Deterrence: Concepts And Approaches For Current And Emerging Threats 3030293661, 9783030293666, 9783030293673

Table of contents :
Introduction......Page 6
References......Page 8
Contents......Page 10
About the Contributors......Page 12
1 Introduction......Page 15
2 Deterrence as a Foreign Policy and Conflict Resolution Tool......Page 16
3 Symmetry and Asymmetry......Page 18
4 Negative and Limited vs Positive and Broader Deterrence in Conflict Resolution......Page 20
5 Engaging, Influencing, Deterring: Influencing and Controlling Behaviour......Page 22
6 Communicating in an Effective Manner: The Importance of a Clear ‘Indirect’ Message......Page 25
7 The Psychological Element......Page 28
8 Fine Balances: Pragmatism and the Best Option Available......Page 29
9 Conclusion: Limits and Strengths of Deterrence......Page 30
References......Page 31
1 Deterrence and Resilience Are Contrasting Cornerstones of Security......Page 33
2 Deterrence and Resilience as Risk Approaches......Page 36
2.1 Rationality in Deterrence and Resilience Frameworks......Page 37
2.2 Deterrence and Resilience Frameworks and Systems Thinking......Page 40
3.1 Areas of Complementarity......Page 42
3.2 Areas of Mismatch or Divergence – The Significance of Change and Transformation in Deterrence and Resilience Theories......Page 43
References......Page 45
1 Introduction......Page 48
2.2 Deterrence and the Avoidance of Threat......Page 49
2.3 Diplomacy......Page 50
2.5 Diplomacy, Intelligence and Deterrence......Page 52
2.6 Dignity, Diplomacy and Deterrence......Page 54
3 End of Victory and Weakening of Deterrence......Page 55
4 Diplomacy and Avoidance of Conflict......Page 57
5 Relationship Between Deterrence and Diplomacy......Page 59
6 Crisis of Deterrence and Diplomacy......Page 60
7 Emerging Challenges......Page 61
7.1 Hybrid Warfare......Page 63
8 Diplomacy of Nuclear Deterrence: A Forgotten Art......Page 64
9 Conclusions......Page 66
References......Page 67
1 Introduction......Page 70
2 The Evolution of Nuclear Deterrence Theory During the Cold War......Page 71
2.1 The First Wave......Page 72
2.2 The Second Wave and the Rise of Arms Control......Page 73
2.3 The Third Wave......Page 75
3 The Logic Behind Nuclear Superiority......Page 76
4 Nuclear Deterrence After the Cold War......Page 77
4.1 The Second Nuclear Age......Page 78
4.1.1 Nuclear Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age......Page 79
5.1 Warfighters Ascendant: Ballistic Missile Defenses Unleashed......Page 80
5.2 Cyber, Artificial Intelligence and Social Media......Page 82
6 The Return of Great Power Competition and the Disarmament Dilemma......Page 84
7 Conclusion: The Way Forward......Page 85
References......Page 86
1 Introduction......Page 89
2.1 Defining WMD......Page 90
2.2 Nuclear Weapons......Page 91
2.4 Biological Weapons......Page 92
3.1 Traditional Notions of Deterrence......Page 93
3.2 Understanding Stigma......Page 94
4 Historical Context: Prior to World War 1: The Morality Debate: Weapons of Mass Destruction......Page 95
5 The Impact of World War 1: Disarmament Talk: Chemical and Biological Condemnation......Page 96
5.1 League of Nations: Temporary Mixed Commission......Page 98
5.2 Chemical Weapons: (A New and Terrible Weapon)......Page 99
6 Stigmatising Deterrence: The Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Cold War......Page 100
6.1 Nuclear Weapons......Page 101
6.3 The United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) 1946......Page 102
7 The Significance of the WMD Stigma: Stigmatising Deterrence......Page 104
8 Conclusion......Page 105
References......Page 106
1 Introduction......Page 109
3 Programmes Carefully Designed Through Legislation......Page 110
4 The Risks and Impact of Overreaction in Deterring Violent Extremists......Page 112
5 Deterring Violent Extremism......Page 114
6 Degrees of Commitment and Action and the Search for a Fitting Approach......Page 118
7 Negative and Limited vs Positive and Broader Deterrence......Page 120
8 Engaging, Influencing, Deterring: The Role of Narrative......Page 122
9 Conclusion......Page 123
References......Page 124
1 Introduction......Page 127
2 Genesis of an Addiction and Initial Use......Page 128
3 Abuse......Page 129
4 Tolerance......Page 130
5 Dependence......Page 131
6 Prognosis......Page 134
7 Conclusion......Page 137
References......Page 138
1 Introduction......Page 140
2 Third-Party Amplification......Page 142
4 The Authors of Destiny: Hezbollah and Al Manar as Power Holders......Page 144
5 The Words Sacred, Glorious, and Sacrifice and the Expression in Vain Hemmingway (1929)......Page 145
6 Tacit Acceptance of the False Dilemma......Page 148
7 What Happens to a Dream Deterred? Hughes (1951)......Page 149
References......Page 150
1 Introduction......Page 151
2 Contentious Politics and Social Movements......Page 152
3 Deterrence and Social Control......Page 155
4 Deterring Environmental Activism in New Zealand......Page 157
5 Conclusion......Page 162
References......Page 163
1 Introduction......Page 166
2 Power and Deterrence......Page 168
3 State, Nation, and Migration......Page 169
4 Deterrence in Migration Policies: The Case of the U.S.......Page 172
5 Outcomes of Migration Deterrence in the United States......Page 178
6 Conclusions......Page 180
References......Page 182
1 Introduction......Page 186
References......Page 197

Citation preview

Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications

Anastasia Filippidou Editor

Deterrence Concepts and Approaches for Current and Emerging Threats

Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications Series editor Anthony J. Masys, Associate Professor, Director of Global Disaster Management, Humanitarian Assistance and Homeland Security, University of South Florida, Tampa, USA Advisory Editor Gisela Bichler, California State University, San Bernardino, CA, USA Thirimachos Bourlai, West Virginia University, Statler College of Engineering and Mineral Resources, Morgantown, WV, USA Chris Johnson, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK Panagiotis Karampelas, Hellenic Air Force Academy, Attica, Greece Christian Leuprecht, Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, ON, Canada Edward C. Morse, University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA David Skillicorn, Queen's University, Kingston, ON, Canada Yoshiki Yamagata, National Institute for Environmental Studies, Tsukuba, Ibaraki, Japan

The series Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications comprises interdisciplinary research covering the theory, foundations and domain-specific topics pertaining to security. Publications within the series are peer-reviewed monographs and edited works in the areas of: –   biological and chemical threat recognition and detection (e.g., biosensors, aerosols, forensics) –  crisis and disaster management –  terrorism –  cyber security and secure information systems (e.g., encryption, optical and photonic systems) –  traditional and non-traditional security –  energy, food and resource security –  economic security and securitization (including associated infrastructures) –  transnational crime –  human security and health security –  social, political and psychological aspects of security –  recognition and identification (e.g., optical imaging, biometrics, authentication and verification) –  smart surveillance systems –  applications of theoretical frameworks and methodologies (e.g., grounded theory, complexity, network sciences, modelling and simulation) Together, the high-quality contributions to this series provide a cross-disciplinary overview of forefront research endeavours aiming to make the world a safer place. The editors encourage prospective authors to correspond with them in advance of submitting a manuscript. Submission of manuscripts should be made to the Editorin-Chief or one of the Editors More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/5540

Anastasia Filippidou Editor

Deterrence Concepts and Approaches for Current and Emerging Threats

Editor Anastasia Filippidou Oxfordshire, UK

ISSN 1613-5113     ISSN 2363-9466 (electronic) Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications ISBN 978-3-030-29366-6    ISBN 978-3-030-29367-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29367-3 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Introduction

Deterrence plays an important role in justifying, influencing, and shaping strategic thinking and practices, significantly affecting contemporary political rhetoric. Consequently, deterrence has become an important way of addressing current and emerging challenges. Through the examination of different themes and case studies, this book aims to provide an in-depth analysis of the concept of deterrence and its utility in dealing effectively with threats. Although the broader concept of deterrence can be placed in antiquity, in modern times and in its traditional form, deterrence is seen predominantly as the product of the Cold War, which transformed ‘narrow’ deterrence approaches into widespread orthodoxy. Increasingly, however, emerging threats and challenges called into question the traditional concept of deterrence. There are many elements that challenge the concept of deterrence and its effectiveness. For instance, it is not just that the concept can be ambiguous and broad, but also there have to be a number of conditions for deterrence to be implemented, and to stand a chance of success. Deterrence, for example, is contextual and situational, and it is not just located in human behaviour, because if this were the case, the expectation then would be to witness the same patterns of behaviour among different countries. The very fact that the English word for ‘deterrence’ cannot be easily translated into other languages suggests that deterrence is not the outcome of a neutral language, but the result of a social process (Lupovici 2010: 717–718). In reality, and as the case studies in this book demonstrate, the variation of effectiveness of deterrence in different countries implies that a number of factors play a role in shaping the deterring and deterred behaviour. Highlighting further the complex nature of deterrence, not only do culture and identity influence and shape deterring policies, but also vice versa deterring measures can influence the culture and identity of the actors who adopt them (Stein 2000: 21–22). For these reasons, deterrence is dependent upon ongoing processes, and thus has to be adjustable and adaptable. Another indication of the ambiguity of the concept of deterrence, for example, is that deterrence policies can act as a delaying mechanism in dealing effectively with an opponent, in which case the aim would be to contain a conflict and the focus is zero-sum, and more short term. On the other hand, deterrence can have the role of a proactive mechanism in dealing with a conflict, where the focus is longer term. v

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Further complexity is introduced by the fact that deterrence entails both overt and covert measures. Overt actions, such as new legislation and reclassification of certain actions, can act as a deterrent, but may also leave a democratic state open to criticism. On the other hand, covert actions may be more effective deterrents; however, the exposure of such actions can strike a blow on the credibility of a state. Revelations, for instance, about extraordinary renditions and enhanced interrogation techniques, or revelations about state infiltration of social and environmental movements in Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, highlight the very high political cost associated when such acts are publicised. Although deterrence appears to entail a zero-sum game situation, this need not be the case, as the need for fine balances requires a more nuanced and holistic approach. For deterrence to be able to effectively deal with the current complexities and be an effective enabler in resolving a conflict, the balance has to shift from zero-­sum, positive-negative endpoint to a more balanced positive-sum, win-win outcome. The book highlights that for a state to be able to transition from zero-sum to a positivesum, the deterring party would have to be aware of context-specific variables such as the non-state actors’ values system, the mindset, and decision-making processes. Through the examination of different perspectives of deterrence, the book aims to examine the inherent complexities associated with the development and application of the concept of deterrence and therefore to provide a unique insight on the concept and test its validity today. Through an analysis of historical and contemporary case studies, the contributors to this book provide an appreciation of the multiple variables and conditions that are incorporated in decision making in order to create effective deterrence policies and measures. Deterrence was originally envisaged as a foreign policy instrument reflecting a state’s influence. Over the years, the concept has had to adjust to new threats and realities while building on past foundational principles. The academic study of the concept of deterrence has gained momentum in recent years. Driven by US, UK, and NATO security and defence policies that have declared deterrence to be a critical strategic aim, scholarly analysis has engaged with these policy commitments, critiquing various types of deterrence as well as the process of deterrence itself (Breitenbauch 2014; Joint Doctrine Note 2019; Fitzgerald 2016). This collection contributes to this growing field of study in a relatively understudied area of interrogating the concept of deterrence itself through a multi-disciplinary approach. The research assembled in this book focuses on deterring extremism, conflict resolution, investigating technological developments, effects of globalisation, the relationship of resilience to effective deterrence, and the associated complexity of contemporary interdependencies to create a contextualised concept of modern deterrence (Mueller 2018). Social science and historical methodologies are utilised to gain a comprehensive cross section of analysis that will reveal the strengths and weaknesses of the use of deterrence as a national security strategy, as well as highlighting the various types of power available for use by the state to create multi-faceted deterrence in order to deal effectively and efficiently with complex emerging challenges. The approach adopted in this book allows us to trace how the adherence to deterrence has evolved and become a significant mechanism and tool influencing policy formation.

Introduction

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The book evaluates the concept of deterrence and its evolution over the years and discusses whether and how deterrence is still relevant and applicable today. The book considers questions such as: How can a state deter but not alienate? In what way can the traditional concept of deterrence be expanded and adapted to deal with current complex realities? How can engagement with non-state actors be best conceived and brought into policy? Is the use of advanced technology a false deterrence? What are the implications for states that use advanced technology, and for those wishing to enter the market? The complexity of the subject of deterrence is aptly reflected in the variety of topics and case studies covered in this book, which is based on relevant themes. The book opens with a chapter on the concepts and approaches to deterrence, which sets the background and forms the thread of the book. Although there are a variety of case studies, this underlying thread of deterrence binds the chapters together. Classic theories of deterrence and the concept of resilience are not usually linked, but the chapter on resilience in this book examines what differentiates and links the two concepts, and argues that the two concepts offer complementary perspectives in envisioning an option for dealing with security threats. Another theme of the book is conventional deterrence, examining the need for understanding the functioning of nuclear and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) deterrence in the contemporary international environment and how emerging threats and challenges are calling the traditional understanding of nuclear deterrence into question. The focus goes beyond the technological aspects of WMD, and it also focuses on the stigmatisation and the image of these weapons with mass destruction and long-term harm. The next theme of the book is asymmetric situations and deterrence, including non-state actors, violent extremism, social movements, and technological advances that enhance asymmetry. The book concludes with a social theme of immigration and economics. The chapters examine the efficiency and effectiveness of deterrence, and they aim to reveal and analyse the merits and demerits of the concept of deterrence. The breadth of the case studies provides methodological advantages, and is instrumental for the pluralistic approach this book advances. Cranfield University  Anastasia Filippidou Cranfield, UK

References Breitenbauch HØ (2014) NATO: conventional deterrence is the new black. War on the rocks, April 14, 2014. https://warontherocks.com/2014/04/nato-conventional-deterrence-is-the-new-black/. Accessed 25 June 2019 Fitzgerald D (2016) Re-evaluating military strategy: the effectiveness of conventional deterrence, clocks and clouds. J Natl Glob Aff 7(1):1–15 Joint Doctrine Note 1/19: Deterrence: the Defence Contribution, UK MOD, February 7, 2019, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/783104/20190204-doctrine_uk_deterrence_jdn_1_19.pdf. Accessed 25 June 2019

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Mueller KP (2018) Conventional deterrence redux: avoiding great power conflict in the 21st century. Strateg Stud Q 2018 (Winter):76–93 Lupovici A (2010) The emerging fourth wave of deterrence theory: toward a new research agenda. Int Stud Q 54(3):705–732 Stein JG (2000) The privatisation of security in the global political space. Int Stud Rev 2(1):21–24

Contents

Deterrence: Concepts and Approaches for Current and Emerging Threats ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    1 Anastasia Filippidou Resilience and Deterrence: Exploring Correspondence Between the Concepts ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   19 Edith Wilkinson Deterrence and Diplomacy������������������������������������������������������������������������������   35 Afzal Ashraf Nuclear Deterrence in a New Age of Disruptive Technologies and Great Power Competition������������������������������������������������������������������������   57 Reuben Steff What’s in a Name? Deterrence and the Stigmatisation of WMD����������������   77 Patricia Shamai Deterring Violent Extremism and Terrorism������������������������������������������������   97 Anastasia Filippidou Deterrence and Drones: Are Militaries Becoming Addicted and What Is the Prognosis?����������������������������������������������������������������������������  115 Ben Tripp Deterrence and Third Party Amplification: The Case of Hezbollah and Al Manar���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  129 Kirby Wedekind ‘The Outrage Was Really Quite Visceral’1: Overt and Covert Deterrence Effects on Social Movement Activism����������������������������������������  141 Thomas O’Brien

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Linking the Deterrence Concept to Migration����������������������������������������������  157 Charis Anastasopoulos Anglo-American Strategic Relations, Economic Warfare and the Deterrence of Japan, 1937–1942: Success or Failure?��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  177 Greg Kennedy

About the Contributors

Charis Anastasopoulos  is a Lecturer in the Department of Educational Science and Social Science at the University of Cologne (Germany). His main interests include Emile Durkheim’s sociology, nation, ethnicity, and stigmatisation. In his qualitative research, he focuses on self-presentations of German migrants in Greece, particularly with regard to the Greek discourse on Germany. His book National Community and Modern Diversity uses Emile Durkheim’s works to examine the power of national ethics in modern societies. Afzal Ashraf  is Assistant Professor at the Centre for Conflit Security and Terrorism at the Univesity of Nottingham. He was a Senior Officer in the Royal Air Force. He served in strategic military appointments in Iraq and Afghanistan during the height of the conflicts in those countries. He also served in UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office where he gained a first-hand insight into diplomacy and later designed and delivered a course in international diplomacy aimed at junior diplomats. He completed his Ph.D. from the School of International Relations in St Andrews University, was a Consultant Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, a visiting Fellow at Nottingham University’s Centre for Conflict, Security and Terrorism, and a Ph.D. Examiner for Durham University. Anastasia Filippidou  is a Lecturer in Conflict Resolution and Counterterrorism at the Cranfield Forensic Institute, Cranfield University, UK. Her research focuses on conflict resolution, counterterrorism, leadership in transitional states, deterrence and radical extremism. Her recent funded research was on ‘Terrorism and Technology’, co-authored with Dr. Afzal Ashraf for COE-DAT NATO (2017) and on ‘Strategic Messaging and the Role of Non-State Actors in Deterring Radical Extremism’, research commissioned by the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre UK (DCDC). In 2014, she published a comparative study on the ‘Role of Leadership in Transitional States’. She previously consulted for the Home Office on counterterrorism and worked with the Centre for Defence Studies, delivering courses on terrorism and counterterrorism for the Home Office. Her monograph on

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About the Contributors

Peace Processes and Negotiating Tactics with Terrorist Organisations is to be published in 2020. She received her Ph.D. from King’s College, University of London. Greg Kennedy  is a Professor of Strategic Foreign Policy, and the Director of the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies at the Defence Studies Department, King’s College London, based at the Joint Services Command and Staff College in Shrivenham. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Alberta in 1998 and before coming to England in 2000 taught at the Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Ontario. Thomas O’Brien  is a Lecturer in Political Sociology at the University of York. His research considers democratisation, leadership, environmental politics, and social movements. Previous work has appeared in the British Journal of Sociology, Journal of Sociology, Democratization, and Kōtuitui. He has also recently edited a special issue of Contemporary Social Science on ‘The People and the State: Twenty-First Century Protest Movements’. Patricia Shamai  is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Portsmouth (UK), writing and teaching units in international politics, security, and defence issues. Her main areas of interest are US and UK national security and foreign policy, focusing on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) counterproliferation, nuclear non-proliferation, arms control, and security issues. Her research has been published and presented within international academic journals and at a number of national and international conferences, including the journal Contemporary Security Policy, where the article ‘Name and Shame: Unravelling the Stigmatization of Weapons of Mass Destruction’ was shortlisted for the Bernard Brodie Prize 2016. She received her Ph.D. and M.Sc. in international relations and security studies from the University of Southampton, as well as a B.A. (Hons.) in international relations and strategic studies from Lancaster University (UK), including a year of study at the University of Nebraska (UNL). Reuben  Steff  joined the University of Waikato as a Lecturer of International Relations in 2015 after working on international security and strategic policy issues at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade for two and a half years. His research focuses on nuclear deterrence and missile defence, arms race, New Zealand foreign policy, global trends, and geopolitical competition between the great powers. His book Strategic Thinking, Deterrence and the US Ballistic Missile Defence Project: From Truman to Obama (2014) was published by Ashgate. His work has been published in Contemporary Security Policy, Defense & Security Analysis, the Journal of Strategic Studies, and the NZ International Review.

About the Contributors

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Benjamin  Tripp  is a Squadron Leader, Royal Air Force, and a Ph.D. candidate with Cranfield University. He draws from his personal experiences and examines the role of deterrence and targeted strikes, just war theory, and foreign policy. More precisely, he focuses on the ‘war against terror’, and the moral boundaries crossed in the name of national security. Kirby Wedekind  serves as a Protective Security Advisor for the US Department of Homeland Security. He previously served for 10 years in the US Marines, reaching the rank of Major with combat deployments to Iraq (2009), Afghanistan (2011– 2012), and with the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (2016). He holds a B.A. in English from Wake Forest University and a Master’s degree from Georgetown University in Emergency and Disaster Management. He is a Ph.D. candidate at Cranfield University. Edith Wilkinson  works at the Cranfield Forensic Institute of Cranfield University as a Senior Research Fellow. Her focal area of research and teaching is resilience. She runs the Risk and Resilience module on the International Defence and Security MSc course. She was involved recently in a DFID-funded initiative to raise the performance of both formal and informal governance institutions operating at the subnational level in provinces of Afghanistan. Previously, her research and policy analysis dealt with information sharing, standardisation and interoperability of agencies involved in disaster and emergency response. Her expertise was drawn through drawing out user requirement for the development of new technology in the field of management of emergency services operations and also investigating information sharing between the military, civilian organisations, and NGOs on IEDs, landmines, and ERW when operating in hazardous areas. She has been a member of BSI SSM/1 on Societal Security Management since October 2008 where she contributed actively to the review of the ISO/TC 223 standard on the ‘Elements of command, control, information, coordination and cooperation for emergency management’. She has also been a member of the Institute of Civil Defence and Disaster Studies since December 2008 and an Associate Fellow of the Higher Education Academy since 2015.

Deterrence: Concepts and Approaches for Current and Emerging Threats Anastasia Filippidou

1  Introduction By exploring and analysing the complexities associated with the development and application of the concept of deterrence in resolving conflicts, this chapter sets the context of the book. Deterrence has to do with maintaining the status quo by convincing an opponent or ally that the cost of an unwanted action is greater than the rewards. Deterrence, on the one hand can act as a delaying mechanism in dealing effectively with opponents, in which case the aim would be to contain a conflict and the focus is zero-sum and more short term. On the other, deterrence can have the role of a proactive mechanism, where the focus is longer term. To be able however, to make shifts from zero-sum to a positive-sum the deterring party needs to be aware of context specific variables such as the opponent’s values’ system, the mind-set, and decision making processes. Routinely, mirror-imaging influences decision making leading states to develop deterrence policies with limited impact and effectiveness, as deterrence requires an understanding of the other’s as well as one’s own motives, objectives, and decision-making processes. Mirror-imaging leads to questionable assumptions about opponents’ values and how they will behave under pressure. The origins of the concept of deterrence can be traced back in antiquity. The Roman adage ‘si vis pacem, para bellum’ (if you want peace, prepare for war) is found in Vegetius’ (2012) De Re Militari (Concerning Military Affairs), but the principle it conveys can also be found in Plato’s (2005) Νόμοι (Laws). In modern times, deterrence theory was predominantly a product of the Cold War. The concept has had to adjust to new threats and realities while building on past foundational principles. The core of deterrence is dealing effectively with a conflict. Although deterrence appears to entail a zero-sum game situation, this need not be the case, as A. Filippidou (*) Cranfield Forensic Institute, Cranfield University, UK e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 A. Filippidou (ed.), Deterrence, Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29367-3_1

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A. Filippidou

an increasingly complex world has led to the need for fine balances, which require a more nuanced approach. For a non-zero-sum approach, a degree of common interest between the deterrent party and the deterred must exist and each side has to believe that more can be gained through compliance than by trying unilaterally to take what it wants forcefully. For deterrence to be able to effectively deal with current global complexities and to be an effective enabler in resolving a conflict, the balance has to shift from zero-sum, positive-negative endpoint to a more balanced positive-sum, win-win outcome. To set the context of the book, this chapter examines the evolution of the concept of deterrence, and it considers questions such as: How can a state achieve the above balance shift? In what way can the traditional concept of deterrence be expanded and adapted to deal with current complex realities? In what way can a state deter but not alienate?

2  D  eterrence as a Foreign Policy and Conflict Resolution Tool Deterrence does not exist in a vacuum. It entails conflicting parties, the issue of conflict, and a tense situation, and friction. One party aims to achieve a goal against another party. Consequently, deterrence is formed against one or more opponents, who also shape their own policy in order to counter the former. The friction is necessary because it creates an interconnectedness between the conflicting parties, and each side’s moves are closely connected with those of the opponent. Deterrence was originally envisaged as a foreign policy instrument reflecting a state’s influence and power. The practice and effective implementation of deterrence complements other instruments states use to exert influence (Johnson 2004). Even though the concept of deterrence has its roots in past experiences, it has had to adjust to new threats and realities while building on past foundational principles. A state’s policy may focus on maintaining or on altering the status quo, and either of these can be achieved by the threat or the actual use of force. As a general indication Table 1 below specifies that a state’s policy may be classified as proactive and reactive, compellent and deterrent. Understandably, what is defensive and reactive or offensive and proactive is viewed differently from the side that is on the receiving end of the deterrent threat. In theory, deterrence aims to maintain the status quo. Through the use of threat deterrence strives to dissuade opponents from attempting to achieve their objectives. The point is that once a deterrence threat is issued its impact can be long term, Table 1  Policy formation and deterrence

Means

Use of force Threat of force

Political objectives Altering status quo Proactive Compellent

Maintaining status quo Reactive Deterrent

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because once a threat is issued it cannot be ‘un-issued’. After deterrence has taken place, and even though deterrence’s aim is to maintain the status quo, the conflicting parties do not really renormalize and return to the status quo ante. The situation changes for all those involved. Moreover, in a complex and interdependent world the distinction between a proactive and a reactive approach is increasingly blurred. In reality, deterrence becomes a borderline between offense and defence. The logic of deterrence is to act in a timely fashion and as early as possible in order to stop an escalation of a conflict before the balance of power tips in any decisive way and before the opponent gains a threatening advantage. A key challenge is that not only does the concept of deterrence have fluid boundaries, there are also conditions in order for it to be successfully implemented. George emphasised the infeasibility of a universal theory of deterrence, and argued that both explanatory and policy relevant theory require context dependent conditional generalisations that were also informed by history (George et al. 1971). Deterrence is inherently imperfect. According to Morgan, deterrence does not consistently work and we cannot manipulate it sufficiently, and it must be approached with care and used as part of a larger tool kit (Morgan 2003: 285). For Schelling deterrence is ‘persuading a potential enemy that he should in his own interest avoid certain courses of activity’ (Schelling 1960: 9). Influencing behaviour through fear is twofold: deterrence – ‘inducing an adversary not to do something’, and compellence  – ‘inducing another to do something’ (Schelling 1982: 72). The former appears to be predominantly but not just reactive, while the latter appears to be more proactive. Based on the above definition, the one concept is the inverse of the other, as to deter someone from doing something will involve a number of coercive actions, while to compel someone to do something will entail a number of deterrent actions. In reality, as both concepts have to do with interpretation, influence, and perception, the boundaries between deterrence and compellence may become blurred. Likewise Luttwak distinguishes between active deterrence as the negative subset of coercion – preventing an opponent from doing something – and compellence, the positive subset, which is making an opponent do something they would not wish to do (Luttwak 1974). Moreover, there is latent and inherent deterrence, according to which a potential opponent is not specifically targeted, however potential opponents would be expected to draw conclusions about capacity and will, upon which to base their decision for future behaviour and action. Still, as already, in a complex political environment the boundaries of deterrence and compellence become blurred, since a lot depends on how action and inaction is perceived. After all, deterrence functions on a spectrum of conflict, and the aim remains the same, which is to prevent objectionable behaviour and to coerce an opponent to comply with one’s own choices. Overall, deterrent threat is categorised into denial, retaliation, and punishment (Freedman 2004; Snyder 1961; Schelling 1966). The aim is that through the threat of force the opponent does not initiate an attack, for fear that the potential cost will far outweigh any likely benefit. Knopf identifies four waves of deterrence conceptualisation. He places the first wave at the end of World War II and the atomic bomb; the second wave originates in the 1950s with the ascendance of game theory at the

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epicentre of nuclear strategy; the third wave in the 1970s recognises the inherent imperfections of deterrence and the limits of its applicability (Knopf 2010). With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the balance of power the applicability of the traditional concept of deterrence came into intense scrutiny. The current fourth wave, according to Knopf, reflects the context of asymmetric threats and emphasises non-state actors and the role non-military tools might play in deterrence. Noteworthy is that this categorisation is predominantly from a Western perspective, and it reflects the dominant school of thought.

3  Symmetry and Asymmetry Governments aim to match capability with deterrence approaches fit to deal with symmetric and asymmetric threats, including terrorist and violent extremist threats. Adopting a stance able to reflect upon and interpret the weight and demands of value-based appeals can suggest targets for deterrent behaviour. Often there is a number of underlying assumptions when implementing deterrence (Paul et  al. 2009). A key assumption is rationality, according to which actors are deemed to engage in objective win-lose calculations. Conventional deterrence theory is linked to Rational Choice theory, which suggests that actors are rational, and they prioritise preferences, and seek to achieve these preferences in a structured and orderly manner. In this context however, conflicting parties would have to weigh costs and benefits in a similar way, as without this common basis different importance would be attributed to different values which could lead to the escalation of conflict. However, within a complex and complicated context, actors apply logic as they understand it. When formulating a deterrence policy states and decision makers often forget or choose to ignore that the opponents they are trying to deter possess an independent will and employ a strategy of their own. For instance, retaliation and punishment might actually be considered by adversary networks as opportunities to boost their cause and their recruitment campaign. Hereby actors may use narratives of oppression and justification of violence as responses against the deterrent threat. Deterrence in this context becomes ineffective as it brings about outcomes that are opposite to those sought. Adler characterises this as a ‘deterrence trap’ where the asymmetrically weaker adversary gains from both possible postures – self-restraint or retaliation - by the stronger deterrent state. ‘Damned if you do and damned if you don’t’ is the way Adler describes deterrent strategies (2009). This had an impact on Rational Choice theory, which had to adjust and developed the concept of bounded rationality that provides for incomplete information, emotional state, and other variables than can lead actors to a decision that does not result to the expected outcome. What is more, the necessary friction and interconnectedness between the conflicting parties has a direct impact on choices and the effectiveness of a deterrence policy. The existence of an opponent will make a state form a deterrence approach through a roundabout route instead of launching a head-on attack, for instance. This paradoxical logic is encapsulated in the Latin dictum referred to in the introduction of ‘si vis pacem, para bellum’ (if you want peace, prepare for war). In the realm of

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deterrence this dictum is accepted as conventional wisdom, as it underlines the crux of the principle of deterrence by arguing that in order to discourage aggression a state must be or appear to be strong enough to defeat an attack, or to make it too costly to make it worthwhile for the opponent to initiate an attack (Luttwak 1987). Certain deterrent approaches may be meaningful before an opponent violates the status quo, but may not form rational choices after an opponent violates the status quo. Retaliation could maintain its deterrent value, as it can still imply grave consequences, but the rationality of its execution can be put into considerable doubt once an opponent actually ‘crosses the line’. The link between asymmetry and rational decision making during deterrence is not straightforward. In theory asymmetry should make deterrence particularly effective, as a threat by a stronger actor should deter a weaker and smaller actor. Barry advocates that ‘the criterion for a power relation is an asymmetry between the parties, and under such conditions threats are always an exercise of power, rewards only sometime’ (Barry 1976: 93). However, in practice more often than not strong states fail to deter weaker opponents because the latter can be highly motivated and fighting a perceived or real existential threat. There is a number of elements such as psychological, historical, contextual, discussed in more detail below, that influence decision making, and action taking. Asymmetry of power and motivations, misinterpreting the type and degree of the possible response, exploiting vulnerabilities and limitations, taking advantage of wider support, are but few of the reasons why a stronger state might not be able to deter a weaker one. What is more, inducements and concessions are not of equal value. Thus, successful deterrence relies on understanding what all actors involved really value, the value they put on inducements and threats, what each actor is willing to risk, and finally in communicating their position in an effective and persuasive manner. It is important for the actors to know their own as well as their potential opponent’s values. Weaker actors may have higher legitimacy and political will defeating materially stronger opponents. When legitimacy and control coincide they can determine the number of national choices available to a state and the maximum national value those choices can achieve (Schwartz and Kirk 2009). The power of motivation can be more important and more effective than physical might. As Clausewitz asserts ‘the more powerful and inspiring the motives for war, the more they affect the belligerent nations and the fiercer the tensions’ (Von Clausewitz 1976: 87). The element of symmetry between conflicting parties could make deterrence more influential and effective, as a failed deterrence could lead devastation. On the other however, this symmetry can lead to a standoff and a lasting stalemate regarding the resolution of the conflict. Asymmetry between the conflicting parties could also make deterrence more effective, as the deterrer might have the power and the ability to obtain low cost compliance. On the other however, this asymmetry may become irrelevant depending on the motivation of the weaker side. A fundamental element of deterrence is identifying the key actors to be deterred. However, this becomes even more complex when aiming to deter non-state actors especially when the latter is part of a loose network instead of a structured and ­hierarchical organisation. On the other, the loose structure of violent extremist networks can be seen as an additional opportunity for deterrence, as there are multiple

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levels, from foot soldiers to fundraisers, to the leadership, and with different degrees of commitment to ‘the cause’ within a non-state group that can be the target of deterrence. After all, non-state groups are rarely homogeneous, instead often they comprise of sub-cultures, with even distinct elements willing to operate independently. Dealing with actors with different levels of resolve, motivation and value systems would require different approaches to deterrence. Certain members and followers of a non-state organisation may be more susceptible to deterrence than others, while some may simply be beyond the reach of deterrence and therefore require different treatment altogether. Moreover, different elements such as timing, the stage of operations, and access to resources will dictate a non-state’s susceptibility to deterrence. Attempts to deter non-state actors generally entail the building of a kind of a mutual deterrent relationship, in the sense that a decision has to be felt as relevant to the deterred in order to feel the pressure and the need to abide by it. This can be achieved by creating an expectation within the target to be deterred that they face very high costs for instance, through the intensification of legislation, and the introduction of new policies and measures. If successful, this should induce the receiving actor to refrain from taking action. The idea is that mutual vulnerability could contribute to mutual security, that is if the conflicting parties desire peace, they would allow for some degree of vulnerability within their defence approaches. Still, in asymmetric conflicts actors often deliberately choose escalation, and an approach of provocation, what Marighella called ‘enraging the beast’ (1969). Thus, actors may choose to adopt a deliberate escalation of a conflict when the restraint required for deterrence is or is perceived to be an unbearable acquiescence to intolerable enemy force or to a losing strategy. The sum total of pressures on non-state actors once they adopt violent extremism as a strategy tend to create an escalation trap, which would make it resistant to deterrence (Neumann and Smith 2008: 76–92).

4  N  egative and Limited vs Positive and Broader Deterrence in Conflict Resolution Deterrence theory dominated the Cold War, to the point that it turned ‘narrow’ deterrence strategies into orthodoxy in the West (Freedman 2004: 1). Old narratives however, have to adapt in order to reflect new and complex realities, and today’s breadth and depth of challenges increases the complexity of formulating and communicating deterrence. In essence though, the objective of deterrence remains to persuade an opponent through the implementation of different means and methods that the costs of taking an action far outweigh the potential benefits that action might offer. Within this context, deterrence is threat-based and it appears to entail a zero-sum situation. This in turn may create an environment that precludes ­constructive and lasting conflict resolution. When deterrence is used in a negative way it has more limited outcomes as it focuses on zero-sum approaches. In this way, deterrence is used as a delaying mechanism during a conflict, mainly focusing on

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conflict containment. This approach however, has a limited and short term outlook regarding the resolution of a conflict, and deterrence becomes more reactive than proactive. For deterrence to have lasting effects, a zero-sum situation would have to be transformed to a positive-sum. To this end, a degree of common interest between the deterrent party and the deterred has to exist or to be created with policies and measures, and each side has to believe that it can gain more by compliance than by trying unilaterally to take what it wants forcefully. On the whole, the concept of deterrence has a negative undertone, as the element of punishment is inherent in the notion of deterrence. Embedded in much thinking on deterrence is the problematic idea that it is external to the deterring side and that only the other side needs to change. The specifics of a deterrence policy would depend on the mindset towards the conflict overall. If the aim is just to contain a conflict, then deterrence may be elevated to a strategy, an outcome and an endgame, but if the aim is to try and resolve a protracted conflict then deterrence becomes a means and a tactic. After all, deterrence is a tool in the toolbox of a state’s policy making, and it depends on the state’s aims as to how deterrence is designed and used. If deterrence is elevated to a strategy, it becomes not just part of what the deterring side does, but also part of who the deterring side is. In effect it validates who the deterring party is internally and externally, as the latter allows the deterring party to have routinized and normalised interactions with others, and the former allows them to hold a coherent narrative of their self (Lupovici 2016). However, as discussed this mindset towards deterrence nourishes and maintains the conflict between the parties, and thus provides the paradox that while attempting to avoid an overt conflict, this type of deterrence preserves the conflict. It appears that deterrence can only be tested negatively, whereby the success of deterrence is assessed by events that did not take place. In other words, a deterrent threat is measured by it not having to be implemented. However, it is not always possible to know that the absence of violent conflict was the result of deterrence or despite of it. It is very difficult however, if not impossible, to prove a negative and to determine with accuracy why something has not occurred. This in turn makes it difficult to assess whether the adopted policy was the best possible option. Shifting from a zero-sum to a positive-sum approach would make it possible to identify and potentially measure improvements that may discourage attacks against the state or its population. Deterrence can also have a positive purpose of reassuring allies that something is done against a potential opponent. Therefore, deterrence may play a simultaneous dual role: negative, focusing on the opponent, and positive, focusing on the allies. However, even this positive role has a negative undertone. In the sense that it may be fear of deterrence being applied on an actor that makes that makes a state remain an ally. The transformation from zero-sum to a positive sum could be possible as deterrence is but a tool, and as such it depends on the attitude and intent of the deterring side as to how and why a deterrent message is issued and how it is implemented. For these shifts from zero-sum to a positive sum to be possible the deterring party needs to be familiar with context specific variables such as the non-states actors’ value

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system for instance, as well as their mindset and their decision making processes. The effectiveness of deterrence depends on defining what the target actor values, having the will and capability of holding it at risk, and for a state to credibly communicate a threat to the target actor. The problem is when actors appear to have no threshold beyond which violence and attacks are unacceptable by them or their own people. Furthermore, in the case of non-state violent extremism if an actor chooses to fight what it defines as an existential and nihilistic threat, then it is less likely for deterrence to be successful. Deterrence is difficult, if not impossible, when opponents perceive their own deaths as the ultimate gain, and who have little material they hold dear that they can be threatened in retaliation, and for whom the religious duty is to alter through the use of violence an intolerable for them status quo. The difficulty to accurately assess the effectiveness of deterrence, combined with deterrence’s inherent ambiguity and dependence on a number of conditions, makes it very challenging to expect deterrence to preserve peace over a long term, unless the conflicting sides actively commit to avoiding war. After all, it would be an oxymoron to have lasting emergency policies, in other words long term deterrence measures, as this would imply that a state has not been able to deal effectively with a threat. Consequently, deterrence is not just the outcome but mainly a process and a means that needs constant adjusting and adapting if it is to lead to a successful and lasting output.

5  E  ngaging, Influencing, Deterring: Influencing and Controlling Behaviour Deterrence entails influence, persuasion, and coercion. Influencing behaviour and controlling cost-benefit calculations through fear involves deterrence – ‘inducing an adversary not to do something’, and compellence – ‘inducing another to do something’ (Schelling 1982: 72). Within the field of deterrence there is a distinction between deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial (see Geearson 2012; Wilner 2011). However, the element of punishment is an overarching undertone of the concept of deterrence as such, and therefore the above distinction between punishment and denial at a conceptual and applicability level becomes more blurred. Deterrence has to do with controlling behaviour by applying coercive leverages against opponents’ assets, goals, and beliefs (Wilner 2011). Punishment or threat of punishment are at the epicentre of deterrence, but only forms part of deterrence, and punishment is only a limited part of what effective deterrence entails. For instance, incentives, inducements, and rewards can also persuade and lead to the same extent as threats in order to alter and adjust an opponent’s behaviour. As George and Smoke argue deterrent threats are most effective when they are combined with assurances and positive inducements (George and Smoke 1974: 590–591). A minimum assurance for instance is that if the opponent complies then the deterrent treat will not be implemented. In this sense, deterrence can have a more proactive and more positive role in dealing with conflict, and they can lead to persuasion, and voluntary compli-

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ance and alter in this way the attitude and the behaviour of a potential opponent. With this approach the focus is also more long term, which should be the ultimate goal of deterrence. Apart from the military and economic power, which fall under hard power, states also employ soft power through cultural, ideological and other indirect influences. Although soft power has formed part of foreign and defence policy for many years, this type of power has historically been underrated, and often seen by decision makers as a weakness. When the aim of a war is to achieve a decisive victory, deterrence, if seen as a form of bargaining, was considered as a state’s failure to achieve a compelling victory. Deterrence is better understood as a compound employment of multiple forms of diplomatic, military, economic means, which are also situational and contextual, and as such adjustable. Deterrence requires active monitoring of a situation that constantly changes within the deterring state, within the state that is being deterred and within their respective broader environments. In effort to reflect complexity and the need for adjustability, Nye introduced the concept of smart power, which is the ability to combine hard and soft power resources into effective strategies (Nye 2009, 2011: 22–23). This fits well the argument in this chapter that in a complex world deterrence has to be malleable and adaptive. In order to be successful, deterrence depends on policies designed in advance of an opponent’s efforts to influence the status quo. More precisely, decision makers have to develop, design, and effectively communicate a fitting policy, and consequently be able to respond in a timely manner to potential threats avoiding conflict escalation. Consequently, deterrence should have a long term focus in design and outcome. Deterrence, as a method of influence, leaves the choice between compliance and defiance to the adversary, and there are conditions that must be met in order for deterrence to be effective. This becomes a threat that leaves something to chance, as Schelling advocates (1966: 121–122). According to Schelling this characteristic of deterrence sets ‘the stage – by announcement, by rigging the trip-wire, by incurring the obligation – and waiting’ (1966: 70–71). Thus, deterrence policy can be fixed with limited flexibility as the actions of the deterrent is determined by the choices of the deterred. The threat conveyed must be sufficiently potent to persuade the opponent that the benefits of compliance will far outweigh the cost of non-compliance. In the case of sanctions for instance, actors assess the risk of sanctions being applied, including their certainty and severity, against the benefits of breaking rules or ignoring warnings (Schelling 1966: 71). Subsequently, the deterrent party and the threat issued have to be credible and clear in the mind of the deterred. At the same time the deterred will have to feel assured that compliance will not lead to further demands. An additional challenge is that for deterrence to be successful the message conveyed often has to be combined with the offer of inducements, in order to achieve compliance, reinforcing the need for a contextualised approach. However, there is a spectrum of inducements ranging from symbolic actions up to the limited use of violence, the latter however risks increased negative consequences. A paradox of deterrence is that it aims to achieve certainty through uncertain means. However, when a state adopts deterrence as part of a broader planning and

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action-taking it could be able to determine, with some degree of confidence, that the policies and initiatives designed to deter certain behaviour have achieved the objective. It is not enough for policy makers to just decide to apply deterrence. Decision makers have to determine the most fitting means, and ensure that the desired conditions and demands are effectively communicated and understood by the target audience. Likewise, policy makers have to be able to assess an opponent’s behaviour and their probable counter moves as accurately as possible. The added complexity is the fact that a state operates within an existing political environment with a number of constantly changing variables which the states do not always control or even influence, but which limit a decision maker’s ability to reach optimal choices. Effective deterrence relies on the ability to obtain the knowledge and intelligence required to devise deterrent methods, but this information and knowledge is neither easily collected nor is it necessarily verifiable and reliable. For instance, calculating how best to deter non-state actors requires, among other things, assessing how individual groups decide on their target selection, how they evaluate successes, and how they weigh unsuccessful and foiled attacks in their utility calculations. This requires detailed information, data, and intelligence on the preferences of non-state actors (Richardson 2006). Only then will deterrence mechanisms be properly tailored to challenge specific non-state actors. However, for democracies all this has to take place within the realistic constrains of the rule of law, something non-state actors do not have to worry about. Another point to take into consideration is the extent to which the commitment, motivation and intent of the target affects their susceptibility to deterrence. Knowing which of the actors to target is not necessarily equivalent to knowing how to influence these actors. In the case for example, where the fight is against an apocalyptic organisation or a group that claims to be fighting an existential religious and ideological struggle, where there is nothing to hold at risk, deterrence is likely to have limited effect on the group as such, although it might be more effective on individuals within that group. Furthermore, credibility can be compromised by what Kroenig and Pavel call a ‘lack of a return-address’ (Kroenig and Pavel 2012). Identifying non-state actors and the ability to attribute attacks are prerequisites to a credible deterrence based counter terrorism approach. Even when intelligence can be reliably provided and assets identified, violent extremists exist and hide among the population governments seek to protect. Governments would have to customise deterrence and with tailored measures could better influence the behaviour and acts of terrorist organisations. Deterrence therefore, is not monolithic, but instead forms part of a larger gamut including reassurance, compellence, and deterrence, and these have to be applied in the right way, at the right time, to the right people in order to create an effective and persuasive tension. Conflicting parties have different decision making processes, interests, and perceptions, and deterrence may target each conflicting party from taking specific actions under a wide range of circumstances. This highlights the importance of treating effective deterrence as a multi-phased approach: prior, during, and after an event.

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6  C  ommunicating in an Effective Manner: The Importance of a Clear ‘Indirect’ Message Effective deterrence relies heavily on successful communication. Information has to be communicated in a way that it is understood by those who it is aimed at. The threat has to be clear to those who issue it, but also to those who receive it. The deterred for instance, needs to be capable and willing to recognise the message and its consequences. This rests on the understanding that the target of deterrent actions can recognise the consequences and accept them. As Jervis notes the failure to establish meaningful communication led the United States to use force on occasions where threats were inefficacious and fundamental messages conveyed shared meaning between adversary sides (Jervis 2009: 150). A related critical issue is that deterrence assumes the existence of bureaucratic structures of control able to define the coercive posture, to make decisions and to respond. Yet the idea is challenged in the case of non-state actors or rogue states where there might not even exist a well-­ structured apparatus nor be in full control of it. Furthermore, there may not even be a fully developed and unified set of interests to frame decisions (Morgan et  al. 2009: 6–7). Dealing with complex issues often requires fine balances, and deterrence is no exception to this. Coercing powers must also be able and willing to recognise when it is appropriate not to use an instrument, as this can also backfire, and can undermine the credibility of a deterrent (Byman and Waxman 2002: 124). To this end a deterrence policy has to be rigid enough to be meaningful, and vague enough to leave room for manoeuvre. A too rigid or a too ambiguous message can send the wrong signal to the opponent. Often there is ambiguity regarding the exact type and degree of the punishment to an opponent, but there can be no uncertainty about the possibility of a response. Thus, ambiguity can be effective when there is uncertainty regarding the degree of the response, and not the possibility of the response itself. The role of ambiguity in deterrence success depends on the attitude of the target actor vis-à-vis risk taking. On the one hand, ambiguity about the kind of response to an opponent’s attack increases the chances of deterrence success by complicating the opponent’s calculations and replies. On the other, the impact of ambiguity depends on the risk-taking inclination of the target country and actor. For instance, risk-averse countries tend to view ambiguity as increasing the risk associated with the action they are contemplating to take, hence enhancing the chances of success of deterrence. Whereas risk-prone actors may interpret ambiguity as a sign of weakness, which can be translated as an opportunity to exploit rather than a risk that should be avoided. Enforcing policies and assuring compliance can be approached in a number of ways, and all share a communication element, which is why fear-based messages have received particular attention (Johnston et al. 2015). Adler asserts that ‘deterring an opponent depends not only on a threat to increase the cost of violent action for the target; it also involves a promise that abstaining from violence will remove

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the threat’ (Morgan et al. 2009: 88). Coercion and persuasion are main elements of deterrence and their success is also based on messaging, and effective communication, which relies on a number of variables. Conveying a message depends on strategic narratives. According to Freedman, narratives are strategic because they do not arise spontaneously, but are deliberately constructed or reinforced out of the ideas and thoughts that are already current (Freedman 2008). Narratives become instruments for structuring information, and they play a central role in constructing and symbolising experienced reality at the level of sense-giving and sense-making. Narratives can help capture the numerous complex relationships and events that are integral to everyday life and to make sense of seemingly unconnected phenomena (Miskimmon et al. 2013: 5). Both, deterrent capability and narratives rely on credibility and commitment. Strategic narratives facilitate the effectiveness and augment the persuasiveness of messaging and communication. Thus, strategic narratives can help the deterrent and the deterred to contextualise a situation and make them think holistically and shape their behaviour. Moreover, strategic narratives may catalyse understanding and through generating analogies they may create a common ground and facilitate common engagement in the implementation of narratives. If deterrence is to have lasting effects the deterred party would have to adapt both, its attitude and its behaviour to reflect its compliance to the message and the intent of the deterring party. Still, the challenge is that it is quite impossible to prove and to know that somebody’s attitude has permanently changed, making it easier to focus on assessing short- to medium-­ term changes. Although it is of high significance for a deterring party to have a strategic narrative it is of equal importance how this narrative is articulated. As mentioned already, deterrence is linked to persuasion and as such it has to do with the ability to convey a message efficiently and effectively. According to Knopf ‘overly complicated messaging may simply become “lost in the noise”’ (Knopf 2010: 9). For a message and a narrative to be persuasive it has to be adapted to the respective audience, and the most fitting language has to be used. This can be done for instance, by highlighting the values of the narrative, and by emphasising how the narrative presents ideals worth pursuing. If the strategic messaging and narrative are too demanding it is likely to be met with resistance by the recipient, whereas if the strategic messaging, where possible, is articulated using an inclusive language that links the deterred to the message, and this could facilitate compliance. Deterrent threats and assurances have to be constructed with the opponent in mind. This introduces the need to understand in detail the actors involved, their determination, their motives and their value systems. Only then can the right combination of policies and measures be brought into effect to achieve the desired deterrent outcome. For a message to be persuasive the target audience, in this case the deterred party has to be exposed to a clear message. However, it is not always obvious what type of deterrent declarations and messages are more effective: vague and general or specific and explicit (Gearson 2012). In addition, the message has to be understood by all sides involved and it has to be perceived as personally relevant by the deterred party in order to feel the need and pressure to comply with the demands

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of the deterring party. The perception of personal relevance is fundamental, despite its subjectivity, and behavioural or attitudinal change engendered by fear is often contested for this very reason. According to Johnston at al. the juxtaposition of a fear-appeal message with a sanctioning rhetoric may induce persuasion in enhancing personal relevance (Johnston et  al. 2015). In this sense, social structures can play a protagonistic role in fear-based communications’ strategies, while social networks and informal social learning environments could be seen as loci where strategic messages are communicated and implemented. The real test of the effectiveness of strategic messaging occurs during its implementation phase. The deterring party has to be seen as acting out the message in order to build credibility within their environment and vis-à-vis the deterred party. On the one hand the deterring party has to convey a message that is believed to be within its capability, and on the other the potential adversary can gauge the magnitude of the deterrent (Gearson 2012). Furthermore, credibility reflects the intention and commitment of implementing the deterrent. This intention is eroded by each instance where the deterring party’s posture is challenged and yet the deterrent is not used. However, once a threat or deterrence has been issued, the more aggression from an opponent is tolerated, the more the deterring party loses credibility. This in turn, may lead to the development of a credibility gap between capability and will. If a state does not implement its deterrence policy this may develop a gap between politico-economic and military capability and will. The matrix below highlights the relationship between capability and credibility and the likelihood of effective deterrence. High C a p a b i l i t y Low Low

Credibility

High

A state’s past behaviour is usually a fitting indicator of the balance between capability and credibility. For instance, if a state has bluffed on a number of occasions in the past, the relationship between capability and credibility will be low. If on the

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other, a state has a history of executing its threats, capability and credibility will be strongly linked, making the effectiveness of deterrence more likely. The point is that capability without credibility will eliminate persuasiveness and will render deterrence ineffective. After all, it is possible to have capability, but no credibility. In this sense deterrence would become a hollow threat, a ‘paper tiger’ as Mao Zedong characterised it, and future opponents would not be deterred because of the lack of previous state responses to challenges. Moreover, in democracies it is important for capabilities to remain subordinate to policy, and not dictate policy making. Whether credibility or capability is more important will depend on the weight actors put either on the relationship or on the contested issue. In the sense that it depends whether a state cares more about the relationship with the other state or if it cares more about the contentious issue rather than relationship.

