Design for Total War : Arms and Economics in the Third Reich. 9783111359588, 3111359581

Table of contents :
Intro
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
PREFACE
I. "Total War", The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy?
II. Enter Georg Thomas, An Economic General
III. Illegality: The Period of Secret Rearmament
IV. Ambiguous Victories: 1933-1935
V. Hitler on War and Economic Policy
VI. Behind the Scenes: The Jurisdiction Tangle, 1933-1935
VII. Four-Year-Plan, 1936-1940
VIII. "A Confusion of Private Empires", 1937-1938
IX. On the Eve, 1938-1939
X. How Warlike a "War Economy"?
XI. Mobilization, 1939: "A War of Each Against All"
XII. A Civilian Munitions Minister: 1940-1941 XIII. Total War, 1942-1945: The Prophecy FulfilledNote on Nomenclature
Note on Sources
Statistical Appendix
Supplementary Notes
Bibliography
Abbreviations
Index

Citation preview

STUDIES IN EUROPEAN XVII

HISTORY

DESIGN FOR TOTAL WAR ARMS AND ECONOMICS IN THE THIRD REICH by

B E R E N I C E A. C A R R O L L University of Illinois

1968

MOUTON THE HAGUE • PARIS

© Copyright 1968 in The Netherlands. Mouton & Co. N.V., Publishers, The Hague. No part of this book may be translated or reproduced in any form by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publishers.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NUMBER: 68-15527

Printed in The Netherlands by Mouton & Co., Printers, The Hague.

In Memory of my Father Morris B. Jacobs

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to express her deep gratitude to the late Professor Sinclair W. Armstrong, without whose encouragement this book might never have been begun, and to Professor Donald G. Rohr, who saw it through the last stages of its preparation as a doctoral dissertation in 1959. Since that time, however, it has undergone such great changes both of form and of content that Professor Rohr must be absolved of any responsibility for its present defects; the revision has benefited, however, from his suggestions. To Gerhard L. Weinberg the author owes special thanks for introducing her to the materials on which the book is mainly based, for giving generously of his enormous fund of knowledge of National Socialist Germany, and for personal encouragement. Fritz T. Epstein and Oron J. Hale have also given valuable advice and information. To Dagmar H. Perman, the author gives thanks not only for aid and counsel, but for enlivening a grim field of study with moments of buoyancy. Of the many persons whose influence has helped to shape this book either in thought or in method, the author wishes to mention and thank especially Jack Hexter and Donald H. Fleming. Many friends and colleagues have also contributed to the formulation and broadening of the author's ideas on the processes of war and peace, through continuing debate on both. Thanks are due to many libraries, librarians and archivists, among whom the author would like to mention especially: the staff of the World War II Records Division of the National Archives, in Alexandria, Virginia; John Taylor of the National Archives in Washington, D.C.; the University of Illinois Library, in particular Billie R. Bozone; and Arthur Schweitzer and the University of Indiana Library, for the generous loan of microfilm. The author is also grateful for advice and access to materials and finding aids at the Institut für Völkerrecht in Göttingen, the Institut für Weltwirtschaft in Kiel, the Institut für

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Zeitgeschichte in Munich, the Bundesarchiv in Koblenz, the Deutsche Industrieinstitut in Cologne, and other libraries in the United States and abroad. The research was begun under a Fulbright scholarship for study in Germany, and later supported in part by a traveling fellowship from Brown University; a small but very helpful grant for the purchase of microfilm was provided by Rutgers University. Leisure for reflection, revision and expansion of the work was provided by my husband, Robert W. Carroll, whose tolerance and sacrifices have both been great, and who has also contributed to the progress of the work, both directly and indirectly. To him the author wishes to express her manifold gratitude and admiration. To her parents, Margaret and Morris B. Jacobs, she owes thanks beyond words for many years of guidance, encouragement and support.

PREFACE

"Total war" is not a single, or "unit" idea, but an accumulation of separable propositions, sometimes mutually contradictory, which have come to be associated under one term. The history of this composite of ideas remains unwritten. Its evolution, from the French Revolution through World War I, is sketched in Chapter I, in which we call attention to the little-known work of Alphonse Séché, Les Guerres cl?Enfer (1915), as the fullest early appreciation of the implications of "total mobilization of national resources" for war. This notion is one of the two most prominent components of the idea of "total war"; the other, of course, is "total destruction of the enemy" (combatants and non-combatants alike). These two components, as will be seen in this book, can be mutually incompatible. In any case, they are capable of interpretation in several ways, or of reduction to more limited terms. "Total mobilization of national resources", for example, embodies both the "organization of enthusiasm" and "economic mobilization for war". These too can compete with as well as reinforce each other (consider the case of radio vs. radar tubes). In practice, these varying components and interpretations of the idea of total war called forth varying blueprints for its realization, what we may call "designs for total war". In the body of this book, we are concerned with the content and fate of one such design for total war, that fixed upon by a group of German officers, led by General Georg Thomas, who sought to insure that Germany's economic mobilization for World War II would be "total". In pursuing this goal, Thomas found his path obstructed not only by opponents of total war itself, but by those of its proponents who were dedicated to differing or opposing "designs". Among the latter, the most prominent examples were Albert Speer and Adolf Hitler himself. Speer's differences with Thomas were much smaller, in principle, than has been claimed; in practice they were sufficient

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PREFACE

to bring about Thomas' destruction. These points are taken up in Chapters II and XIII. Here a word must be said about Hitlers opposition to "total mobilization", which persisted in some respects, despite even Albert Speer, to the end of World War II. To be sure, as indicated in Chapter V, Hitler was a proponent of total war in the sense that he sought total destruction of at least certain selected "enemies", and recognized no moral limitations on the means employed in warfare. In this sense, it can be argued that Hitler s "Blitzkrieg" strategy was a form of total war, as indeed it was widely taken to be during World War II. On the other hand, the strategy of Blitzkrieg was precisely Hitler's justification for opposing, and means of avoiding, "total mobilization" of Germany's resources for war (see Chapter V and passim). The recognition of this fact by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey at the close of World War II, and its confirmation by subsequent studies of Germany's economic preparations for war has resulted in a trend toward painting Hitler as an opponent of total war. To the extent that this book focuses upon a design for total mobilization, it may seem to support this trend. It should be remembered, however, that whether Hitler (and his Blitzkrieg strategy) are viewed as "for" or "against" total war, depends entirely upon which component of the latter term is in question. Our image of the economy of National Socialist Germany used to be that of the "totalitarian economic system", fully geared to preparations for war. This was a conception built up gradually in the late nineteen-thirties (encouraged by National Socialist propaganda itself) and most fully developed in many studies which appeared during World War II. Post-war studies of the German economy showed, however, that it had been, at least in some important respects, highly inefficient, and inadequately prepared for the war as it took shape; furthermore, that Germany had failed to press her economic mobilization to the same degree as did her adversaries, notably England, in the first years of the war. These post-war studies were explicitly cast as opposed to the earlier school of thought, and did indeed clash with some of the earlier conceptions. The older school was not, however, without its champions in the world of post-war scholarship. Thus there arose what appears to be a "great debate" on the nature of the National Socialist economic system. (See Chapter X.) While the conflict is in some measure a debate about "the facts", for example about some disputed or conflicting statistics (see "Sta-

PREFACE

11

tistical Appendix"), there is in reality much less dispute about the data, whether historical or statistical, than might be expected in a "great debate". In the last analysis, the debate arises rather from a consistent failure to disentangle the various parts of the image under attack, from a wide-spread confusion of terminology, and from a peculiar sort of chronological bias. Thus most of the participants in the debate have failed to distinguish clearly between the question "was the German economy totalitarian?" and the question "was it a war economy?" At the same time, they have failed to define those key terms, "totalitarian" and "war economy", so as to provide a meaningful basis for discourse. It is significant to observe that the line-up of champions or challengers of the image of "totalitarian-war-economy" correlates directly with the chronological focus of attention. The champions of the old school are those who have concentrated their attention most fully upon the German economy prior to World War II; these scholars have been heavily impressed by the degree to which that economy was regimented and war-oriented as compared to the years before 1933. The challengers, on the other hand, have devoted their attention mainly to the years of the war itself; they have been most impressed by the degree to which the German economy, at least in the years 1939-1942, fell short of "total mobilization". One has only to expand the range of vision to encompass the entire period from Weimar through World War II, however, and the conflict simply disappears. If one adopts quantitative definitions of terms like "peace economy", "war economy", and "total war economy", as we do in Chapter X, then it appears that there was simply a steady progression from the first to the last in the German economy under National Socialism. But this fact is itself one of the truly remarkable and distinguishing features of the National Socialist economy. For in contrast, both England and the United States show a sharp discontinuity in military-economic effort between the last year of formal peace (1938 and 1941, respectively) and the first year of declared warfare. Such a discontinuity is nowhere evidenced in the development of Germany's war effort, which was greater than that of either England or the United States in the years 1935-1938, but much less spectacular in its response to the formal transition from peace to war. (See Table I, p. 184). Germany's economic commitment to war purposes in 1941 was forty-seven percent of gross national product; in 1942 it was fifty-five

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PREFACE

percent. These levels were exceeded by England, whose war effort topped fifty percent of her national income as early as 1940. On the other hand, the United States never committed over forty-two percent of its gross national product to military expenditures. In the light of these comparative figures, the contention of post-war scholars that Germany's economy was "peacelike" during the first years of World War II appears to be both true and untrue at once. It was true relative to the situation in England, and relative to what was expected of a "totalitarian war economy". It was untrue relative to the situation in the United States, or to Germany's pre-war economy. This is not intended to say that "everything is relative". It is intended to say that the war of catchwords about the National Socialist economic system is largely meaningless, in the absence of clearly defined terms. When the terms ("peacelike", "warlike", etc.) are quantitatively defined, and the perspective expanded to encompass a longer time-span and a broader range of comparison, the results fail to fit any preconceived pattern. The thread of the narrative in this book is carried by the career of Georg Thomas and the office which he headed through most of its existence, which lasted, under varying names, from 1924 to the end of World War II. The choice of Thomas as the narrative center grew initially from the fact that the records of his office survived almost intact at the end of the war, forming a collection quite unparalleled in wealth and continuity among German economic records of that period (see "Note on Sources"). Yet Thomas is a figure of interest in his own right, a figure of paradox, who conspired to overthrow Hitler even while pressing the dictator for more totalitarian measures in the economy. Thomas was also conversant with the intricacies of conflict over power and policy at the highest levels of the economy. At the same time, he was intimately concerned with the practical and administrative details of both armament and economic policies at lower levels. Although continually frustrated in his personal and official aspirations toward military domination of the economy, Thomas was as centrally placed as any other important figure in the economic hierarchy — perhaps more so than any other single figure. He was better informed than Hjalmar Schacht about military and armament affairs, better informed than Hermann Goring about economic affairs, and much longer concerned with economic mobilization than either one, not to mention Albert Speer (whose power and scope ultimately eclipsed all three, but whose engagement in war

PREFACE

13

economics was slight prior to 1942). If the choice of Thomas as the central figure of this narrative has had also its disadvantages, such as the inevitable bias of viewing events continually through his eyes and those of his staff, we have at least tried to keep this bias in mind, and to balance it by critical scrutiny of Thomas' judgments, as well as comparison of Thomas' records with many others, published and unpublished, from other sources. In following the history of Germany's economic mobilization from the period of the Weimar Republic through the end of World War II, we have had occasion to touch upon a number of important peripheral issues. Of these we may note here four: 1. the role of private industrialists in Germany's "secret rearmament" under the Weimar Republic (see Chapter III); 2. the functions and significance of the entrepreneurial associations under National Socialism (see Chapter IV); 3. the development, structure and functions of the organizations of the Four-Year-Plan (Chapter VII); and 4. the details and significance of proliferating economic agencies during Albert Speer's predominance, 1943-1945 (see Chapter XIII). The first two have been treated by others, sometimes at length, but in the opinion of this author, unsatisfactorily. The second two have been singularly neglected.

Urbana, Illinois March, 1966

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgments

3

Preface

5

I. "Total War", The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy? .

.

II. Enter Georg Thomas, An Economic General III. Illegality: The Period of Secret Rearmament

.

.

17

. . .

37

. . .

54

IV. Ambiguous Victories: 1933-1935

73

V. Hitler on War and Economic Policy

93

VI. Behind the Scenes: The Jurisdiction Tangle, 1933-1935 VII. Four-Year-Plan, 1936-1940

122

VIII. "A Confusion of Private Empires", 1937-1938 . . .

140

IX. On the Eve, 1938-1939

158

X. How Warlike a "War Economy"?

179

XI. Mobilization, 1939: "A War of Each Against All" XII. A Civilian Munitions Minister: 1940-1941 .

106

.

. .

.

191

.

213

XIII. Total War, 1942-1945: The Prophecy Fulfilled . . .

232

16

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Note on Nomenclature

251

Note on Sources

252

Statistical Appendix

262

Supplementary Notes

268

Bibliography

273

Abbreviations

281

Index

284

I "TOTAL WAR", THE SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY?

Les événements retardent toujours sur les idées.... Alphonse Séché, Les Guerres d'Enfer, 1915

"Modem war means total war", wrote Bernard Baruch in his memoirs.1 Baruch, with his intimate experience in economic mobilization for two world wars, would seem to need no other authority for these words. They are unlikely to stir his readers to protest, hardly even to uneasiness; more likely, they are passed over with the indifference due a commonly known and well established fact. Yet the statement "modern war means total war" is patently not a fact. It is rather, two ambiguous terms tied together with an equally ambiguous connective. Worse, its generally accepted meaning ("modem war" equals "total war") is demonstrably false, or else a silly tautology. It can be upheld only by excluding from the equation all the many wars fought in the past 200 years which were not total, accepting as "modem" only the handful which were. If we are fairly rigorous about our definition of "total war", only two brief periods of warfare deserve the appellation at all: the years 1917-1918 and 19431945. If we are less rigorous we may extend the list as far back as the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon, but will be unable to add many more, the best candidates being the great (but geographically limited) civil wars: in the United States and in Russia. The most "modem" form of warfare today, defined as the most recent wars in which great powers and great stakes are involved, is that deliberately limited type known as "guerrilla warfare" or "counterinsurgency" (depending which side you are on). Now, one need only glance into the current literature on "strategy in the nuclear age" to discover that it is not merely an error to believe "modern war means total war" — it is a sin, a lethal sin. Raymond 1

Bernard Baruch, Baruch: The Public Years (New York, 1960), p. 21.

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"TOTAL WAR", THE SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY?

Aron, for example, in On War, his eloquent and persuasive defense of "limited war", wrote in 1956: Between the two theses which we posited at the start: to preserve peace by the threat of an increasingly horrible war, or to distinguish as much as possible between the different types of war, in order to limit violence, I have no doubt that the second is right and the first fatal. To approach human affairs in the spirit of geometry is catastrophic. . . . Between peaceful discussion and mutual annihilation there must be other alternatives.2 Nevertheless, we may observe that the assertion "modern war means total war", has one great strength: the undeniable, indeed overwhelming fact of two "total" wars within three decades of this century. If it is easily shown that "modern war" is not necessarily "total", it is far less easily forgotten - and far more matter of wonder and terror — that two wars, so recently, were. It may be well, too, to remind the latter-day proponents of limited war that they had their counterparts, all unavailing, before 1914 and before 1939. They included two of the most prominent military strategists of Germany: Karl von Clausewitz and Hans von Seeckt. Both believed that what they called "absolute" or "mass" war required national sacrifices incommensurate with rational political goals (see below and Chapter III). This argument is, in essence and formulation, identical with the present-day strategic argument against "all-out" nuclear war. Before 1914 and 1939, the "civilized peoples" hardly anticipated the enormous powers of recovery displayed after the Great Wars: they were widely convinced that the strategic argument against "absolute" or "mass" warfare was correct, and feared greatly that such warfare would destroy civilization, at least as they knew it. Most chilling of all to remember, the fact is that in each case, Germany launched the opening battles of the great wars convinced she was embarking upon a 'limited" war, to be over in a few months' time. Hitler himself declared, in the early nineteen-thirties: "The next war will be quite different from the last world war. Infantry attacks and mass formations are obsolete."8 Hitlers strategy was "Blitzkrieg", not "total war". To the latter he turned only in face of impending defeat. » Raymond Aron, On War (Garden City, N.Y., 1959), pp. 136-7. For date of writing, see Preface to this edition, or the original edition, in Espoir et Peur du Siècle (Paris, 1957). * Hermann Rauschning, Hitler Speaks (London, 1939), p. 13. German version, Gespräche Mit Hitler (New York, Europa-Verlag, 1940), p. 9.

"TOTAL WAR", THE SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY?

19

We need to remember these facts, but we need not conclude from them that the failure of the advocates of limited war, and the twicerepeated evolution from limited to total war, was simply inevitable. W e need to guard against being too readily persuaded even by Winston Churchill: Events passed very largely outside the scope of conscious choice. Governments and individuals conformed to the rhythm of the tragedy, and swayed and staggered forward in helpless violence, slaughtering and squandering on ever-increasing scales, till injuries were wrought to the structure of human society which a century will not efface, and which may conceivably prove fatal to the present civilization. . . .4 The implicit assumption here is that "modem war means total war"; the explicit conclusion is that this is - or at least, was — beyond human choice or power to alter. Quite apart from our previous objections to the assumption and the distastefulness of the conclusion, this viewpoint has a self-sealing effect. If we simply accept that total war developed inevitably in the World Wars, "outside the scope of conscious choice", then there seems hardly any need to examine just how it really happened. In The Century of Total War, Raymond Aron drew attention to this problem over a decade ago: "There has been incessant inquiry into the origin of the First World War, but no one has ever asked why it became hyperbolic." Aron s answer was "that the motive force of the evolution at the time was technical". 5 This answer is seriously inadequate, as a moment's reflection will show. All the technique necessary for fighting wars on the Napoleonic scale was available after 1815, yet no such war was fought for a century. All the technique for fighting nuclear war has been available for two decades since the United States first used atomic bombs in Japan, yet the United States has been in two wars, both in Asia, without using them again (to date). Technique alone is simply not capable of being "the motive force" in the form taken by any given war. In this connection it is pertinent to note that the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05 offered a rehearsal of the stalemate-war of entrenchment, often regarded as the key technical feature of the First World War. Nevertheless, neither side pushed on to "total war". Russia Quoted from The World Crisis, 1915, in George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950 (New York, Mentor, 1961, c. 1951), p. 53. 5 Raymond Aron, The Century of Total War (Boston, Beacon, 1955, c. 1954), p. 24. Aron attributes the term "hyperbolic" to Pareto. 4

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"TOTAL WAB", THE SELF-FULFILLING

PROPHECY?

accepted a limited defeat, as Japan accepted a limited victory. On Russia's part: "The strain, the explosive state of Europe, mutterings of unrest at home, caused her to abandon the struggle before it had been fought to a finish.... Russia displayed wisdom in deciding not to continue the war for the sake of two far eastern peninsulas. The game had ceased to be worth the candle." 6 Yet in World War I, though surely "the game had ceased to be worth the candle" to the Romanov dynasty, Russia pursued the war with insensate and suicidal persistence. Whatever the motive force, it was certainly not "technique". A rather better case could be made (as by J. F. C. Fuller) for Baron von der Goltz's aphorism: "A clashing of interests leads to war, but the passions of the nations decide, independently of these, up to what point the war shall be carried." 7 Or as the Baron's mentor, Clausewitz, had put it: "In two nations and states such tensions, and such a sum of hostile feelings, may exist that a motive for war, very trifling in itself, still can produce a wholly disproportionate effect a positive explosion." 8 However, it is not our purpose here to explain how World War I became "hyperbolic". We wish only to draw attention to one sorely neglected influence: the idea of total war. American works on the subject of total war usually attribute the idea to Germans. 9 But Germans invented neither the phrase nor the « Cyril Falls, A Hundred Years of War, 1850-1950 (New York, Collier, 1962), pp. 180, 184, 204. 7 Baron Colmar von der Goltz, The Nation in Arms (London, 1913), p. 9. See also the argument of Major-General J. F . C . Fuller, War and Western Civilization, 1832-1932, "A Study of War as a Political Instrument and the Expression of Mass Democracy", especially pp. 26 ff. 8 Karl von Clausewitz, On War (New York, Modem Library, 1943), Book I, Ch. I, p. 10. Page references for quotations from this work below all refer to this M o d e m Library edition. T h e Book and Chapter numbers are given for convenience in referring to other editions. A one-volume German edition is Vom Kriege (Leipzig, Insel-Verlag, 1944), ed. Friedrich von Cochenhausen. • For example, Henry W. Spiegel, The Economics of Total War (New York and London, 1942), pp. 37-42; also F . O. Miksche, Blitzkrieg (London, 1942), p. 24; Hans Speier, "Ludendorff: The German Concept of Total War", in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. E d w a r d M. Earle (Princeton, 1944), pp. 306 ff. Stefan T . Possony offers a rather unconvincing argument that the "fathers of m o d e m total w a r " were Marx and Engels — who were, after all, Germans: A Century of Conflict (Chicago, 1953), pp. 8 ff. Ladislas Farago, in The Axis Grand Strategy: Blueprints for Total War (New York and Toronto, 1942), points out that "the m o d e m phrases 'guerre totale' and 'mobilisation absolue' were coined in democratic France" (p. 3), but gives no further details, the rest of the book concerning itself with the development of the ideas in the Axis countries, especially Germany.

"TOTAL W A R " , THE SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY?

21

conception. Both owe their origin much more to Paris than to Berlin or Munich. The first full appreciation of the subject was published in June 1915 by the Parisian littérateur Alphonse Séché. His book, Les Guerres d'Enfer, inspired the invention of the term itself by the royalist agitator Léon Daudet. In March 1916 Daudet began a series of articles in L'Action Française which concluded two years later with the publication of a book, all under the title: La Guerre Totale. Yet Daudet understood Séché's work so little that the phrase meant no more to him than a rousing slogan behind which to pursue his own crusade against alleged spies and traitors. In the meantime, Séché was not entirely alone in his ideas. In January 1916, a Parisian journalist named Georges Blanchon published an independently conceived, but closely parallel analysis of warfare: La Guerre Nouvelle.10 When Les Guerres d Enfer appeared in June 1915, it was a vision, not a portrait: World War I was then far from "total". But Séché's vision was not a work of pure imagination. Its antecedents, in life and thought, reached back at least a century, to the wars of the French Revolution. The era opened resoundingly with the famous proclamation of the levée en masse by the National Convention, 23 August 1793: From this moment until that in which the enemy shall have been driven from the soil of the Republic, all Frenchmen are in permanent requisition for the service of the armies. Young men shall go to battle; the married men shall forge arms and transport provisions; the women shall make tents and clothing and shall serve in the hospitals; the children shall turn old linen into lint; the aged shall betake themselves to the public places in order to arouse the courage of the warriors and preach the hatred of kings and the unity of the Republic.11 Lazare Carnot declared that "the Republic is a great city in a state of siege: France must become one vast camp, and Paris its arsenal..."; 10 Alphonse Séché, Les Guerres d'Enfer (Paris, E. Sansot, 1915). Léon Daudet, La Guerre Totale (Paris, 1918); see also Eugen Weber, Action Française (Stanford, Calif., 1962), p. 101. Georges Blanchon, "La Guerre Nouvelle", in Revue des Deux Mondes, ser. 6, vol. 31 (Jan.-Feb. 1916); and La Guerre Nouvelle, (Paris, 1916). By a translator's error, Raymond Aran's On War, p. 11, seems to attribute the phrase "total war" to Clausewitz. Aran's French translation of Clausewitz's words, in the 1957 edition, does not make this error (see n. 2, above). Cf. Clausewitz, On War, Book VIII, Ch. VI, p. 595 (Vom Kriege, 1944, p. 671). 11 F. M. Anderson, The Constitutions and Other Select Documents Illustrative of the History of France, 1789-1901 (Minneapolis, 1904), pp. 183-5. Though well known, this passage deserves repetition in this context.

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"TOTAL W A B " , T H E S E L F - F U L F I L L I N G PROPHECY?

and the report drawn up by the Committee of Public Safety summed it up: "Thus all the French, men and women alike, people of all ages, are summoned by the Patrie to defend liberty. All physical and moral faculties, all political and industrial means, belong to it of right; all metals, all elements, pay it their tribute."12 There was more sound than fury in this. The heart of it was that only young, unmarried men were to go to the front. In this sense it was even a step down from an earlier levy of half a million men, without distinction of age or marital status, which had met with resistance even to the point of rebellion. Not so the levée en masse, "since it affected only a minority who did not count for much politically", and to whom military service offered the temptations of free support, adventure, and loot.13 In any case, there was no system to insure that literally all men and women, "all physical and moral faculties", should somehow serve the war. Taxation, requisitioning, and plunder were still the economic supports of war, not general economic controls, planning, or what we would call "economic mobilization".14 Still, the rhetoric of patriotic unity, combined with the fact of conscription on an unprecedented scale, left an ineradicable impression that warfare had changed its nature. "By this participation of the people in war, instead of a cabinet and an army, a whole nation with its natural weight entered the scale." So wrote a contemporary observer as perceptive - and as influential — as Clausewitz.15 The impression was deepened by the wars of Napoleon, despite a certain subsidence of the Revolutionary fervor. Armies grew larger still, as did the geographic extension of the wars. Unprecedented, too, seemed Napoleon s attempt to wage economic war on a "Continental" scale, and his political subjugation of nearly the whole of Europe. The new warfare also won a nasty reputation for brutality, compared with the allegedly genteel wars of the eighteenth century. If Voltaire's attacks upon the warfare of his time are to be given any credence, one may wonder at this comparison; nevertheless: "If men define situations Carnot quoted in J. M. Thompson, Robespierre and the French Revolution (New York, Collier, 1962). Committee of Public Safety report quoted b y L e o Gershoy, The Era of the French Revolution (Princeton, Van Nostrand, Anvil, 1957). 11 B. H. Liddell Hart, The Revolution in Warfare (New Haven, 1947), pp. 55-56. 14 T h e L a w of the Maximum, September 1793, was of course designed—or father, ill-designed—to control inflation, not to supply the armies. Military requisitioning was actually one cause of its failure. 15 On War, Book VIII, Ch. HI, p. 582. 11

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23

as real, they are real in their consequences."14 Contemporaries believed that the upheavals they witnessed had broken down earlier restraints on the violence of war; historians have accepted this judgment, and taken it to express a fact foreshadowing the appearance of total war. Thus the contemporary belief that war had been transformed in its very nature came to be seen as true prophecy. The trouble with such a prophecy is that it may be self-fulfilling. It "enters into the situation as a new and dynamic factor". Though it may be at the outset "a false definition of the situation", it evokes "a new behavior which makes the originally false conception come true".17 Nowhere can this be seen more readily than in the case of Clausewitz, who persuaded succeeding generations of military strategists that "since the time of Bonaparte, war . . . has assumed quite a new nature, or rather it has approached much nearer to its real nature, to its absolute perfection". The power of this doubtful definition of reality was much increased by the forgetfulness of Clausewitz's followers, who dismissed from their memories his wise conclusion: "it is just as improbable that wars henceforth will all have this grand character as that the wide barriers which have been opened to them will ever be completely closed again". They were hypnotized rather by his idea of "absolute" war, in which the complete overthrow, or even destruction, of the entire enemy nation is the object, and unlimited effort and violence the means. They cherished his phophecy that "the greater and more powerful the motives for war, the more they affect the whole existenoe of the nations involved, and the more violent the tension which precedes war, so much the more closely will war conform to its abstract conception". And they forgot that Clausewitz considered the extreme form of "absolute" war a mere logical fantasy: . . . If, adhering closely to the absolute, we proposed to get around all difficulties with a stroke of the pen and insist with logical strictness that on every occasion we must be prepared for the extreme of resistance and meet it with the extreme of effort, such a stroke of the pen would be a mere paper law, with no application to the real world. . . . the human mind would hardly submit to be ruled by such logical fantasies. In many cases the result would be a futile expenditure of strength which would be bound to 16 This assertion by W. I. Thomas is justly called " a theorem basic to the social sciences" by Robert K. Merton, in Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, 111., 1957), " T h e Self-Fulfilling Prophecy", pp. 421-436. 17 Ibid., p. 423.

24

"TOTAL WAR", THE SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY?

find a counterpoise in other considerations of state. An effort of will would be required disproportionate to the object in view, and therefore impossible to call forth.18 To be sure, the last point does not tally with Clausewitz' cogent observation, noted above, that mass passions can indeed call forth an effort disproportionate to the object in view. But this inconsistency does not alter the main point, often repeated by Clausewitz, that "absolute" war was theory, not reality. Real war must be construed "not from pure conception, but by allowing room for everything of a foreign nature which is involved in it and attaches itself to it - all the natural inertia and friction of its parts, the whole of the inconsistency, the vagueness and timidity of the human mind.. ,".18 Indeed, Clausewitz's general argument, summed up in the famous dictum that war is "nothing but the continuation of state policy with other means", was that political policy does and should dominate military strategy: "The subordination of the political point of view to the military would be unreasonable, for policy has created the war; policy is the intelligent faculty, war only the instrument, and not the reverse." And it followed: "Therefore, once more: war is an instrument of policy, it must necessarily bear the character of policy; it must measure

with policy's

measure." 20

Through the rest of the nineteenth century, warfare did "measure with policy's measure". Those who have tried to cull from the wars of that period forewarnings of the Great War to come have found fairly slim pickings. By calculating size of armies and casualties per population, P. A. Sorokin has even concluded that "the nineteenth century appears to have been . . . very peaceful. The burden of war that it imposed upon the population by the relative size of the army, as well as of the casualties, was comparatively very low, much lower than in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries." 21 All the European 18 This and preceding quotations, in order of their appearance above: On War, Book V I I I , Ch. I l l , pp. 583, 5 8 4 ; Book I, Ch. I, p p . 17, 6. 18 On War, Book VIII, Ch. II, p. 570. Concerning Clausewitz' ideas on " a b s o l u t e " vs. " r e a l " war, read with care On War, Book I, Ch. I, and Book V I I I , Ch. II; cf. H a n s Rothfels, " C l a u s e w i t z " , in Makers of Modern Strategy (see note 9, above), esp. p. 102. 20 On War, " T w o Notes by the Author", p. xxix; Book V I I I , Ch. VI, p p . 5 9 8 ,

601.

P. A. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics, vol. 3 (New York-ChicagoBoston, 1937), p. 347. Sorokin also offers a set of very interesting statistics a n d calculations on the relative burdens of w a r f a r e in ancient Greece a n d R o m e , a n d in E u r o p e since the tenth century A.D., ibid., Part II, Chs. 9-11. 21

"TOTAL WAR", THE SELF-FULFILLING PBOPHECY?

25

wars of the nineteenth century were kept within bounds very much narrower than those of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. Isolated features of "total war" could, of course, be found: new weapons, peacetime conscription, railroad transport, trench warfare, and so forth. But it was only the Civil War in the United States, and there only in the South, that bore a close resemblance to total war. And as J. F. C. Fuller has pointed out, in Europe the "lessons" of this war were not much heeded.22 In the atmosphere of international tension prevailing as the century drew to a close, however, there took place a great revival of the rhetoric of "national war". It was heralded by the appearance in 1883 of Baron von der Goltz's text, The Nation in Arms. Imbued with the classical style and teachings of Clausewitz, it bore no resemblance at all to a manual of total war. Nevertheless, von der Goltz proclaimed, with a dogmatism of which Clausewitz had been free: "War is now an exodus of nations, and no longer a mere conflict between armies.... The day of Cabinet wars is over." Correcting his master, he wrote: War, now as before, aids policy in the attainment of its objects; yet, if only for the sake of subordinate interests it must aim at the complete subjection of the enemy. This necessarily entails the decisive use of all means, intellectual and material alike, tending to subdue the foe; and it is, consequently, right and equitable in time of peace to prepare all available resources with a view to the whole being in a state of readiness for war whenever the occasion arises.23 Bismarck publicized these views in his Reichstag speech of 11 January 1887: "If we Germans wish to prosecute a war with the full effect of our national strength, then it must be a war . . . with which the entire nation is in accord. It must be a people's war." And he added: "The war of the future is economic war, the struggle for existence in general. May my successors keep that ever in mind, and take care that, when this struggle comes, we are prepared."24 Meanwhile, the refrain had been taken up also in France. In 1894 Ferdinand Foch, then an instructor at the École de Guerre, began a Fuller, op. cit., p. 99. Baron von der Goltz, op. cit., pp. 9-10, 463; see also pp. 463-9. For date see "Preface to the First Edition", p. V. Note that von der Goltz attributes the phrase to the Prussian King (later the Kaiser), Speech from the Throne of January 12, 1860. 24 Quoted in Erich Ludendorff, Kriegführung und Politik (Berlin, 1922), p. 11. See also the remarks of the elder and younger von Moltke, quoted by Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August (New York, 1963), p. 38. 22

13

26

"TOTAL WAB", THE SELF-FULFILLING PBOPHECY?

series of lectures later published in part as Des Principes de la Guerre.2S Foch was well versed in both Clausewitz and von der Goltz, better in the second than the first. He set out to teach his students that current training in limited warfare was hopelessly "antiquated". Quoting Clausewitz at length on the impact of the French Revolution, Foch affirmed: "Truly enough, a new era had begun, the era of national wars, of wars which were to assume a maddening pace; for those wars were destined to throw into the fight all the resources of the nation...." 2 6 But Foch dismissed the nuances of Clausewitz's position, calling the warfare of die eighteenth century "obsolete", and insisting that contemporary war "possesses in a singularly enhanced degree a national nature which is bound to produce a more intense form of warfare".27 Still, beyond these introductory lectures on the general nature of war, Foch's text, like that of von der Goltz, was circumscribed by old-fashioned considerations of strictly military strategy and tactics. Nowhere does either book examine how one goes about "throwing into the fight all the resources of the nation". To this time "the nation in arms" remained, as Séché later said, a mere "politician's phrase, without direct correspondence to a reality clearly perceived".28 At this juncture, around the turn of the century, the theory of war suddenly experienced a curious invasion by independent persons, neither soldiers nor statesmen. Two who exerted perceptible influence on the thought of their time, and were known to Alphonse Séché and Georges Blanchon, were I. S. Bliokh and H. G. Wells. I. S. Bliokh ("Jean de Bloch") was a Polish-Jewish banker who published in 1897 a weighty study of war in six volumes. It soon became well known in western Europe and the United States, through several editions and translations, in English entitled The Future of War. Its main purpose was to convince the peoples and statesmen of the world that major wars between world powers would shortly pass the bounds of absurdity, and become "impossible". By "impossible", Bliokh did not mean that war could not break out, but that a major war between world powers would become an act of mutual suicide, leading to economic exhaustion or to revolution within the combatant First published 1903. See Ferdinand Foch, The Principles of War (New York, 1920), p. iv; cf. A. Grasset, Préceptes et Jugements du Maréchal Foch (NancyParis-Strasbourg, 1919), p. vii. 24 Foch, op. cit., p. 30; Grasset, op. cit., p. 125. 27 Foch, op. cit., p. 35. Italics added. 18 Séché, op. cit., p. 77.

25

"TOTAL WAR", THE SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY?

27

nations. Bliokh devoted a volume of his work to proposals for the settlement of conflict between nations through an international court, and as might have been expected, made his greatest impression among pacifists and internationalists. His work is said to have been influential in the origins of the first Hague Peace Conference.2' Though not well received in military circles, Bliokh's Future of War paid close attention to the technical details of warfare. His observations and predictions had, of course, a mixed fate. The conclusion most cogent and, to him, most important, was that "improvements in the rifle and in artillery, and the universal employment of field intrenchments, altogether operate to the advantage of the defensive", thus leading to battles of longer duration and to protracted warfare.30 At the same time, Bliokh offered what may have been the first statistical analysis of the reciprocal influences of economics and war, under conditions then prevailing in Russia, Britain, Germany, and France. In the end, Bliokh's vision of war came strikingly close to what was to be experienced in Europe less than two decades after: At first there will be increased slaughter—increased slaughter on so terrible a scale as to render it impossible to get troops to push the battle to a decisive issue. . . . The war, instead of being a hand-to-hand contest in which the combatants measure their physical and moral superiority, will become a kind of stalemate, in which neither army being able to get at the other, both armies will be maintained in opposition to each other, threatening each other, but never being able to deliver a final and decisive attack. . . . It will be a multiplication of expenditure simultaneously accompanied by a diminution of the sources by which that expenditure can be met. That is the future of war—not fighting, but famine, not the slaying of men, but the bankruptcy of nations and the break-up of the whole social organisation.81 Bliokh still thought of the economic aspects of war mainly in terms of the financial problems it posed, or the economic dislocations it might cause. He had no conception of "economic mobilization" of a country's whole resources, and, perhaps in consequence, he did not believe that any nation could long endure the kind of war he described. H. G. Wells came close to filling the gap thus left by Bliokh. In I. S. Bliokh (I. S. Bloch; Jean de Bloch), The Future of War, 1902? (c. 1899), Introduction by Edwin D. Mead, pp. 3-4; cf. Fuller, op. cit., p. 161. 80 Jean de Bloch, "South Africa and Europe", North American Review, vol. 174 (Jan.-June 1902), April 1902, p. 493. 31 "Conversations with the Author", by W. T. Stead, in The Future of War (n. 29, above), pp. xvi-xvii. 28

28

"TOTAL W A R " , THE SELF-FULFILLING

PROPHECY?

Anticipations (1901), he predicted that twentieth-century warfare would force upon the combatant states "a practical realization of socialistic conceptions": The State that has not incorporated with its fighting organization all its material substance, its roads, vehicles, engines, foundries, and all its resources of food and clothing; the State which at the outbreak of war has to bargain with railway and shipping companies, replace experienced stationmasters by inexperienced officers, and haggle against alien interests for every sort of supply, will be at an overwhelming disadvantage against a State which has emerged from the social confusion of the present time, got rid of every vestige of our present distinction between official and governed, and organized every element in its being.32 Wells drew from this, too, a further consequence familiar to students of total war: the decline of distinctions between combatants and noncombatants. Wells thought that the new warfare would have to be prepared at length in peacetime. He thereby contributed to the idea of the garrison state, a permanent condition of full preparedness for war. On the other hand, the same idea led him to believe that future wars would be shorter than those of the past, since the well-prepared offensive would have, to his mind, an overwhelming advantage. "Save for national lunacy, [war] will be brought about by the side that will win, and because that side knows that it will win. . . . Instead of the bickering interchange of battles of the old time, will come swiftly and amazingly blow, and blow, and blow, no pause, no time for recovery, disasters cumulative and irreparable."33 A forecast, perhaps, of thermonuclear war; but World Wars I and II were still closer to Bliokh's conception. Shortly before World War I, an American named Homer Lea produced two books which later won him the label "American prophet of total war".34 Lea had spent an ailing and crippled childhood nurturing a passion for war. During his college days he decided to emulate Lord Byron: "And China shall be my Greece". Surprisingly, Lea did achieve a military reputation in China, and became briefly military advisor to Sun Yat-sen. When both were obliged to flee H. G. Wells, Anticipations of the Reaction of Mechanical and Scientific Progress upon Human Life and Thought (London, 1902, c. 1901), p. 185. 33 Ibid., pp. 204-5. 34 On Homer Lea, see: Claire Boothe, "Ever Hear of Homer Lea?", Sat. Eve. Post, Vol. 214 (Mar. 7 and Mar. 14, 1942); and Valeriu Marcu, "American Prophet of Total War", American Mercury, Vol. 54 (April 1942). 32

"TOTAL WAR", THE SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY?

29

China, Lea returned in 1901 to his home in Los Angeles, which became a center for Chinese republicans-in-exile. These associations did not preclude Lea's holding views of a racist and anti-democratic cast. His central concern was to urge preparedness on the United States and England - the first against Japan, the second against Cermany. Both his books, The Valor of Ignorance (1909) and The Day of the Saxon (1912) were in the "geopolitical" spirit later made infamous by the proto-Nazis of Germany and by Hitler himself (who is said to have "cribbed several paragraphs" from Lea for Mein Kampf).35 It is difficult to assess the extent of Lea's influence. His work may have been better known in Germany and Japan than in the United States or England. In any case, he is less important in our context than his posthumous admirers claim. Though certainly a "militarist", and though he urged peacetime conscription, universal military training, and indoctrination in "national unity", his conception of national warfare did not go beyond the old rhetoric. He wrote: "Every part of society, every business, every profession now has a definite place in relation to war" — but of what this "definite place" might be, not a word. Of trench warfare, protracted conflict, economic exhaustion, social revolution, organized mobilization of resources not a word. The one point which Lea may have contributed to the theory of total war was his naked rejection of "the sanctity of neutrality". In conflict between great powers, thought Lea, neutrality of small states and border regions "is a modern delusion. It is an excrescence"! 86 Notwithstanding all the exhortations and forebodings of the decades preceding World War I, notwithstanding even the visible facts of an unprecedented arms race, the Great War opened with widespread belief on all sides that the conflict would be short, victory sweet, and the effort required slight.37 No country entered World War I with plans for general economic mobilization. Even partial measures of economic control were instituted piecemeal. In Germany, regarded as the prime example of regimentation, some steps were taken early, but they were very incomplete. For example, at the instigation of civilians (notably Walther Claire Boothe, op. cit., Mar. 14, p. 39. Both of Lea's books published by Harper and Bros., New York and London. 36 The Day of the Saxon, p. 226-7. 37 Excellently portrayed by Tuchman, op. cit. M

30

"TOTAL WAB", THE SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY?

Rathenau), Germany established a system to secure supplies of scarce, strategic materials; but coal and iron were considered so plentiful that they were at first exempted from control!38 A proposal was put forward early in the war to establish an "economic general staff', but General von Moltke brushed it aside with the reproving reminder: "Wir haben jetzt Krieg zu führen!"39 The so-called "HindenburgProgramm" - with which Hindenburg had nothing to do but to lend his name — was not introduced until the fall of 1916, after two years of mass slaughter had gone by. Two measures lay at the core of this program: a compulsory labor law, which was not passed until December 1916, and a new "War Office" (Kriegsamt), responsible for coordinating economic with military planning in order to increase war production. That even this program had serious limitations was later attested by General Groener, who headed the War Office in its first year. Groener was in fact removed from this position when, in the summer of 1917, he tried to close some of the loopholes by recommending comprehensive control of prices, wages, and profits.40 More than two years earlier, and over a year before the Hindenburg-Programm was introduced, Les Guerres dEnfer had offered a far more "total" plan for economic mobilization. "Not a general, are you? Well then, your bouquin doesn't interest me." Thus the Paris publisher, Payot, to Alphonse Séché, already an established literary figure, early in 1915. Séché had tried several publishers with the same rudely negative response. Payot was later obliged to eat his words, publishing a new edition of the "bouquin" in 1918, but in 1915 the best Séché could do for his new manuscript was to persuade the firm of E. Sansot to lend its name, Séché himself footing the bill.41 Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, The War and German Society (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Economic and Social History of the World War, German Series) (New Haven, 1937), p. 77. For general comment on the inadequacy of Germany's economic measures in W. W. I, see also Arthur Dix, "The Experience of the Defeat", in Farago, op. cit., pp. 499-501. »» W i / I F 5.3404, T - 7 7 / 4 2 4 / 1 2 8 4 5 2 7 (see "Note on Sources"). Cf. Tuchman, op. cit., p. 374, and L. Farago, op. cit., p. 499. According to Farago the proposal was put forward by Arthur Dix. 40 On the origin, progress, and problems of the "Hindenburg-Programm", see: Dorothea Groener-Geyer, General Groener (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1955), pp. 47-63; Helmut Haeussler, General William Groener and the Imperial German Army (Madison, Wis., 1962), pp. 91-108; and Wilhelm Groener, Der Weltkrieg und seine Probleme (Berlin, 1920). 41 Alphonse Séché, Dans la Mêlée Littéraire, 1900-1930 (Paris, 1935), p. 185. 98

"TOTAL W A R " , T H E SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY?

31

Séché sent a copy of Les Guerres d'Enfer to his friend, Romain Rolland. Pressed for comment, Rolland wrote on 17 November 1915: "I was seized. Seized with horror, I must say, by its truly 'infernal' ideas and logic. But all in all, seized by the intellectual vigor and the somber passion which animate it." Rolland, writing from his selfimposed exile with the International Red Cross in Geneva, could not have been further in spirit from the path upon which Séché had embarked, but he refrained from disputing the book's thesis. Séché repaid this reticence by publishing an "Open Letter to Romain Rolland" in December 1916 which, while insisting on Séché's "republicanism", and defending Rolland against the scunrilous attacks which had been leveled at him, proclaimed as goal all that was anathema to Rolland: We must have but one preoccupation: to conquerl . . . With all my strength, I call for a dictator. . . . The best government is that which destroys the enemy. . .. All resources in the hands of the state: let us give it the maximum of power. . . . I repeat, militarism is a natural manifestation of the vitality of a people. .. . From now on, let us cease to abhor force. Force is creator of good and of evil. He who possesses it has the power to realize his aspirations. He who is deprived of it bows before the power of others.42 Rolland refrained from any reply. Prodded, he at last wrote Séché, privately: "I will never bow to the abuse of force, and I place a moral wall between those who have recourse to it, and myself. . . . No one has the right to sacrifice others to that which they do not believe. . . . My choice is made: liberty. And every enemy of liberty, from whatever quarter, is the enemy." To blunt the edge of this thrust, Rolland closed with words of friendship, but did not write another line to Séché for seventeen years.43 Les Guerres dEnfer was a book of uneven qualities. Eloquent, inspired, even beautiful, its lucid prose sometimes covered the most opaque thought. If it was, as has been said, "remarkably prescient",44 it was also full of mistakes, both in history and in prediction. An unkind critic would probably have called it repetitious, disorganized, 42 Ces Jours Lointains, Letters and other writings of Alphonse Séché and Romain Rolland (Cahiers Romain Rolland, Cahier 13) (Paris, 1962), pp. 99-100, 109-119. 43 Ibid., pp. 121-2. When Rolland wrote again, it was only upon learning that Séché had published some of his letters without permission: "Je me suis taté, pour savoir si j'étais mort. . . . Mais non, je vous assure, 'petit bonhomme vit encore . . . ' " (ibid., p. 128). Rut Séché's publication of the letters had been wellintentioned, Rolland's protest was mild, and their correspondence was resumed. 44 Eugen Weber, op. cit., p. 101.

32

"TOTAL W A R " , THE SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY?

and self-apologetic. Nevertheless, it marked an entirely new phase in the theory of total war. To begin with, Les Guerres (TEnfer drew together in one place, and in compelling prose, most of the fleeting and partial glimpses which had already appeared: With the appearance of scientific positivism, war becomes methodical, implacable, inhuman. It ceases to be an elegant sport in which theriskstaken confer glory. It incorporates itself, so to speak, with the national, social, and above all, economic life. On the battlefield, as in the workshop, machines supplant men. Generosity is not to be expected of a machine. . .. Modern society is industrial; by the same token, war becomes industrialized. . . . The country fights with all its men, all its intelligence, all its military and economic equipment, all its gold: the sum of all these forming its absolute force of resistance. . . . Modern conflicts tend more and more to destruction, to extermination.45 Like H. G. Wells, Séché thought it only logical that under these conditions, the "outmoded division of forces into combatants and non-combatants" would disappear. "The absolute communion of the nation, its total collaboration in the struggle - are these not an excuse for the brutality of enemy troops toward the civilian population?"46 And like Homer Lea, Séché regarded the neutrality of small nations, in a war between great powers, as impossible. Here he added a new dimension by looking beyond direct violations of neutrality to the idea, so termed by him, of "satellite" nations: As the planets have their satellites, the great nations shall have theirs: the small states, which will partake of their vital radiance. The small countries will not cease to be independent; they will no longer be neutral. They will probably experience, in addition, profound internal changes. . . . They will gravitate around the great nations, will live in their orbit, in their light and in their shadow. . . . Behold "internationalism" as I foresee it!47 Neither did Séché fail to examine the new technical developments of warfare, including the use of entrenchments, gas, submarines, armored vehicles, and airplanes. But Séché's originality lay chiefly in his conception of "the totalization of national forces by the State". With this rather strange and not very grammatical construction, Séché introduced his theory of total national mobilization. Séché had grasped the key principle that requisitioning and improvisation are inadequate; since national re45 49 47

Les Guerres d'Enfer, pp. 30-31, 255, 124, 27. Ibid., pp. 78, 90. Ibid., pp. 78, 104-7.

"TOTAL WAB", THE SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY?

33

sources are limited, military and civilian needs compete with each other and all must be brought under control to eliminate inessentials and insure maximum concentration on the war effort. "Everything realized to the benefit of the noncombatant population is largely at the expense of the national military power." 48 Séché carried this to the ultimate extreme. It followed, in his eyes, that private property, "private initiative", must be swept completely away: "Once the State, at last aware of its duty, decides that the defense of the country must be organized methodically, in order to overcome successfully the appalling damages of the war, private initiative loses all purpose." Here Séché went further than H. G. Wells toward the "practical realization of socialistic conceptions": All means of production, the entire economic plant, must pass instantly into the hands of the State. . . . At the very instant in which the general mobilization of manpower occurs, the general mobilization of economic forces must also take place. . . . All industry, all commerce, all administration not essential for the militarized life of the country will suspend their operations, close their doors. No more superfluities. That which is indispensable, the State will provide. All citizens will be in its charge—for it to clothe them, feed them, pay them. It will have all the initiative and all responsibility. On the other hand, it will dispose of the totality of the nation's forces.49 Séché was also more explicit than H. G. Wells in his portrayal of the garrison state. In peacetime, all men were to be divided into four categories, the first being combat forces, the rest assigned to supporting roles. Not only they, but also all women, would receive military passports, "mobilization cards", directing them to their specific duties in time of war. All categories of men and women would be required to undergo periodic "preparatory exercises". "At the moment of mobilization, every person will report to his post. . . . Thus, everything having been minutely organized, the painful spectacle of disarray offered by France during the first months of the present war will not be seen again." 50 Nor was manpower alone to be subject to this peacetime regimentation. In addition to "moral preparation" of the population for war, including indoctrination and obligatory sports and fitness training, the nation s physical plant was also to be shaped by military requirements. All means of transport, docks, factories, schools, and public buildings were to be not merely subject to requisition in time of war, but constructed and maintained from 48

«

so

Ibid., p. 124 (original italics), p. 75. Ibid., pp. 119-120, 122 ff. Ibid., pp. 120-121.

34

"TOTAL WAR", THE SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY?

the outset "with a view to their utilization by the armed forces". In sum, wrote Séché, under the direction of the Minister of War "the life of the country will be subjected entirely to military obligations". 51 One could hardly look for a better sketch to match the popular image of totalitarian Germany two decades later. Whether this was true "prescience" or, rather, "self-fulfilling prophecy", cannot be judged here. It is pertinent to mention that while Les Guerres d'Enfer is forgotten today, it was not ignored when it appeared. 52 True, it was not widely reviewed in the press, but it did receive acclaim from Laurent Tailhade in L'Oeuvre, and considerable attention in L'Action Française. The book went through four printings before the end of 1915, and Séché received a great deal of correspondence about it, some from military figures. In 1917, Séché even had the opportunity to debate it over dinner with Marshal Pétain, who was evidently familiar with it. Most of the response to the book was negative; but people often absorb what they try to fight. The influence of Séché's ideas was reinforced by the appearance of Georges Blanchon's La Guerre Nouvelle.™ Blanchon is personally less remembered today than Séché, whose literary reputation survives, but in 1915 and 1916 he was probably better known, and better accepted, as a commentator on military and political affairs. He wrote regularly for the established daily, Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires, and had written several books on military subjects before La Guerre Nouvelle. He was thus able to achieve for the latter what Séché could not: first publication in a well known Paris periodical. In January and February 1916, the first version of the book appeared in the Revue des Deux Mondes. 5* An expanded version appeared in book form later the same year. Limitations of space prevent us here from giving Blanchon's work the attention it deserves. It must suffice to point out that, with less flamboyance and better organization, Blanchon presented a vision of total war little less complete than that of Séché. In some points, it was more so, particularly on the erosion of limits upon the geographic extension of Ibid., pp. 161, 163. See the description of its reception, including some of the correspondence it elicited, in Séché's Dans la Mêlée Littéraire, pp. 185-203. 58 Paris, 1916. 54 A side effect of this success was that Blanchon lost "priority" to Séché; Blanchon had submitted his manuscript to the Revue des Deux Mondes before Les Guerres d'Enfer was published. See La Guerre Nouvelle, p. 39. 51

52

"TOTAL W A R " , THE SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY?

35

war ("world war") and on the duration of war, which Blanchon correctly saw would be lengthened by effective use of national resources. But not even Blanchon matched Seche's idea of the "totalization of national resources by the State". The suspicion that there was at work in the idea of total war not "prescience", but "self-fulfilling prophecy", is strengthened if we turn from France back to America; in particular, back to Bernard Baruch. Baruch recounts that as early as August 1915: I was building and elaborating in my mind a picture of the American economy, mobilized for war. I envisioned our farms and our factories synchronized into a vast machine which, in the event of war, would have to work day and night to maintain a military force in the field and sustain the civilian population. I saw raw materials—the products of field, forest, and mine — marshaled, distributed, refined, and fabricated into all the multitude of products that would be needed in such tremendous quantities. And I visualized a centralized governmental organization, manned by experts, directing the whole vast program.55 Whether or not Baruch saw this image whole in August 1915 is impossible to know today, but there can be no doubt that Baruch was urging national plans for "industrial mobilization" as early as September of that year, and that by April 1916, if not sooner, he interpreted this in terms of a "need to mobilize all the resources of the nation".56 In urging industrial "preparedness" in America, Baruch was not alone, and not first. He did, however, exert a direct personal influence in securing early steps toward this end, and eventually, as Chairman of the War Industries Board, he did more than any other single person to shape the United States' war economy to his own specifications. These specifications were naturally quite unlike Seche's extreme state socialism. Baruch would have choked upon Seche's: "all means of production, the entire economic plant, must pass instantly into the hands of the State". Baruch also opposed, in both World Ware, a compulsory labor law for the United States. Nevertheless, he was convinced that in "modern war" armies require "all the nation's resources of men, money, material, and morale mobilized behind Baruch, op. cit., pp. 22-3. As the terminology here suggests, Baruch and the later War Industries Board owed much to the contemporary "efficiency craze": see Samuel Haber, Efficiency and Uplift: Scientific Management in the Progressive Era (Chicago and London, 1964), Introduction and Ch. VII. M Ibid., pp. 23-4, and Margaret L. Coit, Mr. Baruch (Boston, 1957), p. 165. On Baruch's later role, see also Grosvenor B. Clarkson, Industrial America in the World War (Boston and New York, 1923).

