Developing ASEAN-China relations: realities and prospects: a brief report on the ASEAN-China Forum 9789812302847, 9812302840, 9789812306258, 9812306250

Citation preview

ISEAS Report cover FA 10/7/04 9:59 PM Page 3 C

M

Y

CM

MY

CY CMY

K

Reproduced from Developing ASEAN-China Relations: Realities and Prospects -- A Brief Report on the ASEAN-China Forum (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004). This version was obtained electronically direct from the publisher on condition that copyright is not infringed. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Individual articles are available at < http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg >

DEVELOPING ASEAN-CHINA RELATIONS

Composite

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) was established as an autonomous organization in 1968. It is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia, particularly the many-faceted problems of stability and security, economic development, and political and social change. The Institute’s research programmes are the Regional Economic Studies (RES, including ASEAN and APEC), Regional Strategic and Political Studies (RSPS), and Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS). The Institute is governed by a twenty-two-member Board of Trustees comprising nominees from the Singapore Government, the National University of Singapore, the various Chambers of Commerce, and professional and civic organizations. An Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is chaired by the Director, the Institute’s chief academic and administrative officer.

00 ASEAN-China Prelims

2

7/10/04, 2:55 PM

ISEAS Report cover FA 10/7/04 9:59 PM Page 2 C

M

Y

CM

MY

CY CMY

K

DEVELOPING ASEAN-CHINA RELATIONS Realities and Prospects A Brief Report on the ASEAN-China Forum

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

Composite

First published in Singapore in 2004 by ISEAS Publications Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614 E-mail: [email protected] Website: bookshop.iseas.edu.sg All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. © 2004 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Developing ASEAN-China relations a brief report. A brief report on the proceedings of the first ASEAN-China Forum, organized by ISEAS, from 23rd to 24th June 2004 in Singapore. 1. China—Foreign relations—Asia, Southeastern—Congresses. 2. Asia, Southeastern—Foreign relations—China—Congresses. 3. Sea-power—Asia, Southeastern—Congresses. 4. National security—Asia, Southeastern—Congresses. 5. Great powers—Asia, Southeastern—Congresses. 6. China—Foreign economic relations—Asia, Southeastern—Congresses. 7. Asia, Southeastern—Foreign economic relations—China—Congresses. 8. South China Sea—Strategic aspects—Congresses. 9. Economic development projects—China—Yunnan—Congresses. 10. Chinese—Asia, Southeastern—Congresses. I. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. II. ASEAN-China Forum (1st : 2004 : Singapore) DS525.9 C5A841 2004 ISBN 981-230-284-0 Typeset by Superskill Graphics Pte Ltd Printed in Singapore by Seng Lee Press Pte Ltd

00 ASEAN-China Prelims

4

7/10/04, 2:55 PM

CONTENTS

Foreword by K. Kesavapany Session I:

Session II:

vii

Evolving Security Environment in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and Chinese Assessments

1

Role of the Other Major Powers: ASEAN and Chinese Views

10

Session III:

ASEAN-China Maritime Security Co-operation

15

Session IV:

Strengthening Co-operation in ARF: ASEAN and Chinese Views

19

ASEAN-China FTA: Co-operating for a Win-Win Situation

26

ASEAN-China FTA: The Co-operative Endeavours

32

Advancing ASEAN-China Relations: Transcending the Historical Baggage

36

Session V:

Session VI:

Session VII:

Session VIII: Strengthening East Asian Co-operation: ASEAN+3 Process

42

Programme of the ASEAN-China Forum 2004

47

List of Speakers, Discussants and Chairmen

56

00 ASEAN-China Prelims

5

7/10/04, 2:55 PM

FOREWORD

The rise of China is one of the most critical developments in the world today. Some are reflective on its meaning and implications. Others ponder over the long-term impact on the region’s security landscape while exploring security co-operation with this major power. The regional business community seeks to adjust to this change wondering how to ride the tide of benefits that can come with the creation of an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area. There will be the downside but, for the present, the focus is on the immense opportunities that will come with the rise of China. Both ASEAN and China are hoping for a win-win outcome. For better or worse, the rise of China is a development we can ill afford to ignore. To provide a comprehensive understanding of China’s rapid rise and explore the impact and implications for ASEAN, the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) organized the first ASEAN-China Forum from 23 to 24 June 2004 in Singapore. The Forum brought together more than thirty reputable experts and scholars from China and ASEAN countries. They included strategic thinkers, senior economists and policy advisers from leading research institutions and think-tanks. Among the Chinese participants were representatives from the State Council, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. HE Ong Keng Yong, ASEAN Secretary-General, delivered the keynote address on how to develop ASEAN-China relations, while Professor Cai Bingkui, PLA Major General and Vice-President of the China Institute for International Strategic Studies, delivered

00 ASEAN-China Prelims

7

7/10/04, 2:55 PM

viii

Foreword

the luncheon speech on “China’s Peaceful Development and Relations with Its East Asian Neighbours”. Issues discussed at the forum included ASEAN and China assessments of the evolving security environment in Southeast Asia; the role of other major powers; the prospects for ASEANChina maritime security co-operation; strengthening co-operation in the ARF; the proposed ASEAN-China FTA; co-operation in Human Resources Development; co-operation for Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) Development; moving beyond confidencebuilding in the South China Sea; the ethnic Chinese factor in ASEAN-China relations; and strengthening East Asian co-operation through the ASEAN+3 process. ISEAS hopes that this publication, which contains the essence of the discussions at the two-day forum, will contribute towards a greater understanding of ASEAN-China relations. I would like to acknowledge, with thanks, Professor Saw Swee Hock’s sponsorship of the Forum and the publication of the proceedings. K KESAVAPANY Director ISEAS

00 ASEAN-China Prelims

8

7/10/04, 2:55 PM

A Brief Report

1

SESSION I EVOLVING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: ASEAN AND CHINESE ASSESSMENTS In this session, the participating ASEAN and Chinese scholars assessed their regional security challenges, the rise of China, the U.S.-led war against terrorism and its military presence in Southeast Asia, and how to develop ASEAN-China strategic partnership.

ASEAN’s Internal Security Challenges The ASEAN scholar pointed out that ASEAN countries were faced with two internal challenges: the first challenge was due to the financial crisis and globalization, which had not only economic but also social, political and even cultural dimensions. The second challenge was the pressure on the new relations among the Southeast Asian countries that had come from the expansion of ASEAN’s membership from six to ten member states, which had great and different expectations out of the expanded ASEAN. These two internal challenges could be more devastating to ASEAN than any external security challenges, which, in the view of the ASEAN participant, “are in fact non-existent in the foreseeable future”. The Chinese scholar believed that security in Southeast Asia would be stable, but with some potential challenges from ASEAN’s economic instability, its domestic political and social changes, some lingering historic disputes, and terrorism. As for how to maintain ASEAN’s stability, he suggested the following:

2

Developing ASEAN-China Relations

•

stabilize the regional economy, financial system in particular, through individual countries’ readjustment of their economy and regional co-operation, such as “10+3” and “10+1”; make joint efforts to deal with terrorism and to strengthen the regional non-traditional co-operation; and develop a larger regional concept with ASEAN as a driving force economically, politically and in security.

• •

ASEAN’s External Security Challenges The ASEAN scholar viewed potential instabilities in East Asia as potential conflict across the Taiwan Strait, nuclear proliferation in the Korean Peninsula, and the nuclear stand-off between India and Pakistan. In addition, there were new threats and challenges, i.e., terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). What was most important in dealing with international terrorism was to raise the threshold against any attack in the future through regional and international co-operation in intelligence, police, immigration, financial control, and sometimes among the military, when it is needed. Efforts should be made to identify the root-causes and to win the hearts and minds of the Muslim community. In the longer term, the strategic challenges to Southeast Asia would include: • • •

coping with a rising China when it on its own right will become a “superpower”; the evolving relationship between China and Japan; and the future relationship between China and the United States.

How is the region going to cope with a rising China? The ASEAN scholar lauded China’s efforts to portray its rise as

A Brief Report

3

peaceful: “It should be even better if China would like to expand on this new paradigm and work it out into a new strategy of development, including in the security field.” He noted that historically, the rise of a new great power had always led to instability. A new paradigm, for example, the formation of an East Asian Community (EAC), is needed to help bring about the rise of a responsible and peaceful China, which would be a good thing for China and the East Asian region. As for the relationship between China and Japan, the ASEAN scholar noticed that Japan is becoming increasingly assertive while there has been a resurgence of Chinese nationalism. He believed that the normalization between the two powers was a condition for East Asia to make real progress towards deeper cooperation, especially in the political-security field. Hopefully, ASEAN could assist the normalization, especially through the process of the East Asian community building. As for the future relationship between China and the United States, he believed that potential confrontation between them could happen. If China is going to become another superpower on its own right in 20–30 years, the region could be split. On the North Korean issue, he believed that it was important for ASEAN to strongly support a non-nuclear Korean peninsula. Chinese participants generally took an approving attitude towards regional security environment and China’s relations with its East Asian neighbours, except on the Taiwan issue and China’s relations with Japan, which they attributed the current difficulties to Japan’s attitude on Taiwan and the history. As for its economic relations with Japan, they, while being positive in general, hoped that Japan would work harder with both China and Korea as equals to promote Northeast Asia economic cooperation, which would lead to an East Asia FTA instead of

4

Developing ASEAN-China Relations

intensifying the “hub and poke” effect that would cause negative trade diversion in the region.