7  The Psychological Element The ideas discussed above highlight that deterrence is a psychological process in which subjective elements such as fear, pressure, and influence inform how calculations are made and decisions are taken to abide by the issued threat of punishment (Berejikian 2002). Threat and fear are at the epicentre of deterrence, because deterrence as such is a state of mind. However, these two elements are not necessarily conducive to the resolution of protracted conflicts. Compliance depends heavily on psychological factors. The opponent has to feel and believe that the threat from the deterring party is credible and that the latter has the will and the commitment to see its threat through. As discussed, the aim of deterrence is to reduce an opponent’s willingness to engage in a conflict, rather than just its material capability to do so. The means of achieving this is by creating a capability imbalance short of going to war. This imbalance may be created by eliminating capabilities of an adversary or by increasing the capability of one’s own state. As stated by Schelling It is a tradition in military planning to attend to an enemy’s capabilities, not his intentions. But deterrence is about intentions – not just estimating enemy intentions but influencing them…A persuasive threat of war may deter an aggressor; the problem is to make it persuasive, to keep it from sounding like a bluff (1977: 35).

Therefore, any imbalance will have limited deterrent and coercive power unless it is underlined by the political will to use it. However, establishing whether the willingness to implement a deterrence policy is real it is ultimately a subjective decision. According to Stein, cognitive style and culture are important determinants in understanding how actors will interact in a deterrence relationship. The initial default setting for those directly involved is to be hot and emotional rather than reasonable and rational (Stein 2013). This makes behaviour difficult to predict. The dependence of effective deterrence on communication highlights the role and importance of perception, state of mind and psychology. Deterrence is above all a psychological tool and process in which subjective elements, such as fear and

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coercion, inform how decisions are taken. Effective deterrence has to do with influencing the perceptions of actors. The main elements of inducement include commitment of the deterrent to materialise the issued threat, capability and perception of capability, and credibility of the deterrent. This is summarised to perception, ability, credibility, and will. Psychological factors as well as the elements of feeling and belief are emotive and subjective, and all these introduce perception, and interpretation into the equation, which render a deterrence planning, and an accurate evaluation of the effectiveness of deterrence even more challenging. The number and type of the above variables makes deterrence complex and therefore, difficult to predict. The above challenges in combination with complexity problems, are augmented by miscommunication and misunderstanding. Successful deterrence takes place in stages, but it can also fail in stages. These different phases may provide the conflicting parties with an opportunity to adjust their policies and behaviours, and to strengthen or loosen their approaches accordingly. The different stages however, also pose an additional challenge, as a sequential procedure can lead to the collapse of the whole process. According to George and Smoke nearly all of their 11 case studies of deterrence failure are characterised by the sequential, gradual failure of deterrence (George and Smoke 1974: 103). The effectiveness of deterrence becomes even more challenging owing to the different levels a deterrent has to appeal to. Ultimately, deterrence is usually aimed at the leadership of a potential opponent, with whom decision making rests. However, deterrent action may also target and affect the wider public and its support for its leadership. For instance, a deterrent may target a population which in turn could undermine its leadership’s decision to continue with a specific course of action. On the other, a population facing deterrence may rally towards its leader, and this support could strengthen its leadership rendering deterrence ineffective. Relating to multi-level deterrence this requires the deterring state to use different language to the different levels with a potential opponent in order to increase the chances of a successful deterrence. As Schelling argued ‘such circumstances may require a deterrence strategy that pairs promises of restraint with threats of severe cost-­ imposition’ (Schelling 1960: 131–134).

8  Fine Balances: Pragmatism and the Best Option Available From the above it can be deduced that deterrence as a method has to strive for fine balances, and it has to be context specific and proportionate. Deterrence provides a middle ground between the alternative defensive and offensive control methods, appearing at the same time tough and forceful without being reckless and thoughtless. It is difficult however, to frighten and reassure an opponent at the same time. A deterring party has to appear credibly threatening to an opponent but also reassuring that once the opponent complies with the demands of the deterring party the threat will be removed. The concept of deterrence loses effectiveness when it is ‘overstretched’ to the point of making it too general and irrelevant to the targeted group.

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Instead of being an overarching, all-purpose, and permanent policy, deterrence has to be limited to being an occasional stratagem that gives time to opponents to be reconciled or the ideals pressed by deterrence to be internalized. If the balance is tipped to one side deterrence may become nonsensical and it may yield opposite outcomes to those sought by the deterrent. After all, there is a fine line between deterring an opponent and actually provoking an attack. When a state prepares itself for war and overreacts, it can lead to contradictory outcomes, as for instance, it can inspire fear but also mistrust, which in turn can lead to compliance but it can also provoke a preemptive strike by the opponent, and in effect fulfil the prophesy. On the other, if a state underreacts and appears weak it can precipitate an attack. The added challenge is that it is not just the importance of the message itself, but also how this message is meant and how it is perceived. An over-reaction for example, may lead to retaliation of the deterred and the issuing of a threat might actually be seen as an opportunity to boost recruitment or give a positive impetus to the campaign of a non-state organisation. Even a well-formulated deterrence might not be a fitting approach to a specific threat. As such deterrence cannot be applicable to all situations. Certain opponents may not be deterred by any means at the disposal of democratic states. Containment or even eradication may also be an option at times. The aim is that a context-based and broadly-informed deterrence should limit the number of opponents that cannot be deterred.

9  Conclusion: Limits and Strengths of Deterrence Although the concept of deterrence is simple, its implementation in a complex and uncertain world is not. Especially as the fact that absolute security is a chimaera, is not palatable. Deterrence depends on a number of conditions which inevitably, makes it imperfect in its formation and implementation. Since deterrence depends on constantly moving delicate balances, as well as a number of implementation conditions, it is more vulnerable to friction and luck than other foreign policy and military tools. Still, deterrence has been a tool of foreign policy since antiquity, but it remains subject to a number of limitations. Deterrence entails a common basis for certain actions, and a continuous scrutiny of constantly changing situations, through effective channels of communication across psychological and subjective boundaries. This underlines the need for a state to strike a balance between adaptive deterrence and not losing its political identity. The limitations and conditions of deterrence discussed in the chapter, support the argument of the elusive nature of a universal theory of deterrence, but the chapter sheds light on the conditions that can improve deterrence. For deterrence to stand better chances of success policy makers have to realise, accept and take into consideration the need for qualified and customised approaches, with and internal and external actor-specific behavioural mode, contextually grounded, and bounded by scope conditions.

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References Adler E (2009) Complex deterrence in the asymmetric era. In: Paul TV et al (eds) Complex deterrence: strategy in the global age. University of Chicago Press, Chicago Barry B (1976) Power: an economic analysis. In: Barry B (ed) Power and political theory: some European perspectives. Wiley, London Berejikian J (2002) A cognitive theory of deterrence. J Peace Res 2(39):167–173 Byman D, Waxman MC (2002) The dynamics of coercion: American foreign policy and the limits of military might. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Freedman L (2004) Deterrence. Polity Press, Cambridge Freedman L (2008) The evolution of strategic thought. Adelphi Papers: The International Institute of Strategic Studies Gearson J (2012) Deterring conventional terrorism: from punishment to denial and resilience. Contemp Secur Policy 1(33):171–198 George A, Smoke R (1974) Deterrence in American foreign policy. Columbia University Press, New York George A, Hall D, Simons WR (eds) (1971) The limits of coercive diplomacy. Little Brown, Boston Jervis R (2009) Complex deterrence in the asymmetric era. In: Paul TV et al (eds) Complex deterrence: strategy in the global age. University of Chicago Press, Chicago Johnson G (2004) Introduction: the foreign office and British diplomacy in the twentieth century. Contemp Br Hist 18(3):1–12 Johnston AC, Warkentin M, Siponen MT (2015) An enhanced fear appeal rhetorical framework: leveraging threats to the human asset through sanctioning rhetoric. MIS Q 39(1):113–134 Knopf JW (2010) The fourth wave in deterrence research. Contemp Secur Policy 1(31):1–33 Kroeing M, Pavel B (2012) How to deter terrorism. Wash Q 2(35):21–36. http://www.matthewkroenig.com/Kroenig_How%20to%20Deter%20Terrorism.pdf. Accessed 18 May 2019 Luttwak E (1974) The political uses of sea power. The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore Luttwak E (1987) Strategy: the logic of war and peace. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA Lupovici A (2016) The power of deterrence: emotions, identity, American and Israeli wars of resolve. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Marighella C (1969) Minimanual of the urban guerrilla. Praetorian Press, Seattle Miskimmon A, O’Loughlin B, Roselle L (2013) Strategic narratives: communication power and the new world order. Routledge, New York Morgan P (2003) Deterrence now. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Morgan P, Wirtz J, Paul TV (2009) Complex deterrence: strategy in the global age. University of Chicago Press, Chicago Neumann PR, Smith MLR (2008) The strategy of terrorism: how it works and why it fails. Routledge, London Nye J (2009) Get smart: combining hard and soft power. Foreign Aff 88(4):160. (July/August 2009) Nye J (2011) The future of power. Public Affairs, New York Paul TV, Morgan PM, Wirtz JJ (eds) (2009) Complex deterrence: strategy in the global age. University of Chicago Press, Chicago Plato (2005) The laws. Penguin Classics, London Richardson L (2006) What terrorists want. Random, New York Schelling TC (1960) The strategy of conflict. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, p 9 Schelling TC (1966) Arms and influence. Yale University Press, New Haven Schelling TC (1977) Arms and influence, 2nd edn. Yale University Press, New Haven Schelling TC (1982) Thinking about nuclear terrorism. Int Secur 6(4):61. (Spring 1982) Schwartz NA, Kirk TR (2009) Policy and purpose: the economy of deterrence. Strateg Stud Q 3(1):11–30 Snyder GH (1961) Deterrence and defense. Princeton University Press, Princeton

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Stein JG (2013) Threat perception in international relations. https://www.surrey.ac.uk/politics/ research/researchareasofstaff/isppsummeracademy/instructors%20/Stein%20-%20Threat%20 Perception%20in%20International%20Relations.pdf. Accessed 19 Sept 2018 Vegetius (2012) De Re Militari (Concerning military affairs): the classic treatise on warfare at the Pinnacle of the Roman Empire’s Power. Leonaur Von Clausewitz C (1976) On war trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton University Press, Princeton Wilner AS (2011) Deterring the undeterrable: coercion, denial, and delegitimisation in counterterrorism. J Strateg Stud 1(34):3–37

Resilience and Deterrence: Exploring Correspondence Between the Concepts Edith Wilkinson

Classic theories of deterrence do not envisage the concepts of resilience and deterrence as even remotely connected. However, these two notions may not be poles apart and may, in fact, offer complementary perspectives in envisioning options for dealing with the security challenges of the twenty-first century. This chapter explores the correspondence between the two concepts. Firstly, it discusses definitions and key tenets of these concepts in relation to security. Then, it goes on to review what differentiates and what links these concepts in terms of the risk approach each presents; this includes an examination of rationality in deterrence and resilience frameworks as well as looking at the growing acknowledgement that their evolution is influenced by systems thinking. The chapter then considers in what way deterrence theory and the emerging resilience theory display areas of complementary and mismatch. This is achieved by examining how, on the one hand, both approaches may be able to support one another and, on the other hand, how the significance of change and transformation in both frameworks can provide pointers to where future thinking might lead.

1  D  eterrence and Resilience Are Contrasting Cornerstones of Security Deterrence is not new, nor did it start in the Cold War when the balance of power characterising the era was based on the notion central to this concept: that punishment or threats discourages wrongdoers (Bendiek and Metzger 2015). States have long used deterrence amongst other standard practices such as diplomacy or espionage to shape their relations. The turn of the twentieth century sees growing interest E. Wilkinson (*) Cranfield University, Shrivenham, UK e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 A. Filippidou (ed.), Deterrence, Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29367-3_2

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and efforts to qualify the use and value of deterrence as an instrument for security policy. Studies and considerations have multiplied in an effort to clarify what the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu described as “the successful practice of deterrence […] the highpoint of skill – superior even to winning military victories” (Payne 2010; p. 217). Research into the topic became widespread during the Cold War era when investigations broadened to issues of “motives and perspectives that incite preparations to use attacks and war in conflicts; things that make deterrence work or fail; how best to apply it, and what to avoid; the circumstances in which it is most properly used or not; and how to reduce chances of deterrence failures” (Morgan 2012; p. 87). Still today – and perhaps even more so in the post-Cold War and 9/11 world of asymmetric threats  – the search for the place of deterrence in the twenty-first century security environment still attracts academic attention. Defence doctrine, often where deterrence has gained prominence, explains the military instrument of power and its utility and locates it against government’s means to secure policy ends. Deterrence and coercion are both strategies by which a nation can respectively dissuade or encourage another’s course of action. However, the pursuit of strategic goals involving Defence or the ‘military instrument’ will ultimately fit in a broader political setting (UK Chief of the Defence Staff 2014). Time and again, the absence of wars between great powers has been upheld as the confirmation of the success of deterrence strategies, noting that “deterrence did not just prevent wars but was achieved via war” (Morgan 2012; p. 86). According to Morgan (2012) deterrence represented such an underpinning to national security management that approaches to its strategic (relating to nuclear threats) and non-strategic (relating to more conventional threats) implementation attracted more attention and resources than many other instruments in international politics. The reality of the post-Cold War era has seen a redefinition of international security management by a coalition of Western powers being sought. Deterrent instruments in the hands of these powers prove to be of little value in an age of terror groups and unconventional conflicts. Interestingly, advice once given by military experts is increasingly provided by security specialists. Nevertheless, the United States still appears to be committed to the idea that deterrence should remain the cornerstone of global and regional security – notwithstanding their willingness to spread the burden of leading the provision of such core deterrence capabilities. This is all the more noticeable in the light of recent news headlines, such as Russian interventions in Crimea and Ukraine or the development of the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) missile technology and strike capabilities. For the US, the danger is not so much one of a “nuclear attack against the U.S. homeland but from the possibility that nuclear-armed adversaries will use the threat of escalation to the nuclear level to act more aggressively in their regions and prevent the United States from coming to the defense of its allies and partners” (Einhorn and Pifer 2017; p. iv). Turning to resilience, its documented Latin roots (‘resilire’ meaning ‘spring’ or ‘bounce back’) give the concept a sense of being established – yet it is very much seen as a current political catchword and still evolving as a concept in the security domain. To better grasp the concept Giroux and Prior (2012) identify five key

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dimensions, reflecting the various disciplines of the study of resilience. For them, there are five fundamental areas of resilience and, together, they encapsulate the relationships and dynamics of modern society: The “engineering/physical [dimension] refers to physical infrastructure and systems while the psychological dimension refers to the social domain that focuses on the individual. We then turn to perceptions of ‘bouncing back’ within the business/economic world – drawing from debates on business continuity management and business leadership/management. […]. This relates to the overall operations of businesses and the role of management. The final two sub-sections on ecological […] looks at how research on ecological systems has found that bouncing back from shocks can be both static (strict ecological process) or dynamic (in socio-ecological systems) and the expression of resilience is dependent largely on the scale of enquiry (predator-prey interaction versus human interaction in natural ecosystems). Similarly, […] research on community resilience reveals the importance of adaptive learning and transformation.” (Giroux and Prior 2012; p. 6)

On the whole, from a social science outlook and away from its origins in the natural sciences, the most commonly found definitions refer to the characteristics of societies to deal with disruptions – normally global threats such as economic crisis, climate change and international terrorism (Haimes 2009). Focusing on the UK as an example, the concept of resilience evolved predominantly in the public policy sphere of civil contingencies (under the auspices of the Cabinet Office). For the UK government, in 2004, the idea for building resilience was “to reduce the risk from emergencies so that people can go about their business freely and with confidence” (Cabinet Office 2011a). The government’s activities focused on assisting civil protection practitioners to support the work that goes on across the United Kingdom to improve emergency planning and preparedness (Cabinet Office 2013). It is worthy of note that the events of 9/11 greatly influenced resilience thinking by introducing “a form and severity of terrorism not previously encountered in the UK – a dimension where the terrorist has no concern for their own life and is intent on causing as many fatalities as possible” (O’Brien and Read 2005; p. 354). The consequence of this is that international terrorism has become an obvious priority for resilience strategies, not just in the UK, but throughout the Western world. Although a recent addition, resilience features prominently at the heart of contemporary national security. Resilience is thought of as an antidote to new risks and threats from diverse origins – from natural disasters to cyber-attacks – and is thus a critical component of national security strategies in Western powers. Resilience is envisaged as a capability in the hands of public authorities, but also more broadly in society because the protection of critical infrastructure is largely dependent on the private sector – companies that operates and often own such infrastructure (Omand 2008). The broadening of resilience beyond the idea of just ‘securing the functioning of the state’ is noted by Joseph in his comparison of UK and French implementation of the concept and who remarks “Resilience is said to have a social dimension, located not only in the state but also among the actors of civil society. Resilience is both an objective of the state and a state of society.” (Joseph 2013; p. 257). Such an understanding of resilience, one promoting a new relation between government and

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society based on a more proactive culture towards security issues, is, according to Joseph (2013), a contentiously neoliberal concept that has to do with governing populations and assigning responsibilities to different actors. In examining the definitions and understandings of both deterrence and resilience, it is noticeable that both concepts are key components of modern national security. Perhaps the former is more attached to external manifestations of security, whilst the latter is fundamentally focussed on internal national mechanisms. By embracing approaches that involve a broad set of stakeholders and actors (which goes beyond what has hitherto been the sole domain of State actors), resilience provides new thinking and new instruments for managing uncertainty and security challenges. In many ways, resilience can be understood as a pragmatic way to tackle globalised threats to national security.

2  Deterrence and Resilience as Risk Approaches Albeit in differing ways, deterrence and resilience theories have risk at their core. The fundamental processes at the heart of UK resilience1 relate to on-going risk identification and analysis that is essential to the anticipation and management of disruptive events. In practical terms, these processes allow the UK government to define its capabilities programme through which the government seeks to build resilience across all parts of the UK. To all intents and purposes, the 2008 National Security Strategy explains the Government’s approach to resilience entailing in a risk management process set out in the 2004 Civil Contingencies Act. The Act lays out “responsibilities of frontline responders to assess local risks and publish them in community risk registers; to prepare plans; to make arrangements to warn and inform the public in the event of emergencies; and to promote business continuity” (Cabinet Office 2008; p. 41). Resilience has, since 2004, grown beyond the domain of emergency response and it is now the responsibility of risk managers in organisations of all types and sizes, public and private, to plan and prepare their outfits or systems to return to a normal functioning state quickly after a disturbance. To a great extent, resilience is approached in a holistic manner involving stakeholders from all parts of society – be they governance structures, civil society, communities and individuals – to play their role in the mitigation and response to current and future threats. The novelty in the approach to risk relies on the expertise and judgement of practitioners who perform risk assessments and then prioritise those risks and publish their written justification to allow public scrutiny. The communications relating to risks taking place between authorities and the public at local level has, therefore, become a condition of building resilience (O’Brien and Read 2005).

1  ‘UK Resilience’ was the initial designation by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat of its activities relating emergency planning in the UK within the framework of the 2004 Civil Contingencies Act. (Cabinet Office 2011b)

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Equally, traditional deterrence strategy relies on leaders considering rationally the risks and costs of war (Fearon 1995). The frequently cited definition (found in US doctrine) sees deterrence as the “prevention of action by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction and/or belief that the cost of action outweighs the perceived benefits.” (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 2016). Essentially, the mechanism relies on calculations of what gains and consequences follow a certain course of action. Thus, a fundamental assumption underpinning this framework is that actors involved act rationally and will weigh up their options so as to optimise their outcomes (Achen and Snidal 1989). Here the risk approach consists of calculating how much is enough to deter our adversaries from action against us and to fulfil our security needs. At the height of the Cold War the calculations led the US to determine the adequate2 nuclear capability to “assure destruction” of the Soviet threat (Payne 2010; pp. 217–218). Here, an interesting difference can be noted, in that deterrence is an instrument predominantly framed from the perspective of the role of the state. Admittedly, non-state actors are increasingly the subject of interest of new forms of deterrence as it is thought that they too can be subject of political ‘influence’ if not deterrence in the customary sense (Brimmer 2008). Here the issue of “un-deterrability” of some adversaries is paramount. Much research has been geared to understand this phenomenon and some link it to issues of communication (Rhodes 2000). Hence, in a comparable way to resilience, the achievement of deterrence relies in part on credible calculations supported by effective communications.

2.1  Rationality in Deterrence and Resilience Frameworks The importance of perception in people’s sense and judgement of dangerous situations has been the focus of much research in the past 40 years. Stein (2009) refers to this trend as the ‘cognitive revolution’. Seminal papers have pointed to limits to rationality and the existence of heuristics used when thinking and making decisions under uncertainty (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Slovic 1987). This area of research has shown how much richer than expected by experts is the conceptualization of risk by lay people. Calculations reflect sophisticated and compounded concerns on the voluntariness, dread, knowledge, controllability of the risk. In addition, biases introduce errors in decision making and affect the assessment of probability or impact of events. Ultimately, they lead to judgments based on information of limited validity. The rationality of states waging war (or preparing to do so) has been long discussed and rationalist arguments appear deficient. War is costly and risky, so, why 2  Under McNamara, pentagon analysts worked out that the “assured destruction” of 20–25 percent of Soviet population and 50 percent of Soviet industrial base would provide an adequate U.S. retaliatory threat which ensured the deterrence of the Soviet Union attacks. The analysts calculated that the standard metric for measuring how much was enough for such effect was 400 equivalent megatons (EMT). (Payne 2010)

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do rational states fail to favour negotiated settlements (Fearon 1995). Understanding some of the flaws of rationality leading to conflicts will provide some insights as to why deterrence fails. A number of studies point to the paradoxical irrationality described as “the propensity of leaders to go to war in conditions where they are likely to lose” (Lebow 2007; p. 12). Lebow further argues that in the 30 wars fought since 1945 less than a third had achieved their war aims and as was the case the Vietnam War “the United States won every battle but still lost the war.” Lebow’s interpretation is that imperfect or incomplete information is not always the root cause of deficient decision-making processes. All too often leaders focus on their own political goals and subsequently offer justification to their opponent’s tactics: “once committed to challenges, they engaged in bolstering and other forms of post-­ decisional rationalization, and became even more insensitive to information and warnings that suggested their challenge was likely to end in disaster.” (Lebow 2007; p. 8). Fearon (1995) also expressed similar views on miscalculations about relative power that only war can resolve. Such miscalculations reflect the existence of incentives to misrepresent, the belief of an opponent’s (un)willingness to fight or a broken-down commitment to peace negotiations. For Rhodes (2000), rational calculations are imperfect not only in the assessment of risks of a course of action but also in the estimation one has of the control the risks of any option. That is to say that the “desire to control risks and avoid policies that threaten open-ended commitments and costs has important implications for the kinds of military options that risk-averse potential aggressors find attractive or unattractive.” (Rhodes 2000; p. 244). Defence doctrine encapsulates the limits to rationality in a short warning to its military commanders: “Deterrence and coercion strategies will be contested and commanders must understand the weight of effort an opponent will apply to achieve their aims.” (UK Chief of the Defence Staff 2014). Opponents’ interests, their perception of the balance of power, awareness of bargaining space and alternative outcomes available to them, as well as their sense of gains and losses are all part and parcel of calculations. Stein (2009) points out that at the heart of rational decision making lies a careful examination of evidence and a thorough information screening and management process. However, she notes that neuroscience and psychology studies tend to converge in showing the difficulty decision makers have in practice to be logical and to weigh the evidence (without biases and intuitive processes often used to interpret evidence3) in a coherent and consistent manner. As seen earlier, risk management can be envisioned as an entry point in the implementation of resilience (Mitchell and Harris 2012). It is argued that the very essence of managing risks presents weaknesses. Jaeger (2010) suggests that applying general principles and formulas in defining preventative actions to guard against 3  Stein uses the example of “When President George W. Bush was considering whether or not to go to war in Iraq, he was told that Saddam Hussein had sought to buy yellow cake uranium from Niger. That was new information to the president – he had not heard it before – and it was diagnostic; it signalled that Saddam was likely seeking to develop unconventional weapons. What the information was not was reliable or valid, and therefore it should have been excluded from any kind of consideration. The reliability and validity of information is a threshold barrier that any piece of evidence should cross on its way into the decision-making process.” (Stein 2009; p. 62)

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particular risk contexts is laden with difficulties. Mitigation measures are the result of the computation of hypothetical scenario and complex calculations combining probability and utility. Defining rational decisions in the context of disaster management and resilience policies, argues Jaeger, will require more research. Another significant matter is that the illusion of rationality when dealing with risks deceives societies. This view is one put forward by Adams (1999) who refers to risks, particularly those that are not intuitive or directly perceptible (such as climbing a tree), being left to the judgement of “experts” whose analyses are informed by scientific information. The authority of scientific and rational expert views has led risk management to be concerned predominantly with the conversion of all risks into numerical forms disregarding the notions of rewards. This institutionalisation phenomenon of risk management is far reaching and has profound effects, which Adams summarises in writing: “Institutions  – government departments or large commercial enterprises – usually assign the job of risk management to particular people or departments who have no (or very little) balancing responsibility and rarely consider rewards to be gained from particular actions.” (Adams 1999; p.  12). This view builds on the idea of social construction put forward by Douglas and Wildavski (1982). The fundamental question behind the issue of social selection is one that focuses on who would carry out such selection and prioritisation of risks and why. According to this argument, the mobilisation around certain risks allows certain directions and public concerns be prioritised  – thus risk acceptability is a political issue (also referred to as a construction of risks). Similarly, Furedi (2002) denounces a culture of fear, arguing that greater security and safety in modern societies has developed through innovation and experimentation rather than via risk avoidance and obsessive quantification. Amongst the numerous works on biases and influences on risk perception, Slovic (1987) describes how the perception and acceptance of risk is influenced by social and cultural factors such as friends, family and other respected public or private individuals. Slovic’s research on risk from a psychological perspective exposes that mental strategies – heuristics – often developed in order to deal with uncertainty and assist in decision-making are, in fact, persistent biases in the perception of risks. This has fundamental consequences on the public management of risk through the forecasting of acceptance and oppositions. Whilst additional information about hazards will influence public assessments, it is also important to take into account heuristics such as: risk and benefit tend to be positively correlated4 (Slovic and Peters 2006). Consequently, this calls for the inclusion of risk communication about prevention and treatment of risk as integral part of risk management. 4  Slovic and Peters use the example of Nuclear radiation showing “how information about benefit [e.g. benefits to nuclear power is high] or information about risk [risk relating to nuclear power is low] could increase the positive affective evaluation of nuclear power and lead to inferences about risk and benefit that coincide affectively with the information given. Similarly, information could make the overall affective evaluation of nuclear power more negative, resulting in inferences about risk and benefit that are consistent with this more negative feeling.” (2006, p. 323)

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2.2  D  eterrence and Resilience Frameworks and Systems Thinking Systems thinking has permeated in the resilience domain. The frameworks attached to systems theory relate to the examination of processes, linkages and interactions between the parts (or components) of a system. Defining the system also requires delineating its boundaries and, thereafter, allows the investigation of relations with its environment (open systems that have recognised links with their environment are thought to be more common and realistic). Although this had long been the case in the ecological tradition, the exploration of systemic processes and complex interactions that generate resilience is a more recent trend in social science; the broadening of perspectives led to looking at resilience in terms of change and adaptation. This emanated from the ecological and social ecological traditions (Walker and Salt 2012; Folke 2006) where “resilience is the capacity of a system, be it an individual, a forest, a city or an economy, to deal with change and continue to develop. It is about how humans and nature can use shocks and disturbances like a financial crisis or climate change to spur renewal and innovative thinking”. (Stockholm Resilience Centre 2017). Giroux and Prior note the importance of this outlook: “From this perspective, resilience is an adaptive process characterised by systemic re-organisation, renewal and development – where equilibrium or a steady-state response is neither anticipated nor desired” (2012; p. 10). For Joseph (2013) the growing literature on the adaptation of social systems presents challenges. It encourages citizens to take active role and responsibility in ensuring the needed changes take place in order to meet face and absorb shocks. For him, the concept of resilience shows its liberal side through its fundamental acceptance of a situation and its leaning on individuals and not only on institutions to maintain an ‘acceptable’ level of function. Nevertheless, the notion of the ‘dynamics of systems’ fits with a growing consensus that today’s societal challenges are globalised and are exacerbated by complex interconnections. Unsurprisingly, the study and further implementation of resilience goes beyond mere crisis management, it entails the grasp of the system’s internal complexity and of the interconnection the system has with its environment. Giroux and Prior encapsulate the intricacy of building systemic resilience: “It likely calls for a multi-layered approach to resilience development (or maintenance) since it is concerned not only with ensuring infrastructures are resilient, but that these are operated and used by resilient communities, who in turn are buoyed and serviced by resilient businesses and economies.” (2012; p. 14). The broadening of resilience strategies beyond emergency management is noticeable in the UK. The government recognises that resilience in society concerns infrastructure, communities and businesses; thus, the delineation of the system boundaries now includes entities such as buildings, systems and networks (Cabinet Office 2014). It is also visible in the realm of security. Prior (2017) explains that new security challenges for NATO members are to be considered in the light of

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‘hyper-connectivity’ and interdependence. It is, therefore, vital that NATO is coherent in its drive for increased resilience and that “it recognizes the need for distributed responses across the large number of actors responsible for managing and protecting critical infrastructures: a space where threats are not dealt with by solely relying on a military monopoly.” (Prior 2017; p.  2). Hence, the effect of system thinking and broader approaches is a shift in emphasis away from purely military solutions to security. Equally, the broadening of perspective induces a change in security management approaches based on prevention and acknowledging the limited power of centralised structures. The latest resilience approaches attempt to be less specific (than traditional risk management would normally prescribe) and more generic by acknowledging “the existence and persistence of existing risks (anticipating) and the necessity of understanding systemic vulnerability in order to prepare for potential future shocks and disturbances (adapting)” (Prior 2017; p. 3). As noted earlier, deterrence theory evolved through waves of questioning and conceptual development. Knopf (2010) reminds readers of the initial three waves5 in deterrence research and suggests that the fourth wave finds its origin in the events of 9/11 and focuses on the problem of asymmetric threats and great powers dealings with rogue or weak states and terrorists (including in the context of regional rivalries). Consequently, deterrence moved away from attempts to calculate and measure the number of weapons or a specific capability to deter against a particular threat at a particular time (Payne 2010). As opponents and contexts change, there has been renewed interest for ‘deterrence by denial’,6 which fits well with the idea that resilience and flexibility in society meets more appropriately today’s deterrence requirements. Knopf affirms that “bolstering societal resilience is especially important. When a society can demonstrate the ability to withstand terrorism, it sends a message that using this tactic will not enable terrorist organizations to achieve their goals.” (2010, p. 12). In a sense, this is an acknowledgement that specified approaches (e.g. deterrence by retaliation or punishment) are deemed as being too narrow and require clear positioning as to what threat is acceptable and what is not. In contrast, ‘deterrence by denial’ allows a form of systemic thinking and denotes the need to redefine boundaries of the systems in focus (the deterred as well as the deterrent). Just as ‘deterrence by denial’ broadens the approaches to deterrence, so does the concept of ‘extended deterrence’. Such arrangements allow states to extend deterrence through formal and informal alliances  – such as the EU and NATO.  The extension of 5  “The initial wave of deterrence theorizing came after World War II and was driven by the need to respond to a real-world problem – the invention of the atom bomb. The second wave emerged in the 1950s and 1960s. It applied tools like game theory to develop much of what became conventional wisdom about nuclear strategy (at least in the West). Starting in the 1960s but really taking off in the 1970s, the third wave used statistical and case-study methods to empirically test deterrence theory, mainly against cases of conventional deterrence. The case-study literature also challenged the rational actor assumption employed in second-wave theory.” (Knopf 2010; p. 1) 6  Knopf defines this concept as a strategy aiming to “dissuade a potential attacker by convincing them that the effort will not succeed, and they will be denied the benefits they hope to obtain.” (2010; p. 10)

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b­ oundaries is problematic in that it flags up issues of credibility7 at the heart of a deterrent posture.

3  C  orrespondence Beyond Risk – Complementarity and Mismatch Risk tools have matured over centuries of mathematical discoveries and have offered humanity methodologies to understand their environment and to some extent how the past could inform the future (Bernstein 1996). However, in today’s reality of a globalised and highly interactive world, the effectiveness of strategies based on scenario planning is debated. Not surprisingly, both deterrence and resilience have evolved towards a broader scope to underpin their approaches. Accordingly, the conceptualisation of both deterrence and resilience is moving away from risk and its technocratic and formulaic risk management tools now perceived to be restrictive in their offer.

3.1  Areas of Complementarity Building on the above, suggestion that the two concepts are, in fact, complementary is to be expected. For Juncos (2017), complementarity is fundamental: building resilience of the developing world is a way to increase the security of the developed world – hence reducing its need for deterrence. Gearson (2012) actually contends that resilience can be considered as an element of deterrence. For him, resilience strategies  – through their effect on society, businesses and infrastructure – can be likened to the hardening of targets.8 Communication or messaging become particularly important in this respect; the challenge being to convey that resilience measures (here understood as the ability to cope with unexpected events) offer protection and long-term benefits to society by convincing would-be terrorists that their desired effect will not be achieved. Bendiek and Metzger (2015) also converge with that view and propose the term ‘deterrence-by-resilience’. In the context of cyber security, Bendiek and Metzger argue that the new domain of cyber-defence is so fast evolving and ­complex 7  “Extending deterrence in a credible way proved a more complicated proposition than deterring direct attack. It was entirely credible to threaten the Soviet Union with the use of nuclear weapons in response to a Soviet attack on the United States. But how could the United States make credible the threat to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet homeland in response to a Soviet attack on U.S. allies in Europe?” (Pifer et al. 2010; p. 1) 8  Borrowing from the military-like jargon, Gearson explains that “Target hardening of the sort seen initially in London and in recent years across other world cities, and defensive measures taken in response to specific intelligence as a means to deter terrorists from carrying out specific attacks have had quite a good record in the UK and elsewhere.” (Gearson 2012; p. 186)

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and, consequently, there is a lack of clarity and impunity for attackers, which acts as a major block for the implementation of effective deterrence strategies.9 Again, in the cyber context, Bologna et al. (2013) suggest moving from a protective approach, referred to as “fortress”, where all acceptable precaution is taken, to one of “resilience” where protective, preventive, and deterrent safeguards are in place, but have limitations. In recognising that mitigation and protection measures are not always effective, Bologna et al. point to the importance of response, recovery, and restorative action in a resilience approach. This resigned admission is one deplored by Joseph when he criticises the UK National Security Strategy’s fatalistic claim that because risks are unpredictable, and cannot all be prevented, society at large should be involved in the process of risk management and responsible precautionary action. For him, although, “this sounds like a positive approach, but it actually encourages a rather passive attitude. It uses the idea of an external threat to encourage individual adaptation. People are encouraged to engage actively with a wider situation that is deemed beyond their control. Hence the emphasis is on adapting to and exploiting a situation, rather than trying to change the wider social condition. Resilience, in contrast to something like resistance, implies the acceptance of a situation.” (Joseph 2013, p. 262). In a similar vein, Prior notes that in the context of NATO whilst “resilience is sometimes viewed almost as a panacea to anticipating uncertainty, reducing vulnerability and adapting to events – but it must be considered as a transformative process” (2017, p. 4).

3.2  A  reas of Mismatch or Divergence – The Significance of Change and Transformation in Deterrence and Resilience Theories It is noticeable that the recent broadening of the deterrence and resilience concepts has meant that both concepts are now turning to adaptive and transformative outlooks. In the resilience domain, there are many debates on how far prevention, quick response and recovery constitute ‘measures’ of resilience when in fact capacity to adapt and transform are potentially better indicators systems resilience. Giroux and Prior talk of a continuum of the expression of resilience with ‘bouncing back’ at the ‘static’ end; where the systems’ functions are characterised by stability. At the other end of the continuum, where resilience is expressed through system dynamics and is demonstrated by the ability of system to change as a result of learning (2012; p. 11).

9  “Given the offensive advantage, the number of attackers using cheap, readily available tools will continuously rise, empowering non-established powers such as Iran, North Korea or even Daesh/ IS. Reversing this trend requires getting serious about agreeing on international norms and improving both defences, especially employees’ and citizens’ “cyber-hygiene”, and about enforcement.” (Bendiek and Metzger 2015; p. 557)

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With regards to deterrence theory, change and transformation is not so prominent conceptually, yet, Morgan notes “… with respect to actually using deterrence, much more interesting and innovative is how the western bloc is no longer status quo-­ oriented, fending off challenges to the established order. Instead, the West vigorously promotes democracy, open societies and economies, market systems and respect for human rights, in keeping with democratic peace theory and related liberal notions in which spreading those values and practices is the fundamental basis for a peaceful and secure international politics” (2012; p. 90). Makarenko (2008) points to two areas for the development of adaptive capacities relevant to deterrence. Makarenko’s primary focus is on the dynamic nature of the relationship between crime and terrorism and how the study of their interaction reveals networks that extends from an international to community contexts.10 She argues that the nature of terrorist and criminal organisations is adaptive and flexible; but that counter-measures nations adopt are not. Hence her suggestion is to adopt a more flexible approach context of anti-crime and counter-terrorism policies. In particular, Makarenko submits the idea that valuable intelligence and insight would be gained through the observation of crime patterns particularly with regards to financing.11 Perhaps, the proposition to introduce delays in an approach based on ‘deterrence-­ by-punishment’ to allow an approach of ‘deterrence-by-denial’ to emerge is believed to bring about adaptation and benefits in the long run. The study of resilience in the socio-ecological tradition provides interesting pointers in relation of adaptive and transformative capacity of systems. Davidson-­ Hunt and Berkes (2003) remind us of a typology of responses to surprises. The socio-ecological literature suggests that there are three types of surprises. The first type is described as ‘local’ and is generated by lack or narrow exposure (in time or space) by a particular system. Response strategies to these surprises involve broadening observation and information locally about the surprise (Gunderson 1999; Folke et al. 2007). Accumulation of knowledge is generally sufficient to allow risk-­ management-­based strategies to deal with these surprises that are believed to have a statistical distribution. The second type of surprise, referred to as ‘cross-scales’, occurs in the context of interconnection amongst scales when “local variables coalesce to form a regional or global pattern, or when a process exhibits contagion”

 Makarenko has devoted much of her research to the investigation of the convergence between organized crime and terrorism. She claims “Criminal and terrorist networks which have emerged from a state of perpetual conflict and instability blatantly reveal the ultimate danger of the crimeterror connection to international security.” (2008; p. 60) 11  “Although the importance of blocking criminal opportunities is important in both the context of anti-crime and counter-terrorism, the ability to identify crimes which are of interest to both criminal and terrorist networks provides an invaluable intelligence tool. Thus prior to implementing a policy of denial, it is essential to use knowledge of crime-terror interaction to collect more insight regarding organizational design of both groups, including the fundamentals of the acquisition and movement of criminal financing. Such knowledge not only contributes to the building of solid cases for prosecution services, but it also helps develop adaptive forecasting models which allows law enforcement and the security services to focus their resources.” (Makarenko 2008; p. 71) 10

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(Folke et al. 2007).12 Adaptations to this type of surprises require the coordinated effort of many stakeholders and although they may be common, they are controversial in that they require ad hoc policy measures if appropriate institutions are not available or are readily formed (Folke et al. 2007). The third type of surprises precludes predictions because of the genuine novelty the present. As such, the ‘never-­ seen-­ before’ phenomena experienced means that preparation, prevention or pre-adaptation is impossible (Berkes et al. 2003). Coping with this type of surprise requires systems to have developed capacities to reorganise, learn and renew.13

4  Concluding Comments This chapter has offered a review of deterrence and resilience, an undertaking which is topical – as both concepts have developed independently of each other, albeit in similar ways. On closer examination, it appears that both are cornerstones of security strategies – perhaps with their most significant difference being their referent object (deterrence being almost exclusively a matter for States). They both have risk at their heart and involve the management of risks and uncertainty. Consequently, their shared major shortcoming is the limitation of rationality upon which risk management is built. New patterns have seen increasing references to system thinking in both concepts (although for resilience, ecology and other natural sciences had adopted system theory from the outset – the principles have only permeated recently into the social science understanding of resilience). As a result, issues of system boundaries and system dynamics have influenced the evolution of current thinking. The conceptual approaches have broadened and are impacting upon current practice. It is clear that the concepts can be seen as complementary, in particular in the light of a globalised world with hybrid or asymmetric threats. Complementarity may be useful to policy makers, yet it is the notion of change that will bring about the biggest promises in the evolution of these concepts. How are the ideas of adaptation and transformation embraced in these concepts? There, the study of resilience may provide some interesting pointers for the future.

References Achen CH, Snidal D (1989) Rational deterrence theory and comparative case studies. World Polit 41(2):143–169 Adams J (1999) Cars, cholera, and cows. Policy Anal 335:1–49

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Bendiek A, Metzger T (2015) Deterrence theory in the cyber-century. Lecture notes in informatics for INFORMATIK 2015. Gesellschaftfür Informatik, Bonn. Retrieved on 22 December 2017 at https://dl.gi.de/bitstream/handle/20.500.12116/2216/553.pdf?sequence=1 Berkes F, Colding J, Folke C (eds) (2003) Navigating social-ecological systems: building resilience for complexity and change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Bernstein PL (1996) Against the gods: the remarkable story of risk. Wiley, New York Bologna S, Fasani A, Martellini M (2013) From fortress to resilience. In: Martellini M (ed) Cyber security. Springer briefs in computer science. Springer, Cham Brimmer E (ed) (2008) Five dimensions of homeland & international security. Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC Cabinet Office (2008) The National Security Strategy: security in an interdependent world. Cabinet Office, London. Retrieved on 22 January 2018 at www.official- documents.gov.uk/document/ cm72/7291/7291.pdf Cabinet Office (2011a) Keeping the country running: natural hazards and infrastructure. Cabinet Office, London. Retrieved on 22 January 2018 at http://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61342/natural-hazards-infrastructure.pdf Cabinet Office (2011b, September 7) UK resilience. [Website]. Retrieved on 20 June 2019 at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110907105059/http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ ukresilience Cabinet Office (2013, February 20) Guidance: emergency response and recovery. Website. Retrieved on 3 August 2017 at www.gov.uk/guidance/emergency-response-and-recovery Cabinet Office (2014, December 14) Guidance: Resilience in society: infrastructure, communities and businesses. Gov.uk website. Retrieved on 23 January 2018 at https://www.gov.uk/ guidance/resilience-in-society-infrastructure-communities-and-businesses#history Davidson-Hunt IJ, Berkes F (2003) Nature and society through the lens of resilience: toward a human-in-ecosystem perspective. In: Berkes F, Colding J, Folke C (eds) Navigating social-­ ecological systems: building resilience for complexity and change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 53–82 Douglas M, Wildavsky A (1982) Risk and culture: an essay on the selection of technical and environmental dangers. University of California Press, Berkeley Einhorn R, Pifer S (2017) Deterrence requirements: toward a sustainable national consensus, Working Group Report, edited by Brookings Institution, September 2017. Retrieved on 22 January 2018 at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/fp_20170920_deterrence_report.pdf Fearon JD (1995) Rationalist explanations for war. Int Organ 49(3):379–414 Folke C (2006) Resilience: the emergence of a perspective for social–ecological systems analyses. Glob Environ Chang 16(3):253–267 Folke C, Pritchard L, Berkes F, Colding J, Svedin U (2007) The problem of fit between ecosystems and institutions: ten years later. Ecol Soc 12(1):30. Retrieved on 22 January 2018 at http:// www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol12/iss1/art30/ Furedi F (2002) Culture of fear. Risk-taking and the morality of low expectation. Continuum, London Gearson J  (2012) Deterring conventional terrorism: from punishment to denial and resilience. Contemp Secur Policy 33(1):171–198 Giroux J, Prior T (2012) Factsheet expressions of resilience: from “bounce back” to adaptation. Report. Risk and Resilience Research Group Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich. Retrieved on 22 December 2017 at https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-a-009978930 Gunderson L (1999) Resilience, flexibility and adaptive management – antidotes for spurious certitude. Conserv Ecol 3(1):7. Retrieved on 22 January 2018 at http://www.consecol.org/vol3/ iss1/art7/ Haimes YY (2009) On the definition of resilience in systems. Risk Anal 29:498–501. Retrieved on 22 January 2018 at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1539-6924.2009.01216.x Jaeger C (2010) Risk, rationality, and resilience. Int J Disaster Risk Sci 1(1):10–16

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Deterrence and Diplomacy Afzal Ashraf

1  Introduction This chapter considers the roles of, and the relationship between, deterrence and diplomacy, exploring these concepts in the context of power politics, threat perception and fear, and how these factors and the underlying political philosophies of liberalism and realism shape relevant policies and strategies. The challenge to deterrence resulting from the impact on reputation shaped by perceptions of states’ success and failure in past conflicts, is used to identify the current crisis in deterrence capability. That crisis is aggravated by the changing nature of security threats and these are examined to establish the positive role that diplomacy can play in addressing them through a different way of thinking and approach. Deterrence of emerging challenges, including hybrid warfare, and the need to update nuclear deterrence thinking are also discussed from a diplomacy perspective. In common understanding, diplomacy is a concept situated in the realm of peaceful international relationships, while deterrence is understood to be an aspect of conflict. In actuality, both concepts have always been linked. This linkage has strengthened, at least in theory, as the character of war has evolved through the use of nuclear deterrence, globalisation, the proliferation of technology, and the greater employment of non-state actor violence. With the possible exception of nuclear deterrence, diplomacy to support deterrence has been employed by states instinctively rather than doctrinally, as judged by the dearth of international diplomacy doctrine. Given the changes in the character of conflict and the rise of liberal international institutions, the relationship between these concepts deserves to be better explored in both theoretical and practical ­contexts. The emergence of hybrid warfare in particular makes such an exploration highly timely. A. Ashraf (*) School of Politics and International Relations, Nottingham University, Nottingham, UK e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 A. Filippidou (ed.), Deterrence, Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29367-3_3

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This chapter aims to provide a contribution to an improved understanding of how diplomacy and deterrence interact with each other, how they have been applied in both past and in recent events, and in exposing areas of potential improvement. It further attempts to identify theories or models that could potentially be useful tools in current and future international affairs.

2  Concepts 2.1  Deterrence Deterrence as a concept is discussed in detail by others in this book, but it is worth considering features that are relevant to its relationship with diplomacy. In the context of defence and security, deterrence is defined in similar ways by different states. The US Department of Defense, for example, describes it as being “to decisively influence the adversary’s decision-making calculus in order to prevent hostile actions against US vital interests” (Department of Defense 2006, p. 5).. The UK’s national security strategy identifies the purpose of deterrence as being to ensure “that any potential aggressor may know that any benefits they may seek to gain by attacking the UK will be outweighed by the consequences for them” (HM Government 2015). Two common ideas emerge from these definitions. The first is that deterrence involves a cost–benefit decision. The second is that deterrence involves communicating a disadvantageous position for any potential adversary contemplating attack. Whether an adversary’s decision-making process comes to the intended conclusion will depend on a number of factors. Prime among them will be the efficacy of any political analysis that underpins the cost–benefit equation and how well deterrence messages are communicated, understood, and believed. These factors are mainly the purview of the diplomatic community.

2.2  Deterrence and the Avoidance of Threat Much of the thinking around deterrence is from a realist perspective; that threat is assumed to be ubiquitous. National security policies and strategies consequently focus on dealing with a threat through deterrence or other means, rather than considering ways of avoiding the creation of the threat in the first place. Most case studies are analysed to determine how deterrence has either failed or succeeded, but rarely to learn how the need for deterrence might initially have been avoided. Analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis often suffers from this approach. Events leading up to the crisis reveal a chain of deterrence decisions resulting in a high-risk situation of brinkmanship. Each decision had the potential to “draw, not deter, an

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attack” since each decision to deter an existing perceived threat created a new perceived threat (Bertstein 1980, p.  99). The starting point for that chain of events could be identified as the USA’s decision to station the Jupiter nuclear missile system in Turkey, on Russia’s border. Approval for the deployment of the Jupiter missiles followed the Eisenhower administration’s fears of “a ‘confidence’ or ‘deterrence’ gap” between NATO and the USSR (Bernstein 1980, p. 99). In 1959 Turkey agreed to accept them, and the missiles became operational around July 1962, some 3 months before the Cuban Missile Crisis. In the same month, President Khrushchev exploited Cuban Premier, Fidel Castro’s need to deter the USA from further attacks on Cuba, following the failed Bay of Pigs overthrow attempt, to persuade him to agree to basing Soviet nuclear missiles on the island (Office of the Historian n.d.). Records indicate that President Kennedy recognised that the Russians perceived the Jupiter missiles as a threat, that the issue could be linked to Cuba, and that he was considering withdrawing them just weeks before the crisis (Bernstein 1980). This chain of threat and deterrence culminated in one of the most dangerous security situations in history, simply because all sides made deterrence decisions with insufficient consideration of the threat these decisions might present. While the potential gravity might not be so great, such chain reactions also exist in non-nuclear scenarios. Another under-emphasised feature of the Cuban Missile Crisis is that diplomatic deterrence, rather than military deterrence, eventually  predominated. Had the President accepted the military advice to invade Cuba, it is unlikely that a negotiated de-escalation would have occurred. Certainly, the underlying issue of the Jupiter missiles in Turkey would not have been addressed. The enduring lesson from the Cuban Missile Crisis should be that civil-led diplomacy must have primacy over military options. Military action has to be the last resort and should only be employed when that action can be assumed to lead to a clear victory, so that military deterrence options are strengthened for future threats.

2.3  Diplomacy Sir Peter Marshall’s (1997, p. 7) description of diplomacy as “monstrously imprecise” captures the wide variety of definitions the word attracts. Almost every writer on the topic has offered a definition. Harold Nicolson (1950, p.  15) turns to the Oxford Dictionary to suggest that diplomacy is “the management of international relations by negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of diplomatist.” Alexandru Lucinescu’s (2017, p.  63) insightful critical review of the concept includes Nicolson’s five features of “diplomacy: foreign policy, negotiation, processes and machinery necessary for carrying out the international negotiations, a branch of Foreign Service and the ability proven in international negotiations to skilfully manage them or to be cunning.” (Lucinescu 2017, p. 62).