55

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"TOTAL WAR", THE SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY?

them".67 What Baruch saw as necessary to achieve this was not the disappearance of private initiative, but rather its marshalling under the guidance and control of a centralized government bureaucracy. This was precisely the form taken by the "total war economy" in both Germany and the United States during die last years of World War II. One can hardly call this "prescience" on Baruch's part, when he was himself so much responsible for the outcome, certainly in the United States, and perhaps in some small measure also in Germany.58 Baruch's particular contribution to the evolution of total war was thus in the realm of administration. A dull word, which signifies a great deal in the exercise of effective power. Baruch early defined the key administrative problems of organizing a national economy for war. Foremost of these was to secure in the hands of a single, central agency, and in one person at its head, full authority and power over the entire economy. Of equal importance, was to specify that this agency's powers extended to all the "basic economic elements: (a) facilities, (b) materials, (c) fuel, (d) transportation, (e) labor, and (f) capital".59 And finally, it was essential to give this agency a clear and exclusive right to determine the relative priority of different types of production: The most important instrument of control was the power to determine priority—the power to determine who gets what and when. The significance of priority was first impressed upon me in 1916 by Sir Walter Layton, the British economist. . . . Through the use of priority rulings WIB was able to direct, restrain, or stimulate war production as the ever-changing situation required.60 These problems - centralization, comprehensive power, and priority rulings — were later the focal points of conflict and controversy in Germany's economic mobilization for World War II.

Baruch, op. cit., p. 21. Ibid., Chapters II-IV, XV-XVI (note p. 276 concerning influence in Germany). See also Coit, op. cit., Clarkson, op. cit., and Bernard Baruch, American Industry in the War, "A Report of the War Industries Board (March 1921) . . . Including . . . Mr. Baruch's own program for total mobilization of the nation as presented to the War Policies Commission in 1931 . . . " (New York, 1941). 59 Baruch, American Industry in the War (quoting from a pamphlet of the War Industries Board, 1918), p. 5. •« Baruch, The Public Years, p. 55. 57

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"He was . . . too fond of abstract and comprehensive planning." Albert Speer

In November 1944, General Georg Thomas, former head of the German Armed Forces' Economic and Armaments Office, was arrested by the Gestapo, for alleged complicity in the attempt upon Hitler's life on 20 July. In fact, Thomas had played no part in the events of 20 July, although, unbeknownst to the Gestapo, he had had a modest role in earlier plots against Hitler. On the other hand, he had rendered long and faithful service in Germany's rearmament and war effort. Along with others of similarly ambiguous posture, such as Thomas' friendly enemy of the past, Hjalmar Schacht, Thomas remained in prisons and concentration-camps until the end of World War II. He lived to answer some of the questions Allied interrogators wanted to ask him, but by then, less fortunate — or less tenacious — than Schacht, Thomas was extremely ill. He died in a military hospital at Falkenhausen in December 1946 at fifty-six years of age. What brought Georg Thomas to the Gestapo prisons? Not opposition to dictatorship as such, for Thomas had long been the most dedicated advocate in Germany of dictatorial control for the sake of total war mobilization. A Prussian officer of otherwise undistinctive conservatism, Thomas pursued this totalitarian mirage for fifteen years, only to be thrust aside just as it came within reach. By contrast, Hitler and other leaders of the "totalitarian" German state obdurately rejected the dictatorial measures proposed again and again by Thomas. When in 1942 Hitler at last gave way, it was to turn over the economy to his architect, Albert Speer, who quickly succeeded in destroying both Thomas and his organization. Thomas represents a double paradox, one side of which was dreadfully symptomatic of military leadership in the Third Reich: the

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conspirator against Hitler who from day to day "at the office" served his despised master with unwavering diligence, competence, even loyalty. The other side of the paradox was more unusual: the conservative general pressing totalitarian designs upon the unwilling dictator. Thomas' character was of a median quality among the German generals: though unimaginative, and lacking the exceptional moral vision of General Ludwig Beck, leader of the military opposition against Hitler, Thomas did not suffer from the spinelessness of Generals von Blomberg, Keitel, and von Brauchitsch. It is this character which makes him of such interest in illuminating the contradictions of life under National Socialism, as well as the foundations of Hitler's domination over the Wehrmacht. For Thomas did not vacillate out of cowardice; he acted with both courage and consistency in the interests of what he judged to be right. Thomas was born on 20 February 1890, in the town of ForstLausitz in Prussia. His father, Richard Thomas, was a manufacturer, as was the father of Thomas' wife, Käthe Fischer, of the same town. Georg went through the normal course of schooling, concluding at the Technische Hochschule in Stuttgart. In 1908 he entered the army, becoming a Lieutenant in 1910. He was in active service on the western front throughout World War I, fought in many of the major battles of the war, including the Somme, Verdun, and Cambrai, and was decorated many times: Iron Cross Second Class in 1914, Cross of Honor in 1915, Iron Cross First Class in 1916, and in 1918 the Ritterkreuz mit Sehweiten. In 1915 he was promoted to First Lieutenant, in 1917 to Captain. After the war, Thomas was one of the elite who remained in active service with the severely reduced Reichswehr. In 1922 Thomas was sent to East Prussia, assigned to the Garrison Headquarters in Königsberg. In the same year he married Käthe Fischer, a girl thirteen years younger than himself. In 1924 they had a son named Diether, in 1927 a daughter named Brigitte. In 1926 General Ludwig, formerly Chief-of-Staff at Königsberg, became head of the Army Ordnance Office; the following year he brought Thomas to Berlin. Thomas joined the Economic Staff, then still small and obscure (see Chapter III). It was not a post of prominence, but one of special trust. Thomas' rise from this point was steady and rapid. In 1928 he was promoted to Major, and in 1932 to Lieutenant Colonel. With the beginning of rearmament after Hitler's seizure of power, Thomas became a full Colonel in 1934, and less than four years later, a Brigadier General. In January 1940, he was

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promoted to Major General, and in the same year, to General der Infanterie. After working for some time with the Economic Staff, Thomas moved up to the post of Chief-of-Staff in the Army Ordnance Office. But when the Economic Staff was elevated to supra-service status in the Reichswehr Ministry in 1934, Thomas left his position with the Army to become its head. In the years that followed, he built it into an organization which at its height, about the years 1940-42, commanded hundreds of military-economic agencies reaching across the entire face of Europe. Thomas' thought, as expressed in his writings and speeches, changed little in substance between 1927 and 1946. In the years 1935-38, his speeches and published articles became heavily laden with National Socialist catchwords. It is doubtful that these were spontaneous expressions of Thomas' own beliefs. At times he used them as cover for substantive attacks on policies he opposed. However, the ideas about a "guided economy" put forward by some National Socialists accorded well with Thomas' own convictions. These convictions were not at all original. Aside from a specialized concern with economic affairs, he began from premises very ordinary for a patriotic officer of his time: That the German people is bearer of the best blood known on earth has been demonstrated in warfare more than once. Out of this soldierly superiority of ours, however, grow also other spiritual and mental strengths. . . . The German worker — and I include thereunder all workers of mind and hand together — is on the whole not to be surpassed in intelligence, skill, or enthusiasm for work by any worker of another country. . . . The German skilled worker, led by the German engineer, gives us . . . superiority over most other countries in the special field of industry. Yet Germany, said Thomas, could not call herself a great power so long as she remained a small country, hemmed in in the middle of Europe and unable to supply herself with even the most essential raw materials. We are overpopulated, as can be seen from the fact that we cannot feed our people on our own native soil; and we are economically dependent, for we have no tropical or subtropical raw materials at our disposal. Futhermore, our borders are very unfavorable. We have no natural boundaries. Nor do we have even historical boundaries. They are in no way the same as our ethnic boundaries and, viewed from the standpoint of the national state, must be characterized as intolerable.1 1 Wi/IF 5.113, T-77, Rolls 13-14, speech of 16 June 1936, for the Akademie fur Landesforschung und Reichsplanung.

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By the time Thomas spoke these words, in June 1936, he had good reason to suspect that Hitler meant soon to make Germany's boundaries less "intolerable". By then, however, Thomas had spent close to a decade working towards a goal less accepted either by Hitler or by the military elite: general economic mobilization. General von Moltke's disdain for economics still persisted in high military circles, and it took years of propaganda by Thomas and his associates to moderate this sentiment. Some leading generals, too, rejected the experience of World War I as model for the future, convinced that Germany should not try to repeat this disastrous essay in "mass warfare" (see Chapter III). But Thomas had concluded from World War I, in effect if not in so many words, that "modern war means total war". In 1928 he wrote, taking a leaf from Baron von der Goltz: Modern war is no longer a clash of armies, but a struggle for the existence of the peoples involved. All resources of the nation must be made to serve the war: above all, besides men, industry and the economy. 2

Whereas the Baron had left the matter right there, Thomas' words in 1928 were merely preface to a detailed presentation of the "purpose, necessity, and scope of economic preparations for mobilization". Still, Thomas did not speak of "total war" in 1928. It is even doubtful that he ever conceived total war in Alphonse Seche's "infernal" degree. Thomas was never enthusiastic about unlimited destruction, and he actively opposed Germany's progressive extension of World War II, even to the point of treason. But in his conception of Wehrwirtschaft, Thomas advocated a national commitment to war purposes so great as to deserve to be called "total". When the term "Wehrwirtschaft" was first introduced, about the year 1934, it was probably a euphemism for "industrial mobilization", which was not a legitimate subject for the Reichswehr's attention so long as the Treaty of Versailles remained in effect (that is, until March 1935). Thus when the Economic Staff was raised into the Wi/IF 5.2507, T-77, Roll 364/1206420: "Vortragsnotizen über Zweck, Notwendigkeit und Umfang der wirtschaftlichen Aufstellungsvorarbeiten", prepared for the use of the Reichswehrminister, transmitted under covering letter "H.Wa.A 732/28 gK Z Wi Stab", 22 November 1928. The document went out under the signature of General Ludwig, but the letterhead shows it was prepared by the Wirtschaftsstab, and Thomas later mentioned it as authored by himself (Georg Thomas, Grundlagen für eine Geschichte der deutschen Wehr- und Rüstungswirtschaft, Ch. II, p. 23, in T-77, Roll 635; for further details on this manuscript, see Note on Sources).

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Reichswehr Ministry, its title became Wehrwirtschafts- und Waffenwesen (Defense Economy and Weapons Affairs) - unwieldy enough, and perhaps suspect, but not strictly illegal. At this point, a theoretical distinction existed between "Wehrwirtschaft" and both Kriegswirtschaft (war economy) and Wirtschaftskrieg (economic warfare). This did not mean that "Wehrwirtschaft" was really limited to "defense economy", but that it referred to economic measures taken in peacetime, preparatory for war, but not extending to an economy at war. The vagueness of the term was such, however, that it readily expanded to accommodate a much broader range of meaning as the years passed. This trend gained both substance and impetus from the appearance, in 1935, of Erich Ludendorffs Der Totale Krieg. Ludendorff contributed nothing to the idea of total war which had not already appeared in the works of Alphonse Séché and Georges Blanchon, and he had a less clear grasp than Bernard Baruch of its administrative necessities.3 Nevertheless, Ludendorff drew together for the first time both the phrase and the conception of total war. It is possible that Ludendorff knew Léon Daudet's book, La Guerre Totale; but it is equally possible that the phrase came to him spontaneously, in the atmosphere of "total state" and "total" (or "totalitarian") this-andthat which pervaded German ideology and propaganda under the National Socialists. In any case, Ludendorff was a person of great prominence, where Séché and Blanchon were not, and while he held no powerful post in Hitler's regime, his voice echoed powerfully in German society and thought. Thus "total war" became rapidly a familiar term, and Ludendorffs book loosed a flood of disquisitions upon it.4 Georg Thomas was quick to see both the relatedness of Ludendorff s ideas, and the strength they could add, to his own conception of Wehrwirtschaft. As early as November 1935, he informed his listeners at the Wehrmachtakademie that "The totality of warfare, which according to modern conceptions is its only possible form, has Erich Ludendorff, Der Totale Krieg (Munich, 1935, 1936). Hans Speier (see Ch. I, n. 9, above) regards Ludendorffs emphasis on "psychological warfare" and his idea about "spiritual unity of the people" as new, but both were well developed by Séché and Blanchon. 4 For a brief sample in English translation see L. Farago (as cited in Ch. I, n. 9, above), Ch. II; on Wehrwirtschaft, ibid., Ch. XV. The latter is somewhat marred by an inexact and inconsistent translation of "Wehrwirtschaft", frequently given as "total economy". 3

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also led to the concept of total mobilization," Nor did Thomas think of this only in economic terms, for he added immediately: "This extends to all areas of life; not only to armaments and the economy, but also, for example, to political and moral education." In April 1936, he amplified his views on the relation between Wehrwirtschaft and "political education": Wehrwirtschaft is the reconstruction of the communal ( völkische ) basis of a national economy. It signifies a disavowal of the international principle of individualism. It is the economic principle of a total state and breaks with the liberalism of parliamentary democracy. . . . Only a strong state with strong leadership, a strong economy and a strong army can maintain its existence among the nations at length. . . . Therefore the first principle of Wehrwirtschaft: authoritarian and strong leadership of the state.5 "Wehrwirtschaft" denoted, then, not only specific economic measures of "defense" but an entire "national economy", and even the authoritarian political system necessary to back it up. In November of 1936, Thomas also gave a hint that "Wehrwirtschaft" was not limited to peacetime economics. To the Reich Chamber of Labor he explained that it was the experiences of World War I which had "forced upon us the idea of Wehrwirtschaft". The German soldier, said Thomas, had fought bravely and well; military mobilization and performance had been exemplary; battles in the field had been won — yet, "in spite of all that — the war was lost". The reason for this was that economic preparations for war had been insufficient or totally neglected. The victories of the German soldier had been nullified "because all the measures, which we today group under the heading Wehrwirtschaft, were not recognized by the government of that time, or were introduced too late". 6 Walter Warlimont, then a member of Thomas' staff, made the point explicitly when he wrote, in an article published in 1936, that Wehrwirtschaft was "the dynamic principle which embraces peace and war economics . . . " . In World War II, this was confirmed when the term was retained in the wartime title of Thomas' organization: the Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamt. Thus it came to cover all measures of war economy and economic warfare — for while Thomas by no means commanded all such measures, his office was certainly concerned with them. Wi/IF 5.113, T-77, Rolls 13-14, speeches of 7 November 1935, before the Wehrmachtakademie, and 17 April 1936, before the Verein Deutscher DiplomKaufleute. ' Ibid., speech of 24 November 1936. 5

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Ultimately, then, "Wehrwirtschaft" assumed the shape of the garrison state, allowing of no beginning and no end. While any threat of war exists, the nation's economy must be prepared; should the brink of war be reached or crossed, the economy must be mobilized, and thereafter must operate solely and entirely for the war's victorious conclusion; when the war has been won, the economy must remain girded for the inevitable future threat. In this sense, "Wehrwirtschaft" was the reincarnation of Alphonse Séché's "totalization of national forces by the State": a prescription for permanent total war. True, Thomas would have had as little sympathy as Bernard Baruch with Séché's state socialism. Himself of the bourgeoisie, Thomas had close personal ties with private business. He was careful to deny, publicly and explicitly, that Wehrwirtschaft meant "a new economic system"7 - that is, the overthrow of capitalism. True, his writings were sprinkled with pejorative comments on "overdeveloped capitalism" and "economic liberalism". But he declared categorically: "We reject the nationalization of industry and a planned economy", citing Hitler's own expressions of support for private property and private initiative in the economy. It also followed, in Thomas' eyes: "If one wishes to maintain a private economy, one must grant it a certain profit, even on public contracts...." 8 But this solicitude for the preservation and profits of private business did not prevent Thomas from advocating policies which interfered significantly with business independence: We demand . . . a private economy guided by the state.. .. The state should direct, but not go into business. . . . The state directs the economy according to national principles and the fundamentals of Wehrwirtschaft, and sets the tasks which the economy then discharges under its own responsibility and private economic initiative.9 In the last point, Thomas was not quite candid. Though he did reject "nationalization", he advocated far-reaching bureaucratic controls of nearly all aspects of economic life. As he indicated openly in articles published in 1938 and 1939, he was only partially satisfied with the extent or success of controls established in five years of National Socialist rule.10 For the fact was, that proponents of Wehrwirtschaft "Wehrkraft und Wirtschaft", in Wehrmacht und Partei, ed. Richard Donnevert (Leipzig, 1938/39), p. 165. 8 W i / I F 5.113, T-77, Rolls 13-14, speech of 7 November 1935. » Ibid. 10 "Wehrkraft und Wirtschaft" (see above, n. 7), and "Wirtsehaftliche Planung 7

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in Hitler's Germany found themselves with verbal support from many quarters, yet repeatedly frustrated in practice. The chief source of frustration, as will be seen in detail in later chapters, was the regime's failure to give a single central agency dictatorial authority and administrative power over the entire economy. Thomas had at first, by his own admission, placed great hopes in Hitler's government: In view of the declaration of policy given by Hitler in the Garnisonkirche of Potsdam [1933], and in view of other declarations indicating that Hitler wished to restore the honor of the German people, and promising a prosperous period of peace, it was self-evident that every decent German felt ready to support Hitler's measures. . . , u But as time passed, Thomas discovered point after point of conflict with the practical content of Hitler's decisions, and met repeated disappointments in his hopes for comprehensive and efficient economic mobilization. In consequence, he gradually entered into increasing opposition to Hitler's regime. This opposition was not based primarily on moral or political grounds. Thomas' sensibilities as a Prussian officer and a devout Christian were undoubtedly offended by the methods used by National Socialists against opponents, inconvenient personalities, and other selected objects of hatred. In a post-war memoir, Thomas expressed the disgust he had felt at the time of the "Rohm Putsch" and the murder of General von Schleicher, as also with the relentless application of the Niirnberg laws, the increasing number and severity of persecutions of Jews, the first measures against the Protestant and Catholic churches, and the unspeakable violence done to justice and the administration of the law.12 The Fritsch affair also revolted Thomas, though he was inclined to waste no sympathy upon von Blomberg, whom he viewed as having "dug a grave for the decent elements among the Officers' Corps . . . and laid the foundation for turning the Wehrmacht over to the Party". Still, there is no evidence that Thomas ever spoke out on any of these points while Hitler was in power, and it is open to question whether any of them, or all of them together, would have sufficed u n d L a n d e s v e r t e i d i g u n g " , in " D e r D e u t s c h e W i r t s c h a f t s a u f b a u " , S o n d e r a u s g a b e , Der Vierjahresplan (Berlin, J a n u a r y 1939). » Statement of 14 J u l y 1945, f i l m e d in T - 7 7 , Roll 635. 11 G e o r g T h o m a s , memoir of 2 0 J u l y 1945, entitled " G e d a n k e n u n d E r e i g n i s s e " , published in the Schweizerische Monatshefte, X X V ( D e c e m b e r 1945), p p . 5 3 9 - 5 4 0 .

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to draw him into treasonous acts. What brought him to that point was Hitler s approach to rearmament and economic affairs. Thomas first found himself in disagreement with Hitler on points of foreign economic policy relating to Russia and China.13 In the latter case, Thomas favored trading German armaments for raw materials from China, and indeed an agreement was signed with China in 1935 for precisely such exchanges. But a few weeks later, Hitler declared the agreement invalid, having decided upon a pro-Japanese policy. Thomas protested that the agreement must be upheld, but Hitler responded (if we trust Thomas' recollection) that "in politics one must be unscrupulous, . . . and agreements were made in order to be broken at the proper time".14 Thomas also favored a friendly policy toward Russia, as opposed to Poland. He had visited Russia with General von Vollard-Bockelberg (former head of the Army Ordnance Office) in 1933, when he was "deeply impressed with the vast expanse of Russian territory, the vitality of the Russian people, the magnitude of their possibilities for self-sufficiency in raw materials and agricultural products, and especially the great dimensions of Russian industry.. ,".15 On the basis of these observations Thomas concluded that the Soviet Union would very soon be a power of immense military-economic strength, with which Germany must seek to remain on good terms. Hitler early struck a blow against this position by concluding a Non-aggression Pact with Poland in January 1934. His position was still ambiguous, however. In November 1933, he had given his approval to a set of instructions formulated by the Foreign Office, for the German ambassador to Moscow, which recommended a generally friendly orientation. And despite the pact with Poland, in March 1934 an interim trade agreement was reached between Germany and Russia.16 Still, Thomas was not satisfied with this agreement. In April he prepared a memorandum urging that trade with Russia be expanded: Thomas' account of these and later disputes, ibid. See also Walter Görlitz, The German General Staff (New York, 1953), pp. 279-80, and Hans Bemd Gisevius, To the Bitter End (Cambridge, Mass., 1947), p. 353. Pertinent documents in W i / I F 5.383, T-77, Roll 86. 14 "Gedanken und Ereignisse", p. 539. 15 Ibid., p. 538. On Thomas' trip to Russia, see also Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945 (Washington, D. C., Department of State, U. S. Government Printing Office), Series C, Vol. I, p. 468. " Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series C, Vol. II, pp. 123 ff., 647. 13

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Whoever has seen the hunger for German machinery in Russia's armament industry and is familiar with the great industrial projects pending under the Soviet Russian State, and whoever, keeping in mind the difficulties faced by both countries with respect to foreign credits, is aware of Russia's resources of raw materials, must despite all political differences decide to set in motion as rapidly as possible the rebuilding of trade with Russia, in the form of barter exchanges. Why should we pay with foreign credits for ores, oil, cotton, and other goods, when they may be had in Russia in direct exchange for German manufactures?17 Whether or not Hitler ever received this document, or the substance of its arguments, is uncertain. It is doubtful, in any case, that it would have influenced the course he followed. In May 1934, he approved an agreement for Germany to place orders in Russia for thirty to fifty million marks, but only on condition that Russia place orders in Germany for three times that amount, and that the goods desired by Germany be sought first in Poland.18 Meanwhile, Hitler maintained a steady stream of public abuse against Bolshevism, hence, by implication, against the Soviet Union. In January 1935, expressing publicly his growing disdain for the Reichswehr, he told the Polish ambassador, Lipski, that the Reichswehrs policy of "collusion" with Russia against Poland was "the biggest possible absurdity".19 Of course, it no longer seemed such an "absurdity" to Poland in 1939, but as Hitler proved two years later, the Nazi-Soviet Pact was a tactical aberration; though Hitlers friendliness to Poland in the midnineteen-thirties was insincere, his remark to Lipski was truthful enough as a statement of his long-range views. Important as was the question of economic policy toward Russia, to Thomas in the early nineteen-thirties the pace of rearmament at home was a more urgent and more persistent issue of dispute with Hitler. Thomas later described the controversy as one between "Breite oder Tiefe der Rüstung", armament in breadth vs. armament in depth.20 Hitler's policy called for the most rapid expansion of the standing army, with its initial equipment, and provision for equipping W i / I F 5.383, T-77, Roll 86/810101, "Wa A 403/34 gK Wa Stab", 16 April 1934. The document went out under the signature of Liese, then head of the Heereswaffenamt, but was drafted by his Stabsabteilung. Thomas was at the time his Chief-of-Staff. 18 Documents on German Foreign Policy, series C, Vol. II, pp. 792-3. 19 Norman Baynes, ed., The Speeches of Adolf Hitler (London-New YorkToronto, 1942), vol. II, p. 1202. 20 Expositions of this controversy appear in many documents from the hand of Thomas and of others. See e.g. the speech by Thomas, EC-028, IMT XXXVI, pp. 119-120 (for explanation of this citation, see Note on Sources). See also 17

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its immediate wartime complements: "armament in breadth". Thomas' position was that Germany did not have the resources to build up a large army very rapidly and at the same time make provision for long-range supply during a war of substantial length, and he was convinced that it was long-range supply which would be decisive in any major war: "armament in depth". Thomas contended that Germany could never be self-sufficient in strategic raw materials, and if armaments absorbed the resources of Germany's industries, she would not have the foreign credits with which to buy them from abroad. Thomas also believed, like some of the iron and steel industrialists who had been traumatized by the depression crash, that rearmament at too rapid a pace would create a "capacity inflation" of Germany's heavy industries which could not in the long run be supported by Wehrmacht orders.21 In retrospect, there seems a touch of naivete in this. Clearly, in 1935 Thomas envisioned neither the barefaced looting of raw materials from German-occupied territories, as it later took place, nor the demoniac frenzy with which Hitler would drag Germany ever deeper into a war creating demands far in excess of what the "inflated" capacity of German industry could supply. On the other hand, neither did Hitler envision that the war would take such a course. Rather, he was convinced that his opponents would succumb to threats with hardly a fight, or that he would be able, through bluff, intrigue, and "Blitzkrieg', to achieve all his ambitions.22 Thomas, like many other German generals, was much less confident than Hitler that "Blitzkrieg" would work. Thomas displayed more courage than others, however, in setting out to impress upon the German public that a major European war would be a long one, and, fundamentally, a war of attrition. As early as June 1936, Thomas warned an audience, somewhat elliptically, not to be influenced by "the bias of a current war hypothesis" in evaluating the possibility Burkhart Mueller-Hillebrand, Das Heer, 1933-1945, Vol. II (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1956), p. 24; Thomas, Grundlagen, Ch. VIII, pp. 72-3. 21 W i / I F 5.383, T-77/86/810103, conference of 28 June 1935 between Thomas, Herbert Goring and others. 22 Concerning Hitler's "Blitzkrieg" strategy, see "Gedanken und Ereignisse", p. 540; United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report (European War), pp. 1-2; and Burton H. Klein, Germany's Economic Preparations for War (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), pp. 25-27, 173 ff. On the Blitzkrieg strategy generally, but not Hitler's ideas specifically, see Alan S. Milward, The German Econorruj at War (London, 1965), Chs. I and II. See also below, Chapter V.

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of Germany's being "starved out".23 In the following year, Thomas began to speak more openly, and in July 1937, he went so far as to prepare a report specifically for Hitler, warning that the pace of rearmament was outdistancing Germany's economic capacity, and that certain limits would have to be placed upon current military expansion. In particular, Thomas called for a halt in motorization and in the addition of new troop formations, both of which were essential to Hitler's "Blitzkrieg" strategy.24 In January 1939, Thomas' article for a special, self-laudatory issue of Der Vierjahresplan was no paean of praise. On the contrary, it exposed some of the weaknesses of economic mobilization to that time by listing measure upon measure still to be taken.25 In May Thomas stated flatly to representatives of the Foreign Office: I personally do not believe that a conflict between the Axis states and the Western powers will be a matter of a Blitzkrieg — that is a matter of days and weeks. For me . . . the essential thing is to see that our armament is set for all eventualities, including a long war.86 A year earlier, Hitler's decision to "settle tlie Czech issue" had precipitated a flurry of action on the part of those who were convinced that an attack upon Czechoslovakia would be disastrous for Germany. In the summer and early fall of 1938, a plot was hatched for taking Hitler prisoner and establishing a provisional government in place of his regime.27 In this plot, in which Admiral Canaris, Generals Oster, Beck, and Witzleben, Hjalmar Schacht, Carl Gördeler, and many other prominent figures participated, Thomas played little part, although he was informed and in support of the conspiracy.28 Upon Hitler's victory at Munich, however, the plot collapsed. With it collapsed one of the pillars of the conspiracy, General Franz Haider. W i / I F 5.113, T-77, Rolls 13-14, speech of 16 June 1936, p. 20. W i / I F 5.114, T-77, Roll 14, "Vortag über die wirtschaftliche Rüstungslage beim Führer", July 1937. The report was not presented to Hitler until November, and then in somewhat modified form. See W i / I F 5.1042, T-77/205/942325 ff. 25 Thomas, "Wirtschaftliche Planung und Landesverteidigung" (note 10, above). 28 EC-028, IMT XXXVI, p. 122, speech of 24 May 1939. 27 On the 1938 plot, see the following: Gerhard Ritter, Carl Goerdeler und die deutsche Widerstandsbewegung (Stuttgart, 1954); John W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power (New York, 1954); and Hans Rothfels, The German Opposition to Hitler (Hinsdale, 111, 1948). 28 It has been suggested that Thomas was actively engaged in the 1938 plot. Wheeler-Bennett, op. cit., p. 424, n. 1; Klein, op. cit., p. 151. However, this does not appear to be the case, judging by Thomas' own account in "Gedanken und Ereignisse", p. 541, and Gerhard Ritter's account, op. cit. »

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Thenceforward, Haider would move only with the greatest caution; and this fact brought Thomas somewhat to the foreground. It now became Thomas' role to act as intermediary between the retired Beck and the civilian conspirators, such as Schacht, Gordeler, and Ulrich von Hassell, on the one hand, and Haider and von Brauchitsch, the military men thought to be in a position to take effective action, on the other. In August 1939 and again in the spring of 1940, Thomas prepared detailed official memoranda demonstrating Germany's inability to last through a long war. Thomas and others who worked on these memoranda apparently hoped to shake the confidence of Keitel and his like in Hitler's ability to win out against all odds, if not Hitler's own determination to launch and extend the war. On both occasions the effort failed, but throughout this period and the following two years Thomas continued to serve as courier and intermediary between various individuals and groups involved in the conspiracies.2' His official work in administering the economies of occupied territories, and directing his network of subordinate agencies abroad, put Thomas in a particularly advantageous position for this conspiratorial role in the early years of the war, since it permitted him to travel abroad with considerable freedom and little danger of arousing suspicion. But in 1942, at the height of his career, Thomas' situation changed sharply. The death of Fritz Todt in February of that year brought Albert Speer to the fore as civilian Minister for Weapons and Munitions (later, Minister for Armaments and War Production). Speer's personality and talent, backed by Hitler's favor, combined with the mounting pressure of the war to bring about what Thomas had struggled for in vain: an economy geared to total war (see Ch. XIII). But to Speer's eyes, there was no room in this for Thomas.30 In fact, Thomas' organization was the only one of importance which Speer quite destroyed in form. Though he absorbed important See the works cited in note 27, above, and Gisevius, op. cit.; also Ulrich von Hassell, The Von Hassell Diaries (New York, 1947). 30 Milward writes: "The Wi Rii Amt could have been left as a sort of superfluous and harmless appendix in the bureaucracy. This kind of solution was quite common in National Socialist Germany. But Speer did not work that way" (op. cit., p. 78). But on the contrary, as Milward's own book shows, Speer did work exactly that way, in the case of other military offices, as well as several Reich ministries, their subordinates, and other important economic offices. See. below and Ch. XIII. 29

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functions of others, like the Four-Year-Plan, the Ministry of Economics, the Economic Groups, and the ordnance offices of army, navy, and air force, Speer left these largely intact in structure and in top personnel. They became meaningless appendages, but were not utterly dismembered. Dismembered, however, was what Speer insisted that Thomas' organization should be. And though he agreed initially that Thomas should enter his ministry as head of the department it wrested from him (the "Rüstungsamt"), this period of "cooperation" lasted only about six months. In October 1942, Thomas was obliged to leave Speers ministry, which then proceeded to swallow up everything of importance left to the "Wehrwirtschaftsamt" which Thomas still headed in the High Command of the Wehrmacht. Thereupon, Thomas withdrew entirely. In January 1943, Thomas was relieved of his command over the impotent remnant of what he had built over the past decade. For a time, he remained personal advisor to Keitel in economic affairs, particularly in negotiations with German-allied and neutral countries. By 1944, however, he had turned almost exclusively to writing an historical apologia, Grundlagen für eine Geschichte der deutschen Wehr- und Rüstungswirtschaft,S1 Meanwhile, Thomas withdrew also from his clandestine role as conspirator against Hitler. He thought the time already too late; by 1943, Germany's disaster seemed to him too certain to be averted by a change in regime. He may also have doubted that he could still be useful to the conspirators. Probably he was already under suspicion. His open scepticism of Hitler's power to bring the war to a rapid conclusion, and of Germany's ability to win, had won him a reputation for "pessimism" and "defeatism", almost equally serious heresies under Hitler.82 Thomas retained his high posts as long as he did because Keitel long regarded him as "irreplaceable" in his work. But Keitel was too weak, both in personality and in power, to defend Thomas against Speer. Besides, he may have welcomed the opportunity to relieve his High Command of Thomas' "pessimism". At the same time, by re51

For location of this manuscript study, see the Note on Sources. Though certainly no definitive history, it remains an important work of reference. 32 Thomas, written statement of 16 August 1945, pp. 2-3, filmed in T-77, Roll 635. (See Chapter XIII, below.) See also Wi/IA. 84, T-77, Roll 571, letter from Oberst Beutler to Thomas, 10 May 1944.

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taining Thomas as an advisor, Keitel avoided admitting that he had been harboring a "defeatist" in a prominent position. Keitel's high opinion of Thomas' competence was hardly shared by Speer and his ministry. Speer later said that Thomas was "able and intelligent", but "without special qualifications for his position". He also thought Thomas too uncritical of information submitted to him by the "non-experts" of his staff. Some of Speer's chief assistants were less polite, but it is doubtful that their judgments should be trusted in this.33 More pertinent here is Speer's view that Thomas was "too fond of abstract and comprehensive planning", and "too pessimistic and calculating".34 These comments suggest a fundamental difference between Speer and Thomas in approach to a "total war economy". Speer thought Thomas excessively concerned with questions of priority and "programs". Speer claimed to rely more upon technical rationalization and improvisation, upon the ingenuity ot engineers and industrialists. He never tired of repeating — perhaps because he held Thomas in more respect than he admitted — that Thomas had thought it impossible to increase all the military production programs simultaneously, whereas he, Speer, had achieved just that, to a degree beyond anyone's expectations. Nevertheless, the difference in approach was one of style and emphasis, not of substance. Full discussion of this point must be postponed to a later chapter, but we may note here that one of Speer's earliest important acts was to establish a supra-ministerial body called Zentrale Planting; later he created a Planungsamt in his own ministry. Thomas, for all his fondness for "abstract and comprehensive planning", never had a major "Planning Department" in his organization. There was a genuine difference in nature between Speer's "planning" and the "programming" of armaments production before his time, but both were forms of planning, and of the two, Speer's was by far the more centralized and the more "comprehensive" - not in details, but in breadth. Speer's planning was, of course, less "abstract" than that of Thomas, simply because "Speer had one advantage which Thomas never had, power".35 Speer had, too, an even greater advantage than personal power: the fact that Hitler had 33

See Milward, op. cit., pp. 25-26. The charge that Thomas' staff was guilty of "gross mistakes" in its calculations is discussed below, in the Note on Sources. 34 Ibid., pp. 85-86, and USSBS, Speer Interview No. 11, 17 May 1945, p. 2. 35 Milward, op. cit., p. 86.

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conceded at last the necessity for an economy geared to "total war". Perhaps the strangest charge which has been levelled at Thomas is that of a lack of "realism" as compared with Speer. Speer's "more realistic attitude", it has been said, permitted him to "swim with the tide" when Hitler changed course, in contrast with Thomas' "persistent failure [sic/] to agree with Hitler".36 This charge, astounding as it may seem in the recent work of a British scholar, has a certain cogency in the context in which it appeared, namely, a consideration of how Speer had succeeded where Thomas had failed, in acquiring great economic power. But in truth, Thomas' personal will to power was quite subordinated to his concern for the preservation, if not the aggrandizement, of Germany. In that context, there was nothing at all realistic about "swimming with the tide" which was, in Thomas' opinion and in fact, dragging Germany into the abyss. One must wonder, too, whether Speer's single-minded concentration on maximizing arms production for a war Germany could not win (Speer took office after the United States entered the war, and after the first bad winter in Russia), was more "realistic" than Thomas' "defeatism". It is possible — perhaps even probable — that Thomas deliberately kept low his estimates of Germany's war production capacity, to prod the regime in one of two directions: either toward a "total war economy", or away from war altogether. For to Thomas, either of these seemingly opposite policies would have been preferable to the one actually adopted by Hitler in the first years of the war. Given the particular time and conditions Hitler chose to launch his war, Thomas was vehemently against it. But failing efforts to dissuade Hitler through official channels, and to unseat him through conspiracy, Thomas' first concern was to maximize Germany's preparedness — less for victory, than for the blows he was certain would fall upon her. Thus treason against Hitler's regime, and dedicated service to its war effort, were to Thomas equally consistent means to his goal: the salvation of Germany. Thomas' "defeatism" grew out of two premises: first, that "modern war means total war", and second, that Hitler had delayed too long in ordering "total mobilization". Events might have proved Thomas wrong. Blitzkrieg and partial mobilization were highly successful for Germany until 1941. In the end, however, Thomas seemed vindicated Ibid.

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in his predictions that the war would become "total", and that Germany would have to commit herself totally. Was this "prescience", or "self-fulfilling prophecy"? Certainly it would be ludicrous to suggest that Georg Thomas made World War II "total". But Thomas and his associates did contribute to that end: in what manner and measure, succeeding chapters will show.

III ILLEGALITY: THE PERIOD OF SECRET REARMAMENT

"Economic preliminaries, like all mobilization preliminaries, are a violation of the Treaty of Versailles. But something must be done, if we do not wish to find ourselves helpless within a few days after an enemy attack." Georg Thomas, 1928

For more than a decade after World War I, thoughts of total war fell dormant. In Germany, all mobilization planning was illegal under the Treaty of Versailles, which had been adopted as binding in German law. This did not in the least prevent the Reichswehr from making mobilization plans in secret, but it did trim the plans to modest levels, and in practice, it hampered activities reaching to the economy at large. In theory, German military doctrine was far from united in expecting future wars to resemble the Great War. The beliefs of some top military leaders ran quite to the contrary. General Groener, for example, wrote in 1920: "The era of making war with mass armies is finished, for Germany, because our economic strength is no longer equal to the creation and maintenance of a mass army. It will be the task of the future . . . to keep military forces within practicable bounds."1 True, Groener's influence within the Reichswehr was limited, in part because of his role in the founding of the Weimar Republic. As Reichswehrminister in the years 1928-32, he stood in the shadow of his volatile protege, General von Schleicher. But a more important figure inclined toward Groener's view: Hans von Seeckt, chief architect of Germany's military reconstruction. In Gedanken eines Soldaten, von Seeckt challenged the view that material must conquer man in modern warfare; this was true, thought von Seeckt, only if one persisted in the use of mass armies: "the greater the mass of the fighters, the more certain the victory of 1

Groener, op. cit. (Ch. I, n. 40, above), p. 109.

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material". Von Seeckt questioned whether the results of mass warfare stood in any sensible relation to the people's sacrifices, even for the victor. From the strategic viewpoint, too: "the mass becomes immobile; it can no longer maneuver, can therefore no longer win victories; it can only overwhelm". To preserve the victory of the human spirit over material, concluded von Seeckt, wars must be fought with small, mobile, air-supported armies, well trained and equipped, and drawing upon — but not devouring — the human and material resources of the nation. "Destruction of the enemy army, not its country, remains as ever the highest law of warfare, even if it has sometimes seemed otherwise."2 One could hardly look for a more uncompromising repudiation of the idea of total war. Nevertheless, von Seeckt was conscious of a need for some economic preparations for war.3 Therefore, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, he tolerated - if he did not encourage — what was to prove Germany's first step on the road to the end he deplored. In November 1924, an obscure military staff was formed to prepare for a future industrial mobilization. The mission was considerably more grandiose than the office to which it was entrusted, which was originally composed of no more than four officers and two civilian consultants, and inherited the title of an innocuous predecessor, the "Reserves and Replacements Staff" (Nachschubstab). Its name was soon changed to "Economic Staff' (Wirtschaftsstab) — somewhat daringly, since what legal activities could this title cover? Indeed it covered none; but so it was called until after the fall of the Weimar Republic.4 2 Generaloberst H a n s von Seeckt, Gedanken eines Soldaten (Berlin, 1929), p p . 90, 85-6, 91-100. S e e also, on Seeckt's views a n d influence, W o l f g a n g S a u e r , in: K. D . Bracher, Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik ( V i l l i n g e n / S c h w a r z w a l d , 1960), Part One, Ch. I X , esp. p . 2 7 3 , in this connection. 3 Seeckt, op. cit., p. 100. 4 Occasionally also called " W i r t s c h a f t s a b t e i l u n g " or " W i r t s c h a f t s g r u p p e " . O n the b a c k g r o u n d , establishment, tasks a n d responsibilities of the E c o n o m i c S t a f f , see W i / I F 5.515, T - 7 7 / 1 1 6 / 8 4 5 3 9 9 , 8 4 5 2 2 6 ; W i / I F 5.522, T - 7 7 / 1 1 8 ; W i / I F 5.3404-5, T - 7 7 / 4 2 4 ; W i / I F 5.1983, T - 7 7 / 3 2 7 ; W i / I F 5.512, T - 7 7 / 1 1 4 - 5 ; a n d W i / I F 5.1344, T - 7 7 / 2 8 0 . T h e first h e a d of the 1924 staff w a s Major S o l d a n ; its other three m e m b e r s were C a p t a i n s Schüler and von Hanneken, a n d Major (ret.) J a n s e n . J a n s e n was in c h a r g e of contacts with industrialists; he later took over the job of collecting materials for a history of the E c o n o m i c S t a f f a n d its successors, a n d w e o w e him a d e b t of gratitude for preserving a n d collating important g r o u p s of materials, as well a s for s o m e preliminary studies, such as: " D i e E n t w i c k l u n g der Dienststelle f ü r Wehrwirtschaft im W a f f e n a m t , 1 9 2 4 - 1 9 3 3 " , in W i / I F 5 . 3 4 0 5 , T - 7 7 / 4 2 4 / 1 2 8 5 0 3 3 - 4 7 . Hanneken, later a general, p l a y e d an important p a r t in

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The position of the Economic Staff was only slightly more imposing than its size. It was not placed directly under the High Command, but rather under the Army Ordnance Office (see Chart I).5 There, it was supposed to be on a level of equality with the regular ordnance divisions, which in practice, however, were not only larger but much better established than the upstart Economic Staff. Not unnaturally, the older divisions looked with little enthusiasm on the new staffs special privileges, and on its search for an authority superior to theirs. Both special privileges and high authority would have been necessary for the Economic Staff to meet its full responsibilities. At the outset, its main task was set at nothing less than centralizing and coordinating all the Reichswehr's activities in armament development and procurement. Obviously this required, at the very least, that the Economic Staff have the privilege of complete information on all the Reichswehr was doing in this broad field. But information hardly sufficed. What the Economic Staff thought necessary was a centralized power of decision over the many independent projects of military agencies in arms development or procurement. The magnitude of the opposition it faced in this point may be guessed from a glance at Chart I.8 In the mid-nineteen-twenties there were over two dozen Reichswehr offices engaged in armament or economic affairs. Any one of them could make independent approaches to industry or issue independent contracts for goods, up to the limit of their budgetary allotments, without consulting the others. Germany's economic administration, especially from 1937-1942, as Plenipotentiary for Iron and Steel, as described in later chapters. 5 According to Wheeler-Bennett (op. cit., p. 143), Seeckt actually established a Riistungsamt ("Riistamt") in the Reichswehrministerium in November 1924. Gordon Craig follows Wheeler-Bennett on this point: Politics of the Prussian Army (Oxford, 1955), p. 407. This is however, an error, perhaps arising from a slight ambiguity in the first documents concerning the Nachschubstab (later Economic Staff), which was intended to prepare the way for an eventual "Riistamt" (see chapter VI, below). However, neither the "Riistamt" nor its intended superior, the "Kriegsamt", were ever created as such. All the functions ascribed to the "Riistamt" by Wheeler-Bennett were carried out by the Wirtschaftsstab, not in the Reichswehrministerium, but in the Heereswaffenamt. Continued references to Riistamt and Kriegsamt in the later 1920's and early 1930's are in the context of plans for administrative reorganization in the event of war; these remained entirely in the realm of fantasy. • The information in Chart I is partially extrapolated from documents later than 1924, and may therefore contain slight anachronisms, particularly concerning the functions of the Waffeninspektionen. For explanation of German titles and abbreviations used in this and other charts, see Note on Nomenclature.

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The Economic Staff found this situation intolerable - wasteful and undesirable in the short run, and potentially disastrous in the long run: Decentralized procurement is possible only so long as requirements are smaller than production capacity. . . . If however, as is the case with us, the entire productive capacity of the country must be fully utilized, there ensues such a scarcity, that in making conversions, or indeed even in initially distributing contracts among the industrial firms, the needs of one agency can be met only through a certain detriment to the needs of another. Decisions of this sort can be made only by a central office.7 Thus the Economic Staff redefined, in March 1925, the key importance of centralization and priority rulings, to which Bernard Baruch had earlier drawn attention, particularly by the publication, in 1921, of his final report on the work of the War Industries Board in America.8 Though the Reichswehr did not explicitly deny the justice of the argument for centralization, it never granted the Economic Staff the power it sought. The Economic Staff did not therefore sit idle. If it could not rate military projects in order of priority, it could at least combine them into a comprehensive program which would indicate what economic resources were needed. If it could not decide where military contracts were let, it could at least canvass German industry to find out where they ought to be let for most effective use of resources. Work therefore began along two lines: first, to draw up a unified "Armament Production Program"; and second, with the aid of "patriotic" businessmen, to work out plans for putting this program into production in the event of war. In these endeavors, the Economic Staff became privy to a broad range of information on "secret rearmament" in the Weimar Republic, and on the part played therein by private industry. No definitive account of "secret rearmament" in the Weimar Republic exists,9 and one may wonder whether one can ever be written. Reli' W i / I F 5.3404, T-77/424/1284506-7, "Pfennig 3 8 / 2 5 an., streng geheim", 7 March 1925. "Pfennig" was the code name for the Army Ordnance Office at that time, "an", or "Andreas", for the Economic Staff. See Note on Sources. 8 Bernard Baruch, American Industry in the War (Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, 1921). 9 For the best published accounts, with further bibliography, see: K. D. Bracher, W. Sauer, and G. Schulz, Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung (Koln, 1960), Part Three, Chapter II, Section 2; and Hans W. Gatzke, Stresemann and the Rearmament of Germany (Baltimore, 1954). See also Bracher, Die Aufldsing der Weimarer Republik (Villingen/Schwarzwald, 1955, 1960), Part One,

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able documents are scattered and incomplete, and decades of polemics have created a shroud of mystification so dense it can hardly be pierced. Current views still range to extremes. On the one hand, Erich Eyck has revived the charge "that Germany had never disarmed .. .".10 On the other hand, Gerhard Meinck gives us these airy disclaimers: "The real extent of the Treaty violations up until 1933 can only be guessed at from the available materials; in any case one can state that they were insignificant. In the course of the years the bounds on armaments and equipment laid down at Versailles were now and then trivially overstepped."11 It is easy to say that the truth lies somewhere between these extremes; the difficulty is to find its exact location. What cannot be doubted is that for the Reichswehr, the Treaty of Versailles was nothing but a vexatious obstacle, to be circumvented in every possible way and brushed aside at the earliest opportunity. From at least 1924 on, violations of the Treaty of Versailles were directed systematically from top Reichswehr offices. In subsequent years, the military restrictions imposed upon Germany were transChapters V and IX; and Gatzke, Russo-German Military Collaboration During the Weimar Republic", American Historical Review, LXIII, No. 3 (April, 1958), pp. 565-597. One of the most extensive treatments is Georges Castellan's Le Rearmament clandestin du Reich (Paris, 1954). This is a mine of information, largely undigested and possibly indigestible, drawn almost exclusively from the files of the French secret service. Very useful too is: United States, Department of State, The Treaty of Versailles and After: Annotations of the Text of the> Treaty (Washington, D.C., 1947) ( = Conference Series, 92). Pertinent unpublished documents may be found scattered through T-77 and some other Alexandria records (see Note on Sources), especially W i / I F 5.2507, T-77/364/120643-42, "Unterlagen für die Orientierung des Reichskabinetts", 24 October 1928; under the same title, related material in W i / I F 5.3622, T-77/ 431; and W i / I F 5.3683, T-77/437, "Stellungnahme zu den Behauptungen des Auslandes iiber deutsche Rüstungen", gK (military top secret), 1933. (Part of the last document was used at the Niirnberg trials as NIK-11,727, the original of which is W i / I F 5.5, T-77, Roll 2.) See also other documents cited in this chapter. 10 Erich Eyck, Ceschichte der Weimarer Republik vol. 2 (Erlenbach Zürich, 1956), p. 69, original italics. Eyck here quotes Brig. Gen. J. H. Morgan in a letter to The Times (London), 4 November 1933. Morgan's charge had been taken up earlier by Wheeler-Bennett (op. cit., p. 185), who also repeated without qualification a rumor that the final report of the Interallied Military Control Commission was "deliberately suppressed and ignored" (p. 186; Wheeler-Bennett erroneously dates Morgan's letter "6 November"). Morgan himself, however, called this allegation "altogether too imaginative" (Assize of Arms, New York, 1946, Introduction). 11 Gerhard Meinck, Hitler und die deutsche Aufriistung (Wiesbaden, 1959), p. 4. For this period Meinck relies heavily on Burckhardt Mueller-Hillebrand's Das Heer, 1933-45, Vol. I (Darmstadt, 1954), which contains some inaccuracies.

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gressed in almost every point. In various ways, Germany kept over 100,000 men under arms, concealed stocks of arms from World War I, made mobilization preparations, developed prohibited weapons, undertook projects illegal in Germany on foreign soil (Russia, Sweden, Holland), carried on prohibited export-import trade in arms, produced more arms than were permitted in plants authorized to produce armaments, and also produced arms in unauthorized plants. These activities were carried out in complete awareness, and express defiance, of their illegality. Taken together, these violations were far from "insignificant". The most blatant, and the most fateful in their political consequences, were violations involving men under arms. Military formations beyond the authorized seven-division (or 100,000-man) Reichswehr included the Border Defense (Grenzschutz) units, Freikorps units, the "Schwarzer Reichswehr", political armies like the Stahlhelm and the National Socialist S. A., police, and "sport" associations.12 There is no way of knowing exactly how many men received unauthorized military training through these illegal or semi-legal formations, but there can be little doubt that the number was large. On the other hand, most of the military units outside of the regular Reichswehr were ill-equipped and ill-disciplined. Relations between the Reichswehr and the illegal formations were often marked by mutual suspicion, disdain, or hostility. Only the Border Defense units appear to have been integrated with the Reichswehr's operational plans. Perhaps the best estimate of the military importance of illegal formations is given by the number of men the Reichswehr hoped it could mobilize quickly in the event of war. In 1924, when the Economic Staff was born, the Reichswehr had a suiprisingly high notion of how large an "A-Heer" (AufstellungsHeer), or mobilization army, could be organized. Mobilization plans in that year called for a sixty-three-division army; plans of the previous year had called for only thirty-five divisions. It was quickly seen that both figures were much too high. In the spring of 1925 the plans were scaled down to twenty-one divisions. To this figure the Truppenamt13 clung in its operational planning, but the Army Ord12 Illegal military formations are discussed most fully by: G. Castellan, op. tit.; Thilo Vogelsang, Reichswehr, Staat, und NSDAP (Stuttgart, 1962); and K. D. Bracher et al., Die Nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung, (n. 9, above). See also Meinck, op. cit., pp. 5-8. 15 "Troops Office": the thinly disguised (illegal) General Staff of the Army. See discussion of the "Zentrale" in the Note on Sources.

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nance Office, and particularly the Economic Staff, were doubtful that arms and equipment could be provided for even that number of divisions. Mobilization planning was therefore carried out on two levels through the late nineteen-twenties: on the one, for an "IdealHeer" of twenty-one divisions, and on the other, for a "NotstandsHee/', or emergency army, of sixteen divisions. Since with the passage of time the Economic Staffs estimates of Germany's armament capacity went down, rather than up, the Ordnance Office all but abandoned the Truppenamt's goal of twenty-one divisions, and its armament production program was worked out on the basis of sixteen divisions.14 Not until the summer of 1932, the twilight of tiie Weimar Republic, did General von Schleicher introduce a "second armament program" ("2. Rüstungsprogramm") based upon twentyone divisions.15 However, this was a five-year program, whose completion was not thought possible before 1938. As for the goal of sixtythree divisions, it was only revived by Hitler after his rise to power. In general, then, from 1925 through 1932 the Reichswehr never counted on being able to raise more than twenty-one divisions in the event of war, and doubted that it could equip that many. Now, the Treaty of Versailles had reduced the legal size of the Reichswehr to seven divisions, or 100,000 men. Thus from 1925 on, the Reichswehr was engaged in illegal planning for the mobilization of an army triple the size it was allowed; still, three times 100,000 is only 300,000. Such an army was large by the the standards of the early eighteenth century, but only moderate in size by the standards of the nineteenth (Prussia's peacetime army stood at 400,000), and it was fairly small by the standards of its time. In 1929, England had standing armies 14 A statement that the goal of 63 divisions had been laid down in the so-called "Sommerarbeit", appears in W i / I F 5.3404, T-77/424/1284455, conference of 24 November 1924. An explanation of the terms "Winterarbeit" and "Sommerarbeit", which stood for early mobilization plans of the Reichswehr, appears in a very interesting document in W i / I F 5.512, T-77/114/843560-74, "Zentrale 414/5.23", 9 May 1923. This document, which includes a general discussion of the armament situation in 1923, and of the attitude thereto of the civilian government, also states the goal of 35 divisions set in 1923. For the reduction to 21 divisions in 1925, see W i / I F 5.515, T-77/116/845188; W i / I F 5.1983, T-77/327/1162261 and W i / I F 5.3404, T-77/424/1284498, -500. Wheeler-Bennett sets the date of this reduction in March 1926 (op. cit., 143, n. 3). For the reduced goal of 16 divisions, see W i / I F 5.2507, T-77/364/1206479-562, "H.Wa.A. 327/29 gK Z Wi Stab", 24 April 1929, "Grundsätze für die technisch-wirtschaftliche Vorbereitung des Grenzschutzes". 15 See especially Castellan, op. cit., pp. 83-5; also Wolfgang Sauer, in K. D. Bracher et al, (n. 12, above), pp. 777, 779-80.

