Kafle’s lines justify this claim: “If we fight among us and rot ourselves as the dead body, how can we make a nation?” (in Rai et al., p. 150; translations my own). They aspire for unity and commitment among Nepali citizens. It shows that national identity is a “shared destiny that binds together people and not only other elements such as the sharing of the same socio-political space. Nation lives in the people’s psyche and is passed down to the descendents” (“The Role”, 2007, p. 2). Nowadays, the idea and reality of nation-building is “affected by globalization”. So there is usually “a strong sense of collective belonging, a common identity and unity (pp. 3–4). Thus, it is believed that “‘print capitalism’ in whatever forms or generated forms should be wisely utilized to forge nation-building and nationhood” (p. 6). That is why, we can observe that “writers do have their role to play in nation-building, and forging a nation” (p. 10). It is possible even because “people who share a common language and tradition constitute a nation…. According to this framework, a unique geography and topography shapes the character of a people. Different lands produce different national characters and human and national diversity are thus natural” (Samper, 1997, p. 30). So is the case of Nepal and its dreams for future. Along with the creation, protection and promotion of national identity, a prominent aspect of ‘New Nepal’ building is the search for creative role and space for the ethnic people in the nation. Critic Govinda Raj Bhattarai finds such an intricate make up of the poem by Tirth Sangam Rai collected in Registan and dreams (2012). The use of the consciousness of the Kirant culture with its gods, goddesses, religious process, Mundhum and mythical characters justifies it (p. 15). The poet is nostalgic of his cultural songs and dances; and at the same time, he is worried about their protection in future. It reminds the readers of their ethnic culture, values, and so, it makes them think about their identity. As Nepal is the nation made up of cultural diversity, such feelings reassess its originality that is one prominent aspect of the building of ‘New Nepal’. This idea of ethnicity is closely connected with the idea of social inclusion and the need for the establishment of federal organization of the nation. Their literary creations have also dealt with the names and needs of different provinces. At the same time, poets are worried about the fading honesty in the nation. Their hope is to have a better humanitarian nation with the establishment of the federal republican system in the governance. But when it is not going to be achieved, they plead for it from different angles. In the poem “Republicanism and we”, poet Dalbir Singh Baraili from UAE writes: We have the republican government now … We save criminals under the garb of politics

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We tolerate violence by silence. Corruption is our sovereign rights The government is spectator … the promising youths Are sent to the Middle East to be shepherds As if they were put into auction Some of them retun in the Lucky Coffins And many cursed ones purged in agonies Whereas the government is indulged in remittance.

And, finally, he invites every emigrant to return to Nepal and work for its development: “And [we] should initiate good works ourselves” (in Giri et al., 2015, pp. 191–94). Such writings have helped in the creation of both national emotion and national imaginary. Abdul Rajak’s poem written in Bhojpuri has shown the linguistic diversity of the nation. This way, many new words have entered into Nepali language giving it a diversity of feeling and culture. These attempts help to make Nepal a modern nation in a true sense of the term. “Literature, Nation: A Strategic Vision for Literature in Scotland 2008–2018” (2008) claims that “no country that neglects its national literature can claim to be a modern nation or act as a civilizing or even a distinctive force in world culture”. Thus, its literature “underwrites the dynamism and diversity of the nation.... Equally important, without renewing its stories a nation cannot properly nurture its own citizens with a sense of confident, self-critical belonging” (p. 4). On the same light, Cudjoe (2004) gives an example of the effect of V. S. Naipaul’s achievement for his nation: “When V. S. Naipaul won the Nobel Prize in Literature in 2002, it signalled the culmination of a process [that is] an affirmation of a society’s humanity through the exemplary use of language”(para 3). Cudjoe quotes what John McWhorter notes in this regard: “Written language is an artifice uniquely well suited to imparting substantive concepts” (para 5). He further notes: We squander our cultural capital if we do not make our literary heritage a means of entering into some of the substantive concepts to nationhood. A citizen who peruses these works will know a little more about the heartbeat of our society and the things that make us who we are as a people. No society can do without its writers, its thinkers and the imaginative re-presentation of our lives. Although we possess many resources, we remain poorer if we do not mobilize our single most important gift: the ways in which our citizens have engaged our society and how they made meaning out of the experiences they encountered over the past two hundred years. No study of Trinidad and Tobago’s imaginative works can be complete without an examination of the evolution of the language the writers used (para 7).

Similarly, Batia (Feb. 2002, para 8) gives an example of Singapore: “The trauma of Singapore’s separation from Malaysia had convinced some writers who thought and cared deeply about poetry that the form could be harnessed to serve nation-building”. Through literature, they were able to create a “bridge language” or common medium of English. For example, National University lecturer Edwin Thumboo’s poetry “could produce galvanizing myths in service of nation-building. The new poetry

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would foster a sense of national identity. It could help to build a multiracial, multicultural society. His poem refuses to strike a public posture but responds honestly to the spirit of the times” where: Careful tending of the human heart may make a hundred flowers bloom; and perhaps, fence-sitting neighbour, I claim citizenship in your recognition of our kind.

In support of such a role of literature in nation-building, Kaplan (2009) mentions Benedict Anderson’s argument about the role of national imaginary in the building of a nation and writes: “Anderson argues that the development of mass communication systems since early modernity helped shape a common social imaginary along the lines of national identity (p. 314). Anderson talks about the nation as an imagined community: all citizens of a nation do not meet each other in physical terms; but they have a sense of belongingness and feeling of community. In our imagination, there exists the community. Kaplan finds the value of the means of communication in this development: “Since the early twentieth century the electronic media, first the radio and later the television, have assumed a dominant role in shaping national solidarity”. It is the time when “Channel television still generates collective rhythms of daily schedules, annual events, and special events through which a sense of national belonging is sustained” (p. 315). Literature, too, works to communicate national feeling and make its people feel their solidarity in identity formation and maintenance. These ideas can be connected with Vertovec’s findings (2012) about the role of transnational citizens in nation-building: “The spectrum of transnational political activity among migrant diasporas entails both nation-building and nation-wrecking” (p. 97). “Diasporas play an increasingly significant part in processes of development and nation-building in poor countries and in ones which have undergone major transformation” (p. 98). Utz warns against the possibilities of the avoidance of the role of literature and culture in the process of nation-building: In fact, what the term nation-building usually avoids is the uncomfortable reality of a great number of processes – social, institutional, intellectual, ideological, and political – hiding behind this easy terminological solution. At the same time, however, the evasiveness of the term suggests that the issues at stake are somewhat greater and more complex than a mere restructuring or introduction of political institutions and legal frameworks: this would be called state-building and is an important part of any nation-building process. Nationbuilding, however, transcends the state and draws on many more sources than state building does, because a nation is not a state, and even nation states are not necessarily coterminous with nations. (p. 616)

He claims it because “symbolic institutions [work] as factors for a successful nation-building process”, and at the same time, nation-building is to be taken as a “cultural intervention” even because “nations have been regarded as a “soul”, a “spiritual principle” or a “moral conscience” by nineteenth-century scholars” (p. 617). He discusses nineteenth-century nationalist school that takes “objective criteria such

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as territory, language, statehood, and culture [as] the first step and claiming popular identification with them would be the second” (p. 618). His major focus is on the idea of nation-building related to literature is promoted by “the imaginist school, most prominently represented by the very influential work of Benedict Anderson: “nations only exist through an act of the imagination.... Therefore, nations should be distinguished not by their supposed falsity or genuineness but by the style in which they are imagined. Nations, according to Anderson, are imagined as sovereign, limited and as a community”. He quotes Anderson’s idea that “the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” (ibid.). He concludes that “within the societies importing nationalism, three main phases of the process can be identified: structural, cultural, and psychological” (p. 623). And literature plays its role in the cultural and psychological phases. Similarly, Olaoye’s (2007) ideas can be used in connection with the role of literary creativity in a nation-building project: “The role of language and literature is seen here as a catalyst for national development.... Language is the vehicle through which people’s culture is transmitted. It is an index of identity which serves as a repository of a people’s culture, industry and exploits” (p. 748). He further summarizes Fatokun’s (1992) claim: Literature presents situations, interactions and oppositions. It suggests a wide range of values and attitudes. To understand an ethnic group and their culture one may have to turn to their oral and written narratives, their drama and poetry. A good piece of literature can be regarded as an authentic mirror image of its society and time. Through satire, proverbs and symbolism, literary artists communicate ideas, thoughts and feelings about social ills in the society which they criticize with prussic diction. (p. 749)

Then he concludes: “These traits are speech norms, etiquette, ideologies, ethics, stereotypes, artefacts, technologies, intellectual production, etc. Language whether foreign or indigenous, is thus an indelible mark of a people’s identity” (p. 749). It is because “language, literature and culture are inseparable as tools for national development and as veritable tools for national rebranding” (p. 751). The case of Nepali literature created in the Arabs is also the same. The writings collected in Rai et al. (2012) exemplify it. Critic Govinda Raj Bhattarai opines that the life of Registan is not only an example of pain; it is also an opportunity for many people and ultimately for the nation itself (p. 11). So, believes poet Shrawan Mukarung. He writes that these creations are representations of the emotion of all transnational Nepali migrants, and so, they connect them through common human emotion and make the readers feel to start work and change such a condition (p. 22). This is seen even in the writings such as “Harke” by Shikhar Vaidhya. In this story, the main character Harke feels that he has unexplainable pain in the separation from the family. He has a good income, but the memory of home makes him sad (p. 26). Like the character Dukhiram in the story, people take the Arabs as a sudhaaragriha [a rehabilitation home] for the Nepali youths who could not make any progress in the nation. It is hoped that they return Nepal as improved human beings. His story also teaches us how good friendship helps a man change his bad fate to the good one. Such a realization and improvement also help in the building of a nation.

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Similar to this is Badri Parajuli’s story “Sanjel Baa” that has depicted a deserted village where there is lack of enough number of people to carry a dead body to cremation site. It touches the readers’ sentiment and makes them feel and think about developing the nation so that youths will not leave it and the villages may not be so deserted. Similarly, Phanindra Shanta’s story deals with the misuse of remittance and need cum value of labour in the homeland itself. Dipak Bhetwal’s essay “Kataara Mero Khullaa Pustak [Qatar: My Open Book]” deals with the reality of how his certificates are useless in the desert. He makes us feel the value of work for the improvement of our education system so that the young generation can get creative potential explored in the nation itself. Bhetwal’s conclusion is that at present, he does not feel bad about his labour-life in Qatar because he feels he has been able to work for the nation though he has to stay outside it. He writes that he could understand the value of his nation being away from it for a long time. Bhetwal’s next conclusion is that a nation basically is the life practice, dreams, courage, devotion and self-respect. He realizes it there; and so, he is committed to work for promoting it when he returns Nepal. He reports that when he sees landless people as tramps in the desert, he finds the value of being a citizen of a sovereign nation that has alluring geography and culture. Similarly, the opiumeffect-like madness of religion-affected people has made him realize the great value of religious-tolerance found in Nepal throughout its history. He feels proud of being a Nepali at that time. Finally, he finds that a nation is more than a geography and social classes. Such realizations are the needs of present-day Nepal. As these writings are promoting such feelings, ideas and values, the Arabian Nepali literature is surely contributing to ‘New Nepal’ building to a great extent. At the same time, the pain Nepali migrants have to undergo in the Arabs makes them be committed to work for the building of the nation. Bhetwal, in his poem, writes: Why have you come to this town? Where each dream gets awakened without a sleep Here only dreams are present Till you try to capture it But it flies away across the horizon, instead.

The poet further asks: What have you seen here? These tall towers or Your own degraded heads? Deep-deep seas or Your own wounds deeper than the deepest seas? (My translation)

These lines compel all transnational Nepali emigrants and the Nepalis inside the nation to think seriously about their condition and work to end the present condition with the development of their own country, Nepal. In the same connection, poet Charchit Dhungel compares the ‘green passport’ with ‘green bamboo’ that is used

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to carry a corpse to cremation site in Nepali culture. It shows the critical condition of Nepal that compels its people to think about their role in the development of the nation. Many of these writers directly appeal the Nepali nationals to retun to Nepal and work for its development. Poets Rajeshwar Dhakal, Tirth Sangam Rai, Indramani Nepal, Shyam Kumar Glan (Tamang) and Dilip Abiral are a few such names. Thus, in total, these creative writers promote the need of working for the nation at this juncture of its history; and they emotionally motivate Nepali people to start it as soon as possible. It is how Arabian Nepali literature is contributing to the building of ‘New Nepal’.

Are These Writers and Writings Diasporic? A prominent Nepali international scholar, columnist and literary critic Abhi Subedi states how Neha Bhora from California University Irvin in the USA has not put the middle class Indian citizens of Doha under the category of Indian Diaspora in the Arabs. Subedi highlights the reason behind it: the major reason for those Indians to migrate to Doha is economic. They are temporary migrants, not diasporans because to be diasporic is to put cultural aspect of life ahead of all other things. So, according to Subedi, Bhora concludes that all South Asians in the Arabs are in the same position. So, they are not the diasporans. They are merely economic migrants. They are not allowed to stay there permanently. Since their economic involvement is temporary and it only does not create the people’s total identity, only this cannot make a diasporic society (2012, pp. 5–6). Nepalis in the Arabs are also in the same condition. At th same time, their writings also are not diasporic because their total concern is nation, cuture back there and their uses are connected with those ideas as found in Nepal itself. Their identities are not divided between the hostland and homeland. They are purely Nepalis in all aspects of their identity. They possess nothing Arabian. Both the expressed and supressed desires of these Nepalis is Nepal itself. Their writings also display their primary concern to be the socio-economic and politico-cultural conditions of Nepal. At the same time, the styles of their writings are similar to that of contemporary Nepali literature created within Nepal. Even the feelings in these writings are not much different from the feelings of the Nepalis in Nepal (Subedi, 2012, p. 6). These are the reasons why the Nepalis in the Arabs are not diasporans, but the transnationals who stay in the hostland as temporary migrant workers who do not invest there as their permanent home is Nepal itself; and they never think of growing a family and staying there on the permanent basis. For a community to be a diaspora, the following criteria must be fulfilled: 1. Diaspora is a community of permanent settlers in a place away from their land of origin. Those who live and grow, at least, with their nuclear family and long-term investment there can be called permanently settled. 2. It, as a mass, cannot return to homeland for permanent resettlement. Those individual members who return for it stop to be diasporic.

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3. It is formed as a result of involuntary traumatic mass migration and/or gradual accumulation of voluntary individual migrants. 4. It grows in four gradual stages: initial wonder, curiosity and shock (first stage); struggle for material existence (second stage); ethno-cultural and social involvement (third stage); and cultural awareness, and search, establishment and maintenance of differential identity (fourth stage). 5. It is different from transnational communities, mere ethnic minorities and cosmopolitan migrants because of its sedentariness and politically active identity awareness in the hostland. 6. Its consciousness and so consequent behaviours are shaped by love, trust and relation with the homeland, and fear and discontent in the hostland. It promotes the strong desire to return to the homeland and so prevents assimilation in the host society. 7. It maintains some collective memory and idealized homeland myths and so has a nostalgic look/take on them. 8. It maintains and grows contacts and relations with the homeland through its members’ physical visits to it; use of communication technology; endogamous marriages; promotion of more migrations; involvement in homeland development and other forms of assistance and politics; and continuity in following the homeland culture. 9. It maintains the homeland culture through institutions, iconography and communityinvolving activities. 10. Its cultural pattern remains and grows different from that of the host society; but economic pattern grows similar to it. So, it grows hybrid. 11. It maintains international networks and develops a community feeling among the people dispersed into many locales from the same origin. (Timalsina, 2017, pp. 44–45)

As the Nepali emigrants to the Arabs do not confirm to most of these qualities of a diasporic community, they do not create a diaspora in the Arabs. They simply form Nepali transnational economic migrants’ community.

Conclusion Arabian Nepali literature has been a good example for connecting the idea of nationbuilding and literary creativity. When the discourse of building ‘New Nepal’ is on back at home, millions of Nepali youths are compelled to stay away as emigrants because of the lack of appropriate opportunities to sustain their lives in the nation itself. This distance between their motherland and their selves in the physical terms has created emotional pangs within them. As a result, they have been consciously connecting themselves with the nation and their families back there through remittances and occasional visits on the hardware level. They are doing the same through their expression of concern with everyday reality as well as the present and future possibilities of their involvements in the making of the new face of the nation. In creating this software of ‘New Nepal’, their literary creativities are promoting the new concepts of national identity, ethnic identity, social inclusion, republican culture, and finally creating national emotion and national imaginary. All these aspects ultimately persuade the Nepali people inside and outside Nepal to be committed to the works that can make Nepal better than it is now so that all Nepalis can feel pleased

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and proud of being the national of a self-sufficient nation in both the physical and spiritual terms. This paper further suggests that the Arabian Nepalis and their writings are not diasporic; instead, they are transnationals. So, a detailed research based discussion is necessary in this regard.

References Acharya, K. N., Subedi, H. N., & Nepal, P. (Eds.). (2012). Aneka daayasporaakaa kavitaa [Poems from several diasporas]. International Nepali Literary Society. Batia, U. S. (2002, February). A place of our own: On the poetry of Singapore. Poetry Bay. http:// www.poetrybay.com/summer2002/singapore1.htm Cudjoe, S. R. (2004, June 21). Literature and national development. Trinicenter.com. Giri, A., Udas, B., Pokharel, M., & Mukarung, S. (Eds.). (2015). Poems of the Nepali diaspora. Nepal Academy and Non-Residential Nepali Association (NRNA). International Labour Organization (ILO). (2015). Analysis of labour market and migration trend in Nepal. https://ceslam.org/mediastorage/files/Labour%20market%20n%20migration_gizver% 203.pdf International Labour Organization (ILO). (2017, January). Nepal labour market update. http:// www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---ilo-kathmandu/documents/public ation/wcms_5 Kaplan, D. (2009, May). The songs of the Siren: Engineering national time on Israeli Radio. Cultural Anthropology, 24(2), 313–345. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20484541 Literature, Nation: A Strategic Vision for Literature in Scotland 2008–2018. (2008, August). Understanding our Present, Connecting with our Past, Imagining Scotland’s Future. Produced by the Literature Forum for Scotland September 2008: 1–11. Narathunge, I. (2015). Arape [Arab Migrant]. Paradeshi Bimbaharoo [Foreign Images], 7, 53–54. Olaoye, A. A. (2007). Towards vision 20–2020: The role of language and literature in national development. Theory and Practice in Language Studies, 3(5), 748–753. https://doi.org/10.4304/ tpls.3.5.748-753 Rai, T. S., Bhetwal, D., & Paradeshi, H. (Eds.). (2012). Registaan ra sapanaa [Registan and dreams]. International Nepali Literary Society Qatar Chapter and NaboditLiterary Mobile Library. Samper, D. A. (1997). Love, peace, and unity: Romantic nationalism and the role of oral literature in Kenya’s secondary schools. Folklore Forum, 28(1), 29–47. Subedi, A. (2012). Aapravaasa, srijanaa ra desh [Emigration, creation and nation]. In T. S. Rai, D. Bhetwal, & H. Paradeshi (Eds.), Registaana ra sapanaa [Registan and dreams] (pp. 5–7). International Nepali Literary Society Qatar Chapter and NaboditLiterary Mobile Library. The role of writers in nation building and nationhood as analysed from Salleh Ben Joned’s writings. (2007). Paper Presented at ICOSH Seminar at UKM 3rd International Conference on Social Sciences and Humanities. Fouzia Hassan Abdullah Centre of Language Studies and Linguistics Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities The National University of Malaysia UKM –UniversityKebangsaan Malaysia. Timalsina, R. (2017). Exploration into the use of rasa in Nepalese diasporic poetry [Unpubished doctoral dissertation]. Nepal Sanskrit University. Utz, R. (2005). Nations, nation-building, and cultural intervention: A social science perspective. Max Planck UNYB, 615–647. Vertovec, S. (2009). Transnationalism (Special Indian Edition). New Delhi:Routledge. First Indian Reprint, 2012.

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Williams, N. E., Thornton, A., Ghimire, D. J., Young-DeMarco, L. C., & Moaddel, M. (2010, September). Nepali migrants to the Gulf cooperation council countries: Values, behaviors, and plans. https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/558543/CIR SSummaryReport2MigrantLabo

Representation of Literature Through Media: A Comparative Study of Sidhwa’s Ice Candy Man and Mehta’s Earth Sadaf Fareed

Introduction This paper focuses on highlighting how literature is represented through media. We all know that media plays an important role in our lives and we all get affected by it in various ways. Similarly, literature is also a part of human life. What we see, feel or experience becomes literature. Literature and film are two forms of artistic expressions that have been used by man for decades. These are two ways of communication that help in broadening and enlightening the human mind. The connection between Cinema and literature is not new. These are two different mediums with a similar goal to inspire the human imagination and perception. Both of these Art forms are complimentary to each other, and we cannot replace one by the other. Literature and films both work on human mind through words, images, descriptions and actions. The impact of literature on film is as old as the film industry itself. Cinema has adapted many literary works starting from the plays by Shakespeare to stories by Ruskin Bond and many others. The adaptation of literature into film makes one compare the works, whether the book is better or the film. This paper studies Ice Candy Man by Bapsi Sidhwa and its screen adaptation Earth which was directed by Deepa Mehta. Though the theme of the novel becomes the plot for the movie, yet both are different from each other in several aspects. While the novel uses even the minutest of the details to weave the story, the film is based on the major incidents only.