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Lucinescu (2017) further describes the debate between those who believe that diplomacy is solely about peaceful foreign policy and those who regard it as also an instrument of war. This apparent distinction may have come about in modern states due to the creation of civilian institutions for foreign policy and the creation of permanent militaries for defence. However, Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War indicates that this distinction was mostly absent in the past. For example, King Arquidmus implored the Sparta Assembly to consider arbitration instead of war. He said “send envoys to the Athenians … they are ready to submit to arbitration …. but all the while prepare yourselves for the war” (cited in de Magalhães 1988, p. 22). This ancient Head of State’s policy advice was offered to people who would engage in both a diplomacy of arbitration and, if necessary, in fighting a war of attrition. Arquidmus’ speech to the Spartan Assembly provides a timeless insight into the link between diplomacy and war. His advice began with an analysis of the balance of power between Sparta and Athens and the consequences of a protracted war between the two city states, indicating the critical importance of having international relations decisions based on a pragmatic assessment of the relative strengths of the parties involved in potential conflicts. In advocating for diplomacy, he recommended a deliberately ambiguous message to the Athenians on whether Sparta would ultimately appease or confront them. This highlights in the mind of an adversary the importance of magnifying the coercive and deterrent effects of uncertainty and fear resulting from any failed diplomatic negotiations. The time spent in negotiations was to be usefully employed to prepare for war by winning allies and acquiring resources and funds. All this was primarily to be achieved through diplomatic activity involving Sparta and other non-aligned states. His policy prioritised success through negotiations while simultaneously increasing the chances of victory through preparations for war, should these be unsuccessful. Arquidmus further points out that allowing the Athenians to witness the preparations for war may coerce them to yield in negotiations, thereby deterring a costly and risky war. Military coercion can have unintended consequences, as Arquidmus sagely points out. He suggests that by capturing Athenian territory in advance of negotiations, the Spartans may cause the Athenians to become “desperate” and a “more intractable foe to deal with” (de Magalhães 1988, p. 21). Here, Arquidmus seems to be implying a rarely recognised principle of war: the cost of coercion is usually greater than the cost of deterrence for both sides. Rewards of complying with deterrence may be similarly greater. His underlying hypothesis is that in conflict management, negotiations based on national interests have a greater flexibility to accommodate mutually acceptable solutions than war, which usually comes with a singular, costly, and uncertain outcome: For complaints, indeed, whether brought by states, or by individuals, may possibly be adjusted; but when a whole confederacy, for the sake of individual interests, undertakes a war of which no man can foresee the issue, it is not easy to conclude it with honour. (de Magalhães 1988, p. 21)

This maxim has a resonance in modern conflicts, many of which involve coalitions in protracted operations without an ‘honourable’ outcome. Honour in this case

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r­epresents a reputation for decisive victory, which in turn feeds into the nation’s deterrent capability. In the battlefield of political debate, such judicious rhetoric loses to the pathos of fear. So it was that Arquidmus’ failure to persuade the Assembly, led to war with Athens and resulted in disaster for the Spartans. This tendency to disregard diplomacy in favour of a military response to a threat is another persistent feature of deterrence thinking. Fear is the central emotion at work in effective deterrence. When those who feel threatened succumb to fear, they find it difficult to believe in a deterrence strategy based on diplomacy, given its abstract nature. They tend, in those circumstances, to resort to the more tangible option of deploying power through a military strategy. Fear and power are central features of realism (Curtis 2008) and so deterrence strategic choices are influenced in large part by the degree to which a state’s political philosophy ascribes to realism.

2.4  Threat, Fear and Deterrence Choice These mechanisms of perceived threat, fear and a struggle to find the right balance between a diplomatic negotiated settlement and a military response, continue to play out in many recent situations. It is telling that popular historical analysis has been critical of Chamberlain’s apparent naivety for appeasing Hitler through diplomacy while Churchill’s bellicose calls for military confrontation are applauded. In actuality, both men, in their different ways, followed Arquidmus’ advice. Had Chamberlain not gone as an “envoy” to avert Hitler’s attention from the UK, through the Munich Agreement, the country would have been ill prepared to withstand a German invasion. This allowed valuable months to “prepare” for UK’s defences. Even after war was declared a year later, the RAF was in a disadvantageous position and only won the Battle of Britain thanks to Hitler’s interference in the Luftwaffe strategy of bombing RAF airfields. Had the German air campaign continued for just a day or two it would have achieved its objective. Much of the preparation for war was inspired by Winston Churchill’s warnings over the 1930s and he set about “winning allies” in the form of the USA and Russia, albeit after the start of the war rather than before it. If Chamberlain’s proposal for an agreement with Hitler been put to a vote, it is likely to have failed. The threat would have been shaped by the arguments of fear based on previous wars, in the same way as Arquidmus’ appeals were voted out. In that event the UK would almost certainly have faced the same disastrous consequences as Sparta.

2.5  Diplomacy, Intelligence and Deterrence Given the many roles that diplomacy plays involving security, defence and economics, it is necessarily an art deployed in a competitive environment. The need to outwit a competitor requires knowledge of hidden strengths, weaknesses, interests

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and the like. These are generally only available through intelligence, much of which tends to be secrete. Harmen observes that “the diplomatic system which became institutionalised in Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was largely a response to nation states’ need for information” (Herman 1999, p. 10). Intelligence can provide the necessary warning and detail of a threat. It can provide useful information to help evaluate the threats, strengths, weaknesses and opportunities upon which strategic decisions could be based. Intelligence can also underpin successful diplomatic negotiations by providing information on opposition personalities, other’s negotiation strategies and redlines. However, overzealous and intrusive intelligence gathering risks undermining the trust necessary for diplomacy. Diplomacy has a role in international dialogue which requires a degree of trust “and not just as cover for intelligence collection” (Herman 1999, p. 374). Tension and trust characterise the relationship between diplomacy and intelligence in most circumstances. However, in the deterrence situation, where a threat is assumed, trust is of lesser importance, making the role of intelligence almost inseparable from diplomacy. Diplomacy and intelligence work most closely when faced with a potential defence and security threat. In these circumstances, military intelligence and surveillance capabilities often work hand in glove with civilian intelligence personnel and diplomats to identify, negotiate and deal with a threat. Little contemporary information is freely available on such operations because of their covert nature. The UK’s failed mission to Libya in March 2011 provides a rare glimpse into how intelligence services, special forces and diplomats work together to achieve policy objectives in conflict situations. It was not a deterrence mission. Covert negotiations with anti-Gadhafi forces were the operation’s objective, but it is illustrative of how such diplomacy works. Poor communications and planning meant that the rebels detained the British team, forcing the UK Ambassador in Libya to publically request their release. This event only came to public notice because it was mishandled. It would be safe to assume that many missions suceed and go unreported. It is also important to note that not all details were revealed by the UK government because of its policy of not commenting on special operations. However, details are irrelevant to the main point that intelligence, special forces and diplomats can work closely, and in secret, to achieve deterrence related objectives. Additionaly, many states increasingly use intelligence organisations to conduct secret negotiations on matters relating to security. For example, the UK used its foreign intelligence service, MI6, to help secretly resolve its conflict with the IRA in Northern Ireland. MI6 also helped to negotiate the destruction of Libya’s WMD stockpiles. The use of secret intelligence services in such scenarios allows states to avoid potential public embarrassment when dealing with sensitive regimes or organisations. The method can simultaneously maintain the dignity of the weaker party, enabling it to present any subsequent deal as one done voluntarily, without coercion. To the extent that ‘knowledge is power,’ an intelligence capability is a major component of a state’s diplomatic and military deterrence. Whether it leads to success or failure depends on the judgement of those that obtain, analyse and use intelligence.

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2.6  Dignity, Diplomacy and Deterrence Dignity, honour and face-saving are aspects of self-worth. They are significant motivators in states’ decisions about their security and their relationships with other nations. Researchers have attempted to define these different manifestations of self-­worth and have associated each with various regional or national cultures (see Friedrichs 2016). For the sake of simplicity, the exact definitions and differences in these concepts can be ignored. Suffice to say that self-worth is linked to status and the depravation of self-worth at the hands of others leads to the negative emotion of humiliation. All of these have a largely underestimated impact on states’ behaviour, particularly with respect to security. Honour and, to some extent, dignity, are considered old fashioned in the West and diplomats tend to employ them only when speaking of non-western nations. The implication is that western decision making avoids the emotionality of these terms in favour of a purely rational thought process. However, evidence indicates otherwise. One scholar claims that “for all the talk of honor’s obsolescence, it clearly remains central to the waging of war” (Robinson cited in Friedrichs 2006, p. 6) and presumably also to wider diplomacy. A detailed examination indicates that emotions relating to self-worth affected both leaders, Kennedy and Khrushchev, during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Personal emotions combine with myths of past national glory to produce a dignity vision and narrative for Heads of State. Trump’s slogan “Make America Great Again” does just that. In Russia too, Putin has “sought to restore dignity to the past” (Sakwa 2007, p. 37). Day to day ‘rational’ decisions float on turbulent emotions relating to the personal psychology of leaders and the national myths of dignity and power they construct. In the context of deterrence, where decisions are based on a cost–benefit equation, Wohlforth posits that “State’s satisfaction with its place in the existing order is a function of the material costs and benefits implied by that status” (Wohlforth 2008, pp. 34–35). When nations deal with each other in a situation of asymmetry of power, as in colonial, neo-colonial or superpower scenarios, there is political value in mitigating any feeling of loss of self-worth being caused by them to the weaker party while maintaining their power differential. Failure to do so could risk a rebellion and it is to deter this type of behaviour that great powers have instinctively developed a delicate balance over many centuries. In the pre-Cold War era, diplomacy was used in the deterrence role primarily through enhancing the prestige of the state and to showcase its military power indirectly through ceremonial activities. This was done in ways ranging from the flamboyance of military and civil leadership’s uniforms, pomp and ceremony of parades and imperial art and architecture. For example, the UK’s Foreign & Commonwealth Office’s (FCO) Durbar Court, a marble floored courtyard adorned on all sides by symbolic reliefs, statues and inscriptions relating to Great Britain’s jewel imperial possession, India, was especially commissioned to host Indian maharajas and princes paying homage to their British Empress. The architecture simultaneously pointed to the grandeur of British power, and hence the futility of revolt, as well as the reflected glory its subjects

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could enjoy by remaining loyal (Porter 2011). The court’s first use, however, was to host the Sultan of the rival Ottoman empire in 1867. No doubt, the Sultan received a detailed briefing on the names of Indian cities listed as trophies around the court, the statues of British explorers, governors and generals who conquered or managed the colony as well as the interfaith aspects depicted in reliefs of symbols of Hinduism, Christianity and Islam. The Sultan would have understood, without any direct reference to the balance of power, that his empire was in a less favourable situation than his hosts’. Later, when the colonies began to push for independence, colonial leaders were invited for discussions at the FCO. Their arrival into the building involved walking up the Grand Staircase which by 1921 was decorated with a series of murals depicting England’s imperial history and a romantic view of a “‘blood and soil’ understanding of the hierarchy of nations.” These lavish decorations were designed to “send the message that Britain was at the peak of its imperial powers” (Mirkovic 2014). The implication was that its colonies were privileged to be part of Great Britain’s greatness rather than falling prey to its lesser imperial rivals. Deterrence was, of course, not the sole motive behind the symbolic messages. Diplomacy simultaneously communicates several messages, verbal and symbolic, intended to impress and influence thinking and behaviours the greater power likes and deter those that it does not. Lavish buildings, formal attire and banquets to host colonial subjects or the leader of a weaker, potentially rival state simultaneously speak to the power and prestige of the hosts as well as the dignity and respect of the visitor. In this way, the symbolic designs and courtly rituals aim to sweeten the deterrence message through maintaining and reinforcing the dignity of the weaker party. As the world trends towards an egalitarian and more defuse understanding of the nature of power, economics and identity, these courtly tropes are losing their prominence. However, the underlying importance of self-worth has, if anything, increased. This is partly due to the ability weaker states have in responding to offence and insults through public diplomacy using the global media. Reported offensive comments about Haiti, African and some South American countries by the President of the USA were promptly rebutted (Sanders 2018) by not just leaders from affected countries, but also citizens of many unaffected nations, including the USA. In this way, a slight against a weaker party can be turned into embarrassment for the stronger party. Just because individual and collective self-worth is non-quantifiable, its critical role in framing existential threats and hence impacting deterrence cost–benefit decisions should not be underestimated.

3  End of Victory and Weakening of Deterrence A change in conflict has evolved so gradually over the last half century that its dramatic impact has escaped common notice. Victory has progressively eluded the world’s superpowers in their wars. The USA failed to deliver victory in Vietnam. The USSR similarly failed in Afghanistan. More recently, “As then-Defense

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Secretary, Robert Gates, noted in a 2007 lecture, ‘One of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that military success is not sufficient to win’” (Zakaria 2017). This failure to win wars, despite a massive balance of power advantage has, of course, been recognised and agonised over by both military and foreign affairs experts. Many causes and theories have been proposed to account for failures. General Daniel Bolger apportions blames on himself and his peers when he claims that the primary failing “involved generalship.” Specifically, he identified “poor strategic and operational leadership” (Bolger 2014, p. xv). Others identify “weak political leadership … fed by timorous advice from officials and diplomats who usually know better, but choose not to say so,” as the main culprit (Cowper 2011). Whatever the cause, the fact remains that in most recent cases, the great powers have failed to deter resistance to their will and, where resistance occurred, have been unable to coerce opposition forces to comply with their demands. Little critical thought has been given to the impact of these high profile foreign policy and military failures on the future effectiveness of diplomatic and military deterrence. Deterrence relies greatly on convincing an adversary that certain behaviours will exact an unaffordable cost. When great powers fail to exact that cost and reward adversaries with a victory by withdrawing, their political and military reputation is tarnished and their deterrence capability diminishes. Rather than deterring attacks, these failures can actually inspire them. Bin Laden observed: We learned from those who fought there, that they were surprised to see the low spiritual morale of the American fighters in comparison with the experience they had with the Russian fighters … If the US still thinks and brags that it still has this kind of power even after all these successive defeats in Vietnam, Beirut, Aden, and Somalia, then let them go back to those who are awaiting its return. (Arnett, cited in Ashraf 2012)

His analysis of USA’s behaviour was only partially correct. The examples he cited of Vietnam, Beirut, Aden and Somalia were ones where the US was engaged in wars of choice. However, the moment Al Qaeda attacked US citizens on their own soil, this analogy no longer held true. Any reaction to an attack on US soil would have been better understood through the lens of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, the response to which was to awaken what Admiral Yamamoto described as “a sleeping giant,” culminating in the first use of nuclear weapons. Bin Laden, like the superpowers, failed to draw the right lessons from historical perceptions of military failures. Deterrence is not simply related to balance of power or psychology, it is most closely aligned to reputation and to recent history. The importance of building a reputation that shapes the judgment of future potential adversaries’ was well ­understood by President Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis to the extent that he was willing to take the world to the brink of nuclear Armageddon. Speaking to the American people, he explained that it was necessary to do so “if our courage and commitments are ever to be trusted again by friend or foe” (Lebow 1983, p. 448). The failure of the superpowers, USSR and USA, in most recent conflicts has been interpreted as a sign of weakness, particularly as a lack of military stamina and

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political will. Their military failures in past wars emboldened new adversaries to attack them. While President Nixon attempted to contextualise the defeat in Vietnam as a consequence of the media’s continual reporting of the horrors of war without demonstrating sufficient balance on the “underlying purpose of the fighting,” he admitted that “the result was a serious demoralisation of the home front, raising the question whether America would ever again be able to fight an enemy abroad with unity and strength of purpose at home” (Nixon 1978, p.  350). Not only had his administration failed to explain the ‘underlying purpose’ of the war in Vietnam to the domestic audience, but also there was a failure to explain how the USA would react differently when the underlying purpose was to defend the home front. This failure of national and international public diplomacy contributed to the loss of the USA’s deterrence capability and encouraged subsequent insurgencies and terrorist attacks against it. The USA’s poor diplomatic consequence management after the withdrawal from Vietnam was compounded by its failure to recognise that a new approach, beyond public perception management, to its international affairs was necessary. President Gorbachev, on the other hand, seemed to accept at the outset that the USSR’s withdrawal from Afghanistan would presage a revised international approach: “We are taking major steps towards realizing new thinking, a recognition of a balance of interests, and the search for paths of cooperation” (Kalinovsky 2009). While this difference does not entirely account for the USA and Russia’s differing experiences in subsequent conflicts, they will probably have contributed to them. Anne Sartori (2005, p. 5), one of the few people to write on the topic of deterrence and diplomacy, says that “a state that is caught bluffing acquires a reputation for doing so, and opponents are less likely to believe its future communications.” She is referring to reputational damage resulting from a failure of a diplomatic communications or negotiations strategy. Similar reputational damage can occur to a nation’s deterrent capability through failures in war, resulting in the perception of an ineffective power. This major weakness has not been clearly recognised by major powers and their  response has been to increase resources or time, or change the strategic posture from leading the fight to supporting a host nation in a military campaign. None of these have worked in recent times, creating a crisis in deterrence strategy.

4  Diplomacy and Avoidance of Conflict This failure to achieve victory through either deterrence or coercion has been limited to asymmetric warfare scenarios involving non-state actors. There have been several examples of an adversary or potential adversary state being successfully compelled to accept the will of the great powers through diplomatic measures. For example, the USA’s strategy to compel Iran to negotiate over its nuclear programme in 2013, “required intense diplomatic work to get Russia and China to agree to UN

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sanctions and to isolate Iran from neighbours like Turkey” (Zakaria 2017). This diplomatic strategy involved direct and indirect communications with the Iranians, lobbying of superpowers and unaligned countries. It also involved meticulously articulated “and tough sanctions devised by the Treasury Department that leveraged America’s financial power” (Zakaria 2017). This diplomatic success not only deterred Iran from pursuing any designs it might have had to develop a nuclear weapon, but it also deterred a likely Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear research and development capability. Successful deterrence strategies work only to the extent that their aim is maintained and the whimsical nature of political thinking, especially when policy gives way to personality, can turn a diplomatic triumph and successful deterrence strategy into a failure. A similar success was achieved through diplomatic initiatives in persuading the Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi to give up his weapons of mass destruction. The extent to which this  came about as a deterrent following the toppling of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein or whether it was part of Gaddafi’s own desire to come in from the cold in the late 1990s, is debatable (MacLeod 2006). Nevertheless, the process was successful in removing the capability and intention to supply both conventional weapons and WMD in support of international terrorist and rebel groups. Many external factors, such as the fall of the USSR, the coming to power of Nelson Mandela and the raise of Islamist extremism, shaped the opportunity for diplomatic success with the Libyan leader. However, two factors in the nature of the diplomacy used, determined success in this scenario. The first was the level of trust and confidence that had been built up during previous negotiations over the Lockerbie bombing incident. Sanctions and other diplomatic measures had allowed the UK and the USA to extracted concessions from the Libyans in the form of compensation for the victims of the bombings and the handover of suspects after hard negotiations. In return, the Libyans were rewarded by the lifting of sanctions. An important contributory factor to this success was a level of ‘moral’ support provided by Nelson Mandela to the Libyans against the charge of terrorism which damaged the nations ‘dignity’ by indulging in a tactic publicly deemed to be barbaric. President Mandela’s international credibility and ability to draw a moral equivalence with the West on terrorism, was a significant factor in allowing Gaddafi to negotiate without loss of dignity. Secrecy was the second factor. Gaddafi and his son, Saif-al Islam, held direct talks with CIA and MI6 representatives in secret. To some degree these two factors served to redress the unfavourable political and economic balance of power ­situation the Libyans faced against the West. Mandela’s stature played a part in redressing the West’s implied immorality of the Libyan regime. Secret negotiations allowed the Libyan leader to take the risk of potential failure and to present the concessions as a voluntary compromise rather than an extraction under pressure, thus maintaining his own and Libyan national dignity. Throughout these negotiations, and at critical stages towards the end, Gaddafi’s dignity was preserved. Gaddafi hesitated at the final stage as a result of the news that Saddam Hussein had been captured. He worried that his deal with the West would be seen as having been made under the fear of a similar fate befalling him.

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Prime Minister Blair personally wrote to Gaddafi encouraging him to go ahead with the announcement to give up his weapons of mass destruction (WMD). His letters were typically addressed as “Dear Muammar” and ended with “Best wishes, yours ever, Tony” (Davidson 2017). This respectful friendliness was no doubt partly motivated by the UK’s desire for preferential trade following the lifting of sanctions, but it was also necessary to underscore that Gaddafi’s dignity would be maintained during and after the negotiations over his WMD stockpile destruction.

5  Relationship Between Deterrence and Diplomacy The most prevalent factor linking deterrence and diplomacy is the role of diplomacy in communicating deterrence. Power is at the heart of deterrence and it can come in the form of hard power, underwritten by the coercive capability of military force, or in the form of non-hard power, through the use of political or economic threats or inducements. The reference to non-hard power is to distinguish it from soft power, as defined by Joseph Nye (2004), which is considered to be the power of attraction. Soft power cannot, strictly speaking, be capable of deterrent effect because deterrence requires that a potential adversary selects a less attractive course of action. Whether diplomacy either supports a largely military deterrence or is used instead of military force is mainly determined by a state’s foreign policy outlook and its strategic culture. In liberal systems, diplomacy is used to deter unacceptable outcomes using political and economic pressures. These can involve negotiations where compromises and inducements may be offered and accepted by both sides. States where realist foreign policies predominate, tend to give prominence to hard power deterrence. Indeed, in some cases these states may not want to deter an adversary from a threatening stance because their goals are more readily achieved through military intervention to, for example, achieve regime change. States rarely select either a purely liberal or a strictly realist approach to international relations. The two approaches invariably exist as a blend, with relative priority of each approach being affected by factors such as the level and nature of the threat and the possible deterrence options. This duality of political philosophy is near universal in international relations, but is starkest in the West where historic divisions over whether security can be obtained through power or through principles, have resulted in a confusion bordering on political schizophrenia. American independence from Europe in the nineteenth century led to more than a political separation from Europe. It involved a new philosophical and moral approach to security because, “America ascribed the frequency of European wars to the prevalence of governmental institutions which denied the values of freedom and human dignity” (Kissinger 1994, p. 32). European leaders of the time believed that security could come from “a competition of selfish interests” while American leadership imagined a system “in which states would act as co-operative partners, not as distrustful rivals” – thus, the idea of dignity was linked to a new political outlook through the role of morality in international affairs: “American leaders rejected the

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European idea that the morality of states should be judged by different criteria than the morality of individuals” (Kissinger 1994, p. 32). Old European realism progressively gave way to American liberalism as the USA gained power through its involvement in the two World Wars and European empires declined because of them. The emergence of a threat from a rival superpower during the Cold War and the opportunities for power maximisation afforded by the USA’s subsequent political and military supremacy has seen a reversal of outlooks. Europe now champions a liberal international order based on values of human dignity while the waves of liberal and realist approaches of various US administrations have seen the tide turn away from liberalism towards realism. It is mainly this apparent contradiction between the USA’s articulation of liberal international relations and a realist approach to power that gives rise to claims of double standards by other nations. It further complicates deterrence strategies. Diplomatic mechanisms like sanctions are underpinned by international laws based on liberal values. However, the perception of many in the global community is that Western powers manage to bypass these when it suits their national interests. Many non-democratic regimes cite these instances to justify their own non-­ compliance with international norms, thereby weakening the moral effect of diplomatic deterrence-based sanctions. Elements of realist thinking can exist within liberal states and in international institutions such as the UN. Sir Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan’s Permanent Representative to the UN in the 1960s, and a passionate defender of the Arab and Palestinian cause, commented following one of the Arab Israeli wars “What is lost on the battle field, cannot be recovered in negotiations. The Arabs have lost their case. Diplomacy can only soften the effects of defeat” (Koreshi 2004, p. 36). The ‘wisdom’ of this assessment has stood the test of time, presumably because once parties step away from peaceful means of dispute resolution to embark on war, they step into the domain of realism. This empirical reality may have been a significant deterrent to wars in the post-colonial era, but the counterfactual nature of this hypothesis makes any proof difficult. Several useful conclusions could be drawn from a detailed study of the relationship between deterrence diplomacy. One may be that when deterrence is being achieved by a simple, single state action, a realist approach is likely and where it might require a collective or coalition approach, a liberalist response involving international institutions may be employed.

6  Crisis of Deterrence and Diplomacy US Army General Bolger is not alone in identifying the failures of recent wars as being the result of inadequate strategic leadership (Bolger 2014). This lack of strategic leadership, able to effectively adapt and react to the changing character of war, to the changing nature of power and to the emerging challenges in international relations, is the weak link in conventional and, possibly, nuclear deterrence (Strachan and Scheipers 2011; Nye 1990).

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In a well-researched account of the decline of US military strategic leadership, Thomas E. Ricks (2012) states that many of the generals leading the Army in recent years “were not mentally prepared for the wars they encountered.” In the author’s own experience in the Multi National Force in Iraq, the two-star general in charge of strategy was unable to think above the operational level because, according to his senior staff, he was ‘intellectually paper thin’. He was unable to recognise that strategic centres of gravity had a perception dimension. Specifically, he was unable to comprehend that ‘more troops to kill more insurgents,’ was not an effective strategy  because of the negative perception of collateral damage that it created. The insurgency in Iraq grew rapidly as a result. At that time, the military HQ was collocated with the US Embassy. There was no significant understanding gap between the military and political leadership and everyone was working to a common goal and a common plan with adequate resources. Therefore, the failures were due to incorrect strategic choices and an inability to recognise the mistakes early enough. The result was a conflict that merely changed form rather than abated, causing regional insecurity rather than stability. The legacy of these mistakes has been the weakening of the USA’s deterrence capital. Diplomacy can no longer mask the reality that the West is unable to exert its will over weak or failing states. The role of diplomacy in shaping such security situations is further mitigated by the fact that current diplomatic capabilities are optimised to work in interstate or international contexts. Weak or failing states rarely have a monopoly of power within their boundaries and so diplomatic pressure to deter threats emanating from within their territory cannot be effective. This situation encourages the employment of military operations rather than diplomacy and that rarely produce a sustainable solution. In designing deterrence, therefore, states should consider the consequences of policies such as regime change, which cause areas of poorly or ungoverned spaces. They should also consider the complexity and difficulty of negotiating with non-­ government actors who, having become empowered through military and political support, adopt agendas that subsequently pose a threat to the very states that empowered them.

7  Emerging Challenges A number of challenges shape the contemporary threat environment. Globalisation and the emergence of empowered and experienced non-state forces have transformed terrorism from a local to global threat. ‘Democratisation’ of technology, especially the ubiquity of wireless communications and the Internet have reduced the asymmetry of power between states and non-state actors. These complex threats are accentuated by the decline of the Cold War bipolar world and the emergence of an unstable multipolar international order. Responses to these threats are compounded by a lag in the evolution of Cold War doctrines of diplomacy and deterrence to provide effective and confident responses to the uncertainties of the

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contemporary international environment. The result is a stream of government and military initiatives, mostly in terms of labelling rather than in new thinking. Revolution in Military Affairs, the Comprehensive Approach, Network Centric Warfare, the Full Spectrum Approach, Soft Power, Public Diplomacy and many other concepts have entered the contemporary security debates. Most masquerade as novel initiatives, but are in fact old ideas. For example, the Revolution in Military Affairs echoes Liddell Hart’s (1946) Revolution in Warfare, in approach if not in substance. The UK’s National Security Strategy (2015) declares that deterrence will be achieved through the “full spectrum of our capabilities – armed forces including, ultimately our nuclear deterrent, diplomacy, law enforcement, economic policy, offensive cyber and covert means  – to deter adversaries and to deny them opportunities to attack us.” However, President John F Kennedy mentioned the full spectrum approach in a speech to the US Army in 1962 when he said, “Pure military skill is not enough. A full spectrum of military, para-military, and civil action must be blended to produce success … To win [we] must understand and combine the political, economic, and civil actions with skilled military efforts” (DOD 2013). This recirculation of essentially old ideas in the context of an increasing perception of threat and weakening perception of deterrence, appears to be symptoms of an inability to recognise the need for radical change in considering international security. A reason for the absence of an innovative approach may be that thinking about security has been vested almost exclusively in defence or military institutions. Being one of the largest arms of state, these institutions have had both the need for, and the resources necessary, to develop doctrines, concepts and tactics to deal with security issues, particularly those arising out of the complexity of the modern world. The challenges have long been recognised: globalisation, technology, non-state actors, international institutions and wavering between liberal and realist approaches to international relations. Solutions too, have been identified: call for a ‘full spectrum’ approach to doctrine; one that relegates the use of force as a supporting element to politically inspired diplomatic strategies. No institutional doctrine exists outside defence in most states to achieve this, let alone a truly joint political and military one. Recounting his first days in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Sir Christopher Myer explains that it was, “the British way of doing things: to learn on the job … The British diplomatic tradition is not to be overly abstract or intellectual.” (Meyer 2013, p.  9). Limits of this pragmatism and ad hoc stance became progressively apparent with the FCO establishing its first ever diplomatic academy in 2015. While some European states have diplomacy institutes, they are either centres of academic learning or provide skills-based training. Responding to a report that its diplomats lacked sufficient training throughout their career, France, which has a long-standing tradition in diplomacy, opened a similar institute earlier in 2010. Despite introducing training institutions, there is no diplomacy doctrine whereas military doctrine is created in voluminous form across the world. Differences in the meaning of doctrine may be the issue. In the general understanding of the term, doctrine is a prelude to dogma with resonances of fundamentalist religion. In the

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diplomatic context, doctrine means a particular policy directive, usually attributed to a Head of State. For example, the ‘Nixon Doctrine,’ refers to three sentences uttered by the President at a press conference which described a change to the USA’s defence policy towards its allies. While military doctrine claims to teach practitioners “how to think – not what to think,” many, including some in the military, regard doctrine as a constraint on imagination (Spencer n.d.), agility, and creative thinking. Perhaps a greater barrier to establishing a diplomacy doctrine is the difficulty in finding agreement over concepts and principles. Tensions between values-based diplomacy and the national interest are an unresolved feature of modern foreign policy. Meyer (2013, p. 259) echoes many experienced diplomats’ warning against value led diplomacy, “when values become detached from reality, and tip over into ideology, the first casualty is the national interest.” Without a pragmatic resolution of this tension, a doctrine of diplomacy will be difficult to achieve. Without a diplomacy doctrine there cannot be a sustainable institutional alignment of thinking and action between diplomacy and defence, meaning that the relationship between diplomacy and deterrence will remain ad hoc, with the dangers of repeating historical mistakes. Ironically, Meyer (2013, p.  259) laments a litany of such mistakes immediately after warning against doctrine; by quoting George Canning: “…our true policy has always been not to interfere except in great emergencies, and then with a commanding force” he unwittingly provides what could be a foundational principle of diplomacy and deterrence doctrine.

7.1  Hybrid Warfare Hybrid warfare is a new area for defence doctrine development. Russian analysis of the colour revolutions in Europe and the Middle East assumes that these revolutions and the chaos that followed was planned and managed by the West. They believe that there exists a “method behind the madness,” part of a “unified package [which] becomes Hybrid War” (Korybko 2015, p.  25, 70). From a Western perspective, hybrid warfare “refers to Moscow’s use of a broad range of subversive instruments, many of which are nonmilitary, to further Russian national interests” (Chivvis 2017). Hybrid warfare and associated terms such as “gray zone strategies” have a common feature: “Russia is using multiple instruments of power and influence, with an emphasis on nonmilitary tools” (Chivvis 2017) to achieve its foreign policy objectives. Others question the usefulness of the term because it describes nothing more than the use of a full spectrum of capabilities, it introduces nothing new and agreeing a definition is difficult (Van Puyvelde 2015). Whatever its meaning, the fact that the term is being debated indicates a blurring of the political and military boundaries in contemporary conflict. Applied to Hezbollah’s operations against Israel in Lebanon and Russia’s actions in Crimea and Ukraine, the hybrid warfare term implies an element of success for those who employ it and a degree of failure for those who do not. A brief analysis indicates that the failure is primarily one of deterrence by poor integration of political and military

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strategies. These presumably occur owing to the absence of a common doctrine, or way of thinking.

7.2  Snakes and Ladders: The Escalation Conundrum Hybrid warfare works by allowing a protagonist to restrict the scope of political and military manoeuvre of its adversary. A common feature is that initial political and military action against a targeted entity is carried out either covertly or through third parties, making the identification and restraint of the aggressor very difficult. Like a boa constrictor, the more an aggressor advances along a hybrid warfare stratagem, the more constrained the choices open to a defender become. To avoid this situation, the defender should ideally issue deterrence warnings of coercive diplomatic and military consequences at the earliest stage of a hybrid scenario. Doing so, however, risks the defender being labelled an aggressor by escalating tensions, with the consequential loss of national and international political support. The West’s impotence in the face of the Russian annexation of the Crimea and Russia’s operations in Donbas reflected the ‘snake-like’ constraints it faced in terms of viable counter attack options. Had NATO forces been deployed as a deterrent before Russian involvement was apparent, the West would have been accused of climbing the escalation ladder by increasing tensions through aggressive interference and threatening behaviour. A solution for this escalation conundrum has yet to be found, but any viable answer is likely to be based on prioritising the use of pre-emptive diplomatic initiatives, including public diplomacy, rather than escalatory military deterrence. The difficulty of developing an effective and reliable counterstrategy may even suggest that reliance on deterrence is too expensive or risky. Prevention of hybrid warfare through the avoidance of threat perception and other conflict resolution measures may be a more effective policy to adopt, at least as a primary option.

8  Diplomacy of Nuclear Deterrence: A Forgotten Art Nuclear weapons capability is synonymous with deterrence. It is the only modern weapon that is, in most cases, intended for use by the Head of State rather than the military. Mutuality of deterrence in terms of cost and denial of benefits of victory, territory and even national existence is another peculiarity. It is considered a ‘rational’ part of many developed nations’ defence policy and increasingly of developing nations too. Many nations that do not possess nuclear weapons rely on nuclear deterrence provided by a superpower under a concept of “extended deterrence” (Huth and Russett 1984). Nuclear deterrence is justified as essential to states’ security while its use is simultaneously an existential threat to the state. Its logic seems to be that defeat in conventional war is so unacceptable that it is worth destroying

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the aggressor state while being destroyed in the process. The psychology involved in this cost–benefit process deserves greater analysis than it has received, if only to refine the deterrence process. Deterrence will only work if it is perceived that it will be used. President Kennedy would arguably have used nuclear weapons against the USSR if the Cuban Missile Crisis had not been politically resolved. In so doing he would have accepted the grave risk of a retaliation against his citizens, but that calculation may not hold with the current generation of leaders and citizens. Cold War nuclear deterrence strategy was the subject of much research, debate, theorising and modelling by generals, politicians, academics, think tanks and others in the public domain. A sophisticated diplomatic strategy underpinned the deterrence capability. Dwight Eisenhower used his 1953 ‘Atoms for Peace’ speech to send diplomatic  warnings to the Soviet Union through the text of a report on nuclear proliferation. For example, one sentence read “our earlier start has permitted us to accumulate what is today a great quantitative advantage.” Martin Medhurst explains that the implicit message was in fact: “you may have enough nuclear devices to hurt us, but we have a lot more and can outlast you in any nuclear exchange” (Aune and Medhurst 2008, p. 36). Other diplomatic messages were sent by both sides to reinforce their deterrence strategies. In the current post-Cold War era, a diplomatic strategy to reinforce nuclear deterrence appears to be absent from the public domain. The Cold War USA, along with its NATO allies, was weaker in conventional military terms than the USSR. NATO’s conventional strength could only sustain a few days of fighting to allow a negotiated settlement. Failing that, NATO  would have embarked on its first use nuclear strike policy. No deep analysis seems to be taking place to deal with the current situation where both Russia and China are weaker than the USA. A different nuclear calculation now applies – the Russians and the Chinese will be first to go nuclear if confronted by US military might. The USA’s increased conventional strength in any war will, in theory, only shorten the time when its adversaries will be forced to use the nuclear option. Given that any decision to escalate conflict to the nuclear stage will involve civilian political leaders with a likely less nuanced awareness of war and with minimal understanding of deterrence, the potential of miscalculation is great. Any new doctrine of deterrence would benefit greatly by being based on psychological, philosophical and operational research into contemporary nuclear deterrence scenarios. There is much scope for new thinking, possibly based on old maxims: “an important contribution to effective deterrence may emerge from achievement of a goal that is usually sought for other purposes-maintaining and strengthening the ties of mutual interest among nation-states in an open global economic system” (Huth and Russett 1984, p. 524). This post-Cold War challenge is compounded by the trend in lesser powers like Iran and North Korea to develop nuclear capabilities to deter perceived threats of regime change from the USA. Knowing their limited capacity to withstand a conventional attack from the USA, these states regard nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor of security and survival. In any perceived attack from the Superpower,

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these states are likely to adopt NATO’s initial ‘trip wire’ strategy of the Cold War, where an attack by the USSR would have resulted in an all-out NATO nuclear strike. A sophisticated and sustained diplomatic strategy involving sanctions, disruption of Iranian production efforts, inducements and negotiations by the Obama Administrations seemed to have been successful in averting the perceived Iranian nuclear threat. This liberalism-based approach has been challenged by the successor administration’s realist philosophy reflecting, in part, the absence of an agreed and stable diplomatic approach to nuclear (and other forms of) deterrence in the West. It is worth noting that states that have attempted to acquire nuclear weapons in the last couple of decades have shown a willingness to trade them for permanent security guarantees of their survival while older nuclear powers retain them as permanent assurance of their dominance. The Iran example shows how that dominance, couple with skillful diplomacy, can be effective in deterrence as well as how unskilled diplomacy can have the opposite effect.

9  Conclusions Diplomacy includes the process of understanding the international environment, deciding on foreign policy and implementing that policy through communications and negotiations using the full instruments of the state. It should, therefore, be the driver for any deterrence strategy. Historic analysis suggests that effective deterrence is led by diplomacy to shape perceptions of threat and to communicate to an adversary the cost of continuing to pose a threat and the benefit of avoiding it. Military force can, in most cases, underpin the cost element but diplomacy should continue to engage to reinforce or modify the messages necessary to achieve the right perception. Predominance of the realist approach has meant that deterrence has become the prime means of dealing with threats, but a more effective option may be the employment of threat avoidance strategies. Such strategies could be developed within a realist worldview. Many security threats arise out of a deterrence ‘chain reaction’. A deterrence measure against a threat can cause the adversary to perceive it as a threat which the adversary must deter. Deterrence capability of a state is determined primarily by its political and military reputation. Recent failures in wars have reduced states’ ability to deter threats. The failure of superpowers to deliver decisive victory in recent conflicts has emboldened non-state adversaries, resulting in their unprecedented use of violence. An absence of effective diplomacy to manage states’ political and military reputation and to communicate persuasive deterrence messages to non-state actors aggravated this security threat. As the persuasive impact of diplomacy and military force are optimised for interstate relations, it seems prudent for states to avoid arming and emboldening non-state actors. Demonstrating military success is a critical component in effective deterrence meaning that military force should only be used when political and military victory is likely.

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Cases of successful deterrence tend to result from the establishment of trust between adversaries and the acknowledgement and maintenance of self-worth manifestations such as honour. These are mainly led through diplomatic channels, often with the assistance of covert services. Whether diplomacy or military solutions predominate is largely linked to a state’s political philosophy. Realist approaches tend to favour military deterrence, while a liberal solution gives primacy to diplomacy. States rarely adopt one approach to the exclusion of another and so it is useful for states to understand where they are and where they wish to be on that philosophical spectrum, to better engage with an adversary. Inability to balance diplomatic and military options in conflict is one of the main causes of failures in recent wars. This is because leaders, both military and political, are ‘mentally unprepared’ for the situation they face. A major factor in this lack of preparedness is the absence of a diplomacy doctrine and hence the inability to develop joint military and political thinking about problems and solutions. Emerging challenges such as hybrid warfare are exposing this gap in joint thinking. For as long as there is no recognition of issues such as the ‘escalation conundrum’ in hybrid threats, there can be no confidence in successful outcomes in similar future conflicts. Nuclear deterrence was one area where diplomacy and military deterrence thinking became highly refined and joint during the Cold War. That thinking has subsequently frozen despite radical changes in the diversity of the threat, changes in the rational for nuclear weapon use and the reversal of the conventional balance of power between the major superpowers. Deterrence fails for two fundamental reasons. One is the absence of a credible deterrence capability. The second is a failure to communicate the cost of the behaviour being deterred. This last point is sufficiently complex in normal circumstances but when there is no clear or consistent approach to conventional and nuclear deterrence, the potential for miscalculation increases with likely disastrous global consequences.

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Nuclear Deterrence in a New Age of Disruptive Technologies and Great Power Competition Reuben Steff

1  Introduction Since the conclusion of the Cold War (1945–1991) or ‘first nuclear age’, an increasingly complex multipolar nuclear world has emerged. This ‘second nuclear age’ (1991–2019) is characterised by new and culturally diverse states acquiring nuclear arms in unstable regional settings, while the advent of globalization has made it easier than ever for states, including relatively weak ones, and violent non-state actors, such as transnational terrorist groups, to try acquire nuclear arms. If this was not concerning enough, political tensions in recent years have increased and deepened between the established great nuclear powers with their strategic nuclear forces returning to the fore of their competition. This takes place at the same time these nations are modernising their nuclear arsenals and pursuing a raft of new disruptive technologies that collectively are calling into question the survivability of deterrent arsenals. In short, without a radical transformation of international politics, nuclear deterrence will remain a key feature of global strategic interaction. Thus, it is essential that attention is directed to understanding nuclear deterrence in the contemporary international environment. This chapter contributes to this effort in four parts, and chiefly focuses on the role played by the U.S. as the founder of modern nuclear deterrence theory and most important international actor. First, the chapter outlines the evolution of nuclear deterrence theory throughout the Cold War and the dispute between two groups of strategists (the Arms Control School and Warfighting School) over deterrence. Second, it explains that despite the end of the Cold War in 1989, this did not lead to the end of nuclear deterrence or strategic competition. Instead, nuclear arms proliferated to a number of developing states and the U.S. found itself challenged by states with nuclear aspirations, leading the U.S. to reconsider its R. Steff (*) University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 A. Filippidou (ed.), Deterrence, Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29367-3_4

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deterrence strategy, with mixed results. The third section examines the most destabilising features that threaten deterrence stability today. It focuses on how the deployment by the U.S. and its allies of missiles defenses, emergence of cyber technologies, advances in Artificial Intelligence and role of social media are complicating, and potentially undermining, strategic stability. The fourth part considers why the current international environment is not conducive to nuclear disarmament as great power competition between the U.S. and China (a rising and emerging superpower), and U.S. and Russia (a resurgent power) escalates. The article concludes by asserting that the arms control regime must be updated and tailored to address new destabilising features of the contemporary security environment.

2  T  he Evolution of Nuclear Deterrence Theory During the Cold War One of the simplest definitions of deterrence was offered by Patrick Morgan who said it is “the threat of military retaliation to forestall a military attack” (1983, p. 29). This requires convincing an enemy that the costs they would incur from an attack would outweigh any gains. Leaders practising deterrence must “...penetrate and manipulate the thought processes of the opposing leaders so that they draw the ‘proper’ conclusion about the utility of attacking” (Morgan 1985, p.  125). Clear communication is essential so that an adversary knows what one is willing to protect and the methods they are willing to use do it. Thus, ultimately, deterrence is as much a psychological phenomenon as it is a practical one: a state can still achieve deterrence even if it does not have the capability or resolve to retaliate (in effect bluffing), and non-military elements (such as diplomacy, sanctions and material rewards) can be used to deter military action. Yet it is military force – the ability to inflict pain – that has generally been accepted as the essential component underpinning nuclear deterrence strategies. Before proceeding, it is important to recognise that deterrence theory is different from deterrence strategy. Whereas the strategy concerns itself with the military posture, threats, and means of communicating them that states adopt, the theory itself outlines the principles upon which the strategy is based. There are not many theories of deterrence; rather, there are many strategies of deterrence that are predominantly based upon one theory, and most analysts in the post-WWII world generally agreed on a number of assumptions that form the core framework for explaining nuclear deterrence.

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2.1  The First Wave The first wave of nuclear deterrence theory emerged immediately after WWII as technological advances, specifically the advent of long-range ballistic missiles and use of atomic weapons on Japan, led civilian analysts to reconsider the relationship between military force and political objectives. This took place as the Cold War – a global geopolitical and ideological struggle  – broke out between the U.S. and Soviet Union. In 1946, after reading about the U.S. atomic strike on Hiroshima, the American strategist Bernard Brodie told his wife “everything that I have written is obsolete” (Caldwell and Williams 2016, p. 49). Brodie was quick to grasp the implications of nuclear weapons, asserting that their destructive power required a shift of focus in military strategy from winning wars to averting them. This principle became the bedrock of nuclear deterrence theory, and it appeared an especially critical observation after the Soviet Union tested its first atomic weapon in August 1949 (bringing to a close America’s short-lived nuclear monopoly, a topic addressed below). Brodie asserted that it would soon be possible for both superpowers to destroy the other once they acquired survivable second strike offensive nuclear forces. A second strike force would allow them to absorb a surprise nuclear first strike launched by the other, yet have enough survivable weapons to deliver a devastating retaliatory strike. Once two adversaries acquired this capability it would cause a true revolution in strategy, as it was no longer possible for one state to seize the other’s territory or even launch a direct attack while keeping its own population safe. Brodie explained that a deterrent strategy was different from a war-winning strategy. In a deterrent strategy both sides targeted their adversary’s cities (countervalue targeting), holding them hostage. In a war-winning strategy, one targeted the adversary’s armed forces (counterforce targeting). If a state focused on the latter, that is, emphasised counterforce, it could weaken the stability of deterrence by making it appear that the state intended to launch a pre-emptive first strike against the other state’s nuclear forces. If successful, this would leave one state at the mercy of follow-­on strikes, political coercion or a full-scale invasion. In this scenario ‘going first’ could be viewed as the only chance to eliminate the other side’s nuclear forces, and might result not because one state desired conflict but simply out of fear that the other side was contemplating launching its own desperate first strike. Consequently, if the U.S. and Soviet Union could acquire nuclear forces large enough to survive a first strike, strategic stability between them would be possible, as it minimised incentives to strike first and reduced fear that the other state was considering doing so. In 1954, a number of Brodie’s ideas were codified in U.S. nuclear strategy, as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced the doctrine of Massive Retaliation, whereby any Soviet military move against the U.S. or its overseas allies would be met by an overwhelming nuclear response (Dulles 1954). The U.S. also pledged to extend deterrence over its allies, whereby it would defend them with military power, up to and including the use of nuclear force, if they were attacked. This would

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c­ ontribute to non-proliferation by reducing the need for America’s allies to acquire their own independent nuclear deterrents. Glenn Snyder made another important observation when he articulated the distinction between deterrence by retaliation, based on second strike forces, and deterrence by denial – military forces that would deny an adversary its war-time goals (Snyder 1961, pp. 3–15). On one hand, a defensive capability can be used to bolster military forces whose primary purpose was to deter, as a capable defense can make a nuclear deterrent threat appear especially credible to carry out by allowing the deterrer to escape retaliation. At the extreme if defensive technology in the form of Ballistic Missile Defenses (BMD)  – systems capable of intercepting incoming nuclear missiles in flight – could intercept most incoming missiles it could theoretically substitute for second strike forces. But if one state developed defenses it may also look to the other like an attempt to break out of mutual deterrence reliant on second strike forces. First strike pressures would emerge once again on both sides, reducing the stability of deterrence between the superpowers.

2.2  The Second Wave and the Rise of Arms Control From the early 1950s to the 1970s, a second wave of nuclear deterrence theory emerged that drew upon novel methodologies in the social sciences. The most important theoretical development was the assumption that the superpowers were both states rational and should be modelled as such (Schelling 1981, p.  4). This meant their ultimate and permanent preferences was to avoid war since the cost would exceed the benefits. It also recognised the basic reality of mutual deterrence and suggested that deterrence could be made stable if both states agreed to it. Finally, Schelling made a vitally important point when he explained that incentives were crucial to the effective operation of deterrence, stating that a deterrent threat must be paired with an assurance: “To say, ‘One more step and I shoot’, can be a deterrent threat only if accompanied by the implicit assurance, ‘and if you stop I won’t’ (Schelling 1966, p.  74)”. If adversaries are not given this assurance, they could fatalistically conclude that the deterrer sought their destruction no matter what, reducing stability. Deterrence differs from compellance, which occurs when a threat to punish is intended to spit action, or is applied until an unwanted act desists. Schelling explains: “To deter an enemy’s advance it may be enough to burn the escape bridges behind me, or to rig a trip-wire between us that automatically blows us both up when he advances. To compel an enemy’s retreat, though, by some threat of engagement, I have to be committed to move” (Ibid, p. 70). The difference is also in the timing: a deterrent threat can be indefinite in duration, whereas a compellent threat may be definite, as a state may say “move now, or be destroyed” (Ibid, pp.  69–78). Compellance is more difficult to apply than deterrence because compliance with a compellant threat may require open submission to the compeller’s demands. This can incur reputational costs for political leaders.

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Another important realization of Schelling’s was that since direct conflict could lead to mutual destruction, the nature of the superpower competition would instead involve a competition in risk taking. Schelling wrote “the power to hurt” was “a kind of bargaining power, not easy to use but used often (Ibid, p. v)”. Risk could be manipulated to gain the upper hand since international politics in the nuclear age took the form of a “competition in risk taking, characterized not so much by tests of force as by tests of nerve” (Ibid, p. 4). Schelling termed this “brinkmanship,” the choice of “deliberately letting the situation get somewhat out of hand, just because its being out of hand may be intolerable to the other party and force his accommodation” (Ibid, p. 200). Therefore, the superpowers could look to intentionally initiate and escalate crises involving nuclear arms to a point where the other side would feel forced to back down. The strategies of the superpowers, and indeed deterrence theory itself, were influenced by real world events. As the superpowers built up their stockpiles throughout the 1950s and developed Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) capable of striking one another’s homeland, concerns grew in the U.S. that slight shifts in the balance of nuclear forces could undermine deterrence (Wohlstetter 1959, pp. 211–234). Furthermore, for 13 days in October 1962 the Cuban Missile Crisis brought the superpowers to the edge of destruction over the Soviet Union’s emplacement of tactical nuclear missiles in Cuba. This showed how events and tactics of ‘brinkmanship’ could trap and overtake nominally rational  leaders that were not seeking war in the first place (Allison 1971). The newfound sense of vulnerability in the 1960s led to the emergence of the Arms Control School in the U.S., who proffered that co-operation by the superpowers was essential to stabilise deterrence (Goldfischer 1993) and limit the costly arms race. A core assumption was that there was an ‘action-reaction’ dynamic to military acquisitions. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara (1961–1968) articulated this, stating that the superpowers “mutually influence one another’s strategic plans… [Decisions] necessarily trigger reactions on the other side. It is precisely this action-reaction phenomenon that fuels an arms race” (Freedman 2003, p. 240). In other words, the superpowers were trapped in a security dilemma: a situation whereby technological developments and deployments by one state forced the other to react, even if they did not want to, leading to a net decrease in security for both beyond that which existed prior to the first deployment (Tang 2009). McNamara held that BMD was one such technology, as their deployment would force the other superpower to deploy increasingly large offensive missiles to overcome it and which the defense could not credibly intercept. It would be self-defeating and disrupt strategic stability. These ideas have generally been accepted by the Democrat Party in the U.S. In contrast, another group in the U.S., the Warfighting School, held that nuclear war was a possibility and the U.S. had to be prepared to fight and win one. In their view, the surest deterrent to war breaking out in the first place was one where the U.S. held a position of strategic nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. This would be achieved if it had capabilities that allowed escalation dominance whereby U.S. military forces could dominate at each level of escalation during a nuclear

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conflict. In turn, this would force Soviet leaders to back down rather than escalate to another higher level of conflict as, in doing so, they would suffer disproportionate costs relative to the U.S. If successful, the U.S. could impose intra-war deterrence upon the Soviets (Beres 1981). To the warfighters, BMD was critical to obtaining escalation dominance as it could protect critical parts of the U.S. arsenal and mainland during a nuclear war, reducing the costs to the U.S. and adding a valuable denial capability to America’s deterrent strategy. The ideas of the Warfighting School imbue the Republican Party’s deterrence policies. In 1972, the Arms Control School won the debate as the superpowers signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The ABM Treaty outlawed large national BMDs (tactical BMD development that could intercept short-range missiles was allowed to continue). Thus, at least for the time being, both powers accepted mutual vulnerability, reliant on both superpowers sustaining survivable second strike nuclear forces whose task (to retaliate) was simplified by the absence of defenses on both sides. This codified the strategic condition that became known as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). The ABM Treaty was part of the first round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) (SALT II followed in November 1972). This was followed by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) in July 1991 (START II and III followed in June 1992 and March 1997, and New START in April 2010) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. This latter treaty was signed in December 1987 and eliminated all ground-based missiles ranging between 500 and 5500 kilometres. This INF Treaty was significant as, for the first time, the superpowers agreed to eliminate an entire class of missiles. Yet, the ideas of the warfighters did not die, coming to prominence during the Ronald Reagan administration (1981–1989). Reagan made a speech to the American people on 23 March 1983, announcing his intention to make strategic nuclear missiles “impotent and obsolete” through a massive land, sea and space-based BMD system (Atomic Heritage Foundation 2018). Reagan dubbed this the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), labelled ‘Star Wars’ by its detractors (Ibid). Although the technological state of the art was not commensurate to Reagan’s vision and the U.S. did not move forward with deployment (critically, the U.S. maintained compliance with the ABM Treaty), the ideas driving the programme took hold in an assortment of new conservative think tanks (for example the Heritage Foundation and American Enterprise Institute) who would continue to push for them to be put into practise.

