Deputy Ministers in Canada: Comparative and Jurisdictional Perspectives 9781442665170

Table of contents :
Contents
Foreword
List of Figures
List of Tables
Introduction
1. Deputy Ministers in Newfoundland and Labrador: From Guardians to Managers
2. Deputy Ministers in Nova Scotia: The Influence of New Public Governance on Nova Scotia’s First NDP Government
3. Deputy Ministers in Prince Edward Island: Professionalism, Policymaking, and Patronage
4. New Brunswick’s Deputy Ministers: Out of the Ordinary and Close to the Premier
5. Quebec Deputy Ministers: Accent on Program and Service Delivery in Times of Scarcity
6. From “Gurus” to Chief Executives? The Contestable Transformation of Ontario’s Deputy Ministers, 1971 to 2007
7. More Than Nobodies, but Not the Powers behind the Throne: The Role of Deputy Ministers in Manitoba
8. Saskatchewan’s Deputy Ministers: Political Executives or Public Servants?
9. Alberta Deputy Ministers: The Management of Change
10. Government Transitions, Leadership Succession, and Executive Turnover in British Columbia, 1996–2006
11. Comparative Analysis of Stability and Mobility of the Canadian Provincial Bureaucratic Elite, 1987–2007
12. A Canada-Wide Survey of Deputy and Assistant Deputy Ministers: A Descriptive Analysis
13. Federal Deputy Ministers: Serial Servers Looking for Influence
14. Public Sector Executive Compensation in a Time of Restraint
Conclusion: Deputy Ministers in Canada – Evolution of Deputy Ministers as Archetypal Figures
Contributors

Citation preview

DEPUTY MINISTERS IN CANADA Comparative and Jurisdictional Perspectives

Collectively, provincial deputy ministers command the largest assembly of government budgets, employees, and influence in Canada. Despite their importance they have not been the subject of systematic study until now. This unique volume reviews the role of deputy ministers within government, providing a new understanding of their responsibilities and interactions at both the federal and provincial levels. It also contributes important comparative analysis not previously available. Featuring articles by many of Canada’s most prominent scholars of public administration, Deputy Ministers in Canada examines a number of factors in the evolution of deputies’ roles. Taking into account social, political, and administrative history, the essays probe topics such as the socio-economic characteristics of administrative elites, the politicization of recruitment processes, the impact of New Public Management, and varieties of ministerial-bureaucratic relations. Deputy Ministers in Canada makes an important contribution to the political science and public administration literature. jacques bourgault is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at l’Université du Québec à Montréal. He is the recipient of the 2012 IPAC Vanier Medal, awarded for an outstanding contribution to public administration or public service in Canada. christopher dunn is a professor in the Department of Political Science at Memorial University.

The Institute of Public Administration of Canada Series in Public Management and Governance Editors: Peter Aucoin, 2001–2 Donald Savoie, 2003–7 Luc Bernier, 2007–9 Patrice Dutil, 2010– This series is sponsored by the Institute of Public Administration of Canada as part of its commitment to encourage research on issues in Canadian public administration, public sector management, and public policy. It also seeks to foster wider knowledge and understanding among practitioners, academics, and the general public. For a list of books published in the series, see page 457.

Deputy Ministers in Canada Comparative and Jurisdictional Perspectives

EDITED BY JACQUES BOURGAULT AND CHRISTOPHER DUNN

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS Toronto Buffalo London

© University of Toronto Press 2014 Toronto Buffalo London www.utppublishing.com Printed in Canada ISBN 978-1-4426-4622-3 (cloth) ISBN 978-1-4426-1427-7 (paper)

Printed on acid-free, 100% post-consumer recycled paper with vegetable-based inks.

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Deputy ministers in Canada : comparative and jurisdictional perspectives / edited by Jacques Bourgault and Christopher Dunn. (IPAC series in public management and governance) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-1-4426-4622-3 (bound). – ISBN 978-1-4426-1427-7 (pbk.) 1. Government executives – Canada – Provinces. 2. Provincial governments – Canada – Officials and employees. 3. Provincial governments – Canada. I. Dunn, Christopher J.C., 1948–, editor of compilation II. Bourgault, Jacques, 1948–, editor of compilation  III. Series: Institute of Public Administration of Canada series in public management and governance JL111.E93D46 2014  352.2′930971  C2013-905924-5 This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Canadian Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences, through the Awards to Scholarly Publications Program, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. University of Toronto Press acknowledges the financial assistance to its publishing program of the Canada Council for the Arts and the Ontario Arts Council.

University of Toronto Press acknowledges the financial support of the Government of Canada through the Canada Book Fund for its publishing activities.

Contents

Foreword vii List of Figures xi List of Tables xv Introduction 3 jacques bourgault and christopher dunn 1 Deputy Ministers in Newfoundland and Labrador: From Guardians to Managers 12 christopher dunn 2 Deputy Ministers in Nova Scotia: The Influence of New Public Governance on Nova Scotia’s First NDP Government 51 michelle coffin and lori turnbull 3 Deputy Ministers in Prince Edward Island: Professionalism, Policymaking, and Patronage 72 peter mckenna 4 New Brunswick’s Deputy Ministers: Out of the Ordinary and Close to the Premier 100 gilles bouchard 5 Quebec Deputy Ministers: Accent on Program and Service Delivery in Times of Scarcity 123 jacques bourgault and stéphanie viola-plante 6 From “Gurus” to Chief Executives? The Contestable Transformation of Ontario’s Deputy Ministers, 1971 to 2007 148 bryan m. evans, janet m. lum, and duncan maclellan

vi Contents

 7 More Than Nobodies, but Not the Powers behind the Throne: The Role of Deputy Ministers in Manitoba 201 rebecca jensen and paul g. thomas  8 Saskatchewan’s Deputy Ministers: Political Executives or Public Servants? 239 ken rasmussen  9 Alberta Deputy Ministers: The Management of Change 262 allan tupper 10 Government Transitions, Leadership Succession, and Executive Turnover in British Columbia, 1996–2006 283 evert lindquist and thea vakil 11 Comparative Analysis of Stability and Mobility of the Canadian Provincial Bureaucratic Elite, 1987–2007 309 gerald bierling, barbara wake carroll, and michael whyte kpessa 12 A Canada-Wide Survey of Deputy and Assistant Deputy Ministers: A Descriptive Analysis 324 bryan m. evans, janet m. lum, and john shields 13 Federal Deputy Ministers: Serial Servers Looking for Influence 364 jacques bourgault 14 Public Sector Executive Compensation in a Time of Restraint 401 david zussman Conclusion: Deputy Ministers in Canada ‒ Evolution of Deputy Ministers as Archetypal Figures 429 jacques bourgault and christopher dunn Contributors 451

Foreword

This much anticipated book contributes to two areas in public administration that have been positively starved of scholarly a ention. The first one is the role and functions of the individuals who hold the position of deputy minister (DM), the highest peak in the administrative hierarchy of the state. The second urgency is in understanding provincial bureaucratic structure. By its breadth and focus, this volume will surely sate the hungriest appetites while simultaneously, hopefully, build a desire to go further. Given the craze for “leadership” studies over the past thirty years, it is surprising to note that this is the first book purposely focused on deputy ministers in Canada. There have been occasional studies and, thankfully, a few memoirs, but li le else. In part, it was because the field lacked a strong conceptual “problem” ‒ what was there really to say about these mostly anonymous individuals beyond the unverifiable assertion that they had to be influential at some level on the course of governmental development, both in terms of policy and programs? The second reason was, and remains, an obstacle: DMs, trained by a career of discretion, have rarely been willing, beyond generalities, to describe their work. Slowly, minds changed on both those issues. Historians started to chronicle the accomplishments of the select group of mandarins who worked in O awa in the 1930 to 1960 period. A few governments started talking openly about the leadership a ributes they expected from their top officials. Finally, a number of “scandals” raised the question of what exactly DMs were supposed to do. The controversy over money allocations at Human Resources and Development Canada in the late 1990s followed by the fracas over the advertising procedures at Public

viii Foreword

Works and Government Services Canada prompted Justice Gomery to recommend changes to the selection and accountability of the deputies. Numerous controversies across the provinces also highlighted the roles and functions of DMs. As talk has moved to the merits of a “new governance” paradigm where power is atomized while demands for accountability have paradoxically multiplied, the leadership of deputy ministers is in question as never before. The Institute of Public Administration of Canada has long been interested in this position. Perhaps this is not surprising as IPAC was, a er all, the product of deputy ministers at the federal and provincial levels. Since its inception in the late 1940s, DMs have sat on its board of directors. In late 1961, three DMs even contributed a few articles analysing their roles to Canadian Public Administration, IPAC’s flagship journal (which was just completing its fourth year of publication). A few articles appeared over the next forty years, but the interest was substantively revived in the early 2000s. IPAC held a first conference in 2005 in Toronto on Secretaries to Cabinet (the product of that conference yielded Searching for Leadership: Secretaries to Cabinet in Canada, published in this series). A year later, a second conference was held on Deputy Ministers, and at the same time IPAC funded a research team whose work you now hold. Since then, IPAC has held an annual conference on Leadership and has launched a prestigious series of leadership awards in collaboration with private sector partners. Leadership has become a hot issue, and the work of DMs necessarily becomes all the more important as they incarnate it. The IPAC Series in Public Management and Governance has offered a number of side-long glances on the topic of DMs so far. Three deputies have wri en books in the series on subjects of their expertise. Gregory Marchildon, who worked in Saskatchewan, recently edited Making Medicare: New Perspectives on the History of Medicare in Canada. Ben Levin, a deputy in Manitoba and Ontario, wrote Governing Education. Albert W. Johnson, who worked in Saskatchewan and then in O awa, wrote Dream No Li le Dreams: A Biography of the Douglas Government of Saskatchewan. David A. Good, who worked for many years as an assistant deputy minister in the government of Canada, has wri en two incisive books on decision-making and leadership at the highest levels: The Politics of Public Management: The HRDC Audit of Grants and Contributions and The Politics of Public Money. Not least, Robert A. Wardhaugh’s Behind the Scenes: The Life and Work of William Clifford Clark offered an impressive examination of a deputy minister hard at work.

Foreword ix

All these works have informed us that leadership in the public sector is different, and really cannot be compared to private sector practices except in the most general ways. Deputies in government must answer to politicians whose views may or may not be similar to their own, and who typically view the bureaucracy with scepticism (as they should). They are not like private sector Board of Directors who are recruited to actively help a firm thrive in ever-changing environments. There are other important differences. Private sector business leaders constantly work under threat that their companies will be blindsided by economic, social, and cultural forces. They must work as economically as possible lest they earn the disapproval of shareholders. In contrast, deputy ministers have relatively li le discretion over their budgets and must comply with rules established by central agencies who may or may not be sensitive to the particularities of their line department. DMs are not free to tackle bold new areas of activity. Each initiative must be carefully measured against a vast array of bureaucratic and political considerations. Each ministry must work in harmony with others, must consult endlessly, and must exercise its functions under the watchful eyes of treasuries and cabinet offices and the ever-growing numbers of parliamentary agents. Their work is equally demanding ‒ some might say far more demanding of a broader range of skills than in the private sector ‒ but, more than that, it is endlessly fascinating. This book seeks answers to key fundamental questions: Who are these people? How are they selected? How are they accountable? What functions do they really fulfil? How has their job evolved? These queries are not new to this series, but they have never been addressed so directly as in this volume. Bourgault and Dunn are to be commended for the tenacious leadership they have brought to make this book a reality, as are all the contributors. Together, they have opened many new paths of study on the public sector, both in terms of leadership and provincial administration. It can only be hoped that they will continue on their trails of discovery and, be er still, inspire others to chart new directions in helping us understand the mysteries of public sector leadership. Patrice Dutil Editor, IPAC Series in Public Management and Governance Ryerson University Halloween, 2013

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List of Figures

5.1 5.2 5.3

DM Changes in Quebec, April 2003 to November 2005 137 Destinations of Quebec DMs, April 2003 to February 2005 138 Previous Positions of DMs Appointed April 2003 to February 2005 138 6.1 Gender – Current vs Previous DMs 152 6.2 Education – Current vs Previous DMs 153 6.3 Field of Study – Current vs Previous DMs 154 6.4 Employment Prior to DM Appointment – Current vs Previous DMs 155 6.5 DMs Who Ended Their Career, by Premiership/Term (N = 170) 157 6.6 Number of DM Appointments, by Premier 161 6.7 External Appointments (All DMs) 162 6.8 Externally Appointed DMs Who Started Their Career, by Premiership and Term 163 6.9 Ontario Deputy Ministers, by Sex (Total DM Cohort 1971–2007) 165 6.10 First DM Appointment, by Premiership/Term and Sex 165 6.11 DMs with Central Agency ADM Experience, by Sex (1997–2007) 167 6.12 DMs with Central Agency Experience Who Started Their Career, by Premiership 167 12.1 Public Service Is Losing Its Institutional Memory (N = 400) 333 12.2A Public Service Is Losing Its Policy Capacity (N = 400) 335 12.2B Public Service Is Losing Its Policy Capacity, by Gender (N = 392) 336

xii List of Figures

12.3 12.4 12.5 12.6 12.7A 12.7B 12.8A 12.8B

12.9A 12.9B

12.10A 12.10B

12.11 12.12A 12.12B 12.12C 12.13A 12.13B 12.14A

Government Does Well at Medium- to Long-Term Planning (N = 398) 337 A Suitable Replacement Can Be Found When I Leave (N = 394) 338 Organization Can Respond to Tough Questions (N = 399) 338 Organization Can Provide Thoughtful Advice (N = 398) 339 There Has Been a Centralization of Power in My Jurisdiction (N = 398) 340 There Has Been a Centralization of Power in My Jurisdiction, by Level of Government (N = 397) 341 There Has Been Success in Focusing on Policy and Moving out of Direct Service Delivery (N = 392) 341 There Has Been Success in Focusing on Policy and Moving out of Direct Service Delivery, by Level of Government (N = 391) 342 Political Fit Has Become a More Important Factor in Selection of New Deputy Ministers (N = 395) 343 Political Fit has become a More Important Factor in Selection of New Deputy Ministers, by Level of Government (N = 394) 344 There Is a Need to Encourage Public Service Executives to Move around the System More Than They Do (N = 401) 345 There Is a Need to Encourage Public Service Executives to Move around the System More than They Do, by Level of Government (N = 399) 346 Canadian Productivity as a Significant Policy Challenge (N = 395) 347 Environmental Degradation as a Significant Policy Challenge (N = 396) 347 Environmental Degradation as a Significant Policy Challenge, by Level of Government (N = 395) 348 Environmental Degradation as a Significant Policy Challenge, by Gender (N = 388) 349 Economic Inequality as a Significant Policy Challenge (N = 397) 350 Economic Inequality as a Significant Policy Challenge, by Gender (N = 389) 350 The Fiscal Imbalance as a Significant Policy Challenge (N = 397) 351

List of Figures xiii

12.14B The Fiscal Imbalance as a Significant Policy Challenge, by Level of Government (N = 396) 352 12.14C The Fiscal Imbalance as a Significant Policy Challenge, by Gender (N = 389) 353 12.15A Quebec Separatism as a Significant Policy Challenge (N = 386) 354 12.15B Quebec Separatism as a Significant Policy Challenge, by Level of Government (N = 385) 355 12.16A PSE Policy Orientation (N = 383) 356 12.16B PSE Policy Orientation, by Level of Government (N = 382) 357 12.16C PSE Policy Orientation, by Age (N = 383) 358 13.1 The Deputy Minister’s Work – The Ins and Outs 375 13.2 Destinations of Deputy Ministers, February 2006 to January 2009 385 13.3 Origins of Deputy Ministers Appointed February 2006 to January 2009 387 14.1 The Deputy Minister Community in the Federal Government, 1999–2009 411

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List of Tables

1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 4.1 4.2

Deputy Ministers, Newfoundland, 1950 21 Deputy Ministers, Newfoundland, 1960 23 Deputy Ministers, Newfoundland, 1970 27 Deputy Ministers, Newfoundland and Labrador, 1990 35 Deputy Ministers, Newfoundland and Labrador, 2000 36 Deputy Ministers, Newfoundland and Labrador, 2010 41 Career Profiles of NB Deputy Ministers, 1982–2007 110 Comparison of Socio-economic Profiles of NB Deputy Ministers, 1982–2007 117 4.3 Comparison of Socio-economic Profiles of NB Deputy Ministers in Decade Appointed 117 4.4 Comparison of Socio-economic Profiles of NB Deputy Ministers in Decade Appointed 119 4.5 Career Profiles of NB Deputy Ministers in Year Appointed, 1970–2000 120 5.1 Number of DM-Level Positions Held by Incumbent DMs, May 2009 136 5.2 Number of Years in DM Community for Incumbent DMs, May 2009 137 10.1 Deputy Minister Mobility in BC, 1996–2010 288 10.2 Assistant Deputy Ministers in BC, 2002–10 292 10.3 Gender and BC Public Service Deputy Ministers 296 10.4 Gender and BC Assistant Deputy Ministers 296 10.5 DM Turnover and Type of Ministry, 1996–2006 300 11.1 Senior Public Servants, by Province, 1997–2006 316 11.2 Number of Public Servants, by Size of Province 319 11.3 Movers by Classification and Year, 1997–2006 319

xvi List of Tables

11.4

Turnover Rates – Percentage of Senior Civil Servants New to Position, by Electoral Cycle 320 11.5 Turnover Rates – Percentage of Senior Civil Servants New to Position, by Department Function 321 12.1 Gender, by Level of Government (%) 327 12.2 Visible Minority and Aboriginal, First Nations, and Metis Self-Identification, by Level of Government (%) 328 12.3 Age Group, by Level of Government (%) 330 12.4A Highest Level of Education, by Level of Government (%) 330 12.4B Highest Level of Education, by Gender (%) 330 12.5A Professional Degree, by Level of Government (%) 330 12.5B Professional Degree, by Gender (%) 331 12.6A Number of Previous Appointments Held at (Assistant) Deputy Rank, by Level of Government (%) 332 12.6B Number of Previous Appointment Held at (Assistant) Deputy Rank, by Gender (%) 332 12.7 Length of Time in Current Position, by Level of Government (%) 332 13.1 Deputy Ministers, by Region of Birth 382 13.2 Highest University Degree A ained 383 13.3 Number of Years as Deputy Minister and in the Same Position 384 13.4 Average Number of Years in Civil Service Prior to First Appointment 386 13.5 Overview ‒ Departures and Destinations a er February 2006 387 14.1 Leadership of the Federal Public Service 410 14.2 2010–11 Rates of Pay for EX and DM Groups 412 14.3 Compensation for the DM Community, 2000–10 414

DEPUTY MINISTERS IN CANADA Comparative and Jurisdictional Perspectives

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Introduction jac q u e s b o u r g au lt a n d christopher dunn

Collectively, provincial deputy ministers sit astride the largest assembly of government budgets, employees, and influence in Canada, but they have remained largely unstudied and hence largely unsung. This book is an a empt to peel away some of the veneer of mystery from this collectivity. It will review their numbers, stability, mobility, and other ma ers. It will look at the models of DM responsibilities and their interactions with the world of politics. It suggests that more has to be done to systematize our studies of the breed. It will also update the state of knowledge about federal deputy ministers. Their recruitment, a itudes, compensation, and a host of other ma ers are reviewed in detail. At Canada’s origins, the federal government adopted for its cadre of senior officials the model prevailing in the United Province of Canada before Confederation. This model was based on the Province’s Civil Service Act, 1857. Provinces later adopted the same model. It is worth noting that the inspiration for the overall Canadian system was the Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 1853 (Heintzman 1997, 3). Some, of course, evolved in their own particular ways. It is the job of this book to explain where, why, and how. It would be difficult, and it is not our purpose, to compare jurisdictions to find the “best one.” Each has its own history, characteristics, and sensitivities, there is no formal criterion for rigorous comparison, and, above all, much depends on the lens of the observer. This study is not a competition to discover any Canadian idol of virtue. It is be er to look at it as eleven cases where politics meets public management under specific circumstances. Each tells a unique story, featuring a sensitive

4 Jacques Bourgault and Christopher Dunn

bureaucracy and a search for efficient management within the parameters of the rule of law. The study of deputy ministers has to take into account institutional traditions, as well as social, political, and administrative history (Painter and Peters 2010). It should also tell how each jurisdiction has evolved. This entails consideration of such factors as the socio-economic characteristics of administrative elites, possible politicization of recruitment, the impact of New Public Management (NPM), the role of the centre (premier, Premier’s Office), and varieties of ministerial–bureaucratic relations. This study also indicates the extent to which NPM has affected federal and provincial bureaucracies. Recruitment, careers, salary levels, performance appraisal processes, salary increases, bonuses paid, political agenda implementation, authority of ministers, parliamentary accountability, administrative transparency, relations with premiers, Premiers’ Offices, ministers, ministers’ secretariats – all have felt the influence of NPM. The public image of DMs is also an issue we investigate. How do they participate in the new governance modes? Are they more likely to appear before the public, talk to media, present conferences to pressure groups, and participate in seminars with regional or local authorities, or are they to maintain their traditional reserve, leaving the stage for politicians? The literature offers various and sometimes conflicting visions of what the deputy minister should be – archetypes. Jung viewed archetypes as symbols capable of emotive power (Jung 1981). They were the pa erned aspects of the collective unconscious that shape our views of the world. They may be externalized as symbols, which can provoke reactions or expectations. It is not at all fanciful to say that this sort of thinking applies to provincial deputies, since our research reveals that long-standing images of what people expect from deputies determine in large part how governments operate (Dutil 2008). Politicians have expectations of them, seeing them either as experts or as extensions of themselves; departmental officials as well look to them to provide the tone at the top. In addition, deputies have expectations of each other, as any cursory examination of Yes Minister will reveal. The predominance of certain archetypes at certain junctures can also explain why what some call the “standard responsibilities” of deputies are not so standard in all jurisdictions.

Introduction 5

Perhaps no figure in the Westminster model has so many contradictory images and expectations associated with it. One is the British model of the permanent secretary as the guardian of the public interest. The deputy is the policymaker, or a topical specialist mastering a policy sector, or a seasoned official, a pilot directing the policy process. There is a more modern version of the deputy as the manager of a more entrepreneurial corps of public officials, who serves as the centre of a communications network of private and public interveners. Then there is a more hard-to-define version of the deputy as leader; here he or she must ensure that the regime endures, and that there is an assured succession plan for public servants. This is an increasingly important role, especially in the face of increased competition from the private sector and not-for-profits for highly qualified staff. These archetypes may be associated with particular eras in British or Canadian administrative evolution, but they do not disappear; their psychological remnants remain with us, affect how we see the deputy’s role, and are sometimes in conflict. They also help us to understand and, more important, to organize the myriad roles deputies serve, and provide benchmarks by which to evaluate them. These archetypes are, of course, pure forms or ideal types and are seldom found in their entirety in one person or set of persons. However, we tend to find them in certain concentrations in certain administrations across the country. In some jurisdictions, deputies may even have to embody most archetypes on the same day, depending on the situation they address and the will and style of their political masters. The variety of competency frameworks and requirements for deputy minister recruitment among jurisdictions also results in the overlap of archetypal characteristics. Federal and provincial deputies live in somewhat different worlds. Jurisdictions and responsibilities vary, with provinces having narrower jurisdictions but enjoying closer relationships to the citizens. There is a more immediate accountability and appraisal relationship with citizens. The level of uncertainty about important policy options tends to be higher with provinces, as many depend on federal transfer payments, whereas the federal government lives with more global policy influences. Provinces face competition from the federal level in human resource (HR) management, and especially DM management, with different resources to pay, a ract, and retain employees. The world of difference is apparent almost everywhere. Most provincial

6 Jacques Bourgault and Christopher Dunn

inputs (budget, HR, systems, political mapping) and outputs (number of deliveries) generally come in smaller volumes, all policy positions must take into account a narrower but more intense sense of collective identity, the decisions have a more direct impact on taxation, and there is closer scrutiny by the media. These jurisdictional studies lead one to reflect on differences in Canadian public administration. Readers will be struck by the differences in DM roles between and within the provinces. Political– administrative relations also differ. Performing a deputy minister’s role within the provinces may vary according to their size, socio-economic characteristics, wealth, traditions, sense of political identity, relations with the political world, openness to New Public Management, etc. Christopher Dunn (chapter 1) covers the recent evolution of expectations regarding deputy ministers in Newfoundland and Labrador. The province has moved from Smallwood’s partly patronage/partisan management system to a professional non-partisan one still in place but at present influenced by managerial practice expectations. He sees the historically dominant guardian archetype giving way more and more to that of manager. Michelle Coffin and Lori Turnbull (chapter 2), following Peter Aucoin, observe that Nova Scotia is an exemplar of the “new public governance.” Senior officials are in general non-partisan but sensitive to political policy orientations. Political actors employ a series of strategic and tactical levers to try to ensure their political agenda is implemented. Competency of officials and sense of the protection of public interest is, however, still in place. In Prince Edward Island, Peter McKenna explains (chapter 3) that the small size of the province and of its budget allows direct ministerial involvement. The patronage-ridden service of the seventies ceased, replaced by one in which appointments are based on departmental service and merit. “Tables” of deputies, in place since the early 1970s, have evolved to a point where, under Premier Ghiz, they constitute an institutionalized form of corporate management. Gilles Bouchard (chapter 4) presents New Brunswick deputy ministers as being directly under the control of premiers or of the Premier’s Office for most aspects of their job: appointment, agenda, oversight, appraisal, and, finally, pay increases. No surprise if they are very sensitive to the premier’s rotation. The majority, however, are career public servants. In a great many cases, the deputies take orders from premiers rather than from their own minister.

Introduction 7

Quebec has had a tradition of, and a reputation for, political patronage. Where deputy ministers are concerned, Jacques Bourgault and Stéphanie Viola-Plante demonstrate in chapter 5 that the reputation is exaggerated. Most are appointed a er a career in the public service. Even when that is not the case, they a ain deputy status by virtue of being “domain specialists.” True, Premier Charest used Crown corporations to install Liberals when he took power in 2003 and removed some deputies, yet the rate was a “normal one” and recruitment came largely from within. The small milieu of provincial administration makes it difficult to install corporate management. The main levers used to a empt corporate management are involvement by the Premier’s Office and some strategic political appointments (secretary to Cabinet, Treasury Board, Finance, and sensitive departments). Bryan Evans, Janet Lum, and Duncan MacLellan (chapter 6) review the expectations of DMs over the last fi y years in Ontario. All the archetypes were evident over the past several decades, depending on the premier’s agenda and reigning policy preferences. DMs moved from the traditional serial server to the “guru” role, to policy implementer, and now to the politically responsive competent manager and leader. Greater external recruitment was accompanied by a greater level of politicization and more a ractive compensation. The new leadership archetype imports managerial practices from the private sector. Since the 1990s, corporate management has made significant inroads in Ontario and is considered the normal way to run the government’s business. As Rebecca Jensen and Paul Thomas outline in chapter 7, Manitoba retains the classical guardian tendencies but has begun to transition to a leadership model in recent years. It is significant that the stringent measures associated with assuring implementation success, as with the managerial archetype – appointment of deputies on term contracts, the use of annual performance appraisals linked to promotions and compensation of deputies, and the use of larger political staffs – has not materialized in Manitoba. With Premier Doer, deputies played an active role as spokespersons and negotiators on behalf of their departments. Saskatchewan, according to Ken Rasmussen (chapter 8), embraces a hybrid model for deputy ministers, according to which they function not strictly as career bureaucrats but as “political executives.” Premiers expect a high level of sensitivity to the government’s political agenda. The classic portrait of neutral competence made popular by British senior officials never really materialized in Saskatchewan.

8 Jacques Bourgault and Christopher Dunn

The CCF/NDP and successor governments wanted to inculcate loyalty to the program of the party in power, and dismissals tended to follow changes in government. Yet the short careers, high level of turnover, and exclusion of deputies from policy deliberation all made it increasingly difficult for governments to achieve their goals. The latest government under Premier Wall has started to come to grips with the predicament, by having the government-sympathetic external recruits it hired either fired or downgraded a er two years and replaced with people from within the service. As of 2011, there is a move towards a more neutral and more competent cadre of deputy ministers. Deputy ministers in Alberta, as presented by Allan Tupper in chapter 9, represent a modern balance of old roles and new. Unique in Canada, they seem to be a combination of neutral competence and leader archetypes. They are neutrally competent managers and leaders, and results-oriented team players. Chosen through a transparent process open to outsiders, they are not politicized, although they are sensitive and responsive to the government of the day. Deputies frequently practise horizontal management, meeting as a group to discuss their combined role. The deputies’ contribution to corporate management is in fact one of the three criteria for their annual evaluation (the other two being quality of advice to the premier and performance as department manager). The deputy minister of Executive Council has the main role in this evaluation. Evert Lindquist and Thea Vakil (chapter 10) describe the British Columbia deputy minister community as a group with high turnover due to the search for political responsiveness to government’s strategic directions. Government, however, hires a notable and impressive mix of recruits. They tend to be strong individuals with sound public policy experience. Valuing the leadership archetype, British Columbia provides performance incentives for DMs and promotes HR development through a variety of instruments such as professional development programs. Overall, a balance of qualities from all three archetypal models seems apparent, whatever the source of appointment. Two comparative chapters devote special a ention to the provinces. First, in chapter 11, Gerald Bierling, Barbara Wake Carroll, and Michael Whyte Kpessa compare empirical data on arrivals and departures of provincial DMs in relation to provincial elections. They observe that there was an increase in the number of senior bureaucrats, despite the rhetoric of downsizing. Furthermore, incoming governments seem to respect the integrity and knowledge of the permanent establishment

Introduction 9

for purposes of continuity, policy capacity, and implementation. Strong provincial cultures could explain why there is almost no movement of deputies between provincial governments. Bryan Evans, Janet Lum, and John Shields provide a descriptive analysis in chapter 12 of provincial deputy ministers based on a 2006 survey of deputy ministers (DMs) and assistant deputy ministers (ADMs) at the federal, provincial, and territorial levels of government in Canada. Their survey points to some of the challenges and issues facing the public service today. They mention problems such as deputy profiles that have to become more representative, the practice of horizontal government, declining policy capacity, loss of institutional memory, and deficiencies in the strategic capability to plan ahead. Deputies, however, are confident that their institutions do provide them with the capacity to function at a day-to-day level and to offer quality advice to their political masters. Notably, level of government does affect the type of response. Differences and similarities are evident. Differences in response revolved around the demographic profile of deputies, questions on the centralization of power, the evaluation of governments’ success in focusing on policy over service delivery, the importance of political fit in choosing a deputy, and whether senior executives should be encouraged to move around the system more. But on many questions, such as concerns about the loss of institutional memory and policy capacity, there was a consistent pa ern of responses by deputies across jurisdictions. On three key policy issues, gender made a difference in deputy responses. Female deputies, for example, tended to place greater weight on the importance to their jurisdiction of environmental degradation, economic inequality, and the so-called fiscal imbalance. The responses provide insight into such ma ers as the state of policy capacity, the politicaladministrative interface, the struggle for coherence and coordination within the administrative state, and personal policy orientations. Turning to the federal level, Jacques Bourgault and David Zussman (chapters 13 and 14) provide observations on the system and compensation practices. Bourgault first studies statutory and historical aspects of the federal DM’s role, placing particular emphasis on ministerial selection in Canada and its impact on deputy minister selection and role definition. He then looks at the professional status of the senior civil service in Canada and the practice of non-partisanship. He then turns his a ention to the evolution of deputies’ duties, powers, and roles. This is followed by an analysis of minister–deputy relations and

10 Jacques Bourgault and Christopher Dunn

the challenge of multiple DM accountabilities. He presents an analysis of the evolution of the federal deputy ministers’ profile, then turns to more modern challenges, including deputy minister organizational leadership and the effect of corporate management as practised in O awa. He concludes with the ongoing development of public management in Canada and its impact on the deputy minister profession. Zussman studies the evolution of DM compensation in the federal public service. He looks at the relative importance of pay for performance and whether it is a useful management tool for increasing productivity or job satisfaction or has an effect on motivation. He observes that the merits of executive compensation based on generous performance-pay clauses will be heavily scrutinized as the global economy adjusts to the impact of the current recession. He notes that there is increasing recognition that high salaries and performance pay may have induced some inappropriate behaviour. According to Zussman, some lessons were learned along the road: compensation in the federal government for senior executives does not appear to be an issue in recruitment and retention; however, if demographic forces lead to significant vacancies at the apex of government organizations, the compensation gap will be a significant barrier to recruit the best mid-career executives; in Canada there seems to be li le evidence that the at-risk and bonus system increases performance; in fact, at-risk pay and bonus systems may encourage destructive competition among peers. Why this book? It’s simple. Executive federalism still plays a major role in Canada. Interprovincial relations grow in importance every year. Deputies from one jurisdiction have the ability, if not the tendency, to continue their career in any other province or at the federal level. Therefore, it is important to know each other be er and to explain the traditions of particular jurisdictions and the driving forces in each of them. And context ma ers. Institutional conditions may be nearly identical, but different contexts produce a variety of politicoadministrative arrangements. In terms of management and relations with politicians, it may also provide some “learning,” illustrating what works and what does not work under certain circumstances and why. The book looks at ten provinces and the federal jurisdiction. Scholarship on the territories will one day have matured to the point where their deputies can be examined in a work like this. In the time it takes for any collective book to come together, political and administrative portraits continue to change. The collection of material for this book ended between October 2010 and April 2011, depending on the

Introduction 11

authors. It is possible that new trends or new governments establishing new governance modes have evolved in the interim, but we are confident that the material presented is accurate for the periods under observation and represents a significant analysis of each jurisdiction’s trends.

REFERENCES Dutil, Patrice, ed. 2008. Searching for Leadership: Secretaries to Cabinet in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Heintzman, Ralph. 1997. “Introduction.” In Public Administration and Public Management: Experiences in Canada, edited by J. Bourgault, M. Demers, and C. Williams, 1–12. Quebec: Publications du Québec. Jung, C.G. 1981. “The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious.” In The Collected Works of C.G. Jung. Vol. 9, I, paras 87–110. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Painter, Martin, and B. Guy Peters, eds. 2010. Tradition and Public Administration. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. h p://dx.doi.org/10.1057/ 9780230289635.

1 Deputy Ministers in Newfoundland and Labrador: From Guardians to Managers christopher dunn

Deputy ministers in Newfoundland and Labrador are probably the best indicator of the nature of its political system at any particular time. They are hard to decipher, for they have taken on the nature of an elite brotherhood that does not share its secrets readily. One must read into the history of the position, DM backgrounds, hiring pa erns, duration in office, turnover, and methods of creation some of the mysteries of the post. Even then, the picture is incomplete. As indicators of the political system, deputies – sometimes, as in the 1930s, called secretaries – were flawless. When the system was patronage-ridden, as during the period of Responsible Government (1855–1934), they were chosen according to partisan considerations and served political purposes. When fate decreed the dominion be placed in a kind of bureaucratic receivership, as in Commission of Government, they formed a bureaucratic brotherhood and brought Newfoundland closer to the British administrative model. In Confederation, they became a reflection of national movements, initially speaking truth to power and then reflecting performance management trends. Statutory Minimalism Deputies owe their existence, as is the case elsewhere, to a combination of statute and convention. However, unlike in some other jurisdictions, the statutory descriptions are minimalist, and deputies have had to have their duties absorbed almost by osmosis. The primary source is the Executive Council Act of 1995. The Executive Council Act establishes the departmental framework for assigning acts passed by the House of Assembly to a responsible minister. Previous to this act, seventeen departments had their own

Deputy Ministers in Newfoundland and Labrador 13

departmental acts, which were abolished in 1995, and the departments and the authorities accorded to them were continued by the Executive Council Act. Now the premier, rather than the legislature, would create departments. Sections 5, 9, and 12 set the scene. Section 5 provides that “the Lieutenant-Governor in Council may create departments of the government and may on the advice of the Premier appoint ministers of the executive council, to hold office during pleasure, to preside over the individual departments and to discharge those duties, exercise those powers and perform those functions that the Lieutenant-Governor in Council may determine.” A notice including the name of the department and the powers, duties, and functions of its minster is published in the Gaze e, constituting subordinate legislation for the purpose of the Statutes and Subordinate Legislation Act. The Executive Council Act affects not only ministers, but deputies as well. The LGIC appoints deputy ministers and assistant deputy ministers “on the advice of the Premier” [s. 9(1)]. Duties are stated minimally: “The deputy minister shall be the deputy head of the department” [9(2)]. There are several sources of ministerial – and by interpretation, deputy minister – powers. Section 12 of the Executive Council Act provides that the minister’s powers and authorities may be delegated to other persons. This does not mention delegation to the deputy per se, but presumably the wording would catch the deputy in its ambit. Departments administer a number of acts and associated regulations in the name of the minister and the province. In addition, the mandate of each department is set out by a “Notice” under the Executive Council Act. The most recent mandate of a department can be found in that notice. Another source of the authority of the DM is the Financial Administration Act, 1990, which lists some very elemental financial duties: 26. (1) Each deputy minister or other officer charged with the administration of a Head of Expenditure or a subhead of expenditure shall notify the comptroller general of a commitment chargeable against that Head of Expenditure or subhead of expenditure. (2) A deputy minister or other officer charged with the administration of a Head of Expenditure or a subhead of expenditure shall not enter into a commitment unless an appropriation exists or is in a sufficient amount to meet the commitment.

14 Christopher Dunn

Later in the section the deputy is enabled to authorize expenditures in a subsequent fiscal year if this is deemed expedient. Elsewhere, in section 30, the deputy is tasked with certifying that “work has been performed, the goods supplied or the service rendered and that the price charged is according to contract, or where not specified by contract, is reasonable” before payment of public money can be made, or payment is according to contract where it is before the work is to be performed. A third source is the Public Service Commission Act, 1990, where we find that the deputy status is a generic designation of a cohort of elite officers. These are the top of the administrative structure, but of course they are not all heads of departments, like the deputy minister. Deputy status is accorded to chief executive ministers, and 2. (c) “chief executive officer” means (i)

the deputy minister in a department of the government of the province, (ii) the Clerk of the House of Assembly, (ii.1) a person appointed to preside over a statutory office of the House of Assembly, (iii) the Clerk of the Executive Council, and (iv) another official head of an agency designated by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council to function as a deputy minister for the purposes of this Act.

A fourth source is the Public Sector Collective Bargaining Act, 1990, where we find the deputy as part of a general class of persons excluded from collective bargaining: 2 (1) (h) (i) “employee” … does not include a person (viii)

who is employed in a position confidential to the LieutenantGovernor, a minister of the Crown, a judge of the Court of Appeal or a judge of the Trial Division, a Provincial Court judge, the deputy, associate deputy or assistant deputy head of a department of government or a chairperson or chief executive officer of a government board, commission or agency.

Of note is the fact that excluded status descends further than it does in most provinces, including associate deputies and assistant deputies. It also excludes solicitors in Justice, legislative counsels, officers

Deputy Ministers in Newfoundland and Labrador 15

and staff of the House of Assembly, most employees of the Executive Council, employees of the chief electoral officer, managers and supervisors, and those who, in the opinion of the Labour Relations Board, act as labour relations officers in a confidential capacity, or as policy and program advisors in a confidential capacity to the employer. One more act that applies to deputies is the Transparency and Accountability Act, which provides for performance contracts for deputies. Since it is not a framework act in the same fashion as the preceding acts, but one governing the conditions under which deputies work, it will be dealt with later, in the section describing the Williams government and its approach to deputies. The Implications of Statutory Minimalism The acts in operation in Newfoundland and Labrador provide the bare minimum necessary to create departments and their administrative leadership. Governments have not taken the opportunity to infuse the post with corporate and purpose-driven language. Certain things are missing, not explored, or rejected. No Role for Legislature The first thing that is missing is a meaningful role for the legislature in the formation of departments. The province has returned to a method of creation of departments that was the practice before the introduction of Responsible Government in Canada. Gregory Tardi comments, “While the determination of portfolios remains a prime ministerial prerogative, the establishment of departments and the conduct of their life cycle had become a ma er of law in Canadian practice between the Union Act of 1840 and the time of Confederation … Notwithstanding the nineteenth-century constitutional language [of the Constitution Act, 1867], which now seems arcane, it is clear that in the perception of the Fathers of Confederation, government departments need to be grounded in legislation. The modern authors also express the unanimous opinion that departments are required to be established by statute” (2010, 25). The reasons this is preferable to creating departments totally by statute are several. First of all, legislatures, and the public they serve, have precious few tools to exercise influence over departments. Second, departments are the government’s semaphore for signalling which public policy areas are worthy of the most a ention. The public

16 Christopher Dunn

and legislature deserve a role in the identification of problem areas that need emphasis. In creating departments, one is creating purposes for public bodies. When the government ended a stand-alone Fisheries Department and teamed Fisheries and Agriculture, many saw it as a diminution of the province’s concern with the fishery per se. It would have been useful to have a debate on whether or not this was the case. Third, and this foreshadows a later point, if one is to hold deputies to account for the management of the department, as do some accounting officer themes, the legislature should be able to create the structure for which the deputy is accountable in managing. No Description of Deputy Minister’s Generic or Corporate Duties There is no description of functions generic to the post of deputy minister in the Newfoundland legislation, when arguably there should be. Section 9 of the Executive Council Act refers to the deputy minister being the “deputy head” and then obliquely to the “duties of the deputy minister” and the “proper conduct of the business of a department” without saying what they are. The Orders in Council creating departments typically mention the powers of the minister but the deputy minister is not mentioned. By contrast, section 29 of the Public Service of Ontario Act (Ontario Provincial Parliament, 2006), outlines the generic and corporate duties of the deputy minister class. The deputy is “responsible for the operation of the ministry,” for giving the minister information required to perform the multiple roles the incumbent faces, and a general responsibility to promote “effective, non-partisan, professional, ethical and competent public service by public servants.” As Evans, Lum, and MacLellan note in their review of Ontario deputies, this means that “for the first time the deputy minister’s advisory role was explicitly acknowledged, and this … asserted the foundations of Ontario’s public administration in the traditional Westminster doctrines of political neutrality, merit and professional/technical expertise” (chapter 6). It also meant that the legislature recognized the balance of accountabilities inherent in the position, because the deputy is enjoined to serve the minister and Cabinet at the same time and is required to serve the public in the upholding of traditional values, which may on some occasions require the exercise of independent judgment. (On this la er point, see Sossin 2010.) It is not asking too much to suggest similar arrangements for the province, or other provinces for that ma er.

Deputy Ministers in Newfoundland and Labrador 17

The History of the Position As noted elsewhere, there have been three public services in Newfoundland (Dunn 2006b).1 The first public service under Responsible Government was not unified, but a loose collection of ministerial fiefdoms whose only commonality was a tendency to spend with no regard to the public good, only to political expediency. It was not even remotely merit-based. Professionalism was enhanced in the second public service, but it was bought at the cost of an artificial, paternalistic Commission of Government (1934–49). The third public service began when the province joined Canada’s federal system in 1949. I argue that the three public services evolved dialectically, with the third synthesizing aspects or characteristics from the first two (Dunn 2000). The Newfoundland story is also a story of successive Cabinet models: there was first a traditional Cabinet (the patronage-based predecessor to the unaided Cabinet) until 1934; then under the Commission of Government it had no Cabinet at all, but an UK-appointed body of six commissioners, half from Britain and half from Newfoundland, which functioned as a combination legislature and executive; then it had an unaided Cabinet – with minimal central assistance or collegiality – under Smallwood until 1972; therea er it switched to an institutionalized model with strong central agencies and relatively more collegiality, which has endured to the present day, despite widespread allegations of premier-centred government. Responsible Government The literature on deputy ministers in the Responsible Government days is slim to non-existent. One has to piece the information together from disparate sources. The deputy and his minister – there were no women in the position – typically had a small fiefdom to watch over. Channing says that there were only 608 civil servants in the service in 1891, a number not including the employees of the Newfoundland Railway. The number grew moderately until 1901, when it was 739. Ten years later it was 1,468, and in 1921, 1,712 (1982, 5). Divide this by a certain number of departments, and the result was eventually seven quite small bureaucratic entities. By the time the British Amulree Commission (which recommended Commission of Government for Newfoundland) reported, there were the Department of Finance, Department of the Colonial Secretary (later

18 Christopher Dunn

the Secretary of State), Department of Justice, Board of Education (later the Department of Education), Department of Marine and Fisheries, Department of Agriculture and Mines, and the Department of Public Works (Appendix C). Nothing specific is available on the recruitment of deputies. However, general information suggests that the civil service was dangerously suboptimal, because recruitment was based on considerations other than merit. Appointments based on politics, nepotism, and religion were rampant, said the Amulree Commission. The civil service of Newfoundland exists only in name. In place of an organized service by examination or otherwise under established regulations, there is a collection of individuals who for the most part owe their positions to political influence. There is no cohesion and no esprit de corps. Li le regard is paid to the qualifications of candidates for particular posts. The spoils system is in force, and it has been the practice for the party returned to power at a general election to find places in government employment not merely for their political supporters but also for their friends and relations. In addition, the civil service is handicapped by the arrangement under which appointments are distributed as evenly as possible among the denominations; in an individual department, members of one region or another are o en by tradition the predominant factor in it, and, in the case of new appointments, efficiency is liable to be sacrificed in order that a person of a certain denomination may be appointed (Amulree Commission 1933, ss 566, 567). One can only presume that this kind of recruitment must have affected the deputy level as well, especially given the failure, noted later, of the service to speak truth to power, which is – or should be – the nature of the post. In the result, apart from very few individual exceptions, the civil servant is apt to be subservient to the politicians, is afraid of assuming responsibility for fear of offending them, has a tenure of office that is liable to be uncertain, and is generally lacking in efficiency (Amulree Commission, ss 568, 569). The commission notes that the model of the UK service is not followed. There was no traditional financial stewardship dynamic at work here: “In a normal Civil Service [like that of the United Kingdom] it is to be expected that the officials in a given Department will check and prune very carefully any proposals for expenditure which it may have to meet before submi ing them to the Treasury. This is not done in

Deputy Ministers in Newfoundland and Labrador 19

Newfoundland … The Controller of the Treasury can rarely rely on the proper co-operation of Departments in checking and curtailing expenditure; and it is necessary for him to assume a greater responsibility in supervising the detailed work of the Departments in this respect than should normally be required” (Amulree Commission, s 572). The spoils system frustrated a empts, both statutory and informal, to control expenses. Departmental autonomy was a natural accompaniment to sectarianism and the spoils system (Dunn 2000, 175). However, the commission anticipated with approval that “[UK] Government have in view the issue of regulations which will bring conditions in the Civil Service more into alignment with those in force, e.g., in the United Kingdom” (Amulree Commission, s 574). Commission of Government The Commission of Government replaced Responsible Government in the wake of a severe fiscal crisis. The aim was indeed to bring Newfoundland public policy and public administration into line with those of the United Kingdom (Noel 1972, 228). The commissioners reorganized the seven government departments into more functional groupings, each grouping under a commissioner, and required that departmental administrative practices be standardized. Patronage and religion, which had dominated appointment and promotion, now gave way to more merit-based practices, but the lack of a bona fide public service commission was a continuing gap in personnel management. While hiring of staff was improved, their salary, expenditure, and recruitment remained in the hands of departments. Commission of Government was in many ways the antithesis of Responsible Government. The urge to spend was replaced with the urge to control expenditures. Instead of decentralized financial and public administration, there was centralized (UK) financial control. Instead of laissez-faire, professionalism was the focus for financial affairs. Instead of the public servant under the thumb of politicians, the politicians were now directed by a bureaucratic state. Legal-rational bureaucratic norms replaced, to an extent, sectarianism and politicization of decision-making. The day-to-day reality, Susan McCorquodale says, was twofold: tight control from London and delays (1973, 175–6). Small wonder that both commissioners and deputies tended to chafe under these restrictions. One of the commissioners – British! – would even write a book on such

20 Christopher Dunn

inconveniences, the ironically named Dictatorship in Newfoundland (Lodge 1939). What one had in the commission model was layering of civil service elements. There was the Dominions Office in the United Kingdom, to which the commissioners reported through the governor. It was renowned for its slowness in decision-making. Then there were the commissioners, three at a time from the United Kingdom and three from Newfoundland. The commissioners were rotated through the posts: over the fi een years of the commission’s existence, thirteen U.K. commissioners and nine Newfoundland commissioners. All but one of the U.K. commissioners were former public servants (McCorquodale 1973, 159). They made their recommendations to the governor, which nearly always carried the day, a er deciding on them by consensus. Then there were the secretaries to the commissioners, in another layer. The deputies of the day, then, were something like deputies to the receivers of an enterprise in distress. Receivership does not lend itself to taking chances, but to building up organizational capacity. The commissioners and their deputies, then, built what had been lacking in the previous era, a functioning career public service. There were recruitment boards, organized on an ad hoc basis and non-binding, as opposed to the regular public service commissions then existing in Canada, but an approximation nevertheless. The boards were selected by the governor-in-commission and composed of a triad of actors: the hiring department, the Department of Finance, and the auditor general. There were positions designated along British lines, accompanied by fixed salary scales and annual increments determined by the commissioner of the treasury, the staffing authority designated by the Treasury Control Act (Channing 1982, 20). Now that the public service’s origins were not suspect, and the functions of government were moderately expanded, it grew – in fact it almost doubled to 4,737 by 1948–9 (18) – and became a brotherhood of administrators. The First Years of Confederation: Professional but Limited – Smallwood and the Deputy Group The brotherhood – there were no women for many years – would remain relatively intact, even a er a regime change. One benefit of the commission was that it was able to bequeath to the new province of Newfoundland in 1949 a cadre of trained professional deputies from its own deputies (secretaries) and senior officials (see table 1.1). Walter

Deputy Ministers in Newfoundland and Labrador 21 Table 1.1. Deputy Ministers, Newfoundland, 1950 Title

Name

Deputy attorney general Deputy minister of education Deputy minister of finance Deputy minister of fisheries and co-operatives Deputy minister of health Deputy minister of labour Deputy minister of natural resources Deputy minister of public welfare Deputy minister of public works Deputy minister of provincial affairs Deputy minister of supply

Harold George Puddester George Alain Frecker Walter Melvil Marshall F. Scott Leonard A. Miller Selby Headly Clark Parsons K.J. Carter F.W. Rowe R. Manning William J. Carew Clarence Wilhelm Powell

Melvil Marshall (1905–11), appointed controller and deputy minister of finance in 1949, held the post until his retirement in 1966, had in fact been the secretary to the commission’s Department of Finance in the 1940s. George Alain Frecker (1905–79), appointed secretary for education n 1944, remained deputy minister of education with the Province of Newfoundland until 1959. Harold George Puddester (1905–89), made King’s counsel and appointed secretary to the Department of Justice in 1944, served as deputy a orney general from 1949 to 1963. Selby Headly Clark Parsons (1909–68), appointed labour relations officer in 1945, a key official at the time, was in 1951 appointed deputy minister of labour with the key purpose of overseeing the establishment of a provincial Labour Department modelled a er other provinces. Clarence Wilhelm Powell (1918–?), appointed director of local government affairs in 1947, a er Confederation served as the deputy minister of supply, to 1952, and of municipal affairs, 1952–7. One of them, the remarkable William J. Carew, had in fact achieved the distinction of being the trusted senior administrator of three regimes. Born in 1890, he entered the civil service in the prime minister’s staff in 1909 in St John’s at the young age of nineteen. He would subsequently serve as secretary to eight of Newfoundland’s prime ministers until the dawn of Commission Government. Therea er he would serve as the secretary to the commission for the duration of its existence. When Newfoundland became a province of Canada, he became the clerk of the executive council and remained at that post until 1956.

22 Christopher Dunn

Smallwood refers to him as “my old friend” several times in his biography (Smallwood 1973). The general level of education was significantly higher than that of the population served. Three of the eleven deputies (27 per cent) had professional degrees, one had a doctorate (Rowe), and two appear to have had undergraduate degrees. There were no scientific degrees, management degrees, or graduate degrees, with one exception (Rowe). Data are not available on the education background for the rest of the deputies. There were no women in the deputy ranks. There may have been an aura of professionalism in the new province, but it did not extend as far as it could have, especially in personnel matters. For the first time in history, there was a Civil Service Commission, established in 1953, but it had a modest mandate. The lieutenantgovernor in council (LGIC) could exempt posts from the authority of the commission. The commission’s role was limited: its ranking of three candidates for appointment according to merit was advisory and not binding. The minister indeed could reject the list completely and cause an alternative list to be generated. As McCorquodale notes, “The result was to at least open the door to political patronage,” but it was not a wholesale return to the pa ern that had predominated before 1934 (McCorquodale 1973, 355–6). The post-Confederation cohort was relatively stable, as a snapshot of the 1960 group of deputies shows (table 1.2). Four were in the same position as ten years before, and six had worked in the Commission of Government as senior officials. Data are not available on the education background for six of the deputies. Of the seven for whom there are records, two had professional degrees, one had a doctorate (Miller), one a master’s, and two appear to have had undergraduate degrees; there were no scientific degrees, but one had a management degree. Much of this was to be expected. This professional degree status, for example, is in keeping with the nature of the government: a lawyer in Justice, a doctor in Health. There were no women in the DM ranks. The role of deputies in the Smallwood years has to be considered in the context of the decision-making style of the premier. It was centralized, in the fashion of the unaided, or departmental, Cabinet (Dunn 2005). Not all ministers and deputies exercised the same degree of influence. The premier and a small coterie of ministers and deputies, nicknamed the “kitchen Cabinet,” met regularly for lunch in the premier’s dining room on the first floor of the Confederation Building

Deputy Ministers in Newfoundland and Labrador 23 Table 1.2. Deputy Ministers, Newfoundland, 1960 Title

Name

Deputy attorney general Deputy minister of economic development Deputy minister of education Deputy minister of finance Deputy minister of fisheries Deputy minister of health Deputy minister of highways Deputy minister of labour Deputy minister of mines and resources Deputy minister of municipal affairs and supply Deputy minister of provincial affairs Deputy minister of public welfare Deputy minister of public works

Harold George Puddester Arthur Johnson Philip J. Hanley Walter Melvil Marshall Eric Gosse Leonard. A. Miller C.A. Knight G.T. Dyer P.J. Murray Clarence Wilhelm Powell James Channing R.L. Andrews R. Manning

and o en discussed the business of government informally. The inner circle included mostly ministers – A orney General Les Curtis, Fred W. Rowe of Education, John Nolan (Supply), but also one DM, O.L. Vardy, the deputy in the powerful and dirigiste Department of Economic Development, the department headed by the premier himself. Another powerful deputy of the time was the comptroller and deputy minister of finance, Walter Marshall. Len Curtis was the finance minister, but Marshall was the real power in the department, his influence due partly to statute and partly to circumstances. In 1951, a new Revenue and Audit Act was passed, following on the heels of a comprehensive review of the financial practices of the new province. A section of the act described the operations of the Treasury Board, established as a commi ee of the Cabinet, consistent with practice in other provinces with the minister of finance as chairman and the deputy minister and comptroller of finance as secretary. Channing says that the statutory prescription gave way to personal influence: “In practice, the Board met infrequently and all of its powers and functions were exercised by the Deputy Minister and Comptroller who, to all intents and purposes, became a one-man Treasury Board. This modus operandi did not meet with the unanimous approval of the senior executive officers in the various departments, with whom there were frequent differences of opinion and interpretation, but the Deputy Minister and Comptroller remained steadfast in his view that the Department of Finance should

24 Christopher Dunn

be the ultimate arbiter in ma ers of financial control” (Channing, 1982, 63–4). At issue, of course, was the principle that underlay the act itself: a developing consensus based on federal and provincial practice that departments could not continue as they had under the two previous regimes, to act as the independent actors in the taking on of financial obligations. Marshall, with his previous fi een years’ experience as deputy in Finance, knew that such practices were untenable. Under Finance, there would henceforth be centralization of payrolls, of the issuance of cheques (with accompanying authentication), of the control of spending commitments to be based on authority in the estimates headings, and of pensions. Such was the practice until Marshall retired in 1966. For all the dour experience the senior executive manifested, occasionally there was Wild West aura to their operations. Oliver L. “Al” Vardy was a case in point. Vardy was essentially a failed politician with a past who entered the public service as a fallback. Leaving Newfoundland young for the United States, he went to prison for armed robbery in Albany, New York. Returning to the province in the 1930s, he moved to political life and was elected to the St John’s City Council in 1941. He ran successfully for the Liberals in 1949 and served briefly as parliamentary assistant to Premier Smallwood before becoming minister without portfolio from 1950 to 1951. He was first appointed director of the Tourist Development Division in the Department of Economic Development and later became deputy minister of economic development. Commentaries have not been kind to him. Gwyn, writing while Smallwood was still in office, referred to him as a “sour, frowning character.” John Crosbie, who had occasion to experience him in his capacity as both a member of the Smallwood Liberal Cabinet and a Conservative minister trying to mop up the resource mismanagement of the Smallwood years, says he was the “right-hand man” to Joey Smallwood from 1949 to 1972, and in not in a praiseworthy way (Crosbie 1997, 97). He was subject to a number of judicial processes that speak to his unprofessional and illegal behaviour. An examination by the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission in 1977 by investigator Frederick Sparling found several examples of frauds by American entrepreneur John C. Doyle and his associates, one of whom was Vardy. In 1973 Doyle was arrested and charged with two counts of fraud and two of breach of the public trust, and Vardy was as well charged with fraud and accepting bribes relating to the funding of John C. Doyle’s Labrador Linerboard Mill in Stephenville.

Deputy Ministers in Newfoundland and Labrador 25

Vardy was also separately charged with two counts of fraud, two counts of accepting bribe, and one count of breach of the public trust alleging that, between 1957 and 1968, he had defrauded the Newfoundland government of $135,000 by taking kickbacks on printing orders. In May 1976, Vardy’s accomplice, Jack L. Goodson, pleaded guilty to two charges of bribing Vardy with commissions on sales of printing materials to the provincial government. “Doyle spent the weekend in jail, then was released on $75,000 bail. He le Canada and fled to Panama … Vardy was already in Panama City at the time he was charged. He was arrested in Panama during 1974, but was freed by habeas corpus as he passed through the United States. He stayed there [successfully fighting extradition] and died in his residence in 1980” (Crosbie 1997, 118). Egregious as this was, it was not the only case of venality by Vardy. The 1972 Report of the Royal Commission to Enquire in the Leasing of Premises for the Use of the Newfoundland Liquor Commission named Vardy as one of the three secret owners of a number of premises that were overcharging the provincial government on rentals of their properties and using the money for speculation in British Newfoundland Corporation (Brinco) stocks, at the same time as the premier was negotiating with Brinco to build the Churchill Falls hydro-electric project. (The other two were Smallwood crony and developer Arthur Lundrigan; Vardy and Lundrigan were also in the “kitchen Cabinet.”) Crosbie noted that Lundrigan had had a tuna fishing yacht built and staffed by provincial funds, ostensibly for tourism promotion, but in actual fact for his personal use (1997, 140–1). In addition, Vardy stepped over the line between political activity and impartial behaviour, doing political favours for the premier. It was a sorry state of affairs. Other failed politicians were appointed to deputy positions as sinecures. Arthur Johnson (1900–68), a prominent insurance industry figure in the province, had been appointed minister of natural resources in 1951 but had to resign in 1952 a er losing a by-election. Smallwood had him placed as deputy minister of economic development, where he served from 1954 to 1965 (Encyclopedia of Newfoundland, 3:118–19). There were other anomalies, such as deputies being plucked by Smallwood to enter politics. Frederick W. Rowe was chosen DM of public welfare in 1949 until Smallwood convinced him to enter politics in 1951, when he won election as a member of the House of Assembly for Labrador and would go on to become one of the trusted “kitchen Cabinet” and serve as minister of a succession of departments such as Mines and Resources, Education, Highways, Finance, Community and

26 Christopher Dunn

Social Development, and Labour Affairs. George Alain Frecker went from the administrative (DM, education) to the political realm, running as a Liberal and entering the Cabinet as minister of education (1959–64), and minister of provincial affairs from 1964 to his retirement in 1971. While not illegal, it ran the risk of perceptions that the DM position was a stepping stone to politics and could endanger the traditional view of the deputy as politically neutral and impartial. They may have had more expertise than their Responsible Government analogues, but the Smallwood deputies were cowed, underutilized, and insufficiently respected. One senior executive of the seventies and eighties with Smallwood-era experience said Smallwood considered the deputies “hewers of wood and drawers of water,” unimportant figures in the system (confidential interview, St John’s, NL, 20 June 2010). They were used mostly to draw up budgets and classifications and not for policy advice. In addition, they were o en frightened by the premier. Smallwood seemed to be everywhere in the Confederation Building, which housed the ministers and departmental headquarters; all ministers and deputies could be summoned by an intercom system that joined the premier’s office to theirs and berated in person if whim dictated. “Smallwood,” said the same official, “ruled by intimidation. Some DMs were so terrified they could not go to his office, a er being summoned by the ‘squawk-box’” (ibid.). For all his traditional Cabinet, Smallwood had a sense of the new and upcoming. He was not consistent, nor could he afford to be: he realized he was building a new province with officials from the old, even as the game plan was changing in Canada itself (for example, old Cabinet forms to new ones). There was a “new guard” in senior officials and some new Cabinet ministers who entered public service in the late sixties. However, the new guard was to be found mostly among the directors or ADMs; their day was to come in the seventies and beyond. For the time being, even more stability reigned at the DM level. Six of the deputies had been in office ten years earlier, and four had worked in the Commission of Government. Snow on the mountaintop, grass on the slopes (see table 1.3). Regre ably, all that is known about the educational background of this 1970 DM cadre is that the PhD and the two MAs from the last tenyear group remained. Needless to say, the educational background of the deputies must have been more robust than this. Denis Groom, for example, must have had postgraduate training in economics or management.

Deputy Ministers in Newfoundland and Labrador 27 Table 1.3. Deputy Ministers, Newfoundland, 1970 Title

Name

Deputy attorney general Deputy minister of economic development Deputy minister of education Deputy minister of finance Deputy minister of fisheries Deputy minister of health Deputy minister of highways Deputy minister of labour Deputy minister of mines, agriculture, and resources Deputy minister of municipal affairs and housing Deputy minister of provincial affairs Deputy minister of public welfare Deputy minister of public works

Cyril J. Greene O.L. Vardy Philip J. Hanley Denis J. Groom Eric Gosse Leonard. A. Miller C.A. Knight G.T. Dyer G. O’Reilly H.U. Rowe H.J. Coombs R.L. Andrews George Warren

As the veterans of the commission retired, there was a shi in tone and qualifications. Denis Groom became the comptroller and deputy minister of finance from 1967 to 1970, responsible for bringing in new talent to Finance and to the central agencies, such as David Norris. There was a Treasury Board, but no real Treasury Board Secretariat until near the end of the Smallwood years. Norris entered the Treasury Board Secretariat in 1969, holding various positions, including director of collective bargaining and assistant secretary for budgeting. He would go on to become deputy minister for budgeting and secretary of treasury board in 1978 and later deputy minister of finance from 1980 to 1984. Another was Vic Young, whom Norris recruited to the civil service in 1967; later he would become deputy minister of treasury board in 1972, chief executive officer of Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro in 1978, and chairman of the Lower Churchill Development Board, and a host of other senior appointments would follow. Still another was the remarkable Cyril J. “Cy” Abery. Later to become one of the architects of the Atlantic Accord, he was recruited from the Economics Department at Memorial University for the Department of Finance in 1967 and early on would become the director of fiscal policy. In the Conservative years he would serve as assistant executive director of the Planning and Priorities Secretariat and, until 1985, deputy minister of intergovernmental affairs. Like Young, he went to senior responsibilities in Hydro, becoming the

28 Christopher Dunn

chairman and chief executive officer of Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro in 1985. The Brotherhood Reigns: Stability in the Deputy Cohort, 1972–96 Premier Frank Moores, the successor to Smallwood, would be responsible not only for initiating the modernization of the public service, but furnishing it with the first real merit regime it had known. He also established the Commi ee on Government Administration and Productivity (COGAP), pu ing Channing as chair and Stuart “Stu” Peters as vice chair. Peters was an interesting choice. A man with an independent mind, he had clashed with Smallwood and le his post as deputy minister of natural resources in 1968, a er having been in that office for eight years. Moores rehired him, making him the chief executive to the premier and assigning him to COGAP, which produced a White Paper in November 972. The White Paper’s recommendations, once implemented, would bring the province a modern new bureaucracy: an institutionalized Cabinet, a Cabinet commi ee system and central agencies, a new Public Service Commission Act, and a stronger Public Service Commission. It was Peters who was charged with putting the design into effect, as chairman of the Government Planning Task Force. Things improved markedly for the Newfoundland Public Service with the implementation of the Public Service Act. On one level, it added ma ers hitherto missing in the personnel management field in the provincial government: a central personnel directory; a procedure for promotion, staff training, and evaluation; personnel planning; and, jointly with Treasury Board, a staff procedures manual. Yet the greatest achievement of the act and the government lay in the inauguration of a working merit system. A deputy of the time says that it eliminated about 95 per cent of the patronage appointments to the service (confidential interview, May 2010). Of course, DMs and ADMs were still chosen by the premier, but there was a more technocratic and less political basis for choosing them. Moores sent home six deputies from the Smallwood era on full pay and began a university recruitment drive for the best and the brightest the province could a ract. There was also an Executive Interchange program started with Memorial University with the installation of the Channing Fellowship, which saw senior provincial officials seconded

Deputy Ministers in Newfoundland and Labrador 29

to the Political Science Department at Memorial University to work on a project of benefit to both the institution and the province. The DMs tended to be subject-area specialists relating to the main mission of the department in question. Vernon Holle had studied social work at the University of Toronto in the 1950s and served as deputy minister of social services from 1968 to 1978. Cecil Roebotham had a ained a master’s of education at the University of Alberta in 1962, had been a teacher school supervisor, a university professor, assistant superintendent of education (Anglican), superintendent, and associate deputy minister before being appointed deputy minister in 1972. The deputy in Health was a medical doctor. Generalists were not plentiful, but that would later change. Relative stability would reign for the next two decades and some. The Cabinet commi ee system would operate in the same fashion that COGAP had foreseen, with the same commi ee structure, the same configuration of central agency staff, and the same philosophy of circulation of departmental staff through the central agencies to develop a corporate sense of government. Over and above the institutional ma ers, however, it was the administrative culture that Moores built up and that endured ma ered most. It was a classic politically neutral senior cadre, filled with a sense of professionalism and trust. Not that he was a perfect manager, however. He tended to lose interest in the administrative minutiae of government and delegate them to Jim Channing, his clerk, or to Bill Marshall, one of his top Cabinet ministers (and, ironically, the son of Walter Marshall, the former Finance deputy). It was Channing who drew up criteria for the choice of deputies and was involved in vetting the premier’s ultimate choice. The notion of boundaries or space, which had not existed before, now found root. The deputy was to run the administrative aspect of the department, the minister the policy side. The deputy was to provide options from which the minister could choose. Brian Peckford, the new premier in 1979, continued and deepened the commitment to the merit principle. “In Peckford’s time,” said one official, “if you didn’t select the #1 ranked appointment, Cabinet had to approve the choice … There was great emphasis on the merit principle. Peckford was insistent on it with ministers and the Public Service” (confidential interview, St John’s, NL, 11 October 2010). The analogue, in procurement ma ers, was the new Public Tender Act.

30 Christopher Dunn

Peckford had an innate sense of political-bureaucratic space. Part of it had stemmed from his experience as minister under Moores, first in Municipal Affairs and Housing, then in Mines and Energy. He was content to let the deputies handle most of the departmental business and not to have ministers extensively involved in the details. “As a general rule, I tried to get ministers to interact with DMs and directors on policy, and to leave administration to both the clerk and the deputy,” said Peckford (interview, 24 May 2010). The premier wanted to be alerted only if an issue threatened the minister or the government. He also began a system of direct importance to the brotherhood: internal promotion and reliance on Newfoundlanders. He said, “I encouraged a lot of internal promotion from within departments. I wanted independent people; I didn’t want people who would just agree with me. Nationalist that I was … We tended to appoint from within the province and from within the public service. I wanted Newfoundlanders and Labradorians to know that there was a future for them in the province, and this was one way of doing that” (interview, 24 May 2010, as are the other quotes). This internal approach has remained a recruitment pa ern for deputies and senior officials to the present day, with some nuances later added. Peckford was also keenly interested in spo ing potential senior appointments in the system both as minister and later as premier. His criteria for promising candidates were good Cabinet paper writing, ability to do good presentations to Cabinet and Cabinet commi ees, and the ability, as he said, “to marshal evidence for a new way of doing things.” This was, a er all, the era of dramatic new departures, like the Atlantic Accord, Health Boards, and rural development. It was a policy wonk’s paradise. As premier, he had “a different vantage point; I had to ensure the DM was a good person and would not embarrass the government … I became more cognizant of how they [DMs] would reflect the government.” And there was an abundance of them. Indeed, the times called for policy specialists at the helm of departments and agencies. At the peak of the service, overseeing the ambitious gamut of Peckford initiatives, was David Vardy, the clerk of the Executive Council and secretary to Cabinet from 1978 to 1985, and ex-executive director of the Moores Planning and Priorities Commi ee. Along with a negotiating team led by Minister Bill Marshall and chaired by Cyril Abery (and including Cabot Martin, Ron Penney, Jim Thistle, John Fitzgerald, and Barbara Thistle), he was involved in reaching the Atlantic Accord, oversaw the

Deputy Ministers in Newfoundland and Labrador 31

creation of a five-year development plan, and established an executive development plan. He would go on to become president of the Marine Institute, deputy minister of fisheries and aquaculture, and chair and executive officer of the Newfoundland Public Utilities Commission. Ron Penney became deputy minister of justice just in time for the constitutional wrangling that would produce the Constitution Act, 1982, and remain there until 1985. At a time when the ownership of the Newfoundland Offshore was an issue of Promethean importance, he served as a member of the offshore negotiating team from 1980 to 1986, and also as a member of the Hibernia negotiating team – which also included Gordon Gosse of the Petroleum Directorate, Clyde Granter, DM in Industrial Development, and David J. Oake, DM of Treasury Board – which set in place the first offshore project for the province. He also served as a member of the Upper Churchill negotiating team in 1984, which revolved around Peckford’s spirited a empts to redress the effects of Smallwood’s faulty original deal. A er serving as deputy minister of public works and services in 1987 and later deputy minister of health in 1988, he was a victim of Liberal premier Wells’s restructuring of the deputy cadre in 1989. Penney would, of course, work alongside Cy Abery to develop the terms of the accord. Abery was the chair of the offshore negotiating team that worked with the new Mulroney administration in its promise to deliver a be er offshore management and revenue-sharing regime. On 17 February 2008, commemorating his passing, Brian Peckford eulogized him in the Evening Telegram: “As my deputy minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, he acted as chief advisor on many important issues of constitutional reform which marked the 1980’s as a watershed in the development of public policy in the Province. His insight and breadth of knowledge on constitutional ma ers was invaluable to the Government and to me personally. And who can forget his steady hand as chair of the public servant offshore negotiating team during the difficult and intricate Atlantic Accord negotiations?” (Evening Telegram, 17 February 2008). Abery would go on to serve as CEO of Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro from 1985 to 1991, ending a er running into tensions with Premier Wells. A later manifestation of the strain was to materialize when he came out of retirement in 1993 to denounce Wells’s abortive a empt to privatize Hydro. For all his commitment to leaving the operational side of departmental operations to deputies and have ministers doing policy work,

32 Christopher Dunn

this did not mean that deputies went unsupervised. Peckford came to rely on what he termed a “small core group in the Executive Council who a ended to the Cabinet commi ee system” – Robert “Bob” Peters, assistant secretary to the provincial Cabinet and Cabinet Secretariat from 1976 to 1985; Wayne Mitchell, a Finance official a ached to the Executive Council; and David Oake, assistant secretary of the Cabinet (Resource Policy and Planning) from 1985 on; as well as Peter Kennedy, deputy minister of finance – to interact with the deputies. Two of the core were ex-feds. Peters had been hired away from the Department of Regional Economic Expansion in St John’s and so brought with him knowledge of the federal system, where had worked since the early sixties. Wayne Mitchell had been an economist with Environment Canada in O awa until 1972. “As the departments generated Cabinet papers, this core of people got to know the DMs of the departments. I could get advice and insight from this core as to the activity and record of the DMs’ performance – who was doing what in the trenches, in the departments. I would also get advice from the clerk of the Executive Council as well [on these ma ers].” In the mid- to late eighties, Peckford came to rely more on Peter Withers, the chair of the Public Service Commission, and in particular a small informal group of ministers, Gerry O enheimer, John Collins, and William Marshall. From 1985 to 1989 there was more movement of DMs than hitherto. We began appointing new stars. The stars in the departments graduated to the deputy positions … We did a lot of private internal reviews of DM performance, and whether DMs needed to stay or retire or move. Some as a consequence would move to other departments so younger people could move up. [Some of the younger people did in fact enter the senior bureaucracy:] David Oake was encouraged to take on new experiences and work. The same went for Ron Penney, who became DM in Justice, Elizabeth Marshall [who went to Transportation as assistant deputy minister of finance and administration in 1985 and to Social Services as deputy in 1988], Barbara Knight in Intergovernmental Affairs, and Cyril Abery [as CEO of Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro in 1985] … There was also Jim Thistle, Herb Clarke, Hal Stanley, Clyde Granter, John Fleming … All of these people argued well, did their homework, and many went on to the private sector.

Deputy Ministers in Newfoundland and Labrador 33

However, even the stars had to be brought down to earth at times, even over mundane issues. One was the payment of invoices owed to the many small businesses around the province. The department was supposed to submit the invoices to Finance, which would issue a cheque. Yet the speed with which the process would work was proving difficult, since some businesses would go bankrupt if not paid on time. To combat this bo leneck, Peckford instituted a “Report Card to Cabinet” on how departments were handling their invoices. “Within six months we had a lot of DMs and ADMs annoyed with us,” Peckford says, “but ultimately they moved a lot faster.” But overall, “there was a lot of debate on a variety of issues, and big work for the departments … It was an exceptional period of time.” Clyde Wells: The Traditional Arrangement’s Last Hurrah The premiership of Clyde Wells (1989–96) was the last of the traditional post-Confederation deputy minister regimes. There was a continuation of the pa erns that had marked all premiers a er Smallwood. The brotherhood of DM selection continued, as well as a commitment to the merit system and the notion of career public service, recruitment from the ranks, and an unofficial preference for Newfoundlanders and Labradorians. There was also relative stability in the ranks of the deputies themselves but li le a raction for the notion then current federally of short-lived “rotation” of deputies to develop a corporate sense: governments had long since discovered how to establish their own sense of corporate mission, or at least culture. Yet it was not a service that was static; Wells would introduce outsider influences to galvanize the service and occasionally set up parallel structures to move the standard bureaucracy. As if to signal the continuation of the traditional approach to the bureaucracy, Wells maintained in office the same secretary of Cabinet and clerk of the Executive Council whom Peckford had appointed in 1988, Halcum “Hal” Stanley. Stanley had been deputy in two departments and then deputy minister of intergovernmental affairs during the halcyon days of 1984–8. He would remain in the office until 1994, when the position became two, a separate secretary and clerk. Even then, both were long-standing public servants. Despite significant pressures on him to favour party supporters, Wells maintained a commitment to fair play and merit, at least

34 Christopher Dunn

in appointments to the public sector itself. For this, he turned to Hal Stanley to ensure there would be some bending of the spirit of merit occasionally in senior Order-in-Council appointments. Such was the case with Beaton Tulk, a Liberal member (Fogo) for a decade who had just barely missed re-election in 1989 when the Liberals finally retook office. Wells provided a sinecure for him as assistant deputy minister of children and youth services until 1993, when he was elected once again by a healthy margin in Fogo. Tulk was a central political actor who would ultimately become deputy premier in 2000 and premier from 2000 to 2001, pending a post-Tobin leadership campaign. Another political figure who became an official was Ray Hawco, who had run for the PCs federally in the 1980 election. He became an ADM in Northern and Aboriginal Affairs. As had been the case for decades, one ascended to the DM status as a result of previous senior postings. Bruce Peckford, brother of Brian Peckford – proving dramatic continuity of the DM group by his ascension – became assistant deputy minister of works, services, and transportation in 1989, deputy minister in the same department in 1990, and deputy minister of social services from 1992 to 1996. Gilbert Pike was appointed chair of the Public Service Commission a er a string of deputy positions dating from the late 1970s. But there were also some new faces, such as Bob Williams in Health. The DM brotherhood continued in office, perhaps as a result of reliance on recruitment from the senior ranks. Table 1.4 shows only one woman in the 1990 cohort, a deputy selected by the previous premier. It was a varied group with significant levels of higher education. Of the thirteen deputies in 1990, two (15 per cent) had management training, seven (54 per cent) had a master’s degree or higher, six (46 per cent) had a professional degree, and two (15 per cent) had a scientific background. While the DM group was staffed largely by those already in the service, there were also outside recruitments. Education expert Leonard Williams was brought in as education deputy from 1993 to 1995 to manage the government’s review of denominational education, which would result in a shi to a totally non-sectarian system. Many of the ADM recruits were from the outside as well. Wells and Stanley resisted the pa ern that had developed at the federal level, where deputies were frequently rotated in order to foster a sense of corporate culture. Corporate culture was fostered by other mechanisms in Newfoundland. Stanley started a pa ern of

Deputy Ministers in Newfoundland and Labrador 35 Table 1.4. Deputy Ministers, Newfoundland and Labrador, 1990 Title

Name

Deputy minister of development Deputy minister of education Deputy minister of employment and labour relations Deputy minister of environment and lands Deputy minister of finance Deputy minister of fisheries Deputy minister of forestry and agriculture Deputy minister of health Deputy minister of justice and deputy attorney general Deputy minister of mines and energy Deputy minister of municipal and provincial affairs Deputy minister of social services Deputy minister of works, services, and transportation

C.C. Granter Keith Winter Howard Noseworthy John M. Fleming Gilbert Gil David Vardy R.D. Peters R. Williams James L. Thistle Gordon Gosse S.F. Manuel Elizabeth Marshall Clarence Randell

deputy minister breakfasts; up to this point there had been no collective meetings of the DM group. Cabinet's directions were transmi ed at these sessions, and there was also as personal connection between the clerk and the deputies. Wells established influence with the deputies by a variety of means. When appointed, the deputy was called for a meeting with the premier, who had speaking notes prepared by the clerk, and this allowed for a sense of departmental mission to be established. The premier tended to have three to four priority interests per department. There were occasionally joint premier/minister/deputy meetings to check on the progress of priority ma ers. There was the beginning of a “management by objectives” approach. Initially there was performance monitoring, but like most such modern a empts across, it fell short. Later in the administration, direction came through the Cabinet system. There began to be a subtle difference between the DM and ADM levels. Whereas the DMs had tended to be subject area specialists, there was now more emphasis on generic management skill sets. It was at the ADM level that one now expected to find the specialists. The Tobin Years: Towards a Sisterhood of the Travelling Deputies During the time in office of Brian Tobin (1996–2000), changes came to the deputy minister group that would mark most of his successors.

36 Christopher Dunn Table 1.5. Deputy Ministers, Newfoundland and Labrador, 2000 Title

Name

Deputy minister of development and rural renewal Deputy minister of education Deputy minister of environment and labour Deputy minister of finance Deputy minister of fisheries and aquaculture Deputy minister of forest resources and agrifoods Deputy minister of government services and lands Deputy minister of health and community services Deputy minister of human resources and employment Deputy minister of industry, trade, and technology Deputy minister of justice and deputy attorney general Deputy minister of mines and energy Deputy minister of municipal and provincial affairs Deputy minister of tourism, culture, and recreation Deputy minister of works, services, and transportation

John D. Scott Florence Delaney Ann Marie Hann (acting) Phil Wall Leslie Dean Robert Smart Barbara Knight Deborah Fry Wayne Green Bruce Hollett Lynn E. Spracklin Brian Maynard Robert Noseworthy Robert Thompson Barbara Wakeham

There would now be increased rates of rotation in office, more emphasis on gender parity at the top, and some lessening of central controls, while maintaining strategic levers of influence for the centre. This cohort had its own distinctive characteristics. Most distinctive, of course, was the fact that women formed 40 per cent or the DM group, with six women out of the group of fi een (see table 1.5). Of the fi een, there was a notable third (five) with management-related training. There were no DMs with a scientific background and only one with an applied science background. There were two with professional degrees, four with graduate degrees, four with undergraduate degrees, and information for four was not available. The imperatives of government in the age of public management were becoming evident. With Tobin began the Newfoundland equivalent of “DM churn.” There was to be more emphasis on rotation or demotion in the senior ranks in order to heighten responsiveness. When Tobin entered, five deputies le immediately – their departure made easier by the fact that they were pensionable – followed by a sixth, who was almost pensionable. However, more movement was discernible at the ADM level, where fi een le immediately – it must be remembered that ADMs are Order-in-Council appointments in the province – all of whom were fully pensionable. Three additional ADMs who had worked with the

Deputy Ministers in Newfoundland and Labrador 37

Economic Recovery Commission and were not career public servants le as well. The replacements for the DMs had all been ADMs in the service before being appointed DM. Below the ADM group, a “feeder group” of promising provincial officials was established around 1998 by the Cabinet secretary and managed by an informal coordinating group headed by Fonse Faour, deputy secretary to Cabinet, and a few “sages” in the public service. Deputies were asked to identify director-level individuals who would be DM material. The criteria for choice were education, qualifications, what departments they could revolve through to round out their qualifications, and the general balance between their policy and management skills. This necessitated the development of centrally held personnel files relating to the feeder group, which had not existed before. There may have been churn, but there was continuity in the source of the new faces: internal recruitment. A former senior official said, “As a general proposition, recruitment was internal. This was because of the view that a professional civil service – which it was in general terms, as opposed to [some administrations in] Western Canada – was what was wanted. We wanted to reinforce the idea that it was a good profession and contributions to it would be recognized. This originated with Moores, [Hugh] Whalen [a political scientist at Memorial University in the 1960s–1980s] shows this in his work, and J.G. Channing was instrumental in achieving it” (confidential interview, May 2010). However, there were some modest recruitments from outside the service. The statistics on women were no accident. Tobin saw the service through the lens of experience in the federal government, where gender equity considerations held considerably more sway. He and his senior officials saw women as the principal source of talent to be moved up. At the beginning of the Tobin administration, 15 per cent of the senior executive group (DMs and ADMs) were women, and by the end, there were 30 per cent. Many had plateaued at the director or ADM level and were anxious to move up. There now began the formation of a sisterhood, to match the brotherhood pa ern that had marked the service until now. Women could now form their own cliques within the service. There were new expectations of deputies, who were now to be more a uned to external policy trends, corporate needs, and general management skills. Cabinet policy papers from departments now had to reflect policy pa erns in other provinces so that political actors would be able informally to benchmark how the province was doing in relation to

38 Christopher Dunn

other administrations. Departments in the Newfoundland government needed a working knowledge of their counterpart departments in other provinces. Deputies were also expected to contribute to a corporate culture in government. The DM was appointed by the premier, aided the minister, but served the government’s agenda. For the first time there were regular meetings of the deputy group, which took place every Friday morning, to follow the Thursday meeting of Cabinet. The “DMs’ breakfast” discussed not the next week’s events but the past week’s business. They heard from Cabinet officials everything that had happened at Cabinet and therefore had first-hand knowledge of the government’s views. There was also a detailed debriefing between the Cabinet Secretariat and the deputies on the progress of specific important Cabinet papers. If Premier Tobin had a message for the DM group, this was the venue to have it delivered. The Cabinet secretary also briefed deputies on what was coming up in Cabinet business, so that there would be, in compliance with the mantra familiar to Cabinet government, “no surprises.” To stress the importance of corporate identity, there were to be no substitutions by ADMs at these breakfasts. Still another method was to cycle prospective DMs through the central agencies for a period, to them a view from the central executive. General management skills, another federal inheritance of the premier and his secretary, both with O awa experience, were also prized. The deputies were not chosen for subject area experience, but instead for general management skills and knowledge of the way the system worked, in keeping with a pa ern begun in the Mulroney years. There was a combination of decentralization in some ma ers and centralization in others. The Treasury Board system was streamlined by radically reducing the volume of business that it did, rejecting the Board’s micromanagement approach and swollen agendas. Tobin also entrusted Rowe with establishing the philosophy of management for the executive government, while he concentrated on establishing the vision for the government. One point of Rowe’s philosophy of management was to replace the current “command and control” system with one stressing authority and accountability. Ministers and deputies were informed that the centre would not be “looking over their shoulders” all the time. By 1997, decisions were being taken to bring the provincial budget into surplus, and the role of the Treasury Board in enforcing spending freezes was ended. Departments were now to enjoy staffing delegation, with only

Deputy Ministers in Newfoundland and Labrador 39

nominal involvement by the Public Service Commission. Ministers and deputies were given authority to manage their departments but were to be accountable. They had to live within their budget or face the consequences; they were not to produce “last-minute surprises,” nor appear too hesitant to deal with an issue that threatened the image of the government; such things happened, but happened rarely. Another was a premium placed on information flow: the deputy secretaries for economic and social affairs in the Cabinet Secretariat tracked every major issue in the government, and deputies were expected to provide their relevant secretariat analyst with updates on it, not to have the analyst search it out, like inspectors. Another was a realization that the government had to expand horizontal (cross-cu ing) management. Some interdepartmental programs existed for children, human resources, and employment, but there was a felt need to catch up to other governments in this regard (Dunn 2000). The centre had its own way of exerting influence. There was a disciplined approach to planning of policy, and two important levers were employed: choosing senior personnel – already described – and controlling the decision-making process. For example, the Cabinet secretary established the process by which the budget process operated. Treasury Board, driven by financial austerity measures in the Wells years, had, in effect, taken over the budget process, negating the possibility that Cabinet and Cabinet Secretariat would set whole-ofgovernment priorities. Policy authority may have been granted by Cabinet, but Treasury Board controlled disbursements in detail. Under Tobin and Rowe, control returned to Planning and Priorities instead. P&P, although not as central as under Wells, did during the budget process significantly shape policy ma ers with significant expenditure, policy, or symbolic import. The Cabinet secretary was now more involved in the budget process, helping to achieve a synthesis between the Speech from the Throne and the Budget Address, and coordinating departmental input into a communications strategy for the budget. Departments were obliged to bring communication and consultation plans to Cabinet along with proposals for new initiatives. The premier, the Cabinet (during its retreats), and the clerk established a flow chart from these plans and, in concert with the ministers, worked out a system of announcements, which balanced social, economic, and resources ma ers, week by week, for the year. Roger Grimes (2001–3) was a short-lived premier but an extremely energetic one – his victories included an INCO / Voisey’s Bay deal, new

40 Christopher Dunn

ombudsman, and new emphasis on university funding – and came to the position with long experience as minister and manager. In some ways, however, his was a continuation of the deputy approaches of his predecessor. There was an emphasis on internal recruitment. Grimes said, in words reminiscent of other premiers, “The only outsider I brought into the government was as deputy minister, was in education. I liked to reward people for dedication in the [Newfoundland and Labrador] public service, to encourage good civil servants, to show them that there was a future in the service. The current practice [under Williams] is to place an advertisement in the press, despite the fact that this is an Order-in-Council appointment. I would depend on the advice of the clerk” (interview with Roger Grimes, St John’s, 20 May 2010). There was also a continuation of the movement started by Tobin to a generic management skill sets for DMs, as opposed to subject-area specialists. “Deputies tended to be cycled through the Executive Council office and Cabinet commi ees service. This was because they could be exposed to a wide variety of issues and then they would be able to be plunked down in a variety of departments. They would end up being broad-based generalists, able to serve any government of any shape. For example, if you saw a secretary to the Social Policy Commi ee [of Cabinet], you could be assured that they would become a DM one day – if they proved themselves in the position” (Grimes interview). He also noted that the generic approach was also aided by a significant amount of mentoring in the public service. In-services and the honing of general management skills promoted policy generalists as opposed to policy specialists. Grimes had a distinct philosophy of government. “The public is be er served when the politicians avoid politicization of the public service. The public service, in turn, is be er run by generalists [as DMs]. The only specialists should be at the ADM level. Their role is to get the deputy up to speed. The deputies should be good leaders, coordinators, gatekeepers, and facilitators” (Grimes interview). The Williams Government: A Business Model and the Brotherhood Disbanded By 2010, near the end of what was to be an abbreviated second of two terms of the Williams Government (2003–10), another stage in deputy minister history had been reached. It was plain that a business view of

Deputy Ministers in Newfoundland and Labrador 41

government predominated and that the premier was impatient with the traditional Whitehall model of ministers and deputy ministers; but that meant only that levers of power had to be examined to prevent the public service from innovating and changing. As well, there were signs that a new brotherhood was beginning. By 2010, as table 1.6 demonstrates, there was significant turnaround in the DM cadre. Only two faces remained from a decade earlier: Robert Thompson and Robert Smart. Many of the deputies (eight) had been in the provincial system for fi een to twenty years. However, experience in the system and subject area was no longer a ticket to advancement. There were now other considerations at work. The emphasis on management skills and private sector experience was unmistakable. Of the fi een deputies in 2010 (a few of the categories overlap), two were trained as chartered accountants; three held MBAs (notably, even the deputy in Justice had one); six had a bachelor of commerce; and two were postgraduate-level management training. This made almost seven-eighths of the deputies with management training. In addition, a third (five) had sat on private sector boards, and four had significant private sector experience. Rounding out this business-oriented sector were other highly qualified personnel: four

Table 1.6. Deputy Ministers, Newfoundland and Labrador, 2010 Title

Name

Deputy minister of business Deputy minister of education Deputy minister of environment and conservation Deputy minister of finance Deputy minister of fisheries and aquaculture Deputy minister of government services Deputy minister of health and community services Deputy minister of human resources, labour, and employment Deputy minister of innovation, trade, and rural development Deputy minister of justice and deputy attorney general Deputy minister of Labrador and Aboriginal affairs (acting) Deputy minister of municipal affairs Deputy minister of natural resources Deputy minister of tourism, culture, and recreation Deputy minister of transportation and works

Ray Dillon Darrin Pike William Parrott Terry Paddon Alistair O’Reilly David Norman Don Keats Baxter Rose Brent Meade Donald Burrage Sean Dutton Sandra Barnes Robert Thompson Cathy Duke Robert Smart

42 Christopher Dunn

with master’s-level training, and one with a bachelor’s (but even that was a specialty, a bachelor of science in computer science). There were only two women. Of special interest was the fact that, for the first time in sixty years, the DM in Health was not a doctor or a health professional (for example, even Deborah Fry held a BScN and an LLB. She has practised law with the Department of Justice, Newfoundland and Labrador, and had worked in neonatal intensive care, public health and nursing education in Saskatchewan and Australia; and before this, all Health ministers had been doctors). Health deputy Don Keats was part of a new trend in health management. He was trained as a B.Comm and a master of health services administration at the University of Alberta. Health district senior management had similar health management training. An interview with the premier made the business connection explicit: I see deputies a li le differently than other premiers. I see them as my managers. I see the ministers as the CEOs and the DMs as the managing directors. I look at the various departments as business units. For example, we spend $2.7 billion on health. This is about 40 per cent of provincial expenditures. I expect the deputy in Health not only to deliver a social program but to manage efficiently. In the private sector, you have to keep them [the managers] in place. The analogy is to the coach of a hockey team. The frustrating thing [in the public sector] in dealing with managers is that you don’t have a hands-on approach. There is a security blanket around inefficiency. Then I have to deal with my CEOs and manage to deal with that. I look at this as a business with the difference that you don’t have private sector-type control. (Interview with Danny Williams, St John’s, 30 June 2010)

Williams’s analysis was that the standard Whitehall approach – in which the permanent public service views itself as the protector of the public interest, with the politicians as transitory class who were more interested in self-interest and re-election – was at work in the provincial public service and had to be brought in balance with the political necessity. With his trademark problem-solving approach, Williams devised ways of ge ing around the standard approach. The means chosen were the central role of political manifestos, private-sector-type performance contracts, an incentive program for deputies, and a cultural change in the public service elite.

Deputy Ministers in Newfoundland and Labrador 43

The emphasis on political manifestos was an important part of the deputy ministers’ world. This was unusual, because the experience in Canada and the United Kingdom, for example, is that they are merely tone-se ing instruments for a general election, and li le reference is made to them a erward. This was not the approach of the Williams government. Many of the government’s actions in the first and second terms were dictated by the blueprints for the party, most notably the changes in the federal-provincial agreement on offshore revenuesharing, the Atlantic Accord. Williams said, A lot of work went into the blueprint [Our Blueprint for the Future, also known as the Blue Book, and released in 2003]. There were something like fi y dra s of the blueprint. I and a group of advisors – Lorne Wheeler, Bruce Peckford, Doug House – spent six weeks working on the document. What the bureaucracy came to realize [once we were elected] was that this document was to be taken seriously. For example, it delivered the message that the only way to dig the province out of its severe fiscal situation was to go a er the big revenue sources – the feds, the oil companies. That’s what we did. There was a new sense in the bureaucracy that the blueprints don’t sit on the shelf. Deputy ministers rely on them. (Interview with Danny Williams, St John’s, 30 June 2010)

The emphasis on performance contracts was partly in response to critiques from the provincial auditor, and partly to appear to be in step with other provinces. As auditor general, Elizabeth Marshall had for several years outlined a managerialist accountability framework for public-sector entities in the province (see, for example, Newfoundland and Labrador 2000). In Danny Williams, Marshall found another managerialist soulmate. Managerialist outlooks draw a close connection between performance management and accountability. Emphasizing transferable generic management skills, it advocates bringing into the public sector private sector techniques and concepts like business plans, productivity and performance measurement, client-centred service, and managerial accountability. In February 2002, Progressive Conservative opposition leader Danny Williams announced a proposed Transparency and Accountability Act that contained similar principles of legislative reporting. The party commi ed itself to establishing performance planning and reporting for all government departments and agencies. All of this was included in the PC campaign blueprint in 2003 (see Progressive Conservative Party of Newfoundland and Labrador 2003).

44 Christopher Dunn

Policy emulation was also at work. An article in 2004 noted that Newfoundland and Labrador was out of step with the rest of the provinces in performance reporting; it was “the only province that does not have accountability and reporting legislation in Canada … It should be noted that, in half the provinces (B.C., Alberta, Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia), the reporting legislation is not only retrospective but prospective as well. It requires governments to establish strategic plans, performance plans and/or business plans and, in many cases, to report on performance or outcomes measured against these plans” (Dunn 2004, 196). However, performance contracts had the added advantage of being a control mechanism, keeping deputies a uned to the operational and policy aims of the government, namely the minister, acting on directions from the Cabinet. Section 21 of the Transparency and Accountability Act says, 21. (1) The responsible minister of a department shall enter into a performance contract with the deputy minister of that department and the chairperson of the governing body of a public body shall enter into a performance contract with the chief executive officer of the public body. (2) The Lieutenant-Governor in Council shall determine the matters to be included in a contract between a deputy minister of a department and the minister responsible for the department. (Newfoundland and Labrador House of Assembly 2004)

As with the five other provinces, the new arrangement was both prospective and retrospective. If deputies did not fulfil the contract, the minister could report the ma er to Cabinet, a powerful disincentive. Annual performance plans were to be presented to the House of Assembly along with the main budget. An associated requirement mandated departments and agencies to table annual reports at the end of each fiscal year comparing actual performance results for the fiscal year, with the expected results identified in their performance plans. There would be sunset clauses. This all amounted to a powerful incentive for deputies and CEOs to keep their eyes on the prize. An associated move later in the decade bolstered this one – incentive pay – and is in the process of being established now. The process was managed by the Cabinet secretary, Gary Norris. The central executive

Deputy Ministers in Newfoundland and Labrador 45

envisaged an independent commi ee to oversee the management of the scheme. No doubt it will be significantly researched, since similar efforts at the federal level have not been problematical (see chapter 14 by David Zussman in this collection). There has also appears to have been an effort to change the organizational culture of the service (“appears” because no surveys of the public service have been made publicly available, although they are done regularly). Once again, a blueprint for the 2007 election sets itself apart from all other previous administrations: “We remain commi ed to making our government more responsible, transparent and accountable than any other in our province's history … As we proceed to implement our detailed strategic planning and reporting provisions across all government departments and agencies, people will continue to see a new and improved approach to governance that is open and responsive to input and interaction” (Progressive Conservative Party of Newfoundland and Labrador 2007). Certain themes come up in discussions with senior officials about the administration, such as productivity, a renaissance mentality, risk-taking. The premier defined himself as a “workaholic,” and this term has been used by several senior officials to describe him as well. Commenting on the fact that there was more turnover in his deputy and senior officials group, Premier Williams explained, “I am a workaholic. I demand performance. People who are responsible for big departments have big responsibilities. We won’t tolerate incompetence.” Lastly, recruitment has changed. The government is recruiting younger senior officials, more outsiders (but still not so many as to detract from an in-service and in-province pool), and Newfoundlanders with national experience or training. A search of the government’s website – and using first university degree as a surrogate for provincial origin, admi edly an imperfect sign – shows that of the eight ADMs appointed in 2010, one was not a Newfoundlander originally; in 2009 four were appointed, all from the province; in 2008, one of two ADMs appointed was from the province; among twelve ADMs appointed in 2007, two were from away; the one chosen in 2006 was from the province; one of seven new ADMs in 2005 was from elsewhere, as was one of the four new ADMs in 2004. Women were appointed in respectable numbers in some years, in others not. In 2010 four of the new ADMs were women; in 2009 and 2008, none; in 2007, four; in 2006, none; in 2005, three; and in 2004, three.

46 Christopher Dunn

Conclusion Such is the story of the Newfoundland and Labrador deputy minister. It is the story with many chapters, the contents of each new one hard to predict from the one before. Hard to predict, for example, that a patronage-ridden government would give way in the 1930s and 1940s to a rule by administrators – at both the directing and the administrative levels. Hard to predict, as well, that the story of deputies in the Confederation era that started so badly – with an administrative neophyte (Smallwood) in charge – would give way to almost three decades of stable government where politicians and a professional senior administrative cadre would work in harmony, and deputies were accorded an autonomy in operational ma ers like the stereotypical Whitehall/Westminster model. Or that a brotherhood of administrators would yield briefly to more gender equity and then back again to a new brotherhood a er the short term of a reforming premier (Tobin). Or even that a managerialist era would take so long to implant itself in the province under Williams; a er all, its heyday was twenty or thirty years before. In a sense, that is the innately fascinating thing about politics in Newfoundland and Labrador: one never knows what is coming next. However, what strikes one most in the Newfoundland story is the absence of reforms affecting the deputy position. One traverses the entire history of this apparatus to find li le rethinking what the position is about, until the arrival of Danny Williams. In a way, the province has been lucky, since there has been a largely uninterrupted stretch of good deputies and sound administration – even outstanding administration in some cases – since the early seventies. However, in darker periods, political excesses faced no countervailing force. Responsible Government, the Smallwood years – these were years when the bureaucracy fell silent. A healthy system needs checks. This chapter mentioned some, early on. One was to have a role in the creation of departments and roles for ministers and deputies. Another was the codification in legislation of the deputy minister’s generic or corporate roles. However, one more change, in keeping with Westminster practice, has already been introduced. One such reform, long advocated in Canada, makes the deputy an “accounting officer.” The accounting officer promotes accountability of senior permanent officers of the executive branch and gives them a measure of bureaucratic independence concomitant with this

Deputy Ministers in Newfoundland and Labrador 47

accountability. The United Kingdom has had accounting officers since 1861 (United Kingdom Treasury 2000), and the government of Canada has enacted legislation to introduce a weakened version into the federal service (Canada 2006; Gilmore 2010). The idea has gained currency in the last few decades in Canada, especially since it was recommended, in so many words, in the 1979 Lambert Commi ee Report (Canada, Royal Commission 1979), and recommended in clearer terms by the Gomery Commission (Canada, Commission of Inquiry 2006, 200). Several parliamentary and academic sources have since commented on the need for direct deputy accountability (Aucoin and Jarvis 2005; Canada, House of Commons 1985; Canada, House of Commons Standing Commi ee 2005; Franks 2005; and Savoie 2003). Essentially, accounting officers are deputy ministers or equivalents who are held to account before parliamentary commi ees for the exercise of powers that are directly assigned or delegated to them by legislation. In the United Kingdom, they have the right to object in writing to Treasury and the comptroller and auditor general, should a minister propose actions contrary to financial propriety, prudent and economical administration, efficiency, effectiveness, or value for money. This arrangement changes the understanding of the role of the deputy for most of Canadian administrative history. This traditional understanding was that the deputy should report to Parliament through the minister and that the deputy would have no independent observations to offer other than those that were in support of his or her minister (Dunn 2006, cited in Green 2007, 26–7 for most of the preceding paragraph). In Newfoundland’s clerk of the House, Canada has its only UK-style accounting officer (Green 2007, 5–43), and this provides a good model for the executive branch. The federal accounting officer model, as Gilmore demonstrates, replaces ministerial with collective responsibility and does not provide for deputy accountability, among other departures from the classic approach (Gilmore 2010). An accounting officer role for the deputy minister in the executive government of Newfoundland and Labrador could be modelled on section 31 of the House of Assembly Accountability, Integrity and Administration Act, with appropriate modifications. However, just making the recommendation is not meaningful unless the job performance of deputies includes financial and management training. A commitment to the accounting officer throughout the public service would also have to be a commitment to enhanced management training.