S. Fareed (B) Women’s College, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Rahman and N. Tiwari (eds.), Development, Governance and Gender in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-5109-0_15

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Ice Candy Man—The Novel Bapsi Sidhwa is one of the important Diaspora writers of Pakistan. Like many other Parsis, she also encompasses a double migration. Sidhwa has written four novels in English. These novels replicate her individual experiences of the Indian subcontinent’s partition, the bloodshed, women subjugation and abuse along with the political outlines. Her novels also talk about the migration to the U.S. Bapsi Sidhwa was born on 11th of August, 1938 in Karachi but shortly migrated to Lahore. Being born in undivided India, she has seen and observed the gory division of the nation. The pain of that division is clearly visible in her widely acclaimed novel Ice Candy Man. She was brought up and educated in Lahore. As a child, she had suffered with Polio; thus, she was taught and instructed at home by an Anglo-Indian teacher. Later, she completed her studies from Lahore’s Kinnaird College. Being an isolated and lonely child, she had no alternative but to read profusely. In an interview, she had told to Feroza Jussawalla; From the age of about eleven to eighteen, I read non-stop because I did not go to school. I had nothing else to do, no other form of entertainment to fill my life with, and a big slack was taken up by reading. This did turn me, I now realize, into a writer. I must have read The Pickwick Papers (byCharles Dickens) at least four times during that period. I would laugh out loud. I recently reread The Crow Eaters and reread The Pickwick Papers and realized there were so many parallels (Jussawala 217).

She is a well-known and significant name in the world of Commonwealth Literature. Sidhwa’s novels are noticeably diverse from each other in the presentation and handling of the subject matter. All her novels deal with the postcolonial history of the subcontinent. Bapsi Sidhwa’s fiction can be placed within the dual premises of pre and postcolonial era of the Indian History. Her novels relive the horrors of partition and vividly paint the intricacies and difficulties of human life in the Indian mainland after 1947. She recreates a historical account of the bloodshed of 1947 in her third novel Ice Candy Man, thus undermining the British point of view of the History levied on the subcontinent. The story is presented through a small girl, Lenny who is just eight –years old. At the onset of the novel, Lenny is four years old and belongs to a very well-off family. She lives in a grand house with her parents and younger brother Adi and a large staff of servants, on Warris Road, an affluent area of Lahore. Lenny has polio, and her limp has compressed her world and she depends on her eighteen years old Ayah-Shanta to go to her Godmother’s house on the Jail Road and sometimes to Queen’s park and to the zoo too. Ayah is so beautiful that she attracts everyone’s attention around her. Not only the beggars, cart-drivers, hawkers, cooks and holy men but also even the English men cannot resist her charismatic appeal. However, the real pack of her devotees comprise the Fallatis Hotel cook, the

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Government House gardener, a Masseur, the Ice Candy Man, the restaurant wrestler, a knife sharpener Sharbat Khan, Ramzana the butcher, Imam Din, Sikh zoo attendant Sher Singh and a Chinaman. Despite being from different faiths, they live together happily in pre-partitioned India. Among them, the Masseur and the Ice Candy Man are her favourites. They have the advantage of touching her, while the others just talk or nudge around her. The Masseur massages her legs under her sari, and the Ice Candy Man allows his toes to creep along her legs and sometimes reaching up to her private parts. Lenny takes advantage of these situations and sometimes she gets the Masseur to massage her legs as well, and at other times, the Ice Candy Man gives her free popsicles. Lenny is sometimes afraid of her nightmares. Her small world was once jolted down by her nightmare about a German soldier, “coming to get me (Lenny) on his motor cycle”. (21) Her more horrible nightmare is about the “men in uniforms quietly slice(ing) off a child’s arm here and a leg there”. (21) She dreams of herself being dismembered while her Godmother is stroking her head. She exclaims, “I feel no pain. Only an abysmal sense of loss- and a chilling horror that no one is concerned by what’s happening”. (22) These nightmares are symbolic of the impending vivisection of India. Her horror that nobody is bothered about the worsening situation of the country, is symbolic of the general loss of sensitivity to the atrocity of Partition. While another nightmare of hers is about the, “…hungry lion, cutting across Lawrence Road to Birdwood Road prowls from the rear of the house to the bedroom door, and in one bare fanged leap crashes through to sink his fangs into my stomach”. (23–24) Sidhwa sets the stage for a vicious and ferocious cruelty, by using these dreams. The image of the lion is emblematic of the lust for blood the people had shown during the division of the nation. The situation in Lahore is getting worse day by day. The power-hungry Muslim League and the Congress are directly affecting the common persons’ lives. The friendly discussion in Queen’s Park has become communal. When the gardener from the Government House informs his friends that the Lord Wavell has been dismissed at the instance of Gandhi, Nehru and Patel, the Masseur, a Muslim, addresses them all as ‘bastards’ and says, “a new Lat Sahib will favour the Hindus!” (90). Ice Candy Man supports him and asks the gardener, “…aren’t you Hindus expert at just this kind of thing? Twisting tails behind the scene…and getting someone else slaughter your goats?” (91). The gardener fails to assuage their bitterness. Seeing all this, Ayah gets up and declares boldly that she would not come to the park, if they fight like this. To appease her, the Ice Candy Man promises not “to bring it up again”. The air instead of getting clear becomes more infectious and confusing. Lenny notices a great change in the behaviour of people around her. Imam Din and Yousuf start taking Friday afternoon off for “Jumah Namaz”. The Sharmas and the Daulatrams flaunt their caste marks. “People shrink dwindling into symbols. Ayah is no longer just my all-encompassing Ayah—she is also a token-a Hindu”. (93) The people of different religions keep aloof from one another. Even the children are not allowed to interact with each-other. The bitterness was not limited to the cities only. The villages, which earlier seemed unaffected with communal frenzy, have also got affected. Only a year ago, when Lenny had visited ‘Pir Pindo’, a Muslim village, she had her first

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experience of communal amity in rural India. The Muslim citizens of the village, Pir Pindo and the Sikhs from the neighbouring village, Dera Tek Singh used to sit together and converse about the deteriorating communal situations in the towns and cities. Agreeing with the views of the Sikh Granthi, the Muslim Chaudhary of Pir Pindo tells Imam Din: … Our relationships with the Hindus are bound by strong ties. The city folks can afford to fight…we can’t. We are dependent on each other: bound by our own toil; ...To us villagers what does it matter if a peasant is a Hindu, or a Muslim, or a Sikh? (56)

Their avowal of love for each other ends within a year. The marauding bands of the Akalis pounce on Pir Pindo and other Muslim villages. They massacre the males and rape the girls and women. The small Ranna witnesses all this bloodshed in his village. On the other hand, Lenny in Lahore witnesses the bonfire of vulnerable localities on Holi. These scenes of violence have a horrific influence on the delicate minds of children. Finally, India is divided and Lahore becomes a part of Pakistan and remains no longer safe for Hindus and Sikhs to live there. The fanatic ruffians ransack the abandoned houses. They take ‘Sethi’ to be a Hindu surname and zero in on Lenny’s house. But Imam Din, the cook, shouts at them, “The Sethis are Parsee. I serve them. Sethi is a Parsee name too, you ignorant bastards!” (180) Then they ask for Ayah, and he says, “Allah-ki-kasam, she’s gone”. (182) In these troubled times people like Imam Din and the medico Yacoob, who escorted his friend Roshan Singh’s sisters and the whole family to a convoy, are a few rays of hope. Suddenly, the Ice Candy Man advances and cajoles Lenny into disclosing Shanta’s hideouts. Lenny innocently tells him the truth and he carries Ayah off. Sidhwa presents the scene of Ayah’s abduction through the eyes of her eight-year-old protagonist, “The men drag her in grotesque strides to the cart and their harsh hands, supporting her with careless intimacy, lift her into it. Four men stand pressed against her, propping her body upright, their lips stretched in triumphant grimaces”. (183) She is taken to Hira Mandi, a brothel area of Lahore, where she serves as a dancing girl cum prostitute. Let alone countless merchants, coolies, drunkards and goondas, she is sexually exploited even by the Ice Candy Man, whom she had considered as her friend. After three months, he marries her and renames her Mumtaz. Ayah is rescued from this hell only when Godmother comes to know about her condition. First, she summons Ice Candy Man to her house and then herself visits Ayah in Hiramandi. She consoles her by saying: That was fated, daughter. It can’t be undone. But it can be forgiven… worse things are forgiven. Life goes on and the business of living buries the debris of our pasts. Hurt, happiness… all fade impartially... to make way for fresh joy and new sorrow. That’s the way of life. (262)

When Ayah resolves to go to her family irrespective of their acceptance, within a fortnight Godmother gets her away from Hira Mandi and makes her comfortable in

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the camp for the rescued women. Dil Nawaz aka Ice Candy Man tries to cajole Ayah to come back, but the hefty Sikh guard thrashes him away. After a few days, Ayah reaches her home in Amritsar turning the love torn Ice Candy Man into a mad fakir. Sidhwa’s soft spot for Pakistan is significantly visible at two points: first in describing the killings and mayhems happened in East Punjab against Muslims; and then while reassessing the personality of Jinnah. In this novel, her strong narrative skills convince the reader to sympathies with the Muslim sufferers of the partition also. Certainly, both the Sikhs and the Muslims are responsible for the ferocity and viciousness; however, the brutalities by Muslims pale beside the ones inflicted by the Sikhs. Ice Candy Man’s description of two sacks full of women’s breasts is quite disturbing, “…I lose my senses when I think of the mutilated bodies on the train from Gurdaspur…I want to kill someone for each of the breasts they cut off the Muslim women…The penises!” (156) At another point, Sidhwa describes the massacre of Muslims in Pir Pindo. The small boy Ranna witnessed it: Ranna saw his uncle beheaded. His older brothers, his cousins. The Sikhs were among them like hairy vengeful demons, Wielding bloodied swords, dragging them out as a sprinkling. of Hindus, darting about at the fingers, their faces vaguely familier, pointed out and identified the Mussulmans by name. (201).

The other remarkable thing about Sidhwa’s novel is the twin viewpoint based on both the Pakistani and the Parsi opinions. In Ice Candy Man, both the Pakistani and the marginalized Parsi community are represented. In her attempt to showcase the Parsi predicament at the time of the division of India, she reaches back hundreds of years ago to that time in the Parsi History, when they fled from Iran and “sailed to India”. (37). After reaching here, they waited for four days on the Indian shore, the “Grand Vazir” visited them with a glass of milk filled to the brim denoting that their land was already over populated and they could not accommodate “outsiders with a different religion and alien ways to disturb the harmony”. (38) Through this anecdote, Sidhwa underlines the pain and plight, the Parsis had confronted then. It shows the dilemma of assimilating new cultural values while endangering their unique identity. She accentuates here that the impending partition of the country proves that all their efforts to get absorbed into this country are fruitless as the Parsis suddenly suffer the pain of being extirpate in the wake of partition. After the partition, the Parsis were supposed to remain indifferent, but here in this novel, Sidhwa undercuts this received historical view and describes how the Parsis showed a complex attitude towards partition. In the novel, the president of community in Lahore, Colonel Bharucha warns the Parsis that after getting “Swaraj”, “Hindus, Muslims and even Sikhs are going to jockey for power: and if you jokers jump into the middle you’ll be mingled into chutney!”(36) From the very beginning, the Parsis feel alienated from all the major communities in India, this alienation eventually leads the community to follow, “whoever rules Lahore”. (34) Colonel Bharucha advises, “Let whoever wishes to rule! Himdu, Muslim, Sikh, Christian. We will abide by the rulers of the land”. (39).

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Therefore, Sidhwa demonstrates that their choice of being neutral was not due to their indifference, but it was enforced by an intricate and multifaceted historical truth. Sidhwa, additionally, describes that despite being unbiased, the Parsis had participated in the freedom fight of India in every possible way. She says, “The Parsis too were involved in their own ways in the events of the time and that they were not just indifferent and passive onlookers to the awful human tragedy”. (102). In this novel, Sidhwa reverses all the established notions by displaying the silent yet positive role played by Lenny’s parents in helping both the Muslims and Hindus. Such portrayal of the Parsi community works as revelation not only to Lenny but also to all the oblivious readers, when Lenny’s mother says, “I wish, I’d told you…we were only smuggling the rationed patrol to help our Hindu and Sikh friends to run away. And also, for the convoys to send kidnapped women, like our Ayah, to their families across the border”. (242). As it has stated before, Sidhwa has rewritten the History from the point of view of a Pakistani woman. Once, she has said in an interview: The main motivation grew out of my reading of a good deal of literature. on the partition of India and Pakistan…what has been written by the British and Indians. Naturally they reflect their bias. And they have, I felt I’d researched the book, been unfair to the Pakistanis. As a writer, as a human being, one just does not tolerate injustice, I felt whatever. little I could do to correct an injustice I would like to do. I have just. let facts speak for themselves… (Montenegro 520).

Earth—The Film The partition of the subcontinent was undoubtedly the worst man-made tragedy of the twentieth century, at least in this part of the world. Masses died on both sides. Many women were abducted, raped, mutilated and killed. The sighs and tears of partition are very effectively presented in Ice Candy Man but the representation of the trauma of partition is no less strong in Deepa Mehta’s 1947 Earth. Deepa Mehta was born in 1950 to the family of a film distributer in Amritsar. In 1973, she shifted to Canada after finishing her education from the University of Delhi. She had earned a degree in Philosophy. She married Paul Satzman, a Canadian movie producer and director. This marriage became her entry point to the world of films. She began her career with Sam and Me (1991) and then directed many remarkable films and T.V. Series, like Fire (1996), Earth (1998), Bollywood-Hollywood (2002), The Republic of Love (2003), Water (2005), Lets Talk About I (2006), Heaven on Earth (2008) and What’s Cooking about Stella (2008) and also a film shaped on Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children. Deepa Mehta was born three years after the partition. Her family migrated from Lahore to Amritsar leaving everything behind. Her childhood was filled with the stories of the partition of the subcontinent. The theme of partition and the issues of the subcontinent were always her first choice. In an interview to Asseem Chhabra,

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she said, “In Punjab, if you ask people what 1947 means to them, they will never say the independence of India, they say the Partition of India”. She came across Sidhwa’s Cracking India (published in India as Ice Candy Man) at a book store in Seattle. She liked the presentation of partition from an eight-year-old girl’s perspective so much that she decided to make a film on that. The cast of the film included- Amir Khan, Nandita Das, Rahul Khanna, Kitu Gidwani, Arif Zakaria, Kulbhshan Kharbanda, Raghuveer Yadav, Gulshan Grower and Pankaj Malhotra. This film got Best Film Award at the National film Festival. Earth is based on the memories of Parsi women. These are the memories of loss. Shabana Azmi’s talented voice is used for adult Lenny at the opening and the ending of the movie, to recall and represent the events of 1947. This voice clip takes the viewers back to Lahore of 1940s, a few months before the partition. Lenny, the eightyear-old girl is the participant narrator and shares her personal experiences. The film maker has tied to convey what the sub-continent had passed through in 1947. The film begins with an image of a screen sized earth that is trailed by the pieces of the term EARTH, confluence to structure the name of the movie. Here, we listen to the background string instrumental music. Maya Sethna played the role of Lenny as an eight-year-old girl whereas the elder Lenny was played by Bapsi Sidhwa herself but voiced by Shabana Azmi. The film starts with the small Lenny painting the Map of India at her comfortable and grand house in Lahore. The time period is some months prior to the partition. The voice of the raconteur lets the audiences to get a peep into Lenny’s remembrances of the partition, “I was eight years old, living in Lahore in March of 1947, when the British rule in India started to subside…. The subjective line of division the British could draw to carve up India in August of 1947 would scar the sub-continent forever”. (Film) Lenny, then gets up, stumbles ahead, takes up a plate, grasps it and intentionally drops it. The plate breaks into small pieces. She fixes her eyes on the plate. Now, Lenny has many questions that keep on troubling her. She needs answers to all those questions. She thinks, “Can we break a country? What happens if the English break India where our house is? How will I get to the park then?” (Film). After some flashes of narration, Lenny, herself becomes a character of the movie. The scene goes into a flashback and the past becomes a camera to the viewers. This is the time when India was not divided. Mehta succeeds in presenting the scars of partition and the fears of people. The film was at the same time heroic and mild filled with remarks disapproving the partition and the two-faced behaviour of the political leaders. Nevertheless, the remarkable point about the film is that most of such dialogues are spoken by the minor characters. One of the powerful scenes is that when Lenny along with her Ayah, Shanta, the Ice Candy Man (Dil Nawaz), Hari, Hassan, the Masseur and others is attending to a radio transmission. The major roles of Shanta and Ice Candy Man are played respectively by Nandita Das and Amir Khan. They hear Pandit Jawahar Nehru announcing, “At the stroke of midnight hour of August 15, 1947, when the world sleeps, India will awake to life and freedom”. (Film) This diverse group of people, from various religions, react with disbelief and disgust. They do not believe the words of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. Hari, the gardener

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says, “The Independence from the British will be soaked with our brother’s blood”. (Film). His dialogue recommends what the marginal and the poor people underwent and faced. The involvement of the elite classes in the proceedings is also publicized in the film. The parents of Lenny (played by Kitu Gidwani and Arif Zakaria) and their friends’ circle represent the upper class. They are also affected by the tense atmosphere of the country. But the lower classes were the worst victims. Mehta presents very aptly these minor characters. Most of the heart-wrenching dialogues are spoken by them. The complex and many-sided image of partition is presented in a very straightforward manner. One of such scenes is the ‘ghost-train-scene’. Here, Ice Candy Man is standing at the railway station as his sister is supposed to come by this train from Gurudaspur. But to his horrors, he discovers the train jam-packed of viciously slaughtered and maimed bodies. The platform is overcrowded; many people like Dil Nawaz are waiting there for the train to arrive. First, it’s dimly presented, showing only the light beaming from the engine of the train. Then, right behind Dil Nawaz, the train comes into the frame slowly and clearly. The quaffing sound of the train is tailed by the tapping of the feet. He rushes towards one of the coaches but what he sees is quite horrible. Everybody in that train is slayed, and the breasts were there in the coaches, mutilated, cut and filled in the sacks and bags. That section of the film is the most poignant and heartrending one. Lenny and Shanta come to know about this train by the group of Shanta’s admirers. In the film, Lenny is not present at the railway station to witness this scene but she hears it all, and this becomes a part of her recollected memories. This is the only scene which the viewers see with Dil Nawaz but not through Lenny’s lense. This brutal incident transforms Dil Nawaz into a cold-blooded murderer, who does not hesitate in killing-Hassan, Lenny’s trust, Shanta’s individuality and existence and his own fondness for his friends. This scene moves the viewers as it works on their physical as well as emotional sensations. As the ghost train slows down, it rakes up the memories of the historical events which still haunt us. In another scene, Lenny, Shanta, Hassan and Dil Nawaz on look the unrests and uprisings from the roof top of Dil Nawaz’s house. It is that exact house where these very friends had assembled a month ago and relished and appreciated kite flying. That was the time when they had a carefree life. The scene was enlivened by Javed Akhtar’s lyrics “rut aa gyi re”, the bright colours of the kite symbolized of the happiness of life. Everyone was so happy then. But now the scene is different. The terror and fear have gripped the entire nation. This riot takes place just a few days after the ghost train scene. All are shocked except Dil Nawaz. In the beginning of the movie, Dil Nawaz is shown to be very friendly with his Hindu and Sikh friends. But, when they see the riots from the rooftop, his face shines up with some beastly joy, as if something sinister is being occurred on his mind. His expressions frighten others. The beast in him later on kills Hassan, because Shanta had refused marrying him as she was in love with Hassan. Another terrifying scene is the abduction of Shanta. Amidst the communal fury and turmoil, a Muslim crowd enters the Sethi house in search of Hindus. Astonishingly, the procession is led by one of Shanta’s admirers. Once more Dil Nawaz enters the scene and cajoles Lenny

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into telling him about the hiding place of the Ayah. Innocent Lenny believes him and speaks up that Ayah is hiding secretly in their house. Shanta is pulled out of the house and a disorganized and bewildered Lenny watches all. Now, once again, the camera shifts from the past to the present, and the mature Lenny is shown in the scene. She is shown resting by the figurine of Queen Victoria in Lahore, the camera lens is zoomed on her. The film ends with a voice, that of Shabana Azmi, “Two hundred and fifty years of the British Empire ended in 1947, but what is the result? a country divided?… Fifty years have passed since I betrayed Ayah. Some say she married Ice Candy Wallah, some say she was seen in a prostitute house at Hira Mandi, and some say that they saw her in Amritsar. But I did not see her ever again, after that day in 1947 when I lost a large part of myself” (Film).

Conclusion Mehta’s story stops with the loss of Lenny but Sidhwa’s novel takes the story forward. The film ends with a hint about the loss of Lenny’s innocence, her trust and her emotions whereas the novel ends with Godmother helping Ayah to go to her home in Amritsar. The Godmother Rescues Ayah from Hira Mandi, a red-light area. She is referred to the rescued women’s encampment and afterwards, to India to her family. This novel by Sidhwa offers to be a dispassionate account of the partition of the subcontinent. At the onset, the novel shows the non-committal approach of the Parsis towards the turbulence, whereas the other people of India preferred participation and got themselves embroiled at the starting of the twentieth century. The intricate, love–hate–association of the Muslims and the Hindus is presented from the view of Lenny—the Parsi girl. The novel is very absorbing, and throughout the book, the author controls the tension. The novel is more rooted in the partition than in any other thing, (memory bank, looking back to the good old days or the sociological background of Parsis). The Parsi religious rites are not described in details, the main attention is on the heart-rending historical events of the partition of the subcontinent. It was not only a division of the land, but it divided people, relations, friends, and moreover, it separated hearts and souls as well. The main difference between the novel and the film is that Mehta avoids including a certain number of characters who had been given a lot of space in the novel. Though she has avoided taking a plethora of characters but not the real essence of the novel. As the story is cut short to make it fit within the time frame of two hours, thus, some of the characters do not have much scope to be presented on the screen, for example Godmother, Rana, Col Bharucha, etc. However, all the essential details have been provided through some references to the characters or some discussions among other characters. For example, a half-clad boy at the refugee camp replaces the description of the massacre in the book which was witnessed by Rana, Imam Din’s grandson. The film maker has also evaded, however intentionally, Sidhwa’s views about Gandhi, Nehru and Jinnah. In her novel, Sidhwa has disapproved of Gandhi and Nehru. Being a Pakistani, she highlights the positive side of Jinnah which the

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film maker intentionally avoids. The film has apparently not sided with any of the two nations nor their political leaders. The film only talks about the partition and its effects, having Lahore as the central stage. Lastly, but more importantly, Ice Candy Man showcases a feminine view of Partition. It shows that females are the worst sufferers of the riots. Lenny the narrator is a little Parsi girl. Though her world is small and constricted due to her lameness, yet it is full of bright colours and diverse emotions. The next character, her eighteen years old Ayah, is voluptuous and coquettish. All the time, she remains with Lenny. She has many admirers and friends. The Ayah keeps them united in her presence, but she fails to do so before the communal frenzy. The riots affect women most and she becomes a victim of it. Many women are kidnapped and raped and Ayah is one of them. To her shock, her own friends and associates satisfy their lust on her body. She is further forced to embrace Islam and to marry the Ice Candy Man. Now she does not like him and decides to go to her family in Amritsar. Godmother helps her to come out of that filthy place. Another victim is Hamida. She is the representative of those women who are kidnapped and raped otherwise later on rejected by their families. However, Hamida’s entire family is killed and she is taken to a rehabilitation centre. Being lucky, she is employed by Lenny’s mother and is thus saved from the inhuman treatment of the rehabilitation centres. Lenny’s mother, aunt and Godmother all prove to be of great help to the victims. Sidhwa portrays men as perpetrators of horrible barbarity. Her presentation of women as victims as well as saviours, makes Ice Candy Man a feminist text. It can well be called a fictional and imaginary version of the partition from three viewpoints, Parsi, Pakistani and feminine. That is the exceptionality and exclusivity of the book.