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of over 300,000 men (Regular and Territorial Annies), France over 350,000 (in Europe alone), and Poland over 250,000. Even Czechoslovakia's small army of 130,000 men exceeded the size of the legitimate Reichswehr.18 All these countries, of course, had their own plans and preparations for mobilizing and arming larger numbers in the event of war. England and France, we observe, each had already under arms as many men as Germany planned to mobilize. Thus relative to her probable opponents, Germany's planned mobilization force of twenty-one divisions, or 300,000 men, was at best a defensive force, with hardly any hope of launching or sustaining a war of conquest. While unauthorized military training was the most conspicuous expression of the Reichswehr's disrespect for the Treaty of Versailles, other avenues of evasion were not neglected. Perhaps most famous today are the efforts Germany expended to develop new types of weapons and to train forces in prohibited types of warfare on foreign soil, particularly in Russia. For these purposes certain "private" firms were established as cover, in reality directed by the Army Ordnance Office. In Russia, experiments and training in gas and air warfare were carried out by "Gefu" (Gesellschaft zur Forderung gewerblicher Unternehmungen, GmbH) and its successor, "Wiko" (Wirtschaftskontor).17 Less known were " S t a m a g ' and the "Fertigung GmbH". The former (Stahl tind Maschinengesellschaft mbH) was created as cover for secret negotiations on the sale of German-produced arms to Turkey in 1925-26, and later served to camouflage illegal purchases of arms by the Reichswehr within Germany. The Fertigung GmbH was engaged in developing air force armaments.18 Nevertheless, as suggested in our discussion of the Reichswehr's mobilization goals, the Army Ordnance Office and its Economic Staff had a fairly low estimate of Germany's ability to arm and supply its "A-Heer" upon the outbreak of war. This point is of sufficient importance to deserve closer attention here. 16 League of Nations, Armaments Yearbook, 1929-30 (Geneva, 1930); cf. Meinck, op. tit., pp. 5-8. See also Supplementary Notes (III/ll). 17 See especially Gatzke, "Russo-German Military Collaboration..." (n. 9, above). 18 Concerning Stamag, see Wi/IF 5.1344, T-77/280/1105074-86; Wi/IF 5.3049, T-77/399, "H.Wa.A. 611/30 gK Z Wi", 5 September 1930; Wi/IF 5.512, T-77/ 114/843408-11; and Wi/IF 5.509, T-77/113. References to Fertigung GmbH in: Wi/IF 5.3622, T-77/431, "Wa B 6, 2532/28 Org. gK Z", 23 October 1928; W i / I F 5.511, T-77/114/843134; and Wi/IF 5.509, T-77/113. Further information on German arms deals with Russia, Sweden, Turkey and others in: Wi/IF 5.1344, T-77/280/1105087-116; Wi/IF 5.1746, T-77/307; and Wi/IF 5.2546, T-77/368.

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In September, 1928, the Economic Staff drew up a top secret survey of current industrial preparations for war.19 This showed, first of all, that the production capacity of firms authorized to produce armaments by the Interallied Military Control Commission (I.M.C.C.) far exceeded the amounts of weapons and munitions which Germany was permitted to manufacture. Specifically, Germany was allowed a maximum annual production for the Reichswehr of 9,000 rifles, 303 machine-guns, 85 pieces of artillery (all calibers), 35,000 7.7 cm. shells, and 36 million cartridges.20 As compared with this, the German plans of 1928 show that Simson alone could have produced over 6,000 rifles and 600 machine-guns monthly, this amount to be raised, after a period of time, to over 15,000 and 1,500, respectively. Rheinmetall, being located in the Ruhr, was, significantly, not counted on for production in case of war. On the other hand, preparations were under way at Borsig (in Berlin) to enable that firm to produce about 100 pieces of artillery per month, not however, until the fourth month from the initial date of mobilization. Polte had a monthly production capacity of ten million cartridges, Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks AG of 2,250 shells.21 Thus Germany would have been able, in case of war, to produce within a single month at least twice the number of machine guns, two-thirds the number of rifles, and one-third the number of cartridges, allotted to her for an entire year, though only slightly more than the permissible number of shells. But again, while these figures for production capacity were "excessive" by the standards of the Treaty of Versailles, they were far below the requirements set down by the Truppenamt for its twentyone division "A-Heer". This was true especially of munitions, in which the maximum total capacity, both current and planned, in 1928 was 90 million cartridges per month. The Truppenamt was demanding 250 million cartridges per month. Similarly, the monthly capacity for artillery shells was 2,250, as compared with a Truppenamt demand for no less than 2,300,000. Considering that Great Britain's shell production in World War I averaged over 3,800,000 shells per month, the Truppenamt demand seems not exorbitant, and Germany's actual capacity of 2,250 shells seems ludicrously small.22 » W i / I F 5.2507, T-77/364/1206440, 1206443-62, "Vortrag über fabrikatorische Vorbereitungen", 7 September 1928. 20 Castellan, op. cit., p. 255. " W i / I F 5.2507, T-77/364/1206448-53, "H.Wa.A. 619/28 gK Wa Stab", 7 September 1928. 22 Figures on British production in W.W.I: G.A.B. Dewar, The Great Munitions

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We have been considering estimates of production capacity in the event of mobilization, not production currently in progress. Very little information is available on the quantity of weapons and munitions actually produced in Germany during the Weimar Republic. Certainly more was produced than permitted, since the Reichswehr absorbed all the authorized amounts and Germany was selling arms illegally abroad. Moreover, while the "authorized" firms were producing at least what they were allowed, there was also some production of infantry munitions in 1928 at two "unauthorized" firms set up under the auspices of the Army Ordnance Office, namely: "Metattwarenfabrik Treuenbrietzen" and "Drahtfabrik SalzwedeT'.23 Still, it is probable that current production of armaments in Germany was far below the capacity estimated as available for mobilization. In 1927 the Reichswehr issued orders for forty million cartridges; it was proposed that annual production of rifles and cartridges from 1928 on be, respectively, eleven thousand and forty-one million. These figures do not greatly exceed the allowed amounts of nine thousand and thirty-six million.24 An incident in 1930 suggests the same picture for that year: to a proposal that the monopoly position of the "authorized" firms be countered by extending larger orders for arms to other firms, Major Soldan (who had been the first head of the Economic Staff) replied that the Reichswehr could hardly keep the "authorized" firms in business.25 Nor is this picture altered if we turn to consider efforts to enlarge the production capacity of Germany's armament industry, in preparation for future mass production. Such efforts were favored by the Economic Staff as the best device for rebuilding Germany's war potential. Georg Thomas, for example, wrote in 1928: Feat (London, 1921), pp. 107-8. Castellan gives some further details on illegal arms production in Germany, which do not change the quantitative picture given here and below. Note that Castellan's production-capacity estimates are for basic industries (metals, chemicals, automotive industry), not for arms and munitions proper. Castellan, op. tit., pp. 255-60. 23 Occasional "Probeaufträge" were also given out to the Berlin-Karlsruher Industrie A.G., and, according to Castellan (op. cit., p. 255) also to Rheinmetall. 24 W i / I F 5.517, T-77/117/846649,-84, -87: "H.Wa.A. 310/27 gK Wi Stab", 7 May 1927; "T.A. 961/27 T 2 C/II b gK Z", 30 June 1927; and "H.Wa.A. 232/27 gK Z Wi Stab", 7 May 1927. 25 W i / I F 5.3049, T-77/399, "Leiter des Beschaffungswesens 150/30 gK Z Stab III", 29 August 1930. (This is a commentary on a dra*t of "H.Wa.A. 611/30 gK Z Wi", which concerned illegal measures to be taken subsequent to Allied evacuation of the Rhineland.)

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Economic preliminaries, like all mobilization preliminaries, are a violation of the Treaty of Versailles. But something must be done, if we do not wish to find ourselves helpless within a few days after an enemy attack. We have a choice between stockpiling and industrial preparations. The latter have considerable advantages of both political and financial nature over stockpiling.26 To begin with, argued Thomas, "industrial preparations" were more easily camouflaged than actual production of arms. By the same token, there was less danger of exposure by workers in the plants. Investment in plant expansion was both less costly and more profitable than current production and stockpiling. It was of lasting value, and it benefited (hence won the indebtedness of) the firms. It provided means not only for the initial equipment of an army, but for long-term supply through a war. Finally, finished armaments quickly grow obsolete, whereas expanded plant capacity can be applied whenever needed to produce the latest types of weapons.27 It has been suggested that the Reichswehr adopted this policy and followed it with great energy. John Wheeler-Bennett, for example, maintained: From 1924 to 1927 the emphasis lay on the planning and blueprinting of prototypes, but with the departure of the Control Commission there opened that second phase in German rearmament during which the centres of German industry were adapted for the mass production of the prototypes prepared abroad. German military expenditures began to increase steadily and rapidly. From the beginning of the Dawes period in 1924 to the peak point of prosperity four years later, the Reichswehr budget rose from 490 million marks to 827 million.28 This passage leaves the impression that a sum of anything up to about 300 million marks was spent in the year 1928 alone for "the adaptation of the centres of German industry for the mass-production of the prototypes prepared abroad". In fact, however, the sum scheduled to be spent by the Reichswehr for "industrial preparations" in the fiscal year 1928-29 was 27,263,000 marks, according to top-secret information provided by the Economic Staff to the Truppenamt in October 1928. Of this, about 12,445,000 marks was for the expansion of aircraft and aircraft-equipment inW i / I F 5.2507, T-77/364/1206419-34, "H.Wa.A. 732/28 gK Z Wi Stab". See Ch. II, n. 2, above. 27 Much the same arguments were published the following year by Seeckt, op. cit., pp. 99-100. 23 Wheeler-Bennett, op. cit., p. 187. Wheeler-Bennett appears to follow here the argument of Jacques Benoist-Méchin, Histoire de l'armée allemande, Vol. I (Paris, 1936), p. 380, though with slight changes in figures and dates.

28

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dustries. Significantly, only 360,000 marks of the latter was paid out of the Reichswehr budget; the rest was paid by the Transport Ministry. Of the other 14,818,000 marks, nearly 11,400,000 was tagged for projects explicitly stated to be illegal, 3,000,000 for projects of dubious legality, and only somewhat under 200,000 marks for projects involving no violation of the Treaty of Versailles.29 Clearly these "industrial preparations" were almost wholly illegal; but as clearly, they were smaller in scope than Wheeler-Bennett imagined. It should not be assumed that German protestations of their country's disarmed state were designed solely for the hostile press or foreign nations. On the contrary, they appear repeatedly in top secret internal communications of the Reichswehr.30 That the Reichswehr was sincerely convinced of Germany's relative helplessness appears most clearly from its expectation that, in the event of war, Germany would be unable to defend her border territories. This was explicitly stated, for instance, in a top secret document of 1927: As a result of our almost total disarmament and in view of the superiority of our adversaries, in the event of war we will have to reckon with the loss of still further areas which are of special importance for our war economy (Rhineland, Ruhr, Upper Silesia).31 So firm was this expectation, that the whole complex of armament planning during the Weimar period assumed that Germany would be forced to rely solely on the productive resources of "Innerdeutschland" - i.e., central Germany, minus the Ruhr as well as other border areas.32 Altogether, it would be as wrong to exaggerate the extent of secret rearmament in the Weimar Republic, as to deny its importance. Germany was not so "helpless" as her more paranoid officers believed or pretended; on the other hand, she was quite incapable of realizing See the documents cited in n. 9, above, especially W / I F 5.2507, T-77/364/ 1206437-42, and Wi/IF 5.3622, T-77/431, "Wa B 6 2532/28 Org. gK Z", 23 October 1928; also Wi/IF 5.1983, T-77/327. 30 For example see document cited in n. 26, above; also Thomas, Grundlagen, Ch. II, p. 23. 31 EC-98, "Denkschrift über die Notwendigkeit eines interministeriellen kriegswirtschaftlichen Ausschusses", gK (top secret), year apparent from the file designation "zu A II 378/27 (L - ?) g"; original italics. 32 These views appear in many documents in T-77, especially in: Wi/IF 5.3404-5, 5.2507, 5.3179, 5.1983, and 5.522, and 5.512 (Rolls 424, 364, 407, 327, 118, and 114-115, respectively). It should be noted that reliance on the productive resources of "Innerdeutschland" alone was a policy of the Truppenamt; its feasibility was viewed with great skepticism by the Ordnance Office. The controversy began as early as 1924.

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any aggressive fantasies. In that sense, her disarmament under the Treaty of Versailles achieved its main purpose. And this remained so in the first two years of Hitler's regime and perhaps even until 1937. It is frequently said that the most fateful error of western policy toward Hitler was its submission to the reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936; but more fateful still was the fact that a year earlier, in March 1935, it allowed him with impunity to repudiate the Treaty of Versailles, and set about openly creating a standing army of thirtysix divisions. From 1925 to 1932, as we have seen, the Economic Staff was occupied with plans for supplying an army of sixteen divisions, while the Truppenamt and other Reichswehr offices cherished hopes for twenty-one. For either eventuality, the Economic Staff needed detailed information on the resources of German industry. Moreover, its ambitions still reached toward mobilization of all Germany's resources for some war of the future. It therefore set out to compile an exhaustive reference file on Germany's war production capacity. This took the form of directories and card-catalogs of firms, machinery, and products. Ultimately, they were to show at a glance exactly where and in what quantities any given item could be procured, or, conversely, exactly what and how much any given firm could be expected to produce. Suppliers of raw materials and parts were encompassed, as well as producers of finished arms and munitions.83 Four officers and two consultants, working unaided and in secret in Berlin, could hardly hope to get far with such a project. They needed to supplement their meager forces with outside help. In fact, they sought aid in two quarters: in the first place, from local agents called "economic officers", and in the second place, from the top ranks of German industrialists, through an organization called the "Statistische Gesellschaft", or more simply, "Stega". At first, much greater hopes were placed upon Stega than upon the economic officers. But it was the latter who survived, long after Stega had faded away. The successors of the original economic officers served Germany's rearmament and her war economy in many ways until the very close of World War II. " Thomas, Grundlagen, Ch. II, pp. 18-19; Jansen, "Die Entwicklung. . ." (see n. 4, above); W i / I F 5.3405, T-77/424; W i / I F 5.1983, T-77/327/1162174-8; W i / I F 5.2507, T-77/364/1206499; and W i / I F 5.500, T-77/110, "Stand der Zentralkartei", 6 November 1929.

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The economic officers, first appointed in 1925, illustrate one means adopted by the Reichswehr to evade the limitation on its numbers. They were former officers who, upon the reduction in size of the army, turned to the business world for a livelihood. They were certainly not prominent in circles of business or industry, but they could move freely and legitimately in both. In reality, they were agents of the Reichswehr, more particularly, of the Economic Staff. They were officially (if at first secretly) attached to the staffs of the Military District Headquarters (Wehrkreiskommandos), but their work was directed from Berlin by the Economic Staff.34 Initially, this work consisted in collecting information on local industry and local economic conditions. Later, the economic officers were entrusted with the important job of distributing military contracts to local firms. After a time, they were joined by counterpart agents of the navy and, eventually, the air force. They were the direct predecessors of the Wehrwirtschaftsinspektionen (hereinafter, "W. Inspectorates") and the later Armament Inspectorates which figured prominently in Germany's military-economic administration after 1935 (see Chs. VI, VIII). Stega was a much more ambitious undertaking of the Economic Staff. Cautious probings led in December 1925 to what seemed a signal success: a clandestine meeting with prominent businessmen, headed by Geheimrat von Borsig. They declared their willingness to cooperate with the Economic Staff, and founded for this purpose a so-called "Statistical Society". Stega consisted of a Central Commission (Hauptkommission) situated in Berlin, and individual Regional Commissioners around the country, corresponding to the economic officers. It was stipulated that Stega's relations with the Reichswehr would be camouflaged as much as possible. One representative of the Economic Staff would be a member of the Central Commission; for the rest, the Regional Commisioners would cooperate discreetly with the economic officers.35 34 The order requiring the Wehrkreiskommandos to assign an officer to the task of handling economic questions, issued in February 1925, is in W i / I F 5.3404, T-77/424/1284503-1284505. Both Jansen and Thomas state that the W.O. were established in 1926 ("Die Entwicklung T-77/424/1285030,-48; Grundlagen, Ch. II, p. 15). They apparently have in mind the more formal creation of the so-called "W.O.-Dienststellen". 35 For information on the establishment and early functions of Stega, see Thomas, Grundlagen, Ch. II; Jansen, "Die Entwicklung . . . " (see note 2), and another historical note by Jansen, concerning Stega, dated 28 October 1935, in Wi/IF 5.3405, T-77/424/1285048-9. Contemporary documents in W i / I F

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Under these conditions, Stega agreed — astonishingly enough — to undertake the staggering task which the Economic Staff had set itself, but could not carry out itself: a systematic survey of Germany's war production capacity. Stega further agreed to work out in detail production plans for the twenty-one division "A-Heer", while the Economic Staff concentrated on plans for a sixteen-division emergency army. The Economic Staff promised that Stega's Regional Commissioners would be aided by the economic officers, and that wherever possible, Reichswehr dealings with industry would be channelled through Stega. It had taken months of patient persuasion to bring about this first meeting, and then only upon repeated assurances that the work would be of a purely "theoretical" nature, that is, for use only at some indefinite date when it would, presumably, be legal. This proved largely wasted effort and wasted breath. Stega never produced what it had promised. As we have seen, no production program for twenty-one divisions was developed until 1932, under von Schleicher. As to the survey of production capacity, it was carried out, insofar as was possible, by the economic officers. 36 Stega's only real functions consisted in poviding the economic officers with advice, introductions to other businessmen, and a cloak of prestige and respectability. The prestige of Stega's members was certainly great. On the Central Commission sat representatives of Krupp, Siemens-Schuckert, Vereinigte Aluminiumwerke, Rheinmetall, Borsig, Wasag (Westfalisch-Anhaltische Sprengstoff A.G.), the Mitteldeutsches Braunkohlensyndikat, and other prominent firms. Its manager was von During, later a leading figure in Reichsgruppe Industrie (compulsory industrialists' organization after 1934), and on its working committee was Dr. Sorge, the first president of the Reichsverband der deutschen Industrie (voluntary association of the Weimar period). 37 5.3404-3405, T-77/424; Wi/IF 5.521, T-77/118; Wi/IF 5.522, T-77/118, "Wa2, 19/24"; Wi/IF 5.1983, T-77/327/116228-9,-30; and Wi/IF 5.2507, T-77/364/ 1206448. Proposals offered by Stega for the eventual organization of civilian and military administration in war-time may be found in OKW/2050, T-77/640, "Stega 479/Wa", 15 July 1926. 36 On the failure of Stega, see Wi/IF 5.3405, T-77/424/1284872-952, "Niederschrift über die W.O.-Besprechung am 16. und 17. 1928", and Chef des Heereswaffenamt Stabes to Brauchitsch, ? October 1928. 37 A list of the members of Stega's Hauptkommission, undated but probably 1926, appears in Wi/IF 5.1983, T-77/327/1162228-9.

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Nevertheless, Stega did not represent all of Germany's important industry. One striking abstention from its membership was that of I. G. Farbenindustrie, which, curiously enough, was regarded by the Economic Staff as being of "pazifistische Einstellung".39 After World War II, General Thomas gave the following account of I. G. Farben's position, referring to two occasions when he personally had approached the firm: Both times Geheimrat Duisberg declined on the grounds that the big concerns with their international connections just could not open themselves to the charge of treaty-breaking. The same view prevailed in the great electric concerns. Another consideration deterring private businessmen from illegal projects was the simple fear of exposure by "unpatriotic" - or lawabiding — workers. This was a genuine risk, most prominently illustrated by the scandal raised in December 1926, when dock workers revealed that Russia was supplying the Reichswehr with grenades.88 On the whole, private German industry neither felt nor showed such "warm enthusiasm" for the Reichswehr's secret rearmament as sometimes ascribed to it. This was not because the industrialists felt much — if any - moral repugnance against breaking treaty commitments, manufacturing weapons of human destruction, or encouraging an international armaments race. Undoubtedly, most of them would have been happy to see Germany's military power and prestige restored, and, in the euphemistic words of the Economic Staff, they showed "strong and growing understanding of the need to be in a position to aid the Fatherland, in a defensive war, with adequate supplies".40 But patriotic sentiment wore so thin as to become almost invisibile whenever it threatened to require sacrifices. As put by Captain von Hanneken, one of the first four officers of the Economic Staff (later a General, and Plenipotentiary for Iron and Steel), "Industry has taken a completely one-sided position". The industrialists, complained Wi/IF 5.3405 T-77/424/1284974, -6, "H.Wa.A. Nr. 898/29 gK Z Wa Wi", 25 October 1929. 39 The comment by Thomas is as quoted by Louis P. Lochner, Tycoons and Tyrant (Chicago, 1954), pp. 208-9. On the incident of December 1926, see Eyck, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 127-8; Castellan, op. cit., p. 183. 40 The quotation is from the document cited in Ch. II, n. 2, above. On "warm enthusiasm", see e.g. Wheeler-Bennett, op. cit., p. 144. The contrary view is maintained most vigorously by Louis Lochner, op. cit.; but Lochner's presentation suffers from his evident conviction that the German industrialists were only one step removed from the angelic hosts.

38

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von Hanneken, professed "great willingness to cooperate in the military reconstruction", but only when the Reichswehr showed a "proper appreciation" of their situation; whereas they always demanded the broadest consideration of their own interests from military offices.41 Patriotism was all very well, when it paid, but in the 1920's in Germany, it didn't. It is of course true that private businessmen were making some direct contributions to financing illegal military activities. These contributions were motivated by political considerations, and appear to have been quite unsystematic. In the Berlin area, in 1925, private industry was supplying the Reichswehr with some regular financial support, at the rather low rate of one mark per employee annually. The money was collected through the businessmen's associations, either by raising membership dues (in "patriotically inclined" groups), or by personal solicitations. The funds were maintained in a camouflaged account, administered by a "trustworthy" banker. That this system was not typical, is evident from the fact that the document describing it concludes with a plea that it be imitated in the other Military Districts. In any case, the funds were earmarked for paramilitary training and maintaining stocks of arms, not for investment in expanded armament capacity, or even expanded arms production.42 The businessmen were willing to help others do illegal things, but not get too directly involved themselves. The fact was, that investment in armaments was unprofitable as well as dangerous during the Weimar period. The Reichswehr was unable to assure the industrialists of a steady flow of large armament orders. Germany was prohibited from selling arms abroad, and could evade this prohibition only on a small scale. The risks and penalties of illegal arms production, however small, were not balanced by any substantial hope of large, rapid, or certain profits. This was well understood by the Army Ordnance Office, which observed in 1928 that "industry is under present conditions not in a position to offer larger financial sacrifices". As a consequence, the Economic Staff set down the policy: Nothing is to be required of the firms which is not economically viable. For W i / I F 5.518, T-77/117/846739-40, memorandum of 18 december 1924. W i / I F 5.512, T-77/114/843535-40, "Finanzorganization in Coburg". The document is preceded by a covering letter stating that it was issued on 29 October 1925. The title and other identifications are coded. "Coburg" was the code name for Wehrkreis III (Berlin), "Harz" for T 2 III ("z"), and the "Stadte" mentioned in the document are the Wehrkreise. 41

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installations which are made purely in the military interest, a financial subsidy must be maintained.43 The industrialists were not, on the whole, averse to accepting such subsidies. Nor did they mind offering a certain well-camouflaged and quite minimal investment of personal energy, such as that given to Stega, to help the Reichswehr along. Perhaps some were motivated by "patriotism", and some by hope of future profits; others may simply have regarded their connection with Stega as a form of insurance. But it is not at all surprising that they failed to live up to their part of the bargain made with the Economic Staff in December 1925. It was by no means so clear in the mid-nineteen-twenties, as it is today in retrospect, that Germany's military power would be fully restored in little more than a decade; and the businessmen were not much interested in pie in the sky. Despite repeated frustrations such as the defection of Stega and the refusal of the Reichswehr itself to grant any single agency the authority for "centralized procurement", the Economic Staff carried on with its work, and even grew substantially, in the years after 1925. By 1928 its original three sections had grown to six, and by 1929 its personnel had so expanded as to require no less than twentyfive offices in the new Army Ordnance quarters beside the Tiergarten. Nor had the Economic Staff forgotten its wider ambitions. In 1927 the Economic Staff put forward a proposal for an "interministerial committee for war economy". This would be a standing committee, chaired by the Reichswehr Minister or his representative, and requiring first the participation of the Reich Ministry of Economics, later, the Ministries of Food, Finance, Interior, Transport, Justice, and Foreign Affairs. The proposal was hedged with numerous reminders of the need for secrecy and caution, "not only in consideration of the prohibitions imposed by our enemies, but also because of those circles of our own people, who still reject the necessity of warpreparedness". Under the circumstances, it was impossible to ask that the interministerial committee be given any powers of command. It would suffice, as a beginning, if the civilian ministries could be persuaded at least to consult with the Reichswehr in planning economic and legal steps to go into effect "in the e v e n t . . . that Germany is obliged to go to arms in self-defense". In the case of practical steps 43

Wi/IF 5.2507, T-77/364/1206479-562, "H.Wa.A. 327/29 gK Z Wi Stab". See note 14, above.

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to be taken in peacetime, it would be necessary to proceed by separate negotiations with the individual ministries or the Reich Cabinet.44 This modest proposal came too early. Even three years later, when a real beginning was made with the aid of the Truppenamt, the results were small. In 1930 the then Lieutenant-Colonel Keitel, of the Truppenamt's Organisationsabteilung ("T 2"), persuaded some of the civilian ministries to participate in a "Committee of Consultants for the Defense of the Reich". Little is known about this committee, but — despite Keitel's later testimony to the contrary — it probably met only once in the years 1930-32.45 In any case, it is doubtful that it did more than keep the civilian ministries informed of Reichswehr plans, and occasionally secure their assent or advice. In 1933, however, the committee was revived, to assume what promised to be an important — even preeminent - role in "total mobilization". "

EC-98 (see note 31, above). Gerhard Meinck, "Der Reichsverteidigungsrat", Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, vol. VI, no. 8 (August 1956), p. 411; Keitel's testimony at Nürnberg, IMT X, pp. 487-9. For the reluctance of the civilian ministries to cooperate in mobilization preparations during the Weimar Republic, see W i / I F 5.3404-5, T-77/424; also W i / I F 5.406, T-77/92, memorandum concerning the "Weisungen für die Vorbereitung der Reichsverteidigung", draft of 21 October 1932; and Thomas, Grundlagen, Ch. II, p. 23, Ch. V., p. 45. Keitel stated at Nürnberg (IMT X, pp. 487-489) that the Referenten-Auschuss met two or three times per year in the period 1930-33. There is no evidence to confirm this, and in the context of Keitel's general remarks, it seems likely that he was confusing this period with that which followed, i.e., 1933-35. From the available documentary evidence, it seems doubtful that the Referenten-Auschuss met more than once prior to 1933. Note especially that two days after the decree of 4 April 1933, the Truppenamt announced that the "Arbeitsausschuss der Referenten für die Reichsverteidigung" would meet for the second time on 26 April. There is no evidence in the minutes of that meeting, nor apparently anywhere else, that a first meeting had been held in the period since January 1933; and since all meetings thereafter were numbered consecutively, without regard to date, the natural presumption is that the meeting called by the Truppenamt's order of 6 April was in simple fact the second time the ReferentenAusschuss had met. Or in other words, only one meeting had been held prior to 1933. (For the order of 6 April, see T-77/177/912303-4, in W i / I F 5.701; for minutes of the meeting of 26 April, see EC-177, IMT XXXVI, pp. 219 ff.) With regard to the same point, it may be noted that on 22 April 1931, the Truppenamt issued a statement, under top secret classification, that its Organisationsabteilung (T 2) was at the time carrying on, or beginning, negotiations with other Reich ministries concerning their collaboration in defense measures (T-77/92/817446). This is hardly the kind of statement to be expected of an office which supposedly had under its direction a functioning body of ministerial representatives which, by Keitel's reckoning, should have met at least three or four times by April 1931. In any case it is impossible to imagine, in face of such a statement, that the Referenten-Ausschuss in 1931 was at all comparable to the Reichsverteidigungsausschuss after 1933. 45

IV AMBIGUOUS VICTORIES: 1933-1935

"I can only repeat, that in Hitler's so-called Leadership State there subsisted in economic affairs a complete absence of leadership, and an indescribable duplication of effort and working at cross purposes; for Hitler shut his eyes to the need for fixed, long-range planning, Goring knew nothing of economics, and the responsible professionals had no executive powers." Georg Thomas, 16 August 1945

The first years of Adolf Hitler s rule in Germany were filled with delusive gratifications for the Reichswehr, especially for the zealots of "total mobilization". Not only were the military restrictions of the Weimar period rapidly lifted, at first with a thin veil of secrecy, but the status of the Reichswehr, never low in Germany, promised to rise to new heights. By secret Cabinet decree of 4 April 1933, one of the objects sought by the Reichswehr since the mid-nineteen-twenties was ostensibly achieved in the creation of a "Reich Defense Council". The Council was to consist of a selected group of Reich ministers, chaired by Hitler. It was supposed to formulate policy and direct and coordinate all measures for "the defense of the Reich". The cooperation of civilian ministries now became obligatory, though the Council — and the decree creating it - were, strictly speaking, still illegal. Best of all from the Reichswehr's viewpoint, General von Blomberg, the new Reichswehr Minister, was designated Hitlers deputy as chairman of the "Reich Defense Council". In that capacity, he was empowered to issue directives to all other ministries and high government offices.1 With such power as these provisions seemed to promise, 1 The decree itself is not available. For its contents, see Meinck, "Der Reichsverteidigungsrat" (Ch. Ill, n. 45, above), p. 411-412; also EC-177 and EC-408, IMT XXXVI, pp. 222-223, 478. The original of EC-177 is filed at N.A. as USA-390; another copy may be found in the file from which EC-177 was origi-

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von Blomberg might well have seen in himself the fulfillment of Alphonse Seche's prediction: "The Minister of War will have a burden of truly national scope. It will be his to orient the entire social and economic activity of the nation in the direction he judges expedient for the defense of la patrie."2 Hitler soon acted to follow up his pledges of moral and financial support for rearmament. Sometime prior to November 1933, he ordered that the peacetime army be raised as quickly as possible to twenty-one divisions, that threefold expansion which the Truppenamt had hoped for only in the event of war. The mobilization goal was also to be tripled (reviving the idea of sixty-three divisions which had been abandoned in 1925) while the target date, 1938, was to be kept the same. Meanwhile, an independent air force was established under the direction of Hermann Goring and under the flimsy camouflage of Goring's Ministry of Aviation. At the same time, the navy was receiving substantially increased funds for its own expansion. By agreement with the Reichswehr leadership, Hitler refrained throughout the year 1934 from declaring openly that Germany's rearmament had begun in earnest. In March of 1935, however, this restraint came to an end. On 16 March 1935, Hitler repudiated the Treaty of Versailles, announced that compulsory military service would be reintroduced in Germany, and ordered that the standing army be raised to thirty-six divisions.3 nally taken, W i / I F 5.701, T-77/177/912300ff, -305ff. Mention of the Reichswehr's early attempts to found a Reichsverteidigungsrat appears in W i / I F 5.3404, T-77/424, and in OKW/2050, T-77/640, "Marinekommandoamt A II 378/27 S.G.", 28 July 1927. On Blomberg's authority, see also W i / I F 5.406, T - 7 7 / 9 2 / 817619, "Weisungen für die Vorbereitung der Reichsverteidigung", 1 July 1933. 2 Séché, Les Guerres d'Enfer (Ch. I, n. 10, above), p. 163. » On Hitler's army-strength goals, see W i / I F 5.383, T-77/86/810101, -04, -49: "Wa. A. 403/34 gK Wa Stab", 16 April 1934; "H.Wa.A. 200/34 gK Wa Wi I", 31 January 1934; and "Vortragsnotiz über Stand der Bevorratung", 10 November 1933; also Görlitz, op. cit. (Ch. II, n. 13, above), p. 274. On the early arms buildup in general, see Telford Taylor, Sword and Swastika (New York, 1952), pp. 85-87. Much more detail is provided by Wolfgang Sauer, in K.D. Bracher et al., op. cit. (Ch. III, n. 9, above), pp. 780-798. Sauer's information is unassailable, but gives a slightly exaggerated impression of the level of rearmament. The reader should be reminded to note that the figure of three billions RM mentioned on p. 796 refers to the amount initially scheduled for the first military expansion program, i.e. a five-year program, 1933-38; from Sauer's own calculations, the figure for 1933-34 would be about 1.2 billions, which is probably correct, or a little low (the present official estimate, 1.9 billions, is probably high). On the other hand actual military expenditures went up so steeply after 1933 that the figure of three billions becomes meaningless: too high for 1933, too

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75

On 21 May 1935, several new laws were handed down which must have delighted the proponents of total mobilization. Simultaneous with a public reorganization of the armed forces, under the "Wehrmacht Law" of that date, were issued in secret a "War Service Law", an "Emergency Service Law", a "Law to Secure the Defense of People and State", and the "Reich Defense Law".4 For the moment, those that interested the Reichswehr most were the first and the last. Under the "Wehrmacht Law", the title of the armed forces changed from "Reichswehr" to "Wehrmacht", presumably to emphasize the shift from a defensive stance to one of power. Hitler, as successor to Hindenburg, was now Supreme Commander of the entire military organization. Under him Blomberg, newly renamed "Reich War Minister", was active Commander-in-Chief of the combined armed forces. Under Blomberg stood the Commanders-in-Chief of the army and navy, and, theoretically, the Commander-in-Chief of the newlyannounced air force, Goring. Later in 1935, the Heeresleitung and Marineleitung became the "High Command of the Army" and "High Command of the Navy". For many years, however, Goring resisted pressure to organize the air force leadership as a "High Command of the Air Force", because this might imply that his high command was on the same level as those of the army and navy - an implication very natural, but which Goring was at pains to deny. Göring's point was that as Reich Aviation Minister he held Cabinet rank and stood on an equal plane with General von Blomberg as Reich War Minister; he could not therefore be on the same plane as the Commanders-in-Chief of the other services, who were subordinate to Blomberg. Goring therefore insisted that he always be addressed, in his military capacity, by the full title "Reich Minister of Aviation and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force". The fact was, that Göring's high positions in the NSDAP and the civilian government gave him a power far greater than that of Blomberg. Goring was widely regarded as second only to Hitler in the Party, and he wielded low for 1934. (See Chapter X, Table I, below, and the Statistical Appendix.) On the early development of the air force, see Karl-Heinz Völker, Die Entwicklung der militärischen Luftfahrt in Deutschland, 1920-1933 (Stuttgart, 1962). 4 Concerning the "Gesetz über den deutschen Volksdienst", or "Notdienstgesetz" (Emergency Service Law), see RWM/139, T-71/15/405750, in which Staatssekretär Hans Posse explained, on 11 May 1938, that the law made all Germans aged 15 to 65 (except those in the armed forces) liable to obligatory labor service, but that the law had never been published (and hence could not in effect be widely used). See also below, Ch. IX, p. 167, and Ch. XI, p. 204.

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enormous police powers as Prussian Minister of the Interior. He meant to use every advantage at his disposal for his own aggrandizement and that of his beloved air force, and obviously his advantages were great. Neither Blomberg, nor Keitel as his successor, ever succeeded in subordinating the air force to his command. That this would be so was not, however, immediately apparent to Blomberg and his supporters. The decree of 4 April 1933 had authorized him to issue directives to other ministers, including presumably the Minister of Aviation; and the Wehrmacht Law of 21 May 1935 gave him command over "the armed forces". To reinforce the apparent intention of these provisions, the secret Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 made the Reich War Minister Hitler's chief executive in the event that Hitler should declare a "state of defense". It was specified that under those circumstances the War Minister would be empowered to issue decrees contrary to existing law, and that his directives would be binding upon all other ministers.5 It is true that the precise nature and extent of the War Minister's authority were not clearly defined on 4 April 1933, nor in the Wehrmacht Law, and that the powers defined in the Reich Defense Law were not effective until Hitler should declare a "state of defense". Nevertheless, Blomberg's legal claims to wide authority must have seemed great in 1935, and while Blomberg was not a forceful man, he did not quite relinquish those claims. Blomberg's position was much weakened by the fact that it was not only Goring, but also the Commanders-in-Chief of the army and navy, who resisted his authority. The army, traditionally the mainstay and dominant element of Germany's armed forces, was resentful of any superior military agency, imposing itself between the army and the Supreme Commander. The Reichswehr Ministry had previously been more the agent of the army than vice-versa. Since the accession of Hitler, however, a sharp divergence had developed between the Ministry and the Army High Command. This divergence centered upon the political split between the "pro-Nazis" in the War Ministry and the "anti-Nazis", or the less enthusiastic, in the Army High Command. Blomberg, who was Hitler's appointee, and Blomberg's Chief-of-Staff, von Reichenau, were both committed to the cause of National Socialism. In 1933 Hitler had tried to put Reichenau in charge of the army, but was overruled by Hindenburg, who appointed the non-Nazi, General von Fritsch, instead. Second in command to 5

PS-2261, IMT XXX.

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77

Fritsch was General Beck, chief of the Truppenamt (renamed "General Staff of the Army" in 1935), who later led the military resistance against Hitler. The political split was exacerbated by personal rivalries, Reichenau surely not forgetting that Fritsch had displaced him, and the army leaders generally despising Blomberg and Reichenau. Furthermore the navy, though long accustomed to "playing second fiddle" to the army, was quick to emulate both army and air force in adopting a line of aggressive self-interest. Thus Blomberg, and later Keitel, had little to support their semblance of power but an illdefined legal claim — at a time when legality was at best a weak reed - and the changeable favor of the dictator.6 The weakness of the War Ministry's position was manifested in a variety of ways in the first years of Hitler's rule, not least in events - and non-events - following upon the decree of 4 April 1933. To begin with, the "Reich Defense Council" called for by this decree never met. In a passing comment on 26 April 1933, Keitel identified it with the Reich Cabinet, and if he was correct, it may never have been intended to meet independently.7 In any case, it remained strictly on paper, until Goring resurrected it in 1938, under his own chairmanship. Even then it was ineffectual, as will be shown later. The Reichswehr may not have been much distressed by the insubstantiality of the "Reich Defense Council", thinking itself already in possession of a practical instrument to execute the decree as it saw fit: the "Committee of Consultants for the Defense of the Reich" (see Chapter III). This semi-moribund body (later to be known as the On inter-service rivalries and the relatively weak position of the Reichskriegsministerium (later Oberkommando der Wehrmacht), see Waldemar Erfurth, Die Geschichte des deutschen Generalstabes, 1918-1945 (Berlin-Frankfurt-Göttingen, 1957), and the studies of the following authors, as cited above: Görlitz, pp. 280-1; Taylor, p. 101; Mueller-Hillebrand, vol. I; Thomas, especially statements of 14 and 16 July, and 16 August, in T-77/635; Wheeler-Bennett, pp. 294-304; and Craig, pp. 472-4. Further particulars in the chapters below. 7 For Keitel's statement equating Reichsverteidigungsrat and Reich Cabinet, see EC-177, IMT XXXVI, p. 225. Both Keitel and Goring stated flatly at Nürnberg that the Reichsverteidigungsrat created by the decree of 4 April 1933 never met. (See IMT IX, p. 505, 514; IMT X, p. 490.) Meinck, relying chiefly on a statement by Blomberg (IMT, XL, pp. 403 ff.), suggests that the Reichsverteidigungsrat may have met once. Taken in context, Blomberg's statement is better viewed as a denial than a confirmation of such a meeting; in any case Blomberg's testimony on this occasion can be shown to be unreliable in other respects. Thomas also suggests that the Reichsverteidigungsrat may have met a few times, but he clearly has in mind the second Reichsverteidigungsrat, created in 1938, which was chaired by Goring and did meet twice. (Thomas, Grundlagen, Ch. IV, pp. 36-37.) See below, p. 162. 6

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"Committee for Reich Defense") now underwent a marvelous rejuvenation. Its meetings in 1933 were frequent and well-attended, and under its prodding, the work of mobilizing "the entire social and economic activity of the nation" began to take shape. Momentarily, the revival of the Committee for Reich Defense gave the army leadership a spurious position of power. For the Committee had been the Truppenamt's creation, and in 1933 it was still headed by Major General Adam, followed by Beck, as chief of the Truppenamt. By the same token, its secretariat remained in the Truppenamt's "T 2", then still under Keitel. Adam (later Beck), and Keitel as his subordinate, thus appeared to dominate the whole sphere of Germany's mobilization for war.8 This was hardly to the liking of Blomberg and Reichenau, and they naturally sought to wrest from the Truppenamt its supervision over the Committee for Reich Defense. In this they were successful, but not until January 1935. At that time the Committee's secretariat was transferred to "Department L" of the Wehrmachtamt * where the then Colonel Jodl directed its business; Reichenau now presided over the Committee's sessions. Keitel, as successor to Reichenau, eventually returned to a directing role on the Committee, but no longer as representative of the army. The War Ministry's victory in assuming control of the Committee for Reich Defense was superficial, if not quite hollow. By 1935 it was evident that the Committee was far less important than it had seemed in 1933. Blomberg could hardly assert his will over the military establishment, much less impose military interests upon resistant civilian bureaucrats, except with the direct encouragement of Hitler. And while Hitler was willing to support Blomberg in measures which both deemed necessary to Germany's rearmament, Hitler had certainly never intended to let the War Minister dominate his government, nor was he always in accord with the Ministry in matters of military policy. With the "Reich Defense Council" a dead letter, the Committee for Reich Defense failed to substitute for it as a policymaking body. Meinck, "Der Reichsverteidigungsrat", p. 413. Ample confirmation may b e found in the file of correspondence and minutes of or pertaining to the Reichsverteidigungsausschuss (RVA), in W i / I F 5.701, T-77/177. The Nürnberg documents cited by Meinck (EC-177, EC-404-7) were taken from this file. See also Thomas, Grundlagen, Ch. IV, p. 37. Thomas is more reliable on the subject of the Reichsverteidigungsausschuss, in which he and his staff participated, than on the Reichsverteidigungsrat. ' See index.

8

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1933-1935

79

In practice, what the Committee for Reich Defense did was to provide a setting in which the ministries delivered progress reports on their defense preparations, and in which problems related thereto could be aired. As a system of mandatory, periodic progress reports, of a semi-public nature, it did egg on the bureaucrats to "show results". By the same token, it contributed to an inflated notion of the progress achieved. But in any case, in five years of meetings from 1933 to 1938, the Committee seldom decided any doubtful point in the course of its deliberations, and never one of large significance. Important problems were always deferred for decision to negotiation between the Wehrmacht and other interested parties.10 One sign of the declining significance of the Committee for Reich Defense was a sharp decline in the frequency of its meetings after 1933. Another was the broadening of the circle of participants. What had been a suitably full representation of the various agencies concerned with national defense at the outset was gradually inflated until the later sessions were attended by no fewer than seventy-four representatives of the War Ministry, the several service branches, and civilian government offices. A non-parliamentary body of such size and variegated composition could hardly hope to settle any major dispute. By the fall of 1935, Georg Thomas had concluded that "the Committee for Reich Defense is . . . obsolete".11 Thomas was in a position to know whereof he spoke. To begin with, he was personally involved in an important aspect of the contest between the War Ministry and the services, namely, who was to control armament procurement and planning. In this Thomas had ended up, somewhat malgré lui, in the camp of the War Ministry. 10 Cf., in contrast, Meinck ("Der Reichsverteidigungsrat"), who argues that the RVA "preserved the continuity of mobilization preparations" from 1933 on (p. 422). But as Meinck himself shows, it was the Truppenamt Organisationsabteilung, and later the Abteilung Landesverteidigung, which carried out all the preparatory and administrative work in connection with the sessions of the RVA. The "Arbeitspläne", "Mob-Bücher" and "Mob-Kalender" discussed by Meinck were in no sense the work of the Reichsverteidigungsausschuss, but were independently prepared by the various ministries, in conjunction with Wehrmacht offices, as Meinck himself points out (p. 414). See also Thomas, Grundlagen Ch. IV, p. 37, and W i / I F 5.383, T-77/86/809797, memorandum of 14 September 1935. The nature of the RVA's meetings may be seen from their minutes, in W i / I F 5.701 and W i / I F 5.560, T-77, Rolls 177 and 131. 11 Meinck ("Der Reichsverteidigungsrat", p. 414) notes the decline in frequency of meetings, but attributes it merely to a difference in "Führungsstil" as between Beck and Reichenau. Thomas' comment appears in Wi/IF 5.383, T - 7 7 / 8 6 / 809797, memorandum of 14 September 1935.

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Though his personal sympathies were with the Army High Command, after November 1934 he headed a department for "Wehrwirtschaft" in the War Ministry (and later in the High Command of the Armed Forces). In that capacity, as will be shown elsewhere, he was involved in incessant struggles with the services, including the army, in matters both of policy and of jurisdiction.12 He thus had reason to be acutely aware of the weaknesses of the Ministry's position, as well as bitterly contemptuous of Blomberg's failure to use even what weapons he had to best advantage. When Blomberg did try to assert his authority, it was often upon Thomas' prodding. Even before entering the War Ministry, Thomas had been personally engaged, as Chief-of-Staff in the Army Ordnance Office, in the work of the Committee for Reich Defense. He was chiefly responsible, either personally or through the staff of the Ordnance Office and, later, his own staff in the Ministry, for preparing the Committee's deliberations on economic affairs, and for representing the Wehrmacht's economic interests in negotiations with civilian agencies.18 Thus Thomas was excellently placed to know that while the Committee for Reich Defense might be a spur to mobilization work, the work itself, and all important decisions relating to it, remained matters to be settled piecemeal, through multiple negotiations with the civilian ministries and other agencies. For Thomas, the most important of the ministries to be dealt with 12 Thus Alan Milward (op. cit.) is grossly in error in repeatedly confounding the Wi ftii Amt (Thomas' office as designated after 1939) with the Heereswaffenamt, in such careless remarks as: "Waffenamt, the armaments executive of WiRuAmt", or "WiRuAmt was purely an army organization" (pp. 35, 22). These errors are not trivial, for the Wi Rii Amt's lack of authority over the Heereswaffenamt was a key feature of Germany's inefficient armament administration, a point which Milward quite fails to appreciate. This also leads him, incidentally, to blame Thomas and the Wi Rii Amt for sins which in fact they had no power to commit, and to attribute to Hitler an ignorance which was never his: thus in contrast to Milward's account (p. 33), Hitler properly blamed the Heereswaffenamt for maladministration of the munitions program in 1939, for while he had no liking for the Wi Rii Amt, he knew perfectly well that it was not responsible for munitions production (see Chapter XII and documents there cited). Milward's book is in many ways sound and useful, but marred by many errors like these. 15 For the Truppenamt's agreement to Heereswaffenamt supervision of economic mobilization in the period 1933-34, see Wi/IF 5.1265, T-77/262/1084133, -8, -42-3; on Thomas' role, and that of his staff, in the work of the Reichsverteidigungsausschuss, see Wi/IF 5.1845, T-77/315/1147682-3, and the minutes of the RVA's meetings, Wi/IF 5.701 and Wi/IF 5.560, T-77, Rolls 177 and 131. See also Wi/IF 5.2157, T-77/340, and Wi/IF 5.3260, T-77/415, both files of the Abteilung Landesverteidigung in the Wehrmachtamt.

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81

was the Reich Ministry of Economics. In April 1933, the Ordnance Office's Economic Staff urged that the Ministry of Economics set up a number of special committees to handle mobilization questions. These committees, on which the Economic Staff was to be represented, would consider how Germany could best supply the raw materials, labor, and manufactured goods necessary for a war economy. By the end of the following month, six such committees were actually formed. During the rest of the year, they outlined future mobilization work for the Ministry of Economics, surveyed the major problems Germany would have to face in preparing her economy for war, and drafted some regulatory legislation. Late in 1933 or early 1934, the Ministry of Economics created its own mobilization department, euphemistically entitled "Abwehr wirtschaftlicher Kampfmassnah14 men" (later more frankly, Wehrwirtschaftliche Abteilung).15 At the same time, the military economists were observing with some anxiety the highly visible changes taking place in the structure of German economic life under the slogan of "Gleichschaltung". Some form of reorganization was widely expected of the National Socialists and actively sought by various special interests in industry, crafts, and agriculture. For over a year, however, confusion reigned as to the shape and direction it would take. At first, there was fear in business circles of the aggressive designs of National Socialist "special commissars" and "Kampfbünde", especially the so-called Kampfbund des gewerblichen Mittelstandes. But the Party elite, in particular Goring and Hitler, were quick to repudiate the anti-capitalist schemes of their more radical and "intransigent" followers. The "special commissars" were publicly denounced, and the "fighting associations" were progressively dissolved, culminating in the dissolution of the Kampfbund des gewerblichen Mittelstandes in August 1933.1« "Defense Against Economic Warfare". For the foregoing, see: PS-1453 (original, N.A.), "H.Wa.A. 5 2 0 / 3 3 gK Wa Wi I", 27 April 1933, "Vorbereitung einer Kriegswirtschaft", and the file from which it was taken, W i / I F 5.1265, T-77/262, especially frame 1084169; also EC-128, IMT XXXVI, pp. 168-197; Thomas, Grundlagen, Ch. V, p. 45; W i / I F 5.701, T-77/177/912290; W i / I F 5.1845, T-77/315/1147682-3; W i / I F 5.383, T-77/86/810160ff. 16 See: proposals submitted by the "Bezirksgruppe Nordwest" (iron industry) to the Reichswehrminister, in W i / I F 5.3260, T-77/415/1272619ff., and related material in W i / I F 5.406, T-77/92/817862-72. In the latter file, also the memorandum "Stellungnahme der Gesamtvertretung der Industrie innerhalb der Organisation der deutschen Wirtschaft". Further, U.S. consular reports of George 14

15

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This disposed of "arbitrary interference" in business and of "economic experiments", but there remained the troublesome issue of whether or not the entire economy should be restructured on a corporate pattern of "estates". The idea of a corporate structure had been in the NSDAP program since 1920; it was strengthened by the evolution of fascism in Italy, and after Hitler came to power, some National Socialist partisans of corporatism were eager to put it into practice in Germany. The Reich Food Estate and the German Labor Front were, however, the closest approach to success made by advocates of the corporate idea. In the spheres of industry and commerce, they failed completely. For a brief period around the turn of 1933-34, the former Reich Association of German Industry was renamed "Reich Estate of German Industry", but the change in name did not represent a correspondingly significant change in organization. Moreover, this title was quickly abandoned, and with it the entire effort to subordinate business and industry to the corporate principle.17 When in fact the definitive reorganization took place, between February and November 1934, it was in a form acceptable to the industrialists, to the Ministry of Economics, and to the economic experts of the Wehrmacht. At the top of the new structure, but A. Gordon and George S. Messersmith (Consul General) in the U.S. State Department records, dated 2, 8, 12, 15, and 27 May, and 9 August, 1933 (Decimal File nos. 862.60/98-103, 105). Arthur Schweitzer, in Big Business in the Third Reich (Bloomington, Indiana, 1964), has devoted a great deal of attention to the developments discussed in the preceding and following paragraphs, especially the anti-capitalist schemes of what he calls the "intransigent Nazis", and their defeat by the allied power of "big business", "the generals", and the NSDAP elite. Gerhard Schulz (in K.D. Bracher et al., op. tit.; see Ch. Ill, n. 9, above), challenges Schweitzer's view, taking the more conventional position that the "Gleichschaltung" of German industry amounted to a surrender on the part of the industrial leaders to the National Socialists, and that the latter rejected "economic experiments" only because of their disruptive economic effects, not as a concession to "big business". It should be noted that Schweitzer treats only the period to 1937, Schulz only that to 1934; neither considers the later history of relations between private industry and the state in the Third Reich, though Schweitzer suggests (p. 552) that for the years after 1937, he shares Schulz' view. For the view of this author, see text and footnotes below. 17 Franz L. Neumann, Behemoth, 2nd edition (Toronto-New York-London, 1944), pp. 228-34; consular report of Hugh Corby Fox, 21 December 1934 (U.S. State Department Decimal File no. 862.50/857); Der Weg zum industriellen Spitzenverband (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1956), pp. 296-7. For a view of corporativism and its defeat set in a broader context, see Schweitzer, op. cit., Chs. II-V, especially Ch. Ill, "The Failure of Artisan Socialism".

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83

now subordinate to the Ministry of Economics, was the Reich Economic Chamber, which headed both the regional and the "functional" organizations. The former were the Chambers of Industy and Commerce, which persisted almost unchanged, in their traditional semipublic status, until close to the end of World War II. Though periodically subjected to attack, they were not significantly altered until some time after Albert Speer took control of the war economy, when they were transformed into "Gau Economic Chambers" — that is, conforming to the Party district boundaries.18 The functional organizations were also patterned closely on those established prior to 1933. At the top were seven "Reich Groups": Industry, Commerce, Banking, Insurance, Power, Tourist Trade, and Handicrafts. Reich Group Industry was the direct successor to the voluntary, private Reich Association of the Weimar period. Below Reich Group Industry alone stood thirty-one "Economic Groups", subdivided into "Trade Groups" and 'Trade Subgroups", corresponding essentially to the numerous former Verbände. The main features distinguishing the new set-up from the old were compulsory membership (a feature specifically demanded by certain industrial interests, especially cartels), the introduction of the "leadership principle", which gave legal as well as economic power to the business elite; and subordination of the entire structure to the Reich Ministry of Economics, which gave the government a direct power of command over the formerly private business associations.19 The immediate impression created by the new arrangement was of a monolithic structure through which the National Socialist government could readily command the German economy to perform as it willed. This was certainly the impression of the Economic Staff, which commented: The import and purpose of this organization is at last to do away with the bewildering number of economic interest-groups and associations, to create The change was ordered on 30 May 1942, effective 1 April 1943. See Friedrich Facius, Wirtschaft und Staat (= Schriften des Bundesarchivs, no. 6) (Boppard-am-Rhein, 1959); see also the reference to the change in T - 8 1 / 2 / 12511-5, NSDAP Partei-Kanzlei Rundschreiben 121/42, 8 August 1942. 19 The structure and legal framework of the industrial organizations established in 1934 have been treated in detail by Neumann, op. cit.; Otto Nathan, The Nazi Economic System (Durham, N. C., 1944); Maxine Y. Sweezy, The Structure of the Nazi Economy (Cambridge, Mass., 1941); and others. See also Der Weg zum industriellen Spitzenverband. On compulsory membership and its advocates, see Nürnberg documents BB-063, 066, 078, and NI-1,223, at N.A. 18

84

AMBIGUOUS VICTOBIES: 1 9 3 3 - 1 9 3 5

for each economic branch a single, exclusive representation, and therewith to establish the condition for successful direction of the economy.20 Reich Group Industry and its subordinates were judged incomparably more "maneuverable" than their immediate predecessors (the "Reich Estate of Industry") - "to say nothing of the situation prior to the National Socialist rise to power". Like many others in Germany and abroad, then and since, the Economic Staff concluded that the "reorganization of the German economy is of fundamental importance for the preparation of the war economy". This conclusion proved in time erroneous. The "bewildering number of economic interest-groups and associations" was somewhat reduced, but by no means "done away with". From the very beginning it was granted that a strictly "functional" organization would not suffice (or would not be tolerated by certain powerful interests) and that some regional interest-groups, either within particular industries, or cutting across several industries vertically, would have to be adopted into the new structure, as "District Groups". Thus, for example, the association of Rhein-Ruhr industrialists, known familiarly as the "Langnam Verein", was accepted largely unchanged into the system of "groups", ostensibly as the "District Group Northwest" of the "Economic Group Iron Industry". Actually, the "District Group Northwest" was at least as powerful a body as its "parent" organization. Moreover, the total number of groups became in time unmanageably large. Under Reich Group Industry, which was only one of seven major "Groups", there were eventually 161 Trade Groups, 137 Trade Subgroups, and no fewer than 332 District Groups. The fact that the groups were so numerous, and that some were national and horizontal while others were vertical or regional, contradicted the intention "to create for each economic branch a single, exclusive representation". Instead, the compulsory principle created innumerable problems of multiple membership for individual firms and of overlapping jurisdictions for the groups. That some of the "District Groups" were more influential than their nominal superiors did nothing to improve the "maneuverability" of the system as a whole.21 W i / I F 5.1250, T-77/257, "Wa Wi la 2, Vorschlage fur die Weiterarbeit auf Kriegswirtschaftlichem Gebiet", 2 October 1934 (should read "20 October"). 21 For some details, see Der Weg zum industriellen Spitzenverband, esp. p. 300. The conclusions given here and in the next paragraph are those of this author. 20

AMBIGUOUS VICTORIES:

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85

As one might suspect from the fact that the system was desired by many leading industrialists, it served private interests at least as well — probably rather better than — it served "public" interests. The fact that some of the groups were now led by National Socialists instead of prestigious businessmen was to the private advantage of the new leaders, and to the advantage of the NSDAP — it was not necessarily to the advantage of government economic policy, nor of war mobilization. Of course, this might not have been the case had government economic policy been more clearly and uniformly defined, and more efficiently administered, than it was in the Third Reich. But as it was, the compulsory features which made the system an administrative convenience to the Ministry of Economics made it also an admirable weapon in the hands of private interests — whether "big business" or "upstart Nazis" — against competition. Subordination of the groups to the Ministry deprived them of some independence, but it also gave them a bureaucratic "protector" against demands and inroads from other government, Party, or military quarters. The strength of this protector was only great for the few years of Hjalmar Schacht's tenure as Reich Minister of Economics, but it was something more than negligible until at least the year 1942. That the reorganized structure of business and industry was not the primary instrument of government economic control was indeed continuously evidenced by the appearance of ever new bodies to exercise genuine control. Among the earliest and most effective of these were the so-called "Supervisory Agencies" (later "Reich Agencies") for control of foreign trade in specific raw materials and other articles of critical importance. These Supervisory Agencies were first appointed in March 1934 to deal with the mounting foreign exchange crisis of that time (see below). When Schacht became Minister of Economics several months later, their role was expanded in line with his "New Plan" for restoring Germany's foreign credit. Each Supervisory Agency was responsible for regulating foreign trade in some scarce or strategic commodity such as rubber and asbestos, oil, iron The subject has not been given detailed, perceptive analysis since Neumann's Behemoth, which now is out of date, but probably still the best point of departure. Perhaps the chief mistake of those who see in the economic reorganization a surrender of "private interests" to "the state" is that of accepting the Nazis' own identification of NSDAP and state. In fact, as became clear during most of W.W. II, the NSDAP frequently represented and protected private interests (admittedly, of a selected nature, but nevertheless private) as against "the public interest", that is, of winning the war.