48 Christopher Dunn

This reform would be a useful capstone to the evolution of deputies in Newfoundland and Labrador, and effective antidote to the downside of the “strong premier” tradition in the province, which runs the danger of intimidation of those who presume to speak truth to power.

NOTE 1. The next two paragraphs borrow from that text.

REFERENCES Amulree Commission / Newfoundland Royal Commission Report. 1933. London: HMSO. Aucoin, Peter, and Mark D. Jarvis. 2005. Modernizing Government Accountability: A Framework for Reform. O awa: Canada School of Public Service. Canada. 2006. Federal Accountability Act, S.C. c. 9. –. Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities (Gomery Commission). 2006, 1 February. Restoring Accountability: Recommendation. –. House of Commons. Special Commi ee on Reform of the House of Commons. 1985. Third Report. O awa (Chair: James McGrath). –. House of Commons Standing Commi ee on Public Accounts. 2005. Governance in the Public Service of Canada: Ministerial and Deputy Ministerial Accountability, 10th Report. –. Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability. 1979. Final Report. O awa (Commissioner: Allen Thomas Lambert). Channing, J.G. 1982. The Effects of Transition to Confederation on Public Administration in Newfoundland. Institute of Public Administration of Canada. Monographs on Canadian Public Administration 7. Toronto: IPAC. Crosbie, John. 1997. No Holds Barred: My Life in Politics. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart. Dunn, Christopher. 2000. “The Newfoundland Public Service: The Past as Prologue?” In Government Restructuring and Career Public Service in Canada, edited by Evert Lindquist. Institute of Public Administration of Canada Monographs on Canadian Public Administration 23, 173–207. Toronto: IPAC.

Deputy Ministers in Newfoundland and Labrador 49 –. 2004. “The Quest for Accountability in Newfoundland and Labrador.” Canadian Public Administration 47 (2): 184–206. h p://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ j.1754-7121.2004.tb01183.x. –. 2005. “The Persistence of the Institutionalized Cabinet: The Central Executive in Newfoundland and Labrador.” In Executive Styles in Canada, edited by Luc Bernier, Keith Brownsey, and Michael Howle , 21–42. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. –. 2006. “Members’ Compensation in the Newfoundland and Labrador House of Assembly.” Research paper for the Green Review Commission on Constituency Allowances and Related Ma ers. Unpublished, but referenced heavily in the Green Report, chap. 2. –, ed. 2010. The Handbook of Canadian Public Administration. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press. Dutil, Patrice, ed. 2008. Searching for Leadership: Secretaries to Cabinet in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Encyclopedia of Newfoundland. Vols 1–4. Franks, C.E.S. 2005, 11 January. “Ministerial and Deputy Ministerial Responsibility and Accountability in Canada.” Submission to the House of Commons Standing Commi ee on Public Accounts. Gilmore, Alan. 2010. “The Canadian Accounting Officer: Has It Strengthened Parliament’s Ability to Hold the Government to Account?” In The Handbook of Canadian Public Administration, edited by Christopher Dunn, 75–84. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press. Green, Derek. 2007, May. Rebuilding Confidence: The Report of the Review Commission on Constituency Allowances and Related Ma ers. St John’s: Queen’s Printer. Lodge, Thomas. 1939. Dictatorship in Newfoundland. Toronto: Cassell. McCorquodale, Susan. 1973. “Public Administration in Newfoundland during the Period of the Commission of Government: A Question of Political Development.” PhD diss., Queen’s University. Newfoundland and Labrador. 2000. “Comments on Public Sector Accountability.” In Report of the Auditor General to the House of Assembly for the Year Ended 31 March 2000, chap. 2. St John’s: Queen’s Printer. –. 1995. Executive Council Act. SNL Chapter E-16.1. h p://www.assembly. nl.ca/Legislation/sr/statutes/E16-1.htm. –. 2004. Transparency and Accountability Act. SNL Chapter T-8.1. h p://www. assembly.nl.ca/legislation/sr/annualstatutes/2004/T08-1.c04.htm. Noel, S.J.R. 1972. Politics in Newfoundland. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

50 Christopher Dunn Ontario Provincial Parliament. 2006. Public Service of Ontario Act. S.O. Chapter 35 Schedule A. h p://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/so-2006-c-35-sch-a/ latest/so-2006-c-35-sch-a.html. Progressive Conservative Party of Newfoundland and Labrador. 2003. Our Blueprint for the Future: Real Leadership – The New Approach. St John’s: Progressive Conservative Party. h p://books.google.ca/books/about/Real_ Leadership_the_New_Approach.html?id=CORmHAAACAAJ&redir_esc=y. Progressive Conservative Party of Newfoundland and Labrador. 2007. Proud Strong Determined: The Future Is Ours. Policy Blueprint for Election. h p:// www.pcparty.nf.net/blueprint200702.htm. Savoie, Donald. 2003. Breaking the Bargain: Public Servants, Ministers, and Parliament. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Smallwood, Joseph R. 1973. I Chose Canada: The Memoirs of the Honourable Joseph R. (“Joey”) Smallwood. Toronto: Macmillan. Sossin, Lorne. 2010. “Bureaucratic Independence.” In The Handbook of Canadian Public Opinion, edited by Christopher Dunn, 364–79. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press. Tardi, Greg. 2010. “Departments and Other Institutions of Government.” In Dunn, Handbook of Canadian Public Administration, 25–6. United Kingdom Treasury. 2000. Government Accounting. London: HMSO.

2 Deputy Ministers in Nova Scotia: The Influence of New Public Governance on Nova Scotia’s First NDP Government michelle coffin and lori turnbull

Deputy ministers have multiple loyalties, a achments, and priorities. For example, they must account to their ministers regularly on departmental ma ers; on an increasingly frequent basis, they are called to give accounts to legislative and Cabinet commi ees on ma ers internal to their departments; they are stewards of their departments within the government at large; they are trustees of the public interest; and they are loyal to each other. In Nova Scotia, deputies are caught in this web of multiple relationships of accountability, but their connection to the Premier’s Office is perhaps the strongest of them all. There are several factors that fortify deputies’ responsiveness to the Premier’s Office. First of all, deputies are hired and fired by premiers. On the advice of the deputy minister to the Premier’s Office, the premier decides how deputy ministerial portfolios are assigned and how raises and/or bonuses are allocated. Deputies’ vulnerability to the premier is inevitable. Furthermore, the current NDP government under Premier Darrell Dexter has further centralized and politicized the policy process by creating a new Office of Policy and Priorities and appointing a known party supporter as its deputy minister. This office works with a new Cabinet commi ee consisting of the premier, the deputy premier, and the ministers of finance, health, and justice to set the government’s policy agenda. In this chapter, we explain how the factors described above (among others) reinforce deputy ministers’ connection to the Premier’s Office. This environment of political responsiveness among the deputy ministerial cadre in Nova Scotia is evidence of the “new political

52 Michelle Coffin and Lori Turnbull

governance” phenomenon, as has been identified and described by Peter Aucoin. New political governance is characterized by several traits: • Concentration of power in the hands of the premier and a small group of political advisors and senior public servants; • Enhanced presence and power of political staff within government departments; • Increase in premiers’ a ention to the appointment of senior public servants; • Greater pressure on public servants to employ a “pro-government spin” in government communications; • Heightened expectation that public servants “show enthusiasm” for governments’ plans and priorities (Aucoin 2006a, 23). Aucoin observes that these pressures – which stem from increasing demands for accountability, consistency, transparency, and openness in government by legislative commi ees, the mass media, independent auditors of Parliament, and a “less deferential citizenry” – are pu ing considerable strain on the relationship between the elected government and the “professional, non-partisan public service” (Aucoin 2006a, 23–4). Specifically, public servants, under the leadership of their deputy ministers, are expected to be responsive to governments’ political agendas and mindful of ministers’ political interests. The fact the deputy ministers are appointed by the political branch reinforces their political responsiveness, which in turn affects their stewardship of their departments. The chapter is divided into four main sections. First, we discuss the processes by which deputy ministers are recruited, appointed, and promoted in Nova Scotia. Second, we assess deputy ministers’ roles and responsibilities as managers in the Nova Scotia public service. In the third section, we outline the relationships of accountability between deputy ministers and premiers, ministers, and commi ees. In the final section, we conclude by summarizing how Aucoin’s theory applies to the Nova Scotia experience. Selection and Career Advancement In most cases, the people who are selected to become deputy ministers in Nova Scotia are long-time public servants who have held a variety of

Deputy Ministers in Nova Scotia 53

positions throughout their careers and are well known within the ranks of the public service. They are regarded as capable managers, inspiring leaders, strong communicators, and perceptive problem-solvers. A public servant’s track record is taken as evidence of her capacity to manage, staff, and lead a department, to tap into employees’ skills and strengths, and to support and advise a minister. While there is no formal requirement for postgraduate education, most deputies in Nova Scotia have earned master’s degrees – many of them from the School of Public Administration at Dalhousie University in Halifax. It makes sense in some cases to appoint a deputy who has academic and/or experiential qualifications that match the policy focus of the department. Such credentials can equip a deputy with a sense of independent authority, which is a useful tool for a deputy when “speaking truth to power” (in other words, when she is offering objective advice to her minister on a difficult policy choice). Professional and experiential credentials can help to legitimize a new deputy’s leadership in the eyes of stakeholders, staff, and the minister. For instance, over the past ten years, four people have held the deputy minister position in the Department of Health. Two of them were doctors, one was a nurse, and the current deputy, Kevin McNamara, had been the chief executive officer of the South Shore Health Board. Paul LaFleche, deputy minister for Agriculture (formerly Agriculture and Fisheries) and Fisheries and Aquaculture, is an exploration geoscientist by training. His education and expertise in the field of natural resources make him a logical fit to lead these departments. He was brought into the Treasury and Policy Board by Premier John Hamm in 2002 and, two years later, became the secretary to the Executive Council (a position of deputy ministerial rank). It is the Crown’s prerogative to appoint deputy ministers. These are Order-in-Council appointments made on the advice of the deputy minister to the Office of the Premier, who is the head of the public service (not to be confused with the public service commissioner) and one of the premier’s closest advisors. At the time of writing, the deputy minister to Premier Darrell Dexter is Greg Keefe, who has worked as a public servant in Nova Scotia for over thirty years. He is also the secretary to the Executive Council (the Cabinet), the deputy for Communications Nova Scotia, the deputy minister for the Treasury Board, and the deputy responsible for the Chief Information Office (Premier’s Office 2010). As Peter Aucoin explains, it is customary in some provinces for premiers to place primary emphasis on partisan loyalty when appointing new deputy ministers. This approach is associated with a higher rate

54 Michelle Coffin and Lori Turnbull

of turnover among deputies, as new governments want to replace the previous government’s appointees with their own (Aucoin 2006b, 17). It is important, at this point, to clarify the difference between political and partisan responsiveness: deputies who are appointed on the basis of partisan loyalty can be politically responsive to an executive of a different partisan stripe. Therefore, an incoming government need not replace the deputy minister cadre in order to further its political agenda. In Nova Scotia’s recent history, however, many deputy ministers have been appointed on the basis of their skill sets and their experience, either inside or outside the public service, as opposed to solely on account of their partisan connections. Elections do not precipitate a “changing of the guard” among the province’s deputy ministers. It is important to point out, though, that the current state of affairs in Nova Scotia with respect to deputy minister appointments is relatively new. As recently as 1993, a changing of the guard occurred in response to the perceived politicization of the deputy minister cadre. One of the key issues during that year’s election campaign was the rampant patronage in the province’s civil service and the impact that the governing party’s cronies were having on the quality and professionalism of the civil service. This public discourse was led by Liberal leader John Savage, whose party elected members to forty of the legislature’s fi ytwo seats in that year’s election. Savage came to office on a platform to end patronage in the provincial public service. Although the province established a civil service commission in 1935 to reduce patronage and encourage a merit-based professional civil service, and in the 1980s passed legislation that codified the role of the professional civil service, patronage persisted among the ranks of the service into the 1990s. The new premier did not share his predecessors’ approach to recognizing party workers’ efforts with taxpayer-funded employment. The culture among the political elites in the province had long been that patronage was a legitimate form of employment for those who assisted in the rise to power of party and individual elected representatives. This prevailing a itude was well displayed, even by members of Savage’s team. “Let’s be honest and fair about it. Wouldn’t you hire your friends? Wouldn’t you hire the people that helped you? I think that’s what I call fair government and fair hiring practices,” remarked one candidate during the campaign (Stewart 2000, 40). Shortly a er coming to office in 1993, the new Liberal government decided to release nine deputy ministers from their posts as a result of their close relationship with the former Conservative governments of

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John Buchanan and Donald Cameron. Savage suggested in an interview in 1999 that he believed these deputies were unable to implement the new government’s mandate. “It was this perception that we were being constantly undercut … What [the new Cabinet] wanted, they could not get done” (Clancy, Bickerton, Haddow, and Stewart 2000, 13–14). Despite his own party’s discontent with his anti-patronage policy and his desire to transform the civil service into a professional institution, Savage launched a nationwide search to fill the nine vacant deputy minister positions and contracted several management consulting firms to review the operations of several departments. The advice his government received from these specialists influenced the restructuring of the civil service under the neophyte premier (Stewart 2000, 41). In the years since the defeat of the Savage government, several vacancies at the deputy minister level have been filled as a result of nationwide open competitions. Successive governments have also continued to rely on private management consultants to review and audit the management and operations of government departments. At the time of writing, the New Democratic Party, a er winning a majority government in the provincial election in June 2009, had made only one new addition to the deputy minister team – Richard “Rick” Williams. In fact, the government created a new Office of Policy and Priorities and named Williams as its deputy. This decision divided the previous Treasury and Policy Board into two distinct entities. The Office of Policy and Priorities is “responsible for all affairs and ma ers pertaining to identification, prioritization and development of government policy issues, plans and strategies” (Nova Scotia, Office of Policy and Priorities 2010). Treasury Board ensures that the plans and policies are synchronized in a fiscally responsible way (Nova Scotia, Treasury Board Office 2012). Keefe, the deputy minister to the Premier’s Office, is the deputy to the Treasury Board, but the carving out of the agency’s policy branch means that Keefe is a manager, while Williams is a policymaker who sits at the right hand of the premier, the minister for the new policy office. The government also created a new Policy and Priorities Commi ee, consisting of the premier, deputy premier, and ministers of health, finance, and justice, to work with Williams and his staff in the development of priorities and plans. The Treasury Board has a Cabinet commi ee as well, consisting of the chair of the Treasury Board and four other members of the Executive Council. None of the above is to suggest that party politics does not factor into deputy minister appointments. Williams is known in the province as an NDP supporter. His appointment as an elite member of

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the government’s policy branch is a prime example of how qualified party supporters can become leaders in the public service. Williams is not the only recent example of party faithful being appointed to senior positions within the civil service. Former premier John Hamm appointed Duff Montgomerie as the assistant deputy minister of the Office of Health Promotion in 2006. Prior to this post, Montgomerie had served Hamm as his director of community relations in the Office of the Premier, a partisan political appointment. Rodney MacDonald, who replaced Hamm as leader of the Progressive Conservatives and premier of the province, appointed Montgomerie as the deputy minister of the Office of Health Promotion the following year. In Williams’s case, the government created a brand new agency, but upon any vacancy in a deputy minister position, if a premier is given a choice among competent candidates, he might be inclined to choose an individual whose partisan loyalty matches his own. A premier might find such a person within the public service, but since deputy minister appointments are made by Order in Council, it is entirely within the powers of the premier to appoint people from outside the public service. As mentioned earlier, “internal” appointments are more common than “external” ones, but a premier might choose to look beyond the public service if it was felt that there was no one inside it who was “right” for the position. In rare cases, if the government is looking for a particular skill set or policy expertise, and there is no one who fits the bill within the current public service, the government might elect to hold an open competition in the hopes of finding the right person by casting a wider net. The deputy minister to the Premier’s Office, as the head of the public service, sits at the apex of the deputy minister cohort. She or he advises the premier not only on the recruitment and selection of deputy ministers, but on their promotion as well. She or he monitors the performance management of all deputies and, upon assessing individual performances, makes recommendations to the premier on career advancement. This is an opportunity for the political executive to acknowledge political responsiveness; deputies who have successfully advanced the premier’s agenda might be rewarded with new, more distinguished portfolios, while deputies who have been less effective in this regard might be “demoted.” However, there are deputies in Nova Scotia’s recent history who, as a result of their education, skills, and productivity, have climbed the ranks of the deputy minister cadre, holding several posts along the way. Howard Windsor, for example,

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was a public servant in Nova Scotia for almost thirty years. His postings as a deputy minister include Tourism, Culture, and Heritage beginning in 1999, Transportation and Public Works in 2000, and Finance in 2002. Starting in January 2004, he became the deputy to the Office of the Premier under Premier John Hamm, as well as the deputy for Communications Nova Scotia and the Treasury and Policy Board. At this time, another veteran public servant, Vicki Harnish, took Windsor’s place as the deputy minister for Finance. She had served previously as the secretary to the Executive Council (1999–2004) and deputy minister for the Public Service Commission (2002–4) and the Treasury and Policy Board (2003–4). In the last decade, deputy ministers have spent, on average, between two and three years in a department. This is not a long time. The number of years that a deputy minister serves a particular minister is o en influenced by several factors. Retirements and resignations, performance in a department, and the rotation of deputies to provide experience in central agencies trumps a relationship between a deputy and his or her minister. Furthermore, deputy minister “shuffles” are a tradition in Nova Scotia. While individual deputies are sometimes appointed to departments, it is more o en the case that several deputies will be moved in a shuffle. This has li le if anything to do with the relationships between deputy ministers and ministers, and more to do with the management of government and the political realities facing the premier. Deputies with a track record for good department management and “pu ing out fires” may find themselves shuffled to a department that has had difficulty executing the priorities of government or has been stricken with management concerns. Media and public a ention on the management of departments and the success or failure of programs and services can also be influential in determining a deputy’s stay in a department. A deputy who has not handled a file well and who has caused embarrassment to the government may be shuffled to a smaller department, or the file may be transferred to a department whose deputy is seen as capable of managing the file. On the one hand, it makes good sense to move deputies to larger, more complex portfolios as they gain the experience necessary to manage them. Furthermore, the prospect of career advancement is a strong incentive for ambitious deputies. However, the regular rotation of deputy ministers prevents “departmentalization” from taking hold. Because deputies seldom stay in one place for a long period of

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time, it is less likely that their departmental and/or ministerial loyalties will intensify to the point where they trump their allegiances to the Premier’s Office and to each other. This scenario has the potential to increase deputies’ responsiveness to the political centre of government and to strengthen the ties that bind the deputy minister cadre. We return to the themes of centralization and politicization regularly throughout the chapter, but in the following section we discuss briefly the statutes that affect deputies’ performance of their managerial duties. Deputy Ministers as Managers Deputy ministers manage both the financial and human resources in their departments and the delivery of services (Aucoin 2006b, 10). In Nova Scotia, the broad strokes of deputies’ managerial authority within their departments are outlined in the province’s Civil Service Act. The legislation states that deputy ministers, “subject to the administration, supervision, direction and control” of the minister, “shall (a) oversee and direct the a endance, conduct and work performance of the employees in his department; and (b) organize the department in such a manner as he considers best for the efficient administration of the department, its functions and duties” (Civil Service Act, R.S.N.S. 1989). The Public Service Commission (PSC) of Nova Scotia is responsible for staffing government departments, but this authority is o en delegated to deputy ministers. When a empting to fill vacancies, they must conduct recruitment and selection in a manner consistent with the government’s fair hiring policy, the Civil Service Act, and the relevant collective agreements. Deputies are responsible for responding to complaints that arise in recruitment and hiring and for informing the PSC of the nature and substance of any such complaint. The Civil Service Act gives deputies the authority to dismiss public servants for cause. When it is possible to do so, deputy ministers are encouraged by the PSC to download the responsibility for recruitment and selection to the management level of the department. Managerial control over hiring might help to protect the public service from partisan infiltration; some deputy ministers are selected at least partly on account of their partisan connections and might be inclined to consider party loyalty when making their own hiring decisions later on. In cases where hiring managers (as opposed to deputies) conduct the recruitment and selection, they must obtain the wri en consent of the deputy minister before offering

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the job to a candidate. Therefore, deputies are ultimately accountable to the PSC for recruitment and selection within their departments. As with other provincial jurisdictions, the accountabilities of Nova Scotia’s deputy ministers are complex. While much of the day-to-day or weekly accounting takes place between minister and deputy, the complexity of government necessitates various accounts from the deputy minister cadre. These accountabilities are recognized through conventions and statutes but, to an extent, also depend on the premier’s management style. The next section examines the conventions and statutes that frame the accountability relationships of Nova Scotia deputy ministers with ministers, premiers, and House of Assembly and Cabinet commi ees. We focus on how these multifarious accountabilities have been executed in the recent history of the province. Deputy Ministers’ Relationships of Accountability Deputy Ministers and Ministers One of the first obligations – and challenges – of a newly elected premier is to choose a Cabinet. Indeed, a premier’s post-election priority is appointing ministers to departments. This leaves the premier with limited time to determine which caucus members are the best fits. While the premier would have rapport with most candidates who ran under the party’s banner, he or she may not yet have solidified relationships that would easily allow the premier to choose ministers. Perhaps this explains the current premier’s decision to interview each member of his caucus for Cabinet consideration shortly a er his 2009 electoral victory (Chronicle Herald 2009, 19 June). Ministers provide deputies with priorities and a sense of direction, and they make decisions that deputy ministers lack the authority to make on their own. The complexity of today’s government requires that deputy ministers (not ministers) manage their respective departments. They deal with the day-to-day realities of the operations of departments. Also, the fact that today’s ministers are saddled with so many responsibilities and portfolios puts the onus on the deputy ministers to know and understand the specifics of their departments with respect to policies, services, and management. Premier Dexter’s decision to create a smaller-than-usual Cabinet (in an effort to save taxpayers’ money) has

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meant that ministers cannot afford the luxury of specialization and are le vulnerable to the knowledge and expertise of their deputies. This empowers deputy ministers, obviously, but also extends the reach of the Premier’s Office into departments, as deputies are appointees of the premier. While deputy ministers are the senior managers of departments, they are also the “subordinates” of their ministers. The reality of this relationship results in the most direct, unambiguous, and frequent of a deputy minister’s accountabilities. It is the deputy who advises the minister on all aspects that fall within the department’s mandate. Deputies are called upon to “speak truth to power,” as mentioned previously, which means that deputies must provide ministers with objective, neutral, non-partisan advice on the complicated issues facing the department. The deputy reports to the minister on department activities and seeks his or her approval on ma ers that fall outside the boundaries of deputy ministerial authority. It is the minister who instructs the deputy minister and delegates authority to him or her. This authority is both explicit and implicit. The Interpretation Act provides much of the statutory framework for deputy ministers to exercise discretionary power on behalf of their ministers. The legislation allows deputies to act with the minister’s authority without the need for constant and explicit approval. Without such authorization, a deputy would be constrained in the management of his or her department. It appears that the accountability mechanisms are executed mostly informally between minister and deputy. Access to information legislation, the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FOIPOP) in Nova Scotia, has certainly increased the frequency of verbal reporting. As Aucoin and Savoie have argued, through referring to the federal jurisdiction, “the public service now fear pu ing truth to paper for fear that their advice will become public knowledge” (2009). Instead, so their argument goes, deputy ministers a empt to protect their ministers – and indeed the first minister – as well as their own policy advice and administrative functions. In these a empts to limit information to the media, political parties, and interest groups, deputy ministers’ advice has lost some of the thoughtful consideration, analysis, and reflection that is best provided by reports and briefs. As we have outlined, a deputy’s relationship with his or her minister is an important one. But while this is the most direct and continuous link between the civil service and the elected government, deputies and their ministers can bring opposing perspectives to the job. Ministers

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are political; it is their nature. It is for this reason that deputy ministers, as non-partisan professionals, sometimes must carry out directives that they would not recommended or support. Indeed, Nova Scotia’s deputies recognize that there are political realities that must be managed. Deputy ministers know full well that politics will sometimes trump good policy. Each of them addresses this in his or her own style. Confident and experienced deputy ministers respectfully challenge ministers, while the neophyte might choose other methods to influence a veteran minister. Regardless of the tactic chosen, it is important for the deputy minister to speak truth to power. Open and frank dialogue produces be er policy advice and, hopefully, outcomes. Mandate le ers, which outline the premier’s priorities and expectations for the minister and the department he or she oversees, are shared with the deputy minister of the department. This le er is meant to provide a basic roadmap for the deputy as he or she leads the day-to-day management of the department. The le er also assists the deputy in recognizing the events, actions, and decisions that could generate the need for an account to either the minister or the premier. The premier’s mandate would signal to a deputy where department resources should be concentrated. A deputy would surely expect the focus of his or her political masters to address the management of these files. It also gives a deputy a warning that his or her minister might be straying from the premier’s priorities and/or from the overall direction of the government’s priorities. Indeed, ministerial policy dri can only add to the complex accountability of deputy ministers. Tensions arise when conflicting directives come from a deputy’s minister and the premier. But as the sole individual who can remove a deputy from his or her position, the premier guides the actions of the deputy minister cadre. Deputy Ministers and Premiers In the last thirty years, deputy ministers predominantly have risen through the ranks of the public service when they have acquired the necessary skills and experience to lead government departments. They have a comprehensive understanding of their department, experience in navigating the machinery of government, and analytical skills for the risks and challenges associated with policy options that most elected officials lack. Certainly a public service career, typically spanning three decades, provides a deputy minister with a public management capacity beyond that of his or her political master. Although merit-based

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appointments have become standard practice, there have also been cases (a couple of which were mentioned earlier) in which those sympathetic to the party in office have been appointed to the position of deputy minister. Recently, Nova Scotia premiers have chosen not to make changes to the deputy minister cadre early in their terms. During this decade, each of the province’s premiers (John Hamm, Rodney MacDonald, and Darrell Dexter) was at least six months into his mandate before making adjustments to deputy minister portfolios.1 In fact, even deputy ministers to the premier remained in their positions during the transition period. John Hamm, who first formed government in June 1999, waited until September 2000 to choose a deputy minister for his office. The current premier also waited six months to announce his deputy minister. In this case, Dexter relied on the experience of the former premier’s deputy while also bringing in his own advisor to lead the newly created Cabinet commi ee, Policy and Priorities, one month a er winning the June 2009 election. In both cases the preceding government was of a different political stripe. Rodney MacDonald, who served as premier between February 2006 and June 2009, acted more swi ly in appointing his deputy but nonetheless maintained Hamm’s deputy until his retirement ten weeks later. Indeed, these premiers recognized the value and stability that seasoned deputy ministers bring to public management. Because deputy ministers are appointed by the premier, they are disciplined and dismissed only by the premier. This helps to complicate the working relationship of accountability between ministers and deputies. While the most frequent accounting takes place between minister and deputy, premiers can and do call on deputy ministers to explain their actions and decisions. Depending on the issue and the rapport between deputy and premier, these meetings may include the department minister. However, it is common for deputies and the premier to meet one-on-one to discuss department and corporate governance. The current premier’s style favours deputies accounting directly to the deputy minister to the Premier’s Office. However, on major policies and priorities, the premier prefers to meet with department deputies. It is interesting that these meetings are seldom a ended by ministers. This is evidence of the significant workload borne by the small Cabinet, but more significantly it speaks to the tendency of premiers in the province to govern from the centre by communicating their priorities and concerns directly to the deputies. Also, as we mentioned earlier, FOIPOP

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legislation is encouraging more frequent face-to-face meetings than briefing notes, which could be accessed under access to information legislation. The corporate-government responsibilities of deputy ministers certainly explain some of the complexity inherent in today’s web of accountability. As a team of managers who work as a collective to implement government policy priorities in a fiscally responsible manner, deputy ministers account to the head of government. While some of this accounting may take place between the premier’s deputy minister and department deputies, it is acknowledged that the line of accountability goes directly to the premier. A deputy minister’s accountability to the premier is further fortified through annual performance appraisals and, until recently, “pay for performance” packages, which were determined by the deputy minister to the premier on behalf of the premier. Rodney MacDonald’s Progressive Conservative government terminated this remuneration package in 2007 (retroactively to 2006) and, instead, gave all deputy ministers raises that were unrelated to performance. The premier’s ability to offer financial incentives and rewards only reinforces deputies’ responsiveness to his office. The discipline of deputy ministers in the province has conventionally taken place behind the closed doors of the executive. While the legislative standing commi ees are within their authority to seek answers from a deputy within his or her authority, it is only the premier who can discipline the deputy minister cadre. Not receiving bonus pay (or pay for performance), being shuffled to a smaller department, or losing an important policy file is the clearest and most public evidence of deputy ministers not meeting the expectations of a premier (Nova Scotia, Treasury Board 2007). This was the case in the fall of 2008 when it was revealed that Nova Scotia taxpayers spent $230,000 on sixty-six child-sized ATVs and thirteen trailers to train youth on appropriate sized machines the previous year (Chronicle Herald 2008). The legislature had passed legislation in 2005 dictating that training must be provided to anyone under the age of fourteen who wishes to drive an ATV in the province. The Office of Health Promotion and Protection had been assigned responsibility to look at feasible training options. In 2007, it awarded an untendered contract for the purchase of the vehicles and the trailers (Nova Scotia, Legislative Assembly 2008). The premier of the day, Rodney MacDonald, maintained that he had no knowledge of the purchase

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until a reporter who questioned the decision made him aware of it. Media reports showed that the public was clearly incensed. In this case, the premier demonstrated his disapproval by moving the file to another department, where the deputy was made responsible to recoup the money (Chronicle Herald 2008). In an a empt to uncover specifics about the office’s decisions and seek answers, the Public Accounts Commi ee invited the deputies of both departments to appear before it. During this meeting the deputy minister of the Office of Health Promotion and Protection reflected on his decision to proceed with the contract. In retrospect, I should have asked others, like Treasury and Policy Board, to examine the go-forward plan from a broader public policy perspective but at the time I believed it was a solid plan and with the best interests and the safety of youth at heart. In July 2008, the Premier made the decision to move the file to the Department of Natural Resources. I respect his decision, obviously, but I regret that he was placed in a difficult position of having to make such a move. (Nova Scotia, Legislative Assembly 2008)

This incident played out very publicly in the province for several months and resulted in much negative media coverage for the government. Deputy ministers are no longer anonymous public servants. Today their faces are regularly seen on television news, and their quotes appear in newspapers. They are the topic of newspaper columns and le ers to the editor.2 The public no longer reserves its judgment to elected political actors. The media, acting on behalf of the public, seek answers from premiers and ministers on the disciplinary actions taken against deputy ministers. Despite the public appetite, premiers have not disclosed when or if deputy ministers have been punished. However, it will undoubtedly become more difficult to conceal the discipline of deputy ministers as their roles become more public. Because the public is much less deferential than it once was, and politicians are keen to the increased scrutiny that has resulted, it seems that ministers and premiers in Nova Scotia are more a entive to the inner workings of departments than in the past. As a result, ministers and premiers are much more sensitive to debt and deficit and pay particular a ention to platform promises made during the election campaign. FOIPOP legislation and an aggressive press gallery add to the increased a ention paid to department activities. Undoubtedly, these

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factors – combined with three minority governments since 1998, two of which were back-to-back and lasted three years each – have increased the pressures on deputy ministers to be mindful of and to respond to political pressures. The recent minority governments in Nova Scotia faced intense scrutiny from legislative commi ees, which primarily comprised members from opposition parties. In the next section, we discuss deputy ministers’ public interactions with these commi ees. Deputy Ministers and CommiĴees Governments are under constant pressure to provide programs and services in a fiscally responsible and transparent manner. Aucoin and Savoie have outlined the pressures that the media, auditors general, and access to information legislation have put on government to explain decisions, justify expenditures, and account for actions (Aucoin and Savoie 2009). In these pursuits Nova Scotia’s deputy ministers have not been anonymous. As in other provinces and in the federal jurisdiction, legislative and parliamentary commi ees have become mechanisms through which elected representatives can extract public accounts of government activity from deputy ministers. Nova Scotia’s legislative commi ees are o en rife with partisanship. Opposition members of the commi ees take full advantage of the opportunity to question senior public servants on the activities and decisions of the government. While the governing party is the desired target of the embarrassment and criticism, deputy ministers and other senior staff are the conduits to achieving this effect. Deputies appear regularly before legislative commi ees in the province, with the most frequent appearances being before the Public Accounts Commi ee (PAC). For example, in 2008 the PAC had thirteen deputy minister a endees, compared with the Community Services Commi ee’s four and Economic Development’s single appearance by a deputy. This is the result of the PAC’s mandate to investigate and probe the expenditures of government,3 as well as the frequency of its meetings. The commi ee is known to be one of the most active PACs in the country. It generally meets once a week throughout the year, breaking briefly for a couple of weeks in the summer, and recently taking time off when the legislature is in session because of the demand it puts on legislators. The deputy minister cadre’s approach to their appearances before legislative commi ees follows the traditional doctrine of ministerial responsibility. This means that they appear on behalf of their minister

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and not in their own person. They respond to questions in which they have statutory authority or those questions that require fact-based responses. The present government has made no explicit a empt to move away from this approach to deputies’ appearances before legislative commi ees. In this section of the chapter, we give examples in which deputies have been called before House of Assembly commi ees to explain the decisions and actions taken within their departments and to provide details on aspects of departmental activity. One of the most recent and well-publicized cases of a deputy minister appearing before a legislative commi ee took place in March 2009. In response to the economic downturn of 2008/9, the Economic Development Commi ee asked the Department of Finance to provide it with a financial update. The deputy minister of finance, Vicki Harnish, was invited by the commi ee in January 2009, a er the premier and the minister declined to appear. Initially arguing that she could not provide details until budget day, the commi ee issued a subpoena to the deputy minister. Harnish appeared before the commi ee in March, where she repeatedly informed it that she had no authority to provide new figures on the province’s finances and advised members to look to the minister for a fiscal update (CBC Nova Scotia 2009). During the meeting, Finance Critic Graham Steele questioned whether the province had more recent financial data than provided in the government’s recent public fiscal update. Steele argued that the department had “facts” it could disclose, while the deputy maintained that she had the latest statistics on key economic indicators and provided each member of the commi ee with copies (Nova Scotia, Legislative Assembly 2009). The commi ee found Harnish’s argument unconvincing and instead sought legal advice on finding her in contempt of the legislature for refusing to answer specific questions (Canadian Press 2009). Throughout the three hours of questioning, the deputy minister maintained her position, offering elected representatives replies such as, “You know I’m not in a position to answer your question,” and “I do not know what is in the minister’s head” (Nova Scotia, Legislative Assembly 2009, 4–5). A er the meeting she told reporters, “I’m amazed at the political foolishness … And I’m exhausted, and I suspect no other comment is in my best interest right now” (Chronicle Herald 2009, 25 March). Members from both opposition parties seemed equally frustrated by the outcome of the meeting. “I am not a lawyer, but I feel like the people

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of Nova Scotia and each of us, as members of the legislature, have been basically stalled in terms of finding out where this province is headed and how we are ge ing there,” expressed one Liberal commi ee member.4 Steele told reporters a er the meeting that he believed that the deputy was told not to disclose any new figures to the commi ee (Canadian Press 2009). Indeed, the minister of finance later revealed that he instructed his deputy to remain tight-lipped about presenting new figures before he presented a fiscal update as part of the budget process. The commi ee never did seek the opinion of the House of Assembly on the contempt charge, a necessary prerequisite, since the commi ee alone lacks the authority to make such charges. Perhaps the May letter of apology from the deputy to the commi ee, which reiterated her “untenable position” and “frustration” (Chronicle Herald, 2009, 1 May) deterred the commi ee, or perhaps they received legal advice against pursuing such an action. The frustration felt by the deputy minister and members of the Economic Development Commi ee is not an isolated case in Nova Scotia. In 2006, the Public Accounts Commi ee heard from witnesses from a government office and a government agency over a potential conflict of interest involving former premier John Hamm and the minister of economic development.5 Millions of dollars in government loans from a Cabinet-controlled fund had been given to businesses with close connections to the premier and the minister. Members of the commi ee tried for months to access documents on the particulars of the loans. The deputy ministers, in responding to the commi ee, claimed that Cabinet confidence and solicitor/client privilege prevented them from sharing the documents with the commi ee. It should be noted that in this case the solicitor was the Nova Scotia a orney general, and the client the Executive Council. Therefore it was the government’s sole decision not to release itself from that privilege. The commi ee then subpoenaed the production and full disclosure of documents relating to the files. It was then provided with documents so censored, hundreds of pages were blank, that they were rendered inadequate to scrutinize government activities on the files. An accompanying le er from the Department of Justice, however, informed the commi ee that the organizations had complied with the subpoena. In this instance the commi ee sought the advice of the chief legislative council for the House of Assembly who supported the commi ee (Nova Scotia, Legislative Assembly 2006). It then asked the Speaker to rule on whether the commi ee was within its

68 Michelle Coffin and Lori Turnbull

bounds to subpoena and receive the documents requested (ibid.). Four days later the province was thrown into an election without a ruling. Opposition members of Nova Scotia’s legislative commi ees become frustrated with what they maintain is the somewhat “convenient” claim of Cabinet confidentiality and ministerial responsibility invoked by both ministers and deputy ministers. When confronted with a government’s refusal to disclose documents, opposition members have pointed to cases in which documents related to Executive Council advice have been released or disclosed by deputy ministers. It seems that the argument can be made that ministerial responsibility and Cabinet confidence have been used as shields to protect the government – both the political and the professional – from the disclosure of information to the public via the legislative commi ees. Indeed, as is the situation with other provincial and federal standing legislative commi ees, partisan politics comes into play with the work of Nova Scotia’s commi ee system, and certainly deputy ministers have found themselves in the middle, as the deputy minister of finance did in 2009. It is now commonplace for the Office of the Premier to assist deputy ministers in their preparation for appearances before standing committees. In fact, in many – if not all – instances, deputies confer with the premier’s senior political staff prior to appearing before standing commi ees. The current premier’s political staff also spends a significant amount of time meeting with deputy ministers to ensure consistency with platform commitments and coordinate the work of Cabinet commi ees. This speaks to the centralization of control at the level of the premier. The increasing centralization of power at the federal level has been well documented by Savoie (1999). Unfortunately, provincially the ma er has received less a ention. Conclusion The corporate responsibilities of deputy ministers have translated into a corporate-driven vision. Deputies recognize their role in moving the province forward. In other words, their first allegiance is to the province, or the government-wide agenda. Indeed, loyalty to one minister or department perpetuates the silo approach to governing that has been found guilty of creating poor fiscal, economic, and social policy. In addition, deputy ministers of smaller departments or offices typically have multiple management responsibilities. For example, the current deputy minister for Seniors also serves as the deputy to the Public

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Service Commission. This corporate vision, however, also bu resses the concentration of power in the Office of the Premier. As previously mentioned, the corporate-government agenda is driven by the premier. The premier sets the government agenda. The premier’s priorities set the direction of government. The premier also has the constitutional authority to make decisions in any department, with or without the knowledge or input of the department minister. Aucoin’s new public governance theory is obviously applicable in the Nova Scotia experience. Power is concentrated in the hands of the premier and his closest advisors, who advance their plans and priorities with the help of deputy ministers, whom the premier hires and fires, rewards and punishes. Premiers hold meetings with deputies, regularly without ministers present, in order to ensure deputies’ solid understanding of the government’s priorities. Mandate le ers from the Premier’s Office, shared with ministers and deputies, help deputies to prevent ministers from straying from the premier’s agenda. Increased public scrutiny and demands for openness, transparency, and accountability reinforce public servants’ political responsiveness and put pressure on them to show support for the government’s agenda. In Nova Scotia (and elsewhere), this has encouraged deputies to give verbal rather than wri en advice, to protect this advice from becoming public knowledge via requests made under FOIPOP legislation. Deputies have found themselves caught in the partisan crossfire when called to testify before legislative commi ees – exercises that the premier’s office and political staffers help deputies to prepare for. An increasingly aggressive press gallery has heightened demands for political responsiveness from deputies and, by extension, the public service, as governments are under considerable strain to avoid embarrassment and exposure. The evidence to suggest that the new public governance phenomenon is present in Nova Scotia does not negate the fact that many deputy ministers are appointed and promoted on the basis of skills, expertise, experience, and effectiveness. And even deputies who are, at times, pressured into political responsiveness can be and are productive, effective managers who provide sound advice to ministers. It is likely that a veteran deputy who is experienced and, perhaps at the end of his or her career and unconcerned with prospects for promotion, is less “malleable” than a rookie and less vulnerable to pressure. Time will tell to what extent the theory will continue to apply in Nova Scotia.

70 Michelle Coffin and Lori Turnbull NOTES 1. The exception here is the replacement of a few deputy ministers who retired. 2. Certainly, deputies of larger departments and those that are the object of opposition a ention for one political reason or another are more likely to face the glare of the spotlight. 3. For the complete mandate of the Nova Scotia Public Accounts Commi ee, see h p://nslegislature.ca/index.php/commi ees/pa_mandate/. 4. Diana Whalen, finance critic for the Nova Scotia Liberal Party, quoted in Chronicle Herald, 2009, 25 March. 5. In the first case, the loan recipient was a friend of the premier.

REFERENCES Aucoin, Peter. 2006a. “Improving Government Accountability.” Canadian Parliamentary Review 29 (3): 20–6. –. 2006b. “The Roles and Responsibilities of Deputy Ministers.” Author’s collection. Aucoin, Peter, and Donald Savoie. 2009. “The Political-Administrative Dichotomy: Democracy or Bureaucracy?” In The Evolving Physiology of Government, edited by O.P. Dwivedi, Tim Mau, and Byron Sheldrick, 97–117. O awa: University of O awa Press. Canadian Press. 2009, 24 March. “NS Legislative Commi ee Members Accuse Finance Deputy of Being in Contempt.” CBC Nova Scotia. 2009, 24 March. “N.S. MLAs Demand Fiscal Update from Senior Bureaucrat.” h p://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/ story/2009/03/10/ns-commi ee-subpoena.html. Chronicle Herald. 2008, 5 November. “Kiddie ATV Plan Hatched in 2007; Premier Says It Came as News to Him.” –. 2009, 25 March. “Finance Deputy Frugal with Her Words; MLAs Consider Charging Harnish with Contempt for Refusing to Give Fiscal Update.” –. 2009, 1 May. “Deputy Minister Apologizes for Remark.” –. 2009, 19 June. “Cabinet Lineup Today; 11 Positions up for Grabs; 30 NDPers to Choose From.” –. 2009, 6 November. “Taxpayers ‘at Mercy’ of ATV Industry; Natural Resources Official Says Repayment for Kiddie-Sized Vehicles Not Bound by Contract.”

Deputy Ministers in Nova Scotia 71 Clancy, Peter, James Bickerton, Rodney Haddow, and Ian Stewart, eds. 2000. The Savage Years: The Perils of Reinventing Government in Nova Scotia. Halifax: Formac Publishing. Nova Scotia. Legislative Assembly. 2006, 5 May. Debates. h p://nslegislature. ca/index.php/proceedings/hansard/C51/59_2_house_06may05/. –. 2008, 5 November. Hansard. Commi ee on Public Accounts. h p:// nslegislature.ca/index.php/commi ees/commi ee_hansard/C7/ pa_2008nov05. –. 2009, 2 March. Debates. h p://www.gov.ns.ca/legislature/hansard/comm/ed/ ed_2009mar24.htm 5. Nova Scotia. Office of Policy and Priorities. 2010. “Office of Policy and Priorities.” 18 January. h p://gov.ns.ca/ppo/. Nova Scotia. Public Accounts Commi ee. 2013. “Mandate of the Public Accounts Commi ee.” h p://nslegislature.ca/index.php/commi ees/ pa_mandate/. Nova Scotia. Standing Commi ee on Political Development. 2009, 9 March. h p://nslegislature.ca/index.php/commi ees/commi ee_hansard/C9/ ed_2009mar24. Nova Scotia. Treasury Board. 2007. “Changes to Senior Officials Pay Plan.” News release, 15 February. h p://www.gov.ns.ca/news/details. asp?id=20070215002. Nova Scotia. Treasury Board Office. 2012. “About the Treasury Board Office.” h p://www.gov.ns.ca/treasuryboard/AboutTB.html. Premier’s Office. 2010. “Premier Appoints Greg Keefe Deputy Minister to the Premier.” News release, 14 January. h p://www.gov.ns.ca/news/details. asp?id=20100114003. Savoie, Donald. 1999. Governing from the Centre: The Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Stewart, Ian. 2000. “To Bear the Yoke: Renovating the Liberal Party.” In Clancy, Bickerton, Haddow, and Stewart, 30–53.

3 Deputy Ministers in Prince Edward Island: Professionalism, Policymaking, and Patronage peter mckenna

Being a deputy minister is a good job, if job security isn’t your thing. – John Eldon Green

As you may well expect from the author of this quote, John Eldon Green spent ten years of his life as a deputy minister (DM) of the Social Services Department in the PEI government – and, as you can also probably detect, not all of them were pleasant or fruitful. He once revealed in a 1979 speech to the Canadian Cancer Society’s annual meeting in Charlo etown that “the job security of a deputy minister is one week long, in that we could be dismissed at any meeting of cabinet.” He would later add in his personal memoir, “I said that if job security were my concern, I would be home on my knees saying the Rosary, not spending time with this group” (Green 2007, 425). When anyone does think about PEI, Canada’s smallest province, they probably do not gravitate towards the trials and tribulations of provincial deputy ministers. Instead, they likely conjure thoughts of Anne of Green Gables, colourful agricultural fields and sandy beaches, and perhaps long rows of red “spuds” or even tasty lobsters. But if they are asked about the subject while waiting at the ferry terminal, or as they are paying to cross the fixed link with New Brunswick, they might be tempted to think that deputy ministers do not have a great deal to occupy their time and energy in a province of barely 140,000. Still, they might be willing to venture that very few significant public policy decisions are made on the island without the fingerprints or imprimatur of the province’s small cadre of deputy ministers. Alternatively, they may suspect that DMs in tiny PEI have precious li le power and influence

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on the province’s political landscape and long-standing culture of patronage. But when it comes to the shaping of public policy outcomes on PEI, the picture is not exactly crystal clear. It is instructive to note from the outset that very li le has been written about deputy ministers on PEI – let alone their public policy impact. As a result, this contribution seeks to shed some explanatory light on not only the nature and extent of the position, but also on the many challenges facing them in their key governmental roles. The purpose of this chapter, then, is fourfold: to sketch briefly the history of DMs in PEI, their various roles and responsibilities, and issues surrounding recruitment, advancement, mentoring, and training; to examine the relationship between DMs and their ministers, the decisions regarding minister-DM pairings, and DM shuffles (or “reorganizations”); to analyse DM accountability, consultation, and the reporting relationships of DMs; and to grapple with the impact and influence of DMs on policymaking in PEI. Lastly, it makes a number of general concluding observations and delves into what happens to DMs on PEI once they leave their governmental perch. Historical Background Sketch: DMs in PEI Before embarking on any discussion of the historical context of deputy ministers in PEI, one or two caveats are in order. Because the literature on DMs in PEI is sparse, this section is admi edly cursory and devoid of any great detail – pieced together largely through scant primary sources and mostly personal interviews. It does not, therefore, profess to be the definitive work on the historical evolution of DMs in PEI. But it is intended to give the reader a clear sense of the PEI se ing for deputies and what the initial period of the province’s administrative history entailed for them. The more detailed history, if I could say that, really did not begin until a er the provincial government adopted the so-called Comprehensive Development Plan (CDP) in 1969, which was designed to modernize the Island economically, socially, and institutionally. In the early years, just a er PEI entered Confederation in 1873, there was precious li le to do for the senior ranks of the public service. Since PEI was still mostly a sparsely populated and agricultural province, there was no great need or demand for technical experts and highfalutin advisers. To be sure, it did not require a large cohort of intellectually agile and inherently ambitious officials to manage what were then the administrative affairs of governing. The wheels of government turned

74 Peter McKenna

slowly – as it essentially sought to collect taxes, sell liquor, and pave and plough the roads. In the words of long-time island political-watcher, Frank MacKinnon, “Indeed, at times there was hardly enough to keep nine Cabinet Ministers busy, and the la er were generally able to dispense of most of the important ma ers themselves” (1951, 195). This, in turn, le what few deputy ministers there were with limited functions – in some ways stifling the growth of a professional civil service (and leaving, in some cases, a gaggle of political hacks at the junior ranks). During the 1920s, the senior manager of a government department was then referred to as a “secretary” and the minister was regarded as a “commissioner.” By the late 1920s, though, the title changed from secretary to “deputy minister” – at least in the provincial Agriculture Department. According to the annual reports from other line departments, which were contained in the Journal of the Legislative Assembly of PEI, the term secretary was still being used in Public Works and Education in the late 1920s. But the title of deputy minister did start to appear (or to be listed) more frequently in the introductory pages of these annual reports by the mid-1930s. Historically speaking, the efficiency and competency of the senior mandarinate on PEI was heavily obstructed by an ingrained culture of political patronage (MacKinnon 1972, 240–61; Clark 1973, 289–327; and Milne 1982, 39–72). From its very inception, those officials at the senior rank, few though they were, o en owed their position (and their allegiance) to the political party in power. (Because of their exceptional abilities and skill sets, some senior officials did exhibit independent views and held onto their posts even as provincial Cabinets and governments changed [MacKinnon 1951, 195–6].) In fact, the vast majority of civil servants were largely political appointees, with deep and abiding party loyalties, who were routinely ushered out as a new government assumed the power of the Premier’s Office and the accompanying instrument of dispensing political pork. Of course, this high turnover rate did li le to foster a professional cadre of public officials with governmental experience, expertise, or institutional memory. It was also not an appealing vocation for many, what with low salaries, few opportunities for career advancement, and even no guarantee of a government pension upon leaving (MacKinnon 1951, 196). Taken together, this made it extremely difficult to a ract good people from other professions in PEI – to say nothing of qualified people from outside the province. Much of what was happening in the provincial public service was, however, guided by the two Civil Service Acts of

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the 1870s and the Public Service Act of 1937. (It is worth emphasizing here that there was no Public Service Commission in PEI until 1963 – and there is still no provincial ombudsman on the Island.) As such, the government of the day maintained the veneer of hiring on the basis of qualifications and abilities, while mostly singling out those candidates with the correct party affiliation. Although the 1937 act did bring a semblance of job security to the mandarinate, the organization and smooth functioning of the public service was highly suspect – with the invocation of the merit principle sorely lacking. There was also a custom, and is arguably still in place today, of limiting government appointments to only Island-born applicants and avoiding any hiring of “come-from-aways.” By the first decades of the 1900s, and as the complexity of government activities changed, provincial Cabinet ministers came to rely more heavily upon their senior advisers. Given the huge growth in demand for public services in the 1930s, the expansion of scientific agriculture, and the complexity of dominion-provincial affairs, Cabinet members came to depend increasingly on a small group of senior officials to perform a number of core advisory and administrative tasks. “Deputy ministers, agricultural inspectors, engineers, research men, and others became more necessary and the selection of qualified persons and the provision for them of careers rather than mere jobs became for the first time an important feature of government,” wrote MacKinnon (1951, 197). While the demand for such professional services was still admi edly small on PEI, their quality and credentials were now expected to be fairly high. Accordingly, there were eight departmental deputy ministers in 1950, each hauling down a salary that ranged from $3,500 to $5,500.1 Much like today, those respective departments were Provincial Treasury, Industry and Natural Resources, Justice, Public Works, Agriculture, Health and Welfare, Provincial Secretary, and Education.2 And there was now a sense that a truly competent and efficient method of governance and public administration would require modern practices of recruitment, remuneration, and retention (through promotional opportunities) for PEI to have a fully functioning professional and able public service. Prior to the mid-1960s (or thereabout), most of the appointments to the senior ranks of the departmental mandarinate were in-house selections. As the complexity of government became an administrative reality in PEI, and as Cabinet ministers began to execute their responsibilities

76 Peter McKenna

full-time (when they had heretofore done so only part-time), there was greater need for more competent and qualified DMs. It became clear to the political executive that this could best be accomplished by tapping into the expertise and knowledge of an existing permanent officialdom. Many of those who became DMs during this period, then, had actually worked their way up the bureaucratic ladder or came up through the ranks of an incipient provincial public service. On the basis of extensive interviewing with former DMs in PEI, it is important to note that the state of governance or public administration at this time could best be characterized as haphazard or lacklustre.3 (Most of the work in government during the 1940s and 1950s was handled by ministers in a very informal and unstructured fashion. In fairness, there were not enough bodies in place to deliver competent programs in a province that had li le money, few means of generating government revenues, and increasing debt.) But as Don Nemetz, the author of a 1969 government organizational study for PEI, explained, “Deputy Ministers were not normally selected because of any demonstrated competence, or interest, in administration; it was not really necessary” (Public Administration Service 1969, 87). Deputy ministers at that time had the task of carrying out – in the words of one former deputy – “small town operations” and mostly mundane ma ers (e.g., constantly referring simple items to ministers for decisions instead of handling them themselves). Many in the provincial bureaucracy had been administratively weak, since they spent a good bit of their time on issues surrounding road maintenance, welfare, and the like (Nemetz 1982, 155). That was just how things were done in PEI – where political ministers sat around a table and made the most important political and budget decisions in a very unsophisticated and unsystematic way. However, when Liberal Alex Campbell came to power in 1966, there was a firm desire to break with the past administrative ineptitude and to professionalize the provincial public service. (Some steps in this direction had already taken place during the Progressive Conservative government of Walter Shaw, with the promulgation of the 1962 Civil Service Act, the introduction of the “merit” principles of employment, and the establishment of a competent Civil Service Commission in 1963.) Things began to change from an administrative standpoint with the creation of a special body in 1967 – the Economic Improvement Corporation (EIC). With funding from O awa, it was mandated to prepare and to implement programs and plans “related to the furthering and improving of the economic development of the province,” while

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coordinating its initiatives with the relevant provincial departments and federal agencies (Nemetz 1982, 156). Many of those brought in to staff the EIC were from outside the province (Britain, Australia, and the United States) and were of the highest quality – bright, innovative, with top-notch minds (and had worked closely with federal officials in the past and obviously “knew how to play the feds”). They were most familiar with modern administrative management practices (some had academic experience in the field) and used impressive methods of planning, systemizing operations, and instituting rational ways of thinking and prioritizing, rather than relying on intuition and how things had been done in the past. (They grew increasingly frustrated and impatient with government officials and had very li le faith in, or respect for, the existing provincial bureaucracy. Indeed, there was a palpable sense of discomfort between “come-from-aways” from the EIC and Islanders within the provincial civil service – thus creating a glaring disconnect between the two.) Nevertheless, not only did they get politicians on PEI thinking about how to generate expertise within the provincial public service (and what to look for), but they also pushed all departments of government (and their deputies) to get ideas, initiatives, and planning moving at a far more sophisticated and brisker pace. Because of political and administrative difficulties between the EIC and the political leadership in PEI (to say nothing of its warring with provincial bureaucrats), many of the staff from the disbanded EIC were folded into a new entity in 1969 – the Department of Development. Others from the EIC were shi ed into other government departments in various capacities and roles. (This transition turned out to be less problematic than some had anticipated, with former EIC staffers establishing productive working relationships with the regular departmental cohort.) What they brought with them, and subsequently instilled at the deputy minister and director levels, was a commitment to strengthen administrative structures, planning capabilities, and management systems. Accordingly, the provincial Department of Development became responsible for implementing the Campbell government’s so-called Comprehensive Development Plan (CDP) in the early 1970s. (The federally funded plan itself entailed major social and economic change in PEI – including strengthening the provincial economy, restructuring agriculture and increasing production levels, enhancing education, training and management, and improving the delivery of public

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services in the province.) Though there were many fits and starts with the overall plan, it was eventually abandoned in the late 1970s, as a new Progressive Conservative government came into power. And while there was no shortage of critics of the CDP, it did have a profound and positive impact on the professionalization of the province’s public service. As Rand Dyck pointed out, “One clear result of the plan was the strengthened managerial capacity of the Island government in terms of both the cabinet and the bureaucracy” (Dyck 1991, 106). By the mid-1970s, then, PEI was quickly becoming known as having one of the finest public services in the region. In conjunction with a modernized civil service system and a host of staff development activities, people of higher calibre were joining the ranks of the civil service, especially at the deputy minister level. According to Don Nemetz, deputies “began to function as managers, rather than clerks or political aides to the ministers” (1982, 168). Tellingly, and beginning in the late 1970s, almost all senior positions in the provincial public service were filled by Islanders with the requisite professional qualifications. (Non-Islanders did, however, provide a degree of professionalism and experience in program innovation that was not available within the provincial civil service. It admirably filled the gap, pending the availability of qualified Islanders – some of whom they trained [Nemetz 1982, 173–4].) As Nemetz rightly observed, the era of Alex Campbell’s modernization effort singled the end of “partisan, unprofessional, ruleof-thumb type of administration” (1982, 174). This would continue to be the case throughout much of the 1980s – and particularly under the tutelage of Liberal Joe Ghiz. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, and as new thinking about management and governance began to take hold, there was an emphasis on reducing the size of government and cu ing the public service rolls. On PEI, the retrenchment of the provincial state translated into a Liberal government under Catherine Callbeck “restructuring” the bureaucracy in 1993 – largely in response to a growing budget deficit and worsening provincial debt. For this reason, the number of provincial departments went from eleven to eight, and the number of deputy ministers (or equivalents) and directors were reduced. And against the wishes of the senior mandarinate, and at the expense of employee loyalty, the Callbeck government introduced the very controversial 7.5 per cent public sector salary rollback in April 1994. But as John Crossley explained, “[These] most recent changes have not

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altered the professionalism of the civil service nor have they changed the principle of merit-plus-a-li le-bit-of-patronage that has long dominated public administration in the province” (2000, 226). Under the Progressive Conservative government of Pat Binns (1996– 2007), those at the senior levels of the bureaucracy reflected a mix of expertise and partisan connections. When it came into power, there was no wholesale cleaning of the deputy minister roster or any obvious a empt to de-professionalize those at the senior ranks. Some deputy ministers were removed because of their suspected Liberal leanings, while some friends of the party were quietly ushered in. This same scenario would replicate itself once again when Liberal Robert Ghiz was elected premier in May 2007. Some new faces were added at the deputy minister level, and others were not so subtly shown the door, just as three or four with past Liberal party connections were brought in (Thibodeau 2007b). There were also two substantial changes implemented by the senior bureaucracy in October 2009 and January 2010 – in part to replace retiring officials and also to accompany a Cabinet shuffle and some reorganization of provincial line departments. True to form, though, the principle of “merit-plus-a-li le-bit-of-patronage” was scrupulously maintained once again. To be sure, when the head of the PEI Liquor Control Commission retired in the summer of 2008, one of Premier Ghiz’s hand-picked deputy ministers, Brooke MacMillan (who came out of the restaurant and tourism sector), was shi ed over to the post of CEO of the commission. (This, in turn, made room for Michael Mayne – another high-profile Ghiz appointee – to be brought in to replace MacMillan as DM of the Department of Innovation and Advanced Learning.) Howls of patronage, not surprisingly, could be heard from the benches of the Official Opposition. MacMillan would also find himself in additional hot water when it was discovered that he had received funds or “units” from the province’s controversial Provincial Nominee Program (PNP). He maintained steadfastly that he had accepted the funds a er he departed in August 2008 the Department of Innovation and Advanced Learning, which was organizationally charged with ve ing and pairing each immigrant application with a local business enterprise (Wright 2008). Then, in February 2010, the premier appointed Sandy MacDonald, the former superintendent of the Eastern School Board District and the one who spearheaded the closing of eight schools on PEI in 2009, to the post of deputy minister of education. As one opposition MLA remarked

80 Peter McKenna

sceptically, “My opinion would be that Sandy [MacDonald] is being rewarded for following through with the premier’s, in my opinion, brutal a ack on our rural schools and our communities” (Wright 2010). DMs: Recruitment, Training, and Responsibilities On PEI, there has been no single method of recruiting DMs – such as selecting them from a government-wide roster of qualified or prospective candidates. The recruitment process, in general, has not so much been formalized as it has been personalized in such a small province, where most of the political class know a great deal about what other professionals are doing via word of mouth. According to several former deputies, their recruitment is either from within the public service (a er having worked their way up through the bureaucratic system or were plucked from some other governmental body) or without (with li le or no government experience to speak of). What is most important are the individual abilities, skill sets, and experiences of each candidate – honed either in government or from the private sector. In this sense, the emphasis has been on professional and qualified people, and how best they can contribute to the effective and efficient operation of government administration. There are, however, certain similarities or commonalities in many of the DM selections in PEI. Of course, all of the “at pleasure” appointments come with the knowledge and endorsement of the provincial premier of the day. It is also assumed (since many deputies did not want to know one way or the other) that the fingerprints of the respective departmental minister are on the employee contract offer. Not surprisingly, then, the recruitment of DMs was (and still is) not immune to the vagaries of patronage or “spoils” politics in PEI. But as one former deputy observed, “It would be hard to find anyone on PEI who doesn’t have some partisan connections.” Still another explained that it made li le sense to put political hacks into the job simply because of their party affiliation, since “there was no benefit to the government of [subsequent] failure.” So while party politics was and is a factor in the selection of many deputies (and many were wrongly pegged as being sympathetic to one party or the other), it most assuredly was not the only qualification – or even the most important. In addition, most of the DMs interviewed for this chapter indicated that they did not receive training before assuming their posts. Nor was there any formalized structure of having a new deputy mentored

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by another departmental DM for two or three weeks. (Some did find themselves in the awkward position of being the new deputy while the old one was just completing the last few weeks on the job. There was some opportunity to “go to school” while the other deputy was still around, to benefit from some briefings, general orientation, and staff introductions, and to ask any questions before the departing DM le the scene.) Indeed, there was no (and this is still the case on PEI) formal training program, in-house job seminars, or orientation workshops for any newly minted deputies.4 Many former DMs acknowledged that they had to essentially “learn on the job,” “tutor myself,” be “told that here is your desk,” and to find that “no one explained what the job was about.”5 Most were le to learn the nuts and bolts of the job through their exchanges with the director or branch manager. Much like their rude introduction to the position of deputy minister, the various functions and tasks were not made readily clear to incoming deputies. On balance, though, the roles and responsibilities of deputies in PEI are much like those in other provincial (and even federal) jurisdictions. Generally speaking, as the senior departmental executive, they are responsible for managing and administrating the day-to-day affairs of the ministry as well as providing strategic policy advice to the minister (and the government). As the top civil servant, they have a variety of functions – o en wearing the hat of “negotiator,” “policy coordinator,” “interdepartmental diplomat” and “super clerk.” Overall, they act as the key liaison between the political and operational levels of government. Or, as one former deputy wryly pointed out, we basically “do what we’re told” (Green 2007, 424–5).6 There has been some suggestion in the literature that the dispensing of political pork in PEI, at least from the 1970s onwards, moved into the hands of senior government officials and away from the clutches of ministers and other politicians (Milne 2001, 125–8; and Simpson 1988, 161–7). While this argument is not well developed or detailed, it does seem to revolve around seasonal work (snow ploughing, liquor stores, highway flagging, and cu ing brush), departmental staffing decisions, and supply contracts for line departments. But not a single deputy interviewed for this article was aware of any DMs practising patronage politics on the job. “It was clear that ministers relished that role and were not willing to relinquish it,” said one former deputy. Many others pointed out that not only was it not expected of them, but that it was still common knowledge that the political ministers were expected to handle that. As one former clerk of the Executive Council observed

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dryly, “Deputies wouldn’t dare do it [patronage politics] if the minister was already doing it.” In numerous interviews, former and current PEI deputies were noticeably succinct and even forceful in articulating their job description – though there were differences in emphasis and order of importance. In the de words of one deputy, “It basically entails effectively managing up [with giving solid professional advice to the minister], effectively managing across [by working with other senior departmental officials], and effectively managing down [by energizing directors and managers].” All of them understood the constant political pressures of the job, but they insisted that their principal role was certainly not to “protect the minister,” “to keep the minister out of political hot water,” or “to make the minister look good.”7 Essentially, it was to bring good management and administrative practices to government, to see the big picture, to look ahead at what the future issues were likely to be, and to provide professional, non-partisan advice about the organization and pressing public policy issues of the day. As one veteran deputy described it, “Our job was not to be politicians, but to point out how the objectives of the government could best be achieved by going this way.” Still, deputies acknowledged that they needed to be in tune with what was happening politically in the province. “You’re really not doing your job if the minister screws up,” said one current deputy. So it falls to the DM to assist the minister in finding ways to move the government’s agenda – and thus try to ensure a successful minister. But one of their tasks is most assuredly not offering unsolicited political or electoral advice to the minister, as many deputies indicated forcefully, to secure re-election or popular appeal. Instead, the deputy is to be aware of the policy environment, understand what the public may be thinking about (partly through media coverage), and advise the minister on whether the timing is right to get something difficult done. When it came to a breakdown of job functions and time management, practically every deputy minister interviewed for this chapter identified managerial/administrative activities as occupying the lion’s share of their time.8 While many admi ed that a good portion of their time should have been allocated to formulating strategic policy advice, the reality was that they were frequently dragged into more operational issues than they should. (Some even complained about how clu ered their desks became with trivial, day-to-day administrative ma ers such as signing all leaves and vacation requests.) Drawing heavily on their time were management issues involving the breadth of the department

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(its problems and its needs), policy development (involving interaction with other government departments), linkages to the budgetary process and the legislature, and evaluating what program initiatives were working well and which were not. O en they found themselves trying to explain to the Cabinet and others the “present realities of the organization” and what it took for their particular department to be managed and run effectively. On issues of leadership development and supervising of lowerranking officials, DMs in PEI were largely of the same mind on their importance. But in terms of leadership development itself, there was a sense that most deputies understood that they should be doing more in this area – though realizing it was more talk than actual follow-through in the end. However, many DMs pointed to the substantial time spent with other directors and division managers in seeking input, identifying potential trouble spots and internal difficulties, and ge ing empirically based policy direction. Depending upon the department, it was possible for a deputy to spend three or four days each week meeting with directors to find out what was going on at their level and what they were hearing from their networks within other government departments. As one deputy observed, “I spend more time with my directors than I do with the minister or other governmental colleagues.” Over the years, though, there have been meetings involving deputy ministers from the other line departments – sometimes referred to as a “commi ee of deputies,” a “deputies’ table,” or, more recently, the “deputies’ executive board.” From the 1950s to the late 1960s, those meetings were irregular and the structure itself was largely informal and even “haphazard.” Deputies occasionally got together at a local hotel or resort to chat and have lunch a erward, but there was no set issue agenda, and precious li le of administrative substance came out of them. By the early 1970s, however, the meeting of deputies became more regularized (though meetings sometimes were not held for several months) and more structured in the sense that horizontal commi ees were established and a set agenda was circulated beforehand. Though the format, and those around the table (including political staffers in a endance) changed somewhat, the purpose remained largely the same – to find ways of be er managing and organizing government operations. These sessions were also intended to “break down the silos of the bureaucracy,” “to identify any problems with other government departments,” “to clear the air,” and to discuss policy ideas and their implications for the departments involved.

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By the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, the monthly meetings of deputies started to happen weekly and with more focus and purpose. In some cases, the discussion and “exchange of notes” focused on a specific issue like the province’s pressing debt load – where there would be a full airing of views. By adopting a more corporate approach to these gatherings, it was hoped that individual deputies would be able to work together in achieving the government’s overall policy priorities. (Deputies were briefed on key issues and thus found out exactly what was going on in other departments and how they might be able to assist or contribute to resolving a particular problem.) As one current deputy added, “The hope was to get other government departments engaged in the conversation, since most policy issues don’t live in a single line department.” Simply put, the idea was to move the government’s agenda forward by using the feedback from these meetings of deputies to identify ways to deliver be er public policy results overall – in a “whole-of-government” fashion. Under the present Liberal government of Robert Ghiz, there has been an effort to embrace a more traditional model that stresses strategic policy advice from its deputies. Accordingly, the deputies’ executive board has been given the responsibility of ensuring that their respective departments are acting and thinking horizontally and adopting a government-wide policy agenda. Several “policy tables” were created – in areas such as social policy, fiscal planning and review, economic development strategy, and public service modernization – to ensure that deputies are thinking strategically outside of their narrow bureaucratic silos. These tables of deputies meet every two weeks or so (with all deputies ge ing together once a month) with a set agenda and a determination to have a meaningful and active exchange of views and ideas – which is then transmi ed upward to the Cabinet and premier. As one deputy confided, “This will facilitate crisp analysis in memo format and be er help in coordinating and prioritizing what exactly goes up to Cabinet.” Ministers and Their Deputies: A Match Made in Heaven? There is no disputing, in light of the interview material, just how important and “special” the relationship is between the political ministers and their respective DMs. It was roundly viewed as “pivotal,” “critical,” and “exceedingly important,” and emphasis was placed on

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the significance of working “as a team” (for the good of the government and the overall department). While many saw themselves as “subordinate” to the minister, it was frequently considered a “symbiotic” relationship of sorts (in which both benefited from a healthy working relationship). Although face-time with some ministers was always difficult to come by, there was o en an open-door policy between them rather than a set date or time slot for regularized meetings. And it was the job of the deputy minister during this two hours or so a week of one-on-one time to inform the minister of what was happening in the field, where there may be choppy waters ahead, and how best to formulate and to implement the government’s policy priorities. Like most relationships, it was not always smooth sailing. As one long-serving DM explained, “I would o en strive to give the bad news on the minister’s good days, and the good news on the minister’s bad days.” It is, however, critically important for both to realize that it is a professional relationship and most assuredly not a personal friendship. In fact, one former deputy confided that it is incumbent upon a DM to provide “a countervailing power to irrational behaviour or acts [by the minister] to change the world.” Having said that, many deputies acknowledged that a successful minister-DM union requires mutual respect and trust (and confidentiality), and that “personal chemistry” is helpful. (While it is not necessary to share a similar ideological disposition or public policy outlook, there is a pressing need to be able to work together constructively and purposefully.) All felt that it is absolutely essential to be able to speak freely, critically, and candidly to the minister (but that tact and nimbleness are o en more productive than simple bluntness or bull-headedness) and to have open channels of communication (so as to “speak truth to power”). According to one current DM, “It is really not about what they [ministers] want to hear, but what they need to hear and know.” On the thorny question of loyalty, several deputies were uncertain about exactly what to say, and thus choose their words carefully. They were obviously more comfortable in saying “loyalty to the government overall,” “loyalty to Cabinet and not specifically the minister,” and “not loyalty in the political sense.” Any ministerial loyalty entails “pu ing your heart and soul into making them [ministers] successful” and not deliberately trying to undercut them or to unnecessarily put them out on a limb. Generally speaking, many felt that if there is loyalty, it is definitely to the person who appointed them – the premier of the day.

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“It is important to note here that the first loyalty of the deputy is to the premier, who must be protected from possible ministerial neglect, misconduct, or incompetence,” said one former deputy minister. Not surprisingly, the minister-deputy minister pairings themselves have no set pa ern of design or longevity in PEI – though some deputies have stayed in their positions for long periods of time and outlasted several departmental ministers (while others tended to move every three or four years). The length of any union, then, is o en a function of their relationship itself, changes in public policy direction, and, most importantly, the vagaries of a new administration (or a Cabinet shuffle in a si ing government). While it is not exactly scientific or formuladriven, some thought does seem to go into the particular pairing of minister and deputy minister. In other words, the assigned pairings are purposeful in the sense that there is a good personality fit, that the nature of the portfolio and the sensitivity of the issues involved require a certain union, or that it is prudent to join a perceived weak minister with a strong deputy (in terms of process and policy orientation). But as one former deputy observed, “These unions were always a ‘Rubik’s Cube’ of why they were made in the first place.” Shuffles among deputies, however, have tended to be less frequent in general and less o en than ministerial shake-ups in PEI. For the most part, they are the result of a desire to benefit the overall operations of government as a new administration takes up the reins of political power. (The rotations usually involve a move to another government department in tandem with a ministerial shi , the result of others who are changed at the same time because of a retirement, a general shi to some other governmental agency or board, or, much less frequently, shuffled right out the door.) In some cases, they are moved to improve morale in another line department, to get things under control administratively, and to fix what is seen as a major internal problem (or for no obvious reason at all). Still in others, deputies are shi ed to shake things up in another department, to get rid of any perceived sense of complacency, and “to put a fresh face on things.” Lastly, these shuffles depend, in large part, on the premier’s style of governance and how he or she sees the government being revitalized by a rational and planned reorganization. Accountability, Reporting, and Consultation The lines of reportage for DMs seem rather straightforward, while those for accountability are more diverse and far less defined. It was generally

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agreed that deputies are to report to the premier (and his office or the clerk of the Executive Council) first and to the departmental political minister concerned in the second instance. (Of course, the sequencing of whom to report to could change, with the minister being first and the premier second.) Some simply report directly to the minister daily in an ad hoc fashion or with an unscheduled knock on the door. All essentially admi ed that it is extremely rare (but not unheard of) for a DM to go directly to the premier with something behind the back of a respective Cabinet minister. “It would not likely happen unless the minister was acting irresponsibly or illegally,” said one seasoned deputy. As for the central question of DM accountability, there was no real consensus beyond a general accounting to the premier and the political minister involved. Some deputies, either advertently or inadvertently, broke down the lines of accountability between primary and secondary categories. Along with the premier and the minister, there was a primary line drawn to the whole Cabinet and the government’s annual budget document. Into this mix was added accountability to the Treasury Board (for expenditure review), the Public Service Commission (on staffing ma ers or personnel problems), and the provincial legislature (through the Public Accounts Commi ee). Lastly, and arguably most significantly, there is an accountability to oneself. In the words of one veteran deputy, “Yes, at the end of the day you cannot tolerate your core values being violated.” A secondary list of accountabilities was less clear and seemingly less significant. For instance, a DM is accountable to the department and the staff (through performance appraisals) and provides solid leadership to the team. Moreover, some deputies (though a handful disagreed) thought that they were accountable to the general public – especially on PEI, where citizens expect their government officials to be accessible and sensitive to their concerns. (It is not uncommon for ordinary citizens to seek to resolve a problem via a phone call or le er to a DM and even to arrange a face-to-face meeting.) But it is not always clear how these sources of accountability can be ensured, or whether they are subject to penalty if they are found to be wanting. Others thought that public accountability falls less within their job description and more within the purview of ministers and politicians. Nonetheless, engaging in public consultations with civil society groups and interested stakeholders was seen as a form of accountability, but also as intelligent and sensible public policymaking. (Some deputies acknowledged that this taking of the public pulse was of no great concern to them – citing the reliability of the information and the

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fickleness of the public’s focus. And if the public needs to be consulted, some remarked, that is a task best le in the capable hands of the political minister.) In general, though, there is no regularized or structured way of si ing down and taking the temperature of various groups, critics, associations, or “policy communities.” The same could be said about how DMs consult with other departmental deputies or even with outside federal or provincial deputies. But if it does involve a particularly specific and highly technical ma er, someone from the department (not usually the DM) contacts them for their individual expertise. Generally speaking, there is usually a checklist of interest groups to be contacted and consulted – along with a careful interest in any general public polling data. There was a sense that some deputies realize that consultations enable them to cover all their bases with the minister, to seek out balanced and countervailing points of view, and to provide a be er public policy recommendation in the end (by not overlooking something less obvious). (There are regular consultations with departmental directors and division managers to discuss which programs are working with the public and what, if anything, is missing that needs to be offered.) Indeed, the consultations were viewed as lending legitimacy and credibility to the policy recommendation to the minister. (But there is not normally contact with any particular group on an issue unless the minister is informed and approves beforehand.) By doing so, it also protects the minister from being caught unawares by probing media inquiries or being unable to answer a pertinent question in the provincial legislature from a pesky opposition member. “If you don’t do it [consultations], you would do that at your own peril,” said one wily deputy. DMs: Bit Players or Policymakers? Very few would deny that DMs, as senior departmental executives, have a major influence on the formulation and implementation of public policy. The challenge, of course, is to determine the precise nature of that policy impact, whether it varies according to the issue in question, the presiding political minister or the political milieu of the day, and what enables senior officials to have this influence in the first place. One key question then becomes whether the government is executing the policy preferences of the Cabinet and the premier or those of senior departmental officials. Simply put, who exactly is making public policy decisions here? And if it is made by the senior mandarinate, are they

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doing it for the good of the public, the good of the department, or their own good? Some commentators like to simplify this debate by pu ing it all into a context of “power without responsibility,” “responsibility without power,” or perhaps somewhere in between (Inwood 2004: 140–4; Millin 2004; and Hodge s 1985, 139–45). Whatever the case, there is li le disputing the role of deputies in offering public policy advice or initiatives to their respective ministers. In many instances, what makes them pivotal policymakers, besides their position as administrative specialists, is the roles that they perform: that is, as gate-keepers to the minister, policy guru and expert, and guardian of the information flow. If information is power, then deputies must have their fair share, since they have access to reams of paperwork and pie charts – along with the specialized knowledge and requisite expertise. More important, DMs understand how the policymaking process works in a government, whom to contact and how to shepherd a policy initiative through the organizational maze, and what to do in order to bullet-proof it from other rival political or bureaucratic actors. Lastly, the actual implementation (substitute here “stalling” or “torpedoing”) of policy directives from above is ultimately a bureaucratic prerogative. In other words, they may, or may not, want to follow through on its implementation – depending upon its impact on their own organizational and personal interests. When it comes to organizational or “bureaucratic politics” in PEI, almost nothing has been wri en on the topic.9 And what has been written tends to argue against the application of this explanatory model for the PEI scene – in part, because of its small population base, small size of government, and the lack of complexity of the issues here. Writing in 2005, political scientist Peter Buker emphasized that “departments and the public service generally just act to fulfill their Weberian role of implementing executive decisions” (2005, 143). Because of the topdown and hierarchical decision-making authority of the premier and the Cabinet, DMs are not considered to have independent sources of power and influence, and thus PEI does not readily lend itself to the organizational politics model. Besides, as Buker went on to add, “the values are broadly consensual, the relations are implicitly cooperative, and the decisions are mostly apolitically bounded-rational administrative” (129). For him, deputies are essentially products of this same consensual population and not inclined towards controlling the policy process or manipulating highly politicized Cabinet ministers.

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However, the impact of DMs on policymaking in PEI seems less clear cut and more prevalent than one might think or expect. In fairness, the arguments put forth by Buker have validity, and some deputies, during the course of my interviews with them, confirmed his main conclusions. But the Cabinet minister–deputy minister–public policy outcome dynamic does not lend itself to a tight analytical box either – with no room for pushes and pulls from the deputy to the minister (rather than just the other way around). Indeed, in policymaking terms, there appear to be a number of grey areas in PEI. While it is insufficient to suggest that the vast majority of policy initiatives and programs are derived from bureaucratic influences, it is equally mistaken to argue that deputies have not sought to influence the making of public policy in PEI. One might be tempted to declare: Bureaucratic politics if necessary in PEI, but not necessarily bureaucratic politics. It is always problematical, of course, to prove definitively whether DMs had or have a significant hand in shaping a certain governmental policy or program. For one thing, most Cabinet ministers do not want to admit publicly that their strings are o en pulled by their deputies or that they willingly submit themselves to official manipulation and “handling.” And one also needs to be sceptical about deputies who firmly maintain that they have absolutely no influence over policy. On the other hand, one should seriously question the veracity of any DM who claims that virtually no policy directive moved out of the department without his or her imprimatur. So while it is difficult to pinpoint the precise nature of their impact on policymaking, it is a safe bet to assume that deputies do have numerous opportunities and ways of shaping that same process. But on PEI, though, those opportunities seem to be fewer – perhaps reflecting the exceedingly political nature of public affairs here. A er extensive interviewing of former and current deputies, there were those who discounted their impact, and those who acknowledged their central role in policymaking. Those who contended that they had minimal influence on shaping public policy o en pointed to the political sensitivity (or electoral and constituency implications) of practically every issue area of public policy on the Island. While one former deputy admi ed that the policy detail and initiation work o en came from the officials, he emphasized that “the details of the policy on PEI are all about the politics.” In many cases, there is less opportunity for bureaucratic influence since Cabinet ministers in PEI are comparatively more hands on. It is also known that some ministers in PEI make a point of

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sending a message to the staff that they are the ones to make the final decision. In one specific instance, a minister said no to a proposal about sewage disposal “to teach his officials a lesson about taking initiatives that had not emanated from his office” (Green 2007, 438). In addition, the incidence of bureaucratic politics is minimized by the fact that ordinary constituents have no hesitation in going directly to the minister for whatever problem they may have. Ministers, then, need to be more in tune with the political ramifications of most policy initiatives in PEI and know exactly where they want to go to keep their voters happy. According to one deputy, “the politics was always so large and the room for manipulation was so small.” In this kind of situation, there is not much room for officials to influence the behaviour of a determined minister – especially one preoccupied with ge ing re-elected. As one deputy confided, “Ministers o entimes have fixed ideas and won’t budge from them, largely for electoral reasons.” Only a handful of ministers in PEI would permit their deputies or other officials to cost them support on voting day by convincing them that a certain public policy proposal would make good sense from a purely financial or administrative standpoint. Another factor working against the infiltration of bureaucratic tentacles into the policymaking process is the small size of government in PEI. Put another way, the larger the institutional machinery of government, the more difficult it is for a minister or other politicians to control the components of it. Conversely, “in a smaller governmental se ing like PEI’s, there is more capacity for ministers to control the agenda and to influence policy direction than officials,” said a current deputy minister. Officials are hampered by the fact that most decisions are taken by Cabinet commi ee and that the smaller size of Cabinets on PEI curbs the chances for bureaucratic interference. One former deputy argued that it is more difficult to influence policy because there is more scrutiny of what officials are doing and more accountability measures built into PEI’s more manageable system. Of course, some arguments against the incursion of bureaucratic politics can also be invoked to justify its very presence. For example, one can make the case that the small size of government in PEI and the obsession of ministers and politicians with political or electoral minutia actually create greater opportunities for officials to shape policy.10 With fewer layers of government, and thus fewer people to deal with, there is a greater likelihood of more informal bureaucratic ways to get things

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done. Since ministers are o en distracted by everyday political realities, they are more dependent upon DMs for policy advice and knowledge, and thus susceptible to departmental influences and entreaties. In some instances, politicians on PEI were actually perplexed over the extent to which policy initiatives originate with officials and not from the political class. “Some politicians – although not our own ministers – perceived us as a kind of rogue department,” wrote former deputy J.E. Green (2007, 386). It is always possible for officials, especially deputies, to cra their advice to ministers in such a way as to let the departmental minister take not only responsibility and ownership of the policy initiative, but also political credit for it. The challenge, then, is in framing the policy advice to make the minister look good politically, while satisfying the departmental interest at the same time. As one deputy carefully explained, “The job of a good deputy is one who leads his/her minister so that the minister thinks that they are leading – without the minister knowing that they are actually being led.” One deputy minister admi ed that there are “pockets and elements where officials have led as much as the other way around.” The issue of departmental rivalry or competition came up several times in the interviews, as DMs sought to protect their bureaucratic turf, budget allocation, staff complement, and policy mandate from other ne lesome senior officials within the governmental architecture. It is important, then, for DMs to utilize the policymaking process to secure greater financial resources for their department from the annual budget, to make a case for why their needs are greater than those of some other departments, and to explain how the wider public would benefit from such an allocation. In the words of one former deputy, “The public good corresponds with their own [departmental] good.” At other times, it is not so much about bureaucratic “empire-building” as it is about pushing a certain policy change in hopes of improving the department’s service to the public and making government work more efficiently. But whatever the motive, the impact of officials on a department’s policy direction has been unmistakable. While it may not be widespread, or necessarily for Machiavellian reasons, officials do play a key role on PEI in driving the policy agenda.11 That influence, however, most likely varies from department to department and depends upon the individuals there at the time. It is also a function of the government’s disposition, the nature of the issue in question (especially on highly technical ma ers), and the strength and weakness of a particular departmental minister. Rookie or inexperienced

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ministers, for example, are undoubtedly willing to cede more ground to the senior mandarinate. But as one current deputy put it, “A strong minister will trump a strong DM and a strong DM will trump a weak minister. And I have seen it happen both ways.” According to one former deputy minister, about 40 per cent of policy initiatives came up through the department and from the director level especially, while the remaining 60 per cent originated at the political level. But what was critical about triggering the engagement of the political level was the enormously important role of the media and public importunities. Though none interviewed openly suggested that they would selectively leak material to the media in order to secure their policy objectives, they all acknowledged that they carefully followed public opinion surveys and media coverage in general. By invoking media a ention and negative public reaction to an issue (such as oil tank spills and chemically induced fish kills), it was clear that policy recommendations from officials had a greater chance of seeing the light of day. One former deputy pointed out that “once there is pressure from the media coverage, then it [the policy initiative] moves.” It is not the intent of this section, of course, to dismiss the importance of the political level (the premier and the Cabinet) in public policy formulation in PEI. Indeed, it should not be taken to mean, as several deputies strongly emphasized, that ministers are merely puppets on strings (right out of the BBC television comedies Yes Minister and Yes Prime Minister) and therefore subject to calculated manipulation and control. According to one former deputy, “Unless the minister was willing to carry the package into Treasury Board, into Cabinet, perhaps into caucus, and perhaps into the legislature, and perhaps later to defend it in the face of adverse public reaction, we were dead in the water. It is a very foolish deputy, destined for a short career, who does not understand this” (Green 2004). There are likely countless policy decisions and examples where the political leadership rejected the advice and recommendations of senior government officials.12 But this policymaking reality does not detract from the argument that deputies are wellplaced to influence the policy preferences of their respective political masters in PEI. Conclusion In a general sense, the position of deputy minister in PEI has not changed a great deal over the last sixty years and more, including the

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preference for many to largely toil away anonymously.13 It has, however, become increasingly professionalized since the late 1960s, replacing the o en irregular or knee-jerk approach to public administration that existed previously. Certainly it is still a demanding and challenging job that soaks up substantial administrative and managerial time, while requiring a keen willingness to communicate with, and listen intently to, other departmental directors and managers. Many of the deputies also admi ed that they needed to be aware of the political environment of the day and to strive to ensure that their minister was successful, but that it was not their place to be offering partisan and electoral advice. In addition, even though no legislative or legal mandate spells out the precise accountability lines of deputies, many of them were acutely aware of the different ministerial, departmental, and personal accountabilities. Lastly, the overriding factor (in most cases) in recruitment for the position (especially since a good many are filled by in-house candidates) is still competency, merit, and credentials – with their party politics and affiliation coming much lower in the checklist of qualifications.14 Over and over again, former and current deputy ministers interviewed for this chapter highlighted the crucial importance of the minister-DM union. Although some deliberation went into the actual pairing of deputies with certain ministers, it was more the exception than the rule. Several deputies pointed out the importance of clarifying their roles and responsibilities up front with the minister, to prevent “running into one another” and to avoid any misunderstandings down the road. All of them emphasized the significance of being able to speak freely and candidly to their minister – even if it was something that the minister would prefer not to hear. Accordingly, a strong and successful working/professional relationship between the two requires personal chemistry, trust, loyalty (though not in the political sense), and the need for a solid respect in both directions. As one deputy confided, “The other members of the department need to see that the deputy speaks with the support and backing of the minister.” During the course of the research for this chapter on PEI deputy ministers, a couple of key points became more trenchant as the project unfolded. First, it seems obvious that the province, in concert with the Public Service Commission, needs to establish a training/orientation program for incoming DMs (especially those from the outside) – replete with seminars and workshops on the nuts and bolts of the governmental and legislative process, the importance of operational leadership

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and leadership development, methods to build critical relationships with the management team through good communication and listening skills, and, finally, the need for mentoring with other deputies. Second, there is also a need to retool the province’s Conflict of Interest Act to include provisions for a “cooling off ” period for DMs of perhaps three to five years. (Admi edly, this is not a major problem in PEI, but there is the opportunity for departing deputies “to bank up” projects just before leaving their departments for a post-career in consulting.) Third, deputies in PEI may find themselves in additional clashes with political staffers – especially as executive assistants (which has been carried over from the earlier Joe Ghiz and Pat Binns years by the current Robert Ghiz government) become more prevalent. (Although this is not a pressing issue, the possibility and potential is there for these staffers to overstep their boundaries or authority and thus further complicate the life of a deputy.)15 It may very well be that the political juggling act of provincial deputies, not unlike their federal counterparts, could become a more troublesome and time-consuming aspect of the job in the coming years. As a result, time-management skills for deputies on the Island could become even more crucial as they take on, at least potentially, greater policymaking responsibilities. Over the next ten years or so, and as the economic base of the province shi s and demographic trends become more pronounced, not only will the pool of prospective MLAs shrink, but so, too, will their quality likely lessen. (This is particularly noticeable in the rural areas of the province, where there is growing depopulation of the able and educated and signs of small community decay at a disturbing rate.) Ergo, the quality (especially their knowledge of policymaking) and qualifications of future political ministers will also be adversely affected by these same developments. In addition to an enhanced role played by the Premier’s Office in ge ing things done in the province, a larger policymaking role is likely to fall into the hands of provincial deputies as a result. This, of course, would put them in an even stronger position to shape and influence public policy outcomes. “There would be more dependence on deputy ministers to fill that gap, and a greater chance of them becoming an elite,” said one current deputy. Not surprisingly, deputy ministers in PEI, like other professions, leave their positions for a variety of reasons. Some do so because of a change in government (and are subsequently forced out), a more lucrative offer in the private sector or some other governmental board or agency,

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a personal clash with a different minister, and, most o en, having simply decided to retire from the ranks. As one former deputy posited, “You have to make a distinction between retiring and leaving, since there are sharp differences between the two.” Many of these individuals go on to have successful post-DM careers in different capacities – including some contract work with provincial and federal governments. Some gladly retire to quiet solitude and wood-cra ing, while a few others have taken up writing books about their personal journey or their experiences with a premier and government. Many, of course, take their skills and experience from their roles as deputies and utilize them in their post-DM lives. A good number go on to establish stellar careers in the private sector – either working for private firms on a full- or part-time basis (on a fee-for- service contingency) and, in several instances, in forming their own consulting businesses. Others do volunteer and church work, help out with non-governmental organizations like the United Way, and teach at the University of Prince Edward Island. Some even find themselves crossing over to the political domain and involving themselves in politics at the municipal level. In short, deputies leave the public service and end up “all over the map,” as one remarked, pursuing a wide range of opportunities and rewarding post-career endeavours. And as many of them discovered, there is a rich life a er their stint as a deputy minister and the designation of being, as one DM quipped, “two or three levels above the clerk.”

NOTES 1. By way of comparison, the current salary range for a deputy in PEI is somewhere between $126,000 and $143,000. As for job perks, they basically consist of a car allowance for a government-leased vehicle (or your own car), a competitive supplementary pension benefit package, and a non-assigned parking spot in a government underground lot. 2. Prior to September of 1950, the provincial Department of Public Works was the only line department to have two deputy ministers – one for technical ma ers (who was usually an engineer) and one for public administration (who was o en an accountant) (see MacKinnon 1951, 204). While there has been the occasional assistant deputy minister on PEI (in the Department of Health, Early Childhood Development, and most recently, Acadian and Francophone Affairs), they are a rare breed. The second layer of officials normally consists of directors and division managers.

Deputy Ministers in Prince Edward Island 97 3. During a sabbatical leave in the summer of 2007, the author conducted extensive personal interviews with over ten current and former deputy ministers on PEI. Any subsequent quotes or references to a DM on PEI is drawn from those same interviews. 4. A er the Progressive Conservative government of Pat Binns came to power in 1996, it did seek to provide some orientation and “coaching” for incoming deputies – but it was not structured in any formal way. 5. According to the province’s Interpretation Act, a deputy minister has virtually the same powers as that of a political minister. Section 21 (1) of the act’s “powers of officers” stipulates, “Words in an enactment directing or empowering any public officer to do something, or otherwise applying to him by his name of office, include (a) a Minister designated to act in the office; and (b) the deputy of the Minister” (see Legislative Counsel Office 2003, 6). 6. More seriously, Green suggested that part of his job was to “make it possible for my directors to do their job well.” He went on to write that “my program directors were responsible for delivering all the services and programs of the department; my job was to ensure that they had the appropriate resources to get the job done” (2007, 327). 7. But many of those interviewed indicated that they needed to be politically aware, in tune with what was happening in public opinion, and cognizant of not hanging their political minister out to dry. 8. One former deputy minister thought that a seminal article by Henry Mintzberg on the job of a manager – including their roles in decisionmaking, information-gathering and interpersonal relationships – best encapsulated his role as a deputy. See Mintzberg 1975, 49–61. 9. For one notable exception, see Skogstad 1987, 501–23. This chapter, though focused specifically on marketing boards, confirms the autonomy and political power of politicians and political leaders in PEI. For a brief discussion of bureaucratic influences on gaming policy in PEI, see McKenna 2007, 62–4. 10. Because of a smaller governmental apparatus, policy formulation is easier from an official standpoint, since it is not constantly bogged down in internal processes. And to highlight the impact that officials can have, one deputy explained, “A good idea on Monday can get to Cabinet on Thursday and be government policy the next day.” 11. It is obvious, as one deputy pointed out, that with no lawyer in the current crop of Cabinet ministers in the Robert Ghiz government, officials in the Office of the A orney General are effectively running the justice side of the policymaking show.

98 Peter McKenna 12. One obvious example saw several snow crab fishers in PEI granted $13 million in loans over the objections and advice of officials at the PEI Lending Agency (Thibodeau 2007a). 13. The position still remains the preserve of men, with women holding down few deputy minister roles over the years. More qualified women started to move into senior positions in the early 1990s, but it is still largely a maledominated role. As of 2010, there were five women deputies in community services and seniors, tourism, health and wellness, justice, and the Workers Compensation Board – out of a total of roughly sixteen line department deputies and those who were deputy equivalents in the public service. 14. According to one former senior mandarin, “The real challenge is trying to figure out the difference between the good and bad political appointments.” 15. In commenting on the slowing down of the policymaking process, one former secretary to the Cabinet remarked, “It’s a big waste of time and it takes too long to get things done.”

REFERENCES Buker, Peter E. 2005. “The Executive Administrative Style in Prince Edward Island: Managerial and Spoils Politics.” In Executive Styles in Canada: Cabinet Structures and Leadership Practices in Canadian Government, edited by Luc Bernier, Keith Brownsey, and Michael Howle , 111–30. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Clark, Marlene-Russell. 1973. “Island Politics.” In Canada’s Smallest Province, edited by Francis W.P. Bolger, 289–327. Charlo etown: PEI Centennial Commission. Crossley, John. 2000. “The Career Public Service in Prince Edward Island: Evolution and Challenge.” In Government Restructuring and Career Public Service in Canada, edited by Evert A. Lindquist, 206–27. Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada. Dyck, Rand. 1991. Provincial Politics in Canada. 2nd ed. Scarborough, ON: Prentice-Hall Canada. Green, John Eldon. 2004. “Deputies Run Their Departments but They Do Not Run the Show.” CharloĴetown Guardian, 19 July. –. 2007. A Mind of One’s Own: Memoirs of an Albany Boy. Charlo etown: Tangle Lane. Hodge s, Ted. 1985. “The Deputy Minister’s Dilemma.” In Canadian Politics: A Comparative Reader, edited by Ronald G. Landes, 139–45. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada.

Deputy Ministers in Prince Edward Island 99 Inwood, Gregory J. 2004. Understanding Canadian Public Administration. Toronto: Pearson Education Canada. Legislative Counsel Office. 2003. Interpretation Act. Charlo etown: Queen’s Printer. MacKinnon, Frank. 1951. The Government of Prince Edward Island. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. –. 1972. “Prince Edward Island: Big Engine, Li le Body.” In Canadian Provincial Politics: The Party Systems of the Ten Provinces, edited by Martin Robin, 240–61. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada. McKenna, Peter. 2007. “The Politics of Gaming in the ‘Garden Province.’” Journal of Canadian Studies / Revue d’études canadiennes 41 (1): 51–74. Millin, Leslie. 2004. “Cabinet Ministers Must Accept It: Their Deputies Really Run the Show.” CharloĴetown Guardian, 9 July. Milne, David A. 1982. “Politics in a Beleaguered Garden.” In The Garden Transformed: Prince Edward Island, 1945–1980, edited by Verner Smitheram, David Milne, and Satadal Dasgupta, 39–72. Charlo etown: Ragwood. –. 2001. “Prince Edward Island: Politics in a Beleaguered Garden.” In The Provincial State in Canada, edited by Keith Brownsey and Michael Howle , 111–38. Peterborough: Broadview. Mintzberg, Henry. 1975. “The Manager’s Job: Folklore and Fact.” Harvard Business Review 53 (4): 49–61. Nemetz, Don. 1982. “Managing Development.” In The Garden Transformed: Prince Edward Island, 1945–1980, edited by Verner Smitheram, David Milne, and Satadal Dasgupta, 155–75. Charlo etown: Ragwood. Public Administration Service. 1969. The Government of Prince Edward Island: An Organizational Study. Chicago: Public Administration Service. Simpson, Jeffrey. 1988. Spoils of Power: The Politics of Patronage. Toronto: HarperCollins. Skogstad, Grace. 1987. “State Autonomy and Provincial Policy-Making: Potato Marketing in New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 20 (3): 501–23. Thibodeau, Wayne. 2007a. “Millions Could Be Lost in Crab Loans.” CharloĴetown Guardian, 26 July. –. 2007b. “Premier Shuffles Spots in Bureaucracy.” CharloĴetown Guardian, 29 June. Wright, Teresa. 2008. “Deputy Cleared of PNP Wrongdoing: Brown.” CharloĴetown Guardian, 18 December. –. 2010. “MacDonald Promotion to Deputy Minister Raises Eyebrows.” Summerside Journal-Pioneer, 10 February.

4  New Brunswick’s Deputy Ministers: Out of the Ordinary and Close to the Premier gilles bouchard

Like all provinces, New Brunswick has unique characteristics that explain certain traits observed among its deputy ministers. It is one of the smallest Canadian provinces in both its population and its territory. It has barely 750,000 residents. Most are descendants of two founding groups: the Acadians, who sought refuge in New Brunswick following the Great Upheaval, and the Loyalists, who also sought refuge following the American Revolution, another great upheaval of a different nature. Apart from a large influx of Irish immigrants in the nineteenth century, there has been li le subsequent immigration. The Acadian presence (close to a third of the population) led politicians to declare the province officially bilingual, which has a sizable impact on the civil service and the choice of deputy ministers. At the political level, the twoparty system still reigns, and since the 1960s, the province has enjoyed great stability. From 1960 to 1997, New Brunswick had only three premiers. Since then, the situation has changed somewhat, as a er a short interregnum, the province had two successive premiers prior to the arrival of David Alward in 2010, ending the period covered by this study. Like the province, the civil service itself is small, roughly ten thousand people. It is divided among some twenty departments, giving an average of five hundred employees per department. Despite the number of departments, the central administrative structure remains relatively simple. In support of the premier, the Executive Council Office acts as a general secretariat. It has some twenty employees as well as the Women’s Issues Branch, which is a ached to this office. The more recently created Office of the Premier is a partisan political organization that also counts some twenty employees. Prior to the government of Premier Bernard Lord, the two organizations had been one. It was

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therefore difficult to distinguish between political staff and administrative staff. Today, the distinction seems easier to make, although the Executive Council Office still has staff hired on a partisan basis, such as the deputy minister of strategic initiatives.1 On the financial side, there is but one organization, the Department of Finance, and there is no Treasury Board Secretariat. As for the staff of the civil service, one recently created organization, the Office of Human Resources, is responsible for all human resource programs and services for the entire government. The deputy ministers run relatively small departments, and the administrative oversight provided by the central apparatus remains light. As there are few articles on New Brunswick’s public administration,2 we conducted a series of interviews with close to twenty deputy ministers who worked under McKenna and Graham. Background Before the 1960s, there was li le documentation, let alone books, dealing with New Brunswick’s civil service. It is therefore difficult to draw a portrait of Deputy Ministers. In 1960, there were fewer than three thousand provincial civil servants (Savoie 2000, 265). The bulk of government services, education, health, and social services were offered and largely funded by county councils, with the province restricting itself to a supervisory role. The management of Crown land and a portion of the highways constituted the province’s main areas of activity. It was only in 1943 that the first Civil Service Act was passed. That act created the Civil Service Commission, through which the deputy ministers were delegated new powers in human resource management, including the power of appointment and dismissal. In the past, as there were few civil servants, the position of deputy minister rarely involved much more work and responsibility than a branch director would be confronted with today. At the political level, the workload was not much more demanding, since up until the 1940s, the premier’s job had been part-time, and it was only in the seventies that ministers devoted themselves to their duties full-time. Most observers agree that the establishment of a real civil service in New Brunswick dates back to the 1960s with the arrival of Premier Louis Robichaud and his Equal Opportunity Program. That program enabled the province to start managing and funding the three main sectors of activity of Canadian provinces: education, health, and social services.

