Denying the Comfort Women: The Japanese State's Assault on Historical Truth (Asia's Transformations) [1 ed.] 1138048712, 9781138048713

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Contents
Figures
Tables
Contributors
Acknowledgments
Figure acknowledgments
A note from the English editor
Introduction
Part I Comfort women, the Kōno statement, and the quest for truth
1 The Kōno statement: its historical significance and limitations
2 Forcible mobilization: what survivor testimonies tell us
Insight on the issues: coercion, sexual violence, and rape centers in Yu County, Shanxi Province
3 The comfort women and state prostitution
Insight on the issues: guilty verdicts for the traffickers of comfort women—the Shizuoka and Nagasaki incidents
Part II Why the Asian Women’s Fund was not a solution
4 The failure of the Asian Women’s Fund: the Japanese government’s legal responsibility and the colonial legacy
Insight on the issues: the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, Class B and C war criminals, and Japan’s Peace Treaty obligations
5 A reconciliation discourse that shuns survivors
Insight on the issues: the mobilization of Korean adolescents as comfort women—colonialism and the victimization of teenage girls
Part III A realistic settlement is a settlement that victimized women can accept
6 Comfort women, textbooks, and the rise of “new right” revisionism
7 The Japan–ROK claims settlement and the comfort women
8 Listen to survivors’ voices!
Epilogue: the struggle for justice continues
Appendices: Key policy documents on the comfort women
Appendix 1: the Kōno statement (August 4, 1993)
Appendix 2: the Murayama statement (August 15, 1995)
Appendix 3: the Abe statement (August 14, 2015)
Appendix 4: the Japan–ROK agreement (December 28, 2015)
The movement for redress: a chronology of events, (1988–2017)
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Denying the Comfort Women

Planned, instituted and run by the Japanese Imperial Military during the Asia-­ Pacific War, the ‘comfort women’ system remains hugely controversial. Although political leaders often contest the role of coercion, many argue that the ‘comfort women’ were mobilized forcibly, through processes of abduction and deception. Utilising archival research, court testimonies and eyewitness accounts of both survivors and military and civilian personnel, this book argues its case in three ways. Part I analyses the modalities of coercion employed by the authorities and investigates the historical differences and continuities between licensed peacetime prostitution and wartime sexual slavery. Part II then examines the failures of the Asian Women’s Fund to resolve the ‘comfort women’ issue, whilst Part III explores the removal of ‘comfort women’ content from school history texts after the late 1990s and details Japan’s diplomatic efforts to prevent war victims from suing the post-­war state. Presenting a strong argument in opposition to the revisionist school of thought, this book ultimately concludes that a realistic settlement would see a victim-­oriented solution that the survivors can accept. Written by leading Japanese and zainichi Korean scholars, Denying the Comfort Women will be of huge interest to students and scholars of modern Japanese studies, gender studies, women’s studies and Asian history. Nishino Rumiko is co-­representative of Violence against Women in War Research Action Center and a core member of the Center for Research and Documentation on Japan’s War Responsibility and the Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace. Kim Puja is Professor of gender studies and gender history at the Institute of Global Studies, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Japan. Onozawa Akane is Professor of modern Japanese history and gender studies at Rikkyō University in Tokyo, Japan.

Asia’s Transformations Edited by Mark Selden Cornell University, USA

The books in this series explore the political, social, economic and cultural consequences of Asia’s transformations in the twentieth and twenty-­first centuries. The series emphasizes the tumultuous interplay of local, national, regional and global forces as Asia bids to become the hub of the world economy. While focusing on the contemporary, it also looks back to analyse the antecedents of Asia’s contested rise. 46 Transnational Trajectories in East Asia Nation, Citizenship and Region Edited by Yasemin Nuhoḡlu Soysal 47 The Politics of Protection Rackets in Post-­New Order Indonesia Coercive Capital, Authority and Street Politics Ian Douglas Wilson 48 Coal Mining Women in Japan Heavy Burdens Donald W. Burton 49 The Changing Face of Korean Cinema 1960 to 2015 Brian Yecies and Aegyung Shim 50 The Making of Modern Korea Adrian Buzo 51 Danger, Development and Legitimacy in East Asian Maritime Politics Securing the Seas, Securing the State Christian Wirth 52 Denying the Comfort Women The Japanese State’s Assault on Historical Truth Edited by Nishino Rumiko, Kim Puja and Onozawa Akane

Denying the Comfort Women The Japanese State’s Assault on Historical Truth

Edited by Nishino Rumiko, Kim Puja and Onozawa Akane With the Violence against Women in War Research Action Center Adapted from the Japanese by Robert Ricketts

First published 2018 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2018 selection and editorial matter, Nishino Rumiko, Kim Puja and Onozawa Akane; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Nishino Rumiko, Kim Puja and Onozawa Akane to be identified as the authors of the editorial matter, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-1-138-04871-3 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-17001-5 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear

Contents



List of figures List of tables Notes on contributors Acknowledgments Figure acknowledgments A note from the English editor



Introduction

viii x xi xv xvii xviii 1

N ishino  R umiko , K im  P uja , and O no z awa  A kane

PART I

Comfort women, the Kōno statement, and the quest for truth

15

1

17

The Kōno statement: its historical significance and limitations Y oshimi Y oshiaki

2

Forcible mobilization: what survivor testimonies tell us

40

N ishino R umiko



Insight on the issues: coercion, sexual violence, and rape centers in Yu County, Shanxi Province

64

I keda  E riko

3

The comfort women and state prostitution

70

O no z awa  A kane



Insight on the issues: guilty verdicts for the traffickers of comfort women—the Shizuoka and Nagasaki incidents M aeda  A kira

87

vi   Contents PART II

Why the Asian Women’s Fund was not a solution 4

The failure of the Asian Women’s Fund: the Japanese government’s legal responsibility and the colonial legacy

91 93

K im  P u ja



Insight on the issues: the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, Class B and C war criminals, and Japan’s Peace Treaty obligations

114

H ayashi H irofumi

5

A reconciliation discourse that shuns survivors

118

N ishino R umiko



Insight on the issues: the mobilization of Korean adolescents as comfort women—colonialism and the victimization of teenage girls

136

K im  P u ja

PART III

A realistic settlement is a settlement that victimized women can accept 6

Comfort women, textbooks, and the rise of “new right” revisionism

149 151

T awara Y oshifumi

7

The Japan–ROK claims settlement and the comfort women

166

Y oshi z awa F umitoshi

8

Listen to survivors’ voices!

181

Y ang C hingja



Epilogue: the struggle for justice continues

197

N ishino  R umiko , K im  P uja , and O no z awa  A kane

Appendices

Key policy documents on the comfort women

205



207

Appendix 1: the Kōno statement (August 4, 1993)

Contents   vii

Appendix 2: the Murayama statement (August 15, 1995)

211



Appendix 3: the Abe statement (August 14, 2015)

213



Appendix 4: the Japan–ROK agreement (December 28, 2015)

217



The movement for redress: a chronology of events (1988–2017)

219



Bibliography Index

238 257

Figures

1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 3.1 4.1 4.2 5.1 5.2 5.3 7.1 7.2 8.1

Comfort station coupons A military-­issue condom Medicated ointment to prevent venereal infections New Years Day, 1938. Japanese soldiers crowd a Nanjing comfort station that has just opened Four Korean comfort women captured by Chinese Eighth Army forces after the battle for Ramo (Yunnan, China), September 3, 1944 Pak Yŏng-sim in 2000 Filipina survivors cheer the verdict handed down by the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal, December 12, 2000 Former comfort women, Marta Abu Bere and Esmeralda Boe of East Timor  A yaodong cave residence in Linguisha, Yu County Wan Aihua and other Shanxi plaintiffs file suit against the Japanese government on October 30, 1998 A brothel in Takashima, Yokohama In 1991, Kim Hak-­sun became the first Korean survivor to recount her wartime experiences using her real name Kang Il-­ch’ul addresses an Osaka rally, November 28, 2009 Plate 15: Nurses in River Incident, watercolor Dutch and Korean survivors celebrate the verdict of the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal (Tokyo), December 12, 2000 Twenty Korean comfort women being questioned by U.S. troops in Myitkyina, Burma after their capture. August 14, 1944 Japanese civic organizations fill a street in downtown Tokyo’s Ginza area to protest the Japan–ROK treaty The Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea was signed on June 22, 1965 Accompanied by her legal team, Song Sin-­do files a lawsuit against the Japanese state at the Tokyo District Court, April 5, 1993

24 25 25 30 45 48 52 54 66 67 75 93 102 122 131 143 170 171 182

Figures   ix 8.2 Song Sin-­do joins a Wednesday Demonstration in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, September 1998 E.1 The Peace Statue of a Girl in front of the Japanese Embassy, Seoul

188 199

Tables

1.1 A comparison of Japan’s military comfort women system with prewar licensed prostitution 1.2 Military regulations for comfort stations (No. 1 Comfort Station and Asia Hall) in Iloilo City, Visayas, Philippines (November 22, 1942) 2.1 Court recognition of survivor testimonies in lawsuits by former comfort women 4.1 Balance sheet for AWF atonement and related projects (estimated in Japanese yen) 5.1 The ages of 78 Korean comfort women at the time of their recruitment 5.2 The ages of 20 Korean comfort women interviewed in Myitkyina, Burma (August 1944)

18 20 46 99 138 142

Contributors

Editors VAWW RAC: The Violence against Women in War Research Action Center was founded in September 2011 to broaden the activities of the Violence Against Women in War-­Network Japan (VAWW-­NET Japan), the principal organizer of the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery (December 2000). Espousing the ideals of non-­ violence, peace, and postcolonial justice, VAWW RAC is dedicated to creating a society that respects the human rights of women. Since its founding, the group has engaged in extensive research to uncover the historical facts behind the “comfort women” system and work toward a resolution of this issue that is acceptable to victim-­survivors and enduring. NISHINO Rumiko is co-­representative of VAWW RAC and a core member of the Center for Research and Documentation on Japan’s War Responsibility, and the Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace. A well-­known journalist and prolific writer on the “comfort women” system and violence against women in armed conflicts, she is the recipient of the Incentive Award of the Peace and Cooperative Journalist Fund (1995) and the Japan Congress of Journalists Award (2004). She has conducted intensive field studies on “comfort women” in Asia, interviewed victims, and assisted survivor plaintiffs in their lawsuits for redress. Nishino also played a central role in organizing the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal. She is the author of A “Comfort Woman” on the Frontlines: The Journey of Pak Yŏng-sim, a Survivor of the Destruction of Ramo (Tōkyō, 2003), and co-­editor of Japanese “Comfort Women”: Patriotism and Human Trafficking (Tōkyō, 2015) [in Japanese*]. KIM Puja is a professor of gender studies and gender history at the Institute of Global Studies, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. She has written extensively on the problems of education and gender in Korea under Japanese colonial occupation and the “comfort women” issue. In 2007, she became the first recipient of the Award for Scholars in Women’s Studies for her pioneer work, Education and Gender during the Colonial Period in

xii   Contributors Korea (Yokohama, 2005). Kim played a leading role in the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal and is co-­representative of VAWW RAC. She is the author of Continuing Colonialism and Gender: The Concept of “Nationality,” the Female Body, Memory, and Responsibility (Yokohama, 2011) and has recently co-­edited, with Okamoto Yūka, Why the “Peace Statue of a Comfort Girl” Continues her Seated Vigil (Yokohama, 2016) [in Japanese*]. ONOZAWA Akane is a professor of modern Japanese history and gender studies at Rikkyō University in Tokyo. She is a member of the VAWW RAC steering committee and has written extensively on the history of licensed prostitution in modern Japan, the sex industry in Okinawa under U.S. rule, and the “comfort women” system. Onozawa won the Award for Scholars in Women’s Studies in 2012 for her groundbreaking study, Modern Japanese Society and the Licensed Prostitution System (Yoshikawa, 2010) [in Japanese*]. She is co-­editor of Japanese “Comfort Women”: Patriotism and Human Trafficking (Tōkyō, 2015) [in Japanese*].

Contributors HAYASHI Hirofumi is a professor of political science at Kantō Gakuin University specializing in modern Japanese history, the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia during World War  II, and Japanese war crimes. His many publications in Japanese and English focus on Japan’s war responsibility, including the Tokyo and Class B and C war crimes tribunals and the “comfort women;” the battle of Okinawa; and U.S. military bases around the world. Hayashi is a founding member of the Center for Research and Documentation on Japan’s War Responsibility. Among his recent works is The Essence of the “Comfort Women” Issue (Tōkyō, 2015) [in Japanese*]. IKEDA Eriko is board chair of the Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace (WAM) in Tokyo. A former director at the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK), she speaks and writes widely on the “comfort women” issue, women and the media, women’s rights, education, and Japan’s war responsibility. She has produced and directed numerous documentary films, among them The War Never Ends for These “Grandmas”: Sexual Violence in a Loess-­soil Village in Shanxi, China (2004), for which she received the Yamakawa Kikue Award for outstanding research on women’s issues, and We Will Never Give Up: The Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal 10 Years Later (2011). Under her leadership, WAM has received peace prizes from Pax Christi International (2007) and the Peace Studies Association of Japan (2013). MAEDA Akira is a professor of law at Tōkyō Zōkei University, where he teaches peace studies and international humanitarian law. He writes prolifically on the prosecution of World War II war crimes, human rights issues, the

Contributors   xiii “comfort women,” hate speech, and peace education. Maeda is a board member of the Japan Democratic Lawyers Association. Among his recent publications are The “Comfort Women” Problem: A Critical Look at the Japan–Republic of Korea Agreement (Tōkyō, 2016) [in Japanese*], and most recently, Peace Studies on the Road: Touring the World’s Battlefields, Reflecting on the Scars of War (Tōkyō, 2017) [in Japanese*]. TAWARA Yoshifumi is general secretary of Children and Textbooks Japan Network 21 and teaches part time in the College of Contemporary Psychology at Rikkyō University in Tokyo. He also serves as cochair of the Trilateral Joint History Editorial Committee of Japan, China, and South Korea, and is organizing committee secretary for the Historical Consciousness and Peace in East Asia Forum. He writes widely on Japanese education, the “comfort women” issue, the rise of New Right conservatism, and remilitarization. His latest work is An Anatomy of the Japan Conference: The True State of a Vast Secret Organization (Tōkyō, 2016) [in Japanese*]. YANG Chingja is a key activist in the Legal Support Committee for a Zainichi Korean Former Comfort Woman Living in Japan, cochair of the National Action Committee to Settle the Japanese Military Comfort Women Issue, and representative of the Japan Construction Committee of the War and Women’s Human Rights Museum in Seoul. She works as a translator-­ interpreter and teaches Korean at Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo. Producer of the 2007 documentary My Heart is Not Broken Yet [in Japanese*], she also writes and lectures widely on the “comfort women”, women’s rights, ethnic education in Japan, and hate speech. Among her translations is Meehyang Yoon’s Twenty Years of Wednesdays: The Unshakable Hope of the Halmoni—Former Japanese Military Comfort Women (Ōsaka, 2011) [in Japanese*]. YOSHIMI Yoshiaki is Professor Emeritus of modern history at Chūō University in Tokyo. A founding member of the Center for Research and Documentation on Japan’s War Responsibility, he is the author of pioneering books and articles on the “comfort women” and has also written on the rise of fascism and the Japanese experience of war. Yoshimi was the first researcher to find and publish documents proving the involvement of Japanese army, navy, and civil authorities in establishing the “comfort women” system. In English, he is best known for Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military During World War II (translated by Susan O’Brien) (New York, 2000). A recent work in English is Grassroots Fascism: The War Experience of the Japanese People (translated by Ethan Mark) (New York, 2015). YOSHIZAWA Fumitoshi is a professor of history at the Niigata University of International and Information Studies, where he teaches contemporary Korean history and Japanese-­Korean relations. He has written broadly on Japan’s colonial and war responsibility and on historical and diplomatic issues arising

xiv   Contributors from the Japan–Republic of Korea normalization talks. His latest works are The 1965 Japan–ROK Normalization Conferences: The Point of Departure for Postwar Japan–ROK Relations (Tōkyō, 2015) [in Japanese*] and Postwar Japan–ROK Relations: The Negotiations to Normalize Diplomatic Relations (Tōkyō, 2015) [in Japanese*]. He is co-­editor of Changing Perceptions on 50 Years of Japan–ROK Relations: Rethinking the Japan–ROK Claims Agreement (Tōkyō, 2016) [in Japanese*].

Note * Works in Japanese are listed in the Bibliography.

Acknowledgments

Ōtsuki Shoten first published this book in Japanese in June 2013. A Korean translation by the Humanist Publishing Group1 appeared in November 2014. It is now our great pleasure to welcome the English edition published by Routledge (Taylor & Francis Group). The English version has been three years in preparation. We offer special thanks to Lingua Guild in Tokyo, which supervised the draft translations and expertly coordinated the first phase of the project. We are especially grateful to Robert Ricketts, who was asked by Lingua Guild to shepherd the work to completion. He spent two years revising and editing the manuscript, translating supplementary materials, and adapting the text for a readership not necessarily familiar with East Asian history. He also worked closely with the editors to coordinate production with Routledge and bring the English text up to the publisher’s exacting standards. We owe a special debt of gratitude to Professors Takashi Fujitani, Director in Asia Pacific Studies, and Lisa Yoneyama, Department of East Asian Studies and Women and Gender Studies Institute, both at the University of Toronto. Professors Fujitani and Yoneyama provided generous assistance, encouragement, and advice to one of the editors, Kim Puja, during her sabbatical stay at the University of Toronto in 2016. Both played a pivotal role in this project by introducing us to Routledge. We are also indebted to Stephanie Rogers and Georgina Bishop of Routledge, who enthusiastically proposed publication, provided prompt and felicitous advice, and tactfully guided the manuscript over the many hurdles we faced in preparing the final draft. We thank Mark Selden for his painstaking critique of the early drafts of two chapters and for consistently offering valuable advice and strong encouragement for the project. We extend our heartfelt thanks to the many individuals and groups in the redress movement in Japan and South Korea who assisted us in the multifaceted task of readying the manuscript. The Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace (WAM), the Violence against Women in War Research Action Center (VAWW RAC), the Japanese Military “Comfort Women” Problem Kansai Network, the Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan, Fight for Justice, and other groups also went out of their way to assist us

xvi   Acknowledgments in locating reference materials and photographs. Okamoto Yūka of Fight for Justice offered us invaluable professional help in digitally processing visual materials. The comfort women system was a product of Japanese colonial rule and military conquest. It was a crime of war that violated the human rights and dignity of women of many national and ethnic origins in Asia and the Pacific. It is our fervent hope that the story of surviving victims and their long quest for justice will attract a wide readership in English, including in particular those working in the redress movement and addressing the contemporary issues of human trafficking and violence against women in armed conflicts. Nishino Rumiko, Kim Puja, Onozawa Akane

Note 1 Nishino, R., Kim, P. and Onozawa, A. (2014). Kǔdǔl ǔn wae ilbongun ‘wianbu’ rǔl konggyŏk hanǔnga: Kangje yŏnhaeng, Kono tamhwa, Kukmin kigǔm ǔl tullǔssan non­ jaeng ǔi haeksim ǔl malhanda (Why do they attack the Japanese military “comfort women”? The debates over forcible recruitment, the Kōno statement, and the Asian Women’s Fund explained). Seoul: Humanist Publishing Group.

Figure acknowledgments

“Nurses in River Incident” (Figure 5.1) is courtesy of Fred and Elizabeth Seiker, Bevere Vivis Gallery Books, and Museum Bronbeek (Arnhem, Netherlands). The illustration was first published in Fred Seiker (1995) Lest We Forget: Life as a Japanese P.O.W. Worchester (U.K.): Bevere Vivis Gallery Books, Plate 15, p. 24. The original watercolor is owned by Museum Bronbeek.

A note from the English editor

The English editor has benefited from the generous cooperation of many people in bringing this translation to fruition. To Matsumoto Makiko of Lingua Guild, Lynne Riggs of the Center for Intercultural Communication, Yamada Kuniko and Shibasaki Haruko of Santama Support Network for Philippine Victims of Japanese Military Sexual Slavery (Lola Net Santama), Okamoto Yūka of Fight for Justice, Yamashita Fumiko of WAM, Satō Yūko of VAWW RAC, and Andō Rei: I am in your debt; without your help, this would have been a different book. Professor Yoshizawa Fumitoshi and Yun HyunSook interrupted busy schedules to render vital assistance in transcribing Korean names and references into English. Osaku Tadayuki of the Hokkaidō Shimbun helped track down obscure sources that otherwise would have eluded us. I join the editors in expressing our deepest appreciation to Fred Seiker (now deceased) for allowing us to use one of his striking watercolors to illuminate an important point in Chapter 5. Finally, we are greatly indebted to Elizabeth Seiker, who was instrumental in helping us obtain permission to publish her husband’s painting from Heather Taylor of Bevere Vivis Gallery Books (U.K.) and Museum Bronbeek in the Netherlands, to whom we are also most grateful. The authors have checked both the semi-­final and final English drafts of each chapter, making innumerable changes for the better. At one author’s request, Seki Noriko carefully verified the translation of a chapter that the English editor found particularly difficult, making substantial improvements. I am equally grateful to Yamaguchi Tomomi, whose sharp eye caught oversimplifications and more than one error in one chapter and made insightful suggestions concerning another. I also extend my thanks to Margaret Cornell, Emi Koyama, and Sven Saaler, who checked and commented on the penultimate versions of several chapters. Mark Selden edited drafts of several chapters, made many constructive suggestions, and offered strong moral support at critical junctures in the project. Any mistranslations are my responsibility. Finally, it has been a pleasure and privilege to work with the editors on this book. Their erudition, energy, commitment, and good will have never ceased to amaze. They are truly the moving force behind the English edition. Japanese, Korean, and Chinese names follow the traditional East Asian order: surname first, given name last. In romanizing Japanese, the Hepburn system of

A note from the English editor   xix transliteration is generally adhered to, except where the transcription has been standardized in English. For Korean, the McCune-­Reischauer system is used, save where a preferred spelling is well established. When appropriate, I have used English media sources for translations of quotations appearing in the Japanese text. Direct citations from survivor testimonies originally given in English, Chinese, Korean, Tagalog, and other languages have been rendered into English from official court documents, collections of oral histories, accounts by trial lawyers and specialists, and other reliable sources published in Japanese, as indicated in the notes. Robert Ricketts

Introduction Nishino Rumiko, Kim Puja, and Onozawa Akane

Denying the “Comfort Women”: The Japanese State’s Assault on Historical Truth1 brings together cutting-­edge research by leading Japanese and resident zainichi Korean scholars. Its aim is to provide a counter voice to the neo­ nationalist government officials, politicians, and opinion leaders who, over the past two decades, have publicly denied the paramount role of the Japanese military in creating, managing, and expanding the “comfort women”2 system during the Asia-­Pacific War (1931–45). Building on extensive empirical research conducted during the last ten years, we identify and analyze the contentious issues surrounding the comfort women today and sketch the broad outlines of a settlement that the victims themselves might be able to accept. Survivors and their advocacy groups, working together with researchers and legal experts, have demonstrated to the international community that the military comfort women system was a wartime regime of sexual slavery. This has become the standard definition used by world human rights bodies to discuss the military comfort women problem, one that provides us with a basic point of reference.

The comfort women become an issue In August 1991, three South Korean former comfort women went public with their wartime experiences, bringing charges against the Japanese state later that year for the appalling abuses they had suffered. Their coming out marked a decisive moment in the campaign by grassroots civic groups to publicize the inequities of the military comfort women system (see the Appendix: The Movement for Redress: A Chronology of Events). After 1991, victim-­survivors in the Philippines, China, and many other countries stepped forward to share their stories and demand redress. Transnational support groups formed to assist them in the lawsuits they filed in Japan, survivor testimonies were compiled in Korean, Chinese, Filipino, and English and translated into Japanese, and researchers in Japan began to scour national archives for historical documents bearing on the comfort women issue. Between late 1991 and 1993, the Japanese government conducted two internal investigations of its own. On August 4, 1993, Chief Cabinet Secretary

2   Nishino Rumiko et al. Kōno Yōhei announced the surveys’ conclusions, candidly admitting that the Imperial military was “involved in the establishment and management of the comfort stations and the transfer of comfort women.” He also acknowledged that “at times” the military took part in the recruitment of women “against their own will, through coaxing, coercion, etc.,” and that they “lived in misery at comfort stations under a coercive atmosphere” (see Appendix 1). The so-­ called Kōno statement concluded with a clear expression of penance on behalf of the nation “to all those … who suffered immeasurable pain and incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women” and a pledge to “face squarely the historical facts.” While the Kōno pronouncement was a landmark event, it failed to fully recognize the preponderant role of the Imperial military in creating and operating the comfort women system and did not produce an effective, unified policy response (Yoshimi Yoshiaki analyzes the shortcomings of the Kōno statement in Chapter 1). Two years later, in August 1995, Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi marked the 50th anniversary of Japan’s surrender by acknowledging that Japanese colonialism and wars of aggression had inflicted great suffering on people in many countries, particularly in Asia, and expressed his remorse and heartfelt regrets to all the victims of that history (see Appendix 2). As we note below, however, Murayama’s efforts to establish a semiprivate foundation to resolve the comfort issue would end in failure. Amidst these developments, the comfort women advocacy movement joined forces with international groups working to abolish violence against women in armed conflicts and with U.N. human rights mechanisms. They worked together to apply international humanitarian law in the search for a solution to the comfort women problem. Radhika Coomaraswamy’s report to the U.N. Human Rights Committee in 1996 and Gay J. McDougall’s report to the U.N. Sub-­Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in 1998 both made important determinations in this respect. The McDougall report, in particular, noted that the so-­called comfort women were sexual slaves, pure and simple. McDougall characterized the “enslavement and rape of women in ‘comfort stations’ during the Second World War”3 as a crime against humanity. She recommended that the Japanese government provide surviving victims with state compensation and identify and punish Japanese military officers and soldiers responsible for this regime of “wartime military sexual slavery.” While acknowledging the comfort women system as a war-­related problem, the Japanese government rejected the U.N. designation of sexual slavery, a stance it continues to defend to this day. Finally, the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery, organized by world human rights groups and prominent jurists in Tokyo in December 2000, convicted Emperor Hirohito and nine high-­ranking civil and military leaders of crimes against humanity, notably rape and sexual slavery. The verdict also ruled that international laws in force at the time those crimes were committed require the Japanese government to provide survivors with legal reparations, including a “full and frank apology” and “compensation

Introduction   3 through the government … in amounts adequate to redress the harm and deter its future occurrence.”4

A flawed Japanese policy response and the rise of historical revisionism The Japanese government, for its part, was not idle during this time, but its efforts to deal with the issue proved ineffectual, fell short of survivors’ expectations and needs, and only created more confusion about what the state really intended. The 1993 Kōno statement had promised to revise the teaching of Japanese history to reflect the known facts about the comfort women, and by 1997, all state-­approved middle-­school history texts had been revised to include some mention of this system—although offering no analysis of its operation or the central role of the Japanese military in organizing it. By 2006, however, persistent pressure from revisionist government officials had led textbook publishers to remove even these limited references. Beginning with the Murayama administration, from 1995 to 2007, the Japanese government also arranged for privately subscribed “atonement” payments to selected survivors in South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines and issued individual apologies signed by four prime ministers through an ostensibly nongovernmental body, the Asian Women’s Fund (AWF ). The government cited the AWF as evidence that it was working to resolve the comfort women issue, using it to deflect criticisms from U.N. human rights organizations. State redress initiatives, however, were touted as purely humanitarian measures and presented to the public as quasi-­private in nature, although considerable state funding was actually involved. The government refused to honor its obligations under international law to legislate a formal apology and offer surviving victims state-­mandated compensation.5 Attempts to make amends through the semiprivate Asian Women’s Fund, then, seemed arbitrary and inconsistent, prompting many survivors to reject its overtures as insincere and humiliating. Nonetheless, during the 14 years between 1992 and 2006, no Japanese Cabinet openly challenged the known facts enumerated in the Kōno statement, or the postwar state’s responsibility to take some kind of remedial action (see Kim Puja’s discussion in Chapter 4). From the late 1990s, however, public disavowal of the comfort women by neonationalist politicians, media commentators, and academics gradually became a prominent feature of national political discourse and diplomacy. The first term of Prime Minister Abe Shinzō (2006–07) epitomized this reverse course. On June 14, 2007, the Committee for Historical Facts, led by media personality Sakurai Yoshiko and other well-­known revisionists, posted a full-­page advertisement in the Washington Post entitled “THE FACTS,” which attempted to refute the historical truth of sexual slavery. This distortion of history provoked protests not only from living victims but also from the world community. On July 30, 2007, the U.S. House of Representatives adopted a resolution urging the Japanese government to live up to its responsibilities under ­international law and legislate a formal apology accompanied by official

4   Nishino Rumiko et al. recompense. This was followed in short order by similar resolutions from the Dutch House of Representatives, the Canadian House of Commons, the European Parliament, and other national legislative bodies. In 2011, the Constitutional Court of Korea found that the South Korean government’s repeated failure to seek third-­country arbitration to resolve the comfort women issue was a breach of its constitutional duties. Clearly, international pressure on Japan to enact a formal apology and provide official compensation had grown to a new level. Inside Japan, it was a different story. Revisionist forces, determined to defend the honor of the wartime Imperial military, insisted stubbornly that Japanese soldiers did not forcibly recruit comfort women, who, they claimed, were either volunteers or paid “professionals.” In August 2012, several popular politicians, including Osaka Mayor Hashimoto Toru and former Tokyo governor Ishihara Shintarō, proclaimed publicly that no documentary evidence existed to prove that comfort women had been recruited forcibly. In November 2012, shortly before Abe Shinzō was reelected to office, the Committee for Historical Facts placed a second advertisement, nearly identical to the first, in New Jersey’s Star-­ Ledger. This time Abe himself signed on as an “assentor.” Abe’s participation set the tone for his second administration, inaugurated in December 2012, and “comfort women bashing” plumbed new depths. From Abe’s first term in office (2006–07), right-­of-center media outlets amplified revisionist claims, which were reinforced at a popular level by rightwing activists using social networking services. By Abe’s second administration, the emotionally charged diatribes of bloggers targeting the comfort women had slipped the moorings of reasoned debate and reached a deafening crescendo. At the same time, the redress movement was still recovering from internal divisions over the Asian Women’s Fund, which had been dissolved in 2007. The movement’s disarray was compounded by the emergence at that time of a “reconciliation discourse,” which aggravated the turmoil (see Nishino Rumiko’s discussion in Chapter 5). The Japanese version of this book was conceived as a first step toward overcoming this internal crisis and reunifying the movement around the basic demand for justice put forward by survivors. It was published in June 2013, six months after Abe ascended a second time to the premiership.

2015: a pivotal year When Abe returned to power in December 2012, he promptly announced his intention to revise or even void the 1993 Kōno statement. Comfort women bashing escalated, and the prospects of a victim-­oriented settlement of the issue receded from view. To many observers’ surprise, in December 2015, the Japanese and South Korean foreign ministers announced a hastily concluded diplomatic compromise purporting to solve the problem definitively. South Korean victims felt betrayed once again, however, as did the survivors of other nationalities, who were excluded from the deal entirely.

Introduction   5 The Japan–ROK ministerial pact was one of two important events in 2015 that impacted the comfort women issue. The first was Abe’s official statement on August 14 commemorating Japan’s 70th war anniversary (see Appendix 3). His address deeply disappointed many by adroitly sidestepping the issue of state liability for colonialism and the Asia-­Pacific conflict in general and the comfort women system in particular. The Abe statement distanced his administration from the official apology issued 20 years earlier by Prime Minister Murayama. Although Abe previously had vowed to avoid the words “colonial rule” and “aggression” used by Murayama, he repeated these phrases and extended “feelings of profound grief and … eternal, sincere condolences” to all war victims, including Japanese. But the prime minister omitted the essential facts: that colonial conquest and war were carefully planned and executed by the Japanese state and its armed forces, and that the Kōno and Murayama apologies had been offered to the victims in recognition of those facts. Japan, he seemed to be saying, had done nothing worse than other colonial powers of the day. Abe’s August 14 pronouncement was a masterpiece of revisionist logic and rhetoric. Using generalities to sanitize the colonial and militaristic past, it attempted to relieve the postwar state of further legal liabilities for outstanding war-­related claims. Murayama himself noted this strategic retreat from his 1995 declaration and wondered why Abe had bothered to deliver the speech in the first place. “It was hard to understand what he was trying to get at since the focus … was blurred,” the former prime minister said, noting that the address did not specify for which actions Japan was supposedly apologizing.6 A startling omission was the absence of any explicit mention of the comfort women. The Prime Minister intoned piously: “We must never forget that there were women behind the battlefields whose honor and dignity were severely injured during wars in the 20th century.” But he did not say which wars, who these women were, who had procured and transported them “behind the battlefields,” or how their honor and dignity had been impaired. In effect, Abe was attempting to undermine Kōno’s 1993 policy formulation on the issue. Bowing to international opinion, he noted that the positions of previous cabinets on war-­ guilt issues “will remain unshakable into the future” but implied that accounts had been settled fully and that no further action was required. Hopes for a breakthrough were frustrated again four months later when, on December 28, 2015, Tokyo and Seoul announced a diplomatic solution to the comfort women impasse. Unveiled in Seoul by the Japanese and South Korean foreign ministers, the bilateral memorandum of agreement included four points (see Appendix 4): 1

Japanese Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio, speaking on behalf of his government, recognized “an involvement of the Japanese military authorities” in the comfort women system and said the government was “painfully aware of responsibilities from this perspective.” Prime Minister Abe, he noted, expressed “anew his most sincere apologies and remorse to all the women

6   Nishino Rumiko et al.

2

3

4

who underwent immeasurable and painful experiences and suffered incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women.” Kishida promised that Japan would make a one-­time payment of ¥1 billion (US$8.3 million) to a foundation to be set up by South Korea in order to help “all former comfort women [recover] their honor and dignity and [heal their] psychological wounds.” “The Government of Japan,” Kishida said, “confirms that this issue is resolved finally and irreversibly with this announcement” and promised that, in return for a similar pledge by the South Korean government, it would “refrain from accusing or criticizing” the other party “in the international community, including at the United Nations.” ROK Foreign Minister Yun Byung-­se similarly confirmed that “the issue is resolved finally and irreversibly” and that South Korea would not criticize Japan internationally in this regard. Yun vowed that his government would steadily implement the measures proposed by Japan and “strive to solve” the issue of the bronze statue of a teenage girl in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, about which “the Government of Japan is concerned.”

Point 1 appeared at first glance to represent a departure from the Abe administration’s previous revisionist positions. In it, the government seemed to reprise some of the language of the 1993 Kōno statement by referring to “an involvement of the Japanese military authorities” in the comfort women system, and the prime minister indirectly offered his apologies to surviving victims via his foreign minister. On closer examination, however, the agreement did not specify the use of coercion by Imperial forces and civil authorities in mobilizing women and transferring them to military comfort facilities overseas. In exchange for a pro forma Japanese apology accompanied by a ¥1 billion “contribution,” both parties agreed to put paid to the comfort women dispute, forever. Absent a clear recognition of the historical facts and an unambiguous avowal of direct Japanese military and civil responsibility for the massive sexual enslavement of women during the war, we cannot accept that this problem has been resolved “finally and irreversibly.” Reducing the crime of military sexual servitude to a diplomatic dispute between Japan and the Republic of Korea also allowed Tokyo to exclude survivors in North Korea (the Democratic People’s Republic), China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, East Timor, and many other countries and territories in Asia and the Pacific. Nor can we condone an accord that evades Kōno’s earlier vow to revise “the study and teaching of history” in Japanese schools. Abe has passionately opposed the inclusion of the comfort women in middle-­school history texts, and the bilateral pact ignored Kōno’s injunction on educating young people and the public for the future. The ministerial entente itself is an ambiguous instrument. It merely records points of agreement reached after a dozen rounds of bilateral talks held between 2014 and 2015. The document exists only in memo form, and neither Prime Minister Abe nor President Park Geun-­hye signed it. During a joint press conference following the announcement, Foreign Minister Kishida emphasized that the

Introduction   7 ¥1 billion grant did not in any way imply that Japan was offering official state compensation but was simply a humanitarian gesture. That neither Tokyo nor Seoul bothered to consult the aggrieved women in drafting the accord speaks volumes for their real concerns. In that context, Kishida told journalists on December 28, 2015 that, “the groundwork for moving ahead with U.S.–Japan–ROK security cooperation is now complete.” These comments expose the accord as a political expedient designed in large part to further the perceived security interests of both countries and their U.S. ally. This diplomatic artifice cannot be allowed to close the door on the problem of Japan’s wartime sexual violence against women. Subsequent developments in this controversy, including the impeachment and arrest of Park Geun-­hye between late 2016 and early 2017 and the election of a new South Korean President, Moon Jae-­in, on May 9, 2017, are discussed in the Epilogue.

The English edition Edited by three members of the Violence against Women in War Research Action Center (VAWW RAC), the original Japanese tome consisted of 12 chapters complemented by five shorter essays on specific topics called “columns” in Japanese. Here, we have organized the “columns” under the rubric of Insight on the Issues and attached them to chapters that are thematically related. The English edition has been abridged to eight chapters and four Insight pieces, one of them a new addition (see below). To bring the book up to date, the editors have thoroughly revised the introduction, written an epilogue, and appended a chronology of events. Six authors have affixed postscripts to their original chapters. Where feasible, pertinent new information has been introduced in the chapter endnotes. Finally, we have added the Insight subchapter at the end of Chapter 5 to address a current dispute between Japan and South Korea over the statue of an adolescent woman. The book is divided into three sections, as in the original. Part I provides a historical overview of the comfort women system—what we know about it today. The contributors rely on archival evidence and the oral histories of victims, former Imperial military personnel, and civilian administrators and contractors to refute revisionist claims. Chapter 1 by Yoshimi Yoshiaki examines the historical significance and limitations of the Kōno statement, focusing on the primary question of force. He reconfirms in vivid detail the truth that the comfort women were “recruited against their own will through coaxing [and] coercion.” In Chapter 2, Nishino Rumiko analyzes the personal stories and court testimonies of more than 180 survivors from ten countries to establish a typology of coercive procurement practices, all expressly banned under Japanese and international law at the time. She explains how methods of compulsion varied depending on the region and the progress of the war. Chapter 3 by Onozawa Akane probes the pre-­1945 system of state-­licensed prostitution to clarify the complex institutional linkages between Japan’s regime of officially regulated peacetime public sex and the Imperial military’s system of

8   Nishino Rumiko et al. wartime comfort stations. Licensed prostitution based on indentured sexual labor and forced military prostitution employed two different modalities and should not be confused, but in essence both were systems of sexual slavery and as such violated the domestic and international laws of the day. Onozawa shows that state licensing provided an infrastructure and an organizational model that facilitated the establishment and rapid expansion of military comfort facilities abroad. The latter, however, were created from the top down on direct orders from the Imperial high command and its field armies. This, she stresses, is the singular fact that distinguishes the institution of military sexual servitude from state-­regulated public prostitution. Insight essays by Ikeda Eriko (military rape centers and wartime sexual violence in China) and Maeda Akira (early convictions under Japanese law of traffickers of comfort women) follow Chapters 2 and 3, respectively, to broaden the discussion. Part II asks why the Asian Women’s Fund, which successive administrations have touted as Japan’s answer to the comfort women problem, failed to resolve the issue. In Chapter 4, Kim Puja analyzes the AWF, which operated as a public–private body from 1995 to 2007 under the auspices of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The fund offered privately raised “atonement” gratuities, which it disbursed to many victims, but only in South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. Acceptance of atonement money was a qualifying condition for receiving an official letter of apology from the prime minister. Large numbers of victimized women rejected selective, non-­state compensation as an evasion of Japan’s legal duty. Kim shows that instead of healing wounds, the fund’s premises and procedures created fierce internal dissonance that led to rifts within the redress movement, intensifying the isolation and psychological distress of many survivors. Chapter 5 by Nishino Rumiko looks critically at the rise of a liberal reconciliation discourse in Japan that prioritizes political compromise over the survivors’ need for official vindication, legal relief, social justice, and personal closure. Nishino contrasts the politics of expediency with the formal apology and compensation legally authorized by the U.S. Congress in 1982 to compensate Japanese-­ Americans forcibly interned in war relocation camps during World War II. An Insight subchapter by Hayashi Hirofumi following Chapter 4 adds depth to this section by focusing on the legal obligation of the Japanese state under the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty to accept the verdicts of postwar Allied military tribunals, including those that tried Japanese military and civilian personnel for the crime of forced prostitution. A final Insight piece by Kim Puja at the end of Chapter 5 analyzes why the Japanese military mobilized disproportionately large numbers of Korean adolescents as comfort women, and explains why the statue of a Korean girl in front of Japan’s diplomatic missions in South Korea has sparked a bitter bilateral quarrel. Part III examines the comfort women issue from three different perspectives. Chapter 6 by Tawara Yoshifumi shows how “New Right” revisionists used the comfort women controversy to seize power within the ruling Liberal Democratic

Introduction   9 Party after 1996 by linking that issue to the eradication of “self-­deprecating” views of modern Japanese history from middle-­school textbooks. He details the ways in which neonationalist political leaders have intervened in the textbook selection process to promote a statist and Japan-­centric worldview, obscuring the facts of the nation’s colonial and wartime projects. In Chapter 7, Yoshizawa Fumitoshi analyzes the 1965 Japan–ROK claims agreement, which prevented former comfort women and other war victims from pursuing personal claims against the Japanese state for pre-­1945 human rights abuses. The parallels between the 1965 accord, which declared the issue of state compensation to be settled “completely and finally,” and the 2015 ministerial memorandum pronouncing the comfort women problem “finally and irreversibly” resolved, are clear. In Chapter 8, Yang Chingja puts forward the simple but powerful proposition that a realistic settlement is one that victimized women can accept. Based on more than 20 years of experience working with a zainichi Korean survivor, Yang suggests that a workable settlement should include: (1) a clear, official apology that cannot be reversed later, (2) legislated state compensation as proof of the apology’s legitimacy and binding power, (3) a full public accounting of the truth, and (4) the revision of school curricula to include comfort women content and other educational measures to foster public awareness of institutionalized sexual violence in time of war and prevent recurrences. The Epilogue concludes with an overview of the current state of the comfort women controversy and the continuing struggle for justice. Finally, appendices reproduce four important Japanese government policy pronouncements on the issue, and a chronology of the redress movement (1988 to 2017) enables the reader to situate the events described in each chapter in their larger social and political contexts.

Postscript This book is tightly focused on the attempts by the Japanese state over the last two decades to disavow the violent nature of the Japanese military’s systematic sexual enslavement of tens of thousands of Asian women during the Asia-­Pacific conflict. For that reason, we have not attempted to provide a comprehensive account of the origins and actual operation of the military comfort women system, its social and psychological impact on victims (e.g., stigmatization and post-­traumatic stress), and the postwar aftermath for survivors (neglect, denial, disparagement, and retraumatization). Other scholars in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, China and elsewhere have already covered much of that territory. For those requiring easily accessible information, the Japanese government’s original 1993 investigation of the comfort women system is available online in English, Japanese, and Korean at the website of the now defunct Asian Women’s Fund. The military and related documents displayed there are essential reading for a deeper understanding of this problem. Having survived the wholesale destruction of government and military records at the war’s end, the written

10   Nishino Rumiko et al. evidence is perforce sparse. Nonetheless, it shows clearly that the Japanese Imperial armed forces, assisted by various government ministries and agencies, conspired to create, operate, and expand to all of Asia and the Pacific the system of military sexual servitude.7 In our account, we have not analyzed in depth the numbers or the national origins of the women swept up and interned in comfort stations between the system’s inception in 1932 and Japan’s defeat in 1945. Previous estimates of the numbers involved have ranged from as few as 20,000 to as many as 200,000, but as Yoshimi Yoshiaki points out in Chapter 1 (Note 17), it is virtually impossible to arrive at an accurate assessment. He suggests an absolute minimal figure of 50,000, but notes that the final tally must be far greater because this estimate does not include the multitudes of local women rounded up by Japanese field units in China, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific islands. In China, the Philippines, and elsewhere, many such victims were confined not in existing comfort stations but in impromptu rape centers, where they were held and brutalized for various periods of time (see Ikeda Eriko’s Insight subchapter at the end of Chapter 2). Generalizations about the ethnic and national composition of comfort women are equally problematic. In an earlier work, Yoshimi adduces evidence suggesting that in China alone, approximately 52 percent of comfort women were Korean, 36 percent Chinese, and 12 percent Japanese. Japanese women tended to be concentrated in Nanjing and other large cities, Koreans in smaller urban centers, and Chinese in rural cities, towns, and villages. He also cites alternative figures showing that in China “the percentage of Chinese women was overwhelming.”8 With the start of the Pacific War in 1941, yet greater numbers of Korean women were marshaled and dispatched to comfort stations throughout Asia and the Pacific. The large number of Korean victims, a great many of them teenage girls, mirrored Korea’s subaltern status as a Japanese colony. The large number of Chinese women is explained in good part by the long-­term presence of occupying Japanese troops in China (from 1932 to 1945). Another question we have not addressed is whether the other belligerents in World War II also used or established special facilities to provide their armies with women. In other words, what makes the system of Japanese military sexual slavery different from the systems of coercive military prostitution condoned or actively organized by other militaries during the war? Before attempting to answer that question, we should note that research comparing Japanese comfort stations with the military sex venues established by the militaries of other warring powers has intensified in recent years.9 A definitive answer, however, awaits further study. Let us begin with the U.S. forces that occupied Okinawa and the Japanese main islands following Japan’s acceptance of Allied surrender terms on August 15, 1945. When American GIs began deploying in Japan proper on August 28, they found “sexual comfort facilities”—subsequently redesignated Rest and Recreation Associations—already established and awaiting their arrival. The new sex amenities had been created for the exclusive use of occupying soldiers on orders from the Ministry of Home Affairs’ Police Protection Bureau. The

Introduction   11 Police Protection Bureau directive establishing these venues was dated August 18, three days after the surrender. To staff these facilities, prostitutes (licensed and unlicensed), geisha, waitresses, and barmaids were rounded up, often against their will, to be supplemented later by unemployed, working-­class, and other hapless single women. The venues were set up and run by associations of brothel owners and other auxiliaries of Japan’s sex industry.10 The Police Protection Bureau was motivated by the widespread fear, approaching panic, among ordinary Japanese, and particularly among women’s groups, that victorious U.S. and Allied soldiers would run amok, raping women and young girls at will, just as wartime Japanese propaganda had predicted. GIs did indeed engage in wanton acts of sexual assault, with tragic consequences for the victims. U.S. military courts handed down few rape convictions, and many women never complained to police, so the extent of sexual violence remains unknown. U.S. forces were also complicit in this early postwar version of military prostitution. Some American commanders openly asked Japanese authorities to build such facilities for their troops. In the Tokyo region, the Public Health and Welfare Section of the General Headquarters of the Allied Powers (GHQ) jointly administered the “sexual comfort facilities” with its Tokyo counterpart, the metropolitan government’s Public Health Section. But this revival of comfort stations was short-­lived. Under pressure from women’s groups in the United States, in late January 1946, GHQ announced it would abolish licensed prostitution in Japan, and two months later on March 25, U.S. 8th Army Headquarters in Yokohama issued a directive placing all forms of prostitution off limits to GIs. On March 26, the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Board ordered its police chiefs to comply with this directive. This measure closed down the Rest and Recreation Associations, although prostitution took other forms and continued unabated until 1958, when it was formally abolished in law. How about other armies during World War II? Virtually all militaries allowed troops access to prostitution, public and private, and most also required the women prostituted in sex establishments to undergo military medical checks for venereal disease. In North Africa, India, and China, British and U.S. commanders asserted control over existing brothels or organized their own using local women. When word of such activities reached the home front, however, respective military high commands or their governments put an end to militarized prostitution. Unlike Japan, where the presumptive male right to public sex was accepted as inevitable, in Great Britain and the United States, military establishments had to answer to powerful anti-­prostitution lobbies in their home countries.11 Soviet and German militaries in the field engaged in widespread and unrestrained violence against local women, including rape, kidnapping, and impromptu sequestration, and organized their own systems of forced military prostitution at a regional level. In the interest of hygiene management, the German Wehrmacht’s high command also ordered the creation of military brothels for its armies on the eastern front and elsewhere. By 1942, 500 military bordellos had reportedly been set up in conquered territories, equipped and supervised by the occupying army.12

12   Nishino Rumiko et al. Japan’s military high command carefully planned the regime of sexual slavery and coordinated its implementation with armies in the field, which communicated their needs to the top. Military planners received direct assistance from various government ministries, employed licensed civilian brokers in the sex industry to round up women in Japan, and in Taiwan and Korea, secured the assistance of Japanese police and military police to procure large quantities of women with the help of private concessionaries. In comfort stations and ad hoc rape centers, women were systematically abused and sometimes subjected to extreme forms of violence. Moreover, the sheer scope of Japan’s comfort women system is staggering, involving more than a dozen countries and territories spread across the whole of Asia and the Pacific. As we see in the following pages, however, perhaps even more astounding is the Japanese government’s continuing refusal—despite the recent Japan–ROK diplomatic entente—to admit its legal responsibility under international law for the sexual abuses committed by the wartime state and its military. This is the primary thrust of our analysis, but at the same time, it is also our hope that this book will be of some use to researchers, human rights advocates, government officials, and others concerned with the horrors of organized and spontaneous military violence against women in time of war.

Notes   1 Nishino, R., Kim, P., and Onozawa, A. with the Violence against Women in War Research Action Center, eds. (2013). “Ianfu” basshingu o koete:“Kōno danwa” to Nihon no sekinin (Beyond “comfort women” bashing: the “Kōno statement” and Japan’s legal responsibility). Tōkyō: Ōtsuki Shoten.   2 “Comfort women” (ianfu) and “comfort stations” (ianjo) were euphemisms used by the Japanese Imperial military after 1932 to disguise by embellishing the wartime system of military sex venues it built and in many cases operated in Asia and the Pacific. Such expressions are wholly inappropriate for describing what in Yoshimi Yoshiaki’s words amounted to “coerced horror.” Yoshimi, Y. (2000). Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military During World War II (Translated by S. O’Brien). New York: Columbia University Press, p. 39. However, we concede to current English usage and follow Yoshimi in dropping the inverted commas.   3 McDougall, G. J. (1998). Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic rape, sexual slavery and slavery-­like practices during armed conflict. Report to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Sub-­Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (Economic and Social Council), June 22. Geneva: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, p. 28.   4 The comfort women system was found to have violated Japan’s international treaty obligations under the 1907 Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, the 1921 International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children, and the 1930 ILO Convention Concerning Forced Labor, in addition to the norms of customary international law encoded in the 1907 and 1926 covenants. See The Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal (2001a). Judgement. Parts I–VIII. December 4, pp. 182ff. The quotation is from p. 262. Available at: http:// vawwrac.org/judgement_e01.pdf [accessed June 1, 2017].   5 Between 2000 and 2006, Japan’s leading opposition parties jointly submitted “wartime sexual coercion” bills to the House of Councilors on 12 occasions. The draft legislation would have obliged the government to apologize “for violating the

Introduction   13 honor and dignity” of the victims and provide them with formal state compensation. With a single exception, however, conservative lawmakers succeeded in keeping the bills from even reaching the legislative docket, and the proposals were never debated. See Digital Museum: The Comfort Women Issue and the Asian Women’s Fund (2007e). Attempts at Legislation in the Japanese Diet. The Asian Women’s Fund. [online] Available at: www.awf.or. jp/e4/legislation.htm [accessed January 26, 2017].   6 Kikuchi, H. (2015). Murayama fires shots at Abe’s war anniversary statement. Asahi Shimbun, August 15. [online] Available at: https://vietnammiracle.wordpress. com/2015/08/15/murayama-­fires-shots-­at-abes-­war-anniversary-­statement/ [accessed December 28, 2016].   7 Digital Museum: The Comfort Women Issue and the Asian Women’s Fund (2007b). The Japanese Military and Comfort Women. [online] Available at: www.awf.or.jp/e1/ index.html. These documents form the basis of the 1993 Kōno statement. Since then, researchers have discovered more that 1,000 additional wartime military and government records related to the comfort women system—materials the government refuses to acknowledge. Some of these are available in PDF format at the Fight for Justice website: http://fightforjustice.info/?page_id=608. The site is maintained in Japanese, Korean, Chinese, and English, but the documents are in Japanese.   8 The citation is from Yoshimi (2000), p. 95. The discussion of national origins is from Yoshimi (2000), pp. 94–96.   9 See for example, Onozawa, A. (2017). Sei baibai, Nihongun “ianfu” mondai to kokkashakai (The buying and selling of sex, the Japanese military “comfort women” problem, and the state actor). In: Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai hen [The Historical Science Society of Japan], ed. Dai yonji gendai rekishigaku no seika to kadai (Fourth annual issue: accomplishments and problems of modern historiography), Vol.  2. Tōkyō: Seikibundō Shuppan. 10 Yoshimi (2000), pp. 179–85. 11 Yoshimi (2000), pp. 185–92. 12 See for example, Mühlhäuser, R. (2010). Eroberungen. Sexuelle Gewalttaten und intime Beziehungen deutscher Soldaten in der Sowjetunion 1941–1945. Hamburg: Hamburger Edition. The figure of 500 brothels is from Seidler, F. (1977). Prostitution, Homosexualität, Selbstverstümmelung: Probleme der Deutschen Sanitatsführung 1939–1945. Neckargemünd: Kurt Vowinkel Verlag, p.  186, cited in Yoshimi (2000), p. 189.

Part I

Comfort women, the Kōno statement, and the quest for truth

1 The Kōno statement Its historical significance and limitations Yoshimi Yoshiaki

Introduction Prime Minister Abe Shinzō is widely known at home and abroad for his virulent criticisms of the 1993 Kōno statement, in which Chief Cabinet Secretary Kōno Yōhei admitted some degree of state and military responsibility for the so-­called military comfort women system, officially acknowledging the forcible mobilization of victims during the Asia-­Pacific War (1931–45) (see Appendix 1). On March 5, 2007, during his first term in office (2006–07), Abe told the Diet’s upper house that, “[I]t was not as though military police broke into people’s homes and took [women] away like kidnappers.… [T]estimony to the effect that there had been a hunt for comfort women is a complete fabrication.” On March 16, his Cabinet endorsed a statement asserting that among the documents identified by the government between 1991 and 1993, “we could find no specific reference to forcible recruitment by military or civil authorities.”1 Again, during the September 2012 intraparty election for president of the Liberal Democratic Party preceding Abe’s election to a second term in late December, he announced his intention to revisit the Kōno declaration. “Many people don’t realize that during my [first administration], the Cabinet issued a finding entitled ‘There was no coercion’,” he told a meeting of LDP Diet members. He added, “We must reaffirm the fact that the Cabinet decision has revised the Kōno statement.”2 Abe’s contentions are based on a rigid definition of forcible recruitment (kyōsei renkō) that has two correlates: (1) that such actions were carried out directly by military or civilian administrative personnel, and (2) that violence or intimidation was employed. The prime minister apparently thinks that unless both types of behavior were present simultaneously, recruitment could not have been, strictly speaking, coercive. He appears determined to construe “forcible” as narrowly as possible in order to minimize the scope of the word’s application and exonerate Japanese military authorities of wrongdoing. As I show below, however, the Kōno statement is very clear in describing as forcible or coercive all actions taken against the will of the victimized women. Is Abe really correct in saying that the historical record does not support such a broad definition? In this chapter, I attempt to answer these and related questions

18   Yoshimi Yoshiaki by reexamining Kōno’s 1993 expression of guilt and remorse. I reassess the positive significance of his statement and conclude with a brief discussion of its shortcomings and how these might be rectified.

The paramount question of coercion The key question to ask about the comfort women system is whether force was used to ensure compliance inside the comfort stations. In assigning responsibility for this system, it does not really matter whether the women caught up in it were transported to Japanese military installations aboard luxury liners, driven to their final destinations in limousines, or even gave their consent and came willingly. If they were forced to engage in sex with military personnel or the civilians in their employ in facilities under military control, then the Imperial armed forces are legally accountable for that system. Kōno addressed this point in his 1993 declaration, noting cogently that the women “lived in misery at comfort stations under a coercive atmosphere.” This is a straightforward assessment of the issue. It is supported by the oral histories and court statements of numerous victims and is therefore difficult to deny. Survivors’ accounts, in turn, have been corroborated by the personal stories of former soldiers, sailors, and their civilian counterparts who availed themselves of the comfort stations, many registering their utter disgust at the appalling conditions they found there. Taking this a step further, if the comfort women system was a case of de facto institutionalized sexual slavery—which I am convinced it was—then the women providing sex there were obviously not doing so of their own will. Table 1.1 compares Japan’s pre-­World War II regime of state-­regulated prostitution with the Imperial military’s comfort women setup. Both systems are forms of highly organized sexual servitude, with a few minor differences. State-­licensed prostitution and the comfort women system both denied inmates freedom of movement and choice in determining their place of residence. Interned women were obliged to live in segregated quarters that were tightly regulated and kept under strict surveillance. Table 1.1 A comparison of Japan’s military comfort women system with prewar licensed prostitution

Licensed prostitution

Freedom Freedom of of domicile movement

Freedom to quit without notice

Freedom to refuse work

None

None, although in 1933, the Home Ministry directed that it be granted.

Legally recognized, but exercising this right was extremely difficult.

Entering this trade was considered a question of choice, but refusing a client was very difficult.

None

None

Refusing a client was virtually impossible.

Military None comfort women system

The Kōno statement   19 Legally registered prostitutes were known colloquially as “caged birds” because they were forbidden to venture outside the red-­light districts without permission from their overseers. In 1933, the Ministry of Home Affairs issued a directive ostensibly lifting this restriction (see below). The measure was taken in response to international criticism that state prostitution in Japan constituted a form of human trafficking—a charge based partly on the permit system that limited licensees’ mobility. The ministry was intent mainly on rebuffing such accusations, and the order was never seriously enforced. Women bound to comfort facilities had no freedom of movement at all. Military regulations governing comfort station operations often explicitly denied this fundamental right. For instance, standing orders drawn up in 1938 by the 2nd Independent Heavy Siege Artillery Battalion stationed in Changzhou, Jiangsu Province, China, state that “[i]t is forbidden for staff to go outside specially designated zones” (“staff ” being a euphemism for comfort women).3 Placing all areas off limits except those specifically authorized by army officials effectively denied these women the liberty to move about unhindered. The Japanese Military Administration of the Philippines’ Iloilo office on Panay Island adopted rules in 1942 compelling army comfort station operators to “strictly control the outings of comfort women,” who were forbidden to leave the premises without express permission from the Iloilo office chief. The single exception was between eight and ten in the morning, when the women were allowed to take short walks, but even then, they were confined to a nearby park occupying the town square.4 Because a special permit was required to exit the comfort facility, freedom of movement was effectively suppressed. The Home Ministry’s 1900 “freedom-­to-retire” directive purportedly recognized the right of registered prostitutes in licensed quarters to leave whenever they wished, but the ministry had no intention of implementing it. In fact, the measure was virtually unenforceable. First of all, women working there were not told of the order’s existence. Even if they learned about it somehow, bordello keepers intervened to prevent them from submitting letters of resignation to the police, as required by law. Women lucky enough to successfully petition police authorities were almost certain to be sued by housemasters demanding repayment of the cash bonds they had advanced the victims’ guardians in order to secure their sexual labor. In principle, Japanese law viewed employment contracts obliging women to pay off their debts through prostitution as a violation of public order and morality and therefore technically invalid. In almost every case that went to litigation, however, courts sided with brothel owners, issuing decisions that required the plaintiffs to clear all financial obligations before departing.5 The vast majority, who could not pay up, were returned to a life of bondage. A Japanese court would not rule decisively in favor of a prostitute breaking her bond and changing jobs until 1955, ten years after the end of World War II. That year, the Supreme Court declared that any clause requiring a woman to repay a monetary advance by selling her body automatically voided the contract itself. The Anti-­Prostitution Law of 1956 (effective from 1958) proscribed all

7 Comfort women shall be permitted to take walks every day between the hours of 8 a.m. and 10 a.m. If they wish to do so at other times, they must have permission from the Iloilo Office, Visayas Branch, Military Government of the Philippines. Furthermore, they are required to remain within the area shown in Figure 1.1 below.

1)  Absolute vigilance must be exercised to safeguard intelligence [useful to the enemy]. 2)  Comfort women and housemasters shall not be subjected to violence or intimidation. 3)  All fees must be paid in advance in military script. 4)  Clients must use condoms, scrupulously maintain personal hygiene, and do their utmost to avoid contracting a venereal disease. 5) It is strictly forbidden to take comfort women off the premises without permission from the Iloilo Office, Visayas Section, Military Government of the Philippines.

6 All personnel intending to use the comfort stations must strictly abide by the following rules.

1)  Bedding in the buildings shall be kept clean and disinfected by exposure to sunlight. 2)  Facilities shall be fully equipped for cleansing and disinfecting [to prevent the spread of venereal disease]. 3)  Clients who do not use condoms shall be prohibited from availing themselves [of these facilities]. 4)  Unwell women are prohibited from serving clients. 5)  Comfort women shall be strictly supervised to ensure they do not leave the premises. 6)  Women shall bathe daily. 7)  All entertainment not covered by these regulations is prohibited. 8)  Comfort station managers shall submit a report of daily business activities to military government authorities.

1 The following regulations apply to all matters concerning the management and operation of comfort stations in the area controlled by the Iloilo Office, Visayas Branch, Military Government of the Philippines. 2 The supervision of comfort stations shall be under the jurisdiction of the [local] military government. 3 The medical officer attached to the garrison shall be in charge of supervising hygiene [in the comfort stations]. Venereal disease examinations of women serving clients [there] shall take place on Tuesday of each week at 15:00. 4 Use of the comfort stations shall be restricted to uniformed military personnel and civilian employees of the military. 5 Comfort station managers shall scrupulously observe the following provisions.

Table 1.2  Military regulations for comfort stations (No. 1 Comfort Station and Asia Hall) in Iloilo City, Visayas, Philippines (November 22, 1942)

Military government headquarters

Comfort Station No.1

Hotel de Iloilo

Source: Yoshimi, Y., ed. (1992). Jūgun ianfu shiryōshū (Historical documents on military comfort women). Tōkyō: Ōtsuki Shoten, pp. 324–26.

The area for walking is limited to the zone around the central plaza [i.e., the outer perimeter of the four streets surrounding the plaza].

Asia Hall

Plaza

Church

Area where walking is permitted

8 Use of the comfort stations is restricted to personnel holding an authorized military pass (or its equivalent). 9 The comfort stations’ hours of operation and fees are to be posted separately.

22   Yoshimi Yoshiaki forms of prostitution, although it left large loopholes. Until the Supreme Court verdict, the putative freedom to quit without notice was, with very few exceptions, meaningless, and licensed prostitution under conditions of debt slavery amounted to de facto sexual slavery. In the case of the comfort women, however, there was not even the pretense of a right to depart at will. Absent a special dispensation from their military overlords, the women were chattels, pure and simple. Could a woman refuse a client? Prostituted women registered by the state were considered to have elected their occupation. But, once a woman’s guarantor had accepted a cash loan from the proprietor and signed a contract, it would not have been easy to turn down a paying customer due to the extreme pressure she was under to fulfill the terms of her indenture. For comfort women, on the other hand, saying no to a client was almost inconceivable; refusal normally brought immediate retaliation in the form of brutal physical punishment administered by station operatives or military personnel. It bears repeating that both state prostitution and the comfort women system were institutionalized forms of sexual subjugation. One can argue that official licensing differs in that it was subject to civil law and therefore, technically speaking, not true slavery. But in essence it was precisely that, as there was usually little hope of the women paying off the cash advance that had procured their servitude. The comfort women system, however, was a blatant form of slavery—subject to strictly enforced military regulations—that compelled women to surrender the use of their bodies to the Imperial armed forces. Only an extreme form of coercion could have obliged many tens of thousands of women to submit to such a regime. Although the 1993 Kōno pronouncement does not go that far in its analysis, it clearly recognizes that force was the means by which the comfort stations secured obedience and assured the continuation of their operation.

Is it true that military and civil personnel did not use violence or intimidation in mobilizing women? In his 1993 address, Kōno stated, “The Government study has revealed that in many cases [women] were recruited against their own will, through coaxing, coercion, etc., and that, at times, administrative/military personnel directly took part in the recruitment” (see Appendix 1). Prime Minister Abe, however, insists that Japanese military officials and civil administrators used neither violence nor intimidation in mobilizing women. The 1907 Penal Code of Japan defined kidnapping or abduction (ryakushu) as the leading away of a person through force or enticement. Did the military resort to force or enticement to meet its comfort station quotas? The answer is an unqualified yes. It is a well-­documented fact that in China, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere, Imperial army and navy units and their civilian agents kidnapped women outright for purposes of sexual enslavement.

The Kōno statement   23 The abduction and rape of Dutch women A case in point is that of the Semarang comfort stations in the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia). In 1944, a Japanese army unit in Semarang (central Java) forcibly transferred at least 24 Dutch women being held in internment camps to military brothels. In 1948, three years after the end of World War  II, Dutch military authorities convened an ad hoc war crimes trial in Batavia (Jakarta) to try Japanese soldiers and their civilian employees for the Semarang incident. The Batavia Military Tribunal considered rape and forced prostitution to be war crimes and convicted 11 Japanese officers and non-­military contractors of rounding up and sexually enslaving Dutch women. One army officer responsible for setting up the comfort station received the death penalty.6 The Asahi Shimbun gave the Semarang story major coverage in 1992, one year before Kōno delivered his statement.7 The Asahi exposé was compiled from historical records and testimonies, including transcripts of the Batavia trials that had been discovered lying in the National Archives of the Netherlands. The Justice Ministry library in Tokyo held some of the same documents, which at the time had not been publicly disclosed.8 When Kōno issued his 1993 policy position, he was certainly aware of the Semarang data, an inconvenient fact that Abe and other revisionists continue to ignore. In 1994, the Dutch government published an official survey of the ordeals that women of Dutch descent in the East Indies had endured under Japanese captivity. The Report of a Study of Dutch Government Documents on the Forced Prostitution of Dutch Women in the Dutch East Indies During the Japanese Occupation covers not only the Semarang incident but eight additional attempts to prostitute women in comfort stations.9 Here, we examine two of these cases in central Java. The first is the Magelang incident. According to the Dutch report, in January 1944, Japanese army officials and local police picked out a number of Dutch women from the Muntilan Internment Camp. After suppressing a riot led by camp leaders in protest, soldiers hauled the women off to a comfort station in Magelang City. Two young girls were returned to the camp and replaced by two older women who had volunteered to go in their place, but the remaining 13 were confined and violated at Magelang. The second case is known as the Semarang-­Flores incident. In April 1944, Japanese military police assisted by local law enforcement assembled about 100 women—Eurasians and Indonesians not yet interned—and took them to the comfort station in Semarang. There, 20 were chosen and sent to Surabaya. Two months later, 17 were dispatched to a comfort facility on Flores Island. There, according to their depositions, some were forced to meet a daily quota of 20 soldiers in the morning, two junior officers in the afternoon, and one senior officer at night. Others testified that soldiers would give them one coupon for each encounter and that if they amassed fewer than 100 tickets a week, station managers would beat them. These testimonies underline the horrific conditions women endured at Flores Island.10

24   Yoshimi Yoshiaki

Figure 1.1 Comfort station coupons. The three-character Japanese compound word with the double underline reads Ianken (“comfort ticket”). Below the double line, two different Chinese characters are encircled, one (far left column) reads “overnight stay” (tomari), the other “enlisted ranks” (hei). Source: Courtesy Nishino Rumiko.

The 1994 Dutch survey focused mainly on victims of Dutch ancestry. Judging from the large numbers of women involved, however, there can be little doubt that Japanese military and auxiliary personnel in the East Indies seized and enslaved Indonesians and other Asians in far greater numbers. Below, we document two such examples. The abduction and rape of Chinese and Southeast Asian women During the 1990s, 16 survivors from China’s Shanxi Province and eight from Hainan Island launched four lawsuits against the Japanese government seeking redress for wartime sexual abuse. Three Shanxi groups filed separate cases in 1995, 1996, and 1998, and a Hainan group followed up with a fourth suit in 2001. The courts rejected the plaintiffs’ demand for an official apology and state compensation, but in all four instances, Japanese judges accepted as truthful their personal accounts of violent seizure, confinement, and sexual molestation and torture at the

Figure 1.2 A military-issue condom. The four Chinese characters totsugeki ichiban mean, roughly, “champion of the frontal attack.” Source: Courtesy Nishino Rumiko.

Figure 1.3 Medicated ointment to prevent venereal infections. “Star-brand secret ointment” (Seihikō) was distributed regularly to soldiers by military hygiene personnel. Instructions on its use are given on the back of the box. The ointment and the condom were obligatory for visits to comfort stations, but many soldiers refused to use them. Source: Courtesy Nishino Rumiko.

26   Yoshimi Yoshiaki hands of Imperial forces.11 The victims’ stories reverberate through the verdicts, providing eyewitness verification of the Japanese military’s direct involvement in abduction and rape. Original field research conducted in a Shanxi village and published in 2004 by Ishida Yoneko and Uchida Tomoyuki reconfirms the wartime experiences of survivors and village residents through detailed interviews. This dense, internally consistent corpus of eyewitness testimony defies refutation.12 In the litigation brought by 46 Filipina survivors in 1993, Japanese courts did not examine their personal depositions, but almost all of the plaintiffs testified that they had been carried off forcibly by Japanese soldiers, confined, and violated serially over a period of time. A typical example is Maria Rosa Luna Henson, who in 1992 became the first Filipina to step forward and publicly disclose her war experiences. In February 1942, Henson, then 14, was caught, raped, and then abandoned by three Japanese soldiers. Two weeks later, one of the three happened to find her and violated her again, this time in the presence of her uncles, who were powerless to intervene. Outraged, she joined the anti­Japanese resistance. In April 1943, she and two other partisans were stopped at a Japanese checkpoint. She alone was taken away, held with six other women in a room at garrison headquarters, and raped daily for nine months. While there, she was forced to undergo weekly medical checkups by an army doctor.13 The recollections of former military officers corroborate the fact that similar events also took place in the Dutch East Indies. One example is Sakabe Yasumasa, a paymaster attached to naval headquarters on Ambon in the Maluku Islands. He relates that when the Japanese comfort women working there were sent home, military officials decided to open new sex facilities sometime after March 1945. Staff officer “M” proposed that four clubs [comfort stations] be established in the northern, southern, eastern, and western parts of Ambon, and that approximately 100 women be furnished from the local population to fill them. According to the proposal, a proclamation in the Malay language would be posted in each town and village warning that “women who have sexual liaisons with Japanese soldiers will be punished severely.” The aim was to encourage informers to denounce such women, after which local police were to locate, round up, and detain in designated buildings those said to be on friendly terms with Japanese men. The plan was to select from this group individuals who were attractive and free of venereal disease and force them to work as comfort women in the clubs. This was a terrifying prospect for officers like myself who were romantically involved with a local woman. I was afraid to venture out at night with my lover while the hunt for comfort woman was on. Local women might well have been pleased to acquire a Japanese cinta (boyfriend), but they could not possibly have been happy about being interned [in a comfort station] and made to provide sex to an endless stream of men, no matter how much money or [barter] they received. I often despaired to hear the wails of young Indonesian women that emanated from those clubs.14

The Kōno statement   27 This former naval officer states explicitly that, contrary to the claims of Prime Minister Abe, Japanese military and civilian personnel abducted local women as a matter of policy. A Mitsubishi Oil employee working in Palembang, southern Sumatra cites another instance of deception and forcible recruitment by Imperial forces. He recalls soldiers collecting young Indonesians from Bangka Island by means of abduction and trafficking. Since the previous year [1944], the army had found itself short of comfort women. There were not enough ships available to bring them from Japan, so the military began to procure women locally. The military seemed to consider it a matter of course, but the women themselves were pitiable victims of war. When they were requisitioned, their parents were given rice and other items of value in exchange and told that their daughters were being conscripted for some [worthy] purpose. The women were taken away and compelled to become prostitutes.15 Documentary proof of mobilization by force and deception also survives in a more accessible form. The final judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, the so-­called Tokyo trials, of November 4, 1948 is perhaps the best-­known example. This verdict found Japanese troops guilty of deceiving women in Guilin (south central China near French Indochina) into believing they were volunteering for factory work when in fact they were being herded into sex stations. During the period of [the] Japanese occupation of Kweilin, [Imperial forces] committed all kinds of atrocities such as rape and plunder. They recruited women labor [sic] on the pretext of establishing factories. They forced the women thus recruited into prostitution with Japanese troops.16 Nearly three years later, on September 8, 1951, the Japanese government formally accepted the verdict of the Tokyo trials when it signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Article 11 of the treaty read: “Japan accepts the judgments of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and of other Allied War Crimes Courts both within and outside Japan.” There is no hint of ambiguity here, and Japanese authorities cannot now credibly claim ignorance of the Allied findings. To summarize, the above examples, taken from many sources, show that Japanese army and navy personnel and their civilian cohorts employed a combination of deceit, intimidation, and abduction to round up women for military sex venues. This documentary proof was already available to the public when Kōno Yōhei issued his 1993 statement acknowledging responsibility for the comfort women system. The Tokyo trials handed down their decisions in 1948, preserving evidence of the fraudulent, coercive recruitment of sex slaves by Japanese military units in China. Tokyo formally accepted those rulings, together with the judgments of other Allied war crimes trials, when it signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951. Among those “other trials” was the

28   Yoshimi Yoshiaki Batavia Ad hoc Military Tribunal, which prosecuted enforced prostitution as a war crime. The Asahi Shimbun even serialized a special feature on that issue based on Dutch military reports in 1992. Kōno’s 1993 recognition of enticement, brute force, and other coercive methods employed by Japanese troops in the marshaling of women for military comfort stations rested on an unassailable body of evidence. His statement of guilt and contrition is solidly grounded in historical fact, and although it does not go far enough, it cannot be denied.