“Peaceful Rise” of China China is aware of its neighbour’s concern of its rapid rise and tries to soothe it. Instead of using the expression of “peaceful rise”, the participating PLA major general even changed it into “peaceful development”, wherever possible, out of the concern that the word “rise” might be interpreted negatively. He mentioned that it would take “several generations for China to realize its goal of rise”, and noted that China’s development mainly depended on the expansion of its own internal market, thus opening more opportunities for its neighbours, especially ASEAN. China would welcome ASEAN into its home market and China’s rise would provide another economic drive to the region. He reiterated that China’s rise would have a positive impact on the peace, stability and development of Asia and the world. ASEAN participants noted that although there was no consensus among ASEAN countries about the impact of the rise of China, most of them preferred to “ride the Chinese wave” as best they could. They have differing views on the extent to which China could become a potential “threat”. One optimistic note was that China’s main objective in Southeast Asia was to preserve a regional security and economic environment conducive to its domestic development and regime stability. If so, this peaceful rise of China could enhance security and stability of the Southeast Asian region. However, the unease over China’s aspirations in Southeast Asia, though more muted now than it was a decade ago, remains. One ASEAN scholar said: “Interestingly, a significant part of the

A Brief Report

5

unease has less to do with how China deals with the ASEAN states as it does with China’s relationship with the other partners of ASEAN. China’s competition with Japan over economic leadership in the region and, even more, its strategic rivalry with the United States has placed the ASEAN states in an awkward situation.”

The Taiwan Issue The general feeling was that the participants agreed on the “one China” position. Taiwan should try to work within this parameter and neither Taiwan nor China should do anything that would destabilize the cross-strait situation. One ASEAN participant noted the absence of direct talks between China and Taiwan, which might cause misunderstanding. The Taiwan situation was potentially explosive because of the legacy of mistrust between Beijing and Taipei. The danger was that misinterpretation could lead to a possible military confrontation across the Taiwan Straits. Chen Shui-bian’s administration was using “salami-style” step-bystep tactics to stealthily move Taiwan towards independence. ASEAN has a vested interest in that the cross-strait situation does not spin out of control. ASEAN can use the ARF mechanism to help reduce the regional tensions over both the Korean peninsula and Taiwan. The Chinese participants noticed that ASEAN has been playing a role, albeit a minor one, on the Taiwan issue. But they felt that ASEAN had “little to do” on the Taiwan issue. They emphasized the position that China would show utmost sincerity once Taiwan clearly accepts the “One China” policy, and the cross-strait relations would be immediately improved. But China would “crush”, “at all costs”, any attempt by Taiwan for

6

Developing ASEAN-China Relations

independence. China did not want to be forced to take drastic actions and hoped that China, ASEAN and other countries would work together to keep Taiwan from making further provocations.

U.S.-Led Anti-Terrorism and Military Presence in Southeast Asia: A “Three-No” Position Chinese scholars at home are divided into positive and negative groups over enhanced U.S. military presence in Asia. However, the Chinese participants did not raise any alarm, and pointed out that the regional security threat did not mean terrorism alone. It should also include many other non-traditional security threats, against which China and ASEAN should co-operate. They questioned the U.S. notion of terrorism, which, they said, was “not clear”. The best way to deal with this threat is through multilateral co-operation. They suspected that the Bush Administration is using its anti-terrorism strategy to regain U.S. dominance in Southeast Asia. They raised three “No’s”, i.e., the current U.S. anti-terrorist military actions and presence in Southeast Asia “should not be permanent, should not be largescale, and should not change the current international relations in the region”. The Chinese participants noticed the difference between the ASEAN multi-layered approach and the U.S. military approach in dealing with regional terrorism. They pointed out that a successful anti-terrorism strategy requires non-traditional thinking, i.e. including a focus on the socio-economic conditions that provide fertile ground for breeding terrorists. ASEAN participants agreed with this point and acknowledged that there was a need to tackle the root causes. ASEAN could help moderate Muslims to reconcile Islam with economic development and

A Brief Report

7

modernization. They also noted that ASEAN does not have a united response to recent U.S. policy initiatives in Southeast Asia, e.g., the recent U.S. proposal for external Great Power involvement to ensure safety in the Straits of Malacca. Similarly, there were differences among ASEAN states regarding the U.S.led war against terrorism.

China’s National Security Strategy and Core Interests The Chinese participants defined China’s core national interest and divided its national security strategy into three levels: (1) defending its core national interests, which included ensuring domestic stability and national unity, territorial integrity, social prosperity, regional peace and stability; (2) defending its global interest, although it was quite limited at the present moment; and (3) promoting stable security relations with its neighbours. China’s basic starting point was to have a peaceful and stable regional environment that would help China’s modernization.

ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership ASEAN participants generally took an upbeat view of ASEANChina relations. They noted that ASEAN and China are tapping the opportunities and complementarities offered by each other and acting as a catalyst for one another to achieve higher development goals while maintaining peace, security and stability. Chinese foreign policy underwent changes giving way to more pragmatic and proactive strategies. The result was a more focused, nimble and engaging policy on Asia involving enhanced diplomatic,

8

Developing ASEAN-China Relations

economic, and military exchanges, and increased Chinese participation in regional and multilateral mechanisms and tactical flexibility on bilateral disputes. The signing of the Joint Declaration on the Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Bali in 2003 had elevated ASEAN-China relations to a new height. But the word “strategic” did not mean ASEAN and China were developing a defence alliance or a military pact. Both sides are determined not to characterize their relationship as exclusive and aimed against any particular country. It is based on trust, understanding, neighbourliness and a mutually beneficial, and comprehensive partnership premised on the underlying philosophy of “prosper thy neighbour”. It would also enable ASEAN to continue its dynamic relations with other dialogue partners, namely Australia, Canada, the European Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Russia and the United States. The Chinese scholars also took an optimistic view and had high expectations of the development of ASEAN-China relations. They stressed the common interests and multilateral co-operation and would like to see stability in Southeast Asia. They supported ASEAN’s enlargement and believed that it would help peace and stability in the region and they hoped to see further regional integration through institutionalization. But they pointed out some issues that might affect the smooth development, such as the deep-rooted geo-political perception of the “China Threat”, territorial disputes, economic barriers, similar exporting structures and trade markets, and competition for FDI. Echoing ASEAN’s position that the ASEAN-China strategic partnership was not exclusive, the Chinese paper-writer also noted: “China seeks to build up ‘partnerships’ with as many neighbours

A Brief Report

9

as possible”, and “maintain at least a workable relationship with all the major powers in the region (U.S., Russia, Japan, India)”.

How to Develop ASEAN-China Partnership? ASEAN participants made six proposals: (1) Intensify co-operation in the political and security arena, starting with co-operation in less sensitive non-traditional security issues while building confidence in sensitive areas; (2) Continue to promote high-level exchanges and visits, and people-to-people contacts; (3) Keep within the timelines for the realization of the ASEANChina FTA and ensure a high standard FTA as a benchmark for other FTAs being negotiated in the Asia-Pacific region; (4) Co-operate against transnational issues such as combating terrorism, communicable diseases, trafficking in drugs and women and children, and protecting the environment; (5) Collaborate in helping ASEAN integrate; (6) Co-operate in the realization of the East Asian community in the long run by actively driving the ASEAN+3 process with Japan and the Republic of Korea.

10

Developing ASEAN-China Relations

SESSION II ROLE OF THE OTHER MAJOR POWERS: ASEAN AND CHINESE VIEWS This session focused on ASEAN’s relations with other major powers such as the United States, Japan and India. The ASEAN scholar pointed out that ASEAN’s relationship with China was increasingly becoming one of its most important strategic relations, particularly over the long term. However, its relations with Japan and the United States were equally, if not more, important at present. It was commonly perceived that ASEAN’s relations with Japan and the United States were part of a strategy of balancing the increasing power of China in the region. While this concern could not be denied, it should also be pointed out that ASEAN’s relations with Japan and the United States, and certainly with China, were all part of ASEAN’s self-identification as an honest broker in regional politics with the ultimate goal of maintaining peace and stability and promoting prosperity in Southeast Asia. The Chinese scholar was convinced that ASEAN strategy was to use the competition among big powers for a regional balance of power, thus regional security, stability and prosperity. ASEAN intended to enlarge America’s and Japan’s presence and influence in Southeast Asia to balance a rising China. ASEAN countries have already reached a consensus among themselves to take U.S. military and security presence in Southeast Asia as an important and indispensable counterweight for balance of power.

ASEAN-Japan Relations The ASEAN scholar argued that the ASEAN approach towards Japan since the early 1990s has always been based on two

A Brief Report

11

considerations: pushing for greater regional economic integration with Japan taking the lead and making sure that Japan did not transform its enormous economic power into greater military capacity. Even the seemingly innocuous idea of Japan participating in peacekeeping operations overseas invited much debate within Southeast Asia. But much had changed since then. The official premise behind their current relationship was laid out in the 2003 ASEAN-Japan Plan of Action. There are three main areas of co-operation: (1) strengthening ASEAN integration; (2) enhancing ASEAN competitiveness; and (3) co-operation against transnational issues, particularly terrorism and piracy, through institutional and human capacity building with particular emphasis on law enforcement agencies. ASEAN now accepted Japan’s continued importance of economic co-operation, as always, and also its increasing prominence in security co-operation. Presently, Japan would like to pursue a more dynamic role in the region. The revival of the idea of an Asian Monetary Fund gave Japan an opportunity to push this role especially since the idea became more acceptable to the United States. Any increase in economic dynamism on the part of Japan was welcomed by the ASEAN states. However, Japan is increasingly using a regional multilateral framework to gain greater acceptance by regional partners, and more evident in the area of security co-operation. ASEAN states have generally become more relaxed about the idea of Japan becoming a political power, even a military one. The possibility of joint patrols of the Malacca Straits involving Japanese MSDF ships have been broached though the topic seemed to be a controversial one. An overlapping concern was the threat of possible conflict over the South China Sea and the potential Japanese involvement.

12

Developing ASEAN-China Relations

The increasing importance of Japan as a partner in regional security was one of the most important developments that revolve around ASEAN-Japan relations. The nature of the relationship was such that it continued to build on what was evidently growing confidence and trust. While sensitivities between China and Japan made it imperative for the ASEAN states to navigate carefully their relationship with these two powers, the institutionalization of co-operative mechanisms and the support that both China and Japan had given to the process of regionalization made the work of ASEAN easier. The Chinese scholar noted that ASEAN-Japan relations are now at a “subtle turning point”. Taking advantage of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Japan had strengthened its economic ties with, and expansion into, Southeast Asia at a wider and deeper level. Japan’s long-time investment in Southeast Asia has begun to pay huge political and strategic dividends. ASEAN countries now wanted to co-operate with Japan not only economically, but also in the political, military and security fields. Chinese participants at the Forum showed their concern. For historical reasons, China was not willing to see a re-armed Japan in Southeast Asia. China would face a new “security dilemma” if ASEAN-Japan military and security co-operation developed further.