86

AMBIGUOUS VICTORIES:

1933-1935

and steel, chemicals, soaps and; fats, textiles, and non-ferrous metals. With the gathering momentum of mobilization preparations in the middle nineteen-thirties, the Supervisory Agencies also began to work out for each commodity, together with the Ministry of Economics and businessmen's groups, estimated wartime requirements, estimated supplies in time of war, and proposals for filling any gaps. The Supervisory Agencies proved so useful as organs of control, that eventually they acquired the power to issue decrees regulating domestic production and distribution of the articles for which they were responsible.22 As time passed, many other executive agencies were established to regulate one or another aspect of economic life; some of these are considered in subsequent chapters. The final evidence that the system of groups failed as an instrument of war economy was that in the course of World War II, other organizations of businessmen and industrialists supplanted the groups for purposes of raising war production: for example, the "Reich Iron Union" and "Reich Coal Union", and more generally, the system of "Committees" and "Rings" established by Fritz Todt as Munitions Minister in 1941 (see Chapters XII-XIII). If we glance back over the developments we have been considering, the "Reich Defense Council" and Committee for Reich Defense, the accelerated pace of rearmament and the spurious powers of the War Minister, the growing mobilization work of the Reich Ministry of Economics and the dubious contribution of the Economic Groups - all the creaking advances and disappointed hopes of the years 1933 and 1934, what we discern is a great, sprawling machinery for war mobilization, without any driver. Hitler was, in a sense, the dispatcher: he set the destination. What destination, we shall consider in the next chapter. Rut since Hitler quite refused to occupy himself with the controls, he was certainly not the driver. Nor was General von Rlomberg, though he so imagined himself for a time. As early as the spring of 1934, it was apparent at least to Georg Thomas, as a close and anxious observer of the scene, that someone was sorely needed to guide the uncoordinated mechanism. 82 On the "New Plan" and the Überwachungsstellen, see Hjalmar Schacht, 76 Jahre Meines Lebens (Bad Wörishofen, 1953), pp. 414-417; Nathan, op. cit., pp. 44-9 and passim; Sweezy, op. cit., pp. 116ff.; Klein, op. cit. (Ch. II, n. 22, above), pp. 60, 149, 162-4; Neuman, op. cit., pp. 251-4, 272-3, 351-3; J. Barthel, Tätigkeit und Wirkung der Überwachungsstellen (Berlin, 1939); EC-258, IMT XXXVI, p. 254. See also Ch. XIII, below.

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87

This conclusion undoubtedly stemmed from Thomas' own preconceptions, his "fondness for abstract and comprehensive planning"; but it was strengthened by some disquieting signs which began to appear early in 1934 - above all, a critical shortage of foreign credits. The difficulties arose from the uncontrolled injection of substantial funds for public works and rearmament into an economy already on the upswing from the depression. Hitler s demand for immediate expansion of the army to twenty-one divisions, and, in 1935, to thirtysix, was quite unrealistic, and met some determined opposition from the old-line generals. (In fact, the army numbered only twenty-eight divisions in October 1936.23) Nevertheless, the increased funds and firm support for rearmament offered by the regime were welcomed enthusiastically in the ordnance offices of all three services ("pessimists" like Thomas excepted). They began to issue large, essentially uncoordinated, military contracts. Though German industry still had plenty of capacity to fill these contracts in the long run, it was already experiencing some difficulty in meeting the short delivery-terms demanded. Labor was still generally plentiful in 1934, but stocks of raw materials, particularly those supplied from abroad, were sinking. Small and medium-sized firms already complained of tightening in the market for metals and skilled workers.24 Much disturbed by what these conditions implied for the future, Thomas put forward in April 1934 an appeal that the Reich Minister of Economics be made "Economic Dictator". The entire military leadership seemed to concur that an economic dictator should be appointed, but could not agree upon the person to receive the honor. The Wehrmachtamt thought it would be impolitic to designate the On the opposition of the generals to Hitler's army strength goals, see Görlitz, op. cit., pp. 291-2; Wheeler-Bennett, op. cit., pp. 338-9, 349; on the opposition of the Heereswaffenamt, see W i / I F 5.383, "H.Wa.A. 2 0 0 / 3 4 gK Wa Wi I", 31 January 1934. 24 For reports and statistical evidence, see the monthly information-bulletins issued by the Wehrwirtschaftsstab under the title "Stand der wirtschaftlichen Lage", for the period November 1934-December 1935, in Wi/1.126, T-77, Roll 512. See especially the reports of 1 January, 15 February, 5 March, 3 April, and 1 June, 1935. Earlier mention of similar difficulties may be found in W i / I F 5.701, "Übersicht über Auswirkung der augenblicklichen Wirtschaftslage auf die Bevorratung für den A-Fall", 14 August 1934, T-77/177/912188-912191. The Reichswirtschaftsministerium was in general agreement with the Wehrwirtschaftsstab's estimate of the situation, although less alarmed. See the report of Reg. Rat Dr. Barth before the Reichsverteidigungsausschuss, 5 September 1934, W i / I F 5.701, T-77/177/912138, and conference of 28 June 1935 in W i / I F 5.383, T-77/86/810103. 25

88

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Minister of Economics, then Kurt Schmitt, since that might antagonize the Minister of Agriculture, Walther Darr6, who was simultaneously head of the Reich Food Estate and a high-ranking National Socialist.25 Perhaps Reichenau still cherished hopes that the War Ministry could find a way to command the economy. In any case, the proposal was left hanging. That very summer, however, Germany found herself in the midst of an acute crisis of foreign exchange. Where Germany in 1933 had a favorable trade balance of 667 million marks, in 1934 it had a deficit of 284 million marks. This resulted partly from a decline in world market prices as compared with German prices, but also from an absolute increase in German imports of raw materials, directly attributable to government stimulation of the economy, particularly through the armament industry. The latter was in turn hard hit by the severe shortage of foreign credits. The Zinnwerke Wilhelmsburg, second largest electrolytic-copper works in Germany, was forced to suspend operations for lack of raw materials, and other important plants, like Siemens and Opel-Werke, anticipated shut-downs or had already experienced them. Reserves of nickel supplied to Germany from abroad were threatened with sequestration for non-payment; some supplies of rubber had already been carried off on the same grounds.26 On 20 June 1934, Thomas renewed his appeal in a lengthy memorandum submitted to Blomberg, who was sufficiently persuaded to submit it to Hitler on 23 June.27 Thomas began by explaining at some length the defects he observed in present efforts to prepare the economy for war. He regarded as wholly inadequate measures taken so far to regulate the use of scarce materials and increase their domestic production. Strict control over purchase and utilization of base metals was lacking; demands posed months earlier for plant expansion in synthetic oil had not been met; exploitation of domestic ore deposits was too slow and required constant pressure from the War Ministry; the reckless motorization of transport, both civilian and military, was exhausting essential reserves of rubber and fuels; » Wi/IF 5.406, T-77/92/817773, -91, -803ff.; Wi/IF 5.2157, T-77/340/ 1178202ff. and "H.Wa.A. 630/34 gK Wa Wi I, Vortragsvermerk über: A-Aufbau und Stand der kriegswirtschaftlichen Vorarbeiten". 2* Schweitzer, op. cit., pp. 428, 441; Wi/IF 5.2157, T-77/340/1178245ff., "Reichswehrminister 1320/34 Wa Wi I", 19 July 1934. " Wi/IF 5.406, T-77/92/817794ff„ "Reichswehrminister, Wa 632/34 gK Wa Stab", 20 June 1934, "Umbau des Heeres und Wirtschaftslage".

AMBIGUOUS VICTORIES:

1933-1935

89

and development of synthetics and substitutes for scarce materials was too much left to the initiative of private industry (which did not always find it profitable). Having tossed a passing barb at private industry, Thomas now singled out the Labor Front for more elaborate criticism: In these critical circumstances, the actions of certain leaders of the Labor Front run directly contrary to Hitler's own insistence that the people take deprivations and curtailments upon itself . .. One should not preach to the worker the need for a higher standard of living, raising everywhere the desire for wage-increases. The Labor Front's demands upon employers cannot long be borne by middle-sized and small industry, and are incomprehensible in view of the Labor Front's large oudays for the acquisition of luxurious buildings.28 The charge that NSDAP organizations were squandering essential resources in 'large outlays for the acquisition of luxurious buildings" was to be a recurrent one in Thomas' pronouncements over the following years, even during World War II. But in June 1934, the heart of Thomas' argument lay elsewhere. What he wanted was "a resolute and united economic leadership, by which the work of the Ministries of Economics, Food, Labor, and Finance, the Reichsbank, the 'Führer der Wirtschaft', 29 and all agencies of the Labor Front will be dictatorially guided". To achieve this, Thomas thought Hitler should assume formal direction of the economy but appoint as permanent deputy an "Economic Commissioner of the Führer" 30 who would in effect be chief executive in economic affairs. The "Economic Commissioner" would have a staff of advisors from industry, agriculture, trade, and banking; for the small task of "Over-all Planning" a liaison officer from the Reichswehr Ministry would be assigned to a high position on this staff. "The Führer s Economic Commissioner must have authority to issue decrees of decisive significance, and power to enforce them relentlessly against all government and Party offices." No other agency would be permitted to undertake important economic measures without the approval of the Economic Commissioner. Thomas further insisted that the person appointed to this position by Hitler be "an outstanding and influential personage". The last point had a particular significance at the date of writing, 88 !9 30

Ibid. The "Leaders of the Economy" were a passing institution of the year 1934. Ibid.

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for the then Minister of Economics, Kurt Schmitt, was on his way out of office. The circumstances of his demission are somewhat unclear. The Wehrmacht was evidently dissatisfied with his Ministry's progress in matters of rearmament and mobilization, but whether they regarded him as personally unfit, or whether in fact he had fallen ill - the official reason for his exit — is uncertain. That the official reason was true, at least superficially, is suggested by the fact that he went on leave on 28 June 1934, but Schacht, his successor, did not take office until 2 August; furthermore, Schacht was at first only "Acting Minister"; he did not fully replace Schmitt until 30 January 1935.31 Strangely enough, the Ministry of Economics proceeded during the period of interregnum to draft a decree along the lines suggested by Thomas' memorandum, giving the Minister of Economics dictatorial powers, but only on a temporary basis. Hitler, whether impressed by the Wehrmacht's arguments, or simply disturbed by the foreign exchange crisis, seems to have given his approval to this decree.32 This being so, it was a matter of exceptional moment who would be appointed to replace Schmitt, since the new Minister of Economics would have authority to command other ministers, and even Party offices. Hitler's choice fell upon Hjalmar Schacht, President of the Reichsbank and, without doubt, "an outstanding and influential personage". Nevertheless, Schacht made no move at first to take on the role of "economic dictator". He was well occupied, as acting Minister of Economics, with surmounting the exchange crisis — in which task he succeeded admirably. Besides, Schacht may have recognized that until he was Minister not only de facto, but also de jure, he was in a weak position to assert any exceptional authority over other Ministers. In September 1934, the Truppenamt noted that the question of an "economic dictator" was still open, the problem being one of "personalities".88 But once Schacht was formally appointed Minister of Economics, he had not long to wait before becoming "Plenipotentiary-General for War Economy" ("GBK"). The Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 called upon Hitler to appoint such a Plenipotentiary, who in a state of emergency would be empowered, like the War Minister, to issue decrees contrary to existing law, binding upon other ministers 31 54 M

For the dates of Schmitt's demission, see Facius, op. cit. (n. 18, above). Schweitzer, op. cit., pp. 251-2. Wi/IF 5.406, T-77/92/817755.

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91

and offices concerned with economic affairs. An accompanying cabinet decree of the same date, 21 May 1935, called upon the GBK to begin his work in peacetime, to prepare what would be necessary for a war economy. Ten days later, Hitler put an end to the dispute over "personalities" by naming the Reich Minister of Economics, Hjalmar Schacht, to the post of GBK.34 All this ought to have made Thomas happy, since it was just what he had asked for; but it was not long before Thomas found in Schacht's appointment new cause for alarm. In mid-September 1935, Thomas announced irately that "developments in regard to organizing the defense economy threaten to take a direction which in no way accords with the interests of the Wehrmacht". The trouble was, that the GBK was taking all too seriously his claim to "unified leadership" in economic mobilization; his staff was now trying to "monopolize" the entire field, including the armament industry proper.35 At first sight, this outburst from the very author of the plan to unify economic mobilization by making the Minister of Economics "economic dictator" may seem amazing. But the fact was that Thomas and the Wehrmacht had never intended to give up control of the armament industry; their intention was that the GBK should command the rest of the economy in the interests of Wehrmacht and armament industry. This intention must have seemed to them secured by the provisions of the Reich Defense Law which empowered the War Minister to issue decrees binding upon all ministers and other agencies, while the GBK's decrees were binding only in the sphere of economics. In any case, none of these plenipotentiary powers were effective until Hitler declared an emergency. Meanwhile, the cabinet decree which ordered the GBK to begin his work in peacetime had clearly reserved to the Wehrmacht jurisdiction over the armament industry: "Upon direction of the chairman of the Reich Defense Council [Hitler, or Blomberg as his deputy]", the GBK was to "guide economic preparations for war, insofar as they do not fall within the Reich War Minister's jurisdiction over the armament industry".86 What gave Schacht an opening to encroach upon the War MinReichsverteidigungsgesetz and cabinet decree of 21 May 1935 printed as PS-2261, IMT XXX. Schacht's appointment announced at the tenth session of the Reichsverteidigungsausschuss on 26 June 1935, EC-405, IMT XXXVI, p. 416. 35 W i / I F 5.383, T-77/86/809788, memorandum under the letterhead of the Chef des Wehrwirtschafts- und Waffenwesens (Thomas), 14 September 1935, possibly drafted by Thomas' aide Beutler. 38 PS-2261, IMT XXX, p. 63.

34

92

AMBIGUOUS VICTORIES:

1933-1935

istry's preserve was that the nature and extent of "the War Minister's jurisdiction over the armament industry" were nowhere defined. As we shall see elsewhere, this problem of definition remained for many years a chronic source of difficulty for economic mobilization and for the war economy. Moreover, there were other legal ambiguities of which Schacht could take advantage, if he wished indeed to "monopolize" economic mobilization. The cabinet decree of 21 May 1935 enjoined the War Minister and the GBK to "carry out preparations for mobilization in the closest mutual agreement", but no provision was made for the event they might disagree. The Begründung and interpretation of the decree concluded on a truly masterful note of confusion: The GBK was to take over unified direction of the entire economy "in accord with the will of the Führer", but in that capacity the GBK was said to "stand beside the Reich War Minister, who possesses the executive power, independent and responsible in the sphere of his own tasks to the Führer and Reich Chancellor".37 Anyone could make what they liked of that. It was not an auspicious beginning for united progress toward total mobilization.

37

Ibid., p. 65.

V HITLER ON WAR AND ECONOMIC POLICY

"If we had at our disposal the Urals, with their incalculable wealth of raw materials, and the forests of Siberia, and if the unending wheatfields of the Ukraine lay within Germany, our country would swim in plenty." Adolf Hitler, September 1936

Total war was Hitler's nemesis, not his design. He turned his back upon it as long as he could. In some ways he resisted it to the very end, refusing to give undisputed economic power even to Albert Speer. Yet war was deliberately sought by Hitler; it was even glorified by him. Indeed, it was essential to his solution for Germany's economic problems, as he conceived them. And Hitler's own war policies were more responsible than any other single factor for the evolution of World War II toward total war. This paradox, and its origins in Hitler's ideas on war and economic policy, have not been fully understood. Hitler's views on economics have often been dismissed as worthy of nothing but disdain. Even Hitler's unmatched biographer, Alan Bullock, offers little more than that "Hitler neither understood nor was interested in economics". Bullock elaborates this only slightly, painting Hitler as without any sort of economic theory (his views on economics were "entirely opportunist"), shouting magic incantations ("supremacy of politics over economics"), and leaving it "to Dr. Schacht and his successors to find the answers".1 This was certainly Schacht's view of Hitler, and that of Thomas as well. Recent studies have gone far, however, toward correcting this view. Some scholars have shown, on the one hand, that economic considerations occupied Hitler more, and were more important to Alan Bullock, Hitler, A Study in Tyranny, rev. ed. (New York and Evanston, 1964), pp. 152, 402-3.

1

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his expansionist foreign policy, than had been supposed.2 Others have shown, on the other hand, that until about 1942 Germany's economy was logically suitable to Hitlers military strategy of "Blitzkrieg". 3 But far from producing a coherent explanation, these new lines of attack on Hitler's military-economic conceptions have been separate, incomplete, and in appearance even conflicting. 4 It remains to be shown how Hitler's fundamental notions on economics and strategy combined to produce the policies (or seeming lack of policy) which so heavily influenced the character of Germany's rearmament and economic development. The latter is the subject of subsequent chapters; here we limit our attention to Hitler's ideas. It is of course true that Hitler was untrained in economics, unsophisticated in its technicalities, and completely impatient of its administrative problems. Judging by the small space devoted to economics in Mein Kampf and its long-suppressed sequel of 1928, Wolfgang Sauer, in K. D. Bracher et ed., op. cit. (See Ch. Ill, n. 9, above): "Hitlers Kriegsideen". A less brilliant, but prior treatment, is Gerhard Meinck's discussion of "Hitlers Absichten", in Hitler und die Deutsche Aufrüstung. (See Ch. Ill, n. 11, above.) 3 Klein, op. cit.; Milward, op. cit. (See Ch. II, n. 22, above.) 4 Those of the first viewpoint, like Sauer, fail to deal with Hitler's conception of what kind of war Germany was to fight and how this affected the economic policies he adopted. Sauer appears to assume, in direct contrast to Klein (and partial contrast to Milward), that Germany's economy was fully geared to war in the years immediately preceding World War II. Klein and Milward, on the other hand, both dismiss Hitler's economic ideas too lightly, Klein with the remark that "Hitler did not appear to comprehend the essence of economic thinking, namely, that the production of various types of commodities compete with one another for the use of resources" (p. 170), Milward concluding that Hitler was "utterly vague" on the "mechanics of organizing war production", and generally "lacked adequate sense of proportion" in economic affairs (pp. 17-18). While these remarks may be quite just, they leave altogether too much unsaid. Milward seems really to think that nothing more can be said, for he tells us — incredibly — that "owing to the destruction of archives" the question of "what Hitler thought about the general issues of economic strategy . . . can only be answered from material dating from after 1942" (specifically, the record of Speer's conferences with Hitler)(I). The apparent conflict between the two viewpoints has been underlined recently by the appearance of a collection of readings edited by Robert G. L. Waite, under the title Hitler and Nazi Germany (New York, 1965), in which pertinent excerpts from Burton Klein's book appear under the heading "The Economy Not Designed for War", followed directly by excerpts from Sauer's treatment of "Hitlers Kriegsideen" under the heading "The Economy Geared to War". As will be seen below, however, the conflict is much more apparent than real; it arises in part from the failure to see that Hitler could be bent upon war, and the German economy could be fairly heavily directed toward war, without it being fully "geared to war", and without it meeting the popular conception of a "total war economy".

2

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95

now published as Hitlers Zweites Buch, one might well conclude that Hitler had altogether little interest in the subject.5 And while Hitler s remarks on economic affairs occupy over two hundred pages in a topical collection of his speeches, most of these deal less with economics than with politics and foreign policy, reflecting the conviction: "In the long run, if he [Hitler] got the arms, he believed that he would be able to solve Germany's economic problems by other than economic means."® Yet Hitler was acutely aware of Germany's economic problems, as he saw them, and he was not without an economic theory — or at least, what has been called "a substitute for an economic theory".7 And far from being "completely opportunist", both his economic policies and his war plans were geared with maniacal single-mindedness to that theory, which can be discerned almost complete in Mein Kampf, full-blown in the Zweites Buch, and elaborated, but unchanged, in Hitler's most definitive pronouncement on economic affairs, his "Memorandum on the Four-Year-Plan", August 1936.8 Hitler began with two key notions: the "struggle for existence", and the unfavorable relation of food supply to population growth. The first preoccupied him inordinately. The foremost rule of life Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (Munich, 1930) (written about 1924, first published in two volumes, 1925 and 1927). References in this chapter are to a one-volume edition in German, Munich, 1930, which will be cited as "MK G", and to an English translation (Houghton-Mifflin) (Boston, 1943), which will be cited as "MK E". The manuscript of 1928 was first published as Hitlers Zweites Buch (Stuttgart, 1961), edited with commentary by Gerhard L. Weinberg (cited hereinafter as "ZB G"); an English version, entitled Hitler's Secret Book (New York, 1961), will be cited as "ZB E " to avoid confusion with Hitlerfs Secret Conversations (cited below). 6 Bullock, op. cit., p. 412; The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, ed. by Norman H. Baynes (London-New York-Toronto, 1942), vol. I, pp. 767-987. 7 Wolfgang Sauer's phrase. 8 Hitler's "Denkschrift zum Vierjahresplan" was introduced in evidence at the Nürnberg trials as Schacht-48 and also as NI-4955. The copy used at the trials was that of Speer, who had attached to it a memorandum stating that it had been given to him by Hitler in 1944. (The two documents were probably taken from a folder of Speer's papers filmed under the number RMfRUK/353a-f in T-73, Roll 19. The original of this folder has been returned to Germany. The location of the original of the "Denkschrift" and of Speer's attached memorandum is uncertain.) The Denkschrift was first published in full, in English translation, in TWC XII, pp. 430-439. It was later published in full in German, with a commentary by Wilhelm Treue, in the Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, vol. III (1955), pp. 184-203. Excerpts are also published in TWC VII, pp. 787-92. See also Klein, op. cit., pp. 18, 35-37 (Klein is careless about the date of the Memorandum, but generally correct about its contents).

5

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for him was "the right to victory of the best and stronger in this world". In Mein Kampf he wrote: Those who want to live, let them fight, and those who do not want to fight in this world of eternal struggle do not deserve to live.9 Over and over he repeated that the struggle for existence must be carried out with all means. Eventually, he left no doubt, resort to arms would always be both necessary and decisive. In speech after speech he reiterated: "All development is struggle. Only force rules" (1926); "Politics is the struggle of a people with all weapons to the limit of its power for its existence on this earth" (1927); "In the power of the sword lies the vital strength of a nation" (1928). Again, before the assembled peers of German industry in January 1932: "Politics is nothing else and can be nothing else than the safeguarding of a people's vital interest and the practical waging of its life-battle with every means."10 At the outset, Hitler conceived the economic struggle for existence as the struggle between men, and between nations, for "their daily bread", by which he evidently meant, quite literally, food. Hitler explicitly rejected the possibility that the German population could, in the long run, secure its food supply by increased agricultural production at home, by commerce (i.e., industrialization and world trade), or by overseas colonization. The first he thought impossible (particularly since he utterly rejected birth control - for Germans - on racialist grounds), the second two inadequate and, worse, insecure. He saw only one solution. As he explained in 1928 (what had already been said less concisely in Mein Kampf): . . . the bread which a people requires is conditioned by the living space at its disposal. . . . World trade, world economy, tourist traffic, etc., etc., are all transient means for securing a nation's sustenance. . . . The increase of population can be balanced only through an increase, that is an enlargement, of living space. Still clinging to euphemisms, he explained further: In the life of nations there are several ways for correcting the disproportion »

M K E, p. 289 (see note 5, above); M K G, p. 317. Gordon W . Prange, ed., Hitler's Words (Washington, D.C., 1944), pp. 4, 6, 9. The speech at the Industrieklub in Dusseldorf, January 1932, is discussed at some length by Sauer, in "Hitlers Kriegsideen" (see note 1, above); it is reproduced fully by Baynes, op. cit., pp. 777-829 (in English) and by Max Domarus, Hitler, Reden und Proklamationen, 1932-1945, vol. I (Munich, 1962). 10

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between population and territory. The most natural way is to adapt the soil, from time to time, to the increased population. Less elliptically, he added: This requires a determination to fight and the risk of bloodshed. . . . Thus the bread of freedom grows from the hardships of war. The sword is the path-breaker for the plow.11 When it came to his policy for Germany in particular, Hitler abandoned all euphemisms. He had already defined his position clearly in Mein Kampf: For Germany, consequendy, the only possibility for carrying out a healthy territorial policy lay in the acquisition of new land in Europe itself. . . . [And if] land was desired in Europe, it could be obtained by and large only at the expense of Russia, and this meant that the new Reich must again set itself on the march along the road of the Teutonic Knights of old, to obtain by the German sword sod for the German plow and daily bread for the nation.12 Here Hitler was referring to what should have been the policy of Bismarck's "Second Reich", but he soon made clear, in a passage well known today, that his own policy for the future Reich would be the same: And so we National Socialists ... stop the endless German movement to the south and west, and turn our gaze toward the land in the east. . . . If we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in mind only Russia and her vassal border states.13 In short, Hitlers "substitute for an economic theory" was this: for Germany to survive in the struggle for existence and for "daily bread", she must have a great deal more territory, it must be in Europe, and it must be sought primarily to the east, namely, in Russia. Furthermore, as was both obvious and explicit, for Germany to have these things, she must conquer them "by the sword". Hitler made this conclusion and its immediate practical consequence perfectly public in a speech of 1928: The goal of foreign policy is the preservation of a people's means of subsistence. . . . The path to this goal will, in the final analysis, always be war. The means will be the might of the nation as it is set up in its military organization. 11 ZB G, pp. 53-4, ZB E, pp. 13-14; see also ZB E, pp. 16-24, and compare the views expressed in MK E, pp. 131-8, 643, 646-9. (For explanation of these references, see note 5, above.) 12 MK G, pp. 153-4; MK E, pp. 139-140. See ZB E, p. 73. 13 MK G, p. 742; MK E, p. 654; ZB G, pp. 102, 159, ZB E, pp. 74, 139.

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It is impossible in the long ran to carry out our foreign policy without building up the army.14 In the same year, in the Zweites Buck, he declared it to be the first goal of both domestic and foreign policy for Germany to rebuild its national army.15 When he came to power, Hitler was as good as his word. It is true that he now sang a rather different tune in public, assuring the world time and again of Germany's love of peace and determination to preserve it. But he himself had explained the ulterior purpose of these pronouncements, in the Zweites Buch: any policy "which brings Germany into conflict with France, England, Poland and Czechoslovakia, etc., without before-hand giving her the possibility of a thorough preparation, is therefore void". And in secret, as we have seen, he had already begun his "thorough preparation", pressing the generals for a rapid buildup of the army, first to twenty-one divisions, then to thirty-six. As to what was being prepared, whether defense or aggression, Hitler had proclaimed openly in Mein Kampf: "victory lies always and exclusively in attack".16 That the preparations which Hitler undertook were less "thorough" than advocates of total mobilization would have liked was not a consequence of pacific sentiments on Hitler's part, but of Hitler's notions about the future of warfare. Hitler thought war not only necessary and eternal, but also a good thing. He was frequently at pains to heap scorn upon pacifism, and argued in the Zweites Buch that a constant policy of peace results in "the subsequent bleeding to death of a nation through emigration and birth control" (because population outgrows food supply). Many years later, in wartime dinner conversations, he remarked: "For the good of the German people, we must wish for a war every fifteen years. . . . Peoples, like individuals, sometimes need regenerating by a little bloodletting." 17 On occasion, Hitler was also given to the rhetoric of "national Prange, op. cit., pp. 9-10. ZB G, p. 111-112, ZB E p. 85. 18 On Hitler's peace pronouncements, see Baynes, op. cit., vol. II, passim; Prange, op. cit., Ch. X; and the analysis by Bullock, op. cit., Ch. 6; on Hitler's explanation, see ZB G, p. 149, ZB E, p. 128. The last quotation is from MK E, p. 398. 17 Hitler's Secret Conversations, translated by Norman Cameron and R. H. Stevens, with an introduction by H. R. Trevor-Roper (New York, 1961), p. 55 (19-20 August 1941) and p. 614 (26 August 1942). This edition is equivalent to the one which appeared under the title Hitler's Table Talk; for a discussion of the German and English versions, see G. L. Weinberg, in ZB G, pp. 16-18. 14 15

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war", and in certain contexts, he was an advocate of "total war" in the sense of "total destruction of the enemy". These ideas were well formed by the early nineteen-thirties, as expressed in the conversations recorded by Hermann Rauschning. In 1932 Hitler told Rauschning and other listeners: "In the future, whole nations will stand against each other, not merely hostile armies. . . . I have no scruples, and I will use whatever weapon I require. . . . The next war will be unbelievably bloody and grim." 18 And in 1934: "Natural instincts bid all living beings not merely conquer their enemies, but also destroy them." 19 Nevertheless, Hitler explicitly rejected both "permanent" and "total" war. In the Zweites Buck he explained that war should not be taken as "the aim of life of a people", to be engaged in constantly for glory alone, for this would drain "the best blood" of the nation and lead ultimately to its destruction.20 And in the same conversation with Rauschning in which Hitler harked back to Baron von der Goltz's "nation in arms", he also expressed contempt for the way in which World War I was conducted. "Who says I'm going to start a war like those fools in 1914?": The next war will be quite different from the last war. . . . Interlocked frontal struggles lasting for years on petrified fronts will not return. I guarantee that. They were a degenerate form of war.21 What then was Hitler's prescription for future war? It was dual. First, "demoralization of the enemy from within"; and second, mass superiority in armed strength, brought to bear at the critical moment. For the first, Hitler welcomed all means imaginable: "We shall undermine the physical health of our enemies as we shall break down their moral resistance." He even toyed with the possibility of using bacterial warfare to demoralize the enemy "before the war". But in general: What is war but cunning, deception, delusion, attack and surprise? People have killed only when they could not achieve their aim in other ways. . . . When I wage war, . . . in the midst of peace, troops will suddenly appear, let us say, in Paris. They will wear French uniforms. . . . Within a few minutes, France, Poland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, will be robbed of their leading men. An army without a general staff! All political leaders out of the way! The confusion will be beyond belief. 18

19 20 21

Hermann Rauschning, Hitler Speaks (London, 1939), pp. 13, 21.

Ibid., p. 141.

ZB, Ch. I. Rauschning, op. cit., pp. 16, 13.

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If these remarks were fanciful, the conclusion to them proved much less so — "But I shall long have had relations with the men who will form a new government — a government to suit me": We shall find such men, we shall find them in every country. We shall not need to bribe them. They will come of their own accord. Ambition and delusion, party squabbles and self-seeking arrogance will drive them. And finally, "the place of artillery preparation for frontal attack by the infantry in trench warfare will in future be taken by revolutionary propaganda, to break down the enemy psychologically before the armies begin to function at all".22 At a given moment, however, the time would come to apply armed force. For that moment, Hitler thought, "We need armies, not only highly qualified special formations, but mass armies as well. But we shall not use them as in 1914." How would he use them? One might almost imagine he had been reading H. G. Wells, for he thought that "the most inhuman war, one which makes no distinction between military and civilian combatants, will at the same time be the kindest, because it will be the shortest": I shall never start a war without the certainty that a demoralised enemy will succumb to the first stroke of a single gigantic attack. .. . When the enemy is demoralised from within, when he stands on the brink of revolution, when social unrest threatens — that is the right moment. A single blow must destroy him. Aerial attacks, stupendous in their mass effect, surprise, terror, sabotage, assassination from within, the murder of leading men, overwhelming attacks on all weak points in the enemy's defence, sudden attacks, all in the same second, without regard for reserves or losses: that is the war of the future. A gigantic, all-destroying blow.23 There, in 1932, was the essence of Hitlers strategy, which carried him triumphantly through the conquest of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium and even France. Hidden in this tirade was liie key to Hitler s economic and armament policies for the eight years from 1933 to 1942: "without regard for reserves". Hitler was never concerned with building up reserves, whether of arms, raw materials, or foodstuffs, so that Germany could endure a long war, because Hitler never meant to fight a long war. If this seems preposterous now, it certainly did not seem so in 1940 and early 1941, when Hitlers "Blitzkrieg" strategy had won him control of nearly the whole of continental Europe and its resources — 82

»

Ibid., pp. 14, 16-17, 19. Ibid., p. 20.

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short of Russia. Of course, Russia was Hitler's goal, but meanwhile the intended victim was supplying her would-be conqueror with an unfaltering stream of useful supplies, under the aegis of the NaziSoviet Pact.24 Thus Hitler's economic policy for Germany was to accelerate Germany's "armament in breadth" without imposing stringent restraints or cutbacks on the civilian economy, because he planned a type of warfare which could be fought "without regard for reserves".26 Both Schacht and Thomas opposed this policy, united in their doubt that Germany would be able to fulfill Hitler's dreams of conquest. Both also felt that the pace of superficial military expansion should be slowed. Beyond that point, however, their agreement ended, and in their opposition to Hitler they diverged to such an extent as to become diametrically opposed in economic policy. For while Schacht's view was that if any stringent restraints and cutbacks were imposed, they ought to be imposed upon the Wehrmacht and rearmament, Thomas' view was that "armament in depth" ought to be pushed with even greater vigor than Germany was then applying to "armament in breadth", and that this could and should be done at the expense of the civilian economy. Both Thomas and Schacht thought Hitler blind and deaf to their arguments - and proofs - of the weaknesses of Germany's economy, and both were inclined to think that Hitler's attitude arose from mere ignorance, arrogance, or a foolhardy war strategy. In this they were seriously mistaken. Hitler's policy was rooted much more deeply - and fatefully - than they supposed, in his unshakable conviction that it was impossible for Germany ever to build economic reserves adequate to a "great power", within her historic boundaries. In Mein Kampf, this conviction was framed solely in the context of the struggle for "daily bread", or arable land. The term "raw materials" seems hardly to have been in Hitler s vocabulary in 1924. But in 1928, he mentioned Germany's reliance on imported raw materials several times in the Zweites Buch, concluding with a " On Russia's deliveries of oil and other raw materials to Germany see especially Gerhard L. Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union (Leiden, 1954), pp. 161ff. 25 Also, of course, because it was politically expedient to maintain civilian production and consumption at a reasonably comfortable level; it may be doubted, however, that Hitler would have allowed so high a level as was maintained had he thought it necessary to undertake greater restrictions, for the sake of "armament in depth".

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reference to "the limitation of our own raw materials and the ensuing threatening dependence on other countries". Early in 1934, in conversation with Rauschning, he was much more vehement about the need for Germany to be freed from this "dependence on the outside world", which he regarded as a "mortal" weakness in war, and hence fatal to Germany's ambitions to be a great power: "Our dependence on foreign trade... would condemn us eternally to the position of a politically dependent nation."26 In the following years, Hitlers attention was repeatedly drawn to Germany's scarcity of strategic raw materials. From the outset, Hitler felt certain that the problem had only one solution: not greater industrialization and foreign trade, but conquest of vast territories in eastern Europe. It was probably because of this belief that he did very little, in his first two years in office, to press for rapid development of synthetics and substitutes for scarce materials. He appears to have given the matter little attention until, in the midst of the foreign exchange crisis of summer 1934, he boasted to the English journalist G. Ward Price, that if Germans were obliged "to cut down our imports of raw materials from abroad, we shall find substitutes for those raw materials in our own country". It was only after this crisis, in September 1934, that the Ministry of Economics took steps to force a group of somewhat unwilling coal producers into a semi-public enterprise known as "Brabag" (Braunkohlen-Benzin AG), to produce synthetic oil. For the most part, however, Hitler was still willing to leave the development of substitute materials to private initiative. In a speech at the Automobile Exhibition in Berlin in February 1935, he said: "We are all aware that not only the problems of synthetic rubber, but also those of synthetic petrol, have in principle been solved. . . . It is important that the German motor industry should recognize here also that however much attention it devotes to the construction of means of transport, it should also study the possibility of attracting and utilizing German materials...." In his Reichstag speech of 21 May 1935 (the day of the Wehrmacht Law and the secret Reich Defense Law), he alluded again to the need to employ synthetics and substitutes for materials Germany would otherwise have to import.27 But it was not until September 1935 that " Rauschning, op. cit., p. 126. Cf. the German version, Gespreiche Mit Hitler (New York, 1940), p. 116. 87 Baynes, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 903, 907, 909-10. Concerning Brabag, see Nathan, op. cit. (see Ch. IV, n. 19, above), pp. 166-7, and Neumann, op. cit. (see Ch. IV, n. 17, above), pp. 281-2.

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Hitler declared it a matter of official government policy "to make ourselves independent of imports through the production of our own synthetic materials".28 These last words dovetailed nicely with Hitlers proclamation of the Four-Year-Plan at the Party Congress a year later, when he declared: "In four years Germany must be completely independent of foreign c o u n t r i e s . . . B o t h phrases contributed to the notion that Hitler had set out upon a program of "autarky" for Germany, a notion which gave rise to much disdain for Hitler among economists (especially Schacht). But this interpretation did injustice to Hitlers position; worse, it helped to conceal Hitler's true intentions. For what Hitler said at the Party Congress in 1935 was simply . . to the extent that our exports do not provide the means for the purchase of raw materials and food-stuffs, we have come to the decision to make ourselves independent of imports...." And what he actually said in the proclamation of the Four-Year-Plan was: In four years Germany must be completely independent of foreign countries so far as concerns those materials which by any means through German skill, through our chemical and machine industry or through our mining industry we can ourselves produce. . . . He further went on to say that the purpose of this program was to reserve the use of Germany's export earnings "for the supply of foodstuffs or for the supply of those raw materials which we still shall not be able to produce ourselves".29 Hitler was never under the illusion that Germany could be selfsufficient within her own boundaries. The contrary was the very heart of his economic, military, and foreign policy. The Four-Year-Plan was strictly a temporary expedient. He made this explicit, though not public, in his Memorandum of August 1936: "The definitive solution lies in an extension of our living space, that is, an extension of the raw materials and food basis of our nation." 30 Nevertheless, Hitler was indeed an "autarkist". Autarky was, for him, the economic obverse of the geo-political notion "Lebensraum". Where autarky lay for Germany, Hitler made clear in September 1936, not long after the proclamation of the Four-Year-Plan: Die Reden Hitlers am, Parteitag der Freiheit (Munich, 1935), p. 23. Ibid.; Proclamation at the Parteitag 1936, Baynes, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 926-7. Italics added. NI-8495, at N.A., is a photostatic reproduction of the Proclamation read in 1936, as printed in the Völkischer Beobachter, 10 September 1936. M TWC XII, p. 434; Treue (see note 8, above), p. 206.

28

29

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If we had at our disposal the Urals, with their incalculable wealth of raw materials, and the forests of Siberia, and if the unending wheat-fields of the Ukraine lay within Germany, our country would swim in plenty.31 During the campaigns of 1941 and 1942 in Russia, his imagination inflamed by early victories, he returned again and again to the same theme: "A fault we must never again commit is to forget, once the war is over, the advantages of the autarkic economy. . . . There is no country that can be to a larger extent autarkic than Europe will be. Where is there a region capable of supplying iron of the quality of Ukrainian iron? Where can one find more nickel, more coal, more manganese, more molybdenum? . . . Coffee and tea are all we shall have to import. . . . We shall be the most self-supporting State, in every respect, including cotton, in the world. . . . Timber we shall have in abundance, iron in limitless quantity, the greatest manganeseore mines in the world, oil - we shall swim in it!" 32 In October 1941, Hitler completed the thought he had expressed in part to Rauschning in 1934: "National independence, and independence on the political level, depend as much on autarky as on military power."33 Thus Hitler s determination to conquer Russia stemmed not merely from political fanaticism, but also from his "substitute for an economic theory" and his analysis, in its terms, of Germany's economic situation. As the strains on the German economy increased in the late nineteen-thirties, and the warnings and pleadings of Schacht and Thomas grew sharper and louder, Hitler only grew the more certain that his own analysis was correct: Germany could never achieve "world power" with her own economic resources - she must expand them through conquest. And the bitterest irony of Thomas' role was that, contrary to deterring Hitler from war, his gloomy memoranda and prognostications probably served to spur Hitler forward, even to accelerate his own timetable for conquest, in a gamble to achieve his "definitive solution" before the predicted catastrophe should overtake Germany's economy. In all, Hitler's economic policies were shaped with better logic, and better information, than his critics allowed; and they were rewarded with many incredible successes. Nevertheless, as everyone knows today, Hitler fatally miscalculated the resistance of England 51 Quoted by Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia (London, 1957), p. 8, from the Völkischer Beobachter, 13 September 1936. 32 Hitler's Secret Conversations, pp. 95, 78, 96, 58. 33 Ibid., p. 113.

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and Russia, and the role of the United States. The transformation of World War II into "total war" was in large measure the consequence of that miscalculation, for it was England's stubborn persistence, Russia's refusal to capitulate, and the engagement of the United States which forced Germany into the kind of war Hitler had vowed he would never fight. Still, Hitler's miscalculations did not alone make World War II "total" — for Germany's opponents, however stubborn, might have been less thorough in their own war mobilization; and Germany herself might not have responded as effectively as she did to the shift from "Blitzkrieg" to "total war". In these developments, many other factors played their part: not least, efforts to mobilize the German economy as fully as possible, despite Hitler, in the years preceding World War II.

VI BEHIND THE SCENES THE JURISDICTION TANGLE, 1933-1935

"The inhabitant of Hitler's Third Reich lived not only under the simultaneous and often conflicting authorities of competing powers, such as the civil services, the party, the SA and the SS; he could never be sure and was never explicitly told whose authority he was supposed to place above all others." Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism

Hitler s logic on war and economic policy was only dimly perceived by the public, whether in Germany or abroad, in the nineteen-thirties. Those who understood the full import of Mein Kampf were not many; on the contrary, the National Socialist "bible" was widely dismissed as bravado, delirium, or both. The Zweites Buck of 1928 was kept closely secret, and Hitler's later explanations of the theory of autarky-by-conquest, as in certain military conferences after 1933 and in the Memorandum on the Four-Year-Plan, were known only to a small circle of high officials, many of whom misconstrued Hitlers ideas nonetheless. Rauschning did not publish his account of conversations with Hitler until 1939; when he did, the accuracy of his record seemed doubtful, though today it rather seems amazing. It is true that on many public occasions Hitler referred lightly to one or another aspect of his long-range military and economic program. Nevertheless, the bits and pieces did not fit together clearly at first sight; nor did anyone feel certain when Hitler was serious and when he was raving. Those who were most confused were those one might have expected to be best informed. Schacht, though Minister of Economics, President of the Reichsbank, and Plenipotentiary for War Economy, thought Hitlers program was autarky within Germany and reckless rearmament at the expense of all else; Thomas, who as the Wehr-

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macht's chief economic expert was privy to the widest range of toplevel information not only on economic conditions but also on Germany's military establishment and strategic planning, thought Hitlers' economic policies rested exclusively on his "Blitzkrieg" strategy. To many keen observers in Germany and abroad, Hitler's military and economic policies appeared to merge more and more into the image of a true garrison state. This impression, which grew in strength as World War II approached, was later capsulized by Otto Nathan: With the Nazis in power in Germany, a unifying principle was brought to bear upon the economic system. They had a predetermined purpose: the creation of a war machine. In subordinating the economic system to this objective they substituted conscious, over-all direction for the autonomy of the market mechanism.1 Thomas, on the contrary, felt that "in Hitler's so-called Leadership State there subsisted in economic affairs a complete absence of leadership, and an indescribable duplication of effort and working at cross purposes".2 These observations grew out of Thomas' bitter experience with the unending squabbles and confusion prevailing in the top and middle levels of Germany's economic administration. Schacht was at first less troubled by such conditions than Thomas because he had fewer fronts to fight on. Schacht at least had good control of his own ministry, but Thomas had hardly any control over the Wehrmacht. This weakness dated back to the formation of Thomas' office in the War Ministry in 1934. We recall that in the nineteen-twenties, the Army Ordnance Office's Economic Staff had claimed authority to centralize all the Reichswehr's armament planning and procurement. Having failed to assert this claim successfully in 1924-25, the Economic Staff revived it again in 1928, and achieved a momentary victory: armament planning for army, navy, and incipient air force was combined for the first time in a unified production program, coordinated by the Economic Staff and set at the level it considered realistic (sixteen rather than twentyone divisions). The victory was short-lived. In 1929-30 the Army Ordnance Office had to ward off an attack on its very existence, in the form of proposals put forward by Kesselring, amounting to dismemberment of the Ordnance Office and distribution of its functions between the Truppenamt and other military agencies. The Ordnance 1

*

Otto Nathan, op. cit. (see Ch. IV, n. 19), p. 5. Thomas, statement of 16 August 1945, in T-77, Roll 635.

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Office overcame this attack but retreated from its claim to direct all military procurement. In 1929 it proposed, instead, that an "Armament Committee" representing all interested parties be formed in the Reichswehr Ministry for the purpose of centralization. This proposal actually received the approval of the Truppenamt in December 1929, and a first meeting of the "Armament Committee" was held in June 1930. Late as this was, the meeting was of a purely introductory nature. Moreover, nothing appears to have followed the introduction. Talk about the "Armament Committee" persisted for some years, but remained barren.3 The office which Thomas took over in the Reichswehr Ministry in 1934 had no similarity in composition, and little in function, to the abortive "Armament Committee". But in mid-1934 the Army Ordnance Office found an occasion to revive its long-disused title to direct Germany's economic mobilization for war. In the halcyon atmosphere of military life at that time, the Reichswehr had dusted off its old plans for top-level military and civilian administration in case of war ("Kriegsspitzengliederung"), and was in the midst of remodeling. Since 1924 these plans had called for a "Kriegsamt", inspired by, but exceeding in scope, the War Office of World War I, beneath which was to be a Riistungsamt ("Armament Office"), in effect an economic general staff. The Ordnance Office's Economic Staff had been created in 1924 to lay the groundwork for the intended Riistungsamt.4 In July 1934, General Liese, head of the Army Ordnance Office, decided to revive the whole scheme. In a proposal drafted by Thomas, then Liese's Chief-of-Staff, he suggested that the Reichswehr adopt plans for a wartime Wehrmachtrustungsamt, to direct the entire war economy. In peacetime, preparatory measures would be in the hands of the Army Ordnance Office, and in particular its Economic Staff. The latter would also constitute the nucleus from which the Wehrmachtriistungsamt would be formed, with the addition of representatives of navy and air force "proportional to their needs". The Chief of the Army Ordnance Office would become head of the Wehrmachtriistungsamt in time of war.5 In later years Thomas, describing this effort to create a WehrFor further details on the foregoing, see the author's doctoral dissertation, "Design for Total War: The Contest for 'Wehrwirtschaft' in the Third Reich" (Brown University, June 1960), Aim Arbor, University Microfilms, pp. 20, 30-31, 37-39, and documents there cited. 4 See Chapter III, above, especially n. 5. 5 W i / I F 5.383, T-77/86/810091ff., "783/34, Spitzengliederung", 16 July 1934; 3

Thomas, Grundlagen, Ch. Ill, pp. 26-7.

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machtriistungsamt, wrote that its purpose was to regulate the rising competition between the service branches.6 This is not immediately apparent from the proposal itself, since it contained no claims to supervision over the procurement policies of the navy and air force in peacetime. On the contrary, it was explicitly stated that existing regulations on this count were to remain in force; for without such a provision there could be no hope whatsoever that the proposal might pass. Still, the Ordnance Office was requesting direction of both planning and preparations for war mobilization. If granted, this would have offered some measure of restraint upon the intense competition for resources then impending. In any case, at the time the fact of competition between the services was certainly uppermost in the minds of Thomas and Liese. Thus on 11 July 1934, five days prior to submitting the proposal under discussion, Liese had written to Blomberg protesting — quite futilely — against the somewhat irregular demand of the Aviation Ministry for complete control ovei air force procurement.7 The navy at first supported the Army Ordnance Office proposal for a Wehrmachtriistungsamt. But the resistance of the Ministry of Aviation was too strong, and by October, this proposal was abandoned for another, which had the support of von Reichenau. The new plan was to create a Wehrmachtriistungsamt immediately, but at a lower level, namely, subordinate to Reichenau's Wehrmachtamt.8 This move must have been regarded with uneasiness by everybody except Reichenau and Blomberg, but in the last analysis, it was undoubtedly Goring's opposition which blocked it. Despite the high favor in which Reichenau stood with the National Socialist regime, Goring stood immeasurably higher. His victory in this instance, at a time when Hitler was still honeymooning with the officers' corps, was one of the earliest symptoms of the Wehrmacht's later degradation. That the army and navy leadership permitted - perhaps even abetted — this victory is evidence of the division and confusion which reigned in the Reichswehr even when it thought itself most strong. *

Thomas, ibid. Wi/IF 5.3260, T-77/415/1272703-9, "Wa A 764/34 gK Wa Stab", 11 July 1934. It was only "somewhat" irregular a demand on the part of the Aviation Ministry, since at that time the Air Force was still legally non-existent, and all its affairs were handled by the Aviation Ministry; in fact, the two remained nearly identical throughout the Third Reich. Nevertheless, from the point of view of the War Ministry, the demand was irregular. 8 Wi/IF 5.383, T-77/86/810072-6, -95, -96.

7

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While Reichenau thus failed against Goring, he was unwilling to surrender everything. The upshot was, therefore, that an emasculated version of the Wehrmachtriistungsamt, under the title "Wehrwirtschafts- und Waffenwesen", was established in the Reichswehr Ministry, under the Wehrmachtamt. It was not, of course, headed by General Liese, but by the then Colonel Georg Thomas. Liese found himself shorn not only of his Chief-of-Staff, but also of two of his departments. The Economic Staff moved over bodily into the Ministry, and Thomas took along also the Ordnance Office's ZentralKartei (the central catalog of Germany's armament industry, begun by the Economic Staff about 1925). Thomas further took charge of the Ministry's own Department of Contract and Price Supervision. The Economic Staff - headed at the time by Walter Warlimont brought with it control over the economic officers stationed with the Military District Commands.9 Thomas' office immediately took on an impressive range of responsibilities. It concerned itself with questions of organization and jurisdiction in the "defense economy", with planning for armament production in wartime, and with preparations for mobilizing the economy, down to individual plants, for rapid conversion to war production. It exercised varying degrees of influence over strategic raw materials, over expansion and allocation of plant capacity for arms production, and over distribution of military contracts. It also had a certain right of supervision over prices on military goods and over Germany's import-export trade in armaments. It was the Wehrmacht's agency for foreign economic intelligence. And finally, Thomas was supposed to be the prime representative of military interests in economic affairs, vis-à-vis all government and Party offices.10 For all this broad responsibility, Thomas received no authority whatsoever to issue orders to the several service branches, nor to any other agencies except his own staff and local subordinates, the economic officers. Even the latter, as will be seen below, were not at the exclusive disposal of Thomas. The army, navy, and air force retained full control of current supply and weapons development for their own needs. Since Goring had taken air production planning from the Army Ordnance Office in 1933, all three services now worked out separate programs for war production. The Army Ord» W i / I F 5.383, T - 7 7 / 8 6 / 8 1 0 0 3 9 , -60ff., and 810040-3, "W.A. 1601/34 gK L la", 12 November 1934; W i / I F 5.1845, T-77/315/1147680-9. 10 Documents cited in n. 9, above.

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nance Office (not Thomas' office) continued as before to supply the three services with certain articles of common use, including most types of munitions (bombs and mines only partially excepted). In terms of practical power, Thomas could do no more than submit recommendations to Blomberg; and Thomas soon learned that Blomberg could not be depended upon to act forcefully even against the heads of the army and navy, much less against Goring. 11 One focus of the struggle between the War Ministry and the services as to who would control military procurement was the status of the economic officers at the Military District headquarters. These officers, first appointed by the Economic Staff in 1925, were primarily agents of the army, remaining under the jurisdiction of the Army Ordnance Office. They were joined before 1933 by counterpart agents of the navy, but the army's economic officers still dominated the "Economic Officers' Bureaus" in the Military Districts. In June 1934, however, the Ministry of Aviation separately appointed "Air Economic Officers" for local administration of air force contracts and economic interests. This was witness not only to Goring's refusal to leave any air force affairs in the hands of the army, but also to the growing importance of the economic officers, following from the growing burdens of administering Germany's rapid rearmament. Thomas was alarmed by the independent position of the Air Economic Officers, and the Army Ordnance Office protested it, but without success. When Thomas moved into the War Ministry, however, he persuaded Blomberg of the need to centralize military procurement at the local level. On 19 December 1934, Blomberg issued a preliminary order establishing "Wehrwirtschaft Inspectorates" in the Military Districts. On 18 March 1935, the order became definitive, effective 1 April 1935. Each of the new Inspectorates was headed by an Inspector directly subordinate to Thomas' office. The economic officers representing the three services were assigned to the staff of the Inspectorate. Each Inpector also had at his disposal an Adjutantur, an engineer or technical staff, and a special official to handle mobilization questions. The engineer supervised technical aspects of military contracts for all three services, and maintained, 11 Ibid., and Thomas, Grundlagen, Ch. Ill, pp. 28-30. Milward (op. ext., p. 31) is mistaken in writing that "the job of WiRiiAmt, fundamentally, was to provide the equipment for whatever campaign the Army might be ordered to undertake". Thomas' office did not generally provide weapons or "equipment" for the aimed forces, but was only responsible for economic support: insuring the availability of raw materials, machinery, transport, etc.