2.3  The Third Wave The mid-1970s ushered in a third wave of deterrence theorising, as scholars adopted a critical approach (George and Smoke 1974; Lebow and Stein 1995 pp. 157–181). They found that not only were decision makers poor at constructing effective deterrent threats, but breakdowns in conventional deterrence were common. Additionally, human psychology and bureaucratic organizations could lead to deterrence failure (Janis 1972; Jervis 1984) while the very things that could be viewed by one side as

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strengthening deterrence could result in deterrence failure and outbreak of a crisis, such as the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis when the Soviet’s believed their missiles in Cuba would offset U.S. missile emplacements in Turkey. Instead, the U.S. found Soviet moves in Cuba to be intolerable and aggressive.

3  The Logic Behind Nuclear Superiority Before continuing, it is worth pausing to note that accepting mutual deterrence was essentially forced upon the United States. The historical record shows that in the early Cold War period the U.S. wanted to maintain their nuclear monopoly, going so far to even consider a preventive war against the Soviet Union in the late 1940s and early 1950s (and later against China in the early 1960s) to ensure it. This is because the monopoly proved to be of significance by providing Washington with greater freedom of action vis-à-vis the Soviet Union during the Berlin Blockade (June 1948–May 1949) and other early crises (Lieber 2005, pp. 123–148). Even after the monopoly was broken, America’s position of nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union extended into the late 1960s, allowing President John F. Kennedy to credibly signal America’s intentions to resort to nuclear force to counter Soviet belligerence during the Berlin crisis of 1961–1962, and Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, ultimately forcing the Soviet Union to back down (Ibid, p. 135, 139). Even if it is impossible or extremely unlikely the U.S. could ever acquire a technological advantage that, in effect, restored its nuclear monopoly, ensuring a position of nuclear strategic superiority over its rivals is taken to be of value. This gives Washington an advantage over U.S. adversaries by reducing the expected costs of nuclear war to the American homeland, a fact that lead the warfighters in the U.S. to remain interested in acquiring nuclear superiority and capabilities to limit damage throughout the entirety of the Cold War, an objective that has continued into the post-Cold War era. This also speaks to why, despite the assertion of some strategists that all the U.S. needed to ensure its security was a secure second strike capability, it has often sought, and continues to seek, capabilities that go beyond just ensuring a second-strike force (including missile defenses and counterforce targeting and doctrine) (Kroenig 2018). Additionally, a favourable nuclear balance of power in America’s favour is judged to be essential for the US to credibly extend deterrence over its allies. Consider, during the Cold War – and today – the major adversaries of the U.S. are geographically nearer to America’s critical allies – for example Europe to the Soviet Union/Russia, and Japan and South Korea to China – and thus the balance of stakes during a crisis would seem to favour U.S. adversaries. After all, why would the U.S. trade Washington for Brussels or Tokyo in a nuclear war? Arguably, it would make sense to capitulate to Russian or Chinese demands. Yet, doing so could unravel the entire U.S. alliance system, as allies would come to see that America’s security commitment to them was hollow, leading them to seek their own independent nuclear deterrents or even allying with America’s adversaries. A nuclear advantage is thus logically critical as it makes up the deficit in perceived

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stakes by making Washington’s deterrent threats to resort to nuclear force to defend allies seem more credible. In turn, it increases U.S. leverage when manipulating the risk of nuclear war during crises (Ibid). The idea that superiority matters may explain why the superpowers produced arsenal sizes of comical proportions (in 1986 the U.S. nuclear arsenal inventory totalled 23,317; the Soviet arsenal 45,000!) (Norris and Kristensen 2010, pp. 77–83), and pursued technological enhancements that included increasing missile accuracy, hardening silos, emplacing missiles on mobile launches, development of Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs) – single missile payloads that contained multiple warheads, each which could hit a different target (York 1970, Ch. 9) - and flirtation (especially in the U.S. under the Reagan administration) with the idea of establishing a global land, air, sea and space-based BMD system.

4  Nuclear Deterrence After the Cold War As the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the U.S.-Soviet bipolar system gave way to a unipolar system, as the U.S. emerged as the sole global superpower, and one with newfound global interests to protect. As the decade unfolded, the U.S. found itself involved in a series of conflicts and crises with so-called ‘rogue states’ and China over Taiwan (1995–1996). Many ‘rogues’ were former allies of the Soviet Union (Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Sudan and Cuba) that were seeking to acquire nuclear weapons and ballistic missile arsenals to deter U.S. power and assert their own regional interests. Unlike the Soviet Union, U.S. policymakers considered these states to be irrational actors against whom deterrence by retaliation might prove unreliable. Thus, rather than the progressive dismantling of the nuclear enterprise, events and crises created pressure on the U.S. to sustain and adjust deterrence for a new age. Major events included Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and its subsequent ejection by a U.S.-led UN coalition in 1991. Of immense concern was the fact that post-­ war analysis showed that Iraq’s nuclear program was found to be “massive” and “for most practical purposes fiscally unconstrained” (Keaney and Cohen 1995, p. 67). In 1994, the U.S. briefly considered launching a pre-emptive strike against North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, and found itself involved in conflicts across the former Yugoslavia from 1991–1999. In July 1998, a Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat led by Ronald Reagan’s Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, declared “The threat to the U.S. posed by these emerging capabilities [ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD)] is broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than has been reported in estimates and reports by the Intelligence Community” (Members of the Commission 1998). The report continued by stating that expanding global and technological trading links meant the global diffusion of nuclear know-how was accelerating (Ibid). As such, “hostile states could deploy ICBMs capable of hitting the continental U.S. with “little or no warning” (Ibid). Events that occurred immediately prior to and in the

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report’s wake had the political effect of validating its findings, as India and Pakistan carried out nuclear tests in May, Iran tested its Shahab-3 medium range ballistic missile for the first time in July and North Korea launched the Taepodong-1  in August, which travelled further than any ‘rogue state’ missile before it. During its interventions against Iraq and Serbia, the U.S. was fortunate that neither had nuclear weapons that could have deterred it, and it did not go unnoticed that states such as Iran, North Korea and Libya, continued to pursue ballistic missiles and had suspected nuclear programs. The consequence of all of this was that by the end of the 1990s it had become clear that a new and more peaceful world free of strategic competition was not emerging, while the key features of a ‘second nuclear age’ were coming into view. The next section considers this new age, illustrating the key issues nuclear deterrence theorists sought to grapple with after the Cold War.

4.1  The Second Nuclear Age While other states acquired nuclear weapons during the Cold War (the UK in 1952, France in 1960, China in 1964, Israel in 1966, Pakistan in 1968 and India in 1974) the relative disparity in power between the U.S./Soviet Union and the rest meant the implications of other nuclear programs were subordinate to the dynamics of the central U.S.-Soviet strategic conflict. In contrast, the ‘second nuclear age’ (Payne 1996; Gray 1999) that emerged after the Cold War is characterised by proliferation to states for reasons other than the superpower conflict, and a world characterised by greater nuclear multilateralism is expected to pose a greater threat to global stability and be more difficult to manage than a world of two dominant superpowers. Critically, effective management of deterrence requires the mutual understanding of strategic concepts and behaviour, effective communication channels between actors, some measure of trust, and credible signals of commitment to execute deterrent threats if necessary. This may be in short supply between culturally dissimilar nations across Eurasia driven by ideological variants of nationalism and where territorial violations, military incidents and terrorist attacks by non-state actors across borders hold the potential to cause crises. This is different to the experience of the superpowers throughout the Cold War, where the U.S. applied rational decision-­ making theory (at least their interpretation of rationality) to deterrence. Furthermore, many of the Eurasian-based nuclear states share borders (China with Russia, North Korea, India, and Pakistan; Russia with China and North Korea; India with Pakistan and China; Pakistan with India and China), reducing the flight time of ballistic missiles between them which could generate first strike pressures during crises. Additionally, newer nuclear powers may not be able to afford reliable and hardened command and control systems or have appropriate security measures in place to protect theft of their weapons.

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4.1.1  Nuclear Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age Deterrence theorists have sought to grapple with the core features of the second nuclear age. Combined with the attacks on 9/11 by Al Qaeda, a non-state terrorist group, it generated a new wave of theorising and analysis (Knopf 2010). Notably, 9/11 prompted major developments in U.S. deterrence strategy that, at least in part, seemed to imply the dismissal of deterrence as America’s fundamental strategy. This was indicated by the George W. Bush administration’s articulation of the Bush Doctrine in the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States. This document emphasised (1) America’s right to pre-empt and prevent imminent threats rather than live with deterring them (operationalized by the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003); (2) outlined the rationale for a U.S. national BMD shield (discussed in more detail below); (3) articulated a strategy of maintaining U.S. global primacy (Bush 2002); and directed the U.S. to try dissuade opponents from considering to invest in missiles and nuclear warheads in the first place. If successful, the latter would preclude the need to deter at all. Jeffrey Knopf came closest to identifying the capability the Bush administration sought through its strategic innovations, stating that they were designed to provide unidirectional deterrence. This would be a one-­way deterrent capability that denied others the ability to deter the U.S., (Knopf 2010, p.  3) allowing the U.S. to sustain its freedom of military action throughout the world. Rather than dismiss deterrence, in reality the administration was seeking to strengthen deterrence around the margins (Knopf 2008). One area of near consensus amongst theorists is that deterrence remains viable but is unlikely to be fool proof; deterrence by retaliation should play a reduced role and deterrence by denial take on a larger one; and that deterrence has a better chance of success against state actors than it does against non-state actors (Ibid, pp. 248–252). The intersection between proliferation to ‘rogue states’ and terrorism has been a particularly prominent focus, made all the more essential since terrorist actors may be willing to commit suicide for their cause, making it difficult to deter them at all. Furthermore, evidence emerged after 9/11 that Al Qaeda was seeking nuclear arms and material (MowattLarssen 2010). One approach is to ensure terrorists never get hold of WMD by holding states accountable if they are found guilty (or even negligent) of transferring WMDs to terrorist organizations (Litwak 2017). Another method is to renew arms control efforts as an element of U.S. deterrence strategy, for example the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran and the P5+1 (the U.S., U.K., Russia, France, and China, plus Germany) reduced the possibility Iran could acquire nuclear arms. A case can be made that adjustments to Washington’s deterrence strategy were long overdue, as the strategic environment had been changing for some time. On the other hand, one could argue that the Bush administration, by appearing to signal at times that deterrence by retaliation would no longer be the cornerstone of U.S. strategy, actually spurred proliferation. To unpack this, Bush essentially signalled that pre-emptive strikes and even preventive invasions to remove regimes (such as the Hussein regime in Iraq) were legitimate actions by the U.S. to counter the

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p­ roliferation of nuclear weapons and WMD. Yet, a pre-emptive strategy could easily backfire since other states might conclude the administration would remove them no matter what they did. This only increased the incentives for ‘rogue states’ to acquire WMD in order to try deter U.S. power. Indeed, in the wake of the invasion of Iraq intelligence showed that states like North Korea, Iran and Syria actually increased their efforts to acquire ballistic missiles and WMD (although Iran apparently halted its covert nuclear weapons program in 2003) (Steff 2016, p. 97). This suggested a fundamental deficiency in the logic of the administration’s ‘rogue state’ nonproliferation strategy, as it appeared to forget Schelling’s cardinal point that deterrent threats should be paired with a credible assurance. Additionally, as the next section shows, it was not only ‘rogue states’ that felt threatened by America’s changing strategy but other nuclear greater powers as the Bush administrations renewed the push for national BMD. This is followed by a consideration of new complications to deterrence stability posed by cyber weaponization, AI and social media.

5  New Technological Developments and Nuclear Deterrence 5.1  W  arfighters Ascendant: Ballistic Missile Defenses Unleashed In December 2001, Bush announced America’s intention to pull out of the ABM Treaty (Neilan 2001). Bush made the case that these new capabilities would contribute to deterrence and dissuasion (White House 2002) via-a-vis ‘rogue states’ and that, contrary to all evidence, Russia and China would simply understand that the deployment of BMD outside the ABM Treaty was not a threat to their security. Yet, in July 2000 Russia and China had signaled this would not be the case through a joint statement that declared U.S.  BMD plans were “aimed at seeking unilateral military and security superiority… [US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would] trigger off another round of arms race and subsequently reverse the positive trend emerged in world politics after the end of the Cold War” (Nuclearfiles.org 2000). They stated that the only way this could be prevented would be if cooperative efforts to deploy BMD was undertaken against ‘rogue states’ (Steff 2013). Adding to their concerns was that the U.S. would not commit to limiting future deployments or negotiating an eventual successor to the ABM Treaty. Another worrying element from Moscow and Beijing’s view was the U.S. intention to export BMD to America’s “friends and allies” (White House 2002). As a result, major U.S. allies in Europe, the Middle East and Northeast Asia, some of which were, and are, engaged in security competition with Russia and China, have acquired varieties of BMD systems since 2001. Therefore, Russia and China’s objection to U.S. BMD was not simply that it could eventually threaten their own strategic deterrents and provide the U.S. with a position of nuclear superiority, but that their export to U.S. allies could also

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complicate regional deterrent balances (Steff and Khoo 2014). Eventually, the U.S. might even push to unite the regional systems acquired by its allies with its own national BMD system and forward deployed BMD assets to establish a global shield that excludes Moscow and Beijing. Furthermore, even while pursuing BMD, the Bush and Obama administrations embarked on qualitative improvements to U.S. nuclear capabilities. This increased the accuracy of U.S. missiles, leading Russia and China to conclude that BMD was not an isolated ‘defensive’ weapon system but one designed to work in tandem with offensive capabilities to allow the US to achieve escalation dominance during future crises (Lieber and Press 2006a, b), in turn undermining their own deterrents. Despite the fact the Bush administration argued that Russia and China had no reason to fear U.S. BMD and that U.S. BMD would reduce proliferation worldwide through dissuasion, recent analysis by this author and Nicholas Khoo throw doubt on this. Empirically, the U.S. pursuit of BMD has contributed to arms race and security dilemma dynamics that undermine great power relations, even while providing incentives for proliferation to certain states that have longstanding differences with the U.S., such as Iran and North Korea. While word length considerations do not allow a full recounting of Russia and China (and ‘rogue state’) reactions since the U.S. abrogated the ABM Treaty in 2001, they have developed and fielded new strategic nuclear-armed ballistic missile and conventional weapons equipped with BMD countermeasures, made changes in military doctrine (Steff and Khoo 2017), and China has even moved ahead in developing its own missile defense capabilities (although it is yet to field a national system) (MacDonald and Ferguson 2015). These ‘tit-for-tat’ dynamics will continue since, in May 2016, Republican Members of Congress successfully put forward an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act to remove ‘limited’ from the 1999 National Missile Defense Act (the amendment was signed into law by President Obama in December 2016, even as the administration made its objections to it known) (Reif 2017). This word was understood to communicate that U.S. BMD would remain directed solely against the smaller arsenals of Iran and North Korea, rather than the strategic deterrents of Russia and China. The Trump administration has continued on this path, releasing its Missile Defense Review in January 2019. For the first time in the post-­ Cold War era, this document explicitly identifies Russia and China as states the U.S. national BMD system must defend against, and also calls for improving and expanding of existing capabilities, developing new ones, and for studying the feasibility of developing and fielding a space-based missile intercept layer (Department of Defense 2019). China and Russia can be expected to respond by accelerating their own efforts to balance U.S. BMD.

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5.2  Cyber, Artificial Intelligence and Social Media For much of the Cold War the ability of nuclear arsenals to survive a first strike and deliver a retaliatory strike to ensure deterrence seemed feasible, as the superpowers arsenals were vast, mobile, hardened and hidden. But the internet revolution – especially the advent of cyber capabilities, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and big data analytics – could upset nuclear deterrence in a number of ways (Cimbala and McDermott 2015; Futter 2016, 2018; Bracken 2016; Lieber and Press 2017). Firstly, by improving the accuracy and re-targeting capabilities of nuclear missiles. This increases counterforce capabilities considerably and makes the prospect of low-casualty nuclear strikes plausible, which could reduce the political and normative barriers to a nuclear strike. Secondly, the big data revolution, and the ability of AI to harness and integrate it, will allow a more systematic approach to searching and identifying mobile systems, as well as probing large data sets comprised of signals intelligence and imagery to identify patterns and connections. Thirdly, the use of cyber weapons (which in turn will be increasingly automated via AI algorithms) during the early parts of a crisis to sow confusion in the networks of nuclear states and impede command and control systems could reduce political and military leader’s faith in their ability to assess the situation and control escalation. Fourthly, cyber also makes it conceivable that third party hackers on behalf of a state or non-state terrorist groups not directly engaged in a crisis could intervene to exploit the situation to their advantage. For example, Andrew Futter suggests that groups could “break into, interfere with, or sabotage nuclear command and control (C2) facilities; ‘spoof’ or compromise early warning systems or components of the nuclear firing chain; or in a worst-case scenario even cause a nuclear explosion or launch” (Futter 2016, p.164). As nuclear command and control systems (and nuclear secrets) become increasingly digitalised and networked, cyber-threats grow in salience as the opportunities for hacking increase. If states come to believe that cyber pre-emption might be successful, it could increase pressures to be the first state to strike first, generating crisis instability. While it would be comforting to believe the issues mentioned above are merely academic speculation, evidence suggests otherwise, with U.S. officials warning that their nuclear systems “are under constant attack” from a “full spectrum of hackers”, and therefore “… It is reasonable to believe that the threat has extended itself into nuclear command and control systems” (Futter 2016, p. 166). Given the foregoing, it is perhaps not a surprise that the U.S., Russia and China have all formed their own cyber-commands, while the U.S. and Russia recently agreed to establish a “cyber hotline” (Ibid, p. 177). The emergence of advanced AI also has immense implications for nuclear deterrence and crisis stability. In short, AI is not a weapon. It is a technological enabler. Its emergence is akin to the creation of the combustion engine or the lightbulb, and it allows software and machines to undertake tasks that, previously, only humans

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could do. Tasks undertaken by AI will be conducted at superhuman speeds, with greater levels of precision and reliability, for durations that exceed human endurance. It also enables military forces to harness and integrate ever-greater amounts of data across air, space, cyberspace, sea, and land domains. In other words, AI has immense implications for military affairs owing to the increasingly networked nature of the modern military and advances in robotics – which enable AI-automated unmanned robotic systems, including fully-lethal autonomous vehicles  – to be deployed in the field. While analysis of AI’s implications for nuclear deterrence and stability are, at present, speculative and theoretical, the potential implications are vast (Altmann and Sauer 2017; Geist and Lohn 2018; Saalman 2018). It could transform command and control operations (AI could provide ‘advice’ on decisions or replace human decision making wholesale), enabling faster decisions and targeting of other states mobile second-strike forces, accelerating the speed of conflict and undermining crisis stability. Increased autonomy also means that political decision makers will have less time to react to developments during crises, to comprehend incoming messages, and issue their own pre-crises deterrence and intra-war deterrent threats. Additionally, since AI is capable of identifying patterns across large data sets (allowing improved image recognition, labelling and targeting) it could increase the relative capabilities of advanced nuclear forces vis-a-vis those of smaller and less technologically-­ advanced forces, leading these states to improve and expand their nuclear forces and thus, ultimately, feeding arms racing and spurring proliferation. New social communication technologies, like social media, and the overwhelming flow of near-real time information to decision makers, could complicate the practise of deterrence (and compellance) prior to and during future crises. Consider, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy and his key advisors sequestered themselves for over a week to think through and carefully deliberate their options. Despite being heavily pressured by military officials to strike Soviet nuclear installations in Cuba (a step that could very well have precipitated a larger war) or accept a permanent Soviet nuclear presence in Cuba, Kennedy and his officials were able to find a third way through the crisis. This opportunity may not be open to future decision makers who will find themselves constantly harassed from multiple information sources and the media. Furthermore, the use by President Trump of Twitter to convey his views on foreign policy issues could also be counterproductive were he to impulsively issue threats and conditions via Tweet during crises. We could also imagine scenarios where decision makers are pummelled by disinformation via social media channels prior to – and indeed during – a crisis, introducing biases into their appreciation of real-world events and affecting their ability to act rationally during a crisis. This could also include be influenced by the use of AI-enabled ‘deep fakes’: increasingly realistic videos and images that depict an alternative reality, leading leaders to initiate or escalate crises in response to actions or statements that never actually happened.

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6  T  he Return of Great Power Competition and the Disarmament Dilemma A seemingly obvious solution to the inherent dangers of nuclear deterrence is to prioritise nuclear disarmament. While non-nuclear powers are placing normative pressure on the nuclear-armed states, for example through the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in July 2017 (Gladstone 2017), the prospects for nuclear disarmament appear to be getting bleaker. For a start, the aforementioned technological developments make it more difficult to see how deterrence stability could be sustained on a path to low nuclear numbers, as fewer weapons would be more vulnerable to pre-emption. Furthermore, most nuclear powers are actually engaged in modernising their nuclear arsenals (even as the total number of nuclear weapons held by the U.S. and Russia has fallen significantly since the 1980s) (Mecklin 2015). The U.S., under the Obama administration, initiated a programme that will, over the next 30 years result in the refurbishment or replacement of practically every nuclear-armed aircraft, missile, bomb, and warhead, at a total cost of approximately $1 trillion. Nor is the U.S. alone in this. Russia is replacing all its Soviet-era nuclear weapons systems, while China, the UK and France, India and Pakistan are all further modernising, and, in the case of China, India, Pakistan and North Korea expanding the size of their arsenals. For his part, U.S. President Donald J. Trump stated during the 2016 election campaign that the U.S. should “expand its nuclear capability” and was flippant when it came to concerns that a new arms race with Russia and China was in the offing (Shear and Glanz 2016). On this topic, he said to an MSNBC anchor, “Let it be an arms race… We will outmatch them at every pass and outlast them all” (Ed Pilkington and Martin Pengelly 2016). Combined with Trump’s pledge to pursue “one the greatest military build-ups in American history,” (Press TV, 2017) the combination of improving U.S. nuclear and conventional capabilities will reinforce the belief of America’s adversaries that the goal of the U.S. is to achieve or retain an advantage over its great power adversaries, expanding its coercive leverage in future brinkmanship crises and thus enhancing its deterrent threats. This, in turn, reduces the potency of their own deterrent arsenals, in turn leading them to renew their efforts to sustain deterrence and advance their own capabilities. Another reason why disarmament looks unlikely owes itself to rising tensions between the U.S. and its allies in Europe with Russia (over Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support for Ukrainian separatists), and the U.S. and its Asia-Pacific allies with China, which has territorial disputes with a number of its neighbours and is militarising the South China Seas. Nor has Russia been shy in brandishing its nuclear forces during recent crises and making implicit and explicit nuclear threats (Buckley et  al. 2016). Furthermore, the Trump administration’s 2018 National Defense Strategy adopted language not used since the Cold War, stating that the “central challenge” to U.S. security “is the re-emergence of long-term,

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s­ trategic competition” from China and Russia which it dubs “revisionist powers” seeking to “… shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model—gaining veto authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions” (Department of Defense 2018, p. 4). These rising tensions only act to elevate the importance the U.S. and its allies place on Washington’s nuclear deterrent. Additionally, the Trump administration has withdrawn the U.S. from the JCPOA designed to monitor Iran’s nuclear installations; negotiations with North Korea over its nuclear program have stalled; Saudi Arabia is moving forward with a civilian nuclear program (that could be weaponised in the future) and debates are taking place in Japan over whether to weaponise their nuclear programme. Finally, the U.S. and Russia abandoned the INF Treaty in August 2019, as both consider deploying new ground-based nuclear missiles that could position Europe in the firing line of a potential confrontation  (Seligman and Gramer 2019). On the other side of Eurasia in the Pacific, unshackling itself from the INF Treaty will allow Washington to deploy ground-­ based missiles in counter China’s own build-up of missiles in the region which are designed to challenge US primacy in the Western Pacific. Collectively, all of this portends the possibility of a return to full-scale arms racing between the great powers, declining faith in the existing arms control regime, and potential for a nuclear cascade of proliferation to take place in the Middle East and Northeast Asia.

7  Conclusion: The Way Forward Research in the years to come is needed on how emerging technologies could undermine nuclear deterrence. Key questions include: can the existing nuclear arms control regime be re-designed and broadened to include emerging technologies? Can deterrence against ‘rogues’ be strengthened without undermining great power relations? How do new technologies undermine deterrence between less powerful states in unstable regional settings? Attention on strengthening ‘deterrence around the margins’, against ‘rogues’ and non-state actors is also required, and how leaders can avoid the pitfalls the Bush administration fell into, as it pursued a provocative deterrence strategy that seemed to make U.S. adversaries more fearful, generating incentives for them to seek nuclear arms. Fresh thinking by new scholars is essential. New arms control regimes are necessary and we must consider how they can address the extension of security competition into cyber and outer space, both of which have implications for strategic stability. Are pre-emptive arms control accords possible that would limited the most destabilising foreseeable capabilities? We can imagine most states would agree to banning the use of cyber weapons against other states nuclear arsenals and related physical and cyber infrastructure. Perhaps new advances in sensor technologies, combined with AI that can integrate and harness and increasing amounts of data, could be utilised by the international community to monitor and control the proliferation of nuclear and enabling technologies to nefarious actors.

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Ultimately, a state of deterrence between actors is neither inherently positive nor negative – it can tilt political relations in either direction; reinforce or destabilise strategic balances. At present, great power tensions are rising and given the issues considered in the chapter, one vector of effort should be directed toward fostering joint programmatic arms control that includes new emerging technologies that are likely to elevate global tensions. This could help establish a basis for great power stability during a time of immense global flux and uncertainty.

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What’s in a Name? Deterrence and the Stigmatisation of WMD Patricia Shamai

1  Introduction Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons are distinct methods of warfare. This distinction has led to the categorisation of these weapons under the term Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Whilst government decision makers and military experts, tend to refer to a range of terms, such as CBRN, NBC etc …1 to address the threat from these weapons, the term WMD is commonly referred to within the media and by the public. This term has significance and it is synonymous with the stigmatisation of these weapons. The process of stigmatisation has emerged progressively, through time, as a result of the strategic and normative quality of WMD. Even though each of these weapons differ greatly from the other, they are all perceived to cause long term, lasting destruction. Fundamental to the origins and development of this stigmatising process has been the deterrent quality of each of these weapons to the other. At the core of deterrence is the perception of threat. The enemy is deterred from action due to an awareness that the consequences of such action outweigh any benefits. This chapter argues that the deterrent quality of each of these weapons to the other has played a key role in shaping the stigma. All three weapons can be used in differing contexts and by different actors. The development of nuclear weapons has deterred the use and development of chemical and biological weapons, and vice versa. Efforts to control nuclear weapons were shaped by progress towards the non- proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. In turn, the successful ratification 1  For further discussion of this point, please see: W.  Seth Carus. Occasional paper 8. Defining Weapons of Mass Destruction. Centre for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction. (Washington DC: National Defence University.) 2012

P. Shamai (*) University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, UK e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 A. Filippidou (ed.), Deterrence, Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29367-3_5

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of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (1970) reinforced later efforts to proscribe chemical and biological weapons. Condemnation of WMD has been predicated upon the image and association of these weapons with mass destruction and long -term harm. In particular, several themes can be identified as reinforcing the deterrent nature of each of these weapons. Firstly: (1) states have been deterred by the image of these weapons as causing mass destructive effects. (2) The indiscriminate nature of these weapons, both combatants and non- combatants are the targets of such an attack. (3) Finally, the prospect of the increasing development of the technological means of war, leading to the increasing destructiveness of war has magnified the fear of the potential effects of WMD. The labelling of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons under the term ‘WMD’ has created a focus for the dangers posed by all three. This chapter will examine the historical development of the stigma from the turn of the twentieth century through until the twenty-first century. At the turn of the twentieth century, Heads of State sought to bring peace by calling for measures to prevent the technological development of new weapons of war; these emerged within the Conferences of The Hague. The effects of the use of gas in warfare and the subsequent investigations throughout the Interwar period to research the effects of these weapons, if used, will then be explored. Finally, the chapter documents the post – World War II debates within the United Nations that led to the ­categorisation of WMD. In order to appreciate the significance of the stigmatisation of WMD and the important role that the deterrent nature of these weapons has played in shaping this stigma, the key definitions associated with this term need to be defined.

2  Definitions 2.1  Defining WMD The term ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’ was first defined by the United Nations Convention for Conventional Weapons on 1946. Weapons of Mass Destruction were defined as: Atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons and any weapons developed in the future, which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above (United Nations Security Council. 12th August 1948). (The Avalon Project at Yale Law School 1948).

For the ease of definition, WMD can be broken down into nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Whilst, initially, it may seem all three weapons differ greatly from each other, all three are perceived to be distinct due to their destructive effects. They are also unique due to the normative arguments associated with each.

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2.2  Nuclear Weapons Nuclear weapons are currently considered the ‘absolute weapon’. The military strategist Bernard Brodie famously stated in 1946, ‘Thus far, the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them’ (Brodie 1978, p. 65). Nuclear weapons are distinct in three important ways; Firstly, in the blast effect of these weapons, the sheer power created by their explosion far exceeds any conventional explosion (Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defence 2008, p. 135). In addition to the blast effect, the heat from the explosion instantly creates a fireball, an air blast and shock wave is created which draws the oxygen out of the atmosphere and creates lasting damage and destruction. This is the much-publicised mushroom cloud image associated with a nuclear explosion. Finally, destruction is created by the radiation fall out which is released immediately after the explosion, this covers a wide radius around the blast zone and creates long lasting damage and pollution. Nuclear weapons have been used twice (in close succession). On the sixth August 1945, the US dropped the first atomic bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. Three days later the US released a second attack upon Nagasaki. It is estimated that over 100,000 people were killed by these attacks within a 6 square mile radius, and over 50% of built up areas were destroyed (Williamson and Reardon 1993, p. 1). Samuel Williamson and Stephen Rearden (1993, p.  1) note that the destruction caused by the US attacks was similar to that of the incendiary raids against Tokyo and other Japanese cities several months beforehand. The atomic attacks differed from these in the swiftness of their destruction; this was in part caused by the huge amount of power compressed into each bomb. The US bombings highlighted the potential consequences of atomic warfare. They introduced the possibility of a weapon, so devastatingly powerful, as to create total damage and destruction without warning. Acquiring a nuclear weapons capability is a financially costly and a highly advanced technological and industrial process. Stephen Swartz has estimated that from 1940 to 1996, the US had spent, 5.5 trillion dollars on nuclear weapons and weapons related programmes (Swartz 1998, p.  3). Kristensen and Norris (2016, p. 65) have estimated that the US is projected to spend $350 billion dollars over the next decade modernising and maintaining its nuclear forces. The US is not alone in this. Russia is also undergoing an ambitious modernisation programme, in order to ensure parity with the US and to address its conviction that ‘strategic nuclear forces are indispensable for Russia’s security and status as a great power’ (Kristiensen and Norris 2016, p. 65). France has also undergone a programme of modernisation, in February 2015, the former French President Holland announced that Paris would allocate 12.3% (180 billion euros) of its annual defence budget to enhancement of its nuclear deterrent capabilities until 2019 (Nuclear Threat Initiative 2016). The debates within the United Kingdom regarding the renewal of Trident clarified that

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the estimated cost over 35 years of the four new submarines would be £31 billion to build, with an additional contingency of £10 billion (House of Commons, Hansard, Theresa May 2016).

2.3  Chemical Weapons Chemical weapons can be understood as the use of a chemical agent as a weapon. For Centuries, poison has also been used as a subtle method of warfare. There are accounts of early crude chemical weapons being used as far back as 429 BC, when the Spartans are recorded as using noxious smoke and flame against the Athenian allied cities during the Peloponnesian War (Smart 1997, p. 11). The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) defines chemical agents as ‘Any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. This includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or of their method of production, and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere’ (OPCW 2018). Chemical agents are readily available within society due to their dual use nature; chemical materials are used in everyday society, and can be easily adapted to form weapons of war. For this reason, chemical weapons have been referred to as the ‘poor man’s bomb, and have been considered desirable to ‘states lacking the infrastructure to develop a nuclear weapon’ (Shamai 2015, p.  112). Within the contemporary security environment, the possession of chemical weapons by non- state actors is seen as an increasing threat.

2.4  Biological Weapons Biological weapons relate to the use of disease in warfare. Illchman and Revill (2014, p. 754) note that, ‘Disease and toxicity are frequently odourless, tasteless, and silent  – an insidious means of contaminating the body, effectively attacking from within’ The use of biological weapons is recorded in the fourteenth Century, when Tartar armies catapulted plague infected cadavers into enemy cities (Illchman and Revill 2014 p. 754). Biological weapons are most feared due to the perceptions of their potential use and the effects that they may have. Historically, the effects of biological weapons have been difficult to predict due to the difficulties associated with dispersion. It is for this reason that biological weapons have not been considered strategically beneficial as battlefield weapons. There are few documented cases of use. Despite this, the perception of destruction associated with the use of disease as a weapon provokes deep fear. Should these weapons be developed and used by non- state actors, the consequences are terrifying.

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3  Deterrence 3.1  Traditional Notions of Deterrence The term deterrence rests on the perception of harm. Colin Gray (2010, p.  278) notes that ‘to deter is to persuade someone not to do something that they might well have done otherwise’. The aim is to frighten away potential aggressors. It is all about preventing a threat, most specifically an escalation of conflict from happening. Fundamental to this is not necessarily the threat itself, but the perception of the threat. This is shaped by perceptions of power and cultural beliefs and attitudes. The strategy of deterrence has gained prominence in the post- World War II period, as a result of technological developments in warfare. Deterrence theory is formed using the basic premise that states will be deterred from using their weapons due to awareness of the devastating consequences created should they do so. With reference to WMD, the theory rests on the recognition that should WMD be used by one party, the retaliatory action of the defending state will ensure destruction, in some form. Deterrence, specifically with reference to nuclear weapons formed the basis for US and European strategy throughout the Cold war years. With reference to the use of nuclear weapons, Kenneth Waltz (1990, p. 278) has argued that that, Because catastrophic outcomes of nuclear exchanges are easy to imagine, leaders of states will shrink in horror from initiating them. With nuclear weapons, stability and peace rest on easy calculations of what one country can do to another. Anyone-political leader or man in the street-can see that catastrophe lurks if events spiral out of control and nuclear warheads begin to fly.

In order for deterrence to be effective, it is predicated upon three principles, capability, credibility and communication. Capability relates to the weapons themselves, there needs to be evidence to indicate that a state is in possession of an operational WMD capability. Secondly, states need to demonstrate through rhetoric, or displays of strength, that if needed it has the intention or will to use its weapons capability. The threat needs to be believed. Finally, communication reinforces the credible threat the state poses to the international community. These three processes are linked and cannot be viewed in isolation. Traditionally, this conceptualisation of deterrence has been formed from a realist theoretical international relations perspective. Realist theory argues that states exist within an anarchic society. There is no higher authority beyond the state. For this reason, states need to ensure their own survival. In order to survive, they need to acquire power. The ultimate arbiter of power is military capability. Viewed from this perspective, WMD are seen to ensure the ultimate form of survival, due to the fear of the mass destructive effects of each of these weapons. In particular, the destructive effect of nuclear weapons changed the nature of warfare. The neo-realist theorist Kenneth Waltz has noted that, ‘the absolute quality of nuclear weapons sharply sets a nuclear world off from a conventional one’ (1990, p. 732). Within this chapter, deterrence is examined from an alternative constructivist theoretical lens.

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Constructivist theory examines the important role of ideational forces within ­policymaking. Many of these forces, it is argued, are socially constructed. The ‘identities, interests and behaviours of political agents are socially constructed by collective meanings, interpretations and assumptions about the world. Constructivism examines how ‘rational considerations are brought to bear in collective human enterprises and situations (Adler 1997, p. 348).’ Using Constructivist theory, we are able to explore the importance of identity and interests upon the actions of states. Alexander Wendt (1992, p. 395), argues that the concept of anarchy as a pre-­existing entity does not exist; anarchy is what states make of it. It is, itself, formed by the identities and interests of states. Identities and interests are linked; identities are the basis of interests. These are themselves shaped by collective meanings, which constitute the structures that organise our actions. Actors acquire identities ‘by participating in such collective meanings’ (Wendt, p.  397). Using constructivism, it is possible to view the cultural beliefs and attitudes associated with WMD. Deterrence is formed by the image of these weapons, as causing unacceptable harm. The indiscriminate nature of these weapons, targeting both combatants and non- combatants, finally, the technological development of war, leading to the increasing destructiveness of war itself. In order to understand the relevance of these aspects of deterrence, is necessary to understand the conceptual arguments associated with the stigmatisation process.

3.2  Understanding Stigma A stigma refers to mark or branding. Ervin Goffman (1990, p. 13) notes that stigma is defined as ‘a special discrepancy between virtual and actual social identity. The term stigma is referred to as an attribute that is deeply discrediting.’ Rebecca AdlerNissan (2014, p. 145) adds to this definition by stating that ‘stigma is associated with the idea that certain individuals are to be avoided or shunned, particularly in public places, as they are seen to be “deviant” or “morally polluted.” Within the field of sociology, stigma refers to the exclusion of individuals and groups of individuals within society, based upon cultural and social differences. In particular, the study of stigma has been associated with mental health illness, the deaf community, Aids, HIV, and the unemployed. The author Erving Goffman’s work has addressed stigma as part of a human interaction, focusing on how those stigmatized respond in the face of stigma. He argues that there are two faces to stigma, that of the stigmatized and that of society at large and how it defines normality. Stigmas are a ‘social label created by the ‘reaction’ of others in society’ (Slatterly 1992, p. 118). As this ‘reactionary’ process is socially constructed, it is subject to change. In order to gain a wider understanding of the role of deterrence in the stigmati­ zation process, it is possible to highlight the significance of perception in shaping the stigma. If deterrence is viewed as a being shaped by cultural beliefs and attitudes, the role of the stigma is important as it highlights the cultural beliefs and

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attitudes that have formed towards WMD. It is helpful to refer to the conceptualization of stigma adopted by the academics, Link and Phelan, they note that stigma emerges as the convergence of inter-related components. Stigma exists when elements of stereotyping, separation, status loss and discrimination occur together in a power situation that allows them (Link and Phelan 2001, p. 377). According to this definition, stigma occurs when; (1) people distinguish and label human differences, (2) dominant cultural beliefs link labelled persons to undesirable characteristics, (3) labelled persons are put into distinct categories, ‘us and them’, (4) labelled persons experience status loss and discrimination. (5) Underlying this is the recognition that for stigma to develop it must be dependent upon social, economic and political power (Link and Phelan 2001, p. 377). This definition can be applied to the stigmatisation of WMD. The fears of the potential, unseen destruction created by the use of chemical and biological weapons has provoked international action to prohibit the stockpiling and development of these weapons by states. The Chemical Weapons convention (1993) and the Biological Weapons Convention (1972) exemplify this. The sheer power and demonstration of destruction caused by knowledge of the effects of the use of nuclear weapons, distinguishes these weapons from other methods of warfare and brandishes these weapons as indiscriminately destructive weapons. The stigma towards chemical and biological weapons, helped to frame the discourse concerning nuclear weapons, this has culminated in international condemnation, under the labelling of these weapons as ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’. The significance of the labelling of these weapons under this term is that this has harnessed international action to control and address future proliferation of these weapons. The stigma has progressively developed through time, first emerging by way of policy elites and the scientific community, and in time from the media and public opinion. WMD have been associated with an image of total death and destruction. It is important to note here that as the stigma is shaped by cultural identity, it is not a pre -set condition but reflective of cultural norms. Perceptions of deterrence are then also subject to change. In order to explore this linkage in more depth, it is necessary to examine the early condemnation of chemical and biological weapons; this helped to shape the stigma.

4  H  istorical Context: Prior to World War 1: The Morality Debate: Weapons of Mass Destruction The debates during the turn of the Century concerning the increasing destructiveness of weapons of war started to highlight distinct methods of warfare, perceived to create excessive destruction. For this reason, there were early calls to ban the development of new technologically advanced methods of warfare. In particular, at this time, the use of asphyxiating gas was seen to be abhorrent, the first example of this are the discussions held within the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.

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The Czar Nicholas II of Russia initiated the First Hague Convention (1899) so that states could ‘discuss the most efficacious means of assuring to all peoples the benefits of a real and durable peace.’ (Avalon Project) The convening of the Convention was seen as a ‘revision of the Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War stated by the Declaration of St Petersburg (Avalon Project: International Committee of the Red Cross).’ The earlier Declaration of St Petersburg had sought to establish international consensus against the development of new, increasingly destructive methods of warfare. The second Convention developed these debates further. Both Conventions sought to build on the progress of St Petersburg and to promote peace by prohibiting the further development of new weapons of war, prohibiting technology, which at that time had not been used, including poison gas. These two Conventions highlight the early seeds of deterrence. The purpose of both was to prevent war by preventing new technology. This, in itself does not form deterrence, however, drawing on one of the eight principles of the Conventions, representatives agreed to, ‘prohibit the use in the armies and fleets of any new kind of firearms whatever, and of new explosives, or any powders more powerful than those now in use, either for rifles or cannon (Avalon Project). If successful, this would have ensured that all states maintained a limited weapons capability. The difficulty of this, and thus, the importance of credibility and capability, was highlighted by the then US Secretary of State, John Hay in 1899. He argued that that proposals to limit new weapons of war lacked practicality, and when discussed were likely to lead on to discussion of further unrelated issues. It was argued that the limitation of certain methods of war was an unnecessary measure; in fact, it was even argued that by increasing armaments, there would be the eventual limitation of war itself: It is doubtful if wars are diminished by rendering them less destructive, for it is the plain lesson of history that the periods of peace have been longer protracted as the cost and destructiveness of war have increased. (Avalon Project: Mr John Hay 1899)

These arguments changed after gas was used in warfare during the First World War, after this, the true destructive nature of chemical weapons was fully realised. This set the historic precedent for later efforts to control the use and development of WMD, and served to create a stigma toward poison gas.

5  T  he Impact of World War 1: Disarmament Talk: Chemical and Biological Condemnation On 22nd April 1915, The German army launched a chlorine gas attack against French troops in Ypres. This resulted in nearly 13,000 gas related casualties (Bunt 2004, p. 81). As has been noted, the possibility of developing toxic gas as a weapon was not new. Alongside German research, the French and British had been conducting research into the effects of a gas attack. The magnitude of destruction witnessed at Ypres highlighted that gas was a new technologically advanced weapon of

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­ arfare. Diana Preston (2015, p. 264) notes that ‘by the end of the war, gas had w become a prominent component of the arsenals of all belligerents.’ She goes onto note that, some 124,000 tons of poison gas had been used during the war. Half of this by Germany and that 63 different types of gas had been deployed. This demonstrates the race between states to gain a strategic and tactical advantage. Evidence of the hidden wide- spread effects of gas warfare spurred much greater research and efforts to develop preventative methods against future use (Krause 2013, p. 548–550). Scientific experts and senior policymakers feared that gas might be used upon non – combatants, the realisation of this was met with abhorrence. Alongside a recognition of the potential future devastation created by the use of gas in war, was the fear of the potential of the development of bacteriological methods of warfare. The severity of the Spanish flu pandemic in 1918 highlighted this (Trilla et  al. 2008, p. 668–673). The majority of public opinion within Europe and the US was against the use of gas warfare. The most powerful expressions of public opinion came from peace groups, such as the Quaker movement. The industrial changes brought about at the turn of the twentieth Century saw the emergence of the Movement for Women’s Suffrage, also referred to as the Women’s Movement. The core aim of the movement was equal voting rights for women. An additional item was the quest for international peace, which gained expression with the onset of the First World War. The huge involvement of women in the war effort throughout Europe and the US meant that with the ending of the War, arguments in favour of Women’s Suffrage gained a greater momentum. In the UK in 1918, a Parliamentary Bill granting voting rights for women was passed. In the US, the 19th Amendment of the Constitution was ratified on the 18th August 1920 (www.firstworldwar.com). The decision to grant women the vote had a drastic political impact upon policy makers. The atrocities of the War, and the huge upheaval that it created forced policy makers both within Europe and the US to address measures to prevent future war. In contrast to this, there was the arguments inside the military and chemical industry, within the US and Europe, that gas warfare was a more humane method of warfare than other conventional methods (Harris and Paxman 2001, p. 36). It was argued that by disabling soldiers with gas, you were acting in a more reserved manner, than assaulting soldiers with large-scale bomb attacks (Harris and Paxman 2001, p. 36). This contradicted with the publics’ perception of the physical and psychological ‘frightfulness’ (Price 1995, p. 20) of the gas poisoning experienced by the returning soldiers of the War. The actual use of poison gas was an historic incident, after which, the nature of war changed dramatically. As has been noted, the War demonstrated the consequences of technological innovations in warfare which served to heighten the destructive nature of war. The use of poison gas served to shock the Western world and exacerbate fears as to the catastrophic nature of war. The concern was regarding the development and strategic potential of these weapons. For this reason, the development of bacteriological weapons (later renamed biological) was also discussed.

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5.1  League of Nations: Temporary Mixed Commission In order to address these fears, members states in the newly formed League of Nations agreed to form a Permanent Advisory Committee to investigate the effects of the potential use of poison gas in warfare. During the early meetings in the Permanent Advisory Committee, it was agreed that civilian body, a Temporary Mixed Commission, composed of economic and political experts, and members of the Provisional Economic and Financial Committee and International Labour Organisation (League of Nations 1925) should investigate the effects of these weapons. The Temporary Mixed Commission was also to work with the Permanent Advisory Committee to examine the possibility of future development and use of chemical methods of warfare. It is in these discussions that the normative quality of these weapons starts to emerge, these discussions helped to label chemical (and later biological weapons) as distinct from other methods of warfare and helped to shape the discourse towards WMD. In particular, the discussions at this time highlighted the destructive potential of the use of both weapons upon the civilian population. It is here that a normative distinction is drawn between the targeting of combatants and non- combatants in war, elevating these weapons as technologically distinct methods of warfare. During the second session of the Permanent Advisory Committee, three important points were made. These were: • The use of gas was a fundamentally cruel method of war; it was not, however, crueler than other methods of warfare, as long as it was not used upon non-­ combatants (this distinction had previously been established in other treaties, most notably The Hague Conferences). Its use on non-combatants was particularly barbarous. • It was useless to prohibit the use of gas in wartime, by prohibiting its manufacture in peacetime. • Prohibition of laboratory experiments was out of the question. The Permanent Advisory Committee presented these findings to the League’s Council. The Council in reading this report, still chose to condemn the use of poison gas in warfare, and asked the Permanent Advisory Committee to again consider methods which might ensure the effective control of the production of gas (Goldblat, p. 44). This is an important point to note as it signified the progression of these discussions from concerns about the actual use of gas, to the production of gas. In the ensuing discussions, it was noted by Lord Robert Cecil of South Africa that there was not enough detailed knowledge of the overall effects of poison gas upon the population. He noted that, ‘the best method for preventing the use of poison gas was to appeal to the scientists of all countries to make all discoveries public – in that way, no nation would consider itself in a privileged situation with regard to the others’ (Goldblat, p. 45). The Temporary Mixed Commission chose to appoint a Special Sub-committee, comprised of expert chemists, physiologists and bacteriologists to explore the effects of chemical (and it was later agreed to widen the scope to bacteriological)

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warfare upon: human life, animal life, vegetation and the ‘wealth and resources of all kinds of a country attacked at any point within its territory by chemical and bacteriological warfare’ (Goldblat 1971, p. 25). The Special Sub-committee, when exploring these issues, noted that chemical and bacteriological weapons were distinct from other methods of warfare in their ability to be used upon a whole enemy nation in arms. When addressing the distinct quality of chemical and bacteriological weapons, the Sub-committee concluded that, ‘a chemical or bacteriological attack carries destruction beyond the fighting lines, touching nation’s population, riches and resources of every kind.’ (Goldblat 1971, p. 26). With reference to gas warfare, it was argued that its development at the time of investigation did not render it dramatically distinct from other methods of warfare, however, its potential use elevated chemical weapons into a category superior to any other method of warfare.

5.2  Chemical Weapons: (A New and Terrible Weapon) There are three main categories of chemical weapon; irritant agents, suffocating or asphyxiating agents, and toxic agents. Each of these agents produced varying effects when used, from incapacitation to death. Irritant agents, such as lachrymatory agents, which did not cause permanent disablement, could be used in domestic situations by police organizations. The Special Sub-committee noted that all of the three categories of gas mentioned above were well known gases and were used regularly in peacetime within the chemical industry, and that new gases were continually being developed and used. The Special Sub – committee went onto note: • There is very little difference between the manufacture of pharmaceutical products and that of injurious substances used in war. • The release of high explosives often produces toxic gases. • The use of chemical weapons produced fewer deaths than other devices, such as the bullet of a shell, however the effects of chemical gases permanently injure their victims. • There were no cases of lasting damage caused by chemical agents upon vegetation. • Use of poison gas upon populated areas would cause mass inconvenience, however would not cause lasting damage. Populated areas could protect themselves to a limited extent by the use of gas masks. However, if subject to a large-scale attack, no protective measures can counter the effects of chemical agents (Goldblat 1971, p. 26). Overall, it was concluded that gas warfare was ‘a new and terrible weapon (Goldblat 1971, p.  26).’ It could be produced and hidden without difficulty, and

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once used, could easily spread. In large doses there was no protection against its use. Awareness of this prompted calls for the prohibition of these weapons.

5.3  Biological Weapons Bacteriological methods of warfare were distinct from other conventional methods, as they could potentially, ‘reach the civilian population, would cross frontiers, and might reappear or continue even after the cessation of hostilities. Bacteriological weapons may be directed against all mankind (Goldblat 1971, p. 29). It was concluded that at the time of the investigation, it was hard to conceive of a likely attack by germ warfare. However, the possibilities of an attack, as with chemical weapons, outstripped the potential of any other weapon. This was particularly the case, if the targets of such an attack were non-combatants.