102 Gilles Bouchard

Louis Robichaud quickly realized that the civil service he had inherited was unable to properly perform the new tasks that came under provincial jurisdiction. He therefore looked outside the province for the skills he needed to carry out his government’s agenda. As fate would have it, the NDP had just been driven from power in Saskatchewan. The new government in that province hastened to purge the civil service, and Robichaud offered certain officials who had been dismissed or sidelined senior civil service positions in New Brunswick. As a result, the New Brunswick civil service was able to benefit from a high level of public service experience at a time when it was positioned to undergo phenomenal growth.3 Robichaud’s arrival also ushered in a period of great political stability. In fact, Robichaud remained in power from 1960 to 1970, to be followed by Hatfield (1970–87), and then McKenna (1987–97), and a er a short interregnum, Bernard Lord from 1999 to 2006, and Shawn Graham from 2006 to 2010. These periods of relative political stability fostered stability in the senior ranks of the civil service as well. Hatfield succeeded Robichaud in 1970, but contrary to what some people thought or hoped for, the new premier did not conduct a systematic purge of the civil service, opting instead for continuity. Like Robichaud, he was unafraid to look outside the province for seasoned officials. He a ached great importance to their selection and always met with deputy minister candidates personally in order to ensure their potential contribution. His successors would continue this “personalized” approach. According to contemporary observer accounts, Hatfield had great confidence in his senior officials, more so than in his Cabinet. He allowed the establishment of commi ees of deputy ministers parallel to the ministerial commi ees, which laid the groundwork for collective management. These parallel commi ees became as powerful as those of the ministers. In addition, he allowed deputy ministers to sit on ministerial commi ees, se ing the precedent himself by o en not a ending meetings of the Policy and Priorities Commi ee and even, on occasion, Cabinet meetings, and delegating the secretary to Cabinet to speak on his behalf. The practice of personally choosing his deputy ministers helped to make them accountable to the premier rather than their minister. This also led some deputy ministers to develop an almost exclusive personal loyalty to the premier, meaning that when he was defeated, some senior officials le the civil service, including three who were dismissed by McKenna.

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In Canada, the unionization of civil service employees and the negotiation of their collective agreement have led to the decline of civil service commissions, or at least of a significant portion of their duties. Following the federal example, Hatfield removed from the Civil Service Commission the responsibility of determining civil service working conditions and transferred it to the Board of Management, which is the equivalent of the Treasury Board Secretariat. For the deputy ministers, this transfer of responsibilities was significant since, the commission having delegated a number of responsibilities to the deputies, the latter were no longer accountable to an independent organization, but to a Cabinet commi ee and its administrative counterpart. Their margin of freedom vis-à-vis the centre was thereby restricted. The Civil Service Commission retained, however, the responsibility for recruitment. McKenna’s ascent to power would mean changes for the deputy ministers. He did away with the Civil Service Commission, giving all of the power to the Board of Management. Deputy ministers would henceforth receive their delegations of power from a single source, be it in the field of human resources or finance. At the administrative level, by integrating the Board of Management secretariat into the Department of Finance, the la er would become the only central agency responsible for managing human and financial resources. The McKenna reform followed in the steps of the initiative of Hatfield, who wanted to strengthen the central agencies, limit the duplication of duties and controls, and make policy more coherent. That obviously diminished the managerial freedom of the deputy ministers of the sectoral departments, while increasing the influence of those in the central agencies. To ensure greater consistency in implementation of his agenda a er the long reign of Hatfield, McKenna would suppress the parallel deputy commi ees and prohibit the practice of ministers being represented on departmental commi ees by their deputy ministers. Consequently, the influence of the deputy ministers dwindled. McKenna did, however, introduce a standing commi ee of deputy ministers that held monthly meetings, which he a ended regularly, at least in the early years. These meetings had a dual character. First, a briefing and discussion meeting took place, which was followed by a more social gathering. Towards the end of McKenna’s mandate, the premier a ended fewer of these meetings, and the interest on the part of the deputy ministers waned accordingly. The premier retained his power to appoint deputy ministers. Like Hatfield, McKenna enjoyed interviewing prospective deputies to remind

104 Gilles Bouchard

them that their first loyalty was to the premier and to clarify what was expected of them. So that they would not forget the premier’s expectations, McKenna presented them with a wri en mandate. Ever since, New Brunswick’s deputy ministers have received a wri en mandate from the premier describing the objectives that the department must meet. The ministers receive a similar mandate. The premier’s heavy workload and busy schedule posed constant challenges to maintaining this appointment approach. Unlike his two predecessors, McKenna relied on internal recruitment, which went over well with the civil service. That, however, did not prevent the premier from appointing certain individuals from the outside who were identified by the party or himself. In general, he trusted the deputies and did not hesitate to contact them directly without informing their respective ministers. In addition, McKenna systematically met with ministers and their deputies in the midst of major changes to sectoral policies. Bernard Lord came to power in 1999, two years a er the departure of McKenna who had been succeeded by an interim premier, Raymond Frene e, who in turn was followed by Camille Thériault, who did not make significant changes to the group of deputy ministers. Lord continued to give the utmost a ention to the appointment of deputy ministers. Like his predecessors, he interviewed potential deputies prior to their appointment and, in some cases, offered them their choice of departments. He, too, appointed a number of individuals who had party or personal connections. He continued the practice of giving the deputies wri en mandates, but the duration of these mandates was extended over four years and they contained annual deadlines. In essence, the mandates were underpinned by the election platform. Lastly, he doubled the number of deputy minister meetings, making them bimonthly, to strengthen collective management and teamwork. With respect to the central agencies, in 2001 Lord severed management of human resources from the Department of Finance by establishing the Office of Human Resources. The impact of that change is difficult to assess, but it did not please the Department of Finance, as the office was given the responsibility of negotiating and managing affirmative action programs. Lord also clarified the role of the Office of the Premier, which is now run by a chief of staff whose political affiliation is a given. The chief of staff retains, however, the legal status of a deputy minister. The secretary to Cabinet (Council of Ministers) should, in the long term, benefit from this more distinct division between political and administrative roles.

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Premier Lord’s style was very different from that of McKenna. While McKenna was not shy about dealing directly with his deputy ministers, Lord was much more discreet, preferring to go through either his ministers or members of his staff. Within the confines of their work, the deputies were also able to enjoy greater latitude. In September 2006, Premier Lord was defeated by Liberal Shawn Graham. As with all changes of government in New Brunswick, two or three deputy ministers identified with the previous government handed in their resignations. In 2007, a new secretary to Cabinet was appointed at the same time as a substantial reorganization of deputy ministers was being carried out. Following the example of McKenna, the Graham government gave itself a vision: self-sufficiency for the province in every sector. All deputy ministers had to contribute to that objective, which was ambitious, to say the least. The government conducted consultations on nearly a dozen topics ranging from post-secondary education, to the right to information, to municipal reform. Each consultation gave rise to reports and, more importantly, numerous recommendations. Of course, that significantly curbed the role of the deputy ministers in policy initiation, but it did not adversely affect their influence in policy and program development and orientation. No significant changes took place in the central agencies. However, a few concrete actions were taken to identify potential candidates for deputy minister positions. Such individuals were to be offered training. Performance contracts and incentive pay were also introduced for deputy ministers – these will be discussed in greater detail further on. Carefully selected by New Brunswick premiers, the deputy ministers became people in whom the premiers had confidence. Selection and Appointment The Civil Service Act states that deputy ministers are appointed by the lieutenant-governor in council. In reality, the premier puts forward all prospective deputy minister appointments for ratification by Cabinet. This is therefore an important prerogative of the premier, especially since the selection of deputy ministers is in no way controlled by procedure and is le entirely to the premier’s discretion. There is no secretariat in charge of senior positions to track the careers of high-ranking officials that might provide a list of candidates. It seems that some secretaries (clerks) have played a proactive role by preparing advance lists

106 Gilles Bouchard

of potential candidates, drawing support in that task from the group of deputy ministers and the head of the Office of Human Resources. Under Graham, the premier’s chief of staff also offered assistance. The Office of Human Resources would like very much to become such a secretariat, but nothing has yet been formalized. When the premier wants to appoint new deputy ministers, he asks his chief of staff and the secretary to Cabinet to draw up a list of potential candidates from which he can make his choice. The chief of staff, who is o en called the premier’s deputy minister, plays an important role in the final selection. On occasion, the chief of staff will be asked by the premier to contact the candidates, particularly those coming from outside the civil service. Once the list of candidates has been drawn up, the premier asks the secretary to Cabinet to perform a background check on those to be appointed. Once the check has been completed, the premier usually calls each prospective deputy to offer the position and ensure that it will be accepted. The premier also uses the opportunity to inform candidates of his expectations vis-à-vis the new position – expectations that will be found, for the most part, in their wri en mandate. In fact, when each minister is appointed, the premier gives him or her with a mandate, a copy of which is given to the deputy minister. The mandate spells out what is expected of the department in the years ahead. It is a general work plan with annual timelines. The deputy minister will be evaluated on the extent to which the objectives contained in the mandate have been achieved. The evaluation was not always very systematic, so the Graham government decided to add an extra step. Each deputy was asked to provide a performance contract based on the initial mandate. If the government accepted the contract, incentive pay would be incorporated in it and an annual evaluation would be done by the Office of the Premier. The recession could delay or put an end to this practice. In any case, it remains to be seen whether such a system will work as it should. Those who are being appointed for the first time usually meet with the premier in order to draw up an initial contract. The premier discusses deputies’ interests without immediately announcing their appointment, but the premier asks that they make themselves available within the next few hours in order to receive a possible call. Summonses and calls are usually made shortly before the official announcement so as not to encourage rumours. The secretary to Cabinet is then called in to sign the memorandum to Cabinet, which makes the appointments official.

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The premier enjoys the prerogative of selectively choosing and recommending deputy ministers. Strictly speaking, there is no governmental career planning to prepare the future deputy ministers. In 2007, during a meeting following one of these reorganizations, the deputies stated that in New Brunswick the responsibility for career planning is entirely in the hands of every individual. An optional leadership development program was designed by the OHR around 1990 with the assistance of a commi ee of deputy ministers. It is therefore up to the ambitious to be on the lookout for relevant training and a ractive positions through which they can hone their knowledge and skills. A network of relationships must be cultivated in order for potential deputies to be recommended to the premier. They can sometimes be helped by their superiors, but such assistance is in no way the result of a plan. Once appointed, the new deputy receives no specific training other than a two-hour information session offered by the secretary to Cabinet. The la er informs the newcomer of the main responsibilities a ached to the position and offers a few documents describing the position. The deputy minister is invited to contact the secretary to Cabinet should there be any questions. Some senior deputies also offer their younger colleagues the chance to consult with them if needed. Lastly, the government of New Brunswick encourages the deputy ministers to a end a training session offered by a private institute for all newly appointed provincial deputies. A reference manual prepared under the supervision of the clerk is given to each new deputy minister. It contains a vast assortment of background, legal, and practical information on the role and responsibilities of deputy ministers in New Brunswick, particularly the delicate subject of the expectations placed on deputies with regard to their relations with the minister.4 The initiation structure is therefore incomplete. The government is aware of this void and, for a number of years, has considered more concise procedures to make the next generation be er prepared. If the new deputy is from outside the civil service, he or she is offered a term contract. Appointees who are already members of the civil service simply receive a le er of appointment. That has a definite impact on the nature of the employment relationship with the government. As mentioned above, almost every New Brunswick premier has used this great discretion to make partisan appointments. Within the group of deputy ministers, there have always been three or four who are partisans or allies of the premier and will most likely leave the government when the party is defeated or the premier departs. This has been

108 Gilles Bouchard

the case, particularly for the deputy minister of justice and the deputy a ached to Cabinet’s Policy and Priorities Commi ee. Generally, these deputies are more closely connected to the premier than the party. They are appointed for their effectiveness and, of course, their loyalty to the premier. They occupy positions that the premier considers crucial and they generally enjoy special access to the premier. Their presence within the community of deputy ministers is definitely an obstacle to the development of an esprit de corps. Minister–Deputy Minister Relationship New Brunswick’s Legislative Assembly has fi y-two MLAs. With twenty-seven MLAs, a party a ains a majority and can govern. Cabinet has between fi een and twenty members, so usually the majority of the ministerial caucus is made up of ministers. As is the case in most provinces, certain balances, such as linguistic and regional representation, must be maintained. In such circumstances, the premier is not spoiled for choice and must appoint ministers in whom he is not fully confident or who do not have the required qualifications to fill the position. This situation sheds some light on the type of relationship found between ministers and deputy ministers. In New Brunswick, a minister is first and foremost an MLA. Ministers spend a lot of time in their riding, where their permanent residence is o en located. It has only been since the 1970s that ministers have devoted themselves to their job full-time. When the legislature is in session, the minister must be there and even sit on legislative commi ees, since the ministers form the majority of the government’s representation. That explains why most deputies indicate that they meet formally with their minister only once a week, usually to discuss current business or the agenda, despite the fact that their offices are usually side by side. These weekly huddles include a few working sessions where the deputy, along with the communications director or other officials, briefs the minister prior to a meeting with the media or interest groups. The deputy o en accompanies the minister during tours or openings and at business or social gatherings. A few of the ministers devote most of their time to departmental affairs, and in such cases, meetings with their deputies are held more frequently. In New Brunswick, the ministers have a very limited personal political staff, generally three or four people: an executive assistant, a secretary,

New Brunswick’s Deputy Ministers 109

and one or two individuals in the riding. The Board of Management decides on the size of each minister’s office, and such employees do not enjoy job security. The executive assistant is restricted to partisan duties and in no way competes with the deputy minister. As pointed out by one deputy, the department is called on to perform functions for the minister that in larger provinces would be assigned to political staff. For example, the minister does not have a press secretary. The department’s communications director therefore takes on that role. That person, however, is a civil servant whose immediate supervisor is the deputy minister. In a number of departments, the minister also must share the departmental secretarial staff, which in fact is the deputy minister’s secretarial staff. The pairing of ministers and deputy ministers does not meet any specific criteria; it is le completely up to the premier’s good judgment. Since Lord, a minister and his or her deputy have not been appointed at the same time, in order to avoid a too sudden change in the direction of the department. An a empt is made to take each person’s strengths and weaknesses into account, particularly linguistically. Deputy ministers in the 1970s and 1980s spent close to three years with the same minister, whereas their counterparts in the 1990s and 2000s spent one-and-a-half years or half the time with the same minister. It should be noted that the great political stability enjoyed in the 1970s and 1980s explains, in large part, the duration of the ministerial pairings. However, whether in the 1970s, 1980s, or 1990s, over the course of their careers, the deputy ministers rubbed shoulders with an average of three ministers, the careers of deputies in the 1990s being almost six years shorter, whereas their counterparts in the previous decades approached nine years. Lastly, a steady decrease is noted in the amount of time that a deputy spends in the same department, i.e., eight years for the deputies in the 1970s, five years for those in the 1980s, and only three years for those working in the 1990s. These data are presented in table 4.1. These changes were desired as the deputies wanted to diversify their experience and, more importantly, develop their sense of loyalty to the government rather than to a particular department. Under these conditions, the ministerial teams are not meant to be of long duration. In the light of these findings, it is easier to understand that the deputies come to view the minister as a work colleague at best, sometimes an employee, a spokesperson for the Department, but very rarely do the deputies view their minister as a supervisor. One of McKenna’s

110 Gilles Bouchard Table 4.1. Career Profiles of NB Deputy Ministers, 1982–2007

Career as deputy minister Career as DM in the same department

1982

1995

2007

12 years 7 years

10 years 5 years

7 years 4 years

deputy ministers put it this way: “The minister is too responsive to external demands, which clouds his judgment, so it is difficult to be the deputy minister’s immediate supervisor. For reasons of efficiency and separation of power, the deputy minister reports to the premier” (interview 1995). During interviews, a few ministers of that time also spoke of their deputy as a colleague, never as a subordinate. The deputy ministers therefore felt more responsible for their minister than accountable to their minister. Powers and Responsibilities In New Brunswick, the deputy ministers are delegated certain powers either by the Board of Management or by the minister, but they feel they are accountable mainly to the premier. What are the powers of a deputy minister? The Civil Service Act specifically mentions the existence of the position of deputy minister and that out a number of the deputy’s powers. However, there are specific references to deputy ministers in the acts establishing the departments, the Interpretation Act and the Financial Administration Act. These acts allow either the minister or the Board of Management to delegate some of their powers, but the deputy minister is generally not named specifically as the person to whom such powers must be delegated. In reality, however, the power is delegated to the deputy ministers. The body that delegates the most important powers to the deputies is the Board of Management. It is the second of the two Cabinet standing commi ees, the other being the Policy and Priorities Commi ee. The Board of Management is somewhat equivalent to the federal Treasury Board. Presided over by the minister of finance, it is composed of close to ten ministers or about half of Cabinet. The deputy minister of finance acts as secretary. The Financial Administration Act and the Civil Service Act give the Board of Management numerous powers

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in financial and personnel management. With respect to personnel management, the acts give a number of responsibilities directly to the deputies, with no mention made of the ministers. These responsibilities include the selection, appointment, and dismissal of officials, and ma ers relating to remuneration, discipline, occupational health and safety, and training and development. Responsibility is also delegated in financial management. Unlike the federal Treasury Board, New Brunswick’s Board of Management does not have its own secretariat. The Department of Finance and the Office of Human Resources fill this role, each in its own field. The acts establishing the departments and certain individual acts give powers to the ministers. By tradition, a number of those powers are subsequently delegated to the deputies. That the ministers control delegating these powers does not seem to be important, as few deputies feel accountable to their ministers. When asked to whom they were mainly accountable, the eight deputy ministers we interviewed in 2007 responded, unanimously and without hesitation, “to the premier.” It is the premier who, exercising the utmost discretion, appoints them, gives them their mandate, and decides on their future career. A er the premier, there are two people – the chief of staff and the secretary to Cabinet – to whom the deputies feel somewhat accountable. The first is political and the second is administrative. The chief of staff position is a political appointment, but the incumbent has the status of a deputy minister and, since he or she reports directly to the premier, is o en called the premier’s deputy. This status of deputy minister makes the chief of staff a full-fledged member of the fraternity of deputy ministers. Accordingly, the chief of staff a ends the deputy ministers’ meetings. This status is part of the reason that the deputies are not reluctant to contact the chief of staff. Traditionally, when seeking policy direction, deputies turn to the chief of staff, who represents the ideal route for accessing the premier and who is authorized to speak for premier. Indeed, it is from the Premier’s Office, directed by the chief of staff (today called Directeur général in French), that they receive their mandates and requests for policy development. It is also this political office that carries out the deputies’ performance appraisals. New Brunswick’s secretary to Cabinet, who is also called the clerk of the Executive Council, has not a ained the status of the federal counterpart. Jacques Bourgault has plo ed the six stages in the development of the federal position (2007b), and the secretary to Cabinet in New

112 Gilles Bouchard

Brunswick has barely reached the fourth stage. The secretary is the clerk of the Executive Council, despite the fact that, under McKenna, the positions of clerk and secretary were divided for a few years. The clerk is the secretary to Cabinet and, as such, receives the memoranda to Cabinet from the departments and oversees the preparation of Cabinet decisions. He or she is the administrative head of the Executive Council Office, though that office does not have a very large staff, certainly nothing equivalent to the federal Privy Council Office. In addition, there is within the same office one deputy minister who acts as secretary to the Policy and Priorities Commi ee, one of Cabinet’s two standing commi ees. That deputy minister reports directly to the premier and is a partisan political appointment. Since Lord and the formal establishment of the chief of staff position, the secretary to Cabinet has tried to become the leader of the deputy ministers and to be recognized as the top-ranking civil servant. The secretary meets with the deputies more o en and a empts to forge a community among them. Increasingly, the deputies consider the secretary as their special gateway to the premier in administrative matters, but not when seeking policy direction. Occasionally, the secretary also acts as an arbiter among the deputies, should organizational or personal conflicts arise. The secretary contributes to their annual evaluations. However, since the secretary does not play a major role in their selection or represent their sole or even most effective route for accessing the premier, the secretary does not have the influence that his or her federal counterpart over the community of deputy ministers. The secretary has not reached the fi h stage. New Brunswick’s secretary to Cabinet is not considered a deputy minister to the premier, that designation belonging to the chief of staff. The secretary does not meet with the premier daily but does a end a weekly meeting with the premier and the premier’s chief of staff, but that meeting is also a ended by the deputy minister of finance and the deputy minister of the Policy and Priorities Commi ee who is, in principle, the secretary’s subordinate. The secretary also does not have the title of head of the civil service. The deputy ministers are also accountable to the Public Accounts Commi ee of the Legislative Assembly to answer for their policy and resource management. However, here as elsewhere, the MLAs prefer to behave in a partisan manner rather than seriously question the deputy ministers on their management abilities. The pressure of accountability therefore remains limited and civil.

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The Functions of the Deputy Minister Osbaldeston (1988) singled out three main functions of the deputy minister: policy advisor, departmental manager, and collective management official. New Brunswick deputy ministers can add one more function to the roster – that of being the public face of the department. The role of manager takes up most of the deputy minister’s time. Plumptre (1987) even divided that role into two different functions: “expenditure planning and control” and “organizational leader.” In financial management, budget preparation is always a very important operation that requires a lot of time and a ention over the course of several months. The daily management of the budget requires the deputies to sign a number of authorizations. Overseeing requests for additional budget is also time-consuming. Lastly, the ritual of preparing the accounts for the Legislative Assembly o en occupies a deputy for an entire week. When speaking of human resource management, Plumptre employs the expression “organizational leader.” The term reflects the vision that the New Public Management and several other current innovators use for the role of managers in modern organizations. It is an image that in 1995 one of the deputy ministers interviewed used to describe one of his most important functions. According to him, the deputy minister’s main role is to develop a vision for his department that stems from the government’s vision and to convey it to his employees so that everyone is heading in the same direction. If that vision has been properly conveyed, the deputy can delegate and feel confident that the department will run smoothly. At the time, no other deputy viewed the role in this manner, but in 2007, a number of deputy ministers, especially the younger ones, spoke in these terms. They see themselves now more as leaders than as supervisors. With the many retirements that have taken place, staffing has once again become a demanding activity. Departures o en require a reassignment of duties, if not a reorganization of services. Reassignment also means training and development, but that aspect of management is not developed as much as it should be in an era of change. On its Internet site, New Brunswick presents itself as a leader in training of its managers. With the slogan “Great Leaders Develop Great Leaders,” the site describes an ambitious executive development strategy, but the reality falls far short of the model. All deputies interviewed in 2007, particularly those who had been appointed recently, observed

114 Gilles Bouchard

that they had to take charge of their own training. They lamented the situation and hoped that the government would implement a real strategy for training its managers. O en the deputy must become responsible for training the next generation by allowing managers to take training that the deputy deems relevant. In some cases, the government encouraged promising executives to enrol in more expensive courses, but such initiatives were o en ad hoc and isolated. The Graham government wanted to change things and it implemented, through the Office of Human Resources and under the auspices of the secretary to Cabinet, a system to more accurately identify promising executives so as to not leave this responsibility solely in the hands of the deputy ministers. For a number of reasons, the function of advising the minister seems less important than it was a few years ago. First, governments rely less and less on their officials for policy suggestions. Shawn Graham’s Liberal government was an excellent example. As soon as that government came to power, it created multiple task forces that returned with a suite of recommendations, which served as a reservoir for new policies. The government asked its ministers and deputies to implement these policies, not suggest others. Deputy ministers of health and education were perhaps an exception to this rule. That situation caused frustration among deputies excluded from initiating policy. When these new policies were poorly received, the deputy ministers were called on to defend them or at least provide their ministers with arguments to defend them, which entailed further frustration. The deputies therefore came to see their role with the minister differently. They do not consider the minister as a hierarchical superior, but rather as a team player … whom one has to assist. Their mission is twofold: to help the minister achieve the government’s agenda (an agenda supplied by the premier), and to prevent the minister from making missteps. For that, they must prepare the minister to face the media, interest groups, and the opposition, and to defend departmental files in Cabinet and at its commi ees. However, within the framework of collective management, the deputies would very much like to offer the premier advice on public policy, but according to the deputy ministers interviewed, it seems that such is not the case. Indeed, as at the federal level, the function of corporate management has developed the most in recent years. We cannot yet refer to an integrated organizational system, although several initiatives in this direction can be pointed to. Since Lord, for example, the deputies have met

New Brunswick’s Deputy Ministers 115

twice a month under the direction of the secretary to Cabinet, and with the chief of staff, and occasionally the premier, in a endance. The secretary to Cabinet uses these occasions to inform the deputies of Cabinet decisions and other important government initiatives. Besides a ending these meetings, the deputy ministers are increasingly called on to work in small groups, whether on ma ers concerning government as a whole such as human resource management, bilingualism, or new technologies, or on issues that require the support of several departments. They therefore contribute to the horizontal management in the upper strata of government. Lastly, the deputy ministers meet each September for a two-day seminar. Looking at the four elements inventoried by Bourgault (2005) to describe an integrated organizational system, the coordination seems to be present and the implementation of the government agenda has been partially achieved, but two elements are absent: ongoing performance evaluations and the collective contribution to governmental perspectives. Indeed, the deputies complain that the meetings and even the seminar are more like information sessions than venues for discussion. They would appreciate being consulted before the decisions are made. But what most undermines the establishment of an integrated system is the weakness of the position of the secretary to Cabinet. In fact, the secretary to Cabinet must share the a ention of the deputy ministers with the chief of staff and, more importantly, the secretary’s influence over the deputies’ careers is far from decisive. The secretary’s role during the twice-monthly meetings is that of an information-provider/coordinator rather than a leader. There is also work to be done in forging a community of interests. Of course there are social activities, particularly the annual golf tournament, but it is difficult to instil group loyalty when some deputies are political appointees and when the deputy ministers are not selected according to a planned process designed to cultivate this community spirit. Corporate management is gaining ground within the New Brunswick civil service, and the deputies seek its implementation, but it is being thwarted by a lack of power in the secretary to Cabinet and perhaps by a dearth of political will. An important function of the deputy ministers that pertinent literature barely mentions is that of being the public face of the department, particularly the institutions and the interest groups that form the department’s clientele. Most government departments serve the public, either directly or through the intermediary of a network of public institutions. Since New Brunswick is a small province, most of the people in

116 Gilles Bouchard

government and the business community know each other personally or by reputation. Consequently, there is an expectation that politicians and senior officials are easily accessible. The challenge is to manage what information is disseminated and in what form. Persons or organizations served by the departments are o en grouped into associations, and they want to be heard. This function of representing the department among the groups most affected by the programs appears to be very important for the deputy ministers, as it allows them to convey their objectives to these groups, and it gives the groups the opportunity to articulate their grievances. One deputy minister even said that the department became, in some respects, the voice for these groups within government. To a certain degree, this role enables the groups to reach a certain audience among the politicians. The deputy minister is the person who carries out most of these consultations with the groups. Accordingly, the deputy greets them in his or her office and a ends their annual meetings, symposiums, conferences, and other events, and sometimes even travels to their offices. The deputy is sometimes accompanied by the minister. The deputy minister feels responsible for providing the minister with assistance when dealing with pressure groups and clients. Several deputies said that they meet with groups several times a week and that, for them, it was one of the main responsibilities of deputy ministers. In closing, it is perhaps wise to underscore the fact that this new role confirms the growing importance of citizens in the process of policy development and evaluation and the relative decline of representative democracy. Profile of Deputy Ministers Bourgault (2005) sketched a profile of federal deputy ministers, and that profile will be used here as an analytical framework. With the exception of the number of women and francophones and the number of years a deputy minister has held the position and remained in the same position, it was not possible to access all data on all deputy ministers in New Brunswick. We therefore opted to compare the data on deputy ministers at three different dates: from 1982 (Hatfield), 1995 (McKenna), and 2007 (Graham). In an article published in 1999 (Bouchard 1999), the data from 1982 and 1995 were compared. The data from 2007 and from 1995 on the ends of careers are being added here. Where it was possible to obtain information on all deputies, it was grouped by decade, taking into account the year the individual was first appointed.

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Socio-economic Profile This first section deals with the factors identified by the deputy ministers. Three sets of data will be presented: the proportion of women, the proportion of francophones, and the information on place of birth. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 present the data on the first two characteristics. It will come as no surprise that the percentage of female deputy ministers does not correspond to their proportion in the population, which is over 50 per cent. What is encouraging, however, as table 4.2 shows, is that the proportion of women has been growing constantly since 1982, a time when there were no female deputies at all. In 1995, women accounted for 20 per cent of the contingent. By 2007, they had reached close to 40 per cent. In twenty-five years, that is remarkable progress. As shown in table 4.3, the figures for all deputy ministers confirm this trend. With respect to francophones, we note that in 1995, the percentage of French-speaking deputy ministers corresponded roughly to the proportion of francophones in the population. That finding was also true in 2007. However, examining the percentage per decade, the figures vary a great deal, but they do not necessarily reflect the entire reality, since in the 1990s so few francophones were appointed, several of those who had been appointed in the 1980s continued their careers, meaning that in 1995, francophones still accounted for 35 per cent of the cohort. Towards the end of the 1990s, the number of francophone Table 4.2. Comparison of Socio-economic Profiles of NB Deputy Ministers, 1982–2007

Women Francophones

1982 (%)

1995 (%)

2007 (%)

– 17.4

20 35

38 38

Table 4.3. Comparison of Socio-economic Profiles of NB Deputy Ministers in Decade Appointed

Women Francophones

1970–9 18 DMs (%)

1980–9 1990–9 2000–9 21 DMs (%) 27 DMs (%) 26 DMs (%)

– 27

9 38

19 27

33 50

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deputies went down. The government caught up by appointing several francophones in the early 2000s, which somewhat distorts the perception that could be had when we see that, starting from the year 2000, 50 per cent of the deputy ministers appointed were francophone. It should be noted that more and more anglophone deputies are bilingual, even though nearly 40 per cent still do not speak French, which, in a province where more than one-third of the population is francophone, may seem unacceptable. As for places of birth, there is no significant variation in the percentage of deputy ministers born in New Brunswick compared to those born outside the province. Since 1982, over two-thirds of the deputies have been native New Brunswickers. In 2007, that percentage reached almost three-quarters. Within New Brunswick itself, no region is favoured over others when it comes to deputy appointments, not even the capital. Data on the last position occupied prior to becoming a deputy minister confirm that the province tends to recruit its executives from within New Brunswick itself. Career Profile This portion of the chapter focuses on professional data: education, age at time of appointment, and career duration. Two questions on education are of interest: the level of university training a ained by the deputies and their field of study. These data are presented in table 4.4. We note that between 1982 and 1995 there was an increase in the level of education of deputy ministers. In fact, in 1982, close to half the deputies had completed a master’s degree, whereas in 1995, over two-thirds of them held one. The figures from 2007 are almost superimposable over those from 1982, as 55 per cent of the deputies had a master’s degree and none had a PhD. A number of deputy ministers started graduate-level coursework but did not complete it. As for fields of study, a trend observed in 1995 continues: a substantial increase in management training. In fact, in 2007, almost two-thirds of the deputies had received management training, in either administration or social sciences. Scientific training remains below 20 per cent and is confined to the so-called technical departments, such as Transportation and Natural Resources. Prior to their first appointment, more than 75 per cent of deputies from all cohorts came from the provincial civil service, and that percentage even reached 80 per cent for the 1982 and 2007 cohorts. It would appear that an ever-smaller number of sectoral specialists are being sought: in

New Brunswick’s Deputy Ministers 119 Table 4.4. Comparison of Socio-economic Profiles of NB Deputy Ministers in Decade Appointed

Master’s Management training Scientific training

1982 (%)

1995 (%)

2007 (%)

50 22 39

69 56 13

55 63 16

1982, 57 per cent came from the department they would go on to manage, but only 25 per cent and 40 per cent in 1995 and 2007 respectively. That means that few deputy ministers come from the outside, be it from the federal level or the private sector. The age of entry into the position of deputy minister varies significantly over the years. In 1982, it was between forty and forty-nine years; in 1995, between thirty and thirty-nine; and in 2007, it was again between forty and forty-nine. In 1995, two-thirds of the deputies had obtained their first appointment before age forty, but none of the 2007 cohort had been appointed before age forty. Over a third of the deputies in 2007 had been appointed when they were in their fi ies. Hence, we note a significant aging of this group of officials, which reflects the aging of the entire civil service. On average, the deputy ministers from the 1982 cohort remained on the job for twelve years; those from 1995, ten years. The difference between the two groups is not substantial. Those from 2007 have not finished their careers and, on average, they had seven years of experience at the time this report was wri en. Given their age when appointed, the average for this cohort should be lower than the previous ones. These data are presented in table 4.1. Looking at the figures for all deputies grouped by decade, as shown in table 4.5, we also note a gradual reduction in the number of years served as deputy ministers. With respect to the number of years in the same position, the deputies from 1982 remained on the job for an average of seven years, versus five years for those in the 1995 cohort.5 Those from 2007 count an average of four years in their current position. The table for all deputies is even more eloquent, as it marks a significant and constant reduction – eight years, five years, and three years – even though one-fi h of the deputies working in the 1990s are still on the job at the time of the survey. The members of the 1982 and 1995 cohorts occupied, on average, two positions in different departments.

120 Gilles Bouchard Table 4.5. Career Profiles of NB Deputy Ministers in Year Appointed, 1970–2000 Year of first appointment as DM

Career as deputy minister Career in the same position

1970–9

1980–9

1990–9

2000

9 years

8 years

6 years

8 years

5 years

3 years

The majority have not ended their career The majority have not ended their career

Political Profile Despite the numerous partisan political appointments, very few deputies were active in politics as candidates in elections before or a er their appointment. That is likely due to the fact that the premiers, when making political appointments, choose people either for their skill set or for their loyalty. Generally, such loyalty is not partisan, but personal. Moreover, a political career in New Brunswick offers very few of the benefits seen at the senior level of the civil service or in the private sector, which significantly reduces the pool of partisan appointees. Conclusion New Brunswick is a small province, a fact that has an impact on all aspects of the deputy minister position. It is first felt at the recruitment stage, where the predominant role played by the premier is noted. It is evidenced by the importance that deputy ministers a ach to the duty of being the public face of the department. Lastly, the impact is manifested in the quasi-egalitarian or protective relationship that the deputies maintain with their ministers. New Brunswick is also a bilingual province, hence the importance a ributed to knowing both official languages. Some characteristics, however, do not necessarily involve factors that are specific to New Brunswick. Of those, first and foremost, we note the weakness of the position of secretary to Cabinet compared to that of the chief of staff, who also has the status of deputy minister. The presence within the community of deputy ministers of a few individuals who are very politically engaged and who o en occupy strategic positions affects the capacity to establish a community that is truly at

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arm’s length from political influence. Lastly, it seems that there is now a firmer grasp of the importance of the contemporary role of the deputy minister – a finding that is reflected by the growing concern shown by recent governments to pinpoint and train future deputies as well as to establish a real community of deputy ministers. Such objectives can be a ained only by strengthening the role of the secretary to Cabinet.

NOTES 1. Under the Lord government, the branch then called Policy and Priorities was also run by a politically appointed deputy minister. In 2009, an exminister from the McKenna government ran that branch. 2. The most recent article is Hyson (2005). 3. The action of these senior officials is well described in Pasolli (2009). 4. The ministers also receive an equivalent document se ing out their specific obligations and responsibilities. 5. The years 1982 and 1995 were in the middle of the Hatfield and McKenna eras, whereas 2007 was a er the arrival of Graham. The difference between these temporal snapshots may make the average duration of the deputy ministers serving Graham seem shorter than it actually is.

REFERENCES Bouchard, Gilles. 1999. “Les sous-ministres du Nouveau-Brunswick: de l’ère des techniciens à l’ère des gestionnaires.” Canadian Public Administration / Administration publique du Canada 42 (1): 93–107. Bourgault, Jacques. 2005. A Profile of Deputy Ministers in the Government of Canada. [N.p.] Canada School of Public Service. –. 2007a. “Corporate Management at Top Level of Governments: The Canadian Case.” International Review of Administrative Services 73 (2): 283–300. –. 2007b. “Facteurs constitutifs au leadership du Greffier dans la fonction publique du Canada.” Canadian Public Administration / Administration publique du Canada 60 (4): 541–71. Hyson, Stewart. 2005. “Governing from the Centre in New Brunswick.” In Executive Styles in Canada, edited by Luc Bernier, Keith Brownsey, and Michael Howle , 75–90. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Osbaldeston, G. 1988. Keeping Deputy Ministers Accountable. London, ON: National Centre for Management Research and Development.

122 Gilles Bouchard Pasolli, Lisa. 2009. “Bureaucratizing the Atlantic Revolution: The ‘Saskatchewan Mafia’ in the New Brunswick Civil Service, 1960–1970.” Acadiensis 38 (1): 126–50. Plumptre, Timothy W. 1987. “New Perspectives on the Role of Deputy Minister.” Canadian Public Administration / Administration publique du Canada 30 (3): 376–98. Savoie, Donald J. 2000. “New Brunswick: A ‘Have’ Public Service in a ‘Have-less’ Province.” In Government Restructuring and Career Public Service in Canada, 260–84. Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada.

5 Quebec Deputy Ministers: Accent on Program and Service Delivery in Times of Scarcity jac q u e s b o u r g au lt a n d stéphanie viola-plante

Introduction At the top of the executive branch of government, power is wielded by two categories of actors: the political leadership and the top echelons of the administrative apparatus. They must cooperate within a system in which the former hold legal authority and democratic legitimacy, and the la er possess organizational capabilities and expertise in their field (Bernier, Brownsey, and Howle 2005). The role of deputy ministers (DMs) is not confined to subordination to the political authorities whose policies they carry out. Their job transcends daily politics, since the administration incarnates the continuity of the state through changing governments and ministers. The civil service mo o in the Whitehall model fully applies: servants of the state serve the government of the day, while strictly observing the law. Fi y years ago, Quebec deputy ministers led relatively isolated organizations on the strength of their authority. They were policy experts in their fields. Today, to decide on files and recommend policies, they need to integrate a fast-changing body of information and knowledge. The DM functions as part of a college of senior managers and is expected to be both leader and manager. The DM’s role has been shaped by changes in public management: it was defined in successive Public Service Acts (1964, 1969, 1978, 1984), the Financial Administration Act (1970), and certain accountability provisions (1992), and finally the Public Administration Act (2000).1 Those acts reflect the evolution of managerial knowledge and the significantly altered expectations of the conduct of deputy ministers: today, DMs must be at once advisers, strategists, leaders, communicators, managers, and administrators.

124 Jacques Bourgault and Stéphanie Viola-Plante

This chapter describes the status of Quebec DMs, the complexity of their duties today, and the skills needed to perform them. We will look first at the traditional roles of DMs, then the changes in their socioprofessional profile, and finally their relationship with the political masters. We also examine the competencies required to perform a DM’s functions today and the challenges they will face in the future. The Deputy Minister’s Roles To take the measure of the role of deputy ministers in Quebec, we must first consider the status of the person they serve as second in command: the minister. Given their lack of professional preparation and the pressures on their time, ministers depend heavily on the expertise of their officials, and particularly the DM. By convention, the minister is a member of Quebec’s parliament (which, since 1968, has consisted exclusively of the National Assembly). O en, the reasons for picking a member of the National Assembly (MNA) to be a minister relate not so much to his or her professional background as to balanced representation of regions, sexes, language groups, communities, religious groups, and so forth. There is also pressure to appoint loyal supporters, longtime party members, and people who were promised things to induce them to run as candidates. The health minister is sometimes a doctor and, by law, the justice minister must be a lawyer. However, a pharmacist has been minister of transport, a guidance counsellor minister of public security, and so forth. And as ministers have fairly wide-ranging duties, there is no guarantee that a specialist is a narrow field will make the best minister for a department with related responsibilities. As a result of all these factors, Quebec ministers rarely have a background in the field for which they are responsible. And they have many responsibilities outside their ministry: the pressures on their time include their duties as legislators, representatives, and provincial or regional political figures. The location of their riding may make it impossible for them to be at their ministry every day. Quebec DMs are appointed by Cabinet Order in Council on the premier’s recommendation, as are associate deputy ministers and assistant deputy ministers. DM appointments are, of course, surrounded by a swirl of issues, pressures, and speculation. Starting in 1976, proposed appointments were circulated at a meeting of Cabinet on coloured sheets of paper, and if there was no objection they were approved at a subsequent Cabinet meeting. Today, notice of appointment is no longer given. DMs are hired on contract and have the legal status of a contract

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employee, unless they were already civil servants and obtained unpaid leave in order to become a DM. Deputy ministers are appointed as administrators of state, giving them a permanent employment relationship with the government of Quebec. They may, however, be transferred or even demoted to another position. A contract employee who loses his or her position receives, at a minimum, the compensation stipulated in the contract. DM selection can proceed through various paths. In every case, the final decision is up to the premier, who acts on the advice of the secretary general of the ministry of the Executive Council (assisted by the senior management secretariat). Occasionally other players, such as the Premier’s Office or the relevant minister, are involved at an early stage in the process; they might push for vertical promotion of a civil servant, appointment of a loyal party supporter or even a friend of the premier, a new recruit found by a headhunting firm, or an executive from a para-public institution or public agency. The DM community has never played more than an occasional, informal, and marginal role in the appointment process in Quebec. Traditional Roles Changing The acts governing Quebec ministries all provide for a deputy minister position and set out some general responsibilities (management, signing authority) as well as responsibility for signing specific official documents in the case of some ministries (e.g., Justice). Those provisions have been incorporated into the Public Service Acts and given broader scope. For example, the 1969 version of the act (chapter 14, section 18) provides that the deputy minister of each ministry or agency supervises and manages the ministry’s or agency’s human resources. The act also provides that the DM is responsible, under the minister’s authority, for the general management of the organization’s affairs and holds all the other powers and duties assigned to him or her by the lieutenantgovernor in council (i.e., Cabinet). The deputy minister’s administrative role can be stated simply: the DM signs most documents issued by the ministry, including financial submissions to the Treasury Board and occasionally submissions to Cabinet. Traditionally, Quebec DMs have been authority figures in their ministries: since 1870, regulations have required them to fill out reports on employee a endance and performance. Under the 1882 code of discipline, deputy ministers had to authorize employees to receive visitors at the office! (Quebec 1882).

126 Jacques Bourgault and Stéphanie Viola-Plante

Given ministers’ numerous responsibilities, they are not expected to a end to the administration of their ministry or manage its operations. The minister’s duties as head of the ministry and the person responsible for related legislation can be performed by the DM on the basis of informal or specific delegation of ministerial authority, or when the minister makes a specific request. In general, the actions and decisions of the DM and of ministry employees are officially a ributed to the minister; the minister usually “follows” the advice of his or her chief counsellor, the deputy minister. As the minister’s lead advisor, the deputy minister coordinates the development and evaluation of the ministry’s policies and programs. The DM also supports the minister in his or her interventions in the National Assembly, Cabinet, ministry commi ees, and parliamentary commi ees by providing accurate and appropriate information. DMs are responsible for anticipating situations and problems that may arise, and suggesting solutions or possible approaches for the minister’s consideration. During the first half of the twentieth century, deputy ministers were specialists in their ministry’s area of responsibility. They would propose dra bills to the premier, and those bills served as departmental policies. In 1970, former DM Labrie described his experience during the 1950s: “Maurice Duplessis generally received me every second Tuesday, the day before the Cabinet meeting … Naturally, my minister was not present. From time to time, sometimes to my surprise, he would pull a dra consisting of several typed pages out of his drawer and ask me to check it and then consult the legal advisor of the day (Mr Pigeon) and his chef of staff (Mr Tourigny). Sometimes they were documents I had given him several months earlier. At other times, the dra was entirely new to me. It was an order and I followed it” (Bourgault 1971, 253). Another deputy minister, Louis Bernard, described their role during the Quiet Revolution (1960–70): “Quebec senior civil servants were among the main architects of the Quiet Revolution. They helped create a career civil service based on merit and loyalty to the democratically elected government. Their management framework for delivering public services was based on compliance with pre-established bureaucratic standards. They made a recognized contribution to public affairs and had a stable, clearly defined, uncontroversial relationship with their superiors” (Bernard 2009, 100). Bernard recalled happy relations with politicians during that period. Over the years, the situation changed

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with the expansion of ministers’ staffs, the increasing strength of political parties, the growth of the state, and mounting public expectations and frustrations (92–6). Today, deputy ministers continue to play a central role in policy development, but now the ministry of the Executive Council and in some cases the minister’s office o en lead the process (Bernier, Brownsey, and Howle 2005). As a strategist, the DM offers the minister a consistent, overarching vision of the field and develops that vision in practice. DMs think in terms of political and legislative cycles and are a entive to challenges and opportunities. They seek to reconcile the state’s long-term interests with those of the government they serve. Ideally, they view the ministry’s activities horizontally, as a collaboration with other actors from government and civil society. They are not only strategists but also tacticians: the minister may be dubious or sceptical about the proposed solutions; Cabinet colleagues or lobbies may impede or oppose the DM’s efforts. The DM may need to suggest slowing or accelerating the pace of certain initiatives. The DM must also address situations in which employees are reportedly having difficulty achieving the desired results. Public life has changed considerably over the past thirty years, and this has affected the deputy minister’s role in supporting the minister, who is an institutional political figure. Scientific and technical knowledge are advancing at breakneck speed. The media are reacting more quickly to events, armed with more rights and investigative resources than ever before and driven by unquenchable thirst for breaking news to feed the all-news channels. Pressure groups have more information and greater means; they employ professional lobbyists who watch the ministry’s workings closely and are ready to denounce them in public if it suits their purpose, placing the minister in the hot seat. To help the minister make informed decisions and defend them effectively, the DM provides him or her with clear and accurate information on the issues and suggests approaches to the problems at hand. In this way, the deputy minister supports the minister’s participation in the work of the National Assembly, its commi ees, Cabinet and standing ministry commi ees, and the minister’s involvement with the major issues that a ract the a ention of the media and of pressure groups. The nature of the role of deputy ministers has not changed, but the systems they create and administer to perform that role have been revolutionized and demand more of them.

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The Deputy Minister’s New Roles Over the course of the twentieth century, and particularly in the 1960s, the government of Quebec considerably increased its workforce, budget, activities, and transactions, as did other administrations across the West (Gow 1986). For deputy ministers, who occupy a strategic position in the apparatus of government, the changes meant increased importance for two of their roles: administering resources and providing policy advice. Ballooning budgets necessitated more general rules for disbursements, while across-the-board modernization of the state’s interventions demanded policy reviews. But in a change from previous decades, deputy ministers were no longer the lead experts involved in the process: they now coordinated teams of specialists in their ministries assigned to policy development. Some continued to take an authoritarian tack while others already conceived of their role in terms of team-building. There was a steadily increasing focus on the concept of leadership, and reluctant deputy ministers would eventually have to improve their management style. The advent of New Public Management, which led to amendments to Quebec’s Public Administration Act in 2000, had a significant impact on deputy ministers’ work. They now had to manage within the framework of formal, public commitments: a strategic plan, usually extending over three years, an annual expenditure management plan, an annual performance report to a parliamentary commi ee, and a declaration of services to the public, accompanied by a service improvement plan. In some cases, agencies under the DM’s responsibility would have a performance and accountability agreement with the DM and with Treasury Board. Deputy ministers must now coordinate the management of programs and resources with Services Québec and the shared services centre, two horizontal initiatives that take resources from the ministries and provide them with program and management services. Finally, there appears to be a proliferation of sectoral performance frameworks. For example, the 2009 sustainable development plan, which included fourteen action priorities, required all ministries not only to set targets but also to establish action plans and indicators. These innovations have created multiple accountability (Bourgault 2007) and have further expanded the DM’s network of relationships, which already comprised relations with the minister, with other deputy ministers on interdepartmental files, with central agencies, with the minister’s office, particularly the chief of staff (Baccigalupo 1973; Plasse

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1981; Maltais and Harvey 2007) and with different client groups (public and para-public institutions, interest groups, lobbyists). The deputy minister is in constant communication with the minister’s office, since her or she is no longer the minister’s sole advisor; the minister’s staff try to push their political agenda. There is a potential for conflict between staffers and civil servants, and the deputy minister must sometimes serve as moderator. Much depends on the people involved and their personalities: if the minister is a technocrat or wants to take a handson approach, or if the deputy minister adopts a political a itude, the line of demarcation can become blurred. Maintaining the boundaries between the roles can help avoid problems. But some ministers with expertise in the field will ignore the ministry’s experts, and some members of the minister’s staff may try to intervene in program management. Conversely, civil servants have been known to try to impose their own policy preferences. The deputy minister’s job as manager is to make sure that the things that have to be done get done (Mintzberg and Bourgault 2000, 8). DMs identify spheres of action, decide on management orientations and systems, oversee their implementation, seek to ensure their successful operation, and take administrative responsibility for the results. In their managerial role, DMs try to make the most effective possible use of resources while complying with administrative rules. Under the Public Service Act, the deputy minister is accountable to the National Assembly for managing resources (but not for policy directions) and is answerable before the public administration commi ee. For reasons of legitimacy, efficiency, and effectiveness, the environment in which deputy ministers operate is increasingly based on horizontal management: policy development and management involves more than one ministry, more than one level of government, and o en civil society as well. More and more statutory and regulatory provisions transcend departmental lines in areas such as public health, the environment, sustainable development, the fight against poverty, and so forth. To ensure interdepartmental coordination, the DM organizes the necessary consultations on all issues that are liable to involve the responsibilities of his or her colleagues in other ministries and coordinates the process with the work of standing ministry commi ees. Horizontal management has become an essential component of the DM’s work and an additional factor in the management of his or her own ministry. Corporate management, now a cornerstone of government operations, supports the timely provision of the knowledge and information

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DMs need for their work and be er relations with other administrative actors. During the Quiet Revolution, there was close coordination among senior civil servants in Quebec, prompting criticism of the ascendancy of the mandarins. Duplessis had been leery of the power of the senior civil service and had fought it throughout his reign, even prohibiting meetings among deputy ministers (Gow 1986; Bourgault 1971). In the 1966 election campaign, the technocracy became a major issue; its critics won the election but did nothing to curb the influence of the state-building mandarins (Bernard 2009, 93). Then, with the generally higher calibre of ministers a er 1970 and the expansion of the premier’s office, the influence of the mandarins was diminished to some extent. According to Louis Bernard, the growing strength of political parties in Quebec, the clearer differentiation among them, the growth of the ministers’ offices, and the discovery that the technocracy is fallible also contributed to undermining the mandarins’ status as a “standing authority.” A er 1976, new governments began appointing new senior civil servants (95). More frequent changes in the governing party reduced the stability at the top of the administrative pyramid. Indeed, a comparative analysis conducted in 2004 found that Quebec had one of the most poorly organized civil services of any province in terms of corporate management. Under the leadership of André Dicaire, Marc Lacroix, and their teams, the ministry of the Executive Council introduced a strategic plan to improve the situation. The goal was to formalize the deputy ministers’ forum, make its meetings more frequent and more strategic, support the DMs, promote their professional development, apply the results of their discussions, and improve career conditions at the top of the government apparatus. Corporate management gives DMs a be er grasp of and clearer focus on the government’s vision. It makes it easier for them to explain to employees how that vision underpins the ministry’s action plan. The DM meetings, chaired by the secretary general, keep the DMs informed of developments in all ministries and across the government, and help them suit their actions to Cabinet policies. They also help maintain close relations with the secretary general through performance evaluation, which involves target-se ing, followup, and evaluation/feedback meetings. The challenge of corporate management is to keep up the pace a er an enthusiastic start and to maintain the scope of the mechanisms, the depth of the discussions, and the extent of the DMs’ collective action. A number of factors are liable to undermine corporate management

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and make the collective contribution of deputy ministers appear less important, such as the replacement of incumbents, unstable minority governments (as in 2007–8), and the rising power of some ministers. The deputy minister’s audiences include the minister, decisionmakers at the central agencies, employees, parliamentary commi ees, and sometimes the media and interest groups. The DM is o en expected to help make his or her minister convincing to colleagues in the fiercely competitive Cabinet environment. When it comes to policy, DMs explain and help prepare people psychologically; when it comes to management, they justify and defend positions and decisions, negotiating continuously with most of the actors listed above (Mintzberg and Bourgault 2000, 14). The deputy minister therefore pursues multiple objectives: protecting the minister and the government, promoting the ministry’s development, upholding the public interest, promoting his or her vision of policy development or management in the sector, and so forth. The order of priorities among these objectives varies, depending on circumstances. The DM’s communication skills play an important role in the implementation of the government’s agenda by his or her team. Not all employees will necessarily share Cabinet’s policy directions, budgeting priorities, or regulatory decisions. The DM must bring employees to understand and accept those orientations, and secure the most enthusiastic cooperation possible. In a democracy, civil servants must serve the government of the day with loyalty and professionalism, while strictly following the law. As a leader, the DM works to motivate his or her employees in a timely manner to keep pace with ongoing change (transactional and transformational leadership), to convince interest groups to revise their approaches to the files within the DM’s sector, and to broaden his or her peers’ perspective on corporate files. The DM has therefore transitioned from an authority figure to a person who motivates people and brings them together to overcome obstacles and work towards common objectives. Evolution of Deputy Ministers’ Socio-Professional Profile This section looks at deputy ministers’ changing socio-professional profiles. Once a fairly homogeneous group made up of white males from the liberal professions (law, medicine), the DM community is now a more diverse group that reflects some components of Quebec’s population. The evolution of the socio-professional characteristics of deputy

132 Jacques Bourgault and Stéphanie Viola-Plante

ministers indicates the distance Quebec’s senior civil service has travelled towards modernization of the state. To collect our data, we reviewed the résumés of the thirty-two deputy ministers (as of May 2009) published by the government of Quebec, a 1989 study of the evolution of Quebec’s senior civil service (Bourgault 1989), and an MA thesis on Quebec DMs between 1945 and 1970 (Bourgault 1971). The May 2009 contingent included twenty deputy ministers and the twelve associate secretaries general of the ministry of the Executive Council, who have deputy minister rank.2 Is the Civil Service Representative? The first female deputy minister in the Quebec civil service was appointed in 1978. Today, women are still a minority in the DM community. In May 2009, only 22 per cent of Quebec deputy ministers were women. That does, however, represent a significant increase over the past twenty years: in 1986, there were only two female deputy ministers, or 7 per cent of the total. Women made up half of the Cabinet in 2008 and close to 20 per cent of managers in the civil service. Given the discretionary nature of DM appointments, it might have been expected that there would be substantially more female DMs today. There are probably systemic reasons why there are not. In the Quebec civil service, no woman has ever been a DM at a central agency or at the powerful Ministry of Finance. While there were some unilingual English-speaking DMs in the nineteenth century, during the past forty years there have been precious few bilingual anglophone or ethnic minority DMs and only a few isolated examples at the assistant deputy minister level. As members of those communities are not always close to the corridors of power, they can be difficult to recruit. Despite a number of invitations, few have agreed to leave the Montreal area and their social networks to move to Quebec City. University Education Prior to 1960, more than 85 per cent of deputy ministers had a university education, usually an undergraduate degree, and their level of education has since increased steadily. According to Bourgault, the number of DMs and ADMs with a master’s degree or two bachelor’s

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degrees increased from 19 out of 76 for the 1967–77 period to 45 out of the 107 new appointees between 1977 and 1982. By 2009, all DMs had a university education: 41 per cent had a bachelor’s degree and 45 per cent a master’s degree. The increase was due in large part to greater value a ached to higher learning as a result of wider access to a university education. A graduate degree is now an advantage, if not an essential, for candidates for executive positions, the main pool from which deputy ministers are recruited. Field of Study Law degrees figure prominently on deputy ministers’ résumés. Many also hold degrees in traditional specializations that are relevant to policy development. Prior to 1970, deputy ministers were largely experts on policy rather than managers. However, “modern” DMs owe their positions primarily to their managerial skills, as is borne out by their changing academic backgrounds. Most deputy ministers now hold one of their degrees in management (private or public), although law and economics remain highly valued. Age of Deputy Ministers at Time of Appointment The age at which deputy ministers are appointed has fluctuated over the years. From 1945 to 1971, the majority were between thirty-six and forty-five at the time of their first appointment to a DM position. The analysis of the résumés of incumbent DMs in 2009 found that half were between fi y and fi y-nine when first appointed, a significant age increase. During the 1960s, there were many new positions to be filled and the ideal candidates (university graduates with a specialization) were few and relatively young. Subsequently, broader access to education had the effect of increasing the pool of candidates. Individuals now take up their first DM appointment at a more advanced age because there are fewer new positions than there are new candidates. Experts on management also argue in favour of appointing more experienced candidates (Mintzberg 2004). Finally, the government’s priority today is more to consolidate structures and streamline the management of those structures than to develop new program initiatives or to create new institutions – a focus that has, rightly or wrongly, caused a shi towards more experienced candidates.

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Deputy Ministers’ Previous Positions and Years of Experience Prior to Appointment Most deputy ministers appointed between 1945 and the present were recruited from within the Quebec civil service. They were therefore familiar with the workings of the apparatus of government in Quebec at the time of their appointment and had networks of relationships within the public administration. Of the 2009 contingent of DMs, 94 per cent were appointed from within the Quebec public sector; 6 per cent had up to six years of experience in the public sector prior to their DM appointment, 25 per cent had ten to nineteen years of experience, 47 per cent had twenty to twenty-nine years, and 22 per cent between thirty and thirty-nine years, counting both vertical appointments (promotion from associate or assistant deputy minister in the same ministry) and diagonal appointments (from another ministry). The bulk of deputy ministers had a lengthy previous career in the public sector. There have never been many DMs appointed directly from the private sector, even when the government’s agenda was close to private-sector values. The location of the capital in Quebec City, where the private sector is smaller, the pay relatively poor, and perceptions that the decision-making process is slow, complex, and politicized may discourage private-sector managers from applying. Crown corporations, which offer be er compensation, clearer and more operational mandates, and lighter, more discreet central controls, are the most likely to recruit from the private sector. Number of Positions at the Deputy Minister Level Is it possible to make a career at the top, or is one appointment to a ministry in one’s field of specialization the most that can be hoped for? We analysed deputy ministers’ careers for the number of positions at the DM level and the duration of their careers as DMs. Minor changes in assignments were not counted; a change in position was registered if, for example, a deputy minister of transport was transferred to municipal affairs. In May 2009, twenty-three of the thirty-two deputy ministers, or 69 per cent, had held only one DM position, 19 per cent had held two, 3 per cent had held three, and three of the deputy ministers, or 9 per cent, had held four positions at the DM level. It would appear that there is a small circle of top civil servants at this time. In June 2009, there was a wave of twenty appointments to deputy minister, associate deputy minister, and assistant deputy minister

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positions; at that time, eleven deputy ministers were named, an unprecedented batch of DM appointments. Two DMs who had been appointed on the strength of their friendships with ministers lost their jobs and were de facto demoted; eight supporters of the governing party were among the twenty new appointees; eight DMs were moved sideways, and three were promoted to DM (two diagonally and one vertically). The DM group became more experienced, as nearly half of its members were no longer in their first assignment at the DM level. Years of Experience as a Deputy Minister In May 2009, there were nine deputy ministers who had held other positions at the same level (DM or associate secretary general): five were in their second DM appointment and four had served in three or more DM positions (see table 5.1). Among them, the nine “veterans” had a total of 53.3 years of service at the DM level, an average of 5.9 years each. There was therefore a fairly small number of mandarins in May 2009, especially considering that our sample also included the associate secretaries general at the ministry of the Executive Council. While eighteen individuals had 4 or more years of experience at that level, indicating a measure of overall stability in the group, only one had more than 10 years of seniority as a DM and four had between 5 and 10 years. It is therefore difficult to tap into a deep corporate tradition. Politicization Politicization is always a controversial issue. No government wants to admit to hiring on a political basis because of the a endant scent of favouritism and incompetence. But some distinctions must be made here. What exactly is meant by politicization in the senior civil service? All DM appointments are political insofar as they are discretionary and made by a political body (Cabinet) a er a fairly politicized recommendation process. However, a political appointment in this sense is not necessarily marked by the stain of partisanship. If the appointee has been a candidate in an election, a member of a minister’s staff, or a party official, that would certainly suggest partisan politicization of the process, but a profile of that type would not necessarily imply that the individual is incompetent: partisanship does not wipe away a person’s education and relevant experience. Working in a minister’s office can also help prepare an individual to serve as a DM, as the British

136 Jacques Bourgault and Stéphanie Viola-Plante Table 5.1. Number of DM-Level Positions Held by Incumbent DMs, May 2009 Number of positions held

Number of DMs

Percentage of DMs

1 2 3 4 Total responses

23 5 2 2 32

72 16 6 6 100

experience illustrates (Bourgault 1971). At the same time, it is entirely possible to be political without ever having run as a candidate, served as a political staffer, or occupied any other official political function. We therefore need to consider all the other people who are directly linked to the Liberal Party by virtue of their public support for the party, through their spouse, their personal friendship with the premier or a senior minister, and so forth. By these criteria, the proportion of deputy ministers with a partisan background has ranged between 35 per cent in May 2009 and 30 per cent in February 2011. Of the 356 senior civil servants (a broad category that also includes associate and assistant deputy ministers) who served between 1960 and 1982, 27 (8 per cent) had worked in a minister’s office. Exaggerated claims and stereotypes about the formal politicization of Quebec’s senior civil service should therefore be viewed in perspective. It must, however, be borne in mind that if we were to apply the broader criterion of shared ideas, we might find a higher degree of ideological than partisan politicization. Changes in government that involve a change in governing party seem to be followed by a suspicious number of DM departures and arrivals, suggesting there may be a connection. It is generally during these periods that accusations of politicization abound. For example, when René Lévesque was elected in 1976 and when Robert Bourassa took office in 1984, they conducted purges of the senior civil service, reminiscent of the Taschereau-Duplessis, Duplessis-Godbout, and Godbout-Duplessis changeovers between 1930 and 1944. Given Liberal leader Jean Charest’s ferocious a acks on the PQ government’s managerial record, changes in the civil service might have been expected a er the Liberal victory of 2003. But that did not happen (see table 5.2, figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3), at least not immediately. As the pa ern at the time was for deputy ministers to change position every two years, any changes a er two years can probably be a ributed to that established practice rather than to the change in government.

Quebec Deputy Ministers 137 Table 5.2. Number of Years in DM Community for Incumbent DMs, May 2009 Years in DM community

Number of DMs

Percentage of DMs

Less than 1 1–2 2–3 3–4 4–5 5–6 6–7 7 or more Total responses

2 4 1 3 13 2 3 4 32

6 13 3 9 41 6 9 13 100

Figure 5.1. DM Changes in Quebec, April 2003 to November 2005 DMs November 2005* N = 23

Kept** n = 2

Replaced n = 21

Appointed from within n = 20 Appointed from without n = 1 Left public sector n=1

Horizontal n=9

Diagonal n=5

Vertical n=5

Parapublic n=1 Agencies n=4

Private n=0

Ministries n=5

Ministries n=4

Agencies n=1

* Cabinet increased from 20 to 23 members in February 2005 ** Incumbent deputy minister in the same ministry since (year). Based on résumé.

138 Jacques Bourgault and Stéphanie Viola-Plante Figure 5.2. Destinations of Quebec DMs, April 2003 to February 2005 Departures N = 16

To public sector n=7

Agencies n=4

Outside Quebec civil service n=9

Ministries n=3

Retirement, illness, death n=8

Federal n=1

Figure 5.3. Previous Positions of DMs Appointed April 2003 to February 2005 Appointees N = 16 Outside civil service n=2

Civil service n = 14

Ministries n=9

Vertical n=3

Agencies n=5

Parapublic n=1

Diagonal n=4

Returned from retirement from civil service n=1

Horizontal n=2

As these three figures show, the senior civil service was spared immediate purges in 2003, but two years later most of the deputy ministers had changed positions. The new recruits did not come from political backgrounds, and many of those who le were not terminated but transferred. There were, however, cases in which a relationship of trust could not be established or was broken, or in which working methods were incompatible.

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According to one prominent Liberal, the lack of trust continued a er 2003. In 2003, friends of the Liberal Party were named to well-paid, fulltime positions as chairman of the Board or CEO of Quebec Crown corporations, positions that are not so tightly controlled by the government. Some were asked to play a strategic role in the government’s agenda. Others, who were lower in the Liberal Party food chain, were named to head public agencies. When the Liberals were subsequently reduced to a minority, the premier sought to project a statesman-like image, but that did not prevent him from making a few dubious appointments of personal friends who had performed poorly as DMs. Those cases a racted considerable media a ention but were the exception. Link to Politics In a parliamentary system rooted in the Westminster model, deputy ministers have no constitutional status or responsibilities distinct from the government. Ministerial responsibility means that the minister answers before Parliament for everything that happens in his or her ministry. However, in the absence of wri en rules, the minister and deputy minister establish an arrangement, which can be fairly formal and detailed, to manage their relationship and clarify their respective roles. But the development of the relationship is conditioned by considerations of political risk management, given the controversies surrounding policies and the competition among the political parties to win and hold power. The relationship between a minister and a deputy minister will be affected by predictable and unpredictable events. It cannot be governed by a prescriptive wri en code. It is based on mutual trust and can be fragile: once damaged, it can be difficult to restore. The minister–DM relationship therefore demands excellent communication between the two, communication that is immediate, frank, open, and exhaustive. Guidelines must be established to regulate some basic aspects of the relationship: the deputy minister has a responsibility to tell the minister everything, and the minister has a responsibility to listen calmly and not blame the messenger. Discussions between the minister and the DM are strictly confidential. When submi ing a ma er to the minister for decision, the deputy minister’s role is to discuss all considerations that bear on the feasibility of the options honestly and professionally with the minister. The minister’s role is to listen and ask questions until he or she has a good grasp of the issue and all the implications. Once

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the minister has made a final decision, the DM accepts and supports it, even if the decision runs counter to the DM’s advice, provided it is consistent with the principle of legality. The two have complementary roles: ministers enjoy legitimacy and decision-making power under the law and are responsible for selling the decision to other elected officials and the public, while deputy ministers use their competence, information, and networks to prepare the ground, provide advice, and implement the decision. The two sets of roles cannot be isolated; they are located on a single continuum in our system of government. New Expectations Directed at Deputy Ministers Quebec deputy ministers face ever-greater demands from government and the political class. With mounting pressure for the state’s actions to be more relevant, appropriate, and efficient, DMs are expected to be more accountable, to use more precise performance frameworks, and to continuously upgrade their skills. Quebec Deputy Ministers and Performance Quebec deputy ministers are no longer concerned exclusively with the legality of the government’s corporate agenda or their ministry’s effectiveness. They must now a end to performance and deal with performance reports, reports on public services, performance evaluations, sustainable development plans, and so forth. At the end of the spring 2008 session of the National Assembly, the public administration commi ee noted what it considered to be shortcomings in performance management in the civil service and recommended that the Treasury Board Secretariat directs its efforts on supporting ministries and agencies to provide parliamentarians and the public with complete information on various aspects of performance. The TBS provided that help (Quebec 2013). Our survey of Quebec deputy ministers in the fall of 2008 found that of the twenty-three DMs who headed ministries, eighteen were working to develop a comprehensive program performance-management and monitoring framework in their organization. Not all of them had completed it as of the time of writing. Six types of situations were observed, and in fewer than half the cases was there a well-developed performance-monitoring mechanism. However, the signal has been

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sent and, in the long run, all the organizations will have a genuine performance-management and monitoring system. Greater Accountability for Deputy Ministers In 1987, the Budget and Administration Commi ee, chaired by JeanGuy Lemieux, obtained authorization to have the auditor general appear before it annually. However, it was really in 1993, with the adoption of an omnibus bill (the act respecting the reduction of personnel in public bodies and the accountability of deputy ministers and chief executive officers of public bodies), that parliamentary commi ees obtained the power to summon senior civil servants in order to examine their organization’s management when it is dealt with in the auditor general’s report. Since the adoption of the Public Administration Act in 2000, the Public Administration Commi ee, a relatively non-partisan body chaired by an opposition MNA, has been responsible for hearing the auditor general testify about his or her annual report and for analysing the issues raised, in the presence of the deputy ministers. This function was previously divided among sectoral commi ees, according to their specific areas of expertise. These accountability mechanisms for compliance, effectiveness, and efficiency require extensive preparatory work and strong communication and management skills of the deputy minister. The DMs must also distinguish between, on the one hand, policymaking and program development, which are the responsibility of the minister (and of the appropriate parliamentary commi ees), and on the other hand, management of the ministry and its programs, which are the responsibility of the DM and fall within the purview of the Public Administration Commi ee. The proliferation of officers of the National Assembly and their growing prerogatives call for increased a ention from deputy ministers. For example, in the late 1970s, the auditor general began conducting efficiency audits; in the early 1980s, the position of access to information commissioner was created, followed by the lobbying commissioner in the early 1990s; since 2004, the sustainable development commissioner has required each ministry and agency to file reports. On the other hand, starting in the 1990s, the Treasury Board allowed the ministries wider manoeuvring room to manage their resources, which did not, however, shield them from staff cuts as a result of the 10 per cent reduction in total workforce over a ten-year period.

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At the same time, according to former secretary general Louis Bernard, accounts are too o en rendered in the offices of the Public Administration Commi ee’s experts. Bernard seems to be calling for a more public and systematic process: We may well ask whether the senior civil servants themselves sometimes find the current situation more comfortable than having to report on the management of their ministry directly and publicly. To date, few of them have been through public hearings and many of them might experience high anxiety if they had to appear, although most have been called upon to speak during the annual review of their ministry’s or agency’s budget credits and explain a program’s operation. In any event, one cannot demand greater managerial independence without agreeing, in exchange, to be accountable for one’s managerial performance. The two go together … This demands a redefinition of the political principle of ministerial responsibility and a reform of parliamentary processes. It requires senior civil servants to meet the challenge of public accountability, which by virtue of being public is subject to criticism. But on the other hand, they will be able to ask to be paid according to merit, based on results. (Bernard 2009, 100–1)

Continuous Skills Development New Public Management (NPM) originated in the United Kingdom under Margaret Thatcher in the late 1970s, triggering a wave of public administration reform that spread to many Western countries, including Canada (Aucoin 2008) and Quebec. The new way of managing, which in many ways took its cue from private-sector practices, transformed management approaches in the civil service. It had a profound effect on public governance, prompting a reconsideration of the role of the state and reshaping public services management (the services provided to citizens and users, the role of political authorities, results-based management, focus on performance, efficiency, and effectiveness). From an NPM point of view, deputy ministers, long regarded as managers of compliance, must also become managers of optimization. To do so, they need to demonstrate certain skills. Quebec’s deputy minister skills profile, introduced in 2006, lists five key competencies. The first is strategic leadership, which embeds the deputy minister’s actions in government orientations. DMs must constantly read the external and internal environments. They must be alert to new ways of

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doing things and foster creativity. A strategic leader is a communicator, conveying a vision and spearheading change. Second, DMs must have the ability to motivate: they must be able to elicit commitment by supporting their people and recognizing achievement. Third, DMs must be able to produce results. That means they actively commit to achieving the organization’s goals and allocate the organization’s resources appropriately. The ability to make decisions is an essential component of this third competency. The DM must also be a strong alliance-builder and networker, having the ability to establish good contacts within and without the organization and to build consensus. Finally, DMs must be able to manage within a political/administrative environment, which means they must bear the public interest in mind when implementing government decisions and advising the government on policy and program development. This skills framework embraces all dimensions of management and modern governance. In this respect, it resembles other skills frameworks for senior civil servants of the same type established by the governments of Canada, Ontario, and the United States. However, the development and self-evaluation instruments for the skills identified in the framework have yet to be seen. And the framework is not yet used as a factor in candidate selection. Conclusion This study has highlighted changes in the contemporary roles of deputy ministers: some traditional roles have expanded and new managerial and leadership roles have emerged. The influence of mandarins in Quebec’s civil service has declined over the years, as that of party apparatuses and ministers’ offices has grown. New challenges have arisen and can be expected to further modify the DM’s role in the future: political, policy, information, and management. There are two types of political challenges. Today, ministers have numerous channels of information available to them that fall outside their deputy minister’s sphere of influence: information technologies, the proliferation of direct contacts, pressure groups, consultants, political staffers, and so forth. The deputy minister’s first challenge is to remain the minister’s main informant and advisor. Second, the advent of minority governments and the resulting instability are making the daily difficulties that arise in managing a government ministry more politically sensitive, spawning crises of greater proportions that

144 Jacques Bourgault and Stéphanie Viola-Plante

demand more of the DM’s time and a ention. DMs must proceed with caution, sometimes at the expense of program development. In an age of increasing interdependence among states, public policy challenges require DMs to monitor issues that are more and more complex and involve knowledge that quickly becomes obsolete. Examples include health, the economy, and population migrations at a time when information circulates ever more quickly in the corridors of power. Taking global events into account is a challenge for provincial decisionmakers, whose main responsibilities do not involve international relations and who have relatively limited means of direct intervention. Two communication challenges are worthy of a ention: the impact of information technology and media coverage. The development of information technology is leading interest groups and the public to expect greater transparency. A be er educated, be er informed citizenry wants answers – clear, accurate, and precise answers on complex issues that are o en more difficult than government officials realize. A deputy minister’s performance is publicized, compared, and criticized. In a public sector where the spur of competition is not always present, taking full advantage of advances in information technology can also be a challenge. For example, in 2009, few Quebec ministries were using real-time performance-tracking so ware to support management decision-making. The ubiquity and voracity of the media make it a challenge for deputy ministers to manage the news cycle, in concert with the minister. Today, DMs have less time to react when their ministry is subjected to critical or suspicious media scrutiny. Their response must be faster, and lack of coordination in pu ing out information can be fatal, for it is likely to appear as an a empt at manipulation. Management challenges relate to human resources management, scant public resources, and risk management. In human resources, the image of the civil service must keep pace with the changing face of Quebec society. Under-representation of women and minorities will continue to a ract scrutiny for reasons of fair access to the civil service and the legitimacy of the decision-making process, as well as effective delivery of public services to minorities, who as a result of immigration are a steadily growing segment of the population. In its human resources management practices, the organization that the deputy minister heads increasingly needs to deal with employees of varying backgrounds and life paths, who have customs and mores that differ from those of the majority of the workforce. Opposed needs will have to be reconciled and conflicts prevented, particularly in a post-economic

Quebec Deputy Ministers 145

crisis environment in which a workforce will be in short supply and staff retention even more important. With growing numbers of projects involving the efforts and/or resources of several ministries, DMs are devoting ever more time and a ention to horizontal management. Given the need for consultation, and in many cases co-management of the issues, organizations must work together and deputy ministers must see to it that this approach, which runs counter to bureaucratic culture and “defies the laws of gravity” (Savoie 2001), is actually applied. Horizontal management is a long-term trend at the federal level and in most provinces, and Quebec is no exception. Tightly stretched public resources for program delivery and management are likely to remain a fact of life for the foreseeable future. All government agendas from the 1980s and 1990s, including the shortlived period of firm budget envelopes under the Parti québécois government, have been eroded by budget cuts. In its first term of office, the Charest government a empted to modernize the workings of government, but the expected benefits did not materialize and the secretary general slammed deputy ministers who allegedly did not fully cooperate with process and program re-engineering. The Liberal government’s plans to slash the number of agencies were not carried out, sparing the jobs of their deputy ministers. In the end, the government decided to control spending by replacing only one out of two departing employees for the next ten years and granting meagre pay raises that sapped civil service morale. Demands for more economical management and improved efficiency will continue to afflict the deputy minister of the future, as expectations of improved civil service performance continue to grow.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This study was conducted with a grant from SHRC.

NOTES 1. Public Service Act, R.S.Q., c F-3.1; Financial Administration Act, R.S.Q., c A- 6; Act respecting the reduction of personnel in public bodies and the accountability of deputy ministers and chief executive officers of public bodies, R.S.Q., c I-41; Public Administration Act, R.S.Q., c A-6.01.

146 Jacques Bourgault and Stéphanie Viola-Plante 2. To be sure, some of the twelve associate secretaries general of the ministry of the executive council probably do not really do a DM’s job, but they have the job classification and might have been named assistant secretaries general, as a dozen others were. They do not all have the same responsibilities – far from it!

REFERENCES Aucoin, P. 2008. “New Public Management and New Public Governance: Finding the Balance.” In Professionalism and Public Service: Essays in Honour of Kenneth Kernaghan, edited by D. Siegel and K. Rasmussen, 16–33. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Baccigalupo, A. 1973. “Les cabinets ministériels dans l’administration publique québécoise.” Revista ADM 20:317–28. Bernard, L. 2009. “L’évolution du rôle de la haute fonction publique au Québec.” Téléscope 15 (1): 92–101. Bernier, L., K. Brownsey, and M. Howle . 2005. Executive Styles in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Bourgault, J. 1971. Les sous-ministres du Québec 1945–1970 (MA thesis, Université de Montréal). Bourgault, J. 1989. “L’évolution de la haute fonction publique des ministères du gouvernement du Québec.” In L’administration publique québécoise: évolutions sectorielles: 1960–1985, edited by Y. Bélanger and L. Lepage, 13–34. Montreal: Presses de l’Université du Québec. Bourgault, J. 2007. “The Evolution of the Deputy Minister’s Role in Canada.” Galimberti Lecture, IPAC Congress, Winnipeg. Gow, J.I. 1985. Histoire de l’Administration publique québécoise. Montreal: Presses de l'Université de Montréal. Jacob, S. (2006) L’évaluation de programme au Québec: un état des lieux, Télescope 13 (1): 9–18. Maltais, Daniel, and Marie-Eve Harvey. 2007. “Les gestionnaires de l’ombre: les directeurs de cabinets ministériels québécois.” Canadian Public Administration / Administration publique du Canada 50 (1): 53–78 Mercier, J. 2002. L’administration publique: de l’école classique au nouveau management public. Quebec City: Presses de l’Université Laval. Mintzberg, H. 2004. Managers Not MBAs: A Hard Look at the So Practice of Managing and Management Development. San Francisco: Berre -Koehler. Mintzberg, H., and J. Bourgault. 2000. Manager en public. Toronto: IPAC and University of Toronto Press.

Quebec Deputy Ministers 147 Plasse, M. 1981. “Les chefs de cabinets ministériels au Québec: la transition du gouvernement libéral au gouvernement péquiste (1976–1977).” Canadian Journal of Political Science 14 (2): 309–35. h p://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ S0008423900036088. Quebec. 1882. Règlement de discipline dans le service civil. Quebec, Ministère du Conseil executive. 2006. Plan stratégique 2006–2009. Quebec, Secrétariat du Conseil du trésor. 2013. Document de soutien à la production du Rapport annuel de gestion 2012–13: complément du Guide sur le rapport annuel de gestion. h p://www.tresor.gouv.qc.ca/fileadmin/PDF/secretariat/ soutien_rag.pdf. Savoie, D. 2001. Pulling against Gravity: Economic Development in New Brunswick during the McKenna Years. Monograph.

6 From “Gurus” to Chief Executives? The Contestable Transformation of Ontario’s Deputy Ministers, 1971 to 2007 b r y a n m . e va n s , j a n e t m . l u m , and duncan maclellan

Introduction Based on a blend of primary and secondary research, this chapter arrives at several observations on Ontario’s deputy minister cadre between 1971 and 2007 – a specific historical frame chosen for two basic reasons. First, it covers an interesting period that begins to see the gradual unravelling of Ontario’s post-war order, characterized by economic prosperity and forty-two years of a one-party political dynasty. Second, extending the historical time frame back further would have presented serious methodological limitations in conducting the research. The Canadian literature on public service executives is concerned largely with the federal dimension, and we note that the paucity of research on public service leadership in the provinces, and specifically for the larger provinces, such as Ontario, is a problem. While it is both striking and truly unfortunate that only a few deputy ministers have chosen to reflect and write on their experiences, this omission is particularly pronounced in Ontario. We are all the poorer for the absence of these important reflections from previous deputy ministers. Of course, such a state is understandable, in part, where former deputies are to some degree constrained by their oaths. A greater concern, however, is the difficulty in identifying and accessing primary sources. The reality is that there is minimal archival material specifically concerned with Ontario’s deputy ministers. In part, to compensate for this rather shallow reservoir of information, this study invited former deputy ministers to participate in anonymous, semi-structured interviews with the lead author. Twenty-two individuals agreed to do so, and they provided a substantive narrative

Ontario’s Deputy Ministers 149

covering four decades of Ontario public service history. In addition, Ontario government telephone directories provided rich but limited data. “Mining” these data sources became essential to building some insight into issues of churning/mobility, gender, career trajectory, extent of external appointments, and relationship of political change to the deputy minister cadre. Also, the Cabinet Office asked former and current Ontario deputy ministers (as of May 2006) to provide personal background information that contributed to deepening the scope of this study. The historical scope of this study covers seven Ontario premiers representing three different governing parties. One might even suggest that the “Common Sense Revolution” Conservatives of Mike Harris and Ernie Eves represent a fourth party. Two of the Ontario governments in this study governed with minority status. In addition to its dynamic electoral environment, Ontario, in this nearly four-decade historical frame, encountered a series of economic challenges, including significant inflation (1970s) and two deep recessions (1981–4 and 1989–94). Within these volatile economic and political environments, the Ontario administrative state stood with deputy ministers located at the apex of public service. Traditionally deputy ministers have had the job of mediating the relationship between shi ing political leaders (and priorities) and Ontario’s administrative state; however, what we observe in Ontario is an incremental transformation of the role of the senior executive cadre in response to political changes. Commenting on the vital role of Ontario’s secretaries to Cabinet, Evans writes, “Ontario’s secretaries of the cabinet are neither valets nor mandarins but rather, as in Pusey’s account of Australian public service executives, the ‘switchmen’ of Ontario’s policy trajectory … the lessons of leadership generated by those serving as secretary to the cabinet in Ontario are intertwined with the modernization project and the need for a ‘centre’ to provide leadership and manage public-sector reform in response to economic, political and public administrative complexity” (2008, 122). In addition, Evans notes that all the Ontario secretaries to Cabinet in this study, with the exception of David Agnew, served, at one point in their careers, as deputy ministers. Upon reaching the position of secretary to Cabinet, these individuals were, in fact, the premier’s deputy minister. This same characterization logically extends to Ontario’s deputy ministers, whose leadership role has evolved from that of omnipotent advisor and problem “fixer” reigning over a distinct sector – the era of the “guru” – towards a more managerial function ensuring the

150 Bryan M. Evans, Janet M. Lum, and Duncan MacLellan

effective, efficient, and economic management of large organizations within a still larger organization. In the policy advisory role, the relationship to the political leadership is perhaps less collegial and more concerned with directing policy implementation. In this respect, the “switchman” analogy is appropriate. Historical and Legal Foundations The title of “deputy minister” made its first appearance in Ontario, along with that of “minister,” with the introduction of the Education Act in 1876 (Hodge s 1995, 54). Bell and Pascoe characterize the holder of this position as the “chief administrative officer of a ministry” (1988, 39). This is an exceptionally narrow and indeed misguided conceptualization of the role and functions of deputy ministers in Ontario. However, given the duties ascribed by the legislation governing the public service, this focus on the administrative dimension of the role is understandable. Ontario’s Public Service Act (PSA) was enacted in 1878, but the “fundamental assumptions underlying it have remained unchanged” (Ontario Civil Service Commission 2001, 26), particularly in the functions and powers of the deputy minister. In 1970, the PSA simply stated, “Subject to the direction of his minister, a deputy minister is responsible for the operation of his ministry and shall perform such other functions as are assigned to him by his minister or by the Lieutenant Governor in Council” (Government of Ontario 1970, 961). In addition, the act empowered the deputy minister, providing there is ministerial consent, with the authority to delegate any powers and duties to other individual public servants or a “class” of public servants within the ministry. Both sections are rather expansive, but the “basket” clause reading “shall perform such other functions as are assigned” is exceptionally so. The singularly sexist lexicon inscribed in the 1970 legislation, and its antecedents, was amended in 1990 to reflect the progress of women in political and public service occupations over the preceding twenty years. The legislation was revised to read, “Subject to the direction of his or her minister,” and the subsequent authority to delegate powers and duties was similarly redra ed to reflect that a minister and deputy may be male or female (Government of Ontario 1990). In 1999, a full-scale review of the PSA was launched and a specific question on the role of deputy ministers was posed: “Should the Act be changed to permit Deputy Ministers broader scope to delegate their

Ontario’s Deputy Ministers 151

powers and duties?” (Ontario Civil Service Commission 2000, 13). Not until 2006, and a change in government, did the “modernized” legislation emerge, as the Public Service of Ontario Act. On behalf of the minister, deputy minister responsibilities were now enumerated to include operation of the ministry, provision of advice to the minister, and assurance of a non-partisan, professional, ethical, and competent public service. For the first time the deputy minister’s advisory role was explicitly acknowledged, thus asserting the foundations of Ontario’s public administration in the traditional Westminster doctrines of political neutrality, merit, and professional/technical expertise (Government of Ontario 2006). In Ontario, as in other provinces, the formal legal process of appointing a deputy minister is by Order in Council (OIC). Again, purely formalistically, this is to say the premier, in consultation with the Cabinet secretary, makes the appointments. In recent years, the process has become rather different: the Cabinet Office deputy minister responsible for executive recruitment and development (see Centre for Leadership and Learning 2006) undertakes recruitment on behalf of the Cabinet Secretary and then a recommendation is made to the premier by the secretary of Cabinet. On average, Ontario deputies are appointed for a term of three years, subject to renewal. However, the duration of an appointment may vary for a range of situational reasons (Ontario, Cabinet Office 2007). Neither the formalities embedded in the legislation nor the appointment process fully expresses the complexity of the role of deputy minister in terms of duties, relationships, and accountabilities. Below we explore these dimensions with a view to painting a much more complete and nuanced portrait of the Ontario deputy minister cadre. A Brief Profile of Ontario’s Deputy Ministers: Past and Present In the autumn of 2007, the Ontario Cabinet Office administered a brief survey to former and current deputy ministers (current as of 1 December 2006) on behalf of the Ontario study team. Ninety surveys were returned, and of this number, sixty-two responses were from former deputy ministers no longer working in the Ontario Public Service, while the remaining twenty-eight were from active deputy ministers. Obviously, this was not a random nor in any way a scientifically drawn sample. Therefore data from this survey cannot be drawn upon to arrive at generalizations about the entire population of former and current

152 Bryan M. Evans, Janet M. Lum, and Duncan MacLellan Figure 6.1. Gender – Current vs Previous DMs

0.66 Male 0.61

0.34

Previous DMs

Female 0.39

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

Current DMs

0.5

0.6

0.7

Ontario deputy ministers. Nevertheless, of those who chose to respond, the data provide interesting insights into the respondent population. What is most striking is how similar the two populations (former and current) are in gender composition, education, fields of study, average age at the time of first deputy minister (DM) appointment, employment by sector prior to first Ontario DM appointment, and the number of DM assignments held in the course of a deputy minister’s career. The notable departure is with what appears to be an increase in the number of current deputy ministers recruited to their first DM position from outside the Ontario Public Service. In gender composition, there was a consistent bias towards the recruitment of male deputies (see figure 6.1). Among the serving deputy cohort (as of 1 December 2006), seventeen (61 per cent) were male. While this still marks some modest progress, as measured against the former deputy cohort, of whom forty-one (66 per cent) were male, on balance the ratio was consistent with previous studies of public service executives. Evans, Lum, and Shields (2007) found a similar distribution in their 2006 survey of federal, provincial, and territorial assistant deputy ministers and deputy ministers, where 66 per cent of this cadre of “public service elites” were male. Women indeed remained underrepresented in the executive ranks of the Ontario Public Service but strides towards greater equity were evident, given that prior to 1975, women were very nearly “completely absent from the senior public service” (Bourgault 2005, 3). It should be noted, however, that between 1995 and 2007, two of the three Cabinet secretaries were female.

Ontario’s Deputy Ministers 153

At the time of first appointment, perhaps counter-intuitively, Ontario’s deputy ministers had become somewhat older. The average age upon first appointment of our sample of former DM respondents was 47.1, while that for the current cohort was 48.7 years. Turning to educational background, it is fair to conclude that Ontario’s deputy ministers were a highly accomplished group. Again, in comparing the current and former cohorts of respondents, there were no dramatic differences between them (see figure 6.2). All respondents, save a single former deputy, held a degree or diploma. A majority in both cohorts held postgraduate degrees (60 per cent of current and 64 per cent of former DMs). In this respect, compared to the post-secondary educational achievement of the Canadian adult population, Ontario’s deputy ministers stood out as an intellectual elite. Approximately 20 per cent of Canadians twenty-five years of age and older held an undergraduate degree and about 6 per cent some form of post-graduate credential (Statistics Canada 2003, 2). One would assume, given the centrality of law in public policy work, that law degrees would be a virtual necessity for rising to the rank of deputy minister, but this assumption was not borne out in our sample, as noted in figure 6.2, where three current deputies (11 per cent) and nine former deputies (15 per cent) possessed law degrees. In fact, as figure 6.3 demonstrates, Ontario’s deputy ministers demonstrated significant disciplinary pluralism, as measured by the diversity

Figure 6.2. Education – Current vs Previous DMs 0.21

Undergraduate degree/diploma

0.29

0.54

Graduate degree

0.46

0.15

Law

0.11 Previous DMs 0.1

PhD

Current DMs

0.14 0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

154 Bryan M. Evans, Janet M. Lum, and Duncan MacLellan Figure 6.3. Field of Study – Current vs Previous DMs

Other

Social sciences

Public administration/poli sci

Previous DMs

Justice

Current DMs Health/sciences

Business/economics 0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

0.3

of academic fields represented. Among former and current DMs, no single disciplinary background predominated. The three most common areas of study among former deputies were business/economics (24 per cent), public administration/political science (17 per cent), and law (16 per cent). For current deputies, a shi in rankings was discernible, where public administration/political science was the most widely held academic background (26 per cent), followed by health/natural sciences (19 per cent), and then social sciences (19 per cent). Clearly, in Ontario, a generalist academic preparation was still valued. Whereas Michael Pusey saw the recruitment of an increasing number of senior executives with business and economics degrees as an indicator of a shi towards a “New Right” policy perspective within the Australian federal government, no such trend was demonstrable in Ontario (Pusey 1991, 59–64). In addition to academic training, and perhaps more importantly, our data point to the value of professional experience prior to first deputy rank appointment. In particular, our results suggest that inside knowledge of the decision-making processes and delivery of Ontario public policies and programs was a critical consideration in the recruitment

Ontario’s Deputy Ministers 155

and appointment of deputy ministers. Among both former and current deputies, a significant requisite for appointment to one’s first deputy position was experience within the Ontario Public Service. Fully 68 per cent of former deputies were appointed to their first deputy post from within the OPS. There is a noticeable, if not dramatic, decline in this pa ern of internal recruitment among the current deputy cohort to 57 per cent (see figure 6.4). However, given the small numbers in our sample group, it is impossible to infer that this represents a conscious effort towards greater external recruitment. The second-largest source of deputy rank recruits was from Ontario’s broader public sector (BPS), composed of municipalities, universities, boards of education, hospitals, and allied institutions. Among the former deputy cohort, 22 per cent came from the BPS, a proportion that compares favourably to the 25 per cent of current deputies who shared this pre-deputy appointment experience. Recruitment from the private sector among both cohorts was rather modest. Only 6 per cent of former deputies and 11 per cent of current deputies came into the Ontario government via the for-profit sector. The numbers are small, four and three respectively, and, as such, do not suggest a strategy of populating the upper echelons of the Ontario Public Service with individuals with prior experience in the market sector. Figure 6.4. Employment Prior to DM Appointment – Current vs Previous DMs

Other province

0.04 Previous DMs

0.06 0.11

Private sector

Current DMs

0.06 0.07

Municipal

0.68

Internal OPS position

0.57 0.03 0.04

Federal

0.16 0.18

Broader public sector 0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

156 Bryan M. Evans, Janet M. Lum, and Duncan MacLellan

Career Pathways of Ontario’s Deputy Ministers, 1971–2007 Building a profile of Ontario’s deputy ministers as a cadre, an aggregate occupational group, over a significant period of time has not, to our knowledge, been previously done. We were interested in seeing if any distinct pa erns emerged within several categories: length of DM career, gender, premiership, ADM-level central agency experience, policy cluster experience, experience in politically very important ministries, and appointments to DM rank from positions outside the Ontario Public Service. Given the uneven collection and documentation of the backgrounds and career trajectories of Ontario’s deputy ministers, whether in the possession of Ontario’s Cabinet Office or the Ontario Archives, the research team turned to government of Ontario telephone directories as a source of data. For a review of this study’s limitations, refer to the methodology section at the end of this chapter. Of the 197 deputy ministers tracked in this study, some deputy minister careers began during the premiership of Leslie Frost (1949–61). As long as a career extended into the premiership of Bill Davis, these deputy ministers were included in the database. The Duration of Deputy Minister Careers The survey data gathered for this project by Ontario’s Cabinet Office indicate that former deputies served an average of 5.9 years or 70.8 months. This is based on the responses of sixty-two former deputies but is not disaggregated by gender or premiership. The other data set collected from the Ontario government telephone directories indicates a shorter tenure. A review of the data suggests that the length of a career as an Ontario deputy varied by gender, irrespective of external appointment or government in which one served. The data reflect the entire scope of this study from 1971 to 2007, including 197 individual cases, with the average mean length of a deputy’s career across the entire cohort lasting 57.88 months (see figure 6.5). Interestingly, a significant difference in the career duration of male and female deputies is evident. For males, the mean was 60.36 months, while for females it was 48.14 months. This may, in part, be explained by the historic scope of this study, which captures a large number of deputies from an era when the ranks were homogeneously male, and many of these individuals retired well within the frame of this study, which

Ontario’s Deputy Ministers 157 Figure 6.5. DMs Who Ended Their Career, by Premiership/Term (N = 170) 29

McGuinty 1st (n = 29) 10

Harris 2nd (n = 10) Harris 1st (n = 13)

13

Rae 1st (n = 42)

42

Peterson 2nd (n = 11)

11 11

Peterson 1st (n = 11)

19

Davis 4th (n = 19) 12

Davis 3rd (n = 12) 3

Davis 2nd (n = 3)

20

Davis 1st (n = 20) 0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

is prior to 2008. Alternatively, female deputies appeared in noticeable, if not significant numbers only in the late 1980s and the two subsequent decades. Some of these individuals, especially those appointed in Premier Dalton McGuinty’s first term (2003–7), have yet to retire from the public service. Another noticeable difference in career duration can be found in whether the appointment to a first deputy assignment was made external to the Ontario Public Service. That is to say, the individual appointed came from a position outside the Ontario Public Service. Such externally appointed deputies enjoyed a career duration mean of 50.19 months. This was distinctly shorter, compared to the career duration mean of 57.88 months for the total cohort and 60.00 months for internal appointees. To speculate on why this was the case, it may be that these deputies had somewhat greater opportunity to return to a non-public service position. In doing so, comparatively, they shortened the length of their tenure as deputy minister. There is also rather interesting variation by premiership/government and within, based on which premier appointed the deputy, and within which premiership the deputy decided to retire (or at least leave the position of deputy minister). The data raise a question about the deputy–premier/government relationship and specifically, the durability/stability of a premiership and/or government. Bill Davis became leader of the Ontario Progressive Conservative Party and thus premier in 1971, culminating the legacy of a preceding

158 Bryan M. Evans, Janet M. Lum, and Duncan MacLellan

twenty-six years of unbroken Conservative majority governments stretching back to 1945 (the Conservatives came to power in 1943, but as a minority). Davis remained premier for the next fourteen years. The longevity of both Davis’s party leadership and his premiership of Ontario positioned him as an outlier, compared to both the more modest longevity of successor premiers and their political party leadership. The long and politically stable years of Progressive Conservative government, and Davis’s own tenure as premier, produced a comparatively stable deputy minister cadre. The mean for deputies who concluded their career within Davis’s four terms of premiership was 66.41 months. This is based on the career duration of the fi y-four deputies who took their leave at some point while Davis was premier. Similarly, the fi y-six deputies appointed by Davis enjoyed a mean tenure of 62.73 months. Such longevity would not be seen again, though some would be close. In Davis’s fourth and final term as Ontario premier, nineteen deputies le the public service. A further five also did so during the short-lived premiership of Frank Miller. There was some escalation in departures of deputy ministers as Davis’s own political career was concluding and the Progressive Conservative party’s time in government was coming to a close. No doubt this pa ern might have been due to mature careers simply coming to an end; however, it may also indicate some apprehension among deputies. This view is purely speculative with respect to what political change, of any sort, may mean for deputy minister careers. In 1985 the Tory dynasty came to an end, thus lending some credence to the speculative proposition that this movement had, at least in part, a political motivation. However, the short career tenure of deputies who departed during Peterson’s five years in the Premier’s Office resulted in a mean of 45.55 months for the twenty-two deputies who le government service. One interpretation of this finding is that a number of Davis-era deputy appointees, especially from Davis’s fourth term and Miller’s brief premiership, decided to or were required to leave. The most dramatic number of deputy departures occurred during Bob Rae’s premiership, during which forty-two deputies exited. The mean tenure of this cohort was 56.11 months at the deputy rank, which is certainly not markedly different from the total DM cohort mean of 57.88 months. The controversy surrounding the Rae government’s

Ontario’s Deputy Ministers 159

relationship with the senior public service, discussed below, and specifically the charge of politicization, may well have been a significant factor in this rather extraordinary series of departures. An additional motivating factor might have been the expectation that the Rae government would not be returned to government. Also, it is noteworthy that deputies appointed by Premier Rae had careers of 39.70 months (mean), while deputies appointed by Davis (62.73 months), Peterson (52.67 months), and Harris (57.55 months) all had significantly longer careers. The interesting exception here are the deputies appointed in McGuinty’s first term (31.60 months). While much was made of the “house-cleaning” of deputy ranks when Harris and his “Common Sense revolutionaries” ascended to power in Ontario 1995, only twenty-three deputies appear to have ended their OPS career in Harris’s seven years as premier. Seven of those departures (Thea Herman, Jay Kaufman, Michael Mendelson, Rosemary Proctor, Jeff Rose, James Thomas, and Grant Wedge) were politically motivated terminations (Rusk 1995). The mean career duration of deputies who le during Harris’s premiership was a comparatively lengthy 59.81 months. The twenty-nine deputies appointed by Harris had mean careers of 57.55 months. This tenure is rather lengthy, especially in comparison to Rae (39.7) and McGuinty (31.6). From the career-duration data, several hypotheses can be advanced. First, a stable political context defined as a multi-term, majority government does contribute to a more enduring deputy minister cadre. Second, new governments, defined as a change in governing party, tend towards shorter deputy careers. This was certainly true for Rae and McGuinty and to a lesser degree Peterson. The Harris premiership was something of an exception, because deputy careers were rather lengthy. Explaining this may be the very rapid move to terminate a handful of deputies who were, rightly or wrongly, perceived as too close to the defeated NDP government and the appointment of veteran public servant Rita Burak as the new Cabinet secretary. A third factor may well be that Harris won two consecutive majority governments. The Issue of Deputy Minister “Churning” Donald Savoie, writing about federal deputy ministers, observes, “Mobility in the senior ranks of the civil service is now highly valued … Mobility has its advantages … but it also has disadvantages, since highly

160 Bryan M. Evans, Janet M. Lum, and Duncan MacLellan

mobile officials will not be very familiar with the various departments or sectors they pass through … The thinking was that if one had the necessary policy and administrative skills, then one should be able to apply them anywhere” (Savoie 2008, 224). Several interviews with former Ontario deputy ministers cited below refer to a time when deputies were akin to village chie ains or medieval barons who governed their sectors for extended periods of time and, in the process, accumulated significant political capital and specific and detailed knowledge of their policy and program field. The criticisms of “churning” are that its transient nature contributes to organizational instability; it offers insufficient on-the-job time to acquire in-depth understanding and knowledge of the field; and deputies knowing their tenure will be short will not commit to projects that lead to the longer-term success of their organization. Côté and Holland (2007) counter this contention and instead argue that such views “have generally been founded more upon perceived wisdom than empirical fact. There is li le evidence of the actual amount of turnover at the deputy level in recent years” (4). The data assembled here point towards, at least in the Ontario case, supporting Côté and Holland. In fact, overwhelmingly, the typical Ontario deputy minister would have one and perhaps two appointments at the deputy level during the course of his or her career. Of the 197 deputies tracked here, 60.4 per cent appear to have had only one deputy appointment. Those with two appointments numbered 25.4 per cent. Obviously deputies with three or more appointments were relatively few and made up 14.2 per cent or twenty-eight individuals within the data set (see figure 6.6). Nevertheless, several former deputy ministers expressed concerns with the mobility of deputy ministers. A former Peterson-appointed deputy said, “One of the major handicaps was the high turnover and the short term that deputy ministers served. I do think that there is a happy medium between one of my predecessors who served thirteen years as deputy versus some who served ten to sixteen months” (interview 5 June 2008). A colleague appointed by Premier Harris understood the job as too demanding to be held for an extended period of time. The general view among deputies was that this is “not a job that anyone does for decades. It’s a job you do for half-dozen years … Then you do something else. In that sense it is expected that there is going to be turnover” (interview 8 April 2008).