Is it true that forcible recruitment did not occur in colonial Korea and Taiwan? There is no way to know for sure how many women were ultimately entrapped by the comfort women system. By my own very minimal estimate there were at least many tens of thousands.17 Nor do we know for sure the relative proportions of the different ethnic and national groups involved. An Imperial Army Headquarters report on venereal disease infections among soldiers in China between 1937 and 1940 estimates that 52 percent of the women involved were Korean, 36 percent Chinese, and 12 percent Japanese, but this figure would have varied in time and place. Elsewhere, in addition to Filipinas and Indonesians, there were also Malayans, Timorese, Indochinese, Burmese, Indians, Dutch, Pacific islanders, and others.18 But the greater number undoubtedly came from Korea and China. According to the Kōno statement: “The Korean Peninsula was under Japanese rule in those days, and the recruitment, transfer, control, etc. were conducted generally against [the women’s] will, through coaxing, coercion, etc.” (see Appendix 1). Currently, we have no irrefutable historical proof that Japanese military authorities engaged directly in the abduction of women within the Japanese Empire, which included Korea and Taiwan.19 Instead, that task was contracted out to private procurers known as zegen, who enticed, kidnapped, and trafficked women—of whom a disproportionate number were minors—on a daily basis.20 Japan’s Home Affairs and War ministries ordered the governors-­ general of Korea and Taiwan to ensure that Japanese military police, provincial governors, and colonial law enforcement agencies cooperated with these recruiters. Local chiefs of police were instructed to issue recruited women with the identification papers that allowed them to be trafficked to China and other overseas destinations.21 The forcible enlistment of women was a flagrant violation of the 1907 Penal Code, which was applicable in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. Article 226 of the code, “Kidnapping for Transportation out of the Empire,” reads: “Whosoever shall have, for the purpose of transporting him or her out of the Empire, allured [enticed] (yūkai) or kidnapped (ryakushu) a person shall be punished with limited penal servitude for a period of not less than two years.”22 Kidnapping/abduction (ryakushu) was defined as the leading away of a person through physical violence (bōkō) or intimidation (kyōhaku), while enticement

The Kōno statement   29 (yūkai) referred to solicitation by means of deception (damashi) or coaxing (kangen, literally, sweet talk or cajolery). For instance, it was deception when women were told they would be hired as nurses or cooks; it was coaxing when they were led to believe the work would be easy and well paid. Both methods fall under the rubric of kidnapping/abduction and were criminal offenses under Article 226. Clause 2 of Article 226 defined two related offenses: “The same penalty shall be inflicted upon whosoever shall have, with intent to carry him or her out of the Empire, sold a person or transported to a foreign country a person who has been sold or kidnapped.” Conversely, if the victims were not transported abroad, the crime of human trafficking as defined in this clause did not apply.23 The majority of Korean and Taiwanese women were transported overseas, so their requisition involved the statutory crimes of enticement, kidnapping, and human trafficking. It is time for Prime Minister Abe to acknowledge that the legal definition of coercive recruitment included not only abduction in the narrowest sense but deception, cajolery, and sex trafficking as well. The colonial police officials who provided these women with travel documents had to know that procurers were openly flaunting the law, but they generally turned a blind eye. The only plausible explanation for this dereliction of duty was the Imperial military’s single-­minded resolve to fill comfort station rosters. Evidence of these crimes is not confined to the personal testimonials of Koreans and other Imperial subjects. We also have documentary and other written evidence, of which three examples will suffice. The first is an official U.S. military document dated October 1, 1944 and entitled “Japanese Prisoner of War Interrogation Report No. 49.” Issued by a U.S. psychological warfare team in Burma, the account notes that American soldiers took 20 Korean comfort women into protective custody and arrested two Japanese recruiters, a husband and wife team (see the Insight subchapter at the end of Chapter 5). Based on interrogations of the women and their handlers, the report states that: Early in May of 1942, Japanese agents arrived in Korea for the purpose of enlisting Korean girls for “comfort service” in newly conquered Japanese territories in Southeast Asia. The nature of this “service” was not specified but it was assumed to be work connected with visiting the wounded in hospitals, rolling bandages, and generally making the soldiers happy.24 Approximately 800 of these girls were recruited in this manner and they landed with their Japanese “house master” at Rangoon around August 20th, 1942. They came in groups of from eight to twenty-­two. From here they were distributed to various parts of Burma, usually to fair sized towns near Japanese Army camps.25 Clearly, these women were mobilized through deception, an obvious Penal Code offense. The report continues: “The inducements used by these agents included plenty of money, the opportunity to pay off family debts, easy work, and the prospect of a new life in a new land, Singapore.” Again, we have the crime of

30   Yoshimi Yoshiaki enticement. “On the basis of these false representations,” the document notes, “many girls enlisted for duty overseas and were rewarded with an advance of a few hundred yen [to reduce the family debt].” Shackling the women with a cash bond to ensure their compliance is tantamount to buying them outright for transportation abroad and merits the additional charge of human trafficking. Another reliable source of information is a book by Imperial army surgeon Nagasawa Ken’ichi, who relates that even when the Japanese military knew that the women had been abducted or trafficked, nothing was ever done to apprehend the brokers or operators or liberate the victims. He tells of a young Japanese woman with no prior history of prostitution brought from Japan proper to a comfort station in Hankou, China: Crying, she protested: “I was told I would be consoling soldiers in places called ‘comfort stations.’ … I had no idea I’d be doing this kind of thing in a place like this. I want to go home, please let me go home!” she sobbed and then burst into tears again.26 The woman was told she would be assigned to a comfort facility but was never informed what that entailed. She was fraudulently enticed into enlisting.

Figure 1.4 New Years Day, 1938. Japanese soldiers crowd a Nanjing comfort station that has just opened. Sources: Shanhai Hakengun Shireibu hen (Shanghai Expeditionary Army Headquarters), ed. (1938). Shina jihen: Shanhai Hakengun Shireibu kinen shashinchō (The China Incident: Shanghai Expeditionary Army Headquarters Photo Album). February. Shanghai: Shanghai Expeditionary Army Headquarters.

The Kōno statement   31 Nagasawa writes that she also bore a crushing personal debt, indicating that a cash payment had been made to guarantee her cooperation and that trafficking was also involved. The woman’s background was well known to local military authorities. Her story indicates that this was nothing exceptional. Military comfort facilities could only have been established by ignoring Japanese domestic law, notably the Penal Code’s Article 226. Indeed, that was the system’s unspoken premise. A final document is the memoir of former Yomiuri Shimbun war reporter Omata Yukio. Omata retained a vivid memory of the arrival in Rangoon, Burma of some 40 to 50 women from Korea. Learning that Japanese journalists would receive special treatment at a newly opened comfort facility in the city, he presented himself at the venue in eager anticipation. To his surprise, the woman he was paired with was a 22- or 23-year-­old former elementary school teacher. When asked how she found herself in such straits, she replied that a broker in Korea had tricked her into coming. The woman was looking after eight girls between the ages of 16 and 17, all of whom hated the work they were forced to do, and she asked Omata if he could help them. After considering the young women’s predicament, he advised them to escape and throw themselves on the mercy of the local Japanese military police (kenpeitai). The kenpeitai, he told her, might intercede on their behalf or, conversely, they might throw them all in prison, but there were no good options in Burma and that was the best he could think of. Obediently, the girls went to the military police. Perplexed, the military police ultimately got in touch with the brothel operator. The eight young women were reassigned but ended up doing work in an officers’ club.27 It is unclear what happened afterwards, but we know that they were not returned to Korea any time soon. As for the schoolteacher, she remained trapped in the comfort station. The contractors who defrauded her, the agents who trafficked her to Rangoon, and the housemaster who used and abused her were all working for the military and continued to ply their nefarious trade unchallenged. The above examples confirm the accuracy of Kōno’s conclusion that, “the recruitment, transfer, [and] control of comfort women were conducted generally against their will, through coaxing, coercion, etc.” This singular admission cannot be repeated often enough.

Who is the primary culprit? Some have proposed that the Imperial military’s control and operation of comfort facilities were in fact a form of “public management.” This is the argument advanced by the former mayor of Osaka, Hashimoto Toru, at a press conference on August 24, 2012. There, he compared the role of Imperial forces in running comfort facilities to that of Japan’s Public Safety Commission, the government body that now oversees and regulates the entertainment industry.28 The Public Safety Commission’s relation to the entertainment industry, however, is entirely different from that of the Japanese military to the comfort

32   Yoshimi Yoshiaki women system. The commission operates at the local-­government level, keeping watch over public morals in the adult entertainment business. The military comfort women system was an institution of sexual enslavement. Not only did Imperial forces design this system, but they also maintained, monitored, and actively engineered its expansion. Substantial documentation exists to prove this point beyond a reasonable doubt. Even those who insist that only written records constitute historical evidence cannot really deny this. The Kōno proclamation concludes that “this [system] was an act, with the involvement of the military authorities of the day, that severely injured the honor and dignity of many women,” and that “[t]he then Japanese military was, directly or indirectly, involved in the establishment and management of the comfort stations and the transfer of comfort women.” Kōno’s phrasing of responsibility here is somewhat ambiguous and understates the facts, but his is a far better approximation of historical reality than the whimsical comparison suggested by ex-­mayor Hashimoto. This point bears further discussion. First of all, the orders to set up comfort stations emanated from Japan’s Expeditionary Force Headquarters and the Army Central Command (Ministry of War and Headquarters of the General Staff ). These centers of power decided when and where comfort facilities would be established and then expedited the process. When procurers and their auxiliaries required a ship to transport the women, military charters were put at their disposal. The subsequent overland journey was usually by military vehicle. Army and navy units commandeered local buildings for use as comfort facilities and oversaw necessary renovations. Local Japanese military authorities wrote the administrative rules and bylaws governing the operation of sex stations and determined payment rates and work schedules. Even where private operatives actually ran the facilities, the military closely regulated their activities. In principle, the use of these establishments was reserved for military personnel and their civilian hires. The Imperial armed forces provided the victims they prostituted with food, clothing, and daily necessities. Comfort women were subject to military discipline, and army and navy surgeons periodically examined them for venereal disease. It would be difficult to imagine today’s Public Safety Commission performing any of those functions. The businesses that the commission supervises have not been created by a government agency or local municipality. Patronage of such enterprises is not restricted to civil servants—if we wish to compare wartime military personnel to contractual servants of the state. Today, it would be unthinkable for Japan’s national bureaucracy to set up a network of brothels for the exclusive use of its male employees. Imagine, for instance, the Education Ministry establishing sex facilities for elementary and junior high school teachers. The very idea scandalizes. Indeed, that is the heart of the matter. During the Asia-­Pacific War, the vast majority of ordinary Japanese considered such abnormal behavior to be normal or unavoidable. The real problem at the root of the comfort women system is that, in those days, the overwhelming majority of Japanese viewed such

The Kōno statement   33 a­ berrant behavior as inevitable. The public was stunned, however, when Hashimoto told reporters on May 13, 2013 that the comfort system was necessary to provide solace to war-­crazed soldiers29 (two weeks later, he claimed that he had been misquoted and retracted the remarks but did not offer to step down as governor). In any event, official archival records point to the Imperial military as the primary culprit in the crime of sexual enslavement. Hashimoto’s notion of “public management” in this context is as fanciful as it is meaningless. Kōno’s recognition of military “involvement,” on the other hand, strikes us as disingenuous and wholly inadequate. His statement should have said clearly that it was the Imperial armed forces, relying on a network of government bureaucrats and private contractors, who “severely injured the honor and dignity of many women.”

A second look at coercion Returning to the meaning of force, the Kōno declaration says that many comfort women were “recruited against their own will through coaxing, coercion, etc.” What does Prime Minister Abe make of this statement? Mayor Hashimoto complained in his August 2012 press conference that Kōno’s definition of coercion was too broad. There may have been instances, he surmised, where women had personal qualms but nonetheless entered comfort stations of their own accord. In those cases, he suggested, the term “forcible recruitment” is inappropriate and should not be generalized.30 Here, the case of Tanaka Minoru is instructive. In April 2005, the National Police Agency officially confirmed that Tanaka had been abducted by North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK). Police say that in June 1978, the owner of a Kobe restaurant where Tanaka worked persuaded him “to go abroad,” and Tanaka was subsequently sent to the DPRK. The owner of the establishment, a zainichi Korean resident, was acting on orders from the North Korean state, but DPRK authorities were not directly involved. Nonetheless, in 2005, the National Police Agency listed Tanaka as one of 16 Japanese officially recognized as kidnap victims. Police were following Article 226 of the current Criminal Code. On April 25, 2005, the NPA issued a statement explaining its decision. All such cases of suspected abduction are presumed to have been carried out at the instigation of the North Korean government, and the individ­uals involved are considered to have been taken to North Korea against their will.31 This determination is based on the same Article 226 of the 1907 Penal Code, the Criminal Code’s predecessor. Not surprisingly, it is also the reasoning Kōno applies when he finds the Imperial military guilty of recruiting women against their will through “coaxing, coercion, etc.” This case highlights the double

34   Yoshimi Yoshiaki standard employed by the Kōno statement’s revisionist detractors, including Japan’s current prime minister.

Toward a just settlement In closing, we must ask how the issue of wartime military prostitution and sexual violence should be resolved. Here, it is useful to compare the Kōno document with the European Parliament’s resolution of December 13, 2007 on justice for the comfort women.32 The resolution makes five demands. The first “[c]alls on the Japanese Government formally to acknowledge, apologise, and accept historical and legal responsibility, in a clear and unequivocal manner, for its Imperial armed forces’ coercion of young women into sexual slavery.” The Kōno’s declaration admits that most of the responsibility for this system lies with the Japanese military, yet his statement is vague about who played the central role in actually planning and implementing that system. The evidence we have amassed over the past two decades in the form of survivor testimonies, war memoirs, and archival materials overwhelmingly indicts the military as the prime mover, not the bureaucrats, civilian intermediaries, and other private agents who did its bidding. The Japanese government must now, “in a clear and unequivocal manner” assume historical and legal responsibility for the wartime actions of the Japanese state and the Imperial armed forces. While reaffirming the truth of Kōno’s finding that the women “lived in misery at comfort stations under a coercive atmosphere,” the government must go further and admit that the Japanese military comfort women system was a state-­sanctioned institution of sexual servitude. The European Parliament’s second demand “[c]alls on the Japanese Government to implement effective administrative mechanisms to provide reparations to all surviving victims of the ‘comfort women’ system and the families of its deceased victims.” The third calls on the Japanese Parliament [the Diet] to take legal measures to remove existing obstacles to obtaining reparations before Japanese courts; in particular, the right of individuals to claim reparations from the government should be expressly recognised in national law, and cases for reparations for the survivors of sexual servitude, as a crime under international law, should be prioritised, taking into account the age of the survivors. Japan has not begun to tackle the second and third demands. They must now become a priority of the highest urgency for government policy and action. The fourth point “calls on the government of Japan to refute publicly any claims that the subjugation and sexual exploitation of ‘comfort women’ never occurred.” Neonationalist politicians in Japan have attempted to publicly discredit the main tenets of the Kōno proclamation. The government must publicly

The Kōno statement   35 repudiate these insistent distortions if it hopes to fulfill its moral and historical obligation to set the record straight and make amends. Finally, the European Parliament  [e]ncourages the Japanese people and government to take further steps to recognise the full history of their nation, as is the moral duty of all countries, and to foster awareness in Japan of its actions in the 1930s and 1940s, including in relation to ‘comfort women’ [and] calls on the government of Japan to educate current and future generations about those events. The Kōno statement anticipated this final point with the following pledge: “We hereby reiterate our firm determination never to repeat the same mistake by forever engraving such issues in our memories through the study and teaching of history.” Yet the Japanese government has not kept that vital promise. Instead, over the past decade, it has challenged Kōno’s conclusions, expunged references to the comfort women from junior high school textbooks (Chapter 6), disparaged victim-­survivors (Chapter 3), and cast doubt on Japan’s wartime responsibility in the public mind (Chapters 2 and 5). The European Parliament’s 2007 resolution offers a realistic framework for a comprehensive settlement of the comfort women issue. Working within these parameters, the Japanese people must energetically embrace the Kōno statement’s positive historical vision and its call to national action. At the same time, we must strive to identify and critically reassess the document’s obvious limitations in order to better overcome them.

Postscript On December 28, 2015, the foreign ministers of Japan and the Republic of Korea reached a bilateral agreement on the issue of South Korean comfort women (see Appendix 4). Neither government took the trouble to consult the survivors, however. Viewed in the context of the Kōno statement, the recent bilateral understanding presents major difficulties that could subvert hopes for a just resolution of this problem. First of all, the agreement uses the same ambiguous language as the Kōno statement when it speaks of the “involvement of the Japanese military authorities at that time.” As a result, it fails to unambiguously acknowledge the responsibility of the Imperial army and navy, or the Japanese state at the time, for implementing, operating, and extending the military system of sexual servitude. Second, Japan’s Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio, in announcing the “one-­ time contribution” of ¥1 billion, does not use the word “compensation” (as a necessary remedy for a past injustice) but instead speaks of “support” for “recovering the honor and dignity and healing the psychological wounds” of former comfort women. In this way, the bilateral agreement subtly absolves the wartime Japanese military and state of all liability for having brought about that loss of honor and dignity and inflicted those wounds in the first place.

36   Yoshimi Yoshiaki A third point concerns the historical facts of military sexual subjugation. Following the agreement, Prime Minister Abe told the Diet on January 18, 2016 that there was no evidence of comfort women being forcibly rounded up by military or civil authorities, reiterating the Cabinet decision of March 16, 2007 (see Epilogue). In other words, the Abe administration continues to disavow one of the key revelations of the Kōno statement, namely that most comfort women were “recruited against their own will, through coaxing, coercion, etc., and that, at times, administrative/military personnel directly took part in the recruitment.” In that sense, the recent Japan–ROK pact subtly reconfirms the Abe regime’s reinterpretation of a core tenet of the Kōno document. Fourth, after December’s agreement was reached, Prime Minister Abe and Foreign Minister Kishida told the Diet that the term “sexual slaves” was a distortion of historical fact. In that case, one has to wonder what constituted “a grave affront to the honor and dignity of large numbers of women.” What exactly is the agreement acknowledging? Finally, the bilateral memorandum, unlike the Kōno statement, says nothing about “engraving [these] issues in our memories through the study and teaching of history.” In this sense, the agreement represents a step backward. The Japanese government is now under no obligation to take measures to ensure that present and future generations do not repeat the errors of the past.

Notes   1 The English translation is from Niksch, L. (2007). Japanese Military’s “Comfort Women” System. Congressional Research Service Memorandum. April 3. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, p. 5. Abe’s March 5 comments and the March 16 Cabinet decision ostensibly upheld the Kōno declaration, but the March 16 statement, in particular, cast doubt on the coercive nature of comfort women procurement by noting simply that documentary proof could not be confirmed. (Abe made this point in response to a question by lower house member Tsujimoto Kiyomi at the 166th Session of the Diet, No. 110, March 16, 2007.) The Cabinet finding, however, did not state categorically that force had not been a factor. Indeed, on March 5, Abe had conceded that, “In the broad sense, there was coercion” but insisted that this was due not to Japanese military or civil authorities but to private agents who procured women through force, deceit, and intimidation.   2 Asahi Shimbun (2012b). Jimintō sōsai kōhosha tōronkai no hōkoku (Report on LDP deliberations on candidates for party president). September 16, p. 5.   3 Yoshimi, Y., ed. (1992). Jūgun ianfu shiryōshū (Historical documents on military comfort women). Tōkyō: Ōtsuki Shoten, pp. 195–96.   4 Yoshimi (1992), pp. 324–27.   5 Maki, H. (1971). Jinshin baibai (Human trafficking). Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, p. 208.   6 See the discussion in Yoshimi, Y. (2000). Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military During World War  II (Translated by S. O’Brien). New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 163–66, 171–73.   7 Asahi Shimbun (1992a). Oranda josei mo ianfu ni: 35 nin, 4 kasho ni renkō (Dutch women also taken as comfort women: 35 women taken away to four places). July 21, p.  1, and Asahi Shimbun (1992b). Sensō no anbu, uzuku kizuato: Orandajin ianfu jiken no keii to haikei (The dark face of war, festering memories: the case of the Dutch comfort women). August 30, p. 8.

The Kōno statement   37   8 In 1993, the Justice Ministry included a cursory description of these documents in a brief report to the Cabinet.   9 See Yoshimi, Y. (2010). Nihongun “ianfu” seido to wa nani ka (The Japanese military “comfort women” system explained). Tōkyō: Iwanami Pamphlet, pp. 36–38. 10 See Kajimura, T., Kasuya, K., and Muraoka, T. (2008). Ianfu kyōsei renkō—shiryō: Oranda gunpōkaigi shiryō & rupo: “watashi wa ‘riben-­guizu’ no ko” (The forced recruitment of “comfort women”: documents (Dutch military tribunal records) and reportage: “I was a child of the ‘Japanese devils’ ”). Tōkyō: Kinyōbi, pp.  170, 178. This work includes statements by survivors of the Semarang, Magelang, and Semarang-­Flores incidents as well as a Japanese translation of the Dutch government report and related documents. 11 Tsubokawa, H. and Ōmori, N., eds. (2011). Shihō ga nintei shita Nihongun “ianfu”: higai/kagai jijitsu wa kesenai (Japan’s legal system has recognized the [testimonies of] military “comfort women”: the facts concerning victim and aggressor cannot be erased). Tōkyō: Kamogawa Shuppan, pp. 28–50. 12 Ishida, Y. and Uchida, T., eds. (2004). Kōdo no mura no seibōryoku: daniang tachi no sensō wa owaranai (Sexual violence in a Chinese loess-­soil village: the war never ends for these “grandmas”). Tōkyō: Sōdosha, pp. 15–199. 13 Henson, M. R. L. (1999). Comfort Woman: A Filipina’s Story of Prostitution and Slavery under the Japanese Military. Lanham (Maryland): Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 23–25, 35–48. An earlier version of this work was translated by Fujime, Y. (1995) as Aru Nihongun “ianfu” no kaisō: Firipin no gendaishi o ikite (Recollections of a “comfort woman”: living the experience of modern Philippine history). Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten. See also the interview with Henson in Digital Museum: The Comfort Women Issue and the Asian Women’s Fund (2007d). Oral History. [online] Tōkyō: Asian Women’s Fund. Available at: www.awf.or.jp/e3/oralhistory-­00.html [accessed March 3, 2016]. 14 Kaigun Keirigakkō Hoshū Gakusei Daijūkki Bunshū Kankō Iinkai [Editorial Committee of the Tenth Collection of Essays by Supplementary Students of the Navy Accounting School] (1983). Sōmei (The deep blue sea). Vol.  10. Sōmeikai, p.  312. See also the discussion in Yoshimi (2000), p. 128. 15 Tajiri, K. (1993). Sekiyu ni chitta kaenju no hana: aru rikugun chōin no jūgunki (African Tulip Tree blossoms scattered on oil: the diary of a deployed conscript). Tōkyō: Seishidō, pp. 149–50. 16 Kyokutō Kokusai Gunji Saibanshō [International Military Tribunal for the Far East], ed. (1968). Kyokutō Kokusai Gunji Saiban sokkiroku (Stenographic record of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East). Vol. 10: Entry No. 49,617. Tōkyō: Yūshōdō Shoten. 17 One historian calculates that there were only 20,000 comfort women, but in my view, that is far too small a number. In 1939, the Imperial 21st Army in China sought a ratio of one woman for every 100 soldiers. If there were, on average, roughly three million Japanese soldiers and sailors stationed overseas during the war years (not counting those on the frontlines), there were at least 30,000 comfort women. That assumes, however, that none of the women were replaced. If half were replaced during the war, the figure grows to 45,000 (30,000 × 1.5). In the case of the army, smaller military units (company-­level and below) often set up impromptu comfort facilities. Taking these women into account, I would suggest an absolute minimal estimate of 50,000. Even that low figure is almost certainly not high enough, however. In China, the Philippines, and other territories occupied by Imperial forces, frontline units often abducted women and gang-­raped them for periods ranging from a few days or weeks to a few years. When the units moved on, fresh recruits were rounded up. The number of such victims was particularly high among Chinese, Southeast Asians, and Pacific islanders. In these cases, the minimal estimate must be revised upward accordingly. In sum, many tens of thousands of women were undoubtedly caught up in the comfort

38   Yoshimi Yoshiaki women dragnet. Unfortunately, it is not possible to give a maximum number of prostituted victims with any degree of confidence. See the discussion in Yoshimi (2000), pp. 91–94. The author added this note on January 28, 2016. 18 Yoshimi (2000), p. 95. 19 I have been unable to verify through the documentation currently available and survivors’ accounts whether military or administrative personnel participated directly in the kidnapping of women in Korea. The writings of Yoshida Seiji, who claimed to have personally rounded up Korean women on Jeju Island for the Imperial military, were questioned in the early 1990s by scholars on both sides of the issue and shown to be wholly unreliable. Survivor testimony strongly suggests that the military was implicated in abductions in Korea, but we lack written proof to corroborate that charge. On the other hand, it is important to point out that existing materials and testimony do not rule out the possibility of military abductions, either. Concerning Yoshida Seiji, see Yoshimi, Y. and Kawada, F., eds. (1997). “Jūgun ianfu” o meguru 30 no uso to shinjitsu (Thirty falsehoods and truths about the “military comfort women”). Tōkyō: Ōtsuki Shoten, pp. 26–27. 20 In the case of Korea, many zegen were Koreans, who often teamed up with Japanese. Some were Japanese brokers who solicited independently. To facilitate their work, procurers often wore military uniforms and claimed to be civilian employees of the Japanese army. 21 See Yoshimi (2000), pp. 107–17. 22 Penal Code (Act No. 45 of 1907). The English translation is adapted from De Becker, J. E. (1907). The Criminal Code of Japan. Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, p. 82. 23 This was true in prewar Japan as well as during most of the postwar era. In 2005, responding to criticism by the U.S. State Department’s annual review of human trafficking, the Japanese government amended the Criminal Code to criminalize the transporting, transferring, or harboring of victims of trafficking. But this measure left many loopholes, and Japan does not have a comprehensive anti-­trafficking law with teeth. The country remains “a destination, source, and transit country for men and women subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking, and for children subjected to sex trafficking.” U.S. Department of State (2015). 2015 Trafficking in Persons Report. [online] Available at: www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2015/ [accessed January 16, 2016]. 24 Psychological Warfare Team Attached to U.S. Army Forces India–Burma Theater (1944). Japanese Prisoner of War Interrogation Report No.  49. ND-­97. October 1. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Office of War Information, p. 1. 25 Psychological Warfare Team (1944), p. 2. 26 Nagasawa, K. (1983). Kankō ianjo (The Hankou comfort stations). Tōkyō: Tosho Shuppansha, p. 147. 27 Omata Y. (1967). Senjō to kisha (The frontline and journalists). Tōkyō: Tōjusha, pp. 333–34. 28 YouTube (2012). The Problem of Japanese Military Comfort Women: The August 24, 2012 Press Conference of Osaka Mayor Hashimoto, Under Fire for his Comments on that Issue. [online] Available at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=x6fS4ChfuDg [accessed January 9, 2016]. 29 “When soldiers are risking their lives by running through storms of bullets, and you want to give these emotionally charged soldiers a rest somewhere, it’s clear that you need a comfort women system.” English translation is by Tabuchi, H. (2013). Women forced into WWII brothels served necessary role, Osaka Mayor says. New York Times. May 13, p. A7. 30 Omata (1967). 31 National Police Agency of Japan: Suspected Abduction Cases by North Korea (2005). Suspected Abduction Case of Ex-­diner Employee (Hyogo Prefectural Police Headquarters). [online] Available at: www.npa.go.jp/keibi/gaiji1/abd_e/insyokutentenin_e. html [accessed December 14, 2012].

The Kōno statement   39 32 European Parliament (2007). European Parliament Resolution of 13 December 2007 on Justice for the “Comfort Women” (Sex slaves in Asia before and during World War II). P6_TA (2007) 0632, Strasbourg. [online] Available at: www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/ getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-­2007-0632+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN [accessed January 20, 2013].

2 Forcible mobilization What survivor testimonies tell us Nishino Rumiko

Introduction In the summer of 2012, several prominent Japanese political leaders publicly denied the coercive nature of comfort women (ianfu) recruitment by the Imperial military during the Asia-­Pacific War (1931–45). Their statements were meant as a rebuff to South Korean President Lee Myung-­bak’s exhortations to Tokyo to work harder at resolving the bilateral comfort women dispute. These comments echoed earlier disavowals voiced by Prime Minister Abe Shinzō during his first term in office (2006–07). The denialist position may be broken down into four arguments. The first insists that the government has been unable to find, in any of the historical documents it has located, clear evidence that wartime Japanese authorities, civilian or military, forcibly mobilized comfort women. A notable example is Prime Minister Abe’s statement to the House of Councilors’ Budget Committee on March 5, 2007 that, “[T]estimony to the effect that there had been a hunt for comfort women is a complete fabrication.”1 The second pattern of denial rejects eyewitness testimony about the comfort system, including court depositions by victim-­survivors, as unreliable. A third strategy attempts to shift the historical responsibility for coercive enlistment from the Imperial military to private contractors. This is the tactic adopted by groups such as the Young Diet Members Group for Considering Japan’s Future and History Textbooks, a parliamentary conclave inside the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. Formed in 1997, the group advocates for the elimination from public school textbooks of references to Japan’s colonial and militarist past. The Young Diet Members aver that while independent operators may have forcibly procured women against their will, neither the Japanese military nor the state was directly implicated in such practices. The fourth line of attack is to assert that the comfort women were not “sexual slaves” at all but “prostitutes” registered and licensed by state authorities and therefore willing participants in what amounted to a simple business transaction.2 The historical facts, however, are irrefutable. The comfort women system was planned, implemented, and administered by the Japanese military from its beginnings in 1932 until its demise following Japan’s defeat in 1945. It is true that the

Forcible mobilization   41 compulsory assembly of women and the operation of so-­called comfort stations (ianjo) were often outsourced to private contractors, but these intermediaries took their orders directly from the Imperial army and navy. In a combat zone, civilian concessionaires would have found it difficult to work independently of the military. Initially, some proprietors obviously managed to set up brothels at their own initiative, but sooner or later these came under military supervision and control. The historical record shows clearly that once the military high command authorized the establishment of sex venues for its troops, these were quickly integrated into the Japanese war machine, expanding rapidly as Imperial forces brought ever larger areas of Asia and the Pacific under their domain.

The concept of forcible procurement Military authorities and their civilian auxiliaries employed several modes of coercive mobilization, of which kidnapping/abduction was only one. International law in effect at the time—notably the International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic (1910)—defined a broad range of recruiting methods as coercive. The convention outlawed, for instance, the procuring, enticing, or leading away, even with her consent, of a woman or girl under age, for immoral purposes (Article 1). It also prohibited “methods of compulsion” such as fraudulent deceit, physical violence, intimidation, and the abusive use of authority (Article 2). In 1921, the League of Nations enacted the International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children, which superseded the 1910 white slave treaty but retained its basic provisions. Japan belatedly ratified both covenants in 1925.3 The international treaties of 1910 and 1921 provide a baseline definition of forcible techniques and are crucial for understanding military sexual servitude, which must be understood as a totality of coercive practices. Here, we consider this register of abuses to include enlistment by means of enticement and abduction; supervised transportation abroad by military vessels or charters; forcible internment in military comfort stations; continuous rape; the systematic prostitution of many tens of thousands of women; the denial of the rights to life, liberty, and human dignity; structural violence; and ultimately, postwar abandonment. Japan’s neonationalist revisionists foster the impression that comfort women came mainly from the Korean Peninsula, then a Japanese colony (1910–45), and that the problem is therefore a bilateral issue between Japan and the Republic of Korea (the official discourse routinely ignores survivors in the Democratic ­People’s Republic of Korea in the north). In fact, women were taken forcibly not only from the Japanese main islands, Okinawa, Sakhalin, and Japan’s Korean and Taiwanese colonies, but from virtually every country and overseas territory invaded or occupied even temporarily by Imperial forces. That list includes China; American-­held Philippines and Guam; French Indochina; British Malaya, Hong Kong, Burma, and India; Portuguese Macao and Timor; Thailand; the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia); Australian-­administered New Guinea; Japan’s South Pacific mandates; and numerous other Pacific territories. Equating the

42   Nishino Rumiko comfort women with Korean survivors alone dramatically narrows the scope of the problem, denying us a comprehensive view of how the system operated as a whole. This convenient fiction also distorts the concept of sexual enslavement by obscuring the diverse modalities of coercive procurement employed in different regions and at different times during the war. Before examining this system in detail, however, we need to take a closer look at the precise meaning of forcible recruitment (kyōsei renkō, literally, “the taking away by force”). On March 5, 2007, Prime Minister Abe told the Diet that no coercion was involved in assembling women: “it was not as though military police broke into people’s homes and took them away like kidnappers.”4 This claim contradicts the conclusions reached by former Chief Cabinet Secretary Kōno Yōhei, who on August 4, 1993 summarized an exhaustive government investigation in the following words: “The Government study has revealed that in many cases [the women] were recruited against their own will, through coaxing, coercion, etc., and that, at times, [civil] administrative/military personnel directly took part in the recruitment” (see Appendix 1). People with opposing viewpoints often use the same words but endow them with different meanings, failing to achieve meaningful dialogue. For this reason, we return to the domestic and international laws then in force in Japan, which explicitly prohibited the coercive procurement of women and their transportation across national boundaries. Below I have listed six crimes codified in these statutes that applied directly to the comfort women. The first two derive from the International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic and its successor, the International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children. The remaining four are from the 1907 Penal Code of Japan.5 The Imperial military’s system of forced prostitution violated all of them. 1 2 3 4 5 6

It is illegal to procure, entice, or lead away a minor (under 21) for immoral purposes (international conventions). It is illegal to procure, entice, or lead away a woman of adult age by means of violence, threats, abuse of authority, or any other method of compulsion for immoral purposes (international conventions). It is a crime to kidnap a minor by force or allurement [enticement] (Penal Code, Article 224). It is a crime to abduct another by force or allurement [enticement] for gain, an indecent purpose, or with the object of marriage (Penal Code, Article 225). It is a crime to abduct a person by force or allurement [enticement] for the purpose of transporting that person out of the Empire (Penal Code, Article 226). It is a crime to carry out of the Empire another who has been lured or kidnapped or sold for that purpose. (Penal Code, Article 226).

The 1948 Dutch Ad hoc Military Tribunal convened in Batavia, Dutch East Indies for Class B war crimes and Class C crimes against humanity included in

Forcible mobilization   43 its definition of war crimes “the abduction of girls and women for the purpose of enforced prostitution and the act of enforced prostitution” (Clause 7 of the tribunal charter). The concept of “enforced prostitution” coincides with similar prohibitions in the Penal Code (categories 3 to 6 above). Moreover, as other authors in this volume indicate, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo (1946–48) also viewed the coercive procurement and sexual abuse of comfort women as a de facto war crime.6 When gauging the degree of compulsion involved in the comfort women system, the following patterns or modes of solicitation and trafficking offer a useful measure. Bear in mind that each type of mobilization is coercive and has as its objective sexual subjugation. Pattern 1: the abduction of a minor [for sexual servitude]. Pattern 2: the enticement, inducement, or abduction of a woman, regardless of age, through deception, physical violence, intimidation, abuse of authority, or other coercive measures [for sexual exploitation]. Pattern 3: the abduction or enticement of a woman and her transportation out of the Empire of Japan [for sexual enslavement]. Pattern 4: the transportation out of the Empire of Japan of a woman who has been abducted, enticed, or bought or sold [for sexual bondage].

Forcible recruitment in survivor testimonies Historical documents are of limited value in understanding the realities of comfort women enlistment. First of all, Japanese military authorities, fearing prosecution, burned most of the relevant records at the war’s end, leaving little incriminatory material behind. For this reason, transcribed survivor testimonies comprise a particularly valuable summation of comfort women experiences. Such personal stories contain the names of places, people, events, and other historical details that only the victims themselves could relate. These in turn may be corroborated with other oral histories and the written record to shed new light on the issue. Kōno Yōhei later had this to say about the testimonies of Korean survivors interviewed by the Japanese government in the course of its formal inquiry (1993): [The testimonies] contained description after description of concrete events that obviously only someone who actually had experienced such horrible conditions firsthand could relate. Thinking about these events, I have come to believe that, even when viewed from multiple angles, the stories are credible, and there is ample evidence to consider them trustworthy.7 A total of 93 victims testified before Japanese courts, and judges have accepted most of their depositions as factual. Between 1991 and 2001, South Koreans,

44   Nishino Rumiko Filipinas, Chinese, Dutch, and Taiwanese victims filed a total of ten civil suits against the Japanese state demanding an official apology and state compensation for their wartime mistreatment (Table 2.1). The Tokyo District and High courts heard all of the cases except one, which was litigated by the Yamaguchi District Court (Shimonoseki Branch) and the Hiroshima High Court. Both Tokyo and Yamaguchi district courts in seven suits and the Tokyo and Hiroshima high courts in eight acknowledged the plaintiffs’ personal accounts of sexual violence and direct Japanese military involvement to be trustworthy. The district courts in five cases and the high courts in three quoted passages from this body of evidence in their findings (in three suits, judges did not examine personal statements but based their decisions solely on the merits of technical arguments advanced by the state).8 Let us turn now to the realities described in court attestations and other survivor accounts, including published collections of testimonies, case histories, autobiographical writings, and other relevant sources publicly available in Japan.9 Below are summaries of the stories of 180 former comfort women of ten nationalities. Korean women I examined the oral histories and deposed testimonies of 52 former comfort women from Korea.10 Thirteen were plaintiffs in two lawsuits filed in Japan in 1991 and 1992. A few were originally from what today is the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the north. The majority came from the south, now the Republic of Korea. Of the 52 survivors, 45 (86.5 percent) were minors (under 21) at the time of their ordeal, and 48 (92.3 percent) had been transported outside of the Japanese Empire. Recruitment methods included fraudulent deceit and enticement (33 victims, 63.5 percent) and kidnapping (11 victims, 21.2 percent). Of the 52, eight (15.4 percent) believed they had been sold to procurers and trafficked outright. Eight out of 11 abductees said that military personnel or police officers had come and taken them away. The identity of the recruiters in three other instances was not clear. In their statements, the abducted women recounted the following experiences. “I was taken from my house by soldiers and police officers while my parents were out” (Kang Il-­ch’ul). “On the way home from a friend’s place, a Japanese man wearing a military uniform grabbed me by the arm and led me away” (Mun Ok-­jju). “While I was at a beach in Busan, Japanese soldiers [came along and] pinned me down and then put me on a truck” (Chŏng Hak-­ch’ŏl), “About ten soldiers grabbed hold of my arms and legs and threw me into the back of a truck” (No Ch’ŏng-ja).11 Of the 33 women recruited through fraud or enticement, five were deceived by police officers, five by local ward chiefs or subdistrict heads, and two by the factory managers who employed them. The remaining 21 were duped by unknown recruiters. To lure these young women, procurers made patently false promises: “We have a high-­paying job for you” (Pak Yŏng-sim, Kim Kun-­ja, Ha

Forcible mobilization   45

Figure 2.1 Four Korean comfort women captured by Chinese Eighth Army forces after the battle for Ramo (Yunnan, China), September 3, 1944. The pregnant woman on the right is Pak Yŏng-sim (1921–2006). When the author met Pak in Pyongyang in August 2000, she confirmed that she was indeed the woman in the photo. Source: Courtesy U.S. National Archives, Photo No. 111-SC-230147. An account of the author’s meeting with Pak is found in Nishino, R. (2003). Senjō no “ianfu”: Ramo zenmetsusen o ikinobita Pak Yŏng-sim no kiseki (“Comfort woman” on the frontline: the journey of Pak Yŏng-sim, a survivor of the destruction of Ramo). Tōkyō: Akashi Shoten, pp. 205–11.

Sun-­nyŏ). “You’ll make lots of money and wear nice clothes” (Pak Yu-­nyŏn, Kim Yŏng-suk). “You can earn a bundle washing and rolling bandages and cleaning up in a hospital” (Kim Sŏl-an). “The work pays well” (Chang Su-­wŏl) “You’ll be hired as a cook” (Pak Mak-­dal). “The job involves looking after children” (Pak P’il-yŏn).12 Meanwhile, of the eight women who thought they had been sold, one was trafficked by her father, one by her husband, and another was sold because of her early training as a kisaeng entertainer. The remaining five were misled by brokers and sold into bondage. Later we will return to the revisionist argument that at least one of these women was not actually sold but was a licensed prostitute. For now, we include her in the category of human trafficking.

1992

1993

1993

1994

1995

1996

1998

1999

2001

  2 Kanpu (ShimonosekiBusan) Plaintiff Group (South Korea)

  3 Plaintiff Group of Filipina Survivors

  4 Zainichi South Korean Survivor in Japan

  5  Dutch Survivor

  6 First Plaintiff Group of Chinese Survivors

  7 Second Plaintiff Group of Chinese Survivors

  8 Plaintiff Group of Shanxi Survivors

  9 Plaintiff Group of Taiwanese Survivors

10 Plaintiff Group of Hainan Island Survivors 8

9

10

2

Tokyo ◎ Rejected 2006

Tokyo ✕ 2004

Tokyo ◎ Rejected 2003

Tokyo ◎ Rejected 2002

Tokyo ✕ Rejected 2001

Tokyo ◎ Rejected 1998

14 4

Tokyo ◎ Rejected 1999

Tokyo ✕ Rejected 1998

Supreme Court

Remarks

Appeal dismissed 2005 Tokyo ◎ Rejected 2009 Appeal dismissed 2010

Tokyo ✕ 2005

Tokyo ◎ Rejected 2005 Appeal dismissed District Court adds 2005 opinion to finding5

Tokyo ◎ Rejected 2005 Appeal dismissed 2007

Tokyo ◎ Rejected 2004 Appeal dismissed 2007

Tokyo ◎ Rejected 2001 Appeal dismissed 2004

Tokyo ◎ Rejected 2000 Appeal dismissed 2003

Tokyo ✕ Rejected 2000 Appeal dismissed 2003

Appeal dismissed District Court finds 2003 partly in favor of plaintiffs3

Tokyo ◎ Rejected 2003 Appeal dismissed2 2004

High Court

Yamaguchi (Shimonoseki) Hiroshima ◎ Rejected ◎ Partially rejected 1998 2001

1

46

3

9

1991

  1 South Korean Survivors and Bereaved Families Tokyo ◎ Rejected 2001

Number of District Court plaintiffs

Survivor groups initiating suit1 Date filed

Table 2.1  Court recognition of survivor testimonies in lawsuits by former comfort women

Notes Symbols: ◎ = Court recognizes survivor testimony to be truthful; ✕ = Court does not examine survivor testimony. 1 The formal designations of the ten litigated cases are: 1. Claim for Compensation by the South Korean Association of Pacific War Victims and Bereaved Families (Ajia Taiheiyō Sensō Kankokujin giseisha hoshō seikyū jiken). 2. Claim for Official Apology and Compensation by the Busan Military Comfort Women and Members of the Women’s Voluntary Labor Corps (Busan jūgun ianfu/Joshi Rōdō Teishintai kōshiki shazai tō seikyū jiken). 3. Claim for State Compensation by Filipino “Comfort Women” (Firipin “jūgun ianfu” kokka hoshō seikyū jiken). 4. Claim for Apology and Compensation by a Zainichi South Korean Former Comfort Woman (Zainichi Kankokujin moto jūgun ianfu shazai/hoshō seikyū jiken). 5. Claim for Reparation for Injury by Dutch Former Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees (Orandajin moto horyo/minkan yokuryūsha songai baishō seikyū jiken). 6. First Claim for Reparation for Injury by Chinese “Comfort Women” (Chūgokujin “ianfu” songai baishō seikyū jiken—dai’ichiji). 7. Second Claim for Reparation for Injury by Chinese “Comfort Women” (Chūgokujin “ianfu” songai baishō seikyū jiken—dainiji). 8. Claim for Reparation for Injury by Shanxi Province Victims of Sexual Violence (Sanseishō seibōryoku higaisha baishō seikyū jiken). 9. Claim for Apology and Reparation for Injury by Taiwanese “Comfort Women” (Taiwan no moto “inanfu” shazai seikyū/songai baishō jiken). 10. Claim for Reparation for Injury by Wartime Victims of Sexual Violence on Hainan Island (Hainantō senji seibōryoku higai baishō jiken). 2 See Note 8, Chapter 2. 3 Ibid. 4 The single Dutch plaintiff was one of a group of eight survivors suing the Japanese state for injuries suffered during wartime internment in the Dutch East Indies. In her case, the Tokyo District Court did not refer to her statement in its decision, but neither did it contest it. The Tokyo High Court acknowledged the truthfulness of her testimony by citing it in the judgment. The Supreme Court did not examine or comment on the plaintiff’s testimony. It simply dismissed the appeal for legal redress (apology and compensation) on the technical grounds argued by the state. 5 In 2003, the Tokyo District Court rejected the demands of the Shanxi Plaintiff Group for redress but attached an opinion to the decision noting that the court expected the government to take necessary legal and administrative steps to resolve the comfort women problem.

Sources: Tsubokawa, H. and Ōmori, N. (2011). Shihō ga nintei shita Nihongun “ianfu”: higai/kagai jijitsu wa kesenai! (Japan’s legal system recognized the [testimonies of] military “comfort women”: the facts concerning victim and aggressor cannot be erased). Tōkyō: Kamogawa Shuppan), p. 12, and Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace (WAM). “Ianfu” mondai o shirō (Learning about the “comfort women” problem). [online] Available at: http://wam-peace.org/ianfu-mondai/ lawsuit/ [accessed April 2, 2017]. Compiled by Nishino Rumiko, Kim Puja, and Onozawa Akane.

48   Nishino Rumiko Based on this data, we can make the following observations. First, 86.5 percent of the South Korean cases reviewed were minors (under 21, as per the 1921 convention). Among them were young girls such as Chŏng Hak-­ch’ŏl, who was acquired at age 12 and whose case clearly conforms to Pattern 1 above (the procurement of a minor for sexual exploitation). Furthermore, the abduction by military and police personnel was a flagrant breach of the Penal Code, as was the use of deception, clearly assigning this case to Pattern 2 (the enticement, inducement, or abduction of women, regardless of age, through fraud, violence, threats, abuse of authority, and other coercive means). Even more compelling, 92 percent of the women were shipped out of their Korean homeland to China, the Philippines, Burma, and other parts of Asia and the Pacific. These cases correspond to Pattern 3 (the kidnapping or enticement of women and their transportation out of the Empire of Japan). They were carried in trucks and ships owned, rented, or otherwise controlled by the Japanese military. Under both international and Japanese law, the Imperial armed forces were fully liable for the trafficking of these women across state boundaries.

Figure 2.2 Pak Yŏng-sim in 2000. In December of that year, she participated in the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal held in Tokyo. Source: Courtesy Nishino Rumiko.

Forcible mobilization   49 Taiwanese women Here, I analyze the testimonies of 15 survivors from Taiwan, nine of whom sued the Japanese government in 1999.13 Although Taiwan, like Korea, was under Japanese colonial rule, compulsory enlistment there differed in one important respect. Whereas 92 percent of Korean women were trafficked overseas, only 11, or 73 percent of the Taiwanese met that fate. Four were dispatched to comfort facilities in Taiwan and other parts of the Japanese Empire. For example, two indigenous women from the Central Mountain Range, Iwar Tanah (Tsai Fang-­mei), an ethnic Truku, and Tuyo Kage, an Ataiyal, were ordered by local police to perform miscellaneous duties for a Japanese army detachment and were subsequently prostituted as comfort women. Zheng Chen-­tao was enlisted under false pretenses and taken abroad. “Officer Watanabe at the local police station told me that he would accompany me to school [one day], and [the next thing I knew] I was put in a car and taken to a [local] Japanese-­style inn [and prostituted].” Later, she said, “I ended up in a comfort station in the Andaman Islands.”14 A large majority of the Taiwanese testimonies (13 individuals, 87 percent) recount similar tales of deception. Kao Pao-­chu recalls: “I received a summons from the local ward office to go work for the Japanese army. My destination turned out to be a comfort station.” Lee Chun says: “I applied for work at the ward office, but they tricked me and shipped me off to the Philippines instead.”15 The use of public institutions such as local government offices to obtain women is one of the distinctive features of Taiwanese recruitment. There are many other examples of deception based on bogus work offers. Huang A-tao was promised, “there are many jobs as nurses’ assistants and cooks in the South Pacific territories.” Tsai Kuei-­ying remembers how officials fooled her into thinking she would be hired as a waitress. Lu Man-­mei was convinced she was applying for a position as a nurse’s aide.16 Some 60 percent of the Taiwanese women were procured via non-­existent employment proposals, some originating from local municipalities. If we add the five cases (33 percent) in which victims were abducted and prostituted after first working for Japanese military units, then fully 93 percent of the cases correspond to Pattern 2 conscription (the enticement, inducement, or abduction of women, regardless of age, through fraud, violence, threats, abuse of authority, and other coercive means). In the data, I found one evident case of trafficking. Wu Hsiu-­mei describes her induction as follows: “My foster mother sold me into the female entertainment trade. I then applied for a job abroad because I thought I could redeem [my debts and] my freedom faster that way.”17 Her case was similar to that of many Japanese comfort women, as we see below. Eight of the 15 Taiwanese (53 percent) were under age, including Iwar Tanah, who was taken away by force at 13. As in the case of Koreans, their mobilization fits Pattern 1. The 11 (73 percent) who were shipped overseas accord with Pattern 3 (the kidnapping or enticement of women and their transportation outside of the Empire). They are Tang Chen-­tao (Andaman Islands); Kao Pao-­chu (Guangdong,

50   Nishino Rumiko China and Burma); Huang A-­tao (Balikpapan, Dutch East Indies); Su Yin-­jiao and Tsai Kuei-­ying, (Hainan Island, China); Lee Chun and Chen Lien-­hua (Philippines); Lu Man-­mei (Hainan Island); Li Yang Yu-­chuan (Borneo); Wu Hsiu-­mei, (Guangzhou, China); and Anika, an indigenous Bunun (Hong Kong). It is clear that in virtually every case, the coercive assembly of women from Japan’s Korean and Taiwanese possessions violated not only international covenants to which Japan was a party but also the Japanese Penal Code. The Imperial state insisted that international treaties did not apply to colonial, leased, or mandated territories, a position also taken by Great Britain and some other colonial powers.18 In recent years, however, world legal organizations such as the International Commission of Jurists and Japanese legal scholars have pointed out that the comfort woman system was conceived and planned on Japanese soil and that many colonial women were transported out of the Empire aboard Japanese vessels, considered home territory under international law. Moreover, ships from Korea sometimes put in at Japanese ports en route to foreign destinations. Japan’s civil and military authorities were in fact breaking international as well as domestic law.19 I return to this point below. Chinese women Next, I look at the court depositions of 28 survivors from China’s Shanxi Province and Hainan Island. My sources are court documents filed by the victims’ lawyers and published testimonials.20 Of the 28, 24 had participated in four lawsuits against the Japanese state initiated between 1995 and 2001. Twenty-­seven of the 28 women had been abducted. Sixteen described instances of violent seizure in their accounts of wartime Yu County, Shanxi. Liu Mian Huan remembers that, “my whole family was forced outside by Japanese soldiers. After they tied our hands, they took us to the Japanese garrison in Jingui Village.” Hou Qiao Lian recalls: “Japanese troops and local Chinese collaborators captured me, my father—an anti-­Japanese partisan and village head— and five other women, and hauled us off to their camp in Jingui.” Hou Dong’e remembers: “Japanese soldiers surrounded us and dragged us out of the cave where we were hiding and took us to their base in Jingui.” Zhang Xiantu recollects being kidnapped during a Japanese surprise attack on her village and marched off to their fort in Hedong. “When the soldiers raided the village,” Zhao Cunni explains, “I tried to escape with the other people, but my feet had been bound in the traditional manner, so they caught me and carried me off.”21 Clearly, where frontline troops did not have ready access to comfort stations, military units and groups of soldiers organized themselves to kidnap, confine, and systematically rape local women (see the Insight subchapter below). Such examples are typical of Pattern 2 mobilization. In these and similar instances, the Imperial military is directly responsible. The women forcibly mustered on Hainan Island recalled similar experiences. Chen Yapian reported: “While working in the fields, I was assaulted by Japanese troops, beaten with rifle butts, and taken to their garrison. Afterwards, I was

Forcible mobilization   51 confined in the Fujihashi Comfort Station.” Deng Yumin remembers: “While engaged in farm work, I was raped by Japanese soldiers and then taken to their camp about 10 km from my home.” Chen Jinyu tells a similar story: Japanese soldiers broke into my house and raped me. Later, I hid in the mountains, but they found me there and took me back to their garrison. I was forced to do camp chores during the day and submit to rape at night.22 These testimonies also fit Pattern 2. Of the 27 Chinese cases I reviewed, only one, Yuan Zhulin, was obviously tricked. Told she was to work at a Japanese inn [nearby], she was shipped to a warzone and interned in a comfort station. Procurement through deception, although relatively rare in China, is also consistent with this pattern (see Chapter 1). In China, fully 96 percent of all cases of forced recruitment involved violent seizure by Japanese troops, typical of territories under Japanese military control. Presiding judges in the Shanxi and Hainan lawsuits recognized the plaintiffs’ firsthand accounts as reliable. For instance, the Tokyo High Court noted bluntly in its decision of December 15, 2004: “There were incidents in which Chinese women living near Japanese garrisons were forcibly carried off and transferred, raped, and confined for the purpose of being raped on a daily basis as comfort women by members of the Japanese military.”23Twenty (71 percent) whose ages could be positively confirmed were minors. Some were extremely young. Hou Qiao Lian and Wan Aihua, were 13; Chen Yapian, Chen Jinyu, and Huang Youliang were 14. Such examples conform to Pattern 1 recruitment of minors. Filipino women Next, I summarize the stories of 56 Filipina survivors, of whom, 46 were plaintiffs in a civil lawsuit filed in Tokyo in 1993.24 Of the 56, 43 (77 percent) were minors carried off by force, as is typical of Pattern 1. Kidnapping was involved in every instance, and several were taken from their own homes. Anastasia D. Cortez testified that, “Our house was attacked by Japanese soldiers. My husband and I were bound, put on a truck, and taken to Fort Santiago in Manila.” Ortencia G. Martinez reported a nearly identical event: “Japanese soldiers broke into our home, pointed their bayonets at us, and took my father and I to their camp by force.” Catalina Ufalsa recalls, “I was at home with my oldest brother when Japanese troops suddenly attacked us and carried us off to their base.” Tomasa Salinog shared a similar experience: “Soldiers entered our house as we were sleeping. When my father resisted, they cut off his head and dragged me away to their garrison.”25 Other women were commandeered on the street. Amanda Regala remembers: “My daughter and I were on the way to market when we were stopped by Japanese troops and forced to accompany them [to the nearby base].” “I was washing clothes in the river,” said Amonita Balajadia, “when the Japanese grabbed me and hauled me off to their encampment at the southern warf.”

52   Nishino Rumiko Virginia Villarma was passing by a group of soldiers when they seized her and led her off. “I was on my way shopping,” said Carmencita C. Ramel. “Japanese suddenly emerged from a clump of bushes, thrust their bayonets at me, and then beat me unconsciousness. I was taken away to their unit.” Teodora Cogonon Intes and others were selling vegetables and rice at the local market when two trucks filled with soldiers stopped, grabbed them, and took them to their camp.26 These are all examples of forcible seizure. Violent abduction was typical of comfort women recruitment in the Philippines and other occupied territories. All of these cases coincide with Pattern 2. Dutch women The testimonies of the two Dutch survivors I surveyed tell of young women, confined in Indonesian detention centers, who were handpicked by Japanese officers and dispatched to comfort stations. Both were of mixed Dutch and Indonesian ancestry. Jan Ruff-­O’Herne, then 19, was being held at Internment Camp No.  6 in Ambarawa, Semarang (central Java), when she was “chosen” by Japanese officers and sent to a comfort station.27 Ellen Corry van der Ploeg, also 19, was taken from Semarang’s Halmahera Internment Camp and sequestered in a comfort facility. Both were minors (Pattern 1) taken against their will under circumstances consonant with Pattern 2.

Figure 2.3 Filipina survivors cheer the verdict handed down by the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal, December 12, 2000. The tribunal found Japanese civil and military officials who planned and implemented the military comfort women system guilty of crimes against humanity. Source: Courtesy VAWW RAC.

Forcible mobilization   53 Malayan women I examined the case of a single Malayan woman, Rosalind Saw, who was 24 when she was rounded up in 1943. She recounted how Japanese military men came to her house, separated her from her two children, and forcibly took her by truck to the Tong Lock Hotel in Penang, a military comfort station.28 This act of seizure, too, is typical of Pattern 2. Indonesian women I reviewed the cases of two Indonesian women. Mardiyem from Java testified that she was 13 when she was lured by a fake advertisement for a “theater production in Borneo.” The ad had been posted by the Japanese mayor of Banjarmasin in southern Borneo. His name was Shōgenji Kango. When she answered the ad, instead of the acting career she expected, she found herself locked in a comfort station in Tuaran (northern Borneo). Mardiyem was obviously the victim of an elaborate ruse staged by the mayor. In 1942, Suhanah, then 16, was standing in front of her home on Java when six Japanese soldiers snatched her, forced her into their jeep, and took her to a comfort station in Bandung. The two minors, one deceived by fraud the other carried off by brute force, had no idea that their destination was a military comfort station.29 These cases are examples of mode 1 and mode 2 conscription. The women from Portuguese Timor My survey included 21 women from Portuguese (now East) Timor.30 A distinctive feature of procurement in Timor was the Japanese military’s use of intimidation to compel the traditional village elite (liurai) to round up young women for its comfort venues. Many of the survivors were young when they were taken, and we were unable to verify their exact age at the time of recruitment, or the year. How many were minors is an open question, but several, such as Maria Rosa Fernanda Noronha, who we know for a fact was 12 at the time, were premenstrual.31 The experiences of these women obviously belong to Pattern 1. According to the testimonies, every single case involved enlistment by force, abuse of authority, or the threat of violence. Marta Abu Bere from Marobo Village, Bobonaro District remembered: “We were rounded up and made to do road construction. I was handed over to Japanese soldiers by the liurai notables and forced to work as a comfort woman.”32 Esmeralda Boe from Memo Village, Bobonaro described her experience as follows: While working in the fields, some Japanese soldiers called out and asked for the names of my family and the village chief. That evening, some liurai and Japanese came to my house and forced me to accompany them to the home of a Japanese officer by the name of Shimomura. Afterwards, I was forced to serve Shimomura and two other officers.33

54   Nishino Rumiko

Figure 2.4 Former comfort women, Marta Abu Bere (left) and Esmeralda Boe (right) of East Timor, address the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal, December 2000. Source: Courtesy of VAWW RAC.

Twelve-­year-old Maria Rosa Fernanda Noronha, also from Bobonaro, recalls: The Japanese army threatened the village chief and liurai and made them gather up the [young] women. The village chief told me that my parents would be killed if I refused to obey. At first, I belonged to a Japanese officer called Ohara. Later, an officer by the name of Taniyama owned me.  Utao Binaro of Viqueque District remembers: “I obeyed orders out of fear that the village head, the liurai, and my parents would all be killed. Until the end of the war, I was the exclusive property of an officer named Matahari.”34 East Timor was perhaps unique in that Imperial army units systematically resorted to open threats of violence toward family members in order to compel local leaders to produce young women for military sex establishments. These methods are consistent with Pattern 2. Japanese women Many Japanese women once believed that compatriots who worked in the wartime comfort stations were mainly licensed prostitutes—shōgi (individuals

Forcible mobilization   55 fully licensed to work), geigi (geisha entertainers), and shakufu (waitresses and hostesses). It was thought that such people went willingly, for the money, and thus were not victims of coercive induction. This stereotype mirrors the patriarchal view of “prostitutes” as morally deficient and thus different from women trafficked against their will. For example, Kim Hak-­sun became the first South Korean survivor to speak out using her real name in 1991.35 Revisionist critics accused her of not being a “true victim” because as a young girl she had apprenticed as a traditional kisaeng entertainer.36 One of the denialists’ chief rebuttals to the charge of forced mobilization is the allegation that the victims swallowed up by the comfort women system were not enslaved but were actually prostitutes practicing a state-­regulated trade. On June 14, 2007, the Committee for Historical Facts published a full-­page advertisement in the Washington Post making that claim. Entitled “THE FACTS,” the ad asserted that, “The ianfu who were embedded in the Japanese Army were not, as is commonly reported, ‘sex slaves.’ They were working under a system of licensed prostitution that was commonplace around the world at the time.”37 During the Abe years, this contention has become the official mantra for government discourse on the comfort women. Many ultra-­conservative lawmakers continue to cling to it despite the Japan–ROK agreement of December 2015. Few people stop to consider how the trauma experienced by trafficked women differed from that of women trapped in the cogs of state-­controlled prostitution. Both types of victim ended up in military comfort stations. Here, we need to take a fresh look at the victimization of comfort women as a whole by examining the socially constructed mechanisms of coercion that secured their mobilization and internment in military sex facilities. That is the only way to avoid the impasse of useless dichotomies such as “compulsory procurement” vs. “voluntary enlistment/business transaction,” or alternatively, “paid” vs. “unpaid” labor. Such false distinctions conceal a rhetorical trap that the revisionists have fashioned in order to muddy the issue and relieve the government of responsibility for the actions of the wartime state. The full implications of this argument are explored in Chapter 3. The first survivor to speak openly about her experiences as a survivor in Japan was Mihara Yoshie—the only Japanese to have done so. In 1986, five years before Kim Haku-­sun broke her silence, Mihara went on public radio to talk about the system of wartime sexual enslavement. Fifteen years earlier, in 1971, she had published an autobiography under the pen name Shirota Suzuko.38 The term ianfu was a euphemism widely used by the Japanese military during the Asia-­Pacific War. In 1973, Senda Kakō, a former Mainichi Shimbun journalist, popularized the term “military comfort women” (  jūgun ianfu)39 in his 1973 exposé on the subject, and since then that phrase has become widespread in Japan. Since there are few first-­person accounts by Japanese survivors in print, these merit special mention. In 1975, Hirota Kazuko, a young writer and researcher on the Asia-­Pacific War, interviewed several Japanese women prostituted on the frontlines. Her work gave them a chance to voice their wartime memories and

56   Nishino Rumiko their unhappy experiences in postwar society.40 Among the survivors who left testimonials in interviews or wrote about their lives in the comfort stations are Yamauchi Keiko,41 Suzumoto Fumi,42 Takashima Junko,43 and Uehara Eiko.44 Their stories suggest that many women indentured to licensed brothels opted to join comfort stations in order to pay off the onerous bond loans housemasters had advanced their guardians, even if that meant incurring new debts to their military or civilian handlers. In this way, more than a few managed to liquidate all of their financial obligations with money they earned abroad and returned to Japan within a year or two. Yamauchi Keiko (known as Kikumaru), for example, jumped at the opportunity to enlist as a comfort woman when a military recruiter offered to assume the debt she owed her geisha house (see Chapter 3). She sailed to the Truk Islands (now Chuuk Lagoon) on March 17, 1942 at the age of 18. When her father attempted to stop her, she convinced him by pleading, “someone has to do this for the country’s sake. Let me go.” This logic finds little resonance in the testimonies of non-­Japanese comfort women. Eventually, due to worsening wartime conditions, Yamauchi asked to be repatriated and was allowed to return to Japan in December 1943. After repaying all of her debts, she reportedly had ¥10,000 left over, a tidy sum in those days. Born in 1924, Suzumoto Fumi (pseudonym) was indentured to a geisha house at the age of seven. As was expected of a geisha apprentice, she lost her virginity to a patron sometime in her mid-­teens. In 1942, at age 18 and now a licensed geisha, a navy recruiter persuaded her to join a comfort station in the Truk Lagoon, promising,  if you work on the frontlines, you’ll soon save enough money to repay all your debts. And if you die in battle, your spirit will be worshipped with the other war dead at Yasukuni Shrine [in Tokyo] as a civilian employee of the military.  She signed a one-­year contract in return for which the navy assumed her ¥2,300 debt. After completing her contract, Suzumoto said she spent the next ten months thoroughly enjoying herself. When she arrived at Yokosuka port near Tokyo in late December 1943, she, too, could boast savings of ¥10,000. In 1930, Takashima Junko was indentured at age 17 for ¥700 to a brothel in Tamanoi, a Tokyo red-­light district for unlicensed prostitutes. In November 1937, Kunii Shigeru, head of the local brothel proprietors association, was summoned by War Ministry officials and told to collect women for immediate dispatch to war zones, where they would serve as hostesses for Japanese troops. He was also ordered to set up the military comfort venues where the women would work. Junko, then 24, needed money to pay her younger brother’s hospital bills. She offered to go in exchange for an advance of ¥1,500, and in 1938, was attached to a comfort station in Shanghai. Within one to three months, Junko said, the women there had discharged their financial obligations. Two years later, in 1940, she returned to Japan debt-­free and opened a small bar and restaurant in Tokyo’s Shinjuku area.

Forcible mobilization   57 These women obviously joined comfort stations in order to repay debt bonds. Moreover, they appear to have been well treated and were allowed to return home after fulfilling their contracts. These factors seem to set them wholly apart from the experience of most Korean women, for example, who were procured through coercion and trafficked abroad. Nonetheless, the treatment of Japanese women also contravened both domestic and international law. As the war expanded, the government and military increasingly ignored such legal constraints as women were dispatched from Japan proper to all parts of Asia and the Pacific. Yamauchi and Suzumoto were only 18 and thus minors when they signed up as comfort women. Their cases clearly fit Pattern 1 enlistment—illegal even when the minor in question gave her consent. In addition, both were shipped to the Truk Islands, meeting the criteria of Pattern 3 solicitation (the enticement of women and their transportation out of the Empire). As we have seen, many Japanese victims arrived in the comfort stations bound by debts that had been transferred from brothel owners to the army or navy. Accordingly, their cases also correspond to Pattern 4 procurement (the buying and selling or enticement and abduction of women and their transportation out of the Empire). The moment military authorities agreed to assume these bond obligations, the Imperial military became complicit in the coercive marshaling and trafficking of women. If a licensed woman was transported out of the Empire, then the wartime state, which regulated public prostitution, was also in violation of existing Japanese and international statutes and cannot be absolved of liability. Contrary to what many asssume, in wartime Japan, the illegality of coercive solicitation for sexual servitude was not an abstract principle. As Maeda Akira demonstrates in his Insight essay at the end of Chapter 3, in at least two instances, prewar Japanese courts actively prosecuted brokers for employing fraud and intimidation to procure minors and other young women for military comfort stations abroad. In both the Shizuoka case (1935) and the Nagasaki case (1937), the Great Court of Cassation (the equivalent of today’s Supreme Court) invoked the Meiji Penal Code to confirm lower-­court verdicts convicting these agents of abduction and trafficking. It is unconscionable that, shortly after the Nagasaki ruling, Japanese civil and military authorities would flout domestic law and international covenants to forcibly round up not only Japanese from the main islands and Okinawa but also many tens of thousands of Korean, Taiwanese, Chinese and other women in Asia and the Pacific. It is true that among them were indentured individuals already hostage to the debt slavery of state prostitution, but the Imperial juggernaut consumed immeasurably greater numbers of women—many of them minors—with absolutely no experience of institutionalized sexual exploitation.

Conclusions Following the start of the second Abe administration in December 2012, the Prime Minister restated his intention to rewrite the 1993 Kōno statement. This

58   Nishino Rumiko threat bewildered Japan’s Asian neighbors and drew a chorus of dissent from the international community.45 As I have demonstrated here, the official documents and survivor testimonies currently available, while limited, are more than enough to prove the case for compulsory recruitment. No matter how loudly Abe and the revisionist party rail against the existence of this evidence, the truth is beyond dispute. The denial of coercion by Japan’s political leadership is typical of the myopic mentality that prevails among neoconservative revisionists. They seem to live in an intellectual bubble, clinging to an insular, sanitized view of Japan’s wartime past that disclaims the established facts of world history. We must move beyond this narcissistic historical consciousness as quickly as possible. If we are to achieve justice for the survivors and closure on this issue for them and for Japanese society, as well, we must listen carefully to what former comfort women are telling us. It is our duty as a nation to confront honestly Japan’s responsibility for the violence of military sexual enslavement, a crime of war committed by the Imperial state more than 70 years ago that continues to cry out for redress.

Notes   1 The English translation is from Fackler, M. (2007). No apology for sex slavery, Japan’s Prime Minister says. New York Times, March 6, p.  A10. Similar claims by revisionist politicians and commentators include the following statement. “There is no evidence to prove that the alleged comfort women were recruited by the military with the use force or threat. If they claim there is, I want the Koreans to prove it.” (Osaka City Mayor Hashimoto Toru, August 21, 2012). The translation is from Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace [WAM] (2011b). Updated Information from NGOs. Japan Alternative Report—Issues Concerning: Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery. p.  2, Note 2. [pdf] Available at: http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CAT/ Shared%20Documents/JPN/INT_CAT_NGO_JPN_12812_E.pdf [accessed June 20, 2015]. In a similar vein, the Committee for Historical Facts has declared that, “No historical document has ever been found by historians or research organizations that positively demonstrates that women were forced against their will into prostitution by the Japanese Army” (Committee for Historical Facts (2007). THE FACTS. Washington Post, June 14.) See also the Committee’s website (since renamed the Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact), which denies the existence of documentation proving forcible enlistment by Imperial forces. Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact (2017). Opinions from Our Society. [online] Available at: www.sdh-­ fact.com/opinion-­article/page/2/ [accessed January 17, 2017].   2 “[The Japanese military] never forced them. In those days of great poverty, prostitution was an extremely profitable business for anyone be they Japanese or Korean, and poor people picked it up never unwillingly.” (Tokyo Governor Ishihara, press conference, October 21, 2012). The English translation is from WAM (2011), p. 2, Note 2.   3 The International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic (instrument of accession delivered by Japan on October 21, 1925) required the contracting parties to adhere to the 1910 white slave traffic convention, particularly Articles 1 and 2, which read: Article 1. Whoever, in order to gratify the passions of another person, has procured, enticed, or led away, even with her consent, a woman or girl under age, for immoral purposes, shall be punished, notwithstanding that the various acts constituting the offence may have been committed in different countries. Article 2. Whoever, in order to gratify the passions of another person, has, by fraud, or by

Forcible mobilization   59 means of violence, threats, abuse of authority, or any other method of compulsion, procured, enticed, or led away a woman or girl over age, for immoral purposes, shall also be punished, notwithstanding that the various acts constituting the offence may have been committed in different countries. Source: League of Nations (1932). Report to the Council. Commission of Enquiry into Traffic in Women and Children in the East, Geneva: CTFE/Orient 39(1), pp. 522–29.   4 The translation is from Niksch, L. (2007). Japanese Military’s “Comfort Women” System. Congressional Research Service Memorandum. April 3. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, p. 5.   5 Chapter 33 of the Penal Code (Act No. 45 of 1907) is entitled “Of Abduction, Kidnapping, and Alluring.” The pertinent articles are quoted below. The English translation is adapted from De Becker, J.  E. (1907). The Criminal Code of Japan. Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, pp. 80–82. Article 224 (Kidnapping of Minors): Whosoever shall have allured or taken away any minor shall be punished with penal servitude for a period of not less than three months and not exceeding five years. Article 225 (Kidnapping for Profit): Should a person be allured or kidnapped for the purpose of gain or for an indecent purpose, or with the object of marriage, the penalty shall be penal servitude for a period of not less than one year and not exceeding ten years. Article 226 (Kidnapping for Transportation out of a Country): Whosoever shall have, for the purpose of transporting him or her out of the Empire, allured [enticed] or kidnapped a person shall be punished with limited penal servitude for a period of not less than two years. The same penalty shall be inflicted upon whosoever shall have, with intent to carry him or her out of the Empire, sold a person or transported to a foreign country a person who has been sold or kidnapped. See Maeda Akira’s Insight to Chapter 3 in this volume. See also Maeda, A. (2009). “Ianfu” kyōsei renkō wa yūkaizai (The forcible recruitment of “comfort women” is a crime of abduction). Tōitsu hyōron. Vol. 528 (October), pp. 40–49, and Maeda, A. (2012). “Ianfu” yūkaizai no shōmei: Shizuoka jiken hanketsu (Proof that the abduction of “comfort women” was a crime: The Shizuoka verdict). Tōitsu hyōron. Vol. 564 (October), pp. 58–64.   6 The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal cited the case of Guilin, China, where women were recruited for factory work with false promises and subsequently prostituted in comfort stations. See Hayashi, H. (2010). Senpan saiban no kenkyū: senpan saiban seisaku no keisei kara Tōkyō saiban, BC-­kyū saiban made (Research on the War Crimes Tribunals: from the formulation of tribunal policy to the Tokyo and BC-­Class criminal trials). Bensei Shuppan, p. 45.   7 Digital Museum: The Comfort Women Issue and the Asian Women’s Fund (2007a). Atonement Project. Asian Women’s Fund. [online] Available at: www.awf.or.jp/3/ persons-­02.html [accessed June 21, 2015].   8 With one exception, all of the lower courts rejected the plaintiffs’ demands for legal remedy, accepting the state’s arguments that: (1) the statue of limitations had expired, (2) the state was immune from individual damage assertions, and (3) peace treaties and other international agreements had already settled the claims issue definitively. The Supreme Court upheld these legalistic decisions and dismissed all appeals. The single partial victory was the April 1998 decision by the Yamaguchi District Court’s Shimonoseki Branch. This judgment criticized the National Diet for prolonging the agony of survivors by failing to enact a compensation law, expressed the court’s hopes for the passage of appropriate relief legislation, and awarded three former comfort women ¥3 million (US$22,000) apiece for the suffering they had experienced. The finding read in part: “Upon examination of the facts presented in this case, the comfort women system was extremely sexist and racist, disgraced women, trampled on racial pride, and can be seen as a violation of fundamental human rights relating to the core values expressed in Section 13 of the Japanese National Constitution.” The Hiroshima High Court overturned this decision in March 2001. See Yamaguchi District Court (1998). Claim for Compensation of Pusan Comfort Women and

60   Nishino Rumiko Women’s Voluntary Labor Corps and Demand for Official Apology to the Women’s Voluntary Labor Corps and to the Comfort Women. April 27. The translation is from McDougall, G.  J. (1998). Appendix. Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic rape, sexual slavery and slavery-­like practices during armed conflict (Final report to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Sub-­Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities). UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13, 22 June. Geneva: U.N. Commission on Human Rights, p.  50. In Japanese, see Tsubokawa, H. and Ōmori, N. (2011). Shihō ga nintei shita Nihongun “ianfu”: higai-­ kagai jijitsu wa kisenai! (Japan’s legal system has recognized the [testimonies of] military “comfort women”: the facts concerning victim and aggressor cannot be erased). Tōkyō: Kamogawa Shuppan, pp.  17–24, 61–64. The following is a list of plaintiffs whose testimonies were adjudged factual and referenced or quoted in district and high court decisions. (1) Tokyo High Court: Claim for Compensation by the South Korean Association of the Pacific War Victims and Bereaved Families. Six of nine members: Kim Ran-­i, Yi Kwi-­bun, No Ch’ŏng-ja, Pak Pok-­sun, Sim Mi-­ja, and Kim Pok-­sŏn. (2) Yamaguchi District Court (Shimonoseki Branch): the Kanpu Plaintiff Group (Claim for Official Apology and Compensation by Military Comfort Women and Members of the Women’s Voluntary Labor Corps from Busan). All three members: Ha Sun-­nyŏ, Pak Du-­ri, and Yi Sun-­dŏk. (3) Tokyo District Court: Claim for Apology and Compensation by a Zainichi South Korean Living in Japan. One survivor: Song Sin-­do. (4) Tokyo District Court: Claim for Reparation for Injury by Dutch Former Prisoners and Civilian Internees. One Dutch survivor: Elly Corry van der Ploeg. (5) Tokyo High Court: the First Plaintiff Group (Claim for Reparation for Injury by Chinese “Comfort Women”). All four survivors: Li Xiumei, Liu Mian Huan, Zhou Xi Xiang, Chen Lin Tao. (6) Tokyo District Court: the Second Plantiff Group (Claim for Reparation for Injury by Chinese “Comfort Women”). Both survivors: Guo Xi Cui and Hou Qiao Lian. (7) Tokyo District Court: the Shanxi Plaintiff Group (Claim for Reparation for Injury by Shanxi Province Victims of Sexual Violence). All ten Chinese survivors: Wan Aihua, Nan Erpu, Zhang Xiantu, Zhao Runmei, Gao Yin’e, Wang Gaihe, Zhao Cunni, Yin Yulin, Yang Shizhen, Yang Zihe. (8) Tokyo High Court: the Hainan Plaintiff Group (Claim for Reparation for Injury by Wartime Victims of Sexual Violence on Hainan Island). Eight Chinese survivors: Tan Yulian, Huang Youliang, Chen Yapian, Tan Yadong, Lin Yajin, Chen Jinyu, Deng Yumin, Huang Yufeng).   9 See the interviews and testimonies recorded by the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery, held in Tokyo from December 8 to 12, 2000. For the tribunal’s judgment and survivor testimonies, see the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal (2001a). Judgement, Parts I–VIII. December 4. [online] Available at: http://vawwrac.org/judgement_e01-e08.pdf [accessed May 13, 2017]. 10 The author is grateful to the Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (Chŏngsindae) for compiling the testimony of South Korean victims from court verdicts and published case histories. 11 Quotations by Kang Il-­ch’ul, Mun Ok-­ju, and Chŏng Hak-­ch’ŏl are, respectively, from Nishino, R. and Kim, P., eds. (2010). Shōgen: mirai e no kioku—Ajia “ianfu” shōgenshū II, Nanboku, zainichi Koria hen (Testimonies: memories for the future—a collection of testimonial statements by Asian “comfort women.” North and South Koreans and Koreans living in Japan). Vol. 2. Tōkyō: Akashi Shoten, pp. 112, 216, and Korea Chongshindae’s Institute (The Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan and the Research Association on the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan [hereafter, Korean Council]), ed. (1996). Chūgoku ni renkō sareta Chōsenjin ianfu (Korean comfort women forcibly taken to China). (Translated by A. Yamaguchi). Tōkyō: San’ichi Shobō, p. 164.