5.4  Geneva Protocol The debates within the Permanent Commission and the Temporary Mixed Commission helped to shape International action to address the further production and proliferation of chemical and bacteriological (later referred to as biological) weapons. This culminated in the establishment of the Conference on the International Trade in Arms, and resulting from this the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous Or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol) referred to as Geneva Protocol of 1925. The Geneva Protocol (LoN) prohibits under international law the ‘use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices as well as the prohibition of the use of bacteriological methods of warfare’ (OPCW). Some states had reservations ratification of the Protocol and inserted a reservation that agreed to abide by the non- use (first resort) aspect of this but would not agree to prohibit use as a form of retaliation. The Treaty was not seen as a restriction on research into the effects of gas in war, or against states building a stockpile of gas to be used if needed in future war. The US Senate failed to ratify the treaty, arguing again that gas may be a more humane method of warfare.

6  S  tigmatising Deterrence: The Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Cold War The Second World War, once again demonstrated the consequences of the development and use of new technologically advanced methods of warfare. The Second World War had demonstrated the importance of air power, and in particular, emphasized the importance of aerial and strategic bombing.

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The use of chemical and biological weapons was very limited. Despite its anticipated wide scale use, gas was only used one during the war by Japan in China (Preston 2015, 271). A possible explanation for this that the technological advances in air power overshadowed the utility of gas warfare. Biological weapons, had not been used as battlefield weapons, in the Second World War, however there had been significant development of their potential as weapons of war. Both the UK and the US had biological weapons programmes throughout the 1940s (Guillemin 2005). There was also significant evidence during the war and in its aftermath, of a Japanese biological weapons programme (Guillemin 2005, p. 76). With the greater focus on air power, the appeal of biological weapons lay in ‘their perceived potential for large–scale (surprise) attack on enemy cities and industrial centres (Guillemin 2005, p. 7). The consequence of the development of air power had been to blur the distinction between combatants and non-combatants. Civilians were now very much the victims of war. With this thinking in mind, biological warfare gained a new strategic importance. Jeanne Guillemin notes that some British experts saw biological weapons as a more humane way, not of killing soldiers, but of killing civilians already doomed, it was thought, by aerial attacks with high explosives (Guillemin 2005, p. 6). The disadvantages of biological weapons lie in the difficulties presented by their potential dispersion, conducting an accurate attack, determining the appropriate dose to be used, and the testing of any new developments. Biological weapons technology developed significantly during the Second World War, so much so that it was thought that biological weapons would eventually rival all other methods of warfare, in particular nuclear weapons (Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, 2009, p. 1–26). After the war, huge resources were ploughed into the US biological weapons programme (Balmer 2001). But, despite initial efforts, the difficulties posed by the development of these weapons could not easily be overcome, and by 1950, attempts at further development had floundered. Strategic planning became overshadowed by the development of the atomic bomb and later the hydrogen bomb.

6.1  Nuclear Weapons As has been noted, the use of nuclear weapons in 1945 changed the nature of warfare, Michael Quinlan (2009, p.  7) notes that ‘it was widely, if not universally, realised that something entirely special – a deeply radical discontinuity in the business of armed conflict – had happened.’ Nuclear weapons were like no other weapons. The US, in 1945 had an unparalleled strategic advantage. Along with the recognition that the possession of this military capability provided the US with a massive military strategic advantage, came the realisation that it was only a matter of time before other states developed their own atomic programme.

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Public condemnation of the use of nuclear weapons, was at first muted. However, in time, sheer enormity of the effects of the use of these weapons in Nagasaki and Hiroshima became known, so too did calls to prohibit the future development and use of these weapons (Tannenwald 2005, p. 5–49). The condemnation of nuclear weapons developed as a result of the normative debates relating to chemical and biological weapons. The debates concerning nuclear weapons, against the backdrop of the normative debates regarding chemical and biological weapons shaped the stigma towards WMD. Condemnation of each, reinforced condemnation of all. Underlying this was a fear of the power and strategic advantage that each of these weapons could provide. The political jostling to determine the future status of these weapons dominated the debates within the UN.

6.2  Recognising the Dangers of Nuclear Weapons The first international statement regarding the control of atomic energy came from a joint declaration made by the US, UK and Canada. This became known as the Truman -Atlee- King Declaration. In this, the three leaders recognized how the development of the atomic bomb had dramatically changed the nature of warfare, ‘we recognize that the application of recent scientific discoveries to the methods and practice of war has placed at the disposal of mankind means of destruction hitherto unknown, against which, there can be no adequate military defense, and the employment of which, no single nation can in fact have a monopoly.’ (Harry S Truman Library). The Declaration emphasized the need for states to collectively agree to measures to prevent the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes (Harry S Truman Library). The Declaration urged states to consider the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Towards these means, the three leaders proposed that the control of atomic energy should be taken to the UN and that the UN should establish a Commission, which would make specific proposals regarding the control of atomic energy, the exchange of scientific information, the establishment of safeguards against possible violations and ‘the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction’ (Harry S Truman Library).

6.3  T  he United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) 1946 The purpose of the UNAEC was to ‘deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy and other related matters’ (US Dept. of State: Documents on Disarmament (DoD), p. 6).

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In the first meeting, the US representative to the UN Bernard Baruch recognized the horrors of war and indicated the dangers created by the nature of new weapons technology, particularly that of atomic energy; ‘Science has torn from nature a secret so vast in its potentialities that our minds cower from the terror it creates’ (Congressional Research Service (CRS), p. 13) He stated that despite the massive destruction that atomic weapons can create, atomic energy can also be used as a ‘help to humanity’ (CRS, p. 13). In this sense, atomic energy can be used for peaceful purposes to aid and benefit human kind. The Soviet view differed to this in the conception of the possession and use of atomic weapons. The US, at this time the sole state in possession of atomic weapons, sought to establish an environment of collective security, seeking the control of atomic weapons prior to disarmament. The Soviet Union sought the disarmament of these weapons first, in order to establish collective security. The US had the strategic advantage at this time, but it was only a matter of time before the Soviet Union matched this. Both powers were aware of this, and these differences dominated the discussions. In order for states to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent, they need to demonstrate the intention, and will, to use nuclear weapons. In order to promote non-­ proliferation, states openly declare their intention to comply with international measures to ensure the non- use of nuclear weapons. This does not nullify deterrence but weakens the signals that are conveyed. The challenge has been maintaining the credible threat of deterrence and enhancing non-proliferation initiatives. Traditionally, States have needed to maintain a fine balance between the two and communication has been essential. The same principles associated with the nuclear threat can be applied to the threats associated with chemical and biological weapons. Each, differ greatly from the other. Yet, each has the potential to create mass destruction. The interconnection between these weapons, and the importance of deterrence can be appreciated when viewed from the perspective of the stigmatisation of all three. The US, in its original proposals, laid out a comprehensive list of provisions. The overriding theme within these proposals was that the US would be willing to hand over its atomic weapons when they were assured of an international system of controls based on shared interests and co-operation. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, stated very clearly that its aim was for the total prohibition of all atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The prohibition and destruction of atomic weapons should take place before the conclusion of an international agreement to enforce that prohibition, and prevent the misuse of atomic energy (CRS, p. 65). Once the total prohibition of atomic weapons had been achieved, then measures could be taken to look into a system of control to provide for the production and development of any future atomic weapons, and in turn, toward the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

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6.4  U  nited Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments (UNCCA) In the first year of its establishment, the UNAEC had failed to make any progress, this was due to the political and strategic concerns of the US and USSR. In order to change the dynamic of the discussions, the Soviet Union suggested that there should be, The establishment of two Commissions: One for the control of the execution of the decision regarding the reduction of armaments, and the other for the control of the execution of the decision regarding the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes. (The United Nations (UN))

These two Commissions would be the UNAEC and the United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments (UNCCA). In order to break the deadlock between the US and the USSR, member states agreed that there should be a clear distinction between the terms of reference of the UNAEC, and that of the UNCCA. The French representative, M De La Tournelle argued that, ‘considerations on the control of Atomic energy and those relating to general disarmament should be conducted on parallel lines, and were independent of each other since, neither was properly subordinate to the other’ (UN 1970, p. 739) In particular, representatives from UK, China, US, France, Australia, and Canada were of the opinion that there was a need to distinguish and clarify weapons that were deemed to cause mass destruction against all other conventional armaments, to ensure that the work of the UNCCA differed from that of the UNAEC. The representative from the UK stressed that weapons of mass destruction should include ‘atomic, chemical and biological weapons’ (UN 1970, p. 739) The Australian delegate added that radioactive material should also be included in this definition. These discussions continued for some time, until finally, at its Thirteenth Meeting, on the 12th August 1948, members states in both commissions advised the UN Security Council that, It considers all armaments and armed forces, except atomic weapons and weapons of mass destruction, fall within its jurisdiction and that weapons of mass destruction should be defined to include atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal ­chemical and biological weapons and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above. (United Nations Security Council (UNSC))

This Resolution reflects the desire of the members of the UNCCA to stigmatize a category of warfare unique in its potential to create mass destruction and to maintain a clear distinction between the work of the UNAEC and the UNCCA.

7  T  he Significance of the WMD Stigma: Stigmatising Deterrence The UN definition is a reflection of the stigma towards nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. By labelling these weapons under the term WMD, international efforts could be made to address the limitation and prevention of the future prolif-

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eration of all three of these weapons. Deterrence had played an important part in shaping and defining the stigma. Fears of the development of new technological advances towards WMD, as well as public awareness and condemnation of the effects of these weapons forced representatives within the UN to overlook political differences and forge agreement about the perceived dangers posed by WMD. At this time, the fear of the use of nuclear weapons dominated the discussions. Ironically, the first significant legal proscription of these weapons came with the establishment of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation treaty (1968). The progress in establishing this Treaty was, in part, due to the historical efforts of world leaders and state representatives prior to and after the First World War. Chemical and biological weapons, during the Cold War were hidden under the shadow of nuclear weapons. Efforts to proscribe these weapons were limited due to the challenges associated with the dual-use nature of these weapons. States were reluctant to risk their security concerns by agreeing to any proposed treaty verification measures. The shadow of nuclear weapons, deterred the use of chemical and biological weapons in this period. The proxy interests of the US and USSR dominated throughout the Cold War years. The use of chemical weapons during the Iran- Iraq war (1980–1988) sent shockwaves throughout the world and prompted a public outcry (Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)). Saddam Hussein is believed to have been deterred from using chemical and biological weapons upon Israel and Saudi Arabia during the 1991 Invasion of Kuwait, due to fear of a retaliation by the US with nuclear weapons. Brands and Palkki (2011, p. 133–136) have argued that Saddam sought to develop his weapons programme with the long term of view of launching a lengthy conventional war against Israel. He believed that Israel would be deterred from using nuclear weapons due to fear of possible retaliation.

8  Conclusion This chapter has highlighted the significance of the stigmatisation of WMD into one category of warfare. Underlying this stigmatisation process has been the perception of the unique strategic quality of all three of these weapons categorised under this term. Moral abhorrence at the potential destruction caused by each of these weapons has reinforced the perception of the strategic power of all three. This has developed as a result of: (1) the image of these weapons as causing mass death and destruction. (2) The indiscriminate nature of all three weapons. Each can target non- combatants as well as combatants. No group is immune to attack. Finally (3) Awareness of the increasing destructiveness of war. Awareness of technological innovation in all three fields has the potential to magnify the destructives of war. The use of chemical weapons during the Syrian civil war (2013) has prompted a questioning of the strength of the normative condemnation of chemical weapons (Price 2013). The context of twenty-first century security threats has differed from those during the Cold War years. Despite this, many have argued that public con-

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demnation of the use of these weapons has strengthened the norms associated with WMD and encouraged international action to address contemporary threats involving these weapons (UN General Assembly First Committee). Knowledge and awareness of the significance of the WMD stigma provides greater understanding of the dangers of these weapons.

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Deterring Violent Extremism and Terrorism Anastasia Filippidou

1  Introduction There is an ongoing debate among scholars and policy makers regarding the role and utility of deterrence in countering terrorism and violent extremism (Lupovici 2016; Levy 2008; Freedman 1998; Jervis et al. 1991: 211). The chapter focuses on the effectiveness of deterrence on non-state actors and on violent extremism in protracted conflicts. The emphasis on non-state actors highlights additional challenges of deterrence, such as the element of asymmetry, while the protracted aspect emphasises the idea of complexity. For the purposes of this chapter the terms terrorism and violent extremism are used interchangeably in order to avoid the definitional conundrum, owing to the lack of a universally agreed definition of these terms, and also because the two terms reflect better the breadth and depth of deterrence. The gamut of deterrent measures in combination with the numerous types and manifestations of violent extremism, make it very challenging to identify one single case study that can cover all points. Thus the chapter uses the case study of intelligence gathering and extraordinary renditions as a springboard to further examine specific key elements of deterrence that were also partially analysed in chapter “Deterrence: Concepts and Approaches for Current and Emerging Threats” of this book. Deterrence forms part of a broader policy of countering violent extremism, but the different elements of this policy are interdependent and interlinked. This chapter focuses on the key arguments that pertain particularly to deterrence within the terrorist context and it considers questions such as: How can a state deter but not alienate? In what way can the traditional concept of deterrence be expanded and adapted to deal with current complex realities? How can engagement with non-state actors be best conceived and brought into policy?

A. Filippidou (*) Cranfield Forensic Institute, Cranfield University, UK e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 A. Filippidou (ed.), Deterrence, Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29367-3_6

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2  W  hen Intelligence Gathering Goes Wrong: How Not to Deter? Actionable intelligence gathering forms a critical part of deterrence measures in counterterrorism. In the recent years there have been significant changes in the intelligence community at state and international level. In point of fact, most security agencies at any level had to build the necessary intelligence capacity in order to understand the implications of intelligence gathering, analysis, and sharing (Carter 2004). By focusing on intelligence gathering and sharing, and the Extraordinary Renditions Programme (henceforth ERP) the chapter examines the impact and influence of ERPs and enhanced interrogation techniques (henceforth EITs) on deterring violent extremism. The aim of the case study is not to be self-righteous, and moralizing, but the lessons that can be derived from this case are very useful, as societies are being judged by the actions of those who decide to fight in their name and vice versa. With the ERPs Western countries in their ‘war against terror’ ended up extending support or tolerating some of the world’s least free regimes, and as stated in the US Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency field manual ‘lose moral legitimacy, lose the war’ (US Dept of the Army 2006). The case study demonstrates that an impasse was allowed to be created within leading liberal democracies, where intelligence gathering methods became subservient to pre-determined policies and to a political attitude of ‘make fit’. Intelligence gathering ‘did not go through proper scrutiny but it went directly to decision makers’ (Senior British Intelligence Officer 2012). Therefore, intelligence gathering ended up driving policy instead of supporting policy.

3  Programmes Carefully Designed Through Legislation The brief background of the case study is that in the early 1990s just after the Cold War, a large number of CIA’s operational spending was cut, and covert intelligence stations were removed from many developing countries, where Al Qaeda (henceforth AQ) was active. In 1995 for instance, only 25 trainees became CIA officers (9/11 Commission Report 2004, 90). The significant cuts in the intelligence budget were seen as viable because many policy makers and advisors thought that with the US having won the Cold War there was no need for such expenditure. The political masters did not consider the threat of AQ as severe as different security services did, such as the White House’s Counter-terrorism Security Group (CSG). Within this context and with little political support at the time, for certain senior US officials and the CIA the option of extraordinary rendition became increasingly attractive. The aim of this policy of indirect action was to disrupt and deter AQ, even if it would not deal directly with AQ’s main bases. Extraordinary Renditions (ERs) did not appear with 9/11, nor has it been a solely U.  S phenomenon, but over the years ERs were designed through systematic

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l­egislation, giving credence to the argument that they were calculated and determined. US federal agents started using the terms ‘extraordinary renditions’ back in the 1970s (Safire 2004; Clarridge 1997). Still, usually the idea was to bring a suspect back to the US to face justice. In more recent years ‘Rendition to justice’ was approved for use against terrorist suspects by President Ronald Reagan in 1986 (Priest 2005). In 1988 the US Justice Department issued a legal opinion regarding the CIA and the FBI which placed ‘rendition’ into the official lexicon, as the act of capturing and bringing suspects to U. S courts (Ottaway and Oberdorfer 1989). In the 1990s ‘rendition to justice’ continued to be seen as a vital method for bringing suspected terrorists to the United States for trial. Although the document itself remains classified, President George H.W. Bush authorized specific procedures for renditions in 1993 through National Security Directive 77 (NSD-77) (2012). President Clinton signed the Presidential Decision Directive 62 (PDD-62) on 22 May 1998, setting up clear responsibilities for ten major anti-terror programs, the first of which was called “Apprehension, Extradition, Rendition, and Prosecution” (Human Rights Watch 2019). Following the above directives, an additional component, which also remained classified and was summarised later in a staff report of the 9/11 commission, stated that ‘if extradition procedures were unavailable or put aside, the US could seek the local country’s assistance in a rendition, secretly putting the fugitive in a plane back to America or some third country for trial’ (9/11 Commission Report 2004, p. 2). ‘A particularly damaging aspect was that in all the legal memos trying to justify rendition, seems that they know that they are doing something wrong and they are desperately attempting to bring it within the rule of law in a pretty awful way’ (McCracken 2011). The above highlight that the ERs were not a silent idea of an isolated individual. The debate over the use of EITs and torture is centuries’ long with the Bentham for instance, supporting it in a limited category of cases, Kant opposing it as part of his categorical imperative against improperly using people as means for achieving noble ends, and Voltaire’s views on the matter being hopelessly confused (Dershowitz 2002a, b: 149–150). In sum, advocates of the use of EITs usually refer to the ‘ticking bomb’ scenario as a justification and their argument is rooted in utilitarianism, while those in opposition come from the deontological and humanitarian approach. These two diametrically opposed philosophies have long battled for preeminence among policymakers. As Krauss and Lacey posit ‘the utilitarian views the humanitarian as intent upon shattering the national defence, while the humanitarian sees the utilitarian as unconcerned with the killing of innocent civilians’ (2002: 73). Within this context, for utilitarians torture is a necessary evil, whereas for the humanitarians by contemplating torture one is creating the evil. The utilitarian approach would distinguish the nature and purpose of intelligence from its methods. In this way the ultimate value and strength of intelligence would be dependent upon its rigorous testing against reality. According to Dershowitz ‘the real question is not whether torture would be used  – it would  – but whether it would be used outside of the law or within the law. If this however would take place through the issue of a torture warrant by a judge then there would at least be accountability’ (2002a, 2003).

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The utility of information gathering through EITs depends on what the objective is. If the objective is just to obtain a confession, then torture can be an effective method. Legitimisation by confession is an old and quite a widespread method among different countries. Interrogators, and judges in a number of countries accept confessions as chief proof of guilt. A number of countries in the Middle East for instance, base their legal systems predominantly on confessions and therefore, obtaining a confession would become an end in itself.

4  T  he Risks and Impact of Overreaction in Deterring Violent Extremists The elevation of a threat to an existential one opens the way to overreaction and makes the adoption of any questionable measures as more palatable. After all, one of the recurring challenges and dilemmas for an intelligence organisation is that the work calls for relations with individuals and institutions whose practices can undermine US norms and laws. That is part of the job. You do not only deal with people who sing in choir in intelligence. This [dilemma] predates the issue of rendering individuals to foreign intelligence organisations that may well engage in torture. (Carle 2017)

George W.  Bush within days of 9/11 signed a memorandum of notification that authorised the CIA to conduct ERs without any advance approval from either the White House or the State Department or the Department of Justice (Waterman 2005). As such, and to an extent understandably, “there was a ‘before 9/11’ and ‘after 9/11’. After 9/11 the gloves came off” (Black 2002). In other words, all means overt and covert were back on the table and there were increasing whispers to a return to the old days of cooperating, even more readily, with the security forces of some of the world’s most repressive regimes. In the words of Robert Baer, former CIA officer ‘if you want a serious interrogation, you send a prisoner to Jordan. If you want them to be tortured, you send them to Syria. If you want someone to disappear and never to see them gain you send them to Egypt’ (2005). ‘There is a difference between picking up somebody and transferring them to the US for trial, which is what happened in a few instances before 9/11, and setting up your own secret prisons and waterboarding people there which is what happened after 9/11 in a fairly very large programme’ (McCracken 2011). Within the context of 9/11 intelligence organisations were authorised to transfer prisoners to other countries solely for the purpose of detention and interrogation (Jehl and Johnston 2005). As such the ERP was more than just sending suspected terrorists in prisons abroad. It was about intelligence gathering, and different countries have different thresholds of torture tolerance. What is more, there did not seem to be planned justice at the end of that procedure. For once more CIA and FBI disagreed on tactics. The CIA was assigned to dismantle, deter, disrupt and detain terrorist suspects and the organisation initially saw ERs as a good tool to assist it with its counter-terrorism work. The FBI’s focus was to gather evidence that could be used in a US court, which however, was not consid-

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ered by the CIA to be a very efficient way of fighting terrorism. Regarding the ‘ticking bomb’ scenario, Carle asserts ‘How intelligence operatives and law enforcement officials need to respond to likely perpetrators of terrorist acts has almost nothing to do with this [ticking bomb] scenario. Even if it were to happen you do not base your laws on theoretical and astronomically unlikely circumstances. It is just a false story’ (Carle 2017). Furthermore, any information gathered under duress is surrounded with suspicion about its quality in order to have any credibility, and without credibility, intelligence is nothing more than un-sanctionable data. In the case of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed for instance, despite the EITs used, the suspect still lied 183 times (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 2014). Moreover, often vital intelligence is gathered at the capture stage, as the state maintains the initiative, instead of later on after extraordinary rendition takes place and in a cell (Nigerian interrogator 2011). The main issue with intelligence is not the volume of the information but the verification, analysis and linking of the gathered data as well as the timely and accurate dissemination of the information to the right people. Information obtained through EITs more often than not obscured the situation even more (Soufan 2012). Consequently, forced confessions became the source of false intelligence, when the ‘host’ country of a black site would try and extract information designed to give the message this ‘host’ country wanted the West, on this occasion, to hear. Even on the occasions where information extracted through EITs has been accurate, by outsourcing the interrogations, the U.  S destroyed the credibility of the suspects’ statements to the interrogators and with that destroyed the chances of an effective legal case against the suspects. The loss of credibility led to the reduction of inter-agency cooperation. According to Carle ‘from a legal perspective it is completely stupid. There is no justification to use these techniques [EITs] except for a vile visceral response of a nation or an individual in fear of trying to indirectly take vengeance’ (Carle 2011, 2017). Abandoning laws that protected suspects from coercive interrogations proved to be a propaganda own goal. Poor treatment of prisoners, the ERP and EITs increased the sentiment of alienation of the detainees’ families and their broader environment opening the road to further radicalisation, irrespective of the validity or not of ‘their cause’. The ERP played in the hands of Islamist extremists increasing their recruitment but it also contributed to a decrease in the recruitment from members of the Muslim community in intelligence services, for instance. In a comparison between recruitment during the Cold War and post-9/11 Sir Richard Dearlove, the former head of MI6, stated that ‘during the Cold War people would volunteer to help intelligence agencies because they believed in the cause. However, the West is building a wall of rejection through morally compromising policies, especially when thinking of the entire Guantánamo operations, and of sending prisoners to other countries in the full knowledge that they would be tortured (Dearlove 2006). Furthermore, among the prisoners’ families there have been calls for reprisal as a family duty. History provides similar examples, when in the early 1970s during the conflict in Northern Ireland, for instance Britain adopted harsh interrogation techniques, some similar to the EITs used in the ‘war on terror’, resulting to ‘hundreds of young men

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in working class nationalist communities joining the IRA and creating one of the most efficient insurgency forces in the world’ (Eminent Jurists Panel 2009: 30). On the whole, the ERP was aimed and implemented on those suspects against whom evidence was often too thin. As such the ERP ended up dealing ‘with minor-league would-be Islamist terrorist or guerrillas who may or may not have the United States in their sights’ (Gerecht 2005). What is worse is that there have also been cases of innocent people who were rendered by mistake. In their research Arena and Wolford conclude that ‘whether greater investment in intelligence gathering promotes or prevents wars depends upon the state’s initial beliefs about the strength of its opponent and the degree of its uncertainty over its ability to defeat relatively weak versus relatively strong opponents (Arena and Wolford 2012: 361). The more pessimistic the state is initially, the more likely it is that investing in intelligence gathering encourages it to take risks that it otherwise would not; while the more optimistic it is initially, the more likely it is that investing in intelligence gathering will cause it to play it safe when otherwise it might have taken risks (Arena and Wolford 2012: 352). As Simon and Benjamin, two former senior officials at the US National Security Council, stated ‘when we make it easy to hate us, we are also hastening the next attack’ (Simon and Benjamin 2005: 201). It is noteworthy that Extraordinary Renditions were ‘not committed by the majority, but this minority was ruling. As Soufan (2012) argues ‘There were rogue people and a few guys but this small group went high up to people in the government. But that is why they found lawyers and outside contractors to justify their actions. So this term of a minority is used comparatively in that they had u­ nlimited power’. Intelligence sharing, like most complex and inter-dependent issues, is a constantly balancing act. Countries participating in intelligence sharing arrangements have to balance the benefits of more and better intelligence against the possibility that their partners may use unacceptable intelligence gathering methods or may withhold or even distort the information they share. Moreover, what needs to be taken into account is the secondary and broader impact such an approach might have on deterring violent extremism. A further dilemma is if ERs tried to resolve a problem or if they fulfilled the enemy’s prophesy in the end, and became an accelerator to radicalisation and a facilitator of further recruitment in terrorist organisations.

5  Deterring Violent Extremism As is often the case in social science, the quest for truth produces inconclusive results, and this topic would not be an exception. A number of scholars and analysts argue that deterrence has no significant role in countering violent extremism (Davis and Jenkins 2002: p. xviii; Pape 2005: 5). According to this school of thought, if terrorists are viewed as irrational actors, then deterrence with its zero-sum ­calcula­tions would be ineffective. As an example, Dugan and Chenoweth’s (2012)

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research on the impact of oppressive measures by Israel to Palestinian violent extremists found little support for the importance of deterrence, and argue that in general conciliatory reactions were down to decreases in terrorist attacks. Likewise, Argomaniz and Vidal-Diez (2015) whose research focuses on the responses of the Spanish government to the Basque organisation ETA did not find much evidence in support of deterrence. Additionally, if violent extremists are motivated to the point that they are willing to die for their cause, they will not be deterred by fear or punishment or anything else (Pape 2005). If terrorists’ motivation is very high no matter what threat and demand is presented to them, they will continue to pursue their objectives through violence, therefore leaving no space for bargaining. A lot depends on if deterrence is treated as an end or a means. As the former it is likely to produce mixed results, while as a means it can be more effective but more difficult to measure and evaluate. Governments seek to combine capability with a deterrence approach fit to deal with symmetric and asymmetric threats, including terrorist and violent extremist threats. If an actor is prepared to endure more pain than a state is willing to inflict, this would render deterrence ineffective. In protracted conflicts between states and terrorist organisations the broader forms of deterrence become more prominent. In asymmetric conflicts where for instance, violent extremist organisations believe in a rewarding afterlife or if it is fighting an existential and nihilistic war, or if there is an absence of any alternatives, this would make them less vulnerable and less susceptible to punishment, retaliation, and therefore less likely to be deterred. Adopting a stance that can reflect upon and interpret the weight and demands of value-based appeals can suggest targets for deterrent behaviour. As examined in chapter “Deterrence: Concepts and Approaches for Current and Emerging Threats”, even the most effective deterrence only forms part of a broader and inclusive counterterrorism approach. Deterrence is meant as an action or the threat of it aimed at increasing an opponent’s perceived imposed costs by the deterrer as a consequence of engaging in a specific action, and it also includes an implicit or explicit offer of an alternative in the case where the opponent abides by that behaviour (George 1991). Glenn Snyder advocates that this approach to deterrence incorporates the ideas of ‘deterrence by punishment’ and ‘deterrence by denial’ (1961: 14–16). Deterrence by punishment refers to the threat of harming something the adversary holds high if it takes an undesired action, while deterrence by denial has to do with the hardening of targets in order to make an attack too costly to even be attempted. In this sense ‘where punishment seeks to coerce the enemy through fear, denial depends on causing hopelessness’ (Johnson et al. 2002: 16–17). A deterring state can decrease terrorists’ motivation by reducing the benefits from getting involved in an attack. Motivation would increase if terrorists believed that they could attack high-value targets easily. In this sense deterrence by denial can diminish the power of terrorists to cause damage and therefore can minimise the coercive effect of their actions. Logically, this in turn should have an impact on terrorists’ motivation, and increase the effectiveness of deterrence policies. Deterrence by denial also cannot be an end in itself, as no state is in a position to protect every target all the time, but this approach is an essential part of deterrence measures.

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Deterrence by punishment is more reactive than proactive. Punishment or threat of punishment only forms part of deterrence. For instance, incentives and rewards can also persuade and lead to the change of an opponent’s behaviour. It is worth considering the alternative to the threat, and what the deterring state’s offer is in the case where terrorist groups abide by the threat and refrain from the undesired behaviour. Both, governments and violent extremists have a range of objectives with varied value attributed to these objectives. If the preference orderings of terrorists and governments are precisely opposite, the effectiveness of deterrence is limited, while common ground between the two can enhance the chances of deterrence. An implication of this is that developing deterrence measures and policies requires an in depth knowledge and understanding of not just what they want, but also why, and to what extent and in what way, that is as an end or a means. In this way a state can identify intent, purpose, and commitment in addition to the aims and objectives of violent extremists. In sum, this approach should expose the tangibles and intangibles elements of the conflict and of the terrorist group. Different elements have different impact on deterring violent extremists. An additional complexity in successful deterrence is that there are both quantifiable elements, such as access to resources, money, and number of members, as well as non-quantifiable elements, like quality of membership, motivation, commitment that has to be taken into account when deciding a deterrence measure. It is not sufficient for deterrers to just have the capability to deter, they will also have to demonstrate commitment to deter. As this later relies on perception, it would be very difficult to alter this opinion. A basic finding of cognitive psychology, is that images change only slowly, and are maintained in the face of discrepant information, argues Jervis (1982/83: 9). This implies that trying to change a reputation of low resolve will be especially costly, concludes Jervis (1982/83: 9). It is often argued that the resort to terrorist tactics is a choice of weaker actors with the belief, real or perceived, that there are no other means of furthering their cause (Betts 2002). This approach may render an organisation either more open to deterrence measures or less prepared to be deterred. An organisation or an individual would be more open to deterrence if they realise that there is an alternative to the conflict to achieve their goals or if they realise that a state’s will and capacity for conflict is very high. For the same reasons though, an organisation or an individual might be less prepared to be deterred as the first option might fuel the belief that because there is an alternative way out of the conflict if they keep fighting they might improve their negotiating position in the future. Also, they might be less prepared to be deterred if they realise that a state is unyielding leaving no option but to keep fighting. For deterrence to stand a chance of success it requires terrorists and policy makers to be sufficiently guided by cost-benefit calculations. Therefore, deterrence entails a quid-pro-quo and a distancing from a rigid zero-sum approach, and lasting ERPs and EITs fail to take this into account. Conditions apply on both sides, and thus the conflicting parties would have to cooperate towards a situation that they both prefer over the alternative. Consequently, depending the situation deterrence cannot be just about threats and punishment, but also inducements. Effective and

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lasting deterrence therefore entails threats and offers, and striking the right balance between these two. As already discussed in the first chapter deterrence entails numerous conditions. The most basic conditions are that the expressed and implied threat have to be understood by the receiving end, and also decision making has to be influenced by calculations of cost and benefit. The second condition can have significant implications on deterring non-state violent extremists, because it implies the need for a degree of inter-dependence between the two conflicting sides, which might not always be the case in this context. In Schelling’s words ‘if his pain was our greatest delight and our satisfaction his greatest woe, we would just proceed to hurt and frustrate each other’ (1977: 4). If a government manages to transform a situation from zero-sum to non-zero sum, this could make the terrorists more responsive to deterrence. This may be the case when other state approaches, especially force, cannot achieve the states’ ends, and some type of bargaining has been established. In this context, there might be a tacit agreement between the conflicting parties not to do their worst and a threshold of tolerance of violence exists. Consequently, deterrence through the use of force may stand better chances of success when force by itself cannot realistically achieve the ends, but can have a strong impact on an organisation’s actions and attacks. However, to make the shift from zero-sum to a positive-sum the deterring party has to be aware of context specific variables, such as the non-state actors’ value system, along with their mind set and their decision making processes. Following a value system that differs from Western norms does not make an opponent either rational or irrational. This difference is just a fact that has to be taken into account when deciding a deterrence policy. Possibly it would be easier to deter a potential opponent if rationality could be attached rationality to its behaviour. However, rationality is subjective and relative. As Jervis argued for the main lines of deterrence theory to be valid, much less than full rationality is needed (1979: 299). Terrorists’ decision making consist of both rational and non-rational elements, but this is not particular to terrorists. As such this fact does not preclude deterrence, but it does require terrorists to be influenced by cost-benefit calculations. Owing to the strong beliefs and commitment to the cause, violent extremists will often place high value on their broadly defined political objectives and ideologies rather than to life and property. In which case, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the deterring party to hold at high risk something of sufficient value to the terrorists that would affect their behaviour. If the terrorists’ commitment and motivation is high enough, then even the prospect of a successful attack, irrespective of how remote this might be, would not be deterred by the probability of punishment. Information gathered under duress is surrounded with suspicion regarding its quality for it to have any reliability, and with no reliability, intelligence is just un-­ sanctionable data. As discussed above, there have been cases such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who despite the EITs used, suspects are not deterred and still provide false information (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 2014). The higher the value violent extremists place on what is not achieved through terrorist acts ­compared to what is, the higher the cost against the former, and therefore the likelier for deterrence to be effective.

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6  D  egrees of Commitment and Action and the Search for a Fitting Approach There is no homogeneity within violent extremist groups, and not all members of such groups are committed to the cause or are active to the same degree and in the same way, and therefore certain elements of a terrorist organisation are more open to deterrence than others. Davis and Jenkins demonstrate that enduring terrorist groups comprise a variety of roles including leaders, financiers, logisticians and other facilitators, foot soldiers supporting population, and religious or otherwise ideological figures (2002: xi). Moreover, vital elements of terrorist support networks are likely to have a varied degree of motivation, and therefore can be more susceptible to deterrence, especially as there are different phases of preparing for and delivering the attack. Of principal importance to an organisation is its safe havens, as well as its ability to cooperate with other like-minded organisations. In the case where the state cannot have access and direct influence on a terrorist organisation, the deterrer can target the organisation’s support networks, deterring its recruitment efforts, or a state may focus its deterring efforts on preventing cooperation among different terrorist groups. In addition to the lack of homogeneity within terrorist group, a deterrer should view a terrorist activity, as a process and a series of actions ending in violence, rather than just as a single and isolated act or event (Powers 2001: 5). In the same way that there are different stages and steps into radicalisation and terrorism, in the same way there are also different stages in organising an attack. This process approach with the different stages provides an opportunity for early detection and action by the different security services. During the early stages of organising an attack for instance, if the risk of detection and retaliation outweigh the advantages gained from a possibly successful attack, then deterrence could stand a better chance of success. Moreover, even though there is a plethora of potential targets for violent extremists to choose from, not all targets provide the same opportunity for an attack (Freilich et al. 2019: 437). Thus target selection is not unlimited, instead it is conditional and situational. Terrorism is contextual, and opportunities in particular time and place inform terrorist decision making and activities in relation to their operational capacity (Freilich and Newman 2009). Violent extremists’ options for instance rely on accessibility to both, material and non-material means, as well as access to the target. Thus, although there might be an unlimited number of targets, there are limits to what terrorists can actually do. The control of means in combination with the regulation of enabling conditions provides significant opportunities and entry points for government counterterrorism policies. This approach is not without its critics. The main critique is that a situational approach is reactive and too limited, partial, and fragmentary. The added risk is that this type of an approach may just lead violent extremists to diversification of their targets and of their modus operandi. Conflicts are not linear, and neither is conflict analysis and their resolution. Different stages of a conflict, provide different opportunities, obstacles, and differ-

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ent entry points for their resolution. The objective is to find the most fitting approach, and not necessarily the most severe. For each stage in the process of organising and delivering an attack there is a need to establish deterrence measures that will trigger the necessary actions. These deterrence measures will be more effective if they are proportionate and relevant to each point of the process of the attack. While for instance, the early stages of planning an attack may often be the most difficult to find out, the punishment may not have to be as severe and as costly, if caught at that stage, and a proportionate and fitting deterrence would stand better chances of success. Overreaction may inflame resentment against the deterrer, while under-reaction may motivate and hasten an attack. As Paul Wilkinson argues ‘overreaction and general repression could destroy democracy more effectively and rapidly than any terrorist group could, while under-reaction and failure to uphold the constitutional authority of the government, brings the threat of sliding into anarchy or the emergence of no-go areas’ (2006: 61; see also Lafree et al. 2009). In point of fact, over a number of years adapting Carlos Marighella’s (1970) theory of provoking a state into overreacting and therefore creating a heightened revolutionary consciousness among the people and diminishing the legitimacy of a state has been a key aim of different types of terrorist organisations. The above case study highlights the pitfalls of an overreaction, as neither the ERP nor the EITs have deterred terrorist attacks. On the contrary, they served as a great recruiting motif in extremist propaganda. In point of fact, when senior U. S officials gathered in Kuwait to discuss how to halt the flow of foreign fighters going to Iraq, they concluded that the mistreatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo Bay was “the single most important motivating factor” in persuading extremists to join the war (Johnson et al. 2016: 123). In his research Robert Pape identified 26 videos in which the suicide bombers cited torture and EITs as the motivation for their attacks (Johnson et al. 2016). Failure to strike a balance between overreaction and under-reaction, may lead ‘to further radicalisation of the whole movement or some splinter faction’, as Martha Crenshaw (2011) warns. This does not mean that strong measures, such as the use of military force, should be discounted in the efforts to counter violent extremism. Rather the argument is that, as with most complex problems, to constantly try and find the most fitting therapy to a changing, but always around to different degrees, phenomenon of terrorism and its manifestation. Countering violent extremism encompasses a number of hard, soft, and customised measures. In general, hard measures may include making it impossible or more difficult for an attack to be organised and committed, and ensure that potential perpetrators are aware of the retaliation and punishment if they choose to contravene the law. In contrast, soft measures would reduce situational opportunities that could increase a person’s motivation to participate and commit an attack. In general, as the table above indicates, if high importance is placed on the issue and low importance is attributed to the future relationship and coexistence with the other side, then a violent extremist organisation will be uncompromising and unwilling to try and find a non-violent solution to the conflict. On the other, if high importance is attributed to both the issue but also to the future relationship with the

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Table 1  Importance of relationship vs importance of issue

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Accommodate

Win/win mindset

Avoiding resolution

No compromiseRefusing resolution

Low Low

Importance of Issue

High

opponent then the organisation could adopt a win-win approach as a way out of the conflict. There can be a number of combinations based on Table 1, and deterrence can have different entry points and chances of success. Still, the conflicts examined in this book and in this chapter in particular are complex with a plethora of elements affecting its outcome. Heightened commitment to the cause could make terrorists more susceptible to deterrence. If for instance, commitment to the cause is genuine from the terrorists’ perspective, this would also render them more open to taking into consideration different government measures, and therefore become more responsive to deterrence.

7  Negative and Limited vs Positive and Broader Deterrence In the same way that there is no homogeneity within terrorists groups, in the same way deterrence policies can be partial and limited. A partial deterrence approach may be the only pragmatic option at the time, as there may be other more urgent priorities and limited resources (Lustick 1995). This approach could be more effective in cases where organisations use limited terrorist tactics as these could sufficiently advance their objectives, and which groups are constrained, for a number of reasons, by a very low threshold of tolerance of violence, and the same time may wish to avoid a retaliation that a larger-scale attack would cause. Then also, even if a terrorist’s organisation motivation is high, deterrence may still be effective if the deterring measures target the political ends of the organisation, especially in the case where an organisation holds very high its political goals. The organisation might not disappear, but its reason of existence can disappear. In this sense a deterrence policy would also have to be proportionate and customised. Too much and it might tip the balance and become a provocation, not enough and it can end up being a paper tiger. The short and long term benefits of a successful deterrence policy would have to outweigh the costs of deterring. By adapting the threat and offer states could have a more pragmatic outlook that would yield the desired results. Depending how it is done, adapting the demands need not be a

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weakness of the deterring state, but just a pragmatic approach in an effort to achieve the best results. An adaptive deterrence approach is even more necessary now as increasingly states need to deter multiple groups of violent extremism simultaneously. A deterrence policy that would work on a specific organisation or individual, for many reasons, may not be as effective against another group or multiple groups (Treisman 2004). A key initial element of deterrence is identifying the key actors to be deterred. Even if terrorists cannot be located with precision at all times, governments can still influence terrorists’ aims. However, this becomes even more complex when aiming to deter non-state actors especially when the latter is part of a loose network instead of a structured and hierarchical organisation. Still, the loose structure of violent extremist networks provide additional opportunities for deterrence, as there are multiple layers, from foot soldiers to fundraisers, to the leadership, within a non-­ state network that can be deterred. For instance, where appropriate successful deterrence could include the accommodation of certain aims of a terrorist organisation, even if this accommodation is partial and conditional, and then holding that accommodation at risk to prevent escalation or cooperation between organisations. In the same way that not all demands have the same value, in the same way certain types of accommodation carry more weight than others. Deterrence may also be achieved through the accommodation of certain valid terrorist objectives or in the case where valid objectives have been high jacked by terrorists. This accommodation may not eliminate the organisation itself but it can eliminate the terrorists’ raison d’etre, and hence act as a deterrent regarding further recruitment and retention of existing members. Certain objectives could be partially accommodated either by the deterring state or by actors over whom the deterring state has sufficient leverage. Within this context the link between deterring and deterred becomes non zero sum. In order to be able to deter effectively non state actors, a state needs to expand deterrence as a concept and as a set of policies. Accommodations that cannot be held at risk may reduce secondary grievances of violent extremists, but would not necessarily deter them from future action. On the contrary, accommodations that can be held at risk can deter violent extremists. The transfer of imprisoned militants back to their region, for instance, or the conditional early release of an organisation’s prisoners are secondary issues for an organisation as they not form part of their raison d’être and as it will not address the organisation’s core demands, it will not serve deterrence. Consequently, the release of militants while the conflict is still ongoing and with no substantive talks on the horizon, often does not have a significant leverage on the organisation’s behaviour, especially as this concession and accommodation cannot really be held at risk. In addition, in conflicts that include a number of conflicting parties, although accommodations can become effective inducements to the deterred, they have the added risk of encouraging other groups to expect similar behaviour by the deterring side, leading to a ‘revolving door’ approach, according to which as soon as a conflicting party gets a concession, another conflicting party demands a concession and so on. This leads to further contradiction where in an environment of uncertainty, the deterring party has to be clear in stating the different approaches it intends to

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adopt with the different parties in the conflict without though tipping the balances to the point of making deterrence ineffective. Thus, especially in protracted conflicts, deterring states need to constantly strike a balance between public and secret accommodations with the different conflicting parties (Snyder 1961: 246–249). Threat and fear are at the epicentre of deterrence. However, these two elements may not always be conducive to the lasting resolution of protracted conflicts. When deterrence is used in a negative way it has more limited outcomes as it focuses on zero-sum approaches. Within this context, deterrence is often used predominantly as a delaying mechanism in dealing with non-state actors, focusing more on conflict containment. This approach however, has a more limited and short term outlook regarding the resolution of a conflict. What is more a short term deterrence can render a state complacent, and may incentivise a terrorist group to build up its capabilities in preparation for the next attack that could be of greater severity. On the other, if deterrence is a means to a resolution of a conflict, short term deterrence has the very significant role of providing the deterring state with the time and space to apply its long term policies. Furthermore, deterrence is interdependent and linked to other elements of countering violent extremism. An additional impact from pursuing terrorists for instance, is that it demonstrates the will and capability of a state to do so, and therefore it increases the chances for successful deterrence against not just the organisation under pursuit but also other like-minded organisations.

8  Engaging, Influencing, Deterring: The Role of Narrative Strategic narratives constitute an instrument for political agents to influence behaviour, as well as the ‘discursive environment in which they operate’ (Miskimmon et al. 2018; Herrnstein Smith 1981). Deterrence needs communication in order to be effective. The threat has to be clearly understood by those who issue it and by those who it is aimed at. The deterred for instance, needs to be capable and willing to recognise the message and its consequences. However, this would require to reconcile the four different interpretations of a message at any given time, that is what is said, what is meant, what is heard, and what is understood. In its turn, the dependence of effective deterrence on communication highlights the role and importance of perception, state of mind and psychology. Deterrence is above all a psychological tool and process in which subjective elements, such as fear and coercion, inform how calculations are made and how decisions are taken. In this sense, narratives have a much deeper role than simply being one of many communicative means for someone to just tell someone else that something took place. Narratives become a mode of verbal representation (White 1987). People rely upon narratives in order to make sense of complex and incomprehensible phenomena. At the same time, political agents as well as violent extremists rely upon narratives in order to give a certain meaning to phenomena and events. Thus, narratives play a central role in constructing and symbolising experienced reality at the level of sense-giving and sense-making. Sense-giving can be defined as systematic efforts

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to steer meaning-making toward a preferred explanation of experienced reality (Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991: 442). Narrative meaning-making renders violent incidents comprehensible. Defining and describing violent incidents as acts of terrorism depends on the meaning assigned to what has happened, rather than being simply determined by the raw material of the event. Political agents may offer competing interpretations of a violent event in their attempts to own the narrative and deter future attacks. Narratives are relative to other stories and counter-narratives, with a constant struggle from the conflicting sides to have their frame accepted (Boin et al. 2009: 82). Consequently, to classify a group as terrorist or not has its political, economic, and military implications and connotations. Non-state violent extremists tend to depict their victims either as combatants or as part of the presumed oppressive apparatus, and therefore constitute legitimate targets (Walzer 1977: 202). On the other, governments and political agents emphasize the civilian status of victims in the same event, in order to represent violence as beyond the boundaries of legitimate conduct. In this sense, narratives become the key instrument to hold meaning and matter together. The above introduces the elements of subjectivity and perception. Narratives are inevitably selective, as there is always more than one version of reality. Within this context, even if ERPs and EITs did not represent mainstream counterterrorism measures, violent extremists would manipulate and exploit this to their favour in order to justify their actions, galvanise existing support, and increase recruitment, as a response against the deterrent threat. In an effort to own the narrative, violent extremists advance an interpretation of violence as part of wider struggle, and at the same time they seek recognition from their own community and from the opponent, in this case the state, as an army or political organisation to emphasise the legitimacy and even the legality of their actions. The narrative that is used in order to deter violent extremists also depends on the stage of the conflict. In Colombia for instance, the peace process used a less confrontational route of engagement between the conflicting parties. The Colombian government refrained from employing terrorism terminology to describe the FARC and instead emphasised terms like ‘guerrilla organisation’, and ‘armed movement’ (Gobierno de Colombia 2016). This was a conscious approach aimed at giving the best chance to the revived peace process, and to deter the formation of spoiler groups.

9  Conclusion Deterrence aims to prevent objectionable behaviour and to persuade through coercion, an opponent to comply with one’s own choices. However, often in politics there is a mismatch between expectations, deterrence measures, and ultimate goals. Conflict resolution requires measures with long term return aim, but more often than not deterrence has a more immediate and temporary focus. Deterrence, on the

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one hand can act as a delaying mechanism in dealing effectively with violent extremism, in which case the aim would be to contain a conflict and the focus is zero-sum and more short term. On the other, deterrence can have the role of a proactive mechanism in dealing with violent extremism, where the focus is longer term. In order to be able to deter effectively non state actors, a state needs to expand deterrence as a concept and as a set of policies. With this approach the focus is also going to be more long term. What transpires from the above chapter is that effective deterrence has to do with constant acts of balancing. If the balance is tipped to one side deterrence can become nonsensical and it may yield opposite outcomes to those sought by the deterrent. The added challenge is that it is not just the importance of the message itself that matters, but also how it is perceived. An over-reaction may lead to retaliation of the deterred and the issuing of a threat might actually be seen as an opportunity to boost recruitment or the campaign of a non-state organisation.