Ontario’s Deputy Ministers 161 Figure 6.6. Number of DM Appointments, by Premier 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 Davis

Peterson

Rae

Harris

McGuinty

1 appointment

2 appointments

3 appointments

4 appointments

5 appointments

6 or more appointments

External Appointments: Signalling a Trend towards Politicization? For Whitehall scholar Peter Hennessey, the expanding role of external policy advice has produced “an era when the Armani-clad minds in the penumbra of fad-and-fashion-prone private think tanks can be preferred (especially if their advice comes gi -wrapped and suitably politically tinted) to that more sober, sometimes inconvenient fare served up by the tweed-clad minds in the career bureaucracy” (2002, 4–5). External advice and approaches to management are also obtained through the appointment of candidates from outside the public service over candidates who are career “veterans.” Of the 197 deputies tracked in this study, it was possible to identify forty-four individuals (22.3 per cent of the total) who were appointed to the rank of deputy from a position held outside the Ontario Public Service (see figure 6.7). This count is likely on the conservative side, because data were assembled by consulting with veteran former deputy ministers and asking if they could identify persons who qualified as external appointments. The margin for error in such a process is significant, especially as we moved further back historically. For example, data provided by the Cabinet Office on former deputy ministers identified twenty individuals (from a data set of sixty-two), nearly onethird of the total, as being recruited from positions external to the OPS.

162 Bryan M. Evans, Janet M. Lum, and Duncan MacLellan Figure 6.7. External Appointments (All DMs)

22.3

77.7

8% appointments external to Ontario public service (n = 44) % remaining

The data are also imperfect, as they were based on a survey distributed to a limited collection of former deputies where contact information was available. Recognizing the limitation of our data, there are still several interesting pa erns suggesting, as one former deputy did, that a relatively new trend towards external appointments, rather than churning, was a more significant development in the recruitment and composition of Ontario’s deputy minister cadre. In terms of gender, external appointees were disproportionately males who composed 81.8 per cent of the data subset. That in itself may not be very significant, given that the entire DM cohort covered here is 78 per cent male. Moreover, all external appointments of women took place in the post-Davis Conservative era; however, there was no distinct pa ern (given the small number of female appointments, this is not surprising) among the Peterson, Rae, Harris, and McGuinty premierships (see figure 6.8). The Peterson premiership marked a shi towards external recruitment to the deputy minister ranks, as well as a focus on equity and building a more representative public service. What can be determined, on the basis of our collected data and corroboration from former deputies, is that Davis, in fourteen years as premier, appointed six deputies from careers outside the public service. He appointed three in the course of his fourth term (1981–5), or 15.8 per cent of all deputy appointments made for that period. With the end of Davis’s Progressive Conservative government in 1985, and the assent of David Peterson to the Premier’s Office, our data suggest a significant shi in the number

Ontario’s Deputy Ministers 163 Figure 6.8. Externally Appointed DMs Who Started Their Career, by Premiership and Term McGunity 1st (n = 12)

42.9%

Harris 2nd (n = 2)

27.6%

Harris 1st (n = 6) Rae 1st (n = 5)

20.8%

Peterson 2nd (n = 11)

32.0%

Peterson 1st (n = 7) Davis 4th (n = 3) Davis 3rd (n = 1)

32.0%

Davis 2nd (n = 0) Davis 1st (n = 2) 0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

and proportion of appointed persons from outside the public service to the deputy ranks. In his five years as premier, Peterson made eighteen external appointments to Ontario’s deputy ranks. Interestingly, more than half of his deputy appointments came from outside the public service (in his first term, 53.8 per cent of appointments were externals and in his second 50.0 per cent). In comparison to Davis, this represents a remarkable shi in executive recruitment practice; however, there may have been a causal relationship between the end of more than four decades of Progressive Conservative government and Peterson’s effort to “renew” the senior ranks of the OPS. Our data indicate that subsequent Ontario governments led by Rae and Harris marked a return to internal recruitment. Notwithstanding allegations of politicization, Rae made only five such appointments in a period of time comparable to that of Peterson. These represented 20.8 per cent of all new deputies appointed under Rae. Given that forty-two deputies appear to have ended their OPS careers during Rae’s premiership, this is rather counter-intuitive, given the opportunities presented to recruit a significant number of external political allies. At the other end of the political spectrum, Mike Harris’s Progressive Conservative party election manifesto stated, “Our political system has become captive to special interests. It is full of people who are afraid to face the difficult issues, or even talk about them. It is full of people who are

164 Bryan M. Evans, Janet M. Lum, and Duncan MacLellan

doing too well as a result of the status quo” (Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario 1994, 2). Yet the Harris government was largely comfortable with the appointment of internal OPS candidates to the deputy ranks. In total, only eight external appointments were made by Premier Harris over a seven-year period. However, it must be noted six of these appointments did occur in his controversial and tumultuous first term, thus representing fully one-third of all new deputy appointments made at that time. In Dalton McGuinty’s first term, twelve deputies were recruited from outside the Ontario Public Service, representing more than 42 per cent of all new deputy ministers. Given that twenty-nine deputies le the OPS during McGuinty’s first term, there was obvious opportunity to look to external talent to fill vacancies. In this respect, the McGuinty government marks a significant departure from a general pa ern of internal recruitment of executives. Gender Bias in the Upper Echelons of the Ontario Public Service Looking at the gender dimension of the Ontario deputy cohort for the thirty-six years covered for this study, as an aggregate, it is clear that to be an Ontario deputy minister was equated with being male (see figure 6.9). Not until 1974 did Ontario, and indeed Canada, witness the appointment of a woman, Dorothea Cri enden, to the rank of deputy minister. Of course, such a statement does not take into consideration profound social changes, in this case, the entry of women into the labour force and professions, especially in the 1960s and 1970s. These shi s resulted in consequent political pressure being exerted that would see greater effort invested in developing and supporting female public management talent and potential. The premiership of David Peterson saw the first concerted effort in the history of Ontario’s public service to promote women into senior management. His government’s effort to advance women marked a watershed, as every premier/government to follow would continue to make the senior ranks more representative, at least in gender; however, gender equality remained rather distant (see figure 6.10). Of the thirty-five deputy appointments Peterson made in his five years as premier, six were women. NDP Premier Bob Rae followed by appointing twelve women, who accounted for 50 per cent of new deputy minister appointments made during Rae’s single-term government. Next, “Common Sense revolutionary” Mike Harris appointed nine female deputy ministers from a total of twenty-nine new deputy

Ontario’s Deputy Ministers 165 Figure 6.9. Ontario Deputy Ministers, by Sex (Total DM Cohort 1971–2007)

21.3 % males (n = 155) % females (n = 42) 78.7

Figure 6.10. First DM Appointment, by Premiership/Term and Sex McGuinty 1st (n = 11)

39.3% Female

Harris 2nd (n = 3) 31.0%

Harris 1st (n = 6) Rae 1st (n = 12)

Male

50.0%

Peterson 2nd (n = 5)

17.1%

Peterson 1st (n = 1) Davis 4th (n = 0) Davis 3rd (n = 0) 1.8%

Davis 2nd (n = 0) Davis 1st (n = 1) 0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

* Miller appointed 1 and Eves appointed 2 female deputies. Note: N = female DMs

appointments. To round out the list, in his first term as premier, Dalton McGuinty appointed eleven women from twenty-eight new deputy appointments. As noted above, the Peterson era was one where women came to be be er represented in the deputy ranks. From Peterson’s second term onward, the data subset suggests that women composed no fewer

166 Bryan M. Evans, Janet M. Lum, and Duncan MacLellan

than 22.7 per cent of all new deputy appointments made by a premier and as many as 50 per cent. While parity, as Evans, Lum, and Shields (2007, 614) concluded in their study of Canadian public service elites, is still to be achieved, significant progress was made within a relatively short time. While Peterson and Rae pioneered these efforts to advance women into leadership, the practice was maintained by Premier Harris, who appointed women to one-quarter to one-third of all new/vacant deputy positions. Apprenticing with a Central Agency: Pre-Deputy Appointment Experience In our data set, forty-six deputy ministers served, at an earlier point in their careers, as assistant deputy ministers (ADM) in a central agency (Cabinet Office, Ministry of Finance, Management Board Secretariat / Treasury Board, and A orney General). The data also suggest that for women, obtaining valuable executive experience as an assistant deputy minister in a central agency is an important stepping stone towards becoming a deputy minister. While this is not an essential career development phase, it is more significant for women than for men (see figure 6.11). For Ontario’s deputy ministers generally, regardless of si ing premier or governing party, there is a certain advantage to having spent some time in a central agency as an ADM. Clearly having served as a central agency ADM is not a prerequisite to advancement into the DM ranks; however, the proportion of first-time appointments with such experience on a résumé indicates a certain currency. While the granularity of our data does not lend itself to revealing precisely where the advantage of this experience is to be found, public servants know that working in a central agency provides an incumbent with an opportunity to expand networks within the public service, and in so doing raise their profile and draw a ention to themselves. Given the horizontal and coordinative role of such work, one’s personal profile is raised among the deputy cadre and to those senior officials who decide on deputy rank appointments – the Cabinet secretary and the premier. Of Premier Davis’s appointments to first-time deputy positions, fully 25 per cent had served in a central agency. For Peterson, slightly more than 17 per cent of his first-time deputy appointments had such experience. Premiers Rae (33.3 per cent), Harris (27.6 per cent) and McGuinty (25.0 per cent) turned to central agency ADMs to fill from one-quarter to one-third of their vacant deputy seats (see figure 6.12).

Ontario’s Deputy Ministers 167 Figure 6.11. DMs with Central Agency ADM Experience, by Sex (1997–2007) 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 33.3

0.15 20.6

0.11 0.05 0

Male (n = 32)

Female (n = 14)

Figure 6.12. DMs with Central Agency Experience Who Started Their Career, by Premiership McGuinty (n = 7)

Harris (n = 8)

Rae (n = 8)

Peterson (n = 6)

Davis (n = 14)

0%

10% *

20%

30%

40%

Were appointed by that premier

Central Themes in the Careers of Ontario’s Deputy Ministers: A Comparative Periodization As noted earlier, a mix of methods was employed to construct a portrait of Ontario’s deputy minister cadre. The Cabinet Office–administered survey, the results of which are presented earlier, provided data allowing a comparison of former and active deputy ministers. This exercise,

168 Bryan M. Evans, Janet M. Lum, and Duncan MacLellan

while providing a unique snapshot, is clearly static and limited in the conclusions that can be drawn. The semi-structured interviews with twenty-two former and current Ontario deputies provided necessary details that were nuanced by exploring several broad themes including but not limited to roles and responsibilities of deputy minister; management of relations with central agencies and ministers and minister’s offices; politicization of the public service; centralization of decision-making; horizontal management; and “churning.” Conducted as part of this study, these twentytwo qualitative interviews with former deputy ministers, whose careers spanned the premierships of Davis, Miller, Peterson, Rae, Harris, Eves, and McGuinty, provided rich insights into the complexity of roles and functions inherent to the positions as well as their evolution in the context of significant and comparatively frequent change. Their experientially based narratives correspond to what much of the literature on deputy ministers indicates. Of course, both interviews and literature reflect the formal roles and functions established in the various iterations of the Public Service Act but also go well beyond these limited formulations. Roles and Functions of Deputy Ministers: The Forward March of Managerialism R.M. Burns wrote that the “role of the Deputy Minister is not easily defined for what it turns out to be depends much on what each man [or woman: authors’ notes] brings to it” (1961, 357). Burns adopted a highly individualized reading of the role of the deputy (and his reference point is that of the deputy minister in the federal government) that assumes a significant degree of deputy autonomy to choose to perform the role she or he sees as most appropriate. This perspective perhaps reflects a period of state-building grandeur, at least in the federal context. The 1960s and 1970s were decades, whether in O awa, Queen’s Park, or elsewhere, where those of the deputy rank were regarded as “mandarins” as a result of their detailed knowledge of policies, programs, and stakeholders within their policy sector. In the Ontario context, one Davis-era deputy minister observed, “In the early 70s, deputies were powerful people because there wasn’t a bloody thing they did not know … I can’t recall a conversation, with ministers present, where you didn’t hear one of them say, ‘I will have to check with my deputy.’ Not the other way, where the deputy would say he would check with the

Ontario’s Deputy Ministers 169

minister” (Interview 12 June 2008). The deference of ministers to deputies referenced here may well have been the foundation for a period of deputy autonomy. But certainly other factors shaped the roles and responsibilities of Ontario deputy ministers. Almost four decades ago, Kernaghan observed that “the issue of executive manpower intertwines with all the major public policy questions” (1975, 1). He acknowledged the complexity of the role and further understood it as working at numerous levels and requiring a broad range of skills. Kernaghan was not particularly precise in enumerating what such skills are. He referred to a “managerial mind and bent,” “envisioning the future,” and a “knowledge and skills base to be identified” (53). However, given the strategic and positional importance of deputy ministers, Kernaghan, like Pusey (1991), correctly linked “executive manpower,” the “switch,” with public policy. The welfare state–building decade of the 1960s resulted in a more complex ecology of public institutions, programs, interests, and politics. Within this context, concerns arose that the demands of managing this complexity, including pressures to engage with and manage client/ stakeholder relations, distracted and detracted from the deputy’s traditional policy role (Burns 1961, 361). The demands of managing large public institutions charged with delivering essential public services created a fault line between an emerging “public management” and Greaves’s classical view of the deputy minister role where “he is primarily concerned with the making of policy and policy should not wait upon events” (1947, 48). Within the context of rapid expansion in welfare state functions and hence public expenditures, Premier Robarts “had become increasingly concerned that the existing organization of the government was unable to deal with complex planning that a large multi-faceted government in the 1970s was going to have to do.” Robarts identified the problem as “too li le co-ordination, too much vertical structure in the government, not enough horizontal communication and too much reliance by Minister on the thinking of senior civil servants” (Manthorpe 1974, 217). Hodge s framed this as a paradox where responsible government required the integration of appointed senior public servants and politicians but concurrently, the post-war welfare state brought the work of public administrators into direct contact with citizens (Hodge s 1995, 471). Interviews with former Ontario deputy ministers and government documents indicate that Ontario’s deputies, as a cadre, have seen their

170 Bryan M. Evans, Janet M. Lum, and Duncan MacLellan

roles evolve in response to this growing complexity, whether defined by political or economic considerations. Indeed, management concerns have risen in importance, but policy advisory functions have not been totally supplanted as a result. Instead, former deputies observed an incremental rebalancing of their roles and functions. Davis Era, 1971–1985 Ed Stewart, who combined his duties as Cabinet secretary and principal secretary to Premier Bill Davis, understood the responsibilities of deputy ministers in a manner not dramatically different from those expressed in the Public Service Act. In Stewart’s view, DMs have three core responsibilities. First, they are the “administrative heads of their ministries,” responsible for ensuring the effective and efficient management of their organizations and implementation of policy decisions. Second, they must ensure the minister is kept informed and receives quality policy advice. Third, they must integrate government operations by “ensuring effective relationships between and among operating ministries with common interests and between operating ministries and the central agencies” (Stewart 1989, 43). This third dimension, without using the term, refers to improving horizontality, a theme that emerged in the work of the Commi ee on Government Productivity (COGP) in the early 1970s and then became more significant in the 1980s. Horizontality, of which more is said below, emerged as a central issue in response to the expansion of the post-war public sector noted by Kernaghan earlier, and is concerned with how to improve acrossgovernment coordination. In many respects, Stewart’s dual role symbolized the close relationship between Ontario’s long-ruling Progressive Conservative political leadership and those occupying the most senior positions within the Ontario administrative state. Stewart’s appointment essentially fused the Cabinet Office and the Premier’s Office. For several Davis-era deputies, all contemporaries of Stewart, this depth of comfort between public service and political leaders found expression in the substantial latitude granted to deputies in shaping policy. One recalled the “ministers in those days looked to the bureaucracy for policy advice. Deputies were intimately engaged in policy, that was the job, and there was no interference from the minister or staff ” (interview 31 July 2008). Stewart a ributed this to the unique durability of Ontario’s Progressive Conservatives. Forty-two years of one-party government, he explained,

Ontario’s Deputy Ministers 171

forged a relationship “between and among members of cabinet, senior public servants, the premier and indeed, some of his outside advisers,” and in this the public service–political relationship was “very different from that which has transpired with subsequent regimes” (Evans 2008, 131). Stewart’s predecessor as Cabinet secretary, James Fleck (1974–6), also demonstrated the depth of integration between the worlds of the senior public service and political leadership at the very apex of the Ontario state. Prior to being appointed Cabinet secretary, Fleck served as chief of staff in the Premier’s Office. His status was technically that of an Ontario public servant, as he had been recruited to that position from within the public service and the work of the COGP in particular. However, Conservative Party backbenchers were “appalled that when five parliamentary assistants were appointed … it was not Mr Davis who called them into his office and told them of their new jobs. It was James Fleck” (Manthorpe 1972, 8). Three fundamental functions – recommending policy, identifying priorities, and determining directions – are named as central roles of the Davis-era deputy; however, they was not to the exclusion of other roles. In addition, while policy development was acknowledged as a function “shared with the political level,” policy implementation was singled out as the sole responsibility of the deputy. This policy role of the deputy was highly respected by the political leadership of the day. The deputy–minister/Cabinet relationship, in this regard, was symbiotic where the input of deputies was not only essential but deferred to: They wanted the deputy minister involved, they valued your advice, you, as a deputy, had a place at the table that was significant. When Bill Davis put together a commi ee of ministers and deputies, he was looking for advice. He would look to deputies like Ian MacDonald and Rendall Dick for advice. He valued their advice, and the ministers around the table knew be er than to say they thought advice coming from high-calibre deputies was dumb. They recognized that Davis was really looking to these people for an independent, non-political source of advice and so there was a collegiality there … They had a real desire to have the public service be policy initiators. (Interview 10 September 2008)

According to this same former deputy, Premier Davis was not ideological, and it was his pragmatism that gave significant latitude to

172 Bryan M. Evans, Janet M. Lum, and Duncan MacLellan

deputies and ministers to place items on the policy agenda, and consequently “during the Davis years policy sort of bubbled up” (interview 10 September 2008). In the early 1980s, more than policy was bubbling up as a discernible interest in developing a more professional management cadre emerged. First, a deputy ministers’ commi ee noted that it was necessary to identify “individuals with executive potential,” and that potential required more systematic development. Consequently “a program of corporate management development courses, aimed primarily at individuals who have not yet achieved executive status but also open to executives who wish to keep abreast of developments in the management field,” was implemented. Second, as computer technology entered the public service, its applicability, potential benefits, and possible risks required that deputies and assistant deputies become more familiar with this new technology. Third, it was acknowledged that it was necessary to “create greater mutual understanding” between elected politicians and the senior public service (Ontario Civil Service Commission 1983, 18). In January 1985, just as the Davis premiership was ending and that of Frank Miller was beginning, a consultant’s report provided a much broader account of the variety of roles deputy ministers performed in Ontario, at least in the mid-1980s: “The deputy is expected to be a highly competent policy adviser, an effective crisis manager and a sound overall executive. Moreover, the responsibilities of a deputy minister must be carried out in an intense and demanding environment – an environment that subjects incumbents to a high degree of public scrutiny, demands immediate and informed responsiveness and puts personal leadership to the fullest test” (Price Waterhouse Associates and the Canada Consulting Group 1985, 40). The responsibilities and lines of authority for deputy ministers are here further identified as, of course, providing policy advice, but refined to include supporting ministers in answering for their responsibilities, responding to and carrying out government-wide interests with respect to the portfolio, and managing the ministry (Price Waterhouse Associates and the Canada Consulting Group 1985, 41–2). For Ontario’s deputy ministers, the Davis era, characterized by one former deputy as the era of the “deputy as guru” (interview 22 May 2008), was a golden age, at least in their eminent role in the policy process. The rapid expansion of social programs such as the Canada Assistance Plan, the Canada Pension Plan, and medicare required

Ontario’s Deputy Ministers 173

a complete transformation of the deputy minister: “The government wanted people with analytical skills, who had knowledge of these new, big programs and who could offer critical advice. The deputy minister was now someone who could grasp these big and new policy trends and translate them into programs for the government” (interview 22 May 2008). These high-water years of province-building required certain skills and capacities to manage this process effectively. In addition, the longevity of the Ontario Progressive Conservatives in government contributed to a blurring and possibly fusing of senior public service and political roles. Peterson Era, 1985–1990 David Peterson’s Liberals ascended to power in June 1985 as a result of an unprecedented policy “accord” that had been negotiated with Bob Rae’s New Democrats. For Ontario’s public service elite, this would come to mean that the “policy autonomy” that had marked the Davis period would be rebalanced in favour of the premier and his ministers. Signalling a change in the relationship and roles of ministers and deputies, Peterson took the unusual step of discussing his government’s policy agenda with deputies he appointed (Plumptre 1987, 379). Peterson’s Liberals were primarily concerned with policy, so the Davis-era institutional framework remained largely intact. The COGP’s legacy of policy secretariats was dismantled and the Cabinet Office, which had under Davis come to be intimately integrated with the Premier’s Office, was separated from it (Lindquist and White 1994). Yet, as White contends, this “structural stability” was deceiving, as the two years of the accord with the NDP were marked by major policy innovations such as pay equity, the ban on extra billing, and labour law reform, among other initiatives. This short period ushered in a high level of intense activism for the Ontario state (White 2002, 20). Furthermore, while the accord provided a common program to keep the Ontario government from falling, politically it was also important that all of the hard policy choices were made at the very beginning of the term of the new government (Gagnon 1992, 47). Beyond these discrete items, the Peterson government “wanted to restructure Ontario’s industrial base to meet high-tech competition on world markets, plan for an aging society, check rising health care costs without reducing the quality of care and improve the education system to produce the highly skilled workers needed in a postindustrial society” (31).

174 Bryan M. Evans, Janet M. Lum, and Duncan MacLellan

In short, the policy agenda was mostly set, but this also meant that the political staff would provide a much larger policy role than previously. A former deputy whose career straddled the governments of Davis and Peterson said of the new Liberal government, “When Peterson came in, there were significant changes. Because of the Liberal-NDP accord, Peterson had a blueprint that he had to implement. Ian Sco and some staffers held some very strong policy views that the public service was not expected to take a primary role in policy development.” According to this former deputy, two key factors shrank the policy role of the senior public service. First, “a very strong suspicion that most of the deputy ministers were tied to the Tory party,” and second, the “power of the policy staff in the minister’s offices” (interview 10 September 2008). Another Peterson-era deputy echoed these observations in characterizing the public service role as one of “implementation.” Policy was the purview of political staff: “Now, for the first time, the senior public service is not involved in policy at all. The policy is already there. Now you had to implement it … What the Peterson people did was import the Trudeau O awa model … Political staff became real players. With Peterson the ministers’ offices had larger staff with specific policy responsibilities. The policy role was being subsumed into the political level” (interview 22 May 2008). Not all Peterson-era deputies shared this perspective of an incrementally marginalized senior public service. One former deputy said, “The Liberal Cabinet machinery, the Cabinet subcommi ee structure, was such that the deputies still had a voice. You could speak independent of your minister” (interview 9 June 2008). A colleague from that time contended deputies were still very influential during Peterson’s premiership, despite some difficulty in the first year: There were many public servants who had been there for years of Tory government, and the Liberals were suspicious. But they came around, largely because this was not an ideological government. Peterson was Bill Davis again at one level. As soon as they concluded we were competent, they were prepared to work with us. Indeed they went a li le bit further in the Cabinet policy commi ees that existed. The week before each policy commi ee met, the deputies of that commi ee would meet to go through all the material going before the ministers that upcoming week. Peterson went so far as to invite six or seven deputies to sit as active members of the Policy and Priorities Board of Cabinet. They didn’t vote, but they had an equal say and an equal ability to speak and were treated as equals by the ministers in those meetings. (Interview 8 June 2008)

Ontario’s Deputy Ministers 175

The Peterson Liberals, in their early years, oversaw a number of reforms designed to change the culture and composition of the public service rather than its structure (White 2002). However, some of these reforms required a modicum of structural change as well. First, Peterson wanted to send a strong signal that he viewed the public service as a professional and non-partisan institution. Naturally there was some distrust of the senior ranks of the public service because the Conservatives had forty-two years in which to embed their own loyalists into the most senior positions. One anonymous senior Liberal who participated in the early days of the Peterson government acknowledged there was pressure to remove veteran deputies. “They may soon find they’re not comfortable with us, and leave, or be perfectly professional … and stay on … The bias in favour of change is powerful, particularly a er an election in which government departments were dra ed by their political masters to design successful campaign policies” (Howard 1985). That a wholesale massacre of real or imagined Tory deputy minister loyalists did not occur is supported by our deputy minister career-tracking data derived from the government of Ontario telephone directories. From these data, eleven deputies departed the Ontario Public Service in the course of Premier Peterson’s first term. According to Bob Carman, who replaced long-time Davis confidant Ed Stewart as secretary of the Cabinet to Premier Peterson, “The premier had a perception that the Secretary of Cabinet had become a li le too closely involved with the Conservative party” (Gagnon 1992, 28). To address this fusion of roles, Peterson adopted a “three-legged stool” structure at the apex of the Ontario state by redistributing roles and responsibilities in such a way that he reallocated “many of Stewart’s functions to political staff, creating an office in which three people reported to him directly: [Herschell] Ezrin, heading up policy and communications as principal secretary; [Gordon] Ashworth, running the political side and managing the offices as executive director; and Carman, in charge of the public service as cabinet secretary” (28). Having reasserted the politics-administrative dichotomy at the very centre of the Ontario state, Peterson turned to modernizing the management of the Ontario Public Service. The first public management reform initiative to emerge from the Liberal government came in October 1985, when Elinor Caplan, chair, Management Board of Cabinet, announced a review of the Ontario government human resources policy to be led by W.P. Moher. Moher was seconded to conduct this review from his executive

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development position at Imperial Oil Ltd. The review’s terms of reference expressed a rationale that contextualized human resources policy within the larger framework of globalization and intensifying competition: “The need to operate effectively in the new and increasingly competitive global economy of the Eighties has given rise to a wide range of innovative management philosophies and techniques” (Moher 1986, 36). The review proposed striking an Executive Development Commi ee (EDC), which would comprise deputy ministers and be chaired by the secretary of the Cabinet. The EDC would function as a central point for the recruitment and development of a senior managerial cadre for the Ontario Public Service. In addition, the EDC would be “concerned with corporate organization and effectiveness; succession planning for senior executive positions; development of key executive resources; executive compensation and benefits” (Moher 1986, 38). More concretely, the EDC would be responsible for the management and approval of executive appointments. In addition, creation of an Advisory Council on Executive Resources was proposed that would be composed of private sector executives, who would advise the premier on compensation and succession planning for deputy ministers. The responsibilities of this Advisory Council would include a review of data on public and private sector compensation practices and would, in addition, “review the executive development system to ensure that it: foresees the Ontario Government’s senior management requirements; provides for the early identification and development of key resources; [and] brings forward specific succession plans for key positions at the Assistant Deputy Minister and Deputy Minister levels” (38). Both the work of the Advisory Council and the EDC would be supported within the Cabinet Office by an associate secretary of Cabinet for executive resources through provision of operational and policy development capacities. This was an early expression of the centre of the Ontario state beginning to take seriously the need to develop a corporate-oriented senior management cadre. Throughout the Peterson period, elements of Moher’s recommendations surfaced as part of what may be described as the initial phase of a turn to a longer-term trend towards managerialism, which began with the work of the Robarts-Davis-era COGP. The shi towards managerialism was marked in 1987 when deputy minister compensation was modified to link it directly to the achievement of results. An annual performance agreement, effectively a contract, would identify objectives for the year, and then these would be

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assessed against results achieved at year-end. Compensation increases would be directly linked to the performance-rating resulting from the assessment (Ontario Civil Service Commission 1987, 1). Perhaps more significantly, the Peterson government began to take the promotion of women into management positions very seriously. In 1986–7, 66 women were appointed to the ranks of director, assistant deputy minister, deputy minister, or the equivalent, representing a 300 per cent increase in female appointments over the previous year. At the end of 1987, there were 103 women in the senior management rank compared to 75 the year before (Ontario Civil Service Commission 1987, 1). The process of recruiting and promoting women continued through to the end of the decade, when women composed 22 per cent of the total OPS senior management group (Ontario Civil Service Commission 1988, 1; Ontario Civil Service Commission 1989, 2). In addition, the Peterson government’s concern with employment equity was extended to include, in addition to women, persons with disabilities, Aboriginal peoples, francophones, and visible minorities (Ontario Civil Service Commission 1989, 2). While the Peterson era lasted a short five years, the deputy ministers of the time did observe several discernible shi s. Specifically, these were identified as a more politically driven and politically centred policy agenda as a result of the accord between the minority Liberals and the NDP. Also, there was greater interest in creating a more “corporate” senior management cadre through the implementation of recommendations stemming from the Moher Report. In particular, Moher’s report related directly to management education, development, and compensation programs. There was also a vigorous effort by the Peterson government to diversify the senior management ranks through employment equity. Rae Era, 1990–1995 The unexpected victory of Bob Rae’s New Democrats in September 1990 deepened fault lines between the deputy minister cadre and the political leadership that had first appeared with the end of forty-two years of one-party Conservative government in 1985. The New Democrats, veterans in both the role of opposition party and the struggle for social and economic justice, together with their trade union and social movement allies, had forged a view that “the bureaucrats were an integral part of the conservative establishment which impeded genuine reform” (Lindquist and White 1994, 283).

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A significant bond of trust between the deputy and the minister is essential to a functional working relationship between the two offices. Côté (2007) characterized deputy ministers as the “bridge between ministers and other public servants,” and it is therefore “extremely important for both sides that the DM and their Minister have a strong and trusting relationship, with clear and consistent lines of communication” (10). When trust is not present as a rule, it becomes impossible for deputies to function in their roles as policy advisors. A former deputy recalled, “In 1990, deputy ministers became thirdclass citizens. They were refused entry into Cabinet commi ee meetings, the ministers ignored them. There were some exceptions to this. The odd deputy got along quite well because they were viewed as being New Democrats. Overall career deputies were badly treated during the NDP period” (interview 10 September 2008). While it is impossible to ascribe motivation, our data do indicate that a record forty-two deputies ended their careers with the Ontario Public Service during Rae’s single five-year term (see figure 6.5). This does appear to lend at least some credence to several hypotheses including natural rates of retirement, individuals weighing their options and deciding to move on before the 1995 election, and, of course, those who felt or were compelled to leave. Again, perhaps more pointedly, we return to the subject of the appropriate role of the deputy minister vis-à-vis the minister/premier. In the period of Bob Rae’s premiership, some former deputies contended that their role in policy, while still central and indeed intact, became a more balanced, even muted, function. A prominent deputy of the time stated, “It is not a deputy’s job to determine, to make the decisions about direction … those who have the courage to run for elected office, they make those decisions. It is the bureaucracy’s job, under the direction of the deputy minister, to develop and evaluate the best ways to achieve those directions” (interview 17 April 2008). Policy implementation, in this deputy’s view, was the central function. A contemporary expressed a rather different view, where the position of deputy combined both organizational leadership and policy advisory roles and should not be concerned with operational considerations: “A deputy minister is an executive leader, not an operational leader. The deputy minister should be providing the strategic leadership of the organization in terms of how the organization is going to function,” and “one of the critical roles of the deputy is to steer the ministry’s core issues through the central decision-making apparatus, to get a major initiative through Cabinet” (interview 20 May 2008).

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How can these divergent understandings of the deputy minister, presented by Rae-era contemporaries, be reconciled? One explanation is that both characterizations are correct. Interviews and the limited literature suggest the Peterson and Rae periods were transitional in a deputy minister’s-political leadership (inclusive of political staff, ministers, and premier) relationship and functions. As many of our deputy interviewees noted, the relationship of deputy to minister o en depended upon individual personalities and capacities. However, with the New Democrat government, the deputy cadre was not universally marginalized. One group were seen to be politically close to the New Democrats, and this raised concerns over the politicization of the senior public service. One Rae-era deputy observed that there was a hierarchy of deputy ministers, where certain individuals were allowed greater influence than others: “There might have been an inner circle and an outer circle, but because I was trusted … I was involved in a lot of the inner discussions and a lot of the policy discussions … not only was I involved quite frequently with Cabinet Office but with Rae. Bob would call … I would have meetings with him, o en without my minister” (interview 10 June 2008). The result was a re-engineering of the lines of accountability that had governed the relationship between the public service and its political leadership, where certain deputies effectively would report to and receive direction from the premier. As this deputy pointed out, “At times that became problematic … O en the premier was asking me to do things, or giving me his sense of things, that was very different from the minister’s” (interview, 10 June 2008). A former Cabinet secretary, Peter Barnes, understood this as a function of a centralization of power in the Premier’s Office, and a commensurate shi towards a public service role more concerned with implementation. For Barnes it was a ma er where the “party in government said we don’t want you to think, we want you to do – the result is that policy was to be driven from the centre. I still ran the OPS and Rae accepted my recommendations. This worked until the fiscal crisis of 1992. At that point they wanted to play a role in the appointments process … Given this, I told Rae he had to replace me, and so he appointed his principal secretary, David Agnew” (interview 27 February 2004). The appointment of Agnew, director of the New Democrats’ 1990 election campaign and Rae’s principal secretary, to lead the public service, set off a wave of criticism (Globe and Mail 1992). The response to Agnew’s appointment and that of several individuals, notably Jeff

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Rose from the Canadian Union of Public Employees but also others including Michael Decter, Rosemary Proctor, James Thomas, and Jay Kaufman to the rank of deputy, became problematic, because of their close personal ties to Rae. Premier Rae answered the charge of politicization, arguing, “I think every government has done it in various ways. I don’t think it’s terribly unusual … We’ve certainly promoted a lot from within. We’ve brought in people from the outside. There’s always going to be a mixing and matching in our system … I think we need a system that allows people to come in from the outside, that encourages more movement back and forth between different sectors and that allows the government to get on with its job” (Mackie 1992). Expansion of capacity at the apex of the Ontario government – in the Premier’s Office and the Cabinet Office – resulted in “a strong shi toward policy initiatives coming from the Premier’s Office and the ministerial offices of other central agencies” (Evans 2008, 40). According to David Agnew, “There was some thought that a er a hundred years of rule by other parties, there needed to be a new capability at the center to interpret the wishes and desires of the new government” (Evans 2008, 140). The centralization of control over the policy process was broadly interpreted as a politicization of the public service. White cautions against this charge, suggesting instead that “the NDP’s record of bureaucratic appointments differed li le from that of previous governments” (2002, 23); however, the view was still one where the public service was being overtly politicized, as one deputy of the time observed: “When the NDP came in, what was the first thing they did? They fired some of the people that they considered to be people they didn’t want to have around and they brought in NDP people from Manitoba. If you weren’t on that team, you could forget it. Basically, you would have no access” (interview 9 June 2008). The institutional features of decision-making were also modified during Rae’s premiership. The deputy “shadow” commi ees that mirrored the Cabinet commi ee structure disappeared, and with them went the more formalized and structured roles that deputies performed in shaping and preparing policy to brief ministers. The dismantling of these structures, said one former deputy, was a result of the political leadership’s discomfort with “the thought that policies and options would be flowing through the deputies before they went to ministers” (interview 11 June 2008).

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Consequently, it “was le up to individual deputies with agenda items going forward to call their colleagues. There were special meetings of deputies such as inter-ministerial meeting, but these were basically at the request of the lead deputy. And these meetings didn’t go through all the agenda items before they went to Cabinet commi ee” (interview 10 June 2008). However, despite the centralization of the policy process, Ontario’s deputies continued to be present and participate in meetings of Cabinet commi ees, as distinct from their own deputy-level subcommi ees, where they made presentations and were available to answer questions: “You went whether your item was on the agenda or not. And then at a certain point, deputies were asked to leave the room. They went outside while the ministers talked about the politics of the issue, and then the deputies were invited back in and told the outcome” (interview 10 June 2008). Where Peterson had the good fortune of coming to power just as Ontario’s economy boomed, and this provided his government, at least for a few years, with ample latitude to manoeuvre and invest, Rae came into government as Ontario entered the deepest recession since the 1930s. In the wake of the 1991 budget, Rae acknowledged that the postwar arrangements were history. He wrote in his biography, “The period from 1945 on had been a time of unparalleled growth, and a culture of continuing gains and steady improvements took strong hold in those parts of the economy where trade unions had strength. The blissful security and forward motion of this world began to crumble in the mid-1970s with the oil crisis” (Rae 1996, 210–11). The government’s priority now shi ed to exert greater control over public expenditures and towards a significant program of fiscal restraint that was about to unfold. At that point, said one deputy, a discernible change took place in the relationship between the political leadership and the senior public service: “They turned to the bureaucracy in a way that they had not done before. They had to rely on them to bring substantive proposals forward. That started to change the dynamic between the political group and the deputy and ADM group. That was the issue that propelled them into working together with us” (interview 11 June 2008). At one point, all of the ministers and deputy ministers were summoned to Toronto’s Convention Centre for what has come to be known as “The Lost Weekend,” during which constraint proposals were put forward and discussed. The process was characterized as one where “ministers and deputies were actively involved in the discussion as

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to what was to be cut. We were organized by policy cluster – social, economic – there were sub–working groups, and then we met in a plenary. There was a lot of corporate-wide interaction in the NDP days, as we struggled to deal with the deficit” (interview 10 June 2008). For Ontario’s deputy ministers the early 1990s were tumultuous. A party with no government experience had come to power, the economy was entering the deepest recession since the Great Depression (up to that point), and this was the second change in governing party in five years. For senior ranks of the Ontario Public Service, this was a period of crisis that went beyond the economic and fiscal environment. Likely for the first time in Ontario’s post-war history, there was now a questioning of the role of a professional public service and its relationship to the political leadership. A rather extraordinary forty-two deputies ended their OPS careers during Rae’s premiership. While the motivations are no doubt many and complex, this number was unprecedented, suggesting a greater occurrence than simply the maturation and ending of deputy minister careers. Harris Era, 1995–2002 MacDermid and Albo noted that in the early 1980s, Canadian governments, at both the federal and provincial level, irrespective of the governing party’s ostensible location on the political spectrum, began to embrace neoliberalism. What distinguished the approach of one party from another was merely whether the “embrace” of neoliberal policy prescriptions was “boldly trumpeted” or more subdued, even “quiet.” (MacDermid and Albo 2001, 163). The return of the Progressive Conservative party to power on 8 June 1995 with Mike Harris becoming Ontario’s twenty-second premier marked the beginning of a different episode in Ontario’s political history. The Common Sense Revolution election manifesto was an unequivocal statement of policy direction because it proffered the most explicit program for a break with Ontario’s post-war tradition of pragmatic centrism and modest Keynesianism. For Ontario, it was the beginning of the province’s “bold embrace” of neoliberalism. Such a political shi – perhaps rupture is more apt – would have serious implications for the senior public service. A deputy whose career had straddled the Davis and Peterson premierships recalled that some of his contemporaries, who had also served with Davis, were “surprised” by the Common Sense Revolution: “Here

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were the Tories back in power, but it wasn’t the Davis Tories. This was a totally different party … if you wanted to be or remain a deputy you had be er understand that your role had shi ed very much to policy implementation … Your role was to figure a way to make the things they wanted to do happen. It wasn’t to be innovative in policy terms” (interview 10 September 2008). The Common Sense Revolution marked a sharp departure from the more traditional role of Ontario’s deputy ministers, and public service generally, in shaping the policy agenda. Donald Savoie’s study of Thatcher, Reagan, and Mulroney observed that “to regain control over their bureaucracies requires some degree of centralization for prime ministers and presidents and their ministers and advisors, if they are to adopt a hands-on approach in directing government operations” (Savoie 1994, 187). Elsewhere Savoie has characterized this as a “broken bargain” between the public service and the political leadership (2003). But months before assuming power, Ontario’s Conservatives assembled a transition team to work out the details of how to begin governing. An important aspect of the planning process entailed how to deal with the public service. The transition team recommended that the senior ranks of Ontario’s public service be evaluated on two criteria: “competence and comfort with the policy direction of the Common Sense Revolution” (Cameron and White 2000, 86). For the Conservatives, given the platform, there was no question of what policies were to be pursued. Could the public service be relied upon to implement this platform, or was politicization necessary in order to be er align the public service to the government’s objectives? One member of the transition team explained the dilemma of politicization: “I was one of the people involved at the time of the election of the Harris government in persuading them they should not politicize the public service and they should try to make be er use of the public service. On the other hand, we also advised them that if you want to go forward with your pre y hard-nosed agenda, you’re going to have to centralize even more or you’ll lose control” (Evans 2008, 142). This dilemma was partially resolved with the appointment of Rita Burak as Cabinet secretary on 13 June 1995. David Lindsay, Premier Harris’s former principal secretary, explained the choice of Burak as an expression of confidence in her ability to align the public service to the priorities of the Common Sense Revolution. Lindsay explained, “We spent some time thinking about the deputy ministers and the inside public servants, we hired Rita Burak as the Secretary of the

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Cabinet. She is a long-serving public administrator and we gave her a free hand to do what she needed to do to put the civil service into the right position to implement this huge agenda. Rita quickly recommended a number of senior deputy ministers to take on a number of portfolios to help start implementing the agenda” (Evans 2008, 142–3). Graham White has characterized the appointment of Burak at the head of the public service as a “bureaucratic restoration.” In addition, vacancies in the deputy minister ranks were filled primarily from within the public service. “As Burak’s appointment had indicated,” White wrote, “and the internal promotions to the vacant deputy ministerships confirmed, the new Conservative government took seriously its commitment to a politically neutral public service” (1997, 149). Politicization can be a much more subtle process, as White acknowledged in posing the more fundamental question: “Are not senior bureaucrats who are facilitating the implementation of the radical Harris agenda going beyond the professional duty of the public service to do the bidding of the duly elected government and, in effect, adopting a clearly ideological (albeit non-partisan) posture? Can public servants, in other words, be truly neutral players in what amounts to a massive dismantling of the state?” (149). The charge that the New Democrats had somehow uniquely broken a sacred principle of Westminster public administration is dubious, as is the notion that there is a rigid politics-administrative dichotomy at the very apex of Ontario or any other state. It is very difficult to substantiate the charge of politicization of a public service, as it may well be subtle, but it is also built into the very nature of the political-administrative interface at the apex of the state. In this respect, Cameron and White put forward three reasons to explain how difficult it is to find evidence of politicization. First, the relationship between ministers and deputy ministers is examined, and the authors note that deputy ministers in Canadian federal, provincial, and territorial governments are not chosen through open competition. Rather deputies are chosen by the head of government and can be dismissed at the will of their political leaders. There is good reason for this relationship, as a “deputy minister operates at the nexus between politics and administration. A minister and deputy minister exist in a state of mutually dependent professional intimacy; neither can do his or her job properly without the other’s assistance and support.” Second, a public service may be nonpartisan, but that should not be conflated with being devoid of possessing interests, because public servants, Cameron and White observe, have

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an interest in “working with a government that wants to work with them.” In addition, where a party has held office for a lengthy period, as was the case in Ontario from 1943 to 1985, close relationships will develop between political and public service leaders. Third, it is simply “difficult to sort out what politicization really means” (Cameron and White 2000, 44–7). All government parties have done so in different ways. What is interesting, and at least for Ontario it may be argued that, for the first time in at least a generation or more, it was necessary to align the public service with implementation of a political program of consequence. In this respect, implementation of the Common Sense Revolution necessitated a restructuring of the relationship between the senior public service and the political leadership. Specifically, this meant deputies’ cherished role as policy advisors would be constrained and their a ention would be refocused towards management of resources and policy implementation. Managerialism was a means to enlist the state and its leadership in an aggressive neoliberal restructuring in Ontario, as well as elsewhere. The 1995 election manifesto of the Progressive Conservatives identified the problem facing Ontario: “The political system itself stands in the way of making many of the changes we need right now. Our political system has become a captive to special interest groups. It is full of people who are afraid to face the difficult issues … it is full of people doing all too well as a result of the status quo” (Ontario Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario 1994, 2). This situation was far from irretrievable as the manifesto went on to say: “There is nothing wrong with Ontario that a new vision, a new direction and turn-around management can’t fix” (2). The Common Sense Revolution policy proposals envisioned salvation from the “special interests” and the hegemony they threatened – a hegemony that was rooted in the organic crisis of Ontario’s version of the Keynesian welfare state. The dichotomy between policy development/initiation and implementation, noted earlier, became a defining feature of the re-engineered relationship and division of functions between the public service and the political leadership at the helm of the Common Sense Revolution. A former deputy appointed by Premier Harris, interviewed for this study, commented on the reassertion of the politics-administration dichotomy: “They showed up with the ‘Common Sense Revolution’ – they knew what they wanted to do. The civil service was, as is o en the case when a new government comes to power, seen to be loyal to the previous government. So Rita Burak, the secretary of Cabinet at

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the time, was quite clear that there would be a well-lit line between the civil service and the political leadership so that both sides would be able to do business and everyone would be able to survive” (interview 8 April 2008). The centralization of control and the policy function referred to here are an expression of the emergence of a new public administration value and professional competence – “responsive competence.” Responsive competence, in stark contrast to the more traditional value of “neutral competence,” has been defined as the “ability to do the work of government expertly and to do it according to explicit, objective standards rather than to personal or party or other obligations and loyalties” (Kauffman 1956, 1060). This traditional neutral competence was interpreted by politicians as “insufficiently responsive” to their political objectives (Savoie 2003, 103). Thus the challenge was to find the means to align the public service to the priorities of the government and its ambitious restructuring agenda. The general economic crisis of the early 1990s, and the consequent fiscal crisis of the provincial government, required a different approach to public management. The Harris government recognized that senior managers had to be rewarded for managing within the context of austerity, and this included functioning from and adapting to a corporate, government-wide perspective. This process began in earnest in June 1995 with the alignment of the roles of the Civil Service Commission and the Executive Development Commi ee. The membership was to be cross-appointed and the functions were to include “establishing longterm strategies for a racting, developing and retaining the best possible leaders for the OPS,” “identifying goals and objectives for the management of the Senior Management Group as a corporate resource,” and “reinforcing SMG accountability for meeting corporate goals and objectives” (4). Echoing a key recommendation made a decade earlier by Moher that executive compensation must be competitive and linked to performance, a Premier’s Advisory Commi ee (PAC) was established in 1996, consisting of the secretary of the Cabinet, the associate secretary of the Cabinet, and several chief executive officers from private sector firms. This PAC was to undertake a “Total Compensation and Benchmarking Project,” the mandate of which was to ensure that “the OPS has the ability to a ract high calibre private and public sector executives to leadership positions, and to retain them. Compensation levels must be competitive with comparable jobs in broader public sector

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organizations, and reward public servants based on achieving performance results” (Ontario Civil Service Commission 1997, 5). Ultimately the PAC recommended that the OPS executive compensation plan be revised to incorporate four principles: • Support the government’s agenda; • Focus on the achievement of results; • Include key drivers (i.e., fiscal constraint, deregulation, etc.) set and controlled by the premier, Cabinet, and secretary of the Cabinet; and • Reinforce the importance of the performance agreement to link compensation to the ministry’s target (Ontario Civil Service Commission 1997, 6). The result was that, starting in 1996–7, annual performance agreements were put in place for all OPS senior managers and executives, to directly link compensation to the achievement of key results (Ontario Civil Service Commission 1998; Ontario Civil Service Commission 1999, 18). These agreements would be reviewed every year-end to assess performance against results. The emphasis on linking compensation to results was intended to underline the shi in OPS culture from one of “entitlement” to one “demanding performance” (Ontario Civil Service Commission 1997, 6). The importance of performance management to aligning the OPS leadership to the priorities of the government was clearly expressed by the Civil Service Commission: “The government’s direction has emphasized the importance of accountability and the focus on results. The Performance Management Program has been designed to strengthen the linkage of individual activities to the achievement of corporate and ministry business plans and goals” (Ontario Civil Service Commission 1999, 18). The new compensation plan, for the eleven years that it has been in place, was effective in at least one objective – that of making OPS deputy compensation more competitive. Total compensation paid to the rank of deputy minister more than doubled from $3.2 million to $6.8 million from 1997 to 2007. Average individual compensation was nearly $128,000 in 1997 and by 2007 this had risen to $214,000. In 2000, the government launched a second review of executive compensation. The report of an independent consultant “showed that executive pay levels in the Ontario Public Service, which had not changed in four years, were falling further and further behind those in other

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government organizations and in the private sector” (Ontario Civil Service Commission 2000, 18). The result was a 20 per cent increase in deputy minister salaries in 2000. In addition to the adoption of performance contracts linked to a revised and enhanced compensation plan, greater focus was placed on developing and deepening the management skills of Ontario’s senior public service. Given the broader context of constraint, and the premium placed on implementation by the government, this was a logical progression. An executive development curriculum was established to “help executives acquire leadership skills to support new OPS directions” (Ontario Civil Service Commission 2001, 33), and this covered a broad range of subjects to enhance management skills. including contract negotiation, strategic communications, staff retention, executive presentations, project leadership, management of information technology, performance measurement, and risk management (33). In addition, there was recognition that labour relations in the public service had to be taken seriously. Two strikes by the Ontario Public Service Employees Union (OPSEU), one in 1996 and the second in 2002, expressed the polarization evoked by the Common Sense Revolution. In response, an unheard of executive-level focus on human resources questions and concerns emerged (Ontario Civil Service Commission 2003, 8). The Harris era was a defining period for Ontario generally and for the Ontario Public Service in particular. While trends towards greater managerialism and political centralization were apparent well before the Harris premiership, it was in this time that these developments became institutionally embedded. The coveted policy role declined for the public service because demands to be be er managers escalated. A Harris-appointed former deputy saw this as a result of ina entiveness of the public service leadership of the time: “The management side has taken over the government. The majority of deputy ministers are administrators or managers and have accepted the fact that they have li le influence on public policy, and for the most part, don’t even care. There are a bunch of reasons why public servants were pushed out of the policy market or conceded part of that policy market to others … We lost the ba le because we just sat around and watched them take the market from us, because we didn’t respond … Everyone said, ‘We are not here to decide policy, we are just here to implement it’” (interview 11 July 2008). The power to make decisions about the policy agenda had increasingly become absorbed into the “centre” – the Premier’s Office and

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Cabinet Office – located at the political and administrative apex of the Ontario state. One deputy whose career spanned the Peterson, Rae, and Harris premierships saw centralization as a key theme: “It was the changing role of the Premier’s Office and the exertion of greater control over policy and communications at the centre. People point to Harris on this, but it started with Peterson, and it took leaps and bounds under Bob Rae. The PC’s turned it into an art form … Centralization of power in the Premier’s Office has changed both the role of the deputy and that of the minister” (interview 8 June 2008). As the era of the Common Sense Revolution wound down, a rebalancing of roles and functions was being proposed. An internal discussion paper critiqued the regime of centralization and budget constraint, stating, Ever-greater regimes of “modern controllership” and imposed standardization through templates, interministerial and Cabinet commi ees, and further structural consolidation, are not likely the best way to enable the OPS to meet its future challenges. Ever-greater tightening of the existing constraints and even-greater machining of the existing structures and processes may fail to recognize that more fundamental reforms are needed to that regime of constraint and to the existing structures and processes. In other words, making the existing structural “machinery” run faster or reducing its operating tolerances, will not materially improve the end product or lower its cost. (Fenn 2003, 1)

This discussion paper suggested that a new set of practices and relationships be put in place, and it makes a compelling argument for a recentring of the role of the senior public service. This re-centring included the proposal that all deputy ministers participate more fully in budgetary and policy development activities, the budget process be opened up, and the policy-advisory role of the senior civil service be reasserted (Fenn 2003, 2). An important element of Fenn’s thesis was that no organization of the size and complexity of the Ontario Public Service would restrict the use of its senior executive cadres to line management, isolated policy development, and collective information sharing. Rather, these leadership resources would be brought together as a corporate resource to address issues of interest across the “system,” including se ing collective bargaining strategy, corporate budgeting, and the development and implementation of “enterprise-wide” strategic planning and policy: in short, establishing the mechanisms for “coherent” government.

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The election of October 2003 would see a new, more public service– friendly government come to power under Premier Dalton McGuinty. While the relationship between the two would become distinctly warmer, the trend towards centralization and managerialism continued. McGuinty Era, 2003–2007 Dalton McGuinty’s Liberals campaigned in the autumn of 2003 on a platform of preserving and improving Ontario’s public services. The Liberals were equally adamant that taxes would not be increased, and this commitment ensured a particular continuity with the fiscal conservatism of the Common Sense Revolution. In the first four years of Liberal government, there was indeed reinvestment in health, education, and social services. By 2007, spending on social programs had risen by 19 per cent over 2004. However, this reinvestment was enabled by a rather vigorous economy. The Harris-era 30 per cent cut in the Ontario tax rate remained (Evans 2007). Within weeks of electoral success, on 2 October 2003 the Ontario Liberal government announced a comprehensive plan for reshaping and transforming government. The transformation of the Ontario Public Service into a more efficient and effective organization was to be achieved by aligning and integrating services and program delivery. To monitor progress, results-based planning was introduced. This process established the priorities and identified the measurable results, with related performance indicators to monitor progress. In most respects this was a continuation of the annual business planning process of the previous government (Ontario Civil Service Commission 2004, 2). The key and important difference was that the Liberal planning process “moved from ministry business planning to a government-wide resultsbased approach that aims to keep public services affordable, invest in the areas that ma er most and live within our means” (Ontario Civil Service Commission 2005, 5). The competencies required of Ontario’s deputy ministers, under Premier McGuinty, identified by the government’s Centre for Leadership and Learning, suggested a rebalancing of executive roles and functions. Three essential roles were identified. First, deputy ministers were to provide policy advice and support to the minister, premier, and Cabinet through activities that include ensuring that the minister is provided with the information and analysis necessary to make informed decisions; representing the minister “at various commi ees and group meetings to explain and support the decisions and policy agenda of

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the government”; and managing stakeholder “expectations on behalf of the minister and the government and influencing these expectations through presentation and discussion” (Centre for Leadership and Learning 2006, 1). Second, they were to provide leadership to the organization by implementing “the policy directives and decisions of the government through leadership and direction of staff ”; ensuring “that organization structures, systems and processes are sound, and are designed to meet quality, efficiency, effectiveness and program goals of the government”; and contributing to corporate leadership by establishing “effective and collaborative relationships with other OPS leaders to ensure a collective enterprise approach to the achievement of the government’s goals and objectives” (1–5). Third, they were to provide the “visioning” necessary to building for the future, which entailed directing the “development of annual and longer-term business plans and strategies,” collaborating with “other jurisdictions and organizations to define issues that best serve the government’s goals and the public interest,” and ensuring that “human resource management plans and strategies are developed to meet future resource requirements” (5). Former deputy minister Michael Fenn participated as a panellist in a series of orientation sessions for newly appointed deputy ministers. The core objectives of the sessions were to identify, on the basis of his experience, the key success factors in managing the deputy minister– minister relationship and the political agenda of the government, while providing leadership to the organization. For this exercise, Fenn referred to a discussion paper released in 2003 that identified four pivotal relationships: (1) the deputy minister and minister; (2) the deputy minister and the minister’s chief of staff; (3) the minister’s chief of staff and the deputy’s executive assistant; and (4) the Premier’s Office and the ministry. This fourth component was what Fenn termed the “Burak Coda.” The Burak Coda had several practical manifestations: deputy ministers – and people of equivalent rank, such as agency CEOs – should not deal directly with the premier’s office staff, in the absence of Cabinet Office staff; political staff – especially premier’s office staff – should not work directly with – or give directions to – ministry public servants or senior agency officials, except through the deputy minister’s offices or communications branches reporting to the deputy minister; political staff should generally not be considered candidates for civil service jobs, especially in the ministries they serve, and vice-versa, except for transitional roles; and key civil service appointments/replacements should not be initiated by political

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leadership. Of course, the Burak Coda referred to Rita Burak who, as secretary of the Cabinet during the premierships of Harris and Eves, aggressively asserted the politics/administrative dichotomy. Her concern was to ensure that clear lines separated the Ontario Public Service from the political sphere. The rule was that all contact with political offices followed proper protocol and chain of command. This was the key relationship-management principle guiding the political/administrative interface (Fenn 2003). As noted above, the 2003 discussion paper issued in the very closing hours of the Eves government was, in essence, a thesis calling for restoration of the senior public service at the centre of the key decision points within the administrative state, which found traction within the McGuinty government that followed. The deputy minister orientation and the Centre for Leadership’s executive skills inventory pointed to a sophisticated approach to creating a highly professionalized deputy minister cadre emerging through the McGuinty era. In sum, a professional and collaborative role for Ontario’s senior public service was outlined, which could be suggested as a return to the highly integrated role of the senior public service reminiscent of the Davis era. Where Harris imposed a rather fundamental assertion of the politics-administration dichotomy by demarcating a clear division of labour between the political leadership and the senior public service, the McGuinty premiership appeared to offer something of a “new bargain.” According to one former deputy, the new senior public service–political leadership relationship had some hallmarks of the close working relationship enjoyed by both parties during Davis’s government. However, the closeness of the relationship under Davis fostered a degree of mistrust of the public service, and some of the Rae-era deputy rank appointments were met with the charge of politicization. A former McGuinty-era deputy observed that an element of the new bargain was a subtle and sophisticated form of politicization, which had nothing to do with partisanship and more to do with a shared perspective and policy orientation. According to this deputy and using this definition, there were three means by which to politicize: (1) appoint individuals whom the government wanted in those positions, (2) appoint individuals who will simply parrot the options the government wants to hear, and (3) appoint individuals who share the values of the government. The third approach defined the McGuinty government appointments: “I think as the Premier

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and his team have been in government, over time, they’ve brought in more like-minded thinkers who are not partisan but share the valuebase” (interview, 25 September 2008). Politicization is not to be conflated with partisanship, as party association is much less important than shared of values and an overall orientation of being “one of us.” That is, a key job qualification is a shared ideological conviction of the necessity for public sector restructuring (Peters and Pierre 2004, 2). With the centralization of decision-making at the apex of the administrative state, that is where the politics over policy choices is contested; public service advisors are either shunted aside or are recruited for their “political” fit. Conclusion Looking back over nearly four decades, it is possible to discern shi s in the role and functions of Ontario’s deputy ministers. Admi edly, it is trite, but there is a strong suggestion of both change and continuity in this history. The survey data of former and current (up to 1 December 2006) deputy ministers provided by Cabinet Office reflect this view. Predominant themes in the interviews included a shi in the policy advisory role of the senior public service; centralization of decisionmaking in the Premier’s Office, ministers’ offices, and Cabinet Office; a sense of subtle politicization; and an expanding managerial role for the deputy ministers. Of course, these different themes intertwine. The key conclusion on the contribution of the twenty-two former deputies interviewed is that their observations and reflections are not unique to Ontario. The developments they witnessed were a general phenomenon of international scope reflecting efforts to create more coherent governance structures and practices. Ontario was no exception to the need for a more robust approach to public administration and especially so through turbulent times. In sum, it can be said that the roles, functions, and relationships of Ontario’s deputy ministers have evolved, particularly in the post-Davis era. Is there a case to characterize this as a transformation? The answer is no. However, Ontario’s deputy ministers, while largely remaining a fairly static group in academic and employment background, have moved towards a more professionalized management model than prior to 1985. Moreover, it is a more diverse group, at least in the growing but still unequal number of women who have been appointed. Of course,

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there is also greater interest in recruiting candidates with employment experience from outside the OPS. While this may not be a straightforward movement from “guru” role to chief executive, it can be viewed as something more balanced and subtle, where Ontario deputies are both. While it is mere speculation at this point, if we extrapolate from the data and interviews presented here we can discern trends likely to manifest in a rather different future cadre of Ontario deputy ministers and public management environment. Ultimately, women will achieve numeric parity or perhaps even surpass the number of male colleagues. The number of appointments of individuals who have not made their entire career in the Ontario Public Service will increase. And we may project that the mobility of this cadre will continue as an enduring feature and perhaps even evolve towards privileging potential recruits who have a wide range of executive experience spanning public service (and in several governments), the non-profit sector, as well as private business. We can further speculate that the high levels of educational and professional achievement found currently will endure.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Several outstanding individuals have made this work possible. We wish to thank Greg Orencsak, who as executive assistant to Ontario’s secretary of Cabinet was instrumental in gathering data on current and former deputy ministers and in obtaining contact information for a number of former deputy ministers. A number of these current and former deputy ministers participated in the qualitative interview component of this research project. Of course, our research assistants deserve praise for their heavy li ing and contribution to the data gathering and analysis. Alvin Ying brought to this project his substantial data analysis skills in addition to his sage technical advice. Simon Enoch, Amelia Facchin, and Ágoston Kecskés methodically waded through government of Ontario telephone directories and tracked the careers of individual deputies as they moved through the Ontario Public Service. We extend deep gratitude to the many former and current deputy ministers who agreed to respond to surveys and participate in interviews, for without their public spiritedness and willingness to contribute, none of this would have been possible.

Ontario’s Deputy Ministers 195 APPENDIX: ONTARIO DEPUTY MINISTER (DM) STUDY METHODOLOGY SECTION

We contacted both the Ontario Cabinet Office and Archives Ontario to inquire if either agency maintained databases containing the names and appointment dates of Ontario deputy ministers that would coincide with the 1971–2007 timeline for this study; however, neither was able to accommodate our request. We returned to Archives Ontario to ascertain whether it kept Ontario government telephone directories dating back to the start of our study. They did, so we began searching these telephone directories to collect information on the appointment of Ontario deputy ministers from 1971 to 2007. The next step of data collection involved determining the duration of each deputy minister’s appointment within and across Ontario ministries from 1971 to 2007. Again, this information was drawn from the Ontario government telephone directories. We recognized that we could not precisely identify the start and end date of each deputy minister’s tenure from the government telephone directories; therefore, dates were assigned on the basis of the following criteria. First, if the appearance of a deputy minister coincided with that of his or her ministry or department, the creation date of the ministry or department was used as a proxy for the start of the deputy minister’s term. The rationale for this assignment was that the coincidence of a deputy minister’s start/end date with that of the ministry or department in which he or she worked was almost surely related causally. Similarly, the dissolution date of a ministry or department was used as a proxy for a deputy minister’s end date with that particular ministry or department; however, we examined the subsequent telephone directory to determine if the deputy minister had been appointed to another ministry or department. Second, if the appearance of a new or returning deputy minister coincided with that of a new government term, the creation date of the new government term was used as a proxy for a deputy minister’s start or renewal date with that particular ministry or department. Also, the dissolution date of a government term was used as a proxy for a deputy minister’s end date; however, we again referred to the subsequent government telephone directory to determine if the deputy had been reappointed. Over the course of collecting this information, the researchers were careful to track and record the various name changes to many Ontario ministries, because this helped to keep data organized.

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The remaining start dates that could not be assigned by proxy were compiled by averaging the date of the first telephone directory in which the deputy minister appeared for a given term and the date of the preceding telephone directory. The rationale for this assignment was that, in theory, a deputy minister who appeared in a given telephone directory could have begun work between the extremes of directly before the telephone directory was published, or directly a er that particular directory was published. Similarly, the remaining end dates that could not be assigned by proxy were compiled by averaging the date of the last telephone directory in which the deputy minister still appeared for a given term, and the date of the telephone directory that followed in which this person was no longer listed as a deputy minister for an Ontario ministry. To organize the deputy minister data into periods that could be studied in greater depth, we divided data on the basis of the seven Ontario premiers who governed the province from 1971 to 2007. Using the seven periods as our template, deputy minister entries were reorganized as deputy minister terms and supplemented with the name and minority of majority status of the governing political party, the governing party leader’s name, and tenure as premier. In this way we could examine the seven periods when each political party assumed office, but then look more closely within each period in relation to deputy minister appointments. Period 1: 1 March 1971–8 February 1985 (Premier Bill Davis) Period 2: 8 February 1985–26 June 1985 (Premier Frank Miller) Period 3: 26 June 1985–1 October 1990 (Premier David Peterson) Period 4: 1 October 1990–26 June 1995 (Premier Bob Rae) Period 5: 26 June 1995–14 April 2002 (Premier Mike Harris) Period 6: 15 April 2002–22 October 2003 (Premier Ernie Eves) Period 7: 23 October 2003–11 October 2007 (Premier Dalton McGuinty) The outcome of using data contained within and across the seven time periods was significant; therefore, we decided to revisit the archives and review the Ontario government telephone directories from 1971 to 2007 to record the names of the assistant deputy ministers (ADMs) working in Cabinet Office, Ministry of Finance, Management Board Secretariat/Treasury Board, and A orney General. These names were then tracked against our deputy minister database. This approach was to determine if we could observe whether central

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agencies may be considered as a testing ground for future deputy ministers. To complete this aspect of the research project, each person listed as an ADM (or assistant director, in the case of the A orney General’s Office) in their respective departments from 1971 to 2007 was recorded, and this list was then compared with our DM master list. As this line of inquiry proceeded, we again noted that some central agencies’ names were changed as a result of the varying nature of their responsibilities. For example, the Ministry of Revenue and the Ministry of Treasury and Economics were merged as the Ministry of Finance. While we recognize that the approach taken to organize data for this study has limitations, the research team endeavoured to be consistent by cross-checking with additional reliable sources as we collected and analysed data for this study of Ontario deputy ministers from 1971 to 2007.

REFERENCES Bell, George, and Andrew Pascoe. 1988. The Ontario Government: Structure and Functions. Toronto: Wall and Thompson. Bourgault, Jacques. 2005. “Profile of Deputy Ministers in the Government of Canada.” Working Paper Series. O awa: Canada School of Public Service. Burns, R.M. 1961. “The Role of the Deputy Minister: II.” Canadian Public Administration 4 (4): 357–62. h p://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1754-7121.1961. tb00443.x. Cameron, David R., and Graham White. 2000. Cycling into Saigon: The Conservative Transition in Ontario. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. Centre for Leadership and Learning, Ontario Ministry of Government Services. 2006. Deputy Minister Competency Profile. Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario. Coté, André. 2007. “Leadership in the Public Service of Canada.” Public Policy Forum, June. Coté, André, and Alyx Holland. 2007. “Is Deputy ‘Churn’ Myth or Reality?” Public Policy Forum, November. Evans, Bryan. 2007. “Treading Water: Four Years of Ontario’s Liberals.” Relay: A Socialist Project Review 19: 7–9. Evans, Bryan. 2008. “Capacity, Complexity and Leadership: Secretaries to Cabinet and Ontario’s Project of Modernization at the Centre.” In Searching for Leadership: Secretaries to Cabinet in Canada, edited by Patrice Dutil, 121–60. Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada / University of Toronto Press.

198 Bryan M. Evans, Janet M. Lum, and Duncan MacLellan Evans, Bryan, Janet Lum, and John Shields. 2007. “Profiling of the PublicService Élite: A Demographic and Career Trajectory Survey of Deputy and Assistant Deputy Ministers in Canada.” Canadian Public Administration 50 (4): 609–34. h p://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1754-7121.2007.tb02209.x. Gagnon, George e. 1992. Not without Cause: David Peterson’s Fall from Grace. Toronto: Harper Collins. Government of Ontario. 1970. Ontario Public Service Act, 1970. Toronto: Queen’s Printer. Government of Ontario. 1990. Ontario Public Service Act, 1990. Toronto: Queen’s Printer. Government of Ontario. 2006. Public Service of Ontario Act, 2006. Toronto: Queen’s Printer. Hennessey, Peter. 2002. The Secret State: Whitehall and the Cold War. London: Allen Lane / Penguin. Hodge s, J.E. 1995. From Arm’s Length to Hands-On: The Formative Years of Ontario’s Public Service 1867–1940. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Howard, Ross. 1985. “Queen’s Park Job Worries ‘Baseless’: Liberals Seek to Cool Fears of Civil Service ‘Witch Hunt.’” Globe and Mail, 30 May. Kauffman, Herbert. 1956. “Emerging Conflicts in the Doctrines of Public Administration.” American Political Science Review 50 (4): 1057–73. h p://dx.doi. org/10.2307/1951335. Kernaghan, Kenneth. 1975. Executive Manpower in the Public Service: Make or Buy. Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada. Lindquist, Evert A., and Graham White. 1994. “Streams, Springs, and Stones: Ontario Public Service Reform in the 1980s and the 1990s.” Canadian Public Administration 37 (2): 267–301. h p://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1754-7121.1994. tb00858.x. MacDermid, Bob, and Greg Albo. 2001. “Divided Province, Growing Protests: Ontario Moves Right.” In The Provincial State in Canada: Politics in the Provinces and Territories, edited by Keith Brownsey and Michael Howle , 163–202. Peterborough, ON: Broadview. Mackie, Richard. 1992. “Rae Denies Union Push on Public Servants: New Appointment Fuels Controversy.” Globe and Mail, 23 September. Manthorpe, Jonathan. 1972. “Tories Look at Davis Machine and Wonder.” Globe and Mail, 25 March. Manthorpe, Jonathan. 1974. The Power and the Tories: Ontario Politics – 1943 to the Present. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada. Moher, W.P. 1986. “Strategies for Renewal: Planning for People #1.” Human Resources Secretariat, Management Board of Cabinet. Toronto: Queen’s Printer.

Ontario’s Deputy Ministers 199 Ontario. Cabinet Office. 2007. “IPAC Research Study Notes.” Authors’ collection. Ontario Civil Service Commission. 1983. Annual Report, 1982–83. Toronto: Queen’s Printer. Ontario Civil Service Commission. 1987. Annual Report, 1986–87. Toronto: Queen’s Printer. Ontario Civil Service Commission. 1988. Annual Report, 1987–88. Toronto: Queen’s Printer. Ontario Civil Service Commission. 1989. Annual Report, 1988–1989. Toronto: Queen’s Printer. Ontario Civil Service Commission. 1997. Annual Report, 1996–1997. Toronto: Queen’s Printer. Ontario Civil Service Commission. 1998. Annual Report, 1997–1998. Toronto: Queen’s Printer. Ontario Civil Service Commission. 1999. Annual Report, 1998–1999. Toronto: Queen’s Printer. Ontario Civil Service Commission. 2000. Annual Report, 1999–2000. Toronto: Queen’s Printer. Ontario Civil Service Commission. 2001. Annual Report, 2000–2001. Toronto: Queen’s Printer. Ontario Civil Service Commission. 2003. Annual Report, 2002–2003. Toronto: Queen’s Printer. Ontario Civil Service Commission. 2004. Annual Report, 2003–2004. Toronto: Queen’s Printer. Ontario Civil Service Commission. 2005. Annual Report 2004–2005. Toronto: Queen’s Printer. Peters, B. Guy, and Jon Pierre. 2004. “Politicization of the Civil Service: Concepts, Causes, Consequences.” In Politicization of the Civil Service in Comparative Perspective: The Quest for Control, edited by B. Guy Peters and Jon Pierre, 1–13. London: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group. Plumptre, Timothy. 1987. “New Perspectives on the Role of the Deputy Minister.” Canadian Public Administration 30 (3): 376–98. h p://dx.doi. org/10.1111/j.1754-7121.1987.tb00090.x. Price Waterhouse Associates and the Canada Consulting Group. 1985. Study of Management and Accountability in the Government of Ontario. Toronto: PWA and CCG. Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario. 1994. The Common Sense Revolution. Toronto: Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario. Pusey, Michael. 1991. Economic Rationalism in Canberra: A Nation Building State Changes Its Mind. New York: Cambridge University Press.

200 Bryan M. Evans, Janet M. Lum, and Duncan MacLellan Rae, Bob. 1996. From Protest to Power: Personal Reflections on a Life in Politics. Toronto: Viking / Penguin Books. Rusk, James. 1995. “Harris Sweeps Out NDP-Aligned Bureaucrats.” Globe and Mail, 28 June. Savoie, Donald. 1994. Search of a New Bureaucracy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Savoie, Donald. 2003. Breaking the Bargain: Public Servants, Ministers, and Parliament. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Savoie, Donald. 2008. Court Government and the Collapse of Accountability in Canada and the United Kingdom. Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada / University of Toronto Press. Statistics Canada. 2003. “Census Population: Earnings, Level of Schooling, Field of Study and School A endance.” Daily, 11 March. Stewart, Edward. 1989. Cabinet Government in Ontario: A View from Inside. Halifax: Institute for Research on Public Policy. White, Graham. 1997. “Transition: The Tories Take Power.” In Revolution at Queen’s Park: Essays on Governing Ontario, edited by Sid Noel, 139–150. Toronto: James Lorimer. White, Graham. 2002. “Change in the Ontario State 1952–2002.” Paper prepared for the Panel on the Role of Government.

7 More Than Nobodies, but Not the Powers behind the Throne: The Role of Deputy Ministers in Manitoba r e b e c c a j e n s e n a n d pau l g . t h o m a s

Introduction Manitoba is a relatively small society of approximately 1.2 million people, with over 60 per cent of the population located in the capital city of Winnipeg, where the provincial government is headquartered. Compared to that of larger provinces, Manitoba’s governmental system operates on a smaller scale, with fi y-seven members of the Legislative Assembly, nineteen Cabinet ministers, nineteen deputy ministers, and a civil service of approximately fi een thousand. In a relatively small open economy, the provincial government is the largest employer, and its spending ($13 billion in 2010–11 in a provincial economy with a GDP of approximately $50 billion) is important to the maintenance of economic activity and the availability of educational, health, social, and other services that are crucial to the social well-being of Manitobans. Given the significant impacts of the provincial government on Manitoba society, one might think that the nineteen deputy ministers, who in 2010 comprised the senior administrative leadership of the provincial civil service, would be prominent public figures. This was not the case, however. They do not show up in the media regularly. Their careers are not the stuff of legends; they barely rate a mention in provincial histories. To the extent they are known, it is mainly within the specialized policy communities centred on the departments they lead. As one former deputy minister, who had served for ten years in the position, observed in an interview, “I was barely a household name in my own household.” The relative obscurity of deputy ministers might at first seem surprising, given that they play a crucial role in the policy and administrative

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processes of the provincial government. Their experience, knowledge, skills, integrity, and dedication ma er greatly to the quality of the governing process and to the success of programs and services intended to benefit Manitobans. The paradox of being influential figures inside government and relative unknowns outside is explained by the constitutional role of the civil service and the traditions and norms of behaviour that are part of the political and administrative cultures of Manitoba. Under a system of Cabinet-parliamentary government, elected and responsible Cabinet ministers are meant to be the prominent public figures in the governing process. They are to take the public credit or blame for what happens or fails to happen as a result of government actions and inactions. In contrast, deputy ministers are expected to work behind the scenes in support of the government as a whole and the individual ministers with whom they share responsibility for leading departments (Thomas 1997). Deputies are directly accountable to their minister and to the premier and only indirectly accountable to the legislature and the public for their performance as leaders and managers of the departments that exist to provide Manitobans with value for their tax dollars spent on crucial programs and services. Deputy ministers and other career civil servants represent professionalism and neutral competence, concepts that are both somewhat elusive and controversial (West 2005; Overeem 2005; Hildebrand 2004; Svara 2001). Their job is to provide sound policy advice and to translate government decisions into effective and efficient programs and to deliver services to citizens in an impartial, fair manner. As a popular slogan goes, deputy ministers are meant to be “on tap, not on top.”1 Of course, the slogan challenges whether Cabinet ministers, both collectively and individually, are always able to turn the tap on and off when they wish and how well they can judge what flows into their offices in the stream of advice coming from the reservoir of experience and knowledge represented by the deputy ministers and the civil servants who work below them in the multilayered, specialized bureaucracy. Many decades ago, most commentators ceased to accept as fully accurate the traditional interpretation of the role of deputy ministers as faceless and nameless bureaucrats who are merely instruments of the will of the government of the day. During the 1980s, under the influence of public choice theory, which a ributes self-interested behaviour to all public officials, and consistent with rising public cynicism and suspicion about the motivations and competence of all public office holders, the opposite fear developed that deputy ministers might be wielding

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unaccountable power in the policy process by shaping the options considered by ministers and protecting their departmental turf against reduced authority, budgetary downsizing, and political interference in operational ma ers. The result of such discussions was the emergence of two perspectives that seemed to present a polarized choice: either deputy ministers were nobodies who simply carried out the wishes of their political masters, or they were the powers behind the throne who captured ministers and always sought to maximize their own authority, budgets, and staffs. Like most dichotomies in public administration, this choice is too simplified and extreme. It may be less dramatic, but it is more accurate and balanced to argue, as this chapter does, that the motivations, intentions, capabilities, behaviours, and influence of deputy ministers are mixed and varied, and depend on numerous factors, such as the personal backgrounds of incumbents, their personal leadership style, the departmental and governmental context in which they work, and the issues they grapple with. Moreover, even if they wanted to, deputy ministers are seldom free to act in a completely unilateral, singular, and purely self-interested manner. This is partly because in contemporary, complex, pluralistic, less deferential societies, governments are required to consult widely and o en to act in partnership with other jurisdictions, with the private sector, and with so-called civil society. The interconnections among policies and their impacts on society have created pressures for greater collaboration and cohesion in policymaking within and across departmental boundaries. Under these changing conditions, deputy ministers have been required to develop skill sets resembling those of the politicians they serve, such as communication, persuasion, conflict resolution, mediation, and bargaining. In summary, based on their location within the structure of government and their role in policy process, deputy ministers have significant opportunities for influence but seldom wield the actual authority or power to make or block policy. In their administrative roles as heads of departments they enjoy some delegated authority and autonomy to decide important ma ers, but experienced deputies report that the actual exercise of this freedom entails significant informal political and administrative constraints. It is from this perspective that the roles of deputy ministers within the government of Manitoba will be analysed. The second section of the chapter discusses the position of the deputy minister in general terms, emphasizing the constitutional, political, and administrative context in

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which deputies are appointed, work, and leave the civil service. A third section deals with the appointment and removal process for deputies and the frequency of turnover. The fourth section presents an analysis of deputies’ responsibilities and reports the findings from a small online survey, with follow-up interviews, of currently serving deputy ministers in Manitoba on the allocation of their time to their various responsibilities. In broad terms, the job of deputy minister involves both a policy and an administrative component, both of which are intermingled in practice. Section five discusses how Manitoba’s deputy ministers are held accountable for both their policy advisory role to their minister and the government as a whole and their administrative role of managing their department, including the crucial areas of financial and human resource management. A final section draws the main themes of the analysis together and speculates on the future evolution of the role of the deputy minister in Manitoba. A number of sources were used to generate the analysis. There was the usual reliance upon secondary sources, which are rather limited. An electronic search of newspaper sources was conducted, but it yielded few references to the role of deputy ministers. Government websites and documents were examined. Very useful source material was provided through the office of the commissioner of the Civil Service Commission. Finally, as mentioned above, a short online survey of currently serving deputy ministers was conducted, and the findings from this survey provided part of the foundation for a series of elite interviews conducted in August 2010 with seven current and former deputy ministers. The opportunity to discuss the responsibilities, authority, constraints, and accountabilities of deputies produced helpful insights. The value of narrative approaches to the study of public administration has been increasingly recognized by empirical researchers as well as theorists, who point out that illustrating the dynamics, intentions, and meanings of social actors through examples and stories enhances the worth of the more traditional explanatory and analytic approaches to the field (Dodge, Ospina, and Foldy 2005). The Constitutional Position of the Civil Service and the Deputy Minister The leadership skills, management capabilities, and integrity of deputy ministers ma er, because deputies are located at the critical intersection of politics and administration. Without them, the conversion of

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politics into policies, government decisions into actual programs, and delivery of services to the public simply would not happen effectively, efficiently, and responsively, which is not to argue that the tasks of administrative leadership and departmental management are always performed well. A key part of the job of the deputy minister is to promote and support a constructive partnership between the government and the civil service based on a relationship of mutual understanding of their respective roles. Loyalty and responsiveness to the government, of whatever political complexion, must be balanced by deputies with impartiality, objectivity, integrity, and the honesty to provide policy advice and warnings about administrative problems in a “frank and fearless” manner. In Manitoba’s political system, as in other Cabinet-parliamentary governments, the role of the deputy minister is shaped by the principles of collective and individual ministerial responsibility. Since most readers will be familiar with those principles, this is not the place to describe them and the controversies that surround their interpretation in practice. It is worth noting that the most important aspects of the doctrine of ministerial responsibility involve unwri en constitutional conventions, with only a limited number of statutory provisions reflecting the fact that elected ministers, not appointed civil servants, are meant to be directly accountable to the legislature and ultimately to the electorate for the actions and inactions of government (Thomas 2008). The vague nature of the conventions, critics suggest, creates an opening for the premier and other ministers to play fast and loose with the constitutional rules by evading accountability when something goes wrong and instead naming, blaming, and shaming senior public servants. This has led to calls for codifying the conventional rules to ensure that accountability resides with ministers, who in theory are expected to have the final say on policy and have a responsibility to ensure that their departments run efficiently, effectively, and ethically. Whether ministers can actually be in complete charge of their departments, as the pure doctrine of ministerial responsibility implies, is a long-standing controversy, especially in larger governmental systems. Ministerial direction and control may be more realistic in a smaller governmental system like Manitoba’s. A corollary of the notion of ministerial responsibility is the concept of an impartial, professional civil service that represents a permanent repository of knowledge, neutral competence, and the capacity to serve successive governments equally well. Deputy ministers are expected

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to advise and support ministers, but it is also assumed that they will criticize and object if they believe the minister or the government as a whole is making a mistake in policy or administrative actions. The opinions and advice provided by deputies to ministers are generally not for public consumption. Deputies make their views known in frank, confidential discussions, but once decisions have been reached, it is their duty to implement them faithfully and to the best of their ability. Deputy ministers must also avoid taking credit for government actions and in general are expected to maintain a relatively low public profile. In Manitoba, these principles are reflected in the fact that deputy ministers are the only civil servants who have not been granted the right (subject to certain restrictions) to take part in the political process, through such activities as a ending party meetings or making financial contributions to campaigns. Despite the conventions of neutrality and relative anonymity that a ach to the role of the deputy in theory, in practice there has been a growing trend for several decades to expect deputy ministers to serve as spokespersons explaining government policy and actions. Initially, such presentations were restricted to specialized forums in what might be described as semi-public se ings. Now, deputies of high-profile departments grant media interviews with some regularity, and some even appear on radio call-in programs. To avoid the appearance of defending, as opposed to merely explaining, government policy, deputy ministers (and other senior civil servants) must accept invitations only with ministerial approval and must avoid a public communications role, which could entangle them in partisan controversies. The conventions of confidentiality, anonymity, and neutrality are meant to preserve usefulness of deputy ministers as advisors to successive governments who must trust the civil service to implement their policies when they take office. Relative permanence in the senior ranks of the civil service, along with the concept of a career civil service in which promotion from within takes place, is meant to produce continuity in the senior ranks of the civil service. In this way, the civil service represents a deep repository of experience, memory, knowledge, and leadership/management skills, which are available to support premiers, Cabinets, and individual ministers who come and go with some regularity and who tend to be more short term in their thinking and actions than the leadership of the civil service, which is expected to think in the longer term.

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In Manitoba, as elsewhere in Canada, these largely unwri en constitutional conventions and related political traditions have supposedly shaped the relationships between deputy ministers and their elected political masters over many decades during which government expanded its scope and became more technical. In the general literature on public policy and public management, it became fashionable to suggest that most ministers do not really set the agenda within their departments. O en governments and ministers take office with only a limited number of policy ideas of their own, which means there is a void to be filled by advice coming from the civil service. Furthermore, new governments are required to deal with the legacy of the accumulated policy decisions from the past. In the day-to-day world of governing, ministers are involved in only a tiny fraction of the hundreds of decisions made within departments, and there is no way they can be aware of all significant actions taken in their name by the officials serving them. It is alleged that governing under these fundamentally changed conditions means that ministerial responsibility has become a myth, especially in larger governmental systems. Critics suggest that it is now the deputy ministers and other senior civil servants who actually run most departments. For this reason, among others, there is the growing number of a empts by ministers to avoid responsibility and blame when something goes wrong, especially when they had no prior knowledge or involvement. Critics argue that when ministers no longer feel compelled to resign for administrative abuses or errors, a serious void in the traditional system of accountability is created, since senior civil servants are not held directly, personally, or publicly accountable for problems that arise. Beginning in the final decades of the twentieth century, many politicians themselves came around to the view that the permanent bureaucracy was beset with inertia, being unable or unwilling to change directions, mainly because of an a achment to past policies and administrative practices that they played a big part in creating. Deputy ministers, critics suggested, had personal and departmental interests to defend, which led to both active and passive resistance to change, especially changes involving loss of authority, money, and staff. To deal with this problem, governments began to insist on responsive competence from the civil service, as opposed to the traditional expectation of simply neutral competence. To achieve this shi , some Canadian jurisdictions took measures such as removing deputies in whom they

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lacked confidence, pu ing deputies on term contracts, and increasing the size of exempt political staffs serving ministers, all actions intended to ensure that the policy goals of the government were pushed down into the bureaucracy. Where this happened, it le deputy ministers and other career civil servants to square the new interpretation of their roles with the traditional conventions of an anonymous, neutral, career civil service ready to serve successive governments with equal professionalism and loyalty (Aucoin 2008). These debates and developments took place in Manitoba, but not to the extent or with the same intensity of other Canadian jurisdictions and other countries. Why this was the case will become clearer as the analysis of the role of Manitoba’s deputy minister proceeds. Appointment of Deputy Ministers Like in other Canadian jurisdictions, deputy ministers are appointed by Order in Council (i.e., by the Cabinet) on the recommendation of the premier. The legal authority for such appointments is found in section 32 of the Civil Service Act, section 2.1 of the Civil Service Superannuation Act, and section 30 of the Interpretation Act. The Orders in Council passed by Cabinet to appoint deputy ministers are now posted online, with the name of the individual, along with the department, date of appointment, the classification level (there are three levels for deputies), and salary ranged. The premier is advised on appointments by the clerk of the Executive Council, who serves as deputy minister to the premier, secretary to the Cabinet, and head of the civil service. More is said below about the position of the clerk, particularly his or her relationships with the other eighteen deputies. It should be noted here, however, that in modern Manitoba politics (which most observers date from the end of coalition governments in the late 1950s), eight premiers have appointed six clerks and, with one exception, all have been individuals with a known partisan affiliation. This practice reflects the central strategic and influential position of the clerk as the critical link between the political and administrative sides of government. Partisan appointment should not be understood to imply that the individuals who have served in this powerful position are unqualified or even under-qualified for supporting the premier and Cabinet and providing leadership to the civil service based on the shi ing agenda of the governing party. As discussed later in this chapter, some highly educated, experienced, and capable

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partisan appointees have performed well as clerk of the Executive Council over the years. The appointment process for other deputy minister can be described in general terms as non-partisan and professional, with the premier and the Cabinet usually accepting the recommendations of the clerk. As the later analyses of the backgrounds of the deputy group indicates, individuals with a known partisan background have on occasion been appointed, but partisan appointments to deputy positions have been a small minority in the line-up of deputy ministers. Even the appointees who are “friends of the governing party” have arguably possessed qualifications and experience suited to the position of deputy minister, o en including service in other senior public service or private sector roles. In legal terms, deputy ministers serve “at pleasure,” which means in practice for as long as the premier wishes them to be in a particular position. Despite the absence of statutory protection against arbitrary dismissal, the convention in Manitoba has been to regard the position of the deputy minister as part of the permanent civil service. In general, there has not been the political practice of replacing a large number of deputies when political parties in office have changed. Something of an exception was the Progressive Conservative government of Premier Sterling Lyon (1977–81), which had promised before taking office to replace senior civil servants for reasons of political incompatibility and incompetence. This led to three deputy ministers being fired and another forty-six senior managers being replaced, with approximately half of the replacements coming from outside of the civil service (Wilson 2001, 114). Following the defeat of the Lyon Conservatives in the 1981 provincial election, the New Democratic government of Premier Howard Pawley removed three deputy ministers (partly because of a reduction in the number of departments), and at least one deputy with clear political ties to the governing party was appointed (Levin 1988; Pawley and Brown-John 1993). It should be noted that the Lyon-Pawley era was an ideologically polarized period in Manitoba politics, which helps to explain the break from the modern tradition of continuity in the deputy ranks. Generally there seems to have been an acceptance by governments that the present methods for appointing deputy ministers strike the right balance in ensuring responsiveness and accountability to the premier and Cabinet while still preserving the independence, impartiality, and professionalism of the civil service. Pu ing deputy ministers on

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fixed-term contracts corresponding to the normal five-year life of a government have apparently not been seriously considered in Manitoba, even though that option has been adopted in some provinces. Nor has Manitoba enlarged to any great extent the political staff serving at the centre or with individual ministers as ways to provide countervailing advice to that provided by the civil service and to deal with perceived or potential departmental foot-dragging in carrying out the government’s policy and administrative directions. Partly because political staffs at the centre and in departments remain small compared to those of some other Canadian jurisdictions, there has been li le debate about se ing parameters on the behaviour of political assistants in the form of formal rules and codes of conduct. This is not to say there have never been tensions between exempt political appointees and deputy ministers, just that the problem does not appear to be as great as elsewhere in Canada. In the research for this chapter, a high value was found to be placed upon professionalism and competence over partisanship in the appointment and performance of successive generations of deputy ministers in Manitoba. Without exception, deputies and equivalents interviewed spoke of the importance of initially providing advice based upon good policy, not politics or ideology, and subsequently working without hesitation to implement the decisions made by their ministers, decisions that inevitably have a political dimension. Implicit in all conversations, and explicitly stated by one former deputy minister, was the deputy’s duty to support the minister’s decisions, regardless of the deputy’s personal judgment of those actions. If, in extreme circumstances, a deputy’s disagreement might preclude giving full support in the implementation of policy, it was incumbent on the deputy in question to seek reassignment or to resign. In return for this degree of professionalism, deputy ministers in Manitoba have enjoyed relatively good job security, with few politically motivated changes in staffing taking place, compared to recent dismissals of senior and even mid-level managers in the governments of Saskatchewan and British Columbia. An exceptional demonstration of the respect for the principle of non-partisanship and trust in a neutral competence of a high-level civil servant is provided by the career of Harvey Bostrom, deputy minister of Aboriginal and Northern Affairs. Bostrom began his public service as an elected representative, as mayor of his hometown of Manitogagan. In the 1973 Manitoba election he became the New Democratic (NDP) member of the Legislative

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Assembly for Rupertsland, and from 1974 until the defeat of the Schreyer government in 1977, he served as minister in several Cabinet portfolios. From 1977 until 1981 he served in the opposition while Sterling Lyon led the Progressive Conservative government, and then decided against seeking re-election in 1981. A er a period in the private sector, Bostrom returned to government in 1987 as exempt political staff, serving as a secretary to a Cabinet commi ee in the Pawley administration. Six months later, the government fell, and Gary Filmon’s Progressive Conservative party won a minority government. As a political appointee invited by Premier Pawley to serve a government with which he had close personal and professional ties, and with an extensive partisan record of his own, Bostrom expected to be dismissed shortly a er the election. To his own surprise, he was asked by the Filmon government to serve as director of the Indian Affairs Secretariat (later the Native Affairs Secretariat.) “I was a vocal member of the opposition,” Bostrom recalls, “and worked hard to defeat the Lyon government. I expected to get a call saying ‘Thank you for your work, see you,’ but I got the opposite call. They wanted me to work on Aboriginal issues, and I was very interested in that area, so I agreed. It’s unusual for people to move from politics to the civil service, but I had the background and the interest” (interview 6 June 2010). This combination of skills and experience enabled him to serve effectively as director of the Aboriginal Affairs Secretariat. Early in his tenure in this position, the provincial government was in conflict with Manitoba’s First Nations about “Indian gaming,” which a colleague confided to Bostrom he thought meant hunting. This issue involved many jurisdictions and had been a problem throughout many provincial administrations. Serving the Filmon government loyally, Bostrom worked with Oscar Lathlin, then the chief of The Pas First Nation (now Opaskwayak Cree Nation) and later a Cabinet minister in the Doer government, to create the first Indian gaming agreement in Canada. Similar agreements were subsequently adopted in other regions, which resolved many tensions between First Nations and mainstream governments. Had Bostrom been asked to step down a er the election of the Filmon government, nobody, least of all him, would have found anything remiss in the decision. Since that was not the case, Bostrom continued his work on a major provincial policy file, and his extensive background in partisan politics was not considered a liability. On the

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contrary, his understanding of the many dynamics animating political negotiations enabled him to provide exemplary service to the Filmon and Doer governments, in the la er of which he became deputy minister of Aboriginal and northern affairs, a position he holds today under Premier Selinger. One can only speculate why Premier Filmon might appoint a former political opponent to a potentially influential position in his administration. Aboriginal issues were gaining visibility in the wake of public discussion about the Constitution, First Nations, and self-government. While Manitoba’s Aboriginal population was growing both in size and in participation in public life, this policy arena was not then as polarized and partisan as it would later become. It is plausible that Premier Filmon saw the value of keeping an experienced and knowledgeable senior public servant in place to provide policy advice, which dovetailed nicely with the desire of the Progressive Conservative party to broaden its appeal, particularly in the five northern-most ridings, where Aboriginal voters could swing election outcomes. A Profile of Deputy Ministers In 2010 Manitoba had nineteen deputy ministers, including the clerk of the Executive Council, the commissioner of the Civil Service Commission, and the secretary to the Treasury Board. Since 1985 the number of deputy ministers has ranged between eighteen, in the last quarter of 2001, and twenty-three, in the final quarters of 2005 and 2009. During the past two decades, departments have been created in response to new government priorities, as with Aboriginal and Northern Affairs and Conservation, both created in 1999, and Water Stewardship, created in 2003. The merging of a department’s functions into another portfolio has affected the number of deputy ministers. For example, before 1999 Housing was a separate department, but during the Doer government it was made part of Family Services and Housing. When Greg Selinger succeeded Doer (who le to become the Canadian ambassador to the United States) as premier in October 2009, housing ma ers became part of a new department of Housing and Community Development. Similarly, responsibilities that had been under the aegis of the Department of Government Services were in 2005 redistributed amongst other departments. Such changes in the titles and content of ministerial portfolios probably create more of a sense of “swirl” outside

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of government than inside, where operations are seldom drastically changed by reorganizations. Education and Health, significant portfolios from both political and financial perspectives, have experienced regular shuffles of responsibilities as well as personnel. Currently there is a Department of Education and a Department of Advanced Education. The minister of education was responsible for all education-related ma ers until 2001, when responsibilities were shared with the newly created Department of Advanced Education. Earlier, responsibility for Training, Youth, and Citizenship shi ed between the two education departments. Similarly, the expanding importance of health-related policy and programming was recognized by the creation in 2003 of the Department of Healthy Living as a complement to the Department of Health. In the Cabinet reorganization introduced in November 2009 by the new premier, Selinger, a new department of Healthy Living, Youth, and Seniors was established. As a result of Cabinet changes, there have been occasions when parts of one department reported to the deputy minister of another department. In Manitoba, despite such changes, continuity in the assignments of deputy ministers has been greater than in larger jurisdictions, like the government of Canada, where the rapid movement of deputies has meant relatively short assignments within one department (Bierling, Carroll, and Rosenbla 2002). In Manitoba departments in continuous operation for 10 years since 1988, there was an average of 4.3 deputy ministers over the decade. The mean tenure of a deputy minister in a given portfolio was 3.6 years, a number that was depressed by shortterm appointments during transitional periods. When appointments lasting 6 months or less are excluded, the average tenure of Manitoba’s deputies was 4.0 years. Six deputy ministers in this interval held their position for 10 or more years. Reassignment within the DM community is also not uncommon: between 1988 and 2010, 24 deputies served two or more separate appointments, almost all including different departments. The stability in the ranks of Manitoba’s deputies can be contrasted with the “churn” in O awa, where the tenure of deputies has fallen in the 1.8 to 2.4 year range during recent decades. While the factors that determine the length of any appointment are varied and complex, one pa ern suggests itself in turnover amongst deputy ministers: departments whose day-to-day operations are the most politically volatile tend to have more deputies who each serve for

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briefer periods. The length of service of deputies of more operational departments like Agriculture, Highways and Transportation, Labour, and Finance, the civil service commissioner, and the secretary to Cabinet for intergovernmental affairs averaged more than 5 years per appointment. Their counterparts at more policy-oriented departments like Justice, Education, Family Services, Health and Housing averaged between 3 and 3.5 years per appointment. Today many programs and activities ensure that Manitoba’s civil service is broadly representative at all levels of Manitoba society. This first became the focus of explicit policies during the Pawley government from 1981 to 1988, with the initial efforts focusing mainly on the recruitment and advancement of women (Thomas 2010). In 2010 there were programs and activities to support the inclusion of Aboriginals, the disabled, visible minorities, and of course women. Progress in having the civil service more fully mirror the composition of society was slow during the 1990s, in part because of downsizing in the civil service. Until 2001, the number of female deputy ministers fluctuated between one and three, corresponding to 4–15 per cent of the total. Over the course of the past decade, those figures have increased to between four and seven of the DM and equivalent positions, or 21–30 per cent. As a group, today’s nineteen deputy ministers are much more representative of Manitoba’s population. Seven deputy ministers are women and two are Aboriginal, and while in both cases this is lower than the proportion of all Manitobans belonging to these groups, this represents a substantial shi in the direction of greater equity. This cohort also brings significant and diverse prior experience to their roles: eleven hold a postgraduate degree, two at the doctoral level, while four have significant private sector experience, and fully fi een have worked in more than one department during their careers. As noted earlier, research for this chapter included an online survey that deputy ministers were invited to complete. Fourteen of the nineteen deputies completed the survey. These surveys included quantitative questions, in which deputies indicated their agreement or disagreement with a series of statements about the role of deputy minister, and qualitative, open-ended questions. The survey was complemented by face-to-face interviews with seven of the deputies, in which they expanded on their replies and discussed themes arising from the survey questions and responses. While examples and illustrations are used throughout this chapter, the major conclusions offered by the survey are discussed below.