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for the benefit of all military agencies, card catalogs, lists of firms, and reference statistics on the resources of the Inspectorate's region. The mobilization official transmitted mobilization plans and orders to firms and local organizations, and undertook various specific war preparations at the plants, such as measures for air raid protection. The Inspectors further commanded subsidiary offices (Bezirks-Wirtschaftsoffiziere) in important locations other than the sites of the Inspectorates.12 The economic officers representing the three services retained a large measure of independence. On orders from their respective Ordnance Offices, they issued contracts to firms in which they had been assigned plant capacity. This assignment was officially in the hands of the Inspectors; at the outset, however, the services simply retained the right to dispose of whatever plant capacity they already claimed by virtue of existing military contracts or negotiations in progress. The Inspector and his immediate staff were given exclusive authority to undertake new approaches to plants and firms not yet engaged in current or planned production for the Wehrmacht. Again, however, in practice the Inspector normally assigned to one of the economic officers of the services the details of investigating and negotiating with new firms, after a preliminary decision on whether the facilities seemed most suited to army, navy, or air force needs. The Inspector was also granted authority to represent "Wehrmacht interests" when matters affecting two or more of the services were in question, for example, in military demands upon local government, Party or economic organizations. Conflicts between the services over the use of local resources, or problems arising when military contracts proved unsuited to local economic conditions were to be submitted to the Inspectors for resolution. For Thomas, this seemed the best compromise arrangement which could be achieved at the time, and Goring must also have found it acceptable, since he let it pass. Nevertheless, relations did not go smoothly between the Inspectors and the economic officers. To begin with, the Aviation Ministry's order of 25 April 1935, regulating the position of its representatives in the Inspectorates, made them responsible to the Aviation Ministry alone in regard to "mobilization 12 Wi/1.246, T-77/536; also Wi/1.78, T-77/516, "Der Reichsverteidigungsminister, 6 0 0 / 3 5 gK W Wi (lb)", 18 March 1935, "Neuorganisation der W.O.Dienststellen"; W i / I F 5.383, T - 7 7 / 8 6 .

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of the aircraft industry". This provision later set off a major dispute between Thomas and the Ordnance Offices of the services.13 In September 1935, Thomas received from Colonel Freiherr von Riedel, his Inspector in Munich, a report on special difficulties in the relationship between Inspectors and Air Economic Officers: Whereas in the case of the army and navy the question of what a firm can produce in the event of mobilization plays a great part, thus making a large proportion of our work somewhat theoretical, the Air Economic Officer engages in this type of preparations only to a very limited extent. According to the clearly defined plan of the Reich Ministry of Aviation, which does not require the collaboration of the W. Inspectorate, and involves the Air Economic Officer only as intermediary, the armament factories of the Air Force are already being expanded to bring them gradually to the level of production expected of them at the time of mobilization.14 Riedel noted that in the course of this expansion of the aircraft industry, heavy demands were falling upon supplier-firms whose products were also in demand for other types of military production. Still, Riedel made no complaint, contenting himself with the observation that it was the duty of the Inspector to insure that the requirements of all services be given consideration. He concluded: "At present, these important questions are not ripe for judgment." Evidently Thomas thought differently about the ripeness of the questions, for three weeks later, on 3 October 1935, he raised them at a conference at which representatives of army, navy, and air force were present, as well as a number of W Inspectors. The issue under discussion was responsibility for mobilizing individual firms — i.e., insuring their preparedness for rapid conversion to war production. It was naturally the opinion of Thomas and his Inspectors that only the latter had the necessary overview and resources to carry out this responsibility properly. But the spokesmen for army, navy, and air force, namely Colonel von Hanneken, Kapitän zur See Goehle, and Lieutenant-Colonel Löb, were unanimous in insisting that only the economic officers, with their close relations with the firms, could be effective in this task. In the course of the discussion, some doubt was See Thomas' remarks and those of Hanneken at the conference of 3 October 1935 (discussed in the text, below), in Wi/1.246, T-77/536, "Aktenvermerk über die Besprechung bei W A (W) am 3 October 1935". Wi/1.246, T-77/536, "Der Reichsminister der Luftfahrt, L.C. 6885/35 II 5 gK, Dienstanweisung für den W.O. Luft", 25 April 1935. 14 Wi/1.246, T-77/536, "Wirtschaftsinspekteur VII, Oberst Freiherr von Riedel, W.I. VII 02399/35 gK", 17 September 1935. 13

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also raised that the economic officers were keeping their Inspectors fully informed.15 Thomas now found, to his dismay, that it was the Army Ordnance Office, rather than the navy or the air force, which was taking the lead in obstructing unification of economic mobilization on the local level. Indeed, in this instance Thomas succeeded in persuading Lob, for the air force, to entertain the notion of full subordination of the economic officers to the Inspectors, provided the Inspectors in turn became partly subordinate to the several Ordnance Offices.16 Probably Lob had a more far-reaching conception of what such subordination of the Inspectors would involve than Thomas, but in any case the Army Ordnance Office was adamant in its opposition. Some days following the meeting of 3 October, which ended inconclusively, General Liese wrote a "purely private" letter to his "old comrade-in-arms", Thomas, expressing the keen regret he would feel if forced to propose to Fritsch, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, a course of action "which is repugnant to me and which indeed, above all for the sake of our personal — always friendly - relationship, I still reject".17 Despite these tender sentiments, Liese did not mince words in protesting what he considered an effort to degrade the army's economic officers to a role of mere liaison. The trouble was, wrote Liese, that the "Herren" Inspectors could not get used to the fact that they were "Wehrmacht representatives", and as such had little to do with the affairs of the service branches. Thomas' suggestion that the Inspectors be in part subordinated to the Ordnance Offices Liese declared to be "simply impossible, since no one can serve three to seven masters at once. This is not merely a blemish in form, but an organizational impossibility." But the heart of Liese's protest lay in the sentence which followed: "It represents nothing but a disguised Wehrmachtriistungsamt...." Thomas might well have read with indignation this statement from the man who, the previous year, had put his signature to a demand for just such an office — to be headed by himself! Two years were to pass before the conflict over the Inspectorates could be resolved (see Chapter VIII). Meanwhile the Ordnance Offices kept jealous guard over their right to command the economic Conference of 3 October 1935, as cited in n. 13, above. Remarks of Thomas and Lob in ibid.; and in the same file, "W (Wi) 348/34 gK III a", 30 November 1934. 17 Wi/IF 5.383, T-77/86/809785-7, Liese to Thomas. 15 16

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officers as they saw fit. When in October 1935 General Liese indignantly rejected Thomas' assertion that they were motivated by fear of losing prestige, his pique was justified, for indeed much more was at stake. The issue was whether the services were to be free to compete with each other "on the open market", with all the funds, contacts, and influence at their disposal, or whether their demands were first to be submitted to some authority either higher or more central for coordination and adjustment, if not for veto. When it became apparent that the army's traditional prestige and preponderance of numbers would not suffice against the belligerence and political advantages of the air force, nor even against the awakening selfawareness of the navy, the Army Ordnance Office did a complete about-face with regard to the idea of a Wehrmachtriistungsamt. Formerly its champion, the Army Ordnance Office now became its chief antagonist. And the Army Ordnance Office now said explicitly what was already growing apparent in practice: that "the Wehrmacht" - by which was meant, the War Ministry - had interests separate from, rather than encompassing, the interests of the service branches. What the proper sphere of "Wehrmacht interests" was, the Army Ordnance Office was not at all eager to define; it was content to bid the W Inspectors, as "Wehrmacht representatives", to mind their own business and keep out of that of the services. Thus did the first years of rearmament and National Socialist rule bring peace and harmony to the ranks of the armed forces. The summer and fall of 1935 were filled with strife for Georg Thomas, for even while warring with the Ordnance Offices, he was girding up for battle with Schacht as Plenipotentiary for War Economy. Thomas' own plan of June 1934 for an economic dictator had specified that a Wehrmacht liaison officer would enter the latter's staff and take charge of "Over-all Planning" (see Chapter IV). Broad and impressive as this title might seem, Thomas could hardly have hoped that a liaison officer could insure that an "economic dictator" would act in the Wehrmacht's interests. In fact, Blomberg seems not to have pressed for such a liaison officer at all, and none was appointed.18 The Wehrmacht apparently took it as axiomatic that a "Plenipotentiary for War Economy" would serve the Wehrmacht's interests, particularly under a regime which placed such high value on rearmament. Thomas, as well as Blomberg, was then still under 18

Thomas, Grundlagen,

Ch. IV, pp. 4 1 - 2 .

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the mistaken impression that the regime would accept their definition of what was necessary for "national defense", and give the Wehrmacht top priority over all other claimants to economic resources. In this context, it was not unreasonable to imagine that the person entrusted with preparing a war economy would defer to the wishes of those responsible (so the generals thought themselves) for preparing the war itself. But Thomas was quick to learn that this expectation, however reasonable, was not realistic. Instead, a series of disputes arose between the Wehrmacht and Schacht as GBK. These disputes ranged over points from highest to lowest levels. One recurrent source of discord was Schacht's insistence that he had the right to present his budget requests directly to the Reich Minister of Finance, whereas Thomas and Blomberg maintained that all budget requests for defense measures had to be submitted first to Blomberg as War Minister and deputy chairman of the "Reich Defense Council".19 An even more persistent dispute concerned exchanges of information between the W Inspectorates and the so-called "Branch Offices" (Aussenstellen) of the Reich Ministry of Economics. These vaguely-named agencies had been established by the Ministry of Economics in December 1934 (rather reluctantly and only upon prodding by Thomas' office) to handle mobilization problems locally for the Ministry. In view of the legal restraints then still prevailing, they were camouflaged as "Statistical Departments" attached to the staffs of the Oherpräsidenten at the seats of the Military District Commands; to those familiar with their purpose, they were commonly known as the Branch Offices. When Schacht became GBK, he established no administrative apparatus separate from the organs he already commanded as Minister of Economics (apart from a secretariat and a Führungsstab to advise and assist in policy questions). Even these central bureaus were staffed mainly with personnel of the Ministry of Economics, and as for local organs, the GBK was content to use the Ministry's Branch Offices. Thus GBK and Ministry of Economics were united almost indistinguishably.20 " W i / I F 5.386, T-77/87, passim. » See ibid., and W i / I F 5.1265, T-77/262/1083956, -71, -96, 1084014, -90, and 1084202. In W i / I F 5.1265, the titles "GBK" and "Reichswirtschaftsminister" are used interchangeably. An explicit identification is made on frame 1084202. As President of the Reichsbank, Schacht united the latter also with his other two offices. Schacht's stationery letter-head read: "Der Präsident der Reichsbankdirektorium als Generalbevollmächtigter".

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The reluctance of Wehrmacht and GBK to participate in a free exchange of information resulted in part from this identity of GBK and Ministry of Economics. The civilian personnel of the latter were suspicious and resentful of military "meddling" and "encroachments'" in economic affairs, while on their part, security-minded military men, especially the economic officers who represented the services, were close-mouthed on "armament" affairs. This mutual suspicion and reserve might not have signified greater friction than is normal to any bureaucracy, had it not (been for the absence of clearly defined lines of jurisdiction and authority which prevailed in this case. We have already seen that the legal foundations for economic mobilization, namely the decree of 4 April 1933 and the Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935, left the relative scope of authority of the War Minister and the GBK uncertain. The most vexatious differences between the two arose from the ambiguity of the term "armament industry". A fourfold division of enterprises according to their relation to war production was early introduced, namely: (1) "armament firms", (2) enterprises essential to maintaining war production ("kriegswichtige Betriebe"), (3) enterprises essential to the sustenance of the populace ("lebenswichtige Betriebe"), and finally, (4) enterprises which, fitting none of the previous categories, were (in the Wehrmacht's eyes) inessential, to be shut down completely in time of war ("stillzulegende Betriebe").2* Until 1934 little need was felt for sharp differentiation of these categories. The Wehrmacht (in particular the Army Ordnance Office) still hoped eventually to command the entire war economy, through one means or another, and in the interim the Ministry of Economics was not pressing mobilization work with any great vigor. But from 1934 onward, and especially after the creation of the Branch Offices in December 1934 and Schacht's appointment as GBK in May 1935, it became imperative to arrive at a clear definition, as a basis for the division of labor between Wehrmacht and GBK. It was easy enough for all to agree (as the Reich Defense Law specified) that the Wehrmacht, through Thomas' office, would supervise the mobilization of "armament firms", while the GBK would be responsible for the rest of the economy, including both "k" and T enterprises (those essential either to war production or national sustenance).22 But it was not so easy to agree upon which was which. 21 42

An explanation of the terms appears in EC-258, IMT XXXVI, pp. 259 ff. Perhaps this is what Schweitzer means in writing that "the armament pro-

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Schacht's inclination was to restrict the definition of "armament firms" to those producing finished weapons and munitions, whereas Thomas insisted that the Wehrmacht should also have supervision over firms producing other goods important for military purposes (for example, optical and radio equipment), and over firms producing parts for war equipment. In case of war, after all, the latter were expected to convert to production of finished armaments. Indeed, one of the main jobs of the W Inspectorates and the economic officers was to draw up "mobilization contracts" designed to prepare these firms for conversion. But the Ministry of Economics contended that, if allowed free rein, the Inspectorates might issue so many mobilization contracts that when war broke out the supply of essential civilian goods would be endangered.23 In June 1935, Schacht and Thomas tried to reach agreement on a closer definition of "armament firms" and other categories. On 2 July, a joint directive to the Branch Offices and the W Inspectorates defined "armament firms" as those producing "war equipment", including semi-finished articles manufactured from Wehrmacht designs, and consumer's products which for military reasons would in wartime be placed under Wehrmacht control. "K" enterprises were defined as those necessary to the operation of armament firms, such as suppliers of power (electricity and gas), raw materials, parts for war equipment not falling in the first category, machinery, and other producers' goods. "L" enterprises were defined as those producing essential consumers' goods (including supplier-firms). Essential welfare institutions, such as hospitals, were counted as "I" enterprises.24 These definitions were still quite broad, and left important ambiguities unresolved. The GBK had granted that the Wehrmacht could ducers were not permitted to become members of the economic groups" (which is not correct) "and instead had to join special organizations under the control of the procurement agencies" (op. cit., p. 499). This author has never seen mention of any such organizations, nor does Schweitzer specify any. What was involved was a question of "Betreuung", or jurisdiction, as to who would direct the mobilization preparations of the firms; the producers' organizations were not involved at all. It was only under Todt and Speer that new producers' organizations, by types of armaments and munitions, were formed. It is also possible that Schweitzer refers here to factories producing exclusively armaments (some of which had been set up by the Wehrmacht itself), which may indeed have been excepted from membership in the economic groups; however, these factories were very small in number and importance in the German economy; most military contracts went to large firms producing for other purposes as well. 29 See Wi/1.246, T-77/536, passim. " Ibid., " W A 1070/35 gK Wi la 1", 2 July 1935.

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claim as "armament firms" certain enterprises which, while normally producing for civilian use, would convert mainly to military production in time of war, but no definition was attempted of what products or enterprises fell into this category. Nor was any definition attempted of what constituted "essential" consumers' goods. Moreover, the Wehrmacht was still unhappy about leaving in the hands of the GBK enterprises supplying parts, other than those manufactured from Wehrmacht designs, for military products. In addition to these difficulties, there was the vexatious problem of what to do about "mixed enterprises" ("die sogenannte uneheliche Kinder der Wirtschaft").25 Many firms naturally produced goods both for military and for civilian needs. Of a given plant's capacity, twenty percent might be occupied with orders (direct or indirect) from the army, ten per cent with orders from the air force, and sixty percent with orders for export or essential civilian purposes, leaving an additional ten per cent "free", or devoted to "inessential" production. The last ten percent and some part of the sixty percent designated "essential" for civilian consumption in peace-time might be claimed by the Wehrmacht for future war production. In such a case, should the plant be placed under Wehrmacht jurisdiction, as an "armament firm", or under the jurisdiction of the GBK, as a "k and 1" enterprise? The agreement of 2 July 1935 stated that in principle, the Wehrmacht would take precedence in "mixed enterprises"; no provision was made for disputed cases. In the following months, it became evident that such a provision was necessary. Some of the Branch Offices complained to the Ministry of Economics that the W Inspectorates were interpreting the category of "armament firms" much too broadly. They declared that if this persisted, the Ministry of Economics could not guarantee the proper functioning of a war economy. The Inspectorates, in turn, complained that the Branch Offices lacked the personnel and resources to prepare the mobilization of even strictly "k and 1" enterprises, much less the mixed enterprises and other disputed cases. The Ministry of Economics intimated that an arbitrary limit could and should be placed upon naming "armament firms", but Thomas' office maintained that military expansion, weapons' development, and other 25 Ibid., report b y D r e w s of a conference of 16 J u n e 1936, between the Reichswirtschaftsministerium (Abwehr wirtschaftlicher K a m p f m a s s n a h m e n ) a n d the Aussenstellen.

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changing circumstances would require constant revision of the lists of all categories of firms.26 It was in the midst of these disputes that Thomas penned his protest of 14 September 1935, complaining that Schacht was attempting to "monopolize" the sphere of economic mobilization (see above, Ch. IV): "No one can expect the Wehrmacht, either in peace or in war, to make its supply of weapons and munitions dependent upon civilian officials of the GBK. . . . The direction of the armament industry must remain in the hands of the Wehrmacht." 2 7 But Thomas did not confine himself to defending the Wehrmacht against civilian encroachments. He also moved to the offensive: For the prosecution of a war, the armament industry is altogether the primary sector of the economy. In Germany it comprises some 10,000 firms, and in particular, almost all the large and important plants. It follows from this that responsibility for the economic direction of a war can never rest with the G.B.K. alone, but must be carried by both the G.B.K. and the Reich War Minister. Since, moreover, the latter is responsible for the orderly operation of the armament industry, which as stated above, is the primary sector of the economy, it follows that only he, as deputy of the Fiihrer and Reich Chancellor in the Reich Defense Council, can lay down the directives and set the tempo for the rest of [the economy] as well.28 Thus Thomas came to enunciate, more clearly than ever before, that central direction of a war economy must fall to the military establishment, that the "economic dictator" must be no more than civilian administrator of the Wehrmacht's will. Thomas was to reiterate this position in later years still more sharply, but to no avail. Not only was there never much hope that Hitler would give the Wehrmacht ultimate economic power, but the fact was that Hitler was hardly disposed to give anyone such power. Beginning with the shadowy "Reich Defense Council", followed by the appointment of Schacht as GBK, and continuing through the numerous changes of the succeeding years, Hitler's practice was always to grant sweeping powers over the economy to new appointees, rarely revoking the powers of one when introducing another. Thus it was that the full economic Ibid., report of Freiherr von Riedel, as cited in n. 14, above, and Barth (Reichswirtschaftsministerium) to Warlimont, 25 November 1935; Wi/IF 5.1265, T-77/262, complaints of the Aussenstellen and the Wehrwirtschaftsstab's comments; and Thomas, Grundlagen, Ch. V, p. 49. 27 Wi/IF 5.383, T-77/86/809789-91, document cited in Ch. IV, n. 35, above. 28 Ibid., frame 809791. u

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authority of both Blomberg and Schacht remained officially in force even when Hitler brought forward his third, and for a time most powerful contestant: Hermann Goring as Commissioner for the FourYear-Plan.2»

It may be that behind Hitler's refusal to grant anyone undisputed economic power, as well as his refusal later to establish clear lines of priority in armament programs (see Ch. XI, below), lay a profound belief in the efficacy of competition. Of Hitler's encouragement of competition between the services, Thomas later wrote: "Besides, Hitler took the view that it was useful to give the service branches immoderately large programs, and allow the three services free rein to compete with each other for industrial resources without guidance, so that the strongest personalities might prevail everywhere". (Statement of August 14, 1945, T-77, Roll 635.) See also Gisevius, op. cit. (Ch. II, n. 13, above), p. 354. On the other hand it seems as likely that Hitler was wary of the threat to his own power which might be posed by a true "economic dictator".

29

VII FOUR-YEAR-PLAN, 1936-1940

"Within four years the German economy must be ready for war." Adolf Hitler, August 1936

i Hermann Goring seemed a strange choice for Commissioner for the Four-Year-Plan, since by his own admission, as well as the judgment of others, he was ignorant of economics. Göring's own explanation was that Hitler had chosen him for his "energy". In Hitlers estimation, Blomberg had never been more than a pliant tool, whereas Schacht was too much bound, by economic orthodoxy.1 Nevertheless, Hitler s choice of Goring did not fall entirely "out of the blue"; on the contrary, it was preceded by a series of special commissions to Goring in economic affairs, beginning in the fall of 1935. In the first instance, the commission was thrust upon Goring, when Hitler refused to take upon himself the decision of a dispute between Schacht as Minister of Economics and Darre as Minister of Agriculture, over the amount of foreign credits to be allowed for purchase of foodstuffs abroad. Hitler, possibly unwilling to show personal favor either to Schacht or to Darre, sidestepped by turning the problem over to Goring. Goring decided in favor of Darre. The incident is ignored by Schacht in his memoirs, but may well have been the opening round of the contest which gradually built up between him and Goring. In any case, Goring is reported to have kept himself informed on problems of food supply thenceforward.2 On Goring, see Treue, op. cit. (see Ch. V, n. 8, above), p. 188. For Schacht's estimate of Göring's capacity as an economic expert, see his memoirs, op. cit. (Ch. IV, n. 22, above), and Edward N. Peterson, Hjalmar Schacht, For and Against Hitler (Boston, 1954), p. 273; for Thomas' estimate, see his statement of 16 August 1945, T-77/635. Hitler on Schacht, see Hitler's Secret Conversations, pp. 89, 404, 409-10, 590, and 612. Further, NI-1694, interrogation of Goring at Nürnberg, 17 September 1946, at N.A. 8 NI-12,616, sworn affidavit of Friedrich Gramsch, given at Nürnberg, 11 September 1947; testimony of Carl Krauch at Nürnberg, printed in TWC VII, 1

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Göring's second commission in economics came in the early spring of 1936. This time the problem concerned oil supply, and touched his own interests more deeply, since it affected the air force. Since at least the beginning of 1934, the Wehrmacht had been pressing for special measures to improve and secure Germany's supplies of fuel oil (see Chapter IV). In the summer of 1935, Thomas' office estimated that in 1938 Germany's domestic oil resources would provide at best forty-five percent of her probable wartime requirements. This meant that Germany would be primarily dependent upon foreign sources for this critical commodity unless steps were taken immediately to expand synthetic oil production, construct new oil storage facilities, and build up reserves by stockpiling oil purchased abroad. Some action had already been taken: foundation of "Brabag" to produce synthetic oil, and of the so-called "Economic Research Association" (Wirtschaftliche Forschungsgesellsohaft, commonly known as "Wifo"), for stockpiling and tank construction. But the War Ministry's oil experts were still far from satisfied, pointing out that Germany's rapid motorization and industrial expansion far exceeded the rate of progress in oil supplies. In Thomas' opinion, the trouble was that there were altogether too many independent agencies dealing with oil, and no effective coordination.3 True to form, Thomas proposed that some authoritative personality be appointed "Fuel Commissar". All government and private projects, including private business, in the oil industry would be subordinated to the Fuel Commissar, who was to coordinate their efforts, without of course interfering with the initiative of the private entrepreneur. Thomas reluctantly admitted that the Fuel Commissar might be app. 989; Thomas, Grundlagen, Ch. XII, pp. 112-113, also printed in TWC VII, p. 795; Peterson, op. cit., p. 273. The attitude taken by the Wehrmacht, as between Schacht and Darre, is suggested by Schweitzer, op. cit. (Ch. IV, n. 16, above), p. 543: " . . . in food matters General Karmann of the provisioning office was fully on the side of the Nazis and . . . General Thomas was only for a partial reform of agricultural policy." 3 W i / I F 5.2726, T-77/438, study by Oberst Dr. Hedler of the Wi Rii Amt Stab, entitled "Mineralöle und die Versorgungslage im Kriege", concluded 31 August 1941. An expanded version of this study, with documentary and statistical appendices, appears in W i / I F 5.1378 and W i / I F 5.2164 (appendices), T-77, Rolls 282 and 341. Related documents are noted in the descriptions of these three in Guide No. 7 (see Note on Sources). See also Thomas, Grundlagen, Ch. VIII, pp. 83-4, Ch. XII, pp. 116-7. Further, W i / I F 5.433, T-77/101/825852-67, "Reichskriegsminister 2 9 2 / 3 5 W.A. (W) gK", 3 June 1935, and in the same file, "Vortragsnotiz über Treibstoffversorgung im Mob-Fall", 23 August 1935. On Wifo, see also EC-258, IMT XXXVI, pp. 255-7.

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pointed formally under the GBK but urged that the post be set up as a full-time job, that is, not simply added to the work of one of Schacht's current assistants. Thomas also insisted that the Fuel Commissar ought to be fully independent of existing oil interests and regulatory agencies.4 Thomas kept closely in touch with Wilhelm Keppler in this matter. Keppler (then still Hitler's personal advisor on economic affairs, though soon to be relegated to bureaucratic oblivion), was particularly interested in the oil industry, and supported Thomas' demand. Some further support for the idea of a Fuel Commissar came from Goring, with the unfortunate drawback (from Thomas' viewpoint) that Goring thought control of the oil industry belonged in the Ministry of Aviation.5 Regardless of what Keppler and Goring thought, Schacht, being both Minister of Economics and GBK, thought that regulation and coordination of the oil industry was nobody's business but his own. Furthermore, Schacht maintained that all necessary measures were already being taken, under what he judged to be the very capable direction of Dr. Schlattmann, of the Ministry of Economics. Faced with Schacht's determined opposition, Blomberg, who had submitted the request for a Fuel Commissar on Thomas' behalf in June 1935, beat a hasty retreat and withdrew the request in July. Schacht and Schlattmann duly promised Thomas their sincere cooperation, but Thomas remained disgruntled and tried several times more in the fall of 1935 to reopen the issue of the Fuel Commissar. Schacht complained that the Wehrmacht was not allowing Schlattmann sufficient time to show the effectiveness of his methods. He further argued that if confusion reigned in the multiplicity of existing oil agencies, it required time to disentangle matters, and the problem was not to be overcome by appointing still another official, who would simply add to the confusion.6 Late in December, after stalling for six months, Schacht conceded that the Wehrmacht should get something approximating its "Fuel Commissar", but insisted that Schlattmann receive the appointment. Schlattmann was to receive the title "Special Deputy for the Fuel Hedler (Wi/IF 5.2726, as cited in n. 3, above), p. 20; W i / I F 5.433, T-77/ 101/825849-51. 5 Hedler, p. 23; W i / I F 5.433, T-77/101/825849-52, -59. • Hedler, pp. 21-9; W i / I F 5.433, passim. Schlattmann had, for instance, been responsible for organizing Brabag. See Ch. V, p. 102 and n. 27, above. 4

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Industry", his office to be established under Schacht as GBK and to take on representatives of the War Ministry and the services to secure the Wehrmacht's interests. There followed more than two months of negotiations concerning details of Schlattmann's proposed position, none of which came to fruition. This may have been because Keppler objected to Schlattmann receiving the post, but of course Thomas had never been happy with Schacht's choice, and on this point Goring was in agreement with Keppler and Thomas.7 To Thomas' dismay, the outcome was that Goring's own desire to take over the oil industry was gratified by Hitler, who intervened in March 1936 to name Goring "Fuel Commissar". Goring's intention was to style himself "Inspector-General for the Petroleum Industry", and to throw a sop to the rest of the Wehrmacht by accepting representatives of other military offices on his staff. As it happened, these plans were overtaken by a more sweeping economic authority given to Goring by Hitler in April. This was Goring's third commission in economic affairs, and broadened his influence to the entire field of raw materials and foreign exchange. Curiously enough, it was Schacht himself who instigated this move. Sometime early in 1936 Schacht, disgusted with the refusal of N.S.D.A.P. agencies and officials to respect regulations regarding the use and possession of foreign currency, complained to Hitler. Schacht pointed out that he lacked the authority to discipline Party agencies, and asked that some Party dignitary be appointed to back up his position. Hitler inquired whom Schacht would suggest, whereupon Schacht replied, with astounding naivete — or vanity — "Goring".8 In April 1936, Goring let it be known that he had received from Hitler broad authority over raw materials and foreign exchange, and that he proposed to exercise it through a "Raw Materials and Foreign Exchange Staff' (Rohstoff- und Devisenstab), to be headed by Lieutenant-Colonel Wilhelm Lob of the General Staff of the Air Force. But the spring and summer months passed mainly in uneasy negotiations concerning the exact jurisdiction, organization, and personnel of Lob's intended staff, and in acrimonious disputes concerning the Hedler, pp. 29a-32; Wi/IF 5.433, T-77/101; Schweitzer, op. cit., p. 294, gives an account varying slightly in details from that given above. 8 This account is given by Schacht in his memoirs, op. cit., pp. 463-4; see also Peterson, pp. 272-3; Taylor, op. cit. (Ch. IV, n. 3, above), p. 122; Bullock, op. cit. (Ch. V, n. 1, above), pp. 412-413; Thomas, Grundlagen, Ch. XII, p. 113 (selection printed in T W C VII, p. 795-6). Some additional details are given by Schweitzer, op. cit., pp. 544-6. 7

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efficacy of Schacht's "New Plan" and the practicability of expanding production of synthetics and other substitutes for high-import commodities.9 However much Goring was by personality a "man of action", his unfamiliarity with the substance of these questions (and the uncertain competence of his chosen lieutenant, Lob), made it impossible to act very rapidly. All he could do at first was to order his staff to investigate the problems and collect statistics as a basis for impending policy revisions. During the summer of 1936, the shortage of foreign credits and raw materials brought on an acute repetition of the crisis of the summer of 1934. The Supervisory Agencies had had some success in encouraging exports by giving producers for export special priority in the allocation of whatever foreign currency and raw materials were available. Moreover in 1935, Schacht had imposed a compulsory levy on private business to support export industries. Nevertheless, the pressure from government, Party, and military agencies within Germany for short-term delivery on their orders was so great that exports failed to rise in proportion to the growing demand for imports. This demand came in large part from the military establishment, but in 1936 it was intensified by a poor harvest the preceding fall. As a consequence, there had been some cutbacks in military production, particularly in munitions, because of acute shortages of copper, lead, and zinc. In August 1936, it was estimated that for the following fiscal year there would be a foreign exchange deficit of nearly 200 million marks, considering only the most essential import needs (food, and raw materials for armaments and for the export industry itself). If the demands of the rest of German industry were to be met, the anticipated deficit would rise above 750 million marks.10 On 15 August 1936, Lob's staff submitted a report embodying its proposals to ease the foreign currency shortage and "secure the German economy on the basis of domestic raw materials".11 Thomas had doubts about the ultimate merits of Lob's program, as we shall see 9 Gramsch, NI-12,616 (see n. 2, above); Treue, op. cit., pp. 193-5; NI-3480, memorandum by Otto Steinbrmck for Friedrich Flick, 7 July 1936; Peterson, pp. 273-7; Klein, op. cit. (Ch. II, n. 22, above), pp. 22-3. Additional contemporary documents in W i / I F 5.433, T-77/101, and W i / I F 5.203, T-77/35,36. 14 W i / I F 5.203, T-77/35, especially frames 748119-20, -173ff„ 748225-32. Schweitzer, pp. 225, 308, 538. The estimate made in August 1936 that there would be a foreign exchange deficit in 1937 proved only a little too pessimistic; there was a deficit in February-March 1938. (See Ch. VIII, p. 144, below.) 11 R W M / 2 3 / 2 5 , T-71/109/611979.

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below. A more urgent consideration, however, was its failure to deal with the immediate problem of current shortages. With the support of General Liese, Thomas persuaded Blomberg to write Goring a letter in which, after some fawning praise for Goring's "achievements" (Lob's report, perhaps?), Blomberg suggested that a system of fixed quotas be introduced in the allocation of scarce materials. Blomberg urged that the decision be taken as soon as possible after the summer vacations. Schacht also wrote to Goring, a few days later, probably in less sugar-coated terms, requesting an early settlement of the immediate crisis in foreign exchange. Goring replied to Schacht, on 22 August, that since the necessary statistical data would not be ready until late September, the Ministerial Council12 would not be able to meet until then. He added, however, that a meeting of the "Kleine Ministerrat"18 would take place at the beginning of September.14 In all likelihood Goring was already aware that Hitler had decided to intervene again. In any case, on 26 August 1936, Hitler presented Goring with a written "Memorandum on the Four-Year-Plan" - an extraordinary event, for Hitler hardly ever gave his orders in writing.16 On 4 September 1936, Goring convened the Kleine Ministerrat (Blomberg, Schacht, Schwerin-Krosigk, and among others, Popitz and Keppler), and read them parts of Hitler s Memorandum. Schacht himself had learned of the substance of Hitler's decision only two days earlier. Hitler had called him personally to say that he intended to announce a program for a new Four-Year-Plan, emphasizing the goal of economic self-sufficiency, at the impending Party Congress. In great distress, Schacht called Thomas to seek his aid. Schacht felt that Blomberg had to be moved to prevail upon Hitler not to make An informal Council of Ministers, chaired by Goring and presumably created by him in the spring of 1936. 13 A reduced model of the Council of Ministers, also called into being and chaired by Goring, concerned with economic affairs. In practice the "Kleine Ministerrat" met more often than the larger Ministerial Council. 14 Wi/IF 5.203, T-77/35/748179, -218. Schweitzer (op. cit., p. 546) is mistaken in writing: "Actually Schacht's letter produced a magic effect. Within a few days, Goring received the draft of the Four Year Plan, which had been put together by his Bureau for Raw Materials and Synthetics..." Unless Lob's office produced a second "draft of the Four-Year-Plan" within seven days of the first, Schacht's letter of 20 August had nothing to do with it at all, since the first draft was prepared by 15 August (RWM/23/25, as cited in note 11, above; strangely enough Schweitzer also cites this same document). 15 On Hitler's "Denkschrift zum Vierjahresplan", see Ch. V, n. 8 and pp. 103-4, above. 12

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the announcement he had in mind. Schacht was sure the new program would antagonize foreign countries and thus prejudice Germany's essential export trade. Whether Blomberg could have prevailed upon Hitler in anything at all is doubtful, but in this case he flatly refused, expressing confidence that Hitler would find a way out of the difficulty named by Schacht.16 Schacht had misunderstood the import of Hitlers words. As we have seen, Hitler never intended to embark upon a program of autarky for Germany alone; he envisioned the Four-Year-Plan as a stop-gap for bridging the time until Germany could achieve her "definitive solution", conquest of territory in eastern Europe. Although he called bombastically for "100% independence of foreign sources" in those fields "in which this is possible", he specified only two such cases: rubber (in which Germany did in time become almost wholly self-sufficient) and fuels, in which he set the unrealistic goal of independence from foreign sources in eighteen months. Quite correctly, he thought it possible for Germany to expand production of domestic metal ores (particularly iron), synthetic fats and textiles, and substitutes for scarce light metals, but wisely avoided specifying that Germany could reach self-sufficiency in these items. Hitler loudly proclaimed that the program of the Four-Year-Plan would require sacrifices, but he was silent on what these might be. The industrial expansion he demanded was to take place "without regard to cost". How this was to be managed was private industry's headache. He added threateningly: Either we have today a private economy, whose job it is to rack its brains about production methods, or we believe that determination of production methods is the task of the state, in wliich case we have no further need of a private economy.17 Minutes of the meeting of 4 September printed as EC-416 in IMT XXXVI, pp. 488-491 (German) and in TWC XII, pp. 439-42 (English). The document also appears under the number NI-7565, the original of which is W i / I F 5.3614, T-77/431. For the succeeding events, see Peterson, op. cit., pp. 279-80, Schacht, op. cit., p. 464, Treue, op. cit., p. 195; and PS-1301, IMT XXVII. It may be noted here that, strictly speaking, the Four-Year-Plan begun in the fall of 1936 was Germany's second. The first had been announced as a program to overcome the depression; it was so inchoate, however, that Goring's Vierjahresplan, 1936-40, is properly regarded as the first one worthy of the name. Hitler's renewal of Goring's commission in 1940 is generally regarded as the beginning of the second four-year-plan. t7 TWC XII, pp. 436-9; Treue, op. cit., p. 208. Note that Klein (op. cit., p. 36) is mistaken in asserting that "Hider ordered that the oil, rubber, and steel industries were to be ready for war in 18 months". 18

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What private industry might fail to achieve, the National Socialist state would provide. "As National Socialists we have never yet recognized the word impossible, nor do we wish to enrich our vocabulary with it in the future." 18 This was bluster, in the sense that Hitler himself took it as axiomatic that autarky was impossible for Germany without foreign conquest. At the same time, it was deadly earnest: in the long run, in that Hider meant to make autarky possible for Germany by conquest; and in the short run, in that he refused to admit any conflict between fulfilling his plans for industrial expansion under the Four-YearPlan and his plans for rearmament. Despite his menacing disdain for the "cost" of the Four-Year-Plan, and his call for "sacrifices", Hitler made clear that it was not rearmament which was to suffer the costs and sacrifices of making Germany "independent of foreign countries". On the contrary, the whole purpose of the Four-Year-Plan was, in Hitler's opinion, to tide Germany over her immediate economic difficulties, to prepare her for the true goal: I. Within four years the German army must be ready for action. II. Within four years the German economy must be ready for war.19 This certainly seemed promising for the interests of the Wehrmacht; but as always before, it emerged in time that Hitler's plans for rearmament, and Hitler's idea of an economy "ready for war", were not identical with the Wehrmacht's conceptions. The official decree appointing Goring Commisioner for the FourYear-Plan was issued on 18 October 1936. This was the fourth, and most far-reaching, of the economic commissions given by Hitler to Goring. It empowered him to issue directives binding upon all the highest Reich offices, and by implication gave into his hands "unified direction of all forces of the German nation" toward fulfillment of the Four-Year-Plan's goals. By the time the decree was issued, its contents were no surprise, and Schacht, at least, was trying to make the best of the situation. He now expressed the view that "friendly cooperation" between the Ministry of Economics and the Four-YearPlan was both necessary and "entirely possible".20 NI-8495 (as cited in Ch. V, n. 29, above). TWC XII, p. 439; Treue, op. cit., p. 210. 20 The decree is printed as PS-2071 in TWC XII, pp. 446-7, and as Ambros 34 in TWC VII, p. 811. See also W i / I F 5.587, T-77/142, report by Major Drews "Betr. : Verordnung des Fiihrers vom 18. Oktober 1936", 19 October 1936. 18 19

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On 21 October, there was a meeting of the Kleine Ministerrat, at which Goring presented his views on the goals and nature of the Four-Year-Plan. He claimed to base his presentation on discussions with Hitler. Goring emphasized the need for full exploitation of Germany's domestic resources; the importance of maintaining the armament program; the necessity of shouldering the burden of a productive plant exceeding peacetime needs; and the importance of raising exports. .. Under no circumstances may serious difficulties for [the armament program] arise out of the shortage of raw materials", he declared, as though the economy could be ordered about like an army.21 On the same occasion, Goring discussed the relative jurisdiction of the Four-Year-Plan and its prospective relations with other offices. His authority, he began modestly, was unrestricted. On the other hand, all existing state and Party agencies were to retain "full responsibility" within their own fields of competence. In December Goring repeated to his General Council (see below) that the existing jurisdiction of other offices was not to be narrowed. The smaller the staff of an office in the Four-Year-Plan, explained Goring, the more effective it would be. The Four-Year-Plan s tasks were 'leadership, initiative, drive, and supervision", not usurpation of the functions of others. The Four-Year-Plan would take action only in particular areas or cases in which special intervention seemed called for.22 In effect, then, Goring insisted upon his own right to take arbitrary action wherever he saw fit, but simultaneously relieved himself of responsibility for the vast administrative burdens carried by the ministries, military offices, and other government or Party bodies whose work fell within the scope of his new commission. Göring's staff was intended to be not an administrative bureaucracy, but a set of decentralized agencies serving as watch-dogs and goads. Accordingly, the Four-Year-Plan developed as amorphously as an amoeba, extending or withdrawing itself at will, in any direction it pleased. Its organization was highly fluid, its offices frequently created or dissolved in response to temporary needs or political pressures. As organized in 1936, the Four-Year-Plan consisted of two policy21

EAP 66-C-12-62/83, T-84/146, "Sitzung des Kleinen Ministerrats am 21. Oktober 1936. . . . " There were present at the meeting, among others, Goring, Blomberg, Schacht, Schwerin-Krosigk, Popitz, Lammers, Keppler, Kömer, and Backe. 22 Ibid., and in the same file, "Sechste Sitzung des Generalrats vom 16. December 1936".

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making councils, one central planning agency, four "Working Committees" (Geschäftsgruppen), and two officials with special status. Of the latter, one was Wilhelm Keppler as "General Advisor for German Raw Materials and Synthetics", the other was Josef Wagner as Reich Commissar for Price Control. Keppler's role was not very great. For the most part, he concentrated upon two points of special interest to himself: research into Germany's mineral resources, and development of industrial fats and oils. As an individual Keppler still exercised some influence; he was prominent in state concerns such as Brabag and, later, the Reichswerke Hermann Goring; eventually he also played a part in transfers of foreign properties to German hands. Nevertheless, he never made policy for the Four-Year-Plan, and in 1938, when the latter was reorganized, Keppler became president of the newly-founded Reich Office for Geological Research, leaving the Four-Year-Plan entirely. On the other hand, Wagner s office for price control was one of the most enduring of the Four-Year-Plan's creations; but it was also one of the most independent. Wagner maintained his own staff, issued his own orders, and seldom consulted Goring. 23 It was indeed characteristic of the Four-Year-Plan that most of its enduring agencies operated through other organizations. The Working Committee for Food Supply, under State Secretary Backe of the Ministry of Agriculture, operated through Backe's ministerial office. Backe was thus in the enviable position of being able, through Göring's authority, to give orders to his own minister, Darre! A similar situation arose when Präsident Syrup, who headed the Working Committee for Labor Supply, became State Secretary in the Ministry of Labor. Syrup's committee also acted through the Reich Institution for Employment and Unemployment Insurance, under 23 This and the following presentation of the organization, nature and development of the Vierjahresplan draws upon the following materials: 1) NI-12,616, a historical sketch by Friedrich Gramsch, given as a sworn affidavit at Nürnberg on 11 September 1947. Gramsch was assistant to Staatssekretär Neuman, and later himself headed the Geschäftsgruppe Devisen; he was also responsible for taking minutes at many of the meetings of the Ministerrat and Generalrat. 2) Testimony and documents printed in TWC XII and TWC VII. 3) Interrogations of Göring, Körner, Keppler and others in Record Group 238 (Nürnberg records) at the National Archives. 4) Organizational charts, address-directories, work-plans, circulation-lists, letterheads, and similar materials widely scattered through T-71, T-84, T-77, and elsewhere. No adequate history and analysis of the Four-YearPlan has yet been written; the subject is richly deserving of fuller attention than can be given it here. On Josef Wagner in particular, note that he was dismissed in 1940, but the independence of his office had by then been well established.

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1936-1940

Syrup's assistant Mansfeld. In 1942 the Working Committee for Labor Supply was displaced by Gauleiter Sauckel, upon Sauckel's appointment as Plenipotentiary for Labor Supply. Sauckel was theoretically an official of the Four-Year-Plan, but in practice he was wholly independent, acting upon his own authority or orders directly from Hitler. The position of the Working Committee for Foreign Exchange, under State Secretary Neumann, was somewhat different: Neumann's ministry, the Prussian Ministry of Interior, was headed by Goring himself. In 1936 there was also a "Working Committee for Distribution of Raw Materials", under Köhler, but it was very short-lived. Early in 1937 Köhler instituted a system of allocating raw materials, which might have made his office one of great significance. But shortly thereafter Goring appointed Hanneken, now a General, Plenipotentiary for Control of Iron and Steel, and Hanneken took over iron and steel allocations, formerly the most important function of Köhlers committee. Its remaining functions went over to the Ministry of Economics in 1938. Aside from a secretariat, there were actually only three central agencies of the Four-Year-Plan itself in 1936: the Kleine Ministerrat, the General Council, and the Bureau for German Raw Materials and Synthetics (successor to the "Raw Materials and Foreign Exchange Staff'), still headed by Löb. The Kleine Ministerrat, like all councils of ministers in the Third Reich, played a secondary role. Goring appears to have called it into being more to preserve appearances, or perhaps to give himself an audience, than to seek its advice. As expressed by Friedrich Gramsch (assistant to Neumann in the Prussian Ministry of Interior, later Neumann's successor as head of the Working Committee for Foreign Exchange), Goring "preferred not to call upon the counsel of other ministers". Goring himself later boasted that his conferences were always "very onesided: I talked, and the others listened".24 The "General Council for the Economy" (Generalrat der Wirtschaft) composed of bureaucrats of lesser status (but perhaps greater power) than the ministers, was of slightly greater importance than the Kleine Ministerrat. It was chaired only occasionally by Goring, more often by his deputy, Paul Körner. It was attended by fifteen Interview of 18 September 1946, in R.G. 238 at N.A. (see n. 23, above). The boast was not strictly true, at least before 1938; until then, Schacht and others did make themselves heard. After Schacht's fall, the boast became very nearly true. 24

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or twenty persons, namely the heads of the Working Committees and other functionaries of the Four-Year-Plan, with the addition of specialists or officials called in from time to time on particular problems. It met regularly throughout the period before September 1939, and occasionally during World War II as well. It was dissolved only when Körner entered Albert Speers Zentrale Planung in 1942. Still, the General Council did not make important decisions. These were generally engineered by Körner privately in negotiations with the interested parties. Where agreement could not be reached, the matter was presented to Goring (by Körner) for decision.25 The Bureau for German Raw Materials and Synthetics was the only central agency of the Four-Year-Plan responsible in practice for planning and carrying through specific industrial projects. It is therefore a striking fact that little more than a year after its formation, it was dissolved, and its functions transferred to the Ministry of Economics. This took place when, in the winter of 1937-38, the fall of Schacht gave Goring temporary control over the Ministry of Economics (see Chapter VIII). Goring took this opportunity to reorganize the Ministry and fuse it with the Four-Year-Plan. The fusion took the form of transferring to the Ministry both personnel and administrative functions from the Four-Year-Plan. Goring later explained that he had done this because, despite his declared intention to keep the Four-Year-Plan's staff small, by 1938 it had already expanded into what he judged to be an unwieldy and unnecessary bureaucracy. Possibly this was true; it may also have been true that Goring was growing impatient with the burdens of economic and administrative problems presented by the Four-Year-Plan. While not ready to give up the privileges of authority, he may have been happy enough to leave "the details" to the Ministry of Economics, now removed from the defiant influence of Hjalmar Schacht. On Körner and the Generalrat, see NI-12,786, another affidavit by Gramsch, 19 November 1947; and interrogations of Körner, #912, 4 March 1947 and #797a, n.d., in R.G. 238, N. A. By decree of 7 December 1939, Goring enlarged the circle of participants in the Generalrat to include as regular members officials outside the Vierjahresplan (including Thomas), thus presumably enlarging the scope of the Generalrat's functions and hence its importance. (Decree and related correspondence in NG-1177, T W C XXII, pp. 529 ff.) Nevertheless, as stated by Klein (op. cit., p. 169), the Generalrat "met only a few times during the war and exercised none of its powers". Note that the Generalrat was not actually given any new "powers" in 1939, as Klein seems to imply, but was merely increased in size. Minutes of the meetings of the Generalrat are to be found in EAP 66-C-126 2 / 8 3 (1936-1939), T - 8 4 / 1 4 6 , and in W i / I F 5.3593 (1939-1941), T - 7 7 / 4 3 0 (original of NI-7474). s5

134

FOUR-YEAK-PLAN,

1936-1940

Whatever the reason, the fact was that the Ministry of Economics absorbed Löb's office, Köhlers "Working Committee", and in part, Hanneken's office for iron and steel. Löb and Hanneken became department heads in the Ministry (Löb over "Industry, German Raw Materials, and Synthetics"; Hanneken over "Mining and Heavy Industry"), though Hanneken retained his title and independent powers as Plenipotentiary for Iron and Steel. The Bureau for German Raw Materials and Synthetics was reduced slightly in scope, renamed "Reich Agency for Economic Development", and subordinated to the "Wehrwirtschaftliche Abteilung" in the Ministry of Economics.26 It was headed at first by Major Czimatis, formerly of Thomas' staff, more recently Löb's chief assistant. Czimatis, however, was soon succeeded by Carl Krauch, previously head of the section "Research and Development" under both Löb and Czimatis. Under Krauch's leadership this apparently subordinate agency evolved into one of the more powerful economic organizations of Germany in World War II (see below). The effect of the reorganization of the Four-Year-Plan and the Ministry of Economics was dual. On the one hand officials of the Four-Year-Plan, still supported by Göring's authority and owing him a certain allegiance, acquired control over the administrative machinery and trained personnel of the Ministry of Economics. On the other hand, what little central administrative apparatus the FourYear-Plan had previously possessed had passed over into the Ministry. From 1938 on, Goring was more and more inclined to handle vexatious problems by turning them over to special commissioners whom he appointed as occasion arose. Well over a dozen such "Beauftragter", "Sonderbeauftragte/', and "Generalbevollmächtigter" were appointed by Goring in the following years. Usually these commissioners were delegated very broad and ill-defined authority, presumably to be exercised under Göring's direction. In practice, most of them acted as independent agents, using whatever adminisGöring's decree concerning the reorganization of the Reichwirtschaftministerium and the Vierjahresplan is printed as NID-13,629 in TWC XII, p. 482-8. The fall of Schacht and the period of reorganization are treated by Peterson, op. cit., pp. 281-6; Schacht, op. cit., pp. 465-73; Neumann, op. cit. (Ch. IV, n. 17, above) p. 249, 371-2; Schweitzer, op. cit., pp. 537-547 (1936-37 only); and Meinck, "Der Reichsverteidigungsrat" (Ch. III, n. 45, above), pp. 416-9. Almost all of these emphasize the pliancy of Funk and the subordination of the Reichswirtschaftsministerium to Goring; none seems to notice the corresponding loss of administrative control by Goring. (See also Ch. VIII, pp. 141-147, below, and references there noted.)

26

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trative machinery they had at hand. Thus besides Hanneken as Plenipotentiary for Iron and Steel (working through the Ministry of Economics), there were soon: a Plenipotentiary for Automotive Affairs (acting through the Ministry of Transport and military transport agencies); a Plenipotentiary for Technical Communications Media (General Fellgiebel, who also headed the Army Communications Office); and a Plenipotentiary for Control of Construction (Fritz Todt, who used various technical and Party organizations he had himself built up in several capacities, such as Inspector-General for German Roads). What remained to hold the Four-Year-Plan together was the General Council, Korner's mediating influence, and Göring's supreme authority. So long as Goring took sufficient interest in economic affairs to keep track of what his Working Committees and Plenipotentiaries were doing in their widely dispersed ministries or other organizations, and to act from time to time himself, the Four-YearPlan as such exercised a strong, though sporadic, influence over the German economy. Goring retained, for example, the final word on allocations of scarce raw materials to all major categories of public, private, and military claimants (see Chapter IX).27 Goring was also responsible for many major decisions on economic policy, including decisions relating to the economic administration of conquered territories. But from 1941 on, as Goring withdrew ever more into a voluptuary existence at his palatial Karinhall, losing interest in his functions as Commissioner for the Four-Year-Plan, the Four-Year-Plan itself ceased to be more than a miscellany of independent organizations, competing among themselves and with others.28 Of special interest and importance in the history of the Four-YearPlan was the role played by Carl Krauch.29 Krauch, prominent in the business management of I. G. Farbenindustrie, had entered the FourYear-Plan in 1936 as head of the "Research and Development" section 27 That is, Göring's approval had to be secured for the final allocation schedules. What the claimants actually received was quite another matter. S e e Chapter I X , below. 28 On Göring's withdrawal and its consequences, see H. R. Trevor-Roper, The Last Days of Hitler (New York, 1957), pp. 16-17, and NI-5821, Interrogation of Albert Speer, 12 March 1947; see also Chapters X I I and X I I I , below. On the role of Krauch and his offices, see: documents and testimony in T W C VII, pp. 865-1045; documents from the files of the Reichsamt für Wirtschaftsausbau (mainly files of Dr. Ritter), scattered in T-71, T-84, and T-77; NI-5821 (see n. 27, above); NI-10,386, sworn affidavit of Paul Körner, given at Nürnberg, 29 August 1947; and scattered other documents relating to Krauch in T-77.