References Arena P, Wolford S (2012) Arms, intelligence and war. Int Stud Q 56(2):351–365 Argomaniz J, Vidal-Diez A (2015) Examining deterrence and backlash effects in counterterrorism: the case of ETA. Terrorism Political Violence 27(1):160–181 Baer R (2005) American civil liberties Union, ‘National Security Fact Sheet: extraordinary rendition’, http://www.aclu.org/safefree/extraordinaryrendition Accessed 17 July 2018 Betts R (2002) The soft underbelly of American primacy: tactical advantages of terror. Polit Sci Quart 117(1, Spring):19–36 Black C (2002) (Former director of the Counter-Terrorism Centre at the CIA) testimony to the Joint Committee Investigation into September 11: Fourth Public Hearing, 26 September Boin A, Hart P, McConnell A (2009) Crisis exploitation: political and policy impacts of framing contests. J Eur Publ Policy 16(1):81–106 Carle G (2011, 2017) Former CIA interrogator, personal interview, 30 September 2011 and February 2017 Carter D (2004) Law enforcement intelligence: a guide for state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies. US Department of Justice, Washington, DC Clarridge D (1997) Spy for all seasons: my life in the CIA. Scribner, New York Crenshaw M (2011) Explaining terrorism: causes, processes, and consequences. Routledge, Abingdon Davis PK, Jenkins BM (2002) Deterrence and influence in counterterrorism: a component in the war on AQ. RAND, Santa Monica Dearlove R (2006) Speaking to James Fallows, Atlantic Magazine, July 2006 Dershowitz A (2002a) Want to torture? Get a warrant’, San Francisco Chronicle, 22 January Dershowitz A (2002b) Why terrorism works: understanding the threat, responding to the challenge. Yale University, Haven Dershowitz A (2003) The torturer warrant: a response to professor Strauss. New York Law School Law Rev 48:275–294 Dugan L, Chenoweth E (2012) Moving beyond deterrence: the effectiveness of raising the expected utility of abstaining from terrorism in Israel. Am Sociol Rev 77(4):597–624 Eminent Jurists Panel (2009) Assessing damage, urging action: report of the eminent jurists panel on terrorism. In: Counter-terrorism and human rights. International Commission of Jurists, Geneva

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Freedman L (1998) Strategic coercion: concepts and cases. Oxford University Press, New York Freilich J, Newman G (2009) Reducing terrorism through situational crime prevention. Crime prevention studies, vol 25. Lynne Rienner, Boulder Freilich JD, Chermak S, Hsu H (2019) Deterring and preventing terrorism. In: Silke A (ed) Routledge handbook of terrorism and counterterrorism. Routledge, Abingdon George A (1991) Forceful persuasion: coercive diplomacy as an alternative to war. USIP, Washington, DC Gerecht RM (2005) Against rendition. Washington Examiner. 16 May. https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/against-rendition. Accessed 1 July 2019 Gioia DA, Chittipeddi K (1991) Sensemaking and sensegiving in strategic change initiation. Strateg Manag J 12(6):433–448 Gobierno de Colombia (2016) ABC del Acuerdo de Paz [Rudiments of the peace agreement]. http://www.acuerdodepaz.gov.co/sites/all/themes/nexus/files.CARTILLA-PERIODICO.pdf Accessed 29 May 2019 Herrnstein Smith B (1981) Narrative version, and narrative theories. Crit Inq 7(1):213–236 Jehl D, Johnston D (2005) Rule change lets CIA freely send suspect abroad to jails. New York Times, 6 March.  https://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/06/politics/rule-change-lets-cia-freelysend-suspects-abroad-to-jails.html. Accessed 1 July 2019  Jervis R (1979) Deterrence theory revisited. World Politics (31)2 January Jervis R (1982/1983) Deterrence and perception. Int Secur (7) Winter 3 Jervis R, Lebow R, Stein JG (1991) Psychology and deterrence (perspectives on security). John Hopkins University Press, Maryland Johnson D, Mueller K, Taft W (2002) Conventional coercion across the spectrum of conventional operations: the utility of U. S military forces in the emerging security environment. RAND, Santa Monica Johnson D, Mora A, Schmidt A (2016) The strategic costs of torture: how ‘enhanced interrogation’ hurt America. Foreign Aff 95:121 Krauss ES, Lacey MO (2002) Utilitarian vs humanitarian  – the battle over the law of war, Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly XXXII:2 Lafree G, Dugan L, Korte R (2009) The impact of British counter terrorist strategies on political violence in Northern Ireland: comparing deterrence and backlash models. Criminology 47:501–530 Levy JS (2008) Deterrence and coercive diplomacy: the contributions of Alexander George. Polit Psychol 29(4):535–552 Lupovici A (2016) The power of deterrence: emotions, identity, and American and Israeli wars of resolve. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Lustick I (1995) Terrorism and the Arab-Israeli conflict. In: Crenshaw M (ed) Terrorism in context. Pensylvania State University Press, State College Marighella C (1970) Minimanual of the urban Guerrilla. Spade McCracken S, Specialist advisor to Andrew Tyrie MP and chairman of the Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition, personal interview, 12 April 2011 Miskimmon A, O’Loughlin B, Roselle L (2018) Forging the world: strategic narratives and international relations. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (2004) The 9/11 commission report. W.W. Norton, New York National Security Directives. http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/index.html (listing NSD-77 as classified). Accessed 15 June 2019 Ottaway D, Oberdorfer D (1989) Administration alters assassination ban. Washington Post, 4 November Pape RA (2005) Dying to win: the strategic logic of suicide terrorism. Random House, New York Personal interview with interrogator in the Nigerian Security Services, December 2011, Shrivenham Powers MJ (2001) Deterring terrorism with CBRN weapons: developing a conceptual framework. Occasional paper no. 2, CBACI February 2001

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Pre-9/11 Renditions Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/eca/canada/ arar/2.htm. Accessed 30 June 2019 Priest D (2005) CIA’s assurances on transferred suspects doubted. Washington Post, 17 March.  https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2005/03/17/cias-assurances-on-­ transferred-suspects-doubted/d53c2203-6b48-41b5-ac44-44e9147aa21d/. Accessed 1 July 2019 Safire W (2004) Foreign policy leads us into and odd wordscape. New York Times, 20 June in Taipei Times.  http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2004/06/20/2003175843. Accessed 1 July 2019 Schelling TC (1977) Arms and influence, 2nd edn. Yale University Press, New Haven Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (2014) Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Programme. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/ default/files/publications/CRPT-113srpt288.pdf. Accessed 29 May 2019 Senior British Intelligence Officer, JSCSC defence academy, closed lecture, October 2012 Simon S, Benjamin D (2005) The next attack: the failure of the war on terror and a strategy for getting it right. Times Books, New York Snyder G (1961) Deterrence and defence: toward a theory of national security. Princeton University Press, Princeton Soufan A, former FBI agent, personal interview, 18 May 2012 Treisman D (2004) Rational appeasement. Int Organ 58(2):345–373 US Dept of the Army (2006) US Army and marine corps counterinsurgency field manual 3–24, Counterinsurgency 7–9 Walzer M (1977) Just and unjust wars: a moral argument with historical illustrations. Basic Books, New York Waterman S (2005) Analysis: rendition a routine practice. United Press International, 9 March at Spacewar. Accessed 1 July 2019 White H (1987) The content of the form: narrative discourse and historical representation. John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore Wilkinson P (2006) Terrorism versus democracy: the Liberal state response, 2nd edn. Routledge, London

Deterrence and Drones: Are Militaries Becoming Addicted and What Is the Prognosis? Ben Tripp

1  Introduction There is little doubt that some militaries appear to be realising the benefit of utilising armed unmanned aerial systems or drones as they are commonly referred to by academics and the media. There is an obvious allure to drones by the military. They can typically loiter longer than a manned aircraft, observe and strike with lethal force with far more confidence due to their intelligence collection capabilities and decision making process. Furthermore, they eliminate the physical risk to pilots and ultimately reduce the financial costs of projecting military power by negating or reducing the requirement of boots on the ground. Putting ‘boots on the ground’ in the form of invading troops or conducting hostile overflights in contested airspace are inherently dangerous both in terms of an unfavourable foreign policy decision or from having to sustain and justify casualties numbers to the public. Drones appear to nullify this risk by being armed and potentially  deterring a state or individual actor from committing acts that a nation would normally trigger an armed conflict. This chapter will discuss key areas associated to the apparent allure and addiction to utilising armed drones in a deterrence role: First, why is there a growing demand by nations on securing armed drones and why are armies becoming dependent on them? Secondly, if this addiction is not going to be remedied, what is the prognosis and is there a better way to manage it in preparation for the next conflict? The American Psychological Association (APA 2019) defines addiction as a chronic disorder which affects an individual sense of pleasure, motivation and memory). The APA also acknowledges biological, environmental and social factors as effects that can contribute to an addiction (2019). Addiction can materialise in many forms including alcohol, narcotics, gambling, and food to name but a few  (Koob 2006). Reid (2017) argues that even modern technology such as the B. Tripp (*) Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, University of Cranfield, Shrivenham, UK © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 A. Filippidou (ed.), Deterrence, Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29367-3_7

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internet, using social media and smartphones can potentially become habit-forming over time. But what if there was a more bizarre addiction such as the habitual or persistent use of armed drones by militaries either in a conflict zone or as a deterrence capability? While it would be incorrect to define a nation as an individual, it is possible to collectively group nations that use armed drones and those that do not, which will facilitate the identification of hallmarks that are typically associated to an addiction. Price and Emshoff (1997) have differing opinions as to what constitutes an addiction cycle; however for ease of comparison on nations that appear to be addicted to the use of drones in the deterrence role, the common denominators of the addiction cycle will be defined as initial use, abuse, tolerance, dependence/ addiction. This research draws on this addiction cycle framework (Barnes 1988) and applies it to the notion that the use of drones in deterrence role is addictive to militaries for reasons of risk, cost and military dominance and furthermore scans the future horizon identifying that this addiction may not seem as chronic as it would first appear.

2  Genesis of an Addiction and Initial Use The rapid growth of armed drones since the early part of this century and their apparent success above the battlefield has now placed them at the forefront of military operations. Since 9/11 the use of drones has become more prevalent in the news and has attracted supporters and critics alike, however the technology and use predates this terrorism milestone. The original concept was born in 1941 with the development of the OQ-2 radio plane that by the end of WWII, was mass-produced. The modern era of drones that has become synonymous with modern day conflicts was actually commissioned during the 1990s with General Dynamics Aeronautical Systems leading its development. The system was called the RQ-1 Predator, with ‘R’ designating it as reconnaissance and the ‘Q’ designating it as unmanned and was a medium altitude long-endurance tactical surveillance but did not carry any bombs or missiles. The system was employed in both the Bosnian and Kosovo conflicts to assist NATO and the United Nations in an unarmed capacity. The eventual arming of the system came about in early 2000 when the United States Defence Advanced Research Project Agency proposed that they could weaponise the system for use in a combat role and on the 16th February 2002, the Predator Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) fired its first AGM-114 Hellfire missile. This milestone change of functionality brought a designation change to ‘M’ for multi-role, it could carry out reconnaissance and also conduct missile strikes. Furthermore, the on-board sensors permitted the possibility of identifying a target beyond that of other manned systems. Timing for this new capability could not have come at more convenient point as the events were 9/11 unfolding and the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq commenced (World History Project 2018). Since these

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c­ onflicts, the use of armed drones has grown and the number of militaries that have acquired them or intend on acquiring them has increased also.

3  Abuse The rapid growth of drones has meant that it is now the go-to platform for most major conflicts or where there needs to be an enduring intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance footprint. Furthermore, there is a growing civilian market in the use of unarmed drones with platforms assisting law enforcement, civil emergency services and also charities including some non-governmental organizations monitoring humanitarian disaster. However, the evidential difference between these two groups is the weapon carried by the unmanned system in the form of precision guided bombs or missiles which could be used in a time of war or, as will be a recurring theme throughout this article, as a deterrence to preventing conflict from occurring. According to Defence Procurement International (2017), there are 12 countries that possess the ability to arm drones (China, UAE, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States). Hawser’s research (2017) identifies that of those 12, only 9 had used them in a combat role (Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel, Nigeria, Pakistan, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States). Furthermore, he highlights that this list is likely to grow larger as armed drone technology becomes easier for nations to understand and internally develop combined with the relaxing of protective export legislation of drone systems. To illustrate, countries that will be operating imminently armed drones include India, Russia, France, Germany, Italy, Kazakhstan, Myanmar, South Korea, Turkmenistan and the Ukraine (Drone Wars UK 2018). If these lists are combined, it is possible to see that all permanent five members (UN P5) of the United Nations Security Council possess this drone and deterrent capability. The UN P5 nations all possess armed drones yet also all maintain a continuous at sea nuclear deterrent and land based capability. Is it a case that nuclear deterrence is not as effective against both states and insurgents compared to the use of armed drones? Should the use of armed drones be considered an essential additional capability of nations that possess nuclear deterrence? Furthermore, the likes of Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan, Turkey, and Kazakhstan have all had either internal conflicts either between warring factions or external actors affecting their sovereign integrity in recent years. Have the introduction of armed drones helped stabilise these areas by presenting the capability of armed deterrence? There has been interesting research  (The Council on Foreign Relations 2019) undertaken of war-related hotspots which has  identified that (1) the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq/Syria between the US led coalition and insurgents are likely enduring (2) as is the war between Yemen and Saudi Arabi; and that (3) there is no immediate solution to the Kashmir crisis between the Indian and Pakistan nations, and (4) Turkey still retains an internal dispute with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Thus the obvious

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q­ uestion is have armed drones actually deterred these conflicts or have they exacerbated the actual problem itself? Alas some of these questions fall out of the framework of this chapter and are best discussed by others with greater visibility and understanding on the subject. The list of nations that use armed drones is likely to continue to grow. Nations that have ongoing conflicts or internal disputes are likely to continue to use them and those that do not possess the capability will be drawn to their use. Thus, drones will inevitably become financially cheaper and more desirable through the observing of military success of other nations, technological improvements (access to satellite communication and data bandwidth infrastructure are a major bar to entry) and also by the basic economic laws of supply and demand of an international defence product that is manufactured in different guises to suit an individual nation’s needs. However, it could be considered that the evolution of armed drones is creating false deterrent due to the simple fact that nations that possess them have not actually managed to win the war that they have deployed them to.

4  Tolerance Since the introduction of armed drones in 2002 by the United States, their persistent use has become the norm in some conflicts such as the coalition efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. That said, the tolerance to accept the use of armed drones has resulted in critics being quite vocal in their rhetoric against the use. Such critics present a comprehensive list of moral questions regarding the effectiveness of armed drones. For example Jha (2014: 140–144) questions whether their actual use is justified, considering the political fallout of the drone campaign, and whether drones have actually reduced the threat posed by militants by presenting a deterrent capability. Agius (2017: 370–386) summarises that the United States reliance on the use of armed drones has rendered borders ‘contingent and meaningless’. This observation is supported by Gregory (2011: 238) who identifies that in the post 911 era, the decision to use armed drones has categorised these conflicts as an ‘everywhere war’ which are becoming ‘long-term permanent relying on technological innovation of weapon systems rather than a conflict fought through geographical dominance’. The above paragraph highlights some of the geographical and political arguments against the persistent use of armed drones however, there are moral arguments also regarding they use. One moral argument presented by Christian Enemark (2014: 2–8) highlights that the tolerance to continue to use armed drones presents an ethical imbalance between warring entities. Simplifying the arguments to that of a chess game, Enemark (2014: 58–59) argues that’s the two warring parties are bound by the same common goal (winning), the same physical playing pieces, the physical limits of the chessboard and have to adhere to a common set of rules. In this case, just war theory and the law of armed conflict. His argument is hinged on the use of armed drones creating a moral imbalance between the two sides as one has a technological advantage over the other. However, by a nation having monetary

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dominance over its opponent and by having the ability to procure armed drones through military channels, this technological advantage should be considered a natural evolution of warfare. This is best compared to the evolution of the jet engine over that of the propeller aircraft or the introduction of the first tank countering infantry warfare. However, Michael Walzer (2015: 35–41), in his seminal work ‘Just and Unjust wars’ argues that there should be a moral equality of soldiers that in accepting their role, they are entitled to kill their opponents or be killed themselves’. This notion by Walzer (2015) is just not realistic and contradicts Enemark’s (2014) analogy of a chessboard scenario in that a common goal is to win. Making it a fair fight by not utilising armed drones does nothing to help the common goal. In fact Lee (2018: 36) counters Walzer’s notion with authority and states: ‘look at wars throughout history. Start listing the ones where political or battlefield leaders deliberately surrendered a distinct advantage to give their enemy a fair chance of winning. It will not take you long’. Tolerance for the use of armed drones could also be assumed as their use is governed by the law of armed conflict, unlike behaviour of insurgents that resort to asymmetric approaches such as indiscriminate bombings, executions and torture. Therefore, it could be considered that the use of armed drones actually raises the standard of warfare rather than lowering it, thus intolerance by critics to their employment is potentially pacified. It is also worth noting that a there have been a few isolated reports by media outlets  and commentators of insurgents using drones in regionalised conflicts (Reuters 2017; Haaretz 2019; Hambling 2019). The likes of Hamas, Hezbollah and the Islamic State (or Dae’sh as they are sometimes referred to) have reportedly used armed drones to their advantage. If these reports and observations are considered valid then there is some moral equality between soldiers and the tolerance of accepting armed drones in a conflict is thus evident.

5  Dependence The old maxim that acknowledging an addiction is the first step to curing it has never rung so true. But why is the employment of drones so addictive to those nations that can afford them? Before the relationship between deterrence and drones is examined in depth, there are additional contributing factors as highlighted in the introduction chapter that need to be briefly mentioned which will add a richness to the debate. These contributing factors are not weighted, as nations will have differing priorities with regard to the need to possess armed drones for their own security however they should all be considered relevant. The first contributing factor is the unit cost of drones. They are, in relative terms, cheap when compared to a manned alternative. Defence manufacturers often refer to the unit cost of aviation as the ‘fly-­ away cost’ of purchasing the system. For example, according to the US Government (Department of Defence 2019) the fly away cost of the Reaper drone is approximately $ 16 million per airframe. Compare this price quoted by the defence contractor to that of the latest fifth Generation F35A fighter (manned) which tops out at an

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approximate $100 million (Lockheed Martin 2018), it is obvious to see that there is considerable financial savings in purchasing the drones rather than a manned aircraft. However, this simplistic comparison does not include the purchasing of spare parts, the training of pilots and sensor operators or the manpower needed maintain either airframe; nor does it include the analytical support needed to exploit the intelligence from sensors that may be mounted on either the manned or drone aircraft. These additional costs will obviously greatly increase the overall program costs but for ease of comparison, a drone is a lucrative cost saving for nations wishing to possess this type of lethal capability. An additional factor that contributes to the addiction to drones is the reduced political risk to a government. Political risk is inherently subjective depending on a nation’s government due to their published manifesto and overall elected majority but is best generalised as risk associated to a government from being voted out-of-­ office due to unfavourable policies or acts which disenfranchise their constituents. Additionally, an elected office may be forced to resign through political scandals such as the Nixon Administration and their involvement with the Watergate scandal. How does political risk link to addiction to drones? Professor Laurence Freedman (2016), a former advisor to the US Department of Defense, was quoted as saying that ‘the drones’ ability to provide tactical victories without requiring boots on the ground has made them as addictive as Catnip’. Never a truer word spoken as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan attracted their critics for the zealous use of drones which have been used for targeted strikes against insurgents and terrorists but more importantly for the number of military lives lost. Woods (2018) succinctly summarises it ‘After the long and costly ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US public has little enthusiasm for more boots on the ground and so drones seem an easy alternative’. The unique selling point of drones when compared to manned alternatives, is that pilot doesn’t has to overfly enemy territory and run the risk of being personally shot down. If this is expanded further, an invading military does not have to put ‘boots on the ground’ in a country where there is a risk of their troops being shot at and killed creating alienating domestic support for the conflict regardless of the Governments best intent in that region. Woods (2018) further illustrates this point and summarises that when nations couple the functionality of drones with a model of deterrence they make for an attractive pairing. Due to their armed loiter capability, they can slow down a war or prevent further escalation and provide a greater level of confidence in the intelligence needed before conducting a lethal strike. This is akin to undertaking preventative war. Preventative war is based on the fundamental concept that war is inevitable and there is a greater benefit to sooner rather than later. However, research undertaken by Gray (2007: 50–53) the implication of pre-emptive and preventive war by the Strategic Studies Institute provided a comprehensive reconsideration and presented compelling arguments that they are not dissimilar and that time is the only variable and not the doctrine. However, not all nations have seen the need or importance in undertaking pre-emptive or preventative action against a nation outside of enforcing UN Security Council resolutions. This assumption of nations could be based upon the simple fact that any referral to the UN Security Council is enough to deter a

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­non-­state actor or rogue nation from partaking in military hostilities. Military purists and political observers would likely argue that if there is actionable information or intelligence then there should be greater importance in undertaking a full spectrum approach. The UK Government) for example chooses to deter the aggressor through political, economic, social, infrastructure, and information type environment using the military option as a last resort (HMSO 2016). This would be with the intent of tackling the financing, recruitment, retention and support of any rogue state-­sponsored terrorist organisation. Interestingly Hawser (2017) observes that since the emergence and use of armed drones post 9/11, they have predominantly been used in counter-insurgency conflicts against irregular actors and have not been a state-versus-state type scenario. Such conflicts include Afghanistan (AQ), Syria (Da’esh), Iraq (Da’esh), Pakistan (AQ), Yemen (Houti), Somalia (AQ) and Nigeria (Boko Haram). Therefore, given the scale and duration of these conflicts and the growing market and in armed drones, it is only right to question whether their use is actually deterring actors from participating in hostilities. Wirtz and Russell (2003: 113–123) explored the utility of deterrence in a terrorism context and concluded that: …the use of deterrence against a terrorist requires an assumption of levelheadedness in the sense that there must a cost-benefit ratio to undertaking a terrorist act.

Matisk (2015) argues that the use of drones in support of conventional conflicts only works ‘if there are conventional military targets to strike’. In an unconventional conflict, the use of drones is mainly aesthetic and that they undermine the political credibility and psychological effectiveness of military power’. Matisk highlights that this presents a philosophical conundrum when operating drones in an unconventional conflict in that ‘just because you can kill something, does not always mean you should’. Therefore, it could be argued that the use of drones in a deterrence role in an unconventional war is about perception, as the drone operating nation believes that by striking targets is deterring others from undertaking similar actions yet the truth is completely polar opposite. While the military advantage of a precision strike against a high value target terrorist there has to be an assumption by the drone operating nation that while the insurgent network may be temporarily affected by such a strike that affiliated non-­ state actors will be discussing the strike and questioning their role or appetite to continue in hostilities. If this is the case, then the use of drones as a deterrent only works as a second order effect (against the deceased’s fellow insurgents) and fails to deter the primary target (the deceased insurgent). Utilising a similar example, if the targeted strike kills the insurgent but is witnessed or discussed by local civilians not affiliated to the insurgent network, and deters them from joining the cause, then the use of the drone has succeeded. It could also be assumed that a failed strike which is witnessed by the same local civilians could also possibly deter them from joining the insurgency. This type of warfare potentially affects the freedom of manoeuvre of the insurgent when they are forced into hiding as they lose much of their credibility. However, in both examples, deterrence has only worked against the secondary audience (fellow insurgents and civilians). Deterrence was not successful against the

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primary target. Henning (2018) argues that for an armed drone to work against the primary audience, military planners may need to think outside the box and reveal who their intent is actually targeted at through the potential publishing of kill-lists. Kills lists are by their very name, controversial. It is where the military or a civilian agency (for example the Central Intelligence Agency) identify a list of names associated to an insurgent or terrorist network to which lethal force against them has been sanctioned through the thorough review and presentation of intelligence to the delegated authority who has the permission to authorize an attack. Legal advice is sought where necessary, with the net result being a list of names for lethal prosecution as and when they are found in a conflict zone. However, if the publishing of this kill list was made public, akin to the US Federal Bureau of Investigation ‘10 most wanted’ then there is the possibility that an insurgent or terrorist who is on the list may be deterred from undertaking any future actions. The counter argument to this approach is that insurgents who haven’t yet been identified may become emboldened. Notwithstanding this scenario, if the use of armed drones is taking place in addition to ‘boots on the ground’ then military commanders could possibly publish a ‘deter, detain or kill list’. Detain being the arrest of the non-state actor through military or civilian trial. This new approach presents the military force as more a morally acceptable entity, as the act of killing is shown as escalatory and not as the only option; thus the drone crew is no longer the judge, jury and executioner and the onus is on the non-state actor to prove their behaviour is benign and innocent through action or legal avenues. This two-pronged approach could possibly deter insurgents from participating in hostilities. Another deterrence factor to consider is the psychological aspect of visually seeing an armed drone in the airspace above by the non-state actor that is being monitored. Armed drones are typically flown at an altitude beyond that of the visual spectrum, thousands of feet above ground level. If the non-state actor is unaware of the drone’s presence, either in the form of a published kill list or by visually seeing the drone, how can nations expect their drones to deter? A military catch-22 to which there is no easy answer as flying a drone at a lower altitude makes it susceptible to being targeted by an insurgent group using surface-to-air missiles or counter drone capability including ground-to-air fragmentation projectiles or global-­ positioning system jammers which can be purchased on the open market. Furthermore, if the enemy know where the drones are, it might not deter them from operating in unprotected areas. Alas there is no simple solution to the use of armed drones as a visual deterrent.

6  Prognosis lf the long-term use of drones continues, then there needs to be review of the doctrine of deterrence. Matisek (2015a, b) argues that in the long term, targeted strikes from drones will only battle-harden non-state actors who will adapt to the widespread use of drones. Furthermore, he goes on to state that ‘leadership and ideology

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cannot be influenced by the use of armed drones’; thus the panacea-like effect of armed drones providing an assured deterrence initially appears to be false. Furthermore, as highlighted earlier, armed drones have predominantly been used in counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency operations and there are few examples of their use against conventional states. While armed drones were used in the coalition-versus-state conflict against President Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq during 2003, the coalition-versus-state war was over within 2 months before the conflict became civil unrest and then an insurgency. Matiesk (2015) argues that there is little empirical evidence that drones used in the early stages of this conflict provided any form of deterrence as President Saddam Hussein remained a steadfast military leader until the end of his Ba’athist Regime. Since then, nations that have used armed drones in any deterrence capacity have only seen the success in irregular or counter insurgency operations through a lens of false success as their purchase of such a system may prove ineffective against a conventional state. However, as with any military program, drone technology can only improve with research, development and time. Stanford political scientist Amy Zegart (2018) argues that advancement in drone technology may actually turn deterrence theory on its head as they improve their speed, range, stealth and agility. Zegart (2018) highlights that there are three unique deterrence models that theorists have not foreseen: sustainability in long duration conflicts; certainty of precision punishment, which may change the psychology of adversaries and changes in the relative costs of war’. Put simply, a nation’s resolve to conflict may be more effective because of the lower cost (financially and politically) thus a nation can be part of an enduring offensive against a nation. This positive prognosis of the strategic relationship between drones and deterrence in a state-versus-state scenario makes for fascinating reading and highlights that despite there being an addiction to this technology, this dependence can be managed by nations and that they can potentially manage public perception of their involvement in any future conflict. It is unlikely that the use of drones in any type of warfare will rescind due to the obvious tactical success that they bring. For example, the UK currently has employed the REAPER drone with much success in the war against Da’esh in Iraq and Syria. Notwithstanding the public and legal of debates of overflying Syria without sovereign invitation or under the protection of a United Nations Security Council Resolution. The UK has conducted targeted strikes against UK citizens fighting for Dae’sh under the justification of self-defence; and that it would seem that public scrutiny has had little impact on the UK’s desire for employing drones or procuring newer systems (MacAskill 2017). Indeed, during the summer of 2018, announcements were made by the UK Defence Minister, regarding the arrival of Protector UAS (Allison 2018). These technological improvements in the form of airframe de-icing capability and a collision avoidance system permits the ability to fly closer to other aircraft more safely, and closer to poor weather conditions, thus expanding the operating envelope of a deterrence posture (Forces Network 2018). Furthermore, this technological upgrade will appease domestic Civil Aviation Authority legislation regarding the operation of drones in commercial airspace. This will likely open the door to

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domestic law enforcement agencies utilising drones in a deterrence capacity in high crime areas. Again while this may appeal to the police due to the deterrent potential and duration of flight compared to a police officer on shift, the psychological sense of intrusion and surveillance by a nation against its own people will likely have likely open Pandora’s Box and may have negative sociological effects. Furthermore, three still may be a requirement for police to remain on patrol for immediate response to incidents and the use of drones in a deterrent role is akin to that of the role of police helicopters. There is a real possibility that instead of armed police officers being visible in key public areas and key critical infrastructures, there could be an armed drone undertaking the same role. In addition to the new Protector UAS announcement, the UK also announced a major project identifying a Future Combat Aircraft. This airframe, likely to be called Tempest (after the world War II aircraft) can be flown remotely or with a pilot in the cockpit (Davies 2018). The significance of this is that the UK is foreseeing the need to balance the deterrence capability of a drone but maintaining a military commander’s discretion of putting a pilot in the cockpit should the circumstances so need. The UK is only but one example and provides a brief snapshot of what role and technology militaries may want from possessing armed drones and where they see their role in promoting deterrence on a global scale. Rovner (2018) contests that the relationship between the inevitable evolution of drone technology and deterrence has parallel comparisons to Thucydides’ account of war and the presentation of strategic dilemmas: When and how to take risks and how to balance domestic politics against armed conflict. Alas there is no obvious remedy for this regardless of the immediate appeal of utilizing drones in a deterrence capacity. It is likely that drone technology will likely advance in several areas such as speed (from its base location to the target area), height (above the target area), greater payloads of lethal weaponry, and increased stealth capability. All of these characteristics contribute towards of the fabric of a greater deterrence role from drones. A final consideration for the prognosis of the use of deterrence and drones is in a humanitarian role. For this, two hypothetical scenarios are presented on the potential use of armed drones in deterring actors from making a humanitarian situation even worse. First, consider a failed state where warring factions are attacking each other because of faith, political allegiances or quest for power. Not a difficult concept given the recent spate of humanitarian crises in Yemen, Bangladesh, Syria, North and South Sudan. Armed drones could be deployed to maintain over watch of internally displaced persons (IDP) or refugees who are fleeing a war zone to avoid being subject to genocide. Not only could drones provide the assurance and information required that IDPs are evacuating towards humanitarian aid such as the Red Cross or other non-governmental organisations, but also they present a unique ability to produce intelligence on the extent of the problem by summarising the number affected and those fleeing towards danger and not away from it. Where there is a honest belief that there is a threat to their lives by warring parties, drones can intervene utilising lethal force, under the authority of collective self-defence of others as stated in UN Chapter VII Art. 41–42. However, caution must be applied

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to this scenario as although attacking civilians is a breach of international law, armed drones should not intervene where external actors are extorting the wishes of IDPs to leave an area and smuggling them for financial gain. Although a criminal activity, it cannot and will not justify lethal intervention by the armed drone. However, the drone could be used for the collection of evidence, in the form of imagery, for criminal prosecution should the smugglers be caught at a later date. By deliberately informing the world’s media that armed drones are being used to protect IDPs, it creates a veil of deterrence which can be applied to areas where refugees are transiting. As discussed earlier, the use of drones has historically been used in a state versus warring actor scenario however, their use could also be used in a state-verses state type conflict also. The second and final consideration on the potential use of armed drones to assist humanitarian conditions from getting worse is their use in stalled or frozen conflicts. Frozen conflicts are best defined as areas that have not been settled with a peace agreement between warring parties or nations (Tudoroiu 2012: 135–161). Such examples being Russian conflicts in: South Ossetia, Crimea, and Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (Transnistria as it is sometimes called). Even the conflict in Cyprus and Kashmir could be considered frozen by this very definition since there has been no peace accord in place and the conflict lines remain in a state of status-­ quo. The employment of drones in these frozen conflicts could benefit international mechanisms such as the United Nations (UN) or Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) who strive for peace and security in regions that are troubled. Drones could potentially be employed to provide reassurance of no military changes to the UN and OSCE as part of monitoring missions. The use of armed drones is questionable in this scenario as both the UN and OSCE are not militaries themselves and should not be considered offensive entities.

7  Conclusion This chapter has been written to explain that the use of drones is becoming addictive to militaries around the world fuelled by political demands. Furthermore, there is much evidence to support the notion that the use of drones is becoming addictive in a deterrence type role. However, this addiction should not be considered impulsive or unexpected. Economically, the employment of drones is a lucrative attraction to nations needing such a relatively cheap lethal capability for their security due to the lowering costs of scale and basic laws of supply and demand. Notwithstanding the fiscal attraction, with the reduced political risk of having to put ‘boots on the ground’, makes the employment of drones compulsive to say the least. However, this period of growing technology and tactical success should not be considered in isolation. If drones are here to stay, and we truly are addicted to them, then greater thought by nations that possess them should be put towards their future employment on a strategic scale and the implications of targeted strikes either in a pre-emptive or preventative role. Coupled with the potential high-speed ­global-­reach

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of drones that is likely a few technological generations away and with potential associated developments in lethal weaponry, it will make the use of drones even more alluring to nations that feel they need them. This advancement, paired with a review of deterrent theory and methodology, will make this coupling a potent response to warfare. However, reminding that deterrence is inherently subjective to either a person or state nations that utilize drones in a deterrence role are prudent to remember that deterrence only works if their adversary has something to lose. ‘Boots on the ground’ may be necessary especially if use of drones has had a negative deterrent effect and has proven escalatory for adversaries. This addictive fusion of pairing deterrence and the use of drones should not be considered a panacea to conflict, rather one of a range of responses employed by nations when political and diplomatic measures have ultimately failed.

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HMSO (2016) Understanding and decision making (JDP 04) – GOV.UK (2016) HMSO. Available at: www.gov.uk/government/publications/jdp-04-understanding. Accessed 3 June 2018 https://www.apa.org (2019) Addictions. [online] Available at: https://www.apa.org/topics/addiction/index.html. Accessed 26 Apr 2019 Jha UC (2014) Drone wars: ethical, legal and strategic implications. KW in Association with United Service Institution of India, New Delhi Koob G (2006) Clinical manual of addiction psychopharmacology. Addiction 101(4):611–611 Lee P (2018) REAPER force, 1st edn. John Blake Publishing Ltf, London Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II (2018) About: fast facts: cost|F-35 lightning II. [online] Available at: https://www.f35.com/about/cost. Accessed 20 July 2018 MacAskill E (2017) May defends use of drones to kill British terrorists overseas. [online] The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/20/theresa-may-dronestrikes-british-terrorists-reyaad-khan. Accessed 3 Aug 2018 Matisek J (2015a) Drones and airpower: a lack of deterrence in unconventional warfare? | Small Wars J  [online]. Smallwarsjournal.com. Available at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/ drones-and-airpower-a-lack-of-deterrence-in-unconventional-warfare. Accessed 17 July 2018 Matisek J  (2015b) Drones and airpower: a lack of deterrence in unconventional warfare? Retrieved from https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/drones-and-airpower-a-lack-of-deterrencein-unconventional-warfare Price A, Emshoff J (1997) Breaking the cycle of addiction. [online] Pubs.niaaa.nih.gov. Available at: https://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/arh21-3/241.pdf?&sa=U&ei=oowuVMu2O8jOaN L4gfAI&ved=0CEwQFjAM&usg=AFQjCNHPNU6v97FpbNeJcN9fj28EZ1KcRQ. Accessed 26 Apr 2019 Reid S (2017) 5 questions for Adam Alter [online]. https://www.apa.org. Available at: https://www. apa.org/monitor/2017/07-08/conversation-alter. Accessed 26 Apr 2019 Reuters (2017) Hezbollah uses drones against Islamic State in Syria: Hezbollah-run…. [online] Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-lebanon-syria/hezbollah-usesdrones-against-islamic-state-in-syria-hezbollah-run-media-idUSKCN1B11H4. Accessed 28 May 2019 Rovner J (2018) Thucydides and the long war problem. [online] War on the Rocks. Available at: https://warontherocks.com/2017/12/thucydides-long-war-problem/. Accessed 3 June 2018 Tudoroiu T (2012) The European Union, Russia, and the future of the Transnistrian Frozen’ OSCE: De Gucht discusses Montenegro referendum, frozen conflicts, global Security.org, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 2006 UN Chapter VII, articles 41 and 42. http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index. html. Accessed 3 June 2018 Walzer M (2015) Just and unjust wars, 3rd edn. Basic Books (Perseus Books Group), New York Wirtz JJ, Russell JA (2003) U.S. policy on preventive war and pre-emption. Non-proliferation Rev 10(1):113–123. https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700308436920 Woods C (2018) Chris Woods on drone warfare: advantages and liabilities. [online] Lawac.org. Available at: http://www.lawac.org/Events-and-Archives/Commentary/Post/545/Chris-Woodson-Drone-Warfare-Advantages-and-Liabilities. Accessed 3 June 2018 World History Project (2018) Iraq war officially ends. [online] Available at: https://worldhistoryproject.org/2011/12/15/iraq-war-officially-ends. Accessed 3 Aug 2018 Zegart A (2018) Future armed drones will turn deterrence theory on its head – iHLS. [online] Available at: https://i-hls.com/archives/81829. Accessed 3 Aug 2018

Deterrence and Third Party Amplification: The Case of Hezbollah and Al Manar Kirby Wedekind

1  Introduction When achieved, deterrence constitutes an exercise of power through the application of either Conditioned Power, in the form of Persuasion or Manipulation, or Condign Power in the form of psychological or otherwise non-physical violence (Galbraith 1983, p. 70; Wrong 1979, p. 4–5). Deterrence can be said to occur when an individual or entity chooses to change his, her, or their behavior based on information received from an external source that intentionally seeks to compel the particular behavioral change; that is, deterrence transpires when someone modifies their behavior either to do something that he or she otherwise would not have done, or vice versa – someone chooses not to do something that he or she otherwise would have done. The catalyst of this change in behavior comes from the delivery of information from an external source, the power holder, and its processing and subsequent action taken by the individual or entity, the power subject. There necessarily exists a power relationship between power holder and subject, which is characterized by the intentionality of the holder and his or her effectiveness upon the subject. The power holder must act deliberately and achieve the intended effect upon the subject for an exercise of power to manifest – these are universal attributes of power relations. Deterrence occurs when information plays the determinative role in the decision-­making process of the power subject, and the power holder achieves his or her desired effect through the use of persuasion, manipulation, or psychological violence. Conditioned power can achieve deterrence through either persuasion or manipulation. Persuasion occurs when the power holder presents arguments openly to the power subject and convinces him or her either to perform an action that the subject would not have done otherwise, or vice versa. Manipulation transpires K. Wedekind (*) Cranfield University, Shrivenham, UK e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 A. Filippidou (ed.), Deterrence, Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29367-3_8

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when the power holder delivers information covertly, but achieves the same effect upon the subject. Persuasion happens explicitly, whereas manipulation takes place implicitly. In both, the power subject determines that the consequences of performing the action in question will outweigh any potential benefits provided by its completion or that not performing the action will induce negative consequences in excess of the potential and foreseeable gains. When conditioned power, whether via persuasion or manipulation, proves successful, the power holder has changed the behavior of the power subject by convincing him or her through an exchange of information that his or her interest is best served through compliance with the desires of the power holder; deterrence occurs when the power holder convinces the power subject not to perform a particular activity, or to cease its performance if already begun. Deterrence through the exercise of condign power denies the decision to the power subject and forces him or her to do or not to do the action in question. The application of psychological violence, understood in a strictly non-physical sense, compels the subject to comply as the consequences of refusal conveyed by the power holder deny any semblance of choice to the subject. For an exercise of condign power to occur through the application of psychological violence, the power subject must be convinced that non-compliance will induce physical violence. The decision to comply cannot be considered a rational choice, but rather one forced upon the subject by the holder. For deterrence to occur via condign power, the power holder must threaten the use of physical force upon the power subject, directly or indirectly, in such a way that the subject is convinced and therefore deprived of any other option besides compliance with the will of the power holder, in this case the performance or nonperformance of a specific action. The application of non-­physical condign power, like conditioned power, occurs through an exchange of information between at least two entities, power holder and power subject, whose interactions form the basis of a power relationship. When the information exchanged between the two parties induces psychological harm upon one of them and as a consequence convinces that entity not to perform a particular action or to cease performing an activity already undertaken, the power holder has successfully deterred the power subject. In applications of both condign and conditioned power as a way of achieving deterrence, information plays the critical role. The power holder convinces the power subject to believe something that he or she did not before, and then this new belief then determines the actions taken, or not, by the subject. The conditions under which this change happens characterize the means used by the power holder, but the result of the process is the same – the holder has achieved his or her will by deterring the subject from performing certain actions in favor of others desired by the power holder.

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1.1  Content Amplification Content amplification is a marketing strategy that disseminates information intended to promote and propagate a single message through multiple, mutually-reinforcing lines of communication. The concept seeks to increase the number and type of vectors through which members of a specific, targeted audience can receive information that might shape an individual’s beliefs or perception on a particular matter. Content amplification works across multiple dimensions by using mixed media and messaging designed to convert an individual iteratively rather than immediately (Kuenn 2017). By synchronizing topical subjects across social media, television, films, radio, online content, print media, and all advertising contained therein, entities in a position of power seeking to influence the perception of a certain matter can do so by controlling the way in which the issue is presented by promoting the preferred attitude towards the subject while condemning all other competing perceptions of the issue. In addition to operating across mixed media, messaging targets the audience at different stages of the decision making process; that is, messaging is designed to resonate with individuals who encounter the information for the first time to establish a frame of reference just as well with the initiated in order to continue the belief-conversion process. Messaging beyond the point of conversion seeks to sustain what has been gained, though may continue if the power holder intends to create zealots.

2  Third-Party Amplification Third-party amplification is a branch effect of content amplification wherein an entity or individual unaffiliated with the power holding content creator and unaware of the underlying purpose behind the content and delivery endorses it through advocacy. The extensiveness of third-party amplification is correlated to the investiture of competent authority in the third-party by the audience comprising the power subject; the greater share of competent authority possessed by the third-party, the greater amplification occurs when he, she, or it advocates for the position of the originating power holder. When a member of the intended audience changes his, her, or its beliefs based on the endorsement of the third-party in possession of competent authority from the perspective of the targeted individual, the power holder that produced the content can be said to have exercised power. The third-party need not be aware that its actions caused this effect for it to hold true. Deterrence, itself an exercise of power, transpires when the actions of the power subject modifies their behavior by making a choice that otherwise might not have been made. The power subject has been deterred from one course of action because

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he, she, or it has chosen another course of action based on its endorsement by a trusted entity, the third-party. As an exercise of power, deterrence is necessarily zero-sum; one choice in space and time negates the possibilities presented by all others in that same space and time. The consequences of a choice made at a different time or in a different place will necessarily produce different effects due to the corresponding changes that will transpired within the environment surrounding the decision-maker and the effects produced by the actions driven by the decision. Decisions made under the influence of information that has been deliberately delivered to the recipient for the express purpose of determining a particular outcome of a given decision can be said to deter beliefs and behaviors. There is a necessarily voyeuristic element to third-party amplification in that the power holder does not directly influence the power subject, but rather the exercise of power transpires through the intermediary third-party. The power holder sets in motion a chain of events that rely on an external agent, which the holder must then observe in order to detect any measures of effectiveness produced by the original action. Similarly, the power subject observes the third-party, who holds some form of authority over the power subject, acting in a certain way or advocating for a certain belief that derives from the power holder. So long as the power holder exercises influence intentionally, the third-party need not be aware of their role in the power relationship, and the power holder’s actions can be said to constitute an exercise of power. If the power subject remains unaware of the power holder’s intent and corresponding actions, then an act of manipulation has occurred; if the power subject is aware of the power holder’s machinations, then persuasion has transpired. Third-party amplification manifests most evidently through social media. The functionality of social media that enables likes, retweets, shares, tags, and reviews, combined with the ability of other users to see this kind of endorsement, whether positive or negative, endows the content originator or endorser with some measure of influence – the degree of which reflects the competent authority possessed by the third-party from the perspective of the power subject. Social media serves as the delivery mechanism, while the messages sent through a given platform and the responses generated to the content of the message may cause the change in beliefs and behavior desired by the power holder. Content itself can address any topic whatsoever and target any number of individuals or groups; its malleability and scalability make social media one of the most attractive mechanisms for delivering information intended to shape behavior. The critical aspect of social media for third-­ party amplification is its interactive functionality. Users can access information that appeals to them just as easily as an aspiring power holder can expose the user to information designed to alter behaviors and beliefs to align with the holder’s desired perspective for the user. When used deliberately to sway a specific individual or group to modify beliefs as a way of inducing certain actions, third-party amplification becomes a means for exercising power by deterring undesirable behaviors and beliefs. It is in this way that deterrence occurs through third-party amplification. Third-party amplification has been used to exercise power since before the advent and ubiquity of social media. A prime example, and the subject of the case study to follow, is how Al Manar, the public information organization of Iranian-­

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back Lebanese Hezbollah, to project a narrative that intended to inspire jihad among its viewership. In addition to targeting military-aged youths, Al Manar seeks to normalize martyrdom by co-opting the families of fighters killed in action by ­propagating a message that justifies these deaths as a holy sacrifice, which is intended to motivate both the youth to fight and their families to support those efforts. In this case study, Hezbollah and Al Manar can be viewed as two aspects of a single power holder, military-aged youths as the power subjects, and their families as the third-­party amplifying the message of the power holder.

3  Deterrence via Third-Party Amplification Case Study The case study that follows examines the power relationship between Hezbollah as power holder with particular emphasis on Al Manar and its narrative, the families of military-aged youths as third-party amplifiers, and military-aged youths as the power subject. Using the language of power as defined in the preceding sections is intended to outline the nuances of the components comprising a dynamic power relationship that results in deterrence; in this case, the power holder seeks to deter the power subject from pursuing any path other than martyrdom, and the third-party amplifier plays the critical role in propagating and normalizing the holder’s message in such a way that the subject’s acceptance constitutes deterrence, which is necessarily an exercise of power. A case study could also be made of the power relationship between Iran as power holder, Hezbollah and Al Manar as the third-party amplifier, and the Sh’ia community living outside of Iran as the power subject. This research acknowledges that this would be a necessary condition for the validity of any claims it makes, but also recognizes that the scope of any such study would warrant more pages than can be afforded here. The present case study examines the issue from the tactical perspective, rather than the strategic lens that would be necessary to study what has been omitted here.

4  T  he Authors of Destiny: Hezbollah and Al Manar as Power Holders Hezbollah is a political-military organization in Lebanon supported by Iran that seeks to support its interests in the Levant while undermining those of its rivals in the region. Since its founding as a paramilitary organization in 1982, Hezbollah has relied on its ability to exercise condign power through the use of physical and psychological violence to force compliance with its interests. This occurs through the physical violence undertaken by military units as well as through the threat of the use of violence – though not its actual application – as a way of using psychological

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violence to compel compliance with Hezbollah’s goals. As a foil to its ability to wield condign power, Hezbollah entered Lebanese politics in 1992 as a way of expanding its influence through the use of conditioned power and corresponding information campaigns intended to disseminate its messaging while normalizing its agenda as a viable alternative to the status quo. To convert bystanders to followers in areas within Lebanon susceptible to its agenda, Hezbollah began providing services typically associated delivered by the government as a consequence of the social contract such as “schools, clinics, youth programs, private businesses, and local security” (Humud 2018, p. 1). Its ability to provide services that the Lebanese government was unable or unwilling to provide legitimized Hezbollah and persuaded marginalized individuals and groups to adopt its cause and support its efforts. Hezbollah is ideologically and financially dependent on Iran, which drives its information and military operations against Israel, the United States, and Sunni extremist groups in Lebanon and Syria. Estimates of financing from Iran range up to $700 million annually, which serves Hezbollah’s stated goal of guaranteeing Lebanese sovereignty and security against encroachment by Israel or Sunni militias (Mandelker 2018). Having undertaken attacks against both since its inception, the United States designated Hezbollah “as a Specially Designated Terrorist (1995); a Foreign Terrorist Organization (1997); and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (2001)” (Humud 2018, p. 2). In support of its Iranian benefactors, Hezbollah has provided support to the Asad regime and continues to do so as a way of perpetuating the destabilized situation caused by the Syrian Civil War while antagonizing the regional interests of Israel and the global interests of the United States. Vilification of the United States aligns with Iran’s practice of the same, and serves as a critical motivator for recruitment and retention for Hezbollah. With its funding, materiel support, and strategic objectives secured from or otherwise provided by Iran, Hezbollah must cultivate a followership so loyal to its causes that not only do military-­aged youths desire to fight and become martyrs, but also their family members and communities support the pursuit of martyrdom as the noblest of causes. For this purpose, Hezbollah depends upon the success of its messaging efforts communicated through Al Manar programming and intended to reach its target audience via third-party amplification.

5  T  he Words Sacred, Glorious, and Sacrifice and the Expression in Vain Hemmingway (1929) The narrative communicated by Al Manar seeks to increase the influence held by Hezbollah over its subjects in terms of extensiveness, comprehensiveness, and intensiveness. Extensiveness refers to the total number of individuals that support Hezbollah and its mission; the more adherents who believe in its message, the greater is the degree of extensiveness. Comprehensiveness describes the percentage

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of activities undertaken by followers that reflect Hezbollah’s message and its influence. Intensiveness measures to the extent to which Hezbollah’s supporters will go to support its mission (Wrong 1979, p.  43). To sustain its operations, Hezbollah must maximize its reach to increase the number of potential converts by appealing to the aspects of life that are of the greatest cause for concern in order to achieve a high degree of extensiveness and comprehensiveness, respectively. These two attributes are prerequisites for intensiveness, which serves as the determining variable for human capital available to Hezbollah. Followers with a higher degree of intensiveness are more likely to volunteer as martyrs, but such intensiveness is difficult to achieve without surrounding the targeted individuals with a narrative reinforced from multiple information vectors. By co-opting family members, Al Manar is able to provide an additional voice to echo its messaging that seems independent, which increases its likelihood of acceptance  – the act of which constitutes deterrence, which is itself an exercise of power. Hezbollah, as a non-state actor, works through Al Manar to communicate its message continuously as a way of sustaining a “culture of resistance by legitimizing and inciting suicide bombing and other forms of terrorism; by justifying continued Hezbollah attacks in places such as the Sheba’a Farms; by glorifying Hezbollah’s past military successes; by lionizing Hezbollah leaders; by canonizing Palestinian and other Arab martyrs; and by recruiting young people to its militant cause” (Jorisch 2004, p.  80). Casting its activities as heroic is intended to justify them despite illegality and, more importantly, any stigma associated with the method of attack – especially for those reliant upon martyrs. Glorifying sacrifice in this way creates a distinction between the collective and the individual so that any glory achieved by the group derives from the sacrifice of the individual. Hezbollah’s secretary-­general Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah has described martyrdom and specifically “suicide bombing is the only weapon that we possess…the culture of martyrdom is the strongest weapon…here lies our strength” (Jorisch 2004, p.  80–81). Nasrallah distinguishes between the use of suicide bombing  – the act of martyrdom – in addition to the culture of martyrdom supplying it, and identifies the culture as more important component than the act. This distinction is critical because it reveals Hezbollah’s priority and where it will likely allocate its resources; that is, Hezbollah will use Al Manar to propagate its message in order to cultivate and sustain the culture of martyrdom in a way that conditions military-aged youths to accept martyrdom as a valid option while glorifying the act and those who undertake it. From Hezbollah’s perspective, a single suicide bomber will have much less impact than would a suicide bombing campaign. The latter depends upon the existence of a vibrant culture supporting it with willing participants. Al Manar and its programming seeks to foster this willingness so that Hezbollah can exploit it by deterring youths from pursuing any other course of action leading beyond the culture of martyrdom. Muhammed Shari, host of an Al Manar show, stated that “Jihad leads to Arab and Islamic unity…It is the path of life, pride, and dignity. Our jihad against Israel is in defense of humanity and the civilized world…Islamic resistance in Lebanon was the key that awakened the Arab and Islamic masses. The martyrs of the intifada are heroes. God bless the martyrs and their families, and may God give

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them more strength” (Jorisch 2004, p. 68). Shari’s remarks echo those of Nasrallah: “Those who love death defeated those who fear death…Those who see death and martyrdom as a way to immortal life defeated those who see death as destruction and loss…The weapon of loving martyrdom, sacrifices, and readiness for death is one that nobody can take away…Yes, we make life through death” (Jorisch 2004, p.  81). This narrative, originating from Hezbollah and reiterated by Al Manar, is intended to persuade its audience into accepting it as true. Beginning with the initial moment wherein one accepts the possibility of truth in the argument presented, extensiveness increases. Hezbollah appeals to the fundamental aspects of Islamic identity to motivate both the youths who will fight, possibly as martyrs, as well as their families and members of the community. According to Nasrallah, the act of martyrdom through “suicide bombing demonstrates that a ‘male or female youth in Palestine wants to give [a] life to his or her people. He or she wants to restore the smile of their orphan children through martyrdom’” (Jorisch 2004, p. 81). Associating martyrdom with dedication in this way also has a conditioning effect through shame by comparison between the willing and the unwilling, with the former exalted and the latter pressured to comply. In this way, Hezbollah targets the individual by establishing a normative environment in which martyrdom is rewarded and all other options are punished as a way of deterring any other activity in favor of martyrdom. To set conditions within the family and community conducive to supporting the encouragement of youths to pursue martyrdom, Hezbollah cites cultural heritage and history as the sources of suicide bombing and in so doing targets the pride derived from Islamic identity that collectives, such as the family unit and community, rely upon as a foundational element of their being. Al Manar “invoke[s] Islamic tradition as the moral justification for suicide bombing” by “highlight[ing] clerics and fatwas defending the tactic” (Jorisch 2004, p. 81). The words of Sheikh Babil al-Halbawi, imam of the al-Sayida Rikiyya Mosque in Damascus, broadcasted by Al Manar reversed the argument to advance the position that “[abandoning jihad] is actually suicide” (Jorisch 2004, p. 81). These arguments and others like it depend upon reinterpretation of the Quran and Hadith; a passage that states “The ink of scholars is better than the blood of martyrs” comes to mean “The type of ulama… referred to is the scholar who graduates martyrs—the scholar who walks before the masses and will end, God willing, with martyrdom, and who leads masses to the path of martyrdom” (Jorsich 2004, p. 81). Reinterpreting sacred texts in this way provides Hezbollah with the ability to persuade potential suicide bombers that the act is no longer considered a sin because of the purpose it serves, and Al Manar serves as the medium through which these reinterpretations can most effectively reach those who would carry out the act as well as those who hold significant personal authority over the decision-making process of the would-be martyrs. Al Manar’s programming encourages military-aged youths “to focus their attention on the afterlife and on judgment day instead of getting preoccupied with our lives here on earth” while “Mothers are encouraged to give up their sons for God, country, and

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the blessings of the afterlife [by preparing their children] ‘for battle knowing that their blood will mix with the soil’” (Jorisch 2004, p. 82). For Hezbollah, belief in its cause and the means by which it seeks to fight “is the most powerful weapon in the face of technology and advanced weaponry” used against it (Jorisch 2004, p. 82). Al Manar provides one of the primary ways through which Hezbollah works to c­ ultivate such belief and direct the actions caused by this belief in a way that reinforces the original narrative. By targeting family and community members who hold personal, competent, or legitimate authority over the pool of potential martyrs, Hezbollah and Al Manar seek to employ third-party amplification, the purpose of which is to deter military-aged youths from any activities that would preclude their ability to fight, especially as martyrs. These youths receive Hezbollah’s message directly from Al Manar and indirectly from their family members, peers, and community leaders who repeat the message. Receiving the same message from multiple sources and modes constitutes amplification.