Forcible mobilization   61 12 Nishino, R. and Kim, P., eds. (2006). Shōgen: mirai e no kioku—Nanboku zainichi Koria hen, jō (Testimonies: memories for the future—a collection of testimonies by Asian “comfort women.” North and South Koreans and Koreans living in Japan). Vol. 1. Tōkyō: Akashi Shoten, pp. 21, 118, 164. Nishino and Kim, eds. (2010), pp. 23, 132, 164, 178, and Korean Council ed. (1996), pp. 134, 157. 13 The author is grateful to Yamaguchi Akiko for collating the statements of Taiwanese plaintiffs. 14 The quotation by Zheng Chen-­tao is from: Taiwan no Moto “Ianfu” Saiban o Shien suru Kai (Support Committee for Former Taiwanese “Comfort Women” Plaintiffs [hereafter, Support Committee for Taiwanese Plaintiffs]), ed. 50 nen no chinmoku (Fifty years of silence). Support Committee Bulletin No. 21, January 2007. 15 Kao Pao-­chu citation: Onnatachi no Sensō to Heiwa Shiryōkan (Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace [hereafter, WAM]), ed. (2005). Josei Kokusai Senpan Hōtei no subete: “ianfu” higai to kagai sekinin (Everything about the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal: abuses suffered by the “comfort women” and [Japan’s] criminal liability). WAM Catalogue No. 1. Tōkyō: Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace, p.  30, and Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal (2001b). Judgement, Part II. December 4. [online] Available at: http://vawwrac.org/judgement_e03. pdf [accessed May 13, 2017], pp. 51–52. Lee Chun: Support Committee for Taiwanese Plaintiffs, ed. Fifty years of silence. Bulletin No. 26, January 2010. 16 Huang A-­tau citation: Support Committee for Taiwanese Plaintiffs, ed. Fifty years of silence. Bulletin No. 11 (January 2002) and Bulletin No. 24 (April 2009). Tsai Kuei-­ ying citation: Support Committee for Taiwanese Plaintiffs, ed. Fifty years of silence. Bulletin No.  22 (September 2007). Lu Man-­mei: WAM, ed. (2010). Chūgakusei no tame no “ianfu” ten: subete no gimon ni kotaemasu (Panel display on the “comfort women” for middle-­school pupils: an answer to your questions—hereafter, Panel Display for Middle-­School Pupils). WAM Catalogue No.  6, revised and expanded edition. Tōkyō: Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace, p.  24, and Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal (2001b), pp. 50–51. 17 Wu Hsiu-­mei citation: Support Committee for Taiwanese Plaintiffs, ed. Fifty years of silence. Bulletin No. 19 (March 2006). 18 Article 14 of the International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic enabled a signatory to interpret the covenant as exempting “any or all of its colonies, overseas possessions, protectorates, or territories under its sovereignty or authority.” See League of Nations (1932), p. 529. 19 See the discussion in Yoshimi, Y. (2000). Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military During World War  II (Translated by S. O’Brien). New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 158–60. 20 The author is grateful to the Society for the Truth about Shanxi Province, Adachi Yōko, and Yamashita Fumiko for compiling the testimony of Chinese survivors. 21 Liu Mian Huan citation: Chūgokujin “Ianfu” Sosho Bengodan/Shien suru Kai [Legal Team and Support Committee for Chinese “Comfort Women” Plaintiffs], ed. (1999). Sono yūki o muda ni shinaide: Chūgoku Sanseishō de no seibōryoku higaisha no shōgen/sojō (Chinese victims of sexual violence from Shanxi Province: testimonies and legal complaint). Tōkyō: Chūgokujin, pp.  14–15. Hou Qiao Lian: Legal Team and Support Committee for Chinese “Comfort Women” Plaintiffs, ed. (1999). Chinese victims of sexual violence from Shanxi Province, pp.  21–22. Hou Dong’e: Ban, Z. (2006). Gai Sanshī to sono shimai tachi (Gai Shanxi and her sisters). Tōkyō: Nashinokisha, pp. 129–31. This is a companion book to the documentary of the same title. Produced by Siglo (Tokyo), the film is in Chinese and Japanese with English subtitles. Hou Dong’e is the heroine of this true story. Zhang Xiantu: Ishida, Y. and Uchida, T., eds. (2004). Kōdo no mura no seibōryoku: daniang tachi no sensō wa owaranai (Sexual violence in a Chinese loess-­soil village: the war never ends for these “grandmas”). Tōkyō: Sōdosha, pp. 83–85. Zhao Cunni: Ishida and Uchida, eds. (2004), pp. 111–13.

62   Nishino Rumiko 22 Chen Yapian citation: Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho [Tokyo High Court] (2009): Hainantō senji seibōryoku higai baishō jiken: Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho hanketsu (Decision of the Tokyo High Court in Claim for Reparation for Injury by Wartime Victims of Sexual Violence on Hainan Island). Also available online at Web-­suopei (The Society to Support the Demands of Chinese War Victims): www.suopei.jp/saiban_trend/youshi/ post_313.html. See also Tsubokawa and Ōmori (2011), p. 46, and WAM, ed. (2008). Aru hi, Nihongun ga yattekita: Chūgoku senjō de no gōkan to ianjo (One day Japanese soldiers came: rape and comfort stations on China’s battlefields). WAM Catalogue No.  5. Tōkyō: Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace, p.  45. Deng Yumin: Tokyo High Court (2009), pp. 19–20, and Kubokawa and Ōmori (2011), p. 47. Chen Jinyu: Tokyo High Court (2009), pp. 24–25, and Kubokawa and Ōmori (2011), p. 47. 23 Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho [Tokyo High Court] (2004). Chūgokujin “Ianfu” songai baishō seikyū jiken—dai’ichiji (First Claim for Reparation for Injury by Chinese “Comfort Women”). December 15, pp. 27–28.. Also available online at Web-­suopei (The Society to Support the Demands of Chinese War Victims): www.suopei.jp/ saiban_trend/youshi/post_322.html. See also Tsubokawa and Ōmori (2011), p. 29. 24 The author is grateful to Saitō Yumiko and Shibasaki Haruko for organizing the statements of Filipina survivors. 25 Anastasia D. Cortez citation: Takagi, K. and Suganuma, T. [Legal Team] (1997). Firipin “jūgun ianfu” hoshō seikyū jiken: saishū junbi shomen (Claim for state compensation by Filipina “comfort women”: the final brief ). Tōkyō Chisai Saibansho daijūgo gōgigakari (Case Adjudication Section, 5th Civil Division, Tokyo District Court). December 19, p.  64. Ortencia G. Martinez: Takagi and Suganuma (1997), pp.  463–64. Catalina Ufalsa: Takagi and Suganuma (1997), pp.  349–50. Tomasa Salinog: WAM, ed. (2011a). Firipin tachiagaru rora tchi: Nihongun ni fuminijirareta shimajima kara (Lolas [Grandmothers] who stand up and fight in the Philippines: a report from the islands trampled on by the Japanese military). WAM Catalogue No. 9. Tōkyō: Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace, p. 29, and Firipin “Jūgun Ianfu” Hoshō Seikyū Jiken Bengodan [Legal Team: Claim for State Compensation by Filipina “Comfort Women”], ed. (1995). Firipin no Nihongun “ianfu”: seiteki bōryoku no higaisha tachi (Filipina military “comfort women”: victims of sexual violence). Tōkyō: Akashi Shoten, pp. 48–52. 26 Amanda Regala citation: Sajor, I. L., Rodriguez, J., and Domingo, J. A., eds. (1997). Remembering What We Have Tried To Forget. Manila: Asian Centre For Women’s Human Rights, p. 33. For Amonita Balajadia, Virginia Villarma, and Carmencita C. Ramel, see Takagi and Suganuma (1997). Teodora Cogonon Intes: Legal Team: Claim for State Compensation by Filipina “Comfort Women,” ed. (1995), pp. 89–94. 27 Jan Ruff-­O’Herne (2008). Fifty Years of Silence: The Extraordinary Memoir of a War Rape Survivor. Revised and updated. Australia: William Heinemann, pp. 69–95. 28 WAM, ed. (2010). Panel Display for Middle-­School Pupils, p. 31. See also Saw’s testimony in Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal (2001b), p. 63. 29 Regarding Mardiyem, see WAM ed. (2010). Panel Display for Middle-­School Pupils, p. 25. See also Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal (2001b), p. 66. Concerning Suhanah, see WAM, ed. (2005), p.  33, and Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal (2001b), p. 66. 30 The author is grateful to Furusawa Kiyoko for compiling the statements of the East Timor victims. 31 WAM, ed. (2007). Higashi Chimōru: sensō o ikinuita onnatachi—Nihongun to Indoneshia shihai no moto de (East Timor: women who lived through the war—under the rule of the Japanese army in Indonesia). WAM Catalogue No. 4. Tōkyō: Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace, p. 13. 32 WAM, ed. (2007), p.  27. See also Bere’s testimony in Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal (2001b), p. 69.

Forcible mobilization   63 33 WAM, ed. (2007), p.  28. See also Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal (2001b), pp. 68–69. 34 WAM, ed. (2007). 35 In 1941, at age 17, after kisaeng training (Note 36), Kim and a friend traveled to Beijing accompanied by her foster father to find work. Shortly after arriving, Japanese soldiers separated the girls from the father, bundled them into a truck, and eventually interned them in a comfort station. See Howard, K., ed. (1995). True Stories of the Korean Comfort Women (Translated by Y. J. Lee). London: Cassell, pp. 32–35. 36 The kisaeng were originally specialized court entertainers skilled in the arts of dance, song, and poetry recital. The kisaeng system was abolished in the last years of the Yi Dynasty, but during the era of Japanese occupation and colonization, special schools were established to preserve this ancient art form. Kim Hak-­sun was apprenticed to such a school at the age of 14 and trained until she was 17. The local government refused to officially recognize her as a professional performer because she was underage, and Kim never worked as a kisaeng. During the 1970s, the rise of Japanese sex tours to South Korea caused the word kisaeng to be associated with prostitution in the minds of many Japanese, but that modern stereotype did not exist during the colonial era. See Yoshimi, Y. et al., eds. (2014). Q&A: “Ianfu,” kyōsei, seidorei: anata no shitsumon ni kotaemasu (Questions and answers: “comfort women,” coercion, and sex slaves). Fight for Justice Booklet. Tōkyō: Ochanomizu Shobō, pp. 83–84. 37 Committee for Historical Facts (2007). The events prompting the committee’s public advertisement are discussed in Chapter 3, Note 1. 38 Shirota, S. (1971). Maria no sanka (Maria’s song of praise). Tōkyō: Nihon Kirisutokyōdan Shuppankyoku. 39 Senda, K. (1973). Jūgun ianfu: koe’naki onna hachiman nin no kokuhatsu (Comfort women of the Imperial military: the accusations of 80,000 voiceless women). Tōkyō: Futabasha. 40 Hirota, K. (1975). Shōgen kiroku: jūgun ianfu kangofu: senjō ni ikita onna no dōkoku (An oral history: military comfort women and nurses: the woes of women who lived at the front). Shinjinbutsu Ōraisha, pp. 18–25. 41 Hirota (1975), op. cit. 42 Hirota (1975), pp. 38–49, 67–73. 43 Regarding Takashima Junko, see Ōbayashi, K. (1974a). Tamanoi shōfuden: jūgun ianfu dai ichi gō Junko no ba’ai (The story of a prostitute from Tamanoi: the case of Junko, Tamanoi’s first comfort woman), Gendai. April, pp. 340–49, and Ōbayashi, K. (1974b). Tamanoi shōfuden: jūgun ianfu Junko no Shanhai bojō (A prostitute from Tamanoi: Junko the comfort woman and her nostalgia for Shanghai). Gendai. May, pp. 340–49. 44 Uehara, E. (1976). Tsuji no hana: kuruwa no onatachi (The bloom of Tsuji [Naha, Okinawa]: women of the licensed quarters). Tōkyō: Jiji Tsūshinsha. 45 Those critics included the New York State Assembly, the New York Times, the Foundation of Japanese Honorary Debts in the Netherlands, Australian Foreign Minister Bob Carr, and Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of Myanmar’s National League for Democracy, who was visiting South Korea at the time. See Chapters 4 and 5, this volume.

Insight on the issues Coercion, sexual violence, and rape centers in Yu County, Shanxi Province Ikeda Eriko

During the Asia-­Pacific War, which began in September 1931 with Japan’s invasion of northeastern China (Manchuria) and ended with its defeat in August 1945, Imperial forces in China slaughtered local residents without quarter, looted their homes, and committed widespread battlefield rapes. The savagery was intense in the western part of Yu County, Shanxi Province, where anti-­Japanese partisans were concentrated. In August 1940, the People’s Liberation Army routed Imperial troops in the Hundred Regiments Offensive. In reprisal, the Japanese army adopted a scorched-­earth strategy, known as “Three Alls Operations” (Kill All, Burn All, Loot All), and set up military outposts in village after village. Imperial forces established headquarters in the major cities and stationed detachments in the surrounding countryside so as to maximize military control with limited personnel. Under such conditions, Japanese soldiers perpetrated countless acts of sexual violence against Chinese women, of which only a fraction were investigated as war crimes following Japan’s defeat. The scale and intensity of brutalities did not come to light until the mid-­to-late 1990s, when 16 Chinese survivors from Shanxi filed three different lawsuits in Tokyo against the Japanese state, demanding an apology and compensation. The first group (four victims) and the second group (two victims) took legal action in 1995 and 1996, respectively. In 1998, another ten Shanxi survivors initiated a third round of litigation (Table 2.1, Chapter 2). The Supreme Court ultimately dismissed the plaintiffs’ legal claims on technical grounds but did not challenge lower-­court recognition of personal injury and the circumstances leading up to it. The three Shanxi suits were heard by Tokyo District and High courts. In all three cases, the Tokyo High Court recognized that the women had been taken forcibly to Japanese garrisons, confined, and sexually abused regularly, and that at least one had been repeatedly assaulted in her own home, which was near a Japanese camp. The high court adjudged their accusations of abduction and systematic rape by Japanese soldiers to be credible. By allowing this judgment to stand, the Japanese legal system as a whole in effect endorsed the facts of personal trauma as described by the Shanxi women—even though it ultimately accepted the state’s narrow, legalistic arguments and rejected the victims’ demands for legal remedy.

Insight: rape centers, Yu County, China   65 Court recognition was made possible by the courageous decision of survivor-­ activists to stand up publicly and demand justice. It was also the fruit of more than ten years of hard work by a transnational redress movement that included Japanese legal specialists, researchers, and civic groups. In close cooperation with Chinese researchers and local citizens in Shanxi, Japanese support groups interviewed survivors and other witnesses and uncovered relevant documents in Japanese and Chinese archives. The Japanese teams also gathered oral evidence by interviewing former soldiers.1

Three types of sexual violence: battlefield rapes, rape centers, and comfort stations The Japanese military embarked on the extensive creation of brothel-­style comfort stations in response to the growing incidence of rape by Imperial soldiers and the proliferation of sexually transmitted diseases among the troops. Historical documents show that, in 1932, Japan’s Shanghai Expeditionary Army set up comfort facilities following the first Shanghai incident,2 but an all-­out coordinated drive to establish military sex venues did not get underway until after 1937. The Nanking massacre in December of that year was accompanied by extensive violence against local women as military units, with their officers’ approval, engaged in mass rape. To prevent the situation from deteriorating further, Japanese military authorities moved quickly to enlarge the network of comfort stations. Although this failed to suppress rape or the spread of venereal infections, military commands energetically maintained, supervised, controlled, and expanded these establishments, which were considered logistics facilities also useful for boosting troop morale and protecting military secrets from enemy spies. Evidence of warzone rape in Shanxi Province appeared in Chinese war-­ damage surveys conducted immediately after Japan’s surrender. The County-­ wide Property Loss Inventory compiled by Heshun County, for example, listed a total of 566 rape victims in ten rural districts, violated over an eight-­year period. A total of 84 women were found to have sexually contracted illnesses as a result. According to research undertaken in Miaozhuang Village, Pingshun County, a total of 40 women were raped during 15 Japanese mopping-­up operations conducted there over a span of seven years. Meanwhile, comfort stations managed directly by Imperial forces were built in cities large and small. There were nearly 40 such facilities in Taiyuan City, home to the Japanese First Army headquarters, which commanded the Yu County garrisons. Comfort venues were also established in Yangquan City, where headquarters of the 4th Independent Mixed Brigade was located, and in Yu County, headquarters of the 14th Infantry Battalion. In frontline villages with no such facilities, smaller military units set up impromptu rape centers on their own. In Shanxi Province, most of these were situated in traditional yaodong cave residences or in requisitioned houses. Unlike comfort stations, these venues did not even preserve the outward appearances of a brothel

66   Ikeda Eriko In the rape centers, women who had been abducted or detained during “pacification” operations and those “delivered” under military decree by hamlets already in Japanese hands were sequestered and raped continuously. Here, female partisans were also sexually tortured to extract confessions or exact revenge. Captives were subjected to repeated sexual abuse over long periods of time. Some were returned to their homes in exchange for what amounted to ransoms extorted from their families. One document describes in detail the practice of forcibly requisitioning and supplying women: In four villages in Fangshan County, Shanxi, where Japanese garrisons had been set up, the pro-­Japanese local government assigned a quota to each village and each household, obliging them to provide hua guniang [“blossom girls”] to serve Japanese troops. Those who did not supply daughters paid Chinese collaborators to hire prostitutes and send them to the Japanese encampments in their stead.3 In Shanxi, then, sexual violence took three forms: (1) battlefield rapes, (2) rape centers, and (3) comfort stations.

Figure 2.5 A yaodong cave residence in Linguisha, Yu County, where female partisans were held and tortured. Wan Aihua was caught and imprisoned here three times, undergoing serial gang rapes and sexual torture. Guo Xi Cui and Zhou Xi Xiang were also sequestered and tortured here. Source: Courtesy of the Association for Uncovering the Facts of Sexual Violence Committed by the Japanese Military in Shanxi, Acting in Solidarity with the Daniang (the Grandmas).

Insight: rape centers, Yu County, China   67

Court recognition of forcible procurement Of the 16 Shanxi plaintiffs who sued the Japanese government, 15 had been sexually assaulted in rape centers. In 2004, the Tokyo High Court, ruling on the first Shanxi lawsuit filed in 1995 by Li Xiumei and three other survivors, accepted the plaintiffs’ testimony that they had been forcibly seized, cloistered, and violated by Imperial soldiers. In its decision, the court wrote: [The Japanese military undertook no-­holds-barred Three Alls Operations] and in some cases committed atrocities against the Chinese. In this context, there were instances where members of the Japanese military forcibly seized, led away, and raped Chinese women (including young girls) living near their camps and confined and raped them continuously, day after day, reducing them to [the state of] so-­called comfort women.4 In 2003, the Tokyo District Court acknowledged as trustworthy virtually all the accusations of the third group of ten plaintiffs—including Wan Aihua—who stated that they had been raped and sexually molested on a regular basis in rape centers or villages where Japanese troops had been posted. In 2005, the Tokyo High Court allowed the facts admitted by the district court to stand and cited some of them in its summation. Concerning Zhao Runmei, the court wrote:

Figure 2.6 Wan Aihua and other Shanxi plaintiffs filed suit against the Japanese government on October 30, 1998, demanding an apology and compensation for wartime sexual violence. Wan represented the plaintiffs and traveled from Shanxi to Tokyo to attend each hearing, using these occasions to share with supporters what she and other plaintiffs had suffered at the hands of the Japanese military. Source: Courtesy of the Association for Uncovering the Facts of Sexual Violence Committed by the Japanese Military in Shanxi, Acting in Solidarity with the Daniang (the Grandmas).

68   Ikeda Eriko [During the Xiyan Massacre, Japanese soldiers stabbed Zhao Run-­mei’s foster mother and father with their service swords.] They took the [16-year-­ old] unmarried Zhao … gang raped her … and took her by force to a cave [yaodong]. […] She was incarcerated there for 40 or more days and violated daily by from ten to as many as 20 soldiers on a busy day and by seven or eight on a slack one.5 Comfort stations surface in the testimony and memoirs of former Imperial soldiers, but very few are willing to talk about battlefield rapes or rape centers. Since comfort stations were officially authorized by the military, former soldiers may have felt fewer qualms about having used them, but they rarely mention rape. Into this silence one can read a deep-­seated aversion to remembering brute sexual aggression. Most veterans appear to have repressed these traumatic memories, thus evading their personal responsibility for the heinous crime of rape— whether committed in combat, in rape centers, or in the myriad temporary locations where local women were rounded up, forcibly interned, and serially violated. Meanwhile, victims’ families, communities, fellow countrymen, and government have viewed the sexual violence inflicted on these women as a source of acute shame. For more than half a century, the survivors have been reduced to silence.6 Although Shanxi villagers knew of the rape centers, they did not discuss them openly, and few documents referring to them exist. Despite these obstacles, the Shanxi women courageously stepped forward and went on record about the injustices they had suffered. Publicly recounting their painful war experiences empowered them to recover their confidence and self-­esteem and open a new chapter in history As Japanese, we bear a heavy burden of responsibility for the Asia-­Pacific War, and for our country’s postwar failure to provide redress to all those victimized by Imperial Japan. We must redouble our efforts to meet that obligation forthrightly and provide closure to the survivors.

Notes 1 See generally Ishida, Y. and Uchida, T., eds. (2004). Kōdo no mura no seibōryoku: daniang tachi no sensō wa owaranai (Sexual violence in a Chinese loess-­soil village: the war never ends for these “grandmas”). Tōkyō: Sōdosha, and Ōmori, N. (2008). Rekishi no jijitsu to mukiatte: Chūgokujin ianfu higaisha to tomo ni (Facing the truth of history together: Chinese comfort women victims), Shin Nihon Shuppansha. Chinese researchers have remarked on the “extremely difficult circumstances” under which the Japanese groups labored, braving “abusive messages and threats of violence” at home from those opposing their efforts to seek restitution for Japan’s wartime misdeeds. See Qiu, P. with Su, Z. and Chen, L. (2013). Chinese Comfort Women. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.  172–74. The authors analyze military sexual violence in China under Japanese occupation, record victims’ stories, and describe postwar efforts by Chinese researchers, legal specialists, and human rights advocates and their Japanese counterparts to secure justice for survivors. For the case of Yu County, see pp. 114–25, 154–56.

Insight: rape centers, Yu County, China   69 2 In September 1931, the Imperial army blew up a section of the South Manchurian Railway in Mukden as a pretext for attacking Chinese forces there, and in February 1932, established the puppet state of Manchukuo in northeastern China. To deflect international criticism from its seizure of Manchuria, between January and March 1932, the Japanese army garrisoned troops in Shanghai’s international settlement, clashing with local Chinese troops. An armistice in May allowed Imperial forces to maintain a military presence in the foreign settlement. This series of events comprised the so-­called first Shanghai incident, which presaged Japan’s full-­scale invasion of China following the Marco Polo Bridge incident of July 1937. The so-­called second Shanghai incident (August to November 1937) led to the first large military engagement of the Sino-­Japanese War (1937–45). It ended with Japan’s victory over the defending Chinese and its occupation of Shanghai and surrounding areas. 3 The document is from Li, B., Xu, J., and Shi, Y., eds. (1995). Qinhua Rijun baoxing zonglu (Survey of recorded atrocities committed by the Japanese military during Japan’s invasion of China). Shijiazhuang Hebei Renmin Chubanshe. It is included in Onnatachi no Sensō to Heiwa Shiryōkan [Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace], ed. (2008). Aru hi Nihongun ga yatte kita: Chūgoku senjō de no gōkan to ianjo (One day the Japanese military came: rape and comfort stations on the battlefields of China). Catalogue No. 5. Tōkyō: Onnatachi no Sensō to Heiwa Shiryōkan, p. 10. 4 Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho [Tokyo High Court] (2004). Chūgokujin “Ianfu” songai baishō seikyū jiken—dai’ichiji (First Claim for Reparation for Injury by Chinese “Comfort Women”). December 15, p.  27. Also available online at Web-­suopei (The Society to Support the Demands of Chinese War Victims): www.suopei.jp/saiban_trend/youshi/ post_322.html.  5 Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho (Tokyo District Court) (2003). Sanseishō Seibōryok higaisha songai baishō seikyū jiken (Claim for Reparation for Injury by Shanxi Province Victims of Sexual Violence). April 24, p.  48. See also Chūgoku ni okeru Nihongun Seibōryoku no Jittai o Akiraka ni shi, Baishō Seikyū Saiban o Shien suru Kai [The Society to Support the Claim for Reparation for Injury and Clarify Sexual Violence by the Japanese Military in China], ed. (1998). Sojō: Chūgoku Sanseishō Seibōryoku Higaisha songai baishō seikyū jiken (Claim for reparation for injury by China Shanxi Province Victims of Sexual Violence). Tōkyō: The Society to Support the Claim for Reparation for Injury and Clarify Sexual Violence by the Japanese Military in China. 6 See the discussion in Qiu et al. (2013), pp. 151–59 and 169–70.

3 The comfort women and state prostitution Onozawa Akane

The flaw in revisionist logic On June 14, 2007, a group of neonationalist lawmakers, academics, political commentators, journalists, and cultural figures signed a full-­page advertisement in the Washington Post entitled “THE FACTS” to expound a peculiar theory. Seeking to disavow the iniquities of the Japanese military’s comfort women (ianfu) system, their polemic listed five so-­called facts, the last of which made the following claim. Fact 5: The ianfu who were embedded with the Japanese army were not, as is commonly reported, “sex slaves.” They were working under a system of licensed prostitution that was commonplace around the world at the time. Many of the women, in fact, earned incomes far in excess of what were paid to field officers and even generals … and there are many testimonies to the fact that they were treated well.1 The advertisement alleges that the comfort women were prostitutes, licensed and supervised by the state, who were simply plying their trade for personal gain and contributing to the war needs of the Imperial forces. The ad refutes the existence of military sexual servitude and denies any moral or legal obligation by the postwar state to apologize to or compensate victim-­survivors for the traumas they experienced. This revisionist credo airily dismisses overwhelming historical evidence that during the Asia-­Pacific War many tens of thousands of young women across Asia and the Pacific with no exposure to prostitution were coercively mobilized and compelled to provide sex on demand to Japanese troops in so-­called comfort stations. Nor do the ad’s sponsors see anything wrong about requisitioning women already licensed for prostitution in Japan and packing them off to military comfort venues in foreign lands. Underlying these assumptions is a palpable patriarchal contempt for the victims and a stunning ignorance of basic human rights. Sadly, many ordinary citizens as well as political and opinion leaders share these perceptions, which over the past decade or so have become widespread in Japan with the rise of historical revisionism (see Chapter 6).

Comfort women and state prostitution   71 Japan’s central authorities have overseen prostitution since the Tokugawa period (1603–1868). After the overthrow of the feudal regime in 1868, the new Meiji state devised a licensing system patterned on “modern” European models. Following the takeover of Formosa (Taiwan, 1895), southern Sakhalin and the Kwangtung Leased Territory (1905), and Korea (1910), and with the subsequent creation of a Japanese puppet state in Manchuria (1932), Japanese-­style licensing was gradually imposed on the sex industry in these regions as well. Japanese and other local entrepreneurs set up brothels here, bringing in Japanese, Korean, Taiwanese, Chinese, and other women to staff them.2 After the garrisoning of Imperial troops in Shanghai in 1932, the Japanese military began to plan and implement an independent system of sex venues for its troops in China. The high-­ranking officers who devised these facilities called them “comfort stations” (ianjo). Following Japan’s full-­scale invasion of China in 1937 and the start of the Pacific conflict in late 1941, military sex establishments expanded rapidly, including to parts of Asia and the Pacific where licensing systems did not exist. In the latter areas, women were rounded up directly by Imperial forces or recruited by procurers acting on army or navy orders, with the cooperation of local civil authorities. As sexually exploited victims, they shared a common plight with Japanese prostitutes registered by the state, but under wartime conditions, they were denied even the illusion of freedom enjoyed by the latter. As shown in the preceding chapters, we know that the great majority of comfort women were marshaled against their will by means of enticement, fraud, intimidation, and the raw violence of abduction. We also know that, while comfort stations were run according to military regulations, in rape centers and similar settings there were no formal restraints on soldiers—particularly in or near combat zones—and the women incarcerated there were subjected to repeated gang rapes, torture, and other forms of sexual brutalization. Comfort women could not leave the stations without military permission. Duped or dragooned into sexual bondage, with no possibility of escape, they lived under conditions that differed radically from those of women prostituted in peacetime under state sanction, whose right to quit without notice was, in principle at least, ordained by law. On the other hand, we have discovered that once the Sino-­Japanese War began in 1937, licensed brothel proprietors and their agents in Japan proper, acting on orders from the military, vigorously recruited shōgi (licensed prostitutes), geigi (geisha), and shakufu (Japanese-­style bar hostesses)3 to work in army and navy comfort facilities abroad. Dangling the lure of advance cash payments supplied by military recruiters, these concessionaires solicited bonded women for sexual labor overseas, specifying a fixed term of service during which voluntary termination was impossible. From the handful of memoirs and testimonials these women left, it is clear that some were treated better in military sex stations than in the licensed quarters of civilian life. A few even amassed sizeable earnings and managed to return home safely before Japan’s defeat became imminent.

72   Onozawa Akane It is important, however, not to confuse the institution of legalized prostitution with the comfort women system run by the military. At the same time we must remember that, during the war years, the two systems became closely entwined as the Imperial military recruited Japanese from among those already subordinated to the state-­regulated sex industry. The revisionists in their Washington Post ad imply that virtually all comfort women were “prostitutes” from the outset. This claim not only warps historical reality but also disguises the fact that the comfort women system operated from start to finish under the authority and control of Imperial armed forces. Unfortunately, researchers have tended to overlook the victimization experience of the many Japanese shōgi, geigi, and shakufu who were lured away from state-­approved brothels and other venues at home and transferred to military sex facilities abroad. Obviously, as scholars our first priority must be to examine and clarify the suffering inflicted on the great multitude of women who were forcibly mobilized in Japan’s colonial possessions and in the territories invaded and occupied by Imperial troops. It is incumbent upon us to continue deepening our understanding of the injustices done to these victims. Yet if we hope to effectively refute the premises of the Washington Post ad, we must also take a closer look at the fate of the prostituted women from Japan who subsequently joined the ranks of comfort women and ask how they were recruited, what kinds of oppressions they endured, and which laws—national and international—were violated in the process. In the following sections, I first present an overview of state-­regulated prostitution in prewar Japan. I then discuss the recruitment of shōgi, geigi, and shakufu to meet military quotas and introduce the life history of a legally prostituted individual who was dispatched from a sex establishment in Japan to a comfort station in the South Pacific. I go on to demonstrate that a basic understanding of universal human rights and the strictures of existing international law should have been sufficient to persuade Japan to abolish the licensing and trafficking of human beings for prostitution. Specifically, I examine how the Japanese state consistently sidestepped demands for reform coming both from the home front and from abroad in order to maintain the patriarchal social order, which it had no intention of changing. In the final section, I return to the revisionist proposition that the comfort women controversy is a false issue because coercion was not involved: the supposed victims were in fact “professionals” who earned a good living from the military brothel system. I argue that the extensive and rapid rounding up of women throughout the Japanese Empire to satisfy the Imperial military’s voracious appetite for sex was feasible in large measure because of the regime of state-­managed prostitution. This institution had created a vast infrastructure for the procurement of women based on debt slavery and sustained by permissive social norms that naturalized sexual subjugation, allowing the buying and selling of women to run rampant. The Japanese military was able to exploit these features when it embarked on the hasty expansion of comfort stations in the late 1930s.

Comfort women and state prostitution   73

Licensed prostitution in Japan Japan’s prewar system of state-­administered prostitution was based on the inspection, certification, and licensing of brothels in the so-­called pleasure quarters (yūkaku) and the women, aged 18 or above, who were prostituted there. Procurers and intermediaries who solicited impoverished young women and herded them into the sex industry were, in principle, also required to undergo screening and licensing by the state. A defining feature of the Japanese system was its reliance on a form of bondage. During the Tokugawa period, women of the pleasure quarters were sexual commodities sold at will by their parents to brothels and then resold by owners and transferred from one sex venue to another for the rest of their lives. This custom remained basically intact when Japan dismantled the feudal regime and created a modern state in 1868. In Tokugawa times, a woman’s sales price was called a ransom (minoshirokin). With the dawn of the modern era, this nomenclature was changed to the duplicitous term “advance cash payment” (zenshakkin). When a woman contracted to enter a shōgi or geisha establishment, her parents or legal guardians were asked to sign on as guarantors “jointly and severally liable” (rentai hoshōnin) for their ward. Based on that pledge, brothel and geisha-­house managers advanced substantial cash “loans” to the parents, which the woman was then obliged to pay off with her body. Until these de facto ransoms were redeemed in full, a woman could not leave her place of employment. A large share of the fees she earned went to the housemaster, leaving the prostituted inmates with scant resources to redeem their bond. As a result, repayment generally was a long-­term endeavor, with the woman having to secure new loans to cover ever-­mounting living and other expenses. Many such individuals, then, eventually became trapped in a sophisticated system of debt peonage from which escape was extremely difficult, if not impossible. Licensed prostitution constituted a system of indentured sexual labor rooted in an intricate network of brothel proprietors, brokers, and other contractors who made their living by buying and selling women. For all intents and purposes, this was a form of enslavement. Indeed, before 1945, many Japanese commonly referred to state-­controlled prostitution as slavery (doreisei), and in the postwar era, the eminent sociologist of law Kawashima Takeyoshi characterized the prewar licensing of shōgi and geigi as a virtual slave system.4 In 1872, the Meiji Grand Council of State enacted the Ordinance Liberating Geisha and Prostitutes, which in principle outlawed the trafficking of women and purportedly freed shōgi and geisha from chattel-­like conditions. Brothels and related businesses responded by renting out tatami-­mat “reception salons” (kashi zashiki). Under this arrangement, prostituted women ostensibly leased space from house managers. There they met their clients and conducted business, and bordellos became popularly known as kashi zashiki—literally, leased drawing rooms. Needless to say, this was a deceptive convention that tied the victims more firmly to the terms of their contract.

74   Onozawa Akane Subsequently, prostituted women launched “freedom-­to-quit” campaigns in order to compel brothel proprietors to void their contracts. In 1900, Japan’s highest tribunal, the Great Court of Cassation (Daishin’in), issued a verdict to the effect that service contracts infringing on the personal freedom of shōgi and geisha were invalid, even if the individual still owed money on her bond. That same year, the government adopted the Laws Regulating Prostitutes, which established the legal right of licensed individuals to end employment whenever they wished. With assistance from groups such as the Salvation Army and the Japan Women’s Christian Temperance Union, a few women actually managed to have their contracts canceled and win back some degree of autonomy from housemasters. In 1902, however, the Great Court of Cassation ruled that, while service contracts prohibiting discretionary job termination were invalid, cash advances were a different type of contractual instrument. These obligations, the court said, remained in force and had to be met, even if the person involved had already left her place of work. In fact, “room brokers” and other concessionaires continued to advance money to parents in order to tie their daughters to the sex venue, depriving the latter of the free disposition of their own bodies. To the purveyors of women, the cash advance and the service contract were two sides of the same coin: the bond agreement ensured that the contract, with its implicit no-­termination provision, would be honored. If the government had seriously intended to curtail human trafficking, it would have categorically outlawed the advance payment of bond-­like financial obligations. Japan had to wait until 1955, ten years after the end of World War II, for the courts to decide to ban this onerous practice.5 Under the regime of state prostitution, licensed women were subjected to regular medical examinations in an effort to prevent clients from contracting venereal infections. As in Europe, licensing was a system whereby the state undertook to ensure that prostituted women would remain free of sexually transmitted diseases. In Japan, this was the first of two rationales used to defend government intervention in the sex industry. The second was “rape prevention”—prostitution protected “decent girls” from the supposedly irrepressible male libido. In France, a state regulatory model for Japan, government control victimized pauperized lower class women with little or no education and few social resources. Yet in both France and England, prostituted women enjoyed far more autonomy vis-­à-vis brothel keepers than their Japanese counterparts. There was nothing resembling, for instance, Japan’s legally established practice of having the parents of a young woman in effect borrow money from brokers and become co-­guarantors of a loan that condemned their daughter to a life of prostitution. This nefarious practice secured an inmate’s submission to the housemaster or creditor until her debt could be discharged, but repayment was often impossible.6 Such women were victims of the patriarchal Japanese household (ie). The fealty they owed their fathers translated easily into the obedience they showed their housemasters, doubly secured by the cash advance. Ironically, a daughter’s willingness to sell herself to help improve her family’s fortunes was celebrated as the epitome of filial piety.

Comfort women and state prostitution   75

Figure 3.1 A brothel in Takashima, Yokohama. Source: Courtesy Nagasaki University Library.

In Japan, houses of assignation (kashi zashiki) everywhere normally maintained close relations with local military installations, even in peacetime. The creation of a new garrison would often prompt town fathers to deliberate the merits of inviting brothels to set up shop, and in several instances, red-­light districts were actually constructed for that purpose.7 These venues were managed directly by the owners, however, and while they engaged freely in the trafficking of women, hiring was nominally contractual and sanctioned by the obligatory parental authorization. Comfort stations, on the other hand, were set up by explicit order of the military. The Imperial army and navy directed the procurement of women, albeit through private contractors in many cases, and the women interned there could not quit without permission from local military commanders. In the occupied territories of China and later the Philippines and other parts of Southeast Asia, the capture, sequestration, and perpetual gang rape of women were rife. Seen in this light, the comfort women system is best understood as a wartime mechanism of sexual violence designed, activated, and maintained by Imperial forces as they rapidly expanded their influence abroad during the late 1930s. For that reason, while acknowledging the inhumanity of state prostitution, we should

76   Onozawa Akane not conflate it with the comfort women system, which in my opinion requires special treatment. Simply equating the two institutions risks minimizing a salient feature of military sexual servitude: sexual violence, including serial rape and other atrocities at the hands of Japanese troops.

From shōgi, geigi, and shakufu to comfort woman Next, we consider the case of licensed Japanese who were later recruited as comfort women. They included all three categories of prostituted women: shōgi, geisha, and shakufu. National Police Agency (NPA) archives provide a revealing glimpse of civilian procurers working discretely at the military’s bidding to recruit women from the sex industry for comfort stations in China.8 One NPA document, in particular, records inquiries made by several prefectural governors to the Ministry of Home Affairs in early 1938. The governors were conveying their concerns about the activities of private agents operating in Gunma, Yamagata, Kochi, Wakayama, Ibaraki, Miyagi, and other prefectures who were attempting to solicit women for comfort stations being built, they said, by Japanese forces in Shanghai. The agents claimed they had been commissioned by the Special Services Agency attached to Japan’s Shanghai Expeditionary Army. Prefectural police reported that the operatives had been propositioning bar hostesses (shakufu) to work in Shanghai but suspected that their real intention was to assemble women and traffic them to sex venues in parts of Asia outside the Empire. After investigating the matter, they learned that the men were in fact kashi zashiki owners and other licensed recruiters hailing from Kobe, Osaka, and other large cities. The police investigation also confirmed that the Shanghai Expeditionary Army had indeed asked prefectural police authorities to recruit brokers for the purpose of rounding up some 3,000 shakufu for army comfort stations scheduled to be built in the Chinese interior. To verify the procurers’ stories, the Wakayama Prefectural Police contacted the Kujō Police Station in Osaka and the Foreign Affairs Section of the Nagasaki Police. The investigators ascertained that prefectural police in Osaka, Nagasaki, and elsewhere were facilitating the agents’ efforts to enroll women for military prostitution in Shanghai. The business agents and brokers were in possession of service contracts, certificates of parental consent, receipts for loan agreements, and documents specifying the length of duty. The terms of employment included a two-­year obligation, a requirement that the women be between 16 and 30, and a promise to repay the monetary advance upon completion of the contract. The women were entitled to keep 10 percent of their earnings, but if they quit prematurely, they were required to return the original loan with interest.9 The written accounts of former military physicians and comfort station managers also demonstrate beyond a doubt that civilian brothel operators were obeying military instructions to recruit women and establish warzone sex facilities. For example, Nagasawa Ken’ichi, a former military physician, and Yamada

Comfort women and state prostitution   77 Seikichi, the military officer in charge of comfort venues in Hankou (now Wuhan), China both note in their memoirs that housemasters and their auxiliaries in the well-­known licensed quarters of Matsushima (Osaka) and Fukuhara (Kobe) were ordered by military authorities to collect women and set up sex stations under military auspices. Both authors state unequivocally that the Imperial army took a direct hand in running the Hankou comfort facilities.10 Testimonials of former comfort women corroborate these stories, indicating that the army and navy relied directly or indirectly on the trafficking networks of licensed brothels in Japan to meet comfort station staffing needs.11 Yamauchi Keiko’s remembrances are a good example. Born in Aomori Prefecture in 1925, Yamauchi was indentured to a geisha house (okiya) in Otsuka, Tokyo for a ¥300 advance to her parents following her father’s bankruptcy. Not yet ten years old at the time, she was tied to a ten-­year contract. She became a geisha and adopted the sobriquet Kikumaru as her professional name. While working in Tokyo’s Nishi Koyama area, a geisha friend invited her to go to work at a frontline comfort station in the South Pacific. Hearing that the navy would shoulder her debt, which by that time had grown to ¥4,000, she jumped at the opportunity and enlisted. Indebtedness was not the only factor that pushed Yamauchi to enter a comfort facility. Equally decisive was the recruiter’s admonition to serve her country and his promise that, if she died, her spirit would be enshrined at Tokyo’s Yasukuni Shrine, where Japan’s war dead are commemorated. So in March 1942, Yamauchi sailed for Toloas in the Truk Islands (now Chuuk Lagoon). When she moved into the new venue, she was assigned to serve senior naval officers. Yamauchi later remembered that period of her life as “enjoyable,” and she returned to Japan with the generous sum of ¥10,000 in her pocket (rampant postwar inflation would quickly erode those savings). After the war, however, her past as a comfort woman followed her as she moved from job to job, working as a geisha or bar hostess. She grew bitter that she and other women who had served their country in time of war would be treated so shabbily by society afterwards. In April 1972, at the age of 48, she gassed herself to death in her room.12 Yamauchi’s case appears at first glance to fit the caricature of the comfort women in the revisionists’ Washington Post public comment. She began her career as a geisha but later volunteered to work in a comfort station, where she found herself better off than before. But consider things from her perspective. Sold by her parents before she had reached the age of ten, forced into a life of sexual subjugation with no realistic prospect of leaving, and held in contempt by society at large, she must have found it impossible to resist the dual opportunities of clearing her debts and serving her country under military sponsorship. In other words, she might not have agreed to such a proposal had she not been bonded to a profession that required her to discharge her financial obligations with her body (but with little hope of ever fully doing so). A person’s idea of what is “enjoyable” at any given moment depends on their life circumstances at the time, and these can vary widely.13 The fact that women like Yamauchi made money and derived a fleeting contentment from some part of their experiences does not justify sexual servitude. Not even for a day.

78   Onozawa Akane Moreover, Yamauchi happened to work for officers and was lucky to be able return to Japan alive once she had finished her contract. Other comfort women were not so fortunate. As the war drew to an end, many were killed in the fighting or were left to fend for themselves in the jungles of Southeast Asia and the Pacific by the same soldiers who had prostituted them day in and day out.14 Recruited by appeals to their patriotism and the prospect of veneration at the prestigious Yasukuni Shrine, yet scorned and mistreated when they returned home, these women were victims trapped by debt in a life of continuous misery. The state and the military cynically used and mistreated them and then, ultimately, discarded them. It is important to note, however, that by the 1930s, licensed prostitution and the system of debt slavery that underpinned it were increasingly viewed by domestic and world opinion as embarrassing anachronisms that should be abolished. The 1872 state ordinance that purportedly liberated prostituted women failed to do so because of the obfuscation of government authorities and the connivance of the courts, which allowed this system to flourish. In the 1920s and 1930s, however, an international consensus had emerged that decried the selling of women into sexual bondage as a serious human rights abuse. By this time, it was no longer the case that “licensed prostitution was commonplace around the world,” as the 2007 revisionist ad would have it. In fact, the institution was already on its last legs. But the Japanese government refused to give in to world opinion. Instead, it sought new justifications to postpone a final resolution of the question, and in Japan and its colonies, trafficking in human lives continued unabated.

Japan and the international movement for the abolition of the trafficking of women By the early twentieth century, the Western system of certifying brothels, registering prostitutes, and requiring the latter to submit to periodic medical examinations had come to be regarded as abetting the trafficking of women. In the 1920s, many Western nations eliminated state licensing both at home and in their Asian colonies. The United Kingdom, the United States, and the Netherlands, for example, closed down bordellos and other sex venues in Singapore, Manila, and the Dutch East Indies; drove out the pimps; and repatriated their nationals. These efforts were not entirely wholehearted and achieved very uneven results, but they represented an important move away from the past. As we saw in Chapter 2, in 1921, the newly created League of Nations enacted the International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children, superseding the 1910 International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic. Japan acceded to both treaties in 1925. The League’s anti-­trafficking covenant raised the legal age of consent for women from 20 to 21 “completed years of age” (Article 5) but committed the contracting parties to honor the key provisions of the 1910 white slave traffic accord, notably Articles 1 and 2. Article 1 stated that: “Whoever, in order to

Comfort women and state prostitution   79 gratify the passions of another person, has procured, enticed, or led away, even with her consent, a woman or girl under age, for immoral purposes, shall be punished.” Article 2 read:  Whoever, in order to gratify the passions of another person, has, by fraud, or by means of violence, threats, abuse of authority, or any other method of compulsion, procured, enticed, or led away a woman … over age, for immoral purposes, shall also be punished.15 Japan’s licensing regime was in flagrant violation of the 1921 treaty. When the government ratified the accord in 1925, it demanded and was granted an exception allowing women over 18 to be indentured for prostitution. In so doing, it also handed brothel operators and concessionaires the legal authority to solicit these young women—minors under international law—for sexual exploitation (in 1927, wary of international criticism, Japan lifted its reservation, raising the legal age to 21 in line with the 1921 anti-­trafficking convention). More importantly, the licensing system in effect segregated and interned prostituted women until they could repay their debts. Under the 1921 treaty, the Japanese government was required to outlaw this method of compulsion regardless of the women’s ages. In the Japanese main islands, abolitionists worked to raise public awareness of the global movement to end legalized prostitution. Christian social activist Kagawa Toyohiko alerted League of Nations officials to the inequities of licensed prostitution in Japan, and in the 1920s and 1930s, popular support for prohibition grew apace. Bills to repeal state prostitution were submitted repeatedly in the Imperial Diet and provincial legislatures. By the end of 1937, at least 21 prefectural assemblies (nearly 45 percent of the total) had passed resolutions urging the abolition of state-­licensed prostitution.16 A good number of those prefectures actually went on to outlaw that institution.17 The government, for its part, went so far as to repatriate Japanese prostitutes from Western colonies in Asia, but in its own colonies, overseas possessions, and spheres of influence, it openly ignored the League’s abolitionist program by actually expanding Japanese-­style licensing controls.18 As some other colonial powers had done, Japan argued that the international conventions did not apply to its colonies and mandates, removing Koreans, Taiwanese, and other Asian and Pacific peoples from the purview of their protection. A League survey of the early 1930s (see below) reported more than 50,000 registered prostitutes in the Japanese main islands, but pointed out that another 2,000 Japanese nationals—ethnic Japanese, Koreans, and Taiwanese—had been prostituted in areas outside the Japanese Empire, including northern China and Shanghai.19 In these regions, the survey noted, “the recruitment of prostitutes took place in the same way as in Japan itself. It was the usual system of recruitment … for licensed brothels.” Since the majority of these recruits had to travel abroad, the “engagements of Japanese girls … undoubtedly involved an element of traffic.”20 The study continued:

80   Onozawa Akane The system of licensed brothels brings in its train a well-­organized system of recruitment of women as inmates. The keeper of a Japanese brothel in China must get in touch with persons in other places of China or in places within the Japanese Empire in order to keep his establishment supplied with inmates.… According to Japanese laws and regulations, special employment agencies for the engaging of prostitutes were permitted, and this referred to engagement of prostitutes for brothels abroad as well as for brothels within the Japanese Empire.21 Domestically, brothel owners, procurers, and other agents constituted a potent political force whose clout was not easily ignored. As a result, Japan never implemented an effective policy to prevent trafficking. On the world stage, it paid lip service to the ideal of abolition, belatedly ratifying the anti-­trafficking covenant in 1925 but made no substantial effort to reform the system of state licensing and trafficking.22 During the 1920s, the League initiated a series of fact-­finding surveys in each region of the world to track the transport of women across national boundaries. But when investigators attempted to canvass Japan’s East Asian colonies and other dependencies, where many prostituted Japanese and other Imperial subjects had been traded, the Japanese government used every means at its disposal to thwart that effort. It shrugged off other nations’ criticisms of the licensing system, arguing that it would be difficult for Westerners to accurately assess the situation in Asia, whose geography, languages, religions, and customs were profoundly different. Japan did its utmost to dissuade the League from undertaking the Asian survey. Undeterred, in 1931, the League dispatched the Commission of Enquiry into Traffic in Women and Children in the East to study conditions in Asia, including areas where Japan controlled the trade in women. The commission interviewed Japanese officials in the Office of the Governor-­General of Korea, the Acting Governor of the Kwantung Leased Territory, and the Home Ministry. The interviews focused on two primary questions: (1) was prostitution based on debt servitude really entered into by “independent women” acting of their own “free will,” and (2) was it permissible [under the anti-­ trafficking treaty of 1921] to publicly certify procurers and other intermediaries involved in the sex industry.23 Bureaucrats in the office of the Kwantung Leased Territory, for instance, replied vaguely that cash-­advance contracts were different from employment contracts and that the women could quit before the advance was fully repaid, hence no coercion was involved. The women were able to use the cash loan as they liked, spending it all on themselves if they wished, the officials explained. It was the woman’s decision, they said, whether or not to entrust the money to their parents and work to repay it. Neither fraud nor compulsion was involved, hence no trafficking. The women were independent and exercised free will, the bureaucrats insisted implausibly. The certification of proprietors and procurers was also a false problem: licensing allowed the authorities to weed out the bad

Comfort women and state prostitution   81 elements. The police verified applications, conducted identity checks, and made certain that only the most qualified were approved.24 Unconvinced by these answers, League investigators pressed the Home Ministry with tough counterarguments, to which the ministry was unable to even respond. For example, they gave the example of a young woman who, believing it her filial duty to help her parents, signed a cash-­advance contract and became a licensed prostitute. Would the ministry say she was acting of her own free will, the investigators wanted to know. How does the ministry define “free will,” they asked. The officials could not answer. The investigators probed further: Since women are being placed in a questionable occupation in order to settle their parents’ debts, we find it odd that disputes don’t arise over the validity of such contracts with respect to the maintenance of public order and morality. The ministry said only, “we cannot answer that without looking at our records.”25 Finally, the League team cross-­examined the bureaucrats relentlessly on the question of licensing procurers and auxiliaries. Listening to the bureaucrats’ side of the story, they said, it sounded as if licenses are only granted to people of reputable character. But do reputable people trade in young women, they asked? The officials merely repeated, “We give licenses to those who are suitable.”26 Clearly, the Home Ministry had no creditable answers. When the commission filed its initial report in 1932, Tokyo protested mightily. Eventually it succeeded in having three of four offending criticisms watered down or deleted from the final report, which was issued on December 10, 1932. The commission’s first draft singled out four aspects of Japan’s licensing system as problematic. (1) brothel keepers, of course, but procurers and other contractors also are publicly certified to trade in registered prostitutes, geisha, and barmaids; (2) in principle, the cash advance collected by the women’s parents is said to be unrelated to their earnings as prostitutes, but in reality, that loan deprives them of the freedom to leave their employer voluntarily, compelling them to continue working against their will; (3) police officers often intervene to prevent prostitutes from terminating their contracts; and (4) geisha houses habitually adopt girls as apprentices and then urge them to prostitute themselves. Of these objections, only the first remained unchanged in the commission’s final report. Points 2, 3, and 4 were either modified or eliminated altogether.27 In any event, the League of Nations had spoken, and in 1935, the Japanese government felt obliged to actually draft a policy proposal for phasing out the state administration of prostitution. The policy paper called for eliminating, in principle, the licensing system and drawing-­room rental business. Yet it left the most notorious features of the system intact by refusing to ban loan advances and the certification of concessionary sex contractors.28 The proposal was never adopted. Through a combination of diplomatic feint and verbal sophistry, the

82   Onozawa Akane government managed to protect licensed prostitution at a time when world opinion was committed to stamping out the trafficking of women and children. By then, however, the Imperial military had committed itself to the invasion of China, and the Asia-­Pacific War lay just around the corner. Abolition would have to await the conclusion of World War II.

Coercion disguised as “free will” Even if it were true, as the revisionists assert, that the comfort women were licensed prostitutes, that would still be nothing to brag about. The prewar licensing system was built on coercive practices and the development of a sophisticated trafficking network that the League of Nations condemned as a violation of human rights. Many of the concessionaires hired by the Japanese military to round up women for its wartime sex venues abroad were the same people who had been formally authorized by the state to buy, sell, and sexually exploit young women in Japan. Moreover, the infrastructure these agents built extended to Japan’s colonial acquisitions and beyond. In that sense, licensing was one of the deeply embedded elements that facilitated the large-­scale recruitment of comfort women in Japan proper, Korea, and Taiwan after 1937. The women legally prostituted in Japan and trafficked so effortlessly into military comfort stations in Asia and the Pacific are a case in point. To grasp what made this unprecedented mobilization of women possible, we must look critically at two closely related factors. One is a prewar society with its culture of male sexual prerogative that allowed licensed prostitution to flourish unobstructed. The other is a state that systematically ignored or actively subverted opportunities to terminate this antiquated institution in order to perpetuate the status quo. Even so, it is still jarring to discover just how seamlessly the arguments of today’s comfort women deniers (e.g., the 2007 Washington Post ad) meld with those of the government apologists who frustrated the League of Nations’ policy on trafficking in Asia some 80 years ago. The common thread uniting them is the claim that all comfort women—both those prostituted under state license and those commandeered by some combination of enticement, fraud, intimidation, or brute force—willingly choose that fate for personal gain. Such thinking was firmly rejected more than 80 years ago—well before the advent of the Asia-­Pacific War—by an important segment of domestic and international opinion. When the current prime minister of Japan and revisionist political and intellectual leaders openly espouse the same discredited patriarchal ideology of the prewar era, they reveal an ignorance not only of history but also of fundamental human rights that is profoundly unsettling. The denialists admit that the military comfort system itself existed. But they are determined to conceal the coercive apparatus that animated this institution, exculpate the wartime state and the Imperial armed forces, and absolve the present government of any legal or moral responsibility for the depredations its predecessors committed. It is our task as researchers to serve the cause of truth

Comfort women and state prostitution   83 and justice by exposing the historical untruths and misrepresentations that inform those arguments. We will continue to probe and illuminate the interconnections between the state-­managed prostitution of women in prewar Japan and the Imperial military’s wartime system of sexual slavery.

Notes   1 Committee for Historical Facts (2007). THE FACTS. Washington Post, June 14. This “public comment” was released toward the end of Prime Minister Abe Shinzō’s first term (2006–07) and was signed or assented to by more than 60 prominent revisionists. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party contributed 29 “assentors,” but 13 belonged to the centrist Democratic Party of Japan. The advertisement was written and endorsed by the Committee for Historical Facts, which was responding to a full-­page ad in the Washington Post of April 26, 2007 paid for by the Washington Coalition for Comfort Women Issues and entitled “The Truth about Comfort Women.” The ad had been timed to coincide with Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Washington, D.C. on April 26 and 27. The Washington Coalition accused the Abe Cabinet of “retreating from previous statements of contrition and launching a campaign to deny that the government was directly involved” in the mobilization of comfort women. The larger backdrop to the dueling ads, however, was an imminent U.S. House of Representatives resolution calling on Japan to admit full responsibility for military sexual slavery and make just restitution to survivors (the resolution was passed in July—see Chapter 5). Some five years later, the Committee for Historical Facts placed a nearly identical advertisement in the New Jersey Star-­Ledger on November 4, 2012 almost two months before the second Abe administration took office. The ad abridged the list of “facts” from five to three, retaining the accusation that the comfort women were licensed prostitutes (Fact 3). This time, Abe himself and nine of his soon-­to-be Cabinet members signed on as “assentors.” The ad was entitled “Yes, We Remember the Facts.” It was intended to rebut a large poster erected in October in New York City’s Times Square under the headline, “Do You Remember?” that called on Japan to apologize for the comfort women system (the same text had appeared as an ad in the New York Times in May).   2 In occupied Korea, the legal age for women was 17, one year younger there than in Japan’s home islands. Regulations regarding the rights of prostituted women were also stricter than in Japan proper. These differences are the subject of ongoing research. See Fujinaga, T. (2004). Shokuminchi Chōsen ni okeru kōshō seido no kakuritsu katei (The establishment of licensed prostitution in colonial Korea). 20 seiki kenkyū. No. 5, pp. 13–36; Song, Y. (2010). Seiki tenkanki no gunjisenryō to “baishun” kanri (Japanese occupation at the turn of the century and the control of prostitution). In: Y. Song and Y. Kim, eds., Guntai to seibōryoku: Chōsen Hantō no 20 seiki (The military and sexual violence: the Korean Peninsula in the 20th century). Tōkyō: Gendaishiryō Shuppan, pp.  127–82; Song, Y. (2015). Shokuminchiki Chōsen no kōshō seido (Colonial Korea and licensed prostitution). In: Violence against Women in War Research Action Center (VAWW RAC) with R. Nishino and A. Onozawa, eds., Nihonjin “ianfu”: aikokushin to jinshin baibai to (Japanese “comfort women”: patriotism and human trafficking). Tōkyō: Gendai Shokan, pp.  52–69; and Kim, P. (2014). Shokuminchi Chōsen ni okeru yūkaku no ishoku to tenkai (The transfer and development of the licensed quarters in colonial Korea). Shirīzu yūkaku shakai. Vol. 2, pp. 261–91.   3 Shōgi were licensed prostitutes permitted to charge a fee in exchange for sexual intercourse with a client. Geigi, or geisha, were entertainers trained through long apprenticeships to sing, dance, and play the samisen. They were allowed to charge a venue

84   Onozawa Akane fee for their cultural skills, but most also furnished sex to paying clients on the side. Shakufu were prostitutes working in Japanese-­style eating and drinking establishments. They were not legally permitted to sell their bodies, but the authorities tacitly approved their prostitution. See Chūō Shokugyō Shōkai Jimukyoku [Secretariat, Central Employment Placement Service] (1926). Gei/shōgi/shakufu shōkaigyō ni kansuru chōsa (Survey of employment placement agencies for geisha, licensed prostitutes, and barmaids). Reprinted in Tanigawa, K. (1971). Kindai minshū no kiroku 3: shōfu (A record of the Japanese people in the modern era (3): prostitutes). Tōkyō: Shinjinbutsu Ōraisha, pp. 373–438.   4 Kawashima, T. (1951). Jinshin baibai no hōritsu kankei (1): Geishōgi no marugakae keiyaku no kōryoku ni tsuite (Laws related to human trafficking (1): the binding power of comprehensive contracts for licensed prostitutes and geisha). Hōgaku Kyōkai zasshi. Nos. 68–67, February, pp. 1–44.   5 See Maki, H. (1971). Jinshin baibai (Human trafficking). Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, pp. 222–23, and generally, Onozawa, A. (2010). Kindai Nihon shakai to kōshō seido: minshushi to kokusai kankeishi no shiten kara (Modern Japanese society and the system of licensed prostitution: from the viewpoint of a people’s history and the history of international relations). Tōkyō: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan.   6 Regarding the situation in England, see Walkowitz, J. R. (1982). Prostitution and Victorian Society: Women, Class, and the State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.  13–31. For France, see Corbin, A. (1978). Les Filles de noce. Paris: Éditions Aubier-­Montaigne (in Japanese: Koruban, A. (1991). Shōfu [Prostitutes]. Tōkyō: Fujiwara Shoten, pp. 67, 106–18). Reading these accounts, one has the strong impression that English and French prostitutes were indeed more independent than Japan’s shōgi, geigi, and shakufu.   7 Arakawa, S. (2001). Guntai to chiiki (The military and regional society). Tōkyō: Aoki Shoten, p.  120, and Matsushita, T. (2013). Guntai o yūchi seiyo: Rikugun to toshi keisei (Let’s invite in the military: the Japanese army and urban formation). Tōkyō: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, pp.  210–27. In Manchuria and the colonies, in particular, brothels and the military were closely associated from the start, but further research is needed. See, for instance, Song Y. and Kim, Y., eds. (2010). Guntai to seibōryoku: Chōsen Hantō no 20 seiki (The military and sexual violence: the Korean Peninsula in the 20th century). Tōkyō: Gendaishiryō Shuppan, pp. 28–91.   8 Josei no tame no Ajia Heiwa Kokumin Kikin (The Asian Women’s Fund), ed. (1997). Seifu chōsa “jūgun ianfu” kankei shiryō shūsei (Compendium of materials relating to the wartime comfort women issue: Government of Japan survey) Vol.  1. Tōkyō: Ryūkei Shosha, pp. 3–112; Nagai, K. (2015). Nihongun no ianjo seisaku ni tsuite (The Japanese military’s comfort station policy). In: VAWW RAC with R. Nishino and A. Onozawa, eds., Nihonjin “ianfu”: aikokushin to jinshin baibai to (Japanese “comfort women”: patriotism and human trafficking). Tōkyō: Gendai Shokan, pp. 86–108; and Onozawa, A. (2014). Geigi, shōgi, shakufu kara mita senji taisei: Nihonjin “ianfu” mondai to wa nani ka (Japan’s wartime regime as seen by geisha, licensed prostitutes, and barmaids: the controversy over Japanese “comfort women”). In: Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai [The Historical Science Society of Japan] and Nihonshi Kenkyūkai [Japanese Society for Historical Studies], eds., “Ianfu” mondai o/kara kangaeru (Thinking about the “comfort women” issue and its implications). Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, pp. 96–97.   9 Onozawa, A. (2014), pp. 89–129. 10 See Nagasawa, K. (1983). Kankō ianjo (The Hankou comfort stations), Tōkyō: Tosho Shuppan, pp.  51–70, and Yamada, S. (1978). Bukan Heitan: Shina hakengun ian kakaricho no shuki (The Wuhan Commissariat: a memoir by a subsection chief of the [Imperial Japanese] China Expeditionary Army in charge of comfort stations). Tōkyō: Tosho Shuppansha, pp. 70–85.

Comfort women and state prostitution   85 11 Representative works include Senda, K. (1985). Jūgun ianfu Keiko: Chūgoku, Gatō, Biruma—shisen o samayotta onna no shōgen (Keiko the military comfort woman: China, Guadalcanal, Burma—the testimonial of a woman who has been to hell and back). Tōkyō: Kōbunsha; Senda, K. (1978). Jūgun ianfu (Military comfort women). Tōkyō: San’ichi Shobō; and Shirota, S. (1971). Maria no sanka (Maria’s song of praise). Tōkyō: Nihon Kirisutokyōdan Shuppankyoku. It bears repeating here that while a sizeable number of Japanese comfort women were indeed licensed by the state, many others had nothing to do with prostitution, institutionalized or otherwise. 12 Hirota, K. (1975). Shōgen kiroku—jūgun ianfu kangofu: senjō ni ikita onna no dōkoku (An oral history—military comfort women and nurses: lamentations of the women who lived at the front). Shinjinbutsu Ōraisha, p. 11, and Hirota, K. (2015). Nihonjin “ianfu” no sengo: Kikumaru-­san no ba’ai. In: VAWW RAC with R. Nishino and A. Onozawa, eds., Nihonjin “ianfu”: aikokushin to jinshin baibai to (Japanese “comfort women”: patriotism and human trafficking). Tōkyō: Gendai Shokan, pp.  194–205. See also Fight for Justice. Were “Comfort Women” “Licensed Prostitutes?” [online] Available at: http://fightforjustice.info/?page_id=2452&hilite=%22 Yamauchi%22% 2C%22Keiko%22 [accessed May 15, 2017]. 13 A few Japanese comfort women even attended gatherings of their former military units’ social clubs after the war. Refer also to Nishino, R. (2012). Nihongun “ianfu” mondai o saikōsei suru: Nihonjin “ianfu” to jendā (Reconstructing the military “comfort women” issue: gender and the Japanese “comfort women”). Dōjidaishi kenkyū. Vol. 5, p. 72, and Senda (1978), pp. 201–10. 14 Senda, K. (1985), pp. 146–58, 261–77, and (1978), pp. 133–66. See also Nishino, R. (2003). Senjō no “ianfu”: Ramo zenmetsusen o ikinobita Pak Yŏng-sim no kiseki (“Comfort woman” on the frontline: the journey of Pak Yŏng-sim, a survivor of the destruction of Ramo). Tōkyō: Akashi Shoten, pp. 102–15, 136–56. 15 League of Nations (1932). Report to the Council. Commission of Enquiry into Traffic in Women and Children in the East, CTFE/Orient 39(1). Geneva: League of Nations, pp. 522–29. 16 Kokumin Junketsu Dōmei [National Purity League] (1936). Haishō ketsugi ichiran (List of prefectures adopting resolutions for the abolition of state prostitution). September, and Kakuseikai [Purity Society] (1938). Haishō ketsugi ichiran (List of resolutions for the abolition of state prostitution, excerpt). September. These documents are reproduced in Suzuki, Y., ed. (1998). Nihon josei undō shiryō shūshū (Compendium of documents relating to the Japanese women’s movement). Vol.  9 (Human rights and the abolition of prostitution, Part 2). Tōkyō: Fuji Shuppan, pp.  388–98, 398–401. 17 By the end of the Asia-­Pacific War in 1945, 15 prefectures (Gunma, Saitama, Akita, Nagasaki, Aomori, Toyama, Mie, Miyazaki, Ibaraki, Kagawa, Ehime, Tokushima, Tottori, Ishikawa, and Wakayama) had prohibited the licensing system. The abolition movement organ Kakusei (Purity), published in Tokyo by the Kakuseikai (Purity Society) from 1911 to 1945, traces this development. In 1995, Fuji Shuppan reprinted the entire series in 33 volumes. 18 Onozawa, A. (2010), pp. 143–48. 19 League of Nations (1934). Summary of the Report to the Council. Commission of Enquiry into Traffic in Women and Children in the East, Geneva: League of Nations (CTFE 606). February 20, pp. 12, 17. 20 League of Nations (1934), p. 10. 21 League of Nations (1934), pp. 24–25. 22 Onozawa (2010), pp. 153–79. Looking at the European campaign to prohibit trafficking in women we find many problems. For example, the movement was partially motivated by the desire to protect the virtue of “girls from good families.” The post-­ World War I colonial powers set out to abolish licensed prostitution in their colonies largely for the sake of appearances. Conversely, Japan outlawed neither advance cash

86   Onozawa Akane payments, nor the licensing of prostituted women and concessionaires, nor compulsory medical exams. As we have seen, it maintained all of these onerous practices, both in the home islands and in its colonies and overseas mandates. Just as European countries were proceeding to ban legalized prostitution (whatever their reasons for doing so), Japan distinguished itself by heading in the opposition direction, rapidly expanding the domestic licensing system to its Korean colony following the 1910 annexation of that country. 23 See the discussion in Onozawa (2010), pp. 200–01, 213. 24 Naimushō [Home Ministry], ed. (1931). Fujin Jidō Baibai Jitchi Chōsa Kaigi gijiroku: Tōyō ni okeru Fujin Jidō Baibai Jitchi Chōsa In—Rokugatsu 12, 13, 16. Tōkyō Naimudaijin Kantei ni okeru Chōsakaigi gijiroku yōyaku (Summary of minutes of the Committee on Matters concerning the Commission of Enquiry into Traffic in Women and Children in the East: by members of the Committee at the Home Office in Tokyo, June 12, 13, 16). Vol. 3. Tōkyō: Naimushō, p. 63 [Available at: Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan]. 25 Naimushō (1931), pp. 93–94. 26 Naimushō (1931), p. 63. 27 See Naimushō (1932a). Tōyō e no Fujin oyobi Jidō Baibai Kakuchō Jitchi Chōsa: Nihon ni kansuru hōkoku (Enquiry into the spread of traffic in women and children in the East: report on Japan). July 31. Tōkyō: Naimushō, pp. 15, 21–22, 37, 47–48, and Naimushō (1932b). Koksai Renmei Fujin Jidō Baibai Chōsa Iinkai no Nihon ni kansuru hōkokusho ni taisuru Teikoku Seifu ikensho (The Imperial Government’s position paper on the Japan report by the League of Nations Commission of Enquiry into Traffic in Women and Children in the East). August, pp. 1–2, 4–6, 18–20. These documents are included in Kokusai Renmei fujin jidō mondai ikken: Tōyō ni okeru Fujin Baibai Jitchi Chōsa no ken (Honpō kankei chōsa hōkokusho narabini Teikoku ikensho) [A matter pertaining to the question of the League of Nations enquiry into trafficking in women and children: the Enquiry into Traffic in Women and Children in the East (Enquiry report on Japan together with the Imperial Government’s position paper)] Available at: Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. See also Kokusai Renmei Jimukyoku Tōkyō Shikyoku [Tokyo Office, Japan Section of the League of Nations], ed. (1933). Kokusai Renmei Tōyō Fujin Jidō Chōsa Iinkai hōkokusho gaiyō (Outline of the report by the League of Nations Commission on Women and Children in the East). March 15, pp. 1–27. This document is included in the collection by Fuji Shuppan, ed. (2013). Baibaishun mondai shiryō shūsei: senzenki (Compendium of documents relating to the problem of prostitution and trafficking: prewar period), Vol. 21, pp. 192–98. 28 Naimushō Keihokyoku [Police Affairs Bureau, Home Ministry] (1935). Kōshō seido taisaku (Countermeasures on licensed prostitution). September. Reprinted in Suzuki, Y., ed. (1998). Nihon josei undō shiryō shūshū (Compendium of documents relating to the Japanese women’s movement). Vol. 9 (Human rights/abolition of prostitution, Part 2). Tōkyō: Fuji Shuppan, pp. 303–08.

Insight on the issues Guilty verdicts for the traffickers of comfort women—the Shizuoka and Nagasaki incidents Maeda Akira The Shizuoka incident On June 6, 1935, Japan’s Great Court of Cassation (Daishin’in), the equivalent of today’s Supreme Court, rejected the appeal of a group of business associates-­ cum-procurers convicted by lower courts of kidnapping a minor and enticing her overseas under false pretenses. The defendants lured the underage woman from Shizuoka Prefecture to “Manchuria” (the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo in northeastern China) with the intention of making her work as a “waitress” in a “café”1 serving Japanese soldiers. The court upheld earlier verdicts of guilty for “the kidnapping and attempted kidnapping of a minor for transportation abroad.”2 The episode is known in legal circles as the Shizuoka incident. The case began in the Numazu Branch of the Shizuoka District Court and moved on appeal to the Tokyo Appellate Court. The Appellate Court made three determinations of fact, of which the first two are summarized below.3 [First determination] In February 1933, while touring “Manchuria” in search of business opportunities, defendant A’s younger brother B learned that the Imperial Japanese army was stationed there. Foreseeing substantial profits in the café business if soldiers could be attracted as customers, B shared this information with defendants C and D, and [together] they decided to set up a café. In March of that year, B asked D to hire several “waitresses,” and D and A hastily began looking for suitable women. He also asked others, including defendants E and F, to try and procure other “waitresses.” E and F conspired together, approaching G, a restaurant owner in Nakazato Village, Tagata County, Shizuoka Prefecture, where H’s second daughter I (then 19), was working as an apprenticed barmaid (shakufu). Although aware that she was a minor, they dangled various enticements in front of her, saying that if she went to Manchuria, not only could she clear her debts immediately, but if she worked for one year, she would return to Japan a wealthy person. She could even afford [an airplane ticket] to fly home, they said. After persuading I, E and F also deceived her older sister J, as well, convincing her that E planned to redeem I’s debts and marry

88   Maeda Akira her. On or about March 26, E bought I’s freedom [from the bar where she worked] and delivered her to A [via F]. E colluded with F to kidnap her and transport her to Manchuria, outside the Empire. [Second determination] In his home in Numazu City, defendant A took custody of I from F. A was aware that F and E had lured I with false promises, convincing her to go to Manchuria, and then kidnapped her. He also knew that they had lied to J and others in order to persuade them that E had settled I’s debts [in order to marry her]. Finally, A knew that I was a minor and that her father and legal guardian had not given formal permission to travel to Manchuria [as required by law]. Nonetheless, on March 28, A handed I over to D, and together with several other [young women] also recruited as “waitresses,” I was transported by force to Manchuria, outside the Empire.

The Great Court’s judgment In view of the Appellate Court’s findings, the Great Court of Cassation rendered a final judgment on the defendants’ appeal on June 6, 1935. The summary read: The crime of kidnapping with the intent to transport a minor abroad is committed when the [abductor] entices the minor and transfers [that person] to [the abductor’s] control with the intent of transporting said minor abroad, even though the legal guardian is not [deliberately] deceived.4 The main text of the decision is as follows: All final appeals in the present case are hereby dismissed. Reasons: The crime of enticing a minor with the intent to transport [that person] abroad is committed when the minor and [that person’s] legal guardian are [fraudulently] enticed and that minor is transferred to [the perpetrator’s] control with the intent of transporting said minor abroad. Hence, as the original judgment determined, because the enticement of a minor who is then transferred to the [perpetrator’s] custody in order to transport the abductee abroad, or to even attempt to do so, has been shown to violate Parts 1 and 2 of the Penal Code, Article 226. Moreover, because it is not necessary to prove acts of fraudulent deception concerning the legal guardian, the Court finds no reason to reverse the [original] judgment vis-­à-vis the arguments advanced by the appellants.5 The Great Court’s decision confirmed that two crimes had taken place: the abduction of a minor, and abduction with the intent to transport said minor abroad. It is a well-­known fact that many of the women coerced into becoming military “comfort

Insight: Shizuoka and Nagasaki incidents   89 women” were underage. In the case of minors, the test of the crime of abduction is met regardless of whether the victim has “consented” or not. The final judgment in the Shizuoka case is one of the earliest to confirm the criminality of abduction for the purpose of human trafficking. The Great Court’s finding predates a similar verdict in the Nagasaki incident by two years and is thought to be the first of its kind. The Nagasaki decision of March 5, 1937 was issued by the Great Court’s Fourth Criminal Division, which ruled that “deceiving women and sending them to comfort stations amounts to abduction for the purpose of transporting abroad.” The Nagasaki case involved women who in 1932 had been promised lucrative work as waitresses at cafés in Shanghai, recently occupied by the Imperial army. Procurers recruited the women under false pretenses and trafficked them to China to work as comfort women.6

Who is legally liable for abducting and trafficking the comfort women? In the Shizuoka and Nagasaki incidents, the Great Court found that defendants employing enticement and falsehoods to allure women and lead them away were guilty of the crime of abduction. The relevant part of the 1907 Penal Code is Article 226, which reads as follows. Article 226. Whosoever shall have, for the purpose of transporting him or her out of the Empire, allured [enticed] or kidnapped a person shall be punished with limited penal servitude for a period of not less than two years. The same penalty shall be inflicted upon whosoever shall have, with intent to carry him or her out of the Empire, sold a person or transported to a foreign country a person who has been sold or kidnapped.7 The Penal Code was enacted in 1907. Since 1995, Article 226 has been revised and subdivided into Articles 226, 226–2 and 226–3, but the same actions are defined as abduction and are punishable as criminal offenses. Since the law is still on the books, the abduction of comfort women for wartime sexual servitude was at the time, and remains today, a grievous offense. In Article 226, the terms “kidnapped” and “carried away by force” (ryakushu) mean taken off by coercion or intimidation; the term “allured” [enticed] (yūkai) denotes the use of deceit, coaxing, or cajolery. The article criminalizes the use of either of these methods to apprehend and carry away anyone against their will. According to the standard legal commentary on the Penal Code: “Deception” (gimō) or enticement leading to abduction may be defined as inducing the [intended victim] into acting in error by a[n intentional] misrepresentation of reality. Current legal thinking holds that while “enticement” is not as flagrant as “deception,” it [nonetheless] entails manipulating the [intended victim] through trickery or cajolery into committing an error of judgment.8

90   Maeda Akira Under Japanese law, it makes no difference, then, whether the intended victim is removed by physical force or enticed into submitting to another’s will through flattery or cajolery. Both constitute “forcible recruitment” (kyōsei renkō). The Japanese government was well aware that in the Shizuoka and Nagasaki decisions, the Great Court of Cassations had unequivocally determined the abduction and transportation of women “out of the Empire” to be a criminal act. Yet it turned a blind eye to those findings when women in Taiwan and Korea— then colonies and therefore a part of the Empire—were kidnapped and trafficked to military sex venues overseas not long afterwards. In fact, the Imperial armed forces and the Ministry of Home Affairs deliberately and methodically laid the groundwork for the comfort women system, allowing that mechanism of sexual oppression to be introduced throughout Asia and the Pacific region, where it ensnared, on a scale unprecedented in modern history, many tens of thousands of women. This was indisputably a crime against humanity and should be judged as such.