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in the Bureau of German Raw Materials and Synthetics. Goring had asked the steel industrialist, Albert Vogler, to name someone for this post, and after consultation with Carl Bosch and others, Vogler had suggested Krauch. Upon receiving the appointment, Krauch moved from Frankfurt (headquarters of I. G. Farben) to Berlin, setting aside most of his former business duties, but remaining a member of the Vorstand of I. G. Farben. Between the fall of 1936 and the spring of 1937, the Bureau for German Raw Materials and Synthetics worked out a long-range plan for industrial projects to be carried out under the aegis of the FourYear-Plan. This program, which came to be known as "Löbs Bibel" for the tenacity with which Löb clung to it against all attacks and evidence of its impracticability, covered projects in about twenty branches of industry. It was the only plan of such broad scope ever worked out under the Four-Year-Plan, but never pretended to be a complete program for production and distribution in the economy as a whole. Moreover, its scope was much less broad than it purported to be, for from seventy to ninety percent of the investments planned under "Löbs Bibel" were indirect or direct investments in the chemical industry.30 In any case, Löb's program was never carried to completion. Its failure was primarily the result of its own defects, but Carl Krauch did much to determine the manner and rapidity of its demise. Krauch had probably decided fairly early that Löb's program conformed neither to the facts nor to the needs of German economic life, but he bided his time. Late in 1937 the disparities between plan and reality began to appear in statistics and reports received by Körner. Körner called in Krauch, who gladly unburdened himself of his disdain for Löb. Krauch was prepared with new proposals, Arthur Schweitzer, "Der ursprüngliche Vierjahresplan", Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, vol. CLXVIII (1957). Schweitzer refers to the document he analyses, EC-281, as the second edition of the plan, but it was more likely the third. See W i / I F 5.2363, T-77/359, and NI-8590. The estimate that ninety percent of the investments were scheduled for the chemical industry is given in a sworn affidavit of Dr. Werner Hagert, NI-10,036. Hagert had been an official of Wirtschaftsgruppe Chemische Industrie; the affidavit is based on an analysis of EC-281. In another affidavit, NI-10,035, Hagert stated that I.G. Farben's share of the investments scheduled for the chemical industry was 72.7% (or 66.5% of the total investments) planned at that time under the Four-Year-Plan. But see the statistics in Wi/VI 34, T-77/649, file of Dr. Ritter, which suggest that Hagert's estimate of the share of the chemical industry may be slightly too high. 30

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which were well received by Körner. But Löb was still too secure in Göring's favor to be shaken even by Körner. In the spring of 1938, Krauch renewed the attack upon Löb, supporting his complaints with detailed statistics. When Körner presented these to Goring, Goring was impressed, but wished to give Löb an opportunity to defend himself. There followed what Körner later called a "dramatic session" between Göring, Löb, and Krauch at the Karinhall. Even then, Löb emerged still on his feet, but after several more such conferences at the Karinhall, Löb's defeat was total. Göring promised Krauch full authority to put into effect his own plans for the chemical industry: synthetics (notably oil and rubber), explosives, and substitute light metals. Since the chemical industry, as noted above, accounted for at least seventy-five percent of investments under the Four-Year-Plan, "Löbs Bibel" had become almost wholly obsolete, and Krauch in effect superseded Löb as chief industrial planner in the Four-Year-Plan.31 Krauch now had his Reich Office for Economic Development prepare a complete revision of Löb's program; the details were largely worked out by Krauch's assistant, Dr. Ritter.32 The completed "Wehrwirtschaftlicher neuer Erzeugungsplan' (commonly known as the "Karinhall-Plan" or the "Krauch-Plan"), was presented to Göring in July 1938. Göring sealed his approval of the new program in midJuly by appointing Krauch 'Tlenipotentiary for Special Problems of Chemical Production" (commonly called "GB Chem").33 Krauch did not set up a separate office, but in effect his Reich Office for Economic Development became wholly independent of the Ministry of Economics, and in time, much more powerful than the ministry, when it came to defending its own interests in the scramble for scarce materials and labor. This was not immediately the case. In fact, Krauch's failure to secure the raw materials, labor, and machinery he demanded in his first two years as GB Chem made it impossible for him to reach on schedule the goals set in the Karinhall-Plan for oil and explosives. Nevertheless, Krauch had become the supreme arbiter of planning, This account is based upon Körner's affidavit, NI-10,386 (see n. 29, above). Rudolf Hünennann, Thomas' Chief-of-Staff, was of the opinion that Ritter was the driving force behind Krauch: interrogation of Hünermann, 13 November 1947, R.G. 238, N.A. 33 No document appointing Krauch is available; possibly none was issued. In fact, the appointment was not even announced, for Thomas learned of it only indirectly. See Ch. IX, pp. 159-60, below. 31

32

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allocations, and production within a number of key economic fields: chemical industry; synthetic oil, rubber, and textiles; gunpowder and explosives; and light metals. His power was undoubtedly strengthened by the close connections between his office and I. G. Farben, considering the latter's dominance of the German chemical industry and its substantial influence in government and military circles. Later, as World War II became "total", the importance of the economic projects controlled by Krauch grew so much beyond challenge that he was able to press his own demands far more successfully than at the outset. Thomas' reactions to the Four-Year-Plan were mixed. On the face of it, the program announced by Hitler in September 1936 was a major step in the direction which Thomas had been pointing for years. At last, it appeared, the regime had decided to take energetic steps toward meeting critical shortages and increasing the economic war potential. Had not Thomas' staff long pressed for the key points of development adopted now by the Four-Year-Plan? And had it not been Thomas who thought the economy required the guiding hand of an authoritative personage, prominent alike in the state, the Party, and the Wehrmacht? Surely Goring possessed those qualifications. Nevertheless, Thomas had serious misgivings. Better informed than Schacht of Hitler's military plans, he was less persuaded that Hitler believed in autarky for Germany. But like Schacht, he either failed to perceive, or failed to have confidence in, Hitter's ultimate aim of autarky-by-conquest. This left him, like Schacht, convinced that Germany must maintain her exports at a high level, to protect her ability to buy strategic commodities abroad. If Hitler insisted, as he did, that both Four-Year-Plan and rearmament were to be pressed "regardless of cost", then the Four-Year-Plan would become doubly detrimental to Germany's foreign trade balance. For without systematic curtailment of civilian economic expansion, the Four-Year-Plan was simply another burden added to the already heavy demands on German industry by military expansion, public building, and the booming domestic market. The enterprises of the Four-Year-Plan, Thomas pointed out as early as November 1936, were long-range projects which would provide their benefits only after the lapse of several years. Meanwhile, they themselves represented a substantial addition to the drain on raw materials and foreign credits. Moreover, the Four-Year-Plan would do nothing to counteract — rather the opposite - the growing "Exportmiidigkeit" among German businessmen,

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their tendency to stay within the secure domestic market rather than venture into the more hazardous and bureaucratically entangled field of export.34 In the short run, the Four-Year-Plan could be expected to make Germany not less, but more dependent on foreign sources of supply. Furthermore, the Four-Year-Plan significantly worsened both Thomas' position and the general administrative jumble. The most obvious disadvantage was that the Commissioner for the Four-YearPlan was simultaneously Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force and Minister of Aviation. Though officially prominent in "the Wehrmacht", Goring's interests were largely separate from, or even opposed to, the interests of army, navy, and War Minister. It could be expected that his new post would increase the already disproportionate influence of air force interests in armament production. By the same token, Thomas would find greater difficulty than ever in trying to coordinate and adjust the Wehrmacht's armament programs. Altogether, it was evident to Thomas that the Four-Year-Plan raised new, highly intricate jurisdictional problems, without settling any of those which already existed. Since Goring refused to assume the administrative apparatus or particular responsibilities of any of the ministries or other government bodies over which he now had nominal authority, all of them continued to function, with all their jurisdictional claims, just as before. Disputes over competence between the War Ministry and the GBK persisted as before, while each now entered into conflict with the Four-Year-Plan.

Wi/IF 5.113-114, T-77/13-14, especially speeches of 2 November 1936 (Wehrmachtakademie), 15 March 1937 ("Vortrag gehalten vor dem wehrwirtschaftlichen Beirat"), and 1 November 1937 (excerpt printed as EC-14 in IMT XXXVI, p. 110). The "Wehrwirtschaftliche Beirat" may have been successor to the "Rüstungsbeirat" which was established by the Heereswaffenamt Wirtschaftsabteilung in April 1934 to secure the advice of prominent industrialists (in a sense, itself a successor to Stega, which had "fallen into disuse"). In 1937 the Wehrwirtschaftliche Beirat may have been composed of the so-called "Wehrwirtschafts-Führer", who were businessmen given this essentially honorary title by Thomas' office. The official reason for creating this "Wehrwirtschafts-FührerKorps" was to form a corps of economic reserve officers; Hünermann testified after the war that the title had been given out in part as a protection to non-Nazi industrialists. The Wehrwirtschafts-Führer-Korps may have been helpful in persuading a wider audience of the need for total mobilization, but it was a failure as a corps of administrators for the war economy. See Carroll, op. cit. (Ch. VI, n. 3, above), pp. 98-100 and references there cited; also Schweitzer, p. 533, and Milward, p. 62.

M

Vili "A CONFUSION OF PRIVATE EMPIRES", 1937-1938

"The structure of German politics and administration, instead of being, as the Nazis claimed, 'pyrimidal' and 'monolithic,' was in fact a confusion of private empires, private armies, and private intelligence services." H. R. Trevor-Roper, The Last Days of Hitler

Europe's last two years of fitful peace were heralded on 5 November 1937, when Hitler summoned a select group of generals and ministers to inform them frankly of his ambitions for Germany.1 The seriousness of his words was accented by the injunction that they be taken in case of his death as "his last will and testament". Hitler now repeated, with greater emphasis, what he had stated the previous year in the "Memorandum on the Four-Year-Plan": Germany's economic problems could not be solved by "autarky", nor by export trade. What Germany needed was "Lebensraum", and Hitler no longer veiled his determination to get it by conquest. "Germany's problem could be solved only by means of f o r c e . . . " , and that no later than 1943-45. On the other hand opportunities might arise long before then, "even as early as 1938", to conquer Austria and Czechoslovakia with "lightning speed" so as to improve Germany's military position "for other purposes". Hitler did not name Russia as the ultimate object of conquest, but only as a "power factor" to be taken into his calculations. Those calculations, improbable enough in some points, led him to conclude that Germany could expect to take Austria and Czechoslovakia without serious opposition from France, Britain, or the Soviet Union. 1 The occasion is now very well known. Among many accounts, see for example: Wheeler-Bennett, op. cit. (Ch. II, n. 27, above), pp. 360-361; Telford Taylor, op. cit. (Ch. IV, n. 3, above), pp. 140-145; and W. Sauer, in K. D. Bracher et d., op. cit. (Ch. Ill, n. 9, above), pp. 756-7. See also n. 4, below.

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The acuity of this judgment was demonstrated in four months, when on 12 March 1938 German troops rolled into Austria, "unopposed by the Austrians themselves and unchallenged by the Powers who had guaranteed Austria's independence".2 Seven months later it was demonstrated again at Munich, when on 30 September 1938 Great Britain and France abandoned Czechoslovakia to Hitler. Yet Hitler was more disappointed at getting only the Sudetenland than he was pleased with his diplomatic victory. He did not wait long to make up the loss. In March 1939, little more than a year after the occupation of Austria, German armies took Prague. Between the conference of 5 November 1937 and the first of the conquests it portended, a great upheaval had occurred within Germany in the top levels of both economic and military leadership. The first to go was Schacht, whose formal resignation was tendered on 26 November 1937, and accepted by Hitler on 8 December. Schacht's departure was not, however, a consequence of Hitler's revelations of 5 November. In fact, Schacht had left his posts as Minister of Economics and GBK just two months before that date.3 Ever since Hitler had given Goring authority over raw materials and foreign exchange, in the spring of 1936, Schacht and Goring had been feuding over economic policy. They differed on the allocation of foreign credits, on the efficacy of Schacht's "New Plan", on the possibilities of increasing exports, and on the way to go about expanding Germany's use of domestic ores. With Goring's appointment as Commissioner for the Four-Year-Plan, the two clashed on matters of jurisdiction as well. Goring's rise in economic power had been speeded by the stream of reproaches leveled at Schacht by Thomas and Blomberg in the years 1934-36. The generals had complained of dilatory tactics and grudging cooperation on the part of the Ministry of Economics, in matters vitally important to rearmament. Once faced with the choice between Schacht and Goring, however, Thomas found he much preferred Schacht. In January 1937 Thomas had his staff (now renamed Wehrwirtschaftsstab, or "W Staff') prepare a memorandum defending the authority of Schacht as GBK against Goring as Commissioner for the Four-Year-Plan.4 The argument began with the premise that the -

Wheeler-Bennett, op. cit., p. 377. For the dates, see Facius, op. cit. (Ch. IV, n. 18, above). 4 W i / I F 5.684, T-77/173, "Vortragsnotiz fur . . . Hossbach", 21 January 1937, drafted by " G . O . " (Beutler). Hossbach was the Wehrmacht's adjutant to Hitler,

3

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functions of the Four-Year-Plan were to cease with the outbreak of war; it was intended simply to build up in peacetime the economic foundation for war. Once the nation was actually at war, it was the GBK which was to take over the economy. Therefore, the Four-YearPlan had no claim to interfere in mobilization preparations per se, which were the province of the War Ministry (read Thomas) for the armament industry, and of the GBK for the rest of the economy. It would be absurd to take mobilization preparations out of the hands of an agency which was to direct the war economy, and entrust them to one scheduled for dissolution in time of war. What Thomas feared most, as this same memorandum made clear, was that if Goring's right to issue orders to all the highest Reich offices extended to the GBK, it might also extend to the War Minister: This would however result in the grotesque situation that while an organ of the Reich W a r Ministry (Committee for Reich Defense) sets the ultimate goals, the Reich W a r Ministry itself is subordinated, for carrying out the work, to the Commissioner for the Four-Year-Plan. 5

"Such a confusion of competencies", concluded Thomas' aide gravely, "cannot possibly lie within the intention of the Fiihrer". Since the secretariat of the Committee for Reich Defense (almost but not quite defunct) was now in the hands of Alfred Jodl, head of Department "L" in the Wehrmachtamt, Thomas had little trouble in bringing Jodl to see his point. Together, they prevailed upon Blomberg to write to Hitler, in February 1937, setting forth the essence of W Staff s argument. Blomberg refused, however, to state explicitly that the functions of the Four-Year-Plan should cease with the outbreak of war. He was only willing to state that the main job of the Four-Year-Plan was to overcome certain economic bottlenecks (namely ores, fuel, and rubber) in peacetime, while that of the GBK was to prepare the entire economy for war, and in war-time to direct it.4 No immediate response came back from Hitler. In the spring months, disputes intensified between Goring, on the one hand, and Schacht and Thomas on the other. One of the sorest and author of the fullest surviving record of the conference of 5 November 1937. See note 1, above. 5 W i / I F 5.684, ibid. « EC-408, IMT XXXVI, pp. 478ff. (The original of this document is W i / I F 5.3615, T - 7 7 / 4 3 1 ; it belongs in W i / I F 5.684, T-77/173.) EC-244, IMT XXXVI, pp. 238-9, 22 February 1937. Drafts of Blomberg's letter are in W i / I F 5.684, T-77/173. See also Meinck, "Der Reichsverteidigungsrat", pp. 416-7.

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points was control of the oil industry. Goring's plans to make himself "oil dictator" had been held in abeyance in the spring and summer of 1936, while Goring was occupied with expanding his power; but in November 1936 he decided to make use of the authority Hitler had granted him in March. He relieved the Ministry of Economics of its jurisdiction over the Supervisory Agency for Petroleum and, in part, of its supervision over the Economic Group Fuel Industry and its direction of "Wifo". Authority over these agencies was given to the Bureau for German Raw Materials and Synthetics.7 The service branches now turned directly to Lob's office to press their claims for oil, bypassing Thomas. Since Thomas was responsible for securing reserves of oil adequate for the entire Wehrmacht, he was infuriated by this private dealing between the Ordnance Offices and the FourYear-Plan. In May 1937, he got from Blomberg an order making explicit that in economic matters, representation of the Wehrmacht and all its branches lay in the hands of W Staff. Direct negotiations between the services and the Bureau for German Raw Materials and Synthetics were prohibited, except with the express approval of the War Minister. Nevertheless, friction continued until the Bureau for German Raw Materials and Synthetics was itself transferred to the Ministry of Economics (see Chapter VII and below). Thus control of the oil industry returned to its former home, after what Thomas called "a two-year aberration". 8 Meanwhile, Thomas' expectation that the Four-Year-Plan would intensify Germany's short-range difficulties was showing itself justified. At the fourteenth session of the Committee for Reich Defense on 21 April 1937, Keitel's opening remarks were devoted to the strain on Germany's economic resources. It appeared that current conditions in government finances, foreign exchange and scarce materials might require that defense projects be slowed down. Still, Keitel asked nothing more definite than that all Reich agencies exercise moderation in their demands. 9 Schacht had expressed himself more pointedly in a letter to Goring earlier the same month.10 Under attack from Goring for failing to inEC-243, I M T X X X V I , pp. 233-7. See also Hedler, W i / I F 5.2726 (cited in Ch. VII, n. 3, above), pp. 36-7. 8 Ibid. (Hedler), pp. 38-42; Thomas, Grundlagen, Ch. X I I , p. 117 (Thomas actually wrote "three-year aberration", but even counting from March 1936, this is one year in error). » Minutes and preparatory materials in W i / I F 5.560, T-77/131. 10 EC-286, I M T XXXVI, pp. 282-91, Schacht to Goring, 2 April 1937. 7

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crease Germany's exports sufficiently, Schacht replied that exports were suffering as a result of the heavy demands of rearmament and the Four-Year-Plan. On the one hand, firms producing for the Wehrmacht or the Four-Year-Plan lacked incentive to produce for export, and in any case had to offer such long delivery terms that foreign buyers refused to wait. On the other hand, firms which were not producing for the Wehrmacht or the Four-Year-Plan were hampered by serious difficulty in getting raw materials. Even when guaranteed enough to meet their export orders, they might end up with serious losses in a line of goods requiring scarce materials. The "New Plan" had in fact, as Schacht pointed out, succeeded in achieving an export surplus by restricting "non-essential" imports while offering various inducements to export. But military expansion and the Four-YearPlan together were pushing up the need for "essential" materials faster than domestic production could be expanded. For example, mentioned Schacht, while domestic production of light and Diesel fuels in 1936 was over 700,000 tons above the production of 1933, imports of these commodities had nevertheless increased in the same period by over 900,000 tons.11 Indeed, the situation worsened perceptibly in the course of 1937. Exports went up, but the export surplus dropped by over 100 million marks (in 1936 it had been nearly 700 million marks above the deficit level of 1934.) In any case, the export surplus had never been sufficient to halt the precipitous outflow of gold and currency. Reserves of these had been shrinking ever since 1930, but while in 1933 they had stood at about 530 million marks, by 1936 they were down to 75 million. In 1937 the drop in gold and foreign currency was smaller, but still it brought the total reserves to a mere 70 million marks. Oil imports went up by an additional 100,000 tons in 1937, despite increases in domestic production, and despite unfavorable developments in the foreign market (Russia stopped oil exports to Germany in 1936, and Rumania was demanding cash payment or higher prices, in retaliation against the synthetic oil projects of the Four-Year-Plan). By February and March 1938, Germany was again faced with a foreign trade deficit, as in 1934, in place of the modest export surpluses of the years 1935-37. 12 Ibid.; see also Schweitzer, Big Business in the Third Reich, pp. 417, 540-41. W i / I F 5.582, T-77/140/872710, -745, -772, -811: "Stand der wirtschaftlichen Lage", monthly, 1 January-1 April, 1938; Schweitzer, "Der ursprüngliche Vierjahresplan" (Ch. VII, n. 30, above), p. 356; W i / I F 5.560, T-77/131, report of a conference in the Reichswirtschaftsministerium, 25 November 1938. 11

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It was not directly over foreign trade, but over the related problem of exploiting Germany's low-grade iron ores, that the struggle between Schacht and Goring reached its climax. Schacht's position, like that of Thomas, called for moderation, even cut-backs, in domestic programs, for the sake of conserving foreign credit. But Hitler had set exploitation of domestic ores as one of the major tasks of the Four-Year-Plan, and had chosen Goring to push through the program "without regard for cost". This Goring was pleased to do. The main source of opposition to the domestic ores project was the steel industry itself. The steel industrialists, led by Ernst Poensgen of Vereinigte Stahlwerke (head of Economic Group Iron Industry and spokesman of the Ruhr industrial complex), were convinced that increased extraction of domestic ores would prove uneconomical and unprofitable. Poensgen also feared a repetition of the "capacity inflation" which had preceded the great depression. The industrialists maintained that improvements in existing steel plants would be a better investment for the government and, of course, for themselves. At any rate, they were opposed to furthering this project of the FourYear-Plan by investing in it themselves. Nevertheless, under pressure from both Goring and the Wehrmacht, the Ministry of Economics persevered in seeking the steel industry's cooperation. In June 1937, Dr. Schlattmann finally succeeded in arriving at a compromise, by which the industrialists would undertake to mine the domestic ores with government subsidization. According to Poensgen, the plan was cleared both with "the military" (probably Thomas) and with Löb, before being sealed between the Ministry of Economics and the industrialists.18 Goring was not satisfied. At a conference on 16 June 1937, called to consider the immediate problem of the steel shortage, Goring mentioned that he had decided "to have a very large plant built under my personal influence". The following month, the founding of the Reichswerke A. G. "Hermann Goring" was announced. The Hermann Goring works were to produce iron and steel from domestic ores. Poensgen's opinion, expressed openly at a meeting of the industrialists on 24 August, was that some of their number (of whom Poensgen named Röchling and Zangen) had sold out to Goring, that is, decided for their personal profit to invest in Göring's T-580/422/folder #559; Schweitzer, Big Business in the Third Reich, pp. 539-42. See also Milward, op. cit., p. 4.

1S

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project after all.14 Certainly Poensgen was right in his facts, and he may even have been correct in supposing that a continued "united front" in the steel industry could have prevented Göring's move. But the industrialists may have overestimated their own power; perhaps, too, they had set too high a price on their cooperation with the Ministry of Economics. In any case, in July 1937 the "Hermann Goring Works" were a fait accompli, legally if not physically. For Schacht, it was a fact too objectionable to swallow. He doubted that the new enterprise would ever justify the strain it would place on Germany's finances and material resources, but more than that, it was a mortal blow to his standing as Minister of Economics. It made rubbish of the program his ministry had just approved after laborious negotiations. Worse, it proclaimed to the leaders of German industry that Schacht could no longer govern nor protect them, that Goring could overturn his rulings with a mere flip of the hand. Schacht began to talk about resigning. Perhaps he appealed to Hitler, but if so he did not get much satisfaction. Hitler only demanded that Schacht and Goring stop wrangling. Obediently but insincerely, both signed in mid-July a non-committal agreement to cooperate. Schacht had more success in appealing for aid from Thomas and Blomberg. The latter apparently renewed the appeal he had directed to Hitler in February, and on 19 August he was able to write Goring that, by decision of Hitler, the Four-Year-Plan was limited to peace-time operations, while mobilization preparations were the responsibility of the GBK. But Schacht failed to win the full support of the steel industrialists. At his request, Poensgen prepared a memorandum attacking the Hermann Goring Works. Poensgen and five others signed it, but were unable to persuade the rest of the industry to follow their head. At a meeting of 24 August, frightened perhaps by a threatening telegram from Goring, the others followed Röchling in maintaining that "mitmachen" was the best way to insure that the new enterprise would not be too great a threat to their interests.15 After this failure, Schacht admitted himself beaten. On 26 August he wrote Goring "that fundamental differences exist in our economic Ibid.; NI-084, TWC XII, pp. 474ff.; NI-353, XII, pp. 480ff. EC-384, IMT XXXVI, p. 379; EC-254, photostatic copy in W i / I F 5.684, T - 7 7 / 1 7 3 , "Reichskriegsminister, W A 1 0 1 9 / 3 7 gK L IV d", 19 August 1937; see also Meinck, "Der Reichsverteidigungsrat", pp. 416-18 (Meinck slightly overstates the strength of Blomberg's letter}; references cited in n. 13. 14

15

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147

policies, which I hope will induce the Führer to place the further direction of economic policies solely in your hands".14 Schacht agreed, upon Hitler s insistence, not to make his resignation immediately public, but he ceased to function as Minister of Economics and GBK as of 5 September 1937. He remained President of the Reichsbank and "Minister without Portfolio" (actually, without function) until 1939, but no longer had any important influence on economic policy. Schacht's successor was Walther Funk, formerly State Secretary in the Propaganda Ministry and Reichspressechef; Funk's background in economics lay chiefly in having been editor of the Berliner Börsenzeitung until 1931. It was an open secret that Funk was selected for the Ministry of Economics not for any special competence, but for his probable pliancy toward Goring. It was known in November 1937 that Funk was to succeed Schacht, but his appointment was not made effective until 15 January 1938, and he did not in fact take office until February.17 In the interval Goring, as acting Minister of Economics, effected the administrative reorganization described in Chapter VII. From January through August 1937, Thomas had sought to bolster the position of GBK in order to aid Schacht against Goring. With Schacht out of the picture, and Funk, Göring's willing servant, scheduled to replace him, Thomas changed course. It now appeared that it would be best to get rid of the GBK altogether; failing that, to seek once more to bring the office under military control. With Schacht's ministerial corpse hardly cold, Thomas' liaison officer at the Ministry of Economics, Lieutenant-Colonel Drews, sat down on 27 November 1937 to pen a memorandum setting forth his chiefs views.18 Funk was ruled out for the post of GBK, argued Drews frankly, because of his relationship to Goring, for the functions of the GBK required a much more authoritative personage. Goring himself would have been a more likely candidate, but Hitler gave no indication that he meant to make Goring GBK. Now Drews came to the point: no need to appoint a GBK in peacetime at all. A Bullock, op. cit. (1953 edition), p. 376. The fact that Funk's appointment to the Ministry of Economics was known in November is evident from the memorandum of Colonel Drews of 27 November, cited below in the text and in n. 18; thus the tale that Hitler casually informed him of the appointment when meeting him at the opera in mid-January is apocryphal. 18 W i / I F 5.684, T-77/173, "Möglichkeiten der G.B. Organisation nach dem Umbau der wirtschaftlichen Führung", 27 November 1937. 18 17

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"A CONFUSION OF PRIVATE EMPIRES", 1937-1938

GBK could be appointed in wartime to direct the war economy; until then, general economic policy could be laid down by the Commissioner for the Four-Year-Plan. (This was already the case, insofar as "general economic policy" was laid down at all; Thomas saw no way of altering this fact, and probably thought it would please Goring to make it explicit.) As for the administrative functions of the GBK, these could be pursued by the existing Fiihrungsstab, headed by a person of the rank of State Secretary. Now Drews proposed boldly that an officer trained in economics, preferably a general, should take over this post. (Thomas, though still a colonel, was undoubtedly candidate for the promotion to Brigadier General which he received in January 1938.) Whoever might be chosen, this officer should become a member not only of the Committee for Reich Defense (which Thomas already regularly attended), but also of the "Reich Defense Council" (a purely formal provision) and, if possible, should receive some post in the Reich Chancellory (this was sheer fantasy). Drews emphasized that the general-cum-State Secretary who would take charge of the GBK's administrative duties would be responsible only to the deputy chairman of the "Reich Defense Council", that is, Blomberg. In the next two days, Thomas tried unsuccessfully to make Blomberg see Schacht's demission as an opportunity to place the economy under military rule. Failing in this, Thomas tried another angle. Appealing this time through Keitel, now head of the Wehrmachtamt, Thomas modified his proposal. He conceded that, if the appointment of a GBK were inevitable, the post should go to a civilian (presumably Funk). But he insisted that the head of the GBK's Fuhrungsstab should be drawn from the Wehrmacht. The person in this post must be "ready on his own initiative to give military needs priority in the economy as a whole". With a civilian as GBK and a representative of the Wehrmacht as his chief administrator, "a synthesis at the highest level would be achieved, which would do justice both to the needs of the Wehrmacht and the desires of the civilian economy".19 Now Blomberg was persuaded to move, but with disastrous effect. On 29 November 1937, the same day as Thomas' memorandum to Keitel, Blomberg wrote Goring, cautiously, that he would ask Hitler to appoint Funk GBK (this would suit Goring), but that he meant 19

Ibid., Communication 4>

i a

11 È o

261

STATISTICAL APPENDIX

Statistics on the economy of Germany in the years 1933-1945 are notoriously problematical. Official statistics published in the years 1933-38 are at best incomplete, omitting or underestimating significant data, especially those relating to expenditures, investments, production, and construction directly or indirectly for military purposes. In compiling the statistics for Table IV in this book, for example, it was found that prevailing figures given elsewhere for military and for total investments both were seriously underestimated. An earnest attempt by Burton H. Klein (op. cit., pp. 14-15) to tabulate "Total Investment Classified by Purpose" is badly distorted by inadequate figures on military investment, omission of the Four-Year-Plan, overestimation of civilian government investment, and acceptance of the official figures for total investment (which were much too low). The investment figures in Table IV have, therefore, been completely retabulated, from diverse sources, as indicated in # 13-18 below. Official statistics were not published in Germany after 1942. Furthermore, new statistical procedures were introduced in the last years of the war, and compilation of statistics, at least on war production, was taken over by the Reich Ministry for Armaments and War Production. Since that ministry was at once responsible for increasing war production and for collecting statistics on the same, one naturally wonders whether some element of exaggeration did not creep into the statistics on war production; there is some evidence that it did. These problems make it a difficult and complicated procedure to select reliable and meaningful statistics, but one need not therefore despair altogether of the attempt. After a good deal of intricate checking and rechecking, one can fix upon certain figures as reasonable and acceptable. It is neither possible nor desirable, however, to recount the whole tedious procedure here. We simply give below,

263

STATISTICAL APPENDIX

for each column of figures in Tables I-IV, the sources from which we drew data which we judged to be reasonably reliable: 1. Germany's gross national product (Table I, column 1): Burton H. Klein, op. cit., Tables 57, 58 and 65. See Klein's discussion, pp. 241-53. Klein points out that data for the years 1939-1943 are rough approximations. Note that the figures for the years 1929-1938 would b e identical with those of René Erbe, op. cit., p. 100, except for a small sum which Klein adds for "armed forces' pay and allowances". 2. Germany's military expenditures (Table I, column 2): a. 1929 and 1932: Statistisches Jahrbuch (hereinafter, this source will be cited as S.J.), 1935, pp. 426-7, 423-4 (plus a small allowance for estimated "camouflaged funds"). (Munich, 1949), p. 5 5 5 b. 1933: Statistisches Handbuch von Deutschland (hereinafter, this source will be cited as Handbuch). This figure is probably too high, but no reliable figure is available for the year 1933; that given by E r b e (Zoe. cit.) which was the official budget figure, is definitely too low. 1.5 billion RM would b e this author's estimate. See Ch. IV, note 3, above. c. 1934-38: Nürnberg document Schwerin-Krosigk #324, data compiled by Walter Genske, former official of the Reich Finance Ministry, from unpublished Reich budget accounts, with extra-budgetary funds ("Mefo-Wechsel") included in the totals. T h e figure for 1935 is independently confirmed in W i / I F 5.1505, T - 7 7 / 2 8 9 / 1 1 1 5 4 0 7 , -415. d. 1939-43: Klein, Table 65. 3. England's estimated national income Statistical Yearbook, 1952, p. 407.

(Table I, column 4): United Nations,

4. Englands military expenditures (Table, I, column 5): a. 1929-1937: League of Nation, Armaments Yearbook, 1934, p. 784; 1938, p. 171. b. 1938-1945: U.N., Statistical Yearbook, 1951, pp. 514-515. 5. United States, gross national product (Table I, column 7): The Report of the President (Washington, D.C., 1963) (hereinafter, Econ. p. 171.

Economic Rept....),

United States, military expenditures (Table I, column 8): a. 1929-1937: L e a g u e of Nations, Armaments Yearbook, 1934, p. 856; 1938, p. 881. 1963, p. 171. b. 1939-1945: Econ. Rept...,

6.

7. Private Consumption 65; Erbe, p. 100. 8. Private consumption Rept..., 1963, p. 171.

in Germany

(Table II, column 5):

Econ.

9. Share of private consumption in GNP in the U.S., calculated in 1962 (Table II, column 7): calculated from data in ibid., p. 172.

prices

10. German 61, p. 254.

government

in the

(Table II, column 2): Klein, Tables 58 and

United

expenditures

States

(Table III, column 1, top): Klein, Table

264

STATISTICAL APPENDIX

11. U.S. government expenditures for goods and services. (Table III, column 1, bottom): Econ. Rept , 1963, p. 171. 12. Non-military expenditures of the German and U.S. governments (Table III, column 3): residual, by subtraction of military expenditures, as given in Table I. 13. Total investment in the German economy (Table IV, column 1): summation of columns 2, 3, 5, and 7. Figures for 1928 and 1938 independently confirmed: 1928, Handbuch, p. 604; 1938, PS-3562, IMT XXXII, p. 399 (note that this was a top secret document; official statistics, in contrast, alleged total investment in 1938 to be only 18.8 billions RM; thus e.g. Klein, Table 5, p. 14). 14. Military investments in Germany (Table IV, column 2): calculated from Schwerin-Krosigk #324(see above), 1933-38. For 1928, estimated. 15. Investments in basic industry in Germany (Table IV, column 3): calculated from Handbuch, pp. 604-5. 16. Estimated investments under the Four-Year-Plan (Table IV, column 4): based upon Wi/VI.34, T-77/649/1846204, report of 10.6.42 from a file of Dr. Ritter, Reichsamt fur Wirtschaftsausbau. General confirmation of these figures may be found in several other estimates of investments under the Four-Year-Plan, scattered in T-71, T-84, and T-77; in general these are estimates based upon consumption of steel: direct data on funds invested are not available, except for the first year of operations (see RWM/23/19, or NI-8590, in T-71/109/611748ff.). 17. Investments in major transportation and roads (Table IV, column 5): Handbuch, p. 606; cf. S J . 1941/42, p. 609. 18. Investments in the German civilian economy (Table IV, column 6): Handbuch, pp. 604-606, plus estimated public building by state, municipalities, and NSDAP, based on scattered sources. Three points about the statistics given in Tables I through IV require elaboration here: First, with respect to the calculation of military expenditures against national income for England in Table I, it is necessary to point out that calculating the percentages against gross national product would alter the comparisons between England and Germany offered in the text (pp. 1 0 , 1 8 5 , 1 8 9 ) . If we take England's G.N.P. to be one billion £ above national income, the percentages for military expenditures calculated against G.N.P. would be: 1938 1939 1940

7% 18% 46%

1941 1942

53$ 57%

1943

56%

It would then appear that in 1940 England's military effort was still less than 50% of G.N.P., and that the war effort of the two countries drew about equal in 1942 rather than 1943 (1942: England, 57%; Germany, 55$). It would appear, too, that England's peak war effort

STATISTICAL APPENDIX

265

was less than Germany's, which must have been well over 60% of G.N.P. in 1944. If this argument is accepted, it would redress the balance, rather more strongly than does the text, against the view which holds Germany's war economy to have been "peacelike" by comparison with England's. However, it would not alter the main conclusions stated in the text. It would still be true that Germany's war effort showed a steady increase from 1933 through 1944, whereas in England and the United States there was a sharp discontinuity associated with the outbreak of war. It would still be true, too, that England's military effort was greater than that of Germany in the years 1940 and 1941. The remarks pertaining to definition of "war economy" and "total war economy", and attribution of such terms to Germany, would of course be unaffected by the change in calculations for England. In view of these considerations, it seemed best to work from the more precise published data on England's national income, rather than formulate conclusions from arbitrary estimates of G.N.P. Second, with regard to Table IV (investments) and the discussion of it on p. 187, it should be noted that Klein's classification of investments differs substantially from that of Table IV. For example, Klein classifies roads (including Autobahnen) directly with civilian investment, but agriculture with "basic industries". For an estimate of investment in armaments, Klein classifies under "armament plants" all investment in certain industries, namely electrical machinery, vehicle, locomotive, naval, metal-working, optical and chemical industries. This assumes (a) that the publicly reported figures for investment in the industries he calls "armament plants" reflected all or most investment in finished armaments and military equipment, and (b) that most of the reported investment in these industries was for military purposes. Neither of these assumptions appears to be valid. In fact, it appears that most investment for military purposes simply went unreported in the Third Reich (accounting in part for the discrepancy between the actual and published investment totals for 1938; see # 13, above). In view of this, and of other considerations which could be argued back and forth indefinitely, the author judged that the best available data on military investments were the Reich budget expenditures for military "hardware" (armaments proper, military installations, military vehicles and ships, etc.). On the other hand, it does not seem reasonable to count all military expenditure as investment (as does René Erbe), and accordingly expenditures for

266

STATISTICAL APPENDIX

military administration, for clothing, feeding, and medical care of troops, for pay and other personnel expenditures, have been excluded from the "military investment" figures in Table IV. Third, with respect to the figures given in Table I for German military expenditures, attention should be called to the much higher estimates given by Jiirgen Kuczynski in Die Geschichte der Lage der Arbeiter unter dem Kapitalismus, vol. 16 (Berlin, 1963), pp. 128-36. Kuczynski bases his estimates on the increase in the national debt of the Reich, added to the increase in tax receipts and the military expenditures of the year 1932. He assumes that the civilian expenditures of the Reich government held about equal throughout the period 1932-1938, excepting such items as the Autobahnen, which Kuczynski (in contrast with Klein) takes to be strictly military, at least in intent. To this base estimate, Kuczynski adds estimates of military expenditures by parties other than the Reich government, namely: private investments in armament production; military expenditures of the provincial and municipal governments; and military expenditures of the NSDAP (insofar as not government-financed). Since no precise data are available for these items, Kuczynski makes rough estimates. In sum he arrives at the following totals: TABLE

V

Kuczynski's estimates of German military 1932-1938 Year

Billions RM a

1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 » b

1.0 3.5 5.5 9.5 13.5 16.5 26.0

expenditures,

% of National Income a

2 7 10 16 21 22 32

%ofG.N.P. b

2 6 8 13 16 18 25

Kuczynski, op. cit., p. 135. Calculated against G.N.P. as given in Table I (p. 184, above).

Many questions could be raised about the derivation of Kuczynski's estimates. Should Autobahnen be counted as military expenditures?

STATISTICAL APPENDIX

267

Should increased expenditures for the Reichsbahn and other forms of transportation be so counted? Should expenditures under the Four-Year-Plan be counted as directly military (as they are by Arthur Schweitzer too)? If so, why not count all investment in basic industries as military expenditure (which none of the authorities does)? Did administrative and personnel expenditures of the Reich really hold even in the years 1932-38, or did the growth in bureaucracy under the Third Reich involve increased expenditures for these purposes? What part of the increase in Reich indebtedness should be attributed to the office and display buildings which Georg Thomas so deplored? How much did the Reich government expend for industrial and agricultural subsidies other than for armaments? How much of the increase in local and municipal tax receipts (on which Kuczynski bases his estimate of their military expenditures) really went to local office and display buildings, local transportation, and other essentially civilian purposes? Even if these amounts were small, were they entirely negligible, especially when taken all together? Unfortunately, no firm answers to these questions are provided by the statistics which are readily available; in the opinion of this author, Kuczynski's estimates must be reduced by some amount for the items mentioned above, but the exact amount is unknown at present. For the purposes of this book, however, another consideration argues more strongly against adoption of Kuczynski's estimates. That is, that items such as roads and other transportation expenditures of government, private investments in arms production, military expenditures of local governments and of political groups, are not embodied in the statistics on military expenditures of England and the United States. For the purposes of the comparisons offered in the text, therefore, the term "military expenditures" has been taken to refer to national government expenditures for explicitly military purposes. Table IV, however, shows investments in basic industries, in the Four-Year-Plan, and in major transportation and roads, in separate columns, and the text indicates the effect of adding these to the strictly military expenditures. It may be noted that the difference between the figures given in Table IV for expenditures under the Four-Year-Plan, and the substantially larger planned investments cited by Schweitzer (Big Business in the Third Reich, p. 331), reflects the delays in the projects of the Four-Year-Plan occasioned by shortages of raw materials (see text, above, p. 137).

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

The following works, omitted from the footnotes, should be noted as pertinent. Most appeared too late, or reached the author's hands too late, to be taken into account in the manuscript. A few of the older works were omitted inadvertently in the course of revisions of the text and notes. They are placed in context here as addenda to the footnotes; they appear also in the Bibliography.

CHAPTER I n. 9 (p. 20): See also Edmund F. Szczot, Die deutsche Doktrin ¿les totalen Krieges (Vienna, 1946). n. 10 (p. 21): Neither Séché nor Blanchon is mentioned by Eugène Carrias, La Pensée Militaire Française (Paris, 1960); however, Carrias does not appear to take up the idea of total war at all. n. 19 (p. 24): See also Theodore Ropp, War in the Modern World (New York, 1962), pp. 159-60. n. 31 (p. 27): See also Ropp, op. cit., pp. 218-20. n. 40 (p. 30): See also Otto Goebel, Deutsche Rohstoffwirtschaft im Weltkrieg (Stuttgart-Berlin-Leipzig and New Haven, 1930). The most recent treatment of the subject appears in Gerald D. Feldman, Army, Industry and Labor in Germany, 1914-1918 (Princeton, 1966). CHAPTER II n. 2 (p. 40): A published edition of this work has now appeared, under the title Geschichte der deutschen Wehr- und Rüstungswirtschaft (1918-1943/45), edited with a biographical and textual introduction and explanatory notes by Wolfgang Birkenfeld1 (=Schriften des Bundesarchivs, no. 14) (Boppardam-Rhein, 1966) (Birkenfeld thus drops Thomas' own more modest phrase, "Grundlagen für eine ..."). This edition includes Thomas' list of documentary appendices, with their locations when known, and a selection of the appendices themselves, n. 3 (p. 41): Ludendorff's Der Totale Krieg was preceded by Ernst Jüngers Die totale Mobilmachung (Berlin, 1934), a brief essay, claiming to "introduce" the idea of total mobilization, but preoccupied with the origin and setting of the idea more than with its content, n. 4 (p. 41): Concerning Ludendorff's influence and more on Wehrwirtschaft, see also Albert T. Lauterbach, Economics in Uniform (Princeton, 1943), Chs. II-IV; and Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism, rev. ed. (New York,

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

269

1959, 1967), p. 468. Further, see Walter Görlitz, ed., Generalfeldmarschall Keitel: Verbrecher oder Offizier? (Berlin-Frankfurt, 1961; memoirs, letters, documents), pp. 154-166 (Nürnberg document L-211) and Görlitz's comments in his note 21 (p. 166). 29 (p. 49): See also Fabian von Schlabrendorff, The Secret War against Hitler, tr. by Hilda Simon (New York, 1965). This is a revised edition of Schlabrendorff's Offiziere Gegen Hitler. CHAPTER III 11 (p. 58): For an attempt to measure the extent of secret rearmament against an "armament-disarmament scale", and discussion of the implications for disarmament proposals today, see the author's "Germany Disarmed and Rearming, 1925-1935", Journal of Peace Research, no. 2 (June 1966), pp. 114-124. This draws on some of the information in Chs. Ill and X of this book, viewed in a substantially different context. Gerhard L. Weinberg has called to the author's attention an error in the figure given there (p. 117) for England's "standing armies" in 1929. This has been corrected in the text, above (p. 61), to exclude reservists. It might also be argued that the Territorial Army should be excluded, which would reduce the figure from "over 300,000" men to less than 140,000 (the size of the Regular Army). This would seriously alter the comparisons offered on p. 61 with respect to England, but would not change the general conclusion of the passage. 13 (p. 59): On the Freikorps and their impact, the indispensable work is R. G. L. Waite, Vanguard of Nazism (Cambridge, Mass., 1952). 32 (p. 65): The Reichswehr still held much the same view in October 1933: "In the first place one must reckon with an occupation of German territory", read in part General von Blomberg's orders of 25 October concerning the possibility of hostilities arising in the event of sanctions following Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations. See Donald C. Watts, "German Plans for the Reoccupation of the Rhineland: A Note", Journal of Contemporary History, vol. I, no. 4 (October 1966), pp. 193-6. Nor was the defensive stance entirely changed even in 1936, for while Watts shows that "the orders to withdraw, such as they were", called for resistance ("a fighting retreat"), he also shows that the German forces were expected to fall back behind the Rhine. "The main resistance by the field army", in 1936 as in 1935, "was to lie along the line Roer-Rhine-Black Forest" (p. 199). CHAPTER IV 17 (p. 82): On the German Labor Front, and labor in the Third Reich generally, see David Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social Revolution (New York, 1966), esp. Ch. Ill; and T. W. Mason, "Labour in the Third Reich, 19331939", Past and Present, no. 33 (April 1966), pp. 112-141. Schoenbaum also devotes considerable space throughout his book to comparison of Nazi goals and ideology with the economic and social realities of the Third Reich. See also Jürgen Kuczynski, Germany: Economic and Labor Conditions under Fascism (New York, 1945), and the more recent work cited below (addendum to n. X/10). 19 (p. 83): For a view of the Economic Groups as maintaining the supremacy of capitalists, see Daniel Guerin, Fascisme et Grand Capital (Paris, 1945), esp. p. 248.

SUPPLEMENTABY NOTES 21 (pp. 84-5): On the relationship between Party and state, see Schoenbaum op. cit. (addendum to n. IV/17, above), esp. Ch. VII. 23 (p. 87): According to David Vital, "Czechoslovakia and the Powers, Sept. 1938", the German army was still as low as 27 divisions in "effective strength" in April 1938, and in September 1938 "37 divisions represented the maximum force available for the attack on Czechoslovakia . . . even on the assumption that no more than a covering force was needed in the West or on the Polish border", Journal of Contemporary History, vol. I, no. 4 (October 1966), pp. 46-7. CHAPTER V 33 (p. 104): On Hitler and Russia, see also Andreas Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie: Politik und Kriegführung, 1940-1941 (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1965). Hitler's conduct of the war as reflected in. conferences and war directives: Felix Gilbert, Hitler Directs His War (New York, 1950); Walther Hubatsch (ed.), Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegführung, 1939-1945 (Framkfurt-amMain, 1962); and H. R. Trevor-Roper, Blitzkrieg to Defeat: Hitlers War Directives, 1939-1945 (New York-Chicago-San Francisco, 1964). CHAPTER IX 14 (p. 165): It is the Wehrwirtschaftliche Abteilung in the Wehrwirtschaftsstab to which Vagts refers when he mentions "Major Dr. K. Hesse, entrusted with the direction of the Department of Military Economy (Wehrwirtschaß) in the War Ministry", op. cit. (addendum to n. II/4, above), p. 428. CHAPTER X I (p. 179): Two earlier works of this general persuasion are: Thomas Balogh, "The National Economy of Germany", Economic Journal, vol. 48, September, 1938, pp. 461-497; Frieda Wunderlich, "Germany's Defense Economy and the Decay of Capitalism", Quarterly Journal of Economics, v. 52, May, 1938, pp. 401-430. 10 (p. 182): See, in contrast, the Marxist analysis by Daniel Guerin, op. cit. (addendum to n. IV/19, above), who accepts die view that the economy of the Third Reich was a war economy, but denies that it was the state which "directed", insisting rather on the retention by big business of the power to form economic policy. A more recent and substantially different Marxist treatment is that of Jürgen Kuczynski, Die Geschichte der Lage der Arbeiter unter dem Kapitalismus, vol. 16: "Studien zur Geschichte des staatsmonopolistischen Kapitalismus in Deutschland, 1918 bis 1945" (Berlin, 1963), which analyses the German economy under National Socialism as an extension of the development of "state-monopoly capitalism" which Kuczynski discerns already in the earlier period. This volume contains documentary materials, reproduced in part or in full. For discussion of Kuczynski's estimates of military expenditures, 1933-38, see the Statistical Appendix. I I (p. 182): An unresolved and uneven mixture of the conflicting viewpoints described here is presented by David Schoenbaum, op. cit. (addendum to n. IV/17, above), in his chapter on "The Third Reich and Business". Schoenbaum is best where he relies on his own analysis and insights, which are directed mainly toward comparison of Nazi ideological goals (in particu-

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

271

lar, fulfillment of middle class and "populist" aspirations) with what took place in practice. He deals little with economic mobilization, Four-Year-Plan and the economic administration; where he does, he leans fairly heavily on Schweitzer, Erbe, and works of this school. He is aware of Klein's position (and seems to accept it as valid except for its allegedly "revisionist" implications concerning "Nazi intentions"), but dismisses it in two or three paragraphs. The chapter is curiously self-contradictory, in ways too numerous to elaborate here. In the main, however, it insists upon the supremacy of "the Nazis" over business, only here and there suggesting a less simplistic view, more consistent really with Schoenbaum's general picture of the Third Reich as presenting "a new set of classes, a set of mutually competitive elites" (p. 296). It is in the elaboration of this picture that the great value of Schoenbaum's book lies. CHAPTER XI 2 (p. 192): Of this incident, Keitel reports in his memoirs only that in the summer of 1939 he "held it to be his duty" to inform Hitler of the concern of the "leading generals and the General Staff' and their grounds for concern, "although I knew that his mistrust for the generals would only be further strengthened". See Gorlitz, éd., op. cit. (addendum to n. II/4, above), p. 208. 39 (p. 205): Administrative changes in the German economy during the war were followed carefully by H. W. Singer in a series on "The German War Economy", Economic Journal, vols. 51-54 (1941-44). 48 (p. 211): Haider's diary has been published in three volumes, edited by Hans-Adolf Jacobsen: Franz Haider, Kriegstagebuch (Stuttgart, 1962-64). The entry cited (November 27, 1939) appears in vol. I (Stuttgart, 1962), p. 133. CHAPTER XII 1 (p. 213): Further information and documents pertinent to the munitions crisis of 1939-40 and Todt's ministry appears in the published edition of the Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht, (Wehrmachtfuhrungsstab) 1940-1945, vol. I: 1940-41, ed. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (Stuttgart, 1965). This is the last-published of four volumes, and most relevant to topics treated in this book. The others are: vol. II: 1942, ed. Andreas Hillgruber (1963); vol. Ill: 1943, ed. Walther Hubatsch (1963); and vol. IV: 1944/45, ed. P. E. Schramm (1961), general editor. CHAPTER XIII 8 (p. 238): The changes instituted tinder Speer were reported in a perceptive contemporary article by Heinz Paechter, "Recent Trends in the German Command Economy", Journal of Political Economy, vol. 52, no. 3 (September 1944), pp. 217-233. 10 (p. 240): The intensity of the competition for manpower in 1942 which occasioned the break between Speer and Thomas is reflected in the space devoted to this issue by Keitel in a post-war memoir on Hitler's direction of the war: see Gorlitz, éd., op. cit. (addendum to n. II/4, above), pp. 293-8. Keitel also remarks here on Hitler's encouragement of unrestrained

272

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

competition (see n. VI/29, p. 121, above): "But it was characteristic of Hitler's methods, to seek to reach the optimum performance by playing off against each other the opposing interests, in this case the Armaments Minister for materiel, the Chef OKW for personnel, making demands on each which he himself knew could not be fulfilled, to match them against each other" (p. 297). m. 14 (p. 242): In this connection note also Oron J. Hale's remarks on newsprint allocations during the war: "The monthly allocation to the newspaper press in mid-1939 amounted to 28,200 tons. This amount remained remarkably stable during the first four years of the war", dropping sharply only after Finnish sources of supply were cut off in 1944. The Captive Press in the Third Reich (Princeton, 1964), p. 274 (italics added).

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Arendt, Hannah, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York, 1960). Aron, Raymond, The Century of Total War (Garden City, New York, 1954, Boston, 1955). , Espoir et Peur du Siècle (Paris, 1957). , La Société industrielle et la guerre (Paris, 1959). , On War (Garden City, New York, 1959). Barth, Eberhard, Wesen und Aufgaben der Organisation der gewerblichen Wirtschaß (Hamburg, 1939). Balogh, Thomas, "The National Economy of Germany", The Economic Journal, vol. 48 (September, 1938), pp. 461-497. Barthel, Johannes, Tätigkeit und Wirkung der Überwachungsstellen (Berlin, 1939). Baruch, Bernard M., American Industry in the War (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1921, New York, 1941) ("A Report of the War Industries Board . . . Including . . . Mr. Baruch's own program for total mobilization of the nation as presented to the War Policies Commission in 1931..."). , Baruch: The Public Years (New York, 1960). Baynes, Norman H., ed. The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, 2 vols. (London-New YorkToronto, 1942). Benoist-Méchin, Jacques, Histoire de l'armée allemande depuis l'Armistice (Paris, 1936, 1938). Birkenfeld, Wolfgang (ed.), see Georg Thomas. Bilanz des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Oldenburg/Hamburg, Gerhard Stalling Verlag, 1953). Blanchon, Georges, La guerre nouvelle (Paris, 1916). , "La guerre nouvelle", Revue des deux mondes, ser. 6, vol. 31 (January, February 1916). Bliokh, Ivan S., The Future of War (Boston, 1902). , "South Africa and Europe", North American Review, vol. 174 (April 1902), pp. 489-504. Bloch, Jean de, see: Bliokh, Ivan S. Boothe, Clare, "Ever Hear of Homer Lea?", Saturday Evening Post, vol. 214 (March 7 and March 14, 1942). Bracher, Karl D., Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik (Villingen/Schwarzwald, 1960). Bracher, Karl D.; Sauer, Wolfgang; and Schulz, Gerhard, Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung (Köln und Opladen, 1962). Brady, Robert A., The Spirit and Structure of German Fascism (New York, 1937). Bramsted, Ernest K., Goebbels and National Socialist Propaganda, 1925-1945 (Ann Arbor, Michigan State University Press, 1965). Brown, A. J., Applied Economics: Aspects of the World Economy in War and Peace (New York-Toronto, 1948).

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ABBREVIATIONS

AA-Fall A-Heer A-Vorarbeiten AK A St Abt. Andr., and., an. BBBfdVJP d DAF DDIK EAPECF. P. F Wi Amt, Fwi Amt g GB GBA GB Bau GB Chem GB Eisen GBK GBV GBW gK GL gR GenStdH HA HL HVA HWaA, Wa A

Aufstellungsmobilization mobilization army mobilization preparations Abwehr wirtschaftlicher Kampfmassnahmen (in RWiM) Aussenstellen (of RWiM and GBK) Abteilung (department, section) Andreas (code for Nachschubstab) a series of Nürnberg documents Beauftragter für den Vierjahresplan code for Truppenamt, 1923-24 Deutsche Arbeitsfront Die Deutsche Industrie im Kriege a document series designation, derived from "Einheitsaktenplan". See Note on Sources. Nürnberg documents series Fertigungs-Program (Wehrmacht) Feldwirtschaftsamt (in OKW, 1944-45) geheim Generalbevollmächtigter Generalbevollmächtigter für den Arbeitseinsatz Generalbevollmächtigter für die Regelung der Bauwirtschaft Generalbevollmächtigter für Sonderfragen der chemischen Erzeugung Generalbevollmächtigter für die Eisen- und Stahlbewirtschaftung Generalbevollmächtigter für die Kriegswirtschaft Generalbevollmächtigter f ü r die Reichsverwaltung Generalbevollmächtigter für die Wirtschaft geheime Kommandosache (military top secret) Generalluftzeugmeister geheime Reichssache (civilian top secret) Generalstab des Heeres Hauptausschuss (under RMfBM, RMfRüK) Heeresleitung Heeresverwaltungsamt Heereswaffenamt. See also Nss, Wa Stab, Wa Wi, Wi Stab.