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As indicated above, deputies bring to their appointment a wide range of backgrounds informed by formal and informal education, experience in the department they head, and other experience in the public and private sectors. Respondents were asked to evaluate how much a number of factors had contributed to the development of qualities that helped their career to progress. General on-the-job experience was identified as the most significant element, with respondents rating it on average as 4.14 on a scale from 1 to 5. A more specific aspect of on-the-job learning, in the form of a specific assignment or project that led to a higher profile within the department, had an average rating of 3.31. Formal education prior to employment in government was also considered very important, with an average rating of 3.29. By contrast, training and development opportunities within government, and formal education outside of government during employment, were rated as only slightly important, with average scores of 2.57 and 2.07 respectively. Mentorship, which combines experience within government with the building of professional relationships, had an average score of 3.07, meaning that respondents considered it important. More broadly, in the open-ended responses linked to this question, one deputy minister suggested that there was no substitute for time in senior management, which was the sine qua non of proving one’s suitability for the job. The government wants deputies who understand the processes and pressures of both politics and governing, and this is demonstrated through years of work building strong relationships and managing tensions between different stakeholders. When asked how well prepared they were for the various components of the DM role, the majority of respondents stated that they were largely prepared for the administrative, management, and executive responsibilities of the role. The more policy-related aspects of the job, such as program advice and evaluation, and support to Cabinet on these ma ers, were judged as more congruent with experience and education, with five of the fourteen respondents stating that they were thoroughly prepared for this aspect of the job. A substantial number of deputies had experience working in fields relevant to their department’s mandate and so brought to the position of deputy minister not only expertise in designing and implementing programs but also a good grasp of the implications of policy and administrative decisions for operations. One deputy, who had managed multiple departments, stated in an interview that the skills developed as deputy in one

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department could be smoothly transferred to another. Two respondents explicitly mentioned the crucial nature of an extensive background in evaluating and analysing issues and problems from a number of perspectives. The diversity of the issues that a deputy minister must manage means that effective performance requires the ability to assess the financial, policy, and political implications of any decision, and advice to the minister or Cabinet must take into account not only the narrowly defined department-level issues at stake but also the effects on intergovernmental relationships, public and private stakeholders, and longrange planning. The Content of the Job of Deputy Minister The range of responsibilities of deputy ministers is very broad and is derived from a number of sources, including statutory provisions, delegated formal authority, government-wide administrative policies, rules and procedures, understandings and expectations developed in their relationships with the premier/Cabinet and with the central institutions of government, directions from their minister and the external relationships they are expected to maintain with other governments, outside groups, the legislature, and the media. Formal responsibilities of deputies laid down in law and administrative rules have changed li le over the years, but informal expectations and pressures, and the importance of reputations based on performance, have increased in importance as circumstances inside and outside of government have changed and presented new challenges. Even in a relatively small governmental system like Manitoba, deputy ministers put in full days at the office and expect to take work home. Each deputy minister has an individual style of leadership and management, but all are challenged to balance responsibilities and priorities and to manage the demands they face within the limits of the time available. Deputies in charge of departments with broad policy content, with impacts on all citizens and with a correspondingly higher profile in the legislature and the media, generally face more pressures and more time-management challenges than deputies who lead more operational, low-profile departments. These general pa erns can obviously vary on the basis of short-term events and issues. For many reasons the job of deputy minister became more multidimensional and difficult during the la er half of the twentieth century. Externally, there were such developments as the increased scope and

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technicality of government activity, an expansionary period in budgets and staff followed by restraint and layoffs, the rise of neoconservatism and New Public Management ideas that challenged the traditional roles and ways of managing governments, diminished public trust and confidence in public office holders, increasingly insisted on citizen engagement, and introduced stricter requirements for transparency, accountability, and higher ethical standards in government (Thomas 2010). Internally, the civil service was challenged to adapt to new requirements and expectations: to be more responsive to both ministers and to outside groups, to do more with less, to be er reflect the diversity within society, to replace the “baby boomer” generation of civil servants with new knowledge workers who demanded meaningful work and autonomy, to incorporate information technology into their operations, and to meet new and expanded accountability requirements. In addition to these broad, longer-term trends, contemporary deputy ministers were required to cope with the swirl of short-term events and developments, shi ing priorities, and deadlines that are a part of the more instantaneous, frenetic world of government. Simply stated, the deputy minister’s job is to • support the minister; • support the premier and Cabinet; • lead and manage within the department and any non-departmental bodies that comprise the minister’s portfolio; • engage in external relationships with the legislature, other orders of government, other organizations and groups, and the media; and • work with central agencies and with other deputies on horizontal, whole-of-government processes (Podger 2009). This breakdown of the components of the job is useful for analytical purposes, but in practice the duties and activities overlap and intersect. Also, it is clearly possible for these components to be further broken down into more specific activities. A brief description of each component will be presented, followed by the findings from a survey of current deputy ministers about how they allocate their time among the components. Providing policy advice and more generally supporting the minister who is the nominal head of the department is usually thought of as the primary duty and the main activity of the deputy minister. Ministers and deputies are brought together by the premier in what might be

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described as an arranged marriage. Just like in other marriages, the two individuals are interdependent, are meant to support one another, and ideally develop a close, mutually respectful, and trusting relationship. This takes time, which in government is always scarce. Governments change, ministers come and go, deputies leave or are moved to new assignments, and that can inhibit the development of close working relationships and trust. Fortunately, in Manitoba, both ministerial and deputy ministerial shuffles seem to occur less frequently than in O awa and some other provincial capitals. The arrival of a new minister requires the deputy and the department to inform and educate the minister about the department’s mandate, structures, programs, and agenda of ongoing activities. Communication must be two-way, with the deputy communicating to the department the priorities and decisions of the premier, the Cabinet, and the minister. The deputy must also develop an understanding of the minister’s leadership style and share it with the department. Ensuring the timely development of information and advice from within the department to meet the minister’s demands and needs is a crucial part of the job of the deputy minister. The co-location of ministers and deputies in the Manitoba Legislature building means that contacts are relatively easy, within the limited time available to both parties. Not all deputies interviewed for this study believed that co-location is positive. A former deputy stated that on balance co-location was negative because it draws deputies into the swirl of everyday political events and both physically and psychologically draws them away from departmental staff. While deputies must work closely with their ministers, they must not confuse their role with that of ministerial staff, who are there to help ministers with the political management of issues. Support for the premier and the Cabinet overlaps and links with the activities involved in supporting the minister. There has been much discussion in other jurisdictions about the centralization of power in the office of the first minister, but according to the clerk of the Executive Council this has not happened to the same extent in Manitoba (Vogt 2009). Apart from those areas where the premier is traditionally in charge (such as intergovernmental and transnational relations), it is exception that he or she will initiate policy or take control of ma ers within the portfolio of other ministers. However, a growing emphasis on collective decision-making in Cabinet and its commi ees in priority policy areas does mean somewhat diminished autonomy for individual ministers and their departments. According to the deputies contacted

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in this study, generally ministers and their deputies still retain significant freedom to initiate policy and to run departments. As a practical expression of collective responsibility, and reflecting the recent emphasis on policy and program coordination, deputy ministers participate in weekly meetings with the clerk of the Executive Council (a position discussed below), regular group meetings with the secretary to the Treasury Board, and a shi ing line-up of crossdepartmental commi ees that reflects the changing agenda of the government of the day. Informal meetings between and among deputies are also important for clarifying and resolving disagreements that ministers must ultimately decide. The scale of the Manitoba government makes these informal, face-to-face, interpersonal dealings among ministers, among deputy ministers, between ministers and their own deputies, and between deputies and their departmental staff easier to accomplish and reduces the need for more formal structures and communications. Leadership of the deputy minister, who is administrative head of the department, somewhat resembles that of chief executive in a private firm but is different because of such factors as the political context, nature of the functions of departments, scope of the impacts of government on society, need to coordinate across departments and other orders of government, requirements for transparency, extensive outside scrutiny, exposure to almost continuous criticism, and multiple processes of accountability. As leaders and managers of departments, deputy ministers must ensure that: • the department has a vision and a strategy; • there is an appropriate structure and delegation of authority to support implementation of decisions and the enforcement of internal accountability; • there is an internal financial management process to allocate and manage resources; • there are plans and performance reports to align departmental activities with government priorities, to manage risks, and to achieve results; • there are staffing and human resource management processes to ensure that the department has competent employees to provide sound policy advice and effective program management; and • there are activities to motivate and to support employees and to promote a shared culture of purpose, pride, commitment, and integrity.

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In addition to having to work with the minister on many of these ma ers, the deputy minister finds that his or her freedom as the administrative leader is also constrained by central administrative policies and processes for policy coordination, budgeting, and staffing. During the la er decades of the twentieth century, the development and maintenance of external relationships became a much larger part of the job of Manitoba’s deputy ministers. The NDP governments of Premier Gary Doer (1999–2009) placed a strong emphasis on a networked, collaborative approach to policy development and program delivery, which put deputies more “out front” as spokespersons and negotiators on behalf of the government and their departments (Thomas 2010). Deputies now spend a significant amount of their time on external interactions with a wide range of stakeholders, including other governments, pressure groups, advisory bodies, community organizations, and various professional forums. Appearances before commi ees of the legislature are another external role for Manitoba deputies. Short legislative sessions and a relatively weak commi ee system mean these events are not as time-consuming or challenging as in larger Canadian jurisdictions. Also, unlike in the Parliament of Canada and some provincial legislatures, such as Ontario, Manitoba’s deputy ministers do not appear before legislative commi ees without the minister being present (for example, when estimates are being reviewed), and answers to questions come through the minister, even though the deputy is o en the source for the information being provided. The exception is the Standing Commi ee on Public Accounts, which reviews past spending and management. In that forum the deputy answers, but questions on policy ma ers are reserved for ministers. There are still risks for ministers and their deputies because of the unpredictable and o en highly partisan nature of the proceedings of legislative commi ees, leading to the generation of unwanted controversies and headlines. Perhaps the most sensitive external dealings are with the media, which play a role in shaping the agendas of government and public perception of its performance. The professional lives and reputations of deputies are affected by media coverage, regardless of whether they have direct, personal contacts with journalists. With the growing emphasis in all governments on agenda and issue management, the conduct of internal and external communications has become more extensive, professionalized, and sophisticated within government.

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These conclusions are borne out by the second and third sections of the survey completed by fourteen deputies. Three questions dealt with constraints on successfully managing the duties of deputy minister. Respondents were asked first to describe how they perceived these constraints to affect them, and then to indicate the frequency and magnitude of the limits they imposed on their work as deputy. Many deputies interviewed pointed out that finite resources and time, while sometimes significant obstacles to overcome, are constraints shared by any organization. A number of them nonetheless cited challenges unique to this position, such as the personal risks sometimes implied in “speaking truth to power,” the need to reconcile political sensitivities with the administration of programs and service delivery, “questionable political direction,” and constant and o en hostile media scrutiny. The quantitative questions on the frequency of constraints were congruent with these comments. The lack of financial and human resources was considered a frequent constraint by eight of the fourteen deputies who completed the survey, and a chronic constraint by three, with an average rating of 4.0 on a scale ranging from 1, “never a constraint,” to 5, “a chronic constraint.” Only slightly less frequent, according to respondents, were the constraints arising from a preoccupation with appearances, especially with how the media will depict a given event. Two other time constraints also scored highly amongst the deputies surveyed: a general lack of time to carry out the department and deputy’s functions, and “unrealistic and artificial deadlines.” Time pressures generally resulted in less a ention paid to planning, which was “crowded out” by short-term events. While constraints relating to unclear political direction, shi ing priorities, and restrictions related to decision-making were rated as the least important among the eight categories included in this survey question, they nonetheless all scored between “an occasional constraint” and “a frequent constraint.” Asking deputies about the difficulty of coping with constraints, as compared to the frequency with which they occur, paints a slightly different picture of the major challenges facing deputies. Insufficient time, deadlines and regulations to do with staffing, budgeting, and decision-making were most frequently characterized as “a minor constraint requiring very limited resources” to overcome and “a constraint requiring moderate resources.” It is possible that the frequency of such constraints led deputies and departments to develop skills and

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tools to work around routine problems. The lack of financial or human resources was judged by the majority of respondents to be “a major constraint requiring significant resources.” By far the most severe constraint, as judged by the deputies answering this question, was a preoccupation with media coverage and appearances, cited by a third as “a challenging constraint requiring intense resources.” Slightly less serious but still ranked as the second and third most important constraints respectively were unclear or inconsistent political direction, and shi ing priorities within the department. In discussion, a number of deputies indicated that the frequency and magnitude of any given challenge could shi rapidly, depending upon external factors. Elections and political crises placed additional strain on resources as a result of intensified media scrutiny and political sensitivity, as well as a shi in priorities of ministers and their political staffs. Bad economic times, whether specific to Manitoba or part of a worldwide recession, affected not only available resources but also the sensitivity a ached to perceptions of spending and good financial management. One deputy pointed out that while lack of resources had been a consistent constraint on departments for decades, “government has never been bigger or more interventionist than now.” The requirement to do more with less, accordingly, had less to do with diminished resources and a greater need for services in absolute terms, but rather was a consequence of “the growing public expectation for government services,” combined with lack of tolerance for more taxation. Straitened finances were a factor for every organization in every sector since the economic turbulence that began in 2008. These challenges made themselves felt in the Manitoba public service no less than in other jurisdictions. Since 1996 the government of Manitoba has operated under the restrictions of a balanced budget law and, even though amendments have been made to increase the financial flexibility of allowing deficits to occur, the budgetary circumstances have become very tight. In an interview, a deputy minister noted that limited funding and staffing was always a constraint, but was less so from 1999 to 2008, when Manitoba had enjoyed a sustained period of economic growth and increased revenues, including larger federal financial transfers. Following the worldwide economic downturn in 2008, restraint was introduced, and the deputy minister predicated that the civil service faced several years of tight budgetary controls. The major casualty of further budgetary constraints was in areas such as policy development and long-term planning. In the short term,

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cuts to these areas were relatively painless. The problem, according to several DMs interviewed, was that over time a lack of capacity for inhouse policy research and planning created a significant weakness in the department, which led to an increasingly reactive, rather than proactive, approach to dealing with problems. These reactions tended to result in costly but temporary solutions, se ing the stage for more serious problems in the future. A deputy minister with experience in several departments commented that some of the most significant challenges facing Manitoba in the coming decade were in demographic change as the baby boomer cohort reached its sixties and seventies. Income support, health care, and other social services for the elderly, and health prevention for the entire population would put even greater cost pressures on the Manitoba government. These problems presented an intrinsic need for strategic policy and long-term planning, and yet the problems arising next week or next month inevitably had a higher claim on a department’s time and finances. This was particularly true in three of the departments with the highest budgets: Health, Family Services, and Justice. The final set of questions dealt with the relative importance and priority of five broad categories of activity: advice and support to the minister, advice and support to the premier and Cabinet, leading and managing within the department, working with central agencies and other deputy ministers on whole-of-government issues, and conducting external relationships with the legislature, other governments, stakeholder groups, and the media. The average deputy minister, according to responses, spent 20–30 per cent of his or her work week providing advice and support to the minister, and 10–20 per cent providing advice and support to Cabinet. Leading and managing within the department was easily the most significant element of the job according to time spent in each area, with the average respondent allocating between a third and half of the work week to these activities. Working with other branches within the provincial government took an average 10–20 per cent of a deputy minister’s work week, while interacting with external bodies took 10 per cent or less of that time. This last category, which included dealing with external stakeholders and the media, was rated as one of the least time-consuming categories of activity, according to the responses to the quantitative questions. However, in interviews two deputies indicated that media demands and issue management accounted for about half of their work week, which confirmed the point made earlier that the

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importance of this aspect of the work of deputy ministers varied by department and the issues making headlines at the time. Scrutiny not only of government but also of the public service has transformed over the past decade. The 24/7 news tempo, in which new content is expected and generated constantly and without regard to the actual magnitude or importance of events being discussed has established a climate in which the differences between criticism and coverage have been blurred. The egalitarian nature of the blogosphere has given anyone with an Internet connection the chance to share an opinion, which has many positive consequences but also lowers the cost of entry into the world of punditry to almost zero, with a corresponding lack of accountability or accuracy. These changes were felt by deputy ministers. “Issue management is a huge part of every deputy’s job,” observed one deputy minister. “If you’re responsible for a particular program area, you should be prepared to promote or defend that, because presumably it involves a program or service which you believe is helpful or useful in some way.” In practice, this expectation imposed another tension on senior civil servants, who were to support the government’s policies without involving themselves in partisan politics. In practice, the deputies interviewed agreed, the line between advocating for a policy decided upon by Cabinet, which was within the boundaries of her or his role, and promoting the party in government, which was not, was porous and hard to define. The perception of effective management, both by the media and by ministers, was o en derived from factors beyond the deputy ministers’ control. “People a ribute a lot more direct influence to us than actually exists,” according to one deputy interviewed for this chapter. “I’ve been congratulated for my excellent management of a politically sensitive ministry when there has been a long stretch without any major negative events, when in fact it’s good luck as much as anything else.” Another deputy suggested that the media had more power than it knew in se ing the government’s agenda. “You only have to listen to Question Period to see where questions come from. The opposition gets the paper and decides on its theme for the day. The media strongly drive the politics of government, and this inevitably flows into the operations of departments.” The same deputy also perceived a trend towards the sensationalistic in Winnipeg’s media and described cases where the media, especially the press, completely misrepresented events, either

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through a genuine lack of understanding or a desire to generate flashy headlines. Media requests consumed significant and growing amounts of time, according to the survey and interviews. The symbiotic relationship between media and politicians also limited the ability of departments to ration the time they spent dealing with media requests. Many requests did not involve access to information issues and pertained to information that could be obtained by journalists on their own. A deputy minister who served in a particularly sensitive department described an ongoing temptation to invite the media to do their own research, rather than expecting government staff to do it for them. “But that would harm the political interests of the minister and also the department,” he concluded. Another deputy pointed out that media did increase accountability to the public and help to create a feeling of accessibility between the electorate and the government. As evidence on this point, he noted that there were regular protests about federal ma ers on the grounds of the legislature but far fewer in relation to provincial ma ers. This difference may have reflected in part the public’s confusion over who does what within Canada’s federal system, but the deputy suggested it also reflected the public perception that the provincial government was better connected and more responsive to citizens. Currently, according to the deputies interviewed, all media requests went through a central office in the Department of Culture, which then coordinated contact with the appropriate department. Even with this filtering, many departments got one to two requests per day, all of which required some response. The media community, like the political sphere in Winnipeg, is small, meaning that “it’s very dicey to take on a particular editor or reporter even if they handled a specific issue very poorly, because you’re working with them the next day.” Manitoba’s deputy ministers appeared regularly before the legislature’s Standing Commi ee on Public Accounts (PAC), which was chaired by an opposition MLA. Officially such sessions were meant to deal with financial and management issues, but in practice the proceedings o en dri ed into policy and partisan controversies. One deputy observed, “O en the questions put to civil servants are about politics, rather than policy or administration. I’ve seen colleagues hung out to dry with their ministers si ing beside them.” The predominately negative orientation in PAC was one reason why over the years governments have sought to restrict the number of meetings of the commi ee and have not followed the example of the government of Canada of

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adopting the “accounting officer” model, which makes deputy ministers directly and personally accountable before PAC for the prudent financial management of their departments. The average deputy minister currently in office had filled that specific role for an average of 3.6 years, although a number of incumbents had previously directed other departments or served in the role during an earlier period not contiguous with their current term. Reflecting on their time as deputy ministers, respondents were asked to characterize whether these five broad components of the job had become more or less important than in the past, or whether they were about as important now as in the past. Their responses reflected a high degree of continuity in the relative importance a ached to each set of activities. A majority of respondents felt that working with central agencies and other deputy ministers had become more important than in the past, while the other four categories were judged to be neither significantly more or less important in 2010 than in the preceding five years. Finally, respondents were asked whether, in their judgment, these same categories should be higher or lower priorities than they currently were, or whether the priority was about right. None of the areas was identified as needing to have lower priority, and the great majority of respondents felt that four of the categories currently had about the right priority. The exception was working with central agencies and other deputies on whole-of-government issues; the majority of respondents felt that this should be a higher priority. Improving communications within the Manitoba government and between departments has been a priority throughout the past decade and should continue to be so, according to respondents, as should be er coordination with other jurisdictions. Four major themes emerge from the answers elicited by the online survey and follow-up interviews. The first is the importance of developing skills on the job, within the senior ranks of the civil service. The challenges and dynamics of the deputy minister’s job have some aspects in common but are fundamentally different from those in the private or non-profit sector. For example, building relationships within the department, with central agencies, with other deputies, and with the leadership of non-departmental bodies that fall within the portfolio of the minister can be of great importance, both to facilitate the increasing integration and collaboration between separate areas of government, and to acquire skills and wisdom from counterparts. Informal learning was rated by deputy ministers as significantly more important

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to their job performance and career trajectories than external education post-employment, such as graduate-level university studies or certificate programs, or formal internal development and training. The second theme is the tension between the sensitivity of the political dimension of policymaking and implementation on the one hand, and the need to maintain excellent administration and service and program delivery independent of political highs and lows on the other. In the words of one deputy, “A great challenge is matching political objectives with policy goals. A successful deputy will effectively marry good policy and good politics. Of course not all good policy can be good politics. On these issues, deputies and ministers must show leadership” while working together within the parameters established for the political and administrative heads of a given department. Doing “more with less” has been the catchphrase of public service for years. Certainly the twin pressures to deliver more and be er public services while freezing or lowering tax rates are heightened during times of financial stress, which became more intense a er the economic downturn in 2008. This particular set of constraints is exacerbated by the insufficient resources allocated towards, or available for, long-term strategic planning and research. Economies achieved by cu ing back on these activities are transient, several respondents pointed out, since any time or money saved is ultimately nullified by the less efficient use of remaining resources without a clear long-term plan. A more frenetic pace also exacts a toll on human resources, as burnout increases, which reduces efficiency and performance while increasing the costs of recruiting and training new staff. Pu ing yet more tension on overburdened budgets and staffs is the fact that political priorities and direction can change on very short notice, necessitating great change in programming and service delivery. Finally, the pressure placed on deputies and their departments directly or indirectly by heightened scrutiny, particularly by the media, demands significant time and effort to manage, for three major reasons. First, deputies must recognize the political responsibilities and concerns of ministers and the si ing government, and must respond to changes in direction, changes that are frequently driven by concern with appearances. Second, when political staff, who tend in the words of one deputy to be “very young and inexperienced,” involve themselves in the political element of decision-making, particularly in the face of media scrutiny, they “do not ask or sometimes even want to know what the short-term or long-term implications are for direction

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and decisions they make to solve a problem.” Third, the traditional separation between senior civil servants and direct interaction with the media has eroded. Partly as a result of the more confrontational and less deferential character of media in the twenty-first century, and in response to structural changes, such as requiring deputies to testify before commi ees in the legislature, it is increasingly hard for deputy ministers to remain aloof from the stresses and challenges of working in an environment in which the slightest misstep, or even the appearance of one, is used as fuel to boost readership of newspapers and blogs, or to gain political advantage. Clerk of the Executive Council A critical bridge between the political and administrative sides of government is the clerk of the Executive Council, who must ensure that the government’s directions are carried out while also promoting the professionalism and integrity of the civil service. The clerk is Manitoba’s top civil servant and deputy to the premier. Pursuant to British constitutional practice, the position of clerk has been around since the creation of the province in 1870. Back then there were only four departments of government, which had grown to just seven when Manitoba’s first Civil Service Act came into force in 1885. One of the seven departments was the Executive Council, consisting of the lieutenant-governor and five ministers. The premier was president of the council, and he was supported by a “deputy head,” who held the position of the clerk of the Executive Council and clerk of the Legislative Assembly. For this dual role, the incumbent in 1887 was paid the princely sum of $1,200 per annum (Robertson 1887, 27). From modest beginnings, the clerk’s role evolved to become a critically important and influential actor at the centre of government. Since there is no full history of the Manitoba civil service, it is impossible to state precisely when the content of the clerk’s job changed. It appears to have been mainly administrative until the late 1950s. This might be inferred from the fact that from 1952 to 1958 no clerk was appointed, and the duties of the position were performed first by the deputy a orney general and then by the clerk of the Legislative Assembly (Wilson 2001). Reflecting the limited scope of government, the volume of legislation introduced annually was small and the civil service employed just 4,000 people in 1957. The Cabinet process was simple and informal,

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with no minutes of meetings kept and only limited use made of commi ees (Vogt 2009). Modernization of the Manitoba government began with the election of the Progressive Conservative government of Premier Duff Roblin in 1958. Over the next eleven years, Roblin’s government introduced new departments, policies, and programs. Provincial expenditure increased fourfold and the civil service grew to over eight thousand employees by 1967 (Thomas 2010). To enable the Cabinet to cope with the expanded volume of government business, Roblin began circulating Cabinet agendas and supporting documents, and Cabinet minutes were sent to deputy ministers, who were responsible for implementing decisions. For the first time a small policy secretariat supporting the premier was created. Finally, in 1958 Premier Roblin recreated the position of clerk of the Executive Council (Vogt 2009). Taken together, these actions represented the transition from what has been called the “unaided” Cabinet to the “institutionalized” Cabinet. In his study of the Cabinet system of Manitoba and two other western provinces, Christopher Dunn (1995) described the evolution from a simple (few commi ees), informal (limited analytical support), and personal (dependent on the personalities of the premier and other leading ministers) Cabinet system to a more complicated (far greater use of Cabinet commi ees), formal (more paperwork and analysis), centralized (a larger personal advisory apparatus to support the premier) system. The trend had both centralizing and decentralizing implications. The premier had more support for his leadership of government, but other ministers and their deputies had the opportunity to work on policy in the commi ees of Cabinet. The development of an institutionalized Cabinet system in Manitoba during the Roblin era was mainly a product of pragmatic necessity, given the activist agenda of his government. Roblin began in 1958 with a small Cabinet of just nine members, which included him serving in the three roles of premier, provincial treasurer, and the minister responsible for federal–provincial relations. Even though it was a simpler time, juggling these weighty responsibilities obviously involved the need for some staff support. While there has been much tinkering and many name changes to Cabinet structures under the seven premiers who succeeded Roblin, the basic Cabinet architecture has changed li le since he le office in 1967. And, contrary to the conventional wisdom that personal advisory systems serving

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first ministers have increased in the national and all provincial governments, this has not been the case in Manitoba, as is discussed below. The Roblin era was also the beginning of a transition in the role of the clerk of the Executive Council. Roblin’s choice for the position was Derek Bedson. He had been born and educated in Manitoba before going to Oxford to study. Eleven years of employment in the federal public service followed, most of them with the Department of External Affairs. Always a philosophical conservative, Bedson was recruited to the office of George Drew, leader of the Progressive Conservative Party in opposition in Parliament. He went on to serve with Drew’s successor, John Diefenbaker, including a brief stint as principal secretary in the Prime Minister’s Office a er the Progressive Conservatives took power nationally in 1957. Accepting Roblin’s invitation in 1958 to come home to Manitoba, Bedson insisted that he could perform the job of clerk in a non-partisan manner, but the opposition parties accused him of running Progressive Conservative election campaigns and serving as the premier’s press secretary (Wilson 2001). Whatever his political loyalties, Bedson work from 1958 to 1981 for three Conservative premiers (Roblin, 1958–67; Weir, 1967–9; Lyon, 1977–81) and one NDP premier (Schreyer, 1969–77). In 1981 when the NDP returned to power under Premier Howard Pawley, Bedson was, in effect, dismissed (officially it was described as a “reassignment”), and within a year he had accepted a job with the Ontario government. A biography of Bedson concludes that his dismissal was based on his identification with previous Progressive Conservative governments and specifically on his presence at a meeting back in 1977 when three deputy ministers suspected of having NDP ties were fired even before Sterling Lyon had been sworn into office as premier (62). The Bedson period represents a transition in the role of clerk because, with one exception, premiers have chosen individuals who had a party background and were running the policy secretariat in the Premier’s Office at the time of their appointment. The exception was the period from 1999 to 2005 when Jim Eldridge, a career civil servant who had served six different governments as head of the federal–provincial relations unit, was appointed. Since 2005 the clerk of the Executive Council has been Paul Vogt, who worked as chief of staff to Gary Doer in opposition and served from 1999 to 2005 as head of the Policy Secretariat in the Premier’s Office. Once part of a triumvirate of political insiders involved with the political management of issues and relations with the party, Vogt dropped direct involvement with partisan events in order

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to concentrate on running the machinery of government. This did not change his party loyalty and, being at the centre of the policy process, he was clearly involved in political discussions almost daily. Today, the clerk performs three broad, interrelated, and demanding roles: deputy minister to the premier, secretary to the Cabinet, and the head of the civil service. The manner in which these roles are performed depends on a number of factors, such as the expectations and demands of the premier, the clerk’s own understanding of the role and leadership style, and the issues that dominate the government agenda. Probably the greatest single change over the past five decades is the greater expectation that the clerk will serve as a coordinator, mediator, and problem-solver on behalf of the premier. Government has become larger and more complicated, and the clerk’s role has expanded, but the size of the central staff serving the premier and Cabinet has not grown much since the Roblin era. When Roblin resigned in 1967, the Executive Council had forty staff. In 2009, that number was basically the same, with thirty-six staff on the office payroll and another dozen seconded from departments on a term basis (Vogt 2009). The clerk works closely with the premier’s chief of staff, who directs a small policy coordination group that manages daily and longer-term political issues. Relations between the clerk and the chief of staff might be described as structured informality; they meet every morning to brief the premier on issues and have a longer meeting once a week. The role that the premier and the clerk of the Executive Council are expected by tradition and convention to play in maintaining a professional and non-partisan civil service deserves mention here. As mentioned earlier, respect for the impartiality of the civil service has generally been strong in most Manitoba governments. The relatively low turnover among deputies and a less politicized senior bureaucracy are partly explained by good communications between ministers and deputies, and among deputies. The relatively small scale of Manitoba’s governmental system and the locale of most deputies in the legislative building or within a radius of a few blocks assist greatly in ensuring be er communications. Smaller departments mean that accountability and authority are not devolved outside the legislative building as extensively as in larger jurisdictions. Under these conditions, ministerial responsibility becomes more meaningful; deflecting blame onto a nameless or a specific bureaucrat has less traction with critics when decision-making and administration are central.

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While sudden or radical change in a new government is hard to effect, one serving DM pointed out that “a particular government choosing to champion a particular issue can result in dramatic changes,” using civil service renewal, and the development of Aboriginal and Healthy Child cross-departmental efforts, as examples of effective and reasonably quick new developments. Crucial to such successes, though, is “the coordination of the clerk between departments, deputy ministers, and Cabinet.” A long-serving deputy observed that collegiality among deputies was greater than at any other time in his career. This deputy minister expressed the view, shared by others interviewed, that building and managing relationships is critical to effectively serving as a deputy. When mutual trust and respect have been created, relationships can survive disagreements about roles or ideals. Literal proximity and a blend of camaraderie and professionalism make it easier for face-to-face discussions of potential problematic issues, formally or informally, before they become entrenched or seemingly insurmountable. “The role of the people in the leadership capacity is critical,” the deputy continued. “We have seen a lot of issues in the past decades, and every deputy could rant about something, but as a group Manitoba’s deputy ministers have been able to talk to their colleagues. They know how to problem solve. The relationship between the minister and the deputy minister is also critical. If you don’t have trust or confidence between those two parties, the relationship won’t work, and the clerk helps to mediate this informally by se ing the tone and helping to manage relationships.” In this deputy’s experience, Manitoba was recognized as a leader for its strength in keeping the interface between Cabinet and the deputy minister community as smooth as it was. Another long-serving DM reported being asked by counterparts in other jurisdictions how a given challenge would be managed in Manitoba, based on the reputation it had developed for pragmatism and a generally reasonable culture. Circumstances seldom deteriorate to the point where outright clashes, public or private, arise between ministers and their deputies, because pre-empting such conflict is given a high priority. “The civil service and how it’s treated is very much led by the premier, and the clerk he appoints, and how respectful they are to the civil service. It sets the tone. When the premier believes in a meritorious civil service and that the staff are commi ed and doing a good job, it filters down.”

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In an interview one deputy spoke highly of both Jim Eldridge and Paul Vogt in their roles as clerks to Cabinet. Whereas Eldridge had spent his entire career in the civil service and worked in senior roles, including as clerk, with both Progressive Conservative and NDP governments, Paul Vogt became clerk a er working in a political, partisan role, which has been the normal pa ern in the modern era of Manitoba politics going back to 1958. A er observing this difference, the deputy pointed out that there were advantages in having a clerk who had experience within the party in power, despite the formal requirement that clerks withdraw from political activity upon assuming their posts: “The clerk needs a particular temperament. If you’re providing advice to Cabinet, and you don’t understand the bent and ideals of the government, you’re out of sync, and potentially less effective because of it.” Serving as a bridge between the two groups is perceived as requiring experience within the civil service, but experience with the political elements of government should not necessarily be considered subordinate to that requirement. The political and civil service realities, and the subtleties of political and administrative nuance that accompany many issues and mandates, must be taken into account. This deputy expressed the opinion that being known not to share the political inclinations of the si ing government can complicate the issues and relationships involved. Nevertheless, “I’m an apolitical official, and I’ve had the support of the clerk in all my work, and he has a partisan background. There’s no question that politics enters into some of what’s requested of you. I believe in good government. If I were asked to do something that I think is contrary to good government, I would need to rethink where I’m si ing. That hasn’t happened very o en.” As to the frequency or intensity of partisan pressures exerted upon deputy ministers specifically and the civil service in general, one of the longest serving DMs reported having seen li le change over the course of more than three decades in the civil service. “All governments have a partisan bent that they bring into power with them. Over time, they figure out how to govern, and the civil service figures out how to manage, within that context.” The evolving issue of ministerial responsibility, meaning at the extreme that a minister ought to resign for failures of a certain magnitude under his or her leadership, whether or not he or she had any direct involvement, is also a factor in Manitoba, according to several DMs interviewed. While a minister stepping down in disgrace has

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never been a frequent occurrence in this province, it is less likely to happen now than in earlier generations. That this transition has generally not occurred at the expense of public servants, who have in other cases been used as scapegoats precisely to draw fire away from politicians, should be credited at least in part to how premiers and clerks have conducted themselves and expected their ministers and deputies to do likewise. Without the expansion of central capacity witnessed in larger Canadian governments, Manitoba’s policy and management processes continue to rely significantly on ministers and their deputies to take the initiative and to carry out Cabinet decisions. Since becoming clerk in 2005, Paul Vogt made a strong effort to ensure that government thinking and decisions were communicated directly and immediately to the deputy ministers. The clerk meets with deputies every Friday following the Wednesday meeting of Cabinet, to go over ma ers arising from Cabinet discussions. A former deputy minister and current deputy both expressed the view in interviews that the weekly meetings with the clerk were valuable, but that communications in such meetings needed to become more two-way. Both suggested that a er the clerk briefed the group on Cabinet developments, there should be more opportunity for exchanges among deputies. They acknowledged that finding time for more two-way communication was a difficulty because the meetings with the clerk were short. A change in the position of secretary to the Treasury Board in 2003 also reflected the philosophy of working with deputies. Monthly meetings with deputies on financial management were instituted, and deputies were encouraged to propose budget and staffing options rather than have the Treasury Board Secretariat impose them. All of the current deputies interviewed for this study suggested that the new collaborative approach was much to be preferred over the past, more confrontational approaches. Collegiality was also encouraged by the use of interdepartmental commi ees, which involved deputy ministers and other civil servants working together on issues that transcend departmental boundaries. A leading example was the “mirror commi ee” of seven deputy ministers which supported the Health Child Initiative commi ee of Cabinet. There was also a Cross-Department Coordination Initiatives Division, led by an assistant deputy minister, which involved pooling money and personnel to address issues like homelessness and affordable housing. In an interview for this study, a deputy minister with over

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twenty-five years’ experience observed that he had never witnessed as much collegiality within the group of nineteen deputies as existed in 2010. Conclusions The roles of Manitoba’s deputy ministers and how they are performed in practice reflect the context in which they work. By context we mean the economic, financial, intellectual/ideological, social, technologic, and political circumstances in the province and how these factors change over time. Over the past five decades there has been both continuity and change in the context in which Manitoba’s deputies work. The basic facts of Manitoba society have not changed dramatically over the past five decades; it has a relatively small population, it is socially diverse, the economy is mixed and stable, and the provincial government’s employment and spending make an important contribution to the economic and social well-being of its citizens. Federal provincial transfers are still significant in the capacity of the provincial government to pay for important programs and to comply with a balanced budget law, which has been on the books since 1996. Reflecting these circumstances, the Cabinet and civil service systems are not large, compared to those of some other provinces. The most important government activity takes place in downtown Winnipeg. The scale, location, and financial circumstances of the provincial government have encouraged a public sector philosophy of collaboration, and this has led to a thick web of relationships between various segments of society and public office holders, both elected and appointed. Consultation and collaboration with other orders of government, with industry, labour, and the various groups that comprise civil society have become an important part of the job of the deputy minister. Working under political direction and having to deal with the constraints of the political process remain a perennial challenge for deputy ministers, a bigger challenge for some than for others, depending upon the department involved and the issues on the government’s agenda. Governments of different partisan persuasions have generally been satisfied that the traditional arrangements, for the appointment and accountability of deputy ministers have produced a reasonable balance between loyalty and responsiveness to the government of the day and the professionalism and impartiality required for deputies to provide frank advice and to deliver programs efficiently and fairly.

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Relative stability in the ranks of deputy ministers remains the pa ern in Manitoba, compared to the rapid movement found in some jurisdictions. Devices used elsewhere to promote responsiveness to the government of the day, such as the appointment of deputies on term contracts and/or the use of larger political staffs to drive government goals, have not been seen as necessary in Manitoba. Unlike larger governmental systems, Manitoba has not made use of annual performance appraisals linked to the promotions and compensation of deputy ministers. Since he became clerk of the Executive Council in 2005, Paul Vogt has met annually with each deputy to discuss how she or he is contributing to the corporate agenda of government. During the expansionary decades of the 1960s and 1970s, policy entrepreneurs with strong planning and analytical skills seemed to have an advantage, rising to the top of departmental structures. By the late 1980s, public confidence in government declined, spending restraint arrived, and the ideas of “reinvention” and New Public Management gained ascendancy. The result was more emphasis on alternative ways to design and deliver programs, stricter requirements for financial management and reporting, and greater use of measurement and evaluation to eliminate or reduce programs that were no longer seen as relevant and effective. The result today is that deputies are expected to demonstrate both policy analysis and management skills, with the relative importance of each skill set depending on the tasks of their departments and what ma ers are on the government’s agenda. From the online survey and the interviews, we learned that leading and managing departments occupied the greatest amount of the time of current deputy ministers. Providing support to the minister was the second most time-consuming activity, and advice/support to the premier/Cabinet was third. The survey and the interviews also revealed that the establishment and maintenance of relationships with external actors, particularly with the media, was becoming a more demanding part of the job of the deputy minister. New rules requiring greater transparency and accountability (for example freedom of information, whistle-blower protections, conflict of interest and lobbyist registration laws/rules), and a more aggressive, instantaneous media environment made issue management and communications a more critical aspect of the deputy minister’s role. Today and for the immediate future, Manitoba’s deputy ministers will be forced to cope with austerity. This will add momentum to the

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trend of working with other governments, the private sector, and civil society to stretch scarce resources of money and staff. An external focus will also be encouraged by the search for policies and programs that command public support and contribute to greater public confidence in the capacity of government to cope with external changes, which will continue be constant and wide-ranging. Such developments will make deputy ministers somewhat be er known outside of the corridors of power, but the traditionalism that has shaped Manitoba’s civil service over the years will still mean that deputy ministers will never become household names or powers behind the throne.

NOTE 1. The phrase is usually a ributed to Winston Churchill in describing the ideal relationship between scientists and politicians.

REFERENCES Aucoin, Peter. 2008. “New Public Management and New Public Governance: Finding the Balance.” In Professionalism and Public Service: Essays in Honour of Kenneth Kernaghan, edited by David Siegel and Ken Rasmussen, 16–33. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Bierling, Gerald A., Barbara Wake Carroll, and Michael Rosenbla . 2002. “Movers and Stayers: Mobility Pa erns among Senior Public Servants in Canadian Provinces.” Canadian Public Administration 4 (3): 198–217. Dodge, Jennifer, Sonia M. Ospina, and Erica Gabrielle Foldy. 2005. “Integrating Rigor and Relevance in Public Administration Scholarship: The Contribution of Narrative Inquiry.” Public Administration Review 65 (3): 286–300. h p://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2005.00454.x. Dunn, Christopher. 1995. The Institutionalized Cabinet: Governing the Western Provinces. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Hildebrand, Sean. 2004. “The Nature of Public Administration in the New Millennium.” Public Performance and Management Review 27 (4): 186–9. Levin, Ben. 1988. Managing Change under Restraint. Toronto: IPAC Case Study Program. Overeem, Patrick. 2005. “The Value of the Dichotomy: Politics, Administration and the Political Neutrality of Administrators.” Administrative Theory and Praxis 27 (2): 311–29.

238 Rebecca Jensen and Paul G. Thomas Pawley, Howard, and Lloyd Brown-John. 1993. “Transitions: The New Democrats in Manitoba.” In Taking Power: Managing Government Transitions, edited by Donald J. Savoie, 173–86. Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada. Podger, Andrew. 2009. The Role of Departmental Secretaries: Personal Reflections on the Breadth of Responsibilities Today. Canberra: Australian National University E-Press. Robertson, John Palmerston. 1887. A Political Manual of Manitoba and the Northwest Territories. Winnipeg: Call Printing. Svara, James H. 2001. “The Myth of the Dichotomy: Complementarity of Politics and Administration in the Past and Future of Public Administration.” Public Administration Review 61 (2): 176–83. h p://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ 0033-3352.00020. Thomas, Paul G. 1997. “Ministerial Responsibility and Administrative Accountability.” In New Public Management and Public Administration in Canada, edited by M. Charik and A. Daniels, 141–64. Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada. Thomas, Paul G. 2008. “The Swirling Meanings and Practices of Accountability in Canadian Government.” In Professionalism and Public Service: Essays in Honour of Kenneth Kernaghan, edited by D. Siegel and K. Rasmussen, 43–75. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Thomas, Paul G. 2010. “The Past, Present and Future of Manitoba’s Civil Service.” In Manitoba Politics and Government: Institutions, Issues, Traditions, edited by Paul G. Thomas and Curtis Brown, 227–56. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press. Vogt, Paul. 2009, “Reflecting Manitoba.” Canadian Government Executive 15 (2) (May): 16–18. West, William F. 2005. “Neutral Competence and Political Responsiveness: An Uneasy Relationship.” Policy Studies Journal 33 (2): 147–60. h p://dx.doi.org/ 10.1111/j.1541-0072.2005.00099.x. Wilson, Jan. 2001. “Derek Bedson: Clerk of the Executive Council of Manitoba, 1958–1981.” MA thesis, University of Manitoba.

8 Saskatchewan’s Deputy Ministers: Political Executives or Public Servants? ken rasmussen

The most widely accepted definition of the role of deputy ministers in Canada is that they are career public administrators who are permanent, neutral, and independent from the governing party (Osbaldeston 1989). Like all public servants, deputy ministers are to be appointed on the basis of merit and they are not to be fired following the election of a new government. While they are normally Order in Council appointments and thus, strictly speaking, outside the classified career public service, in the ideal model they are permanent career officials who provide continuity and institutional memory for the non-permanent ministers who come and go with elections. These ideals emerge from a series of constitutional conventions built around notions of anonymity, public service neutrality, and impartiality that are designed to create a public service that is able to play a meaningful role in providing policy and administrative advice to elected politicians (Kernaghan 1976). The goal in creating a neutral and impartial public service from top to bo om was to have a sphere of non-partisanship in which all public servants could do their job more effectively and create an organization that was free from political patronage and instead was staffed on the basis of merit. To emphasize this fact, when reforming the public service, governments initially restricted public servants from any form of political activity, including party membership and campaigning ( Juillet and Rasmussen 2008). The criteria for both hiring and firing became the ability to perform the work rather than personal or political favouritism. Citizens would then have confidence that the public service was functioning in a neutral way and was dealing with the public fairly and equitably. A non-political public service selected exclusively on the basis of merit requires a commitment to retaining senior personnel

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a er a change in government. Otherwise there will be suspicions about the impartiality of the public service, which can potentially erode the trust between the public service, politicians, and citizens. Public servants in this model are granted tenure as long as they do their jobs well, and in turn they reward the incoming government with a willingness to use all their resources and skills to respond to the legitimate political directions and policy preferences of the government of the day (Heclo 1977, 20). These ideas are clear and comforting, but in reality they have been practised only vaguely in Saskatchewan, where something of a counter-convention has arisen in which, a er every change in government, a number of deputy ministers (up to half) are dismissed because the incoming government had “lost confidence” in them (Leader Post 2008b). These firings o en extend down the hierarchy into the classified public service as well (Leader Post 2008a). The fired public servants are then replaced by individuals who are more in tune with the agenda and philosophy of the incoming government. A number of these individuals have partisan connections to the incoming government, but not all are open partisans. It is a cycle that has been repeated in the post-war era in Saskatchewan but picked up steam in the 1970s and 1980s with the transitions from the Liberals to the NDP in 1971 and with the subsequent transition from the NDP to the Progressive Conservatives in 1982. The two most recent elections that resulted in a change in government in 1991 and in 2007 indicate that this pa ern is well entrenched in Saskatchewan, but there are signs that it may be moderating. (Eisler 1991; Saskatoon Star Phoenix 1992; Leader Post 2007a; Leader Post 2008b). The firing of public servants a er an election and the subsequent recruitment of outsiders into leadership positions can be a stimulus to creating a more responsive public service, but it may also have serious consequences for the health of the career public service. While it is possible to recruit good and capable people into the deputy minister ranks, this practice almost always leads to accusations and suspicions of politicization of the public service (Lewis 2008). The problem with a politicized public service is the belief that it is o en unwilling to challenge ministerial policy preferences, focuses on the immediate goals of the political leadership, and does not offer a serious discussion of the long-term consequences of policy options. That is, with growing politicization of the public service comes an unwillingness to provide the “frank and fearless” advice that ministers might not always want to hear or even appreciate, but that they should be required to hear

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in order to make informed decisions. In short, a public bureaucracy that becomes politicized priorizes political responsiveness over neutral competence. It goes without saying that provincial politicians in Saskatchewan accept some of the generalities around non-partisan career public service – it should be neutral and independent of the political party – but it is equally clear that they are not completely commi ed to these ideas in the senior ranks. Instead they prefer to rely on law and legal responsibilities rather than constitutional convention in their interpretation of the proper relationship between senior bureaucratic officials and Cabinet ministers. The ideal of creating a self-selected community of deputy ministers who can offer incoming governments something crucial to their short- and long-term success has never been fully endorsed by the main parties of government in Saskatchewan. In addition, the political leadership in Saskatchewan has generally given low priority to the notion that a public-service career system is a cultural construction that requires people at the top who serve as mentors and role models and who can transmit its values and ideals throughout the system (Heclo 1988, 43). This fact remains a threat to the long-term health of the career public service. On the basis of evidence from the past four changes of government between 1971 to 2007, Saskatchewan’s political elite has rejected the classic notions of a permanent senior public service and instead embraces something of a hybrid model in which deputy ministers are not regarded as strictly career bureaucrats, but rather are forced to function o en as “political executives.” That is, rather than focusing primarily on maintaining the integrity of government programs, overseeing the continuity of their organizations, and providing institutional memory, deputy ministers have been required to take on a broader set of responsibilities involving a higher level of sensitivity to the government’s political agenda. In this regard it might be appropriate to describe deputy ministers, or at least a subset of deputy ministers in Saskatchewan, as political executives as much as they are public servants. This chapter will explore the emergence of this particular approach to the senior public service, first by examining the roots of the idea of the “political executive” in the post-war era and its full articulation by Premier Allan Blakeney in the 1970s. This will be followed by an examination of the demographic profile of deputy ministers, including their career paths, and how this establishes a particularly

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Saskatchewan-based approach to creating the deputy minister cadre. Finally, the chapter will examine ways forward and how recent reforms such as the creation of a chief of staff position in departments and the professionalization of the senior leadership of Crown corporations is creating a sense of a new way to get political input into decision-making without having partisans occupying key administrative positions. The “Political Executive” in Saskatchewan The modern professional public service in Saskatchewan emerged with the arrival of the Canadian Commonwealth Federation (CCF) government of Tommy Douglas in 1944. The CCF came to office with a wellarticulated parliamentary form of socialism in which, among other things, the public service would become a big part of the changes that had been promised during the election (Lipset 1968, 303–23). Even more than the British Labour party, the CCF wanted to establish its credentials as a legitimate and responsible party of government, and to do this it felt it needed a competent public service (Johnson 2004). While the CCF was clearly a Fabian party commi ed to working though existing institutions, it never fully accepted the notion of the state and the state bureaucracy being neutral instruments in the hands of any party that formed government. It wanted strong, decisive, and responsible government, but it also felt that senior officials were not to be relied upon exclusively as a source of advice and support (Richards 2008, 14). The CCF government was commi ed to reforming and modernizing the public service, but at the same time it also established a pattern of relations between the senior public service and Cabinet that still echoes. A first step to reform the public service was passage of the Public Service Act, which established a merit-based public service with a Public Service Commission that would recruit, appoint, and promote public servants. It also was the first province to establish a full collective bargaining regime under the province’s Trade Union Act, which was a much more substantial change. When other provinces followed later, they chose instead to create a separate collective bargaining regime that retained more power in the hands of the government. Both reforms remain to this day and were early and enduring examples of a commitment to a patronage-free professional public service. These positive developments meant, for the most part, an end to patronage in the classified public service in Saskatchewan. But by ending patronage for the majority of the public service, the CCF government

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believed that it would now need to rely even more on senior public servants. The premier and those close to him wanted to appoint those who were clearly competent but also commi ed to the government’s agenda. In this, the CCF in Saskatchewan moved away from key aspects of the Whitehall model and was not as willing to accept the public service as a benign and necessary instrument to implement a le -wing manifesto. Nor did it share the Labour party’s respect for the notions of neutrality and permanence at the heart of the model (Richards 2008, 22). In Saskatchewan the CCF took most of the public service out of politics, introduced merit, and granted the majority of the public service collective bargaining rights during its first few years in office. However, it made it clear that if it was to overcome bureaucratic inertia, key deputy ministers and other select senior officials would need to be loyal to the new government’s progressive and innovative programs. Premier Douglas held two convictions about the nature of the senior public service that dominated thinking of the Saskatchewan political elite. First, the senior public service must have some sympathy with the programs they were administering, and second, the new government inherited people in some senior positions who did not have the skills to do their job (Johnson 2004, 57). However, when it came to replacing this second category of “incompetent” officials, they were inclined to replace them with individuals who were in sympathy with the agenda of the government, in addition to being more competent. These were quite radical changes in a number of ways. First, the CCF was willing to remove the bulk of public servants from the grasp of political patronage by appointing a Public Service Commission and extending collective bargaining rights to almost all public servants, developing a merit system for appointment and promotion, and creating a non-partisan sphere of impartial public service. Yet it clung to the right to appoint not only deputy ministers, but also other senior civil servants in the classified public service, and it used this ability to appoint those who they thought would be in sympathy with the government’s agenda while also removing those senior officials who they felt did not have the administrative or professional capacity to implement the new government’s plans. This tradition has marked the relations between ministers and deputy ministers in the post-war era and is indeed at the very core of this relationship. This model was notable for bringing to Saskatchewan a group of very talented public administrators who were sympathetic to the ambitions

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of the government (Marchildon 2006). One key member of this group was Allan Blakeney, who was recruited as legal counsel to the new Government Finance Office (GFO), which would oversee the government’s expanding network of Crown corporations. He eventually le the public service and became a Cabinet minister in the Lloyd government, then became premier himself in 1971. He gave this Saskatchewan model of minister–public servant relations its most through articulation. Premier Blakeney began implementation of this model by describing the ideal minister, whom he regarded as the individual “who would interpret and explain policies of the department to the public – and here I include both the particular public which may be concerned and the general public, that is, the electorate as a whole” (Blakeney 1972, 42). This was straightforward enough, but Blakeney was concerned that public servants sometimes had the impression that the minister’s role was to explain to Cabinet why the public service’s view of public policy was correct, even if the Cabinet and the public did not accept it! Premier Blakeney clearly wanted the political direction of government to trump the policy expertise of departmental officials. He was acutely aware of the danger of ministers being captured by their officials and insisted that they should be more a uned to the views of the public than those of the public service. He urged his ministers to avoid being caught up in working with the department at an early stage in policymaking and insisted that ministers ensure that they were consulting, circulating, and listening to the voices of various publics. If ministers became too involved in departmental policy too early, they would lose the capacity to criticize, become implicated in an early solution, and become captive to the departmental viewpoint. This is probably good advice for ministers and is consistent with their role within the standard Westminster model. However, when Blakeney turned his a ention to the role of deputy ministers, he began to stretch the limits of the model. Blakeney felt that public servants needed to be aware of the political element, and in presenting recommendations to a minister they “should frame their recommendations in two sets, one based upon technical considerations and the other introducing the elements of public acceptability.” Blakeney broke company with the strict British model of neutrality and felt that the “the role of deputy minister demands awareness of both public acceptability in the general sense and consideration of the philosophic and political directions of the government he serves” (Blakeney 1972, 44). While this may be true, it is not in keeping with the normative theory behind the

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Westminster/Whitehall model, and as such it makes it harder for public servants to defend themselves from accusations of partisanship. Blakeney’s views on this, endorsed by every subsequent premier of the province, suggests that the traditional model based on the primary need to create neutral competence does not serve a new government, especially when it first comes to power. Indeed, he argued that if there were no changes at the top, the departmental hierarchy of the public service would be “insulated from what the public is saying,” and “the momentum generated under the previous regime seems almost impossible to halt.” Likewise, if public servants were too insulated from political considerations, departments might simply “sit and wait” (Blakeney 1972, 45). What is clear is that Blakeney believed that if they had too much independence, public servants could ignore or even subvert the intentions of the government. Blakeney, presumably on the basis of his considerable experience as public servant, Cabinet minister, and premier, was particularly concerned about the bureaucratic tendency to “protect turf” (Blakeney and Borins 1998, 94). Thus Premier Blakeney, and subsequent premiers of Saskatchewan, did not support the notion of a permanent or self-selected group of “permanent secretaries” who would exist from government to government, as in the British model. Nor did they accept the federal practice of selecting deputy ministers only from the corps of existing assistant and associate deputy ministers. While the vast majority of public servants should be seen as neutral, in Saskatchewan senior officials needed to be sympathetic to the government’s ideology, if not necessarily being outright partisans. Premier Blakeney clearly did not view senior public servants as the classic neutral public servants associated with the British and federal model. That is, deputy ministers should be prepared to interpret public reaction to departmental policy and not only bring forward a view based on their technical judgment but also one on their reading of the political reaction to the recommendation. Sound policy, frank and fearless advice, and speaking truth to power were not as important in this view as was the ability to help the government implement its agenda. This notion of the proper role for the deputy led Blakeney to suggest that a “manager is not being accountable to a minister and thus to the electorate if he generates technically feasible but politically unacceptable alternatives … To put the idea crudely: a good technically sound policy, the most economical solution to a problem but the one that the public will not accept, is a bad policy and a bad solution” (Blakeney 1981, 4). Yet Blakeney would also have to accept the notion that a good

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solution is one that the public likes, but that public servants know to be sub-optimal, costly, and ultimately damaging to the province, but that they should not forcefully advocate to their minister, and that a minister should not take to the public because they might reject it. More than in most provinces, Saskatchewan operates a hybrid system that has few of the legal protections of independence at the most senior levels. The public service does not get as much respect nor is there as much adherence to the constitutional conventions as in Britain or even in other provinces. Each government comes to accept that it is possible to both remove those who have become too closely associated with the previous government and replace them with those sympathetic to the incoming government. Becoming too closely associated with the government, however, is very easy in this model, and many individuals who are not inclined towards a particular political philosophy or orientation become caught in the system. This system encourages more traditional deputy ministers to act in a manner that would not be expected or accepted in other jurisdictions. In Saskatchewan, not only are deputies to be talented administrators and substantive policy experts, but they should also foster a solid network of contacts, be able to take the political temperature as they develop policies, and keep political timing in mind in developing policy. The role of the deputy in Saskatchewan requires these officials to have an intimate knowledge of the policy sector and introduce evidence-informed policy options for ministers’ consideration, but also be able to help the government implement its political agenda. The sense of what is a political crisis and how to justify what the government wants has come to ma er more than giving sound policy advice (Aucoin and Savoie 2009, 108). As part of the senior leadership of the public service, the deputy is leader, manager, and integrator. In short, the deputy minister can become a “political executive” as much as he or she is a public servant. A permanent public service creates an indivisible relationship between ministers and deputy ministers, based on the expertise of the public service and the authority and legitimacy of the Cabinet minister. But it is precisely this notion of sharing power with the public service that has always troubled Saskatchewan’s political elite. They persist in the belief that the public service can stand in the way of their ability to fully implement their complete agenda. While it would be too much to call this a conspiratorial view, it is clear that premiers of Saskatchewan, beginning with Tommy Douglas, expressed concern about their plans

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being thwarted by public servants who, either for lack of ability and talent, or lack of sympathy with the views of a new government, would be unable or unwilling to implement the government’s policy preferences. Public servants, from this perspective, wield enormous and unaccountable power based on the limited tenure of ministers, constraints on a minister’s time, and the impact of strong and deeply entrenched departmental views that condition their advice. Such a view has been embraced by all political parties and leads to concerns about the level of politicization of the senior public service. Deputy ministers in Saskatchewan are a crucial part of the mechanism by which successive governments implement their agenda. Governments have been very keen to ensure that the deputy cadre in the province understands the needs of a new government and is quick to help them implement their changes. Yet Saskatchewan’s political leaders have all believed that what they need in addition to skilled, dedicated, and competent deputy ministers are instead a number of deputy ministers who are sympathetic to the government’s philosophy of governance. This is in violation of the Westminster model of public servant–politician relations, which accepts that public servants need to be professional, discreet, talented, and capable, but should not be supporters or “fellow travellers” of the governing party. In Saskatchewan, political sensitivity has become prized more than neutral competence in at least some deputy minister appointments. The Demographic and Career Profile of Deputy Ministers in Saskatchewan The above argument concerning the nature of the deputy minister community in Saskatchewan can be strengthened by examining the demographic profile of Saskatchewan deputy ministers and turnover a er elections. On the demographic front, li le is different in the profile of Saskatchewan’s deputy minister community in that they tend to be predominantly male, college-educated, and originating from the dominant socio-economic groups in the province (Evans, Lum, and Shields 2007). However, over the past three decades there have been notable changes in this profile. The most obvious include an increased presence of women in the deputy minister ranks, more professional and graduate degrees, and an increasing average age of entry to the ranks of deputies. In their careers in the public service we have noted an increased pace of rotation from department to department, and an increasing number of

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deputies recruited from outside the public service, especially following elections, which includes those recruited with no senior public service experience at all. Of the 326 deputy ministers appointed in Saskatchewan since it became a province in 1905, only 26 have been women, or less than 8 per cent. This figure is not surprising, given the historic underrepresentation of women in the public service in all levels of government. The first woman deputy minister was Arleen Hynd, appointed deputy minister of consumer affairs in 1972, who held that post until 1979. She went on to hold other deputy minister positions in the Romanow government in the 1990s. However, her deputy career was interrupted a er the 1982 election when she was fired by the incoming Progressive Conservative government of Grant Devine. Until recently, she remained the province’s longest serving female deputy minister and held that rank for over ten years. Arleen Hynd also had the distinction of being one of the youngest deputy ministers when she was appointed at the age of twenty-eight. Like a number of other deputy ministers in Saskatchewan, Arleen Hynd, as noted, was fired with the coming of a new government in 1982. Gender in no way trumps the tradition of removing those who are considered to have moved too close to the previous government. Since 1982, many women have been appointed and dismissed from the deputy ranks. Most appointments of women have been in culture, education, and social services, with few in the central agencies, particularly the Department of Finance and the Crown Investment Corporations. The first woman deputy minister of finance was appointed in 2010, and was replaced by another female deputy in 2012. However there has not been a woman head of the powerful Crown Investment Corporation in Saskatchewan, and there has been only one deputy minister to the premier, and that was in an acting position for only a few months. Currently there are seven female deputy ministers out of fi een, and this number has been constant at between six and eight for at least a decade, when 40–50 per cent of deputies have been women. A number of women deputy ministers were fired in the 2007 transition, to be replaced by women in whom the new Saskatchewan Party government had more “confidence.” Under the previous NDP government some women appointed to the deputy minister ranks included a former chief of staff to Premier Romanow as well as individuals with strong partisan connections and clear sympathies to the NDP, which guaranteed their dismissal with the change in government. However, it is important to

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point out that the majority of women who became deputy ministers in Saskatchewan have been career officials. Nevertheless, an assortment of appointments of women deputies includes those with ideological and/or partisan affinity and career public servants that mirrors the profile of their male colleagues and has similar career consequences. There have been relatively few appointments of Aboriginal candidates to the senior ranks, and the only Aboriginal appointments to the deputy rank has been in the Departments of Northern Affairs and Aboriginal and Metis Affairs. There have been only two Aboriginal deputy ministers in Saskatchewan, and li le priority has been given to making such appointments or developing a potential pool of Aboriginal candidates within the public service to draw from. There is presently only one deputy minister of Aboriginal ancestry and one African Canadian. The same case prevails in Saskatchewan’s large Crown corporation sector in which very few women have been appointed president, and indeed there are only two women presidents/CEOs of Crown corporations or similar entities out of eighteen. Again, this is a very low number and is lower than one would expect, given that the boards of Crown corporations are made up of political appointees who should be sensitive to the issue and the nature of the very real influence exerted by Cabinet in most hiring decisions at Crown corporations. One would have assumed that political pressure could create a more representative group of Crown corporation presidents in the province. None of the current presidents are of Aboriginal or visible minority status, and only one woman has held the position of president of one of the four major Crown corporation in Saskatchewan. The average length of appointment for women at the rank of deputy minister has been 3.9 years, with Arleen Hynd, the first female deputy minister, having the longest tenure at 10 years. The current group of female deputy ministers has been in place for an average of 2.9 years, but this includes deputy ministers who came in with the new government in 2007 as well as those who survived the transition, and thus the number of years in office will presumably increase. This contrasts with the overall average for both male and female deputy ministers, which is 4.6 years and sometimes involves deputies being moved to other departments within that period, meaning that the level of experience is not what one would imagine, given the complexity of the job. There is a high level of post-secondary achievement among deputy ministers, and this has been a characteristic of this group since 1905.

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However, the trend has been away from liberal arts, education, and law to more professional training, o en in business and a growing number of graduate degrees in professional disciples, as well as those with doctorates. Public administration as a profession has no single point of entry, unlike law, medicine, or engineering, and as a consequence we will continue to see a wide variety of educational backgrounds in the senior ranks, but the growth of more professional degrees and graduate degrees will likely continue. What is being displaced is the older notion of a liberal arts education as the best preparation for public service, and instead more specialists with a technical or scientific education are now making their way to the deputy ranks. Age at entry to the rank of deputy minister has fluctuated over the years but is increasing. Most deputy ministers are appointed to the position in their forties, and the vast majority of current deputies tend to be in their fi ies. While some extremely young deputies have been appointed over the years, including Albert Johnson, Arleen Hynd, and James Langford, all of whom were appointed deputy minister at twenty-eight, that is clearly the exception. Deputies are mostly appointed in their mid- to late forties, and we will likely continue to see the age of appointment increase, given the uncertain job tenure and the relatively short time most individuals tend to be in the job. For career civil servants in Saskatchewan, moving from an assistant deputy minister to deputy minister is clearly something to consider only towards the end of a career. Where Do Deputy Ministers Come From? The number of deputies who come from outside the public service has always varied. As noted above, Saskatchewan does not have the classic unified career structure associated with the federal or UK governments, where virtually all in the deputy community come from the public service, particularly from the ranks of assistant deputy ministers. In Saskatchewan, outsiders are frequently brought directly into the ranks of deputy ministers. Yet outsiders rarely come from the private sector and instead typically come from other provincial governments, municipal governments, and, on rare occasion, the federal government. The next largest source of new talent is other public sectors like school boards, health districts, followed by universities and assorted NGOs, quasi-government agencies, and think tanks. Most people recruited to the ranks of deputy minister have broad public sector experience, but significantly almost none come from the private sector.

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The reasons for this recruitment pa ern is that individuals who come from the broad public sector understand the environment, are prepared to work with a long and uncertain decision-making structure, and understand the challenges of working within a highly charged political atmosphere in which decisions are o en made in public and only a er a great deal of consultation. Individuals from the private sector are further discouraged by the comparatively modest wages offered, the lack of job security in the deputy minister ranks, and the sense that both managerial and policy authority is limited by the overwhelming political imperative. There are, of course, significant advantages enjoyed by those who do move into the deputy ranks from within the Saskatchewan public service, thus these individuals tend to be more successful and remain in their positions longer than those brought in from the outside. The key is, of course, that by being insiders, career officials have a substantial network within government and considerable working knowledge of a complex system of governance. The number of years of experience in the Saskatchewan public sector before becoming a deputy minister varies, but for the current career deputy ministers it ranges between fi een and twenty-five years. Yet at any given time the cadre of deputy ministers will include career public servants with twenty years of continuous service prior to their appointment as a deputy, and those who have had no experience in the public service at all. It would be surprising if the la er group was not notably more successful than the former. Politicization This is one of the most important aspects in the study of deputy ministers in Saskatchewan and tends to dominate discussion during a transition in government. With every approaching election, and particularly when a change of government is anticipated, anxiety mounts in the public service generally about the possibility of a purge, but deputies are particularly well aware that they are more vulnerable than most. Beginning with the 1971 election of the NDP, we note a change in the career profile of deputy ministers. While all appointments at the deputy minister rank are by Order in Council, Premier Allan Blakeney took a very direct interest in ensuring that he had a group of deputies who were not only competent but was also sensitive and responsive to the government’s agenda. It was a er the 1971 election transition that a number of directly partisan appointments were made involving

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individuals who had a previous position in the party apparatus or were active in the party. It has now become more common that those with direct partisan connections be appointed to the deputy rank in Saskatchewan, but this was first notable with the Blakeney government beginning in 1971. A second category of appointments are those with no partisan connection but who have ideological and/or philosophical affinity with the government of the day or a close relationship with the premier. This group tends to be larger than those with direct partisan connections, but, like the category of partisan appointments, they are usually outsiders to the Saskatchewan public service, tending to be individuals in whom the premier has confidence. The number in this group varies, but these appointments usually take place just a er a transition and become less important the longer the government remains in office. The final and largest group is of career civil servants who have spent their entire career with the government of Saskatchewan and who entered the civil service on traditional merit-based criteria. This group is always the majority. It should be noted that those in the two previous categories are o en extremely well qualified and have substantial management and policy experience in other organizational se ings, yet they o en are moved aside when it emerges that they do not have the experience and capacity to succeed in the government environment. The most recent example of this transition from partisan appointments to career public servants can be seen a er the November 2007 election of Premier Brad Wall. Of fi een deputy ministers positions, seven deputies were fired on 26 November, and new deputy ministers were appointed the same day to serve the expanded Cabinet. Of this group of new deputies, many were selected because of their policy affinity and/or partisan loyalty to the new government. None had senior government experience in a provincial public service, and many had no provincial or federal government experience at all. However, in less than two years, five were either fired or moved aside to lesser assignments, while none of the career public servants who survived the transition have been removed or fired. Equally telling is the fact that as the new SaskParty government has made additional appointments to the deputy ranks they have chosen to rely on public servants from the Saskatchewan public service, including the deputy minister of finance and the deputy minister to the premier, both of whom were experienced and professional public servants who have spent their entire careers in the Saskatchewan public service.

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The Role of the Deputy Minister in Saskatchewan Deputy ministers in Saskatchewan, like those in many other jurisdictions, are given a wide variety of both managerial and statutory responsibilities, making the nature of the relationship between ministers and deputy ministers complex but crucial to effective governance. Each department of government is provided with a deputy minister by statute. Once selected, the deputy minister then becomes the chief policy advisor to the minister and the chief administrative officer of the department. In the first role as chief advisor to the minister, the deputy is expected to identify the needs and consequences of various alternatives, suggest methods of coping with emergencies, point out possible problem areas, anticipate and note possible negative reactions and their sources, and assess the feasibility of proposed actions. When it comes to managing the department, deputies are to have independent authority, and ministers are expected to stay well removed from day-to-day operations. The deputy is provided with significant responsibilities under the Public Service Act for human resources, and while employees are o en hired by the Public Service Commission, they can be fired only on the authority of the deputy minister. What this means is that only the deputy can politicize the public service by firing those in the classified public service for reasons other than competence. The implications can be serious for the professional public service if the deputy minister is a political appointee or can be intimidated by a minister or the premier. Without a strong culture of professional public administration and without a deputy minister to the premier willing to defend the deputy community, there are few protections for public servants if a government wants to dismiss an employee for purely political reasons. Individuals who are fired can appeal to the Public Service Commission, and if successful they can be put on a re-employment list, but in a politicized public service it is impossible to continue with any semblance of a career in such a situation. Employees have been fired and have accessed their appeal rights, but at the end of the day, they will be gone (Leader Post 2008b). While it is expected that the deputy will be the principal advisor to the minister and provide the minister and government with nonpartisan advice, evaluation, and analysis, it is also expected that deputy ministers will anticipate the political consequences of the alternatives that they present to the minister and Cabinet. While other jurisdictions may implicitly have this as part of the duties assigned to a deputy,

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Saskatchewan has made it explicit, and it is widely accepted by the political class in the province as being well within the realm of what a deputy minister’s responsibilities should include. Thus, the deputy minister is also a strategist and possesses a comprehensive and coherent understanding of his or her area of responsibilities and develops it into a plan for action. The deputy minister must think in terms of policy and legislative cycles and must be a entive to the challenges and opportunities that arise as a result of these cycles. Yet it is clear that the deputy minister, who traditionally tries to reconcile long-term public interest with the short-term interests of the government he or she serves, must focus on the short term and remain highly responsive to the government’s political direction. While the environment that the deputy operates in has changed a great deal in twenty-five years, the nature of the deputies’ relationship to the political level of government has not been altered significantly. What has transformed has been the public visibility of deputy ministers as the result an emphasis on public consultation, duty to consult with Aboriginal communities, more transparency in response to freedom of information, and especially the new practice of having deputies answer for ministers at Public Accounts Commi ee meetings. At one time, these were conducted in camera to protect the anonymity of public servants, but now these commi ee meetings are televised and archived on the Legislative Assembly website (Perrins 2008). A deputy minister must not only navigate the adversarial nature of the partisan process during commi ee hearings, but must now do it while the province is watching. Thus, while the functions of the deputy minister have not changed significantly in the last forty years, the environment in which he or she operates in has. And these changes, rather than emphasizing the non-political aspects of the role of the deputy, have instead brought the deputy minister into a more visible relation with the minister and thus closer scrutiny by the opposition and the media. Saskatchewan has had, since at least the 1950s, a sophisticated budgeting system, which favoured centralized planning that allowed for a strong system of central control (Rasmussen and Marchildon 2005). This system, with occasional modifications, has remained in place since that time, with the result that in the collective, deputy ministers have a role of considerable importance in shaping policy. When the government had substantial trust in this group, due in many cases to an affinity over the political values that they shared, this system was effective and perhaps was at is high point during the 1970s. They were given

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important roles in coordinating government initiatives and they were expected to ensure that ministers never got too involved in administrative and management ma ers (Blakeney 1972, 95). Indeed, because deputy ministers were appointed by the premier, they were to report back on ministers who were beginning to act a li le too entrepreneurially. They were seen as the general managers of government in a collective way, and they had very close relationships with Cabinet. They even a ended joint planning retreats involving deputies and Cabinet ministers every autumn, and these retreats sometimes lasted as long as a week ( Johnson 1973, 24). With the arrival of Grant Devine in 1982, the slow decline of the influence of the deputy community began, along with the growth of outside advisors and a deliberate a empt to reduce the influence of the deputy ministers. The most recent change in government also brought a new and potentially very significant change with the creation of the position of chief of staff in every ministry in 2007. This has resulted not only in larger ministerial offices but also increased numbers of political staff providing policy input. While still small and in many cases staffed by well-qualified individuals with more policy capacity, this development is changing the policy role of the deputy minister. In addition, there is a more centralized communications function and an increase overall in the political control that the government exercises over policy. The new chief of staff model has much to recommend it, but when the relationship between the deputy and chief of staff is not positive it actually becomes a serious impediment to the traditional deputy–minister relationship and the effectiveness of the ministry. Developing a partnership and a genuine trusting relationship between the minister and the deputy was difficult enough in the past, but adding a chief of staff can make this a much more fraught relationship. Yet the chief of staff model is also a promising development with the potential to end the pa ern of purge and appointment that has burdened the public service of the province. This innovation by the Wall government signals the possible transformation in which the leadership of the public service can provide its expected experience, impartiality, and caution and allow the partisan side associated with the chief of staff to bring the responsiveness and commitment to the government’s agenda (Axworthy 1988). Current practice gives the chief of staff and the deputy equal access to the minister. While it requires trust to make this relationship work, it does mean that ministers will get both the partisan and political advice they need while allowing public servants

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to avoid worrying excessively about the political popularity of policy proposals. This can help avoid confusion over functions, ensure that policy is responsive, and provide the public service with the space to concentrate on their areas of policy expertise and their greater understanding of the difficulties associated with policy implementation. The structure of the government of Saskatchewan has also begun to change as it has in other jurisdictions. These structural changes are further reducing the role of deputy ministers. In particular, the development of new hybrid organizations like Enterprise Saskatchewan, Build Saskatchewan, Saskatchewan Water Security Agency, among others which have managerial boards, has reduced some deputy ministers’ policy influence. We have seen a decline in the power and influence of deputy ministers in Saskatchewan, which is matched by that in other provinces and at the federal level. They have lost the monopoly on policy advice, which had been key to the effective relationship between deputies and their ministers. In recent years, all a empts to have deputies act as a coordinating body have been either abandoned or neglected. While Saskatchewan has not go so far as some other provinces in not allowing the deputy ministers to meet as a group, the government has not yet put a priority on the idea of having a close working relationship between Cabinet and the deputy community. The NDP under Roy Romanow and later Lorne Calvert had tried to make the Blakeney model work, but even towards the end of the Romanow era and during the Calvert government, it became less central to their model of governance. With the Wall government this formal structure of planning with the extremely close working relations between deputies and ministers has receded. While it would be too early to suggest that the influence of Saskatchewan’s mandarins has collapsed, they are clearly only one group that is consulted on public policy. In 1971 Saskatchewan was governed by a self-conscious elite of ministers and deputy ministers. Now Saskatchewan, like most other jurisdictions, is governed by a growing constellation of networks including business, municipalities, school boards, health boards, NGOs, and other groups embedded in a web of financial commitments and reciprocal ties with the provincial government (Rasmussen 2001). Conclusion: A Made-in-Saskatchewan Model Deputy ministers in Saskatchewan have a well-articulated role. Like elsewhere in Canada, their role begins with the reality that politicians

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have authority and political legitimacy, whereas deputy ministers have policy and administrative expertise; as such, they form a single unit at the very heart of good government in the Westminster tradition. Where Saskatchewan has been different is the expectation that part of the senior bureaucratic leadership should be sympathetic to the political philosophy of the incoming government, and that the others should be able to help it develop its policy ideas while keeping an eye on the politics surrounding their policy agenda (Leader Post 2007b). What came to guide this system over time was not so much adherence to the conventions of Westminster/Whitehall, based on a strong public service ethic tied to both the government and citizens, but instead a belief that the deputy minister and minister need to rely on a shared commitment to common goals articulated by the political leadership. This has had the effect over the past forty years of increasing the perception of politicization in the senior ranks of the public service in ways that o en go well beyond what is permi ed by convention and in both subtle and not so subtle ways has changed the way the public service in Saskatchewan responds to politicians. Successive governments in Saskatchewan have not embraced the model of neutral competence and independence from politics at the heart of the Westminster/Whitehall model. Instead, the province has over most of the past forty years opted for a hybrid structure that sees some deputy ministers as career officials and others as political appointees. Yet the Saskatchewan Public Service Commission noted the problems with this system in a ruling that reinstated a public servant who was fired without cause in 2007. In their report they commented, “An effective public service, one that works in the public interest, is one that will always tell the truth to power. If a public service employee fears job loss, then advising the government of the day that what they are considering is not the best plan or approach, for whatever reason, is very unlikely. It is more likely that the employee will say nothing or only what he/she believes the government wants to hear neither of which will be in the public interest” (PSC 2008, 18). This, then, is the danger inherent in the pa ern of recruitment of the senior public service that successive governments in Saskatchewan have created with their politicization of the top rung of the public service. Despite the fact that deputy ministers in Saskatchewan have power through statutes, delegated legislation, and the prestige of their office, like every other deputy minister in Canada they are appointed by the first minister. Some are political appointees and others are career officials. What this means is that even the best and most knowledgeable

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Cabinet ministers in Saskatchewan come to see the senior leadership of the public service as being there to help shape what he or she wants, administratively and politically. Public servants at the ADM and perhaps even the director general and director level come to be more sensitive to the wishes of politicians, because that group controls access to the final rungs of the career ladder and may well have a role in their career progress. But as the independence of the public service is compromised, it actually becomes less useful to politicians. By doing away with independence, governments risk corrupting the very values that can help them achieve their goals, such as the objective expertise, their institutional memory, a strong network of communications among stakeholders, and its knowledge of government procedures and informal processes (West 2005). This is the core of how the Whitehall system works, and politicians need to put more trust in public servants and established institutions. No one accepts the proposition that policy or policy implementation is somehow apolitical, and instead there is a belief that the independence of the public service and its objectivity can serve political, though not partisan, goals. As Hugh Heclo noted, “The independence entailed in neutral competence … exists precisely in order to serve the aims of partisan leadership” (1975, 83). While the political leadership eventually recognizes this and appoints more career officials to senior positions the longer they are in office, the damage is done and cannot be easily reversed. Saskatchewan’s political elite has created a hybrid model for the senior public service, in which some deputy ministers are political and some are career officials, but all are highly responsive to the immediate desires of Cabinet. In the Saskatchewan system, deputy ministers’ careers are short, their rotation is o en high, and they are increasingly excluded from key policy deliberations and decisions. Thus there is a loss of institutional memory, expertise, and organizational continuity, which has caused all premiers problems. This is, of course, a risk that the premiers of Saskatchewan have been willing to accept. They select senior officials for their ideological orientation and political responsiveness and accept a risk that these officials might not have the same analytical capacity and technical expertise as career officials. The long-term costs are seen to be secondary and well worth paying. Yet the current government of Saskatchewan seems to be developing a new model that will allow deputy ministers to shed their role as someone who is keenly a uned to the government’s political

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agenda, and allow them to concentrate on their areas of expertise, make longer-term judgments, and provide more organizational and operational context to help ministers make be er decisions. By creating a chief of staff, the government of Saskatchewan may have found a model that creates a be er balance, ensuring that governments get policies and programs that are responsive to their agenda and their legitimate electoral mandate, while also ensuring that the public service brings continuity and policy competence to the table. This too would be a hybrid model but one that reflects the growing reality and requirements of elected government. It has the advantage of ending the need of public servants to be “promiscuously partisan” (Aucoin 2008b) and instead creates a system that would provide stability and responsive competence in equal measures. The political leadership of the province will likely be much be er served by this sort of a model, and it appears a welcome development and a positive step in the evolution of relations between the senior public service and politicians in Saskatchewan.

REFERENCES Aucoin, Peter. 2008a. “New Public Management and New Public Governance: Find the Balance.” In Professionalism and Public Service: Essays in Honour of Kenneth Kernaghan, edited by David Siegel and Ken Rasmussen. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. –. 2008b. “New Public Management and Quality of Government: Coping with the New Political Governance in Canada.” Paper presented at New Public Management and Quality of Government, Gothenburg, Sweden. Aucoin, Peter, and Donald Savoie. 2009. “The Politics Administration Dichotomy: Democracy versus Bureaucracy?” In The Evolving Physiology of Government: Canadian Public Administration in Transition, ed. O.P Dwivedi, Tim Mau, and Byron Sheldrick. O awa: University of O awa Press. Axworthy, Thomas S. 1988. “Of Secretaries to Princes.” Canadian Public Administration 31 (2): 247–64. h p://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1754-7121.1988.tb01316.x. Blakeney, Allan. 1972. “The Relationship between Provincial Ministers and Their Deputy Ministers.” Canadian Public Administration 15 (1): 42–5. h p://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1754-7121.1972.tb01227.x. –. 1981. “Goal-Se ing: Politicians’ Expectations of Public Administrators.” Canadian Public Administration 24 (1): 1–7. h p://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ j.1754-7121.1981.tb00325.x.

260 Ken Rasmussen Blakeney, Allan, and Sandford Borins. 1998. Political Management in Canada. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson. Eisler, Dale. 1991. “Patronage Part of Tradition.” Regina Leader Post, 17 June. Evans, Bryan, Janet Lum, and Jon Shields. 2007. “Profiling of the Public Service Élite: A Demographic and Career Trajectory Survey of Deputy and Assistant Deputy Ministers in Canada.” Canadian Public Administration 50 (4): 609–34. h p://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1754-7121.2007.tb02209.x. Heclo, Hugh. 1975. “OMB and the Presidency: The Problem of Neutral Competence.” Public Interest 38: 83. –. 1977. A Government of Strangers: Executive Politics in Washington. Washington: Brookings Institute. –. 1988. “The In-and-Outer System: A Critical Assessment.” Political Science Quarterly 103 (1): 37–56. h p://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2151140. Johnson, A.W. 1973. “Planning, Programming and Budgeting in Canada.” Public Administration Review 33 (1): 23–31. h p://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2151140. –. 2004. Dream No LiĴle Dreams: A Biography of the Douglas Government of Saskatchewan, 1944–1961. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Juillet, Luc, and Ken Rasmussen. 2008. Defending a Contested Ideal: The Public Service Commission of Canada, 1908–2008. O awa: University of O awa Press. Kernaghan, Kenneth. 1976. “Politics, Policy and Public Servants: Political Neutrality Revisited.” Canadian Public Administration 19 (3): 432–56. h p://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1754-7121.1976.tb01728.x. Leader Post. (2007a). “Major Changes to Civil Service,” 28 November. –. (2007b). “Wall Names Deputy Minister,” 10 November. –. (2008a). “Sask Party Prepared to Bring In Supporters,” 26 January. –. (2008b). “70 Civil Servants Let Go by Government,” 25 January. Lewis, David E. 2008. The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Lipset, S.M. 1968. Agrarian Socialism: The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan. New York: Doubleday. Marchildon, G.P. 2006. “Saskatchewan Mafia.” The Encyclopedia of Saskatchewan. h p://esask.uregina.ca/entry/saskatchewan_mafia.html. Osbaldeston, Gordon. 1989. Keeping Deputy Ministers Accountable. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson. Perrins, Dan. 2008. “From In Camera to On Camera: The History of Legislative Commi ees in Saskatchewan and the Role of the Public Servant.” In Saskatchewan Politics: Crowding the Centre, edited by Howard Leeson. Regina: CPRC Press.

Saskatchewan’s Deputy Ministers 261 Public Service Commission. 2008. In the MaĴer of Allan Walker and Ministry of Advanced Education, Employment and Labour. O awa: PSC. Rasmussen, Ken. 2001. “Saskatchewan: From Entrepreneurial State to Embedded State.” In The Provincial State in Canada: Politics in the Provinces and Territories, edited by Keith Brownsey and Michael Howle , 241–75. Toronto: Broadview. Rasmussen, Ken, and Gregory P. Marchildon. 2005. “Saskatchewan’s Executive Decision-Making Style: The Centrality of Planning.” In Executive Styles in Canada, edited by Luc Bernier, Michael Howle , and Keith Brownsey, 184–207. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Richards, David. 2008. New Labour and the Civil Service: Reconstituting the Westminster Model. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Saskatoon Star Phoenix. 1992. “NDP Has Fired at Least 155 Government Employees,” 15 January. West, William. 2005. “Neutral Competence and Political Responsiveness: An Uneasy Relationship.” Policy Studies Journal: the Journal of the Policy Studies Organization 33 (2): 147–60. h p://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.15410072.2005.00099.x.

9 Alberta Deputy Ministers: The Management of Change allan tupper

This chapter analyses Alberta’s modern deputy ministers, paying particular a ention to the turbulent first decade of the new century, especially the years between 2004 and 2009. That period is instructive for two reasons. First, it yields major political dynamics, including two provincial general elections and a leadership change in the Progressive Conservative party that has governed Alberta without interruption since 1971. Second, during this period the Alberta economy, stimulated by demand for its oil sands products and related capital construction, grew substantially. The provincial treasury received large resource royalties and related revenues but also faced heavy pressures for infrastructure, education, and social services expenditures. At time of writing, the boom, while certainly not a bust, has slowed and the province confronts a deficit for the first time since the mid-1990s. These substantial events evoked change, response, and new dynamics for Alberta’s deputy ministers. Remarkably li le has been wri en about Canadian deputy ministers and administrative elites. The provincial, territorial, and municipal levels of government are li le studied. Accordingly, this chapter is exploratory and suggestive rather than definitive. One of its purposes is to establish research questions that might inspire others to examine a badly neglected topic. The chapter examines the statutory powers of Alberta’s deputy ministers, their current roles and major duties, accountabilities and responsibilities. It argues that Alberta deputy ministers now act as a relatively cohesive group who work extensively together, either en masse or in groups, on major cross-government initiatives as well as playing large roles in the management of their ministries and the advising of

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ministers. A related, significant development is the substantial role of the deputy minister of executive council, the province’s chief civil servant, in the selection, deployment, and assessment of deputy ministers. Equally, Alberta’s central agencies, long underdeveloped compared with those of the government of Canada and such provinces as Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia, are growing in numbers and weight. A profile of Alberta’s deputy ministers is then provided. It looks at pa erns of change, reassignment, and recruitment in 2004–9. In broad strokes, two general elections and the selection of a new premier caused considerable turnover in Alberta’s deputy ministers. Many new deputies were appointed, all of them from within the public service itself. Finally, the chapter raises two classic questions about the Alberta public service. First, given the Progressive Conservatives’ political hegemony, is the Alberta public service politicized? Is there a substantial blurring of government and party as was o en claimed about the government of Canada a er long periods of Liberal rule? Second, the chapter argues that Alberta’s deputy ministers must be understood in the context of Alberta’s status as a petro-state, a political jurisdiction whose politics, economy, and very society are shaped by the production of oil and natural gas. A persuasive literature argues that petrostates, despite radical differences in their geographic location, formal government structures, and political histories, share common problems to which, in broad measure, they respond in similar ways. The governance obligations of Alberta’s status as a petro-state place unique burdens on its deputy ministers. Both these important topics are flagged as important issues that require much more research and scholarly a ention. No firm conclusions are advanced about both of these complex ma ers. Alberta Deputy Ministers: Roles and Responsibilities The position and role of deputy minister is li le discussed in the core statutes of Alberta public administration. The two most relevant statutes in this regard are the Financial Administration Act (FAA) and the Public Service Act (PSA). The former, as its title suggests, establishes the legal framework for the expenditure of, and accounting for, government monies. The la er outlines the basic obligations of personnel management. The FAA defines the “deputy head” of a department as “the chief officer of a department.” The deputy’s major role in financial administration

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is made clear in section 11, where she is held responsible for collection of revenues and the establishment of appropriate procedures for collecting and spending public money. The deputy is also empowered, under certain circumstances, to examine and seize financial records, and to appoint expenditure and accounting officers in the department and related provincial agencies. Importantly, the act establishes a Treasury Board and provides for the appointment of a board secretary. The Public Service Act, with a heavy emphasis on human resources, complements the FAA. The act establishes a key public service position, the public service commissioner, who holds overall responsibility for public service personnel management. Significantly, the PSA provides the commissioner with broad powers of delegation to the deputy heads of departments. In turn, the deputy head is charged with the overall personnel administration of her department, including competitions and appointments. The deputy head may, among other things, issue a “supplementary code of conduct and ethics” in areas that hold particular significance and relevance for the department. Equally, the PSA imposes post-employment limitations on deputy ministers. Other important provincial laws, notably the Government Accountability Act and the Government Organization Act, when read in context with the FAA and the PSA, suggest major roles for deputy ministers. Antiseptic statutory language does not illuminate the complex roles and responsibilities of a current Alberta deputy minister. In essence, Alberta deputy ministers now do three major things. First, they provide advice and support to a minister and act as “the major interface between the political and administrative functions of government” (Alberta 2003, 1). Second, and significantly, under the direction of the deputy minister of executive council, they bear major responsibilities for achieving a “strategic corporate agenda” that requires them to work closely with their counterparts in other departments as well civil society groups and other governments. As an Alberta government document puts it, “The Deputy Minister supports the Deputy Minister to Executive Council in ensuring that over-arching policies of government are communicated and co-ordinated, and that ma ers and sensitive issues requiring strategic direction on the part of government are monitored to ensure their expeditious resolution” (3). Finally, each is the chief administrator of a government department or ministry where she is responsible for its effective overall management. Even this quite traditional role is related to the achievement of government-wide

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objectives. Deputies must align their ministry’s activities with the government’s overall agenda. Various institutions and processes reinforce the deputy’s role as a member of a service-wide senior management team that have abandoned silos and work together on government priorities. First and most importantly, Alberta premiers now define major cross-ministry initiatives that must be achieved through interdepartmental work and co-operation. Recent examples include the Alberta Children and Youth Initiative, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome and a provincial Land Use Framework. Second, deputies also meet frequently en masse and in smaller groups where they discuss and work on government priorities. Third, they also a end educational activities including presentations by high-powered speakers on major topics at the Government Interchange Program administered by the University of Alberta for Alberta deputy ministers. Fourth, certainly to a greater degree than in the past, Alberta deputy ministers are now moved between departments, although, as we will see, the extent and frequency of change varies. Such activities and processes are similar to those described by Jacques Bourgault in his extensive studies of federal deputy ministers (2005, 2006, 2007). They aim to retain deputy ministers who envision and define themselves as members of a cohesive senior executive team whose mission is the achievement of government-wide priorities. The modern Alberta deputy minister is not envisioned as an “autonomous, powerful leader” who heroically steers her ministry in new directions (Denis, Langley, and Rouleau 2005, 450). To the contrary, she is seen as a results-oriented team player in a complex, pluralistic environment that places a premium on teamwork, network creation, participation in the establishment of effective communications systems, and gaining of consent from diverse stakeholders. As the Alberta government says, “Relationship building is key [for deputy ministers] in working with diverse internal and external stakeholder groups, as the Deputy Minister oversees the development of service standards according to the needs of clients and within the realm of government policy and available resources” (2003, 1). Deputy ministers are obliged to “actively seek out” opportunities for partnerships with other deputy ministers in pursuit of the corporate agenda. The deputy minister of executive council, Alberta’s chief civil servant, plays a major role in the overall management of Alberta deputy ministers. His role is multifaceted and embraces significant duties as secretary to Cabinet and chief public service advisor to the premier.

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He is an omnipresent force in the activities and roles of deputy ministers. Notably, deputy of executive council is an integral player in the appointment, evaluation, and, as required, rotation of deputy ministers. He chairs deputy ministers’ meetings, has direct access to ministers and the premier, and communicates government priorities to the other deputies. Recruitment and evaluation processes for Alberta deputy ministers have varied in their details in recent years. There is no template, yet common pa erns prevail. A powerful theme is the major role of deputy of executive council. In fact, he is the primary architect of deputy recruitment and evaluation. Another noteworthy trend is the move to more structured and formalized recruitment and evaluation. A recent deputy to executive council began advertising all positions, insisting on formal interviews, and employing advisory panels, including some that involved persons outside the government and others that engaged only other deputy ministers (Canada 2006, 149–50). A third common theme is the critical role for deputy minister of executive council in explaining short lists and recommendations to both the premier and engaged ministers. The performance of Alberta deputy ministers is evaluated through processes established and dominated by the deputy of executive council. These procedures have varied somewhat in recent years, but as with appointments, common themes emerge. First, evaluations are formalized and structured. They occur in understood cycles and operate through formal criteria. Deputies have performance contracts and there is a bonus system, although such can presumably be altered if economic situations dictate. Second, the deputy minister of executive council is the lead actor. He determines the overall approach and, a er ministerial input, is the final judge of performance quality and amount of merit pay, if any. Third, recent evaluations have stressed three things: performance as a contributor to overall government priorities, performance as an adviser to a minister, and performance as a department’s senior manager. A number of commentaries, notably the final report of the so-called Gomery inquiry, have heralded the Alberta approach to deputy minister appointment as a model to be emulated (Canada 2006, 149–51). Gomery’s position has merit. Alberta has made strenuous efforts to make deputy appointments through well-understood, merit-based processes. Careful analysis precedes appointments. That said, Alberta’s deputy minister selection is dynamic and sometimes modified in light

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of changing conditions and needs. Procedures thus vary as political and economic circumstances change and as the deputy of executive council interprets them. They are not carved in stone for others to replicate and admire. Advocates of Alberta’s processes see merit, non-partisanship, and public service ideals as their characteristics. As the Gomery report said of Alberta’s deputy minister selection: “It introduces a much higher level of transparency in the appointment process, encourages competent people from both inside and outside government to become candidates, casts a much wider net in the search for the best qualified people, and strengthens the application of the merit principle” (Canada 2006, 150). Such virtues are noteworthy but require context. Ministers undoubtedly engage the deputy selection process and vie for particular candidates. The premier also has a key role and must approve appointments. Put differently, Canadian provincial deputy ministers, while selected by diverse methods, are the products of democratic political systems. Careful comparative analysis, based on clear criteria for evaluation, is required before judgments can be rendered about the relative effectiveness of different appointment processes. All undoubtedly reflect the deeper “administrative cultures” from which they spring. None is likely to be easily exportable or replicable in other provinces, although important interprovincial learning might well occur. A final important change in the work of Alberta’s modern deputy ministers is the slow but certain strengthening of the central agencies of the provincial government. Broadly speaking, Alberta’s central agencies seem less vigorous, less organizationally differentiated, and less powerful than in the other large provinces and certainly in the government of Canada. In this vein, Keith Brownsey effectively chronicles how Premier Peter Lougheed began to strengthen the central agencies in the early 1970s when he recognized the likely impact of world economic events on Alberta’s economy, government, and society. Lougheed expanded Executive Council and put great weight on a centralized approach to intergovernmental relations, both domestic and international. As Brownsey notes, “The Executive Council was transformed from a weekly gathering of cabinet ministers into an elaborate decision-making body, and the unstructured and informal executive was replaced by a more rational, collegial organization” (2008, 204). But li le else was done, and Lougheed’s changes were not altered until the late 1990s and the new century.

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Over the last decade, the rise of the centre has become apparent, although debate is easily engendered about the precise definition and characteristics of a central agency. In Alberta, Executive Council now has a Policy Secretariat that encourages departments and agencies to think about policy in broadly similar ways, that sponsors activities to that end, and that serves as a clearing house for policy-related materials in the provincial government. Equally, Executive Council established an Agency Governance Secretariat in 2008, recently transferred to Treasury Board, that deals with the challenges of generating common policies for Alberta’s array of agencies, boards, and commissions. While still a small body, the secretariat highlights growing awareness of the complexity of Alberta’s administrative and policy apparatus and the need for central policy advice and leadership. In addition, Executive Council manages the policy process, supports Cabinet, and houses the Public Affairs Bureau, the central communications agency of the provincial government. A more obvious manifestation of the growth of central power is the formal separation of the Treasury Board from the Ministry of Finance. For a long period, expenditure control and provincial economic and fiscal policy were housed in and controlled by the same ministry, formerly Treasury and, more recently, Finance. In 2006, the province separated these functions and housed each in a separate ministry with a dedicated senior minister. This process is analogous to the organizational differentiation described by Bruce Doern in his pioneering studies of federal central agencies (1971). Treasury Board now also houses Corporate Human Resources (CHR), the government of Alberta’s central personnel management office. The public service commissioner, an officer of deputy minister status, leads CHR. Alberta’s executive centre now has a powerful central agency, Treasury Board, with responsibilities for human resource management and detailed budget analysis, program evaluation, and audit. One aspect of Alberta’s central agencies merits brief note. The Office of the Premier and the Executive Council Office are both elements of the larger organization, Executive Council. The Office of the Premier, explicitly dedicated to the premier and clearly partisan, remains part of the same department as the Executive Council Office, whose primary goals are governmental, not political, and whose mandate is explicitly non-partisan. Surprisingly, the two activities, unlike the recent Treasury Board / Finance separation, remain united in the same body.

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Alberta’s political centre, like that of the other large provinces and certainly the government of Canada, also hosts an expanding array of legislative officers and officers of the government whose roles are to hold government officials and agencies to account, to ensure high ethical standards, and to supervise the release and flow of information. Alberta has an ethics commissioner with authority over deputy ministers, including their post-employment activities. A registrar of lobbyists, in some governments a separate officer of the legislature, is a new element in Alberta government and is a delegate of the ethics commissioner. An auditor general, whose recent role has been controversial, has a wide-ranging mandate over government agencies and their financial and policy management. A provincial ombudsman can investigate and publicize instances of maladministration by provincial officials. Finally, Alberta deputies deal with an information and privacy commissioner. Recently Canadian political scientists, including Paul Thomas and David E. Smith, have wri en about the roles and influences of Canada’s burgeoning corps of legislative officers (Thomas 2003; Smith 2007). Precise conclusions are lacking at this point about their overall impact. However, inescapable is their growth in numbers and the expansion of their mandates into new areas. A precise definition of a central agency of government might well exclude legislative officers. But ultimately they are a potentially powerful group with capacity to shape both the general and specific behaviours and activities of public service agencies and senior officials. Minimally, officers of the legislature are a significant point of reference for modern Alberta deputy ministers in ways unknown to their predecessors. Alberta Deputy Ministers in a New Century: A Profile This section provides a profile of Alberta deputy ministers in 2004–9. The profile makes no claims to comprehensive analysis, although it certainly reveals interesting characteristics of Alberta deputy ministers and the Alberta public service. As noted, the 2004–9 period was a period of turbulence in Alberta politics and society. The period boasts two general elections, 2004 and 2008, a 2006 leadership change in the governing Progressive Conservative party, and the resignation of a deputy minister of executive council in 2008. The early part of the period was one of strong economic growth, while from 2008 forward the economy slowed considerably. The period was also one of considerable change and

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instability in national politics, where Stephen Harper’s Conservatives governed with strong Alberta support, although the impact of changing national politics on Alberta’s deputy ministers is difficult to gauge precisely. The period’s two general elections yielded Progressive Conservative majority governments, thus retaining the Conservatives’ grasp on government that, remarkably, they have held since 1971. Premier Ralph Klein won the first majority in November 2004, while his successor, Ed Stelmach, won the second in March 2008. Klein relinquished leadership when he deemed a leadership review vote by party members to be unacceptably low. Accordingly, a leadership selection was launched that resulted in the victory of Ed Stelmach in December 2006. Stelmach, whose political strength is in the Edmonton area, held several portfolios in Klein’s governments, and became the fourth Progressive Conservative premier since 1971. Interestingly, the 2008 general election yielded a voter turnout of around 40 per cent, an ominously low number by any standards and one whose implications for public management are likely to be substantial. The first period of analysis, 2004–6, reveals clearly the impact of a general election. Between 2004, the election year, and 2005, Alberta’s deputy ministers were substantially shuffled. Nine of twenty-two were reassigned to a new ministry, ten stayed in their existing ministry, and three new deputy ministers were appointed. Interestingly, two of the three new deputy ministers were drawn from the ranks of the Alberta public service, while the third had been a senior official in a municipal government and thus continued a career in public service. In contrast, in 2006, a period beyond the direct impact of the general election, only one deputy minister was changed, while the other 21 one remained in their ministries. The period between 2007 and 2008 is equally instructive about the pervasive impact of partisan political developments on the assignments of Alberta deputy ministers. The period shows the weight of a leadership change and a general election in quick succession. The leadership change evoked substantial changes, but these were less than a er the 2008 general election. A er his selection as Conservative leader, Premier Stelmach appointed a Cabinet. As a result, six deputy ministers were reassigned, thirteen stayed in their ministries, and three new deputy ministers were appointed. The 2008 general election led to even greater changes, presumably because Stelmach saw his majority government as a clear mandate. The deputy minister group was expanded

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from twenty-two to twenty-six. A er the 2008 election, nine deputies changed their ministry and nine remained. Eight new deputy ministers were appointed and by the end of 2008, thirteen of Alberta’s twenty-six deputy ministers were new to office. The backgrounds of the thirteen “new” deputy ministers are interesting. Four were women and nine were men. All were selected from the ranks of the Alberta public service. Six had been assistant deputy ministers (ADMs) in the ministry to which they were appointed deputy minister, and six were ADMs in another ministry. The remaining new deputy had been an acting deputy. The new deputies had an average of twenty-one years of service in the government of Alberta; seven of them had spent their entire career in the provincial public service. Periods of service in the Alberta government ranged from three to thirty-five years. Those who had not spent their full careers in the Alberta public service were uniformly persons with substantial public sector experience, generally in municipal government, the federal government, or another province. The thirteen experienced deputy ministers also yield interesting backgrounds. Three were women and ten were men. Three of them were in their first appointment as a deputy, while the remaining ten had been in at least two ministries. Of those ten, three had been in two ministries, three had been in three ministries, and one had had four deputy appointments. The final three were in their fi h assignment as deputy ministers. The experienced deputies had served an average of six years as deputy ministers. Interestingly and importantly, the three who had held five deputy appointments were also the longest-serving deputies with deputy careers ranging from eight to ten years. Experience in a central agency, presumably to provide potential deputies with an overview of the entire governmental apparatus, does not seem to be requisite to become a deputy minister in Alberta, in contrast to appointment in the federal government. Only five of the sample’s twenty-six deputies had spent a period in a central agency, although three of them had been appointed since 2006. Alberta’s deputies gain their experience in the line ministries of government. Seen together, Alberta’s twenty-six deputy ministers in 2008 were very well educated. Collectively, they had thirty-six university degrees and various professional credentials. Their fields of study were diverse and include arts, journalism, engineering, science, public management, and business administration. Nine deputies had Masters as their final degrees and two others had PhDs.