References 1947 Earth. Dir. Deepa Mehta. Perf. Rahul Khanna, Nandita Das, Maia Shethna, Aamir khan. 1998. Bharucha, N. The postmodern Indian english novel. New Delhi. Jussawalla, F., & Dasonbrock, R. W. (Eds.). (1992). Interview with writers of the post colonial world (pp. 198–221). University Press of Missippi. Montenegro, D. (1990). Bapsi Sidhwa: An interview. The Massachusetts Review 513–533. Sidhwa, B. (1989). Ice- Candy Man. Penguin. Spencer, D. (1960). Indian fiction in english. University of Pennisylvania Press.

Gender and Development

Gendered Demonology: Women as Witches Farhat Nasreen

Introduction ‘Act IV Scene 1. A dark cave In the middle a cauldron is boiling. Thunder. Enter the three witches. First Witch: Thrice the branded cat had mewed. Second Witch: Thrice and once the hedge-pig whined. Third Witch: Harpier cries; tis time, tis time. First Witch: Round about the cauldron go; In the poisoned entrails throw. Toad that under cold stone, Days and nights has thirty one’ Swelt’ red venom sleeping got, Boil thou first I’ th’ charmed pot. All the witches: Double, double toil and trouble; Fire burn and cauldron bubble. Second Witch: Fillet of a fenny snake, In the cauldron boil and bake; Eye of newt and toe of a frog, Wool of bat, and tongue of dog, Adder’s fork and blind worm’s stin, Lizard’s leg and howler’s wingFor a charm of powerful trouble; All the witches: Double double toil and trouble Fire burn and cauldron bubble. Third Witch: Scale of dragon, tooth of wolf, F. Nasreen (B) Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Rahman and N. Tiwari (eds.), Development, Governance and Gender in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-5109-0_16

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Witch’s mummy, maw and gulf Of the ravin’d salt-sea shark, Root of hemlock Digg’d I’ h’dark, Liver of blaspheming Jew, Gall of goat, and slips of yew Silver’d in the moon’s eclipse, Nose of the Turk, and Tartar’s lips, Finger of birth strangled babe Ditch-deliver’d by a drabMake the gruel thick and slab; Add thereto a tiger’s cauldron For th’ ingredience of our cauldron. All the witches: Double, double toil and trouble; Fire burn, and cauldron bubble. Second witch: Cool it with a baboon’s blood, Then the charm is firm and good.1 According to the Oxford dictionary of English, the word ‘witch’ has a range of meanings: A woman thought to have evil magic powers, popularly depicted as wearing a black cloak and a pointed hat and flying on a broom stick/informally; the word could mean an ugly or unpleasant woman/or a girl or a woman who is bewitchingly attractive/or a follower or practitioner of modern witchcraft; A Wiccan priest or priestess. Wicca is supposed to be the religious cult of modern witchcraft, especially an initiatory tradition founded in England in the mid-twentieth century. It claims its origin in pre-Christian pagan religions, and the word itself is derived from the Old English ‘Wicca’ which meant witch. It is believed that a witch can do many things ranging from causing bad weather, natural calamities, epidemics, diseases and unexplained deaths; of animals as well humans. They are adept at handling magic. Magic is also categorized into two types: White and Black. The latter type is a negative activity undertaken to either control someone or destroy him/her. Thus, the witches can supposedly cast spells, make predictions and have control over phenomenon usually beyond human understanding. The above passage is cited from Macbeth a famous play of William Shakespeare. It is a proverbial passage that shows the crazy and cruel character of three witches. In this passage, the witches are in the process of preparing a magical broth. This preparation preceded a meeting with Macbeth; the latter had murdered his trusting master; a king and had usurped power. The witches collect the most grotesque of ingredients to prepare their broth: tongue of a dog, a lizard’s leg, a snake’s teeth, a Turk’s nose, a Tatar’s lips and a finger of a female child strangled at birth are just to name a few. Apparitions appear from the fumes of the cauldron in which the broth is being boiled, and they answer Macbeth’s questions. It is a kind of divination or a prophecy coming from the devil. However, their answers are wrapped in so many layers of deception that although they make Macbeth believe that he was going to be safe from any retaliation from his enemies, in reality he dies and so does his overtly ambitious wife. The plot of the play establishes that Macbeth’s seeking help from the witches does not help him in any way; in fact, it becomes a reason for his eventual downfall and death. Macbeth is supposed to be one of the

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most powerful tragedies written by Shakespeare. Within this drama of conspiracies and betrayals, the witches play a major role in leading Macbeth to his doom. Written in the seventeenth century, this play echoes the stereotype about witches in medieval Europe. Interestingly, the character of the witches of Macbeth continues to intrigue readers and researchers. A noteworthy factor here is that Macbeth’s wife who is not a witch per se but has ‘witch-like’ characteristics. She is portrayed as an evil character who encourages her husband to betray his trusting master. She later tries to normalize Macbeth’s conscience by underrating his crime. She is depicted as the classic case of a recipient of divine punishment because she loses her mental balance and keeps washing her hands to clean them from blood. She hallucinated that her hands were smeared with the blood of the people who were murdered in the betrayal in which she was a coconspirator. Her following dialogue is considered to be a masterpiece of Shakespeare and also an undying reminder of what happens to conspirators and especially so if they are women: ‘Here’s the smell of blood still. All the perfumes of Arabia will not sweeten this little hand. Oh, oh, oh!!!’2 Thus, in a sharper understanding of the plot of the play, we have the witches who are ‘witches’ per se, and then, we have women who are not ‘witches’ but like ‘witches’; evil and inhuman. Though the ‘born’ witches may reside in fiction, the idea that some women are like witches has a far-reaching impact. An older rendering of the same format appears in a version of Vishnu Sharma’s Panchatantra. The version used here appears in a widely popular-influencer; Amar Chitra Katha series, which traces it to the twelfth century Kannada text of Durgasimha. It has about twenty tales which are unavailable in the standard compilations of Sharma’s Panchatantra. The story is about two women and two witches. Kumati the wife of the Headman of village Salagram always ill-treated her simple daughter-in-law Saumitri. The latter slogged all day and yet was criticized for whatever she accomplished. One day, Saumitri decided to feed a poor mendicant out of her own share of meal. This enraged Kumati, and she threw Saumitri out of the house. The poor girl started off for her father’s village. As night fell on the way, the scared girl sought shelter in a hollow tree trunk. That tree was the resting place of two witches. That night the witches made the tree fly to an island called Swarnadwip (the gold island); its sand was made of gold particles. The hidden Saumitri was also flown to the island with the tree. She came out of the hole while the witches were away and collected as much of the gold sand as she could. Later, she reached back the very jungle from where the tree had been flow. The witches had not noticed her presence. After the creatures left for a hunt Saumitri quickly came out of the tree and rushed back to her in-laws’ place. She had hoped that she would be able to impress her mother-in-law this time. However, she failed. Kumati was too greedy and thankless to be satisfied by whatever wealth Saumitri had brought even though it was enough to last a few generations of luxurious living. She decided to herself take a ride with the witches. Accordingly, she hid in the same hollow. Unfortunately for her, the witches decided to go to another location that night. This was a beach full of crabs instead of gold. When Kumati heard their plan, the tree was already in mid-air. However, since she was so used to being dictatorial that she could not restrain herself from shouting out to the witches to change their plan and go to the

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golden beach instead. The witches were outraged by the fact that someone had seen them and also knew of their priceless beach. Besides this the audacity to tell them what to do, enraged them further. Thus, they shook the tree so vigorously that Kumati fell off and died. This was supposedly a manifestation of divine justice. The woman was punished for her cruelty, haughtiness and greed. Like Lady Macbeth, Kumati is also a manifestation of women who are like witches. Although these narratives told us the fate of ‘witch-like women’ they did not speak much about the eventual fate of the witches themselves. Fictions do not have the space for an analysis of the ‘making’ of a witch. However, researchers of medieval societies and perhaps even times before that did try to figure out who the witches were: whether they were born like that or they did something extraordinary to become that way. In a very well-researched article on Witchcraft, Merry E. Wiesner analyses the categorization of women under two types: firstly as agents of the devil and secondly as the incarnation of the devil. In the first case, they only work for the devil. He grants them extraordinary powers to operate as witches. Sometimes, they enter into a pact with him willingly, and at other times, he manages to ‘possess’ them so that they act on his orders without knowing what they are doing. However, in such a scenario, religious or spiritual intervention could free them of the devil’s possession, and they could be reverted to being ‘normal’ women from being ‘witches’. However, in the second case where they are not workers of the devil but are born as devilish witches, they cannot be changed or rescued in any way. The born witches were supposed to be evil by nature, and whatever misery they brought forth was out of their own free will. Thus, in the first case, women were persecuted for what they did as agents of the devil, and in the second case, they were persecuted not only because of what they did, but more so because of what they were. The second case scenario was definitely a dead end because no one could change the inborn character of a being. This study of Wiesner is based largely on the medieval European scenario. In the premodern times, the issue of witch-hunting had gained such a momentum that there were people who literally made a profession out of it. In the fifteenth century, two Dominican monks wrote a witch-hunter’s manual. It was called the Malleus Maleficarum. In this, they asserted that the witches are mostly females. The devil finds it easier to control them because they are more credulous, carnal and impressionable than men. In fact, they push back the faultiness and imperfection of women to the creation of the very first woman: Eve. The latter was supposedly created from the bent rib of Adam. According to them, the curvature of the rib made Eve temperamentally unreliable. They argue that ‘this is indicated by the etymology of the word; for Femina comes from Fe and Minus, since she is ever weaker to preserve and hold faith…. To conclude. All witchcraft comes from carnal lust, which is in women insatiable’. Martin Luther in a statement that tries to rationalize the susceptibility of women to be dictated by the devil said: ‘It is commonly the nature of women to be timid and to be afraid of everything. That is why they busy themselves so much about witch craft and superstitions and run hither and tither, uttering a magic formula here and a magic formula there’. Unfortunately, the assertions cited above seemed to have a substantial bearing on the way witches were identified in medieval Europe. After the sixteenth century, between seventy five to eighty five per cent of the people questioned, tried

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and executed for witchcraft were women. The deadly trials were known as ‘Great Witch Hunts’ or ‘Witch Craze’.3 Like Europe, in India too persons usually accused of practising witchcraft or being witches were women. In an article entitled ‘Witchcraft and Witch Hunting in India’ Shamsher Alam and Aditya Raj introduce readers to an overview of the witch-hunting scenario in India.4 In an article dated 20 June 2016, Amitabh Srivastava claims that over 2000 women were killed in India for practising black magic in the previous 14 years. A death related to witch-hunting is reported every now and then. He presents data from the National Crimes Record Bureau which states that 2290 women were ‘hunted’ for witchcraft in India between 2001 and 2014. In a tabular presentation of data, the tally of the various states of India is as follows: Jharkhand: 464, Odisha: 415, Andhra Pradesh: 383, Madhya Pradesh: 234, Haryana: 209, Chhattisgarh: 142, Bihar: 37 and others: 406. This data pertains to life threatening attacks. Other types of oppression and torture like, forced tonsuring of hair, beating, flogging, being paraded naked, eating and drinking of excreta and urine, insertion of sharp objects in private parts and gruesome gang rapes are sometimes not even included in the list of witch-hunting episodes.5 In her report entitled: ‘Witch Hunts Today: Abuse of Women, Superstitions and Murder Collide in India’ in the Scientific American, Seema Yasmin narrates the details of an incident in which three women were accused of being ‘Dakan’; witches, and were beaten ruthlessly by their male relatives in Gujarat. The incident took place in 2014, and she interviewed them a couple of years later. She was told that the women, Madhuben, Susilaben and their sister-in-law, used to grow corn, lentils and peas in a fertile and well-located plot of land which they owned. Their male relatives started defecating in their plot. When they objected to it, they were beaten up and turned out of their houses for ten days as a punishment. After a few months, two young male members of the family died of renal failure and cancer. Then, the hostilities against these women were renewed, and they were blamed for the untimely deaths. Accused of being witches and practising black magic, they were beaten up ruthlessly and were made to sign papers of transfer of their expensive land to male members of their family. In the interview, they told that if they had not done so they would have been killed and lost the land in any a case.6 Sixty-three years old Purni Orang was stripped naked and beheaded in Assam’s Sonitpur district. It was suspected that she was a witch who was causing illnesses. Between 2009 and 2015, approximately 90 persons were beheaded, burnt alive or stabbed to death on the charge of being a witch.7 In another case, a 65 years old woman and her 35 years old daughter were accused of being witches and causing illnesses. They were made to walk through the streets; stripped naked and heads shaven. They were forced to eat excreta and drink urine. Later, investigations revealed that the instigators were interested in usurping their property.8 In an equally shocking case, Mangri Munda and her four children, aged 1, 4, 7 and 12 years, were found dead in a well near their home. They had been beaten with wooden sticks and hacked with axes. In this case too, the woman was accused of being a witch. In 2016, 83 cases of this kind had been reported from Orissa. In 2017, this number rose to 99.9 In most of these cases, women were targeted for the usurpation of their property or some other form of wealth. In many cases, they were raped as well. It is ironical that the very women who

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are accused of being powerful enough to perform magic to cause deaths by illness are in reality so weak that they cannot even defend their own bodies or possessions. They are raped by the very men who claim to be afraid of the ‘witches’ powers. In many cases, the accusers are known to the women and are even their relatives. Seema Yasmin, in the mentioned report, cited Soma Chaudhari, a sociologist at Michigan State University. Chaudhri says that witch hunts and beatings of women are an outlet for the frustration and powerlessness that men feel. Generally, it is women who handle food in households. Thus, it becomes easy to accuse them of having done magic on eatables. Most of the cases cited above were from remote rural areas where education and scientific knowledge is yet to be dispersed. Many deaths are caused by poor sanitation, Malaria, Typhoid, Cholera and other such diseases, but due to the lack of medical knowhow, these deaths become mysteries. In case if a vulnerable female resident of such an area has enemies or wealth vultures around her, she is used as an explanation for the deaths. Once the momentum against her is built anything can happen. She can be tortured, raped or murdered. Since she is declared to be a ‘witch’, the common conscience of the society does not feel guilty about the cruelty since they are made to believe that killing a ‘witch’ is after all an act of self-defence or even social service for that matter. An alarming trend that one notices is that though females are usually labelled as witches, the actual practice of voodoo rituals is not a monopoly of females alone. While some innocent women are blamed for witchcraft and black magic that they did not perform, there are some others: both men and women who actually perform dangerous rituals due to superstition. In a criminal case, a 9 years old boy’s head was severed from his body in a supposedly religious ritual.10 In an urban area„ like New Delhi, a married man; father of three children, sacrificed an owl in a black magic ritual to attract a woman whom he felt attracted to. He cut the owl’s claws with a knife and inserted several needles into its liver and lungs.11 The extent of belief in effectivity of black magic and voodoo rituals is so rampant that the persons who claim to have a knowledge of such crafts are paid heavily by people to solve other’s problems. These supposed masters of witchcraft are tech savvy enough to receive payments through Pay TM and use WhatsApp. A 16 years old girl paid a man to help her retain her boyfriend through magic. Many women pay such ‘magicians’ to help them give birth or give birth to a male child.12 In Nagpur, a man was killed allegedly by his relatives because the latter thought that he was responsible for someone’s suicide. It was suspected that his mother practised black magic. In fact in a particular case, a man’s murder was conspired by two women; his paternal aunt and her daughter. In this case, the real motivation for murder was perhaps an issue of property inheritance.13 Thus, we see that blaming persons to be ‘witches’ often has something to do with the economic or personal ambitions of the accusers. Usually, the accused party is the weaker one, either in terms of social status or in terms of gendered hierarchy. Persons who deliberately pose as ‘witches’ or practitioners of witchcraft have their own agendas. In the rural areas sometimes, women act like ‘witches’ so that people fear them. This creates an aura around them, which helps them seek aid from their neighbours more easily. It might also save them from sexual predators. The data in this regard suggests quite clearly that most of the victims of accusations of witchcraft

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are women. The tech savvy frauds of the urban areas use their victims’ insecurities to their advantage. Alam and Raj in their above-mentioned article present a list of legislations which reflect the concerns of international and national agencies towards the issue of witch-hunting and oppression of women in particular. A few examples are Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Articles-1, 3, 5 12 and 13, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Act; Articles—6(1), 7, 9(1), 10, 17, 18 (2), Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment; Articles-2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 11, International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; Articles-1(2), 5(1), 9, 10(1), 12, 13, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; Articles-2(e), 2(f), 3, 5(a), The Drugs and Magic Remedies; under the Objectionable Advertisements Act, etc. In India, a reasonable bit of legislation has been put in place in this respect at the states’ level as well. For example, The Prevention of Witch (Dayan) Practices Act—1999, Bihar, The Prevention of Witch (Dayan) Practices Act—2001, Jharkhand, The Odisha Practice of Witch Hunting Act 2013, The Rajasthan Prevention of Witch Hunting Act 2015, The Assam Witch Hunt Bill-2015, Karnataka Prevention and Eradication of Inhuman Evil Practices, Black Magic Bill-2012, Maharashtra Prevention and Eradication of Human Sacrifice and the Inhuman, Evil and Aghori Practices and Black Magic Act, 2015. However, putting the legislations in place is just the beginning of a long drawn battle. The awareness about the laws in this regard does not reach everyone. Besides, a large number of people choose to continue with their belief in taboos and superstitions. The acts broadly define a ‘witch’ as a woman locally known as dayan/dakan/dakin—who have been identified as any person believing her to be in a position of or having an evil power for causing harm to any person or property. ‘Witchcraft’ means the use of supernatural/magical powers with evil intention to call up spirits from another world or cast spell or do some other destructive activity. This practice is often called Tonatotka, Tantra-mantra, Jadu-tona and Jhad-phunk, etc. The ‘witch-doctor’ is often known as gunia, ojha or tantric, etc. He typically claims that he has supernatural or magical powers to cure a supposed ‘witch’ or free a woman from the evil influence of spirits. ‘Witch-hunting’ is described as identifying, accusing or defaming a woman as a witch and harassing, harming or injuring such a woman mentally or physically. A reading of the Rajasthan Prevention of Witch Hunt Act 2015 gives an idea about the legal seriousness of the crime. The term recommended for simple accusative type of hunt is 1–5 years in jail or a fine of at least rupees 50,000/—for torture of a woman in the course of hunting; as in shaving of hair, parading her naked or making her drink urine or eat excreta is 3–7 years in jail or a fine of at least 50,000/—or both, the punishment for causing death in the act of witch-hunting is 7 years to life imprisonment and a fine of at least rupees 1 lakh or both. The punishment for practising black arts is a jail term of 1–3 years or a fine of rupees 10,000/- or both. The provision of collective fines from numerous perpetrators of the crime in a locality also exists. In February 2020, The National University of Study and Research in Law and the National Commission for Women organized a one daylong seminar to create awareness about the prevalence of witch-hunting among young lawyers. Suman Gupta a senior IPS officer said on the occasion that despite the laws being

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in place it is often difficult to save women from, this menace. Often the victims do not complain due to the fear of further backlash. They are usually not given a protective cover even by their families who also choose to be quiet. Thus, the perpetrators of the crime get away either completely or with a meagre fine.14 In this context, the case of Birubala Rabha of Assam is particularly interesting. In a very informative write up entitled: ‘The Indian Woman who Hunts the Witch-Hunters’, Soutik Biswas reports that Birubala Rabha’s son had fallen ill with perhaps Typhoid in the 1980s. She approached the local witch-doctor type quack, who diagnosed that her son had somehow impregnated a fairy of the other world. It was predicted that once the fairy gave birth to the human child, the father of the baby would certainly die. Luckily Birubala just could not get herself to believe this outlandish story. Eventually her son was cured and became healthy again. This made her realize the hollowness of superstitions and the dangerousness of witch doctors. Thereafter, she started a movement to help women who were accused of being witches. She had saved at least seventy-seven women till the time the said report was published. Anjali Hajongwas accused of being a witch perhaps because some men wanted to assault her sexually. Another woman, Puduni Rabha, was accused of being a witch because her husband’s pharmacy had hit the business of the local quacks. Birubala became the voice of many such victims and saved their souls.15 It is thus important to have a local grassroots level network of persons to help in making the anti-witch-hunting legislations effective. For example, in some states, the district collectors have been asked to identify villages prone to witch-hunting and keep an eye on the area. They are also encouraged to rope in local NGOs, for establishing a chain of connection with the locals. The government will have to actively encourage people to report cases and give protection to those who report. Besides this the state must also take on the responsibility to help in the rehabilitation of persons scarred in anyway by the cruel ways of witch-hunting. A recent report from Rajasthan regarding the killing of bats to combat the COVID19 is quite horrifying. In the Lohargal area of Nawalgarh, many greater mouse tailed bats (Rhino-Poma-Microphyllum) have been killed. The villagers sealed all crevices where small bats and their pups roost. Forty-five bats have been killed in Churu as well. Despite the clear and loud dissemination of information regarding the factors that spread the COVID-19, the locals believed that bats could be spreaders and thus had to be killed. The biodiversity experts are alarmed by this trend because the bats are vital for the pollination of flowers and protection of plants from other pests.16 It seems that the key to overcome dangerous superstitions and gender-based cruelty in the name of witch-hunting and magic lies in education. Women need to be better informed about their rights and the legal remedies available to them. The underlying issues that trigger off outlandish accusations of witchcraft also need to be identified and addressed. Notes 1.