ASEAN-U.S. Relations The ASEAN participant mentioned that the U.S.-ASEAN relationship has since 9/11 been dominated by concerns over terrorism, which called for security co-operation. The U.S. war on terror has placed the ASEAN states on a very difficult position in their relationship with the United States. While some ASEAN states valued their security relationship with the United States, others, particularly those with large Muslim populations, were

A Brief Report

13

concerned with the reaction of their citizens to the close relationship with the United States. If the United States increased its pressure, this could threaten the unity of ASEAN. He warned: “If choices are made on the basis of pragmatic considerations in the face of greater U.S. pressure, it could very well mean the break up of the association. The United States has to be careful not to foist invidious choices on ASEAN.” He noted that the rivalry between Japan and China had only served to improve ASEAN-China relations, and create the push for enhancing economic institutionalization through the ASEAN+3 process. It was the relationship between the United States and ASEAN that had the greatest potential for creating problems between China and ASEAN. U.S. relations with Taiwan, particularly the U.S. guarantee of its security, created a clear area of conflict with China. It would be a conflict, wherein having to choose between sides could be disastrous for ASEAN unity. Over the short-term, it was the balance between China and the United States that had important implications for ASEAN. ASEAN must be able to navigate its relationship with these two powers and perhaps steer them towards less confrontational situations.

ASEAN-India Relations Another ASEAN scholar explored ASEAN-India relations. He noted that the economic transaction between India and ASEAN increased significantly in the past decade, though, from the ASEAN’s viewpoint, India’s trade with ASEAN was still in its infancy. But India’s thrust is not only on economic, but also on security issues. In the past, different security perceptions kept the two sides apart. At present, there are more similarities than differences.

14

Developing ASEAN-China Relations

He noted that China and India could develop as competitors in the economic and security arenas in Southeast Asia. ASEAN must manage the two rising powers and the two major powers of the United States and Japan in such a way that they would compliment each other and learn to respect one another. Another Chinese scholar discussed Indian considerations in strengthening its relations with ASEAN. They were (1) for economic growth; (2) for stability in India’s northeastern region, especially in dealing with insurgency at the India-Myanmar border; (3) against terrorism; (4) to balance China’s growing influence; (5) for its great-power ambitions. Adding a balanced view, the Chinese scholar said: “The close India-ASEAN relations would also be in the economic, security and political interests of ASEAN, especially in the economic field. ASEAN has benefited and will still continue to benefit a lot from India’s ‘Look East’ policy. … Besides, India’s engagement (sic) will not only contribute to the security and stability of ASEAN but also facilitate the democratization process of ASEAN. … India-ASEAN mutual approach has proved to be a blessing for both sides.” Nevertheless, he pointed at the “China factor” as existing “in nearly every development of India’s ‘Look East’ strategy”, by which India hoped to “balance” China and to “ease the geographic and psychological pressure” brought about by the warming up of the China-ASEAN relations. “Economically, India wants to contest with China in the ASEAN market and to expand substantially India’s economic influence in ASEAN”. He told the Forum: “[India’s] Far Eastern Naval Command (FENC) based on the southern tip of Andaman Island in July 2001 was most likely a direct response to China’s increased influence in ASEAN countries with Burma in particular.”

A Brief Report

15

SESSION III ASEAN-CHINA MARITIME SECURITY CO-OPERATION In this session, the participating PLA strategist raised the six principles and nine forms for China-ASEAN co-operation in maritime security. He pointed out that this co-operation has fallen far behind their economic co-operation and has failed to meet the needs of the regional security situation. As for the content of maritime security co-operation, he noted that the non-traditional threat increasingly underlines the need for this co-operation. He raised the following six principles for China-ASEAN maritime security co-operation: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

mutual respect; mutual recognition of interests; mutual trust and mutual benefit; equal negotiation and co-ordination; effectiveness; and steady advancement.

The PLA paper-writer went on to explain: “All parties should take into full consideration others’ presence, interests and requirements on the basis of mutual respect.” As for the principle of “steady advancement”, he said: “On the basis of consensus, we may carry out flexible security co-operation of various forms in different fields and levels”. He proposed the following nine forms: (1) (2) (3) (4)

maritime security dialogue; consultation on shipping security; maritime anti-terrorism operations; maritime search and rescue;

16

(5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

Developing ASEAN-China Relations

building up maritime military communication channels; marine environment protection; joint law enforcement against transnational crimes; joint military exercises; and regional peace-keeping operations and humanitarian assistance.

As for the proposal of a maritime security dialogue, the PLA participant pointed out that in the absence of a regular formal mechanism of security dialogue and consultation, he supported “dialogue between governments, but through Track II, on shipping security, anti-terrorism and piracy, protection of maritime environment, maritime search and rescue and humanitarian assistance”. On the safety of international shipping, he said: “It is necessary for ASEAN and China to consult each other on how to safeguard the safety of navigation, hold multilateral special symposiums, and actively create favourable conditions for exchange of information, technical training of personnel and selective exchange of intelligence.” With regard to China-ASEAN maritime security co-operation, he said: “[China] will take maritime anti-terrorism co-operation as a major field of this co-operation. The two sides can, first of all, carry out substantive co-operation in such areas as anti-terrorism intelligence exchange, co-operation and co-ordination in handling legal cases, and deportation of suspects. These actions are to be followed by a further step, i.e., further co-operation in scenario and even real exercises.” He proposed that the principle of anti-terrorism should be “based on prevention, taking the initiative to launch an attack, coping with terrorism efficiently, and strengthening international co-operation”.

A Brief Report

17

He also called on ASEAN co-operation to build maritime military communication channels. In order to protect the maritime environment, he suggested that attention should be given not only to civilian vessels, but also to naval vessels. In discussing China-ASEAN joint law enforcement, he said: “It should be conducted on the designated sea area on the basis of consensus of respective countries, against not only transnational crimes, but also for maintaining orderly exploitation of fisheries and oil and gas, and safety of maritime navigation.” On his proposal for joint military exercises between China and ASEAN, he elaborated: “The basic objective of military exercises is to train troops, improve operational theories, and test the combat effectiveness of troops. However, the major function of maritime joint military exercises is to strengthen international military exchanges, deter hostile forces, stabilize regional situation, and promote the establishment of a favourable international order. Maritime joint military exercises may first take search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, minesweeping, and cracking down on drug trafficking as its main forms. Subsequently, we can include counter terrorism, piracy, and fighting other maritime criminal activities.” On regional peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance, he noted: “It is possible that under the request of the United Nations, the Chinese Navy will attend to necessary regional peace-keeping operations, especially some operations of humanitarian assistance.” One local participant noted that as China continued to grow, it would become increasingly dependent on imports of oil and gas, much of which would be brought in tankers via three relatively narrow Southeast Asian maritime arteries, chiefly the Straits of

18

Developing ASEAN-China Relations

Malacca. Therefore, there was increasing pressure for major East Asian economies, led by China and Japan, to gain control over natural resources, especially offshore oil and gas. He noticed the ASEAN hesitation in maritime security cooperation with China and said that this was because of potential U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan. The United States would block the sea-lane and hence disrupt China’s energy supply. Therefore, this co-operation was beyond consideration at the moment. But it might now be timely for Southeast Asian countries with significant navies to develop a programme of naval training exercises with China that included a counter-terrorism and antipiracy component. For its part, China should accept the standing invitation from the United States and Southeast Asian countries to play a bigger role in regional military co-operation exercises with a maritime dimension that increasingly focused not on defence against external attack but on peacekeeping, disaster relief and combating terrorism, piracy and other potential threats to safety and freedom of navigation. Such steps would help build confidence between Southeast Asian countries and China. The ASEAN discussant was concerned that China and ASEAN might not be equal partners in maritime security cooperation because of their power asymmetry. He therefore believed that this co-operation would be somewhat marginal. The status of U.S.-China security co-operation would be a major consideration in ASEAN’s willingness to co-operate with China on maritime security. Chinese participants showed their concern over the U.S. plan to set up a “regional maritime security centre” for maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia. In their view, there was no need to invite such a U.S. presence into the region.

A Brief Report

19

SESSION IV STRENGTHENING CO-OPERATION IN ARF: ASEAN AND CHINESE VIEWS In this session, the ASEAN speaker discussed how the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) should be strengthened, and areas where ASEAN and China could work together. He noted that given the many challenges and constraints confronting security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, the ARF had performed reasonably well. Much, however, can still be done through the ARF. The priorities, in his view, were in the area of institutionalization and capacity building, reform of organizing concepts for promoting collaborative security, norm-building, strengthening of work in the “non-traditional” sphere of security, and redressing imbalances in the ARF’s security agenda.

Strategic Constraints He elaborated the strategic factors impinging upon the ARF’s development: (1) The members of the ARF have some widely diverging security perspectives and interests. They also had different political and security cultures. (2) The “geographical footprint” of the ARF for key activities was confined to Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and Oceania, but, unfortunately, leaving out the United States (and Canada) and therefore did not conform to the realities of the strategic environment in East Asia where the United States was a key part of the equation on such issues as of Sino-American relations, the Korean problem, cross-Taiwan Strait issues,

20

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Developing ASEAN-China Relations

terrorism and WMD, where the U.S. policies needed to be scrutinized, too. There was no powerful defining and overarching conflict involving the Asia-Pacific countries like the Cold War in Europe, that impelled both sides to come together to construct a strong and institutionalized common security mechanism in the form of the CSCE/OSCE to manage and contain conflict between them. There are a number of essentially bilateral disputes, especially with regard to territory that the states concerned felt no particular compulsion or usefulness to submit to a regional multilateral mechanism for resolution. There is a number of bilateral mechanisms for security management among many countries to address essentially bilateral problems that reduced the worth and relevance of multilateral mechanisms. Suspicion and lack of trust held back the ARF from proceeding from confidence-building to its next stages of preventive diplomacy and conflict-resolution. Many developing countries are still unwilling to compromise on their sovereignty while a similar reluctance also existed in the United States, which still preferred unilateral space and relied heavily upon its bilateral alliances. China is still concerned that the ARF process would be used by the United States and like-minded states to contain it and intervene in disputes that involved its fundamental interests, such as the cross-strait problem and Tibet.