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Three important conclusions arise. First and interestingly, elections and leadership changes have considerable consequences for the roles and assignment of Alberta deputy ministers, even when the governing party does not change. The preceding reveals the remaking of Alberta’s deputy minister corps between 2007 and 2008, when the Progressive Conservative party’s leadership changed and when the new premier, Ed Stelmach, won a majority government. Thirteen new deputies were appointed and veteran deputies were reassigned. The upshot is that leadership changes in a system dominated by one party may, broadly speaking, have impacts similar to that of government changes in more competitive political systems. Put differently, leadership changes reflected and contributed to the internal remaking of the Progressive Conservative party. Indeed, over its nearly forty-year electoral hegemony, the Alberta Conservative party has certainly taken on different policy orientations and different styles of governance. And obviously, so too have the political and economic circumstances that shape government. Alberta in 1971 is scarcely recognizable when compared to Alberta in 2010. The province’s population has doubled since Lougheed’s initial election, a continental market, a long-standing goal of Alberta business and political elites, has been established under NAFTA, and the country has an entrenched charter of rights, to cite just a few jarring differences. That the Conservative party of Premiers Lougheed, Klein, and Stelmach are studies in contrast is hardly surprising. The PCs’ reinvention, manifest most powerfully in leadership changes, leads to new demands on governance and new policy priorities. In turn, these changes alter the demands on, and capacities of, Alberta deputy ministers. In addition, general elections, especially when combined with a leadership change, o en bring new entrants into political elite, some of whom become ministers. Such newcomers bring their own policy preferences and expectations of deputy ministers. One-partydominant systems, in peculiar ways, embody unique political rhythms and challenges. Second, modern Alberta deputy ministers are selected from, and have considerable experience in, the provincial public service. Premier Stelmach, for example, recruited all his new deputies from within. Moreover, Alberta deputy ministers who have not spent all or most of their career in the Alberta public service bring considerable public management experience from either another provincial government, an Alberta municipal government, or, as another example, the Canadian

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Armed Forces. In other words, those who have dedicated their careers to public management and public service lead the Alberta public service. No tradition is apparent in either recruitment from the private sector or in deputy ministers who migrate between the private sector, universities, and the provincial government. Third, Alberta deputy ministers are unlikely to spend their careers in a single ministry. As deputies, they will have several appointments and may well be expected to serve in ministries with quite different demands and policy problems. The model of a deputy minister rooted in a ministry and armed with deep technical and policy knowledge no longer works in Alberta. As noted earlier, the prevailing image of a modern Alberta deputy minister is that of a skilled general manager, team player, and consensus builder who is constantly aware of the government’s larger policy goals and their relationship to her particular ministry. Our data show that three deputies have held five deputy appointments during tenures as deputies of around nine years. There is a link between years as deputy and number of deputy appointments held. This point raises the larger question about the frequency of rotation of deputy ministers. Some suggest a magic number of five years in a ministry, which is allegedly long enough to allow deputies to understand the ministry’s culture and to grasp the larger issues at stake. At the same time, five years is not long enough to allow a deputy to get stale. Critics of deputy rotation challenge the underpinning assumptions and generally hold that deputy ministers should have deep technical and policy knowledge and should seldom, if ever, move. Such competing claims are seldom subject to careful evaluation, and debate is destined to continue. The government of Alberta, like most other Canadian governments, is commi ed to the ideal of mobile deputies and seems unlikely to return to yesterday’s world of deputies who spend their careers in a single ministry. Alberta Deputy Ministers in a Changing World What major challenges will Alberta deputy ministers face in the next several decades? Three complex administrative issues will confront Canadian provincial governments: the continuing proliferation of new public and quasi-public organizations, the impact of advanced computer technology, and the now dominant view in Canada that deputy ministers are a “corporate” group that work together in support of the

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government’s goals. Alberta also has two particular questions – the maintenance of public-service neutrality in a political system dominated by one party and the particular challenges of a petroleum-based economy. Modern public management, in Alberta and throughout the Western world, delivers public services through intermediary bodies. A remarkable array of non-department agencies, quasi-public organizations, and public-private partnerships characterizes modern governments. So pervasive is this phenomenon that Frank Vibert (2007) argues that modern democracies must be constitutionally reinvented to accommodate the pressures. He is especially concerned with heightening governments’ capacities to wed technical and policy expertise, increasingly housed in independent bodies, with the popular will. How can hybrid government be undertaken to ensure coherent policy, government accountability, and public responsiveness? Advanced communications technologies exert unrelenting pressures for change in public management (Snellen 2005). Their pervasion in modern societies demands that governments communicate with citizens in new ways, make policy differently, and, more practically, employ new types of personnel with unique skill sets. In all this, the “publicness” of public management looms large. Governments must bear in mind the capacities of different citizens to employ advanced technologies. Services must continue to be provided “off-line” as well. Governments also bear heavy responsibilities for data privacy, for ensuring access to accurate information, and for avoiding the use of the Internet and other media for partisan purposes. Information technology will pose many challenges for Alberta deputy ministers. Deputies may well not have deep technical expertise but regardless will be pivotal in judging costly hardware and so ware acquisitions, adopting technologies whose full impact is not yet known, and ensuring that all citizens remain equally able to access the Alberta government. The government of Alberta has been a Canadian leader in conceiving its deputy ministers as a cohesive management team whose primary goal is achievement of the government’s overall agenda. As Jacques Bourgault has noted, the vision of a deputy minister “community” is highly developed in O awa, where it is bu ressed by policies, practices, and organizations (2007). This significant change in Canadian government has been widely observed but seldom systematically researched or analysed. Its implications are probably pervasive and major.

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Some questions are empirical and easily researchable. How much time do deputy ministers spend on “corporate” as opposed to ministryspecific work? Is cross-ministry work, “joined-up government” to use a generic term, really be er than its predecessors? How are such initiatives evaluated and judged? How large are the (probably) considerable “transaction costs” involved with horizontal governance? Other questions arise. For example, has Alberta’s emphasis on corporate governance brought deputy ministers closer to ministers? Do deputy ministers grow remote from their public service colleagues who may be much less integrated into the world of horizontal governance and who, broadly speaking, still work in “silos”? Political Neutrality Much has been wri en recently about the emergence and impact of new forces in governance, public management, and the economy that have altered the roles of senior civil servants. A concern is that “new public governance” has engaged public servants in more explicitly political roles, giving rise to the view that they are politicized and lack neutrality. Unfortunately, li le rigorous research has been conducted on these crucial questions, core assumptions are seldom made explicit, and basic terms like politicization are seldom defined precisely.1 On the la er point, when and through what processes does a civil service shed its neutrality and become politicized? And what precisely are the manifestations of politicized behaviour? This section simply raises several Alberta-specific issues about deputy minister politicization. It asserts no definitive conclusions and calls for much more rigorous research. Alberta raises interesting questions about political neutrality because of its history of one-party dominance. As noted repeatedly in this essay, the Progressive Conservative party has governed Alberta without interruption since 1971. Moreover, the impact of the “first past the post” electoral system has magnified Conservative dominance. The party has frequently won legislative landslides in the face of a sometimes substantial but badly fragmented opposition vote. The result is a government with overwhelming legislative majorities and a legislature that appears more Conservative than the electorate. Alberta deputy ministers thus inhabit a provincial political world that has in broad measure been constructed by the Progressive Conservative party. They are easy targets for those who assert “politicization.”

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Easy answers do not emerge about the long-term impact of Conservative electoral dominance on the behaviour of Alberta senior officials. One commonly agreed on measure of politicization, probably the only rigorous one, is in the appointments and the backgrounds of senior officials. Here the Alberta evidence is compelling. Considerable efforts have been made recently to insulate the selection and evaluation of deputy ministers from partisan political pressures. Moreover, our data reveal clearly that Alberta deputy ministers achieve their appointments through long careers in public administration, o en exclusively within the provincial public service. No evidence suggests a public service that is selected for its links to partisan politics. In this respect, Alberta deputy ministers seem aptly described by Jacques Bourgault’s conclusion about contemporary federal deputies: “The Public Service of Canada remains eminently apolitical and professional” (2006, 256). Data on appointments seldom satisfy those who sense widespread politicization, particularly in a political system like Alberta’s. Critics argue that, over time, senior officials and ministers come to hold similar views about policy and that competing interpretations or new approaches are seldom even considered. A common mindset unfolds where civil servants and politicians think alike. This argument has frequently been made about the federal public service, given periods of Liberal electoral dominance. Such claims cannot be easily assessed and possibly cannot be rigorously assessed, given complex methodological issues. The Alberta Progressive Conservative party is a centrist party that incorporates persons of diverse views and responds to a reasonably broad spectrum of opinion. Within its ranks are those who see the need for active and vigorous government leadership, those who advocate, at least in principle, a lesser role for government, and many who examine questions about government’s proper economic role on a case-by-case basis. A similar range of views holds on individual rights and social policy. The party has always been challenged by tensions between its urban and rural members. And as noted, the Alberta Conservative party has changed considerably over its forty-year tenure in response to changing social and economic conditions. Finally, Alberta politicians have been assertive in arguing that the public service must be subordinate to political authority and that ministers must make decisions. Such viewpoints, widely expressed throughout Western democracies in recent years, imply a sense of, or at least desire for, greater distance between politicians and senior officials. Such forces do not provide fertile ground for the emergence of common mindsets among politicians and civil servants.

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The final argument concerns broad changes in democratic government that, to many observers, imply politicization. These forces, commonly referred to as “new public governance,” include the concurrent growth of executive power and its concentration in leaders’ hands, an apparently greater role for ministerial staff in policymaking, and the rise of alternative expertise in such bodies as think tanks (Aucoin 1996; Osborne 2010). Other forces include the greater obligations of public officials to engage civil society in policymaking and public management, the idea that deputy ministers should be a cohesive group in pursuit of government goals, and governments’ rigid insistence on tightly scripted media strategies. In Canada, government leaders’ formal control over deputy minister appointments is o en taken as further evidence of politicization (Aucoin 2006). Those who see politicization as a serious concern view these forces as stronger than evidence that public servants come from the ranks and have few partisan connections. Power structures allegedly trump career background. Critics believe that the senior public service, while not overtly partisan, errs on the side of excessive responsiveness to political priorities or even whims. Put differently, the modern public service is unlikely to challenge political authority or present policy options that offend the government’s current thinking. Alberta’s one-party-dominant tradition is seen as a further powerful contributor to excessive responsiveness. On balance, the case for excessive responsiveness rests, to employ legal terminology, on circumstantial evidence. A host of important forces is said to cause politicization, but causality is unclear. Moreover, responsiveness and excessive responsiveness, both vague concepts, are seldom defined. Compelling evidence of public service pliability in the face of political authority is not provided. In short, the structural case for politicization or excessive responsiveness comes up lacking in Alberta, given limits of current evidence and thinking. Definitive answers to the complex ma er of deputy minister politicization require much more research, including extensive interviews with deputies, politicians, and other policy participants. Alberta as a Petro-State: Implications for Public Management For several decades, scholarship and public debate have revolved around the impact of oil and other resources on the political and economic development of nations. Powerful themes include the impact of resource dependence, especially oil, on domestic politics, and the pervasive

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consequences of petro-states on world politics. Considerable diversity of opinion has emerged. Opinion ranges from Thomas Friedman’s blunt articulation of a “law of petropolitics” that posits an inverse relationship between the price of petroleum and the quality of democracy, to subtle analyses of the impact of resource dependence on pa erns of economic growth (Friedman 2006; Dunning 2008; Goldberg, Wibbels, and Mvukiyehe 2008). Considerable diversity of opinion notwithstanding, observers are united in the view that oil profoundly shapes societies, domestic governments, and the international political economy. Terry Lynn Karl has wri en the most persuasive interpretation of the impact of oil on governments and the emergence of a distinct class of nations called “petro-states” (1997). Her impressive scholarship notes remarkable similarities in the behaviour of petroleum-rich societies. Among other things, she notes their tendency to use resource rents to displace conventional tax revenues. Equally, petro-states require heavy public expenditures to sustain both an oil industry and public opinion that supports resource development as society’s motor. Over time, petro-states generate deep elite and o en broader societal commitments to the well-being of the oil industry. Equally, petro-states are characterized by periods of growth, where the society becomes almost euphoric about the future, and periods of severe economic decline when prices and demand fall. Alberta, albeit a member of a complex, democratic federation, exhibits the characteristics of a petro-state. Its economy and its public finances are heavily shaped by the fate of its oil and natural gas industries that in turn are the creatures of a complex international political economy. No other Canadian province is so acutely dependent on oil and gas royalties. And in classic petro-state mode, Alberta has employed resource royalties to maintain Canada’s lowest tax rates, to replace personal and corporate taxes, and in many areas to establish high public expenditures. Its elites, and large parts of Alberta society, exhibit strong commitment to the well-being of the provincial oil industry and even deeper commitment to the sanctity of provincial resource ownership. Alberta certainly knows the joys (and problems) of resource booms and the pain of collapse. Like many petroleum-dominated societies, Alberta has intensively debated whether more resource rents should be saved for “rainy days” or other purposes. Intergenerational equity is an important policy concern. On the other hand, Alberta, although still a very new society, had relatively stable and established democratic institutions before the

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discovery of oil under its territory. Especially since the 1970s, it has also established governmental institutions and practices with autonomy from dominant oil interests and a capacity to shape the public interest. In this vein, Karl’s analysis of Norway highlights the importance of a strong civil service in petro-states in ways that highlight Alberta’s situation. In the 1970s, large discoveries of oil in offshore Norwegian waters led to major pressures on an already wealthy and prosperous modern democracy. Norway’s case, in one sense, reveals the remarkable impact of major oil discoveries on a society. At the same time, Norway’s powerful, long-established, and independent civil service provided it with a capacity to moderate the boom’s impact and to ensure Norwegian benefit from a depleting resource stock. Strong democratic institutions, a powerful civil service, and established societal institutions independent of oil interests allowed Norway to chart a relatively autonomous course. As Karl says about the importance of such forces, “In Norway, where state capacity is high, such institutions counteracted the temptation to accelerate development, defused potentially divisive political issues through the use of routine procedures, developed clear policy alternatives, corrected mistaken policy decisions, and controlled the spread of rent-seeking behaviour” (1997, 220). No serious a ention has yet been paid to the role of Alberta deputy ministers as important participants in the management of Alberta’s valuable oil and gas resources. The following analysis is preliminary and suggestive rather than thorough and definitive. That said, do Alberta deputy ministers, while sharing the obligations of modern public management with their colleagues in other provinces, play special roles in the management of a unique political economy? Are those roles different from, for example, the role of Newfoundland deputies in tending to the fishery and offshore oil industries, or to Saskatchewan deputies as guardians of the potash and uranium industries? Are oil and gas, as asserted by petro-state thinkers, significantly different in their impact from that of other dominant commodities in other provinces? Certainly, the Alberta public service over the past thirty years has, among other things and o en in partnership with politicians, coped with volatile revenues, given the vagaries of resource pricing in world markets. And deputy ministers in Alberta have certainly been deeply engaged in discussions of economic diversification, which is, a er all, the flip side of resource dependence. They probably have considerable institutional memory about how to cope with booms

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and busts. The public service had to focus on the longer-term consequences of resource development and the problems of too rapid resource exploitation. Such roles and influences are more easily asserted than either executed by deputy ministers or studied by social scientists. The Alberta public service does not exert a monopoly over policy development. It must persuade, not command. Moreover, the imperatives of a petrostate lead to tremendous pressures for rapid resource development. Policies for the long term are not easily made when a boom starts. Suggestions that the pace of development should slow somewhat are seldom popular in a booming oil economy. Alberta deputy ministers have essential but difficult roles in balancing complex forces. Such deputy minister roles probably require considerable, possibly unique, talents, experience, and insights. Regardless, the impact of a province’s economic structure, especially where the province’s economy is resource dependent, is a topic that requires serious analysis by students of public management. Conclusions This chapter examines Alberta deputy ministers in the first decade of a new century, with emphasis on the period between 2004 and 2009. It is an exploratory account that urges others to do further research. Four major conclusions arise. First, Alberta deputy ministers are now a relatively cohesive group that work together on major programs with government-wide consequences. Second and interestingly, Alberta’s political system, noteworthy for long periods of one-party rule, changes internally in ways that have major implications for deputy ministers and governance. The Progressive Conservative party has remade itself several times over its forty-year tenure. Such internal party dynamics, especially when manifest in leadership changes, exert, broadly speaking, impacts comparable to changes of government in competitive party systems. Third, Alberta’s deputy ministers are experienced career public servants with long service in the Alberta government or related areas of public administration. Yet despite its scrupulous non-partisanship, the senior Alberta public service is an easy target for assertions of politicization. The chapter chronicles common assertions about politicization and finds them unconvincing in the Alberta case. Finally, the chapter establishes a unique role for Alberta deputy ministers – arbiters of petro-state dynamics.

Alberta Deputy Ministers 281 NOTE 1. For a clearly wri en and rigorous antidote to these problems, see Eichbaum and Shaw (2008). The authors expand the debate significantly and instil a seldom-found methodological rigour.

REFERENCES Alberta. 2003. Deputy Minister Profile. Edmonton: Government of Alberta. Aucoin, Peter. 1996. “Political Science and Democratic Governance.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 29 (4): 643–60. h p://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ S0008423900014414. Bourgault, Jacques. 2005. Profile of Deputy Ministers in the Government of Canada. Working Paper Series. O awa: Canada School for Public Service. Bourgault, Jacques. 2006. “The Deputy Minister’s Role in the Government of Canada: His Responsibility and His Accountability.” In Parliament, Ministers and Deputy Ministers, Research Studies Volume 1, Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Other Activities. O awa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services. Bourgault, Jacques. 2007. “Corporate Management at the Top Level of Governments: The Canadian Case.” International Review of Administrative Sciences 73 (2): 257–74. h p://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0020852307077974. Brownsey, Keith. 2008. “Leviathan Arises: Harry Hobbs and the Rise of Alberta.” In Searching for Leadership: Cabinet Secretaries in Canada, edited by Patrice Dutil, 204–221. Toronto: Institute for Public Administration of Canada and University of Toronto Press. Canada. Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities. 2006. Report Phase 2: Restoring Accountability – Recommendations. O awa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services. Doern, G. Bruce. 1971. “Recent Changes to the Philosophy of Policy-Making in Canada.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 4 (2): 243–64. h p://dx.doi.org/ 10.1017/S0008423900026664. Dunning, Thad. 2008. Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes. New York: Cambridge University Press. h p://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ CBO9780511510052. Eichbaum, Chris, and R. Shaw. 2008. “Revisiting Politicization: Political Advisers and Public Servants in Westminster Systems.” Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions 21 (3): 337–63. h p://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2008.00403.x.

282 Allan Tupper Friedman, Thomas L. 2006. “The First Law of Petropolitics.” Foreign Policy, 25 April. Goldberg, E., E. Wibbels, and E. Mvukiyehe. 2008. “Lessons from Strange Cases: Democracy, Development and the Resource Curse in the U.S. States.” Comparative Political Studies 41 (4–5): 477–514. h p://dx.doi.org/10.1177/ 0010414007313123. Karl, Terry Lynn. 1997. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. Berkeley: University of California Press. Osborne, Stephen P., ed. 2010. The New Public Governance? New York: Routledge. Snellen, Ignace. 2005. “E-Government: A Challenge for Public Management.” In Oxford Handbook of Public Management, edited by Ewan Ferlie, Laurence E. Lynn Jr, and Christopher Polli , 398–421. New York: Oxford University Press. Thomas, Paul G. 2003. “The Past, Present and Future of Officers of Parliament.” Canadian Public Administration 46 (3): 287–314. h p://dx.doi.org/ 10.1111/j.1754-7121.2003.tb01171.x. Vibert, Frank. 2007. The Rise of the Unelected. New York: Cambridge University Press. h p://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491160.

10 Government Transitions, Leadership Succession, and Executive Turnover in British Columbia, 1996–2006 e v e r t l i n d q u i s t a n d t h e a va k i l

Introduction British Columbia has a reputation for polarized, colourful, and sometimes a “take-no-prisoner” approach to politics. The last three decades have seen many decisive shi s in the philosophy and policy mix of provincial governments, o en leading to significant impact on program delivery models and the structure of the public service. This governing dynamic comes in addition to the mounting demands on Westminster parliamentary systems and public service institutions everywhere to increase responsiveness to elected governments, to improve performance, and to increase transparency. We would expect that, with the coming and going of governments and premiers in BC, there should be higher turnover in top public service executives than in other jurisdictions, including serving as fodder to meet accountability demands of the Opposition and public. The national annual figures from supplied by Bierling (tables 11.2 and 11.3 in chapter 11 of this volume) show that BC had significant growth rates in deputy ministers (DMs) and assistant deputy ministers (ADMs) between 1997 and 2006, including the highest growth in numbers of ADMs of any Canadian jurisdiction. From 1997 to 2001, under two NDP governments, the number of DMs ranged from eighteen to twenty-three, and ADMs from fi y to fi y-four. During 2002–5, under the Campbell Liberal government, the numbers for DMs shi ed to between twenty-three and twenty-five, and ADMs increased significantly to the sixty-five to sixty-nine range.1 The national data set suggests that BC had the highest growth in ADMs from 1997 to 2006

284 Evert Lindquist and Thea Vakil

of any Canadian province or territory at 56.9 per cent, compared the national average growth of 34.4 per cent. For observers of BC politics and government this may come as a surprise, given the significant retrenchment of the early 2000s. While BC’s growth in DMs of 50 per cent seems high, Alberta and NWT had similar growth rates, and the number of DMs in Ontario and Quebec roughly doubled. Table 11.4 also suggests that, consistent with BC’s reputation for polarized politics, the rates of turnover for DMs and ADMs are highest across the provinces and territories in post-election years (45 per cent), and in the upper third of jurisdictions in pre-election and election years (around 32 per cent). National snapshot figures, of course, can mask many important developments, particularly in BC where, in the late 1990s, there were many “in-year” changes beyond elections pertaining to leadership succession and government restructuring. In order to tackle questions of turnover and mobility among the top public service executives in BC, we have developed finer-grained data based on comings and goings of governments and premiers, o en reflecting scandal and internal party struggles, as well as restructuring of Cabinets and machinery of government. In interpreting these data, we consider explanations for turnover beyond ideology of incoming governments and type of department, including the notion that many executives will naturally retire in the context of transitions because positions are very demanding and these are natural junctures, and that in relatively lean institutions there is simply not the budget or room to keep extra executives in orbit when restructuring takes place. We also consider executive turnover from a gender perspective, noting advances and slides over the decade under consideration. The first section of this chapter provides general background on the nature of BC politics and governance and draws out implications for executive appointments in the BC public service. The second section provides a finer-grained historical perspective on elections and political leadership succession, as well as noting significant policy announcements and administrative restructuring, material to decisions about executive appointments. The third section introduces additional data to explore whether such turnover and growth were products of ideological or policy directions, and whether there is evidence of politicization or a distinctive BC style of executive recruitment and engagement with governments. We conclude with some ideas on implications for the national study and for further research.

British Columbia, 1996–2006 285

BC’s Governance Style: Implications and Questions for Executives List the politicians who have successfully fought elections to become premier of British Columbia in the modern era – W.A.C. Benne , Dave Barre , Bill Benne , Bill Vander Zalm, Mike Harcourt, Glen Clark, and Gordon Campbell – and one is immediately reminded of the significant swings and shi s in the priorities of governments. These political leaders, with remarkably different personalities and political philosophies, precipitated dramatic shi s in the goals and approaches of successive governments, and significant policy and program change. LeSage (2000) has argued that the ideological struggles across governments implicated the BC public service in two ways: “The public service assisted governments in their crusades to frame the province according to particular visions … and BC governments have not been shy about manipulating the structures and core processes of the public service” (441–2). This, along with economic upheavals, public sector labour relations struggles, and shi s in public opinion, has led to what LeSage calls a pronounced “‘herky-jerky’ dynamic affecting the public service” (442, 456). These struggles, over the years, have had significant consequences for the size and structure of the BC public service, and, not surprisingly, its top executive group. LeSage also observed that “the neutrality concept is generally, albeit loosely, maintained as a core principle of the British Columbia public service” (462). Looking back over several decades, Ruff (2010) notes that many of BC’s modern premiers have had “dictatorial” styles (208), leading strongly from the centre of government, and since the early 1980s, they have relied on a strong Office of the Premier to do so (211). This has included not only a strong chief of staff, who handles the political business of the premier, but also very capable central agencies and strong deputy ministers to the premier who, in recent years, and much like practice in the Canadian Public Service, have increasingly had their roles delineated formally as Cabinet secretary, head of the BC Public Service, and chair of the Deputy Ministers’ Council (213). While BC may have been ahead of its time, Ruff rightly points out that in recent years the province’s centralizing tendencies in the Premier’s Office is similar to that of many other Westminster jurisdictions, consistent with Donald Savoie’s (1999) conceptualization of modern “court government” with powerful first ministers and strong central offices at their command, who set the agenda and o en do not rely heavily on their Cabinets for strategy and policy direction.

286 Evert Lindquist and Thea Vakil

Perhaps the most distinctive and consequential BC practice is that the premier not only has the power through the lieutenant governor to appoint ministers and deputy ministers (Order in Council appointments), but also assistant deputy ministers, among others in the broader public sector. It is well known in other jurisdictions that the ability to appoint ministers and deputy ministers alike results in the la er serving the first minister as much as their own minister; in BC this influence is further accentuated through ADM appointments and, for the more ambitious ADMs, responsiveness and alignment to the agenda of the premier looms large. Over the last few years, BC governments have o en searched outside the provincial public service for top executive positions, meaning that, no ma er how capable and professional, successful external executive appointees may be less commi ed to the BC public service as an institution. With this background in mind, along with the national data that provide some perspective on BC mobility pa erns, several questions arise: • Why have there been spikes in turnover of BC deputy ministers? Does a finer-grained look at the data support the implication that departures are for ideological reasons? Do changes in premier – as opposed to different political parties – make a difference? • What accounts for an increase in the number of deputy ministers, and, in particular, the number of assistant deputy ministers in BC? • What proportion of executives were internal or external appointments? Were there discernible pa erns, such as coming from Alberta or other jurisdictions undergoing change? Has the mix of educational and professional backgrounds changed over time? • What proportion of this turnover might be a ributable to natural departure or retirement dates, as opposed to departures forced by new governments or premiers? Were many departures driven by accountability demands? Did they leave for other public service institutions in Canada, or to the private or local government sectors? • Do BC turnover pa erns at the DM and ADM levels, which proceed on the basis of Order in Council appointments, differ significantly from those of other provinces and territories? • Has the gender balance in the BC executive group improved from 1996 to 2006? • Is there evidence that the pa erns in executive recruitment has gone beyond encouraging responsiveness, to politicize the BC public service?

British Columbia, 1996–2006 287

By introducing additional data, we provide some preliminary answers to these questions. However, as we point out in the conclusion, our data are limited and we indicate how further data could be collected so as to lead to more definitive answers. Recent Eras in BC Governments and Executive Appointments As noted in the introduction, the national figures point to several interesting features about executive transitions in BC from 1996 to 2006. The figures suggest that the BC public service has had higher turnover in top executives (DMs and ADMs) in the post-election years, and sit in the top tier for turnover in pre-election and election years combined. In this section we seek to interpret these figures with finer-grained historical background and data. We begin by reviewing developments and trends under NDP governments, and then consider how executive turnover proceeded under three additional Liberal governments led by Gordon Campbell. Executive Turnover under the NDP: Clark, Miller, Dosanjh (1996–2001) Understanding the pa erns in executive turnover in the BC public service during 1996–2001 requires developing an appreciation for the political decisions and dynamics driving decisions. In BC politics 1996 was a remarkable year, because NDP Premier Harcourt resigned in response to the simmering bingo-gate affair in February,2 with Glen Clark succeeding him as leader of the NDP and premier in February 1996. Many observers thought, given the low standing of the NDP in the polls, this would mark the end of a tumultuous era in BC politics. However, Clark engineered a surprising victory in the May 1996 provincial election with a shrewdly run campaign, including claims that the provincial budget was well in surplus, and efficient voting in key ridings secured a majority. Clark’s resurgence was a precursor to further political drama. When it was discovered a er the election that the budget was significantly in deficit, there emerged a ferocious and sustained effort by the Canadian Taxpayers Federation and National Citizens Coalition to recall individual MPs and charge the NDP with election fraud because of misleading election advertising, leading to what has been described as the “politics of siege warfare” (Phillips 2010, 118–20). Clark was further compromised by the fast-ferries cost overruns and eventually stepped down when he was indicted on charges relating to casino

288 Evert Lindquist and Thea Vakil Table 10.1. Deputy Minister Mobility in BC, 1996–2010

Time

Ministries

NDP governments 1996–2000 Clark designation February 1996 15 Election May 1996 13 Cabinet shuffle September 1996 14 Cabinet shuffle January 1997 14 Cabinet shuffle February 1998 18 Miller designation 21 August 1999 Dosanjh designation 20 February 2000 Liberal Governments 2001–10 Election May 2001 20 Election May 2005 19 Cabinet shuffle 2008 20 Election May 2009 21 As of 1 August 2010 20

DMs

DMs who left

DMs in new portfolios

16 16

3 4

0 16

17

1

2

26

0

12

25 25

1 4

9 3

26

2

2

28 21 27 29 23

18 6 10 4 3

28 19 14 15 4

licensing. Dan Miller stepped in as interim NDP leader and premier in August 1999, until the party elected Ujjal Dosanjh, who served as premier from February 2000 until the May 2001 election, when the NDP were roundly defeated. In short, this period was one of extraordinary political instability and change, including many recalibrations of the Cabinet and ministerial portfolio restructurings (see table 10.1). Table 10.1 shows that there was significant turnover of deputy ministers during the Clark era, even though early on there was a stable number of DMs (sixteen to seventeen). Three deputies le when the new premier was appointed, and another four deputies le a er Clark’s victory in the May 1996 election. These changes are noteworthy because there had already been a purge a er the Harcourt government arrived in 1991 a er years of Social Credit rule (LeSage 2000, 462). Interestingly, with the swearing in of a new Cabinet in May 1996, there was a wholesale shuffle of deputy ministers that essentially assigned all to new portfolios. There followed three subsequent Cabinet shuffles

British Columbia, 1996–2006 289

(September 1996, January 1997, February 1998). Although the January 1997 shi led to twelve of twenty-six deputies assigned to new responsibilities, there were relatively few departures of deputy ministers. Indeed, the number of deputy ministers significantly increased from the sixteen to seventeen range, to twenty-five to twenty-six,3 and essentially stayed more or less at that threshold ever since, while the number of ADMs stayed around fi y. A er Premier Clark resigned in August 1999, four deputy ministers departed with the appointment of Dan Miller as interim party leader and premier – a similar number of departures following Clark’s designation, but off a larger base of twenty-five (rather than sixteen). A year later, another two deputy ministers le a er Dosanjh became premier. Under Miller and Dosanjh the number of deputies stayed at the twentyfive to twenty-six range and, interestingly, for all the talk of “big” NDP government, there remained a fairly consistent number of ADMs, continuing in the fi y to fi y-four range. The significant growth in the ADM complement would not occur until a er the arrival of the first Campbell government. Life under the Liberals: Three Campbell Governments (2001–2009) The Liberal party, led by Gordon Campbell, was swept into power on 16 May 2001, with seventy-seven seats in a seventy-nine-seat legislature (only two opposition members from the NDP). Disappointed by their unexpected defeat in 1996 and dismayed by NDP scandals during the late 1990s, the Liberals had a lot of time to develop an election strategy and policy platform (the New Era for Government promises), and to consider how it would govern, scanning models in other national and subnational jurisdictions (Lindquist, Langford, and Vakil 2010, 220–1). Following BC traditions, this would be a time for house-cleaning of public service executives who were suspect in loyalty, normative alignment, or perceived under-performance by the incoming government. The Campbell government’s New Era platform set out a very ambitious agenda, including income and corporate tax reductions, performance-oriented and innovative government, transparent and open government, restructuring of the health sector, devolution to the local government sector, and a concerted effort to privatize or deliver public services in alternative ways, such as through public-private partnerships and contracting out, and a reformed procurement system (Lindquist, Langford, and Vakil 2010). Immediately a er the election,

290 Evert Lindquist and Thea Vakil

the government started to implement its New Era undertakings, which were posted prominently in the wall of the Cabinet chambers. A core services review was set in motion out of the deputy to the Premier’s Office to identify dramatic expenditure targets across ministerial portfolios over a three-year period, which implied considerable staff reductions and program elimination, restructuring, or devolution. A parallel review was undertaken of Crown agencies, boards, and commissions. A reform of the health delivery system was set in motion, involving the consolidation of regional health authorities and the contracting out of services in many health facilities. All of this involved centralized planning, including moving the communications function and the Crown Agencies Secretariat into the centre. The implication was that Campbell and his top advisors needed a commi ed, energetic executive group leading the BC public service to implement their ambitious program. Immediately a er the election, over two-thirds of the deputy ministers either resigned or were removed from their positions. The premier appointed his former city manager when Campbell was mayor of Vancouver, Ken Dobell, as his deputy minister, and promoted Brenda Eaton, a long-time public servant, as deputy minister for coordinating the core review and public service restructuring. Forty-one executives (eight of twenty-six DMs, thirtytwo of fi y-one ADMs, and one acting DM), survived the transition from NDP to Liberals in 2001. The government brought in executive talent from outside the BC public service – examples include Penny Ballem (DM of health services), Emery Dosdall (DM of education), Paul Taylor (DM of finance), and Andrew Wilkinson (DM of intergovernmental relations) – and relied on executive search firms for other positions. Some, such as Vince Collins, a former BC deputy minister and former federal public servant, were brought in for time-defined periods (Lindquist, Langford, and Vakil 2010, 228). Others, such as Chris Trumpy, were retained as deputy ministers, or promoted from the ADM ranks, like Robin Ciceri and Tamara Vrooman, later appointed as the first female deputy minister of finance (2004). Given BC’s governance traditions, such changes were not surprising. However, it was striking that almost all of these deputy appointments sported significant public sector experience. Even Wilkinson’s appointment, a former president of the BC Liberal party, could not be challenged on merit, given his many professional and education credentials. The new government did not rely simply on recruiting and promoting new talent to complement the handful of continuing deputy

British Columbia, 1996–2006 291

ministers, it also introduced parallel but different incentive systems for ministers and deputy ministers: ministerial pay would be docked if they did not meet targets, and deputy ministers would receive bonuses if their ministries met targets. During the first Campbell mandate, aside from the restructuring set in motion by the core services review, there was li le change in the ministerial portfolios and the machinery of government. The exceptions were the consolidation of the two ministries responsible for health services and long-term planning, the consolidation of the Ministry of Water, Land, and Air Protection with Sustainable Development and the creation of a new ministry focused on Aboriginal relations and reconciliation. Several new entities and programs were pulled into the Office of the Premier such as the Crown Agencies Secretariat, the Progress Board, and the communications function, joining entities like Intergovernmental Relations, which had long reported directly to the premier and was enmeshed with Cabinet operations (Ruff 2010, 211). Interestingly, though, beyond the initial cuts in programs and staff, the executive complement of the BC public service increased! The number of deputy ministers expanded to twenty-eight (this would be reduced to twenty-one by 2005, and the number of ADMs grew to sixty-six from fi y-one under the NDP (see tables 10.1 and 10.2). Such expansion reflected the breadth of the Liberals’ activist agenda, o en involving huge out-sourcing, public-private, and alternative service-delivery deals. It also affirmed that, despite the “smaller government” rhetoric of the government and the fact that many Liberal ministers had a fundamental antipathy to the BC public service, the new premier had greater confidence in its capacity to serve and evolve. Under Campbell’s leadership, the Liberal government tended to define public service performance as having emerged from poor governance and insufficient scope and incentives for leadership and innovation. Rather than continue to pursue a significant and ever-deepening purge inside the public service, the government instead moved forward with a concerted cultural change and leadership agenda, driven from the Office of the Deputy Minister to the premier and the Public Service Employee Relations Commission, soon renamed the Public Service Agency (for more detail, see Lindquist, Langford, and Vakil 2010, 226–8). Following his victory in the 14 May 2005 election, albeit with a slimmer majority, Premier Campbell appointed Jessica McDonald to replace Ken Dobell as deputy minister to the premier. McDonald, the first woman to be appointed in this role, had worked on special projects

292 Evert Lindquist and Thea Vakil Table 10.2. Assistant Deputy Ministers in BC, 2002–10 Annual Aggregates and Growth

Ratio of ADMs to Full Time Equivalents

Year

ADMs

Year

FTEs

ADMs

FTES/ADM

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2010

66 65 69 67 80 95

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2010

34,106 30,793 28.376 26,571 27,903 31,472

66 65 69 67 80 95

517 474 411 397 349 331

and transition planning as a deputy minister in the Premier’s Office during the previous years (Ruff 2010, 207; Lindquist, Langford, and Vakil 2010, 229). McDonald had worked at a relatively junior level in the BC public service under the NDP, but le in 1998 to set up a consulting firm with her partner, the former director of Liberal caucus communications. This continued the tradition of premiers appointing DMs to the premier who understand, internalize, and are keen to implement the government’s agenda – for the second Campbell mandate these would include the Five Great Goals for the Golden Decade, the Climate Action Plan, the New Relationship (Ruff 2010), and hosting the 2010 Winter Olympics. In addition to her many responsibilities, McDonald also initiated and drove a public-service-wide branding, recruitment, renewal, and engagement strategy (Lindquist, Langford, and Vakil 2010, 229–33). The second Campbell mandate produced different challenges for top executives, most of which concerned implementing ambitious new priorities, but there were also compensation and retention issues. A er the 2005 election, the number of DMs declined from twenty-eight to twenty-one (even if the number of ministries did not significantly decline). This reduction was achieved partly through the departure of six deputy ministers, a mix of involuntary and voluntary departures, and partly by changing titles for the same positions from deputy minister to associate deputy minister, a reason for at least one deputy to quit.4 By 2006, the number of ADMs had increased to eighty from the 2002–5 range of sixty-five to sixty-nine, and the ratio of full-time equivalents

British Columbia, 1996–2006 293

(FTEs) to ADMs had reduced from 517 to 331 FTEs per ADM (see table 10.2). One of the more interesting dynamics at play was the premier’s continued reliance on key former deputy ministers, such as Ken Dobell and Dan Doyle, who continued to work on contract on several important files for the government. Conclusion: Beyond the New Era Once the changes flowing from the 2005 election in BC were digested at the political and bureaucratic level, the character of the second Campbell regime began to take shape, with strong focus on climate change, Aboriginal relations, infrastructure and facility development for the 2010 Olympics, and preparation for the legislated election date of 12 May 2009. Having canvassed his ministerial colleagues about their political plans, the premier announced a pre-election Cabinet shuffle in 2008, which also led to the departure of ten deputy ministers before the election, who presumably did not want to continue for another mandate, which led to fourteen deputies taking on new portfolios.5 Campbell was rewarded with a third majority government in the spring of 2009, and increased the number of ministries from nineteen to twenty by separating the Labour portfolio from the Ministry of Labour and Citizen’s Services. Four more deputies le not long a er, most notably Jessica McDonald, deputy minister to the premier, followed by another three by the end of summer 2010.6 The steady departure of deputy ministers since 2005 – twenty altogether – did not generally arise as the result of poor performance, but reflected personal assessments of retirement or pursuing other career possibilities. This turnover led to a smaller group of deputy ministers, twenty-one by 2010, and a consistently high level of new portfolios assigned to new or established deputy ministers since 2005 (see table 10.1), reflecting an increasing number of changes in ministerial portfolios and the structure of ministries during the second mandate, although this did not rival the fundamental changes of 2001. Such turnover was not confined to the deputy community: looking at the next tier, forty-six of the ninety-five ADMs (48 per cent) in mid-2010 were appointed a er 2006. However, the number of ADMs shot up to ninetyfive in 2010, a great increase from the fi y to fi y-four range during the NDP era and the sixty-five to sixty-nine range for most of the first Campbell government!

294 Evert Lindquist and Thea Vakil

It is not surprising that, against this backdrop, the challenge of retaining and a racting talented executives became an issue. It had been recognized that compensation for BC DMs and ADMs was increasingly out of step with that of other jurisdictions, despite modest increases in the early 2000s. In 2008, the government announced significant compensation increases for top executives, reasonably competitive with other jurisdictions, even if it did not deal with the even greater compensation gaps with the band of excluded executives just below DMs and ADMs. However, the communications strategy for the announcement was mishandled, occurring in the glare of the opening ceremonies of the Beijing Olympics in August 2008 and leading to public controversy and some back-tracking (Lindquist, Langford, and Vakil 2010, 235).7 Indeed, a de facto quid pro quo was that there would be fewer deputy ministers with broader spans of control, as the BC public service was downsized in response to the global financial crisis, with restraint flowing from hosting the 2010 Olympics, and anticipation of a smaller public service due to labour market challenges and new business models (Lindquist, Langford, and Vakil 2010, 238). Exploring PaĴerns in Mix, Turnover, and Mobility With some background on the ebb and flow of BC governments and executive turnover in the BC public service from 1996 to 2006 and beyond, we have more grist for our analytic mill. In this section we explore the evolving mix of executives with respect to background and gender; voluntary as opposed to involuntary departures; the trail of one cohort of executives to ascertain their fortunes; the effects of different leadership and government transitions on executive turnover; how turnover has affected the gender of the executive group; and where departing deputy ministers landed a er their time in the BC public service. With this in hand, we venture our views on whether government direction and significant turnover has politicized or simply led to a more responsive public service. Recruitment: Has the Mix Been Changing? Long ago, Selznick (1957) argued that leaders could shape the character, competence, and adaptability of institutions through recruitment, changing the mix, expertise, and values of members. In this sense, then, turnover can present an opportunity to bring in different

British Columbia, 1996–2006 295

kinds of expertise and perspectives into public service institutions. Here we undertake an exploration of whether the professional and education background of deputy ministers has changed over the years and whether the representation of women in the executive ranks has increased. A review of the educational backgrounds of a mix of well-known past deputy ministers and of the cohort in 2010 showed a diversity of educational backgrounds. There are impressive mixes of types and levels of degrees, with an interesting balance between humanities, sciences, social sciences, and professional degrees. The review also showed an intriguing distribution of degrees covering the waterfront of the social sciences (particularly economics), with a sma ering of science and professional school degrees (public administration, business, social work, and particularly law). Perhaps the biggest shi with the 2010 group of deputy ministers, which was also wonderfully diverse, was that there were more law, public administration, engineering, and science-related degrees, with business and politics not far behind. We also note that, with the exception of the deputy a orney general, a deputy minister’s education is not readily predictable from the portfolio he or she holds. Longer-serving deputy ministers o en change portfolios, and it is not unusual to move from “dirt” ministries to social ministries or the other way around. Where the gender mix is concerned, we noted the Campbell Liberal government made two breakthroughs in the mid-2000s by appointing Jessica McDonald and Tamara Vrooman to the positions, respectively, of deputy minister to the premier and deputy minister of finance. Campbell also appointed women to other key central agency positions (e.g., Brenda Eaton, Sharon Halke , Joy Illington, Virginia Greene, Dana Hayden, etc.). But, in the context of considerable turnover and expansion in the ranks of deputy ministers and assistant deputy ministers alike, were there overall gains for women over the period under study? Tables 10.3 and 10.4 show that, under the NDP, from 1996 to 1999 25–31 per cent of DMs were women, and from 1997 to 2000 23–28 per cent of ADMs were women. Our snapshot data for 2001 and 2005 show that, under the Liberals, 36 per cent and 48 per cent respectively of DMs were women, a notable increase from the NDP levels of 25–31 per cent. From 2001 to 2005 under the Liberals, the proportion of women in the ADM ranks varied from as low as 28 per cent to 36 per cent, but the figures se led more around the 30–34 per cent level. Indeed,

296 Evert Lindquist and Thea Vakil Table 10.3. Gender and BC Public Service Deputy Ministers Government and year

Women/total

Percentage

NDP Election 1996 Cabinet shuffle January 1997 Cabinet shuffle February 1999

4 of 16 8 of 26 7 of 25

25 31 28

Liberals Election 2001 Election 2005 Cabinet shuffle 2008 Election 2009 As of 1 August 2010

10 of 28 10 of 21 6 of 27 7 of 29 5 of 23

36 48 22 24 22

Table 10.4. Gender and BC Assistant Deputy Ministers Government and year

Women/total

Percentage

NDP 1997 1998 1999 2000

14 of 51 12 of 50 15 of 54 12 of 52

27 24 28 23

Liberals 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2010

16 of 51 20 of 66 20 of 65 19 of 69 24 of 67 27 of 80 38 of 95

31 30 31 28 36 34 40

with the exception of one year, when the Liberal government’s worst performance equalled the NDP’s best performance, the Liberals outperformed the NDP in government with respect to appointing women executives. That said, the ability to make such appointments may reflect the changing educational and labour markets, which were supplying ever more well-qualified women. In 2010 the proportion of women DMs dropped to 22 per cent, but the proportion of women at the ADM level increased to 40 per cent, creating a different mix in the public service stream for future DM appointments. It may also indicate

British Columbia, 1996–2006 297

a reduction in status of women executives who, by percentage, are in lower positions than before. Executive Departures: Personal or Government Decisions? When examining turnover rates in executive positions, particularly at the deputy-minister level, we believe that looking at the number of departures is insufficient. Executives leave for a variety of reasons and not simply because a new government or party leader has arrived. DM and ADM positions are remarkably demanding and consuming, and are o en costly in family relationships and lost income-earning opportunities. Top executives may be near retirement, either seeking to leave the labour force or moving their career along by taking up other public sector or private sector positions, including consulting. They will o en signal to a premier or premier-in-waiting that they are keen to stay, ready to go, or indifferent. In some cases DMs and ADMs may be asked to leave – not because of ideological or performance issues, but rather because downsizing or restructuring of ministerial portfolios leads to fewer executive seats. On the other hand, some deputy ministers who know their time is up will nevertheless stay to secure more generous severance arrangements, and still others may indicate publicly they intend to leave when they were willing to stay. For these reasons, it is o en difficult to interpret what the departures of deputy ministers really mean. Another perspective concerns the proclivity of different governments to clean house when they take power, and, as we noted at the outset of this chapter, BC has a governance tradition that allows new governments to reach into the ADM ranks as well as DMs when doing so. However, the Canadian literature on government transitions has also noted that o en the shi to different leaders within the same party in government can be more dramatic than the shi to another party (Savoie 1993). The transitions in leadership under the NDP and Liberal governments from 1996 to 2006 provide an opportunity to probe this contention with respect to turnover in top public service executives. Here we seek to understand whether recent experience in BC (1996– 2006) is significantly different from earlier experience, whether it differs across governments and party leaders, and across jurisdictions. Table 10.1 contains data comparing DM turnover from 1996 to 2010. At about the time of Clark’s designation in 1996, only three of sixteen deputy ministers le the BC public service, but then another four le just a er the election in May, three months later. This is a significant

298 Evert Lindquist and Thea Vakil

number (seven cumulative departures from the sixteen deputies working in early 1996), which needs to be put in perspective: in 1991, with the arrival of the Harcourt NDP government, eight deputy ministers appointed under the Social Credit government resigned (LeSage 2000, 468n57), approximately half the deputy group.8 But beyond 1996, deputy departures under NDP governments tailed off, with a small spike of four following Miller’s designation as interim premier. The contrast with the Campbell era is stark: close to two-thirds of sitting DMs departed with the arrival of a new government and premier in 2001. Moreover, there were significant departures in May 2005 (six), 2008 (ten), and May 2009 (four). This could partly reflect the working through of the “boomers” through the ranks and partly be a ributable to the toll of high-pressure positions. But it also shows that there can be significant changes in the executive ranks without changes in government or party leaders – this suggests departures could be driven by the personal preferences of deputy ministers, policy and machinery priorities of the premier, or assessments of performance. In short, table 10.1 suggests that more turnover in deputy ministers occurred under the Campbell Liberal governments (2001–10) than under the earlier NDP governments (1996–2001), even if we take into account the 1991 transition, and there was a more steady stream of departures. With the exception of the Yukon and Newfoundland, table 11.4 indicates that BC has the highest post-election-year turnover of the larger provinces, with deputy ministers at 43.1 per cent (compared to 27.8 per cent in large provinces) and 45.7 per cent for ADMs (compared to 33.5 per cent in large provinces). Moderating Turnover: Does Type of Ministry MaĴer? Bierling, Carroll, and Rosenbla (1999) find some support for the expectation that turnover will be less frequent in ministries that require more professional and technical expertise, because “there is a strong identity with a particular kind of education or technology associated with the department” (204). For example, engineers will populate the executive in Transportation, Finance will be dominated by economists, and Forests by professional foresters, and a ministry like Energy and Mines would employ engineers or other technical specialists. Social ministries, on the other hand, do not require the same kinds of expertise and their executives may be more readily replaced. To test this proposition, we compared the amount of DM turnover in the ten ministries that remained largely intact from 1996 to 2006: Agriculture; Children

British Columbia, 1996–2006 299

and Family Development; Education; Energy, Mines and Petroleum; Finance; Forests; Health Services; Housing and Social Development; and Transportation and Infrastructure. The top part of table 10.5 presents the data on deputy minister turnover for the ten ministries. The Bierling, Carroll, and Rosenbla (1999) hypothesis is not supported by the data, which show that all of the long-standing ministries, regardless of professional or technical hue, have experienced similar turnover in deputy ministers (four each). The exception is the Ministry of Children and Family Development (MCFD), but this reflects the ongoing issues and political volatility with its mandate; however, the current deputy minister has served since April 2006, with the full confidence of the premier who recruited her from South Africa. Other ministries have more unstable and evanescent histories or are relatively new. The bo om of table 10.5 shows how some ministries are short-lived, such as the Ministry of Community Development, Cooperatives, and Volunteers established under the NDP in 1999, and the Ministry of Multiculturalism and Immigration created by Premier Dosanjh in February 2000 – both eliminated a er the 2001 election. The Ministry of Women’s Equality, established by the NDP in 1991, disappeared gradually, becoming a program in Community, Aboriginal, and Women’s Services in 2001 and eliminated in 2005.9 The Ministry of Management Services was established in 2001 and discontinued in 2005 (although many of its functions moved into the Ministry of Citizen Services). Others have waxed and waned, such as the Ministry of Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation, which had been a separate ministry under the NDP government (Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs), then relegated to Community, Aboriginal, and Women’s Services by the Liberal government in 2001, only to be reinstated as its own ministry in 2005 to help drive the “New Relationship” strategy. Finally, there are the ministries established a er 1996 but before 2006, which include Advanced Education (1998), Public Safety and Solicitor General (2001), Tourism, Sports, and the Arts (2005) and Small Business and Revenue (2005). Executive Survival Rates: Exploring the Fortunes of a Cohort Another way to look at the extent of turnover is to follow different cohorts of executives and to ascertain their “survival rates.” While we did not have the time to undertake such analysis for every cohort of executives, it is illuminating to explore the experience of the cohort of

300 Evert Lindquist and Thea Vakil Table 10.5. DM Turnover and Type of Ministry, 1996–2006 Ministries (2010 titles) Ministries largely intact, 1996–2006 Agriculture

DMs 4

Forests

4

Transportation and Infrastructure

4

Energy, Mines, and Petroleum Resources Environment

4 4

Finance

4

Health Services

4

Children and Family Development Education Housing and Social Development

6 4 4

Ministries that came and went, 1996–2006 Community Development, Cooperatives, and Volunteers Multiculturalism and Immigration Women’s Equality Management Services Ministries created between 1996 and 2006 Advanced Education Public Safety and Solicitor General Tourism, Sports, and the Arts Small Business and Revenue

Comment Sometimes combined with Fisheries, Food, or both Expanded to Forest and Range in 2005 Name changes: Transportation and Highways Transportation, and Transportation and Infrastructure

Ministry split into Sustainable Resource Management and Water, Land, and Air Protection (one extra deputy). Water, Land, and Air Protection rolled in with (then) Sustainable Resource Management Finance and Corporate Relations under the NDP Ministry of Health split up after the June 2001 election into Health Planning and Health Services (one extra deputy). Restored to (then) Ministry of Health Planning and Health Services in November 2001 Ministry was established in 1996 Frequently renamed: Social Services, Human Resources, Employment and Income Assistance, Social Development and Economic Security

Established 1998 Established 2001 Established 2005 Established 2005

British Columbia, 1996–2006 301

the 41 executives (eight DMs, thirty-two ADMs, and one acting DM) who survived the transition from NDP to Liberals in 2001 for more than one year. We note that the total number of executives who worked for the BC public service at some time during 1996–2006 was 297. Of the eight deputy ministers, all have since le the BC public service. Some stayed until their retirement, while others were either let go or decided to leave. When interpreting these data, however, it is important to know that several had served as deputy ministers – demanding positions to say the least– before the 2001 transition. Of the thirty-two assistant deputy ministers, eleven were promoted to deputy minister. As of August 2010, five of these still served as deputy ministers, including an acting DM, and the other six le the public service. Interestingly, ten of the twenty-one remaining (not promoted to DM) ADMs still held executive positions in 2010; six were ministry ADMs and four had other titles but would have kept their ADM status. Stepping back, this means that six of the twenty-three current DMs (26 per cent) also served as executives under the NDP, and ten of the current ninety-five ADMs (11 per cent) also served as ADM under the NDP. On the other hand, forty-six of the current ninety-five ADMs (48 per cent) were appointed a er 2006, which include five ADMs in the Ministry of Energy, Mines, and Petroleum Resources (all hired since 2008). This indicates an interesting blend of continuity and turnover in the upper reaches of the BC public service. Where Do BC Executives Go? We have considered where executives come from in terms of professional and educational backgrounds. While the rate of turnover in top executive positions in the BC public service may be in the upper echelons of provincial and territories, we see no evidence on the basis of a review of backgrounds of a pa ern of inexperienced, insufficiently capable, ideological, or unethical individuals appointed to complex, challenging positions. Another way to address the question of turnover is to consider what BC public service executives do when they leave: do they continue with public service careers or show their competence in other ways, do they get involved in politically related activities, or do they melt away, never to be heard from again? Given the diversity in skills, interests, backgrounds, health, age, and lifestyle preferences of departing executives, this is obviously a difficult question to definitively answer. However, we have collected high-level

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data on what former BC DMs and ADMs have gone on to do. A search on the Internet revealed that, aside from those who opted for pure retirement or for whom we could not readily collect information on the web, the vast majority of former deputy ministers have gone on to rewarding opportunities with other public entities (o en in other jurisdictions or levels of government), the private sector, consulting, university teaching, and serving on non-profit, government, university, or community boards. Turnover and Top BC Public Service Executives: Politicized or Responsive? Underlying many discussions about the extent of turnover and mobility of top public service executives are abiding concerns about politicization and the quality of leadership and policy advice. At its worst, politicization can lead to ideologically aligned executives who cannot give good advice or properly manage budgets and organizations – such individuals would care li le about the state of the public service institutions they leave behind. A related concern is that too much turnover and rotation of top executives may create disjuncture between the executive suites of ministries and the staff, clients, and partners of the programs they deliver, leading to ill-thought-out change programs and “self-management” by managers further down the line. BC has a tradition of strong executive leadership, which has included appointing commi ed and trusted deputy ministers to the premier and other deputy ministers. Such appointments have included wellknown personalities such as Norman Spector, David Emerson, and Bob Plecas under the Benne government; David Poole under the Vander Zalm government; George Ford under the Harcourt government; Doug McArthur, Tom Gunton, and John Walsh under the Clark government; Philip Halke under the Miller and Dosanjh governments; and Ken Dobell and Jessica McDonald under the Campbell government. Premiers also have the authority to hire and fire assistant deputy ministers, but they have other instruments for achieving their political and policy objectives, including the shaping of Cabinets, structuring ministerial portfolios and the machinery of government, se ing agendas and budget frameworks, controlling government communications, and liaising with the leaders of other jurisdictions, among other things. Governments need competent executives, otherwise critical undertakings will not be carried out, and confidence in the government will be at risk due to maladministration. Although this study has not

British Columbia, 1996–2006 303

systematically reviewed all the career paths of DMs and ADMs, it should be clear that BC governments have relied heavily on the career BC public service as a proving ground and feeder group for top executive appointments, and those who have been appointed from outside the BC public service have typically had substantial public sector experience and, if not, significant non-profit, university, or private sector experience. Not every executive appointment works out, but we are struck by the fact that in recent years we have heard li le generalized concern about the quality of the BC public service. Indeed, we sense that the evolving mix of appointments have found a reasonable balance among a racting new sorts of expertise and perspective on policy and management, acknowledging the experience and institutional memory of the public service,10 and providing trusted advice and the prospect of solid leadership and management of ministries for governments. Over the years, several observers of BC governance and public administration have considered the question of politicization, and they resisted suggesting that the public service became politicized by the evolving mix of executive appointments. However, they do acknowledge that the public service has been urged and induced to become more responsive, even if there are limits due to budgets, technology, and the willingness of would-be partners to progress (LeSage 2000; Ruff 2010; Lindquist, Langford, and Vakil 2010). Our review of the available data on executive turnover in the BC public service does not lead us to alter those conclusions. There can be no doubt that recent Campbell Liberal governments sought to bring “responsiveness” and alignment to new levels by instituting performance incentives and trying to encourage leadership, innovation, and cultural change through professional development programs, speakers, awards, and a broader range of marketing and recruitment strategies at all levels. But when making executive appointments, the government clearly a ached a premium to proven experience and familiarity with leading in public sector environments. We would take this line of analysis a step further. The next BC premier will undoubtedly work quickly to appoint a new executive team to help realize the ambitions of the next government: dismissing some DMs and ADMs, welcoming the resignations of others, hiring new talent from outside, promoting from within the BC public service to the DM and ADM ranks, and retaining some in current positions. However, had the NDP been in power over the last decade in a parallel BC political universe, we believe that many of the executives selected

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by the Liberal government would have emerged as desirable talent for an NDP government. The demands for responsiveness and sustained high performance in providing policy advice and implementing government decisions do not stop at the boundaries of particular political parties. Moreover, we also believe not only that most executives would have accepted invitations because the time was right in their careers to take up interesting and challenging opportunities, but also that they would have performed in an equally commi ed, aligned, dynamic, and trusted manner. By taking on such roles in a province like BC with its governance tradition, executives risk becoming bound to the reputation and fate of the governments they serve, but this does not make them any less professional as public servants. Concluding Remarks: Future Research Directions and Expectations This study set out to provide a finer-grained description and explanation of nationally collected data on the turnover of top executives in the BC public service. In many ways the national data as well as the data we supplied support the caricature of a high-turnover executive group in the upper echelons of the BC public service because of the decisive swings in provincial governance regimes and the authority of the premier to make Order in Council appointments, not only for DMs and other board and agency leaders, but also for ADMs. BC’s turnover among executives is high, compared with most other provincial and territorial public services, and there can be no doubt that BC premiers have sought to appoint cadres of executives who are responsive and aligned with government strategic directions. However, we have argued that this has not resulted in a lesser commitment by governments and top advisors to appoint a strong executive group and a professional public service, and it has allowed for an evolving mix of expertise, professional backgrounds, and gender at the DM and ADM levels. Although our study has provided a finer-grained perspective on national figures, we are acutely aware of the limitations of space and our data. More a ention should be directed to exploring how the advising and recruitment processes for top executives worked at the centre, including the extent to which premiers and deputy ministers to premiers hold relative sway in making top appointments, the link between the premier’s Cabinet and machinery-of-government decisions and the

British Columbia, 1996–2006 305

appointment and dismissal of top executives, and the assessments of the performance of executives. Less clumpy data on executive appointments would be helpful. It would also be useful to conduct confidential post-exit interviews with former deputy ministers and assistant deputy ministers to ascertain whether they were ready to leave or indifferent about staying, and whether they had a conversation about that with either the premier or the deputy minister to the premier. Conversely, it would be useful to get finer-grained data on the supply side of the executive labour market: on educational backgrounds, career trajectories, age, and personal aspirations, which would inform the extent to which departures were involuntary or reasonably agreeable. Such data would also permit a firmer grasp of mobility within and across public service and public sector jurisdictions in Canada, as opposed to looking at turnover from the vantage point of single public service institutions. At the time of writing, BC politics and government is at another intriguing juncture, with the Liberal and NDP parties replacing leaders in early 2011, and with the appointment of new Liberal Premier Christy Clark in March. Consistent with BC's governance traditions, the new premier replaced the deputy minister to the premier, Allan Seckel, a former deputy a orney general, and appointed John Dyble, an experienced public service executive who had served as deputy minister of health and previously transportation. Mr Dyble also has a long-standing association with Minister Kevin Falcon and served as his deputy minister in both ministries. The new premier also replaced Lesley du Toit, the controversial deputy minister of the Ministry of Children and Family Development, who had been recruited by Gordon Campbell in 2006. Finally, Campbell’s former chief of staff, Martyn Brown, who had been appointed as the deputy minister of tourism, trade, and investment, was relieved of his responsibilities a er six months on the job. Otherwise, there was modest movement of selected deputy ministers and assistant deputy ministers flowing from the aforementioned appointments and departures, and stabilization of natural-resource-related ministry structures. We anticipate a modest spike in top executive turnover in the months to come: a product of the premier announcing new ministry structures, assessments of the effectiveness and alignment of deputy ministers and assistant deputy ministers, and experienced public service executives making professional and lifestyle decisions in anticipation of working with yet another government in the run-up to the next provincial election. In short, a new executive cadre will take shape under the Christy

306 Evert Lindquist and Thea Vakil

Clark government, and the one that follows as a result of the next provincial election. When the dust se les, we believe it will become evident that, once again, considerable importance was a ached to choosing executives with sufficient commitment and energy to implementing the new government’s agenda along with retaining, promoting, and a racting executives with public-sector experience.

NOTES 1. Later, there were twenty-seven DMs and eighty ADMs in 2006. 2. Bingo-gate was a kickback scheme in which money raised by a charity bingo was used to fund the NDP through the Commonwealth Holding Society. 3. We believe that this reflects stability in the structure of ministerial appointments and associated portfolios. The pa ern tends to be three or four more deputy ministers than ministries, with the extra deputies taking on central positions (DM to the premier, DM of communication, and DMs in a holding pa ern taking on special projects, etc.). So if the Cabinet and portfolios are steady, so too is the number of deputy ministers. It becomes interesting if there are many more deputies than ministries. 4. Ten ADMs were affected: one quit, three were later appointed to DM, five le the BC public service soon a er, and one has the title of director. In 2010, one associate deputy was listed in the government directory. 5. Of the ten DMs who le , several were special advisors to the premier and were not replaced. Otherwise, one function was changed from DM to an ADM position, two new DMs were brought in from outside, one ADM was promoted to DM, and one ADM was promoted to DM. 6. McDonald delayed her departure in order to shape the rationalization of the BC public service following the election and protect the renewal gains and full-time public service as much as possible. As she stated in her le er to staff, “I considered enabling a change of leadership during the transition immediately following the election, but I found I could not take the decision to leave in the middle of impending workforce adjustment. I felt it was important to see any job impacts through, continuing to work on finding every solution to minimize effects on employees.” Jessica McDonald, “A Message from Jessica McDonald: Thank You to the BC Public Service,” broadcast e-mail to BC Public Service, 5 October 2009, author’s collection.

British Columbia, 1996–2006 307 7. These compensation increases were uneasily compared to the modest compensation trends for the rest of the public service and broader public sector during this period. Labour peace beyond the 2010 Olympics had been achieved in 2006 by the Campbell government by means of a brilliant negotiating strategy announced in November 2005: significant inducements were given to unions and members across the entire BC public sector, if they signed collective agreements by 31 March or 30 June 2006. 8. LeSage (2000, 446) notes that during 1972–5 the Barre (NDP) government made eighteen DM appointments, six of which were career public servants; half the ADM appointments were from the BC public service. By 1978 only four the NDP-appointed DMs remained. During 1975–8, twenty of thirty-one ADM appointments went to BC public servants. 9. The minister of community services was made responsible for women’s issues, although this responsibility was removed with the Cabinet shuffle of 2008. MCS is now the Ministry of Community and Rural Development. 10. See March 1991 for an interesting discussion of optimal turnover, particularly in maintaining fidelity to the “organizational code” while encouraging experimentation and adaptation.

REFERENCES Bierling, Gerald A., Barbara Wake Carroll, and Michael Rosenbla . 1999. “Movers and Stayers: Mobility Pa erns among Senior Public Servants in Canadian Provinces.” Canadian Public Administration 42 (3): 198–217. LeSage, Edward Jr. 2000. “British Columbia’s Career Public Service: Weathering Ideological Storms.” In Government Restructuring and Career Public Service in Canada, edited by Evert Lindquist, 441–72. Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada. Lindquist, Evert, John Langford, and Thea Vakil. 2010. “Government Restructuring and the BC Public Service: Turmoil, Innovation, and Continuity in the 2000s.” In British Columbia Politics and Government, edited by Michael Howle , Dennis Pilon, and Tracy Summerville, 217–42. Toronto: Emond Montgomery. March, James G. 1991. “Exploration and Exploitation as Organizational Learning.” Organization Science 2 (1): 71–87. h p://dx.doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2.1.71. Phillips, Stephen. 2010. “Party Politics in British Columbia: The Persistence of Polarization.” In British Columbia Politics and Government, edited by

308 Evert Lindquist and Thea Vakil Michael Howle , Dennis Pilon, and Tracy Summerville, 109–29. Toronto: Emond Montgomery. Ruff, Norman J. 2010. “Executive Dominance: Cabinet and the Office of Premier in British Columbia.” In British Columbia Politics and Government, edited by Michael Howle , Dennis Pilon, and Tracy Summerville, 205–16. Toronto: Emond Montgomery. Savoie, Donald J., ed. 1993. Taking Power: Managing Government Transitions. Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada. Savoie, Donald J. 1999. “The Rise of Court Government in Canada.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 32 (4): 635–64. h p://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ S0008423900016930. Selznick, Philip. 1957. Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation. New York: Harper and Row.

11 Comparative Analysis of Stability and Mobility of the Canadian Provincial Bureaucratic Elite, 1987–2007 g e r a l d b i e r l i n g , b a r b a r a wa k e carroll, and michael whyte kpessa

Introduction This chapter is about mobility pa erns among provincial deputy and assistant ministers in Canada from 1987 to 2007, with particular reference to the past decade. Among others things, the study seeks to understand and explain the factors that shape or influence mobility of deputy and assistant ministers in all the Canadian provinces. It is based upon original work done by Bierling, Carroll, and Rosenbla and updated for this volume (Bierling, Carroll, and Rosenbla 2000).1 It explores how the neutrality and professionalism upon which the Westminsterstyled public service was based is threatened by political appointments (Rasmussen 2008; Weller 1989). For example, Peter Aucoin has argued that “the Canadian system of staffing and managing the deputy minister cadre is regarded by public service leaders in other Westminster systems as the most politicized, given the powers of the Canadian prime minister relative to counterparts in Britain, Australia and New Zealand” (Aucoin 2006, 301). At both levels, officials are recruited from public servants with knowledge and experience in government, although they are occasionally drawn from areas such academia, the corporate world, nongovernmental organizations, and international institutions (Kernaghan and Siegal 1991). We chose to focus on the provinces because, unlike at the federal level, where Jacques Bourgault and Stéphane Dion argued that mobility trends among senior bureaucratic are not related to partisan politics (Bourgault and Dion 1989), the picture at the provincial levels remains unclear. There are two main schools of thought on the staffing and management of Canadian provincial bureaucrats.

310 Gerald Bierling, Barbara Wake Carroll, and Michael Whyte Kpessa

On the one hand, it can be argued that movement in and out of provincial bureaucracies varies across time in different jurisdictions, and movements are not necessarily a function of partisan politics, because there were no consistent pa erns of post-election mobility, which represented only one-third of overall movements (see Bierling, Carroll, and Rosenbla 2000, 201). On the other hand, another study (Bierling, Carroll, and Rosenbla 2000) also found that the degree of mobility in the provinces runs across departments in a manner consistent with the degree of technical expertise or core knowledge required for effectiveness and efficiency of the departments. In other words, senior public servants have much lower turnover rates in the departments in which specific technical expertise is a basic qualification for staffing, and higher rates in those that require less technical expertise or core knowledge. As a result it may be that elections and change in political parties are not the only factors that affect mobility pa erns among provincial senior public servants (Bierling, Carroll, and Rosenbla 2000). Contrary to this assertion, other scholars argue that movement in and out of the provincial public service is a function of partisan politics or political affiliation. Lindquist (2000) has argued that appointment to senior bureaucratic positions is based mostly on partisan-political traditions or practices in some, if not all, provincial bureaucracies. Peter Aucoin echoed the position of this school of thought: Deputy ministers are appointed by the premier precisely because they are known to share the partisan persuasions of the government of the day. This usually means that these deputy ministers are recruited and appointed from outside the provincial public service in question, especially following a change in government. In some instances, a ention is given to their qualifications as well (“partisan but expert”); in some other instances, partisanship and/or personal connections to the premier are the dominant, even exclusive, considerations. In the la er cases, appointments come close to being patronage appointments for past partisan services rendered and invariably have the not unexpected consequences of introducing incompetence into the public service. In any event, where partisan considerations come into play the deputy ministers in question are merely an extension of the ministry; however otherwise personally qualified, they cannot claim to be members of the professional and nonpartisan public service. They are appointed by partisans acting, at least in part, on a partisan basis. (2006, 302)

The Canadian Provincial Bureaucratic Elite, 1987–2007 311

The position of the senior bureaucrats is an influential one, especially in relation to the minister in the giving of advice, but also in administering the department and representing the interests of the department’s constituency to the broader public. Thus Canadian public servants are expected to offer advice to ministers in confidence, and in return for their service, they, in theory, receive protection of anonymity and job security. This framework is based on the politics–public administration dichotomy developed mostly by political scientists who “focus upon the role of senior bureaucrats and their relationship with ministers” (Carroll 1990, 345). The variety and variations in these relationships across provinces are well developed in the chapters in this volume on the senior public service in the individual provinces. Variations in Mobility across Provinces This chapter is an overview of mobility of deputy ministers and assistant deputy ministers in all provinces from 1987 to 2007 and in the territories from 1997 to 2007. The methodology and detailed findings follow. Other chapters in this volume look at each province separately, and while there are differences in the findings between this chapter, which analyses a census, and those of the individual provinces, the la er put meat on the bones of the aggregate numbers by province and at specific periods of time. For example, while the broader study may have found that three out of six deputies le within one year, the chapter on the individual province may provide specific reasons why each departure was idiosyncratic and does not necessarily represent a pa ern. At the same time, while each departure may be individual, the aggregate may mask the demographic or other trends in which many people in senior ranks tend to be of similar age and experience and leave or move at about the same time, producing waves and pa erns that tend to persist (Carroll and Garkut 1996). In looking at the provinces, we found that greater mobility over time is supported by most individual studies. This is explained in part by Coffin and Turnbull writing on Nova Scotia (chapter 2), and Bouchard on New Brunswick (chapter 4), as the need to professionalize the senior public service and to reduce the departmentalization that had created fiefdoms for long-serving senior deputies and ADMs. This is also explained to some extent in Alberta (Tupper, chapter 9) and Ontario

312 Gerald Bierling, Barbara Wake Carroll, and Michael Whyte Kpessa

(Evans, Lum, and MacLellan, chapter 6) as a need to professionalize by providing some central agency experience. While not all deputies developed this experience, those in senior portfolios tended to have spent some time in central agencies.2 All of this reflects the general trend towards managerialism, which has been found across countries and is one result of the impact of the New Public Management through the 1980s and 1990s (Bouchard 1999; Carroll 1990). Dunn (chapter 1) found this was also achieved through education, while this was not as significant in British Columbia, where the education range remained very wide. Lindquist and Vakil, writing about British Columbia (chapter 10), also provide an insightful explanation for the higher levels of mobility in areas such social services, which have a lower technologic component. They suggest that these are also the most sensitive and contentious policy areas and therefore have high levels of public sensitivity and involvement. This is consistent with earlier findings in the area of education (Bunwaree, Carroll, and Carroll 2005). It may be that this mobility is also a result of burnout and the tendency for government to put their strongest deputies, the firefighters, into areas that need immediate a ention, later moving them out when the crisis has passed. Another spin on the extent of mobility is the degree of outside recruitment, which was found in PEI and to some extent in Saskatchewan. But Rasmussen (chapter 8) observes that in Saskatchewan those recruited from the outside tended to stay for a limited time. The movers moved, but the stayers tended to stay within government. It should be pointed out that, while it is outside the scope of this chapter, some of the recruitment, retention, and mobility can be explained by what Bourgault and Viola-Plante (Quebec, chapter 5) consider the need to reflect diverse groups that represent important components of the state. Gender was part of the studies in this volume in Saskatchewan, and language in New Brunswick. Finally there is the question of election movement. The larger census did not find an “election effect.” But as Lindquist and Vakil point out, in British Columbia it is not so much election as changes in party or leadership and the polarization of politics that largely causes this movement. An additional variable measuring the importance or degree of change as a result of an election might find quite different results overall. For example, while in Alberta only one party has governed throughout the period considered, there was a relatively important transformation in the nature of governance of the governing party.

The Canadian Provincial Bureaucratic Elite, 1987–2007 313

Bourgault and Dion argued that the “incentive to politicize highranking positions is stronger than ever during transitions in power. The new government finds itself face-to-face with a senior public service that only yesterday worked for the opposition. Tensions are high and distrust is widespread” (1989, 125). To ensure some level of job security for senior bureaucrats, they are situated on the administration side of politics – public administration dichotomy where they operate – and are protected by constitutional conventions such as anonymity and neutrality. Consequently, senior bureaucrats link the political and administrative worlds and must accept the challenges in operating between political and bureaucratic cultures (Plumptre 1987). Although senior bureaucrats play a dominant role in government, the principle of anonymity enables them to work in relative obscurity and thus yield the spotlight on policy decisions and public pronouncements to sector ministers. This also implies that when the highest-ranking bureaucrats provide candid advice to their superiors, it must be in private and in confidence (Kernaghan 1973, 56). Similarly, the concept of neutrality also requires public servants to “avoid activities likely to impair, or seem to impair their impartiality or the political impartiality of the public service” (Kernaghan and Langford 2006, 56). Methodology and Analytical Framework This chapter provides an analysis of empirical data on the mobility or pa ern of change and movement across departments of deputy and assistant deputy ministers in the Canadian provinces. We used the Corpus Almanac and Canadian Sourcebook (all years) to compile the data set, because it has a consistent format and was available for the entire period. We had hoped in the la er years to find the data from websites, but this was not possible. The original cases broke into more than two hundred different department titles, as names of departments were changed and functions merged over the years. These titles were then recoded to represent sixteen different generic department titles. The sixteen generic departments were further re-coded to represent the extent to which they represented high, medium, or low functional determinism. Functional determinism is the extent to which there is a strong identity with a particular kind of education or technology associated with the department. Highways, for example, is considered to have high functional determinism, because it is a department that is

314 Gerald Bierling, Barbara Wake Carroll, and Michael Whyte Kpessa

strongly associated with engineering. Similarly, finance and treasury functions are strongly associated with economics. The expectation was that there would be lower levels of mobility among the departments with high levels of functional determinism. In order to measure the effect of elections on the mobility of senor elites, we noted the election years for each province and then compared mobility in the years before or in an election and in the year a er the election. These data points were used to isolate the mobility (or stability) of the senor public service before and a er elections. It was important to allow for the changes that might occur in the year a er the election. Change could be achieved by a “new” official starting in any particular portfolio. However, examining more than one year a er the election might confuse natural with politically motivated a rition. We thus developed a unique data set for researchers interested primarily in provincial public administration. In 1997, three researchers were asked about provincial policy capacity in terms of the more extensive literature on the demographics of federal bureaucrats than for provincial bureaucrats (Bierling, Carroll, and Rosenbla 2000). As a result, Gerald Bierling, Barbara Wake Carroll, and Michael Rosenbla built a database that tracked the career paths of provincial deputy ministers and assistant deputy ministers from 1988 to 1998. Their findings were that elections did not ma er as much as one might expect: a new government did not “clear the decks,” but there was a pa ern of change amongst these senior public servants that depended more upon the level of technical knowledge required of the office holders. As a result, there was more rapid changeover among senior public servants in areas such as health and social welfare than there was in areas such as highways. The original data set was updated to 2006 and expanded to include the Yukon, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut. The data set contains 6,716 cases, and the following variables: • Year of observation (1997—2006) • Province • Provincial electoral cycle year (pre-election year, election year, postelection year, none of these conditions) • Department name • Classification (deputy minister, assistant deputy minister)

The Canadian Provincial Bureaucratic Elite, 1987–2007 315

• Name of official • Experience (whether or not the senior official was in the position in the previous year) • Province size (Alberta, BC, Ontario, and Quebec classified as large; all others classified as small) Discussion of Findings Table 11.1 shows the total number of deputy and assistant deputy ministers in each province and territory from 1997 to 2006. While the previous time period analysed (1988 to 1996) witnessed a general decline in the number of senior officials, the trend from 1997 to 2006 was an increase. This rise occurred in all provinces and territories and at both levels of the senior civil service. The only exception was that of assistant deputy ministers in the Northwest Territories. One province, Manitoba, experienced no net change during the period. However, the number of senior civil servants in Manitoba increased initially, decreased by 2006, then returned to 1997 levels. In most provinces the increase actually started in the la er part of the period, from 2001 and on. Notable exceptions to this pa ern were found in Ontario and Quebec, which significantly increased the number of senior civil servants before 2000. The largest increases were in the most populated provinces. For example, the increases in British Columbia and Ontario were 55.1 per cent and 42.0 per cent respectively, while the increases in New Brunswick and Newfoundland were 28.6 per cent and 25.0 per cent respectively. There is no clear pa ern when examining the level of the senior civil service: in some provinces the number of ADMs increased faster than did the number of DMs (e.g., British Columbia and New Brunswick), while in other provinces the reverse was true (e.g., Alberta and Quebec). Overall, the rate of increase for DMs was slightly higher than for ADMs. This may be an outgrowth of the reverse pa ern when examining the trends from 1988 to 2008. In the previous time period, the decline in DMs was larger than it was for ADMs (in fact, the number of ADMs overall grew slightly during this period, by 1 per cent). The largest increases (in both absolute and relative terms) at the deputy minister level were in Ontario and Quebec, with Ontario doubling the number of DMs and Quebec doing almost the same. At the ADM level the largest increases were in Nova Scotia (500.0 per cent), Yukon (72.7 per cent). and British Columbia (56.9 per cent).

Table 11.1. Senior Public Servants, by Province, 1997–2006

Province

%Change, Average, %Change, Average, Rank 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1997–06 1997–06 1988–96 1988–96

Alberta

DM ADM Total

16 45 61

15 42 57

13 47 60

16 44 60

21 40 61

22 55 77

23 56 79

23 60 83

23 57 80

24 66 90

50.0 46.7 47.5

19.6 51.2 70.8

−35 −28 −30

19.3 67.3 86.7

British Columbia

DM ADM Total

18 51 69

19 50 69

20 54 74

23 52 75

22 51 73

27 66 93

25 65 90

23 69 92

23 67 90

27 80 107

50.0 56.9 55.1

22.7 60.5 83.2

27 30 29

17.8 56.8 74.6

Manitoba

DM ADM Total

19 40 59

23 40 63

22 40 62

19 38 57

18 42 60

16 47 63

17 42 59

21 42 63

20 48 68

19 40 59

0.0 0.0 0.0

19.4 41.9 61.3

−22 −8 −13

19.3 38.4 57.8

New Brunswick

DM ADM Total

16 33 49

16 37 53

17 39 56

15 41 56

15 35 50

16 39 55

17 38 55

13 35 48

19 49 68

20 43 63

25.0 30.3 28.6

16.4 38.9 55.3

6 10 9

17.9 32.3 50.2

Newfoundland DM ADM Total

15 37 52

15 38 53

14 35 49

16 36 52

19 36 55

21 38 59

18 45 63

17 38 55

17 42 59

19 46 65

26.7 24.3 25.0

17.1 39.1 56.2

−24 5 −4

14.2 39.6 53.8

Nova Scotia

14 1 15

15 0 15

14 0 14

14 0 14

13 0 13

15 1 16

15 1 16

15 2 17

14 5 19

14 6 20

0.0 500.0 33.3

14.3 1.6 15.9

−19 −67 −25

18.9 1.9 20.3

DM ADM Total

Ontario

DM 16 ADM 84 Total 100

19 90 109

23 92 115

22 83 105

23 87 110

23 85 108

26 95 121

26 95 121

28 110 138

32 110 142

100.0 31.0 42.0

23.8 93.1 116.9

−43 25 5

24.0 77.8 101.8

PEI

DM ADM Total

8 0 8

9 0 9

9 0 9

9 2 11

9 2 11

10 2 12

10 2 12

10 2 12

10 2 12

11 0 11

37.5 37.5

9.5 1.2 10.7

−25 −100 −36

10.9 1.8 11.9

DM ADM Total

19 58 77

23 77 100

36 65 101

35 54 89

35 55 90

35 64 99

30 61 91

36 65 101

33 70 103

37 70 107

94.7 20.7 39.0

31.9 63.9 95.8

−26 −10 −14

21.4 81.4 102.9

Saskatchewan DM ADM Total

16 27 43

21 20 41

18 20 38

18 23 41

18 22 40

17 24 41

18 27 45

18 30 48

18 30 48

22 30 52

37.5 11.1 20.9

18.4 25.3 43.7

−28 7 −7

17.2 30.2 47.4

Yukon

DM ADM Total

9 11 20

6 8 14

8 12 20

9 13 22

9 13 22

9 14 23

9 16 25

9 16 25

9 18 27

10 19 29

11.1 72.7 45.0

8.7 14.0 22.7

NA NA NA

NA NA NA

NWT

DM ADM Total

8 11 19

9 11 20

9 10 19

9 6 15

10 8 18

10 7 17

10 10 20

10 9 19

11 10 21

12 10 22

50.0 −9.1 15.8

9.8 9.2 19.0

NA NA NA

NA NA NA

Nunavut

DM ADM Total

NA NA

NA NA

11 10 21

11 13 24

11 14 25

11 18 29

11 16 27

10 14 24

10 14 24

12 15 27

9.1 50.0 28.6

10.9 14.3 25.1

NA NA NA

NA NA NA

174

190

214

216

223

232

229

231

235

259

48.9

220

−21

181.0

Quebec

National Totals DM

Note: ADM = assistant deputy ministers; DM = deputy ministers

318 Gerald Bierling, Barbara Wake Carroll, and Michael Whyte Kpessa

Table 11.2 shows how the size of the province (by population) is related to the size of the senior bureaucracy: the larger provinces have the largest number of senior civil servants, at both the beginning and end of the time period. The correlations (Spearman’s rho) indicate that this association is quite strong, but not quite as strong as it was in the previous period analysed. New Brunswick has a larger senior bureaucracy relative to its population size, while Nova Scotia seems to have a slightly small senior bureaucracy relative to its population size. Table 11.3 presents the number and percentage of senior civil servants who were new to their position, broken down by classification level. Overall, turnover rates at both levels from 1997 to 2006 were quite similar to those from 1989 to 2006 – almost exactly 31 per cent. That is, on average, roughly 30 per cent of senior civil servants were new to their position in any given year. However, there was some variation to this pa ern by year and level. More specifically, turnover was higher at the outset (especially in 1997), lowest in the middle years, and increased slightly towards the end. With regards to turnover rates by level of classification, in all years but two (1997 and 2000), turnover was higher among ADMs than among DMs. This finding is also consistent with that found when examining the earlier time period, which again leads to the conclusion that the ADM level represents the career pinnacle for most civil servants who achieve this level. Table 11.4 compares turnover rates for each province, by level of classification and by electoral cycle. There was no significant difference in turnover rates between the large and small provinces. The turnover rate ranged from 26 to 37 per cent, with Nunavut and Quebec having the highest rates, while Alberta and Saskatchewan had the lowest. Consistent with the results shown in table 11.3, turnover rates in most provinces were highest for ADMs. Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland were the exceptions to this pa ern. While there were differences in turnover rates with respect to the electoral cycle, there was no consistent pa ern. For some provinces (such as Alberta and Manitoba), the turnover rate was higher in postelection years than during election/pre-election years. For others (such as Ontario and Quebec) the reverse was true. However, the postelection year turnover rates were highest in British Columbia and the Yukon. The findings for British Columbia3 were consistent with those for 1989–96 and again suggest that the senior civil service in that province was more politicized than in other provinces. Regardless of the period within the electoral cycle, turnover rates were typically higher for ADMs than for DMs in all provinces.

The Canadian Provincial Bureaucratic Elite, 1987–2007 319 Table 11.2. Number of Senior Public Servants, by Size of Province Province

1988

1997

2006

1988–2001

% Change

Ontario Quebec British Columbia Alberta Manitoba Saskatchewan Nova Scotia Newfoundland New Brunswick Prince Edward Island Northwest Territories Yukon Nunavut Spearman’s rho

97 102 65 90 61 45 24 56 45 14

100 77 69 61 59 43 15 52 49 8

142 107 107 90 59 52 20 65 63 11

46.0 4.0 64.6 0 3.2 15.5 −16.6 13.8 40.0 21.4

+ 42.0 + 39.0 + 55.1 + 47.5 0.0 + 20.9 + 33.3 + 25.0 + 28.6 + 37.5

–

19

22

–

+ 15.8

– – –

20 NA .85*

29 27 .78*

– – .99*

+ 45.0 NA

Note: Correlations significant at ∞ = .01

Table 11.3. Movers by Classification and Year, 1997–2006 Rank DM ADM Total

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total % No. % No. % #

55.2 96 50.3 200 51.7 296

29.5 56 30.5 126 30.2 182

28.0 60 32.3 137 30.9 197

28.2 61 28.2 114 28.2 175

16.1 36 22.5 91 20.2 127

27.2 63 37.0 170 33.7 233

18.8 43 28.5 135 25.3 178

21.6 50 25.6 122 24.3 172

28.1 66 31.1 162 30.2 228

23.9 62 32.3 173 29.6 235

26.9 593 31.7 1,430 30.1 2,023

Note: ADM = assistant deputy ministers; DM = deputy ministers

Table 11.5 shows that the turnover rates overall were highest for low-function positions, although the differences in rates were not substantially large between the three functional levels (only 4.9 percentage points). As was the case when examining provincial differences, the turnover rates were highest for ADMs compared to DMs. These pa erns were the same as those found with the 1989–96 data. However, the differences between ADM and DM turnover rates were more pronounced in the more recent time period (especially for the low- and high-function levels).

320 Gerald Bierling, Barbara Wake Carroll, and Michael Whyte Kpessa Table 11.4. Turnover Rates – Percentage of Senior Civil Servants New to Position, by Electoral Cycle

Overall rates

Election/pre-election year rates

Post-election year rates

Province

All

ADM

DM

All

ADM

DM

All

ADM

DM

Alberta

25.8 183 32.5 270 25.4 156 28.8 159 28.8 161 32.7 52 28.7 336 27.1 29 36.1 346 26.1 114 33.0 75 35.3 67 37.3 75 30.1 2,023 29.1 888 31.0 1,135

28.3 145 32.6 197 27.0 113 30.1 117 27.5 107 50.0 8 30.0 279 16.7 2 39.1 250 28.1 71 35.7 50 44.6 41 43.9 50 31.7 1,430 30.6 559 32.4 871

19.4 38 32.2 73 22.2 43 25.6 42 31.6 54 30.8 44 23.9 57 28.4 27 30.1 96 23.4 43 28.7 25 26.5 26 28.7 25 26.9 593 26.9 329 26.9 264

24.7 85 32.4 107 21.9 67 29.1 102 25.6 74 34.8 40 30.9 184 21.8 12 40.1 190 30.0 65 28.7 41 29.6 29 50.0 36 30.5 1,032 28.3 466 32.5 566

26.9 66 32.6 78 22.0 46 32.2 79 25.7 52 50.0 7 32.2 152 33.3 2 42.1 139 38.0 46 32.6 29 37.5 18 55.0 22 32.6 736 30.9 301 33.8 435

19.2 19 31.9 29 21.6 21 21.9 23 25.3 22 32.7 33 26.0 32 20.4 10 35.4 51 19.8 19 22.2 12 22.0 11 43.8 14 26.2 296 24.6 165 28.7 131

32.2 69 45.0 121 28.3 34 28.8 30 33.5 53 32.3 10 15.9 36 19.4 6 32.2 65 22.5 20 64.4 29 26.5 9 29.2 14 31.6 496 31.1 205 31.9 291

35.1 54 45.7 90 27.5 22 27.6 21 29.1 32 50.0 1 16.9 30 0.0 0 36.2 47 22.6 12 59.3 16 33.3 5 37.0 10 32.3 340 30.2 119 33.5 221

25.0 15 43.1 31 30.0 12 32.1 9 43.8 21 31.0 9 12.5 6 22.2 6 25.0 18 22.2 8 72.2 13 21.1 4 19.0 4 30.1 156 32.3 86 27.8 70

British Columbia Manitoba New Brunswick Newfoundland Nova Scotia Ontario PEI Quebec Saskatchewan Yukon NWT Nunavut National totals Small provinces Large provinces

Notes: 1. ADM = assistant deputy ministers; DM = deputy ministers 2. Items in italics are percentages. Items in regular text are observed cases. 3. Large provinces are Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec.

The Canadian Provincial Bureaucratic Elite, 1987–2007 321 Table 11.5. Turnover Rates – Percentage of Senior Civil Servants New to Position, by Department Function

Overall rates

Election/preelection year rates

Post-election year rates

Province

Period

All

ADM

DM

All

ADM

DM

All

ADM

DM

Low

1988–96 1988–96 1997–06 1997–06 1988–96 1988–96 1997–06 1997–06 1988–96 1988–96 1997–06 1997–06 1988–96 1988–96 1997–06 1997–06

33.9 482 34.6 401 29.0 963 32.3 790 29.3 578 27.7 340 30.1 2,023 31.7 1,531

36.2 336 35.3 275 29.9 659 33.4 581 31.5 435 27.8 248 31.7 1,430 32.4 1,104

29.6 146 33.0 126 27.3 304 29.6 209 24.0 143 27.2 92 26.9 593 30.0 427

38.5 272 34.1 197 29.4 494 29.8 352 26.6 266 26.3 156 30.5 1,032 30.0 705

41.1 187 36.4 142 31.0 344 31.0 262 29.5 205 28.0 120 32.6 736 31.5 524

33.7 85 29.4 55 26.3 150 26.7 90 20.0 61 22.0 36 26.2 296 26.3 181

31.9 108 32.0 82 31.7 243 32.2 187 31.2 145 27.4 77 31.6 496 31.0 346

33.3 75 32.9 57 32.0 162 32.5 135 32.1 103 24.4 49 32.3 340 30.5 241

28.9 33 30.1 25 31.2 81 31.5 52 29.2 42 35.0 28 30.1 156 32.0 105

Medium

High

Totals

Notes: 1. ADM = assistant deputy ministers; DM = deputy ministers 2. Items in italics represent the percentage of senior civil servants new to the position. Items in regular text are the number of senior civil servants new to the position.

Table 11.5 also compares turnover rates for the three function levels by electoral cycle. No consistent pa ern in terms of electoral year affected turnover rates. For the low-function level, turnover was lowest in post-election years, while for the high-function level the reverse was true. For the medium-function level, the post-election year rate was virtually the same as during election/pre-election years. Conclusion There was an absolute increase in the numbers of senior bureaucrats, despite the rhetoric about downsizing. This can be a ributed to classification creep or increased complexity. Overall, there was a limited election effect. Incoming governments seemed to respect the integrity and knowledge of the permanent establishment to ensure continuity and

322 Gerald Bierling, Barbara Wake Carroll, and Michael Whyte Kpessa

implementation. This seems to point to the resilience of the values of permanent, non-partisan public service in the provinces. Surprisingly, there was almost no cross-governmental movement, underlining the strong provincial culture that other chapters in this book indicate. Deputy ministers and ADMs are important repositories of policy capacity in provincial governments. At a minimum, they must have two types of knowledge – process and substance – while knowledge of the institution is assumed to exist at that level of the hierarchy (Carroll 1990). Staying in place may improve substance at the expense of knowledge of the overall processes within policymaking and implementation. Too much movement may result in the loss of substantive expertise. The answer is a balancing act that each government must try to achieve on its own.

NOTES 1. The authors would like to thank the Institute of Public Administration of Canada for financing the updating of the database used in this volume. 2. The extent to which individuals moved into or out of central agencies was not analysed for this chapter, but the data set allows for this further analysis. 3. The NDP government was soundly defeated by the Liberals in the 2001 election, winning only two seats compared to the Liberals’ seventy-seven.

REFERENCES Aucoin, P. 2006. “The Staffing and Evaluation of Canadian Deputy Ministers in Comparative Westminster Perspective: A Proposal for Reform in Commission of Inquiry into Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities.” In Restoring Accountability: Research Studies, Vol. 1, 296–336. O awa: Ministers of Public Works and Government Services. Bierling, Gerald A., Barbara Wake Carroll, and Michael Rosenbla . 2000. “Movers and Stayers: Mobility Pa erns among Senior Public Servants in the Canadian Provinces.” Canadian Public Administration 43 (2): 198–217. h p://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1754-7121.2000.tb01567.x. Bouchard, Gilles. 1999. “Les sous-ministres du Nouveau-Brunswick: de l’ère des techniciens à l’ère des gestionnaires.” Canadian Public Administration 42 (1): 93–107. h p://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1754-7121.1999.tb01549.x.

The Canadian Provincial Bureaucratic Elite, 1987–2007 323 Bourgault, J., and S. Dion. 1989. “Governments Come and Go, but What of Senior Civil Servants? Canadian Deputy Ministers and Transition in Power (1867–1987).” Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions 2 (2): 124–51. h p://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.1989. tb00086.x. Bunwaree, S., B.W. Carroll, and T. Carroll. 2005. “Popular Participation in Contentious Policy Area.” Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis 7 (1): 1–25. Carroll, B.W. 1990. “Politics and Administration: A Trichotomy?” Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions 3 (4): 345–66. h p://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.1990.tb00127.x. Carroll, B.W., and D.E. Garkut. 1996. “Is There Empirical Evidence of a Trend towards ‘Managerialism’? A Longitudinal Study of Six Countries.” Canadian Public Administration 39 (4): 535–53. h p://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1754-7121. 1996.tb00149.x. Kernaghan, K. 1973. “Politics, Policy and Public Servants: Political Neutrality Revisited.” Canadian Public Administration 19 (3): 432–56. Kernaghan, K., and J. Langford. 2006. The Responsible Public Servant. Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada. Kernaghan, K., and D. Siegal. 1991. Public Administration in Canada. 2nd ed. Scarborough: Nelson Canada. Lindquist, E., ed. 2000. Government Restructuring and Career Public Services. Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada. Plumptre, T. 1987. “New Perspectives on the Role of the Deputy Minister.” Canadian Public Administration 30 (3): 376–98. h p://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ j.1754-7121.1987.tb00090.x. Rasmussen, K. 2008. “Is Public Service Independence Disintegrating in Canada.” Lecture to the Saskatchewan Regional Group of the Institute of Public Administration of Canada, Regina. Weller, P. 1989. “Politicization and the Australian Public Service.” Australian Journal of Administration 48 (4): 369–84.

12 A Canada-Wide Survey of Deputy and Assistant Deputy Ministers: A Descriptive Analysis b r y a n m . e va n s , j a n e t m . l u m , and john shields

Introduction This chapter offers a statistical report of a 2006 survey of deputy ministers (DMs) and assistant deputy ministers (ADMs) at the federal, provincial, and territorial levels of government in Canada. The value of this survey is that it provides us with a rich source of information on the changing demographic make-up and career profiles of the most senior civil servants in Canada, as well as their assessments of key public administration and policy issues facing their jurisdictions. A broad survey of this kind conducted across jurisdictional boundaries has not been done before in Canada and its results enable us to draw empirically based observations based on factors such as government jurisdiction and the gender of the deputy population. While our concern here is with a descriptive analysis of our survey findings, these data will illuminate many of the insights drawn from the case studies of particular deputy minister populations found in this volume. This study is concerned with the most senior non-elected ranks within Canada’s federal, provincial, and territorial governments – deputy and assistant deputy ministers. These ranks make up the connective tissue of the public service and between the public service and the political leadership they serve. DMs and ADMs (herea er collectively referred to as deputies) hold pivotal leadership positions within the governance structures of the Canadian state. Deputies are important administrative decision-makers and, along with their political masters, help shape the content and direction of public policy (Miliband 1969; Plumptre 1987; Pusey 2003; Rhodes and Weller 2001; Shergold

Canada-Wide Survey of Deputy and Assistant Deputy Ministers 325

2004). Consequently, surveying their views and assessments of public administration and policy issues is revealing, especially in a period of considerable change. To lead and manage change necessitates an enabled public service with the institutional and human capital resources necessary to carry out public service roles. But do Canada’s public services at the national and sub-national levels possess the necessary resources to fulfil their numerous functions they are expected to play in government? Moreover, what are the profiles of the most senior leadership in our civil service? How closely do deputies reflect the demographic characteristics of the Canadian population, especially in gender, aboriginal background, and racial composition? What are some of the salient career development pa erns of deputies? The study, furthermore, asked deputies to respond to questions on the administrative and policy capacities of their jurisdictions and their policy orientation (also see Baskoy, Evans, and Shields 2011). Since the 1970s, there have been initiatives to drive change from the centre, and therefore the upper echelons of government have had as their purpose to construct a different way of doing government. Canadian governments have over the past three decades endured a great deal of stress, fiscally and politically. The question now is this: what have been the implications for the optimal functioning of Canada’s federal, provincial, and territorial public administrations? The Survey Instrument The survey canvassed deputy and assistant deputy ministers from across Canada to document their demographic characteristics and career trajectory paths, their assessments of public administration institutional capacity and change, their views on the salience of public policy issues for their level of government, and their overall policy orientations. The survey was sent to every DM and ADM in Canada. In total 403 deputies responded to the mail-back survey, constituting a return rate of 43.61 per cent of the identified deputy population in the summer of 2006. Of the total responses, 78.4 per cent came from the provincial level, with 10.4 per cent from the federal, and 11.2 per cent from territorial levels respectively. These proportions closely matched the overall breakdown of the deputy populations by level of government, with the territorial deputies being somewhat over-represented and federal deputies slightly under-represented in the survey. The sample

326 Bryan M. Evans, Janet M. Lum, and John Shields

size is considered very strong and broadly representative of the overall deputy population. The overall representativeness of the sample is considered accurate 95 times out of 100, plus or minus 3.7 percentage points (Govindarajulu 1999). To ensure confidentiality and encourage a higher response rate, given that DMs and ADMs are a small and select population, the survey did not ask respondents to reveal their specific deputy ranking. Hence, the analysis contains no breakdown of deputies by rank (DM vs ADM) or by individual provinces or territories. The aggregated data, hence, refer to respondents simply as “deputies,” and “level of government” refers to federal, provincial, or territorial level. The survey questionnaire consisted of mostly closed-ended questions that could be completed in about twenty minutes to accommodate the busy schedules of the deputy group. The survey was available in both English and French. Each deputy was mailed a survey with a selfaddressed return envelope. Deputies were sent a reminder to complete the survey if they had not already done so approximately a month a er the initial mailing. Demographic Characteristics of the Deputy Population Historically the deputy cadre was a group of public service mandarins drawn from a select background, at least in the sense that they were overwhelmingly male, white, well educated, and by virtue of their positions, well connected to leading decision-makers in society (Campbell and Szlabowski 1979; Olsen 1980; Porter 1965). The question of the representativeness of the deputy population has long been a ma er of interest. There has been a desire to make the civil service at all levels more reflective of the population it serves. We examine the “representativeness” of deputies along a number of salient dimensions. Table 12.1 begins by presenting a gender breakdown of deputies, controlling for level of jurisdiction. Overall, 34.2 per cent of the total deputy population was composed of women. At the federal and provincial levels of government, 35.0 per cent and 32.5 per cent of deputies respectively were female. Significantly, it was at the territorial level that the biggest differences manifested. Fully 46.7 per cent of the deputies in the territorial sample were women. As we will see, on a variety of demographic variables the territories distinguished themselves from other levels of government in terms of higher levels of representation from historically more marginal populations.