William Shakespeare, cf. William Shakespear The Complete Works, Oxford & IBH Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, p. 1016.

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4.

5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

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Ibid., p. 1022. Malleus Maleficarum, cf. Merry E Wiesner, Women and Gender in Early Modern Europe, Second edition, Cambridge University Press, USA, 2000, p. 264. Proceedings of the Odisha State Commission for Women’s National Convention on Emerging Challenges of Violence Against Women; 22nd-23rd February, 2018, entitled: Cyber Crime and Witch Hunting Reflection and Ground Realities. www.indiatoday.com, 20-6-2016, accessed on 14-4-2020. www.scientificamerican.com, 11 January 2018, accessed on 14-4-2020. www.bbc.com, 22 July 2015, accessed on 14-4-2020. www.bbc.com, 19 February 2018, accessed on 14-4-2020. www.bbc.com 30June 2019, accessed on 15-4-2020. India Today, 21 October 2018, accessed on 17-4-2020. India Today, 13 November 2018, accessed on 17-4-2020. Mail Today, 9 December 2018, accessed on 17-4-2020. India Today, November 21, 2019, accessed on 17-4-2020. Times of India, 11 February, accessed on 5 May 2020. BBC, reported by Soutik Bissau, dated 10 April 2016, accessed on 5 April, 2020. Times of India, 4 May 2020, accessed on 5May 2020.

‘Masculinizing’ the Women: Strategic De/Reconstruction of Gender in the Fiction of South Asian Women Writers Afrinul Haque Khan

Simone de Beauvoir, in her book, The Second Sex, makes distinction between two different kinds of women: the feminine and the emancipated. While the ‘feminine’ woman involves herself in trapping the man, “in enchaining him by means of the desire she arouses in him in submissively making herself a thing” (674), the ‘emancipated’ or the ‘modern’ woman ‘accepts masculine values’ and ‘refuses the passivity man means to impose on her’ (674). She thinks, works, creates and acts, in the same way as men. A major preoccupation of the feminist writers, therefore, is to ‘masculinize’ the women in their fiction, to attribute them with what had hitherto been termed as masculine traits and characteristics. Such a strategic de/reconstruction of gender aims at dismantling the age-old ideals and conceptions of femininity constructed and propagated by the dominant male rhetoric and defying the misogynistic stereotyping of the female characters in much of male fictional writing, for, says Amy Hudock, the published images of women “serve as a means of social manipulation and control—a type of gender propaganda” (my italics) (Hudock, 2005, xx). While it is obvious that such a gender propaganda relegates woman to a subservient position and makes her vulnerable to the omnipresent patriarchal oppression and exploitation, for the feminists, the whole idea is degrading, and this kind of propagation a trap. It is against this ‘gender propaganda’ that the feminist writers, from South Asia and beyond, have railed most systematically and brilliantly, through their fiction. Creating women characters who are like men, both in thought and practice, these writers reconstruct those areas of women’s experience which foreground the so-called masculine traits in their character. In this essay, I explore how texts like Shashi Deshpande’s The Dark Holds No Terrors, Anita Desai’s Clear Light of Day and Jhumpa Lahiri’s The Lowland through ‘masculinizing’ women characters attempt to demolish the traditional image of women and how such a demolition changes and redirects our perception and understanding of women and eventually A. H. Khan (B) Nirmala College, Ranchi, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Rahman and N. Tiwari (eds.), Development, Governance and Gender in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-5109-0_17

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leads to their emancipation from what Simone de Beauvoir, calls the ‘condition of vassalage’ (641). I also investigate, through an examination of these texts, how such a strategic de/reconstruction of gender helps to liberate the women from patriarchal dictatorship and enables them, to say in Adrienne Rich’s words, “to see and …liveafresh.”(Rich, 1972, 18).

Interrogating Femininity I do not intend to rehearse here an analysis of the status accorded to woman and the inequities and marginalities associated with her status. I do not even intend to examine here those beliefs, assertions and practices that convince the women of their inferiority and frailty and entitle men to power and authority. Much has been written and said about the age-old patriarchal authoritarianism and female subjectivity. My concern here, in the first section, is to conduct a brief inquiry into the literary representation of woman, focusing specifically on the epoch making text produced in the Indian subcontinent, both in the ancient and modern age, to argue how literature, over the ages, has aided in nurturing, strengthening and appropriating the patriarchal theorizing about gender and hence in conditioning the minds of the people and determining the way they look at women or even the way women perceive themselves or conceptualize their situation in society and feel themselves incapable of combating the hostile and oppressive forces. In the second section, I develop further my argument to assert and establish how the South Asian woman writers use literature not only as a means to challenge, critique and resist the patriarchal theorization of gender, but also to alter it, by constructing in their fiction, the image of woman who is masculine in her approach, temperament and practices. The main objective behind such a tactical de/reconstruction of gender, as has been discussed earlier, is to liberate the women from the dominion of authoritative, oppressive and regressive patriarchal regime. I begin my investigation by interrogating the representation of women in the ancient Sanskrit epic Mahabharata, regarded by the scholars as ‘one of India’s grandest text’, ‘hugely influential in shaping gender and social norms’ (Brodbeck and Black, 2007, 11) and ‘one of the definitive cultural narratives in the construction of masculine and feminine gender roles in ancient India’ (10–11). One can easily gauge here the tremendous impact that the representation of female characters in a grand narrative like Mahabharata was to have on the subsequent construction of gender in India. Simon Brodbeck and Brian Black, in their pioneering work, Gender and Narrative in the Mahabharata, argue that ‘pativrata, ‘the wife who is religiously devoted to her husband’, is the text’s principal explicit model of femininity’ (16). They substantiate their argument by citing instances from the text, of female characters who conform to this model like Savitri, who, through her sheer devotion and loyalty to her husband, retrieves him from death or Gandhari, who wilfully blindfolds herself when she marries the blind Dhritarastra, resolving that ‘she would not experience more than her husband could’ (16). ‘The ideal of the

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pativrata’, they emphasize, ‘is perhaps best articulated by Draupadi, as she instructs Satyabhama in how to be a successful wife: My Law rests on my husband, as, I think, it eternally does with women. He is the God, he is the path, nothing else’ (17). While it is clear that the text regards the pativrata model as ‘the dominant paradigm for ideal female behavior’ (Dhand, 2008, 32), the broader implications of the model need to be understood in terms of patriarchal definitions of femininity and gender role. The model suggests that an ideal woman is one who remains devoted, loyal and dutiful to her husband and provides unconditional service to him. It implies that marriage would entitle a man to absolute authority over his wife whereas it would suspend or incorporate the existence of woman, as wife, into that of man, as husband. To say in brief, the model seems to lay emphasis on marriage as a tool which enables a man to exercise a systematic control over the woman or a means through which a man enacts his masculinity and a woman her femininity. That the deviation from the pativrata model can lead a woman to destruction is projected in yet another narrative of mega significance in Indian literary and cultural tradition, that is, Bankimchandra Chatterjee’s Rajmohan’s Wife, which concerns ‘the question of Woman in the nineteenth century’ (Pranjape). As is explicit from the title, the text narrates the story of a woman who is identified not by her name or occupation but by a category which legitimizes her ‘otherness’ and concretizes her existence as what Simone de Beauvoir says ‘an object paradoxically endued with subjectivity’ (675). Matangini, the heroine of the novel, though embodies the feminine ideals of beauty, is not feminine in her spirit. She is bold, assertive and rebellious and constitutes what Pranjape calls a ‘new female subjectivity’. Her character, like her actions in the novel, crosses the threshold and makes her a paradigm of the ‘new woman’ in the making. Her devastating marriage with Rajmohan threatens the erasure of her beauty, the marker of her feminine identity, whereas her non-conformity to the ideals of a chaste and devoted wife threatens the erasure of her life itself. Matangini’s banishment and her early death are the punishments pronounced upon her by the author, for her transgressions, who even assigns her husband, the right and task of chastising his wife by force and violence. Rajmohan’s abomination at his wife’s boldness that takes the shape of his desire to kick his wife to death (Chatterji, 1984, 13) represents woman at the peak of her vulnerability and man at the zenith of his authority. Indeed, there is no dearth in the literature of the image of woman as the silently suffering and submissive wife. Closely associated with and also parallel to the literary image of an ideal wife is the image of a sacrificing mother, yet another or perhaps a great symbol of a woman’s entrapment within a system which is ‘based on male dominance and control of female sexuality and reproduction’ (Gangoli, 2007, 8). If we examine the more recent literary representations of women, we observe a continuity of trends which extol the ideals of femininity and establish the image of woman in the ‘cult of true Womanhood’ (Welter, 1966, 1).

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Defeminizing/Masculinizing the Woman While recognizing the tactics behind a literary representation that emphasizes, what Nancy Reinhardt says, ‘a male world in which women are either kept to the sides, in recesses, or are placed on display for the male viewer’ (Aston, 1995, 2–3)1 or as hostages at home enduring ordeals or in servitude to men and understanding how such images systematically oppress women, the South Asian women writers have attempted to subvert the patriarchal conceptions of an ideal woman by constructing, in their texts, a new model of woman who is ‘masculinized’ in character. Estelle B. Freedman, while speaking about the formulations of effective strategies for combating patriarchy, quotes anthropologist Gayle Rubin: ‘If innate male aggression and dominance are at the root of female oppression, then the feminist program would logically require either the extermination of the offending sex, or else a eugenics project to modify its character’ (Freedman, 2006, 21). I argue, through an exploration of Shashi Deshpande’s The Dark Holds No Terrors, Anita Desai’s Clear Light of Day and Jhumpa Lahiri’s The Lowland, how the feminist program of the South Asian women writers, rather than attempting to ‘modify male character through a eugenics project’ (Freedman, 2006, 21), aims at creating an alternative model of ‘masculinized’ woman, who rejects the patriarchal ideals of femininity imposed on her, and seeks to redefine herself, not in relation to her status as ‘the Other’ but in terms of her acceptance of masculine value system and traits. Such a model, as is explicit, is suggestive of two distinct phases in a woman’s life, namely the phase of innocence, when unaware of the tactics and tools of patriarchy, women accept and exhibit values which essentialize them as feminine, and the phase of experience, when having gained maturity and wisdom, woman acquires and internalizes what George L. Mosse calls the ‘so-called manly virtues such as will power, honor and courage’ (Mosse, 1996, 4), and hence, is initiated in the community of ‘masculinized’ women. Bimla, Sarita and Gauri all belong to this community, displaying at times, one or another of the attributes of masculinity. To develop further my argument, I draw upon Robert W. Connell’s conception of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ as discussed by Rebecca Feasey in her groundbreaking work on Masculinity and Popular Television where she mentions how Connell coins the term by developing Antonio Gramsci’s seminal work on Italian class relations to construct the image of ‘hegemonic male’ (Feasey, 2008, 2). ‘The hegemonic male is said to be a strong, successful, capable and authoritative man who derives his reputation from the workplace and his self-esteem from the public sphere. This model of masculinity is said to be the ideal image of the male against which all men are judged, tested and qualified, so much so in fact that hegemonic masculinity has ‘become the standard in psychological evaluations, sociological research’ (Feasey, 2008, 3). I use this model as a touchstone, to verify and establish how Bim, Sarita and Gauri are perfect models of ‘masculinized women’, defined and distinguished by their more pronounced and per formative masculine behaviour and temperament. Writing the novel in 1980 Desai was fully aware of the constraining effect of marriage for a woman or how it curtailed her sovereignty and so she keeps Bim, her female

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protagonist, single and to facilitate her entry in the public sphere, she gives her the professional identity of a teacher. That she continues to occupy a space in domestic sphere does not in any way constrict her existence or even suggests her inferiority, rather it is an emblem of her extended authority enforced through the command she exercises on her autistic brother, Baba, with whom she lives in her old rented childhood home in old Delhi. With her parents dead, and Tara, the younger sister, happily married and leading a contented life with her husband and two daughters in Washington, and Raja, the other brother, having married their landlord’s daughter, Benazir, she enjoys absolute authority in household matters and on several occasions, even dominates her mentally retarded brother. The scene, where outraged by Raja’s letter assuring her to keep her rented house at the same rent as long as she and Baba needed it, she strides into Baba’s room in a fit of fury to vent her rage, is an illustration of her authoritative and dominant nature and is worth quoting here as it gives us penetrating insight in her so-called male temperament; ‘All afternoon her anger swelled and spread, acquiring demonic proportions…she strode into his room and jerked the needle-head off the record and twisted back the arm…he was the target she had chosen to hit- and hit and hit. “With my salary, I’ll be able to pay the rent, keep on the house…but I might have to send you to live with Raja…Are you willing to go and live with Raja in Hyderabad?”’ (Desai, 1984, 163). When women rather than men are breadwinners and are defined by their performance in that area, then gender ceases to exist as a discriminating category, instead it emerges as a malleable, non-rigid, transformative space which keeps its vistas open for new constructions, formulations and equations which presuppose not merely a dismantling of all the conventional ‘gender division of labor’ (Koenig, 1997, 177), but also a de/reconstructing of all the patriarchal assumptions regarding the woman as ‘the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential’ (Beauvoir, 1953, 16), or as being ‘subordinated economically and socially to her husband’, ‘the good wife’ or ‘man’s most precious treasure’ (191). It is important to note here that the concept of ‘good wife’ (as has been discussed in the first section) while granting, within marriage, absolute right and authority to men over women, authenticates her position as a ‘passive, submissive responder’ (Welter, 1966, 159). It is within this restrictive and reductionist framework which makes woman ‘more vulnerable, more infirm, more mortal than man’ (Welter, 1966, 162) that Shashi Deshpande sets her novel The Dark Holds No Terrors and makes her female protagonist, Sarita, enact masculine roles. Born in a society with rigidly defined gender roles, Sarita’s gender programming begins at a very early age. Sarita recalls a conversation she had with her mother; Don’t go out in the sun. You will get even darker. Who cares? We have to care if you don’t. We have to get you married. I don’t want to get married. Will you live with us all your life? Why not? You can’t.

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And Dhruva? He is different. He is a boy. (45)

The language of patriarchy which her mother speaks becomes the language of her cultural conditioning intent on initiating in her the consciousness of her sex/gender and also of the differences in the roles and ideals that her gender entails. For Sarita, the whole exercise which aims at her initiation in a tradition of femininity is humiliating, even despicable and so she expresses her rejection in very unequivocal terms. A kind of shame that engulfed me, making me want to rage that put me in the same class as my mother… If you are a woman I don’t want to be one. (62)

Implicit in Sarita’s blatant refusal, to be placed in the same class as her mother’s, is the author’s intense desire to renounce the gender stereotypes and redefine the ideals which characterize woman as ‘timid’, ‘weak’ and as someone who ‘needs protector’ at every stage in her life or as someone whom, as Manu says: Pita rakshati kaumare, bharta rakshati youvane, Rakshanti sthavire putra, na stree swatantry amarhati.

(A woman is protected by father in childhood, her husband protects her in youth, and in old age, she should be protected by her son. At no stage in life should a woman be left alone and destitute) (Tripathi, 2014, 111). The ire of Deshpande, it seems apt to emphasize here, is directed not against any specific individual but against a whole class, which never questioned the dominant male practices which validated the oppression of women, which necessitated the association of women with ‘the domestic realm—i.e. with private familial, reproductive, household and marital concerns and responsibilities’ (Mikell, 1997, 7) or never challenged the gender asymmetry which privileged men over women, a gender asymmetry which thrived and survived on the power of economics being possessed and controlled wholly by men to assert their authority over women. Comprehending the ways in which women’s economic dependence on men serves as means through which, men within the institution of marriage, feel empowered to exercise a systematic control over the women, use her to satisfy their needs, and the women feel compelled, on the other hand, to render selfless service to the man, Deshpande grants her female protagonist with what had so long been masculine rights and privileges, that is the control over the economy which positioned the men in their role as the family providers. Shashi Deshpande knew that for her female protagonist to gain access to employment and livelihood, she must have an access to education, and for gaining an access to education, she needs to defy the restrictive forces and rigid traditional norms. Sarita’s whole endeavour now is directed towards defying her mother, which she does, initially by joining the medical college and staying in a hostel, against the wishes of her mother and later by marrying a man of her choice outside her caste. That Deshpande attributes her protagonist the hitherto regarded masculine traits like aggression and defiance is clearly indicative of her strategy to reject the patriarchal constructions of gender and de/reconstruct the image

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of woman who is capable of displaying masculine characteristics and behaviour. It is not surprising therefore that Iyengar finds her character, the character of the ‘masculinized’ woman, rather ‘unusual’. He says: ‘Shashi Deshpande’s first novel, The Dark Holds No Terrors, presents an unusual character, Sarita, who defies her mother to become a doctor, defies her caste to marry outside, and defies social conventions by using Boozie to advance her career’ (Iyenger, 1995, 758). Emancipation for the Indian woman, Deshpande makes it clear, is a continuous process which necessitates and articulates the need for the woman to continuously assert the behaviour which projects her as masculine. Sarita’s marriage with Manohar though liberates her from the circumscribed and rigidly regulated way of life she led at her mother’s house, the illusory and paradoxical nature of her newly gained freedom is, however, revealed when despite performing the role of the breadwinner of the family, patriarchal connotation of gender imposes on her the depreciatory stereotype of the ideal wife who renders endless services to her husband in her multiple roles as Manu says: Karyeshu mantra, Karaneshu Daasi Rupeeha Lakshmi, Kshamayaa Dharitri Bhojyeshu Mata, Shayanetu Rambha Sat Karma Yukta, Kula Dharma Patni.

(Like a slave while serving, like a minister when counselling, Goddess Lakshmi in her looks; the earth in forbearance; a mother while feeding; Rambha, the celestial entertainer in bed; these six are the true characteristics of an ideal wife) (Tripathi, 2014, 112). Shashi Despande’s critique of the socially/culturally created gender asymmetry which aims at treating the women (despite their status as breadwinner of the family) as, what He-Yin Zhen says, ‘private property’ (Liu, Karl, & Ko, 2013, 2) and hence vulnerable to any kind of exploitation—physical, mental or sexual—comes through her theorizations on ‘unequal equations’. She explains in a more pragmatic term: a + b they told us in mathematics is equal to b + a. But here a + b was not, definitely not equal to b + a. it became a monstrously unbalanced equation, lopsided, unequal, impossible. (Deshpande, 1990, 42)

This ‘unequal equation’ becomes devastating for Sarita, the educated and professional ‘masculinized’ woman, who feels incapable of aligning herself with the traditional ideals of feminine submissiveness/surrender or simply resigning herself to fate and passively enduring the nightmarish brutality which her husband inflicts on her night after night. She reflects: Yet she knew, she could not go on, either. If only she had belonged to another time, where a woman had no choice, but to go on… because they believed, they knew, there was nothing else for them. And they called that fate (70).