6  Tacit Acceptance of the False Dilemma Al Manar presents its message in a way that portrays the necessity of martyrdom as an inescapable conclusion – as the only plausible solution to providing its audience with those things it desires most of all – while limiting interpretation; that is, a perpetual resistance movement against Israel and the influence of United States dependent upon suicide bombing: [Al Manar] openly urges parents to ensure that their children are taught the philosophy of resistance. Al Manar depicts resistance – including suicide bombing – as a family affair rather than as isolated instances of individual militancy. The relatives of potential martyrs are urged to support those engaging in resistance and embrace the prospect of sacrificing their loved ones for the sake of a greater goal. Such programming is meant to convince ordinary members of Arab society to subscribe to the culture of resistance (Jorsich 2004, p. 85).

Inclusion of family and community members within its broader target audience indicates that Al Manar relies upon third-party amplification to increase the probability that military-aged youths will fight for Hezbollah. While the messaging is intended to achieve this affect, working through the family and community members as co-opted third-parties to compel youths to fight by endorsing and advocating for such actions meets the criteria for amplification. Family members and friends of one such university-educated martyr stated after his death and on his behalf that his desires were fulfilled through his actions and ultimately by his “life after death;” officials at the university where the individual attended stated that “he sets an example for others to follow” (Jorisch 2004, p. 89). By speaking on his behalf after his martyrdom, both the family members and university official used their connections to the individual to endorse his actions by speaking through Al Manar to encourage

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others to emulate the martyr, and thereby demonstrating that third-party amplification can target both specific individuals and an anonymous viewership. The message from Al Manar prioritizes the performance of martyrdom operations as part of the greater resistance campaign over its effectiveness. The act itself results in a victory no matter the actual impact on Israel, the United States, or the activities of either. Survivors receive at least praise and adulation, with the wounded provided additional material resources; the families of those killed in action or who have conducted a suicide bombing gain an exalted status in their community courtesy of Al Manar’s coverage in addition to the financial support provided by Hezbollah: “Individuals who do in fact carry out suicide bombings earn high respect from al-Manar. Besides imploring Palestinian youths to carry out such attacks, the station prominently displays pictures of past suicide bombers, provides a forum for future bombers to express their views, and airs footage of their suicide missions” (Jorisch 2004, p.  88). Al Manar’s programming that highlights the sacrifices of deceased fighters “features parents, siblings, friends, and fellow guerrillas explaining the virtues of martyrdom and the significance of sacrifice – all with the goal of recruiting new militants for Hizballah” (Jorisch 2004, p. 88). The purpose of incorporating the perspective of individuals close to the fighters kill in action is to communicate to potential new recruits that they too would be praised and remembered in the same way, assuaging the concerns of the living over how they will be seen and how their family will be treated after they have departed. The benefits of the sacrifice come to be seen as greater than its cost, and justify submission to the goals of the power holder.

7  What Happens to a Dream Deterred? Hughes (1951) Deterrence is the product of power exercised intentionally to dissuade an individual from pursuing a particular course of action. If a power holder can deter a subject from pursuing any course of action other than the one favored by the holder, then deterrence can be said to have occurred. This is the degree to which Hezbollah, through Al Manar and its information operations that target both military-aged youths directly and also indirectly by co-opting the figures of authority holding sway over the decision-making processes of these youths, is able to exercise the power of deterrence in order to sustain its resistance campaign that depends upon suicide bombing as a key component. By providing no alternatives to its preferences, Hezbollah limits the options available to its audience; by casting this option in glory, it appeals to the desires of the audience and in so doing reconciles competing interests by arguing that they are in actual fact the same. Hezbollah needs fighters and to supply its own demands it creates within the communities subject to Al Manar programming a need to fight. Success of the endeavor depends upon its ability to deter potential fighters from pursuing any other path.

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References Galbraith J (1983) The anatomy of power. Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston Hemmingway E (1929) A farewell to arms. Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York Hughes L (1951) Harlem: Montage of a dream deferred. https://www.loc.gov/rr/program/journey/ hughes-transcript.html Humud C (2018) Lebanese Hezbollah. Congressional Research Service. June 22, 2018 Jorisch A (2004) Beacon of hatred: inside Hizbillah’s Al Manar television. Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, DC. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/ beacon-of-hatred-inside-hizballahs-al-manar-television Kuenn A (2017) Content amplification: how to promote and distribute content effectively. Content Marketing Institute. https://contentmarketinginstitute.com/2017/08/contentamplification-promote-distribute/ Mandelker S (2018) Under Secretary Sigal Mandelker speech before the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. June 5, 2018. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0406 Wrong D (1979) Power: its forms, bases, and uses. Transaction Publishers, London/New Brunswick

‘The Outrage Was Really Quite Visceral’1: Overt and Covert Deterrence Effects on Social Movement Activism Thomas O’Brien

1  Introduction In April 2006 a group of environmental activists set up a protest camp at the site of a proposed coal mine and remained in place until April 2009 when participants were served with an eviction notice (The Press 2009). The year after the camp was established news emerged that there was a paid informant feeding information to Solid Energy, the state-owned enterprise behind the mine (Hager and Mussen 2007). In March 2011 a flotilla of boats sailed from Auckland to the East Coast with a plan to disrupt a survey of offshore oil deposits. This action led to confrontation between activists and the oil exploration ship, with the government deploying a navy vessel to assist police in serving trespass notices and arresting the captain of one of the boats (see O’Brien 2013a). Finally, April 2013 saw the New Zealand government revise the Crown Minerals Act to include maximum penalties of 12  months in prison and $50,000 fine for damaging or interfering with an offshore oil rig, with a fine of up to $10,000 for entering any predefined exclusion zone of up to 500 m (Smellie 2013). These vignettes illustrate the actions the state can take to manage the tension between the desire to allow free expression of claims and the perceived need for unfettered economic development. Contentious politics challenges the institutions of the state by operating at the margins of behaviours that are tolerated, forcing a response from the state (Tarrow 2011). Direct action is particularly challenging for the state in this regard, as it requires the authorities to physically engage activists, removing them from industrial sites and high-profile locations. When coupled with the proliferation of media technologies the reputational costs can be high, with activists highlighting heavy-handed forms of social control to reinforce collective action (see Vicari 2015). Activist groups also risk their position if their actions are T. O’Brien (*) Department of Sociology, University of York, York, UK e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 A. Filippidou (ed.), Deterrence, Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29367-3_9

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deemed to be too far from what is deemed acceptable, as the message may be obscured (see Evans 2016). Therefore, in the case of the state and social movement organisations, image maintenance is central in demonstrating the legitimacy of the actions and positions taken. State actors can turn to social control as a form of deterrence in an attempt to dissuade social movement actors from particular behaviours. The decision of an individual to take part in a protest action can present personal costs in terms of time, threat of physical harm or social sanction, requiring an assessment of whether these can be borne (Carson 2014). In building its deterrent capacity, the state can draw on overt and covert forms of social control. Overt actions, including banning orders, legal restrictions or the reclassification of certain actions can be effective in dissuading participation, making the costs obvious and explicit. However, they risk reinforcing portrayals of the state as heavy-handed, preventing free expression of deeply felt concerns and also providing a target for further disruptive or transgressive actions. In such an environment, states have turned to covert actions, by which the state can gain information to develop more sophisticated social control tools and subvert from within. The deterrent effect of covert actions is more difficult to identify, given their hidden nature, but potentially more damaging (see Marx 1974). This chapter considers forms of covert and overt actions to deter environmental activism in New Zealand. The open, democratic character of the state presents a challenge when deterring social movement activities, as it seeks to manage the tension between its progressive image and the need to restrict actions deemed harmful to economic performance. The aims of the chapter are to (1) map the relationship between social movements, social control and deterrence, and (2) examine how the New Zealand state deters certain environmental activists through the deployment of overt and covert social control mechanisms. The chapter consists of three sections. The first section provides an overview of contentious politics, considering how and why people engage in protest, with a focus on the environmental movement. Deterrence is examined as a form of social control in the second section, outlining the range of overt and covert actions that can be deployed. The third section introduces the environmental movement in New Zealand before examining attempts to deter environmental activism through overt and covert forms of social control. This section focuses on episodes targeting protest over mining and offshore oil exploration as these have proven the most contentious in recent times.

2  Contentious Politics and Social Movements The decision to engage in an act of protest requires a degree of commitment on the part of the participant, as the costs and benefits of breaking the ‘crust of convention’ (Tarrow 1993: 302) cannot be known in advance. Democratic states are more likely to tolerate a broad range of such actions, but as Tilly and Tarrow (2007: 83) argue, ‘every regime divides known claim-making performances into prescribed, tolerated, and forbidden.’ In engaging in protest, individuals and groups are demonstrating the

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failure of the existing order and the need to redress perceived injustices or wrongs. To be effective, actors need to operate closer to the forbidden space in order to present a challenge and generate sufficient attention to bring about meaningful change. This form of action has been located in the broader space of contentious politics, specifically transgressive contention, which McAdam et  al. (2001:7–8) have argued: consists of episodic, public, collective interaction among the makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims, (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants, (c) at least some of the parties to the conflict are newly self-identified political actors and/ or (d) at least some parties employ innovative collective action.

This definition captures the relational character of such actions, as participants struggle to generate meaningful support for their position. It also demonstrates the uncertainty involved, as challenging the status quo requires the formation of new solidarities or the adoption of unanticipated or novel actions to advance the claims of the collective. The external environment plays a key role in determining the emergence of contentious actors as well as their chances of success. Describing the factors that can facilitate or hinder actors, Tarrow (2011: 32) notes that ‘political opportunities [are] …consistent – but not necessarily formal, permanent or national – sets of clues that encourage people to engage in contentious politics.’ Defining political opportunities, Tilly (2008: 92) pointed to five specific characteristics – openness of the regime, coherence of the elite, stability of political alignments, availability of allies, and repression/facilitation. These opportunity structures are not static and change over time in response to shifts in the external environment, including those of contentious actors. It is also important to note that each can move independently. For example, loss of elite coherence and increasing availability of allies for contentious actors may lead to a hardening of political alignments and reduced facilitation (or increased repression) among state actors. The nature of claim-making under the banner of contentious politics brings actors with common interests together as social movements. Operating in the broader sphere of civil society, Offe (1985: 820) argues that social movements adopt ‘practices that belong to an intermediate sphere between “private” pursuits and concerns… and institutional, state-sanctioned modes of politics’. This means that in order to be successful social movements have to bridge the gap by collectivising or representing the views of their members. Aggregating claims in this way and challenging the status quo also brings social movement actors into conflict with entrenched interests and established groups (see Dalton et al. 2003; Gale 1986). Navigating between these pressures requires social movement actors to recognise the nature of the threats and opportunities distinguishing between ‘effects of structural changes in opportunities… [and] effects or signals sent by the political system.’ (Meyer and Minkoff 2004: 1464) Misreading these signals can lead to increased threat or loss of legitimacy and support among followers. Within the broad scope of social movement forms, the environmental movement has emerged as a significant site of action since the 1960s. Environmental issues are

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particularly open to contentious action, as their uncertain character involves constant adjustment, feedback and negotiation between affected parties (Lidskog and Elander 2007). These complex relationships have led Rootes (2007a: 610) to argue that: an environmental movement may be defined as a loose, noninstitutionalised network of informal interactions that may include, as well as individuals and groups who have no organizational affiliation, organizations of varying degrees of formality, that are engaged in collective action motivated by shared identity of concern about environmental issues.

Variation within the environmental movement is also reflected in the range of organisation forms and actions undertaken. While some groups that have moved towards professionalisaton (van der Heijden 1999) and away from the adoption of forbidden performances, others continue to maintain a more radical stance (Kousis 2004). Taylor (2008: 27) notes that ‘Radical environmentalism most commonly brings to mind the actions of those who break laws in dramatic displays of “direct action” in defense of nature’. The ability of these distinct organisational forms to exist within the same movement clearly presents challenges to the state in attempting to manage and respond to claims, requiring a diverse range of approaches. A further feature of contentious politics that needs to be considered is the spatial construction and the positioning of such actions. Actions at the local level differ from those at the national or transnational level, as Rootes (2007b) argues, ‘Local campaigns are the most persistent and ubiquitous forms of environmental contention… [they are] persistently recurrent.’ Localised protests resort to spectacle to generate attention (Kousis et al. 2008; see also O’Brien 2016), as the targets of their claims are generally less prominent. Protest campaigns at the national or transnational level are more significant, as they potentially present a more direct challenge to the governance of the state, attracting greater media attention and support from multiple communities. Space plays a role in the effectiveness of contentious politics at the national level, as the lack of geographical rootedness allows a more creative use of space when compared with the opportunities available to local actions. Endres and Senda-Cook (2011; also Sewell 2001) argue that the social construction of space provides opportunities for protest actors to challenge existing norms and practices through their actions, thereby amplifying the claims being presented. Operating in this context, social movements have decisions to make regarding how and where they act. Opportunities and threats in the environment suggest enabling and constraining features, which will be important in shaping these decisions. However, given that social movement actors are seeking to break with the status quo, such signals will be interpreted in different ways depending on the level of risk and cost the actors are willing to bear. It is also necessary to consider the ways in which targets of contentious actions may attempt to deter or prevent such actions from having the desired effect. Additionally, the character of the opportunities and threats may not be clear, requiring actions to be based on expected reactions of targets and opponents and assessing whether their stated positions will be followed through (see Meyer and Minkoff 2004). Targets of claims may engage in hidden behavior to deter contentious acts, raising the costs associated and

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potentially undermining trust and collective resolve amongst those involved (see O’Brien 2015). In order to understand the ability of such behaviour to impact contentious actions it is necessary to consider the range of approaches that can be deployed to deter claimants.

3  Deterrence and Social Control Social movements target the state as the actor most able to address claims, also the actor most vulnerable to challenges that threaten its legitimacy. Gale (1986: 203) reinforces this point arguing that ‘Because the state significantly affects the distribution of… [resources], movement activists interested in change must negotiate with its representatives.’ In turn, states have various tools at their disposal to answer or attempt to dissuade protest claims. In democratic states, such actions are more limited, due to the need to maintain support from the broader population. As such, deterrence is a more effective form of management of claims, alongside responses that directly address the issue, where possible. Examining the meaning of deterrence in the context of radical environmental groups, Carson (2014: 487) argues that it ‘centers on the idea that an increase in costs, as measured through punishment, will influence criminal behaviour.’ The difficulty with this definition is that much social movement action is not criminal, raising the issue of how states deploy deterrence. Broadening the scope of deterrence is possible by focusing on norms and behaviour deemed acceptable. Zald (1978: 83) captures this in the concept of social control, which he identifies as ‘the process by which individuals, groups and organizations attempt to make performance, the behaviour and operations of other groups, organizations and individuals, conform to standards of behaviour or normative preferences.’ Given the aim of social movement actions is to disrupt, they are automatically at risk of breaching normative preferences of wider society. In such a context, Marx (1974: 403) notes that ‘efforts of the larger society to control or accommodate to social movements… should be viewed as an integral part of the environment of these groups’. More recently, Davenport (2017: 258) has argued that: the key to understanding how states establish and maintain control over their territorial jurisdiction resides more in the minds of their constituents than in observing behavior enacted on the streets and hills of the polity.

The result being that to deter social movement action the state is able to use social control mechanisms to define what is acceptable and restrict what is not, directly and indirectly through shaping social norms and expectations. When considering the enactment of social control, it is necessary to consider who is involved and their respective influence. In identifying the control agent, Earl (2004: 62) distinguishes between national political actors, local political actors, and private actors, noting that ‘processes that drive private protest control may be distinct from the processes that drive local and/or national state-based protest control.’ The distinction between national and local political actors is important, as

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the capacity of the former to exercise control will be much greater than the latter. While both public and private actors are likely to be concerned with legitimacy or reputation, private actors may also be driven by concerns around profitability. Complicating this distinction, Walby and Monaghan (2011) argue that there has been blurring of boundaries as public bodies draw on privately sourced intelligence and private actors are able to activate public control agents in service of their ends through the provision of information. This illustrates the composite character of social control, as the agents involved are able to work together to achieve shared goals. Turning to the ways in which social control is exercised in the management of social movements there are a number of factors to consider. Earl (2004) draws a distinction between coercion and channelling, where coercion involves attempts to directly influence protest actors through policing, surveillance or the mobilisation of counter movements. In contrast, ‘Channelling involves more indirect repression, which is meant to affect the forms of protest available, the timing of protests, and/ or flows of resources to movements.’ (Earl 2003: 48) This can involve actions such as requiring permits for protests and tightening restrictions on tax-free status (Earl 2004). The identification of groups for targeted for deterrence is not precise and can be shaped by a range of factors. Considering the actions of the FBI in targeting the New Left in the 1960s Cunningham and Browning (2004: 365) argue that as: social control agencies are often attracted to… [a] broad brush logic… (through which even peripheral adherents and sympathizers could be tainted as ‘deviant-by-association’ with movement leaders), the impact of these repressive acts spreads well beyond their particular targets.

Expanding on the mechanisms underpinning such actions, Boykoff (2007: 287) identifies resource depletion, stigmatization, divisive disruption and intimidation. Each of these can be implemented through a variety of means (direct and indirect) and the effects can also lead to emulation, whereby groups not directly affected change their actions to avoid attracting the attention of social control agents (Boykoff 2007). The exercise of social control can be further be divided according to whether the actions adopted are overt or covert. Examining the actions of the state, Davenport (2017: 259) argues ‘that a perception of order is created… through a well-crafted performance put forward by political authorities and directed toward the mass public within the relevant territory.’ Creation of such an order allows the control agents to determine the appropriate norms and behaviour, with associated sanctions for deviation (Zald 1978). There are various means available to achieve this end, but the dissemination of such norms through the mass media provides a useful tool for the state (Boykoff 2007). In a more direct form, King (2013: 466) identifies protest permits as a form of ‘Negotiated management [that] has become a normative structure defining what legitimate protest is, labelling “good” and “bad” protesters in relation to the norm’. In exercising its control, the state must be careful not to overstep, as ‘Revelations that the state is something other than what is projected could… result in mass outrage and defection as individuals feel betrayed.’ (Davenport

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2017: 271–2) This places limits on the range of overt actions open to a particular state, leading to a search for alternatives to supplement this form of control. Alongside overt forms of social control, the state is able to draw on covert or hidden actions to disrupt movement coherence or external credibility. As Tilly (2008) noted, worthiness in the eyes of observers is key to a movement being able to persist and present credible claims. The use of covert actions by the state varies in form and intensity, and is difficult to identify with certainty (Cunningham 2003), but the aim is often to challenge the appearance of worthiness or credibility. Addressing the effects of covert actions, Marx (1974: 403) argued that ‘undercover agents… can serve as mechanisms of containment, prolongation, alteration, or repression’ and that ‘considerable damage may be done to an unpopular yet legal group without necessarily evoking legal sanctions’ (436). At the same time, Cunningham and Soto-Carrión (2015: 160) note that ‘ostensibly repressive efforts can have divergent or ambivalent effects on their intended targets.’ Rather than disruption, perceived infiltration may lead to increased solidarity and commitment from members, driven by an emotional response (Aminzade and McAdam 2001; Rodgers 2010) or by a heightened perception of threat (Goldstone and Tilly 2001). Revelations of covert actions by the state may also have negative effects on its own standing among the broader public (Davenport 2017). This all demonstrates that the ability of the state to adopt social control measures is not straightforward. The existence of competing interests and linkages between agencies within the state shape its ability to operate in a unitary manner as agencies seek to maintain access to resources (see Cunningham and Browning 2004). Morgan and Orloff (2017: 18) also point to the complex relationship between state and non-­ state actors, arguing: we are better off charting the linkages and flow of resources and power between these spheres or investigating where boundaries blur, why that may be the case, and what implications this has for power, authority and legitimacy.

The compound nature of the state and social movement ‘speaks to players each having their own (sometimes multiple) strategic agendas and interests’ (Cunningham and Soto-Carrión 2015: 158). Attempts at social control need to be considered in the light of the interests of the actors (public and private) responsible, as they may not fit directly with those of the state.

4  Deterring Environmental Activism in New Zealand Contemporary environmental movement action in New Zealand can be traced to the 1960s and protests around the construction of a large hydroelectric dam on Lake Manapouri (Mark et  al. 2001). This was followed by sustained campaigns over the logging of native beech forests and mining during the 1970s and 1980s (Downes 2000).

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The movement was also involved in the campaign to remain nuclear free and prevent nuclear powered ships from entering New Zealand waters in the 1980s (Meyer 2003). As O’Brien (2013b) argued when examining the evolution of the movement, recent developments have involved more nuanced campaigns. The loss of ‘black and white’ issues has resulted in a scaling back of environmental movement organisations and a subsequent rise in small-scale community focused groups. Although this development has been facilitated by state action in addressing environmental issues, this is not universal and can be sacrificed in the interests of economic development (O’Brien 2017). In this context, relations between the state and social movement actors have varied. Since the late 1990s this has entailed greater participation and involvement of non-state actors. Downes (2000) identified a shift from hostility to one of collaboration under the Labour government that was elected in 1999, a pattern that was also seen under the 1984–90 Labour government (Bührs 2014). However, the extent of collaboration was always shaped by the nature of the groups concerned and their actions. In managing these relationships the state sought to influence behaviour, exercising different forms of social control. Radical groups were marginalised and faced sanction for unacceptable behaviour. Large, mainstream groups also faced sanction when they deviated from the defined script, as was illustrated by the removal of charitable status from Greenpeace after the organisation’s campaigning was deemed to be political (New Zealand Energy and Environment Business Week, 2011). This suggests that while the state is willing to tolerate and engage the environmental movement, it seeks to do so on terms it defines while deterring actions and actors deemed unacceptable. The challenge in identifying covert acts of deterrence as part of this mix in that they are by their nature hidden. However, at certain points it is possible that they emerge into the open or at least sufficient indications will surface to suggest their presence. In assessing the extent of the state’s willingness to deploy social control mechanisms it is useful to consider previous periods of heightened contention. Large-scale opposition movements targeting the South African ‘Springbok’ rugby tour (MacLean 2010) and nuclear ships (Meyer 2003) during the 1980s challenged the ability of the state to manage dissent. The 1981 rugby tour by a team from apartheid South Africa led to a severe divide in society and intense levels of social conflict, due in part to the significance of the sport in the national cultural identity. Describing the atmosphere during the 56 days of the tour, MacLean (2010: 72) notes that: thousands of New Zealanders twice a week faced riot police who had logistical support from the military. They were baton charged, assaulted and imprisoned. They had telephone calls intercepted, police surveillance became routine, organizing meetings were infiltrated, and there was public discussion of the possibility of the declaration of, in effect, martial law.

The intensity of the protests and the response of the security services was unprecedented, something illustrated by the fact that ‘use of realistic bomb threats was contemplated as a deliberate tactic by protest movements to stretch police resources’ (Battersby 2018: 61). This episode revealed the willingness of the state to use a range of covert and overt tactics to deter behaviours it deemed unacceptable and

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to  maintain control. Work examining contemporary practices has shown that the public sector has increasingly come to rely on private security actors to support these ends (see Bradley and Sedgwick 2010). This suggests the state has an interest in using social control mechanisms for deterrent purposes, but is wary of reputational damage, making indirect and covert tools attractive. Environmental movement actors have not escaped scrutiny from the state and have been subject to covert actions to observe and disrupt their actions. In particular, groups engaged in more disruptive and radical actions that presented a more direct challenge to perceived economic interests have been targeted. Radical environmental groups are likely to receive more attention from the state, as they are more willing to breach accepted practices. Examining radical environmental actors in Australia opposing native forest logging and Japanese whaling, Cianchi (2015: 1) has argued that they: are willing to undertake what for most of us would be an unacceptable level of discomfort, disobedience and confrontation. Their tactics include forms of lawbreaking such as trespassing on facilities to record breaches of environmental laws and conditions, blockading entrances to logging coupes, locking themselves onto industrial equipment and placing themselves in small inflatable boats between whalers and their prey.

The level of commitment required to engage in radical action is therefore higher than most people are willing to bear, also limiting the effectiveness of standard deterrent practices, such as legal restrictions. However, the risk and hardship entailed in such actions potentially opens the space for infiltrators to operate; as such groups are potentially more accepting of those apparently willing to demonstrate commitment. Where covert actions are successful, they can have a more significant damaging effect on members and organisational cohesion, due to the risks involved and depth of commitment required. Questions are also likely to be asked about ‘strangers’ and the potential threat to individuals of unintended disclosures, leading to greater enclosure and potential withdrawal (see Marx 1974). The effects of covert social control on radical environmental groups and the wider movement were demonstrated by the infiltration of Save Happy Valley (SHV). SHV emerged as a group opposed to the development of a coal mine on the remote West Coast of the South Island of New Zealand. The target of the action was Solid Energy, a state-owned enterprise (SOE) responsible for managing coal resource exploration and extraction (McClintock and Taylor 2002). The first actions of the campaign involved 20 students hiking into the forest and attempting to set up camp in April 2004 before being chased off (NZPA 2004). The subsequent campaign against the mine lasted until 2009. A more permanent occupation camp was established in April 2006 and remained until activists were evicted in April 2009 (The Press 2009). In conjunction with the occupation, protests against the mine took place involving marches and gatherings at Parliament in Wellington (NZPA 2006a) and through Auckland (NZPA 2008). More radical actions involved temporary occupations of Solid Energy’s offices in Christchurch (NZPA 2005a, 2006b), blocking of coal transports (NZPA 2005a, b, 2007) and a high-profile disruption of Solid Energy’s AGM by entering dressed as Santa Claus, throwing pies and pouring

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out lumps of coal (Hall 2008). These actions placed SHV at the radical margins of the environmental movement and a clear target for deterrent actions. The willingness of SHV activists to engage in disruptive actions of questionable legality and high potential risk presented a challenge to the state. As arms length’s bodies, SOEs have a greater degree of independence and are required to return an economic surplus. During the occupation it became apparent that one of the participants had been paid by Solid Energy to infiltrate the group and feed information back to the organisation (Hagar and Mussen 2007). This was in line with subsequent cases involving other SOEs and findings by Bradley and Sedgwick (2010) regarding the use of covert private security companies to obtain information on protest groups. The effects on the actions of SHV were minimal, as they continued to maintain pressure on Solid Energy until the mine was granted final approval. There was an effect on the wider movement, as information rippled outwards. Describing the feeling in the movement, one former activist argued ‘the outrage was really quite visceral because it was such a betrayal of trust and a stripping bare of how vulnerable groups can be’ (quoted in O’Brien 2015: 793). The idea that the state and other actors were willing to use paid informants to gather information and potentially disrupt activities had a chilling effect on members of the movement, potentially deterring further actions by more moderate actors. Alongside covert actions, the New Zealand state has the ability to introduce overt restrictions or guidelines that attempt to influence environmental movement actors. The democratic character of the state precludes outright bans, but does allow for more subtle forms of regulatory control. As noted above, the ability to deter actions is shaped by the character of the group concerned. Shifts toward institutionalisation and professionalization within social movement organisations (see Tarrow 2011) mean that they are more vulnerable to such regulatory constraints. Van der Heijden (1999) identified this tendency as being linked to building and maintaining a sufficiently robust funding base to ensure organisational longevity. This can present a difficulty for groups that seek to challenge the status quo, as they encounter established interests (Dalton et  al. 2003) and organised countermovements (Gale 1986) that may threaten their continued viability. In attempting to deter such actors the state is able to rely on less contentious and controversial forms of control. A clear example of attempts to deter certain activities can be seen in regulations governing classification of charities. The Charities Act (2005) introduced restrictions on the range of activities that could be undertaken, particularly political campaigning, by threatening the loss of tax-free status. Inability to register as a charity can have a significant impact on such groups, as their non-profit status makes them vulnerable to loss of income needed to pursue their aims. Greenpeace was a high profile victim of the change, as the Charities Commission refused to register them in 2010, on the basis that (Greenpeace New Zealand 2014):

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although the bulk of Greenpeace’s purposes and activities, such as the promotion of the protection and preservation of nature and the environment, were charitable, the promotion of disarmament and peace would not be charitable.

Challenging this decision through the courts, Greenpeace was granted the right to be recognised as a charity by the Supreme Court in August 2014 (Papatsoumas 2014). Lee (2015) argues that the extent of the victory was tempered by the requirement that public benefit must be generated from any political activities. The challenge of this position is that it can be seen as limiting the extent to which such organisations can engage in disruptive behaviour without risking decertification. There are also less visible impacts on the movement, as organisations that rely on their charitable status may self-regulate to ensure they are not similarly threatened. The state has also engaged in more direct forms of deterrent social control to limit disruption by social movement actors. Attempts to restrict protest actions targeting offshore oil exploration provides a clear example of how deterrent efforts can escalate over time. In March 2011 when surveys of potential oil deposits began in earnest off the East Coast of the North Island, Greenpeace and other actors formed a flotilla that travelled from Auckland to the coast near the exploration site. Following this display, a small group of boats remained in the area, disrupting the survey by putting swimmers in the way and generally attempting to prevent the normal operation of the survey vessel. The government responded by sending a naval vessel to assist police, leading to protest vessels being boarded, trespass notices being issued and the arrest of Elvis Teddy, captain of the fishing boat San Pietro. The protest ended in May when the survey was complete and the ship left the area (see O’Brien 2013a). The actions of the police hindered, but failed to stop the protest, showing the limits of control effects when faced with actions already underway. Faced with the threat of ongoing actions targeting offshore oil drilling the state developed more comprehensive measures. In 2013, amendments to the Crown Minerals (Permitting and Crown Land) Bill were introduced to create tougher legal penalties for protest. Dubbed the ‘Anadarko Amendment’, after one of the companies involved in exploration, the amendment made it a criminal offence to interfere with or damage any ship or equipment involved in offshore mining, with a maximum penalty of 12 months in jail and $50,000 fine ($100,000 if corporate body). It also allowed for the creation of non-interference zones of up to 500 m, with a fine of up to $10,000 for breaches (see McMenamin 2013). The deterrent effect of amendment is clear, as it significantly raises the potential cost of participation in protest, so that individuals and groups will be wary of the risks involved. It also demonstrates the willingness of the state to use significant legal force to deter direct action against perceived economic interests. These three cases demonstrate the willingness of the state to use social control to protect its perceived interests. Radical actors, such as SHV and groups targeting offshore oil have faced more robust forms of social control given the more extreme character of their actions, but the resulting deterrent has a wider ripple effect. The

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discovery of a spy in SHV was a shock to the group, but served as a stronger deterrent on less radical actors, as it demonstrated the lengths the state could go to if pressed. In a similar fashion, the legal restrictions on offshore oil protests directly impacted only a small part of the movement. However, it sat within a broader pattern of behaviour where the state attempted to  channel environmental action in acceptable directions. Participation and engagement with the state has increased over time, but as the experience of Greenpeace shows there can be limitations associated with greater access. Social control in this case acts as a deterrent by reinforcing the boundaries of permissible behaviour, although these remain partially obscured, potentially raising the costs of participation.

5  Conclusion The purpose of this chapter was to examine the way in which covert and overt forms of social control can contribute to deterrence. Social movement actors draw on a range of behaviours that seek to challenge and disrupt the status quo. Contentious politics in this sense draws on identifiable values and expectations to present claims operating on the margins of what is tolerated. The legal nature of the majority of these actions means that the state is less able to resort to direct restrictions. Social control addresses this issue by providing the state with tools to coerce and channel such actors, defining the boundaries of what is tolerated. Overt actions focus on openly specifying these boundaries, through legal and regulatory tools. By contrast, covert actions can be seen as an attempt to exercise social control from within, subverting or disrupting the actions of targeted actors. The deterrent effect results from the extent to which social movement participants are willing and able to bear the costs of action. This is compounded by the degree of uncertainty, as the costs of participation may not be immediately apparent. The experience of the environmental movement in New Zealand has been used to provide an illustration of the operation of deterrent effects. The state has opened a space for non-state environmental actors, but has done so on terms that it has defined. Where groups engage in contentious politics that deviates from what is tolerated it has been willing to use both covert and overt forms of social control. Radical actors have been challenged by infiltration and punitive legal regulations that have attempted to restrict their ability to operate. More mainstream groups, such as Greenpeace, have also faced restrictions on what they are able to do, with costs associated with deviating from tolerated forms of participation and activism. The forms of social control exercised are carefully calibrated to ensure that they do not openly overstep the mark and conform to the normative standards prevalent in society. Rather than banning groups, the state has sought to restrict their behaviour on the grounds of public interest, safety and other acceptable terms. The more significant impact of social control falls on the wider environmental movement, as the perception of robust actions by the state serves as a deterrent, raising the costs of participation.

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Linking the Deterrence Concept to Migration Charis Anastasopoulos

1  Introduction On 24 January 2017, U.S. president Trump addressed employees at the American Department of Homeland Security. In his speech, he announced that his administration was going to put into action his promise regarding building the wall along the country’s southern border with Mexico. The U.S. president said, “The Secretary of Homeland Security, working with myself and my staff, will begin immediate construction of a border wall. So badly you needed – you folks know how badly needed it is as a help  – but very badly needed. This will also help Mexico by deterring illegal immigration from Central America and by disrupting violent cartel networks. As I have said repeatedly to the country, we are going to get the bad ones out – the criminals and the drug dealers and gang members and cartel leaders. The day is over when they can stay in our country and wreak havoc”. The border wall announced by the U.S. president is merely one step in his anti-migration policy. In addition, in his first month in office, the U.S president ordered the extension of the controls by which undocumented migrants might be apprehended more effectively, the enhancement of deportations, and the implementation of a travel ban on citizens of mainly Muslim countries. While the imposition of identity controls and refusal of entry admission are actions that are performed by law enforcement agents, the border wall is a physical artefact. The U.S. border wall is supposed to scare and thus deter migrants from entering the United States. Its purpose is to physically obstruct and prevent migrants from crossing the U.S. border, and it is an obstacle to migration that is meant to physically affect migrants at United States’ southern border. A wall constructed at that border would indeed impair migration regardless of how well it would

C. Anastasopoulos (*) University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 A. Filippidou (ed.), Deterrence, Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29367-3_10

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d­ iscourage a migrant’s aspiration to cross the Mexico-United States border. It is a physical fortification that obstructs the movement of bodies. Furthermore, the U.S. president mentioned the border wall’s efficacy for Mexico. This physical artefact of the U.S. anti-migration policy is supposed provide Mexico with the opportunity to cognitively prevent Central American migrants from crossing the border and entering Mexico. The U.S. president has indicated that the American border wall would negatively impact migration from Central America to Mexico. However, migrants who attempt to cross the southern Mexican border without authorization would not straightforwardly face the border wall projected by the U.S., but, according to the U.S. president’s ken, they would be deterred by the American border wall, which would actually be far from the southern Mexican border. The U.S. president’s expressions suggest that migrants would face an impediment that would affect their decisions to move towards the southern Mexican border and enter Mexico. Therefore, the U.S. president’s border wall would be both a physical obstacle along the southern U.S. border and an immaterial obstacle at the southern Mexican border. The border wall may affect migrants who are determined to cross the southern U.S. border without permission but who may fail to succeed in entering the country due to the fortification’s effect on their physical power. The border wall may affect migrants physically. Moreover, the border wall may have a negative impact on migrants’ minds, as their courage may sicken into dismay by virtue of a fortification they anticipate while contemplating unauthorized migration to the U. S. or to Mexico. The deterrence of migration may be traced to anticipation of apprehension and punishment in the case of unlawfully crossing a national border or in the case of unauthorized residence within a national territory. However, standing in front of a physical barrier may have a deterring effect by evoking the notion of how to scale the border wall physically. Deterrence has an effect that is preceded by anticipation. An actor who faces a threat is not confronted with consequences, but he or she apprehends consequences before they occur. Deterrence engenders a decision owing to the inconvenience that is envisioned and that an actor is particularly unwilling to experience. Deterrence “literally means to stop someone from doing something by frightening him” (Waltz 2003: 5). In the case of the U.S. president’s speech, migrants are discouraged from commencing or continuing migration, as they imagine that a physical barrier will confront their bodies. U.S. president Trump has suggested that migrants might be deterred from crossing national borders if they are beset by doubts about the success of their journey. This chapter is concerned with migration control that is devoted to the concept of deterrence. It is divided into four sections in which general elements of deterrence and a specific application of migration control – the case of the United States – are brought into focus. The first section addresses the threat’s function within the process of deterrence. Moreover, the section highlights how deterrence appears in international politics and in the criminal justice system. The second section deals with the question of how the perspective on migration has transformed as the modern relation between state, nation, and territory has emerged. It recalls how international undocumented migration challenges the state and that international documented

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migration relies on regulations by which the state reinforces its sovereignty. The third section exemplifies the concept of deterrence within U.S. migration policies in which undocumented migration is deemed a problem. The last section reveals selected outcomes of U.S. efforts aimed at deterring migration.

2  Power and Deterrence Deterrence deals with anticipated danger. A disadvantage that has not yet occurred burdens one’s agency and sentiment. The deterrent threat is put forth with the intention to induce renouncement. Instead, compellence includes a threat with the intention to prompt the threatened actor to do something. Schelling (2008: 70) made this distinction: “The threat that compels rather than deters often requires that the punishment be administered until the other acts rather than if he acts”. The actor whom a deterrent threat is addressing perceives his or her action as inducing more costs than benefits, and he or she “can and will be made to suffer for his [or her] aggression more than he [or she] can possibly gain by it” (Dulles 1954: 358). While being affected by that burden, the actor who deters can control the behaviour of the threatened actor. If one is deterred, he or she might refrain from translating an idea into action. In international politics, power engendered by deterrence appears if one succeeds in avoiding the opponent’s attack and one’s own counterattack. Considering a potential counterattack, the deterred opponent abstains from an attack considered beforehand (Morgan 1980: 29). What matters is that deterrence entails a threat that effects the omission of offensive action. “Essentially, deterrence means discouraging the enemy from taking military action by posing for him a prospect of cost and risk outweighing his prospective gain” (Snyder 2015: 3). Notwithstanding the strategy of deterrence as often linked with the invention of nuclear weapons, states threatened their opponents with potentially destructive counterattacks before nuclear weapons existed (Freedman 1983: 40). However, since the thorough destructiveness of nuclear weapons emerged, states have been forced to consider that a decision to conduct a military attack may cause a devastating repercussion by the opponent or their allies. “Nuclear deterrence was the ultimate in threatening awful consequences to prevent wars” (Morgan 2003: 7). As states obtained the opportunity to deploy nuclear weapons, the emphasis on deterring a potential aggressor changed. From then on, deterrence required notification of a potential aggressor of the nuclear danger (Waltz 1990: 732). A deterrent threat predicated upon nuclear weapons is supposed to convey the message that existential fear will be reasonable if an opponent is contemplating an attack. Furthermore, deterrence is a substantial approach of the criminal justice system. In modern societies, the imposition of a penalty on a convicted criminal is not premised on the belief that punishment inflicts pain on the offender solely for the sake of pain (Durkheim 1994: 172, 2008: 135). Additionally, modern punishment is not predicated upon the idea that every crime assaults a monarch who then demands taking vengeance upon the offender (Foucault 2003: 63). Modern criminal justice

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systems have the goal of preventing future crime, and deterrence is an approach to prevention of criminal action (Dölling et al. 2007: 635). One is deterred if he or she avoids or restricts criminal action by virtue of an anticipated penalty that is expected to be imposed (Gibbs 1986: 87). While deterrence is directed at convicted criminals as well as innocent people, incapacitation and rehabilitation are intended to have a preventive effect on offenders (Samaha 2011: 24). In the case of deterrence, both a convicted criminal and all those who have not yet committed a criminal act are supposed to be affected by the deterring effect of legal punishment. Deterrence is distinguished as specific deterrence, which occurs if offenders undergo legal punishment that is meant to have an impact on their prospective action, and general deterrence, which is intended to inhibit potential offenders from performing criminal acts (Nagin 2013: 200). In general, if deterrence works, the deterred will not dare to put a plan into operation. The induced avoidance of implementation is achieved with an announcement that is at least tacitly communicated. In so doing, power is exercised by an action that does not execute force (Snyder 1963: 163). This action exposes knowledge regarding a prospectively implemented deed that is or was intended to take an undesirable course. Therefore, the behaviour of a deterred person is shaped by a calamity that he or she anticipates. This disadvantage may be controlled by the deterred as he or she opts for avoidance. However, though the deterred obtains decisive power, he or she can choose between opposition and subjugation. In the case of efficiently executed deterrence, the latter occurs. Subjugation that owes to a threat dispenses with force and authority. Power that is exercised by force succeeds as opposition is inhibited or thwarted (Weber 2013: 210). Unlike force, authority shapes the behaviour of the subordinated by delivering or withdrawing recognition. Authority, however, also relies on the recognition performed by the subordinated (Simmel 2006: 163). In the case of the threat, one wields power by defining how to achieve conformity and what deviation will cause. A threat may control one’s behaviour by virtue of action that actually remains unperformed. An actor whom is affected by a threat is introduced to opportunities. The actor who threatens determines which of the opportunities obtained by the subordinated he or she prefers and which consequence the subordinated is supposed to face if he or she opts for nonconformity. Thus, power attained using a threat departs from power based on force, as the threat maintains a choice the subordinated may make (Popitz 2004: 81). Being affected by force excludes the possibility of opting for one’s subjugation.

3  State, Nation, and Migration The emergence of the modern state and the modern nation has affected the perspective on migration. A modern state issues laws, receives tax revenues, deploys armed forces, and conducts diplomacy (Benz 2008: 20). However, according to Max Weber, a state is not specified by a specific goal. Instead, the opportunity to apply a

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monopoly of violence defines it (Weber 2013: 212). The modern state monopolizes violence in its hands, which means that the state’s administration stops being possessed by the administrators (Weber 1994: 40; Habermas 1999: 131). The dispossession of ruling organizations operated by aristocratic or clerical actors is a crucial method for monopolizing violence (Tocqueville 1989: 74). Moreover, abolishing patrimonial privileges adapted to fill vacancies in the administration facilitates the modern state’s scheme of violence monopoly. In a modern state, the election of a person to fill a vacancy in its administration draws upon rational principles and is accomplished by assessing his or her educational qualification (Weber 2009: 43). This principle is supposed to replace patrimonial privileges. The monopoly of violence obtained by a state may be applied to reinforce the regulations of that state (Weber 2013: 212; Elias 1980: 227). This may occur within the territory of a state and demands compliance with its constitution. Furthermore, a modern state’s acts do not require religious approval, but they are supposed to rely on the people legally affiliated with the state and, as members of the nation, possessing rights and duties in terms of the state’s acts (Jellinek 1914: 525). Some states also provide the opportunity for the nation’s members to attend procedures such as, for instance, elections whose results affect the direction of a state’s rule (Lepsius 1990: 242; Habermas 1998: 605). Regardless of whether this opportunity is given, the legitimacy of a state’s rule derives from its relation to a nation. In European history since the eighteenth century, religiously approved legitimacy of rule has undergone a crisis accompanied by ruled peoples’ demand for political participation (Eisenstadt 2006: 213; Hobsbawm 2004: 19). Since the American Revolution and French Revolution, the nation has gradually substituted the principle of religious approval of a rule’s legitimacy (Arendt 2000: 211). Prior to these occurrences, a rule’s legitimacy was not covered by the idea of a nation (Anderson 2006: 83). The modern state claims that its acts are performed on behalf of a nation and that, therefore, the nation’s members are equal in terms of approval of the state’s rule. As the legitimacy of a state’s rule is predicated upon its relationship to a nation, a state is solely committed to one nation that, moreover, relies on a lack of inner discord. By virtue of this term, members of a nation are supposed to superordinate their commitment to the nation and to subordinate commitments arising from religions, professions, ethnic groups, or labour unions (Ziegler 1931: 69). Nations are distinguished from each other by their relationship to one state or by their members’ desire to establish their own state, and, moreover, by selectively employing a particular attribute or a particular combination of attributes, such as, for instance, historical events, language, cultural heritage, or ethnic lineage. Prior to this application, nations do not exist (Gellner 1983: 55). Insofar as the attributes nations refer to match diverse categories and as one attribute, such as one particular language, is claimed by more than one nation, the expression of national identity indicates that attributes are selected randomly to create national identity (Weber 2001: 189). A member of a nation may apply the national attributes in order to shape his or her identity, or he or she may be assigned with the attributes of his or her nation. Furthermore, a state maintains the perception and appreciation of national attributes as allegiance towards the nation, thereby engendered, avails the legiti-

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macy of the state’s rule (Bauman 2005: 109). Dedication towards the nation that is accomplished by inserting national attributes into one’s identity backs the state’s proposition to dwarf regional, ethnic, racial, and religious identities, which may evoke peril to the nation. Such groups may apply their identities to claim political autonomy and to constitute themselves as a nation, whereas a state endeavours to refuse national movements within its territory (Bauman 2001: 233). The members of regional, ethnic, racial, and religious minorities may legally belong to a nation. However, history has shown that minority members may experience disadvantages and be exposed to extraordinary peril. Jews, for instance, were deprived of their German citizenship in Nazi Germany, and, thereafter, the Nazis moved to the industrial mass murder of Jews and other minority members (Arendt 2006: 612). In the U.S., African-American citizens were affected by the Jim Crow laws, which segregated them from white people in everyday public life (Myrdal 2009: 579). In recent times, states have been obliged to ensure the political equality of minorities whose members possess citizenship related to their host country. Noncompliance with this expectation may be condemned by intergovernmental organizations. Furthermore, members of minorities may be contented with their status, or they may attempt to accomplish political independence. On the one hand, the demand for political autonomy may be lacking, and their members may merely claim recognition for their particular identity. In Germany, for instance, members of the Sorbian minority claimed independence during World War I (Stone 2015: 32). In the present day, members of the Sorbian minority are eager to preserve their ethnic identity (Ermisch 2000: 75). On the other hand, independence may still by claimed, as performed by some Catalans in Spain. In similar cases, minority members possess the host state’s citizenship and attempt to emancipate themselves from the state’s administration by building a nation that is independent from their host state’s rule. In other cases, minority members reside in a host state and are legally affiliated with this state by citizenship, but link themselves to another state and another nation (Brubaker 1995: 108). In light of the emergence of the modern nation and the recent treatment of minorities residing within the state’s territory, states refer negatively to migration. In the world before the “old trinity of state-people-territory” (Arendt 2006: 560) emerged, migrants did not cross borders, which revealed the geographical extent of a state’s rule related to a nation. Thus, the perspective on migration has been altered, as the modern state defines its national homeland. Being affiliated with such a state includes rights and duties (Brubaker 1994: 45). Presently, even minority members possessing a state’s citizenship and claiming an identity apart from that state’s nation may mostly have those rights and duties related to their affiliation with the state. Citizenship varies from state to state; for instance, the right to political participation by attending elections is not globally ubiquitous. However, owing to the widespread right of movement, a state’s citizens are usually allowed to settle in and to return to their country of origin if they leave it. Primarily, the state ensures its citizens’ right of movement and distinguishes between its citizens’ mobility performed while leaving and re-entering and the mobility of all the others whose right of movement is not an object of the state’s accountability. Thus, citizens may accomplish

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mobility, which entails international entry and departure, but this opportunity does not appear out of thin air. Instead, citizens obtain this opportunity because the state is obliged to guarantee their mobility. However, the state’s obligation in terms of unconditionally ensuring mobility is limited to its citizens. Whereas a non-citizen who is not a member of the state that he or she intends to enter may not refer to the right of movement, a supranational institution’s policies on mobility may differ. In the case of supranational citizenships, as, for instance, possessed by EU member states’ citizens, unrestricted entrance to any EU member state is permitted (Mindus 2014: 746). The member states of this supranational institution exclude non-EU citizens from the right to move freely within the territory of any EU member state. Thus, in this case, the right of movement is extended across an EU member state’s borders, but the mobility, re-entry, and residence freely accomplished by the EU member state’s citizens are restricted to the supranational institution’s territories. Policies in terms of migration are related to the legal nature of actions that are performed by crossing national borders and taking up residence within the territory of a state or a supranational institution. While inner migration mostly occurs in accordance with the right of movement and within a state’s territory, international migration refers to a movement that transcends national borders regardless of how long migrants reside or independently of whether they continue their movement. The term “international migration” relates to territorial border crossing and permanent, temporary, or repetitive change of residence (Pries 2010: 475). Therefore, international migration is a form of global mobility for which the movement’s objective and the length of residence are of no relevance (Koslowki 2011: 2; see also Zelinsky 1971: 226). Both a state and a supranational institution address policies to handle migration and other forms of mobility, such as, for instance, commuting or tourism. Policies may allow migration as it occurs in the case of the mobility performed by EU member state’s citizens within the EU, or policies may control migration by allocating an entry visa based on the migrant’s age, previous income, education, and skills. In addition, policies may impair and obstruct migration by applying measures that, among other things, are predicated upon a strategy of deterrence. The policies’ goal is to prevent undocumented migrants from entering and remaining in a country.

4  Deterrence in Migration Policies: The Case of the U.S. The responsibility of ensuring non-citizens’ re-entry may not exist for states or supranational institutions, but, when it comes to justifying restrictions in terms of migration, the rationale behind policies concerning the control of migration may be beyond the scope of the right of movement. Migration from poorer countries becomes an issue that features threats attached to migrants. In this case, the securitization of migration takes place (Huysmans 2000: 753). Members of populations in countries that receive migrants from poorer countries discern menaces owing to

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migration. Migrants may be deemed a threat to the cultural identity of the nation, to its welfare status, or to the stability of the state’s rule (Castles et al. 2014: 200). In the perception of members of the local population, the quality of life may be disturbed if newcomers from other countries settle in their homeland. Hence, migrants may be blamed for strained housing, healthcare systems, public education, and job competition. Members of the local population may make migrants accountable not least for an increasing crime rate (Legomsky 2007: 508). This may also occur in cases of inner migration, such as, for instance, in the 1930s, when refugees from Oklahoma were forced to move to California due to a drought that devastated agriculture. “California taxpayers came to see them as an invading host straining local coffers. Small-town residents, noting the rise in criminal behaviour, attributed it to the Okies or their influence. The reaction to the refugee workers, ranging from cruel negligence to violence, added only to their misery” (Babb 2007: 60). Similar cases of opposition towards inner migration occurred in the U.K. (Elias and Scotson 1994) and Germany (Pates 2013: 9) at that time. A phenomenon that is represented as an existential threat and that is subsequently apprehended by the representations’ audience as a threat undergoes a transformation that is referred to as “securitization”. This assignment may occur regardless of whether actual peril to people, state, economy, infrastructure, or nature is approaching. “In security discourse, an issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority; thus, by labelling it as security, an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means” (Buzan et al. 1998: 26). An issue that has been selected to be considered as a threat is subject to measures created in response. However, the measures’ legitimacy depends on whether the issue’s linkage to awful consequences is accomplished. In the case of migration, once this issue has been transformed into an issue that indicates a security threat, the application of measures to control migration appears to be a vital necessity (Bourbeau 2015: 1964). The securitization of migration is effected if the movement of migrants is perceived as a danger that a state and a nation are exposed to. Therefore, states and supranational institutions aim to control migration by attaching border crossings performed without authorization to the risk of punishment and misery. In addition, migration policies are also designed to make life unpleasant for migrants who unlawfully reside within a territory. The perception of suffering experienced by both migrants heading for the border and migrants having already crossed the border is supposed to have an impact on the intention to approach and enter a territory. To control migration through deterrence means “convincing would-be unauthorized immigrants to remain at home (or to choose a different destination). Prevention and removal contribute to deterrence by raising the expected costs of unauthorized migration, including by making it more difficult, and often more physically dangerous, to enter without inspection; by reducing expected benefits, including through the threat of deportation; and by penalizing attempted re-­ entries after deportation with jail time and bars to legal re-entry, a strategy of enforcement with ‘enhanced consequences’” (Rosenblum and Cornelius 2012: 260). Migration policies purposed to engender deterrence involve the imposition of laws and the deployment of enforcement staff, infrastructure, and technology.