Canada-Wide Survey of Deputy and Assistant Deputy Ministers 327 Table 12.1. Gender, by Level of Government (%)

Federal Provincial Territorial Total

Male (n)

Female (n)

65.0 (26) 67.5 (210) 53.5 (23) 65.8 (395)

35.0 (14) 32.5 (101) 46.5 (20) 34.2 (135)

The contemporary Canadian public service has undergone a profound workforce transformation over the last number of decades. A once overwhelmingly male-dominated profession has been feminized, with women now surpassing men in public sector employment (Statistics Canada 2007, 2). However, women have appeared in more senior ranks of the civil service at a slower rate. Before 1970, for example, there were virtually no women in the executive levels of the Canadian public service (Bourgault and Dion 1991). The fact that over one-third of the deputy population in 2006 was composed of women stands as an important marker towards a more gender-balanced civil service, although there is still some distance to go. Our findings also clearly indicate that it was in the territories where the most progress had been made in female representation at the most senior levels of the bureaucracy. The English-French issue once marked the great divide in ethnicity in government. Canadian society is far more ethnically/racially complex today. Successive waves of immigration have helped to transform Canada’s population base, moving the country from a predominately white, Western European society to a truly multicultural one. At the same time, there has been growing recognition of Canada’s aboriginal population, which has been growing in recent years because of their higher than Canadian average birth rates. We asked deputies to self-identify along two dimensions: whether they were a visible minority, and whether they were Aboriginal, First Nations, or Metis (herea er collectively referred to an aboriginal). A summary of deputy responses along these demographic dimensions is presented in table 12.2. Overall, 4.2 per cent of our deputy population identified themselves as visible minorities. Broken down by level of government, 4.8 per cent of federal, 2.5 per cent of provincial, and 15.6 per cent of territorial deputies identified themselves as such. As a whole, the deputy

328 Bryan M. Evans, Janet M. Lum, and John Shields Table 12.2. Visible Minority and Aboriginal, First Nations, and Metis Self-Identification, by Level of Government (%)

Federal Provincial Territorial Total

Visible Minority (n)

Aboriginal, First Nations, Metis (n)

4.8 (2) 2.5 (8) 15.6 (7) 4.2 (17)

– 0.6 (2) 24.4 (11) 3.2 (13)

population was far less racially diverse than the overall Canadian population, by a wide margin. The 2006 census revealed that 16.2 per cent of the Canadian population was composed of visible minorities (Statistics Canada 2008b). As was the case with gender, it was in the territorial governments that the highest proportion of visible minority deputies could be found in Canada. In fact, when compared with the actual visible minority population level in the territories, which stood at only 3.9 per cent in 2006, visible minority deputies were in fact statistically over-represented within their geographic location (Statistics Canada 2008c). Among respondents, 3.2 per cent of deputies self-reported aboriginal background, which was close to the 3.8 per cent of the national proportion of the population in 2006 identified as aboriginal (Statistics Canada 2008a). However, when viewed by level of government, there was a stronger pa ern of under-representation. No one in our federal deputy sample declared aboriginal identity, and only 0.6 did so provincially. Almost all aboriginal deputies were drawn from the territories, where fully 24.4 per cent of their deputy population so identified. However, even in this instance they were under-represented, in comparison to their territorial population base, where 52.8 per cent of the overall territorial population was of aboriginal origin in 2006 (ibid.). Still, territorial deputies faired far be er in aboriginal representation among their deputy ranks than did the other levels of government. Hence, it is at the territorial level among deputies where the greatest advances have been achieved in terms of gender, visible minority, and aboriginal representation. The reasons for this difference are a matter of some speculation. However, it is reasonable to suggest that in the territorial governments there have been greater opportunities for highly qualified, but perhaps less traditionally experienced individuals

Canada-Wide Survey of Deputy and Assistant Deputy Ministers 329

to move into senior civil service positions, given their smaller talent pool. This has meant that under-represented groups in senior bureaucratic positions have had more opportunities to advance in the territories. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that territorial deputies are considerably younger than deputies from elsewhere (as is reported below) and that they are far more likely to have worked at other levels of government. In fact, our survey found that over 60 per cent of territorial deputies had worked for another level of government, while only just over one-third of provincial and federal deputies had done so (Evans, Lum, and Shields 2007, 630). Deputies, as the most senior government officials, are a group that we would expect to be composed of an older population. In fact we found that 62.3 per cent of deputies were fi y years of age or older. Broken down by level of government, federal deputies were more concentrated in the fi y-five and older group, with 52.3 per cent falling into this age bracket, followed by provincial deputies at 31.8 per cent, and 13.3 per cent of territorial deputies fi y-five or over. Very significantly 62.2 per cent of territorial deputies were under fi y years of age (see table 12.3). The fact that the territories had proportionally considerably more women, visible minorities, and aboriginal deputies than the federal or provincial levels of government was consistent with a considerably younger age profile for territorial deputies. Historically, under-represented groups tend to be drawn more heavily from younger groups, as career human-resource investments by organizations have concentrated on younger members of such groups. As would be anticipated by the elevated level of their position and the kinds of responsibilities they held in the state bureaucracy, deputies were a highly educated group, and table 12.4A vividly reinforces this reality. Only 2.7 per cent of all deputies had no post-secondary degree, with 92.8 per cent possessing at least one university degree. But among those with a graduate degree, federal deputies held an advantage, with 65.8 per cent possessing such degrees. At the provincial level this number declined to 50.5 per cent and at the territorial level it shrank further to 27.9 per cent. As table 12.4B shows, educational level was not significantly influenced by gender. Overall, 25.3 per cent of deputies had professional degrees (see table 12.5A), and there was li le meaningful variation between federal and provincial deputies in this regard. Once again at the territorial level, however, only 15.9 per cent held professional degrees. Overall, the educational qualifications of territorial deputies were somewhat more

330 Bryan M. Evans, Janet M. Lum, and John Shields Table 12.3. Age Group, by Level of Government (%) Age 30–44 (n) Age 45–49 (n) Age 50–54 (n) Age 55–59 (n) Age 60+ (n) Federal Provincial Territorial Total

7.1 (3) 16.2 (51) 31.1 (14) 16.9 (68)

26.2 (11) 18.4 (58) 31.1 (14) 20.8 (84)

14.3 (6) 33.7 (106) 24.4 (11) 30.5 (123)

45.2 (19) 24.8 (78) 8.9 (4) 25.1 (101)

7.1 (3) 7.0 (22) 4.4 (2) 6.7 (27)

Table 12.4A. Highest Level of Education, by Level of Government (%)

Federal Provincial Territorial Total

No postsecondary degree (n)

Community college degree/ diploma (n)

Undergraduate degree (n)

Graduate degree (n)

– 2.7 (8) 4.7 (2) 2.7 (10)

2.6 (1) 3.8 (11) 11.6 (5) 4.9 (17)

31.6 (12) 43.0 (126) 55.8 (24) 43.3 (162)

65.8 (25) 50.5 (148) 27.9 (12) 49.5 (185)

Table 12.4B. Highest Level of Education, by Gender (%)

Male Female Total

No postsecondary degree (n)

Community college degree/ diploma (n)

Undergraduate degree (n)

Graduate degree (n)

2.1 (5) 4.8 (6) 3.0 (11)

3.7 (9) 4.0 (5) 3.8 (14)

44.4 (108) 43.2 (54) 44.0 (162)

49.8 (121) 48.0 (60) 49.2 (181)

Table 12.5A. Professional Degree, by Level of Government (%)

Federal Provincial Territorial Total

Yes (n)

No (n)

24.4 (10) 26.8 (84) 15.9 (7) 25.3 (101)

75.6 (31) 73.2 (230) 84.1 (37) 74.7 (298)

Canada-Wide Survey of Deputy and Assistant Deputy Ministers 331 Table 12.5B. Professional Degree, by Gender (%)

Male Female Total

Yes (n)

No (n)

24.9 (64) 25.9 (35) 25.3 (99)

75.1 (193) 74.1 (100) 74.7 (293)

modest than those of the federal and provincial deputies, although they were still a highly educated group. Once again, with regard to professional degrees no significant differences could be identified on the basis of gender (see table 12.5B). Some Deputy Career PaĴerns: Experience and Horizontality In career pa erns, two variables were examined. The first was the number of previous appointments held at the deputy rank. Table 12.6A informs us that most of the deputy population already had experience at this level, with over 92 per cent having held at least one previous appointment at the deputy level, although a large proportion, 49.6 per cent, had only one other appointment. The group’s real veterans, those who had held three or more deputy appointments, stood at a more reserved 19.7 per cent. Second, while there were cell variations in table 12.6A broken down by level of government, no meaningful patterns of intergovernmental differences emerged on this question. Again, in gender (see table 12.6B) there were no strong variations observable, with the exception of deputies with three or more appointments. Here 23.8 per cent of female deputies fell into this category, while the figure for men was a more modest 17.7 per cent. A high value seems to have been placed on experienced female deputies. Table 12.7 identifies the length of time deputies had held their current position. These figures speak in part to the question of horizontality in government – the idea that public servants should move around government more, building a broad horizontally derived knowledge and experience base that many consider important for effective modern governance. Among Canadian deputies we find that long tenure in specific deputy posts was not the dominant situation. If we use the dividing marker of deputies who had been in their position for more than five years, we

332 Bryan M. Evans, Janet M. Lum, and John Shields Table 12.6A. Number of Previous Appointments Held at (Assistant) Deputy Rank, by Level of Government (%)

Federal Provincial Territorial Total

No previous appointment (n)

1 previous appointment (n)

2 previous appointments (n)

3 or more previous appointments (n)

2.5 (1) 8.0 (24) 9.5 (4) 7.6 (29)

30.0 (12) 52.8 (158) 45.2 (19) 49.6 (189)

42.5 (17) 21.1 (63) 19.0 (8) 23.1 (88)

25.0 (10) 18.1 (54) 26.2 (11) 19.7 (75)

Table 12.6B. Number of Previous Appointments Held at (Assistant) Deputy Rank, by Gender (%)

Male Female Total

No previous appointment (n)

1 previous appointment (n)

2 previous appointments (n)

3 or more previous appointments (n)

8.1 (20) 7.1 (9) 7.8 (29)

50.4 (125) 48.4 (61) 49.7 (186)

23.8 (59) 20.6 (26) 22.7 (85)

17.7 (44) 23.8 (30) 19.8 (74)

Table 12.7. Length of Time in Current Position, by Level of Government (%)

Federal Provincial Territorial Total

Less than 1 year (n)

1–2 years (n)

2–5 years (n)

5–10 years (n)

10 years or more (n)

14.6 (6) 19.0 (59) 27.3 (12) 19.4 (77)

26.8 (11) 27.0 (84) 20.5 (9) 26.3 (104)

51.2 (21) 32.2 (100) 31.8 (14) 34.1 (135)

4.9 (2) 18.0 (56) 11.4 (5) 15.9 (63)

2.4 (1) 3.9 (12) 9.1 (4) 4.3 (17)

discover that 20.2 per cent fell within this category. By contrast, 45.7 per cent of deputies had been in their position for two years or less. When level of government is examined, the only noticeable variation occurred at the federal level, where deputies with over five years in a position constituted only 7.3 per cent. The overall dominant pa ern reveals that, as a group, deputies tended not to occupy specific deputy positions for extended periods of time, suggesting frequent horizontal movement.

Canada-Wide Survey of Deputy and Assistant Deputy Ministers 333

Public Administrative and Public Policy Issues and Orientations The State of Canadian Public Administrative Institutional Capacity A series of questions were asked of our deputy population about the administrative capacity of their respective public services. The intent of this line of questioning was to elicit a perspective on how aspects of public administration were faring and the capacity of the Canadian civil service to respond to short- and longer-term demands. This assessment is important for understanding the strengths and limits of the state bureaucracy in Canada to address the daily requirements of running government and to respond appropriately to policy and administrative challenges. To begin, respondents were asked whether they believed their organization was losing its institutional memory. A clear 55 per cent of deputies agreed with this statement, with only 18 per cent disagreeing (figure 12.1). There was li le variation in responses when the question

Figure 12.1. Public Service Is Losing Its Institutional Memory (N = 400)

334 Bryan M. Evans, Janet M. Lum, and John Shields

was cross-tabulated with other variables, such as gender and level of government, suggesting that loss of public service institutional memory was considered to be a generalized problem across the breadth of Canadian government. The loss of institutional memory is a serious concern for a wellfunctioning public service. This problem is closely related to the large demographic shi s occurring in the state bureaucracy today, as significant numbers of post-war boomers retire and are replaced by a much younger and less experienced cohort. The public service workforce is considerably older than those employed in the private sector, and hence the effects of workforce displacement over the coming years will be felt more acutely in the public sector over other segments of the economy. In the federal public service in 2006, for example, individuals aged forty-five and over comprised 52 per cent of the workforce, as compared to only 39 per cent for the overall Canadian workforce (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2007). As well, an estimated “80 per cent of senior-level public servants will be eligible to retire by 2010,” according to the Canadian Advisory Commi ee on Senior Level Retention Compensation, underscoring the problem of memory drain (Bontis 2007, 159). In addition, the emphasis on more horizontal government – with its encouragement of frequent job movements within the public service, in response to the more integrated nature of policy and administrative challenges in a globalized world – also means that “memory” (that is, knowledge of technical and political processes and actors) held by individuals in portfolios and specific departments is regularly displaced with these moves. In policy units within government, for example, the concrete and tacit research and policy knowledge related to specific policy areas and programs held by individuals is removed when they transfer to a new posting. The combined effects of demographic change and rapid mobility of staff within the public service has inevitably diminished institutional memory. What, according to DMs and ADMs, was the policy capacity in government? As Painter and Pierre (2005) note, “Policy capacity refers to the ability of a government to make intelligent policy choices and muster the resources needed to execute those choices” (257). An important component of policy capacity in modern government is the human and infrastructure resources from the public service to provide informed non-partisan policy advice to the political executive.

Canada-Wide Survey of Deputy and Assistant Deputy Ministers 335 Figure 12.2A. Public Service Is Losing Its Policy Capacity (N = 400)

Our survey reveals that a sizable proportion of deputy respondents felt that the public service was in fact losing its policy capacity (figure 12.2A), with 44 per cent of deputies agreeing, 28 per cent disagreeing, and 28 per cent registering a neutral response on this question. On this variable, the gender of deputies made a significant difference: 53 per cent of female deputies agreed with the statement, while only 40 per cent of male deputies did so (figure 12.2B). There was no significant variance on this question when controlling for level of government, indicating that this was a common feeling among deputies, regardless of jurisdiction. It is unclear why there was a gender difference on this question. However, one speculative explanation would be that women tend to be concentrated in socially oriented line ministries as opposed to more male-dominated central agencies, which may have been differentially affected by government resources restructuring affecting the unit’s policy capacity. A government’s administrative capacity can also be measured by its ability to plan for the future. When deputies were asked how prepared

336 Bryan M. Evans, Janet M. Lum, and John Shields Figure 12.2B. Public Service Is Losing Its Policy Capacity, by Gender (N = 392)

their government was at medium- to long-term planning (five to ten years or more), a sizable proportion (41 per cent) did not believe it was doing well, while less than a third (30 per cent) believed it was meeting this performance expectation (figure 12.3). The responses to the questions on “institutional memory,” “policy capacity” and “capacity for medium- to long-term planning” together provide a strong indication that a plurality of our deputy respondents felt that the state’s capacity to carry out its administrative and policy duties had been and continued to be weakened. These findings reinforce much of the academic literature, which suggests that public sector restructuring and downsizing during the 1980s and 1990s have damaged not only morale but a good deal of the Canadian public service’s capacity to fulfil the breadth of its traditional functions (Shields and Evans 1998; Savoie 2003).

Canada-Wide Survey of Deputy and Assistant Deputy Ministers 337 Figure 12.3. Government Does Well at Medium- to Long-Term Planning (N = 398)

Nonetheless, there remain areas where the modern Canadian public service is still very capable of effectively responding to demands made on it. For example, a large majority of deputies, fully 68 per cent, did not foresee a problem for their organization to find suitable replacements for them when they leave (figure 12.4). If there was a demographic deficit creating a significant shortage of suitably qualified replacements for vacated civil service spots, it appeared not to be a serious concern for replacing the most senior level of the public service leadership. When deputies were queried about how well their organizations would be able to respond to issues arising out of Cabinet submissions, perhaps the most important and sensitive work of ministries/departments, the responses indicated that their organizations were well equipped. For example, 78 per cent of deputies believed that their units could respond “well” to tough questions arising from such submissions (figure 12.5), and 74 per cent believed that their ministries could provide “thoughtful advice” on any issues that might arise from such submissions (figure 12.6). Controlling for level of government and gender did not significantly influence outcomes on these variables.

338 Bryan M. Evans, Janet M. Lum, and John Shields Figure 12.4. A Suitable Replacement Can Be Found When I Leave (N = 394)

Figure 12.5. Organization Can Respond to Tough Questions (N = 399)

Canada-Wide Survey of Deputy and Assistant Deputy Ministers 339 Figure 12.6. Organization Can Provide Thoughtful Advice (N = 398)

The responses to this series of questions suggest a pa ern of strengths and weaknesses in the capacities of the Canadian public service. In short, routine transactional capabilities appeared strong, while the capacity of the public service to “get out in front of the curve” appeared to be more constrained. Changing Administrative Structures and Operating Environment Another set of questions tapped into changing administrative structures and altered operating environments for the public service. Questions here probed aspects of structural change and organizational culture. Most recently, emerging from debate on adoption of New Public Management has been the question of movement towards greater centralization of power in government, aptly captured in Savoie’s Governing from the Centre (1999). When questioned whether there had been a trend towards centralization of power in their jurisdiction, twice as many deputies agreed than disagreed with the statement (48 per cent versus 22 per cent) (figure 12.7A). The data also revealed important variations by level of government. Centralization of power was

340 Bryan M. Evans, Janet M. Lum, and John Shields Figure 12.7A. There Has Been a Centralization of Power in My Jurisdiction (N = 398)

felt most keenly at the federal and provincial levels, where 59 per cent and 50 per cent of the sample respectively agreed that centralization of power was occurring, and only 20 per cent in each case felt it was not. In the territories, by contrast, only 33 per cent of deputies agreed that movement towards greater centralization was taking place, while 38 per cent disagreed (figure 12.7B). In the territories this reversal of pattern could possibly be explained by the devolution of responsibilities by the federal government over recent years to territorial authorities. For this reason, territorial deputies may perceive the power of the centre, O awa, to be diminishing. When questioned about the success of their jurisdiction in focusing on policy and moving out of direct delivery, fewer than one-third (29 per cent) of deputies overall agreed that this was being accomplished, with 32 per cent disagreeing and the largest group (39 per cent) remaining neutral on the question (figure 12.8A). When viewed by level of government, however, there were again important jurisdictional variations. At the federal level, more deputies agreed (32 per cent) than

Canada-Wide Survey of Deputy and Assistant Deputy Ministers 341 Figure 12.7B. There Has Been a Centralization of Power in My Jurisdiction, by Level of Government (N = 397)

Figure 12.8A. There Has Been Success in Focusing on Policy and Moving out of Direct Service Delivery (N = 392)

342 Bryan M. Evans, Janet M. Lum, and John Shields

disagreed (22 per cent) with this proposition. In the provinces, opinion was evenly divided between agreements and disagreements at 31 per cent each. In the territories, however, deputies by a margin of 50 per cent to 16 per cent disagreed with the position that a policy focus was winning out over direct service delivery (see figure 12.8B). This likely speaks to the continued importance – despite calls of the “reinventing government” movement for the state to steer rather than row – of direct service delivery as a key function of government, particularly at the provincial/territorial level, where most responsibility for actual program delivery resides. Changes in government and public administration over the last three or four decades, especially those informed by neoliberal restructuring and New Public Management, have given greater emphasis to the importance of political leadership and of revived and reasserted politicaladministration dichotomy as a fundamental principle in politicalbureaucratic decision-making (Evans and Shields 2002; Goodsell 2005;

Figure 12.8B. There Has Been Success in Focusing on Policy and Moving out of Direct Service Delivery, by Level of Government (N = 391)

Canada-Wide Survey of Deputy and Assistant Deputy Ministers 343

Savoie 1994, 2003). In part, this masks a politicization of the upper echelons of the public service (Peters and Pierre 2004). In this context, what is meant by politicization is fundamentally different from partisanship. Here politicization is defined as “the substitution of political criteria for merit-based criteria in the selection, retention, promotion, rewards and disciplining of members of the public service” (2; also see Aucoin, 2012). In an a empt to capture a be er sense of politicization in the upper echelons of the Canadian public service, the question was asked whether “‘political fit’ or ‘comfort’ have become increasingly important factors in the selection of new deputy ministers.” About 41 per cent of deputies agreed while 28 per cent disagreed (figure 12.9A). The breakdown by jurisdiction was telling. Territorial (45 per cent) and provincial (41 per cent) deputies registered the strongest agreement; in contrast, federal deputies tended to disagree (46 per cent) rather than agree (32 per cent) with the statement (figure 12.9B). We offer two speculative explanations for these responses. First, the question of political fit or comfort is not new. Participant responses in this survey may simply have caught a timeless reality of the senior public service: political interface. However, there is a second, more complex explanation. Political fit or politicization may well be a necessary precondition in adapting the state to changing economic and political environments. In other words, currently it is seen as necessary to closely Figure 12.9A. Political Fit Has Become a More Important Factor in Selection of New Deputy Ministers (N = 395)

344 Bryan M. Evans, Janet M. Lum, and John Shields Figure 12.9B. Political Fit Has Become a More Important Factor in Selection of New Deputy Ministers, by Level of Government (N = 394)

align the senior public service to the political objectives of government in order to reorient successfully the policy and organizational focus of the state apparatus. In public administration there has been much discussion about the importance of broad transferable skills and more horizontal government. Such orientations are thought to be reflected in the idea of movement among senior civil servants within and between departments. Our survey results offer some insight into this phenomenon of lateral “mobility.” A larger proportion of deputy postings were for two years

Canada-Wide Survey of Deputy and Assistant Deputy Ministers 345

or less (46 per cent), and an overwhelming majority (80 per cent) did not stay in one position beyond five years before moving on to another deputy posting (Evans, Lum, and Shields 2007, 629). To further explore the desirability of such movement, deputies were asked whether there was need to encourage public service executives to move around the system more than they already did. A strong majority of the respondents (60 per cent) agreed with this statement, although when broken down by level of government, federal deputies were far less agreeable (36 per cent) to this suggestion than deputies from other jurisdictions (62 per cent agreement each) (figure 12.10A and figure 12.10B). Policy Issues and Challenges Our deputy population was also presented with a series of questions on policy. They were asked to rank whether or not various broad policy areas were a significant threat to their jurisdiction. A sample of some of the more revealing deputy perspectives is identified below. This survey of policy issues gives a snapshot of how deputies across Canada viewed policy challenges that confronted their governments at the time.

Figure 12.10A. There Is a Need to Encourage Public Service Executives to Move around the System More Than They Do (N = 401)

346 Bryan M. Evans, Janet M. Lum, and John Shields Figure 12.10B. There Is a Need to Encourage Public Service Executives to Move around the System More Than They Do, by Level of Government (N = 399)

On a specific economic policy issue, there was broad agreement that Canadian productivity was a significant challenge to Canadian governments. Overall, 57 per cent agreed with the urgency of this policy challenge. This was a view that deputies shared consistently. regardless of level of government (figure 12.11). When questioned about the problem of environmental degradation, 56 per cent of deputies said that this was a significant policy challenge, with only 17 per cent not viewing it as such (figure 12.12A). Broken

Canada-Wide Survey of Deputy and Assistant Deputy Ministers 347 Figure 12.11. Canadian Productivity as a Significant Policy Challenge (N = 395)

Figure 12.12A. Environmental Degradation as a Significant Policy Challenge (N = 396)

down by level of government, deputies from all jurisdictions saw this as an important policy problem, but some rated the challenge here more strongly than others. Fully 78 per cent of the territorial, 63 per cent of the federal and 51 per cent of provincial deputies identified

348 Bryan M. Evans, Janet M. Lum, and John Shields Figure 12.12B. Environmental Degradation as a Significant Policy Challenge, by Level of Government (N = 395)

environmental degradation as a pressing policy problem for their jurisdiction (figure 12.12B). The especially strong ranking of this issue in the territories may well reflect concerns with the effects of global warming and industrial pollution stemming from substantial economic development in mining and oil and gas exploration and extraction in an environment particularly sensitive to such changes. On this issue of environmental degradation, gender played a role on the intensity of responses. Women (62 per cent), more so than men (52 per cent), ranked environmental degradation as a compelling policy challenge for their jurisdiction (figure 12.12C). An issue associated with social policy is that of economic inequality in society. Once again there was broad agreement that economic inequality is an important policy issue for the deputy population: 59 per cent agreed that this was a significant issue for their jurisdiction, and only 17 per cent disagreed (figure 12.13A). Again, gender made a significant difference on how strongly deputies perceived this issue: 67

Canada-Wide Survey of Deputy and Assistant Deputy Ministers 349 Figure 12.12C. Environmental Degradation as a Significant Policy Challenge, by Gender (N = 388)

per cent of female versus 55 per cent of male deputies weighed this as a significant issue (figure 12.13B). A current policy issue that taps deeply into the policy realm of federalism concerns the so-called fiscal imbalance between the provinces and the federal government. This has been the topic of considerable federal-provincial discussion since the end of the Second World War and beginnings of the process of building a redistributive welfare state in Canada. The issue was also the centrepiece of the 2007 federal budget

350 Bryan M. Evans, Janet M. Lum, and John Shields Figure 12.13A. Economic Inequality as a Significant Policy Challenge (N = 397)

Figure 12.13B. Economic Inequality as a Significant Policy Challenge, by Gender (N = 389)

Canada-Wide Survey of Deputy and Assistant Deputy Ministers 351 Figure 12.14A. The Fiscal Imbalance as a Significant Policy Challenge (N = 397)

and was prominently profiled in the Canadian media at the time. The importance of this policy area for deputies was very strong in our sample, with 71 per cent seeing it as significant for their jurisdiction, and only 12 per cent ranking it as not significant overall (figure 12.14A). Not surprisingly, how deputies responded to this question depended on their level of government. While deputies from the territories and provinces identified this issue as significant by a wide margin (84 per cent and 75 per cent), only 22 per cent of federal deputies saw it as so, with a full 41 per cent indicating it was not significant for their jurisdiction (figure 12.14B). On this variable as well there was a noticeable gender gap, as some 79 per cent of women versus 67 per cent of male deputies categorized it as significant (figure 12.14C). National unity and the threat of Quebec separation has been a longstanding policy challenge in Canada. The general deputy perspective in the summer of 2006 was that the issue of Quebec separatism is not a significant policy challenge at that time. Only 15 per cent of deputies agreed that the threat of Quebec separatism was a significant policy challenge, while close to half (48 per cent) believed that it was not (figure 12.15A). This perspective appears to have been endorsed by the results of the March 2007 Quebec election, where the Parti québécois did poorly. Broken down by level of government, the overall pa ern holds, except at the federal level. Among the federal deputies in our

352 Bryan M. Evans, Janet M. Lum, and John Shields Figure 12.14B. The Fiscal Imbalance as a Significant Policy Challenge, by Level of Government (N = 396)

survey, disagreements outpaced agreements by only a 35 per cent to 25 per cent margin (figure 12.15B). Given the strategic place of Quebec in national politics, the elevated level of prominence given to concerns about Quebec separatism by O awa-based deputies should not be surprising. A Glimpse of the Policy Orientation of Canadian Public Service Elites One question was designed to probe the policy orientations of deputies.1 Respondents were asked the following question and then prompted to choose one of three responses that best matched their feelings:

Canada-Wide Survey of Deputy and Assistant Deputy Ministers 353 Figure 12.14C. The Fiscal Imbalance as a Significant Policy Challenge, by Gender (N = 389)

Overall, when I take myself out of my daily work and reflect on issues broadly I would say my policy orientation is one where (circle the one that most closely reflects your view): a) There is room for greater public sector involvement in social and economic management. b) Individuals need to be enabled to manage their own affairs. c) Market solutions are ultimately the best solutions.

354 Bryan M. Evans, Janet M. Lum, and John Shields Figure 12.15A. Quebec Separatism as a Significant Policy Challenge (N = 386)

Admi edly, the response to one question cannot provide a comprehensive assessment of the policy orientation of Canada’s deputy population. Moreover, each of the three possible responses can be interpreted in various ways, at least concerning ideological leanings. This is especially the case since public servants are sensitive to revealing ideological “biases,” given the highly sensitive nature of their work. Still, our findings disclose some broad policy orientations of our deputy sample. The least popular choice by a wide margin was towards the “market-knows-best” policy orientation. This is a policy response most closely associated with neoliberal approaches governance. Only 16 per cent of deputies identified their orientations with this response. It was slightly more popular among federal deputies (21 per cent) and even more strongly expressed among those deputies sixty years of age and older (30 per cent). Deputies whose orientations were more favourable to greater public sector involvement in economic and social affairs (a policy instrument traditionally identified with Keynesian and statist approaches) represented one-third of our deputy population (33 per cent). It was a less popular choice among the territorial deputies at 25 per cent and among those sixty years of age and older, where it garnered only 17 per cent endorsement. By far the most popular, and in some ways the most pragmatic response was an orientation towards “enabling” individuals to manage

Canada-Wide Survey of Deputy and Assistant Deputy Ministers 355 Figure 12.15B. Quebec Separatism as a Significant Policy Challenge, by Level of Government (N = 385)

their own affairs. Arguably this is a policy response in harmony with a more moderate and “third way / middle way” approach to governance. Just over half of the deputies (51 per cent) selected this choice, and it was the most popular pick among all categories of the deputy population. In the territories it was the choice of fully 70 per cent of deputies (figures 12.16A, 12.16B, and 12.16C). These findings suggest that the deputy population in Canada is “pluralistic” in its policy orientation. Even a er many years of neoliberal-oriented governments, those deputies favouring more government involvement outnumber more free-market oriented deputies by

356 Bryan M. Evans, Janet M. Lum, and John Shields Figure 12.16A. PSE Policy Orientation (N = 383)

a margin of two to one. Moreover, the majority of deputies appeared to be most comfortable with a more pragmatic centrist orientation to policy solution. Conclusions Over the last several decades, the Canadian public services at all levels have been subject to significant changes brought on by shi ing political and policy paradigms, demographic transformation, adoption of New Public Management systems, and the rise of public policy challenges associated with structural changes in the economy and society. This survey of senior ranking public executives points to problems related to deputy profiles that have not caught up to significant demographic shi s in Canadian society and the labour force, deputy career pa erns that are adjusting to more horizontal government, as well as declining policy capacity, loss of institutional memory, and deficiencies in the strategic capability to plan ahead. At the same time, deputies are confident that their institutions do provide them with the capacity to function at a very high level in routine day-to-day functions such as offering high-quality advice to their political masters. Herein may be the most fundamental challenge for Canada’s governments emerging from this research. While there appears to be confidence in the capability of the public service to address short-term

Canada-Wide Survey of Deputy and Assistant Deputy Ministers 357 Figure 12.16B. PSE Policy Orientation, by Level of Government (N = 382)

requirements, DMs/ADMs face significant and “wicked” policy problems, including productivity and competitiveness, fiscal imbalance, inequality, and environmental degradation. The capacity to address these issues appears to be equivocal, at best. However, in this respect, Canada’s deputies will likely seek pragmatic solutions to problems. Jocelyne Bourgon, former clerk of the Privy Council, may have been correct in proposing that Canada had largely rejected more ideological

358 Bryan M. Evans, Janet M. Lum, and John Shields Figure 12.16C. PSE Policy Orientation, by Age (N = 383)

approaches to restructuring and adaptation to intensified globalization, and instead opted for a more pragmatic “Canadian way,” which maintains a central if modified role for the state (Bourgon 1997). However, even in this respect, the survey suggests that this cadre is rather pluralist in its policy approaches, no doubt reflecting in part the diversity of Canada’s regions and political cultures. Our study demonstrates that level of government does ma er in Canada. On a good number of the issues explored in our survey, the level of government from which the deputies came made a noticeable impact on the responses given. Of course, it was also true that on many

Canada-Wide Survey of Deputy and Assistant Deputy Ministers 359

questions, such as concerns about loss of institutional memory and policy capacity, there was a consistent pa ern of responses by deputies across jurisdictions. Areas where there was a discernible variation in responses when controlling for level of government covered the demographic profile of deputies and questions on the tendency towards centralization of power, evaluation of governments’ success in focusing on policy over service delivery, the importance of political fit in choosing a deputy, and assessments of whether senior public service executives should be encouraged to move around the system more. This suggests that the impact of public administration and institutional change are o en experienced differently at the federal, provincial, and territorial levels. Moreover, variations that emerged on some policy questions in our survey suggest that level of government o en makes a difference in the significance deputies give to particular policies. On three key policy issues, gender made a difference in deputy responses. Female deputies, in contrast to their male counterparts, tended to place greater weight on the importance to their jurisdiction of environmental degradation, economic inequality, and the so-called fiscal imbalance. In each of these cases, the difference was statistically significant. While our findings suggest that female deputies as compared to male deputies tended to be more a entive to policy issues that had strong social and environmental implications, it is unclear what impact female deputies will have in shaping public policy. With few exceptions (e.g., Whitford, Wilkins, and Ball 2007), studies reviewing the relationship between women and public policy have centred primarily on the potential impact on policy of female voters, or elected female officials, or the differential consequences of public policy on women rather than the policy influence of high-ranking female bureaucrats (Beckwith 2007; Brodie 1996; Burt 1998; Gidengil 2007; Jenson and Sineau 2001; MacIvor 2003; Tremblay and Trimble 2003; Trimble and Arsco 2003; Young 2003). Clearly, more empirical work along this line of inquiry is needed for more definitive conclusions as to whether women in deputy positions ma er, to what extent, and how. In total this survey offers a snapshot of how the most senior members of the public service were experiencing administrative and policy challenges, and adjusting to demographic and career transformations. The responses of our deputy sample provide insight into a range of issues on such ma ers as the state of policy capacity, the political-administrative interface, the struggle for coherence and coordination within the

360 Bryan M. Evans, Janet M. Lum, and John Shields

administrative state, the salience of various policy issues, and personal policy orientations. The findings suggest that the public service faces challenges to institutional capacity in a time of global complexity and constant change, but that senior executives will tend to address pressing policy issues facing their level of government with pragmatic, though not homogeneous, policy orientations.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This project was supported by the Ryerson University Summer Research Assistant program and the dean of arts, Carla Cassidy. We also appreciate the considerable research assistance and contributions by Jessica Ng and Alvin Ying.

NOTE 1. Given the importance of political and ideological neutrality/objectivity for the active deputy cadre in Canada, only one carefully constructed question on policy orientation was presented at the end of the survey.

REFERENCES Aucoin, P. 2012. “New Political Governance in Westminster Systems: Impartial Public Administration and Management Performance Risk.” In Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions 25 (2): 177–99. Baskoy, T., B. Evans, and J. Shields. 2011. “Assessing Policy Capacity in Canada’s Public Services: Perspectives of Deputy and Assistant Deputy Ministers.” Canadian Public Administration 54 (2): 217–34. Beckwith, K. 2007. “Numbers and Newness: The Descriptive and Substantive Representation of Women.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 40 (1): 27–49. h p://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0008423907070059. Bontis, N. 2007. “Mining the Nation’s Intellectual Capital: Knowledge Management in Government.” In Digital State at the Leading Edge, edited by S. Borins, K. Kernaghan, D. Brown, N. Bontis, and F. Thompson, 155–82. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Canada-Wide Survey of Deputy and Assistant Deputy Ministers 361 Bourgault, Jacques, and Stéphane Dion. 1991. The Changing Profile of Federal Deputy Ministers: 1867–1988. O awa: Centre for Management Development. Bourgon, J. 1997. “‘The Changing Paradigm of Governance’: Are We Willing and Able to Exercise Power Differently.” Address to ADMs Forum. O awa: Privy Council Office. h p://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/index. asp?lang=eng&page=clerk-greffier&sub=archives&doc=19971029-eng.htm. Brodie, J., ed. 1996. Women and Canadian Public Policy. Toronto: Harcourt Brace Canada. Burt, S. 1998. “Advisory Councils as Sites of Research, Policy Influence and Networking: Contradictions and Possibilities.” In Women and Political Representation in Canada, edited by C. Andrew and M. Tremblay, 115–44. O awa: University of O awa Press. Campbell, Colin E., and George J. Szlabowski. 1979. The Superbureaucrats. Toronto: Macmillan. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. 2007. “Face of Public Service Changing, StatsCan Says.” CBC News Canada/O awa, 5 March. h p://www.cbc.ca/ news/canada/o awa/story/2007/03/05/statscan-publicservice.html. Evans, B., J. Lum, and J. Shields. 2007. “Profiling the Public Service Elite: A Demographic and Career Trajectory Survey of Deputy and Assistant Deputy Ministers.” Canadian Public Administration 50 (4): 609–34. h p://dx.doi. org/10.1111/j.1754-7121.2007.tb02209.x. Evans, B.M., and J. Shields. 2002. “The Third Sector: Neo-liberal Restructuring, Governance and the Re-making of State–Civil Society Relationships.” In The Handbook of Canadian Public Administration, edited by C. Dunn, 139–58. Toronto: Oxford University Press. Gidengil, E. 2007. “Beyond the Gender Gap: Presidential Address to the Canadian Political Science Association, Saskatoon, 2007.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 40 (4): 815–31. h p://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0008423907071181. Goodsell, C. 2005. “The Bureau as Unit of Governance.” In The Values of Bureaucracy, edited by P. Du Gay, 3–26. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Govindarajulu, Z. 1999. Elements of Sample Theory and Methods. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Jenson, J., and M. Sineau. 2001. Who Cares? Women’s Work, Child Care and Welfare State Redesign. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. MacIvor, H. 2003. “Women and the Electoral System.” In Women and Electoral Politics in Canada, edited by M. Tremblay and L. Trimble, 22–36. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press. Miliband, R. 1969. The State in Capitalist Society: The Analysis of the Western System of Power. London: Quartet Books.

362 Bryan M. Evans, Janet M. Lum, and John Shields Olsen, Denis. 1980. The State Elite in Canadian Society. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart. Painter, M., and J. Pierre. 2005. “Conclusions: Challenges to Policy Capacity.” In Challenges to State Policy Capacity: Global Trends and Comparative Perspectives, edited by M. Painter and J. Pierre, 255–61. Houndsmill, UK: Palgrave. Peters, B.G., and J. Pierre. 2004. “Politicization of the Civil Service.” In Politicization of the Civil Service in Comparative Perspective: The Quest for Control, edited by B.G. Peters and J. Pierre, 2–13. London: Routledge. Plumptre, T. 1987. “New Perspectives on the Role of the Deputy Minister.” Canadian Public Administration 30 (3): 376–98. h p://dx.doi. org/10.1111/j.1754-7121.1987.tb00090.x. Porter, John. 1965. The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Pusey, M. 2003. Economic Rationalism in Canberra: A Nation-Building State Changes Its Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rhodes, R.A.W., and P. Weller, eds. 2001. The Changing World of Top Officials: Mandarins or Valets? Buckingham, PA: Open University Press. Savoie, D. 1994. Thatcher, Reagan, Mulroney: In Search of a New Bureaucracy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. –. 1999. Governing from the Centre: The Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. –. 2003. Breaking the Bargain: Public Servants, Ministers and Parliament. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Shergold, Peter. 2004. “Lackies, Careerists, Political Stooges? Personal Reflections on the Current State of Public Service Leadership.” Australian Journal of Public Administration 63 (4): 3–13. h p://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ j.1467-8500.2004.00396.x. Shields, J., and B.M. Evans. 1998. Shrinking the State: Globalization and the “Reform” of Public Administration. Halifax: Fernwood. Statistics Canada. 2007. “Employment Trends in the Federal Public Service, 1995 to 2006.” Daily, 5 March. –. 2008a. “Population Reporting an Aboriginal Identity, by Mother Tongue, by Province and Territory (2006 Census).” h p://www.statcan.gc.ca/tablestableaux/sum-som/l01/cst01/demo38a-eng.htm. –. 2008b. “2006 Census: Ethnic Origin, Visible Minorities, Place of Work and Mode of Transportation.” Daily, 2 April. –. 2008c. “Visible Minority Groups, 2006 counts, for Canada, Provinces and Territories.” h p://www12.statcan.ca/english/census06/highlights/ethnic/ pages/Page.cfm?Lang=E.

Canada-Wide Survey of Deputy and Assistant Deputy Ministers 363 Tremblay, M., and L. Trimble, eds. 2003. Women and Electoral Politics in Canada. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press. Trimble, L., and J. Arsco . 2003. Still Counting: Women in Politics across Canada. Peterborough, ON: Broadview. Whitford, A.B., V.M. Wilkins, and M.G. Ball. 2007. “Descriptive Representation and Policymaking Authority: Evidence from Women in Cabinets and Bureaucracies.” Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions 20 (4): 559–80. h p://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491. 2007.00372.x. Young, L. 2003. “Can Feminists Transform Party Politics? The Canadian Experience.” In Women and Electoral Politics in Canada, edited by M. Tremblay and L. Trimble, 76–91. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press.

13 Federal Deputy Ministers: Serial Servers Looking for Influence1 jac q u e s b o u r g au lt

The Canadian Institutional Framework and the Effect on Deputy Ministers Deputy ministers are at the top of the administrative hierarchy in Canada’s apparatus of state. They have a well-established tradition for well supporting ministers and the government in all aspects of the exercise of executive power (Granatstein 1982). A series of institutional and contextual factors affect the way deputy ministers do their job of supporting ministers, who are responsible to Parliament. Ministerial responsibility encompasses both individual and collective responsibility: the minister of a given department has individual responsibility for that department and for specific files (e.g., the status of women or state-owned corporations connected to the particular portfolio) and at the same time shares collective responsibility for the actions of all other ministers and for Cabinet decisions. This dual responsibility informs the work of deputy ministers and their relations with ministers. Ministers are immersed in partisan politics and lack time and leisure to study all files that require their approval. They must perform their institutional duties as local MPs, parliamentarians, and ministers. They a end meetings of Cabinet and of Cabinet commi ees, receive dignitaries, and take part in events at home and abroad. So a minister has li le time to manage a department with thousands of employees and a budget in the billions. Ministers do not always have the required training and experience, or all the requisite information, to prepare and make all decisions on their own. They are therefore assisted by senior civil servants. The deputy minister prepares the phases of the decision-making

Federal Deputy Ministers 365

process and makes suggestions on the decisions for which the minister is responsible to Cabinet and Parliament. The minister and the deputy minister are not aware of everything that happens in the department. However, a general constitutional convention, imported from Britain and reformulated in 1916 by Prime Minister Robert Borden, holds that ministers are politically responsible before the House of Commons for their department’s actions. At the same time, as ministers cannot know everything, their personal political responsibility is limited. But ministers need not ensure that effective systems are put in place, that suspected difficulties are investigated, and, if problems are found, that the system is improved, the culprit punished, and the damage repaired (Canada, Privy Council Office 1987; Dawson 1963). At the federal level, Canada’s two-party tradition (Conservatives and Liberals) has evolved into a four-party system with the emergence of the New Democrats and the Bloc Québécois. Today, the political parties are largely regionally based. As of the time of writing, Canada had a minority government, as the governing party had only a plurality of the seats in the House of Commons. Canadians elected minority governments in 1963, 1972, 1979, and in every election since 2004 (2004, 2006, 2008). A minority government can be brought down by a vote in the House (on a non-confidence vote, tax measure, or major piece of legislation). The prime minister may also resign and ask the governor general to call new elections. Policy development, to which the deputy minister contributes, is influenced by whether the government is a minority or majority. Minister Selection in Canada and Impact on Deputy Ministers By constitutional convention, Canadian ministers must be members of Parliament. Ministers come from the leading party in the House, which will generally have between 130 and 200 MPs. The twenty to forty ministers are therefore chosen from a relatively small pool. In exceptional circumstances, senators may be named ministers and so may ordinary citizens, in which case they are expected to seek election to Parliament at the first opportunity. In Canada, appointing ministers is the exclusive prerogative of the prime minister, which was criticized by some analysts (Aucoin 2006). This authority lends the PM super-presidential status and influences the way ministers, and hence deputy ministers, exercise their powers. The prime minister chooses ministers on the basis

366 Jacques Bourgault

of a variety of considerations: trust, language, home region, seniority in the party, services rendered, gender, and so forth. These factors help maintain a measure of diversity in the government, ensuring representation of different demographic groups. They carry more weight than technical knowledge of the portfolio for which the minister is responsible. This method of choosing ministers has two consequences for relations with the senior civil service: ministers are o en generalists with li le expertise in their designated field and no networks of their own, leaving senior civil servants in charge of the technical side of files and of reaching and persuading specialized stakeholders. A er fulfilling their obligations as MPs (representing constituents, the work of the House and party, being present in their riding), Canadian ministers have li le time to manage their departments or update policies in their portfolio. Their political staffers assist them in their duties as public figures (Benoit 2006). Given the way Canadian ministers are selected, senior civil servants are generally more familiar with the field and with the key stakeholders, and are directly plugged into information about their department. This shapes the relationship and play of influence between ministers and deputy ministers. Status of Senior Civil Service in Canada and Non-partisanship Canada has a “professional” civil service that falls between the “career system” and the “spoils system.” The civil service operates on the merit principle. Civil servants do not enjoy any legal guarantee of permanent employment, as they do in “career systems.” However, the accepted practice is that Canadian civil servants are assured of keeping their jobs as long as there is work to be done and they are doing it well. On the other hand, the most senior personnel are appointed on a discretionary basis and have no guarantee of retaining a particular position. Deputy ministers are appointed for open-ended terms and serve at the prime minister’s discretion. Under a constitutional convention that dates back to 1896 and is still followed, the prime minister chooses senior civil servants. The PM has sole authority to initiate the appointment process and is free to demote or transfer senior officials, since the power to appoint includes the power to dismiss. However, an effort is generally made to manage departures and to provide reasons for terminations. Appointments at the deputy minister level are essentially political: they are initiated by the prime minister and effected by

Federal Deputy Ministers 367

Order in Council (Halliday 1959). However, “political” does not mean “partisan.” The process is intended to reflect a principle of democratic government according to which the government, which is responsible to the House and has a relatively short term of office, needs people who are trustworthy in all respects (politically, technically, managerially, ethically) running government departments so it can carry out its mandate from the voters. As a rule, DMs, associates, and assistant DMs are appointed from within the upper echelons of the civil service and have not been involved in partisan politics for many years. Many deputy ministers previously worked in a minister’s office; of twenty-three DMs in 2000, six had been in a minister’s office at one time. However, that experience was in the distant past and they had been far removed from partisan politics for an average of twelve years. And almost all of them were serving as DMs under a government led by a party other than the one for which they had worked in a political capacity. Conversely, some ministers were previously deputy ministers. In one case, a clerk of the Privy Council became a minister, but for a party other than the one that had appointed him. Therefore, we find no partisan pa ern to appointments. The prime minister does not act alone in choosing deputy ministers. First of all, the PM considers the suggestions of the clerk of the Privy Council, who in turn takes recommendations from the Commi ee of Senior Officials (COSO), which has been made up of eight to twelve deputy ministers at different times. COSO’s functions include reviewing candidates’ files and carrying out performance appraisals. Through COSO, the other DMs exert a degree of indirect influence over appointments and transfers. In rare cases, the minister of the department has no input; former minister Francis Fox says he once learned of changes to the DM community by reading the morning papers. Appointments o en reflect the prime minister’s (and clerk’s) desire to achieve balance at the top: for example, a new minister will need a more experienced deputy minister, while a minister who is an expert in the field might not need a DM with the same expertise. The selection process has the advantage of being thorough and producing appointments that are compatible with the community. However, it also entails the risk of allowing the bureaucracy supremacy over political authorities and tends to yield appointees who reproduce the profile of the people involved in the selection process (known as the “Russian doll syndrome”).

368 Jacques Bourgault

Duties, Powers, Roles Duties A DM’s chief duties are to advise the minister, the government, and the clerk of the Privy Council on all issues, administer the department and the policies for which the minister is responsible, manage employees using a modern leadership style, and help advance the corporate files assigned to him or her by the clerk (Bourgault 2002). We will deal with other aspects of the deputy minister’s duties later; for now, we will only note that advising the minister is the broadest and most variable component of the DM’s work. Theoretically, this duty can relate to all aspects of the minister’s portfolio and all facets of the minister’s public life as a minister and member of Cabinet. But it all depends on what advice the minister is prepared to hear. And the turf wars can be fierce. Agency heads and presidents of Crown corporations do not always want to go through the DM to get to the minister. They try to skirt the DM, who is trying to coordinate. The corporate secretariat can help undermine the DM’s influence by enabling others to contact the minister directly without the deputy minister’s presence. The minister’s staff is o en in competition with the DM in providing advice. Some ministers distrust the senior civil service and prefer to listen to their staff. Powers Legally, the deputy minister has few specific powers; in accordance with democratic principles, all authority is vested in the minister, who is responsible to Parliament. Under the legislation governing deputy heads, the “management and direction” of the department is entrusted to the minister. However, the acts creating departments allow ministers to delegate certain powers to DMs, and allow the DMs to sub-delegate. Their status as deputy department heads and their delegated powers from central agencies (such as the Public Service Commission and Treasury Board Secretariat) give deputy ministers the authority to manage their department’s human and financial resources. As accounting officers, DMs are accountable before commi ees of the House and Senate. They must answer questions concerning the measures taken to deliver departmental programs, the measures taken to

Federal Deputy Ministers 369

maintain effective systems of internal control, the signing of accounts, and the performance of other specific duties assigned under any other act (Financial Administration Act, paragraph 16.4[1]). These responsibilities have been expanded recently with the empowerment strategy adopted by central agencies such as Treasury Board (modern comptrollership) and the Public Service Commission (management of delegations): instead of exercising controls in advance, in a piecemeal fashion, the central agencies are establishing a framework of rules and a process for accountability and auditing a er the fact. When deputy ministers delegate, they commit their own authority and the minister’s responsibility. The DM’s role in this context is to provide clear guidelines, keep them updated, and make sure they are implemented. For appointments, the DM uses powers delegated by the Public Service Commission, but the PSC may withdraw that delegation if a DM exercises it carelessly or without appropriate controls (e.g., making irregular appointments, using non-compliant processes, etc.). Role of Deputy Ministers in the Political System For a deputy minister, serving the state means serving the government of the day competently and loyally, but within the framework of the law. DMs strive to keep the trust of the minister and the government. They need to earn and maintain the confidence of all ministers in the competence and integrity of the DM community. However, there are limits to civil servants’ loyalty to the political leadership: they must act within the law. A Canadian DM advises the minister and the government competently, professionally, and loyally, but must not politically promote the government and its decisions. erving the minister Aside from providing advice, serving the minister essentially means preparing departmental plans and the minister’s decisions. To do so, the deputy minister must provide the minister with all the information necessary to make the “right” decision: studies and wri en observations on the issue, opinions, counsel, and so forth. In practice, ministers do not decide on all departmental operations themselves; the DM does so, on behalf of and under the responsibility of the minister. The challenge is to determine, o en quickly and under pressure, what information is essential for the minister to have. Selecting information

370 Jacques Bourgault

for dissemination demands a clear vision of the roles of minister and deputy minister. Otherwise, those roles may become confused, and it can become unclear who should really be responsible for what before Parliament (Franks 2006) and the central agencies (Bourgault 2006). In addition, the minister and deputy minister may not share the same point of view on a decision on a given file, on policies, or on funding for a given project. Two results may ensue. The minister may have made a politically motivated decision that reflects the government’s agenda, and the DM implements it in accordance with the law. But if the minister is contemplating a decision that the DM believes is seriously adverse to the public interest and the DM is unable to convince the minister to reconsider, he or she informs the clerk of the Privy Council, who brings the issue to the prime minister’s a ention. The final decision will be made by the prime minister or, more rarely today, by the government, or by the prime minister and the minister. The minister will then be responsible before Parliament for both the process and the outcome. Some deputy ministers annotate decision documents so the record will show their misgivings about the decision, but that can erode the relationship capital between the minister and the DM. incorporating cabinet priorities into those of the department The work of Canadian deputy ministers is governed by the corporate management model. In theory, DMs put the interests of the government as a whole ahead of those of their department. The dimensions listed in their performance contracts reflect the government’s priorities and those that are more specific to the department. As of 2009, performance contracts took into account the priorities that the minister was assigned in the prime minister’s annual mandate le er. This corporate approach can yield a variety of actions: changes to policies, programs, and legislation to bring them into line with government priorities, budgeting with a view to the same priorities, and a ention to priorities in relations with actors such as the provinces, interest groups, and international talking partners. The deputy minister makes sure that all employees are guided by the same understanding of the goals. Specifically, the deputy ministers’ priorities shape those of the assistant deputy ministers, whose contracts are based on those of their superiors. The same process extends to directors and all the way down the command chain.

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ongoing policy development Policy development remains an essential part of the deputy minister’s role. DMs make sure the process moves ahead and coordinate its various phases. They advise the minister in each stage of the process. Policies are of strategic importance. It is therefore essential for the department’s top manager, the DM, to be involved. DMs are a key source of information on the department’s modus operandi and a conduit for information between the department and the central agencies. operational management In policies and programs, the DM sees to carrying out vertical actions for which the minister is responsible, in accordance with the emerging needs of civil society and the state. This means making decisions and taking measures to establish and update regulatory standards, continually develop programs, and validate the decisions taken. On the administrative front, deputy ministers perform a variety of responsibilities under the authority of the central agencies and horizontal departments. They make sure that the operational systems and information systems required to carry out the department’s and government’s missions are in place. In Mintzberg’s terms, their “job frame” is organized around information, people, and actions (Mintzberg and Bourgault 2000). To this end, they drive forward the department’s decision-making systems and supervise the performance of the organization and its employees. A 1993 study of deputy ministers’ use of time (Bourgault 1997) showed that they worked an average of fi y-eight hours per week, spread out over 5.5 to 6.5 days. Twenty-five per cent of this time was devoted to planning and assessing policies and programs, 19 per cent to supervising immediate subordinates, and 15 per cent to managing human resources. In theory, they were not involved in daily operational management, which was systematically delegated, but 16 per cent of their time was spent on handling crises, which were not necessarily related to operations. A portion of the time devoted to subordinates and to human resource management could also be counted towards time spent on operations. As well, a small portion of the 25 per cent of time spent on miscellaneous duties was related to operations. Deputy ministers spent only 5 per cent of their time with the minister. A similar study conducted in 2003 (Bourgault 2003) found that DMs were working sixty-nine hours per week, a 21 per cent increase in just

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ten years. Interdepartmental management and corporate management took up twenty hours of valuable time, or 29 per cent of working hours. DMs spent two to three times as much time with their peers as with the minister. informing parliamentarians and accountability The tradition in Canada is that ministers do not resign for the deeds of others. Many ministers have therefore laid the blame for problems in policy implementation or departmental management at the door of their deputy minister. How can DMs be held accountable without undermining the basic democratic principle of ministerial responsibility to Parliament? Since the 1980s, the Conservatives have introduced two reforms to make senior officials more accountable without making ministers unaccountable: the changes that followed the 1985 McGrath report and the Federal Accountability Act of 2006. At the end of the day, DMs’ obligation to answer to Parliament was clarified without increasing their burden of accountability. Deputy ministers report to Parliament by appearing before parliamentary commi ees to answer questions about “supervision of the financial, personnel and other resources at the department’s disposal,” program implementation, service delivery, and assessment of progress (Canada, Privy Council Office 2003, 12–16). By constitutional convention and under the act, the DM does not serve Parliament directly but rather the minister. The DM assists the minister, who bears full and exclusive responsibility before Parliament. The DM’s parliamentary accountability is neither parallel to nor lesser than the minister’s, in the sense of being distinct but relating to ma ers of lesser political importance. Rather, the DM’s accountability, as interpreted by government of Canada directives issued by the Privy Council Office, is included in the minister’s ministerial accountability (Canada, Privy Council Office 1990). The interpretive directives from the government of Canada elaborate on two aspects of the deputy minister’s assistance to the minister: DMs appear on behalf of their minister on general ma ers, but in support of their minister in their capacity as accounting officers (Canada, Privy Council Office 2011).2 Appearance as Deputy Head. Deputy ministers are deputy department heads. Under the enabling legislation by which departments are created, the minister is responsible for the “management and direction” of the department, whereas agencies are governed by a legal instrument

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that does not give the minister similar authority. So the “management and direction” of the department remains the purview of the minister, who has final responsibility. Under a government directive issued in 1990, deputy ministers appear before parliamentary commi ees in their capacity as deputy head only on behalf of the minister, only if the minister designates them to do so, only under the minister’s authority, and only with the minister’s permission to answer questions on his or her behalf. These rules water down somewhat the recommendations of the McGrath report of 1985; DMs answer questions on behalf of the minister and with the minister’s permission in order to explain the department’s actions and policies. They take no position on the merit of the policies and, as a rule, provide no information that is not available to the public. Appearance as Accounting Officer. A er many recommendations (Franks 2006), and since the Financial Administration Act was amended by the Federal Accountability Act, a DM, when called to appear in his or her capacity as accounting officer, is legally required to testify before competent commi ees on four specified fields. The minister may not designate anyone other than the DM to answer questions in those four areas. Limitations. The accounting officer’s obligation to testify is not limited by time. The deputy minister is not summoned to appear personally but as the accounting officer. He or she must therefore answer questions for his or her predecessors, who are assumed, in non-criminal ma ers, to have acted institutionally and not personally. Deputy ministers are given an opportunity to obtain more information about the reasons they have been invited to appear and the subjects that will be discussed. They can expect commi ees to act within their mandates. Subsection 16.4 of the Financial Administration Act spells out the management responsibilities for which accounting officers are accountable: (a) the measures taken to organize the resources of the department to deliver departmental programs in compliance with government policies and procedures; (b) the measures taken to maintain effective systems of internal control in the department; (c) the signing of the accounts that are required to be kept for the preparation of the Public Accounts pursuant to section 64; and

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(d) the performance of other specific duties assigned to him or her by or under this or any other Act in relation to the administration of the department. However, there are some general restrictions: the deputy minister may be summoned only with reasonable advance notice and with reasonable frequency. There are also specific restrictions on the subjects that may be dealt with: DMs cannot disclose confidential information, even if they are called by a commi ee. Confidential information includes: • Cabinet confidences; • advice to Ministers; • actions or policies that are under consideration but not in the public realm; • disagreements between Ministers and officials (including those that may have been the subject of the formal resolution process); and • ma ers pertaining to individual cases or persons, such as human resource ma ers (Canada, Privy Council Office 2011). The rule against disclosing confidential information applies even when that information relates to management issues. The limitations also bear on the responses expected of the accounting officer during appearances before a commi ee: he or she can ask to be excused from answering certain questions and may refer some requests to the minister. On all subjects, the deputy minister’s contribution to the commi ee’s work is limited to providing information and explanations; it is not the DM’s job to debate the appropriateness of programs and policies or to defend them. Limitations also apply to preparations for an appearance: the deputy minister must inform the minister that he or she has been summoned to appear and discuss how to handle the questions and present the information, verbally and in writing. As deputy ministers are not accountable to Parliament but before Parliament, and as there is no direct line of authority between them and Parliament, they can never be sanctioned by Parliament or by a commi ee of Parliament. Responsibility for the DM’s actions continues to rest with the minister under the principle of ministerial responsibility. Deputy ministers testify during discussion of the budget both as deputy heads and as accounting officers. They may appear before the House commi ee that deals with their department, the Public Finance

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Commi ee, or the Government Operations Commi ee. They may appear following the tabling of reports from officers of Parliament, such as the president of the PSC, the commissioner of official languages, or the auditor general. Figure 13.1. The Deputy Minister’s Work – The Ins and Outs In

Information from: Internal sources Peers PCO Media

Pressure: Groups Clients Central agencies Parliamentary committees

What the DM does

Out

Harness knowledge and regulate

DM’s typical external output

Select, validate, transform

Decide orientations and develop strategies

Issue work instructions

Filter internal output Decide communication approaches and issue messages

Requests: PMO PCO Central agencies Internal Officers of Parliament

Launch discussion

Plans and comments: Internal Groups

Survey stakeholders to exert influence and initiate action

Attend committee meetings Provide information/ answers Authorize proposals

“Heads up” questions: Parliament Media Groups Clients:

Analyse administrative situations

Make management decisions

To/from: minister, PM, Cabinet, central agencies, parliamentary committees, officers of Parliament, groups, employees, peers

376 Jacques Bourgault

Ultimately, the new legislation does not diminish the minister’s obligation to exercise administrative vigilance: the minister’s duty of oversight requires him or her to ensure that the DM is properly performing duties as both deputy head and accounting officer. Relations with Ministers The deputy minister’s work is determined, first and foremost, by his or her relationship with the minister, which has two main dimensions: relations with the minister personally and with the minister’s staff. Personal Relations Like all relations between co-workers, the relationship between the minister and the deputy minister is coloured by each individual’s personality and also their mutual compatibility. Some ministers have a command-style approach while others are more flexible. Theoretically, DMs should adjust to each minister’s personality. The DM’s main job is to advise the minister on all ma ers. The first thing a minister needs to do is to set an agenda for the department. When they arrive, ministers may already have one in mind, or they may seek help in developing one. Currently, the minister also receives an annual mandate le er from the prime minister. The minister generally invites the DM to a weekly meeting to review progress on the files on which the department is working. At this meeting, they take stock of the work that is under way, look at problems that arose during the week, and look ahead to the challenges and opportunities of the coming week. This system may vary, depending on factors such as the type of department, the minister’s personality, the distance from the minister’s riding, the parliamentary calendar, and current events and crises. The DM also meets with the minister as necessary, which can sometimes mean several times per day. There are different types of meetings, and meetings can become more frequent when there are priority political files (e.g., the budget speech), questions discussed in Parliament, the dra ing of strategic documents, or crisis management to be dealt with. Ménage à Trois: The Minister’s Staff The relationship between the deputy minister and the minister office, which is made up of fi een to forty partisan political staffers,3 can

Federal Deputy Ministers 377

create problems for operations and relations with the bureaucracy. The minister’s office is responsible for the minister’s schedule, public image, and relations with other political actors. It helps the minister prepare speeches, and it comments on documents and suggestions from the department. Its role is to support the political agenda of the minister and the government, whereas the deputy minister takes a longer view and analyses the impact of decisions from various angles, including the public interest and the country’s long-term interests. Ministers are also concerned with the public interest, but they tend to focus more on the voting public and their prospects for re-election. The minister’s chief of staff is not supposed to interfere in relations between the minister and the DM. Judge Gomery criticized ministerial staff for their involvement in the daily departmental operations (Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities [Gomery] 2006, recommendation 11). The difficulty of strictly applying Judge Gomery’s recommendation in real life is well known. Deputy ministers’ relations with the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) have become fraught. For one thing, the PMO has grown much more powerful than it once was. In the hierarchy, the PMO is above the ministers’ offices (Tellier 1972). Moreover, the PMO assumes special mandates that sometimes intrude on departmental turf. Finally, some staffers in the PMO may, rightly or wrongly, distrust a given minister, minister’s chief of staff, or deputy minister, prompting them to intervene more strongly in that department’s affairs. Deputy ministers say they sometimes have more problems with the PMO than with the office of their own minister. For example, according to a Toronto newspaper, a PMO staffer told an assistant deputy minister with responsibility for the government’s economic recovery program, “We don’t want your advice; we want you to do as you’re told” (Ivison 2009). The same newspaper reported that the PMO was responsible for the retirement of Clerk of the Privy Council Kevin Lynch and Deputy Minister of Infrastructure Louis Ranger. The breakneck stimulus program entails the same risks as those that spawned the sponsorship scandal: DMs are being pushed to spend the money quickly while making sure that financial management rules are followed. Which is worse: for their heads to roll today for the crime of administrative delays or for their reputation to be sullied later when the auditor general reports they were too willing to yield to political pressure?

378 Jacques Bourgault

Disagreements The DM’s role is generally to help the minister understand the ins and outs of departmental policies. Deputy ministers make specific recommendations and draw the minister’s a ention to particular aspects of the file or available options. The final decision on all policy issues is up to the minister, who is answerable before the House of Commons, the seat of democratic power. When it comes to questions of management, and particularly the four areas listed in section 259 of the Accountability Act (which amended the Financial Administration Act by adding subsection 16.4), DMs have the impression that they are in a stronger position to prevent the minister from interfering and micromanaging the department’s resources: a er all, as DMs, they are the ones who are answerable before parliamentary commi ees. As a rule, deputy ministers say they will talk to the clerk of the Privy Council or the deputy if they feel a minister’s behaviour is “dangerous” and the minister refuses to listen to them. The first step in expressing a disagreement is to note it on the decision document (e.g., a grant award). For subjects listed in subsection 16.4 of the Financial Administration Act that involve interpretation or application of a policy, directive, or standard issued by the Treasury Board, a specific process for handling disagreements is provided in subsection 16.5 of the Financial Administration Act: (a) a difference of opinion between the minister and the DM is observed; (b) the DM asks the Secretary of the Treasury Board for guidance by se ing out the issue in a clear and balanced manner in a le er, with a copy to the minister. At this stage, it is hoped that the response will be acceptable to all parties. (c) if the issue remains unresolved, the minister refers it to the Treasury Board by means of an official submission. A copy of the Treasury Board’s decision is sent to the Auditor General as a confidential document from the Queen’s Privy Council, although the difference of opinion that gave rise to the process is confidential. Problem situations are generally se led between the clerk of the Privy Council and the PM or his or her chief of staff. In the long run,

Federal Deputy Ministers 379

going the formal dispute se lement route can damage the ability of the minister and the DM to coexist. The Challenge of Multiple Accountability Deputy ministers are answerable to many parties. Not only are they accountable to Parliament, as discussed above, but they report to different segments of the executive. Numerous parties assign powers to them, and in exchange they must report to the prime minister, the minister, the clerk of the Privy Council, and the central agencies. Other parties require accountability on the basis of their specific mandates: Parliament, some officers of Parliament, and government agencies. Finally, DMs report, in the normal course of their duties, to the minister, their peers, their employees, and various players and service recipients. Clearly these varieties of accountability are not all of the same nature and do not have the same implications. The difficulty lies in the fact that a single action, in its various dimensions, can trigger a series of simultaneous accountability requirements to different parties with sometimes divergent points of view. The DM’s challenge is to meet the objectives and standards of all these actors, and then report to all of them in accordance with their specific concerns. When it comes to their accountability to the prime minister, who selects and recommends them for appointment and approves their performance appraisals, the expectation is that DMs will serve the government by supporting the minister of the department to which they have been assigned. They are accountable for the assistance provided to the minister, for implementation of the government’s agenda, and for the specific mandates entrusted to them by the prime minister or Cabinet. In view of their role in collective management of the government’s affairs, DMs are also answerable to the prime minister for implementation of Cabinet policies as a whole. As well, they are expected to ensure that appropriate interdepartmental consultations are held when an issue concerns more than one department. The most frequent reporting requirement for deputy ministers is to the minister, whom the DM supports in the performance of all his or her responsibilities. The legislation stipulates that the DM works, first and foremost, under the authority of the minister and in accordance with the law. There are, however, choices of appropriateness to be made, and the minister remains responsible for the choices he or she makes in this area, with or despite the DM’s advice. Deputy ministers act for their

380 Jacques Bourgault

minister, exercising the minister’s statutory powers on the minister’s behalf, and playing the role of manager, administrator, and controller of the department’s financial, human, and other resources. Deputy ministers are responsible for effective management of their department. It is up to them to tackle problems head-on and to improve management practices within the department when necessary. They are also accountable to their minister on these ma ers (Canada, Privy Council Office 2003, 16–18). Deputy ministers prepare a report on plans and priorities for the minister to accompany the budget submission in order to justify the allocation of credits to the department. Eight to ten months later, a performance report is submi ed for the fiscal year that ended with the budget submission. Deputy ministers report to the clerk mainly on three types of mandates. The most personal accountability of the DM involves generic performance expectations (e.g., the Management Accountability Framework) and appraisal; the clerk recommends a performance rating and performance award to the prime minister. Second, in recent years, the clerk’s priorities have generally expressed the government’s agenda in policy and administrative terms; these o en complement the ministers’ annual mandates and form part of the DM’s performance agreement. Finally, the clerk of the Privy Council may, from time to time, issue special instructions or mandates to DMs, such as championing a pan-governmental issue or piloting a particular file. The central agencies’ standards spell out, in government directives, the trade-off for management authorizations. Deputy ministers are accountable for their use of the powers entrusted to them by the central agencies; for example, they must comply with the requirements of central agencies such as the Treasury Board and the Public Service Commission on human and financial resources and public property. This accountability is formally expressed through periodic and annual reports, audits, and investigations, as well as answers to questions posed by central agencies. The DM is responsible for instituting measures to ensure an internal audit capacity appropriate to the needs of the department and for establishing an audit commi ee for the department (Accountability Act of 2006, section 261, which amended the Financial Administration Act by adding subsections 16.1 and 16.2).

Federal Deputy Ministers 381

Profile of Deputy Ministers in the Canadian Federal Government As we have noted, Canadian deputy ministers display a low level of political partisanship. Candidates are not selected on the basis of party membership or political connections. Those types of appointments have been almost non-existent for the past fi y years: of 225 DMs appointed since 1967, 2 have been friends of a prime minister and both were qualified for the position. It was also rumoured that Chrétien appointed a deputy minister against the advice of the clerk of the Privy Council. On the other hand, a number of DMs became ministers a er their civil service careers, in most cases in Liberal governments, making the community suspect in the eyes of the Conservatives. In this section, we will look at the other dimensions of the DMs’ profile: socioeconomic factors, qualifications, and career. Socio-economic Profile of Deputy Ministers In June 2008, there were thirty-three federal deputy ministers. They had an average age of just under fi y-four, making them a relatively young group. Women had almost reached parity with men, constituting 42 per cent of the group. Significant progress has therefore been made since the first female deputy minister was appointed in 1974. The geographic origin of deputy ministers roughly matched the distribution of Canada’s population, with ten from Ontario, ten from Quebec, eight from western Canada, two from the Maritimes, and three from outside Canada. If we look at the trend over time (see table 13.1), we find that it does not entirely correspond to changes in the relative political and economic weight of the regions: Quebec is slightly overrepresented and Ontario under-represented, the former for political reasons and the la er because some of its representatives departed for the private sector. Francophones were well represented in 2008: 60 per cent of deputy ministers were native English speakers, 31 per cent were native French speakers, and 9 per cent spoke another mother tongue. From Confederation until a er the Second World War, only 15 per cent of DMs were francophones. The figure subsequently fluctuated between 23 and 32 per cent, and then peaked at 40 per cent between 1997 and 2003.

382 Jacques Bourgault Table 13.1. Deputy Ministers, by Region of Birth Period

Maritimes Quebec Ontario West Outside Canada Number of DMs

1867–1917

1917–47

1947–67 1967–77

1977–87

1987–97 1997–2003 2008

11% 33% 30% 0% 27%

11% 20% 48% 10% 11%

5% 28% 28% 31% 9%

9% 21% 28% 33% 9%

2% 37% 36% 15% 10%

9% 25% 38% 21% 7%

4% 33% 33% 15% 15%

6% 30% 30% 25% 9%

75

67

62

49

60

56

27

33

In Canada today, deputy ministers typically have experience coupled with a master’s degree rather than a PhD. In 2008, 12 per cent had a doctorate, 64 per cent a master’s degree, and 21 per cent an undergraduate degree; one DM did not have a university degree (see table 13.2). Their educational profile reflects their career trajectory: DMs are generally hired for a professional position, work their way up, and earn an MBA or a master’s in public administration as their career progresses. In this sense, the senior civil service is no longer seeking specialists at this level of responsibility but rather discriminating managers who can effectively draw together the knowledge provided by the department’s experts. In 2008, almost half the DMs (fourteen out of thirty-three) had a multidisciplinary university education, 53 per cent had a social science background (in economics, political science, history, sociology, or geography), and 67 per cent had studied management. Fewer had a legal background than in the 1960s: 24 per cent had completed a law degree. Finally, 6 per cent of DMs had a degree in pure science. Most deputy ministers (67 per cent) had graduated from an Ontario university, 39 per cent had studied in Quebec, 21 per cent in western Canada, and 6 per cent in the Maritimes. Our previous research has found that the educational breakdown by province follows the same pa ern as region of birth. Only 24 per cent had a degree from a foreign university, fewer than in the 1970s, reflecting the increased availability of training in Canada.

Federal Deputy Ministers 383 Table 13.2. Highest University Degree Attained Period 1867–1917 1917–47 1947–67 1967–77 1977–87 1987–97 1997–2003 2008 None 65% Undergraduate 27% Master’s 7% PhD 1% Number of DMs 75 No info 0 Response rate 100% (Info/Total DMs)

39% 44% 8% 9% 67 3 96%

9% 53% 22% 16% 62 4 94%

7% 35% 47% 12% 49 6 86%

3% 32% 34% 30% 60 1 98%

4% 50% 25% 21% 56 0 100%

0% 37% 48% 15% 27 0 100%

3% 21% 64% 12% 33 0 100%

Career Profile of Deputy Ministers The thirty-three DMs as of 30 April 2008 had been in their positions for an average of 2.5 years: 15.2 per cent had been on the job for less than a year, 30.3 per cent for between one and two years, 24.2 per cent between two and three years, 18.2 per cent between three and five years, 9.1 per cent between five and seven years, and 3 per cent for more than seven years (see table 13.3). As the table shows, the number of years spent in the same position has decreased dramatically. The same trend can be seen in the private sector. It reflects the fast-paced increase in the level of difficulty of the work. In 140 years, the time spent in the position has decreased from 12 years to 2.5 years, and the number of years at the DM level from 13.3 to 5. Some consider the duration of deputy minister assignments too short. By the time reforms or projects have been instituted, the DM is no longer there to answer for the results. It takes more than a year to become familiar with the department’s operations and become part of the community’s networks of influence. Increasingly, a DM’s career is do ed with transfers: 39 per cent had previously been DMs in one or more other departments, having spent an average of five years at the deputy minister level. Deputy ministers learn the ropes gradually, on the job. All had some prior experience as an assistant or associate deputy minister. While twenty-one of the DMs of 2008 had no experience at the DM level when

Table 13.3. Number of Years as Deputy Minister and in the Same Position Period

At DM level In same position Number of DMs Responses No info

1867–1917

1917–1947

1947–1967

1967–1977

1977–1987

1987–1997

1997–2003

2008

13.3 years 12.2 years

9.5 years 8.7 years

7.2 years 5.9 years

6.8 years 4.1 years

6 years 2.3 years

6.76 years 4 years

3.2 years 3.3 years

5 years 2.5 years

75

67

62

49

60

56

27

33

75 0

67 0

62 0

48 1

56 4

40 16

5 22

33 0

Federal Deputy Ministers 385

they were appointed, they had been prepared for the position by serving as assistant deputy ministers and then associate deputy ministers for an average of 3.5 years. Candidates for DM had two common traits in their backgrounds: they had occupied staff-line and assistant/associate DM positions, and they had served in one or more positions at the key central agencies, particularly the Privy Council Office. In 2008, none of the DMs came from the private sector. We can think of only two such cases in the past thirty years, both of whom came from the banking industry. One was a friend of Brian Mulroney’s and the other le a lucrative position as a bank vice-president to reorganize a department that was the target of harsh criticism. Some of the DMs had previous experience with a provincial government or a major civil society organization during the five years preceding their appointment. The deputy ministers of 2008 had an average of twenty years of public sector experience. Since 1867, the number of years in the public sector prior to first appointment to a DM position has ranged between 19 (1887–1997) and 26 (1997–2003) (see table 13.4). In this respect, the 2008 group was close to the historic average. All had spent between three and five of those years as an assistant or associate deputy minister prior to appointment. Career Progression within the Deputy Minister Group As of April 2008, only one incumbent had been in a deputy ministerlevel position for less than a year, two for less than 2 years, two for less than 3 years, three for 3 to 7 years, and four for more than 7 years. The Figure 13.2. Destinations of Deputy Ministers, February 2006 to January 2009 Departures from DM positions N =17

Departure from federal civil service n=4

Retirement / death n=3

Departure to other position in federal civil service n =13

Private sector n =1

Agency n=5

Demotion within civil service n=1

Transfer to another DM posting n=7

386 Jacques Bourgault Table 13.4. Average Number of Years in Civil Service Prior to First Appointment Period 1867–1917 1917–47 1947–67 1967–77 1977–87 1987–97 1997–2003 2008 In civil service Number of DMs Responses No info

21 years 75 48 27

20 years 67 48 19

22 years 62 53 9

20 years 49 37 12

20 years 60 56 4

19 years 56 54 2

26 years 27 26 1

20 years 33 33 0

DM with the most experience had 10.5 years at that level. Some had served as DM in as many as four different departments. The most longlived mandarins put in 12 to 15 years as deputy ministers. Figures 13.2 and 13.3, along with table 13.5, show the extent to which DMs were drawn from the civil service and continued their careers within the civil service a er serving as DM. It is noteworthy that during the period covered there was a change in the governing party; the election of the Conservatives on 23 January 2006 might have been expected to produce large-scale personnel changes. In fact, the firings and hirings did not take place; it was business as usual. Assignments at the deputy minister level tend to follow a typical career progression pa ern. DMs move up to assignments of greater scope, entailing tougher challenges. A DM starts at the first level (in a department that is small or a racts li le media a ention) and then may rise through progressively larger departments (e.g., from Veterans Affairs to Environment, then Transport, and finally Health). The compensation structure for deputy ministers reflects four distinct levels of responsibility. Deputy Ministers’ Organizational Leadership Up to the 1970s, deputy ministers’ ability to lead was rooted in their aura as gurus in a particular field, acquired in the course of years spent in the same department; the DM was the expert. Hierarchical authority, as practised at the time, and the high value a ached to respect for the law, rules, and standards, were also factors. Modern management has ushered in a new leadership style. A series of studies conducted in 2001 and 2009 found that the DM is expected to anticipate challenges, show intellectual initiative in

Federal Deputy Ministers 387 Table 13.5. Overview – Departures and Destinations after February 2006

Retired Deceased To agency Same level in civil service Demotion within civil service To private sector Total

Within 6 months

Within 12 months

Within 24 months

Within 27 months

1 1 1 5 1 0 9

1 1 1 6 1 1 11

2 1 2 7 1 1 14

2 1 4 8 1 1 17

Figure 13.3. Origins of Deputy Ministers Appointed February 2006 to January 2009 Changes N = 18

From inside civil service n = 17

Departments n = 12

Vertical promotions n=7

From outside civil service n=1

Agencies n=5

Diagonal promotions n=4

Private sector n=1

Other n=0

Transfers n=6

discussions of the issues facing the department, and work closely with central and regional units. The key leadership competency framework from 2005 called for DMs to frame a vision for the department and the team at different levels, to understand and find solutions for problems that arise, and to be proactive; they should demonstrate strategic thinking, passion, and vision, focus on self-realization, be people-oriented and able to influence others. They should lead by inspiring and galvanizing

388 Jacques Bourgault

employees, care about people, manage by values more than rules, and practise result-based rather than compliance-based management, even if it entails risk-taking (Canada, Privy Council Office 2003). The survey of Canadian deputy ministers asked them to give practical examples of their leadership as DMs. The situations in which the DMs reported exercising leadership fell into four categories: change leadership, risk leadership, day-to-day leadership, and external leadership (Bourgault 2003). These categories were established on the basis of the characteristics that deputy ministers most o en highlighted in their stories and comments about the examples provided. The categories may overlap. For example, change leadership o en demands courage, involves risk-taking, and cannot succeed without day-to-day support. Change leadership refers to openness to new ideas and the ability to stimulate change and commitment at all levels of the organization. This dimension of leadership rests on five characteristics: perceptiveness/ vision, determination to make the necessary organizational changes, readiness to champion a cause or project, commitment to steering files, and hands-on engagement. The deputy minister applies his or her vision to set priorities and show employees where the department is headed. Those priorities are set out in a strategic plan that guides the individual priorities and actions of each employee. It is important for employees to commit to the process, and the DM must encourage them to take ownership. Leading organizational change consists of refashioning established structures, processes, approaches, and culture: the DM becomes personally involved in explaining the meaning of the changes and makes it a personal commitment as leader. Championing a cause or a project entails total personal commitment by the DM. The DM sets an example, delivers speeches, launches and backs initiatives, sets expectations for subordinates, and ensures they meet them. Steering files means taking charge of the ma er personally and organizing the team’s work around the DM’s own efforts. Hands-on engagement means being on the front lines of hot issues: taking the initiative, listening, taking the field early in the game and supporting the front-line troops. Risk leadership, taking the lead in risk-taking, courage, and boldness, is part of the deputy minister’s line responsibility. The DM is at the top of the pyramid: if situations in the organization have been ignored, tough decisions that have been bumped up the command chain, there is no one higher up to whom the buck can be passed, and it is up to the leader to take the heat. Deputy ministers consult, but ultimately

Federal Deputy Ministers 389

they make the decision, knowing it will not be popular with everyone. Easy decisions rarely make it to the deputy minister’s desk; they are dealt with in the normal course of events. Decisions that involve strategic change, reforms that alter ingrained habits, and approaches that challenge ways of doing things are more difficult. They clash with established interests, create discomfort and insecurity, and demand greater effort and original approaches. Another type of difficult decision involves risk-taking necessitated by the nature of the file: in the face of contradictory opinions and aggressive pressure, a decision has to be made. Some people are worried and frustrated. The deputy minister does not run for cover but instead makes the decision. Five types of situations were mentioned: going against established standards; becoming personally involved in decisions and doing what it takes to get the job done; making thankless decisions; providing leadership during crisis, which demands keeping a cool head in order to make the necessary decisions; and recognizing and learning from mistakes, which means not denying them but rather concentrating on the lessons and the conditions for success. Day-to-day leadership directly addresses employees and managers: it inspires their trust and motivates them to behave as desired. Four dimensions of the day-to-day leader’s role emerge from the examples provided: the front man, the supportive leader, the leader in the trenches, and the unifying leader. Being a front man requires awareness of the way others see the leader. Supportive leadership for risktaking means spurring employees to take risks, even if it can lead to mistakes. The leader is close to employees, supporting them on the ground. To be a leader in the trenches, the deputy minister must be personally involved in all significant events at all levels of the organization. Unifying leadership maintains the cohesiveness of the management team in the midst of major changes and crises in the organization. External leadership refers to the deputy minister’s involvement in the civil and political arenas, in relation to peers or internationally. It is leadership outside the department, although not necessarily alien to departmental concerns. With the development of various forms of horizontal management involving several federal institutions, other levels of government, civil society, other countries, and international organizations, this type of leadership will become increasingly important. These partners’ actions or inaction will have an impact on the agendas of Canadian federal departments, which is why Canadian deputy ministers must lead on this front.

390 Jacques Bourgault

Effect of Corporate Management Over the years, Canada has developed close coordination at the upper echelons of the apparatus of state, making it easier to factor the general interest into decision-making and supporting effective communication at the top levels of the civil service. Corporate management gets decision-makers to put the broader governmental perspective ahead of their particular department’s point of view. Deputy ministers, assistant deputy ministers, and associate deputy ministers belong to the government, not to the department to which they are assigned: their professional community is horizontal, not vertical. Individuals, mandates, and duties must be integrated into a cross-governmental perspective. Corporate management is supported by three sets of processes within the federal government. First, the individuals who will occupy the position are groomed and selected. This happens throughout the person’s career through training, monitoring, postings to diverse assignments, and successive screening. The pervasive corporate culture influences DMs’ socialization, selection criteria, and training throughout their careers. New deputy ministers also need orientation and, if need be, induction into the DM circle of influence. The second type of process is based on the mandate le ers and management frameworks that describe what is expected of deputy ministers and how they will be evaluated. These le ers reflect the priorities of the government, the prime minister, the clerk of the Privy Council, the minister, and the DM. The third component of corporate management is made up of collective processes. Much of the deputy minister’s work is done as part of a group. Group meetings are held regularly: weekly information breakfasts, biweekly discussion lunches, quarterly retreats, and commi ees of deputy ministers, the number of which can range from ten to nineteen and whose meetings can range from twice a week to twice a year. Finally, DMs take part in collective learning activities, professional events, and social events. According to our 2003 survey, DMs spend an average of 37 per cent of their time on horizontal management, and they feel satisfied with this situation. These processes demand the active involvement of a central agency, the Privy Council Office. Its Senior Personnel Secretariat plays a role in DM selection, appointment, and evaluation. Other secretariats support

Federal Deputy Ministers 391

the commi ees, and the deputy clerk of the Privy Council is always available to provide the deputy ministers with support. Through corporate management, DMs unite their department to the “centre” and transmit inflows from the centre to the department. The centre’s decisions are based on the departments’ studies and opinions. In the view of participants in the system, the trend towards more modern corporate management has more advantages than disadvantages. Canadian deputy ministers form a functional and coherent community with a strong sense of identity. Some observers fear the formation of an alternate centre of power that will reduce ministers to stooges, but the record of Conservative governments shows that politicians are perfectly capable of taming the system. Others see a danger of loss of efficiency due to multiple meetings outside the department. In Governing from the Centre (1999), Donald Savoie criticizes this approach, calling it “court management.” It would rather appear that, given the conditions under which DMs operate, they can achieve nothing without the simultaneous support of the centre and the department. When the question was put directly in 2003, none of the DMs said they wanted to go back to the way things were, despite the constraints created by corporate management. Privy Council Office The clerk of the Privy Council is the head of the civil service and the prime minister’s general secretary. The clerk advises the prime minister in all of the PM’s prerogative areas (e.g., appointments, hirings, classifications, salaries, separations, promotions, appraisals, etc.) and provides support for the prime minister, notably to identify the subjects on which expectations might be expressed. Until the late 1960s, the clerk was regarded as one of the deputy ministers, one who was assigned some specialized duties, was in daily contact with the PM, and was potentially influential (Osbaldeston 1989). With the increasingly complex system of commi ees and the clerk’s growing role, due to the concentration of executive power in the modern world, the clerk has come to be regarded as the government’s top civil servant (Tellier 1972). In 1992, a legislative amendment made the clerk the head of the Public Service and responsible for its development; the clerk was required to provide an annual report to the prime

392 Jacques Bourgault

minister on this subject (Bourgault 2005, 21). The leadership of the clerk of the Privy Council is essential for the smooth operation of the deputy minister community. The leader of this community strives to forge a shared perspective, serve as facilitator, offer personal support, protect the integrity of management systems, and see to periodic review of those systems. As of 2009, the PCO had nineteen secretariats supporting the work of the clerk. Most were headed by a deputy secretary with deputy minister rank. Horizontal Management: Commi ees and Group Meetings Horizontal management in the deputy minister community is conducted through bilateral and multilateral commi ees, commi ees of the whole, and specific processes developed for the operation of the DM group. Deputy ministers come together in some fi een DM commi ees and ad hoc commi ees; some meet a few times a week and others a few times a year. The commi ees serve to exchange information and discuss approaches to shared files in order to foster improved collaboration. The deputy minister community also goes on several oneor two-day retreats every year. Each clerk of the Privy Council brings to this system the scope and pace he or she deems appropriate, depending on personal style and the prevailing political and administrative circumstances, although some commi ees, such as the Coordinating Commi ee of Deputy Ministers (CCDM) and the Commi ee of Senior Officials (COSO), are more permanent. Every Wednesday morning, all the deputy ministers and the clerk of the Privy Council gather for breakfast from 8:00 to 9:00 to be informed of and discuss operational issues. In 2009, the CCDM met every Wednesday over lunch to discuss ma ers of public policy, management, and the agenda. A er lunch, the Treasury Board Secretariat Advisory Commi ee, made up of ten to twelve DMs, met once a month to discuss and provide informed advice on the projects being contemplated by Treasury Board officers. Also a er the Wednesday lunch, the COSO, made up of approximately twelve DMs, met an average of once every three weeks to provide advice on policies related to deputy ministers. COSO has come to play a strategic role in the development of the civil service, dealing with succession planning, DMs’ conditions of employment, and performance appraisal.

Federal Deputy Ministers 393

Corporate Plan Every government has an agenda it wants to implement, o en based on the program on which it was elected. Deputy ministers must bring their department’s actions into line with the government’s agenda, and corporate management processes serve this end. The corporate agenda influences the mandate le ers that DMs receive and therefore the annual departmental planning processes. The array of deputy ministers’ commi ees supports implementation of this corporate agenda. At the political level, ministers also contribute to the corporate management process. There are similar mechanisms for ministers, with five to twelve sectoral commi ees established by the prime minister. The minister, his or her chief of staff, and the department’s senior officials hold weekly meetings to ensure they are on the same page. performance and appraisal Individual performance appraisals of deputy ministers consider three factors: policies, management, and special mandates. The process has three goals: to promote excellent performance by se ing clear and rigorous objectives; to recognize and encourage good results and identify areas for improvement; and to provide a policy framework within which a fair and consistent performance management approach can be applied (Canada, Privy Council Office 2008). Since 1968, performance appraisal of deputy ministers has been carried out by COSO, which is made up of a dozen DMs and chaired by the clerk of the Privy Council. Practices have changed over time: in 1990, the process was applied to the thirty most important DMs; today, the number has grown to ninety. The commi ee begins by considering the comments of a “visiting commi ee,” which meets with the minister and receives reports from the central agencies. Currently, the visiting commi ee is made up of former deputy ministers. The commi ee reviews all the comments received and makes its own observations on each deputy minister’s performance. COSO is responsible for measuring each DM’s performance level and providing feedback in writing. The assessment is then recommended to the clerk of the Privy Council, who makes a recommendation to the prime minister. Subject to the clerk’s interest and availability, the clerk and the deputy secretary to the Cabinet meet with all the DMs to give them structured feedback (strong points and weak points, suggestions for improvement). The clerk of the

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Privy Council informs the prime minister of the appraisals, and the PM makes the final decision. This process helps create solidarity in the DM group and encourages DMs to consult with their peers throughout the year, as failure to maintain strong relations with them could lead to a more negative appraisal of their performance. The mandate le ers introduced in 1999 included clearly defined objectives: long-term corporate and management objectives, and specific corporate and departmental targets. The deputy minister’s bonus, which is based on achievement of these objectives, has become much more than a token, increasing over time from 5 per cent of a relatively modest salary to 25 per cent of a substantial salary. Today, the deputy ministers’ mandate le ers are harmonized with the ministers’ mandate le ers; they include an annual agreement se ing concrete goals and a rigorous, quantitative, transparent appraisal process. The agreement (with the clerk of the Privy Council, in the case of deputy ministers) spells out the expectations for the period in question. The mandate le er covers three categories of results: 1. The results of policies and programs established under the organization’s activity plans, in accordance with the government’s broad objectives; 2. Management results as defined in the Treasury Board Secretariat’s Management Accountability Framework, particularly with respect to human resource management; 3. Leadership results based on senior civil servants’ leadership competencies (values and ethics, strategic thinking, dedication, commitment to excellence) and special mandates assigned by the clerk of the Privy Council. Two criticisms were levelled against this system. First, the foundations of the performance appraisal process can never be perfect. Departments face different challenges, and the appraisal does not necessarily take into account the different degrees of difficulty when analysing performance. It can also be difficult to give due credit to new, experienced DMs in comparison with those who have been on the job for years and already receive more generous compensation. At the same time, the list of criteria set out in the Management Accountability Framework and each DM’s specific commitments can give rise to confusion when

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it comes to weighing all factors to be taken into consideration in the appraisal. The second criticism relates to the provision of appropriate feedback to deputy ministers. During the 1990s, the clerk of the Privy Council and the associate secretary general began holding individual meetings with each DM about the performance appraisals. The practice proved useful for supporting professional learning by DMs. However, at the time, the Commi ee of Senior Officials was allowed to apprise DMs of its deliberations but was under no formal obligation to discuss them with the DMs or provide explanations. Some deputy ministers were disappointed to receive their appraisal in the mail. Today, there is still a more formal process for delivering the appraisals, but the commi ee’s deliberations are always discussed with the DM. Consequences of the Performance Appraisal Process The performance appraisal process has produced three classes of consequences: financial, professional, and functional. The financial consequences consist of pay increases within the deputy minister salary range and results-based bonuses. This system is consistent with the recommendations of the advisory commi ee on senior civil servant retention and compensation, made up of executives from the private sector and major organizations. The commi ee was overhauled in 1997 to provide independent advice on compensation and human resources management for senior civil servants.4 In 1998, the government introduced a new compensation plan for deputy ministers and associate deputy ministers made up of two components: a base salary and performance-based pay consisting of a variable amount that must be earned each year, in addition to a bonus for DMs who exceed expectations. A er further changes in 2005, the compensation system looked like this in 2008: • economic increase: a percentage of base salary, generally tied to the achievement of official targets (except if there were none); • in-range increase: earned if goals were achieved; worth approximately 5 per cent per year; • at-risk pay: an annual lump sum not included in base salary, with the percentage dependant on success in the achievement of objectives;

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• bonus: a lump sum over and above at-risk pay, based on exceeding objectives. When targets are achieved, the bonus can be as much as 35 per cent of base salary (as of 2008). The bonus is definitely not automatic: performance is plo ed on a bell curve, and a deputy minister who is in the bo om 5 per cent receives neither a bonus nor an in-range increase. The bonuses are a loaded issue, creating enormous public image problems and a racting predictable criticisms from the unions and the media; people don’t want managers in the civil service to be well paid! The second consequence relates to career development: the deputy minister may be kept in his or her position or assigned new challenges in a department with a higher degree of difficulty. The third consequence of performance appraisal is more functional, insofar as conclusions are drawn about the deputy minister: excels in this or that type of situation, needs support in this area. Deputy ministers may be placed “under watch,” and a second mediocre appraisal could end their days in the DM community. COSO will pay special a ention to any negative comments in the reports from the central agencies. Deputy ministers exercise various powers delegated by the central agencies, and these may be temporarily or partially revoked. The performance appraisal reinforces four aspects of the DM’s role: pursuit of the government’s priorities, in keeping with the corporate plans and mandate le ers; a ention to the quality of management through the application of modern, results-based management, which is more flexible and motivational; leadership that galvanizes employees and peers; and recognition of each DM’s contribution to the government’s corporate life. Outlook: Ongoing Development of Public Management in Canada The government o en formulates contradictory objectives. In public management, the government needs to balance administrative rigour with the need for flexibility. As a result of certain political (not administrative) scandals, such as the sponsorship scandal, the empowerment approaches introduced by the New Public Management have been tightened up. Today, risk management is part of the Treasury Board management framework, and deputy ministers must include it in their management practices.

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Deputy ministers operate within a framework that reflects the increased pressure for transparency, particularly since the adoption of the Accountability Act (2006). For example, civil servants are now protected by whistle-blower legislation that encourages them to report wrongful acts commi ed by higher-ups. As well, the Financial Administration Act stipulates that the deputy minister “is responsible for ensuring an internal audit capacity appropriate to the needs of the department” (subsection 16.1). With the amendments to the Financial Administration Act, deputy ministers have become accountable before parliamentary commi ees, “within the framework of the appropriate minister’s responsibilities and his or her accountability to Parliament,” for: (a) the measures taken to organize the resources of the department to deliver departmental programs in compliance with government policies and procedures; (b) the measures taken to maintain effective systems of internal control in the department; (c) the signing of the accounts that are required to be kept for the preparation of the Public Accounts pursuant to section 64; and (d) the performance of other specific duties assigned to him or her by or under this or any other Act in relation to the administration of the department (Financial Administration Act, paragraph 16.4.1). Parliament seems to have wanted to institute more direct accountability without changing the basic principle of ministerial responsibility. Finally, the legislation now requires a five-year review of the appropriateness and effectiveness of all programs (Federal Accountability Act, section 260). In these times, DMs must operate in the media spotlight: all-news channels and the Internet have increased the amount of information available, controversies abound, and dealing with hot-bu on issues takes up a growing portion of managers’ time. Deputy ministers must strive to keep minor issues from garnering excessive media a ention. Response time and the quality of the response are decisive factors in the political environment in which ministers work. Globalization has made the deputy minister’s work more demanding. DMs no longer control the flow of information; interest groups and

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businesses are able to use technology to circumvent rules and policies (free circulation of capital is an example) and can easily gain a bargaining advantage. Deputy ministers must therefore be a entive to these considerations in their department. Canada has seen a series of minority governments since 2004. The risk that the government might fall, triggering new elections, has two impacts on the deputy minister’s work: rising tensions in the minister– deputy minister relationship due to declining trust, and greater government reluctance to embrace an ambitious agenda because of fear of controversy. The government focuses on a limited number of lowrisk projects and is less concerned with the long-term public interest. Deputy ministers who want to see important long-term projects developed may grow frustrated. Because of all these demands, deputy ministers can become overloaded and require considerable support from their organization. The DM must therefore maintain an effective, trusting, mutually motivational working relationship with assistants and subordinates. This is an increasingly critical part of the deputy minister’s role.

NOTES 1. The author thanks the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for providing financial support and Marie-Élise Maurice and Stéphanie Viola-Plante for assisting with the research. 2. Note that this directive was never formally issued as an Order in Council or regulation. The Government of Canada’s position is that it is not up to the government to tell Parliament what its prerogatives are; it can only provide its deputy ministers with guidelines. 3. According to our July 2009 survey. At the time, the deputy ministers’ offices had about eight employees. 4. This type of commi ee has existed since the 1960s. A group of experts from the public and private sectors was assembled to produce a series of proposals to provide a point of reference for determining deputy ministers’ salaries and working conditions.  Before the 1997 reorganization, the advisory commi ee on executive compensation in the public service, created in 1968 to advise the prime minister on compensation and related issues for managers not covered by collective bargaining, produced at least twenty reports.

Federal Deputy Ministers 399 REFERENCES Aucoin, P. 2006. “The Staffing and Evaluation of Canadian Deputy Ministers in Comparative Westminster Perspective: A Proposal for Reform.” In Restoring Accountability: Research Studies, vol. 1, edited by Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities (Gomery Commission), 297–336. O awa: Public Works and Government Services Canada. Benoit, L.E. 2006. “Ministerial Staff: The Life and Times of Parliament’s Statutory Orphans.” In Canada, Restoring Accountability, 1:145–252. Bourgault, J. 1997. “De Ka a au net: la lu e incessante du sous-ministre pour contrôler son agenda.” Gestion 22 (2): 18–26. –. 2002. “The Role of Deputy Ministers in Canadian Government.” In The Handbook of Canadian Public Administration, edited by Christopher Dunn, 430–49. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press. –. 2003. The Contemporary Role and Challenges of Deputy Ministers in the Government of Canada. O awa: Canadian Centre for Management Development. –. 2005. Les greffiers. Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada. –. 2006. “The Deputy Minister’s Role in the Government of Canada: His Responsibility and His Accountability.” In Canada, Restoring Accountability, 1:253–96. Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities (Gomery Commission). 2006. O awa: Public Works and Government Services Canada. Canada, Privy Council Office. 1987. The Office of Deputy Minister. Rev. ed. O awa: Queen’s Printer. –. 1990. Notes on the Responsibilities of Public Servants in Relation to Parliamentary Commi ees. O awa: Queen’s Printer. –. 2003. Guidance for Deputy Ministers. O awa: Senior Personnel Secretariat. –. 2008. 2008–2009 Performance Management Program Guidelines. O awa: Senior Personnel and Special Projects Secretariat. –. 2011. “Accounting Officers: Guidance on Roles, Responsibilities and Appearance before Parliamentary Commi ees 2007.” h p://www.pco-bcp. gc.ca/index.asp?lang=eng&page=information&sub=publications&doc=aoadc/2007/ao-adc-eng.htm. Dawson, R.M.G. 1963. Democratic Government in Canada. 3rd ed. Revised by W.F. Dawson. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Franks, C.E.S. 2006. “The Respective Responsibilities and Accountabilities of Ministers and Public Servants: A Study of the British Accounting

400 Jacques Bourgault Officer System and Its Relevance for Canada.” In Restoring Accountability: Research Studies, vol. 3, edited by Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities (Gomery Commission), 157–230. O awa: Public Works and Government Services Canada. Granatstein, J.L. 1982. The O awa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935–1957. Toronto: Oxford University Press. Halliday, W.E.D. 1959. “The Executive of the Government in Canada.” Canadian Public Administration 2 (4): 229–41. h p://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1754-7121. 1959.tb00672.x. Ivison, J. 2009. National Post, 8 May. Mintzberg, H., and J. Bourgault. 2000. Managing Publicly. Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada. Osbaldeston, G. 1989. Keeping Deputy Ministers Accountable. Scarborough, ON: McGraw-Hill Ryerson. Savoie, D. 1999. Governing from the Centre. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Tellier, P.M. 1972. “L’évolution du rôle du Bureau du Conseil privé et du secrétaire du Cabinet.” Canadian Public Administration Journal 15: 377–82.