Deshpande’s statement is obviously a satire on those women of the past age who meekly accepted the feminine ideals of submissiveness, tolerance and endurance

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assigning all their sufferings to ‘fate’ without ever questioning the validity of the sources which authenticated such formulations. It would not be irrelevant here if we pause a little and observe how the women activists in China in early twentieth century have visualized the systematic oppression of women and how their insights have helped in conceptualizing women’s liberation and emancipation. Lydia H. Liu, Rebecca E. Karl, and Dorothy Ko, in their book The Birth of Chinese Feminism, discuss the writings and ideas of He-Yin Zhen, a preeminent Chinese feminist theorist, who develops ‘a systematic global critique of the political, economic, moral, and ideological bases of patriarchal society’, ‘to elucidate how “woman” as a trans historical global category—not of subjective identity but of structured unequal social relations—had been constituted through scholarship, ritual, law, and social and labor practices over time, in China as elsewhere’ (Liu et al., 2013, 9). Their emancipation from such constraining situations demanded what He-Yin Zhen calls ‘radical reconfiguration’ (23) of social and cultural sphere. Such a radical reconfiguration is closely associated with the idea of restructuring hierarchical and unjust relations between genders and sexes which the South Asian women writers have boldly attempted in their fiction by strategically de/reconstructing the gender. Envisioning gender as a malleable, non-rigid category, these writers have invested their woman characters with the so-called masculine powers and traits, given them access to public domains and prestigious jobs with high wages. With the ceiling on their income being removed and their participation in the public sphere absolute, the woman characters enjoy the sovereignty and dominance that masculinity offers to men. Deshpande, however, does not seem to favour a radical restructuring of the system or a complete abandonment of traditions, instead she proposes that there should be a rethinking, a re-evaluation of tradition and convention and so she says: ‘Liberation does not mean leaving your marriage…Liberation means you refuse to be oppressed, you refuse to give up your individuality…’ (Sree, 2010, 147). Perhaps this explains why Deshpande makes her protagonist reconsider her decision and negotiate a balance between her domestic and public worlds with full comprehension of her superiority and authority as the provider of the family. Such a rethinking or a re-evaluation of tradition and convention is, however, not acceptable to Jhumpa Lahiri, the Indian diasporic writer whose novel, The Lowland, though a key feminist text like Shashi Deshpande’s The Dark Holds No Terrors, and Anita Desai’s Clear Light of Day, in exploring women’s oppression and challenging gender stereotypes, goes far beyond these two texts in seeking to assign masculine traits and characteristics to her female protagonist. The novel subtly critiques and questions the gender theorizations which validate discriminatory and denigrating treatment of women and redefines the social constructions of gender. Gauri, a young widow, an unwilling mother, a disinterested homemaker and a passionate scholar has been said to be Lahiri’s ‘most challenging character to date’ (vogue). What is most fascinating in the delineation of Gauri’s character is her radical transformation from ‘essentially feminine’ to a ‘truly masculine’ woman. Keeping in view the tremendous significance of marriage for the Indian woman and knowing how marriage imposed limiting roles on woman, made her a devoted wife or ‘confined her to mothering role’ (Assiter, 1996, 101) or emphasized her

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exclusion from public life, Lahiri ensures that Gauri is married twice in her feminine role. While Gauri marries Udayan out of love and Subhash out of necessity, ironically it is her marriage with Udayan, her marriage of love that places her within ‘a narrow and limiting circle’2 , subjects her to control, subjugation and exploitation. Udayan’s marriage with Gauri presupposes for him a reinforcement of his male ideology and an enactment of his male powers. He starts using the services of Gauri not only for his personal needs within the domestic sphere but also beyond the confines of home, out in the public world. It is only after his death when Gauri gets remarried to Subhash, Udayan’s elder brother, and goes to live with him in Rhode Island that she realizes how her marriage with Udayan had ‘enslaved’ her and created for her ‘condition of vassalage’. Gauri’s ‘consciousness raising’, it is pertinent to note here, comes by the independence that her second marriage offers her by providing access to the public sphere and exposing her to the modern or Western influences of the outside world. Gauri’s migration to Rhode Island allows her independence from conventions and with her newly gained independence in a foreign land she becomes conscious, for the first time in her life, of her confinement. While Gauri’s ‘consciousness raising’ takes place at the age of twenty-three after she has married twice, Bim and Sarita experience it relatively early in their lives. Sarita’s awareness of the vulnerability associated with her gender takes place when still a child, she is constantly instructed by her mother to follow the rules dictated by the patriarchal guidebook, whereas for Bim, it is not exactly an instance of ‘consciousness raising’. In fact, from the beginning itself, Desai does not project her as feminine woman. Her childhood dreams make it clear that she always wanted to become a Joan of Arc or a Florence Nightingale. Even at school, Bim was the all-rounder, a born leader, always sure of herself. However, her awareness regarding the injustices emanating from the constructs of her gender is raised when her beloved brother Raja announces his decision to leave her. It is at this juncture that Desai makes her female protagonist assert the masculinity lying dormant in her character. Though shocked by Raja’s betrayal, she does not succumb to the pressures generated by the circumstances and says boldly to Baba: So now there are just you and I left, Baba… Everyone’s gone… They won’t come back. We’re just by ourselves and there’s nothing to worry about… (Desai, 1984 101)

From this point onwards in the narrative, Desai’s whole endeavour is directed towards dramatizing those areas of her experience which foreground masculine traits in Bim’s character. Alison Assiter in Enlightened Women: Modernist Feminismin Postmodern Age refers to Wilson’s argument to describe the male nature. E.O. Wilson, one of the most prominent writers on socio-biology, regards aggressiveness and dominance as essential constituents of male nature. He says: ‘Males are characteristically aggressive …. Included in male “nature” is male dominance: universal male dominance is a fact of nature’. (Assiter, 1996, 116) It is not surprising for the readers to see that after Raja’s betrayal of Bim, the feminist consciousness of the author ensures to portray only those events and episodes in Bim’s life which highlight the elements of aggressiveness and dominance in her nature. Similarly, it can be said of Gauri that as long as she is in India she submits passively to what

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Gerda Lerner says in The Creation of Patriarchy the ‘culturally constructed customs and institutions which forced women into subordinate roles’ (Lerner, 1986, 52) but once she reaches Rhode Island and sees men and women moving freely, realization dawns on her about her own ‘confinement’, and awareness is raised in her regarding the misappropriations arising from the ‘cultural character of gender’ (Millet, 2000, 29). Lahiri understands that the basis of the gender imbalance/hierarchy is material— the economic power that patriarchy confers on men. She knows that for Gauri, with her impoverished resources and her dependence for subsistence on Subhash, it is unthinkable to visualize a change in her status. A change in her category as ‘the Other’ necessitates a radical makeover of her womanhood, a reconfiguration of ideals and roles assigned to her gender. Recognizing the urgent need to dismantle the patriarchal conception of woman as nurturer, caretaker or as being ‘ naturally endowed domestic’ (Neal, 2010, 33), the author de/reconstructs the image of Gauri by making her perform roles and practices which essentialize her as masculine. In her new role as a masculinized woman, she refuses to be bound by patriarchal laws and conventions or even accept ‘mothering’ and ‘child rearing’ which is, according to Mary Wollstonecraft, ‘insisted on as the peculiar destination of woman’ (221). She now longs to abandon her role as mother and homemaker and pursue her vocation, the scholarship of Philosophy which she had taken earlier in India before marrying Udayan. One can note here in her rebellious longing and desire the reverberations of confessions made by Adrienne Rich in Of Woman Born: ‘I have to acknowledge to myself that I would not have chosen to have more children, that I was beginning to look to a time, not too far off, when I should again be free… pursuing a more or less intellectual and creative life’ (9). It is imperative to concede here that Lahiri’s de/reconstruction of gender encompasses a complete reconfiguration of the gendered roles and ideals. In a move that may be termed as transgressive by patriarchal standards, the author radically reverses the gender roles and behaviour, forcing the readers to reconsider patriarchal definitions of gender popularized and propagated by dominant male rhetoric. Lahiri’s de/reconstruction of gender also includes a denunciation of the patriarchal division of gendered labour. So, on the one hand, she makes Gauri reject the roles that restrict her to maternity and housekeeping and acquire masculine values and traits like emotional insensitivity and aggressiveness and achieve complete independence through her employment, for Beauvoir believes that it is only ‘gainful employment’ that can guarantee a woman’s ‘liberty in practice’ (641), and on the other hand, she assigns her hero the role of nurturer and homemaker. Like a ‘naturally endowed domestic’, Subhash looks after his home, raises Bela, Gauri’s daughter, remains passionately devoted to her and exhibits characteristics like docility, submissiveness and sensitivity which according to Brown are ‘the cultural characteristics of the social construction of women’ (Feasey, 2008, 9). By redefining man’s domestic role and responsibility, the author not only challenges the patriarchal notions of manhood but also crosses the dividing line between the constructions of gender.

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Conclusion ‘Patriarchy is ‘in trouble’ worldwide’ says Kate Millet in Sexual Politics (Millet, 2000, xii). Feminist writers and theorists across the world, ‘as social change agents’ (White 4), have challenged the coercive and oppressive myth regarding woman being weak and vulnerable, perpetuated by the traditional representation of woman in the literature which created stereotypes that, to use the words of Delia Jarrett Macaule, ‘persisted, multiplied like lice, and found their way into every form of contemporary media’ (Macaule x) and further exacerbated what Estelle B. Freedman calls ‘long- standing social inequities’ (Freedman, 2006, 1). Michel Foucault is of the opinion that ‘one single and identical ‘formula’ of power (the interdict) comes to be applied to all forms of society and all levels of subjection[…] [where] power is conceived as a sort of great absolute Subject which pronounces the interdict’ (Gedalof 16).4 Similarly, the South Asian woman writers and their diaspora have used ‘one single and identical formula’ of redressing the situation and collectively asserting ‘agency and power’ (Midgley, 2007, 8). Through their writings, they have initiated the campaign of demolishing the idealized image of woman as the ‘creator of a domestic haven for her husband and children’ (Osborne, 2001, 26) constructed and popularized by the vast ‘dominion of fictions’ (Riley, 1988, 1). They have used their texts as a forum for refuting the patriarchal categorization of woman as ‘the Other’ and in the process evolved certain strategies. They have constructed alternative models of woman who are masculinized in their approach, thinking and practices for, says Rizvi, ‘[t]he arts allow a social space in which it is legitimate to ask how things might be otherwise’ (Khoo, 2003, 99).5 Such a strategic de/reconstruction of gender has forced a reconsideration of existing set of assumptions/notions about woman and think about the possibility of an alternative model which would rule out oppression and injustice for Eagleton says, “the valuable work of literature violates or transgresses these normative ways of seeing, and so teaches us new codes for understanding… our conventional assumptions are ‘defamiliarized’, objectified to the point where we can criticize and so revise them.” (Eagleton, 1996, 68). The collective action of these women writers and the organized activism manifested in their writings have ‘punctured the pretenses’ of patriarchal society and facilitated the annihilation of traditional beliefs and practices that were, what Anne E Fernald says, ‘corrosive for women’ (Fernald, 2006, 15) and created circumstances conducive to the emancipation of women. Notes 1.

2.

Elaine Aston quotes Nancy Reinhardt in An Introduction to Feminismand Theatre to suggest the necessity of a ‘feminist re-framing of theatre history’ (2). Irene Gedal of in Against Purity: Rethinking Identity with Indian and Western Feminism refers to Uma Chakraborty’s arguments that the perception of a lost ‘Vedic-Aryan Golden Age’ led the Indian women to a ‘narrow and limiting circle’ (42).

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See Mark Anthony Neal’s essay, “Bringing up Daddy: A Black Feminist Fatherhood” in African Americans Doing Feminism: Putting Theory into Everyday Practice. See Irene Gedalof’s Against Purity: Rethinking Identity with Indian and Western Feminism where she discusses Michel Foucault’s theorizations of power. Tseen-Ling Khoo quotes Rizvi in Banana Bending: Asian-Australian and AsianCanadian Literatures to suggest how writing provides an ideal forum for artists.

References Assiter, A. (1996). Enlightened women: Modernist feminism in a Postmodern Age. Routledge. Aston, E. (1995). An introduction to feminism and theatre. Routledge. Beauvoir, S.D. (1953). The second sex [Trans. H. M. Parshley]. Jonathan Cape. Brodbeck, S., & Black, B. (2007). Introduction. In S. Brodbeck & B. Black (Eds.), Gender and narrative in the Mahabharata (pp. 1–34). Routledge Hindu Study Series. Routledg. Chatterji, B. C. (Ed.). (2010). Rajmohan’s wife. Penguin Books India. Desai, A. (1984). Clear light of day. Penguin Books Ltd. Deshpande, S. (1990). The dark holds no terrors. Penguin. Dhand, A. (2008). Woman as fire woman as sage: Sexual ideology in the Mahabharata. State University of New York Press. Eagleton, T. (1996). Literary theory: An introduction. Blackwell Publishing. Feasey, R. (2008). Masculinity and popular television. Edinburgh University Press. Fernald, A. E. (2006). Virginia Woolf: Feminism and the reader. Palgrave Macmillan. Freedman, E. B. (2006). Feminism, sexuality and politics. The University of North Carolina Press. Gangoli, G. (2007). Indian Feminisms: Law, patriarchies and violence in India. Ashgate Publishing Limited. Gedalof, I. (1999). Against purity: Rethinking identity with Indian and Western feminism. Routledge. Hudock, A. (2005). Foreword. In J. Bomarito & J. W. Hunter (Eds.), Feminism in literature a gale critical companion (Volume 4: 20th Century, topics) (pp. xix–xxiii). Thomson Gale. Iyenger, K R Srinivasa. Indian Writing in English. Sterling Publishers Private Limited: New Delhi. 1995. Print. Jarett-Macauley, D. (1996). Editor’s introduction. In D. Jarett-Macauley (Ed.), Reconstructing womanhood, reconstructing feminism: Writings on black woman (pp. ix–xv). Routledge. Khoo, T.-L. (2003). Banana bending: Asian-Australian and Asian-Canadian literatures. Hong Kong University Press. Koenig, D. (1997). Women’s roles in settlement and resettlement in Mali. In G. Mikell (Ed.), African feminism: The politics of survival in Sub-Saharan Africa. University of Pennsylvania Press. Lahiri, J. (2013). The Lowland. Random House India. Lerner, G. (1986). The creation of patriarchy. Oxford University Press. Liu, L. H., Karl, R. E., Ko, D. (Eds.) The birth of Chinese feminism: Essential texts in transnational theory. Columbia University Press. Midgley, C. (2007). Feminism and empire: Women activists in imperial Britain, 1970–1865. Routledge. Mikell, G. (1997). Introduction. In G. Mikell (Ed.), African feminism: The politics of survival in Sub-Saharan Africa (pp. 1–50). University of Pennsylvania Press. Millet, K. (2000). Sexual politics. University of Illinois Press. Mosse, G. L. (1996). The image of man: The creation of modern masculinity. Studies in History of Sexuality. Oxford University Press.

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Neal, M. A. (2010). Bringing up daddy: A black feminist fatherhood. In A. M. White (Ed.), African Americans doing feminism: Putting theory into every day practice (pp. 31–50). State University of New York Press. O’Grady, M. (2015). Jhumpa Lahiri in Rome: The pulitzer prize winner talks about her new novel and new ideas. www.vogue.com, August 7, 2015. Osborne, S. (2001.) Feminism. Pocket Essentials. Paranjape, M. R. (Ed.). (2015). The allegory of Rajmohan’s wife. www.makarand.com. June 14, 2015. Rich, A. (1972). When we dead awaken: Writing as re-vision. College English, 34(1), 18–30. Rich, A. (1976). Of woman born: Motherhood as experience and institution. Norton. Riley, D. (1988). Am I that name? Feminism and the category of ‘women’ in history. University of Minnesota Press. Sree, S. P. (2010). In conversation with Shashi Deshpande. In Women in the novels of Shashi Deshpande (pp. 145–158). Sarup & Sons. Tripathi, P. (2014). Marriage, marital violence and Indian masculinity: Exploring the short fiction of Shashi Deshpande. In S. M. Yahiya Ibrahim (Ed.), The gaze reverted (pp. 110–124). Adhyayan Publishers & Distributers. Welter, B. (1966). The cult of true womanhood: 1820–1860. American Quarterly, 18(2), 151–174. Wollstonecraft, M. (2014). A vindication of the rights of woman. In E. H. Botting (Ed.). Yale University Press.

The “Third Space” of Feminist Sensibility in South Asian Diaspora Literature Shabina Nishat Omar

In Postmodern Geographies and in Third space, the idea of “third space” developed by Edward Soja challenges spatial boundaries and becomes a dialogic space of continuous deconstruction and reconstruction which are both subjected to domination and seek to articulate oppression. Soja’s spatial trialectics deconstructs and moves beyond the dualistic spatial notions of identity and location by assuming a significant social perspective. It attempts to recreate cultural spaces, emphasize change and reiterate multiplicity and pluralism. Its radical openness challenges the notions of homogeneity, equality and permanence. It celebrates contradiction and change and transcends the limitation of constricting binaries to achieve a celebration of multiplicity and heterogeneity. It seeks to discover an open and different option that would transcend the centre-margin opposition and dichotomy. This concept of “third space” can be adequately and appropriately applied to the hyphenated feminine identity of the Diasporic South Asian woman writer. To call any articulate literary expression either migrant or diasporic, we need to understand the essence of the experiential identity of what goes into the making such a character or formulating such a voice. Is it simply years of living away from one’s native land? Or is it simply a matter of experience or expression or both? The crystallization of the literary expression of the settler arises from a juxtaposition of the immigrant within a hostile or unfamiliar physical and psychological site and a desire to inscribe the experience of that site. In The Other Side of Silence, Urvashi Butalia reports what Krishna Sobti, a writer and a refugee in 1947, once said about the Partition: it is “difficult to forget and dangerous to remember”. This can be applied also to the South Asian diasporic woman write who carries her memories even as she carves out her own identity. This statement contains two major implications: on the one hand, the impossibility to cancel from one’s private memory a past experience of any memorable or lifechanging impact on one’s life, and on the other hand, the risk ingrained in such a S. N. Omar (B) Faculty Member, Department of English, Acharya Jagadish Chandra Bose College, Affiliated to University of Calcutta, Kolkata, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Rahman and N. Tiwari (eds.), Development, Governance and Gender in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-5109-0_18

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memory since recalling it means not only letting traumatic experiences painfully resurface but also trying to come to terms with them by giving them an order, a signification that may turn out to be intractable and also intolerable. It is extremely complex to attain an understanding or make sense of the atrocities witnessed as a victim or as a perpetrator, of the loss of one’s home and identity in the name of the boundaries sanctioning new nations. Public memory is discriminative, it foregrounds all that is functional to the national project of state-building, it emphasizes heroism, sacrifice for the common cause and glorifies many acts which may not have necessarily been heroic then, and in the process, the suffering and trauma of its dark side is concealed and suppressed. It is the kind of selective memory we find in the historian’s history and school textbooks. Public memory informs official history, “an artificial form of remembering” and requires of the traditional historian a bodiless absence with objectivity to sort faces and arrange them erasing what does not fit into his homogeneous and linear pattern. As Foucault explains in L’Achelogie du Savoir, history rebuilds the past planning teleology and neglects gaps and dislocations. Private memory may be fragmentary and partial but is a concrete actuality of flesh and blood to testify to a past which persists in the present trauma and represents the only site of mourning in the absence of any monuments, memorial or ceremony to remember the victims. It deals with the inexplicable too and represents the site of an alternative rendering of facts and events. Private memory represents what Sidonie Smith (talking about autobiography) defines as “experiential history” which “can function as countermemory, a means to renarrativitize the past and break the silences of official history” or what has elsewhere been labelled “emotional history” since it takes into account the affective and psychological backlash historical events produce in human beings. In their article “Engaging Subjective Knowledge”, Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph propagated an interesting discussion on the validity and usefulness of subjective knowledge in social and political studies: the knowledge––they argue–– produced in diaries and personal testimonies that does not claim the status of truth but simply of a “telling what I know” tale, a partial truth, tied to particular circumstances, times and places. This kind of knowledge challenges the epistemological claim to objectivity and shows that the pretence to know the whole truth is something unattainable by mortals; it offers narratives of reality that counter hegemonic histories and retrieves the “truth” of those who have been neglected marginalized silenced; thus, in its own specific way, it contributes to general knowledge. This “truth” emerges from the many of first person memoirs and diaries of people who went through trauma and memory, from the interviews to writers or activists who lived through the turmoil of independence, from the work of social historians and others who based their studies of historic events and public memory on oral testimonies, of painful memories which do not exactly fit into the frames of history, and which can be incomplete, contradictory, but fundamental to acquire what Butalia calls an “extremely important perspective on history”. All memory can contribute to redress our understanding of event, especially as Edward Said wrote, “memory is not necessarily authentic, but rather useful”.