A Brief Report

21

Shortfalls Despite some successes of the ARF, shortfalls were also evident: (1) It has played no significant role in managing or resolving any of the traditional conflicts afflicting the region. It has explored non-traditional security problems more extensively, but has yet to adopt any binding substantive region-wide measure. (2) There is no full-fledged ARF Secretariat to support and organize the many ARF activities. (3) It is perceived to be less sensitive to problems in Northeast Asia. (4) It is too slow in responding to unfolding situations, because it was not organized or equipped to respond in a more timely fashion.

Proposals The ASEAN scholar made the following proposals to strengthen the ARF: (1) There is a need to build up ARF-dedicated institutional capacity either within the ASEAN Secretariat or outside it, with adequate capacity to undertake its responsibilities and the longer term vision of establishing a full-fledged ARF Secretariat, led by an ASEAN national but staffed by personnel from other countries as well. (2) The ARF should continue to be “driven” by ASEAN for the time being, until there is consensus for a Co-Chair system involving a non-ASEAN Co-Chair as well. It was suggested that the ARF start thinking about co-chairing with nonASEAN partners.

22

Developing ASEAN-China Relations

(3) The involvement of defence and security officials in the ARF process should be further upgraded, with Defence Ministers and Ministers responsible for internal security also meeting annually. Security officials should include the military and the police, and others involved in non-traditional security work as well, such as the immigration authorities. (4) To have ARF Summits, initially informally, which could be held back-to-back with the APEC Leaders Meetings. (5) To adopt the new concept of co-operative and comprehensive security, in replacement of the current “realist” approach, to underpin ARF approaches to regional security. (6) To re-visit the idea of a Pacific Concord as proposed by Russia and ASEAN-ISIS, and develop a set of norms unique to the Asia-Pacific region that would draw inspiration from the universal norms as well as from the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. (7) In addressing “non-traditional” security issues, ARF should acknowledge the inapplicability of the three-stage nomenclature, confidence-building, preventive diplomacy and conflict-resolution, and conduct activities outside this conventional framework. (8) A bold effort must be made to redress the imbalance in the ARF security agenda between non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the reduction and elimination of existing nuclear weapons. (9) Given the massive militarization underway in the region, especially on the part of the United States, it is important that the ARF address the critical issue of arms control. The Chinese scholar advocated a new and comprehensive security concept against old-fashioned realist concept. He said: “The new security challenges have brought into question traditional

A Brief Report

23

security concepts and security strategies.” “The new security concept has evolved to be multi-fold with its contents extending from military and political to economic, social, environmental, and many other areas. … Regional security problems should be solved through multilateral co-operation and comprehensive measures.” “New security situations have strongly appealed for new security concept and approaches to emerging threats and challenges. It is the ARF that represents such a call of the time and puts the perspectives of cooperative security on its agenda for security dialogue in the region.” According to some Chinese participants: “China and ASEAN have nurtured a considerable sense of common identity, and share similar values. Both sides prefer the use of informal, consultative process and emphasize the importance of inclusiveness in the process of security dialogue and co-operation. The principle of mutual trust, making gradual progress, moving at a pace comfortable to all, consensus in decision-making and noninterference in the internal affairs of member states is in conformity with China’s foreign and security policy.” They hoped that these principles would continue to “guide future ARF process”. Like the ASEAN speaker, Chinese participants also opposed the arms race. They pointed out: “Efforts to develop military strength and attempts to use military means to solve new security issues would probably lead to arms race and regional tensions.” ARF, in their view, needed to address the following issues: (1) Security co-operation for economic development: economic security was a reliable basis of political security, which in turn was a catalyst for common security. (2) Multilateral co-operation against common threat: coordination and co-operation among major countries were particularly needed in this respect.

24

Developing ASEAN-China Relations

(3) Co-ordination of multilateral processes: to have an effective co-ordination of various overlapping multilateral co-operation mechanisms. (4) Co-ordination and co-operation of big powers. (5) Balance between institution-building and issues-orientation (agreed by the Thai discussant, who stressed that institutionbuilding and issues-orientation did not conflict with each other). The Chinese participants stressed China’s New Security Concept as the “foundation” for China-ASEAN co-operation in the ARF. They emphasized that the concept of threat did not mean terrorism only, but also non-traditional threat, which the ARF should cover. They noted: “China attaches importance to the leading role played by the ARF in pushing forward regional security dialogue and co-operation. China supports the ARF in further exploring and developing dialogue and co-operation in nontraditional security field, including counter-terrorism, in gradually expanding the participation of defence officers in the ARF.” “China has consistently supported ASEAN’s status of the leading role within the ARF process.” The Chinese discussant felt that attention should be paid to non-traditional issues, and should not focus on military cooperation only. He also said that the ARF procedure could learn from the EU’s experience. But they were two different models of regional integration. Other ASEAN participants also noticed that China’s increasing confidence towards the ARF has paved the way for the ARF to bring up the sensitive South China Sea sovereignty issue for discussion. The ARF has become a regional security framework crafted and designed by ASEAN to contain threats without specifically containing any particular power.

A Brief Report

25

As for the question from the floor on why China was absent from the recent Shangri-La Dialogue, the Chinese speaker explained that it was because of Taiwan’s presence at the Dialogue and China’s absence was only temporary. However, there were some differences among ASEAN scholars regarding the proposal by the Malaysian scholar for setting up an ARF Secretariat or ARF Summit. They were concerned over potential weakening of the efficiency of the ASEAN Secretariat. They argued that ASEAN already has too many summits. If the ARF has a secretariat, ASEAN+3 would also likely ask for its own secretariat. The Chinese participants were against co-chairing because ASEAN might lose its leadership and be divided. Moreover, with two chairs, it was difficult to reach consensus.

26

Developing ASEAN-China Relations

SESSION V ASEAN-CHINA FTA: CO-OPERATING FOR A WIN-WIN SITUATION This session focused on China-ASEAN FTA (CAFTA) and economic co-operation. The scholars generally agreed that China’s economic growth was largely internally driven and could act as a driving force for economic growth of the ASEAN region. China was not only a locomotive for regional economic development, as one ASEAN scholar pointed out, “some might see it as the new locomotive of the world economy as developed countries may not be able to strive for a new source of growth so soon”. CAFTA is an important vehicle in strengthening ASEAN-China economic linkages, promoting trade, investment and the trans-border flows of goods and services. While China was ready to be liberal with offers, especially in agriculture, ASEAN needed to better synchronize its moves towards the CAFTA.

ASEAN-China Economic Co-operation The Chinese economists said that from 1990 to 2003, the average annual growth rate in trade between ASEAN and China was 20.8 per cent. In 2003, the trade achieved a record high of US$78.3 billion, with a growth rate as high as 42.9 per cent. The goal of US$100 billion might be achieved in 2004, instead of 2005 as originally scheduled. The trade structure has also improved. In 1993, the top five ASEAN exports to China were oil and fuel, wood, vegetable oils and fats, computer/machinery and electrical equipment, and the top five ASEAN imports from China were electrical equipment, computer/machinery, oil and fuel, cotton and tobacco. Compared

A Brief Report

27

with the early 1990s, the strongest growth has been in the trade of manufactured products, especially the five categories of (1) office machines and automatic data-processing machines; (2) electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances, and electrical parts; (3) telecommunications and sound-recording and reproducing apparatus and equipment; (4) petroleum, petroleum products and related materials; (5) general industrial machinery and equipment, and machine parts. The fact that these products were both the leading exports and imports of both ASEAN and China suggested the importance of intra-industry trade, brought about by product differentiation and economies of scale. Mutual investment has also expanded. From 1991 to 2000, ASEAN investment in China increased at an average annual rate of 28 per cent. In 1991, ASEAN investment in China was only US$90 million, and increased to US$26.2 billion by 2001, accounting for 6.6 per cent of total FDI utilized by China. China’s investment in ASEAN was comparatively small, but also increased sharply to US$1.1 billion by 2001, accounting for 7.7 per cent of China’s overseas investment.

Business Opportunities from China One Chinese scholar believed that China’s rapid economic growth would provide opportunities for ASEAN. China’s GDP in 2000 was one quarter of that of Japan, and one half if calculated in PPP. Some Chinese scholars expect China’s GDP to be the same as Japan’s in the next ten to fifteen years. By 2003, China had bypassed Japan and the United States as the main trading partner of many countries in this region and accounted for almost one quarter of the increase in total world trade in 2003 and passed Japan as the world’s third largest importer. In 2003, China accounted for

28

Developing ASEAN-China Relations

5.3 per cent of the total world import, and increased by 40 per cent over the previous year, the fastest growth rate among all the 30 leading importers. ASEAN’s share in China’s import had increased from the 6 per cent in 1991 to 11.46 per cent in 2003.

Business Opportunities and Investment from CAFTA It was forecast that the CAFTA would increase ASEAN’s exports to China by 48 per cent and China’s exports to ASEAN by 55 per cent. However, the Chinese economists said that this model did not reveal their exports to the whole world markets. They believed that the CAFTA would enhance their export to the world markets. The Chinese economists were optimistic that Chinese companies’ overseas investment in ASEAN would surely increase with the CAFTA and encouragement by the Chinese government. “Some Chinese companies might establish research and development centres in those technology-advanced ASEAN countries, and some might invest in natural resources development projects in those resources-abundant ASEAN countries.”