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Governments of, for instance, the U.S., Australia, and the EU have formed policies and measures directed at controlling migration and avoiding unauthorized migration. The following section provides an overview of forms of migration deterrence executed in the U.S.  The section focuses on measures and strategies applied by American governments. American policies regarding migration highlight the situation on the southern border and are particularly intended to obstruct migration from Mexico. The legitimacy of policies designed to deter migration is often linked to the securitization of undocumented border crossings. For instance, in response to 9/11, the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (PATRIOT Act) of 2001 linked the threat of migration to the defence against terrorism (Estévez 2012: 50). Migration is regarded as a security hazard by shifting border crossings close to the issue of terrorism. The PATRIOT Act included, among other things, possibilities for auscultating communications, tagging resident non-citizens as “alien enemy combatants”, and, subsequently, detaining them without charges (Zolberg 2008: 630). Additionally, the PATRIOT Act simplified denial of entry to non-citizens and the detention of asylum seekers originating from Middle-Eastern countries during the review of their applications (Freilich et al. 2016: 53). Despite the emphasis on the war on terror, the PATRIOT Act enhanced opportunities to detain and deport migrants (Lebowitz and Potheiser 2002: 876; Ho and Lucky 2012: 99). Thus, since the PATRIOT Act was enacted, unauthorized migration has been increasingly perceived as a threat to national security (Legomsky 2007: 509). According to allegations, unauthorized migration is likely to facilitate the entry of alien terrorists (LeMay 2007: 22). Hence, obstacles to migration are deemed to assist the country’s protection from terrorism. Before and after the PATRIOT Act of 2001, several laws related to migration were, among other things, aimed at diminishing prospects for entering the United States. These laws have in common the strategy of preventing migration through deterrence (Ewing 2014: 198). Among others, the following laws conducive to deterring migration to the U.S. have been enacted: the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, the Immigration Act (IMMACT) of 1990, the Welfare Reform Act (WRA) of 1990, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act (EBSVERA) of 2002, the REAL ID Act of 2005, and the Secure Fence Act (SFA) of 2006. These laws have enabled law enforcement and migration authorities to enhance the control of migration along the borders and to treat migration-related phenomena appearing within the national territory as crimes. In other words, as the acts improved security at U.S. borders, unauthorized migration got tougher and, in addition, resident migrants’ everyday lives in terms of labour, education, housing, health, consumes, and movement within the territory of the United States became impaired. The IRCA of 1986 was a pivotal point in policing migration to the United States. Since the IRCA, hiring an undocumented migrant residing in the U.S. has become a crime. The act requires employers to examine the authenticity of the applicants’ documents and to deny engagement to an undocumented migrant. An employer can

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even be punished for inaccurately examining the application submitted by an undocumented migrant (Laham 2000: 140). In addition, border authorities have been strengthened to secure the southern border in particular. The purpose of the augmentation is premised on the logic of prevention through deterrence that aims to reduce entries without authorization by increasing the risk of apprehension when crossing the border between Mexico and the United States. In contrast, the IRCA also created an opportunity for undocumented migrants who had settled in the U.S. after 1982 to obtain amnesty (Parker 2015: 209). Overall, the IRCA has exposed the issue of undocumented migration and the government’s will to alter this issue’s conditions. “The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 was a frontal attack by Congress on the perceived problem of illegal immigration and based on the belief that the United States had lost control over its borders” (Espenshade 2015: 265). Measures linked to the IRCA have underlined the need to take steps against undocumented migration and have been conducive to engendering the uneasiness and discontent that may be perceived by both undocumented migrants in the U.S. and would-be migrants who aim to enter the U.S. without authorization. The American migration laws mentioned above placed an emphasis on restricting and repelling migration. Both the measures deployed to have an impact on undocumented migrants within the country and the measures developed to inhibit undocumented migration have been advanced since the IRCA was enacted. Most policies have advanced law enforcement personnel, infrastructure, technology, and the legal grounds to deport and detain undocumented migrants. That advancement has been performed with the objective of apprehending migrants whose border crossing has been classified as an offence. The IMMACT, the IIRIRA, and the SFA have strengthened the personnel resources of the United States Border Patrol (USBP) and have expanded barriers along the southern borders, particularly along the southwest borders. Aside from the hundreds of miles of new fences that have been constructed, new technologies have been deployed to obstruct undocumented migration (Dunn 2009: 222; Dotty 2013: 134). The Border Patrol’s work has been backed by lighting systems, satellites, drones, and cameras provided to the officers. This enhanced surveillance at border gates has been conducive to obstructing border crossings performed without authorization in urban areas. Thus, undocumented migrants choose isolated spaces far from American cities (Gilbert 2009: 29). In so doing, undocumented migrants who have successfully crossed the border are obstructed from availing themselves of mobility opportunities such as airports and bus and rail lines that are located close to former border crossing points. Apart from measures to enhance border protection, penalties established for undocumented migrants’ actions have been imposed by certain legislation. The IMMACT and the IIRIRA, for instance, have simplified the deportation of undocumented migrants who have been apprehended and have eased the terms for removing migrants who are offenders. Furthermore, harsh penalties have been implemented for smuggling across the border, forging passports, and omitting the instruction to depart (Koven and Götzke 2010: 142). Subsequently, the EBSVERA introduced extended elements of the offence related to smuggling. Aid provided to undocumented migrants might be deemed an offence. Those who have supported

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undocumented migrants might have committed a crime and be found guilty, “thus putting migrant-friendly churches, legal services, refugee agencies, and social service organizations in the same criminal category as human smuggling organizations” (Romero 2008: 75). While the conditions for deporting undocumented migrants from the U.S. have been unburdened, entry and mobility within the country is impaired. Legislation has decreased opportunities to enter the U.S. with authorization. Terms for re-entry have become tougher for those who have been caught residing in the U.S. without authorization. The AEDPA has established penalties for migrants who have been removed and attempted re-entry without authorization. Further measures that impair entry and mobility were imposed by the REAL ID Act, which introduced criteria necessary to prove identity and set new standards for all drivers’ licences. The REAL ID Act imposed regulations to obtain a legal identification document, but those new regulations could not be fulfilled by undocumented migrants (Koulish 2010: 95). Consequently, opportunities for undocumented migrants to travel within the country have been restricted by the bill. Moreover, no foreign identification document other than an official passport has been accepted since the REAL ID was enacted. Additionally, regulations have been imposed that affect the everyday lives of both migrants and undocumented migrants within the United States. Especially the latter have been experiencing exclusion from public education, public health services, and welfare. In 1990, the WRA established new criteria regarding the eligibility of aliens for public assistance and restricted welfare benefits requested by migrants; cash assistance, food stamps, and medical aid were limited. In 1996, the IIRIRA linked public assistance to the verification of citizenship and migration status. Moreover, the bill reinforced the ineligibility of migrants who were residing without authorization for welfare benefits (Potocky-Tripody 2002: 93). Migrants’ eligibility for higher education benefits have also been restricted by the IIRIRA. However, policies were not only created to restrict migration. For instance, the IRCA of 1986 made the legalization of undocumented migrants already living in the U.S. possible, and the IMMACT of 1990 provided formally valid entry paths. After the Immigration Act of 1965, the IMMACT modified policies for migration in line with the law. A key to gaining eligibility to cross American borders and settle in the U.S. was family reunification. Nevertheless, family reunification categories imposed by the IMMACT also restricted the eligibility of certain family members (Park and Park 2005: 19). Moreover, the opportunity to enter the country with authorization was given if one met criteria in terms of labour needs. Professionals and highly skilled people were in demand, and thus employment-based migration was endorsed. Furthermore, IMMACT set the objective to raise ethnic diversity within the U.S., and, therefore, the migration of people belonging to an underrepresented nationality was facilitated (DeLaet 2000: 79). Apart from regulations concerning migrants’ admissions to the U.S., policies addressing undocumented migration aim to deter migration by increasing the risk of apprehension if migrants attempt to cross the southern border without authorization. The purpose of deterrence emerged as undocumented migrants entering the country turned out to be increasingly difficult due to several boosts in the Border Patrol’s

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personnel and supplements in the authorities’ equipment. Additionally, penalties for crimes related to border crossings have been increased, and the relocation of border crossings has made it more difficult for undocumented migrants to traverse. “Border Patrol and INS officials felt that the harshness of the conditions in outlying areas would not only heighten crossing difficulties, but would also lead to fewer people making the attempt to enter illegally – i.e., that it would lead to further deterrence and not just displacement” (Dunn 2009: 205). The policies’ objective is to secure the country’s borders and to signify that they are a peril to undocumented migrants approaching them with the aim to enter the country. The rearrangements across the borders are sufficient to cause migrants to retreat, and, moreover, they induce would-be migrants to rethink the intended border crossing. Therefore, the policies are conducive to raising the cost of unauthorized migration. Would-be migrants may perceive approaching the U.S. as a peril to their physical safety. They may further discern that entering the country is linked with the threat of temporarily risking one’s liberty. The idea of deterrence emerges within the policies regardless of whether the measures applied to influence undocumented migrants indeed have an impact on migration. In addition, the policies affect migrants’ quality of life within the country. Uneasiness among undocumented migrants who have already entered the country successfully is a consequence that traces back to the laws mentioned above. Undocumented migrants observe that shortcomings appear that hamper routines of everyday life. Like the prohibition imposed by the IRCA to thwart hiring of undocumented migrants, the intersection of migration policy and welfare policy reduces the attraction of life in the United States. Both the obstacles to employment and exclusion from welfare assistance faced by undocumented migrants in the U.S. may deter migration insofar as would-be migrants may anticipate that they would probably be affected by barriers to employment opportunities and by omissions regarding social security. In other words, there is a likelihood that residing in the U.S. could be linked to poverty. Besides these shortcomings, deportations of undocumented migrants, which have increased and have grown exuberantly since the PATRIOT Act (Golash-Boza 2016: 40), have engendered anxiety and fear of detention and deportation. This plight becomes tangible in the everyday lives undocumented migrants as they experience restrictions in terms of mobility, consumption, education, and community life. Undocumented migrants “have avoided shopping in ‘ethnic’ stores and participating in school meetings. They have altered their driving routes to avoid arrests, fees and deportations, and have devised emergency family plans in case of one member not returning from work” (Gilbert 2009: 32). Experiences of isolation are additionally heightened by regulations affecting supporters of undocumented migrants. Isolation is a substantial feature of low quality of life, which is likely to signal would-be migrants that daring movement towards the U.S. is not worth the effort. In sum, U.S. policies regarding migration pursue, among other things, the traditional goal of maintaining control over national borders. Measures applied to control borders address, for instance, the trafficking of humans, drugs, and weapons, as well as entry conducted without authorization. According to the Border Patrol

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Strategic Plan 1994 and Beyond, the control of the border shall be achieved by “implementing a strategy of ‘prevention through deterrence’” (United States Border Patrol 1994: 6). The case of the United States shows that adverse effects on the everyday lives of migrants who reside in the United States and a proliferated risk of apprehension along the borders are supposed to deter migrants. In addition, U.S. migration policies illustrate how the goal of maintaining control over national borders is justified by considering threats to national security, which is deemed to be jeopardized by undocumented migration. Since the securitization of migration was initiated, undocumented migrants have appeared as a peril to national security.

5  Outcomes of Migration Deterrence in the United States The achievement of migration deterrence can be assessed by considering the alterations stemming from migration policies. In the case of the United States, migration-­ related laws have emerged that aggravate the circumstances both documented and undocumented migrants may face, but they have not achieved the abolishment of undocumented border crossings. In fact, according to estimates, the number of undocumented migrants residing in the United States increased from 3.5 million in 1990 to 7 million in 2000, reaching 11 million in 2013 (Rosenblum and Ruiz Soto 2015: 4). Forty per cent of them entered with authorization and remained in the United States after their residence permit had expired (Martin 2014: 53). In parallel, the United States has repetitively increased border enforcement’s annual budget and quintupled it from $750 million to $3.8 billion between 1993 and 2004 (Cornelius 2005: 777). With this in mind, it is questionable whether spending money on measures applied to deter undocumented entries discourages would-be migrants. On the one hand, since the imposition of the IRCA of 1986, the United States has succeeded in providing authorities with tools to exercise power over migration-­ related phenomena. On the other hand, instead of deterring would-be migrants and ceasing improper entry offences, the United States’ migration policies have contributed to increasing undocumented migrants’ risk of death. While the strategy of deterrence has not achieved the cessation of non-U.S. citizens’ idea of working and residing in the United States, paths to enter the country have been converted and linked with dangers. The practices of human smuggling conducted by so-called “coyotes” have been adjusted to the modified circumstances along the southern U.S. border. In so doing, undocumented migrants who move across United States borders in a way that commits a crime have been exposed to perils, especially the heat and cold. Since ­migration regulations have been toughened and the places designated for crossing the border properly between the United States and Mexico have been heavily equipped with additional personnel and control technologies and infrastructure, coyotes import people by directing them towards desert areas, particularly in California and Arizona, to avoid close encounters with Border Patrol agents. Subsequently, while entering the United States, 4600 undocumented migrants died

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between 1994 and 2007 (Dunn 2009: 177). Furthermore, the imposition of penalties for smuggling people across United States borders have not been successful in terms of deterring coyotes from assisting undocumented migrants in entering the country. Instead of coyotes being discouraged, prices for human-smuggling services have increased (Ewing 2014: 214; Cornelius 2001: 668). Therefore, measures appropriate to deterring both undocumented migrants and coyotes have been increasing the burdens and charges of migration rather than accomplishing the reduction of the violation of migration laws. In addition, measures applied to deter would-be migrants and employers located in the United States do not succeed in covering a particular reason that prompts migrants to depart from their country of residence. Labour opportunities for undocumented migrants do not vanish, as they continue to be significant to the U.S. economy. Hitherto, undocumented migrants take jobs nobody else wants; they are “America’s untouchable underclass” (Caso 2011: 220). Despite the fact that employers commit labour offences and violate migration laws when they hire an undocumented migrant in the United States, employers do not cease to take them on. Research has shown that employers related to the residential building and service industry in particular have still been hiring undocumented migrants and accepting fraudulently submitted application documents (Chavez 2013: 27). Furthermore, undocumented migrants who take unpleasant jobs do not lack acceptance. According to a national survey conducted in 2006, U.S. Americans predominantly agree that undocumented migrants take on unpleasant types of work, and they also agree that undocumented migrants thereby support the U.S. economy (Gerston 2007: 89). “Thus, the US public does not perceive significant, direct competition between immigrants and native-born workers in the labour market” (Cornelius 2005: 777). Considering this, migration policies that aim to adversely affect undocumented migrants’ job opportunities fail, insofar as they do not successfully deal with the specific labour needs that employers fulfil by hiring undocumented migrants. Though migration policies have been conducive to impairing undocumented migrants’ everyday lives, the United States remains a valuable place in terms of labour. Nevertheless, by imposing tough laws concerning the deportation of undocumented migrants and by causing increased fear of being apprehended in the face of missing residence permission, U.S. migration policies have engendered unfavourable working conditions that have an effect on undocumented migrants’ quality of life. Employers might pose a threat to migrants by signalling possible deportation. In so doing, employers can, for instance, assert that they will pay lower wages or increase working hours. Exposed to the danger of being apprehended, undocumented migrants would have no alternative but to accept unfavourable working conditions (Vaughan et al. 2012: 331). As a consequence, while U.S. employers continue to hire undocumented migrants, migration policies have not been able to cause a deterrent emerging in aggravated labour opportunities, but they have succeeded in reducing undocumented migrants’ safety on the job. Furthermore, undocumented migrants who have experienced detention and subsequent deportation face the threat of being severely punished in the case of re-entry into the United States. However, neither deportation nor conviction for re-entry dis-

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suades undocumented migrants from re-attempting border crossings. Apprehensions for re-entering without authorization increased from 2695 in 1994 to 35,836 in 2010 (Inda and Dowling 2013: 17). Escalating convictions for re-entering the United States without authorization suggest that detention and deportation do not prompt those migrants who have been led back to their home countries to avoid border crossing. “The vast majority of apprehended migrants attempt to enter again the next evening or within a couple of days. People smugglers typically give their clients three ‘free’ tries, and most do not need more than one or two” (Cornelius 2005: 780). In addition, the enhancement of deportation proceedings does not contribute to deterring border crossings. Instead, Border Patrol has been able to carry out deportations with ease and avoid overcrowded detention facilities, while deported migrants have gained from it, as it has “shortened the delay before another attempt at crossing” (Andreas 2009: 37). On those grounds, it is not evident that increased migration control proceedings such as deportations have the impact that is favoured by migration policy makers in terms of undocumented migrants’ determination to pass through U.S. borders. It appears that both measures applied to restrict migration and undocumented migration occur side by side.

6  Conclusions Undocumented migrants trespass on a state’s territory. In so doing, they violate a country’s law with the mere existence of their living body. Consequently, a pivotal objective of migration policies is preventing crime that occurs once a person traverses a state’s border illicitly. Along with this, prevention of crime committed by undocumented migrants coincides with controlling migration. In addition, migration policies may also be designed to impede migration that is undertaken in compliance with a state’s entry and residence standards. Even documented migrants may be considered a peril to a country’s labour market, welfare and education system or national and regional identity. The states’ efforts to control migration through deterrence manifest in a specific interweaving that legal scholars investigate by applying the concept of crimmigration. The case of the United States illustrates this interweaving. The legislation mentioned above exemplifies how criminal law and migration law, which once existed separately from each other, have been approaching each other and intersecting. According to Juliet Stumpf, this interweaving reveals alterations in criminal law (Stumpf 2015: 241–2). Crime committed by alien offenders has changed insofar as it is linked with a consequence that addresses their residence. Alien offenders may experience deportation. “Drug crimes, certain crimes involving ‘moral turpitude’ and a list of crimes designated aggravated felonies’ may form the basis for deportability” (ibid.). Furthermore, a growing variety of migration-related actions have been classified as crime and linked with newly developed prohibitions. Finally, an extension of law enforcement in terms of migration-related phenomena has been achieved. Growing law enforcement patterns have contributed to the surveillance

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and control of undocumented migration. Essentially, the interweaving characterized as crimmigration does not include the idea of correcting an offender, except for citizens unlawfully supporting undocumented migrants. Instead, if undocumented migrants violate laws designated to control migration, they will mostly face physical exclusion from the country. The intention of this exclusion is to contribute to deterrence of would-be migrants. Hence, controlling migration is a transnational phenomenon that emerges when measures are applied to deter would-be migrants. Deterrence that is executed within the U.S. territory is aimed at affecting and disciplining members of the populations of foreign countries. They are governed by a deterring state even though they are absent from the state’s territory. Undocumented migrants whose everyday lives take place in the U.S. face anxiety and fear stemming from measures to engender their isolation, but their misery has an additional impact on individuals outside of the U.S. territory. If deterrence is successful, and if would-be migrants are dissuaded from entering the U.S., their conduct is governed by a foreign state; they comply with laws that are not valid in their country of residence. Therefore, policies directed at both undocumented migrants and would-be migrants transcend national borders and create a common population (Foucault 2006: 114) governed by the deterring state. This population emerges even though one or more national borders divides it. Moreover, a crucial factor that prompts the United States to control migration is the threat that terrorism presents to national security. The linkage between undocumented migration and terrorism-related menaces has contributed to the sense of a security threat that is attached to the former. Terrorism challenges a state, as its legal monopoly of violence is undermined by terrorist action that applies violence without legal grounds. In addition, terrorism contrasts criminal violence, as terrorist violence is directed at the collective identity that is linked to the state attacked (Freudenberg 2008: 97). With the above in mind, a state’s performance at its borders directed towards undocumented migration showcases its agency and sovereignty. Actions declared to be eligible to prevent terrorism epitomize the core of a state and expose its aptitude to cope with the challenge its monopoly of violence is confronted with. Accordingly, by controlling migration, a state provides proof of its rule sustained across its territory. Deterrence is based on the idea that disadvantages prevent specific action. The case of the United States has, after all, shown that increasing measures aimed at preventing migration through deterrence have not achieved a reduction in migration. However, disadvantages experienced by undocumented migrants have emerged. On the one hand, U.S. migration policies have succeeded in deteriorating undocumented migrants’ quality of life. On the other hand, U.S. migration policies have failed to discourage migrants from attempting to enter the United States ­unlawfully. Instead of effectively reducing migration, the U.  S. has extended the agency and power of the authorities related to migration. Primarily, they have asserted their ability to control migration.

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Anglo-American Strategic Relations, Economic Warfare and the Deterrence of Japan, 1937–1942: Success or Failure? Greg Kennedy

1  Introduction The study of the use of deterrence as a strategic concept employed by a Great Power, or combination of Powers, has traditionally been associated almost entirely with the Cold War and the use of nuclear weapons within a containment strategy context (Freedman 2004, 2005, pp. 789–801). Therefore, like the concept of containment, deterrence has not been assessed rigorously as a viable strategic tool within the conventional conflict spectrum. Furthermore, the use of empirical historical analysis as the means of providing that assessment has also been absent from considerations regarding the utility of deterrence in the modern international security environment. Finally, deterrence has most often been associated with the threat of the use of military power being the mechanism by which changed or deterred behaviour is achieved (Gaddis 2005; Heuser 1998, pp. 311–328; Tarock 2016, pp. 1408–1424; Milevski 2016). Through an analysis of British and American economic and fiscal policies from 1937 to 1941, aimed at deterring Japan from disrupting the balance of power system in place in the Far East that protected their imperial possessions in the region, a better appreciation of non-military deterrence is achieved (Lacey 2015). This study will demonstrate that conventional deterrence is a strategy that cannot work alone or in isolation. Most often it works in conjunction with other strategic concepts such as compellence, appeasement, or containment. As well, deterrence during peacetime between relatively equally powerful states is only as effective as the level of suspicion or hostility between actors will allow. As a deterred state becomes more and more conscious of its being deterred, if other avenues of strategic interaction are not presented to allow positive state to state relations to develop, the effectiveness of the deterring nation lessens as the deterred state becomes less willing to be compelled to modify its behaviour (Asada 2006, pp. 211–230). This is G. Kennedy (*) King’s College London, London, UK e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 A. Filippidou (ed.), Deterrence, Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29367-3_11

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particularly true in the case of when the type of power being used to deter is non-­ military, and thus perceived as being less of a decisive or existential threat to the state’s national security (Knopf 2012, pp.  375–399). Unlike the nuclear context, with the outcome of refusing to be deterred having an end-state of global destruction, or, accepting deterrence resulting in no such catastrophe, conventional peacetime deterrence must accept variations in its level of success. The optimal level of successful conventional peacetime deterrence would be to prevent formal war from becoming the reality. Therefore, varying levels of conflict, tension, pressure and strategic discomfort is allowable and cannot be regarded as a failure of deterrence. However, if ever belief in the utility or ability of the deterring power to use military force is significantly eroded, deterrence cannot be sustained by other elements of a state’s power, such as diplomacy, economics, technological transfer, or appeasement in trade/market relations (Stein 2013). Deterrence alone is, therefore, in a conventional peacetime condition, not effectively sustainable indefinitely. Therefore, the utility of the study of Economic Warfare as a deterrent is particularly apropos (Petersen 2016; Ravich 2018; US Senate Committee Hearing on Global Threats 2019; US Naval Academy Conference 2018). Economic Warfare exists in both war and peace, has offensive and defensive applicability, and can be considered as an Ends, Ways or a Means in modern strategic thinking parlance. The definition of Economic Warfare today has grown since the Cold War historiography first attempted to place the phenomenon within the strategic thinking lexicon. The British and American definition of the aim of economic warfare was to disorganize the enemy’s economy so as to prevent them from being capable of carrying on modern industrial warfare. The physical destruction of the enemy’s industrial centres and storage, production and transportation infrastructure by the military was the “means” most often focused on (O’Leary 1985, pp. 179– 206; Clemens 2013, pp.  523–527). Associated with this offensive aspect of Economic Warfare were/are the traditional maritime strategic levers of contraband controls produced through blockading and other maritime access denial activities, such as interdiction (commerce raiding) and access denial of strategic raw materials and trade through control of merchant shipping, marine insurance, or other critical maritime enablers. Denial of products at source with embargoes and sanctions, asset freezing, black listing, commodity restrictions, market destruction or control, fiscal or currency manipulation and credit denial in the international financial market were other offensive methods proven during the First World War and studied throughout the interwar (Meilinger 2000, pp.  467–502; McDermott 1986, pp. 61–76). However, it is important to see Economic Warfare as a defensive strategy as well. The ability to sustain proxy powers worth investing in economically, with limited political risk, due to a common appreciation of another state as a threat, was also a defensive use of Economic Warfare. The use of loans, preferred trade agreements, technology transfers, to name just a few, represents some of the means of providing such assistance (Medlicott 1954). The ability to assist other states economically whose actions would diminish, deter, deflect, or in some way help protect the strategic interests of the state offering assistance represents the purpose of such defensive Economic Warfare activities

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(Bertsch 1988; Ellings 1985). There is then a close linkage as well between what some would term proxy warfare and the concept of economic warfare. This chapter will look at a particular historical example: Japan’s attempt to gain greater power through aggressive expansion in the Pacific region, from 1937 to 1941. In that case, these myriad influences and actions were all present as deterrence was applied by Great Britain and the United States in an attempt to maintain the balance of power system of the immediate pre-World War Two period. Throughout the interwar period Great Britain and the United States faced the challenge of an expansionist Japan seeking to destabilize the established balance-­of-­ power system that governed the international order in the Far East (Borg and Okamoto 1973; Trotter 1975; Neilson 2005; Endicott 1975; Haslam 1992) The growth of the perception, and eventual reality, of the Japanese threat to both Western nations’ national security interests in the region provoked a number of responses (Nish 2004, pp. 149–161; Park 2011, pp. 388–407). International arms agreements, naval fortification agreements, declaration of spheres of influences in China, appeasement, coercion, persuasion, appeals to moderation, sanctions, embargoes, proxy war and economic warfare were all utilized in the quest to arrest Japan’s drive to dominate Pacific international affairs (Goldman 1994; Hall 1987; Murfett 1992; Roskill 1968; Barnhart 1987; Nish 1972, 1982; Miller 1991; McDonald 1989; Goldstein and Maurer 1993; Dingman 1976; Braisted 1971). However, until the actual threat of war in Europe initiated real rearmament programmes for the western powers, one of the few effective means of deterring Japan’s challenge to Anglo-­American strategic interests in the Far East was the use of economic and fiscal power. Economic warfare was the weapon of choice for Great Britain. The British were the world’s masters in its dark arts, having waged it successfully in the modern age from the wars against Napoleon through to the successful conclusion of the First World War. From 1914 to 1918 the British Empire’s main strategic weapon had been the ability to deny Germany and its allies access to the necessary tools of modern industrial warfare. Credit, raw materials, finished goods, market access, trade patterns, had all been disrupted or denied. America had participated in that process during the First World War (Lambert 2012; Simpson 1991; Kennedy 2007, pp. 699– 721; idem 2008a, pp. 22–33; idem 2008b, pp. 190–206) and proved itself a quick and avid student of the concept in the interwar period. Therefore, in the summer of 1937, Great Britain and the United States were the world’s undisputed experts in utilizing a strategy of economic warfare. It was not surprise then that when the need to deter Japan arose in July 1937, following that nation’s open demonstration of its intention to use of military force in China, the obvious choice for the two Western nations was to look to economic warfare as the solution to the threat presented to their Far Eastern national security interests. President Roosevelt’s famous October 5th “quarantine” speech in Chicago galvanized thinking regarding sanctions against Japan on both sides of the Atlantic (Burns 1956). Under-Secretary of State in the State Department Sumner Welles confirmed that that aspect of the speech was specifically aimed at Japan and its expansionist policies in China (Rosenman 1951, p. 159). Freelancing foreign policy and strategy as was his want, the President had fallen back on his experiences of the

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blockade in World War One and theorized about drawing a line in the Pacific, enforced by the United States Navy and other allied naval powers such as Great Britain, beyond which Japan would not be permitted to trade or to expand in the event that it persisted in the policy of military expansion being demonstrated in China (Cowman 1996, pp. 133–135). In that Chicago speech, drafted for the most part by the president of the Council on Foreign Relations (at the time working in the State Department) Norman Davis with inputs from the Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes, Roosevelt referred to this quarantine policy for containing Japan “…in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease” (Dallek 1979, p. 151). The President had made, however, an uncharacteristic error in his judgement of the American people’s appetite for international leadership which did not match his own temperament. The majority of the American press and public responses to the speech were negative, chastising Roosevelt for being a warmonger or sabre-rattler. Annoyed at a perceived lack of support from key Administration officials and senior Democrats in both houses Roosevelt quickly climbed down from his desires for some sort of economic actions to be taken against Japan (Rosenman 1951, pp. 161–163). However, the President’s comments and attitude on the matter had not gone unnoticed in Britain. In October 1937, 2  months after the Japanese invasion of China, Desmond Morton head of the Board of Trade’s Industrial Intelligence Centre, (Bennett 2007) send a request to the British Embassy in Washington for their views on the impact on the United States of any British attempts to put economic pressure on Japan (FO837/528, Oct.19, 1937). The Embassy argued that due to Japan’s aggressive actions in the Far East American public opinion and large parts of the administration were calling for America to make some sort of economic response in retaliation. Already, in the early stages of the crisis three main proposals had been put forward for consideration by the various Governmental Departments for discussions with the press. The first possible course of action concerned a boycott of Japanese goods. Such activity, it was thought, lay in the unpredictability of the overall economic effects of an unofficial boycott due to the uncertainties over how complete it would be. In addition to the interest in the matter being shown by those operational levels of British foreign policy-making, Anthony Eden the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was also mindful of Roosevelt’s speech. After some extensive discussions in Cabinet, the Foreign Office (FO) and Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) Eden wished to clarify the possible American desire for using economic warfare to deter Japan, as well as make the British position regarding such actions clear to the Americans. Citing the specific use of the word “quarantine” he instructed the British Embassy in Washington: I have no doubt that the President recognises the implications of this phrase but I am somewhat concerned lest public opinion here and in the United States should too hastily and too easily assume that quarantine means economic sanctions without the risk of war. This is in fact the interpretation openly put upon the phrase by Senator Pitman, and it is in this sense that there is already a tendency to interpret the expression here. It is an interpretation that in fact needs clarification. It would surely be unjustifiable and therefore in her present mood highly dangerous to assume that Japan would submit to a boycott or to economic sanctions

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that were effective without seeking to rectify the consequences. She might for instance seize some territory in the Far East under the control of those applying the embargo with a view to counteracting its effect, or with a view to acquiring bases, or by way of retaliation. (FO 837/528, Oct.12, 1937)

Eden told the Embassy that he would send further information and plans regarding the British position on such activities so that those could be shared with senior American officials in the State Department, United States Navy (USN) and White House before the US delegation to the Brussels Conference left America. Given the complexity and sensitivity of the idea of Anglo-American cooperation in economic warfare against Japan, Eden instructed the Embassy to emphasize the particular importance of the matter and desire on the part of the British to have the Americans stop in London for a day or two prior to then going on to Brussels (FO 837/528, Oct.12, 1937). Although the moment had not yet arrived for deliberate action to be taken by the two English-speaking nations, discussions, debates and deliberations on the use of economic warfare to deter Japan had now entered the lexicon of Anglo-­ American strategic relations. While both nations weighed the risks and benefits to their strategic positions in the Far East if sanctions and embargoes were implemented, other areas of the Anglo-American strategic relationship matured, furthering the ability of their potential joint usage of economic warfare in the region. Taking advantage of the continuing deterioration of American-Japanese relations in the Far East from 1936 to 1938, the British Ambassador in Washington, Ronald Lindsay headed a concerted British diplomatic effort to complete a trade agreement with the Americans. Despite many reservations from the Treasury and Bank of England, and key political figures such as Chancellor of the Exchequer and eventually Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, an agreement was deemed necessary for national security purposes (FO 371/20651/A1925/38/45, March 10, 1937; FO 371/20651/A2378/38/45, March 22, 1937). The Japanese invasion of China in July 1937 presented the final impetus for the creation of the will on the part of both Western nations to complete a trade agreement as a deterrence measure. Seizing the opportunity of closer Anglo-American relations being evident at the Brussels Conference in the autumn of 1937 (the conference was an attempt to galvanize international support for actions against Japan that failed to implement any useful or effective responses), Lindsay urged the Foreign Office to now unite London’s efforts to finalize the criteria for a trade agreement that could then be used to deter Japan: The one gleam of hope arising was Anglo-American co-operation. This had been very close at Brussels and as I understood it afforded great satisfaction to both our governments. The announcement that we are now contemplating an intention to embark on trade agreement negotiations would hold out prospect of further, stronger and more fruitful Anglo-American co-operation in the future. As international cooperation declined Anglo-American would arise. I was therefore anxious to join Brussels failure to trade agreement success (so far as it goes) and as I said frankly to lend political importance to the latter. This I suggested should be brought out in announcement to be made about trade negotiations. My suggestion met with no disapproval from either Mr. Hull or Mr. Sayre. Mr. Hull in concurring generally with my views did indeed launch into one of his usual length disquisitions of a general

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and abstract character, but Mr. Sayre who is a practical man perfectly grasped the implications. They said that they were perfectly willing to contemplate some procedure such as I had foreshadowed and would anxiously await your views on it. They thought statement should be issued simultaneously in London and in Washington and that the hour and day for issue should be agreed on. They would be willing to have it on Monday if that was the day you preferred. They even seemed prepared to contemplate a joint statement. Above all they emphasized that your immediate attention to this question is urgently necessary (T160/752 F14329-9, Nov.16, 1937). By early 1938, with the basis for an Anglo-American Trade Agreement in place, both London and Washington were signalling the importance of this symbolic moment to the Japanese Government. Now, with a unique trading relationship established between the two Western nations, did that economic collaboration indicate a close strategic relationship that Japan needed to respect? This was the question for Japanese policy-makers: how united were Anglo-American strategic relations? The 1938 Trade Agreement had introduced a degree of uncertainty, risk and danger as a part of the strategic deterrent in the Far East equation (T160/752 F14329-11, Feb.8, 1938; Ibid, March 1, 1938; FO 371/21490/A556/1/45, Feb.1, 1938; Crawford Papers, March 1, 1938). Therefore, by the time war broke out in Europe in the summer of 1939, Anglo-American economic relations had two key deterrence pieces at play in the Far East. Japan was deterred from immediately exploiting the European crisis for its own regional benefit by a combination of loans to ensure China remained a proxy protector of Anglo-American interests, and the uncertainty of the true nature of the Anglo-American strategic relationship created by the 1938 Anglo-American Trade Agreement. However, once war became a reality in Europe and all nations began large-scale rearmament programmes, one more economic tool of deterrence would have to be deployed in the Far East. Before the point, however, other Anglo-American economic activity aimed at strengthening China’s role as a proxy opponent to Japan took place. Indeed, tensions over what form of support to lend to China in early 1939 reflected long-standing differences of opinion of the strategic worth of that nation in the parallel Anglo-American attempts to deter and contain Japan’s action on the mainland. The Foreign Office and senior British Treasury official Sir Frederick Leith Ross were of the opinion that loans to China and fiscal assistance were vital. The Bank of England, in particular its Governor, Montague Norman, viewed any money being lent to China, no matter what the terms, conditions or collateral being offered as an act of throwing more good money after bad. The Foreign Office and pro-China lobby within the Treasury won out the day, assisted for the most part by a worsening strategic condition in Europe that cried out for any allies in the Far East to be supported in their fight against Japanese aggression. In the pro-China camp one main message rang out at all times: the reconstruction of Chinese finances must be a joint, coordinated, Anglo-American effort (FO371/23413/F8029/11/10, July 28, 1939; FO371/23413/F8103/11/10, July 28, 1939; T160/1131, Feb.9 and Feb.10, 1938). In Washington Henry Morgenthau Jr., the head of the US Treasury, was an avid pro-China supporter. His relations with the British Treasury financial advisor to the British Embassy in Washington, Mr. Thomas K. Bewley, were a hot and fiery

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affair, with Morgenthau launching tirades and kisses in equal amounts toward the unfortunate British official. Nonetheless, the Morgenthau-Bewley network allowed open and honest dialogue to take place between the two Treasuries throughout the Roosevelt administration’s lifetime, an important part of the linkages of the parallel strategies directed at the Far East. Morgenthau supported the tung oil scheme of 1937, a means of purchasing the product from China at a highly inflated price, which guaranteed that China would have a hard currency to use in its newly opened war with Japan. By 1939 and the outbreak of war in Europe, Morgenthau and the US Treasury were ideologically and bureaucratically connected to Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s State Department. The two American departments were in agreement regarding Hull’s desire to use economic and trade methods to try and either acquire proxy states for the deterrence of Japan, or for the outright embracing of such nations into a bi-lateral relationship with the United States in an attempt to contain it (Nelson T. Johnson Papers, May 23, 1940; Ibid, Feb.11, 1941). In January 1940 Chiang Kai-shek increased his pressure on both America and Great Britain to find a way to loan money to China and provide the necessary military equipment for the continued struggle against the Japanese. While both Western nations wished to do so, both were also reluctant to take any action that could be seen as overtly or directly challenging to Japan through support to China (FO 371/23414/F10982/11/10, Oct.13, 1939; T 160/1133, F/15194–9, Dec.7, 1939). Simultaneously the Chinese Ambassador to the United States, Hu Shih, applied pressure on the State Department to allow a favourable sale of tin, following the tung oil and wolfram purchase agreement examples, to go through, thereby providing new credits for the Chinese war effort. Citing the favourable attitude of Morgenthau and the US Treasury, Ambassador Shih told Stanley Hornbeck that he could not understand why the requested financial aid was not immediately forthcoming and hoped that this arrangement would be funded in the very near future (Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) Far East 1940, January 6, 1940; On the wolfram precedent see: T 160/1134, June 31, 1938. On attempts to control export of wolfam from China to deny export to Russia and possibly Germany, as well as to get something of value out of loans being provided to China, see FRUS, Far East, 1940, February 5, 1940). Simultaneously, the Chinese government was also pressuring Great Britain into an even greater amount of financial and equipment aid (FRUS Far East 1940, January 10, 1940). Indeed, over the period from January 1940 to December 71,941 hundreds of millions of dollars in Anglo-­ American loans, investment, market manipulation and equipment aid were provided to Chiang Kai-shek’s government in order that China could continue their war with Japan (T160/1136, F15194-07-11, March 14, 1939; T160/1136, F15194-07-14, April 24, 1941; FRUS Far East 1941, vol. 2, April 24, 1941, pp. 632–33; Bank of England, OV9 Otto Niemeyer Papers, OV9/9, China Mission, which has a complete record of loans and preferential economic and financial treatment given to China prior to July 1941). However, despite the increase economic and equipment ­assistance from both Great Britain and America still those efforts were not enough. At the beginning of 1941 both nations looked to yet again increase their support to their valuable proxy. The final expression of this Anglo-American cooperation

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aimed at keeping China’s war fighting capacity solvent and effective was played out in the events surrounding the British dispatch of the Otto Niemeyer mission to the US and China in 1941. As negotiations between Japanese and American officials in Washington dragged on throughout 1941, British and American diplomacy hoped to use signals of continued economic support to China to deter Japan any escalation in its use of military action in the region. At the invitation of the Chinese Government, an American economic mission arrived on February 3rd 1941, headed up by Laughlin Currie, the Director of Research and Statistics Bureau, Federal Reserve System and Administrative Assistant to President Roosevelt. Emile Despres, Chief Economist in the Bureau of Research and Statistics accompanied his chief. Currie had travelled to China to gain a first-hand appreciation of the state of China’s fiscal condition and its ability, from an economic and financial perspective, to continue to wage a modern industrial war (Sandilands 1990, pp.  107–116). Any further aid from the United States would depend on Currie and his recommendation of whether or not China was a worthwhile investment for continuing to attrite and thereby deter Japan from contemplating conquering other areas of the Far East. British sources understood that as well as Currie’s mission T.V. Soong, Chiang Kai Shek’s brother-in-law and personal representative in Washington, was agitating for other experts from the US Treasury, State Department and Export and Import Bank to also come and assesses China’ worthiness as an ally (FO 371/27590/F400/1/10, January 25, 1941). This request, direct from Chiang Kai Shek, was paralleled with one to the British for a high-level economic adviser to come out from London, as well a request from Chiang for a British and American mission on finance, as part of comprehensive programme of Anglo-American co-operation and assistance to China (FRUS, Far East, 1941, vol. 2, January 2, 1941, pp. 590–592). The Chinese Government was specifically interested in exploring the best way both Britain and America could help China’s war effort economically, focusing on budget expenditure, non-borrowed revenue, borrowing by public bodies, Government and private banks, transfer of money, extent of inflation and effect on war economy, foreign exchange, pricing, productivity and trade, and the entire range of transportation, economic, warfare and administrative machinery planning (FO 371/27590/F535/1/10, February 3, 1941). Early reactions in the British Foreign Office to the request regarding a joint Anglo-American mission, was one of resignation. If the Americans were to send such a delegation Great Britain would have no choice but to follow suit. It would have to do so not only to continue to build a more cohesive and joint approach to the question of supporting China for both nation’s benefits, but also to ensure that American activities would not diminish British influence and prestige in China further: “…we must work in with the Americans over matters like this in the Far East. If it comes to a show-down there it is logical that America should take the lead and we second place in view of our other commitments. … Currie recommends an American economic mission and I think we should press strongly in Washington for it to be joint Anglo-American…. or at least a close liaison between the two missions” (FO 371/27590/F535/1/10, Feb.6, 1941). Eventually Currie would lead an American mission to China, which was mirrored by a British mission under the

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direction of the Bank of England finance expert Otto Niemeyer. (Niemeyer Papers, all dates) Despite the best efforts of both partners in this attempt to stabilize the Chinese financial condition, there was little hope for China’s long-term condition in that regard: “It is impossible for Britain and America to give China any very effective financial help at present. The form of loan guarantee now under consideration is all that can be done, that is mere palliative, a gesture perhaps mainly of psychological import. What China urgently needs in military help, artillery and planes” (Niemeyer Papers, Nov.28, 1941). This effort to create a unified Anglo-American financial aid and assistance programme to support the ongoing Chinese war-effort was de-railed by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. In contrast to the use of the economic weapon defensively, to support and sustain the Anglo-American strategic deterrent in China, offensive economic warfare played an equal if not greater part of the combined efforts of the two nations. In the aftermath of the Anglo-American trade discussions and post-Brussels interactions over Far Eastern security in late 1937, British strategic planners began to re-consider the worth of economic sanctions and embargoes against Japan (FO 837/528, Oct. 19, 1937; FO 837/529, January 1, 1939; FO 837/529, January 23, 1939). As a measure of deterrence, sanctions were imprecise and long-term solutions at best. However, to be effective key trading partners had to be incorporated into the sanctions programme. If Britain was to attempt to wage economic warfare on Japan through the threat of sanctions and embargoes then it was absolutely vital that American agree to be a strategic partner in such a deterrence strategy (FO 371/22095/F9706/62/10, August 30, 1938). Stanley Hornbeck in particular, was a keen supporter of the use of sanctions and embargoes to deter Japan, a strong and valuable ally for the British in Washington, so long as all partners realized the need to have credible military power available to support such actions (Stanley K. Hornbeck Papers, January 25, 1939; Buhite 1969). Until such time as the rearmament programmes of the Western powers were complete, economic deterrence was the dominant leverage available in the Far East. In the summer of 1939 the Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain instructed the Economic Advisory Council (EAC) and the Industrial Intelligence Centre (IIC) to create an organisation that could obtain information from non-Government sources in Great Britain regarding economic matters in foreign countries. That unit was located at the National Institute for Economic Research and was led by Professor Noel Hall. The work of this economic intelligence centre was secret and provided information to both the Ministry of Economic Warfare, the Far Eastern Committee and the FO, all of whom were interested in the best way to implement an embargo or sanctions regime against Japan in order to deter that nation. Desmond Morton, the head of the IIC instructed Professor Hall to use his unit for “…the purpose of considering economic action in peace against Japan” (FO 837/529, July 14, 1939). And while the formal and public economic climate in the United States prevented open and formal government to government activities aimed at such a deterrence strategy, nonetheless, informal coordination and discussion of such a joint Anglo-­ American form of economic warfare did go on between the two governments (FO 837/529, July 25, 1939).

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By 1940 thorough discussions about how such a sanction programme could be installed, as well as the potential outcomes, had been shared between the Americans and British strategic planners. Already in 1939 America had installed a moral-­ embargo programme on Japan and USSR to limit necessary aviation technology. Roosevelt’s government had condemned the bombing of civilian populations and despite powerful neutrality legislation existing, United States implemented this restricting policy. Still reluctant to fully expose themselves to Japanese retaliation, however, the American Treasury continued to argue against a full-blown embargo, blacklisting or system of economic blockade of strategic raw materials to Japan (Medlicott 1954, Chapter X). Nevertheless, with the information provided by the State Department and the American embassies in China, Great Britain and Japan, by July 1940 the Ministry of Economic Warfare was able to “hypothesize” in a secret memo for Government on “Notes on the Effect on Japan’s Economic Position in a War with the British Empire, Assuming that the United States of America Exercise full Economic Pressure Against Japan” (FO 837/530, July 31, 1940). With the collapse of France, the Netherlands and the isolation of Great Britain in the war against Germany, Japan was free to consume the now abandoned imperial possessions of the defeated powers. Only military force or a concerted escalation in the economic warfare being used against Japan could prevent it from moving on the British imperial interests. The combination of loans to China and a unified international trade front could only go so far in this new strategic context to help protect Anglo-American strategic interests. In the autumn of 1940, America and Great Britain deployed an even larger amount of military aid and loans to China, while at the same imposing even more stringent commercial relations with Japan itself. Still, it was not a combination of activities that were likely to deter Japan fully. An even more aggressive stance had to be taken to match the bolder and more aggressive Japanese expansion. That escalation took the form of a formal, collaborative and coordinated system of sanctions and embargoes being placed on Japan in the spring of 1941 (Worth Jr 2014; Kolton 1985; FO 837/533, June 28, 1941). This sanction and embargo strategy, in combination with the American Lend-­ Lease programme for Great Britain and China, represented the final use of economic signalling and action that the Anglo-American relationship could utilize to deter Japan: We are trying to prevent goods of importance to the Japanese war effort reaching their destination in Japan from neutral sources, i.e. we are trying unofficially to blockade a country which is not in a state of war with us but against which we and the US Government have declared a `state of economic siege’. Such partial warfare is not catered for under the rules of international law and we must therefore devise some other means of control. (FO 837/536, Oct. 9, 1941)

In the face of the combined effects of aid and loans to China, discriminatory trade agreements aimed at thwarting Japanese economic development, and a specific programme of sanctions and embargoes aimed at starving Japan of the necessary raw materials required for the waging of modern, industrial warfare, the choice was clear. Japan could accept the need to find another way to accommodate an Anglo-­ American alliance that had clearly demonstrated its desire for Japan to do so. Or, it

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could use the military power option to achieve its desired end state of dominance in the Far East before the European war spurred the two Western allies on to a level of rearmament and war preparation that Japan’s limited military power could not to match. Given the nature of its strategic policy making elite to favour such a path Japan choose to ignore the deterrence messages and employ military force to achieve its strategic ends. Without the fear of a powerful Anglo-American naval force protecting their maritime trade interests in the Far East, Japan was able to utilize the control of the sea to impose its will and favourable conditions for the prosecution of the war against China without interference. The requirement for the two Western naval powers to resort to supplying China’s war effort through landlines of communications severely weakened not only the Chinese war effort but encouraged Japan in its pursuit of a dominant maritime economic warfare strategy. That confidence led to Japan’s seizure of Indo-China in 1940, with the fall of France. Control of Indo-China’s air and sea spaces threatened both Singapore and the Philippines to such a degree that the Western powers were forced to escalate their economic warfare at-a-distance actions, a weak and provocative choice which only further encouraged Japanese naval adventurism. Without adequate naval power to support a peace time economic war in the region, Great Britain and The United States could not gain the strategic initiative. That lack of ability to combine maritime and economic power meant that the two Western powers remained reactive to Japanese actions, therefore having to take ever increasing steps within the economic sphere alone in order to try and create a deterrent effect (Kennedy 2020). Only the Japanese step too far, the attack on Pearl Harbour and the transitioning of the strategic condition from one of a contested and tense peace to that of open warfare in 1941, allowed Anglo-American naval and economic power to wage at total war strategy instead of an economic warfare strategy. This total war condition was one which favoured the strategic superiority granted by access to vast amounts of credit, raw materials and manpower. More importantly, it lifted the self-regulating restrictions the two Western capitalist democracies had imposed on their ability to conduct wartime actions in peacetime. In the end, for Japan, it was the wrong choice to not be deterred into another course of action by Anglo-American economic warfare and instead seek to attempt to create a more favourable peace through conventional warfare. The system of various forms of economic warfare used by Great Britain and the United States failed in the end to prevent the outbreak of war in the Far East. However, there is a need to not see that failure as a complete failure of the deterrence strategy used. Events created by the war in Europe, particularly the perceived impending fall of the USSR, all combined to change the nature of the strategic environment within which Japanese decision makers worked. No forecasts in any capital had predicted the rapid fall of France, changing the nature of British options regarding the deployment of its naval forces globally. Nor was there a coordinated strategy in place between Japan and Nazi Germany to take greatest advantage of Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, an act which once more changed the core assumptions of Anglo-American planners and their appreciation of naval needs and power in the Far East. The combined Anglo-American economic

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deterrence programme did ensure China’s ability to be a significant actor in the Pacific conflict, trapping limited Japanese war fighting capability in a mainland quagmire despite all European events. The economic warfare strategy ran high risk, in that it could slip from being a deterrent to become the cause of escalation without careful management and coordination of the economic, financial, military and diplomatic levers of power in both America and Great Britain. However, it did deter Japan from adopting a Southern Strategy aimed at the French, Dutch East Indies, American and British imperial possessions for some time, even when Western military forces able to support the economic deterrence strategy were neither strong nor available. Finally, the economic deterrence strategy ensured a growing alliance relationship between the Anglo-American partners that had global effects on the power and strength of that relationship, as well as its ability to engage with the new challenges created by the actual realities of a war in the Pacific. Therefore, it is important to understand the enduring and complex outcomes that the economic deterrence relationship established in its totality and over an extended period of time (1936– 1942), rather than ask as to whether or not such a deterrence strategy was in and of itself enough to prevent war.

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