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The internationally renowned Indian-American writer Chitra Banerjee Divakaruni’s literary works primarily negotiate the existential quandaries of expatriates and address two key areas of contemporary theory—‘diaspora’ and ‘feminism’. Based on her own multilayered experience as an immigrant, Divakaruni projects the conflicts, root lessness and anxiety as also the adaptation and assimilation of foreign cultures by the Indian diaspora. She portrays delicately and accurately how South Asian expatriate women, naturally endowed with the feminine ability to relate simultaneously to two homes, employ wisdom and compassion to empathize with two different cultures Indian and American, and to heal their hyphenated and fractured selves by synthesizing and reconciling the positive facets of both cultures. Thus, in addition to the mandatory ‘double’ vision that diasporic writers possess, Divakaruni, inspired by both Indian and foreign feminist writers, projects a “third space” or a “feminine vision”. This third space inhabited by her highlights the feminist sensibility of the South Asian diasporic woman writer. ‘Diaspora’ (meaning ‘to disperse’ in Greek) is an important specialization in contemporary social, literary and cultural discourse. “Diasporas, the voluntary or forcible movement of peoples from their homelands into new regions, is a central historical fact of colonization” (Ashcroft, 1998, 68–69). The South Asian diaspora is now an integral and indispensable part of American life, culture and literature. Indian-American writers have made a simultaneous and substantial contribution to both Indian and American literatures. Their writings are a testimony to the complex blending of East and West, convention and modernity, Indian tradition and American independence and Prof. Jasbir Jain writes, “Expatriate writing occupies a significant position between cultures and countries. It generates theory and defines positions as it constructs a new identity which negotiates boundaries and confines and relates to different temporal and spatial metaphors. Cultures travel, take root or get dislocated and individuals internalize nostalgia or experience amnesia. Writers living abroad live on the margins of two societies and cultural theory are today being created by people who live on the margins” (Jain, 1998, 11). Chitra Banerjee Divakaruni (born Chitralekha Banerjee in 1956) is an acclaimed Indian-American writer based in Houston with her family. Born in Kolkata, she migrated to the USA for her higher education in the late 1970s to pursue a master’s degree in English at Wright State University, followed by a Ph.D. at the University of California, Berkeley. Today, she is a professor of Creative Writing at the Houston University; she is also a popular reviewer and columnist. The immigrant experience was pivotal; she notes, to her emergence as a writer. “I did not think I had a story to tell”, she writes on her blog. “Moving to a very different culture and learning to live on my own made me see the world much more clearly…. I thought about India more than I had ever before. I realized what I appreciated about it; the warmth, the closeness of extended family, the way spirituality pervades the culture. But I also recognized problems [with regard to] how women are often treated”. As prolific and versatile writer, she has won several prestigious awards for her poetry, short stories, essays and novels. She writes for both children and adults and her fiction encompasses multiple genres—realism, history, magic realism and fantasy. Her works focus on the experiences of South Asian immigrants to the USA and her predominant thematic

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concerns are profeminist concerns of identity, assertion of self, transformation of perspective and the courage of rebelling against the victimization suffered by Asian women. This concern is reflected in her real-life role as an activist with several women’s organizations and as the cofounder of Maitri (1991) a helpline for South Asian women dealing with domestic abuse. A list of her works includes—poetry collections such as The Reason for Nasturtiums (1990), Black Candle (1991), Leaving Yuba City (1997), short-story collections and novels such as—Arranged Marriage (1995), The Mistress of Spices (1997), Sister of My Heart (1999), The Unknown Errors of our Lives(2001), Neela: Victory Song (2002), The Vine of Desire (2002), The Conch Bearer (2003), Queen of Dreams (2004), The Mirror of Fire and Dreaming (2005), The Palace of Illusions(2008), Shadowland (2009), One Amazing Thing (2010), Oleander Girl (2013), Before We Visit the Goddess (2016) and The Forest of Enchantments (2019) along with several collections of essays. Divakaruni is today regarded as one of the foremost writers of South Asian diasporic literature. A plethora of theoretical constructs dominate contemporary postcolonial discourse and are manifestations of the quintessential diaspora identity. These include hybridity, exile, displacement, marginalization and dislocation and find concrete examples in Divakaruni’s fiction. She articulates the subjective dilemmas of a woman in conflict, turmoil or even in cultural transition, straddling and balancing two complementing yet contrasting worlds, particularly that of Indian immigrants struggling for a peaceful and prosperous life in America. The USA has always been regarded as the land of hope and promise, a land of opportunities with a tolerant and culturally pluralistic society. It is seen by many as a Utopia where all hopes will be fulfilled and all desires satiated, all dreams realized and all ambitions achieved successfully. Thus, it becomes a land of promise and plenty which the aspiring and ambitious immigrant expatriate population must acclimatize themselves to by uprooting themselves from their cultural moorings. The immigrants however are initially disturbed by their up rootedness and reluctant to release themselves from the bonds and stereotypes of the native identity that they have carried with them. This makes it difficult and virtually impossible for the immigrant South Asian populace to get assimilated in their adapted American homes. Divakaruni’s books are articulations and expositions of the third space of common female experience in the face of conflicting boundaries of their culture and religion as native culture and its past memories intersects with migrant culture and its present reality. She states: My characters struggle in the balance between family responsibilities and Individual happiness which is in away, at the centre of conflict between our Hindu culture, which always shows the mother as the giver, nurture and sacrificing herself for the good of the family and the western concept of self-happiness. (Divakaruni, 2005, 8)

It has been argued that art, better than any other language can express the unresolved burdens of the past. Thus, the kind of memory that would allow the representations of the past nostalgic experiences is what Marianne Hirsch calls post-memory and says that: “Post-memory is a powerful and very particular form of memory precisely because its connection to its object or source is mediated not through recollection but through an imaginative investment and creation”. Fiction unlike

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history normally has an added value: “the realm of fiction is essentially a meeting ground of opposites, of contraries—a space large enough to accommodate competing versions of truth”. In the light of this perspective, “the imaginative truths” of literature can rightfully sit “at the roundtable of knowledge”. Literature, unconcerned with ideologies, has rendered the physical, psychological and emotional dimension of the human experience, has told us what people said or felt or remembered, thus filling the interstices and the erasures of official histories. Chitra Banerjee Divakaruni’s first collection of short stories was Arranged Marriage (1995) earned her accolades in the form of an American Book Award (1996), a PEN Josephine Miles award (1996), and a Bay Area Book Reviewers Award (1996). The book Arranged Marriage (1995) has eleven stories out of which ten stories are set in the USA. Each pivot around the choices made by women caught in trying but identifiable and realistic circumstances. The central characters are all native and traditional Bengali women. Divakaruni succeeds in creating a poignant and evocative tableau of memory that pervades the atmosphere with blended sights, smells and memories from the villages and cities of Bengal, from Calcutta (now Kolkata) and Burdwan, as also New York, San Francisco and California. Divakaruni’s emphatic and powerful portrayals in the stories articulate the female experiences arising from the confluence, conflict and blending of cultures, even as her female protagonists struggle to maintain a fine balance between cherished and traditional beliefs and practices carried in the heart and mind from India and the new and emancipating desires that find expression in the USA. They seek to start afresh surfing the waves of empowering foreign emancipation and adventurism without losing the rootedness of Indian wisdom, morality, cultural ethos and ethics. Divakaruni’s portrayal of the feminine self’s holistic epiphany from within through the external self-discovery from diffidence to maturity is remarkable for its authenticity and delicacy. Divakaruni’s work which chiefly deals with the existential and experiential dilemma of South Asian women expatriates negotiates two problematic areas of contemporary post-colonial theory—‘diaspora’ and ‘feminism’. The Indian diasporic community is especially and significantly heterogeneous in terms of race, religion, region and language. It straddles the dichotomies of a sense of homelessness on the one hand and a sense of networking and solidarity on the other hand. It encompasses a virtually endless plethora of efforts to bridge the gap between native and assimilated cultures. The word ‘diaspora’ encapsulates the duality and ambivalence of being both an ambassador and a refugee. “While one requires the projection of one’s culture and the ability to enhance its understanding, the other seeks refuge and protection and relates more positively to the host culture” (Jain, 1998, 11–12). Divakaruni’s feminist perspective is multilayered: many of her novels focus closely on the unexpected power of women in the face of cultural restraints, and her politics have spurred her work in activism. She considers her dual pursuits not just connected by a common focus, but one and the same. “Writing is definitely activism”, she says in an interview, “especially if one’s passions outside of writing intersect with one’s interests within writing”. Imbibing from her personal multifaceted experience as an immigrant, Divakaruni projects the struggle, rootlessness and anxiety as also the adaptation and assimilation of foreign cultures by the Indian

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diaspora. On the other hand, the Indian woman is physically and mentally enslaved by traditions prevalent in her native country and which is her cultural legacy in a foreign country. She often encounters overwhelming experiences in a foreign land. Divakaruni delicately portrays how expatriate women, naturally endowed with the feminine ability to relate simultaneously to two homes, employ wisdom and compassion to empathize with two different cultures Indian and American, and to heal the fractured selves (their own and those of fellow human beings) by synthesizing the moderate and the best in both the cultures. Subsequently in addition to the mandatory ‘double’ vision that diasporic writers possess, Divakaruni, inspired by both Indian and foreign feminist writers, projects a ‘third feminine vision’ one with far-reaching social implications especially in India where the attempt to assert feminine identity has met with brutal violence from orthodoxy and patriarchy. Divakaruni’s empathetic and genuine rendering of the lives of third-world women may also be seen in the light of a corrective perspective to the usual Eurocentric bias of Western feminist theories. In the volume entitled Arranged Marriage, the first story entitled ‘Bats’ is the only story in the collection that is set completely in India. The narrator describes her childhood and early adolescence in Calcutta and her experiences as the daughter of a woman who has always been the victim of spousal domestic violence. The intense trauma of the mother emphatically communicated in symbols and gestures to the innocent and even naïve little girl child who has no idea about the viciousness and cruelty inflicted by her father since he behaves very differently with her. The story is aptly titled ‘Bats’ because the mother and daughter are driven out and then called back again and again to their house and like bats they return to roost and perch mainly due to social pressure as well as personal desire to conform, hoping beyond hope every time. They are like the bats in the mango orchards of the rural countryside, pests who return to those trees again and again only to be eventually to be poisoned and killed. This story seeks to portray the psychological nuances of traumatized childhood and the pangs of lost innocence, the obstinacy and supremacy of the male ego that exercises its potency by battering and victimizing women and ruining domestic life. This sets the tone for the rest of the collection wherein it is unambiguously stated that life is not easy for women in India, especially as they struggle against gender bias and patriarchy and are subjected to incessant horrors and humiliation in the name of family honour and social respectability. In the story, the narrator recalls: That year mother cried a lot, nights. Or maybe she had always cried, and that was the first year I was old enough to notice. I would wake up in the hot Calcutta dark and the sound of her weeping would be all around me, pressing in, wave upon wave, until I could no longer tell where it was coming from. (Arranged Marriage 1)

She further states that: “Father always slept late in the mornings…I didn’t see him much. I heard him, though, shouts that shook the walls of my bedroom like they were paper, the sounds of falling dishes”. In the other stories after this, the geographical transition is accomplished and at the same time it is also gradually elucidated that

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women in the Western countries too face numerous problems, on account of their gender, despite their economic independence and apparent empowerment. The second story ‘Clothes’ is the story of Mrs. Sumita Sen, a young girl from Calcutta, married off to Somesh, a store-manager in California. Sumita and her life in India show that the cynosure of attention in any woman’s life in India should be marriage and girls must be conditioned and acclimatized culturally to be destined to embrace the unknown, to belong to their in-laws, to prioritize the spouse and his family above all. Hailing from a land where even marital rape is largely considered a part of the “wifely duties”, Sumita is forced to relocate to an alien land but she is lucky to get a caring husband who encourages her to emerge from the rigid traditional and cultural stereotypes. He evokes within her a desire for self-improvement and success and encourages her to establish her individuality. One day suddenly all their dreams and aspirations are shattered when Somesh is shot dead in a random midnight robbery, a freak incident. It is then that Sumita realizes that there is an ugly side to life in America—the promised land of freedom and hope with the streets mythically paved in gold. Despite all diffidence and fear, loneliness and hopelessness, the young widow decides to stay back, drawing resilience from her husband’s unfulfilled American Dream. Clothes play a major role in the story, exquisite saris from India, bold dresses from America, symbolizing the strengths and weaknesses of each culture. Initially, Sumita had been wearing pink, blue, red and orange—the colours of bride hood, marital vibrance and new beginnings. Now Sumita is forced to wear white—the colour of widowhood and austerity. Eventually she empowers herself as an individual by enabling a synthesis or fusion of apparel cultures. Sumita’s final choice of a long flowing brown skirt gifted by her husband proves that she has been able to synchronize the best in both cultures. A colour so universal and devoid of signification that it is almost liberating in its anonymity, Divakaruni uses it to offer a poignant glimpse into how cruel Indian society can be to widows, whether at home or abroad and so heartless that death becomes a better alternative when evaluated against the desire to live. Thus, Sumita’s choice to live and to live on her own terms is heroic and laudable. It shows the caterpillar becoming the butterfly, a step towards true empowerment and transformative thought. Her final statement is very assertive: … I cannot go back. I don’t know yet how I’ll manage, here in this new, dangerous land. I only know I must. Because all over India, at this very moment, widows in white saris are bowing their veiled heads, serving tea to in-laws. Doves with cut-off wings. … I tilt my chin, readying myself for the arguments of coming weeks, the remonstrations. In the mirror, a woman holds my gaze, her eyes apprehensive yet steady. (Arranged Marriage, 33)

‘Silver Pavements, Golden Roofs’ is the next story, and it articulates the desires and aspirations of Jayanti, a young girl from a conservative Bengali family who qualifies for admission to the University of Chicago. She is eager to enjoy the glitter of the first world and immensely relieved to escape from the terror of an arranged marriage. She resides as a paying guest in the house of her aunt and her Uncle Bikram whose very long stay in the USA can be seen as the most potent illustration of the shattering of the NRI dream. Reduced to poverty by racist violence, Bikram is a melancholy, haggard, exhausted, bitter and frustrated man. Aunt Pratima is a

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woman whose beauty and talent are wasted as she is not permitted to step out of her house by her husband who fears she may be attacked by racists. Jayanti thinks of her uncle as a tyrant and a delusional neurotic until she herself experiences racial violence on a random evening walk with her aunt. It is then that she realizes how the mutual affection and understanding of the couple and their nostalgia for India had enabled their marriage to succeed in an essentially hostile land. It is a classic case of ‘exile’, indicating “a compulsory isolation and a nostalgic anchoring in the past” (Jain, 1998, 12). This story presents two contrasting views of America and suggests that reality is a grey area, a blend of the black and the white. While Jayanti visualizes America as a magic land with silver pavements and golden roofs, her uncle Bikram calls America a witch who pretends to give and then snatches everything back. Yet, even after her encounter with the ugly reality of racism, the protagonist’s view of the beautiful snow-covered landscape leads her to the realization that the beauty and pain of expatriate life in America are universal everywhere. There is no destination in the world to which one can migrate and not be subsumed by feelings of both happiness and loss, excitement and anxiety, eagerness and fear. So, life is a blend of both the promise and its partial fulfilment, and this is seen in the way she observes and responds to the landscape of the new country the next morning: It is snowing. I step outside onto the balcony, drawing my breath in at the silver marvel of it, the fat flakes cool and wet against my face as in a half-forgotten movie. … The snow has covered the dirty cement pavements, the sad warped shingles of the rooftops, the rough noisy edges of things. I hold out my hands to it, palms down, shivering a little. The snow falls on them, chill, stinging all the way to the bone. But after a while the excruciating pain fade …. the snow has covered my own hands so they are no longer brown but white, white, white. And now it makes sense that the beauty and the pain should be part of each other. (Arranged Marriage 55, 56)

The fourth story, entitled ‘The Word Love’, depicts the intense clash of cultures and the subsequent mental dilemma of a young Indian doctoral research scholar in the USA. On the one hand, it is her deep sense of loyalty to her widowed mother in Calcutta who has brought her up with lots of love and affection but still in the strictly conservative manner where many kinds of action and behaviour are taboo and independent thought and outspokenness is regarded as rebelliousness and misbehaviour. On the other hand, it is her passionate love for a young American with whom she shares a live-in relationship as is normal and acceptable in her adopted sociocultural American milieu. Being American in outlook and yet Indian in thought, she is continuously suffering the clash of ideals between the ethically permissible and the socially acceptable as per the stereotypes of native culture in India. She is perturbed at the thought of disclosing her “illegitimate” relationship to her orthodox mother. Her lover does not understand the Indian way of life, for he is the child of divorced parents, longing to find in her the affection that he never got as a child. When she finally tells her mother of the relationship, the mother disowns her. Her trauma and its effect on the relationship shatters her partner and he abandons her. In a surprising end to the tale of agony and conflict, the girl triumphs by deciding to live for herself, not for her mother or her lover, neither the Indian society nor the American way of life, both of which stand condemned for viewing women as objects to be controlled

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or enjoyed. She finally reconciles herself to a synthesis of thought and decides to take one step forward and live for herself: …Surely there’s another choice. …. your new life, the one you’re going to live for yourself. And a word comes to you out of the opening sky. The word love. You see that you had never understood it before. It is like rain, and when you lift your face toit, like rain it washes away inessentials, leaving you hollow, clean, ready to begin. (Arranged Marriage 70–71)

The fifth story in the book entitled ‘A Perfect Life’ is the tale of Meera, a highly successful Indo-American entrepreneur leading a stylish and luxurious life. Admired by her employers and colleagues, independent and confident, she has a perfect American boyfriend. Her rigid attitude to marriage and motherhood as a bondage and burden surprises even American women. One day, all these changes as she takes pity on a seven-year old injured, starving, physically abused orphan whom she chances upon hiding outside her apartment. The young boy, whom she names Krishna, awakens the universal maternal instinct lying dormant deep within her. As time passes, the maternal bond develops and strengthens and takes on native cultural tropes in its manifestation. However, she is forced to give up the boy for adoption to state agencies. The separation shatters both of them as they have come to regard each other as family. Krishna runs away from his foster home and Meera keeps searching for him forever. Henceforth, no joy can compensate for the gaping void caused by the absence of Krishna in her life. The story boldly contrasts the ways in which motherhood is looked at, in Indian and American cultures. Both cultures assign a position of dignity to the mother but the Indian ideal of becoming a mother is quite different from that of Western feminism which ends up advocating a selfish escape from one’s own self. Ultimately, the Indian ideal of motherhood, of sacrificing a part of oneself to gain fullness, which is the highest aspiration of every Indian woman, asserts its power unequivocally. This story also negotiates the location of the myth of Krishna, the deity who had two mothers, one who gave birth to him and the other who brought him up. The location of this myth in the dislocation of culture gives the story a decidedly profound significance. As the heroine, Meera confesses, “… I knew mother-love was real. Real and primitive and dangerous, lurking somewhere in the female genes - especially our Indian ones - waiting to attack. I was determined to watch out for it”. (Arranged Marriage 75)

She later asserts: “… in Indian marriages becoming a wife was only a prelude to that all-important, allconsuming event - becoming a mother”. (Arranged Marriage 76)

‘The Maid-Servant’s Story’, which is the sixth story in the collection, articulates the dilemma of a young Indian girl living in the USS who wonders whether she should conform to the traditional Indian arranged marriage or trust her Indian-American lover who does not believe in marriage. At this juncture she comes to know the secrets of her own past, of her father who had died when she was young and of her mother who always seemed cold and withdrawn. She learns how her wealthy, intellectual father was a hypocrite and womanizer who had destroyed not only the

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life of her beautiful and intelligent mother but also that of Sarala, her maid-servant who had been the victim of his lust and abuse. Divakaruni brutally unmasks the self-righteous facade of Indian upper-class conventions and morality, exposing the horror of patriarchal culture and arranged marriage which reduces women to puppets and victims. The exploitation of women continues across the gender divide. On the one hand is the cultured daughter-in-law of an aristocratic family who is considered as yet another showpiece to adorn the mansions and perpetuate the family legacy by producing preferably male heirs on the other hand is her maid-servant whose aspirations to lead a dignified life are thwarted by her rich masters and her own poor relatives who reduce her to a prostitute and an object for satiation of lust. Despite such continuous atrocities perpetrated through generations, women remain mute and meek, continuing to suppress the truth, pretending that all is well, hiding from their own emotions, living amidst shadows and illusions. “It’s how we survive, we Indian women whose lives are half-light and halfdarkness, stopping short of revelations that would otherwise crisp away our skins…. Perhaps it is like this for all daughters, doomed to choose for ourselves, over and over, the men who have destroyed our mothers” (AM 167). The next story titled ‘Disappearance’ is the only story in the book that has been narrated from a male perspective. It portrays a young husband and father whose wife disappears suddenly. His reminiscences about his wife which resemble Robert Browning’s dramatic monologues, reveal that this man who claims to be liberal and Americanized is at heart a chauvinist, who first underestimates and then resents the intellectual prowess and independent thinking of his wife, a man who suppresses her freedom in several subtle and indirect ways. The little affection he has for her disappears when he comes to know that all her jewellery is missing and perhaps she has abandoned him to start a new life on her own terms. He immediately burns her photos and plans to remarry, reminding himself that this time he would choose a rustic, uneducated girl without a mind of her own. However, his sense of shame and guilt at having failed the woman he married lurks deep inside. Here, Divakaruni explores the Indian man’s idea of marriage, based more on the idea of convenience than genuine feeling. She articulates the desire to see a woman not as an individual and more as the expectation of the wife being a ‘perfect’ object. Such is the male gaze and the male perception of the female companion in his life. The eighth story titled ‘Doors’ is a perfect example of how a perfect marriage is ruined by the clash of cultures. Preeti, an Indian girl brought up in the USA, falls in love with and marries Deepak, an Indian boy who has come to the USA very recently. Despite the fears of family and friends, both of them adjust perfectly to each other. However, the only problem is that while the Americanized wife loves to guard her privacy and keep all the doors shut, the Indian husband loves the opposite. Things get complicated further when the husband’s friend Raj comes from India to visit them. Raj’s easygoing uninhibited ways trouble Preeti until she becomes almost psychotic and paranoid. The story underlines the vital differences in Indian and American cultures that are seldom reconciled. It is also a study of how old cultural habits never die and any marriage, whether arranged or otherwise, demands a painful effort to transcend the self.