Notes 1 The so-­called cafés (kafé) were unregulated sex venues where young women were trafficked and prostituted by brothel owners or other sex entrepreneurs via the mechanism of debt slavery. The expansion of cafés paralleled the declining fortunes of state-­ supervised prostitution from the late 1920s through the early 1930s. See Onozawa, A. (2010). Kindai Nihon shakai to kōshō seido: minshushi to kokusai kankeishi no shiten kara (Modern Japanese society and the licensed prostitution system: from the viewpoint of a people’s history and the history of international relations). Tōkyō: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, pp. 82–83. 2 Daishin’in (1935). Kokugai yūkai isō dō misui kokugai yūkai hikoku jiken (The kidnapping and attempted kidnapping of a minor for transportation abroad). Second Criminal Section, Case 491. Daishin’in keiji hanreishū (Great Court of Cassation Criminal Cases). Volume 14. Tōkyō: Hōsōkai, pp.  625–31. See the discussion in Maeda, A. (2012). “Ianfu” yūkai hanzai no shōmei: Shizuoka jiken hanketsu (Proof of the crime of abducting “comfort women”: the Shizuoka verdict). Tōitsu hyōron. No.  564, pp. 58–64. 3 Daishin’in (1935), pp. 625–31, and Maeda (2012), pp. 59–60. 4 Daishin’in (1935), pp. 625–31, and Maeda (2012), p. 61. 5 Daishin’in (1935), pp. 625–31, and Maeda (2012), p. 61. 6 Daishin’in (1937). Daishin’in keiji hanreishū (Great Court of Cassation Criminal Cases). Volume 16, Part 1. Tōkyō: Hōsōkai, pp. 254–62. See discussion in Maeda, A. (1998). Sensō hanzai to jinken (War crimes and human rights). Tōkyō: Aoki Shoten, pp.  71–77, and Maeda, A. (2000). Sensō hanzai ron (On war crimes). Tōkyō: Aoki Shoten, pp. 265–81. 7 Penal Code (Act No. 45 of 1907). The English translation is based on De Becker, J. E. (1907). The Criminal Code of Japan. Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, p. 82. 8 Ōtsuka, H. et al., eds. (2001). Daikonmentāru keihō (Annotated compendium of Japanese criminal law). Vol. 8. Seirin Shōin, p. 603.

Part II

Why the Asian Women’s Fund was not a solution

4 The failure of the Asian Women’s Fund The Japanese government’s legal responsibility and the colonial legacy Kim Puja Introduction The late 1980s and early 1990s, nearly half a century after the Asia-­Pacific War (1931–45), dramatic changes took place in Asia as the Cold War confrontation between East and West came to an abrupt end and non-­violent democratization movements triumphed first in the Philippines and then in Taiwan and South Korea. This transformation of the East Asian political landscape coincided in Japan with shocking revelations about the Imperial military’s system of wartime comfort stations. Revelations by South Korean survivor Kim Hak-­sun (1924–97)

Figure 4.1 In 1991, Kim Hak-sun became the first Korean survivor to recount her wartime experiences using her real name. She is protesting the Japanese government’s 1995 plan to create a private fund to deal with the comfort women issue rather than provide state compensation. Source: Courtesy of the Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan.

94   Kim Puja and other former comfort women prompted a national reexamination of the country’s pre-­1945 history of colonization and military conquest. As a sign of the times, Japanese society, too, had finally begun, in the words of Nagahara Yōko, to “decolonize” its understanding of history by reexamining the colonial and wartime past from the standpoint of the victims.1 In August 1993, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kōno Yōhei issued a formal statement of culpability which, while limited in scope, acknowledged the role of the Imperial state and its armed forces in creating and administering the comfort women system. Comfort stations were operated in response to the request of the military authorities of the day [who were] involved in the establishment and management of the comfort stations and the transfer [there] of comfort women.… [I]n many cases [the comfort women] were recruited against their own will, through coaxing, coercion, etc., and, at times, administrative/ military personnel directly took part in [their] recruitment. (See Appendix 1) The so-­called Kōno statement also offered the victimized women an apology, which is worth repeating here:  The Government of Japan would like to take this opportunity once again to extend its sincere apologies and remorse to all those, irrespective of place of origin, who suffered immeasurable pain and incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women. Finally, Kōno’s declaration committed Japan to  face squarely the historical facts as described above instead of evading them, and take them to heart as lessons of history. We hereby reiterate our firm determination never to repeat the same mistake by forever engraving such issues in our memories through the study and teaching of history.  (See Appendix 1) On August 15, 1995, the 50th anniversary of the end of the Asia-­Pacific War, Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi issued a broader expression of contrition for past actions. “Japan followed mistaken national policies,” he said, “inflicting, through colonial rule and aggression, great damage and pain on people in many countries, especially in Asia.” He then voiced “feelings of deep remorse” and offered a “heartfelt apology” for those misdeeds (see Appendix 2). The Kōno and Murayama policy pronouncements seemed to signal an earnest desire on the part of Japan’s leaders to take greater responsibility for the nation’s prewar and wartime human-­rights violations in Asia and the Pacific. Today, more than 20 years later, however, we must ask if Japan’s understanding of history has in fact been decolonized. Current trends are not

The failure of the Asian Women’s Fund   95 encouraging: if anything, Japanese society seems to have moved rapidly in the opposite direction. Since the late 1990s, a wave of historical revisionism has engulfed the country. Revisionist politicians and their allies in academia and the media deny that the Imperial military was directly responsible for Japan’s wartime comfort women system. Pressured by a neonationalist alliance of lawmakers, government leaders, and Education Ministry officials, Japanese textbook publishers first revised then deleted comfort women references from middle-­ school history books (see Chapter 6). Since Abe Shinzō’s first administration (2006–07), and particularly his second (late 2012 to the present), the prime minister has threatened repeatedly to emend or even retract the Kōno and Murayama statements. The Japanese government’s official position on the comfort women has revolved around two issues: legal responsibility and moral accountability. The question of legal liability was settled, state officials insist, in 1965 with the signing of the Japan–Republic of Korea Basic Relations Treaty. Specifically, the treaty’s Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property and Claims and on Economic Co-­operation between Japan and the Republic of Korea (hereafter, the claims agreement) is said to have absolved the Japanese state “completely and finally” of all responsibility for individual war-­related demands, notably monetary compensation. The second issue is moral accountability. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan settled this question definitively through the National Asian Peace Fund for Women (popularly known as the Asian Women’s Fund (AWF ), which operated from 1995 to 2007.2 For a long time, the Asian Women’s Fund3 was something of an enigma to many observers. Nonetheless, since its inception in 1995 under Prime Minister Murayama, successive administrations have defended the fund at home and abroad as Japan’s official response to the comfort women problem. Former Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko (Democratic Party of Japan, 2011–12), for example, told the Wall Street Journal in September 2012 that South Korea should view the fund more positively since Japan was acting in good faith. Korean accusations that previous Japanese efforts have fallen short, he complained, “hurt the feelings of conscientious Japanese, and it’s a pity.”4 Leading Japanese dailies also defended the initiative. “Although Japan has settled the question of legal responsibility, it sought to provide financial redress through the Asian Women’s Fund,” the Asahi Shimbun noted in August 2012. “We hope the world will appreciate what postwar Japan, under its peace constitution, has tried to accomplish [since 1945].”5 Both the government and major media outlets were saying, in effect, that Japan’s legal accountability is not open to debate. South Korea, they suggest, should publicly acknowledge the goodwill Japan has displayed in tackling this issue and commend the AWF for its efforts to meet the nation’s moral obligation to surviving comfort women. When all is said and done, however, what exactly was the Asian Women’s Fund? A closer look is required. From the survivors’ point of view, is an apology without formal state compensation sufficient recompense for their wartime

96   Kim Puja suffering? In this chapter, I examine the comfort women controversy and the AWF in the context of the Japan–ROK relationship, paying special attention to Japan’s legal obligations under international law, the role played by liberal Japanese intellectuals in promoting the fund, and the enduring legacy of colonialism.

The Asian Women’s Fund: official compensation or sympathy offering? In August 1993, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kōno exposed the basic historical facts underpinning the comfort women system, conveyed the government’s “apology and remorse,” and pledged to “consider seriously how best we can express this sentiment.” Here, we need to stop a moment to consider an implicit but crucial assumption. Kōno’s expression of regret, however laudable, was made in lieu of official compensation, an issue that the 1965 claims agreement had purportedly settled “completely and finally.” With legal responsibility (i.e., state compensation) a moot question, the Murayama administration inaugurated the Asian Women’s Fund as a humanitarian gesture on July 19, 1995. “Involving the cooperation of the Government and citizens of Japan,” Murayama proclaimed, “the ‘Asian Women’s Fund’ is an expression of atonement on the part of the Japanese people toward [the comfort] women.”6 The AWF was a non-­profit foundation under the dual jurisdiction of the Prime Minister’s Office and the Foreign Ministry, and the state covered its administrative expenses (from 2001, the Foreign Ministry alone exercised supervisory authority). Conceived as an act of contrition by the Japanese people, the fund was a quasi-­public, quasi-­private initiative designed to meet the nation’s moral— but not legal—obligation to victim-­survivors. A former Cabinet minister and upper house speaker, Hara Bunbei, together with former Prime Minister Murayama were named board chairs. Board members included such prominent figures as Wada Haruki and Ōnuma Yasuaki, both Tokyo University professors, and Akamatsu Ryōko, a well-­known women’s rights advocate, labor bureaucrat, and former education minister. The AWF had three primary objectives. It was mandated to give each surviving victim: (1) ¥2 million (US$17,000 in 1999) in “atonement money” (tsugunai kin) raised through private donations from Japanese citizens, (2) a letter of apology from the serving prime minister, and (3) access to medical and welfare support—the so-­called atonement projects—paid for out of the national treasury (¥1.2 to ¥3 million per recipient). According to official records, a total of ¥565 million in contributions was solicited from the Japanese public (the original goal was ¥1 billion), while ¥750 million was distributed to individual survivors by the state in the form of medical and welfare assistance. By the time the distribution of gratuities had been concluded in September 2002, a total of 285 South Korean, Taiwanese, and Filipina survivors had accepted the private payments, and state-­funded medical and social welfare aid had improved the living conditions of 79 Dutch women. Before the AWF closed down at the end of March

The failure of the Asian Women’s Fund   97 2007, the government completed financial disbursements in support of a social welfare program for elderly Indonesian victims unable to work and without family to care for them.7 Although the breakdown of recipients by country was never made public, it was revealed in 2012 that, of the 234 survivors officially recognized by South Korea, only 61, or one in four, had accepted AWF atonement money.8 At least one woman counted as a recipient, however, in fact received nothing (see below), and further scrutiny will be required to arrive at an accurate final figure. There are three major problems with the Asian Women’s Fund. First, the term “atonement money” is ambiguous and misleading. Second, official letters of apology were not sent to all known survivors, and the AWF made no effort to apologize to victims who had been excluded. Finally, there was a lack of transparency in handling the taxpayers’ money that financed atonement projects and other expenses. Insistence on the word “atonement” (tsugunai) created widespread confusion in South Korea. Major Korean media outlets and publishers rendered the Japanese term tsugunai (償い) as bosankŭm (보상금) or bosang (보상) in Korean, which generally means “reparations” or “reparations money.” For example, a leading South Korean daily wrote the following in August 2012: Although the Japanese government, through the Asian Women’s Fund, has attempted to offer compensation (bosang) to former comfort women, the survivors themselves and the Korean Council [for Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan] continue to call on Japan to enact legislation officially admitting its [wartime] involvement and authorizing a formal apology accompanied by reparations (bosang).9 Here, the first use of bosang refers specifically to the AWF ’s atonement disbursements, not to reparations. The word’s second occurrence at the end of the paragraph, however, clearly denotes state compensation. It would be easy to misread this article as suggesting that, although Tokyo proposed official reparations through the AWF, survivor-­activists and a leading support group spurned that offer. As I have pointed out elsewhere, Park Yuha’s For Reconciliation, published in Korean (2005) and Japanese (2006), contains a similar mistranslation.10 But this gloss is nonsensical. If state compensation had been offered to survivors from the outset, there would be no need for a movement demanding official reparations—a monetary indemnity paid to individual claimants by the Japanese state in recognition of and restitution for personal injury suffered at the hands of the wartime agents of that state. The AWF ’s tsugunai payments, however, came exclusively from private-­sector contributions by citizens, public employees, corporations, labor unions, and other civic entities (see Chapter 5). In other words, atonement money was paid instead of compensation, i.e., as a substitute for formally legislated indemnification. As such, the term should have been rendered as the Korean equivalent of irōkin, a gratuity for services rendered, or mimaikin, a

98   Kim Puja sympathy gift or grant—or explained concisely and transliterated directly into the Korean hangul syllabary as tsugunai. Not all South Korean media sources committed this error. Since the late 1990s, dailies such as The Hankyoreh and Dong-­A Ilbo have parsed the term accurately as a “gratuity/sympathy” payment.11 Other newspapers, however, adopted different renditions, and even within the same paper, usage has not always been uniform. The ambiguity of the tsugunai concept has caused unnecessary perplexity elsewhere, as well. Wada Haruki, former managing director of the Asian Women’s Fund, believes that “there is no choice but to translate tsugunai as bosang in Korean.”12 Yet, I argue that the fund’s choice of this misleading term led to a serious misunderstand of Japan’s intentions in South Korea, intensifying distrust of AWF activities there. This was, I believe, one of the factors that frustrated the fund’s efforts to effectively address the comfort women issue. A second problem with the AWF is that the prime minister’s letter of apology was not sent to every known survivor, and the fund ultimately refused to provide any clear expression of regret in its place. This omission violated the spirit and letter of Kōno’s 1993 pledge to extend the government’s “sincere apologies and remorse” to all former comfort women “irrespective of place of origin.” Moreover, Tokyo viewed the fund’s objectives as a set of interlocking conditions. In principle, only individuals who accepted the tsugunai solatium received a letter of apology. The apology, then, was conditional. Women who refused to accept atonement money received no word of remorse.13 Incredibly, violated women from China, North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic), Malaysia, East Timor, Vietnam, Burma, and many other countries and territories were not eligible for the payments. Prime Ministers Hashimoto Ryūtarō (1996–98), Obuchi Keizō (1998–2000), Mori Yoshirō (2000–01), and Koizumi Jun’ichirō (2001–06) all signed one-­page notes of apology. But during those years, the government and the Education Ministry, in particular, were leaning on textbook publishers to restrict or remove comfort women content from middle-­school history and civic texts. Between 1994 and 1997, the seven ministry-­approved public schoolbooks had gradually expanded their coverage of this issue, but by 2006, all references to the comfort women had been scrubbed (Chapter 6). Since the first Abe Cabinet (2006–07), revisionist politicians, academics, and media commentators have attempted to narrow the definition of “coercion” so as to disavow the compulsory nature of mobilization, a core admission of the 1993 Kōno declaration. In this way, the Abe regime has sought to dispute the historical facts acknowledged by both Kōno and Murayama and nullify their attempts to accept responsibility. The decolonization process of the early 1990s, which had seemed to augur a new historical awareness, slowly ground to a halt and then regressed swiftly. What we have witnessed over the past two decades is the relentless recolonization of Japan’s historical consciousness by revisionist forces. A third area of contention is the AWF ’s lack of financial transparency in its use of public money to underwrite medical and social-­welfare projects and

The failure of the Asian Women’s Fund   99 defray administrative costs. In August 2011, Japan’s Foreign Ministry published on its website an estimate of the budget for the fund’s various activities, presented in Table 4.1. According to this data, the national treasury contributed approximately ¥4.8 billion ($40 million) in support of fund endeavors between 1995 and 2007. The AWF took in about ¥600 million ($5 million) in private contributions from the general public, most of which went for gratuity payouts to 285 South Korean, Taiwanese, and Filipina survivors. Including both public and private funding, then, the AWF listed total receipts of roughly ¥5.4 billion ($45 million). Of this total, it disbursed some ¥1.7 billion in both atonement money and social welfare assistance combined to a total of 364 survivors from the three recipient countries plus the Netherlands. In addition to these outlays, the state also financed the construction of welfare facilities for victim-­survivors in Indonesia. If the Foreign Ministry figures are correct, subtracting ¥1.7 billion from ¥5.4 billion leaves approximately ¥3.7 billion, which is thought to have gone for administrative and incidental expenses (office overheads, personnel costs, advertising, travel expenses, etc.). Why adopt such a circuitous method of funding? Had Tokyo reiterated earlier apologies, reaffirmed Japan’s commitment to revising history education, and then taken the ¥4.8 billion ($40 million) it had withdrawn from the national coffers and offered that as official compensation, the comfort women problem would have resolved itself overnight.

Table 4.1 Balance sheet for AWF atonement and related projects (estimated in Japanese yen)1,2 Revenues National treasury contribution Donations from the public Total Disbursements Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines:    tsugunai money (private donations) = ¥2 million × 285 individuals Medical and welfare assistance activities (national treasury) Indonesia: welfare facilities for the elderly (national treasury) The Netherlands: Financial support of the Project Implementation    Committee in the Netherlands (national treasury) Total Difference

¥4,800 million ¥600 million ¥5,400 million ¥570 million ¥512 million ¥367 million ¥245 million ¥1,694 million ¥3,706 million

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2011). Recent Policy of the Government of Japan on the Issue known as “Comfort Women.” August. [online] Accessed at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/ taisen/ianfu.html [Accessed on 30 January 2013]. The ministry revised this page on October 14, 2014. Notes 1 Expenses for medical and welfare assistance activities for South Korean, Taiwanese, and Filipino survivors and the projects in Indonesia and the Netherlands were calculated based on “final actual expenditures.” 2 These figures differ from those presented on the Asian Women’s Fund website.

100   Kim Puja

The AWF, as seen by the South Korean government and the world community In March 1993, ROK President Kim Young-­sam (1993–98) announced that Seoul would not ask Japan to pay compensation to former comfort women. Instead, Kim asked that Tokyo reveal the full truth about wartime sexual servitude and issue a formal apology to surviving victims. In June, the South Korean National Assembly passed the Social Security Law for Comfort Women during the Period of Japanese Colonial Rule, which authorized a one-­time payment to survivors for livelihood support and medical aid. Until June 1995, shortly before the Fund’s inauguration on July 19, Kim had entertained a favorable impression of the AWF concept, but as he learned more about the details, he began to voice doubts. His displeasure deepened in early January 1997 when the fund covertly dispatched members to Seoul to enlist seven Korean survivors as solatia recipients and paid them without consulting the South Korean government. “The Asian Women’s Fund staff do not understand the seriousness of the issue,” Kim exclaimed. “It is extremely regrettable that they have ignored the demands of the Korean government and numerous survivors, seeking instead to impose a one-­time payment.”14 In May 1998, President Kim Dae-­jung’s administration (1998–2003) made substantive disbursements to survivors who had refused sympathy allotments and ordered the AWF to terminate its activities in South Korea. Seoul was keenly aware of the disdain in which survivors and redress organizations held the AWF policy of one-­off private contributions, and in 2002, it called for a new approach that both former comfort women and their supporters could accept. Mindful of these views, South Korea continued to criticize the AWF, and from 2011 until the latter part of 2015, Seoul intensified pressure on Tokyo to admit full legal responsibility and legislate appropriate redress. The response of the world community has been sharp and virtually unanimous. In 1998, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women in Wartime, Gay J. McDougall, submitted a report on systematic rape and sexual servitude during wartime to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights’ Sub-­ Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. The McDougall report was highly critical of the AWF. The fund, it said, “does not … satisfy the responsibility of the Government of Japan to provide official, legal compensation.” Moreover, “the ‘atonement’ money … is not intended to acknowledge legal responsibility on the part of the Japanese Government for crimes that occurred during the Second World War.”15 On July 30, 2007, four months after the AWF ’s dissolution, the U.S. House of Representatives adopted a resolution urging the Japanese government to apologize to former comfort women. The document commended “the hard work and compassion of Japanese officials and private citizens” but noted that the AWF was not a solution and pressed Tokyo to formally acknowledge, apologize, and accept historical responsibility for wartime sexual servitude “in a clear and unequivocal manner.” Resolutions passed on November 8, 2007 by the Dutch

The failure of the Asian Women’s Fund   101 House of Representatives and on November 28 by the Canadian House of Commons contained similar language. It is worthy of note that the Dutch government, whose citizens received benefits from AWF medical and welfare projects, proposed an additional reparations initiative tailored to individual victims. On December 13, the European Parliament issued a statement that went a step further and urged the Japanese government to “take historical and legal responsibility,” make financial restitution to survivors, and recognize the right of individuals to seek damages from the state.16 In Asia, former victims of Japanese aggression followed suit. On October 8, the South Korean National Assembly approved a similar resolution, as did Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan on November 5. The United Nations, other international organizations, and national and local governments around the world have also found the AWF to be ineffective as an instrument of official restitution. Since the December 2015 Japan–ROK comfort women agreement (see below), many international human rights bodies have continued to argue for an unambiguous apology, official compensation, and the creation of a consultative mechanism for survivors of all nationalities.

How do survivors perceive the Asian Women’s Fund? How do the survivors, the critical stakeholders in this controversy, perceive the AWF? While it is not possible, of course, to lump all living victims into a single category, many women in South Korea and Taiwan spurned atonement money because of Japanese ambiguity about state responsibility. If it is true as reported that 61 of South Korea’s 234 survivors (as of 2013) eventually accepted these payments, then the overwhelming majority—nearly 75 percent—rejected the money. The first Korean to step forward publicly under her real name, Kim Hak-­sun, died in 1997, having opposed the AWF to the end. Another survivor, Kang Il-­ch’ul told an Osaka rally in November 2009: Instead of taking proper responsibility itself, the Japanese government is passing the buck to the Japanese public. Something fishy is going on when [the state] has to collect donations from ordinary citizens and distribute them [to survivors] in the name of the Asian Women’s Fund. Some got the money and others didn’t, and that created bad feelings all around. I myself didn’t take anything. What did the Japanese government hope to accomplish by going about things in this way?17 Kang went on to describe the discord that had spread among recipients and non-­ recipients of atonement funds and urged the Japanese government to accept both its moral and legal responsibility to find a lasting solution to the issue. The mistrust sowed by the AWF not only divided survivors but also presented some individuals with a fierce and debilitating moral dilemma. A long-­term Korean resident of Japan, Song Sin-­do is a prominent example, as we see in Chapter 8. On the other hand, the number of survivors who took AWF money was not insignificant. The problem was the way in which the fund distributed its

102   Kim Puja

Figure 4.2  Kang Il-ch’ul addresses an Osaka rally, November 28, 2009. Source: Courtesy of the Japanese Military “Comfort Women” Problem Kansai Network.

payments. On January 11, 1997, disregarding strong opposition from the South Korean government and public opinion, an AWF official visited Seoul. In a closed ceremony at a local hotel, she presented seven handpicked survivors with atonement and welfare payments followed by letters of apology. The fund then used the occasion to denounce advocacy groups, and Korean society in general, for criticizing women who had shown interest in accepting the money. Thereafter, the AWF made it a policy not to publicly disclose the names of recipients. Here, the case of Sim Dal-­yuon is pertinent. Sim was swindled out of a sympathy allotment she had never asked for as a result of irresponsibly lax AWF oversight. In 2002, while attending a survivors’ meeting, she recalled that in 1995 she had allowed a man to photocopy her government-­issued victim’s certificate.18 Suspecting that someone might have taken her atonement payment, she asked the Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan to investigate, and the council contacted the fund. The fund’s secretariat in Tokyo, however, refused to divulge whether or not a payment had been made in Sim’s name on grounds of confidentiality. In December 2002, Japanese and South Korean attorneys approached the AWF on her behalf but were turned away with the same answer. When Sim herself visited Tokyo headquarters, she was told that the fund was not able to verify the payment. Nevertheless, in late March 2007 as the AWF was shutting down, the secretariat faxed Sim’s Japanese attorney a one-­page statement saying that her

The failure of the Asian Women’s Fund   103 allotment had been deposited to the bank account of a certain Kim and provided the account number. The person was a complete stranger. Sim Dal-­yuon, who had never intended to accept a solatium in the first place, had been cheated. If the AWF had carefully vetted each beneficiary, such a mistake could not have happened. Sim’s case raises the possibility that other survivors in South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines, may have been similarly defrauded. Former comfort women were demanding state compensation, not charity from a semiprivate organization whose ties to the government were obscure. Whether or not to accept the AWF relief money deeply divided the women, creating not only rifts within their ranks but also tensions among and inside redress organizations. Consequently, in South Korea, most survivors turned the offer down. Furthermore, given the controversy surrounding the issue, those who accepted the gratuity did not publicize the fact, making the special allocations useless as a form of public exoneration. A formal apology sanctioned by law and accompanied by official compensation would have enabled violated women to restore their self-­esteem and normalize their standing in the community. Instead, the AWF disbursements became a painful personal ordeal for most. Regardless of their choice, they could not avoid offending someone. This dilemma caused much confusion, anguish, sadness, anger, and mutual suspicion and recrimination. From the standpoint of the victims, it was hard to understand how anyone could regard the fund’s efforts as a meaningful act of contrition for their suffering during the war. Chapters 5 and 8 explore this issue in greater detail.

Two liberal views of the AWF—Wada Haruki and Ueno Chizuko Despite sustained criticism from South Korean authorities, the international community, and the survivors themselves, Tokyo continues to insist that, through the AWF, it has discharged Japan’s moral obligations to former comfort women. Major newspapers generally have also defended the fund’s activities. That was not the case in the early 1990s, when the first victims went public with their war experiences. In order to understand how the thinking of some liberal-­leaning Japanese has evolved, I focus here on the role played by two well-­known scholars and opinion leaders, Wada Haruki and Ueno Chizuko, in the period immediately following the AWF ’s dissolution in 2007. Wada Haruki Wada is a Korea scholar and professor emeritus of Tokyo University. Since the 1970s, he has earned a solid reputation in Japan and South Korea as a staunch advocate of the Korean democratization movement. Following the AWF ’s creation in mid-­1995, he served as its executive director and in many ways came to personify the foundation in the public eye. Following the fund’s closure, Wada assessed its role in an essay published in 2008, in which he listed two

104   Kim Puja preconditions for reconciliation between the two countries.19 First, he said, Japan must acknowledge the forcible nature of its colonial rule in Korea (1910–45), apologizing after due reflection for the pain and humiliation this brought the Korean people. Second, with the fulfillment of the first condition, the two countries must find a way to work together to resolve outstanding issues and achieve genuine reconciliation. Concerning the first point, Wada notes that under the Murayama Cabinet (1994–95), the government overcame strong opposition from the powerful Liberal Democratic Party’s rightwing and implemented two bold measures. In June 1995, Japan’s House of Representatives adopted a resolution pledging “to renew the determination for peace on the basis of lessons learned from history” and conveying “a sense of deep remorse [for] many instances of colonial rule and acts of aggression.” In August, to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the end of the Asia-­Pacific War, Prime Minister Murayama issued the formal apology cited earlier. According to Wada, these measures “satisfied the minimum requirement for achieving reconciliation between Japan and South Korea.”20 To meet the second condition, Wada wrote, the AWF was tasked with facilitating “the first concrete steps toward reconciliation.” Achieving this goal, he noted, “would require the cooperation of both Japan and South Korea.” He pointed out, however, that survivors and their support movement were not the fund’s only detractors. In late 1995, as the AWF got underway, centrist and left-­of-center political parties, the Asahi Shimbun, the nationally owned Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK), and the progressive monthly Sekai all took positions critical of AWF activities. With more than a trace of self-­deprecation, Wada reported that Sekai had attacked him personally for repeating the mistakes of leftist Japanese intellectuals in the 1930s, who had promised to rectify the state’s misguided foreign policy but ended up working hand-­in-glove with the war party. Wada went on to say that while the Korean Council, South Korea’s largest redress group, strongly opposed the fund, some Korean “grandmothers” (halmoni) had taken the gratuity. Ultimately, the AWF was “criticized in Japan as being inadequate, and in South Korea as being insincere.”21 Many ordinary Japanese who had applauded the 1995 Murayama statement were perplexed by the adverse public reaction to the fund. Wada argued that deep internal divisions among its Japanese promoters compounded by diplomatic friction between Tokyo and Seoul sparked a revisionist backlash, propelling into prominence rightwing revisionist groups such as the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (formed in 1996). He concluded that to achieve reconciliation, “what is pivotal is whether or not South Koreans are willing to endorse the efforts of the Japanese people [to find a solution].”22 We should remark that when Wada asks South Korean survivors and their government to acknowledge Japanese sincerity, he is privileging the Japanese public. In other words, the victims are being asked to change, not ordinary Japanese or their leaders. An ardent supporter of South Korea’s democratization movement, Wada seems to have abandoned faith in the democratization of his

The failure of the Asian Women’s Fund   105 own country—Japan’s ability to transform itself through reflection, atonement, and the offering of redress to victims of its colonial and militarist past. Whatever his conscious intentions, in effect, he is attempting to assuage that painful inner contradiction by subtly shifting the blame for colonial rule and war from the aggressor to the aggrieved. Ueno Chizuko We now turn to Ueno Chizuko, one of contemporary Japan’s best-­known feminists. The Japanese women’s movement generally was not proactive in dealing with the comfort women issue. Ueno was exceptional for her outspokenness about the outrages of military sexual enslavement and her criticisms of the AWF. Exactly what role did she play? In 1993, Ueno was one of ten eminent Japanese who proposed the creation of a private fund to help provide long-­term livelihood assistance to Korean survivors. Leading Japanese and Korean support organizations opposed that plan, which seemed to sideline the issue of state liability, and the advocates of a privately generated relief fund subsequently abandoned their efforts.23 For that reason, many redress groups initially viewed Ueno with a degree of skepticism. In September 1995, however, she and five other Japanese and zainichi Korean women, including this author, presented a workshop on the comfort women at the United Nation’s Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing. The workshop was organized to critically assess the Asian Women’s Fund created just two months earlier in July. At that time, Ueno was considered a firm opponent of the endeavor. During the workshop, she posed the question, “Can feminism cross national boundaries?” A Korean participant from Hawaii took up the challenge, noting that the Japanese Empire had erased her country’s national boundaries by annexing Korea in 1910. Just because we’re sisters, she said, doesn’t mean we can just step across historical borderlines and all join hands.24 Afterwards, Ueno wrote frequently on the comfort women issue and the wartime collaboration of Japanese feminists with the militarist regime and continued to speak out on sexual slavery. In a 1997 symposium, “Nationalism and the Comfort Women Issue,” hosted by the Center for Research and Documentation on Japan’s War Responsibility in Tokyo, Ueno identified three intellectual challenges posed by the comfort women.25 The first task, she said, is to seek an alternative reading of history. By redefining themselves as victims of sexual violence, survivors allow feminists to reinterpret and reevaluate that history. A second challenge is to analyze the need for individual reparations as a separate issue that goes beyond the traditional settlement of claims between states. The third project is an oral history that respects the evidentiary force of testimonies by former comfort women as multivalent, lived historical experiences. Regarding the second point, Ueno cites the following statement by Yamazaki Hiromi: “Who imagines that the dignity of a rape victim can be restored by telling her, ‘well, we’ve already spoken to your father and brothers about it’? Don’t be ridiculous.” Ueno argues: “even if two countries reach a mutual claims

106   Kim Puja settlement, my personal rights don’t belong to the state, and the state doesn’t represent me as an individual. Those propositions pose very big intellectual challenges.”26 She goes so far as to assert that the struggle of former comfort women for personal redress has the potential to transcend South Korean nationalism. In 2008, ten years later, Ueno published a historical summing up of the Asian Women’s Fund.27 While acknowledging that the fund was to blame for creating the “unfortunate circumstances” that prompted many Korean survivors to reject atonement payments, Ueno makes a 180-degree turn and abandons her “critical perspective” by lauding Wada and other members of the AWF board for their “unrequited efforts in the face of indescribable hardship and anxiety.”28 She goes on to say that, if the AWF had not been set up [in 1995], the establishment of a similar organization later would have been extremely improbable. Looking back at the historical significance of the AWF some 10 years after its inception … [I have to conclude that] the political decision to establish it was correct.29 Given the conservative political climate of the day, she opined, the prospects for a legislative solution were slim. To the fund’s critics, she had this to say: “If you are going to criticize the AWF, you also have to show us what the alternatives were at the time.”30 Here, Ueno refutes the point she had made ten years earlier about an individual’s right to claim compensation without state mediation. Abandoning the possibility of personal restitution as a means of empowering survivors, Ueno’s feminism prevents her from confronting and overcoming her own nationalism. A persisting colonial relationship Two common threads inform the discourses of Wada, Ueno, and former AWF board member Ōnuma Yasuaki. First, they argue that it is up to the Korean side to acknowledge Japan’s “efforts at reconciliation” (Wada), appreciate the “unrequited work” of board members (Ueno), and understand “Japan’s wish to apologize” (Ōnuma).31 Second, they ascribe the refusal of advocacy groups to respond to AFW overtures and their criticisms of the fund to feminist-­inspired “anti­Japanese nationalism” (Ōnuma),32 telling the Korean redress movement, in effect, to either come up with an alternative or be quiet (Ueno). In other words, the victims are to blame for the fund’s failure. Wada, Ueno, and Ōnuma expect South Korean survivors and their political leaders to applaud the “hard work” and “sincerity” of the Japanese government, the AWF, and liberal intellectuals, but they themselves offer little in return. The opinions that should matter most, the views of former comfort women who demand justice and legal redress, are ignored. The AWF regards the survivors (and their government) as passive actors who should instinctively prioritize Japanese needs and assumptions. I suggest that what we have here is not a case of good intentions gone awry, but the playing out of a colonial relationship that should have ended more than 70 years ago.

The failure of the Asian Women’s Fund   107 By the 2000s, the widespread criticisms of the AWF that prevailed in Japan a decade earlier had all but disappeared, to be replaced by a flood of self-­ congratulatory opinions commending the AWF for its perseverance and goodwill in seeking a settlement. On March 6, 2007, just before the fund closed its doors, AWF President Murayama Kiichi set the tone by telling a press conference: “We sincerely wish that this Japanese people’s atonement feeling remains in the hearts of people in Asia and around the world.”33 By amplifying this sentiment, Wada, Ueno, and Ōnuma all influenced the shift in popular perceptions. It is easy to forget that the AWF also stirred up a great deal of mischief. Its representatives said nothing when revisionist lawmakers publicly made sexist comments directed at former comfort women. On the other hand, the fund used every means at its disposal to persuade survivors to accept its sympathy payouts, creating dissention and unhappiness among individuals, between them and their supporters, and inside the advocacy movement at large. The AWF program also afforded Japanese authorities an alibi for dismissing recommendations by the South Korean government and U.N. human rights organizations and for deflecting serious legislative proposals by progressive Japanese lawmakers and civic groups.34 Did the AWF contribute to the “decolonization” of Japan’s understanding of history? Or did it ultimately impede progress toward a genuine settlement of the problem? Wada himself may have answered that question when he concluded frankly in 2012 that the fund had failed to achieve reconciliation with either South Korea or Taiwan.35

Acknowledging Japan’s legal obligations In closing, I return to the question of Japan’s legal responsibility for the comfort women system. Due to space limitations, I will focus on the positions taken by the United Nations, international civic groups, and South Korean authorities (see also Chapters 5, 7, and 8). In 1996, Ridhika Coomaraswamy, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, addressed the issue of Japan’s legal obligations to the comfort women, concluding that: [N]either the [1952] San Francisco Peace Treaty nor the bilateral [Japan– ROK] treaties were concerned with human rights violations in general or military sexual slavery in particular.… It is, therefore, the conclusion of the Special Rapporteur that the treaties do not cover the claims raised by former military sexual slaves and that the Government of Japan remains legally responsible for the consequent violations of international humanitarian law” [emphasis added].36 The 1998 McDougall report to the United Nations suggests that Japan may have consciously concealed its direct involvement in the comfort women system in 1965 when the Japan–ROK claims agreement was signed. It points out that the

108   Kim Puja bilateral accord “is an economic treaty that resolves ‘property’ claims between the countries and does not address human rights issues” and that “the funds provided by Japan under the Agreement were intended only for economic restoration and not individual compensation for the victims of Japan’s atrocities.” The report concludes that “the 1965 treaty … extinguished only economic and property claims between the two nations and not private claims, and Japan must still be held responsible for its actions” [emphasis added].37 Other U.N. human rights mechanisms, such as the Commission on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Committee Against Torture, and the International Labor Organization, have also made frequent recommendations to Japan on this issue.38 Representing global civil society, the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery, which convened in Tokyo in December 2000, brought together several thousand participants from around the world, including 150 NGOs and human rights groups and 64 victim-­ survivors from North and South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, China, Malaysia, East Timor, and the Netherlands. The tribunal found the Japanese state guilty of crimes against humanity and admonished the government to “accept its legal responsibility” for military sexual servitude.39 What was the South Korean response? As discussed earlier, in the 1990s, the Republic of Korea did not insist that Japan compensate individuals for war-­ related wrongs, largely because of the 1965 normalization treaty. In 2002, however, a group of South Koreans mobilized for forced labor and former comfort women launched a successful lawsuit requiring Seoul to declassify secret diplomatic records on the question of individual claims. In August 2005, a joint government-­private sector commission announced that, “Japan has a standing legal obligation that cannot be construed as having been waived by the 1965 Claims Agreement” (see Chapter 7). This remained Seoul’s official position until December 2015. In August 2011, the Constitutional Court of Korea ordered the South Korean government to challenge Tokyo’s interpretation of the claims question and open formal diplomatic negotiations on the comfort women impasse. This injunction prompted President Lee Myung-­bak to demand during a December 2011 summit in Kyoto that Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko use his political authority to settle the problem definitively. Taken aback by the fervor of Lee’s insistence, Noda balked. In February 2013, a former South Korean official reported in the Asahi Shimbun that, in early 2012, both governments had in fact engaged in “sincere dialogue” and were close to reaching agreement on a settlement that would include an apology from the Japanese prime minister and the offer of official monetary reparations.40 This suggests that Tokyo was searching for a face-­saving way around its long-­standing interpretation of the claims entente. Thereafter, under pressure from their American ally, both sides returned to the table, and a ministerial pact was announced in December 2015. That hastily constructed compromise deeply disappointed the expectations of surviving victims, redress advocates, the South Korean public, and U.N. human rights bodies.

The failure of the Asian Women’s Fund   109

Postface The details of the December 28, 2015 Japan–ROK agreement on the comfort women have been discussed in preceding chapters. Here, I will simply restate two points of concern and share some of my personal thoughts. First, Tokyo agreed to make a one-­time contribution of ¥1 billion (US$8.3 million) to Seoul on condition that the South Korean government establish a foundation to help recover “the honor and dignity and [heal] the psychological wounds of all former comfort women.” Second, Japan’s offer required both countries to confirm the problem thereby resolved “finally and irreversibly” and to “refrain from accusing or criticizing each other regarding this issue in the international community, including at the United Nations” (see Appendix 4). Immediately following the announcement, Foreign Minister Kishi Fumio told Japanese reporters that the ¥1 billion was not official state compensation and repeated that the comfort women controversy was now ended. By providing humanitarian assistance instead of direct compensation, Tokyo successfully shifted responsibility for the issue to Seoul, which agreed to withhold future criticism, establish a new foundation, and attempt to remove the bronze statue of a comfort woman from in front of Japan’s embassy in Seoul (and, since late 2016, its consulate in Busan). In my opinion, this diplomatic quick fix is an even worse disaster than the Asian Women’s Fund, for it allows Japan to elude “finally and irreversibly” its legal responsibility for the comfort women system. The Abe administration is interested less in reconciling with South Korea than in enforcing Seoul’s silence on the comfort women question and removing the statues of a teenage girl from the vicinity of its South Korean diplomatic venues—a visible reminder of Japan’s colonial and wartime misdeeds. The recent entente was the handshake that sealed the deal. In the background, of course, loom U.S. geopolitical interests in East Asia, and American pressure is widely acknowledged to have been instrumental in securing the December accord (see Epilogue). The agreement was generally greeted with relief in Japan, but in South Korea, many objected that the survivors themselves had been ignored. Without the victims’ understanding, many felt, a meaningful solution is not possible, and 386 civic groups immediately launched a campaign to nullify and renegotiate the accord. An agreement that attempts to erase the comfort women from historical memory is not what the aging survivors have been fighting to achieve for the past quarter of a century. We cannot allow Japan’s political leadership, with the collusion of its South Korean counterparts, to sweep this egregious human rights abuse under the rug. Nor can we forget that survivors in other Asian and Pacific countries, excluded from the accord, are still denied hope of closure. As we explain in the Epilogue, political developments in South Korea since 2016 have brought popular discontent with the bilateral “settlement” to the boiling point. As a new president takes the helm in Seoul, the fate of the agreement itself is uncertain. Under Japan’s revisionist regime, our only hope of countering the recolonization of historical consciousness in this country lies in

110   Kim Puja renewing our commitment to fulfill Kōno Yōhei’s 1993 pledge to “face squarely the historical facts instead of evading them, and take them to heart as lessons of history.” That means continuing to work for a survivor-­oriented solution that secures justice for all of the victims of military sexual slavery, regardless of nationality.

Notes   1 Nagahara, Y., ed. (2009).“Shokuminchi sekinin” ron: datsu shokuminchi no hikakushi (“Colonial responsibility” discourse: a comparative history of decolonization). Tōkyō: Aoki Shoten, p. 29.   2 See the statement by Foreign Minister Genba Kōichirō. Genba, K. (2011). Shūgiin Gaimuiinkai sokkiroku (Digest of Proceedings: the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives). Proceedings No.  5, 179th Diet, December 7. [online] Available at: www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_kaigiroku.nsf/html/kaigiroku/0005179 2011120 7005.htm [accessed January 10, 2013].   3 The National Asian Peace Fund for Women (Josei no tame no Ajia Heiwa Kokumin Kikin) is generally rendered in English in abbreviated form as the Asian Women’s Fund (AWF ). This is the term employed by the fund’s official home page (the Digital Museum) and by government officials, journalists, and academics of many political persuasions. I prefer the term National Fund, which strictly speaking is more accurate and avoids the paternalistic and self-­congratulatory nuances of Asian Women’s Fund. With this reservation, I follow common usage and employ the familiar English term. There is an extensive literature on the AWF. Contributions range from a defense of the Fund by Ōnuma Yasuaki to the critique offered by Kim Puja and Nakano Toshio. See Ōnuma, Y. (2007). “Ianfu” mondai to wa nan datta no ka: media, NGO, seifu no kōzai (What was the “comfort women” issue? The pros and cons according to the media, NGOs, and the government). Tōkyō: Chūōkōron Shinsha, and Kim, P. and Nakano T., eds. (2008). Rekishi to sekinin: “ianfu” mondai to 1990 nendai (History and responsibility: the “comfort women” issue and the 1990s). Tōkyō: Seikyūsha.   4 Sekiguchi, T. and Nishiyama, G. (2012). Japan PM Warns China on Dispute. Wall Street Journal, September 25. [online] Available at: www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000 8723963 904448131045780 14020227775866 [accessed on April 10, 2017].   5 Higashioka, T. (2012). Nikkan kankei: Nihon no doryoku o shitte hoshii (Japan–ROK relations: I want South Korea to appreciate Japan’s efforts). Asahi Shimbun. August 29, p.  16. In the same edition, an Asahi editorial entitled Kinrin gaikō (Diplomatic relations with nearby countries) advanced a similar argument.   6 Digital Museum: The Comfort Women Issue and the Asian Women’s Fund (2007f ). Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama on the Occasion of the Establishment of the “Asian Women’s Fund” (July 18). Tōkyō: Asian Women’s Fund. [online] Available at: www.awf.or.jp/e6/statement-­08-2.html [accessed on June 3, 2015].   7 Digital Museum: The Comfort Women Issue and the Asian Women’s Fund (2007c). Establishment of the AW Fund, and the basic nature of its projects. Tōkyō: Asian Women’s Fund. [online] Available at: www.awf.or.jp/e2/foundation.html [accessed on June 3, 2015]. See also Murayama, T. (2007). The Statement by President of the Asian Women’s Fund Murayama at the Final Press Conference. The Asian Women’s Fund, March 6. [pdf] Available at: www.awf.or.jp/pdf/0209.pdf [accessed on June 3, 2015].   8 Aoyama, S. (2012b). Kankoku moto ianfu no tsugunaikin jukyū 61 nin (61 former South Korean “comfort women” accept atonement money). Hokkaido Shimbun. September 28, p. 6.

The failure of the Asian Women’s Fund   111   9 Chŏng, K. J. (2012). Kun wianbu munje haegyŏl il e tasi ch’okku rŭl (Once again pursuing a settlement of the comfort women issue). Dong-­A Ilbo. August 13. [online] Available at: http://sports.donga. com/ISSUE/Vote2016/News?m=20120814&gid=48613605 [accessed on April 2, 2017]. 10 In Korean, Park, Y. (2005). Hwahae rŭl Wihaesŏ. Seoul: Puriwaip’ari. In Japanese, Park, Y. (2006). Wakai no tame ni: kyōkasho, ianfu, Yasukuni, Takesima (Towards reconciliation: textbooks, comfort women, Yasukuni Shrine, and the Liancourt Rocks). (Translated by H. Satō). Tōkyō: Heibonsha. See the critique by Kim Puja. Kim, P. (2007). “Ianfu” mondai to datsu shokuminchi shugi (The “comfort women” issue and decolonization). Impaction. Vol.  155, pp.  128–29. Reproduced in Kim P. (2011). Keizoku suru shokuminchi shugi to jendā: “Kokumin” gainen, josei no karada, kioku to sekinin (Continuing colonialism and gender: the concept of “nationality,” the female body, memory, and responsibility). Yokohama: Seori Shobō, pp. 165–68. 11 The Hankyoreh (1996). Il, wianbu wirogŭm suryŏng hoeyu (Japan’s Asian Women’s Fund uses gentle persuasion to win acceptance for comfort women gratuity/sympathy payments). October 12, p.  2, and Kwŏn, S.  H. (1999). Il, Asia yŏsŏng kigŭm Hangugin wianbu e wirogŭm e wirogŭm chigŭp p’ogi (Japan’s Asian Women’s Fund abandons payment of gratuity/sympathy money to Korean comfort women). Dong-­A Ilbo. May 10, p. 21. These publications also have occasionally used the term bosang for sympathy funds, inviting further distraction. 12 Wada, H. (2012). Nikkan kankei kiki no naka no ianfu mondai (The comfort women issue amid the crisis of Japan–ROK relations). Sekai. December, p. 134. 13 The Dutch women appear to have been the sole exception. They received medical and social welfare payments (some ¥3 million each) from the Japanese state but no sympathy money from private donors. The Dutch government forwarded to each woman a personal copy of the letter of apology signed by Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō and sent to Dutch Prime Minister Willem Kok in 1998. Asian Women’s Fund (2003). The “Comfort Women” Issue and the Asian Women’s Fund, pp. 23–24. [pdf] Available at: www.awf.or.jp/pdf/0170.pdf [accessed February 20, 2017]. 14 Chang, I. C. (1997). Wianbu p’ihaeja e taehan ilsigŭm chigŭp e haehan Oenmubu taebyŏnin sŏngmyŏng (It is highly regrettable that the Asian Women’s Fund has failed to recognize the seriousness of the problem, ignoring the demands of the South Korean government and most victims by insisting on a one-­time payment [Note: atonement money]). Han’guk Ilbo, January 12. [online] Available at: www.bigkinds. or.kr/search/totalSearchView. do?news_id=01101101.1997011200000020. 15 McDougall, G. J. (1998). Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic rape, sexual slavery and slavery-­like practices during armed conflict. Report to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Sub-­Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (Economic and Social Council), June 22. Geneva: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, p. 43. 16 The resolutions may be viewed at the Onnatachi no Sensō to Heiwa Shiryōkan (Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace) website. Nihon seifu ni taisuru kokusai shakai no koe (The international community speaks truth to the Japanese government). [online] Available at: www.wam-­peace.org/index.php/ianfu-­mondai/intl [accessed on June 4, 2015]. 17 Ianfu Kansai Network Website (2009). Nihongun “ianfu” higaisha no koe ni kotae, ima koso rippō kaiketsu o! Dōji-shōogen shūkai in Osaka 2009: Kang Il-­ch’ul halmoni “Shinde mo watashi no han o tokitai” to uttaeru (Now’s the time to listen to the voices of “comfort women” survivors and seek a legal solution! A meeting to hear survivors’ testimonies in Osaka 2009: Kang Il-­ch’ul exclaims, “I want to settle my grievances even if I die trying”). [online] Available at: www.ianfu-­kansai-net.org/ shougen_shukai 2009.html [accessed January 7, 2013].

112   Kim Puja 18 Like a majority of Korean women born during the colonial era, Sim had received no formal education and was illiterate. Sometime after the Fund began operating in mid-­ 1995, a survivor acquaintance phoned to tell her that a large sum of money might come her way. The friend dispatched her younger brother, whom Sim had met before, to escort her to Seoul to discuss the matter. When the brother arrived at Sim’s home, however, he insisted that she lend him her victim’s certificate. When Sim refused, the man demanded that she allow him to photocopy the document. Against her better judgment, Sim relented and the man made a copy and left. Yamaguchi, A. (2010). Sim Dal-­yuon-san to “Kokumin Kikin” sakushu (Sim Dal-­yuon and the “Asian Women’s Fund” scam). In: R. Nishino and P. Kim, eds., Shōgen: mirai e no kioku— Ajia “ianfu” shōgenshū II, Nanboku, zainichi Koria hen (Testimonies: memories for the future—a collection of testimonial statements by Asian “comfort women.” North and South Koreans and Koreans living in Japan). Vol.  2. Tōkyō: Akashi Shoten, pp. 76–77. 19 Wada, H. (2008). Ajia Josei Kikin to chishikijin no sekinin (The Asian Women’s Fund and the responsibility of intellectuals). In: Y. Komori et al., eds., Higasi Ajia rekisi ninshiki ronsō no meta hisutorī:”Kan’nichi, rentai 21” no ayumi (A metahistory of the debate on East Asian historical consciousness: tracing the trajectory of “Korea-­Japan solidarity” in the 21st century). Seikyūsha (Korean edition), pp. 133–46. 20 Wada (2008), p. 140. 21 Wada (2008), p. 143. 22 Wada (2008), p. 146. 23 See Suzuki, Y. (2013). “Kokumin Kikin” to hantai undō no rekishiteki keii (The historical trajectory of the National Fund and the opposition movement it engendered). In: R. Nishino, P. Kim, A. Onozawa with the Violence against Women in War Research Action Center, eds., “Ianfu” basshingu o koete: “Kōno danwa” to Nihon no sekinin (Beyond “comfort women” bashing: the “Kōno statement” and Japan’s legal responsibility). Tōkyō: Ōtsuki Shoten, p. 111. 24 Kim, P. (1996). Sekai Josei Kaigi hōkoku “ianfu” mondai o chūshin ni (World Conference on Women report: the “comfort women” issue). In: IDE-­JETRO, ed., Daisan Sekai no hataraku josei (Working women in the Third World). Tōkyō: Akashi Shoten, pp. 258–59. 25 Ueno, C. (1998). Jendāshi to rekishigaku no hōhō (Gender history and historiological method). In: Center for Research and Documentation on Japan’s War Responsibility, ed., Nashonaruizumu to “ianfu” mondai (Nationalism and the “comfort women” issue). Tōkyō: Akashi Shoten, pp. 21–31. 26 Ueno (1998), p. 29. 27 Ueno, C. (2008). Ajia Josei Kikin no rekishiteki sōkatsu (A historical summing up of the Asian Women’s Fund). In: Y. Komori et al., eds., Higashi Ajia rekisi ninshiki ronsō no meta hisutorī:”Kan’nichi, rentai 21” no ayumi (A metahistory of the debate on East Asian historical consciousness: tracing the trajectory of “Korea-­Japan” solidary in the 21st century). Seikyūsha (Korean edition), pp. 147–53. 28 Ueno, C. (2008), p. 148. 29 Ueno, C. (2008), p. 150. 30 Ueno, C. (2008), p. 152. 31 Ōnuma’s 2007 work was translated into Korean as Ōnuma, Y. (2008). Ilbon ŭn sajoe hago sipta: Ilbon’gun “wianbu” munje wa Asia Yŏsŏng Kigŭm (Japan wishes to apologize: the problem of Japan’s military comfort women and the Asian Women’s Fund). (Translated by H. S. Chŏng). Seoul: Kyobo Book. 32 Ōnuma (2007), pp. 62, 210–11. 33 Murayama (2007), p. 3. 34 Concerning “wartime sexual coercion” bills sponsored by Japanese Diet members, see the Introduction, Note 3. For proposals by civic support groups, refer to Chapters 5, 7, and 8.

The failure of the Asian Women’s Fund   113 35 Wada (2012), p. 129. 36 Coomaraswamy, R. (1996). Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences (Report on the Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea and Japan on the Issue of Military Sexual Slavery in Wartime). UN Document E/CN.4/1996/53/Add.1, January 4. Geneva: U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Paragraph 108. 37 McDougall (1998), pp. 41–42. 38 Since 1996, for example, the International Labor Organization’s Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations has adopted annual statements finding the comfort women system to be in violation of Japan’s international legal obligations under the 1930 Forced Labor Convention, ratified by Japan in 1932. In English, see Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace (2013). Appendix No. 3: Compilation of Recommendations by the U.N. Human Rights Bodies on the “Comfort Women” Issue, and Appendix No. 4: ILO. Japan Alternative Report— Issues Concerning: Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery. April, pp. 26–69. [pdf] Available at: http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CAT/Shared%20Documents/JPN/INT_ CAT_ NGO_JPN_12812_E.pdf [accessed May 20, 2015]. 39 Onnatachi no Sensō to Heiwa Shiryōkan (Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace), ed. (2005). Josei Kokusai Senpan Hōtei no subete: “ianfu” higai to kagai sekinin (Everything about the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal: abuses suffered by the “comfort women” and [Japan’s] criminal liability). WAM Catalogue No. 1. Tōkyō: Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace, p. 53. Estimates of the number of participants vary from 5,000 to as many as 10,000. 40 Kim, T. (2013). Lee Myung-­bak gaikō no gonenkan (Five years of Lee Myung-­bak diplomacy). Asahi Shimbun. February 22, p.  19. Kim Tae-­hyo is former ROK Presidential Advisor for Foreign Affairs Strategy. Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace, p. 53. Estimates of the number of participants vary from 5,000 to as many as 10,000.

Insight on the issues The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, Class B and C war criminals, and Japan’s Peace Treaty obligations Hayashi Hirofumi Japan was occupied by the armed forces of the Allied Powers in 1945 after losing its war of aggression in Asia and the Pacific. The country regained its independence in April 1952 with the entry into force of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, signed in San Francisco in September 1951. In Article 11 of the treaty, Japan made the following promise to international society. Japan accepts the judgments of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and of other Allied War Crimes Courts both within and outside Japan, and will carry out the sentences imposed thereby upon Japanese nationals imprisoned in Japan.1 There is some discussion among legal scholars about whether the term “judgments” in Article 11 should be rendered as “trials” (saiban) or “rulings” (hanketsu), but there is no question that the treaty obliges Japan to accept the guilty verdicts handed down by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (1946–48, hereafter, Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal) and the trials for Class B and C war criminals. Here, I consider how this obligation also applies to victims of the Imperial military’s so-­called comfort women system.

The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal did not probe deeply into crimes involving sexual violence against women. Documentary evidence submitted to the tribunal recorded a total of 87 incidents of sexual brutality, 39 in China and 48 in Southeast Asia. Of these, only eight pertained specifically to comfort women under Japanese military control. The Netherlands prosecutor evidenced cases of sexual slavery in four locations: Pontianak in Borneo (now Kalimantan, Indonesia); Moa (Banks) Island in the Torres Straits Islands, Australia; Magelan in central Java; and Portuguese Timor (now East Timor). Of these, the victims from Java were Dutch or of Dutch ancestry; those from the other three areas were local women of various ethnic backgrounds. The French prosecutor submitted evidence for incidents in Lansong Province in northern Vietnam and “several unspecified locations,” while the Nationalist

Insight: war crimes trials   115 Chinese prosecutor presented proof of sexual crimes in Kweilin (Guilin), China.2 There were previously thought to be seven such cases, based on research by the Center for Research and Documentation on Japan’s War Responsibility in Tokyo. A closer examination of the “unspecified locations,” however, reveals an additional instance, bringing the total number of incidents to eight. Due to the diligent efforts of prosecutors, references to rape crop up throughout the Tokyo Tribunal’s final judgment. Concerning the comfort women, the data from Kweilin, China are graphic and show clearly that tribunal justices viewed this case as a war crime. During the period of [the] Japanese occupation of Kweilin, [Imperial forces] committed all kinds of atrocities such as rape and plunder. They recruited women labor [sic] on the pretext of establishing factories. They forced the women thus recruited into prostitution with Japanese troops.3 Taking a closer look at sexual depredations against comfort women, the incidents cited during the Tokyo Tribunal fall into four patterns: (1) where local women engaging in or suspected of having engaged in sexual relations with Japanese nationals were arrested, stripped naked, and forced by the Japanese military to become comfort women; (2) where tribal leaders were intimidated by the Japanese military into rounding up young women; (3) where soldiers in counterinsurgency operations killed the men in a village and forcibly took the young women away to comfort stations; and (4) where women were promised factory jobs but made to work in comfort stations instead. These examples represent the most common methods employed by Imperial forces to procure women for sexual servitude. Although limited in number, such instances nonetheless enable us to conclude that the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal regarded the enforced prostitution of comfort women as a war crime, although this recognition was limited and remained at an elementary level.4

The trials of Class B and C war criminals Each Allied Power conducted its own military trials for Japanese accused of Class B and C war crimes.5 The Dutch convened an ad hoc military tribunal in Batavia (now Jakarta) to try a number of cases involving sexual slavery in the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia). Among these, the best known is the Semarang incident of 1944, in which some 35 Dutch women (aged 17 to 20) held in an internment camp in Semarang, Java were pressed into service as military comfort women. Two indictments were filed against 13 Japanese military and auxiliary personnel, resulting in a death sentence for the major who established the comfort station and prison terms ranging from two to 20 years for six commissioned officers and four private operators who ran the sex facility. The Dutch prosecuted forced military prostitution as a war crime in several other instances, as well. The operator of the Sakura Club, a comfort venue in Batavia, was given a ten-­year prison term. In Jember, East Java, a military police

116   Hayashi Hirofumi captain was sentenced to death (guilty of additional charges, he escaped and was killed trying to evade capture). A tribunal in Pontianak found 13 military personnel, including a navy captain, liable for the illegal arrest, cruel treatment, and murder of comfort women and ordered seven executed. The Balikpapan Tribunal in eastern Borneo, on the other hand, dismissed charges against the private operator of a military comfort station. In sum, a total of 29 Japanese were charged with various war crimes offenses stemming from their involvement in the comfort women system (a different set of data places that number at 34). The U.S. Navy Tribunal in Guam convicted a Japanese civilian expatriate of “illegally procuring Guamanian women for the purpose of prostitution against their will and without their consent.” The death penalty was decreed for this and other crimes but was ultimately commuted to 15 years at hard labor. Military courts convened by the Republic of China prosecuted three cases of forced prostitution and one of abduction. The details are not clear, however, and a final summation requires further research.6 The important point here is that Allied tribunals for Class B and C offenses indicted, tried, convicted, and punished Japanese military personnel, their civilian employees, and private operators for their role in the system of military prostitution.

Japan’s treaty obligations In Article 11 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan pledged to accept these judgments (or “trials,” depending on one’s interpretation). The government, however, has shown no sign of remorse for war crimes. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Ministry of Health and Welfare forwarded the names of more than 1,000 Japanese convicted of Class A, B, and C offenses, including those who were executed or died in prison, to Yasukuni Shrine (literally, Shrine for Establishing Peace in the Empire)—the preeminent symbol of prewar and wartime Japanese militarism and ultra-­nationalism. Shrine authorities, responsible to a private religious corporation, deified these “heroic souls” (eirei) by enshrining them in the Shrine’s precincts. Those enshrined include some of the men who created, managed, and extended the comfort women system to all corners of Asia and the Pacific. The involvement of the state in honoring these and other convicted war criminals is a blatant violation of its Article 11 pledge. There are also problems inhering in the peace treaty itself. The document was signed in 1951 at the height of the Korean War (1950–53) and was shaped by U.S. Cold War imperatives in Asia. The United States needed Japan as a strong ally willing to accept American military bases on its soil and serve as a rear-­area logistics center to support the fighting in Korea. As a result, the treaty’s drafters left questions of Japan’s war responsibility purposely vague. Today, the Japanese government’s persistent denial of the forcible recruitment openly defies the spirit and the letter of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan’s point of departure in building a democratic postwar society. Our political leaders have used the East–West confrontation of the postwar years as a way

Insight: war crimes trials   117 of obscuring the issue of war responsibility, but the Cold War ended nearly 30 years ago. If Japan truly aspires to the ideals embodied in the preamble of the 1947 Constitution, desiring “to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance,” then it must forthrightly acknowledge its responsibility for wartime sexual servitude and offer appropriate redress to victim-­survivors.

Notes 1 “The World and Japan” Database Project. (last updated: 2017). Treaty of Peace with Japan. Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, University of Tokyo. Available at: www.ioc.u-­tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/docs/19510908.T1E.html [accessed February 14, 2016]. 2 Yoshimi, Y., ed. (2011). Tōkyō Saiban seibōryoku kankei shiryō (Documents from the Tokyo War Crimes Trials pertaining to sexual violence), Gendaishiryō Shuppan, pp. 17, 29–33. 3 Kyokutō Kokusai Gunji Saibansho [International Military Tribunal for the Far East], ed. (1968). Kyokutō Kokusai Gunji Saiban sokkiroku (Stenographic record of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East). Vol.  10: Entry No.  49,617. Tōkyō: Yūshōdō Shoten. 4 The Tokyo Tribunal regarded forced prostitution as one kind of war crime among many others, not as a separate category per se. That determination had to await the outcome of the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery held in Tokyo in December 2000, which equated the military comfort women system with sexual slavery and declared it a crime against humanity (Class C). See Hayashi, H. (2013). Review of United Nations’ Policy for War Crimes Trials. Nature-­PeopleSociety: Science and the Humanities. No.  55, July 2013 [pdf]. Available at: http:// library.kanto-­gakuin.ac.jp/e-­Lib/catdbl.do [accessed on March 3, 2017]. 5 The Tokyo Tribunal was empowered by the Allied Powers to try Japanese war criminals for three kinds of offenses: Class A crimes against peace, Class B conventional war crimes or violations of the customs or laws of war, and Class C crimes against humanity. Although American prosecutors considered Class A crimes to be the main focus of the tribunal, other Allied countries regarded Class B crimes as equally important, especially where Japanese occupation had been accompanied by widespread atrocities and human rights abuses. Hayashi (2013), pp. 1–2, 4. 6 A recent analysis of forced prostitution and Class B and C war crimes is Hayashi, H. (2015). Nihongun “ianfu” mondai no kakushin (The essence of the Japanese military “comfort women” issue). Tōkyō: Kadensha.

5 A reconciliation discourse that shuns survivors Nishino Rumiko

Introduction In late December 2012, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won a landslide victory in Japan’s general election, restoring to the premiership Abe Shinzō, who had resigned abruptly in the midst of his first administration (2006–07). Abe’s second ascension to power produced immediate apprehension at home and abroad about his revisionist views on Japan’s modern history and how those ideas would impact Japan’s diplomacy and national defense posture. Of particular concern was Abe’s threat during the election campaign to amend or even withdraw earlier statements by former Chief Cabinet Secretary Kōno Yōhei (1993) and former Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi (1995) admitting culpability for Japan’s colonial and wartime past and the so-­called comfort women system. As in 2007, Abe again issued serial denials that the Imperial army and navy had forcibly mobilized women and prostituted them against their will in military comfort stations during the Asia-­Pacific War (1931–45). The international community instantly voiced dismay at the prospect of government tampering with the Kōnō apology. The speed and intensity of this outcry reflected the acute sense of crisis the new prime minister’s comments had generated abroad. A New York Times editorial of January 2, 2013 took Abe to task for suggesting that, “he might seek to revise Japan’s apologies for its World War II aggression, including one for using Koreans and other women as sex slaves.”1 The opinion piece concluded by characterizing Abe’s “shameful impulses” as “an embarrassment to a country that should be focused on improving its long-­ stagnant economy, not whitewashing the past.” An official in U.S. President Barack Obama’s administration went so far as to suggest that if the Kōno statement were rewritten, Washington might feel compelled to take diplomatic action.2 On January 29, the New York State Senate adopted a resolution commemorating the 2012 establishment of a memorial in New York State “that pays tribute to those who have become known to the world as ‘Comfort Women’.”3 The Netherlands also conveyed its bewilderment to the Japanese prime minister. On January 8, the Dutch Foundation of Japanese Honorary Debts wrote Abe to express “shock” that he seemed to be “ignoring again the historical

A reconciliation discourse   119 facts.” On January 13, Australian Foreign Affairs Minister Bob Carr held a joint press conference with his Japanese counterpart, Kishida Fumio, and stated that the 1993 Kōno statement “was an acknowledgement of an episode that is one of the darkest in modern history and we consider it in no one’s interests that [it] be revisited.”5 In the Republic of Korea, newly elected President Park Geun-­hye devoted part of her memorial address on March 1, 2013 (commemorating the 1919 independence movement) to the comfort women issue, warning that, 4

The historical perspective of aggressor and victim cannot be changed.… It is incumbent upon Japan to have a correct understanding of history and take an attitude of responsibility in order to partner with us in playing a leading role in East Asia.6 In April, Park told Deputy Prime Minister Aso Tarō, who was attending her inauguration, that: “We must work to keep the wounds of the past from festering and to gain a genuine understanding of the pain of the victims.”7 World opinion and surviving victims of Japan’s wartime aggression united in criticizing Abe’s revisionist ideas on history. For this reason no doubt, the Japanese premier told a plenary session of the Diet on January 31, 2013 that the Kōno position should not become a political or diplomatic football and that he was shelving plans to review it for the time being. He noted that the 1993 statement had been prepared and presented by the chief cabinet secretary at the time and promised he would refrain from making further comments. Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide, he said, would deal with the question. On March 16, 2007, Abe’s first administration had issued a formal finding denying that comfort women had been coercively recruited. The Cabinet decision asserted that there was no statement it could identify in government archives that directly proved forcible abduction by military or civilian authorities.8 Now, some six years later, Abe seemed to be saying that the 2007 Cabinet position was a decisive policy statement and that his current project to revise the Kōno statement was a fait accompli. The Abe government’s long-­standing efforts to recalibrate and obscure the comfort women issue have produced widespread uncertainty in Japan about the facts of history. Against that backdrop, this chapter examines an appeal for reconciliation that in recent years has won considerable support in Japan—and recently even in the United States—but has only added to the public’s confusion. It also considers what a just and enduring settlement of the comfort women problem might entail.

The emergence of a reconciliation discourse In the past few years, the term reconciliation has gained wide currency here, and popular magazines, newspapers, and books have attempted to apply that idea to the issue of military sexual slavery. In 2005, Park Yuha, a professor of Japanese

120   Nishino Rumiko literature at Sejong University in Seoul, published Towards Reconciliation.9 Originally released in South Korea in 2005, the book was revised for a Japanese readership and published in Tokyo in 2006. When I asked a Korean acquaintance familiar with the comfort women problem about the book’s reception in South Korea, I was told that the public had shown little interest. In Japan, however, Towards Reconciliation caused a stir. Park’s work purported to take a neutral stance on the comfort women issue but commended the activities of Japan’s National Asian Peace Fund for Women (below, the Asian Women’s Fund) and harshly criticized South Korean redress organizations. This stance drew rebuttals from some Japanese advocacy groups. On the other hand, many so-­called liberals concurred with the author’s approach and praised the book highly. The mass media followed suit. For example, in late 2007, the Asahi Shimbun announced that Park’s book had won the 7th Osaragi Jirō Prize for Commentary. This award honors work “praiseworthy in its exceptional discussion of how to create a better society in the new century, taking into account Japanese politics, economics, society, and culture.” Ueno Chizuko, in her endorsement to the Japanese edition, wrote: “I agree with many of the points Park so meticulously raises” and concluded by quoting the author: “The prospect of reconciliation should appear at the point where sufficient tolerance by the victims intersects with sufficient humility by the perpetrators.”10 Ueno’s enthusiasm is puzzling. Given Park’s apparent lack of interest in surviving comfort women, Ueno’s panegyric suggests that perhaps she, too, has not fully considered the victims’ side of things.11 Park believes that the Japanese government, through its administration of the Asian Women’s Fund, has already done everything in its power to resolve this issue. Surprisingly, she treats the fund’s “atonement” payments (tsugunai kin) to survivors as official compensation. After developing this hypothesis in great detail, she criticizes the influential Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan as overly nationalistic. She dismisses the council, which advocates a legislated apology accompanied by direct state compensation, as a “movement of elite women out to indulge their personal idealism.”12 In her work, Park cites examples of fathers who sold their daughters to Korean traffickers and Korean brothel operators who ran comfort stations for the Japanese military. Other researchers have made similar observations, but she goes well beyond these analyses to make a number of controversial claims. “In assigning responsibility for forcible recruitment, we must also look within [our own society] and admit that Koreans themselves were involved.” “Clearly, Koreans must also shoulder the blame for the rancor this problem has aroused.” “[Those who became] comfort women might well have become prostitutes anyway, even if Japan had not occupied Korea.”13 These one-­sided statements ignore a fundamental reality: colonial subjugation, occupation, and control. Park doesn’t ask how victimized women and their recruiters fit into the colonial power structure, with its hierarchy of Imperial Japanese administrators and military officials, local elites and law enforcers,

A reconciliation discourse   121 Japanese and Korean profiteers, and subaltern Korean subjects. Nor does she consider that these women were responding to directives backed by the implicit threat of reprisal. Emanating from the military high command in Tokyo, recruitment quotas were relayed to local procurers via colonial military authorities and military police. Instead, she reduces this complex colonial order to a simplistic proposition: Koreans were accomplices, even perpetrators. This categorization seems to apply to Korean brothel owners and intermediaries who recruited comfort women, and to the patriarchal society that tolerated such abuses. Bizarrely, Park seems to be saying that it takes two to pick a fight—Japan is wrong, certainly; but South Koreans, too, must accept their share of blame. To Japanese ears, this is a sonorous and particularly useful notion, coming as it does comes from the citizen of a former Japanese colony whose arguments would appear to attenuate Japanese responsibility. It should come as no surprise, then, that many liberally inclined Japanese have wholeheartedly embraced Park’s appeal for reconciliation. As the “plague-­on-both-­houses” argument gained traction, the 2007 Cabinet decision denying the forced mobilization of comfort women in general continued to discredit and stigmatize victim-­survivors in the public mind. For many victims, this amounted to a kind of public shaming, producing feelings of retraumatization. Closing our eyes to this reality and uncritically advocating a problematic vision of reconciliation not only compounds the survivors’ pain but actually impedes progress toward a genuine solution. On closer examination, one finds little space in Park’s reconciliation discourse that would accommodate a survivor’s perspective. To see this, the following example may be useful.14 In 2009, Park, writing in the bimonthly journal Impaction,15 chose a single watercolor sketch from the illustrated autobiograph­ ical essay Lest We Forget by Fred Seiker, a former Dutch prisoner of war who had been forced to work on the Thai-­Burma Railroad during World War II. She poses the question: “Do we see here [comfort women] victims behaving as ‘assailants’?” The drawing she selects is entitled “Nurses in River Incident” (Plate 15). According to Seiker: A P.O.W. would be ordered into the river where Japanese “nurses” were bathing in the nude. He would be forced to wash their back watched by his fellow P.O.W.s. He would be called back to the river bank upon which the “nurses” would make lewd gestures. If the P.O.W. showed even the slightest sign of sexual excitement the guard would hit his penis with a slender pliable bamboo. The extreme pain and mental humiliation for the P.O.W. was complete. It is understood that some P.O.W.s suffered mental anguish from this torture, long after their release.16 Park analyses this account as follows: The author portrays the P.O.W., stripped naked in broad daylight and subject to this painful treatment, as the victim, and the women taunting him

122   Nishino Rumiko and the guard tormenting him as the aggressors.… [T]he so-­called guard checks the [sexual] response of the young prisoner who stands naked in front of the cajoling women and then strikes him [with the bamboo stave]. The women are clearly depicted here as complicit in the guard’s “act of aggression.”17 Park believes that Seiker remembered the naked women as assailants and concludes: “There is no doubt that his memory of them as ‘aggressors’ … overpowers his image of them as ‘comfort women.’ That realization fundamentally subverts any perception of the comfort women as victims.”18 Although it is impossible to determine whether these “nurses” were, in fact, comfort women, Park assumes that they were, and that their collusion in what appears to be a sadistic game overrides an awareness of them as violated women. I find this leap to judgment somewhat perplexing. But even if they were comfort women—in fact, no matter who they were—I am unable to picture the women shown here as simple aggressors, nor does Seiker’s depiction of this scene suggest that he did, either. The soldier, who does indeed look Japanese, seems to be pointing a bamboo stave at the naked P.O.W.’s lower body, but we can also picture him wielding the same instrument to intimidate the disrobed women standing in the river. It is not difficult to imagine that these women were making

Figure 5.1 Plate 15: Nurses in River Incident, watercolor. Sources: Courtesy of Fred Seiker. Seiker, F. (1995). Lest We Forget: Life as a Japanese P.O.W. Worchester (U.K.): Bevere Vivis Gallery Books, Ltd., p. 24.