“Early Harvest” Programme The Chinese participants mentioned that China would like to make economic concessions to ASEAN states through the “early harvest” programme. China has been running a deficit in its total trade with ASEAN. But in the “early harvest” products, since 1992, except for 2000 and 2001, China had trade surpluses. If the “early harvest” programme was implemented, according to their simulation analysis, by 2006 China’s export of “early harvest” products to ASEAN would increase by US$784 to 946 million, its

A Brief Report

29

import from ASEAN would increase by US$838 to 1017 million, and China would run a trade deficit of US$125 to 157 million. The Singaporean economist provided an analysis of the overall Chinese economic performance. He argued that the whole debate over “hard” and “soft” landing of Chinese economy was completely misguided because the current economic expansion in China was led by the private sector. Several reasons were identified for the growth of China’s private sector and entrepreneurs, recognition of property rights, liberalization of the labour market, market driven prices, improved logistics infrastructure and market access and rapid urbanization. The Chinese Government acted earlier this year in a proactive way only to curb excessive investment in the public sector, primarily the state-owned enterprises, not the private sector. Excessive worry over “overheating” and “cooling down” of the Chinese economy was not justified. Going by the definition of “overheating”, he identified its symptoms, i.e., faster money supply growth relative to historical trends, rapid credit expansion, current account deficits adjusted for FDI, accelerating general inflation, rising asset prices and falling corporate profit. In the case of China, he argued that there were no such symptoms of overheating. In fact, he was of the view that the official statistics on fixed investment was overstated by 10 per cent. He argued that while the banks nonperforming loans were high, they were not yet dangerous to the economy, as China’s overall contingent liability was 81.1 per cent of GDP. The real bottlenecks in China might be due to the shortage of skilled workers. He debunked the myth that exports and FDI were the drivers of China’s economic growth. He argued that the growth was endogenously driven, due to domestic investment and

30

Developing ASEAN-China Relations

consumption boom. China’s endogenous growth was underpinned by the medium term juglar cycle of capital replacement and expansion and the long-term Kuznet cycle of demographic change and urbanization. It shared strong similarity with the early stages of Japan’s take-off such as undervalued currency and fixed currency and large inflow of FDI. A critical challenge for the Chinese economy in the coming years was “the urgent necessity to build viable, transparent, and effective public institutions that can set and enforce the rules needed for a market economy to function properly. In other words, these are the institutions needed to allow creative destruction to operate effectively with minimum disruptive impact.” One Thai participant added a note of caution. He said that it seemed like China’s economic attractiveness made ASEAN’s outlook vulnerable. Another Thai participant also cautioned: “It is, nonetheless, still too early to claim any substantive achievements for the effort at institutional consolidation [CAFTA]. The acceptance of these Chinese overtures by the ASEAN states cannot be said to be ‘wholehearted’, but guarded, in spite of their leaders’ endorsement. The economic initiatives of China cannot erase the fact that China and most of the ASEAN states are competitors in the export market.” He said that ASEAN was concerned about Chinese competition for FDI. The tension rested on a widespread perception that investors have left ASEAN for China. “Although the decline of ASEAN-bound FDI has been overstated, the perception in Southeast Asia is nevertheless that FDI to China is having a “hollow out effect” and this perception has contributed to a growing sense of threat across much of the Southeast Asian region.” But he also added that Chinese investment in ASEAN was rapidly growing and ASEAN states, especially those in

A Brief Report

31

mainland Southeast Asia, were the earliest beneficiaries of such a changing trend. “Indeed, Chinese manufacturers are actually looking at the region for production to penetrate new markets, apart from resources-based Chinese overseas investment. This trend could be a significant boost to calm down fear in Southeast Asia over losing export income and FDI to China.” He also believed that CAFTA would allow trade expansion. But he also expressed his concern: apart from non-tariff barriers in China, such a free trade area could create significant costs with regard to rules of origin and its administrative surveillance and implementation. This could cause more complications as different countries in ASEAN and perhaps China got involved in an increasing number of separate but overlapping FTAs.

32

Developing ASEAN-China Relations

SESSION VI ASEAN-CHINA FTA: THE CO-OPERATIVE ENDEAVOURS CAFTA and Shanghai’s Development Strategy The Chinese participant from Shanghai briefed the Forum on Shanghai’s business environment and development strategy: (1) The main focus was on four groups (or “bases”) of highvalue-added industries: micro-electronic industry; autoindustry; modern chemical industry; and fine steel production, while continuing to upgrade its manufacturing capability in complete sets and components. (2) Developing science and education as the basic development strategy, including human resource development (HRD), public service, and the strategy to attract the best brains from both home and abroad. (3) Building economic, trade, finance and sea transportation centres. (4) Developing its central region as a modern service centre for finance, commerce and trade, information, conferences, exhibitions and real estate, and building its suburbs and neighbouring delta area of the Yangtze River into international industrial regions. (5) Developing itself into a high-level “digital city” by 2007. (6) Enhancing infrastructure with ten projects: Yanshan deep port; Pudong international airport; Shanghai south railway station; central city rail transportation network; city highway network and bridges and tunnels across the Huangpu River.

A Brief Report

33

(7) Enhancing the ecological environment. (8) Attracting FDI and investment abroad. (9) Using the 2010 World Expo to promote overall and rapid development (10) Improving governance.

GMS Development and Co-operation The Chinese participant from China’s Yunnan Province explained China’s (Yunnan’s) GMS development strategy. The Province would use the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) co-operation as the pioneer in the CAFTA. It would focus on the areas of agriculture, mining, energy, and industry and project contracts. These would include building roadways, waterways, railways and airlines that connect Yunnan with other GMS countries. Its strategic vision was to “take high-level roadways as its basic backbone, airlines as accessories, waterways as complementary and railways as a medium/long-term foundation”. The focus is on road and waterway building, of which two were particularly important. One is the Lancang-Mekong International Shipping Route and the other is the Kunming-Bangkok Highway, Yunnan-Vietnam Highway and Yunnan-Myanmar Highway. Trade and tourism would be the leading sectors in its overall development. It would build up Kunming as the centre of commerce, manufacturing, finance, transportation, tourism as well as science, education, culture, health and service exchanges between south-western China and Southeast Asia, especially the GMS countries. It would also make the effort to develop its port cities, areas along main transportation lines, and the borders into economic centres.

34

Developing ASEAN-China Relations

It would make great efforts to build up three north-south economic corridors and a sub-regional economic zone along the Kunming-Hekou-Hanoi Highway (Yunnan-Vietnam Railway), Kunming-Bangkok Highway (Lanchang-Mekong Waterway) and Kunming-Rangoon Passage. The three economic corridors would be the Kunming-Hanoi-Hai Phong Economic Corridor, the Kunming-Bangkok Economic Corridor (also known as YunnanLaos-Thailand Economic Corridor), and Kunming-MandalayRangoon Economic Corridor (also known as Yunnan-Myanmar Economic Corridor). There are plans for five service platforms inside Yunnan: the finance platform, information platform, trade platform, platform of science, education and health, cultural platform, and a convention centre. The joint contributors of the Cambodian paper examined GMS co-operation with China. They believed that developing ASEAN-China relations was necessary for mutual benefit and hoped that their co-operation on the GMS should be based on mutual partnership, not a core and periphery relationship. They said: “China has made the GMS one of its high priorities in the region, especially with emphasis on the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) for bridging development gaps between the new members of ASEAN with their veteran counterparts, and it is for this reason that China has made many lenient trade agreements with Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV).” ASEANChina co-operation over GMS should focus on the infrastructure sector, as well as the service and human resource development sector. They were, however, concerned about overheating of China’s economy, its governance reform, and environmental and health hazards, which could very well affect regional co-operation.

A Brief Report

35

The challenges facing GMS co-operation include institutional weaknesses and inadequate financial and human resources. Structural reform should be a priority for GMS development. Previous setbacks were due to the lack of political commitment to implement structural reform, which lagged behind economic development.

36

Developing ASEAN-China Relations

SESSION VII ADVANCING ASEAN-CHINA RELATIONS: TRANSCENDING THE HISTORICAL BAGGAGE This session addressed historical baggage in ASEAN-China relations, such as the issues of the South China Sea (SCS) and the ethnic Chinese. It assessed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (hereafter cited as the Declaration). Although the Declaration does not automatically prevent conflict, it nevertheless reduces the opportunities for conflict. More significantly, although the sovereignty issue remains a sticking point, some breakthroughs on the bilateral level are worthy of note, namely, the joint development negotiations between China and the Philippines and the maritime delimitation agreement between China and Vietnam. The Forum learnt of China’s willingness to engage all parties in negotiating a binding Code of Conduct on the SCS. However, some ASEAN countries are not ready for such a Code of Conduct, fearing that it might be “too legalistic”.