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The next story ‘The Ultrasound’ is yet another indictment of the male-dominated Indian society and its strong bias against the girl child. It portrays the deep friendship between two cousins Arundhati and Anjali. Anjali gets married to an NRI in California while Arundhati gets married to a family of landlords in Burdwan, Bengal. At every stage, the contrast in their married lives is highlighted. While Anjali is her husband’s friend and equal partner, Arundhati seems to be a glorified maid-servant in the house of her in-laws. Both the cousins are expecting babies around the same time. Anjali is pampered by her husband. But Arundhati is pressurized to abort her child when the ultrasound reveals that the child is a girl. Everybody including Anjali’s husband Sunil feels that abortion is the best option because a woman in India has no life once she is deserted by her husband and in-laws. A shocked Anjali vows to bring Arundhati to the USA. She advises Arundhati to go to her mother’s house and give birth to the child. However, Anjali wonders if the fate of the Indian woman is the same everywhere and she is lucky only because her unborn child is male, because she is in the USA and not in India. Even as the heroine Anjali bravely resolves to protect the unborn child of her cousin, Divakaruni wonders aloud at the Indian culture which victimizes barren wives and those without male children. There was a disturbing tone in his voice. See how lucky you are to have a husband like me, to live in this free and easy American culture, it seemed to say. You’d better start working harder at being a good wife. Or else…… I wept long, hot tears at the unfairness of a world which insisted not only that women had to have husbands but they had to be grateful to them. (Arranged Marriage 219)

‘An Affair’ which is the tenth story in the collection showcases the lives of two incompatible couples—Abha and Ashok and Meena and Srikanth. Abha, the idealistic conservative wife is regarded with derision and condescension by her modern and stylish husband, Ashok. On the other hand, Meena the ultra-modern and smart woman finds life with her simple, conservative husband Srikanth extremely suffocating. Things change suddenly when Meena is discovered to have an affair and walks out on Srikanth. Meena’s divorce changes Abha’s life forever. She is first hurt and then rather inspired by her friend’s secret move. She decides to clarify matters with her own husband Ashok and to free him from the marriage bond. Meena’s approach to a difficult marriage is to cheat on her husband and to assert herself. However, Abha’s approach to the problem brings out the fact that she has combined in herself the faithfulness and resilience of the Indian wife and the independence and boldness of the American woman. Divakarunire affirms that a successful marriage is a union of hearts and minds based on mutual appreciation and respect, not compromise, guilt or shame. Ultimately, an honest, frank appraisal and acceptance of the self and of relationships alone can lead to the liberating truth. She writes to her husband: What are you going to do about your own life, Abha? … Selfish, they’ll call me. Immoral. A bad woman….. The old rules aren’t always right. Not here, not even in India….I feel your resentment growing around me, thick and red and suffocating. Like mine is suffocating you. …. We’re spiraling toward hate. And hopelessness. That’s not what I want for the rest of my life. Or yours. …. It’s better this way, each of us freeing the other before it’s too late...... so, we can start learning, once more, to live. (Arranged Marriage 270–272)

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The last story ‘Meeting Mrinal’ acts as a fitting finale to Divakaruni’s attempt to view the Indo-American cultural melting pot from the feminist perspective. On the one hand is Asha whose illusions of a perfect life and a perfect marriage are shattered when her husband suddenly leaves her and her son to start a new life with his American secretary. On the other hand, is Mrinal, Asha’s best friend whose illusions of being a perfectly successful, independent, single woman are shattered by the deep loneliness she experiences as a result of not having a family. Both these Indian women, one steeped in Indian culture and the other in American culture, both maturely tackling the challenges of life, come to a common conclusion at the end. It is in the dominant American atmosphere that all their experiences mingle and distil, and they learn that despite one’s best efforts, one can never have a perfect life and that human life is precious and beautiful because it is an unending battle to create perfection out of the imperfect. Divakaruni negotiates fiction as a tool to highlight and rebel against the subaltern status imposed on Indian women. Narrated often in the first person, each of her stories has a female protagonist. These women who live in the villages and cities of India or the urban centres of America range from little girls to young women to brides and widows, to middle-aged housewives and high-profile working women. Drawn from the upper, middle and lower classes, they can be either conservative or modern, highly educated or barely literate. What all of them share is the common experience of suffering by explicit or implicit patriarchal oppression. Almost all of them emerge as extremely sensitive and intellectual, conscious, compassionate and sacrificing individuals while the men are largely seen to be insensitive and selfish, egoistic and narrow-minded, concerned with mundane and carnal desires. The Indian-American women, like Divakaruni herself, placed at a vantage point where Indian culture can be viewed both intimately and from a detached distance, share a strong sense of bonding and empathy with suffering womankind and can pierce through their keen vision, the hypocrisy of even the most sophisticated. The men…. in spite of their Bill Blass suits and alligator-skin shoes and the sleek Benzes that waited obediently for them in their parking lots, they still belonged to the villages of their fathers. Villages were a woman caught in adultery was made to ride around the market square on a donkey, her head shaved, her clothes stripped off her, while crowds jeered and pelted her with garbage (Arranged Marriage 246). The sense of female bonding is the keynote of Divakaruni’s writing. As she writes in her essay “What Women Share”- “…. I find myself focusing my writing on friendships with women, and trying to balance them with the conflicting passions and demands that come to us as daughters and wives, lovers and mothers. ….. In the best friendships I have had with women, there is a closeness that is unique, a sympathy that comes from somewhere deep and primal in our bodies and does not need explanation, perhaps because of the life-changing experiences we share … The same tragedies, physical or emotional, threaten us ….We take joy in the same small, good things of life …We’re sometimes furiously competitive and bitchy and exasperated. But ultimately we can be ourselves with each other. Ourselves with all our imperfections….We can be women and know that, as women, we are understood” (Divakaruni, Bold Type, 1998).

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The stories reveal that is like her fellow-expatriate women still rooted to India and cherishes this ethnic identity perhaps much more consciously than those living in India. Her work thus serves as a bridge between Indian and American cultures which have a reciprocal and also ambivalent influence on each other. “Arranged Marriage” delves into the unique way of life and the cultural diversity that the Indian diaspora brings into the American setting. It also explores the impact of the powerful American culture upon Indians. Interestingly, it highlights not only the differences but also the similarities between Indian and American cultures. The struggles of the IndianAmerican women in these stories symbolize the common aspirations for freedom and fulfilment shared by women from both continents. Divakaruni’s heroines seem to profess that extremes of rigidity and of licence are both equally harmful and the secret to happiness lies in the golden mean. Neither conservatism nor liberalism can be perfect. Often, the exploitation of women continues across cultures whether orthodox or ultra-modern, and it is only the form and manner of the oppression that changes with change of place. As Deepika Bahri writes in her essay “Feminism in/and Post colonialism”,“Globalization offers unprecedented opportunities for transnational feminist activism, but seizing these opportunities will depend upon feminists’ ability to read sameness and difference on a global scale…. It will require that we learn to read literature by and about “third-world” women as more than informal sociology, even as it will enjoin upon us the need to read global experiences and events as complex, intricately interwoven social texts. We would then read women in the world not as the same but as neighbours, as “near-dwellers” whose adjacence can become more meaningful. Through this logic—a logic that might usefully be applied to the general orientation of post-colonialism—we would read the world, not as one (in the sense of being already united), but as belonging together” (Bahri, 2004, 220). Oliva Espín asserts that each person experiences the identity crisis of diasporic experience differently, in complex ways: “The process of adaptation and acculturation is not linear. The multiple intrapsychic and behavioural changes required for successful acculturation occur at many levels. Individuals will experience these changes at their own unique paces” (21). The experience of South Asian immigrants cannot possibly be represented accurately without telling each of their stories. However, in Divakaruni’s attempt to present multiple different experiences combined with varying levels of negotiation of fractured identity issues, she paints a powerful portrait of a selection of South Asian immigrants. Within that portrayal, she is able to explore expectations based on individuality as well as gender and ultimately is able to support the strength of women in diaspora. As Prof. Prabhat K. Singh observes in his anthology The Indian English Novel Today, “Women writers are fearlessly giving full and candid expression to female consciousness and experiences exploring the secret spaces of women and the difficult terrains of their lives, their love and betrayal, melancholy and anger…. They are also interrogating and refuting the notion of woman as a possession or as a mere instrument of procreation…. they are conscious artists mapping life with maturity on scales of instinct, emotion and intellect in the contemporary world” (Singh, 2013, 9, 11).

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References Bill, A., Griffiths, G., Tiffin, H. (Eds.). (1998). Key concepts in post-colonial studies (pp. 68–70). Psychology Press. Bahri, D. (2004). Feminism in/and postcolonialism. In N. Lazarus (Ed.), The Cambridge companion to postcolonial literary studies (pp. 199–220). Cambridge University Press. Divakaruni, C. B. (1998). What Women Share. Bold Type. http://www.randomhouse.com/boldtype/ 0199/divakaruni/essay.html Divakaruni, C. B. (1995). Arranged marriage. Black Swan Books—Transworld Publishers (1997) (all textual quotations are from this edition) Divakaruni, C. B. (2000). Sister of my heart. Anchor Books. Divakaruni, C. B. (2003). Vine of desire. Anchor Books. Divakaruni, C. B. Queen of dreams. Abacus. Grewal, I. (2005). Transnational America: Feminisms, diasporas, neoliberalism. Duke University Press. Grewal, I. (1999). Women’s rights as human rights: Feminist practices, global feminism, and human rights regimes in transnationality. Citizenship Studies, 3(3), 337–354. Hadi, A. H. (2001). Diasporic consciousness in Chitra Banerjee Divakaruni’s Queen of Dreams. In T. Jayakumar (Ed.), Research sources of literary resources. Essays in honour of Prof. A. M. Safiullah. Ajantha Printers. Jain, J. (1998). Introduction. In J. Jain (Ed.). Writers of Indian Diaspora: Theory and practice. Rawat Publications. Johnson, S. A. (2004). An interview with Chitra Banerjee Divakaruni. Writing Outside the Lines, 117(3), 20–23. Kapoor, K. (2004). Theorizing diaspora and the Indian experience. In A. K. Sharma & P. A. Chakrabarthi (Eds.), Theorizing and critiquing Indian diaspora. Papers Creative Books. Singh, P. K. (2013). The narrative strands in the Indian english novel: Needs, desires and directions. In P. K. Singh (Ed.), The Indian english novel today (pp. 1–33). Authors Press. Soja, E. W. (1989). Postmodern geographies: The reassertion of space in critical social theory. Verso Press.

Sharing the Destiny: Women’s Political Representation in India in the South Asian Perspective Nabila Sadiq

The Russian women’s campaign slogan “Democracywithout women is not democracy”, succinctly portrays the predicament of women of the world due to their political under-representation (Cockburn, 1991: 141). By definition, democracy is a kind of government where the ultimate power lies essentially with the people. But if nearly half of the population of the world is stranger to democratic institutions, then what definition would fit democracy accurately. Oddly, the term ‘people’, earnestly often spoken of to explicate democracies, excludes women from its ambit. The division of society into two spheres, i.e. the public and the private, tends to miss out women from the definition of democracy. The divide leaves the public affairs embodying the state, the decision-making, the economy and so forth, with men and relegates the women to the private domain of homes, families and children. This further deepens the gender division of spheres of human activity. However, these spheres are not mutually as apart as they appear, for the laws of the state also sway the homes and the violence in the family affects everybody else. Anyway, women woke up in time to the idea of natural rights to pave the way for a political space for themselves. Initially, therefore, feminism voiced concerns for the voting rights of women. The suffrage movement for women, usually termed as the first wave of feminism, was ostensibly seen as an elitist white upper-class women’s movement. However, it did signify a strike towards something positive, in any case. A beginning seemed imperative to bring about a change in politics and so, in the lives of women. Perhaps, women would not have won the basic human rights, whether social, political, economic or cultural, without a sort of mutiny, however modest and misty it might have been. The beginning augured well for the equal rights amendment in the second wave, eventually to focus on the marginalized identities in the third wave. Even at present, women find the political, social or cultural environment very unkindly, nay, hostile, to enter politics. Even a cursory glance at the composition of N. Sadiq (B) Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Rahman and N. Tiwari (eds.), Development, Governance and Gender in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-5109-0_19

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political decision-makers in the world, reveals that women face sundry hurdles not only in entering the coterie of influential politics and their words and influence are not considered at par with that of their male colleagues. The statistics prove that globally the average percentage of women in parliaments stands at a mere 25.5%, and it comes to a meagre 14.44% in the Indian parliament (IPU, 2021). However, increasing the level of women’s representation and participation in decision-making bodies would require acute tactics and measures to impart good training to representatives and excite the masses to vote for them. Sadly though, the issue of women’s representation hardly seems a priority in any participatory democracy. Often, the male and female partisans cherish different sets of priorities and leadership styles, yet the idea of relevance of women’s representation evokes awkward frowns. In the sphere of political representation, theorist Hanna Pitkin’s work bears great significance. Pitkin (1967) identifies four main categories of representation, namely: formalistic, symbolic, descriptive, and substantive (Hofmeister et al., 2015). In her view, descriptive representation characterizes the extent to which a representative resembles the representing object and substantive representation happens when an agent or substitute of the represented takes actions in their interest. It is these two kinds which bear most relevance to women’s representation. On the one hand, substantive representation deals with the ‘what’ of representation, descriptive is all about addressing the issue of ‘who’ representing ‘whom’ (Pitkin, 1967). Much of the literature on gender and political representation explores the relationship between these two concepts, frequently suggesting that higher levels of descriptive representation (more women in decision-making bodies) will generate better levels of substantive representation (greater attention to women’s issues) (Childs, 2001; Krook, 2005; Mackay, 2004). The present study seeks to portray the experience of women’s representation in politics in South Asia, especially India. Even though the South Asian countries are well-established democracies, they figure bare minimum in women’s representation in the legislatures. Apart from Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal and Afghanistan, no other country offers national legislation to ensure women’s political participation. The hold of orthodox cultural ethos and dogmatic stereotypes makes it very difficult for women to get elected to the legislative bodies. Hence, the concerns of women’s political participation and representation in South Asia, especially India, would be better comprehended along with an outline of the barriers that inhibit their rise in politics. Debates surrounding the quotas and underscoring the importance of breaking the glass ceiling for women in politics would as well figure in the study.

Political Representation and Women Statistically, women are about half of the world’s populace.1 They substantially contribute to the social and economic development of society today by donning dual roles in the productive as well as the reproductive domains.2 However, their participation is peripheral when it comes to formal political edifices and processes.

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At present, women’s representation in the legislatures all over the world is around 25.5%. The international community has committed itself to gender equality in the international forums and treaties, yet there are merely thirty-three countries where women occupy 30% or more seats in their parliaments (IPU, 2019). However, the bias is changing; redress of gender imbalances seems in sight. The rising participation of women in politics bodes well for a just political order. The worldwide debate on the importance of women’s political representation centres on two sets of arguments: intrinsic and instrumentalist. The intrinsic argument champions the requirement of an equal participation of women in politics from a human rights perspective. Since women comprise almost half of the world’s population, it would be fair for them to have equal share of participation and representation along with men in the countries which are democratic in nature. The other argument follows from an essentialist perspective and sees men and women as different so they induce different perspectives and goals in politics (Bari, 2005). Some feminists argue that women are a ‘different voice’ and bring different leadership style and policy priorities to politics (Gilligan, 1993).3 A considerable literature in support of the diverse rationales for women’s equal role in politics bears out broad agreement on women’s initiation into politics. Historically, women have long been excluded from the various political assemblies due to structural, functional and individual factors that differ worldwide depending on the specific social contexts (Dahlerup, 2006; Krook, 2009; Lovenduski, 1997). The feminist perspective on the state betrays the underlying patriarchal, male-centric values (Mackinnon, 1989). It submits that the state was structured from its inception to serve only men and to propagate male domination, both in Western (Lerner, 1986; MacKinnon, 1989) and in the non-Western countries (Charrad, 2001). In the absence of women, legislations that followed obviously protected the male interests alone. Democracies, from the ancient to the modern times, have excluded women from their framework, dividing the society into public and private domains. Most of the classical thinkers and philosophers4 considered women fit only for domestic roles as a caring mother or wife, signifying they had no place in politics. This view justifies the reasoning behind normative political theory that considered private sphere as nonpolitical and exerted no energy to investigate the political environment of private life.5 Old and new democracies failed to consider women as citizens for long and downgraded their woes in theory and practice (Bathla, 1998: 39). Even Western democracies left them high and dry everywhere. The peak of liberal philosophy in the nineteenth century brought forth the idea of ‘free and rational’ individuals which was expanded by the suffragists later to demand the right to vote for all human beings. But even then, the theoretical basis of liberal thought remained inherently gendered, as it disseminated patterns of patriarchy and ignored gender subordination in politics and society at large (Rai, 2000: 2). Feminist political theorists have argued that the appearance of gender neutrality in government actually disguises substantial gender inequality. Hence, the usage of gender-neutral language merely intimates a principle for in practice only men appear in politics (Paxton & Hughes, 2007). Feminist theorists such as Anne Phillips, Carol Pateman, and Iris Marion Young have explained that abstract gender-neutral terms like individual or citizen actually

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signify white males only (Phillips, 1995; Young, 1990). This makes women invisible, not equal. That is why women, despite having the right to vote, were not able to shape public policy and bring crucial issues in the private sphere to the mind of the public. Hence, democracy and the public–private divide have served men rather than women (Rai, 2000). Whenever women opt for politics, the patriarchal backdrop of modern democracies disables them to change the sexual politics and inhibit the play of masculinist polity. Such a situation calls for a change in the basics of liberal democracies to carve out an authentic political space for women. The ‘Fourth World Conference on Women’ which was convened in Beijing advocated for adequate representation of women in the decision-making bodies suggesting that to ensure equal care to the voice of the concerned segments of society it was necessary to have logical balance among the various groups in public life (United Nations, 1995). This echoes Jürgen Habermas’s idea of participatory and just democracy. The gender balance in decision-making would thus entail good governance in every other field (Pandey, 2010: 63).6

Women Representation in South Asian Politics

South Asia7 as a region comprises eight countries, namely Afghanistan, Pakistan, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, India, Nepal and Bangladesh. Significantly, the region

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has very often experienced spells of volatility. Several of the nations of the region are new to democracy,8 and some have suffered military rule.9 In the midst of low percentage of women in parliaments,10 some countries of South Asia present a heart-warming scenario. In Nepal, women’s representation in parliament is 33%, and Afghanistan has touched a good 27.7% (IPU ). Interestingly, the region can congratulate itself for the impressive record of women as heads of states and governments. Bangladesh is unique in having women as leaders of the ruling and opposition parties for a fairly long time. Conversely, Maldives bars women from the highest positions of president and vice-president (True et al., 2012). Bangladesh first introduced the quota system for women through the 1972 Constitution where it reserved 15 seats, which were subsequently raised to 30. In 2004, the ruling alliance of Bangladesh announced an increase in the number of seats in the Jatiya Sangsad (National Parliament) to 345, of which 45 were reserved for women. This gave women 13% of the total seats. Today, women occupy 73 out of 349 seats in the national parliament of Bangladesh which amounts to 20.92% (IPU, ). At the lowest tier of local government, one-third of the seats are reserved for women today. In India, the number of women elected members is 78 out of 543 (14.3%) in the lower house of the parliament (Lok Sabha), and there are 25 out of 248 women in the upper house (Rajya Sabha) (10.42%) (IPU, 2020a, 2020b). The Women’s Reservation Bill which sought to reserve one-third of the seats in the Lok-Sabha and in all the State Legislative Assemblies for women was passed in the Rajya Sabha in 2010 but lapsed with the next elections. However, seats at the local level stay reserved since 1993. Some states have raised the quota to 50% for the panchayats and municipalities both 11 and some for panchayats alone.12 The national assembly of Pakistan in the year 2002 passed an act which allocated seats to women: 17% seats in the national and provincial assemblies and the senate. At present, women hold 69 (out of 342) seats in the National Assembly of Pakistan and 20 (out of 104) in the Senate (20%). However, the seats are allocated to the political parties in proportion to their electoral standing, and this is tied to a system of nomination. Each party submits a list before the election to the electoral authorities before the election. From them, a list of 60 women is prepared, and women are nominated from them. Thus, the political parties have complete control over the nominations, and they happen to be male dominated. This method in a way gives top male powerholders the complete power to choose nominees from the list. Hence, women members chosen through such a way cannot really be representatives of the people in the real sense. (Omvedt, 2005: 475). In Nepal, the Women Reservation Bill reserves 33% of the governmental positions to women, and as a result, woman occupy 112 out of 333 seats in parliament (33.63%). Women in Maldives have just four out of eighty-seven parliamentary seats (IPU, ). In Afghanistan, under the Taliban, women were not allowed to study or work. However, later in 2005, an affirmative action law was passed securing over one-fourth of the seats in parliament and over 30 in provincial councils for women (Hahn, 2010). Now, the number of women in the lower house is 67 out of 248 and 19 out of 68 in the upper house. Bhutan established a democratically elected parliament in 2008, a bicameral one with a national assembly of 47 members of which seven are women (14.89%)

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(IPU, ). Only twelve out of 225 members in the Parliament of Sri Lanka are women, which makes only 5.33%. There are no quotas for women in Sri Lanka even though its constitution encourages affirmative laws and policies for women. An overview of women’s representation in South Asia reveals that reservations or quotas serve them well. However, in countries averse to reservations, women still struggle to make their presence felt in politics, for time-honoured stereotypes brush them aside as outsiders.

Women’s Representation in Indian Politics The issue of political representation of women in India first came up in the year 1917. Back then, it was more of a plea for universal adult franchise. Thereafter, women got the right to vote in the year 1930, but it was conditional and favoured the ones from influential families. Women’s participation in movements for political and civil rights in India was never alone and without a male support. Still, women’s involvement in national struggle impacted and brought changes in their lives along with fostering the cause of their constitutional and legal rights. However, even after the right to vote, their political representation remained low (Kaushik, 1993, 1996; Mazumdar 1993). However, few women through male patronage and dynastic affiliations did rise and attain crucial positions as member of parliaments and state legislatures. However, the number of women in public positions ever fall short of their numerical strength (Kaushik, 1993; Mehta et al., 2001).

Political Participation and Representation In India, women are almost half of its population, and yet they are very poorly represented in its legislative bodies. The Constitution of India guarantees to men and women the fundamental right to equality, equal voting rights and political participation. Empowerment of women very much enshrined in a number of provisions of the Indian Constitution. The fundamental right to equality and non-discrimination are justiciable rights according to the Constitution. Equal opportunity when it comes to employment or appointment to offices under state is another crucial fundamental right. Equal pay for equal work for both men and women is also emphasized in the Directive Principles of State Policy. There are also provisions for humane working conditions and maternity relief in these principles. Furthermore, the Indian constitution also dictates for upholding harmony and relinquishing practices derogatory to women (Austin, 1999). The political rights of women are recognized without any discrimination or distinction. They in fact have all the rights to participate in all levels of decision-making which are at par with men. The right to constitutional equality has been augmented further through the passage of a number of acts in order to rectify and abolish the traditional inequalities that exist for women when it comes

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to marriage, divorce and property. However, in spite of these provisions, the ground reality proves that women are yet to secure ample and proportionate representation in the legislative and other decision-making bodies (Subramanian, 2002).Thus, there still remains a big gap to cover for women when it comes to the journey from formal to substantive representation in the political system of India.

Women’s Representation in the Lok Sabha*

*Source Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation13 ; Economic and Political Weekly 201114 (Paliath, 2019). Remarkably, women’s political mobilization and participation in elections in India have steadily grown. Women voters’ turnout has also shown a gradual rise over the years (from 37.1 % in 1952 to 67.11% in the 2019 general elections) (Deshpande, 2004; Election Commission of India, 201915 ). However, this higher voter in elections has not converted into higher representation in legislative bodies. Almost all the political parties compete for women’s votes in elections, but few care to afford them an opportunity to fight the elections. In fact, political parties seem to waver when it comes to fielding women candidates. Therefore, the number of women that even stood for elections has always been very low. The representation of women in the Lok Sabha has varied over the years. It started with 4.8 in 1952 and reached a high of 8.3 in 1984, but then declined to 5.4 in 1989, which then rose massively to 9.6 in 1999 and again regressed to 9.5 in 2004 to rise to 13.1 in 2019. In totality, women representation in political assemblies has remained low. Thus, despite the increase in

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electoral participation of women, their representation in the formal political structures has not changed much (IPU, 2017, 2019).