A reconciliation discourse   123 “lewd gestures” because they had been ordered to. In other words, some level of coercion was most likely involved, a possibility that Park does not envisage. In the roughly limned figures of the soldier and the women, we glimpse not only a violence-­based power relation between master and subaltern but also an implicit colonial tie: the relationship that binds the comfort women to their colonial rulers. And yet Park highlights this drawing because it seems to prove her point that subjugated women could sometimes also behave as aggressors, as if that somehow diminished their victimhood and the implied colonial violence that underpinned it. I can only shake my head in wonder.19 The Asahi Shimbun selected Park for the prestigious Osaragi Jirō Prize in December 2007 because her book, widely acclaimed in Japan, “proposes a path towards reconciliation based on mutual self-­examination and tolerance by two countries that, while close neighbors, have many unresolved political issues between them.” According to the Asahi: “The author directs her sincere and courageous plea to the people of both nations to close the ever-­widening misinformation gap and explore the possibilities of mutual understanding.”20 The newspaper agreed wholeheartedly with Park’s stance on reconciliation, giving it a strong endorsement. It bears repeating that Park received the award some nine months after Prime Minister Abe jolted world opinion by repudiating the 1993 Kōno statement’s admission of coercive recruitment. The March 16, 2007 Cabinet decision to that effect was followed up on June 14 by a full-­page advertisement in the Wash­ ington Post placed by the revisionist camp alleging that the comfort women victims were not sex slaves but in fact prostitutes. The ad was endorsed or “assented to” by more than 60 well-­known lawmakers, academics, journalists, and opinion leaders (see Chapter 3, Note 1). Five weeks later, on July 30, the U.S. House of Representatives adopted a resolution refuting the Abe Cabinet’s position and urging Tokyo to “formally acknowledge, apologize, and accept historical responsibility in a clear and unequivocal manner for its Imperial Armed Forces’ coercion of young women into sexual slavery.”21 On November 8, the House of the Netherlands passed a motion asking Japan to “publicly take full responsibility, without any reserve, for the system of forced prostitution … and for the suffering thus caused to the so-­called comfort women and about which no doubts can and should be raised.”22 Subsequently, the Canadian House of Commons (November 28) and the European Parliament (December 13) also issued statements urging justice for the comfort women. Despite this chorus of protest, the daily Mainichi Shimbun and other left-­ofcenter print media followed the Asahi’s lead in featuring stories about Park and her reconciliation concept. Her “both-­sides-are-­wrong” approach, however, failed utterly to account for the needs and wishes of former comfort women themselves and aggravated the misunderstanding already created by the Abe government’s pronouncements. That said, what is currently being done to resolve the comfort women problem? What obstacles stand in the way of a final solution acceptable to the

124   Nishino Rumiko victims? Indeed, what does the word “just solution” mean, and what would one look like if it could be articulated and achieved?

A discourse to deflect international condemnation In April 2007, just as the U.S. House of Representatives was collecting signatures for its motion to censure Prime Minister Abe’s provocative comfort women policy, an unusual event took place. On April 6, just one week after the dissolution of the Asian Women’s Fund, Park Yuha visited Japan. Accompanied by Wada Haruki, a former AWF director, she took part in a press conference at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan in Tokyo. There, Park and Wada teamed up to defend the fund’s activities and provide a counter opinion to the impending U.S. lower house resolution (formally adopted nearly four months later). Park told the foreign press corps: What concerns me here is how U.S. criticisms and views of Japan [on this issue] have incorporated wholesale the South Korean viewpoint. In point of fact, the critiques heard in the United States and the main points of the House of Representatives’ [draft] resolution sponsored by Congressman Mike Honda merely repeat verbatim the assertions of Korean groups working on the comfort women question.… Japan’s response to the comfort women problem [i.e., the Asian Women’s Fund] is virtually unknown in South Korea.… Although South Korea has condemned the AWF for relying on private donors to raise money, in fact, the Japanese government was deeply involved, and an official letter from the Japanese prime minister was even sent [to participating survivors]. This was a simple gesture, but it had a clear symbolic significance.… Yet the South Korean public remains unaware of these facts.… What I want to stress here is that, first and foremost, a basic misunderstanding has occurred because the truth was not faithfully conveyed to South Koreans. As a result, popular opinion continues to berate Japan, believing that it has refused to apologize or pay compensation.23 Park appears to sincerely believe this contention, and she has repeated it in the Asahi Shimbun’s WEBRONZA, an online blog for commentary on politics and world affairs.24 She delivered the above message to attending journalists with great conviction in what could be seen as a bid to forestall adoption of the pending U.S. Congressional resolution. Park is convinced that the AWF did everything in its power to achieve results. Instead of more effective efforts to apologize and provide financial redress, she says, we should now actively pursue reconciliation. I suspect that the Asahi Shimbun and other media outlets gave Park’s work such broad exposure because they fundamentally agreed with her assessment. So-­called liberal voices in the media had already concluded that the fund had reached its limit and that it was time to move on to the next stage. They seized on reconciliation as a congenial and timely concept—particularly as the primary advocate was someone who was not

A reconciliation discourse   125 only a former colonial subject but, additionally, a woman. In an act of adept self-­ interest, the liberal media promoted this concept in an attempt to shape a new public consensus on the issue. This collusion inevitably leads us back to the question raised by Kim Puja in Chapter 4: what exactly was the Asian Women’s Fund?

A spurious argument Following the launch of the AWF in 1995, the Japanese government took great pains to convince the public that consolation money did not come from the national treasury and thus could not be considered direct compensation. Citizens were told that the disbursements were raised from private sources to express primarily personal rather than state atonement. When the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and other international bodies criticized Japan’s refusal to accept legal responsibility for the comfort women issue, however, Tokyo replied that it was hard at work on the problem via the AWF and its solatia payouts. In other words, the fund became the centerpiece of a national strategy to persuade the world community that Japan had found a viable solution to the accountability question and was busy implementing it. AWF policy, then, was an accurate reflection of Japan’s double standard on compensation. That built-­in ambiguity has encouraged neonationalist politicians and other revisionists to flaunt their chauvinist views of Japan’s modern history. It also explains why so many former comfort women have refused to accept sympathy payments. Experience has taught them to deeply distrust Tokyo’s shifting and equivocal stance on Japan’s war responsibility and to question the motives behind its frequent apologies. To recapitulate, Park insists that the government was intimately involved in the fund’s activities. As evidence, she stresses the significance of the official letter four successive Japanese prime ministers sent to participating survivors. Because the South Korean public was not properly informed of these facts, she asserts, many came to believe wrongly that Japan has refused to apologize or indemnify the victims She seems to feel that the official letter of contrition, which only the recipients of sympathy money were eligible to receive, was apology enough, and that the issue is now closed. As we have seen, Park considers the U.S. House of Representatives’ Resolution 121 to be a mere reiteration of the position taken by South Korean activist groups and that it does not necessarily represent the personal views of survivors. We must point out, however, that Park’s criticism of HR 121 reflects some fundamental misconceptions. One is the issue of state compensation. Park insists that Japan effectively paid reparations through the AWF in the late 1990s, thereby equating gratuity payments with state indemnification. In her WEBRONZA comment of March 3, 2012, she also referred to AWF “atonement projects” (medical and social welfare support) as “compensation projects.”25 At a symposium on March 10, she described the fund as Japan’s first attempt to offer direct restitution for the suffering it had caused the Korean people during the era of colonial occupation.26

126   Nishino Rumiko The Japanese government, however, has consistently and tenaciously advanced exactly the opposite arguments. According to Tokyo, neither the solatia payments nor the financing of atonement projects are state-­sanctioed compensation. This discrepancy in viewpoints stems from different ideas about what compensation means and for whom it is intended. For Park, state administrative and financial involvement in the AWF conferred on fund activities an official seal of approval, whence the confusion of private gratuities and atonement project money with direct government compensation. Here, too, we sense her considerable distance from the reality of survivors’ needs and wishes. What the victims of military sexual abuse seek is not the “involvement” of the Japanese government. They want the state to publicly accept full responsibility for the misdeeds of its wartime predecessor and the Imperial armed forces, the primary culprits in the crime of forced military prostitution. For the victims, compensation ordained by law is the only convincing public proof of legal accountability and moral atonement. Both of these mutually dependent conditions are necessary to fully restore in these women a sense of social and personal wholeness. The individual atonement contributions were subscribed entirely by Japanese citizens acting in a private capacity. The national treasury contributed not a single yen. This was intentional. A special claims agreement attached to the 1965 Japan–Republic of Korea Basic Relations Treaty exempted Japan from all individual property, economic, and related claims for state redress, most notably individual monetary damages. Tokyo has clung rigidly to the position that this exemption applied equally to human rights infringements (see Chapter 7). As of this writing, Japanese authorities remain entrenched in the position that the AWF was not dispensing legally prescribed relief. Ironically, the medical and social welfare portion of the Asian Women’s Fund—the atonement projects—came almost entirely from direct government financing. Indeed, as we saw in Chapter 4, these state-­funded projects far surpassed the sums raised privately for the personal solace of survivors. In 2006, the fund’s vice president, Ishihara Nobuo, said that these particular disbursements were “not reparations but something similar to Japan’s Official Development Assistance—specific support provided for humanitarian purposes. It is not compensation. The government is highly regarded for this kind of assistance.”27 Park accepts the Japanese position as unavoidable in light of the 1965 bilateral claims agreement but considers these disbursements a prime example of state-­ directed compensation, nonetheless.28 The trouble is that the Japanese government very strongly disagrees. Individual atonement doles, as we saw, came exclusively from private-­sector sources and were not authorized by law. The AWF used the term “citizens’ atonement” (kokumin no tsugunai). But who were these “citizens?” Former fund director Ōnuma Yasuaki writes: A majority of the contributions came from fundraising in the workplace. In each ministry and government office, in local government and public

A reconciliation discourse   127 organizations at the prefectural, municipal, and town levels, as well as in regional tax bureaus, police departments, Self-­Defense Force units, and even Japanese embassies abroad, requests for individual contributions arrived in the form of personal letters, fax messages, and telephone calls from AWF board members and advocates.29 Of course, trade unions, civic organizations, and many ordinary Japanese no doubt contributed as well. But if the bulk of the solatia outlays were in fact collected by direct request through a top-­down style of organizational fundraising, then the term “citizens’ atonement fund” is disingenuous, to say the least. Moreover, although the National Police Agency and Self-­Defense Forces reportedly participated in this act of contrition, their time and abilities would have been better employed locating and fully disclosing all surviving documents in their archives related to military sexual enslavement.30 Furthermore, as indicated earlier, not all victimized women received the prime minister’s signed letter of apology. It was not sent to the many who turned the money down. Nor did the missive reach survivors in countries other than South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines.31 To assert that this short, one-­page document is an adequate official expression of remorse that settles the issue of Japan’s responsibility for wartime sexual enslavement once and for all is preposterous. South Korean redress groups have not misread the situation because they were unaware of the prime minister’s letter. They continue to call today for an unambiguous apology, ratified by Diet legislation and accompanied by official compensation, because they know very well that the Asian Women’s Fund was set up as a substitute for more substantive, durable measures. The U.S. House of Representatives called on Tokyo to provide “a clear and unequivocal” apology because so many survivors have criticized past statements of regret as insincere and lacking force of law. The Japanese government employs a dual discourse. On the one hand, it pays lip service to the Kōno statement, highlighting the numerous “official apologies” issued by past administrations. Then abruptly, Prime Minister Abe and his Cabinet declare that “there was no forced rounding up of women,” call testimony to that effect “a complete fabrication,” and threaten to rewrite the 1993 Kōno policy document. And when the U.S. Congress enacts a resolution challenging those contentions, the Abe administration invests a considerable sum of the taxpayers’ money in a lobbying operation to discredit that initiative. This is the inconsistent, ambiguous stance that has vexed former comfort women for nearly a quarter of a century, making it difficult for them to acknowledge in good faith the official apologies emanating from the Prime Minister’s Office. That is the context in which the comfort women controversy has evolved. Simply ascribing mutual misunderstanding to a dearth of accurate information in South Korea will convince no one, certainly not Koreans.

128   Nishino Rumiko

What constitutes an apology? What is just compensation? In July 2007, as national legislative assemblies in the West and Asia and world human rights organizations lost patience with the Abe administration for its campaign of disinformation regarding the comfort women, three civic groups in Japan released a set of recommendations entitled “Proposal for an unequivocal apology to the comfort women” signed by 32 leading women’s and human rights organizations.32 Its main points merit summarizing. 1

2

3 4

The government of Japan must explicitly accept the facts that the during the Asia-­Pacific War, the Japanese government and military made women from its colonies, occupied areas, and other territories into comfort women against their will and … that these acts were illegal according to the human rights norms prevailing at the time. Based on such acceptance, either the Japanese government or the National Diet must issue, through an official legal instrument such as a Cabinet order or a Diet resolution, an apology in which the responsibility of the Japanese state is made clear. The government of Japan must provide a letter of apology to each and every individual survivor regardless of her nationality, place of birth, or current domicile. In order to show that this apology is genuine, the Japanese government must provide compensation to individual victims through separate legislation.

Here, I would like to recall the 1988 U.S. Civil Liberties Act that provided recompense to Japanese-­Americans for their wartime eviction, relocation, and internment during World War II. Soon after the start of the war with Japan, the U.S. government came to fear, despite the lack of concrete evidence, that more than 120,000 people of Japanese ancestry living on the strategically important West Coast constituted a potential security risk. It reacted by forcibly interning them in relocation centers, where most remained from March 1942 until December 1944. Subject to eviction were not only first-­generation citizens of Japan but also their U.S.-born second-­generation children, who were American citizens by law. Indeed, anyone, citizen or alien, with even “one drop of Japanese blood” was arrested and relocated to concentration camps. It was racism, pure and simple. The Civil Liberties Act was passed on August 10, 1988, more than 30 years after the end of the war, and each survivor was paid an indemnity of US$20,000, beginning in 1990. The important point is that the $20,000 was paid to compensate the victims for “significant human suffering.” Redress was intended to atone for the insult of internment, which the U.S. Congress and government admitted was due to “race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership.” The law also included a formal expression of contrition that merits quoting here. The excluded individuals of Japanese ancestry suffered enormous damages, both material and intangible, and there were incalculable losses … all of which resulted in significant human suffering for which appropriate

A reconciliation discourse   129 compensation has not been made. For these fundamental violations of the basic civil liberties and constitutional rights of these individuals of Japanese ancestry, the Congress apologizes on behalf of the Nation.33 For redress to work, the victims must recognize its appropriateness and social efficacy. In the case of Japanese-­Americans, that meant stating clearly in the law that restitution was being made to right a gross injustice. The same is true for women forced into sexual bondage by the Imperial military during the Asia-­Pacific War. Without the cachet of a legally sanctioned public acknowledgment of injustice—a formal apology for “significant human suffering” accompanied by appropriate compensation, both codified in law—it will be difficult for the victims to completely overcome the social stain attaching to their past and recover their self-­ esteem and standing in society. It is vital that just compensation accompany the recognition of culpability. The indemnity is material proof that a grievous wrong has been righted and underwrites the legitimacy of the apology. In the case of the comfort women, however, Japan’s revisionist leaders have consistently sabotaged “official apologies” by their public statements and actions. The duplicitous policy of denialism included Cabinet-­level refutations of forcible procurement and the stigmatization of survivors as “prostitutes,” threats to withdraw or redact the Kōno statement, and the rewriting of school textbooks to eliminate references to comfort women. These words and actions are deeply disturbing and hurtful to victim-­survivors and generate in them a deep-­seated mistrust that will be difficult to overcome, no matter how many times official apologies are repeated.

In closing Foreign policy expert and former diplomat Tōgō Kazuhiko, writing in the Tōkyō Shimbun, noted that “the Kōno statement presents a balanced view of the comfort women issue; nothing could be more dangerous than voiding that statement.” He went on to say that, The comfort women have already become a major international issue.… If we continue down this path, Japan will be seen as an uncivilized nation that does not respect women, and rifts in Japan’s relationship with the United States may open as a result.34 Tōgō also pointed out that penance is not complete until the victims themselves say, “we accept your apology and forgive you.” And Japan will never be able to apologize enough to their descendants. “When the last survivor dies,” he writes, “resolution of this problem will become impossible. We must quickly reach a settlement before it turns into a festering sore that never goes away.” Tōgō is not proposing that we reconcile for the sake of reconciling. The logic of “it takes two to make a quarrel” assumes a false equality between aggressor and victim. As we attempt to sort out the rights and wrongs on both sides, we lose sight of the power relation that enabled and sustained the original injustice

130   Nishino Rumiko of sexual enslavement. The comfort women system was conceived by the Imper­ ial military high command and sanctioned and facilitated by the state; it was extensive, systematic, and marked by a high degree of coercion. Military sexual subjugation was an unforgivable infringement on the dignity and fundamental human rights of the women forced to endure serial rapes from morning to night, day after day. Protesting that, “well, the victims were not entirely innocent” is unconscionable. A reconciliation discourse based on such fallacies precludes the possibility of an unequivocal and lasting settlement. In this chapter, I have criticized the idea of a diplomatic solution that fails to engage the survivors, ensure their understanding, and secure full redress. Another perspective on this problem is that offered by Theo van Boven, Special Rapporteur for the U.N. Sub-­Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (1986–91). In his final report of July 1993, van Boven outlined the general principles and guidelines affecting the rights of redress for victims of serious human rights violations. The report was released one month before Kōno Yōhei announced the conclusions of the Japanese government’s extensive comfort women survey (1991–93).35 In the section on general principles, van Boven writes that: “Every State has a duty to make reparation in case of a breach of the obligation under international law to respect and to ensure respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.” He goes on to say that, “Reparation for human rights violations has the purpose of relieving the suffering of and affording justice to victims by removing or redressing to the extent possible the consequences of the wrongful acts and by preventing and deterring violations.” Van Boven stresses that, “Reparation should respond to the needs and wishes of the victims [emphasis added]. It shall be proportionate to the gravity of the violations and the resulting harm and shall include: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-­repetition.” He concludes that: “Reparation for certain gross violations of human rights that amount to crimes under international law includes a duty to prosecute and punish perpetrators.” The Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Military Sexual Slavery by Japan, held in Tokyo in December 2000, adopted several of van Boven’s recommendations. These were reflected in the tribunal’s slogans, “restoring justice” and “no judgment, no reconciliation.” As a participant, I felt strongly that the survivors’ unwillingness to accept Japan’s previous apologies was a pivotal point in the process of reaching a true settlement. I repeat again: redress for the survivors must address their needs and wishes. Japan’s revisionist political leaders, however, appear clueless: they trample on these needs and wishes every time they proclaim that comfort women were not forced to work in military comfort stations but did so for personal profit. This further compromises Japan’s ability to meet its moral and legal obligations to rectify these wrongs. We must beware of would-­be diplomatic solutions that skirt the core issues. Ignoring the women’s plundered freedom, their violated self-­esteem, and the pressing need to restore their sense of wholeness and standing in the eyes of society will never bring reconciliation.

A reconciliation discourse   131

Figure 5.2 Dutch and Korean survivors celebrate the verdict of the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal (Tokyo), December 12, 2000. From right to left: Jan Ruff-O’Herne (Netherlands), Pak Yŏng-sim (North Korea), Kim Yŏng-suk (North Korea), Kang Il-ch’ul (South Korea), and Pak Ok-ryŏn (South Korea). The tribunal was a rare occasion on which Korean survivors from both North and South Korea could participate together.

Postscript In August 2013, two months after this collection of essays went to press in Japan, Park Yuha brought out a new work in Korean, Comfort Women of the Empire. Even more so than her first book, the second volume is riddled at every turn with inconsistencies, errors of fact, misleading statements, and inappropriate citations. Here, however, I will focus on the following provocative comments, which, I believe, best sum up the author’s thinking.36 Park lumps together violated Koreans, Taiwanese, Japanese, and Okinawans and refers to them collectively as “comfort women of the Empire.” She claims that Korean women, as Imperial subjects, felt a sense of comradeship with Japanese soldiers and willingly offered them mental and physical solace. She goes on to say that Korean victims were trafficked by private procurers, not the Japanese military per se, and that the work they performed in the comfort stations was, broadly speaking, that of prostitutes. Therefore, the Japanese state cannot be held legally accountable for their forcible recruitment and degrading treatment, which was actually the doing of local operatives and brothel keepers under contract to the military. In any event, she says, the Japanese government has already apologized adequately and provided de facto state compensation to surviving victims.

132   Nishino Rumiko When it was first published, Comfort Women of the Empire elicited little comment in South Korea. In June 2014, however, nine survivors living in a group home, the House of Nanum (Sharing), in Seoul, filed three simultaneous lawsuits against Park. The first was an injunction to stop further sales of the book. The second was a civil suit seeking damages for having portrayed the comfort women as prostitutes, impugning their honor. The third was a criminal complaint alleging libel. In November 2014, with the cases in court, Park came out with a Japanese edition published by the Asahi Shimbun Press,37 further alienating the plaintiffs. In February 2015, during the first round of litigation, the Seoul Eastern District Court ordered Park to delete 34 passages considered injurious to survivors. As failure to comply would result in her work being banned from bookstores, Park acquiesced but reprinted the volume with the objectionable passages prominently left blank.38 In the criminal suit, prosecutors indicted Park on November 18, 2015 for libel but without arrest. In January 2016, the court ordered her to pay damages (ten million South Korean won, or US$8,300) to each of the women for the emotional distress her book had caused them. When the Japanese edition of Comfort Women of the Empire appeared in 2014, the book was warmly received by many liberal Japanese academics, political commentators, and journalists. On November 26, 2015, following Park’s indictment for defamation, 57 Japanese and U.S. scholars signed a petition criticizing that decision as a violation of freedom of speech and academic freedom.39 The joint statement proclaimed that, “Above all, we feel that this book does not harm the honor of the former comfort women” (emphasis added). In view of the fierce reaction of the nine plaintiffs, this is a rather astonishing assertion. In response, critics of that statement in Japan and South Korea have pointed out that many of the errors of fact and interpretation in Park’s book are too serious to be defended under the banner of academic freedom, especially when they suggest that violated women were, in fact, not victims but “voluntary prostitutes.” Such characterizations undermine the social position and self-­esteem of survivors. As Maeda Akira points out in a recent article, freedom of speech carries with it an obligation to exercise that right responsibly. “Signatories to the statement are effectively telling the survivors they are not the arbiters of their own experience … and that, instead, it is [the signatories] who must judge.”40 In January 2016, researchers and activists met in Seoul to inaugurate the Research Group on Japanese Military Comfort Women. The group will bring together 380 people from around the world to continue the quest for a just, victim-­centered settlement to this problem. What is important here is the fact that Comfort Women of the Empire has wounded the dignity and self-­respect of these—and no doubt many other— victims. Park Yuha was indicted on charges filed by women who felt diminished and defamed by her writings. Japanese who defend Park’s “right” to inflict on these survivors yet another injury in the name of free speech must seriously confront their own motives and evident lack of historical consciousness.

A reconciliation discourse   133

Notes   1 New York Times (2013). Editorial: Another Attempt to Deny Japan’s History. January 2. [online] Available at: www.nytimes.com/2013/01/03/opinion/another-­attempt-to-­ deny-japans-­history.html [accessed February 13, 2017].   2 Nakayama, S. (2013). Rekishi ninshiki minaoshi: Beiseiken ga kensei (The U.S. administration warns Japan on historical revisionism). Nihon Keizai Shimbun, January 6, p. 2.   3 The New York State Senate resolution memorialized a monument that had been erected in June 2012 at the Veterans Memorial in Eisenhower Park, Westbury, New York to honor victims of the comfort women system. The resolution noted that the monument “symbolizes suffering endured by comfort women and serves as a reminder of the crime against humanity committed through the Comfort Women system.” It also underlined the contemporary relevance of this issue for the “2.4 million people across the globe [who] are victims of human trafficking at any one time … 80 percent of [whom] are being exploited as sexual slaves.” New York State Senate (2013). Senate Resolution 304 (Bill No. J00304), January 29. [online] Available at the Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace (WAM) Website: http://wam­peace.org/ianfu-­mondai/intl/region/us20130129/ [accessed February 15, 2017].   4 The Dutch Foundation of Japanese Honorary Debts is a nongovernmental organization that was established in 1990 to demand that the Japanese government recognize its international legal responsibility under Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention to pay compensation to Dutch victims of human rights abuses during the Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies in World War  II, including “enforced sex slavery.” The citation is from: The Foundation of Japanese Honorary Debts (2013). Petitie No.  218. Learning from the past. January 8. [online] Available at: www.japanse-­ ereschulden.nl/2013/01/petitie-­218/#more-­292 [accessed February 15, 2017].   5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2013). Press Conference: Japan–Australia Foreign Ministerial talks (overview). January 13. [online] Available at: www.mofa.go.jp/region/ asia-­paci/fmv1301/ja_jpc_130113_en.html [accessed February 16, 2017].   6 Park, B. (2013). In memorial address, President Park calls on Japan to correct its interpretation of history. The Hankyoreh, March 2 [in English]. [online] Available at: http:// english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/576257.html [accessed on February 17, 2017].   7 Seok, J. (2013). Due to Yasukuni visits, Pres. Park changes diplomatic schedule with Japan. The Hankyoreh, April 24 [in English]. [online] Available at: http://english.hani. co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/584332.html [accessed on February 17, 2017].   8 See Chapter 1, Note 1.   9 In Japanese, Park, Y. (2006). Wakai no tame ni: kyōkasho, ianfu, Yasukuni, Take­ shima (Towards reconciliation: textbooks, comfort women, Yasukuni Shrine, the Liancourt Rocks). (Translated by H. Satō). Tōkyō: Heibonsha. 10 Ueno, C. (2006). Kaisetsu: aete kachū no kuri o hirō (Commentary: rescuing our chestnuts from the flames). In: Y. Park (2006), pp. 247, 251. 11 See Kim, P. (2007). “Ianfu” mondai to datsu shokuminchi shugi (The “comfort women” issue and the decolonization process). Impaction. Vol. 158, p. 123. 12 Park (2006), p. 78. 13 Park (2006), pp. 86, 88, 64. 14 Nishino, R. (2010). “Aida ni tatsu wakairon” to wa nani ka? (What does “mediating a reconciliation discourse” mean?). Impaction. Vol. 172, pp. 130–45. 15 Park, Y. (2009). “Aida ni tatsu” to wa dō iu koto ka (What does it means to be a “mediator”). Impaction. Vol. 171, pp. 134–151. 16 Seiker, F. (1995). Lest We Forget: Life as a Japanese P.O.W. Worchester (England): Bevere Vivis Gallery Books, Ltd., pp. 24, 39. Seiker’s illustrations are also available online at: www/go2war2.nl/artikel/2883/Fred-­Seiker-Lest-­We-Forget.html?page=10.

134   Nishino Rumiko 17 Park, Y. (2009), p. 135. 18 Park, Y. (2009), pp. 135–36. 19 On her official website, Park attempts to rebut some of the criticisms leveled at her earlier statements in an essay dated June 1, 2013. Asserting that “Korean women … were mobilized out of ‘patriotism’ for Japan,” she confirms that “the presence of Korean comfort women was created by Japan’s colonial occupation [of Korea], and in that regard, Japan is responsible.” However, she goes on to say that, “It is wrong to conclude that the [Imperial] military, as an organization, engaged in … deceit or forcible recruitment.” Concerning sexual slavery, Park observes:  The key players who coerced [the comfort women] into forced labor were [Korean and Japanese] recruiters.… The slavery of these women in the sense that they had no freedom was first of all the result of the relationship with recruiters, called “masters.” The issue of sexual slavery should be considered from the perspective of the nature of that relationship.… These women were also slaves of the [Japanese] state in the sense that they were indirectly mobilized to meet the needs of the state.… They were no different from [Japanese] servicemen in the sense that they had no freedom of movement. See Park, Y. (2013). How We Should Consider the Comfort Women Issue Based on Dis­ cussions between Ikuhiko Hata and Yoshiaki Yoshimi. June 1, pp.  6, 7, 14. [online] Available at: http://parkyuha.org/archives/4368 [accessed on February 19, 2017]. Refer also the Postscript to this chapter. 20 Asahi.com Book (2012). Dainanakai Osaragi Jirō Rondanshō wa “Wakai no tame ni” (The 7th Osaragi Jirō Prize for Commentary is awarded to Towards Reconciliation). December 16. [online] Available at: http://book.asahi.com/news/TKY200712150222. html [accessed February 19, 2017]. 21 U.S. House of Representatives (2007). House Resolution 121. July 30. Reproduced by Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace [WAM] (2013). Appendix No. 2: Resolutions on the “Comfort Women” Issue Adopted by Foreign and Domestic Assemblies. Japan: Alternative Report—Issues Concerning: Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery, April, p.  13. [pdf] Available at: http://tbinternet.ohchr..org/Treaties/CAT/Shared%20 Documents/JPN/INT_CAT_NGO_JPN_12812_E.pdf [accessed June 23, 2015]. 22 House of the Netherlands (2007). Motion by Van Baalen. November 8. Reproduced in WAM (2013). p. 14. [accessed June 25, 2015]. 23 Park, Y. (2007). Statement at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan. Tokyo, April 6. 24 Park, Y. (2012a). Tenkanki no Nihon kara: ima futatabi “ianfu” mondai o kangaeru (8): aratana “hoshō” ni deru beki mittsu no riyū (ge) (Contemporary Japan in transition: reconsidering the “comfort women” [8]—Three reasons Japan should introduce new “compensation” [final comment in a series of three]). webRonza, March 16. [online] Available at: http://webronza.asahi.com/politics/articles/2012031500012.html [accessed June 25, 2015]. 25 Park, Y. (2012b). Tenkanki no Nihon kara: ima futatabi “ianfu” mondai o kangaeru (7) aratana “hoshō” ni derubeki mittsu no riyū (chū) (Contemporary Japan in transition: reconsidering the “comfort women” [7]—Three reasons Japan should introduce new “compensation” [second comment in a series of three]). WEBRONZA, March 3. [online] Available at: http://webronza.asahi. com/politics/articles/2012030200019.html [accessed June 25, 2015]. 26 Park, Y. (2012c). Symposium: “Ianfu” mondai no kaiketsu ni mukete (For a settlement of the “comfort women” issue). Kyōto: Dōshisha Univesity (Imadegawa Campus), March 10. 27 Ishihara, N. (2006). Interview: Ōraru hisutorī Ajia Josei Kikin (An oral history of the Asian Women’s Fund). Digital Museum: The Comfort Women Issue and the Asian Women’s Fund. March 6, p.  15. [pdf] Available at: www.awf.or.jp/pdf/k0003.pdf [accessed June 27, 2015].

A reconciliation discourse   135 28 Park (2013), p. 10. 29 Ōnuma, Y. (2007). “Ianfu” mondai to wa nan datta no ka—meidia, NGO, seifu no kōzai (What was the “comfort women” issue? The pros and cons according to the media, NGOs, and the government). Tōkyō: Chūōkōron Shinsha, p. 40. 30 Since the 1993 Kōno statement, researchers have unearthed some 1,000 additional wartime military and government documents pertaining to the comfort women system. Many of these materials have come from the archives of Japan’s Ministry of Defense. The government has yet to recognize this new body of evidence. See Hayashi, H. (2015). Nihongun “ianfu” mondai no kakushin (The essence of the Japanese military “comfort women” issue). Tōkyō: Kadensha, pp. 83–85. 31 A copy of the prime minister’s letter was forwarded to Dutch survivors via their government, although the women neither requested nor received personal recompense (see Chapter 4, Note 13). 32 The groups are the Violence Against Women in War-­Network Japan (VAWW-­NET), predecessor of the Violence Against Women in War Research Action Center (VAWW RAC); the Center of Research and Documentation on Japan’s War Responsibility; and the Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace (WAM). See Center of Research and Documentation on Japan’s War Responsibility Home Page (2007). What makes [a] Japanese Government apology to “comfort women” unequivocal? July 31. [online] Available at: http://space.geocities.jp/japanwarres/center/english/appeal05. htm [accessed July 30, 2015]. 33 United States Public Law 100–383, 102 STAT. 903, 100th Congress, August 10, 1988 (H.R. 442). 34 Tōgō, K. (2012). Nikokukan mondai de nai jūgun ianfu (The comfort women are not a Japan–ROK issue), Tōkyō Shimbun, September 11, p. 28. 35 The citations that follow are from: van Boven, Th. C. (1993). Study concerning the right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms: final report. Geneva: U.N. Sub-­Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, July 2, 1993, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8. [online] Available at: www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f4400.html [accessed August 3, 2015]. 36 For a discussion of Park’s views in English, see Park (2013). 37 Park, Y. (2014). Teikoku no ianfu: shokuminchi shihai to kioku no tatakai (Comfort women of the Empire: the battle over colonial rule and memory), Tōkyō: Asahi Shimbun Shuppan. 38 Park also made the redacted Korean version available for free on her website (Note 20). 39 A Statement Against the Indictment of Park Yu-­ha. November 26, 2015. See Park Yuha’s official website. Available at: www.ptkks.net/en/ [accessed February 10, 2016]. 40 Maeda, A. (2016). The indictment of Park Yuha for Comfort Women of the Empire and Japan’s enduring colonialist mindset. The Asia-­Pacific Journal: Japan Focus. Vol. 14, No. 2, February, p. 3. [online] Available at: http://apjjf.org/2016/04/Maeda. html [accessed February 27, 2016]. See also Maeda, A. (2016). “Ianfu” mondai/ Nikkan “gōi” o kangaeru (The “comfort women” problem: a critical look at the Japan–Republic of Korea “agreement”). Tōkyō: Sairyūsha.

Insight on the issues The mobilization of Korean adolescents as comfort women—colonialism and the victimization of teenage girls Kim Puja The South Korean women’s movement and the image of “Korean comfort women as teenagers” From 1910 to 1945, the Japanese Empire exercised total colonial control over Korea. After 1932, as Japan’s war of aggression commenced in northeastern China, the Imperial armed forces created the military comfort women system, rounding up Japanese, Chinese, Filipinas, and women of many other nationalities for forced prostitution in military comfort stations. In Japan’s Korean colony, women were also mobilized and dispatched to comfort facilities in or near foreign warzones. Many of the Korean victims were sexually inexperienced girls and young women still in their teens, virtually all of them procured by abduction, deceit and fraud, or trafficking. In December 2011, South Korean civic groups erected the life-­size statue of a teenage girl in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul. This peace memorial personifies the many Korean women who were forced into Japanese military comfort stations at a very young age. In recent years, however, a South Korean researcher, Park Yuha, has questioned the meaning of the peace statue, with its bronze representation of a teenage comfort woman sitting attentively next to a second, empty chair. Park proposes that the association of Korean comfort women with adolescent girls derives from the sense of national victimhood that pervaded South Korean society in the 1990s. She further asserts that Korean teenagers were rarely mobilized as sexual slaves and that they were recruited not by the Imperial army and navy but by professional civilian procurers acting on the military’s behalf.1 Let us note for the record that Park specializes in Japanese literature and is not a historian. In the 1990s, Japanese feminist Ueno Chizuko made a similar observation. The contention that Korean comfort women were young virgins when they were kidnapped through fraud or violence, she said, represents an attempt by the South Korean women’s movement to project a patriarchal image of the “model victim.” Not only does this construct conceal a discriminatory attitude toward prostitutes, Ueno affirms, but it reflects an “ethnic nationalist discourse” that is “anti-­Japanese,” setting up an ethnicity-­based opposition between Korean comfort women and their Japanese counterparts, a good many of whom were, in fact, licensed for prostitution by the Japanese state.2 In Ueno’s view, this image

Insight: Korean teenage comfort women   137 of the model victim (Korean comfort women as virgin girls) codifies an essentialist argument whose implicit assumption is racial purity. Ueno, of course, is a sociologist and not a historian. For her part, Park Yuha also postulates the existence of a “comradely relationship” between Korean comfort women and the Japanese soldiers who prostituted them. It was this assertion, in particular, that led nine South Korean victim-­survivors to sue Park for defamation in June 2014. After careful examination, researchers and activists in Japan and South Korea have found serious flaws in Park’s writing, noting that she tends to misread earlier research in a way that supports her arguments, ignores historical context, and commits numerous errors of fact. These problems have not prevented Ueno Chizuko and many male sym­ pathizers in Japan from dismissing the pain, humiliation, and outrage that Park’s allegations have elicited among surviving victims. Ueno and her supporters defend Park by arguing that she has succeeded in demonstrating “the great diversity” that existed among victims of the comfort women system. Ultimately, this position leads Ueno, Park, and the intellectuals who share their views to downplay or even deny the responsibility of the Imperial military for the system of wartime sexual exploitation. This stance poses a direct challenge to historians and activists in the women’s movement, who have struggled for many years to uncover the facts of forced military prostitution and find a just solution to the issue that survivors and bereaved families can accept. Below, I examine the historical evidence for the claim that many Koreans assembled and sent to comfort stations were young virgins and ask what, if anything, prevents a feminist perspective from acknowledging the existence of diversity among the victims. Where did the experiences of Korean and Japanese comfort women converge and where did they differ? In this short chapter, I attempt to answer these questions from the standpoint of a researcher who specializes in the history of gender relations in colonial Korea.

Survivor testimonies confirm that many Korean comfort women were adolescents Bae Pong-­gi was a grown woman of 29 when she was forcibly taken from Korea to Okinawa and prostituted, whereas other women were recruited out of licensed brothels in Japan. Certainly, we can say that such differences constitute diversity of a sort. Empirical confirmation based on the personal stories of survivors and military and civilian participants and reliable historical documents, however, demonstrates that a disproportionately large number of adolescents was one of the defining features of Korean comfort women as a whole (see the discussion in Chapter 2). Three primary sources of information lead to that conclusion. The first are survivor testimonies. These statements come largely from women living in South Korea and have been compiled in six volumes by Korean scholars and the advocacy movement.3 Table 5.1 shows the ages of 78 former comfort women at the time of their procurement.4 Of these, 73, or 94 percent, were minors when they were forcibly enlisted and shipped to comfort facilities abroad. Seven were 12 and 13 years old.

138   Kim Puja Table 5.1  The ages of 78 Korean comfort women at the time of their recruitment Survivor testimonies

Name

Date of birth

Age at recruitment

Collection No. 1 19 Survivors

Kim Hak-sun* Kim Sun-dŏk Yi Yŏng-suk Ha Sun-nyŏ Oh O-mok Hwang Kǔm-ju* Mun P’il-gi* Yi Yong-su Yi Ok-bun Mun Ok-ju** Yi Sun-ok Yi Sang-ok Yi Tŭk-nam Yi Yong-nyŏ Kim T’ae-sŏn Park Sun-ae Ch’oe Myŏng-sun Yun Tu-ri Kang Tŏk-kyŏng*

1924 1921 1922 (?) 1920 1921 1922 1925 1928 1926 1924 1921 1922 1918 1926 1926 1919 1926 1928 1929

17 17 17 20–21 16 20 18 16 12 16 17 15 22 16 18 23 19 16 16

Collection No. 2 15 Survivors

Ch’oe Il-rye Park Yŏn-i** Kim Pun-sŏn Pae Chok-gan Yeo Pok-sil Jin Kyŏng-p’aeng Kim Ch’un-ja Park Tu-ri* Son P’an-im Chŏn Kǔm-hwa Kim Pok-dong** Kang Mu-ja Ch’oe Chŏng-rye Park Sun-i Kin Ŭn-jin

1916 1921 1922 1922 1922 1923 1923 1924 1924 1924 1926 1928 1928 1930 1932

16 18 15 17 17 15 15 17 17 17 16 14 14 14–15 12–13

Collection No. 3 14 Survivors

Grandmother Hun Kim Sŏl-an** Kim Kun-ja** Kim Ok-ju Kim Ŭn-rye Sim Dal-youn** Cho Sun-dŏk Ch’oe Hwa-sŏn Hwang Sun-i Kim K’ǔt-sun Cho Nam-rye Ha Yŏng-i Sim Hyŏn-sun Kim Yu-gam

1924/25 1926 1926 1923 1926 1927 1921 1930 1922 1914 1921 1922 1924 1930

16 (est.) 18 17 17 17 12–13 19 14–15 13 27–28 (est.) 16 15 18 14–15

Insight: Korean teenage comfort women   139 Survivor testimonies

Name

Date of birth

Age at recruitment

Collection No. 4 9 Survivors

Kim Hwa-sŏn Kim Ch’ang-yŏn Han Ok-sŏn Kim Yŏng-ja Ch’oe Kap-sun Chŏng Yun-hong Yun Sun-man Kim Pok-dong An Pŏp-sun

1926 1925 1919 1923 1919 1920 1929 1915 1925

16 16 19 16 15 22 13 19 17

Collection No. 5 9 Survivors

Sin Kyŏng-ran Sŏk Pok-sun Kim Chŏng-sun Yi Kǔm-sun Yun Yae-ja Yi Hu-nam Ha Pok-hyang Yang Chŏng-sun Yi Yang-gǔn

1921 1921 1922 1927 1931 1925 1926 1925 1922

17 18 19 17 13 17–18 15 16 20

Collection No. 6 12 Survivors

Kong Chǔm-yeop Kim Haw-ja Chŏng Sŏ-un Kang Il-ch’ul** Sŏk Sun-hi Yi Ok-sŏn* Yim Chŏng-ja No Ch’ŏng-ja Chang Chŏm-dol Kim Pong-i Kim Sun-ak Kil Wŏn-ok**

1920 1926 1924 1928 1928 1927 1923 1920 1923 1927 1928 1928

16 17 18 16 14 16 17 19 (est.) 16 16 16 13

Total 78

Under 21 = 73

Source: Kim, P. (2016). Chōsenjin “ianfu” wa, naze shōjo ga ōkatta ka? (Why were so many Korean “comfort women” teenage girls?). In: Y. Okamoto and P. Kim, eds., “Heiwa no shōjozō” wa, naze suwaritsuzukeru no ka? (Why does the “Peace Statue” of a teenage girl continue her seated vigil?). Yokohama: Seori Shobō, pp. 67–69. Notes ** Survivor testimonies were edited in six volumes (Collections No. 1 through No. 6) by the Korea Chongshindae’s Institute in 1993, 1997, 1999, 2001 (Nos.  4 & 5), and 2004, respectively. See Note 3. ** The single and double asterisks beside some women’s names indicate that their testimonies have been translated into Japanese. A single asterisk (*) shows the testimony is included in Nishino, R. and Kim, P., eds. (2006). Shōgen: mirai e no kioku—Nanboku zainichi Koria hen, jō (Testimonies: memories for the future—a collection of testimonies by Asian “comfort women.” North and South Koreans and Koreans living in Japan). Vol. 1. Tōkyō: Akashi Shoten. A double asterisk (**) indicates the testimony is included in Nishino, R. and Kim, P., eds. (2010). Shōgen: mirai e no kioku—Nanboku zainichi Koria hen, ge (Testimonies: memories for the future—a collection of testimonies by Asian “comfort women.” North and South Koreans and Koreans living in Japan). Vol. 2. Tōkyō: Akashi Shoten.

140   Kim Puja Not all Korean survivors live in South Korea. Song Sin-­do, for instance, makes her home in Japan. She was 17 when she was forced to enter a comfort station in China. Many women from northern Korea (now the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea) were also teenagers when they were taken. Ri Gye-­wŏl was 15 years old. Pak Yŏng-sim, Kwak Kŭm-­nyŏ, Chang Su-­wŏl, and Ri Sang­ok were all 17. Ri Chong-­nyŏ, 21, stands out as one of the exceptions.5 Here, a short description of the experiences of two survivors will give us a better picture.6 Pak Yŏng-sim was born in northern Korea in 1921. In 1938, a Japanese policeman in uniform carrying a sword appeared at Pak’s workplace to offer her a factory job that would pay good money. Pak was from a poor family and decided to apply. At the age of 17, she recounted, she and another young woman, 22, from the same village were taken to Pyongyang, where they were put in a vehicle with other women and driven to Nanjing. There she was interned in a comfort station. Pak recalls her life there. I was in a three storey building in Nanjing.… There I was called by the Japanese name “Utamaru.” I had to service up to 30 soldiers every day. [Once] I was really in pain and when I didn’t respond to the demands of one officer, [he] beat me up with his fists, kicked me with his boots, took a long knife and held it up against my throat and … cut me. The blood … soaked my whole body but the bastard went on to satisfy his lust. Other comfort women who caught diseases and became malnourished were carted out or … dumped into the river to drown. I also saw two Japanese army privates stab a pregnant woman in the belly and kill her. I was there three years.7 From Nanjing, Pak was transported to a series of military comfort venues in Lashio (Burma) and finally Ramo and Lameng in China’s Yunnan Province, near the Burmese border. She is heavily pregnant in the iconic 1944 photo of her and three other comfort women in China taken by a U.S. soldier after her capture by Chinese troops (see Figure 2.1). Because she had been forced to continue providing sex to Japanese soldiers while pregnant, the child was born dead. After the war, Pak was not able to bear children.8 The second case is that of Ha Sang-­suk, born in 1928 in southern Korea. She remembers how a Korean man duped her with the prospect of a “factory job.” Soon she was taken by train together with 40 other girls and young women to Pyongyang in northern Korea and then on to Hankou (now Wuhan) in China. Ha remembers the time vividly. When I left home in 1944, I was in my 17th calendar year [as reckoned in East Asia—16 in Western terms]. At that time, my younger sister was 15 … my younger brother 12. I left home in June of the lunar year. In Hankou, she recalls being “presented to the military department responsible for comfort stations.” Her “permission slip” stated that she had to be over 18 to

Insight: Korean teenage comfort women   141 work, so “[m]y age was raised to 18,” Ha says. She was examined by a doctor and given “medicine and injections to prevent pregnancy.” The Japanese doctor told me that I was a virgin all right … [then] he slept with me. The rape station had two storeys.… There were about 20 rooms, all with tatami floors. Usually 10 to 15 soldiers came each day. If the soldiers gave money to me, I gave it to the owners in exchange for condoms and tissue … and the managers kept [a] record of it in an account book.… When I refused to allow a soldier to go twice, I was sometimes beaten. Some soldiers showed up drunk and threatened to kill me. I fought with those who refused to wear a condom.… After servicing a soldier, I went to the bathhouse and washed in medicated water. Every Monday I went to a hospital in [the] village and was checked for sexually transmitted diseases.… The owner hated it if anyone contracted a disease so [the women] covered cotton [pads] with dust and swabbed themselves. This way, even if there was an infection, it was possible to pass the examination.9 In August 1945, when Ha heard that Japan had lost the war, she left the comfort station. Korea had been liberated, but she decided to remain in China, where she married a Chinese national and gave birth to three children. Memoirs by former Imperial soldiers are a second source of historical data. Yamada Seikichi was a military logistics specialist charged with overseeing comfort stations in Hankou, which boasted the largest military sex venues in China. Regarding Korean women, he wrote, “Those coming from the [Korean] peninsula had no prior experience as prostitutes, and most were 18 or 19 years old.”10 Finally, we possess official records compiled by the U.S. Army. In August 1944, U.S. forces in Myitkyina, Burma captured and questioned 20 Korean comfort women. Of that number, 12, or 60 percent, had been minors when they were rounded up in Korea two years earlier.11 Park Yuha makes use of the same material but claims that the women were adults whose average age was 25. Several researchers, including myself, have commented publicly on this discrepancy (Table 5.2). The oral and written documentation presented above shows clearly that many Korean teenagers were indeed marshaled for military sexual servitude through fraud and intimidation, abduction, and human trafficking.

The paradigm of “comfort women as teenagers”: a creation of Japanese civil and military policy Next, we find that the mobilization policies and practices of Imperial Japan in Korea were in themselves sufficient to create a large cohort of underage comfort women.12 Here, four points can be made. First, the recruitment methods employed by Japanese military and colonial authorities in Korea were different from those used in Japan proper. Japan’s

142   Kim Puja Table 5.2 The ages of 20 Korean comfort women interviewed in Myitkyina, Burma (August 1944)

 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Initial (family name)

A = Age when captured (August 1944)

B = Age when recruited (August 1942)

S K P C C K K K K K K P C K Y O K H O N

21 28 26 21 27 25 19 25 21 22 26 27 21 21 31 20 20 21 20 21

19 26 24 19 25 23 17 23 19 20 24 25 19 19 29 18 18 19 18 19

Average age

23.15

21.15

Sources: Psychological Warfare Team Attached to U.S. Army Forces India-Burma Theater (1944). Japanese Prisoner of War Interrogation Report No. 49. ND-97. October 1. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Office of War Information. See Yoshimi Yoshiaki, Chapter 1 this volume, and Yoshimi (2000), p.  84. The document is reproduced in Japanese in Yoshimi, Y., ed. (1992). Jūgun ianfu shiryōshū (Historical documents on military comfort women). Tōkyō: Ōtsuki Shoten, pp. 440–52. This table originally appeared in Japanese in Kim, P. (2015). Chōsenjin “ianfu” ni shōjo wa sukunakatta ka (Were teenage girls really rare among Korean “comfort women”). In: P. Kim and R. Itagaki, eds., Q&A: Chōsenjin “ianfu” to shokuminchi shihai sekinin (Q&A: Korean “comfort women” and the responsibility for colonial rule). Fight for Justice Booklet No. 3. Tōkyō: Ochanomizu Shobō, p. 48. Notes 1 The 20 Korean women were captured on August 10, 1944 after the fall of Myitkyina in northeastern Burma and were interrogated by a U.S. psychological warfare team between August 20 and September 10. They were put into protective custody along with a husband and wife team of Japanese procurers. According to the report, the women had been recruited by Japanese agents in Korea in May 1942. The procurers were looking for women willing to work in Southeast Asia “visiting the wounded in hospitals, rolling bandages, and generally making the soldiers happy.” They were part of a group of about 800 Koreans who had reached Burma in late August 1942. After their arrival, the women were divided up and sent to various parts of the country, “usually to fair sized towns near Japanese Army camps.” 2 Column A gives the age of each woman when she was captured in Burma in August 1944. Column B gives her age upon arriving in Rangoon from Korea two years earlier, in August 1942.

Insight: Korean teenage comfort women   143

Figure 5.3 Twenty Korean comfort women being questioned by U.S. troops in Myitkyina, Burma, after their capture. August 14, 1944. Twelve of the 20 were minors when they were fraudulently recruited in Korea and trafficked to Burma by a Japanese husband-and-wife team. Source: Courtesy U.S. National Archives, photo no. 111-SC-262579.

Ministry of Home Affairs determined that dispatching Japanese women with no links to prostitution to provide sex to soldiers “would have a baleful influence on the home front, especially on the families of soldiers who are stationed overseas.”13 The Ministry therefore limited the recruiting of Japanese to women who were “over 21 years of age, free of venereal disease, and had worked as prostitutes.” As a result, many of those mustered for the comfort stations were pauperized individuals already vetted and registered for prostitution by the government. Locating such recruits in sufficient numbers, however, was no easy task. When it became clear that a regular and abundant supply of women could not be assured in the Japanese main islands, the military, with the close cooperation of the state, targeted impoverished young women in Japan’s Korean colony instead. A second point is that Japan insulated its colonial possessions from the reach of international law, allowing the involuntary enrollment of underage Korean women to proceed unopposed.14 In 1925, Japan had ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children, which prohibited the buying, selling, and transporting of minors under age 21 for purposes of sexual exploitation. The Japanese government, however, convinced the League of Nations to make exemptions for Taiwan, Korea, and other mandated

144   Kim Puja territories, which were placed outside the scope of the covenant. The Imperial military exploited this opening to organize in Korea the large-­scale mobilization of women who were underage, disease-­free, and had no association with prostitution. As described above, the recruitment policy for comfort women differed according to ethnic group. In other words, Japanese government and military authorities discriminated against Japanese comfort women based on their previous status as prostitutes while discriminating against Korean comfort women on the basis of their ethnicity. What both groups have in common is a subalternity grounded in sexual subjugation (the patriarchal family system) and class oppression. Yet a more fundamental difference separated the two groups: Japanese colonialism and the racial injustices that accompanied it. A third factor was the determination of Imperial forces to prevent the spread of venereal diseases among the troops. This concern led the military to privilege the recruitment of unmarried, sexually naive Korean adolescents. In early 1938, for example, Asō Tetsuo, an obstetrician-­gynecologist by profession who served as a military doctor with the Shanghai Expeditionary Force, noted in his Assertive Measures for the Prevention of Venereal Disease15 that the number of Korean women “suspected of having contracted a venereal disease are exceedingly small.… Most are young and [sexual] neophytes.” Asō proposed that “we should take the younger ones” in order to curtail sexually transmitted infections. In other words, Japanese forces required “young women free of venereal illnesses” and so turned to Korea in search of healthy teens to fill comfort station quotas. Asō recounted performing VD exams on about 100 women, of whom 80 percent were Korean and 20 percent Japanese, indicating that as early as 1938, nearly a year after Japan’s invasion of China, the large-­scale mobilization of Korean (and Japanese) women for sexual enslavement was already well underway.16 A fourth consideration was the social expectation in Korea that young women would wed in their late teens. In 1935, the average age at marriage was 18.45 years; by 1940, that figure was 21.46 years.17 To minimize potential resistance to their activities, Japanese military officials and civilian procurers presumably would have been careful to conscript women considerably younger than the ideal marital age. From the above profile of the average Korean comfort woman, drawn from various sources, we can conclude that many were recruited as minors—under age 21 by Japanese criteria—because of a loophole in international law and the military’s need to combat debilitating venereal diseases. By the same measure, it is also clear that many of these women were necessarily adolescents lacking adult sexual experience. The overriding factor driving this phenomenon, however, was the system of colonial control that kept Korea in Japan’s thrall. What produced such a large contingent of young virgins in the ranks of the Korean comfort women was the structural violence (ethnic, class, and sexual oppression) of Japan’s colonial occupation of Korea compounded by its military aggression in Asia. Korean comfort women were, in fact, victims twice over, being doubly afflicted by Japanese colonialism and racial injustice, on the one hand, and by both Korean and Japanese patriarchy, on the other.

Insight: Korean teenage comfort women   145

The over-­representation of Korean teenage comfort women is itself a sign of diversity Returning to the thesis championed by Park and Ueno, that the large number of underage Korean comfort women is a myth generated by an anti-­Japanese, ethno-­nationalist Korean women’s movement, we find the following problems in its basic assumptions. First of all, both Park and Ueno neglect the large body of evidence in the form of survivor testimonies, veterans’ memoirs, and archival materials. Denying that large numbers of underage Korean women were prostituted against their will by the Japanese military, they elaborate instead a set of “alternative facts” designed to support their thesis, obscuring the locus of moral and legal responsibility for forcible mobilization. Second, as in the case of rape myths, where the rapist blames the victim for the sexual assault, Park and Ueno strive mightily to find something amiss in the stories of former comfort women and in the activities of the South Korean support movement. What must be addressed in cases of sexual violence, however, are less the reactions of the aggrieved party than the actions of the aggressor. As regards the comfort women, the crucial point is to demand that the Japanese government accept full responsibility for the wartime actions of the Imperial state and its armed forces, which grossly violated the human rights of an absolute minimum of 50,000 (and most likely many more) women across Asia and the Pacific. Finally, both Park and Ueno seem indifferent to the political and social asymmetries that obtained between Japanese and Korean comfort women. The preponderance of Korean teenagers mobilized for sexual bondage was a direct consequence of Japanese colonial rule. This primordial fact imparted to Korean comfort women as a group a distinctively different kind of diversity than that displayed by Japanese victims. Park and Ueno neglect this reality to focus narrowly on sexual discrimination. This causes them to overlook the enormous importance of colonial control and racism in shaping the fate of Korean victims. They ignore the fact that, in general, ethnic minority women are victimized more by ethnic oppression than sexual bias. Indeed, it is Park and Ueno who seem determined to deny the facts of diversity. Eschewing a myopic concern with gender theory, critics such as Ueno and Park should look seriously at the personal accounts of former comfort women and the documentary materials that corroborate them. Doing so will convince them that the very high percentage of Korean adolescents recruited by Japan as comfort women is a historical fact. Hopefully, they will also agree with us that a feminist perspective does not preclude the recognition of diversity. Japanese and Koreans both endured horrific sexual violence in the comfort stations, but despite a common oppression, each group had its specific characteristics and exhibited correspondingly different forms of diversity. (Nor should we forget to factor in the heterogeneity that also existed within each ethnic group.) In addition to Koreans, victims also included Chinese, Taiwanese, Filipinas, Indonesians, Timorese, Dutch, Pacific islanders and many other national and

146   Kim Puja ethnic groups. Each existed within a specific historical context; each suffered wounds that both coincided with and differed from those experienced by others. Only by taking the interplay of all these factors into consideration can we hope to begin to understand the variety of experiences arising from this hierarchy of differences, and thus the multifarious forms of suffering and humiliation that Japan’s regime of military sexual servitude inflicted on the women it confined and abused. Bringing empirical evidence to bear on this highly complex problem is the appointed task of women’s studies and gender history.

Notes   1 Park, Y. (2014). Teikoku no ianfu (Comfort women of the Empire). Tōkyō: Asahi Shimbunsha. For a critique of Park’s ideas, see Kim, P. (2015). Chōsenjin “ianfu” ni shōjo wa sukunakatta ka (Were adolescent virgins really rare among Korean “comfort women”). In: Kim, P. and Itagaki, R., eds., Q&A: Chōsenjin “ianfu” to shokuminchi shihai sekinin (Q&A: Korean “comfort women” and the responsibility for colonial rule). Fight for Justice Booklet No.  3. Tōkyō: Ochanomizu Shobō, pp.  45–50, and Chŏng, Y. H. (2016). Bōkyaku no tame no “wakai”: Teikoku no ianfu to Nihon no sekinin (“Reconciling” in order to forget: Comfort Women of the Empire and Japan’s responsibility). Yokohama: Seori Shobō.   2 Ueno, C. (1998). Nashonarizumu to jendā (Nationalism and Gender). Tōkyō: Seidosha.   3 Table 5.1 is collated from survivors’ stories in six volumes edited in Korean between 1993 and 2004 by the Korea Chongshindae’s Institute (Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan and the Research Association on the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan). The first three volumes were published in 1993, 1997, and 1999 as Kangje ro kkŭllyŏgan Chosŏnin kun wianbudŭl: chŭngŏnjip (The forcibly drafted Korean “comfort women”), Vols. 1–3. Seoul: Hanul. Vols. 4–6 were released in 2001 and 2004 under the same title but published by Pulbit. Volume 1 is also available in English: Howard, K., ed. (1995). True Stories of the Korean Comfort Women (Translated by Y. L. Lee). London: Cassell. Two other volumes have been published containing stories of women sent to China. See Korea Chongshindae’s Institute, ed. (1995). Chungguk ŭro kkŭllyŏgan Chosŏnin kun wianbudŭl: 50-yŏn hu ŭi chŭngŏn (The Korean “comfort women” forcibly transported to China). Vols. 1 & 2. Seoul: Hanul. This was translated into Japanese in 1996 as Chūgoku ni renkō sareta Chōsenjin ianfu (Korean comfort women forcibly taken to China). (Translated by A. Yamaguchi). Tōkyō: San’ichi Shobō.   4 Kim, P. (2016). Chōsenjin “ianfu” wa, naze shōjo ga ōkatta ka? (Why were so many Korean “comfort women” teenage girls?). In: Y. Okamoto and P. Kim, eds., “Heiwa no shōjozō” wa, naze suwaritsuzukeru no ka? (Why the “Peace Statue” of a teenage girl continues her seated vigil). Yokohama: Seori Shobō, pp. 67–69.   5 Nishino, R. and Kim, P., eds. (2006). Shōgen: mirai e no kioku—Nanboku zainichi Koria hen, jō (Testimonies: memories for the future—a collection of testimonies by Asian “comfort women.” North and South Koreans and Koreans living in Japan). Vol. 1. Tōkyō: Akashi Shoten. See also Nishino, R. and Kim, P., eds. (2010). Shōgen: mirai e no kioku—Nanboku zainichi Koria hen, ge (Testimonies: memories for the future—a collection of testimonies by Asian “comfort women.” North and South Koreans and Koreans living in Japan). Vol. 2. Tōkyō: Akashi Shoten.   6 Ibid.   7 Kim delivered this testimony at the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal held in Tokyo in December 2000, and it was cited in the tribunal’s verdict of December 4,

Insight: Korean teenage comfort women   147 2001. See Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal (2001b). Judgment. Part 2, p. 54. [online] Available at: http://vawwracrac.org/judgement_e03.pdf [accessed May 10, 2017].   8 Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal (2001b), pp.  54–55. Kim revealed her identity as the pregnant woman in the photograph to Nishino Rumiko during the tribunal. See Chapter 2, figures 2.1 and 2.2. That story is recounted in Nishino, R. (2003). Senjō no “ianfu”: Ramo zenmetsusen o ikinobita Pak Yŏng-sim no kiseki (A “comfort woman” on the frontlines: the journey of Pak Yŏng-sim, a survivor of the destruction of Ramo). Tōkyō: Akashi Shoten, pp. 205–10.   9 See Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal (2001b), pp. 56–57. 10 Yamada, S. (1978). Bukan Heitan: Shina hakengun ian kakaricho no shuki (The Wuhan Commissariat: a memoir by a subsection chief of the [Imperial Japanese] China Expeditionary Army in charge of comfort stations). Tōkyō: Tosho Shuppansha, p. 86. 11 Psychological Warfare Team Attached to U.S. Army Forces India-­Burma Theater (1944). Japanese Prisoner of War Interrogation Report No.  49. ND-­97. October 1. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Office of War Information, p. 1. See also Kim, P. (2015) and Yoshimi, Y. (2000). Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military During World War II (Translated by S. O’Brien). New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 81, 105–06, 110. 12 Kim (2015), op. cit. See also Yoshimi (2000), pp. 51–64, 111–15. 13 The citation is from a Japanese Home Ministry document, “Matters Concerning the Handling of Women Sailing to China” of February 23, 1938. Yoshimi (2000), pp. 154–55. 14 Kim (2015). See also Yoshimi (2000), pp. 153–59. 15 This document is included in the following memoir: Asō T. (1993). Shanhai kara Shanhai e: heitan byōin no fujinkai (From Shanghai to Shanghai: an obstetrician-­ gynecologist in a rear-­echelon hospital). Fukuoka: Sekifūsha, pp. 215–17. 16 Asō (1993). See also the discussion in Yoshimi (2000), p.  53. Asō’s figures on the percentages of comfort women are often cited, but they are not an accurate gauge of overall ethnic composition. Yoshimi also cites a more representative estimate for the years between 1937 and 1940 (see Chapter 1, this volume). A survey of 14,755 soldiers in China who caught a venereal disease during that period indicates that about 52 percent of the soldiers’ “female partners” were Korean, 36 percent were Chinese, and 12 percent were Japanese (Yoshimi (2000), pp. 94–95). These seem to me more reliable figures. 17 In the Japanese home islands, the average age at marriage was more than four years older than in Korea. See Nakatani, C. and Kawauchi, M. (1944). Chōsen ni okeru joshi no mikon zanson ritsu ni kansuru jakkan no tōkeiteki kōsatsu (2) (Some statistical observations on the percentage of Korean young women who do not marry, Part 2). Chōsen Sōtokufu, ed., Chōsa Geppō. August/September.

Part III

A realistic settlement is a settlement that victimized women can accept

6 Comfort women, textbooks, and the rise of “new right” revisionism Tawara Yoshifumi

The comfort women issue and textbook revision In Japan, school texts are subject every four years to a process of review, revision, and certification by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (hereafter, Ministry of Education). Through its advisory body, the Textbook Authorization Research Council, the ministry periodically challenges and screens out interpretations of national history it deems biased or unflattering to Japan’s national self-­image. For many years, a group of ultra-­nationalist politicians, bureaucrats, academics, opinion leaders, and cultural figures have also influenced textbook content and selection, combating what they view as “objectionable ideas” through a series of well-­funded, efficient lobbying campaigns. The first of these took place from 1955 to 1956, the second between 1979 and 1982. The third offensive1 began in 1996 in response to the inclusion of comfort women content in school textbooks and is still underway today, some 20 years later. This chapter presents an overview of that controversy and its relation to the rise of what might be called “New Right” revisionism.2 On June 27, 1996, the Education Ministry announced the partial results of the junior high school textbook screening and authorization round for the 1997 school year (grades seven to nine).3 Texts published three years earlier, in 1993, had contained no mention of Japan’s wartime system of sexual slavery. Now, for the first time, the history sections of all seven public junior-­high social studies books (each by a different publisher) contained passages discussing that problem. Moreover, almost all civics textbooks included a discussion of postwar compensation issues for unresolved war-­related problems, and four took up the question of the comfort women, as well. Two publishers of geography texts also touched on this question. The comfort women system unmasked Inclusion of the comfort women in junior high school texts was long in coming. During the 1970s and 1980s, centrist and left-­of-center Japanese political parties opposing the ruling conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) occasionally

152   Tawara Yoshifumi raised this topic in the National Diet. In each instance, however, the government responded that military brothels had been operated by civilian proprietors and not by Japanese civil or military authorities. The postwar state thus bore no responsibility, it explained. A similar exchange during Diet deliberations in June 1991 impelled a South Korean survivor, Kim Hak-­sun, to convene a press conference in Seoul in August. Using her real name, she revealed for the first time that she had been forced to work in military comfort stations during the war: “I am a living witness,” she told journalists. In December, Kim and two other victims filed a lawsuit in the Tokyo District Court demanding an official apology and state compensation from the Japanese government. Shortly afterwards, Prof. Yoshimi Yoshiaki of Chūō University unearthed a 1938 Imperial army memorandum in the library of the Self-­Defense Agency’s National Institute for Defense Studies entitled “Matters concerning the recruitment of women workers for military comfort stations.” The document was written by a War Ministry adjutant and addressed to the chiefs of staff of the North China Area Army and the Central China Expeditionary Force.4 On January 11, 1992, the Asahi Shimbun carried a front-­page story on the memo. In light of this discovery, Tokyo found itself obliged to recognize publicly a degree of Japanese military involvement in the comfort women system. On January 13, Chief Cabinet Secretary Katō Kōichi issued an official statement expressing the government’s “sincere apology and remorse” to all former comfort women. On January 16, during a meeting with South Korean President Roh Tae-­woo in Seoul, Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi officially acknowledged military culpability, offered his “heartfelt remorse and apology,” and pledged to gather all relevant facts on the problem. The Miyazawa administration initiated an in-­depth study of the comfort women system. On August 4, 1993, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kōno Yōhei publicly summarized the results of the survey. In his official pronouncement, the so-­ called Kōno statement, he admitted that the “Japanese military was involved” and conveyed once again the government’s “sincere apologies and remorse” to the victims. The statement concluded with the following promise. We shall squarely face the historical facts … instead of evading them, and take them to heart as lessons of history. We hereby reiterate our firm determination never to repeat the same mistake by forever engraving such issues in our memories through the study and teaching of history. (See Appendix 1) Upgrading schoolbook content Honoring that pledge meant rewriting school textbook content, and the government promptly directed authors, editors, and publishers to include information on the comfort women in future junior high history readers. Although compulsory education in Japan stops at the junior high school level, references to the topic were also incorporated by all high school history texts for the 1994 and

Comfort women, textbooks, the “new right”   153 1995 school years. Several textbooks on modern society, geography, politics and economics, and ethics also broached the problem.5 When the Education Ministry announced its screening results on July 1, 1993 and again on the same day a year later, all of Japan’s major dailies reported the changes. On July 1, 1994, the Tōkyō Shimbun ran a banner headline asking, “Will students finally learn about Japan’s war responsibility?” and noted that the newly approved history primers had dramatically expanded coverage of outstanding war-­related issues, including sexual slavery.6 Despite the media attention, the reaction by conservatives and the far right was surprisingly muted compared to the fury that would be unleashed in 1996. A rare attack came from Itakura Yoshiaki, a self-­proclaimed expert on the Nanking massacre (1937–38). Writing in the September 1993 edition of the ultra-­ conservative monthly Shokun!, he took umbrage at the new schoolbook references to comfort women, but the article caused only a minor stir since Itakura’s ire was focused mainly on inclusion of the Nanking atrocities. The revamped high school texts released for use in 1994 and 1995 had actually been drafted in 1991 and 1992. Their textual improvements were inspired by the dramatic developments that had unfolded during those two years: Kim Hak-­sun’s “coming out” and the launching of the first lawsuit for redress, the Asahi Shimbun’s scoop on Yoshimi Yoshiaki’s discovery of the War Ministry memorandum on comfort stations, and Chief Cabinet Secretary Katō Kōichi’s official admission of guilt and expression of regret. Influenced by these events, junior high school texts, too, took up the issue of the comfort women and postwar reparations in general. In fact, in the mid-­1980s, accounts of Japanese colonial expansion and wartime conquest had already appeared in elementary, junior, and high school texts. The 1993 junior high readers made substantial additions in this area.7 Consequently, the history texts that appeared in 1997 are now adjudged the most accurate and comprehensive of the post-­World War II period.8 The careful pairing of military-­enforced prostitution with the reparations issue was the culmination of a succession of carefully calibrated upgrades introduced gradually over many years. In 1996, however, a coterie of ultra-­rightist revisionists challenged this progress with exceptional zeal. They objected strenuously to what they perceived to be a “masochistic” obsession with the “dark side” of Japan’s modern history. The textual assimilation of material on the comfort women in public schools was singled out as the introduction of a particularly onerous historical “distortion” and attacked ferociously.

The backlash begins: the 1996 revisionist campaign On June 27, 1996, the Education Ministry announced the selection of a new round of junior high textbooks, and major news outlets gave the story top billing. TV and radio broadcasters reported the event on the evening news, and leading dailies ran feature-­length articles the next day, noting the fact that all of the approved history books contained passages on the comfort women. Taken by

154   Tawara Yoshifumi surprise and angered by these reports, right-­leaning academics, journalists, writers, political action groups, LDP government officials, and Diet members immediately mounted a concerted counterattack demanding the modification or deletion of the changes. Thus began the third wave of assaults on liberal content in schoolbooks. Spearheading the campaign were academics Fujioka Nobukatsu9 (University of Tokyo), Takahashi Shirō (Meisei University), Nishio Kanji (University of Electro-­Communications), and the late Sakamoto Takao (Gakushūin University). Disseminating these views at a popular level was Kobayashi Yoshinori, a well-­ known comic-­book writer and neoconservative ideologue. Japan’s leading conservative daily, the Sankei Shimbun, directed the media blitz, backed by a chorus of conservative monthlies (Seiron, Shokun!, Bungei Shunjū, Voice, Samsara, Sapio) and weekly tabloids (Shūkan Shinchō, Shūkan Bunshun). Key LDP figures also played a prominent role in orchestrating the backlash. They included members of the party’s Committee for Historical Investigation (active from August 1993 to February 1995), and the Diet Members’ Alliance for a Bright Japan (formed in June 1996). Japan’s current prime minister, Abe Shinzō, was a central figure in both groups. From February 1997, led by Abe, the Young Diet Members Group for Considering Japan’s Future and History Textbooks assumed leadership of the LDP’s revisionist echelon. Around this core, a neonationalist coalition would coalesce, gradually displacing the party’s conservative mainstream and preparing the way for Abe’s rise to political power. The Diet Representatives “Japan Conference” Roundtable (Nippon Kaigi Kokkaigiin Kondankai), formed in May 1997, became the political wing of the Japan Conference (Nippon Kaigi), a broad-­based New Right civic alliance dedicated to promoting the revisionist agenda.10 Revisionist activist groups organized synchronized attacks on liberal textbook companies, parading their caravans of “sound trucks” in front of head offices, loudspeakers blaring, and intimidating textbook authors with written threats. On June 28, 1996, the day the results of the recent textbook review hit the news, Fujioka Nobukatsu made the following comments to the Sankei Shimbun. [The textbook changes] parade before the reader’s eyes a horrendous catalog of dark, masochistic, and anti-­Japanese historical views.… It is hard to believe that these seven authorized textbooks were even written for Japanese students. A “backdoor invasion” by countries that despise Japan for its prosperity has nearly completely invaded the field of history education, where textbooks form the core of the Japanese people’s collective knowledge.11 The attack on textbook content launched by Fujioka and his allies focused on the explanations given by junior high history books for the military comfort stations. Below, Fujioka explains why neonationalists targeted that issue in particular. The role of Japanese history textbooks is to teach historical facts to Japanese children, who will shoulder the country’s future. But instead, the textbooks

Comfort women, textbooks, the “new right”   155 have fallen prey to foreign propaganda that negates our nation’s very existence, whence the fabrication of the “forcible recruitment of military comfort women” thesis, which has now appeared simultaneously in all junior high school texts.12 [The military comfort women issue] is being disseminated by anti-­Japanese forces inside and outside Japan in order to deliver a decisive blow that will spiritually cripple the Japanese state. In short, this is a grand conspiracy abetted by outside forces to destroy Japan.… From a pedagogical standpoint, and in the context of compulsory education, it is a fundamental mistake to teach junior high school students a subject that links the problem of sex with violence.… Around the world, Japanese are increasingly being blamed and looked down upon because of the “military comfort women” problem.13 A true cause for dismay is that many Japanese actually seem to believe this preposterous story to some degree.… Anti-­Japanese citizens at home have spread this story to Koreans and other anti-­Japanese forces, who have jumped on the band wagon in condemning Japan. In this sense, the “military comfort women” issue demonstrates in exquisite detail how an anti-­Japanese view of history is being forged anew and planted firmly in people’s minds.14 Fujioka and other revisionists deny the existence of comfort women as sex slaves by focusing on a single argument: such women were not forcibly recruited or relocated. The proof of this claim, they say, is that no ironclad documentary evidence of coercive procurement (kyōsei renkō) has been found. Moreover, survivor testimonies are unreliable and do not constitute empirical evidence. If forcible recruitment cannot be proved, then it didn’t exist, they reason. So-­called comfort women actually asked to work in military brothels. They were former prostitutes or volunteers who were paid for their services. Prime Minister Abe, his Cabinet, and many revisionist LDP politicians remain committed to this argument. Other New Right conservatives treat the issue as a joke. Sakamoto Takao of Gakushūin University, a former board member of the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (see below), suggested facetiously that there was no sense in studying the “history of toilets” just because Imperial soldiers referred to comfort women as “group latrines” (kyōdō benjo, literally, group toilet)— military jargon for sexual slaves.15 In a published talk with Fujioka Nobukatsu, Okazaki Hisahiko, former ambassador to Thailand and an active supporter of the Society for Textbook Reform, compared military comfort women to licentious paintings displayed at so-­called erotic temples. “It would be out of the question,” he said, “to include such materials in a textbook.”16 From a survivor’s viewpoint, these crude sexist comments are a second rape. On August 10, 1996, the Association for the Advancement of an Unbiased View of History17 issued an “emergency appeal for the elimination of references to ‘military comfort women’ from junior high texts.” Responding to this call-­toarms, New Right coalitions formed to petition local legislative bodies across Japan to pressure the central government to remove descriptions of comfort

156   Tawara Yoshifumi women and the Nanking massacre from schoolbooks. This led to occasionally raucous confrontations with citizen’s and advocacy groups supporting the recent textual changes. Petitions and appeals were filed in 19 prefectural and metropolitan assemblies, but only the Okayama and Kagoshima prefectural legislatures adopted the common statement of intent, and the Ibaraki assembly alone passed the proposed resolution in full. Petitions were also taken up in 272 municipal, town, and village assemblies, but again only 22 local bodies actually adopted them (three passed only the statement of intent). The appeal failed to achieve its objectives and sputtered to a halt. On December 2, 1996, Fujioka, Takahashi Shirō, Nishio Kanji, and Sakamoto Takao together with cartoonist Kobayashi Yoshinori held a press conference at the Akasaka Tokyo Hotel to announce the formation of the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (hereafter, Tsukurukai).18 The group was launched formally on January 30, 1997 with the objective of compiling historically “reliable” junior high history and civics readers. To support the Tsukurukai in its revisionist project, the late Nakagawa Shōichi, Abe Shinzō, and Etō Seiichi, all LDP lawmakers, inaugurated a new association called the Young Diet Member Group for Considering Japan’s Future and History Textbooks (hereafter, the Young Diet Member Group).19 This very conservative conclave was led by relatively young politicians having served five terms or less in office (Abe Shinzō joined the Diet in 1993). In April 2000, the Tsukurukai submitted its newly minted junior high history and civics texts, published by Fusōsha (Fujisankei Communications Group), for certification. The Young Diet Member Group worked in tandem with the Tsukurukai to get the new books approved. They were authorized for use in the 2001 school year, inaugurating a new phase in the revisionist offensive.20

Effacing the comfort women Two major developments led to the expunging of comfort women references from junior high history books. First, the Education Ministry and LDP parliamentarians urged publishers to delete objectionable passages voluntarily. Bowing to this pressure, most publishers chose to play it safe by exercising self-­ censorship and removing potentially problematical passages. Second, the Tsukurukai conspired with allies in the Education Ministry and LDP to revise the system by which local schools and school boards adopt texts for classroom use. Self-­censorship On June 8, 1998, on the upper house floor, former justice minister Nagano Shigeto21 queried the government about the appropriateness of schoolbook history materials. Education Minister Machimura Nobutaka replied that history texts were biased and would be “improved,” beginning at the drafting stage and extending to final certification and school-­board adoption, as well.