282 IuH IMCC IMT IWG k1L LWA MK E, MK G ML MWa A N. A. NCA NG-, NI-, NID-, NIKNS NSDAP Nss, nss Ob d H Ob d L Ob d M Obd W OKH OKL OKM OKW OKW/WFSt OKW/Wi Rü Amt Org. PSRAM REM RFM RKM RLM RMfBM RMfRüK RVA RVR RwM, RwMin. RWiM, RWM Rü I, Rü In Rü Kdos Rü Amt sth. TT A, T T 2

ABBREVIATIONS

Industrie- und Handelskammer Interallied Military Control Commission International Military Tribunal, Nürnberg; refers to Trials of Major War Criminals, "blue series" of published testimony, court proceedings, and documents Inspektion für Waffen und Gerät kriegswichtige (Betriebe) lebenswichtige (Betriebe) 1. Landesverteidigungsabteilung; 2. Luft Landeswirtschaftsämter Mein Kampf, English and German editions cited Marineleitung Marinewaffenamt United States, National Archives Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression ("red series"; see Note on Sources) Nürnberg documents series National Socialist Nationalsozialistische deutsche Arbeiterpartei Nachschubstab Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe Oberbefehlshaber der Marine Oberbefehlshaber der Wehrmacht Oberkommando des Heeres Oberkommando der Luftwaffe Oberkommando der Marine Oberkommando der Wehrmacht see WFSt see Wi Rü Amt Organisationsabteilung (in T A) Nürnberg documents series Reichsarbeitsminister/ -ium Reichsminister/ -ium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft Reichsfinanzminister/ -ium Reichskriegsminister/ -ium Reichsluftfahrtminister/ -ium Reichsminister/ -ium für Bewaffnung und Munition Reichsminister/ -ium für Rüstung und Kriegsproduktion Reichsverteidigungsausschuss; Referentenausschuss für die Reichsverteidigung Reichsverteidigungsrat Reichswehrminister/ -ium Reichswirtschaftsminister/ -ium Rüstungsinspekteure, -inspektionen Rüstungskommandos Rüstungsamt code for Heeresleitung Stab, 1923-24 microfilm series in N.A. Truppenamt — Organisationsabteilung

ABBREVIATIONS

283

— "Zentrale" Trials of War Criminals Before the 'Nuernberg Military Tribunals ("green series") U.S. exhibits series, Nürnberg trials USAU.S. Strategic Bombing Survey USSBS Vierjahresplan VJP Wehrmachtamt WA W A (L) — Landesverteidigungsabteilung W A (W) — Wehrwirtschafts- und Waffenwesen W A (W Stb) — Wehrwirtschaftsstab WFSt Wehrmachtführungsstab wg geheime Waffen (?), code for a special section of HWaA, Wa 4 (Chart I) Wehrwirtschaftsinspekteure, -lnspektionen; earlier, WirtW I, W In schaftsinspekteure, -inspektionen U.S. War Industries Board (W.W.I.) WIB Wirtschaftsoffiziere WO — of the Army W O-Heer — of the Air Force WO-Luft — of the Navy W O-Marine Wehrwirtschaftsstab, Rohstoffabteilung (later, Wi Rü WRo Amt, Ro) Wehrwirtschaftsstab, Rüstungswirtschaftliche Abteilung WRü (later Wi Rü Amt, Rü) Wehrwirtschaftsstab W Stb, W Stab Wehrwirtschaftsstab, Wehrwirtschaftliche Abteilung WWi (later Wi Rü Amt, Wi) Waffenamt; Heeres—; Marine— WaA Waffenamt, Beschaffungsabteilung WaB Heereswaffenamt, Stabsabteilung WaStab Heereswaffenamt, Wirtschaftsstab Wa Wi Wi/I, Wi/IA, Wi/IF 5, document series designations in T-77. See Note on Sources Wi/VI, Wi/VIII, etc. Wehrwirtschaftsamt (in OKW, 1942-43) Wi Amt Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstimgsamt Wi Rü Amt Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamt, Stabsabteilung Wi Rü Amt Stab Wirtschaftsstab (in Heereswaffenamt, 1927-34); soi Wi Stab times also, Wa Wi Wirtschaftsstab Ost (during World War II) Wi Stab Ost Zentrale (T 2 III) Z, z Hitlers Zweites Buch, English and German as cited ZB E,ZB G Zentrale Planung ZP

T2III TWC

INDEX

"absolute war", 18, 23 Abteilung Landesverteidigung, see Wehrmachtamt, Department L Abwehr wirtschaftlicher Kampfmassnahmen, see Defense Against Economic Warfare Action Française, 21, 34 Adam, Wilhelm, 78 administration, 36, n. 111/35 (p. 68), 73, 85, 94, 108, 111, 161, 172-6, n. VII/34 (p. 139), 235, 237, 248, 250, Supplementary Notes (XI/ 39); of chemical industry, 243; confusion in, 73, 106, 107, 139, 140, 173-4, n. X/5 (p. 180), 211, 227, 244, 247, 248, 250; decision by negotiation, 79, n. IV/10, 80, 133, 153, 165, 173-4; duplication of labor, 73, 107, 152, 154, 211, n. XIII/21 (p. 248); of Four-YearPlan, 130, 133-5, n. VII/26, 147; by GBK, 116, 148, 156, 157; by GBW, 198, 211; inefficiency, n. IV/12 (p. 80), 85, 172-6; lack of centralization, 44, 183, 248; local, 67, 111-5, 116-9, 153-6, 162-4, 165, 205-7, 211, 224, 244; by Ministry of Economics, 83, 85-6, 116, 133-5, 147; role of ministries, 132, 134-5, 139, 150, 161, 162, 229, 232, 233; occupied territories, 49, 135, 165, 229-230, 244; proliferation of agencies, 11, 56, 84-6, 123-5, 130, 134-5, 173, 180, 205-7, 211, 232, 233, 244; "shapelessness", 180, 249; under Todt, 218, 219, 221-4, n. XII/22, 230-31, 237. See also bureaucracy; centralization; jurisdictional questions;

Albert Speer; total war agriculture, 96, 122, n. VII/2 (p. 123), 126, Table IV (p. 188) air armaments, 61, 237, 240-41, 244. See also aircraft Air Economic Officers (W. O. Luft), 67, 111, 112, 113, 114, 155 Air Force, 139, 150, 158, 160, 165, 168, 202, 210, 232, 234; and Aviation Ministry, 74, 75, 109, n. VI/7; as competitor for resources, 113, 176, 193, 217; early development, 61, 64, 67, 74, 75, 107, 109, 110, 111; expansion, 158, 164; independence, 76, 109, n, VI/7, 110, 111, 112, 113, 155, 215, 231; local armament affairs, 111-115, 155; and oil industry, 123; power of, 108-9, 115, 175, 236, 243; priority of programs, 195, 201, 209, 227, 228. See also aircraft production; Hermann Goring air raids, 247; protection against, 112, 193, 195, 227 aircraft industry, 64, 112-113, 227 aircraft production, 201, 220, 227228, n. XII/41 and 43, 244, 246 Akademie für Landesforschung und Reichsplanung, n. II/l (p. 39) aluminum, 176, 177, 193 Amt für deutsche Roh- und Werkstoffe, see Bureau for German Raw Materials and Synthetics anti-aircraft program, 195, 227 Anticipations, 28, n. 1/32 Arbeitsausschuß der Referenten für die Reichsverteidigung, see Committee of Consultants for the Defense of the Reich

INDEX

Arbeitsgemeinschaften, see Working Associations Arendt, Hannah, 106, 180, n. X/5 (p. 180-181) Armament Commands (Rüstungskommandos, under Rii In), 112, 232 Armament Committee (Rüstungsausschuss, in Reichswehr Ministry, 1930), 108 Armament Committees (Rüstungsausschüsse, under RMfBM), 224, 232 armament industry, 88, 120, 153, 218, 239; during the Weimar Republic, 59, 61-5, 66, 70; jurisdiction over, 91-2, 113, 117-120, n. VI/22, 153-7, 159, 162-4, 219, 222 ff„ 230-31, 236, 237, 238; mobilization preparations, 57, 615, 66 ff., 110, 111-114, 117-119, 163, 166, 192; position in allocations system, 175, 241; reorganization, 221-4 Armament Inspectorates (Rüstungsinspektionen, under Wi Rü Amt and RMfRüK; formerly W Inspectorates, q. v.), 67, n. XI/22 (p. 199), 207, 232, 234, 235, 237, 240 Armament Office, see Rüstungsamt armament policy, 10, 45, 51-2, 94, 98, 100-101, n. V/25, 208-9, 221, 223-4, 224-5 Armament Sub-contracts Office (Rüstungslieferungsamt, in RMfRüK), 236 armaments, n. 111/14 (p. 60), 62, 64, 69, 167, 179, 196, 233, 235, 239, 247-8, 249-50; allocations to, 126, 168, 235; bottlenecks, 193, 196203, 221, 246; capacity, 60, 61-5, n. 111/22, 66, 68, 87, 110, 164, 215; cutbacks, 126, 143, 226, 228, n. XII/45, 239; development, 56, 59, 61, 64, 110, 119, 195, 221, 230-31, 241; foreign trade in, 61, n. 111/18, 70, 110; illegal stocks, 64, 70; investment in, 63-5, Table IV (p. 188), Stat. App.; planning, 62, 79-80, 107-9, 110, 183, 235; procurement, 56, 60, 61, 64, 79-80, 107-8, 109, 110, 111, n. VI/11,

285 120, 152, 165, and see military contracts; production, 52, 59, 63, n. 111/22-24, 126, 158, 227, 228, 239, 245, 247-8, 249; programs and priority, 51-2, 57, 60, 68, 107, 110, 120, 130, 139, 150, 153, 159, 192-6, 201, 208, 209, 214, 225-8, n. XII/42, 231, 236, 245-6, 248; weight in economy, 183-9, n. X/ 13. See also components; military equipment; munitions; rearmament; weapons; and specific items Armaments Advisory Council (Rüstungsbeirat) 1. 1934, n. VI/34 (p. 139); 2. under RMfBM, 223-4 Armaments Minister, see Albert Speer; RMfRüK armed forces, 166, 180. See also Reichswehr; Wehrmacht; OKW; Army; Air Force; Navy Armed Forces' Economic and Armaments Office, see Wi Rü Amt armies, 22, 24, 27, 35-6, 55, Supplementary Notes (III/ll) armored vehicles, 32, 164 Army, 44, 64, 75, 76-80, 129, 139, 149, 158, 160, 209, 210, 232, 240, 241; local affairs, 111, 112, 113, 155; munitions, 216, 217, 220, 226, 227, 228, 231; programs and priorities, 195, 201, 226-8, 231, 236, 239; relations with other services, 110, 111, 139, 150, 159; size, 48, 59-61, 74, 87, 98, 101, 164, n. IX/13, 168, 170, 177, 226-7, 228, Supplementary Notes (IV/23). See also Reichswehr; rearmament Army Communications Office, 135 Army Ordnance Office (Heereswaffenamt), during the Weimar Republic, 38, 55-56, n. III/4 and 5, n. III/7 (p. 57), 59-60, 61, 63, n. 111/32 (p. 65), 70, 71; 19331939, n. 11/17 (p. 46), 80, n. IV/ 13, n. IV/23 (p. 87), 107-111, 111115, 155, 159-60, 165; during World War II, n. IV/12 (p. 80), 197, 201, 202, 210, 213-216, 217, 218, 223, 225, 230-31, 241. See also Economic Staff; ordnance offices

286

INDEX

Aron, Raymond, 17-18, n. 1/2, 19, n. 1/5, 1/10 (p. 21) artillery, 27, 62, 100, 158, 225, 226, 227 "artisan socialism", n. IV/17 (p. 82) asbestos, 85 assault guns, 254 Aufstellungs-Heer (A-Heer; mobilization army), 59, 61, 65 Aussenstellen, see Branch Offices Austria, 99, 100, 140, 141, 152, 164, Tables I and II (pp. 184, 186), 189, 192, 229, 245 Auswärtiges Amt, see Foreign Office autarky, 45, 47, 101, 103-4, 106, 1279, 138, 140, 233 Autobahnen, 171, n. IX/24, Table IV (p. 188), 193, 198, 200, 201, 245. See also roads automotive industry, n. 111/22 (p. 63), 102, Table IV (p. 188) Backe, Herbert, n. VII/21 (p. 130), 131, 171, n. IX/25 (p. 172) Balkans, 199, 230 Balogh, Thomas, Supplementary Notes (X/l) Baltics, 230 Barth, Reg. Rat Dr. (Eberhard?), n. IV/24 (p. 87), n. VI/26 (p. 120) Baruch, Bernard, 17, n. 1/1, 35-6, n. 1/55, 1/56 and 1/58, 41, 43, 57, n. I I I / 8 basic industry, n. 111/22 (p. 63), 118, 187, Table IV (p. 188), Statistical Appendix battleships, 164. See also ship-construction bauxite, 177 Baynes, Norman H., n. 11/19 (p. 46) Beauftragter für den Vierjahresplan, see Commissioner for the FourYear-Plan Beauftragter, Sonderbeauftragter, see Commissioners Beck, General Ludwig, 38, 48, 49, 77, 78, n. IV/11 (p. 79), 191 Becker, General (Chef HWaA), 159, 160 Becker, Wilhelm, 240 Behemoth, n. IV/72 (p. 82), IV/21 (p. 84-5), 179, 180

Belgium, 100, 220, 230 Benoist-Mechin, Jacques, n. III/28 (p. 64) Berlin, 154, 171 Berlin-Karlsruher Industrie AG, n. 111/23 (p. 63) Beutler, Otto, n. 11/32 (p. 50), IV/ 35 (p. 91), n. VIII/4 (p. 141) Bezirks-Belegungsausschiisse, see Regional Contract-Distribution Committees Bezirksgruppen, see District Groups Bezirksgruppe Northwest, see District Group Northwest Bezirkswirtschaftsämter, see District Economic Offices Bezirkswirtschaftsoffiziere, see District Economic Officers "big business", n. IV/16 (p. 82), 85, 180, 182, Supplementary Notes (X/10). See also businessmen Big Business in the Third Reich, n. IV/16 (p. 82), 182 Birkenfeld, Wolfgang, Supplementary Notes (II/2) Bismarck, Otto von, 25 black-outs, 198 Blanchon, Georges, 21, n. 1/10, 26, 34, n. 1/54, 41, n. I I / 3 Blitzkrieg, 8, 18, 47-8, n. 11/22, 52, 94, 105, 107, 110, 140, n. XI/13 (p. 196), 228, 229, 241, 247 Bliokh, I. S. (Jean de Bloch), 26-7, n. 1/29, 28, Supplementary Notes d/31) Blomberg, Field Marshal Werner von, 38, 44, 76, n. IV/7 (p. 77), 80, 86, 88, 109, 111, 115, 122, 124, 127, 128, n. VII/21 (p. 130), 141, 143, 146, 148-9, 151, 155, 161, 231; positions and powers, 73-4, n. IV/1, 75-8, 91, 116, 120, 127, 142, 149-50 bombers, 227, 228, 246. See also aircraft bombs, 111, 195, 215, 226. See also munitions Boothe, Claire, n. 1/34 (p. 28) Border Defense (Grenzschutz), 59, n. 111/14 (p. 60) Bormann, Martin, 232, 234, 241, n. XIII/12, 242

INDEX

Borsig AG, 62, 68 Borsig, Geheimrat von, 67 Bosch, Carl, 136 Brabag, see Braunkohlen-Benzin AG Bracher, Karl Dietrich, n. I I I / 2 (p. 55), I I I / 9 (p. 57), 182 Bramsted, Ernest K., n. XIII/13 (p. 242) Branch Offices (Aussensteilen, of RWiM and GBK), 116-19, n. V I / 25 and 26 (pp. 119-20), 153-6, 163, 205-6 Brauchitsch, Walter von, 38, 49, n. 111/36 (p. 68), 149-50, n. X I / 4 8 (p. 211), 217 Braunkohlen-Benzin AG (Brabag), 102, n. V/27, 123, n. V I I / 6 (p. 124), 131 Bücher, Hermann, 212 building, see construction Bullock, Alan, 93, n. V / 1 Bureau for German Raw Materials and Synthetics (Amt für deutsche Roh- und Werkstoffe, in VJP), n. VII/14 (p 127), 132, 133, 134, 136, 143 bureaucracy, 43, 117, 130, 132, 133, 138, 154, 166, 180, 182, 218, 221, 233. See also administration businessmen, 43, 51, 57, 66, 67-71, 81, n. I V / 1 6 (p. 82), 83, 85, 89, 96, n. V/10, 102, 136, 138, n. V I I / 34 (p. 139), 145-6, 166, 169, 174, 175-6, n. IX/35, 211-12, 221, 224, 234, Supplementary Notes (IV/19, X/10, X / l l ) ; businessmen's associations, 11, 68, 82-6, n. IV/17, IV/18, I V / 1 9 and IV/21 (pp. 824), n. V I / 2 2 (p. 117-18), 158, 1745, 206, 222-4, n. XII/24, 228, 230. See also industry; civilian economy; private industry, etc. Cabinet, see Reich Cabinet Cabinet decrees, see decrees and laws Cameron, Norman, n. V/17 (p. 98) canals, 158. See also transportation Canaris, Wilhelm, 48 capitalism, Supplementary Notes (IV/19, X / l , X/10). See also "big business"; businessmen; industry

287 Carnot, Lazare, 21 Carrias, Eugène, Supplementary Notes (1/10) Carroll, B. A., n. V I / 3 (p. 108), Supplementary Notes ( I I I / l l ) cartels, 83 Castellan, Georges, n. I I I / 9 (p. 58), n. I I I / 2 2 and 23 (p. 63) cement, 173 Central Commission (Hauptkommission, of Stega), 67, 68, n. 111/37 Central Planning Board, see Zentrale Planung centralization, 36, 51, 56-7, 66, 83-4, 107-10, 129, 136, 180, 208, 21112, 224-5, 233, 235-7, 238-41, 2435, 248-9; absence of, 44, 57, 71, 73, 9 3 , 1 1 0 - 1 1 , 1 2 3 - 4 , 1 2 5 , 1 3 9 , 1 6 8 , 173, 183, 196-7, 198, 205-12, n. X I I / 2 2 (p. 221), 225, 248-9; decentralization, 130, 134-5, 245, 246; "economic dictator" and GBK, 87-8, 89-92; in local affairs, 111-15, 155-6, 205-7 Chambers of Industry and Commerce (Industrie- und Handelskammern), 83, 205, 206, 232 Chef OKW, 149, 161, 162, 207, 221. See also Wilhelm Keitel chemical industry, n. I I I / 2 2 (p. 63), 86, 103, 136, n. VII/30, 137, 138, 159, 160, 176, Table IV (p. 188), 232, 243 Chief of Army Ordnance and Commander of the Reserve Army (Chef Heeresrüstung und Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres), 219 China, 28, 45 Churchill, Winston, 19 civilian economy, in competition for resources, 33, 118, 162, 164, 169, 170-72, 173, 175, 176, 196, 197, 198, 201, 226, 239, 242, 245-6; consumption, n. V / 2 5 (p. 101), 185-6, Table II, 199, 245; control over, 118-19, 151, 163, 168, 199, 231, 236, 236-9, 240-41, 243-4, and see administration; curtailments and resistance, 89, 101, n. V/25, 138, 145, 159, 174, 194, 199, 203-5, n. XI/36, 227, 239, 242-3, 245-6, Supplementary Notes

288

INDEX

(XIII/14); investments, 187, Table IV (p. 188). See also businessmen; consumers' goods; foreign trade; industry; private consumption, etc. civilian-military relations, 29, n. I l l / 14 (p. 60), 71-2, 73, 75, 79, n. IV/10, 80, 82, 141, 145, 146, 165, 180, 182, 216; re control of economy, 10, 34, 49-50, 78, 85, 86, 87-92, 108-9, 115-16, 117-21, 129, 138-9, 141-3, 147-9, 150-54, 1557, 159-64, 168, 201-2, 206-7, 21819, 220-25, 229-31, 233-4, 234-8, 239-40, 241, 243-4, 247, 248-9. See also businessmen; civilian economy; G. Thomas; Wehrmacht Clarkson, Grosvenor B., n. 1/56 (p. 35) Clausewitz, Karl von, 18, 20, n. 1/8 and 10, 22, 23-4, n. 1/19, 25, 26, Supplementary Notes (1/19) coal, 30, 102, 104, 197. See also Reich Coal Union Coit, Margaret L., n. 1/56 (p. 35) "comb-out commissions", see conscription Commander-in-Chief (Oberbefehls 1 haber) — of the Air Force (der Luftwaffe), 75. See also Hermann Goring — of the Armed Forces (der Wehrmacht), 75, 149, 150. See also Blomberg; Hitler — of the Army (des Heeres), 55, 75, 76, 114, 149, 150, 217. See also Fritsch; Brauchitsch — of the Navy (der Marine), 75, 76. See also Raeder; Doenitz Commanders-in-Chief, 150, 210, 217, 221 Commissioner for the Four-YearPlan (Beauftragter f ü r den Vierjahresplan), 121, 122, n. V I I / 1 6 (p. 128), 129, n. VII/20, 135, 139, 141, 142, 148, 151, 207, 211, 219. See also Four-Year-Plan; Hermann Goring Commissioners, Special Commissioners (Beauftragter, Sonderbeauftragter), 134-5, 218 Committee of Consultants for the Defense of the Reich (Referenten-

Ausschuss f ü r die Reichsverteidigung), 72, n. III/45, 77 Committee for Reich Defense (Reichsverteidigungsausschuss), n. I I I / 4 5 (p. 72), 78-80, n. IV/8-11 and 13, 86, n. I V / 2 4 and 34 (pp. 87 and 91), 142, 143, 148, 162, 207, 208, 238 Committees and Rings (Ausschüsse; Ringe), 86, 222, 230, n. XII/47, 238, n. XIII/8, 241, 244, 245-6 communications, 135, Table IV (p. 188) competition for resources, 57, 85, 87, 109, 112, 115, n. V I / 2 9 (p. 121), 135, 137, 143, 167-76, 180, 193ff., 196-203, 215, 216-17, 232, 233, 248-9, Supplementary Notes ( X / l l ) . See also jurisdictional questions; priority; private interests; military contracts; Wehrmacht components, 66, 113, 118, 119, 162, 221, 238, 244-5, 246 compulsory levy, 126 conscription, 21, 22, 29, 33, 74, 152, 206, 239 conspiracies against Hitler, 37-8, 48-9, 50. See also military leaders; G. Thomas construction, 33-4, 89, 138, 158, 170-72, n. IX/24, IX/27, Table IV (p. 188), 193, 194, 196, 198-9, 200-202, 214, 216, 232, 245 consumers' goods, 118, 119, 159, 162, 170, Table IV (p. 188), 193, 194, 226, 227, 229, 244, 245 copper, 88, 126, 173, 177, 199, 218, 254 corporate idea, 82, n. I V / 1 7 cosmetics, 205 cotton, 46, 104 councils of ministers, see Ministerial Council; Kleine Ministerrat Craig, Gordon, n. I I I / 5 (p. 56) Czechoslovakia, 48, 61, 140, 141, 158, 192, 229, Supplementary Notes (IV/23) Czimatis, Major, 134 Dallin, Alexander, n. V / 3 1 (p. 104) Darre, Waither, 88, 122, n. V I I / 2 (p. 123), 131

INDEX

Daudet, Léon, 21, n. 1/10, 41 The Day of the Saxon, 29 decrees and laws, 73, n. IV/1, 75, n. IV/4, 76, 77, 83, 90, 91-2, 117, n. VII/20 (p. 129), 130, 134, 14950, 151-2, 161-2, 167-8, 176, 1956, 197, 213, 214, n. XII/5, 218, 219, 220-21, 223, 225-7, n. XII/34 and 39, 228, n. XII/45, 231, 249, 250 Defense Against Economic Warfare (Abwehr wirtschaftlicher Kampfmassnahmen, in RWiM; later Wehrwirtschaftliche Abteilung), 81, n. VI/25 (p. 119) "defense economy", 41, 110, 150, 166. See also economic mobilization for war Defense Minister, see Reichswehr Minister; Reich War Minister demobilization plans, n. XII/36 (p. 226) Denkschrift zum Vierjahresplan, see Memorandum on the Four-YearPlan Denmark, 100, 220, 229 Department of Contract and Price Supervision (of the Reich War Ministry), 110, 165 depression, 87, 181, 185, 187, 203, 245 Deputy Plenipotentiary for the War Economy (Stellvertretender GBK), 149, 151. See also Hans Posse destroyers, 164. See also ship-construction Deutsche Arbeitsfront, see German Labor Front Dewar, G.A.B., n. 111/22 (p. 62) Die Deutsche Industrie im Kriege (DDIK), n. IX/19 (p. 168-9), 181 Dienstverpflichtung, see Emergency Service Law disarmament, 65-66, Supplementary Notes (III/ll). See also rearmament District Economic Officiers (BezirksWirtschaftsoffiziere; later Rüstungskommandos), 112 District Eoonomic Offices (Bezirkswirtschaftsämter, under RWiM;

289 later Landeswirtschaftsämter), 2056, 232, 244 District Group Northwest (Bezirksgruppe Nordwest), n. IV/16 (p. 81), 84 District Groups (Bezirksgruppen, under Reich Group Industry), 84, 206 District Labor Offices, 232 Dix, Arthur, n. 1/38 and 39 (p. 30) Doenitz, Karl, n. XI/9 (p. 194), 243 Domarus, Max, n. V/10 (p. 96) Donnevert, Richard, n. II/7 (p. 43) draft deferments, see conscription Drahtfabrik Salzwedel, 63 Drei-Männer-Ausschuss (Three-ManCommittee), 242-3, n. XIII/15 Drews, Colonel, n. VII/20 (p. 129), 147-8, 150, 152-3, 154, 165 Duisburg, Geheimrat, 69, The Dual State, 179, n. X/l. Düring, von, 68 Earle, Edward M., n. 1/9 (p. 20) "Economic Commissioner of the Führer", 89 "economic dictator", 87-91, 115, 120 "economic experiments", 82, n. IV/ 16 economic general staff, 30, 108 Economic Group (Wirtschaftsgruppe; under Reich Group Industry) — Chemical Industry (Chemische Industrie), n. VII/30 (p. 136), 243; — Fuel Industry (Treibstoffindustrie), 143; — Iron Industry (Eisen schaffende Industrie), n. IV/16 (p. 81), 84, 145; — Machine Construction (Maschinenbau), 197; — Textile Industry (Textilindustrie), 174 Economic Groups, 50, 83, 85-6, n. VI/22 (p. 117), 175, n. XII/24 (p. 222), 232, 243-4, Supplementary Notes (IV/19) economic mobilization for war, 7-11, 17, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 32-4, 248-50; in World War I, 29-30, n. 1/38 to 1/40, 35-6, Supplementary Notes (1/40); "Wehrwirtschaft",

290

INDEX

40-44; in the Weimar Republic, 54, 55-7, 59-66, 71-2, 107-8; in the Third Reich, see: administration; armaments; businessmen; centralization; civilian economy; civilian-military relations; Committee for Reich Defense; economic policy; firms; Four-YearPlan; GBK; GBW; Goring (Hermann); Hitler; industry; jurisdictional questions; labor; planning; priority; propaganda; raw materials; Reich Ministry of Economics; Reich War Ministry; Thomas (Georg); Todt; total war; totalitarian economy; Speer; war economy; Wehrmacht Economic Officers (Wirtschaftsoffiziere), 66-7, n. III/34, 110, 111115, n. VII/34 (p. 139), 155 economic policy, 10, 37, 43-5, 85, 88, 89, 93-7, 100-105, 106-7, 1259, 135, 141, 145-6, 147, 148, 182, 211, n. XI/48, 233, 249, Supplementary Notes (X/10) "Economic Research Association", see Wifo. economic self-sufficsiency, see autarky Economic Staff (Heereswaffenamt, Wirtschaftsstab; formerly Nachschubstab), 38, 39, 40-41, n. II/2, 55-7, n. III/4, I I I / 5 and III/7, 59-60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66-8, 69, 70-71, 81, 83-4, 107, 108, n. VII/ 34 (p. 139), 248. See also Wi Rü Amt economic war games, 166, n. IX/15 Educational Staff (Lehrstab, in W Staff), 165-6 electrical industry, 69, 118, 152, Table IV (p. 188), 242. See also power industry electrolytic-copper works, 88 Emergency Service Law (Notdienstgesetz), 75, n. IV/4, 204 Engels, Friedrich, n. 1/9 (p. 20) engineers, 51, 111, 221, 223, 224 England, 8, 10, 27, 29, 60-61, 62, n. 111/22, 98, 104, 105, 140, 141, Table I (p. 184), 185, 189, 191, 209, 212, 215, 216, Supplementary Notes ( I I I / l l )

entrenchments, 25, 27, 32, 100 Erbe, René, 182, n. X/9 Erfurth, Waldemar, n. IV/6 (p. 77) "estates", 82 exploitation of foreign territories, 47, 49, 131, 135, 165, n. X/5 (p. 181), 229-30, 244 explosives, 137, 138, 156, 158, 159160, 172, 176, 193, 195, 201, 202, 213, 214 exports, see foreign trade export industry, 119, 126, 138, 139, 140, 141, 143, 144, 158, 162, n. IX/19 (p. 168), 170, 173, 193 Eyck, Erich, n. 111/10 (p. 58) Facius, Friedrich, n. IV/18 (p. 83) Fachgemeinschaft der Eisen- und Metallindustrie, see Trade Association of the Iron and Metals Industry Fachgruppen, see Trade Groups "Fall Weiss", 166 Falls, Cyril, n. 1/6 (p. 20) Farago, Ladislas, n. 1/9 (p. 20), 1/ 39 (p. 30), I I / 3 (p. 41) fascism, Supplementary Notes (IV/ 17, IV/19) fats, 86, 128, 131, 176, 216 Feldman, Gerald D., Supplementary Notes (1/40) Feldwirtschaftsamt, see Field Economic Office Fellgiebel, Erich, 135 Fertigung GmbH, 61, n. 111/18 Field Economic Office (Feldwirtschaftsamt, in OKW, 1944-45), 240 "fighting associations" (Kampfbünde), 81 firms, and economic reorganizations, 84, 222, 230, 238; and foreign trade, 144; and priorities, 150, 197; and secret rearmament, 59, 61, n. HI/18, 63, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70; categories and jurisdiction over, 117-120, 153, 155, 156, 157, 159, 162-4, 244; conversion and mobilization, 57, 110, 111, 112, 113, 118, 119, 159, 163, 166, 204; difficulties of, 87, 144, 227-8; large, 88, n. VI/22 (p. 118); position in allocations system, 174-6,

INDEX

n. IX/35, 223; rationalization, 221, 238; shut-downs, 88, 204, 242; small and medium-sized, 87, 203, 204. See also businessmen; industry; military contracts; and particular firms by name Fischer, Wolfram, n. X / 5 (p. 181) Flick, Friedrich, n. VII/9 (p. 126) Foch, Ferdinand, 25-26, n. 1/25 food supply, 95, 96, 97, 100, 101, 103, 104, 126, 131, 153, 157, 199, 205. See also fats foreign credits and currency, see foreign trade foreign economic intelligence, 110, 165, 167, n. IX/17, 235, 240 foreign economic policy, 45, 96-7, 100-101, 102-4. See also foreign trade foreign exchange, see foreign trade Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt), 45, 71, n. IX/7 (p. 161), IX/13 foreign trade, 46, 47, 85, n. IV/22 (p. 86), 87-88, 90, 96, 102, 103, 104, 110, 122, 123, 125, 126-127, n. VII/10, 130, 132, 138, 139, 141, 144, 145, 158, 165, 171-2, n. IX/ 25, 198, n. XI/19, 199, n. XI/22, 208, 209, 244 Forestry and Lumber Offices, 205 fortifications, 167, 170, 171, 193-4, 195, 199, 200, 212 Four-Year-Plan, 11, 103, n. V/29, 121, n. VII/23 (p. 131); background, 122-7; Hitler's Memorandum on, 127-9; appointment of Goring, 129, n. VII/20; his ideas, 130; drafts of economic plans, n. VII/14 (p. 127), 136, n. VII/30, 137, 159-160; organization of, n. VII/13 (p. 127), 130-135, n. VII/23, VII/25, VII/26, VII/29; "first" and "second", n. VII/16 (p. 128); industrial expansion, 128, n. VII/17, 128, 136; relation to rearmament, 129-30, 138-9, 158; Schacht accepts, 129; policymaking bodies, 130, 132-3, n. VII/25, 135; reorganization, 131, 132, 133-4, n. VII/26, 135, 143, 156; Thomas' evaluation of, 138-9, 143f.; and jurisdictional questions,

291 139, 141-3, 146, 153, 156-7, 207, 211, 219, 220; Schacht criticizes, 143-4; domestic ores project, 1456; position in allocations, 135, 169, 173, 175; role of Krauch and chemical industry, 135-8, n. VII/29-32, 159-60, 176; investments under, 136, n. VII/30, 137, Table IV (p. 188); achievements and delays, 128, 171-172, 176; plenipotentiaries and special commissioners, 132, 134-5, 15960, 197, 206, 218, 231, 232, 234, 241; and priority questions, 196, 201; and central planning, 136, 208, 236; as competitor for power, 121, 232, 248; Göring's withdrawal, 135, 235; loss of power, 240, 249. See also Hermann Goring; jurisdictional questions Fox, Hugh Corby, n. IV/17 (p. 82) Fraenkel, Ernst, 179, n. X / l France, 21-2, n. 1/9, 25, 27, 30-35, n. I I I / 9 (p. 58), 60-61, 98, 99, 100, 140, 141, 191, 199, 209, 220, 226, 230 "free market economy", 233 Freikorps, 59, n. 111/13, Supplementary Notes (III/13) Frick, Wilhelm, 161, 162, 172, 207 Fritsch, Werner von, 4, 76, 77, 114, 149, 151 Fromm, Friedrich, 219, 224 Fuel Commissar (Treibstoffkommissar), 123-5 fuels, 88, 123-5, 128, n. VII/17, 142, 144, 156, 158, 165, Table IV (p. 188) Führer and Reich Chancellor, see Hitler Führer der Wirtschaft, 89, n. IV/29 Führungsstab (of GBK, later GBW), 116, 148-9, 151, 162 Führungsstäbe Wirtschaft (Regional Leadership Staffs for the Economy, under GBW), 205-6 Fuller, J. F. C., 20, n. 1/7, 25 Funk, Walther, n. VII/26 (p. 134), 147-9, n. VIII/17, 151-2, n. VIII/ 28, 155, 156, 162, 198, 204-5, 207, 209-10, 211, 216, 221, 229, 234, 238-9, 243

292

INDEX

The Future of War, 26-7, n. 1/29, 1/30 GB Chem (Plenipotentiary for Special Problems of Chemical Production), 137, n. VII/33, 159-60, 176, 213-14, 243, n. XIII/16. See also Carl Krauch. GBK (Plenipotentiary for the War Economy), background, 87-90; appointment of Schacht, 90-91; united with RWiM, 116, n. VI/ 20; jurisdictional conflicts under Schacht, 91-2, 115-120, 124-5, 139, 141-3, 146; Schacht and Hitler, 106, 120, 122; and oil industry, 124-5; resignation of Schacht, 141, 147; appointments of Funk and Posse, 147-9; subsequent relations with Wehrmacht and Four-Year-Plan, 147-9, 15057, 220; renamed GBW, 161 GBV, see Plenipotentiary for the Administration of the Reich GBW (Plenipotentiary for the Economy), authority and new name (for GBK) in 1938, 161; contestant for power, 248; jurisdictional conflicts, 162-3; agreements with Thomas and GBV, 163-4, 167; lack of achievement, 168, 198, 204; protector of civilian economy, 203-4, 224; new local agencies, 205-6; represented in Ministerrat, 207; abolition of, 204, 211, 229, 249 Galbraith, K„ n. IX/24 (p. 171) Gatzke, Hans W., n. 1II/9 (p. 57-8), 111/17 (p. 61) "garrison state", 28, 33, 43, 107 gas (power industry), 118 gas warfare, 32, 61 Gau Economic Chamber (Gauwirtschaftskammer), 83, n. IV/18, 244 Gauämter für Technik, 206 Gaue (Party Districts), 206 Gauleiter (NSDAP District Leaders), 203, 204, 206-7, 232, 249 Gedanken eines Soldaten, 54 Gefu (Gesellschaft zur Förderung gewerblicher Unternehmungen mbH), 61

Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks AG, 62 General Advisor for German Raw Materials and Synthetics (Generalsachverständiger für deutsche Roh- und Werkstoffe), 131 Generalbevollmächtigter für . .., see Plenipotentiary for . . . General Council for the Economy (Generalrat der Wirtschaft), 130, n. VII/22, VII/23 (p. 131), 132-3, n. VII/25, 135, 152, 158, n. XI/23 (p. 199), 236 General Staff of the Army (Generalstab des Heeres), 77. See also Truppenamt Generalinspekteur für . . . , see Inspector-General for . . . Generalluftzeugmeister, see Quartermaster General of the Air Force Generalrat der Wirtschaft, see General Council for the Economy "the generals", n. IV/16 (p. 82), 182. See also military leaders geopolitics, 29, 103 German Labor Front (Deutsche Arbeitsfront), 82, 89, 205, 206, 232, Supplementary Notes (IV/17) Germany, 8, n. 1/9 (p. 20), 27, 2930, n. 1/38, 34; war potential and preparedness, 46, 49, 52, 54, 63, 66, 68, 138, 164, n. IX/13, 176-7, 179, 191-2, 209-210, 212, 215, 248, 249; war fortunes in World War II, 199, 219-220, 228-9, 230, 239, 241-2, 247; character of economy, 8-10, 94, n. V/4, 179190, 233, 248-50, Supplementary Notes (X/10, X/ll, XIII/8). See also Third Reich, and particular subject headings Gershoy, Leo, n. 1/12 (p. 22) Geschäftsgruppe . . . (in VJP), see Working Committee for . . . Gesetz über den deutschen Volksdienst (Notdienstgesetz), see Emergency Service Law Gilbert, Felix, Supplementary Notes (V/33) Gisevius, Hans Bemd, n. 11/13 (p. 45), n. 11/29 (p. 49) "Gleichschaltung", 81, n. IV/16 (p. 82)

INDEX

Goebbels, Josef, 161, 242-3 Goebel, Otto, Supplementary Notes (1/40) Goehle, Kapitän zur See, 113 gold, 144 Goltz, Baron Colmar von der, 20, n. 1/7, 25, n. 1/23, 26, 40, 99 Gördeler, Carl, 48, n. 11/27, 49, 191 Gordon, George A., n. IV/16 (p. 81-2) Goring, Herbert, n. 11/21 (p. 47) Goring, Hermann, positions and power, 74, 75-6, 77, n. IV/7, 109, 121, 122, 125, 126, n. VII/16 (p. 128), 129, 132, 135, n. VII/27, 138, 139, 147, 151, 161-2, 175, 194, 207, n. XI/40, 211; withdrawal, 135, n. VII/28, 229, 235; policies of, 81, 130, 133, 135, 141, 145-6, 158-9, 160, 167, 168-172, 177, 178, 193 201-4, 208; and independence of Air Force, 76, 109, n. VI/7, 110-11, 112, 139; background for appointment to Four-Year-Plan, 122-7; personal qualities, 122, 126, 132, 135, n. VII/24, 151, 159, 234; declined administrative responsibilities, 130, 133, n. VII/26 (p. 134), 139; independence of his nominal subordinates, 131-2, n. VII/23, 1345; reorganized Four-Year-Plan and RWiM, 133-4, n. VII/26; enlarged Generalrat, n. VII/25 (p. 133); and Krauch vs. Löb, 135-7; vs. "Wehrmacht" interests, 139; disputes with Schacht and Thomas, 141-9; and industrialists, 145-6; and jurisdictional conflicts, 139, 141-3, 146, 147-9, 151-2, 156-7, 159-60, 162-3; and Funk, 147, 151-2, 155-6, 210, 211, 229, 243; and Todt, 217-18, 219, 225, 229; rapprochement with Thomas, 229; and Speer, 234-5, n. XIII/3, 2367; growing weakness, 240-41. See also Air Force; Wehrmacht; FourYear-Plart; Reich Minister of Aviation Görlitz, Walter, n. 11/13 (p. 45), Supplementary Notes (II/4) Gramsch, Friedrich, n. VII/2 (p.

293 122), VII/23 (p. 131), 132, n. VII/25 (p. 133) Grasset, A., n. 1/25 (p. 26) grenades, 69 Grenzschutz, see Border Defense Groener, Wilhelm, 30, n. 1/40, 54, n. IV/16 (p. 81) Groener-Geyer, Dorothea, n. 1/40 (p. 30) gross national product (G.N.P.), 9-10, 183, 184, 185, 186, 188, 189, 229, 245, Statistical Appendix Grundlagen für eine Geschichte der deutschen Wehr- und Rüstungswirtschaft, 50, n. II/31, 257, Supplementary Notes (H/2) Guerin, Daniel, Supplementary Notes (IV/19, X/10). La Guerre Nouvelle, 21, n. 1/10, 34, 1/54 La Guerre Totale, 21, n. 1/10, 41 Les Guerres d'Enfer, 7, 17, 21, 1/ 10, n. 1/28 (p. 26), 30-34 "guided economy", 43 gunpowder, 138, 158, 176, 214. See also explosives Haber, Samuel, n. 1/55 (p. 35) Haeussler, Helmut, n. 1/40 (p. 30) Hagert, Werner, n. VII/30 (p. 136) Hague Peace Conference, First, 27 Halder, Franz, 48-49, n. XI/48 (p. 211), Supplementary Notes (XI/48) Hale, Oron J., Supplementary Notes (XIII/14) Hamburg, 171 Hamburger, L., 179, n. X / l handicrafts, n. XI/36 (p. 204) Hanke, Gauleiter, 241 Hanneken, Hermann von, n. III/4 (p. 55), 69-70, 113, n. VI/13, 132, 134, 135, 172, 173, 174, 175, 197, 198, 200, 208, 241 "Harz", n. 111/42 (p. 70) Hassell, Ulrich von, 49, n. II/29, 191 Hauptausschuss . . . , see Main Committee Hauptkommisison (of Stega), see Central Commission Hedler, Colonel, n. VII/3 (p. 123) Heeresleitung, see High Command of the Army

294 Heereswaffenamt, see Army Ordnance Office Heereswaffenamt, Wirtschaftsabteilung, see Economic Staff Henschel, 227-8 Hermann Goring Works, 131, 145-6, 170, 238 High Command of the Air Force (Oberkommando der Luftwaffe), 75 High Command of the Armed Forces (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht), 50, 80. See also OKW High Command of the Army, 1. Heeresleitung, 56, 75; 2. Oberkommando des Heeres, 75, 80 High Command of the Navy (Oberkommando der Marine, formerly Marineleitung), 75 highways, see Autobahnen; roads Hilferding, Rudolf, 182 Hillgruber, Andreas, Supplementary Notes (V/33, X I I / 1 ) Himmler, Heinrich, 161, 180, 233, n. X I I I / 1 Hindenburg, Paul von, 30, 75, 76 Hindenburg-Programm, 30, n. 1/40, Supplementary Notes (1/40) Hitler, Adolf, on "total war", 7-8, 18, 93, 99, 105, 192, 243; on economic mobilization, 8, 37, 40, 44, 51-2, 73 (quote), 86, 98, 101, n. V/25, 105, 167, 169 and 170 (quotes), 192, 194, 204-5, 230, 231, 235, 236, 238, 239, 246; on "Blitzkrieg", 8, 18, 47-8, n. 11/22, 99-100, 228, 229; on war and economic policy, 93-105, 106, 138; on economic affairs, 43, 81, 88 (quote), 93-7, 100-104, 122, 128-9, 145, n. I X / 2 (p. 159), 201, 204-5; on foreign economic policy, 45-6, 96, 102-3, 140; geopolitics, 29, 103; rearmament policies, 45, 46-8, 74, 78, 87, 100-101, 129, 138, 158, 170; war plans, 40, 48-9, 93-4, n. V/4, 97-101, 104-5, 122 (quote), 140-41, 158, 166-7, 191-2, n. X I / 3 , 195, 205 (quote), 209, 215, 216, 219-20, 226, 227, 228, 229; autarky, 102-4, 106, 128-9, 138, 140; ideas misconstrued, 106-

INDEX

7, 138; as author, 94-5, n. V/4, V/5, and V / 8 ; speeches, n. V / 6 (p. 95), V / 1 0 (p. 96); table talk, n. V/17 and 18 (pp. 98, 99); war directives, Supplementary Notes (V/33); army strength goals, 60, 66, 74, 87, 98, 164; and Treaty of Versailles, 66, 74; and Reich Defense, decrees and laws, 73, 76, 91, 92, 102, 120, 142, 149-50, 151-2, 161-2, 167, 207; Supreme Commander, 75, 149, 210; and military leaders, 76-7, 78, 109, 120, 122, 128, 129, 140, 142, 146, 149-51, 161-2, 164, 176, 191-2, 209, 215-16, 217, 219, 221, 232 (quote), 242, Supplementary Notes (111/10); declined economic responsibilities, 86, 94, 122; appointment of GBK and background, 88-91; Memorandum on the FourYear-Plan, 95, n. V/8, 103, 106, 122, 127-9, n. VII/15, VII/17, 140; refused to grant sweeping economic power, 120-21, n. VI/29, 248-9; commissions to Goring, 122, 125, 141; appoints Goring to Four-Year-Plan, 120-21, 122, 12930, n. VII/20, n. V I I / 1 6 (p. 128); and Schacht vs. Goring, 122, n. VII/1, 141-2, 146-7; and Funk, n. VII/17 (p. 147), 151, 198, 210; bypassed Goring, 151; construction projects, 170-71, n. IX/24, 172, n. IX/27, 194, 200; priority questions, 176, 193-6, 197, 198, 200, 209, 213, 214, 215-16, 217, 226-7, 228, n. XII/45, 231; munitions questions, n. IV/12 (p. 80), 178, 210, 211, 213-16, n. X I I / 5 , 217-20, 225-7; and Todt, 194, 198, 208, 217-19, 220-21, 223, 225, 230, 231, 234; and Speer, 49, 52, n. I X / 2 4 (p. 171), n. X I I I / 1 (p. 233), 234-5, 244; and dissolution of Wi Rü Amt, 232 (quote), 237, 240, and see G. Thomas; preferred Röchling to Vogler, 238; appointment of Sauckel, 241; Drei-Männer-Ausschuss, 242-3, n. XIII/15; opposition and conspiracies against, 37,

INDEX

38, 44, 48-9, 50, 52, 76-7, 87, n. VII/34 (p. 139), 191-2, 195, 211-12, n. XI/48, Supplementary Notes (11/29) Hitlers Zweites Buch, 95, n. V/5, 96-7, 98, 99, 101, 106 Holland, 59, 100, 220, 230 Hossbach, Friedrich, n. VIII/4 (p. 141) Hubatsch, Walther, Supplementary Notes (V/33, XII/1) Hünermann, Rudolf, n. VII/32 (p. 137), n. VII/34 (p. 139), 165, n. XI/34 (p. 204), 236, 237, 240 I. G. Farbenindustrie, 68, 135, 136, n. VII/30, 138, 243, n. XIII/16 "Ideal-Heer", 60 imports, see foreign trade industrialists, see businessmen; industry Industrie- und Handelskammern, see Chambers of Industry and Commerce industry, 43, 56, 57, 66, 81-3, n. IV/16, 86, 88-9, 96, 102, 123, 128, 129, 130, 133, 136, 146, 170, n. X/13 (p. 183-4), Table IV (p. 188), 230-31, 233, 238, 249, Statistical Appendix; capacity, 47, 64, 110, 111, 130, 145, 158-9, 164, 170, 176. See also armaments; businessmen; civilian economy; consumers' industry; chemical industry; firms; iron and steel; military contracts inflation, n. 1/14 (p. 22), 159, n. IX/2 "Innerdeutschland", 65, n. 111/32 Inspector of Fortifications (Inspekteur der Festungen), 200 Inspector-General for German Roads (Generalinspekteur für das deutsche Strassenwesen), 135, 161, 201 Inspector-General for Special Tasks in the Four-Year-Plan (Generalinspekteur für Sonderaufgaben im Vierjahresplan), 218 Inspector-General for Water and Power (Generalinspekteur für Wasser und Energie), 201 Interallied Military Control Com-

295 mission, n. 111/10 (p. 58), 62, 64 internationalism, 27, 31, 32 "intransigent" Nazis, 81, n. IV/16 (p. 82) investments, 136, n. VII/30, 137, 145, 146, n. IX/27 (p. 172), 181, 183, 187, n. X/14, 188, Table IV, Statistical Appendix iron and steel, 30, 85, 86, 104, 128, 132, 134, 145-6, 168-9, n. IX/19, 170, 171, 172-6, n. IX/34-35, 177, Table IV (p. 188), 197, 198, 199200, n. XI/24, 202, 213, 214, 215, 216, 222, n. XII/24, 223, 232, 241, 245 Jacobsen, H. A., Supplementary Notes (XI/48, XIII/1) Jakob, General, 200 Jansen, Rudolf, n. III/4 (p. 55), I I I / 34 and 35 (p. 67) Japan, 19-20, 29, 45 Jodl, Alfred, 78, 142 Ju 88 airplanes, 193, 195, 197, 201, 202, 209, 213, 226, 227, 228 Jünger, Ernst, Supplementary Notes (H/3) jurisdictional questions, 79-80, 84, 106, 107, 108-121, n. VI/7, VI/11, VI/20 and 22, 125, 130, 131, 139, 141-3, 146, 147-9, 151-7, 159-60, 161-4, 167, 219, 220-22, 224-5, 231, 232, 233, 236-7, 238-9, 23940, 243-4 "k and 1" enterprises (kriegs- und lebenswichtige Betriebe), 117-19, 153, 162, 204 "Kampfbünde", 81 Karinhall, Karinhall-Plan, 135, 137, 176 Karmann, Friedrich, n. VII/2 (p. 123) Kehrl, Hans, n. IX/19 (p. 169), 228, 236, 238, n. XIII/9 (p. 239), 243 Keitel, Wilhelm, 38, 50-51, 72, n. HI/45, 76, 77, n. IV/6, 78, 143, 148, 149, 150, 151, 155, 159, 160, 161, 162, 191-2, 193-4, 195, 196, 207, 215-17, 218-19, 221, 222, 232, 240, 242, Supplementary Notes (II/4, XI/2), XIII/10)

296

INDEX

Kennan, George F., n. 1/4 (p. 19) Keppler, Wilhelm, 124, 125, 127, n. VII/21 (p. 130), 131, n. VIII/23 Kesselring, Albert, 107 Klein, Buxton H., n. 11/22 (p. 47), 11/28 (p. 48), V/4 (p. 94), V/8 (p. 95), VII/17 (p. 128), VII/25 (p. 133), IX/27 (p. 172), 181, 182, n. X/9, X/12 (p. 183), 187, n. X/ 14, 247, Stat. App., Supplementary Notes (X/ll) Kleine Ministerrat, 127, n. VII/13, 130, VII/21, 132 Köhler, Walter, 132, 134 Kolko, Gabriel, Supplementary Notes Körner, Paul, n. VII/21 (p. 130), VII/23 (p. 131), 132-3, n. VII/ 25, 135, n. VII/29, 136, 137, n. VII/33, 160, 236, 237, 241, 249 Krauch, Carl, n. VII/2 (p. 122), 134, 135-8, n. VII/29, VII/31 and 32, 159-60, n. IX/5, 172, 176, 21314, 220, 225, 243, n. XIII/16, 244 Krauch-Plan, see Karinhall-Plan Kriegsamt (War Office), 1. in World War I, 30, 108; 2. planned by Reichswehr, n. III/5 (p. 56), 108 "Kriegspitzengliederung", 108 Kriegstagebücher (war diaries), n. XIII/10 (p. 240), Supplementary Notes (XI/48, XII/1) "Kriegswirtschaft", 41 Krupp (firm), 68 Kuczynski, Jürgen, Statistical Appendix; Supplementary Notes (IV/17, X/10) labor, 30, 35, 42, 64, 69, 74, n. IV/4, 87, 89, 111, 131, 132, 137, 152, 153, 159, 167-8, 194, 196, 201, 202-3, 204, 205, 214, 215, 226, 231, 235, 239, 241, n. XIII/15 (p. 243), 244, Supplementary Notes (IV/17, X/10) Labor Front, see German Labor Front Lammers, Hans Heinrich, n. VII/21 (p. 130), 152, 207, 219, 242 Landesernährungsämter, see Provincial Food Offices Landesverteidigungsabteilung, see

Wehrmachtamt, Dept. L; see also under Wehrmacht Operations Staff Landeswirtschaftsamter, see District Economic Offices Lange, Carl, 197, 231, 241 "Langnam Verein", 84 The Last Days of Hitler, 140 Lauterbach, Albert T., Supplementary Notes (II/4) Law to Secure the Defense of People and State, 75 laws, see decrees and laws Layton, Walter, 36 Lea, Homer, 28-29, n. 1/34, 1/35, 32 lead, 126, 173, 177 Leaders of the Economy, n. IV/29 (p. 89) leadership principle, 83 "Leadership State", 73, 107 Leeb, Emil, 225, 227 League of Nations, Supplementary Notes (111/32) Lehrstab, see Educational Staff Ley, Robert, 241 Liddell Hart, B. H., n. 1/13 (p. 22) Liese, Kurt, n. 11/17 (p. 46), 108, 109, 110, 114-115, 127 Lipski, Ambassador, 46 Lob, Wilhelm, 113, 114, 125, 126, 127, n. VII/14, 132, 134, 136-7, 143, 145, 159, 160, 171, n. IX/25 (P. 172) "Lobs Bibel", 136-7, n. VII/30, 160 local economic and armament affairs, 67, 111-115, 116-119, 153-6, 1624, 205-7, Statistical Appendix Lochner, Louis P., n. 111/39 (p. 69) locomotives and cars, 176, Table IV (p. 188), 197, 198 Ludendorff, Erich, n. 1/9 (p. 20), 1/24 (p. 25), 41, n. II/3, Supplementary Notes (II/3, II/4) Ludwig, Max, 38, n. II/2 (p. 40) machine industry, machinery, 46, 66, 103, n. VI/11 (p. I l l ) , 118, 137, 162, Table IV (p. 188), 195-6, 197, 215, 217, 232 magnesium, 193 Main Committee (Hauptausschuss, under RMfBM, RMfRuK): — Armored Cars and Tractors (Ge-

INDEX

panzerte Wagen und Zugmaschinen), 230; — Machine-Construction (Maschinenbau), 230, 231, 241; - M u n i t i o n s (Munition), 222, 230; — Ship-building (Schiffsbau), 238; - W e a p o n s (Waffen), 230; — Wehrmacht Equipment (Wehrmachtsgerät), 230, 231 Main Committees and Rings (Hauptausschüsse, Hauptringe), see Committees and Rings manganese, 104 manpower, 33, 217, 223, 224, Supplementary Notes (XIII/10). See also labor; conscription Mansfeld, Werner, 132 Marcu, Valeriu, n. 1 / 3 4 (p. 28) Marineleitung, see High Command of the Navy Marx, Karl, n. 1 / 9 (p. 20) Mason, T. W., Supplementary Notes (IV/17) mass armies, 54, 55, 99-100 "mass war", 18, 40 Mead, Edwin D., n. 1 / 2 9 (p. 27) Meendsen-Bohlken, n. X I I / 1 5 (p. 218) Mein Kampf, 94, 95, n. V/5, 96, 97, 98, 101, 106 Meinck, Gerhard, n. I I I / l l (p. 58), I I I / 4 5 (p. 72), I V / 7 (p. 77), I V / 1 0 and 11 (p. 79), V / 2 (p. 94), V I I I / 28 (p. 151) Memorandum on the Four-Year-Plan, 95, n. V / 8 , 103, 106, 127-9, n. VII/17, 140. Mendelssohn Bartholdy, Albrecht, n.