The South China Sea Issue The Chinese participants were happy to see that the long-standing jurisdictional claims and territorial disputes in the SCS have yielded to the attention over comprehensive security in the region, tackling the non-traditional security issues, such as economic and environmental security; piracy; transnational crimes; and maritime terrorism. But they felt that after the 9/11 terror attack, the SCS policy of the United States has evolved “slowly but steadily” from “neutrality” to “active neutrality”, and would continue to evolve into one of “active concern”. It might be even willing to intervene

A Brief Report

37

on sovereignty issues. They were concerned over the recent U.S. attempts to station troops in the Malacca Straits. They were also studying the implications of increasing security role by both Japan and India in the SCS. China pays special attention to the Declaration, which provided ASEAN and China with a formal framework for understanding and co-operation on the SCS issue and served as a safety valve. China has no problem in making it legally binding, i.e., to have a code of conduct rather than simply a declaration as it is now. It was some ASEAN countries that are unwilling to develop the Declaration into a code of conduct. The Chinese participants criticized the continued sporadic actions and counteractions taken by the same claimants to bolster their respective claims to the disputed islands and waters in the SCS. They have a strong view over the recent Vietnam-organized boat tours to the Spratly Islands. They called it “an open violation of the spirit and word of the Declaration, poisoning the current understanding and co-operation between ASEAN and China”. They emphasized that since China signed the Declaration, not with Vietnam but with ASEAN as a group, such a violation by Vietnam should be seen as violation by ASEAN as a whole. They said: “If unchecked and unregulated, it is likely to reopen the Pandora’s Box, i.e., igniting another round of spiralling counteractions.” They proposed that a review mechanism be established, first within ASEAN and then between ASEAN and China. The speaker from the Philippines noted that the current bilateral confidence-building measures still fell short in preventing unilateral activities from taking place. Neither did the existing agreements prevent other possible triggers of conflict such as the apprehension of fishermen by foreign navies, military over-flights

38

Developing ASEAN-China Relations

by one country over the occupied territories of another, continuing upgrades of military facilities, or the presence of frigates and survey vessels in disputed areas. There have also been multilateral ASEAN-China efforts to defuse tensions, but the progress has been slow. Notably, however, ASEAN claimants have not been able to sustain solidarity on the matter of how to deal with China on the SCS issue. For that matter, tensions among the ASEAN claimants have also surged occasionally, such as between the Philippines and Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia, and Malaysia and Vietnam. The speaker described her view of the Declaration as being neither sceptical nor optimistic. She urged the parties to push forward the process beyond confidence-building into the next stage of preventive diplomacy, eventually paving the way for claimants to explore together co-operative approaches to the management of the SCS and its resources. She saw three specific provisions in the Declaration as being particularly significant. The first is an undertaking to “refrain from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features”. The second is a pledge to continue regular consultations on the observance of the Declaration. The third is that the Parties agreed to work for the eventual adoption of a code of conduct on the basis of consensus. In her view, through these three provisions, the Declaration pointed the way for the future management of the SCS disputes to go beyond confidence-building into preventive diplomacy and even conflict resolution. She suggested the following measures: (1) Freezing the status quo of occupations, and limiting the scope and nature of military presence in the disputed areas.

A Brief Report

39

(2) Implementing specific conflict prevention measures, including adjustment in the rules of engagement, and entering into bilateral incidents at sea agreements. Monitoring and verification procedures should also be in place; (3) Establishing modalities and regular structures for continuous co-ordination, consultation, and progressive agreement on other issues relating to the disputes. The first step is the early conclusion of an operationalized regional code of conduct that will be considered truly binding by all parties concerned. She believed that the construction of a true and lasting peace between China and ASEAN over the SCS must proceed by building on what little progress already made, moving with patience but with persistence to achieve “peace by pieces”. In this process, champions and believers were needed on all sides, not sceptics. An Indonesian participant noticed with satisfaction that the SCS dispute was once a source of worry, but has improved a lot with the signing of the Declaration. One Malaysian participant noted that it was important that China be willing to withdraw from its position on the “dotted lines” (supposedly demarcating its claim) in the SCS. In this regard, one Chinese participant replied that China’s SCS claim could find basis in international law as well as in history. It was difficult for China to abandon its sovereignty claim just as it was difficult for the ASEAN states. But he personally considered that those dotted lines were not territorial in nature, but only marking China’s historical rights. As for joint development in the SCS, he thought that it was easier to start co-operating between two parties instead of among five or six parties.

40

Developing ASEAN-China Relations

Ethnic Chinese Factor in ASEAN-China Relations The session also discussed China’s policy towards the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia. The ASEAN scholar noted that China has been dictated by its national interests in its policy towards Southeast Asian Chinese and has even sacrificed ethnic Chinese interests, if they had come into conflict with China’s higher priorities. China had successfully improved its relations with Southeast Asian countries while the Southeast-Asianization of ethnic Chinese in the last few decades had been quite successful. The problem faced by many ASEAN states, in fact, was not the problem of ethnic Chinese but their own indigenous minority groups. Other ASEAN participants also noted that as the concern of many ASEAN countries was predominantly economic in nature and China appeared to have been able to offer economic opportunities, the ethnic Chinese might be able to serve as a golden bridge between China and ASEAN states, provided that China would not reverse the policy towards the continued integration of the ethnic Chinese into the local societies. For the time being, the ethnic Chinese factor has not been considered as a negative factor in ASEAN-China relations. Be that as it may, one ASEAN participant also pointed out that the rise of China could bring about a resurgence of closer identification of the ethnic Chinese with China at the cost of national integration within their societies. In the past, ethnic Chinese investment in China was often considered to be at the expense of their adopted countries. Many ASEAN governments did not see the investments as purely business ventures but an expression of the ethnicity. However, with globalization and the economic crisis in Southeast Asia, the

A Brief Report

41

perception has gradually changed. China’s policy remained neutral in dealing with the ethnic Chinese issue in the ASEAN states. One test case was Beijing’s attitude towards the anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia where the major policy of non-intervention remained. One participant opined that more attention should be paid to those new Chinese migrants and their second generations, who may also have impact on China-ASEAN relations.

42

Developing ASEAN-China Relations

SESSION VIII STRENGTHENING EAST ASIAN CO-OPERATION: ASEAN+3 PROCESS The participants discussed the roles of ASEAN and China in the process of ASEAN+3. The ASEAN scholar pointed out that East Asia rode on “three waves” of socio-economic transformation towards East Asian regionalism: The first wave was the globalization that started from early 1990s and siphoned all the countries closer; the second wave was the 1997–98 Asian crisis when East Asia realized its vulnerabilities and need for regional integration; the third wave was the SARS crisis whose socioeconomic consequences made countries in this region feel closer with “a new East Asian bonding and awareness”. Domestic events in one country could affect its neighbours severely and a regional co-operative mechanism among the countries is needed. These three waves of socio-economic change have helped cement East Asian regionalism and “concretized” the ASEAN+3 framework. Three models for East Asia integration newly listed: (1) FTAs (knitting or weaving a web of existing FTAs together in the region to create a huge East Asian Free Trade Area); (2) Japan savingsbased; and (3) China-centred economic integration. With the shift from “flying geese” to “bamboo capitalism”, the Japanese model of regional integration is now called into question as production networks expanded horizontally and as the social dimension increased in the East Asian economic model. As the state-led and SME-led East Asian models “converged”, the social dimension is again highlighted, especially in post-SARS Asia today. It appeared therefore that the East Asian model is fast integrating the social dimension into its economic model, thus reducing the influence of the “pure” U.S. model, based solely on productivity and

A Brief Report

43

shareholders’ value. The ultimate “economic integration model” for East Asia, or a combination of all three integrative models in varying doses and degrees, would also need a firm social dimension. Otherwise, Asian socio-economic development, given its traditional communal base, would not be truly sustainable in the long run. Given these factors, China and ASEAN can play a key role in shaping this integrative economic model. The strategic convergence of interests between ASEAN and China is obvious at this stage, thus guaranteeing their respective key roles in “driving” ASEAN+3 forward, at least in the foreseeable future. ASEAN needed ASEAN+3 for at least three principal reasons, namely: (1) A bigger and more diversified market for ASEAN to stimulate growth; (2) A new challenge for “laggard” countries within ASEAN to enhance their own national competitiveness through reforms via a bigger and liberalized market; (3) A new impetus in crisis and HRD management. On the other hand, China realized that it needed a peaceful regional environment and external stability in order to develop itself internally and had thus embarked on supporting the ASEAN initiative of creating a viable ASEAN+3 to “balance” America and Europe. China needed ASEAN, and ASEAN too needed China to succeed in their own development; this mutual convergence of interests in fact constituted China’s and ASEAN’s driving force for ASEAN+3 as East Asia’s emerging regionalism. This driving force of “mutual interests” should propel ASEAN+3 forward as the main pillar of East Asian regionalism. The Indonesian participant added that East Asian Community building started with ASEAN+3 co-operation, could be the critical

44

Developing ASEAN-China Relations

regional institution to assist in achieving the three strategic objectives for the security of the region in the longer term: (1) To absorb a great power such as China in a regional institution and therefore strengthening the new paradigm of China, namely the peaceful rise of China. (2) To assist in the normalization of China-Japan relations and make the East Asian region much more conducive for peace and stability. (3) To help to prevent in the longer term a China-U.S. confrontation, especially if China is going to become a real great power in the next 20-30 years. One Malaysian participant pointed out that the East Asian Community (EAC) can be based on the principles of mutual benefit, trust, and common interests and supported by three pillars: political will, active involvement of the business community, and engagement of civil society. ASEAN and China have played key roles in fostering greater regional co-operation and integration. It is important to build on the goodwill that has been created over the past few years. ASEAN participants also noted that while market forces would remain fundamental in bringing about a de facto East Asian Community, it is the exercise of political will and a real sense of community and commonality in East Asia that will actualise a “common East Asian house”. To the suggestion that ASEAN should drop the pretence of the ASEAN+3 process and called it the East Asian Community instead, a response from the floor was who would then be the driver of such a community. ASEAN must remain in the driver’s seat. The Chinese scholar believed that with the challenge by the two trade blocs in Europe and North America, East Asia should

A Brief Report

45

expand intra-regional markets by relying on regional economic integration. He said that in 2003 the Development Research Centre (DRC) of the State Council of the PRC used the computable general equilibrium model (CGE) to make simulation analyses of the effects of China-ASEAN FTA (CAFTA), China-Japan-Korea FTA (CJKFTA) and East Asia FTA (EAFTA) on the various countries against their baseline scenario. It ascertained that CAFTA could boost the economic growth of each other and add to their welfare gains. Compared with the baseline scenario, the GDP of ASEAN could grow by 1.95 per cent ($50 billion), China by 0.78 per cent ($22.3 billion) in terms of overall welfare increases. As for CJKFTA, by adopting the same model, a tri-party joint research came to the following conclusion. First of all, China, Japan and Korea could all benefit from the CJKFTA, which would produce a win-win situation. Secondly, the economic effects or welfare gains out of any bilateral FTA among the three countries could be less remarkable than the CJKFTA. And any bilateral FTA could make the excluded country sustain great losses because of the trade diversion effect. Thirdly, if the CJKFTA was established, benefits brought about by the capital aggregation effect (including the FDI) could be much higher than the static efficiency benefits from trade liberalization. As for EAFTA, the GDP of all its members could increase faster, about 4.0 per cent for ASEAN, 3.4 per cent for both China and Korea. Although Japan might have a GDP growth of 0.8 per cent, yet owing to its huge economic aggregation, its absolute welfare was larger than the others. The conclusion was drawn that “if China, Japan and Korea establish bilateral free trade relationships with ASEAN or certain ASEAN members respectively, while the three countries themselves fail to boost mutual co-operation and co-ordination,

46

Developing ASEAN-China Relations

each country can only derive limited benefits, and will be unable to play an active role in the trade liberalization process in East Asia. Therefore, speeding up the establishment of a free trade relationship among China, Japan and Korea is of great significance to the East Asian regional economic integration.” The Chinese participants stressed on institutionalization of this regional economic integration to avoid another APEC-like forum in Asia. They emphasized that China does not want to compete with Japan for leadership in the East Asia FTA. On the contrary it wants Japan to play a very important role in the regional integration. They also stressed that ASEAN and China should go beyond their CAFTA into an East Asia FTA, and then to a new Pan-Asia FTA or even a Pan-Asia Economic Community that should cover the East Asian countries as well as Australia, New Zealand and India.