Comfort women, textbooks, the “new right”   157 Consequently, in January 1999, the ministry told textbook publishers to “make content more balanced” and to “revise the list of authors,” a not-­so-subtle suggestion to find writers amenable to neoconservative views. In August of that year, three publishing houses (Tōkyō Shoseki, Kyōiku Shuppan, and Teikoku Shoin) submitted textual modifications, striking the terms jūgun (“attached to the military”) and kyōsei (“forced,” “forcible”) from descriptions of the “military comfort women” (jūgun ianfu) system in earlier drafts. The authors consented and the ministry approved the altered submissions in December. Some publishing houses actually switched authors for the 2002 school-­year edition, but at this point, no company planned to eliminate all reference to the issue itself. The situation changed dramatically, however, as government officials insisted on more than partial revisions. Discretionary compliance was no longer enough. In December 1999, as publishers were completing the plain-­cover mockup edition for submission to the April 2000 screening committee, someone in the Prime Minister’s Office made a personal phone call to the publishers, warning them “to treat any mention of the comfort women with discretion.” Just before the new edition went to press, four firms revised or deleted passages on the topic. This author obtained copies of the final drafts and galley proofs from the publishers who ultimately censored their own textbooks. I was able to verify that, at that point, comfort women references were still intact. But when the mockups were delivered to the Education Ministry, all had disappeared. Sometime in February 2000, shortly before the screening deadline, one editor­in-chief, who will remain anonymous, personally visited all of his authors, relaying to each the company’s decision to delete mention of the comfort women and a footnote on the number of Nanking victims and pleading for their cooperation. When queried, the editor of another company replied there was nothing he could do. “The order came from the very top,” he explained. Consequently, of the seven publishers of junior high history books, four excised all accounts of forced military prostitution, and two made alterations, substituting the term “comfort facilities” (ianjo) for “comfort women” (ianfu). Only one publisher, Nihon Shoseki, refused to comply and actually strengthened coverage of this and other war-­related questions (see below). Who was the mysterious source in the Prime Minister’s Office who made the phone calls? I was told that it was a bureaucrat, but since Japanese government officials never seem to do anything on their own, I suspect that a certain former state secretary for education reform (soon to be education minister) intervened, instructing someone there to make the calls.22 Subverting the text adoption process A second focus of the rightist attack on schoolbook content was the subversion of the selection process by which texts are adopted for actual classroom use. Education boards routinely choose new texts for local public junior high schools, and recommendations by teaching staff normally carry weight in this process.23

158   Tawara Yoshifumi The Tsukurukai guessed correctly that only a handful of teachers could be counted on to recommend The New History Textbook (Fusōsha, 2000) it had just published. As the junior high selection round for 2001 schoolbooks approached, Tsukurukai members petitioned local assemblies across Japan to reinforce the authority of education boards vis-­à-vis teachers in choosing new texts. The Tsukurukai petition demanded the curtailment of the following practices as illegal: selecting textbooks according to teachers’ preferences, ranking them via a “school vote” taken by the teachers in text-­selection districts or according to committee recommendations, narrowing the options to two or three publishers, and reporting the results to education boards and text-­selection committees. All of these methods—eminently democratic in intent and practice—were seen as disadvantageous for the adoption of The New History Textbook. Citizens groups opposed to this initiative actively contested the petition campaign, and as of July 2000, only four prefectural legislatures and some 20-odd municipal bodies had passed resolutions based on the Tsukurukai appeal. The situation changed abruptly, however, on August 8. In an upper house budget committee session, Koyama Takao, Deputy Secretary of the LDP’s Young Diet Member Group (who would soon resign and then be arrested over a bribery scandal), asked Education Minister Ōshima Tadamori a series of questions keyed to the Tsukurukai petition. The minister stated that he fully agreed with all the points that Koyama had raised. Subsequently, on September 13, 2000 and again on January 24, 2001, the Education Ministry issued written instructions to local school boards to “select textbooks responsibly and on your own authority,” a strongly worded bit of “ministerial guidance,” indeed. Upon receiving the September directive, metropolitan boards in Tokyo, Yokohama, Kawasaki, Kawaguchi, Niigata, and Hiroshima abolished teacher-­centered school voting, and others revised the adoption system so as to minimize or bypass teacher input.24 Of the seven junior high textbook publishers, Nihon Shoseki, popularly known as Nissho, was hardest hit by these changes. Nissho refused to censor or amend the comfort women section in its 2002 edition. Instead, it strengthened its 1997 edition to give a far more detailed accounting of Japan’s wartime behavior. The Tsukurukai and the conservative daily Sankei Shimbun attacked the publisher as the ringleader in trying to cultivate a masochistic view of Japan’s pre-­ 1945 past. Nissho’s history books enjoyed a relatively broad base of support among teachers, and the texts were widely adopted in text-­selection districts where teachers had a voice in the choice. But as the selection system itself was gradually undermined, Nissho’s market share fell dramatically. In 1997, for example, 21 out of 23 Tokyo text-­selection districts chose Nissho history books through the school-­vote system, but in 2002, only two districts opted for them. By 2006, there were no takers at all. In Yokohama, all 18 districts picked Nissho schoolbooks in the 1997 round, but that figure dropped to ten in 2002 and eventually to zero in 2005. The publisher’s total orders plummeted by more than half, declining from 129,000 copies in 1997 to 59,000 in 2002.25 The last progressive history text had been squeezed out of the market place.

Comfort women, textbooks, the “new right”   159 Textbook adoption was now in the hands of local school boards acting independently of teachers’ recommendations. Textbooks singled out as flawed by the Tsukurukai, the Sankei Shimbun, New Right politicians, and other revisionist groups were henceforth off limits.26 Fearful of criticism, board members increasingly steered clear of any text hinting of controversy. The dramatic decline in Nissho’s standing now convinced two other publishers, who had retained but diluted their account of the comfort women system, to erase all mention of the issue. What can be done in the face of this ideological onslaught? It is incumbent upon concerned educators, politicians, and the general public to demand an overhaul of the current adoption process so as to faithfully reflect teachers’ views in the selection of history texts. We must continue to insist on including within the purview of our school curricula historically accurate information on Japan’s colonial conquests, wartime actions, and the system of military-­enforced sexual servitude. Only in this way can we hope to impart a balanced view of Japan’s modern history and its place in Asia to the nation’s youth.

Problems and prospects The second Abe administration was formed following the LDP’s landslide victory in the general election of December 16, 2012. Of 19 Cabinet ministers, 13 were affiliated with the Diet Representatives’ “Japan Conference” Roundtable, nine with the Diet Member Group for Considering Japan’s Future and History Textbooks, 14 with the Shintō Political Alliance Diet Members’ Roundtable, 15 with the Association of Diet Member for Worshiping Together at Yasukuni Shrine, 12 with the Diet Members Alliance for Promoting the Assessment of a New Constitution, and eight with the Diet Members Alliance for Enacting a New Constitution.27 Far more lawmakers belong to these groups in the second Abe administration than did in the first (2006–07). Prime Minister Abe has appointed two of his closest far-­right associates to serve as special advisor and deputy chief cabinet secretary. Many parliamentary secretaries and vice ministers are also neonationalist LDP politicians. Abe’s second government has shifted much closer to the extreme right than his first administration.28 On June 14, 2007, revisionists took out a one-­page paid comment in the Washington Post entitled “THE FACTS” to disavow the historical truth of military sexual enslavement. The 44 lawmakers who signed, endorsed, or “assented to” this ad included 29 LDP Diet members, 13 from the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), and two unaffiliated with any party. Among the sponsors are several politicians now prominent in the second Abe administration, including one minister, one parliamentary secretary, and two vice ministers (see Note 1, Chapter 3). On November 4, 2012, the revisionist camp placed a similar advertisement, “Yes, We Remember the Facts,” in a small regional U.S. paper, the New Jersey Star-­Ledger.29 Of the 37 Diet members who signed, 24 were from the LDP, 11

160   Tawara Yoshifumi from the DPJ, and two from the Sunrise Party of Japan. Abe (not yet prime minister), five of his future ministers, and four future senior Cabinet officials endorsed the ad. This time, Abe himself signed on as an “assentor.” The current Abe Cabinet is rife with comfort women deniers. On September 26, 2012, Abe was elected president of the LDP as a prelude to December’s general election (in Japan, the party president automatically becomes prime minister if the party wins enough votes to form a government). One of Abe’s first actions following his elevation to party chief was to instruct the LDP to set up the Headquarters for the Revitalization of Education.30 The group held its first meeting on October 24, and after less than a month of intense discussion, it released an interim proposal on November 16. Most of its recommendations were subsequently incorporated into the LDP’s party platform prior to the December general election. This manifesto states unequivocally that, “many school textbooks retain a masochistic historical perspective and contain biased descriptions” and pledges to extirpate such material. Abe touted educational reform as one of the central pillars of his administration’s political agenda. Consequently, in January 2013, following his return to power, the Council for the Revitalization of Education was created, reporting directly to the prime minister.31 The council is responsible for implementing the educational program outlined in the LDP manifesto. These policies are predicated on “the state’s authority to educate” (kokka kyōikuken) and call for the close monitoring and regulation of every aspect of mandatory schooling, infringing on constitutional guarantees of academic freedom and freedom of thought and conscience. The Abe government ultimately plans to amend the 1947 School Education Law to include a textbook certification statute that would transform today’s schoolbooks into quasi-­official state texts. The government knows this will be difficult and hopes to achieve its goal via a far-­reaching overhaul of the national Courses of Study—Japan’s curriculum guidelines (Shidō Yōryō)—and the Textbook Examination Standards. The current Courses of Study guidelines are already complex, but the government claims that they are too liberal and must be tightened and made obligatory. The Education Ministry currently issues an instruction manual, Explanation of the Courses of Study, which gives precise directions on how to implement the guidelines. The manual effectively restricts textbook content and, by extension, what is taught in the classroom. The Abe administration intends to bring the Courses of Study into stricter conformity with the manual, so that every aspect of textbook writing and production can be closely regulated from start to finish. Moreover, the Textbook Examination Standards, which guides the Ministry’s Textbook Authorization Research Council in reviewing and accrediting prospective texts, would be so finely tuned that textbook writing and editing could be micromanaged even during the final screening stage. Furthermore, the LDP’s education reform program would empower the education minister to issue highly detailed instructions on the drafting of school texts, allowing direct state intervention in the screening and authorization

Comfort women, textbooks, the “new right”   161 process. Nominations for membership in the Textbook Authorization Research Council would require prior parliamentary approval, giving the Diet a say in schoolbook certification. The ruling party or coalition thus would be ideally positioned to influence or even determine textbook content. Via a Cabinet ordinance, it could rewrite the Textbook Examination Standards with pinpoint precision, assuring it of even greater control. Party leaders could insist that schoolbooks present the official government view on controversial topics, together with supporting Supreme Court rulings, as majority positions, thereby sidelining or even excluding alternative interpretations. Abe’s education reform also intends to revisit the so-­called Neighboring Country Clause in the Textbook Examination Standards. The clause reads, “Sufficient regard must be given to international understanding and harmony when dealing with modern historical events that involve neighboring Asian countries.” This stipulation was introduced in 1982 by Miyazawa Kiichi, then chief cabinet secretary, in response to criticisms of Japanese textbook content by nearby Asian countries. Removing it could enable government bureaucrats to redact or delete references to Japan’s prewar colonial rule, wartime atrocities, and the comfort women system during the textbook review process. Indeed, in April 2013, the LDP Council for the Revitalization of Education recommended that Japan abolish the clause, and Education Minister Shimomura included that demand in the ministry’s educational reform plan, unveiled in November of that year. So far, no action has been taken to implement it. If Abe has his way, boards of education will become subordinate advisory bodies to the board chair or local superintendent of education. This would place important decisions on education in the hands of the latter, turning local boards into rubber-­stamp entities. Specifically, the board chair and the local government chief will select which school texts to adopt for classroom use. In selection districts where both officials are historical revisionists, Tsukurukai-­approved texts, such as those published by Jiyūsha and Ikuhōsha, could then be chosen without much difficulty. For the time being, Abe will probably feel constrained to retain current screening and authorization procedures, and local schools will continue to choose between several texts by different publishers every year. Because of top-­down adoption procedures, however, the texts will increasingly be similar if not identical in content. The result will be de facto state textbooks controlled by politicians, not historians and educators.32 The Abe regime has already taken giant strides in this direction. In January 2014, it revised the Textbook Examination Standards and in March introduced new textbook screening guidelines. According to these, publishers are now required to give equal weight to the official government position on controversial subjects. Moreover, they must also state the “commonly accepted view,” which means the government view. In the case of the comfort women, the “common view” is that there is “no source that directly proves forcible abduction by the military or state authorities.” Other explanations—the commonly held opinions of reputable researchers and academics—are labeled “deficient,” and textbooks that devote space to those views are rejected and returned to the

162   Tawara Yoshifumi authors for reediting. Clearly, the government is determined to impose its warped views of history on Japanese schoolchildren. In a healthy democracy the function of education is to help children develop the ability to make their own critical judgments about the world and their society based on a plurality of views. One-­sided textbooks obstruct students’ right to know and can stunt their growth as independent thinkers and good citizens. Abe’s revised text examination norms cannot be allowed to stand. They must be abolished immediately. To stem the rising tide of reaction, knowledgeable and politically active citizens will have to build a far broader opposition movement than in 2005 and 2006 if they are to prevent a dangerous rewriting of the Fundamental Law of Education. This is the only way of slowing the Abe administration’s forced march toward a totally state-­controlled textbook system. On March 22, 2013, 24 academics and opinion leaders inaugurated a new organization, the “NO! to Abe’s Education Policies—Yes to Peace and Human Rights Education!” Network. As the public becomes more aware of the stakes involved, I believe that popular resistance to the Abe administration’s proposed education reforms will grow apace.

Notes   1 See Kodomo to Kyōkasho Zenkoku Netto 21 hen [Children and Textbooks Japan Network 21], ed. (2008). Sairyō no “kyōkasho” o motomete: “kyōkasho seido” e no atarashii teigen (In search of the ideal “textbook”: A new proposal for the reform of the “textbook system”). Ichikawa: Tsunan Shuppan, pp. 32, 37–38, 46–48.   2 The term “New Right” has been suggested by Nakano Kōichi, who speaks of the transition to a “New Right alliance” in the late 1990s fueled by the backlash against revising middle-­school history texts to include discussions of the comfort women and other war-­linked issues. See Nakano, K. (2015). Ukeika suru Nihon seiji (The rightward shift of Japanese politics). Tōkyō: Iwanami Shinsho, pp.  99–110. A comprehensive treatment of this question is Tawara, Y. (1997a). Dokyumento: “ianfu” mondai to kyōkasho kōgeki (A report on the “comfort women” issue and the assault on school textbooks). Tōkyō: Kōbunken.   3 The Japanese school year follows the Japanese fiscal year, which ends in March and begins anew in April. In the past, textbook review and certification was completed by late March, but the Education Ministry did not publicize the results until late June. Since the 2000s, however, screening results have been announced sometime between late March and early April. Authors begin revising their work in the school year following the release of a new edition. It normally takes three to four years before a revised textbook reaches the classroom. The various stages, each requiring roughly one year, are writing, ministry screening, adoption by local boards of education or schools, and, finally, actual classroom use.   4 See Yoshimi, Y. (2000). Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military During World War  II (Translated by S. O’Brien). New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 58–60.   5 A total of 21 high school texts in both 1994 and 1995 editions included descriptions of the comfort women system.   6 See Tawara, Y. and Ishiyama, H. (1995). Kōkō kyōkasho kentei to konnichi no kyōkasho mondai no shōten: kodomotachi ga nerawareteiru, Pāto 3 (High school textbook screening and today’s textbook problem: children are being targeted, Part 3).

Comfort women, textbooks, the “new right”   163 Tōkyō: Gakushū no Tomosha, pp. 1, 27–32, 255–57. The appendix includes all high school text references to the comfort women in books then in use.   7 Tawara, Y., ed. (1994). Kenshō—15 nen sensō to chūkō rekishi kyōkasho: shin (93–95 nendoyō) kyū (81–83 nendoyō) kyōkasho kijutsu no hikaku (Reexamining the 15-year war in junior and high school history textbooks: comparing treatment of the war in textbooks, present (1993–95) and past (1981–83). Tōkyō: Gakushū no Tomosha, pp. 6–14, 32–35, 50–51, 62–65.   8 Tawara, Y. (1997b). Kyōkasho kōgeki no shinsō:”ianfu” mondai to “jiyūshugi shikan” no sajutsu (What’s behind the campaign against school textbooks: the “comfort women” issue and the illusion of an “unbiased view of history”). Tōkyō: Gakushū no Tomosha, pp. 33–34.   9 Fujioka wrote a series of articles criticizing Japanese history education in the monthly Shakaika kyōiku (Social studies education), Meiji Tosho Shuppan. The first article appeared in the April 1994 number. Together with Takahashi Shirō, who shared his views, Fujioka formed the Association for the Advancement of an Unbiased View of History (Jiyūshugi shikan kenkyūkai) in January 1996. This prompted the president of Sankei Shimbun, Hazama Shigeaki (later, Fujisankei Communications Group chair), to run a series by association members entitled “Kyōkasho ga oshienai rekishi” (The history that textbooks don’t teach), which ran from January 1996. 10 The Committee for Historical Investigation (Rekishi Kentō Iinkai) advocated textbook reform. Its revisionist view of World War II was published in 1995 as Daitōa Sensō no sōkatsu (A summing up of the Greater East Asia War). Tōkyō: Tendensha. The Diet Members’ Alliance for a Bright Japan (Akarui Nihon Kokkai Giin Renmei) was led by Okuno Seisuke (chair), Itagaki Tadashi (general secretary), and Abe Shinzō (deputy general secretary). See Note 19 below concerning the Young Diet Member Group for Considering Japan’s Future and History Textbooks (Nippon no Zento to Rekishi Kyōkasho o Kangaeru Wakate Giin no Kai). A recent analysis of the Japan Conference is Tawara, Y. (2016). Nippon Kaigi no zennbō: shirazaru kyodai soshiki no jittai (An anatomy of the Japan Conference: the true state of a vast secret organization). Tōkyō: Kadensha. 11 Sankei Shimbun (1996). Chūgaku shakai kyōkasho o yonde (Reading middle-­school civics textbooks). June 28, p. 3. 12 The citation is from a speech by Fujioka entitled “Han’nichi shikan wa kōshite tsukurareta” (This is how an anti-­Japanese view of history was created). Iwata, Y. (1997). Kindaishi no henkō to kyōkasho mondai (The bias of modern history and the problem of school textbooks). Kaikō. March, pp. 7–8, 38. 13 Fujioka, N. (1996b). Ianfu kyōsei renkō, kyokō no shōmei (1): Nihonjin o shinjikomaseta yotsu no jōken (New light on the fiction of the forcible recruitment of comfort women (1): four factors that convinced the Japanese). Gendai kyōiku kagaku. November, pp. 109–15. 14 Fujioka, N. (1996a). Han’nichi shikan wa kōshite tsukurareru (This is how an anti­Japanese view of history is created). Samsara. November, pp. 30–39. 15 Sakamoto, T. (1997). Rekishi kyōkasho wa ika ni kakareru beki ka (How should history textbooks be written?). In: Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho o Tsukurukai [Japan Society for History Textbook Reform], ed., Atarashii Nihon no rekishi ga hajimaru: “jigyaku shikan” o koete (A new history of Japan begins: beyond the “masochistic view of history”). Tōkyō: Gentōsha, pp. 46–60. 16 Fujioka, N. and Okazaki, H.  (1997). Kyōkasho ga oshienai rekishi dōsatsuryoku (Historical insights that [today’s] textbooks don’t teach). Samsara, January, p. 37. 17 The Association for an Unbiased View of History (Jiyūshugi Shikan Kenkyūkai) was formed in 1995 by Fujioka Nobukatsu and like-­minded revisionists. As do other kindred organizations, the association aggressively advertises its message through a wide variety of media outlets: newspaper and journal articles, books, manga, radio, television, and films.

164   Tawara Yoshifumi 18 For a fuller discussion of the Tsukurukai, see Tawara, Y. (2008). Tsukurukai: bunretsu to rekishi gizō no shinsō—shōnenba no rekishi kyōkasho mondai (Tsukurukai: the truth behind the split in conservative ranks and the falsification of history—a moment of truth for Japan’s history textbooks). Tōkyō: Kadensha. 19 The Young Diet Member Group for Considering Japan’s Future and History Textbooks (Nippon no Zento to Rekishi Kyōkasho o Kangaeru Wakate Giin no Kai). Early board members included Nakagawa Shōichi (chair), Abe Shinzō (director-­general), and Etō Seiichi (secretary-­general). Following the 2001 round of junior high text selections, the alliance was inactive for a while but resumed its activities again in February 2004, as the 2005 screening period approached. At that time, it dropped the word “young” from the organization’s name and is now known as the Diet Member Group for Considering Japan’s Future and History Textbooks. 20 For details leading up to this new phase, see Tawara, Y. (1997c). Dokyumento: “ianfu” mondai to kyōkasho kōgeki (Exposé: the “comfort women” issue and the textbook attack). Tōkyō: Kōbunken, pp. 48–148, and Tawara (1997b), pp. 131–45. 21 Nagano was a former Imperial army officer and chief-­of-staff of the Self-­Defense Forces. In April 1994, following his appointment as Justice Minister, he told the daily Mainichi Shimbun that the “Nanking massacre is a fabrication, in my opinion.” He was forced to step down 11 days later. 22 See Tawara, Y. (2001a). Tettei kenshō—abunai kyōkasho: “sensō ga dekiru kuni” o mezasu “Tsukurukai” no jittai (Investigating a dangerous textbook: the truth about the “Tsukurukai,” which wants to create “a country that can wage war”). Tōkyō: Gakushū no Tomosha, pp. 72–73, and Tawara, Y. (2005). Abunai kyōkasho NO! 21 seiki ni sensō o okosasenai tame ni (NO! to dangerous textbooks: for a war-­free 21st century), Tōkyō: Kadensha, pp. 41–42, 141–42. 23 In the case of high schools, school authorities make the decision, as they do in all national junior and senior high schools and private schools. Concerning the selection process, see Saaler, S. (2006). Politics, Memory, and Public Opinion: The History Textbook Controversy and Japanese Society. Monograph Series of the German Institute for Japanese Studies. Tōkyō: IUDICIUM Verlag. 24 See Children and Textbooks Japan Network 21, ed. (2008), pp. 46–48, and Tawara, Y. (2001b). “Tsukurukai” undō to wa nan datta no ka (Looking back on the “Tsukurukai” movement). Sekai Bessatsu (Sekai special issue: Rekishi kyōkasho mondai e no kaitō (A response to the history textbook issue). Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, pp. 113–14. 25 Nihon Shoseki went bankrupt as a result of its poor sales performance in the 2001 textbook adoption round. The company has since been restructured as Nihon Shoseki Shinsha, but results have continued to disappoint, and the publisher did not submit any new editions for screening and certification in 2012. The company abandoned the textbook business after distributing the last of its existing curriculum-­based schoolbooks for the 2014 school year. 26 In national and private schools, where individual schools pick their own textbooks, Nissho’s texts had the highest adoption rate of any history book. This did not change even when the publisher’s sales fell rapidly in local public school districts where education boards did the choosing. The problem, then, clearly lies in the adoption system itself, where the outcome now depends on the votes cast by the school board officials in each textbook-­selection district. 27 The Shintō Political Alliance Diet Members’ Roundtable (Shintō Seiji Renmei Kokkaigiin Kondankai) is dedicated to restoring ethnic purity and Shintō traditionalism, including formal visits to Yasukuni Shrine by government officials. The Association of Diet Member for Worshiping Together at Yasukuni Shrine (Minna de Yasukuni Jinja ni Sanpai suru G’in no Kai) was created in 1981 and promotes official worship at Yasukuni by conservative parliamentarians. The Diet Members Alliance for Promoting the Assessment of a New Constitution (Kenpō ChōsaSsuishin GiinRrenmei) was formed in 1997 to coordinate constitutional revision, notably the elimination of

Comfort women, textbooks, the “new right”   165 Article 9’s pacifist clauses. The Diet Members Alliance for Enacting a New Constitution (Shinkenpō Seitei Giin Dōmei) dates from 1955 and early conservative initiatives to rewrite the Constitution. It is less influential than the Alliance for Promoting the Assessment of a New Constitution, although many lawmakers belong to both. For a brief discussion of these organizations in English, see Penney, M. (2013). The Abe Cabinet: an ideological breakdown. The Asia-­Pacific Journal: Japan Focus. January 28. [online] Available at: http://apjjf.org/Matthew-­Penney/4747/article.html [accessed December 12, 2015]. 28 Abe appointed nine associates of the Diet Members Group for Considering Japan’s Future and History Textbooks (Diet Members Group = DMG) to ministerial posts in his second administration. In addition to the Prime Minister himself, who serves as DMG advisor, members include Shimomura Hakubun, Education Minister (DMG secretary); Furuya Keiji, National Public Safety Commission Chair (DMG chair); Yamamoto Ichita, Minister of State for Okinawa and Northern Territories Affairs (DMG assistant chief of general affairs); Shindō Yoshitaka, Internal Affairs and Communications Minister; Kishida Fumio, Foreign Affairs Minister; Nemoto Takumi, Minister for Reconstruction; Inada Tomomi, Minister of State for Regulatory Reform; and Suga Yoshihide, Chief Cabinet Secretary. Other DMG members are Etō Seiichi, special advisor to the prime minister (DMG vice-­chair) and Yoshiie Hiroyuki, the Education Ministry’s parliamentary secretary (DMG general affairs director). 29 Both public comments were placed by the Committee for Historical Facts (Rekishi Jijitsu Iinkai), an organization of ultra-­conservative intellectuals, journalists, and opinion leaders. Members included Sakurai Yoshiko, Sugiyama Kōichi, Yayama Tarō, and Fujioka Nobukatsu. Committee for Historical Facts (2007). THE FACTS. Washington Post, June 14 and Committee for Historical Facts (2012). Yes, We Remember the Facts. Star-­Ledger (New Jersey), November 4. 30 Led by Abe’s future education minister, Shimomura Hakubun, the Headquarters for the Revitalization of Education consisted of five working groups (WG). These were the Basic Policy WG (Endō Toshiaki, chair), the Board of Education Reform WG (Yoshiie Hiroyuki, chair), the Textbook Screening and Adoption Reform WG (Matsuno Hirokazu, chair), the Measures against Bullying WG (Hase Hiroshi, chair), and the Strengthening Higher Education WG (Yamatani Eriko, chair). 31 Members of the Council for the Revitalization of Education include the former governor of Ehime Prefecture, Kato Moriyuki, who arranged to have The New History Textbook and other Fusōsha texts adopted by local school boards; Kōno Tatsunobu, who heads the rightwing National Federation of Teachers of Japan, which supports the Japan Education Rebirth Institute (Nippon Kyōiku Saisei Kikō); Sono Ayako, a veteran denier of, among other things, forced collective suicides during the 1945 battle of Okinawa; and Yagi Hidetsugu, chair of the Japan Education Rebirth Institute and one of the authors of a controversial junior high civics text published by Ikuhosha. Taketomi Town in Okinawa rejected the Ikuhosha text because of its one-­sided emphasis on constitutional revisionism and its glorification of war, leading to a clash of wills with the Education Ministry. The local board of education continues to defy a rare direct order from the ministry to employ the Ikuhosha schoolbook. 32 See Kodomo to Kyōkasho Zenkoku Netto 21 hen [Children and Textbooks Japan Network 21], ed. (2013). Kyōkasho no koteika ka!?—Abe-­ryū “kyōiku saisei” o tou (Will textbook content be prescribed?!: questioning the Abe-­style “revitalization of education” campaign), Tōkyō: Kamogawa Shuppan, pp.  20–30, and Tawara, Y. (2015). The Abe Government and the 2014 Screening of Japanese Junior High School History Textbooks. The Asia-­Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, Vol. 13, Issue 16, No. 2, April 27. [online] Available at: http://apjjf.org/2015/13/16/Tawara-­Yoshifumi/4312. html [accessed December 15, 2015].

7 The Japan–ROK claims settlement and the comfort women Yoshizawa Fumitoshi

The problem During the war waged by the Empire of Japan in Asia and the Pacific from 1931 to 1945, Imperial armed forces coercively mobilized tens of thousands of women of Korean and many other ethnic and national origins to become “comfort women.” Today, the dignity of victimized survivors continues to be impaired by the social onus of their wartime past. Japan has yet to take decisive steps to remove that stigma by making appropriate amends for colonial and military brutality. The Japanese government asserts that the comfort women issue was settled definitively by a bilateral accord—the Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property and Claims and on Economic Co-­operation between Japan and the Republic of Korea (hereafter, claims agreement), which was concluded in 1965 as part of the Japan–ROK Treaty on Basic Relations. Although the Japanese position on claims and compensation is limited to South Korean comfort women, I explore here the ways in which the 1965 accord impinges on the issue of military sexual enslavement and consider the wider implications this has for the international community in general. This chapter has two main objectives. The first is to understand how the Japan–ROK treaty conferences (1951–65) that produced the claims entente dealt with the comfort women problem, specifically the legal right of individual survivors to assert damages against the Japanese state. To understand this, I have examined declassified records of the treaty conferences. The second objective is to assess the importance of these documents for a just settlement of the comfort women controversy, both in Japan and in South Korea. Since 2005, Tokyo and Seoul have progressively opened their diplomatic archives to the public in response to unrelenting legal pressure from an alliance of war victims and grassroots civic organizations. Here, I pay special attention to Japanese and South Korean court rulings on declassification requests and the subsequent responses of both governments. The chapter concludes by considering the prospects for a genuine resolution of the comfort women problem based on the points I raise. Due to limitations of space, I have not included background information on the Japan–ROK negotiations.1

The Japan–ROK claims settlement   167

The comfort women issue and the 1951–65 treaty talks Japan and the Republic of Korea held bilateral normalization talks from 1951 to 1965, mediated by the U.S. government. The negotiations took place within the framework of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, which was signed on September 8, 1951 in San Francisco and entered into effect on April 28, 1952.2 A document of particular importance to the comfort women question is a survey of compensation claims against Japan carried out by South Korean officials during the tenure of the U.S. Military Government in Korea (1945–48). The guiding principle behind the study was “not the imposition of punitive measures based on revenge, but a rational demand for the restoration of [colonial-­era and war] victims’ legitimate rights.”3 Article 4 (a) of the San Francisco Peace Treaty recognized the right of South Koreans to press individual claims against Japan: “The disposition of claims, including debts, of [South Korean] authorities and residents against Japan and its nationals shall be the subject of special arrangements between Japan and such authorities.” The treaty made a distinction between these demands and war reparations, which were covered by Article 14. Since South Korea was not a signatory to the treaty, it was not entitled to official reparations per se, but Article 21 expressly entitled it and its nationals to seek the benefits of Article 4. The liabilities specified in Article 4 were broader than war reparations, however, and during postwar talks, Japanese and South Korean diplomats were first obliged to agree on what constituted a legitimate claim. Previous research has concluded that the comfort women problem was not raised as a point of discussion during the seven normalization conferences held between 1951 and 1965. The claims committee minutes for the second round of talks on May 19, 1953 contain only a passing reference by Chang Ki-­yŏng, a ROK Foreign Relations Committee member. Discovered by researcher Yi Yang-­ soo,4 this document appears to contain the only direct mention of the comfort women in the conference records. The relevant passage reads as follows. There is the issue of savings belonging to South Korean nationals repatriating from Japan or its occupied territories. This is similar to the problem of yen-­denominated bank notes issued by the Bank of Japan. Such individuals returned home, bringing with them only the [small] sums allowed by currency restrictions on the export of BOJ notes. According to the holders’ declarations, we calculate that such deposits total more than 100 million yen, and many of these individuals are asking [the ROK government] to loan them money using their BOJ deposits as collateral. There are also Korean women who worked as comfort women in Singapore and other southern territories controlled by the Japanese Navy during the war, and who abandoned their savings and other assets. Some have come to us with receipts [for the deposits] issued by the Military Government of the Allied Powers [deletion in original] asking for loans. As a social relief measure, we have sometimes lent them money on the basis of those receipts.5

168   Yoshizawa Fumitoshi Here, comfort women are discussed only obliquely in conjunction with Korean repatriates forced to leave their Bank of Japan savings behind. It is not surprising, then, that nothing is said about the suffering these women endured in wartime comfort stations. In subsequent negotiations, Tokyo renounced the right to pursue claims for assets lost by Japanese nationals living in South Korea at the war’s end, and thereafter, the focus shifted to the ROK government’s prerogatives in seeking compensation from Japan. Those negotiations ended abruptly in less than a year, however, as the discussion shifted to the question of Japanese economic assistance to South Korea, in effect sidelining the issue of claims compensation. The talks culminated in the so-­called Ōhira-Kim memo, which described a secret agreement reached in November 1962 between Ōhira Masayoshi, Japan’s Foreign Minister, and Kim Chong-­p’il, Director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency. Not fully declassified until 2005, the memo stipulated that Tokyo would provide Seoul with a total of $300 million in grants and economic development funds in lieu of direct compensation. In return, Seoul agreed to drop all claims for the property, rights, and interests of South Korean nationals during the colonial era (1910–45). From the Japanese viewpoint, this understanding deprived individual Koreans of the right to demand legal redress. The Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea was signed on June 22, 1965, together with related implementing protocols, including the claims agreement. Article 2, paragraph 1 of the claims agreement stipulates that: The Contracting Parties confirm that [the] problem concerning property, rights and interests of the two Contracting Parties and their nationals … and concerning claims between the Contracting Parties and their nationals, including those provided for in Article 4, paragraph (a) of the Treaty of Peace with Japan … is settled completely and finally.6 What, then, were the specific claims that had been “settled completely and finally?”7 First, we should note that on June 18, 1965, shortly before the claims agreement was initialed, Japan’s Foreign Ministry spelled out its interpretation of South Korea’s right to pursue compensation requests against Japan as follows. The basic thinking behind Japan’s draft agreement rests on the understanding of both countries, since the Ōhira-Kim agreement, that the problem of the right to property and other claims related to a so-­called postwar settlement necessitated by the separation [from Japan] and independence of the Republic of Korea is [hereby] finally settled. Therefore, with the restoration of bilateral relations following a period in the immediate aftermath of the war when such relations were discontinued, and since the resumption of normal contacts between the two countries and peoples, the property, rights, and interests of South Korean nationals who have resided in Japan (also including as a matter of course persons who have lived continuously in

The Japan–ROK claims settlement   169 Japan since before the war), as well as the property, rights, and interests that South Korean nationals have managed to acquire [in Japan since the resumption of normal bilateral contacts] will not be affected [by this agreement]. However, as concerns the property, rights, and interests in Japan of Korean nationals who have repatriated to the Republic of Korea, it is within reason that they ultimately should be dealt with as part of said settlement.8 In short, the Ministry believed that property and other bilateral claims were part of the postwar settlement of unresolved issues occasioned by South Korea’s formal separation from Japan in 1952 (as per Article 29 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, effective April 28, 1952). After the claims agreement entered into force in 1965, this understanding prompted Japan’s labor, finance, health and welfare, and other ministries to begin extinguishing the compensation rights of individual South Koreans—demands related to unpaid wages, military pensions, postal savings, bank deposits, government bonds, insurance premiums, workers compensation, etc. Below is a list of war relief benefits scheduled for liquidation as potential claims. The benefits registry was drawn up by the War Victims Relief Bureau, the Health and Welfare Ministry agency that would most likely have dealt with comfort women claimants had the Japanese government so directed. Nothing in the list pertains even remotely to former comfort women. 1 2 3 4 5 6

Benefits under the Assistance Law for Families and Others Related to Unrepatriated Soldiers, the Special Measures Law for Unrepatriated Soldiers, and the Special Relief Law for War Invalids. Disability and survivors’ benefits under the Assistance Law for War Invalids and Families of the War Dead. Allotments to returnees and families of the war dead under the Repatriates Benefit Law. Allotments to war widows under the Special Benefits Law for Wives of the War Dead. Special condolence grants for war-­bereaved families. Other disbursements (outstanding wages for veterans and civilian auxiliaries employed by the military, payments for already delivered goods, compensation for terminations of contract, damage claims, and debts accrued under items 2, 3, and 4 above after August 16, 1945).10

All of these benefits relate to potential civil and property liabilities stemming from pre-­surrender colonial-­era law.11 War-­victims relief is one of eight categories of compensation claims submitted by the South Korean side, including back pay earned by forced laborers and military conscripts. It is these outstanding demands that the 1965 claims agreement “settled completely and finally.” Damages for injuries suffered by surviving comfort women and other war-­crimes victims were obviously beyond the purview of the 1965 claims agreement. They were never considered.

170   Yoshizawa Fumitoshi The Japanese Foreign Ministry, for its part, assumed it would deal with Korean personal claims simply by having both countries waive their respective diplomatic rights to espouse and protect the interests of their respective nationals. A document compiled by the Ministry’s Treaties Bureau on April 6, 1965, contains a straightforward expression of this view of diplomatic espousal and is worth citing here. There are two main points to consider. First, the Ministry defines diplomatic protection as “the right of a state to seek compensation at an international level against another state for injuries to its rights [and interests], such injuries arising from infringements on the rights [and interests] of its own nationals.”12 A second point is that the state does not serve as a proxy for those nationals whose rights have been violated. Diplomatic espousal is considered to be a prerogative of the state, not of the individual. The state can decide at its own discretion whether or not to raise these kinds of claims. Moreover, concerning the satisfaction of claims brought by another state against itself, the state is entirely free to determine the form in which, and the extent to which, such demands will be met, and how compensation, etc. is to be distributed among the victims.13

Figure 7.1 Japanese civic organizations fill a street in downtown Tokyo’s Ginza area to protest the Japan–ROK treaty. Demonstrators say the accord will make South Korea a cog in the U.S. economic, political, and military strategy for the Far East. This style of street protest was employed by civic groups opposing the Vietnam War, November 7, 1965. Source: Courtesy of Kyōdō Tsūshin.

The Japan–ROK claims settlement   171 Using this argument, the Japanese government concluded that both itself and South Korea, by abandoning their respective rights of diplomatic espousal, would become free to dispose of property and other claims belonging to the other country and its citizens. The question of individual compensation, however, was left in abeyance. On December 17, 1965, Japan then enacted a domestic law to void the personal demands of South Korean claimants: the Act regarding Measures in Relation to Property Rights of the Republic of Korea and Others Incidental to Enforcement of Article 2 (of the claims agreement). The act stated simply that, “any liability or security right claims of [South] Korea or its people against Japan or its people that qualifies as property and interests as provided by Article 2 of the Agreement is terminated as of June 22, 1965.”14 To summarize the principal arguments so far, we discern here two phases in a clever and decisive diplomatic maneuver on Japan’s part. First, the Japan–ROK normalization talks never raised the question of comfort women as war victims and potential claimants. This omission effectively excluded them from the scope of the agreement, which purported to settle all outstanding war-­related claims “completely and finally.” Second, the Japanese government equated the disposition of its legal

Figure 7.2 The Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea was signed on June 22, 1965. Koreans in Japan associated with the Korean Resi­ dents Union in Japan (Mindan) supported the treaty, but two student organiza­ tions strongly opposed it for not protecting the civil and political rights of resident zainichi Koreans. Here, the Korean Youth Union in Japan and the Korean Students Union in Japan hold an emergency rally in Hibiya Park, central Tokyo, to criticize the normalization treaty, March 25, 1965. Source: Courtesy Kyōdō Tsūshin.

172   Yoshizawa Fumitoshi liabilities with the mutual abandonment of diplomatic protection for individual claimants, leaving the pursuit of personal damages undefined and tenuous. It then proceeded to enact a domestic law that established procedures for abrogating the rights of aggrieved South Koreans to initiate action against the Japanese state.

The release of normalization documents and the comfort women issue After the claims agreement, South Korea’s successive attempts to indemnify war victims proved woefully inadequate, as such efforts were limited primarily to property losses and consolation payments to the families of deceased war conscripts. With the Republic of Korea’s transition to a democratic state in the late 1980s, survivors not only in South Korea but also throughout Asia stepped forward to demand redress for crimes committed by the Imperial state during the Asia-­Pacific War (1931–45). The greatest obstacle encountered by Korean victims was the rigid insistence of Japan’s government and judiciary that the 1965 bilateral accord had settled the claims issue once and for all. In view of this impasse, on October 11, 2002, 100 war survivors, including ten former comfort women, filed a lawsuit with the Seoul Administrative Court demanding the public disclosure of Japan–ROK normalization documents. Their intent was to determine whether or not the claims accord had truly liquidated personal compensation rights, as Tokyo asserted. On February 13, 2004, the court ruled partially in favor of the plaintiffs, and in November of that year, the South Korean government set up the Truth Commission on Forced Mobilization under Japanese Imperialism and began to prepare for the declassification of relevant documents. On January 17, 2005, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Korea released five volumes of records in compliance with the Administrative Court’s finding, and on August 26, it opened to the public all 156 volumes in the ministry’s possession. This body of diplomatic materials comprised approximately 36,000 pages.15 Of particular significance to the comfort women issue was Seoul’s creation, also on August 26, 2005, of the Public–Private Joint Committee (PPJC) on Follow-­up Measures After the Public Release of ROK–Japan Negotiations Documents (chaired by Prime Minister Lee Hae-­chan). The PPJC deliberated the legal scope of the claims settlement and future South Korean policy on the question. It announced that concerning  crimes against humanity, such as the Japanese military comfort women [system], that involved the exercise of state power by the Japanese [state] and its military, Japan has incurred a standing legal obligation that cannot be construed as having been waived by the 1965 Claims Agreement.16  The PPJC also urged the South Korean government to “maintain pressure on Japan to assume legal responsibility and to raise the problem with the U.N. Commission on Human Rights and other international organizations.”

The Japan–ROK claims settlement   173 Acting on this recommendation, Seoul worked through diplomatic channels to have the Japanese side act decisively on the issue. Tokyo remained recalcit­ rant. The year 2010 marked the centennial of the 1910 Japan–Korea Annexation Treaty, which signaled Korea’s formal occupation as a colony. The Japanese government, however, missed a rare occasion to gain traction on the comfort women and other pending bilateral issues, responding instead with clichés and half-­measures. On August 10, Prime Minister Kan Naoto issued a statement that read in part: As demonstrated by strong resistance, such as the Samil [March 1, 1919] independence movement, the Korean people of that time [were] deprived of their country and culture, and their ethnic pride was deeply scarred by colonial rule, which was imposed against their will under the political and military [order of the day].17 Kan’s statement was framed in the passive tense and failed to clearly identify the aggressor. Few Koreans were moved by it. The Japanese premier followed up his pronouncement by returning some important Korean cultural assets carried off by Japan during the colonial period, including the Uigwe, the royal books of rites and ceremonies, but on military sexual servitude, his administration had nothing new to say. A year later, on August 30, 2011, the Constitutional Court of Korea took up the gauntlet, handing down a landmark decision on the claims accord and its applicability to the comfort women. The Court [finds] unconstitutional the [government’s] failure to resolve, under Article 3 of the Agreement on the Settlement of Problems concerning Property and Claims and the Economic Co-­operation between the Republic of Korea and Japan, the dispute over the interpretation of whether damage claims filed by the complainants against Japan, in their capacity as comfort women, have been terminated by Article 2, paragraph 1 of the same Agreement.18 Article 3, Paragraph 1 of the claims settlement states that: “Any dispute between the Contracting Parties concerning the interpretation and implementation of the present Agreement shall be settled, first of all, through diplomatic channels.” Furthermore, Paragraphs 2 and 3 stipulate that if diplomatic efforts fail, the dispute is to go before an arbitration board composed of representatives of Japan, the ROK, and a third country amenable to both countries. In other words, the Constitutional Court declared that since a dispute in fact exists between Japan and South Korea over the interpretation and implementation of Article 2, Seoul’s failure to take concrete steps to negotiate the comfort women issue with Tokyo and, if necessary, submit the problem to arbitration as per Article 3 is unconstitutional in light of the ROK Constitution, which requires the state to safeguard the fundamental human rights of all citizens.

174   Yoshizawa Fumitoshi Under virtual court order, Seoul again called on Tokyo to find a solution to the comfort women problem. At a Japan–ROK summit on December 18, 2011 in Kyoto, South Korean President Lee Myung-­bak strongly urged Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko (Democratic Party of Japan) to assert his leadership and address the problem at a political level. When the two leaders met again in Beijing on May 13, 2012, Lee told Noda that, “If we face up to history and pool our wisdom, our countries can strengthen their relationship.” Noda had not prepared a concrete proposal but replied, “I would like to join you in giving serious thought to this question.”19 Sometime in the later part of 2011, Japan’s Foreign Ministry posted a document on its official website entitled Recent Policy of the Government of Japan on the Issue known as “Comfort Women.” Dated “August 2011,” it presumably was in response to the Korean Constitutional Court decision. Instead of rebutting the ruling, however, the Ministry lauded the Japanese government’s successful collaboration with the National Asian Peace Fund for Women (also known as the Asian Women’s Fund) between 1995 and 2007 and congratulated itself on having addressed contemporary problems affecting “the honor and dignity of women,” including sponsoring international gatherings on women’s rights.20 In its August 2011 judgment, the Constitutional Court criticized the PPJC for failure to act on its 2005 determination that Article 2 of the claims agreement does not nullify Japan’s legal obligation to resolve the claims of former comfort women. “This hardly constitutes a settlement through diplomatic channels under Article 3 [of the Agreement],” the court admonished. It then added, and even if it does, the settlement efforts should continue and the procedure of arbitration referral provided [for] in Article 3 must be [invoked] should there be no further way [to achieve] a diplomatic resolution. Yet [the government] has neither mentioned the comfort women issue directly since 2008 nor [formulated] specific plans for a settlement.21 As far as this author could tell, the South Korean government was reluctant to fulfill its constitutional obligation to initiate talks with Japan, which also dragged its feet on the issue. In 2012, there were two major new developments in the claims controversy. The first was two rulings by the Supreme Court of Korea. On May 24 of that year, the court overturned two Busan High Court verdicts, remanding the cases for retrial. One was the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Labor Conscript Case (filed by Korean A-­bomb victims forcibly recruited by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries during the war); the other was the Nippon Steel Labor Conscript Case. Paragraph 6 of the ruling—essentially the same for both complaints—dealt with the question of whether the 1965 claims agreement liquidated the plaintiffs’ right to assert damages. The Supreme Court noted that the South Korean and Japanese governments disagreed over the legality/illegality under international law of Japan’s colonial rule over the Korean Peninsula. “Given this circumstance,” it said, “neither claim rights for crimes against humanity involving

The Japan–ROK claims settlement   175 [the exercise of] Japanese state power nor damages inflicted [on individuals] by the crime of colonial rule were addressed by the Claims Agreement.”22 The bilateral agreement, the court concluded, did not extinguish the rights of individual plaintiffs to demand redress. Nor, it added, had the Republic of Korea relinquished its right thereby to extend diplomatic protection to its own nationals. Essentially, the court found that the plaintiffs’ right to file compensation claims for forced labor mobilization was intact and not subject to the “settled completely and finally” clause in the claims agreement, and that Seoul retained diplomatic rights of espousal for Koreans victimized by colonial rule and war. A second key event occurred on October 11, 2012, when the Tokyo District Court issued a disclosure order directing the Japanese government to open the Foreign Ministry’s treaty archives to public scrutiny.23 This was the result of intensive lobbying by civic groups in Japan, notably the Citizen’s Group for Full Disclosure of Japan–ROK Normalization Documents (Nikkan Kaidan BunshoZzenmen Kōkai o Motomerukai—hereafter, Motomerukai). The Motomerukai was formed in December 2005 to lobby the Foreign Ministry to emulate its South Korean counterpart and declassify all treaty-­related documents. By May 9, 2008, the ministry had released approximately 60,000 pages of secret materials. Key files had been withheld, however, and many of those ultimately made public were partially redacted. Dissatisfied with this piecemeal response, the Motomerukai continued to push for full disclosure by pursuing three civil suits, the first of which was filed in 2006. The District Court ruling of October 2012 established an important precedent by requiring the ministry to establish clear criteria, and give sound reasons, for withholding archival materials more than 30 years old. On October 24, two weeks after the decision, the Foreign Ministry appealed the verdict to the Tokyo High Court. The same day, Foreign Minister Gemba Kōichirō warned that releasing all of the requested materials could damage the national interest. It was advisable, he said, that additional documents remain inaccessible. Nonetheless, the ministry proceeded to release 20,000 pages of records, making fully public two-­thirds of the 268 document groups covered by the disclosure order. Moreover, it indicated that some of the papers under ministry appeal would be partially opened. The court had concurred that 114 document groups should remain confidential, but the ministry indicated it would disclose, fully or in part, 20 of these.24 The Motomerukai has continued to contest the ministry’s insistence that full declassification would prejudice future diplomatic negotiations with both Koreas. The gradual opening of the Japan–ROK treaty archives allows us to reaffirm that the 1965 claims agreement did not affect the comfort women issue. Settlement of the bilateral dispute through Article 3 arbitration remains a viable option, even after the Japan–ROK agreement of December 2015 (see below). The Motomerukai disbanded in December 2016 but will continue to manage the diplomatic materials it has amassed and challenge the state’s refusal to open the entire archive.25 As the disclosure process moves forward in Japan, future releases are likely to further undermine the Japanese government’s contention

176   Yoshizawa Fumitoshi that individual compensation claims have been “settled completely and finally,” or that the comfort women issue itself has been “resolved finally and irreversibly” as stated in the December 2015 accord.

Looking to the future I believe that two possible avenues could lead to a resolution of the comfort women controversy using what we now know about the 1965 claims agreement. The first concerns future developments in the civil lawsuit to force full disclosure of Japan’s normalization records. In December 2012, lawyer Higashizawa Yasushi told a Motomerukai symposium in Tokyo that, from a legal standpoint, a document proving that both sides had agreed to ignore or postpone discussion of the comfort women issue during treaty negotiations would be a major breakthrough.26 We already know of one such example: a memorandum on the bilateral territorial issue. Just prior to the Ōhira-Kim talks of November 12, 1962, the Japanese side handed their South Korean counterparts an outline of the talking points. In it, Ōhira proposed that both countries submit the dispute over ownership of the Takeshima (Dokdo) islets to the International Court of Justice. Tokyo argued that, since a verdict will require at least two years or so, [when it is reached] a considerable period of time will have elapsed since the conclusion of the normalization treaty. For the moment, there is no danger of [such a] decision arousing strong popular dissent in either country. This memo has been declassified by Seoul.27 A matching copy is almost certainly among those papers subject to the disclosure order that Japan’s Foreign Ministry now opposes. Discovering a document of similar import pertaining to the comfort women would be a significant step forward in the struggle to win genuine justice for the survivors of military sexual enslavement. A second approach requires us to take a more universal view of the problem. At a July 14, 2012 Motomerukai symposium, Abe Kōki, a prominent scholar of international law at Kanagawa University, suggested that: “since the claims dispute is a recent event, the accord should be reevaluated by contemporary legal standards, not by criteria obtaining when the agreement was concluded nearly 50 years ago. Recent interpretations of international humanitarian law should be applied.”28 In other words, one way to rectify past injustices is to work through transnational human rights mechanisms, using the legal insights of modern human rights jurisprudence. The 1965 claims agreement did not settle legally or historically the comfort women issue, which involves Japan’s unresolved liability for colonialism and military aggression. Overcoming the limitations of that accord in order to achieve genuine redress would help the aging survivors fully regain their dignity in the eyes of society. Finding a solution has much broader implications,

The Japan–ROK claims settlement   177 however, for a lasting settlement would also liberate the Japanese people from the vicious historical cycle of war, which even now threatens to repeat itself, creating new victims. In that sense, the claims controversy is more than a simple diplomatic dispute between Japan and South Korea. Resolving it will ultimately help safeguard the dignity of people everywhere, paving the way for a world where all can live together peacefully as decent human beings.

Postscript On December 28, 2015, the foreign ministers of Japan and the Republic of Korea agreed on a “solution” to the comfort women problem. I would like to comment briefly on that accord as it relates to the 1965 claims agreement. A first point is that the crucial issue here is to fully restore the honor and dignity of former comfort women. The recent bilateral understanding, however, does not reflect survivors’ needs, wishes, or thinking. In lieu of consulting the victims individually, Tokyo agreed to “contribute” ¥1 billion to “support” the women in return for Seoul’s confirmation “that this issue is resolved finally and irreversibly.” This amounts to the aggressor forcing the aggrieved to accept the former’s point of view (humanitarian support, not compensation) and stifle victims’ voices. Many former comfort women are unlikely to agree to such a demand. The 1965 Japan–ROK normalization treaty and the attendant claims agreement reflected no awareness of Japan’s colonial rule of Korea. The Abe Cabinet, drawing on past statements by former Chief Cabinet Secretary Kōno Yōhei (1993), former Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi (1995), and Abe himself (2015), acknowledges that the comfort women system, “with the involvement of the Japanese military authorities of that time, was a grave affront to the honor and dignity of large numbers of women.” In that sense, the bilateral agreement demonstrates some degree of historical awareness. Japan does not, however, admit responsibility for colonial rule and continues to stick to its position that all South Korean compensation demands were “settled completely and finally” by the bilateral claims accord of 1965. This is incompatible with the South Korean position, which views colonial rule as a “forcible occupation” and the comfort women issue as lying outside the framework of the claims agreement and therefore unresolved. As in 1965, the two incompatible standpoints have not been reconciled. The December 2015 agreement was reached without basic consensus on the substantive issues at hand. If we are to break the impasse of the 1965 claims agreement, revalidate the victim-­survivors’ self-­respect and social standing, and put the Japan–ROK relationship on a sound footing, Japan must demonstrate a clear awareness of its historical role as aggressor in its past relations with the people of the Korean Peninsula. It is vital to remember that comfort women also exist in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Japan and the DPRK have yet to sign a normalization treaty, and North Korean victims have been virtually excluded from the debate on military sexual slavery. Japan signed the 1965 Treaty on Basic

178   Yoshizawa Fumitoshi Relations with South Korea at the height of the Cold War. Since then, Japan, South Korea, and the United States have worked together to isolate the DPRK. In that sense, too, Japan must go beyond the bilateral Treaty on Basic Relations and reach out to all living Korean victims of the Japanese military comfort women system.

Notes   1 For a full discussion, see Yoshizawa, F. (2011). Nikkan kokkō seijōka (The normal­ ization of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea). In: S. Nakano et al., eds., Iwanami Kōza: Higashi Ajia kingendai shi (Iwanami Lecture Series: The early modern and contemporary history of East Asia). Vol. 8: Betonamu sensō no jidai, 1960–1975 (The Vietnam War era, 1960–1975). Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, pp. 154–70. In English, see Cha, V. D. (1996). Bridging the Gap: The Strategic Context of the 1965 Korea-­Japan Normalization Treaty. Korean Studies. Vol. 20, pp. 123–60, and Yoon, T. (2008). Learning to Cooperate not to Cooperate: Bargaining for the 1965 Korea-­Japan Normalization. Asian Perspective. Vol.  32, No. 2, pp. 59–91.   2 Occupying the southern half of the Korean Peninsula, the Republic of Korea was one of two independent states created there in 1948. The northern state, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, was refused diplomatic recongition by Japan and the United States. For reasons beyond the scope of this chapter, both Koreas were excluded from participation in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and Japan has yet to sign a normalization treaty with Pyongyang.   3 Taehan Min’guk Oemubu Chŏngmuguk [Political Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea] (1954). Taeil paesang yogu chosŏ (Report on compensation claims against Japan). Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, p. 2.   4 Yi, Y. (2014). Shinki kaizi bunsho o sankō ni shita Nikkan seikyūken mondai no kōsatsu (Observations on the Japan–ROK claims issue based on recent declassified documents). Nikkan kaidan bunsho zenmen kōkai o motomerukai (Motomerukai) website. [online] Available at: www.f8.wx301.smilestart.ne.jp [accessed April 5, 2017]. Note that all of the declassified diplomatic papers relating to the Japan–ROK normalization talks cited in this chapter are available online in both Japanese and Korean. The Japanese documents can be accessed at the Motomerukai website listed above. For South Korean documents, see the Northeast Asia History Network website, managed by the Northeast Asian History Foundation at: http://contents.nahf.or.kr/ index.do.   5 Ajiakyoku Dainika, Gaimushō [Second Division, Asian Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan] (1953). Nikkan kōshō kaigi giji yōroku (12) dainikai seikyūken kankei bukai (Minutes of the Japan–ROK negotiation conference (12), second claims committee). May 19. (MOFA public disclosure. Release No. 1081. Document No. 693, p. 27.)   6 “The World and Japan” Database Project (last updated: 2017). Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property and Claims and on Economic Co-­operation between Japan and the Republic of Korea (June 22, 1965). Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, University of Tokyo. [online] Available at: www.ioc.u-­tokyo.ac. jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPKR/19650622.T9E.html [accessed March 25, 2017].   7 For details, see Yoshizawa, F. (2012). Nikkan Seikyūken Kyōtei to sengo hoshō mondai no genzai: dai nijō jōbunka katei no kenshō o tōshite (The current stage of postwar compensation issues and the ROK–Japan Claims Agreement: the drafting process of Article 2). In: Nihon Heiwa Gakkai [The Peace Studies Association of Japan], ed., Taisei ikōki no jinken kaifuku to seigi (The restotation of human rights

The Japan–ROK claims settlement   179 and justice during the transition to a new political regime), Vol. 38. Tōkyō: Waseda Daigaku Shuppanbu, pp. 41–56.   8 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (1965a). Zaisan oyobi seikyūken mondai kaiketsu jōkō [Dainijō] ni tsuite (Regarding provisions on settling the issue of property and claims [Article 2]). June 18. (MOFA public disclosure. Release No. 1164. Document No. 1314. Volume 3, pp. 72–73.).   9 Article 2 (a) states simply that “Japan, recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title, and claim to Korea.…” 10 War Victims’ Relief Bureau, Ministry of Health and Welfare (1965). Nikkan Seikyūken Kyōtei no seiritsu ni tomonau kokunaihō jō no sochi no yōhi shirabe (Assessment of necessary measures to be taken in relation to domestic laws when the Japan–ROK claims agreement takes effect), August 13, 1965. (MOFA public disclosure. Release No. 1163. Document No. 1226, pp. 21–27.). 11 Japan’s war-­relief laws were enacted after the return of Japanese sovereignty on April 28, 1952, with the entry into force of the peace treaty, and included a nationality clause that automatically barred non-­Japanese from receiving benefits. The exclusion of Koreans and Taiwanese residing in Japan was based on pre-­1945 legal distinctions under colonial law. See Yoshizawa, F. (2015a). Nikkan kaidan 1965: sengo Nikkan kankei no genten o kenshō suru (The 1965 Japan–ROK normalization conferences: the point of departure for postwar Japan–ROK relations), Tōkyō: Kōbunken, pp. 117–18 and Chapter 4. 12 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (1965b). Heiwa jōyaku ni okeru kokumin no zaisan oyobi seikyūken hōki no hōritsuteki imi—jōki (The legal meaning of the waiver of indiviual property and claims rights in the peace treaty—stipulation). April 6, 1965. (MOFA public disclosure. Release No. 1164. Document No. 1312, pp. 1–2). 13 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (1965b), p. 2. 14 The English translation is by Taejin Kim, in Kim, T. (2014). Views on compensation for conscripted Korean laborers from Japanese companies: A recent Korean Supreme Court case. The Asian Business Lawyer. Vol. 13, No. 15, p. 22. 15 Kim, J. (2009). “Han-­Il hyŏpchŏng oegyo oegyo munsŏ” munsŏ konggae sosong ŭi chŏn’gae wa naeyong (Diplomatic documents related to the “ROK–Japan Claims Agreement”: the progress of the disclosure lawsuits and an overview of the documents released) [printed résumé]. Han-­Il yangguk ŭi munsŏ konggae ro pon 1965nyŏn Han-­Il hyŏpchŏng kwa ch’ŏnggukwŏn munje (Symposium: The 1965 ROK–Japan Agreement and the claims issue: disclosed documents in Korea and Japan). The Institute for Research in Collaborationist Activities and the Motomerukai (Seoul). December 4. 16 Office of the Prime Minister, Republic of Korea (2005). Public–Private Joint Committee meeting for the publication of documents pertaining to the 1965 ROK–Japan talks. Press materials. August 26 [in Korean]. 17 Kan, N. (2010). Naikaku Sōridaijin Danwa (The Prime Minister’s Statement). Sōri Kantei hōmu pēji (Home page of the Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet). August 10. [online] Available at: www.kantei.go.jp/kan/statement/201008/10danwa. html [accessed March 25, 2017]. 18 Nihongun “Ianfu” Mondai Kaiketsu Zenkoku Kōdō [Japan Nationwide Action Committee to Resolve the Military “Comfort Women” Issue], ed. (2011). Nihongun “ianfu” mondai: hontō ni “Nikkan Seikyūken Kyōtei” de kaiketsuzumi ka? Kankoku Kenpō Saibansho “kettei” o yomu (The Japanese military “comfort women” issue: has it really been settled by the “Japan–ROK Claims Agreement?” Reading the “verdict” of the Korean Constitutional Court), Pamphlet, p. 8. 19 Nihonkeizai Shimbun (2012). Kankoku Daitōryō, ianfu mondai de kaiketsu yōkyū Noda Shushō ni (Japan–ROK Summit Meeting: President Lee urges Japan Prime Minister to move forward on comfort women issue), May 13. [online] Available at: www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASDE13002_T10C12A5PE8000 [accessed March 25, 2017].

180   Yoshizawa Fumitoshi 20 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2011). Ianfu mondai ni taisuru Nihon seifu no kore made no shisaku (Measures taken by the government of Japan on the issue known as the “comfort women”). August. [online] Available at: www.mofa.go.jp/ mofaj/area/taisen/ianfu.html [accessed March 25, 2017]. The website was revised on October 14, 2014. 21 Japan Nationwide Action Committee to Resolve the Military “Comfort Women” Issue (2011), p. 27. The English translation is from: Constitutional Court of Korea. (2011). Twelve Landmark Cases on Social Integration: Political Cases—Challenge against Act of Omission Involving Article 3. August 30. Case No. 2006Hun-Ma788, KCCR: 23–2(A) KCCR 366, View: 36. [online] Available at: http://english.court.go.kr/ cckhome/eng/decisions/social/socialDetail.do [accessed March 25, 2017]. 22 Nihon Seitetsu Moto Chōyōkō Saiban o Shien Suru Kai/Taiheiyō Sensō Higaisha Hoshō Suishin Kyōgikai (Citizens in Support of the Nippon Steel Conscript Case/The Committee for Compensation for Victims of the Pacific War), eds. (2012). 5.24 Kankoku Daihōin hanketsu shiryōshū: Mitsubishi Hiroshima Moto Chōyōkō Genbaku Higaisha/Nihon Seitestu Moto Chōyōkō Saiban (Reference materials on the 5.24 South Korean Supreme Court ruling: the Mitsubishi Labor Conscript Case [filed by Korean A-­bomb victims conscripted by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries], and the Nippon Steel Conscript Case), p. 9. The English version of the judgment is based on a provisional English translation available at: http://library.scourt.go.kr/jsp/html/decision/ 924ohkh2012.5.24.2009Da22549.htm [accessed March 25, 2017]. 23 Refer to the Motomerukai’s website for details on this ruling as well as its lobbying activities (Note 4 above). 24 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2012). Gaimudaijin kaiken kiroku (Minutes of the Foreign Minister’s press conference). October 24. [online] Available at: www. mofq.go.jp/mofaj/press/kaiken/gaisho/g_1210.html#8-A [accessed March 25, 2017]. 25 Motomerukai (2015). Kaisan sengen (Announcement of Closure). December 23. [pdf] Available at: www.f8.wx301.smilestart.ne.jp/kai/news/kaisansengen.pdf [accessed March 2, 2017]. 26 Motomerukai (2012a). Hanketsu o yomitoku: Nikkan kaidan bunsho kaiji seikyū daisanji soshō (Symposium: Dissecting the recent court ruling: the third Japan–ROK documents disclosure lawsuit). Tokyo, December 22. 27 Republic of Korea government public disclosure. (n.d.). Special envoy Kim Jong-­pil’s visit to Japan: 1962. 10–11. Category No. 724.41JA, Registration No.  796, p.  171. This was among the documents released by the South Korean government to the public between January 17 and August 26, 2005. 28 Motomerukai (2012b). Nikkan kaidan bunsho zenmen kōkai o motomerukai nyūsu (Motomerukai news). Vol. 32, August 2, p. 5. [online] Available at:: www.f8.wx301. smilestart.ne.jp.

8 Listen to survivors’ voices! Yang Ching ja

Introduction What would constitute a just settlement of the comfort women issue? Those who advocate for survivors of the Imperial military’s system of wartime sexual servitude must seek a solution based on the demands of the victims themselves for justice, redress, and personal closure. That being said, such a task is not simple. Each survivor has her own private experiences, ideas, and needs. Since it is not possible for those of us in the redress movement to meet with each person individually, any attempt to speak on behalf of all victims inevitably invites accusations of arrogance and misrepresentation. In the Republic of Korea (South Korea), 239 survivors have stepped forward since August 1991, when Kim Hak-­sun first spoke out publicly as a former victim using her real name. When the Japan–ROK memorandum of agreement on the comfort women issue was released in December 2015, 46 were still alive. As of May 2017, only 36 remain. I have no reliable data for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea). Similarly, in other Asian countries, very few of the women who shared their wartime experiences are still with us.1 In the past 20 years or so, the list has shrunk dramatically, and today many survivors are bed-­ridden and unable to communicate effectively. Nonetheless, civic organizations in South Korea continue to work closely with known victims to ascertain their hopes for a settlement and help care for their daily needs. In Japan, too, redress groups frequently visit former comfort women in neighboring countries and energetically advocate on their behalf. For more than 20 years, I have been directly involved with some of the victims. I have personally assisted Song Sin-­do, a zainichi Korean resident of Japan, with the lawsuit she brought against the Japanese government in April 1993 demanding an apology and compensation for the appalling treatment she endured as a comfort woman during the Asia-­Pacific conflict. This chapter focuses on what the survivors envisage as just recompense for their wartime ordeal. My reflections are based on what I have learned from other supporters who have worked closely with survivors, as well as my own interactions with a small number of Korean women, most notably Ms. Song.

182   Yang Ching ja

Figure 8.1 Accompanied by her legal team, Song Sin-do files a lawsuit against the Japanese state at the Tokyo District Court, April 5, 1993. Source: Photo by Lee Moonja, courtesy Yang Chingja.

Here, an important qualification is in order. It is not easy to assess the innermost feelings of even a single woman. Over the past 20 or so years, I have been confronted with this difficulty repeatedly. Survivors have secreted away their memories of physical and emotional trauma, suffered at an impressionable age, in the deepest recesses of their souls. That “truth” is probably inaccessible to someone who has not personally shared a similar experience. Probing the women’s real feelings and trying to communicate that information effectively to the outside world requires tact, a keen sensitivity, and a sense of deep humility on the part of the interlocutor. With that caveat, I proceed with my observations.

The Asian Women’s Fund and Song Sin-­do “Did Hashimoto really write that himself?” That was Song Sin-­do’s first reaction to the “letter of apology” Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō (1996–98) issued to four former comfort women on August 14, 1996. When the secretariat of her trial support group, the Tokyo-­based Legal Support Committee for a Zainichi South Korean Former Comfort Woman (Zainichi Kankokujin no Moto Ianfu Saiban o Sasaerukai), informed Ms. Song of the letter’s contents, I happened to be visiting her home in Miyagi Prefecture and, with her permission, recorded her response.

Listen to survivors’ voices!   183 If he’s really serious about apologizing, he should visit the house of each and every survivor himself, even if that means coming all the way out here. If he’s sorry from the bottom of his heart, why doesn’t he compensate us? Instead, he gives us a low bow and says, “Sorry, private donations are the best we can do. Please accept it.” I don’t believe all this kowtowing, and I don’t trust [Hashimoto]. Maybe a three-­year-old would fall for it.… What do you think? By the way, what’re you going to do about this? Song was asking the person on the other end of the line to clarify her own position. There was no response. “That’s right! Your silence says it all,” Song replied. “Throwing hundreds of millions of yen at us isn’t going to make old wounds go away.”—More silence on the other end—“You bet I’m riled up!” Song continues. “You’d feel the same way if someone had forced you to become a comfort woman!”—Again, silence—Song finishes: No way. There’s no way Hashimoto could think up those words by himself. He’s just trying to pull the wool over our eyes. Stop fooling around and compensate us! We don’t want private donations! [The Japanese state] did something wrong and has to compensate us. If [Hashimoto] can’t grasp that simple fact, then we’ll just fight it out in court! There’s no other choice…! When the news of Hashimoto’s apology reached us on that August day, Ms. Song’s lawyers and I had gathered at her house to prepare for her cross-­ examination on November 1. After three days, she was exhausted from the intense schedule. We were probing wounds that she insisted no amount of money could ever heal. When the phone rang, she had just thrown a tantrum, screaming “if you’re going to be so damned persistent, I’ll give up the court case! I’m sick and tired of being asked the same things over and over again.” Since initiating her lawsuit three years earlier, Song Sin-­do had testified in court and spoken publicly on numerous occasions, but had never allowed anyone a glimpse of her deepest emotions. When you try to go there, she changes the subject, gets upset, and occasionally throws a fit. Because of our close relationship, we supporters were painfully aware that she was dodging the issue not because she hated being pestered but because she did not want to remember. The wounds were so deep that she had repressed their memory, or if she did remember, was unable to express them. But these traumatic experiences were a vital part of the lawsuit, and we had to keep dogging her about them. We were sure that Song was aware of this—after all, it was her trial. On the morning of the third day, however, she couldn’t contain herself any longer and in a voice that was neither reproachful nor imploring told us to stop. “I’ve had enough! I can’t stand it! Don’t ask me any more questions. I’m begging you.” At that moment the phone rang, and Song heard about the prime minister’s written apology. She immediately forgot her irritation and shouted that she would continue her court battle. Ironically, the letter reminded her that while the trial and her testimony would be distressing, the opponent they were up against was formidable and no effort could be spared in the legal fray.

184   Yang Ching ja The National Asian Peace Fund for Women (the so-­called Asian Women’s Fund) had been established a year earlier, on July 19, 1995. On August 5, less than a month later, the AWF began soliciting contributions from private donors for consolation payments. Reports of the amount to be disbursed, however, did not begin to circulate until late April and early May of 1996, almost a year later. The fund’s board of directors had scheduled an announcement for May 9, but disagreements over the content of the prime minister’s letter forced a delay. In June, the AWF reached a general consensus that “the amount will not be less than ¥2 million Japanese yen,” but a final determination was not made until July 19, after a great deal of internal wrangling. It was decided that: (1) ¥2 million in “atonement” (tsugunai) money, collected in principal through private donations, would be distributed to approximately 300 survivors in South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines; (2) medical and social welfare expenses, paid for with a ¥700 million grant from the national treasury, would be provided to survivors over a ten-­year period; and (3) atonement payments would be accompanied by a letter of apology personally signed by the prime minister (see Chapter 4). Based on this decision, the fund dispatched “dialogue teams” to each of the targeted countries. In South Korea and Taiwan, however, the teams ran into strong opposition, and payments there had to be postponed temporarily. Instead, on the morning of August 14, 1996, an award ceremony was held in Manila for three of the four Filipina survivors willing to accept the money. The Japanese ambassador handed each recipient a copy of Prime Minister Hashimoto’s written apology, and the contents became public for the first time. Song Sin-­do’s legal support committee in Tokyo immediately phoned her to relay the content. On August 13, just before the Manila award ceremony, Song learned on the evening news that the AWF had decided to pay the Filipina victims first. She had been glued to the TV screen but turned to me and said, “You know, there’re lots of people around here who say, ‘who cares where the money comes from. Private or public, what’s the difference? It’s a good deal. Go ahead and take it.’ ” Ever since Song filed her legal complaint, many people have offered their unsolicited advice about what she should do. “Someone like you who lives on the public dole has no business taking the government to court,” said some. Others warned, “Your support group is just using you for its own ends,” or “Your lawyers are after your money.” Such counsel closely reflected the development of AWF activities. People would come snooping around and ask: “Well, did you get the money yet?” Expounding on what they had seen on TV, some urged her to take the payment; others said, “Don’t touch it!” These conflicting voices perplexed Ms. Song. By then, she had lived in Japan as a Korean for 50 years. Her experiences there had made her hypersensitive to Japanese attitudes toward Koreans in general and herself in particular. She had to take these words of advice seriously. Song was being pulled in two directions. She was always conscious of the dominant gaze of her Japanese friends and neighbors, but she couldn’t stifle the rage that welled up inside—rage, mingled with recurring pangs of guilt and feelings of self-­loathing.

Listen to survivors’ voices!   185 The AWF money not only created divisions among survivors but also set off a fierce internal struggle in individuals. Whether these women continued to press for justice or opted out, there was no relief. Like it or not, survivors were forced to deal with the unjust and arbitrary choice the fund had thrust upon them and reach a decision. On the one hand, given the perverse obstinacy of the Japanese government, the prospects for victory seemed scant indeed, even if they went all the way to the top. In fact, in 1999, the Tokyo District Court dismissed Song Sin-­do’s lawsuit. In 2000, the Tokyo High Court confirmed that judgment, and in 2003, the Supreme Court upheld it by rejecting her final appeal. Many victims wavered. Some reasoned that it would be easier to say yes to the AWF and at least walk away with some money in their pocket. At the same time, however, they could not hide their anger. As she listens to these discordant voices reverberate in her mind, Song cries out in despair: “If only I hadn’t begun that lawsuit, none of this would be happening.”