I/S8 (p. 30) Merton, Robert K., n. 1/16 (p. 23) Messersmith, George S., n. I V / 1 6 (p. 82 Metallwarenfabrik Treuenbrietzen, 63 m e t ü s (non-ferrous and other), 86, 87, 88, 128, 137, 138, 173, 177, - 39, 218. See also copper, iron ?nd steel, etc. me -al-working industries, Table IV p. 188) 222, n. X I I / 2 4 middle class, 81, 243 \ ksche, F . O., n. 1 / 9 (p. 20)

297 Milch, Erhard, 217, 219, 234, 236-7, 241 military contracts, 47, 56, 57, 63, n. I I I / 2 3 , 67, 70, 87, 110, 111, 118, n. VI/22, 126, 153, 154, n. V I I I / 35, 156, 160, 162-3, 163-4, 166, 175, 197, 203, 204, 223, 224, 230, 238, 241, 246 Military District Commissioners (Wehrkreisbeauftragter, of RMfBM), 222, 232, 237 Military District Headquarters, or Commands (Wehrkreiskommandos), 67, 110, 111, 116, 165, 206 Military Districts (Wehrkreise), 70, n. 111/42 military equipment, 60, 64, n. V I / 1 1 (p. I l l ) , 118, 164, 198, 230-31, 238, 242. See also armaments; military contracts military expenditures, 9, 10, 64-5, 70, 74, n. I V / 3 (p. 74-5), 87, 116, 159, n. I X / 1 9 (p. 169), I X / 2 4 (p. 171), 172, 183, Table I (p. 184), 185, 186, 187-9, Table III, Table IV, Statistical Appendix military investment, 187, 188, Table IV, Statistical Appendix military leaders, 37, 38, 40, 44, 46, 47, 48, 54-5, 75, 76, 77, n. I V / 1 6 (p. 82), 87-8, n. I V / 2 3 , 90, 106, 109, 115-16, 140, 141, 147-8, 14950, 151, 160-61, 164, 165, 166, 182, 219-220, Supplementary Notes (11/29, X I / 2 , X I / 4 8 ) . See also Blomberg; Goring; Hitler; Keitel; Thomas; Wehrmacht military strategy, 17, 18, 23, 26, 40, 54-5, 78, 94, 98-100, 101, 104-5, 106-7, 208-9, 246 military training, illegal, 59-61, 69, 70; universal, 29, 33 military-civilian relations, see civilian-military relations military-economic effort and potential, 9-10, 185-9, Tables I-IV, 191. See also under Germany Milward, Alan S „ n. I V / 1 2 (p. 80), V / 4 (p. 94), V I / 1 1 (p. I l l ) , n, 11/22 (p. 47), 11/30 (p. 49), 11/33 and 35 (p. 51), 181, n. X I / 1 3 (p. 196), X I / 1 9 (p. 198), X I / 4 8 (p.

298

INDEX

211), XII/5 (p. 214), XII/22 (p. 221), 247 mines, 111, 215, 226. See also munitions mining and metallurgy, 46, 88, 103, 131, 142, 156, 177, Table IV (p. 188), 197, 199, 200 Minister (or Ministry) of —, see Reich Minister (or Ministry) of — Ministerial Council (Ministerrat, 1936 -39), 127, n. VII/12, n. VII/23 (p. 131). See also Kleine Ministerrat Ministerial Council for Reich Defense (Ministerrat für die Reichsverteidigung, 1939-42), n. XI/32 (p. 203), XI/36 (p. 204), 207, XI/40 ministerial councils, 162, 207 Ministerrat, see Ministerial Council Mitteldeutsches Braunkohlensyndikat, 68 "Mischbetriebe", 119 "Mob-Bücher", n. IV/10 (p. 79) "Mob-Kalender", n. IV/10 (p. 79), 166, n. IX/15 Mob-Plan Rüstung, 163, 166, n. IX/ 15, 192 "Mob-Plan Wirtschaft", 163, 168 mobilization, 52, 229; illegal, 54, 59-61, n. 111/14, 71-2, 107. See also economic mobilization for war, total war "mobilisation absolue", n. 1/9 (p. 20) Moltke, Graf von, the elder, n. 1/24 (p. 25) Moltke, Grof von, the younger, n. 1/ 24 (p. 25), 30, 40 molybdenum, 104 "moral preparation" for war, 33, 42 Morgan, Brig. Gen. J. H., n. 111/10 (p. 58) motorization, motorized troops, 48, 88, 123, 170, 195, 196, 198, 226, 227, 230 Mueller-Hillebrand, Burkhart, n. I I / 20 (p. 47), I I I / l l (p. 58) Munich, 141, 158, 171 munitions, 158, 168-9, 177, 200, 210, 211, 238, Supplementary Notes (XII/1); administration, 66, n. IV/

12 (p. 80), 111, n. VI/22 (p. 117), 118, 195, 196, 197, 217-219, 221, 222-4, 230-31, 241, 249; production, 62, 63, 215, n. XII/7, 220; programs and priority, 178, 193, 194, 204, 213-16, n. XII/5, 217, 220, 225-6; shortages and supplies, 126, 168-9, 177-8, 195-7, 202, 203, 211, 213-16, 219, 231. See also armaments; explosives Munitions Advisory Council (Munitionsbeirat), 222, 223 Munitions Committees, 222. See also Committees and Rings Munitions Minister (Ministry), see Reich Minister (Ministry) for Weapons and Munitions (RMfBM) NSDAP, 44, 59, 82, 83, n. IV/18, 103, n. V/28 and 29, 127, 135, 218, 232, 234; as competitor for power and resources, n. IV/16 (p. 82), IV/21 (p. 84-5), 85, 89, 90, 125, 126, 130, 167, 169, 170, 198, 203, 205, 206-7, 232, 244, 249; not identical with state, 85, n. IV/21 (p. 84-5), Supplementary Notes (IV/21). See also National Socialism; -ist . . .; -ists Nachschubstab (Reserves and Replacements Staff; in HWaA; later Wirtschaftsstab), 55, n. III/4, n. I I I / 5 (p. 56). See also Economic Staff Nagel, Hans, 165 Nathan, Otto, n. IV/19 (p. 83), 107, n. IX/29 (p. 173), 179 "the nation at war", 22-3, 32 "the nation in arms", 26, 98-9 The Nation In Arms, n. 1/7 (p. 20), 25, n. 1/23 national income, Table I (p. 184), 185, Statistical Appendix National Socialism, 38, 149, 243. See also Hitler; NSDAP; Third Reich; and following entries National Socialist economic policies, 81, n. VII/2 (p. 122-3), 182, 233; economic system, 8-9, 43, 83-4, 106 (quote), 107, 179-90, 247-50, Supplementary Notes (IV/17, X / l , X/10, X / l l ) , and see references

INDEX

under economic mobilization; elite, 75, 81, n. IV/16 (p. 82), 88, 180, 182; propaganda, 8, 41; regime, 87, 109, 115, 116, 179, 233 National Socialists, 41, 44, 81, 82, n. IV/16, 85, 88, 129, 149, 179, 182, 250. See also preceding entries Nationalsozialistische deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National Socialist German Workers Party), see NSDAP Die Nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung, 182 "national war", 22-3, 25-6, 29, 32, n. II/3 (p. 41), 98-99 nationalization, 43, 23S Naval Ordnance Office (Marinewaffenamt), 243. See also ordnance offices Navy, 67, 74, 75, 76, 77, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 139, 150, 155, 158, 164, 169, 176, 193, 194, n. XI/9, 195, 197, 201, 209, 212, 215, 217, 224, 231, 232, 238, 243. See also ship-construction program; submarines Nazi-Soviet Pact, 46, 192 Neumann, Erich, n. VII/23 (p. 131), 132, 171, 208 Neumann, Franz L., n. IV/17 (p. 82), IV/21 (p. 85), 179, 180, n. X/5 neutrality, 29, 32 New Plan, 85, n. IV/22, 126, 141, 144 nickel, 88, 104, 107 non-ferrous metals, see metals Norway, 100, 220, 230 Notdienstgesetz (Gesetz über den deutschen Volksdienst), see Emergency Service Law "Notstands-Heer", 60 Nürnberg, construction, 171 OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht), 37, 149, 150, 151, 152-7, 159, 160, 161-2, 167, 208, 215, n. XII/5, 220-21, 223, 224, 231, 232, 234, 235, 236, 239-40, 248, Supplementary Notes (XII/l). See also Keitel; Thomas; Wehrmacht

299 Oberbefehlshaber . . . , see Commander-in-Chief . . . Oberkommando des Heeres, see High Command of the Army Oberkommando der Marine, see High Command of the Navy Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, see OKW oil, oil industry, 46, 85, V/24 (p. 101), 104, 123-5, n. VII/17 (p. 128), 131, 143, 144, 165, 176, 177, 199, 239. See also fuels; synthetic oil On War, 1. Raymond Aron, 18; 2. Karl von Clausewitz, 20, n. 1/8, 1/10 (p. 21) Opel-Werke, 88 optical equipment, 118, Table IV (p. 188) ordnance offices, 50, 87, 112, 113, 114, n. VI/22 (p. 117), 143, 166, 175, 208, 210, 232. See also Army Ordnance Office; Naval Ordnance Office; Quartermaster-General of the Air Force ores, see mining and metallurgy Organisationsabteilung (T 2), see Truppenamt; Zentrale Organisation Todt, 201 organization (civilian, economic, and military), see administration "organization of enthusiasm", 7 The Origins of Totalitarianism, 106, n. X/5 (p. 180) Oster, Hans, 48, 191 Paechter, Heinz, Supplementary Notes (XIII/8) Pareto, 19 Partei-Kanzlei, see NSDAP Party, see NSDAP "peace economy", 9, 189 "peacelike war economy", 181, 249 peacetime "preparedness", 25, 28, 29, 33, 35, 40, 41, 71-2, 91, 108-9, 142, 146, 153, 156-7, 162, 163, 166-7, 193, 204 Peenemünde, 201 "permanent war", 99 Pétain, Marshal, 34 Peterson, Edward N., n. VII/1 (p. 122)

300

INDEX

"Pfennig" (Heereswaffenamt), n. III/ -

7

(P" 5 7 )

„

"phony war", 199 planning, 22, 30, 43, 51-2, 57, 66, 73, 86, 89, 110, 115, 131, 133, 136, 137-8, 153, 159, 163, 168, 173, 183, 208-12, 227, 229, 23031, 233, 235, 236, 237, 238, 241, 245, 246 "Planning Committee for Reich Defense", 208 Planspiele, n. IX/15 (p. 166) plant capacity, plants, see armaments; firms; industry Planungsamt (in RMfRüK), 51, n. IX/19 (p. 169), 228, 236, 243, 244, 246 "Planungsstelle" (in Wi Rü Amt, Rohstoffabteilung), n. XI/41 (p. 208) Pleiger, Paul, 238 Plenipotentiary for (Generalbevollmächtigter für) — the Administration of the Reich (die Reichsverwaltung), 161, 162, 167, 207 — Armament Tasks (Rüstungsaufgaben), 234 — Automotive Affairs (das Kraftfahrwesen), 135 — Control of Construction (die Regelung der Bauwirtschaft), 135, 201, 206, 234, 241 — the Economy (die Wirtschaft), see GBW, also GBK — Control of Iron and Steel (die Eisen- und Stahlbewirtschaftung), n. III/4 (p. 56), 69, 132, 134, 135, 172 — Labor Supply (den Arbeitseinsatz), 132, 241 — Machine Construction (den Maschinenbau), 197 — Special Problems of Chemical Production (Sonderfragen der chemischen Erzeugung), see GB Chem. — Technical Communications Media (technische Nachrichtenmittel), 135 — Total War (den Totalen Kriege), 242 — War Economy (die Kriegswirt-

schaft), see GBK; also GBW — Water and Power (Wasser und Energie), 241 plenipotentiaries (Generalbevollmáchtigter), 134, 135, 159, 232. See also "supreme Reich authorities" Poensgen, Ernst, 145, 146 Poland, 45-6, 60, 166-7, 178, 191, 192, 194, 196, 199, 200, 213, 229 Polte, 62 Popitz, Johannes, 127, n. VII/21 (p. 130), n. XI/48 (p. 211) Posse, Hans, n. IV/4 (p. 75), 149, n. VIII/21, 151, n. VIII/28, 153. 154, 155, 162, 209 Possony, Stefan T., n. 1/9 (p. 20) Post office and communications, Table IV (p. 188) power industry, 118, 152, 153, 162, Table IV (p. 188), 232. See also electrical industry Prague, 141, 166 Prange, Gordon W., n. V/10 (p. 96) precision instruments, Table IV (p. 188) Preussisches Staatsministerium, see Prussian Ministry of the Interior price controls, 30, 110, 131, 165 Price, G. Ward, 102 Des Príncipes de la Guerre, 26, n. 1/25 priority, 36, 51, 57, 116, 119, 126, 148, 150, 158, 161, 163, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 176, 1936, n. XI/9 and 13, 197, 201, n. XI/28, 204-5, 208-10, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 226-8, 231, 245-6 private construction, 170, n. IX/27 (p. 172), Table IV (p. 188) private consumption, 181, 183, 1856, Table II, 245 private economy, 43, 126, 128-9. See also civilian economy private industry, 11, 57, 66-71, 1289, 194. See also businessmen; industry private initiative, 33, 36, 43, 51, 89, 102, 123, 233 private interests, 81, 83-5, n. IV/21, 233. See also competition private profits, 30, 43, 70, 89, 145 private property, 33, 43, 233

INDEX

"Probeaufträge", n. 111/23 (p. 63) producers' goods, 118, Table IV (p. 188) producers' organizations, see businessmen's organizations Production-Program Civilian Economy, 163, 168 Production-Program Wehrmacht ("F.P."), 163, 192-3, 194 propaganda, 8, 29, 33, 40, 41, 100, 166, 244, 249-50, Supplementary Notes (XIII/14) Provincial Food Offices (Landesernährungsämter), 205 Prussian Minister (Ministry) of the Interior (Preussisches Staatsminister/ -ium), 76, 132 public building, see construction public opinion, 106-7, n. VII/34 (p. 139), 166, 191, 211, n. XI/48, 229, 239, 247, 249-50 public works, 87. See also Autobahnen; construction Quartermaster-General of the Air Force (Generalluftzeugmeister), 243 radar tubes, 242 radio equipment, 118, 242 Raeder, Erich, 150, 176, 217, 243 railroad transport, 25, 158, 176, Table IV (p. 188). See also locomotives and cars Rathenau, Walther, 30 rationalization, 51, 221, 230, 231, 238, 245 Rauschning, Hermann, n. 1/3, 99, n. V/18, 102, n. V/26, 104, 106 raw materials: Germany dependent on foreign sources, 39 (quote), 47, 102, 123, 139, 177; and foreign trade, 45, 47, 85, 88, 102-3, 110, 126, 128, 130, 138-9, 141, 143-4, 145, 199; and Russia, 45, 101, n. V/24, 104, 144, 199; looted from occupied territories, 47, 199, 244; control over, 30, 66, 85-6, 110, n. VI/11 (p. I l l ) , 118, 125-6, 131, 132, 133, 137-8, 141, 142, 143, 153, 162, 173, n. IX/35 (p. 176),

301 199, 205, 206, n. XI/41 (p. 208), 223, 231, 238-9, 243, 245; supplies and shortages, 87, 88, 126-7, 130, 143-4, 171, 176, 177, n. XI/ 13 (p. 196), 199, 204, 209, 217, 229, 239; Hitler on, 100, 101-4, 127-8, n. VII/17; domestic development, 102-3, 126-8, 133, 135-8, 141, 145-6, 156, 199, 221; allocations, 126, 127, 132, 135, n. VII/27, 137, 165, 168ff., 175, 200, 209, 210, 212, 214, 217, 223, 224, 231, 235, 243, 246; see also autarky; iron and steel, oil, etc.; priorities Raw Materials and Foreign Exchange Staff (Rohstoff- und Devisenstab), 125, 126-7, n. VII/14. See also Bureau for German Raw Materials and Synthetics rearmament: secret, in Weimar Republic, 11, 54, 57-66, 70; cooperation of businessmen, 66-71; cooperation of civilian ministries, 71-2; illegal mobilization planning, 54, 55-7, n. I V / 1 (p. 73-4), Supplementary Notes (III/ll); illegal, 1933-35, 73-4, n. IV/1 and 3, 75, n. IV/4; financing, n. IX/2 (p. 159), and see military expenditures; policy questions, 45, 46-8, 78, 86, 87, 90, 94, 98, 101, 106-7, 115, 129, 138, 141, 153, 158; as competitor for resources, 129, 138, 143, 144, 159, n. IX/2; progress of, 164, 167, 177; "rearmament boom", 182. See also administration; armaments; economic mobilization; munitions; war economy Referentenausschuss fiir die Reichsverteidigung (Committee of Consultants for the Defense of the Reich), see Committee for Reich Defense Regional Commissioners (of Stega), 67 Regional Contract-Distribution Committees (Bezirks-Belegungsausschiisse), 163-4 Reich Agencies (Reichsstellen, formerly Supervisory Agencies), 8586, n. IV/22, 174, 175, n. IX/33,

302

INDEX

206, 232, 238, n. I I I / 9 (p. 239), 243 Reich Agency for Economic Development (Reichsstelle, later Reichsamt, für Wirtschaftsausbau), 134. See also Karl Krauch; Dr. Ritter Reich Association of German Industry (Reichsverband der deutschen Industrie), 68, 82, 83 Reich Aviation Minister, see Reich Minister of Aviation Reich Cabinet (Reichskabinett), n. I I I / 9 (p. 58), 72, 77, n. IV/7 Reich Chamber of Labor (Reichsarbeitskammer), 42 Reich Chancellory (Reichskanzlei), 148, 152, 207, n. XI/40, 213 Reich Coal Union (Reichsvereinigung Kohle), 86, 238 Reich Commissar for Price Control (Reichskommissar für die Preisbildung), 131, 233 Reich Defense Commissars (Reichsverteidigungskommissare), 206-7, 232 Reich Defense Committees (regional), 206 Reich Defense Council (Reichsverteidigungsrat), 1. 1933-38, n. I l l / 45 (p. 72), 73, n. IV/1, 77-8, n. IV/7 and 8, 86, 91, 116, 120, 148, 207; 2. 1938-39, 77, n. IV/7, 162, 163, 167. See also Committee for Reich Defense Reich Defense Law (Reichsverteidigungsgesetz), 1. 21 May 1935, 75, 76, 90-91, n. IV/34, 102, 117; 2. 4 September 1938, 161-2, n. IX/6, 163, 167, 211 Reich Economic Chamber (Reichswirtschaftskammer), 83 Reichenau, Walther von, 76, 77, 78, n. IV/11 (p. 79), 88, 109, 110 Reich Estate of German Industry (Reichsstand der deutschen Industrie), 82, 83 Reich finances, 116, 143, 158-9, n. IX/2, 172, 186-8, Table III, Table IV, 244; see also military expenditures Reich Food Estate (Reichsnährstand), 82, 88

Reich Group Industry (Reichsgruppe Industrie), 68, 83, 84, 158, n. XI/ 48 (p. 211), 222, 231 Reich Groups, 83 Reich Institution for Employment and Unemployment Insurance, 131 Reich Iron Union (Reichsvereinigung Eisen), 86, 238, 241 Reich Minister of Agriculture, see Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture Reich Minister (Ministry) for Armaments and War Production (Reichministerium für Rüstung und Kriegsproduktion), 49, 51, n. IX/ 19 (p. 169), 244, 245, 246, n. XIII/21 (p. 248); see also Albert Speer Reich Minister (Ministry) of Aviation (Reichsluftfahrtminister/ -ium), 74, 75, 76, 109, n. VI/7, 111, 112, 113, 124, 139, 158, n. IX/1, 227, 228. See also Air Force; Hermann Göring. Reich Minister of Defense, see Reichswehr Minister; Reich War Minister; Reichsverteidigungsminister. Reich Minister (Ministry) of Economics (Reichswirtschaftsminister/ -ium), 50, 71, 81, 82-3, 85-6, n. IV/22, IV/24 (p. 87), 89, 90, 91, 102, 107, 116-119, n. VI/20, 122, 124, 132, 133-4, 135, 137,141,143, 145, 146, 147, 149, 153, 161, 165, 173, 175, 198, 203, n. XI/35 (p. 204), 205-6, n. XI/41 (p. 208), 210, 211, 229, 231, 232, 234, 238, 239, 243, 248. See also Funk; GBK; Schacht Reich Minister (Ministry) of Education, 161 Reich Minister (Ministry) of Finance Reichsfinanzminister/ -ium), 71, 89, 116, 161, 172, 243. See also Schwerin-Krosigk Reich Minister (Ministry) for Food and Agriculture (Reichsminister/ -ium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft), 71, 88, 122, 131, 161, 205, 233. See also Darre; Backe Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs, see Foreign Office

INDEX

Reich Minister (Ministry) of Interior (Reichsminister/-ium des Innern), 71, 161, 172 Reich Minister (Ministry) of Justice (Reichsjusti2mmister/-ium), 71, 161 Reich Minister (Ministry) of Labor (Reichsarbeitsminister/-ium), 89, 131, 161, 202, 203, 205, 232, 241, 248 Reich Minister (Ministry) of Propaganda (Reichsminister/-ium für Propaganda und Volksaufklärung), 147, 161, 242 Reich (Minister) Ministry of Religion, 161 Reich Minister (Ministry) of Transport (Reichsverkehrsminister/-ium), 65, 71, 135, 161, 198, 233 Reich Minister of War, see Reich War Minister Reich Minister (Ministry) for Weapons and Munitions (Reichsminister/ -ium für Bewaffnung und Munition), 49, 86, 213-16, 217-19, 22021, 222, 232, 233-4, 235-6, 237-8, n. XIII/7, 239-40, 243, 244, 248, 249. See also Fritz Todt; Albert Speer Reich Office for Economic Development (Reichsamt für Wirtschaftsausbau; formerly Reichsstelle), 134, n. V I I / 2 9 (p. 135), 137. See also Carl Krauch; GB Chem. Reich Office of Forestry, 205 Reich Office for Geological Research (Reichsamt für Bodenforschung), 131 Reich offices, in competition for resources and power, 106, 169, 180, n. X / 5 , 231-2 Reich Postal Ministry, 161 Reich War Minister, Ministry (Reichskriegsminister/-ium), 75-80, n. IV/ 6, 86, 88, 90-92, 107, 109-115, n. VI/7, VI/12, 116, 120, 123, 125, 139, 142, 143, 149-50, 151, 161. See also Blomberg; OKW; Reichswehr Minister (Ministry); Wehrmacht Reichsamt für Wirtschaftsausbau, see Reich Office for Economic Development

303 Reichsarbeitsminister/-ium, see Reich Minister of Labor Reichsbahn, 173, 176, 197, n. X I / 1 9 (p. 198) Reichsbank, 89, 90, 106, n. V I / 2 0 (p. 116), 211 Reichsgruppe Industrie, see Reich Group Industry Reichskabinett, see Reich Cabinet Reichskanzlei, see Reich Chancellory Reichskommissar für die Preisbildung, see Reich Commissar for Price Control Reichskreditgesellschaft, n. IX/27 (p. 172) Reichskriegsminister/-ium, see Reich War Minister (Ministry) Reichsluftfahrtminister/-ium, see Reich Minister (Ministry) of Aviation Reichsminister/-ium für Bewaffnung und Munition, see Reich Minister (Ministry) for Weapons und Munitions Reichsminister/-ium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft, see Reich Minister (Ministry) for Food and Agriculture Reichsminister/-ium der Finanzen, see Reich Minister (Ministry) of Finance Reichsminister/-ium für Rüstung und Kriegsproduktion, see Reich Minister (Ministry) for Armaments and War Production Reichsnährstand, see Reich Food Estate Reichspressechef, 147 Reichsstelle für Wirtschaftsausbau, see Reich Agency for Economic Development Reichsstellen, see Reich Agencies; Supervisory Agencies Reichsverband der deutschen Industrie, see Reich Association of German Industry Reichsvereinigung Eisen, see Reich Iron Union Reichsvereinigung Kohle, see Reich Coal Union

304

INDEX

Reichsverteidigungsausschuss, see Committee for Reich Defense Reichsverteidigingsausschüsse, see Reich Defense Committees Reichsverteidigungsgesetz, see Reich Defense Law Reichsverteidigungskommissare, see Reich Defense Commissars Reichsverteidigungsminister (Reich Defense Minister, interim title, 1934), see Reich War Minister see Reich Reichsverteidigungsrat, Defense Council Reichswehr, 38, 40, 46, 54, 56, n. III/6, 57-72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 1078, 108-11, 248, Supplementary Notes (111/32). See also rearmament; Wehrmacht Reichswehr Minister (Ministry), 39, 41, 54, n. III/5 (p. 56), 71, 73, 76, n. IV/6 (p. 81), 108, 110. See also OKW Reichswerke A. G. Hermann Goring, see Hermann Goring Works Reichswirtschaftskammer, see Reich Economic Chamber Reichswirtschaftsminister/ -ium, see Reich Minister (Ministry) of Economics requisitioning, 22, n. 1/14, 32, 33, 153 "Research and Devlopment", 134, 135 Reserves and Replacements Staff, see Nachschubstab Rheinmetall, 62, n. III/23 (p 63), 68 Rhineland, n. 111/25 (p. 63), 65, 66, Supplementary Notes (111/32) Riedel, Colonel Freiherr von, 113 Riess, Curt, n. XIII/13 (p. 242) Rings, see Committees and Rings Ritter, Gerhard, n. 11/27 and 28 (p. 48) Ritter, Dr., n. VH/29 (p. 135), VII/ 30 (p. 136), 137, n. VII/32, XIII/ 16 (p. 248) roads, 135, 158, 187, Table IV (p. 188). See also Autobahnen Röchling, Hermannn, 145, 146, 238 rocket project, 201 Roges (Rohstoff-Handelsgesellschaft mbH), 244

Rohstoff- und Devisenstab, see Raw Materials and Foreign Exchange Staff Rohstoffabteilung (Raw Materials Section, under W Staff, later under Wi Rü Amt), 165, n. XI/41 (p. 208) Rolland, Romain, 31, n. 1/42 and 43 Ropp, Theodore, Supplementary Notes (1/19) Rothfels, Hans, n. 1/19 (p. 24), II/27 (p. 48) rubber, 85, 88, 128, n. VII/17, 137, 138, 142, 156, 158, 176, 177, 193, 199. See also synthetic rubber Ruhr, 65, 84, 145, 154 "ruling class", 179, 182, Supplementary Notes (X/ll) Rumania, 14, 198, n. XI/19, 199 Russia, 17, 19-20, 27, 45, 46, 52, 97, 101, n. V/24, 104, 105, 140, 144, 192, 198, 199, n. XI/22, 226, 227, 228, 229-30, 239, 241, 242, 247 Russo-German military collaboration, n. III/9 (p. 58), 59, 61, n. 111/17 and 18, 69 Russo-Japanese War, 19-20 Rüstungsamt (Armament Office), 1. "Rüstamt", planned by Reichswehr, n. III/5 (p. 56), 108; 2. in RMfRüK, 50, 235, 236, 239, 240 Rüstungsausschuss (Armament Committee in RwMin), 108 Rüstungsausschüsse (Armament Committees, under RMfBM), 224, 232 Rüstungsbetriebe (armament firms), see armament industry, firms Rüstungskommandos, see Armament Commands Rüstungsinspektionen, see Armament Inspectorates Rüstungslieferungsamt, see Armament Sub-contracts Office S A , 59, 106 S S, 106, 161, 180, 233, 244, 249 Sarnow, Ministerialdirektor, 151, 153, 162-4, 167 Sauckel, Fritz, 132, 169, 241, n. XIII/12, 244, 249 Sauer, Wolfgang, n. III/2 (p. 55),

INDEX

III/9 (p. 57), n. V/2 and 4 (p. 94), V/7 (p. 95), V/10 (p. 96), 182 Saur, Otto, 234, 236, 237, n. XIII/7 (p. 238), 254 Schacht, Hjalmar, as conspirator, 37, 48, 49, n. XI/48 (p. 211>; economic policies, 126, 138, 141, 1446; as GBK and RWiM, 85, 90-92, n. IV/34, 107, 115-21, n. VI/20, 124-5, 126, 129, 141-3, 146; and Göring, 122, n. VII/1, 125, n. VII/8, 127, n. VII/14, 129, 141, 142-4, 145-7, 152; and Hitler, 93, 101, 103, 104, 106, 122, n. VII/1, 127-8, 138, 145, 234; and Thomas, 10, 37, 49, 141-2, 146, 152, 163; positions, 106; résignation and background, 133, n. VII/26 (p. 134), 141-7, 210, 211 Schieber, Walther, 236, 237, n. XIII/7 (p. 238), XIII/14 (p. 242) Schlabrendorff, Fabian von, Supplementary Notes (11/29) Schlattmann, Heinrich, 124-5, n. VII/6, 145 Schleicher, Kurt von, 44, 54, 60, 68 Schmidt, Major, 202 Schmitt, Kurt, 88, 90, n. IV/31 Schoenbaum, David, Supplementary Notes (IV/17, IV/21, X / l l ) Schramm, Percy E., Supplementary Notes (XII/1) Schüler, Captain, n. III/4 (p. 55) Schulz, Gerhard, n. III/9 (p. 57), n. IV/16 (p. 82), 182 Schulze-Fielitz, Günther, 236, 238, 241 "Schwarzer Reichswehr", 59 Schweitzer, Arthur, n. IV/16 and 17 (p. 82), VI/22 (p. 117), VII/2 (p. 123), VII/14 (p. 127), VII/30 (p. 136), 182, Statistical Appendix Schwerin-Krosigk, Lutz von, 127, 172 Séché, Alphonse, 7, 17, 21, 26, 30-34, n. 1/41, 1/42, 1/52, 1/54, 35, 40, 41, n. II/3 (p. 41), 43, 74 Seeckt, Hans von, 18, 54-5, n. III/2, 153, 167 Seeckt, Hans von, 18, 54-5, n. III/2,

305 III/5 (p. 56), 111/27 (p. 64) "Seelöwe", 226, 227 self-fulfilling prophecy, 22-23, n. 1/ 16, 35-6, 53, 250 "self-responsibility" system, 222-4, 230, 238, 247 self-sufficiency, see autarky "shapelessness", 180, n. X/5, 181, 249 shells, 62, 225, 226, n. XII/35. See also munitions ship-construction program, ships, 150, 168, 170, 176, 177, Table IV (p. 188), 194, XI/9, 195, 226, 227, 238 Siemens-Schuckert, 68, 88 Simson AG, 62 Singer, H. W., Supplementary Notes (XI/39) small business, 87, 89, 176. See also firms; handicrafts Spain, 17 soaps and fats, see fats socialism, 28, 31-3, 35-6, 43, 81-2, 233 Soldan, Erich, n, III/4 (p. 55), 63 "Sommerarbeit", n. III/14 (p. 60) Sonderausschüsse, see Special Committees Sorokin, P. A., 24, n. 1/21 Soviet Union, see Russia South Africa, n. 1/29 (p. 27) "special commissars", 81 Special Committees, 1. in RWiM, 1934, 81; 2. under RMffiüK, 230, 238. See also Committees and Rings Special Rings, 238. See also Committees and Rings Speer, Albert, achievements and administrative changes under, 4950, n. 11/30, 51, n. VI/22 (p. 117), 133, n. XI/40 (p. 207), 215, n. XII/22 (p. 221), 225, 236-7, 238, n. XIII/8, 239, 244, 245, 247-8, Supplementary Notes (XIII /8); compared with Todt, 221, n. XII/22; policies, 51, n. IX/24 (p. 171), n. IX/35 (p. 176), 242, 2457; positions and power, 10, 4952, 93, 201-2, 231, 232-3, n. XIII/1, 234, 235-7, 238-41, 243-4,

306

INDEX

249; relations with: Funk, 238, 243; Goebbels, 242-3; Göring, n. VII/28 (p. 135), 201, 234, 235, 240, 243; Himmler, n. XIII/1 (p. 233), 244; Hitler, 8, 37, 49, 93, n. V/8 (p. 95), IX/24 (p. 171), 205, 234, 235, 244; Krauch, 243, n. XIII/16, 244; Thomas, 7, 37, 49-52, n. 11/30 and 33, 165, 20002, 234-8, 239-40, 242, 243, Supplementary Notes (XIII/10); Sauckkel, 241, 244 Speer Ministry, and aides, see Reich Ministry for Armaments and War Production Speier, Hans, n. 1/9 (p. 20), II/3 (p. 41) Spiegel, Henry W., n. 1/9 (p. 20) "Städte", n. III/42 (p. 70) Stahl- und Maschinengesellschaft mbH (Stamag), 61, n. 111/18 Stahlhelm, 59 Stalingrad, 242 state and economy, 9, 37, 43, 44, 81-86, n. IV/16, 1V/21, 86-92, 128-9, 173ff., 179-83, 233, 248-50, Supplementary Notes (X/10, X/ 11). See also Hitler; Reich offices; specific ministries and other offices by name State Secretaries, 167 "statistical departments" (of RWiMin), 116 "Statistical Society", see Stega statistics, 8, 27, n. IV/24 (p. 87), 88, 112, n. VII/3 (p. 123), 144, n. VII/30 (p. 136), VIII/35 (p. 154), 168, 169, n. IX/19, IX/27 (p. 172), 173, 183-90, Tables IIV, n. XII/5 (p. 215), XII/34 (p. 226), 245, n. XIII/18, Note on Sources, Statistical Appendix Statistische Gesellschaft, see Stega Stead, W. T „ n. 1/31 (p. 27) steel, see iron and steel Stega (Statistische Gesellschaft), 66-9, n. III/35-7, 71, n. VII/34 (p. 139) Steinbrinck, Otto, n. VII/9 (p. 126) Stellvertretender GBK, see Deputy Plenipotentiary for the War Economy Stevens, R. H., n. V/17 (p. 98)

Stolper, Gustav, n. X/l (p. 179) Studt, General, 202 submarines, 32, 164, 195, 201, 209, 213, 227, 228 subsidization, 70-71, 145 substitute materials, 89, 102-3, 126, 128, 137, 221 Sudetenland, 141, 165, Tables I, II (pp. 184, 186), 189, 192, 245 Sun Yat-sen, 28 Supervisory Agencies (Überwachungsstellen), 85-6, n. IV/22, 126, 174, n. IX/33 (p. 175). See also Reich Agencies Supervisory Agency for Petroleum, 143 Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, 75, 76 "supreme Reich Authorities", 161, 218, 232, 240 Sweden, 59, n. 111/18 (p. 61) Sweezy, Maxine Y., n. IV/19 (p. 83), 179 synthetic fats, 128, 216. See also fats synthetic oil, 88, 102, 123, 137, 138, 176, 193. See also oil; fuels synthetic rubber, 102, 128, 137, 138, 176, 193, 199. See also rubber synthetic textiles, 128, 138 synthetics, 89, 102-3, 126, n. VII/14 (p. 127), 128, 137, 138, 159. See also specific materials Syrup, Friedrich, 131-2, 201, 202-3, n. XI/36 (p. 204) Szczot, Edmund F., Supplementary Notes (1/9) Tailhade, Laurent, 34 tanks, 158, 194, 220, 226, 227, 228. 230, 245, 254 taxation, 22, 126, 244, Statistical Appendix. See also Reich finances Taylor, Telford, n. IV/3 (p. 7 4 Technical Office (in RMfRiiK), 236 technical organizations, 135, 167, 218 Teske, Hermann, n. IX/24 (p. 171) textiles, 86, 128, 174, 238-9 Third Reich, see Preface and Chs. IV-XIII, passim; mentioned specifically, 37, n. IV/16 (p. 82), 106 (quote), n. VI/7 (p. 109), 132,

INDEX

180, 183, 185, 189, 221, 234, 246, 248, 249, 250, Supplementary Notes (IV/17, IV/21, X/10, X/ 11); economy of, see National Socialist economic system. See also Hitler; Wehrmacht; etc. Thomas, Brigitte, 38 Thomas, Diether, 38 Thomas, Georg, 7-8, 10-11; career and personal qualities, 37-9, 43, 44, n. 11/17 (p. 46), 47, 49, 50, 51, 87, n. VII/25 (p. 133), 148, 151, 192, 229, 232 (quote), 235-6, 237-8, 239-40; growth and functions of his office, 107-111, 164-7, n. IX/14, 229-30; Wehrmacht representative in economic affairs, 50, 80, 107, 110, 143, 235; his limited power, 214, n. IV/12 (p. 80), 248; titles of, n. II/7 (p. 46), n. IV/35 (p. 91), n. VII/19 (p. 148), n. XI/45 (p. 209) (see list of abbreviations); in Speer's ministry, 50, 235-6, 237-8, n. XIII/7, 239-40; dismissal and resignation, 49-50, 232 (quote), 240; and Blomberg, 49, 80, 88, 115, 124, 127, 141, 142, 143, 146, 148-9, 151, 155; and Committee for Reich Defense, 79-80, 208; and Funk (GBK), 147-9, 150-56; (GBW), 162-4, 167, 168, 198, 204-5, 20910, 211, 229, 234; (RWiM), 216, 229; and Göring, n. VII/1 (p. 122), 124-5, 127, 138-9, 141-2, 143, 146, 152, 156-7, 160, 168-9, 201, 204, 208, 218, 229, 234; and industrialists, 43, 69, 145, 197, 211-12; and Keitel, 49, 50-51, 151, 161, 191-2, 193-4, 196, 208-9, 21517, 218-19, 224-5, 232 (quote); and Krauch, n. VII/33 (p. 137), 160, 214-15; and military rivalries, 79-80, n. IV/12 and 13, 107, 11015, 124, 125, 139, 143, 153, 155, 169, 215-17, 221, 248, and see below, on priority questions; and occupied territories, 10, 47, 49, 50, 229-30; and Schacht (or GBK), 37, 48-9, 91, 93, 101, 104, 106, 107, 115-20, 124-5, 127, 138, 141, 142, 145, 146, 152, 234; and Speer,

307 49-52, 165, 200-202, 234-8, 23940, 243, 245-7, Supplementary Notes (XIII/10); and Todt, 49, 171, 198-9, 200-202, 208, 213, 218-19, 221-2, 224-5, 230, 231, 232-3, 240; as author, n. II/2 (p. 40), II/7 (p. 43), 11/10 (p. 43-4), 11/12 (p. 44), 50, n. 11/31 and 32, n. III/34 (p. 67), 181, 257, Supplementary Notes (II/2); aspirations for military domination of economy, 10, 37, 44, 49-52, 91, 147-8, 151, 163, 166, 168, 231, 246-7; conspiracies and opposition to Hitler, 37-8, 44-5, 48-9, n. II/ 28, 50, 52, 77, 87, n. IV/23, 101, 104, n. VII/34 (p. 139), 191-2, 195, 211-12, n. XI/48, Supplementary Notes (11/29); ideas of, 39-40, 41-2, 43-4, 45-6, 46-8; on agricultural policy, n. VII/2 (p. 123); on armament policy and Blitzkrieg, 46-8, 52, 101, 138-9, 170, 177-8, n. XI/13 (p. 196), and see below, on priority; on authoritarian rule, 42; on competition for steel, 158 (quote), 168-72, 199201, 202; on construction, 17072, 200-202, 214, 216; on dispersal of military contracts, 203, 204; on domestic ores project, 145; on economic mobilization, 40-44, 48, 51-2, 54, 63-4, 86-90, 91,1389, 190, 192-3, 195-6, n. XI/13, 203-5, 208, 210-12, 213, 233, 2467; on foreign economic policy, 45-7, 138-9, 146; on German economy, 190, 191 (quote), 191-2, 211-12, 216-17, 233; on German Labor Front, 89; on Germany, 39, passim; on "guided economy", 39, 43; on Hitler, 93, 101, 106-7, 138, 213, and see above, conspiracies; on jurisdictional questions, 91, 111-120, 139, 141-3, 146, 147-9, 151-2, 154-7, 160, 161, 163, 167, 205; on Lob's program (FourYear-Plan), 126, 138-9, 143, 171; on munitions, 177-8, 193, 194, 213-16, 223; on priority questions and bottlenecks, 170-71, 176, 1936, 197, 198, 203, 212, 213, 214-

308

INDEX

17, 246; on total war, 40, 41-2, 52-3, 232; on Wehrwirtschaft, 4041, 42-3; "pessimism" and "defeatism", 50, 52, 104, 191-2, 20811, 216, 229, 232; propaganda and demands for total mobilization, 166, 192, 212; proposed economic dictator, 86-90, 91; proposed "Fuel Commissar", 123-5; proposed quota system for raw materials, 127; staff of, 7, 11, 42, 51. See also Wi Rii Amt; Wehrmacht Thomas, Käthe Fischer, 38 Thomas, Richard, 38 Thomas, W. I., n. 1/16 (p. 23) Thompson, J. M., n. 1/12 (p. 22) timber, 104 tin, 177. See also metals Todt, Fritz, 49, 86, n. VI/22 (p. 117), 135, 161, 171, n. IX/35 (p. 176), 194, 198-9, 200-2, 206, 208, 213, 217-19, 220-26, n. XII/22, 227, 229, 230, n. XII/47, 231, 233-4, 236, 238, n. XIII/8, 239, 240, 245, 247, 248, Supplementary Notes (XII/1) "total economy", n. I I / 4 (p. 41) total mobilization, see economic mobilization for war; total war "total state", 41 total war, 7-8, 17-29, n. 1/9 and 10, 32-6, 37, 40, 41, n. II/3, 43, 49, 51-3, 181, 182, 242-3, 247, Supplementary Notes (1/9, 1/10, I I / 4); erosion of neutrality, 29; total commitment of resources, 25, 26, 28, 32-4, 35-6, 40; total destruction, 7, 23, 32, 40, 55, 99; "complete subjection", 25; total mobilization, 7-8, 9, 30, 32-4, 35-6, 37, 40, 42, 52, 72, 73, 75, 92, 93, 98, 99ff., 105, n. VII/34 (p. 139), 166, 167, 182, 183, n. X/12, 192, 194, 204-5, 212, 230-31, 239, Supplementary Notes (II/3); total war economy, 9, 36, 49, 51-2, n. V/4 (p. 94), 152, 163, 179, 181, 182, n. X/12 (p. 183), 189-90, 233,234, 242-3, 247, 248, 250, and see totalitarian economy. See also items under economic mobilization for war

Der Totale Krieg, 41, Supplementary Notes (II/3) totalitarian economy, 8, 9, 10, 34, 107, 179-80, 183, 233, 249-50 totalitarian state, 37 totalitarian war economy, 3, 9, 10, 179-83 Trade Association of the Iron and Metals Industry (Fachgemeinschaft der Eisen- und Metallindustrie), 222, n. XII/24 Trade Groups (Fachgruppen), 83, 84, 174, 206 Trade Sub-groups (Fachuntergruppen), 83, 84 transport, 33, 88, n. Vl/11 (p. 111), 135, 153, 158, 167, 177, 187, Table IV (p. 188), 197-8, n. XI/ 19, 205, 214, 215 Transport Ministry, see Reich Ministry of Transport "Travelling Control Engineers" (of RMfBM), 218 Treaty of Versailles, 40, 54, 58-72, 74, 116 Treibstoffkommissar, see Fuel Commissar Treue, Wilhelm, n. V/8 (p. 95) Trevor-Roper, H. R., n. V/17 (p. 98), VII/28 (p. 135), 140, 180, 189, Supplementary Notes (V/33) Truppenamt; Truppenamt Organisationsabteilung (T 2), 59, n. 111/13, 60, 62, 64, n. 111/32 (p. 65), 66, 72, n. 111/45, 74, 77, 78, n. IV/10 (p. 79), 90, 107, 108. See also "Zentrale" Tuchman, Barbara, n. 1/24 (p. 25) Turkey, 61, n. 111/18 USSBS, 8, n. 11/22 (p. 47), 181 USSR, see Russia U-Boats, see submarines Überwachungsstellen, see Supervisory Agencies unemployment, 131, 202, 203, 204 United States, 10, 17, 19, 25, 29, 35, n. 1/55, 36, n. 11/15 (p. 45), 52, n. III/9 (p. 58), IV/16 (p. 81), 105, 176, Table I (p. 184), 185, Table II, 186, Table III (p. 187), 189, 212, 230

INDEX

—, Strategie Bombing Survey, see USSBS —, War Industries Board, 35, n. 1/58 and 59 (p. 36) —, War Policies Commission, n. 1/58 (p. 36) Upper Silesia, 65 Vagts, Alfred, Supplementary Notes (11/4, IX/14) The Valor of Ignorance, 29 vehicles, 153, Table IV (p. 188), Statistical Appendix Vereinigte Aluminiumwerke, 68 Vereinigte Stahlwerke, 145 Vierjahresplan, see Four-Year-Plan Der Vierjahresplan, n. 11/10 (p. 44), 48 Vital, David, Supplementary Notes (IV/23) Verein Deutscher Diplom-Kaufleute, n. II/5 (p. 42) Vogelsang, Thilo, n. 111/12 (p. 59) Vogler, Albert, 136, 234, 238 Völker, Karl-Heinz, n. IV/3 (p. 75) Volkswagenwerke, 202 Vollard-Bockelberg, Alfred von, 45 W firms, see WehrwirtschaftsBetriebe W Inspectorates, see Wehrwirtschaft Inspectorates (Inspectors) "W.O.-Dienststellen", n. 111/34 (p. 67} W. O. Luft, see Air Economic Officers W Staff (Wehrwirtschaftsstab), see Wi Rü Amt and predecessors Waffenamt (Ordnance Office), see Army Ordnance Office; ordnance offices Waffeninspektionen (Weapons Inspectorates), n. III/6 (p. 56) Wagenführ, Rolf, n. IX/119 (p. 169), 179, 181, n. X/13 (p. 183-4), 244, 248, 249 Wagner, Josef, 131, n. VII/23 Waite, R. G. L., n. V/4 (p. 94), Supplementary Notes (111/13) war, 7-10, 17-36, 40-43, n. II/3, 54-5; Hitler on, 93, 96-100, 102, 104-5, 106-7; "modern war means

309 total war", 17, 18, 19, 52, 250. See also Blitzkrieg; economic mobilization; Germany; Hitler, G. Thomas; total war; war economy; World War I, II war economy, 9, 41, 86, n. V/4 (p. 94), 156-7, 181-3, 187-90, 247, Supplementary Notes (X/10); World War I, 29-30; World War II, 190, 191, 229, 233, 247-50, Supplementary Notes (XI/39). See also administration; economic mobilization; Speer; G. Thomas; Todt; total war war effort, see military-economic effort; total war war potential, see under Germany. See also military-economic effort war production, see armaments; war economy War Industries Board, see under United States War Minister (Ministry), see Reich War Minister (Ministry) War Service Law (Kriegsleistungsgesetz), 75 Warlimont, Walter, 42, 110, n. VI/ 26 (p. 120) Warsaw, 195 warships, see ship-construction Watts, Donald C., Supplementary Notes (111/32) weapons, 27, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, 110, n. VI/11 (p. I l l ) , 118, 119, 158, 177, 194, 195, 220, 221, 223-4, 226, 228, 230-31, 238, 241. See also armaments Weapons Inspectorates, see Waffeninspektionen Weber, Eugen, n. 1/44 (p. 31) Wehrkreise, see Military Districts Wehrkreisbeauftragter (under RMfBM), see Military District Commissioners Wehrkreiskommandos, see Military District Headquarters Wehrmacht, 75, 76; and economy, 80-81, 82, 90, 115-20, n. VII/2 (p. 123), 124-5, 129, 141-3, 144, 145-6, 148-9, 150-57, 161-4, 204, 206, 207, 208-9, 211-12, 216, 235, 236, 240, 246, 248-9; and Hitler,

310 38, 44, 75-7, 78, 127-8, 129, n. VIII/4 (p. 141), 149-52, 164, 204, 24©; competition for resources, 87-88, 108-73, 175-6, 193-203, 224, 239; loss of political authority, 109, 149-50, 164, 207; military rivalries, 75-80, n. IV/7 (p. 77), 107-15, n. VI/7, 139, 141-3, 150, 155, 156-7, 159-61, 168-9, 176, 193-6, 200, 201, 208, 215, 223, 224-5, 248. See also armaments; Army; civilian-military relations; Blomberg; economic mobilization; Goring; Hitler; Keitel; military contracts; military leaders; munitions; OKW; G. Thomas; Wehrmachtamt; Wi Rü Amt; etc. Wehrmacht Law, 75, 76, 102 Wehrmacht Operations Staff (Wehrmachtführungsstab), Supplementary Notes (XII/1); Home Defense Department (Landesverteidigungsabteilung), 208 Wehrmachtakademie, 41, n. I I / 5 (p. 42), VII/34 (p. 139), 170 Wehrmachtamt, 78, 87, 109, 110, 142, 148, 149; Department L (Landesverteidigungsabteilung), 78, n. IV/10 (p. 79), IV/13 (p. 80), 142. See also OKW Wehrmachtführungsstab, see Wehrmacht Operations Staff Wehrmachtrüstungsamt (planned), 108-10, 114-15 Wehrwirtschaft, 38-43, n. II/4, 80, 165, 181. See also war economy Wehrwirtschaft Inspectorates, Inspectors (Wehrwirtschaftsinspektionen, -inspekteure), 67, n. 111/35 (p. 68), 111-114, 119, 153-5, 163, 164, 165, 166, 192, 198, 201, 204, 206, 213, 222, 223, 224, 232. See also Armament Inspectorates Wehrwirtschaftliche Abteilung, 1. in RWiM, 81, 134; 2. in W Staff, Wi Rü Amt, 165, Supplementary Notes (IX/14) Wehrwirtschaftlicher Beirat (Wehrwirtschaft Advisory Council), n. VII/34 (p. 139), n. IX/19 (p. 168) "Wehrwirtschaftlicher neuer Erzeugungsplan", 137

INDEX

Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamt (Armed Forces' Economic and Armaments Office), see Wi Rü Amt Wehrwirtschafts- und Waffenwesen (Defense Economy and Weapons Affairs), see under Wi Rü Amt and predecessors Wehrwirtschaftsamt (in OKW, 194243), 50, 235, 236, 239 Wehrwirtschafts-Betriebe (W Betriebe), 162-4 Wehrwirtschafts-Einheiten, n. IX/17 (p. 167) Wehrwirtschafts-Führer, n. VII/34 (p. 139) Wehrwirtschaftsinspektionen, -inspekteure, see Wehrwirtschaft Inspectorates Wehrwirtschaftsstab, 1. W Staff, 1935-39, see Wi Rü Amt and predecessors; 2. 1943-44, 240 Weimar Republic, 9, 11, 54, 57-69, 73, 83, 248 Weinberg, Gerhard L., V/5, V/17 (p. 98), V/24 (p. 101), n. XII/38 (p. 226), Supplementary Notes (III/ll) welfare institutions, 118 Wells, H. G., 27-8, n. 1/32, 32, 33 Weiter, Erich, n. XII/43 (p. 228) Westwall, see fortifications Westfälisch-Anhaltische Sprengstoff AG (Wasag), 68 Wheeler-Bennett, John W., n. 11/27 and 28 (p. 48), n. I I I / 5 (p. 56), III/10 (p. 58), III/14 (p. 60), 64-5, n. III/28 Wi Rü Amt and predecessors, 1. Heereswaffenamt Wirtschaftsabteilung, 1924-34, see Nachschubstab; Economic Staff; 2. Wehrwirtschafts- und Waffenwesen, 193435 (under Wehrmachtamt in Reichswehr Ministry), 41, 107-111; 3. Wehrwirtschaftsstab (W Staff), 1935-39 (under Wehrmachtamt in Reich War Ministry; later Amtsgruppe Wehrwirtschaftsstab in OKW), n. IV/24 (p. 87), IV/35 (p. 91), 118, 119-20, n. VI/26, 141-2, 143, 150, 152-5, 156, n.

311

INDEX

IX/5 (p. 160), 163, 164-6, 167, 175, 176-7, 193, 197, 199, 200, 214, 248; 4. Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamt (Wi Rü Amt), 193942 (under OKW), 42, 49-50, 51, n. IV/12 (p. 80), n. VI/11 (p. 111), 214, 215, 218, 224, 229-30, 231, 232, 234-6, 237, 239-40, 2489, 253-5. See also Economic Officers; Wehrwirtschaft Inspectorates; Armament Inspectorates; Wehrmacht; G. Thomas Wifo, see Wirtschaftliche Forschungsgesellschaft Wiko, see Wirtschaftskontor "Winterarbeit", n. 111/14 (p. 60) Wirtschaftliche Forschungsgesellschaft (Wifo, "Economic Research Association"), 123, n. VII/3, 143 Wirtschaftabteilung, -gruppe (in HWaA), n. III/4 (p. 55). See also Economic Staff Wirtschaftsgruppe (under Reich Group Industry), see Economic Group Wirtschaftsinspektionen, see Wehrwirtschaft Inspectorates Wirtschaftskontor (Wiko), 61 Wirtschaftskrieg (economic warfare), 41 Wirtschaftsoffiziere, see Economic Officers Wirtschaftsstab, see Economic Staff Wirtschaftsstab Ost (Economic Staff East), 229 Witzell, Carl, 219 Witzleben, Erwin von, 48 workers, see labor Working Associations (Arbeitsgemeinschaften, under RMfBM), 222, 223, 224, 230, 232

Working Committee (Geschäftsgruppe, in VJP) — for Distribution of Raw Materials (Rohstoffverteilung), 132, 134; — for Food Supply (Ernährung), 131, and see Backe; — for Foreign Exchange (Devisen), n. VII/23 (p. 131), 132; — for Labor Supply (Arbeitseinsatz), 131-2 Working Committees (Geschäftsgruppen, in VJP), 131-2, 133, 135, 238 Working Rings, see Committees and Rings World War I, 19, 20, 24, 28, 29, 30, 40, 42, 54, 62, n. 111/22, 99, 108, 156, 203, 242 World War II, Chs. X-XIII, passim; mentioned elsewhere, 7, 8, 9, 11, 19, 28, 42, 47, 53, n. IV/21 (p. 85), 86, 89, 93, 94, n. V/4, 104, 105, 107, 128, 129, 133, 134, 138, 140, 141, 165, 166-7, 168, 171, 178. See also total war Wunderlich, Frieda, Supplementary Notes (X/l) Yugoslavia, 199 Zangen, Wilhelm, 145, 158, 222, 223, 231, 234 "Zentrale" (T 2 III), n. 111/13 (p. 59), 111/14 (p. 60), 254, 259 Zentrale Planung (Central Planning Board, 1942-45), 51, 133, 236-7, n. XIII/6, 238, 241, 243, 246 Zentralkartei, n. 111/33 (p. 66), 110 zinc, 126, 177 Zinnwerke Wilhelmsburg, 88

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