14 Public Sector Executive Compensation in a Time of Restraint d av i d z u s s m a n 1

Introduction Over the past twenty years, in response to the growing awareness of the importance of the public sector in well-performing economies, there have been a burgeoning number of studies published about ways to improve public sector management at all levels of government. Much of the recent literature, especially in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, has concentrated on examining whether the New Public Management (NPM) movement – the introduction of private-sector management techniques in such areas as leadership, change management, organizational design, and human resources management into government – has been successful. Given the unique characteristics of the public sector, especially its role within a political and public environment, the public management literature needs to filter much of the private-sector management research through a “political” lens. Given the complexity of the public environment, the public management literature has also been bu ressed with its own research in the crucial areas of accountability, transparency, recruitment and the appointment process, parliamentary oversight in public management, and the interface between public servant and politicians.2 In Canada, during this same time frame, interest in public management has also been growing. The Canadian response, however, has been driven less by the NPM movement than by the pressures created by demographics, competition with the private sector for talent, and increased public and media scrutiny of government activities.3 Indeed, the recent intense media scrutiny of the federal government’s problems with grants and contributions, abuse of authority, sloppy accounting

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practices, or fraudulent behaviour has focused a ention on senior public servants as much as it has on elected officials and has placed them in the unusual situation of being at the centre of some of these unhappy events. As a result of these developments, much of the recent public management research in Canada is being framed around the changing roles of senior public servants (and especially of deputy ministers) in light of the new accountability regimes that have been introduced at the federal level to remedy the real and apparent weaknesses in the management culture. As a result, only a few researchers have mirrored the work being done in the private sector by looking at executives as managers of large numbers of staff and leaders of complex organizations. In this context, one area that has received very li le a ention has been compensation and its impact on public sector performance.4 Aside from the heroic efforts of public servants such as Jim Lahey, who produced the first comprehensive study of federal government compensation, and academics like Jacques Bourgault, who has been scrutinizing the careers of deputy ministers for almost twenty years, there is hardly any a ention paid to public sector compensation in Canada. This is especially troubling, given the growing size of the federal government’s wage and benefit package. The paucity of systematic research on public sector executive compensation is all the more puzzling, given the importance that the private sector, which is closely monitored by government, a aches to compensation and the role it is perceived to play in increasing productivity and shareholder value. Whatever the reasons, there is a serious lack of discussion and analysis of public sector compensation and far too li le comparative research on the ways in which private-sector compensation strategies can inform public sector issues. Public sector compensation is even more salient in the context of the post-2008 economic crisis that forced most countries to adopt radical fiscal and spending policies to avoid a deep economic recession. In Canada, for example, the recent federal government budget projected an operating deficit of more than $50 billion in 2010/11. Since human resources account for such a large proportion of the discretionary (nonstatutory and non-program) spending of the federal government, it is not surprising that in Budget 2010–11 the federal government took aim to lower its labour costs while arguing it could do so without lowering service standards. At a minimum, one key challenge will be to find a way to reconcile the current financial constraints with a

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rational compensation policy that does not affect the performance of the public sector. In this chapter, the general issue of deputy minister compensation in the federal public service and, subsequently, the importance of pay for performance and whether, generally, there is evidence that it is a useful management tool for increasing productivity or job satisfaction will be looked at in some detail.5 More broadly, is there compelling evidence that compensation is an effective motivator in the public sector? Does performance pay for senior executives enhance performance? Will higher levels of compensation a ract more qualified and suitable people to senior level jobs in the federal public service? Are higher levels of compensation an effective way to retain the most qualified executives? To do this, the recent research on pay and performance is examined with a particular reference to private sector compensation studies in order to provide some comparative perspective and the opportunity to learn from a sector that has had more experience with performance regimes. Finally, the chapter concludes with recommendations about the future of executive compensation and, in particular, whether the federal government should alter the current benefit package for senior executives. While the total cost of executive compensation, including bonuses and performance pay, makes up a relatively small percentage of the cost of government operation, that includes salaries, perks, pensions, and other benefits, they have important symbolic value to the incumbents in these jobs. Moreover, they are also crucial signals of their relative worth to recruiters and, more important, to taxpayers who actually foot the bill. Executive Compensation in the Canadian Federal Government Adam Smith may have been the first observer to link individual rewards to group performance in the public sector. He once observed that “public services are never performed be er than when their reward comes only in consequence of their being performed, and is proportional to the diligence in performing them” (1776, 678). At the most general level, then, the principle of public sector compensation for performance has a long and established record. Traditionally, executive compensation6 has been used in the private sector to find an appropriate reward system for individual executives to enhance corporate performance. As a result, much a ention has been

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paid to differentiating between salary and rewards, individual and corporate performance, and short- and long-term performance goals. This has created a very extensive and vigorously debated literature devoted to these issues, as they are seen to be critical in the quest to unleash an organization’s corporate performance. By comparison, the general view of the public sector had been that public servants were motivated by “public service,” and the issue of “pay” was seen as an “unseemly” activity for people who served the public. In essence, public service typifies “those in official positions of public authority who regard the interests of the whole society as being the guiding influence over all public decision-making, that their personal, or class or group interests are to be set aside when making decisions, and that they are public servants purely out of a perceived duty to serve the public” (Perry and Hondeghem 2008, 18). As a result, public sector executive competition was structured around an adequate salary scale, set well below the private sector, and a generous pension system. This system was designed primarily to recruit entry-level employees (professional and non-professional) and to keep them within the federal government “family” until they retired, typically thirty-five years later.7 One of the unintended consequences of the public sector pension scheme has been to limit the movement of employees out of the public sector by locking them into a very generous pension regime (known as “golden handcuffs”), thus rendering private sector opportunities less a ractive except for exceptional individuals who command special a ention from the private sector. In Canada, the first concerted work on linking compensation to performance begins with the establishment of the Burns Commi ee in 1968 to deal with public sector executive compensation.8 At that time, the commi ee created the first formal linkage between government compensation and external compensation comparisons. In particular, the Burns commi ee stated that first–level managers should receive total compensation on a par with the private sector and that compensation at higher levels should be determined by internal relativities. Building on the modest first steps taken by the Burns commi ee, beginning in the 1980s, the federal government began to take a more proactive approach to linking compensation to performance. Its most significant decision at that time was to implement a cash bonus system for the then 1,800 executives and deputy ministers in the federal

Public Sector Executive Compensation in a Time of Restraint 405

government who were judged to have performed at “outstanding or superior” levels during the previous year. In explaining the government’s rationale to implement this performance pay system, the president of the Treasury Board at the time, Don Johnston, noted that the “bonus system had been a proven method for enhancing productivity in the private sector” (Zussman 1982, 251). This relatively bold move on behalf of the federal government was a reflection of the reforms sweeping Western democracies that mimicked private sector practices in an effort to make governments more efficient. This approach, called New Public Management (NPM), included measuring organizational and executive performance, introducing new schemes to reward performance, and using bonus regimes to encourage greater government productivity. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Thatcher in the United Kingdom, for example, management contracts were introduced for all deputy minister–level appointees that linked performance objectives with bonus schemes, performance pay, and terms and conditions of appointment. Moreover, in the United Kingdom and elsewhere NPM defined a “business-like” relationship between deputy ministers9 and their ministers and challenged the traditional Westminster system that had previously defined ways in which the politicians interacted with their senior public servants. Generally, the governments of the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia moved aggressively to adopt elements of NPM in an effort to dramatically improve government performance at all levels by tying bonuses to the performance of individuals who were explicitly responsible for outcomes. While many countries were rewriting the rules of public management in their own countries, the Canadian federal government resisted the temptation to join in the adoption of NPM in any meaningful way, moving cautiously in borrowing best practices from the private sector. In the mid-1990s, the most important development in the area of executive compensation in Canada was the creation of the Advisory Commi ee on Senior Level Retention and Compensation (also known as the Strong commi ee) by Prime Minister Chrétien, to replace the work of the Burns commi ee that had slowly disappeared under Prime Minister Mulroney. Its first chairman was Lawrence Strong, who was then the CEO of Unilever Canada and had established himself as determined protector of the public sector in the face of society’s shi to a more market-based and deregulated environment. The commi ee’s

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first report signalled their faith in the positive role of government by underscoring the importance of a first-class public service in helping Canada to remain a competitive nation in a globalized economy. In particular, the commi ee noted that as a result of changes taking place in society at large, the senior public service would need “continued exceptional leadership, creative thinking, and new operating skills and competencies” in order to keep its place in the new competitive environment (Advisory Commi ee on Senior Level Retention and Compensation 1998). Moreover, the commi ee predicted serious problems on the horizon that would test the resilience of the public service if action were not taken to deal with the existing problems in the executive cadre of the federal public service. In their first report, they argued, “We have very serious concerns that the quality of the public service management could erode in the future” (Advisory Commi ee on Senior Level Retention and Compensation 1998). In essence, they saw four factors at play that could collectively undermine the quality of the institution. First, there was the impact of the downsizing that had already resulted in the loss of personnel with many years of experience. Second, the low morale and uncompetitive compensation system had created a significant short-term risk of further departures. Third, they were among the first to signal a significant demographic gap in the next five to ten years, as executives retired from the workplace. And finally, the commi ee felt that the public service was no longer able to a ract the highest calibre of people, because compensation was inadequate and the public had a growing distrust of government making many of the jobs less a ractive than previously. Given these four factors, the commi ee were single-minded in addressing the recruitment problems by righting the imbalance between public and private sector compensation. As a result, they stated, “Our recommendations are made in the belief that the federal public service has a critical contribution to make to the wellbeing of our country as we enter the new millennium. While the role of government is changing, the need for high calibre leaders in the public sector is more critical than ever. The government has taken many difficult decisions in its recent efforts to deal with the financial deficit. We believe that the government needs to be similarly decisive today if it is to avoid serious human resource deficit in the public service” (Advisory Commi ee on Senior Level Retention and Compensation 1998).

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In the course of its work, the Strong commi ee asked the Public Management Research Centre (PMRC) of the Public Policy Forum (PPF) to conduct a series of focus group consultations on organizational retention and compensation. During their sessions the PMRC met with 116 current and 23 past public service executives to discuss their respective work environments, compensation issues, and view of future of the public service in Canada. With regards to compensation, the respondents noted that it was unreasonable to expect that public sector salaries would be viewed as competitive with the private sector. In part this was because the relative security of a public service career was viewed as an “offset” against risking-taking in the private sector. However, the most significant recommendation from these roundtable meetings was that, while compensation is not the primary driver for senior executives in the private or public sector, addressing salary issues should be the first priority in an overall review of the management, retention, and recruitment of government executives. In light of these focus group conversations, the PMRC recommended that compensation and performance be removed from the control of politicians. Furthermore, they also recommended that salaries and benefits for government executives be disconnected from compensation negotiations for unionized employees and for politicians. One of the more controversial recommendations of the report was that the federal government should strengthen its performance pay system and base it on organizational, team, and individual objectives, as a way of motivating individuals and reinforcing desired behaviour. The Strong commi ee felt, then, that compensation in the form of pay and benefits was at the centre of a reward strategy in any private sector or public sector organization. As a result, they recommended to the federal government a number of strategies that would increase the effectiveness of the recruitment efforts to a ract and retain talent, reward superior performers, motivate improved performance, reinforce core values, and focus individuals on what they need to deliver (see Advisory Commi ee on Senior Level Retention and Compensation 1998). In particular, the federal government was encouraged to take a different approach to compensation. The Strong commi ee perceived compensation as the most effective way for the federal government to recruit and retain the “best and the brightest” in its ongoing competition for talent with the private sector. While the commi ee was deeply commi ed to a rational compensation system, they were also keen on linking performance to pay.

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Federal Public Sector Executive Compensation Policies Before the creation of the Strong commi ee in 1997, most compensation research was conducted in silos without any overall framework or guiding principles. As well, the work was largely descriptive and had li le predictive analysis. It wasn’t until the Strong commi ee began to define its mandate and develop a work plan that it became apparent that there was a need to break down the silos and to integrate the management activities of all executives in the federal government. To simplify the system of categorization and to recognize the role of chief operating officers (CEOs) of Crown corporations and of governor-in-council (GIC) appointees, the Strong commi ee se led on a taxonomy containing four different groups: deputy ministers, CEOs of Crown corporations, governor-in-council appointees, and executives (levels EX1 to EX5). Of these four groups the deputy minister cadre has received the most a ention in the academic literature, to a large degree, due to the pivotal position that the deputies occupy between ministers (and the Cabinet) and the top of the public service pyramid. In fact, the important role of deputy ministers was acknowledged early in Canada’s history, since the deputy minister positions were created in 1857 to ensure the coordination of government departments and to provide a permanent head for administrative purposes. The prime minister chooses deputy ministers for their competencies as policy advisers and administrators (Osbaldeston 1989, 197). In the Canadian tradition, they are non-partisan but are very politically sensitive in order to provide sound policy advice to their ministers (Granatstein 1982; Aucoin 2006). It is for this reason that, in 1991, Jacques Bourgault, “The deputy minister is one of the most important players in Canada’s political system.”10 In many ways deputy ministers share characteristics of private sector CEOs, but there are so many significant differences in their respective roles and responsibilities that it is dangerous to see them as having complementary jobs (see Zussman and Jabes 1989). The typical career path of a deputy minister in the federal government starts in a policy section of a federal department a er completing a graduate degree in the social sciences or in law. It leads to a long string of policy assignments in a number of different departments but almost certainly in one of the central agencies such as the Privy Council Office, the Treasury Board, or the Department of Finance.

Public Sector Executive Compensation in a Time of Restraint 409

Twenty years ago Frank Swi reported that “experience in a central agency, most notably the Privy Council Office, is now a virtual prerequisite for deputy level appointment.” Swi also noted that deputy ministers are primarily generalists, not specialists. The vast majority of them have no program management experience and have very li le experience outside of O awa (1993). Current evidence suggests that Swi ’s characterization of the deputy minister community has not changed very much, despite Donald Savoie’s observation that the role of deputy ministers has dramatically been altered as a result of the changing relationship between public servants and their political masters (2003). There has been much less a ention paid to the CEOs of Crown corporations or the even larger community of governor-in-council appointees who occupy key jobs as the heads of important federal organizations. As table 14.1 demonstrates, the heads of Crown corporations and agencies constitute important public sector leaders with very wide-ranging corporate and public policy responsibilities (for example, the Atomic Energy of Canada Limited and Export Development Canada) and, at times, manage substantial workforces, such as Canada Post, with more than seventy thousand employees.11 Like deputy ministers, the governor-in-council and Crown corporation positions are filled by the prime minister, although at various times, depending on its legislation, the organization’s board of directors is responsible for nominating the CEO to the prime minister.12 Most of these CEO and head of agency appointments are made for fixed terms (usually five years), and the level of compensation is established at the time of appointment. For the past few years, the Privy Council Office (PCO) has produced guidelines that explain how performance is managed for the CEOs of Crown corporations. The document contains a very explicit effort to link individual performance to achievements around the corporate plan and the government’s objectives. It also endeavours to identify underperformers and to ensure some consistency in the application of performance pay and bonuses in all government-owned enterprises.13 Despite some missing data, it appears that there has been relatively li le change in the number of people who lead the federal government’s departments, agencies, and Crown corporations. The dramatic increases have taken place among the executives who have increased in number from more than 3,000 in 2000 to 4,716 in 2010. The growth in number of executives clearly mirrors rapid growth in the size of the overall federal

410 David Zussman Table 14.1. Leadership of the Federal Public Service Number of Deputy ministers CEOs of Crown corporations Governor-in-council appointees Executives Public servants*

1990

594 248,000

2000

2010

58 36 542 3,032 218,000

70 40 489 4,716 268,000

*Federal public service includes all departments and agencies for which the Treasury Board is the employer and separate employers. Excluded are the RCMP, Armed Forces, and Crown corporations.

public service that has occurred during the last decade. A er program review lowered the number of employees by 55,000 between 1995 and 2000, in response to activist governments (Martin and Harper), the federal government has effectively replaced all employees who were let go during program review and created more than 50,000 new jobs in the last decade. Given the large number of people hired to replace recent retirees, the federal public service has, in effect, welcomed more than 100,000 new employees within its ranks. With regards to the deputy ministers, the modest increase in their numbers represents a need to manage a larger public service than ever before, but also to accommodate the increase in associate deputy ministers who have been appointed to help deputy ministers manage particularly larger or more complex departments. Figure 14.1 provides a more detailed presentation of the number of deputy ministers in the federal public service from 1999 to 2009. Prior to the salary freeze of 1991, the Burns commi ee had established clear principles for external compensation comparisons: firstlevel managers should receive total compensation on a par with the private sector, and compensation at higher levels should be derived from internal relativities. Surveys of comparable private sector organizations were routinely conducted as a way of recommending changes to compensation that included salary, incentive pay, pensions, other fringe benefits, perquisites, and conditions of work. By 1998, for jobs of similar content, scope, and responsibility, senior public servants had total compensation that was ahead of the provinces in most instances, less than the broader public sector, and significantly less than the private sector. As a ma er of policy, the shortfalls compared to the private sector increased markedly for the higher-level

Public Sector Executive Compensation in a Time of Restraint 411 Figure 14.1. The Deputy Minister Community in the Federal Government, 1999–2009 40

35

30

DM2 DM1

25 DM1 DM2 DM3 DM4

20

15

10

DM3

5 DM4 0 FY 09/00 FY 00/01 FY01/02 FY 02/03 FY03/04 FY04/05 FY05/06 FY06/07 FY07/08 FY 08/09

deputy minister positions, and the differences were in the base salary and incentives. With regards to the public sector pension regime, the Strong commi ee noted that pension arrangements were more generous in the public service than comparator groups in the private sector. Given the changes taking place in the private sector and the provinces, the compensation system in the federal public service was developed on the following principles. First, the total compensation package for the executive group was made distinct from that offered to unionized employees. Second, the compensation system where the job rate, which is the fixed component of compensation, paid for fully satisfactory performance, is adjusted at intervals using comparisons based on total compensation with appropriate private sector comparator groups. Third, there should be a significant pool of money available for pay that is “at risk” and subject to reliable performance measures. The

412 David Zussman Table 14.2. 2010–11 Rates of Pay for EX and DM Groups

Level

Minimum ($)

Maximum ($)

Maximum performance pay (%)

Bonus pay (%)

EX-1 EX-2 EX-3 EX-4 EX-5 GX DM-1 DM-2 DM-3 DM-4

99,600 111,600 124,900 143,300 160,600 179,700 179,700 206,700 231,500 259,200

117,200 131,400 147,000 168,700 189,000 211,500 $11,500 243,200 272,400 305,000

12 12 12 20 20 20 20 25 25 30

3 3 3 6 6 6 6 8 8 9

fourth principle that has evolved over the years has been the practice to remove public service compensation issues away from the political arena to the extent possible. As a consequence, there has been an effort to ensure that the Treasury Board, as the employer, conducts an independent compensation survey every two years amongst relevant comparator groups, and to implement the appropriate changes to salary scales. The fi h and last principle was to use the EX1 group as the comparator with the private sector and to establish compensation levels for higher management levels by basing it upon internal relativities. As a result of these five principles, the data in table 14.2 display the full range of pay for the executive and DM cadre in the federal public service for the fiscal year 2010–11.14 Of note is the salary progression of executives from a minimum of $99,600 per year to a maximum of more than $300,000 for the four DM-4s in the current federal public service when they are compensated at the full job rate for this position. In keeping with the recommendations of the Strong commi ee, 12–20 per cent of the compensation is at risk to the extent that the employees must be fully satisfactory in order for them to receive maximum performance pay. As well, the table also reveals that executives and deputy ministers are also eligible to earn additional cash bonuses of 3–6 per cent of their salary on top of their performance pay. Following the recommendations of the Strong commi ee, the cash compensation structure now in place is as follows: executives and deputy ministers fall into nine salaried job rates in addition to “at risk”

Public Sector Executive Compensation in a Time of Restraint 413

pay ranging from a maximum of 10–20 per cent to be paid annually, based upon results. For the CEOs of Crown corporations there are ten salaried job rates in addition to “at risk” ranging from a maximum of 10–25 per cent to be paid annually, based upon results. For the other GIC appointees there are eleven salaried job ranges but o en no “at risk” opportunities, since it determined that it might be inappropriate for many of the people in the GX category who serve in quasi-judicial or regulatory positions to accept a bonus for their performance. As an example, for deputy ministers, the 2009 Stephenson advisory commi ee recommended that DM-1 job rates be increased by 11 per cent and DM-3 job rates by 19 per cent, in order to keep up with changes in the private sector.15 The issue of performance pay or pay at risk has been fraught since it was first introduced in the federal government in 1981. In its first seventeen years, the federal government awarded it only seven times. By the time the Strong commi ee began its deliberations in 1997, they concluded that performance pay had been administered in a way that was far from ideal and, as a result, the concept of performance had been totally discredited, despite the merit of the concept. The commi ee was of the view that “performance pay is seen as neither linked to achievement of business plans, nor as transparent and fair. Further, its rather chequered history has created an alarming lack of trust between senior levels of the public service management and the government” (Advisory Commi ee on Senior Level Retention and Compensation 1998). The commi ee was most adventuresome in recommending a new scheme of variable at-risk compensation that would be paid on the basis of performance measured against agreed-upon targets and the achievement of business plans. The plan envisaged by the advisory commi ee was to identify targets for individual senior executives that would have three elements: individual, team related, and corporate. At the same time, the intention was to also include ways to recognize achievements in managing resources, leadership linked to quality service, policy advice, innovations and, most importantly, results and exemplification of core values. As the result of these operating principles, the federal government approved the following compensation regimes for 2000–10 (see table 14.3). As well, the table contains data on the percentage of deputy ministers judged to have surpassed their performance agreements and who received performance bonuses for the previous year’s work. Most notably, deputies appear to have been surpassing the performance targets

414 David Zussman Table 14.3. Compensation for the DM Community, 2000–10 DM-1

DM-2

DM-3

Maximum Surpassed Bonus Maximum Surpassed Bonus Maximum Surpassed Bonus (000s) 2000 $158.0 2005 $189.4 2010 $211.5

% 8 10 20

% 5 6

(000s) $181.7 $217.7 $243.2

% 10 13 25

% 7 8

(000s) $203.5 $243.8 $272.4

% 10 13 25

% 7 8

agreed to with the clerk of the Privy Council to a higher degree in recent years, while the bonus regime has been stable for the last five years. Given the relatively small number of deputies, it is difficult to discern whether the increased performance of deputies is due to actual changes in outcomes or to a change in standards. Research on Public Sector and Private Sector Compensation The federal government’s concerted effort to modernize its executive compensation system against the background of the NPM movement made it necessary to evaluate the evidence for transferability from one sector to another. In a fascinating summary chapter comparing public and private sector management, Rainey and Chun observed that the two sectors were in many ways similar, thus opening the door to more comparative work between the public and private sector. They stated, for instance, “The evidence indicates points on which the two domains of management do not differ significantly, or in the ways certain claims and stereotypes would suggest” (2005, 74). However, they emphasized that, while there were large areas of similarity between the public and private sector, “at higher levels of management and in certain externally oriented managerial rules at lower levels, public managers will be more engaged with, and constrained by, political and governmental processes such as nurturing support from interest groups and managing relations with legislative bodies and the chief executive” (85). Rainey and Chun identified other areas where the public and private sectors operate differently. With regards to incentives and incentive structures, for example, they noted that there are a number of studies that show how public managers perceive greater administrative constraints on the administration of extrinsic incentives such as pay,

Public Sector Executive Compensation in a Time of Restraint 415

promotion, and disciplinary action then do their counterparts in private organizations. They also reported that public managers perceived weaker relations between “performance and extrinsic rewards such as pay, promotion, and job security than do their private sector counterparts” (2005, 87). However, these studies do not find any clear relationship between such perceptions and actual employee performance. Given the differences between the two sectors, some authors have questioned whether the private sector is the appropriate comparator for public sector compensation work. In an interesting study published by the Hudson Institute, the authors argue that the worlds in which the two sectors operate are profoundly different in small but significant ways. For example, leaders in the public sector tend to spend more time focusing on long-term strategies rather than on short-term outcomes (although this is not always apparent). Moreover, the public sector spends more time on “controlling” the work environment to a much larger extent than private sector leaders, who have more streamlined delegated models and greater trust in the judgment of their managers. Public sector managers are also less optimistic about the outcome of their actions, even though they take more time and appear to be more “thoughtful” about their work. Of great significance, especially if it can be replicated in other studies of this kind, is the fact that younger managers in the private sector get more opportunities and more room for self-development than those in the risk-averse public sector (Hudson Institute 2009). As well, the overall impression is that private sector leaders have a preference to go for short-term results by being prepared to take more risks and to be optimistic about the results that they can expect. In contrast, the public sector takes a more distanced perspective on the problem and “opt for a more thoughtful, innovative, and risk-averse approach of solving problems” (Hudson Institute 2009). The Hudson study reports that these findings are very consistent with behaviour one would expect in the different environments of these two sectors. The private sector is constantly under pressure to produce results on a quarterly basis and to continuously improve its productivity and bo om line results. Generally, the public sector is guided by rules and regulations that are designed to achieve fairness and equity in its operations rather than efficiency and outcomes. Moreover, the public sector is there to support the political priorities of the government of the day, which, by definition, means that coherence and consistency are not likely to be cornerstones of the public sector’s management framework.

416 David Zussman

In the end, this means that private sector leaders have relatively clear and measureable objectives and are judged on how closely they reach their goals. Public sector leaders, by contrast, are subject to conflicting and sometimes obscure objectives that are subject to multiple stakeholder conditions, where the accountabilities are increasingly diffuse and public (Hudson Institute 2009). As well, the criteria against which senior executives, but especially deputy ministers, are judged have more to do with processes (that champion fairness and equity) than they do with results and outcomes.16 In one of the few comparative studies of the public and private sector in Canada, Gunderson looked at the real and predicted differences between compensation in the two sectors. In the study, he outlined political and economic forces that determine public sector compensation and the importance of “ge ing it right” by ensuring that public servants are paid at an appropriate level: not low, but not too high (1995).17 In examining the differences between the two sectors, Gunderson noted that while “the non-competitive forces to fix compensation, in theory, can work in either direction, in practice they likely work in the direction of facilitating public-sector pay premiums or rents above the pay of comparable workers in the private sector” (1995, 5). He concluded that, in the future, public sector pay will be greater for lowwage and disadvantaged workers and that non-cash compensation regimes such as seniority-based increases, pension benefits, and job security are likely to be more prominent in the public sector than in the private sector. Given this analysis, Gunderson concluded that the area for greatest concern is the danger posed by excessive long-term compensation, such as defined benefit pension plans that defers costs by shi ing the burden to future taxpayers who have no say over their negotiation. For Gunderson, questions remain over whether generous pay practices for women and low-wage earners will be able to continue in the face of economic pressure to a ract investment. Gunderson’s analysis is one of the few studies that look at whether the public and private sectors can borrow from one another when it comes to compensation issues. Given that his work is based heavily on economic theories, there is li le mention of incentives, aside from monetary ones that may govern workers’ decisions regarding the public or private sectors. As a result, it is probably more prudent to keep looking at the two sectors separately, despite the subtle differences, than it is to borrow private sector compensation principles from the public sector.

Public Sector Executive Compensation in a Time of Restraint 417

In fact, one of the most contentious public management issues yet to be resolved in Canada is whether governments should do more to a ract executives from the private sector. At this point, there is very li le movement back and forth between the two sectors in Canada, creating separate and non-competing silos that operate in splendid isolation from one another. Despite many executive exchange programs that originated with Prime Minister Mulroney in the early 1980s, there has been very li le evidence that private sector executives are interested in public sector careers. In the limited instances when private sector executives do make the move, the majority of them do not stay long. The reasons for the high failure rate have been documented elsewhere and have more to do with unwelcome work environments than compensation.18 However, the situation is very different in the United Kingdom, where a special effort has been made to recruit executives into the British public sector. At this point, almost 40 per cent of UK executives have been recruited from outside the public service. As a consequence, comparison compensation studies that look at the public and private sectors are critical in keeping the UK public service competitive for recruitment purposes. As the UK Steering Group to the Cabinet Secretary noted in its 2008 report, “Paying the senior civil service (SCS) very differently wouldn’t ma er if they were fished from a different pool and stayed in a separate world from their commercial counterparts … Now that has changed” (Steering Group to the Cabinet Secretary 2008). Whether or not private sector compensation policies are transferable to the public sector, a more fundamental question is whether performance and pay are indeed linked. Cynthia Devers and colleagues completed a massive overview study of developments in executive compensation. Their study looked at ninety-nine individual studies published since 1997 in leading management journals (Devers, Cannella, Reilly, and Yoder 2007). The purpose of the work was to establish whether there was a causal relationship between performance and pay, or between pay and performance. In the end, Devers et al. reported, “The results of research examining the ability of pay to influence performance have produced equivocal results and raised questions concerning the efficacy of executive compensation, as currently designed, to adequately align the interests of managers and shareholders” (1021). Interestingly, many of the studies that Devers et al. cited include recent instances of the considerable increase in executive pay in the private sector that accompanied the economic boom of the last decade.

418 David Zussman

In another study of bonuses and their impact on management behaviour, Benardo, Cai, and Luo concluded, “Managers likely receive greater performance-based pay because they manage higher quality projects rather than performance-based pay causing higher quality projects” (2001, 323). Finally, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) took another perspective on this issue when they challenged the traditional view that executive remuneration arrangements increase shareholder value. The authors concluded that managerial power, exercised primarily by corporate CEOs, has resulted in remuneration being structured to benefit the financial interests of the executives rather than the shareholders, and moreover, the boards of directors are captive to the influence of executives in this respect. There are no recent published papers on the impact of public sector productivity as a result of performance pay. It appears that the public sector has accepted the basic tenets used in the private sector without much question. And both the Strong and Stephenson commi ees have endorsed the practice without quibble. While conventional wisdom suggests that performance pay makes a real difference in performance, as early as the early 1980s there was lively debate about the efficacy of bonuses as a motivator to increase performance. In fact, within the Canadian context, in response to the federal government’s first decision to introduce performance pay, Zussman (1982) presented the case that was no real evidence that performance pay enhanced outcomes and productivity. Moreover, he also argued that the administrative costs and public servant “gaming” may exceed the benefits of performance pay. Next Steps for Public Sector Executive Compensation So much has changed in the world of compensation since the Strong commi ee restarted the conversation about public sector compensation at the federal level. Many of the changes have been the result of a radical increase in compensation in the private sector and the perception that higher compensation and especially performance pay will result in higher corporate performance and profits. In the public sector, most Canadian governments, while not trying to match the private sector, nonetheless increased executive pay to make up for lost ground during the “frozen pay” 1990s, partly through the use of performance pay. However, given the controversies about the excesses in private sector

Public Sector Executive Compensation in a Time of Restraint 419

compensation during this recent recession, it is unlikely that the federal government will introduce new and generous compensation schemes that mirror those in the private sector. In fact, until Budget 2010, the federal government had shown very li le interest in limiting the size of the federal public service and had not taken a hard look at compensation except to freeze salaries for members of Parliament and their staff in the upcoming fiscal year. In fact, given the ideological bent of the current government and its focus on fiscal constraints, it is somewhat surprising there have been no explicit efforts to limit the compensation of public servants, given the fiscal imperative. However, recent developments at the political level are having an impact on the morale of senior officials, and this must be factored into our thinking about next steps for public sector executive compensation. First, the centralization of power in the Prime Minister’s Office is having a profound impact on the work style of executives and morale. As Savoie pointed out a few years ago, the centralization of power has relentlessly undermined the confidence of the public service and had an impact on work motivation and collegiality. While it has been difficult to document, there is sufficient evidence based on multiple sources that the uneven and sometimes acrimonious relationship between the public service and their political masters is having a significant impact on morale and productivity at senior levels. One area where the centralization of power is very evident has been in the appointment or reappointment of governor-in-council appointees and heads of Crown corporations. While the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) has only recently shown interest in se ing compensation levels, the Harper government has taken a deep interest in who is appointed to these jobs. Ironically, the evidence suggests that the PMO has expressed li le interest in deputy minister appointments, even though these appointees work more closely with ministers and the government’s political apparatus. Instead, the PMO has been determined to dismiss appointees, albeit at the end of their terms, who were appointed by the Martin or Chrétien governments or perceived to be “offside” government priorities. While there are a number of ways to improve on how governorin-council appointees are selected, the current government has shown li le appetite for implementing recommendations of the Public Appointment Commission, which was a cornerstone of its 2007 Federal Accountability Act.19 In fact, the government has resisted the

420 David Zussman

opportunity to improve the appointment process and instead has further politicized it by ensuring that PMO and ministerial staffs are formal members on all selection boards for high-ranking governor-in-council appointees.20 In the most 2012 budget, the government made a modest commitment to decrease the number of GIC appointments by 245 (most of which are unfilled positions) as a cost-saving measure, but it has been silent on implementing ways of making the appointment process less political and partisan. The role of executives has also expanded recently. Over the last ten years, in light of the weaknesses that became apparent in oversight with the Sponsorship Program, federal deputy ministers and heads of government agencies have seen their responsibilities and levels of accountability increased substantially. In a post-Gomery world, where accountability has a higher profile than ever before, the deputy minister community has been assigned, through legislation, formal responsibilities that directly make them accountable to Parliament for all financial and human resource ma ers. Effectively, these changes have exposed the deputy minister and executive community directly to the scrutiny of Parliament and its commi ees. In the case of a minority government environment like we had in the early 2000s where the government cannot control Parliament’s agenda and has li le control over the behaviour of commi ees, public servants have been subjected to withering a acks from parliamentarians, with li le protection from their ministers or the government.21 All of this underscores Donald Savoie’s argument that the traditional bargain between government and the senior public service no longer exists. The well-established trade-off between the anonymity of the public servants in exchange for unvarnished frank advice (“speaking truth to power”) has been broken and there is li le prospect that it will ever be re-established.22 In the current environment of increased public and parliamentary scrutiny, senior executives in the federal public service may insist that their compensation take the risk of personal public a acks and personal accountability into consideration when se ing compensation. The traditional compensation arrangement is clearly being threatened by these recent developments. If job security is threatened by the government’s reluctance to reappoint or its predilection to publicly chastise those that are perceived to be out of line with the government’s intentions and Parliament feels it can a ack public servants, it will not be long before “pay at risk” will be seen in a different light. An executive

Public Sector Executive Compensation in a Time of Restraint 421

in the federal government has a more difficult and less secure job today than ever. As Aaron Wildavsky wrote some years ago, “The most senior bureaucracy now is only for the brave” (quoted in Pollit 1988, 97). While almost all of the deputy minister community appears to have permanent tenure at the deputy minister level (with assured compensation levels), one issue that has recently caught the eye of researchers has been the high level of movement of deputy ministers from one job to another. More than likely this has been fuelled by the demographic profile of the senior public service that is all on the verge of retirement. In his last report to the prime minister, Kevin Lynch noted his efforts to keep deputies in their job for a long enough period for them to become knowledgeable about their portfolio. The high level of churn among executives has already been discussed in an annual report of the Public Service Commission (1998) and has been covered in another chapter in this book. While the Stephenson commi ee still reports to the Treasury Board each year to set compensation levels for the four executive groups, its real impact has been to stimulate the federal government to take management more seriously. During its thirteen years of reporting, the advisory commi ees, under the leadership of Laurie Strong and Carol Stephenson, recommended that more work be done in defining the roles of senior executives and their accountabilities, linking performance to compensation, and developing a be er way to evaluate performance. The 2003 Public Service Modernization Act and the Lahey report on government compensation are tangible examples of their work. The outstanding compensation-related issue is the value of performance pay (bonuses) and whether, given the fiscal constraints of the federal government, the practice should be continued. In reality, the cost of performance pay is not substantial enough to justify its curtailment on financial grounds. Instead, the question is whether there is sufficient evidence that performance pay increases productivity or the quality of outcomes to justify the administrative cost and the cash outlay. By freezing the operating budgets of departments in Budget 2010–11, the government le it to the departments themselves to save on costs in ways that they saw fit. As we have seen, given the recent analyses of the private sector’s experiences with performance pay that clearly demonstrate the weak relationship between outcomes and performance pay, it is probably a good time to take a serious look at executive bonuses.

422 David Zussman

Conclusion Despite the looming deficits in all developed countries, there will be increased demand for government services as governments roll out new programs that respond to the impact of an aging population and the need to stabilize national economies. Within this context, the merits of executive compensation based on generous performance pay clauses will be heavily scrutinized as the global economy adjusts to the impact of the current recession and the recognition that high salaries and performance pay may have influenced some of the inappropriate behaviour that precipitated the collapse of so many financial institutions and other large private sector corporations.23 In fact, there is growing evidence that it was, indeed, the perverse effect of undisciplined compensation that created the problems in the financial services and mortgage sector (Conference Board of Canada 2009). To add a further level of complexity to the appropriate use of compensation in the public sector, the general public, otherwise known as taxpayers, is very critical of CEO compensation and is increasingly critical of public sector executive compensation.24 The issue of compensation is a very useful lens through which to examine the role of the public service in our country and to look for answers about key management challenges that help to define public service today. At a minimum, compensation forces us to consider the status of jobs, the “bargain” that defines who does what, performance pay, the appointment process, as well as many other issues. Given these factors, a number of lessons can be drawn from the collective work of the advisory commi ee and their monitoring of developments in the private sector for the federal public service. First, compensation for federal senior executives does not appear to be an issue in recruitment and retention at this time, even though the private comparator groups pay considerably more. In part, this is because the federal government does li le recruiting from the executive ranks of the private sector, where the gaps are largest. If, however, demographics is creating significant vacancies at the top of government organizations, the compensation gap will be a significant barrier to successfully recruiting mid-career executives. That is, if the pending demand for skilled executives materializes in the next five years, this is a good time to look at the compensation structure and, more important, to develop a more aggressive recruiting approach. As a starting point, the advisory commi ee, which already offers the

Public Sector Executive Compensation in a Time of Restraint 423

federal government much-needed insight into private sector practices, could also add its considerable credibility in the private sector by serving as a recruiting arm of the federal government. It is also time to look at the performance-based arrangements for senior government executives. The system is administered well in Canada, but there is li le evidence that the at-risk and bonus system increases performance. The OECD has noted that there are significant problems with performance pay, while the Canadian deputy minister community is very content with the current system (Bourgault 2010). The authors state, in cautionary OECD phrasing, “There ought to be less certainty that any moves toward the measurement of results and the creation of new incentives to achieve them are automatically a step forward” (Ketelaar, Manning, and Turkisch 2007, 252). Indeed, there is a potential perversity in the bonus system through its occasional tendency to lower productivity and encourage destructive competition among peers. As a result, I conclude that the current system for rewarding performance through the deputy minister Commi ee of Senior Officials and the Management Accountability Framework will likely not achieve their intended goals of improving executive productivity.25 Moreover, we should take a more careful look at Aucoin’s arguments on the appointment process for deputy ministers, which he feels is not a system independent of political influence. As a result, he argues that an independent deputy minister commission would give the whole federal public service a new optic on notions of merit and rewards (Aucoin 2006, 331). Finally, given the changing nature of the “bargain,” as Savoie calls it, between public servants and their political masters, and the persistent concerns about the precarious state of the federal public service, it may be appropriate to accompany rethinking public service executive compensation strategies with a broader discussion about the role of the Public Service as a valuable institution for Canada and the way that compensation can be used to recruit and retain executive talent in the service of Canada (see Zussman 2010).

NOTES 1. Once again, I would like to acknowledge the remarkable help and collaboration of my colleague Joseph McDonald, executive-in-residence, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of O awa.

424 David Zussman

2. 3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

His insights were particularly useful in organizing the vast amount of material. As well, I would also like to thank Patrick Wilson of the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, who provided me with excellent research assistance in preparing this chapter. For an excellent overview on the meaning of public service and its unique characteristics see Perry and Hondeghem (2008, 333). Despite Canada’s stellar reputation for good government and its long history of progressive management practices, the recent a ention focused on Canadian public sector wrongdoing has created an environment of doubt and retrenchment in the federal public service. In recent years the federal government has sponsored investigations into contract irregularities (Gomery Commission) and the abuse of authority and misuse of government funds (House Commi ee in the activities of George Radwanski). As well, there was a lot of media a ention on the administration of the federal government’s grants and contributions program (the so-called HRDC scandal). Overall, the transgressions were not major ones, and the errors were largely a ributed to the errors of individuals, although the whiff of scandal persists. Jim Lahey, former associate deputy minister at the Treasury Board Secretariat, undertook the first comprehensive compensation study in the federal government. This study is now available on the Treasury Board Secretariat website, h p://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/spsm-rgsp/er-ed/er-ed_e.asp. There are many critical questions about compensation that are of interest to public sector managers and, more importantly, to those who develop the terms and conditions of employment. However, given the range of the issues, they are not discussed in this chapter. Further research might look at questions such as: Should public sector compensation such as salary and benefit packages lead those in the private sector? To what extent should members of Parliament’s compensation compare with other public sector employees? How should executives in the federal public service be compensated in comparison with those of deputy ministers, and should heads of agencies and Crown corporations be compensated in ways that are more similar to the private sector? And what does the public know and care about the appropriate levels of compensation for public sector employees? In general terms, compensation comprises base salary, bonuses, performance pay, pension benefits, and perquisites (for example, a car allowance or chauffeur). Usually this meant within the same department or agency, although the issue of executive churn would become an issue in the mid-1970s and again around 2007 as retirements drove a hiring binge.

Public Sector Executive Compensation in a Time of Restraint 425 8. The first external Advisory Group on Executive Compensation was created in 1968 to advise the prime minister on compensation and related ma ers. The first chair of the commi ee was James Burns, who was the deputy chairman of Power Corporation of Canada. 9. In the United Kingdom, deputy ministers are referred to as permanent secretaries. 10. Jacques Bourgault, Profile of Deputy Ministers in the Government of Canada (O awa: Canada School of Public Service, 2004); J. L. Granatstein, The O awa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins 1935–1957 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 333; and Peter Aucoin, “The Staffing and Evaluation of Canadian Deputy Ministers in Comparative Westminster Perspective: A Proposal for Reform,” in Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities, Volume 1: Parliament, Ministers and Deputy Ministers, 2006. O awa: Queen’s Printer. 11. See the annual report on Crown corporations and agencies published annually by the Treasury Board Secretariat. 12. The issue of the appointment process is a very complex and important process that deserves special a ention. It has been studied in Canada on many occasions. One useful reference is a report produced by the Public Policy Forum. See Governor-in-Council Appointments: Best Practices and Recommendations for Reform, by Nancy Averill, Nicole Murphy, and Susan Snider, Public Policy Forum, February 2004. 13. For more information, see Privy Council Office (2009). 14. There are five executive management levels in the federal public service. Typically, EX-1s occupy director-level jobs, while the EX-5 jobs are held by assistant deputy ministers. There are four levels of deputy ministers. Normally, a DM-1 occupies the position of associate deputy minister, and the DM-2 to DM-4 represent increasingly senior deputy minister positions. For example, the clerk of the Privy Council Office is a DM-4. 15. The Advisory Commi ee on Senior Level Retention and Compensation, located in the Treasury Board Secretariat, was reconstituted in 2001 with Carol Stephenson as chair. Ms Stephenson is dean of the Richard Ivey School of Business and former president and CEO of Stentor Resource Centre and vice-president of Bell Canada. 16. A good example is the Management Accountability Framework, which is administered by the Treasury Board Secretariat in assessing the performance of federal deputy ministers. 17. An updated discussion of this issue appears in Gunderson (2010). 18. For more information on this topic, see Larson and Zussman (2006, 2); Kroeger and Heynen (2003); and Tetzner (2009).

426 David Zussman 19. Prime Minister Harper decided to sideline the Public Appointments Commission in May 2006 when the opposition parties resisted approving his choice of chair. As a result, it is the only part of the Federal Accountability Act that has not yet been promulgated. 20. This has been the subject of many conversations among GIC appointees who have expressed concerns about the politicization of the appointment process. 21. For a more detailed description of these challenges, see Sossin (2010). 22. One reason cited by Savoie is that a decade of frozen salaries and the cancellation of the bonus payments for high performers seriously undermined the confidence of public servants in their political masters. 23. A good example of the public’s growing concern about executive compensation was reported by Angus Reid Public Opinion in November 2009 that 78 per cent of Americans supported salary caps on executive compensation and 52 per cent thought that executive pay packages were connected to the economic crisis. 24. See a wide range of studies published by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, and Greenberg (2010). 25. The Commi ee for Senior Officials is chaired by the clerk of the Privy Council Office and comprises of a small number of senior deputy ministers.

REFERENCES Advisory Commi ee on Senior Level Retention and Compensation. 1998. First Report. O awa: Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, January. h p://www. tbs-sct.gc.ca/rp/adcm1-eng.asp. Aucoin, Peter. 2006. “The Staffing and Evaluation of Canadian Deputy Ministers in Comparative Westminster Perspective: A Proposal for Reform.” In Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities, Volume 1: Parliament, Ministers and Deputy Ministers, 2006, 296–336. O awa: Queen’s Printer. Averill, Nancy, Nicole Murphy, and Susan Snider. 2004. Governor-in-Council Appointments: Best Practices and Recommendations for Reform. O awa: Public Policy Forum. Bebchuk, L., and J. Fried. 2004. Pay without Performance: The Unfilled Promise of Executive Compensation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Bernardo, A., E. Cai, and J. Luo. 2001. “Capital Budgeting and Compensation with Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard.” Journal of Financial Economics 61 (3): 311–44.

Public Sector Executive Compensation in a Time of Restraint 427 Bourgault, Jacques. 2004. Profile of Deputy Ministers in the Government of Canada. O awa: Canada School of Public Service. –. 2010. “The Role of Deputy Ministers in Canadian Government.” In Dunn, Handbook of Canadian Public Administration, 504–20. Conference Board of Canada. 2009. Corporate Governance Handbook: Legal Standards and Board Practices, 3rd ed. h p://www.conference-board.org/ retrievefile.cfm?filename=Corporate%20Governance%20Handbook. pdf&type=subsite. Devers, C., A. Cannella, F. Reilly, and M. Yoder. 2007. “Executive Compensation: A Multidisciplinary Review of Recent Developments.” Journal of Management 33 (6): 1016–72. Dunn, Christopher, ed. 2010. The Handbook of Canadian Public Administration. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press. Granatstein, J.L. 1988. The O awa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins 1935–1957. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press. Greenberg, Lee. 2010. “Province Will Look at Linking Pay and Performance.” Financial Post, 8 April. Gunderson, Morley. 1995. Public and Private Sector Wages: A Comparison. Working Papers, School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University. –. 2010. “Compensation in the Public Sector.” In Dunn, Handbook of Canadian Public Administration, 203–16. Hudson Institute. 2009. “Decoding the DNA of Public and Private Sector Leaders.” The Hudson Institute, h p://eu.hudson.com/node.asp?kwd=200906-decoding-the-dna-of-public-and-private-sector-leaders. Ketelaar, A., N. Manning, and E. Turkisch. 2007. Performance-Based Arrangements for Senior Civil Servants OECD and Other Country Experiences. OECD Working Papers on Public Governance, No. 5. Kroeger, Arthur, and Jeff Heynen. 2003. Making Transitions Work: Integrating External Executives into the Federal Public Service. O awa: Canada School of the Public Service. Larson, Peter, and David Zussman. 2006. “Canadian Federal Public Service: The View from Recent Executive Recruits.” Optimum 36 (2): 2–21. Osbaldeston, Gordon. 1989. Keeping Deputy Ministers Accountable. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson. Perry, James, and Annie Hondeghem, eds. 2008. Motivation in Public Management: The Call of Public Service. New York: Oxford University Press. Polli , Christopher. 1988. Managerialism and the Public Service: The Anglo-American Experience. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell. Privy Council Office. 2009. 2010–2011 Performance Management Program Guidelines: Chief Executives Officers of Crown Corporations. Senior Personnel and Special Projects Secretariat, October.

428 David Zussman Public Service Commission. 2008. Annual Report. O awa: Public Service Commission. Rainey, Hal, and Young Han Chun. 2005. “Public and Private Management Compared.” In The Oxford Handbook of Public Management, edited by E. Ferlie, L. Lynn, and C. Polli , 72–102. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Savoie, Donald. 2003. Breaking the Bargain: Public Servants, Ministers, and Parliament. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Smith, Adam. 1776. An Inquiry in the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Sossin, Lorne. 2010. “Democratic Administration.” In Dunn, Handbook of Canadian Public Administration, 268–86. Steering Group to the Cabinet Secretary. 2008. Report of the Steering Group to the Cabinet Secretary. Senior Civil Service Workforce and Reward Strategy, November, Annex D. Swi , Frank. 1993. Strategic Management in the Public Service: The Changing Role of the Deputy Minister. O awa: Canadian Centre for Management Development. Tetzner, Doug. 2009. “Making the Leap: A Guide for Private Sector Executives Exploring a Career in the Public Service.” Human Resources Professionals Association 9, no. 3 (2011): 7–9. Zussman, David. 1982. “Bonuses and Performance in the Public Sector.” Canadian Psychology 23 (4): 248–55. –. 2010. “The Precarious State of the Federal Public Service.” In How O awa Spends, 219–42. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Zussman, David, and Jak Jabes. 1989. The Vertical Solitude. Halifax: Institute for Research for Public Policy.

Conclusion: Deputy Ministers in Canada – Evolution of Deputy Ministers as Archetypal Figures jac q u e s b o u r g au lt a n d christopher dunn

This book’s authors have described the evolution of deputy ministers’ roles, their conditions of employment, and their relationship with their political masters in jurisdictions across Canada. In doing so, authors have revisited the archetypal models of their contemporary roles. It was not our purpose to compare jurisdictions in order to find the “best one.” Each province and the federal level has its own history, characteristics, and sensitivities, so rigorous comparison or ranking would have been difficult, even unfair, since much depends on the lens of the observer. This study was not a competition to discover a Canadian paragon of virtue. We have looked at eleven cases where politics met public management under specific circumstances. Each case told a unique story, but all featured a sensitive bureaucracy and a search for efficient management within the rule of law. Across jurisdictions, common questions emerged about the roles deputy ministers were expected to play in these times of political centralization and of public management, and about the appropriate status that could enable them to perform that role. The various cases permi ed the examination of four archetypes (Dunn and Bierling 2009) that we identify as representing DM role expectations: guardians, gurus, managers, and leaders. These are evolving with time, and a role well-regarded in the 1950s, for example, may now be seen as much too bureaucratic. Roles also vary according to who is chosen as DM, since some people are selected for their experience, others for their managerial skills or policy knowledge. Roles can also vary according to factors such as how much or what kind of influence the prime minister or premier wants to exert on strategic and tactical decisions.

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The Guardian Archetype The guardian archetype has a lot in common with the mandarin: knowledge, strong views, a sense of the state, and influence. Mandarin may appear to be a very old archetype, but it has been used quite recently to describe senior officials in Canada. In China and the countries under Chinese influence in the two last millennia, a mandarin was a civil servant who had been well-trained in special schools since childhood. Strictly selected through rigorous exams, he developed a particular mode of thinking and would serve the emperor, protectorate, or king (Poisson 2004, 51). Devoting his entire career to the state, the mandarin became part of a state elite that was recognized and functioned as a caste, and would exert a powerful influence on political and administrative decisions. In modern times mandarin refers not just to senior officials but also to groups of people whose power is based both on knowledge and on belonging to an exclusive circle. In such institutions as hospitals and universities, the word may refer to a select group of people with common backgrounds, who make critical decisions or are influential. In Canada the term is o en used to refer to the most senior bureaucracy, and by authors who want to allude to an exclusive club or a group of very knowledgeable people (Granatstein 1982, 11; Wilson 1983, 448). The British model, followed by Canada, of the permanent secretary has existed for well over a century. There is a distinction between the role of the minister and the role of the head of the department. The head is permanent, in the sense of not being subject to Parliament’s confidence and electoral cycles, despite being chosen under prerogative power by Order in Council. The permanent head is expected to be neutral and impartial, neither for the government nor against it. Even though the political actors may change, the deputy was described as a guardian. Granatstein sees the mandarin as guarding and promoting views about nationally important issues. These views are ideological in the wide sense of the term. “Politicians come and go … but the national interest endures. And the mandarins are its keepers” (Granatstein 1982, 1). Generalists and policymakers, mandarins feel involved with the final results. They have a strong centralist view of Canada’s development, and they actively involve themselves in its realization (11–13, 276). Granatstein portrays them as very influential and dedicated to the public service of the country: “From 1935 to 1957 the influence of the

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mandarins had been paramount … it is unlikely that a group of civil servants could ever again have such influence” (282). “They remained because they liked their job and they believed that they were doing the most important job in the country … they shared a belief that public service was a civic virtue: a duty to serve their country and its people” (10). No doubt there are guardian values within the senior public service in Canada, and these apply in many domains: administrative order; the department as an institution as well as an organization; the public interest; and the public purse. Guardian of the “Administrative Order” Some have argued that the deputy minister is the guardian of the administrative order, demonstrating what Herbert Kaufman refers to as “neutral competence.” Neutral competence is the “ability to do the work of the government expertly and to do it according to explicit, objective standards rather than to personal or party or other obligations and loyalties” (1956, 1060; see Schaffer 1973). It is difficult to define closely what administrative order they should be guarding, however. It has been understood that DMs were “guardians” to protect the administration from such mishaps as politically partisan interventions, inappropriate influences, or administrative irregularities, and from those breaking the rule of law. Guarding the Department as an Institution and as an Organization Deputies are expected to provide politicians with information, knowledge, wisdom, and analysis, so that no political pet project will jeopardize administrative organization or the efficiency of actual policies. In doing so, they protect the credibility of the department’s officers and the morale of the civil servants. They are guarding the fortress! Nowadays corporate management has slightly modified this perspective (Bourgault 2007), since corporate management involves more agenda centralization, and since DMs do not spend their whole careers within the same department, but rather in “The Government” as a corporation (e.g., federal, Ontario, Quebec, Alberta, etc.). This changed employees’ perception of their top managers’ loyalty, according to interviews conducted with federal employees in the 1980s (Zussman and Jabes 1989, 60). Notwithstanding corporate management-style realities, federal deputy heads still remain primarily responsible for the

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organization of the department, as general administrators and accounting officers. The difference may be that before, they were guardians for the sake of the department as an institution, while now they are also guardians of the department for the sake of the entire government. Guarding the Public Interest Some make the argument that as senior officials, they have a constitutional empowerment to guard and protect the public interest. The case was made for the “recognition on the part of government of the independent constitutional duties of the public service and, operationally, [and the recognition of] the accountability of Deputy Ministers and the Clerk of the Privy Council for the integrity of the public Service” (Sossin 2006, 65). They would be guardians of the public interest and be entitled to some political autonomy when called upon to obey inappropriate political orders. It may be difficult to set objective standards for making those calls. The notion of “objective standards” for providing advice is slippery, and one can o en argue objectively for or against a position if analytical constraints are slightly changed. There is also the question of what information the minister is to be told from among the many pieces that flow into the DM’s office: in the Létourneau inquiry, for instance, generals testified that it was they who decided that it was not in the public interest for the minister to immediately know about a murder in a camp. It is also known that scientific findings may not be definitive or error-free, that scientists are not always as objective as they claim to be, and that people with scientific knowledge may in fact have vested interests (Meynaud 1964, 221–4). Acting on “knowledge” and out of concern for the “public interest” is not always an absolute argument for legitimacy. The opponents to the autonomy thesis would respond that the “guardian” task is rather to provide advice, to speak truth to power, to provide the timeliest, best, and most prudent information possible to the government, no ma er how unpalatable this may be politically. Deputies should not guard against content, only against poor political decision processes. Guarding the Public Purse Deputy ministers may be the guardians of the purse: protecting the public purse against deceptive practices, the spoils of patronage, and expenditures not authorized by the budget. This was highlighted

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with the adoption in Canada of the concept of accounting officer, first practised in the United Kingdom and long recommended by C.E.S. Franks. “It was ultimately the responsibility of the Deputy Minister to recognize the impropriety of what was occurring, to object and, if his protests fell on deaf ears, to resign” (Benoit and Franks 2006, 294). The head controls management of the department. He or she is also responsible for financial probity in the department and may be called upon to answer before Parliament or officers of Parliament on ma ers relating to it. Although there is no necessary correlation with administrative decentralization, this form is conducive to management practices reconciling decentralization and accountability. The various guardian images are to protect administrative order or public interest. Some may argue that, instead, they present someone’s own ideological views, his or her own understanding of public interest and policies, the views of a bureaucratic clique, the quest to influence power (Granatstein 1982, 281), or the protection of bureaucratic selfinterest (e.g., in the sense that a change may hamper or advance someone’s personal or professional advantages: see Bozeman 2000, 17–25). Mrs Thatcher criticized her senior officials on grounds of ideological irresponsiveness (meaning that bureaucrats did not agree with the political agenda and it was feared they would sabotage it), and the early stages of the 1983 Conservative government in Canada produced similar accusations (Bourgault and Dion 1989, 124–7). The Guru (Policy Wonk) Archetype A guru is a renowned expert, whom people tend to follow with confidence. At the end of the sixties and the mid-seventies new public policies were blossoming in health, transportation, social services, housing, etc. DMs were expected to be policy experts (Bryden 1997, 115–17). They had to understand the content of such policies because of their credentials, their careers as specialists, and their national and international networks within the policy domain. They had to appear to be masters of the issues and possible solutions, and of the policymaking process, etc. At that time, many of the newer social sciences were just developing, so those with doctorates in those disciplines were in demand. Political masters, trailblazing new fields of knowledge, wanted to rely on the very best specialists. “The mandarins considered themselves as policy advisers and even policy originators, but subject to the ultimate approval of the politician who must bear responsibility for the effects of the policies implemented.

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Anonymity and privacy were crucial to most of these men” (Wilson 1983, 455), since identification with political masters comes with limits in the Westminster model. Inspiring policies may create perceptions of ideological politicization within the ranks of senior civil service. Some media argued that federal senior officials were developing “liberal policymaking,” which the authors a ributed either to continuity of government or to affinity more than to political affiliation. Other versions of the same story dealt with the pink civil service between 1926 and 1983 (Reg Whitaker, quoted in Wilson, 457). With the first Mulroney government and in provinces like Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia, the years of the 1970s and 1980s offered cases where new governments wanted to change their upper civil service, which they thought were too closely associated with the previous regimes’ policies. At the end of the seventies, it was observed that high-quality scientists appointed as DMs might not be either interested in management or capable of sound management. Subsequently, management became more complex and specialized. As science continued to develop, it became obvious that no single individual could be seen as the depository of all knowledge in any given domain, and that policymaking should involve a variety of scientific, administrative, and political contributions, from many disciplines and sub-disciplines. When DMs devoted more time to policymaking than to management, and when they involved themselves in some of the minutest details of an issue, they were called “policy wonks.” Knowledge evolved so quickly that no deputy performing his or her managerial job could keep pace with it in any domain. At the beginning of the eighties, government specialists and universities were no longer the only repositories of knowledge. Many interest groups paid high prices to commission their own studies, and information began to move more freely and faster within society. Levels of government, o en in competition with or opposing each other, began to publicly exchange information, breaking their monopolies on knowledge. Governance began to call for consultation and coordination. Beginning in the eighties, there were fewer DMs with PhDs, particularly in science, fewer with law degrees, and more with social science degrees and two or three diplomas, particularly in management. DMs were evolving from gurus into integrators of policy information. Not all senior officials could be called mandarins because of their involvement in policymaking. Wilson distinguishes “mandarins” from “kibitzers,” those senior officials for whom career ma ers most: “As

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most bridge players know, a ‘kibitzer’ is a spectator at a card game who looks at the players’ cards over their shoulders while giving gratuitous advice. In the trenches of political power, policy advisers, as well as those senior public servants who sit in the rumble seat rather than at the steering wheel of power, are categorized as kibitzers. Mandarins, of course, play at the real thing” (Wilson 1983, 447). Some deputies may well be those kibitzers, “policy advisers,” or “process advisers” who have no bond to or relation with the politician’s projects, acting like indifferent civil servants, mostly concerned with their career progression. The Manager Archetype With the rise of auditing functions (auditor general reports and value-for-money approaches, for example), regimes with new obligations for disclosure and accountability mechanisms (e.g., the rise of a ention within Parliamentary commi ees), it appeared that management was becoming more key to public administration. Inquiry commissions like Glassco and Lambert in 1979 pleaded for more management capacities and awareness at the top of departments. Management issues began to a ract more a ention from the media and public opinion. In consequence, political masters wanted to raise concern about and avoid criticism on management issues. Policymaking became only a part of the DM’s role in the 1980s. The advent of the head as a manager (Swi 1993), then a mandate, then a contractor came about with the rise of managerialism in the la er part of the twentieth century, in the wave of New Public Management. In this approach, inspired by the status of private companies’ CEOs and practised during Thatcher’s years in the United Kingdom, and in New Zealand, the head is less permanent and more likely to be hired in a limited contractual relationship with government. Some of those elements are found in the BC and Alberta appointment conditions for DMs. The deputy will at least need to work in an environment characterized by increased external recruitment, centralization of policymaking under the first minister, and an increased role for political staff. Rather than neutral competence, responsiveness is valued; the actions of the head are assessed by the extent that they further the priorities of government, and this is reflected in their performance appraisal. The head is not primarily impartial, but task-focused; this orientation is aided by performance contracts that outline government expectations of the candidate along with rewards for fulfilment

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and penalties for non-performance. There may also be associated measures, such as performance reporting, performance pay, business plans, and benchmarking. The managerial archetype has its clearest expression in UK permanent secretaries and American undersecretaries, but inroads are being made in Canada and its provinces as well. In this archetype, the policy advice role has not disappeared but has diminished significantly, to the profit of political advisors, think tanks, consultants, and pressure groups, while implementation of the mandate of the government of the day is foremost. The Leader Archetype The new role of genuine leader began to emerge at the top of the public sector in the 1990s. Leadership competency appeared as a subcomponent of managerial competencies, and multiple components of management were o en included in leadership competencies. Such is now the case in Ontario, Quebec, and the federal government, where the term is used in their training programs. At the federal level the Managerial Accountability Framework does not label leadership as one of the ten specific components but requires leadership in all of them. For all its newness, it is a role definition that has begun to take on a note of urgency and primacy, making it qualitatively different from the others. In this role, the head pays great a ention to corporate issues, emphasizes corporate human resources (HR) planning, engages in succession planning, monitors employee engagement, and generally is sensitive to the issue of government as “employer of choice.” Of course, deputy ministers have always been leaders in their department. Leadership based on statutory authority has moved towards leadership by vision, engagement, mobilization, care for people, and personal example. The importance of practising sound leadership at the top is now imperative (Dutil 2008). Government senses the fragility of the image of public service as a whole and extreme competition in a racting new recruits and retaining employees, and the sense of urgency is apparent. Corporate approaches are seen as the way to protect the institution. There is a tendency for governments to mature over time, away from the managerial archetype, toward a more corporate culture. Deputies have to be managers and leaders at the same time. The deputy head is o en expected to engage in what the Blair government called “joined-up government,” meaning more horizontal management, which calls for be er leadership skills.

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In sum, the archetypes have evolved, as expected roles for the DMs. From guardians and mandarins they became policy gurus and then managers with a strong leadership component over recent years. No archetype is the only one put into practice. All come into play on any day in the DM’s office. We must emphasize that the way each archetype is being practised has changed over the years: the guardian of 1960 would not survive one week in office today; involvement in policymaking is now more strategic; the mandarinate has moved from a closed clique to a corporate management set of good practices; the manager faces a more complex tissue of constraints that may appear contradictory, and must pay more a ention to results and less to conforming to procedures; now the leader has to inspire, set an example, collaborate with staff in lieu of insisting on his or her position at the top of the hierarchy, and create and manage people’s engagement. In the course of the DM’s workday, there is a balance as well as a blend of roles: organizing policy advice, implementing and overseeing programs, assuring administrative efficiency, and providing departmental leadership. The Archetypes within Jurisdictional Contexts The study has demonstrated differences for the role within jurisdictions. Size does not ma er as much as history, traditions, sense of identity, and penetration of NPM ideas – same-size provinces had and still have different practices for the DM’s role. Each practice is in line with a unique socio-political identity: some may value private sector management because their populations consider it very positively (Alberta and Ontario), while others are well aware of innovations in public management and want to be ahead of the wave (federal, British Columbia, Ontario, Alberta), some favour a strong premier’s role (Newfoundland and Labrador, New Brunswick), and others are sensitive to the party’s agenda (Saskatchewan and Quebec), etc. Observers tend to use recruitment and departures as entry points for analysing the “black box of power.” Recruitment from the private sector may mean less danger of a caste effect as well as openness to new ideas, be er management, and more efficiency. Relations between politics and recruitment are always a ma er of interest for opposition leaders, media, or the public. Everywhere, few people are recruited from the private sector, and if they come to federal and provincial government, they do not stay long

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(Kroeger 2004). Why? Is it to be remedied? Money was and still is a factor for a raction: the public sector will never be politically capable of offering what the DM equivalent is paid in private companies. The public eye is also a burden: in the private sector the Board can have a confidential look at decisions, whereas media a ention makes public sector decisions more open to criticism, whether demagogical or welldeserved. Those coming from inside the civil service benefit from a long-established network of governmental relations (and IOUs), which can ease some decision processes. Newcomers from other public service levels and universities tend to “succeed” more than those recruited from the private sector. Private sector recruits at the DM levels, pressed with challenges to deliver results, tend to expect fast and bold implementation of decisions in a rather simple organizational system. The reality is that the public sector is a theatre with different plays presented all at the same time. Actors have different and simultaneous codirectors. Spectators sometimes have contradictory expectations. The key to private sector recruitment, aside from money, seems to be acclimation of newcomers at a lower level. In political recruitment, is there an election effect? In Alberta there seems to be none, but since changes in the DM roster is more linked to Cabinet secretary changes than to election changes, there is a leadership change effect. Moreover, although the election effect triggers an important leadership effect at the federal level,1 in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec, and Ontario the incoming clerk helps to replenish the DM cadre. In mobility, the federal government now tends to recruit more from the provincial DMs. Some come from New Brunswick, Quebec, and Saskatchewan. They are inserted at a lower level (associate or assistant) and promoted to principal DMs within four to five years. This helps to prepare the next cohort of deputy ministers and to sensitize O awa to regional issues and provincial governmental challenge, and may contribute to the easing of federal–provincial relations. It is notable that the managerial archetype is currently in the ascendancy, but the pace varies with jurisdictions. The guardian and leader archetypes are growing in importance in most provinces. Consider Newfoundland and Labrador. There the guardian archetype was prevalent for many decades. It had been put into place in the Moores years (1972–9) as a counter-reaction to the unprofessional and somewhat partisan management style of Joseph R. Smallwood, and it stayed. It stayed because it was a functional necessity, to establish

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a sense of stability for a service that had seen anything but for years. “It was,” says Christopher Dunn, “a classic politically neutral senior cadre, filled with a sense of professionalism and trust” (chapter 1, this volume). Every successive premier and government since then has retained the commitment to a merit-based public service, has respected the divide between political and administrative roles, and has been receptive to a degree of policy input from the senior public service. In the early twenty-first century, the managerial form began to make inroads, and the examination of provincial jurisdictions provides no shortage of examples. Premier Danny Williams, imbued with decades of business experience, felt constrained by the traditional approach taken by senior staff. By the end of his time in office, only two of the original cadre of deputies remained. Most of the new ones had business training. Williams said that he now considered them as CEOs, as managing directors leading departments roughly analogous to business units, in order to counter the tendency towards inefficiency that could, in his opinion, arise from the “security blanket” that surrounded deputies. A series of expedients directed the senior bureaucracy to follow political direction: party blueprints (that is, manifestos), performance contracts, performance reporting, investigation of incentive pay, and a change in the culture of the service to risk-taking and productivity. The analogy to the managerial archetype was imperfect, in the sense that there was no large-scale move to temporary CEO contracts. However, there was some movement away from sole reliance on hiring Newfoundlanders for senior positions. Other provinces have not been this impatient with the guardian role, but there have been overtones of it in recent years. Coffin and Turnbull observe that the task orientation of Nova Scotia’s deputies was encouraged, until recently, by a formal interlocking system of annual performance appraisals and pay-for-performance packages. Premier Rodney MacDonald weakened the system in 2007 when he terminated this design and instead gave raises unrelated to performance; however, the authority of the premier was retained, in that bonus pay could be eliminated for some deputies, they could be moved to smaller departments, or they could lose an important policy file. Managerial management has taken on a different hue in present-day Nova Scotia, under what Coffin and Turnbull refer to as the “new public governance,” a term they borrow from Peter Aucoin. It is an ensemble of tendencies: the concentration of power in the Premier’s Office, increased numbers of political staff in departments, more a ention to

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senior appointments by the Premier’s Office, and pressure on departments to put pro-government spin in their communications strategies and show enthusiasm for Cabinet plans and priorities. In addition to this general strategy of corporate governance, some other tools are available to the centre. The deputy minister to the premier advises the premier on the allocation of raises and/or bonuses, and there has been a new central deputy position in the Office of Policy and Priorities, with a partisan appointment filling it. The office serves a new Cabinet commi ee consisting of the premier and key ministers and sets the government’s agenda. The current premier’s style features deputies accounting directly to the deputy minister to the premier’s office, but on major policies and priorities, the premier prefers to meet with department deputies. This is task management with a vengeance. However, the authors note that even if the new public governance phenomenon is present in Nova Scotia, many deputy ministers are appointed and promoted on the basis of skills, expertise, experience, and effectiveness. As well, the guardian model is still relevant: even deputies who are sometimes pressured into political responsiveness can be productive, effective managers who provide sound advice to their ministers. Prince Edward Island’s deputies similarly manifest a combination of roles. However, because the bureaucracy is small, a disproportionate number of decisions are made by ministers. It is not so much a ma er of political direction as it is direct ministerial involvement. McKenna estimates that about 60 per cent of policy initiatives start with ministers and about 40 per cent with departments. By the 1970s, the service had gone from a patronage-ridden service to one considered among the best in Atlantic Canada. The choice of deputies is based on departmental service and merit for the most part, with a few partisan appointments made that were reminiscent of practices earlier in the century. There has been substantial corporate involvement by deputies: “deputies’ tables” have existed since the early seventies and have taken on new importance in the government of Robert Ghiz: There has been an effort to embrace a more traditional model that stresses strategic policy advice from its deputies. Accordingly, the deputies’ executive boards has been given the responsibility of ensuring that their respective departments are acting and thinking horizontally and adopting a government-wide policy agenda. Several “policy tables” were created – in areas such as social policy, fiscal planning and review,

Conclusion 441 economic development strategy, and public service modernization – to ensure that deputies were thinking strategically outside of their narrow bureaucratic silos.

New Brunswick deputies progressively enjoyed more managerial responsibilities under the premier’s direct oversight. Traditionally politicization affected appointments in some positions, like the DM of justice. Most other recruitments come from within the career civil service. Ministers, in general, tended not to have as much influence on their DMs as the premier did. There is some progression towards corporate management, but this varies with the political balance of power at the top, with the clerk as influential as the secretary to the premier. Acting as guardian is a more delicate task when the DM is under the premier’s direct supervision, but New Brunswick DMs remain pivotal in the process of policymaking. Deputy ministers from Quebec have experienced a variety of major political changes since 1960. In 1960, 1966, 1970, 1976, and 1984 the DM staff was subject to waves of changes, since incoming governments had li le confidence in either the loyalty or the policy orientations of the DMs. The nationalist debate in 1976, followed by the right-le debate, could be seen to justify the belief that more ideologically compatible DMs were required. Since 1995, fewer DM staff changes occurred a er a new government was sworn in. The academic profile was modified in the 1980s, when professionals replaced university professors as deputies. Since 2003, corporate management seems more difficult to implement where ministers and deputies have direct access to the Premier’s Office. With 33 per cent having partisan backgrounds, particularly at the highest DM positions, it is difficult to perform the role of guardian adequately: this was noted when there was criticism about the appointment process for judges, for awarding road contracts, for developing sound policies on mines and gas, etc. Ontario’s deputy ministers, note Evans, Lum, and MacLellan, have seen their leadership role evolve “from that of omnipotent advisor and problem ‘fixer’ reigning over a distinct sector – the era of the ‘guru’ – toward a more managerial function ensuring the effective, efficient, and economic management of large organizations within a still larger organization.” In short, from guardian to corporate manager. The guardian code was outlined by Ed Stewart in his institutional biography (1989): the deputies were to be the “administrative heads of their ministries,” implementing the decisions of political masters; they

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were to keep the minister informed and provide quality policy advice; and they were to maintain effective relationships between ministries and between ministries and central agencies. Here is a plain indication of a balance of implementation and policy role. Policy development was shared with the political level, but policy implementation was the sole responsibility of the deputy. There was even a certain deference among the politicians to the policy expertise of deputies during the province-building era under Premier Davis (1971–85); hence the nickname “gurus.” Managerial concerns – the authors call it “the forward march of managerialism” – increased in importance under the next two Liberal and NDP governments of Peterson and Rae. The deputies’ policy role declined for various reasons, including the centralization of policy initiatives in the Premier’s Office and ministerial offices during Peterson’s time (1985–90), and the active distrust of most of the senior bureaucracy in Rae’s interlude (1990–3). Yet the most notable decline was during the tumultuous Harris years (1995–2002). In this respect, the process of implementing the Common Sense Revolution necessitated a restructuring of the relationship between the senior public service and the political leadership. Specifically, this meant deputies’ cherished role as policy advisors would be constrained, and their a ention was refocused towards management of resources and policy implementation. Managerialism was a means to enlist the state and its leadership in implementing an aggressive neoliberal restructuring in Ontario as well as elsewhere. This emphasis on “responsive competence” as opposed to “neutral competence” was furthered by administrative policies like annual performance agreements for all OPS senior executives, and a new compensation plan that linked pay to results, and an executive development curriculum to help senior managers develop leadership skills in furtherance of “new OPS directions.” Inherent in the executive curriculum was a mixture of skills indicative of both the managerial and leader archetypes. These included contract negotiations, strategic communications, staff retention, executive presentations, project leadership, management of information technology, performance measurement, and risk management (Ontario Civil Service Commission 2001, 33). In response to two major strikes by public service employees, say the authors, “an unheard-of executive-level focus on human resources questions and concerns emerged” (Evans, Lum, and MacLellan, chapter 6 in this volume).

Conclusion 443

The much greater emphasis on external recruitment – non-OPS candidates to DM ranks – say the authors, was significant in the Peterson and Harris premierships. Part of it was due to subtle politicization and a ractive senior compensation. However, part of it also reflected a new leadership archetype concern: “A greater premium is now placed on management skills, such as recruitment. This premium may well reflect an effort to import managerial knowledge and practices, which are viewed to being be er developed in both private and broader public sector organizations outside of the OPS.” Manitoba, with its balance of policy, implementation, and leadership roles for deputies, presents a different picture. It retains the classical guardian tendencies but has begun to transition to a leadership model in recent years as well. It is significant that the stringent measures associated with assuring implementation success, as with the managerial archetype – namely appointment of deputies on term contracts, the use of annual performance appraisals linked to promotions and compensation of deputies, and the use of larger political staffs – has not materialized in Manitoba, say Jensen and Thomas. “Governments of different partisan persuasions,” they say, “have generally been satisfied that the traditional arrangements for the appointment and accountability of deputy ministers have worked satisfactorily to produce a reasonable balance between loyalty and responsiveness to the government of the day, and the professionalism and impartiality required for deputies to provide frank advice and deliver programs efficiently and fairly.” Not only has policy advice not been downplayed in the list of deputy responsibilities, it is the deputy’s “primary duty and main activity.” Centralization of power in the Premier’s Office, which is endemic to many other jurisdictions, does not happen in Manitoba, where ministers and deputies still enjoy significant autonomy, subject to a growing emphasis on collective Cabinet / Cabinet commi ee decision-making. Jensen and Thomas also note a number of administrative leadership skills that are considered important in Manitoba. Many of them are reminiscent of the leadership archetype: ensuring the department has a vision and strategy, an appropriate structure of authority for ensuring internal accountability, an appropriate internal financial management process, plans and performance reports to align departmental activities with government priorities, staffing and human resource management processes sufficient to provide competent employees, and motivational activities to promote a shared culture of purpose, pride, commitment and integrity. In addition, as a result of Premier Doer’s commitment to

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developing external relationships and collaborative government, deputies are increasingly “out front” as spokespersons and negotiators on behalf of their governments and departments. Ken Rasmussen’s senior executive cadre, on the other hand, does not fit comfortably with any archetypal deputy types, but it is probably closest to the managerial archetype. He argues that they form a hybrid model in many ways. Saskatchewan’s political elite has rejected the classic notions of a permanent public service and instead embraces something of a hybrid model in which deputy ministers are not strictly career bureaucrats, but are “political executives.” That is, rather than focusing on maintaining the integrity of government programs, overseeing the continuity of their organizations, and proving institutional memory, deputy ministers have been required to take on a broader set of responsibilities involving a higher level of sensitivity to the government’s political agenda than would normally be associated with the ideal deputy minister. In this regard it might be appropriate to describe deputy ministers in Saskatchewan as political executives as much as they are public servants. The notion of a largely self-selected, neutral, independent public service relying on law and legal responsibilities for the proper relationship between officials and ministers has never had significant roots in Saskatchewan. Going back more than six decades – and the province is li le more than ten decades old – the CCF/NDP initiated a theme of shaking the perceived inertia of the senior bureaucracy in order to inculcate loyalty to the innovative programs of the party in power – even though it had made most of the service merit-based and endowed with collective bargaining rights. This tendency was duplicated by most succeeding administrations of various partisan hues. Significant numbers of deputies and even some typical career public servants find themselves dismissed upon a change in government because of incompatibility with the partisan stripe of the administration in power. This is plainly not the neutral competence of elsewhere and of other times. “Sound policy, frank and fearless advice, and speaking truth to power,” says Rasmussen, “are not as important … as the ability to help the government implement its agenda.” Yet evidence is beginning to accumulate that the province is about to move beyond this model, which generates “a system in which deputy ministers’ careers are short, rotation is quite high, and they are increasingly excluded from key policy deliberations and decisions.” What follows is a lack of institutional memory and organizational continuity,

Conclusion 445

which ironically makes it harder for premiers and Cabinets to reach their goals. The Saskatchewan Party, which started its reign in the familiar hybrid mode, has realized its shortcomings and moved in the direction of neutral competence. More than half (eight) of its initial DM appointments had no senior government experience in provincial public service, or no experience in government at all. However, in less than two years, five were either fired or moved aside to lesser assignments. No surviving senior career public servants have been removed or fired, and additional appointments have relied on existing public servants from the Saskatchewan public service, most notably the deputy minister of finance and the deputy minister to the premier. It is probably too early to judge, but the province’s political elites may be at ease with the notion of career DMs with longer service, who are competent in policy ma ers and who can concentrate on their areas of expertise, make longer-term judgments, and provide organizational and operational context to help ministers make be er decisions. Allan Tupper’s Alberta deputy is a far cry from the new public governance senior official who is said to hold sway in Nova Scotia and, if one makes an approximation, Saskatchewan. Deputies in Alberta do not exhibit politicization. First, they are appointed a er long careers in the public service, most o en within the provincial public service. Second, the possibility of a “common mindset” in politicians and officials is also dismissed. Experience has shown that there is actually a variety of mindsets at work, and divisions on several fronts: between those promoting activist and limited roles for government, urban and rural foci, and individual and social rights. As well, public servants are expected to leave decisions to the politicians. Third, evidence for excessive responsiveness to political direction in Alberta has not been provided. Alberta deputies are sui generis. According to Tupper, they seem to be a cross between the neutral competence and leader archetypes in a style unequalled across Canada. They have the balance of responsibilities familiar to the neutral competence model: exercising policy process advice and support to the minister, and responsibility for overall management of the department. However, the leader archetype is evident at a number of turns. According to Tupper, “The modern Alberta deputy minister is not envisioned as an ‘autonomous, powerful leader’ who heroically steers her ministry in new directions (Denis, Langley, and Rouleay 450). To the contrary, she is seen as a results-oriented team player in a complex, pluralistic environment that places a premium

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on teamwork, network creation, participation in the establishment of effective communications systems, and gaining of consent from diverse stakeholders.” Government sees them as having an obligation to seek out opportunities with other deputies to pursue the government’s corporate agenda. No other government makes this a standard for judging the deputy cadre. To further corporate governance, premiers define “crossministry” initiatives, deputies meet frequently as a whole to discuss their combined role in furthering government priorities, and one criterion used by the deputy minister of Executive Council in evaluations of deputies is their performance as a contributor to overall government performance. They are evaluated mainly by the deputy minister of Executive Council, who has the last word on performance quality and merit pay, if any is to be allocated. Another unique aspect of Alberta deputies is the method of their recruitment in which the deputy minister of Executive Council plays the lead role. This also has the effect of discouraging politicization (although the premier makes the final decision on their choice, and ministerial input is encouraged). Deputies are chosen by an open, transparent process, outsiders are encouraged to apply, and there is a wide-net approach to recruitment. British Columbia also confounds easy categorization. It promotes political responsiveness, say Evert Lindquist and Thea Vakil: “BC’s turnover in executives is high, compared with most other provincial and territorial public services, and there can be no doubt that BC premiers have sought to appoint cadres of executives who are responsive and aligned with government strategic directions.” On the other hand, it simultaneously hires strong individuals with sound policy experience who are not simply instruments of government. BC governments have relied heavily on the career BC public service as a feeder group for top executive appointments, and even those appointed from outside the BC public service have typically had substantial public sector experience. Whatever the source or reason for appointments, “the evolving mix of appointments has struck a reasonable balance among a racting new sorts of expertise and perspective on policy and management, acknowledging the experience and institutional memory of the public service, and providing trusted advice and the prospect of solid leadership and management of ministries for governments,” say Lindquist and Vakil. Recent Campbell Liberal governments, especially under Jessica McDonald, when she was deputy

Conclusion 447

minister to the premier, have sought to bring “responsiveness” by instituting performance incentives, but have also encouraged leadership, innovation, and cultural change through professional development programs, speakers, awards, and a wider range of marketing and recruitment strategies at all levels. Gerald Bierling, Barbara Wake Carroll, and Michael Whyte Kpessa observed the mobility for provincial deputy ministers from 1987 to 2007, searching for an election effect that would confirm the thesis of partisan politicization of deputy ministers. The two main schools of thought on the staffing and management of Canadian provincial bureaucrats are that movements in and out vary across time in different jurisdictions and not necessarily a function of partisan politics and in the provinces, and the degree of mobility reflects a much lower turnover rate in the departments in which specific technical expertise is a basic qualification. Others, like Lindquist and Aucoin, have conducted studies leading them to conclude that movement in and out of the provincial public service is a function of partisan politics or political affiliation. Their observations lead them to conclude that there had been an absolute increase in the numbers of senior bureaucrats for that period of time, and that there is only a limited election effect. “Incoming governments seem to respect the integrity and knowledge of the permanent establishment for purposes of continuity and implementation. This seems to point to the resilience of the traditional values of permanent, nonpartisan public service in the provinces.” This tells how important deputy ministers and ADMs are in the provincial policy process, on the basis of “two types of knowledge, process and substance.” Federal deputy ministers have been at the forefront of paradoxical managerialism in Canada: they were expected to implement managerial reforms but to prevent their political masters from experiencing public embarrassment – an impossible task, particularly with hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of transactions every year being processed by more than three hundred thousand employees! Bourgault explains that the increasingly corporate management style the government adopted influenced how it framed the DM function: DM commi ees in the early 1960s, peer performance evaluation in the late 1960s, group seminars, career plans and performance pay in the 1970s, and an increased role for the clerk in the 1990s (particularly a er 1993). Now there is an informal preparation for the first DM appointment, with candidates drawn from the assistant and associate deputy minister ranks. Although deputy ministers were still recruited from within the public service, their

448 Jacques Bourgault and Christopher Dunn

professional qualifications and educational background shi ed in the late 1970s. There were fewer scientific experts and more seasoned public managers. In the early twenty-first century they enjoyed an ambitious program of pay for performance, and their performance criteria were determined by the clerk as well as through the general Managerial Accountability Framework. Depending on the minister, the DM role changed from the most important minister’s advisor to one advisor among many. Deputy ministers became more formally accountable on the administrative side, while still retaining classic political ministerial accountability. Final Remarks This book represents, at least for most of the provinces, an ambitious, fair, and pioneering depiction of the evolution of DMs’ roles in political science and public management. It demonstrates how each jurisdiction adopts practices according to the needs, capacities, and wishes of its political establishment and its own legal framework. A er the reign of guardian archetypes, there has no doubt been a common policy evolution towards more manager and leader archetypes. Some may think it is unfortunate that the “guardian only” archetype is in retreat in some provinces such as Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, and Ontario, or that it never was seriously tried in others, such as Saskatchewan, where it was feared that it provided too much power to deputies, and it was felt that democracy means elected officials make the calls and participate closely in their formulation. In such cases the senior official’s role becomes one of fulfilling the government’s expectations, having its programs implemented effectively by ensuring that managerial mechanisms are in place. This also reveals much about the evolution of political capacity at the executive level. Much of what was expected from deputies in analysis and policy evaluation can now be organized and produced by the political powers themselves, if they so wish. Will the corporate management style evolve into systemic ideological or partisan politicization? Some fear that the recruitment of only those officials who agree with the government agenda (sometimes termed the “Russian doll syndrome”) may jeopardize the quality of advice received by the prime minister and premier, lessen the capacity to speak truth to power, and squeeze the recommendation process into a too-narrow format (Bourgault 2007). Can the leader archetype be too

Conclusion 449

inward-looking within his or her department? Or must this role be balanced with that of corporate manager, acting as a spokesperson for the government within the department? Contemporary DMs need qualities that enable them to perform all archetypes simultaneously: guardian, guru (acting as integrator), manager, and leader. This balance of archetypal elements has been recently achieved in Ontario, and in Manitoba, British Columbia, and in the federal government. The challenge for all is to have systems to develop and nurture people’s capacity to perform such simultaneous roles at the highest level, and to adapt as the roles evolve. Deputy ministers in Canada are archetypal figures. Several decades of postwar evolution have resulted in overlapping role definitions and multiple performance expectations. Some may seem paradoxical, if not actually contradictory. This poses a challenge not only for deputy ministers but for the Cabinet secretaries who manage them and the ministers and premiers for whom they work. The next few years should be interesting ones, as these complicated tensions work themselves out, and should be the topics taken on by further senior executive studies.

NOTE 1. In one of the many available cases, a DM was moved to a less important department, but came back to a prestigious department right a er his friend was appointed clerk.

REFERENCES Benoit, Liane, and C.E.S. Franks. 2006. “For the Want of a Nail: The Role of Internal Audit in the Sponsorship Scandal.” In Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities (the Gomery Commission), 233–303. O awa: Queen’s Printer. Bourgault, Jacques. 2007. “Corporate Management at Top Level of Governments: The Canadian Case.” IRAS 73 (2): 257–74. Bourgault, Jacques, and S. Dion. 1989. “Governments Come and Go, but What of Senior Civil Servants? Canadian Deputy Ministers and Transitions in Power (1867–1987).” Governance 2 (3): 124–51. Bozeman, Barry. 2000. Bureaucracy and Red Tape. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

450 Jacques Bourgault and Christopher Dunn Bryden, Penny E. 1997. Planners and Politicians, Liberal Politics and Social Policy: 1957–1968. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Dunn, Christopher, and Gerald Bierling. “Les sous-ministres des gouvernements provinciaux canadiens comme figures archétypales.” Telescope (Winter 2009): 65–78. Dutil, Patrice, ed. 2008. Searching for Leadership: Secretaries to Cabinet in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Granatstein, Jack L. 1982. The OĴawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935–1957. Toronto: Oxford University Press. Kaufman, Herbert. 1956. “Emerging Conflicts in the Doctrines of Public Administration.” American Political Science Review 50 (4): 1057–73. h p:// dx.doi.org/10.2307/1951335. Kroeger, Arthur. 2004. Deputy Ministers Coming from Outside the Public Service: Challenges and Lessons Learned. O awa: CCMD. Meynaud, Jean. 1964. La technocratie. Mythe ou réalité. Paris: Les Éditions Payot. Ontario Civil Service Commission. 2003. Annual Report, 2002–2003. Toronto: Queen’s Printer. Ontario Civil Service Commission. 2001. Annual Report, 2000–2001. Toronto: Queen’s Printer. Poisson, Emmanuel. 2004. Mandarins et subalternes au nord du Viêt Nam. Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose. Schaffer, Benjamin Bernard. 1973. The Administrative Factor: Papers in Organization, Politics and Development. London: Frank Cass. Sossin, Lorne. March 2006. “Defining Boundaries: The Constitutional Argument for Bureaucratic Independence and Its Implications for the Accountability of the Public Service.” In Research Studies, 2:25–72. Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities (the Gomery Commission). O awa: Queen’s Printer. Stewart, Edward. 1989. Cabinet Government in Ontario: A View from Inside. Halifax: Institute for Research on Public Policy. Swi , Frank. 1993. Strategic Management in the Public Service: The Changing Role of the Deputy Minister. O awa: Canada School of Public Service. Wilson, V. Seymour. 1983. “Mandarins and Kibitzers: Men in and around the Trenches of Political Power in O awa.” Canadian Public Administration 26 (3): 447–61. h p://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1754-7121.1983.tb01037.x. Zussman, David, and Jak Jabes. 1989. Vertical Solitude: Managing in the Public Sector. O awa: Renouf.

Contributors

Gerald Bierling works in the Department of Sociology at McMaster University and has taught research methods and statistics in the Department of Political Science at McMaster. He has researched and published in the areas of provincial government expenditures, political corruption, and mobility pa erns of senior civil servants. Gilles Bouchard holds a PhD from Université de Montréal, and retired as professor and director of the Département d’administration publique at Université de Moncton. He has published many articles and chapters on public administration in Canada, with a particular focus on New Brunswick and Quebec. He studies the relations between public administration and society, including the political system. Jacques Bourgault is working in national and international consulting on public administration with COFAP Inc. He retired as full professor at UQAM and is now adjunct professor at UQAM and ENAP and was emeritus scholar at CSPS. Bourgault chaired the Institute of Public Administration of Canada, sat on many boards (like UQAM, CCMD), and participated in several panels of inquiry. Bourgault has published numerous books, chapters, and articles, organized conferences, and conducted many studies of public administration, senior officials, strategic planning, human resources, performance appraisal, and management by results. For more information see h p://www. jacquesbourgault.com/. Barbara Wake Carroll is a professor emerita in the Department of Political Science, McMaster University. She was editor of Canadian Public Administration from 2005 to 2011. She has wri en extensively

452 Contributors

on bureaucratic elites in developed and developing countries. She has wri en or edited many books and articles on public administration, organization theory, public policy, and development. Her work has appeared in Canadian Public Administration, Canadian Public Policy, Canadian Journal of Urban Research, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Governance, International Review of Administrative Science, Journal of Development Studies, Journal of Comparative and Commonwealth Studies, and others. Michelle Coffin is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at Dalhousie University. Her current research project evaluates the impact of appointment processes of public sector senior management on the efficacy of accountability regimes in Westminster systems, specifically Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. In addition to the political-administrative dichotomy, her research interests include Canadian and comparative politics. She is a part-time faculty member at Dalhousie University and Acadia University. Christopher Dunn is a professor in the Department of Political Science at Memorial University of Newfoundland. His teaching and publishing areas include Canadian politics, the constitution, federalism, public policy, and public administration. He is the author of several books and the editor most recently of The Handbook of Canadian Public Administration (Oxford University Press, 2010). He was a member of the Green Commission on Constituency Allowances and Related Ma ers (Newfoundland and Labrador) and contributed to two other commissions of inquiry: the federal Macdonald Commission (1985) and the provincial royal commission report on Renewing and Strengthening Our Place in Canada (2003). Bryan M. Evans is an associate professor in the Department of Politics and Public Administration at Ryerson University. Prior to his academic appointment, Bryan enjoyed a professional career spanning several public sector organizations, including the Ontario Public Service. His teaching and research interests focus on the politics and public management of neoliberalization, policy capacity, and provincial government and politics. His publications reflect this research agenda, most notably Shrinking the State: Globalization and Public Administration (with John Shields) (Fernwood, 1998).

Contributors 453

Rebecca Jensen holds an MA in political history and an MPA, both from the University of Manitoba. For her doctorate, she plans to research change and innovation in large public organizations. Paul Thomas was her MPA supervisor, and she worked as Dr Thomas’s research assistant. Michael Whyte Kpessa, PhD, is a research fellow at the Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, Legon. His fields of research include public administration, public policy, and comparative politics. His current research analyses the transformative and innovative uses of social policies for nation building, economic development, and democratic governance, and examines the nexus between democratic mobilization and redistribution (or lack thereof) in sub-Saharan African countries. Previous peer-reviewed articles were published in Canadian Public Policy, Canadian Public Administration, Poverty and Public Policy, Journal of Developing Societies, International Social Security Review, and Review of International Political Economy. Evert Lindquist (PhD Berkeley, Public Policy) is a professor in the School of Public Administration, University of Victoria, and has served as director since 1998. During 2010–11 he held the ANZSOG-ANU chair in Applied Public Management Research at the Australian National University. He is an adjunct faculty member with ANU’s Crawford School of Economics and Government. He has published widely on public sector reform, governance and decision-making, central agencies and initiatives, policy capability, think tanks and consultation processes, and recently on policy visualization. He is editor of Canadian Public Administration, the Institute of Public Administration of Canada’s flagship journal. Janet M. Lum is a professor in the Department of Politics and Public Administration, Ryerson University, and co-chairs the Canadian Research Network for Care in the Community, a national and international network of researchers, community organizations, professional providers, consumers, and policy analysts. The network aims to provide evidence about the crucial role of community support services within the broader continuum of health and social care available to policy planners and administrators. Her publications focus on key issues in health, supportive housing, and the aging experience of diverse populations.

454 Contributors

Duncan MacLellan is an associate professor in the Department of Politics and Public Administration, and a member of the Yeates School of Graduate Studies, Ryerson University. Duncan’s teaching and research interests are in educational politics and policymaking at the provincial and local levels, state and teacher relations, and local/urban governance. Duncan’s recent publications include “Neoliberalism and Ontario Teachers’ Unions: A ‘Not-So’ Common Sense Revolution,” Socialist Studies 5, no. 1 (2009): 51–74. Peter McKenna is chair and professor of the Department of Political Science, University of Prince Edward Island, Charlo etown. He has published widely on Prince Edward Island politics, gaming policy in Atlantic Canada, and Canadian–Latin American affairs. Among his books are Terminal Damage: The Politics of VLTs in Atlantic Canada (Fernwood, 2008) and Canada–Cuba Relations: The Other Good Neighbor Policy (co-authored). His most recent work is an edited volume entitled Canada Looks South: In Search of an Americas Policy (University of Toronto Press, 2012). Ken Rasmussen is an associate director of the Johnson-Shoyama Graduate School of Public Policy, University of Regina. He holds a PhD in political science from the University of Toronto and is a member of the editorial board of Canadian Public Administration and Public Management Review. He is the author of numerous articles on public management and public policy. Most recently he completed a book with Luc Juillet called Defending a Contested Ideal: Merit and the Public Service Commission, 1908–2008 (University of O awa Press, 2008) and is co-editor (with David Siegel) of Professionalism and Public Service: Essays in Honour of Kenneth Kernaghan (University of Toronto Press, 2008). John Shields is a professor in the Department of Politics and Public Administration, Ryerson University. He has published widely on public policy and administration. His books include Dismantling a Nation (with Stephen McBride); Shrinking the State: Globalization and Public Administration “Reform” (with Bryan Evans); and Restructuring and Resistance: Canadian Public Policy in an Age of Global Capitalism (edited with Mike Burke and Colin Mooers), published by Fernwood Publishing. Paul G. Thomas is a professor emeritus in the Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, where he taught for over forty years, the last ten as the first Duff Roblin Professor of Government. He

Contributors 455

is the author of 150 book chapters and articles. In recognition of his academic work and his service on numerous boards and commissions, he has received many awards, including the Order of Manitoba (2007) and the Vanier Medal from the Institute of Public Administration of Canada (2003). Allan Tupper is a professor and head, Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia. Previously, he taught at the University of Alberta. Tupper’s major teaching and research interests are Canadian and Western Canadian politics and public management, and he has published extensively on these topics. He is president of the Canadian Association of Programs in Public Administration and Public Policy and former editor of Canadian Public Administration. Lori Turnbull is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science and Canadian Studies, Dalhousie University. Her research and teaching focuses on parliamentary governance in Canada, elections and campaigns, and political ethics. She has published articles in Canadian Public Administration, Canadian Political Science Review, Journal of Parliamentary and Political Law, and the Canadian Parliamentary Review. With Peter Aucoin and Mark Jarvis, she is the author of Democratizing the Constitution: Reforming Responsible Government (Emond Montgomery, 2011). Thea Vakil is an associate professor and associate director of the School of Public Administration, University of Victoria. She is also responsible for the Centre of Public Sector Studies at the School of Public Administration. Thea is a researcher, educator, and former executive with extensive experience in large portfolios with the government of British Columbia. She has special expertise in human resource management, organizational change, public policy, strategic planning, and leadership development. She teaches widely in these and other areas at the School of Public Administration and the Faculty of Business. Stéphanie Viola-Plante is a PhD candidate in political science, University of Quebec in Montreal, specializing in public administration. Her thesis explores the impact of the New Public Management on the deputy ministers of four Canadian provinces. Her research interests are the senior civil service, management of human resources, organizational theory, and public management.

456 Contributors

David Zussman holds the Jarislowsky Chair in Public Sector Management and is director of the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of O awa. He has served as assistant secretary to the Cabinet for Machinery of Government and Program Review in the Privy Council Office, dean of the Faculty of Management at the University of O awa, president of the Public Policy Forum, and professor of public administration at the University of Victoria, and has been a regular columnist with the O awa Citizen and Canadian Government Executive, writing on public management and policy.

The Institute of Public Administration of Canada Series in Public Management and Governance Networks of Knowledge: Collaborative Innovation in International Learning, Janice Stein, Richard Stren, Joy Fitzgibbon, and Melissa Maclean The National Research Council in the Innovative Policy Era: Changing Hierarchies, Networks, and Markets, G. Bruce Doern and Richard Levesque Beyond Service: State Workers, Public Policy, and the Prospects for Democratic Administration, Greg McElligo A Law unto Itself: How the Ontario Municipal Board Has Developed and Applied Land Use Planning Policy, John G. Chipman Health Care, Entitlement, and Citizenship, Candace Redden Between Colliding Worlds: The Ambiguous Existence of Government Agencies for Aboriginal and Women’s Policy, Jonathan Malloy The Politics of Public Management: The HRDC Audit of Grants and Contributions, David A. Good Dream No Li le Dreams: A Biography of the Douglas Government of Saskatchewan, 1944–1961, Albert W. Johnson Governing Education, Ben Levin Executive Styles in Canada: Cabinet Structures and Leadership Practices in Canadian Government, edited by Luc Bernier, Keith Brownsey, and Michael Howle The Roles of Public Opinion Research in Canadian Government, Christopher Page The Politics of CANDU Exports, Duane Bra Policy Analysis in Canada: The State of the Art, edited by Laurent Dobuzinskis, Michael Howle , and David Laycock Digital State at the Leading Edge: Lessons from Canada, Sanford Borins, Kenneth Kernaghan, David Brown, Nick Bontis, Perri 6, and Fred Thompson The Politics of Public Money: Spenders, Guardians, Priority Se ers, and Financial Watchdogs inside the Canadian Government, David A. Good Court Government and the Collapse of Accountability in Canada and the UK, Donald Savoie Professionalism and Public Service: Essays in Honour of Kenneth Kernaghan, edited by David Siegel and Ken Rasmussen Searching for Leadership: Secretaries to Cabinet in Canada, edited by Patrice Dutil Foundations of Governance: Municipal Government in Canada’s Provinces, edited by Andrew Sancton and Robert Young Provincial and Territorial Ombudsman Offices in Canada, edited by Stewart Hyson

Local Government in a Global World: Australia and Canada in Comparative Perspective, edited by Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly and John F. Martin Behind the Scenes: The Life and Work of William Clifford Clark, Robert A. Wardhaugh The Guardian: Perspectives on the Ministry of Finance of Ontario, edited by Patrice Dutil Making Medicare: New Perspectives on the History of Medicare in Canada, edited by Gregory P. Marchildon Overpromising and Underperforming? Understanding and Evaluating New Intergovernmental Accountability Regimes, edited by Peter Graefe, Julie M. Simmons, and Linda A. White Governance in Northern Ontario: Economic Development and Policy Making, edited by Charles Conteh and Bob Segsworth Off and Running: The Prospects and Pitfalls of Government Transitions in Canada, David Zussman Deputy Ministers in Canada: Comparative and Jurisdictional Perspectives, edited by Jacques Bourgault and Christopher Dunn