Though mainstream political parties realised the place of women as a constituency in the 1980s, this has not translated into a greater number for them in the political bodies. As a token the political parties set up women’s cells or wings; but still very few women were able to scale the height in the parties (Kumar, 1994). However, it was only in the late 1980s that a conscious attempt was made to induct more women in the various levels of the party organisations. The CPM started admitting more women into its various bodies and committees. Later on, it also changed its stance on gender-based reservation. Meanwhile, the BJP had the highest percentage of women in its decision-making bodies at that particular time (Manchanda, 1998). Traditionally, though, the Congress Party has been fielding the largest number of women candidates, but even then, its working committee etches quite a low representation of women (Ghosh, 1999). In spite of the efforts of political parties to induct more women, the extent of representation of women has not changed much when it comes to the inner party structures or its decision-making bodies or in the higher posts within the party. Women are still sparsely represented in most political parties, and their low representation in the decision-making bodies rarely influences the crucial

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party policies. Usually, women are confined to the ‘women’s wing’ of the party ostensibly to deal with what are thought to be ‘women’s issues’ such as dowry and rape and sometimes with more common concerns like price rise. If women bag a few ministerial berths, they are normally assigned portfolios in the social service sectors: health, education, social welfare, women and child development, etc. (Human Development in South Asia 2000).

*Source Press Information Bureau 16 Election Commission of India17 ,18 PRS Legislative Research19 (IndiaSpend, 2019). In the background of the observation that women representation is low in politics, it is quite remarkable that some women have reached the summit in Indian politics. Some of them led strong regional parties and have forged alliance with national parties in and outside the government. Even though the rise of these women leaders have often been rationalised to their proximity to male leaders, the fact remains that they hold a position in the party in their own right and decide the course of their parties and influence national politics. However, their position does not bind them to a specific mandate to concentrate specifically on women issues. In fact, women leaders have been typically apprehensive about conceding critical space to other women in their organizations or in the political process. So, representation of women has not evidently gone up under the leadership of women. Moreover, women parliamentarians or legislators do not content themselves simply with women issues. Rather, power play has made them rather ruthless and make them follow similar approach as that of men in politics. Also, the influence of patriarchy and a craving for

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acceptance in politics have often made them to not bring a different style in politics, and they rather attempt to project themselves as ‘bahus’ and ‘betis’ in the following the traditional patriarchal notions of femininity. Quite often, women public figures do assume male priorities in public life to feel acceptable. Many women internalize the norms and rules of patriarchal political structures and replicate them, thus reinforcing the existing hierarchies of power (Subramanium, 2007: 7). Now, it seems quite timely to consider if a qualitative shift in policy styles happen with an increase in numerical strength of women in the political process and if women leaders tend to pay greater attention to the woes of women. There is no doubt that if women are absent in public life then the chance of their priorities and opinions finding expression in the public space is absolutely null. Hence, women’s involvement in political process and decision-making in greater numbers does makes a difference. Researchers observe that without sufficient female presence in the national and other decision-making bodies, it is unlikely that issues which women as a group are more prone to take up would not be adequately addressed in their absence. While it is important to bring women to positions of power, it is equally necessary to gender sensitize those in power, men or women. Along with this, the importance of women’s economic independence, education and social awareness cannot go a begging. The resetting of gender relations within the family and society would be an equally important step towards freedom, equality and justice (Kazi, 2016).

The Reservation Debate Debates about the proper political representation of women in India have thrown up various alternatives to treat the subject. Notably, gender quotas have emerged as a beginning of a global approach to redress the deep-seated exclusion of women from the vast arena of politics. Gender quotas started emerging in the second half of the twentieth century when various nations instituted them to address certain discrimination of the past. A clear consensus in the literature corroborates that gender quota would effectively eliminate women’s exclusion and ensure that they rise in formal structure of politics. However, controversy still haunts gender quota per se and its failings to empower women (Tadros, 2011). Rai (2008) has emphasized that “while quotas are important in addressing the exclusion of women from the public political sphere, they can only form one part of a multi-faceted strategy for empowering women, which must together with increased political participation also involve a redistribution of socio-economic resources within societies”. Women cannot exercise their full political rights if they are bereft of civil and economic rights. The gender quotas, therefore, need to be affixed with the issue of social and economic redistributive justice in the society. Debate on women’s reservation came to the fore of Indian politics in 1974 with the publication of the report, Towards Equality. The National Committee on the Status of Women recommended quotas for women but only at the panchayat level.

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However, over 10 years later, after a renewed women’s movement, a national perspective plan for women issued by the government in 1988, recommended 30% quota at all layers. By the end of 1980s, several political parties, including the Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party, assumed it as a demand. A new “women’s bill” was first introduced under the Janata Dal-led National Front government. It triggered intense controversy every time it was introduced. The members of several minor political parties, with the support of some male members of the dominant parties, raised a ruckus in parliament and each time effectively stalled action on the bill. Much of the opposition20 came from the men of the “backward castes” who were making significant gains on their own during the last decade or so; their male leaders feared that reservation for women would transfer many of their seats to upper caste women. The fact that a large section of existing women parliamentarians came from the “high” caste and elite families deepened the fear. Hence, a major confrontation grew between the women and “backward caste” political leaders. The bill provided for reservation by rotation: every third constituency would be reserved for women, to be chosen by lottery and rotated after a parliamentary period of five years. Several features in the bill provoked dissent. For, it was argued, the rotational reservation of constituencies, would in effect mean “reserving” the remaining two-thirds for men and simply pit women against women. Besides, it would bring in instability in the political system, for after de-reservation, when the lottery shifts the reserved constituency, a new representative would be chosen. Rarely, the elected woman would hold her seat in an open contest. The link between representatives and their constituencies would become further tenuous. An alternative to smooth the situation proposed to make it legally compulsory for all parties to provide a list of candidates for the elections listing one-third women. Another alternative proffered was to introduce a system which amalgamated several (perhaps three) constituencies into one and then provided for three representatives to be elected, one of whom perforce a woman, likely to do away with the most obnoxious features of the original bill. Thus, women would be contesting in an open field; no specific men would be threatened with losing their seats by having their constituencies “reserved” away from them. This suggests a move in the direction of an electoral system based on proportional representation that provides more assured and self-chosen representation for minority groups. Proportional representation as a system gives the groups in minority in any one area but spread out throughout the country a much better chance to get true representation. Hence, this system has been supported by many feminists and African-Americans in the USA (Chaudhury, 2000). In 2008, the Manmohan Singh government introduced the bill in the Rajya Sabha. Two years later on 9 March 2010, it was passed by the house in spite of high drama and scuffles. The BJP, the Left and some other parties came together with the ruling Congress to help pass it in the upper house (Pisharoty, 2016). However, the Lok Sabha never voted on the bill, and it lapsed after the dissolution of the 15th Lok Sabha in 2014. One wonders, if mere presence of more women in Parliament will bring about a savoury change if the not so warm debate on women’s reservation bill foreshadows anything. It will not mean much unless women in parliament truly represent women’s concerns inside out with sound logic. An undifferentiated reservation for women

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will also reinforce the existing inequalities in women’s access to positions of power. Women from the elite and politicized families alone will make a smooth entry to politics. Hence, the gender gap in politics cannot be redressed simply by bringing more women in the system; it would phase out if supportive mechanisms are put in place and given an enabling environment. The quota system per se should be central to an affirmative action measure. Therefore, quota modalities must be direct and empowering so as to assist the women to extend their constituency. In short, democratic institutions will be strengthened by compulsorily extended presence of women through reservation. This is evident from the impact of implementation of 33% reservation for women in the local bodies (panchayats) by the 73rd Constitutional Amendment in India as a result of which the representation of women in the formal structure of governance at the local level has recorded steady progression (Subramanium, 2007).

Source Lok Sabha (unstarred Q No. 6343), Paliath, 2019 Women’s bearing on the decision-making forums would not only shore up their stature but also foster democratic traditions rendering democracy more tenacious

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to wipe out injustice and oppression. An explicitly female perspective would thus appear on the political horizon.

Obstacles to Women’s Political Participation The obstacles women encounter in political office can be summed up into two kinds: Political and Economic Barriers, Social and Cultural Barriers (Shvedova, 2005; SWARSWP, 2013; Mc Glen et al., 2002).

Political and Economic Barriers • • • • •

The patriarchal structures and conservative attitudes that permeate political life. Lack of party support. Limited access to political networks. Limited social and financial support for women candidates. Lack of contact and cooperation with other public organisations such as business groups, civil society organisations, women’s organisations and parliamentarians. • The absence of a well-developed educational and training system to promote women’s leadership and orient them to politics. • The nature of the electoral system, favourable or not, to women candidates.

Socio-Cultural Barriers • Poverty and unemployment. • Illiteracy and limited access to education and professions; and • The dual burden of domestic tasks and professional obligations. All these barriers besides an unwillingness to run for elections seem the oddest barrier to women’s political participation.

Prospects Women’s ascent in parliament can make a difference in redefining political priorities. Although an increase in the number of women in parliaments seems visible, it evinces no sign of gender equality. Specific interventions to address barriers that can bring a change to women’s political participation are of the following types (SARSWP, 2013):

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Legislative changes: Changes in the electoral systems aiming at proportional representation with quotas for women can bring significant changes in women’s representation in the legislatures. Quotas have been advocated as a fast track means to redress gender inequalities even though feminists undervalue their efficacy for women’s representation (Lindberg, 2004). However, implementation of the system needs clear guidelines and focus on how women can force changes in the rules and enlarge the rights for other women. In order to integrate women in the decisionmaking process, nations need to evolve ways to push women’s access to different positions. Acquiescence of political parties can further ease women’s participation (Tadros, 2011). Attitudinal Changes: Prevailing conservative and male-oriented values quite influence the approach to women’s representation. To promote women’s participation in politics, all barriers, subtle or obvious need to be phased out. Awareness programmes as much need to be initiated to usher in basic changes in society. Women’s organizations and other international establishments can also provide advisory and financial support during the elections to women candidates. This can promote constituency building, provide capacity support and enliven the visibility of candidates, to elevate the sense of value and credibility among women candidates (SWARSWP, 2013). Capacity Development: Women, already in the political arena, need to be persuaded to learn the laws of parliamentary system to promote the cause of women and influence the decision-making. Shared action and talent help promote link with networks and form alliances with other political forces. Women’s movements and organisations can promote women’s political participation, as well as provide women politicians with training, instil confidence in them and help develop skills and a knowledge base that would enable them to strive for gender sensitive legislation. Capacity development initiatives should not only include women already at the decision-making level or in parliament, but also those who aspire to opt for politics (SWARSWP, 2013).

Conclusion The women around the world suffer innumerable and unspoken barriers on their way to politics. Prevailing political structures and socio-economic regimes shelter these barriers. An analysis of the number of women in South Asian countries, particularly India, definitely demonstrates the under-representation of women as a class. No doubt, in India, the 73rd and 74th Amendments to the Constitution have served as a major breakthrough to ensure women’s equal access to and increased participation in political assemblies and provided for reservation of 33.33% to women at different levels of local governance in rural and urban areas. However, the number of women representatives in both houses of parliament, though steadily rising, continues to be negligible. They count only 14.44% of the total members of Parliament as of today. The number of women in the Central Council of Ministers remains dismally low. An affirmative action seems the way out to ensure that women’s concerns gain

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political prominence and a fairly representative number of women occupy positions at grass root level, as well as state and national levels. With reference to representation of women in parliament, India’s record remains rather cheerless. Even Afghanistan outclasses India in the reckoning of women legislators. In India, women hold merely 14.3% of the seats in the lower house, while in Afghanistan, they number 27.2% in parliament, a surfeit of violations of women’s rights notwithstanding. This has much to do with the denial of reservations in the national parliament in India. India still debates the reservation of seats for women in the Lok Sabha and state assemblies, while in some of the poorest countries such as Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Uganda and Mozambique women adorn a third to half of the parliamentary seats. The passage of the women’s bill, seeking 33% reservation for women, has been languishing in Indian Parliament since 1996. Successive governments have placed it on the table of Parliament, but only to shelve it for lack of consensus. Though reservation can be deemed as the only way to increase the number of women in politics in South Asia keeping in view the cultural ethos of the region, the fact remains that this is only the first step to having a more gender transformative area of politics. It is often observed that numbers are mere symbolic expressions and increasing the number does not mean actual improvement in the status of women in a particular country. Hence, in the context of women’s political empowerment what we should be aiming for is a mix of numerical and substantive representation so that the issues which affect the women are actually addressed by their representatives. This is the reason so many feminist thinkers believe that more than women politicians we need feminists in politics actually fighting for women’s rights in parliament. Giving representation to women in Parliament is not merely a matter of giving an equal role to women in the affairs of the nation; it rather corresponds, in essence, to the codes of equilibrium and equality. Above all, women’s cry for fair representation is like calling for the natural, for they are a major segment of the population. Women across the political spectrum aver that the passage to their empowerment passes through politics. Hence, with another half of its people suffering from lack of political empowerment, India cannot aspire to be a great power. Notes 1. 2. 3.

4. 5.

As of the latest census data, women comprise 49.6% of the world’s population. According to statistics, women do about two-thirds of the world’s work and are yet the poorest of the poor. ‘Different Voice’ refers to bringing more cooperative and consensus kind of leadership style to decision-making and pushing more family and childrenoriented bills in parliament. Absence of female legislators in parliament has led to many female insensitive decisions like in the Thomas Clarence-Anita Hill case in United States or in legalization of wife beating in Nigeria. Thinkers like Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, John Lock, Thomas Hobbes and Hegel to name a few. ‘Personal is Political’ is one of the key slogans of the radical feminists that emerged in the 1960s and questioned this divide.

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6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

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Participation, accountability, predictability and transparency are the basic characteristics of good governance. Factly 2016 [Online: Web]. Accessed: 11 April 2017. URL: https://factly.in/ women-in-parliament-where-does-india-figure-among-the-rest-world/. Nepal and Maldives were monarchy till recently. Bangladesh and Pakistan have been ruled by militaries for long. Statistic on women’s representation in parliament in South Asia has been taken from IPU. Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Maharashtra, and Tripura. Assam, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Manipur, Rajasthan, Uttarakhand, and West Bengal. URL: http://mospi.nic.in/sites/default/files/reports_and_publication/statis tical_publication/social_statistics/WM17Chapter5.pdf Accessed on 2 January 2018. URL: https://www.epw.in/system/files/pdf/2011_46/03/Electoral_Participa tion_of_Women_in_India_Key_Determinants_and_Barriers.pdf Accessed on 2 January 2018. URL: https://eci.gov.in Accessed on 30 December 2019. URL: http://intrapib.nic.in/elections2019/Tree.aspx. Accessed on 7th January 2020. URL: http://results.eci.gov.in. Accessed on 7th January 2020. URL: https://www.prsindia.org/sites/default/files/parliament_or_policy_pdfs/ Vital_Stats_17thLS_Profile_Final_0.pdf. Accessed on 7th January 2020. For critical analysis of the women’s reservation bill, see Menon, Nivedita (2000) “Elusive ‘Woman’: Feminism and Women’s Reservation Bill.” Economic and Political Weekly, 35:43/44, 3835–3844.

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Index

A Accountability, 94, 100, 101 Am¯ır al bahar, 199–203 Anti-nationals, 172, 175 Aparichitathaaumaa, 210 Aristotle, 5 ASEAN, 183 Asia pacific, 19 Authoritarian, 181 Axiological, 21 Ayah, 222–224, 226, 229, 230 Azaadi, 174

B Bait-ul-mal, 16 Beijing, 274 Blasphemy, 114, 116, 118 Boozie, 249 Brexit, 186, 187 BRICS, 186 Broadcast, 163, 164, 175 Buddhism, 185 Bureaucracies, 93, 96 Bureaucratic, 23

C CAA, 110 Cambay, 196–198 Catalytic, 151 Central Asia, 29, 185 CII, 127 Citizenship, 180 Civilization, 180, 186 Civil rights, 276

Civil society, 22–25, 31, 141, 143, 146 Cold War, 155 Colonial, 179, 185, 186, 191 Colonialism, 3, 269 Colonization, 259 Commonwealth, 222 Communication, 72, 81, 96, 221 Communication network, 181, 182, 185, 186, 192 Communications, 97 Communist, 181 Companies Act, 127, 128, 131, 133, 135 Conflict management, 159 Connell coins, 246 Constituent Assembly, 107 Constitution, 275, 276, 284 Corporate social responsibility, 128 Cultural, 244, 245, 248, 250, 252 Cultures, 259

D Dark Holds No Terrors, The, 243, 246, 247, 250 Decision-making, 277, 278, 282, 284 De-feminizing, 246 Deficit, 49 Democracy, 21, 22, 24, 27, 29–32, 93, 180, 189, 271 Democratic, 20, 22–24, 26, 28–32 Democratization, 141 Demographic, 27, 61, 70, 75, 77, 81, 87 Demography, 140 Developing countries, 72, 73, 126

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Rahman and N. Tiwari (eds.), Development, Governance and Gender in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-5109-0

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290 Development, 20–23, 25–28, 30–32, 55, 63, 69–73, 75, 78, 80–83, 86, 160, 164, 169, 179–186, 189, 191, 192 Diaspora, 62, 63, 222, 259 Diplomatic, 96, 100 Divakaruni, 259–261, 263, 266–269

E East Asia, 70, 139 Economic, 19, 20, 22, 23, 27, 28, 30, 32 Economic growth, 69, 70, 72, 140 Election Commission, 277 Electoral Commission, 98 Epistemological, 258 Ethics, 135 Ethnic composition, 3 European Union, 186 Exclusions, 144 Expatriate, 61, 65

F Femininity, 243–246 Feminism, 250, 251, 253, 254, 259, 261, 265 Feudal legacy, 185 Florence Nightingale, 251 Fundamental right, 276

G GCC, 55, 56, 61–63, 65, 66 GCC Countries, 209 GDP, 5, 7, 10, 12, 16, 49, 73, 78 Gender, 8, 9, 12, 14, 15 Geography, 140, 142, 257 Global, 35 Globalization, 140, 143, 146, 269 GNI, 35, 41 GNP, 149 Golden Roofs’, 263 Good governance, 141 Governance, 93, 94, 126, 127, 129, 131–134, 140–145 Grand Vazir, 225 Greek, 197, 203, 204 Growth rate, 49 GSAT-9, 186 GST, 96, 100 Gulf region, 55, 60

H Habeas Corpus, 107

Index HDR, 4, 6–8, 10, 12–17 Hegemonic masculinity, 246 Heterogeneity, 145 Hindutva, 107, 109, 111, 119 Historiography, 195 Human capital, 69, 71, 179 Human development, 3–10, 12–17 Human resource, 4 Human rights, 142, 143

I ICCPR, 111, 113, 120, 121 Ice Candy Man, 222, 225–227, 230 Ideology, 164 IGMDP, 153 Illegitimate, 264 ILO, 66, 67, 209 Insaniyat, 168 Islamization, 118, 119

J J&K, 165–171 Juxtaposition, 181

K Kashmiryat, 168, 175 Kautilya, 145

L L’Achelogie du Savoir, 258 Legitimacy, 94, 141 Leviathan, 20 Liberalization, 127 Literature, 244, 245, 253 Lowland, The, 246, 250

M Madagascar, 200, 204 Mahabharata, 200, 204 Malabar Pirates, 196 Masculinist, 274 Mass media, 160 Media, 181 MGNREGA, 16 Middle East, 29 Migration, 55, 56, 60, 61, 64, 65 Militarization, 184, 185 Minorities, 105–114, 117–121 Minority rights, 110, 113

Index Mir’at e Sikandari, 203 MNREGA, 24 MRG, 114, 117 Mughal, 145 N Nationalism, 19, 28, 31 NCLAT, 130 NCLT, 130 Neo-Liberal, 141 New Nepal, 208, 211, 212, 216–218 NFRA, 131 NITI Aayog, 95, 96, 99, 101 NRI, 263, 267 O OECD, 63 P Pacific, 70 Pandemic, 19, 20 Paradoxical, 148 Parsi, 225, 227, 229, 230 Patriarchal, 243–249, 251–253, 273, 274, 283 Peskithaapnujeevanako, 211 Planning Commission, 95, 96 Policy, 149, 151 Policy making, 22, 28, 83, 144 Political, 271 Political representation, 272, 273, 280 Political rights, 105 Political systems, 141, 145 Posture Optimization Theory, 148 Poverty, 70, 73, 87 PPP, 41 Premeditated development, 141 Print capitalism, 212 Private sector, 93 Privatization, 127 R Reductionist, 247 Regions, 70, 71, 80, 81 Religious, 105–107, 110, 112–114, 116–121 Remittance, 55, 57, 63, 64 Remittances, 208, 209, 218 Roman, 197, 203 S SAARC, 143

291 SAFTA, 186 Saharan Africa, 70 SEBI, 127, 129, 132, 135 Sexual Politics, 253 SFIO, 128, 131, 132, 135 Silk Route, 185 Silver Pavements, 263 Simone de Beauvoir, 243, 244 Sino-American, 154 Social, 19, 22, 23, 25, 27–29, 31, 271–273, 279, 280, 283 Social development, 145 Social exclusion, 70 Socialism, 24 Socialist, 20, 27, 30 Social media, 168 Society, 273, 280, 283, 284 Socio-economic, 280, 284 Socio-political, 207, 208, 212 South Asia, 3, 10–17, 140, 142–145, 148, 150, 152–155, 272, 274–276, 279, 286 South Asian, 257, 259, 260, 269 South Asia Region, 69 South West coast, 196 Sovereign, 213, 215, 216 Sovereignty, 246, 250 Soviet Union, 26, 29, 147 State Policy, 276 Sudhaaragriha, 215 SunaSaainlee, 207 Swaraj, 225 Swarajya, 99 T Third space, 257, 259, 260 Third-World, 269 U UN Human Rights, 120, 121 W Waz¯ır, 198, 199, 203 Weaponization, 150 Womanhood, 252 Women’s right, 276 World Bank, 3, 70, 71, 73, 75, 79 World Economic Forum, 3 Z Zakat, 16