PROGRAMME

ASEAN-CHINA FORUM 2004 “DEVELOPING ASEAN-CHINA RELATIONS: REALITIES AND PROSPECTS” 23–24 June 2004 Mandarin Ballroom, 6th Floor, South Tower Meritus Mandarin Hotel Singapore

Wednesday, 23 June 2004 8.30 am – 9.00 am

Registration

9.00 am – 9.10 am

Opening Remarks Professor WANG Gungwu Chairman, Board of Trustees, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies; and Director, East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore

9.10 am – 9.40 am

Keynote Address HE ONG Keng Yong Secretary-General of ASEAN, The ASEAN Secretariat Topic: “Securing a Win-Win Partnership for ASEAN and China”

9.40 am – 10.10 am

Reception

10.10 am – 11.30 am SESSION I:

Chairperson:

02 ASEAN-China Prog

47

EVOLVING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: ASEAN AND CHINESE ASSESSMENTS Mr K KESAVAPANY Director, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

7/10/04, 2:56 PM

48

11.30 am – 1.00 pm

02 ASEAN-China Prog

Developing ASEAN-China Relations

Paperwriter:

Mr Jusuf WANANDI Co-founder and Member, Board of Trustees; and Senior Fellow, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta

Discussant:

Professor REN Xiao Senior Fellow and Director, Department of Asia Pacific Studies, Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS), Shanghai

Paperwriter:

Professor HAN Feng Deputy Director, Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Beijing

Discussant:

Professor Amitav ACHARYA Deputy Director and Head of Research, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

SESSION II:

ROLE OF THE OTHER MAJOR POWERS: ASEAN AND CHINESE VIEWS

Chairperson:

Professor CAI Bingkui PLA Major General and Vice-Chairman, China Institute for International Strategic Studies, Beijing

Paperwriters:

Professor HU Shisheng Director, Institute of Asia-Africa Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), Beijing

48

7/10/04, 2:56 PM

Programme

49

Associate Professor Chulacheeb CHINWANNO Head, Department of International Relations, Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, Bangkok Mr Herman Joseph S KRAFT Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines Professor CAO Yunhua Director, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Jinan University, Guangzhou 1.00 pm – 2.15 pm

Lunch

2.15 pm – 3.45 pm

SESSION III:

ASEAN-CHINA MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION

Chairperson:

Associate Professor Robert C BECKMAN Vice-Dean (Academic Affairs), Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore

Paperwriter:

Professor WANG Zhongchun PLA Senior Colonel and Deputy Director, Teaching and Research Division for Foreign Officer Students, National Defense University of PLA, Beijing

Discussant:

Mr MAK Joon Num Visiting Research Fellow, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

Paperwriter:

Mr Michael RICHARDSON Visiting Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

02 ASEAN-China Prog

49

7/10/04, 2:56 PM

50

Developing ASEAN-China Relations

Discussant:

Professor GAO Zhiguo Executive Director, China Institute for Marine Affairs (CIMA), State Oceanic Administration (SOA), Beijing

3.45 pm – 4.00 pm

Tea

4.00 pm – 5.30 pm

SESSION IV:

STRENGTHENING COOPERATION IN ARF: ASEAN AND CHINESE VIEWS

Chairperson:

Professor Amitav ACHARYA Deputy Director and Head of Research, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Paperwriter:

Professor LIU Xuecheng Director, Department of American Studies, China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing

Discussant:

Dr Kusuma SNITWONGSE Chairperson, Advisory Board, Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS), Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok

Paperwriter:

Dato’ MOHAMED JAWHAR Hassan Director-General, Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Kuala Lumpur

02 ASEAN-China Prog

50

7/10/04, 2:56 PM

Programme

51

Discussant:

7.00 pm

Professor HAN Feng Deputy Director, Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Beijing

Dinner Cruise

Thursday, 24 June 2004 9.00 am – 10.30 am

SESSION V:

ASEAN-CHINA FTA: COOPERATING FOR A WIN-WIN SITUATION

Chairperson:

Professor John WONG Research Director, East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore ASEAN-China FTA: Opportunities, Modalities and Prospects

Paperwriters:

Dr SHEN Danyang Vice President, Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation (CAITEC), Ministry of Commerce, Beijing Associate Professor Suthiphand CHIRATHIVAT Dean, Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok

02 ASEAN-China Prog

51

7/10/04, 2:56 PM

52

Developing ASEAN-China Relations

ASEAN-China FTA: Business Environment and Opportunities in China Paperwriters:

Dr Yuwa HEDRICK-WONG Economic Advisor, MasterCard International, Singapore (On “Business Environment and Opportunities in China”) Professor ZHANG Youwen Director, Institute of World Economy, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (On “Business Environment and Opportunities in Shanghai”)

10.30 am – 10.45 am Coffee 10.45 am – 12.30 pm SESSION VI:

Chairperson:

ASEAN-CHINA FTA: THE COOPERATIVE ENDEAVOURS Professor SAW Swee Hock Professorial Fellow, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies ASEAN-China Technical Cooperation and Business Opportunities

Presenters:

Mr Robert CHUA Hian Kong Director, Technical Cooperation Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore Mr WANG Yongli Counsellor, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China, Singapore

02 ASEAN-China Prog

52

7/10/04, 2:56 PM

Programme

53

ASEAN-China Cooperation for Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) Development Paperwriters:

Professor HE Shengda Visiting Professorial Fellow, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Mr SISOWATH D Chanto/ Dr KAO Kim Hourn Deputy Executive Director/ Executive Director, Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP), Phnom Penh

12.30 pm – 2.00 pm Lunch

Luncheon Speaker: Professor CAI Bingkui PLA Major General and Vice-Chairman, China Institute for International Strategic Studies, Beijing Topic: “China’s Peaceful Development and Relations with Its East Asian Neighbours”

2.00 pm – 3.30 pm

SESSION VII:

ADVANCING THE ASEAN-CHINA RELATIONS: TRANSCENDING THE HISTORICAL BAGGAGE

Chairperson:

Mr K KESAVAPANY Director, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Moving Beyond ConfidenceBuilding in the South China Sea

Paperwriters:

02 ASEAN-China Prog

53

Professor GAO Zhiguo Executive Director, China Institute for Marine Affairs (CIMA), State Oceanic Administration (SOA), Beijing

7/10/04, 2:56 PM

54

Developing ASEAN-China Relations

Associate Professor Aileen S P BAVIERA Dean, Asian Center, University of the Philippines, Diliman Ethnic Chinese Factor in ASEANChina Relations Paperwriter:

Dr Leo SURYADINATA Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

Discussant:

Associate Professor LIU Hong Assistant Dean, Research and Graduate Studies, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, National University of Singapore

3.30 pm – 3.45 pm

Tea

3.45 pm – 5.15 pm

SESSION VIII: STRENGTHENING EAST ASIAN COOPERATION: ASEAN+3 PROCESS Chairperson:

Dr OW Chin Hock Visiting Senior Fellow, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

Paperwriters:

Professor ZHANG Xiaoji Director-General, Research Department of Foreign Economic Relations, Development Research Center of the State Council, Beijing Dr Eric TEO Chu Cheow Council Secretary, Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA)

02 ASEAN-China Prog

54

7/10/04, 2:56 PM

Programme

55

Discussants:

Dato’ Dr Michael YEOH Chief Executive Officer/Director, Asian Strategy & Leadership Institute (ASLI), Kuala Lumpur Associate Professor Chulacheeb CHINWANNO Head, Department of International Relations, Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, Bangkok

5.15 pm – 5.30 pm

02 ASEAN-China Prog

Closing Remarks Mr K KESAVAPANY Director, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

55

7/10/04, 2:56 PM

56

Developing ASEAN-China Relations

LIST OF SPEAKERS, DISCUSSANTS AND CHAIRMEN

1.

Professor Amitav ACHARYA Deputy Director and Head of Research Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Nanyang Technological Univesity South Spine 4, Level B4 Nanyang Avenue Singapore 639798 Tel: (65) 6790-6213 Fax: (65) 6793-2991 Email: [email protected]

2.

Associate Professor Aileen S P BAVIERA Dean Asian Center University of the Philippines Romulo Hall, Guerrero cor Magsaysay St Diliman, Quezon City 1101 Philippines Tel/Fax: (63-2) 927-0909 Email: [email protected]; [email protected]

3.

Associate Professor Robert C BECKMAN Vice Dean (Academic Affairs) Faculty of Law National University of Singapore Dean’s Office, Level 3 13 Law Link Singapore 117590 Tel: (65) 6874-3601 Fax: (65) 6776-3601 Email: [email protected]

02 ASEAN-China Prog

56

7/10/04, 2:56 PM

List of Speakers, Discussants and Chairmen

57

4.

Professor CAI Bingkui PLA Major General and Vice-Chairman China Institute for International Strategic Studies No. 6 Hua Yan Bei Li Chaoyang District, Beijing 100029 People’s Republic of China Tel: (86-10) 6201-6943 Fax: (86-10) 6202-1048 Email: [email protected]

5.