Song Sin-­do’s wishes Song Sin-­do was born in 1922 in occupied Korea’s South Chungcheong Province (today, western South Korea). At age 16, she ran away from home to escape a marriage arranged by her parents. In 1938, a Korean woman offered her a job on the China front, telling her she would make enough money “serving her country” (Japan) to live independently. On the strength of that promise but without knowing the nature of the work, Song agreed and was taken to Wuchang (now Wuhan in eastern Hubei province), which had recently been occupied by Imperial forces. There, to her horror, she was confined in a military comfort station called the World Pavilion (Sekaikan), and “Kaneko,” her Japanese slave name, was tattooed on her arm. Song recalls: There were a dozen or so “comfort women” … and we were all Korean. We were not allowed to speak Korean, and even speaking familiarly among ourselves was prohibited. Of all the women, I had the hardest time. I was so young I had not even begun to menstruate yet. The first time I was forced to serve a soldier, I didn’t know what I was supposed to do. I couldn’t stop crying and ran out.… In the “comfort station” office, I got very frightened. Since I didn’t know where I was, I didn’t speak the language, I had no money, and no idea how to take the train, and the area was surrounded with soldiers, escape was impossible.… The manager slapped my cheek until my nose bled, withheld my food and shut me up in a narrow room.… [Afterwards] I was forced to service dozens of soldiers every day. Rest was not permitted during menstruation. Especially on Sundays, there were a lot of soldiers, and some of them demanded dominant and barbaric sexual acts.… If the “comfort women” were too exhausted and tried to refuse the soldiers’ demands, they were threatened with knives, beaten, and subjected to all sorts of violence.2

186   Yang Ching ja The soldiers were required to use condoms, but Song says most of them did not. Women who got pregnant were forced to continue providing sex on demand. Sometime around 1941, Song became pregnant and was transferred to a nearby comfort facility in Hankou, where she gave birth. Compelled to continue working as a comfort woman, she had to give the child up for adoption. After a second pregnancy, Song was transferred closer to the front lines, ending up in Yuezhou (today, Yueyang) in northeastern Hunan Province. Until 1945, she worked for various garrisons in the Yuezhou area, traveling by military transport with the troops she was assigned to. The military withheld her earnings as “national defense contributions.” In mid-­1945, she was transferred to Xianning in southeastern Hubei, about two months before Japan’s surrender on August 15. After the war, a former sergeant she knew asked her to marry him and accompany him to Japan, to which she agreed. In the spring of 1946, soon after arriving at Hakata port in Kyushu, however, her would-­be husband abandoned her Song later met a long-­time Korean resident of Japan and settled down in Miyagi Prefecture in northeastern Japan. They worked together in his restaurant until he died.3 Ms. Song’s legal support committee has devoted itself to securing redress for the violation of Song Sin-­do’s personal dignity and human rights. During the Asia-­Pacific conflict, the Imperial military used her body as a tool for furthering its war of aggression in China. After Japan’s defeat, she endured ethnic discrimination as a resident zainichi Korean. Her oft-­repeated plea, “If I die like this, I’ll never be at peace,” expresses the harsh realities of her wartime and postwar experiences. Taking these words to heart, the legal support committee has focused on exposing the violent infringements of Song’s elementary rights as a human being, including the right to lead a decent life. Together with Song, we are demanding that the state publicly recognize this crime, formally apologize for it, and legislate compensation as partial recompense. The Japanese government must publicly recognize that it has committed a grievous offense against Song’s humanity and take legal measures to redress that wrong. Only that can remove the social stigma attaching to Song’s past, allow her to reclaim a sense of personal wellbeing, and normalize her standing in the community. We have also learned that if we are not very careful, we, too, can end up violating Song Sin-­do’s rights. We must always keep that in mind when interacting with her. When we approach Ms. Song, it is her decision whether or not to respond, and to what extent. She controls the transaction, not us. This should be obvious, but that is not always the case, and people in the advocacy movement must make a conscious effort to put this principle into practice. For that reason, we have been openly critical of people and groups who dogmatically insist that Song refuse to cooperate with the Asian Women’s Fund. That decision is Song’s alone to make. In my case, I tried to be careful not to pass judgment on AWF activities in Ms. Song’s presence. Any opinion offered by a supporter she trusts influences her thinking. If we want to respect Song’s free will, we have no business saying something that might sway her. That said, on many occasions, we also felt that it

Listen to survivors’ voices!   187 was callus to simply repeat, “make up your own mind.” Until the trial began, Song Sin-­do had never been asked to decide anything important by herself, nor had anyone ever solicited her views on an issue. Song was extremely sensitive to the contrary currents agitating local opinion. She resisted pressures to conform but at the same time wanted a measure of acceptance from the community. Given this fact, could we really sit by when her neighbors confused her with contrary advice and piously advised her to think for herself? Or when she was obviously trying to consider her supporters’ feelings in giving an answer? Or when she became exasperated and snapped, “you just work it out with the lawyers and tell me what to do afterward, OK”? Not infrequently, we felt that perhaps the most appropriate way to respect Song’s personal autonomy was to acknowledge her hesitation, anguish, and irritation and, taking those into account, simply say, “this might be a good way to go, but it’s your decision.” Ultimately, sometimes to our amazement, Song coped with every crisis that arose by trusting in her own judgment. When South Korea passed the Military Sexual Slaves Livelihood Stabilization Act in June 1993 and later, when the AFW wrote Song requesting an interview, she responded promptly. Her sharp replies taught us some important lessons. The common thread in her thinking was that the Japanese government must accept full responsibility for the comfort women issue, formally apologize, and pay official compensation. Song will probably spend the rest of her life in Japan. She wants to hold her head high in the community and be treated like everyone else. To illustrate Song Sin-­do’s thinking, I share below an excerpt from an interview I had with her on August 18, 1994, a year after she launched her lawsuit. I did the interview at the request of a journalist who needed a survivor’s response to an Asahi Shimbun article scheduled to appear the next day, on August 19.4 The article described plans for a private fund that would provide “sympathy money” to former comfort women, with the government shouldering operational costs only. The reader should bear in mind that while the media had already floated the idea for an Asia Exchange Center,5 the August 19 article would outline a proposal for a state-­administered private fund. This would lead to the creation of the Asian Women’s Fund in July of the following year. Song Sin-­do was hearing that news for the first time. I’m against it. If that’s what [the government’s] proposing, they should just shut up and forget about it. [Because I’m on welfare] people already say, “you’re living at the taxpayers expense.” Imagine what they’d say if I accepted sympathy money. I’d really get the cold shoulder. In any case, the money should come from the government, not the public. If they showed up with a fist-­full of bills and said, “Here you go, have some sympathy money,” no one would take it, would they? Even a child could see that. People can shun me all they want, but I get along by thinking for myself. I don’t know how they’re planning to raise the money, but I can tell you this: if they’re serious about giving out money or apologizing, then

188   Yang Ching ja they’ll have to apologize about the right thing. If they’re going through the motions just to satisfy themselves, there’s no way I’ll take anything from them. You’ve got to be careful and respect the victims’ needs and wishes. You can fool anyone some of the time, but you can’t fool me, whether you’re the government or just an ordinary citizen. I mean, if they said, “Look, we’re really sorry, but this is all we can afford. So please accept our apologies and take what we offer. The economy’s in bad shape, and we can’t do everything.” If the government said sorry and asked for our understanding, we might think it over. In my heart, I just hope that Japan never goes to war again. The Japanese loved war, didn’t they? Hup, hup, hupping around all day from morning to night, with their rifles and all. Meeting and talking with people is fine. That’s OK, but former comfort women are getting on in years, aren’t they. They may not have much time left. But that didn’t stop [the military] from dragging them off to the front lines when they were young. The government and everyone else have treated us like dirt for the last 50 years. Now all of sudden they’re going on about our future. Everyone has a future. I may be getting old, but even I have a future. What a bunch of crap. It’s not about the money. I’d rather keep giving them hell for what they did to me. I’m not going to swallow my pride for a lousy handout.

Figure 8.2 Song Sin-do joins a Wednesday Demonstration in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, September 1998. It is her first visit to South Korea since beginning her civil suit five years earlier. Source: Photo by Kawata Fumiko, courtesy Yang Chingja.

Listen to survivors’ voices!   189 When I read the final draft of the Asahi article to Song, I had no idea how she would react. But I remember that my whole body snapped to attention when she spoke up quickly and firmly, “It’s not about the money”—a phrase she repeated over and over with real feeling. Those words have guided me in our work together ever since. “It’s not about the money.” I am constantly forced to reconsider my own attitudes toward former comfort women and readjust my thinking. In that way, my understanding of their lives continues to deepen as we go along.

New developments, 2011–13 When the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), then the country’s largest opposition party, took power in September 2009, it offered a ray of hope, however slight, to those of us working on the comfort women issue. In 2001, the DPJ teamed up with the Social Democratic and Communist parties to sponsor the Bill to Promote the Resolution of Issues Concerning the Victims of Wartime Sexual Coercion. The three parties had already introduced the bill on 12 different occasions and failed (see Introduction, Note  5). Now that the DPJ was running the government, survivors and their advocates looked to the party for a legislated solution to the issue and began to organize accordingly. After the DPJ victory, concerned civic groups and human rights organizations in Japan met to form the 2010 Japan Nationwide Action to Resolve the Military Comfort Women Issue (Nihongun Ianfu Mondai Kaiketsu Zenkoku Kōdō 2010).6 The Nationwide Action established blocs in each electoral district across Japan. These branches coordinated their activities, lobbying local municipalities to adopt resolutions urging the central government to find a formula for a just and binding settlement. Nationwide Action blocs also attempted to enlist local Diet members to push for formal legislation mandating an official apology and direct state compensation. In 2010, the DPJ set up an intraparty caucus of lawmakers to formulate a policy response to outstanding war-­reparations issues in general, and it looked as if the comfort women question would be near the top of the agenda. The only concrete measure the caucus took during its three-­year tenure, however, was to distribute special funds to ex-­Japanese prisoners of war who had been detained in Siberia for many years after the end of World War  II.7 Even this measure was limited to Japanese nationals, excluding Korean and Taiwanese veterans—former colonial subjects forcibly conscripted by the Imperial military. During its three years in office (2009–12), the DPJ did not introduce a single comfort women bill. The optimism generated by the DPJ’s rise to power soon dissipated, and the support movement once again found itself backed into a corner. But on August 30, 2011, the Constitutional Court of Korea issued a landmark decision, delaring that the South Korean government’s diplomatic inaction on the comfort women problem was a breach of its constitutional duty. The court’s reasoning was as follows. According to Tokyo’s interpretation, a bilateral claims agreement attached to the 1965 Japan–Republic of Korea Basic Relations Treaty absolved Japan of legal responsibility for the comfort women system. Article 2 of the agreement

190   Yang Ching ja specified that all compensation demands had been settled “completely and finally” by the signing of the 1965 treaty, which restored diplomatic relations between the two countries.8 The Korean Constitutional Court ruled that Seoul’s failure to contest Article 2 of the claims agreement and invoke the arbitration clause in Article 3 was unconstitutional.9 Consequently, South Korea’s Foreign Ministry proposed talks to its Japanese counterparts in September 2011 and again in November, but Tokyo refused to budge, insisting that the 1965 claims agreement had settled the problem. At a December 18 summit in Kyoto, President Lee Myung-­bak personally asked Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko to exert political leadership and renegotiate the issue. Lee was broaching the subject for the first time—nothing had been said in their earlier talks—and spent most of the one-­hour session pressing Noda on the issue. Nonplused, Noda retorted that South Korea should remove the bronze statute of a young comfort woman that Korean redress groups had erected outside the Japanese Embassy in Seoul four days earlier. But he also promised to reconsider the issue. Lee’s insistence reflected not only the Constitutional Court’s finding but also an upsurge in international civic activism on behalf of the comfort women. On December 14, survivors and supporters had celebrated the 1,000th Wednesday Demonstration in front of the Japanese Embassy by unveiling the “peace state” of a teenage woman. On that day, solidarity actions took place in 30 cities in South Korea, 15 cities in Japan, and 29 cities in eight other countries. Lee’s tough stance at the Kyoto summit four days later reflected this unprecedented manifestation of support for the comfort women around the world. Noda and Lee were to meet again on May 13, 2012 during the annual China– Japan–South Korea trilateral summit in Beijing. It was expected that Noda would present a detailed proposal for settling the comfort women controversy. That was not to be. On May 9, the Asahi Shimbun reported that Tokyo had sent Foreign Ministry officials to Seoul to hammer out a new set of humanitarian aid measures but had failed to reach agreement. “At this stage,” the newspaper said, “the Japanese government has concluded that it ‘does not understand what the South Korean government wants in concrete terms’ (government official), and has abandoned the idea of presenting an official proposal at the upcoming [Beijing] meeting.”10 On May 12, the Hokkaidō Shimbun revealed that a proposal had in fact been discussed prior to the meeting. It consisted of (1) an apology from Prime Minister Noda to President Lee, (2) a direct apology from Japanese Ambassador Mutō Masatoshi, to former comfort women, and (3) compensation payments to the victims by the Japanese government.11 The South Korean media amplified that report, and on June 1, Foreign Minister Genba Kōichirō called a press conference to deny that a three-­point plan was in the offing. “Naturally,” he explained, “in the process of refining our ideas, we would consider a wide range of options, but there is no truth to this particular assertion.”12 On June 2, a South Korean official told the daily Han’guk Ilbo that, “until the dignity of the ‘comfort women’ victims has been restored, there is no point in discussing reparations.”

Listen to survivors’ voices!   191 The official noted that, “the only way to resolve the issue is for the Japanese government to acknowledge its legal responsibility toward survivors.”13 The reports coming out of Seoul and Tokyo were contradictory, and there is no way of knowing for sure what diplomatic contortions took place before the May 13 talks. In any event, when Lee and Noda finally met in Beijing, the Japanese premier was empty-­handed. Neither Tokyo nor Seoul had anything concrete to show the survivors, and a precious opportunity to begin the reconciliation process was lost. When nothing came of the May summit, the Nationwide Action set its sights on August 15, 2012 as the next opportunity to push for a legislated solution. On August 10, however, President Lee, nearing the end of his term, paid a personal visit to the contested island of Dokdo (Takeshima) in a bid, he said, to force Tokyo to act on unresolved grievances stemming from the colonial and wartime eras. Then, on August 14, he suggested that if Emperor Akihito ever planned to visit South Korea, he would first have to apologize for Japan’s colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula. These remarks sparked fury in Japan, and bilateral relations sank to a new low. In a September 25 interview, Prime Minister Noda told the Wall Street Journal that “the matter is closed” when asked whether he would consider additional reparations for the comfort women. “In the long negotiation process,” he said, “we have completely and legally resolved the matter of compensation.”14 In December, the ultra-­conservative Liberal Democratic Party ousted the Democratic Party of Japan and took charge of the government. With the advent of Abe Shinzō’s second administration, the prime minister’s widely publicized threats to void the official statement of culpability and contrition issued by Chief Cabinet Secretary Kōno Yōhei in 1993 brought the comfort women issue back to the fore of world attention. Prospects for a meaningful solution to the problem faded rapidly.

A “realistic” settlement is one that survivors can accept For more than a year, a solution to the issue of military sexual slavery seemed tantalizingly within reach, and many new ideas surfaced, but the obstacles preventing an agreement proved insurmountable. It is true that Tokyo and Seoul both ran into a diplomatic impasse that could not be easily negotiated, but what really prevented a breakthrough? At the time, the term “realistic proposal” was heard often. It always meant a proposal that the Japanese government could realistically implement. For a while, even I was more or less convinced. As I encountered various difficulties in my work, however, I came to realize that a “realistic proposal” is quite simply a proposal that the survivors can accept. Yun Meehyan, current representative of the Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan, has repeatedly asked Japanese redress advocates to adopt a similar attitude. It’s important, she says, to consider the problem from the standpoint of what the Japanese government should do rather than what it can do. The question then

192   Yang Ching ja shifts to what kind of settlement do former victims want? For survivors, what would a just resolution of the comfort women problem look like? The first step is to acknowledge the facts. Former comfort women invariably demand that, first of all, the Japanese government officially admit what historians have now proven beyond a doubt: that the system of military sexual servitude was planned, implemented, and administered by the Japanese Imperial armed forces, with the active assistance of civil authorities, and that its victims were horribly abused by the wartime state. If Japan as a sovereign nation truly recognizes these facts, then the government must deliver a formal expression of regret to each surviving victim, regardless of nationality or place of birth. Once an apology is tendered, official compensation—the material proof that a terrible iniquity has been committed and requires rectifying—is the next order of business. To talk about money first not only puts the cart before the horse but insults the intelligence, honor, and dignity of the victims. In the past, when we raised these points, the government temporized: “The issue was settled by the 1965 Agreement on Property and Claims and Economic Co-­ operation.”15 “We would like to consider the possibility of resolving this question from a humanitarian standpoint.”16 “Korea should first revise its assessment of the [Asian Women’s] Fund before the two sides can look at alternatives.”17 Such statements suggest a solution similar to that espoused by the AWF, which has been criticized for obscuring rather than clarifying the question of state liability. Even if Tokyo could formulate a plan within the narrow framework of humanitarian relief without opening a Pandora’s box, it would not be “realistic” unless the survivors themselves acknowledge it as such. Japanese authorities must first ask themselves why former comfort women grit their teeth and cringe every time they intone the phrase “humanitarian measures.” As successor to the wartime state, the Japanese government is responsible for compensating these women for what they suffered during the war and easing their lives today. Before the state can propose a viable remedy, however, it must first understand the survivors’ anguish. In that sense, President Lee, who also used the phrase “humanitarian” in two official utterances, is no different in his inability or unwillingness to imagine the survivors’ pain.18 I also hear people say, “no matter how hard you try, you’ll never solve all of history’s problems.” And yet a genuine settlement is feasible if Japan admits historical responsibility for colonial rule and wartime sexual slavery and responds appropriately. It is equally obvious that if the government persists in equivocating, a lasting solution will remain out of reach. Just how hard has Japan tried to resolve the problems of history for which it is responsible? By what right does it dismiss the injustices it committed in the past so lightly? Former comfort women are not interested in stopgap measures or diplomatic shortcuts. They continue to invest the remaining years of their lives in the hope that someday soon the government and the Japanese people will have a change of heart and see their way clear to implementing a just and enduring resolution of the problem of military sexual enslavement.

Listen to survivors’ voices!   193

Postscript: another missed opportunity (2014–15) From late May to early June 2014, the 12th Asian Solidarity Conference for the Issue of Military Sexual Slavery by Japan convened in Tokyo around the theme “A Realistic Settlement is a Settlement that Victimized Women Can Accept.” Reflecting the views of former comfort women and redress organizations from eight countries, the conference issued a set of recommendations to the Japanese government. The proposals, transmitted to the Abe Cabinet on June 2, call on the government to “preserve and further develop” the 1993 Kōno declaration, reaffirm the points listed below, and take all measures necessary to achieve a genuine settlement. Below is a summary of the demands. Recognize the following facts and responsibilities 1 2 3 4

[During the Asia-­Pacific War] the Japanese government and military proposed, established, managed, and controlled military facilities known as “comfort stations.” There, women were forced against their will to become “comfort women” (sexual slaves) and kept by coercive methods. There were various forms of victimization of women, depending on whether they were from colonies, occupied areas, or Japan proper; the scale of victimization was extensive; and the suffering continues today. The military comfort women system was a serious violation of human rights that contravened Japanese and international laws then in effect.

Take the measures necessary for a just resolution 1 2 3 4

Apologize to individual victims in a way that is clear, official, and cannot be rescinded. Provide compensation to victims as proof of the legitimacy of the apology. Assure a complete accounting of the truth (full disclosure of all official documents, further investigations of the facts—in Japan and internationally—to include hearings with survivors and other knowledgeable persons). Take measures to prevent the recurrence of organized violence against women (revise school curricula and materials to include references to the comfort women, hold commemorative events, prohibit statements by public figures denying or casting doubt on the facts enumerated in the first paragraph).19

On December 28, 2015, the foreign ministers of Japan and the Republic of Korea unveiled a bilateral agreement on the comfort women (see Appendix 4). The entente neatly sidestepped virtually all of the Asian Solidarity Conference recommendations. The first paragraph of the accord, touted by Tokyo as an apology, contained the phrase “with the involvement of the Japanese military,” a point the Kōno statement had confirmed some 20 years ago, and repreated the

194   Yang Ching ja now clichéd phrases “painfully aware of [Japan’s] responsibilities” and “sincere apologies and remorse” used 20 years ago in expressions of official regret. Unlike Kōno’s statement, however, Tokyo’s recent formulation did not propose a full accounting of the truth or the adoption of educational measures and other forms of reflection that might prevent a recurrence of wartime sexual violence. Moreover, Prime Minister Abe’s terse apology was transmitted to South Korea indirectly via his foreign minister. At no time did he or any member of his administration attempt to speak directly with survivors. Indeed, Japanese and Korean officials never consulted them. Former comfort women were left with the impression of a pro forma apology imposed from political expediency and, once again, devoid of sincerity. The Asian Solidarity Conference recommendations affirmed that, “the first step toward ‘resolution’ can only be taken after presentation of a proposal that can be accepted by the survivors themselves.” The path to a solution that eases the emotional pain of violated women whose human rights have been egregiously abused and who have spent most of their lives in physical and mental anguish as a result will not be easy. “Resolution” means that apologies and other remedial measures will have to be repeated over and over, until the survivors find it in their hearts to forgive Japan. In other words, the Japanese government is being asked to make a long-­term, concerted commitment to remedy a historical wrong committed by the pre-­ surrender predecessor of today’s state. The inhuman treatment of former comfort women is not something that can be redressed “finally and irreversibly” by a contrived quid pro quo between two governments. The comfort women system encompassed all of Asia and the Pacific and affected many tens of thousands of women. The Abe administration’s declaration that the controversy “is resolved finally and irreversibly with this announcement” is a major misstep. That condition imposes on Japan’s closest neighbor a de facto gag rule. It also reflects an unrepentant mindset that tacitly condones the colonial and militarist past, raising questions about Japan’s future relations with the rest of Asia.

Notes   1 In the Philippines, more than 170 former comfort women came forward publicly, and 46 took the Japanese state to court over the issue in 1993. By 2013, when this book was first published, there were just over 100 survivors. As of February 2017, only about 70 are thought to remain. In Taiwan, 58 women revealed their wartime traumas, of which nine sued the Japanese state in 1999. A total of eight were still alive in 2013, but today there are only three. In China, some 100 victims went public in the early 1990s. Between 1995 and 2001, 24 filed civil suits in Japanese courts, but by 2013, only 12 former plaintiffs were left. The last one died in 2015. Fewer than 20 Chinese survivors are now believed to still be living. The data on China is from Peipei, Q. with Su, Z. and Chen, L. (2013). Chinese Comfort Women. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.  186–87. See also the interview with one of the authors: Su Zhiliang (2016). Remembering sexual slavery: museum details fading history of Japan’s “comfort women” system. Global Times. October 24 (Shanghai). [online] Available at: www.globaltimes.cn/content/1013375.shtml [accessed February 27, 2017].

Listen to survivors’ voices!   195   2 The Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal (2001b). Judgement, Part II, pp. 58. [online] Available at: http://vawwrac.org/judgement_e03.pdf [accessed May 10, 2017].   3 Zainichi no “Ianfu” Saiban o Sasaerukai hen [Legal Support Committee for a zainichi Korean Former “Comfort Woman”], ed. (2007). Ore no kokoro wa maketeinai: zainichi Chōsenjin “ianfu” Song Sin-­do no tatakai (“My heart is not broken yet”: the struggle of Song Sin-­do, a former zainichi Korean “comfort woman”), Tōkyō: Kinohanasha, pp. 301–02.   4 Asahi Shimbun (1994). Moto ianfu ni “mimaikin,” minkan kikin kōsō, seifu wa jimuhi nomi (For former comfort women: sympathy money. A privately financed foundation planned. Government to cover administrative costs only). Asahi Shimbun. August 19, p. 1.   5 We have little information on the so-­called Asia Exchange Center (Ajia Kōryūkai), except that it was established in July 1994 as a forerunner to the Asian Women’s Fund, set up a year later in July 1995. Designed to take “moral” but not legal responsibility for the comfort women system, it proposed to dispense money to victim-­survivors but not as official compensation. Tamaki, T. (2010). Deconstructing Japan’s Image of South Korea: Identity in Foreign Policy. London: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 130.   6 The network was rechristened the Nihongun “Ianfu” Mondai Kaiketsu Zenkoku Kōdō (Japan Nationwide Action to Resolve the Military “Comfort Women” Issue), dropping the year 2010 from its name in January 2013.   7 The Law on Special Measures Related to Issues Regarding Individuals Forcibly Detained after the War (Siberia Detainees Special Measures Law) was adopted and entered into force on June 16, 2010.   8 Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property and Claims and on Economic Co-­operation between Japan and the Republic of Korea states that: “the claims between the Contracting Parties and between their nationals, including those provided for in Article 4, paragraph (a) of the Treaty of Peace with Japan … have been settled completely and finally” (see Chapter 7).   9 Article 3 states that:  1. Any dispute between the Contracting Parties concerning the interpretation and implementation of the present Agreement shall be settled, first of all, through diplomatic channels. 2. Any dispute which fails to be settled under the provision of paragraph 1 shall be referred for decision to an arbitration board composed of three arbitrators, one to be appointed by the Government of each Contracting Party within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt by the Government of either Contracting Party from the Government of the other of a note requesting arbitration of the dispute, and the third arbitrator to be agreed upon by the two arbitrators so chosen within a further period of thirty days or the third arbitrator to be appointed by the government of a third country agreed upon within such further period by the two arbitrators, provided that the third arbitrator shall not be a national of either Contracting Party. 10 Asahi Shimbun (2012a). Ianfu mondai no kaiketsu saku: Nihon, teiji miokuri e Nikkan shunō kaidan (At Japan–ROK summit, Japan postpones settlement of the comfort women problem). May 9, p. 4. 11 Aoyama, S. (2012a). Ianfu mondai: Shushō shazai to hoshō dashin, Kankoku nanshoku shimeshi, gōi sezu (Comfort women problem: the prime minister sounds out ROK about apology and compensation, but South Korea does not agree). Hokkaidō Shimbun. May 12, p. 5. 12 Jiji Tsūshin (2012). Ianfu mondai meguru Kankoku hōdō o hitei: Genba Gaisō (Foreign Minister Genba rejects South Korean media coverage of the comfort women problem). June 1. [online] Available at: www.jiji.com/jc/c?g=pol_30&k=2012060100282 [accessed August 30, 2012].

196   Yang Ching ja 13 Kim, K. S. (2012). Wianbu munje, Ilbon kwa tahyŏp ŭn ŏptta (On the comfort women problem, no compromise). Han’guk Ilbo, June 2. 14 Sekiguchi, T. and Nishiyama, G. (2012). Japan PM Warns China on Dispute. Wall Street Journal, September 25. [online] Available at: www.wsj.com/articles/ SB1000087239639044481310457801 4020227775866 [accessed February 27, 2017]. 15 Statement by Japanese Foreign Minister Genba Kōichirō at a Japan–ROK foreign ministers’ conference in New York. Tosa, S. (2011). Ianfu mondai heikōsen: Nikkan gaisō kaidan (Japan refuses to recognize claim rights at Japan–ROK foreign ministers’ conference). Asahi Shimbun. September 25, p. 4. 16 Statement by DPJ Policy Bureau Chief Maehara Seiji in Seoul. Azuma, T. (2011). “Ianfu mondai” de jindō teki sochi kentō: Maehara shi, Kankoku gawa ni hyōmei (Mr. Maehara and South Korean side reveal humanitarian measures under consideration in “comfort women problem”). Yomiuri Shimbun. October 11, p. 4. 17 Prime Minister Noda to the Wall Street Journal. Sekiguchi, T. and Nishiyama, G. (2012). 18 At a press conference on March 22, 2012, Lee called the comfort women question “a humanitarian problem.” (Hakoda, T. [2012]. Jindō shienjiku ni kyōgi mo: ianfu mondai de Ri Kankoku Daitōryō ga kaiken [We also discussed the possibilities of humanitarian aid: press conference by South Korean President Lee]. Asahi Shimbun. March 22, p. 13.) Then in June, he told another press conference that, “As the aggressor, Japan absolutely must take humanitarian measures to deal with comfort women survivors.” Ch’a, P. (2012). Kahaeja Ilbon, P’ihaeja e indochŏk choch’i haeya (Exclusive interview with President Lee Myung-­bak: Japan as the aggressor should take humanitarian measures to aid victims). Han’guk Kyŏngje Sinmun. June 11, p. 4. 19 Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace Website (2014). Recommendations to the Government of Japan For Resolution of the “Comfort Women” Issue. 12th Asian Solidarity Conference on the Issue of Military Sexual Slavery by Japan. June 2. Available at: http://wam-­peace.org/category/ianfu-­topics/page/2/ [accessed February 28, 2017].

Epilogue The struggle for justice continues Nishino Rumiko, Kim Puja, and Onozawa Akane

On December 28, 2015, South Korean President Park Guen-­hye unilaterally approved an agreement with Tokyo claiming to settle “finally and irreversibly” the bilateral dispute over the comfort women. The entente proved overwhelmingly unpopular with the South Korean public, but what happened next to President Park would have been difficult to imagine at the time. In late October 2016, she found herself embroiled in an escalating influence-­peddling scandal involving a top aide and confidante, Choi Soon-­sil. Dubbed “Choi Soon-­sil Gate,” the affair saw Park accused of corruption and other abuses of presidential authority. Over the next four months, massive demonstrations demanding Park’s resignation spread from Seoul to all parts of South Korea. On December 3, at the height of the protests, 1.7 million people filled the streets of the capital, and a total of 2.3 million joined candlelight vigils across the country. On December 9, the South Korean National Assembly voted to impeach Park, who was relieved of her presidential duties. On March 10, 2017, the Constitutional Court of Korea ruled that her dismissal from office was legally justified, and on March 31, state prosecutors placed her under arrest. Former human-­rights lawyer Moon Jae-­in was elected president on May 9, 2017, taking office the next day. On May 11, Moon held his first telephone conference with Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, and the 2015 Japan–ROK agreement was one of two main topics discussed. Abe told Moon, “It will be important to implement in a responsible manner the agreement that has been highly appraised by the international community.”1 Moon replied that the great majority of Koreans were not able to accept the bilateral accord. Regarding Tokyo’s demand that peace statues be moved from in front of Japanese diplomatic offices in Seoul and Busan, Moon noted that there were limits to what his government could do to resolve what was essentially a civil society issue. In short, the South Korean President made clear that his administration could not support full implementation of the bilateral agreement, including removal of the peace memorials.

Statues of peace First, let’s consider the issue of the bronze sculpture—in Korean, Sonyeosang (Statue of a Girl). On December 30, 2015, two days after the Japan–ROK accord,

198   Nishino Rumiko et al. university students in Seoul mobilized spontaneously to protect the monument in front of the Japanese Embassy, setting up a tent and organizing a 24-hour sit-­in to keep watch and prevent its forcible removal. As of this writing (June 2017), the sit-­in continues. Similar statues have appeared in the United States, Canada, Australia, Germany, and elsewhere.2 On January 26, 2017, South Korean survivor Kang Il-­ch’ul, aged 87, told a press conference at the Diet Members Building in Tokyo that, “getting rid of the statue is the same as killing us.”3 The bronze icon has evolved from a potent symbol memorializing Korea’s colonial history and war victimization to an emblem of the global resistance that has emerged to challenge the Japan–ROK agreement. It also stands as a reminder of Park Guen-­hye’s failure to settle the issues underlying the comfort women controversy. On December 30, 2016, one year after the bilateral pact, students and local citizens erected another peace statue in front of the Japanese Consulate in Busan. The Japanese government protested by recalling its ambassador and consul to Tokyo in January 2017, only to allow their return in early April, some 85 days later, with nothing to show except a further deterioration in bilateral relations. With no solution in sight, the peace memorials have become an intractable diplomatic issue. In Japan, the Abe Cabinet, parliamentarians, and revisionist media have united in demanding that the statues, viewed as sullying Japan’s national image, be transferred from around Japanese diplomatic venues in South Korea. Germany has taken a very different stance regarding its responsibility for World War II. The Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, completed in 2005, is prominently located in the heart of Berlin near the Brandenburg Gate so that Germans will never forget their role as aggressors during World War  II. What prevents Japan from building a similar monument in downtown Tokyo to the memory of the tens of thousands of women sexually enslaved by the Japanese military in Asia and the Pacific and other victims of Japanese colonialism and war? Instead of showing remorse, Tokyo presses South Korea, a former victim, to move what has become the national embodiment of that historical memory away from its official presence there, reinforcing the impression that unlike Germany, Japan is unwilling to fully confront past war crimes.

The 2015 Japan–ROK agreement On January 26, 2017, South Korean survivor Yi Ok-­sŏn, aged 87, looked back at her wartime experiences and told a Tokyo press conference: Those weren’t comfort stations; they were execution grounds. We had to service 40 to 50 Japanese soldiers a day. If we refused, they cut us with their swords or stabbed us with their bayonets. Many women took their own lives because they couldn’t stand the suffering.4 Concerning the 2015 bilateral accord, Yi said, “I can’t accept an agreement that ignores us. They should have met the victims and explained their intentions.” Many former comfort women criticized the deal.

Epilogue   199

Figure E.1 The Peace Statue of a Girl in front of the Japanese Embassy, Seoul. Her bare feet represent the hard life she has led. Behind her, we feel the presence of the Halmoni, the Grandmothers, who have gathered in this space every Wednesday since January 1992. The empty chair beside her memorializes those survivors who are no longer with us. Source: Photo by Okamoto Yūka.

Seoul established the Foundation for Reconciliation and Healing on July 28, 2016, fulfilling a key condition of the 2015 pact, and one month later on August 25, the Abe Cabinet authorized the transfer of ¥1 billion to the new foundation. When the comfort women agreement was announced in December 2015, there were 46 survivors, but at this writing, only 36 are still living. A majority of the original 46 accepted payments from the foundation, but a solid core has refused to cooperate. Among the recipients are women too old to decide by themselves, whose families received the money on their behalf (at least one survivor later returned the disbursement). The Korean public is unhappy with the agreement. According to a poll taken by Gallup Korea in February 2017, 20 percent of those queried replied they opposed the accord, and 70 percent said it should be renegotiated.5 During the presidential campaign, Moon promised to resume talks on the issue and in campaign speeches criticized the bilateral compromise as a mistake, reflecting strong popular dissatisfaction.

200   Nishino Rumiko et al. The Japanese government, on the other hand, considers the accord a done deal. In his May 11 telephone conversation with President Moon, Prime Minister Abe asserted that the arrangement has been “highly appraised by the international community.” To be sure, on December 28, 2015, both U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and National Security Advisor Susan Rice applauded both sides for coming to terms and called on the international community to support the initiative. Kerry noted that the agreement would enhance Japan–U.S. “economic ties and security cooperation,” and Rice spoke of its importance in “advancing trilateral security cooperation.”6 Neither addressed the resolution of the comfort women question. On January 7, 2016, one day after North Korea conducted a nuclear test, President Obama personally telephoned the Japanese and South Korean leaders and congratulated them on resolving the dispute. Washington’s interest in promoting Japan–ROK reconciliation is obviously the “strategic benefit” it confers, and between 2014 and 2015, the Obama administration intervened actively on several occasions to encourage a settlement.7 Both sides stood to reap financial and other benefits from closer ties, but U.S. pressure appears to have pushed the two adversaries to reach an understanding. The need of aging survivors to see justice done was not the decisive factor On December 29, 2015, U.N. Secretary-­General Ban Ki-­moon also welcomed the comfort women agreement, thanking Park and Abe for their “leadership and vision.” A year later, however, when he returned to South Korean in hopes of entering the 2017 presidential race, Ban abruptly repositioned himself. On January 12, 2017, he told journalists that, “If the ¥1 billion is related to the removal of the girls’ statues … the money should be sent back.”8 Angered by Seoul’s reluctance to relocate the statues, Abe boasted that his government had kept its part of the bargain by contributing the ¥1 billion and chided South Korea, asking it “to respond in a sincere manner.”9 The implied criticism, coming on top of Japan’s decision in early January to recall its diplomatic representatives, further enflamed Korean public opinion.

Tokyo hews to the denialist line In the agreement, Prime Minister Abe relayed his “his most sincere apologies and remorse to all the women who underwent immeasurable and painful experiences and suffered incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women.” But this was done indirectly through his foreign minister. He then reportedly apologized personally to President Park via telephone, but not to the survivors themselves. When the Foundation for Reconciliation and Healing and the South Korean government asked Abe to provide a letter of apology to individual survivors in early October 2016, the premier answered dismissively that he was “not considering such an idea at all.” Immediately following the agreement’s announcement, Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio stressed to journalists that the ¥1 billion grant Tokyo had just promised Seoul was not state compensation but a humanitarian “contribution.”

Epilogue   201 In return, Japan was asking South Korea to consider the issue “resolved finally and irreversibly” and to “refrain from accusing or criticizing [Japan] regarding this issue in the international community, including at the United Nations” (see Appendix 4). It appeared that Tokyo was attempting to buy Seoul’s silence on the issue. But it is the Japanese government and ruling Liberal Democratic Party that cannot let the issue go. Immediately following the agreement, revisionist lawmakers and Japan’s top leadership reverted to their denialist rhetoric, both within the LDP and in the National Diet and U.N. human rights forums. On January 14, 2016, Liberal Democratic Party lawmaker Sakurada Yoshitaka, a former deputy minister of education, told a party committee at LDP headquarters that the comfort women “were prostitutes by occupation.” Later the same day, Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide remarked that LDP members should follow government policy but allowed Sakurada’s comments to go unchallenged.10 Two days later, on January 18, Foreign Minister Kishida told the House of Councilors Budget Committee that, “The term ‘sex slaves’ doesn’t match the facts, and [the government] believes it should not be used.” Abe, who was also in attendance, echoed those sentiments. Elaborating on the comfort women issue, Abe reiterated that, “There is no written evidence to show that military and civilian authorities employed force directly [in recruiting women].… The government’s stance has not changed at all since the [March 2007] Cabinet decision of the first Abe administration.”11 As Yoshimi Yoshiaki pointed out in Chapter 1, with that statement, the premier again denied one of the central tenets of the 1993 Kōno statement, namely, that most women were “recruited against their own will, through coaxing, coercion, etc., and that, at times, administrative/ military personnel directly took part in the recruitment.” One month later, on February 16, 2016, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Sugiyama Shinsuke declared in Japan’s official statement to the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) that, “it is not appropriate for [CEDAW] to take up the comfort women issue in terms of the implementation of [Japan’s] duties regarding the Convention [on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women].”12 The next day, February 17, Sugiyama told CEDAW that the “forceful taking away” of women by Japanese military and administrative authorities “could not be confirmed in any of the documents that the Government of Japan was able to identify in [its 1993] study.” Moreover, the expression “sex slaves,” he said, contradicts the facts. Asked by an expert on the committee “if Japan [is] so willing to solve the issue, would it send an apology to all comfort women,” Sugiyama sidestepped the question.13 Through the comfort women agreement, the Abe regime apparently hopes to gain three things. It seeks to silence Korean criticism of Japan’s colonial rule and military aggression; remove the most visible reminder of that past—the “statues of girls”—from around Japanese diplomatic sites in South Korea; and create in the world community a wider familiarity with, and acquiescence in, Japan’s revisionist views on the issue of military sexual servitude. This is the

202   Nishino Rumiko et al. logic of revisionism, which disowns the comfort women in order to disavow the facts of Japan’s colonial and militarist past.

A problematic accord: the world human rights community responds On March 7, 2016, the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women responded to Japan’s report on the issue of wartime military sexual slavery by voicing regret that Tokyo had yet to implement any of CEDAW’s earlier recommendations. In its conclusions, the committee criticized the Japan–ROK entente on the following points: (1) some comfort women have died without an “official unequivocal recognition of responsibility” by Japan; (2) Japan has not fulfilled its obligations under international law to survivors in other countries; and (3) Japan has deleted references to the comfort women in its school textbooks. CEDAW then listed a series of long-­standing proposals for a genuine settlement. It urged the Japanese government to: (1) ensure that officials and leaders refrain from making disparaging public comments about Japan’s responsibility toward the comfort women, “which have the effect of retraumatising victims;” (2) “recognize the right of victims to … full and effective redress and reparation, including compensation, satisfaction, official apologies and rehabilitative services;” (3) take “due account of the views of victims/survivors and ensure their rights to truth, justice, and reparations;” and (4) introduce the comfort women issue in school textbooks and “ensure that historical facts are objectively presented to students and the public.”14 On March 10, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, addressed the U.N. Human Rights Council noting that the terms of the Japan–ROK agreement “have been questioned by various U.N. human rights mechanisms, and most importantly by the survivors themselves.” It is vitally important, he said for “the relevant authorities [to] reach out to these courageous and dignified women; ultimately only they can judge whether they have received genuine redress.”15 The next day, March 11, a group of U.N. human rights experts on discrimination against women, transitional justice, and torture concluded their review of South Korea by noting that the bilateral accord “falls short of meeting the demands of survivors.” Lacking a proper consultation process for victims, the agreement “does not meet standards of State accountability for gross human rights violations,” the experts said. The group also expressed its concern that Seoul “may remove a statue commemorating not only the historical issue and legacy of the ‘comfort women’ but also symbolizing the survivors’ long search for justice.”16 Finally, two months later, on May 11, 2017, the day of the Abe-­Moon telephone parlay, the U.N. Committee Against Torture adopted a recommendation that South Korea revise its agreement with Japan on the comfort women “to ensure that the surviving victims of sexual slavery during World War II are

Epilogue   203 provided with redress, including the right to compensation and rehabilitation and the right to truth, reparation and assurances of non-­repetitions.”17 Human rights violations are generally considered to be ongoing until the victims have received satisfaction through redress and reparation. Under international law, then, Japan’s legal obligations to former comfort women have not been fulfilled. Nothing, in sum, has been settled “finally and irreversibly.” U.N. human rights groups are telling us that if true reconciliation is the goal, the agreement must be rewritten in close consultation with former comfort women to achieve a settlement that they, too, can accept. For Japan, that will mean returning to the 1993 policy statement of Kōno Yōhei and building on the positive aspects of that legacy to complete the unfinished work of atonement and reparation. The rise to power of Moon Jae-­in, could put his administration on a collision course with the Abe regime. At this writing, it is not clear how the controversy will be handled. As the United Nations reminds us, however, it is evident that there can be no final settlement absent a victim-­centered approach complete with consultative mechanism. For the comfort women problem exists not just between Japan and the Republic of Korea but also between Japan and the entire Asia-­ Pacific region. At its heart is the wartime sexual enslavement of many tens of thousands of women from more than a dozen countries by Japanese Imperial forces. This horrendous human rights abuse can only begin to be addressed by providing redress to surviving victims regardless of nationality or place of residence, assuring them of “the right to truth, reparation and assurances of non-­ repetitions” (emphasis added).18

Notes   1 The Asahi Shimbun: Japan and Asia Watch (2017). Abe, Moon Discuss North Korea, “Comfort Women” Problem. May 11. [online] Available at: www.asahi.com/ajw/ articles/AJ201705110044. html [accessed May 27, 2017].   2 See Okamoto, Y. and Kim, P. (2016). Hajime ni (Introduction). In: Y. Okamoto and P. Kim, eds., “Heiwa no shōjozō” wa naze suwaritsuzukeru no ka? (Why the “Peace Statue” of a teenage girl continues her seated vigil). Yokohama: Seori Shobō, pp. 3–7.   3 Okamoto, Y. (2017). Nihongun “ianfu” higaisha ga rainichi shi, “gōi” o zenmen hihan: higai tōjisha no koe o mushi (Japanese military “comfort women” survivors visit Japan, roundly criticize the Japan–ROK agreement for ignoring victims’ voices). Shūkan kinyōbi. February 17. [online] Available at: www.kinyobi.co.jp/kinyobi news/?p=5783 [accessed May 27, 2017].   4 Okamoto (2017).   5 Asahi Shimbun (2017). Gekidō Kankoku, Moon Jae-­in seiken shidō. Moon gaikō, kokunai yoron o hanei, ianfu gōi, tsuyoi taido (Amid political turbulence in South Korea, Moon Jae-­in government takes office. Moon diplomacy, reflecting domestic opinion and wary of the United States and China, takes strong stand on comfort women agreement). May 14. [online] Available at: www.asahi.com/articles/ DA3S12936547.html [accessed May 29, 2017].   6 Chang, J. S. (2015). U.S. Praises S. Korea, Japan for reaching breakthrough on wartime sexual slavery. Yonhap News Agency, December 28. [online] Available at: http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2015/12/29/0200000000AEN20151229000353 315.html [accessed May 28, 2017].

204   Nishino Rumiko et al.   7 Eilperin, J. (2017). Agreement on “Comfort Women” Offers Strategic Benefit to U.S. in Asia-­Pacific. Washington Post. January 9. [online] Available at: www.washingtonpost. com/politics/agreement-­on-comfort-­women-offers-­ancillary-benefit-­to-us-­in-asia-­pacific/ 2016/01/09/41a03d84-b54c-11e5-a842-0feb51d1d124_story.html?utm_term=.30493f3 da535 [accessed May 26, 2017]. The United States did not hide its intentions. In May 2015, a top State Department official warned that ongoing “tension between those two friends constitutes a strategic liability to all [three] of us.” Jun, K. and Martin, A. (2015). Japan, South Korea agree to aid for “comfort women.” Wall Street Journal, December 28. [online] Available at: www.wsj.com/articles/japan-­south-korea-­reach-comfort-­ women-agreement-­1451286347 [accessed on February 1, 2016].   8 The Japan Times (2017). You Keep the Money, We Keep the Statues: Ban. January 13. [online] Available at: www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/01/13/national/politics-­diplomacy/ keep-­money-keep-­statues-ban/ [accessed May 29, 2017].   9 Higashioka, T. and Takeda, H. (2017). Japan–S. Korea Dispute Escalates over “Comfort Women” Statue. The Asahi Shimbun: Asia and Japan Watch. January 10. [online] Available at: www.asahi.com_awj/articles/AJ201701100047.html [accessed May 27, 2017]. 10 Huffington Post (2016). “Ianfu wa shokugyō toshite no shōfu” Jimintō no Sakurada Yoshitaka Giin ga hatsugen (“Comfort women were professional prostitutes,” the LDP’s Sakurada Yoshitaka says). January 14. [online] Available at: www.huffingtonpost. jp/2016/01/14/ianfu-­sakurada_n_8976130.html [accessed June 1, 2017]. 11 Yoshida, R. (2016). Japan’s Foreign Minister Challenges the Use of “Sex Slaves” Term for “Comfort Women.” The Japan Times. January 18. [online] Available at: www. japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/01/18/national/politics-­diplomacy/japans-­foreign-minister-­ challenges-use-­of-sex-­slaves-term-­for-comfort-­women/ [accessed 29 May 2017]. For Abe’s comments, see Abe Shinzō (2016). Session No. 3. House of Councilors Budget Committee, 190th National Diet. January 18. [online] Available at: http://kokkai.ndl.go. jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/190/0014/19001180014003a.html [accessed June 1, 2017]. 12 Sugiyama, S. (2016). Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women: Statement by the Head of the Delegation of Japan for the Seventh and Eights Periodic Reports. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. February 16, p. 8. [pdf] Available at: www.mofa.go.jp/files/000133481.pdf [accessed May 19, 2017]. 13 Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (2016a). Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women examines reports of Japan. February 17. [online] Available at: www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=17052 [accessed May 28, 2017]. 14 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (2016). Concluding Observations on the Combined Seventh and Eighth Periodic Reports of Japan. March 7, pp.  7–8. [pdf] Available at: http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20 Documents/JPN/CEDAW_C_JPN_CO_7-8_21666_E.pdf [accessed May 23, 2017]. 15 Zeid, R. A. H. (2016). Statement by Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, to the Human Rights Council’s 31st Session. Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, March 10. [online] Available at: www.ohchr.org/ EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=17200&LangID=E [accessed on May 28, 2017]. 16 Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (2016b). Japan/S. Korea: The long awaited apology to “comfort women” victims is yet to come. March 11. [pdf] Available at: www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=17209&LangID=E [accessed May 24, 2017]. 17 U.N. Committee Against Torture (2017). Concluding Observations on the Combined Third to Fifth Periodic Reports of the Republic of Korea. United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner. May 12, p.  13. [pdf] Available at: http://tbinternet. ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CAT%2fC%2fKOR %2fCO%2f3-5&Lang=en [accessed on June 1, 2017]. The recommendation was adopted on May 11, reported on May 12, and officially distributed on May 30. 18 U.N. Committee Against Torture (2017).

Appendices

Key policy documents on the comfort women

Appendix 1 The Kōno statement (August 4, 1993)

Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kōno on the result of the study on the issue of “comfort women” (August 4, 1993) The Government of Japan has been conducting a study on the issue of wartime “comfort women” since December 1991. I wish to announce the findings as a result of that study. As a result of the study which indicates that comfort stations were operated in extensive areas for long periods, it is apparent that there existed a great number of comfort women. Comfort stations were operated in response to the request of the military authorities of the day. The then Japanese military was, directly or indirectly, involved in the establishment and management of the comfort stations and the transfer of comfort women. The recruitment of the comfort women was conducted mainly by private recruiters who acted in response to the request of the military. The Government study has revealed that in many cases they were recruited against their own will, through coaxing coercion, etc., and that, at times, administrative/military personnel directly took part in the recruitments. They lived in misery at comfort stations under a coercive atmosphere. As to the origin of those comfort women who were transferred to the war areas, excluding those from Japan, those from the Korean Peninsula accounted for a large part. The Korean Peninsula was under Japanese rule in those days, and their recruitment, transfer, control, etc., were conducted generally against their will, through coaxing, coercion, etc. Undeniably, this was an act, with the involvement of the military authorities of the day, that severely injured the honor and dignity of many women. The Government of Japan would like to take this opportunity once again to extend its sincere apologies and remorse to all those, irrespective of place of origin, who suffered immeasurable pain and incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women. It is incumbent upon us, the Government of Japan, to continue to consider seriously, while listening to the views of learned circles, how best we can express this sentiment. We shall face squarely the historical facts as described above instead of evading them, and take them to heart as lessons of history. We hereby reiterated

208   Appendix 1: the Kōno statement our firm determination never to repeat the same mistake by forever engraving such issues in our memories through the study and teaching of history. As actions have been brought to court in Japan and interests have been shown in this issue outside Japan, the Government of Japan shall continue to pay full attention to this matter, including private researches related thereto. Source: Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono on the result of the study on the issue of “comfort women”: August 4, 1993, Cabinet Councillors’ Office on External Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (official website) www.mofa.go.jp/policy/women/fund/state9308.html.

On the issue of wartime “comfort women” (August 4, 1993) 1  Study background The issue of wartime “comfort women” has been attracting attention from both within and outside Japan, as actions have been brought to court in Japan by those concerned and the issue has been debated in the Diet. During Prime Minister Miyazawa’s visit to the Republic of Korea in January 1992, the issue was brought up in the meeting between the Prime Minister and then President, Mr. Roh Tae-­woo, in which the Korean side requested strongly that relevant facts be brought to light. Other countries and areas concerned also have shown strong interest in this issue. Under these circumstances, the Government of Japan, since December 1991, has been conducting a study by means of individual hearings of former military personnel and others concerned in parallel with a search for relevant documents. In addition, for five days from July 26 to 30, the Government of Japan conducted detailed [interviews] regarding of [sic] former comfort women, with the cooperation of the Association of Pacific War Victims and Bereaved Families, in Seoul, the Republic of Korea, regarding the circumstances at the time. Furthermore, in the course of the study, government officials were sent to the United Sates to search for official U.S. documents and a field study was conducted in Okinawa as well. The following gives the details of the study, and a list of the documents discovered by the study is attached. Institutions covered by the study: the National Police Agency; the Defense Agency; the Ministry of Justice; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Ministry of Education; the Ministry of Health and Welfare; the Ministry of Labor; the National Archives; the National Diet Library; and the U.S. National Archives. People covered by individual hearings: former comfort women; former military personnel; former officials of the Government-­General of Korea; former operators of comfort stations; residents in the areas where comfort stations were located; and history researchers, etc. Domestic and foreign documents and publications used for reference: the study report compiled by the Government of the Republic of Korea; collections of testimonies by former comfort women, compiled by those concerned including the Association of Pacific War Victims and Bereaved Families and the Korean Council

Appendix 1: the Kōno statement   209 for the women Drafted for Sexual Slavery by Japan; and also practically all of the numerous Japanese publications on the subject matter were perused. On 6 July 1992, the Government of Japan announced the results of its study on this issue conducted up to that time. In view of the further progress of the study since then, the Government has decided to announce the findings reached as below. 2  Facts on the issue of wartime “comfort women” The following has been brought to light as a result of the aforementioned search for documents and individual hearings as well as comprehensive analysis and review of the various documents used as reference. 1

2

3

4

5

Background to the establishment of comfort stations The comfort stations were established in various locations in response to the request of the military authorities at the time. Internal government documents from those days cite as reasons for establishing comfort stations the need to prevent anti-­Japanese sentiments from fermenting as a result of rapes and other unlawful acts by Japanese military personnel against local residents in the areas occupied by the then Japanese military, the need to prevent loss of troop strength by venereal and other diseases, and the need to prevent espionage. Timing of the establishment of comfort stations As some documents indicate that a comfort station was established in Shanghai at the time of the so-­called Shanghai Incident in 1932 for the troops stationed there, it is assumed that comfort stations were in existence since around that time to the end of World War II. The facilities expanded in scale and in geographical scope later on as the war spread. Areas with comfort stations The countries or areas where it has been possible as a result of the study to confirm that comfort stations existed are: Japan; China; the Philippines; Indonesia; the then Malaya; Thailand; the then Burma; the then New Guinea; Hong Kong; Macao; and the then French Indochina. Number of comfort women It is virtually impossible to determine the total number of comfort women, as no document has been found which either indicates their total number or gives sufficient ground to establish an estimate. However, in view of the fact, as described above, that comfort stations were operated in extensive areas for long periods, it is apparent that there existed a great number of comfort women. Comfort women’s place of origin The countries or areas from which it has been possible as a result of the study to confirm that comfort women came are: Japan; the Korean Peninsula; China; Taiwan; the Philippines; Indonesia; and the Netherlands. Apart from Japanese, many of the comfort women transferred to the war areas were from the Korean Peninsula.

210   Appendix 1: the Kōno statement 6

7

8

Operation and management of comfort stations Many comfort stations were run by private operators, although in some areas there were cases in which the then Japanese military directly operated comfort stations. Even in those cases where the facilities were run by private operators, the then Japanese military was involved directly in the establishment and management of the comfort stations by such means as granting permissions to open the facilities, equipping the facilities, drawing up the regulations for the comfort stations that set the hours of operation and tariff and stipulated such matters as precautions for the use of the facilities. Recruitment of comfort women In many cases private recruiters, asked by the comfort station operators who represented the request of the military authorities, conducted the recruitment of comfort women. Pressed by the growing need for more comfort women stemming from the spread of the war, these recruiters resorted in [m]any cases to coaxing and intimidating these women to be recruited against their own will, and there were even cases where administrative/military personnel directly took part in the recruitments. Transportation of comfort women, etc. When the recruiters had to transport comfort and other women by ship or other means of transportation, the then Japanese military approved requests for their travel by such means as regarding such women as having a special status similar to its civilian personnel serving in the military, and the Japanese Government issued certificates of identification. In quite a few cases the women were transported to the war areas by military ships and vehicles, and in some cases they were left behind in the confusion of the rout that ensued Japanese defeat.

Source: On the Issue of “Comfort Women”: August 4, 1993, Cabinet Councillors’ Office on External Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (official website) www.mofa.go.jp/policy/postwar/issue9308.html.

Appendix 2 The Murayama statement (August 15, 1995)

Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of the war Fifty years have passed since the end of the war. Today, when I recall the many people at home and abroad who fell victim in that war, I am overwhelmed by many emotions. After the war, Japan overcame many difficulties and arose from devastation to enjoy peace and prosperity today. This is something we can be proud of, and I would like to pay tribute to the wisdom and untiring efforts of all Japanese people who worked toward those aims. I would also like to express once again our profound gratitude to the United States and other countries of the world for their support and cooperation in helping Japan reach those aims. It gives me great pleasure to note that Japan has developed friendly relations with neighboring countries in the Asia-­Pacific region, the United States, and the countries of Europe. Now that Japan enjoys peace and affluence, we tend to forget how precious and sacred peace is. We must talk to younger generations about the tragedy of war, so that we never repeat the mistakes of the past. I am convinced that, in order to join hands with people of neighboring countries to ensure true peace in the Asia Pacific region, and ultimately in the entire world, we must, more than anything else, foster relations with these countries that are based on deep understanding and trust. Guided by this conviction, the Government of Japan has launched its Peace, Friendship and Exchange Initiative, which promotes two major objectives: support for historical research into relations between Japan and neighboring Asian countries, especially during the modern era; and rapid expansion of exchanges with those countries. And in order to further strengthen the relations of trust between Japan and those countries, I will continue to work in all sincerity for solutions to postwar issues that are currently being addressed. As we now mark the 50th anniversary of the end of the war, we must look into the past to learn from the lessons of history, then look toward the future and ensure that we make no mistake as we strive for peace and prosperity for humankind. During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan followed mistaken national policies and took the road to war, ensnaring the Japanese people in a

212   Appendix 2: the Murayama statement fateful crisis and inflicting, through colonial rule and aggression, great damage and pains on people in many countries, especially in Asia. Regarding in all humility these irrefutable facts of history, and in the hope that no such mistake will be made in the future, I express once more my feeling of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology. I also offer my sincere condolences to all victims of that history, both at home and abroad. Building on our deep remorse on the occasion of today’s 50th anniversary of the end of the war, Japan must reject self-­righteous nationalism and promote international cooperation as a responsible member of the international community, thereby advancing the ideals of peace and democracy. It is also essential that Japan, as the only country to have experienced atomic bombing, actively promote global disarmament, especially through a stronger nuclear non-­ proliferation regime, with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. I firmly believe that this is the way for Japan to atone for the past and console the souls of the victims. It is said that nothing is more reliable than good faith. At this time of remembrance, I declare to the people of Japan and abroad my intention to base our Government policy on good faith, and this is my vow. August 15, 1995 Tomiichi Murayama, Prime Minister of Japan Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, On the Issue of Wartime “Comfort Women” August 4, 1993 [online] Available at: www.mofa.go.jp/policy/postwar/.

Appendix 3 The Abe statement (August 14, 2015)

Statement by Prime Minister Shinzō Abe, Cabinet Decision On the 70th anniversary of the end of the war, we must calmly reflect upon the road to war, the path we have taken since it ended, and the era of the 20th century. We must learn from the lessons of history the wisdom for our future. More than 100 years ago, vast colonies possessed mainly by the Western powers stretched out across the world. With their overwhelming supremacy in technology, waves of colonial rule surged toward Asia in the 19th century. There is no doubt that the resultant sense of crisis drove Japan forward to achieve modernization. Japan built a constitutional government earlier than any other nation in Asia. The country preserved its independence throughout. The Japan–Russia War gave encouragement to many people under colonial rule from Asia to Africa. After World War I, which embroiled the world, the movement for self-­ determination gained momentum and put brakes on colonization that had been underway. It was a horrible war that claimed as many as ten million lives. With a strong desire for peace stirred in them, people founded the League of Nations and brought forth the General Treaty for Renunciation of War. There emerged in the international community a new tide of outlawing war itself. At the beginning, Japan, too, kept steps with other nations. However, with the Great Depression setting in and the Western countries launching economic blocs by involving colonial economies, Japan’s economy suffered a major blow. In such circumstances, Japan’s sense of isolation deepened and it attempted to overcome its diplomatic and economic deadlock through the use of force. Its domestic political system could not serve as a brake to stop such attempts. In this way, Japan lost sight of the overall trends in the world. With the Manchurian Incident, followed by the withdrawal from the League of Nations, Japan gradually transformed itself into a challenger to the new international order that the international community sought to establish after tremendous sacrifices. Japan took the wrong course and advanced along the road to war. And, 70 years ago, Japan was defeated. On the 70th anniversary of the end of the war, I bow my head deeply before the souls of all those who perished both at home and abroad. I express my feelings of profound grief and my eternal, sincere condolences.

214   Appendix 3: the Abe statement More than three million of our compatriots lost their lives during the war: on the battlefields worrying about the future of their homeland and wishing for the happiness of their families; in remote foreign countries after the war, in extreme cold or heat, suffering from starvation and disease. The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the air raids on Tokyo and other cities, and the ground battles in Okinawa, among others, took a heavy toll among ordinary citizens without mercy. Also in countries that fought against Japan, countless lives were lost among young people with promising futures. In China, Southeast Asia, the Pacific islands and elsewhere that became the battlefields, numerous innocent citizens suffered and fell victim to battles as well as hardships such as severe deprivation of food. We must never forget that there were women behind the battlefields whose honour and dignity were severely injured. Upon the innocent people did our country inflict immeasurable damage and suffering. History is harsh. What is done cannot be undone. Each and every one of them had his or her life, dream, and beloved family. When I squarely contemplate this obvious fact, even now, I find myself speechless and my heart is rent with the utmost grief. The peace we enjoy today exists only upon such precious sacrifices. And therein lies the origin of postwar Japan. We must never again repeat the devastation of war. Incident, aggression, war—we shall never again resort to any form of the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. We shall abandon colonial rule forever and respect the right of self-­determination of all peoples throughout the world. With deep repentance for the war, Japan made that pledge. Upon it, we have created a free and democratic country, abided by the rule of law, and consistently upheld that pledge never to wage a war again. While taking silent pride in the path we have walked as a peace-­loving nation for as long as 70 years, we remain determined never to deviate from this steadfast course. Japan has repeatedly expressed the feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology for its actions during the war. In order to manifest such feelings through concrete actions, we have engraved in our hearts the histories of suffering of the people in Asia as our neighbours: those in Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines, and Taiwan, the Republic of Korea and China, among others; and we have consistently devoted ourselves to the peace and prosperity of the region since the end of the war. Such position articulated by the previous cabinets will remain unshakable into the future. However, no matter what kind of efforts we may make, the sorrows of those who lost their family members and the painful memories of those who underwent immense sufferings by the destruction of war will never be healed. Thus, we must take to heart the following. The fact that more than six million Japanese repatriates managed to come home safely after the war from various parts of the Asia-­Pacific and became the

Appendix 3: the Abe statement   215 driving force behind Japan’s postwar reconstruction; the fact that nearly 3,000 Japanese children left behind in China were able to grow up there and set foot on the soil of their homeland again; and the fact that former POWs of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Australia and other nations have visited Japan for many years to continue praying for the souls of the war dead on both sides. How much emotional struggle must have existed and what great efforts must have been necessary for the Chinese people who underwent all the sufferings of the war and for the former POWs who experienced unbearable sufferings caused by the Japanese military in order for them to be so tolerant nevertheless? That is what we must turn our thoughts to reflect upon. Thanks to such manifestation of tolerance, Japan was able to return to the international community in the postwar era. Taking this opportunity of the 70th anniversary of the end of the war, Japan would like to express its heartfelt gratitude to all the nations and all the people who made every effort for reconciliation. In Japan, the postwar generations now exceed 80 percent of its population. We must not let our children, grandchildren, and even further generations to come, who have nothing to do with that war, be predestined to apologize. Still, even so, we Japanese, across generations, must squarely face the history of the past. We have the responsibility to inherit the past, in all humbleness, and pass it on to the future. Our parents’ and grandparents’ generations were able to survive in a devastated land in sheer poverty after the war. The future they brought about is the one our current generation inherited and the one we will hand down to the next generation. Together with the tireless efforts of our predecessors, this has only been possible through the goodwill and assistance extended to us that transcended hatred by a truly large number of countries, such as the United States, Australia, and European nations, which Japan had fiercely fought against as enemies. We must pass this down from generation to generation into the future. We have the great responsibility to take the lessons of history deeply into our hearts, to carve out a better future, and to make all possible efforts for the peace and prosperity of Asia and the world. We will engrave in our hearts the past, when Japan attempted to break its deadlock with force. Upon this reflection, Japan will continue to firmly uphold the principle that any disputes must be settled peacefully and diplomatically based on the respect for the rule of law and not through the use of force, and to reach out to other countries in the world to do the same. As the only country to have ever suffered the devastation of atomic bombings during war, Japan will fulfill its responsibility in the international community, aiming at the non-­ proliferation and ultimate abolition of nuclear weapons. We will engrave in our hearts the past, when the dignity and honour of many women were severely injured during wars in the 20th century. Upon this reflection, Japan wishes to be a country always at the side of such women’s injured

216   Appendix 3: the Abe statement hearts. Japan will lead the world in making the 21st century an era in which women’s human rights are not infringed upon. We will engrave in our hearts the past, when forming economic blocs made the seeds of conflict thrive. Upon this reflection, Japan will continue to develop a free, fair and open international economic system that will not be influenced by the arbitrary intentions of any nation. We will strengthen assistance for developing countries, and lead the world toward further prosperity. Prosperity is the very foundation for peace. Japan will make even greater efforts to fight against poverty, which also serves as a hotbed of violence, and to provide opportunities for medical services, education, and self-­reliance to all the people in the world. We will engrave in our hearts the past, when Japan ended up becoming a challenger to the international order. Upon this reflection, Japan will firmly uphold basic values such as freedom, democracy, and human rights as unyielding values and, by working hand in hand with countries that share such values, hoist the flag of “Proactive Contribution to Peace,” and contribute to the peace and prosperity of the world more than ever before. Heading toward the 80th, the 90th and the centennial anniversary of the end of the war, we are determined to create such a Japan together with the Japanese people. August 14, 2015 Shinzō Abe, Prime Minister of Japan Source: Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet (2015). Speeches and Statements by the Prime Minister. [online] Available at: http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/ statement/201508/0814statement.html.

Appendix 4 The Japan–ROK agreement (December 28, 2015)

Japan–ROK foreign ministers’ meeting (December 28, 2015) On December 28, commencing from around 2:00 p.m. to 3:20 p.m., Mr Fumio Kishida, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, held a Japan–ROK Foreign Ministers’ Meeting with Mr Yun Byung-­se, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea (ROK), and announced about the issue of comfort women at the press occasion held after the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting as follows. 1

(1)  Foreign Minister Kishida announced as follows. The Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of Korea (ROK) have intensively discussed the issue of comfort women between Japan and the ROK at bilateral meetings including the Director-­General consultations. Based on the result of such discussions, I, on behalf of the Government of Japan, state the following: i The issue of comfort women, with an involvement of the Japanese military authorities at that time, was a grave affront to the honor and dignity of large numbers of women, and the Government of Japan is painfully aware of responsibilities from this perspective. As Prime Minister of Japan, Prime Minister Abe expresses anew his most sincere apologies and remorse to all the women who underwent immeasurable and painful experiences and suffered incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women. ii The Government of Japan has been sincerely dealing with this issue. Building on such experience, the Government of Japan will now take measures to heal psychological wounds of all former comfort women through its budget. To be more specific, it has been decided that the Government of the ROK establish a foundation for the purpose of providing support for the former comfort women, that its funds be contributed by the Government of Japan as a one-­time contribution through its budget, and that projects for recovering the honor and dignity and healing the psychological wounds of all former comfort women be carried out under the cooperation between the Government of Japan and the Government of the ROK.

218   Appendix 4: the Japan–ROK agreement iii While stating the above, the Government of Japan confirms that this issue is resolved finally and irreversibly with this announcement, on the premise that the Government will steadily implement the measures specified in (ii) above. In addition, together with the Government of the ROK, the Government of Japan will refrain from accusing or criticizing each other regarding this issue in the international community, including at the United Nations.

(2) Foreign Minister Yun announced as follows. The Government of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Government of Japan have intensively discussed the issue of comfort women between the ROK and Japan at bilateral meetings including the Director-­General consultations. Based on the result of such discussions, I, on behalf of the Government of the ROK, state the following: i The Government of the ROK values the GOJ’s announcement and efforts made by th Government of Japan in the lead-­up to the issuance of the announcement and confirms, together with the GOJ, that the issue is resolved finally and irreversibly with this announcement, on the premise that the Government of Japan will steadily implement the measures specified in 1. (1) (ii)above. The Government of the ROK will cooperate in the implementation of the Government of Japan’s measures. ii The Government of the ROK acknowledges the fact that the Government of Japan is concerned about the statue built in front of the Embassy of Japan in Seoul from the viewpoint of preventing any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity, and will strive to solve this issue in an appropriate manner through taking measures such as consulting with related organizations about possible ways of addressing this issue. iii The Government of the ROK, together with the Government of Japan, will refrain from accusing or criticizing each other regarding this issue in the international community, including at the United Nations, on the premise that the Government of Japan will steadily implement the measures it announced.

2 3

Furthermore, Foreign Minister Kishida announced that the amount of budget contributed to the foundation would be approximately one billion yen. In addition, both sides exchanged views briefly about the Japan–ROK cooperation in the fields of security and other various issues between the two countries.

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2015). Japan–Republic of Korea Relations. [online] Available at: www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/page4e_000365.html.

1990

continued

Feb. 12–21: Yun Chŏng-ok (Professor, Eiwa Women’s University) and two members of the ecumenical group Korean Church Women United survey sites of former comfort stations in Fukuoka (Kyushu) and Okinawa. July 20: Korean Church Women United establishes the Chŏngsindae Research Association. The Korean term Chŏngsindae is a literal translation of the Japanese Teishintai, the Women’s Voluntary Labor Corps mobilized by Japanese colonial authorities in Korea in support of the war effort. In South Korea, it is widely rendered in English as Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan. Jan. 7: The Korean Federation of Women’s Organizations issues an appeal protesting the South Korean government’s plan to send an official representative to attend the funeral of Emperor Hirohito. The appeal referred to Japan’s wartime use of the Women’s Voluntary Labor Corps as a recruiting ground for comfort women as well as labor “volunteers” and demanded an official apology from the Japanese government. Jan. 1–24: The Hankyoreh Newspaper (Seoul) runs Yun Chŏng-ok’s Report on Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan as a four-part series. June 6: During deliberations in Japan’s House of Representatives Budget Committee, Moto’oka Shōji of the Japan Socialist Party asks the government to undertake a study of the comfort women. Shimizu Tsutao, Labor Ministry Employment Security Bureau Chief, replies that the “brokers [who handled the comfort women] tagged along with the military” and for that reason “it may be difficult to investigate [the issue].” July 10: The Korean Research Institute for Chŏngsindae is created. Oct. 17: Thirty-seven South Korean women’s groups, including the Korean Federation of Women’s Organizations and Korean Church Women United, send an open letter to Japan’s National Diet protesting June 6 statement by the Labor Ministry’s Shimizu. Nov. 16: Thirty-seven women’s organizations inaugurate the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Sexual Slavery by Japan (hereafter, the Korean Council on Japanese Military Sexual Slavery, or Korean Council).

1988

1989

Event

Year

A chronology of events, (1988–2017)

The movement for redress

April 1: In the House Budget Committee, Tanino Sakutarō, head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Asian Affairs Bureau, replies to the Korean Council’s open letter of October 17 by asserting that, “We conducted a search [of ministerial archives] but could find no documentary evidence to go on.” Wakabayashi Yukinori of the Labor Ministry’s Employment Security Bureau tells the Committee: “the section responsible [for labor mobilization] at that time had absolutely no involvement with [comfort women].” Aug. 14: At a press conference in Seoul, Kim Hak-sun becomes the first Korean former comfort woman to use her personal name in public. Oct. 18: The death of former comfort woman Bae Pong-gi is confirmed in Okinawa. Dec. 6: Kim Hak-sun and two other survivors lodge a civil suit with Tokyo District Court against the Japanese government, former military personnel, and civilian employees of the military demanding an apology and state compensation. Jan. 8: The Korean Council on Japanese Military Sexual Slavery holds its first Wednesday Demonstration in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul (the weekly demonstrations continue as of this writing—May 9, 2017). Jan. 11: The Asahi Shimbun reports that Prof. Yoshimi Yoshiaki of Chūō University has uncovered a document in the library of the National Institute of Defense Studies proving that the Imperial Army created comfort stations in China and controlled the mobilization and transportation of comfort women. Jan. 13: Chief Cabinet Secretary Katō Kōichi issues a statement affirming that “the involvement of the army cannot be denied.” Jan. 17: During a visit to the Republic of Korea (ROK), Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi officially apologies to South Korean President Roh Tae-woo over the comfort women issue. Feb. 1: During normalization talks with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, hereafter North Korea), the Japanese government apologizes to North Korea for the comfort women system. *From this point forward, victim-survivors from South Korea, North Korea, the Philippines, China, Taiwan, the Netherlands, and Indonesia come out publicly as comfort women victims. Various survivors’ groups initiate litigation against the Japanese state, insisting on a formal apology and legally binding compensation. Feb. 2: The South Korean government establishes the Victims’ Center and invites survivors to register and testify about their experiences. July 6: The Japanese government releases its first report on the comfort women system: Results of an Investigation into the Question of “Military Comfort Women” Originating from the Korean Peninsula. The report officially acknowledges the direct involvement of the Imperial military but does not find any documents demonstrating that women were forcibly recruited. The government announces that “measures other than compensation” are being considered. July 31: The South Korean government releases the Interim Report on the Fact-finding Survey of Military Comfort Women during the Period of Japanese Colonial Rule. The report concludes that comfort women were procured using strongarm tactics and were in fact mobilized for sexual servitude.

1991

1992

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1993

continued

Aug. 10–11: The first Asian Solidarity Conference for the Issue of Military Sexual Slavery by Japan is convened in Seoul. Attending are survivors and support organizations from South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Hong Kong and civic groups from Japan. The Asian Solidarity Conference continues to meet annually. Oct. 10: The Buddhism Human Rights Committee of Korea establishes the House of Sharing (Nanum-ui jib) in Seoul as a home for comfort women survivors and support staff. Dec. 9: Japanese historians and lawyers organize the International Public Hearing Concerning Japan’s Postwar Compensation (International Public Hearing) in Tokyo. Survivors of comfort stations, forced labor, and prisoner of war camps from North and South Korea, China, Taiwan, the Philippines, and the Netherlands participate. Dec. 25: The Busan Military Comfort Women and Members of the Women’s Voluntary Labor Corps sue the Japanese government. The civil case is heard in the Yamaguchi District Court’s Shimonoseki Branch, whence the name Kanpu (Shimonoseki-Busan) Plaintiff Group. Feb. 1: The Korean Council and the Research Association on the Women Drafted for Sexual Slavery by Japan publish True Stories of the Korean Comfort Women in Korean. The English version, edited by Keith Howard, is released by Cassell (London) in 1995. April 3: Maria Rosa Luna Henson, a Filipina victim-survivor, lodges a civil complaint against the Japanese government in the Tokyo District Court, demanding state compensation. April 5: Survivor and zainichi Korean resident of Japan, Song Sin-do, files suit in the Tokyo District Court, asking the Japanese state for an apology and compensation. April 21: Organizers of the Dec. 9, 1992 International Public Hearing create the Center for Research and Documentation on Japan’s War Responsibility in Tokyo (representative: Arai Shin’ichi). June 21: The South Korean government enacts the Social Security Law for the Comfort Women during the Period of Japanese Colonial Rule. In August, it begins one-time payments for medical and living expenses. July 2: Theo van Boven, Special Rapporteur for the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, submits his final report, Study Concerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, outlining the legal principles for providing redress to victims of serious human rights abuses. Aug. 4: The Japanese government releases the results of its second investigation into the comfort women system. Based on these findings, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kōno Yōhei issues an official statement admitting that military and administrative personnel were involved in the recruitment, transportation, and control of comfort women, who were forced to comply “against their own will.” Aug. 23: In a policy speech to the National Diet, Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro apologizes to Asian countries for Japan’s past actions, “including aggression and colonial rule.” Offended by this statement, a group of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Diet members, promoting visits by government officials and lawmakers to Yasukuni Shrine, form the History Review Committee (chair: Yamanaka Sadanori, secretary general: Itagaki Tadashi). This provides an early platform for revisionist politicians.

Jan. 25: A group of Dutch survivors, comprising one former comfort woman and victims of Japanese internment camps launch a lawsuit against the Japanese government. Feb. 7: South Korean survivors lodge a criminal complaint with the Tokyo District Prosecutors Office. The complaint is rejected. April: University of Tokyo Professor Fujioka Nobukatsu begins a series of articles in the journal Shakaika Kyōiku entitled “How to reform courses on ‘modern history’.” The series is published in book form in March 1996 as The Reform of “Modern History” (Meiji Tosho Shuppan) [in Japanese]. Aug. 13: Japanese newspapers report a proposal for “a private fund to make condolence payments” to former comfort women. The government is said to be studying the idea of establishing a nongovernmental body to which the state can also contribute. Aug. 22: Survivors and 35 support organizations issue a joint appeal to revoke the private fund scheme and demand that the state accept full responsibility, issue an official apology, and provide compensation directly. Aug. 31: In a speech, Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi expresses “profound remorse” to the peoples of Asia for Japan’s pre-1945 “acts of aggression” and “colonial rule.” Nov. 2: The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) releases a 200-page report on the comfort women problem, Comfort Women: An Unfinished Ordeal (Geneva: ICJ). It concludes that victim-survivors of military sexual servitude retain the right under international law to file personal compensation claims. The report also recommends that the Japanese government set up an administrative forum to hear and dispose of victims’ claims, provide legal relief to survivors, and submit the issue to an international tribunal or arbitration panel. Dec. 1: The Liberal Democratic Party takes offense at a draft Diet resolution to “renew the determination for peace on the basis of lessons learned from the past,” to be submitted by Prime Minister Murayama’s coalition government on the 50th anniversary of Japan’s defeat in the Asia-Pacific War (August 1995). To oppose the initiative, the LDP establishes an intraparty group, the 50th End-of-War Anniversary All Party Diet Group (chair: Okuno Seisuke). Jan. 24: The Japan Federation of Bar Associations (Nichibenren) submits a proposal to the government on the comfort women issue, calling on the state to provide legal relief, including direct compensation. Feb. 15: The revisionist Association for an Unbiased View of History (Jiyūshugi Shikan Kenkyūkai) is inaugurated and publishes the first edition of its newsletter. April 22: Director Byun Joo-young releases her documentary The Mummuring, exploring the lives and memories of survivors living together in the House of Sharing. In 1997, Byun completes a sequel, Habitual Sadness, which is followed in 1999 by My Own Breathing. July 19: The National Asian Peace Fund for Women (Josei no tame no Ajia Heiwa Kokumin Kikin), popularly known as the Asian Women’s Fund (AWF), is created as a quasi-public, quasi-private foundation. Forty-three civic support groups, including the Korean Council, immediately issue a public statement criticizing and opposing the project.

1994

1995

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1996

continued

July: Linda Chavez, Special Rapporteur to the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, submits a series of working papers on systematic rape, sexual slavery, and slavery-like practices in time of armed conflict. July: The Indonesia government’s Minister of Social Affairs states that “the issue of compensation has been settled by the 1958 Japan–Indonesia Agreement on Compensation.” July: The Taiwanese government begins financial payments to former comfort women who have declared themselves as victims. Aug. 15: Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi issues his Statement on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the End of the War, the so-called Murayama statement (Appendix 2). In it, he admits that Japan “inflicted, through colonial rule and aggression, great damage and pains on people in many countries, especially in Asia….” He then added: “I express once more my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology.” Sept. 20: The Association for the Advancement of an Unbiased View of History (Jiyūshugi Shikan Kenkyūkai) issues the first issue of its official organ, The Reform of Courses in “Modern History.” Dec. 9: The House of Sharing moves to Twoichon Township in Gwangju City, Gyeonggi Province. Jan. 4: Radhika Coomaraswamy, U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women (1994–2003), presents her report on Japan and the issue of military sexual slavery to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. She categorizes the comfort women system as a violation of international law and urges the Japanese government to fulfill its legal responsibility to provide official redress to victim-survivors. The report is released publicly on Feb. 6. Jan. 15: The Association for the Advancement of an Unbiased View of History begins a series in the conservative Sankei Shimbun entitled “The History that Japanese Texbooks don’t Teach.” March: The International Labor Organization (ILO)’s Committee of Experts finds that the comfort women system constituted sexual slavery and that, as such, it violated the ILO’s Forced Labor Convention (ILO29) of 1930, which Japan ratified in 1932. April 29: In a supporting resolution, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights takes note of the significance of the Coomaraswamy report. June 4: The Liberal Democratic Party’s 50th End-of-War Anniversary All Party Diet Group inaugurate the Bright Japan All Party Diet Group (chair: Okuno Seisuke, secretary-general: Itagaki Tadashi). At a press conference, Okuno tells reporters that “the comfort women were in it for business motives … no forcible recruitment was involved” and criticizes school history texts for discussing the issue. June 27: The results of the 1997 middle-school history book selections are announced. All seven texts contain references to the comfort women. July 20: The Association for the Advancement of an Unbiased View of History decides to wage a national campaign criticizing middleschool history books and demanding the removal of comfort women content. In August, it releases an emergency appeal calling for the deletion of all passages on the comfort women.

Aug.: Cartoonist Kobayashi Yoshinori writes a series of articles in the monthly magazine SAPIO casting doubt on the testimonies of former comfort women and disputing the accuracy of mass media coverage. Aug. 14: The Asian Women’s Fund begins procedures to disburse “condolence money” to former Filipina comfort women. Sept. 22: The National Conference to Preserve Japan (formed in 1981 by war veterans to promote constitutional revision) demands the deletion of all schoolbook references to the comfort women and launches a month-long protest campaign across the country. Oct. 18: South Korean human rights groups establish Citizen’s Solidarity for a True Resolution of the Japanese Military Comfort Women Problem. The alliance begins to collect donations to provide material support to comfort women survivors as an alternative to the Asian Women’s Fund. The group dissolves on May 21, 1997. Dec. 2: The Japan Society for History Textbook Reform (Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho o Tsukurukai—below, the Tsukurukai) organizes a press conference to announce its inauguration. Founders include Fujioka Nobukatsu, Nishio Kanji, Kobayashi Yoshinori, Sakamoto Takao, and Takahashi Shirō. Jan. 11: The Asian Women’s Fund secretly makes consolation payments to seven South Korean survivors. The South Korean government denounces the action as “regrettable.” Jan. 30: The Japan Society for History Textbook Reform (Tsukurukai) holds its opening meeting. Feb.: Sixty-two conservative lawmakers form the Young Diet Member Group for Considering Japan’s Future and History Textbooks (Nippon no Zento to Rekishi Kyōkasho o Kangaeru Wakate Giin no Kai), with Nakagawa Shōichi as chair, Abe Shinzō as director-general, and Etō Seiichi as secretary general. Feb. 2: South Korean survivor Kang Duk-kyung dies, leaving as part of her legacy a painting she did entitled “Punish those responsible— For Peace” (1995). March: The Indonesian government signs a memorandum of agreement with the Asian Women’s Fund and begins social welfare projects for aging survivors using official Japanese treasury funds. March 20: Some 300 Japanese activists and supporters attend an emergency rally under the banner, “Don’t erase history. Women will not remain silent.” March 31: The Tsukurukai holds its first symposium, “Overcoming the Masochistic View of History.” *From April 1, the new middle-school history texts go into use. All seven carry passages on the comfort women problem. May 29: The revisionist interparty Japan Conference Roundtable of Diet Representatives is established. May 31: The National Conference to Preserve Japan (Nihon o mamoru Kokumin Kaigi) joins with the Society for the Preservation of Japan (Nihon o mamoru Kai) to form the Japan Conference (Nihon Kaigi), chaired by Tsukamoto Kōichi, President of Wacoal Holdings. The Japan Conference becomes the country’s largest revisionist organization.

1996 cont.

1997

Event

Year

2000

1999

1998

continued

Aug.: The Taipei Women’s Rescue Foundation (estab. 1988) organizes an auction to raise funds for the support of former Taiwanese comfort women. Oct.: The International Conference on Violence against Women in War is held in Tokyo, bringing together 40 people from 20 countries. Dec. 16: South Korean survivor Kim Hak-sun dies. Dec.: The Taiwanese government gives each victim-survivor ¥2 million (then US$18,500) as a self-declared “payment in advance” from the Japanese government. April 27: The Shimonoseki Branch of the Yamaguchi District Court orders the Japanese government to pay three survivor plaintiffs ¥300,000 (US$2,800) each in a civil case initiated by the Kanpu (Shimonoseki-Busan) Plaintiff Group in 1992. May: The South Korean government disburses ¥3 million (US$28,000) to each recognized former comfort woman. June 6: The Violence against Women in War Network Japan (VAWW-NET Japan) is inaugurated, with Matsui Yayori as representative. July 10: Revisionist cartoonist Kobayashi Yoshinori publishes New Gōmanizumu Manifesto Special: On War (Tōkyō: Gentōsha), a nationalistic view of the Pacific War. Aug. 8: The report of 22 June by Gay J. McDougall, U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women in Wartime, on systematic rape and sexual servitude in wartime is made public by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights’ Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. The report recommends to the Japanese government that public officials responsible for the military comfort woman system be punished and that victim-survivors receive formally legislated compensation. Aug. 14: The Museum of Sexual Slavery by the Japanese Military opens inside the site owned by the House of Sharing. It is the world’s first museum dedicated to the subject of military sexual slavery, Feb.: The Human Rights Subcommittee of the Philippines House of Representatives passes a resolution calling on the Japanese state to enact legislation to officially compensate former comfort women. Aug: Four publishers of middle-school history texts eliminate references to the comfort women. Aug. 24: The California State Legislature approves a joint resolution entitled “War Crimes: Japanese Military during World War II,” referring to sexual slavery. Oct. 29: Nishio Kanji and the Tsukurukai publish A National History of Japan (Tōkyō: Sankei Shimbun). The first run is 350,000 copies. Jan.: The Legislative Council of Hong Kong enacts a resolution calling on Japan to apologize to and recompense comfort women survivors. March: Shanghai Normal University hosts the International Symposium on Chinese Comfort Women. It is the first such gathering in the People’s Republic of China (hereafter, China). April 13: Revisionist publisher Fusōsha submits the Tsukurukai’s 2002 history book to Education Ministry examiners. May: Members of Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan send a letter to the Japanese prime minister, speaker of the House of Representatives, and Diet lawmakers urging them to legislate official compensation for comfort women survivors.

June: The U.S. House of Representatives of introduces a draft resolution on the comfort women. July 1: Japanese newspapers report on the content of middle-school history texts submitted to the Education Ministry for official screening. Three publishers voluntarily reduce coverage of the comfort women issue. Sept. 18: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit hears a civil action suit brought by 15 former comfort women asking for an apology and damages from the Japanese government (Hwang Geum Joo vs. Japan) Dec. 8–12: The Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery is held in Kudan Hall in Tokyo, attended by 64 victims. After three days of testimony by survivors and experts, the Emperor Showa and nine former military and political leaders are convicted of crimes against humanity The tribunal also finds that the Japanese government bears state responsibility for providing redress to women victimized by wartime violations of international law. Jan. 30: The Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) airs a documentary on the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal but alters the content at the last minute due to political pressure (for example, parts pertaining to Emperor Showa are deleted). March: In the U.K. House of Representatives, lawmakers voice support for the lawsuits initiated by former comfort women. March: In Japan’s House of Representatives, female lawmakers from the opposition Democratic, Socialist, and Communist parties submit the Bill for the Promotion of Resolution of the Issues of Victims of Wartime Sexual Coercion. The wartime sexual coercion bill is referred to the lower chamber’s Cabinet Committee. March 4: It is reported that the Tsukurukai has made 137 changes to its pilot history text as requested by the Education Ministry. March 29: The Hiroshima High Court overturns the Shimonoseki District Court’s award of damages to the Kanpu Plaintiff Group (see entry for April 27, 1998). April 3: The Education Ministry announces that the Tsukurukai’s middle-school history and civics texts have been accepted for use during the 2002 school year. May 8: The South Korean government asks the Japanese government to revise the content of middle-school history books. It requests that 25 changes be made to the Tsukurukai text and ten to seven other schoolbooks. May 16: The Chinese government makes representations to the Japanese government concerning its textbook changes. It requests that the Tsukurukai revise eight items in its new text. June 4: The revisionist Fusōsha and Tsukurukai textbooks go on sale. The publishers have printed a total of 300,000 history and 50,000 civics texts and add an additional 200,000 and 100,000 copies, respectively. July 2: The Tsukurukai asks the Education Ministry to approve nine changes to seven entries concerning the 1910 annexation of Korea. The proposed revisions are voluntary. July 9: In response to queries from the South Korean and Chinese governments regarding requested textbook changes, the Education Ministry says it has no plans to ask the Tsukurukai for further revisions.

2000 cont.

2001

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July 24: VAWW-NET Japan files suit against NHK and affiliates, charging that by altering the content of its documentary presentation on the December 2000 Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal, the national broadcaster has violated a public trust and failed to give a reasonable explanation for censoring the film. Aug. 15: It is revealed that none of Japan’s 544 textbook-selection districts chose the Tsukurukai submissions, which accounted for only 0.1% of total textbook adoptions. Aug. 31: The U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights finds that “compensation offered to wartime ‘comfort women’ by the Asian Women’s Fund … has not been deemed an acceptable measure by the women concerned.” It recommends that Japan “find an appropriate arrangement in consultation with the organizations representing the ‘comfort women’ on ways and means to compensate the victims in a manner that would meet their expectations.” Former Filipina comfort women are in attendance. Aug. 31–Sept. 14: The United Nations sponsors the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance in Durban, South Africa. Dec. 4: The Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal delivers its final verdict in The Hague, Netherlands. Dec.: The Philippines House of Representatives passes a resolution asking the House Committee on Women and Gender Equality to investigate the comfort women problem. *During the 2002 school year (April 2002 to March 2003), only three out of eight middle-school history texts retain references to the comfort women. July: Another wartime sexual coercion bill is introduced in the House of Representtives Cabinet Committee and is deliberated for the first time. The bill is scrapped but reintroduced periodically thereafter, although never successfully. Sept. 17: At the first-ever Japan–DPRK (North Korea) summit, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō and Chairman Kim Jong-il issue the Pyongyang Declaration as a prelude to restoring diplomatic relations. Oct.: Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan adopts a resolution urging the drafting of a comfort women bill. Oct. 10: In South Korea, 100 war victims, including former comfort women, lodge a civil complaint with the Seoul Administrative Court demanding the release of classified documents pursuant to the Japan–ROK normalizations talks that led up to the 1965 Treat on Basic Relations. Feb.: The South Korean National Assembly adopts a resolution urging special legislation for comfort women relief. March: Japan’s Supreme Court rejects the final appeal of the Kanpu Plaintiff Group. The dismissal of other survivor lawsuits by the highest court follows in short order (Table 2.1, Chapter 2). April 22: A historical marker is set up in Manila to memorialize an estimated 1,000 Filipinas victimized by Japanese military sexual slavery “in the hope that his tragedy will never happen again.” Aug.: The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women recommends that Japan “endeavor to find a lasting solution for the matter of ‘wartime comfort women’.”

Feb. 13: The lawsuit filed by South Korean war victims to compel release of Japan–ROK normalization documents is accorded a partial victory by the Seoul Administrative Court. Nov.: The South Korean government establishes the Truth Commission on Forced Mobilization under Japanese Imperialism and begins readying relevant archival materials for declassification. Nov. 27: Education Minister Nakayama Nariaki says, “It is gratifying to note that use of the word ‘military comfort women’ has declined recently.” Jan.: The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Philippines House of Representatives adopts a resolution supporting the enactment of legislation for comfort women relief. The South Korean government proceeds with an investigation into South Korean survivors living in China and takes steps to confer on them ROK nationality. Jan. 17: South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade complies with the Seoul Administrative Court finding and opens to the public five groups of Japan–ROK normalization documents. Aug.: The Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace (WAM) opens in Tokyo, becoming the first documentation center in Japan to specialize in the problem of Japanese military sexual slavery. Aug. 26: The South Korean government convenes the Public–Private Joint Committee (PPJC) on Follow-up Measures After the Public Release of ROK–Japan Negotiations Documents. The Committee finds that “Japan has incurred a standing legal obligation that cannot be construed as having been waived by the 1965 Claims Agreement.” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade makes public an additional 156 documents. Sep.: The U.S. House of Representatives presents the first resolution on the comfort women issue, but it is not put to a vote. Jan.: Doudou Diène, U.N. Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance, recommends in his report that the Japanese government adopt legal provisions to include in school textbooks content on “crimes linked to the colonial era and wartime committed by Japan,” including the comfort women. *In the 2006 school year, all public middle-school history books have deleted references to the comfort women. April 28: The Japanese Cabinet proposes to revise the Fundamental Law on Education to include the fostering of patriotism and respect for tradition. A strong grassroots movement arises to oppose the revision. 1. Oct. 3: Prime Minister Abe Shinzō states that his government intends to abide by the 1993 Kōno statement. Dec. 15: The revised Fundamental Law on Education is promulgated and goes into effect on Dec. 22. Jan. 29: The Tokyo High Court awards damages to the Violence Against War and Women Network Japan in its NHK suit, upholding the plaintiff’s claim of violation of expectation rights and the obligation to provide a reasonable explanation.

2004

2007

2006

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Jan. 31: Mike Honda and six other lawmakers in the U.S. House of Representatives submit a bill (House Resolution 121) to the House Foreign Affairs Committee calling on the Japanese government to “formally acknowledge, apologize, and accept historical responsibility in a clear and unequivocal manner” for wartime sexual slavery. Feb. 15: The U.S. House of Representatives invites three victim-survivors to testify at a public hearing on the comfort women issue. March 1: PM Abe tells a press conference that the government had found no documents in earlier investigations proving the use of coercion in recruitment “as that term was originally defined.” March 5: The Prime Minister says no coercion in the narrow sense of military or administrative personnel breaking into people’s homes and abducting women was involved. Regarding the U.S. House Resolution, he retorts that since recruitment was not coercive, there is nothing to apologize for. March 16: The Abe Cabinet issues a Cabinet decision formally rejecting the accusation of forcible procurement. In Diet deliberations, the prime minister asserts that in the documents the government previously examined, it could find no specific reference to forcible recruitment by military or civil authorities. March 31: The Asian Women Fund is officially dissolved after 12 years of operation. April 27: PM Abe, during a visit to Washington, D.C., expresses to President George W. Bush his “deep-hearted sympathies” with the suffering of the comfort women. April 27: Japan’s Supreme Court dismisses on appeal two civil suits by Chinese plaintiffs, one by forcibly conscripted workers and bereaved families against Nishimatsu Construction Co. (Hiroshima) and the other by comfort women survivors (the second Chinese plaintiff group) against the state. June 14: TV personality and revisionist commentator Sakurai Yoshiko and other members of the Committee for Historical Facts publish a fullpage public comment in the Washington Post entitled “THE FACTS” claiming that the comfort women were not victims recruited by force but well-paid prostitutes. The ad is “assented to” by 44 conservative lawmakers, including some members of the centrist Democratic Party of Japan. June: The Dutch primer minister sends a letter to Japanese House Chair Kōno Yōhei calling the Washington Post ad “totally inappropriate” and demanding an explanation for its factual distortions. June 22: Japanese Ambassador to the United States Katō Ryōzō sends a letter to five House leaders, including Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, warning that the adoption of H.Res. 121 threatens to damage U.S.-Japan relations. July 5: The “Comfort Women” Archives open at Shanghai Normal University. July 30: The U.S. House of Representatives passes H.Res. 121 in open session. In the months that follow, the national assemblies of countries victimized by Japanese military prostitution, including South Korea, the Netherlands, and Taiwan, adopt similar statements. Sept.: The Australian Senate fails by one vote to adopt a comfort women resolution. Nov.: The Korean Council on Japanese Military Sexual Slavery and other support groups together with surviving victims from the Netherlands, the Philippines, and South Korea tour Europe to explain the comfort women issue. They testify at a public hearing held by the European Parliament.

Nov. 8: The House of the Netherlands issues a comfort women resolution calling on Japan to refrain from devaluing earlier expressions of official regret, “take full responsibility for the involvement of the Japanese army in the system of forced prostitution,” and offer direct moral and financial compensation to the victims. Nov. 14: Ninety-seven South Korean lawmakers from all parties present a draft resolution asking Japan to offer an official apology for the system of military sexual slavery and provide legal compensation to living victims. Nov. 28: The Canadian House of Commons adopts a comfort women resolution using similar language. Dec. 13: Meeting in open session, the European Parliament, representing 27 countries, unanimously passes a comfort women resolution. Its statement enjoins Japan to “take historical and legal responsibility,” make financial restitution to survivors, and recognize the right of individuals to seek damages from the state. March 11: The Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives of the Philippines votes unanimously to ask Japan for “an official apology and legal reparations” for ex-comfort women. March 28: The Takarazuka City Council (Hyogo Prefecture) in a written opinion petitions Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo to “deal sincerely with the question of the Japanese military comfort system.” Thereafter, municipal and other local governing assemblies in Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the United States forward comparable petitions and resolutions to the Japanese government. Oct. 8: The South Korean National Assembly adopts a statement on the comfort women. Nov. 5: Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan approves a comfort women resolution. Aug. 8: The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women issues its position on the comfort women issue. The committee notes its concern about the removal of comfort women content from public schoolbooks and calls on Japan to find a lasting solution, to include “the compensation of victims, the prosecution of perpetrators, and the education of the public about these crimes.” Feb. 7: The 2010 Japan Nationwide Action to Resolve the Military “Comfort Women” Issue is launched. Aug. 10: On the 100th anniversary of Japan’s 1910 annexation of Korea, Prime Minister Kan Naoto issues an official statement but does not refer to the comfort women. Oct. 23: The first comfort women monument in the United States is unveiled in Palisades Park, New Jersey. The inscription reads in part: “In memory of the 200,000 women and girls who were abducted by the armed forces of … Imperial Japan known as ‘Comfort Women.’ They endured human rights violations that no peoples should leave unrecognized.” Nov. 25: The Japan Nationwide Action to Resolve the Military “Comfort Women” Issue submits to the government 610,000 signatures collected in Japan and overseas calling for a just settlement of the comfort women issue.

2007 cont.

2010

2009

2008

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2012

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Aug. 30: The Constitutional Court of Korea finds that the South Korean government’s failure to go beyond diplomatic representations on the comfort women issue and seek third-country arbitration, as provided for in the 1965 bilateral claims agreement, as a means of settling the comfort women issue is unconstitutional. Sept. 14: The District Court of The Hague finds the Netherlands state legally responsible for the massacre of Indonesians by Royal Dutch troops in 1947 during the Indonesian War of Independence. The Court rules there is no statute of limitations, recognizes the right of individuals to sue the state for legal relief, and orders the Dutch government to provide redress to plaintiffs. Subsequently, the Netherlands issues victims a formal apology and state compensation. Sept. 15: In view of the Constitutional Court’s finding, the South Korean government proposes the resumption of diplomatic consultations with Japan over the comfort women issue. Sept. 25: The Violence Against Women in War Research Action Center (VAWW RAC) is inaugurated, replacing and carrying on the work of VAWW-NET Japan. Dec. 14: The Wednesday Demonstration in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul commemorates its 1000th week by erecting the Peace Statue of a Teenage Girl, the bronze sculpture of a seated adolescent symbolizing Korean comfort women. Such memorials soon appear across South Korea and in several U.S. cities. In Japan, the Nationwide Action to Resolve the Military “Comfort Women” Issue holds demonstrations in 15 urban areas, and supporters in Tokyo encircle the Foreign Ministry with a human chain. Demonstrations are also held in other Asian and Western countries. Dec. 18: Japanese Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko holds talks with South Korean President Lee Myung-bak in Kyoto. Lee urges Noda to prioritize the comfort women issue, but the Japanese premier shows little enthusiasm. Instead, Noda asks that the peace statue in Seoul be removed, to which Lee warns that if the Japanese side refuses to act in good faith, a second statue is likely to be built. March 1: President Lee Myung-bak, speaking at South Korea’s annual National Liberation Day celebration, publicly raises the comfort women problem. May 5: The Korean Council opens the War & Women’s Human Rights Museum in Seoul. May 22: Pressured by rightwing activists, the Nikon Salon in Shinjuku (Tokyo) announces abruptly the cancelation of Ahn Sehong’s scheduled photo exhibition on former comfort women living in China. Ahn challenges that decision in the Tokyo District Court and is awarded damages in December. May 24: The Supreme Court of Korea overturns two Busan High Court dismissals, remanding the cases for retrial. One is the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Labor Conscript Case (filed by Korean A-bomb victims forcibly mobilized by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries); the other is the Nippon Steel Labor Conscript Case. The court rules that the 1965 Japan–ROK claims agreement did not extinguish the rights of individuals to seek redress and that South Korea has not relinquished its right thereby to extend diplomatic protection to its nationals for crimes committed against them during the colonial era and wartime.

Aug. 10: President Lee visits Dokto (Takeshima) Island, citing as his justification Japan’s reluctance to engage South Korea on the comfort women question. Aug. 21, 24: Osaka Mayor Hashimoto Toru complains that the 1993 Kōno statement has become a disruptive factor in Japan–ROK relations. He repeats the assertion that there is no proof comfort women were procured by force. Oct. 5: The British High Court rules that three Kenyans have legal standing as individuals to sue the British state for torture and sexual violence suffered at the hands of British soldiers during the Mau Mau uprising against British colonial rule (1952–60). Oct. 11: The Tokyo District Court orders the partial public release of Foreign Ministry archival materials on Japan–ROK normalization talks (the Foreign Ministry appeals the decision). Nov. 4: Sakurai Yoshiko and members of the Committee for Historical Facts place a second full-page advertisement in a U.S. newspaper denying that the comfort women were victims. Their ad in the New Jersey Star Ledger is “assented to” by Abe Shinzō, soon to be returned to power, and 38 revisionist lawmakers, including several who will serve in the new Abe Cabinet from December 26. Dec. 27: Suga Yoshihide, Prime Minister Abe’s Chief Cabinet secretary, indicates that the 1993 Kōno statement will be revised. China’s Foreign Ministry immediately expresses displeasure. Jan. 3: A New York Times editorial, citing PM Abe’s attempt to distort Japanese history, criticizes his “shameful impulses.” Jan. 6: A high-ranking official in the Obama administration discretely informs the Abe government that if Japan retracts the Kōno statement, the United States will feel obliged to respond accordingly. Jan. 13: Australian Foreign Affairs Minister Bob Carr tells his Japanese counterpart, Kishida Fumio, that revising the Kōno statement is “in no one’s interests.” Jan. 29: The New York State Senate issues a resolution criticizing Japan’s position on the comfort women. Feb. 4: Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga states that the Abe administration has no intention of making a political issue of the Kōno statement, stepping back from earlier pronouncements. Feb. 7: PM Abe tells the Diet once more that there is no evidence women were forcibly rounded up but says he will leave the issue of the Kōno statement to Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga. April 21: Three Cabinet members, including Deputy PM Aso Tarō and more than 160 conservative Diet members, pay homage to the war dead at Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, drawing immediate protests from China and South Korea. Seoul cancels the planned visit of the ROK foreign minister. April 23: In the Diet, PM Abe says that, concerning Japan’s colonization of Korea and wartime aggression, “The definition of what constitutes aggression has yet to be established in academia or in the international community. Things that happened between nations will look differently depending on which side you view them from.”

2012 cont.

2013

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April 26: A Washington Post editorial entitled “Shinzo Abe’s inability to face history,” concludes by noting that “his ability to promote reform at home, where many voters remain skeptical, and to reassure suspicious neighbors plummets when he appears to entertain nostalgia for prewar empire.” May 13, 14: Hashimoto Toru, Osaka Mayor and co-representative of the Japan Restoration Party, says that the comfort women system was necessary at the time and suggests that he would like the U.S. military forces in Japan to avail themselves of similar services in order to reduce sexual violence by U.S. servicemen in Okinawa. His comments raise a storm of protests in Japan and abroad. May 17: The U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights asks the Japanese government to “educate the public on the exploitation of ‘comfort women’ so as to prevent hate speech and other manifestations that stigmatize them.” May 27: During a press conference by Mayor Hashimoto at the Foreign Correspondents Club in Tokyo, the FCC chair refers to Prof. Yoshimi Yoshiaki’s work, Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military During World War II, Columbia University Press, 2000. Sakurauchi Fumiki, a lawmaker and member of the conservative Japan Restoration Party, asserts that Yoshimi’s book has been proven to consist of fabrications and is not worthy of consideration. June 2: The U.N. Committee against Torture (CAT) criticizes Japan for its “continuing official denial of the facts and re-traumatization of the victims by high-level national and local officials and politicians, including several Diet members” and for the government’s rejection of past recommendations. June 18: The Abe administration responds to CAT’s charges by denying that the committee’s recommendations are legally binding and says it is under no obligation to implement them. These countercharges are endorsed by the Cabinet as official policy. July 26: Prof. Yoshimi initiates a civil suit with the Tokyo District Court against Sakurauchi Fumiki for defamation based on the latter’s May 27 comments at the Foreign Correspondents Club. The case is dismissed in 2016. July 30: A peace monument honoring the comfort women is installed in Glendale Central Park outside of Los Angeles, California. The memorial is the fourth to be established in a U.S. city. Over next four years, new statues and monuments appear in Virginia, New Jersey, New York, Michigan, and California. Peace statues are also erected in Canada (2015), China (2016), Australia (2016), and Germany (2017). Aug. 1: The website Fight for Justice is created to provide up-to-date information on the Japanese military comfort women system. The site is available in Japanese, Korean, Chinese, and English. See http://fightforjustice.info. Oct. 16: The conservative Sankei Shimbun announces in a four-page scoop that it has obtained copies of the interviews the Japanese government conducted with 16 former comfort women in South Korea during its 1993 investigation of the comfort women issue. According to the story, the Kōno statement was based on the interviews, which the paper said, were worthless as historical evidence. It concludes that the Kōno statement lacks credibility. The December issue of the revisionist monthly Seiron continues the attack on Kōno’s conclusions. Dec. 26: Against the explicit advice of Washington, PM Abe visits Yasukuni Shrine, eliciting protests from China and South Korea. The Obama administration says it is “disappointed.” It is the first visit by a serving prime minister since Koizumi Jun’ichirō paid his respects there in 2006.

Jan. 24: Momii Katsuo, the new director-general of Japan’s state-run broadcaster, NHK, says comfort women have been found on every battlefield in the world, defending Japan’s wartime use of comfort stations. The remarks draw sharp criticism domestically and internationally. March 1: Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga announces the creation of a “top secret team” inside the Abe government to investigate the process by which Kōno Yōhei drafted his Aug. 4, 1993 acknowledgement of state culpability for the comfort women system. March 1: South Korean President Park Geun-hye, on Korean National Liberation Day, publicly berates the Abe Cabinet for trying to void the Kōno statement. Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se delivers the same message to the U.N. Human Rights Council. March 14: Just before U.S. President Obama visits Tokyo, PM Abe declares that his Cabinet is not thinking of revising the Kōno doctrine. April: The Sankei Shimbun begins a series entitled “The History Wars.” The articles are later published in Japanese and English as History Wars: Japan—False Indictment (Tōkyō: Sankei Shimbun, 2015). June 2: The 12th Asian Solidarity Conference for the Issue of Military Sexual Slavery by Japan convenes in Tokyo. The conference adopts a proposal to the Japanese government for resolving the comfort women issue based on the principle: “a realistic settlement is a settlement that victimized women can accept.” June 20: The government releases an investigative report on the drafting of the Kōno statement. The rightwing initiative collapses when it becomes clear that purportedly questionable interviews with 16 South Korean survivors were conducted just before Kōno’s announcement and were not incorporated in his statement. July 24: The U.N. Committee against Torture addresses the Japanese government’s complaint that the term sexual slavery is “inappropriate” and that “it is not possible to confirm that women were forcefully recruited.” The committee reaffirms that the topic will continue to be listed under the subtitle “Sexual slavery practices against ‘comfort women’,” and that its recommendations pertain to “the sexual slavery system as committed by the Imperial Military of Japan.” Aug. 8–6: The Asahi Shimbun, Japan’s leading liberal daily, runs a special series reexamining its past coverage of the comfort women issue. It retracts articles published in the early 1990s on Yoshida Seiji’s claim to have personally rounded up Korean comfort women on Jeju Island during World War II, an assertion it now labels a fabrication. Rightwing intellectuals intensify their attacks on the Asahi. Jan.: U.S. publisher McGraw-Hill refuses a request made in December by Japan’s Foreign Ministry to delete passages in a U.S. highschool history textbook that discuss the comfort women. On Jan. 29, PM Abe publicly criticizes the textbook as inaccurately portraying Japan’s wartime behavior. Feb.: Nineteen U.S. historians issue an open statement denouncing Japan’s attempt at censorship. “The essential features of a system that amounted to state-sponsored slavery,” they said, is “beyond dispute.”

2014

2015

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April 28: PM Abe, addressing a joint press conference in Washington, D.C. after a bilateral summit, affirms that “The Abe Cabinet upholds the Kōno Statement and has no intention to revise it.” With respect to the comfort women, however, he stops short of issuing an apology for Japan’s involvement, saying only “I am deeply pained to think about the comfort women who experienced immeasurable pain and suffering as a result of victimization due to human trafficking.” May 5: Some 187 U.S. Japan specialists and other scholars issue an Open Letter in Support of Historians in Japan. Afterwards, 270 European and other researchers add their names, bringing the number of endorsements to 457 (as of May 19). Aug. 14: PM Abe delivers his memorial statement on the 70th anniversary of the end of the Asia-Pacific War (Aug. 15) but without mentioning the comfort women. Dec. 28: At a joint press conference in Seoul, Japanese and South Korean foreign ministers announce a bilateral agreement on resolving the comfort women problem. PM Abe issues a verbal apology indirectly via his foreign minister, and Japan promises to pay ¥1 billion (US$8.3 million) for humanitarian support to a foundation to be established by South Korea. Japanese Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio insists at the press conference that the ¥1 billion grant is not official compensation. Both sides agree to “refrain from accusing or criticizing each other…in the international community” and that the issue is settled “finally and irreversibly.” Japan additionally demands that the peace statue in front of its embassy be removed. The Korean Council on Japanese Military Sexual Slavery and other South Korean civic groups immediately protest against the agreement. Dec. 31: The Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace releases a statement, Bridge the Political “Agreement” for a True “Resolution,” that calls on the Japanese government to fully acknowledge its legal as well as moral responsibilities for the comfort women system, issue a formal state apology directly to survivors instead of a vague “apology by proxy,” make an unambiguous acknowledgement of all the facts pertaining to military sexual enslavement, implement the fund as “proof of apology” based on full consultations with survivors and redress organizations, continue basic research on the comfort women system and promote awareness of this issue via school history textbooks and social education projects, and recognize and implement the past recommendations of U.N. human rights bodies. Jan. 14: During a meeting at LDP headquarters, Liberal Democratic Party lawmaker Sakurada Yoshitaka, a former deputy minister of education, reiterates that the comfort women were “prostitutes by occupation.” Jan. 14: In South Korea, 386 redress and human rights organizations launch a movement to retract the Japan–ROK Agreement. Jan. 18: In the House Budget Committee, Foreign Minister Kishida and PM Abe deny that comfort women were sex slaves. Abe insists again that, “There is no written evidence to show that military and civilian authorities employed force directly [in recruiting comfort women].” “The government’s stance,” he asserts, “has not changed at all since the [March 2007] Cabinet decision of the first Abe administration.” Jan. 27: During the visit of the Japanese Emperor and Empress to the Philippines, former comfort women rally in Manila asking Japan for an official apology and state compensation.

Event

Feb. 16: In a written statement to the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Sugiyama Shinsuke notes that the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women does not apply to events prior to Japan’s 1985 accession and that it is therefore “not appropriate” for the committee to comment on the comfort women issue. Feb. 17: Sugiyama tells CEDAW that the “forceful taking away” of women by Japanese military and administrative authorities “could not be confirmed in any of the documents that the Government of Japan was able to identify in [its 1993] study.” Moreover, the expression “sex slaves,” he says, contradicts the facts. He also blames the Asahi Shimbun for negative news coverage of the issue. March 7: CEDAW criticizes Japan for not adopting “a victim-centered approach” to the comfort women in its agreement with South Korea. June 9: The Korean Council and other South Korean redress groups set up the Foundation for Justice and Remembrance on the Issue of Military Sexual Slavery. July 28: In accordance with the Dec. 2015 joint agreement, the South Korean government establishes the Foundation for Reconciliation and Healing. Aug. 25: Following a Cabinet meeting, the Japanese government transmits the promised ¥1 billion to the new South Korean foundation. Oct.: The Foundation for Reconciliation and Healing and the South Korean government ask PM Abe for a “letter of apology” to survivors. Abe replies he is “not considering such an idea at all.” Oct.: In late October, South Korean President Park Geun-hye is implicated in a national security scandal involving her close friend and confident, Choi soon-sil. From November, spontaneous candlelight demonstrations spread across the country and pressure mounts on Park to resign. Nov.: The Foundation for Reconciliation and Healing announces it has disbursed cash donations to 23 former comfort women. Dec. 9: The South Korean National Assembly votes to impeach Park and she is relieved of her presidential duties. Dec. 10: The Taipei Women’s Rescue Foundation opens Taiwan’s first museum dedicated to the comfort women, the Ama Museum (ama is the Hokkien word for Grandma). Dec. 30: Civic groups erect a peace statue on a public street in front of the Japanese Consulate in Busan.

Year

2016 cont.

Jan. 6: The Japanese government recalls its ambassador and consul-general to protest the installation of the Busan statue. Tokyo insists that the statue be removed, and Japan–ROK relations deteriorate rapidly. Jan. 9: The Japanese ambassador and consul-general return to Japan temporarily (they take up their posts again on April 4 after an absence of 85 days, during which time diplomatic relations come to a virtual standstill). Feb. 3: Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga announces that the “peace statues” will be referred to officially as the “comfort women statues.” March 10: The Korean Constitutional Court rules that the dismissal of President Park is legal. March 27: The U.S. Supreme Court refuses to hear an appeal by the Global Alliance for Historical Truth and other Japanese living in the United States, who are contesting the rejection by lower courts of their lawsuit against Glendale, California to remove the peace statue there. Many Japanese American leaders are supportive of the peace memorial, notably those from Nikkei for Civil Rights and Redress and the Japanese American Citizens League. March 31: South Korean prosecutors arrest former President Park on suspicion of corruption and abuse of authority. May 2: The Japanese ambassador meets the South Korean foreign minister and asks that Seoul fully implement the Japan–ROK agreement and remove the peace statues from in front of the embassy and consulate (a demand that South Korea did not formally commit to in the 2015 agreement). May 9: Former human-rights attorney Moon Jae-in is elected President of South Korea. May 11: In Geneva, the U.N. Committee Against Torture recommends that South Korea revise its Dec. 28, 2015 bilateral agreement with Japan on the comfort women issue to “ensure that the surviving victims of sexual slavery during World War II are provided with redress, including the right to compensation and rehabilitation and the right to truth, reparation and assurances of non-repetitions.”

Notes 1 The Chronology of Events is based primarily on developments related to the comfort women issue as discussed in this book. In Japanese, the military euphemism “comfort women” is often enclosed in quotations marks to stress that the term itself was used to legitimize sexual slavery. Here, however, we defer to common English usage and remove the emphasis, except in direct citations. 2 We do not record all the developments in the ten lawsuits initiated by victim-survivors against the Japanese state. These are summarized in Table 2.1, Chapter 2. 3 We cite only a few of the innumerable abusive public comments that government officials, politicians, governors, and other public figures have uttered about the comfort women over the past 20 years.

Source: Compiled by Kim Puja.

2017

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Index

Page numbers in italics denote tables, those in bold denote figures. 50th End-of-War Anniversary All Party Diet Group 222, 223 abduction/kidnapping 115; Chinese women 24–6, 50–1, 64–8; concept of 28–9, 41–3; Dutch women 23–4; Filipina women 51–2; Indonesian women 53; Korean women 38n19, 44, 48, 136; Malaysian women 53; by North Korea 33; Shizuoka and Nagasaki incidents 57, 87–90; Taiwanese women 49 Abe Kōki 176 Abe Shinzō 3, 4, 5–6, 17, 22, 29, 33, 34, 36, 40, 42, 57–8, 83n1, 95, 98, 109, 123, 124, 127, 154, 155, 156, 159–62, 177, 191, 193, 194, 197, 200–2, 213–16, 224, 228, 229, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236 Abe statement (2015) 5, 177, 213–16, 235 adolescents, Korean 136–46, 138–9, 142, 143; see also minors Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property and Claims and on Economic Co-operation between Japan and the Republic of Korea see Japan– ROK Claims Agreement (1965) Ahn Sehong 231 Akamatsu Ryōko 96 Akihito, Emperor of Japan 191 Ama Museum, Taiwan 236 Anti-Prostitution Law (1956), Japan 19–22 apologies 3, 5–6, 103; Asian Women’s Fund apology letters 2, 96, 97, 98, 102, 111n13, 125, 127, 182–3, 184; demands for 24, 34, 44, 64, 67, 100–1, 127, 181, 219, 220, 221, 222, 225, 226, 229, 230, 235, 236; to Dutch women 111n13, 231;

Kōno statement 94, 96, 118, 119, 127, 129, 207–8; Murayama statement 2, 5, 94, 104, 211–12, 223; to North Korea 220; proposals for just 34, 128–30, 192, 193; to South Korea 6–7, 108, 152, 190, 193–4, 200, 220, 235, 236 Asahi Shimbun 23, 28, 95, 104, 108, 120, 123, 124, 152, 153, 187–9, 190, 220, 234, 236 Asian Solidarity Conference for the Issue of Military Sexual Slavery by Japan 193, 194, 221, 234 Asian Women’s Fund (AWF) 3, 4, 8, 9, 93–110, 120, 174, 222, 229; apology letters 2, 96, 97, 98, 102, 111n13, 125, 127, 182–3, 184; atonement payments 3, 96, 97–8, 101–3, 125–7, 184, 224; international response 100–1, 107–8, 227; liberal views of 103–7; medical and welfare support 96–7, 98–9, 99, 125–6, 184, 224; and reconciliation discourse 103–7, 124, 125–7; and Song Sin-do 182–5, 186–7; source of private donations 126–7; South Korean government response 100, 108, 224; survivors’ perceptions of 101–3, 106, 182–5, 186–7 Aso Tarō 119, 232 Asō Tetsuo 144 Association for the Advancement of an Unbiased View of History 155–6, 163n17, 222, 223 Association of Diet Members for Worshiping Togther at Yasukuni Shrine 159, 164n27 atonement gratuity payments 3, 96, 97–8, 101–3, 125–7, 184, 224

258   Index atonement projects 96–7, 98–9, 99, 125–6, 184, 224 Australia 114, 119, 198, 229, 232, 233 AWF see Asian Women’s Fund (AWF) Balikpapan Tribunal, Indonesia 116 Ban Ki-moon 200 Bangka Island, Indonesia 27 bar hostesses (shakufu) 83n3; see also state prostitution Batavia Military Tribunal, Indonesia 23, 28, 42–3, 115 battlefield rapes 64, 65, 68 Borneo 53, 114, 116 Bright Japan All Party Diet Group 223 Buddhism Human Rights Committee of Korea 221 Burma 29–30, 31, 141, 142, 143 Burmese women 28, 98 Busan, South Korea 236, 237 Busan High Court 174, 231 Busan Military Comfort Women 221 Bush, George W. 229 Byun Joo-young 222 California State Legislature 225 Canada 198, 233 Canadian House of Commons 4, 101, 123, 230 Carr, Bob 119, 232 cash bonds 19–22, 29–30, 73–4, 76, 77, 80–1 CEDAW see United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) Center for Research and Documentation on Japan’s War Responsibility 105, 221 Chang Ki-yǒng 167 Chavez, Linda 223 China: Guilin (Kweilin) 27, 115; peace statues 233; requests for textbook changes 226; Shanxi Province 24–6, 50–1, 64–8, 66 Chinese women 1, 6, 8, 10–11, 28, 98, 220, 221, 225, 229; forcible recruitment 24–6, 27, 50–1, 64–8, 66; lawsuits 24–6, 44, 46, 50, 51, 64–5, 67–8, 67, 229; numbers of survivors 194n1; testimonies 50–1, 108 Choi Soon-sil 197, 236 Chǒngsindae Research Association 219 Citizen’s Group for Full Disclosure of Japan–ROK Normalization Documents 175, 176

Citizen’s Solidarity for a True Resolution of the Japanese Military Comfort Women Problem 224 Civil Liberties Act (1988), US 128–9 civilian procurers see private procurers claims agreement see Japan–ROK Claims Agreement (1965) coercive recruitment see forcible recruitment comfort stations: comparison with state prostitution 18–22, 18, 75–6; establishment of 65, 71; military regulations for 19, 20–1; public management argument 31–2; soldier testimonies 68 comfort women: ages of 136–46, 138–9, 142; ethnic and national composition 10, 28; numbers of 8, 10, 28, 37n17; numbers of survivors 181, 194n1; postwar neglect 56–7, 77–8; retraumatization 9, 29, 156: see also victim-survivors of the comfort women system “Comfort Women” Archives, Shanghai Normal University 229 Comfort Women of the Empire (Park) 131–2 comfort women monuments see peace statues Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military During World War II 233 Comfort Women: An Unfinished Ordeal 222 Commission of Enquiry into Traffic in Women and Children in the East 80–1 Committee for Historical Facts 3, 55, 70, 83n1, 229, 232 Committee for Historical Investigation 154, 163n10 Compendium of Materials Relating to the Wartime Comfort Women Issue: Government of Japan Survey 242 consolation payments see atonement payments Constitutional Court of Korea 4, 108, 173–4, 189–90, 197, 231, 237 Coomaraswamy, Radhika 2, 107, 223 Council for the Revitalization of Education, Japan 160, 161, 165n31 Courses of Study guidelines, Japan 160 court cases see lawsuits crimes against humanity 2, 42–3, 117n4, 117n5, 226

Index   259 Criminal Code of Japan 33, 38n23; see also Penal Code of Japan (1907) debt slavery 19–22, 29–30, 31, 73–4, 77, 78, 80–1 deception 115; Chinese women 27, 51; concept of 29, 41–3; Indonesian women 53; Japanese women and Nagasaki incident 57, 89–90; Japanese women and Shizuoka incident, 87–90; South Korean women 29–30, 31, 44–5, 48, 136, 140–1; Taiwanese women 49 Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 159, 160, 189, 229 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea see North Korea Diène, Doudou 228 Diet Members Alliance for a Bright Japan 154, 163n10 Diet Members Alliance for Enacting a New Constitution 159, 165n31 Diet Members Alliance for Promoting the Assessment of a New Constitution 159, 164n27 District Court of The Hague 231 Dokto Island 176, 191, 232 Dong-A Ilbo 98 DPJ see Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) 23–4, 26–7, 42–3, 52, 78, 115 Dutch Foundation of Japanese Honorary Debts 118–19, 133n4 Dutch military tribunals 23, 28, 42–3, 115–16 Dutch women 28, 114, 131, 220, 221; apologies to 111n13, 231; and Asian Women’s Fund 96, 98, 99; forcible recruitment 23–4, 52, 115; lawsuits 44, 46, 222; medical and welfare support 96, 98–9, 99; testimonies 52, 108 East Timorese women 6, 28, 53–4, 54, 98, 108, 114 education reform program, Japan 160–2 enticement: concept of 28–9, 41–3; Japanese women 30–1; South Korean women 29–30, 44–5; see also deception Etō Seiichi 156, 224 European Parliament 4, 34–5, 101, 123, 229, 230 feminist perspective 105–6, 136–7, 145–6; see also gender Fight for Justice website 233

filial piety, prostitution as 74, 81 Filipina women 1, 3, 6, 8, 28, 52, 220, 227, 235; and Asian Women’s Fund 3, 96, 98, 99, 224; forcible recruitment 26, 51–2; lawsuits 26, 44, 46, 51, 221; numbers of survivors 194n1; payments to 3, 96, 98, 99, 184, 224; testimonies 51–2, 108 Flores Island, Indonesia 23 Forced Labor Convention (1930) 12n4, 223 forcible recruitment 17–31, 33–4, 40–58, 115; Chinese women 24–6, 27, 50–1, 64–8, 66; comparison with state prostitution 18–22, 18, 75–6; concept of 28–9, 41–3; court recognition of 24–6, 43–4, 46–7, 64–5, 67–8; denialist position 40, 55, 155, 201; Dutch women 23–4, 52, 115; East Timorese women 53–4, 54; Filipina women 26, 51–2; Indonesian women 23–4, 26–7, 53; Japanese women 30–1, 54–7; Malaysian women 53; military regulations for comfort stations 19, 20–1; reconciliation discourse on 120–1; South Korean women 28–30, 31, 38n19, 43, 44–8, 55, 136, 140–1; into state prostitution 18–22, 18, 73–6; survivor testimonies 43–57, 46–7; Taiwanese women 28–9, 49–50 Foreign Correspondents Club, Toyko 233 Foundation for Justice and Remembrance on the Issue of Military Sexual Slavery. South Korea 236 Foundation for Reconciliation and Healing, South Korea 199, 200, 236 France 74 fraud see deception Fujioka Nobukatsu 154–5, 156, 222, 224 Fukuda Yasuo 230 Fundamental Law on Education (1947), Japan 160, 161–2, 228 Fusōsha (publishers) 156, 225, 226 geigi (geisha) 83n3; see also state prostitution Gemba Kōichirō 175, 190 gender 52, 70, 82, 105–7; and ethnicity 136–7, 145–6; and nationalism 105–7, 120–1, 125, 136–7, 145–6 General Headquarters of the Allied Powers (GHQ) 11 Germany 11, 198, 233 Glendale, California 233, 237

260   Index

Habitual Sadness (film) 222 Hague Convention (1907) 12n4 Hainan Island 24–6, 50–1 Han’guk Ilbo 190–1 Hankyoreh, The 98, 219 Hara Bunbei 96 Hashimoto Ryūtarō 98, 182–3, 184 Hashimoto Toru 4, 31, 32, 33, 232, 233 Higashizawa Yasushi 176 Hirohito, Emperor of Japan 2, 219, 226 Hiroshima High Court 44, 46, 59n8, 226 Hirota Kazuko 55–6 historical revisionism 3–4, 95, 98, 200–2; allegation that comfort women were prostitutes 40, 55, 70, 72, 77, 82–3; denialist position 40, 55, 155, 201; public management argument 31–2; and school textbooks 3, 40, 95, 98, 153–6, 157–62, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227; Star Ledger advertisement 4, 83n1, 159–60, 232; Washington Post advertisement 3, 55, 70, 72, 83n1, 123, 159, 229, 233; see also Abe Shinzō History Review Committee 221 History Wars: Japan—False Indictment 234 Hokkaidō Shimbun 190 Honda, Mike 229 Hong Kong Legislative Council 225 Hong Kong women 221 Hosokawa Morihiro 221 House of Sharing (Nanum), South Korea 132, 221, 222, 223, 225 Howard, Keith 221 human trafficking see trafficking of women Al Hussein, Zeid Ra’ad 202

recruitment 23–4, 26–7, 53; medical and welfare support 97, 99, 224; testimonies 53 Interim Report on the Fact-finding Survey of Military Comfort Women during the Period of Japanese Colonial Rule, South Korea 220 International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) 50, 222 international community: response to Asian Women’s Fund 100–1, 107–8, 227; response to Japan–ROK agreement 202–3 International Conference on Violence against Women in War, Tokyo 225 International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children (1921) 12n4, 41, 42, 78–9, 143–4 International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic (1910) 41, 42, 78 International Court of Justice 176 International Labor Organization (ILO) 12n4, 108, 223 international law 2, 12n4, 41, 42, 78–82, 176 International Military Tribunal for the Far East 27, 43, 59n6, 114–15, 117n4, 117n5 International Public Hearing Concerning Japan’s Postwar Compensation, Tokyo 221 International Symposium on Chinese Comfort Women 225 intimidation 41, 53–4, 115 Ishida Yoneko 26 Ishihara Nobuo 126 Ishihara Shintarō 4 Itagaki Tadashi 221, 223 Itakura Yoshiaki 153

ICJ see International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) ILO see International Labor Organization (ILO) Impaction 121–3 Indian women 28 Indochinese women 28 Indonesia 223, 224; see also Dutch East Indies Indonesian War of Independence 231 Indonesian women 6, 28, 114, 220; and Asian Women’s Fund 97, 99; forcible

Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) 104, 226, 227, 228, 234 Japan Conference 154 Japan Conference Roundtable of Diet Representatives 154, 224 Japan Federation of Bar Associations 222 Japan House of Representatives 12–3n5, 104, 226, 227 Japan Restoration Party 233 Japan Socialist Party 219 Japan Women’s Christian Temperance Union 74

Global Alliance for Historical Truth 237 Great Court of Cassation 57, 74, 87–90 Guamanian women 116 Guilin (Kweilin), China 27, 115

Index   261 Japan–ROK Claims Agreement (1965) 95, 107–8, 126, 166–78, 192 Japan–ROK ministerial agreement on comfort women (2015) 5, 35–6, 101, 109, 177, 193–4, 197–203, 217–18, 235, 237 Japan–ROK normalization documents 172–6, 227, 228, 232 Japan–ROK Treaty on Basic Relations (1965) 95, 126, 166, 168, 170, 171, 177–8, 189–90 Japan–ROK treaty conferences (1951–65) 166, 167–72 Japanese American Citizens League 237 Japanese Constitution (1947) 117 Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform 104, 155, 156, 158, 224, 225, 226, 227 Japanese women 10, 28, 131; forcible recruitment 30–1, 54–7; recruitment of shōgi, geigi and shakufu as comfort women 54–7, 71, 72, 76–8, 143, 144; testimonies 54–7, 71, 77 Japanese-American internment 128–9 Java 23, 52, 53, 114, 115–16 Jeju Island, South Korea 234 just settlement: proposals for 34–5, 128–30, 192, 193, 194, 202–3; survivors’ wishes 181–94 Kagawa Toyohiko 79 Kan Naoto 173, 230 Kanpu Plaintiff Group 46, 221, 225, 226, 227 Katō Kōichi 152, 153, 220 Katō Ryōzō 229 Kerry, John 200 kidnapping see abduction/kidnapping Kim Chong-p’il 168 Kim Dae-jung 100 Kim Jong-il 227 kisaeng system 45, 55, 63n36 Kishida Fumio 5, 6–7, 35, 36, 109, 119, 200, 201, 217–18, 232, 235 Kobayashi Yoshinori 154–5, 156, 224, 225 Koizumi Jun’ichirō 98, 227, 233 Kōno statement (1993) 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 17–36, 94, 96, 98, 118, 119, 127, 129, 152, 177, 193, 201, 207–10, 221, 228, 232, 233, 234, 235 Kōno Yōhei 2, 5, 6, 7, 17, 18, 22, 23, 27, 28, 32, 33, 42, 43, 94, 96, 118, 152, 177, 207–10, 221, 229, 234 Korean Church Women United 219

Korean Constitutional Court 4, 108, 173–4, 189–90, 197, 231, 237 Korean Council on Japanese Military Sexual Slavery 102, 104, 120, 191, 219, 220, 221, 222, 229, 231, 235, 236 Korean Federation of Women’s Organizations 219 Korean Students Union in Japan 170 Korean women see North Korean women; South Korean women Korean Youth Union in Japan 170 Koyama Takao 158 Kunii Shigeru 56 Kweilin, China see Guilin, China Laws Regulating Prostitutes (1900), Japan 74 lawsuits 1, 43–4, 46–7, 59n8; Chinese women 24–6, 44, 46, 50, 51, 64–5, 67–8, 67, 229; for disclosure of Japan– ROK normalization documents 172–6, 227, 228, 232; Dutch women 44, 46, 222; Filipina women 26, 44, 46, 51, 221; Kanpu Plaintiff Group 46, 221, 225, 226, 227; against NHK 227, 228; against Park Yuha 132, 137; against Sakurauchi Fumiki 233; by Song Sin-do 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 221; South Korean women 1, 43–4, 46, 132, 137, 152, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 220, 221, 222, 225, 226, 227, 228; Taiwanese women 44, 46; in United States 226, 237 LDP see Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Japan League of Nations 41, 78–82, 143–4 Lee Myung-bak 40, 108, 174, 190, 191, 192, 231, 232 Lest We Forget (Fred Seiker) 121–3, 122 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Japan 17, 40, 83n1, 104, 118, 154, 155, 156, 158, 159–62, 191, 201, 221, 222, 223, 235 licensed prostitution see state prostitution loan agreements see cash bonds McDougall, Gay J. 2, 100, 107–8, 225 McGraw-Hill 234 Machimura Nobutaka 156 Maeda Akira 132 Magelang incident, Indonesia 23, 114 Mainichi Shimbun 55, 123 Malaysian women 28, 53, 98, 108 Matsui Yayori 225 Mau Mau uprising, Kenya 232

262   Index medical and welfare support 96–7, 98–9, 99, 125–6, 184, 224 medical examinations 11, 26, 74, 78, 141, 144 Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, Berlin 198 memorials see peace statues military regulations for comfort stations 19, 20–1 Military Sexual Slaves Livelihood Stabilization Act (1993), South Korea 187 Ministry of Education, Japan 95, 98, 151, 153, 156, 157, 158, 160–1, 225, 226, 228 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, South Korea 172, 190, 228 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 95, 99, 169, 174, 175, 190 Ministry of Health and Welfare, Japan 116 Ministry of Home Affairs, Japan 10, 19, 28, 76, 81, 143 minors 43, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 57, 79; Japanese policy towards 141–4; Korean adolescents 136–46, 138–9, 142, 143; Shizuoka incident 57, 87–90 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Labor Conscript Case 174–5, 231 Miyazawa Kiichi 152, 161, 220 Momii Katsuo 234 monuments see peace statues Moon Jae-in 7, 197, 199–200, 203, 237 Mori Yoshirō 98 Motomerukai 175, 176 Moto’oka Shōji 219 Mummuring, The (film) 222 Muntilan Internment Camp, Indonesia 23 Murayama Kiichi 107 Murayama statement (1995) 2, 5, 94, 104, 118, 177, 211–12, 223 Murayama Tomiichi 2, 5, 94, 95, 96, 104, 118, 177, 211–12, 222, 223 Museum of Sexual Slavery by the Japanese Military. South Korea 225 Mutō Masatoshi 190 My Own Breathing (film) 222

National Archives of the Netherlands 23 National Asian Peace Fund for Women see Asian Women’s Fund (AWF) National Conference to Preserve Japan 224 National History of Japan, A 225 National Institute for Defense Studies 152, 220 National Liberation Day, South Korea 231, 234 National Police Agency, Japan 33, 76, 127 Nationwide Action to Resolve the Military Comfort Women Issue, Japan 189, 191, 230, 231 Neighboring Country Clause in the Textbook Examination Standards, Japan 161 Netherlands 118–19, 229; end of licensed prostitution 78; and Indonesian War of Independence 231; military tribunals 23, 28, 42–3, 115–16; support from Asian Women’s Fund 96, 98, 99; see also Dutch women Netherlands House of Representatives 4, 100–1, 123, 229, 230 New History Textbook, The 156, 158, 225, 226, 227 New Right alliance 151, 162n2 New York State Senate 118, 133n3, 232 New York Times 118, 232 NHK see Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) Nihon Shoseki (publishers) 158, 164n25 Nikkei for Civil Rights and Redress 237 Nikon Salon, Shinjuku, and Ahn Sehong 231 Nippon Steel Labor Conscript Case 174–5, 231 Nishimatsu Construction Co. 229 Nishio Kanji 154–5, 156, 224, 225 Noda Yoshihiko 95, 108, 174, 190, 191, 231 North Korea 200, 220, 227; abductions by 33 North Korean women 6, 44, 98, 108, 131, 140, 177, 181, 220, 221 “Nurses in River Incident” (Fred Seiker) 121–3, 122

Nagahara Yōko 94 Nagano Shigeto 156 Nagasaki incident 57, 89–90 Nagasawa Ken’ichi 30–1, 76–7 Nakagawa Shōichi 156, 224 Nakayama Nariaki 228 Nanking massacre 65, 153, 156

Obama, Barack 118, 200, 232, 233, 234 Obuchi Keizō 98 Ōhira Masayoshi 168, 176 Ōhira-Kim memo 168 Okazaki Hisahiko 155 Okuno Seisuke 222, 223 Omata Yukio 31

Index   263 Ōnuma Yasuaki 96, 106, 107, 126–7 Open Letter in Support of Historians in Japan 235 Ōshima Tadamori 158 Pacific islanders 28 Palisades Park, New Jersey 230 parental selling of daughters 73–4, 77, 120 Park Geun-hye 6, 7, 197–8, 200, 234, 236, 237 Park Yuha 97, 119–23, 124, 125, 131–2, 134n19, 136, 137, 141, 145 payments to women 221, 222, 223, 225; Asian Women’s Fund atonement payments 3, 96, 97–8, 101–3, 125–7, 184, 224; for South Korean foundation 6, 35, 109, 177, 199, 200, 235, 236 peace statues: Australia 198, 233; Canada 198, 233; China 233; Germany 198, 233; South Korea 6, 109, 136, 190, 197–8, 199, 200, 231, 235, 236, 237; United States 230, 231, 233, 237 Pelosi, Nancy 229 Penal Code of Japan (1907) 22, 28–9, 31, 33, 42, 43, 48, 50, 57, 59n5, 89–90 Philippines 78; see also Filipina women Philippines House of Representatives 225, 227, 228, 230 Police Protection Bureau, Japan 10–11 Pontianak Tribunal, Indonesia 116 PPJC see Public–Private Joint Committee (PPJC), South Korea private procurers 28, 38n20, 40, 41, 76 “Proposal for an unequivocal apology to the comfort women,” Japan 128 prostitution see state prostitution public management argument 31–3 Public Safety Commission, Japan 31–2 Public–Private Joint Committee (PPJC), South Korea 172, 174, 228 “Punish those responsible—For Peace” (painting) 224 Pyongyang Declaration 227 rape centers 8, 10, 65–6, 66, 67–8, 71 reconciliation discourse 4, 8, 118–32, 136–7; and Asian Women’s Fund 103–7, 124, 125–7; Park Yuha 119–23, 124, 125, 131–2, 134n19, 136, 137, 141, 145 recruitment: of shōgi, geigi and shakufu as comfort women 54–7, 71, 72, 76–8, 143, 144; into state prostitution 18–22, 18, 73–6; see also forcible recruitment

Reform of Courses in “Modern History”, The 223 reparations see apologies; just settlement; state compensation Report on Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (Yun) 219 Republic of Korea see South Korean government Research Association on the Women Drafted for Sexual Slavery, South Korea 221 Research Group on Japanese Military Comfort Women, South Korea 132 Rest and Recreation Associations, for US soldiers, Japan 10–11 Results of an Investigation into the Question of “Military Comfort Women” Originating from the Korean Peninsula, South Korea 220 revisionism see historical revisionism Rice, Susan 200 Roh Tae-woo 152, 220 Sakabe Yasumasa 26–7 Sakamoto Takao 154–5, 156, 224 Sakurada Yoshitaka 201, 235 Sakurai Yoshiko 3, 229, 232 Sakurauchi Fumiki 233 Salvation Army 74 San Francisco Peace Treaty (1952) 27, 107, 114, 116–17, 167 Sankei Shimbun 154–5, 158, 223, 233, 234 SAPIO 224 school textbooks 151–62; American 234; Chinese requests for changes 226; inclusion of comfort women content 3, 98, 152–3, 223; move to total state control of 159–62; removal of comfort women references 95, 98, 156–9, 228; revisionist campaign 3, 40, 95, 98, 153–6, 157–9, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227; South Korean requests for changes 226; UN concerns about 228, 230 Seiker, Fred 121–3, 122 Seiron 233 Sekai 104 Self-Defense Forces, Japan 127 selling women: into state prostitution 73–4, 77, 78, 120; see also trafficking of women Semarang, Indonesia 23, 52, 115 Semarang-Flores incident 23 Senda Kakō 55 Seoul Administrative Court 172, 227, 228

264   Index Seoul Eastern District Court 132 service contracts, in state prostitution 19, 74, 76 sexual slavery: state prostitution as 22, 73–4; use of term 2, 18, 22, 36, 40, 55, 70, 73, 75–6, 201, 234 sexually transmitted diseases 11, 65, 74, 141, 144, 147n16 Shakaika Kyōiku 222 shakufu (bar hostesses) 83n3; see also state prostitution Shanghai Expeditionary Army, Japanese Imperial 30, 65, 76, 144 Shanghai Normal University 225, 229 Shanxi Province 24–6, 50–1, 60, 64–8, 66 Shimizu Tsutao 219 Shintō Political Alliance Diet Membes’ Roundtable 159, 164n27 Shizuoka incident 57, 87–90 Shōgenji Kango 53 shōgi (licensed prostitutes) 83n3; see also state prostitution Singapore 78 Social Security Law for the Comfort Women during the Period of Japanese Colonial Rule, South Korea 100, 221 Society for the Preservation of Japan 224 South Korean government 4, 197, 219, 220, 221, 225, 228, 231, 236; Japan– ROK agreement (2015) 5, 35–6, 101, 109, 177, 193–4, 197–203, 217–18, 235, 237; Japan–ROK Claims Agreement (1965) 95, 107–8, 126, 166–78, 192; Japan–ROK normalization documents 172–6, 227, 228, 232; Japan–ROK Treaty on Basic Relations (1965) 95, 126, 166, 168, 170, 171, 177–8, 189–90; Japan–ROK treaty conferences (1951–65) 166, 167–72; requests for textbook changes 226; response to Asian Women’s Fund 100, 108, 224 South Korean National Assembly 100, 101, 197, 227, 229, 230, 236 South Korean women 1, 4, 7, 28, 45, 131, 131, 198, 219, 220, 221, 224, 225, 228, 234; adolescent 136–46, 138–9, 142, 143; and Asian Women’s Fund 3, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101–3, 106, 224; forcible recruitment 28–30, 31, 38n19, 43, 44–8, 55, 136, 140–1; and Japan–ROK agreement 109, 198–9; lawsuits 1, 43–4, 46, 132, 137, 152, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 220, 221, 222, 225, 226, 227, 228; numbers of survivors 181; payments to

3, 96, 97, 99, 99, 101–3, 184, 224; testimonies 43, 44–8, 55, 108, 137–41 Soviet Union 11 Star Ledger 4, 83n1, 159, 232 state compensation 2, 3, 7, 9, 223, 225, 230, 231; and Asian Women’s Fund 97–8, 103, 125–6; for JapaneseAmericans 128–9; and Japan–ROK Claims Agreement 95, 107–8, 126, 166–78, 192; proposals for just 34, 128–30; rights to 222; see also lawsuits state prostitution 11, 70–83; and international abolition movement 78–82, 85n22; prewar system of 18–22, 18, 73–6, 79–82; recruitment of shōgi, geigi and shakufu as comfort women 54–7, 71, 72, 76–8, 143, 144 Study Concerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 221 Suga Yoshihide 119, 201, 232, 234, 237 Sugiyama Shinsuke 201, 236 Sunrise Party of Japan 160 Supreme Court, Japan 19, 22, 59n8, 64, 161, 185, 227, 229 Supreme Court of Korea 174–5, 231 Supreme Court, United States 237 survivor testimonies 1, 43–57, 46–7; adolescents 137–41; Chinese women 50–1, 66, 67, 108; Dutch women 52, 108; East Timorese women 53–4, 54; Filipina women 51–2, 108; Indonesian women 53; Japanese women 54–7, 71, 77; Korean women 43, 44–8, 55, 108, 137–41, 185–7; Malaysian women 53, 108; Taiwanese women 49–50, 108 Taipei Women’s Rescue Foundation 225, 236 Taiwanese government 223, 225 Taiwanese Legislative Yuan 101, 225, 227, 229, 230 Taiwanese women 3, 6, 8, 131, 220, 221, 225; and Asian Women’s Fund 3, 96, 98, 99, 101; forcible recruitment 28–9, 49–50; lawsuits 44, 46; numbers of survivors 194n1; payments to 3, 96, 98, 99, 184; testimonies 49–50, 108 Takahashi Shirō 154–5, 156, 224 Takarazuka City Council 230 Takeshima Island 176, 191, 232 Tanaka Minoru 33 Tanino Sakutarō 220

Index   265 teenage girls, Korean 136–46, 138–9, 142, 143; see also minors Textbook Authorization Research Council, Japan 151, 160, 161 Textbook Examination Standards, Japan 160–2 Tōgō Kazuhiko 129 Tokyo Appellate Court 87–8 Tokyo District Court 44, 46, 64, 67, 152, 175, 182, 185, 221, 231, 232, 233 Tokyo High Court 44, 46, 51, 64, 67–8, 175, 185, 228 Tokyo Metropolitan Police Board 11 Tōkyō Shimbun 129, 153 Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal see International Military Tribunal for the Far East Torres Straits Islands, Australia 114 Towards Reconciliation (Park) 120–1, 123 trafficking of women: concept of 29, 41–3; Criminal Code of Japan 38n23; international abolition movement 78–82, 85n22; Japanese women 30–1, 57; Shizuoka and Nagasaki incidents 57, 87–90; South Korean women 45, 48, 136; Taiwanese women 49–50 transportation of women abroad see trafficking of women tribunals see war crimes tribunals True Stories of the Korean Comfort Women 221 Truth Commission on Forced Mobilization under Japanese Imperialism, South Korea 172, 228 tsugunai payments 3, 96, 97–8, 101–3, 125–7 Tsukamoto Kōichi 224 Tsukurukai see Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform Uchida Tomoyuki 26 Ueno Chizuko 105–6, 107, 120, 136–7, 145 United Kingdom: end of licensed prostitution 78; High Court 232; House of Commons 226; use of military prostitution 11 United Nations: response to Asian Women’s Fund 100, 101, 107–8, 227; response to Japan–ROK agreement 202–3 United Nations Commission on Human Rights 100, 125, 223 United Nations Commission on the

Elimination of Racial Discrimination 108 United Nations Committee Against Torture 108, 202–3, 233, 234, 237 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 227, 233 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 201, 202, 227, 230, 236 United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 236 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 202 United Nations Human Rights Committee 2 United Nations Human Rights Council 202, 234 United Nations Secretary-General 200 United Nations Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance 228 United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women 2, 107, 223 United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women in Wartime 2, 100, 107–8, 225 United Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities 100, 223, 225 United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 130, 221 United Nations World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance 105 United Nations World Conference on Women 105 United States 118, 232, 233; Civil Liberties Act (1988) 128–9; end of licensed prostitution 78; and Japan– ROK agreement 200; lawsuits brought in 226, 237; New York State Senate 118, 133n3, 232; peace statues 230, 231, 233, 237 United States House of Representatives 3, 83n1, 100, 123, 124, 125, 127, 226, 228, 229 United States military: and comfort women in Burma 29–30, 141, 142, 143; use of prostitution 11

266   Index United States Navy Tribunal, Guam 116 United States Supreme Court 237 University of Tokyo 222 van Boven, Theo 130, 221 venereal disease see sexually transmitted diseases veterans’ memoirs 26–7, 30–1, 68, 76–7, 141 victim-survivors of the comfort women system, China: Chen Jinyu 51, 60n8; Chen Lin Tao 60n8; Chen Yapian 50–1, 6n8; Deng Yumin 51, 60n8; Liu Mian Huan 50, 60n8; Gao Yin’e 60n8; Guo Xi Cui 60n8, 66; Hou Dong’e 50, 60n8; Hou Qiao Lian 50, 51, 60n8; Huang Youliang 51, 60n8; Huang Yufeng 60n8; Li Xiumei 60n8, 67; Lin Yajin 60n8; Nan Erpu 60n8; Tan Yadong 60n8; Tan Yulian 60n8; Wan Aihua 51, 60n8, 66, 67, 67; Wang Gaihe 60n8; Yang Shizen 60n8; Yang Zihe 60n8; Yin Yuling 60n8; Yuan Zhulin 51, 60n8; Zhang Xiantu 50; Zhao Cunni 50; Zhao Runmei 60n8, 67–8; Zhou Xi Xiang 66 victim-survivors of the comfort women system, East Timor, Portuguese: Bere, Marta Abu 53, 54; Binaro, Utao 54; Boe, Esmeralda 53, 54; Noronha, Maria Rosa Fernanda 53, 54 victim-survivors of the comfort women system, Indonesia (Dutch East Indies): Mardiyem 53; Suhanah 53 victim-survivors of the comfort women system, Japan: Kikumaru see Yamauchi Keiko; Mihara Yoshie (Shirota Suzuko) 55; Shirota Suzuko see Mihara Yoshie; Suzumoto Fumi 56, 57; Takashima Junko 56; Uehara Eiko 56; Yamauchi Keiko (Kikumaru) 56, 57, 77–8 victim-survivors of the comfort women system, Korea, North and South: Bae Pong-gi 137, 220; Chang Su-wǒl 45, 140; Chǒng Hak-ch’ǒl 44, 48; Ha Sangsuk 140–1; Ha Sun-nyǒ 44; Kang Dukkyung 224; Kang Il-ch’ul 44, 101, 102, 131, 198; Kim Hak-sun 55, 63n36, 93, 93, 101, 138, 152, 153, 181, 220, 225; Kim Kun-ja 44; Kim Pok-sŏn 60n8; Kim Ran-i 60n8; Kim Sǒl-an 45; Kim Yǒng-suk 45, 131; Kwak Kǔm-nyǒ 140; Mun Ok-ju 44; No Ch’ǒng-ja 44, 60n8; Pak Du-ri 60n8; Pak Ok-ryǒn 131; Pak

Pok-sun 60n8; Pak Mak-dal 45; Pak P’il-yǒn 45; Pak Yǒng-sim 44, 45, 48, 131, 140; Pak Yu-nyǒn 45; Ri Chongnyǒ 140; Ri Gye-wǒl 140; Ri Sang-ok 140; Sim Dal-yuon 102–3, 112n18; Sim Mi-ja 60n8; Song Sin-do 60n8, 101, 140, 181, 182–9, 182, 188, 221; Yi Kwibun 60n8; Yi Ok-sǒn 198; Yi Sun-dŏk 60n8 victim-survivors of the comfort women system, Malaysia (British Malaya): Saw, Rosalind 53 victim-survivors of the comfort women system, Netherlands: Ruff-O’Herne, Jan 52, 131; van der Ploeg, Ellen Corry 52 victim-survivors of the comfort women system, Philippines: Balajadia, Amonita 51; Cortez, Anastasia D. 51; Henson, Maria Rosa Luna 26, 221; Intes, Teodora Cogonon 52; Martinez, Ortencia G. 51; Salinog, Tomasa 51; Ramel, Carmencita C. 52; Regala, Amanda 51; Ufalsa, Catalina 51; Villarma, Virginia 52 victim-survivors of the comfort women system, Taiwan: Anika 50; Chen Lienhua 50; Huang A-tao 49, 50; Iwar; Tanah (Tsai Fang-mei) 49; Kao Pao-chu 49; Lee Chun 49, 50; Li Yang Yu-chuan 50; Lu Man-mei 49, 50; Su Yin-jiao 50; Tang Chen-tao 49; Tsai Kuei-ying 49, 50; Tuyo Kage 49; Wu Hsiu-mei 49, 50; Zheng Chen-tao 49 Victims’ Center, South Korea 220 Vietnamese women 98, 114 Violence against Women in War Network Japan (VAWW-NET Japan) 225, 227, 228, 231 Violence Against Women in War Research Action Center (VAWW RAC) 231 Wada Haruki 96, 98, 103–5, 106, 107, 124 Wakabayashi Yukinori 220 Wall Street Journal 95, 191 War & Women’s Human Rights Museum, Seoul 231 war crimes 42–3, 117n4, 117n5 war crimes tribunals 27–8, 114–16; Dutch military tribunals 23, 28, 42–3, 115–16; International Military Tribunal for the Far East 27, 43, 59n6, 114–15, 117n4, 117n5; United States Navy Tribunal 116; Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military

Index   267 Sexual Slavery 2, 52, 54, 108, 117n4, 130, 131, 226, 227 war criminals, Japanese honoring of 116 War Ministry memorandum on comfort stations, Japan 152, 153 war relief benefits 169 War Victims Relief Bureau, Japan 169 wartime sexual coercion bills, Japan 12–3n5, 189, 226, 227 Washington Coalition for Comfort Women Issues 83n1 Washington Post 3, 55, 70, 72, 83n1, 123, 159, 229, 233 WEBRONZA blog 124, 125 Wednesday Demonstration 188, 190, 220, 231 Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace (WAM), Tokyo 228, 235 Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery, Tokyo 2, 52, 54, 108, 117n4, 130, 131, 226, 227 Women’s Voluntary Labor Corps 219, 221 World Conference against Racism, Racial

Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance 227 Yamada Seikichi 76–7, 141 Yamaguchi District Court 44, 46, 59n8, 221, 225 Yamanaka Sadanori 221 Yamazaki Hiromi 105 yaodong cave residences, China 65–6, 66 Yasukuni Shrine 77, 78, 221, 232, 233 Yi Yang-soo 167 Yomiuri Shimbun 31 Yoshida Seiji 38n19, 234 Yoshimi Yoshiaki 152, 153, 201, 220, 233 Young Diet Members Group for Considering Japan’s Future and History Textbooks 40, 154, 156, 164n19, 224 Yu County, Shanxi Province, China 64–8, 66, 67 Yun Byung-se 6, 218, 234 Yun Chǒng-ok 219 Yun (Yoon) Meehyan 191 zegen see private procurers