Professor CAO Yunhua Director Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Jinan University Guangzhou 510632 People’s Republic of China Tel: (86-20) 8522-0292 Fax: (86-20) 8522-6122 Email: [email protected]; [email protected]

6.

Dr CHIN Kin Wah Senior Fellow Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614 Tel: (65) 6778-0955 Fax: (65) 6775-6264 Email: [email protected]

7.

Associate Professor Chulacheeb CHINWANNO Head Department of International Relations Faculty of Political Science Thammasat University Prachan Road Bangkok 10200 Thailand Tel: (66-2) 613-2314 Fax: (66-2) 224-1406 Email: [email protected]

02 ASEAN-China Prog

57

7/10/04, 2:56 PM

58

Developing ASEAN-China Relations

8.

Associate Professor Suthiphand CHIRATHIVAT Dean Faculty of Economics Chulalongkorn University Phayathai Road, Patumwan Bangkok 10330 Thailand Tel/Fax: (66-2) 218-6295 Email: [email protected], [email protected]

9.

Mr Robert CHUA Hian Kong Director Technical Cooperation Directorate Ministry of Foreign Affairs Tanglin Singapore 248163 Tel: (65) 6379-8450 Fax: (65) 6379-8488 Email: [email protected]

10.

Professor GAO Zhiguo Executive Director China Institute for Marine Affairs (CIMA) State Oceanic Administration (SOA) # Fuxingmenwai Avenue Beijing 100860 People’s Republic of China Tel: (86-10) 6802-2137 Fax: (86-10) 6803-0767 Email: [email protected], [email protected]

11.

Professor HAN Feng Deputy Director Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) 3 Zhaongzizhong Lu Beijing 100007 People’s Republic of China Tel: (86-10) 6403-9039 Fax: (86-10) 6406-3041 Email: [email protected]

02 ASEAN-China Prog

58

7/10/04, 2:56 PM

List of Speakers, Discussants and Chairmen

59

12.

Professor HE Shengda Visiting Professorial Fellow Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614 Tel: (65) 6778-0955 Fax: (65) 6775-6264 Email: [email protected]

13.

Dr Yuwa HEDRICK-WONG Economic Advisor, Asia/Pacific MasterCard International 152 Beach Road #35-00 The Gateway East Singapore 189721 Tel: (65) 6390-5975 Fax: (65) 6296-8259 Email: [email protected]

14.

Professor HU Shisheng Institute of Asia-Africa Studies China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations A-2 Wanshousi, Haidian Beijing 100081 People’s Republic of China Tel: (86-10) 8854-7723 Fax: (86-10) 6841-8641 Email: [email protected]

15.

Mr K KESAVAPANY Director Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614 Tel: (65) 6778-0955 Fax: (65) 6778-1735 Email: [email protected]

02 ASEAN-China Prog

59

7/10/04, 2:56 PM

60

Developing ASEAN-China Relations

16.

Mr Herman Joseph S KRAFT Assistant Professor Department of Political Science University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City 1101 Philippines Tel: (63-2) 920-7246 Fax: (63-2) 924-4875 Email: [email protected]

17.

Associate Professor LIU Hong Assistant Dean Research and Graduate Studies Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences National University of Singapore AS7/03-35, 5 Arts Link Singapore 117570 Tel: (65) 6874-5066 Fax: (65) 6779-4167 Email: [email protected]

18.

Professor LIU Xuecheng Director Department of American Studies China Institute of International Studies Ministry of Foreign Affairs 3 Toutiao, Taijichang Beijing 100005 People’s Republic of China Tel: Fax: (86-10) 6512-3744 Email: [email protected]

19.

Mr MAK Joon Num Visiting Research Fellow Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614 Tel: (65) 6778-0955 Fax: (65) 6775-6264 Email: [email protected]

02 ASEAN-China Prog

60

7/10/04, 2:56 PM

List of Speakers, Discussants and Chairmen

61

20.

Dato’ MOHAMED JAWHAR Hassan Director-General Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) No. 1, Pesiaran Sultan Salahuddin P O Box 12424 50778 Kuala Lumpur Malaysia Tel: (02-03) 2693-9366 Ext 105 Fax: (02-03) 2697-7266 Email: [email protected]

21.

HE ONG Keng Yong Secretary-General of ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Secretariat 70A Jln Sisingamangaraja Jakarta 12110 Indonesia Tel: (62-21) 724-3340 Fax: (62-21) 724-3348 Email: [email protected]

22.

Dr OW Chin Hock Visiting Senior Fellow Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614 Tel: (65) 6778-0955 Fax: (65) 6775-6264 Email: [email protected]

23.

Professor REN Xiao Senior Fellow and Director Department of Asia Pacific Studies Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS) No. 1, Lane 845, Julu Road Shanghai 200040 People’s Republic of China Tel: (86-21) 5403-2537 Fax: (86-21) 5403-0272 Email: [email protected]

02 ASEAN-China Prog

61

7/10/04, 2:56 PM

62

Developing ASEAN-China Relations

24.

Mr Michael RICHARDSON Visiting Senior Research Fellow Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614 Tel: (65) 6778-0955 Fax: (65) 6775-6264 Email: [email protected]

25.

Professor SAW Swee Hock Professorial Fellow Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614 Tel: (65) 6778-0955 Fax: (65) 6775-6264

26.

Dr SHEN Danyang Vice President Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation (CAITEC) Ministry of Commerce 28 Donghouxiang, Andingmen Wai Beijing 100710 People’s Republic of China Tel: (86-10) 6425-4949 Fax: (86-10) 6421-2175 Email: [email protected]

27.

Dr SHENG Lijun Senior Fellow Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614 Tel: (65) 6778-0955 Fax: (65) 6775-6264 Email: [email protected]

02 ASEAN-China Prog

62

7/10/04, 2:56 PM

List of Speakers, Discussants and Chairmen

63

28.

Mr SISOWATH D Chanto Deputy Executive Director and Research Fellow Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP) Government Palace Compound (CDC) P O Box 1007, Phnom Penh Cambodia Tel/Fax: (855-23) 219-728 Email: [email protected]; [email protected]

29.

Dr Kusuma SNITWONGSE Chairperson, Advisory Board Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS) Chulalongkorn University Prajadhipok-Rambhaibarni Building, 5th Floor Phya Thai Road, Bangkok 10330 Thailand Tel: (66-2) 218-7432 Fax: (66-2) 254-0119 Email: [email protected]; [email protected]

30.

Dr Leo SURYADINATA Senior Research Fellow Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614 Tel: (65) 6778-0955 Fax: (65) 6775-6264 Email: [email protected]

31.

Dr Eric TEO Chu Cheow Council Secretary Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA) c/o Savoir Faire Corporate Consultants 91 Tanglin Road #02-01 Singapore 247918 Tel: (65) 6238-3481 Fax: (65) 6235-1255 Email: [email protected]

02 ASEAN-China Prog

63

7/10/04, 2:56 PM

64

Developing ASEAN-China Relations

32.

Mr Jusuf WANANDI Co-founder and Member, Board of Trustees; and Senior Fellow Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Jalan Tanah Abang III/23-27 Jakarta 10160 Indonesia Tel: (62-21) 380-9640 Fax: (62-21) 380-9641 Email: [email protected]

33.

Professor WANG Gungwu Chairman, ISEAS Board of Trustees; and Director, East Asian Institute National University of Singapore AS5, Level 4 7 Arts Link Singapore 116571 Tel: (65) 6775-2033 Fax: (65) 6779-3409 Email: [email protected]

34.

Mr WANG Yongli Counsellor for Education Embassy of the People’s Republic of China 150 Tanglin Road Singapore 247969 Tel: (65) 6418-0235 Fax: (65) 6418-0454 Email: [email protected]

35.

Professor WANG Zhongchun PLA Senior Colonel and Deputy Director Teaching and Research Division for Foreign Officers Students National Defense University of PLA No. 8, Gate 8, Apartment A15 Fuxinglu Road 83, Haidian District Beijing 100856 People’s Republic of China Fax: (86-10) 6970-9464 Email: [email protected]

02 ASEAN-China Prog

64

7/10/04, 2:56 PM

List of Speakers, Discussants and Chairmen

65

36.

Professor John WONG Research Director East Asian Institute National University of Singapore Blk AS5 Level 4 7 Arts Link Singapore 117571 Tel: (65) 6874-3708 Fax: (65) 6779-3409 Email: [email protected]

37.

Dato’ Dr Michael YEOH Chief Executive Officer/Director Asian Strategy and Leadership Institute (ASLI) 1718 Jalan Ledang Off Jalan Duta 50480 Kuala Lumpur Malaysia Tel: (02-03) 2093-5728 Fax: (02-03) 2093-4178 Email: [email protected]

38.

Professor ZHANG Xiaoji Director-General Research Department of Foreign Economic Relations Development Research Center of the State Council #225 Chaonei Street Beijing 100010 People’s Republic of China Tel: (86-10) 6523-5537 Fax: (86-10) 6523-6060 Email: [email protected]

39.

Professor ZHANG Youwen Director Institute of World Economy Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences 622-7 Huaihai Road (M) Shanghai 200020 People’s Republic of China Tel: (86-21) 5306-9286 Fax: (86-21) 5306-3814 Email: [email protected]

02 ASEAN-China Prog

65

7/10/04, 2:56 PM

66

Developing ASEAN-China Relations

Rapporteurs: 40.

Ms GE Juan Research Assistant Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614 Tel: (65) 6778-0955/6870-4553 Fax: (65) 6775-6264 Email: [email protected]

41.

Ms Maghaisvarei SELLAKUMARAN Research Associate Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614 Tel: (65) 6778-0955/6870-4545 Fax: (65) 6775-6264 Email: [email protected]

42.

Mr TEO Kah Beng Intern Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614 Tel: (65) 6778-0955 Fax: (65) 6775-6264 Email: [email protected]

02 ASEAN-China Prog

66

7/10/04, 2:56 PM